CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN TURKEY

From Militant-Secular to Islamic Nationalism

Abdulkerim Sen
and Hugh Starkey

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AKP	*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [Justice and Development Party]
BoE	Board of Education
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDCC	Council for Cultural Cooperation
CEPS	Citizenship Education Policy Study
CHP	*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People's Party]
CoE	Council of Europe
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DP	*Demokr*at Parti [Democrat Party]
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EDC/HRE	Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education
EU	European Union
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESC	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kürdistan [Kurdistan Worker's Party]
RP	Refah Partisi [Welfare Party]
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Grand National Assembly of Turkey]

UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USA	United States of America

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as the founder of the modern nation-state of Turkey and became its first president in 1923. The constitution of the new state was heavily influenced by the French nation-building experience. The multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire was replaced by a new ideology of nationalism that strove to transform the diverse inhabitants of Anatolia into a homogeneous secular nation (Zürcher 2004). Education was the key instrument of nation-building. Across the country new schools were built as schooling was made compulsory and opened to girls. Inspired by the use of civic education to turn peasants into French citizens, civics courses were immediately introduced as a priority subject in the Turkish school curriculum (Weber 1979). These reforms were widely perceived as progressive, and American educationalist John Dewey visited Turkey for two months in 1924, writing two reports for the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) (Dewey 1939). Considering schools as the engine of modernization, John Dewey made recommendations to strengthen the educational link between modern Western countries and Turkey. From a liberal education perspective, Dewey set the overarching goal of education as making Turkey as a respected secular member of modern nations. In fact, educational reforms of modern Turkey had the same goal as the new civics curriculum projected an image of a modern, secular, and homogeneous nation, even though the nation was, in reality, mostly religious, ethnically diverse, and economically disadvantaged. Despite the gradual inclusion of traditional-religious elements after 1950, the secular nationalist civic education continued with no substantial change until 1995.

Following the end of the Cold War, there was a new global interest in promoting human rights as common standards for building peaceable communities. When the United Nations (UN) called on member states to introduce human rights education (HRE) in 1994, the MoNE responded by

changing the title of the Citizenship Studies course to Citizenship and Human Rights Education (MoNE 1995). This decision was followed by a revision of the course's content through the integration of some human rights themes. However, the rise to power of the Islamist Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi*, RP] discontinued the reform effort by 1996 by igniting the long-smoldering tension between the forces of secular and religious nationalism. In the following years, the tension between the rival sources of power, namely the elected governments and the secular state establishment, saw the transformation of traditional civic education as a site of struggle. Our book analyzes the process and the results of this epic confrontation.

In 1997, the ideological clash between the religious nationalist government and the secularist army escalated to the extent that the military staged a coup to topple the Islamist party-led coalition government (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Çınar 2003). The coup took place, in an atypical manner, during the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on February 28, 1997. The military members of the NSC forced the cabinet to re-establish the ideology of secular nationalism in education. Even though the government complied with the military's demands, such as the closure of conservative religious middle schools, the exclusion of graduates of conservative religious high schools from secular college programs, and the ban on wearing a headscarf in schools and universities, sustained military pressure led to the resignation of the government in June 1997. This military intervention was called the February 28 coup or a postmodern coup, since it took place without a direct takeover of the government. The military's ongoing influence after the coup was referred to as the February 28 process.

From 1997–1999, the military's interventions were reflected in the citizenship curriculum, which now attempted to promote militarist nationalism. However, the European Union's (EU) recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership in the 1999 Helsinki Summit broke the military-dominated atmosphere. While the EU integration reforms opened a space for the demilitarization of citizenship education, the rise of a successor Islamist party to power in 2002 again escalated the power struggle. Despite the pressure of the secular establishment, the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP] has remained in power since 2002 and reconfigured the state ideology in many ways. The EU reforms had the perverse effect of enabling the AKP to strengthen its grip on power and align the curriculum to its own ideology of Islamic nationalism. This culminated in the complete removal of citizenship courses from the middle-school program in 2012.

This book investigates the evolution of the traditional civics curriculum from the start of the reform in 1995 to its end in 2012 by drawing on multiple sources, including interviews, archival and public documents, programs of study and textbooks. While previous studies have relied solely on publicly available documentary sources (e.g., programs of studies, BoE decisions and

textbooks) (Çayır 2007, 2011; İnce 2012a; Karaman Kepenekçi 2005; Üstel 2004; Gülmez 2001; Gök 2004), our study also draws on the perspectives of key actors and previously unseen archival documents. It analytically investigates the evolution of citizenship courses in parallel with the ideological transition of the country. By exploring the evolution of the citizenship curriculum in a crucial period in which political power switched from secular militant to Islamic nationalism, the book sheds light on the ways in which a combination of internal and external influences shaped the curriculum. These include the power struggle between the two forms of nationalism and the role of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Council of Europe (CoE) in that process.

In most countries, the national curriculum is modified when there is a change of government. In Turkey, the alignment of the national curriculum to the dominant ideology in power is to be expected. Therefore, our investigation aimed to offer more than a descriptive account of the transformation of citizenship education curriculum. Against the backdrop of the ideological transformation of the national education landscape from 1995 to 2012, we present a nuanced and critical account of citizenship education curriculum change. We capture discursive continuities and changes in the curriculum and provide rich background about the changing content and status of the middle-school citizenship courses. In particular, we explore the ways in which universal discourses of citizenship and human rights were re-contextualized in the curriculum. For example, we highlight ways in which consideration of citizenship and human rights was adapted to the new Islamist government. We note the changing discourses on Atatürk, the army, minorities, and diverse identities. In this respect, we are not neutral observers. We ourselves have been proponents of democratic citizenship and human rights education. We view education in general and citizenship education courses in particular as means to create and strengthen a strong consensus on the basic values of liberal democracy, citizenship, and human rights. We hope that the insights provided in this book will encourage debates about citizenship and human rights education not only in Turkey but also in contexts around the world. We are very much aware that far-right nationalism and authoritarian populism challenges liberal Western democracies, and that ethno-religious discourses continue to find fertile ground among vulnerable Muslim youth in the current political context of 2019.

NATIONALISMS AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN TURKEY

Nationalist projects entail a process of collective identity formation. They involve imbuing people with an identity claim that overrides all other types of belongings, a temporal claim that links them to a particularistic construction

of the past, and a spatial claim that encourages them to identify with a particular space or territory (Özkırımlı 2010). In order to make their truth claims appear natural and common-sensical, nationalist projects always attempt to suggest an essential homogeneity by excluding alternative voices and identities. Since education plays a vital role in the consolidation of nationalist discourses, dominant nationalisms compete to control and use it in their bid to disseminate their truth claims.

Two nationalisms have competed for hegemony in Turkey, both of which have struggled to ensure control of education. The first one is secular nationalism, which holds that Turkish society is secular, modern, and in the process of developing as a liberal democratic society, often referred to by the shorthand term "Western." Secular nationalism is the founding state ideology, which, in the 1990s, was seen by urban middle classes as a bulwark against the rise of Islamic nationalism and Kurdish separatism (Özyürek 2006; Bora 2017). Secular nationalists use symbols associated with Atatürk to signal their ideological attachment. In line with the French model of civic republican citizenship, the identity claim of secular nationalism involves cultivating secular nationals who leave their ethnic and religious affinities to the private sphere. Its spatial claim identifies the Turkish nation with the territory of modern Turkey, while its temporal claim exalts the Republican era of Atatürk (Bora 2003; Özkırımlı 2011). The national education system attempted to make the truth claims of secular nationalism seem natural. However, the official ideology was severely challenged by the rise of Islamic nationalism.

The second dominant ideology, religious or Islamic nationalism, was originally developed by a group of intellectuals in the 1970s. What the leading advocates of religious nationalism sociologically have in common is that they have traditional-religious upbringing, rural background, and educational background in secular educational institutions of modern Turkey (Taşkın 2007). Even though they are not radically anti-Western, their rural, religious, and disadvantaged backgrounds position them against those who grew up in secular and modern middle-class families and were educated in relatively better-resourced urban educational institutions. Religious nationalism thrived on its analysis that those from secular-urban backgrounds are greatly advantaged compared to those with religious-rural backgrounds. As an implication of that antagonism, religious nationalists developed ideological discourses that either refuted, repudiated, or at least challenged the dominant official discourses of secular nationalism.

Religious nationalism defines Turkish identity in terms of the Sunni interpretation of Islam. Its temporal claim exalts the Islamic Ottoman past. Its spatial claim is not limited to the present geography of modern Turkey but encourages the identification of the "Muslim Turkish nation" with the territories of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Religious nationalists refer

to Turkey's Islamic past and the Islamic era of the Prophet Muhammed to justify their beliefs. They envision a nation proudly conscious of its Islamic past aspiring to a leadership status in the Muslim world. The leading intellectuals of religious nationalism made attempts to integrate their truth claims into the curriculum and to a great extent accomplished that in the post-1980 coup on the grounds of opposition to communism (Copeaux 2006; S. Kaplan 2006). By the 1990s, the ending of the ideological polarization of the Cold War provided a new context in which ethnic and religious identities found increasing political expression and the support of observant Muslim voters propelled the Islamist parties to power. This rise was disrupted for a while by the interventions of the secularist military, but the successor to the disbanded Islamist parties, the AKP was elected to government in 2002 and has gradually made religious nationalists look more prominent in Turkish society. Islamic nationalism became the official dominant discourse, and this has been strongly reflected in the school curriculum.

In religious nationalist discursive spaces, phrases like *our religion, our culture, our traditions, our customs, and our civilization* are frequently used to advocate, justify, or criticize certain thoughts and practices. In such spaces, instead of referring to human rights and democracy discourses, people use religious discourses to make sense of what they or others experience in public life. Religious discourses may explicitly conflict with democracy and human rights principles in some cases. For example, the constitution does not forbid unmarried couples from living together, but in a religious neighborhood, a single man may be attacked for living together with his partner. In an extreme scenario, a single man may be attacked for hosting a female friend. Assailants in such situation may legitimize their actions in reference to *our religion, our customs, our civilization, or our traditions* and feel emboldened by a supportive sociopolitical context. This example shows the potential of ideological discourses in shaping public interactions pertaining to the realm of citizenship and human rights. It shows the abiding place of religion in the social memory, which functions as a force regulating public interactions. More examples can be given in relation to the conflict between religious discourses and human rights principles, but the point we would like to make here is that religious nationalism taps into the sedimented religious discourses that exist in the social memory in offering people truth claims to make sense of their public experience.

SCOPE OF OUR INVESTIGATION

In Turkey, traditional civics courses promoted a particular citizenship regime. Their status and content were re-structured in conjunction with the direction

toward which dominant groups in power wished to take the country. The immediate responsiveness of civic education to the balance of power resulted from the fact that one centralized authority makes all curricular decisions and approves all curricular materials. This ensures that the civics curriculum is pivotal to the balance of power. It arguably represents the most sensitive subject in a given political context and, therefore, may be considered as a bellwether of ideological impacts.

The civics curriculum can be viewed as a sensitive barometer that shows the degree to which the educational system is committed to, or distanced from, the founding objective of building a secular nation. It was initially developed at the service of secular nationalism. The result of decades-long programs of civic education is that the ideology of secular nationalism is now widely accepted as a given in Turkey. One can even argue that, today, the Turkish national education system continues to carry out the unfinished business of nation-building. After the AKP came to power in 2002, religious nationalism began to effectively contest the hegemony of secular nationalism. The influence of other ideologies went unrecognized because the centralized curriculum authority allowed only the most dominant ideology to be represented.

We refer to pre-1995 citizenship education as traditional civic education and accept that the reform produced aspects of democratic citizenship education. After developing a conceptual distinction between civic education and citizenship education, we explore the evolution of the traditional civics curriculum toward liberal-internationalist citizenship education. We focus on the courses taught at middle-school eighth grade (thirteen- to fourteen-year-old students) because the curriculum reform targeted this grade level, and the subject was taught at this grade level for the longest time. An analysis of the eighth-grade citizenship courses enables us to trace changes and continuities. Our investigation starts from the title change of the civics courses in 1995 and ends with the decision to repeal the middle-school citizenship courses in 2012. The key events that took place concerning the curriculum reform are illustrated in the timeline shown in figure 1.1.

To provide a comprehensive account, we will focus our attention on three aspects of the citizenship education reform. First, we will scrutinize ways in which the political contestation and Turkey's links to the international organizations, namely the UN, CoE, and EU, influenced the curriculum reform. By exploring internal and external drivers of the curriculum reform, we will throw light on the interplay between the political conditions and the citizenship curriculum. Secondly, we will analyze the intended curriculum of citizenship courses to identify changes and continuities. Thirdly, our investigation will investigate the changing ways of citizenship education curriculum development. The consideration of these three aspects in an interconnected



Figure 1.1 Key Events of the Period. *Source:* Author Created.

manner is expected to provide a comprehensive and critical account of the curriculum reform.

METHODOLOGY

We frame our investigation as a case study that investigates the Turkey's citizenship education curriculum reform (Yin 2003). It is grounded in original empirical data collection undertaken in 2014–2015. The Board of Education (BoE) was the main data collection site since the curriculum reform was undertaken there. The BoE is the centralized curriculum authority of Turkey, which makes nationwide-binding decisions regarding all aspects of the curriculum. We considered the national curriculum authority as a site of a power struggle where dominant social groups compete not only to shape the configuration of power relations within the organization, but also to influence national curriculum discourses (Mumby and Clair 2009).

The concept of curriculum can be variably defined depending on the context of use. It may refer to the whole educational experience, student-teacher relations, school ethos, what is taught and what is learned by students. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement has proposed a three-layered conceptualization of curriculum: intended, implemented, and attained (Travers and Westbury 1989). An intended curriculum is the result of curricular texts that codify official intentions or system-level expectations, such as programs of study and textbooks. A distinction can therefore be made between the intended curriculum and the implemented curriculum, namely what is taught at schools. An attained curriculum is what is learned by students. Morris and Adamson (2010, 4) propose that "the intended curriculum is an official plan of what those who have the power

to make decisions want the younger generation to learn." This definition implies that the dominant ideological discourses find their expressions in the intended curriculum because its production is often controlled by dominant groups. What is included in the selection of text for the intended curriculum is the result of struggles around cultural politics (Apple 2004). Hence, the intended curriculum legitimizes "the cultural forms of the dominant group while implicitly and often explicitly suppressing alternative cultural forms or identities" (Osler and Starkey 2010, 88).

In Turkey, programs of study and textbooks constitute the intended curriculum of citizenship courses. The programs of study provide an outline of the content, objectives, units, topics, teaching approaches, and assessment criteria. They spell out the rationale behind the introduction of a course and course objectives. Textbooks translate programs of study into pedagogical forms by making the official intentions of the programs of study accessible to students. When the BoE decides to introduce a course, it first sets up a committee to prepare a program of study. Following the completion of the program of study, authors are commissioned to write a textbook. After the textbook is completed, it is first examined by textbook examination panels, then sent to the board for approval. The board's approval does not guarantee that it will be taught in schools. It needs to win a bid if it is to be distributed to schools.

Some textbooks are written by authors who are commissioned by the BoE and published by state-owned publishing houses, while some textbooks are written by authors commissioned and published by private publishing companies. Nevertheless, both versions undergo the same process of approval. The process of the production of the intended curriculum shows that the BoE exercises a tight control on the production of school knowledge, so it may be considered as what Apple (1993, 1) calls "official knowledge."

Data Collection

The first author held interviews with seventeen key actors from September 2014 to October 2015. The interviewees were those who played a role in the citizenship curriculum reform in the given period. Policy and curriculum documents revealed the names of those involved, and they were contacted via email and phone call. More interviewees were reached by the help of those who had been interviewed first. Seventeen individuals agreed to participate in a semi-structured interview. The shortest interview lasted around nineteen minutes and the longest, one hour. Interview questions were concentrated on revealing the participants' views on the details of the curriculum reform as to what led the MoNE to launch the citizenship education reform, how it started, continued, and ended, and what roles the interviewees played in the whole process.

Our dataset includes all of the citizenship course programs of study implemented in the given period. As for textbooks, we only included those published by the MoNE since they have the advantage of containing information on how many copies were printed, which gave a sense of how widely they were used (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 2004; Özpolat 2012). The private company textbooks do not contain any details that would give a sense of the extent of their use. We compared the number of copies of the textbooks against the number of eighth-grade students at the time when the textbooks were in use and concluded that the MoNE textbooks were used by a majority of schools across the country. In any case, our examination of the textbooks did not find significant differences between state-published and privately published versions. In fact, the units and topics were all identical in both versions of textbooks because they are based on the same program of study and go through the same process of approval.

Our dataset includes documents issued by various branches of the MoNE in respect of the citizenship education reform. Decisions made by the BoE concerning the subject's status and content, which were accessed via the online archive of the Ministry of National Education Circulars Journal, are the first group of documents. The second group is archival documents that include correspondence between the branches of the MoNE, and the MoNE and external institutions, such as the CoE in relation to the curriculum reform. During the fieldwork, the first author was allowed one-day access to archival documents and made a photographic record of nearly 900 pages of documents.

Data Analysis

In the analysis of data, we draw on the conventions of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is an analytical approach to language "concerned with the production, circulation and interpretation of texts in which relations of domination and control may be said to be at stake" (O'Regan and Betzel 2016, 282). The interest of CDA in language comes from the conviction that "every instance of language use makes its own small contribution to reproducing and/or transforming society and culture, including power relations" (Fairclough and Wodak 2009, 273). With this belief, CDA aims to reveal ways in which language legitimizes unequal distribution of social, economic, and cultural capital in Bourdieu's terms (Bourdieu 2004). By making the relationship between micro relations of language and macro relations of power, it aims to bring about change toward a more just and equitable society.

Discourses are social, historical, and stable as they originate in particular social groups. Discourses are produced and disseminated within a social structure, so they shape and are shaped by social reality in which they reside.

Instead of following the Marxist critical discourse analysis tradition, we borrow analytical concepts and ideas from liberal critical discourse analyst Teun van Dijk. The underlying reason for this choice is that the transformation of citizenship education in Turkey happened in a nationalist context and the direction of curriculum change was toward liberal-internationalist citizenship education. Drawing on van Dijk's (1995) conceptual tools, we hold the view that discourses are ideological if they are identified with a particular group and nonideological when they are identified with the whole community. The primary function of ideological discourses is to generate consent for the perpetuation of existing power relations that favor certain groups. They achieve this by manufacturing consent through noncoercive strategies, such as legitimation, naturalization, and rationalization.

Van Dijk (2011, 380) defines ideologies as "general systems of basic ideas shared by the members of a social group, ideas that will influence their interpretation of social events and situations and control their discourse and other social practices as group members." Ideologies can be seen as systemic configurations of discourses by social groups to advance their interest in the best possible ways. Therefore, they promote a positive representation of the group they belong to and a negative representation of rival groups. They mitigate the negative aspects of the group they belong to and exaggerate the negative aspects of rival groups. Although the powerful are likely to be more influential in the production and dissemination of ideological discourses, those who struggle for justice can seize opportunities to change or resist the dominant discourses reinforced by the powerful. The status of a social group within the power structure of society might allow it "to create solidarity, to organise struggle and to sustain opposition" against the powerful groups (van Dijk 1998, 138). Anti-racist, egalitarian, and libertarian ideologies can be regarded as the ideologies of disadvantaged groups.

In contrast to ideologies, knowledge represents the common interest of the whole society. It is associated with the interest, existence, and reproduction of the whole society. For example, despite having many disagreements, "racists and anti-racists agree that there is immigration in Europe, that there are countries with borders, that people may have passports" (van Dijk 2004, 18). Given the fact that groups or communities are not static entities but can be variably defined depending on the context in question, it can be concluded that there is no universally accepted knowledge. Against the risk of relativism, van Dijk (2006, 117) argues there are temporal and contextual variations in defining knowledge and ideology. For example, human rights represent universal knowledge, which are recognized beyond ideological boundaries and widely shared across the world. Organizations such as the UN, whose membership includes virtually all national governments, promote the transmission of human rights as universal standards. Whereas traditional

civic education is the product of the influences of dominant groups, liberal-international citizenship education is based on transcending nationalist ideologies and promoting the cosmopolitan perspectives exemplified in human rights principles.

In conducting the critical discourse analysis, we initially scrutinized the lexical and grammatical features of the text, such as foregrounding and backgrounding of agents, use of modalities, tenses and pronouns, and presuppositions. As a second stage, we linked the specificities of language use to the power relations within the broader context in order to identify a relationship between discourses in the text and the ideological structures in the context. At the third stage, we attempted to explain how the discourses identified contributed to or challenged the existing power relations. We applied this analysis to the intended curriculum, public/archival documents, and verbatim interviews.

In relation to the intended curriculum, we considered the programs of study and the textbooks as the discursive embodiment of the power relations in the wider society. Our consideration of the intended curriculum is informed by the view that texts embody wider questions of power relations (Apple 2014). In other words: "The decision to define some groups' knowledge as the most legitimate, as official knowledge, while other groups' knowledge hardly sees the light of day, says something extremely important about who has power in society" (Apple 1993, 1). Our close textual analysis of the intended curriculum enabled us to explore how the ideological discourses of powerful groups resonated in it. We were able to trace the direction of the curriculum as it oscillated between liberal-internationalist citizenship education and traditional-nationalist civic education.

We identified ideological discourses in public/archival documents where there was an explicit recognition of the political context. We recognized that policy documents often tend to minimize suggestions of social conflict while being suggestive of a noncontroversial assessment of the public interest (Codd 1988). In order to match discourses in the documents with ideological discourses prominent in the political context, we first chronologically ordered all documents. Even though we examined over 900 pages of archival documents and roughly 400 pages of publicly available documents only a small fraction was relevant to our research. Archival/public documents in general proved significant in throwing light on the emergence, evolution, and abandonment of the curriculum reform agenda and the influences of the dominant ideologies in the curriculum.

In relation to the interviews, the first author transcribed the audio-recorded interviews and made a clean copy of notes that he took during the non-recorded interviews. We identified and selected excerpts significant in terms of the research objectives and analyzed them taking into consideration the role of the interviewee in question. We compared respondents' accounts on

the same issue against each other and documents when clarifying ambiguities regarding the background of the curriculum reform. We cross-checked and used all data sources in a triangulated manner in generating findings.

Throughout the book, we cite public/archival documents with the name of the institution where they were produced and with the exact date of their production, as in the following example: Board of Education, March 30, 2010. Interviewees who are quoted are given pseudonyms and the date of the interview, as in the following example: Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014. The interviewees are cited with the pronoun "he/his" in a way that is intended to be gender-neutral. Details about the archival documents and textbooks can be found in the Appendix.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework by outlining our conceptualization of citizenship and citizenship education. We offer a conceptual distinction between traditional civic education and liberal-internationalist citizenship education, which we use as the main conceptual framework to explore the transformation of Turkey's citizenship curriculum. In an effort to provide a background, chapter 3 traces the historical evolution of citizenship and citizenship education in Turkey. Chapter 4 investigates how the rise of militant nationalism influenced the curriculum reform and the citizenship curriculum. It presents the discursive manifestation of the power struggle in the curriculum by an analysis of the course's main textbook. Chapter 5 explores how the changing balance of power between the military and civilian actors during the EU accession process affected the citizenship curriculum reform. Chapter 6 is focused on the background to the introduction of a citizenship course in 2010 from the emergence of the reform agenda in 2008 to the repeal of the course in 2012. In the concluding chapter, we return to our main research objectives, attempting to make sense of the whole curriculum reform period and discussing the findings in relation to the relevant literature. We close the book with a brief update on the evolution of citizenship courses after 2012.

Chapter 2

Theorizing Citizenship and Citizenship Education

INTRODUCTION

This chapter develops a theoretical and conceptual framework that provides the background to our investigation of citizenship education reform of Turkey in the period from 1995 to 2012. We start with sketching our understandings of the concept of citizenship, then show the relationship between nation-building and education, and move to identify the major theoretical approaches to citizenship education. After conceptualizing two models of citizenship education, we analyze a number of empirical studies which illustrate transitions from traditional civic to citizenship education. This enables us to situate our study within a theory of citizenship education and link it to a relevant strand of empirical studies.

THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship can be defined as a type of membership of a political community. The nature of this membership varies with context. Isin and Nyers (2014, 1) define citizenship "as an institution mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong." "The subjects of politics" can be anyone, regardless of holding a formal citizenship status, while "the polity" might include any political arrangement where people engage with "social conflicts and social struggles" for the betterment of their conditions (Turner 1990, 194). Competition for scarce resources drives the subjects of a community to come "together and engage in political and cultural activity" on the principle of "equal respect and dignity" (Starkey 2002, 7). Such public engagement for improving the public good is a defining characteristic

of citizenship. For this reason, the Ancient Greeks used citizenship to express the acts of free people to improve public life in contrast to idiocy, which they defined as an obsession with personal interests (Parker 2003). This distinction suggests civic engagement as an indispensable prerequisite to becoming a citizen.

In the classical world, citizenship was most visibly practised in autonomous cities where "particularistic kinship systems" were dissipated with the development of "universalistic notions of the subject" (Turner 1990, 194). The etymological root of the concept hints at its city-based origin. In urban public spaces, citizens came together and deliberated on their standard of living, jurisprudence, and resource distribution in pursuit of a better society. In Ancient Greek city-states (polis), a citizen was the one who resided in polis, had the right to take part in decisions that governed the public life of polis, and had an obligation to fulfill certain responsibilities in return (Waldron 2005). Here, polis refers to, not a tightly run political authority, but a sociopolitical arrangement where citizens were entitled to have a say in decisions shaping the collective life of society. In this regard, citizenship does not merely refer to a formal participation or a legal status in a sovereign state, or the relationship between individuals and political authority. In a broader sense, it means working with others for the improvement of society in which one lives and enjoying equal rights and responsibilities coming from the membership to society.

In the age of nation-states, autonomous city spaces became part of national polities, and not all inhabitants of nation-states were recognized as full members, but many were discriminated against due to ethnicity, race, language, religion, ideology, and gender (Shafir and Brysk 2006). Nation-state-sanctioned criteria for inclusion marked the fault lines of citizenship, and the struggle of political subjects for equal membership drove the evolution of citizenship rights. Regarding the criteria for membership in nation-states, two citizenship conceptions became prominent: territorial-universalism and ethno-culturalism (Faulks 2000; Heater 2004). In territorial-universalist traditions, all inhabitants of a sovereign state are regarded as citizens as long as they are loyal to the state and work for the common good. Ethnic and religious differences are not seen as a barrier to full membership. This model was developed after the French Revolution of 1789 to maintain the integrity of the newly founded Republican French nation-state (Brubaker 1992; Lefebvre 2003). The inhabitants of France, who were previously the subjects of the monarch, were reconstituted as the citizens of the Republic. Citizenship was conceived as an adherence to certain norms and values rather than to a monarch since the concern was the unification of differences around a common national identity.

On the other hand, ethnic and religious differences stand in the way of full membership in ethno-cultural citizenship. Developed in Germany, this version functioned as a tool to gather the people of the same ancestry under the roof of a nation-state (Brubaker 1992; Lefebvre 2003). In this model, people of the same ethnicity were regarded as full citizens. The ethno-cultural model aimed to gather dispersed members of the same descent under the roof of a nation-state, whereas the territorial model aimed to build a nation within a demarcated territory. Because of this difference in method rather than goal, homogenization through assimilation became the defining feature of territorial citizenship, whereas ethno-cultural citizenship was identified with homogenization via exclusion of differences. Thus, the territorial model relied on an assimilationist, while the ethno-cultural model rested on an exclusionary notion of citizenship.

The balance of rights and responsibilities varies in the two prominent citizenship traditions: liberal and civic republican (Heater 1999; Kuisma 2008; Vincent 2010). The liberal approach is associated with rights, whereas civic republicanism is identified more with duties. Liberal citizenship relies on the assumption that the common good is best served when people are encouraged to pursue their own interests. In contrast, civic republicanism casts fulfillment of duties and participation as the main property of citizenship. It imagines a citizen as a political subject stripped of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences when acting within the public space. It relies on an interventionist state that maintains a rigid distinction between public and private spheres. Historically, England represented the paragon of liberal citizenship, while the civic republican model was identified with France.

The advancements in communication and transportation technologies and the widespread recognition of human rights after the Second World War paved the way for new conceptions of citizenship to gain prominence. Globalization and a rediscovery of cosmopolitan perspectives challenged citizenship as exclusively linked to nationality. As Brodie (2004, 323) succinctly summarizes, "The symmetries forged largely in the past two centuries between national states, national territory, and national citizenship rights, have been progressively fractured by transnational networks, flows, and identities." Similarly, Delanty (2000, 126) holds that the four components of citizenship, rights, responsibilities, participation, and identity "are no longer united by into a coherent national framework [*sic*]." Based on empirical research, Soysal (1994) heralded post-national citizenship as having gained recognition in some European contexts where immigrants were recognized from the viewpoint of personhood instead of nationality. From a sociological standpoint, Sassen (2002) argued that there are now de-national and post-national citizenships. The former encapsulates citizenship within a state that

has been transmuted with the influence of globalization, whereas the latter refers to citizenship as enacted on transnational platforms.

Focusing on the revival of local cultures, Kymlicka (2003, 2011) has developed a liberal theory of multicultural citizenship on the supposition that minorities are now in a position to live autonomously without relinquishing their diverse identities. Similarly, Parekh (1998, 408) held national citizenship to scrutiny on the basis of the principle of equality. He argued that the principle of equality underpinning modern citizenship is conceived "in the context of a culturally homogenous society." However, this mythical social homogeneity has been challenged by the increasing presence in all societies of visible minorities. In particular, the increasing numbers of Muslims in Europe have brought into question the notion of the public sphere as an exclusively secular construction.

Given the increasing interconnectedness of the world, Held (1999) envisioned that transnational forms of citizenship would gain traction leading to the emergence of a cosmopolitan world order. He maintained that a multilayered world government would make the idea of world citizenship a feasible possibility: "cosmopolitan law would demand the subordination of regional, national, and local sovereignties to an overarching legal framework" (Held 1999, 107). In support of this position, Brodie (2004, 325) put forward that globalization has created "new spaces for political action and new ways of conceiving of collective rights that are neither exclusively nor appropriately the singular domain of national citizens." Similarly, Habermas (1994) proposed a theory of constitutional citizenship in which ethno-cultural differences are relegated to a secondary position in favor of creating a public space built on political, democratic, and civics values. In this transnational public space, people of all backgrounds can act as citizens with rights and responsibilities guaranteed by a constitution.

In a further development of citizenship theory, Isin (2017) has argued that citizenship is an institution that governs who can make rights claims and who can have the right to practise rights in any given polity. The defining feature of a citizenship act is that it must recognize the rights of others as universal. A struggle that has the potential to deprive others of their rights cannot be regarded as a citizenship struggle. He contrasts an official view of citizenship, which favors dominant groups, such as adults, white people, heterosexuals, and those from dominant religious sects and ethnicities with what he calls performative citizenship. Unlike the narrow focus of official citizenship, performative citizenship regards all acts of right-claiming and right-practising as citizenship, such as the struggle of sexual minorities, ethnic and religious minorities, and political dissidents. People of all polities, whether democratic or nondemocratic, can act as performative citizens. The distinction between performative and official citizenship is a useful heuristic device to

deconstruct citizenship policies and practices and understand the multifarious and fluid aspects of citizenship.

To explore citizenship as practised in educational institutions, Osler and Starkey (2005a) conceptualized citizenship as a combination of status, practice, and feeling. Citizenship is both a legal and moral status, deriving its legality from a legislative or constitutional ground, such as having a passport or identity card. Moral status of citizenship rests upon the widespread acceptance of international human rights instruments which confers upon individuals a set of inalienable and indivisible rights. Secondly, citizenship is a practice exemplified by the participation of individuals in society. Joining a nongovernmental organization, campaigning for a sociopolitical cause, becoming a member of political party or sports, youth or religious organizations, voting, paying taxes all represent the practice dimension of citizenship. Citizenship is also a feeling of belonging to multilayered and interconnected communities from the local to global level. Active citizens with a sense of belonging to their community act to create changes for the improvement of their collective conditions. In doing so, they derive a legitimacy for their actions from national and international rights instruments. We subscribe to this expanded concept of citizenship, firstly, because it stands remarkably different from the narrow official views reducing citizenship to a formal status, rights and responsibilities, and, secondly, as a theoretical lens, it enables to better detect citizenship acts in educational settings.

EDUCATION AND THE NATION-STATE

National educational systems are indispensable for nation-building projects. Prominent scholars of nationalism placed an explicit emphasis on the role of education in nation-building processes. Gellner (1998) argued that the Industrial Revolution altered fundamentally the division of labor and the occupational structure of agrarian societies. Contrary to the rigid structure of agrarian societies, fluidity became the defining feature of industrial societies. The fluid occupational structure entailed the standardization of a population to create a workforce who could make a smooth transition from one job, city, and workplace to another. Thus, education explicitly aimed to develop a common identity by disseminating a national language, history, and national sports, symbols, and traditions (Weber 1979). It played a pivotal role in making the culture of people congruent with the political authority by spreading a culture, "the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a community," to all inhabitants of a given territory (Gellner 1998, 2). Anderson (2006) contended that, after the development of print technologies increased the number of literate people, inhabitants of a bounded territory were able to

imagine themselves as members of a larger *imagined* community, which gave life to the intangible notion of nation. Hobsbawm (1992, 71) paraphrased Anderson's (2006) proposition that "common collective practices" fostered in education "give a palpable reality to otherwise imaginary nation [*sic*]." In these three accounts, nation-building seems to be a project of enabling people to imagine themselves as a part of a collective entity. In that project, educational systems spreading the same version of language, history, religion, culture, sport, and music are designed to bring about standardization and homogenization that would enable people to have a collective memory through which they could imagine themselves as a nation.

There is evidence that national educational systems emerged as a worldwide model in the nineteenth century out of the rivalry among the nation-states (Meyer et al. 1997). Competition among the fledgling nation-states of Europe compelled them to establish mass educational systems for the goal of national progress. Advocates of this world society thesis put forward that there is an endless worldwide competition between various forms of social, political, and economic arrangements. Those who win the competition survive, thrive, become world models, and are diffused from one context to another. Ramirez and Boli (1987, 3) argued that "a military defeat or a failure to keep pace with industrial development in rival countries stimulated the state to turn to education as a means of national revitalization to avoid losing power and prestige in the interstate system." Based on the world society thesis, Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal (1992, 146) examined a set of enrolment data from over 120 countries of the period from 1870 to 1980 and found that the sharp increase in mass schooling, especially after the Second World War, was affected only by countries' "structural location in the world society" (146). This study revealed that countries immersed in the interstate system first established the initial forms of mass educational systems.

In the post–Second World War period, the foundations of international organizations and increasing demographic mobility and communication created new spaces where national education policymakers were exposed to transnational educational discourses that are usually originated in the developed Western countries and disseminated by a network of international organizations. The exposure of nation-state policymakers to transnational policy discourses through conferences, workshops, and meetings and the participation of nation-states in international educational projects resulted in the production of "multilayered" and "multidimensional" policies (Rizvi and Lingard 2009, 14). This process of trans-nationalization of educational policies began in the interwar period, saw a remarkable increase following the Second World War, and reached its peak in the 1990s after the end of Cold War. Goodson (2007) argues that international competition is the

preponderant driver of national education systems since education is now seen as key to a country's socioeconomic development.

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION THEORIES

The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), which has conducted international civic education surveys since 1971, reported in 2009 that citizenship education is taught as a separate or integrated compulsory subject in twenty of the thirty-eight countries (Ainley, Schulz, and Friedman 2013; Schulz 2010). This is confirmed by Eurydice, a European Commission-funded educational network organization, which reported in 2017 that twenty of total forty-two European educational systems teach citizenship as a compulsory discrete subject at one stage of their formal education (Eurydice 2018). Most of these twenty countries, thirteen out of twenty, offer citizenship education courses at secondary level. These reports show that citizenship education does not have an established status in the curriculum as science, math, and language courses, and it does not have a standard curriculum even in the countries where it is taught as a compulsory separate subject.

All educational systems inevitably teach a version of citizenship although the ways it is provided, grades in which it is taught, and the content of citizenship education vary significantly across countries. Traditional civic education was an important building block of national educational systems. Its original function was to promote a national identity, forge a loyalty to the state and transmit knowledge of political structures by encouraging conformity rather than active participation (Eurydice 2018). In the post–Cold War period, increasing interactions between people from different backgrounds through international organizations limited the relevance of traditional civic education and prompted a need for alternative models to raise citizens who competently act in the changing local, national, and newly emerging transnational public spaces (Hughes, Print, and Sears 2010). Soysal and Wong (2007) identified a renewed interest in citizenship education fuelled by the following factors: the end of the Cold War; the hegemony of liberal human rights ideologies; liberal economic orders' prevalence; the changing perception of the world as a connected place; declining electoral participation in Western countries; the entry of eastern European countries to the EU; immigrant integration policies; the need to support the legitimacy of the European integration project through education; the concern about ethnic and religious terrorism. In an early attempt to propose a new citizenship education model, the Citizenship Education Policy Study project (CEPS), undertaken by a group of international

researchers between 1993 and 1997, observed that "when the world was a simpler place, this [traditional] conceptualization of citizenship education may have served us well; but this is no longer the case" (Cogan 2000, 1). The CEPS pointed out that rather than a monolithic nationalist citizenship, an expanded form of citizenship was being practised and proposed that "multidimensional citizenship" must permeate new programs to raise competent citizens for the twenty-first century (Kubow, Grossman, and Ninomiya 2000). The CEPS recommended that new programs must conceive students as members of a global society, improve their ability to work with others, bear responsibility, recognize cultural differences, think critically, resolve conflicts peacefully, care for the environment, advocate human rights, and participate in politics and civil society at multiple levels. This new approach heralded a new model of citizenship education as an alternative to traditional civic education.

The influence of international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and UNESCO, has encouraged a redefinition of citizenship education as addressing "a far more complex set of purposes which broadly reflect changing conceptions of what it means to be a good citizen" (Johnson and Morris 2010, 77). However, neither international agencies nor national education authorities have been able to establish a standard form of citizenship education. Rather, citizenship education literature now features many different conceptualizations of the subject. Educational scholars of different persuasions have proposed several citizenship education theories in response to the question of what an ideal citizenship education should look like.

Our literature review found four major citizenship education theories. The first one aims to re-calibrate citizenship education to the emergence of a cosmopolitan society, which we call as universalist citizenship education. The leading proponents of this version put forward that human rights principles enshrined in international human rights instruments should be used as the main frame of reference for citizenship education (Osler 2016; Osler and Starkey 2003, 2005; Starkey 2017). Universalist citizenship education aims to impart commonalities in students and promote a shared sense of humanity that will contribute to the creation of a cosmopolitan society. This version is the closest to the version of citizenship education promoted by international agencies, such as the Education for Democratic Citizenship/Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) of the Council of Europe and the global citizenship education promoted by UNESCO (Council of Europe 2010; UNESCO 2014).

The second group of citizenship education theories intends to use the subject to promote respect for ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity, which we call as multiculturalist citizenship education. The priority of this version is to help students improve their knowledge, skills, and values to recognize differences and become competent members of diverse societies.

This group of theories garners inspirations from the American Civil Rights Movement (Banks 2008, 2011; Kymlicka 2008, 2011). Unlike universalist citizenship education theory, multiculturalist citizenship education theories do not highlight human rights principles as central to citizenship education. Considering the fact that multiculturalist citizenship education theories are based more in the USA, the lack of reliance on human rights principles might be associated with the fact that human rights are not highly regarded in the USA, as evidenced by the fact that the USA has not ratified the bulk of human rights instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Osler 2016).

The third group of theories is called democratic citizenship education, which are concerned with improving the quality of social democracy by raising democratic, justice-oriented, and active citizens. Recurring concepts of democratic citizenship education theory are participation and democratic citizenship. As one of the major advocates of democratic citizenship education, Parker (2003) suggested that democratic citizenship education must give an equal regard to the issues of unity and diversity and critically engage students in public issues with an appreciation of group differences. He highlights deliberation as the most important concept of democratic education explaining that deliberation fosters dialogue across differences and initiates students into civics discourses of the national polity. In Parker's (2003) view, deliberative education encourages students of diverse backgrounds to have sincere dialogues, express their opinions without self-censorship, listen to each other receptively, develop solutions to public issues, and take the right course of action according to collective deliberations.

In a similar vein, Hess (2009) developed teaching techniques to improve students' abilities to participate in a democratic society in a meaningful manner. She underlined the importance of controversial issues discussion by stating that "democratic education without controversial issues discussions would be like a forest without trees, or an ocean without fish, or a symphony without sound" (Hess 2009, 162). M. Levinson (2012) also contributed to the theory of democratic citizenship education by developing innovative concepts: civic empowerment gap and civic opportunity gap. These concepts point out that students of disadvantaged backgrounds are deprived of civic skills and opportunities in comparison to their peers from privileged backgrounds. Situated in this group, Westheimer and Kahne (2008) viewed citizenship education as a tool to produce democratic citizenship by raising citizens who are committed to advancing a greater social justice by going beyond the existing legal structures when necessary.

The last group of theories, critical citizenship education, aims to educate students who work to bring about a structural change toward a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and resources. Critical citizenship education

theories regard the stories of oppressed and disadvantaged social classes as a core curricular theme for citizenship education. Giroux (1980) critiques citizenship education in the USA for not challenging the established power relations and proposes a model of citizenship education based on the principles of radical democracy, such as the recognition of differences and promotion of a sense of agency in the maximal sense. Johnson and Morris (2010) develop a model of critical citizenship education drawing mainly on critical pedagogy. According to this model, citizenship education must provide students with the knowledge, skills, values, and dispositions necessary to stand against oppressions and injustices. Even though Michael Apple has not written specifically on citizenship education, his works support critical citizenship education theory as he views education as an emancipating tool for the creation of a just and equal society (Apple 2011, 2013).

TOWARD A CONSENSUAL MODEL

In an effort to propose a consensual model of citizenship education, a panel brought together the leading scholars in the area at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2005 (Banks et al. 2005). The panel concluded that citizenship education must be underpinned by concepts of diversity, unity, global interconnectedness, and human rights, and supported by experience and participation. The model proposed by the panel did not end the unstable content and ways of provision of citizenship education, as McCowan (2009, 5) posited that citizenship education still "resists unifying efforts, and remains diverse and fragmented." Since there is not one agreed-upon version of citizenship education, we call the old nationalist version as traditional civic education and reserve the expression citizenship education for the contemporary liberal-internationalist model. Traditional civic education is underpinned by a monolithic notion of citizenship tailored to maintain the interests of dominant groups. Grounded on a narrow conception of national identity, traditional civic education inculcates conformity and obedience to authorities by transmitting abstract knowledge of the political structures of the context in which it is taught. It encourages learners to take up subject positions set up by the dominant forces of society. Its primary goal is to raise citizens who serve the interests of dominant groups as though they are serving the universal common good. Traditional civic education curriculum is often produced in nonparticipatory ways in centralized curriculum authorities.

Unlike traditional civic education, citizenship education is underpinned by an inclusive and pluralistic notion of citizenship. It aims to make learners competent members of their multilayered communities who are equipped with participation and deliberative decision-making skills, value the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and diversity, and contribute to the realization

Table 2.1 Two Versions of Citizenship Education

Traditional Civic Education	*Citizenship Education*
Underpinned by an official view of citizenship	Underpinned by an inclusive notion of citizenship
Encourages conformity and obedience	Encourages participation and active citizenship
Includes constitutional rights and responsibilities	Includes human rights besides constitutional rights and responsibilities
Promotes a monolithic national identity	Recognizes pluralistic identities
Emphasizes a duty-based citizenship	Emphasizes a rights-based citizenship
Presents a homogenous image of society	Recognizes and celebrates diversity
Presents rights, democracy, and citizenship as a finished business	Presents rights, democracy, and citizenship as an ongoing struggle
Prioritizes an essentialized and frozen notion of identity and culture	Prioritizes a fluid and dynamic notion of identity and culture
Favors non-participatory and non-inclusive curriculum development process	Favors participatory and inclusive curriculum development process
Views students as citizens-in-waiting	Views students as already-citizens

of a greater social justice. It aims to develop learners' abilities to challenge inequalities and question authority in a pursuit of social justice. In line with the fundamental principle of liberal education, citizenship education aims to ensure students' transition "from hopeless dependency into an autonomous maturity" (Appiah 2005, 62). To this end, it aims to create opportunities for students, including ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, to achieve their full potentials, overcome barriers to participation, and become autonomous and productive members of their societies.

Whether underpinned by ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism, a traditional civics curriculum tends to project a hierarchical ordering of diverse identities by prioritizing and promoting a particular national or cultural identity. Therefore, traditional civics relies on a frozen and essentialized notion of culture and identity. Liberal-internationalist citizenship education is underpinned by a human rights discourse and treats all diverse identities as equals of flourishing democracies. It relies on a fluid and evolving notion of culture and identity with a firm belief that the development of culture of democracy and human rights is a dynamic and unending process. Table 2.1 sums up the differences between the two versions of citizenship education.

Despite the stark differences between the two models of citizenship education, it is important to underline that traditional civic education is not the opposite of citizenship education. While traditional civic education represents the nationalist form, citizenship education is the form closer to international standards. These two forms mark the end points of an idealistic spectrum on which citizenship education can be placed depending on the degree to which it is aligned with universal values or nationalist ideologies.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Empirical studies attempting to reveal the nature and drivers of curriculum change in citizenship education have put forward three main propositions. The first one argues that globalization and international agencies effectively push nationalist civic education toward liberal-internationalist citizenship education. The second proposition contends that the national-local factors are the driving force of curriculum change and the indicators of internationalization are superficial. The last proposition suggests that changing socioeconomic conditions force both national and international actors to tailor citizenship education to the goal of raising individuals who can operate effectively in the hegemonic neoliberal socioeconomic order.

First Proposition: International Organizations as the Main Driver

This strand of literature has provided ample evidence that that national curricula are shifting from nationalist to post-national emphases as evidenced by the increasing references to diversity, human rights, and global issues (Bromley 2011; Soysal and Szakács 2010; Soysal and Wong 2007). These studies found an increase in references to human rights, global issues, and diversity after the end of Cold War. They also found that militarist themes reduced, and the historical narratives shifted to a new tone that foregrounds the socioeconomic history of people, not that of rulers, military leaders, and dynasties. These studies concluded that citizenship education is now underpinned by a more inclusive notion of citizenship which signals a significant shift away from nationalist citizenship favoring a particular ethno-religious identity.

Bromley (2011) examined the citizenship curricula of British Columbia and found that the national identity promoted previously was re-defined by incorporating human rights and multiculturalism into it. The revised curriculum in British Colombia is no longer based on a single-voiced narration of historical events but incorporates the experience of minorities into the national experience. It makes rarer attribution to military figures as compared with the previous curricula and presents international involvement of peacekeeping and aid and social and sports accomplishments as elements of national identity. Moon (2013) found that topics associated with multiculturalism and globalization increased in South Korean civics textbooks over time. In regard to Taiwanese citizenship education, Hung (2014, 2015) found that the monolithic Confucianism-based moral philosophy was replaced with the Western liberal values of individualism and pluralism. These studies concluded that in these cases globalization and international agencies have successfully transformed nationalist citizenship education toward the liberal-internationalist model that recognizes diverse and global identities.

Examining a cross-national dataset of social science courses, Wong (1991) found that social science courses replaced national history and national geography courses from 1900 to 1986. Wong (1991) concluded that the spread of social science courses not only is a matter of title change but demonstrates the decline of nationalism in education since social science courses are underpinned by a more liberal-internationalist notion of citizenship. Rauner (1998, 1999) conducted a cross-national longitudinal study drawing on civic education materials from forty-two countries belonging to the period from 1955 to 1995. She found a transition to a global model of civic education as evidenced by the increase in references to rights, global issues, and the individual that she attributed to the effective role of UNESCO in the worldwide dissemination of new civics topics. Moon (2009, 2013a) showed that the best predictor of the adoption of HRE was a country's commitments to international human rights regimes. Countries with a high level of involvement in UNESCO's efforts created more provision for HRE. Moon (2009, 64) did not hesitate to conclude that "the diffusion of reforms such as HRE indicate that the world is heading in the direction of gradually accepting post-national dimensions of citizenship."

An examination of a cross-national set of 465 civics, history, and social studies textbooks found an increase in attributions to themes on diversity and human rights (Meyer, Bromley, and Ramirez 2010; Ramirez, Bromley, and Russell 2009). After examining 450 civics, history, and social studies textbooks from sixty-nine countries, Bromley (2009) concluded that citizenship education has globally become more supportive of cosmopolitan identities. Moon and Koo (2011) found that human rights, democracy, diversity, and global citizenship have gained more space in the South Korean curriculum especially since the 1990s as a result of South Korea's keen engagement with international human rights bodies. Other studies in this tradition documented the worldwide spread of environmental discourses in social studies, history, and civics textbooks (Bromley, Meyer, and Ramirez 2011); the increasing incorporation of multiculturalism in social science textbooks (Terra and Bromley 2012); an increased emphasis on globalization and global citizenship (Buckner and Russell 2013); and cross-national expansion of rights discourses in textbooks (Russell and Tiplic 2014). The findings of these studies all suggest that international educational organizations and globalization create a transition from traditional civic education toward liberal-internationalist citizenship education.

Second Proposition: Local-National Dynamics as the Main Driver

The second proposition contends that national-local forces are still effective, and signs of internationalization are superficial in citizenship education. A group of researchers who had previously advocated the view that citizenship education was evolving toward liberal model have cast doubt on their earlier

argument. After examining 576 social science textbooks from 78 countries, published from 1955 to 2011, Lerch, Russell, and Ramirez (2017, 172) found that "textbooks continue to deploy nationalist narratives" and revised their previous position by admitting that "globalization has not resulted in the demise of the national in textbooks throughout the world." The proposition that citizenship education is becoming more internationalist has been challenged by many other studies as well. B. Levinson (2005, 2004) found that citizenship education in Mexico was designed via the appropriation of globally flowing discourses of democracy and citizenship to help democratize the national political culture. However, global discourses gained different meanings after they were subject to national and local influences in Mexico. Cardenas (2005) drew a similar conclusion that the cross-national adoption of HRE can be accounted for by the fact that HRE provides nation-states with a source of prestige, legitimacy, and respectability in national and international communities. Nonetheless, she underlined that the tension between HRE and the priorities of state authorities may lead to largely symbolic changes that eventually engender a gap between the promotion and implementation of HRE.

Some studies examined changes in citizenship education policies in European contexts. They acknowledged the influence of international agencies, but concluded that citizenship education was still far from having a standardized way of instruction and content (Keating 2009a, 2009b, 2014; Ortloff 2005; Philippou, Keating, and Ortloff 2009). Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007) and Piattoeva (2009) observed great variation in the curricula of the countries, which are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and influenced by UNESCO's projects, and concluded that the international agencies had limited influence. Engel (2014) examined the most recent citizenship education courses in Spain and concluded that the elements of human rights and diversity are superficially included without making a significant transformation in the promoted notion of national identity. Muñoz Ramírez (2018) explored the citizenship education reform of Spain and found that the Council of Europe became influential, notwithstanding the ultimate power rested with the government, in the introduction and removal of the citizenship education courses. She highlighted the influence of a governmental change and subsequent mobilization of grassroots organizations by the Catholic Church on the repeal of the course, which demonstrated the limited impact of international agencies and the prevalence of local and national influences.

Studies investigating England's citizenship education reform considered the introduction of citizenship education in England as a governmental response, not an externally driven initiative. They highlighted the role of national-local influences on the introduction and revision of citizenship education curriculum. Kiwan (2008) explained England's reform through the needs of the multicultural society of the United Kingdom. Kisby (2009, 2006)

argued that the Labour government made citizenship education compulsory in England to boost young people's political participation since sustainable economic development requires it. Jerome (2013) put forward that the Labour government launched the citizenship education reform in an effort to improve the quality of democracy by fostering the democratic citizenship skills of youth in England.

Investigating citizenship education curriculum change in Asian counties, Law (2004, 2006) and Law and Ng (2009) found the transition from nationalist to post-nationalist citizenship as an oversimplification of a very complex situation surrounding the curriculum change debate. These researchers highlighted that the studies advocating the first proposition paid inadequate attention to local and national conditions and showed that the persisting influence of local and national dynamics by drawing evidence from curricular changes in China, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Taiwan. Han et al. (2013, 2) critically approached to the first proposition on the grounds that its advocates were too focus on "superficial features" to discern "the more substantive issue of the values and norms promoted in the curriculum." Morris, Clelland, and Man (1997, 43) presented a detailed analysis of the evolution of social studies curriculum in Hong Kong and disputed the first proposition by concluding that "worldwide trends can provide both rhetoric and models for specific sorts of policy changes. At a micro level, however, conflict or competition among subgroups can modify or transform proposed changes." Cogan and Morris (2001, 113–114) found that the East Asian countries place more emphasis on "national identity, moral behaviour and personal attributes (e.g., honesty civility)," whereas the Western countries promote "democracy, political processes, human rights, and free market economics." With similar findings, the studies of the second proposition regarded the curriculum as "a prime expression of culture" and "rooted in different historical and religious traditions" (Han et al. 2013, 6). Hahn (2008, 5) compared citizenship education to "a wonderful window on a culture." Overall, the advocates of the second proposition maintained that the international agencies and globalization may trigger curriculum reforms, but substantive values underpinning the curriculum are resilient to internationalist discourses; consequently, local-national dynamics still permeate the citizenship curriculum.

Third Proposition: Neoliberalism as the Main Driver

A last strand of literature proposes that neither international organizations nor national-local factors drive the curriculum change in citizenship education, but the major driving force is the hegemonic neoliberal economic order. Both international organizations and national governments make use of citizenship education to better adapt young people to neoliberalism. Pykett (2007) argued

that citizenship education in England aimed to imbue young people with an understanding of security, civility, and decency in line with the wishes of the then Labour government. She considered citizenship education as a political instrument of governmentality to bring citizenry in line with the expectations of political power. Mitchell (2003, 2006) contended that the citizenship education policies of England, Canada, the USA, and the EU foster neoliberal subjectivities by raising self-serving citizens who can function in the neoliberal system. Kennelly and Llewellyn (2011) argued that the Canadian civics curriculum promotes self-regulating and self-serving subjectivities. Pashby (2015) also concluded that there is a tension between the dominant conceptions of global citizenship and multiculturalism permeating the Canadian social studies education curriculum because both concepts are used in tokenistic ways to support the neoliberal socioeconomic order.

CONCLUSION

In order to develop a conceptual framework for the investigation of citizenship education reform in Turkey, we first sketched our definition of citizenship and then proposed two models of citizenship education: traditional-nationalist civic and liberal-internationalist citizenship education. We intend to operationalize these models in ascertaining the direction of citizenship education curriculum change in Turkey. We have identified three propositions sustained in empirical studies regarding the drivers and nature of curriculum change in citizenship education. These propositions inform our study in a way that we look for evidence whether or not the local-national or the international dynamics, or neoliberalism drove the citizenship curriculum change in Turkey in the given period. Our initial hypothesis was based on the second proposition that the international organizations and globalization were influential in this curriculum reform, although we recognized that local-national dynamics have the potential to shape the curriculum produced.

We acknowledge that globalization and international agencies play a discernible role in the introduction of liberal-internationalist citizenship education courses. However, their impacts often do not penetrate under the surface, and local and national influences dominate the curriculum. Therefore, in the case of Turkey we were cautious about the first proposition that the traditional civics curriculum is moving away from nationalist paradigms and aligning with the international standards. This caused us to pay close attention to whether or not the dominant ideologies twisted the internationalist discourses of citizenship, human rights, and democracy in Turkey's citizenship curriculum. With these theoretical approaches, we now move on to provide an in-depth examination of the citizenship education reform and discuss the nature of curriculum change in Turkey in relation to the international trends.

Chapter 3

An Instrument for Nation-Building

Citizenship Education in Turkey

INTRODUCTION

This chapter delineates the sociohistorical context of citizenship education in Turkey. We first outline the theory of Turkish citizenship, then expand on the historical evolution of citizenship and citizenship education under three periods. The first is the state formation era (1923–1950) characterized by single-party rule; the second is the era of military-controlled democracy (1950–1999); the third is the era of civilian democracy, which began after the European Union's (EU) recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. In the post-Helsinki period, the EU reforms limited the military's paternalistic role in politics and consolidated the power of civilian politics. However, since the civilian government was elected on the basis of its Islamist agenda, the inherited secular framework for education was soon superseded.

Turkish citizenship has been predominantly studied by drawing on theoretical constructs that were originally developed to explore citizenship in liberal Western contexts. Based on certain binaries, such as civic republicanism versus liberalism and territorialism versus ethno-culturalism, Turkish citizenship is judged to be civic republican, not liberal; top-down/passive, not bottom-up/active; and a combination of territorial-universalist and ethno-culturalist models (İçduygu, Çolak, and Soyarik 1999; Kadıoğlu 2005, 2007; Yeğen 2004; Keyman and Kanci 2011). However, these conceptual tools fall short of providing an adequate account since Turkish citizenship has considerable differences from its Western counterparts. This is because concepts are saturated with their sociohistorical, cultural histories. The term in Turkish [*vatandaşlık, yurttaşlık*] bears little relationship to the concept of citizenship in English. The etymological root of the English version is derived from

Table 3.1 Middle-School Citizenship Education Courses

Course Title	*Year*	*Grade(s)*	*Hours per week*
Knowledge of Civility [*Malumat-ı Medeniyye*]	1923–1924	2 and 3	1
Knowledge of the Motherland [*Malumat-ı Vataniyye*]	1924–1930	2 and 3	1
Knowledge of the Homeland [*Yurt Bilgisi*]	1930–1938	1, 2, and 3	1
Knowledge of the Homeland	1938–1949	2 and 3	2
Knowledge of Citizenship [*Yurttaşlık Bilgisi*]	1948–1969	1, 2, and 3	1
Integrated into Social Studies [*Sosyal Bilgiler*]	1969–1985		
Citizenship Studies [*Vatandaşlık Bilgileri*]	1985–1995	3	1
Citizenship and Human Rights Education [*Vatandaşlık ve Insan Haklari Egitimi*]	1995–1998	3	1
Integrated in Social Studies	1998–2005	2 and 3	1
Citizenship and Democracy Education [*Vatandaşlık ve Demokrasi Egitimi*]	2005–2010		
	2010–2012	3	1

the word "city," whereas the Turkish term is a derivative of "homeland or country" [*yurt, vatan*]. The English version connotes public engagement, whereas the Turkish concept expresses loyalty to the state. That difference in the meaning of the concept is associated with the fact that Turkish citizenship was developed as a formula to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire rather than to improve participation in public affairs.

The courses that we can nonetheless identify with citizenship education in Turkey from 1923 until 1948 aimed to help create a secular nation out of remnants of the collapsed multi-ethnic and multi-Ottoman Empire and were consequently labeled with concepts like motherland, homeland, and civility. Courses explicitly called citizenship [*yurttaşlık*] were introduced in the late 1940s (table 3.1).

The table shows that the citizenship course, named Knowledge of Civility, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, was re-named as Knowledge of the Motherland in 1924 and as Knowledge of the Homeland in 1926 (Gülmez 2001; Üstel 2004). In 1948, the course was retitled as Knowledge of Citizenship, which was later subsumed into social studies in 1969. In 1985, the social studies course was broken into three courses, one of which was a citizenship course, called Citizenship Studies. The course title became Citizenship and Human Rights Education in 1995, but the course was repealed in 2005 and a new course, Citizenship and Democracy Education, was introduced in 2010, which was, in turn, repealed in 2012. The concept of citizenship first appeared in the title in 1948 in the pro-democracy international context of

post-Second World War. Similarly, the course title included the concepts of democracy and human rights after 1995, which was also associated with the pro-democracy international atmosphere of the post–Cold War period. The changing title of the course shows the responsiveness of the subject to international political changes. It also suggests that citizenship courses in Turkey have provided a curricular space to teach global discourses of democracy and citizenship.

THE PERIOD OF SINGLE-PARTY RULE (1923–1950)

After the collapse of the multiethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire after the First World War, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) emerged as the chief commander in the Turkish Independence War (1919–1922), and later as the founding leader modernized the Turkish state by abolishing the Sultanate in 1922 and proclaiming the Republic in 1923. He was elected as the first president in 1923 and remained in power until he died in 1938. One of his comrades, İsmet İnönü, continued the project of secular nation-building until 1950. Since the Republican People's Party [*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*], founded by Atatürk, ruled the country from 1923 to 1950, this period is often referred to as the period of single-party rule.

Citizenship Policies and Practices

Taking inspiration from the French nation-building experience, Atatürk aimed to build a secular nation composed of a citizenry encouraged to adopt a supposedly modern mindset of rational thinking and decision-making (Berkes 1998). From the Atatürk era onward, secular nationalism marked the official ideology of the Republic of Turkey. Modern Turkey was built on a homegrown secular nationalism rather than having a constitution imposed by a colonial industrialized power. The founding fathers were a group of military elites or, "a small band of nationalist officers" in Zürcher's (2005, 380) words, who were mostly from the western parts of the Ottoman Empire and graduates of the modern military schools. It was these Westernized Ottomans, who subscribed to the dominant Western liberal ideology of secular nationalism, that, led the Turkish nation-building experience and founded modern Turkey.

Gellner (1998) contends that nation-building processes bring about some degree of secularization to ensure cultural homogenization. In some cases, a state secularizes, even nationalizes, a religion to consolidate its central power. In such cases, "the high religions, those which are fortified by a script and sustained by specialised personnel [. . .] become the basis of a new collective identity" (Gellner 1998, 72). In Turkey's nation-building experience, the

Sunni interpretation of Islam, having a script and specialized personnel, was elevated to the level of state religion. The new regime promoted a particular interpretation of Islam to consolidate its central authority (Çolak 2005; Gürbey 2009). From the days of Atatürk onward, the state became interventionist in the private sphere in order to create "a 'secular habitus' in a Muslim culture" (Göle 2013). Considering the secular lifestyle as an indicator of civilization, the founding leaders regarded the traditional ways of observing Islam as primitive and backward. They abolished the caliphate, repealed the Sharia law, adopted the Swiss civil code, prohibited religious titles and dress, and outlawed Islamic lodges and shrines. The Latin alphabet was introduced in place of Arabic scripts in 1928, official holidays were shifted to Saturday and Sunday from Friday (the Muslim holy day), call to prayer was Turkified, and all religious symbols were banned, including wearing a headscarf in public spaces.

The instrumental use of Sunni Islam to consolidate the state authority made the official ideology "too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevis, and too Turkish for the Kurds" (Casanova 2001, 1064). The weak social base of the official ideology led the founding leaders to entrust the task of its preservation to the military (Göle 2013; Jenkins 2007). Secular nationalism was maintained "by legal rulings or the support of the army" (Göle 2013, 42). The classic citizenship regime of modern Turkey was assimilationist in the sense that it intended to transform the inhabitants of Turkey into a secular, modern, and homogeneous society by using ideological and repressive state apparatus (Althusser 2001). It favored ethnically Turkish, religiously Sunni, and ideologically secular groups (Kadıoğlu 2007). The majority population was forced to abandon the traditional-religious norms and values, supposedly incompatible with secularism; native languages other than Turkish; and religious identities other than Sunni Islam.

Mylonas (2012, 45) argues that citizenship regimes in the Balkan countries take form under the influence of contextual parameters of interstate relationships. Citizenship policies for a "noncore group" are decided on the basis of whether or not that "noncore group" has any engagement with an external power. Decisions on assimilation, exclusion, or accommodation of noncore groups in the Balkan countries are determined from a national security perspective. Since non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire did in fact collude with external powers and were held responsible for its disintegration, the religious identity of Sunni Islam shared by the majority of inhabitants emerged as the most significant marker of the core groups in Turkey. The defining descriptors of core groups were modern, Sunni Muslim, and Turkish, while the defining descriptors of noncore groups were non-Muslim, non-Turkish, and traditional-provincial.

The 1924 constitution recognized the ethno-cultural characteristics of ethnic Turks as the universal characteristics of Turkish citizenship (Aktürk

2012). In the 1930s, "one language, one culture, one ideal" was the official motto of the new regime (Ince 2012). For Turkification purposes, the Kurdish people were dispersed and relocated across the country (Yeğen 2004), while ethnically Turkish newcomers were settled in areas where the ethnic Turks did not form a majority (Çağaptay 2002, 2003). In the Lausanne Treaty, the founding treaty of the Republic of Turkey, religious identity was recognized as the main criterion distinguishing minorities from those considered as Turkish (Oran 2007). On that basis, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were given minority status, while all Muslim people of Turkey were regarded as Turkish. Population exchange agreements took religious identity as the essential criterion to distinguish who was Turkish and who was not (Çağaptay 2002, 2003). Because of this demographic policy based on a particular conception of citizenship, the number of non-Muslim people in Turkey steadily decreased.

In the 1930s, the founding leaders attempted to purify the Turkish language from the influence of foreign languages by discarding words derived from mostly Arabic origins (Ince 2012; Üstel 2004). A campaign launched in İstanbul University, called "Citizen! Speak Turkish," was also a state-sponsored attempt to prohibit the use of minority languages in public. During the Second World War, the imposition of a wealth tax was also a measure of Turkification. The wealth tax required non-Muslims who had some degree of income to pay excessive amounts of taxes (K. Karaosmanoğlu 2010). It resulted in the confiscation of the properties of those who did not comply with the law, which eventually forced non-Muslim minorities to flee the country.

The citizenship regime brought significant improvements to women's rights. The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 gave women equal rights in marriage and inheritance (Arat 2005). The granting of women's suffrage in 1934 was a breakthrough, given that women were not allowed to vote even in some European countries such as France and parts of Switzerland at the time. However, these reforms mostly remained on paper. Arat (2005, 105) notes that "the founding fathers knew the best interests of women and did not need to collaborate with them or expect their active participation in support of their rights." Aside from the failure to implement these reforms, the legislative framework itself privileged men. The civil code regarded men as the breadwinner and the head of the family and required women to have their husband's permission to work outside (Arat 2005). The citizenship law did not allow women to pass their citizenship to their non-Turkish husbands but permitted men to pass their citizenship to their non-Turkish wives. Furthermore, laicist policies were excessively fixated on the external appearances of women rather than their status in society. For example, the headscarf ban aggravated the subordination of women in the male-dominated society since it deprived veiled women of their fundamental rights, such as the right to education and the right to work.

Citizenship Education

The weak social base of the official ideology made education key to the success of the nation-building project. In 1924, the passage of the Unification of Education Act [*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*] put an end to single-sex education and closed all Islamic educational institutions (Yavuz 1999). There was no formal institution providing Islamic education and no Islamic courses taught from 1930 to 1949 (Ozgur 2012). The law subordinated all schools to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) on the rationale that the neglected and fragmented educational system of the Ottoman Empire inhibited the development of national consciousness in young people. Subsequently, a committee was formed to bring school curricula into compliance with the official ideology (Üstel 2004). This committee jettisoned the Ottoman history from the curriculum and changed the title of the citizenship courses from Knowledge of Civility to Knowledge of the Motherland. Citizenship education courses were renamed as Knowledge of the Homeland in the 1926 primary education program.

The objectives of citizenship courses emphasized collective values and advised students to put the national interest before their own. Although the objectives were mainly inculcating obedience, one objective stipulated teaching rights and responsibilities that exist in "a democratic state" (Üstel 2004, 133). Attribution to democracy was a complete novelty, no textbook included the concept of democracy at all. The course objectives aimed to generate a strong sense of loyalty to family, nation, state, and homeland and make students identify with an imagined community (Anderson 2006). The motto of the Republic "one language, one culture, and one ideal" was repeated, while the terms of citizen and Turk were used synonymously in textbooks (Caymaz 2008). In some learning contexts, citizenship was implied to be territorial, while, in others, it was cast as an ethno-cultural concept (Keyman and Kanci 2011). One textbook made an ethno-cultural distinction between coming from the same nation [*milletdaş*] and living in the same country [*vatandaş*]. Based on this distinction, it described non-Muslim citizens as *vatandaş*, but not *milletdaş*. Some textbooks labeled non-Muslims as bad people: "*faizciler* (usurers), *madrabazlar* (swindlers), and *muhtekirler* (profiteers)" (İnce 2012b, 122). Women were depicted as second-class citizens whose main responsibility was to become a good wife and mother.

The Turkish nation was described as an army-nation, a nation of soldiers, or militant nation. Military education courses that were taught by military officials in uniform became compulsory for male and female students alike in 1926 (Altınay 2004). The physical education courses required military training for students (male and female), such as how to use a rifle (Caymaz 2008). The new regime exalted a citizen-soldier model of citizenship and

prepared everyone for national defence. Although civics textbooks published before 1929 did not include a definition of either nation or citizenship, after 1929 they defined a nation as a "political and social community formed by citizens bound by a unity of language, culture and ideal" (İnce 2012b, 119). The definition made no reference to religion, which manifests the secularist aspect of citizenship. The ruling elites used education as a vehicle for "the reproduction of oblivion" of "the multi-religious and multi-ethnic history of the lands that they inhabit" (Kadıoğlu 2007, 289). To this end, a set of secular values was promoted, such as "being hard-working, well-mannered, docile, obedient, trustworthy, brave, heroic and sacrificial" (Keyman and Kanci 2011, 323). Given the fact that the majority of the population lived in rural areas at the time, the textbooks included topics like hygiene, how to get rid of germs, how to dress, self-care, and appropriate mannerisms (Caymaz 2008; Üstel 2004). In line with the nationalizing and civilizing role of citizenship education, a duty-based conception of citizenship-dominated textbooks. Doing military service, casting a vote, obeying laws, and paying taxes were the most-emphasized citizenship duties in textbooks. Rights and freedoms received little attention. Rights and freedom were presented with an overly formalistic and rigid language and deliberately in small fonts in some textbooks. Even multiparty democracy was negatively depicted as the cause of disharmony and chaos in society.

Atatürk himself dictated a textbook, titled *Civic Information for Citizens* [*Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler*], which was taught as the most important textbook in the 1930s (İnce 2012; Üstel 2004). This textbook included the Turkish History Thesis [*Türk Tarih Tezi*] and the Sun Language Theory [*Güneş Dil Teorisi*]. The proponents of the language theory asserted that all languages originated from Turkish, while the Turkish History Thesis put a favorable gloss on pre-Islamic history by claiming that the Turkish nation was one of the largest and oldest nations that had created most of the great civilizations in China, India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. The Turkish History Thesis was an attempt to imagine a non-Islamic history for the secular nation in the making, disconnect it from the surrounding Muslim countries and its religious past.

Civics textbooks emphasized the Treaty of Sevres and maps that visualized this treaty, which was signed in 1920 to partition the Ottoman Empire between the Western powers (İnce 2012a). The emphasis on the Treaty of Sevres inculcated a xenophobic and highly defensive security culture by urging students to be vigilant about the malevolent intentions of foreign powers on Turkey. The 1936 objectives of the course accentuated the militarist aspects by stressing that civic education should make students love the Turkish nation and the Turkish military in a way that they would become "loyal and self-sacrificing citizens" (Üstel 2004, 42). In the hostile international

atmosphere of pre-Second World War, the concept of democracy was removed from the objectives of the course. After 1936, citizenship education took on a political role to create a social base for the single-party rule. The six principles of the party were inserted in textbooks. Since these principles were known as the "six arrows," Gülmez (2001, 218) referred to the version of citizenship education of this period as "six-arrow citizenship."

PERIOD OF MILITARY-CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY (1950–1999)

The triumph of the Allies over the Axis powers in the Second World War ushered a new era in international politics characterized by the foundation of the UN in 1945 and the announcement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. In an effort to integrate Turkey into the new international order, the ruling CHP slackened the pace of top-down nation-building policies by giving a green light to the transition to democracy in 1946. As a result, the Democrat Party [*Demokrat Parti, DP*] came to power in 1950. The rise of the DP to power did not end secular nationalism, but the state establishment, backed by the military, continued enforcing the classic citizenship regime. The state establishment and the elected governments subscribed to contrasting versions of nationalism, which engendered an ideological discrepancy. The state establishment adhered to secular nationalism, while the elected governments, especially the ones coming to power without a coalition, advocated religious nationalism. This bifurcation in the source of political power had a considerable impact on citizenship policies and practices.

Citizenship Policies and Practices

Despite the fact that the Republic was proclaimed in Turkey in 1923, multiparty democracy had not been established until 1946. After the establishment of the multiparty regime, the majority Sunni Muslim electorate gained the right to have a say in the country's administration, which led to the formations of governments responsive to the wishes of the conservative majority. Because of electoral concerns, the ruling CHP was compelled to introduce elective Islamic education courses and open Islamic schools. These reforms were expanded upon after the DP came to power in 1950, such as the reinstitution of Arabic as the language of prayer.

Given the fact that the majority of the population has remained religiously conservative, most of the governments since 1946 have been formed by

center-right political parties. The conservative governments, especially the ones ruling without a coalition, kept attempting to extend the limits of what was possible in respect of religion. Also, there was concern in the secular establishment about the spread of communism among college students. In this period, religious identity based on the state-sanctioned Sunni interpretation of Islam was promoted as an instrument to de-politicize the youth. Religion was again used as an instrument to consolidate State authority (Gürbey 2009).

The instrumental approach to religion is best illustrated by the state's promotion of the Islamic belief of martyrdom that those who sacrifice their lives for their homeland are to be rewarded in the afterlife (Çayır 2014; Gürbey 2009; B. Türkmen 2009). This belief, strongly reinforced in textbooks, was reiterated in the funeral ceremonies of soldiers who were killed in the armed conflict with the Kurdish separatists. However, this religious instrumentalism did not extend to the secular nationalists accepting the public visibility of women wearing a headscarf.

In the multiparty period, three key institutions (the military, the judiciary, and the presidency) continued enforcing the secular nationalist citizenship regime. The state establishment fought three dissidents: communism, Kurdish separatism, and Islamic nationalism. Acting as the purveyor of secular nationalism, the military toppled governments in 1971 and 1997, and directly seized power in 1960 and 1980. The constitutional court shut down twenty-seven political parties from 1961 to 2012 on allegations that they were involved in promoting either communism, Islamic, or ethnic nationalism. The constitutions drafted under military supervision justified the oversight of the military over civilian politics. Highlighting the military's overbearing role, Celep (2014, 383) described Turkish democracy as a "militant democracy." The citizenship regime underwent remarkable changes, but the bottom line was an ardent determination not to recognize diverse identities that had the potential to undermine the nation-building project.

In the post–Second World War period, the increased international recognition of human rights created a dilemma for Turkey: either to carry on top-down homogenization policies at the expense of isolation from the international community or comply with human rights standards (W. Hale 2003; F. Türkmen 2007). On the one hand, the unfinished nation-building project compelled the authorities to turn a blind eye to human rights, while, on the other, the international community exerted pressure on Turkey to live up to its commitments to human rights. Human rights came to symbolize a "reform rhetoric" in the official discourse, with no sincere commitment to eradicating the root causes of human rights violations (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2001, 59). The underlying concern was to gain international recognition and respectability.

Turkey has been reluctant to ratify international human rights instruments that had the potential to run counter to the nation-building project (Babül 2012). Even though Turkey joined the United Nation (UN) as a founding member in 1945 and the Council of Europe (CoE), as one of the first members in 1950, it entered reservations when it signed up to human rights conventions of these organizations (F. Türkmen 2007). Only in the context of its EU membership application in 1987 did Turkey ratify the article of the European Convention on Human Rights allowing individual citizens to bring cases to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It was only in 1989 that Turkey fully recognized the jurisdiction of the ECHR (Smith 2007). In the 1990s, the ECHR was overwhelmed with the number of lawsuits brought against the Turkish government mostly concerning Kurdish citizens. After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2003 with reservations on the articles that required the recognition of diverse ethnic and religious identities. Turkey is now one of the four members of the CoE that have not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Kaya 2009).

Turkey's monolithic citizenship regime has been justified by national security concerns (A. Karaosmanoğlu 2000). With respect to non-Muslim minorities, exclusionary policies persisted in the multiparty era. For instance, depending on the course of the relationship with Greece, Turkish citizens of Greek origin were subject to mistreatments (Oran, 2004). Galvanized by rumors spread by the media that Greeks were killing Turks in Cyprus and the house where Atatürk was born in Salonika, Greece, had been bombed, people in three major cities of Turkey, attacked the properties of Greek citizens on September 6–7, 1955 (İnce 2012). They were perceived as proxies of Greece and subjected to retaliation. The approach to non-Muslim citizens continued to be shaped by the contextual parameters of interstate relations.

The hegemony of secular nationalism was challenged by Islamic nationalism and Kurdish separatism from the 1990s. This led to armed clashes with the Kurdistan Worker's Party [*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK*] and increasing electoral support for Islamist nationalist parties. The Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi, RP*], an Islamic nationalist party, formed a coalition government in 1996, which was toppled by the military on February 28, 1997 under the pretext that the government had violated the constitutional premise of laicism. Rather than directly overthrowing the government, the army colonels coerced the cabinet to take measures to stop the rise of Islamic nationalism. Military impositions included the strict enforcement of a headscarf ban for all female students, the closure of Islamic middle schools and the indiscriminate exclusion of all graduates of Islamic high schools from college programs (Ozgur 2012). The headscarf ban forced female employees and students alike,

in both public and private institutions, to uncover their head if they wish to continue their education or job. With these impositions, the coup leaders reasserted the citizenship regime of the state formation era aiming to eradicate the divisive influence of identity politics, which marked the hallmark of the post–Cold War era.

Citizenship Education

We have already noted that before 1948 citizenship education courses did not include the term of "citizen" or "citizenship." Rather, the central concept was motherland [*vatan*] or homeland [*yurt*] in their titles. In 1948, the course was entitled with the concept of citizenship for the first time. Textbook research has noted that the new textbooks, which remained in use until 1968 started with a new unit, entitled "Democracy," in which the multiparty regime was positively presented. Secondly, a more humanistic approach came to define the characteristics of a good citizen, more emphasis was placed on rights, and the state was depicted with obligations to protect citizens' rights. One of the statements by Atatürk, "peace at home, peace in the world," was included in textbooks, while some introduced the full text of the UDHR in their appendices (İnce 2012). Non-Muslim citizens were acknowledged in statements that minority rights should be respected. Reflecting the changing political atmosphere, a picture of a woman wearing a headscarf and standing by a ballot box was permitted in one of the textbooks. The image of a veiled woman was significant in that all religious visibilities in education were wiped out in the previous era.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, the military government obliged teachers to present the coup as a revolution and teach children the importance of the military (İnal 2004). In fact, textbooks published after the coup included a new unit, entitled May 27 Revolution, which introduced the coup as a revolution and denigrated the toppled government party. A new more liberal constitution was adopted in 1961, which paved the way for the development of 1969 program, which placed more emphasis on democracy, international solidarity, and universal values. The 1969 program also made civics courses as a component of newly introduced social studies course. While the accompanying textbooks undoubtedly included some relatively progressive features, they nonetheless aimed to raise "loyal and self-sacrificing" citizens and tended to portray women as faithful wives or good mothers (Oğuz 2007, 160).

After the 1980 coup, a new statist, nationalist, and authoritarian constitution drafted under the military rule came into effect in 1982. In the post-coup context, Intellectuals' Hearth [*Aydınlar Ocağı*], a think tank organization formed by a group of academics from İstanbul University, played a

significant role in the shift from secular to Islamic nationalism. In an effort to help restore sociopolitical stability, the Hearth promoted a doctrine called Turkish-Islam Synthesis, which highlighted religion as an indispensable part of national identity. By developing relationships with army colonels, the Hearth affected educational reforms (Kurt 2010). The number of Islamic schools increased as did koranic teaching centers and student dormitories run by religious organizations. History themes associated with the Turkish-Islam Synthesis were inserted into textbooks (Copeaux 2006). Evolution theory was removed from the curriculum in this period. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis effectively became the new state ideology at the expense of the Republican ethos of radical secularism). In fact, the education ideology was reformulated as Atatürk Nationalism or Atatürkism, which included religious identity as one of its main components (Kanci 2009, 363). Islamic education courses, two hours a week, were made compulsory from fourth grade onward. All textbooks were revised in 1986 to promote the ethno-religious national identity (S. Kaplan, 2002).

In 1985, social studies course was divided into three separate courses: National History, National Geography, and Citizenship Studies. The objectives of civics course included the term of "citizen" on only one occasion. The importance of state and nation was emphasized by glossing over the concept of democracy. The first pages of the textbooks featured a written version of the national anthem, a picture of Atatürk, and his address to youth. The new textbooks also included a new definition of a nation: "a union of language, religion, race, history and culture" (İnce 2012b, 124). That definition is significant considering the nation had been previously defined with no reference to religion. The MoNE intensified the teaching of a national security doctrine by adding themes like external enemies and internal threats to the curricula. Turkey was depicted as though it was surrounded by many internal and external threats. These characteristics became more prominent when the military attempted once again to suppress the ethnic and religious identities in the 1990s.

After joining an international educational initiative, the UN Decade for Human Rights Education, the MoNE changed the course title from Citizenship Studies to Citizenship and Human Rights Education. Following this change, some new topics associated with human rights were added to be taught in the 1995–1996 academic year. A new program for the new course was prepared in two years, which was approved by the MoNE in 1998. The longest unit of the new program was National Security and National Power Elements, which made up 30 percent of the content (Gülmez 2001). This unit depicted neighboring countries and some groups within the country as threats to national security. Inconsistently, the textbooks included universal human rights principles, while promoting a "very particularistic, nationalistic, passive and authoritarian notion of citizenship" (Çayır and Gürkaynak 2008, 56).

PERIOD OF CIVILIAN DEMOCRACY (1999–2012)

The EU's recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit helped restore civilian democracy after the February 28 coup. A group of young Islamist politicians founded a new party in 2001, the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*], which came to power in 2002. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP's rise to power, the political context did not favor an intervention, since the EU integration reforms meant that previous habits of the military using informal channels to achieve political aims were now less effective. With the ascendance of the AKP, a more conciliatory political discourse, unlike the radical discourses of the traditional Islamist movements, began to prevail. The AKP 'repeatedly stressed its commitment to secularism and described itself as a "Muslim Democrat" rather than an "Islamist party"' (Jenkins 2007, 348). Nonetheless, the AKP did not follow a line of politics similar to that of the conservative parties in Europe (Hale 2005; Hale and Özbudun 2010). Unlike the European conservative parties, it pursued antiestablishment policies to weaken the hegemony of secular nationalism. Since 2002, the AKP has remained in power and reconfigured the official ideology in many areas, including citizenship education, in line with the version of Islamic nationalism to which it has subscribed.

Citizenship Policies and Practices

The AKP government carried on the EU integration reforms launched by the previous coalition government in 2001. Fundamental rights and freedoms were consolidated; derogatory expressions against minorities were criminalized; speaking, broadcasting, publishing and teaching in languages other than Turkish were decriminalized; non-Muslim foundations were permitted to own property; and the use of non-Turkish names was legalized (Kadıoğlu 2007; Oran 2004). A law passed in 2004 stipulated prioritizing international human rights instruments over domestic laws in case of a contradiction between the two. A state-owned television channel was launched broadcasting in five minority languages: Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, and Zaza, appearing to mark the end of the assimilationist citizenship regime.

Following the 2004 Brussels Summit, where the EU set a date for starting accession negotiations, the EU process stalled (Öniş and Yilmaz 2009). With the slow-down of the EU accession process, the secular establishment's pressure was intensified, and a broad coalition of secularist forces launched a series of public demonstrations in 2007, called the Republic Protest (İnce 2012). The protesters wanted to prevent the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from being elected as the president. In the meantime, the military

announced a memorandum warning the government to uphold the constitutional premise of laicism. In March 2008, the constitutional court escalated the tension by attempting to disband the ruling AKP on the grounds that it had become the focal point of activities that violated laicism (Çinar 2010). After 2008, the government deviated considerably from adhering to the military-sanctioned policy objectives. The government attempted to solve the perennial citizenship problems that had been untouchable by elected governments. It launched two significant initiatives: the Kurdish and Alevi openings. The main purpose of the former was to persuade the Kurdish separatists to lay down arms on the condition that the state would revisit citizenship policies for Kurdish citizens. The latter sought ways to accommodate the Alevi identity (the largest religious minority of Turkey) in a more democratic manner. After the third election victory in the 2011 general election, the ruling party completely ended the 1997 coup measures, such as the headscarf ban in public institutions and the exclusion of graduates of Islamic high schools from college programs.

Citizenship Education

In 2002, the European Commission funded a project to investigate whether textbooks in Turkey conform to human rights principles. After examining 190 textbooks, the first round of the project reported 4,000 instances of conflict with human rights principles (Tarba Ceylan and Irzık 2004). The project concluded that "the most serious problem observed in almost all textbooks is the underlying state-centred mentality that prioritises and indeed often sanctifies the state, the state authority, and national unity over the individual's rights and freedoms" (Tarba Ceylan and Irzık 2004, 3). In 2004, the MoNE launched a curriculum reform to restructure the whole curriculum on the basis of student-centered pedagogy. Based on the philosophy of constructivism, the MoNE introduced a more participatory pedagogical approach, allowing students to construct knowledge by taking an active part in learning processes.

The new textbooks published after the reform did not represent a radical break with the past, but the ethno-religious national identity continued to permeate textbooks (Çayır 2009, 2014, 2015). Nonetheless, the ethno-religious national identity has been weakened in the new textbooks in which more neutral concepts like country and society, instead of concepts that carry ideological connotations like nation and homeland, were employed. Also, the new textbooks encouraged students to take part in classroom activities and develop their independent research skills. However, no reference was made to diverse identities, but differences were glossed over by attributions to "physical traits, identification cards, feelings, thoughts and hobbies" (Kanci 2009, 370).

The MoNE repealed citizenship courses with the 2005 curriculum reform. A part of citizenship themes was integrated into social studies. A more individual-centered approach began to prevail, which was evidenced by the removal of topics associated with militarism and national security culture, such as national power and internal and external enemies (İnce 2012b). The new textbooks appeared supportive of religious pluralism, even though there was still no mention of ethnic and religious identities. In 2010, the MoNE introduced a new course, named Citizenship and Democracy Education. The new course managed to avoid militarism, national security, and external and internal enemies (Çayır 2011). The textbooks introduced tackling discrimination and increasing students' awareness about gender equality. However, the tone is strongly nationalistic, based on Turkishness with a monolithic view of language and culture. The new course treated rights and freedoms as an issue for other countries omitting instances of human rights violations from Turkey.

CONCLUSION

The historical account of citizenship and citizenship education clearly shows that Turkey is a context in which the two versions of nationalism, civic-secular militant nationalism, and ethno-religious nationalism compete for hegemony. However, neither of these ideologies recognizes the equality of diverse identities. Rather, they make a hierarchy among identities and promote an essentialized notion of national identity. For this reason, the historical evolution of citizenship in Turkey vividly illustrated tensions between nationalism and citizenship (Smith 2005). Citizenship underpinned by human rights requires the recognition of all diverse identities as equal within a democratic polity. These dominant nationalisms favor identities based on a particular ethnicity, religion, sect, and gender. Consequently, political developments and power struggles between the dominant ideologies became the major determinant of citizenship education curriculum reform, impeding the educational reform efforts to introduce liberal-internationalist citizenship education.

Even though the military was periodically involved in ensuring that education remained loyal to the founding ideology of secular nationalism, a shift to Islamic nationalism took place after the advent of the multiparty democracy in 1946. After 1950, textbooks included a modified definition of the concept of nation, whereby religion began to be counted as a constitutive element of a nation, an image of a woman wearing a headscarf and an ethno-religious conception of citizenship based on Sunni-Turkishness. This shift to Islamic nationalism accelerated following the 1980 coup and became very conspicuous after the AKP came to power in 2002. Expanding on the studies cited

throughout this chapter, we will now link the changing features of the citizenship curriculum from 1995 to 2012 to the changing balance of power between the dominant ideologies and the changing roles of international organizations. We demonstrate how the dominant social groups in power contextualized their ideological beliefs in the citizenship curriculum under the influence of national and international contextual factors. Our original data gained from unique access to national education ministry officials and archives enable us to have an in-depth account of the context of citizenship curriculum reform.

Chapter 4

Militarization of Citizenship Education

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reveals the power struggle over the citizenship education curriculum of Turkey between 1995 and 1999 which were the last years of the military-controlled democracy period (1950–1999).[1] Just before the European Council's recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership of the EU, the military used its strategic position as guardian of secular nationalism to co-opt education in an attempt to suppress the rising tide of Islamism. Under the guise of promoting human rights education, supporters of the military within the ministry of education in fact managed to introduce explicitly militaristic themes to citizenship education.

In response to the United Nation's (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education (HRE) initiative, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) launched the citizenship education curriculum reform in 1995 by changing the title of citizenship courses from "Citizenship Studies" to "Citizenship and Human Rights Education" (Ministry of National Education 1995). This decision started the curriculum reform, which coincided in the following months with the victory of the Islamist Welfare Party [*Refah Partisi, RP*] in the 1995 elections. An initial standoff, between the Islamist government and the armed forces wishing to defend the secularist basis of the Republic, ended with a military coup in 1997. The military then forced the government to allow interventions in the curriculum, resulting in what was effectively the militarization of citizenship education.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, was a field marshal and war hero who had led the victory at Gallipoli. The constitution he introduced accorded a central and privileged role to the military, charged with defending the State against internal and external threats. Largely independent of political control, it nonetheless ensured that it was well represented in all the key institutions and used informal but powerful influence on key decision-makers (Jenkins 2001, 2007). The military developed an impressive internal security apparatus based on the premise that external enemies were colluding with their internal operatives to undermine the State (A. L. Karaosmanoğlu 2000). The secular nationalist military retained the memory of Western powers betraying Turkish interests when partitioning the Ottoman territories at the Treaty of Sevres, after the First World War. This encouraged essentially xenophobic beliefs and distrust of those, like the Islamists, that evoked loyalties beyond the Turkish nation.

Until the end of the Cold War, the military prioritized communism as the major internal enemy. In the post–Cold War period, political Islamism took hold among those who had been alienated by long-standing secularist policies. In this period, the military identified two internal threats, namely political Islamism and Kurdish separatism represented by the Kurdistan Worker Party [*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK*]. Even though the military was largely successful in repressing the PKK insurgency, it was powerless to stop the rise of political Islamism. After the formation of the Welfare Party-led [*Refah Partisi, RP*] coalition government in 1996, the military intervened in politics on the grounds that the government had violated the constitutional premise of laicism (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Çınar 2003). The military's interventions culminated in the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on February 28, 1997 in which the military members of the NCS-imposed measures on the RP-led cabinet. In spite of agreeing to the military's demands, the government was forced to resign, and the constitutional court disbanded the RP for violating laicism and banned its key politicians from any role in political life.

This military intervention was called the February 28 or Postmodern Coup since it took place without a direct takeover of power. The period that followed the NSC meeting was referred to as the February 28 process because the military continued to act as a major political force. Justifying their intervention by reference to the 1924 Unification of Education Act, the hard-line secularist military aimed to re-establish the original education ideology of secular nationalism. To that end, it shut down Islamic middle schools, excluded the graduates of Islamic high schools from secular college programs, and imposed a headscarf ban in public institutions including schools

and universities (Ozgur 2012). The coup had an explicit impact on the school curricula as militaristic discourses appeared in a revised set of textbooks.

The February 28 process accentuated the established relationship between the military and education. It showed that the military had three mechanisms to disseminate secular nationalism and the national security doctrine: The Board of Education, Educational Legislation, and the National Security Council. The Board of Education is the centralized curriculum authority, which makes nationwide-binding decisions regarding all aspects of school knowledge. It was established in 1926 to ensure curriculum policies' compliance to secular nationalism. The number of members serving on the board has changed (currently eleven including the head), but its highly centralized structure has been preserved with no major change (Ministry of National Education 2012a). It represents the first of the interface mechanisms that mediates the military's ideological influence on education. Although we use the title "Board of Education" its original name is *Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*, whose close translation would be "Board of Training and Discipline." The connotations of the words "training" [*talim*] and "discipline" [*terbiye*] are authoritative and militaristic. Unlike the Higher Education Council, where the general staff is directly represented, there is no military-appointed member on the BoE (Ministry of National Education 2012a; Higher Education Council 1987). However, board members are appointed by a tripartite decree, signed by the education minister, the prime minister, and the president. This procedure allows the military to have a say in the appointments of board members. Considering that the BoE also approves the curriculum of military schools, it would appear that the military's influence over the BoE is considerable.

The military influence on education is further evidenced by the fact that the Basic Law of National Education is a product of a political context in which the military was acting as the dominant actor in the aftermath of the 1971 coup (Ministry of National Education 1973). Educational legislation requires the curriculum authority to adhere to secular nationalism. This law was amended in 1983 in a political context where the military was the dominant political force in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. This law is still in effect without a major change in its ideological character. The law sets the inculcation of "Atatürk reforms, principles and Atatürk nationalism" as the first goal of the Turkish educational system (Article 10, Ministry of National Education 1973). Article 11, entitled "Democracy Education," reads as follows: "Political and ideological inculcation that is not in line with Atatürk nationalism expressed in the constitution and involvement in daily political debates of this sort can be by no means tolerated in educational institutions." With these vague but heavy-handed restrictions, this law encourages indoctrination rather than democracy education.

The third mechanism, the NSC, is one of the highest decision-making bodies where the president, cabinet members, and military chiefs deliberate on national security issues. The NCS was established with the 1961 constitution, and its status was strengthened with the 1982 constitution. While the NSC decisions were initially advisory to the executive, the 1982 constitution obliged the cabinet to give priority consideration to the NSC's recommendations. The 1982 constitution also increased the ratio of military members in the NSC (W. Hale 2003, 120). The NSC has a secretariat-general, where over 400 officials, the overwhelming majority from the military, work (Jenkins 2007). The NSC secretary-general had enjoyed an unlimited access to information in public institutions and become influential in politics until the EU reforms limited its power after 1999. National education has been one of the areas about which the NSC has taken decisions (Altınay 2004). There are thus three mechanisms that channeled militaristic influences to the institutional realm of education.

STAGES OF CURRICULUM REFORM

In 1994, the UN General Assembly announced that the period from 1995 to 2004 would be the UN Decade for Human Rights Education. From January 1, 1995, the UN began to promote human rights through education in its member states. In Turkey, the state minister responsible for human rights acted on the UN's call and signed protocols with ministries to promote compliance with the UN's initiative. It signed a protocol with the MoNE in 1995 in a ceremony where the prime minister, deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, the education minister, and the minister responsible for human rights were present. The signing of the protocol started the curriculum reform which intermittently lasted until 2012. Below are extracts from the protocol:

INTRODUCTION

> The Human Rights Age starts with the foundation of the United Nations (1945). Turkey, one of the founding members of the United Nations, is one of the first member states which signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Afterwards, it displayed its positive approach to human rights by ratifying a series of universal and regional human rights conventions.
>
> Now, the fact our century gained recognition as the human rights age is known. While entering into a new century, new developments emerging in the world show that, as of today, the measure of developmental level of countries will be the importance that countries attach to human rights and the degree to which countries protect them.
>
> (. . .)

DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN CONCERNING
HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION

> "Citizenship Studies" course, which is still taught in the second stage of primary education institutions, shall be re-structured under the name of "Citizenship and Human Rights Education."
>
> (. . .)
>
> In order to avoid personal and political inculcations, as a principle, international human rights documents shall be taken as the basis for human rights education.
>
> [Signatures]
>
> State Minister Responsible for Human Rights Minister of National Education. (Board of Education 1995, March 6, 1995)

The protocol includes a decision that the title of "Citizenship Studies" course would be changed to "Citizenship and Human Rights Education," and human rights themes would be integrated into the content of the course. This decision signals that the citizenship courses were seen as the best possible curricular space to offer HRE. The main discourse of the protocol is that human rights are a defining marker of modernity, so their adoption is a precondition for Turkey to be seen as a developed nation. This discourse does not recognize an intrinsic value in human rights but implies that the introduction of HRE is a requirement of human rights instruments to which Turkey was signed up. The introduction of HRE is also seen as a marker of status as developed nation. In other words, the introduction of HRE is a response to external conditions, not internal, so the teaching of human rights is not expected to include human rights problems from Turkey, but a decontextualized transmission of universal principles.

After the protocol was signed, the MoNE's effort to prepare a new curriculum was disrupted by the rise of the RP to power. When the military began to intervene in politics under the pretext of upholding the constitutional principle of laicism, the interest in the curriculum reform disappeared. This change in the official approach is captured in a letter, which was issued by the BoE in 1997 in response to the CoE's invitation to the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative:

1. There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe would learn from Turkey. Because the concept of "Citizen" was formed as an approach superseding the concept of "subject hood" in a period of 150 years, and the modern identity of "Democratic Citizen" has developed [in Turkey].
2. This process started with the 1839 Sultan's Decree for Reorganization [*Tanzimat*]; the classifications of ummah-congregation-religious

> community reached to the stage of neighborhood-hometown; after the promulgation of the National Republic under the leadership of Atatürk, the individuals of modern Turkish society that were expected to come into being are called "Citizens."
>
> In this last stage, the one who acted as both leader and teacher is Atatürk. He urged prominent scientists and politicians of the time to work on the identity of democratic citizenship on the condition that he himself would extensively make contributions. The book, Civic Information for Citizens [*Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler*], which is an outcome of these efforts, is the most important matter that should be brought onto agenda, as a comprehensive source of democratic citizenship education in our country, in the Conference of Ministers of Education of Europe and Education Committee meetings. (Board of Education 1997, January 14, 1997)

The letter explains how Turkey was a leader in democratic citizenship education thanks to the Atatürk reforms and offers to help the other states. Even though Turkey has been historically in a position to learn from Europe about democratic citizenship, this relationship is reversed in the letter by the sentence, "There are many things concerning democratic citizenship that Europe will learn from Turkey." The sentence does not include any modality that gives a meaning of nuance and possibility, such as "there might be something in Turkey which Europe can learn." It expresses the unequivocal view that Turkey is in a position to teach European countries "many things" about democratic citizenship. "Many things" are not illustrated by any concrete example, but the statement is expanded on by a peculiar narration of the history of secularization in Turkey. There seems to be a confusion between citizenship and secularism in the letter because what is being conveyed is a version of Turkey's secularization history rather than citizenship.

Using citizenship and secularization synonymously, the letter makes a contrast between "subject hood" [*kulluk*] and democratic citizenship. It argues that the people of Turkey were stripped of their characteristics that made them "subject" [*kul*] and became "democratic citizen" in a period of 150 years. Before the emergence of democratic citizenship, the people of Turkey are described with concepts that have religious connotations like "subject hood [*kulluk*], ummah [*ümmet*]-congregation [*cemaat*]-religious community [*millet*]," whereas after the emergence of democratic citizenship, they are associated with secular concepts like "neighborhood" [*ahali*] and "hometown" [*memleket*]. The contrast reveals an assumption that democratic citizenship developed in Turkey through a transition from a religious to secular society. According to this discourse, Atatürk is "the leader and teacher" who gave the final shape to democratic citizenship.

This particularistic way of presentation of the historical development of Turkish citizenship exalts the state formation era and the role of Atatürk. The first sentence of the last paragraph exaggerates the role of Atatürk in the evolution of citizenship by placing his name as the main emphasis of the sentence: "the one who acted as both leader and teacher is Atatürk." To support this claim, the letter provides evidence that one of the books of democratic citizenship *Civic Information for Citizens* was written with the request and contribution of Atatürk. The letter suggests disseminating this book to Council of Europe member countries after translating it into French and English as a comprehensive source for democratic citizenship. This book is the main civics textbook of the 1930s, which is heavily under the influence of the secular nationalist ideology of the state formation era (Üstel 2004). The undiplomatic tone and content of the letter in fact reveals a lack of previous engagement with European organizations.

The portrayal of secular nationalist citizenship education of Turkey as the epitome of democratic citizenship education and the depiction of Turkey as a country with an outstanding history of democratic citizenship were arguably intended to convey a message to the CoE that Turkey was not in need of a citizenship education reform. This was mainly because a possible citizenship education reform to be undertaken in collaboration with the CoE would require taking into account the demands of rights-claiming groups, namely the Kurdish political movement and the political Islamist parties. In order to avoid a fallout with the Europe-based intergovernmental organizations, the BoE presents Turkey as a country which does not need to advance a curriculum reform but is an experienced candidate ready to help other countries who would like to undertake such a reform. The foregrounding of secularist discourses suggests an intention to use citizenship education as an instrument to suppress political Islamism. In fact, this interest in the instrumental use of citizenship education became more visible after the 1997 coup.

In 1998, the BoE announced a program of study for the course while the military was active in redefining the ideological premises of the educational system in the aftermath of the coup (Ministry of National Education 1998). The interviewees reported that the military played a decisive role in the making of the new curriculum. For example, an influential decision-maker at the BoE, told us that

> in those years in Turkey, the 28 February Process was under way and the domination of the tutelage regime over the educational system was conspicuous; therefore, I do not think decision-makers, academics, curriculum experts and those who prepared the curriculum, those who wrote the textbooks managed to exceed the boundaries set by the military people of the period and prepare a curriculum that is in line with the principles of human rights and democracy. Because it was a dark period of Turkey.

These reflections give some idea about the nature of the military's involvement in education. He casts doubt on who really prepared the program and describes the aftermath of 1997 coup as "a dark period of Turkey." He implies that those who prepared the program were under the influence of the military, so they had to reflect the wishes of the military. Similarly, one of the members of the committee, which prepared the program, made clear that the program was modified in the Secretariat-General of the NSC to emphasize militaristic discourses.

TEXTBOOK ANALYSIS

The new course Citizenship and Human Rights Education required a textbook. This was produced consisting of four units (Çiftçi et al. 2001).[2] The first unit is entitled "state, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights and responsibilities," the second, "protection of human rights, the third, "national security and national power elements," and the last one, "issues faced in the protection of human rights." The longest unit is the third one, which is twenty-nine pages and exceeds the total page number of the two units on human rights, which are twenty-six pages in total. We illustrate the militaristic discourses in the textbook through three identifiers: the representation of the Kurdish people, political Islamists, and the army and Atatürk.

Representation of the Kurdish People

The textbook relies on the constitutional definition of Turkish citizenship. That definition is particularistic in the sense that it is based on the norms and values of secular Turkish groups. It is underpinned by a territorial-universalist notion of citizenship in that the majority's ethnic identity is regarded as the citizenship title of all people, so all citizens are called Turkish regardless of their ethnic and religious identities. The constitutional definition does not recognize Kurdish identities, but names them as Turkish. Even though that definition signals that the territorial-universalist conception of citizenship is adopted, the textbook is inconsistent in this regard since the ethno-nationalist definition comes to the surface on some occasions:

> Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: "if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish." (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 35)

Atatürk's aphorism implies that Turkishness is something that can only be acquired by birth, which represents an ethno-nationalist definition which

does not view living on the same territory as an adequate prerequisite to be called Turkish. The textbook presents a paradoxical combination of territorial-universalist and ethno-nationalist models, which has been identified as a long-standing characteristic of Turkish citizenship in other official texts, such as in the constitutions and official policy documents (Kadıoğlu 2007; Yeğen 2004; Smith 2005; Çağaptay 2003), and textbooks (Keyman and Kanci 2011; Bora 2004). This inconsistent conception does not allow the recognition of diverse identities. Therefore, the textbooks did not mention minorities but included statements that implicitly accuse the Kurdish people of the spread of PKK terror:

> In some places, citizens' not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive. Leaving the fight against terrorism to officials shows people's public unconsciousness. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 69)

The excerpt sustains a neutral and formal tone as though expressing a scientific fact. The intention of this excerpt is to point the finger of blame at "citizens" who do not deliberately report terrorists; hide and shelter terrorists; aid and abet terrorists; provide food and dress for terrorists. "Citizens in some places," implies and will be read as referring to Kurdish people who are assumed to support PKK terrorism in the Southeast Region. This reinforces the militaristic discourses on the spread of the PKK terror by portraying the state security forces as blameless victims of terror. The following excerpt, without mentioning the name of a terrorist organization, makes references to the PKK terrorism by specifying the region where the terror was rampant at the time:

> In our country, those who wish to create an atmosphere of terror and chaos, from time to time, desire to divide our society into enemy camps by pitting one brother against the other.
>
> (. . .)
>
> The GAP project [a dam construction project], which will change the fate of Southeast Region made many countries jealous, so a terror atmosphere was immediately created in the region. Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey set a goal for himself to work for the peace of the country with the love of the homeland and nation without falling into these traps. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 81)

The author of the textbook asserts that external enemies "pit one brother against the other" [*kardeşi kardeşe düşürerek*]. Through a family metaphor, this idiom depicts Turkish and Kurdish people as brothers, and implies that they are fighting because external enemies set them against each other. The

excerpt claims that the PKK terror is supported by countries that are "jealous" of Turkey's developmental pace. This personification links the spread of terrorism to a dam construction project in the region and ascribes PKK terrorism to manipulation by foreign countries. It insulates the PKK terror from its sociopolitical and ethnic dimensions and considers it as a security issue created by external enemies. The last sentence addresses "the Turkish youth" by assuming all people in the region as Turkish. The expression, "the Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic of Turkey," is a formulaic statement frequently used by the general staff when addressing the press. The implication is that the effective dissemination of secular nationalism in the region will stop the spread of terror.

The textbook presents secular Turkification as the solution to PKK terrorism. Another interpretation of the political realities might be that PKK terrorism originates in a struggle by the Kurdish people against assimilation. If the root cause of the issue is assimilation, it is paradoxical to present it as a solution. This discourse reinforces the unequal power relations between the Kurdish and secular Turkish identities and supports the privileged status of secular Turkish identities at the expense of the suppression of the Kurdish identities.

Representation of Religious Nationalists

The political context in which the textbook was published was the aftermath of the 1997 coup. We argue that the citizenship course was seen as an instrument to fight political Islamism, since it promotes discourses that denigrate political Islamists. The first indication of this is the modified definition of the concept of nation (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 35). When compared with the definition in the previous textbook, the omission of religion from the constitutive elements of a nation signifies an important shift. While textbooks of the 1980s included reference to religion among the constitutive elements of a nation as a sign of the acceptance of some religious education in the post-1980 coup period, its omission from the post 1997 textbook is a significant modification that aligns with the military's efforts to stamp out political Islamism (Dal, Çakıroğlu, and Özyazgan 1986). The modified definition is an attempt to re-conceptualize the nation in a way that leaves out political Islamists and universalize the attributes of secular nationalist groups as the characteristics of the whole nation. This is well illustrated in the following excerpt:

> The Turkish nation looks to the future with hope and is respectful of the past. It is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 73)

In this excerpt the Turkish nation is personified to emphasize its good qualities. On the other hand, it associates political Islamists with pejorative terms such as fundamentalism [*köktencilik*], bigotry [*taassup*], backward-looking [*gerici*], and pious [*yobaz*]. In the textbook the characteristics associated with secular nationalists are exalted, and the characteristics associated with political Islamists are denigrated. On other occasions, the textbook authors make a contrast between "modernity" [*çağdaşlık*] and "primitiveness" [*ilkelliğin*] and "bigotry" [*bağnazlık*] (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 79). The secular nationalists tend to present themselves as secular, Western, modern or European, while they employ the descriptors like primitive, backward and bigot to denigrate religious identities. By employing these ideological descriptors, political Islamists are framed as "primitive" and "bigoted" people who are against "modernity" and "innovations" (79). A few pages earlier, a question is posed, ostensibly to invite reflection and discussion:

> What would be the dangers of people's interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 74)

The word "dangers" [*sakıncalar*] implies a threat. The grammatical structure of the question (what would be) implies that if people interpret freedom of conscience and religion in their own way, it would be a dangerous thing. The way the question is posed lead students to think that the principle of the freedom of conscience and religion should not be interpreted individually, but that individuals should accept the interpretation of the secular authorities. This discourse is associated with the heated debate of the post-coup period over the state's interpretation of laicism. In the post-coup period, wearing a headscarf was banned on the grounds that it is a violation of the constitutional principle of laicism. The question is intended to promote that interpretation of laicism. It encourages students to simply accept the state's interpretation and not to consider alternatives. The textbook thus frames its argument in a way that supports the military measures of the coup leaders.

Representation of the Army and Atatürk

The textbook strongly promotes secular nationalism through the hagiographic depiction of Atatürk and an emphasis on the key role of the army. The official ideology instigated by Atatürk presents the army as a "personified symbol of nationalism" (Bora 2003, 437). This discourse exalts the military power around the cult figure of Atatürk. The textbook, which is ostensibly promoting human rights education, legitimizes the use of weapons: "Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence" (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 68). It presents a weapon as a basic need equivalent

to food and drink. That early people needed weapons to protect themselves is uncontroversial, but when this is generalized to "mankind" [*insanoğlu*] and without further explanation, it implies that use of weapons is normal. In addition to the presentation of the weapon as a basic need, the textbook makes a positive representation of the military power:

> The Turkish people founded many states throughout history thanks to the importance they attach to military power. This situation in the Turkish states indicates that military power comes before everything else, and it reaches the level of sovereign power in society (. . .) Our army is also the guardian of our republic that is a democratic regime (. . .) If Turkey has not gone to a general war since the foundation of the Republic, it is thanks to the power and deterring influence of the armed forces. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 62–63)

In the excerpt, the assertion that Turkey has not gone to a general war since its foundation thanks to its military power is a particular interpretation of history rather than a fact. The textbook attributes Turkey's avoidance of a general war solely to the power of its army as opposed to political and diplomatic factors. Similarly, the importance the Turkish people attach to military power has a rather tenuous relationship to the founding of Turkish states in history. The glorification of the army as the most vital institution then places all other institutions, such as the Grand National Assembly or even the government, in a secondary position. The army is portrayed as an institution that founds states, protects the regime of democracy and ensures the happiness of citizens. The statement, "military power comes before everything," situates the military as the pre-eminent institution in Turkey. The excerpt includes a phrase identified with the military circles who describe the army as "the guardian of the Turkish democracy." In a learning context on the military's relations with democracy, one might expect to see some mention of the military coups, but the textbook does not include any sign in this regard.

The other dominant discourse regarding the military is that states cannot run the risk of waging war against each other because rapid advancements in the weapons industry have made war almost impossible. Consequently, terrorism is seen as a substitute for war. The textbook implies that enemy countries use terrorist organizations to keep Turkey under control. This claim is strengthened with an argument that Turkey's geopolitical location makes a possible war against Turkey almost impossible since it is in an extremely critical location in terms of the balance of world powers. Since a war against Turkey may spark a regional or even world war, enemy countries support terrorist organizations to achieve their goals in Turkey:

> Many countries have aspirations on our country. Therefore, we are a country, which is under a constant risk. Places where terrorist organizations that aim to

> destroy our country were sheltered mostly are neighboring countries outside Turkey that we think of as allies. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 80)

The excerpt makes a link between external and internal enemies and brings "neighboring countries" under suspicion for aiding and abetting terrorist organizations against Turkey. The argument strongly presented is that terrorism is inevitable, and Turkey is under a constant threat. This confirms the vital importance of military power and justifies the hegemony of the army.

Atatürk is presented as a saintly figure, and his aphorisms and pictures are included throughout the textbook. The following excerpt is illustrative of this aspect:

> The recognition of women's rights [in Turkey] is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish women. (. . .) New laws did not go against Turkish women's actual conditions because the great leader Atatürk knew in great detail the cultural characteristics of Turkish society. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 25–26)

The excerpt presents the entitlement of women to their rights as an individual success of Atatürk. Explaining such historical progress through Atatürk's charismatic leadership overshadows the agency of women who struggled for their rights. The excerpt overlooks women's agency to emphasize the hagiographic virtues of "the great leader Atatürk." Also, the excerpt assumes that reforms on paper were sufficient to end women's subordination. It does not include a reference to the real conditions of women and discussion on whether "new laws" made a difference in reality. Finally, Atatürk is referred to as, "our great father" (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 76), "the Turkish state which Atatürk founded" (78), "the Great leader Atatürk" (79), "the Republic which Atatürk established" (80), "the Turkish youth to whom Atatürk entrusted the Republic" (81), and "the goal of transcending the level of contemporary civilisations that Atatürk set" (81). In this way, Atatürk is portrayed as the paragon of a soldier, citizen, and commander that all citizens should revere, and his aphorisms are quoted as though they were verses from a holy scripture.

CONCLUSION

When the secularist state establishment was challenged by the rise of political Islamism and Kurdish separatism in the 1990s, the military took measures to suppress the ethnic and religious movements. As a result, a militarized

curriculum was taught in Turkey under the title of citizenship and human rights education. Based on the intensity of the militaristic discourses in the textbook, it appears that the citizenship and human rights education course's curriculum was designed as the middle-school version of the high-school course, *National Security Knowledge*. The textbook depicted diverse identities in a negative light, promoted animosity against neighboring countries, and legitimized state violence and war as necessary and normal. It contained militarist discourses targeting both the Kurdish people and religious nationalists and presented using a weapon as natural as the need to drink water and eat food. The implementation of that militarized curriculum was not a cultural or historical necessity but facilitated by the structure of the curriculum development system.

By highlighting the militaristic discourses in the textbook, this chapter draws attention to the possibility that curriculum reforms sponsored by international organizations may simply be diverted from their intended objectives and provide opportunities for the promotion of the ideological discourses of powerful groups. Citizenship education reforms that are launched with no recognition of specific human rights and democracy issues are unlikely to promote democracy. The curriculum reform in Turkey ended with the military's instrumentalization of the subject arguably because it was launched with no recognition of any of Turkey's many appearances before the European Court of Human Rights. Turkey is presented as immune from concerns about human rights democracy, citizenship, and treatment of minorities.

The military's ideological influence had been a long-standing feature of the citizenship curriculum, but the Citizenship and Human Rights Education textbook makes this explicit. We have argued that the infusion of militaristic discourses into the curriculum was linked to last gasp efforts to stamp out political Islamism. With the failure of the army and the national secularists to contain popular attraction to Islamism, citizenship education continued to be the site of ideological struggles that side lined the role of international organizations.

NOTES

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2. This citation refers to the third edition of the main textbook, whose first edition was published in 1999.

Chapter 5

Citizenship Education Curriculum in Transition

INTRODUCTION

Following the 1997 coup, the military instrumentalized citizenship education to disseminate strongly nationalist discourses that included outlawing any mention of Kurdish aspirations and promoting Kemalist secularism.[1] Shortly after the announcement of the new curriculum that bore the hallmark of military involvement, the European Union (EU) recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership. This decision, made at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, created a significant change in the official approach to the citizenship education reform. The EU accession reforms implied close attention to the quality of democracy in Turkey and this required curbing any overt military influence on policy, including educational policy. Consequently, the military-sponsored citizenship curriculum was gradually replaced.

From 1999, in the immediate post-Helsinki Summit period, the Board of Education (BoE) engaged in a collaboration with the Council of Europe (CoE) aimed at demonstrating a commitment to European values and principles. This initiative was relatively short lived, however, since the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*], came to power in 2002. The AKP stands for Turkish nationalism based on traditional Ottoman values including an endorsement of the status and role of Islam within the nation. This is in stark contrast to the staunchly secular Kemalist nationalism defended by the military. In terms of education policy, from 2002, the BoE, now responding to the AKP government, started to cleanse textbooks of militarist discourses and move away from the military-backed secular nationalism. That said, the BoE, responding to AKP priorities, did not go so far as to introduce democratic citizenship education. Indeed, after a rather

limited engagement with the Council of Europe, the BoE brought to an end the discrete status of citizenship courses in 2005. In the following years, the subject was integrated into the content of other courses, notably the content of social studies courses.

In this chapter, we look into the evolution of citizenship education in relation to the changing balance of power from 1999 to 2008. We first describe the political context with a focus on the changing aspects of the three interface mechanisms which enabled the military to shape the curriculum. We outline the preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE by considering that collaboration as a barometer of the interest in the curriculum reform. In the final part, we analyze the revised textbook of the course.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey's application for the EU membership was formalized, represents a turning point in the democratization history of Turkey. During the post-Helsinki era, the Turkish Parliament passed democratization reforms to meet the EU criteria for opening accession negotiations (Müftüler Baç 2005; Öniş 2000). The EU accession requirements helped to restore democratic order given that the military hijacked civilian politics after the overthrow of the government in 1997. The EU accession reforms from 1999 to 2004 run as the engine of democratization. They brought substantial changes to the configuration of military-civilian relations. As a result, the balance of power between the dominant ideologies changed considerably in the post-Helsinki era because the status of the military as the guardian of Atatürk's legacy of secular nationalism and hence what Jenkins (2007, 354) calls "the mystical embodiment of the Turkish nation" had to be re-defined in order to meet the EU criteria. Although the EU accession process required the military to relinquish its dominant role, the army colonels were able to continue to pressure the government to resist such EU demands. The tension between the government and the military was starkly revealed when the Deputy Prime Minister, fearing damage to the case for EU accession, blamed the military for afflicting Turkish politics with "national security syndrome" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2003, 213–214).

The EU accession process for a while provided a context for democratization and limitations to military influence. Military judges were removed from the state security courts in 1999 (Jenkins 2007). In October 2001, the composition of the National Security Council (NSC) was reconfigured by including the justice minister and deputy prime minister, thus increasing the proportion of civilian members (Hale, 2003). The state of emergency and the effective military rule in some parts of southeast Turkey were repealed in

2002 (Müftüler Baç, 2005). The death penalty was abolished, and the ban on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was lifted.

The limitation of the military's power in the post-Helsinki period provided an opening for political Islamism to gain a foothold in the political landscape. The group of young Islamist politicians that founded a new political party in 2001, the AKP, came to power in 2002 following a period of coalition governments. Even though the military was alarmed by the AKP's rise to power, the new political context was no longer favorable to direct military interventions. However, the AKP was careful initially to avoid a direct confrontation with the military and so broadly pursued policies that did not challenge the secular principles, known as laicism, that were so strongly defended by the military.

Thus, the AKP, with its conciliatory rhetoric, cleverly used the EU integration reforms to reduce the role of the military (Tombuş 2013). In the early years of the AKP government, none of the parties wanted to jeopardize Turkey's chances of opening accession negotiations due for the Brussels summit in December 2004 (Jenkins 2007, 351–351). That said, it was not long before the AKP government's enthusiasm for the EU waned (Öniş 2008, 2009; Patton 2007). The AKP developed an instrumental view of the EU accession process that enabled it to consolidate its power domestically (Usul 2008). For example, the EU accession required reforming the National Security Council by reducing the frequency of meetings and this limited the military's contact with the cabinet (Müftüler Baç 2005, 125). These significant changes in restricting the military's influence enabled the Islamist government to challenge the hard-line secularism that was the Kemalist legacy to the Turkish state.

In July 2003, the rule that the secretary-general of the National Security Council was appointed from the ranks of the military was repealed, and civilians had a chance to serve in this post. Furthermore, the secretary-general's virtually unlimited power over civilian government agencies was severely curtailed. For example, the secretary-general's staff appointment regulations were changed to increase the ratio of civilian staff. The AKP government moved warily, having previously witnessed the suppression of earlier Islamist political parties by the military. It attempted to avoid perceptions that attempts to restrict the military's influence were intended to undermine the secular, Kemalist constitution. The AKP's opponents feared a hidden Islamist agenda. Within the civil service, many bureaucrats, appointed under secular nationalist governments, were reluctant to implement new AKP policies.

Even though the AKP deliberately avoided confrontation with the military, the headscarf issue was a site of struggle between the AKP government and the military. Since the Kemalist modernization from 1922, wearing a headscarf in a public institution such as a university was considered at odds with

the secular nationalist citizenship regime of Turkey. To the military, the presence of a veiled woman at an official ceremony was anathema and tensions rose when the wives of AKP ministers turned up wearing headscarves.

In 2007, a coalition of secularist forces launched public demonstrations called the Republic Protest. One goal of the protesters was to prevent the then prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from being elected as president in the upcoming election. The presidency was perceived to be one of the key institutions for the continuation of the secular nationalist order. While the Republic Protests were underway, the military announced a memorandum to state its concerns about the constitutional premise of laicism. The government took a stance against the memorandum by construing it as a military intervention in the upcoming presidential election. Even though the pressure of the secularist circles including the military was able to halt on the nomination of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the presidential candidate, it was unable to prevent, Abdullah Gül, one of the founding figures of the AKP whose wife wore a headscarf too, from being elected as the president in 2007.

THE CURRICULUM REFORM IN THE PRE-AKP PERIOD (1999–2002)

Turkey's recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit changed the official approach to reforming the militarized content of citizenship courses. An archival document reveals that initially there was a lukewarm and diplomatic response to the CoE invitation to participate in the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative in the pre-Helsinki Summit period (Board of Education 1997, January 14, 1997). However, after the military suppressed the Islamist movement and the EU signaled its positive approach to Turkey's membership at the 1998 Cardiff Summit (Müftüler Baç 2005), the BoE began to express an interest in the EDC/HRE initiative discreetly at first (Board of Education, January 11, 1999) and then quite enthusiastically following the 1999 Helsinki Summit.

An archival file note written by the head of the foreign relations directorate of the MoNE shows this change in the official approach (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate General for Cultural Affairs, February 18, 1999). The director reports on attending a meeting of the CoE's Council for Cultural Cooperation (CDCC). The note first gives introductory information about the administrative structure of the CDCC and recommends ways in which Turkey can contribute to the workings of the CDCC. However, the note gives an impression that Turkey approaches the CoE to make a positive representation of itself in the light of impending EU accession negotiations, not primarily to

collaborate on educational reforms. This was confirmed by a BoE insider, a curriculum designer:

> For the first time, a ministry responsible for the EU is created under AKP rule. Now, we are talking about a country with this perspective and this ministry. When we hear Europe, the first thing that springs to our minds is a thoroughly-functioning judiciary. How is that possible? It is possible through democracy. Then, it needs to be addressed in the curricula, in the education system. (Interviewee 9, September 1, 2014)

According to the interviewee, citizenship education reform was an educational effort to bring Turkey's culture of democracy and human rights in line with European standards. There is a sense that it is only external pressure that motivates the introduction of democratic citizenship education. Similarly, Interviewee 10, who is also a curriculum designer, agreed that Turkey turned its face to the West at this time and that education policies were affected by this choice (September 1, 2014).

The archival documents and interviewees' accounts suggest a close association between the citizenship education reform and the EU membership bid. In 2000, Turkey was represented for the first time by a board member who attended the final conference of the first phase of the EDC/HRE initiative. After the conference, the board member reported that pupils should be given opportunities to practise democracy, while teachers should be offered in-service training on democratic citizenship education. The report also emphasized the importance of school-society cooperation in terms of providing a quality citizenship education (Board of Education, September 19, 2000).

In 2001, at the request of the CoE, the BoE appointed a national coordinator for the second phase of the EDC/HRE initiative (Board of Education, March 3, 2001). The appointed national coordinator joined in the EDC/HRE activities, maintained correspondence, and organized several efforts, including the formation of an EDC/HRE project group and advisory committee, the adoption of an EDC/HRE national plan and pilot implementations (Board of Education, August 2, 2001). An EDC/HRE plan was developed with the contributions of forty-two participants from various sectors. Two primary and two high schools were selected to pilot the materials (Board of Education, March 8, 2002). Interviewee 14, who was Turkey's EDC/HRE coordinator and took part in the preparatory efforts, acknowledged the positive approach to the citizenship education reform:

> It was 2001 or so, efforts on democratic citizenship education began in the Board of Education, and sub-committees were formed (. . .). In that period, there were board members at the BoE who were dedicated to this business

> [citizenship education reform]. There were board members who were working diligently with a full effort. (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015)

Interviewee 14's testimony corroborates evidence from the archival documents that the citizenship education reform was taken seriously in this period. Interviewee 15, who was a high-profile educational bureaucrat, described the efforts of this period as "in-depth," "having philosophical depth," and "well-established" (August 4, 2015).

Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a Turkish-EU Secretariat-General was created in 2000 to develop relations with the EU authorities by using the "Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance" (IPA) framework. The IPA framework is intended for candidate countries to apply for financial assistance in realizing integration reforms (European Union Ministry of Turkey 2015). Although the EU acquis does not include a criterion concerning citizenship education, education was perceived as an instrument to meet the Copenhagen criteria in the Turkish case (Alexiadou 2014; Keating 2014). One of the interviewees, who worked in Turkey's EU delegation team, mentioned that they considered citizenship education as a tool to improve human rights and democracy in Turkey (Interviewee 13, July 6, 2015). This perspective on citizenship education paved the way for the preparation of an IPA project proposal on citizenship education in 2001 (Board of Education, September 27, 2002). In the following years, the interest in this IPA project proposal showed the level of willingness to undertake a citizenship education reform.

THE CURRICULUM REFORM IN THE AKP PERIOD (2002–2008)

The first appointee of the Islamist AKP government to head the BoE began work in March 2003. The archival documents show that the new administration was less enthusiastic about collaboration with the CoE in respect of the EDC/HRE activities. The new director of the BoE revised the last EDC/HRE activity report, which had been sent to the CoE in February 2003, and resubmitted it in April 2003 (Board of Education, February 20, 2003; April 30, 2003). The revisions reveal a cooler engagement with the Council of Europe, using more formal, diplomatic language in reporting the educational reforms. It presents democratization efforts in education as part of the implementation of the 2001–2005 Working Programme. It signals that the new administration intends to maintain the relationship with the CoE in a diplomatic manner.

The revised report was in fact the last EDC/HRE activity report to be submitted to the CoE. In August 2003, the BoE declined the CoE's invitation of a representative to participate in an upcoming EDC/HRE meeting

(Board of Education, August 19, 2003). The BoE's response to the draft of a CoE-sponsored study, *All-European Study on Education for Democratic Citizenship Policies*, shows an early symptom of this negative approach (Board of Education, June 27, 2003). One of the CoE experts who had been commissioned to review EDC/HRE policies of a group of countries including Turkey sent his draft to the BoE to receive comments. In response, the BoE merely criticized the CoE for including a topic entitled "The 1974 Coup and the Ensuing Turkish Invasion," which refers to events in Cyprus.

In 2004, the BoE appointed an academic as the new EDC/HRE national coordinator (Board of Education, May 10, 2004). Unlike the previous coordinator, the new one had not previously worked in the BoE:

> It is a job which you are supposed to do completely voluntarily (. . .). What I mean by this is that there is no financial profit from this job for me. (. . .) It was an effort to show that (. . .) the name of our country is heard, something is being done in Turkey and some things are really done in Turkey (. . .) I want to underline that when I was appointed to the project, I could not reach any document, there was no information. I was not going there for decorative purposes. Someone from there told me, dear, this project is like a stillborn child, do not tire yourself too much. (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015)

The commissioning of an academic from outside the MoNE is indicative of the MoNE's indifference to the EDC/HRE activities in this period. In fact, the interviewee clearly felt that it was a purely nominal or "decorative" role and was shocked at the lack of cooperation from the civil servants even though the appointment was made by the education minister. The likening of the EDC/HRE project to "a stillborn child" is highly suggestive of institutional indifference. The Interviewee's account and the archival documents provide ample evidence of the declining interest in citizenship education reform after the AKP's rise to power.

An archival document shows that, in 2005, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit, the authority responsible for IPA contract negotiations, canceled all components of the IPA citizenship education project proposal (Central Finance and Contract Unit 2005, October 31, 2005). The BoE indicated the international experts' lack of knowledge about Turkey as one of the reasons for the cancelation of the project negotiations (Project Coordination Centre of Ministry of National Education 2008, March 20, 2008). After the cancelation, the official interest completely disappeared. The interviewees stated that the director of the BoE made it explicit that he wanted to repeal the citizenship courses. Interviewee 14, a decision-maker in the policy cycle, recalled the director as saying, "In which country of Europe did you see such a course? (. . .) I am against this course" (July 28, 2015). In fact, in 2005, the BoE acted in line with this approach and ended the discrete status of citizenship courses.

From 2005, citizenship education became a cross-curricular subject. Although the main textbook of the course was revised in 2004 and a considerable number of the militaristic discourses were removed, the citizenship curriculum still reflected a profound impact of the militaristic perspectives. The militarized content of the subject was arguably one reason for the repeal of the course considering that the ideology of religious nationalism was in power. In spite of the revised textbook that introduced some religious discourses to the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course, the ruling AKP decided to repeal the citizenship courses in 2005 (Ministry of National Education 2005). A curriculum designer revealed that after the courses were abolished, the BoE turned down the EU's offer to start the implementation of the IPA project in 2005 on the grounds that this was an external rather than a national project:

> The head of the Board of Education rejected it by saying "We do not need a course which will be taught as a result of an imposition from outside, we are successfully teaching it as cross-disciplinary subject, we do not do business by inculcation from outside." With this idea, he rejected the project and whatever that would come with the project. (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014)

However, the removal of the citizenship and human rights education course required governmental support because the BoE sits within the MoNE, under the education minister who is part of the government. Since the head and members of the BoE board are appointed by a tripartite decree of the prime minister, education minister, and president (Ministry of National Education 2012a), the removal of the citizenship education courses and the dismissal of the EU's offer for the IPA project were not simply decisions of the head of the BoE. Arguably, the demise of citizenship and human rights education was an effect of the dominant ideology in power. In Turkey, political Islamist circles make a distinction between scientific advances and the moral values of Europe. They tolerate the adoption of scientific elements but abstain from the adoption of moral values (AKP Program 2002). At the same time, there was a worsening of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey abandoned the EU membership bid following the 2004 Brussels Summit.

The negative official approach can be alternatively explained by the ongoing military influence. The introduction of democratic citizenship education stands at odds with the official ideology of secular nationalism, so the concern that the military circles would disapprove of such a curriculum reform could be a factor that discouraged the government. In fact, the military circles reacted to the AKP's demilitarization agenda in education in 2007. The mainstream media featured news in 2007 that the BoE decided to revise certain programs of study after allegations that themes on secular nationalism were removed from the curriculum (Haberturk 2007). For the revision of certain

programs of study, the BoE invited three army officers to work in revision committees (Milliyet 2007). Because of controversies around the invitation of military officers, the MoNE released a press statement acknowledging that the army officers were invited to revise themes about secular nationalism in the curriculum. The press statement further highlighted that this sort of collaboration between the military and the MoNE had been ongoing for a long time as an established practice. Furthermore, one of the interviewees claimed that the military's influence in education was still intense in the BoE by 2007 (Interviewee 15, August 4, 2015). He mentioned a board member by name as someone who had close relationships with the military circles. According to the interviewee, the board member kept the military circles up to date about curriculum policies. This ongoing continuance of the military influence can be shown as the other reason for the reluctance to undertake the curriculum reform.

TEXTBOOK ANALYSIS

A line-by-line comparison of different editions of the citizenship education textbook reveals an ideological shift after the AKP came to power in 2002. For instance, the militaristic discourses denigrating the Kurdish people as an internal enemy who colludes with foreign enemies were toned down in the new series of the textbook:

Old Version

> In some places, citizens' not reporting terrorists, unconsciously hiding them as a guest, abetting them, providing their needs for food and dress led terror to thrive. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 69)

New Version

> Our citizens should individually be sensitive to activities of terrorist organizations. (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 63)

The old version is based on a discourse that the people of the region where terror is rampant, which Turkish readers will recognize as the southeast region, are abetting and aiding terrorists. It blames the Kurdish people of the region for facilitating terrorism. This statement was replaced with a more neutral phrase in the new version which makes a general warning regarding terrorist organizations. The phrase "citizens" becomes more inclusive, "our citizens," and the phrase "terrorist/s" becomes "terror organizations." In this way, the new version is phrased as a piece of advice in contrast to the old version's accusatory tone.

The new textbook also tones down ethnic-nationalist discourses. The following comparison illustrates this discursive shift:

Old Version

> By saying "How happy is the one who says I am Turkish," Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. *This understanding shows unity in plurality [understanding] in our culture. Atatürk summed up his love of Turkishness for a society that was in the process of becoming a nation in the following way: "if there is something superb in my nature, it is my being born as Turkish." We should all be proud of our country and society. As Our Great Father advised, we should all work, be proud and trust.* (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 76)

New Version

> By saying "How happy is the one who says I am Turkish" Atatürk expressed the pride and honour of becoming a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Everyone who regards himself as Turkish is Turkish. (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 68)

In the old version, the first quote from Atatürk presents Turkishness as an identity that can be adopted by everyone who says I am Turkish. However, this is contradicted by the second quote from Atatürk that implies that Turkishness is acquired by birth. By removing the italicized part of the old version and highlighting the last sentence, the new version eliminates the contradiction by focusing on the possibility of self-identifying as Turkish.

When political Islamists, who were referred to by derogatory expressions in the previous version of the textbook, came to power after 2002, the expressions used to denigrate them were wholly removed from the textbook. For instance:

Old Version

> The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. *The Turkish nation is respectful to its faiths, rejects fundamentalism, and does not like bigotry. It is neither backwards-looking nor pious.* It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 73)

New Version

> The Turkish nation is open to innovations. It is loyal to its traditions. It regards everyone who lives in our homeland as precious. (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 66)

The old version attaches the attributes of secular nationalist groups to the whole of the Turkish nation. Some of the descriptors used in the old version like "fundamentalism [*köktencilik*], bigotry [*taassup*],

backwards-looking [*gerici*], and pious [*yobaz*]" were the pejoratives that were used to denigrate political Islamists. In the new version, the italic part is removed, and the characterization of the Turkish nation is made in a more inclusive way.

The old version of the textbook aimed to justify the antidemocratic measures of the 1997 coup, such as the headscarf ban. The new version reflects a discursive shift:

Old Version

> What would be the dangers [*sakıncalar*] of people's interpretation and practice of the freedom of conscience and religion in their own way? (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 74)

New Version

> Is the right to education a fundamental right for the enjoyment, improvement and protection of other rights? (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 84)

The old version aims to make students agree with the military impositions of the 1997 coup that people must respect the authorities and accept limitations on their freedom of conscience and religion. The new question conveys a message that education is a fundamental right and no one should be deprived of the right to education under any circumstances. It may encourage students to question the still existing headscarf ban in schools.

Many parts of the previous version of the textbook depicting the army as the most vital institution are modified in the new version. The old version of the textbook presented weapons as a basic need, which is modified in the following way:

Old Version

> Mankind needed weapons as much as food and drink since the first day of his existence. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 68)

New Version

> Mankind has needed weapons to hunt animals in nature or benefit from them since the first day of his existence. (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 62)

The new version subverts the discourse of the old version, first, by specifying a reason why mankind needed weapons, and, secondly, by getting rid of the part which compared the need for the weapon with the need for food and drink. The new version explains the need for weapons by highlighting a reason for it (protection and nutrition).

The old version of the textbook presented a glorified picture of the army. It included statements that can be construed as legitimizing the military's interferences with Turkey's parliamentary democracy. The following statement was cut from the new version:

> The protection of the homeland against internal enemies is among the duties of the Turkish Armed Forces. The Republic of Turkey is an indivisible with its state, country and nation. There might be some groups who wish to jeopardise this integrity and destroy the free, democratic parliamentarian order, fundamental rights and freedoms. Against internal threats posed by these groups, within limits set by the constitution and laws, the Turkish Armed Forces can intervene in a situation. It fulfils the duty given by the constitution and the Grand National Parliament. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 63)

In the past, the military toppled governments under the pretext of protecting "the free democratic parliamentarian order and fundamental rights and freedoms." Referring to the presence of "internal enemies" within the country, the excerpt attempts to justify the military interventions. It legitimizes the military interventions by linking them to a good cause, meaning the military intervenes to ensure the peace and happiness of the nation. It also claims that the military's interventions complied with the laws. The removal of this part is linked to the dominant ideology in power, which was committed to restraining the political autonomy of the military at that time.

The old version of the textbook strongly promoted secular nationalism through adulation and veneration of Atatürk as an incontestable national hero. Atatürk's aphorisms were included throughout the textbook. The following expressions exalting Atatürk were in the previous version: "the republic which Atatürk founded" (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 80), "Atatürk gave the Turkish citizens the Republic of Turkey as a present," (75) and "this duty [of protecting the Republic] assigned by Atatürk" (75). These phrases all disappeared in the new version. The following comparison is another illustration of the discursive shift in respect of Atatürk:

Old Version

> The recognition of women's rights [in Turkey] is not a consequence of a movement of thought and social evolution as in some European countries. The rights granted to women in our country are a consequence of Atatürk reforms that took place in the state formation era. Reforms undertaken under the leadership of Atatürk opened up new horizons for Turkish women. (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 25–26)

New Version

> The heroic acts women displayed during the Independence War played a significant role in their entitlement to their rights. Women's rights were expanded by

> the Atatürk reforms that took place in the Republican era. New horizons were opened up for Turkish women. (Çiftçi et al. 2004, 25)

The old version overlooks women's agency by glorifying Atatürk's contribution. It portrays the progressive reforms regarding women's rights as Atatürk's success. The new version recognizes women's agency and deemphasizes the personal role of Atatürk. It links the progress in women's rights to women's "heroic acts" in the War of National Independence. The last statement of the old version is expressed in an active form to highlight the role of Atatürk, whereas the same statement is expressed in a passive form in the new version, which breaks the tie of dependency between "opening up new horizons for Turkish women" and Atatürk's leadership. The backgrounding of Atatürk's role and removal of discourses exalting Atatürk are manifestations of the changing balance of power at the time of the EU integration drive.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the military's status within the system, we considered the 1999 Helsinki Summit as the dividing line in the evolution of Turkish democracy. Before 1999, the secularist military had been the main authority regulating civilian politics and acted as the main force in the shaping of the citizenship education curriculum. After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the EU reforms empowered the political Islamists to limit the military's power, which led to a decline in the promotion of the secularists' discourses in citizenship education.

Since the government-controlled curriculum development system in Turkey reflects the dominant ideologies in power, it is not surprising to record the rise and fall of the citizenship and human rights education course. The pre-AKP part of the post-Helsinki era saw a series of preparatory efforts undertaken in collaboration with the CoE, but no tangible change in the militarized curriculum of the course. Under AKP rule, the transition of power from secular to religious nationalism created opportunities for the curriculum reform. Since the AKP government wished to replace militaristic discourses in education, it reinforced a reform rhetoric that the EU membership requires to re-design the curriculum. However, in reality, the AKP's ideology of political Islamism disputed the discourses of secular nationalism and European norms and values. As an implication of that ideological belief, the MoNE repealed the citizenship courses and abandoned the reform agenda in 2005. Overall, the evolution of citizenship curriculum went in parallel with the changing configuration of the balance of power, which left its discursive traces in the curriculum and led to the repeal of the citizenship courses.

NOTE

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Chapter 6

Struggle between Democratization and Islamization (2008–2012)

INTRODUCTION

The efforts to introduce citizenship education in Turkey, which started with the integration of human rights themes into the citizenship curriculum in 1995, continued under the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP] government with the introduction of a new course, "Citizenship and Democracy Education," in the eighth grade of middle schools (thirteen- to fourteen-year-old students) in 2010 (Ministry of National Education 2010). The course was a result of the MoNE's engagement with the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE) initiative of the Council of Europe (CoE). Its introduction was also facilitated by Turkey's European Union (EU) membership agenda as it urged the MoNE to further its collaboration with the Europe-based organizations like the CoE.

In this reform, the proponents, in collaboration with the CoE, attempted to move the secular nationalist citizenship curriculum toward the model of liberal citizenship education promoted by the CoE. The proponents' ideological beliefs had an impact on both the reform process and the curriculum developed. To provide a comprehensive account, this chapter will shed light on how the CoE model of citizenship education was received in a majority-Muslim country under a religiously conservative government. We start by presenting the background of the CoE-Turkey relations and the characteristics of liberal citizenship education promoted by the CoE, then move to show the degree to which the latest reform stretched the Turkey's nationalist citizenship education toward the CoE model.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND TURKEY

The CoE, an intergovernmental organization of forty-seven member states including all twenty-eight members of the EU, has a cultural rather than economic agenda (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer 2010). It promotes a harmonious, if not united, Europe based on three core principles: human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. It is involved in a wide range of sociopolitical issues, such as human rights, child custody, prevention of torture, minority rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, environmental issues, and so on (Macmullen 2004). Only national defence remains outside the interest of the CoE.

Turkey became a member of the CoE in 1949. The Grand National Parliament of Turkey approved Turkey's membership to the CoE after the French ambassador conveyed the CoE's invitation in 1949. During the Cold War period, Turkey collaborated with the other member states in upholding the core principles of the CoE (Öncü and Cevizliler 2013). Turkey's membership was temporarily suspended after the 1980 coup due to human rights violations (Kabasakal Arat and Smith 2014; Macmullen 2004). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015) takes pride in collaborating with the CoE and states that Turkey has assumed the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers seven times and played an important role in the integration of Eastern and Central European countries to the CoE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2015). It also acknowledges that Turkey has been in close collaboration with the CoE in advancing the amelioration of civil law and the penal code.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

The CoE is interested in education as a force to promote its core principles and create harmony and unity between its member states (Bîrzéa 2005). The European Cultural Convention, in force since 1955, provides a legal basis to encourage the member states to cooperate in cultural issues, including education. CoE's policy instruments are produced in consultation with the member states as "adaptable reference text and not as an inflexible framework" (Jackson 2014, 135). Promoting human rights and democratic citizenship through education has been a parcel of the CoE's commitment to its core principles (Birzea 2000). During the post–Cold War period, an interest in education for democratic citizenship emerged in the education minister's meetings in Madrid in 1994 (Kerr et al. 2010). In 1997, the CoE and the EU representatives decided to launch a three-year program, which was later named the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/

HRE). The purpose of the EDC/HRE initiative was set to foster a culture of democracy and human rights as well as to fight racism, violent extremism, xenophobia, and discrimination through and in education (Naval, Print, and Veldhuis 2002; Kerr et al. 2010).

The EDC/HRE program was completed in three phases, each one of which lasted nearly three years. The first phase was completed between 1997 and 2000, the second phase from 2001 to 2004, and the third phase from 2006 to 2009 (Kerr et al. 2010). In the first phase, the various divisions of the CoE collaborated to form a conceptual and definitional basis for EDC/HRE, to develop methods and materials, and to encourage grassroots organizations to contribute to the initiative. One of the outcomes of the first phase was the adoption of a declaration and program of action on education for democratic citizenship in 1999. In the second phase, the education committee bureau identified "policy development" as "the first priority of the EDC activities" (O'Shea 2002, 5). One of the education policy instruments, Recommendation Rec (2002) 12, was adopted in 2002. This document called on the member states to promote democratic citizenship in all stages of their educational systems. In the second phase, the member states were asked to appoint national coordinators for the EDC/HRE initiative with a view to enhancing networks and disseminating good policy and practices.

In the third phase, the focus was shifted from the development of policy instruments to designing manuals for policymakers and practitioners to facilitate the implementation of EDC/HRE policies. In this last phase, the committee of ministers adopted the Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (the EDC/HRE Charter) in 2010 (CoE 2010). The EDC/HRE Charter signifies "a turning point in the Council of Europe's work in promoting citizenship and human rights education" (Osler 2013, 31). The model of citizenship education set out in the EDC/HRE Charter, which is a version of liberal-internationalist citizenship education as conceptualized in the first chapter, differs considerably from traditional civic education promoted by nation-states. Traditional-nationalist civic education promotes a monolithic national identity and obedience to authorities by transmitting abstract knowledge of the political structure of the context it is taught. On the contrary, the CoE model aims to make learners competent members of their multilayered communities who are equipped with participation skills, value the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and diversity.

Although the CoE promotes an internationalist version of citizenship education, its members often pursue a nationalist vision in education to boost young people's sense of belonging to the nation at the expense of suppression of diverse identities (Hüfner 2011; Jallade 2011). This is largely because the CoE does not have the legal power to force its members to offer liberal citizenship education. The CoE's educational policy instruments

are recommendatory and nonbinding, which are "mediated, resisted, and/or co-opted by member states, depending on member states' institutions, histories and current political needs" (Keating 2014, 18–19). Although the CoE is weak on enforcing its education policies, cooperation with CoE offers its members some benefits like improving their international respectability (Cardenas 2005). The CoE also utilizes several strategies to reinforce a compliance with its core values, such as capacity building, transparency, rule interpretation, and shaming and naming.

It is widely acknowledged that the CoE's influence becomes far-reaching in countries that are in the process of meeting the EU accession requirements, since the CoE and the EU have many standards in common. Although they stand as two separate institutions, their mutual standards lead to call the CoE as a "waiting room" before EU membership (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer 2010, 13). In fact, the symbolic value and advantages of cooperation with the CoE for Turkey were amplified in the context of the EU membership process, which resulted in the implementation of the EDC/HRE initiative in Turkey with the financial assistance of the EU.

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND: TURKEY'S RESPONSES TO THE EU

In the power struggle between the dominant ideologies of Turkey (religious and secular nationalism), the presidency, the judiciary, and the military represented the historical strongholds of secular nationalism, whereas the Grand National Assembly became an alternative source of power when it was invested by religious nationalist members voted in by the majority conservative electorate from 1996. In fact, the end of the Cold war created a political atmosphere favorable to democratization that opened a space for the expression of Kurdish separatism and religious nationalism both of which were anathema to the State ideology of secular nationalism. The secularist establishment consequently feared democratization reforms which were limited to tokenistic measures undertaken to enhance the image of Turkey as a respectable democratic state.

After Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for EU membership in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the secular nationalist establishment approached European intergovernmental organizations with certain reservations. This was due to the concern that the EU reforms would interfere with the Turkey's national security policies, such as the Kurdish question and Cyprus. The reluctance on the part of the secularist circles was because the EU reforms had the potential of depriving them of their privileged status

(Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 2003). Unlike the secularist circles' reserved approach, the religious nationalists, silenced by the secularist establishment not long ago, saw a benefit in EU membership to weaken the secularist military's hegemony (Çınar and Sayın 2014).

In the post-Helsinki Summit context, the EU reforms restrained the military's power, allowing the religious nationalist AKP to come to power in 2002 with an agenda of supporting EU membership as a means to further weaken the hegemony of secular nationalism (Özbudun 2014). Early reforms of the AKP government included outlawing hate speech against minorities, permitting speaking, broadcasting, publishing, and teaching in non-Turkish languages as well as the revival of non-Turkish names (Kadıoğlu 2007; Oran 2004). A state-owned channel launched public broadcasting in five minority languages: Arabic, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, and Zaza (Aktürk 2012). Furthermore, a law enacted in 2004 stipulated the prioritizing of international human rights instruments over domestic laws in case of a contradiction between the two.

As the ruling party, the Islamist AKP has introduced alternative discourses that ally Turkish identity with its predominantly Muslim culture. This has brought the government into a tense relationship with the secularist state institutions (W. Hale 2005; Jenkins 2007). In March 2008, the constitutional court attempted to disband the ruling party for violating the principle of laicism. Saved by a single vote, the AKP began robustly confronting the secular establishment (Çınar 2010). A series of lawsuits were brought against army colonels for they plotted coups to topple the government (Polat 2011). Feeling more confident in its longer-term survival, the government attempted to solve the perennial democratization issues. A peace negotiation was launched with the outlawed Kurdistan Labour Party [*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, PKK] and talks opened with the representatives of the Alevi community. The government further consolidated its position through reforms of the judiciary and a further general election victory in 2011 (Cizre 2011). It fully lifted college entrance restrictions on Islamic schools and legalized the wearing of headscarves by women members of parliament in 2013.

A window of opportunity for the citizenship education reform was opened following the ruling party warded off the constitutional court's attempt to disband it. When the government was willing to launch the democratization initiatives regarding Turkey's perennial minority issues, the MoNE was given mandate to further its cooperation with the European intergovernmental organizations like the CoE. The collaboration with the CoE had a history but had not come to fruition in the previous periods. The proponents of the reform resumed the collaboration with the CoE regarding a citizenship curriculum reform by the end of 2008.

CURRICULUM REFORM

Under the AKP government, there was a power struggle within the Board of Education (BoE) between civil servants who wanted to reflect the EDC/HRE initiative objectives in the curriculum and others who argued that the EDC/HRE initiative would harm the teaching of national and moral values (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). The opponents wished education to promote religious nationalist instead of secular nationalist discourses and opposed the internationalist version of citizenship education. The opponents strengthened their positions after the governmental change in 2002, which resulted in a gradual weakening of the BoE's engagement with the EDC/HRE initiative. The BoE archival documents show the active participation of the EDC/HRE national coordinator in the EDC/HRE initiative activities from 1999 to 2003, but after 2003, there was not much involvement. In fact, the first head of the BoE under AKP rule stated that the EDC/HRE initiative risked the imposition of Western norms and values under the cloak of democratic citizenship education (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015). In line with this view, the BoE repealed the citizenship courses in 2005. In the same year, the BoE also turned down the EU's offer to sponsor the implementation of an Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)[1] project, developed jointly by the BoE and the CoE to introduce a citizenship course:

> The BoE head said "In which country of Europe did you see such a course? (. . .) I am against this course." (Interviewee 14, July 28, 2015)

> The BoE head rejected it by saying "We do not need a course which will be taught as a result of an imposition from outside, we are successfully teaching it as cross-curricular subject, we do not do business by inculcation from outside." With this idea, he rejected the project and whatever that would come with the project. (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014)

This objection is rooted in the beliefs of the dominant religious nationalist groups in power. Religious nationalist circles make a distinction between the scientific and moral values of Europe. They support the acquisition of European scientific and technological advances but refrain from adopting moral values such as equalities measures.

Although the official interest in the EDC/HRE initiative diminished after 2005, a struggle for influence continued within the BoE. The proponents kept seeking out chances to introduce a citizenship course (Interviewee 11, August 14, 2014). When they were promoted to influential bureaucratic positions by the end of 2008, they resumed relationships with the CoE. The proponents aimed to advance the reform as part of the previously developed IPA project even though the objections of "religious groups," in Interviewee 16's words, remained effective (September 16, 2015).

To persuade the opponents, the CoE funded a conference in Ankara in November 2009 (Interviewee 11, August 11, 2014; Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015). The main purpose was to set "the groundwork in a way for the political acceptance to work with" the CoE as the main partner (Interviewee 16, September 16, 2015). The proponents emphasized the fact that working with an international partner is a requirement of the IPA project, not a choice, and Turkey is a member of the CoE and signed up to the EDC/HRE Charter.

The opponents argued that such a course would speed up the pace of individualization and secularization and lead to the degeneration of national and moral values (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). The proponents, who happened to occupy influential posts by 2008, were also able to claim political support for their position. Interviewee 11(August 24, 2014) recounted a detail that helped to secure the education minister's support for the introduction of the course. When a previous citizenship course was repealed in 2005, the hour of curriculum time accorded to the repealed course was reallocated to another course entitled the History of Atatürk's Principles and Reforms. This course promotes secular values and identities and makes a negative representation of religious groups (Demiralp 2012; İnce 2017). Upon learning this, the infuriated minister ordered the reduction of the Atatürk course's weekly hours from three to two, making one hour available for a new citizenship course. Thus, the proponents were granted permission to introduce a new course.

After deciding to introduce a citizenship course, the BoE designated a board member to set up a curriculum development committee. The designated board member had a distinct influence on the composition of the curriculum development committee:

> I wanted right-leaning, left-leaning, Alevis, Sunnites, Kurdish and Turkish to be represented in the committee as far as those who were available within the BoE reflected the social, intellectual and cultural diversity of Turkey. In my own way, I formed a committee reflecting all colours. In the first meeting, I made it clear that the reason why they are selected for the committee was their diverse identities. (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014)

The interviewee believes that a democratic citizenship curriculum should be developed by a committee that has a diverse membership. Although the regulatory framework does not allow to take into consideration peoples' diverse identities when setting up committees at the BoE, the interviewee claims that he informally succeeded to reflect the ethno-religious diversity of Turkey in the committee (Ministry of National Education 1993). However, this claim was not confirmed by the committee members, none of whom accepted any representative status. The designated board member's political identity (he described himself as an AKP bureaucrat) seems to have an impact on the committee membership. Of the nine members, seven described

themselves as conservative. A leftish committee member was criticized by his friends for joining in a "tokenistic initiative" since his friends did not believe that the committee was really in favor of the internationalist version of citizenship education (Interviewee 7, September 1, 2014).

What to include in the program of study provoked disagreement among the committee members. One point of contention centered on how to strike a balance between national and global citizenship. A curriculum designer, who described himself as an observant Muslim, stated the following:

> Universalism bothers us, I mean some circles. Why? Because universalism is equal to global citizenship, people perceive it like that (. . .) there is an understanding that the boundaries will disappear and national values like national culture will disappear. (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014)

The interviewee's reflections reveal that religious circles wished to promote national and moral values against the harmful impacts of globalization. By way of recounting the position of "some circles," the interviewee made it explicit that he shares the belief of religious circles that "global citizenship" would harm national and moral values. The second issue involved historical religious references. The committee came up with an idea to develop an "authentic" curriculum based on not only "Western sources," but also "our" cultural sources (Interviewee 1, September 8, 2014; Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014; Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014). To that end, they included historical religious references from "our" past that allegedly support democratic citizenship. Some members insisted on including the Farewell Sermon of the Prophet Muhammed among the human rights documents:

> We wanted the Farewell Sermon to be included because I think the Farewell Sermon includes human rights themes, there were friends who agreed with me, we wanted it, but another group resisted to it (. . .) The most intense debate happened on this issue. (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014)

The interviewee describes a struggle within the committee resulting in the Farewell Sermon being included without having persuaded those who objected to it. In the board meeting for the final approval of the program of study, a board member opposed a learning objective involving the issue of discrimination, arguing that discrimination does not exist in contexts where all people are regarded as equal members of the same nation, so the learning activity is irrelevant, since all citizens are accepted as equal in Turkey (Interviewee 8, September 2, 2014). This intervention exemplifies both the BoE's nationalizing mission and the asymmetrical power relations between curriculum designers and board members. Interviewee 4, a curriculum designer,

stated that he suggested to include the Kantian notion of autonomy, but was accused of making reference to the Kurdish issue by some board members. This accusation was because the concept of autonomy connotes the claim of the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. Even though the concept had nothing to do with political autonomy, board members categorically refused it, which exemplifies the board's uncompromising approach to national unity. The following excerpt is a different illustration of the BoE's strict control:

> The sacred state, the lofty interests of the state and the fear of fragmentation are always at the back of our mind. What would happen to us if we touch on these issues? What trouble would we face? (. . .) We could not touch on controversial issues maybe because of this fear, there is always a village in the distance, and discrimination does not exist in our country. (Interviewee 4, August 26, 2014)

The interviewee admits that no matter how hard they tried to introduce elements of diversity, the institutional constraints led to the development of a curriculum that did not effectively address any citizenship and human rights issues of Turkey. Finally, the designated board member admitted that the pressure from the Islamist circles continued until the approval of the program of study:

> I was maintaining the negotiations of the citizenship and human rights education project with the Council [of Europe] and the Ministry. I was receiving many criticisms like we were having the Council make programmes. Fortunately, the programme was finished before starting to work with the Council. We said thank God! (Interviewee 11, August 24, 2014)

The interviewee admits that he felt relieved when the program of study was finalized before the start of the IPA project, which enabled him to reject the accusation that they allowed the CoE to intervene in the curriculum work of Turkey. This admittance exposes one of the constraints under which the curriculum reform was realized at the BoE. This constraint suggests that international education projects having the potential to interfere with the nation-state ideology needs strong political support and detailed planning and preparation in advance. The overall analysis of the interview data and archival documents does not suggest that these prerequisites were taken into consideration in the case of the curriculum reform of Turkey.

REPEAL OF THE COURSE

After the government party consolidated its power, it enacted a law in 2012, known as the 4+4+4 educational reform, which restructured the entire

curriculum (Grand National Assembly 2012). The updated timetables for middle schools did not include a citizenship course, but an unprecedented number of Islamic education courses (MoNE 2012). The 2012 timetable increased the weekly course hours of middle schools to thirty-six. It preserved the compulsory Islamic education courses (two hours per week) besides introducing three new Islamic education courses (each one two hours per week). From 2012 onward, eighth-grade students have been enabled to take unprecedented eight-hours Islamic education courses per week out of thirty-six total weekly hours. It appears that the AKP government sacrificed citizenship education to make more room for Islamic education courses. In fact, the influential decision-makers within the policy circle saw citizenship education as a subject that is harmful to national and moral values. One interviewee surely stated that the repeal decision was taken with the permission of the then-prime minister (Interviewee 17, October 2, 2015). Just as the allocated hours for the History of Atatürk's Principles and Reforms were reduced to accommodate a citizenship course, the citizenship course in turn was sacrificed to make more room for Islamic education courses.

TEXTBOOK ANALYSIS

The analysis of the course's main textbook suggests that the cooperation between the CoE and the religiously conservative government led to the development of a citizenship curriculum, which reflected more of religious nationalism and less of secular nationalism along with some signs of the CoE model. The textbook included quotations from the Farewell Sermon by the Prophet Muhammed, *Masnevi* by the Sufi poet Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi and *Malakat* by the thirteen-century Muslim mystic Haji Bektash Veli. These religious references are described as "sources feeding our culture" (Özpolat 2012, 12). The expression "our culture" assumes everyone as a member of the same religious culture. Next to the quotes are the pictures of Rumi and Haji Bektash Veli, featured with the calligraphy of a whirling dervish. The pictures and excerpts are intended to teach students the principle, recognized in Islam and in modern human rights instruments, of the inherent dignity of human beings.

However, this attempt to give an Islamic reading of human rights is problematic because the cited sources include statements that can be construed as contrary to human rights principles. First, some versions of the Farewell Sermon appear to encourage men to beat women under certain circumstances (Chaudhry 2013). Secondly, the message of the excerpts, written or spoken at least 800 years ago, is unclear. Twenty-first-century students may struggle with phrases such as "red-skinned people" and "the ninth heaven," while the

comparison of a non-Arab with an Arab loses its force in non-Arab Turkey (Özpolat 2012, 12).

The influence of religious nationalism is shown in the definition provided of what makes a society a nation, namely "knowledge, art, history, language, religion, ethics, manners and customs" (Özpolat 2012, 133). The inclusion of religion among the constitutive components of a nation is an innovation as compared with the previous textbooks (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 2004). Another novelty is the inclusion of pictures of religious-looking men and women (Özpolat 2012, 19–23, 141–142), since the old textbooks was dominated by modern secular-looking people.

The dominant ideology also shaped the ways in which human rights are conceptualized in the textbook as exemplified by that the freedom of conscience and religion are presented as though only applying to the believer of the Abrahamic religions. The inclusion of images of the then-prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is linked to the rise of religious nationalism. Supposedly illustrating a public ombudsman office, the image is dominated by a large framed picture showing a smiling Prime Minister Erdoğan speaking with a veiled old woman. The caption reads, "The prime minister is listening to you" (Özpolat 2012, 99). The textbook includes further evidence of politicization. A learning activity, designed as a newspaper template, prompts students to fill empty spaces according to specific news topics:

> The Prime Minister inaugurated the first school of Turkey, which has an elevator for disabled people.
>
> Computers that students needed are distributed to schools.
>
> The State accelerated efforts that aim to increase the prosperity of workers and civil servants and improve their living conditions. (Özpolat 2012, 125)

The news topics present government policies in a positive light. In other parts, human rights abuses are presented as occurring elsewhere than Turkey implying that Turkish citizens are fully protected by the law. For instance, in a learning context on child labor, no issue regarding child labor in Turkey is brought to the attention of students:

> One of the important problems of the world is child labour. It is known that child labour in some places of the world is very common. In some research, it is found out that more than 44 million child labourers were made to work in just one country. (Özpolat 2012, 86)

Next to the above statement are two pictures of a possibly East Asian child laborer carrying bricks. The excerpt portrays the issue of child laborers as a problem of outside world, not Turkey. Similarly, issues of racism are covered

through examples from the American Civil Rights Movement (Özpolat 2012, 50). No incidence of discrimination and human rights violations from Turkey is mentioned at all.

In the textbook, secularist elements are toned down compared to the earlier textbooks (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 2004). One indication of this is that exclusionary expressions about the Kurdish people and religious nationalists have been removed. However, there is still no mention of the ethnic and religious minorities of Turkey. Another significant revision is that the textbook included no mention of the army, weapons, internal threats, or external enemies. The only term which can be construed as militarist was "doing military service," used on one single occasion (Özpolat 2012, 128).

Nonetheless, there are elements revealing the remaining influence of secular nationalism. For example, the textbook presents a list of "the fundamental values which an individual who is loyal to his homeland is supposed to have" (Özpolat 2012, 127). The list counts fourteen characteristics, all of which, but one, includes the terms "loyalty, respect and responsibility." The list seems to have been adapted from the previous citizenship textbooks in which the militaristic discourses were promoted (Çiftçi et al. 2001).

A significant change can be seen in the way Atatürk is portrayed. In contrast to his nationalist and militarist representation in the previous textbooks (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 2004), the present one foregrounds his liberal, pro-human rights, and pro-peace characteristics. Atatürk is shown holding the hand of a little child (Özpolat 2012, 107), helping a little child to walk (113) and reading a book on a table (115). Although the previous textbook quoted Atatürk saying "the most important duty of a woman is motherhood" (Çiftçi et al. 2001, 26), the Atatürk aphorisms highlight equality between men and women in the present textbook. The textbook undresses the military uniforms of Atatürk and transforms him from military leader to peace-loving statesman. Atatürk remains a national symbol, but he is no longer identified with the military bastion of secularism.

CONCLUSION

The transition of power from secular to religious nationalism made significant changes to the Turkish state's approach to internationalization, and, therefore, had important implications for the citizenship education courses. Even though the transition of power put the MoNE in a closer relation with the Europe-based organizations which promoted democratic citizenship education, the Islamist circles within the ruling party was alarmed by the possibility of the internationalization of citizenship education. They

supported a shift from the secular nationalist curriculum to one in which their ideological discourses were promoted. With this intention, they arguably continued the international collaborations to present the intended reforms to the outside world as democratization efforts when aligning the curriculum with religious nationalism.

The analysis of interview data and archival documents shows that the curriculum reform was realized within the institutional constraints of the BoE, which was established in the state formation era to disseminate a homogenizing nation-state ideology. Therefore, the BoE's established practices in terms of curriculum development are not inclusive, nor are they participatory. The unfavorable institutional culture and weak political support made the proponents of the curriculum reform shy away from developing a liberal citizenship curriculum that conforms to the CoE model. In fact, the collaboration with the CoE gained momentum by the end of 2008 not because the MoNE was intent on transforming the education ideology and establish liberal citizenship education. There were no pronouncements of such an intention in either the interview transcripts or the archival documents. Rather, the curriculum reform happened with the pushing of a group of proponents, who wanted to democratize the curriculum by taking advantage of the political context in which comprehensive democratization initiative like the Kurdish and Alevi openings were underway. The proponents were not many in number and lacked a serious political support. Their efforts were impeded by the pressure of religious groups from the government party, the legislative framework of education, and established curriculum development practices.

The citizenship curriculum developed after the reform did not show a significant departure from the nationalist model of citizenship education. It featured some progressive characteristics but reflected a profound influence of the dominant ideology in power. For example, the textbook made reference to international human rights instruments more than the constitution and included none of the militaristic discourses, but was completely silent on barriers in the way of participation of diverse identities (Özpolat 2012). It kept presenting students an image of a homogenous nation in a more religious way as compared to the past. Despite the citizenship curriculum's shortcomings and its promotion of the dominant ideology in power, the course was not allowed to remain in the curriculum. The course was repealed shortly after its introduction, and no citizenship course was introduced in middle schools since then.

The repeal of the Citizenship and Democracy Education course and introduction of Islamic education courses strongly suggest that the new dominant ideology was not supportive of democratic citizenship education. The repeal

of the course symbolizes a significant moment in the ideological transformation of the country that took place gradually from 2002 to 2012. The democratization efforts in education that culminated in the 2005 curriculum reform did not lead to the institutionalization of democratic citizenship education but turned toward the Islamization of the curriculum.

NOTE

1. IPA is one of the expansion instruments of the EU that facilitates candidate countries integration process by offering them financial assistance.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

As we set out in the introduction chapter, we proposed to study three aspects of the citizenship education reform in Turkey. The first was the examination of the external and internal drivers of the curriculum. We paid attention to how the political developments in the period affected the evolution of citizenship education curriculum. The second dimension of our investigation was to reveal the changes and continuities in the citizenship education curriculum, while the third dimension explored the mechanisms of curriculum development. By exploring these three aspects of the curriculum reform in an interconnected manner, we attempted to provide an in-depth critical account of the citizenship education curriculum reform in Turkey.

In this conclusion chapter, we will summarize findings in relation to the three research objectives and discuss our major findings. After providing a brief update on the citizenship education reform of the period since 2012, we will close the book with recommendations for future curriculum reforms.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS OF THE CURRICULUM REFORM

Studies investigating the political and ideological aspects of Turkish educational system have provided little insight into the role of the military in curriculum development processes. S. Kaplan (2006, 175) acknowledged that there was a silence "about the central role the military has played in shaping educational policies." In relation to the military influence in curriculum development, Altınay (2004, 120) described "'national education' and 'national defence' as the two fronts of nation building." Altınay's (2004) research showed that the military exerted an explicit influence on the teaching

of the National Security Knowledge course. However, Altınay (2004) did not provide evidence that there was military influence in the curriculum of civilian courses, nor did she expand on the curricular implications of the 1997 coup. Üstel (2004) is the only scholar who underlined the role of the 1997 coup with an observation that the textbooks published after the coup counted religious nationalists as an internal threat. Furthering this argument, we proposed that the military was involved in the making of the citizenship curriculum in the given period. Our examination of the dataset led us to develop the following hypothesis: the military used three mechanisms to insert a national security doctrine into the curriculum. First, the national curriculum authority enabled the military to keep the curriculum within certain ideological boundaries. Secondly, the military controlled the subject through educational legislation enacted in the aftermath of military coups. The military influence on the legislative framework had a direct impact on the subject since the content of the subject was derived from the constitution. The last mechanism is the National Security Council (NSC), which gave the top army colonels a chance to influence the cabinet members. By this platform, the military had an opportunity to talk to the leaders of the executive regarding curriculum policies. As a result, a militarist nationalism permeated the citizenship curriculum.

The ideological features of citizenship education began to change when the military's hegemony came into question at the beginning of the 1990s. As early as 1992, the Minister of National Education remarked that the militarist perspectives would be removed from citizenship textbooks (Milliyet 1992). The same year, the MoNE decided to discard some militaristic discourses from the curriculum, such as terror and anarchy, external and internal threats, national defence, the NSC, military service, and so on (Ministry of National Education 1992). However, the weakening of the military's dominant role in the system did not progress in a linear way, neither did the democratization of the citizenship curriculum.

In 1995, the MoNE attempted to reform the citizenship curriculum through the integration of human rights after joining the United Nations (UN) Decade for Human Rights Education (HRE) initiative. However, the tension between the military and government escalated after an Islamist party formed a coalition government in 1996. This political development cast a long shadow over the prospect of the curriculum reform. The new citizenship curriculum was developed after the military overthrow of the Islamist government in 1997, so the military's attempts to suppress religious nationalism and Kurdish separatism were echoed in the citizenship curriculum of 1998. The reform efforts that culminated in the participation in the UN program in 1995 ended with the announcement of the 1998 curriculum, which placed the military's ideological perspectives at the center of the course's curriculum.

After securing candidacy status for EU membership in the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey accelerated the pace of democratization reforms. In the post-Helsinki era (1999–2012), the citizenship education reform was closely associated with the MoNE's involvement with one of the Council of Europe's programs, called the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (EDC/HRE). In the years from 1999 to 2004, several preparatory efforts were undertaken as part of the MoNE's participation in the EDC/HRE programme, but those preparatory efforts gradually disappeared following the appointment of an AKP-nominated head to the BoE in 2003. The new head showed reluctance to accept assistance from the Europe-based organizations because he construed the involvement of the international organizations with the curriculum reform as a sort of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. Since the AKP government wished to dispense with the military's ideological discourses in education, it reinforced a reform rhetoric that the EU membership accession required the re-structuring of the whole curriculum. This reform rhetoric led to the repeal of the citizenship courses and abandonment of the curriculum reform agenda in 2005. The reason for the repeal was that the educational bureaucrats who represented the new dominant ideology saw the citizenship education as a subject promoting the discourses of secular nationalism and European norms and values. In parallel to the shift from secular to religious nationalism, the importance attached to the citizenship courses faded away.

In 2008, the attempt of the constitutional court to disband the government party created a sea change in the political context and re-motivated the government to make a stride in the EU membership bid, which revived the citizenship education reform agenda. The MoNE re-launched the negotiations with the EU and the CoE regarding the curriculum reform, which led to the introduction of a new course: Citizenship and Democracy Education. This course was introduced in a political context wherein the government seemed willing to revisit the assimilationist citizenship policies toward the Kurdish and Alevi people. More importantly, the armed conflicts with the PKK had ceased at the time the curriculum reform was undertaken. In this respect, the course symbolized the most tangible outcome of the two-decade long reform efforts that hung in the balance because of the ideological clash between secular and religious forces.

The MoNE's ongoing involvement with the EDC/HRE programme had a significant impact on setting a citizenship education reform agenda. It helped the proponents resume the IPA project negotiations and undertake the curriculum reform in 2010. The CoE involvement had also some disadvantages. For example, the CoE experts' lack of knowledge about the Turkish educational system, the nonbinding characteristic of the CoE's policy instruments,

and being a Europe-based organization hardened the opponents' objection to the curriculum reform.

The Citizenship and Democracy Education course proved a short-lived experiment, as the MoNE decided to repeal it two years after its introduction. The repeal decision was linked to the government's new agenda which came to the surface after the 2011 general elections. With the consolidation of power, the government began pursuing an ideological path more openly and re-structured the whole educational system in 2012. Following the parliament passing a law to re-structure the whole K-12 education, the MoNE announced new weekly course timetables, which did not include the citizenship course. The new timetable gave an impression that the MoNE sacrificed the citizenship course to make more room for Islamic education courses.

Our findings suggest that a combination of internal and external influences had the most reliable explanatory power for the phenomenon of curriculum change in citizenship education (Cardenas 2005; Keating 2009a; Levinson 2004, 2005; Morris, Clelland, and Man 1997; Ortloff 2005). Curriculum change in citizenship education can be partially explained without paying attention to internal influences. In the Turkish case, the CoE seems to have more impact than the UN because the first course, introduced in response to the UN Decade for HRE initiative, contained ideological, militarist, and exclusionary discourses, which manifested the limited influence of the UN project. However, the second course, introduced in coordination with the CoE, included fewer signs of exclusionary discourses. Although there are temporal gap and significant contextual differences between the two periods, the qualitative differences between them suggest that the CoE's impact became more discernible as compared to the UN. This difference is associated with the fact that the EU and the CoE support each other in countries in the process of EU membership. The CoE made a more discernible impact because Turkey was willing to undertake efforts that would support the EU membership bid. In fact, the national curriculum authority of Turkey responded to the CoE's educational projects more positively during times when Turkey's EU membership prospect was promising.

The findings also suggest that the EU can have negative implications for democratic citizenship education when it empowers internal forces of a society that do not embrace the CoE's core values. Previous studies highlighted post-nationalizing and democratizing aspects of the EU and acknowledged that the EU's impact did not become far-reaching because it did not have binding authority over national curriculum authorities (Keating 2009a, 2014; Ortloff 2005; Piattoeva 2010). However, these studies did not note a negative impact that the EU could produce for citizenship education. This study showed that the EU reforms in Turkey enabled the religious nationalists to dismantle the secularist military's hegemony and align the curriculum with

their own ideologies. This suggests that the EU reforms do not necessarily support the democratization of citizenship education but might result in the Islamization of the curriculum as exemplified by the Turkish case.

The MoNE under AKP rule effectively used a policy rhetoric that the EU membership required certain changes in curricula. Previous studies did not take a critical look at the MoNE's rhetoric as to whether the EU membership really required a curriculum reform (Altinyelken 2015; Çayır 2009; Kanci 2009). However, we did not take that rhetoric at face value and found that the EU membership did not have requirements involving citizenship education curriculum (Alexiadou 2014; Keating 2014). Thus, we put forward that the MoNE's justification that the EU membership required certain changes in curricula was a rhetorical device designed to moderate the secular establishments' resistance. In other words, it was a strategy to terminate the ideological hegemony of secular nationalism in education. Since the militant-secular nationalism had severely curtailed the public expression of religious identities and limited freedom of religious expression, particularly for women, the EU's efforts to democratize and liberalize the state institutions had the perverse effect of encouraging religious nationalism. This strengthened the AKP's hand and ironically resulted in the Islamization rather than the democratization of the citizenship education curriculum.

In light of these observations about the internal and external drivers of the curriculum reform, we conclude that the second of the three propositions, which we set out in chapter 2, has a better explanatory power for the phenomenon of curriculum change in citizenship education. The first proposition, namely that the main driver of the curriculum change in citizenship education is international organizations, has little explanatory power since the political struggle which affected the curriculum reform was mainly domestic. The third proposition, that neoliberalism is the main driver of the curriculum change, does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the changes since the citizenship curriculum itself and the curriculum reform debate carried almost no overt influences from the ideology of neoliberalism.

The second proposition, which is that local/national dynamics are the main driver, best captures the reality. As we have seen, from the beginnings of the Republic, citizenship education courses were envisaged as an ideological tool by the militant-secular nationalist forces to impose a secular framework on the religious-traditional majority. For this reason, the Islamic nationalist forces, when they had a chance, first ended that ideological instrumentalization of the subject, then used it to their own interest and eventually repealed it altogether. The international educational projects offered what was necessary to achieve this goal, namely they gave them a rhetorical tool to justify the transformation of citizenship education curriculum. The MoNE under AKP rule first cleansed the citizenship curriculum of the militant-secular nationalist

discourses, then introduced the Islamic nationalist discourses into the curriculum through a selective appropriation and ideological re-contextualization of universal discourses of citizenship, human rights, and democracy. Universal discourses of citizenship and human rights were diluted and co-opted to the new Islamist religious nationalism. For instance, consideration of sexual and ethnic identities or struggles of human rights activists were absent from all phases of the curriculum reform and the textbooks.

The international collaboration provided both the rhetoric and a model for the curriculum reform, but the domestic political struggles among the nationalist groups determined the evolution of the citizenship curriculum. The national curriculum authority or the citizenship education policy cycle managed to put both universal citizenship and human rights discourses and militant-secular and Islamic nationalist discourses into the curriculum. The intermingling of fundamentally different, even contradictory, discourses resulted in the weakening of the power of citizenship and human rights education. Although domestic political struggles drove the curriculum change in citizenship education, they precluded the transition to liberal-universalist citizenship education. Our investigation concludes that local-national dynamics are likely to be the most influential factor in curriculum change in citizenship education. The international projects provided a blueprint for the generalities of national curriculum reforms, but the specifics were determined by the local-national conditions.

CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN THE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION CURRICULUM

In the whole period, discursive changes in the citizenship curriculum was consistent with the transition of power from secular to religious nationalism. When the secular nationalist forces were prevailing, the intended curriculum of the citizenship courses was filled with secularist and militarist discourses. When the religious nationalist forces were dominating, the citizenship curriculum was infused with religious nationalist discourses and eventually the course was repealed altogether as the religious nationalist forces preferred Islamic education to citizenship education. The citizenship curriculum of 1998 was under a profound influence of the military's ideological discourses. In parallel with the AKP's consolidation of power, religious nationalist discourses were emphasized, and the citizenship curriculum of 2010 reflected a profound influence of the ideology of religious nationalism. During the first years of the AKP government, the main citizenship textbook was revised to de-emphasize the militaristic discourses. Exclusionary views on the Kurdish minority and religious nationalists and hagiographic representation of

the army and Atatürk were modified. In 2005, the MoNE made the subject a cross-curricular theme, which took the demilitarization of the subject one step further. The citizenship education curriculum of 2010 can be regarded as the first civilian citizenship curriculum in the sense that it did not include militarist discourses.

Another significant change is that the latest citizenship curriculum was filled with religious nationalist discourses and included the pictures of the prime minister and other political figures from the ruling party. Finally, the repeal of the citizenship courses in 2012 was an unprecedented in the history of citizenship education in Turkey since the subject had never been removed completely in the past. The citizenship education courses were made a cross-curricular subject twice throughout the history of modern Turkey, but never wholly repealed until the MoNE decided to remove them from the middle-school course list in 2012.

Throughout the period, no ethnic and religious minority was mentioned by name in the textbooks. However, the curriculum of the Citizenship and Human Rights Education course (taught from 1999 to 2005) included more signs of the assimilationist approach compared to the curriculum of the Citizenship and Democracy Education course (taught from 2011 to 2015). Another continuity is that the citizenship curriculum did not promote criticality to the political authorities. Students are not encouraged to hold the public authorities to account and have a democratic discussion about social issues. Finally, the citizenship curriculum did not include any democracy and human rights issues from Turkey. Even though the latest curriculum included more contemporary issues regarding human rights, it did not include an example from Turkey. Rather, the curriculum showed a deliberate attempt to bring human rights issues of other contexts to students' attention and not to touch upon any citizenship and human rights issue of Turkey.

A cursory examination of the citizenship curriculum might find evidence supportive of the studies of the world society thesis, but an in-depth analysis would dispute it because the nationalist discourses remained powerful in the curricula. The ways in which the citizenship curriculum was instrumentalized in the power struggle showed that the gatekeepers of the curriculum change were still nationalist actors from the dominant ideologies. Even though these gatekeepers had been exposed to transnational educational discourses, this did not prevent them from redressing the global discourses to serve their group interest in the ongoing struggle. Therefore, our investigation casts doubt on the proposition that international organizations are the main drivers of citizenship curriculum change, and there is a cross-national transition from nationalist to post-nationalist forms of citizenship education.

On the surface, one can argue that the evolution of citizenship education in the given period showed a trend of democratization that the militarist themes

dissipated, human rights and democratic values emphasized more, but the evolution of Turkish citizenship curriculum was not driven only by international organizations. It is true that the de-militarization of the curriculum in Turkey was supported by the international agencies, but more importantly, the rise to power of an ideology, which had fiercely clashed with the military, played a pivotal role in the decline of militaristic discourses. If the secular nationalist forces had continued to prevail with the backing of the military, the international influences would still be powerless to remove militarist themes from the curriculum. For example, the participation of the MoNE in the UN Decade for HRE initiative in 1995 did not result in the demilitarization of the curriculum, but an intense incorporation of militarist themes into the curriculum. This suggests that the international agencies cannot be given credit for the declining military emphasis.

The citizenship curriculum did not move in the direction of becoming more inclusive of diverse identities of Turkey's society. On the contrary, the Citizenship and Human Rights Education curriculum contained exclusionary discourses targeting the Kurdish people and religious nationalists in addition to statements presenting using a weapon as natural as the need to drink water and eat food. What was called human rights education had little in common with international standards. Similarly, the Citizenship and Democracy Education curriculum transmitted religious nationalist discourses as evidenced by many elements designed to support the ideology of the ruling party and Islamic values. In this sense, the international agencies had a limited impact that was evident at a symbolic level, while the underlying discourses kept favoring those in power. This suggests that the citizenship curriculum changes are driven by national/local dynamics, although the international organizations may exert a limited influence.

Since a government with a considerably different ideology had a chance to dominate for the first time, the citizenship curriculum demonstrated a considerable departure from secular nationalism. This novelty might be explained by the fact that the ruling parties in the past did not pursue an overtly divergent ideology, so their impact largely went unnoticed. Because the AKP government subscribed to an ideology which was overtly in conflict with the ideology of secular establishment, it left discernible discursive traces in the curriculum. This novelty may be a result of the AKP's uninterrupted stay in power for more than one decade, as it now represents the party which has stayed in power for the longest time in the history of Turkish democracy. There are few studies that draw parallels between the characteristics of the curriculum and the ideology of ruling party (e.g., B. Türkmen 2009). Rather, the major tendency in the literature is to look into the ways in which the general characteristics of political context affected the curriculum or how the official ideology, backed by the secular state establishment, permeated the

curriculum (Altınay 2004; İ. Kaplan 1999; S. Kaplan 2006). The previous researchers did not need to look in detail at the influence of the ruling party's ideology because the ideological hegemony of the secular nationalist establishment left little space in the past for the ruling parties to exert an influence over the curriculum (Çayır 2011, 2014; Çayır and Gürkaynak 2008; Caymaz 2008; İnce 2012a; Üstel 2004). In the past, secular nationalism enjoyed the support of not only the education community, but the whole apparatuses of the state including the military and the judiciary, and the political parties that ruled without a coalition did not deviate considerably from the ideological premises of the secular establishment. This kept the citizenship curriculum within the ideological boundaries of secular nationalism. However, the election of the AKP which opposed substantial elements of the secular nationalist establishment and its stay in power for nearly two decades led to significant changes in the curriculum. The ideological shift in the content of the subject was eased by the EU integration reforms that weakened the ideological hegemony of the military, which allowed the government to align the curriculum with its ideology. This had never been the case before.

Government's influence in citizenship education has been found in other contexts. Parker (2004) noted a close association between dominant ideologies and citizenship education in Palestine, Brazil, Israel, the USA, and South Africa. In England, after the Labour government made citizenship education a compulsory subject in 2002, some elements associated with the ideology of the Labour Party, such as communitarianism and diversity, was echoed in citizenship education (Jerome 2013; Kisby 2012; Kiwan 2008). Davies and Chong (2016) found that the formation of a Conservative-led government led to less emphasis on human rights and the positive representation of the monarchy in citizenship education in England. Soysal and Wong (2007, 83) found that after the socialists came to power in France, "ample space is devoted to substantiate and prescribe plurality and tolerance as corrective measures to racism and discrimination." In South Korea, after the transition to a democratic system, citizenship education textbooks began to mention women, workers, immigrants/refugees, indigenous peoples, and sexual minorities (Moon 2013b). These examples show that the national actors are still the effective arbiter of citizenship curriculum, which challenge the contention that the external influences drive the curriculum change in citizenship education.

CHANGING WAYS OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

The third objective of our investigation aimed to describe the processes of developing a citizenship education curriculum in order to draw links between the ways of curriculum development and the characteristics of curriculum.

The underlying assumption was that a democratic citizenship education curriculum is developed through democratic curriculum development processes. Our analysis of the dataset revealed that the making of the 2010 program was relatively more participatory when compared with the development of 1998 curriculum. One of the interviewees, who was a member of both committees which prepared both of the program of studies, stated that a committee consisting of four or five members prepared the 1998 program of study (Interviewee 5, September 2, 2014). However, the making of the 2010 program of study was more inclusive and more participatory in the sense that a committee comprising eight members prepared it through a relatively more participatory process. For example, the draft program of study of 2010 was sent to NGOs, academics, and teacher unions to receive feedback, which had not been the case for the program of study of 1998. Also, the curriculum development process in 2010 saw pilot implementation of the program of study, whereas the program of study of 1998 was not piloted before its nationwide implementation. The comparison of the curriculum development processes of the two courses suggests that participatory curriculum development processes are more favorable to the development of a citizenship curriculum.

Participatory curriculum development processes support citizenship education, whereas nonparticipatory curriculum development processes impede the development of citizenship education curriculum. Han et al.'s (2013) cross-national examination about the association between the nature of values promoted in the curricula and ways of curriculum development found that citizenship education tends to promote collective norms and values in countries with centralized curriculum development practice, whereas the subject is more aligned with democratic values and encouraged individual autonomy in countries with a decentralized curriculum development practice. In fact, political actors with an agenda to disseminate a particular nationalist ideology favor more centralized curriculum development systems that effectively enable political powers to control educational discourses.

Citizenship education needs the support of internal forces of a society if it is going to create long-lasting improvements in the culture of democracy and human rights. Investigating citizenship education reforms in Australia, Canada, England, and the USA, Hughes et al. (2010) concluded that successful citizenship education reforms require a public interest in citizenship education. A national debate on citizenship education is of paramount importance in Turkey. When the BoE decided to introduce or repeal the citizenship courses, no remarkable objection or support was recorded against or in favor of these decisions. In this respect, the case of Spain contrasts sharply with that of Turkey. When the Spanish government introduced a citizenship education course, "Education for Citizenship and Human Rights," in 2006, the Catholic Church mobilized the conservative segments of society against

the subject on the grounds that the course was harmful to Christian values. The Spain case shows that the majority of the internal forces mobilized by the Catholic Church was against the subject, while those who wished to keep the subject had to seek external support. Even though the Spanish case is not an example where citizenship education is institutionalized, it still supports the conclusion that the support of internal forces is key to the institutionalization of citizenship education.

In South Korea, grassroots organizations made efforts to institutionalize citizenship education by effectively challenging the conservative ruling elites. Moon (2009, 122) stated that "much of the success of HRE in South Korea came as a result of the efforts of local citizens and civil society groups with most of the resistance coming largely from conservative political elite circles." The close collaboration of domestic NGOs with transnational networks of human rights organizations resulted in the consolidation of citizenship education in South Korea. In fact, human rights norms are best socialized into domestic practices when there is a continuing pressure from both above and below on governments (Risse and Ropp 1999; Risse and Sikkink 1999). In South Korea, pressure from above came from a network of transnational human rights organizations, while pressure from below was mounted by grassroots human rights organizations. As a result, a quality citizenship and human rights education was developed in South Korea as evidenced by the fact that students were encouraged to discuss "poor prison facilities [in South Korea] as human rights violations" in comparison to the conditions of prison facilities in other countries (Moon 2009, 193). This constitutes a contrast to Turkey's citizenship curriculum where no citizenship and human rights issue of Turkey was mentioned in the textbooks.

Regardless of the details of curriculum development system, political support seems the key to the success of citizenship education reforms. This is because nationalist ideologies, whether religious, secular, militant, or ethnic nationalism, are not supportive of the teaching of universal human rights at schools. This obliges the advocates of citizenship education to persuade key political actors of the importance of citizenship education. When political support is guaranteed, international collaboration may proceed smoothly, citizenship curriculum reforms may be easier to accomplish, and educationalists may become more courageous to teach universal values of human rights, citizenship, democracy, and respect for diversity. When political support is absent or ambivalent, chance would be slim for the success of citizenship education reform. This is because the teaching of human rights, citizenship, and democracy values at schools unavoidably go against entrenched nationalist discourses in nationalist contexts. Curriculum designers and educational decision-makers are unlikely to alter such entrenched discourses without securing an assurance from key politicians.

The significance of political support for successful citizenship education reforms alludes to the central importance of local/national dynamics. The support of those in power is essential to create a substantive shift in the discourses of citizenship and human rights passed down to future generations at schools. For instance, in England, the support of the Labour government was crucial to citizenship becoming a compulsory subject that promoted the discourses of democratic citizenship, human rights, and diversity (Jerome 2013; Davies and Chong 2016). The importance of citizenship education in England's national curriculum noticeably faded after the Conservative party-led coalition took charge in 2010. Both the England case and the Turkey case vividly illustrate the central significance of governmental support and the determining role of local/national dynamics for curriculum change in citizenship education.

CURRICULUM REFORM AFTER 2012

In 2012, the repeal of the middle-school citizenship course and introduction of an unprecedented number of Islamic education courses symbolized a significant moment in the ideological transformation of the country that took place gradually from 2002 to 2012. The demilitarization efforts that went on until 2012 did not lead to the institutionalization of citizenship education but turned toward the Islamization of curriculum. The political developments after 2012, namely the Gezi Park demonstrations and the collapse of the alliance between the AKP and the Gülenists, have had significant repercussions for education policies. The Gülenists are an Islamist group led by preacher Fetullah Gülen, who still lives in self-imposed exile in the USA. Gülen was a former ally of Erdoğan and his supporters played a political role in challenging the secular military's hegemony. Sharing the same fate of being excluded from civil and military bureaucracy of secular nationalist Turkey, the Gülenists devised ways to infiltrate their followers into key state institutions of judiciary, academy, and military. It is alleged that the Gülenists appear to meet all formal requirements and secure entrance into the closed state bureaucracy of modern Turkey by hiding their religious identity. In this way, they attempted to conquer the secular nationalist bureaucracy from inside. To achieve their cause, they also developed close collaboration with international actors. Unlike the Gülenists, political Islamists such as the AKP who stood against the exclusionary state policies did so openly. They maintained their struggle by founding legal political parties. Even though the political Islamists were democratically elected to rule the country, their political parties were shut down by the constitutional court on the ground that they violated the principle of laicism. After the closure of a series of political

Islamist parties, the progressive wing of political Islamists which founded the AKP collaborated with the Gülenists. During the coalition between the Gülenists and the AKP, these two representatives of the previously excluded Islamist identity attempted to break the hegemony of secular nationalism in key state institutions. However, for some reasons, that coalition came to an end in late 2013.

The Gülenists' support for the government ended soon after the government deployed an excessive police force in suppressing the protest of a group of people who opposed the government's construction plan in a central park of Istanbul. The clash between the protesters and the police led to the escalation of the protest movement and spread it across the country. The government took extreme security measures by considering the protest as a replication of the Arab spring, threatening to topple the AKP. The AKP had built a reputation of being democratic but conservative especially thanks to its commitment to passing EU democratization reforms. However, the violent suppression of the Gezi Park protests shattered the reputation of the AKP. Subsequently, the Gülenists revealed their hostile intentions toward the governing party by bringing corruption charges against the key AKP ministers. The AKP considered this attempt as an extension of the Gezi Park protest intended to discredit and topple the government.

The struggle between the internationalist Islamists (Gülenists) and nationalist Islamists or religious nationalists, escalated to a new level when a group of army officers attempted an unsuccessful military intervention in 2016. The AKP government accused the Gülenists of masterminding the coup with their international collaborators. Since the July 15 coup attempt, the ruling party has purged tens of thousands of state employees in judiciary, academia, and military on the grounds that they were involved in Gülenism or other terror organizations. Weakened by the collapse of the coalition with the Gülenists and the coup attempt, the AKP began to develop relations with powerful nationalist forces. It began to follow an ultra-nationalist line of politics by allying with the political representative of Turkish nationalism, the Nationalist Movement Party [*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP*].

We called the core ideology of the AKP as Islamic nationalism since Islamic discourses were given priority in the educational discourses and practices of the ruling party. From the same angle, we called the official ideology of the state establishment as militant-secular nationalism since the primary concern was to maintain, with the backing of the military, the Atatürk's legacy of undifferentiated French model of citizenship. In the post-July 15, 2016 unsuccessful coup period, the alliance of the Islamic nationalist AKP with the ultra-nationalist MHP turned the dominant ideology in power from Islamic nationalism to nationalist conservatism since the main concern is now nationalism rather than Islamism or conservatism. The political rhetoric of

the ruling coalition argues that the USA used the Gülenists to topple the government in order to divide and rule Turkey. They could not succeed, but still look for ways to topple the government and achieve their goal. Against that perceived threat, the ruling AKP justifies its nationalist agenda by developing closer strategic military relations with Russia. This shift in the international relations of Turkey from the Western to Eastern bloc unites almost all nationalist forces within the country. Nationalistic fervor has been further fuelled by the formation of a Kurdish autonomous authority in northern Syria, which borders Turkey's Kurdish-populated southeast region. Therefore, we call the current dominant ideology, which came to power after the foundation of the new coalition between the Islamic nationalist AKP and the ultra-nationalist MHP, as nationalist conservatism since the ideological characteristic of this new coalition is primarily nationalism along with the ongoing influence of Islamic discourses.

This new ideological alliance turned Turkey's parliamentary democracy to a strong-executive presidency system in 2017. In 2018, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the first president of the new system and began to introduce significant changes in an effort to build a powerful Turkey by 2023, the centenary of the foundation of modern Turkey. The formation of an ultra-nationalist bloc and the exacerbation of national security concerns have led to a curricular de-emphasis on universal values of citizenship, human rights, and democracy at middle schools. Even though the 2018 social studies education program of study includes learning areas, such as individual and society, efficient citizenship, and global connections, there is an explicit decline in the indicators of liberal-internationalist citizenship education (MEB 2005a, 2018). References to human rights almost disappeared in the new program, while there is convincing evidence that an ethno-religious nationalism and Islamic multiculturalism permeates the new program. In this respect, the new program reflects a return to traditional civic education when compared with the previous program of study.

While the curriculum reform after 2012 reflects a move away from liberal-internationalist citizenship education, the MoNE's joint projects with the CoE still continue. As an outcome of the international collaboration, a new course, named Human Rights, Citizenship and Democracy, was introduced in 2012 to be taught two hours per week at fourth grades of primary schools. The ongoing international collaboration also enabled the renewal of the program of study of an existing elective course at high schools, named Human Rights and Democracy. The intended curriculum of these courses reflects the influence of the CoE, but a preliminary analysis suggests that perennial issues of citizenship education (e.g., ignorance of internal citizenship and human rights problems, influence of dominant ideologies, and statist/nationalist emphases) still persist. A new joint project of MoNE, CoE, and EU collaboration was

launched in late 2018 with the goal of strengthening a democratic school culture in basic education. The results of the project are yet to be seen, but it seems the challenge facing the institutionalization of citizenship education is now more insurmountable since pressing national security concerns and a soaring economy have further fortified the hegemony of ultra-nationalist actors in power.

The controversy around the Student Oath mirrors the evolution of citizenship education curriculum after 2012. Reciting the Student Oath was a common practice of nation-state making that primary school students performed every morning from 1933 to 2013. The Student Oath was often carried out as a ritual in which a student standing in the high stairs of school entrance recites the oath, and all other students lined up in the ground repeats after that student. The Oath goes as follows:

> I am a Turk, honest, hardworking. My principle is to safeguard the younger and respect the elder and love my homeland and nation more than myself. My goal is to rise and make progress. O Great Atatürk! I swear to walk steadily to the goal you set on the road you opened. May my existence be a gift for the Turk's existence. How happy is the one who says I am a Turk. (Translated by the first author)

While reciting the oath, students stand in a position where they can see a Turkish flag and a bust of Atatürk. The performing of the Student Oath was repealed in 2013 when the government was pursuing an Islamic nationalist agenda in education. In 2018, five years after its repeal, however, the Council of State ruled to reinstate it, which was welcomed by the ultra-nationalist partner of the ruling coalition but criticized by Islamic nationalist circles. The court decision to repeal and reinstate the Oath created a controversy which polarized even divided the ideological groups in the ruling coalition. While the nationalist forces in power and even nationalist groups in opposition support the continuance of the performance of the Student Oath, a group of Islamists, conservative and liberal democrats within the ruling circles oppose it because of the nationalistic and even militaristic nature of that school ritual. For that reason, the MoNE so far seems unwilling to act in accordance with the decision of the Council of State and reinstate its recitation at schools. The ongoing controversy around the Student Oath exposes the unbridgeable ideological divide between the Islamic nationalists and their ally, ultra-nationalists, on the matters that concern official nation-building practices in education. It also gives an idea about the (un)sustainability of the new ideological alliance in education. In fact, the citizenship education issues of Turkey are largely political and ideological, and the controversies over them have the potential to collapse the ideological/political coalitions in power.

The Student Oath controversy also suggests that the direction of education policies is now toward not liberal-internationalist citizenship education but traditional-nationalist civic education end point of the spectrum presented in chapter 2. This direction of citizenship education policy may be seen as an implication of securitization policies that followed the Syrian crisis and the rise of far-right nationalism on the international word stage.

WAY FORWARD

Even though the 2010 citizenship curriculum did not last long, this experiment showed that liberal-internationalist citizenship education flourishes when the forces of both dominant ideologies stand in balance. In future, developments in the EU membership bid or the elimination of security issues may give an impetus to renewed democratization efforts. In such case, the existing non-participatory and non-inclusive curriculum development system may hinder the institutionalization of citizenship education. This is because the current system was originally devised for the goal of unifying the diverse people of Turkey into a homogeneous nation. Since it was originally intended to turn inhabitants of the country into a secular nation, its centralized structure favors a curriculum that represents the most powerful groups and minimizes alternative visions. The nation-state ideology disseminated by citizenship education changed from secular to religious nationalism, but the mechanism conveying a monolithic official ideology has persisted up to the present with no significant change. The current regulatory framework does not allow nongovernmental organizations to join curriculum development committees (Ministry of National Education 1993). Since the BoE is still an appointed, not elected board, its authority over the curriculum has remained unchallenged.

As a secular nation-state in the Middle East, a frontline member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a country having suffered from ethnic separatism for decades, dominant sociopolitical forces have never fully overcome the fear of disintegration. During the state formation era, the goal of nation-building; during the Cold War era, the danger of communism; and, since the post–Cold War era, the clash between secular and religious forces, and separatist Kurdish movements have discouraged a less centralized curriculum development practice. The presence of irreconcilable differences among social groups further justified and consolidated this system. Nevertheless, a more inclusive and participatory curriculum development mechanism is necessary to bring citizenship education in line with the international standards. In order to institutionalize liberal-internationalist citizenship education, the existing curriculum development system should be

made participatory and inclusive to allow multiple actors to contribute to the curriculum development process.

Citizenship curriculum reforms sponsored by international organizations may, as we have demonstrated, result in the promotion of the dominant ideological discourses under the name of democratic citizenship or human rights education. In order to prevent this, international agencies must ensure that the marginalized groups are included in curriculum development processes. Since general frameworks are easy to manipulate, international agencies must have a clear set of standards developed for specific target countries. They should only sponsor efforts that have the potential to bring about a considerable shift. The potential of a curriculum reform can be estimated by looking at whether key ministers and decision-makers in target countries recognize the major human rights issues of their countries and are willing to strengthen the culture of human rights and democracy.

Citizenship curriculum reforms launched with no explicit recognition of domestic human rights issues are unlikely to yield positive outcomes. The recognition of human rights issues is an indispensable precondition for the contextualization of EDC/HRE principles in the curriculum. Rather than presenting them as mere information, they should be taught through examples derived from democracy and the human rights struggle of the target context. The contextualization of EDC/HRE principles is the locus where dominant ideologies' distortion comes into play. International organizations can minimize this by hiring experts with an adequate level of knowledge on the dynamics of power relations in target countries and with an expertise in citizenship/human rights education. In this way, they can help prevent citizenship education from being used as an instrument for the interest of powerful groups and effectively support the institutionalization of liberal-internationalist citizenship education.

Appendix

1. ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

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2. COMPARISON OF TEXTBOOKS

Title	*Citizenship and Human Rights Education*	*Citizenship and Human Rights Education*	*Citizenship and Democracy Education*
Pub. Years	1999–2003	2004–2005	2010–2012
Unit 1	State, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights, and responsibilities	State, democracy, constitution, citizenship, citizenship rights, and responsibilities	Every human being is precious
Unit 2	Protection of human rights	Protection of human rights	Culture of democracy
Unit 3	National security and national power elements	National security and national power elements	Our rights and freedoms
Unit 4	Problems faced when protecting human rights	Problems faced when protecting human rights	Our duties and responsibilities

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About the Authors

Abdulkerim Sen works as an assistant professor at the College of Education of Eskisehir Osmangazi University in Turkey. His research interest lies in the field of citizenship and human rights education. Abdulkerim completed his PhD in education at UCL Institute of Education in 2017. He was awarded with a Master of Science degree in social studies education from Florida State University in 2013. After completing his undergraduate studies, he worked as a social studies teacher between 2006 and 2010 in İstanbul His research interest lies in the field of citizenship and human rights education. His doctoral research investigated tensions between the international and the national in the introduction/revision of citizenship/human rights courses and the imprints of that tension in curricular texts.

Hugh Starkey is a professor of Citizenship and Human Rights Education at UCL Institute of Education, London. His research focuses on education for democratic citizenship, human rights, and social justice in a globalizing world. He is the founding co-director of the International Conference for Education and Democratic Citizenship and editor of the London Review of Education. He has led European-funded projects on citizenship and human rights education and has acted as a consultant for several governments and the Council of Europe, UNESCO, European Commission, and the British Council. Since 2016 he has led the Active Citizenship strand of the UCL Global Citizenship Programme.