

Language

Planning and Policy

Ideologies, Ethnicities, and Semiotic Spaces of Power

Edited by

Ashraf Abdelhay
Sinfree Makoni
Cristine Severo

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إهداء
إلى روح صديقنا وزميلنا
دكتور محمد بن رابح (رحمه الله)

In memory of our friend and colleague
Dr. Mohamed Benrabah

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FOREWORD

LINGUISTICS, COLONIALISM AND THE URGENT NEED TO ENACT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE POLICIES TO COUNTERACT THE LATTER'S BALEFUL FALLOUT ON FORMER COLONIES

KANAVILLIL RAJAGOPALAN

The truism that the history of linguistics is tied up, both viscerally and intellectually, with that of European colonialism in Africa, Asia and Latin America no longer raises any sceptical eyebrows. This is especially so in the wake of the publication of Errington's (2008) landmark book *Linguistics in a Colonial World*, followed by a raft of other titles that include Zimmermann and Kellermeier-Rehbein's (2015) collection of papers *Colonialism and Missionary Linguistics*, all of which were, in a sense, foreshadowed by Christopher Hutton's (1999) monumental work *Linguistics and the Third Reich* and Bamgbose's (2000) equally pioneering work *Language and Exclusion: The Consequences of Language Policies in Africa*, not to forget Calvet's (1974) groundbreaking *Linguistique et colonialisme: Petit traité de glottophagie*.

Sir William Jones, whose landmark 1786 presidential address to the Asiatic Society in Calcutta laid the foundation stones of what came to be called comparative linguistics in the succeeding century, and George Abraham Grierson, whose ambitious project *The Linguistic Survey of India* (begun in 1894 and brought to a close in 1928), were both closely tied to the colonial administration, along with its elaborate bureaucracy, of the Indian subcontinent.

But such historical facts only point to the contemporaneity of the rise of modern linguistic thought and the heyday of colonialism and the mindset that it helped promote. They do not provide any incontrovertible clues as to any direct link or possible collusion or complicity between the two.

Nevertheless, as soon as we begin to scratch the surface, we are struck by the discovery that the very thinking of these early precursors of modern ‘scientific’ linguistics was itself shot through with the colonial mindset and its nefarious ideology. That ideology is yet to be fully hunted down and rooted out and, until that task is successfully realised, will continue to raise its ugly head every now and then. This is especially the case when it comes to the reluctance or unwillingness on the part of many a theoretically oriented linguist to fully face up to the sweeping changes to language ecologies resulting from mass migrations at an unprecedented scale and people across the world coming into close contact with one another thanks to the digital revolution, making a total mockery of the idea of “cloture” so ably put forward by Saussure and held close to their hearts by linguists ever since. Hutton’s (1996) blunt statement that modern linguistics is, in its essence, still a 19th-century discipline presents a grim warning that we need to undertake a major overhaul of some of its founding concepts with a view to weeding out the last vestiges of their colonial trappings.

Among Modern Linguistics’ working tools that reveal their colonial provenance is, of course, the highly controversial concept of the ‘native speaker’. In Rajagopalan (1997: 226), I characterised it as “one of the founding myths of Modern Linguistics” – all the more powerful in virtue of being tied to a number of equally well-entrenched beliefs that constituted the *Zeitgeist* of the 19th century. Towards the end of her influential book *The Emergence of the English Native Speaker*, Stephanie Hackert (2012: 275) refers to “Anglo-Saxonism, a powerful historical theory and political ideology which, during the second half of the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries, encompassed the British empire and the U.S. in a logic of racial exceptionalism based on both descent and culture” and adds:

> Even though it had been around for quite some time, in the 19th century, Anglo-Saxonism took on a distinctly racial cast, which made it square with the more racial theories that were being developed in the emerging sciences of man as well as by theorists and practitioners of colonialism. (Hackert 2012: 275-276)

As Collingham (2001: 1) notes at the very outset of her book, “[t]he British experience of India was intensely physical.”

The lingering after-effects of European colonialism on the fledgling nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America are clearly discernible in the haphazard way that the endemic issues of widespread multilingualism are often stage-managed in these set-ups. To begin with, let us remind ourselves that the very notion of monolingualism is an essentially European dream, concretised somewhere around the late 15th century or thereabouts (Wright 2016). The whole idea had been brought to fruition by dint of wilfully suppressing the rights of minorities to speak their own languages – a policy put in place in the name of 'nation-building' (whereof the 19th-century slogan *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Sprache* – One people, one state, one language – comes from). When these European nations went on a conquering and colonising spree into the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, they carried with them their newly discovered idea of nationhood wedded to a common language and sought to implement their language policies accordingly. The results, especially in the less stable regions of Africa, were a total disaster and their consequences persist today, as the contributions to this volume that address the complex linguistic realities of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia demonstrate.

Against the backdrop sketched in broad brushstrokes in the foregoing paragraphs, the publication of this book with its title *Language Planning and Policy: Ideologies, Ethnicities and Semiotic Spaces of Power*is a welcome addition to a growing literature on the topic and is sure to provide a much-needed jolt to some to wake up from their 'dogmatic slumber'. What stands out as we peruse the ten chapters that make up this volume is that the authors are fully aware of the importance of viewing language planning as key to offsetting the corrosive after-effects of the legacy of colonialism that still persist, albeit in subtle and often imperceptible ways, in many of the nation states, most of which were relatively recently carved out from the shambles of colonialism.Needless to say, language education policy is a crucial and integral part of this intervention. For, as the editors note in Chapter One, "what counts as a language" turns out to be a key issue in the post-colonial realities, here represented by vignettes from Africa, Latin America and the Arab world that the contributors to this volume of papers zero in on. In the contributors' own words, "educational policies in such contexts are shaped by this stratified conception of language and the regime of language rights which it presupposes."

The urgent need for more studies such as those presented in this volume is hard to overstate. But what they also underscore is that more and more voices from the South need to join the chorus. There is an obvious reason why: colonialism and its lingering legacy are there for anyone to see and size up. But the way one goes about it will bear the hallmarks of one's station and point of view. In other words, there are bound to be at least two ways of approaching the issue – from the vantage points of those on the '*khushi*' side of the colonial divide and those on the seamy side. Accounts of the colonial legacy that claim objectivity and value neutrality often end up whitewashing (no irony!) the real story of untold misery of colonial subjugation and its long-standing consequences. Only genuinely concerned voices, speaking on behalf of the downtrodden, can plead forcefully for meaningful intervention into the sordid state of affairs left over from the colonial past and make amends for the imbalances that are still present. The studies reported in this volume are therefore a step in the right direction.

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CHAPTER ONE

LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY: THE DISCURSIVE LANDSCAPING OF MODERNITY[1]

ASHRAF ABDELHAY, SINFREE B. MAKONI
AND CRISTINE G. SEVERO

1. Language policy and planning: Terminological and conceptual issues

The concept of language policy is complex, polysemous and socially contested. Generally, any organised effort to affect the existing patterns of language choice, structure and acquisition is a form of language planning (Ricento 2006; Tollefson 2008). Although language-planning practices permeate all spheres of social life, it is readily observable in the field of education where it is mainly concerned with decisions about the selection of the medium of teaching. This role can be appreciated because education is normally viewed as the cornerstone of political and social processes of integration. The result of this process is explicit or implicit language policy for a given institution (e.g. school): a set of norms or guidelines which are intended to direct linguistic behaviour (Tollefson 2008). Haugen (1959) was credited with the use of this term to cover both status and corpus planning in relation to standardisation of the Norwegian language.

Language policy is heterogeneous and varies according to its object, levels of intervention, purpose, participants and institutions involved, underlying language ideologies, local contexts, power relations, and historical context, among others. Language policy and planning is also related to socio-political contexts: North American, European, African,

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[1] Cristine Severo would like to acknowledge the financial support by the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development.

Asian, Latin American and Russian/Soviet traditions, for example, do not share the same theoretical-methodological priorities and approaches. Despite such heterogeneity, the birth of language policy as an institutionalised field occurred parallel to the emergence of socio-linguistics. One institutional landmark of this emergence was a seminar organised by William Bright at the University of California in 1964, which gathered together scholars such as Einar Haugen, William Labov, John Gumperz, Dell Hymes and Charles Ferguson. We understand that the emergence of language policy as a discipline serves as an ideological framework that imposes a “domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a game of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments” (Foucault 1981: 59).

This initial phase of the configuration of language policy in the West as a disciplinary field aimed at systematising and rationalising a model applicable to the description of the relationship between languages and their functions within the limits of the national state followed what we can call ‘a politics of functionalisation’. This period is reflected in a field-shaping body of publications in the 1960s and 1970s, which linked language planning with processes of modernisation and nation-building. One example of the scholars’ concern with national issues was the publication of *Language Problems of Developing Nations* in 1968 by Fishman, Ferguson and Das Gupta. The principle of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) oriented the practice of language planning toward a particular ideology of language.

Language ideologies refer to commonsensical notions about language structures and functions, which normatively position their users in the social system, and they are enacted through institutional and everyday practices (Tollefson 2008; Rubdy 2008; Haviland 2003). Language ideologies embody conceptions about the functions, values, norms, expectations, preferences, predictions and roles that guide linguistic practice (Blommaert 2006). Language ideologies in turn articulate broader socio-political ideologies.

Any institutionalised choice of a linguistic variety as the official medium of conducting formal politics and education has significant stratificational effects on the groups and individuals whose varieties are systematically excluded and devalued. In this sense, we understand that “status planning decisions conform to ideologies of the power elite or respond to conflicting ideologies between those upheld by the power elite and those of other constituent groups” (Cobarrubias 1983: 62). In other words, the formative phase of the field of language planning was informed by a “reflectionist” (Silverstein 1985) view of language, where language is viewed as a corpus of words standing for independently existing things. However, as later critical theoretical developments showed, all policy discourses on language are performative in the sense that they are creative acts of social representation and thus they are associated with issues of power relations and inequality (Bourdieu 1991). Under the right institutional conditions, when an official policy ‘names’ ‘a dialect’ as ‘a language’, a new social construction is brought into being; a new symbolic representation is imposed on the existing reality.

Examples of an initial domain of objects and methods in language policy and planning include standardisation, hierarchical classifications of languages (vernacular, standard, classical, creole and pidgin) and the classification of language functions (teaching language, official, international, lexical modernisation, nationalisation and terminological unification, among others) (Lo Bianco 2004; Calvet 2007; Manley 2008; for a detailed review of the goals, see Hornberger 2006).

Standardisation in the broad sense involves the selection, codification and implementation or imposition of a norm (Haugen 1983; Milroy and Milroy 1999). The discursive mechanisms of codification and institutionalisation impose order on the selected norm and they effect a binary opposition between standard and non-standard, and it is these socially embedded values which guide the linguistic choices of individuals (Blommaert 1999) Hence, these mechanisms are strategies of effecting consensus, power and inequality because they establish systemically ratified linguistic hierarchies. In other words, standardisation enforces constraints to manage the functional distribution of linguistic varieties, and these restrictions result in unequal socio-linguistic repertoires that shape access to social opportunities (Blommaert 1999). It is a deep political process because it creates difference and hegemony through mechanisms of normalisation and naturalisation including the educational apparatus. Language planning and policy as theory and practice were implicated in projects of nation building and the construction of subjectivities. As noted by a number of scholars in the field of nationalism studies (e.g. Anderson 1991), standardisation as a process of linguistic regimentation or institutionalisation plays a fundamental role in the construction of ‘nation states’. Thus, language planning has always been a political enterprise.

The framework of language policy has helped to construct abstracted, detached and codified (standardised) concepts of language that have been reproduced by pedagogical manuals. This view of language is called “standard language ideology” (Lippi-Green 1997). In addition, at the beginning of language policy as a disciplinary field, “[i]n keeping with the prevailing intellectual climate of scientific optimism, only a minority of

LPP [language policy and planning] pioneers were sceptical about any limits to technical protocols and many imagined banishing subjectivity and interests from consideration" (Lo Bianco 2004: 740). Such technical aspects have been prioritised to the detriment of political ones, helping to shape a positivist practice that, although the subject of repeated criticism, still models contemporary language policy (Rajagopalan 2005).

The critical linguistic ethnographic perspective to language planning emerged as a critique of the traditional approaches and it is informed by the critical social theory. In this perspective, the notion of 'social context' is made much more sophisticated than in the traditional approach. A context is a dynamic construction in social interaction through a generically situated performance of an ensemble of cultural norms, knowledge, conditions and practices that define and regulate it as a social and cultural space. It is a complex of multi-layered structures of material and symbolic relations which organise language use. Contexts are not exclusively regimented or excessively ordered and objectively embedded as in the case of ritualised discursive orders (e.g. doctor–patient interaction), or as in the case of other institutions of social reproduction (e.g. school), where individuals are positioned according to relatively fixed roles and statuses (e.g. Silverstein's presupposed indexicality). Contexts are also 'emergent', created and shaped by interactional practices. The implication for language planning here is that research should focus not just on the objective dimensions of context but also on the subjective world of ideologies and representations.

In the mainstream trend, language is viewed as disconnected from its authorising environment (which is a prerequisite for the imposition of standard languages). By contrast, in the critical perspective, 'language' is viewed as 'culture': it is always relatively dialectically authorised and locally regulated and valued. It is in this sense that language policy is a metapragmatic discourse in that it links linguistic issues with socio-political issues. Most importantly, the question of the 'sovereign subject' which featured in the traditional paradigm is now converted into the question of 'voice' and agency in the symbolic horizons of power relations. Thus, what is needed to be investigated is the total discursive apparatus including the historical conditions of constitution and interpretation which (de)value linguistic products.

In keeping with language policy, language planning is neither uniform nor homogeneous. For example, Einar Haugen (1966), in *Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian*, systematised four levels of language planning: norm selection, coding/standardisation, implementation/acceptance and elaboration/modernisation of language. These levels were later expanded to include corpus planning (coding, graphization, grammar, lexical systematisation, literary manuals), status planning (language designations and uses, according to laws and decrees), acquisition planning (language teaching and learning policies), planning of uses (politics of dissemination and use of languages) and prestige planning (evaluation of linguistic uses). The first two were proposed by Kloss (1967), the third was added by Cooper (1989), and the fourth and fifth were suggested by Baker (2003). In addition to these five levels, we can include 'discourse planning', which is charged with dealing with the ideological work of institutions, media, and discourses of authority in the production and circulation of beliefs and language ideologies (Lo Bianco 2004).

We argue that the proposal of macro, meso and micro levels of intervention in language policy follows what can be called a "politics of scale" (Summerson and Lempert 2016). From this scaling perspective, as applied to language policy, there are two explicit political dimensions at play: one that links language policy to institutional, vertical, official and legal actions, and another that focuses language policy on local beliefs and practices, ideologies, and motivations that lead the subjects to choose one or another language option. Spolsky (2004), for example, proposes an approximation between local policies and practices, with a focus on language management, language ideologies and language practices. In this case, the boundaries between language policy and planning become more tenuous. Such a local perspective has helped to deconstruct the prioritisation of top-down and macro politics: "Whereas the language planning literature has focused mainly on the macro level, it is important to understand that language policy and planning operates at the micro level as well" (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 1).

Such a politics of scale also has helped to shape what counts as language in Africa, Latin America and the Arab world. In addition, educational policies in such contexts are shaped by this stratified conception of language and the regime of language rights that it presupposes. In this sense, language policy and planning are ideological political frameworks embedded in both broad and local contexts. According to Bonacina-Pugh (2012: 216), "Language policy and planning are ideological processes which contribute to maintaining unequal power relationships between majority and minority language groups." We consider that, by assuming pre-organised models and methods applicable to local language contexts, we tend to reproduce universal practices and ideologies that have historically favoured some individuals or groups (the so-called West- and North-oriented language policy) to the detriment of others (the so-called East- and South-oriented perspectives). We also understand that an analysis of the regime of language rights must consider contemporary capitalism and technology, for which the ideas of diversity and local culture have been turned into objects of desire and consumption. Dor (2004: 102) notes, "Linguistic and cultural relativism is a popular commodity within the business community. Researching linguistic and cultural variability, and selling the results of this research, is a flourishing business."

Johnson and Ricento (2013), in a revision of the literature on the field of language policy and planning, propose the following chronology: (a) early language planning scholarship that began in the 1960s and was focused on the politics of unification, for which language was seen as a resource and subject to technical planning; (b) expanded works in the 1970s and 1980s that started to criticise the positivist perspective of early works; (c) critical language policy that considers the political mechanisms that underlie language policy and planning; and (d) the emergence of the ethnography of language policy in the 21st century, which combines structure-agency, micro-macro and policy-practice perspectives. Although such a revision seems didactic and only coherent mainly in North American and European contexts, we believe that it does not problematise colonial and post-colonial language policy and planning. Hornberger (2006) integrated the various language-planning goals, types and approaches in one conceptual framework (see Figure 1.1).

We believe that a critical and historical perspective is needed to understand both (a) the effects of Euro–North American perspectives on how languages have been shaped in non-European or non-North American contexts and (b) local non-Euro–North American concepts and 'experiences of language'. This means that even ethnography, as it has been shaped into North American and European academic contexts, may help to reproduce historical colonial ideologies. We argue that history helps us to comprehend how colonial memories have been reproduced and updated into contemporary language policy and planning.

Finally, we may consider that language policy is strongly related to specific identity politics, which means that discourses on language also concern specific ways of framing the other. For example, the linguistic question concerning immigrants or refugees is also a question of identity related to what counts as being a citizen in national or nationalised contexts. In these contexts, linguistic choice and linguistic use are an "authorized" human right (Whiteley 2003). Discourses of endangerment strategically framed languages as natural species (e.g. 'language death'), and hence they provided a basis for the mainstream discourse of language rights. The organicist ideologies of language are schemes of place-making and making of a specific form of subjectivity (for example, Errington's rhetoric of language endangerment). A critical semiotic ethnographic lens argues for a consideration of language rights within a conceptualisation of linguistic relativity by focusing on the ways that local socio-linguistic markets organise linguistic resources (Bourdieu 1991).

The ideas of assimilation and integration, as well as of dialect, variety and language, also can be problematised from a political, historical, discursive, multi-translingual and multi-semiotic language perspective.

Types	*Policy planning approach* (on form)	*Cultivation planning approach* (on function)
Status planning (about uses of language)	**Officialization** **Nationalization** **Standardization of status** **Proscription**	**Revival** **Maintenance** **Spread** **Interlingual communication – international, intranational**
Acquisition planning (about users of language)	**Group** **Education/School** **Literary** **Religious** **Mass media** **Work**	**Reacquisition** **Maintenance** **Shift** **Foreign language/second language/literacy**
	Selection Language's formal role in society *Extra-linguistic aims*	**Implementation** Language's functional role in society *Extra-linguistic aims*
Corpus planning (about language)	**Standardization of corpus** **Standardization of auxiliary code** **Graphization**	**Modernization** (new functions) **Lexical** **Stylistic** **Renovation** (new forms, old functions) **Purification** **Reform** **Stylistic simplification** **Terminology unification**
	Codification Language's form *Linguistic aims*	**Elaboration** Language's functions *Semi-linguistic aims*

Figure 1.1: Language policy and planning goals: an integrative framework (Hornberger 2006: 29)

Another phenomenon, which is addressed by language planning, is the semiotic articulation of social spaces. The notion of ‘linguistic landscape’ was born within the field of language planning, particularly in the contexts of Belgium and Quebec to stress the role of language in organising the public space through the regulation of language usage on public signs (Landry and Bourhis 1997). However, the concept of linguistic landscape was under-theorised and under-researched in the traditional practice of language planning, which focused mainly on issues related to corpus and status planning. Landy and Bourhis (1997: 25) provided the following formulation of the concept that became the default definition:

> The language of public road signs, advertising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs, and public signs on government buildings combines to form the linguistic landscape of a given territory, region, or urban agglomeration.

Although the seminal study of Landry and Bourhis (1997) adopted a statistical approach in the study of the linguistic landscape as a variable of ethnolinguistic vitality in multilingual contexts, the field has now developed immensely in terms of methodology and epistemology using different interdisciplinary perspectives and methods including semiotics, ethnography and discourse analysis (Blommaert 2013; Shohamy and Gorter 2009). Research in the field now engages with cultural and social theory to explore the ways historical and social forces are materialised and sedimented in the linguistic landscape. This ethnographic historical emphasis problematised the abstract and self-contained notion of ‘language’ and instead broadened it to include all modes of semiotic communication and how they are linked with other social, political and economic factors (see Mokwena, Chapter Eight).

2. Colonial discourses of language: A Eurocentric monoglossia

Colonial discourses of language and practices in non-Western contexts, including Africa, the Arab Middle East and Latin America, have actively contributed to the construction of specific socio-communicative realities. Colonial language policies are part and parcel of colonial strategies of governmentality that include, among other things, the social invention of artificial structures of belonging and the imputation of hierarchically stratified values to ‘local idioms’ in relation to one another, on the one hand, and in relation to Western media of communication, on the other. The material effect of this social ideological restructuring of the existing pre-colonial relations is a plethora of spatially bounded, racially managed and romantically aestheticised ethnic bodies and categories. Although the colonial discourses of language are not strictly uniform or monolithic (e.g. the French versus the British pattern), they have generally shaped, among other things, the post-colonial sectarianisation of formal politics and the politicisation of sectarian relations. The current socio-political conditions in almost all African countries and the Arab world (e.g. Lebanon, Iraq) are cases in point. These conditions are one of the key reasons for situating the current socio-economic and discursive relations in these countries in wider historical contexts: to understand how (trans-)local relations have become the way they are.

These colonial and post-colonial linguistic projects that are linked with processes of nation-building are informed by a particular instrumental conception of language as a 'means of communication' or the instrumental view of language that conceives of it as neutral (thus apolitical), singular (thus unvarying), fixed (thus unaffected by contextual usage) and strictly rule-governed (rather than partly chaotic). Such a language is conceived of as predating the social interaction as a totality that includes speakers and, thus, is treated as naturally given rather than interactionally emergent. We argue that colonial ideologies that helped to shape, classify and label languages still reverberate in contemporary language practice and planning in regard to certain local practices as their being non-languages or small, defective or degenerated languages.

It is remarkable that language ideological conflicts in contexts such as Algeria always interrogate the institutionalised status of ex-colonial languages, such as French (e.g. see Benrabah, Chapter Two). Even though some countries (e.g. Sudan) have abandoned formalised colonial language policies, they still live with discursive coloniality as a condition. It is precisely the objective of the colonial linguistic perspective to trace this everyday lived condition of coloniality in the Global South. In what follows, we identify the main properties of this colonial narrative of language.

First, the colonial narrative of language aestheticised social relations through the naturalisation of historical categories of interaction, such as 'indigenous languages'. The construct that implies pre-modern 'purity' is designed to serve specific theological and pragmatic ends. For example, in some African contexts, the conception of linguistic indigeneity was one of the discursive resources for the artificial creation of 'tribal' relations as they are 'imagined', particularly by the colonial Christian missionaries. Indigenous languages are thus institutionally 'enregistered' (Agha 2007) with specific spatialised groups. This semiotic process of enregisteration effected a particular conceptualisation of the ‘local’, which was ‘normalised’ through the production of text artefacts, such as dictionaries, primers and textbooks.

Although the text artefacts are projected as objective instruments of education, this process of knowledge construction rationalised the unequal power relations between the ‘locals’ and the missionary organisations. If ‘indigenous languages’ in some contexts are a product of language-planning intervention, this means that the notions of ‘mother tongue’ and ‘native speakers’ upon which these ‘indigenous languages’ are patterned are themselves part of this ‘colonial order of things’ (see Makoni, Severo and Abdelhay, Chapter Nine). In other words, what counts as a ‘mother tongue’ or who counts as a ‘native speaker’ in these ‘indigenous languages’ can now be determined ‘objectively’ with reference to a set of codified textual standards. In the colonial narrative of language, the term ‘indigenous languages’ is cued with specific ideological articulation to represent the ‘exotic’ and ‘pure’ Other (i.e. the pre-modern). The current use of the term ‘indigenous language’, particularly in international legal discourse and by indigenous people themselves, has ‘erased’ this negative ideological trajectory and injected the term with a positive loading, such as through the use of the term ‘plurality’ (Maurial 1999). We argue, however, that in historically dynamic contexts structured by relations of conflict over political and material resources (e.g. Sudan), the term can be strategically employed in official policy documents to index the ‘Other’ (e.g. Arab(ised)). The point here is that colonial language planning activities are essentially ‘performative’: they result in the construction and naturalisation of hierarchically controlled ethnolinguistic differences ‘locally’ anchored to specific ‘places’.

One of the significant discursive strategies of organising social diversity used by colonial governments, including missionaries and professional linguists, is ‘conferences’. During colonial conferences, such as the Rejaf Language Conference in Sudan in 1928, ethnolinguistic boundaries are constructed, codified, imposed and naturalised. This is precisely the colonial brand of multiculturalism/multilingualism that largely determined the post-colonial nature of political practice in the Global South.

Another characteristic of the colonial discourses of language is that they embody monoglossic ideologies that conceptualise ‘monolingualism’ as the normative yardstick against which dynamic linguistic practices are assessed. Eurocentric monoglossia treats ‘language’ as a monolithic whole that is statistically countable, stable and abstract. As a conceptual apparatus, monoglossia is a mechanism of regulating and organising access to formal institutions of knowledge production.

In short, concepts are organised within structural frameworks and theories. The Western theories of language have provided us with concepts cued with specific theoretical and ideological loads. The list of such loaded terms includes ‘language’, ‘mother tongue’, ‘native speaker’, ‘language rights’, ‘first language’ and ‘bilingualism’. And most of the contributions in this volume used or critiqued these terms as they are used in the Western conceptualisations of language and society.

3. Arabic and the emblematic function of language

The socio-linguistic situation in the Arab world is complex, as public policies and political ideologies are interwoven with the issues of language policies. The relatively established national socio-communicative orders that comprise the Arab world are generally conceptualised as ‘diglossic’ (in Ferguson’s (1959, 1991) sense of the term). That is, Arabic register variation is functionally, thus hierarchically, organised into a high variety (normally represented by Standard Arabic or *Fus-ha*) and a low variety (represented by the dialects or the Colloquial). Diglossic language situations articulate the power and status positions of the linguistic groups within the social stratification (Bourhis, Montaruli and Amiot 2007).

It is not our aim to review the notion of diglossia in relation to Arabic, as there is voluminous literature on the topic. Rather, it is our aim to stress that language policy and planning in the Arab world should always be inspected as an aspect of a wider monoglot (Silverstein 1996) socio-political totality. To do this, we can use the macro-level concept of diglossia as a heuristic entry into the political and cultural history of the region. Indeed, diglossic language situations provide one image of how discursive relations are organised in the Arab world; however, it is the most prominent image because it is embedded in folk ideologies of languages (Suleiman 2014).

Language use should be understood as a totality with two broad dimensions: the instrumental and symbolic (Suleiman 2003). Any single instance of language use involves this dual function though one dominates over the other. In some contexts, the instrumental dimension might be strategically reified to perform specific emblematic functions (Silverstein 2003; Suleiman 2013, 2014). It is the emblematic or symbolic dimension of diglossia which is under-emphasised in the literature as it relates to the issue of conflict, history and identity. Language planning and policy has to take this distinction into account very seriously to explore policies and articulate ideologies (Bassiouney 2009). The three contributions in this volume more or less operate with this distinction in the background.

In the Arab world, formal politics is organised in terms of cultural constructions, such as the *Umma*, which is predominantly identified as ‘a pan-national identity’, although in some modern contexts it is loosely used as an equivalent to the Western concept of ‘nation’. The word *watan* is equivalent to the ‘State’ (as understood in the Western conceptual system) (Bassiouney 2009). Historically, the Arab and Islamic world had its own distinctive form of modernity before its systematic incorporation into the world order of territorially bounded nation states. This is where the significance of language policy has emerged as a cultural instrument of a (pan)nation-building process. A significant caveat should be noted before proceeding. Language planning as an institutionalised process of cultural selection, exclusion and codification was exercised by the companion of Prophet Mohamed, Abu Bakr (573–634)[2], as a textual mechanism of compiling the Qur’an into one recognised standard copy.

Equally important, due to Islamic expansion into largely non-Arabic-speaking territories and communities, the early Muslim scholars, supported by governing politicians, subjected a particular variety of Arabic to a process of standardisation with the goal to protect ‘the language of the Quran’ from ‘corruption’ as an effect of being used by the *Ajam* (individuals for whom Arabic is not their mother tongue). The point here is that the Muslim world already had an idea of the grammatical construction of languages before the start of Western colonialism. Thus, the question here, which will link diglossia with politics, should address the socio-linguistic effects of Western modernity on the linguistic culture in this region.

Briefly, the modern structure of the state in the Arab world is shaped, either directly or indirectly, by, among other things, the cultural discourses of Western colonialism (see Benrabah, Chapter Two). Following independence, most of the Arab countries involved in a modernisation process of nation-building use the Western model as a reference. Legislating Arabicisation language policies and setting up language-planning apparatuses, such as Arabic language academies and a modern education system, were part of this process of nation-building. In this nationalist scheme, Arabic (read: Standard Arabic) was given a place of pride as both a bureaucratic instrument of communication and as a symbol of belonging to a particular nation (Suleiman 2003). The underlying dominant ideology of language was a centripetal monoglot conception of ‘one language, one nation’. All centrifugal voices and forces were brutally suppressed or subordinated. This is the case in the majority of the Arab countries.

Another feature of the ideological language policies in the Arab world is that ‘language’ is treated as singular (e.g. ‘the Arabic language’ is the official language of Egypt). This, in part, is an effect of systematic reduction of variability not just within ‘Arabic’ but, most importantly, within

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[2] Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abu-Bakr (accessed 26 February 2019).

‘Standard Arabic’. This centripetal conception of Arabicisation is also reflected in ‘language ideological debates’ (Blommaert 1999), for which ‘Arabic’ (understood as Standard Arabic) is rhetorically projected as an ‘endangered language’.

Arabic discourses of language endangerment are, by default, ‘purist’ in orientation. Arabic should be constantly purified from the structural effects of using colloquial and foreign languages. This form of socially established language anxiety rationalises and reinforces a linguistic hierarchy between the colloquial and the standard, on the one hand, and between Arabic and European languages, on the other. Institutional mechanisms of Arabic language planning, such as codification, including the production of dictionaries (whether general, specialised or historical), have imposed constraints that organise the usage of Arabic registers in specific sociolinguistic orders. This results in the emergence of unevenly distributed verbal repertoires, and thus unequal relations of power, in the standard or highly valued registers of Arabic.

It is worth remarking that there is no necessary correlation between a given standard language and ‘prestige’: an urbanised Arabic dialect, such as the Cairene Arabic, is viewed by some speakers as prestigious and highly valued even though it is generally a non-standard variety of Arabic (Haeri 2003). However, the standard register remains the preferred choice at the ideological level, as compared with the Arabic dialect, due mainly to its relationship with the Qur’an (see Almahmoud and Ahmed, Chapter Four). The Arabic monoglot ideology operates through concrete multilingual practices by shaping the speakers’ attitudes toward their own linguistic resources in relation to Arabic (see Alkooheji, Chapter Five).

In short, Arabic diglossia is about the social organisation of Arabic register variation, and it is intimately linked with political ideologies and, thus, with questions of power hierarchy and inequality. Nationalist projects of belonging exploit a monoglot ideology of Arabic (‘one language, one nation’) as a basis of achieving and justifying these objectives. The situated strategies of conducting formal politics by the proxy of Arabicisation led to the emergence of anti-hegemonic ideologies of language that, particularly when successful, are cemented in official (multilingual) language policies, as in the case of Morocco and Sudan (see Benton-Monahan and Severo, Chapter Three; Makoni et al., Chapter Nine).

4. The structure of the book

In this book, we understand a language as a socially configured, dynamic and thus variant, and situated complex of resources (e.g. registers of various types, styles, dialects, genres). In other words, language is a historical and political phenomenon, as it is articulated and articulating the real socio-political concerns of people in a context invested with power relations and social struggle. This means that the trajectory of any language is, by definition, an ideological one and an aspect of the wider social dynamics and processes that constitute the conditions of existence. To understand the intricate relationship between language and socio-economic phenomena (e.g. racism, effects of colonialism), a comprehensive investigation of language usage should re-insert linguistic products (e.g. a policy statement) into an ethnographically and historically reconstructed complexity of practices and processes. This is precisely what each contribution tries to do in its own way. The following nine chapters that comprise this book are described below.

This volume offers unique cross-cultural perspectives on language planning and policy in diverse African and Middle Eastern contexts, including South Africa, Bahrain, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Zambia and Algeria. The South American diaspora is also considered, as in the case of Brazil. By bringing together diverse contexts in Africa and the Middle East, this volume encourages a dialogue in the burgeoning scholarship in language policies in the different regions of these areas. In this volume, the main objective is to analyse the social, political and educational functions of official language policies and their impact on religious, national and sectarian identities. The second objective of the book is to provide an analysis of both common and professional views of multilingualism and how they shape, and are shaped by, language policies.

The third objective of the volume is to analyse language policy texts from diverse theoretical perspectives, using linguistic landscapes, colonial linguistics, colonial history, language ideology, language attitude and systemic functional linguistics. Such a diverse framework helps to shape an interdisciplinary perspective toward language. The fourth objective is to highlight several examples of language use, language ideologies and language policy in African and Middle Eastern contexts, signalling the role played by colonial ideologies in contemporary views. The volume concludes by exploring the contributions that scholarship from the Global South in colonial and post-colonial contexts can make to language scholarship generally.

Mohamed Benrabah's chapter, *Undoing the "Old World": The Politics of Language in Colonial and Post-Colonial Algeria*, addresses from a critical perspective the linguistic-cultural excesses of colonisation and decolonisation in Algeria. Benrabah argues that colonial practices introduced by Europeans have tended to continue in former colonies and that linguistic decolonisation remains incomplete due to the resilience of colonial language ideologies. The author discusses both (i) the colonial implementation of a practice of Frenchification to de-Arabise and de-Berberize the colonised people and (ii) the post-independence implementation by local leaders of a practice of de-Frenchification, whereby debates on national identity had to deal with Islam and the Arabic language. Both political practices are, according to Benrabah, imbued with colonial ideologies, such as the ideology of ethnicization, the monolingual ideology and the ideology of language hierarchies. For the author, the project of decolonisation failed to offer linguistic peace to Algerians, as linguistic divisions continue to reproduce colonial ideologies.

Chelsea Benton-Monahan and Cristine Gorski Severo, in *Amazigh Language Policy in Morocco and the Power of Contradiction*, describe the Amazigh language policy based on the relation between scholarly research and a local individual’s experience. The Amazigh language has been battling for higher status and officiality against Arabic and French for almost seven decades in Morocco. Its speakers comprise the so-called indigenous population of Morocco as well as its close neighbours of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, holding deep, cultural ties to the land. The authors show how the Amazigh language gained recognition, first being taught in schools in 2000 and then being made into an official language in 2011, which stands in contrast to the perspective of an Amazigh teacher in Morocco, whose personal experience reveals how language policy is a product of the tension between top-down and bottom-up forces.

Mahmoud A. Almahmoud and Mahgoub Dafalla Ahmed are the authors of the chapter titled *Language Planning in the Saudi Context through Investigating Students’ Attitudes Towards SA, CA and English.* They investigate Saudi university students’ attitudes towards using two Arabic language varieties, Standard Arabic (SA) and Colloquial Arabic (CA), in addition to English. The demographic situation in Saudi Arabia, characterised by its high numbers of non-Arab foreigners, has contributed to the creation of a unique socio-linguistic reality. For example, an individual may use SA to write an official letter, CA to speak with friends, pidgin to talk to foreign workers and English to order in a restaurant. The results show that students almost always use CA but rarely use SA or English, and that SA is more widely applied in the media than in social interactions or education. In addition, all students have a stronger progressive attitude towards using English as compared to the two Arabic language varieties. The positive attitudes towards SA may indicate that students are influenced by religious, linguistic and cultural factors.

The chapter titled *Identity Perception of Pakistani and Balochi Minorities at State Schools in Bahrain in Association With (Implicit) Language Policy*, by Lamya Alkooheji, is based on observations of Urdu and Balochi immigrant students in Bahraini state schools and explores how the students themselves perceive their native language(s) and the Arabic language after being exposed to the language policies practised in their schools. Bahrain is a small country in the Arabian Gulf in the Middle East with a dense population of over a million people in an area of 770 km^2. The official language in this country is Arabic. The chapter explores how implicit language policies affect participants' linguistic choices and their attitude towards each language. The Bahraini government permits all residents to benefit from its state schools for free. This has created multilingual communities within state schools, where the main medium of instruction is Arabic. The findings confirm the positive impact of the implicit educational language policy without suppressing language rights or creating discomfort for those with an ethnic background.

Felix Banda and David Sani Mwanza's chapter, *"The idea was that those who were trained needed to teach others": Critical Reflections on the 2014 Zambian Language of Initial Literacy Policy Change*, focuses on a specific change of language in education policy that occurred in Zambia in 2014. This proposed that the language of instruction from nursery school to grade 4 would be one of the seven official zoned Zambian languages. The authors use observation and interview data from teacher training college lecturers, primary and secondary school teachers of Zambian languages, and Zambian languages subject experts to evaluate the policy shift. Banda and Mwanza also trace the history of contradictions and contestations that surround language education policies in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) through missionaries, the British South Africa Company, the British Colonial Office and the emergent independent African government administrations. Their findings show that the new policy is not different from those that had failed in the past for their rigidity in application and for insisting on standard versions of Zambian languages when few teachers and learners spoke them.

In the chapter titled *A Systemic Functional Grammar Analysis of Clause 29 in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996 with Reference to the Post-Apartheid Maintenance of a System of Racialised Identities: Implications for Nation-Building*, Ebrahim Alexander and Leon Pretorius argue that the maintenance of a post-apartheid racial classification system is at odds with meaningful transformation for all South African citizens. The authors advocate that public policy appraisal should include, in addition to the implementation of language policy and management considerations, the textual dimension, which includes the level that people interpret and come to understand public policy as discourse. In their conclusion, the authors highlight South Africa's post-apartheid maintenance of a system of racialised identities, as implicated in its 'diversity' concepts in the preambles of the selected public policy documents.

Lorato Mokwena's chapter, *"As long as I understand the customers, I will answer them": The Translingual Tuckshop vs the Pluralised Monolingual South African Constitution*, deals with the contrast between a tuckshop owner's fluid approach to language and the South African Constitution's approach to language. While the South African government inherited and institutionalised a colonial epistemological perspective of language, Mokwena illustrates how the tuckshop exists as a translanguaging space by using linguistic landscape material and interview data with tuckshop owners and customers. The chapter argues that, although the Constitution portrays South Africa as a plural monolingual society, in reality and on a broader scale, South African society consists of various translanguaging spaces such as the linguistic/semiotic landscape of tuckshops.

Sinfree Makoni, Cristine Severo and Ashraf Abdelhay, the authors of *Colonial Linguistics and the Invention of Language*, aim to contribute to the large debate about how language policy and practice have been historically shaped by local context through focusing on the role played by colonial linguistics in Sudan and Brazil. The authors assume colonial linguistics as a contemporary approach that has revisited colonial narratives on the political role played by language in colonising processes, which includes the idea that language policy has traditionally been faced with the relationship between colonisation and language. The authors problematise the broad generic use of categories such as 'colonial policy', 'colonial expansion', 'post-colonial indigenous language', 'colonial language', 'colonial area', 'colonial power' and 'colonial world', among others, to cover local contexts.

In *Post-Colonial Language Education or Coloniality of Language by Stealth?* Finex Ndhlovu seeks to add new theorisation to conversations on post-colonial African language policies by bringing to light the intricate linkages between language policymaking, the interests of politics, and the exigencies of fashioning linguistic and cultural uniformity in the midst of diversity. The author's argument is that although language policies are generally designed with good intentions, they also have a darker side. They often result in unintended consequences, such as the social, economic and political exclusion or marginalisation of speakers of minority ethnic and reticent languages. The author proposes that mainstream models of language education – multilingual education, mother tongue education, additive bilingual education – that are widely celebrated in post-apartheid South Africa exemplify the subtle manifestation of the 'coloniality of language', which problematises the relationship between language and power by raising the question: Are there no philosophies of or about language other than those inherited from the Global North? If they are indeed absent, why are we not able to develop some? Why do scholars, governments and social policy experts from the Global South always choose the easy route of adopting the language ideologies and theoretical frameworks that originate from the Global North?

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CHAPTER TWO

UNDOING THE 'OLD WORLD': THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL ALGERIA

MOHAMED BENRABAH

1. Introduction

> The overall effect of colonial language policies, in ecological terms, was the destruction of the habitat of languages traditionally spoken and the imposition of a linguistic monoculture. At the same time, the colonial system created a sufficiently large population of educated Westernized people to perpetuate these practices after the nominal end of colonialism. Their views on language in many instances were far removed from those of traditional modes of communication and characterized by European ideas above both the structure and functions of language. Planning language meant planning uniformity, modernization, national identity and the like. (Mühlhausler 1996: 196)

The points discussed in this chapter are fleshed out in the above epigraph. Language planning in modern Algeria has tended to continue colonial practices. I will, therefore, study colonial language policies and their appropriation in the post-independence era. The politics of language in Algeria's colonised and decolonised histories will be carefully contextualised within the socio-political reality of the time-space under study. Using both a historical approach and an interdisciplinary perspective, I will analyse the discourses, ideological debates, legislative texts and political developments of the historical moments investigated here. Arguments will be drawn from both literary works and post-colonial and socio-linguistic studies. Also, the discourse of prominent figures from colonising and colonised societies will illustrate their behaviour as representative of the period they were living in.

This chapter consists of two main parts. The first one deals with colonial history and France’s policies of Frenchification by focusing on the disruptions to the colony’s linguistic ecology, the colonisers’ discourses on their Algerian identity and the ideological indoctrination of colonised elites. The second part of the chapter presents Algeria’s national history and its policy of Arabisation. It addresses the question of national identity raised by insecure elites who had suffered colonialism as a trauma, the policy of Arabisation as the image of Frenchification, post-colonial unplanned developments, and Algeria’s recent changes in language planning. However, before studying the country’s colonial and national histories, I will first introduce a few concepts related to the central issues discussed in this work.

2. Theoretical preliminaries

Among the conceptual tools defined here, there are “language planning” and related notions such as “social change”, “identity”, “ideology” and “colonialism”. Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to change a community’s language use/behaviour in the future. It imposes one or more languages to achieve linguistic, political and social aims. As conscious intervention, language planning seeks “language spread” which allows the institutionalised language to increase in both its “uses” in education, political institutions, publishing and media, and its “users” as speakers or readers and writers (Cooper 1982: 6). The diffusions of uses and users are called “status planning” and “acquisition planning” respectively. Moreover, language planning seeks socio-political change by influencing society’s and an individual’s identity (Cooper 1989; Pool 1979).

The concept of “identity” refers to an individual’s or group’s sense of who they are, in their “own eyes and in other people’s” (Joseph 2004: 13-14). Language forms a significant defining characteristic of a person’s or community’s identity, even though a number of other cultural factors (religion, family, name, etc.) may assume comparable importance to that of language (Smolicz and Secombe 2003). The literature on linguistic identity, in both interactional and anthropological socio-linguistics, shows that linguistic signs (language code) used in a particular interactional moment (speech event) signal meaning: they express regular social relationships that help in the identification of individuals as members of a particular group (Mortimer and Wortham 2015; Ricento 2013). Contrary to the earlier studies which treated identity as a fixed set of attributes, more recent (post-structuralist) approaches view identity as something forged by language/discourse and in a constant process revealed by identity "adjustments", and by "multiple" identities (Edwards 2009; Joseph 2004).

As for the word "ideology", it concerns beliefs shared by individuals or groups of people about the workings of society. "Language ideology" refers to an individual's or group's conceptions about language (its nature, structure and use) and about the place of communicative behaviour in social life, and their conceptions' manifestation in certain social and cultural values. Language ideology and identity have implications for both language planning and the dynamic of disqualification in multilingual situations (Garrett 2010). "Linguistic inequality", Jan Blommaert (2006: 516) writes, "starts as soon as someone's repertoire is disqualified as 'nonlanguage' or denied the status of 'full languageness'." Oppressive linguistic policies can produce ideological minority views that elevate the mother tongue as a marker of "We-group" building or contested/oppositional identities. Colonial systems often produce such reactions.

2.1 Colonialism and the linguistic habitat

The term "colonialism" can be defined as foreign domination characterised by the forcible relocation of a minority of exogenous people into a new territory inhabited by an indigenous population. In this system:

> The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of an ordained mandate to rule. (Osterhammel 2005: 16-17)

This quote contains three important elements. First, an entire "peripheral" community becomes subordinate to the "metropolis". Second, colonisers make no cultural concessions to the colonised. Third, invaders rationalise their domination as a "mission" to "civilise" the "barbarians". This rhetoric lays the foundations of the "ideology of minorisation" which creates the inferior "Other-ness", and the colonisers' belief in their racial and cultural superiority (Osterhammel 2005; Rath 1993).

There are various forms of colonialism but only one category is preferred in the present context: "overseas settlement colonialism". In this colonial type, the metropolis uses its military and economic superiority to support a settler minority which acquires political dominance at the expense of local peoples who are demographically superior but dispossessed of their best lands. The intruders employ a "logic of elimination" to annihilate the natives physically and/or culturally (MacQueen 2007: 3; Osterhammel

2005: 6-9). Also, they declare the conquered country "rulerless" (*Res-nullius*), claim the lands as their own and become the natives of the colony as African, American, etc. Thus, colonisers disqualify the colonised as their equals, and share a "colonialist thought" (mentality) based on racist theory and biological determinism.

In the past, language scholars magnified ideas about linguistic difference, and devised notions like the African, Oriental, and Arab "character" and the myth of the "lazy natives" (Osterhammel 2005: 109). These categories allowed 19th-century Europe to create itself in opposition to the "East" (Asia and Africa). Their discourses of orientalism represent the "collection of dreams, images, and vocabularies available to anyone who has tried to talk about [the East]" (Said 2003: 73). David Spurr (1993: 1) writes: "The particular languages which belong to [the historical process of colonisation], enabling it while simultaneously being generated by it, are known collectively as colonial discourse." Recent research enjoys using "colonial discourse" to examine different source material: administrative files, the press, travel writing, fictional literature, etc. (Osterhammel 2005). It also investigates the mentalities of those involved with the colonial situation characterised by both brutal force and "pseudo-justifications and stereotyped behaviours" (Spurr 1993: 6).

Colonial expansionism also means linguistic imperialism which imposes the colonists' language and culture to eliminate indigenous cultures and tongues. Mother-tongue eradication comes with negative linguistic judgements ("Otherness") and "the rhetorical opposition between 'good' European languages and 'bad' African ones" (Blommaert 1999: 28). However, "[t]he first manifestation of European linguistic imperialism", Peter Mühlhausler (1996: 77) claims, "is not the reduction of the quantity of indigenous languages but the destruction of the region's linguistic ecology." Einar Haugen (1972: 325) defines "language ecology" as "the study of interactions between any given language and its environment". To him, "the true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes". This concept refers, thus, to the study of languages in relation to one another and to their broader social, linguistic, educational, historical and political contexts (Vandenbussche, Jahr and Trudgill 2013).

2.2 Colonial ideologies and legacies

The end of European colonialism is often regarded as not yet complete. In language matters, elites in the post-independent era often maintain their loyalty to colonial ideologies and to the ex-colonial language. Robert Phillipson (1992: 128) argues that "the colonized people have internalized the language and many of the attitudes of their masters, in particular their attitude to the dominant language and the dominated languages." This "colonized mentality" appears clearly in one post-colonial development called "elite closure": the rich and well-connected secure education in the ex-colonial language to provide their offspring with the best careers, while the children of the masses struggle to find decent jobs because of their education in the institutionalised (national and/or official) language which lacks social and economic capital (Jaffe 2006).

As regards the main colonial ideologies manipulated by colonisers, they all stem from an essentialist philosophical position which produces belief in the supremacy of one's race, culture, language, etc. (Jaffe 2006; Janicki 1993). For present purposes, only three colonial ideologies are considered here, as identified by Luisa Martín Rojo (2010: 250-264). The first one, called the "ideology of ethnicization", is synonymous with the above-mentioned "ideology of minorisation" which seeks to divide and rule people.

The second ideology, the "ideology of monolingualism", is taken as a norm enshrined in language planning. As an element of nation-building, it defines group membership with a single language tied to a unitary identity, and any inconsequential differentiation must be erased in the name of communication efficiency and national unity. The monolingual ideology rhymes thus with homogeneity, particularly with standardisation or "normative monolingualism" (Irvine and Gall 2000: 76). The latter has insidious objectives: to ensure people's allegiance to the fatherland and the colonial empire, planners use "language governmentality" to "regulate the language use, thought, and action of different people, groups, and organizations" (Pennycook 2006: 65). Normative monolingualism is also associated with the social distribution of capital in the Bourdieusard perspective: highly valued linguistic varieties have a certain "cultural capital", but they are not available to all members of society (Martín Rojo 2010: 257). In this inclusion/exclusion process, schools have an agent role in the colonial context (segregationist policies) and in the post-colonial era (elite closure).

The third and final colonial ideology is the "ideology of language hierarchies", a companion to racial categorisation typical of 19th-century ethnocentrism (Van den Avenne 2012: 2-5). At the time, European producers of discourse were convinced that some "developed" nations had better languages than other tongues deemed inferior (Coulmas 1989: 181; Robins 1979: 175-176). In Europe, the French have probably the most elaborate ideology of language hierarchies often traced to the *Académie Française*, Rivarol, the Revolution, etc. (Phillipson 2003; Wardhaugh

1987). In colonial Algeria, France used it in unrestrained terms and associated it with the ideologies of ethnicization and monolingualism to disrupt the colony’s language habitat.

3. Disruptions to Algeria’s linguistic ecology

In 1830, the French conquered Algeria which went on to become an integral part of the metropolis in 1848. In 1840, Marshal Bugeaud was appointed Algeria’s governor-general and military commander to ruthlessly conclude the seizure of this territory which was strongly defended by its natives. The Marshal confirmed France’s overseas settlement and colonialism by encouraging the relocation of *colons* (colonists), and forcibly expropriating local lands (Horne 1987). To him, total colonisation meant total war, and he made the colonial project a reality thanks to an army which grew from 37,000 in 1830 to 107,000 in 1847 (Harchi 2004).

Bugeaud felt no inhibition in using genocidal methods as he planned to turn the conquered land into “a vast cemetery” (Hussey 2014: 100). Parliamentarians and anthropologists shared his ideas**:** the former called for a “war of extermination” and the latter hoped to see a future “Algeria without Algerians” (Brower 2012: 61). Between 1830 and 1871, 825,000 Algerians died as war victims and 250,000 disappeared as a result of emigration, the destruction of traditional solidarity, drought, famines and epidemics. Estimated at three million in 1830, the indigenous population had decreased by one third by around 1871 (Kateb 2010). The French army’s brutality was accompanied by seizure of lands ceded to settlers from France and southern Europe (Corsica, Italy, Spain, Malta, etc.). Their number increased rapidly, from 25,000 during the 1830–1840 period to 245,000 in 1871, 781,000 in 1940 and around one million in the 1950s (Horne 1987). Greedy for land, these colonists declared Algeria *Res-nullius* to delegitimise the natives, eliminate them physically and grab their properties (Hussey 2014).

Since 1529, Algeria had been under a loose suzerainty of Ottoman military rule, controlled via tribal segments and urban aristocracies – under the Turks, activities were exclusively geared towards agriculture and nomadism, and only 5–6% of the total population lived in cities (Ruedy 1992). With military violence and land expropriation, France dismantled Algeria’s age-old social organisation based on 516 tribes (Harbi 1994). Urban elites (bourgeoisie, religious and military rulers) disappeared with the collapse of their milieu deserted by its inhabitants. Cities lost the richest and most educated segments of their populations, and the Turkish establishment estimated at 15,000 departed for Turkey in 1830 (Kateb 2010;

Ruedy 1992). The urban habitat was reconfigured by colonists who replaced the natives and outnumbered them until the mid-20th century (Hussey 2014; Wesseling 2009).

The French also disrupted Algeria's linguistic situation. Prior to 1830, Literary Arabic was common to all as the language of their Islamic faith. Moreover, half of the rural population spoke local Arabic and the other spoke half-Berber varieties (Valensi 1969). Interestingly, between the Arab conquest in the 7th century and the French invasion, Arabic failed to displace Berber completely despite its high prestige as the language of Islam. In fact, the traditional system did not require the masses to have a native competency in Arabic. It was internalised for religious needs and for reaching out to the Muslim world (*umma*), while mother tongues remained for day-to-day communicative interactions outside religion. Normative monolingualism and attendant language governmentality were quite alien to Algerians at the time. This linguistic tolerance also coloured the few urban centres, situated mainly along the Mediterranean coast. According to contemporaries, Algiers was home to approximately fifteen languages between the 16th and the 19th centuries (de Haëdo 1998).

Thus, French imperialism transformed Algeria's linguistic profile. With the elimination of one third of the population, the Berber-speaking community decreased dramatically: estimated at 50% in 1830, it fell to 18.6% when France left in 1962 (Chaker 1998). Furthermore, brutal force went hand in hand with the denigration of the natives' traditional values, particularly Islam and the Arabic language. For example, in 1862, the Orientalist Ernest Renan (1862: 27) wrote: "Islam is the complete negation of Europe; Islam is fanaticism." Then in 1897, the Minister of Public Education outlined his department's activities in Algeria: "[The] conquest will be by the School: this should ensure the predominance of our language over the various local idioms … and replace ignorance and fanatical prejudices by the simple but precise notions of European science." (Colonna 1975: 40)

3.1 Disorganisation of the traditional schooling system

The other disruption to Algeria's linguistic ecology concerns the traditional schooling system ripped apart by the French. Yet, until 1830, it had served local purposes quite well since literacy in Arabic stood at 40–50% (Gordon 1978). Colonialism affected education in two different ways. First, traditional schools collapsed between the 1840s and the end of the 19th century. Around 1850, the literacy rate was almost halved, then it worsened further when the administration fell into the hands of European civilians in

1871 (Colonna 1975). Second, Muslim parents adopted systematic "resistance-refusal" which lasted until the 1920s. They were suspicious of France's secular education seen as an evangelistic policy to de-Islamise children (Djeghloul 1986). Their mistrust was reinforced when France passed a law in 1883 to systematise declericalized education and disseminate standard French in primary schools. This Act imposed the exclusive use of French for Muslim school children, and it explicitly dismissed Arabic: "The Arabic language could only be taught after class hours" (Lanly 1970: 18). So, the indigenous youth did not join colonial education in large numbers. Compared to European enrolments in French-language schools, Muslim enrolments remained very low until World War I (WWI) when they increased slowly, from 3,172 in 1882 to 32,517 in 1907 (see Figure 2.1). These figures are fairly insignificant because there were 730,000 native children of primary-school age in 1908. As for Europeans who attended primary schools, there were 40,468 non-French and 60,137 French children in 1900–1901 (Lanly 1970).

Negative attitudes towards French education changed after WWI during which Muslims served in the French army or replaced conscripted French workers. Both conscripts and workers quickly realised the importance of modern education for social advancement. By 1920 to 1922 the demand had increased for more French education (Colonna 1975). However, this evolution did not meet with an ambitious educational plan because the *colons* refused it (see Figure 2.1), and when they tolerated it, they preferred segregationist schools. Until 1949, European children and those of Muslim collaborators followed an "A" teaching programme that opened the door for advanced studies. Programme "B" concerned three quarters of the total number of colonised children. This apartheid-like curriculum trained second-class citizens who could not progress beyond low-level vocational training (Hadjeres 1960). In sum, the European community was at an advantage, and it is worth studying it now.



Figure 2.1: European and Muslim (*indigènes*) enrolments in colonial primary schools, 1883–1938 (in thousands) (Colonna 1975: 14)

3.2 New man in contemporary Latin Africa

At the end of the 19th century, there were major social and political changes in Algeria. Following the 1871 uprisings in Kabylia, a mountainous region in the east of Algiers, European civilians dominated much of the colonial administration. Their number grew from 245,117 in 1872 to 633,850 in 1901, and 791,700 in 1921 (Kateb 2010). In 1870, the authorities granted full French citizenship to all Jews (*Crémieux* decree), and, in June 1889, all Europeans became French nationals but not the Muslims. The native population, which decreased dramatically around 1870, re-established itself at 3.3 million in 1886, then took off from 3.6 million in 1891 to 4.4 million in 1906, and 4.9 million in 1921. Between the 1920s and 1950s, the Muslims' birth-rate was ten times higher than that of the Europeans (Kateb

2010). Colonists worried about being washed overboard by a Muslim wave which, in effect, started to surge forward with the rise of Algerian nationalism in the 1920s. This nationalism grew in the diaspora in France, the Middle East and Algeria’s urban centres where the rate of urbanisation rose from 16.6% in 1906 to 20.2% in 1926 (Khiar 1992). In this section and those that follow, I look at developments for both Europeans and Muslims and their relationship with each other, studied through the lens of some of their intellectuals.

The colonists’ demographic growth and their appropriation of the political and administrative powers facilitated the implementation of an ever more racist and unequal system. Consequently, the use of racist language increased substantially to justify the natives’ “deficiencies” and legitimise the Europeans’ superiority. Colonists considered Muslims as “inferior and particularly degenerate races” (Kateb 2010: 206).

One man, Louis Bertrand, proved to be instrumental in constructing the identity of European settlers and their colony, or “contemporary Latin Africa” as he called it. Bertrand argued that colonisers were directly descended from Ancient Rome and its six-century-long occupation of Algeria. He made a fetish of the Latin past, and his indifference to the Muslims made him discount the Arab and Ottoman dominations. Colonists were quick to identify themselves with the “new Latin race” as “heirs” of the Romans. They were the “new” man and “new” society, and they justified the “new” by sanctifying it as old to maintain a sense of identity (Graebner 2007; Lorcin 1995). So, descendants of Spaniards, Italians, Maltese, etc., reserved the term “Algerian” for themselves to symbolically kill the natives. Incidentally, when Algeria gained its independence in 1962, the vast majority of Europeans abruptly repatriated to France, and they swapped the term “Algerian” for *Pied-Noir* (Black Feet), a denomination they had not assumed before (Gosnell 2002).

The *Pieds-Noirs*’ loss of their “homeland” comes from their rightist politics and their blindness to the Muslims, their cultures and their languages, especially Arabic. For example, there were only 210 Arabic loanwords in colonial French, while the number of French lexical items assimilated into Algerian Arabic has been estimated at 140 out of every 1,665 words (Benrabah 2013; Lanly 1970). Among these 210 Arabic lexical borrowings, several terms convey racial prejudice and the harsh realities of everyday life dominated by unequal power relations. They include words like *balek* (“Get out of the way!”), *rodd balek* (“Look out!”), *emchi* (“Keep moving!”), *skoot* (“Shut up!”) and *boujadi* (“a fool”). Their sheer number “gives the image of an offensive and violent [native] community” (Hureau 2010: 279). Moreover, segregation reinforced this perception and increased the settlers' ignorance of Muslims: "In school", Algerian-born Jacques Attali writes, "we did not know any Arab because we could not see them … And the rare Arabic words I knew consisted of orders: 'Get out of the way', 'Shut up', etc" (Koubi 1979: 17).

3.3 Celebrating the dehumanisation of "Arabs"

Europeans at the top of the social hierarchy did not shy from employing the words *indigène* and "Arab", two of the most notorious racist terms used to name the natives. For the purposes of this study, I will only consider the word "Arab". With it, colonists expressed their indifference towards the "anonymous figure", the Muslim. The most remarkable examples come from two novels of *Pied-Noir* writer Albert Camus, *The Plague* [*La Peste*] and *The Outsider* [*L'Étranger*]. Both books are devoid of Algeria's natives. *The Plague*'s setting is Oran in the 1940s, the most Christian city of French Algeria with its 300,000 settlers against 150,000 natives (Chaulet-Achour 1998; Horne 1987). Camus's blindness to one third of the Oranese population comes out in the number of times he mentions the word "Arab". The novel's content reveals three occurrences of this term, on pages 22, 68 and 98 (Camus 1947). To Christiane Chaulet-Achour (1998: 135), an Algerian academic of French descent, there were extenuating circumstances: "In fiction", she writes, "the echo of reality cannot always be measured against the number of words related to it." A paraphrase of novelist Chinua Achebe (1977) suffices to say that Camus's work calls into question the very humanity of the colonised.

In *The Outsider*, set in Algiers in the late 1930s, Camus's negation of Muslims as human beings strikes the reader. To Alistair Horne, "*The Outsider* … perhaps personifies the *Pied-Noir* mentality better than any other fictional character" (1987: 52). French historian Marc Ferro (2010) describes this "mentality" as fundamentally racist. In 1960, *Pied-Noir* writer Jules Roy confirmed Ferro's point: "One thing I knew because it was told me so often, was that the Arabs belonged to a different race, one inferior to my own" (Horne 1987: 55). The central theme of *The Outsider* is the irrational murder of the unknown "Arab" gunned down by the icy European narrator Meursault. The *colons*' racist blindness comes to the fore in one of the most chilling scenes in Camus's novel. After executing his victim, Meursault finds himself in a prison cell full of Muslims who laugh at him and then ask what he has done. "I said that I killed an Arab and they remained silent", Meursault says (Camus 1942: 104). Camus does not question the prisoners' silence, not even fear it.

In November 1954 when the National Liberation Front (FLN in French) launched Algeria's War of Liberation, Camus expressed his settler nationalism during the 1957 Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm. Asked to choose between his mother and justice, he picked the former. His nationalist mentality can also be depicted in his views on language. To him, being "Algerian" meant speaking only French, and like the majority of *Pieds-Noirs*, he spoke no Arabic (Benrabah 2013). In truth, he had little patience with the Arabic language and the natives' Arabo-Islamic identity. For example, in a series of reports on life in Kabylia published in 1939, he denounced the French government's "arabizing their country [Kabylia] with the *caidat* [Muslim administration] and with the introduction of Arabic" (Camus 1958: 72). Then, during March and April 1958 in the midst of the Liberation War, he expressed his loyalty to colonial France (language governmentality) by rejecting any future independent Algeria that would humiliate France's Greatness symbolised by its colonies. Camus (1958: 28) said that Algeria's liberation meant "an Islamic empire which could only bring poverty and sufferings to the Arab masses." Consciously or unconsciously, he was faithful to his colonial mentality for he preferred "Arabs" to remain anonymous, silent and non-human, and the Arabic language to be eliminated from Algeria. As Jean Cohen put it in 1955 (590), "if the 'Arabs' want to be human beings, they have to dress like Europeans and speak French."

Assimilation in colonial Algeria meant the supremacy of the French language and the death of other tongues, be they European (Spanish, Italian, Maltese) or indigenous, namely Arabic and Berber. France's language policies in its North African colony succeeded in turning into Frenchmen into *Pieds-Noirs*, like Camus who was of Spanish descent. The main agent for this success was the schooling system symbolised by its teachers who were often reminisced with gratitude by their former European and Muslim students.

In actual fact, the hierarchical education of colonial Algeria trained an indigenous elite of French expression moulded by France's dominant ideologies. From the 1920s onwards, these educated Muslims filled the vacuum created by the elimination of urban leaders in the 19th century. Nonetheless, prior to this era, the absence of a native leadership to unite the colonised had produced a natural way of cohering in opposition to France: despised and disqualified by colonisers, Islam and the Arabic language kept alight the fires of resistance to colonialism. Then, when the three major strands of Algerian nationalism rose during the first quarter of the 20th century, they strongly focused on the Arabic language. Colonial France released, thus, a genie from the bottle. Unknown to Algerians in pre-colonial times, cultural polarisation by linguistic means so typical of French culture was appropriated by educated natives who adopted new thought patterns on language. Nationalist leaders took up the fight for cultural hegemony and turned colonial ideologies and discourses against France with devastating effects.

In the next two sections, I look at the policy of Frenchification through the three colonial ideologies defined at the beginning of this chapter. I show how colonists employed them to rationalise the so-called civilising properties of their language, and to indoctrinate the colonised.

3.4 Battle for minds

In French Algeria, the “ideology of ethnicization” served to divide and rule the natives along religious and/or language lines. Recall that, unlike Muslims, all Jews were granted French citizenship (*Crémieux* decree). Moreover, colonisers invented the “Berber/Kabyle myth” to divide Muslims into “superior” Berbers/Kabyles and “inferior” Arabs (Lorcin 1995: 243-250).

Following the birth of the independence nationalist party – Algerian People’s Party/Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (PPA/MTLD in French) – talks on the identity of the future “Algerian nation” divided its members. Its leader, Arabic-speaking Messali Hadj (1898–1974), defended an “Arabo-Islamic” Algeria with Literary Arabic as its language (“Arabo-Islamism”). His opponents, mainly from Berber-speaking Kabylia, backed an “Algerian Algeria” with colloquial Arabic and Berber. This strife called the “Berberist crisis” ended in 1949 in favour of Messali who condemned “Berberism” as regionalist. Thus, he laid the groundwork for contested identities in pre- and post-independent Algeria (Benrabah 2013). Nonetheless, the status of Arabic and Islam as unifying forces against colonialism prevented the “Berberist crisis” from reaching the majority of Kabylia’s PPA/MTLD supporters. French-language Kabyle writer Mouloud Feraoun (1913–1962) corroborates this. In his *Journal*, Feraoun reports almost daily on his experience of the Liberation War (1954–1962). On 2 February 1956, he describes a meeting held by the FLN freedom fighters in his Kabyle village. One of the villagers told him: “the leader … started reciting the Koran, the Surah of Al Fatiha all in Arabic. What an accent! What a tone! What a high spirit! We didn’t need to understand [what he said], it was a moving experience.” (1998: 84)

As regards the “ideology of monolingualism”, France relied on schools to displace local languages and spread its tongue. For example, Algeria’s Governor General between 1832 and 1833 said: “The remarkable feat would be to gradually replace Arabic by French … which can only spread among the natives, especially if the new generation will come in numbers to be educated in our schools" (Turin 1983: 40-41). Furthermore, the control over the Muslims' thought and linguistic use (language governmentality) was clearly stated by a theorist of colonial education in 1917: "To transform the primitive peoples in our colonies, to render them as devoted as possible to our cause … the safest method is to take the native in childhood … in a word to open schools for him where his mind can be shaped at our will." (Taleb Ibrahimi 1981: 12-13)

Recall that France passed the 1883 Act to Frenchify Muslim children and minorise Arabic. Then in 1890 and 1898, the educational authorities implemented programmes to impose French monolingualism on to young natives (Colonna 1975). As for the Arabic language, it was introduced in secondary schools as a "foreign" language. Being poorly taught, students and teachers took it lightly. Those who used it during playtime faced humiliation. Born in 1931 to a Muslim father and a French mother, Betoule Fekkar-Lambiotte (2007: 60-61) testifies to this: "I was destined to be bilingual, even though, when playing and speaking Arabic in the schoolyard, I was often slapped by my teachers who dictated that 'At the French school, speak French'!"

Within Algeria's nationalist movement, one party proved favourably disposed to monolingualism: the reformist Association of the Algerian Muslim Ulema (AAMU) – "Ulema" meaning "Muslim scholars". Founded in 1931, the AAMU grounded its doctrine on the return to the first principles of Islam to regenerate Algeria (*Islah*). These religio-conservatives called for the integration of the "Algerian Muslim community within the great French family" (Stora 1991: 75). However, after World War II, they adopted Messali Hadj's agenda until they joined the FLN in 1956. Their creed says: "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland" (Bennoune 2000: 168-169). The Ulema equated Algerian identity with their urban and bourgeois background. They rejected the faith of the majority, the rural populations and their languages, and dialectal Arabic and Berber (Horne 1987). The AAMU defended Literary Arabic as the single spoken/written language to unify both the Algerian nation and the Arabophone zone (pan-Arabism). They thus divorced from the pre-colonial linguistic tolerance discussed above.

In truth, the Ulema followed unhesitatingly the Middle Eastern founders of pan-Arab linguistic nationalism, an imitative adaptation of Western culture that posits an essential link between a single language (Literary Arabic) and a unitary "Arab" identity. Pan-Arabism also considers local linguistic varieties divisive for the Arab nation (Benrabah 2013).

Unsurprisingly, the Ulema harboured suspicions about Algeria's Berberophones. For example, in 1948, they urged France to shut down Kabyle-language radio programmes, arguing that Kabyles would be real Algerians when they "ceased to whisper their jargon (the Kabyle language) which grates on our ears" (Ouerdane 2003: 80). It must be noted here that the Ulema will strongly influence language planning in the post-independence period.

3.5 Dazzling power of French language and culture

As an expression of the "ideology of language hierarchies", the French regarded Arabic and Berber as "nonlanguages" for they were "small languages", "defective", "degenerate" and "without grammatical rules" (Chaker 1981: 451; Morsly 1990: 81). For example, in 1886, Onésime Reclus (1886: 680) described Arabic and Berber as sharing "a passion for terrible guttural sounds which resemble vomiting". In 1931, William Marçais disqualified Literary Arabic because of its alleged incapacity to deal with the modern world. This Whorfian faith implies the French language would better instruct Muslims in the way of modernity and colonised elites internalised this rhetoric, as illustrated by Feraoun's (1998: 4) writings in 1955: "What is a native for the European? He is a man with ludicrous manners, peculiar customs, and with an impossible language."

Such colonial discourse also influenced nationalists like Ferhat Abbas (1899–1985). In his early writings, Abbas defended assimilation and rejected a separate national identity for Algerians. With Germany's occupation of France in 1940, reformist Abbas hardened his position like the Ulema. When the War of Algeria broke out, he joined the FLN, and, in 1958, he headed the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA in French). Heretofore, Abbas had consistently called for the teaching of Arabic and he even demanded its recognition as an official language in 1943. He, nevertheless, asked France to modernise Algeria through "a powerful lever: the language of Corneille and of Racine" (Abbas 2011: 130). Long after Algeria's independence, Abbas remained attached to France's culture. In the preface to the 1981 re-edition of his book, first published in 1931, he argues: "one cannot spend his youth with Pascal, Corneille, Racine, Danton, Saint-Just, Pasteur, Hugo, without acquiring a certain citizenship … without also getting attached to this education and regret that it had not spread amongst one's compatriots." (2011: 29) The belief in the French language being the only route to the modern world (Whorfian faith) has proved durable and it persists to this day (Benrabah 2013: 78-80).

While the GPRA was successfully ending the independence war, the FLN met at Tripoli, Libya, in May–June 1962. The Tripoli meeting repudiated the GPRA leadership and sanctified the military as the backbone of independent Algeria. It also determined the political programme for the future government which was urged:

> … to restore to the Arabic language, which incarnates the cultural values of the nation, its dignity and effectiveness … our culture must be Algerian, founded on the Arabic language which is deep-rooted in the nation … to establish scientifically a basic vocabulary of Arabic common to the countries of the Maghreb. (Murphy 1977: 5)

This announcement fixed independent Algeria’s language policy called Arabisation. The omission of any reference to regional languages and cultures reveals that it will be as exclusive as colonial Frenchification. Moreover, in April 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella, soon-to-be the first Head of State, resoundingly declared: “We are Arabs, we are Arabs, we are Arabs.” He, therefore, defined Algerians’ national identity as “fundamentally” Arab, as an echo to Messali Hadj’s choice in 1949. Nonetheless, the nationalist discourse, very effective in theorising Algerians’ opposition to colonial France, would soon be confronted with the country’s realities.

4. Who are we?

After France’s defeat in July 1962, Algeria was completely transformed. There were 10 million inhabitants, 25% lived in towns and around one million non-Muslims left the country (Kateb 2010). Illiteracy stood at around 90%, only 300,000 (5.5%) could read Literary Arabic, 10.6% were literate in Arabic and French, 8.9% in French only, and 18.6% spoke Berber (Bennoune 2000; Chaker 1998). Hence, colonialism produced “a linguistic drama” hinted at by an Algerian poet/writer in 1963: “In ten to fifteen years … Arabic will have replaced French completely and English will be on its way to replacing French as a second language. French is a clear and beautiful language … but it holds too many bitter memories for us” (Gordon 1966: 113). The poet/writer raises the issue of Algerians’ sense of alienation and the scars left by the colonial genocide of populations and languages. “Psychologically damaged” (Hussey 2014: 67), Algerians had a “problem of identity”, and they soon asked: “Who are we?” (Déjeux 1965: 6; Gordon 1966: 201-202).

Debates on national identity dealt with Islam and the Arabic language. Two ideological opposites emerged: Marxists/thinkers influenced by Western progressive-materialistic theories, and the religio-conservative

Ulema. The language issue concerned Arabisation and the French language. For the former, progressive thinkers called for gradual Arabisation, but their opponents insisted on its rapid implementation; the religio-conservatives chose Literary Arabic, but the opposition supported dialectical Arabic and Berber; Marxists wanted Arabic to replace French in most linguistic uses ("Arabicisation"), but their opponents preferred Arabisation-Islamisation (assimilation) to provide populations with an exclusively Arabo-Islamic identity. As for the ex-colonial language, Marxists favoured its appropriation, but the opposition wanted it dead.

Following Algeria's independence, the authorities played a major role in language planning. Supporters of Arabicisation held power in President Ben Bella's government (1962–1965), but there were Cabinet members who supported Arabisation-assimilation, particularly the president. For example, in October 1962, he abolished the only Chair of Berber studies at Algiers University. In return, an armed revolt erupted in Kabylia in 1963–1964. The rebels were former FLN freedom fighters who had adhered to Arabo-Islamism to transcend divisions and fight colonialism, but they unanimously refused it as Algeria's official dogma. The Kabyle rebels' defeat in 1964 led to the imposition of a monolithic identity based on Arabo-Islamism, the image of colonial Frenchification. In status planning, the authorities chose monolingualism: the first Constitution sanctified Arabic as the country's unique national/official language in September 1963. As for acquisition planning, Ben Bella did not Arabise education systematically. Confronted with the religio-conservatives' call for the total Arabisation of schools, the first Education Minister defended its gradual implementation. Yet, in September 1964, the first grade in the primary cycle was Arabised, and to compensate for the lack of Arabic-language teachers, the government recruited around 1,000 Egyptian instructors.

Ben Bella's cautious implementation of Arabisation ended with the military coup on 19 June 1965, which would deeply affect Algeria's language planning. The putsch weakened the legitimacy of the country's leaders who chose the legitimising cover of language. This meant the politicisation of the linguistic issue, and the adoption of ever more radical measures. When the coup leader, Houari Boumediene, declared his presidency to be guided by Arabo-Islamic ideals, the Ulema joined his Cabinet. The new leadership's determination to abandon Ben Bella's approach to Arabisation is best illustrated in a declaration made by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Boumediene's first Education Minister. Taleb Ibrahimi said: "This [Arabisation] will not work, but we have to do it" (Grandguillaume 1995: 18). Arabisation-assimilation (Islamisation) in both status and acquisition planning was part of the new government's agenda.

In education, it became more assertive with language governmentality clearly voiced by elites who echoed colonial discourses. In November 1965, Taleb Ibrahimi (1981: 72) asked: "What kind of man do we want to train (in schools)?" Then he quoted T. S. Eliot saying: "Culture is something that *must grow. You cannot build* a *tree*; you can only plant it, and care for it, and wait for it to mature" (1981: 66). He even used expressions like "a new Algerian" and "a new Algeria", and talked about the need for new generations "to learn to think in Arabic" (1981: 217-218).

4.1 Return to the sources

After Ben Bella's downfall, educational policies were focused inward, as illustrated in the teaching of history for sixth-graders, the first subject to be Arabised. From September 1966, "school-children tackled history starting not from Antiquity but from the beginnings of Islam" (Haouati 1995: 56). In his writings, Taleb Ibrahimi (1981: 61, 98) insists on the need to recover for Algeria her "authenticity" and "to return to the sources of Arabo-Islamic culture". At the time, historian David Gordon (1971: 20) cast doubt on Taleb Ibrahimi's project:

> Taleb's theme … raises the question … whether the past he speaks of can, first, be resurrected in the modern world, and, second, whether the French 'overlay' may not be, for good or bad, an intrinsic part of modern Algeria. Taleb's argument is typical of many intellectuals of new nations who are more often inspired by sensibility than historical realism.

In fact, Taleb Ibrahimi (1981: 63) does not only reject the French "overlay", he also dismisses Algeria's linguistic-cultural substratum that he describes as "this mixture of elements from ill-assorted and often contradictory cultures". So, following the military overthrow of 1965, Algeria's history would continue to be abused with the writing and re-writing of textbooks that ignore "historical realism".

The 1970s saw the intensification of an ever more repressive Arabisation that evokes colonial practices. For example, Berber-speaking schoolchildren were among its victims: "Speaking Kabyle [Berber] was forbidden … Teachers punished children caught speaking Kabyle" (Sharkey 2012: 438-439). Finally, in 1974, elementary education was completely Arabised, and the teaching of French as a subject began with the third-graders. Then, an experimental schooling system called the Fundamental School was implemented in 1976. It consisted of nine consecutive years with the Arabic language serving as the medium of instruction for all subjects, with the exception of foreign languages. In 1976–1977, Boumediene made Algerians vote for the National Charter (an authoritative analysis of the national situation and goals), a new Constitution, the president, and the parliament. His Constitution confirmed Arabic as Algeria’s single national/official language, and the Charter condemned Berberophones’ demands for the institutionalisation of their language as “regionalism”, a “social scourge to be eradicated” (Murphy 1977: 7).

One year before Boumediene’s death in December 1978, his government made a pause in the over-hasty Arabisation, but his successor, Chadli Bendjedid, resumed the country’s systematic Arabisation. President Bendjedid generalised the Fundamental School, and the secondary cycle was fully Arabised (de-Frenchified) in 1989. Concerning status planning, “Act No. 91-05 of 16 January 1991, on the generalization of the use of the Arabic language” is probably the most important French-style Jacobin piece of legislature to be enacted since 1962. Its initiator boasted about using as his model France’s “Act 75-1349 of 31 December 1975”, an anti-English law driven by the fear of “Anglo-Saxon” domination (Benrabah 2013: 71).

To conclude this section, I will describe the practice of elite closure in post-1962 Algeria. In truth, leaders resorted to schools operated by France to educate their children who thereby avoided institutions that catered for the masses. They chose French for good careers in modern business and technology which required competence in the ex-colonial language. As a colonial legacy, elite closure shows conflicting societal goals. It implies that French is more valuable than Arabic, and that the latter would put at a disadvantage those who choose it or are forced to study in it. This strategy expresses the rulers’ reproduction of the Whorfian faith introduced by colonial France. Soon after independence, leaders who had internalised this myth maintained Arabic for prayers and French for modernity, tying henceforth Arabisation to Islamisation and Francophonie to secularisation (Ruedy 1992).

4.2 Perverted language planning

“In Algeria”, James McDougall (2011: 251) writes, “the official Arab-Islamic formulation of national identity has arguably been, in some respects, the most obviously artificial and imposed of all Arab nationalist rhetorics.” It is a somewhat similar situation to France’s forced Frenchification of Algeria, and as expected it has generated resistance from the population. This stems from the elite’s internalisation of colonial ideologies which prevented them from contemplating alternatives to those of Europe/France. To them, French Jacobinism-Unitarianism based on monolingualism and linguistic hierarchies represented the legitimate way for building modern nations. Centralised language policies are, therefore, inherently confrontational in a multilingual country like Algeria. They have produced “unplanned” developments that pervert language planning. These results involve language conflicts, the rise of conservatism/traditionalism, the lowering of standards in education and linguistic acquisition, and language shift, etc. (Benrabah 2005). Only language conflicts will be discussed here.

Soon after Boumediene’s death, President Bendjedid found himself confronted with two language-related crises. The first one concerns Arabised students at Algiers University who, in November 1979, rebelled against French favouritism and the lack of economic opportunities for those graduating in Arabic. The fear of the protest being captured by Islamic fundamentalists, who had been on the rise, made the authorities Arabise the secondary and university levels, and also compel the judicial system to provide jobs for Arabised law graduates. This is how Arabisers came to dominate the country’s cultural activities. Nevertheless, prestigious functions related to economic power have still been occupied so far by those competent in French.

The second conflict would prove far more challenging to the government than the Arabisers’ strike. When the authorities made concessions to the Arabic-language students at the end of 1979, Kabylia went into civil disobedience in the spring of 1980. Demonstrators shouted slogans like “We are not Arabs”. Indeed, “many of the Kabyle children who went through the first Arabised schools developed in exactly the opposite way that the government intended: rather than becoming more ‘Arab’, they became more self-consciously Berber” (Sharkey 2012: 439). Known as the “Berber Spring”, Kabylia’s convulsions were the most serious rioting of independent Algeria: as a minority nationalism, Berberism would rock official Arabo-Islamism to its foundations; it made the language issue get the better of an allegedly invincible regime. Following these uprisings, Kabyle unrest was to be rekindled nearly every decade until the early 2000s.

Around the end of President Bendjedid’s term in office, the effects of rapid social change – demographic growth, urbanisation, high literacy rates, emigration and the development of telecommunications media (e.g. satellite TV channels) – led to the youths’ nationwide uprisings of October 1988. The 1988 *intifada* transformed Algeria’s socio-political panorama. In February 1989, the authorities adopted a new Constitution which confirmed Arabic as the single national/official language, and guaranteed basic human rights, including freedom of expression (Ruedy 1992). So, young Algerians rejected the officialised a-historical narrative and demanded a new narrative based on the history of Algeria that had been banned. The question of "Who are we?", unanswered in the 1960s, resurfaced in the late 1980s with voices calling for the recognition of the country's complex history and linguistic-cultural pluralism (Aït Saadi-Bouras 2013). At the time, Islamic fundamentalism, which had been rising since the end of the 1970s, developed into Algeria's most important movement with its own oppositional identity based on Islamic nationalism. The re-definition of Algerian-ness led to the tragic Civil War of the 1990s which "largely represented a battle of history and collective memory over how to be Algerian" (Sharkey 2012: 439). On this "new" Algeria, Andrew Hussey (2014: 70) observes: "During the 1990s it became all but impossible to visit Algeria. By then, reading Camus as a way-in to this Algeria was simply a waste of time."

4.3 Recent developments

Since the 2000s, Algeria has been transformed, socio-politically and economically. The number of enrolments in primary-secondary education rose from 3.9 million in 1979 to 8.2 million in 2011. Literacy increased from 52% in 1990 to around 82.2% in 2016 (Bennoune 2000; CIA 2016). The complete Arabisation of schools in 1989 has led to the majority presumably being literate in Literary Arabic today. Moreover, the total population, which is currently estimated at 40.3 million, has quadrupled since 1962, and those under the age of 30 represent the majority. In 2015, there were 45.9 million mobile phones and 15.1 million internet users, and the rate of urbanisation stood at 70.7% (CIA 2016). Regarding the regime, it changed direction politically and ideologically as a result of the pressure exerted internally (Berber Spring, 1988 *intifada*, Civil War) and externally (economic globalisation). In actual fact, the inward-looking vision of Algerian-ness, dominant until the 1990s, started to give way to a pluralist approach. And centralised socialist economic planning, which characterised the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, was gradually replaced by the market economy.

In April 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president. His public discourse signalled, amongst other things, the advent of new language policies to supplement ongoing political and economic change (Benrabah 2005). This affected status and acquisition planning activities. When uprisings burst out in the Berber-speaking areas in April 2001, parliamentarians declared Berber a national (but not official) language in April 2002. Then the authorities hesitated for almost fourteen years before adopting "Act No. 16-01 of the 6 March 2016" to recognise Berber as

Algeria's second official language. The government's long period of hesitation fuelled Berberophones' sense of cultural marginalisation, a real catalyst for radical developments. One Berberist group, the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK in French), has jumped in to capitalise on Berber resentment. The party leader has developed a minority nationalist narrative based on the "Kabyle myth" invented by France's colonial ideologues. In June 2010, the MAK established the Provisional Government of Kabylia, and in March 2016, its leader described Algeria's regime as "colonial power" (Arab 2016).

With regard to acquisition planning, the committee established in May 2000 by President Bouteflika made, among other things, two language-related recommendations: the introduction of the French language in the second year of elementary education instead of the fourth year, and the teaching of scientific subjects in French in secondary schools. But nationalist-Islamist-conservative quarters strongly opposed these reforms, and the authorities suspended them. In September 2004, French was finally introduced for second-graders, then moved from grade 2 to grade 3 two years later. Concerning the teaching of scientific disciplines in French, it has not been implemented to this day (Oulebsir 2016: 4).

It is probably in the teaching of history that the most innovations have been introduced in programmes since 2002–2003. In her comparative study of 40 history textbooks used between 1962–1963 and 2008, Lydia Aït Saadi-Bouras (2013: 451) shows how schoolchildren's learning of their origins has changed with the new syllabus: "they develop young Algerians' healthy attachment to their fatherland". So, loyalty to the "Arab nation" has been replaced by loyalty to Algeria. Nevertheless, the collective identity in the new textbooks does not account for all the constituent parts of the country's complex history. For example, the Berber dimension continues to be minorised: schoolbooks present Berberophones as "separatists". In sum, schools encourage children to be loyal to Algeria, but they present Algerian-ness in truncated form. This denial suggests that an Algerian Algeria is still not part of the agenda. With the recent institutionalisation of Berber, it remains to be seen whether the questions of language and identity will continue to be in a state of chronic pathology, or they will finally be solved for the sake of socio-linguistic peace.

5. Conclusion

Lessons from Algeria's colonised and decolonised linguistic histories may be useful for understanding other cases in the world, particularly those where language planning represents a repeat performance of colonial practices.

As "new men", the settlers of French Algeria sought legitimacy in the Roman past to disqualify indigenous people's languages and cultures, and to Frenchify them through one language (French monolingualism and language governmentality). After France's defeat, decolonised elites decided to "return to the sources" of Arab-Islamic "authenticity" to de-Frenchify and Arabise Algerians through Arabic monolingualism as a form of control over their thought and language use. The policy of Frenchification and its image linguistic Arabisation were not enlightened by historical realism for they failed to account for Algeria's complex histories.

Today, this country is divided by religion, language, etc. Linguistic divisions come mainly from the colonial ideologies introduced by France and internalised by decolonised leaders who reproduced them in modern times.

The ideologies of ethnicization and monolingualism have given rise to oppositional identities based on Berberist and Islamic nationalism. Whether the recent recognition of Berber as an official language takes its toll on one colonial legacy (monolingual ideology) remains an open question. As for the ideology of language hierarchies, it still continues to plague people with the toxic Whorfian faith – French equals modernity, Arabic equals traditionalism – that prevents Arabic from being a working language in most linguistic domains. However, the remarkable spread of Arabic (de-Frenchification), and the linguistic pressures exerted by the globalised world and its linguistic voice – the English language – do not augur well for the future of the ex-colonial language in the long term. In view of France's excesses in French Algeria, this is not at all surprising.

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CHAPTER THREE

AMAZIGH LANGUAGE POLICY IN MOROCCO AND THE POWER OF CONTRADICTION[1]

CHELSEA BENTON-MONAHAN AND CRISTINE G. SEVERO

> *Ah, let me explain this word. We don't say Berber, we say Amazigh, because it has been a long time now that people have called us Berber, meaning they don't like them (us).*
>
> Malika (interviewee for this research)

1. Introduction

Situated in the upper north-east corner of the African continent, Morocco has long stood as a crossroads between Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Countless people have crossed its borders and shores, and numerous empires have attempted to conquer its land. Within Morocco, language policy is a delicate matter that must be addressed for the betterment of the country, its people and its solidarity. Central to this issue is the Amazigh language, which has been battling for higher status and officiality against Arabic and French for almost seven decades now. Its speakers make up the so-called indigenous population of Morocco as well as its close neighbours of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Sahel, holding deep cultural ties to the land. Within the past two decades, the Amazigh community in Morocco has finally gained significant momentum in improving its status. One of the ways that this was achieved was by having its language officially taught in schools in 2003 and made into an official language, alongside Arabic, in 2011. However, this language policy has not played out in real life as it has on official paper, leaving its current status in a vague, unclear state. Many are aware of the Amazigh language policy and the positive steps that the king has taken to support it, but very little can be found in regard to the policy after 2011, leaving one to wonder about its current state.

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This chapter describes the Amazigh language policy based both on scholarly research and on a local individual's experience. It begins with a background of Moroccan history as it pertains to the Amazigh community and language. Then, it is explained how the Amazigh language gained recognition, first being taught in schools in 2003 and then being made into an official language in 2011, in contrast and comparison to the perspective of an Amazigh teacher in Morocco. An interview with an Amazigh teacher in Morocco called Malika was conducted in May 2017 by Chelsea Benton-Monahan in a city located in north-central Morocco. Malika knew the language and was of Amazigh origin. We aimed to examine the perspective of a local individual who had gone through the process of Amazigh's official recognition. We argue that the local teacher's personal experience with this language policy allows us to understand that the policy comes to light as a product of the tension between top-down and bottom-up forces. Even though it is not our purpose to generalise Malika's personal experience, we believe that by focusing on this individual narrative we may understand "the precise position they [the teachers] hold in society and reproducing at this scale the same sense of order and expectation we recognise as that of the society as a whole" (Miller 2009: 5).

The process to find a teacher that taught Amazigh was an arduous task that, when reviewed, showed a need to be included in the analysis of the interview, for it sheds light on the current political and social constructions that exist within Morocco. One example was the need for an official letter of approval which was written mainly in Modern Standard Arabic. On the top of this letter there was the royal crest of the monarchy, and to each side it stated the official name of the ministry: "Ministry of Education, Professional Training, Superior Teaching and Scientific Research." To the left it was written in Amazigh, and to the right it was written in Arabic. Since Amazigh is an official language, it is understandable why government documents now have Amazigh on them. If a simple letter used three languages to convey separate but necessary meanings, then it is not hard to imagine how the rest of society must use these languages interchangeably to effectively communicate. A second example is the interview, which took place in an administrative office within the school and lasted about 40 minutes. The interview was conducted in Moroccan Arabic, and afterwards we had to translate it into French, and then into English. In the interview, it took a great deal of energy for just three people in a room to understand one another. Enlarge this to a national scale, and again, it is not hard to imagine the communicative difficulties that exist throughout the country.

This chapter is divided into three sections: first, we bring a general view of Morocco's culture, history and language policy; then, we focus on issues related to Amazigh in terms of language, ideology and power; and the third section is about the relationships between teacher education, literacy and standardisation of Amazigh. At the end of this chapter, it is concluded that in the case of the Amazigh language policy, the policy itself has been generated and maintained due to the interplay of these top-down and bottom-up forces. While this has unfortunately left it in an unclear, nebulous state, it has also allowed it to survive to this day.

2. Morocco: Culture, history and language policy

The official beginning of Morocco's history is contested among scholars, with many believing it began in the Arab-Islamic era during the 7th century. However, other scholars claim it dates back as far as the 3rd century during the period of Amazigh reign, when the majority of the population consisted of various ethnic groups that had settled in the area from different regions of the Eastern world, mainly being Amazigh with a few Jewish and Christian diasporas (Ennaji 2005). It wasn't until the Arab conquest in the 7th century that all this changed, for with this conquest came the religion of Islam and the language of Arabic. The majority of the population adopted this religion, and the association of Arabic with the Quran made it easy for the language to become the *lingua franca* of many communities. Amazigh ethnic groups, in the meantime, adopted the religion but dismissed the language. For this and other political or cultural reasons, they settled in the mountains and other desolate areas of the country, far away from the influence of the Arab culture. From this time forward, many Amazigh communities would continue to live in these remote areas and become marginalised from the larger society (Crawford 2002; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

In the Arab conquest, Arabic became the dominant language over Amazigh and a hybrid Arabic was born, which is distinctive to Moroccans and was used until recent times. The French Protectorate in Morocco lasted from 1912 to 1954. They developed French schools, used French as an official language for administrative processing and other governmental functions, established trade and businesses in French, and built new sections of cities that were designated only for the upper class (Ennaji 2005; Aitsiselmi and Marley 2008). With the Amazigh population, the French intentionally supported their culture and language in order to separate them from the monarchy and the Moroccan majority, who were mainly of Arab origin. Actions such as these promulgated separations even further, creating even more animosity between those who considered themselves Amazigh and those who considered themselves Arab-Moroccan. This was a precursor to Amazigh national identity and rights, which would come later in the century (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 2015; Wyrtzen 2011).

In response to years of French influence, an Arabisation movement began in Morocco to bring back Arab-Islamic identity, language and nationalism. Arabic became the official national language and Islam was declared the official religion of the state. Arabic was essentially given primary importance in all public matters as a means to establish and maintain this identity. However, the government allowed French to be taught in schools, and it continued to remain an integral part of society as well as a powerful symbol of prestige, education and wealth. Meanwhile, Amazigh retained little or no status at all and was seen only as a peasant language used for tradition and folklore (Ennaji 2005). This shows how languages can be taken as signals of dynamic and complex social, cultural and political struggles. With this history in mind, we can better understand why and how Moroccans negotiate their identity through language.

It can be argued that language identity is also formulated through code-switching, in which interlocutors index certain language choices to reflect their stance or status. In other approaches, language is very closely correlated to ethnic identity, and therefore language choice is an attempt to negotiate proximity to an ethnicity. Others argue that language choice is contingent upon social, political or economic factors, which are continually changing, causing identity negotiation to become a fluid process. Lastly, some scholars believe that negotiation of identity through language choice is bound by power relations, with the standardised language holding most power due to its instillation by hegemonic institutions (Bucholtz and Hall 2004; Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004).

In terms of language policy, whereby top-down forces are driven by ideologies surrounding laws, politics or regulations, bottom-up forces are driven by the "people" as part of their language practices. In order to look at and analyse these bottom-up forces, Shohamy (2006, 2015) argues we must examine the variety of mechanisms that indirectly create a de facto language policy, both implicitly and explicitly. These mechanisms include rules and regulations; language education; language tests; language in public space; and ideology, myths, propaganda and coercion. In this specific case study of Amazigh, it is important to examine the myriad of top-down and bottom-up forces which form the Amazigh language policy.

In certain contexts, language policies are explicitly stated from the top in order to make transparent a specific change, ideology or statute (Edwards 2013). This can be done through specific doctrines, curriculum, texts, etc., and sends an explicit message in regard to the language and its implementation within the nation state. In other cases, a policy is implicitly enacted through de facto practices, which are generated from the bottom-up and often reflect the culture within which the policy is being enacted (Shohamy 2006; Spolsky 2012). It is only through covert policy actions that the policy is maintained, but these remain unseen by the majority of the population.

Morocco is considered a multilingual state: Moroccan Arabic is the main dialect but it is not written, and therefore Modern Standard Arabic must be used for all literature, forms, etc. French is not an official language but many find it valuable for educational and economic reasons, and therefore they still learn and use it. Amazigh is an official language of the state and must be used for governmental purposes. The intricacies that lie within the day-to-day functionality of a multilingual state come to the fore in this process, and we can see why the Amazigh community may struggle for their language to be recognised.

Language policy in Morocco is complex. In the location where the research for this study was conducted, Moroccan Arabic was the main language of communication between Moroccans, demonstrating that we were in an area where the majority were of Arab descent, which is the majority population of Morocco who thereby holds the most power. Modern Standard Arabic was used on all of the signs in the administrative buildings – no French nor Amazigh could be seen. This reflects the government's ideology that Arabic is the official and most powerful language of the nation state. By utilising only Arabic on their signs, it was sending a strong message that one needed to know Arabic to be there.

As an example, Modern Standard Arabic was also used on the approval letter we mentioned above, where religious phrases were written on behalf of the monarchy. This is reflective of the religious identity of the state, for as an Islamic country, Arabic is used to represent their affiliation and devotion to the religion. French – representative of the West, modernisation, science and economics – was used on my [Chelsea Benton-Monahan] behalf as the Westerner and was not difficult for most of the Moroccans to utilise. One who knows French is often considered "educated," and therefore those within this specific office had taken the time to learn this language and reflect that identity. Amazigh was on the approval letter next to the seal of the monarchy, for the letter was an official document, but other than the letter and the Amazigh written on the school signs, it could not be seen nor heard.

3. Amazigh: Language, ideology and power relations

"Amazigh" refers to the group of so-called indigenous people that inhabit parts of Morocco, Algeria and adjoining parts of the Sahel. In Morocco, estimates vary but many figures show that the Amazigh make up approximately 30-40% of the population (around 15 million), which is the largest percentage of any country in North Africa (Ennaji 2005; Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe 2011; Zouhir 2014; El Aissati, Karsmakers and Kurvers 2011). Within Morocco there exist three predominant groups of Amazigh: Tashelhit in the southern desert regions; Tamazight in the central plains; and Tarifit in the northern Rif mountains (see Figure 3.1). All three speak different varieties of the Amazigh language, which are often unintelligible to one another (Sadiqi 2011). Based on personal observation within the country, many other groups exist from region to region, and even village to village. They wear different clothing, perform different rituals, live off the land differently and have their own traditions. This shows how languages do not exist prior to an individual's shared life and mode of living; rather, languages are a product of social and historical practices.


Tanger
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Essaouira
Goulmima
Ouarzazate
ALGÉRIE
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arabe
J. Leclerc 2008

Figure 3.1: Amazigh dialects in Morocco (Map of Berber and Arab Morocco, 2009–2015; source: http://www.mappi.net/morocco.php)

Many Amazigh communities live in remote rural[2] areas as a result of fleeing the Arab conquest. This has resulted in their marginalisation throughout the centuries, leaving them underprivileged and economically disadvantaged (Crawford 2002). Such precarious economic conditions helped to reinforce ideological perspectives that articulated poverty, lack of education, illiteracy, simplicity, oral tradition and rurality (Makoni and Meinhof 2004; Severo and Makoni 2015). The World Bank currently reports that Moroccans living in rural areas represent 46% of the population, but 66% of the poor live in rural areas (Morocco: Poverty Update 2015).

Many Amazigh are monolingual; sometimes Moroccan Arabic becomes their second language if they are exposed to the larger society, which often happens to men if they leave their village and move to a city in search of work. As a result, rural Amazigh women are often not exposed to other languages. They tend to stay at home and raise their families, which inevitably allows them to pass the language on to younger generations. Amazigh were traditionally only ever considered to be literate if they could read or write Arabic or French, which of course was contingent upon their exposure to education. Since the Amazigh had no writing system for such a long period of time and education has always been scarce in the countryside, Amazigh speakers have often been considered illiterate and uneducated (Ennaji 2005). We see that gender and linguistic differentiation are reinforced by the economic role played by individuals as well as by their concept of family, childcare and education.

By this general report we may identify how languages index social and political meanings (Irvine and Gal 2000). Scholarly research in the field of language ideology is varied and a unified definition has yet to be established, for the literature is diverse and there are a host of definitions surrounding the term (Anchimbe 2007; Kroskrity 2004; Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 1998). Despite this variety, a basic description in the book *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory* by Schieffelin et al. (1998: 20) encompasses its meaning:

> … ideologies of language are not about language alone. Rather, they envision and enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology. Through such linkages, they underpin not only linguistic

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[2] The definitions of "rural" and "urban" in Morocco may differ, but in this context rural areas include farmland, mountain areas, the desert and any other natural land areas where there are not large numbers of inhabitants. Urban areas in Morocco are those which consist of enough occupants to create and populate a robust transportation system, suburbs, a city centre, government buildings, various restaurants, hotels, etc.

> form and use but also the very notion of the person and the social group, as well as such fundamental social institutions as religious ritual, child socialization, gender relations, nation-state, schooling and the law.

In short, language ideologies are linked and influenced by a range of various social, economic and political factors. Kroskrity (2004) writes about this approach and the analysis of language and discourse as a political and economic resource utilised by speakers, ethnic groups and nation states. He provides five levels of organisation in regard to language ideologies, which help the reader understand how this field consists of a cluster of concepts with various dimensions. These levels are as follows:

1. Language ideologies represent the perception of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group.
2. Language ideologies are profitably conceived as multiple due to the plurality of social divisions, meaning groups have the potential to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group membership.
3. Members may display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies.
4. Members' language ideologies mediate between social structures and forms of talk.
5. Language ideologies are productively used in the creation and representation of various social and cultural identities.

Language ideologies in the complex situation we are analysing encompass an articulation of several categories, such as: (i) the relation between language and identity (Amazigh identity); (ii) the classification of Amazigh from a geographical perspective, which helps to differentiate sub-groups into this Amazigh identity as well as into Amazigh spoken language; (iii) the approximation of the ideas of oral tradition, childcare, being a mother and Amazigh language; (iv) the ruralisation of language by using it as an index of the ideological differentiation between urban and rural; (v) the relation between literacy and education; and (vi) the idea that what constitutes a language is an alphabet and a writing system. Also, during the analysis of the interview with Malika, we noticed that the influence of her parents' and grandparents' ideologies was reflected in her own personal experiences. Parents are undoubtedly affected by cultural, social and economic factors that influence their decisions to teach their children a specific language.

In terms of local protagonism, it is also necessary to understand the importance of the Amazigh movement, which consists of various but similar political/ethnocentral ideologies and actions (mainly protests) that have taken place in recent decades by those within the Amazigh community. When independence was gained, an Arabisation effort moved forward on behalf of the nation's nationalists, who called for a return to their Arab-Islamic roots, leaving both French and Amazigh behind. Amazigh was almost completely neglected, which contributed to the birth of the Amazigh Movement (Ennaji 2005; Collado 2013). This Movement has strived to improve their rights, promote their identity and raise their status within society through involvement within the country's political sphere, as well as challenging the ideological foundations of the country. This Movement not only exists in Morocco but also across North Africa, allowing it to be recognised at an international level (Maddy-Weitzman 2011). While most actions and protests by this Movement have been peaceful, it is important to note that some have not, such as the revolt in 1958–1959 by Amazigh tribes in the northern Rif region. Scholars attribute this Movement not only to the desire for more rights, but also to a national push towards democratisation in response to growing Islamic extremism; a new significance of diversity and pluralism that had gained momentum; and a new importance that was being given to minority, linguistic and human rights by international organisations (Errihani 2006; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

Ideologically, the Amazigh Movement consists of the following principles (Bouali 2012: 15), which helps us understand the efforts behind the Amazigh language policy:

1. Declare Amazigh as a national and official language in the Constitution.
2. Make Amazigh customs a source for national legislation.
3. Separation of religion from the state.
4. Grant certain Amazigh regions in Morocco self-rule.
5. Affirm the supremacy of international treaties over national law (which would allow Amazigh communities to defend themselves against the national government).

As can be seen, there are many other goals of the Movement besides elevating the status of the Amazigh language, turning language policy into a sociological and political field. In addition, it is imperative to understand the influence the Amazigh Movement played during the protests of the Arab Spring, which became known as the February 20th Movement. The

Amazigh Movement was one of the main driving forces behind these protests, which is what eventually pushed King Mohammed VI to make the language of Amazigh official in 2011. The king announced in a speech that along with other democratic processes, Amazigh would be instated in the Constitution as an official language alongside Arabic, pointing out the importance of Amazigh for Moroccan national identity. The constitutional Moroccan reform stated:

> Arabic remains the official language of the state, with the state laboring to protect it, develop it, and increase its usage. The Amazigh language is also considered as an official language of the state, since it represents a common credit for all Moroccans without exception. A law is to be formulated to determine the stages of the officiation of the Amazigh language and the manner of its inclusion in the field of education and the spheres of public life, so that the Amazigh language could, in the future, perform its task as an official language. (Bouali 2012: 32)

Once again, momentum for Amazigh language and culture began to increase even more, and its status was strengthened from a powerless folk language to a language of cultural identity.

4. Amazigh: Standardisation, literacy and teacher education

In 1999 King Mohammed VI began a series of reforms which included the 2000 Charter for Educational Reform, a new educational policy established to improve the state of education (Sadiqi 2011). Article 96 specifically called for the following (El Aissati et al. 2011: 213):

1. The reinforcement and improvement of Arabic teaching.
2. Diversification of languages for science and technology.
3. Openness to Tamazight.[3]
4. Increasing proficiency in foreign languages.

In Article 115 it then explicitly stated that local authorities were allowed to use Tamazight or “any local dialect” in order to facilitate the learning of the national language, which was Arabic at the time. The charter also allowed for Amazigh research and projects in universities, support for language teaching in Tamazight and the full implementation of Amazigh into every school curriculum by 2010 (Errihani 2006, 2008; Marley 2005).

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[3] Tamazight is the official term for the standard form of Berber language in Morocco.

At the same time, the king issued what is known as the “Berber Manifesto”, a core text which described Amazigh national identity, laid out a historical narrative of Morocco in sharp contrast to the official national one, and depicted a clear program of remediation of their culture and status. Also, the Royal Decree of 2001 established the formation of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) (El Aissati et al. 2011; Maddy-Weitzman 2011; Sadiqi 2011). This organisation was established with the purpose of “preserving and promoting the Amazigh culture as well as reinforcing its status in national educational, socio-cultural and media context, and to give it a new impulse as a national heritage and a source of pride for all Moroccans” (El Aissati at al. 2011).

In terms of a standard language, there have been several variations of Tifinagh due to its interpretation by various scholars throughout the century, but not one variety alone could be considered the standard form. In addition, there were three different forms of Amazigh that had to be accounted for. As a result, the process of Amazigh standardisation developed an official script, which has become a contentious issue. In 2002 it was decided by the IRCAM in a vote that a standardised form of Amazigh was to be established for all forms of the language (El Aissati et al. 2011). Some believed that the Latin alphabet was best because it could be easily transcribed and used on computers. Others, such as Islamists, believed Amazigh was closer to Arabic since both languages belonged to the Chamito-semitic family. They also believed that since Amazigh were Muslim, it would give them more access to read and write Arabic, thereby improving their literacy and providing more access to the religion (Ennaji 2005). However, in the end, the council of IRCAM voted for Tifinagh as the standardised script (see Figure 3.2), under the pretence that this would strengthen Amazigh identity and consolidate language autonomy. Meanwhile, others disagreed and argued that it would hinder development since this was now a third script that Moroccans had to learn in addition to Arabic, French and English (Marley 2005).


Caractères Tifinaghe-Ircam de base
Autres lettres Tifinaghe Ircam, néotifinaghes et lettres touarègue modernes attestées

Figure 3.2: Standard Tifinagh alphabet (with Arabic and Latin phonetic equivalents) (Kalserud 2017)

Such a process of Amazigh standardisation seeks for linguistic codification and uniformity by inscribing literacy in non-writing communities, which involves "a shift away from an indigenous world perspective towards a European-based one" (Makoni and Meinhof 2004: 89). Such a process aims at legitimating a language by inventing and adopting a non-local ideological framework of what counts as language. The standardisation ideology is strongly connected to the education system and helps to reinforce the idea that languages need to be systematised in order to be taught. Also, standardisation is connected to other ideologies and practices, such as the European idea of unification, nationalism and modernisation. We argue that in the ideological process of standardisation of African languages, such languages "were constituted as 'other' and the student as 'deficient', as someone who needs to learn and master the rules of their '(m)other tongue' by rote" (Deumert 2010: 249). Also, standardisation plays an important role in creating, inverting and reinforcing language ideologies. According to Malika, at the beginning of bringing Amazigh to her school, the parents' attitudes affected the children, but later this shifted and the children's attitudes originating in the educational context affected their parents, inscribing new meanings to what counts as Amazigh language.

Right after the language was made official, it was mandated that signs had to be written in Amazigh, despite the fact that many did not know how to read it. It can also be supported by the fact that these signs and official letters in Amazigh were used in communities where the language was not spoken much, meaning they were not for functionality purposes but for representational purposes. The linguistic signage was perpetrated from the top-down to portray a specific ideology on behalf of the king, but from the bottom-up these signs were interpreted much differently.

For those who were illiterate in Amazigh, the expansion of signs in the language appeared to be a demonstration of the government's support towards it. For Malika, these signs were a reflection of the government's neglect towards the language policy, because during her interview she shared with us that many of these signs were incorrect. When she passed different signs, she couldn't help but notice that many had blatant errors. This frustrated her in two ways. First, it was another example of neglect on the side of the government. Second, it reflected people's lack of support for not only the language but also the policy, which was an initiative of the king. "They need to hire specialists in the language, not just anyone who thinks they know it", she stated. Therefore, from the bottom-up we have an interesting analysis of the signs based upon one's background. If one is illiterate in Amazigh, then this looks like a positive top-down action of support from the government. However, if one is literate in Amazigh, then this is a negative top-down action by the government. Therefore, all in all, the linguistic signage associated with this policy can be viewed in various different manners depending on one's own personal lived experience.

One example of how literacy helps to shape the concept of Amazigh language comes with its comparison to French and Arabic. For Malika, "They found it easy because the Amazigh language is written just how it is spoken, not like Arabic or French, where there are a lot of grammar rules." For her, this was a positive attribute that she utilised to gain support of its instruction. Yet this also backfired in a way, because she said many did not view her and other Amazigh teachers as "specialists" but instead as non-advanced "elementary school" teachers. This attitude could have very well been because the language was "simple", a conception inherited from a framework of language based on written script. Either way, the attitude that the language was simple had an effect on Malika's instruction, the way others viewed it and her reputation as a teacher. This shows how language ideologies may operate in controversial ways depending on the context, agents and interests.

Educational language policies take on the top-down ideology of a policy and then disseminate that through the classroom. They are a critically important component to any language policy, serving as its "policy-makers" or main agent for policy implementation and success (Shohamy 2006). Research literature has examined educators and their roles as policy makers due to their significant impact on policies (Aertselaer 2012; Davis 2014), which provides insight into a variety of cases where educators were interpreting, negotiating, resisting or restructuring language policies on the ground. Teaching Amazigh in the classroom was challenging not only because the educational system in Morocco already lacked infrastructure, but also because even native Amazigh speakers had to adapt to the new alphabet and develop methods of instruction for their classrooms. The majority of teachers only received two weeks of training before the policy's implementation in the autumn of 2003, and after that minimal training efforts were organised to assist teachers with the new scripts and language-teacher pedagogy (Errihani 2006).

Morocco isn't the only country where this minimal amount of training has been given to teachers; the same thing happened in Sudan when they shifted from teaching in Arabic to English (Abdelhay, B. Makoni and S. Makoni 2018). Based upon personal experience, if one goes to a rural Amazigh school in Morocco, one may likely find that the building is made of mud with little (if any) running water or electricity, which reinforces the ideological relation between poverty, rurality and illiteracy. There is often a single, shabby blackboard at the front and hard wooden chairs and desks for the students. Also, many people, including Amazighs themselves, do not believe that learning Amazigh will promote economic growth and stability for their children.

In 2003, when the policy was first implemented into schools, the momentum and support for it began to die out after a few years (Sadiqi 2011). In 2011, teacher training began to crumble and support for the maintenance of the policy began to subside after the very first year. As a result, the covert "inactions" of neglect by the government caused the general public to possess very little knowledge of what was ever happening in regard to the policy. In the case of Malika, once the government stopped its support, bottom-up (covert) forces then started arising to maintain the policy. Unfortunately, these were (and still are) unseen by the public eye.

In our individual's case study, Malika went through a teacher-training experience the first year the policy had been enacted and was then hired in an urban school. She was studying to become a biology teacher when she heard the government was recruiting students to become Amazigh teachers. As she described it, they seemed to simply show up and ask: "Who wants to teach Amazigh?" The government let teachers know that this was new and that there wasn't any methodology, but that they could "go ahead and try." Since Malika knew the language and was of Amazigh origin, she decided to sign up. The government then provided her with a full year of teacher training and language instruction in Amazigh, after which she was placed in a larger city to teach non-native speakers of the language in order to create awareness of and support for the language and policy. After this, her official teaching experience could begin.

According to Malika, teacher training programs were shortened to three weeks and they started to try to recruit teachers who were already trained in the language; also, the Institute of Amazigh Culture never came to analyse the teachers' situations and the government did not make it mandatory to learn the language in junior or senior high school as it was supposed to do – just elementary school. Malika stated that the government stopped placing Amazigh teachers in the cities to create awareness of the language, but placed them in the countryside instead, where many already spoke the language. These examples of top-down actions by the government reflect their neglect of this policy over time.

In terms of agency and bottom-up politics, Malika gave many examples of the actions that she and others took on their own to maintain this policy despite the lack of government support. One of the first and most vivid examples is her stamina in teaching the language despite the pushback from parents, since they were not happy at the beginning that their children were learning Amazigh. Malika also made her own classroom materials. She and other teachers only had one version of a textbook to work from and therefore when she needed photos or additional reading materials, she made them on her own. Malika also shared information about the Amazigh culture and way of life, including poems, songs and folklore stories of the oral tradition. Amazigh has traditionally been an oral language passed down from generation to generation through family members. Along with this practice came a strong oral tradition of poetry, songs and folklore (Hoffman 2008).

5. Conclusion

As a result of the historical background, literature review and analysis provided in this chapter, we can see the current status of this policy as it exists in its organic form: a policy both enacted and maintained from a complex interplay between the top-down forces which created it and the bottom-up forces which sustain it. From the beginning, the policy, first, had to be enacted and made official by the king of Morocco; without this, the Amazigh community would not have been able to gain nationwide support for this cause. It was then up to the government to move forward with teacher training and placement, classroom material production, changing signage throughout the country, and making sure that the infrastructure was in place for the language to be both used and taught. Yet after its induction, it was the actions of Malika and her fellow teachers that kept the policy alive in local schools and communities. This supports the notions of many recent scholars in the field of language policy who have argued that we cannot simply examine the top-down actions that affect a policy, but we must also examine the coexistent bottom-up actions.

We also believe that local people's opinion should be taken seriously, as it was during our experience with Malika. From her perspective, the language policy was enacted just to calm the Amazigh Movement protestors during the Arab Spring in 2011, because after all it was this Movement that had spurred many of the protests and unrest throughout the country during this time. Therefore, many have argued that the king made Amazigh an official language simply to appease the Amazigh population and thereby keep the country safe from a revolution. Malika too had begun to believe this was the case after four years of teaching Amazigh. As a result of her experience and the neglect she felt, she believed it was quite obvious that Amazigh was made an official language to simply "calm them".

Finally, with this specific study, it seems safe to go one step further and say that both top-down and bottom-up actions must be examined together, for it is only then that we can get a true picture of a policy as a whole – not just what it is from the top or the bottom, which is merely from one angle, but what it is as a complete entity once the various forces surrounding it come into play.

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CHAPTER FOUR

LANGUAGE PLANNING IN THE SAUDI CONTEXT THROUGH INVESTIGATING STUDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS SA, CA AND ENGLISH

MAHMOUD A. ALMAHMOUD
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1. Introduction

The present study aims at investigating Saudi university students' attitudes towards using two Arabic language varieties – Standard Arabic (SA) and Colloquial Arabic (CA) – besides English. The study is directed at gaining an insight into aspects of such perspectives. The sample of the study is extracted from 257 male undergraduate students at King Saud University. The coherent research design incorporates a questionnaire to examine the conscious attitudes of the participants. In order to examine the subconscious attitudes, a matched guise test is given, and a focus group protocol is used to analyse the aspects behind these approaches. Results show that students always use CA and rarely use SA or English, but that SA is more widely used in the media than in social interactions and in education.

In addition, most subjects believe they use English more than they use SA whereas CA is widely used in informal written discourse. Findings reveal that all students have a stronger progressive attitude towards using English language compared to the two Arabic language varieties. Although they overtly agree that SA is still considered superior to CA and English, the participants subconsciously believe that English is superior. The positive attitudes towards SA may indicate that students are influenced by religious, linguistic and cultural factors. The outcomes of the study throughout subconscious and conscious outlooks and attitudes of students may have significant inferences in Saudi Arabia for language planning in different dimensions (status, corpus, acquisition and prestige).

The study is structured into eight sections as follows: The theoretical parts, which include describing the linguistic situation, language varieties and education policy, and media language in Saudi Arabia, are covered in sections 1, 2 and 3. Section 4 provides the methodology used in the study. Data collection and data analysis are presented in sections 5 and 6, whereas section 7 is devoted to the findings revealed and their discussion. The chapter is concluded in the final section (section 8).

2. The linguistic situation in Saudi Arabia

The demographic situation in Saudi Arabia characterised by its high numbers of non-Arab foreigners has contributed to the creation of a unique socio-linguistic fabric. As a result, different language varieties are used among people, including Standard Arabic (henceforth SA), Colloquial Arabic (henceforth CA) and a pidgin language, along with English. The use of these varieties is based on the circumstances of communication. SA is mainly used in formal situations or to show respect. It is used in official government speeches, public lectures, religious discourse, academic discussion, formal meetings and in written form in general. CA, on the other hand, is the dominant form in informal situations. It is used to communicate with friends, relatives and with other Arabs in daily life. Pidgin is the *lingua franca* among the non-Arab labour force when they do not have a common language or if they talk to Arabs. English language has a significant place in social interaction. Hospitals and big private companies such as oil and petrochemical companies use English in the workplace. It is also used in places of high prestige such as hotels and luxury restaurants. All public signs and car plates usually use both Arabic and English. In their daily lives, residents may use all of these language varieties (SA, CA, pidgin and English). For instance, an individual may use SA to write an official letter, CA to speak with friends, pidgin to talk to foreign workers and English to order in a restaurant.

2.1 Language varieties and education policy in Saudi Arabia

Education policy in Saudi Arabia at both school and university levels aims to sustain the mother tongue, on the one hand, and to benefit from foreign languages, on the other. In Saudi Arabia, as well as in other Arab countries, linguistic conflict can be seen not only between the Arabic language and foreign languages such as English but also within the Arabic language itself. The Arabic diglossia has made Arabic speakers resemble bilinguals because they acquire and use two main varieties of Arabic, SA and CA (Ferguson 1959; Alchlih 2007). Therefore, many researchers have claimed that SA cannot be considered the first language (Ayari 1996; Eviatar and Ibrahim 2000). The discrepancy between these two varieties of Arabic has significant implications for education.

The Arab Human Development Report, which is presented by the United Nations Development Programme (2003), states that the difficulties arising from the diglossia between SA and CA besides the lack of a national language policy are considered to be significant aspects for the conflict within the Arabic language. In the same report it is claimed that SA is not usually used by the public for their daily communication needs or to express warm and spontaneous emotions and feelings. Thus, the situation is considered one of the prime difficulties facing Arabic language education (United Nations Development Programme 2003).

This has been confirmed by several researchers who have attributed the complexity of teaching and learning Arabic literacy in the Arab world to the diglossic situation with SA and CA (Abu-Rabia 2000; Aldannan 1999; Ayari 1996; Maamouri 1998). Clear evidence of this is the fact that the language which the teachers use in their classes and the language in the textbooks are not the same. Teachers speak and explain their lessons using CA, whereas the textbooks are based on SA. This difference negatively affects the learning situation as well as the learners' impression of the textbooks and their attitudes to reading in general (Aldannan 1999). Therefore, there is an urgent need for deeper understanding of the diglossic situation within the educational context and its impact on learning, whether school-based or through informal structures (Dakwar 2005: 77).

The challenges that Arabic language faces in the education setting require thoughtful action. Tinbak (2005) suggests several steps that might help preserve the position of the Arabic language in education. He insists on paying attention to the Arabic language at all educational levels, especially at primary school where the pupils' language acquisition ability is in its ideal period. He adds that the colloquial vernacular should be banned from use in all educational contexts, while reinforcing the use of SA. More effort should be made to improve the Arabic language curriculum to make it more interesting. There is a need to review the training of Arabic language teachers in educational colleges. At the same time, the Ministry of Education should choose distinguished teachers and improve the situation with the current teachers. Furthermore, a national awareness programme should be introduced to promote the significance of SA and its relationship with the Arab identity. Thus, simultaneous efforts from several directions (school environment, curricula, teacher training, society and media) are effective actions that can be taken to maintain the position of the Arabic language.

Since the establishment of the Ministry of Education in 1953, English has become a compulsory subject in intermediate and secondary schools. It is the only foreign language taught in public schools. However, in higher education, the learning of English depends on the university and the field of study. In some universities such as King Saud University, English is the medium of instruction for science subjects, besides teaching some compulsory English courses for all university students regardless of their field of study. Other universities such as Imam Islamic University consider English as an optional unit for students of human sciences. In February 2002, it was approved by the Ministry of Education that English should be taught in the fourth, fifth and sixth grades of primary schools (Alammar 2009).

2.2 Media language policy in Saudi Arabia

The media policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia requires Saudi media to maintain SA – because it is the language of Islam – and its culture and heritage (Ministry of Culture and Information 1982). However, in practice, the media is not always in harmony with this policy. In recent years, the Saudi government has had less control over mass media than in the past due to the introduction of new media technologies (e.g. satellite and internet), which is reflected in language use in the media setting.

In the Arabic media, different varieties of Arabic language exist. According to Shousha (2003), it is not easy to categorise the language used in the Arabic media in any Arab context as just CA or SA. It goes beyond this simple classification. Applying Badawi's (1973) categorisation, Shousha (2003) notices five different varieties of contemporary Arabic in the media context: (1) the classical Arabic of Arabic heritage in religious programmes and historical dramas; (2) Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in news bulletins, political programmes, cultural programmes and in the majority of the written media; (3) CA of the cultured participants in serious talk shows, programmes of opinion, and debates; (4) CA of those with a basic education in light dialogues that discuss social issues, art and sports, and is also commonly used in live broadcasts; and (5) CA of illiterates which is used mainly in dramas with some characters representing illiterate people.

Alshamrani (2012) proposes another classification of the different varieties of Arabic used in media settings. He distinguishes between three different forms of Arabic used in today's media: Literary Arabic (H), middle language (ML) and local vernacular (L). The H variety refers to the language used in Arabic literature, the L variety refers to the local colloquial language of a particular Arabic place and the ML variety is in the mediatory level between Literary Arabic and the local vernacular. This categorisation seems more practical than that of Shousha's (2003) classification.

Alshamrani (2012) also notices that while some TV channels commonly use the H level, other TV stations generally use the L variety. This difference in language level occurs according to the nature of the programme on the channel. The H variety of Arabic is common on news and documentary TV stations; however, music, entertainment and series channels regularly use the L variety. Whereas, the ML variety can be found on most channels, depending on the nature of the programme presented.

In the light of the earlier studies and the purpose of this study, we attempt at arriving at reasonable answers to the following two questions: (i) What are the attitudes of the students at King Saud University towards the frequent use of SA, CA and English varieties? and (ii) What are the factors behind these attitudes from the students' perspectives?

3. Methodology

3.1 Research design

An integrated approach is used in this study to investigate the attitudes towards the use of two varieties of Arabic (CA and SA) besides English in the Saudi context. A combination of direct and indirect investigation of attitudes with both quantitative and qualitative research approaches was adopted. Instruments included a questionnaire, a matched guise test (MGT) and a focus group protocol as shown in Figure 4.1.


Integrated approach to investigate attitudes
Using a quantitative approach through:
• Direct method (questionnaire)
• Indirect method (matched guise test)
Exploring the factors behind attitudes
Using a qualitative approach to explore the factors behind the attitudes through the use of the focus group protocol
Implications for language planning

Figure 4.1: The integrated design of the current research

As noted above, the research data were gained from both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative data were obtained from a questionnaire used directly to investigate the students' attitudes towards the two varieties of Arabic besides English. The second instrument used to obtain quantitative data was the matched guise test (MGT). It was used to indirectly provide data about attitudes to the two varieties of Arabic and English. To obtain the qualitative data, the study used a semi-structured focus group protocol. The qualitative data were used to gain a deeper understanding of the factors behind students' attitudes. According to Thøgersen (2010: 297):

> There are several reasons for complementing quantitative measures with qualitative ones, not least the wish to gain insights into respondents' own thinking about issues the researchers found it relevant to ask about – that is, to understand not just which attitudes they hold, but maybe also why they hold them and what other issues might exist.

The combination of quantitative and qualitative measures means that a phenomenon can be investigated from different perspectives and as a result reciprocal supplemental data, substantial findings, better validated results and subsequent conclusions are delivered (Creswell 2003).

3.2 Research participants

The participants in this study were drawn from an unplanned sample of undergraduate Saudi students from King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Two hundred and fifty seven students from three different faculties (61 students from Human Sciences, 96 from Medicine and 100 from Sciences) participated in the MGT. The total number of participants in the questionnaire was 260 students from the same three faculties (96 students from Human Sciences, 93 from Medicine and 71 from Sciences). First, the majority of the participants completed the MGT, then the questionnaire. However, for one reason or another, a few completed only one instrument. Seventeen students from the three main faculties (5 students from Human Sciences, 5 from Medicine and 7 from Sciences) participated in the focus group protocol.

3.3 Research instruments

As mentioned previously, to examine the attitudes of the participants and to understand the factors behind such attitudes, the current research made use of three instruments: the questionnaire, the MGT and the focus group protocol. These three instruments are explained under the next subheadings.

3.3.1 The matched guise test (MGT)

The results of this socio-linguistic test helped to investigate indirectly the participants' attitudes towards using SA, CA and English. In the MGT, the participants listened to three people speaking the three language varieties. So, they listened to nine different versions in total. After that, they were asked to judge the speakers for personal characteristics, without knowing that each set of the three voices in fact belonged to one person. The participants were not informed that their attitudes were indirectly under investigation. Therefore, any differences in the evaluation could be attributed to the language that the speaker was using. Most of the participants were expected to have intermediate-level English proficiency and have studied English for at least six years at school and one intensive year during the university preparation year.

3.3.2 The questionnaire

To investigate the participants' attitudes directly, a questionnaire was used. The questionnaire helped the researchers to obtain information about the participants' attitudes towards the two main varieties of Arabic (SA and CA) and English. There were three main sections in the questionnaire. The first section focused on the students' actual use of the varieties based on their self-evaluation. This section was divided into three general categories: social interaction, education and media. Each category had several items. The participants could identify their use of SA, CA and English for each item by choosing one of four levels of use, which were 'always', 'sometimes', 'rarely' and 'never'. The second section of the questionnaire included several statements arranged on the Likert scale in order to measure the participants' attitudes directly. The items were also divided into three major groups that represented the use of the language, namely social interaction, education and media. The last section of the questionnaire aimed to collect information about the participants, namely: age, university field of study, college, English proficiency and previous English courses undertaken.

3.3.3 The focus group protocol

To obtain the qualitative data, a semi-structured focus group protocol was used in order to investigate the factors behind the participants' attitudes towards using the two varieties of Arabic and English. Using this technique helped the researchers to obtain the required data from observation of the interaction among the participants (Harrell and Bradley 2009).

3.4 Data collection

Since the study was based on a random cluster sample from three faculties at King Saud University (Human Sciences, Sciences and Medicine), the researcher[1] arranged about 15 sessions over the three months of the second semester of 2011 to collect the data. Interested students were informed that participation would consist of two parts: the first part would be a test to examine their reactions to people's voices and the second part would be a questionnaire about the same issue. After they were given instructions, some of the participants volunteered to do the MGT but most of them only completed the questionnaire.

When investigating the participants' attitudes, the researchers ensured that the participants thoroughly understood the questionnaire items about attitudes. This was achieved through the wording of the items and by consultation about and testing of the questionnaire. The researchers also tried to encourage participants to ask about any unclear statement before the questionnaire was administered in each session. The subjects were required to retrieve information from their minds to indicate their attitude judgement. Therefore, they were asked to read each item carefully and think about it before deciding their position. They were given enough time to do so. Some of the participants preferred to take the questionnaire away and return it after a few days, whereas others preferred to do it immediately at the arranged session.

The focus group protocol was administrated after conducting the MGT and the questionnaire. The MGT and the questionnaire forms included a question for participants about whether they were able to participate in the research interview. The participants were selected randomly to represent the three main faculties (Human Sciences, Medicine and Sciences). Five sessions were arranged with three to four participants in each. The sessions lasted between 75 and 90 minutes.

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[1] The data collection process was organised by Mahmoud Almahmoud.

3.5 Data analysis procedures

3.5.1 Quantitative data analysis

For the quantitative analysis, the research applied the SPSS programme. As mentioned earlier, two instruments were administered to collect the quantitative data, namely the MGT and the questionnaire. For both instruments, the participants' demographic profiles were processed in the same way. Frequency and percentage were used to analyse participants' ages, academic specialisations and their previous English courses undertaken. The mean and standard deviation were calculated to determine the participants' self-evaluation of their English proficiency.

Concerning the MGT analysis, frequency, percentage, mean, standard deviation and ranking for each item were calculated for the speakers of each language variety. The mean and standard deviation based on the evaluation aspects (social attractiveness, competence and personal integrity) were calculated individually and for each language variety. Additionally, the research applied one-way analysis of variance (F-test) to find out whether the MGT evaluation was significant between the three language guises for each trait.

Regarding the items about attitudes on the questionnaire, the mean of each questionnaire category was calculated, taking into consideration the use of both negative and positive items. Thus, the scales of the negative items were reversed when scoring the total mean of each section of the research questionnaire. Failure to take this significant step produces a hidden error that some researchers do not recognise although it has an effect on the research outcomes (Sauro and Lewis 2011).

In the questionnaire analysis, the items were divided into the three language varieties (SA, CA and English). Each variety had three subsections, namely social interaction, education and media. The comparative items were also divided into the three language varieties. The one-way analysis of variance (F-test) was used to determine whether the direct and indirect methods revealed any significant differences in the participants' attitudes towards using SA, CA and English based on their university field of study. When a significant difference was determined, a multiple range test (the Scheffé test) was applied to define where the difference occurred.

3.5.2 Qualitative data analysis

To gather qualitative data, the research used the focus group protocol. All the focus group sessions were first transcribed into Arabic. Then, the transcript was coded, categorised and organised. The ATLAS programme was utilised to assist the researchers in processing the qualitative data. A coding system based on previous research as well as generating codes based on the data analysis was used. To enhance the intra-code reliability of the coding scheme, 10% of the transcript was selected randomly and then coded. After a week, the same transcript was coded and the correlation between the first and second coding was calculated. The coding correlation was 98%. Another person was also asked to code the same transcript after being trained to code the list. The correlation between the coding of the researchers and the second coder was 95%. This indicates acceptable intra-code reliability of the coding system since the consistency among the different coders was satisfactory.

4. Findings and discussion

This part of the study explains and discusses findings from the research relating to the participants' attitudes towards using the three language varieties of SA, CA and English.

4.1 Participants' use of SA, CA and English

Findings indicated that the mean score for participants' attitudes towards CA was M=3.16, while the mean scores for SA and English were M=2.17 and M=2.39 respectively. The high use of CA in comparison to SA and English resulted from its position as a mother tongue of the participants. Normally, Arabs acquire CA before learning SA during formal education (Dakwar 2005; Maamouri 1998; Owens 2006; Saidat 2010). An unexpected finding in this study was that when the participants stated they used English more than SA. This could be justified by many reasons. Firstly, the occurrence of rapid economic growth in Saudi Arabia over the last few decades has increased the need for manpower (Al-Haq and Samadi 1996). In Saudi Arabia, about one-third of the population are foreigners and the majority of them are non-Arabic speakers. Secondly, the participants in this study represented a sample of university students, two-thirds of them were studying sciences or medicine where the content of instruction was essentially in English. This might have influenced their language behaviour outside the educational context as well. Thirdly, all participants considered themselves to have an intermediate level of English proficiency, which enhanced their use of the language. Figure 4.2 provides a comparison between the uses of the several language varieties investigated in various circumstances.



Figure 4.2: Participants' actual use of SA, CA and English

Figure 4.2 shows an inverse relationship between the uses of the two varieties of Arabic: the higher use of CA results in a lower use of SA and vice versa. SA and CA are two varieties of the same language representing two different levels of it, which are used extensively; hence, more use of one variety results in less use of the other, which is common in all diglossic situations.

The overall findings indicated that SA was rarely used in social interactions or in an educational setting. However, the discussion with the focus groups suggested that use was based more on the context of the communication. Ennaji (1991) states that when the conversation is about serious and respected themes or it is with a highly educated person, the H variety of Arabic will be used. The high use of CA among the participants in social interactions might be due to its position as their mother tongue. The interviews also revealed two reasons that explained why CA was used extensively in the written form: because of its simplicity and to avoid making mistakes when using SA. Interviewees maintained that they feel more competent using CA than SA.

Additionally, the participants indicated that they used English more than SA but less than CA. They declared that they used English in reading and writing more than in speaking. Also, they used English more than SA and CA when talking with non-Arab workers in hotels and restaurants, but when talking to non-Arab workers while shopping, English and CA were used equally.

Notably, the use of English when talking to non-Arabic speakers was based on the prestige of the place where the interaction took place. The more prestigious it was, the more English was used. Participants' answers showed that their perceptions did not link English only with the level of prestige but also with the quality of the service. The link between English use and prestige has been widely addressed in the literature associated with this field. In several contexts, many researchers (Li 1999; Ager 2005; McKenzie 2008; Blommaert 2010; Abu-Ghazaleh and Hijazi 2011; Malallah 2000) have also concurred on this link.

4.2 Attitudes revealed by using a direct method of investigation

4.2.1 Attitudes towards the use of SA

The conscious methods of investigation used in the current research revealed that the participants' attitudes towards using SA were positive (M=3.22). As will be indicated later by the qualitative data, these attitudes were influenced by religious, linguistic, social and cultural factors. Studies by Saad (1992) in Algeria, Saidat (2010) in Jordan and Ennaji (1991) in Morocco arrived at the same conclusion. However, the subconscious investigation of attitudes, which will be addressed later, did not support this conclusion.

Direct evaluation of attitudes supported the belief of students concerning the superiority of SA over CA and English. SA was commonly perceived as the mark of an educated person. This is can be explained due to the position of SA as an H-variety language in the speech used among educated people. However, many participants agreed that people had a negative feeling towards them when they used SA in usual communication. This negative feeling was also noted by Saidat (2003), who suggests that there is a widespread certainty that people who use SA in their communication will probably be subject to derision. Also, this negative feeling might be related to a linguistic factor represented in the participants' incompetence in SA. In addition, it seems that the participants thought that SA was not used in regular communication, but in specific contexts. Thus, in the interview, the context in which a language is used was identified as one of the social factors behind the participants' attitudes.

Concerning the students' attitudes towards the use of SA in the educational settings, in consistent with other studies (e.g. Al-Haq and Samadi 1996; Al-Jarallah and Al-Ansari 1998), findings showed that the students consciously chose to use SA as the preferred medium of instruction for scientific subjects. In contrast with their unconscious statement about preferring English as a medium of instruction in all scientific subjects. These findings present a conflict between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes.

This could be explained by the fact that the interviewees distinguished between situations where they would prefer to continue using English as the medium of instruction. It seems they realised the problems of a lack of Arabic resources and translating concepts into Arabic. For several reasons, the majority of participants concurred that science knowledge should be Arabicized. One factor is that the participants believed that scientific subjects were easier to be understood when taught in SA. Another factor is that motivating the Arabicization of science knowledge was the desire to preserve culture and identity.

On the other hand, two points revealed the negative attitudes of students towards using SA in education. The first point was that although the participants expressed consciously their support for Arabicizing science, they apparently felt that SA was the language of religion and literature more than that of science and technology. The second point was related to the nature of teaching and learning SA. Most of the respondents granted that learning SA was not enjoyable.

Regarding the media, students' attitudes towards using SA could be generally seen as positive. The participants acknowledged that they preferred to see SA rather than CA used in the press because it was "a beautiful form of language". The beauty of the language was specified as one of the linguistic factors that enhanced positive attitudes towards using SA. Although the participants believed in the beauty of SA, their actual use of it on social media was less than CA and English. On the one hand, this showed that the participants' knowledge and their actions were not always in harmony; the three components of attitude – action, knowledge and emotion – might not co-exist in agreement (Baker 1992; Matsuda 2000). On the other hand, SA is considered to be an H-variety language and there are specific situations in which it is used, so it is not appropriate to be employed in every situation. Prestige is always associated with using SA. The respondents were unanimous that prominent TV channels used only SA. Although the participants' attitudes towards radio stations that used SA were positive, they were not in favour of watching films that used SA. Often, SA is used exclusively in historical films, whereas most drama and comedy movies use the local vernacular (Alshamrani 2012).

4.2.2 Attitudes towards the use of CA

The direct methods of investigation used in the current research revealed that the participants' attitudes towards using CA tended to be positive (M=3.12). Several linguistic, social and cultural factors led to these results. Regarding social interaction, the findings showed that the participants concurred that it was easier for them to express feelings using CA than SA. A close relationship between CA and identity was shown because most participants considered that CA represented their local identity. The relationship between CA and local identity was investigated in many other Arabic contexts such as in Morocco (Marley 2004) and Iraq (Murad 2007). The respondents were conscious of the value assigned to SA as giving an Arab identity rather than a local one. Hence, they acknowledged that the use of CA threatened Arab unity, and they thought that the use of CA was clearly restricting the spread of SA.

Attitudes towards CA in education equally ranged between positive and negative. About half of the participants acknowledged that if a teacher used CA in class, it would make it easier to understand the subject. On the other hand, the rest of the respondents believed that using CA in the classroom was not appropriate. It was assumed to be an L-variety language that had limitations for becoming the language of knowledge. Therefore, many participants supported banning it from use in educational contexts. Demanding the banning of CA from use in education on the grounds that it affects education in general and the education of the Arabic language in particular has been supported by many researchers (Abu-Rabia 2000; Aldannan 1999; Ayari 1996; Maamouri 1998; Tinbak 2005).

In general, there seem to be two views about using CA in education. The first view focuses more on the advantages of using CA in educational settings because of its linguistic simplicity, whereas the other view is more concerned about the disadvantages of its cultural impact. However, the participants apparently preferred CA as the medium of instruction because it made learning easier, yet at the same time, they realised the importance of upholding the position of SA as perhaps the most prominent marker of identity.

As for the media, students' attitudes towards using CA were positive. Findings showed that most of the participants preferred watching TV programmes that used CA. Moreover, they were unified in the view that radio programmes using CA were more comprehensible than those that used SA. The participants suggested that this was possibly linked to the simplicity of CA. However, most of the participants stated that it was not acceptable to use CA in written media. These findings together also present a conflict between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes. The respondents were more likely to support the position of SA because of their knowledge and perhaps due to its position as an H-variety language that is prestigious and considered to be superior, more logical and respected within the speech community. Similar to Ferguson’s (1959) diglossia, however, emotionally they tended to favour CA, because it was their mother tongue and people might have a stronger attachment to their own dialect than to others (Cook and Bassetti 2010).

4.2.3 Attitudes towards the use of English

Findings revealed that attitudes towards the use of English were generally positive (M=3.53). Several linguistic, social, instrumental and educational factors contributed to these positive attitudes. In consistency with many other studies (Almaiman 2005; Young 2006; Tachibana, Matsukawa and Zhong 1996; Karahan 2007), participants shared a strong desire to speak English well. Almost two-thirds of the participants believed that if they could speak English well, their family would be proud of them. This social value of English seems to be a unanimous finding in investigations of attitudes towards English (Abu-Ghazaleh and Hijazi 2011; Crismore, Ngeow and Soo 1996; Esseili 2011; Karahan 2007; Malallah 2000; Matsuda 2000; Pierson, Fu and Lee 1980; Pishghadam and Sabouri 2011). Another social factor which motivated students’ positive attitudes towards using English was the social contact with non-Arabic speakers. The majority of the participants admitted that they used English when talking to non-Arabic speakers.

As for instrumental factors, the participants felt that the use of English was a contributory factor to their success and essential to their attainment. In agreement with Al-Haq and Samadi’s (1996) study, most of the research participants realised that English language was essential for using technology. Besides, about half of the participants seemed to think that English language use in everyday life was a sign of social advancement.

However, the students of human sciences seemed to be more conservative in their responses. This conservative view was compatible with the view of persons committed to religion (Al-Haq and Samadi 1996).

The views of students of medicine and of sciences might be influenced by the status of English in their fields of study. In conformity with other contexts such as in Japan (Chiba, Matsuura and Yamamoto 1995) and Korea

(Lee 2009), the participants appreciated the position of English as an international *lingua franca*.

In addition to their favourable attitudes towards the use of English, the participants were conscious of the cultural value involved in using English. The majority of participants conceded that using English in various domains of public life was a sign of the influence of western culture in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, more than half of the participants granted that the extension of English education into elementary school would increase the western influence. This was also expressed in the interviews as one of the cultural factors behind negative attitudes towards English. The awareness of the cultural influence of English may not be in conflict with their thoughts about the relationship between using English and employing technology and national development. However, they were concerned about the increasing use of English.

In general, the use of English language in the educational system in Saudi Arabia is a controversial issue. The participants broadly supported English use in education. The majority of them acknowledged that the frequent usage of English as a language of instruction opened the doors to careers for students, especially with the rapid development that the country is witnessing. Most of the leading private companies in Saudi Arabia use the English language as a medium of communication (Elyas 2008). The interviews with the participants also showed that occupational opportunity was an instrumental value that motivated progressive attitudes towards English language use. Therefore, most of the participants opined that classes at universities should be conducted exclusively in English.

Regarding using English language in the media, students' attitudes were generally positive. Most of the participants liked to watch films in English. Several factors might contribute to this preference for English films, e.g. the affluence of the English-speaking film industry. Findings also showed a substantial difference in the attitudes of the participants towards using English language based on their university field of study. Students of medicine had a considerably more progressive attitudes towards using English language than the students of sciences and human sciences. This might be due to the fact that English language is used as the language of instruction at the Faculty of Medicine. These results are similar to the results of the studies conducted by Sayadian and Lashkarian (2010), and Abu-Ghazaleh and Hijazi (2011), which concluded that the university field of study had an impact on the conscious attitudes of the participants. Similarly, Malallah (2000) found significant differences between the attitudes towards English in the Kuwait context based on the students' field of study.

4.3 Attitudes revealed by using an indirect method of investigation

For a wider picture of the subconscious evaluation of the participants' attitudes, Figure 4.3 compares the three language varieties for all the MGT items.



Figure 4.3: Matched guise test outcomes for SA, CA and English

Figure 4.3 shows how the participants evaluated the speakers of the three language varieties in the MGT. Interestingly, the differences are significant for all the traits evaluated. The inclusive view indicated that the English speakers were rated higher than the SA and CA speakers in most areas. The SA speakers appeared to be in the middle between the English and the CA speakers for most traits, whereas the CA speakers received the lowest gradation.

4.3.1 Attitudes towards the use of SA

Findings from the MGT revealed that the participants' overall evaluation of the SA speakers was positive (M=3.19). Viewed in detail, the evaluation was positive for 'personal integrity' (M=3.34) and 'competence' (M=3.22) but negative for 'social attractiveness' (M=2.58). This evaluation might reflect the participants' view of SA as an H-variety language that had high esteem, with its use related to more serious official matters. In general, these outcomes from the MGT were supported by the results of both of the conscious methods of investigation: the questionnaire and the interviews. From the interviews, the situational context was identified as one of the social factors behind the attitudes towards using SA. The interviewees reported that SA was the language used by educated people when discussing serious issues.

Overall, attitudes towards using SA revealed by indirect investigation (M=3.19) corresponded with those revealed by the questionnaires (M= 3.22). SA was evaluated positively in three components of the direct study of attitudes, although results were more positive for knowledge and action than for emotion. Additionally, when using the indirect method of investigation, SA was judged positively for both 'competence' and 'personal integrity', whereas the 'social attractiveness' was evaluated negatively.

4.3.2 Attitudes towards the use of CA

The overall evaluation of the CA speakers was marginally positive (M=3.11). This might be resulted from the fact that most of the Arab individuals perceive CA as an L variety of the Arabic language (Altwaijri 2004; Tinbak 2005). The L variety enjoys only a low prestige and is not considered to be superior and logical (Ferguson 1959). Nevertheless, this result might be explained by the fact that the variety of CA used in the MGT was what can be defined as 'educated colloquial'. The level of such CA is intermediary between local colloquial and MSA. It is close to SA and is used among educated people. In general, the CA guises were assessed negatively for 'competence', whereas for 'social attractiveness' and 'personal integrity' they were evaluated positively. This is probably resulted from the influence of the lower value linked to CA.

The overall outcome of the conscious method of investigation of attitudes towards using CA was M=3.12, which was almost identical to the results of the subconscious methods of investigation used in this study (M=3.11). However, on the basis of the three components of the conscious methods, the participants expressed negative attitudes through their knowledge, while there were positive outcomes for the actions and emotions components. As for the results from the subconscious method of investigation, the attitudes of the participants were positive for ‘social attractiveness’ and ‘personal integrity’ but were negative for ‘competence’. These differences in attitudes based on the level of consciousness contribute to our understanding of how the participants perceived CA.

4.3.3 Attitudes towards the use of English

Unconscious attitudes towards using English were distinctly positive. The findings of covert attitudes towards using English (M=3.51) in a broad sense corroborated the findings of overt attitudes (M=3.53). The English guises were assessed positively with regard to ‘competence’ and ‘personal integrity’, as well as the components of direct attitudes investigation – ‘knowledge’, ‘action’ and ‘emotion’ – while being assessed negatively for ‘social attractiveness’, principally for having ‘a sense of humour’. From these overt and covert attitudes about how English was perceived by the participants, it is evident that both methods of investigation revealed favourable attitudes towards using English. These results can probably attributed to the marked attention given to the English language in the Saudi context at different levels (AlJarf 2004, 2008; Alkhabti 2002; Elyas 2008). The position of English as a superior language (AlJarf 2008) and the language of the elite global community (Blommaert 2010) means that it is used among ‘high level people’ who are distinguished by their personal qualities.

Regarding the differences in the participants’ assessments of the English guise based on their university field of study, a significant difference was brought to the fore. The students of sciences had significantly more progressive attitudes towards using English language than the students of medicine and human sciences in the MGT. However, in the questionnaire, the attitudes of the students of medicine were significantly more positive.

A question that remains unanswered is why the direct method of investigation revealed that the students of medicine had more positive attitudes towards English, whereas the indirect methods of investigation revealed that students of the sciences had more positive attitudes. A possible answer to this query might be that the students of medicine were more involved with English language through their textbooks, the teaching they experienced and their practice, which might have influenced their answers in the part of the study that investigated attitudes using direct methods of investigation. On the other hand, science students were less involved in using English than medicine students and they used English only in textbooks. Their teaching and their actual practice was a combination of Arabic and English, as the participants indicated in the interviews. Therefore, indirect investigation of attitudes revealed that English was becoming more attractive to the students of science. From the direct and indirect methods of studying attitudes, it appears that attitudes may be related to language need, use and cultural factors.

4.4 Factors behind students' attitudes from their perspectives

The main aim of the researchers from this qualitative part was to find out a deeper understanding of the participants' attitudes and the factors that constructed and guided such attitudes, taking into consideration the concept of attitude with its three components of knowledge, emotion and action. To answer the question, focus group discussions were used. The data were recorded, transcribed, coded, categorised and organised. Coding was done based on the analysis of the interview transcripts as well as with reference to previous literature including Al-Haq and Samadi (1996), AlJarf (2008), Dakwar (2005), Lo (2009) and Saidat (2010). The analysis of the focus group discussions revealed six main factors behind the participants' attitudes, namely: religious, linguistic, social, cultural, instrumental and educational factors. These main factors involved several sub-factors, with some overlap. Figure 4.4 presents a conceptual schema of the factors that were revealed.


Linguistic factors
Simplicity
Language beauty
Terminology
Nature of topic
Logical structure
Difficulty
Vocabulary richness
Abbreviation
Social factors
Self-image
Social interaction with non-Arabic speakers
Acquisition
Context or situation
Cultural factors
Identity
Pan-Arabism
Heritage
Religious factors
Understand religion sources
Spread religion
Religious identity
Instrumental factors
Occupational opportunities
Modern technology
Travelling abroad
Practice
Educational factors
Teacher's speech
Textbook and academic resources

Figure 4.4: Hierarchical arrangement of focus group discussion codes and sub-codes

As shown in Figure 4.4, students' attitudes were influenced by several factors distinguished by language varieties. Findings indicated that the attitudes towards each variety were guided by specific factors that were different from the other varieties.

5. Conclusion

The results of this study have assisted the researchers in identifying a section of the linguistic situation in the Saudi context. Regarding language use, the study showed that the participants always used CA, with extended use in social interactions. The use of SA was rarely found in both social interactions and in education, and sometimes in the media. Findings also revealed that English was less used when compared to CA. However, a significant finding was that English was used more than SA, especially in social interactions and in education. Furthermore, this research work showed that CA was used more widely than had been thought. The common perception had been that CA is only a spoken variety of Arabic; however, the results showed that it was also commonly used in informal writing. In addition, investigation of the actual use of English revealed that its use was associated with the stature of the discourse.

The overall findings from both the direct and indirect methods investigating attitudes are perhaps in harmony in a broad sense. Nevertheless, to be more specific, some discrepancies were found based on the level of consciousness. Consciously, the participants, for example, believed that SA was superior to CA and English, never the less, the indirect investigation of attitudes showed that they perceived English to be superior. This might be related to the participants' cognitive awareness of the significance of SA, on the one hand, and the strong indirect influence of English, on the other. While the participants revealed clearly positive attitudes towards English in both the conscious and subconscious investigations, their attitudes towards the two varieties of Arabic were similar but less positive.

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CHAPTER FIVE

IDENTITY PERCEPTION OF PAKISTANI AND BALOCHI MINORITIES AT STATE SCHOOLS IN BAHRAIN IN ASSOCIATION WITH (IMPLICIT) LANGUAGE POLICY[1]

LAMYA ALKOOHEJI

1. Introduction

Bahrain is a small country in the Arabian Gulf in the Middle East with a dense population of over a million people across a total of 770 km^2 (Survey & Land Registration Bureau 2013a). The official language is Arabic; however, more than half of the residents of Bahrain are not citizens, some of whom are Arabs and some are not, while the citizens themselves are diverse and come from various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. The Bahraini government allows all residents to benefit from its state schools (known as government schools) without fees on an equal basis without any discrimination. This has created multilingual communities within schools, which are officially "Arabic speaking" communities. Despite this community comprising a significant population of students in state schools in the capital, Manama, no research has been published on them as a speech community within Bahrain which can be affected by language policies.

Recent research on language policy in difference countries emphasised the language rights of ethnic minorities within a country and on minority groups of immigrants. The idea of forcing a society to speak a single language is no longer acceptable to many researchers (and arguably to the people themselves), nor is it practical in a rapidly growing world that is mostly bilingual or multilingual.

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This chapter aims to observe the language status of students in Bahraini state schools and how they perceive their native language(s) and Arabic as a result of language ideologies and policies practised in the government schools**.** The study is interested in exploring, first of all, whether language policies and/or local ideologies affect participants' language choices in different domains and their attitudes towards each language and, secondly, whether self-perception and attitudes towards spoken languages change after years of exposure to Arabic in state schools.

To reach its goal, this chapter examines data collected using a survey of young Pakistani and Balochi students in government schools in Bahrain and analyses their responses in association with various factors. This chapter fills a gap in the literature about linguistic choices of immigrant children and the role of state schools in Bahrain in promoting integration. This chapter is divided into four sections; the first presents an overview of language policy in relation to immigrants, language rights of minorities and implicit versus explicit policies. The second section will present the methodology and explain how the survey was designed and conducted. This will be followed by a presentation of the data and then a discussion. Upon that, the chapter's conclusions are drawn and, as one would expect, more questions are raised.

2. Language policy and immigrants / language rights of minorities

The question of the integration of immigrants is one of identity. To start with, it is important to note that assimilation and integration are not to be used interchangeably. While "assimilation" suggests deleting or at least blurring the differences, such as cultural and/or linguistic differences, to become more like the majority and in our case the host-country people, "integration" does not indicate a loss of identity for the sake of adopting the host-country's lifestyle. Rather, "integration" proposes an understanding and acceptance of the host country, with its new customs, new terms and expectations. Integration does suggest a degree of assimilation, while simultaneously reserving the other identity, that of the ethnic (and sometimes religious) nature.

To many socio-linguists and sociologists (e.g. Joseph 2004; Castells 1997), identities are constructed and "the emergence of a new identity" does not conflict with "pre-existing components" of an individual identity (Bruter 2005: 15). In other words, despite it being challenging at times, immigrants do not have to choose between the identity relating to their ethnic origin and the newly acquired (or desired to be acquired) identity of the host country. For example, in reference to the United States, one of the most ethnically diverse countries with immigrants from all over the world, Salomone (2010: 12) concludes that the "[a]dvances in the fields of technology and transportation, along with new opportunities for dual citizenship" are a few of the advantages that permit dual identities to emerge, something that was not possible even five decades ago. Salomone (2010: 12) explains that "[t]he recognition afforded ethnic ties in the wake of the civil rights movement has further created a climate where young people from immigrant families now feel free to forge their own sense of what it means to be American." To them, the image of the melting pot is no longer valid in a rapidly changing world (Salomone 2010). Nevertheless, balancing the "dual cultures" remains difficult for many due to cultural clashes (Salomone 2010: 94).

Language is not only a means of communication, but also a conduit of identity (May 2001). Recently, bilingualism and multilingualism have no longer come to be seen as a threat to the integration of immigrants in a community. As modern education recognises the advantages of embracing bilingualism and even trilingualism (see, for example, Chua (2011) and Gorter, Zenotz and Cenoz (2014) on Singapore shifting from bilingualism to trilingualism in education), it would be discriminative on the one hand and regressive on the other to ban (or expect banning) a language other than the official language(s) of the country from being spoken and used, whether by citizens or immigrants. Requiring students to master the official language of the country as a medium of instruction does not require them having to shift from their other language(s).

The terms "mother tongue" and "native language" seem to be politically charged and tend to be, by many laypeople, ethnicised. While some speakers (and references) use either term to refer to the language learnt first in the early years of a speaker's life, there is still a strong tendency by a large number of speakers to link the term to the language that originates from the region or ethnic group they belong to, even if they learn this language at a later stage in their lives or, in some cases, even if they never master it or learn it. The term "first language", on the other hand, while used interchangeably with the former two by many, can also be a language that one learns in the early years of his or her life and masters it better than other languages even though it is not the language of his or her ethnic group. In this chapter, I will use "native language"[2] to refer to the language of the ethnic group, whether it is a first language, a second language or not mastered or used by the speaker. I will use "first language" to refer to the language that is used most in one's communication, the language seen as the more instant choice for a more comfortable and easier communication.

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[2] The term "mother tongue" is used once when referring to another author and his/her use of the term matches mine of "native language".

Linguistic choice is a human right. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) distinguishes between (a) language rights, which she views as being more general and unnecessary, such as learning a foreign language; and (b) linguistic human rights, which she views as necessary rights. She categorises the latter into types; first, as necessary individual rights, which are "the right to identify with, to maintain and to fully develop one's mother tongue(s)" and also access to mother tongue(s) (2000: 498). The second type of linguistic human rights, as described by Skutnabb-Kangas, are the necessary collective rights, which are "the right of minorities and indigenous people to exist and to reproduce themselves as distinct groups, with their own languages and cultures" (2000: 498). It would be, thus, useful to use the term "linguistic rights" to illustrate what this chapter is focusing on; however, despite the usefulness of this distinction, I will be using "language rights" to refer to these necessary rights since the sources I am referring to use this more generic term to refer to this specific right.

Van der Stoel (1999) presented a dichotomy of negative rights versus positive human rights. Negative rights are defined as "the right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights", whereas positive rights are "the right to the maintenance and development of identity through the freedom to practice or use those special and unique aspects of their minority life – typically culture, religion and language" (Van der Stoel 1999: 8).

Language rights should be considered when constructing the language policy of a country or an educational institution. Language planning and policy came to attention in the 1950s but were developed into a structured field of study only in the 1990s (Ricento 2006). Language planning can be defined as "[a] systematic, rational, theory-based effort at the societal level to modify the linguistic environment with a view to increasing aggregate welfare. It is typically conducted by official bodies or their surrogates and aimed at part or all of the population living under their jurisdiction" (Grin 2000: 7).

Kloss (1971, 1977) classifies language policies that provide language rights to minorities (or speakers of other than the official language) into two types: promotion-oriented policies, by which a government supports teaching and maintaining minority languages; and tolerance-oriented policies, which allow speakers of other languages to learn and use their languages without the government participating in maintaining these languages. Kloss (1971, 1977) suggests that immigrants should enjoy tolerance rights but not promotion rights. Of course, Asian languages that are spoken in Bahrain are not national languages and the type of language rights that would be expected is that of tolerance-oriented rights. This, nevertheless, does not mean that rights are guaranteed by simply allowing minorities to speak their language.

3. Explicit vs. implicit language policy

Language planning, according to Tollefson (1991: 16), refers to "all conscious efforts to affect the structure or function of language varieties" while she distinguishes of language policy as being "language planning by governments". Schiffman (1996) distinguished between overt and covert language policies. He explained that overt language policies are formalised, explicit policies, while the covert ones, which are often ignored, are the implicit, *de facto*, unstated ones (Schiffman 1996). He explains that the covert part of policy is "supported and transmitted by the culture" (Schiffman 1996: 13). Shohamy (2006: 50) uses the terms explicit and implicit for overt and covert respectively. The distinction is simply between stated formal policies as in the laws and regulations of the country or institution for explicit policies, versus the mental representations of language choice and use in interlocutors' minds for implicit policies. Schiffman (1996) emphasises the importance of studying covert policies for being the *de facto* practice. In other words, regardless of the written and announced policies, the covert policies are the ones that leave an impact and direct attitudes and reactions, whether they meet or diverge from the explicit policies.

3.1 Domains

From a socio-linguistic perspective, linguistic choice is best examined in a socio-linguistic context. While context is often seen as a factor influencing linguistic choice, the linguistic choices a speaker makes can be an indication of how he or she perceives the context (Herman 1961). The socio-linguistic notion of domain was first presented by Fishman (1972), who stressed that, in a multilingual speech community, different settings necessitate the use of different languages and different linguistic varieties from in a monolingual community. Languages spoken by an individual have symbolic and communicative functions for their speakers (Moormann-Kimáková 2016). These functions "can be fulfilled by one or more languages" while not each language can function in any domain (Moormann-Kimáková 2016: 53).

With immigrants, the language of their original country or region, at least between the first and second generations, initially maintains a communicative function with the family and community members who cannot speak or do not have a good command of the host country's language. However, it loses some significance at the communicative function level with later generations that have native-like command of the language of the host country. This language of their original country will have a strong symbolic function that serves to construct a part of their identity, especially for the early generation(s). Some immigrants maintain this symbolic function longer than others, depending on the factors affecting their ability and, most importantly, willingness to delay a total shift to the host language and to maintain their language and, often concurrently, their identity as being from a different ethnicity. These factors in turn affect the bottom-up perspective of identity, i.e. to which group a person feels that he or she belongs.

3.2 Bahrain as a multilingual society

3.2.1 Demographic facts

Bahrain is a small archipelago in the Arabian Gulf. It has always been open to various cultures, whether via trade or immigration. It declared its independence from the British following a UN survey of the Bahraini population on 16 December 1971. Since then, it has had an Arab government, while encompassing a diverse ethnic composition: mainly, but not exclusively, Arabs from the west and other nationalities from the east coast of the Gulf (Persians, Pakistanis, Balochis and Indian). On its small land area of 770 km^2 (Survey & Land Registration Bureau 2013a), the population now exceeds one million people (614,830 Bahrainis and 638,361 non-Bahrainis in 2013) (Survey & Land Registration Bureau 2013b).

3.2.2 Language education policy in Bahrain

In Bahrain, there are state schools and private schools. State schools are free of charge and all residents, whether citizens or not, are allowed to benefit from them. The only restriction is the system of the catchment area, i.e. each school serves residents of a defined number of blocks surrounding it. Article 7 of the Bahraini Constitution states that "education is compulsory and free in the early stages as specified and provided by law". The early stages refer to the first nine years, starting from grade 1. According to 2013–2014 statistics provided by the Ministry of Education, there were 206 state schools, 102 of which were for females and 104 were for males (Educational Statistics Section 2014).

3.2.3 Urdu and Balochi immigrant families in Bahrain

Far Eastern and Western residents tend to enrol their children in private schools that mainly teach in their native language or in English. There are British, American, Indian, Urdu and Filipino schools, for example. At government schools, on the other hand, besides the majority of Arabs (Bahrainis and other nationals), there is a large number of Pakistani and Balochi students, most of whom come from families who are settled or intend to settle in Bahrain for long periods.

The majority of Asian families in Bahrain are Indians, Pakistanis and Balochis, some of whom still hold their original nationality while others have gained Bahraini citizenship, particularly Pakistanis and Balochis. This makes this sector an important one to focus on when considering integration and educational language policies.

Very often, research on language policy and minorities takes one of two forms. First, the minorities are inhabitants of the region or country in question who may have different ethnicities or origins from the majority (cf. Benedikter 2009). In these cases, the minorities are actually settled in the region or country as their homeland. The other common form of research is that of new immigrants, often of the first three generations. The concept of immigration in the modern sense of the term includes naturalisation, or a request to be naturalised, in the host country. In Bahrain, however, when we consider Asian minorities, neither label fits them. They relate to other countries from which they, their parents or grandparents have come. They relate to that homeland at the cultural level and often have relatives who still live there and with whom they connect. While most bachelor workers intend to go back home at a certain stage, many Asian families, though not all, intend to settle in Bahrain as long as possible. However, Bahrain has no immigration policies and naturalisation does not happen automatically. This is understandable if one compares the size of the country to its population. Thus, naturalisation is not common, though it happens occasionally.

However, despite naturalisation being unlikely, many Asians find Bahrain an attractive destination to move to for its multicultural nature and its openness to diversity, while maintaining a degree of conservativeness that conforms to that of near-Eastern nationals in general and Muslims in particular. This shift to Bahrain as a family on a working visa (which requires being renewed every two years) without any official immigration process, on the one hand, and the intention to settle in Bahrain for as many years as possible, on the other, makes the status of Asian minorities different from that of immigrants as known in Western culture and literature. Nevertheless, once they have moved to the country as a family, their status is often stable as long as they hold a job and abide by the law of the country. Many Balochi and Pakistani families have been in Bahrain for generations, and a large number of them are naturalised. Naturalised Balochis in particular are more integrated in Bahraini society. More intermingling with other Bahrainis, involving mainly third-generation and later-generation Balochis, has emerged within the Bahraini lifestyle when it comes to clothes, language, customs and traditions.

With Pakistani immigrants, however, most retain an individual sense of identity. This may be partially because Balochistan, according to modern political boundaries, is a vast region divided between (or within) three countries: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This means that officially there is no such “country” as Balochistan. Thus, Balochi people tend to associate themselves with either one of the three countries or the country to which they emigrate, and often exist in certain countries of the Arabian Gulf (mainly Bahrain and Oman) as extended families.

The two groups, Pakistani and Balochi families living in Bahrain, are at the practical level immigrants. They are either second or third generation immigrants (many having earned citizenship already), with their family’s original language, not Arabic, spoken at home.

3.3 Methodology

This being one of few, if not the first, investigations of Bahraini immigrant speech communities and identity, the researcher considered it appropriate to obtain some generic information about linguistic choice and identity perception. Accordingly, a survey was used to collect quantitative data. First, the study used a cross-sectional examination of younger Urdu and Balochi students at elementary level to high school. The participants were chosen from Urdu and Balochi speakers living in and going to state schools in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, where the vast majority of expatriates live. The research employed a two-page paper-based questionnaire to explore which languages the participants speak, in which domains they use each language, and their perceptions and attitudes towards each language within the implicit language policy in schools.

The participants in this survey are the children of immigrant Urdu and Balochi families who go to state schools in Bahrain. As Spolsky noted, “[i]n an immigration situation, it is common for the children to take leadership in the socialization process” (2004: 45). With the children being the speech community members who are most actively affecting language choice made by an immigrant community, the choices of these children are to a great extent affected by language policies, both implicit and explicit. Spolsky (2004: 15) asserts that:

> More commonly, schools reflect the ideological position of those who control them. Normally, their policy will be driven in part at least by the policy of the national government. …The present language policy model, then, suggests that the school domain is the one most likely to be influenced externally, whether from "below" (home, religion, neighbourhood) or "above" (levels of government), and to be most often the target of activist intervention in support of one variety or another.

This makes the schoolchildren's perception of their identity and of the school language policy a valid viewpoint from which to examine how the implicit language policies are associated with and contribute to integrating Urdu- and Balochi-speaking immigrants into the Bahraini community.

The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) consisted of 16 questions divided into three parts: demographic information, language use, and language and identity. The questions required minimum writing, mostly being multiple choice or requiring answers of only a word or two. Originally, the questions were designed to be used in guided interviews; however, the researcher faced some difficulty in meeting individual students as, while parental consent was needed for ethical reasons, some parents were resistant to the idea. The questions were therefore simplified and translated into Arabic and used as a questionnaire which was distributed to Urdu and Balochi speakers at three different afterschool gatherings, with the support of a number of native speakers from within the groups to facilitate access to them. The survey was conducted in the period from 26 January to 1 February 2016. The survey process took several days to complete as different groups of participants were met in each of their neighbourhood gatherings on different days.

The researcher recognised some major drawbacks of this method. To begin with, the change of interviewer can affect the responses; hence, the three groups from whom the responses were collected could be said to be put in slightly different conditions. Nevertheless, this was not expected to significantly affect the validity of the results. Another disadvantage of shifting from interviews to a questionnaire was the concern about younger participants being able to fill in the questionnaires properly, despite being assisted by the researcher. However, the limited time the researcher was given necessitated this shift to self-completed questionnaires. The researcher walked around as she read and explained each item in order to assist individual participants with understanding the question and staying on track. No difficulties were faced with this method.

The collected responses were coded using a letter and a two-digit number and saved onto an Excel spreadsheet for analysis. Some responses were grouped under more general categories. For example, Balochi and Urdu were coded as native languages. Thus, whenever a participant responded by stating Urdu or Balochi, whether separately or in combination with other languages, the languages of Urdu and Balochi were replaced with the word “Native”. A similar categorisation principle was used for identity. Responses to the open questions of “How would you identify yourself to a foreigner?” and “How do people identify you?” were divided into three general categories as follows: Bahraini, Bahraini in combination with origin (e.g. Bahraini from Pakistani origin, Balochi born in Bahrain, Pakistani-Balochi, Pakistani, etc.), and Origin (Pakistani or Balochi). The responses were recorded and some associations were made between responses to certain questions using a chi-square test. The results are provided in detail in the following section.

It must be noted that despite the fact Balochi and Urdu are two different languages and the fact that Balochi people see the Balochi identity as distinct from Pakistani historically, ethnically and traditionally, in this chapter the results are presented as from a single community for several reasons. First, the number of participants in each group is too small to allow analysis or comparison of responses. Second, the two groups are viewed by many of the laypeople in Bahrain as being from the same country since Balochistan is mostly within the boundaries of Pakistan. Third, in Bahrain, the Balochi and Pakistani students who go to government schools often share a neighbourhood and have some joint social activities and religious ceremonies, something which brings the two cultures and societies close to each other.

3.4 Findings

A total of 53 responses (27 female and 26 male) were collected from students at government schools whose native language was either Balochi or Urdu. The participants were from grades 3 to 12, distributed as shown in Table 5.1.

Grade	No. of Participants
3	1
4	6
5	2
6	6
7	12
8	7
9	5
10	5
11	5
12	4
Total	*53*

Table 5.1: Distribution of participants according to grade at school.

3.4.1 Spoken languages

Participants were asked to list the languages they could communicate with, from strongest to weakest. They all listed at least two languages. A total of 22 participants (41.5%) listed Arabic[3] as their first language, while 29 (54.7%) chose to list their native language (i.e. Urdu or Balochi) as their first language. The remaining two participants chose English as their first language. As for the second language, 25 participants (47.2%) said it was Arabic, and 16 (30.2%) said it was English. The remaining 12 (22.6%) gave their native language as their second language. When it came to their third language, a total of 43 (81.1%) participants provided a response. Of these, 18 participants (34%) stated that it was English, 19 (35.8%) said it was their native language, and only 6 (11.3%) said it was Arabic. Four participants mentioned a fourth language (two Urdu and two Punjabi). Thus, according to the participants' general classification of their command of languages, Arabic was mainly the first, and to some the second. Native languages were mainly viewed as second in the order according to competence.

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[3] Only the word 'Arabic' was written and this normally means Bahraini dialect(s) in spoken language and Modern Standard Arabic in writing. However, in social media communication such as WhatsApp and Instagram, comments tend to vary depending on how formal the topic is.

The participants were then asked which of the languages they had listed that they could communicate with orally (speaking and listening) but could not write or read. A total of 11 participants each mentioned a language. Of these, 2 were Punjabi (the only 2 participants who actually mentioned it in the spoken languages; it was in both cases mentioned as a fourth language); 6 mentioned Balochi (all of whom were of Balochi origin); and 10 mentioned Urdu (5 of whom were Pakistani, whose native language was Urdu, and 5 were Balochi, whose native language was not Urdu).

3.4.2 Domains of language use

The participants were given a table with a list of domains (called "places" in the questionnaire). They were asked to list the languages they mostly used in these domains, from highest to lowest frequency. They were informed that they could mention one or more languages, depending on their actual language choice. The results by domain are shown in Figures 5.1 to 5.7 (with Urdu and Balochi listed under a unified category as Native language, "Ntv" in the graphs).

The responses, in general, reflected a dominance of native language (Urdu or Balochi) mainly at home with family members and in the neighbourhood, while Arabic was used more frequently in the other domains. A total of between 48 and 52 of the participants provided details for different domains. In the results presented in the following graphs, the percentages are based on the total responses per domain.

Figure 5.1 illustrates language choice made by participants in school as the speech domain. The vast majority (a total of 48, i.e. 92%) considered Arabic as their first choice. In this group, 18 (a third of the participants) stated that they used only Arabic at school, while 30 used other languages for communication purposes at school as their second option after Arabic. Only 4 (7.5%) mentioned that they used their native language more frequently at school.



Figure 5.1: Participants' language choice at school

Figure 5.2 summarises the responses of the participants to the languages they used at home, in order of frequency. As is common in immigrant families, native language is dominant with a total of 44 (85%) of the participants stating their native language as being the first choice at home. A total of 30 participants (58%) stated that they only used their native language (Urdu or Balochi), and none of the participants used solely Arabic at home. The second biggest group is that using their native language as a first choice and Arabic as their second (22%). As for the eight (15%) participants who chose Arabic as their first language at home, they all indicated that they used both English and their native languages alongside Arabic at home.



Figure 5.2: Participants' language choice at home

In response to the question about which language(s) participants used in their neighbourhood, a total of 51 responses were received. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the number of responses in each category. A major switch to the native languages is noticed, with 33 (63.5%) participants stating that they solely used their native language in the neighbourhood. The second combination of language use was for Arabic and the native language with a total of 12 (23%) participants. This reflects, first, the ethnographic composition of the residential areas, as they are dominated by people from similar linguistic communities; and second, it reflects a desire to demonstrate and maintain their association to their native community and hence maintain this component of their identity that is greatly, though not solely, reflected in the preservation of their language.



Figure 5.3: Participants' language choice in their neighbourhood

A total of 48 participants responded about language use when shopping. As shown in Figure 5.4, the major language is Arabic, with a total of 33 participants (68.8%) considering it their first choice; only 12 participants (22.9%) considered their native language as their first choice, seven of whom considered Arabic as their second choice. Four participants (8.4%) stated that English is their first choice in shops and stores. Among the 15 participants who did not choose Arabic as their first option, eight mentioned Arabic as a second or third choice, leaving only 7 (14.5%) who did not consider using Arabic in shops and stores.



Figure 5.4: Participants' language choice when shopping

In response to the section about which language(s) the participants used when reading other than for school, a total of 51 responses were received. As shown in Figure 5.5, 27 participants (74.5%) stated that they used Arabic, while 12 others mentioned Arabic alongside another language, whether it was their native language or English or both. Of these 12 participants, 11 had Arabic as their first choice. Only 3 participants stated that they read solely in their native language and 7 mentioned only English. The native language as a first choice was only chosen by 2 participants (3.9%).



Figure 5.5: Participants' language choice in reading other than school materials

In response to the section about languages used in writing diaries (if applicable), a total of 34 participants shared their experience. Figure 5.6 shows that 25 (73.5%) stated that Arabic was their first choice, of whom 19 (55.9%) mentioned that they wrote solely in Arabic. Two participants (5.9%) wrote in their native language as their first choice and Arabic as the second, and 4 (11.8%) wrote their diaries in their native language.



Figure 5.6: Participants' language choice in writing diaries

A total of 45 responses were collected about language(s) used in writing lists. Figure 5.7 shows that Arabic was the first choice of 30 participants (88.2%), of whom 26 (76.5%) had Arabic as the only choice. Eight participants (23.5%) used their native language as their first choice, and 7 (20.6%) chose English as the language to write shopping and things-to-do lists.



Figure 5.7: Participants' language choice in writing lists

3.4.3 Language command vs. preference

The participants were then asked which languages they thought they spoke best and which they most liked to use. As for the language spoken best, 23 (43.4%) mentioned that it was Arabic and 26 (49.1%) said it was their native language. Two said it was English. When it came to the language they preferred or liked to speak, 26 (49.1%) said Arabic, 17 (32.1%) said their native language and 8 (15.1%) said English. One participant said Punjabi. Generally, there was no difference between preference and command, with a tendency towards English, probably for having more weight in employment in Bahrain than Arabic, something that the public seem to realise at a very early stage.

For the following questions, a chi-square test of independence was used to examine the association between pairs of responses. The results showed that there was either a significant association or a high association between certain pairs of responses, with $x^2(6) = 34.59$, $p < 0.05$.

Preferred Medium			Identifying Self					
	Total		Bahraini		Bah-other		Other	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Arabic	37	71.15	10	19.2	15	28.8	12	23.1
Native Lang.	7	13.46	0	0.00	1	1.9	6	11.5
English	8	15.38	4	7.7	1	1.9	3	5.8
Total	*52*	*100*	*14*	*26.9*	*17*	*32.6*	*21*	*40.4*

Table 5.2: Preferred medium of learning in association with self-identification

As the table illustrates, over 70% of the participants said they preferred to study at schools in which the main medium of instruction was Arabic and only 13% of them wished they could study in a school where it was their native language (Balochi or Urdu). The rest (15%) wished they could be in a school where the medium of instruction was English. As for how they identified themselves, a total of 31 (59.5%) identified themselves as either Bahraini or Bahraini in combination with their other identity in one way or another (e.g. Balochi-Bahraini, Pakistani born in Bahrain, Bahraini from Pakistani origins, a Balochi living in Bahrain, etc.). The remaining 21 participants (40.4%) identified themselves by labels other than Bahraini or Bahraini with association with another identity (i.e. Balochi or Pakistani, and one of them used the label "foreigner").

Interestingly, when associating the responses to this question with those of how the participants identified themselves, there appeared to be a clear association between the two. None of those who solely identified themselves as Bahraini wished to be at a school teaching in their native language. Additionally, most of those who identified themselves as using a combination of identities, one of which was Bahraini, were also strongly in favour of studying in Arabic-medium schools. Only 1 of the 15 who identified themselves as such wished they could study in a school where the medium of instruction was their native language. As for those who identified themselves solely with an identity different than Bahraini (e.g. Balochi or Pakistani), more than half were still in favour of studying in Arabic, although over a quarter wished they could study in their native language and 14% would prefer studying in English.



Figure 5.8: The need for Arabic for everyday use

When asked whether they thought they needed Arabic for everyday use in Bahrain, the majority agreed that they do (see Figure 5.8). As expected, the older ones (grades 7 to 12) were more certain about this need than the younger ones (grades 1 to 6). Over a quarter of the younger participants thought that they did not need Arabic, compared with just over a tenth of the older ones.

	Grades 1-6		Grades 7-12		Total	
Response	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	8	53.3	25	67.6	33	63.5
No	4	26.7	10	27.0	14	26.9
Not sure	3	20.0	2	5.4	5	9.6
Total	*15*	*100*	*37*	*100*	*52*	*100*

Table 5.2: Responses according to grade about whether learning Arabic helps integration in Bahraini society

In general, over 63% of the participants believed that speaking Arabic properly would help their integration into the Bahraini community (see Table 5.3). When grouped according to school grade, the younger participants were less in favour of the need for Arabic for integration, with just over half thinking it would help, a quarter thinking that it would not help and the rest being unsure. Uncertainty, however, dropped dramatically among the older students, and more than two thirds of these participants thought learning Arabic would help them integrate into the Bahraini community. In both age groups, however, slightly over 25% disagreed and did not think learning Arabic would help them integrate better.

When analysed according to sex, female participants were all positive about the role of learning Arabic in helping them to integrate into the Bahraini community, as Table 5.4 reflects.

		Need for Arabic for integration						
		Yes		I don't know		No		
		No.	*%*	No.	*%*	No.	*%*	Total
Sex	Male	12	*46*	9	*35*	5	*19*	26
	Female	22	*81*	5	*19*	0	*0*	27
Total		*34*	*64*	*14*	*26*	*5*	*9*	*53*

Table 5.4: Responses to Arabic helping integration, according to sex

This was the only significant association of response according to the sex of the participant. It is a large difference and there is no uncertainty in the female stance towards the role of Arabic in integrating into Bahraini society.

	Need for Arabic in daily life						
	Yes		I don't know		No		
Preferred Medium	No.	%	No.	%	No	%	Total
Arabic	32	60.4	5	9.4	1	1.9	38
Native Lang.	6	11.3	0	0.0	1	1.9	7
English	3	5.7	3	5.7	1	1.9	7
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.9	1
Total	*41*	*77.4*	*8*	*15.1*	*4*	*7.6*	*53*

Table 5.5: Preferred medium of learning in association with the need for Arabic in daily life

As shown in Table 5.5, despite their preferred medium of instruction, the majority of participants (77.4%) believed they needed Arabic in their daily life. If compared to what participants said about the need for Arabic to integrate, the participants were more definite about the need for Arabic for daily use than they were about the need for it for integration.

Need for Arabic to integrate			When you were told not to speak your native language							
	Total		Never		In class		In class and break		In break	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes	32	*63*	16	*31*	6	*12*	7	*14*	3	*6*
No	14	*27*	9	*18*	1	*2*	3	*6*	1	*2*
Not sure	5	*10*	1	*2*	1	*2*	3	*6*	0	*0*
Total	*51*	*100*	*26*	*51*	*8*	*16*	*13*	*25*	*4*	*8*

Table 5.6: The association between the need for Arabic to integrate and the freedom of language choice at school

Participants were asked if they were ever told at school not to speak their native language, and, if so, where. To this question there were a total of 51 responses (see Table 5.6). Over 30% of the participants said that they were never asked not to speak their native language, but 12% reported that they were asked not to speak it in class, 14% in both class and during break, and only 6% during the break. There seems to be a freedom of language choice at schools, and students automatically and deliberately shift to the most suitable language. The fact that only very few were told not to speak their native language in class does not mean that students do not speak Balochi or Urdu in class, but that they shift to Arabic without being asked to. When the responses to this question were associated with the responses to whether the participants thought learning Arabic would help them integrate into the Bahraini community, the two groups were largely in favour of it. There was no association between being told not to speak their native language at school and a rejection of the need for Arabic to integrate.

There was no significant association between the feeling of the need for Arabic to integrate into the Bahraini community and whether teachers provided special support to the participants for not speaking Arabic.

The participants were then asked to circle how they defined themselves and were given a number of examples: a Bahraini, a Pakistani, a Pakistani living in Bahrain, a Pakistani-Bahraini, a Pakistani born in Bahrain, a Bahraini originally from Pakistan, an Asian living in Bahrain, Hindi, foreigner, etc. They were then asked to state how others defined them.

		Identified by Others					
		Bahraini	Pak.-Bah	Pak. born in Bah	Bal. born in Bah or Bal. living in Bahrain	Bah.-Bal.	Total
Identify Yourself	Bahraini	8	0	5	2	0	15
	Pak-Bah	0	0	5	0	0	5
	Paki born in Bah	1	1	10	0	0	12
	Bal born in/living in Bah	3	0	0	4	2	9
	Bah-Bal	0	0	0	0	3	3
	Bah of Paki origin	0	0	0	2	0	2
	Foreigner	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total		*13*	*1*	*20*	*8*	*5*	*47*

Table 5.7: Responses to how participants identify themselves vs. how they were identified by others

As Table 5.7 illustrates, there was no significant difference between how the participants defined themselves and how others normally defined them. This means that the bottom-up perspective of identity (how they feel) did not significantly differ from the top-down perspective (how the society identified them).

Since Arabic in Bahrain has two varieties – high (Modern Standard Arabic) and low (Bahraini dialect(s)) – the participants were asked which they found easier.

	Total	Grades 1-6	Grades 7-12
Standard Arabic	18	5	13
Bahraini Dialect	24	7	17
Both	9	3	6
Total	*51*	*15*	*36*

Table 5.8: Which participants found easier: standard Arabic or Bahraini dialect

Table 5.8 shows that the results did not differ significantly despite the Bahraini dialect being seen as easier by some, a result which is the normal response expected from anyone about his or her first language when asked to compare his or her local dialect with the standard language, giving Arabic the position of a first language for the majority of the participants. However, the difference is not significant. No association was found between the responses to this question and any other questions. The participants' views of the Bahraini dialect and standard Arabic, thus, did not affect their language preferences or integration into the Bahraini community.

4. Discussion

Although language conflicts are associated with nationalism conflicts (Hechter 2000), having a unified language is not enough for a group to see itself as a nation, as can be seen in countries such as Ireland and Serbia (Patten and Kymlicka 2003). More factors play a part in making integration possible. It is also understandable that attitudes towards the language of the host country are a result of various and complex factors; however, I believe that the implicit policy of language in state schools in Bahrain has a major effect on Balochi and Pakistani participants' attitudes towards Arabic and the level of integration. This can be confirmed by the fact that while the data illustrated that native languages are the first choice at home and in the neighbourhood, the responses of the participants at state schools in Bahrain reflect first a high degree of satisfaction with Arabic as the medium of instruction, on the one hand, and secondly a significant association of one's identity with Bahrain. The integration reflected in the choice of presenting oneself as a Bahraini or a Bahraini in association with one's native identity was also confirmed by the high number of positive responses to the question of whether they needed Arabic for daily use and the question of whether they needed Arabic for integration. It is true that the positive response to the latter was smaller than to the former; nevertheless, this reflects the participants' awareness of the fact that integration requires more than speaking a language, something which signals a degree of cultural awareness.

One interesting finding concerned participants being told not to speak their native language at school. The fact that a large number of participants said they were not stopped from speaking their language(s) is not because they had a freedom of language choice at school, since the official language is Arabic and all classes (apart from English language classes) are conducted only in Arabic. Instead, this reflects a conscious language choice made by the participants. They are aware of the language policy in class and shift to Arabic there. Even those who mentioned that they have been asked in class or during the break not to speak in their native language still demonstrate in their other responses a high level of integration and are highly satisfied with Arabic as the medium of instruction. In turn, nevertheless, they extensively use their native language(s) at home and in their neighbourhood, which allows them to maintain the other dimension of their identity without a feeling of linguistic oppression. This confirms that the implicit language policy in Bahrain's state schools has a positive impact on immigrants' integration.

While the main factor affecting language use at school, at home and in the neighbourhood domains is the presence of other participants in an illocutionary act (i.e. the other speakers and listeners/readers), writing lists and diaries is more of a solo language use with no participants other than the writer himself or herself. Thus, language choice in this situation may better reflect which language(s) the participants tend to feel more comfortable with, or as some may like to put it, the main language they think in. This can be the case because "interest in the language on the part of the third generation may resurface only as part of an attempt to construct a symbolic ethnic identity" (Carnevale 2009: 10).

Interestingly, when it came to these domains of language use, native languages had a very low priority and Arabic language became dominant. This raises the question of whether the participants are in the stage of shifting to Arabic, or if the next generations are more likely not to be addressed in native languages by the participants as their parents. At this stage, the Arabic register is added to the speakers' repertoire. However, as with many minorities, there is a risk of gradually abandoning native languages. The likelihood of this shift is high in most immigrant generations; however, the shift becomes noticeably slower (or sometimes even stagnant) when there are other traditions such as those that most Balochi and Pakistani immigrants in Bahrain maintain: intermarriage, living within a community from the same linguistic background, and having connections with relatives in the home country.

Ideally, to understand whether and to what extent the years mingling in Arabic-medium state schools has affected self-perception and attitudes toward languages, one would use the data to conduct a cross-sectional examination and compare responses of students in the very early years to the responses of those in the last few years (e.g. grades 1 and 2 in contrast to grades 11 and 12). However, this is not possible with our data since the number of participants, after categorising them according to grades (see Table 5.1), is too small to conduct any useful comparison. This keeps the data limited to the self-perception after "some" time of exposure to state school, with that time ranging from a few months to 12 years.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has shed light on the association of being at a state school and hence exposed to implicit language policies, on the one hand, and the level of integration into the Bahraini community without losing one's own linguistic rights and ethnic identity, on the other. It has found that the state schools in Bahrain are positively contributing to the feeling of integration and command of the Arabic language, without it interfering with the other facets of the identities of the participants or intruding in their linguistics rights, something which pertains to identity construction.

Although I realise that open questions could have enriched the qualitative data, I excluded them in order to focus on processing basic information on the topic, a subject not previously examined by academic research. At this initial stage, I have attempted to provide a general overview of this speech community in order to pave the way for further studies within the rich and varied linguistic communities of Bahrain.

Since no previous research addressed minority languages in Bahrain nor the effect of explicit and/or implicit language policies on the speakers of these languages from different perspectives (integration, identity conflict, language shift and language maintenance, etc.), it is strongly recommended that the use of these languages be further documented. A better understanding of these overlooked topics will serve not only the speech communities themselves, but also the educational institutions, other communities and the government. It will encourage the development of better procedures and policies to help improve or at least maintain a harmonious society that maintains its national language while balancing it with language rights within rich multinational and multi-ethnical societies such as Bahrain. It has to be borne in mind, for example, that most parents cannot communicate in Arabic, and school–home correspondence, which is currently solely in Arabic in state schools, should include a variety of languages; this is something that does not contradict the acknowledgement of Arabic as the national language but which in turn should accelerate integration.

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Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Part I: Demographic Information

1. Interview code _________
2. Sex Male Female
3. Grade _________
4. At which grade did you join a government school in Bahrain? _________

Part II: Language usage and skills

1. *What are the languages that you can speak? How well can you read and write these languages?*

Language	Write and read very well	Write and read but with difficulty	Can only speak, not write or read	Can read but cannot write myself
L1				
L2				
L3				

2. *Can you tell us which language you use in the following places (if you choose more than one, number them from 1 for the most used, 2 and then 3 for the least used):*

Domain	L1	L2	L3
School			
Home with family			
Neighbourhood			
In shops and the market			
Reading books other than school books (or webpages, magazines, newspapers, etc.)			
Writing your diaries or poems (if applicable)			
Writing lists such as shopping lists, things you need to do/prepare			

3. *Which language do you speak best?* L1 L2 L3
4. *Which language do you **like** to speak most?* L1 L2 L3
5. *At school, do your teachers provide more help the ones to whom Arabic is not their mother tongue* (e.g. explaining points again or more slowly, providing extra exercises, asking a friend to translate something for them)

a. Yes, most of the time
b. Yes, sometimes
c. Not much
d. No, not at all

6. *At school, were you ever asked not to speak any language other than Arabic? If so, when? Who asked you to do so?*

a. No, never. I choose which language to speak by myself.
b. Yes, only in class.
c. Yes, in class and in the breaks.
d. Yes, in the break.
e. Others

7. *Which one are you learning faster and find easier:*

a. Standard Arabic (fus-ha)
b. Bahraini dialect
c. They are the same

Part III: Language and identity

1. If you had a choice, would you prefer being in a school in which the medium of instruction is:

a. Arabic
b. Urdu
c. I am not sure
d. Other _____________ (specify)

2. How do you identify yourself? (e.g. a Bahraini, a Pakistani, a Pakistani living in Bahrain, a Pakistani-Bahraini, a Pakistani born in Bahrain, a Bahraini originally from Pakistani, an Asian living in Bahrain, Hindi, foreigner, etc.)

3. At school, how are you identified by other students and teachers? (e.g. a Bahraini, a Pakistani, a Pakistani living in Bahrain, a Pakistani-Bahraini, a Pakistani born in Bahrain, a Bahraini originally from Pakistani, an Asian living in Bahrain, Hindi, foreigner, etc.)

4. Do you think you need to learn and use Arabic properly like native speakers in everyday life?

Yes
Not sure
No

5. Do you think that learning Arabic well like native speakers will help/ has helped you integrate in (become part of) the Bahraini community?

Yes
Not sure
No

CHAPTER SIX

"THE IDEA WAS THAT THOSE WHO WERE TRAINED NEEDED TO TEACH OTHERS": CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE 2014 ZAMBIAN LANGUAGE OF INITIAL LITERACY POLICY CHANGE

FELIX BANDA AND DAVID SANI MWANZA

1. Introduction

Just before the opening of the school calendar in January 2014, the Zambian government announced a change in language in education policy from English to using a designated official regional Zambian language as the medium of instruction from nursery school to grade 4. Taking this language in education policy change in Zambia as a point of departure, this chapter is a critical reflection on language policy pronouncements in Zambia and in Africa generally.

We trace the history of contradictions and contestations surrounding language education policies in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) through missionaries, the British South Africa Company, the British Colonial Office and the emergent independent African government administrations. Thereafter, we use observation and interview data from teacher training college lecturers, primary and secondary school teachers of Zambian languages, and Zambian languages subject experts to evaluate the 2014 policy shift. The pedagogical implications of the language policy change are analysed considering language zoning, the monolingual/monoglot ideologies, teacher preparedness, material availability, and the apparent gap between the government-endorsed standard Zambian languages and varieties of the same language and the 'unofficial' languages spoken by teachers and learners in multilingual practices. We conclude that, although well-intentioned, the new policy is unlikely to yield the required results of promoting early literacy because it has been implemented before teachers were trained, before material was put in place and it ignored the multilingual dispensations in place.

In terms of classroom language practices, the new policy is not too different from those that have failed in the past in terms of its rigidity in application and in insisting on standard versions of Zambian languages when few teachers and learners speak them. Following Banda and Mwanza (2017), we argue that there is a gap between the official monoglossic ideology, which is reminiscent of colonial language ideology, and the multilingual (language) practices of Zambian learners. The chapter shows that contemporary language education policy shifts in Zambia and in Africa generally in reality mask underlying colonial language ideologies that seek to exclude the majority of African languages as legitimate languages of education. The colonial monoglot ideologies also promote concepts such as 'mother tongue' and 'additive bilingualism' in singular and autonomous language terms.

Banda (2010) criticises the distorting effects, in multilingual contexts of Africa, of concepts and language education policies designed for monolingual societies in Europe or elsewhere. These are (mis)applied in multilingual education contexts of Africa and to learners whose everyday language practices typically involve using more than one language or language blends. These language ideologies are designed to devalue or erase translanguaging and/or heteroglossia as a legitimate linguistic practice for language in education in multilingual and urbanising African societies. This leads to learners being *muted*, which according to Banda (2003) refers to multilingual learners having no linguistic form to express themselves due to the monolingual/monoglot (English) policy governing classroom language practices.

As stated earlier, at the beginning of 2014 the Zambian government announced that the language of instruction from nursery to grade 4 would be one of the seven zoned official Zambian languages. From grade 5 onwards, English would be the language of instruction up to university. It must be mentioned without fear of contradiction that the 2014 policy framework is not a new policy. The use of a Zambian language up to the fourth grade existed during the time of the missionaries. The current policy recommendation can be viewed as a revitalisation of the missionaries' policy.

However, looking at the changes and lack of consistency in policy formulation and implementation in Zambia, a number of questions can be asked about the 2014 policy. For example, how sound is the policy considering the multilingual contexts of Zambia? Was there wider consultation in the process of policy formulation? Zambian parents, like others in Africa, have favoured English as the language of education for their children. Were Zambian parents consulted about the change? What preparation in terms of materials and human resource was put in place at the dawn of the policy? These and many other questions ought to be asked and answered as we reflect on the policy change, even in the initial stages of its implementation.

The rest of the chapter is arranged in five main sections. The first section gives a historical account of language policy pronouncements in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). The idea is to showcase the fact that contradictions between policy and practice, the monolingual/monoglot ideology in language policy pronouncements and resulting contestations of local agency in evolving multilingual contexts, started way before Zambia became independent on 24 October 1964. In this section, we follow Banda (2009) to identify three phases in language policies, which relate to who was in charge of 'educating' the 'natives': the missionaries (before and after 1888), the British South Africa Company (until 1994) and the British Colonial Office (until October 1964). The second phase evaluates the various language education policy reforms that have taken place since 1964. The third phase coincided with Zambia's independence, with the pronouncement making English the official language of government and education.

We shall highlight the half-hearted attempts to reform this policy by having Zambian languages play a role in education. We argue that such attempts have been futile for socio-economic reasons in which English is associated with socio-economic mobility and modernity. The monolingual/monoglot dispensation that underpins the language education policy reforms also works against embracing multilingual language practices, which would make space for Zambian languages in classroom practices.

The second section of the chapter highlights the monolingual biases in secondary literature on the language of education in Zambia. We note that this literature has unwittingly supported the monoglot/monolingual policy in which education is thought to be better if one language at a time is used. In this connection, insisting on a singular 'standard' African language is seen as de-legitimising the other languages in multilingual contexts of Zambia. The multilingual repertoires that teachers and learners are competent in are seen as 'devious' and aberrations unfit for use in education.

The third section evaluates primary interview data with teacher training college lecturers, teachers and Zambia language experts on their views on the government's language education policy shift that English was to be replaced by the official Zambian language for each of the 10 provinces. We highlight the extent that the policy considered the multilingual contexts of Zambia; the kinds of consultations that took place in the process of policy formulation, and the kinds of preparation in terms of materials and human resources that took place before the policy was enacted.

The fourth section looks at the implications for language in education policy in multilingual Zambia considering recent developments in conceptualisations of translanguaging and heteroglossia as linguistic practice. The fifth section concludes and makes suggestions for comprehensive language policy changes that recognise the multilingual language practices and mobility of languages across regions and practices.

2. The monolingual orientation in language policy: Historical reflections

A number of language-in-education policies and pronouncements have come and gone in Zambia since the missionaries established classroom education in Northern Rhodesia, which was to become Zambia in 1964. The policies have all professed a monolingual perspective in which only one language is used at a time for classroom practices. What do we mean by language policy? Trask (1997) refers to language policy as an official government policy which regulates the form, teaching or use of one or more languages within the area controlled by that government. Language policy can also be explained as a set of interventions pronounced and implemented by states which are supported or enforced by law. Language education policy is that which governs the language(s) to be used for teaching and learning.

Banda (1996) has argued that for language education policy to be successful, it needs to be part of a larger language policy reform governing the use of different languages for government business and in public spaces. Language policy is so important that governments should consider all factors and stakeholders not only in its formulation but also in its implementation. This is because language policy by design or default may impact on the manner in which citizens conduct their interactions in different domains. Language policies can therefore empower or disempower certain sections of the population not familiar with the designated languages of interaction.

We are mindful that language policy does not necessarily have to be legislated. It can be in place by default as noticed from people's language practices in different domains. It can also be the case that legislated language education policy takes place together with language practices that are not officially recognised. This can happen in the same school and region and the nation at large. For instance, although English was the officially prescribed medium of instruction from primary school to higher education level until 2014, classroom practices differed. Literature abounds that in some schools the teachers would use local Zambian languages or translanguage between English and local languages. Some private schools and some schools in urban areas in particular used English as a medium of instruction from kindergarten to secondary school.

The failure to implement language education policy, poor language skills by teachers and learners, and contradictory language practices in and across schools have been blamed for the poor literacy practices of Zambian learners (Mwanza 2012; Zimba 2007; Simwinga 2006). In all these shortcomings, the use of English rather than Zambian languages has been isolated as the cause. Williams (1996), in comparing reading skills in Zambia and Malawi, blames the use of English for initial literacy and as the language of learning and teaching for poor reading skills in both Nyanja and English in Zambia. In concert with this observation, Muyebaa (1998, 2000, 2001), Sampa (2005) and Gordon (2014), to mention just a few studies, appear to blame the use of English as the cause. Successive government education reform reports have also pointed to language education policy that prioritises English over indigenous Zambian languages as the cause. Consider the following Ministry of Education (MoE) report, for example: “For over 30 years, (i.e. since the 1966 policy) children who have very little contact with English outside school but have been required to learn concepts through English medium have had unsatisfactory experience” (1996: 39).

Language diversity – that is, multilingualism – has been named as a factor contributing to low literacy rates among Zambian learners (see, for example, Tambulukani and Bus 2012). There are supposedly 72 indigenous Zambian languages spoken in Zambia but only 7 of these have been designated official languages. The MoE gives linguistic diversity as the reason for continuing with the policy of using English instead of indigenous Zambian languages: “It is generally accepted by educationists that learning is best done in the mother tongue. This situation is found to be impracticable in the case of every child in multi-lingual societies, such as Zambian society” (1996: 22).

The monolingual/monoglot ideology surrounding the language teaching and learning problems as well as the suggested solution – that is, the use of a singular mother tongue – are palpable in the majority of studies. In this conceptualisation of policy, English and Zambian languages are seen as autonomous and thus cannot be used together in the classroom. The ‘solution’ of using a Zambian language for initial literacy and as part of primary school education is to prepare learners for education in English.

This is what Banda (2010) has called replacing English-based monolingualism with a Zambian-language-based monolingualism. The question is how do learners cope with this strict monolingual/monoglot orientation considering the multilingual language practices they are accustomed to? Given the government's lack of an implementation plan in the past, will the change from English to a Zambian language as the main language of initial and primary education work this time? Why not allow the use of multiple languages for initial literacy to mirror community language practices?

The monolingual ideology in language policy and practice in education is not entirely new. It is an inheritance from the missionary and colonial past of Zambia. Following Banda (2009), we want to identify three phases in the language in education policy in Zambia. In all these phases, English and Zambian languages were treated as separate and their use in education was also seen as successive rather than inclusive, in the sense of blending the languages in classroom practice. The first phase started with the partition of Africa in 1888 until 1924. The British South Africa Company ruled what was to become Zambia from around 1890 to 31 March 1924 on behalf of Great Britain. The British government took direct control thereafter until 1964 when the new African government under Kenneth Kaunda took the reins.

Whereas the missionaries who had arrived before the 1800s to set up mission posts and schools depended on local languages for their work, the British South Africa Company came with settlers and hunters who had English as their mother tongue. The missionaries used local languages for evangelism and for education in the schools they set up. Commenting on the missionaries' use of local languages, Manchishi (2004: 1) notes:

> [T]he drive for evangelism proved extremely successful because the missionaries used local languages. The Bible and other Christian literature were translated into local languages. People chanted hymns in the language they understood best i.e. their own local languages, and even in the schools, the medium of instruction was in their own local languages at least up to the fourth grade.

To work in their homes and farms and also as administrative staff, such as clerks and support staff, English settlers and hunters, on the other hand, wanted African artisans and labourers who spoke some English. Thus, with the onset of the money economy, knowledge of some English slowly but surely started to matter to Africans. Even with the best of intentions, missionaries started offering English in some form after grade 4. At the very least, it can be said that missionaries instigated the beginning of a more or less formalised language policy in education involving the use of both English and local languages as media of classroom instruction.

During the phase of missionaries' direct control of schools, education was generally ineffectual and unsatisfactory, and as far as English is concerned, it did not feature prominently in the curriculum, if at all. It is not surprising that when the British Colonial Office took over control of the then Northern Rhodesia in 1924 from the British South Africa Company, one of the first things they did was to rein in mission schools and 'forced' them to improve the quality of education; particular with the infusion of more English in the curriculum (Banda 2009). Therefore, with the increase in British involvement in the running of the mission schools came more English in the curriculum.

As stated above, the second phase started in 1924 with the British Colonial Office taking direct control of the administration of Zambia from the British South Africa Company (Banda 2009). Aware of the poor education offered to Africans by mission societies, the British Colonial Office set up the Phelps-Stokes Commission and charged it with coming up with recommendations for the effective development of African education.

The Commission recommended that the colonial government should increase its expenditure on education in the form of grants-in-aid to the mission societies and predicted that such an investment would eventually "be reflected in better health, increased productivity and a more contented people" (Phelps-Stokes 1924: 265). With regard to the language of instruction, the Commission recognised the complementary roles that English and local languages could play in personal and national development. As a result, it recommended that English should become the official language in education and government business, while local languages were to be used for the preservation of African cultural values and ethnic identities. As a result of the recommendations, the government formally recognised four main local languages – Bemba, Cewa/Nyanja [henceforth Nyanja], Tonga and Lozi – as regional official languages to be used in the African government schools as media of instruction for the first four years of primary education.

This policy declaration was a major development in language policy formulation for Northern Rhodesia (to become Zambia in 1964) with regard to the medium of classroom instruction and, by extension, to the language of wider communication by zone. We would like to argue that even though the declaration gave legal status to and appeared to acknowledge the importance of local indigenous languages in education, it also inadvertently promoted English above these languages by pronouncing it the official language of government, business and education generally, after grade 4.

The zoning of languages not only entrenched the ideology of languages as autonomous phenomena; it was also arbitrary in the sense that it did not reflect the multilingual contexts in the different geographical locations. Thus, the implementation of language policy in 1953 created the problem of a three-tier policy. It was not uncommon for a pupil to be taught in a less dominant mother tongue for the first two years of primary education. Thereafter, the pupil would be taught in the more dominant regional official language for another two years and then in English from the fifth year onwards (Kashoki 1978: 26).

This problem, as will be clear, becomes critical again in the implementation of the new policy. What we see is the beginning of the situation in which African languages are being relegated to early literacies before learners are channelled to an English medium giving the ideological basis that these languages cannot cope with advanced and specialist content. Thus, “instruction through a local language was invariably seen as a transitional phase prior to instruction in English” (Ansre 1979: 12). The idea was that pupils would transfer the skills of reading and writing learnt through local languages to English. In principle, there was an attempt to start with what the pupils knew before moving gradually to English, which they were expected to have mastered by the fifth grade. This principle has been the mainstay of Cummins’s (2000) common underlying proficiency (CUP) and has been taken up by academics to argue that learners should first use one language – ‘the mother tongue’ – and then graduate to English after four or more years. The problem is that in multilingual contexts, people use multiple languages rather than a singular one as assumed in CUP, and the official Zambian language of education is not always spoken in the form it is used in books and other teaching material.

The third phase of the language in education policy coincided with Zambia’s attainment of independence. Its highlight was the proclamation in 1966 of English as the sole official language at national level and as the language of classroom instruction from grade 1 to the highest level of education.

In essence, what has been called the legacy of marginalisation of African languages continued, but this time it was perpetuated by emergent African leaders. Emergent leaders in independent Zambia adopted English as an official language because they felt that the country had too many indigenous languages, none of which could be accepted nationwide. In addition, they felt there was no Zambian language at the time that was developed well enough to function as a medium of wider or international communication (Mwanakatwe 1968). English was seen as a neutral non-indigenous language that would be acceptable to all the divergent linguistic and ethnic groups in the country and thus would foster national unity. The first minister of education after Zambia's independence (John Mwanakatwe) confirmed this when he stated the following:

> It is unity in diversity which must be forged without exacerbating inter-tribal conflicts and suspicions which have a disruptive effect. Because of this fact, even the most ardent nationalists of our time have accepted the inevitable fact that English – ironically a foreign language and the language of our former colonial masters – definitely has a unifying role in Zambia. It is the language used by the administration at all levels – central, provincial and district. In parliament, in the courts, at meetings of city and municipal councils, in the more advanced industrial and commercial institutions – the banks, post offices and others – English is the effective instrument for the transaction of business. (Mwanakatwe 1968: 212-213)

This thinking and the status quo between English and Zambian languages has not changed. As this chapter shows, not even the change of policy to use Zambian languages for initial literacy and primary education will change attitudes towards English.

Although it was clear by 1977 that the English-only medium of instruction was not working, the monolingual policy orientation can be gleaned in the 1977 education reforms. It recommended continued use of English as the language of education, while making provisions for the utilisation of the seven local official languages where necessary. In 1992, the MoE revisited and reappraised the language in education policy, and found that the English-only policy had weaknesses which included: downgrading of local languages, isolation of the school from the community, alienation of the learner from tradition and impairment of children's future learning. With these weaknesses in consideration, the 1992 policy document recommended that the MoE would institute a review of the primary school curriculum in order to establish the main local languages as the basic languages of instruction from grades 1 to 4. The 1992 recommendation provided teachers with greater freedom to determine 'the main local language' to be used as the language of instruction in primary schools and while at secondary schools; English was going to be a medium of instruction as well as a compulsory subject for everyone. But teachers continued to teach in English for various reasons: local languages had no materials and teachers did not always speak the 'standard' version of Zambian languages as found in written books and material.

In another reform initiative, the 1996 policy document "Educating Our Future" also retained the use of English as the official language of classroom instruction but, in addition, recommended the employment of familiar languages to teach initial literacy in grade 1. The policy states:

> [A]ll pupils will be given an opportunity to learn initial basic skills of reading and writing in a local language … officially, English will be used as a language of instruction but the language used for initial literacy learning in grade one will be one that seems best suited to promote meaningful learning by children. (MoE 1996: 27)

In 1998, another turn took place. The New Break Through to Literacy programme (NBTL) started as a pilot study in the Mungwi and Kasama Districts of Northern Province. The study involved an experiment of using a familiar language as a medium of instruction in grade 1 to teach literacy. The results showed that pupils were able to read by the end of grade 1 and that the level of reading for grade 2 pupils was equivalent to grade 4 pupils who had undergone the English medium. As a result, the project was scaled up to all schools in Zambia under the title “Primary Reading Programme (PRP)” (Chishiba and Manchishi 2014). The notion of learning through a familiar language is potentially interesting only in the plural as in ‘familiar languages’. Considering the multilingual dispensation in Zambia, it is conceivable that such languages are not necessarily any of the seven official languages or those constituting the official linguistic zones. Since familiar languages in communities are not necessarily “standardised”, there is also an interesting prospect that the languages are not necessarily the formalised ones. The ‘success’ of the PRP led to the government announcing the shift of language policy in 2013 recommending the use of a familiar local language as a language of initial literacy.

However, in January 2014 there was another language education policy shift, in which the government announced that with immediate effect the language of instruction from nursery school to grade 4 would be one of the zoned seven official Zambian languages. The policy change noted in its introduction that from grade 5 onwards, English would be the language of instruction up to university. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, it is the purpose of this paper to explore how implementable this policy is considering various parameters including the history of education in Zambia, the kinds of consultations with stakeholders (if any), teacher and learner preparedness for classroom practices in line with the new policy, and the availability of teaching material, among others. To get a clear picture of the language education policy change, below we review literature on language practices and policy in Zambia. We believe it is partly due to the monoglot/monolingual ideology underlying most of these studies that provided a motivation for language education policy change, the ideology of which is also to produce a monoglot/monolingual learner.

3. The monolingual biases in academic literature on language education policy in Zambia

A number of studies have been conducted in Zambia unearthing the challenges that have been faced in implementing language in education policies. Other than the monolingual ideologies that surround most of these policies, there is an underlying theme that a mere switch from English to Zambian languages will not solve the problem of low literacy levels. One issue that keeps coming up in the literature is the use of ‘standard’ Zambian languages. These tend to be different from the ‘real mother tongues’ spoken by teachers and learners. For instance, the official Nyanja found in schoolbooks is based on Cewa, the version spoken in parts of Malawi and a few areas in Eastern Province of Zambia (Banda and Mwanza 2017). The choices and zoning of seven Zambian languages also appear to have been done arbitrarily in most areas. For Lusaka, Nyanja is the ‘zonal’ language of education, yet people in the surrounding areas speak Soli, Lenje and other languages.

As the review of recent literature on language education shows, it is not just government policy but also academics that see the replacement of monolingual education in English in the initial stages of a learner’s education with a singular Zambian language to be desirable. However, as the review below shows, literacy problems in Zambian schools are much more than mere choices between English and Zambian languages. More importantly, the use of a singular language, whether English or a Zambian language, would be contrary to multilingual practices that learners bring to school from their communities.

Mulenga (2012) conducted a study in which he wanted to establish grade 3 pupils’ preparedness to read and write in Bemba and English. These are pupils who were taught through a Zambian language in grade 1 and changed to English in grade 2. Most pupils in grade 3 were not able to read and write at the desirable level, including some who had supposedly broken through to initial literacy by the end of grade 2. Pupils faced difficulties spelling words in English and Bemba especially when the words were raised from one-syllable to three-syllables. Pupils could not write simple sentences that were deemed to be at their grade level. Mulenga (2012) concluded that those pupils who had not ‘broken through’ faced the most challenges as they had little or nothing at all to transfer from Bemba as a first language into English as a second language by the third grade. The Bemba that the majority of learners spoke was different from the 'book' Bemba found in the materials.

Mwambazi's (2011) study set out to establish the factors and the nature of low reading achievement among grade 2 pupils in selected schools in the Mpika and Mbala Districts. Grade 2 pupils in the targeted schools were not able to read Zambian languages and English according to their grade level. Some of the factors that led to low reading levels included absenteeism; a shortage of suitable teaching/learning materials; a shortage of teachers particularly those trained in PRP methodologies; large classes; a poor family and educational background; poor and inadequate infrastructure; pupils not breaking through in grade 1; inadequate time allocated for literacy/reading lessons; and most importantly, the unfamiliar language of instruction.

Phiri's (2012) study on teachers' perception of factors which prevent some grade 1 learners from breaking through to initial literacy showed that the language of instruction to a larger extent was a barrier both to learners and teachers. The situation was more pronounced in urban and in peri-urban schools because of the factor of multilingualism which made it impracticable to use a regional standard language (Kaonde) as the medium of instruction. In rural schools, on the other hand, language did not pose a threat to the learners because the language of instruction was almost the same as the regional ethnic language. Yet rural learners tended to do worse than those in urban areas due the inadequacy of the materials which had made the learning and teaching process difficult. Learning through the 'mother tongue' did not help those in rural areas, while those in urban areas were hampered by the less familiar regional local language of education. Phiri's study revealed that overall the pupil-to-book ratio was as high as 5:1 or higher. The respondents attributed the situation to the lack of replacement of lost or worn out books. Other challenges included large class sizes, poor infrastructure and learner absenteeism. These problems are not unlike those found in other studies which were conducted in other parts of the country. The point here is that the whole country seems to be faced by similar problems that hinder pupils from breaking through to literacy.

Kumwenda (2011) sought to establish the initial reading performance in Nyanja in multi-ethnic/multilingual Chipata (the capital of Eastern Province of Zambia) urban areas. Specifically, this research sought to find out the reading performance of pupils for whom Nyanja, the regional language of education, was not their first language in comparison with those for whom it was. Findings showed that the latter group of pupils performed better than the former. The analysis of the quantitative data revealed that the difference in performance in reading between the two groups of pupils was significant.

Matafwali (2010) observed that even after the use of an official regional language as the initial language of instruction was introduced in 2000, the reading levels of the majority of Zambian children were still low in 2005, especially in Lusaka Province. She concluded that a lack of proficiency in the language of instruction explains difficulties in becoming a conventional reader in a Zambian language and English. Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia, is more multi-ethnic and multilingual than Chipata. Nyanja, the proclaimed regional language of education and local administration, is described in the literature as the 'mother tongue' or a familiar language for the majority of pupils in Lusaka. This is misleading as so many languages are spoken in the area. Moreover, the Nyanja used for academic purposes, as already noted, is not exactly the same as the one spoken by the majority of Lusaka residents. Evidently, the regional language or 'mother tongue' in reality was not so familiar.

Similarly, Kalindi (2005) studied reading problems in Bemba of 60 grade 2 students who were poor readers (as identified by teachers) from selected basic schools in Kasama and Mpika urban areas in Northern Province. According to the study, only 13% could read two-syllable words and only 8% could identify 20 letters of the alphabet. The study showed that even with excellent and intensive instructions in place, some children still failed to make satisfactory progress in reading. It turned out that the exclusive use of 'standard' Bemba was a barrier to initial literacy. The variety of Bemba used in multi-ethnic/multilingual classes was not the 'mother tongue' or familiar language to a good number of pupils, and hence they struggled to learn to read and write in it.

In another study, Zimba (2007) established that the use of the regional official language, Nyanja, was ineffective as a medium of initial literacy in communities that were predominantly Tumbuka-speaking in Lumezi District in Eastern Province. The study revealed that pupils consistently performed below expectations in literacy skills because they could not understand Nyanja which was used to perform classroom tasks.

There is a sense that, the misrecognition of the standard language aside, the imposition of regional languages as official languages of education has negative effects on initial literacy development. Has the government learnt anything from this? It is also interesting that none of the reviewed studies hold any views about using multiple languages and features of languages as language practice. The ideology appears to be about replacing one language, the official regional language, with a non-official local language. The other languages and the multilingual repertoires that learners and even teachers depend on in their everyday interactions are made illegitimate and undesirable for education.

4. Design and methodology

For our primary databases, the study involved four of the ten provinces: Lusaka, Central, Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces. The specific districts are: Lusaka (Lusaka Province), Mufulira and Chingola (Copperbelt Province), Kabwe and Serenje (Central Province) and Petauke and Lundazi Districts (Eastern Province). The study was qualitative. This is because the intention was to get detailed information from respondents through detailed interviews. The target population was primary school teachers, primary school college lecturers, language experts and curriculum developers in the country.

A total of 20 respondents were sampled and interviewed in the study. Of the 20, ten were teachers who were divided into groups of five rural and five urban primary school teachers. Five lecturers from five different colleges of education were also sampled. Four language experts and a Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) officer were also part of the 20 respondents. Purposive sampling was used to identify the respondents. This is because the intention was to interview people who were specifically relevant to the topic under investigation.

Four different interview guides were used. These were for teachers, lecturers, language experts and the CDC officer (henceforth language experts). The interview guides consisted of the main research questions to guide the discussion. However, follow-up questions were also asked in order to get clarification and other details depending on the issues that were raised in the interview.

Data collection started with the teachers. This was followed by interviews with the lecturers in colleges of education. Thereafter, the language experts were interviewed.

The data was analysed qualitatively and thematically. This involved grouping and categorising the data according to identified themes. In fact, the grouping was mainly guided by research questions. After grouping the data, analysis was performed. Some of the responses from respondents are quoted verbatim as a way of providing evidence to the analysis.

Academic and research ethics were observed. The researchers explained the purpose of the study to the respondents and gave them reasons why they were sampled. Further, the researchers informed the respondents that the findings of the study were purely for academic purposes and that no name or identity would be published or associated with the findings. Respondents were also informed of their rights in the study, which included the fact that they had the right to refuse to participate and that they could choose to withdraw from it at any time. Participants signed the informed consent form.

4.1 The 2014 Zambian language policy: Critical reflections on consultations during policy formulation

Lecturers and teachers were unanimous that they were not consulted during the process of policy formulation. They said that they were surprised when they heard on television and radio that the policy had changed. The respondents added that it was the habit of government not to involve them when new policies were being formulated although they were the ones to implement the policy. One college lecturer said the following:

> *But I wouldn't say they did [consult us]. If they did, maybe a sample of colleges, not all. Our college was not consulted.*

There are 14 teacher training colleges run by the government (Beyani 2013). Given the small number of colleges, one would expect that the government would involve at least one member from each of the colleges. On the contrary, the findings show that lecturers were not consulted and, in most cases, the whole college was not involved. Note that as trainers of teachers who would be implementing the policy in schools, lecturers are central to the success of the policy. The new policy implies that lecturers should change their curriculum in colleges and doing so requires that they have a full understanding of the policy. Lecturers felt that the MoE was using a 'top-down' approach to policy formulation. Consider the following response:

> *No. We were not consulted. There was no consultation whatsoever. UNZA says ministry is trying to use top down method. But I don't know that they meant.*

All the five lecturers from five different colleges said the same. Therefore, one wonders how these lecturers will prepare teachers who should perform according to the expectations of the policy. As one of the respondents stated above, the government used a top-down approach when coming up with the policy. No doubt, this type of policy formulation is faulty as implementers may resist the policy or simply fail to implement it since they did not have a full understanding of it.

All the teachers who were interviewed also stated that they did not know anyone who was consulted. Each teacher suspected that perhaps teachers from other schools were consulted, yet no teacher from the sampled schools could confirm that they were. Some of the teachers were categorical when they stated that there were no consultations at all, with some suggesting that politicians decided the policy on their own without involving teachers. One teacher said: “It was just among politicians themselves.” To add on to the suspicion that politicians decide policies on their own without involving implementers, two teachers stated the following:

> *(1) No consultations with teachers. Bamacitila kumwamba kwamene kuja [they do it from the top], us we just receive.*
>
> *(2) Personally, I am not aware. But maybe teachers from somewhere. But when I attended a workshop at DEBS [District Education Boards], even Head teachers expressed ignorance. So, there was no consultation.*

It is an anomaly not to involve teachers in policy formulation that directly relates to classroom practices. They are the ones who are now expected to use local languages for the first four years of primary education. Since they have been doing the same for the first grade only, their experiences and challenges in the NBTL programme would be useful when strategising for the new policy. Thus, excluding them from a policy which they will have to implement is a recipe for failure on the part of government. Sadly, this appears to be the way that the government has approached policy formulation and implementation as noted in the literature above. Studies undertaken on previous policies have shown that part of the cause of policy failure is the lack of consultation by government.

The subject experts interviewed had similar sentiments as the teachers and lecturers. Two of them stated that they knew an expert who was involved in the process of policy formulation. However, they were not sure about the criteria that was used to select the said experts. We are mindful that it is logical that not all experts can be consulted. Nevertheless, the problem still remains of involving experts but not teachers and lecturers who would have shared their practical experiences so that the experts could give their contributions not only based on their theoretical understanding of pedagogy but also based on the realities of the factors surrounding schools. Without teachers and lecturers, we cannot be too sure of the quality that will come from colleges and how teachers will effectively implement the policy for which they have no input and little knowledge about.

One expert stated the following: “I was not consulted but they say they made consultations. They also read research reports.” While it is a good idea to think that policy makers read research reports, we wish to argue that actually perhaps they did not, as they would have known that consultation with stakeholders and those who implement the policy on the ground is critical.

Most of the studies conducted on the language of initial literacy have stated the factors affecting implementation and have suggested what could be done to improve the situation. The elements of the new policy which reflect previous research in Zambia are the monolingual/monoglot biases (only one language at a time for classroom practice) and the extension of local language use from grade 1 to grade 4. However, as noted in the literature reviewed above, the problem goes beyond choices of language. There are issues relating to, among others, unfamiliar Zambian languages as the medium of instruction, a lack of teaching and learning materials, the poor language background of teachers, poor teacher training and insensitive teacher/classroom allocation where a teacher who cannot speak the language of instruction is asked to teach grade 1. With this background, one can argue that, in fact, research reports were not read or that if they were read, then, they were not taken seriously.

4.2 Teacher training before policy implementation

Respondents said the new policy was initiated first and thereafter attempts to train teachers ensued. Teachers we interviewed revealed that only one or two teachers per school attended the training. However, some schools were not represented as none of the teachers from them were invited to attend the training workshop. It was also the case that the majority of teachers who attended the training were from urban areas. In fact, some teachers from rural areas did not even know that there was any training and expressed shock when they learned that there was.

Further, respondents stated that government facilitators had told them that the idea of inviting few teachers was that those who attended were supposed to go back and share their knowledge with those who remained at school. The government had no funds to run countrywide training workshops. Those who attended training workshops were supposed to hold their own workshops at the school level so that everyone would have the knowledge and skills to implement the new policy. It is not clear how such workshops would take place without funding and material support from government. Moreover, teaching through a particular language assumes that one speaks it competently and it takes years to build such ability and confidence. As noted in the literature, teachers and learners are not usually conversant with the versions of Zambian languages that the government wants them to use. Certainly, there is no way that a 3- to 4-day workshop would produce such competence.

The following excerpts are some of the responses from selected respondents. Evidently, it is not just that the training of teachers started only after the policy was already under implementation, but some of teachers who attended were not clear as to what the training was about:

> *The training was not done. We went for training afterwards. We were told to start teaching. Then, they organised workshops. When we started, we did not know.*

More problematic is that it is unlikely that the teachers the government used for such training received training themselves as college lecturers were caught unawares of the change of policy. Since the majority of teachers were from urban areas, it is also unlikely that they spoke the ‘standard’ version of the language as envisaged in the policy. The haphazardness with which the training was done is captured in the quote below in which some teachers did not attend the training because the call up was too sudden:

> *Some [teachers] went, especially those in urban area. The government got teachers from nearby schools and went to give training in zones. But some teachers did not attend. For example, I did not attend because I had other commitments. The training was for three days.*

It is also interesting that the government itself did not have adequate resources to fund the training, and resorted to inviting teachers “from nearby schools”. It is also interesting that in some cases the government invited school administrators to attend training instead of the teachers who needed it most:

> *(1) Yes, the last week of April holiday. It [training] was at district level at DEBS office. It took 3 to 4 days. Because of resources, only grade 1 teachers attended and deputy head teachers. The idea was that those who were trained needed to teach others. But it has not happened yet even at our school because schools are saying that they do not have resources.*
>
> *(2) Some people went. One teacher and Deputy teacher. Us, we don’t know, we were just briefed in the staff room during the staff meeting.*

The problem here relates to how and when training of teachers was done. Firstly, the timing of the training was wrong. The ministry was supposed to train teachers before the commencement of the school calendar in which the policy was to start functioning. The government should also have separated those who spoke the zonal language competently and the majority who did not. The two groups do not need the same type of training. This would have efficiently prepared teachers in advance for what they needed to do in the classroom from the first day of the 2014 school calendar. Thus, starting to implement the policy before training or before teachers understood the content and implications of the policy was a risk on the part of government. As it turned out, every teacher was left or allowed to do whatever they thought was the right way to do it. The policy was rushed. The government was supposed to take time to educate teachers and college lecturers and to produce material before the policy was implemented.

The next section discusses the availability of materials in detail. It should, however, be argued that when policy makers work in isolation of people who implement the policies as established in the section above, the result is normally failure. If the government consulted teachers on how best they thought the policy could be implemented, perhaps they would have suggested teacher training before the policy was implemented. Since it is reported that some experts were consulted, one expects that the government should have been advised on the logical steps to take towards the implementation of a new policy. Commenting on the alleged rush by the government to implement the policy, one expert stated the following:

> *There is a mismatch between policy and preparation for that work. People are being sensitised now [when the policy is under implementation]. So, we have implementation and sensitisation going on. Government is mishandling the issue. They are handling it as a political issue, not as a pedagogical issue.*

The danger here is that experts who are supposed to 'own' the policy and see to its effective implementation disown it as a political ploy. There is no doubt that the government rushed the implementation of the policy and it appears doomed to failure. It also appears that the government did not learn from the past mistakes described at length above, which led to failures of previous policies.

The second challenge relates to how the training was done. From the findings, only grade 1 teachers attended the training. This is not progressive because it appears that the focus is still on grade 1 as was the case under the NBTL programme. The new policy proclaims that a Zambian language should be used up to grade 4. This means that teachers of grades 1 to 4 were all supposed to be trained. Thus, inviting only grade 1 teachers is an indirect resistance to the new policy, initiated ironically by policy makers themselves. It is a serious contradiction within the MoE.

Another problem regarding training is that, contrary to expectation, most of those who attended it did not actually teach those who did not attend. Briefing teachers during staff meetings, as happened in some schools, amounts to a lack of seriousness on the part of school managers and the respective teachers who attended the training. The importance of training cannot be overemphasised and should not be reduced to a mere morning briefing. One of the reasons given for lack of feedback was the lack of materials in schools which could be used. At this point, one wonders whether the MoE did not give any handouts to teachers who attended the training. These handouts would have helped the teachers to train their colleagues back in their own schools. This argument aside, one can agree that a lack of materials can affect training. However, it is not enough to justify the negligence.

4.3 Availability of materials for the policy

All the teachers complained about a lack of teaching materials. While some said that the materials were not adequate, others said that they did not have any materials at all. In cases where the schools had some materials, these were delivered after the programme had already started being implemented. Consider the following responses:

> *(1) We have books just for grade 1. We don't have materials ... even for grade 1, we just have for literacy. We are using old books for NBTL and we just improvise old books.*
>
> *(2) As at now, [we have] syllabus and also books for grade 1. Materials are not yet in schools. For other classes, we just have syllabi. For ICT, we have done research and we have information which is relevant to the syllabus. We come up with the content.*

As was captured in the literature, materials are not enough. Some schools only have materials for grade 1 and teachers improvise materials for grades 2, 3 and 4. Professionally, teachers are expected to be creative and resourceful in their lesson preparation and teaching. Thus, it is commendable that teachers are taking the initiative in researching, sourcing and creating their own materials. However, there arises a question as to whether there is uniformity in the standard of the materials that are being produced by teachers. A situation like this where each teacher creates their own material is not conducive to effective teaching and learning.

Moreover, what is happening in schools is not necessarily because teachers are creative and resourceful but because they are under duress as the MoE has not provided the needed materials. It is an intervention by teachers in a situation where the government has enacted a policy without providing materials and resources that are needed to implement the policy. In one of the quotes above, a teacher said that they only received syllabuses and they were developing the content on their own. This situation raises many questions. For example, how accurate, rich and responsive is the content that teachers are developing to the objectives of the syllabus? Is the content being subjected to review by experts or people from the MoE? These are important questions which the government should answer because if they are ignored, such practices might become reasons why a well-intended policy does not succeed.

As part of the new language policy initiatives, teachers were told to embrace the use of ICT, or computers, to teach. In one school, teachers said that they were given a tablet by a non-governmental organisation (NGO) to use in teaching. They stated that the NGO got permission from the MoE. The tablet was said to have a syllabus, schemes of work and lesson plans. This was actually a project and the school was chosen to pilot it to test how effective the use of ICT in teaching would be. In other schools, teachers said that although they did not have any computers in school, they were still encouraged to use computers to teach.

Note that the use of ICT in teaching is commendable and in line with modern practices in the world. Thus, embracing technology is responding to the 21st-century way of teaching. ICT is not just fashionable but is also believed to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in teaching. However, one tablet is not enough for one classroom, let alone a school. There is no way the change of language education policy can be implemented when the software and programs on tablets, and on computers generally, are not in local languages.

Three problems arise in Zambia regarding the use of ICT in schools generally and the implementation of the new language policy in particular. Firstly, schools do not have ICT equipment. Practically, this means that teachers cannot use ICT in their teaching. Secondly, the majority of teachers cannot afford computers from their salaries. Those who manage to purchase computers and tablets have them for their personal use. Thirdly, most teachers, especially those in rural areas, are computer illiterate. This implies that even if they were given computers or other gadgets such as tablets, they could make use of them because they do not have the knowledge and skills to use technological equipment in teaching. To substantiate this argument, here is what one teacher said:

> *We were told to use computers to teach. But for me, I don't know computer. So how can I teach using computer when I haven't learnt?*

The concerns raised by teachers are genuine. In this context, we wish to argue that the lack of computer literacy among teachers also points to the fact that teacher training programmes in Zambia are generally weak.

Teachers are not trained in how they can apply ICT in teaching. It can be argued that every modern teacher training programme should have components on ICT and how teachers can embrace it in their daily classroom practices. Evidently, the new language in education policy, with its lack of material support and training components, will not make teachers adopt the use of ICT in delivering the curriculum.

5. Translanguaging and heteroglossia as language practice: Implications for language education policy

In this section, the basic premise is that there is a need for the re-orientation of language education policy that takes into account the extent of the multilingual practices in communities. Otherwise, there is a risk that language policy is enacted for a child who lives in a monoglot/monolingual community that no longer exists. Although the two notions were conceptualised at different times, we see translanguaging and heteroglossia as related in that one portends the presence of the other.

We want to state that an effective language policy is one that takes into account the socio-economic, cultural, educational and literacy imperatives of learners. These imperatives are multi- rather than mono-dimensional. For instance, in multilingual and multicultural contexts, learners necessarily have to acquire and appropriate multiple cultures and languages to be useful citizens in their communities, nation and the world at large. However, successive language education policies in Zambia, starting from the missionaries to recent and current government’s policy pronouncements, are based on the monoglot/monolingual and monocultural citizen. This is based on the European conceptualisation of ‘one nation/region, one language ideology’. The language policies not only de-legitimise so-called non-official languages through selective language ‘zones’, but they also disaffirm multilingual practices in favour of monoglot classroom practices. Since only one Zambian language can be used per region, meaning there are seven exclusive linguistic zones, the use of the seven Zambian languages is therefore restrictive and limiting. Children are restricted from utilising an extended multilingual repertoire to engage in and access cognitively demanding practices and knowledge.

Recent developments in the study of language reject the notion of it as stable and discrete with bounded entities. Language is conceptualised as a socially, culturally, politically and historically situated set of resources and its use as a social practice (Heller 2007; Pennycook 2010; Blackledge and Creese 2010). This new thinking accepts multilingualism as a linguistic dispensation and, hence, so-called hybrid or blended language use as a legitimate multilingual practice. Language policy pronouncements in Zambia and other multilingual countries in Africa and elsewhere have been slow in embracing multilingualism as a linguistic dispensation in classroom practices. Banda and Mwanza (2017) argue that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the language deemed the standard Zambian language is not often used by teachers and learners, who often speak related dialects or use it in multilingual blends with other languages, including languages that are official in other regions.

Therefore, there is a gap between the official monoglossic ideology which champions one ‘standard’ language at a time and place, and the diverse multilingual practices of Zambians. The academic knowledge and competences embedded in learners’ multilingual cognitive processing and problem-solving strategies are discarded as illegitimate. Heteroglossia as a linguistic practice (Bakhtin 1981) is an advantage that multilingual learners have over monolinguals. In this case, they are expected to take an unnatural monolingual disposition even in contexts where adopting a multilingual disposition would be to their benefit.

In multilingual contexts as found in Zambia, a comprehensive and effective language education policy needs to recognise that learners and teachers alike come from multilingual homes. The policy needs to allow the use of multiple Zambian languages including hybrid forms and (Zambian) English in classroom practice. The policy needs to recognise what is now called translanguaging in Zambian classrooms. Translanguaging has been conceptualised as “the purposeful pedagogical alternation of languages in spoken and written, receptive and productive modes” (Hornberger and Link 2012: 262; see also Baker 2003, 2011; Williams 1994). This enables learners to use their extended linguistic repertoire for academic purposes, which is often denied under the current policy as already noted above. We give more specific examples below.

We follow Garcia (2009) and Hornberger and Link (2012) among others in recognising translanguaging as a new approach, which is different from code-switching. The difference between the two notions, according to Hornberger and Link (2012: 263), is that code-switching “tended to focus on issues of language interference, transfer or borrowing”, while translanguaging “shifts the lens from cross-linguistic influence” to how multilinguals “intermingle linguistic features that have hereto been administratively or linguistically assigned to a particular language or language variety” (Garcia 2009: 51). Almost without exception, the literature we reviewed on Zambian language policies above, as well as the teachers we interviewed, do not see the value of alternative use of linguistic forms. As Mohamed and Banda (2008) have shown for Tanzania, and even during our interviews for this chapter, teachers would blend English, Nyanja, Bemba and other languages while stating that they did not allow their learners to 'mix' languages.

In essence, interviews showed that regardless of the policy on the use of Zambian languages for initial literacy, some teachers apply not just the one language policy but also the English only policy. This is applied so strictly that it prevents learners from participating in classroom activities. Consider the following comment from a teacher:

> *The problem here is that pupils speak Nyanja and Bemba. Some speak Lenje and Tonga even at school. They don't speak English. You ask them to speak English, they are quiet ... They can't communicate. They like the local language. Their background has spoiled them.*

Mentioning Bemba, Tonga, Lenje and Nyanja is interesting as it tells us the extent of the complexity of the multilingual/multicultural mix of the learners. Nyanja is the recognised official regional language for the province. In terms of the 2014 government pronouncement, Nyanja is supposed to be the language of teaching and learning. Bemba and Tonga are among the seven recognised official Zambian languages, but for different regions, while Lenje is an unofficial local language. This teacher effectively wants learners to use English only. He takes their inability to linguistically operate in monoglot English as an inability to communicate and indeed a reflection of their general incompetence. Yet, it is the language education policy as reflected in the monoglot classroom practice that *mutes* learners by not allowing the use of heteroglossic language practices (Banda 2003).

Taking a lead from the monoglot dispensation in the language education policy, the following teacher also perceives multilingualism to be a problem. In particular, he does not see any role for Zambian languages in teaching and learning. He does not condone the use of Zambian languages, and would rather learners remain quiet and not participate than use Zambian languages:

> *These children like local languages. I can't allow pupils to speak the local language in the classroom. I can just ask another pupil to speak. It's better for a pupil to keep quiet than to speak in vernacular.*

Over the years, the word 'vernacular' has acquired negative connotations, starting from the missionaries and colonial administrators and teachers who used the term to describe African languages as inferior to English in all spheres of human endeavour. In their view, African languages were only good as vehicles of African cultures and tribal rituals, some of which were banned by missionaries and colonial governments. In any case, the very few Africans deemed to be ‘clever’ were often encouraged to learn English in preparation to be used as ‘office boys’, clerks or *Kapitaos* (‘Captains’), that is, leaders of farm labourers on white-owned farms or of groups of African miners in white-owned mines. The rest had to make do with the ‘vernacular’. The streaming of learners has continued in which ‘weak’ students are told to learn the ‘vernacular’ while the ‘intelligent’ ones learn sciences and French, for example.

The teacher in the above quote denies learners the chance to competently discuss content at high cognitive levels, which wouldn’t be the case if they were allowed to use their extended linguistic repertoire. This involves translanguaging practices blending a number of local languages with English. Language education policy needs to allow for translanguaging as a classroom practice to engender multilingual and multimodal literacies. As Garcia (2009: 44) notes, translanguaging is about “engaging in bilingual or multilingual discourse practices [and] not on languages as has often been the case, but on the practices of bilinguals that are readily observable.” The language policies that have been pronounced over the years have failed to draw on the learners’ multilingual competences and knowledge. Our contention, therefore, is that successive language policies have sought to substitute one form of monolingual education – an English-based monolingual education – with a mother-tongue-based monolingual education (and vice-versa). As Banda (2010) argues, even the so-called mother-tongue-based bilingual programmes are effectively monolingual as the mother tongue is replaced by an English-based monolingual education after four, five or six years. The problem is that a language policy that purports to promote multilingualism through use of African languages in education and other spheres is based on the colonial and inherited ideology that languages are discrete and autonomous systems that ought to be kept apart. In this conceptualisation, the promotion of multilingualism is a case of promoting multiple monolingualisms (Banda 2010).

The problem of the use of monolingual/monoglot models of education is that concepts and language practices that do not reflect the multilingual contexts of Zambia are advocated and thus create a distorted reality for learners and teachers alike in so far as language practices are concerned. The consequence of this, as Banda (2003) has argued, is that learners’ linguistic experiences and expectations of literacy practices are in direct conflict with, and alien to, the experiences and expectations of the monoglot English-based programme in place. A learner’s inability to effectively ask academic questions and involve themselves in meaningful learner–teacher roles and interactions is a reflection of distorted and conflicting social practices. The learner's *mutedness* is therefore a result of a language education policy that denies learners the language(s) or language blends through which they can literally and metaphorically express themselves (Banda 2003).

Translanguaging needs to be the mainstay of classroom practice in multilingual contexts so as to allow learners to access and engage in various cognitively demanding tasks and knowledge. Banda (2003, 2007, 2010) has shown how high school and university multilingual learners, through translanguaging practices, are able to discuss complex assignments and seminar topics, which they later rewrite in 'standard' English with the editing/proofreading help from other students or academic writing services. Without translanguaging, such students would not be able to participate in generating complex ideas and arguments, which are found in the resultant academic essays. Translanguaging enables these learners to participate as multilingual citizens in their own education.

6. Conclusion

We can conclude that although leadership and control of what happens in the classroom has changed over the years – from missionaries, the British South Africa Company and the British Colonial Office to emergent Zambian leaders – the language education policies have changed very little. The policies all have one thing in common: they have a monolingual/monoglot bias in which either a Zambian language or English is proclaimed the language of initial literacy. The either/or ideology only works to the advantage of the English language, as it eventually becomes the main language of education. It works to the disadvantage of the majority of learners who find that they cannot draw on their multilingual language practices for their education.

Regarding the new language policy, teachers and college lecturers were not consulted when the policy was initiated and formulated. Teaching materials were not prepared. After the policy had already started being implemented, grade 1 materials were then provided to a few selected schools, while others did not receive any teaching materials. Some schools only received syllabi for grades 2, 3 and 4. Teachers were the ones researching and developing the content.

Further, the message coming from the findings is that training took place in a haphazard manner. The selection of who was asked to attend appears to have been by word of mouth. In a number of cases, administrators such as deputy headmasters attended training at the expense of teachers. The training also started after the policy was implemented. For example, some attended the workshop in April, meaning that one term had already passed before they were trained. Most of the teachers who attended the workshop did not give feedback to those who did not attend. Thus, most teachers currently implementing the policy are not trained and therefore not prepared to effectively teach under the new policy. The lecturers were also not trained and there was no time for teacher trainers and colleges to revise the syllabus and curriculum to be in line with the new policy. We would like to argue that these problems are not peculiar to this particular policy change; it appears that the government has not learnt from past mistakes.

We have a situation where it is not only the voices of critical stakeholders such as lecturers and teachers that were silenced by the lack of consultation during the process of policy formulation, but the policy of enforcing a regional language also reflects the colonial heritage which sought to stratify language, with the colonial language (English) at the top followed by a regional official language and the unofficial African languages at the bottom. The colonial ideology of ‘one language, one nation’ or ‘one region, one African language’ is also at play. In Zambia, this means the majority of African languages are erased from classroom practice (Banda and Mwanza 2017). At the same time, the learners’ voices are also silenced as the familiar heteroglossic practice is disallowed and replaced by the not so familiar monoglot English or standard regional African language. Therefore, it is not just that certain languages are erased (in Zambia, it is 65 out of 72 languages) as possible languages of education and government business, but learners are forced to use unfamiliar regional languages or English. Moreover, learners’ voices are further silenced as the colonial monoglot ideology still governing education excludes heteroglossic language practices.

In terms of what needs to be done to ameliorate the situation, we suggest that only a policy that draws on learner and community strengths will work. The policy needs to acknowledge translanguaging, that is, heteroglossic (multilingual) language practices as legitimate discourse practices for initial literacy development.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

A SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR ANALYSIS OF CLAUSE 29 IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSTITUTION ACT 108 OF 1966 WITH REFERENCE TO THE POST-APARTHEID MAINTENANCE OF A SYSTEM OF RACIALISED IDENTITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATION-BUILDING

EBRAHIM ALEXANDER AND LEON PRETORIUS

1. Introduction

> Currently, the dominant nostrums and prescriptions that inform "sound" statecraft are the constructs of "good governance" and the "big" or "new" society agendas. However, these approaches often deny and refuse to admit the realities of developing conditions and/or fail to adequately negotiate them. These realities manifest in the (un) making of institutions and social order; the effects of the inordinate weight of culture, clienteles and patronage in social structures, politics and institutions; and the carrying forward of (unruly) rupture(s) into the post-colonial social order. (Khan 2014: 2)

Until recently, the views of two groups of researchers were used in South Africa to assess the failures and successes of post-apartheid public policy since 1994. The first group argues that in order to understand why public policy fails, sometimes one has to look at the management of public policy (Cloete, Wissink and de Coning 2006). To resolve the failure in the management of public policy, this group proposes a round-table discussion of equal stakeholders. The second group contends that public policy is by nature 'messy'. This 'messiness' stems from the fact that public policy formulation involves a conflict of different interest groups. This could be one reason why public policy fails, because it remains a work in constant progress, negotiation and renegotiation, which is by nature muddled. To address the messiness of public policies democratically, this paper argues that the above-mentioned approaches should be combined with a grammar-based model of discourse (Halliday and Hasan 1989; Halliday 2004).

Discourse in this paper refers to the multi-dimensional phenomenon that encompasses and amalgamates diverse forms of communication, viz. *spoken and written text* (Halliday and Hasan 1989; Halliday 2004), *modes of knowledge and power* (Foucault 1954–1984, 1971, 2002), *discursive and social practices* (Fairclough 1992), and *ways of thinking, acting, believing, behaving and speaking* (Gee 1996). To our knowledge, these different perspectives of discourse all seek to explain the role of language in the making of societies. At this juncture, we want to point out that there are diverse models of discourse and discourse analysis (see Cook 1989; Swales 1990; Fairclough 1992). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, critical discourse-based approaches have the following in common:

> The term 'discourse' is used in day-to-day language interchangeably with discussion or dialogue. The story of a discussion or dialogue is the object of discourse analysis. Such analysis aims to expose patterns and hidden rules of how language is used and narratives are created. Thus, discourse analysis is a research method, which involves examining communication in order to gain new insights. (Hewit 2009: 1)

In view of the above, we maintain that discourse-based approaches will not only be useful to analyse public policy as written text, but will also enable one to venture beyond the text to an analysis of the types of social and discursive practices it generates, implicates and seeks to invoke subliminally with the intention to maintain the status quo (Foucault 1954–1984, 1989, 2002; Halliday and McIntosh 1964; Halliday 1973, 2004; Halliday and Hasan 1976, 1985, 1989; Fairclough 1992). Since a systemic functional model of discourse provides the tools necessary to analyse meaning within, between and beyond texts, it proposes the types of action necessary to address and redress subliminal discriminatory practices by not only disrupting the text but also by analysing it constructively. Such an approach is, in our view, necessary to intervene in the cases of reproducing apartheid relations of knowledge, power and meaning. As such, we found Halliday's model of discourse analysis useful to analyse the public policy narratives historically: what happened through a linguistic analysis of the *field of discourse*, who was involved (the actors) in public policy formulation, the *tenor of discourse* and finally, the part that language played and continues to play through a linguistic analysis of the *mode of discourse*.

Hasan (1990), Martin (1990), Fairclough (1992) and Gee (1999) not only adopted Halliday's systemic functional grammar model of discourse analysis as the basis for their own entry into discussions about discourse, but also expanded upon it (see Swales 1990 for the origin of discourse studies). So, when we talk about discourse or discourse analysis, we mean it in the Hallidayean sense of a systemic functional grammar of discourse.

2. Methodology

We use the preambles of selected public policy documents as data (Appendix 3). We draw on Ruby's (1972: 65) definition of argument: "By 'argument' here we shall mean the basic unit of reasoning. An argument is a unit of proof (or attempted proof) that something is or is not a fact."

For Martin (1990), a typical argument structure has an introduction, body and conclusion. Winter (1976) proposes a more evaluative model: "Situation: review of the literature; Problem: the question(s) to be addressed; Solution: answers/proposals flowing from the analyses and findings of the research questions; Evaluation: a conclusion that comments on what has been achieved and what remains to be done." Like Winter (1976) and Hasan (1990), we propose an evaluative model to explain the sections of an argument structure, viz. a precipitating event, consequence and revelation. According to Hasan (1990: 70), the contextual configuration (unity of texts) is decided by two sources, viz. structure and texture. While structure is determined by the situation, the texture (textual configuration) is confirmed by the presence of certain semantic and lexico-grammatical relations. If certain elements are missing or present in the configuration of a text, one would know whether the text makes grammatical sense. Thus, Hasan's model is useful to show how concepts are conceptually related as they contribute to the overall cohesion and coherence of an argument structure.

A typical written argument structure in the humanities is a logical syllogism – a model invented by Aristotle, the Greek philosopher (see Badenhorst 2008: 114). An example of a 'true' syllogistically structured argument is:

1st Premise	A = B
2nd Premise	B = C
Therefore	A = C

Whereas, an example of a false syllogistically structured argument is:

Introduction	1st Premise	A cow has four legs
	2nd Premise	A table has four legs
	Conclusion	Therefore, a cow is a table

The first example of a typical syllogistic structure is not value-based, while the second one is value-based. The table is inanimate but the cow is animate. Therefore, to compare the legs of a table with those of a cow creates a false premise in the argument structure.

3. Analysis

The following is an example of how a systemic functional model of discourse can be applied to make sense of the preamble argument structure of public policy (Martin 1990). In our initial analysis of the preambles of public policies, we found that the logical structures of the preambles of selected public documents ((1) Clause 29 in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996; (2) the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998; and (3) The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53) are basically the same (see Appendix 3). In general, the preambles of the aforementioned public policies follow the argument structure:

1st Premise: During apartheid, the vast majority of people were denied their basic human rights – equal access to the factors of production and hence could not realise their full human potential.

2nd Premise: As a result, South Africa became a grossly unequal society in which whites solely made decisions and hence dominated in every sphere of society.

Conclusion: It follows, therefore, that in a post-apartheid South Africa there is the undisputable need for a social, educational, economic and political transformation in order to address the apartheid legacy of unequal power relations.

Given South Africa's apartheid history, it would be difficult to dispute the relevance and validity of the initial public policy argument, irrespective of whether the logical structure makes sense. The ethical problem with South Africa's redress strategy lies in the nature of texture (the logical connectives which argue for sameness, but at the same time give credence to differences based on the notion of different races). The challenge for South Africa is to undo the discriminatory and unequal power relations of apartheid while avoiding the formulation of new power relations that are unequal in decision-making because they are majority-based and automatically assumed to be logical. Herein lies its potential for discriminatory practices.

We now turn to the various models that assessed and provided reasons for the failures and successes of public policy since 1994. We introduced a systemic functional discourse model to argue the point that one should also focus on the grammar of the discourse in public policy to unravel its hidden meanings, particularly its potential for subtle forms of discrimination. In our analysis, we try to make sense of certain concepts from linguistic, legal and mathematical perspectives. Thereafter, we discuss the implications for nation-building. As mentioned, we found Halliday's notion of field, tenor and mode of discourse useful to structure the paper at a macro level for an analysis of the grammar of discourse.

3.1 Assessment of public policy: The management perspective

While debates around 'race', transformation, fairness and unfairness are still ongoing, some studies focus on the legal and management aspects of race-based affirmative action (for example, Bosch 2007; Loyson 2009; Burger and Jafta 2010; Nel 2011; Pauw, Woods, Fourie and Visser 2002; Cloete et al. 2006; Fourie and Opperman 2011; Black, Calitz and Steenekamp 2012). Legal models argue about the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action (for example, Bosch 2007; Loyson 2009; Burger and Jafta 2010; Nel 2011). The public management models of Cloete et al. (2006), Fourie and Opperman (2011), and Black et al. (2012) are essentially a-historical and a-political. Despite the inherently racist nature of South African capitalism, it appears that they accept the economic mode of capitalism unquestionably. They, therefore, contend that to solve the facile management of public policies, the different stakeholders just have to convene a round-table discussion of equals. In doing so, the model disregards the fact that in a capitalist society, public policy is underpinned by antagonistic classes who struggle for control of the means of production (Marx 1844). In South Africa, this struggle has been largely between a white minority entrepreneurial and management class, on the one hand, and a large disenfranchised majority of so-called non-whites, on the other.

To seek plausible solutions to these *de facto* conflicts, de Coning and Cloete (2006: 36-54) assess the approaches of various models: the elite mass model; the group model; the institutional model; the social interaction model; the systems model; the policy network and community model; the chaos, complexity and quantum model of policy analysis; the functional policy stages/phases model; and the Symbolic models management model.

The management models focus specifically on different management phases: initiation, design, analysis, formulation, dialogue, advocacy, implementation and evaluation (Cloete et al. 2006), The ‘phase analysis’ of these models ignores the fact that public policy is also a form of language in use, a social and discursive practice. To address this, one should conceptually link the linguistic nature of public policy to its wider social, economic and political contexts with a view to understanding how it informs what we call ‘citizenry social practices’. The management model of public policies notes:

> It is important that all scholars of governmental sciences (Political Studies, Public Administration or Management) understand that good governance is the essence of the public sector, and that good public policy management is inextricably linked to good governance. A good government aims to provide, safe, democratic and orderly environment that is conducive to sustainable growth and the development of its citizens. (Cloete et al. 2006: v)

It is evident that the above approach ignores the racialised class nature of South African society. The antagonistic nature of class struggle stems not only from unequal class relations of power, that is, who controls the means of production, but, equally important, also from whose discourse language in use prevails as the dominant cultural currency or hegemony. Cultural hegemony is evident in the two dominant modes of formal educational instruction in South Africa. On an academic level, English and Afrikaans are the two dominant modes of instruction in South Africa. For many ‘Black’ people who are Bantu/African speakers, English is not only a second language but also often a third or fourth language (Alexander 2011). Thus, they face many social obstacles as they compete within the free market system equipped with their education to gain equal access to the discourses of control. Various studies show that this task has thus far been proven insurmountable for the vast majority of mainly previously disfranchised people (Alexander 2011).

Ever since the official inception of apartheid, the majority of people were positioned by various geographical apartheid strategies to compete predominantly from a working-class base. The apartheid government, through various discriminatory stratification strategies, confined the vast majority to townships, which are characterised by poor infrastructure compared to extremely affluent white communities. This is the nature of the apartheid-created status quo, which the government led by the African National Congress (ANC) inherited post-apartheid. Given the education status quo of continued inequality between the previously disenfranchised and the white-dominated economy, one clearly cannot assume that a round-table discussion of how to address apartheid-created inequalities is going to be one of equals.

3.2 Assessment of public policy: The conflict approach

In contrast to the previous approach to public policy issues, the conflict model argues that public policy is inherently 'messy' because it is forever a work in progress (see de Satge 2009). Apart from this, public policy also involves conflict because different stakeholders have different interests in it. For the owners of the means of production, public policy should regulate, maintain and stabilise the markets so that they can be conducive for investment and optimal profit-generation capabilities. On the flipside of this scenario are the workers who expect that public policies ensure equal employment opportunities, social security and service delivery (health, education, social welfare and so on).

Unlike the management model, public policy is historical and political for the conflict model. In other words, it views public policy as a product of specific historical processes that involve conflict. However, like the management model, it fails to encapsulate the discursive nature of public policy. In doing so, it overlooks the fact that public policy discourse becomes a template for how citizens are socialised to accept unequal relations of power due to apartheid as the norm – and thereby leads to a doctrine that is not questioned. In the next section, we discuss how a systemic functional grammar approach can be useful in the sense that it can problematise the arbitrary definitions of what it means to be human that are taken for granted.

3.3 A systemic functional grammar approach to public policy assessment: The field and tenor of South African public policy discourse – What happened and who was involved?

In 1994, after a decade of white minority rule, all South Africans could vote for the first time. This vote signalled a change from white minority rule to a democratic black majority rule. Long before this democratic change, a number of people imagined a South African society fundamentally different from apartheid – a separate but equal one (for example, Hellman 1956; Van Der Horst 1960; Adam 1971; Leatt, Kneifel and Nurnberger 1986; Relly 1987; Shabalala 1990; Innes, Kentridge and Perold 1993).

However, since the ANC became the new government in post-apartheid South Africa, the focus and analysis of this paper are on the policies of the

ANC-led government. The ‘new’ South Africa was a result of a negotiated settlement reached between the previously white minority government and representatives of the ANC, while international capital ostensibly played a mediating role (Turok 2008). A key aspect of the outcome of these negotiations was the sunset clause agreement reached by the Nationalist Party and the ANC. (Turok 2008). The sunset clause specified that the ANC-led government would not immediately change the status quo. Instead, they would introduce a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to effect transformation:

> The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilise all our people and our country’s resources toward the final eradication of Apartheid and building a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist government. (African National Congress 1994: 1)

In terms of the sunset clause agreement, it stated that in cases where a white person resigns or accepts a government-offered retirement package, the person concerned will be accorded all the privileges as per an employee and employer contractual agreement. This meant that apartheid ministers received full pensions as well as a legal pardon for their participation in the apartheid system. In the view of the fact that white people could maintain their privileges accorded by the apartheid system, race-based affirmative action and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies became the main strategies aimed at transformation or historical redress.

As indicated, the first strategy aimed at historical redress was the RDP. According to Turok (2008), the key strategy of the RDP was to work with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who shared the ANC’s vision of the urgent need to address ‘structural distortions’ in South Africa’s economy in which white people still dominated (Turok 2008: 100). In view of this, the ANC proposed a ‘people-centred sustainable development programme’. Of this ‘self-empowerment’ strategy, according to Turok (2008: 101), ‘even’ the World Bank endorsed:

1. a community-based control of natural resources;
2. creating units of economic management in the market place;
3. people’s participation in their own development and governance;
4. priority aid for women and their empowerment; and
5. community ability to produce or otherwise gain access to necessary goods and services.

Turok (2008) notes that since the RDP was in line with the vision of redress as articulated in the Freedom Charter, many international investors withheld investments. He observes further that the ANC then had to make adjustments to their redress strategy to appease both local and international investors, which led to the introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan. The key strategy of GEAR is to manage macro-economic growth and development with a view to creating employment, which in turn may lead to redistribution of resources and access to opportunities. However, twenty years into democracy, studies show that GEAR had little impact on transforming the South African economy (Turok 2008). Some of the reasons for this have to do with the continued white-dominated structured economy, while others relate to the ANC's failure to make service delivery in health, housing, education, sport and recreation an 'equitable' reality for the majority previously disenfranchised and mainly working-class people (Turok 2008: 106-107).

For example, in the education sector, a key indicator of transformation – assessments of key public sectors – shows that transformation continues to happen very slowly and the vast majority remain seriously impoverished, physically and psychologically trapped by apartheid-created structures. According to a report by the Council for Higher Education (2013), less than 5% of 'Black African' and 'Coloured' youth succeed at university. The 2013 Global Information Technology report shows that a serious lack of access to technology by the majority of South Africans impedes the country's competitiveness. In addition, South Africa ranks second last in the world in mathematics and science. Moreover, the 2011–2013 Progress in International Reading Literature Study (PIRLS) report indicates that most South African grade 5 learners struggled to acquire basic literacy skills (Howie, van Staden, Tshele, Dowse and Zimmerman 2011). Research by Scott et al. (2007) analysed a total of 2005 higher education enrolments and reported a five-fold difference between the gross participation rates of white (60%) and black (12%) 20–24 age-groups. Based on the 2000 intake into higher education, the study showed that only 38% of all first-time students graduated within five years.

A number of structural changes have been put in place at the level of government in order to widen access through financial support for students from disadvantaged backgrounds and the funding of academic development programmes. At the level of pedagogy, many academics have identified the role of English and literacy pedagogy as central to improving access and success.

More recently, Saul and Bond observe and summarise as follows (2014: 3):

> For the problem lies in determining just how 'new' the new South Africa really is. Against the undeniable drama of the transition from the formal

> structures of white minority rule that has occurred must be set the fact that South Africa today is a much more unequal society than during apartheid, one deeply stratified in class and gender terms, and also in racial terms ('class' still remaining so substantially 'raced' in the country). Moreover, it is facing the prospect of genuine economic and ecological calamities.

It is against this background of failure to level the apartheid-spawned playing fields that we now turn to a grammar of discourse analysis of public policy.

3.4 Assessment of the preamble of Clause 29 in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996: Implications for social and discursive practices in the maintenance and reproduction of the status quo

We show below how a systemic functional model of discourse can be applied to evaluate the discriminatory implications of the preambles of public policy documents for nation-building. For Halliday (1985), public policy as a written text is a form of discourse or language in use. Thus, to understand public policy processes, one has to understand not only how the policy is produced consumed and distributed, but also even more importantly who produces, distributes and consumes it, and for whom and for what purposes (Fairclough 1992). Public policy as discourse is also *intertexual* in nature in that it is connected to other similar discourses that may transcend space (places) and time (historical boundaries). As such, public policy is never neutral because it is inherently a contested terrain or a site of social, economic, political and legal struggles.

We now draw on Hasan's (1989) discussion of argument structure to explain how an argument may unfold in the preambles of a given public policy document. According to Hasan (1989), an argument structure starts with a precipitating event, followed by a consequence and finally a conclusion. To understand how this may occur, one has to analyse the structure of the preambles of public policy documents as a form of argument consisting of a precipitating event, a consequence and a conclusion. At the same time, one has to refer to ideas that conceptually link the three parts. The preambles of selected public policy documents include specifically those that contain or implicate aspects of the 'united we are in our diversity' clause: (1) South Africa's Constitution, (2) the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998, (3) The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, as well as other relevant literature (see

Appendix 3).

3.5 Linguistic indicators of the maintenance of the apartheid status quo: Clause 29 in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996 (see Appendix 3)

> We, the people of South Africa,
> Recognise the injustices of the past;
> Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land
> Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
> Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity …
>
> (South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996: Preamble)

In the preamble to South Africa's Constitution, the caption/summary of the past injustices is the precipitating event, which sets the tone for the consequence followed by the revelation:

> 'We the people of South Africa recognize the injustices of the past' triggered a consequence/action for social and economic redress as set out below under the heading point (2) consequence …

'We' is a collective pronoun; it signifies unity. This is followed by a second 'We' in "We therefore: Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land, Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country". The pronoun 'those' in the sentence "Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land, Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country", in our opinion, may refer to all people who suffered in South Africa – the previously disenfranchised as well as white people who, because of conscience, chose to protest against apartheid.

If this is not the case, then it therefore poses, in our opinion, a moral dilemma for all South Africans that the children of whites who suffered because of their parents' participation in the anti-apartheid struggles are not included in the 'designated' groups. Here, we are thinking specifically of Neil Agget and Brahm Fisher as well as many others who paid with their lives. Since the pronoun 'those' refers to the designated groups 'Coloureds', 'Indians' and 'Blacks' and is grammatically linked to 'our country', it shows political prejudice towards white people who suffered and in doing so ignores their contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle. While we agree that whites in general were privileged, one should – on a matter of political principle – acknowledge that there were many people who conscientiously objected to the apartheid system from so-called different races and various class backgrounds. Therefore, like Alexander (2006), we suggest that a class-based redress strategy is required rather than one based on race. In doing this, one would also seek to address the structural inequalities that racial capitalism generates.

3.5.1 Consequence: Preamble excerpts from South Africa's Bill of Rights (see Appendix 3)

The revelation follows the precipitating event: "Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity". The verb 'believe' is a commitment that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it". At this point, this discourse strategy aimed at nation-building is inclusive of all citizens. However, with the introduction of the clause structure "united in our diversity", the diversity concept, in our opinion, challenges the notion of unity because it is not clearly defined, particularly by objective criteria that specify the government's notion of 'unity in diversity'. Unity in diversity sounds like a contradiction in terms (see part 4. Discussion).

3.5.2 Revelation: Preamble excerpts from South Africa's Bill of Rights (see Appendix 3)

The different sections of the preamble speak to each other as a coherent whole. The preamble is based on a single idea about South Africa's apartheid injustices and what needs to be done in a post-apartheid South Africa to correct the apartheid wrongs. The authors (parliament) speak for and on behalf of all South Africans in the country as "We the people of South Africa" as though the "We" is a given in terms of a common collective agreement.

3.5.3 Arguments towards an alternative public policy discourse

> 'In the broadest sense all writing is about yourself. Even your laundry list. Wise readers have always known that words reveal the person: Napoleon studied an officer's writing before promoting him to high rank. Every kind of prose – exposition, argument, description – tells us something about the writer: in choice of subject matter, breadth and depth of knowledge, the skill with which the material is shaped and explored.' (Kane and Peters 1986: 3)

Since the preamble of a public policy is sanctioned by parliament, it is also about how members of the ANC-led government view their identities as South Africans. In other words, it is about their individuality. As authors of the act and as individuals, they view themselves collectively as people belonging to different racial groups because their identities/individualities are separately and at the same time collectively embedded in the act. By individuality, we mean that writers draw on their personal, cultural and linguistic experiences to use discourse markers in specific ways in order to assert their identities in text (Martin and Rose 2003). In their choice of words, such examples signify and give expression to the clause construct of unity in diversity.

South Africa does not have an affirmative policy act. Race-based affirmative action, as indicated earlier, is extrapolated from the Constitution ("diversity") as well as from the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998 ("diverse workforce"), the Promotion of Unfair Discrimination Act, No. 2000 ("the great majority of our people … and historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and social groups") and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 ("by the majority of its people" and "vast majority of its people") (see Appendices 1, 2 and 3). The question of whether race-based affirmative action is discriminatory remains a contentious topic, which is still debated across South Africa (see Loyson 2009 for case law studies). The preamble of Clause 29 in the Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996 sets the tone for the argument structure for discussions around historical redress which other public policy documents endorse.

For Ivanič, identity, like writing, is a socio-political practice and, therefore, open to "contestation and change" (1997: 225). In this sense, the representation of identity connects to issues beyond the text. As alluded to earlier, another often overlooked strategy in learning about asserting one's identity in texts in South Africa's context of situation and culture (for example, our past and present social experiences of apartheid) is that this process could involve a potential clash in values, in what it means to be human for South African citizens (see Street 2003).

4. Discussion

South Africa's "united in our diversity" clause is based on an assumption that "We" (South Africans) can find unity despite our cultural, religious, gender, disability and racial differences (diversity). South Africa's biological racial unity concept conforms to a single plot (unity of action), a single location (unity of place) and a single day (unity of time), as explicated by the Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus (1998: 1270-71). However, its problem lies in what we call 'unity of purpose'. By this, we mean that whether the ANC-led government believes that the creed of "united in our diversity" can purposely unite South Africans on the basis of notions of different races, because to our knowledge many people do not accept the label of "Coloured" (see Alexander 2006).

The key purpose of South Africa's post-apartheid redress strategies is transformation from an apartheid state to a democratic one based on the values enshrined in South Africa's Constitution. While we agree that in principle one may find unity of purpose, South Africa's current transformational agenda does not transcend racial categories, but maintains them in its unity of action (Appendices 1 and 2). Herein lies the discrimination because the post-apartheid government not only denies current theories that there are not biologically distinct human races, but it also arbitrarily defines through a legal system what it means to be human (Frederickson 1982). Fraser (1997: 68) explains that in such scenarios, "Cultural domination supplants exploitation as the fundamental injustice. And cultural reproduction displaces socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and goal of political struggle." In doing so, the post-apartheid government complements colonial and apartheid conceptions of absolute and immutable categories to encapsulate differentiated humanness for the different 'racial groups'. Moreover, in our view, the idea of unity in purpose should have been founded on an agreed upon set of principles by all South African citizens. The ANC-led government did not hold a discussion, debate or referendum around the following:

1. The maintenance of the racial classification system as a redress strategy in post-apartheid South Africa;
2. The use of race-based affirmative action as a redress strategy aimed at transformation and reconciliation.

The definition of a South African in terms of stereotypical racial categories and in doing this usurped the prerogative to a finalised a template in which they in their discourse (see Halliday 1985):

1. Present South African realities
2. Enact identities
3. Regulate human relations and social interactions as typical 'Coloureds', 'Blacks', 'Whites' and 'Indian' behaviour in text and contexts in public domains.

Apart from the above, the argument by post-apartheid policy legislators that unity can be found in biological racial diversity and thereby avoid any form of discriminatory practices does not make sense from the standpoint of (1) mathematics, (2) presumptions as in the interpretation of statutes, and (3) linguistics as in discourse as a form of social and discursive practice (the production, distribution and consumption of messages). We discuss each of these in turn to show how the argument does not make any logical sense.

4.1 Discussion of unity in racial diversity: A mathematical perspective

The conception of unity as "We", "all" and "united" in South Africa's Constitution is consistent with the Collins English Dictionary (1998) definition of unity as "oneness, whole, uniformity, numeral one, unity of action and place". Collins English Dictionary (1998) also defines unity as "the act or quality of forming a whole from separate parts". These separate parts, to our knowledge, refer to percentages or fractional parts that make up the whole, because:

> Mathematics knows no races or geographic boundaries; for mathematics, the cultural world is one country. (Hillbert 1862–1943, cited in Willers 2011: 9-10)

The intended meaning of the diversity concept may be to unite, but when translated into practice, its actual meaning divides at the level of texture in the respective policies as well as subsequent employment practices (see Appendices 1 and 2).

Thus, from a mathematical standpoint, for each real number A (post-apartheid), there is a unique real number denoted $-A$ (apartheid) such that $A + (-A) = 0$. Therefore, to undo apartheid one must inverse it completely and not partially. By maintaining the racial classification system this is not possible. As one can see from a mathematical standpoint, one cannot undo the apartheid 'negative' by adding one 'positive', while keeping one of its key components, viz. the racial classification system (see Appendices 1 and 2).

4.2 Discussion of unity in racial diversity: Legal perspective

Legal presumptions refer to what has gone before or to past case law studies (Anderson, Dodd and Roland 2012). It follows that historical presumptions refer to what has gone before in history. We have learnt from history (what has gone before) about situations when people deemed themselves as distinctly different races and they conjured up imagined enemies as they constructed "imagined communities" (Anderson 1982; Patterjee 1993). This happens because people may view their cultures, religions, rituals, norms and so on as distinctly different, immutable and eternally fixed. It is in these situations that the beauty of the human imagination becomes, in our opinion, destructive rather than creative. Cultures, particularly religious beliefs and rituals, are polarised rather than generating a discourse of possibilities for new forms of innovation and beauty in our varieties of arts and sciences. A particular cultural-specific world-view may claim universality status and may regard other forms as inferior (Frederickson 1982; Jamieson 2002). The treatment of 'Blacks' in North America and South Africa by so-called 'Whites' is, in our opinion, a historical exemplification of the creation of 'imagined communities' to justify unequal dominant power relations under the guise of appeasing so-called "different races" (Haley 1982; Brown 1991).

4.3 Race-based policies: Implications for nation-building

As indicated, South Africa's transformation agenda happens against a legacy of colonialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism within a capitalist-driven economy (Reader's Digest 1988). Capitalism, Marx (1844) argued, is inherently contradictory because it generates structural inequalities between different classes. South Africa was hitherto a racial capitalist system in the sense that a white minority constituted the entrepreneurial and managerial classes, while the vast majority of previously disenfranchised people were relegated by the ideological and repressive state apparatus to positions of predominantly working class. This was the legacy of centuries of dispossession inherited by the vast majority.

It was also the legacy of structural inequalities between the minority whites, on the one hand, and the previously disenfranchised majority, on the other, which the post-apartheid government was expected to transform. However, given the inherent capitalist contradictions of generating structural inequality, the post-apartheid government has, in the view of many South Africans, failed to address the 'generative inequality' contradiction in their own policies (our emphasis). Instead, with its transformation policies of Black Economic Empowerment and race-based affirmative action, it has polarised South African society more by 'ratifying' the apartheid contradictions (our emphasis).

In a survey conducted by Du Toit (2004), he summarises the consequences of post-apartheid race-based policies:

- South Africans disagree with one another about what the Constitution stands for; and therefore

- About the nature of the negotiation process that produced this Constitution;
- South Africans therefore do not have any national consensus on political transformation;
- There is enough common ground among South Africans to draw up a political code of good conduct for the application of affirmative action rules.

Du Toit (2004) infers and concludes:

- Such a code is much needed if a large part of the South African labour force is not to have their human dignity impaired;
- A new definition of empowerment is needed and public support for one does exist.

It appears from the survey that the opinions of local people do not matter in addressing the contradictions in post-apartheid race-based policies. This is evident in South Africa's downward economic spiral, as confirmed by Moody's (2018) credit rating. The main criticism levelled against race-based policies is that a minority of "African Black" elite mostly benefitted, while the majority of working class still live in squalor (de Havilland 2007). Mvuyo (2018: 6) encapsulates perhaps best in the Human Sciences Annual Report the current status of South Africa's race-based policies agenda:

> Impatience with the current conditions has led to very important calls for, amongst others, radical economic transformation, decolonisation of education, and others. Not enough is being done to understand the policies, programmes and plans which must be put in place to transform our society in a meaningful, and more importantly, sustainable way. Without this deeper understanding, changes could be superficial and serve only to entrench the interests of a few and patterns of inequality, which have persisted for hundreds of years.

With regard to the above, we have argued the manner in which the post-apartheid government uses discourse in their policy formulations to play a key role in either enhancing or retarding transformation. Therefore, in the words of Du Toit (2004: 5), "there is no national consensus on the basic presuppositions of the Constitution order – to establish such a consensus the social contract will have to be re-negotiated". It follows that when this social contract is re-negotiated, the post-apartheid government should be more critical in their use of language in public policies.

5. Conclusion

This paper has shown that South Africa's post-apartheid maintenance of a system of racialised identities – as implicated in its 'diversity' concepts in the preambles of the selected public policy documents – bear the imprints of colonial and apartheid discourses in the social discourse and legal construction of the 'other(s)' in cultural traditions and ideological rhetoric. As such, the ANC-led government wove different textual tapestries of linguistic and cultural meaning into public policies, drawing on the resources of their home language norms and values as shaped by apartheid and colonial discourses of 'other(s)'.

Therefore, to assess the successes and failures of public policy with a view to improving transformation, one should interrogate the discourses that the different stakeholders bring to the public policy mediation table. As mentioned, many people were excluded from a discussion of the maintenance of the racial classification system and the implications for nation-building. As such, a key argument of this paper is that the current discourse of public policy might be far removed from the situation it seeks to transform. Thus, to effect meaningful social transformation, it might be necessary, as an initial step, to transform key aspects of the preambles of public policy discourse, especially those that augment the notion of 'unity in diversity'. The notions of unity in diversity and striving for a non-racial society are, in our view, contradicted by the maintenance of a racial classification system (Appendices 1 and 2). The paper shows how the discourse of public policy maintains, rather than transforms, the base and superstructure insofar as it maintains a system of racial classification and it has failed to address the question of land redistribution.

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Appendix 1



Application for Employment **Z 83** (81/971431)

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS FORM

To assist a government department in selecting a person for an advertised post.

This form may be used to identify candidates to be interviewed. Since all applicants cannot be interviewed, you need to fill in this form completely, accurately and legibly. This will help to process your application fairly.

WHO SHOULD COMPLETE THIS FORM

Only persons wishing to apply for an advertised position in a government department.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

This form requires basic information. Candidates who are selected for interviews will be requested to furnish additional certified information that may be required to make a final selection.

SPECIAL NOTES

1 – All information will be treated with the strictest confidentiality and will not be disclosed or used for any other purpose than to assess the suitability of a person, except in so far as it may be required and permitted by law. Your personal details must correspond with the details in your ID or passport.

2 – Passport number in the case of non-South Africans.

3 – This information is required to enable the department to comply with the Employment Equity Act, 1998.

4 – This information will only be taken into account if it directly relates to the requirements of the position.

5 – Applicants with substantial qualifications or work experience must attach a CV.

A. THE ADVERTISED POST

Position for which you are applying (as advertised)	Department where the position was advertised
Reference number (as stated in the advert)	If you are offered the position, when can you start **OR** how much notice must you serve with your current employer

B. PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname				
First Names				
Date of Birth				
ID number [2]				
Race [3]	*AFRICAN*	*WHITE*	*COLOURED*	*INDIAN*
Gender [3]			*MALE*	*FEMALE*
Do you have a disability? [3]			*YES*	*NO*
Are you a South African Citizen?			*YES*	*NO*
If no, what is your Nationality				
And do you have a valid work Permit?			*YES*	*NO*
Have you ever been convicted of a criminal offence or been dismissed from employment? [4]			*YES*	*NO*
If your profession or occupation requires State or official registration, provide date and particulars of registration.				

C. HOW DO WE CONTACT YOU

Preferred language for correspondence?			
Telephone number during office hours			
Preferred method for correspondence	POST	E-MAIL	FAX
Correspondence contact details (in terms of above)			

Appendix 2



ANNEXURE G5

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
EXTERNAL BURSARY APPLICATION FORM

This form will be considered as incomplete and will be eliminated if the following documents are not attached to this application:

- Certified copy of ID
- Certified copy of matric
- Certified copy of highest qualification
- Certified copy of academic record if already enrolled for the qualification
- Course Curriculum / Prospectus
- Course fee outline
- Acceptance letter or proof that the applicant has applied for acceptance at tertiary institution (tuition and accommodation)

A. PERSONAL DETAILS:

1. Identity number: ………………………………….. 2. Date of birth: …………………………

3. Title: ……………………………………………… 4. Gender: M F

5. Surname ………………………………………… 6. Race: Black White Coloured Indian

7. Full names: ……………………………………………………………………………………

8. Disabled/Not disabled: If disabled, state the nature of disability……………………………………

9. Physical Address:

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………….. Postal Code ……………………………

10. Postal Address:

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………….. Postal Code ………………

11. Region/(Province) : …………………………………..

12. Telephone no: ……………………………..

Cell phone no: …………………………….. : E-mail address:…………………………………………

13. Next of kin:

Name: ………………………………………………………………………… Relation: …………………………..

Contact telephone numbers (H): ………………………………………………………………………
(Cell) ……………………………………………………………………

Residential Address……………………………………………………………………………………………
……

14. If employed, name and address of employer: ……………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

Appendix 3

Bill of Rights of South Africa's Constitution Act 108 of 1996 states:

We, the people of South Africa,
Recognise the injustices of the past;
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity

Preamble of Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998

Logical Structure	**1. Introduction/Precipitating Event**
1st Premise	*that as a result of Apartheid and other discriminatory laws* and *practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation* and *income within the national labour market;* and *that those disparities create such pronounced disadvantages for* ***certain categories of*** **people** *that they cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws,*
2nd Premise	**2. Body/Consequence** *To provide for employment equity;* and *to provide for matters incidental thereto.* *Preamble.--Recognising--* *that as a result of Apartheid and other discriminatory laws* and *practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation and income within the national labour market; and* *that those disparities create such pronounced disadvantages for* ***certain categories of people*** *that they cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws,* *promote the constitutional right of equality* and *the exercise of true democracy;* *eliminate unfair discrimination in employment;* *ensure the implementation of employment equity to redress the effects of discrimination;*
Therefore	**3. Conclusion/Revelation/Solution** *achieve* ***a diverse workforce*** *broadly representative of our people;* *promote economic development and efficiency in the workforce;* and *give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a member of the International Labour Organisation,*

Preamble of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000

Logical Structure	**1. Introduction/Precipitating Event**
1st Premise	*The consolidation of democracy in our country requires the eradication of social* and *economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in nature, which were generated in our history by colonialism, Apartheid* and *patriarchy, and which brought pain* and *suffering to the great majority of our people;* *Although significant progress has been made in restructuring and transforming our society and its institutions, systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our constitutional democracy;*
2nd Premise	**2. Body/Consequences** *The basis for progressively redressing these conditions lies in the Constitution which, amongst others, upholds the values of human dignity, equality, freedom and social justice in a united, non-racial and non-sexist society where all may flourish;* *South Africa also has international obligations under binding treaties and customary international law in the field of human rights which promote equality and prohibit unfair discrimination. Among these obligations are those specified in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;* *Section 9 of the Constitution* provides *for the enactment of national legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination* and *to promote the achievement of equality;*
Therefore	**3. Conclusion/Revelation/Solution** *This implies the advancement, by special legal and other measures, of historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and social groups who were dispossessed of their land and resources, deprived of their human dignity and who continue to endure the consequences;* *This Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society****, united in its diversity,*** *marked by human relations that are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human dignity* and *freedom.*

Preamble of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003

Logical Structure	**1. Introduction/Precipitating Event**
1st Premise	WHEREAS *under Apartheid race was used to control access to South Africa's productive resources and access to skills;* WHEREAS *South Africa's economy still excludes the vast* ***majority of its people*** *from ownership of productive assets and the possession of advanced skills;* WHEREAS *South Africa's economy performs below its potential because of the low level of income earned and generated by the* ***majority of its people****;* AND WHEREAS, unless *further steps are taken to increase the effective participation of the* ***majority of South Africans*** *in the economy, the stability and prosperity of the economy in the future may be undermined to the detriment of all South Africans,* irrespective *of race;*
2nd Premise	**2. Body/Consequence** AND IN ORDER TO— • *promote the achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-based and effective participation of* ***black people*** *in the economy and promote a higher growth rate, increased employment* and *more equitable income distribution;*
Therefore	**3. Conclusion/Revelation/Solution** *and establish a national policy on broad based* ***black economic empowerment*** so *as to promote the economic unity of the nation, protect the common market, and promote equal opportunity and equal access to government services,*

CHAPTER EIGHT

"AS LONG AS I UNDERSTAND THE CUSTOMERS, I WILL ANSWER THEM": THE *TRANSLINGUAL* TUCKSHOP VS. THE *PLURALISED MONOLINGUAL* SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION

LORATO MOKWENA

1. Introduction

The quotation in the title of this chapter is extracted from an interview with a tuckshop owner who remarked that the language customers speak during economic transactions is insignificant – as long as she understands the customer, she will respond accordingly. The tuckshop owner's fluid approach to language is in contrast to the South African Constitution's approach to language. The South African Constitution stipulates that the country has 11 official languages. The official languages are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.

Makoni (2003) and Phaswana (2003) have noted the South African government's failure to implement the national language policy specifically with regard to the increased use of the nine indigenous languages. Makoni (2003) argues that by dividing the indigenous languages into nine separate categories, the South African government perpetuates the misinvention of African languages by missionaries and colonial administrators, and the South African Constitution merely advances plural monolingualism, i.e. prompting citizens to only be efficient in their mother tongue. According to Makoni (2003: 135), missionaries "invented different languages out of one language through a process marred by 'faulty transcriptions and mishearings' mediated through partial competence in African languages".

Makoni (2003: 138) states that in the South African Constitution, the country's landscape is wrongfully portrayed as one that is "composed of many language boxes and linguistic 'things' separate and distinct". Essentially, the South African government inherited and institutionalised a colonial epistemological perspective of language – a perspective that considers languages, and subsequently, people, as fixed entities that can be neatly separated and categorised. However, this portrayal is not an accurate representation of the South African socio-linguistic reality, nor of speakers' actual linguistic practices.

Tuckshops are an unmissable feature of the South African landscape, especially in the townships. Tuckshops (also known as spaza shops)[1] became popular in South Africa around the 1980s (Moloi 2014). Ligthelm (2005: 202) defines spaza or tuckshop as "a business operating in a section of an occupied residential home or in any other structure on a stand in a formal or informal township for residential purposes and where people live permanently". Tuckshops were dubbed by Terblanche (1991) as South Africa's first black-owned retailing institution and positioned them as a means of survival for the impoverished, unemployed black South Africans.

Decades later and the 'face' and core purpose of tuckshops have dramatically changed – from South African to international; from survivalist to entrepreneurial. As attested by Charman, Petersen and Piper (2012: 48), "since about 2005, a growing class of entrepreneur retailer has emerged as a major economic player within spaza markets. These entrepreneurs, characterised by 'opportunity-motivated' individuals, have steadily outcompeted many survivalist businesses". According to Charman et al. (2012: 48), "the majority of these opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs are immigrants, and the ensuing consequences of their rising dominance has a distinct national or ethnic character". These opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs originate from various countries, including Somalia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Charman et al. 2012: 48).

Makalela (2017: 112) explains that "the first port of entry for both local rural migrants and immigrants from countries outside of South Africa has always been the Black township". According to Makalela (2017: 112), this "necessary unprecedented immigration expanded the traditional bases of Black townships and typically, a Black township is now a site of linguistic contact between linguistic communities that were separated from one another during the apartheid area". The transformation from being a static entity to a flexible institution – the transfiguration from being a black 'South African' survival strategy to a multipurpose international, pluricultural and multilingual institution – positions the tuckshop's semiotic landscape as one of the ideal socio-linguistic situations from which to explore current day South African linguistic practices – written and spoken.

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[1] In this chapter, I use the term 'tuckshop' as that is how it is commonly referred to in the Northern Cape.

This chapter aims to explore the extent to which a multicultural and multinational institution such as the tuckshop and its *de facto* linguistic landscape language policy challenges the notion of languages as neatly boxed objects, as depicted by the South African national language policy. This paper argues that, as an institution motivated by the harsh economic pre-apartheid era and which continues to exist in democratic South Africa, the tuckshop is a transformative translanguaging space that transcends arbitrary linguistic and national/ethnic barriers. This research is of an ethnographic nature as it includes interviews with tuckshop owners and customers about their linguistic practices and therefore it contributes to what Makalela (2017: 112) calls a "paucity of research on hybrid language forms as well as on the points of view of the speakers in complex multilingual contexts".

2. A *de facto* translanguaging South African language policy?

This chapter draws on the conceptual work of Shohamy (2006) and Spolsky (2004) on language policy and translanguaging (García and Wei 2014) to illustrate how the tuckshop's semiotic landscape is a translanguaging space (Wei 2011). This translanguaging space serves as a *de facto* language policy that undercuts the official national language policy as declared in the South African Constitution, and problematises the conceptualisation of language in the Constitution.

Shohamy (2006: 46) defines language policy as "specific documents, laws, regulations or policy documents that specify certain language behaviours". Shohamy (2006) provides the distinction between two types of language policies: explicit and implicit. According to Shohamy (2006: 50), explicit language policies are stated through "official documents, such as national laws, declarations that accord certain languages official or national status, language standards, curricula, tests and other types of documents". In contrast, implicit/*de facto* language policies are "not stated explicitly but can be derived implicitly from examining a variety of *de facto* practices". Shohamy's (2006) distinction between explicit and implicit language policies is similar to that of Schiffman (1996) who distinguishes between overt and covert language policies. The linguistic practices by tuckshop owners and customers discussed in this chapter are examples of a *de facto* language policy that 'governs' spaces such as the tuckshop.

Spolsky (2004: 5) contends that the language policy of a speech community consists of three components:

1) its language practices – the habitual pattern of selecting among the varieties that make up its linguistic repertoire;
2) its language beliefs/ideology – the beliefs about language and language use;
3) language planning or management which are any specific efforts to modify or influence linguistic practices.

Shohamy (2006: 54) calls for an expanded view of language policy, arguing that the study of it "should not be limited to the examination of declared and official statements but should include analysing the mechanisms that produce, perpetuate and even challenge existing written policies". Shohamy (2006: 52) justifies this call by arguing that "most multilingual declared policies do not always reflect the *de facto* and 'real' language policies as declared policies provide only lip service, declarations and intentions".

In order to uncover and understand 'real' language policies, it is necessary to go beyond language policy documents and examine the mechanisms that create *de facto* language policies. According to Shohamy (2006: 54), mechanisms can be defined as "overt and covert devices that are used as the means for affecting, creating and perpetuating *de facto* language practices". Shohamy (2006: 110) lists language in the public space (linguistic landscape) as one of these *de facto* language policy devices and stipulates that it refers to "all language items that are displayed in a variety of contexts in the environment". In this paper, the language (written and spoken) in the tuckshop environment is considered an overt device that creates and perpetuates *de facto* language practices that challenge the existing written national language policy.

Jaspers (2017: 2) notes that the concept of translanguaging was first coined in Welsh, as *trawsieithu*, and originally it referred to a pedagogy that encouraged the use of two languages. The initial translation of *trawsieithu* to translanguaging was done by Colin Baker and defined as "the process of making meaning, shaping experiences, gaining understanding and knowledge through the use of two languages" (cited in García and Wei 2014: 20).

Bradley and Moore (2018) note that translanguaging joins a group of similar notions that challenge the traditional understanding of languages as monolithic constructs. Examples of such notions include polylanguaging (Jørgensen 2008), plurilingual practices (Lüdi and Py 2009), metrolingualism (Otsuji and Pennycook 2010), and codemeshing (Canagarajah 2011).

However, for García and Wei (2014: 21), translanguaging "does not just refer to two separate languages nor to a synthesis of different language practices or to a hybrid mixture". Otheguy, García and Reid (2015: 297) assert that "translanguaging is the deployment of a speaker's full linguistic repertoire without regard for watchful adherence to the socially and politically defined boundaries of named (and usually national and state) languages". García and Wei (2014: 21) add that translanguaging is "the enaction of languaging practices that use different features that had previously moved independently constrained by different histories but that are now experienced against each other in speakers' interactions as one new whole".

Translanguaging, as a catalyst in the deconstruction of the named languages boundaries, is important for this paper as tuckshops are spaces where individuals with different histories meet and interact. Due to its non-binary nature, García and Wei (2014) consider translanguaging as transformative. As a transformative practice, translanguaging refers to "*new* language practices that make visible the complexity of language exchanges among people with different histories, and releases histories and understandings that had been buried within fixed language identities constrained by nation-states" (García and Wei 2014: 21).

Considering that translanguaging was initially conceptualised as a teaching method, it comes as no surprise that most of the scholarly attention related to translanguaging focuses on the education environment. Due to its expansion beyond the classroom, Lewis, Jones and Baker (2012) distinguished between three types of translanguaging-related research: (1) Classroom translanguaging; (2) Universal translanguaging; and (3) Neurolinguistic translanguaging. Universal translanguaging is described as a translanguaging search that "explores the lives of bilinguals irrespective of context and particularly for gaining understandings, everyday communication, and achievement in interactions irrespective of site" (Lewis at al. 2012: 650).

The work in this chapter can be classified as universal translanguaging; however, the participants are not categorically bilingual – rather, they are social actors who draw creatively on their linguistic repertoire. Makalela (2013: 114) notes that "there is a dearth of research that investigates translanguaging outside of the classroom to assess the cognitive and social dimensions of multilingual speakers". This view is shared by Lewis et al. (2012: 653) who suggest that future research avenues for universal translanguaging should include thinking about "how do we depict everyday translanguaging that occurs in thinking, interpersonal negotiations, understanding of meaning and is situated within changing scenery, coactors, audience, expected lines of a play, and a moving and not static storyline?"

This chapter responds to this need by exploring how translanguaging is drawn on in socio-economic relations and how it is operationalised on commercial signage and in conversations for meaning-making purposes.

2.1 Translanguaging space

Wei (2011) proposes the notion of translanguaging space to emphasise the transformative nature of translanguaging. Wei (2011: 1223) argues that translanguaging "creates a social space for the multilingual language user by bringing together different dimensions of their personal history, experience and environment, their attitude, belief and ideology, their cognitive and physical capacity". Consequently, a translanguaging space performs a dual role: it is "a space for the act of translanguaging as well as a space created through translanguaging" (Wei 2011: 1223). Wei (2011: 1223) adds that a translanguaging space "is not a space where different identities, values and practices simply co-exist, but combine together to generate new identities, values and practices".

Translanguaging space, as a notion, hinges on two central concepts: creativity and criticality. According to Wei (2011: 1223), "creativity can be defined as the ability to choose between following and flouting the rules and norms of behaviour, including the use of language". It is about pushing and breaking the boundaries between the old and the new, the conventional and the original, and the acceptable and the challenging. Criticality refers to "the ability to use available evidence appropriately … to inform considered views, to question and problematize received wisdom" (Wei 2011: 1224). Wei (2011: 1224) contends that these two concepts are interdependent: "one cannot push or break boundaries without being critical; and the best expression of one's criticality is one's creativity".

2.2 Translanguaging and multimodality

Wei (2011: 1223) states that translanguaging is going both between and beyond different linguistic structures and systems, including different modalities (speaking, writing, signing, listening, reading, remembering). García and Wei (2014) comment on the progression of the notion of translanguaging following its inception and voice their particular conceptualisation of the term. García and Wei (2014: 28) state that considering the increasingly multimodal nature of communication, their notion of translanguaging "includes all meaning-making modes".

Focusing on street puppetry performers in Slovenia and spoken word poets in the UK, Bradley and Moore (2018) apply the notion of resemiotisation in conjunction with translanguaging to understand how semiotic transformations emerge with and beyond linguistic practices. Using data from a Bangladeshi-owned corner shop, Pennycook (2017: 270) explores the possibility of the expansion of translanguaging beyond just language codes to include a broader set of semiotic resources. Pennycook (2017: 270) draws a comparison between linguistic landscape research and translanguaging research, and argues that similar to linguistic landscape studies, "so translanguaging research can also benefit from questioning not only the boundaries between languages, but also the boundaries between different modes of semiosis".

Pennycook's (2017) suggestion of the expansion of translanguaging's scope emphasises the need to analyse how the various semiotic resources complement each other in a given space to enhance meaning-making. As argued by Pennycook (2017: 270-271), "we cannot merely add more semiotic items to our translinguistic inventories, but need instead to seek out a way of grasping the relationships among a range of forms of semiosis". Pennycook (2017: 278) suggests the notion of assemblages to describe how "a range of linguistic, artefactual, historical and spatial resources are brought together in particular assemblages in particular moments of time and space". Pennycook (2017: 278) puts forth that "an understanding of semiotic assemblages gives us a way to address the complexity of things that come together in the vibrant, changeable exchanges of everyday urban life".

The recent expansion of the scope of translanguaging, i.e. the incorporation of additional modes and its consideration as a catalyst in the invention of space, Wei (2011) positions this framework as an applicable lens through which to analyse the multimodal tuckshop landscape.

3. The study

This study forms part of a larger ethnographic study conducted in two district municipalities in the Northern Cape, South Africa, from December 2015 to July 2017. The data herein results from a combination of two types of ethnographies: visual ethnography (Pink 2007) and material ethnography (Stroud and Mpendukana 2009). Androutsopoulos (2014: 86) states that "photographic documentation lies at the heart of linguistic landscape data collection and basic hardware requirements such as a digital camera will prove adequate for photographic documentation". A digital camera was used to take photographs of the material that form part of the landscape of the given environments. The photographic material, for the larger ethnographic study and this chapter, includes more than 500 images and 70 one-on-one interviews with local people recorded on a digital audio recorder.

Interviews were conducted with tuckshop owners and customers and two types of interview strategies were used: semi-structured interviews and walking-talking interviews (Banda, Jimaima and Mokwena 2018; Brown and Durrheim 2009; Stroud and Jegels 2014). The tuckshop is essentially a mobile space both inside and outside (there is a constant influx of customers into and around the tuckshop and typically owners constantly move back and forth to fetch purchased products). Consequently, walk-talk interviews were more practical and efficient in comparison to sedentary interviews. The researcher would initiate a conversation with tuckshop customers before or after they complete their purchases and walk with them while conducting the interview.

During transcription, most of the interviews were translated into English; however, the interviews were conducted in either Setswana, Afrikaans or English, or in certain cases, a translingual blend of these languages was used. Examples of translingual interview questions are: *"O itse di tuckshop tse feng mo plekeng e?"*[2] and *"lo dirisa taal e feng ha lo bua le die man?"*[3] Both questions are a blend of Afrikaans and Setswana.

3.1 Is Setswana only meant for Batswana?

Makoni (2003) argues that the stance on languages and ethnicity in the South African Constitution is based on 18th-century German Romanticist views which considered language and identity as inseparable. According to German Romanticism, language was the most significant indicator of identity – which explains the current-day assumption in South Africa that, for instance, Xhosa speakers automatically are affiliated with the Xhosa ethnicity. This link between language and identity, specifically ethnicity, is questioned by the written linguistic practices on tuckshop commercial signage.

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[2] Translation: "Which tuckshops do you know in this area?"

[3] Translation: "Which language do you speak when you speak to this man [the tuckshop owner]?"



Figure 8.1: Dumelang tuckshop



Figure 8.2: Gagona Mathata tuckshop

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 serve as examples of how non-South African tuckshop owners dismantle the assumed link between language and ethnicity. The names of the tuckshops, i.e. 'Dumelang' and 'Gagona Mathata', form part of typical Setswana greeting practices. First, the word *'Dumelang'* is used when one greets a group of people simultaneously. *'Ga gona mathata'* means 'There are no problems', and is typically the response after one asks *"O kae?"* ("How are you?") after one says *"Dumelang"*.

Although the linguistic inscriptions in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 are in Setswana, the owners are non-South African citizens.

Whether one permanently migrates to or just visits another country/city, one is bound to quickly learn how locals in the area greet each other. In Figures 8.1 and 8.2, the non-Setswana speakers and non-South African tuckshop owners are drawing on their basic Tswana skills and have repurposed local ways of greeting as tuckshop names. The repurposing of local greetings as tuckshop names exemplifies what Pennycook (2006) describes as transcultural flows which are "the ways in which cultural forms move, change and are reused to fashion new identities in diverse contexts".

Deumert and Mabandla (2013) explored Chinese traders' migration to the rural Eastern Cape, South Africa, with particular interest in language learning and intergroup communication between migrants and the local population. According to Deumert and Mabandla (2013: 45), one strategy used by Chinese traders is the creation of signage which draws on local meanings. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 above serve as testimony that non-South African tuckshop owners use a similar strategy to locate themselves within the "realm of familiarity" (Deumert and Mabandla 2013: 49). However, I contend that, although the tuckshop owners are positioning themselves in the realm of familiarity, they are simultaneously defamiliarising South African customers with something overly familiar to them. By using a language on the commercial signage that does not 'match' the identity of the owner, the familiar becomes unfamiliar, thereby coercing customers to create an alternative discourse about named languages and their supposed link to identity. Additionally, the non-South African tuckshop owners thus repurpose Setswana as a named language to eliminate the social distance between the South African clientele and non-South African tuckshop owners.

The following extract from an interview with a group of tuckshop customers illustrates the assumed link between language and identity:

Extract 1

***I**nterviewer: Now which language do you speak to the owners at the white tuckshop?*
***G**roup: Afrikaans and English.*
I: Do you not speak Setswana?
G: No. We do not know Setswana. They [tuckshop owners] use a little bit of Setswana when they speak to us.
I: So they do not speak any other languages with you?
G: They are not 'Koelies' ['Coolies'].
I: What is that?
G: They are like us.
[Interjection from one of the group members]

G: Hey, those are 'Koelies' ['Coolies'].
I: What is the name of the person you are referring to?
G: Kgomotso.[4]
I: So what is Kgomotso not?
G: Kgomotso is not a 'Koelie' ['Coolie'].
I: Is he Muslim?
[Clarity from another group member]
G: No. She is trying to say that Kgomotso is like us. Brown people.
I: Tswanas, Zulus or Xhosa? Which people?
G: Tswana, it appears to me.

The interview with the group of tuckshop customers started out plainly with the interviewer asking the standard interview questions related to language use during economic transactions at tuckshops and the tuckshops' commercial signage. As can be seen, the interview took a different turn following the interviewer's probing about the use of any additional languages that tuckshop owners use with them as customers. The interviewees continue to suggest it is improbable that the tuckshop owner who they are familiar with, Kgomotso, would speak to them in any other language as he is not a 'koelie'.[5] Interesting to note is that although the participants provided no clear description of what a 'koelie' is, a 'koelie' is suggested to be anyone foreign – anyone who is not like 'us'. Kgomotso is categorised as being Tswana and is one of them based on the named languages he speaks: he speaks Afrikaans and English and even a bit of Setswana to them.

However, Kgomotso's self-reported linguistic repertoire and identity is inconsistent with that of the group of interviewees categorising of him as Tswana:

Extract 2
Interviewer: Which languages do you speak to your customers?
Kgomotso: I speak Amharic. No, no, I speak Afrikaans.
Interviewer: But you originally speak Amharic?
Kgomotso: No, I speak Afrikaans.
Interviewer: Do you only speak Afrikaans to them?
Kgomotso: Yes, I don't understand Tswana. I am still learning. They are still teaching me.
Interviewer: So, what is Amharic?

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[4] Pseudonym.

[5] At its most superficial level, 'Koelie' / 'Coolie' is a term used to refer to people from Indian descent. Refer to https://mg.co.za/article/2011-11-08-from-one-makula-to-another-get-over-it for a more in-depth discussion about the use of the word in South Africa.

Kgomotso: It is the other language that I know and speak.

As is apparent from Extract 2, the fixed categorisation by the group of interviewees of Kgomotso is partially skewed – primarily due to the faulty, outdated and Eurocentric link between identity and language. Kgomotso portrays himself as an individual with a fluid and expanding linguistic profile – a profile he does not relate to any identity, nor does he consider any of the named languages to grant and/or deny him outsider or insider status.

The fixed, ‘language = ethnicity’ manner of thinking is evident in Extract 1, which illustrates why the named languages used in commercial signage and the identities of the owners of the tuckshops, pictured in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, can be considered a ‘mismatch’ (for lack of a better word). However, these ‘mismatches’ and Extract 2 transgress South African societal assumptions and bring into disrepute the segregationist thinking perpetuated by the South African national language policy. Jokweni (2002: 177) argues that “the notorious laws which disintegrated people into ethnic groups during the apartheid era in South Africa were in actual fact borne out of the fear of unity or integration of any form among Africans, as it was always perceived as a threat to white ‘supremacy’”. The disassociation between ethnicity and language use in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, and Kgomotso’s account of his fluid linguistic identity, can be viewed as a way of Africans continuing to problematise colonialism and apartheid ideologies that continue to influence socio-linguistic practices in democratic South Africa.

3.2 Translanguaging as a new linguistic dispensation

In addition to the non-binary written commercial signage that dismantles the assumption that language is an irrefutable social indicator of ethnic/racial identity, spoken linguistic practices further exemplify that tuckshop owners and customers do not adhere to the stark distinction between named languages. Orality forms part of translanguaging as a practice, as stipulated by García and Wei (2014).

Spolsky (2004) distinguishes between three components that construct the language policy of a given speech community: language practices, language beliefs and language intervention/management. However, Spolsky (2004: 8) cautions that “even where there is a formal, written language policy, its effect on language practices is neither guaranteed nor consistent”.

The disagreement between an overt written policy and language practices is evident in the semiotic landscapes of tuckshops. Irrespective of

South Africa's national policy, which projects languages as 11 boxed and static entities, the translingual language practices between tuckshop owners and customers challenge the language policy. Table 8.1 illustrates this phenomenon. The third column shows the interview responses from some of the tuckshop owners when asked which language(s) they use with their customers.

Tuckshop name	**Language on sign**	**Language(s) used with customers**
Shameen	Arabic	"Afrikaans, English and Setswana."
Al-ag dan	Arabic	"Sometimes Afrikaans, sometimes English. Sometimes Tswana."
Madeena	Arabic	"I speak to them English. A few guys it is Afrikaans, like that. Some Tswana also."
Nellie	Afrikaans	*"Jong, ek praat Tswana, ek praat Afrikaans en die ander talle. Solank ek net kan hoor wat sê hulle, ek antwoord."* ("Look, I speak Setswana, I speak Afrikaans and the other languages. As long as I can understand the customers, I answer.")
Special	English	"English. Sometimes it is Tswana. Not too much. A little bit."
Khaled Sylhet	Arabic	"More than English and then a little bit Tswana and a little bit Afrikaans."

Table 8.3: Translingual practices in tuckshops

As can be observed from the table above, when it comes to economic transactions, multilingual skills are more valuable than the tuckshop owners' mono-ethnic affiliations.

Aronin and Singleton (2008) argue that, in comparison with historical multilingualism, current-day multilingualism can be considered as a new dispensation. Although it is commonly known that multilingualism is not a new social phenomenon, Aronin and Singleton (2008) argue that there is something distinct about the current version in comparison with the 'historical' one. According to Aronin and Singleton (2008: 8-9), "vital societal processes and salient characteristics of contemporary society are inseparably linked with multilingualism whereas 'historical' multilingualism was largely supplementary to the development and maintenance of previous societies". In the Northern Cape, the tuckshop is one of those vital societal processes that are inseparably connected to multilingualism or rather, in this case, translanguaging. Understanding that the face of the tuckshop industry has changed dramatically in recent times with an increase in non-South African owners, economic transactions and general interaction among tuckshop owners and customers now hinge on translanguaging, not only as a practice but also as the new linguistic dispensation. This view is shared by Deumert and Mabandla (2009: 427), who observe that "the informal economy, with its various entrepreneurial activities, operates largely through the city's local languages – socially and economically dominant languages".

Although the majority of tuckshop owners and customers all report using a blend of Setswana, Afrikaans and English during general interaction and/or economic transactions, it is noticeable that there is no standard way to blend these languages. Social actors blend and use these languages in accordance with their idiolects.

Below are extracts from interviews with tuckshop owners that exemplify the centrality of translanguaging in tuckshops and modern-day South Africa.

Extract 3
I*nterviewer: Which language do you normally use?*
P*articipant: In this place, it is mixed – Afrikaans, Tswana and English.*
I: Okay, what is the first language you spoke when you came to this place? With your customers?
P: English. But when they are speaking their own languages, their mother languages, then I am trying to understand what they are saying. Like now I understand Afrikaans but I can't speak it properly.
I: But when they come in, you assist them?
P: Yes, I try to catch what they want.

Extract 4
I*nterviewer: Which language does Kamogelo*[6] *use when he speaks to the customers?*
P*articipant: He speaks Setswana.*
I: Upon arrival, which language did Kamogelo speak to the customers?
P: Kamogelo speaks Ethiopian language but he spoke English to the customers when he first arrived.

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[6] Pseudonym.

Extract 5

I*nterviewer: Which languages do you speak normally with your customers?*
P*articipant: Sometimes English, Setswana and Afrikaans. Now I speak three languages.*
I: Which language did you speak to them initially when you got here?
P: English was better.

Extract 6

I*nterviewer: Which language do you speak to your customers?*
P*articipant: My country is in East Africa. But I try the English language. I know my language.*
I: So, if I come speak Afrikaans to you, will you assist me?
P: Afrikaans – I don't talk but I know the name, what they want. I don't talk together. I know my problem.

Jokweni (2002: 178) argues that "linguistic and cultural barriers perpetuate ethnic divides and political instability, and this in turn hampers economic development in various ways". In this instance, multilingualism extends beyond being a new linguistic dispensation because it is also a new economic dispensation – it is economically profitable to be able to draw on hybrid linguistic practices.

This type of translanguaging practised by tuckshop owners and customers is equivalent to what Jokweni (2002: 185) calls "spontaneous harmonisation", or maybe more to the point of this research, spontaneous translanguaging harmonisation. According to Jokweni (2002: 185), "spontaneous harmonisation is a natural process which arises when mutually intelligible languages co-exist". I argue that spontaneous harmonisation is not limited to the harmonisation of languages that share similar orthographies – even languages such as Setswana, Afrikaans and English that do not necessarily share orthographies can spontaneously harmonise through being used in a translingual manner by tuckshop owners and customers.

Spontaneous translanguaging harmonisation in fact is not new to South Africa. In giving an account of multilingualism in pre-colonial South Africa, Makalela (2017: 299) relays that "complex communication systems were found between different ethnic groupings in pre-colonial South Africa which suggests that mutual inter-comprehensibility of the languages was used". Jokweni (2002: 187) argues that one advantage of any natural (or grassroots) process of harmonisation or convergence is that "it does not cause conflict of any kind between the speakers". This lack of linguistic conflict is evident in the tuckshop environment, as speakers creatively make their language harmonise. Jokweni (2002: 177) proposes language harmonisation as a "recourse against the poor linguistic planning and policies of the twentieth century whose aim was to disintegrate and underdevelop Africans" – i.e. linguistic planning strategies that might possibly be the foundation of the disintegrated linguistic perspective implied in the South African Constitution.

Based on the interview extracts quoted above, it becomes apparent how non-South African tuckshop owners have had to learn local languages in order for them to conduct their business transactions. This illustrates how translanguaging and transgressing the fixed boundaries of named languages are critical linguistic practices in modern-day South Africa – a country that is home to a diverse population.

3.3 Tuckshop linguistic practices – an example of Ubuntu translanguaging?

As mentioned in the introduction, Makalela (2013: 112) considers that most 'typical' black townships are sites of increased linguistic and cultural contact. Makalela (2017) suggests that individuals in sites that consist of diverse linguistic communities such as tuckshops draw on what he terms 'Ubuntu translanguaging' in order to negotiate the linguistic diversity. Makalela (2017: 307) explains that:

> While Ubuntu is essentially a philosophy and a way of life for many Africans, its principles of belonging together, discontinuous continuity, and valorising interdependence over independence provide a useful framework to see how African languages cross-pollinate and to offset rigid boundaries between the 11 official languages that are based on oneness ideology.

The direct translation of Ubuntu is 'humanity' and when operationalised, a call for Ubuntu translates to showing humanity towards others and realising that, as the human race, there is more that connects us than what divides us. The following extracts exemplify a sense of Ubuntu translanguaging, as the emphasis is on finding common ground and communication instead of the standardised use of named languages and/or the exclusionary use of a specific language by a specific ethnic/racial group.

Extract 7
Participant: I don't know. I don't talk Setswana or Afrikaans. I hear. But if you want Tswana "mae" [eggs in Setswana], I can give you eggs. But I don't know. I can't talk Afrikaans and Tswana.

Extract 8
Interviewer: So, if a customer comes here and speaks Tswana?
Participant: Bietjie nyana. [a little bit] [laughs]

Extract 9
***I**nterviewer: Which language do you use when purchasing goods from the tuckshop owner?*
***P**articipant: I speak any language.*
I: And how does the owner respond?
P: The owner responds in English.

Extract 10
***I**nterviewer: Which language do you use when purchasing goods?*
***P**artipant: I use Setswana and English now and then.*
I: So, if I walk in there now and speak Setswana, would they help me?
P: No, this one doesn't know Setswana that well. The one that speaks Setswana a lot is not here.

Deumert and Mabandla (2009: 427) state that "sales in the informal economy can be successfully completed even in cases of low linguistic proficiency – rarely involving more than a basic knowledge of numbers and the names for the products on sale". Extracts 7 and 8 demonstrate, in particular, how high proficiency in a language is not a priority for communication and/or sense-making. *"Bietjie nyana"* is a hybridised Afrikaans-Setswana term commonly used in the Northern Cape and it means "Just a little bit". *"Bietjie nyana"* is an essential term to know as a tuckshop owner, as these shops are particularly famous for selling certain products in small quantities, such as plastic pouches of sugar (Gastrow and Amit 2013: 26). Therefore, if a customer requests *"Bietjie nyana atchaar"* or *"Bietjie nyana butter"*, the tuckshop owner will understand the quantity needed. From the interview extracts, it is noticeable how understanding and communication are more important than the use of the standardised and 'correct' usage of named languages.



Figure 8.3: Product list – special shop



Figure 8.4: Special shop

Shohamy (2006: 23) argues that, although language is generally described and understood as "open, personal and dynamic", policy makers tend to view language "as a closed and finite system, as it is often used as a symbolic tool for the manipulation of political, social, educational and economic agendas". This view of language results in "language being judged as correct vs. incorrect, grammatical vs. ungrammatical, native vs. non-native, good vs. bad, high vs. low" (Shohamy 2006: 22). Those who conceive language to be a fixed, rule-bound system will classify the spelling of 'Available' as 'Availble', 'Fruit' as 'Fruei' and the mispunctuation of 'Air-Time' as errors. However, this study supports Pennycook's (2010) view that language is a localised practice. Pennycook (2010: 1-2) warns against the tendency to juxtapose between global and local uses of languages that mock the notion of locality. In concurring with Pennycook (2010: 7) that "all language practices are local", the language practices evident in Figure 8.3 are best understood as emanating from socio-economic factors related to the tuckshop landscape.

Lanza and Woldemariam (2014) provide an explanation for the supposed ungrammatical use of English by small shop owners as evident in figure 8.4. According to Lanza and Woldemariam (2014: 503-504), "in many cases involving smaller shops that employ English on their signs, the owners themselves do not necessarily speak English – the English is necessary for their business, including the English on the sign". The tuckshop owner could be targeting what Blommaert (2012: 86) refers to as an "oecumenical" audience, appreciating that existing and potential customers are not homogenous – tuckshop customers come from all walks of life. Therefore, the owner draws on an oecumenical *lingua franca* (Blommaert 2012) which is English – be it 'standard' or not. As tuckshop owners do not cater to a homogenous clientele who use one specific English, the spelling of the English words in figure 8.4 is contextually acceptable as the language is merely used for its commercial power, as implied by Lanza and Woldemariam (2014).



Figure 8.5: Ratanang tuckshop/"restuarant"

Figure 8.5 is a picture of a tuckshop and/or "restaurant in the village of Kagung in Kuruman – a residential area in which most language practices are conducted in Setswana. As can be seen in Figure 8.5, the English word 'restaurant' is spelled incorrectly as 'restuarant' on the wall in black and white, yet the word Setswana 'Ratanang', which means 'Love each other', is consistently spelled correctly on the wall and the red tuckshop sign. Similar to Figure 8.3, in this instance, there is also no interest in reproducing and adhering to 'standard' English. In actual fact, the tuckshop owner might not even consider the misspellings as errors – 'restuarant', similar to 'availble' and 'air-time', could be a result of the tuckshop owner drawing on the sound of the words and converting this sound into spelling (Blommaert 2012). Juffermans (2015: 67) refers to this type of spelling as an “eye dialect – a type of ‘non-standard spelling’ that is visible to the eye, rather than audible when read out loud”.

Lanza and Woldemariam (2014: 504) argue that in ‘peripheral’ communities where the informational content of English is limited, English is drawn on to index “prestige, luxury and modernity”. The evident disinterest in attempting to correct the word ‘restuarant’, either through repainting and/or using the Coca-Cola sign to cover it up, suggests that, in the tuckshop semiotic landscape, English as a named language is considered to be fluid and flexible.

The use of English in Figures 8.3 and 8.5 is better conceptualised as examples of a contestation against the fixity and rule-boundedness of named languages instead of being considered as ‘errors’. The English variations used in Figures 8.3 and 8.5 are not “bad language but language that does not conform to the imagined and invented rules that are maintained in the historical or economic centres of the language” (Juffermans 2015: 67). Wei (2011) proposes that “creativity” and “criticality” is essential in the construction of a translanguaging space – the former describes the right to decide to replicate or go against language norms, and the latter involves knowledgeable problematising and questioning existing wisdom. Taking into consideration the decisions of the owners of the businesses pictured in Figures 8.3 and 8.5 to transgress the language rules of English and intentionally only attach importance to English’s symbolic associations, the tuckshop environment can be considered a translanguaging space.

Makalela (2017: 298-299) argues that Ubuntu translanguaging offers us the opportunity to “rethink the South African multilingual space to accommodate fluid discursive resources where interdependence is highly valued over independence of language systems”. The interview extracts and figures discussed above exemplify how Ubuntu translanguaging is operationalised in tuckshops where mutual inter-comprehensibility is prioritised above standardised orthographies, separation of named languages and typical conversation rules.

3.4 “I love it when you talk ‘foreign’”

This section’s heading is appropriated from an advertisement for one of South Africa’s popular fast-food establishments, Wimpy. In the advertisement, in a bid to charm his female companion, Henry starts reciting the names of different coffee types to her (creamochino, caffé mocha and macchiato) which he secretly reads from a Wimpy serviette. Upon reciting the name of the last coffee type, i.e. macchiato, the female says: “Ah Henry, I love it when you talk ‘foreign’.” Although humorous, symbolically the advertisement evokes thoughts or curiosity about internationalisation and challenges South Africans to create a society that openly welcomes unfamiliarity. Similar to Wimpy’s invitation to South Africans to love ‘foreign’ coffee, the South African Constitution instructs the Pan South African Language Board (PANSALB) to:

> “(b) promote and ensure respect for—
> (i) all languages commonly used by communities in South Africa, including German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu; and
> (ii) Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other languages used for religious purposes in South Africa”
> (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996: 4).

This provision suggests that PANSALB’s primary goal is to ensure the mutual respect, use and promotion of all languages used within the South African boundaries. Subsequently, this provision implies that South Africa considers itself a safe and welcoming haven for all its linguistic communities and their members. Yet, regardless of this progressive and inclusive stance towards its diverse linguistic communities, in 2008 xenophobic attacks erupted in the Johannesburg township of Alexandra, eventually spreading throughout the entire Gauteng province and later to Durban and Cape Town. During these xenophobic attacks, linguistic ability/proficiency was used to differentiate between a ‘foreigner’ and a ‘non-foreigner’ as protestors subjected many South Africans to “elbow tests” which encompassed asking potential victims to supply the Zulu word for elbow (Claassen 2017). Tuckshops and other business establishments owned by non-South African nationals were specifically targeted and as a result, 342 shops were looted and 213 were burnt down.[7]

Driven by their disapproval of the common perspective that violence against Somali tuckshop owners was purely fuelled by xenophobic attitudes in South Africa, Charman and Piper (2012) conducted research in Delft, South Africa, to tease out further plausible reasons for this violence. Delft is an area with a tuckshop market that has experienced a growth in immigrant-run shops and the demise of South African shops. In relation to xenophobic attitudes, Charman and Piper (2012: 93) concluded that the majority of the participants interviewed appeared indifferent towards foreign tuckshop owners, with some participants speaking favourably about foreign-owned tuckshops.

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[7] https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa retrieved on 05 October 2019.

The indifferent yet positive and reciprocal relationship between immigrant tuckshop owners and South African customers, as observed by Charman and Piper (2012), was also noticeable in the Northern Cape. The linguistic accommodation practices by customers, as evident in the extracts below, serve as examples of this positive reciprocal relationship:

> **Extract 11**
> ***I****nterviewer: So which language do you use when purchasing goods from the tuckshop?*
> ***P****articipant: Setswana and English.*
> *I: And when the owner responds? Which language do they use?*
> *P: Setswana and English. They don't know it well [Setswana] so we use English a lot.*
>
> **Extract 12**
> ***I****nterviewer: So which language do you use when you come to purchase goods?*
> ***P****articipant: I speak English mostly.*
> *I: So what happens when you speak Afrikaans?*
> *P: He understands Afrikaans here and there but most of the time he doesn't.*
> *I: When you speak Afrikaans to him, in which language does he respond? When you go to buy something?*
> *P: In English.*
>
> **Extract 13**
> ***I****nterviewer: Which language do you speak to your customers?*
> ***P****articipant: More English and then a little bit of Tswana and a little bit Afrikaans.*
> *I: Which language did you first speak with the customers when you got here?*
> *P: English. If the customers don't know English, then it is a little bit of Tswana.*

The misguided assumption by the xenophobic protestors that language proficiency serves as an uncontested indication of ethnicity and nationality shows how the national government and PANSALB neglected to ensure respect for all the linguistic communities within South Africa. Makoni (2003: 139) argues that the South African Constitution implicitly promotes plural monolingualism: "… a variant and an extension of monolingualism. Instead of South Africans being encouraged to be multilingual, the policy could actually end up making each citizen merely competent in her/his own language." The Constitution's promotion of plural mononlingualism (as suggested by Makoni) is not reflective nor consistent with South Africa's current sociolinguistic practices – South Africa is a melting pot of languages and cultures which renders knowing pluralised monolingualism impractical and probably non-existent at a societal level .

Ten years after xenophobic attacks were incentivised through language, Extracts 1 to 4 serve as indications of how South Africans and non-South Africans transcend this 'one language equals one ethnicity' mentality perpetuated by the South African Constitution. Through using a translingual blend of Setswana, Afrikaans and English, customers and tuckshop owners illustrate respect for all languages and language users without apparent intervention from the government or PANSALB.

This does not mean that there is no tension between South Africans and non-South African tuckshop owners, as it has become the norm to loot tuckshops during protests, as was the case in 2018 in Kimberley, the Northern Cape's capital city.[8] However, I put forth that these tensions are mostly political, i.e. related to the lack of service delivery from local government, and unfortunately looting is used as a conduit to illustrate frustration. Linguistically, customers and owners are accommodative of each other and strategies such as the 'elbow test' ideology would be less 'effective' due to the now normalised change in tuckshop ownership and, as is evident above, non-South African tuckshop owners' use of translanguaging practices.

Jokweni (2002: 178) argues that "colonial policies in Africa as a whole and apartheid policies in South Africa were never intended to support what would later benefit the Africans in Africa". Although the South African Constitution continues to be plagued with outdated and non-African perspectives of language, it is arguable that the translocal linguistic hybridity employed by tuckshop owners and customers is illustrative of a pre-colonial South African manner of being which was "endowed with Ubuntu, which encouraged cohabitation and interdependence between people of different tribes and their languages" (Makalela 2017: 300).

4. Concluding remarks and implications

This chapter aimed to illustrate how the disjuncture between the written national language policy, as captured in the South African Constitution, and the *de facto* language policy of a translanguaging space, such as the tuckshop linguistic/semiotic landscape of the Northern Cape, challenges the epistemological perspectives of language in the South African Constitution. The tuckshop's linguistic landscape was selected as an ideal case study considering its evolving ownership, purpose and clientele. In sheer contradiction to the written language policy of South Africa, the tuckshop linguistic landscape creates a *de facto* language policy that not only challenges the written policy, but also exposes the weaknesses in a Constitution celebrated as one of the most liberal and progressive in the world. Specifically, the linguistic/semiotic landscape of the Northern Cape tuckshops creates a *de facto* language policy that challenges the South African Constitution's perspectives on: (1) language as an indicator of racial/ethnic identity; (2) languages as boxed and fixed objects; and (3) plural monolingualism as a societal norm (instead of Ubuntu translanguaging).

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[8] https://www.dfa.co.za/news/tuck-shop-owners-plead-with-sol-16204521 retrieved on 23 November 2018.

Through 'mismatched' commercial signage and translingual spoken economic transactions, the linguistic landscape of tuckshops challenges the '11 languages equals 11 ethnic groups' notion perpetuated by the South African Constitution. Tuckshop customers and owners draw on their entire linguistic repertoire during interactions, particularly to conduct economic transactions. Tuckshops have partially aided in the disassociation between language and ethnic groups in society, particularly since language can be used for exclusion/inclusion purposes. Tuckshops caters to a diverse clientele who bring their own socio-linguistic history and, therefore, language practices in this semiotic landscape are creative and constantly fluctuate as the clientele and ownership fluctuate. There is minimal adherence to 'standard' languages – in spoken form (evident also in the variations of English that tuckshop owners speak) and written form (on signage, price lists, etc.).

This chapter contributes to the body of existing work on translanguaging outside of the classroom/educational setting. The findings that result from this work simultaneously prompt new conversations and/or reinvigorate existing ones. The existence of a *de facto* language policy that is borne from translanguaging spaces, such as the linguistic landscape of the tuckshop, necessities a critical review of South Africa's national language policy and its problematic epistemological assumption that language is an automatic ethnic identity marker. The increased use of translanguaging practices and mutual inter-comprehensibility between different languages calls for a reassessment of the arbitrary separation of languages (as separated by former colonial administrators and missionaries) and for solutions such as Ubuntu translanguaging and the harmonisation of mutually intelligible languages. Harmonising the orthographies of such languages (as done by the Centre of Advanced Studies of African Societies, CASAS) will not merely provide us with orthographies that can be used transnationally among African countries, but it will also symbolically break down these imagined boundaries and enhance unity among Africans.

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CHAPTER NINE

COLONIAL LINGUISTICS AND THE INVENTION OF LANGUAGE[1]

SINFREE B. MAKONI, CRISTINE G. SEVERO AND ASHRAF ABDELHAY

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the large and profitable debate about how language practice and policy have been historically shaped by local contexts. Our focus here is on colonial linguistics in the context of Africa. We problematise the historical and political processes of language invention in the colonial contexts. This means that we do not assume languages as natural or a prior reality but, rather, as a product of social practice. We consider colonial linguistics as a contemporary approach that has revisited colonial narratives on the political role played by language in colonising processes. This means taking into account not only the Age of Discovery, but also the current reconfigured and redesigned colonial and colonising power relations. We interrogate the way that scholarship on language policy has traditionally faced the relationship between colonisation and language.

Even though language policy is seen as a modern discipline that arose along with reflections on the relationship between language, 'developing' nations and the emergence of new independent nations in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, we consider that issues that entail coloniality and language are not sufficiently addressed. Examples include the generic, homogeneous and top-down use of the term 'colonial' to cover complex, ambivalent and heterogeneous colonised and ex-colonised realities through the use of broad categories, such as 'colonial policy', 'colonial expansion', 'post-colonial indigenous language', 'colonial language', 'colonial area', 'colonial power' and 'colonial world', among others, to cover local contexts.

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Colonial linguistics is an interpretive perspective that inspects the role that linguistics plays in the construction of specific cultural stereotypes for non-Western individuals and societies. As a programme, colonial linguistics endorses a critical attitude that intends to deconstruct the taken-for-grantedness of language: the concept of 'language' is not treated as a given but, rather, as a problem to be understood through historical and critical enquiries (Warnke and Stoltz 2013: 471). Further, language practice is intimately linked with other wider socio-political phenomena and forces. Although the mainstream (formalised) theory of language reduces language to the 'informative function' of communicating abstract propositions and ideas (language as a 'neutral' means of communication), colonial linguistics focuses on the ideological (or indexical) functions that language use is socially oriented to serve. It tries to understand how cultural politics is conducted through the terrain of language, including how language is used as a proxy to articulate 'extra-linguistic' concerns in settings shaped by unequal power relations, such as colonial contexts (Abdelhay and Makoni 2018; Abdelhay, Eljak, Mugaddam and Makoni 2016; Suleiman 2013).

Colonial linguistics endorses a conflict perspective to understand how macro-scale structures of domination are discursively enacted, appropriated and transformed at the micro-scale of social interaction. It focuses on the semiotic strategies of identity construction in its all-observable dimensions (Irvine and Gal 2000). Further, colonial linguistics views the canonical formulation of 'language' (as a self-contained entity with a name, e.g. English, French, German) as a political invention, a product of and a resource for the construction of projects of belonging. Generally speaking, the very idea of 'discrete' and 'countable' languages is a modernist construction by orthographic literacy and standardisation procedures to achieve specific socio-economic ends. It is in this sense that language and literacy are instruments of social control and inequality because they are elements of the machinery of modern governmentality (Blommaert and Rampton 2011). Collins (2006: 251) argued, "Orthographies (systems of inscription) are never neutral phenomena. They are instead often the object of sharp controversy over the best (i.e. the most authentic or scientific) way to represent a given language."

The effect of the European colonial text-artefactualisation of local communicative styles (turning languages into 'portable things') is profound: it has created an artificial (mis)representation of socially layered multilingual geographies (Blommaert 2008; Errington 2008; Irvine and Gal 2000; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Said 1978). Modernist ideologies of language also have led to the emergence of ‘discourses of language endangerment’ (Duchêne and Heller 2007) and ‘language anxiety’ (Abdelhay and Makoni 2018). The moment that we try to look at Africa from a non-enumerating ideology, we may have a different epistemological version of reality.

The (colonial) monoglot ideology of language (Silverstein 1996) also has shaped the way that we view Africa through school literacy. In this ideology, Africa and illiteracy are synonyms. This observation should not in any way imply that Africa lacked any pre-colonial literacy traditions; on the contrary, there had always been ‘indigenous’ literacy practices in Africa (see Abdelhay, Juffermans and Asfahan 2014). The word ‘indigeneity’, however, should not invariably be taken to mean ‘non-Western’ because in some African contexts, such as Sudan, Eurocentric discourses on identity and language operated precisely through what was promoted as ‘local’ (Abdelhay et al. 2016). As part of this complex of resources, writing is no longer considered a secondary mirror of speech but, rather, a discursive action with serious effects. The task here, then, is to understand how writing as a technology is exploited by colonial missionary linguists to create social semiotic boundaries that, through institutional acts of regimentation, are naturalised and thus converted into ‘natural facts’.

As we show in our analytic commentary on the (post-colonial) context of Sudan, the result of the colonial language-planning practices is that script choices are ideological because they implicate issues that are not necessarily purely ‘linguistic’ (or ‘informative’). The observation that the language–theology link is a product of a particular ideological enterprise of language is a case in point. Consequently, (post)colonial debates about orthography and script that are, in principle, debates about socio-political concerns articulated on the terrain of language have some roots in colonial language (educational) policies and practices. Colonial language-planning practices left a socio-linguistic infrastructure that is largely incorporated and integrated into the post-colonial systems of civil service and education in Africa (Bassiouney 2009).

In other words, in contexts of struggle, linguistic choices are converted into metadiscursive statements about spatial and cultural identities. As we see in the case of Sudan, an effect of the colonial missionary regime of language is that Latin script is readily and indexically correlated with Christianity and Western rationalism, while Arabic script is associated with Islam and Eastern traditionalism (Abdelhay, B. Makoni, S. Makoni and Mugaddam 2011). One of the consequences of these observations is that terms such as ‘vernacular’, ‘local language’, ‘indigenous language’ and ‘mother tongue’ are not part of the ‘natural order of things’ but, rather, are part of the ‘colonial order of things’. Methodologically, to understand the discourses on/about language in Africa, we need to inspect the ‘natural history’ (Silverstein and Urban 1996) of these discourses by integrating them into the wider socio-political universes within which they were constructed and through which they were naturalised.

In light of the above discussion, we organise our chapter into two sections. First, we consider British colonisation and its effects on Sudan’s linguistic contexts. Second, we consider Portuguese colonisation and the Brazilian linguistic contexts. We aim at problematising the concept of language in both colonial contexts, pointing out the political and ideological linguistic frameworks that underlie local language policy and planning.

In general terms, we conclude that the outcomes of a comparative perspective of colonial policies in Sudan and Brazil are the following: (i) while Sudan can be considered a highly divided country, a mosaic of constructed tribal units, Brazil has been invented as a fairly monolingual country; (ii) such realities are aligned to different colonial histories – while Sudan has gone through a process of independence from British politics, Brazil gained its independence at the beginning of the 19th century from Portuguese colonisation; (iii) British and Portuguese colonisations operated differently in terms of language policy; (iv) South America’s process of decolonisation should be seen in relation to several independence struggles that occurred in America in the 19th century, while Sudan’s independence should be seen in relation to a broader African movement in the 20th century; and (v) while slavery played a key role in Brazilian colonisation, linking Brazil and Africa in specific ways, in Sudan the invention of tribes and indigenous languages integrated a racial and colonial politics.

2. The British colonial linguistics and the villagisation of identities in Sudan

Sudan, like the rest of the nation states in Africa, was formed through various historical forces. One such force is the British colonial system of governance (nominally known as the Anglo-Egyptian rule or Condominium 1898–1956). In this section, we focus on the key British colonial linguistic practices in Sudan, paying special attention to the goal-oriented policies of inventing self-contained villagised and indigenous ethnolinguistic identities. The aim is to show how linguistics was implicated in the colonial production of racially enclosed tribal units in Sudan.

Post-independent language policies were deeply shaped by the British colonial discourses on language and subjectivity (Abdelhay et al. 2016; Sharkey 2008). The systematic British colonial division of the space that ‘enregistered’ (Agha 2007) specific forms of language with specific places was re-enacted through the very same post-colonial liberating policies that sought to undo this colonial regime of discursive governance. Through the brutal implementation of divide-and-rule policies, such as the 'Southern Policy' (officially declared in a 1930 memorandum), the British colonial system restructured the already-existing cultural geography into the 'South' and the 'North' as socio-political indices of polarised identities, with the 'indigenous' ethnolinguistic identities as the unmarked reference in southern Sudan. The following excerpt embodies the key goal of the colonial Southern Policy:

> The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon *indigenous* customs, traditional usage, and beliefs … Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is an essential feature of the general scheme it must not be forgotten that Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed, will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it were first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and adopted as the language of instruction in the schools could it fulfill the growing requirements of the future. The local vernaculars and English, on the other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other. (1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy, as cited in Abdel-Rahim 1965: 20–23, emphasis ours)

Before commenting on how the above policy was implemented, we should note that another British colonial policy in Sudan with the same goal (to construct anti-Arab-Islamic indigenous ethnolinguistic identities) is known as the 'Nuba Policy' and was embedded in a 1931 memorandum formulated by A. J. Gillan (then-Governor of Kordofan and later Civil Secretary) (for a detailed discussion, see Abdelhay 2010). The memorandum was titled 'Some Aspects of Nuba Administration'. The goal of this colonial policy was literally the invention of a 'Nuba race' as a self-contained entity. The following excerpt embodies this key goal of the colonial Nuba Policy:

> How many reasonably well informed outsiders are there who realise that there is no 'Nuba' tribe or race, but an as yet unknown number of entirely different stocks, of different cultures, religions and stages of civilisation, speaking perhaps as many as ten entirely different languages and some fifty dialects more or less mutually unintelligible? It is these factors that in broad outline constitute half the 'Nuba Problem' in as far as it concerns native administration and indigenous culture, the other half being their contiguity

> with the Arab. If we were dealing with one solid and separate pagan race there might still be a problem, but its solution would be comparatively simple and would not be urgent. We should only have to isolate it within a metaphorical wall and deal with it at our convenience. (Gillan 1931: 6)

What is worth noting here is that, as the above excerpt indicates, there was no ‘Nuba tribe or race’ in the way imagined by the British colonial system, and, thus, the task was to invent it, using the Western binary system of metaphorical imagination (urban versus tribal identities). Before the colonial policy intervention, there were cross-cultural interactions among the individuals and the groups in the area, and, thus, the boundaries were intersectionally fluid and dynamic. The above Nuba Policy was designed precisely to tribalise identities (anchoring identities to places), using the strategy of villagisation. The result would be, we contend, a colonially created version of multilingualism (urban Arabic-speaking Muslims versus tribal/indigenous pagan/Christian Nubas). The romanticising strategy of villagisation is formulated by Gillan (1931: 28) in the following terms:

> Instead of an enlarged town the present plan is to institute a Nuba village, or series of villages, within easy distance of the town, where the Nuba, whether permanently or temporarily, can live as far as possible under tribal conditions … I am convinced that villagisation rather than urbanisation is the policy to adopt.

Most important, the colonial education system was partly responsible for the implementation of this Nuba Policy of villagisation. In a ‘Memorandum on Educational Policy in the Nuba Pagan Area’, the Secretary for Education and Health, J. G. Matthew (cited in Gillan 1931: vi), stated more generally: “The wish of the Government is that Nubas should develop on their own lines and be assisted to build up self-contained racial or tribal units.” The missionaries’ educational practices also played a significant role in the implementation of the colonial Southern Policy. One powerful strategy here was the organisation of colonial conferences, such as the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, which intended to create ‘language groups’ in Southern Sudan. Through processes of codification, the linguistic resources in the southern part were developed and formalised by the Christian missionaries into clearly demarcated ‘proper languages’. Again, this effected an official image of linguistic pluralism or multilingualism as naturally demarcated homogeneities. The use of the language-planning instruments did not aim solely to improve communicative efficiency but, most importantly, to articulate by proxy extra-linguistic concerns embedded in the larger socio-political project of the colonial government (to divide the space along ethnic and theological lines).

The colonial regime of language systematically correlated Arabic with Islam, and, in effect, Arabic became indexically 'the' carrier of a dangerous discourse. The task orientation of the colonial Southern Policy in its discursive dimension was, thus, to stamp out Arabic from the southern region. A similar policy of cultural control was exercised in the North, where artificial tribal boundaries were constructed, and the tribal chiefs were allocated state powers, such as the collection of taxes. The product of these colonial policies was that the 'South' and the 'North' have become physically and ideologically self-contained social spaces, and the identities anchored to these spaces have become, in effect, particularly through post-colonial practices of social reproduction, part of the 'natural order of things'.

A few years before independence, however, the colonial regime changed its separatist policy and decided to reunite the now-perceived two antagonistic parts. The ideological seeds of one of the longest civil conflicts in Africa, however, had already been firmly planted, and the colonial discourse on 'villagised' and 'indigenous' languages and identities was later (re)appropriated in post-colonial policies and peace agreements.

Following independence, the central governments in the North tried to implement a monoglot ideology of normalisation to reverse the effects of the separatist colonial policies. Arabicisation and Islamisation of the South were the key features of this monoglot scheme, and the state's brutal violence was readily employed to silence the southern resistance (see Nyombe 1997). The north–south relations erupted into a fully-fledged armed conflict that was eventually ended by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005–2011 (CPA 2005), which is also famously known as the Naivasha Peace Agreement (as it is signed in Naivasha in Kenya). It is this peace accord that recognised the right of the Southerners to self-determination through a referendum. Most significantly, it deploys the epithet 'indigenous languages', which is intertextual with the British colonial discourse sketched above. The CPA contained a significant language policy that is known as Naivasha language policy (Abdelhay et al. 2011). This language policy stipulates (CPA 2005: 26–27):

> (1) All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, developed and promoted;
> (2) The Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan;

> (3) Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official working languages of National Government business and languages of instruction for higher education;
> (4) In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its level; and
> (5) The use of either language [Arabic or English] at any level of government or education shall not be discriminated against.

Notwithstanding the colonial cultural and political production of 'tribalised/villagised' identities in Sudan, it would be grossly misleading to imply that southern elites or resistance leaders bought into this colonial discourse on language and identity. For example, the late southern leader John Garang's post-colonial project of the 'New Sudan' was intended to dismantle these colonially inherited boundaries, which were blindly embraced as the basis of their cultural politics by a significant number of post-colonial governments:

> The history of the Sudanese people from time immemorial has been the struggle of the masses of the people against internal and external oppression. The oppressor has time and again employed various policies and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of our people, including the most notorious policy of 'divide and rule'. To this end the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners, Halfawin and the so-called Awlad et Balad who have hitherto wielded political power in Khartoum; while in the South, people have been politicized along tribal lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as 'Dinka Unity', 'Great Equatoria', 'Bari Speakers', 'Luo Unity' and so forth. The oppressor has also divided us into Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans. (Garang 1992: 19)

The first step taken by Garang (1992) toward (relative) emancipation from the domination of this (post)colonial discourse was to recognise that these 'homogenised identities' are a product of the historical order of things: we are a product of history and not nature.

3. African-Brazilian Portuguese as a political invention

In this chapter, we avoid reproducing the ideological concepts of languages as compartmentalised, fragmented, labelled and hierarchical units; rather, we assume the conception of language as a political and historical invention (Errington 2008; Irvine 2008; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Phillipson 1992; Severo and Makoni 2015). Such a political and critical perspective aims at problematising both colonial and modern linguistics' 'politics of truth' (Foucault 1977) by resisting the 'compartmentalisation principle' (Harris 1984), which includes avoiding the reproduction of certain concepts of language, such as the mother language, second language, foreign language and language proficiency, among others. Such concepts are reinforced by ideological ideas, such as the commoditisation of languages, which feed the economic industry of language teaching and testing (Duchêne and Heller 2011), language as natural national flags (Rajagopalan 2013) and the belief in a direct two-way relationship between language and identity (Severo and Makoni 2015).

We recognise that the process of Africanisation of Western languages, by inventing such categories as African-American English or African-Brazilian Portuguese, are ideologically and discursively constituted and, therefore, should be submitted to ongoing review and critical inquiries. We argue that a cross-Atlantic invention of African languages does not necessarily have to correspond with either historical or contemporary descriptions of African languages. (Makoni and Pennycook 2005: 152).

Brazil is a former Portuguese colony and a member of the Community of *Portuguese* Speaking Countries (CPLP), along with Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor and others. The Portuguese empire created interconnectedness among different geopolitical contexts, mainly Brazil and African countries. These associations were facilitated by a colonial landscape shaped, to a large extent, by language, religion and the military. The relationship between Brazil and Africa can be analysed from the following perspectives: (i) the politics of slavery in the colonial era, between the 16th and 19th centuries; (ii) the religious invention of 'Christian-lects' by Jesuits (Severo and Makoni 2015); and (iii) the modern and nationalistic politics that invented Brazilian Portuguese as different from European Portuguese, mainly from the 19th century onwards. Such aspects, which are discussed below, contributed to the invention of African-Brazilian Portuguese.

The politics of slavery was a defining feature of Portuguese colonial practice: "Portugal was the first European nation to initiate slavery in Africa, and was the last to abolish it" (Lobban 1995: 25). By way of example, the current estimate of the historical presence of Africans in Brazil is that, between 1550 and 1855, four million enslaved Africans were brought in from different regions, such as Guinea and Costa de Mina in the 16th century, and Congo and Angola in the 17th and 18th centuries. Brazil became the largest destination, outside Africa, of Africans in the colonial era. Linguists classify populations brought to Brazil into two large 'ethnolinguistic groups': the Sudanese from West Africa, and the Bantu from equatorial and tropical Africa.

When comparing Catholic missionary work in Brazil with that in African countries, some important differences can be noticed. In Brazil, the relationship established between the Jesuits and the so-called indigenous people and the African people was different, as the Church condemned indigenous slavery but validated, for economic reasons, African enslavement: "African slavery was approved for reasons of subsistence of the mission"[2] (Hoornaert, Azzi, Der Grijp and Brod 1983: 259). The enslaved African people under control of the missionaries were called 'dos Santos' (Saints), a surname that became common in Brazil, although a few Jesuits, such as Luís do Grã, disapproved of African slavery (Sá 2007). We notice a colonial hierarchical system that classified indigenous groups as different from Africans in Brazil. Whereas the former were capable of being 'civilised' and 'Christianised', the latter had their 'enslaved condition' justified by the rhetorical construction of slavery as a consequence of original sin.

Such rhetoric, together with other elements, helped to construct an image of black African people as coin-men:

> The noun 'Black' is the name given to the product resulting from the process by which people of African cultures are transformed into living minerals … the plantation in the New World is the place of its smelting, and Europe, the place of its conversion into currency.[3] (Mbembe 2014: 78)

Christianity and slavery were deeply connected, as only enslaved Africans who had become Christians could be sold and only Christians could acquire them: "The Church in Angola derived much of its income by instructing and baptizing the enslaved" (Isichei 1995: 71). Antonio Vieira, a famous Jesuit in Brazil in the 17th century, gave several sermons that justified African slavery of black people:

> "Christ naked, and you naked; Christ starving, and you hungry; Christ completely mistreated, and you as well. The irons, the prisons, the lashes, the wounds, the offensive names - all these elements make part of your

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[2] *"a escravidão africana foi aprovada por motivos de subsistência da missão."*

[3] *"O substantivo 'Negro' é depois o nome que se dá ao produto resultante do processo pelo qual as pessoas de origem africana são transformadas em mineral vivo ... a plantação no Novo Mundo é o lugar de sua fundição, e a Europa, o lugar de sua conversão em moeda."*

> imitation, which, if accompanied by patience, will also bring the merit of the martyrdom" (Vieira 1958: 261–262).[4]

The extent to which the Portuguese religion contributed to the invention of languages can be exemplified by the first Bible translation to Portuguese in Africa and the first book written in a Bantu language by a Portuguese priest in Brazil in 1642 (Spencer 1974). In addition, "By 1957 there were probably between 8,000 and 10,000 missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, in Sub-Sahara Africa … Perhaps fifty to sixty percent of missionaries in Africa can claim some competence in an African language" (Welmers 1974: 192–193). The contact between Christian missionaries and the so-called indigenous and African peoples in colonial Brazil and Africa produced the emergence of 'Christian-lects' (Severo and Makoni 2015), a set of linguistic discourses and instruments that were used as a mechanism of domination by framing people and languages in specific ways, inventing and naming local languages, inventing ethnolinguistic categories that overlapped ethnicity and language using literacy as a framework to define what counts as language, and translating several Christian discourses to 'local' languages that, in turn, helped to frame the 'local' in specific ways (Irvine and Gal 2000; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Phillipson 1992). Currently, missionaries' interest in languages is evident in the description, analysis, writing and teaching of languages, as we can notice in the intense work of Bible translation to 'local' languages by the Summer Institute of Linguistics.

The contemporary linguistic discourse reinforces African-Brazilian Portuguese as a fragmentary conception of language in which pieces of languages, such as lexicon, syntax and prosodic elements, shape a shredded language. African-Brazilian Portuguese, from a linguistic perspective, would be the result of an 'irregular process of acquisition' of Portuguese by Africans (Lucchesi, Baxter and Ribeiro 2009). We problematise the framework of 'languages in contact', as it reproduces the Eurocentric concept of compartmentalised languages. We argue that the Creolist perspective, widely used as a framework to explain the colonial languages, is not neutral but, rather, produces ideological effects on the way that 'local' languages have been framed since the colonial era. Curiously, linguist Hugo Schuchardt (1842–1927) used Portuguese colonial contact with 'local languages' to frame the Creolist perspective.

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[4] *"Cristo despido, e vós despidos; Cristo sem comer, e vós famintos; Cristo em tudo maltratado, e vós maltratados em tudo. Os ferros, as prisões, os açoites, as chagas, os nomes afrontosos, de tudo isso se compõe a vossa imitação, que, se for acompanhada de paciência, também terá merecimento de martírio."*

The creation of modern Brazil started in the mid-19th century, when independence from Portugal took place. Several Brazilian intellectuals, who had studied in Portugal, helped to create the idea of a Brazilian nation. Nation and nationalism are discursively invented, as stated by Said (1989: 221): “Nationalism, resurgent or new, fastens on narratives for structuring, assimilating, or excluding one or another version of history.” In Brazil, nationalism constructed specific discourses on the role played by African languages and discourses by bringing together several elements, such as the ideas of Brazilianness, Afro-Brazilianness, regionalism, oral culture, popular culture, rurality and illiteracy. We argue that the historical invention of African-Brazilian Portuguese is related to how discourses on Africa and African people were politically shaped in Brazil, reinforcing and naturalising the asymmetrical and racist as well as excluding power relations in Brazilian society. Some examples of power relations include:

(i) the idea of Brazil being a racial democracy as a result of *Lusotropicalism*, an ideological explication given by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freire (1933) for Brazilian identity formation that would have included the harmonic fusion/miscegenation of the Portuguese and Africans originating the *Mestizo*; in linguistic terms, ‘African-Brazilian Portuguese’ would reproduce the ideological perspective of fusion and miscegenation, erasing important power relations that involve different symbolic worlds;

(ii) the emergence of dialectology as a way of framing Brazilian linguistic diversity in the 19th century by accommodating linguistic and discursive diversity into a national discourse. Language difference would be labelled as ‘linguistic regionalism’. Such discourse submitted African languages and discourses to regional interpretation that worked under a national umbrella (Severo 2015). Dialectology helped to regionalise languages by overlapping geography and language. It is not by chance that dialectology was at the service of legitimation and delimitation of national boundaries: “The 19th century saw the triumph of the nation-state, on the one hand, and the establishment of the dialect geography, on the other” (Auer 2002: 4);

(iii) the construction of a framework that considers African linguistic influences in Brazilian Portuguese from the perspective of ‘popular tradition’. Several intellectuals, inscribed into the Modernist Brazilian Movement, proposed the influence of African rhythm, beat, dance and prosody into Brazilian music and orality. Mario de Andrade, a famous Brazilian Modernist (1891–1945), proposed that Brazilian music “comes from strange sources: the Amerindian in small percentage; the African in a much larger percentage; the Portuguese in vast percentage"[5] (Andrade 1928: 7). The idea of a miscegenated cultural and racial society would reverberate into a miscegenated musical expression. In 1932, anthropologist and psychiatrist Nina Rodrigues published the book *Os Africanos no Brasil* (Africans in Brazil) in 1932, in which he describes the structural linguistic influence of African languages, Yoruba and Bantu, on Brazilian Portuguese. Rodrigues also mentions the African rhythm of these languages and uses a linguistic perspective that divides languages into pieces and codifies them into a script model, reinforcing the 'politics of orthography' (Irvine 2008). We argue that 'popular culture' and 'folklore' are discursive and political constructions that must be contextualised socio-historically (Canclini 2008; Hall 1996). In general, the concept of popular culture, on the one hand, is linked to political projects that seek to assimilate the 'people' within discourses of government and control and, on the other hand, is taken as a sign of ideological struggles and tensions; and

(iv) the modern Brazilian linguistics that has operated with two broad and polarised categories to define Portuguese language in Brazil: popular Portuguese (Vernacular Portuguese, which includes African-Brazilian Portuguese) and Standard Portuguese. This apparently dichotomous view has sometimes been represented by a more fluid one, in which, at one end, there is rural African-Brazilian Portuguese and, at the other end, urban Standard Portuguese. Between these two extremes are rural dialects and non-standard urban speeches (Petter and Oliveira 2011). The categories of rurality and urbanity, instead of regionalism, become central to the definition of what counts as African-Brazilian Portuguese in contemporary discourses. An example of the complicated relationship between rurality and orality versus urbanity and literacy is the political role that literacy plays in reinforcing colonial categories. The Brazilian census of 2010 shows that the highest rate of illiteracy is located in north-east Brazil, especially in rural areas, where a heterogeneous group of people live and which includes *quilombolas*, field workers, farmers, extractivists, landless fishermen and people of the forest; among these groups, the elderly, black and 'indigenous' women stand out with the lowest literacy rates (Peres 2011).

We argue that the ideology of literacy helps to ratify a negative social representation of local people as well as validates differentiation between urban and rural. If, for example, we consider *quilombola* communities, which were constituted as a result of political struggles of former enslaved African people in Brazil to legitimise lands and gain the freedom to exercise their practices, values and beliefs (Leite 2000), the illiteracy rate helps to label communicative practices as discredited, especially in the face of a state whose administrative machinery is based on writing. Writing is effectively a ‘technology of power’ (Foucault 1977). In addition, the invention of African-Brazilian Portuguese as a rural and isolated variety of Portuguese helps to reinforce the complicated myth of authenticity, a political discourse invented and reinforced by intellectuals and political agents, as what is considered authentic may vary if we consider the local perspective (Makoni and Meinhof 2004).

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[5] *"provém de fontes estranhas: a ameríndia em porcentagem pequena; a africana em porcentagem bem maior; a portuguesa em porcentagem vasta."*

Finally, by understanding the complex way that African experiences were historically and politically framed by several official and institutional discourses in Brazil, we may problematise power relations inscribed into miscegenated and creolised discourses. We agree with Hall (1996: 225) that: “The ways in which black people, black experiences, were positioned and subjected in the dominant regimes of representation were the effects of a critical exercise of cultural power and normalisation”. In this sense, we claim for a critical perspective of language that allows us to destabilise the ‘limits of the right to govern’ (Foucault 1977).

4. Final remarks

The aim of this chapter was to highlight the political and social importance of a critical perspective toward the relationship between colonial experience and language policy by showing how language in colonised contexts works as an arena of ideological and material struggles, such as in the cases of Sudan and Brazil. In both cases, language viewed as a self-enclosed system of communication is a historical invention that helped to shape power relations through a politics of division, classification, hierarchisation and differentiation. There are points of convergence and difference between the Portuguese and the British colonial systems in Brazil and Sudan, respectively. In both cases, language is cued with a monoglot function to create local ethnic identities to achieve extra-linguistic ends. For example, both the Portuguese and the British systems of colonial control constructed ‘local’ ethnolinguistic identities through the processes of Africanisation and villagisation in contrast to the Western forms of identity (in Brazil) and Arabic language and Islam (in Sudan).

Again, in both cases, the colonial regimes used ‘language’ as a geopolitical discursive strategy of ‘divide into blocks and rule’. Brazilian Portuguese was created as distinct from Portuguese proper and it was converted into a diacritic of a particular Africanised identity. A similar observation obtains in the case of Sudan where the British colonial policy was intended to invent a ‘pure’ Nuba race or uncontaminated southern identities (pure and uncontaminated by the effects of Islam and Arabic). In both cases, ideas of north, south, literacy, urbanity, rurality and tribalism are political ideas that, under the linguistic umbrella of Arabic, English or African-Brazilian Portuguese, helped to reinforce power relations, social asymmetry and social injustice.

However, there are points of difference between the two forms of colonial systems of domination. In the case of Brazil, the whole state was imagined as a single, homogeneous and stable socio-linguistic space, whereas in Sudan, the objective was to produce multiple homogeneities (tribal units). Unlike the British colonial practice in Sudan, slavery was the defining motive and feature of the Portuguese colonial rule. In an increasing context of global relations and intercultural encounters, we claim that the field of language policy and, importantly, its researchers should be sensitive to such issues, helping to avoid reproducing colonial ideologies and practices.

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CHAPTER TEN

POST-COLONIAL LANGUAGE EDUCATION OR COLONIALITY OF LANGUAGE BY STEALTH?

FINEX NDHLOVU

1. Introduction

Regardless of domain – whether education/educational linguistics, media, business and law, and so on – language policy always necessarily implicates several issues that are economic, political, cultural and developmental. For this reason, we need to approach the discourse and praxis of language policy in a manner that recognises and integrates all these separate, but intricately connected, disciplinary perspectives. In another sense, we need to draw on a much wider battery of critical, reflective and more progressive views on languages and language policies that not only question but also proffer viable alternatives to canonical models of language policy and planning regimes. This chapter seeks to add new theorisation to conversations on post-colonial African language policies, which is one of the themes of this edited volume. It brings to light those intricate linkages between language policy-making, the interests of politics, and exigencies of fashioning linguistic and cultural uniformity in the midst of diversity. The argument is that while language policies are generally designed with good intentions, they also have a darker side. They often result in unintended consequences, such as the social, economic and political exclusion or marginalisation of speakers of language varieties that do not fit within the straightjacket of normative language policy regimes. As James W. Tollefson (1991) observed, planning language is, *ipso facto*, planning inequality.

The language policy enterprise in post-colonial Africa, and in many other parts of the world that historically were colonial outposts, still proceeds from homogenising standard language ideological frameworks (Ndhlovu 2015b). Most, if not all, such standard languages currently considered as mother tongues or home languages of students in educational settings are, in fact, colonial impositions that were and continue to be embraced by post-colonial African regimes. I call this 'coloniality of language by stealth', a concept I use as a summary term for describing the ways that colonially invented versions of languages continue to be used as a technology of political control, manipulation and subtle cultural normalisation. This view on language has its roots in colonial modernity, where colonial administrators, aided by early Christian missionaries, embarked on projects of inventing particular identities for native populations that were subsequently conflated with standard African national languages (Ranger 1985; Makoni 1998; Brutt-Griffler 2006; Chimhundu 1992; Ndhlovu 2006). The process is still ongoing throughout post-colonial Africa, largely being perpetuated through medium of instruction and language education policies that are built around colonially-invented languages.

In discussing contending issues emanating from this legacy of colonial ways of seeing language, the focus is on the dark side of language policy in African contexts. The relation between the Global North and the Global South is problematized by drawing on the idea of coloniality of language. The overall intention is to deploy the analytical framework of decoloniality in fresh and arresting ways that might help us see what we couldn't – or wouldn't – see before in the domain of language education policy.

The chapter brings a critical discussion on post-colonial African language policies, by questioning how contemporary celebratory discourses of diversity – multilingualism, multilingual education, multilingual language policy, additive bilingual education and so on – still reverberate colonial ideologies. Examples are from South Africa and Zimbabwe, with some passing remarks on other comparable countries from the Global South. In line with Ndhlovu and Kamusella (2018), I conclude by suggesting a broadening of the horizon of our conceptualisation of language policies by integrating Southern and decolonial perspectives that draw attention to *real* language practices of *real* people in *real* life. The goal is to push the envelope beyond the 'norm' of named languages as invented, imposed and controlled by colonialists, and now continued by post-colonial regimes.

2. On coloniality of language

The concept of 'coloniality' originates from the decolonial school of thought. This is a social-theoretical framework pioneered by Latin American and other like-minded thinkers from the Global South, including Walter D. Mignolo (2000, 2002, 2011); Anibal Quijano (1998, 2000); Ramón Grosfoguel (2005, 2006); and Enrique Dussel (1995), among others. It questions the monopoly and universalising tendencies of epistemologies from the Global North and calls for the recognition and mainstreaming of other knowledges and ways of engaging with knowledges. Decolonial theorists, therefore, criticise both the intellectual distortions of Western modernity and the concrete oppression brought by 500 years of colonial domination. Banazak and Ceja (2010: 115) explain the concept of 'coloniality' (which must be clearly distinguished from that of 'colonialism') in the following terms:

> When they use the term 'colonialism' decolonial thinkers are referring to a form of political domination with corresponding institutions; [and] when they use the term 'coloniality' they are referring to something more important for them, a pattern of comprehensive and deep-reaching power spread throughout the world. In other words, colonialism has been one of the historical experiences constitutive of coloniality; but coloniality is not exhausted in colonialism, as it includes many other experiences and manifestations, which still operate in the present.

The important point here is this: even when the formal process of colonisation has come to an end, there still remains a form of power (coloniality) which produces, uses and legitimises differences between societies and forms of knowledge. An additional pertinent point is that although decolonial theory is more broadly associated with scholars from post-colonial societies, the focus of coloniality is in many ways different from that of post-colonial studies. While post-colonial studies have always sought to problematise colonialism as a historical event, coloniality takes a much broader focus that problematises colonial power as a continuum that transcends the colonial era and whose presence continues to influence and affect current social realities, including discourses on language, language education and language policy regimes.

One leading decolonial theorist, Anibal Quijano (2000, 2007) provides a taxonomy of 'coloniality' as consisting of four strands, namely: 'coloniality of power', 'coloniality of knowledge', 'coloniality of being' and 'coloniality of nature'. I add to this list the concept of 'coloniality of language', which I use as an explanatory paradigm for how notions of language and language policy regimes in post-colonial Africa still remain colonial. I argue that mainstream models of language education – multilingual education, mother tongue education, additive bilingual education – that are widely celebrated in post-apartheid South Africa exemplify the subtle manifestation of 'coloniality of language'. All languages of South Africa accorded official or national language status are semiotic social inventions that serve the colonial purpose of invisibilising other language practices. As was the case during the colonial/apartheid era, those languages that are recognised in bi-/multilingual education programmes inadvertently obscure underlying social and educational inequalities.

It is apparent that the same colonially invented versions of languages are being celebrated as bastions of socio-linguistic justice and equity in the domain of language and literacy education. What a classic and colossal example of history repeating itself! It is now well known that during the colonial and apartheid periods, standard 'African languages', also known as vernacular languages, were invented and then deployed toward socio-cultural and political engineering processes that produced skewed versions of local native/indigenous identities (Ranger 1989; Chimhundu 1992; Brutt-Griffler 2006). It is here that the notion of 'coloniality of language' becomes clearly relevant as it reveals in unequivocal terms that there is really nothing new, novel or progressive about current bi-/multilingual or additive bilingual education policies that rest on colonially invented conceptions of language, culture and identity.

What this analysis aims to show is that models of language education in post-colonial Africa thrive on fallacies and misconceptions about the nature and roles of different varieties of language in society – that is, these beliefs are sustained and justified by false assumptions about what certain languages can and cannot be used for in educational and other applied social policy settings. In their critique of the popularisation of the concept of 'additive bilingualism' in educational contexts, Makoni and Pennycook (2007) note what they see as a disconcerting similarity between monolingualism and additive bilingualism in so far as both are founded on notions of language as an 'object'. It is precisely for this reason that we continue to witness hierarchisation of languages in multilingual societies as much as in monolingual ones (Ndhlovu 2013, 2015b). It is also for this reason that in spite of having a 'multilingual' national language policy framework that prescribes 11 official languages, the entire South African education system continues to be mediated exclusively in English.

The problem with South Africa's multilingual language policy and other similar policies around the world is that they focus on the wrong things while turning a blind eye to those things that, in my view, matter most, namely the diversity of language practices. Conceptually, the standard versions of languages that are currently considered to be the official languages of South Africa (IsiZulu, IsiXhosa, SiSwati, IsiNdebele, Sepedi, Sesotho, Chivhenda, Xitsonga, Setswana, English and Afrikaans) are modernist versions of languages that were embraced by both the apartheid and post-apartheid political systems for purposes of building social cohesion, political control, manipulation and cultural normalisation (Ndhlovu 2015a).

Therefore, apart from simply broadening the number of official languages-with-names, there are no concrete theoretical and practical contributions that post-colonial/post-apartheid language education policies bring to the African multilingualism debate. This is because such languages continue to be conceived and imagined as countable ontological objects, the only difference being that this is now happening in the post-colonial era under the watchful eyes of equally hegemonic African political elites. The entire project amounts to repetition without difference insofar as it is bereft of original and innovative thinking about 'languages' beyond the colonially inherited ideologies of language. The current constitution of bi-/multilingual education models and their *modus operandi* in post-colonial African countries are founded on this premise.

African post-colonial language education policies are pre-eminently reinforcement and carryover from where the colonial language-based social engineering processes left. In other words, while the objective of promoting standardised language forms during the colonial period was "marketed as a program of enhancing administrative convenience, the same process is now being popularized as part of a response to the exigencies of 'globalisation', 'progress' and 'modernization' [whatever these mean] in the context of the post-colonial dispensation. However, the common denominator in both cases is that of control, manipulation", subtle cultural oppression and, indeed, coloniality of language by stealth (Ndhlovu 2009: 144).

This rather uncritical embrace of colonial language ideologies (i.e. that language exists in standard monolithic form) and the almost cultic celebration at the altar of colonial ideologies of language (i.e. that language is there to be used as a tool for cultural normalisation) is an instantiation of what I call 'coloniality of language'. Three crucial questions invoked by this scenario follow: (1) Are there no philosophies of or about language other than those inherited from the Global North?; (2) If they are indeed absent, why are we not able to develop some?; and (3) Why do scholars, governments and social policy experts from the Global South always choose the easy route of adopting those language ideologies and theoretical frameworks originating from the Global North? I address these and other related questions in subsequent sections of this chapter.

3. Language policy-making as coloniality of language

Regarding the dangers of embracing and imposing some kind of linguistic uniformity on culturally diverse societies, Thompson (1991) cautions that a completely homogeneous language or speech community does not exist in reality: it is an idealisation of a particular set of linguistic practices that have emerged historically and have certain social conditions of existence. This idealisation is the source of what Pierre Bourdieu (1991) calls “the illusion of linguistic communism”. As Thompson (1991) further points out, by taking a particular set of linguistic practices as a normative model of correct usage, an illusion of a common language is produced that ignores the social-historical conditions that established a particular set of linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate. “This dominant and legitimate language, this victorious language, is what is commonly taken for granted” (Thompson 1991: 5). Therefore, the “idealised language or speech community is an object that has been pre-constructed by a set of social-historical conditions endowing it with the status of the sole legitimate or ‘official’ language of a particular community” (Thompson 1991: 5).

Most introductory socio-linguistics textbooks have shied away from looking at language and language policies using these critical lenses that bring to light the pitfalls of idealised standard languages. From the pioneering work of Einar Haugen (1972), Joshua Fishman (1968), Charles Ferguson (1959), Ralph Fasold (1984, 1990), Richard Hudson (1996), Ronald Wardaugh (2002) and Bernard Spolsky (1998) to the more recent studies by Florian Coulmas (2013), Janet Holmes (2013) and Enam Al-wer (2011), one can see consistent accounts of canonical models of language policies steeped in a rather uncritical glorification of normative language standards. The dominant theme in most of these socio-linguistic textbooks is one of a step-by-step explanation of typologies of language policies in different regions of the world. What is lacking, though, is a very strong and robust critique of the phenomenology of ‘language objects’, and how they are products of complex ideological processes that empower and disempower different sections of society in equal measure.

While some of these pioneering and more recent studies are critical of the ways in which national language policies sometimes legitimise the social, economic and political disadvantages faced by ethnolinguistic minorities, they have, unfortunately, done so in ways that inadvertently entrench such inequalities. In particular, mainstream socio-linguistics studies have been heavily influenced by Joshua Fishman’s (1972) typological models of language policies, which are said to correspond to particular types of societies.

Fishman identifies three types of language policy. First is the *modal approach*, which applies to societies that are said to have no overarching linguistic, sociocultural or political past; that is, societies with no “widely accepted and visibly implemented belief and behavior system of indigenously validated greatness” (Fishman 1972: 194). The language policy option for these society types is said to be one in which a language of widest communication is selected as a national or official language. Second is the *unimodal approach*, which is said to apply in societies that have long-established socio-cultural unities with well-established political boundaries (Garcìa and Schiffman 2006: 38). In this case, a single indigenous or indigenised language is selected as the national language. The *multimodal approach* is third. It is said to pertain to societies that have multiple conflicting or competing 'Great Traditions', thus making it imperative for the nations to aspire to a supra-nationalist goal by developing a language policy that accommodates all competing regional/sub-national identities. Under this model, the outcome is a multilingual language policy regime consisting of regional official languages and a language of widest communication.

All three typologies described above clearly indicate that language policies are products of a "set of deliberate activities systematically designed to organize and develop the language resources of the community" (Fishman 1973: 24) – otherwise known as language planning. An important point missed by such approaches is that they take for granted the object (language) that is subjected to such planning and policy activities. While Fishman's model is part of the established global orthodoxy in language policies, it betrays the pitfalls of standard language ideological thinking, which has become the subject of recent scholarly criticism. Fishman's typological model seems to gloss over the theoretical and empirical questions on the distinction between 'language as an object' and 'language as capacity', or way of communication. The work of scholars – such as Roy Harris (1987, 1998, 1999, 2006, George Wolf and Nigel Love (1992), and Michael Toolan (1999) – who all argue for an integrationist theory of language and (socio)linguistics, has long demonstrated the unhelpfulness of looking at 'language' as an ontological object – or something that can be subjected to processes of planning and policy-making in unproblematic ways.

Current approaches to language policy-making in post-colonial African countries can be explained in terms of their hegemonic intentions as follows. First, language policies sometimes wrongly consign languages and their associated cultural identities into bifurcated categories of 'superior' and 'inferior', 'useful' and 'less useful', and 'important' and 'unimportant'. This breeds all sorts of injustices, inequities and exclusions, as the fortunes of ethnolinguistic groups and individuals within them become indexically tied to those of the languages they speak (Ndhlovu 2015a). In multi-ethnic and multilingual African contexts, language policies can determine who has access to schools, who has opportunities for economic advancement, who participates in political decisions, who has access to governmental services and who gets treated fairly by governmental agencies (Brown and Ganguly 2003). Language policies can determine who gets ahead and who gets left behind. Language policies do, indeed, affect the prospects for ethnic success – for both ethnic groups and the individuals in these groups. Politics, economics, community development, advocacy activities and active participation in all other aspects of life will always remain elusive for the majority as long as they are conducted in languages other than those spoken and easily understood by all sections of society, both local and trans-local. The prevailing conditions in most African countries are such that active citizenship participation and national political deliberations are mediated mainly in standard national and official languages, such as isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, Tshivenda, Sesotho, isiNdebele, ChiShona, Chinyanja, Portuguese, English and Afrikaans (among others). This is exclusionary. For example, participatory democracy requires that the deliberations of legislators be conducted and communicated in languages understood by and accessible to all citizens, including those labelled as minority ethnolinguistic groups.

The second problem about language policies is that they have traditionally proceeded along the route of what has come to be known as the ‘standard language ideology’. *Language ideologies* are beliefs that we hold about what constitutes language. Our responses to the question of ‘What is language?’ explicitly or implicitly betray our language ideologies. On the other hand, the related concept of *ideologies about language* refers to beliefs that we hold about what language is for, or why we need language (Milroy 2001; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Our responses to the question of ‘What are languages used for?’ betray our ideologies about language. Both language ideologies and ideologies about language are cultural representations – whether explicit or implicit – of the intersection of language and human beings in a social world. They link language to identity, power, aesthetics, morality and epistemology – and, indeed, to just about everything else we do in life. Ideologies and beliefs about language are also deeply rooted in personal biographies, and in political and educational contexts (Shohamy 2009). Through such linkages, language ideologies and ideologies about language underpin not only linguistic form and use, but also significant social institutions and fundamental notions of person and community (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Language ideologies and ideologies about language proceed from, and are shaped by, what Walter Mignolo (2000) calls “locus of enunciation”; that is, our point of departure in looking at the world and everything in it, including how we conceptualise things called ‘languages’.

The locus of enunciation of the ‘standard language ideology’ derives from what Makoni and Pennycook (2007: 143) call the “census ideology”. Founded on the dual notion of both ‘languages’ and speakers of those languages being amenable to counting, the census ideology masks the differences in the ways the objects called ‘languages’ have been conceptualised. Makoni and Pennycook (2007: 143) note that “it has been widely attested that there is massive disparity between the number of languages that linguists believe exist [the etic or outsider’s view] and the number of languages that people report themselves as speaking [the emic or insider’s view]”.

The origins of both the standard language ideology and the census ideology of language can be traced back to the emergence of Western modernity. This is tied to the fatalistic claims about universalism and global standards of just about everything that constitutes the modern world system. Standard language ideologies can, therefore be said to be part of a global system of hegemony and hierarchies of humanity, whereby the meanings and ideas about languages and what they are meant to do are shaped by dominant modernist worldviews that tend toward universality and uniformity. In his critique of modernist Euro-American epistemological paradigms and their apparent totalising approaches to the interpretation of social reality, Anibal Quijano (2007: 168) cautions:

> It is essential that we continue to investigate and debate the implications of the epistemological paradigm of the relation between the whole and its parts as this relates to socio-historical existence. Eurocentrism has led virtually the whole world to accept the idea that within a totality, the whole has absolute determinant primacy over all of the parts, and that therefore there is one and only one logic that governs behaviour of the whole and all of the parts. The possible variants in the movement of the parts are secondary, as they do not affect the whole and are recognized as particularities within the general rule or logic of the whole to which they belong.

This quotation captures clearly the homogenising ideology behind standard language forms, often erroneously considered to be constituted by mutually intelligible dialects. Within current imaginings and understandings of post-colonial African cultural identities, all other language forms are and continue to be considered as constituent parts of standard languages. This is a problematic view that stems from modernist ideological thinking about languages. It misses the crucial point that there is no universal concept of language – every cultural group has its own understanding of what constitutes a language. Therefore, the major problem with dominant and universalising theories of language policy, and language and identity, is in their desire to speak for everyone else; yet, beneath such pretentions is the tendency to want to gate-keep and monopolise the domain of knowledge production, theory formation and conceptualising the universe. It is this fallacy that this article questions and challenges in relation to language policies, languages, and their associated political and cultural identities in post-colonial Africa.

Following the rise of standard language ideological frameworks from the Global North, meta-discursive regimes have been constructed to describe languages with significant implications for both ‘language’ (as a general capacity) and ‘languages’ (as entities). This means that although it is acknowledged that all humans have language, the way in which both senses of language are understood is constructed through a particular ideological lens that excludes other ways of thinking. These are non-linguistic imperatives that form the basis of language scientists’ analyses and evaluations of languages.

In this vein, Makoni and Pennycook (2007) have sought to debunk, in particular, the standard language ideology that underpins dominant understandings of languages, language policies and the discourses that sustain them by pointing out that linguistics does not need to postulate the existence of (standard) languages as part of its theoretical apparatus. They suggest that “linguistics needs to become the study of how people communicate rather than the scientific study of language … It becomes human linguistics rather than a linguistics of language” (Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 19). Their overall argument is that the dominant ways of talking about languages (meta-discursive regimes) are part of a process of epistemic (or epistemological) violence that was visited on the speakers of different language forms that were suppressed through modernist and colonial invention and imposition of standard languages.

‘Epistemic violence’ is a crucial concept that aligns with the notion of coloniality of language introduced in this paper. It captures the ways in which the standard language ideology has been applied to the systematic obliteration of other conceptualisations of languages and their associated cultural identities through processes of language policy and planning. As I have argued, the notion of language is more complex and broader than is currently suggested by standard language ideological frameworks. Definitions of language should encompass any or all of the following: dialect continua, cultural practices and identities, discursive practices, traditions, customs, social relationships, connections to the land and nature, religion, spirituality, worldviews and philosophies, proverbial lore, and so on (Ndhlovu 2013, 2015a). In other words, the concept of language does not have to refer to a noun only; it can be an action word or even a describing word – and all these imperatives should be taken into account when formulating language education policies.

But mainstream language policies seeking to promote additive bilingualism, for example, are founded upon a very specific view of language; a view that takes languages to be 'entities' which, when accessed, will then be beneficial to the speakers. In this regard, additive bilingualism and multilingualism must also be understood as particular ways of thinking about language.

In an edited volume, aptly titled *Dangerous Multilingualism*, Blommaert, Leppänen, Pahta, Virkkula and Räisänen (2012) discuss key themes expressed by the most recent and burgeoning body of socio-linguistics scholarship critical of the 'endangering' nature of mainstream conceptualisations of bilingualism and multilingualism. Pitting the modernist notions of 'order' against 'disorder', 'purity' against 'impurity', and 'normality' against 'abnormality', Blommaert et al. (2012: 18) argue that the older tradition of socio-linguistic theorisation saw "problems with multilingualism … as problems of (dis)order, and the solutions that emerged out of such analyses rarely brought real benefit to the multilingual subjects to whom they were addressed. The reason for this failure was that sociolinguists of that era tended to overlook the complexity of the phenomenology of multilingualism-on-the-ground". Blommaert et al. advise that we need to start with our "feet on the ground from a strong awareness that the phenomenology of language in society has changed, has become more complex and less predictable than we thought it was. We have the advantage over earlier generations of being able to draw on a far more sophisticated battery of sociolinguistic insights and understandings" (2012: 18).

Taking a cue from these insights, I argue that, in its current iteration, the notion of multilingualism and how it is incorporated in language policy frameworks is, indeed, a very dangerous one because it hides more than it reveals. Some of the things that are hidden by seemingly progressive multilingualism discourses include: (i) that the process of enumerating multiple monolithic 'language' objects is underpinned by principles of the standard ideology; and (ii) that like other similar (post)modernist notions – emancipation, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, universalism and globalisation – the mainstream conception of multilingualism is part of the global imperial designs constituting ideological leanings of elite researchers and those in power bent on keeping certain groups out of their areas of interaction (Makoni 2012). In what I think is the most candid critique of the misleading and disingenuous nature of ideologies that inform mainstream understandings of multilingualism, Makoni (2012: 192-193) argues that:

> [Multilingualism] contains a powerful sense of social romanticism, creating an illusion of equality in a highly asymmetrical world, particularly in contexts characterized by a search for homogenization …

A close look at the epistemological architecture of multilingualism in applied settings (such as multilingual education and multilingual national language policies) reveals that this concept reinforces social class hegemony and privilege by masking endemic inequalities, narrow forms of ethnonationalism, and xenophobia.

4. Conclusion: Way forward

The primary goals of any meaningful form of education include those of meeting the learning needs and aspirations of individuals; addressing the development needs of society; contributing to the creation, sharing and evaluation of knowledge; and contributing towards the development of enlightened, responsible and constructively critical citizens (Department of Education 1997). Therefore, in our attempts to mitigate the pervasive effects of the monolingual mindset (Clyne 2005; Gogolin 1994, 2002) that is prevalent in language classrooms, we need to first of all get the policy settings right. That is, we need to adopt language education policies that are sensitive to the diversity of cultures and language profiles that students bring into the classroom. International research reports on language education policy are replete with case studies on how learners can easily accomplish academic tasks collaboratively when encouraged to draw from multiple linguistic and literacy practices. See, for example, the work of Baker (1996) and Creese and Blackledge (2008) for eloquent theorisation and documentation of hybrid multilingual education practices as well as their benefits. With specific reference to the Australian context, Michael Clyne (2008: 361) has suggested that:

> A way of beating the monolingual mindset might be to have in decision making roles people who were brought up bilingually or who have acquired a high level of bilingualism through the education system, sometimes complemented by travel and/or exposure to other languages in Australia.

In making this recommendation Clyne also cautions that the possibility of beating the ‘monolingual mindset’ will almost remain a far cry because any such efforts are “largely undermined by the present generation of decision makers obsessed with a monolingual mindset” (2008: 361). This is, indeed, a legitimate concern. However, I would add that what is even more worrisome is the obsession with a narrow and monolingual view of language that we find among both the decision makers and the academic community. As I have indicated above, the real substance of the matter is not necessarily about embracing multiple pre-given 'language' objects. Rather, I see the solution to the challenges besetting language education as being located at the sites of policy makers' and academic experts' epistemological and conceptual imaginings of language.

While the desire to have more bilingual or multilingual decision makers is an enviable aspirational goal, the question still remains: What is it that these people will be accommodating in their mindsets? If they only have exposure to multiple named and enumerable things called 'languages', then there is a very slim chance that their decisions will make any difference at all. What these decision makers need to have is openness and capacity to embrace and formulate language policies that recognise the diversity of language practices, including those communicative practices of Southern communities that fall outside the narrow orbit of standard language ideological frameworks. A foundational principle of Southern perspective on language education is one about its discourse systems that are "inherently transdisciplinary, multilingual and multicultural. The choice and use of methods are wide-ranging and eclectic …" (Shi-xu 2014: 362); grounded in local cultural contexts yet still open to global disciplinary dialogue as a way "to achieve or maintain harmonious relationship with others through attending to others' interests, incorporating differences, avoiding conflicts, balancing powers, etc" (Shi-xu 2014: 364). These are all useful insights of Southern epistemologies that are in short supply in the hegemonic Northern discourses that currently mediate language education policies.

The African philosophy of Ubuntu (meaning 'I am because you are') (Mbigi and Maree 1997) is one example of a Southern perspective that can help both to broaden the understandings of what counts as language and education, and to simultaneously push back the frontiers of coloniality that are currently embedded in mainstream language education policies. Ubuntu is holistic in its inspirations and emphasises the need to harness the social experiences and worldviews of African people and align them with successful conceptual frameworks from other parts of the world (Ndhlovu 2019). In other words, Ubuntu does not believe in itself as the only way. Instead, it is an approach that is motivated by the desire to establish rapprochement among the multiple ways in which different societies and civilisations read and interpret the world – including the multiple language practices that ought to have a place in educational policy frameworks.

A significant part of Southern perspectives on language and social policy-making is one about recognising and embracing culturally relevant modes of engaging communities that we serve as educators. Southern perspectives are devoted to finding connections, points of confluence, and opportunities for transfer of methods, pedagogies and concepts, not only among members of academic communities, but also between them and the non-communities they serve. A major goal is to develop alternative ways for meeting the practical educational needs of individuals and communities – in ways that mitigate the limitations of conventional approaches such as the interventionist top-down Northern paradigms that tend to overlook the centrality of local community actors. This is about forging collaborative teaching and research agendas with non-academic communities as equal partners, whereby education practitioners and policy makers are willing to learn at the feet of community leaders, women, the youth, refugees, migrants – the subaltern so to speak – by listening to their stories, and using such stories to generate concept notes that will inform language education policies. Such an approach is in line with the 'decolonial turn', a trend pursued mainly (but not exclusively) by Latin American, African and other like-minded social scientists from both the Global South and the Global North.

The coloniality of language thesis advanced in this chapter stresses the interdisciplinary and unifying potential of decolonial epistemology, and in particular its applied interests in relation to the cultural mediators of language education policy. It calls for pluralisation of knowledge production processes in globally inclusive ways that require us to seriously consider contextual particularities and the multi-dimensional character of educational practices in different societal contexts. This is about integrating praxis, theory, action and reflection in ways that provoke revolutionary thinking about the roles of knowledge and knowledge production in social transformation (Chilisa 2011; Smith 2012).

Deploying the analytical framework of 'coloniality of language' holds the promise for overcoming challenges besetting language education policies in post-colonial African contexts. The insights of coloniality of language draw our attention to what Benson (2014) calls a multilingual habitus, which is the direct opposite of a monolingual habitus. A multilingual habitus makes "the language(s) of teaching and learning explicit" (Benson 2014: 293) through the development of appropriate methods, materials and assessments that reflect the social and cultural realities of learners and the communities to which they belong.

Benson (2014) explicates the characteristic features and benefits of a multilingual habitus as follows. First, it allows for the negotiation of language(s) of literacy and interaction among classroom participants. Second, it allows for the design of learning goals and their assessments in terms of the quality and usefulness of competences that learners bring to the classroom context, or what others have called ‘funds of knowledge’ (McIntyre, Rosebery and González 2001). Third, it provides opportunities for building on children’s knowledges and experiences. Fourth, it exposes learners to dominant forms of language at developmentally appropriate levels. Fifth, it promotes the development of metalinguistic awareness among both teachers and learners as an integral part of language learning. And lastly, while a multilingual habitus values the use of dominant language materials as necessary, it also strongly encourages scaffolding meaning and using methods and other language types appropriate to the learners’ needs and experiences. These approaches of the multilingual habitus rely on and promote the use of both fixed and fluid linguistic resources in language education.

When put together, the two notions of coloniality of language and multilingual habitus help us see students’ ‘funds of knowledge’. This is about harnessing the totality of linguistic resources, communication codes and cultures of learning, and deploying them towards language teaching in multilingual classrooms. Therefore, if we are to successfully circumvent standard language ideologies that underpin current language education policies, we need to revisit those colonial imperatives of language that have usurped and monopolised the domain of language education with the view to opening up spaces for the recognition of alternative, especially Southern, conceptualisations. This is the most important step that we need to take before we can try to address methodological questions around language teaching, language and social justice, and language and citizenship participation, and so on.

To summarise, this chapter has extended further the promises held by alternative conceptualisations of languages to push the boundaries of the field of educational linguistics. The argument is that language policy and planning research needs to focus not only on the political contexts in which it operates, but also on the nature of the concepts of language that underpin the different options – to question not only the realpolitik, but also the reallinguistik of the 20th century, which appears to be still ensconced in 21st-century academic debates and conversations around this topic. Therefore, when language education policy is seen through the lens of coloniality of language, it should apply a transactive approach to language use whereby language is viewed as an ongoing process of social transaction rather than an institution. As Khubchandani (1997: 37) posits, this will enable us to recognise the “synergic network of plurilingual language use as a means to inspire trust in cross-cultural settings”. In looking at language from this angle, the intention is to highlight the various ways by which students can find richness and strength out of their linguistic capabilities, which will ultimately see them reach their full potential and achieve educational outcomes beneficial to themselves and their communities.

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