



Deleuze and Guattari's
Philosophy of
'Becoming-Revolutionary'

Raniel S.M. Reyes

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*For Gino, Nhie,
and all the victims of the COVID-19 pandemic*

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FOREWORD

The Latin noun *revolūtiō*, from which the term “revolution” came from, entails the act of “turning back” or “rolling back.” A revolution presupposes temporality, for a revolution is a “course,” that is, a “movement” through time. To be more precise, as a movement, a revolution implies the complete turning around of something—for instance, the earth’s movement around the sun upon which we measure a year. Understanding the temporality of revolution allows us to also shed light on another relative term, “event.” The term also comes from Latin, specifically *evinere* (*ex + venire*) meaning “to result from” or “to come out from.” Therefore, an event is an “outcome” and can only occur through the course of time. So, both revolution and event presuppose time as movement. While we usually regard a revolution as a “big event” because it radically alters a given social or political landscape, it is something that, nevertheless, happens *only after* a series of smaller historical moments have come to pass. An event, in this context, is the moment when a revolution comes full circle; however, it only occurs after the fact.

But while a revolution as event presupposes the temporal, and I say dialectical, aggregation of smaller historical moments, we should not unwittingly construe it as a finished product or a final *telos*. The political notion of revolution points to another *telos*—freedom. I believe that this is the universal motivation for any philosophy of revolution. In order to understand freedom as the *telos* of revolution, which is at the same time its normative basis, it will benefit us if we expatiate on it from the point of view of “small politics,” rather than “big politics.” It is important that we understand the amorphous character of the idea of freedom, and so while it is the normative basis for a theory of revolution, freedom itself averts any grand narrative of political theory. I believe that Raniel S.M. Reyes’ *Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of ‘Becoming-Revolutionary’* points us towards that direction.

Reyes offers a timely treatise on the philosophical idea of revolution. By patiently presenting a nuanced reconstruction of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s ontology, Reyes narrates to us the possibility of understanding revolution from the point of view of small politics, that is, micropolitics. Through micropolitics, the temporality of revolution as political praxis is underscored. Presented as a political ontology, the optics

of micropolitics shifts from mainstream (macro) social and political spheres to the singularity of subterranean and unlikely locations as potent spaces for political praxis. In this sense, the possibility of a revolution, normatively based on a vague notion of freedom, is brought about by temporal, albeit non-sequential, moments. This means that the “micro” moments of micropolitics come from different directions and in various degrees of intensity and commitment—in other words, they come together rhizomically. These micro spheres are spaces where we could imagine our utopias, our vague ideas of a good life, in the sense of Ernst Bloch. “Becoming-revolutionary,” Reyes adumbrates, “involves the schizophrenization of oedipalized desire in the individual, familial, societal, and cyber spectrums.” From these spaces of “desire” we begin to build a sense of hope for something better, the obverse of which is described by Reyes as capitalism. It is in this sense that the revolution is still to come.

Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of ‘Becoming-Revolutionary’ is one but also many or many singularities in one: an assemblage of moments. It is a thorough introduction to the main philosophical ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, a necessary moment in Reyes’ attempt to articulate a micropolitics. Arguably, one could read his interpretation of “schizoanalysis” as a critical theory based on the aforementioned vague notion of freedom. For after all, any critical theory is normatively grounded in the abolition of social injustice. As Reyes puts it, “becoming-revolutionary advocates the cultivation of new subjectivities and relations irreducible to the repressive, protean, and gaseous frontiers of Empire.”

Ultimately, Reyes’ book is an original reading of Deleuzo-Guattarian political theory, for this type of political theory is often accused of a lack of political or ethical commitment. Reyes attempts to remedy this seeming deficit in interpretation by presenting micropolitics as a critical theory. Thanks to Reyes, the emancipative potential of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy is placed at the center stage. Reyes’ interpretation radicalizes the notion of revolution, as the concept of “becoming-revolutionary” presents revolution not as a *telos* but an image of thought, in the Deleuzian/Nietzschean sense, that counters ideology and sustains our continuous (for after all a revolution is a rolling back) imagination of freedom.

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- “The Revolutionary Spinoza: Immanence, Ethology, and the Politics of Desire.” *Kritike: An On-line Journal in Philosophy* 11, no. 1 (June 2017): 197–217.
- “Becoming-Democratic as Becoming-Revolutionary.” *Kritike: An On-line Journal in Philosophy* 12, no. 3 (April 2019 – Special Issue): 68–95.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Gilles Deleuze (cited by page number)

<i>PS</i>	<i>Proust and Signs</i>
<i>NT</i>	“Nomad Thought”
<i>NP</i>	<i>Nietzsche and Philosophy</i>
<i>S</i>	<i>Spinoza: Practical Philosophy</i>
<i>B</i>	<i>Bergsonism</i>
<i>C1</i>	<i>Cinema 1: Movement-Image</i>
<i>C2</i>	<i>Cinema 2: The Time-Image</i>
<i>ES</i>	<i>Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature</i>
<i>EP</i>	<i>Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza</i>
<i>LS</i>	<i>The Logic of Sense</i>
<i>DR</i>	<i>Difference and Repetition</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>Negotiations</i>
<i>OLM</i>	“One Less Manifesto”
<i>ECC</i>	<i>Essays Critical and Clinical</i>
<i>PI</i>	<i>Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life</i>
<i>FB</i>	<i>Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation</i>
<i>TRM</i>	<i>Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995</i>
<i>WG</i>	<i>What is Grounding?</i>

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (cited by page number)

<i>AO</i>	<i>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i>
<i>K</i>	<i>Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature</i>
<i>ATP</i>	<i>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>What is Philosophy?</i>

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (cited by page number)

<i>D</i>	<i>Dialogues II</i>
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INTRODUCTION

Revolution is a perennial companion of life's immanent dynamism and humanity's capacity to transform the world. It has been appropriated and misappropriated by people for political, economic, religious, and scientific reasons, and it has been actualized in different epistemic planes such as geography, aesthetics, and mass media. From a conventional political stance, revolution aspires to overthrow a tyrannical system, a dominating party, and a rogue country. Furthermore, past revolutions were more ideological and class-based, launched by certain colonized, oppressed, and marginalized subjectivities against cruelty and hegemony.

Notwithstanding a large number of social factors and nuances, the overarching *telos* of most revolutionary actions is freedom. Its fervent desire to undermine obsolete traditions and abolish unjust structures is guided by an earnest attempt to listen to people's voices—a gesture that contributes to consensus-building and reform. To achieve these liberating ends, individuals of varying principles, especially in the past, resorted to vehement upheavals after exhausting all deliberative options. From the perspective of Marxist intellectuals, for instance, the annihilation of capitalist exploitation calls for radical action. The communist leader, Mao Tse Tung, aptly summarizes this point: “A revolution ... cannot be so refined ... and magnanimous. A revolution is ... an act of violence by which one class overthrows another” (Tse Tung 1927). However, we are witnesses to the so-called miscarriage of Marxism. The failure of Marxism is engendered by the failure of the so-called followers of Marx to put into fruition the original vision of Marx, that is, the achievement of social justice via the ultimate abolition of societal classes. Instead, the once radical praxis has converted into a degenerated political conservatism, which resulted not in social transformation, but rather in the stagnation of history.¹ This form of political conservatism is a dangerous ideology because it exists in the name of Marx; but in reality, it is the ultimate bastardization of Marx's original concern for the plight of the oppressed. In connection to this, Hannah Arendt argues in *On Revolution* that, “Only where this *pathos* of novelty ... is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution. But violence is no more adequate to describe ... revolution than change ... in the sense of a new beginning ... of a new body politics, where

the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution” (Arendt 1965, 27–28).

This debate between violent and reformist kinds of struggle is also characteristic of history and politics. As such, the concept of revolution is integrally intertwined with the *telos* of nationhood. In the context of Philippine political history, for example, it is profoundly informed by an ardent opposition to a colonial ‘other’ such as Spain and the United States of America. In this vein, revolution has become a great and persistent concern for Filipino consciousness. But the passionate quest for nationalism was desecrated by recurrent contradictions inherent in Philippine history itself. In the 1896 revolution, a huge 38th parallel existed between those revolutionaries privileging radical action and those endorsing peaceful reforms.² This difference in approach was aggravated by the social participants’ paucity in military resources and intelligence, personal tensions between revolutionaries, and connivance with the oppressors.³

At this juncture, a caveat must be mentioned. It is beyond the scope of this book to argue which is the better procedure for a revolution. In fact, past radical actions are still captives of political representation and teleology. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, however, revolution is a praxis that would not force a classless society or the reemergence of previous revolutions, if the materialities of the immanent field of life are still plagued by descending life-typologies, fascist principles, and arborescent relations.

Despite the promise of past successful revolutions, a repetition of their identities is already impossible. This is the reason why this unenlightened practice engenders us to misrecognize new struggles’ distinctive attributes and potentials for novel terrains of thinking. Similarly, the mediocre clamor for the repetition of the old paves the way for oligarchs and opportunists, to name a few, to strengthen their fortresses and manipulate people’s historical consciousness. If ever we would desire the repetition of any past struggle, it should be a yearning to repeat the power of difference (*DR* 41) that produced it and an aspiration for incessant self-critique.

At present, revolution has drastically transfigured its rhetoric, intensities, and scope by virtue of the dialectics of history and the world, as well as the contingencies of the human condition. In the light of globalization, revolution transcends the traditional boundaries of nation, society, and state. As the world is miniaturized by such enormous technological breakthroughs such as the World Wide Web, people who were divided by language, race, and culture are now enunciating more fluid relations with the rest. In this vein, any form of regional or local resistance

inevitably bears a global dimension. Of course, the pragmatics fostered by these developments is similarly matched by threats such as terrorism and environmental catastrophes.

In the realm of contemporary social movements, past local uprisings against an exploitative state, imperialistic policies, and neoliberalism, to name a few, currently assume worldwide constellations. Today's revolution is constitutive of a hybridity of voices, affects, and subjectivities. Similar to the Occupy Movement, revolutionary resistance now is rhizomic, nonteleological, and is characterized by different initiatives across the globe. Additionally, it is prosecuted by an assemblage of subjectivities, which is performed in various geographies and fueled by variegated causes.⁴ However, the radical attributes and possibilities offered by these movements are always hunted by life-denying possibilities that include the reactive return to debased practices, the voluntary submission to exploitation, and the fortification of the very nemesis these activities seek to subvert. One of the most notable contributions of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the fields of Continental philosophy in general, and French Critical Theory in particular, is the critical analysis of contemporary forms of societal predicaments and antagonism through the lens of schizoanalysis and the principle of becoming-minoritarian, to name a few.

A. The Contemporary French Micropolitical Tradition

The aftermath of World War II and France's Liberation had a profound effect on the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Felix Guattari. The 1960s marked a point in France's history when the socio-political climate of the time was ripe and provided a concrete condition for the development of ideas of young philosophers.⁵ These young thinkers made waves by relating their critique of metaphysics, science, and history to the socio-political climate—which resulted in philosophical currents such as postmodernism and poststructuralism.⁶ In the sphere of politics, any political theory that aims for the unitary justification of political governance, performance of societal diagnosis, and critical opposition was cast to doubt. Theorists therefore were inclined to alternative conceptions of political resistance.

Against the grain of politics as a normative theory, Foucault casts his attention to the “specificity of the mechanisms of power.”⁷ In his major works, especially *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, he demonstrates how institutions such as prisons, schools, and hospitals convert into disciplinary devices of control and subjugation. Foucault and Deleuze are kindred spirits principally in relation to their socio-political

struggles and critical approaches to modern life. Paul Patton claims that most of Deleuze's political-activist engagements involve common causes with Foucault in the 1970s, such as his participation in the Prisoner's Information Group formed by Foucault, Daniel Defert, and other intellectuals in the early parts of 1971, including Deleuze's integral role in the campaign later that year expressing support for immigrant workers and against racism.⁸

For Foucault, the possibility of the existence of a societal Leviathan is arbitrary because power in the contemporary condition is no longer in closed spaces but is dispersed in the body politic.⁹ As such, the state's invincible grip on people is enfeebled because the configurations of power are not anymore derived from an overarching concept. For this reason, power now originates from the periphery, and it is exercised in innumerable nodes.¹⁰ He claims that power already operates in pockets and is "employed and exercised through a net-like organization ... individuals circulate between its threads" (Foucault 1980a, 98). As the singular expression of sovereignty turns problematic, the dispersion of power in various coordinates causes amplified and more pluralistic atomizations. This novel kind of technology of power renders control and domination more subtly yet progressively detrimental and generalized in the entire society.¹¹

Foucault believes that the lack of a nerve center of monarchical power in the contemporary epoch causes power-relations to be transmitted and deployed in web-like manner perpetually. This novel social configuration likewise allows power to surmount the restraining boundaries of philosophical anthropocentrism because it puts a premium on the instruments of its scattered expressions and practices of positioning in the body politic.¹² In his view, power relations are derived from the support that forces relation, which includes both human and nonhuman materialities (Foucault 1980b, 92). This eventuality is engendered by what he calls the swarming of different disciplinary mechanisms transfigured from the local exercise of forces within the confines of a particular institution into extensive constellations of power. This social fluidity is also present in the conceptualization of 'assemblage'—a dynamic principle evasive to the governance of any transcendental *eidōs*. It comprises the collection of matter-flows such as affects and bodies regulated by web-like processes of historical configuration (*ATP* 406). A corollary principle to assemblage is the Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization of micropolitics or the minoritarian logic of production. As opposed to macropolitics, micropolitics is based on heterogeneous investments and local connections. Whereas the former functions in rhizomic fashion, the latter operates in hierarchical relations.

Foucault's micropolitics is directed to the local expressions of power and subjugation in our everyday lives.¹³ In this political template, the individual is portrayed as an agent of subversion and transformation, and not simply as an after-effect of the configuration of forces or as objects of power and exploitation in society. The individual's role is likewise not only to subvert values encompassing domination, but also to reconstruct the epistemological underpinnings governing relations of power. This brand of genealogical critique against essentialist knowledge-formations and principles that fossilize truth and power is likewise one of the fundamental pillars of Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.¹⁴

Deleuze's reconstruction of Nietzsche is an experimentation and radicalization of our thinking and language.¹⁵ It promotes a minoritarian reading of the text, that is, without reference to any preconceived essence.¹⁶ As a result, everything becomes fragmentary, dynamic, and relational. Furthermore, the Deleuzian typological reading of nihilism is rooted from Nietzsche's principle of genealogy. This new philosophy is a critique of the value of values (*NP* 1). Specifically, it assesses whether values differentially originated from noble and base or ascending and descending typologies. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze writes:

Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values. Genealogy is opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference ... in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in the origin (*NP* 2).

Genealogical critique is a form of evaluation and an active expression of a mode of existence or creation. In other words, in genealogy's aptitude of evaluation lies its ability to create. Genealogy's endorsement of the invention of new concepts and possibilities of life (*NP* 101) serves as a philosophical blueprint of Deleuze's (in collaboration with Guattari) genealogical critique of capitalism and Oedipus. In *Anti-Oedipus*, they explicate that these oppressive phenomena are products of socio-historical configurations and contingencies; that is why, they can be critically diagnosed and undermined.

Further, Derrida joins Foucault in what is called a 'generation.'¹⁷ Deleuze and Derrida's contribution to the French Postwar scholarship weights upon their efforts to revive Nietzsche's philosophy of difference. Their philosophies seek to invert Platonic metaphysics and reevaluate the

Hegelian dialectical philosophy because of their nihilistic and teleological underpinnings.¹⁸

Furthermore, Derrida conceives that the goal of his philosophy of difference or what is famously known as ‘deconstruction,’ is no longer the achievement of absolute truth. Rather, it is the deconstruction of dogmatic structures plaguing the present so as to open up the passage to the ‘other’ (Derrida 1992, 341). In the Deleuzo-Guattarian parlance, the trajectory toward the other entails a philosophy of the future¹⁹ or a virtual philosophy—a term borrowed from Bergson.²⁰ In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida delineates that his deconstructive appraisal aspires to assume niftily the form of a Marxist critique to radicalize the present in pursuit of a “movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming,” (Derrida 1994, 16) which, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian terrain, refers to a future philosophy capable of inventing untimely concepts and revolutionizing people’s reactive thoughts and practices.

Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction assumes the role of a democracy-to-come in diagnosing the contemporary society.²¹ Essentially, this form of democracy does not provide universal guides that will engender the achievement of an ideal democratic society. Rather, it critically diagnoses traditional democracy based on the concepts of absolute sovereignty and the androcentric tradition. This reformulated brand of democracy maintains a close affinity with Deleuze and Guattari’s principle of becoming-democracy²² in the sense that it analyzes the tensions immanent in our understanding and practices of democracy, justice, governance, and the like toward an absolute future of pure becoming.²³

Becoming-democracy maintains a critical stance on conventional democratic practices and popular opinions, as well as its violence to the human condition.²⁴ Ultimately, it exemplifies the principle of becoming-revolutionary via its critical diagnosis of different capitalist and democratic codifications in society. Such mode of resistance fuels philosophy’s political vocation—the creation of concepts capable of radicalizing the grain toward a people- and world-to-come.

Foucault and Deleuze are contemporary fellow-questors by virtue of their respective formulations of immanent critique, micropolitics, sympathy to nonhuman materialities or mechanisms, and repudiation of any macrorevolutionary transformation. However, what I think remains unexplored is the micropolitical analysis of the dynamics of psychic and social oppression from the perspective not of power, but of desire (desiring-production). Deleuze’s philosophy attempts to diagnose and subvert all kinds of exploitations or fascism in social classes, institutions, and organizations of political government at the subterranean domains of

sensibility, affect, and allegiance.²⁵ In Derrida's case, despite his philosophy's radical critique of identity and projection to the horizon of the other, it is bankrupt of any elaborate explanation about the mapping of a subjectivity of the future and a world open to nonhuman materialities. The critical study of oppression (social and individual) using desiring-production, the analysis of society through micropolitics, and the receptivity to the nonhuman, are the important themes Deleuze investigated and problematized in collaboration with Guattari.

B. The Deleuzo-Guattarian Connection

From Foucault's micropolitics and Derrida's differential philosophy, let us now turn to the historico-philosophical encounter between Deleuze and Guattari—against the backdrop of the May 1968 event and the succeeding predicaments that occurred in the French society.²⁶ Prior to Deleuze and Guattari's encounter in the summer of 1969, their lives and careers were divergent from each other. The former just completed his Doctorat D'Etat, whose major thesis serves as the content of *Difference and Repetition*.²⁷ Meanwhile, the latter, is an organic individual educated by his immersion into the life outside the university walls. He is neither an academic nor a philosophico-literary scholar. Whereas the former was a famous academician known for authoring phenomenal books such as *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, the latter was a recognized radical psychoanalyst and activist.²⁸ Negri profoundly describes his experience with the opposite personalities of Deleuze and Guattari in *Negri on Negri*: “We talked about many things, but I couldn't tell him that I was depressed, that I was tired, that I had problems.... It was difficult to explain to him what was happening in Italy. With Felix I could. Very soon we began to come up with ideas together—and not only from the theoretical point of view” (Negri 2004, 46). As a footnote to Negri's divergent experience with Deleuze and Guattari, scholars claim that Deleuze and Guattari's relationship is comparable to that of a wasp and an orchid. In fact, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain this form of relation and becoming:

Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a

capture of code, surplus-value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp (*ATP* 10).

Their encounter, which initially lacked any historical necessity, was made possible by Jean-Pierre Muyard, a psychoanalyst practitioner at the La Borde Clinic—whose goal is to formulate and provide radically novel brands of care capable of differentiating various institutions.²⁹

What Deleuze lacks is relatively what is excessive in Guattari—his creative capacity to organize people and collective action, as well as his experience with the socially and psychologically deranged individuals. In fact, in 1969, Muyard wanted to moderate Guattari's enthusiasm and militancy in and outside the clinic. Muyard thought that teaching Guattari how to write would mitigate his radical fervor. This plan only materialized upon Guattari's meeting with Deleuze. In their first meeting, their pathways immediately converged in variegated ways. Whereas philosophy was radically criticized by structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Guattari was marginalized by Lacan himself as his interlocutor.³⁰ Deleuze's encounter with Guattari then provided an avenue for the former to articulate his response against these critics. Meanwhile, the latter's perennial plan to critically engage with Lacan's Oedipal triangulation and the reductionism-of-signifier thesis strengthened upon meeting Deleuze. Guattari's critique of Oedipal triangulation or psychoanalytic familialism was affirmed by Deleuze.

Deleuze and Guattari's first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, *Anti-Oedipus* attests to the creativity that stays in-between their collaboration. Their first experimental book granted what Deleuze really wanted to do aside from *Difference and Repetition*. According to him, "The time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy the way it has been done for so long.... This search for a new means of philosophical expression begun by Nietzsche must be pursued today with respect to the renewal of certain other arts" (*DR* xxi).

Deleuze and Guattari's creative experimentation with language has transformed the writer 'Kafka' into a paramount figure of becoming-minoritarian, the biological concept 'rhizome' into a political principle, and the geographic term 'cartography' into a revolutionary activity, to name few. Inspired by Nietzschean philosophy, among others, Deleuze and Guattari's project was fueled by the goal to abolish the frontiers of the 'old image of thought' toward the 'new image of thought' (*NP* 91).

Furthermore, various scholars claim that the philosophical encounter of Deleuze and Guattari during the revolutionary ferment of the 1970s was a significant turning point in both thinkers' career. On the one

hand, Guattari's antipsychiatric thinking was deepened by his encounter with an alternative philosophical tradition consisting of maverick philosophers, namely Hume, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Bergson.³¹ On the other, Deleuze's philosophy of difference was contextualized and harnessed upon its immersion with the theoretico-institutional struggles in French psychoanalysis and psychiatry, as well as with the political turmoil surrounding students' and workers' movements in France (and in the entire Europe). The creative conjunction of their ideas and experiences transfigures their project into an assemblage of philosophy, politics, and psychiatry. The concepts 'schizophrenia' and 'paranoia,' for instance, are then comprehended as products of historico-political materialities. In this manner, these forms of psychic repression are perceived as by-products of social oppression. Moreover, their collaborative scholarship expands the Deleuzian critical diagnosis of philosophy to a critique of the social and political aspects of discourse, subjectivity, and organizations. As such, they view the May 1968 phenomenon not merely as a commonplace political protest, but a "becoming breaking through history" (*N* 153). It is because this event ardently challenges the standard concepts of conventional psychoanalysis, party politics, social movements, and intellectual scholarship, whose configurations all revolve around the identitarian notion of the rational human subject.

The basic foundation of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is incomplete without the conjunction of the May 1968 event with their critical diagnosis of structuralism, psychoanalysis, and Marxism.³² All these historico-philosophical components are conceived based on a history of struggles where disturbances or fissures are evaluated to craft new perspectives of life and reality, which is neither unifying nor totalizing (*ATP* 292). Influenced by Marx, Deleuze and Guattari incorporate into psychoanalysis the socio-historical materialities of Marxism in shaping behavior of individuals. In turn, Marxism is likewise reconfigured through its dialectical relation to Freudian psychoanalysis (including Lacanian psychoanalysis). They bridge the gap between political economy (Marxism) and libidinal economy (psychoanalysis) through the problematic of desire. Specifically, they transform the pathologization of desire into both a psychiatric and a socio-historical question through the conceptualization of desiring-production.

The radical historicization of psychoanalysis is paramount in contextualizing psychoanalysis and capitalism. The creative effort of capitalism to separate libido from labor-power is strengthened by psychoanalysis. In other words, the attempt to harmonize psychoanalysis and libidinal economy actualizes as a device to undermine the former's

fortification of capitalism. The seemingly infallible frontier and surreptitious operation of capitalism is one of the principal objects that their project, popularly known as schizoanalysis, seeks to confront by disclosing its paralogs, systemic oppression, and socio-historical orientation. More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari's merging of psychoanalysis (libido) and Marxism (labor-power) envisions to search for the 'unconscious libidinal investment' capable of deterritorializing the exploitative citadel of advanced capitalism while maximizing its immanent revolutionary potentiality.³³

Despite the belligerency of *Anti-Oedipus*, the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia, A Thousand Plateaus*, received a higher acclaim. Whereas the former is characterized by sophisticated arguments against Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, traditional Marxism, and fascism, the latter is constitutive of abstemious discussions on a wide range of topics understood as plateaus. The apparent restrained language of the second book is a moderation of the radical fervor of the first, which is more historical than intentional. It is historical because the 1975 oil crisis in France abolished the people's hope for a grand societal reconfiguration. Likewise, the concerns of *A Thousand Plateaus* are not limited to the predicaments of the French society or Europe; the book also tackles primitive societies, geology, music, nomadology, and the like.

Inspired by Nietzsche, one of the tacit goals of *A Thousand Plateaus* is the undermining of all metaphysical codifications and arboreal structures in the history of thought (not only of philosophy) through the principle of the rhizome. Such a concept substitutes desire as the new image of thought. Guattari's noble appreciation of Kafka's scholarship provided an excellent supplementary resource to Deleuze and Guattari's dynamic and creative collaboration. Eventually, they wrote a new book espousing a micropolitics of literature: *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*.

Before the publication of Deleuze and Guattari's last collaborative work, *What is Philosophy?*, a hiatus occurred between their philosophical engagement. This temporary distance was necessary for them to rethink everything they learned from their transversal encounter. The former came up with his book on cinema, while the latter returned to his previous comfort zone—activism. However, this brief break did more harm to Guattari than to Deleuze. The former, as Dosse describes, "once again suffered from a sense of absence, of void, of isolation and solitude" (Dosse 2010, 14).

Indeed, the encounter between Deleuze and Guattari, which fundamentally fuses the horizons of philosophy and materialist psychiatry, has also spawned the intersections of politics, arts, cultural studies, and the like. This is the why the claim that Deleuze's philosophy is apolitical is

problematic or baseless. Deleuze's philosophico-political imagination was shaped by "the enthusiasm and naiveté of the Liberation" (*PS* 15). As a university professor in 1968, he joined the fuming crowd known as the 1968 French Student Revolt. Henceforward, this radical demonstration, among other factors, magnified the politico-revolutionary import of the overall endeavor, which he shared with Guattari. Nevertheless, this idea was not wholeheartedly accepted by some contemporary thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek. In *Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences*, Žižek considers Deleuze to be more of an *avant garde* than a political writer. Žižek writes, "It is crucial to note that not a single *one* of Deleuze's own texts is in any way directly political: Deleuze 'in himself' is a highly elitist author, indifferent toward politics."³⁴ Žižek views the 1968 revolution as the principal cause of the decay of morals, authority, and class consciousness in the French society (Adolphs and Karakayali 2007). For him, an emancipatory pedagogy and politics cannot be derived from this molecular struggle through the loss of universal values; for this reason, a universal nihilism necessitates the construction of a total emancipatory project. However, a universal thrust to overcome nihilism, fascism, or capitalism overlooks the micropolitical existence of these problems. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari assert that "those who evaluated things in macropolitical terms understood nothing of the event, because something unaccountable was escaping" (*ATP* 238).

Furthermore, other scholars argue that Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of the political vocation of philosophy as the perpetual creation of novel concepts is an inchoate, if not insufficient, basis for a political philosophy. This allegation only makes sense from the perspective of traditional or normative politics. Under such a political template, a macropolitical theory of a state and revolution, which is present in the works of Plato, Rousseau, and Machiavelli, is being championed.³⁵ However, Deleuze and Guattari's entire scholarship was conceptualized and developed as a form of micropolitics. As a critical counterpart of micropolitics, micropolitics focuses on the molecularization of desiring-production, as well as the heterogeneous and local relations. It is in this respect that I agree with Patton's claim about the possibility of a Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy. In *Deleuze and the Political*, he opines that the aforementioned political philosophy diverges from the traditional political framework in the sense that political concerns such as the best form of government and the nature of democracy, are absent from their project. Patton maintains, "Deleuze and Guattari discuss society and politics in terms of machinic assemblages, becomings ... forms of capture and processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization" (Patton 2000, 1).

Inspired by Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy, the Occupy Movement presents one of the best concretizations of micropolitical resistance at present. The movement epitomizes an unrelenting struggle geared to radically confront the dehumanizing effects of global capitalism and political representation.³⁶ Different from past revolutionary activities, it does not adhere to traditional political principles and praxes. The alternatives posed by demonstrators are unorthodox in nature to elude the totalizing hands of politicians and capitalists.³⁷

In terms of historical influence, the Occupy Movement owes its existence to the Alter-Globalization Movement principally because of the latter's proposal for horizontal relationships, direct democratic practices, and multifronted struggle—famously organized by the Zapatistas of Brazil.³⁸ Beneath the movement's theoretical indebtedness to the Anti-Globalization struggle is a deeper foundation derivable from Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy in general, and revolutionary philosophy in particular.³⁹

Of course, a critique of the capitalist system is incomplete without reference to the works of Karl Marx. When Deleuze was interviewed two years before he passed away in 1995 about his affinity with the Communist Party, he stated that he only became a Marxist after coming across Marx's literature in the 1960s (*N* 169). However, notwithstanding the action-theoretic relevance of Marx's philosophy in Deleuze, as well as in Guattari's scholarship, Deleuze and Guattari's critical distance with Marxism did not vanish. In *Anti-Oedipus*, for example, they critically reconstructed Marx's theory of political economy in conjunction with Freud and Lacan's psychoanalysis.

In the contemporary period, capital has survived the collapse of grand narratives in Western philosophy and has reconstructed its relation of production into an immanent system and force capable of configuring its own territory, limit, and overcoming.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari undermine the underlying Hegelian-Marxist belief that history is a form of an organism capable of fashioning its own self-destruction and healing, and a picture of a universal history and emancipation. They repudiate the codifications of history-as-organism toward the formulation of a history of nomadic movements and becomings (*ATP* 30).

C. Overview of the Book

This book seeks to reconstruct Deleuze and Guattari's micropolitics toward a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. Of course, this is not the first book on Deleuze and Guattari's politics. My work is indispensably influenced

and inspired by previous literatures on Deleuze and Guattari's socio-political philosophy such as Paul Patton's *Deleuze and the Political* and Eugene Holland's *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: An Introduction to Schizoanalysis*.⁴¹ My research project primarily investigates the relationship between the principles of micropolitics and becoming-revolutionary. It begins with the typical discussion of the fundamental principles in the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics, with a particular thrust on the revolutionary possibilities latent in these concepts. More importantly, I demonstrate how these conceptual apparatuses exemplify the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary, in conjunction with the politico-revolutionary imports derivable from geophilosophy and the analysis of the societies of control. This book establishes its niche by engaging with Chantal Mouffe's theorization of radical democracy, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's diagnosis of Empire, Franco Berardi's analysis of semicapitalism, the ASEAN Integration Project, as well as the principles of geobiosociality and populism, to name a few. Concurrent with these discussions, it navigates various present-day mode of resistance that carry with them the radical potentials of a revolution-to-come. Ultimately, these initiatives aim to expand, examine, and challenge Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy against the backdrop of contemporary predicaments, theories, and practices.

The first three chapters discuss the rudimentary themes of micropolitics and its various articulations through the principles of schizoanalysis, becoming-minoritarian, and nomadology. I present in Chapter One the basic features of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference. I start with an elucidation of Deleuze's philosophy of difference, succeeded by an effort to elicit a politics of difference from it. The philosophy of difference crafts relations that antagonize all attempts to transcendentalize thinking and reduce the possibilities of life into quantifiable and marginalized variables such as Platonism and Hegelianism. Deleuze circumvents his engagement with Hegelian philosophy through his reconstruction of Nietzschean philosophy. Through Nietzsche, Deleuze is able to undermine the logic of identity or philosophy of representation plaguing Hegelian philosophy. Deleuze's diagnosis of Platonism, as well as Hegelianism, is, of course, only one aspect of his overall critique of transcendental philosophy. The other implicit themes of his philosophy of difference include his theories of immanence, subjectivity, multiplicity, and difference-in-itself, which are greatly influenced by his critical engagements with the philosophy not only of Nietzsche but also of Hume, Bergson, and Spinoza.

From the discussion of fundamental concepts in the Deleuzian differential philosophy, I reconstruct Deleuze and Guattari's theory of

schizoanalysis in Chapter Two. As a theory of desire and critique, schizoanalysis is indispensably informed by the aftermath of the May 1968 struggle. First, I explain desire's pathologization in the history of Western philosophy, and how this marginalization obscured its social investments and revolutionary potentialities. Second, I elucidate Deleuze and Guattari's internal and external critique of Oedipus. I elaborate the former through a disquisition of different syntheses and paralogisms of desiring-production. With regard to the latter, I explicate the genealogy of social production that further subjects Oedipus to historicization. It is through this holistic form of critique that schizoanalysis' goal of achieving freedom from all kinds of oedipalization and capitalist exploitation becomes possible.

Meanwhile in Chapter Three, I explicate the importance of the principle of rhizome or rhizomatics in minoritarian literature and politics, as well as in the concept of nomadology. The unifying principle that connect all these concepts is the philosophy of becoming-minoritarian. It is a principle of prudence and transformation that stays between all majoritarian and minoritarian codifications in society, which further subject these principles to perpetual variations. Furthermore, in last section of this chapter, I differentiate the nomad and the State apparatus to further backbone Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of history.

From the fundamental features of schizoanalysis elucidated in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Four how schizoanalytic revolution operates as a principle of becoming-revolutionary, or as a philosophy of therapeutic and revolutionary transformation. From the goal of undermining Oedipal repression within the nuclear family, Deleuze and Guattari also extend schizoanalysis to the larger societal milieu where asceticism, oedipality, and capitalism interweave through the manifold networks of molar investments. Schizoanalysis likewise labors for the subordination of molar principles and organizations to molecular investments, which further cultivates schizophrenia. Moreover, the schizophrenic process of permanent revolution subordinates capitalist social production to desiring-production, toward a new socius characterized by an unconscious libidinal investment and prosecuted by the subject-groups.

In the subsequent chapter (Chapter Five), I explicate Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of the principle of becoming-minoritarian as a middle principle of becoming-revolutionary. To begin with, I explain the nomad's alliance with the principle of becoming-minoritarian because it appeals to a revolution-to-come against the State apparatus or any principle that totalizes life. Moreover, I elaborate the theory of becoming-democracy as one of the timeliest concretizations of becoming-minoritarian/revolutionary through its antithetical relation with traditional or capitalist-configured democracy. To

further expand and examine becoming-democracy's relevance to the present time, I engage with some contemporary theorists of democracy such as Chantal Mouffe. Likewise, I provide some concrete examples from the Philippine society in order to demonstrate that some lines of creativity (or opportunities) crafted through becoming-minoritarian/democracy also author lines of destruction or debasement.

In Chapter Six, I explore the principle of geophilosophy as another expression of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. In the first part, I discuss concepts such as complexity politics, contingency, and fabulation to transform geophilosophy into a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. In addition, I explain the socio-political relevance of complexity theory in conjunction with the principle of geology of morals or geobiosociality. It is followed by a discussion on the art of fabulation and the people-to-come, in conjunction with the theory of refrain and politics. Speaking of politics, I engage with geophilosophy through a problematization of the contemporary political phenomenon that plagues both the Left and the Right political spectrums—'populism.' Lastly, I elucidate geophilosophy in relation to revolutionary becoming and utopia. In this vein, geophilosophy is transfigured into a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary whose underlying principle is the creation of a world- and people-to-come.

From the discussion and critical diagnosis of the repressive features and axiomatic logic of capitalism through Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, micropolitics, and geophilosophy, in Chapter 7, I provide a full-blown disquisition and analysis of capitalism in its most advanced form—the 'societies of control.' I reconstruct the control society phenomenon by interfacing it with Hardt and Negri's theorization of Empire, and Berardi's formulation of semicapitalism, for increased historical concretization and relevance. Subsequently, I elucidate another concept parallel with the control society phenomenon—neoliberal capitalism. Specifically, I trace the development of neoliberal capitalism and its infiltration into the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Integration Project in general, and the K to 12 Educational Reform in particular. Lastly, I explicate and analyze the revolutionary potentials immanent in all spaces and zones where the control society operates, reigns, and mutates, such as Negri's theorization of the multitude, and the insurgent initiatives of Edward Snowden and the Occupy Movement. In the Conclusion, I summarize and highlight all the indispensable characteristics of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary.

This humble opus is an unfinished project. If ever some discussions and engagements with other philosophers appear as abridged and insufficient, I hope that these inadequacies serve as invitations to further

travel with Deleuze and Guattari, and with other contemporary theorists ruthlessly critical of advanced capitalism and all expressions of ethical fascism. More importantly, I hope that this book provokes action-theoretic revolutionary possibilities, as well as challenges us to wake up from our oedipalized, Statist, and fascist slumbers.

Notes

¹ Orthodox Marxism's dogmatic utilization of scientific or objectivist methodologies incapacitates its very mechanism to become receptive to the contingencies and nuances of societal and individual conditions. Its reductive appropriation of social reality disheartens any conceptualization of a theory of subjectivity or philosophical anthropology. As a result, it lacks conceptual apparatuses to analyze the miscarriage of the proletariats' revolutionary consciousness, as well as to cultivate opportunities and spaces for the cultivation of this radical impulse.

² Even historians are divided into those thinking that Jose Rizal is counter-revolutionary like Renato Constantino and those who adhere to the view that there is a revolutionary Rizal foremost of which are Gregorio Zaide and Floro Quibuyen. See (Quibuyen 1997).

³ See (Ileto 1998).

⁴ See the #OccupyTogether website in <http://www.occupytogether.org>. Accessed 25 July 2014.

⁵ See (Patton and Protevi 2003).

⁶ Jean Francois Lyotard defines postmodernism's primary attitude as the 'incredulity towards meta-narratives.' See (Lyotard 1984).

⁷ See (Foucault 1980a, 145).

⁸ See (Patton 2010a, 84). Patton's comprehensive essay provides the readers with a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the different convergences and divergences between the philosophies of Deleuze and Foucault, ranging from their theorizations of power and history, and the mapping of the 'new.'

⁹ See (Patton 2010a, 188).

¹⁰ See (Foucault 1980b, 94).

¹¹ The critical theorist Herbert Marcuse formulates the concept of false needs as a capitalist aesthetic device for ever-increasing and systemic subjugation. See (Marcuse 1964, 5).

¹² See (Rouse 1994, 106).

¹³ Ulrich Beck's theory of 'subpolitics' is shaped by the theory of reflexive modernity. Subpolitics is informed by the erosion of the coherent power emanating from the nation-state. Its existence is grounded on the pluralistic voices and localized centers of people's everyday endeavors, including the novel deployment of collective struggles operating outside the State apparatus. Consequently, self-help cooperatives and grassroots societal organizations are formed to address the local needs of the community akin to their security, human rights, and housing. See (Beck 1994).

¹⁴ Deleuze's engagement with Nietzsche spearheads the renewal of interest in Nietzschean philosophy in contemporary French philosophy in general, and French poststructuralism in particular. In Deleuze, Nietzsche is portrayed as a systematic philosopher whose radical project is immensely informed by his comprehensive critique of Platonic, Hegelian, and Kantian transcendental philosophies. Specifically, it is indispensably inspired by Nietzsche's overturning of Platonism toward an ontology of becoming; a replacement of the Hegelian 'negation of negation' with an affirmative philosophy of life; and a completion of Kant's critical philosophy against the backdrop of conventional Western rational scholarship (*NP* 195).

¹⁵ See (Bolaños 2014, 2).

¹⁶ See Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy*. In the said book, Deleuze writes that "the way Spinoza understands the notion of expression ... lies perhaps at the heart of his thought and style, and is one of the secrets of the Ethics: a two-sided book, with its continuous succession of propositions, demonstrations and corollaries on the one hand, and its violent, broken chain of *scholia* on the other" (*EP* 337).

¹⁷ See (Derrida 2001). In their efforts to reintroduce Nietzsche in France, Deleuze comes up with his books such as *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*, and Derrida, contributes by publishing *Writing and Difference* and *Speech and Phenomena*. See (*N* 88); cf. (Patton and Protevi 2003, 4).

¹⁸ Ian Buchanan argues that despite Deleuze's repugnance to dialectics, he is still a dialectician in several instances. I think Buchanan's claim would only make sense if we liberate the dialectics from its incarceration to the metaphysics of identity. Thus, it would convert into a dialectics of nonconceptual difference or a nondialectical philosophy of difference. See (Buchanan 2000).

¹⁹ See (Nietzsche 1961).

²⁰ As opposed to the 'actual,' the 'virtual' involves a process prompting the existence of events irreducible to any kind of appropriation or to those circumstances that might never have occurred (*B* 14).

²¹ See (Derrida 2005); cf. (Derrida 1994 and Derrida 1997).

²² Deleuze's theorizations of desiring-production and becoming-democracy are formulated in collaboration with Guattari such as in *Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, and *What is Philosophy?*

²³ See (Patton 2007).

²⁴ From the critique of psychoanalysis, Marxism, capitalism, and the State apparatus, the shift in the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy, from the 1980s onward, already included engagement with existing institutions, especially in relation to human rights and jurisprudence. These manifest engagements with liberal democratic principles and practices are articulated in Deleuze's "Open Letters to Negri's Judges" and Deleuze and Guattari's *What Is Philosophy?*, to name a few.

²⁵ See (Smith and Somers-Hall 2012, 202).

²⁶ After the brief discussion on the critical place of Deleuze's philosophy in the French micropolitical tradition, I will present in this part the historico-philosophical encounter between Deleuze and Guattari.

²⁷ See (Negri 2004, 12).

²⁸ Of course, this does not mean that Deleuze was politically uninvolved. His participation is best depicted by his politico-philosophical scholarship that focuses on the incessant creation of concepts that can fabulate a future plane of existence and can antagonize the present order.

²⁹ In the said clinic, all people such as the doctors, nurses, and patients, cooperatively maintain the hospital. Moreover, the therapy of patients is the collective responsibility of all the doctors, nurses, and the staff. See (Buchanan 2008, 6).

³⁰ In relation to their first meeting, Deleuze argued that, “It’s hard to get beyond the familialism of psychoanalysis with its daddy-mommy.... So the issue is to show how, in psychosis, for example, socio-economic mechanisms can bear directly on the unconscious. I don’t mean the mechanisms per se—profit margin, benefit—it’s much more complicated and your addressed this once when you said that madmen don’t simply create a world, they also create a political economy (Gilles Deleuze, letter to Felix Guattari (July 16, 1969), IMEC, cited in (Buchanan 2008, 5).

³¹ Deleuze elaborates in *Empiricism and Subjectivity* his materialist critique of transcendental philosophy, which was vitally influenced by David Hume’s empiricist philosophy. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze’s reconstruction of Bergsonian concepts such as intuition, duration, and the virtual are comprehensively elucidated. Such a reformulation offers a radical counter-history of philosophy against transcendental philosophy in pursuit of a new kind of philosophy of immanence. Further, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze explicates Spinoza’s materialist ontology, which offers a radical possibility of thinking and living emancipated from transcendentalized State. Deleuze, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, explains how Nietzsche’s philosophy informs his critique of transcendental philosophy. Through different Nietzschean principles, philosophy becomes conscious of its immanent configuration and its inability to appropriate absolute truth. Deleuze critically reconstructs the philosophies of these maverick philosophers, which further provide him the conditions for the invention of radical concepts that would subvert the ‘Old Image of Thought’ (*D xvii*).

³² At the heart of Deleuzian philosophy of difference is the belief that comprehending an event or principle necessitates us to primarily cast our attention to its underlying problem. This epistemological imperative informs Deleuze’s whole philosophy in analyzing, evaluating, and criticizing the underlying problems of transcendental philosophy, which has assumed the face of the entire Western philosophical canon since the time of Zeno and Plato.

³³ Contrary to the radical critique of capitalism popularized by Adorno and Horkheimer [see (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 7)], Deleuze and Guattari perceive capitalism as an ambivalent system capable of recoding and decoding, as well as deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

³⁴ See (Žižek 2004, 20).

³⁵ See (Hallward 2006).

³⁶ See (Nail 2012, 1).

³⁷ According to Nail, “The fact that the Occupy movement has not delivered a ... unified set of demands indicates a deeper mistrust of the very form of political representation itself.... Additionally, the method of ... ‘unlawful occupation’ should

also indicate a breakdown of the normal legal channels that are supposed to respond to the will of the people, instead of demanding reforms from representatives or even trying to create its own representatives (Nail 2012, 1–2).

³⁸ See (Nail 2012, ix); cf. (Hardt and Negri 2009).

³⁹ See (Žižek 2004, xi). For him, the Deleuzo-Guattarian project serves as the groundwork of today's Anti-Global Left.

⁴⁰ See (Marx and Engels 1973, 37); cf. (*N* 171) and (Thoburn 2003, 2).

⁴¹ See (Patton 2000) and (Holland 1999). One may also refer to (Patton 2010b), (Buchanan 2008), and (Thoburn 2003). It is recommendable to read my work alongside these great literatures for a more comprehensive understanding of Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ABCS OF THE DELEUZIAN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

A. The Power of Simulacrum and Anti-Hegelianism

Like Nietzsche, Deleuze underscores the function or importance of the ‘untimely’ in thought—capable of going against the grain of the time toward a world-to-come. Philosophical thinking, for Deleuze, engenders a novel way of perceiving the world and life. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, he claims that this kind of thinking entails the discovery and invention of new pathways of life (NP 101). Evidently, this emancipatory import of thought is conceived against the backdrop of what he refers to as the ‘Old image of thought’ or ‘State Philosophy’—the French-style history of philosophy enormously inhabited by “bureaucrats of pure reason who speak in the despot’s shadow and are in complicity with the State.”¹ Although some scholars identify Deleuze as a postmodern theoretician, his philosophical project is not simply an incredulity toward metanarratives (Lyotard 1984, 7). In other words, his version of contemporary French philosophy is not only a radical critique of representation but also a diagramming of new terrains of thinking and living.

Deleuze is a historian of philosophy prior to becoming a philosopher of difference. He critically reconstructs the materialist ontologies of various philosophers in the history of philosophy. Foremost of them are what Todd May calls the Holy Trinity of the early Deleuzian philosophy, namely Spinoza, Bergson, and Nietzsche: “Spinoza offers us immanence.... Bergson offers us the temporality of duration.... And Nietzsche ... of the active and creative affirmation of difference” (May 2005, 26).² The role that this philosophico-historical endeavor serves for his overall project is that it functions as a springboard for developing his own philosophy of difference and eventually his politics of difference (micropolitics) in collaboration with Guattari. Deleuze’s anti-Platonist and anti-Hegelian philosophy constitutes the early phase of his differential philosophy.

The marginalization of contingent materialities over immutable Forms in the Platonic metaphysics resembles one of the illustrations of difference's subordination to representation and sameness. As Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition*:

The model is supposed to enjoy an originary superior identity ... whereas the copy is judged in terms of a derived internal resemblance. Indeed, it is in this sense that difference comes only in third place, behind identity and resemblance, and can be understood only in terms of these prior notions. Difference is understood only in terms of the comparative play of two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an identical original and the imitative similitude of a more or less accurate copy (*DR* 126–127).

However, despite this general devaluation of the difference, the dialogues of Plato likewise contain the seeds of its critique or overturning through the articulation of the existence of the 'simulacrum.'³ The dialogues cannot deny the fact that simulating nature poses a threat to the Ideal world.⁴ The danger it introduces to the so-called coherent Platonic world of representation is, as Deleuze elucidates in *The Logic of Sense*, "a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model, and reproduction... In the reversal of Platonism, resemblance is said of internalized difference, and identity of the Different as primary power" (*LS* 300).

The simulacrum negates the original by virtue of merely simulating its appearance. As such, the original transforms as an effect or result conditioned based on the internal difference between the simulacrum and the very object it represents. Its internalization of the principle of difference overturns the privileging of identity and sameness over difference. Furthermore, Deleuze's appropriation of the concept of simulacrum enables him to suggest that Platonic philosophy should rather focus on the difference between the simulacrum and the copy, and no longer on the conventional distinction between the original and the copy. This Deleuzian imperative discloses Platonism's moral spectrum that favors stability and hierarchy over the chaotic and rhizomic world of "simulacra which are identified with the Sophist himself ... the simulator that always disguised and displaced false pretender" (*DR* 127).

More importantly, simulacrum is a critical concept for Deleuze. The ending of the dialogue *Sophists* provides a glimpse of the possible triumph of the simulacrum in which "the model collapses into difference, while the copies disperse into the dissimilitude of the series which they interiorize, such that one can never say that the one is a copy and the other

a model” (*DR* 128). The Sophists’ interrogation regarding their difference with Socrates destabilizes the possibility of conceiving whether there exists any difference between the real and the illusion (*DR* 128). Thus, the instrumental value of the simulacra lies in its power to overturn Platonism toward a world of pure difference and perpetual flux.

In a world of endless becomings, there exist no ultimate Good, immutable foundations, as well as original and fixed identities. While everything becomes part of the process of becoming-other, philosophers must maximize this opportunity to create assiduously new concepts using the fecund resources found in the plane of immanence.⁵

As a principle espousing the univocity of being, the Nietzschean philosophy of the ‘Eternal Return’ finds a place of solace in the Deleuzian world of pure difference. Its hostility to identity and sameness engenders the redefinition of the concept of repetition into a *ritornello* of difference or the production of sameness via the recurrence of that which differs. As Deleuze argues, “Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same,’ but returning constitutes the only ‘Same’ of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself” (*D* 41). Notwithstanding its breadth, significance, and profundity, the Hegelian dialectics is likewise guilty of putting primacy to identity.

Deleuze’s academic years at the Sorbonne in the mid-1940s started as a kind of incarceration from the dogmatic regime of the history of philosophy dominated by Hegelianism, Marxism, and Phenomenology. In his words, “We threw ourselves like young dogs into a scholasticism worse than that of the Middle Ages” (*D* 18). Deleuze is a microcosm of the French people’s communal frustration with these traditions, especially with Hegelianism. Outside the academic milieu, even other social spaces were already longing for a condition other than what the Hegelian notion of unity, teleology, and the Absolute could offer. He describes the Hegelian dialectic as an apparent expression of nonrationality. As Ronald Bogue puts it, the Hegelian philosophy’s logic of negation and contradiction is based on the philosophy of identity “within which the nonrational *other* could only be conceived of as the shadow of the rational *same*” (Bogue 1989, 2). Reflecting on the widespread dissonance and turmoil engulfing the French society in Deleuze’s time, what is greatly needed is a philosophy of pure difference that cannot be totalized by the logic of identity or representation. A philosophy of this kind, according to Deleuze, is realizable in the Nietzschean philosophical corpus.

As discussed earlier, Nietzsche’s philosophy ushers us into a dedeified world of contingencies and pure becoming. Aside from his

theorization of the principle of the eternal return as the recurrence of difference, Deleuze argues that the notion of ‘sense’ must also be understood in the yardstick of difference, constellation, and multiplicity, rather than of identity, singularity, and linearity. The differential element of origins likewise posits the pluralistic attributes of sense. Here, we are reminded of Nietzsche’s philosophy of perspectivism, which Deleuze ponders to be one of philosophy’s greatest achievements. However, to avoid falling prey to the quicksand of anarchism, relativism, and even nihilism, he transfigures genealogy as a tool both for evaluation and interpretation (NP 4).

Interpretation is a process that discloses the complexity of the genealogical critique. When there is a new force that seeks to appropriate or totalize a certain object, it must first put “on the mask of the forces which are already in possession of the object” (NP 5). Generally, this is a lucid illustration of genealogy as a creative immanent process. This is the reason why when a genealogist-philosopher searches for the differential elements of forces that engender nihilism, he or she must first camouflage himself or herself in the mask of the priest, ascetic, and the religious—the dominant anthropological (and debased) symbols prior to his or her arrival (NP 5). As the philosopher penetrates the forces regulating or manipulating the object, he or she eradicates his or her mask toward the creation of the new. Of course, the meaning of genealogical interpretation is as intricate as attempting to apply it in grasping the axiomatic phenomenon of advanced capitalism. This is because capitalism presently consists of its own sets of ideological masks, which are equally oppressive and emancipatory, as well as one-dimensional and creative.

Further, the Nietzsche-Hegel engagement is illustrated by Deleuze primarily in his early literatures, namely *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, *Difference and Repetition*, and *The Logic of Sense*. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, for instance, Deleuze claims that: “There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s philosophy has a great polemical range; it forms an absolute anti-dialectics and sets out to expose all the mystifications that find a final refuge in the dialectic” (NP 195).⁶ The Hegelian obsession with the concept of unity annihilates and totalizes difference. This incapacitates the dialectical philosophy to recognize multiplicities because all manifestations of difference are interpreted as contradictions so that it can be subsumed under the principle of unity. But Deleuze explains that despite the profundity of the Hegelian dialectics (opposition), genuine difference is irreducible to any kind of dialectical opposition because it is protean, nuanced, and creative. When the 1968 student protest agitated people’s sensibility, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

assumes a somewhat Biblical status to a wide range of scholars and the fuming crowd, for this year became an ecstatic moment for everyone to philosophize by violating the monotony of order using not only words but force as well.

From Platonism and Christianity's promise of the otherworld, repugnance of the immanent, and the positivistic optimism of science, Deleuze also includes the notion of dialectical history (dialectics) to be one of the most compelling sources of nihilism. In fact, after deliberating the manifold depictions of nihilism across religions, disciplines, and civilizations, Deleuze even dedicates a section in the said book with the title "Against the Dialectics." From the denigration against Hegel's analysis of the-death-of-God proposition as constitutive of degeneration, Deleuze proceeds with a barefaced appraisal of the dialectic principle. Even though Hegel fought the prevalent metaphysics of representation during his time, the Hegelian dialectic, at least in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, still transforms into another representationalist philosophy.⁷ In this manner, it becomes debilitated to go beyond its own symptoms and nemesis because it is already despoiled by the forces of *ressentiment* and bad conscience. Deleuze further argues that:

Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential mechanisms: topological displacements, typological variations.... Deprived of all its ambitions, opposition ceases to be formative, impelling and coordinating; it becomes a symptom to be interpreted. Deprived of its claim to give an account of difference, contradiction appears for what it is: a perpetual misinterpretation of difference itself, a confused inversion of genealogy. In fact, to the eye of the genealogist, the labor of the negative is only a coarse approximation to the games of the will to power (*NP* 157).

Whereas the Hegelian dialectic always leaves one foot behind in its struggle, Nietzsche's radical philosophy proposes a total destruction of the past edifice. Although his genealogical critique looks at the past origin of values, it is equipped with a bold quest to qualitatively identify whether they are of slavish or noble origins and more importantly, to reach the primary protean source receptacle of all of these—the 'Will to Power' (*NP* 252).

The will to power is the differential character of forces. Deleuze explains that life forces and values are only secondary to the will to power. This principle consists of a confluence of forces that necessitate further engagement with other forces. Deleuze conceives that the dialectic is simply operating based on a seemingly superficial normativity, for it only appears

as a simulating state of the will to power. Even after the demise of God, as well as the reconciliation of God and man, they retain their identities as epitomes of reactive forces. The Hegelian dream of thought's lofty elevation is thereby undermined. Because this so-called dialectical development of thought only ends as a form of will to nothingness, Deleuze (via Nietzsche) thinks that it miserably transfigures like Christianity—so effective in imposing moral guilt on the crowd yet deficient in creating new values and possibilities. In other words, although the dialectic has a teleological slate of advancement, it falls short in becoming revolutionary or in bringing forth genuine transformation. It is because as things are negated, some values are preserved in the camel's back (to use a Nietzschean vocabulary) and as such, can still condition the subtle mutation of decadent forces. This mentality of negation and self-preservation, for Nietzsche, is constitutive of the 'last man'—the individual who does not have enough audacity to lion all values in pursuit of totally new relations of forces, which can be biological, economic, or political. Therefore, as modernity engenders God's death, it degenerately crafts some substitute metaphysical guarantors such as 'permanence,' 'soul,' 'Geist,' and the like, thereby authoring new forms of foundationalism and strengthening nihilism's pervasiveness.

Nietzsche affirmatively formulates the typologies of the ascending and the descending modes of life and introduces the metaphor of the eternal return so as to test us on what kind of life we want to recur. Because values are based on how we view life and expend our potentialities, their significance depends on whether we are going to recognize it as ascending (noble) or descending (slavish). In other words, the manner through which we value life is identified by the sense of power we affirmatively cultivate, not by its truthfulness or falsity. After this transvaluative recommendation, Deleuze further explains that: "Against Hegelian dialectics, which overcomes alienation via the comprehension of our historical experience, Nietzschean genealogy overcomes nihilism by harnessing the active forces of the body and the unconscious to invent new concepts and modes of existence" (Sinnerbrink 2007, 177).

Robert Sinnerbrink in *Understanding Hegelianism* is correct to claim that the youthful radical spirit in Deleuze has moderated over the years.⁸ In the *Logic of Sense*, for example, it can be seen that Deleuze is aware of Hegel's work on the relations between appearance and the beyond, and points out that it was Hegel's 'genius' that overturned the Aristotelian notion of representation (*LS* 259).⁹ This more welcoming regard for Hegel speaks of Deleuze's maturity conditioned by the historical evolution of his time; moreover, it is also an attempt at self-criticism. As such, his project

converts into a painstaking reconstruction of the dialectics that develops into a receptivity to difference.

Deleuze's reconstruction of the Hegelian dialectics led him to new theoretical possibilities, upon which his mentor, Jean Hyppolite, was profoundly influential. Hyppolite provided, for Deleuze, a possibility of reading the Hegelian dialectics beyond the unity of reason, complementing a philosophy of difference. However, despite Hyppolite's influence, Deleuze finds the former's notion of difference to be inadequate inasmuch as difference is only understood as a form of contradiction. Rather, difference in-itself is "something which distinguishes itself from other things, imagine something which distinguishes itself, and yet in distinguishing itself it does not distinguish itself from the other" (*DR* 43).

As a radical thinker, Deleuze strives to pursue the possibility of conceiving the dialectics beyond a teleological unity. He is no Marx or Lenin in this aspect. But he is a philosopher whose unwavering thrust is the differential dialectics of the play of multiple becomings in the world of the 'chaosmos.' Deleuze's major challenge then is to perceive the dialectics in terms of problematics, rather than of propositions and reconciliations, as well as to invert the subordination of difference to identity, negativity, and contradiction toward thought's liberation from the yoke of representationalist thinking.¹⁰ Moreover, historical progression, for Deleuze, does not happen because of the dialectical movement of the negation of negation, but because of the affirmation of difference and problem-decisions (*DR* 268). This is so because contradictions in reality can be manipulated anytime by the powerful (e.g., politicians, capitalists, psychoanalysts) be it for the maintenance of the status quo or for the justification of exploitation. From a wider perspective, philosophical thinking must learn the logic of the dice-throw amidst the experience of chaos because this is the very state into which it would be awakened from its slavish and essentialist slumber. One of the significances of a dice-throw-inspired philosophy or politics is that it subjects all representationalist principles in society to perpetual critique and variation. In doing so, socially-constructed hierarchies, irrational adherence to different metaphysical guarantors, and polarized mechanisms of power are undermined.

When Deleuze contends that thought must confront chaos, it does not mean to vanquish chaos because that would condition the possibility of reverting to identity or representation. Rather, it is to delineate a plane of consistency composed of heterogeneous forces. These forces are constitutive of chaos acting as a bastion of creativity, active forces, and infinite possibilities. Instead of waiting for the 'Owl of Minerva' to arrive, a time where all things will synthesize toward higher forms of unity, the

role of philosophy is to disturb the present through the invention of new concepts and lines of flight.¹¹ This is what Deleuze calls differential thinking or nonconceptual difference.

B. Difference, Transcendental Empiricism, and the Immanent Subject

‘Difference’ is the unthought in Deleuze’s early philosophical career. He grounds his philosophy of difference through Hume’s empiricist philosophy, Spinoza’s materialist ontology, and Bergson’s theory of multiplicity. These principles play instrumental roles in his project of undermining the various binary opposites or representationalist principles plaguing Western philosophy.¹² Difference, as one commentator puts it, is a disruptive principle that antagonizes the “unifying forces that have abounded in philosophical discourse and to substitute for such forces a new perspective by which one can continue to think philosophically” (May 1997, 176).¹³

In Deleuze’s essay “Immanence a Life,” he claims that his new philosophy of transcendental empiricism contradicts every narrative that divides the world into subject and object or into binary opposites (*PI* 25). Deleuze furthers this claim in *Dialogues* where he asserts that the prevalence of dualism in the whole tradition of Western philosophy can be overcome when we find the in-between of binaries, “whether they are two or more, a narrow gorge ... like a frontier which will turn the set into a multiplicity, independently of the number of parts” (*D* 132). These disquisitions remind us of Deleuze’s indebtedness to the Humean philosophy.

What makes Hume important in Deleuze’s project of dismantling the frontiers of the empiricist-dualist paradigm is that despite being a child of a tradition (i.e., Classical Empiricism) which is also constitutive of some metaphysical axioms, there is in Hume “something very strange which completely displaces empiricism, giving it a new power, a theory and practice of relations” (Badiou 2000, 53).

Deleuze’s early work on Hume *Empiricism and Subjectivity* serves as a building block of Deleuze’s philosophy of ‘transcendental empiricism.’¹⁴ The word ‘transcendental’ means that Deleuze’s philosophy seeks to deduce the implicit conditions of the possibility of conscious experience. Such a claim can be made because human beings cannot access the necessary conditions of experience according to Kant. These conditions situated in the ‘given’ are contingent propensities irreducible to empirical appropriations. These material propensities allow us to grasp experience in its singularity

and fecundity, as well as its distinctive relations with other beings.¹⁵ Hence, any transcendental concepts or categories dependent on material singularities are pondered as contingent or creative propensities. This obviously premises Deleuze's criticism against Idealism, Marxism, and Phenomenology, for they still harbor on certain transcendental principles. On the other hand, his reformulated brand of empiricism does not perceive these implicit conditions as abstract or logically necessary and repudiates the atomistic appropriation of experiences and subjectivity. In this manner, there is no distinct subject or subjectivity detached from the landscape of history and culture, or habitual expressions of the community. The constituted subject is rather an assemblage of complex impressions or contingent effects of the interplay between various life forces such as memory, events, socio-economic conditions, and the like.

As a form of transcendental empiricism, Deleuze's philosophy is neither dialectical nor empiricist.¹⁶ From a macroperspective, the philosophy of transcendence views experience as something drawn from a necessary foundation and whose value is gauged according to some logically-deduced generalizations. On the other hand, transcendental empiricism primarily underscores the possibility of experience unsubordinated to transcendental philosophy.¹⁷

Take the case of Kant's theorization of subjectivity. Kant identifies all the conditions of the possibility of achieving a universal theory of human knowledge. Human beings are equipped with cognitive capabilities, viz., the regulative principle of the mind. Accordingly, it allows them to come up with universal claims about the world as it appears *a priori*.¹⁸ These abilities (i.e., sensibility, understanding, and reason) are necessary and universal for human knowledge. Hence, the Kantian notion of subjectivity serves as a unitarian principle that warrants any explanations regarding the possibility of diverse experiences. In other words, it becomes the precondition for the possibility of any human experience.

Deleuze criticizes this aforesaid Kantian one-size-fits-all characterization of human knowledge and experience. Kant thinks, in Deleuze's perception, that transcendental deduction replicates the sensory in transcendental form and then safeguards it from scrutiny. Critical theorists describe this gesture as the philosopher's 'bad faith.' Adorno, one of the foremost pillars of the Critical Theory tradition, argues that modern epistemology (i.e., Cartesian and Kantian) puts primacy to transcendental concepts or categories, for they are treated as metaphysical givens.¹⁹ On the one hand, the aforesaid modern epistemological bad faith sees these concepts or categories as something detached or exempted from factual

variations. On the other, it marginalizes the dynamism of the object or experience and the contingencies of life's materialities.

Meanwhile, Deleuze perceives the subject as “defined by the movement through which it is developed. Subject is that which develops itself. The only content that we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence” (*ES* 85). As such, the subject is only characterized by the attributes or movements of mediation and transcendence, which engender it into a dipartite process of becoming-other: “the subject transcends itself, but it is also reflected upon” (*ES* 85). Likewise, in the Humean context, Deleuze observes that this two-fold content of subjectivity is articulated as inference and invention. When this novel characterization of subjectivity is analyzed within the backdrop of transcendental empiricism, the crucial question becomes: *how can the subject in transcending the given be constituted within the given?* This inquiry is subdivided into two questions: (1) *How can the subject transcend the given?* and (2) *How can the subject be constituted in the given after transcending it?* Before answering the question, it is critical to discuss briefly what it presupposes—the ‘given.’ Deleuze defines the given as an assemblage of impressions and images, “the totality of that which appears, being which equals appearance; it is also movement and change without identity or law” (*ES* 87).²⁰

Based on the above definition, empiricism translates as the experience of this assemblage, which is congruent to a heterogeneous and creative succession of different perceptions because they are distinct and independent. At this point, we can answer the aforesaid question, that is, by referring to the Deleuzo-Humean account of subjectivity as mediation/inference and transcendence/invention. Human subjectivity has the capability to infer the existence of something not given from the given itself.²¹ It also creates societal standards and systems not found in nature by default. In other words, subjectivity consists of a dual movement—the subject's becoming-other transcends itself, but it is also reflected upon in the fields of ethical judgment and arts, to name few.²² As Jeffrey Bell claims, Deleuzo-Humean subjectivity is “an attempt to understand the emergence of identities, whether social, political, individual, ontological etc. in a manner that does not entail a condition that transcends the conditioned” (Bell 2003).

It is evident that the aforesaid problem creates a chasm between transcendental philosophy and Humean empiricism (or Deleuzian transcendental empiricism). In *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze elucidates the divergence between the two:

We embark upon a transcendental critique when, having situated ourselves on a methodologically reduced plan that provides an essential certainty—a certainty of essence—we ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given to a subject, and how can the subject give something to itself? Here, the critical requirement is a constructivist logic modeled after mathematics. The critique is empirical when, having situated ourselves in a purely immanent point of view... we ask: how is the subject constituted in the given? (*ES* 87)

The given, as an immanent plane of existence, engenders the subject's constitution. As a result, the subject can constitute itself in this immanent plane. Undoubtedly, this brand of empiricism is an emancipation from the shackles of transcendental philosophy and even psychology (*ES* 87). Primarily, it is characterized by self-reflexivity in the sense that it is governed by self-critical principles or rules rooted from habit. As a device of critique, habit castigates and moderates the operations and judgments of the subject's ethical, social, and political imagination. To further this task, it is imperative for habit to assure that the subject does not become oblivious to its factual constitution, repetitions, and limitations.²³ More importantly, habit must serve as a relentless reminder to the subject, i.e., of being vigilant with the possibility of comprehending the fictions of the Subject, World, History, God, and the like as immutable constitutive ideas (*ES* 9).

Deleuze's transcendental empiricism or philosophy of immanence is also greatly influenced by Spinoza's materialist ontology. In *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze pronounces his noble recognition of Spinoza as the prince of all philosophers (*EP* 11). This man deserves such a description because he provides "the best plane of immanence ... the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions" (*WP* 60). Deleuze finds in Spinoza the radical possibility of thinking and social existence emancipated from the fetters of the State.²⁴ We can see, for example, in the *Political Treatises* how Spinoza formulated a philosophy that assumes the form of a critical appraisal of the degenerate status quo. Specifically, he questions his fellowmen why they choose their own enslavement and perceive it as freedom.²⁵

Deleuze's theorization of immanence, greatly influenced by Spinoza's notion of nature, is evident in Deleuze's antijudicial position against State philosophy. In *Savage Anomaly*, Negri ingeniously describes Spinoza's relationship with Deleuze as an 'encounter with continuity,' which likewise presupposes not only Deleuze's but also Negri's profound indebtedness to the antijudicial philosophy of Spinoza.²⁶ The antijudicial

philosophy of Deleuze appendages his overall criticism of transcendental morality—the morality behind the marginalization of the materiality of life and the creative potentialities of the body. Spinoza is a critical witness to this type of morality prevalent in Western scholarship, especially in the juridical tradition.²⁷

Instead of simply dismissing Deleuzian philosophy of immanence as another contemporary resistance to the State's transcendental authority, we must perceive it as concerned with the various immanent power-relations that engender particular relations of forces and historical possibilities in society.²⁸ In Spinoza's later project, States are illustrated as products of a purely natural process in consonance with the cultivation of natural right and personal life (*S* 125). It means that the States' genealogies and configurations are nothing but off-shoots of secularized procedures and struggles, and not of metaphysical or transcendental processes. Although life can achieve a certain degree of optimization within a democratic State or a liberal society, the philosopher must not limit himself with it. Following Deleuze, "the philosopher solicits forces in thought that elude obedience as well as blame, and fashions the image of a life beyond good and evil... The philosopher can reside in various states, he can frequent various milieus, but he does so in the manner of a hermit, a shadow, a traveler" (*S* 4).

Furthermore, a philosophy of the middle exhibits Deleuze's radical reconstruction of Spinoza's materialist ontology. Deleuze explains that the title of the last chapter, "Spinoza and Us" in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, means being at "the middle of Spinoza" (*S* 122).²⁹ Precedent to Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of the principle of minoritarian politics as a 'politics of the middle,' is the recommendation that the most profound way to comprehend Spinoza's philosophy is by way of the middle. Deleuze's 'Spinozism' is not simply a conservative asseveration of a single substance; rather, it is a diagramming of a common plane of immanence where all bodies, minds, and individuals are situated (*S* 122). In this monistic realm, the plane of organization and the plane of immanence are not perceived as dual opposites, but as a multiplicity of dimensions, lines, and directions in an assemblage (*D* 132).³⁰

In this regard, instilling oneself in the middle of Spinoza implies two things. First, it entails Spinoza and Deleuze's underlying belief that thought is devoid of any primordial origin whatsoever, but only of outside by which it is connected; and second, being in Spinoza's middle means situating oneself in the immanent modal plane. Also, because this plane is not founded on any metaphysical principle, relations, forces, and bodies are defined in accordance to their 'zones of neighborhood' (*WP* 20) or ability

to affect and be affected by other bodies whether by virtue of cultivation or decomposition.³¹

Moreover, Spinoza's materialist ontology is an ethics situated in the plane of immanence—'Ethology.' In this plane, the subject or the human individual is the only immanent substance—a mode of nature's attributes and a fragment of a protean and interrelated whole. But the individual does not enjoy a privileged position in relation to other entities, in the same manner that subjectivity is not limited to the realm of rationality. The univocity of being promotes an ontological democracy where everything metamorphoses into bodies, whose value is gauged not based on one's rational and discursive capacities but on speed (i.e., fast and slow), as well as the ability to affect and to be affected (*S* 125).³² In other words, the subject, in the plane of immanence, is shattered toward individuating affective states of nonsubjective affects, as well as unspecified forces and mobilities.

Ethology likewise maintains a philosophical perspective that does not presuppose a reality beyond the contours of life's material conditions, and a philosophy of thinking and experience outside the epistemological regimentations of Platonic, Cartesian, and Kantian metaphysics.³³ This is apparently in contradistinction with the claims of metaphysics where an all-encompassing essence beyond life is posited. Because metaphysics is the handmaiden of morality, Spinoza's ethology transforms as its antithesis by virtue of its differential and transformative characteristics. Thus, because the locus of morality is the universal Subject or the mechanistic organism, ethology serves as a venue for a micropolitics of the subject that focuses on the in-between molded from its interminable relation to itself and to other assemblages of bodies.

The reason behind Spinoza's formulation of agency is two-fold. From a personal or historical standpoint, it seeks to revolutionize the decadent multitude of his time; and from a philosophical lens, it aspires to antagonize the traditional (i.e., Platonic, Cartesian, or Kantian) notion of subjectivity that has enormously shaped Western philosophical thinking for centuries. Specifically, it aims to salvage the 'body' from its marginalization in the history of Western morality (i.e., Christianity), which likewise reminds of Nietzsche's affirmative theorization of the body.³⁴

C. Multiplicity, Difference-in-itself, and the Possibility of Politicized Difference

In their collaborative work, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari theorize difference through the concept of 'multiplicity.' For them,

multiplicity “was created precisely in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost to Unity or Totality” (*ATP* 32).³⁵ Similarly, Deleuze and Parnet discuss the notion of becoming-multiple in *Dialogues*: “Concepts and impressions are not deemed as individuated givens or as either-or identities. Rather, they are seen as multiplicities found in-between identifiable terms. Deleuze calls this as the AND between identities—a thinking with AND and not with IS” (*D* 57). Hence, rather than problematizing the privileging or individuation of one concept over another, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the said predicament should be approached ‘in-between’ or via the manifold kinds of multiplicity.

Before his collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze principally turns to Bergson to develop his ‘theory of multiplicity.’ Of course, the seminal ideas comprising Deleuze’s theory of multiplicity can already be discerned, for example, from Hume’s empiricism and from Spinoza’s ethology. However, it is Bergson’s theorization of multiplicity that provides the most comprehensive theoretical framework to his overall philosophy of multiplicity.

‘Bergsonism’ is fundamentally a philosophizing against State philosophy or transcendental philosophy. Deleuze and Parnet opine in *Dialogues* that there is something in Bergson that escapes the coalescing net of State philosophy (*D* 15).³⁶ Specifically, the primary goal of Bergsonian philosophy is to overcome the metaphysics of transcendence toward a novel kind of philosophy of immanence. In “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson defines this new philosophy as “one which purposes to keep as close to the original as possible, to probe more deeply into its life, and by a kind of spiritual *auscultation*, to feel its soul palpitate; and this true empiricism is the real metaphysics” (Bergson 1965, 175).

Bergsonism is analogous to the Hegelian project of overcoming Cartesian metaphysics. Likewise, Hegelian philosophy argues that the nature of reality can already be accessed thinly through a series of dialectical struggles, unlike the Kantian demarcation of the phenomenal and noumenal world.³⁷ But instead of an outright extermination of the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world, and radicalization of the privileging of the ideal over the material, Bergson reorients the fundamental pillars of metaphysics. In *Matter and Memory*, he advocates a creative undermining of the traditional dualism between body/matter and the mind/spirit, to name few.³⁸

For Deleuze, traditional philosophy’s extreme adherence to dualism can be surmounted by searching the in-between of binaries that will

turn the set into a multiplicity irreducible to the number of its parts, which he calls the philosophy of “becoming-multiple” (*D* 132). Like Hume’s project, the Bergsonian version of overcoming traditional metaphysics does not aspire for the abolition of the distinction between different conceptual binaries; rather, it aims for the reformulation of the mind-body or ideal-material world problem in a manner that the two binaries achieve a creative interpenetration or differentiation. In Bergson’s view, even though Kant’s Copernican Revolution has undoubtedly advanced an indispensable contribution to contemporary philosophy, it remains unsuccessful in liberating thought from the yoke of transcendentalism. He opines that as long as traditional philosophy (or science and metaphysics anchored on a representationalist principle) lives under the delusion of entirely appropriating the real by critical analysis and logical deduction, and locates the conditions of experience outside experience, it will be condemned to perpetual miscarriage.³⁹ In other words, Bergson’s critical diagnosis of Kantian metaphysics in particular, and traditional philosophy in general, is informed by the affirmative goal of transvaluating transcendental philosophy.

Deleuze asserts that when we philosophize from the vantage point of traditional dualism, we neglect the two kinds of multiplicity: “Conceiving everything in terms of more or less, seeing nothing but difference in degree or differences in intensity ... is perhaps the most general error of thought, the error common to science and metaphysics” (*B* 20). This argument is two-fold: first, it highlights a philosophical blunder authored by transcendental philosophy in privileging a metaphysical thinking in terms of difference in degree; and second, it introduces the two kinds of multiplicity.⁴⁰ With regard to the first point, this error is the crime traditional Western scholarship is guilty of, for it simply differentiates knowledge, concepts, and relations in terms of quantitative configurations.⁴¹

Further, Valentine Moulard-Leonard contends that traditional philosophy is enslaved by the intellect’s “pragmatic orientation and its resulting tendency to analyze ... to reify and hypostasize its own mental states ... things and concepts” (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 91). This brand of metaphysics discards any type of creative production and a future philosophy. On the contrary, Bergson asserts that our mind is capable of intuitively reorienting itself to produce machinic constellation of concepts freed from the conservative logic of the ‘One’ and the ‘Multiple’ problematic.⁴²

With the dominance of science and metaphysics, a unitarian or absolute idea of the One is conceived and is combined with its opposite, the Multiple, “to reconstruct all things from the standpoint of the forced opposed to the multiple or to the deterioration of the One” (*B* 47). To

overcome this problem, Bergson formulates the concept of multiplicity. In *Time and Free Will*, multiplicity is no longer used as a mere description of things because it transforms into an independent or substantive term (Bergson 1950, 176).⁴³ This metamorphosis allows us to operate on a radically new terrain of philosophizing or image of thought. Gone are the days where philosophical questions revolve around the problem, “Is it one or multiple?” For Bergson, rather than casting our attention to this problem, we should focus on the types of multiplicity.⁴⁴ The two kinds of multiplicity are ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative.’ The former is constitutive of the principle of its own metrics by which the measure of one of its parts is being given by the number of elements it contains. It belongs to the realm of science and metaphysics (or space). On the other hand, the latter belongs to the sphere of duration.

The intellectual tendencies of difference in degree and kind correspond to the multiplicities of ‘space’ and ‘duration.’ In Bergson’s eyes, all other divisions and dualities are derived from these multiplicities: “The first implies going all around it, the second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests on no symbol. Of the first kind of knowledge [analysis] we shall say that it stops at the relative; of the second [intuition] that, wherever possible, it attains the absolute” (Bergson 1965, 159).⁴⁵ Bergson claims that the multiplicity of space is a subjective perception that empowers us to see all calculable, categorizable, and indifferent quantitative changes.⁴⁶ Space, as a kind of multiplicity and perception, is merely a home to difference in degree because of its attribute of quantitative homogeneity. The variations among things are true in space but only in the ambit of difference in degree. At this point, it can be claimed that difference in kind does not exist between duration and space because it can only be found in the plane of duration where qualitative difference exists. Conversely, the multiplicity of duration is an objective kind of perception that can bear all the expressions and aspects of difference in kind through its aptitude of qualitative self-variation.

Moreover, if quantitative multiplicity can be divided into parts because of its numerical configurations, qualitative multiplicity cannot be divided without its nature or intensive state being altered. Of course, Deleuze prefers qualitative multiplicity because he believes that the encounter of multiplicities always leave no essences unchanged. More importantly, it is because duration that belongs to it is indispensably related to the concept of ‘virtuality.’ The conjunction of duration as a qualitative brand of multiplicity and virtuality, serves as the building block of Deleuze’s philosophy of virtual multiplicity.

Deleuze describes duration as the invisible, nonmeasurable, and more importantly, “that which divided only by changing in kind, that which was susceptible to measurement only by varying its metrical principles at each stage of the division” (de Beistegui 2004, 250). Thus, it is in duration where things vary in kind from all the rest and from itself. It is here that we experience an affirmative differentiation of our respective states or conditions. Moreover, the multiplicity of duration refers to a pure interiority with perpetual succession, while space is pure exteriority devoid of succession. Whereas the role of space is to provide exteriorized, homogenous, and discontinuous frames, the function of duration is to render interiorized, heterogeneous, and continuous successions. For Deleuze, a dialectical relationship must be established between auxiliary space and homogenous time. He accentuates that the project of philosophizing from the standpoint of duration rather than of space is the heart of Bergson’s prominence. It is because the direction of this kind of philosophizing can disclose the real difference—the perennial task of philosophy.⁴⁷

After explicating Deleuze’s engagement with the immanent philosophies of Nietzsche, Hume, Spinoza, and Bergson, let us now elaborate Deleuze’s philosophy of difference or ‘virtual multiplicity.’⁴⁸ Primarily, this Deleuzian differential philosophy is a critique against transcendental and representationalist philosophies, which can only bestow as the actual and the possible, and not the virtual.⁴⁹

Contrary to Structuralism (as one of the expressions of representationalist philosophy), Deleuze perceives structures as ‘virtual.’ The virtual refers to incorporeal singularities that do not coincide with the actual. Bergson’s philosophy of the virtual is shaped by its overarching project of seeking for the necessary conditions of the real (reality). This radical initiative is informed by the significant quest for various articulations that precondition these contingencies. Deleuze further argues that these conditions do not resemble Kantian conditions of all possible experience derived from the real’s immanent commensurabilities.⁵⁰ Instead, they are generic conditions of the real experience, which are qualitatively diverse from the conditioned (*B* 28). This virtual point refers to the harmony existing between mind and matter, the privileging of duration over space, as well as the protean creativity of difference.⁵¹

Moreover, the virtual subtends all beings rhizomically as it undermines all *a priori* notions or segmented planes of representation. Given this aptitude, the virtual resides in variegated singularities and potentialities where the thought of pure immanence can be fashioned. Philosophical production of this kind necessitates an experimentation with our integral experience. Likewise, the reality of the virtual is contrary to

Kantian and Husserlian's characterization of experience. It goes beyond the quantitative variations and homogenous frames of scientific and transcendental knowledge.

To probe deeper into the virtual, it is significant to accentuate that for both Bergson and Deleuze, an object can be separated into a thousand ways. But before objects are divided, the mind (thought) has already grasped them as conceptual possibilities. These objects already become perceivable in the object's image. More so, although they are not realized (only possible), they are actually perceivable in principle (*B* 41). This form of actuality (the realm of matter) is what is referred to as objectivity or the objective. Because objectivity only transforms quantitatively and remains immutable qualitatively during the division process, it is bereft of virtuality.

As opposed to the virtual, the concept of the 'possible' pertains to an uncovering of what already exists, i.e., it is already assured of what will happen in the future.⁵² Its occurrence is shaped through its conformity with the logic of identity or representation where its entirety depends on a preformed element or *eidōs*. The possible (like the actual) is a descendant of the multiplicity of space. Being mired by the logic of exteriority, homogeneity, and discontinuity, it is not hospitable to the existence of unthinkable events such as the people- and the world-to-come—extensively articulated in Deleuze's collaborative writings with Guattari.

Science and metaphysics, among others, can only bestow us the actual and the possible. Their incapability to surmount the quantitative differentiation existing between things and their incapacity of qualitative self-differentiation alienate the possibility of philosophizing toward the virtual. As Deleuze avers, whereas the possible "has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality" (*B* 96). In *Proust and Signs*, additionally, he defines the virtual as the "real without being actual, ideal, without being abstract" (*PS* 58). This means that the virtual is a state of existence actualized by virtue of undergoing differentiation, in the same vein that it is compelled to distinguish itself by formulating its own lines of differentiation as a necessary condition of its actualization.

As discussed earlier, it is only the multiplicity of duration that is hospitable to the virtual. Duration's ability of continuous and qualitative self-differentiation spawns the overcoming of the quantitative, the scientific, the metaphysical, and the human, thereby opening the horizon of the virtual. Although Deleuze perceives the multiplicity of duration as the pure side, it does not necessarily convert duration into something beyond divisibility and measurement. In other words, instead of restricting himself with the antagonism between duration and space or with the pedigree of the

former over the latter, he reformulates this negative relation by formulating the two kinds of multiplicity. As Keith Ansell Pearson explains, Deleuze's critical appropriation of the virtual presents an ontological challenge to our traditional understanding of the one and the many, substance and subject, and more importantly, duration and space.⁵³

Furthermore, Deleuze radicalizes the concept of the virtual in order to expand its theoretical scope, especially in relation to contemporary scholarship, predicaments, and practices. He uses the philosophy of the virtual as the underlying theme not only of his philosophy of difference but also of his collaborative projects such as schizoanalysis, minoritarian politics, and geophilosophy. All these scholarly productions are indisputably faithful to Deleuze's (in collaboration with Guattari) overall definition of philosophy as the creation of new concepts capable of radicalizing the present order toward a virtual people and earth. The people-and the world-to-come are unthinkable events that always defer their historical concretizations.⁵⁴

Aside from *Bergsonism* and *Proust and Signs*, the other aspects of Deleuze's philosophy of difference is elaborated in *Difference and Repetition*. Fundamentally, he problematizes how other thinkers grappled with the principles of difference and repetition in their philosophies. To be specific, he critically diagnoses how other philosophical traditions or theories of repetition subordinate difference to representation, although he asserts that marginalization of this kind does not utterly overturn difference. Irreducible either to 'any same or One,' Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, "an entire multiplicity rumbles underneath the 'sameness' of the Idea" (*DR* 274).

Further, Deleuze thinks that the problem with Structuralism is that it perceives structure to "exist[s] absolutely only in its relation to the other: it is no longer necessary, or even possible, to indicate an independent variable. For this reason, a principle of reciprocal determinability as such here corresponds to the determinability of the relation" (*DR* 172). This quandary, among others, engenders his two-fold theorization of difference. There are two ways to understand difference in the Deleuzian differential ontology, namely difference as an expression of 'differentiation,' and difference as 'differenciation.'⁵⁵

The virtual does not need to become actual to become real. It is real by virtue of its composition, consisting of differentiated heterogeneous qualities and intensities. It is only in the realm of the virtual that differentiation occurs. Differentiation is a creative and perpetual movement or process of division and combination where the virtual content of

multiplicity is identified. Deleuze contrasts the two in *Difference and Repetition*:

We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differentiation. It is always in relation to a differentiated problem or to the differentiated conditions of a problem that a differentiation of species and parts is carried out, as though it corresponded to the cases of solution of the problem. It is always a problematic field which conditions a differentiation within the milieu in which it is incarnated. Consequently ... the negative appears neither in the process of differentiation nor in the process of differentiation (*DR* 207).

The relationship between differentiation and differentiation reminds us of the principle of multiplicity or virtual coexistence found in the works of Hume and Bergson, to name a few. In other words, notwithstanding the divergent capacities, operations, and breadth of differentiation and differentiation, they maintain an immanent coexistence. As Deleuze explains:

Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differentiation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by local integrations). Differentiation is like the second part of difference, and in order to designate the integrity or the integrality of the object we require the complex notion of different/citation.... Differentiation itself already has two aspects of its own, corresponding to the varieties of relations and to the singular points dependent upon the values of each variety. However, differentiation in turn has two aspects, one concerning the qualities or diverse species which actualise the varieties, the other concerning number or the distinct parts actualising the singular points (*DR* 209–210).

Considering that Deleuze's philosophy is a radical critique of the philosophy of representation, the crucial problem that must be addressed then is: *how does the actualization of the virtual in differentiation avoid the trap of representation or identity?* With respect to this question, Patton claims that the relation between virtual structures and the actualized Ideas/structures, which he calls spatio-temporal events and state of affairs, is "the means by which Deleuze circumvents the philosophy of representation: bodies and states of affairs do not resemble the structures or

ideal events of which they are the expression” (Patton 2000, 38) Even though I fully agree with Patton’s argument, there are still other ways to illustrate how Deleuze’s notion of difference escapes the totalizing trap of representation.

It is critical to underscore that the actualization process occurring in differentiation does not entail the synthesis or unification of all heterogeneous qualities and intensities. Equating actualization with unification is yielding to the philosophy of representation itself. This runs contrary to Deleuze’s definition of differentiation in *Difference and Repetition* as a process of affirmative creation. In his words, “The actualisation of the virtual ... always takes place by ... divergence or differentiation. Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate” (*DR* 212).

Because it is not an outcome of a predetermined possibility, the kind of actualization that occurs in differentiation is always characterized by affirmative and authentic creation (*DR* 212). Something entirely new is produced (e.g., novel intensities, events, state of affairs) in this very moment of actualization, not simply a replication of the Same, to use a Nietzschean jargon. In this vein, it can be claimed that creation is repetition. As an analogy, Deleuze refers to the Nietzschean principle of the eternal return that espouses a recurrence of the different/difference. What repeats or returns is the fecund force of difference in and of itself—a continuous heterogeneity of the one and the multiple. Repetition is hence a positive power (*puissance*) of transformation that destabilizes all expressions of the old image of thought toward new planes of existence. In other words, the actualized ideas/structures in differentiation are not identical copies of the intensities and qualities in differentiation. The production of identical copies, of course, implies the adherence to the philosophy of representation that halts the incessant current of difference.

Therefore, the Deleuzian philosophy of difference-in-itself does not revert to a primal notion of unity or identity, for it directs us to further differences where “difference must be shown differing” (*DR* 56). As what James Williams asserts, “Difference is to be an ideal or virtual potential for the transformation of identities.... This pure difference does not have fixed identity. It is an ongoing variation of relations, rather than any given object, substance, or quality” (Williams 2013, 10). In addition, rather than succumbing to the Hegelian dialectics, Deleuze asserts that difference is a first-order term whereby contradiction derives its value or meaning (not the other way around).⁵⁶ In Deleuze’s words, “Our claim is not only that difference in itself is not ‘already’ contradiction, but that it cannot be

reduced or traced back to contradiction, since the latter is not more but less profound than difference” (*DR* 51).⁵⁷ The brand of limitation and opposition engineered by Hegelianism and Leibnizian metaphysics garbles pure difference or difference in itself, which “presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and original space and time; all of which persist alongside the simplifications of limitation and opposition” (*DR* 50–51).

Deleuze’s two-fold theorization of difference (difference-in-itself) is a radical device freed from the epistemological tyranny of concepts and principles. The transcendental privilege given to objects by the conventional theory of representation argues that each entity in the world is represented by an overarching category, and their configurations are immutable regardless of the material contingencies in society. Deleuze clarifies the flaw of the philosophy of representation in *Difference and Repetition*:

The fault of representation lies in not going beyond the form of identity, in relation to both the object seen and the seeing subject. Identity is ... conserved in each component representation than in the whole of infinite representation.... Infinite representation may well multiply points of view and organize these in series; these series are no less subject to the condition of converging upon the same object, upon the same world (*DR* 56).

Therefore, difference or difference-in-itself is a praxis that puts primacy on the singularity of each event and the provisional attributes generated upon its conjunction and disjunction with others. In Deleuze’s words, “We propose to think difference-in-itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms which make it pass through the negative” (*DR* xix).

Deleuze’s philosophy of difference imagines a world against various types of representations. This resonates with Adorno’s principle of the nonidentical discussed in *Negative Dialectics*. The principal function of the nonidentical is to counter all forms of identity that valorize the reification of concepts at the expense of the object’s alterity. Deleuze terms this marginalization as the misrecognition of the unrepresented singularity every moment representation occurs (*DR* 52). In stark hostility to all philosophies of totalization, Deleuze asserts, “Everyone recognizes the universal because it is itself the universal, but the profound sensitive conscience, which is nevertheless presumed to bear the cost, the singular,

does not recognize it” (*DR* 52). Albeit the philosophy of difference advocates a radical critique of all brands of representation, identity, and sameness, it is insufficient to establish a politics of difference.⁵⁸ One of the ways to establish a connection between the two is to focus our attention to the ethical implication of a philosophy of difference. Strictly speaking, *Difference and Repetition* is devoid of the explicit political principles and problems articulated in *A Thousand Plateaus*. However, this does not mean that no political themes, albeit implicit ones, are derivable from the former, especially when read in conjunction with *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Anti-Oedipus*, and *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, for instance. From this kind of reading, the marginalization of difference in the history of Western philosophy can be also understood as the marginalization of certain identities or subjectivities and principles in society. The social pathologies produced by these tensions vitally summons for the specification and analysis of politically relevant kinds of difference or minorities capacitated in engendering creative social transformation. Deleuze elucidates:

Social problems can be grasped only by means of a ‘rectification’ which occurs when the faculty of sociability is raised to its transcendent exercise and breaks the unity of fetishistic common sense. The transcendent object of the faculty of sociability is revolution. In this sense, revolution is the social power of difference, the paradox of society, the particular wrath of the social Idea (*DR* 208).

The audacious quest to achieve freedom or the becoming-other of a society in revolution is the expression of the socio-political power of difference. This radical potentiality argued in *Difference and Repetition* then serves as a guiding principle in Deleuze’s formulation of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary, which inspires the formulation of the philosophies of schizoanalysis, becoming-minoritarian, and geophilosophy.

Notes

¹ See Brian Massumi, “Translator’s Foreword: Pleasure of Philosophy,” in (*AO* ix). Meanwhile, State philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari explain what they mean by State Philosophy in *A Thousand Plateaus*: “Western metaphysics since Plato.... It reposes on a double identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy. The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity.

Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains (*ATP* xi).

² In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze's reconstruction of Bergsonian concepts such as intuition, duration, and the virtual are elucidated. Such a reformulation offers a radical counter-history of philosophy against transcendental philosophy in pursuit of a new kind of philosophy of immanence. Further, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy and Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze explicates Spinoza's materialist ontology, which offers a radical possibility of thinking and living emancipated from transcendentalized State. Deleuze, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, explains how Nietzsche's philosophy informs his critique of transcendental philosophy. Through different Nietzschean principles, philosophy becomes conscious of its immanent configuration and its inability to appropriate absolute truth. Deleuze critically reconstructs the philosophies of these maverick philosophers, which further provide him the conditions for the invention of radical concepts that would subvert the 'Old Image of Thought' (*D* xvii).

³ For Patton, "They include the Sophist, who is described as 'a sort of wizard, an imitator of real things'; writing, which is 'a kind of image' of living discourse that does not produce true wisdom but only its semblance; and the 'imitative poets' in Book X of *The Republic*, who do not produce imitations of the true nature of things, but only imitations of their appearances" (Patton 2000, 33).

⁴ Albeit the simulacrum merely occupies a minor place in in the Deleuzian philosophy, unlike in the Baudrillardian postmodern philosophy, Deleuze uses this concept to antagonize identity. See (Baudrillard 1983).

⁵ In *Anti-Oedipus*, it is observable how the real is understood as desiring-production and how identities metamorphose only as after-effects of a plethora of conjunctive and disjunctive relations.

⁶ In other writings of Deleuze, such a position is moderated or contradicted. See (Houlgate 1987). Another foremost divergence from Deleuze's negative appropriation of the Hegel-Nietzsche problematic can be found in (Cauchi 2016).

⁷ See (*NP* 8–10).

⁸ See (Sinnerbrink 2007).

⁹ Somers-Hall's book, *Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation and Difference*, approaches the Hegel-Deleuze from a common problematic, which Deleuze calls finite representation. For Somers-Hall, "Thus, we will compare Hegel and Deleuze's treatments of Kant and Aristotle to see ... where their diagnoses of the problem of representation diverge from one another. The analysis of the problematic will be the ground for an analysis of their attempts to overcome the difficulties of representation ... my starting point has been to show how both Hegel and Deleuze develop from difficulties in Kant and classical logic, rather than showing how Deleuze's philosophy develops from Hegel" (Somers-Hall 2012, 2); cf. (*WP* 11-12).

¹⁰ See (Sinnerbrink 2007, 183).

¹¹ In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari explain "[N]o one needs philosophy to reflect on anything. It is thought that philosophy is being given a great deal by being turned into the art of reflection, but actually it loses everything. Mathematicians, as mathematicians, have never waited for philosophers before

reflecting on mathematics, nor artists before reflecting on painting or music. So long as their reflection belongs to their respective creation, it is a bad joke to say that this makes them philosophers” (*WP* 6).

¹² Some noted binary opposites are: ‘one-multiple,’ ‘mind-body,’ and ‘being-becoming.’ These oppositions dichotomize or polarize life and consequently reduce reality into quantifiable variables. More importantly, they adhere to a unitarian concept or transcendental philosophy that privileges the first term and marginalizes the second.

¹³ Despite coming with his own affirmation of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, May’s version was criticized by Patton in *Deleuze and the Political*. One of May’s arguments is that Deleuze necessitates a relapse into transcendence to avoid inconsistencies in his philosophy of difference, specifically its revocation of the privilege attached to identity. Patton argues that such a claim is unthinkable because Deleuzian philosophy is formulated against the backdrop of the philosophy of transcendence; cf. (Patton 2000, 40).

¹⁴ After thirty-four years, Deleuze claims that “I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist” (*N* vii). Empiricism as multiplicity can also be perceived from the vantage point of nominalist philosophy, that is, between the nameable and the yet-to-come. This possibility prefaces his conception of the ‘Event’ (*LS* 151).

¹⁵ See (Parr 2005, 290).

¹⁶ See (Descombes 1980, 152); cf. (*ES* 3).

¹⁷ In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze proposes: “to think difference in-itself independently of the forms of representation which reduces it to the ‘Same,’ and the relation of difference to different independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative” (*DR* xix). He elucidates that the idea of negative here refers to the dialectics of categorical opposition. His recommendation of thinking difference in-itself is therefore his effort to overcome such oppositions or as what Nietzsche terms as ‘beyond good and evil.’

¹⁸ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, in (Kant 1988).

¹⁹ In “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Theodor Adorno writes: “Whoever chooses philosophy as a profession today must first reject the illusion that earlier philosophical enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real. No justifying reason could rediscover itself in a reality whose order and form suppresses every claim to reason; only polemically does reason present itself to the knower as total reality, while only in traces and ruins is it prepared to hope that it will ever come across correct and just reality” (Adorno 1977, 120).

²⁰ Cf. (Hume 1975, 190).

²¹ See (Hume 1975, 85).

²² See (Hume, 1975, 85–86).

²³ In trying to differentiate ‘habit’ from ‘experience,’ Deleuze writes, “Habit is a principle different from experience, although it also presupposes it.... Experience causes us to observe particular conjunction. Its essence is the repetition of similar cases” (*ES* 67).

²⁴ See (Spinoza 1951b). If ever he speaks about the perils of a revolution, he speaks of the perdition and disappointments of Cromwell's revolution and the possible *coup d'état* by the House of Orange. In his words, "During these periods, 'revolutionary' ideology is permeated with theology and is often, as with the Calvinist party, in the service of a politics of reaction" (ES 9).

²⁵ Spinoza's audacity should not surprise us when the contemporary thinker Negri considers him as the anomaly of the century: "an anomaly of victorious materialism, of the ontology of being that always moves forward and that by constituting itself poses the ideal possibility for revolutionizing the world" (Negri 1991, xvi). Moreover, in Foucault's "Preface" to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, he mentions about the danger of ethical fascism: "the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (AO xii).

²⁶ See (Negri 1991, 3–21).

²⁷ Juridical scholarship implies that "forces have an individual or particular origins; that they must be socialized to engender relation that adequately correspond to them; that there is a mediation of Power; and that the horizon is inseparable from a crisis, war, or antagonism for which Power is presented as the solution, but the 'antagonistic solution' (Armstrong 1997, 56); cf. Deleuze's 'Preface' to Negri's *Savage Anomaly* (Negri 1991, xvii–xxiii).

²⁸ In order to distantiolate Spinoza from the accusation of anarchism, it must be made clear that he does not categorically negate any effort of the State to harmonize individual relationships in the form of ethical standards and public policies. What he opposes is the State's project of advancing its totalizing and narcissistic interests using the ploy of achieving communal cohesion under the authority of the Leviathan (EP 257). In other words, he only repudiates all transcendental configurations that overlay on the initiative of the multiplicity of a transcendent synthesis. See (Negri 1991, 130). Against the various juridical mystification of the State, Spinoza formulates a kind of immanent horizon characterized by active forces, relations, and possibilities.

²⁹ Being at the middle of Spinoza is analogous to the Humean project of becoming-multiple. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze and Parnet characterize Hume's empiricist philosophy as a practical philosophy of "becoming-multiple, instead of being-one, a being-whole or being as subject" (D 132).

³⁰ The plane of organization's legitimacy emanates from a transcendental sphere. It always involves genetic or structural subjectivity formations that can only be inferred from what it gives. The plane of immanence, on the other hand, comprises of innumerable quantities of collectivities, individuals, and bodies, immersed in different variations or relations (S 128). It is important to note that for Deleuze, the plane of immanence is Nature's plane of composition; cf. (Gatens 1996, 165).

³¹ Hardt and Negri describe Deleuze's plane of immanence as the primary event of modernity. See (Hardt and Negri 2000, 71). For them, this event affirms the power and dynamics of this world and human capacities to further their lives in self-determination for the fashioning of social transformation or a new world.

³² Cf. (D 40) and (ATP 225).

³³ See (Parr 2005, 261).

³⁴ According to Nietzsche, “The human body, in which the most distant and most recent past of all organic development again becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is a more astonishing idea than the old ‘soul’” (Nietzsche 1967, 659).

³⁵ Cf. (*D* 132). Albeit one may assert that the Hegelian dialectics itself is a tedious initiative to legitimize that the one-many opposition is just an illusion.

³⁶ In addition, Deleuze writes in “Letter to Michel Cressole”: “I imagined myself getting onto the back of an author, and giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster. It is very important that it should be his child, because the author had to say everything that I made him say. But it also had to be a monster because it was necessary to go through all kinds of de-centerings, slips, break-ins, secret emissions.... My book on Bergson seems to me a classic case of this” (Cressole 1973, 111).

³⁷ A significant import derivable from the Hegelian philosophy is that Kant’s *noumenon* can already be known (indirectly) in the arena of historical configurations. When things are viewed in the ambit of the immanence, all epistemological binaries and ideas can be mediated. Thus, the nature of reality is fathomable through a series of struggles because in the first place, nature and reality are rational. See (Hegel 1969, 31); cf. (Houlgate 1998, 140).

³⁸ See (Bergson 2002).

³⁹ See (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 91).

⁴⁰ In Deleuze’s *Essay: Clinical and Critical*, there is a short essay titled “He Stuttered!” where he claims that language itself can stutter (*ECC* 108). Of course, this goes against the grain of traditional philosophy, which is anthropological and grounded on the old image of thought.

⁴¹ In relation to this, Bergson opines that “Metaphysics dates from the day when Zeno of Elea pointed out the inherent contradiction of movement and change, as our intellect represents them” (Bergson 1965, 17). This entails that even before Plato defined reality or truth as that which is immutable, the pre-Socratic thinker Zeno already considered movement and change as absurd.

⁴² See (Bergson 1965, 191); cf. (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 96).

⁴³ Cf. (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 142).

⁴⁴ The new characterization of multiplicity is inspired by the physician-mathematician G.B.R. Riemann who creates a typology of multiplicities that can provide a distinction between space and duration, matter and memory, as well as the possible and the virtual.

⁴⁵ Cf. (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 91–92).

⁴⁶ Cf. (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, 92).

⁴⁷ See (Bergson 2002, 71); cf. (*B* 17–35).

⁴⁸ See (*DR* 168–221); cf. (Patton 2000, 37).

⁴⁹ See (*DR* 211–213).

⁵⁰ See (Moulard-Leonard 2008, 100).

⁵¹ See (Bergson 1950); cf. (*B* 39).

⁵² In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze contrasts ‘discovering’ with ‘inventing.’ The former is a process where one discovers what is given or which would certainly happen sooner

or later. The latter, on the other hand, allows the existence of an event that escapes one's appropriation or that which might never have happened (*B* 14).

⁵³ See (Ansell-Pearson 2002, 4).

⁵⁴ In the later Deleuze, these virtualities are already corrupted by the 'actual people'—the neoliberal democratic symbol of collectivity incapable of narrating, resisting, and creating.

⁵⁵ The distinction between 'differentiation' and 'differenciation' is elaborated in (*B* 96–98) and (*DR* 208–214).

⁵⁶ For Deleuze, "Nietzsche's 'yes' is opposed to the dialectical 'no' affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour; lightness, dance, to dialectical responsibilities. The empirical feeling of difference, in short hierarchy, is the essential motor of the concept, deeper and more effective than all thought about contradiction" (*NP* 9).

⁵⁷ Cf. (Patton 2000, 32).

⁵⁸ According to Patton in his definition of *Difference + Politics* in *The Deleuze Dictionary*: "Identities presuppose differences and are inhabited by them, just as differences inevitably presuppose and are inhabited by identities. A politics of difference requires the specification of politically relevant kinds of difference." This is Patton's observation as he defines difference in relation to politics (Parr 2005, 76).

CHAPTER TWO

A SCHIZOANALYTIC THEORY OF DESIRE AND CRITIQUE

A. The Pathologization of Desire and Anti-Oedipus

Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* primarily seeks to reconstruct Wilhelm Reich's query in relation to the rise of fascism in the 20th century: *how could the masses be made to desire their own oppression?* (*AO* xvi).¹ To be specific, this book hurls a radical critique of the French people's herd instinct or voluntary submission to 'State philosophy,' especially in the post-1968 era.² Foucault echoes Reich's claim in his "Preface" to *Anti-Oedipus* and describes this predicament as "the fascism in all of us ... the fascism that causes us to ... desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (*AO* xii). In other words, the main task of 'schizoanalysis' is to investigate and analyze the conditions that engender people to desire oppression or Oedipus.³ This philosophic challenge presupposes that previous scholarship fails to bridge the gap between libido (Freudian concept of libido) and labor-power (Marxian notion of labor-power). This is a microcosm of the French and European Marxist parties' fiasco as they become outdated in comprehending the aforementioned problem because they utilize old concepts and molar categories such as 'proletariat,' 'class consciousness,' and 'revolution' to understand 20th century fascism and its effects on contemporary social organizations.⁴ This is the reason why the critical theorist Adorno in *Negative Dialectics* argues that the reification of concepts destroys the creative possibilities of the objects or realities they represent.⁵

Marxism's historico-economic reduction fails to perceive that oppression in the current scheme of things is no longer class-based, that the revolution is not anymore proletarianized, and more importantly, that mass psychology or libido is indispensable in conducting a comprehensive and timely social analysis or critique. Presently, fascism operates outside the terrains of party-politics and historical materialism. It is a reactive life-topology that does not deceive us in order to be manipulated. On the

contrary, it is a typology that causes people in broad daylight to submit themselves to exploitation or ideology. In other words, dominant theories before the May 1968 student revolt fell short in recognizing how psychic repression is caused by or inextricably related to societal domination.

Of course, the synthesis of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxist historical materialism is not an original project of Deleuze and Guattari. Before they reconstructed Reich's appropriation of this problem, the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse already attempted to elucidate the aforesaid fusion in *Eros and Civilization*.⁶ Marcuse's notion of scarcity buttresses his criticism of Freud's concepts of the pleasure and reality principle. For him, scarcity is a historically mediated and a socially configured concept. Specifically, scarcity's dissemination is regulated by the ruling class that thereby promotes social domination.⁷ Moreover, Marcuse theorizes the principle of Oedipus as a figure of repression and oppression from the domain of the family (individual repression) to the social milieu (societal domination).

Meanwhile, Deleuze and Guattari's historicization of Freud traverses an opposite pathway. They reverse the equation and opine that social oppression is the sole determinant of psychic repression. The quantity and quality of scarcity, surplus, productive forces, and the like, as well as the dynamics between them vary in manifold social organizations. In this manner, social oppression bears a plethora of appearances and consequently influences psychic oppression intermittently. This is the very reason why psychic repression is not a categorical exemplification of Oedipus complex. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari find Reich's critique of traditional Marxism and materialist psychiatry relevant and commendable, specifically in the conceptualization of schizoanalysis. Initially, they affirm Reich's project of critically showing how repression in the individual's psyche depends on domination in society. What is remarkably distinct in Reich's elucidation is the inclusion of desire. According to Deleuze and Guattari, "Social repression bears on desire.... It is the social repression of desire or sexual repression—that is, the *stasis* of libidinal energy—that actualizes Oedipus and engages desire in this requisite impasse, organized by the repressive society" (AO 118).⁸

It is interesting to note at this point that despite Deleuze and Guattari's indebtedness to Reich's critique of Marxism and materialist psychiatry, they maintain a critical distance from the latter's theory. The loophole of Reich's project is perceivable after a careful examination of his elucidation on how individual psychology is shaped by social dynamics. What Reich one-dimensionally presupposes in this equation is that society is constitutive of first-order and independent rationality, while individual

psychology is bereft of such a capability and distinctive attributes, hence making it susceptible to the perpetual manipulation of capitalist ideology. As Holland puts it, “The role of an unreconstructed Marxism for Reich is to understand and further the revolutionary historical movement of increasing productivity, rationality, and potential freedom in the ‘objective’ sphere of society ... while psychoanalysis is constrained to explain the neurotic inhibitions and irrationalities of the ‘subjective’ private sphere” (Holland 1999, 7). On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Marxism and psychoanalysis must be revised to have a better theorization of individual subjectivity and to become more dynamic in relation to societal and historical contingencies, respectively.⁹

Such dichotomies in Reich’s materialist psychiatry exist because he unsuccessfully formulates the concept of desiring-production where everything is perceived not as binary opposites but as a process of perpetual machinic connections. In addition, albeit he introduces desire in the social field, he fails to insert “desire in the economic infrastructure itself, the insertion of the drives into social production” (AO 118). This detaches psychoanalysis from societal praxis that further develops as an embodiment of what Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal—a kind of repugnance to life. In other words, psychoanalysis becomes complacent in merely explaining “the subjective, the negative, and the inhibited without participating directly as psychoanalysis in the positivity of the revolutionary movement or in the desiring-creativity” (AO 119).

In Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, psychic repression significantly involves the workings of the unconscious. However, I need to clarify that this distinctive attribute does not imply that it is comprehensible and isolated from social repression. Psychic repression exists because social repression is desired. As a result, a bogus image of its object is desired, which creates the illusion of its autonomy from the social.¹⁰

The problem of desire is neither a sole quandary of Marxism nor psychoanalysis. The marriage between politics and psychiatry espoused by schizoanalysis provides reflective and extensive resources to elucidate why the May 1968 protest occurred and how psychic repression is related to social domination and vice-versa. This enables Deleuze and Guattari to conceptualize their political philosophy as an attack against all reductive psychoanalytic and socio-political analyses that remain configured based on the principle of totality or oedipality toward a creative and revolutionary theorization of desire or desiring-production. Likewise, *Anti-Oedipus* provides theoretico-practical tools to explicate how desire can overcome itself or, at least, regulate its degenerative and fascist propensities toward praxis. As Foucault articulates in his “Preface” to the said book, Deleuze

and Guattari's project is an art that problematizes how one introduces desire into discourse and action, and how can the forces of desire be deployed within the political realm to dismantle the oppressive and degenerative frontiers of the established order (*AO* xii).

As I argued earlier, schizoanalysis is primarily a polemic against the reductive appropriation of desire of orthodox psychoanalysis. At this point, let me elaborate what Deleuze and Guattari mean by 'reductive psychoanalysis.' Dismissing any nonsexual human behavior as a kind of sexual perversion is one of the reductive features of conventional psychoanalysis. As they describe, "We have difficulty understanding what principles psychoanalysis use to support its conception of desire, when it maintains that the libido must be desexualized or even sublimated ... to proceed to the social investments, and inversely that the libido only resexualizes these investments during the course of pathological regression (*AO* 322).

Rather than desexualizing or sublimating desire, Deleuze and Guattari claim that sexuality exists ubiquitously in the social topography of the every day, and "there is no need to resort to metaphors, any more than for the libido to go by way of metamorphoses. Hitler got the fascists aroused. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people aroused" (*AO* 322). Further, the statement 'sexuality is everywhere,' entails a kind of liberation or overcoming of the Freudian psychoanalysis where sex is simply reduced to an anthropocentric concept (*AO* 294). Surprisingly, Marx argues in *Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"* that the real distinction in the discussion of sexuality is not between the male and the female sexes, but between the human and the nonhuman sexes.¹¹

In fact, the object of desire recognizes no anthropological boundaries because it deals with the entire "surroundings which it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined and in which it introduces breaks and captures" (*AO* 294). The ontological democracy characterizing the plane of immanence, which I explained in Chapter One, assumes its novel form in *Anti-Oedipus*, where Deleuze and Guattari argue that ethology can be comprehended in the realm of production (desiring-production). In this domain, a dichotomy or hierarchy does not exist between man and nature, or the human and the nonhuman. Instead of perceiving them as binary opposites, they are already perceived as part of a whole process of life (*AO* 5). The parallelism between sexuality and desire (desiring-machine) is legitimized as long as these machines operate in their social fields. As Deleuze and Guattari opine, "Desiring-machines are the nonhuman sex, the molecular machinic elements, their arrangements and their syntheses, without which there would be neither a human sex

specifically determined in the large aggregates, nor a human sexuality capable of investing these aggregates" (AO 294).

Rather than asking *how does desire work?*, psychoanalysis preoccupies itself with the essentialist query *what is desire?* From a macrolevel perspective, the representationalist structure of the question betrays the productive powers of the unconscious. Meanwhile, from a microlevel perspective, it represses desire's creative dynamism and affirmative capacities. This makes Guattari's assertion in *Chaosophy* indubitably correct: "The history of desire is inseparable from the history of its repression" (Guattari 1995). Since then, desire is merely described as something negative and isolated from the realm of social production and organization.

Deleuze and Guattari employ the 'factory model' of desire instead of the theater model as a critique of representation.¹² The said model grounds their positive theorization of desire that revolutionizes the whole Western philosophical tradition, which merely considers it as a lack or need.¹³ Their schizoanalytic project elucidates the affirmative potentialities of desire in relation to its marginalization in Psychoanalysis and Marxism. Primarily, desire in Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is illustrated as a first-order active force, not a slavish response to unsatisfied need. Desire actively produces connections, constellations, and intensities. Sadly, since the time of Plato, desire is limited to an unremitting, if not insuperable, goal in retrieving a missing object of satisfaction.

The formula desire as lack is constitutive of two binary terms, namely the desired object and the desiring subject. Psychoanalysis appropriated these two terms by theorizing the essential lack of desire to be a *conditio sine qua non* of subjectivity-formation. The child breastfed by the mother, with all needs gratified, lacks a sense of self, world, and difference.¹⁴ It is only when the baby learns to escape from this fulfilling experience or desired origin that subjectivity emerges.¹⁵ In the lens of psychoanalysis, as desire tries to surmount all kinds of lack, aversions, and differences, it likewise prepares its own deathbed. In this vein, the death drive actualizes as the essence of subjectivity that accentuates psychoanalysis' reductive interpretation of desire. In relation to this predicament, Deleuze and Guattari write:

To a certain degree, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us choose between production and acquisition. From the moment that we place desire on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (dialectical, nihilistic) conception, which causes us to look upon

it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object (AO 25).

Like Kant's theory of desire,¹⁶ psychoanalysis also examines the unexplored production side of desire. Although it initially offers an alternative and promising perspective in understanding desire, in the end, it merely concludes that desire is the production of fantasies (AO 25–26). For Deleuze and Guattari, desire, as a production of fantasies, marginalizes its dynamism and potentialities. The productivity of desire rests on its capacity to produce reality. Desire, they argue, "is the set of *passive syntheses* that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end-product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious" (AO 26). In this manner, the productive power of desire negates its perennial definition as a lack.

On the contrary, what desire lacks is a fixed subject.¹⁷ A fixed subject is fashioned through repression. In the case of desire's configuration as a lack, its representation is a kind of repression that distorts or obliterates its capacities. In fact, when we think of an individual or any human organization, desire is already repressed. Repression incapacitates the subject to capitalize its machinic attributes, i.e., to connect to other machines and establish perpetual constellations. In other words, desire is a machine—a nomadic machinery. Because of repression, unfortunately, its dynamism is segmented or is detached from the incessant flow of life.

Further, desire is not about the external relation between the binaries of the desiring subject and the desired object. Desire is production itself. Like sexuality, it is beyond the anthropocentric configurations constructed by traditional Western philosophizing. Philosophical anthropocentrism and its foremost valorization of the 'white rational man' (the transcendental image of the Western individual) only become possible because of the coding of the flows of desire into various organisms. In fact, the plane of immanence is composed of desire in the form of rhizomic flow of becoming and relations. This optimization of the capacities of desire frees itself from representation (as lack, essential to the formation of subjectivity, and as anthropological). As a corollary, we are left with our experience of the duration and encounters of bodies, not limited to the human (B 28). What is desired is thus a preindividual 'germinal influx of intensity' (AO 164).¹⁸ The fecund, impersonal, and differential characteristics of desire transform it as intrinsically revolutionary capacitated to dismantle all kinds of oppressive and dogmatic systems.

Desire is intrinsically capable of crafting connections and reality. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari:

There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other.... We maintain that the social field is invested by desire, that it is the historically product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation ... in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production. There is only desire and the social, and nothing else (AO 31).

Desire does not necessitate a mediation of fantasy and the deceptions of ideology to be socially invested. I agree with Buchanan in claiming that Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of desire "offers a model of the unconscious which exerts far greater influence on the subject, yet also has far more psychical independence than either psychoanalysis or Marxism allow for" (Buchanan 2008, 48).

If the concept 'object' or 'objective' has a place in the Deleuzo-Guattarian schizoanalysis, it is in the form of a critique of stratified or oedipalized organizations. These organizations estrange desire from its objective and protean existence because creative becomings are homogenized by representationalist or Statist principles. Doubtless, the revolutionaries and artists receive noble admiration from Deleuze and Guattari: "Revolutionaries, artists ... are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs" (AO 27).¹⁹ Indeed, desire has a crucial role in revolution (becoming-revolutionary) and its immanent existence in the social milieu (AO 377). More importantly, desire, as Patton profoundly asserts, "must be understood to embody the power of differential reproduction or becoming-other which is the condition of creativity in culture, as well as in nature" (Patton 2000, 70).

B. Schizoanalytic Critique of Oedipus and Capitalism

B.1 Syntheses of Desire and the Internal Criticism of Oedipus

Anti-Oedipus aims to fulfill the promise of Kant's critique through the replacement of conventional psychoanalysis (i.e., Freudian and Lacanian) toward a revolutionary materialist psychiatry (schizoanalysis). The utilization of the schizoanalytic model of desire depicts the psyche as an assemblage of desiring-machines. This initiative indisputably supports the entire *Anti-Oedipus* project whose primary goal is to connect psychoanalysis (libidinal economy) and Marxism (political economy). For a comprehensive

understanding of the nature of desiring-machines, it is important to explain how it operates based on the three syntheses of desire, namely the ‘connective synthesis of production,’ the ‘disjunctive synthesis of recording,’ and the ‘conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation.’ They are referred to as ‘syntheses’ so as to conjure their analogical relation to Deleuze’s explanation in *Difference and Repetition*, specifically on how Freud underscores the significance of repetition in psychic life in the form of a materialist ontology of repetition that espouses a ritornello of difference instead of sameness (*DR* 14).²⁰

The connective synthesis of production is derived from the Freudian concept of drives, cathexis, and polymorphous perversity.²¹ Productive desire is intrinsically connective because it “constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows” (*AO* 5). In *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, Deleuze and Guattari explain how Franz Kafka’s *The Metamorphosis* illustrates the two metaphoric states of desire that operate across *Anti-Oedipus*’ immanent critique of conventional psychoanalysis: the ‘bent head/portrait-photo’ and the ‘straightened head/musical sound.’ The former, as “Gregor glues himself to the *portrait* of the woman in fur and bends his head toward the door in a desperate attempt to hold onto something in his room” (*K* 5), represents a neutralized or repressed image of desire, characterized by scarce connections, memory of childhood experience, and reterritorialization.²² On the other hand, the latter, as “Gregor leaves his room, guided by the *vibrating* sound of the violin, and tries to grab onto the uncovered neck of his sister,” (*K* 5) signifies a desire that ceaselessly moves and opens up for new connections and deterritorializations. Of course, affirmation is directed to the latter because music, as a sonorous material, bears the aptitude of becoming-other (becoming-child/animal) that further blocks the decadent and rigidifying propensity of visual memory.

Furthermore, the first synthesis merely connects partial-objects, not whole organs or persons. ‘Part-objects’ is a term coined by Melanie Klein in *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*.²³ The connections between part-objects are unceasing and heterogeneous: a hand rubs an eye, then holds a book, and then grabs another hand, as well as a mouth connecting to a mother’s breast, eating a food, and then biting an arm, and the like. The connective synthesis is “inherently connective in nature.... This is because there is always a flow-producing machine and another machine connected to it that interrupts ... part of this flow (the breast-the mouth)” (*AO* 5).

Whereas the connective synthesis of production deals with incessant connections, the disjunctive synthesis of recording initially deals

with the psyche as a recording apparatus of past objects of satisfaction. The utilization of the Freudian characterization of the psyche aspires to criticize psychoanalysis' fixated relation to the Oedipus complex.²⁴

Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition* a philosophy of difference that would backbone his materialist poststructuralist philosophy. In Deleuze's collaborative years with Guattari, the restoration of difference in relation to identity actualizes as its paramount concern. What I mean by the restoration of difference is that Deleuze obliterates the pedigree of identity over difference in the history of Western philosophy. The restored primacy of difference, accordingly, transfigures the concept of 'repetition' no longer as a repetition of the same, but of difference.²⁵ In short, a materialist philosophy of difference espouses a recurrence of difference, not of reactive repetition.

From a microperspective, this radical project also includes a critique of Freud's metaphysical conceptualization of repetition based on identity, or as what Nietzsche describes as the old image of thought. The compulsion to repeat, as Freud asserts in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, qualifies pleasure to be a principle of psychic life.²⁶ However, because this coercion for repetition is grounded on the death instinct (the return to life's primal state), it redounds to a mechanical return to identity—a state of incarceration in the principles of stasis, fixation, and neurosis. As regards the first synthesis of desire, being recurrently fixated with a certain connection is unproductive—the reactive kind of desire portrayed by the bent head/portrait photo model. On the other hand, the Deleuzian philosophy suggests a differentialization of repetition in psychic life, which is the principle of pleasure—the active desire symbolized by the straightened head/musical sound. Thus, pleasure is emancipated from metaphysical repetition and linear temporality, that is, from a reactive kind of repetition anchored on identity (the kind of pleasure fixated on the past) to an active repetition of difference and variation.

Furthermore, the disjunctive synthesis of desire necessitates a counter-force that would complement it with the connective synthesis of production. This counter-force ascertains that an organism develops habitual patterns of connection with another. More importantly, it obliterates a preexisting or fixated connection toward newer connections. The productive desire operating in the connective synthesis, fueled by differential repetition and improvisation, requires the neutralizing presence of the principle of 'antiproduction.'

Because Nietzschean philosophy is an omnipresent framework in the Deleuzian canon, it is interesting to relate Nietzsche's "Three Metamorphoses" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to the present discussion. One

important facet of this principle is the ardent recommendation that modern humanity should not be reactively overwhelmed or apprehensive with the hammering philosophy of the Lion (the destroyer). Being fixated on this symbolic stage (albeit signifying the principle of the will to power) would surely engender unbearable consequences in the long run. Antiproduction resembles that of a Nietzschean force that would either stop or freeze the rampaging current of the lion toward new beginnings and connections.

Another relevant concept with regard to antiproduction is the Freudian notion of the death instinct. The former is a revitalized version of the latter. Rather than merely being a passive spectator of the connective synthesis' productivity, antiproduction halts the existing organ connections to craft new ones. Also, it desexualizes desire, which then constitutes a recording surface where networks of relations are registered. Thus, the 'anti' in antiproduction is not automatically negative like the Hegelian antithesis. Albeit antiproduction cuts the dynamism of desiring-production, it introduces desire a new virtual capacity.²⁷

The novel dimension of desire elicited from antiproduction (disjunctive synthesis of recording) facades Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of the 'Body-without-Organs' (BwO).²⁸ Although the term BwO is borrowed from Antonin Artaud, the question of the composition of individuals using the body as the model of philosophizing goes as far as Deleuze's Spinozist and Nietzschean lineages. But, of course, what is derived from these thinkers is the theorization of the body as something beyond the categorizations of logic, science, and metaphysics. Deleuze circumvents the essentialist question of "*what is the body?*" by focusing on how the body differentializes itself to affect other bodies and to be affected perpetually. The kinetic and expressionist attributes of the body abolish any attempt to conceive it as an organism characterized by *a priori* and immutable attributes. This explanation initially grounds the Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of the BwO.²⁹

In relation to the production of desire, BwO is conceptualized in conjunction with the problem of how the body is organized and disorganized to fashion other kinds of organizations, if not an utter breakdown of all. Deleuze understands the body as a protean locus of organization and disorganization. The noble importance of the disorganizing aptitude of antiproduction and BwO is its repulsion or neutralization of the possibility of desiring-production to be fixated only with a single organ-machine or relation. A typical example is when the baby via his or her mouth achieves the nourishment it needs from the mother's breast. The relation between the two organ-machines is destroyed as soon as the latter finishes giving its product in the form of satisfaction to the former. Consequently, connection

transitions to disjunction, or the connective synthesis of production transforms into the disjunctive synthesis of recording. In the said process, the satisfying experience achieved is recorded in the BwO. This experience can also be understood as a kind of emancipation from the preexisting relation in pursuit of new ones open-endedly.

As signs of machinic connections are registered, the BwO provides a surface that harmonizes repetition and memory, which subsequently mobilizes individuals to iterate a mode of desiring-satisfaction in the past, with either superior or inferior quantity or quality of freedom of variation within repetition.³⁰ Unlike the Lacanian notion of the metonymy of desire,³¹ the system of relations created in the BwO is multiple, synchronic, and polyvocal. Its operations are shaped by the rhizomic mode of ‘free association’ among signs that thereby craft diversified sign-relations—“a multiplicity so complex that we can scarcely speak of one chain or even of one code of desire” (AO 38).³²

The intermittent relation between desiring-production (connections) and antiproduction (repulsions) ushers the organ-machines and the BwO into a dice-playing existence. If the latter overrides the former, the opaque and undifferentiated appearance of the BwO is activated to subject the organ-machines’ fluid mobility into a halt. On the other hand, when the former prevails, the organ-machines are attracted to the BwO, and as such, novel relations are produced in a grid-like manner. Notwithstanding the detrimental consequence produced via the annihilating or interruptive power of antiproduction, the BwO has the positive dimension of opening up to new types of relations and sign-systems. Therefore, the BwO (the disjunctive synthesis of recording) can illustrate a potentiality for freedom.

However, despite the liberating potential of the disjunctive synthesis, its antiproducer spirit can likewise engender the total breakdown of connections and organizations. Because there is no guarantee whether disorganization would prevail over organization or vice-versa in the social sphere, the repulsion of preexisting relations can be internalized as a kind of repression (neurosis or self-denial), which reminds us of Freud’s ‘primal repression.’³³ If all existing connections are withdrawn and new organ-machine connections are no longer established, the disjunctive synthesis can lead to the full existence of the BwO. In this vein, individuals enter the state of ‘catatonia’ that is usually the authorship of capitalist society’s vehement refusal to countenance—the schizophrenic process cultivated by capitalism itself (LS 189).³⁴ Catatonics are people pauperized by Oedipus as “they become immobile, silent, they retreat to the body without organs ... where all desiring-production is arrested.... These catatonic bodies have ... entrusted all their forces to primal repression, in

order to escape the system of social and psychic repression that fabricates neurotics” (*AO* 135–136).

The dominance of one kind of production over the other greatly depends on the prevailing mode of social production and whether individuals would relate to it actively or reactively. But aside from the formations and breakdowns generated from this antithetical relationship, the interplay between the forces of desiring-production and antiproduction can also engender multiple forms of subjectivity in the stage of conjunctive synthesis consumption-consummation. The indispensability of this stage rests on its power to dispossess the subject from developing an attitude of hubris in relation to other things. Rather than being a metaphysical concept, the subject simply appears as a result of the selective process rendered by desire among manifold connective and disjunctive syntheses. This reminds us of Deleuze’s indebtedness to thinkers such as Hume and Spinoza, where the subject is pondered as a by-product of different impressions, and agency is merely produced by its power to affect another body and the aptitude to be affected, respectively.

The creative struggle between desiring-production and antiproduction produces two notable kinds of subjectivity conceptualized by Freud as the ‘pervert’ and the ‘neurotic.’ The former is produced when desiring-production predominates over antiproduction. Forces of connective production spawn and uphold unconventional organ-machine connections despite the panoptical control of social norms. On the other hand, the latter is created if the antiproduction prevails over desiring-production. Here, the disavowal of newer organ-connections causes the fixation to an unsatisfactory substitute connection.³⁵

Even though the 38th parallel that separates the pervert and the neurotic is configured by their quantitative and qualitative divergence, they converge on the idea that the subject is merely an outcome of the connection and disjunction initiated by desire in the BwO. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “the subject is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines, or that he confuses himself with this third productive machine and with the residual reconciliation that it brings about: a conjunctive synthesis of consummation in the form of a wonders truck ‘So that’s what it was!’” (*AO* 17–18). Thus, traditional Western philosophy’s hubristic conception of the sovereign or transcendental subjectivity—of a subject who is consciously and wholly responsible for all its choices and pleasures, is nothing but a whimsical idea. If ever the subject recognizes its constitution (its choices, desires, pleasures, and the like), it is only through retrospective thinking—“That was me.” The consummating experience of

the subject is likewise a democratizing moment in its fluid constitution derived from the two previous syntheses of desire.

Further, the subject's delusion of sovereignty is one of traditional Western philosophy's bad faith(s) that allows us to conceive 'the Subject'—the transcendental, metaphysical, and Cartesian. The three syntheses of desire do not produce a subject of this sort unless it becomes fixated on a specific connection or identity such as the pervert and the neurotic. Whereas the first and the second syntheses engender perpetual connections and fluid recordings, the third derives from the BWO relations heterogeneous and web-like intensities. These states of experiences are then recognized and consummated retroactively by a subject of that experience, "as through which it passes and is born of each of them anew" (*AO* 41).³⁶

Although the pervert and the neurotic subjectivities illustrate fixed identity personalities, there are also types of subjectivities emerging from the fissures of the interaction between desiring-production and antiproduction, namely the 'paranoiac' and the 'schizophrenic.' Because their genealogies are offshoots of less rigidified relations, these personality-structures are not entirely estranged from the dynamic and open-ended characteristics of the syntheses of desire.

The paranoiac resists the aggressiveness of desiring-production. It becomes incompletely successful because there remain residues of the forces of attraction. Positively, a sense of hope emanates from this struggle because intensity is still produced as compared with the full BwO's zero-degree intensity. The schizophrenic, on the other hand, embraces both the forces of production and antiproduction affirmatively and radically. It pushes them to their limits by going back to square one, that is, by starting from the first (connective) and the second (disjunctive) syntheses of desire toward the consummation of a nomadic subject or subjectivity. As Deleuze and Guattari assert, "The proportions of attraction and repulsion on the body without organs produce, starting from zero, a series of states in the celibate machine; and the subject is born of each state in the series, is continually reborn of the following state that determines him at a given moment, consuming-consummating all these states that cause him to be born and reborn" (*AO* 20). In other words, schizophrenic subjectivity offers a model of intensive experience (enjoyment and suffering) that ceaselessly radicalizes the psychic life by producing nomadic subjects or subjectivities capable of differentializing the imperialized citadel of Oedipus.

The three syntheses of desire comprise the dynamic configurations of the schizoanalytic model of the psyche or subjectivity. The formulation of this Deleuzo-Guattarian brand of subjectivity is primarily conditioned by the reactive dominance of Oedipal subjectivity in the study of the psyche

(individual and societal). The Freudian-authored concept serves as the nerve-center of the nuclear family under the capitalist regime. It operates based on a systematic yet illegitimate utilization of the very syntheses of desire that make schizoanalytic subjectivity possible. Schizoanalytic subjectivity, on the other hand, serves as the regulative principle of the Deleuzo-Guattarian materialist psychiatry. A psychiatry founded on the material contingencies of life is presented by Deleuze and Guattari as the basic foundation of their critique of Oedipus. Specifically, they want to delineate Freudian psychoanalysis' paralogisms in relation to the nature of desire.³⁷ Freudian psychoanalysis appropriates the Oedipus complex as the child's prohibition to marry his mother and to murder his father. This theory is flawed because its conclusion is a direct derivative of the prohibition against incest (*AO* 114).³⁸ In this circumstance, desire is trapped in the 'paralogism of displacement.' Desire is presented with a fabricated image of itself by virtue of the Oedipus complex in the very activity of prohibiting it. In other words, as individuals come to discover what they want in life, they suddenly realize that these things are beyond their grasp. The falsified image of desire's inaccessible object made possible by Oedipal prohibition represses desire because it is created to trap desire's revolutionary potentialities.

The paralogism of displacement is a significant microcosm of fixed representations that distort or falsify the dynamism of desire. But let me highlight at this juncture that the distortion or the fixed representation of desire is something inevitable because the BwO is a neutral surface that records productive connections as signs. Its ambivalent attribute opens desire for possible distortion, fixation, and variation (*AO* 339). In relation to this, we are reminded of Lacan's characterization of the unconscious as comparable to language (sign-system). For Lacan, the catastrophic disappearance of any direct relation between consciousness and the bodily drives occurs the moment the operations of the unconscious are interpreted in relation to semiotics. Pessimism then shrouds Lacanian philosophy because the only recourse left for subjects is the resignation to the absurdity of the unconscious, and consciousness would simply lead to neurosis. Deleuze and Guattari affirm the Lacanian argument that the unconscious is structured like language as a multifaceted sign-system. Even though the impossibility to conceive a perfect representation of the machinic connections of bodily drives opens desire for fabrication or misinterpretation, "its 'form-of-semiosis' constitutes ... a crucial index of the extent to which a given system of representation agrees with or contravenes the dynamics of unconscious desire as understood by schizoanalysis" (Holland 1999, 38). The presence of such a criterion makes schizoanalysis a critical and

revolutionary semiotics. Despite the cogency of Lacan's pessimistic criterion, it can guide us in determining the illegitimate uses of the syntheses, portrayed by Freudian psychoanalysis which betrays desire's revolutionary potentialities.

Schizoanalysis conceives the nuclear family as an assemblage of social practices and discourses. The nuclear family is comparable to psychoanalysis' system of representation, as well as its appropriation of the Oedipus complex. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari assert that it is psychoanalysis that fortifies the nuclear family's objective movement in the capitalist society. But this explanation does not entail that they accuse psychoanalysis of creating Oedipus (*AO* 122).

In the nuclear family, desire is recorded as oedipalized in the BwO. Its representationalist recording halts desire's protean capabilities that thereby ground the production of oedipalized subjects. However, the nuclear family (as a capitalist-configured and psychoanalytic-fortified institution) is not beyond critique. Although it is transcendentalized in psychoanalysis, the nuclear family is a historically configured institution of production, and despite its capitalist capture, its historico-material specificities open the windows for psychoanalysis' self-criticism that would further lead to Oedipus' overthrow.

Moreover, the nuclear family is an institution that crafts fixed subjectivities—contrary to the nomadic subject produced in the conjunctive synthesis. The belief of fixed subjectivity (the neurotic or pervers) adheres to the metaphysical illusion of sovereign subjectivity, and such commits the 'paralogism of the illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis.' This paralogism is guilty of depriving the subject of its nomadic nature and its fluid relation to other subjectivities. In history, we witness how this restrictive blunder authors different forms of totalizations and exclusions such as religious fundamentalism, gender inequality, and cultural imperialism. Luce Irigaray, for example, boldly argues in her magnum opus, *This Sex which is not One*, that: "Female sexuality has always been conceptualized on the basis of masculine parameters. Thus, the opposition between 'masculine' clitoral activity and 'feminine' vaginal passivity ... in the development of a sexually 'normal' woman seems rather too required by the practice of male sexuality" (Irigaray 1977, 23). Her claim rests on the privileging of the male phallus in the sexual political economy or discourse that violently reduces women into subaltern or commodified categories.

Irigaray's project is a microcosm of the poststructuralist movement that aspires to critically diagnose or dismantle the totalizing artilleries of transcendental or State philosophy. However, one of the

distinguishing features of Deleuze and Guattari's project is that they approach the problems brought about by State philosophy not from the vantage point of power, language, or sexual politics, but from something more fundamental—desire. They analyze the legitimate and illegitimate utilizations of desire, and how the paralogisms of appropriating desire contributed to different societal marginalizations: “Desire is part of the infrastructure. Preconscious investments are made ... according to the interests of the opposing classes. But unconscious investments are made according to positions of desire and uses of synthesis” (*AO* 104).

In nomadic subjectivity, identities are democratized and are perceived to be inseparable from the collective whole. On the contrary, in Oedipal (fixed) subjectivity, individuals are polluted by hubris as they believe to be part of a privileged group such as the Christians and the white male people. The illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis “brings about the feeling of ‘indeed being one of us,’ of being part of a superior race threatened by enemies from outside” (*AO* 103). The more individuals imbibe this delusional or ideological sentiment, the more Oedipus strengthens.³⁹ Hence, a nomadic revolution or resistance today must be characterized by inclusivity and fluidity, which includes even nonhuman factors.

The nuclear family is an institution that caters and reinforces the reproduction of fixed and exclusionary subjectivity. Capitalism consciously individuates Oedipal subjects in the nuclear family from other social mechanisms for their identities to be restrictively patterned before the mother (the prohibited object of desire) and the father (the agent of desire).⁴⁰ Increased illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis and reproduction of exclusionary subjectivity in the family would mean increased manipulation and marginalization. Unfortunately, the more individuals are denied of their exterior relations, the more the creative subjectivities get enfeebled, and the more desire's alterity and revolutionary potentialities are corrupted. To rehabilitate their constricted subjectivity and fairly cope with the contingencies of life, Oedipal subjects seek the capitalist-laden therapy of the psychoanalyst. Sports and political fanatics, religious fundamentalists, and blind nationalists are some of the social manifestations of the problem emerging from the nuclear family. In relation to the aforesaid quandary, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate their critique of the nuclear family:

[It] is never a microcosm in the sense of an autonomous figure, even when inscribed in a larger circle that it is said to mediate and express. The family is by nature eccentric, decentered.... The family does not engender its own ruptures. Families are filled with gaps and transected by breaks that are not familial:

the Commune ... the rise of fascism, Stalinism, the Vietnam War, May '68—all these things form complexes of the unconscious, more effective than everlasting Oedipus (*AO 97*).

This critique confirms their position that individual repression cannot be holistically comprehended and analyzed independent from societal repression. The nuclear family is neither a microcosm nor an independent institution. Like the body, it serves as a conduit of socio-historical determinations. While psychoanalysis misrecognizes this fact, capitalism erects rigid walls around its territory and creates a fabricated notion of desire and subjectivity to safeguard its incessant domination and amplification. Highlighting such a capital mistake of psychoanalysis and viciousness of capitalism elicits another illegitimate use of the conjunctive syntheses—the ‘biunivocalization of subjectivity.’ This process reduces the polyvocal attributes of nomadic conjunctions and contingencies. It likewise totalizes the complex and rhizomic terrains of the unconscious.

The two paralogisms incarcerate desire in binary hierarchies, thereby segregating subjectivities into privileged and marginalized groups. The homogenization of desire is aggravated in the nuclear family because its aptitude is limited to the Oedipal triangulation. The prohibitor-prohibited paradigm of the mother and the father eventually translates into the oppressor-oppressed rubric. The nuclear family estranges psychoanalysis in the sense that Oedipal subjectivity reduces everything into Oedipal triangulation—‘paralogism of application’. All contingencies and nuances of social materialities are converted into biunivocal interpretations. Therefore, all are oversimplified into an Oedipal problem, regardless of the complexities of societal productions.⁴¹ On the contrary, nomadic or schizophrenic subjectivity legitimately utilizes the disjunctive synthesis. It affirms other differences and possibilities beyond Oedipus Complex’s myopic territories and mobilizes subjectivity beyond the Oedipal double-impasse. It is true that the father-mother model remains as one of the identity-determinations of the nomad or schizo. But individuals must not get fixated with it because such an Oedipal pattern is only one among the conduits of desire such as animals, plants, and any other forms of human collectivities.

From the family, let us now turn to gender distinctions—the very concept by which Lacanian psychoanalysis is guilty of the illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis. This paralogism limits gender distinctions into either male or female. Following the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy of the middle, sexuality is conceived as irreducible to either aforementioned identities or even to homosexuality or heterosexuality. In this sense, everyone is at the same time neither and both. Neither subjectivity-category

contains immutable essences while remaining hospitable to the elements of both, without synthesizing the two in a way that divergences and tensions between them would be annihilated. There are neither one nor two, but ‘*n* sexes.’ In fact, schizoanalysis is formulated by Deleuze and Guattari as “the variable analysis of the *n* sexes in a subject, beyond the anthropomorphic representations that society imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality” (AO 296).

Instead of succumbing to the limiting configurations of Oedipus or the nuclear family, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of ‘transsexuality’: “We are statistically or molarly heterosexual, but personally homosexual, without knowing it or being fully aware of it, and finally we are transsexual in an elemental, molecular sense” (AO 70). Briefly, adhering to the legitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis, transsexuality is never fixated to particular binary relations such as homosexuality and heterosexuality. Rather, this novel concept affirms a multiplicity of differences beyond Oedipal and anthropocentric representations.⁴² Subjectivity is transsexual then when it has the aptitude of becoming-other. Writ large, disjunctive synthesis is legitimately abused when it encourages exclusivity rather than inclusivity. Meaning to say, it discriminately limits the kinds of possible satisfaction for the multifaceted drives it differentiates. This compels us to choose between limited binary identities, which contain the potentiality of becoming ideological, reductive, and repressive.⁴³

The illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis breeds the illegitimate use of the connective synthesis or the ‘paralogism of extrapolation.’ One of its adverse effects is the biunivocalization of the principle of free association authored by no less than psychoanalysis. Ideally, free association portrays a legitimate usage of the connective and disjunctive syntheses. Unfortunately, conventional psychoanalysis biunivocalizes the polyvocal connections rendered or promoted by free association, resulting in stereotype identifications or prejudiced propositions such as ‘English is the global language,’ ‘Everything that is Western is superior,’ and ‘All Muslims are terrorists.’ It commits a paralogism because it privileges and isolates one term (such as the ‘English’ or ‘Western’) over other connections or chain of associations. Thus, these terms are reified such as reason, man, and money as they transfigure into universal concepts that condition the possibilities and regulate the meanings of all the others.⁴⁴

The last paralogism is called the ‘paralogism of the afterward.’ Similar to the paralogism of application, it positions the nuclear family as the regulative principle of anything socio-historical in relation to psychic life. Socio-historical productions and investments are demoted as sublimated forms of Oedipal relations processed within the nuclear family.

Saying that the “father is first in relation to the child” (*AO* 274) means that social investments, the investment of desire, are more primary than the Oedipal relations in the family.⁴⁵ Thus, Oedipal relations in the nuclear family are not primary, autonomous, and universal in relation to socio-historical dynamics. These fixated and restrictive relations are mere creations and delegations by capitalism. In addition, the nuclear family is not an abstract nor universal concept because it is a socio-historically constituted capitalist institution.

The five paralogsms exclude socio-historical investments from the institution of the nuclear family. As the nuclear family is magnified as a sovereign and primary institution, it strengthens its capacities as a capitalist-manipulated reproductive mechanism (*AO* 99). Societal production can eventually develop and continually revolutionize itself without regard for nomadic subjectivity-formation and reproduction, as well as the direct management of desire. Through the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of desire vis-à-vis the fortification of the nuclear family as capitalist machinery, any attempt to antagonize Oedipal authorities (the father or the capitalist) would always appear, in a deceitful fashion, as an incestuous initiative.

Desiring-production and social production initially constitute the two sides of the same coin (*AO* 29). Nevertheless, from a schizoanalytic standpoint, they are different from each other because the former contains the immanent rubrics in critically diagnosing the historicity of social production. In doing so, desiring-production conceals social production’s oppression and corruption of its capability to radically overthrow the prevailing social mechanism (*AO* 116).

Capitalism’s delegation of social repression to the nuclear family deceptively constructs a narrative that indicts the Oedipus complex as an independent source of psychic repression (*AO* 113). However, adhering to this narrative prioritizes psychic repression over social repression—in a way that analyzing the predicament of the former no longer necessitates its interface with the latter. Oedipal psychoanalysis’ valorization of psychic repression as primary and universal, and social oppression as secondary and inevitable are reversed in Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis.⁴⁶ Instead of merely reversing the situation one-dimensionally, they ascribe the potentiality of both kinds of repression to the recording of desire in the ambivalent BwO initially through the primary repression engendered by antiproduction (*AO* 120). This movement emphasizes that despite the difference in nature between the two kinds of repression, genuine independence cannot be established: “Psychic repression is such that social repression becomes desired; it induces a consequent desire, a faked image

of its object, on which it bestows the appearance of independence.... Psychic repression is a means in the service of social repression. What it bears on is also the object of social repression: desiring-production" (*AO* 119).

What is then the overarching significance of knowing the criteria immanent to the creative operations of the unconscious? Through the elucidation of the legitimate and illegitimate utilizations of the syntheses of desire, Oedipal psychoanalysis is subjected to self-critique. Avoiding such immanent examination is acquiescing to the allegation of being oppressive and metaphysical. Schizoanalysis does not restrict itself to the critical examination of the nuclear family. It magnifies its critical project by highlighting that even the social milieu of production and reproduction is guilty of parallel misconducts, which necessitate its immanent diagnosis and more importantly, its radical transformation.

B.2 A Genealogy of Social Production as External Criticism of Oedipus

The internal critique of Oedipal psychoanalysis opens the possibility for psychic oppression to be historicized—the locus of the external critique of Oedipus. In this part, a historicization of the transcendental status achieved by Oedipus in contemporary social organization and the kind of repression it gives to desire will be elucidated through a genealogical analysis. It is also significant to note that a genealogy of Oedipus or capitalism necessitates a genealogy of two previous dominant social organizations, namely ‘Savage Territorial Machine’ (Savagery) and the ‘Barbarian Despotic Machine’ (Despotism).⁴⁷

Foucault positively appropriates the Nietzschean notion of ‘genealogy’ to demonstrate that what society considers as universal truths are merely products of historical contingencies and power-relations.⁴⁸ Whereas Nietzsche launches a genealogical critique of nihilism, Deleuze and Guattari utilize genealogy to illustrate the differential origins of Oedipus. Genealogy aims to search and appraise how an array of events, tensions, and propensities spawn novel social relations and organizations (*NP* 2). A genealogy of Oedipus therefore attempts to reveal and evaluate the fragments and fissures responsible for the cultivation of social repression that forms the assemblage of Oedipus, as well as seeks how its very own reproductive mechanism is specific to capitalism. More importantly, because genealogy also endorses the invention of new concepts and possibilities of life (*NP* 101), a genealogy or external critique of Oedipus depicts its capability to produce schizophrenia. Paradoxically,

schizophrenia is a ubiquitous and general propensity of capitalism despite Oedipal repression and biunivocalization of desire.

Among the three kinds of social organization, savagery is the most primitive. Under this societal setting, power dynamically circulates in the community because it is not monopolized by a single group, and the entire structure of the community is nonhierarchical. However, the positive democratization of power in savagery entails the absence of any sustainable economic apparatus that thereby opens the door for punitive governance based on rigorous beliefs and practices.

The case of incest-taboo, for example, is viewed as an affirmative provocation of establishing relations, rather than as a deviant sexual behavior within the family. Of course, we should not hastily conclude that it is not verboten in a savage society. It is merely overridden by the overarching goal of establishing and strengthening the culture of sharing, solidarity, and distribution. It is because all means of life in savagery democratically circulate in the whole social field. The structure of expenditures and the system of debt-obligations consist of "mobile and finite blocks of debt" (*AO* 190). Although perverse, they are built to preclude desire's instantaneous access to its object (life's fundamental needs such as food and shelter, including the presence of the mother). In terms of the syntheses of desire, the productive synthesis of connections (in relation to the earth and the mother) are interrupted by the registration process of disjunctive synthesis or antiproduction (*AO* 188).

However, the exclusivist kind of disjunctive synthesis epitomized by savagery still diverges from the overall structure of the modern nuclear family. In the former, lineage filiations and coalitions exceed the boundary of the family, hence are dispersed in the entire social field. In the latter, relations are segregated from the entire social milieu, and only one layer of familial alliances is involved. Oedipal relation is estranged from the savage social organization. Albeit both of them repress desire, the former merely inhibits the desire for life under a social system of representation, not desire itself, which is the object of the latter: "Oedipus is indeed the limit, but the displaced limit that now passes into the interior of the socius. Oedipus is the baited image with which desire allows itself to be caught.... Then a long story begins, the story of oedipalization" (*AO* 166).

A partitioned society generally characterizes the barbarian despotic machine, the second kind of social organization. As opposed to savagery, despotism is structured by classes or gradations. Although fluid codes and principles are propagated in the communal space, they promote political power and imperial domination beyond the panoptical grasp of economic machinery: "the law is the invention of the despot himself" (*AO*

212). The deficiencies of the two previous types of social organization are addressed by the civilized capitalist machine. The creative struggle between economics and power in capitalism, including its productivity that can really uplift the overall welfare of communal life. But these supposed affirmative features are always vitiated by capitalism's endorsement of private ownership and production for its own sake, primarily because of the power-structure behind it. Because of this unrealized potentiality intrinsic to capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari schizoanalyze capitalism to foster the fourth social organization, a 'new earth'—virtually located at the end of universal history (*LS* 49).⁴⁹

At the levels of power and economic relations, Deleuze and Guattari summarize the distinction of the three kinds of social organization:

[T]he savage territorial machine operated on the basis of connections of production, and that the barbarian despotic machine was based on disjunctions of inscription derived from the eminent unity. But the capitalist machine ... will first establish itself on the conjunction. When this occurs, the conjunction no longer merely designates remnants that have escaped coding.... When the conjunction moves to the fore in the social machine, it seems on the contrary that it ceases to ... the excess consumption of a class, that it makes luxury itself into a means of investment, and reduces all the decoded flows to production ... for production's sake that rediscovers the primitive connections of labor, on the sole condition that they be linked to capital and to the new deterritorialized full body (*AO* 224–225).

Further, the plane where social production is organized is in the socius, while that of desiring-production is in the BwO. In this case, the earth serves as the socius of savagery, while the despot and capital (money) act as the socius of despotism and capitalism, respectively. However, the comparison between the two must not be understood in binary terms. For Deleuze and Guattari, "The socius is not a projection of the BwO; rather, the BwO is the limit of the socius ... the ultimate residue of deterritorialized socius ... the earth, the body of the despot, capital-money—are clothed full bodies, just as the BwO is a naked full body; but the latter exists at the limit, at the end, not at the origin" (*AO* 281). Concurrent with these historical variations of the socius is the historically dynamic relationship between social production and desiring-production.⁵⁰

The relative divergence between social production and desiring-production is differentially harmonized by antiproduction. As previously discussed, antiproduction bears the ability to actively stop the existing

current of organ connections for the creation of new ones. Similarly, it desexualizes desire in the BwO that further constitutes a recording surface where a web of relations is registered. Side-by-side with antiproduction's positive attributes is its ambivalent characteristic in relation to desiring-production. Its *Janus* face consists its affirmative feature that enables the assessment of registration process results and emancipates desire from deterministic constellations. Meanwhile, the possibility of capturing desire through societal representation resembles its negative quality. Despite its imperfection, antiproduction has rectified the pathologization of desire in traditional Western philosophy (and psychoanalysis) since Zeno and Plato's time. Distinguishing the three kinds of social organization helps us determine the various degrees antiproduction incorporates to lack and needs to desiring-production.⁵¹

Marx's philosophy converges with schizoanalysis in putting a premium on the forces of production. Forces of production remain significant for Marx, but it is the relations of production that define societal configuration. Meanwhile, for Deleuze and Guattari, the former is important because they can serve as a fecund milieu for desire's expression and operations. But the forces of production's dynamism should not lead us to overlook the fact that production's meaning is dependent, nevertheless on the relations of antiproduction.⁵²

Lastly, by virtue of antiproduction's capability to organize energy and matter flows in society, it opposes the structuralist argument that societal organization is ubiquitously similar across the globe, inasmuch as it is being regulated by a system of exchange.⁵³ Of course, the genealogical analysis of social organization would negate this position. Because there is a respective *socius* to the three types of social organization, it implies that there are manifold ways by which desire is coded and inscribed.

The invention of money exemplifies another instance that contradicts the structuralist system of exchange.⁵⁴ Money, from the perspective of schizoanalysis, is created as an instrument for the payment of debt, not as a means for the barter of goods (*AO* 97). In relation to the invalidity of the 'exchangism' principle of structuralism, even debt lacks any universal face across the three types of social organizations. For example, the collective debt of marginalized individuals owed to the despot is apparently different from the debt owed to the capital in the capitalist system. Deleuze and Guattari acclaim Nietzsche for his philosophic insight regarding this matter: "For the Genealogy, the second essay is an attempt and a success without equal at interpreting primitive economy in terms of debt, in the debtor-creditor relationship, by eliminating every consideration of exchange or interest 'à l'anglaise'" (*AO* 190). The principle of debt

generally represents relations of societal obligations to be administered and enforced by antiproduction. Therefore, antiproduction is coextensive with how societal relations are managed in systems of debt processed according to different social organizations.

As discussed earlier, energy and matter-flows are organized by antiproduction in the socius. At this point, it is equally important to discern how this aptitude is related to the three ideal types of social organization. In the beginning of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze distinguishes two major orders, namely the ‘qualitative order of resemblances’ and ‘the quantitative order of equivalences’ (*DR* 1). Using these rubrics, social organization can be administered either qualitatively (symbolically) or quantitatively (economically).

Savagery is organized symbolically via codes (coding). Under this social organization, antiproduction comprises of the ephemeral and democratized accumulation of certain goods of paramount value to the community. Because the existing social codes serve as the determinant of what is essential and worth accumulating, Deleuze and Guattari describe this process as the ‘surplus-value of code.’ Being a primitive kind, the surplus-value of code “carries out the diverse operations of the primitive territorial machine: detaching segments from the chain, organizing selections from the flows, and allocating the portions due each person” (*AO* 150). Debt is intermittent, shared, and immanent to the kinship system. These characteristics help prevent the monopolization of power by a single family or group.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, despotism is managed symbolically in the form of overcodes (overcoding). The system of antiproduction involves infinite and monopolized debt to the despot. The web-like characteristics of debt processed in the previous organization are totalized by the despot to fortify his imperial authority. In savagery, antiproduction comprises of democratized sharing and distribution of all means of life; while in despotism, antiproduction consists of the despot’s withdrawal of tribute from its wretched subordinates toward a life of extravagance.

The mode of inscription promulgated in savagery is executed on the body and is autonomous from verbal representation (voice and graphics). In despotism, meanwhile, written decrees dethrone bodily inscriptions. This novel brand of imperial inscription transforms as a subordinate to the voice it represents. Desire under despotism only responds to the written decrees enforced by the despotic state. It is a kind of response premised on the Lacanian configuration of desire by which the subject-people desire the despot’s privileged existence (desire transforms as the despot’s desire).⁵⁶ In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze describes people’s

reaction to despotism as a reactive kind of vengeance: “Reactive force ... limits active force, imposes limitations and partial restrictions on it and is already controlled by the spirit of the negative” (*NP* 56).⁵⁷

The subject-people’s debt to the despotic ruler translates as a “debt of the existence of the subjects themselves” (*AO* 197). Coupled with this event is the cessation of networked alliances and filiations found in savagery. As the figure of the despot dethrones the earth in savagery, a simplified and one-sided alliance is created—the relationship of the despot and the homogenized subordinates. The banality of such an unjust relation legitimizes incest to be the sole privilege of the despot. Rather than viewing this pseudo-alliance as an exploitative practice, it is understood as an exercise of political power that distantiates the despot from the subject-people (*AO* 201–202).

Because antiproduction singularly flows into its blinkered and artificially configured transcendental fortress, then the despot becomes intrinsically paranoid because of the widespread envy, resistance, and disobedience incited from the people. In relation to the other types of social organization, the despot’s paranoia corresponds to perversion in savagery, and schizophrenia in capitalism. In despotism, moreover, debt is not paid in terms of locally configured currencies; rather, it is paid by a single unit (gold, then followed by money) that transforms into an overcoded transcendental or universal signifier of surplus-value. In this vein, one concept is privileged over other heterogeneous and networked relations and meanings in the form of a metaphysico-imperial guarantor. This, of course, vindicates Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that the genesis of transcendental law can be genealogically perceived and examined in the realm of the despotic social production, not of desiring-production and language as Lacan would theorize. The transcendental value of the phallus only enters the auspice of the nuclear family during the advent of capitalism.

The emergence of the use of money in social relations is shaped by the imperial tribute to the despot. It symbolizes the first great deterritorialization of codes and meaning by abstract value (*AO* 223–230). In other words, value is no longer derived from concrete objects because it is already accrued to gold or money. Despite this radical moment, the essence of tribute money is still fueled by political subordination, which entails that it has not yet achieved the level of exchange-value. The system of antiproduction configured under despotism converts the agglomerate of temporary and immanent debts in savagery into an infinite and imperialized debt owed to the despot. Like the symbolic codes in savagery, the despotic overcodes still depict the surplus-value of code, which is “the primitive form of surplus-value” (*AO* 150).⁵⁸

The despot's royal incest, albeit rooted from his unobstructed and omnipresent power, still does not parallel the brand of incest in every individual's Oedipus complex. Despite the immensity of despotism's influence, its repressive machinery remains enforced in a rigid caste system. Writ large, despite despotism's exploitative and complex attributes, the descending life-typology exemplified by the subject-people, and the reactive capture of desire, Oedipal complex remains nonexistent in despotism.

Meanwhile, capitalism is economically administered through axioms (axiomatization). An axiomatized social organization involves directly consolidated, quantified, and heterogeneous energy and matter flows. From conformity to symbolic codes and overcodes typified by savagery and despotism, what capitalism initiates is subversion. In other words, all symbolic configurations are overcome by capitalism. According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism engenders "the decoding of the flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded.... [I]t effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any other" (*AO* 246). From prefigured symbolic principles and practices, the direct conjunction of quantified flows in capitalism is calculated whether it is fecund in producing surplus-value or not, and the axioms' attributes are merely conceptualized posterior to the conjunctions.

The market serves as the fulcrum of capitalism where money assumes the role of the common currency. The subversion of everything symbolic and qualitative leads to the quantification or obliteration of all codes and overcodes that define and influence the communal life. In the pre-Hispanic Philippines, for instance, women are distinctively acknowledged as food-gatherers and as one of the pillars of the family and society. On the contrary, a social organization based on axiomatization merely quantifies all things qualitative and human. In this vein, women's value in a capitalist context only makes sense because of their capability to render abstract labor-power. As capitalism anonymizes individualities, it likewise deletes the vital difference between labor and surplus-labor. In the end, the estranged laborers have no choice but to merely sell their labor-power as the only perceived means for their survival. More importantly, concurrent with capitalism's goal of searching for anything profit-oriented is its incessant axiomatization of all qualitative resource flows into quantitative products such as artistic expression, scientific research, and education. Deleuze and Guattari explain: "The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of

adding a new axiom to the previous ones. Capitalism defines a field of immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field. But this deterritorialized field finds itself determined by an axiomatic, in contrast to the territorial field determined by primitive codes” (*AO* 250).

Capitalist axioms are irreducible to the concrete pillars of symbolic and territorial representations. As extant beliefs become unnecessary, the attributes of quantitative or quantified conjunctions are liquid and still in-progress. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari claim, “Despite the abundance of identity cards, files, and other means of control, capitalism does not even need to write in books to make up for the vanished body markings” (*AO* 250). Capitalist axiomatization’s unsaturated form is enacted on a global scale—divergent from the localized and gradational contexts. Forget about the networked debt-relations and the transcendental appearance of antiproduction in savagery and despotism. As the market fulcrums all social relations, it increasingly axiomatizes all qualitative codes toward the unending creation of surplus-value. Furthermore, the subversive, calculative, and totalizing characteristics of capitalism include a contradictory process of decoding and recoding. Specifically, the extant symbolic codes and overcodes are eradicated by the calculative machinery of capitalist axiomatization. The tentative recodification of novel practices and meanings then emerge. However, they are only temporary and unstable because the succeeding currents of axiomatization would cause their extermination *ad infinitum*.

Moreover, the market serves as the regulative principle of the forces and relations of antiproduction in capitalism. In this regard, capital deposes the transcendental figure of the despot. The vanishing of the despot, however, does not redound to the cessation of the State. Although the State remains a central structure, it is recalibrated as it becomes immanent to the capitalist system while functioning as a regulative principle of axioms and decoded flows (*AO* 252).⁵⁹ The institutional capillaries of the State enable capitalism “to introduce lack where there is always too much, by effecting the absorption of overabundant resources” (*AO* 235).

In capitalism, antiproduction becomes a creative rather than restrictive apparatus by installing itself at the core of the production machinery and “becomes firmly wedded to it so as to regulate its productivity and realize surplus-value” (*AO* 235).⁶⁰ Capitalist antiproduction reaches its climax by virtue of the extreme avarice of the capitalist machinery. It perpetually and copiously produces and, in doing so, engineers an enormous scheme of antiproduction. Via different political, media, and technological conduits, capitalism propagates a fabricated ‘lack’ such as the latest electronic gadget, the timeliest foreign policy, and the most advanced

military technology, despite its overabundant rate of production. *Prima facie*, the debt owed by the estranged consumers to capital bears some affinities with the despotic social organization like its unidirectional attribute. But a significant 38th parallel separates despotism and capitalism in relation to the principle of antiproduction. Like the State, antiproduction is intrinsically installed at the production's core. It is also indispensably fueled by its goal of surplus-value production as an end in-itself that further engenders escalated consumption among people. These creative actualities generate liquid capital necessary for the succeeding social production cycle.

In the context of social inscription, the capitalist system of decoding and recoding consists of two moments in the process of axiomatization. The first is an affirmative phase because of its capacity to emancipate desire from the constrictions, fixations, and fabrications of codification. Even Marx and Engels appreciate this decoding feature of capitalist production, for it salvages practices from debased codifications. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, they argue:

Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed relations ... are swept away, all newformed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober faces his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind (Marx and Engels 1973, 36–37).

However, the subsequent event of decoding is reactive, which once again incarcerates what was previously liberated for the *telos* of privately realizing and appropriating surplus-value.⁶¹ The capitalist production-for-production-itself scheme aspires to cultivate the superlative phase of socialized labor, which Deleuze and Guattari call deterritorialization. However, this objective is disheartened by private investment in the means of production that thereby limits life and social labor to mere default capitalist-stock, which is the moment of reterritorialization.

Decoding and recoding, the two distinct moments of capitalist axiomatization, parallel with deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The emancipation elicited by desiring-production parallels with deterritorialization. Meanwhile, the capture of desire in recoding is a moment of reterritorialization and egotistical capitalist accumulation. Deleuze and Guattari's thrust on the schizophrenic potentialities of capitalism is influenced by Marx's *Capital* and *Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*.⁶² In the latter, Marx argues that

capitalism's dynamic movement "in one period appears as altogether fluid—the period of the maximum realization of capital; in another, a reaction to the first, the other moment asserts itself all the more forcibly—the period of the maximum devaluation of capital and congestion of the production process" (Marx 1973, 623). While deterritorialization frees all libidinal energies and revolutionizes productive forces, reterritorialization submerges the relations of production and consumption to the archaic capitalist-stock of private surplus-appropriation. The radical spirit of deterritorialization is simultaneous with the retrogressive attribute of reterritorialization. The latter is fueled by reactive forces because it deters the creation of novel productive forces and fixates surplus-expenditure to mere reinvestment. But despite the seeming dominance of reterritorialization (power) over deterritorialization (economics) in capitalism, the ascendancy of one over the other varies historically.⁶³

However, the relation between decoding and recoding, and deterritorialization and reterritorialization is merely simplistic without accentuating the superiority of reterritorialization over recoding. The latter lacks potent and sufficient resources to seize the revolutionizing fervor of decoding. In sum, the cessation of the intersection of voice and writing, and the authority of codes in the two previous kinds of social organization transitions to the critical relation between the moments of axiomatization in the capitalist social organization (*AO* 250–251).

As capitalist axiomatization quantifies all codes, the market devalues the sovereignty of the family and the State, i.e., in being the fulcrum of every fabric of social production and reproduction. As a result, capital assumes the role of being the institutional regulative principle in society. The preeminence of capital in society is, of course, economic rather than political. Unlike the despot who deletes anything critical or divergent from its unilateral autocracy, capitalism does not wholly annihilate the previous regulative institutions (family and State) found in savagery and despotism. Rather, it appropriates them as conduits of decoded flows. In this sense, the operation of capitalism is also political because it creatively incorporates politics into its productive machinery for profit alone. The State, for example, is "subordinated to a field of forces whose flows of coordinates and whose autonomous relations of domination and subordination it expresses" (*AO* 221). As Marx and Engels argue, this remarkable transformation of the social engenders the "dissolution of all products and activities into exchange-values," (Marx and Engels 1973, 156) including ethical connectedness and societal transactions between individuals and groups. This means that the potency of capitalism's

calculative logic rests on its ability to commodify ethical relations and the cultural values that define them.

Moreover, capitalism's supremacy converts abstract labor into a concrete reality. This transformation redounds to the emergence of industrial capital and commodified labor-power. The extensive commodification of relations detaches exchange-value from its previous open-ended or erratic configuration characterizing merchant capitalism—determined by a relationship of alliance.⁶⁴ As industrial capital serves as the core of all operations and relations, merchant-laden alliances and activities are totalized by the unitarian taxonomy of industrial capitalism. Consequently, capital metamorphoses as filiative, that is, “when money begets money, or value a surplus-value.... Value ... presents itself as an independent substance.... It is solely under these conditions that capital becomes ... the new socius ... that appropriates all the productive forces” (*AO* 227).

Despite its omnipotence, capitalism does not provide a material topography for subjectivity-formation. The building blocks of the development of subjectivity are grounded on beliefs, practices, and qualities—the very sources overcome by capitalist axiomatization upon its emergence. Capitalism's abstract logic radicalizes all territorial representations found in previous social organizations. According to Deleuze and Guattari:

Representation no longer relates to a distinct object, but to productive activity itself. The socius as full body has become directly economic as capital-money.... What is inscribed ... is no longer the producers or nonproducers, but the forces and means of production as abstract quantities that become effectively concrete in their becoming related or their conjunction.... There ensues a privatization of the family according to which the family ceases to give its social form to economic reproduction (*AO* 263).

Apparently, capitalism deputizes the nuclear family as the accommodating institution for subjectivity-formation. This is capitalism's ingenious initiative posterior to its cognizance regarding its incapability to spawn the necessary underpinning for subjectivity-formation. This process appears as a normal capitalist activity *prima facie*. However, this is detrimental on the subjects' part. The capitalist delegation of the family implies that human production or reproduction is already ghettoized from the realms of social production and reproduction. Subjectivity-formation is now the family's private pursuit. In this vein, capitalism is also guilty of the paralogue of the double-bind or the illegitimate utilization of the disjunctive syntheses of desire. The oedipalization of desire and identities,

and the segregation of the nuclear family from the social landscape converge with this so-called capitalist delinquency.

The simultaneity of the social production or reproduction administered by capitalism and the privatization of subjectivity-formation in the nuclear family establish a factory for ascetic subjectivity under the authorship and supervision of capitalist antiproduction. If incest-taboo is justified in despotism, it metamorphoses as a form of biological prohibition in capitalism. Of course, this prohibition is a capitalist ploy for appeasement, not only politically (as in the case of despotism) but also psychologically. Desire is then disallowed from accessing its desired objects, except that of the family members.⁶⁵ More notably, this convergence transforms the family as a microcosm of fundamental capitalist relations: “Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of capital (‘Mister Capital, Madame Earth,’ and their child the Worker)... The familial determinations become the application of the social axiomatic” (*AO* 264).

As the dynamicity of social obligations is totalized by capitalism, family roles become mere reflections of capitalist pragmatics. The paradox behind this event is that the family actualizes as a training ground for ascetic subjectivity, albeit being isolated from social repression (i.e., social production or reproduction), yet a mouthpiece of capitalist machinery. As Holland articulates, “the capitalist family also reproduces the basic elements of social repression from other social formations: separation from the means of life, incarnated in the forbidden mother, and obedience to despotic law, incarnated in the forbidding father. The Oedipus *as complex* has arrived” (Holland 1999, 84).

The Oedipus complex effectuates incest to be the very representation (although reactive) of desire itself. The Oedipal restriction posited by capitalist relations, for Deleuze and Guattari, “finds itself ... inhabited and lived ... in which the social images produced by the decoded flows actually fall back on restricted familial images invested by desire. It is at this point that ... Oedipus is constituted, at the same time as it completes its migration in the in-depth elements of representation: the displaced represented has become, as such, the representation of desire” (*AO* 267). The Oedipus paradox leads desire to its road to perdition, for it is no longer cognizant of what it desires, thereby opening itself as a vulnerable prey to capitalist oedipalization. In the sphere of human every day, the specter of the death instinct increases its magnitude and immanent possibility. Death is equated with the lack of money, job, and shelter—a ‘lack’ that must be immediately addressed and solved. This restriction espoused by the capitalist-induced Oedipus complex, accordingly, crafts a

generalized oblivion to other qualitative or existential factors constituting our subjectivity and relations. Thus, the perpetual pacification of desire and the augmented pervasiveness of the death instinct entail amplified capitalist subjection.

Nevertheless, Oedipus complex should only be understood as a relay of the social investment of desire. Its so-called independence and repressive capillaries are merely conceptualized because the nuclear family reconfigures it as an agent of ascetic subjectivity. In a way, the preeminence of the social investment of desire vindicates psychoanalysis from the accusation that it is the efficient cause of the complex, albeit it is insufficient to stop Deleuze and Guattari from criticizing its various paralogisms of desire. They contend that psychoanalysis is a stringently and systemically capitalist institution. The Oedipus complex is the specific representation that capitalism offers desiring-production as the representative.⁶⁶

Notes

¹ Reich claims in *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* that “It is generally clear today that ‘fascism’ is not the act of Hitler or a Mussolini, but that it is the expression of the irrational structure of mass man” (Reich 2000, xx).

² In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari write, “For many French intellectuals, the hyperactivism of post-May gave way to a mid-seventies slump, then a return to religion or political conservatism in a foreshadowing of the Reagan eighties” (*ATP* xi).

³ Cf. (*ATP* 215).

⁴ Although Reich’s book *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* was published several years before the May 1968 Student Revolt in France, it is already a very timely critique of the gradual deterioration of Classical Marxism: “The political ideology of the European Marxist parties was based on economic conditions that were confined to a period of some two hundred years, from about the seventeen to nineteenth century.... Twentieth century fascism raised the basic question of *man’s character, human mysticism and craving for authority, which covered a period of some four to six thousand years*” (Reich 2000, xxvi).

⁵ Regarding the reification of concepts, Adorno suggests searching for the nonconceptuality of objects: “A philosophy that let us know this, that extinguishes the autarky of concepts, strips the blindfold from our eyes. That the concept is a concept even when dealing with things in being that does not change the fact that on its part it is entwined with a nonconceptual whole. Its only insulation from that whole is its reification—that which establishes it as a concept (Adorno 1973, 12).

⁶ See (Marcuse 1955).

⁷ As Holland explains, “Repression of pleasure by reality is supplemented by a surplus-repression sustaining class hierarchies; the reality principle succumbs to the performance principle has finally culminated in the conquest of scarcity, with the result that the very rationality of the performance principle has now become

irrational” (Holland 1999, 5). Marcuse’s initiative to articulate that scarcity as a servant of social domination is praiseworthy. However, it is not an ethical imperative to surmount scarcity by productive forces in society. The reason is that scarcity is already a form of fabrication *ab initio*. Surplus is constantly fashioned in societies regardless of their conditions be they flourishing or impoverished (Holland 1999, 5).

⁸ Reich also blames Freudian psychoanalysis for betraying the discovery of libido and the repression of sexuality (Holland 1999, 6).

⁹ See (AO 344–345).

¹⁰ As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “Psychic repression is a means in the service of social repression. What it bears on is also the object of social repression: desiring-production. But it in fact implies an original double operation: the repressive social formation delegates its power to an agent of psychic repression, and correlatively the repressed desire is as though masked by the faked ... image to which the repression gives rise. Psychic repression is delegated by the social formation, while the desiring-formation is ... displaced by psychic repression (AO 119).

¹¹ See (Marx 1970, 138–141).

¹² See (Zourabichvili 2010, 164); cf. (AO 26–27, 104).

¹³ Conceiving desire as a lack subordinates it to need. However, for Deleuze and Guattari, needs are, in fact, derived from desire: “they are counter-products within the real that desire produces. Lack is a counter-effect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence” (AO 27).

¹⁴ See (Colebrook 2002b, 98).

¹⁵ See (Honneth 1995).

¹⁶ Albeit Kant attempts to further the production side, he associates in the end his theory of desire with hallucinations, superstitions, and fantasies. At the same time, his theory of desire, even though it explored the other side of the coin, did not question the conventional definition of desire (AO 25).

¹⁷ Inevitably, it brings us back to the Nietzschean theorization of the body as a mere conduit of desire or forces, and our expenditure of them determine whether our life typology is ascending or descending.

¹⁸ See (Colebrook 2002b, 100).

¹⁹ Cf. (Patton 2000, 68–77).

²⁰ Cf. (Holland 1999, 25). Moreover, Buchanan argues in *Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus* that the three syntheses correspond to the three phases in Marx’s general formula of capital—“MCM”: the synthesis of connection is the ‘free labor’ or ‘primitive accumulation’ phase that sets everything in motion; the synthesis of disjunction corresponds to the intermediate phase of investment in industry; and the synthesis of conjunction is the third phase in which money capital is set free all over again” (Buchanan 2000, 55).

²¹ Cf. (Holland 1999, 26).

²² Cf. (Holland, 1999, 26–27)

²³ See (Klein 1948, v). In Lacanian jargon, part-objects are comprehended as the object *petit-a*; cf. (Lacan 1978) and (*LS* 187–216).

²⁴ Deleuze and Guattari transform Artaud's notion of 'Body-without-Organs' and Freud's concept of 'death instinct.'

²⁵ Regarding the immanent attribute of the principle of the eternal return, see (*NP*) and (*DR*).

²⁶ See (Freud 1961); cf. (Holland 1999, 27).

²⁷ See (*LS* 208–245).

²⁸ See (Artaud 1965).

²⁹ In *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, Deleuze writes, "The body does not lack organs, it simply lacks the organism, that is, the particular organization of organs. The body without organs is thus defined by an indeterminate organ, whereas the organism is defined by determinate organs" (*FB* 47).

³⁰ See (*AO* 11–12); cf. (Holland 1999, 29).

³¹ Lacan's metonymy of desire is a hopeless quest for some lost object from the past. See (Lacan 1977).

³² Cf. (Holland 1999, 29).

³³ Freud's understanding of 'primal repression' converges with Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of the principle of antiproduction. Insofar as psychic repression is defined and conditioned by societal oppression and repression, both kinds of repression are by-products of primal repression. See (*AO* 184, 339); cf. (Freud 1926, 94).

³⁴ Cf. (Holland 1999, 33)

³⁵ See (Holland, 1999, 33).

³⁶ Cf. (Holland, 1999, 35).

³⁷ The concept paralogism reminds us of Kant's 'paralogism of pure reason' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See the paralogism of extraposition (*AO* 74), the paralogism of the double bind (*AO* 79), the paralogism of biunivocal application (*AO* 101), the paralogism of displacement (*AO* 114), and the paralogism of the afterward (*AO* 127).

³⁸ For Deleuze and Guattari, "The law tells us: You will not marry your mother, and you will not kill your father. And we docile subjects say to ourselves: so that's what I wanted!... One acts as if it were possible to conclude directly from psychic repression the nature of the repressed and from the prohibition the nature of what is prohibited" (*AO* 114).

³⁹ As Deleuze and Guattari argue, "Oedipus depends on this sort of nationalistic, religious, racist sentiment, and not the reverse: it is not the father who is projected onto the boss, but the boss who is applied to the father, either in order to tell us 'you will not surpass your father,' or 'you will surpass him to find our forefathers... The segregative use is a precondition of Oedipus, to the extent that the social field is not reduced to the familial tie except by presupposing an enormous archaism, an incarnation of the race in person or in spirit: yes, I am one of you" (*AO* 104).

⁴⁰ The subject or the child then fails to realize that "its father has a boss who is not a father's father, or moreover that its father himself is a boss who is not a father ... the father and the mother exist only as fragments, and are never organized into a figure or a structure able both to represent the unconscious, and to represent in it the various agents of the collectivity" (*AO* 97).

⁴¹ It is vital to recognize Lacan's effort to depersonalize psychoanalysis. He claims that the Oedipus complex is concerned only apparently with the concrete figures of the father and the mother. It actually "involves functions rather than figures or images: the functions of agent of prohibition or Law, and object of prohibition or desire" (Holland 1999, 42). Regardless of Lacanian philosophy's vital contribution to the current discussion, its distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic is marred by exclusivism. Consequently, the Lacanian theorization also commits the paralogsism of the double-impasse. The root of the problem is that the Oedipus complex or oedipalized subjectivity restrictively provides only the twin possibilities of resolution or fixation.

⁴² Desiring-production finds solace in trans-sexuality, which in the macrolevel elicits Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of transversality.

⁴³ Contemporary scholarship is noted for rupturing the reductive binary of man and woman in relation to gender distinction, *en route* to novel categories and principles of civil representation such as the transgenders and the bisexuals. However, understanding these new vocabularies as fixed categories other than the man-woman binary espouses a betrayal of the very form of molar representation it seeks to dismantle.

⁴⁴ See (Goux 1990). Aside from Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari also critically diagnose Klein's theory of the 'pre-Oedipal.' Klein's point of departure is the infant's experience characterized by partial-objects. Because the world is anxiety-generating, the infant crafts primitive defenses such as projection, denial, and withdrawal. He or she then segregates the threatening objects and preserves the beneficial ones internally and externally. Although they find this Kleinian theory as plausible, the characterization of partial-objects as a mere transitory phase toward the integration of drives and instincts under a unified and sovereign ego is problematic, because such conception of the ego is merely delusional. The possibility of whole-objects and its completion is only a temporary phase. A unified subjectivity is merely an epiphenomenon of heterogeneous constellations, disjunctions, and capture of desire.

⁴⁵ As Deleuze and Guattari write, "To say that the father is first in relation to the child really amounts to saying that the investment of desire is in the first instance the investment of a social field into which the father and the child ... are simultaneously immersed.... What the child invests through the infantile experience, the mother's breast, and the familial structure is already a state of the breaks and the flows of the social field in its entirety.... Never is the adult an afterward of the child, but in the family both relate to the determinations of the field in which both the family and they are simultaneously immersed" (AO 274-275).

⁴⁶ See (Holland 1999, 57).

⁴⁷ At the outset, I need to adumbrate that there exist some categories that can be used to distinguish the three kinds of social organizations (savagery, barbarism, and capitalism) such as economics (Marx) and power (Nietzsche), relations of antiproduction, system of inscription, and the like.

⁴⁸ See (Foucault 1977b).

⁴⁹ Cf. (LS 72).

⁵⁰ For instance, the savage social production comprehensively organizes desire because it is intimately connected to the socius. Of course, such a relation is absent in the capitalist social organization because it separates production from reproduction.

⁵¹ See (Holland 1999, 62). Another positive consequence antiproduction does for desiring-production is that it interposes the issue of power into the dialectics of the relations of production.

⁵² See (Holland 1999, 63).

⁵³ Claude Lévi-Strauss argues that social partitions and belief-systems in savagery are alike everywhere. The same is true with the legal codes in despotism, and the surplus and labor laws in capitalism. See (Lévi-Strauss 1966).

⁵⁴ For Deleuze and Guattari, “If one wants to do an analysis of the flows of money and capital that circulate in society, nothing is more useful than Marx and the Marxist theory of money. But if one wishes also to analyze the flows of desire, the fears and the anxieties ... that traverse the social field ... one must look elsewhere” (*AO* xviii).

⁵⁵ See (Bataille, 1988).

⁵⁶ Before Lacan, Nietzsche argues that the man of *ressentiment* is fueled by the spirit of revenge: “The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.... While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different’.... This inversion of the value-positing eye—this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of *ressentiment*: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world ... in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (Nietzsche 2000, 36–37).

⁵⁷ Cf. (*AO* 214).

⁵⁸ Being a primitive form of surplus-value, the surplus-value of code, for Deleuze and Guattari, “carries out the diverse operations of the primitive territorial machine: detaching segments from the chain, organizing selections from the flows, and allocating the portions due each person” (*AO* 150); cf. (*AO* 174–176, 163–164) and (*LS* 192–193).

⁵⁹ For Deleuze and Guattari, “The capitalist State is the regulator of decoded flows as such, insofar as they are caught up in the axiomatic of capital. In this sense, it indeed completes the becoming-concrete that seemed to us to preside over the evolution of the abstract despotic *Urstaat*: from being at first the transcendent unity, it becomes immanent to the field of social forces, enters into their service, and serves as a regulator of the decoded and axiomatized flows” (*AO* 252).

⁶⁰ Cf. (Holland 1999, 79).

⁶¹ See (Holland, 1999, 80).

⁶² See (Marx 1976 vol. 3, 249–50).

⁶³ For Holland, the 1960s might epitomize the dominance of deterritorialization over reterritorialization, while the 1980s demonstrates the supremacy of the latter. See (Holland 1999, 139).

⁶⁴ In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari identify the fundamental characteristic of merchant capitalism: “The merchant is continually speculating with the maintained

territorialities, so as to buy where prices are low and sell where they are high” (*AO* 227).

⁶⁵ See (Holland 1999, 84).

⁶⁶ See (Holland, 1999, 84).

CHAPTER THREE

ASSEMBLAGE THEORY: A PHILOSOPHY OF ‘A THOUSAND RHIZOMES’

A. Rhizomatics and Its Relation to Minoritarian Literature

After the phenomenal *Anti-Oedipus* and before the publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari produced significant works, namely *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* published in 1975, and *Rhizome* and a revised edition of *Proust and Signs* in 1976. From ‘difference’ in *Difference and Repetition* and ‘desire’ in *Anti-Oedipus* as the ‘unthought’ or the ‘new image of thought’ comes ‘rhizome’¹—which they started developing in the three aforementioned books.

Walter Benjamin emphasizes in *Illuminations* that there are two ways to misinterpret Kafka’s works: “One is to interpret them naturally, the other is the supernatural interpretation. Both the psychoanalytic and the theological interpretations equally miss the essential points” (Benjamin 1969a, 127). Literary violence is hence committed, for Deleuze and Guattari, when we reduce Kafka’s works into the restrictive frontiers of Oedipal triangulation and the interiority of human subjectivity. Benjamin shares with Deleuze and Guattari the sentiment in freeing Kafka from what Reda Bensmaïa calls a ‘political-ideological recuperation of Kafka.’² Contrary to orthodox interpretations, Kafka is an author of praxis. He is a writer of radical politics that refuses all these kinds of accusations.³ In doing so, he embodies the principle of minoritarian literature and politics.

Kafka’s works are assemblages of rhizomes. As Deleuze and Guattari explicate in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*:

The castle has multiple entrances ... it even has entrances and exits without doors.... We will enter ... by any point whatsoever; none matters more than another, and no entrance is more privileged.... We will be trying only to discover what other points our entrance connects to, what crossroads and galleries one passes through to link two points, what the map of

the rhizome is and how the map is modified if one enters by another point (*K 3*).

Meaning to say, upon entering Kafka's rhizomic realm, we perceive an incalculable number of realms in conjunctive and disjunctive relations to other realms composed of actual and subterranean passageways. No opening enjoys a privileged position over others—humanity or anything transcendental is dethroned from its previous deific location. This so-called literary democracy circulated in Kafka's world leads him to perceive literature as machinic (machine) or dynamic as opposed to fixed and impregnable hierarchies.

If Kafka's works are composed of rhizomes, it is significant to explain the meaning of rhizome, specifically in *A Thousand Plateaus*, before we return to an elaboration of Kafka's rhizomic style of writing as an example of minoritarian literature and politics. The rhizome succeeds difference as the new image of thought. Like Kafka's room, the whole of *A Thousand Plateaus* can be read like a rhizome through its nonlinear structure and open system. Every plateau or part of the book is an orchestration of crashing bricks derived from an array of disciplines serving as edifice: "They carry traces of their former emplacement, which give them a spin defining the arc of their vector. The vectors are meant to converge at a volatile juncture, but one that is sustained, as an open equilibrium of moving parts each with its own trajectory" (*ATP xiv*).

Rhizome is a protean concept, as well as a horizontal and transformative process, devoid of any beginning or end. *A Thousand Plateaus* must be approached, as Brian Massumi claims, in such a way that we "open the vacant spaces that would enable you to build your life and ... the people around you into a plateau of intensity that would leave afterimages of its dynamism that could be reinjected into still other lives, creating a fabric of heightened states between which any number, the greatest number, of connecting routes would exist" (*ATP xv*).

The concept of rhizome, like desire, detaches man from the seemingly infallible and privileged seat it has occupied since time immemorial. We are witnesses to the adverse consequences of man's hubris across cultures, religions, and races. This blind optimism to the aptitude of human rationality is oblivious of our finitude, and as such, a severe violence to the inviolable dignity of all life-forms in this world.⁴ As humanity experiences a kind of self-emptying, it fashions an ethical space where man learns how to think with the world. Being humbled by its previous designation, the world is liberated from its appropriation and instrumentalization.

Borrowing from the language of botany, Deleuze and Guattari contrast the rhizome (rhizome book) with the concept of arborescent thought or schema (tap-root book). The former refers to a type of plant capable of extending itself through its subterranean and labyrinthine root system consisting of various branches and deadlocks. In this manner, it conjures the concealed web-like attributes of interconnected forces irreducible from the striating capillaries of the land surface and air, as well as the arboreal State. Deleuze and Guattari explicate:

A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots ... may be rhizomorphic.... Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers (*ATP* 7–8).

The latter contrasts the rhizome because it refers to a tree-like model. Its upper portion is composed of transcendental principles infallible from the contingencies of life such as Hegel's 'Geist' and Plato's 'Forms.' These unitarian principles regulate or organize vertically or hierarchically (from top to bottom) the operations of all particulars or concepts in a tree or trunk. Copies, no matter how artistic and profound they are, in Platonic metaphysics, for instance, are regarded with mere secondary value.

A significant model of an arborescent structure is that of Porphyry. Deleuze relegates the concept of 'Substance' as the transcendental principle, that is, at the tree's upper part; and every level of the tree consists of dichotomous branching categorized as subconcepts of the unitarian concept until the lowest part.⁵ Particulars and their disjunctive relationships lack distinctive conceptual features, for they are merely subsumed by a governing concept (Substance). Its egotistic system is divisible to its parts insofar as each particular's configurations are totalized by Substance. Such a hierarchical organization reminds us of Adorno's criticism to Cartesian and Kantian epistemologies for reifying certain concepts at the expense of the protean potentialities and the prolificacy of objects and our lived experiences. Not only are particulars subordinated, but their horizontal movements are also blocked so as to dishearten dynamic and creative constellations with other particulars and concepts. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari similarly accuse traditional psychoanalysis of biunivocalizing the rhizomic movement and creativity of desire. Consequently, desire is disabled from crafting more connections and gaining more attributes, thus producing myopic subjectivities whose qualities are already predetermined

by Oedipus, or in the context of *A Thousand Plateaus*, by the transcendental concept or the State apparatus.

A rhizome is characterized by ‘connectivity’ and ‘heterogeneity.’ Unlike a tree-model that plots, points, and organizes unity within, a rhizome model can be approached and connected to any part of another: “A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (*ATP* 7). As a heterogeneous reality, a rhizome is not organized by any discursive or linguistic universals. It is an assemblage of “dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener and mother tongue” (*ATP* 7). Language as a stable concept is not free from genealogical diagnosis. Dissecting its logically configured structures is tantamount to a decentering act toward other linguistic registers and zones. Take the case of the Internet as a contemporary example of a rhizome. It serves as a liquid milieu that promotes rhizomic initiatives such as the sporadic and parallel resistances launched by the Occupy Movement assemblage across the globe. At the same time, the instantaneity of communication in the Internet surmounts any arboreal structures, thereby effectuating connectivity among different users in a decentered cybersociety.

Rhizome is a ‘multiplicity.’ Whereas the particulars’ movements and locations within an arborescent structure are already prefigured, in a rhizomic multiplicity, all are provisional and are still-to-come. In the same vein, all the lines are determined not by any interior transcendental concept but by exteriority’s deterritorialization or lines of flight that incessantly mutate and craft web-like relations with other multiplicities in the world. Like Bergson’s characterization of a qualitative multiplicity, a rhizomic multiplicity “has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature” (*ATP* 8). The intersections of heterogeneous multiplicities or lines are in no way regulated by any notion of unity or closed system.

Moreover, the connections and disjunctions among protean multiplicities bring us to another feature of a rhizome—‘principle of asignifying rupture.’ Like an army of ants, a rhizome can be shattered, but surely, it can be reborn in one of its old or new lines. The nonexistence of a central organization in a rhizome is not a liability. Its thousand lines of flight is constantly equipped with the aptitude to regenerate itself at any location that thereby voids the possibility of being wholly annihilated: “Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees” (*ATP* 9). A rhizome is

ruptured upon the collapse of segmentary lines toward a line of flight, which is immanent in the rhizome. But because all of us consist of microfascisms at the brink of concretization, we must always be vigilant to the possibility that the said rupture may also bring us back to previous stratification, if not lead us to further hierarchical, Oedipal, and fascist state of affairs. Furthermore, asignifying rupture involves the two-fold process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization caught up with what Rimy Chauvin calls as 'a-parallel evolution' (*ATP* 10). Their dynamic interweaving engineers the bursting of two multiplicities or heterogeneous succession of lines of flight constitutive of a common rhizome irreducible to any kind of stratification. As Deleuze and Guattari endorse:

Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and tortuous of lines of n dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialized flows.... Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency (*ATP* 11).

Lastly, a rhizome endorses 'cartography.'⁶ Cartography as mapping is distinct from tracing. A map "is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself.... It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs" (*ATP* 12). Holland profoundly characterizes mapping in contradistinction with tracing: "Mapping ... follows various lines of a multiplicity, evaluates and experiments with their escape-velocities, evaluates their potential for transformation, and ... intensifies the lines of flight" (Holland 2013, 40). Meanwhile, tracing only reproduces its object, which is merely an expression of a unitary model or representationalist category; while mapping, by virtue of its repugnance to all manifestations of 'genetic axis or deep structure,' contains the propensities for transformation and creation.⁷

Furthermore, tracing poses a danger to mapping in the form of redundancies, impasses, and blockages (*ATP* 13). It is detrimental because tracing can reduce mapping into a photographic or representationalist image, thus converting the rhizome into arborescent structures of the root. In addition, mapping is immanently and creatively thinking with the word. Thinking with the brain is thinking with the brain as a kind of rhizome.⁸ Despite the fact that several individuals cultivate trees within their heads, Deleuze and Guattari believe that through the brain, a grass or a rhizome can likewise emerge, as in the case of short-term memory. As opposed to

long-term memory, it is a type of memory that is basically nonarboreal and noncentralized. It is irreducible to any kind of stratification in the same manner that it cannot be subjected to a law of immediacy and contiguity. A rhizome can move, emerge, and vanish anywhere, and can recur any moment because it is fueled by “discontinuity, rupture, and multiplicity” (*ATP* 16). In sum, all the movements and operations of the rhizome are always located at the middle (neither at the start nor at the end). A plateau bears the similar characteristic. Each plateau in a book can be read or approached from any vantage point, and can be connected to any other plateaus. The rhizome operates between plateaus like a root via unique and even untimely alliances, not filiations. It is at the middle that becoming occurs, where things gain and calibrate their speeds: “*Between* things does not designate a localized relation going from one thing to another and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away” (*ATP* 25).

Going back to the Kafka-machine, it consists of rhizomic expressions and contents formalized in various levels by amorphous materials that enter it. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, “To enter or leave the machine, to be in the machine, to walk around it ... these are all still components of the machine itself.... The line of escape is part of the machine.... The problem is not that of being free but of finding a way out, or even a way in, another side” (*K* 7–8). *The Trial* is a perfect example of the rhizomic Kafka-machine. Albeit the story revolves around a question of a determined machine or unity, it is nevertheless nebulous to the point that its ambiguity deletes any clear distinction between being at the interior and being at the exterior (*ATP* 8).

Additionally, Kafka’s letters embody his machinic literary canon. They are comparable to Nietzsche’s ‘aphorisms’ and Adorno’s ‘essays,’ which are distinctively radical weapons crafted to dismantle the overriding presence of identitarian or representationalist thinking, be it in philosophy or any other kinds of writing. But what makes aphorisms and essays unique is the intention of not even publishing them. Similarly, Kafka’s letters are like machinic gears that can vanish or be annihilated anytime. Its volatility is important because it can lead to the emergence of other pieces. The inscription of letters comes to a hiatus because of a certain return or processing that blocks it; some stories stop because of their inability to develop as novels (*ATP* 41). As Deleuze and Guattari opine, “Never has so complete an *oeuvre* been made from movements that are always aborted, yet always in communication with each other. Everywhere there is a single and unique passion for writing but not the same one. Each time the writing crosses a threshold; and there is no higher or lower threshold” (*K* 41). More

importantly, his letters are experimental devices capable of deterritorializing and halting experiences and state of affairs; from dismantling love and prompting the possibility of becoming-animal, it is, without a doubt, a “perverse, diabolical utilization” (*K* 29).

The entire Kafka-machine offers us a rhizomic plane of existence perpetually characterized by a line of escape. Of course, this invalidates the traditional Kafka persona who takes writing as his refuge because of his so-called incapacity to confront the obscure moments of his life. Hence, the conventional Kafka epitomizes what Nietzsche calls the slave morality or the descending life-typology characterized by impotence, impoverishment, and hatred toward life. On the contrary, Kafka is like Spinoza—a man who celebrates life with affirmative joy. Kafka’s experimentations are inspired by a life so Heraclitean and fecund as to render realities that are yet-to-come—be it a novel way to live and revolutionize the society or a new enemy in the likes of neoliberal capitalism and terrorism. In this vein, he likewise resembles a political philosopher of the future. Deleuze and Guattari perceive Kafka as a nomad who is vigorously immersed in the complex dynamics of socialism, anarchism, and social movements (*ATP* 41).

From a macroperspective, Deleuze and Guattari’s appropriation of Kafka provides important distinction between philosophy and art (science, as well). Primarily, what the former can learn from the latter is its capability to free us from coded configurations and messages of language, leading us back to a prehistorical phase of sounds and affects where meanings are developed. More importantly, the former can learn the latter’s creative aptitude to imagine and invent state of affairs beyond our everyday experience. Via literature (minoritarian literature), we become capable of fabulating a people- and world-to-come.

Before elaborating the principle of minoritarian literature and its relation to minoritarian politics or becoming-minoritarian, I deem it necessary to accentuate Deleuze and Guattari’s view of literature in particular and language in general. Literature is characterized by creative and emancipatory powers. These attributes fashion and animate the affective aspect of literary discourses. As an affective machine, literature neither discloses the author’s intention nor states the main topic of a story. Rather, it fosters a verbal communication beyond the rubric of any subject of enunciation.⁹

Minoritarian literature is based on the ontological claims on the nature of language, as well as its relation to the world.¹⁰ As such, a minoritarian appropriation of language includes a critical engagement with social and political forces, and nonlinguistic factors constitutive of different

speeds and affective intensities.¹¹ Implicit in this characterization of minor literature is a conception of language that Deleuze and Guattari delineate most fully in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In stuttering in their own language, exceptional writers stutter language. Accordingly, the stuttering of language subjects language into a state of becoming-other or into perpetual metamorphosis.

The minoritarian aptitude of linguistic stuttering is merely a preface to Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of language. Drawing immense inspiration from Austin, Volshinov, Bakhtin, and Hjelmslev,¹² Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*' assert that they oppose all discourses claiming that language is a system of homogeneity, immutability, and universality or what may be called as majoritarian language. Likewise, they argue that the configuration and importance of language cannot be detached from its social milieu. Lastly, language's function is to enforce commands or power-relations, rather than merely to transmit information. Its active configuration is what they term as 'order-word.' From the word itself, order-word enunciates imperatives rather than informs or communicates. According to Deleuze and Guattari:

The elementary unit of language—the statement—is the order-word. Rather than common sense, a faculty for the centralization of information, we must define an abominable faculty consisting in emitting, receiving, and transmitting order-words. Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience.... Spengler notes that the fundamental forms of speech are not the statement of a judgment or the expression of a feeling, but the command, the expression of obedience, the assertion, the question, the affirmation or negation.... Language is not life; it gives life orders (*ATP* 76).

As such, any conception of universality or standardized usage when we talk about language only indicates the existence of the hierarchy of values where a dominant power maintains a cultural or linguistic power-relation to its subordinates. In fact, linguistic standards or phonemic constants are merely idealized abstractions whose existences are indebted to virtual lines of incessant variation immanent within a language. A line of perpetual mutation, Bogue explains, traverses "through all possible enunciations of a phoneme, just as all possible syntactic permutations are manifestations of virtual lines of continuous variation, and all standard pronunciations, grammatical and syntactic regularities, are merely isolated,

extracted, and rigidified segments of such oscillating, constantly moving lines of variation” (Bogue 2012, 295).

Deleuze and Guattari’s functionalist approach to language is a microcosm of their philosophy of ‘pragmatics.’¹³ In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze comprehensively elucidates the pragmatics of language by theorizing meaning as the intangible surface between words and bodies.¹⁴ The aforesaid book serves as an insightful prologue to *A Thousand Plateaus*’ discussion of language (pragmatics). In both books, language is portrayed as an active principle or a mode of action. Dorothea Olkowski explicates in *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*,¹⁵ Deleuze’s problem of language in relation to the theory of style as langue-vibration, as set forth in this same ‘stuttering’ model in *Essays: Critical and Clinical*. In the said book, Deleuze opines:

Make the language system stutter—is it possible without confusing it with speech? Everything depends on the way in which language is thought: if we extract it like a homogeneous system in equilibrium, or near equilibrium, and we define it by means of constant terms and relations, it is evident that the disequilibriums and variations can only affect speech.... But if the system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium, if the system vibrates—and has terms each one of which traverses a zone of continuous variation—language itself will begin to vibrate and stutter (*ECC* 108).

Speech acts bear the ability to configure and reconfigure the world by virtue of bodies’ incorporeal transformation. In every society, the traditional schemes and patterns of speech acts and the hierarchy of values related to them create a collective assemblage of enunciation. These enunciations consecutively interfere with bodies and arboreal structures, which are organized by nondiscursive schemes and practices (*ATP* 66). In this vein, what is fashioned is an assemblagic world of democratized bodies, practices, and cultures in constant relations and variations. Doubtless, these speech activities characterize the language of minoritarian literature—of being “affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (*K* 16), thereby authoring manifold kinds of vibrations and stutterings or minoritarian becomings. For Deleuze and Guattari, “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language” (*K* 16).

Given the above discussion, the works of Kafka indubitably epitomize minoritarian literature. He is a Czech who wrote his books in German.¹⁶ The utilization of a major language (German) engenders the

immanent subversion of the German language and culture, hence engendering the creation of further identities and lines of flight. Similarly, Michel de Certeau's understanding of writing provides another way of describing minoritarian literature:

Writing is born from and deals with the acknowledged doubt of an explicit division, in sum, of the impossibility of one's own place. It articulates an act that is constantly a beginning: the subject is never authorized by a place ... it remains a stranger to itself and forever deprived of an ontological ground, and therefore it always comes up short or is in excess, always ... indebted with respect to the disappearance of a genealogical and territorial "substance," linked to a name that cannot be owned (de Certeau 1975, 327).

The Filipino national hero Jose Rizal can also be categorized as a minoritarian writer. Prior to their Filipino translations, his two masterpieces, *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*, were written in Spanish to criticize the Spanish colonial government, to magnify its corruption and oppression, and to subvert the Spanish language itself as a language of hegemony. Like Rizal's minoritarian works, Kafka's writings disturb the equilibrium of the German tradition, which prompts "the deterritorialization of the German population itself, an oppressive minority cut off from the masses" (K 16).

Whereas minoritarian literature is fueled by the power to be untimely, the majoritarian represents any privileged principle or concept deemed as a transcendental term expressive of an identity or identities such as 'linear time,' 'man,' 'God,' and the 'West.' The so-called universal model of man (the white, male, adult, and rational European), for instance, enjoys the privilege of being the referential nerve-center governing all arboreal distributions in the social field. As Deleuze and Guattari argue: "The central point ... has the property of organizing binary distributions within the dualism machines, and of reproducing itself in the principal term of the opposition; the entire opposition at the same time resonates in the central point" (ATP 292). In the realm of political economy, moreover, the majoritarian is represented by the axioms of the capitalist society or civilized machine (ATP 469).¹⁷

Furthermore, everything in minoritarian literature is political as opposed to majoritarian ones where the social field merely serves as a background for marital or familial (individual) concerns, for example (K 17). In *Anti-Oedipus*, one is likewise reminded how traditional psychoanalysis isolates desire from the realm of social production. Oedipal

controversies among characters in Kafka’s works are always elucidated and analyzed in connection to a larger milieu. However, I need to clarify that Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of minoritarian literature as intrinsically political must not be interpreted in a manner that the political assumes the position of a majoritarian principle; otherwise, we will commit a similar *Reichian* blunder in privileging the social over the individual. The issues in Kafka’s stories are significant because “a whole other story is vibrating within it. In this way, the family triangle connects to other triangles—commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical—that determine its values” (K 17). In short, the political ruptures the insular or Oedipal frontiers of a life-story toward constellations with other aspects of life—the social, the economic, the ethical, to name a few. As a result, its value is magnified, and new affects, intensities, and lines of flight emerge.

Postcolonial and marginal literatures (gay, lesbian, and women’s) are undoubtedly influenced by the Deleuzo-Guattarian minoritarian literature not only because they stress the inseparability of the political from the individual. It is also a collective mechanism of expression of all the individual struggles instigated by the marginalized. It is because “literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation. It ... produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism; and if the writer is in the margins or ... this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community” (K 17).

Lastly, Kafka seeks to ingeniously perform what *Anti-Oedipus* does with psychoanalysis and capitalism (micropolitics of desire) by formulating a micropolitics of literature where writing metamorphoses into an instrument of political critique and praxis. A micropolitics of literature perceives writing as:

[T]he enunciation forms a unity with desire, beyond laws, states, regimes. Yet the enunciation is always historical, political, and social. A micropolitics ... of desire that questions all situations. Never has there been a more comic and joyous author from the point of view of desire; never has there been a more political and social author from the point of view of enunciation (K 42).

B. Minoritarian Politics and the Becoming-Other of Life

The distinction between majoritarian and minoritarian literature must not be perceived in terms of difference in degree; rather, it should be viewed in terms of difference in kind or as two types of multiplicity: extensive or quantitative (majoritarian) and intensive or qualitative (minoritarian). A

holistic understanding of these two kinds is only possible in relation to the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of difference in general.

The complex relationship between Deleuze's philosophy of difference and his politics of difference can be clarified by explaining his theory of multiplicities as discussed in Chapter One. Against the backdrop of the philosophy of representation (or all forms of universalization), Deleuze states that "there is always an unrepresented singularity who does not recognize precisely because it is not everyone or the universal" (*D* 52). The voiceless or the subaltern is an essential ingredient of minoritarian politics. In *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari assert that every individual or Oedipal issue in a life-story must be viewed via the lens of the political, which is also in conjunction with other spectra of living (e.g., economic, aesthetic, cultural, and the like). This perspective is magnified in *A Thousand Plateaus* where they claim that "everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics" (*ATP* 213).

Minoritarian politics is a paramount feature of Deleuze and Guattari's "relational understanding of difference" (Patton 2000, 47). The opposition between minority and majority is inevitably marred with complexity. Writ large, the majoritarian logic of production derives its regulative principle from a transcendental concept or arborescent principle, which is external to the particularities it produces, homogenizes, and hegemonizes. The majoritarian resembles a hierarchical and nonreflexive structure because it assumes a leverage over other particularities. In Deleuze and Guattari's words, "When we say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the determination of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian" (*ATP* 291). The 'white-heterosexual-European-male,' for example, is a majoritarian standard. Albeit they are fewer in numbers compared with blacks, Asians, transgenders, women, and the like, 'man' still is designated as the majoritarian model. Man "appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is extracted. Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure" (*ATP* 105).

The minoritarian promotes singular and local connections by virtue of its autopoietic and protean attributes. It also espouses an ethics of prudence. In other words, its elucidation of the value of the minorities does not want to commit the similar blunder by the very principle it seeks to critically diagnose. Its specific goal, as Patton profoundly argues in *Deleuze and the Political*, is merely to defend the right of the minorities by expanding the majoritarian standard to include the excluded and by practicing gender sensitivity and neutrality, as well as multiculturalism.¹⁸

Joining man hence are also other concepts such as ‘woman,’ ‘Asians,’ ‘Africans,’ ‘homosexuals, and the like. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s penchant for the minoritarian is merely a prologue to the third and most important term in micropolitics—‘becoming-minoritarian.’

Before elucidating becoming-minoritarian’s significant role in micropolitics or assemblage theory, I deem it necessary to first explicate the Deleuzian notion of ‘becoming’—an omnipresent concept in Deleuze’s philosophy even before his collaboration with Guattari. Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming is greatly Spinozian (affects) and Nietzschean (power). Affects and power are indispensably contributory to schizoanalysis and assemblage theory articulated in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, respectively. In Spinoza’s philosophy, the affective dimension of a body (individual and collective agencies) implies both the capacity to affect another body and the power to be affected. As such, the affective aspect of the body or power is parallel to the Nietzschean concept of the will to power. Nietzsche’s understanding of power is not about craving for power and the eradication of the weak because these are only expressions of slave morality or the descending life-typology. Relation of bodies can either be active or reactive, or it may increase or diminish an agency’s capability to act. Engagement with other bodies increases one’s powers. Ideally, the processes involved in the said encounters result in the bodies’ creative transformation, not appropriation.

Deleuze perceives the feeling of power as a kind of affect inextricably connected to a process of becoming or becoming-other.¹⁹ Apparently, implicit in becoming-other is the goal of joy in Spinoza, the active expenditure of power in Nietzsche, and the enrichment of desire via perpetual and creative connections and production in Deleuze and Guattari. Becoming-other, additionally, refers to transversalities with other bodies and proximities, or what Bergson calls the realm of the ‘nonhuman.’

Becoming-minoritarian resembles Kafka’s minoritarian literature. As opposed to being the standard (majoritarian) and the marginalized (minoritarian), becoming-minoritarian advocates a principle of becoming that operates at the middle of the former and the latter. As Deleuze and Guattari explicate:

A line of becoming ... passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs ... transversally to the localizable relation to distant or contiguous points. A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end.... The middle is not an average ... it is the absolute speed of movement. A becoming is always in the middle.... A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it

is the in-between.... If becoming is a block ... it is because it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility ... a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other (*ATP* 293).

In *Dialogues*, the majoritarian, minoritarian, and becoming-minoritarian principles are discussed in terms of a triadic politics of immanence. Assemblages are comprehended through these lines that immanently constitute different things, individuals, and groups. In the words of Deleuze, “We think lines are the basic components of things and events. So everything has its geography, its cartography, its diagram. What’s interesting, even in a person, are the lines that make them up, or they make up, or take, or create” (*N* 33). The intricate nuances and tensions produced through the conjunction and disjunction of these lines are the very objects of study of schizoanalysis, micropolitics, rhizomatics, and cartography (*D* 125).

The first is the line of ‘rigid segmentarity’ (molar line). Modern society or State society bombards us with enormous numbers of rigid lines or striated spaces by which individuals move from one place to another—the line that connects us from the oedipalized relation in the family to the arborescent structures in the university, the compartmentalized setting in the workplace, and the bureaucratic configurations in the government, among others. These lines are characterized by “clearly defined segments, in all directions, which cut us up in all sense, packets of segmentarized lines” (*D* 124). Segments are interdependent to social binary opposites such as black and white (race), man and woman (sex), and rightist and leftist (political affiliation). Albeit they are characterized by rigid lines, they collide or cut across each other in various directions and operate diachronically (*D* 128). Consequently, new lines or binaries are produced such as the transgender identity, i.e., when man-and-woman binary collides or when you are neither a man nor a woman.

Despite rigid segments’ dynamic production, they are likewise instruments of power. Social segments in the form of social codes are formulated as devices of control and surveillance. Using the prison model (as a microcosm of all other institutions such as the hospital and the factory), Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* elucidates a macrolevel account of power and its aptitude of disciplinarity. A reconstructed version of Jeremy Bentham’s notion of panopticon is the central idea of Foucault’s political philosophy. Through the State’s centralized machinery, “each segment is underscored, rectified, and homogenized in its own right, but also in relation to the others. Not only does each have its own unit of measure, but there is

an equivalence and translatability between units. The central eye has as its correlate a space through which it moves, but it itself remains invariant in relation to its movements” (*ATP* 211).

The molar lines that cut across each other also produce fissures. Deleuze and Guattari clarify that instead of establishing the distinction between the segmentary and the centralized, we should elucidate the existing difference between the two kinds of segmentarity, namely rigid (modern) and supple (primitive) (*ATP* 210). The ‘molecular lines,’ the lines which operate in primitive societies, are suppler than the molar. Because they are characterized by fluxes and are elusive to all types of overcoding or the State’s panoptical control, they bring about molecular becomings. If molar lines operate diachronically between segments to produce more binarized segments, the molecular lines operate at each segment’s subterranean plane via disjunctions and conjunctions, or repulsion and attraction. The rhizomic fluxes are “imperceptible, marking a threshold of lowered resistance ... you can no longer stand what you put up with before ... the distribution of desires has changed in us, our relationships of speed and slowness have been modified” (*D* 126). Nevertheless, unlike the rhizomic fluxes, traditional binaries retain their existence even though new ones are produced after a series of collisions. Although apparent dissimilarities separate the molar (modern or rigid) from the molecular (primitive or supple) lines, it is important to know why Deleuze and Guattari deem Kafka as the greatest theorist of bureaucracy. *How can he be a writer who espouses rhizomic or rhizomatic thinking and a theorist of rigid segmentarity at the same time?* The modern bureaucratic societies are not only governed by arborescent structures, segmented spaces, and a centralized mechanism, but they are also characterized by “a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations” (*ATP* 214).

In the case of fascism, it can exist both in the rigid and the supple segments, i.e. in the forms of macrofascism and microfascism, respectively. The same is true with race. Although it is traditionally regarded as a minoritarian concept, Deleuze and Guattari contend that it can anytime transform into racism, fascism, or microfascism (*ATP* 379). In other words, the minoritarian logic of production or the molecular line is not categorically a vector of becoming or transformation.

Moreover, the molecular line is not downsized or individualistic although it operates in fissures and pockets. The distinction between the molar and the molecular lines therefore is analytic and qualitative, and the relationship between them is characterized by intricate interdependence.

Molar and molecular lines coexist. One of their clearest depictions can be found in Kafka's writings. His literatures show how stratified segments can coexist with rhizomic fluxes in all social assemblages. Specifically, Kafka's minoritarian philosophy illustrates how the "barriers between offices cease to be 'a definite dividing line' and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segments" (*ATP* 214).

Lastly, a line enables us to navigate across our segments and thresholds toward something *terra incognita*—the 'abstract line.' It resembles the line of flight by which the other kinds of line owe their existence. In this vein, it entails a power to rupture all binaries, be it segmented or supple, toward the state of becoming-imperceptible. Although the fluidity of the molecular lines actualizes as a device of deterritorialization, the possibility of reterritorializing into molar lines is inevitable. Meanwhile, the abstract line can transfigure into a creative and radical assemblage, as well as the assemblage it affects. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari design and conceive *A Thousand Plateaus* not only as a rhizomic literature but also as a philosophical piece promoting lines of flight in thinking and living. It is a book that fosters novel and radical pathways of theory and praxis in a way that deterritorialization leads to further deterritorializations, and creation to perpetual creations.²⁰

A line of flight is relative when it operates in-between milieus that are usually preestablished attractors or flows. In this regard, it can reterritorialize into extremely rigid segments, and worse, it can metamorphose into a line of decadence or destruction. Moreover, a line of flight is absolute when it endorses absolute deterritorialization that fashions entirely novel relations, ways of thinking, and thresholds. Mark Bonta and John Protevi, in *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, describe the absolute line of flight as a vector of freedom.²¹ As a tool for freedom, Deleuze and Guattari underscore the call for the transfiguration of the lines of flight to become machinic assemblages of incessant enunciation, relation, and overcoming that would radicalize social life as a protean plane of existence, always hunted by the horrifying possibilities of lines of destruction (*ATP* 229).

As a vector of freedom, the absolute line that fuels the principle of becoming-minoritarian gains a political force because it liberates the subaltern concepts and entities from the totalizing dominion of the molar line and the highly polymorphous current of the molecular. More importantly, becoming-minoritarian abrades the minoritarian to the majoritarian to extinguish the rigid ramparts of majoritarian, as well as the

subaltern frontiers of the minoritarian principle, and differentialize them through incessant deterritorialization.

Becoming-other as becoming-minoritarian is immensely informed by its dynamic and reflexive relation with marginalized social collectivities outside the frontiers of traditional institutions such as the family and the State. They represent "minoritarian groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions" (*ATP* 247). As a creative process, becoming-minoritarian deterritorializes the minoritarian's determinate configurations in relation to the majoritarian. In the case of the majoritarian 'man' and the minoritarian 'woman,' becoming-minoritarian is tantamount to becoming-woman. All becomings, even the becoming-minoritarian of language in its stuttering, should pass 'becoming-woman'—another term Deleuze and Guattari utilize that represents becoming-other. In this manner, becoming-woman subjects 'man' and, in fact, even 'woman' into perpetual deterritorialization: "In a way, the subject in a becoming is always 'man,' but only when he enters a becoming-minoritarian that rends him from his major identity.... Conversely, if ... women must become-woman, if children must become-child ... it is because only a minority is capable of serving as the active medium of becoming, but under such conditions that it ceases to be a definable aggregate in relation to the majority" (*ATP* 291).

Becoming-minoritarian as becoming-woman dismantles conventional woman stereotypes fabricated by the male phallic economy in the same manner that it deletes even the essentialist underpinnings and values traditionally associated with women. The audacious efforts of the first wave of feminists, for example, who struggled for equal rights to education and suffrage are indeed praiseworthy. Deleuze and Guattari, however, argue that a molar political initiative of this kind should be coupled by a molecular politics of becoming-woman.²² Failure to pass the process would imply their conversion into another kind of majoritarian politics where its process of incessant minoritarian variation comes to a halt.

Doubtless, Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of becoming-woman receives stark criticism from feminist scholars.²³ In my perspective, the feminists' repudiation of the philosophy of becoming-woman is only legitimized when it is pondered as a stable concept and perspective (speaking-position), not as a molecular process of creative becoming that lies at the middle of man and woman. Furthermore, becoming-woman is not tantamount to the obliteration of gender politics in particular, and all kinds of molar politics in general. It simply aims for the enhancement, differentialization, and the magnanimous call for all of us to "ungender

itself [ourselves], creating a nonmolarizing socius that fosters carnal invention rather than containing it” (Massumi 1992, 89).²⁴

The creative interplay between the molar segments of the majoritarian and the molecular flows of the minoritarian, and the virtual potentials of becoming-minoritarian are ubiquitous in all fields—gender, cultural studies, music, science, among others. In this manner, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the history of societies is not shaped by the contradiction between socio-economic classes (which are all majoritarian or molar) as Marxists scholars would claim. Rather, it is differentialized by the molecular fissures emerging underneath rigid segments, and more importantly, it is deterritorialized by the lines of flight toward a superlative kind of creativity. For them, a micropolitics of society:

[I]s defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular. There is always something that flows or ... escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding machine: things that are attributed to a “change in values,” the youth, women, the mad, etc. May 1968 in France was molecular, making what led up to it all the more imperceptible from the viewpoint of macropolitics (*ATP* 216).

Deleuze and Guattari use the events behind the May 1968 struggle as a case in point. A significant problem occurs at the interstices of the said event. Being theoretical captives of obsolete philosophical theories such as Psychoanalysis, Marxism, and Phenomenology, the French people evaluate the said struggle through macropolitical terms. Unfortunately, they misrecognize the radical alterity or singularity of such an event irreducible to any forms of representation and more prominently, that which opens them to a future plane of existence. According to Deleuze and Guattari:

[T]he people ... understood nothing of the event because something unaccountable was escaping. The politicians, the parties, the unions, many leftists, were utterly vexed; they kept repeating over and over again that “conditions were not ripe. It was as though they had been temporarily deprived of the entire dualism machine that made them valid spokespeople.... A molecular flow was escaping, minuscule at first, then swelling, without, however, ceasing to be unassignable” (*ATP* 216).²⁵

At this juncture, let me emphasize that it is incorrect to think that the Deleuzo-Guattarian minoritarian politics only deals with perpetual and polymorphous becomings; neither should scholars view it as an arborescent principle isolated from the sedentary frames of the majoritarian.

Minoritarian and majoritarian politics operate in a continuous interplay via the principle of becoming-minoritarian, and they must remain inexorable to avoid or escape representation, marginalization, and pure anarchy. As Deleuze and Guattari underscore, “molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes, and parties” (*ATP* 216–217).

C. The State’s Capitalist Capture and the Nomadic War-Machine

In the chapter “Treatise on Nomadology:—The War Machine” of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explicate the critical relation between the two types of thought and assemblage, namely the ‘State-form’ (state apparatus) and the ‘nomad’ (machine), through different disciplines such as war, ethnology, and history (philosophy of history).

Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history or nomadology serves as an alternative to traditional or majoritarian history. It is a kind of history or historicism chronicled “from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus” (*ATP* 23). Whereas the latter is informed by a philosophy of time in its undertakings, the former is grounded on a philosophy of space, that is, of territory and topology.²⁶ In this manner, it can be said that nomadology is geographical, and as such, is inextricably linked with becoming: “Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (*D* 2). Being an alternative history, nomadology’s differential power can also subject traditional history to a state of becoming-other—a state where it can be liberated from the fetters of the State philosophy. It would be surprising for some scholars to discover that despite their manifold criticisms on history, nomadology offers an escape from the preexisting dualism between becoming and history. Deleuze and Guattari’s problematization of the relation of the ‘root-tree’ and the ‘canal-rhizome’ models can help us further explain nomadology’s emancipatory import:

We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through which we pass. Arrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging (*ATP* 20–21).

After this brief background on Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of history or nomadology, let us go back to the distinction between the State-form and the nomad thought. The difference between them is fundamentally based on divergences between spatial activities, distributions, and relations in the social or political fields. The former bears the capability to proliferate striated thought and space whose logic adheres to the double-articulation of State power as an interiority and an overarching principle of *logos* for universal legitimization. Meanwhile, the latter contains the aptitude to produce a smooth space that further poses a critical challenge to the former.

Deleuze and Guattari use the games of 'Chess' and 'Go' to elaborate the significant differences between the striated (State) and the smooth (nomad) space. Chess pieces are characterized by mechanistic functionalities and intrinsic properties that regulate all movements and possible scenarios: "Each is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers combine in a subject of enunciation, that is, the chess player or the game's form of interiority" (*ATP* 352). On the other hand, Go pieces are composed of "pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function" (*ATP* 352). Because the pieces serve as nonsubjectified assemblages, then their properties are protean, and their relations mobilize in rhizomic constellations. On the contrary, Chess pieces' functions are governed by a hierarchy of powers and determined by the logic of interiority. Deleuze and Guattari further elaborate their differences:

Within their milieu of interiority, chess pieces entertain biunivocal relations with one another, and with the adversary's pieces: their functioning is structural. On the other hand, a Go piece has only a milieu of extrinsic relations with ... constellations ... according to which it fulfills functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, shattering.... Chess is ... an institutionalized, regulated, coded war.... But ... Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even.... Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself.... In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space ... of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is ... perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival (*ATP* 353).

Deleuze and Guattari have nothing but praise for the game of Go. It does not code and decode spaces and biunivocalize relations such as the Oedipal relation promulgated in the nuclear family. Rather, Go territorializes or

deterritorializes space or “deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere” (*ATP* 353).

Further, Deleuze in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* describes the radical necessity for a philosopher to become a nomad or a Go player in a State that diminishes or disheartens freedom and creativity, as well as mediocrity life. According to Deleuze, “the philosopher fashions the image of a life beyond good and evil.... The philosopher can reside in various states, he can frequent various milieus, but he does so in the manner of a hermit, a shadow, a traveler” (*S* 4).²⁷ Additionally, the difference between the two kinds of space articulated by the State and the nomad is parallel to the distinction between the two kinds of multiplicity.²⁸ Whereas striated space resembles a homogenous space of quantitative multiplicity, the smooth space resembles the heterogeneous space of qualitative multiplicity.²⁹ In the former kind of multiplicity, activities and concepts are predetermined by an arborescent principle or an “overarching metric principle of directionality” (*S* 4). In the latter, operations and concepts are distributed fluidly through rhizomic variations and through a plethora of subterranean trajectories and relations.

The difference existing between the striated and the smooth space can likewise be perceived in the domain of evaluation *a la* Nietzsche’s distinction between the active (ascending) and the reactive (descending) forces. If the former can be interpreted as a realm of capture and debasement, the latter is a place where interminable predicaments are confronted, diverse struggles are transfigured, novel undertakings are initiated, and new directions are pursued. Nevertheless, vigilance must be at work all the time because despite its rhizomic dynamism, the smooth space always runs the risk of being homogenized by the striated. Similarly, smooth space can emerge from a reactive source, specifically from the corrosion of the striated. Hence, the smooth space is not necessarily an ‘active’ plane for creative possibilities of life. Like the continuous interplay between the majoritarian and minoritarian logic of production, the State (striated) and the nomad (smooth) must be viewed as a process of incessant intersection, struggle, and coexistence: “smooth space is constantly being translated, traversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (*ATP* 474).

As argued earlier, the nomad is characterized by extrinsic properties, not by intrinsic ones that are products of arborescent relations. As such, there exist no unitary laws that configure or regulate space. Rather, laws are formulated in the traversal of space.³⁰ This is the very reason why

the nomad is significantly linked to the ‘war-machine.’ As Deleuze and Guattari explain:

[T]he war-machine ... has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space. At this other pole, the machine does indeed encounter war, but as its supplementary or synthetic object, now directed against the State and against the worldwide axiomatic expressed by States. We thought it is possible to assign the invention of the war-machine to the nomads (*ATP* 422).

Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of the State goes against the grain of traditional, that is, the evolutionist theory of the State. According to this theory, the State emerges when a society accelerates into a certain level of maturity, complexity, and productivity. Influenced by the anthropologist Pierre Clastres, they perceive the State as an overarching principle that consolidates labor power and the very factors that constitute it, which produce surplus-value (*ATP* 357). In the past, the State serves as a regulative principle in administering the production of surplus-value, as well as in reproducing the forms of accumulation. However, in the contemporary period, the various configurations of the State are axiomatized in high and uninterrupted velocity, and its power and territorial breadth are overcome by advanced or global capitalism. In a period where advanced capitalism reigns, capital actualizes as an omnipresent milieu or as a majoritarian principle responsible for commodifying and totalizing everything. In this regard, all types of human activities and cultural values are anonymized and are subordinated to the prevailing law of capitalist consumption. What makes the civilized capitalist machine enormously detrimental is that its axiomatizing power is perpetually coupled by its molecular totalization of individual psyche where people choose their own oppression or submit themselves to State philosophy.

The war-machine, meanwhile, is of nomadic origin and is created as a social catalyst assemblage of the State apparatus. The war-machine is incessantly appropriated by the State apparatus through the process of political reductionism. In this process, the State reduces the war-machine’s creative and revolutionary potentialities into a war (*ATP* 420). However, despite its enormous efforts, the war-machine remains irreducible or exterior to the State apparatus. Deleuze and Guattari caution us that it is insufficient to simply accept the war-machine’s critical relation to the State apparatus: “It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war-machine as itself a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes

the form of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking" (*ATP* 354). Because the war-machine embodies the nomad thought, its relation to the State is characterized by radical exteriority typically in the form of strikes, civil defiance, and revolution. Social deviations of these kinds occur because of the rigidifying structures and tendencies of the State apparatus that discourage creativity, dynamism, and fissures. At the same time, there exist other organizations such as indigenous communities, civil societies, and ecumenical organizations that emerge and operate beyond the exploitative mechanisms of the State.

While a continuous interplay exists between the State and the war-machine, the latter, like the principle of becoming-minoritarian, is located "between the two heads of the State ... and that it is necessary to pass from one to the other ... in that instant, even ephemeral, if only a flash, it proclaims its own irreducibility" (*ATP* 355). War-machine's nomadic character incites paranoia to the State apparatus. To be specific, the State is incapacitated in reducing the war-machine's configurations into a stable military institution (*ATP* 230). Being an unknown and irreducible assemblage to the State, the war-machine, in turn, poses the possibility of warding off its entire mechanism, as well as liberating thought from Statist representation. Whereas the State (as a form of interiority) is constitutive of the propensity to reproduce itself despite a series of relations and modifications, the war-machine (as a kind of exteriority) merely exists in its own transformation. The latter "exists in an industrial innovation as well as in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State" (*ATP* 360).

As discussed earlier, the lines of flight can always morph into a line of destruction or danger when it deteriorates along the process of transformation. Such a decadent state can also be analogously experienced by the war-machine. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war-machine after it has lost its power to change" (*ATP* 230). Hence, the only place war has in relation to the war-machine is in the form of an appalling detritus left by a totalized State. A war-machine incorporated in the mechanism of the State voids its nomadic aptitude to author mutant lines of flight and craft a "pure, cold line of abolition" instead (*ATP* 230).

Although it is repugnant to all kinds of segmented spaces of capture, the war-machine's goal is not really to wage a military war against the State. Rather, because war-machine is a machine of metamorphosis, its

aim is to “engender the production of something altogether different” (Patton 2000, 110). The war-machine seeks to search for the factors and conditions that bring forth the possibility of creative mutation and transformation, or what Deleuze and Guattari term as absolute and relative deterritorialization. This is the very reason why the war-machine is inextricably linked to the lines of flight or deterritorialization. The radical force of these lines would not mutate and thus would lack efficacy, without the intervention of the war-machine: “Mutation springs from this machine, which in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows in the sense all creation is brought about by a war-machine” (*ATP* 229–230).

Being an ally principle of the lines of flight, the war-machine provides the means to extract thought from the State through the concept of the ‘outside thought,’ or the ‘untimely.’³¹ Because the nomadic war-machine is devoid of a stable or sedentary image of itself, it devours all images of thought (such as modern or Christian nihilism and oedipalized psychoanalysis), including the possibility of subordinating thought to an arborescent model such as the Platonic Truth, the Kantian just, and the Hegelian right (*ATP* 377). All these models, which are analogous to the State (State-form of thought), are determined by a kind of methodical and preconfigured direction by which they cross one striated space going to another.

On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari understand the nomad thought or the war-machine’s direction as an arrow that “does not go from one point to another but is taken up at any point, to be sent to any other point, and tends to permute with the archer and the target” (*ATP* 377). Holland comprehensively elaborates this distinction by arguing that the direction of the nomad thought does not seek to build fixed universal models that would limit thought’s dynamism in striated spaces. Rather, in the trajectory of the nomad thought or the arrow, it exhibits instantaneous and ephemeral modifications to “compensate for cross-wind velocities, the initial aims of the archer long forgotten—the target of smooth capital, for instance, as a new adversary and moving target” (Holland 2013, 47). The war-machine’s trajectory and intervention are a kind of relay in-between by which its rhizomic current deterritorializes the already archaic and impractical *ethos* of living and relating with the world toward the production of novel ones. The nomad thought or the nomadic war-machine is a thought, “grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered up in an interior form, operating by relays instead of forming an image; an event-thought, a haecceity, instead of a subject-thought, a problem-thought

instead of an essence thought or theorem; a thought that appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry” (*ATP* 378).

In other words, the nomad thought does not plea for the creation of rationally constituted individuals, or a majoritarian principle that would augment and succumb to the striated capillaries of the State or Universal Reason. It appeals to a people- or revolutionary-to-come. Such collectivity, as Deleuze and Guattari adumbrate, is capable of drawing the lines of becoming that can deterritorialize every striated space designed by the State apparatus toward becoming-other or ever-renewed productions, relations, and transformations.

Notes

¹ Other relevant concepts discussed in *Kafka* further elaborated in *A Thousand Plateaus* are ‘desiring-production’ and ‘assemblage.’

² See Reda Bensmaïa’s foreword in (*K* ix). The said foreword is a comprehensive elucidation of the convergences and some divergences between Benjamin, and Deleuze and Guattari’s appropriation of Kafka.

³ Prevalent among Kafka’s short stories is the use of animal figures as actors and participants, which on a larger scale destabilizes the anthropological privileging or the privileging of ‘man’ in literature in particular and life in general. In *The Trial* (1925), for instance, he explores the different facets of life as a machine. Of course, this runs contrary to traditional reading that looks at this literature as a manifestation of a neurotic symptom or a problematic Oedipal relationship with his father.

⁴ See (*B* 28) and (*AO* 164). Furthermore, Adorno and Horkheimer claim that humanity instead of achieving a society of enlightened reason, ours has entered into an age of barbarism. See (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 1). The overriding goal of their philosophy of the nonidentical is to recuperate our mimetic relationship with nature—the very form of relation annihilated by the project of Enlightenment.

⁵ See (Parr 2005, 15).

⁶ Deleuze and Guattari define schizoanalysis as a kind of diagramming or mapping of socio-psychic entities, which they call ‘schizanalytic cartographies.’ However, it is Guattari who further utilizes and develops the term. See for instance (Guattari 2011).

⁷ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari define genetic axis and deep structure: “A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages are organized; a deep structure is more like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension” (*ATP* 11).

⁸ In relation to the brain as a rhizome or multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari argue: “The discontinuity between cells, the role of the axons, the functioning of the synapses, the existence of synaptic microfissures, the leap each message makes across these fissures, make the brain a multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency or neuroglia, a whole uncertain, probabilistic system” (*ATP* 15). In

another plane, traditional psychoanalysis subjects the brain or the unconscious, to arboreal structures, hierarchical graphs, recapitulatory memories, and central organs. Inherent in psychoanalysis is a dictatorial organization headed or regulated by Oedipus. In rhizomatics or schizanalysis, the unconscious is perceived as an acentered organization—“machinic network of finite automata” (*ATP* 17).

⁹ See (Colebrook 2002, 106).

¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari’s view of language is functional or pragmatic, rather than essentialist. It is an antithesis to the structuralist understanding of language as a signifier in a sluggish and absurd world that necessitates the organizing and representation of signs (semiotics). However, the thrust on language as a kind of signification or representation rests on the principle of transcendence. In structuralism, language is understood as isolated from the material society. Meanwhile, the functionalist approach to language of Deleuze and Guattari is a microcosm of their philosophy of pragmatics, which is discussed in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Moreover, in *Anti-Oedipus*, they relate pragmatics to the functionalist approach to desire and the unconscious. A functionalist approach in understanding desire focuses on how desire works, i.e., how it fashions dynamic and rhizomic connections.

¹¹ See (Bogue 2004, 72).

¹² These thinkers attack traditional and erroneous postulates on language that perceive primarily as informational and communicational, as well as homogenous and transcendental a system that merely deals with major languages. Austin, for instance, claims that the very fact of speech (where words are uttered) already connotes an activity or performance.

¹³ Before *A Thousand Plateaus*, the concept of pragmatics was already enunciated by virtue of their functionalist approach to desire and the unconscious, elucidated in *Anti-Oedipus* and *The Logic of Sense*.

¹⁴ See (Bogue 2004, 65).

¹⁵ See (Olkowski 1999); cf. (Lacercle 2002).

¹⁶ In relation to Proust, Deleuze and Parnet argue: “It is not a question of speaking a language as if one was a foreigner, it is a question of being a foreigner to one’s own language” (*D* 59).

¹⁷ Cf. (*AO* 250).

¹⁸ See (Patton 2000, 47).

¹⁹ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain how affects are related to becomings: “To the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual there correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from external parts or from the individual’s own parts. Affects are becomings” (*ATP* 256).

²⁰ See (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 106).

²¹ See (Bonta and Protevi, 2004, 106).

²² Even the second wave feminism (which criticizes the patriarchal model of society), the third wave (which endorses multivocality and inclusivity), and the fourth wave (which extends the causes of the third wave in the cyber space), must pass the process of becoming-woman.

²³ One of the foremost critics of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in the domain of gender is Rosi Braidotti. See (Braidotti 1994).

²⁴ Cf. (Patton 2000, 82).

²⁵ The legacies of May 1968 can only become pragmatic upon our critical analysis and intervention of the manifold subterranean occurrences, if not the collective decadence, which are overridden by the crowd’s frenzied posture. In short, contemporary humanity and scholarship must learn the lessons it conveyed positively and negatively, especially *contra* various microfascisms that call for micropolitical diagnosis and revaluation.

²⁶ See (Lundy 2012, 64).

²⁷ In the “Preface” of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant describes the nomad as an individual who despises “all permanent cultivation of the soil” (Kant 1998, 99).

²⁸ Originally, the difference between the two kinds of space is used by Pierre Boulez to distinguish two kinds of musical space (*ATP* 477).

²⁹ See (Patton 2000, 112).

³⁰ See (Parr 2005, 187).

³¹ All of Nietzsche’s writings such as *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are directed against modern or Christian nihilism in all its societal expressions or guises. But Deleuze and Guattari argue in *A Thousand Plateaus* that perhaps it is in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ that Nietzsche launches his most staunch critique of Statist image of thought (*ATP* 376).

CHAPTER FOUR

SCHIZOANALYTIC REVOLUTION AS BECOMING-REVOLUTIONARY

A. Prelude: Micropolitics and Becoming-Revolutionary

Aside from the celebrated May 1968 political struggle, Deleuze and Guattari's micropolitics is greatly informed by Classical Marxism, Leninism, and the Bolshevik Revolution, to name a few. Nevertheless, while the concept of the 'Communist revolution' is perceived to inform Deleuze and Guattari's socio-political imagination, its proletarianization of the revolution and teleological trajectory are criticized as leaning toward a micropolitical mapping of a revolution-to-come or becoming-revolutionary.

Deleuze and Guattari repudiate the possibility of a global revolution against totalitarian and capitalist-captured States whose goal is to eliminate all contradictions in society. Likewise, they negate any kind of macropolitical struggles that would convert ethical fascism or microfascism¹ into molecular investments of desire. For them, it is imperative to launch a micropolitical diagnosis of fascism in contemporary institutions, as well as in the manifold networks of political and subcultural enunciations. Its creative mutations in these social spaces transform fascism into a transhistorical phenomenon, and as such, a hazardous phenomenon. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari elucidate that: "What makes this fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism" (*ATP* 236). In *Chaosophy*, Guattari adds, "The historical transversality of the machines of desire on which totalitarian systems depend is ... inseparable from their social transversality. Therefore, the analysis of fascism is not simply a historian's specialty. I repeat: what set fascism in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms and within the complex contemporary social space."²

The molecular nuances of fascism in contemporary social spaces incapacitate any macropolitical interventions or examinations. Unlike macropolitics, Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics is concerned with critical

and active experimentation with the numerous angles and fissures existing between politico-economic institutions or investments and subinstitutional movements of desire.³ As such, Deleuze and Guattari commiserate with the minoritarians by virtue of their ability to antagonize the molar social codes, subjecting majoritarian norms to transfiguration. The minoritarians' capacity for deterritorialization is the essence of revolutionary becoming. Moreover, included in the principle of becoming-minoritarian is the goal of inventing novel investments and subjectivities capable of shaking the status quo.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, a 'concept' is an open-multiplicity. In *What is Philosophy?*, they argue that it is a "specifically philosophical creation [which] is always a singularity" (*WP* 7). Speaking of multiplicities and singularities, a concept is likewise an assemblage whose components consist of concepts.⁴ Its relations with other concepts are also tantamount to its relations with historical circumstances and problems: "[E]very concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections. Every concept has components that may, in turn, be grasped as concepts" (*WP* 19). Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as the active creation of concepts that can antagonize the present, as well as radically transfigure economic, political, and historical occurrences that thwart life's possibility of becoming-other (*WP* 108). In this vein, through a concept (philosophical concept) we can go beyond our experiences toward novel kinds of thinking and living. The reason is that philosophical concepts "are fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together, because their edges do not match up. They are ... the outcome of throws of the dice" (*WP* 35).

'Micropolitics' is a philosophical concept whose workings can only be understood when problematized in relation to another philosophical concept, namely 'becoming-revolutionary.' Micropolitics' dynamic hybridity (in conjunction with other concepts such as becoming, multiplicities, deterritorialization, among others) crafts new intensities, connections, and possibilities of life that escape capitalism's molar codification and the State's capture. Meanwhile, the concept of becoming-revolutionary is untimely. It does not only aid micropolitics in the molecular reinstatement of desire, for instance; rather, it also subverts all molar codes or majoritarian representations under the capitalist or State capture that derail the rhizomic movements of desire and the endless creation of nomadic forces in society. Aside from its radical character, Patton, in *Deleuze and the Political*, claims that the principle of becoming-revolutionary "is a process open to all at any time. Moreover, its value does not depend on the success or failure of the molar redistributions to which it gives rise" (Patton 2000, 83). This

explanation reinforces Deleuze and Guattari's argument in *What is Philosophy?*, which states that "the victory of a revolution is immanent and consist in the new bonds it installs between people, even if the bonds last no longer than the revolution's fused material and quickly give way to division and betrayal" (*WP* 177).⁵

Micropolitics is based on a politicized philosophy of difference. It is concerned with transversalities, tensions, and transformations that occur alongside, beneath, and outside the capitalist system or State apparatus. Such a Promethean task is the challenge of the subject-groups or the nomads. Because micropolitics is more concerned with problems involving performances and pragmatics than with essences, then the question that needs to be asked is: *how does micropolitics or becoming-revolutionary work?* instead of *what does micropolitics or becoming-revolutionary mean?*"⁶

B. Schizoanalysis as Becoming-Revolutionary

B.1 Schizophrenia and Therapeutic Transformation

The operation of capitalism, unlike savagery and despotism, is characterized by immanent contradiction—the contradiction between decoding and recoding, as well as deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Deleuze and Guattari describe capitalism as "inseparable from the movement of deterritorialization, but this movement is exorcised through factitious and artificial reterritorializations. Capitalism is constructed on the ruins of the territorial and the despotic, the mythic and the tragic representations, but it re-establishes them in its own service and in another form, as images of capital" (*AO* 303).

Deterritorialization liberates all libidinal energies from deceptive objective codes. In doing so, desire and labor's subjective and abstract attributes are revealed. Meanwhile, reterritorialization relocates the relations of production and consumption to private ownership, or to the oppressive mechanism of Oedipus (capital). Such a contradiction, in my view, can be perceived as a kind of ambivalence. On the one hand, the process of recording stops repetitive or reactive organ-machine connections, and more importantly, emancipates desire from preexisting obsolete and unproductive relations. On the other, the freedom enjoyed by desire is ambivalent and merely ephemeral because it is likewise in this very state that it becomes vulnerable to the repressive organizations of the capitalist socius. In the capitalist society, the disclosure of the abstract and subjective qualities of desire and labor is succeeded by their axiomatization.

Consequently, human reproduction is singled out from social reproduction in the nuclear family in the same manner that desire (desiring-production) is separated from labor (social production).

Capitalism segregates labor from desire in the same way that these aforesaid principles are subjected to privatization. The eradication of this chasm and the dynamic harmonization of these two investments actualize as the paramount goals of schizoanalysis. Primarily, schizoanalysis transfigures desire and labor from their corresponding determinate or polarized systems of representation into the concepts of desiring-production and social production so as to accentuate their convergent genealogy from production in general and without distinction in the capitalist society (*AO* 302).⁷ As Deleuze and Guattari explicate:

We know that molar social production and molecular desiring-production must be evaluated both from the viewpoint of their identity in nature and from the viewpoint of their difference in regime. But it could be that these two aspects, nature and regime ... are actualized only in inverse proportion. Which means that where the regimes are the closest, the identity in nature is on the contrary at its minimum; and where the identity in nature appears to be at its maximum, the regimes differ to the highest degree (*AO* 336).

The creative conjunction of labor (political economy) and desire (libidinal economy) is inspired by the schizoanalysis' overall goal of achieving critical freedom from all kinds of oedipalization and capitalist exploitation. Aside from its critique of Oedipus and capitalism, schizoanalysis must also be reconfigured to become "revolutionary, artistic, and analytic machines working as parts" (*N* 24) in order to cope with the acceleration of capitalism. But the concept of 'revolutionary' is one of the most abused and misunderstood notions in history; that is why, it is important to know how Deleuze and Guattari define the revolutionary path: "Is there one?—To withdraw from the world market, as Samir Amin advises Third World countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist 'economic solution'? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization?" (*AO* 260)

Contradictions that fuel societal dynamicity are appropriated by capitalism. Societal machinic assemblages are habituated in feeding off "the contradictions they give rise to, on the crisis they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they regenerate. Capitalism has learned this, and has ceased doubting itself, while even socialists have

abandoned belief in the possibility of capitalism's natural death by attrition" (*AO* 151). To achieve schizoanalysis' revolutionary goal, the great challenge is to initially capitalize on capitalism's immanent contradiction.

In fact, the capitalist system's propensity toward decline (falling rate of profit) is a contradiction that fortifies the system. According to Deleuze and Guattari, "If capitalism is the exterior of all societies ... this is because capitalism for its part has no exterior limit, but only an interior limit that is capital itself and that it does not encounter, but reproduces by always displacing it" (*AO* 230). Amin explicates that capitalist deterritorialization moves from the center (developed countries, for instance) to the margins or periphery (underdeveloped countries, for example). Capitalism undergoes schizophrenization where it displaces its crisis of accumulation perpetually from the center going to the periphery, or from the molar to the molecular.⁸ However, its capability of engendering deterritorialization or pushing its own limits is merely a ploy to its narcissistic aim of gaining interminable profit. In other words, as long as a particular kind of social innovation produces profit, capitalism immediately appropriates it for its strengthening. Likewise, the proliferation of opportunities and solutions to different problems people experience only serves as ruses for increased domination and axiomatization. After numbing the people's critical impulse, capitalism assiduously mutates and modifies itself in manifold domains by even fashioning redemptive possibilities 'for the people,' hence creating a vicious cycle of subjugation.⁹ This is the reason why the Occupy Movement activists are so vigilant in providing countermeasures against capitalist oppression because any kind of radical initiative today can immediately be totalized by or associated with capitalism.

The emancipatory component of capitalism is blemished by its concealed conservatism, systemic deception, and reactive tendency to reterritorialize into capture. This is the reason why Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism is not the absolute limit of society despite its power to decode all symbolic codes: "But it is the relative limit of every society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any other" (*AO* 246). The lingering question about the limit of society remains. Their answer to the aforesaid query is schizophrenia. However, I deem it necessary to first distinguish the said concept from 'paranoia.'

As two kinds of subjectivity, paranoia and schizophrenia are molecular by-products of the interaction between desiring-production and anti-production. Because they are of less rigidified relational origins, they

are not entirely estranged from the dynamic and open-ended characteristics of the syntheses of desire.¹⁰ Paranoia repels the aggressiveness of desiring-production. On the other hand, schizophrenia embraces the forces of production and antiproduction affirmatively and radically. It pushes the belligerent forces of desiring-production to their limits by starting all over again from the first and second syntheses of desire toward the consummation of nomadic subjectivity.

Moreover, as two poles of libidinal investments, paranoia arises from the processes of reterritorialization and recoding, hence representing the reactionary pole; while schizophrenia is an offshoot of deterritorialization and decoding, thus the schizoid revolutionary pole (*AO* 366). As Deleuze and Guattari distinguish:

The two poles are defined, the one (paranoia) by the enslavement of production ... the other (schizophrenia) by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities... the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities... The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows, constrict them ... the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative ... schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the ... territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production (*AO* 366–367).

Schizophrenia deals with subjectivities characterized by molecular singularities, nomadic mobility, and creative flows. It is the social libidinal investment that legitimately utilizes the syntheses of desire where desire's polyvocal and radical attributes are maintained and advanced. In this regard, schizophrenia is capacitated in subverting the molar norms or representations aesthetically engineered by Oedipus. Therefore, it can be said that schizophrenia is society's true limit and capitalism's greatest adversary. In Deleuze and Guattari's words:

Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibit[s] this tendency, or that it push[es] back or displace[s] this limit, by substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale. It axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other. Such is the way one must reinterpret the Marxist law of the counteracting tendency. With the result that schizophrenia pervades the entire capitalist field from one end to the other. But for capitalism it is a question

of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits (*AO* 246).

This is the reason why the nuclear family is deputized by the capitalist system to neutralize schizophrenia's revolutionary potentials. Specifically, the family is built as an avenue for capitalism to repress or restrict the rhizomic movement of desire via psychoanalysis' Oedipal triangulation. In this manner, an interior limit to desire is crafted, which further pulls it up short of schizophrenia (as an exterior limit).¹¹ But despite the radicality of schizophrenia, capitalism furtively configures its own ambivalent investments. On the one hand, capitalism is paranoiac because of its propensity to reterritorialize and recode; on the other, it is schizophrenic by virtue of its unavoidable tendency to deterritorialize and decode.

The schizophrenic character of capitalism installs its position in 'universal history' or what Marx calls 'world history.' The etymology of the concept of universal history is indebted to Marx's use of the term in *Grundrisse*. World history is merely a result, not something that exists *a priori* (*AO* 109). As Marx puts it, world history is a result when labor's abstract category gains the status of a 'practical truth as an abstraction' only with capitalism.¹²

Furthermore, schizophrenia only occurs at the end of history. This event engenders capitalism to unleash what it privatized and separated, that is, the inextricable link or common quiddity of desire and labor. The schizophrenization of capitalism emancipates desiring-production from the estranging fetters of social production. In this regard, desiring-production fuels a 'permanent revolution' or diagrams a 'new earth,' which is a movement of unceasing differentiation and creativity. Such a disclosure not only deletes the egotistical-oriented chasm configured by capitalism to police the rhizomic movement of desire, but it also allows capitalism to perform its autocritique—an attribute concealed in savagery and despotism. According to Deleuze and Guattari, "capitalism is without doubt the universal of every society, but only in so far as it is capable of carrying to a certain point its own critique ... the critique of the processes by which it re-enslaves what within it tends to free itself or appear freely" (*AO* 270).¹³ Therefore, capitalism introduces us to a brand of universal history where values are no longer externally determined by objects. Through universal history, objects assume values by virtue of subjective labor or human activities (i.e., economic, artistic, and political). Marx asserts that capitalism ingeniously discovers the subjective abstract essence of human activity

“only to be put in chains all over again, to be subjugated and alienated-no longer, it is true, in an exterior and independent element as objective, but in the element, itself subjective, of private property” (*AO* 303).

Nevertheless, the subordination of objects to the subjective value-giving leads to another external subordination, and this time, it is authored by capitalism. In Freudian philosophy, polymorphous desire is biunivocalized via the Oedipus complex or privatized in the nuclear family. In the capitalist system, the deterritorialized subjective essence of activity in general reterritorializes by means of privatization (*AO* 270).¹⁴ Whereas Marx criticizes political economy’s privatization of capital in pursuit of free wage-labor, Nietzsche criticizes modernity’s nihilism to dedeify nature toward a life of affirmation and becoming. Meanwhile, Deleuze and Guattari criticize traditional psychoanalysis to unshackle desire from the repressive confines of Oedipus.

In Marxist philosophy, production as a dynamic and self-sustaining human activity serves as a human universal.¹⁵ This indispensably informs Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of the schizoanalytic notion of universal history. Production, in their perspective, is a difference-engine irreducible from all forms of capture or representation. Paradoxically, the market in the capitalist system both serves as the fulcrum of all operations and the difference-engine. It perpetually fashions a differential network of relations despite the fact that “capital extracts its surplus from the differential flows enabled by this network, by means of exploitation and the never-ending repayment of an infinite debt” (Holland 1999, 95).¹⁶ Although capitalism falls short in realizing universal history, it inaugurates the potentiality for such a kind of history because of its differential capacity. Capitalism’s shortcoming informs and inspires schizophrenia’s principal goal of freeing capital from the narcissistic and oppressive machinery of the market. By virtue of schizophrenia, difference is creatively and dynamically proliferated toward critical freedom immanent in universal history.

As opposed to the Hegelian *telos* of unity and reconciliation, universal history deals with creativity, contingency, and openness to the future.¹⁷ Despite universal’s adjacent relation to Marxist historical materialism, it is also unconcerned with the realization of a society devoid of class distinctions and contradictions. Universal history’s concern is the molecular unconscious of the human animal as biological life-form, that is, the perpetual reproduction and transformation of life *a la* Nietzsche and Spinoza.¹⁸ In *Anti-Oedipus*, the molecular unconscious serves as the principle of freedom and difference. In its schizophrenization, capitalism deterritorializes the domains of the consciousness and representation to emancipate this molecular unconscious from the objective brand of

estrangement provided by the symbolic codes of savagery and despotism. But as discussed previously, the deterritorializing force of the capitalist mode of social production is always expelled by decadent reterritorializations that subject desire to the mechanism of Oedipus (capital).

Through schizoanalysis, capitalism is subjected to self-critique that further leads to the virtual reality of a permanent revolution. This differential brand of revolution eradicates power and paranoia (which arise in the despotic mode of social production) to allow the rhizomic movement of schizophrenia, thereby subordinating molar libidinal investments to molecular ones.¹⁹ Additionally, permanent revolution brings us to an alliance-oriented network of societal relations diverse from savagery and despotism. The ‘free-market’ produced in this fourth mode of social production crafts transversal and participatory alliances liberated from the fetters of infinite debt, as well as monopolized death and expenditure. In this manner, all market alliances would revolve around the principles of freedom, opportunity, and molecular libidinal investments. Similarly, the molecular kind of deterritorialization and decoding subordinate (and not annihilate) molar reterritorialization and recoding.²⁰

The internal and external diagnoses of Oedipus and capitalism comprise the first major phase of *Anti-Oedipus*’ schizoanalytic project. The next phase involves a critique of the various manifestations of reterritorialization, recoding, and paranoia in society. Outside the realm of the nuclear family, asceticism, oedipality, and capitalism interweave through the numerous networks of molar investments that polarize the productive and creative capabilities of desiring-production.

The third thesis of schizoanalysis deals with “the non-familial libidinal investments of the unconscious [which] have primacy over the familial investments of the unconscious” (AO 356). Nonfamilial libidinal investments are social investments that are more primary than those conditioned under the myopic regime of the nuclear family. Oedipus is instrumental in traditional psychoanalysis and capitalism’s homogenization of subjectivity-formation in the nuclear family in particular, and the fecundity of desiring-production in general. As such, Oedipus cannot be perceived as a determining principle or an efficient cause of anything social. If Oedipus is to be analyzed in relation to societal investments, it is in the form of a blockage or reduction of societal flows into personalized images of “paranoiac type of territoriality” (AO 278). Oedipus’ paranoiac territoriality further translates into paranoiac investments in society through the sponsorship of capitalist-laden reterritorialization. Because of this reactive process, paranoiac social investments are further applied to the familial investments (nuclear family): “The subjective abstract Labor as

represented in private property has, as its correlate, subjective abstract Desire as represented in the privatized family. Psychoanalysis undertakes the analysis of this second term, as political economy analyzes the first. Psychoanalysis is the technique of application, for which political economy is the axiomatic" (*AO* 304). In the social milieu, the flows of social investments forbid individuals to reappropriate the collective products of their labor and prohibit them from murdering their boss. As the paranoid social flows are invested in the nuclear family, flows translate into more stringent proscriptions to kill or antagonize the father, and to reappropriate the mother, including the siblings.

The paranoia that capitalism imposes upon Oedipus can find its expression in myth and tragedy.²¹ As such, Oedipus appears as a universal fantasy.²² The consolidation of capitalism, myth, tragedy, and Oedipus actualizes as a principle of representation that captures desire's nomadism and creative relation to social production. Schizoanalysis repudiates a representationalist and belief-oriented unconscious. Representation and beliefs halt and fixate desire's proclivity toward unceasing connections necessary for cultivating subjectivity-formations and heterogeneous relations. Paranoid territoriality prepares the unconscious for conscious yet nonconcrete capture. Regardless of this possibility, desire remains irreducible to the biunivocalized representation of conscious prohibition. In other words, the clamor for an overarching principle that would ground all things, and more importantly, would univocalize the rhizomic character of life, diverges from capitalism's axiomatization of everything in the contemporary period. Beliefs of paranoid social or molar investments segregate, privilege, and restrict molecular investments of desiring-production.

Capitalism's repressive paranoid investments inform schizoanalysis' revolutionary aim, that is, to molecularize or dismantle the networks of representation in society and the family such as debt to capital, Oedipus complex, and various kinds of ideologies (like fundamentalism and fanaticism). Political ideologies, for example, need to be surmounted and eliminated because they do not only commit the paralogism of extrapolation, but rather, they also author multifaceted forms of violence. For Franco Berardi, adherents of fundamentalism and fanaticism are guilty of 'identitarian obsession.'²³ In his words, "Rather than specific national, religious or ethnic identities, it is the very process of national identification, religious identification and ethnic identification that has led to dangerous historical game-playing, often culminating in war and slaughter" (Berardi 2015b, 101).

The negative task of schizoanalysis, as Deleuze and Guattari articulate, "goes by way of destruction—a whole scouring of the unconscious,

a complete curettage. Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the superego, guilt, the law, castration. It is not a matter of pious destructions, such as those performed by psychoanalysis under the benevolent neutral eye of the analyst” (*AO* 311).²⁴ But schizoanalysis’ critical occupation is constantly accompanied by its positive task. Affirmatively, it undoes molar recoding so that it would be subordinated to molecular investments. The process of undoing, however, is always subjected to deterritorialization and reterritorialization; that is why, an utter escape or emancipation from molar organization is neither necessary nor possible.²⁵ In relation to the State, schizoanalysis must undo molar organizations so that they would be differentialized and subordinated to molecular activities and relations. In other words, schizoanalysis differentializes molar investments in order to express superbly the rhizomic dynamicity of the molecular unconscious. In addition, schizoanalysis’ societal embeddedness shapes its goal of meticulously locating captured desiring-machines and reinstating their primordial molecular aptitude. Such a quest is premised on the cognizance of the operations, syntheses, flows, and becomings of the subject’s desiring-machines. In short, schizoanalysis’ positive task:

[C]annot be separated from ... the destruction of the molar aggregates, the structures and representations that prevent the machine from functioning. It is not easy to rediscover the molecules—even the giant molecule—their paths, their zones of presence, and their own syntheses amid the large accumulations that fill the preconscious, and that delegate their representatives in the unconscious itself, thereby immobilizing the machines, silencing them, trapping them, sabotaging them, cornering them, holding them fast (*AO* 338).

Both negative and positive tasks of schizoanalysis resemble its therapeutic component. Of course, these are analogous to deterritorialization and reterritorialization, as well as to decoding and recoding. The subversion of molar investments engenders the discovery of molecular investments capacitated to free individuals from the paranoiac territoriality imposed by Oedipus and capitalism. The discovery of molecular investments and freedom of subjects from paranoia is a form of “immanent schizo-law that functions like justice ... that will dismantle all the assemblages of the paranoiac law” (*K* 60).²⁶ Likewise, through molecular investments, the free-form of schizophrenia, fashioned by market decoding, is cultivated and endorsed.

B.2 The Molecularization of Desire and Revolutionary Transformation

From the nuclear family to the society, schizoanalysis aims to reinstate desire's molecularized pragmatics. The important link connecting the familial space to the larger societal sphere highlights the vital relation between libidinal and social investments. The inseparability of these two spaces is also an evident attribute between schizoanalysis' therapeutic and revolutionary components.

In trying to associate the concept 'revolution' with the notion of schizoanalysis, which Deleuze and Guattari draw from psychoanalysis and Marxism, the value of Nietzschean philosophy must not be overlooked. Perhaps, the discussion on revolution is the very moment where schizoanalysis partially distantiates itself from Marxism to give way to Nietzschean philosophy. Primarily, while it is true that desire is the driving principle of schizoanalysis, it lacks a determinate role in Marxism. A paramount role is associated with desire because it is constituted in the social infrastructure in the same manner that it can radicalize and free such territoriality from its capitalist seizure. The creative combination of Freudian and Nietzschean terminologies comprise schizoanalytic revolution's anticapitalist and antiascetic postures—derivative of desire, not of a particular interest, be it class-related or of nationalist cause. Deleuze and Guattari believe that, "Revolutionaries often forget, or do not like to recognize, that one wants and makes revolution out of desire, not duty. Here as elsewhere, the concept of ideology is an execrable concept that hides the real problems" (*AO* 344).

Deleuze and Guattari claim that desire is embedded in our social infrastructure. They argue that society is constitutive of desiring-machines (literal and actual), not figurative ones. The same applies to desire's sociality. Like sexuality, desire is ubiquitous, "the way ... a business man causes money to circulate; the way the bourgeoisie fucks the proletariat... Hitler got the fascists sexually aroused. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people aroused" (*AO* 293).²⁷ Unfortunately, despite desire's rhizomic attribute, contemporary capitalism initiates a peculiar type of fascism—ethical fascism, which operates at the molecular level. As it calibrates itself to axiomatize the polyvocal nature of desire, it creatively persuades subjects to blindly submit themselves to voluntary enslavement or oppression. Given that all societal machines such as nations and states are presently totalized by the capitalist molar investment, a schizoanalytic revolutionary machine therefore is confronted by an enormous challenge to overcome these repressive machines so as to resurrect desire's creative capacities.

Schizoanalysis problematizes ‘how things (desire) work and connect’ to form new machinic assemblages, not ‘what things are.’ In the context of revolution, schizoanalysis is concerned with the affirmative production of nomadic subjectivities, connections, and intensities, not obsessed with a definitive *telos*. Hence, schizoanalytic revolution deals with ‘schizophrenia as a process,’ not with the schizophrenic (schizo) as a psychoanalytic entity. Deleuze and Guattari clarify this claim in *Anti-Oedipus*:

There is a whole world of difference between the schizo and the revolutionary: the difference between the one who escapes, and the one who knows how to make what he is escaping escape, collapsing a filthy drainage pipe, causing a deluge to break loose, liberating a flow, resecting a schizo. The schizo is not revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process—in terms of which the schizo is merely the interruption, or the continuation in the void—is the potential for revolution (*AO* 341).

As a process, schizophrenia bears the revolutionary potential. It conditions the possibility of polyvocal desire capacitated in undoing and subverting the capitalist system—the author of wide-scale power-manipulation and paranoia in society. As a revolutionary potential, the schizophrenic process can undermine molar investments in society in the same manner that it can anytime be vitiated or immobilized by suppressive forces. Because the schizophrenic process operates like a rhizome via multiple, nonteleological, and nondeterminate characteristics, then vigilance must always be at hand.

In reference to the Nietzschean concept of the will to power, Deleuze, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, explicates that one of the foremost misinterpretations of the concept of the will to power is its appropriation as a clamor for power and the desire for domination.²⁸ Perhaps, such misunderstanding is based on a Schopenhauerian perspective where will is described as a sort of deficiency.²⁹ In Nietzschean philosophy, only the slaves desire for power because they view it as something external to the will. Because of this, the slaves maintain that what the will wants is an object or goal. Deleuze asserts that there is a difference between power as an object of desire and power as an indicator of the will’s quality. Of course, Nietzsche prefers the latter because he ponders the will to power as the differential element of forces. As Deleuze writes, “The will to power is the element from which we derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation” (*NP* 50).³⁰

The inclusion of the term *telos* in discussing the dynamic and revolutionary nature of schizoanalysis elicits a contradiction. The subject, for both Nietzsche and Deleuze, is merely a conduit to desire's rhizomic motion and an assemblage of forces whose attributes are not immutable and final. In short, there is no subject who desires or wills. Subjecting desire to a predetermined *telos* is tantamount to annihilating its productive and creative abilities. In the same vein, the theorization of a sovereign subject, as well as unitary organizations and principles, as discussed in Chapter Two, represses desiring-production. Because a goal or end lacks a positive place in the Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics of desire, it can be claimed that schizoanalysis is devoid of any political objective or platform to propose, including a singular voice to articulate the masses' sentiments (*AO* 380).³¹ The problem behind positing a definitive *telos* posterior to all kinds of processes or activities is that it disregards the contingencies of social materialities and the mapping of new possibilities and virtualities. Classical Marxism educates us on how the sightless or extreme valorization of the *telos* of a classless society leads to its perdition. For schizoanalysis, becoming reductively teleological voids the very nature of the schizophrenic as a process and homogenizes the molecular heterogeneity of desire.

The schizophrenic process of permanent revolution is irreducible to any teleological confinement and molar representation. It necessitates a complex reversal of values where desiring-production overrides capitalist social production by nullifying its relatively impervious sovereignty and asceticism. The cessation of capitalism's pedigree over desiring-production obliterates among individuals their paranoia of infinite debt to capital, as well as the enormity of filiation-laden societal relation. The performance of this intrepid yet perilous task requires us to initially learn from Hitler's aesthetic rhetoric of ethical fascism that was able to effectively manipulate the masses' desire. Meaning to say, the axiomatic language of capitalism must be studied and analyzed carefully, that is, in cultivating itself as a creative and regulative machinery capable of generating political, cultural, economic, and social productive forces beyond different societal organizations and structures. Grasping comprehensively capitalism's axiomatized language is succeeded by the project of calibrating the socius to fashion productive forces that would serve as an alternative to capitalist representation. Although capitalism is indubitably capacitated to craft productive forces in the socius, such creativity also manifests as exploitation of resources, which further oppresses the community and nature. The productive forces fashioned in the socius characterize a novel mode of social production—new earth or permanent revolution (*AO* 131).

Deleuze and Guattari are quick to warn individuals that this “new world can only be bodied forth in so far as it is conceived. And to conceive there must first be desire” (*AO* 299).

The formulation of a nonteleological revolutionary politics of desire leads us to the second thesis of schizoanalysis: “There are two types of social investments: there is the unconscious libidinal investment of group or desire and the preconscious investment of class or interest” (*AO* 343). Deleuze and Guattari argue that the preconscious investment is only of secondary significance as compared with the libidinal investment. This is because our interests are merely caused by the unconscious libidinal investments of desire. Such invest a degree of development of forces.³² Based on the capitalist system, its radical power to subvert conventional molar representations and frontiers of power relatively opens its doors for us to access capital’s productive forces. But in the long run, such accessibility can metamorphose into a ploy for increased axiomatization, accumulation, and fortification. Take the case of independent films. The aesthetic, subversive, and subcultural contents and forms of these films penetrate the hegemonized body of the mainstream film industry to reinstate its molecularity. One of the most notable quandaries that confront independent movies, especially after receiving both global and national acclaims, is the possibility of being commodified by capitalism. In *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, Adorno explains the ingenious nature of advance capitalism or the ‘Culture Industry’:

The culture industry intentionally integrates its consumers from above. To the detriment of both, it forces together the spheres of high and low art, separated for thousands of years. The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of the lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent within it as long as social control was not yet total. Thus, although the culture industry undeniably speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions towards which it is directed, the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation, an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject but its object (Adorno 2001, 108).

The commodification and techno-mechanical reproduction of Independent Films in particular, and arts in general, destroy their *aura* (*auratic* character), and thereby contributing to the numbing of people’s critical or

revolutionary consciousness on one hand, and the fortification of capitalism on the other.³³

In relation to Deleuze and Guattari's problematization of ethical fascism, it must be clarified that the masses are not deceived in the same way that a typical marketing product deceives a customer because of the product's fabricated images and attributes. The masses are not deceived by fascists or capitalist ideologies; rather, their desire is engrossed by an exploitative (fascist or capitalist) social investment or organization that instills in their consciousness the utopia of greater freedom and productivity of forces. Their uncritical consciousness and voluntary exploitation are undeniably conditioned by a submission to the very system that would annihilate their critical impulse and repress desire's productivity. Regarding this matter, I agree with Holland in saying that the crucial question that must be the object of critical attention is not what kind of revolution should the masses formulate, but what conditions that interest "becomes their desire, and conversely how that desire can so easily get captured and taken in quite opposite direction" (Holland 1999, 103). This occurs when despite their perceived coexistence, preconscious investments are substantially revolutionary and molecularized, yet formally repressive and molarized.

The Leninist version of Marxism is an appropriate example of this aforesaid problematic. Its preconscious investment is indeed revolutionary, specifically in relation to its goal of liberating the proletariat from capitalist domination. However, the prejudiced inclusion of the role of the Communist party posterior to the worker's upheaval subjects this dejected collectivity to a relatively vicious cycle of domination. *Anti-Oedipus* alludes to this problematic: "A group maybe revolutionary from the standpoint of class interest and its preconscious investments ... and even remains fascist and police-like—from the standpoint of libidinal investments" (AO 348).

The coexistence of libidinal and preconscious investments, and the possibility of their noncoincident occurrence is presupposed in Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between the two kinds of revolutionary rupture, namely 'preconscious' and 'libidinal.' The former labors for the actualization of new socius constitutive of novel objectives, polarizations, and schemes of power. One may rapidly think of the revolutionary rupture capitalism instigated against despotism via the axiomatization of old symbolic codes and its legacy of unshackling the molecular unconscious from its objective estrangement. Capitalism's calculative logic incessantly axiomatizes everything and crafts ever-renewed productive forces and relations of power in pursuit of massive and interminable expansion.

Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari maintain a critical stance on the concept of capitalism as a new socius. Primarily, it is insufficient for the

libido to invest in a new socius based on the novel goals and codifications projected by the preconscious revolutionary rupture. Moreover, the new social body can be immediately recoded and reterritorialized by capitalism. Meanwhile, the libidinal revolutionary rupture aspires for the promotion of molecular desire that subverts or differentiates molar codifications in society. Because these kinds of revolutionary rupture function diversely, they opine “that there can be a preconscious revolutionary break, with no real libidinal and unconscious revolutionary break. Or rather ... there is first a real libidinal revolutionary break, which then shifts into the position of a simple revolutionary break with regard to aims and interests, and finally reforms a merely specific reterritoriality, a specific body on the full body of capital” (*AO* 375). Unless these revolutionary ruptures coincide actively, then a schizoanalytic or permanent revolution would remain inconceivable and impracticable. In other words, the configuration of a new socius must be critically accompanied by the molecularization of desire or desiring-production and an undermining of all molar representations.

The molecularization of molar codifications and the maximization of desiring-production in society entail a break from causal determinations authored by capitalist axiomatization. The said rupture underscores the idea that the cause of revolutionary struggles is indissolubly associated with the oppressive and the marginalized classes. In this vein, from the question about the factors that make the revolution conceivable and practicable, the paramount issue transforms into the relationship between these revolutionary ruptures and the estranged masses—the “weakest links of a certain social system” (*AO* 377).

The status of desire in the socius, whether it can be molecularized via permanent revolution or molarized through capitalist reterritorialization, is defined by its relation to the two kinds of collectivity or group-formation, namely the ‘subject-group’ and the ‘subjugated group.’³⁴ The presence of these groups adheres to the concept of differentiation discussed in Chapter One. As the second part of the Deleuzian principle of difference, differentiation is the actualization of multiplicity in material occurrences and state of affairs.³⁵ In the context of schizoanalysis, differentiation is reflected through the two kinds of group-formation that prosecute revolution. Furthermore, the aforesaid kinds of group-formation are very much related to the schizophrenic and paranoiac libidinal investments, respectively. Specifically, the operation of the former is grounded on schizophrenic libidinal investments, while the latter is based on paranoiac preconscious investment. Deleuze and Guattari aver:

The two poles are defined, the one by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the ... aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a ... sovereignty; the other by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power. The one by these molar structured aggregates that crush singularities, select ... and regularize those they retain in ... axiomatics; the other by the molecular multiplicities of singularities.... The one by the lines of integration and territorialization that arrest the flows ... break them according to the limits interior to the system ... the other by lines of escape that follow the decoded and deterritorialized flows, inventing their own nonfigurative ... schizzes that produce new flows, always breaching the ... territorialized limit that separates them from desiring-production (*AO* 366–367).

The two kinds of group-formation are dynamic and typological categories. What I mean by dynamic is that at a particular revolutionary event, one group may transition from one group-formation to the other. Likewise, a revolutionary movement can be carried out, characterized by a hybridity or an oscillation between the schizophrenic and the paranoiac investments—albeit Deleuze and Guattari clarify that such oscillation privileges the former over the latter. Meanwhile, I describe these categories as typological because despite both groups' capability to launch a revolution, the subjugated group, for example, merely operates within preconscious investments. This reminds us, of course, of the Nietzschean distinction between the ascending and the descending life-typologies where an individual may appear as strong or master-like yet, in terms of values or life perspectives, is poisoned by asceticism and slave morality. Political organizations tend to repress desire's dynamicity and productivity—although this is not tantamount to Deleuze and Guattari's sheer rejection of vanguard parties' existence. Internally, these parties function as a subject-group. But their paranoiac and preconscious totalization of the masses' sentiments or interests inevitably redounds to the conversion of these people into a subjugated group.³⁶

Despite the respective coexistence of the two kinds of social investments and revolutionary rupture, Deleuze and Guattari stress that an unconscious revolutionary rupture can only be sustained through an unwaveringly schizophrenic libidinal investment. The problem with the paranoiac preconscious investment is that its arborescent mechanism merely produces homogeneous identities and reactive forces, as well as halts desire's molecularization. Using the jargon of revolution, even though a revolutionary preconscious investment succeeds by utterly nourishing a paranoiac investment 'libidinally,' desiring-production and the actualization

of its novel *socius* remain subordinated to “higher interests of the revolution and the inevitable sequences of causality” (AO 378). In this manner, it can be claimed that schizoanalytic or permanent revolution (as a form of becoming-revolutionary) can only be prosecuted by the subject-groups via the revolutionary rupture provided by schizophrenic libidinal investment. As Deleuze and Guattari defend: “The schizophrenic process ... is revolutionary in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (AO 379–380).

Schizophrenia, as a process of libidinal investment, empowers subject-groups to optimize the productive forces released by capitalism. The creative utilization of the decoded and reterritorialized flows crafted by capitalism prevents these active forces from being recoded and reterritorialized by capitalism itself toward the fortification of its autoproductive and axiomatic system. The ideal consequence is achieved when the subject-groups fashion a revolutionary line of escape that can subvert the capitalist-authored molar codifications while in the process of escaping them, at least tentatively or ephemerally (AO 377).³⁷ The affirmative result I discuss here is only provisional because the activity of subversion can easily be recoded and reterritorialized by capitalist axioms or any dominant system. Take the case of Negri’s theorization of the *Autonomia*. Informed by the capitalist axiomatization of all human activities and values in the entire society, the undermining of capitalist society no longer revolves around the structure of the factory but around the radical organization of social relations.³⁸ The *Autonomia* movement’s initial phase is characterized by optimism and radicalism. It appropriates the overwhelming potency of capitalism in the age of globalization by formulating novel kinds of transnational solidarities and minoritarian subversions capable of confronting dominant and hegemonic global forces and mechanisms, specifically the capitalist system. The movement’s guerilla-like activities and communication processes bear close affinity with the Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization of subject-groups. But again, we should not forget that these revolutionary collectivities always face the predicament of perpetrating more arboreal relations and being totalized by the capitalist system.

In the Philippines, for example, some subversive initiatives in various societal institutions are mollified by the capitalist or representationalist-laden government in the form of Trade Unionism and Party-List Organizations or Legislations, to name a few. In Deleuze and Guattari’s historical milieu, the French Communist Party serves as the

offspring of the axiomatization of the workers' movements. We may even think that the United Nations Organization is also a product of this repressive process, where, in seeking to reconcile all cultural differences, it commits violence to societies of various races, religions, and ethnicities. Capitalism's axiomatic system induces subject-groups to risk being complemented by preconscious revolutionary rupture just to augment its deterritorializing and decoding proficiencies. However, vigilance should always be observed because this is merely a capitalist ploy that can further vitiate our radical efforts leading to another brand of exploitation or totalization. In this vein, the revolutionary actors inopportunely convert into subjugated groups, if they are not subjected to disbanding. Holland provides a profound description of what happens to the subject-groups during and after capitalist recoding and reterritorialization. In his words, "it comes to see itself as permanent rather than transient ... it assigns itself long-term aims and goals and thus defers fulfillment of desire ... it forms exclusive and exclusionary inside/outside boundaries ... rather than continually making, breaking, and re-making new connections with society at large; it develops an internal hierarchy and promotes identification with an authority figure, along with disdain for outsiders" (Holland 1999, 105). In other words, the subjugated-group serves as a familiar territory for oedipalized subjects or repressed subjectivities in the nuclear family.³⁹ It is because Oedipus goes beyond the confines of the family institution. Outside the paranoiac territoriality of the nuclear family, Deleuze and Guattari elucidate:

[It] provides a means of integration into the group.... Oedipus also flourishes in subjugated groups, where an established order is invested through the group's own repressive forms. And it is not the forms of the subjugated group that depend on Oedipal projections and identifications, but the reverse: it is Oedipal applications that depend on the determinations of the subjugated group as an aggregate of departure and on their libidinal investments (*AO* 103).

Given these challenging circumstances, an unconscious revolutionary sensibility develops among subject-groups. The ubiquity of capitalism influences the enormous presence of subjugated groups and paranoiac investments. But we must not be oblivious to the fact that it is also in capitalism's very system that its catalysts (decoding and deterritorialization) are unleashed. This critical moment of immanent contradiction renders the inexorable possibility of schizoanalytic revolution. Its paramount objective is to bolster and intensify decoding and deterritorialization's belligerent

force that would fuel the affirmative metamorphosis of subjugated groups into subject-groups. Moreover, it aspires to assemble its desiring-machines and subject-groups in the subaltern regime of society in order to reinstate its molecular networks, amplify its value and strength, and undermine the capitalist power-structure.

Notes

¹ In Foucault's "Preface" to *Anti-Oedipus*, he distinguishes the two kinds of fascism: historical and ethical or microfascism. He associates the former with the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini. On the other hand, he characterizes the latter as "the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (AO xii).

² See (Guattari 1995, 236).

³ See (Patton 2000, 7).

⁴ The same description of a concept appears in Massumi's "Translator's Foreword" of *A Thousand Plateaus*: "A concept is a brick. It can be used to build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window.... Because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a of circumstances, at a volatile juncture.... The concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act" (ATP xiii).

⁵ Cf. (Patton 2000, 83).

⁶ Rather than focusing on the essentialist and conventional appropriation of desire, Deleuze and Guattari concentrate on the query: "how does desire work?" Their change of focus, from the essentialist to the functionalist problematic, is a microcosm of their overall critique of all forms of representation.

⁷ Cf. (Holland 1999, 80).

⁸ See (Buchanan 2000, 111).

⁹ Hardt and Negri are plausible in observing that Empire "appears in the form of a very hightech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production)" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 39).

¹⁰ This is the reason why in *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari liken the distinction between the two kinds of subjectivity with the distinction between the two states of desire: "Desire will function in two coexisting states: on the one hand, it will be caught up in this or that segment, this or that office, this or that machine or state of machine; it will be attached to this or that form of content, crystallized in this or that form of expression (capitalist desire, fascist desire, bureaucratic desire, and so on). On the other hand and at the same time, it will take flight on the whole line, carried away by a freed expression, carrying away deformed contents, reaching up to the unlimited realm of the field of immanence" (K 59).

¹¹ See (Buchanan 2000, 116).

¹² See (Marx 1973, 105).

¹³ Cf. (Marx 1973, 104–108).

¹⁴ In relation to the aforesaid discussion, Deleuze and Guattari claim: “Marx said that Luther’s merit was to have determined the essence of religion, no longer on the side of the object, but as an interior religiosity; that the merit of Adam Smith and Ricardo was to have determined the essence or nature of wealth no longer as an objective nature, but as an abstract and deterritorialized subjective essence, the activity of production in general. But as this determination develops under the conditions of capitalism, they objectify the essence all over again, they alienate and reterritorialize it, time in the form of private ownership of the means of production” (AO 270); cf. (Holland 1999, 94).

¹⁵ See (Holland 1999, 95).

¹⁶ Cf. (Parr 2005, 43).

¹⁷ See (Lundy 2012, 106). If there exists a room for the concept of unity in the Deleuzo-Guattarian universal history, it is the reconciliation of succession and simultaneity where one is not reduced to the other “but promotes a form of historical creativity” (Lundy 2012, 106).

¹⁸ See (Holland 1999, 95).

¹⁹ See (Holland 1999, 95).

²⁰ Similar to its operations in the BwO, the principle of antiproduction engineers social investments and connections that are always-in-the-making and are based on the nomadic movement of desiring-production.

²¹ Deleuze and Guattari explain that “the ambiguity of psychoanalysis in relation to myth or tragedy has the following explanation: psychoanalysis undoes them as objective representations and discovers in them the figures of a subjective universal libido; but it reanimates them and promotes them as subjective representations that extend the mythic and tragic contents to infinity. Psychoanalysis does treat myth and tragedy, but ... as the dreams and the fantasies of private man, *Homo familia* and in fact dream and fantasy are to myth and tragedy as private property is to public property” (AO 304).

²² See (Foucault 1970, 208–211); cf. (Holland 1999, 97).

²³ See (Berardi 2015b, 101).

²⁴ In another passage in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that “schizoanalysis must devote itself with all its strength to the necessary destructions. Destroying beliefs and representations, theatrical scenes. And when engaged in this task no activity will be too malevolent. Causing Oedipus and castration to explode, brutally intervening each time the subject strikes up the song of myth or intones tragic lines, carrying him back to the factory” (AO 314).

²⁵ See (Holland 1999, 98).

²⁶ The two coexistent states of desire (i.e., paranoia and schizophrenia) are also understood by Deleuze and Guattari as two states of the law. Aside from the schizo-law explained above, “there is the paranoid transcendental law that never stops agitating a finite segment and making it into a completed object, crystallizing all over the place” (K 60).

²⁷ Adorno and Horkheimer use the concept ‘culture industry’ to refer to the primary principle responsible for this wide-scale arousal or estrangement. See (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 94–136).

²⁸ See (Kaufmann 1974, 284–306); cf. (Golomb 2002).

²⁹ See (Schopenhauer 1975, 484–485); cf. (Bolaños 2014, 19).

³⁰ If ever the will clamors for something, it desires for something immanent to itself. For Deleuze: “What the will wants ... is to affirm its difference or to deny what differs” (*NP* 78).

³¹ Cf. (Holland 1999, 101).

³² See (Holland 1999, 102).

³³ Although Adorno categorically despises the technical reproduction of arts, Benjamin sees something positive about it. For him, this phenomenon likewise emancipates the artwork from its cultic configuration, as well as widens people’s cognitive fields. See (Benjamin 1969b, 217–252).

³⁴ See (Holland 1999, 103); cf. (Sartre 2004a, 2004b).

³⁵ See (Patton 2000, 38).

³⁶ Deleuze and Guattari’s critical distance from vanguardism directs us to alternative political organizations, which are less arboreal and centralized in the likes of the *autogestion* in France, as well as the *Autonomia* in Italy. See (Negri 1984); cf. (Holland 1999, 143–144).

³⁷ Cf. (Holland 1999, 104).

³⁸ See the “Introduction” of Negri’s *Marx Beyond Marx* (Negri 1984, xix–xxxix).

³⁹ See (Holland 1999, 105).

CHAPTER FIVE

BECOMING-MINORITARIAN AS BECOMING-REVOLUTIONARY

A. Becoming-Nomadic as Becoming-Minoritarian

A.1 The State/Striated and the Nomad/Smooth Spaces

Philosophical concepts in the Deleuzo-Guattarian canon undergo various transfigurations as they intersect with other concepts, principles, and disciplines. Take the case of the concept of capitalism. In *Anti-Oedipus*, its ambivalent image across psychoanalysis and Marxism serves as the object of schizoanalytic critique. On the one hand, it acts as the nerve-center of all molar codifications of desiring-production; on the other, its capacity to deterritorialize and decode symbolic codes and its potential for universal history inform Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of schizoanalytic or permanent revolution. Meanwhile, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, it is the State apparatus of capture that serves as the arborescent or majoritarian principle that regulates all gradations and transformations of things. The State's alliance with capitalism or capitalist appropriation likewise conditions the possibility for it to be differentialized by the principle of the nomadic war-machine.

Capitalism can also recode and reterritorialize into further axiomatized mechanism after its decoding and deterritorialization. It can likewise appropriate the organizational ability of the State so that it can fortify itself. The dangerous sovereignty of the capitalist State in the contemporary times inspires Deleuze and Guattari to conceptualize a revolutionary movement and organization that do not merely reterritorialize into the very system it tries to confront—characterized by forces that stay in-between the exploitative capitalist State and pure anarchy. Such an alternative organization or revolutionary project is prosecuted by the nomad. It is the State's historical nemesis because it represents the "Deterritorialized *par excellence*" (ATP 382). Furthermore, the nomad's capacity to undermine the sedentary frontiers of the State is also identical to its irreducibility from State capture. Even though the word 'nomos' is

originally related to law, Deleuze and Guattari clarify its operational definition based on its characterization of nomadology:

The *nomos* came to designate the law, but that was originally because it was distribution, a mode of distribution. It is a very special kind of distribution, one without division into shares, in space without borders or enclosure. The *nomos* is the consistency of a fuzzy aggregate; it is in this sense that it stands in opposition to the law or *polis* (*ATP* 380).

The opposition between the State and the nomad is based on their distribution of or in space. As early as *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze described the two modes of distribution in discussing the gradations of univocal being. According to him:

We must first of all distinguish a type of distribution which implies a dividing up of that which is distributed.... A distribution of this type proceeds by fixed and proportional determinations which may be assimilated to 'properties' or limited territories within representation.... Then there is a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad *nomos*, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space—a space which is unlimited, or at least without precise limits (*DR* 36).

The distinction between these two kinds of distribution is referred to as the difference between 'striated' and 'smooth' spaces in *A Thousand Plateaus*.¹ With reference to *Bergsonism*, the distinction between striated and smooth spaces parallels with the difference between metric or quantitative and nonmetric or qualitative multiplicities (*B* 47). Whereas the former corresponds to the State apparatus, the latter corresponds to the war-machine. Smooth space is likewise the equivalent of the principle of deterritorialization. It calibrates life to its optimum where new challenges and opportunities are produced. While it is in smooth space where struggles are carried out and transfigured, freedom is not guaranteed in this space. It is because it can be hegemonized by the State, if not a mere aftermath of striated space's disintegration. In other words, it is not essentially creative and emancipatory. This is the reason why Deleuze and Guattari remind us that smooth space will never save us (*ATP* 500). Even though the nomad's deterritorializing and differential attributes lend us a glimmer of liberation, it falls short in assuming the role of an alternative organization that

resembles the Deleuzo-Guattarian revolutionary project.² However, this alternative still requires the destabilizing force of the nomad as its principal ingredient. As such, our challenge converts to the formulation of an organization of the nomad—an organization that stays in-between the State apparatus and pure anarchy.

Before delving deeply into the components of a nomadic organization, I deem it necessary to return to the concept of becoming-minoritarian. The primary reason is that the said concept also assumes the role of a middle-principle between majoritarian and minoritarian politics. As discussed in Chapter Three, politics, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a triadic discipline. The three lines, namely segmented, molecular, and absolute, intersect with one another. Among the three, it is the absolute line that resembles the principle of becoming-minoritarian. It is a vector of freedom because it emancipates the subaltern concepts and entities from the molar line's territorializing characteristic, and the molecular line's highly polymorphous appearance. Additionally, becoming-minoritarian abrades the minoritarian to the majoritarian to extinguish the latter's rigid fortifications and structures, as well as the former's subaltern frontiers. Similarly, it differentiates the minoritarian and the majoritarian through interminable deterritorialization. Minoritarian and majoritarian politics function in an unremitting interplay through the principle of becoming-minoritarian.

Like the majoritarian and minoritarian political investments, the striated and smooth spaces undergo immanent reconfiguration. Meaning to say, despite their stark contradiction, the striated can become smooth, or vice-versa. Deleuze and Guattari owe this idea to the French composer Pierre Boulez. Rather than being merely preoccupied with the opposition between the striated and the smooth, Boulez interprets their relation as a kind of communication where “a strongly directed smooth space tends to meld with a striated space ... ‘texture’ can be crafted in such a way as to lose fixed and homogeneous values, becoming a support for slips in tempo, displacements of intervals” (*ATP* 478).³ They understand Boulez's argument as a form of critical confrontations, alterations, and superpositions between the striated space and the smooth space. Although the latter possesses a greater magnitude of power (deterritorialization) over the former, it can still be subjected to organizational codifications, or vice-versa: “Nothing is ever done with: smooth space allows itself to be striated, with potentially different values, scope, and signs” (*ATP* 386).

I have to clarify that every time one space is transmuted into another, the said space retains something in its nature. When something is retained in the course of transformations, there exists between the rigid

striated and the fuzzy smooth spaces, or what Paul Virilio calls ‘fleet in being.’⁴ Deleuze and Guattari utilize the sea as a body of water to elucidate the concept of fleet in being. From their theorization of the smooth space as the seat of deterritorialization, they describe the sea as the “hydraulic model *par excellence*” (ATP 387). This means that the sea originally represents the smooth space; but it can also symbolize an initial attempt to striate and transform into a dependency of the land, with its fixed routes, constant directions, relative movements, a whole counter-hydraulic of channels and conduits (ATP 387).

In the past, Western countries such as Spain, Great Britain, and the United States of America are known for mastering a political technology that optimizes the State apparatus’ power to striate the sea and airspace as they navigate different seas across the globe and colonize countries. Their arrogation of the sea, for instance, serves as an avenue for them to expand their territory and influence. The imperialistic tendencies of the West—fueled by the ideologies of religious indoctrination, education, and political liberation—have resulted in hegemonic hubris. Today, the expansionist foreign policy of China resembles the old imperialism of the West. By arrogating the contested islands along the South China Sea and building artificial structures and military facilities on some of them, the Chinese government has openly ignored the plea of equally deserving nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Vietnam. This aggressive attitude of China has raised the concern not only of claimant nations but also of the international community.

Unpredictably, the said fleet in being initiated by aggressive countries produces results beyond the defined parameters of the striated sea in the form of the differentialization and maximization of relative movements and speeds that allow the emergence of absolute movements (ATP 387). The fleet in being phenomenon thus revolutionizes the perennial polarized relations between the striated (State) space and the smooth (nomad) space. Previously, the transformation of one space into another is likened to a movement from one point to another. However, such a phenomenon allows us to operate from any point, which resembles Kafka’s rhizomic room composed of multiple entrances, passageways, and exits, inspired by an interminably moving vector of deterritorialization (ATP 387).⁵

What should really concern us at this point is not only the emergence of the principle of fleet in being but also the State’s capability to relativize and further absolutize movements. Moreover, it should be noted that the generation of smooth spaces is not the sole authorship of the State’s security apparatus. Advanced capitalism’s liquid capacities

enunciated by multinational corporations fashion numerous and nuanced types of smooth spaces that are more oppressive, reifying, and subtle. The reign of capitalism engenders “a complex qualitative process bringing into play modes of transportation, urban models, the media, the entertainment industries, ways of perceiving and feeling” (*ATP* 492).

Despite the fleet in being’s possibility of capture, it remains capable of engendering a novel kind of nomadism resistant to State totalization. For Deleuze and Guattari:

We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment ... the way in which total ... and popular war, and even guerilla warfare, borrow one another’s method (*ATP* 387).⁶

A.2 The Quest for the Nomadic or Revolutionary Line

One of the lessons that can be derived from the above discussions is that the emergence of the fleet in being principle nullifies the idea that a smooth space can save us. Simply put, the said type of space is not necessarily transformative or revolutionary. It is because the smooth space can be created as a product of the State’s deterioration and can be inevitably captured by the State for its perpetual axiomatization and intensification.⁷ Furthermore, because the fleet in being nullifies the binary opposition between the striated and the smooth spaces, and between the State and the nomad, then it opens the possibility for the striated to become smooth, or vice-versa. In other words, rather than seeing these concepts as characterized by binary contradiction, they must be perceived as immanent to each other. This is the reason why our quest for the nomadic and revolutionary organization must be reformulated to include the idea of these binaries’ immanent relation to each other. Such immanence is explicated at the concluding part of *A Thousand Plateaus*: “It is not enough, however, to replace the opposition between the One and the multiple with a distinction between types of multiplicities. For the distinction between the two types does not preclude their immanence to each other, each ‘issuing’ from the other after its fashion” (*ATP* 506).

At this juncture, it can be argued that the striated and the smooth spaces are rendered immanent to each other by virtue of the fleet in being as a middle principle. Along this line of reasoning, it can likewise be asserted that the immanence to each other between the State and the nomad

is only possible through another middle principle—the ‘phylum.’ Deleuze and Guattari define the phylum as:

[A] single phylogenetic lineage, a single machinic phylum, ideally continuous: the flow of matter-movement, the flow of matter in continuous variation, conveying singularities and traits of expression. This operative and expressive flow is as much artificial as natural: it is like the unity of human beings and Nature. But at the same time, it is not realized in the here and now without dividing, differentiating (*ATP* 406).

Spatially, the phylum’s flow of matter-movement and perpetual variation that is neither striated nor smooth is termed as the ‘holey space.’ Albert Einstein associates the holey space with a disturbing collectivity “each emerging from his or her hole as if from a field mined in all directions” (*ATP* 413–414). Deleuze and Guattari, meanwhile, associate the characteristic of the holey space with the Smiths,⁸ which “are not nomadic among the nomads and sedentary among the sedentaries, nor half-nomadic among the nomads, half-sedentary among sedentaries.... It is in their specificity, it is by virtue of their itinerancy, by virtue of their inventing a holey space, that they necessarily communicate with the sedentaries and with the nomads.... They are in themselves double: a hybrid” (*ATP* 414–415).

In relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s micropolitics, these three spaces are transmuted as three lines, namely the molar, the molecular, and the lines of flight (as discussed in Chapter Three). From the rigid molar lines and the supple molecular lines or “fluxes with thresholds or quanta” (*D* 124) come the third line that represents the absolute line or the line of flight. The third line is parallel with the fleet in being and the holey space, which serve as middle principles in Deleuze and Guattari’s micropolitics. In addition, this line rhizomically moves in-between segments and thresholds toward a destination that is *terra incognita* (*D* 125).

Craig Lundy, in his article “Who are our nomads today? Deleuze’s political ontology and the Revolutionary Problematic,” perceives the problematization of these three lines as a kind of spatialization of three various aspects and processes of existence: “one that consists of our acquiescence to clearly identifiable oppositions: a second that reveals cracks in this façade and various accumulations of exceptions to the binary rule; and a third aspect/process of life by which we become something completely new” (Lundy 2013, 240).⁹ But despite his relatively politico-existential interpretation of the three lines, the question *which among them represents the nomadic line—the line of becoming-revolutionary?* remains.

Despite the distinctions between the three lines in *Dialogues*, there are times when the second and the third lines appear to be indistinguishable from each other.¹⁰ In *A Thousand Plateaus*, for example, the answer seems to be the second line because it is referred to as the nomadic line, yet its essence is located at the third line: the first is the “rigid segmentarity of the Roman Empire, with its center of resonance and periphery,” its State; the second, the line of the advancing Huns, with the war-machine fully directed toward destroying the Roman peace “who come in off the steppes, venture a fluid and active escape, sow deterritorialization everywhere”; and the third: “the migrant barbarians are indeed between the two: they come and go, cross and recross frontiers ... but also integrate themselves and reterritorialize” (ATP 222). In both cases, it appears that the nomadic line is located both at the second and the third lines.¹¹ At this point, the first line is already eliminated from the scene, hence leaving us the problem on the 38th parallel that separates the molecular line from the lines of flight in relation to the nomad.¹² Hence, a subquestion arises from our original problem: *do the nomads pursue the molecular line or the line of flight?*

Lundy’s analysis of the problematic is convincing and complements my initial pronouncement regarding which among the molecular line and the line of flight is the nomadic line. For him, if the nomad represents the “man of earth, the man of deterritorialization” (D 134) and the symbol of becoming-other or transformation, then it is possible that the nomad resides dynamically in-between the first and the second lines. However, another question emerges: *if the nomad or becoming-nomadic is an amorphous in-between principle, can we then argue that this refers to the barbarians?* The answer is yes. The migrant barbarians are equipped with ingenuity to traverse in all directions, entrances, and exits, both the frontiers of the Romans and the Huns. Similarly, they can integrate and reterritorialize themselves. There are times that they establish alliances with the empire, “assigning themselves a segment of it, becoming mercenaries ... settling down, occupying land or carving out their own State” (ATP 223). Likewise, the migrant barbarians ally themselves with the nomads at times to the point that they become indiscernible (ATP 223). Deleuze and Guattari further argue that “it is odd how supple segmentarity is caught between the two other lines, ready to tip to one side or the other; such is its ambiguity” (ATP 205). Such a peculiar attribute of the third line allows it to stay in-between the lines of pure being and pure becoming.

The answer to the question on the location of the nomadic line among the three lines or processes of existence posits an ethical imperative to contemporary theorists of revolution and revolutionaries—the practice of a kind of ethico-political moderation and cautiousness. Nevertheless, the

attempt to free humanity from the dehumanizing effects of capitalism must not divert us from the genuine point of revolution. Contrary to popular interpretation, Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy does not seek for the cessation of the State and the annihilation of all rigid codifications in society. Deleuze and Parnet echo this claim in *Dialogues*:

Even if we had the power to blow it up, could we succeed in doing so without destroying ourselves, since it is so much part of the conditions of life, including our organism and our very reason? The prudence with which we must manipulate that line, the precautions we must take to soften it ... to divert it, to undermine it, testify to a long labour which is not merely aimed against the State and the powers that be, but directly at ourselves (*D* 138).¹³

The popularization of the idea that Deleuzo-Guattarian politics merely deals with absolute deterritorialization would likewise violate this ethico-political moderation and cautiousness that I discuss. This excess in judgment leads to another misconception as regards the schizophrenic as the new face of the revolution capacitated to fashion free-floating desire beyond the terrains of any molar codifications: “We believe, rather, that schizophrenia is the descent of a molecular process into a black hole. Marginals have always inspired fear in us.... They are not clandestine enough” (*D* 139). However, the critical revolutionary problematic is not merely reduced to the binary opposition between “utopian spontaneity and State organization” (*D* 145). In this manner, it appears that the reconfiguration of the revolutionary problematic in *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Dialogues* includes a critical diagnosis of some essential principles found in *Anti-Oedipus* such as the schizophrenic or schizophrenia (schizophrenia as a process).¹⁴ But if the minoritarians or the marginals have been terrifyingly overt, then who can we nominate as the true revolutionaries?

The complexities of capitalist axiomatization and exploitation in the contemporary period have surpassed the walls of the factory. In the lens of Critical Theory, oppression already achieves a cultural value in the sense that one does not need to be a proletariat or a laborer to be oppressed. Such banality of dehumanization and reification crosses all cultures, races, and religions. Because the very site of exploitation is already dispersed in all planes of existence because of capitalism’s creativity and fluidity, then our collective resistance or revolutionary action must also be dispersed, inclusive, and self-reflexive, especially with the inevitable propensity of ethical fascism or being totalized by capitalism. Given these circumstances, then who will serve as our political subjects or revolutionary nomads today?

In his book, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*, Simon Critchley lucidly articulates this problem. He argues that the breakdown of the Marxist proletariat necessitates present scholars and radicals to nominate a new name of political subjectivity. However, such an invention of a new name still commits hegemony where such a nomination presupposes a certain collective association and collective will amongst all the oppressed.¹⁵ As Critchley puts it: “The logic of political nomination ... is ... a determinate particularity in society [that] is hegemonically constructed into a universality. This is what Ernesto Laclau calls ‘hegemonic universality’ (Critchley 2007, 104). It is a hegemonic universality because a contextualized political subject or group assumes a hegemonic value that can possibly discriminate rather than fuse different revolutionary collectivities, initiatives, and experiences. Some call this new political subjectivity the migrants or the Occupy Movement protesters. One of the most famous names comes from Negri and Hardt’s books, *Empire* and *Multitude*. They term this political subjectivity emerging from the Empire as the multitude.¹⁶ Inevitably, several thinkers associate the multitude with the Deleuzo-Guattarian revolutionary. However, the legitimization of such a political label receives serious criticisms at the realm of ontology. Foremost of them is Critchley. According to him, “The analysis given in *Empire* at the ontological level risks retreating into the very anti-dialectical materialist ontology of substance that Marx rightly criticized in his early work, and also because it makes the work of politics too systemic insofar as both empire and multitude ... originate in the same ontological substance” (Critchley 2007, 105).

While there are resemblances between the multitude and Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of the true revolutionaries, nominating a single or universal name is outside the confines of their political agenda. Further, they argue that the minoritarians or marginals, as well as the forerunners of absolute deterritorialization and the State dissolution, are incapacitated in bringing forth a new type of revolution or revolutionary becoming. The novel type of revolution that they imagine is not enacted by already-known subjectivities and does not have *a priori* characteristics and projects. There is even no guarantee that lines of flight would not lead to lines of destruction.

Deleuze and Guattari’s revolutionary project is marked by ethico-political moderation, and is pursued by the molecular and migrant barbarians. Borrowing the notion of ‘the crack’ from Fitzgerald, they describe a rhizomic line that exists and operates in-between the line of rigid segments and the line of absolute deterritorialization. The metaphor of the crack may describe the space of the revolutionary moment. Such a space is

widened by being a “little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little guerilla” (*LS* 157–158). In other words, the expansion of the crack must critically maintain balance and cautiousness. If these virtues are forgotten or neglected, our audacious effort to revolutionize the crack would just rigidify the very spaces we want to transform or aggravate the very problems we want to solve.¹⁷ As Lundy explains, “When you do so, a line will be drawn that is distinguishable from both the inexpressive and the expressions of State segmentarity: a nomadic line that is *invested with* abstraction and *connects with* a matter-flow (that moves through it); a developmental line of becoming that is not enslaved to the incorporeal surface or corporeal depth, but is the progressive movement between them” (Lundy 2013, 245).

Because the notion of becoming is one of the overarching principles in this discussion, then the question on who are our nomad revolutionaries at present must be accompanied by the query: “*where are your lines, cracks, and ruptures? And do you recognize them within yourself and in the different societal organizations we are a part of?*” (Lundy 2013, 246). In other words, all of us must be attuned to these lines that constitute us, and we must maintain a critical relation to them in a moderate and vigilant way.

B. Becoming-Democratic as Becoming-Minoritarian

B.1 Becoming-Democratic as Becoming-Anti-Democratic

The absence of a normative reference to democracy is one of the reasons why the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophic project is hastily accused of being apolitical. Democracy does not occupy a very significant role in their political philosophy primarily because they do not understand democracy as a kind of majoritarian or normative political theory. Liberal democracy, for instance, is only discussed as one of the models of societal investment under capitalism.¹⁸ Although a straightforward mention of democracy was only made in *What is Philosophy?*, the democratic guise of despotic States or despotism was already articulated in *Anti-Oedipus*. As Deleuze and Guattari write:

As for democracies, how could one fail to recognize in them the despot who has become colder and more hypocritical, more calculating, since he must himself count and code instead of overcoding the accounts? It is useless to compose the list of differences after the manner of conscientious historians.... The differences could be determined only if the despotic State were

one concrete formation among others, to be treated comparatively. But the despotic State is the abstraction that is realized-in imperial formations, to be sure—only as an abstraction (the overcoding eminent unity). It assumes its immanent concrete existence only in the subsequent forms that cause it to return under other guises and conditions (AO 220).¹⁹

Democracy, conventionally speaking, is a kind of government that underscores the value of equality among individuals. From a more philosophical standpoint, Derrida, in *Politics of Friendship*, elucidates the historical association between democracy and friendship. He views democracy as a complex term constitutive of various conceptual components such as involvement, equality, and consent in relation to the development of the majority rule.²⁰ Ideally, in a democratic society, the voice of every individual and group is considered significant, especially in relation to personal welfare, public policies, and political deliberations (such as the local and national elections). An egalitarian form of society does not arbitrarily privilege and exclude any individual, class, or group based on economic stature, religious affiliation, and cultural orientation. In reality, from the Ancient times until the modern period, Plato and Nietzsche, for instance, would attest that the practice of democracy is characterized by none other than a politics of oppression and degeneration regulated by the power-greedy elites. However, despite the criticism of democracy's imperfections by philosophers, it has gained more friends than foes throughout the history of political thought.

Deleuze and Guattari's project focuses on a diagnosis and critique of democracy and its pitfalls. When a student's human rights are violated by his or her university authorities, when a member of the LGBTQIAP+ community is prohibited from running an administrative position in an office, and when an employee is prevented from being regularized in a company, are possible issues where Deleuzo-Guattarian politics may be relevant. But while Deleuze and Guattari are still committed to the values of equality and freedom, which are known pillars of the democratic ideal, they do not subscribe to the logic of collective will, otherwise known as the rule of the majority. Minoritarian politics aspires to critically examine how laws are created and interpreted, and how minoritarians can challenge majoritarian principles in society so as to produce novel laws and relations. Moreover, minoritarian politics resuscitates desire's ability to fashion heterogeneous constellations and becomings. As a minoritarian principle, democracy involves incessant agonism between conflicting opinions via experimentation and creation, thereby cultivating it into a politics of pure immanence.²¹ This is the reason why this new theorization of democracy is

called minoritarian democracy or becoming-democracy. It is in this sense, therefore, that Deleuzo-Guattarian politics offers an alternative to traditional democracy.

Minoritarian democracy, for example, would claim that “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” issued by the United Nations should not be construed as a final document (*WP* 107). Of course, it would only be considered as something definitive when we presuppose that human rights is an ahistorical concept, which is the fundamental assumption of traditional democracy. For minoritarian democracy, the application of the said declaration of human rights should not be performed in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ fashion because it would misrecognize historico-cultural contexts and contingencies. As such, new rights or laws must be created if certain situations push our current laws to their limits. In Deleuze’s interview with Negri, he claims that “it is jurisprudence that truly creates laws: this should not be left to judges” (*N* 230).²² It means that the conceptualization of new laws or rights must always recognize the voices of citizens (especially of the human-rights-violations victims) and their dynamics with various social factors and circumstances or what Deleuze and Guattari call the people’s immanent mode of existence (*WP* 103).

Deleuze’s penchant for jurisprudence over universal rights entails his valorization of localized and open-ended creative processes that engender the emergence of novel and opportune rights. It is because jurisprudence is the creative modification of existing laws and rights to address varying and present situations.²³ Such a definition of jurisprudence serves as a springboard to the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary because it is faithful to the Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of philosophy as the invention of new concepts capable of counteractualizing the present and becoming closer to life. As Deleuze narrates:

To act for freedom, becoming-revolutionary, is to operate in jurisprudence when one turns to the justice system ... that’s what the invention of law is ... it’s not a question of applying ‘the rights of man’ but rather of inventing new forms of jurisprudence.... I have always been fascinated by jurisprudence, by law.... If I hadn’t studied philosophy, I would have studied law, but precisely not ‘the rights of man,’ rather I’d have studied jurisprudence. That’s what life is. There are no “rights of man,” only rights of life, and so, life unfolds case by case.²⁴

Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari’s enigmatic relation to the idea of democracy has resulted in a division among contemporary scholars, as cogently elucidated by Patton in *Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy*,

Colonization, and Politics. On the one hand, Nicholas Thoburn is sympathetic to the idea that Deleuze and Guattari pursue an alternative democratic politics. For Thoburn, the Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics serves as an alternative to Laclau and Mouffe's neo-Gramscian post-Marxism.²⁵ In the chapter "The Grandeur of Marx" of the book *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*, Thoburn asserts that Deleuze's last book was supposed to be called *The Grandeur of Marx*.²⁶ Despite the challenges that haunt Marxism, it still offers a very cogent critique of capitalism.²⁷ Despite Deleuze and Guattari's intellectual gratitude to Marx's philosophy and their revolutionary project (which diverges from traditional Marxist revolutionary struggles that focus on the emancipation of the proletariat from capitalist alienation), they focus on the liberation of individual and collective desire from Oedipal and capitalist totalization, as well as the minoritarianization of codified and hierarchized principles and relations. In addition, their concept of revolution does not aspire for the capture of State power; rather, it seeks the crafting of new relations and subjectivity-formations by undermining all representationalist or molar significations in society.²⁸

Meanwhile, the scholar Philip Mengue thinks that the Deleuzo-Guattarian political project completely departs from democracy. Mengue thinks that democracy is either devalued or merely given a secondary importance in the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy. This antipathy to democracy is based on an uncritical acceptance of the Marxist *doxa* prevalent among French scholars in the post-1968 period.²⁹ Mengue argues that albeit Deleuze and Guattari deserted the praxis of class struggle, their conceptualization of the relationship between modern forms of State and capital still relies on the principle of economic determinism. This allows them to replicate their version of the classical Marxist denunciation of liberal democracy as little more than a concession or alibi that only serves to maintain the capitalist system of exploitation and repression.³⁰ Mengue's accusation that Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is devoid of any positive relation with democracy is only legitimized from the vantage point of majoritarian or normative politics. However, as I argued earlier, this is beyond the scope of their minoritarian politics. After discussing the inimitability of Deleuzo-Guattarian politics, let us now confront the question: *what is the place of democracy in Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy?*

In relation to the aforesaid query, Mengue asserts that Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is devoid of any institutional space to legitimize the value of any political exchange or deliberation. This is the consequence of a political theory bereft of transcendental categories and rigid codes that would backbone political normativity. Of course, Deleuze and Guattari do

not discredit the importance of institutional spaces and regulative principles in the forms of laws to ground manifold actions within a political community. Otherwise, their project would simply promote populism or anarchism.

This problematic necessitates us to return to my discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's triadic politics. Lundy in his essay "Who are Our Nomads Today?" argues that contrary to the general belief that Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy espouses the felicitation of absolute deterritorialization and pure lines of flight, their project is informed by an 'ethics of prudence' (Lundy 2013, 1). His discussion presupposes that when the molecular line metamorphoses as the governing principle of politics, political instability is of high possibility. The same is true with the molar line because the segmentarized majoritarian politics is the sphere of State philosophy and rigid molar codes—the nemesis of the nomad. Because the nomad depicts the figure of transfiguration, it might be more apt to delegate the nomad to the perpetually shifting space in-between the molar (striated) and the molecular (supple) lines, which Deleuze and Guattari call the holey space.³¹ This means that the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is not simply concerned with perpetual transfiguration, polysemy, and fluidity in the same vein that it does not categorically despise the existence of certain infrastructures or institutions. Hardt and Negri echo this claim in *Empire*:

Difference, hybridity, and mobility are not liberatory in themselves, but neither are truth, purity and stasis. The real revolutionary practice refers to the level of production. Truth will not make us free, but taking control of the production of truth will. Mobility and hybridity are not liberatory, but taking control of the production of mobility and stasis, purities and mixture is (Hardt and Negri 2000, 156).

The principles of difference, hybridity, and mobility, according to Hardt and Negri, are not by default revolutionary. Societal mechanisms and institutions are necessary to regulate their productive processes and emancipatory potentials. Because an ethics of prudence is embodied by Deleuzo-Guattarian politics, then there is a place for institutions that would serve as sites for political discourses, transactions, and evaluations—conducted in nonteleological and nonpolarizing fashions. For example, a legal institution must be established so that the rule of law would override everyone, especially in times when the minorities are abused by the majority, or when minorities themselves abuse their fellowmen. But it should be noted that these principles must be derived from a multilevel and

multisectoral engagement, which is an alternative to normative or transcendental authority that grounds politics since time immemorial.

With the absence of a higher authority, politics in the Deleuzo-Guattarian context transforms into a vertical differentialization and into the political field where dissenting opinions and political orientations are played out.³² Of course, this is certainly a difficult challenge because the pluralistic character of the modern and the contemporary world does not revolve around a single notion of a democratic state. Concurrent with the singularities of democratic States are dissenting opinions (populist, nationalist, or philosophical) regarding justice and fairness that further support the institutional structure of democracy. Philosophical or national opinions are indispensable in the local configuration of each democratic society. In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari contend that, “In each case philosophy finds a way of reterritorializing itself in the modern world in conformity with the spirit of a people and its conception of right. The history of philosophy therefore is marked by national characteristics or rather by nationalitarianisms which are like philosophical opinions” (*WP* 104).

Unfortunately, advanced capitalism totalizes all singular democratic States under the axiomatic and overarching principle of global capital. As Deleuze and Guattari critically elucidate:

If there is no universal democratic State ... it is because the market is the only thing that is universal in capitalism.... Capitalism functions as an immanent axiomatic of decoded flows.... National States are no longer paradigms of overcoding but constitute the “models of realization” of this immanent axiomatic. In an axiomatic, models do not refer back to a transcendence.... It is as if the deterritorialization of States tempered that of capital and provided it with compensatory reterritorializations. Now, models of realization may be very diverse (democratic, dictatorial, totalitarian) ... but they are nonetheless isomorphous.... That is why ... democratic States are so bound up with, and compromised by, dictatorial States that the defense of human rights must necessarily take up the internal criticism of every democracy (*WP* 106).

An utter debasement of democratic politics or States occurs when everything about democracy is subsumed under the axiomatic of advanced or global capitalism. As such, all the egalitarian values of democracy reterritorialize into capitalist values that benefit the capitalist system alone. In his 1990 interview with Negri, Deleuze explicates how the market, as a sphere of exchange of commodities and capital, generates both wealth and

misery, and distributes them in neither universalizing nor homogenizing manner (*N* 173).³³ When there is a conflict between some fundamental political rights and the security of private property, for example, a higher priority is relegated to the latter. To be more specific, “when private property in the means of production,” Patton explains, “exists alongside the absence of mechanisms to provide minimal healthcare, housing or education, the basic welfare rights of the poor are effectively suspended” (Patton 2010b, 188). Capitalism’s supremacy over democracy only proves that “rights can save neither men nor a philosophy that is reterritorialized on the democratic State. Human rights will not make us bless capitalism” (*WP* 107). In particular, human rights based on capitalist ideals or configurations will not pave the way for the creation of new values and relations, and more importantly, the fabulation of a people-to-come. In general, democratic States that regulate and ground human rights are incapable of mapping a new earth. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari claim that “this people and earth will not be found in our democracies,” but only in the thinking of the most untimely and radical of philosophers such as Nietzsche (*WP* 108).

Deleuzo-Guattarian politics acts as an antithesis to the numerous infractions found in capitalist-configured democracy, which Thoburn refers to as social democratic politics.³⁴ Moreover, its anti-capitalist stance is directed toward the totalizing character of advanced capitalism that obliterates the singularities of present democratic States and subordinates all democratic principles, transactions, and processes to capitalist axioms. The variegated faces of misery capitalism introduced to humanity banalize human existence and numb our critical or revolutionary impulse. Although capitalism is equipped with a self-reflexive attribute that offers the possibility of inaugurating universal history, it merely aspires for its internal fortification and expansion. A capitalist-configured democracy therefore does not provide us radical and creative means to antagonize the present state of affairs toward a people- and world-to-come. It is only at this critical point, I suppose, that Mengue’s main argument makes sense.

B.2 Becoming-Democracy and Minoritarian Becoming

Given the various capitalist-authored injustices and democracy-related predicaments in society, Parnet interrogates Deleuze in the *Abécédaire* interview: *what does it mean to be on the Left?* The chronic poverty experienced by millions of people worldwide invalidates the belief that the good life is still possible. In several depressed places, the variegated appearances and implications of poverty such as massive death and

moribund healthcare system dishearten us to find any reason for existence anymore. Being on the Left, for Deleuze, implies, “starting with the edges ... and knowing how, and say what one might, knowing that these problems that must be dealt with.... [Being on the Left] is really finding arrangements, finding world-wide assemblages.”³⁵

In other words, starting with the edges and searching for minoritarian constellations that would aid us to critically engage with different forms of injustices (specifically poverty) entail one’s adherence to the principle of becoming-minoritarian. Generally, the said principle of becoming asserts that the ‘majority’ or majoritarian rule is an abstract concept and arbitrary standard because its political identity is simply grounded in a particular configuration of power and control.³⁶ The problem behind this majority-rule paradigm is that it is prone to being manipulated by any prevailing organization or system (capitalist system) by which a particular configuration of power and control can assume a universal dominion over things.

Becoming-minoritarian, in addition, is nonteleological and does not privilege any minority as the sole revolutionary agent of the future or the collectivity that would antagonize all forms of oppression emanating from the majoritarian rule. The rhizomic and molecularized trajectories of revolutionary transformations and the democratization of the revolutionary agency portray becoming-minoritarian as becoming-democratic. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain that becoming-minoritarian refers to the potentiality of an individual or a group to deviate from the majoritarian politics or the normative standards in society and to craft novel relations and intensities.³⁷

Becoming-minoritarian does not only undermine the rigid walls of majoritarian codifications in society. More importantly, it puts a premium on the process of differentializing totalized representations in the same vein that Deleuze and Guattari valorize the schizophrenic process instead of the schizophrenic himself or herself as articulated in *Anti-Oedipus*. Put differently, becoming-minoritarian empowers free and creative desiring-machines to radicalize the manifold sedentary spaces maintained by State philosophy through continuous mutations and relations. In this manner, its interstitial distance from majoritarian politics is conditioned by its thrust of not acquiring the terrain of the majority (*ATP* 106).

Minoritarian politics’ divergence from the majoritarian does not necessarily indicate their opposition with each other. For Deleuze and Guattari, the relation between the majoritarian and the minoritarian must be viewed in terms of difference between degree or configuration. Majoritarian standards and political activities are oftentimes fostered via democratic and

legal procedures. Whereas they perceive the majoritarian as a symbol of emptiness because it represents no specific individual or group, they view the minoritarian as a representation of a departure from the representative politics of the majoritarian.³⁸ Becoming-minoritarian or minoritarian politics does not propose a definitive alternative to majoritarian politics. By alternative, I mean another codified or majoritarian category that would substitute the existing one. Such an initiative, if pursued, simply reintroduces the old predicament disguised in a new appearance. As an alternative, however, it orients us to a radically novel way to perceive democracy not as a grand theory of society, but as a minoritarian principle of becoming-other. Rather, becoming-minoritarian operates alongside the majoritarian in the sense that it critically antagonizes the latter to fashion new relations, connections, and intensities.

In recent years, certain legislative standards (by virtue of becoming-minoritarian) already extend to nonwhites, nonmales, and nonChristians (in a nonbinary fashion) as a differentialization of the majoritarian categories of ‘white,’ ‘male,’ and ‘Christian.’³⁹ In short, even normative politics today has started to configure its own concept of creativity and has opened its doors to the kaleidoscopic voices of the subalterns (as a process, not as privileged or majoritarian subjectivities).

While there are incongruities between Mengue’s description of democratic politics and Deleuzo-Guattarian minoritarian politics, the latter finds a kindred spirit in William Connolly. In Connolly’s view, democracy is a distinctive form of cultural and political practice because it allows participation in collective decisions while enabling contestation of past settlements.⁴⁰ In this kind of politics, legal and institutional judgments, as well as convictions, are always open for critical analysis and revision. Take the case of Deleuze’s “Open Letter to Negri’s Judges,” where he questions the legal basis of the charges against Antonio Negri, specifically “the lack of consistency in the charges themselves, the failure to follow ordinary logical principles of reasoning in the examination of evidence, and the role of the media in relation to this judicial procedure” (Connolly 1995, 103). This self-critical typology of democracy undoubtedly crafts a space where even the marginalized groups and subaltern discourses are indispensably recognized in the formulation and reformulation of laws and policies. This becomes possible because Deleuzo-Guattarian minoritarian politics is configured by subterranean shifts in the attitudes, sensibilities, and beliefs of people and communities. Likewise, this new theorization of politics runs parallel to this democratic *ethos* in the sense that it challenges liberal democracy to always consider micropolitical processes, especially in the domains of decision-making and dialogical exchange.⁴¹

Connolly's agonistic politics and Deleuze and Guattari's principle of becoming-democracy or minoritarian democracy also find a kindred spirit in Chantal Mouffe's theorization of radical democracy. In this novel brand of democratic revolution, Mouffe opines in *The Return of the Political*:

[N]o identity is ever definitively established, there always being a certain degree of openness and ambiguity in the way the different subject positions are articulated. What emerges are entirely new perspectives for political action, which neither liberalism, with its idea of the individual who only pursues his or her own interest, nor Marxism, with its reduction of all subject positions to that of class, can sanction, let alone imagine (Mouffe 1993, 12–13).

Mouffe's principle of radical democracy is primarily informed by contemporary Critical Theory's repugnance to some of the ideals or assumptions of the Enlightenment project, specifically its conversion of nature into a mere object of calculation and domination. The reduction of nature to a blank canvas, as Adorno and Horkheimer assert in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, eradicates its immanent powers and properties.⁴² Consequently, individual objects and human nature's immanent, specific, and protean attributes are expelled because everything is totalized into matter or mere objectivity.⁴³

In politics, the Enlightenment project reductively grounds all subjectivity-formations, interpersonal relations, and social deliberations on a metaphysical conception of unitary Subject or undifferentiated human nature.⁴⁴ Mouffe thinks that this form of universalism hinders the fluid development of contemporary theories of democracy in general, and her principle of radical democracy in particular. Informed by the diversity and complexity of current socio-political predicaments, her project does not presuppose a universal or ahistorical subject. Rather, it is constitutive of decentered and specific agencies, which are by-products of various conjunctions and disjunctions of subject positions, as well as constellations. Ultimately, radical democracy recognizes the "particular, the multiple, the heterogeneous—in effect, everything that had been excluded by the concept Man in the abstract. Universalism is not rejected but particularized" (Mouffe 1993, 13).

Furthermore, whereas the principle of becoming-democracy is faithful to the Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of philosophy as the invention of new and untimely concepts, Mouffe's radical democracy thrusts on the creation of novel subject positions that would provide a common site for a

multiplicity of democratic activities such as anticapitalist and antiimperialist struggles. The emergence of a ‘new common sense’ transfigures the identities of various collectivities in a way that each collectivity’s causes can be addressed based on the principle of democratic equivalence. In her words, “[I]t is not a matter of establishing a mere alliance between given interests but of actually modifying the very identity of these forces. In order that the defense of workers’ interests is not pursued at the cost of the rights of women, immigrants or consumers” (Mouffe 1993, 19).

Evidently, Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy bears strong and interesting affinities with Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-democracy. Despite these convergences, it seems that a political philosophy receptive to nonhuman materialities does not have a place in her political project. Perhaps, this relative shortcoming can be counterbalanced by diagnosing the Deleuzo-Guattarian becoming-democracy itself through Mouffe’s critical reconstruction of liberalism, communitarianism, and pluralism—in conjunction with an array of democratic struggles; and an engagement with the contemporary phenomenon of populism.

Minoritarian becomings, fashioned through the recognition of the particular, the heterogeneous, and the molecular, modify the overall configurations of different socio-political institutions. However, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that these modifications always work alongside the majoritarian. In this regard, minoritarian politics is not an alternative to majoritarian politics or normative democratic politics. It would be better to understand becoming-democracy or minoritarian democracy as a critical complement to majoritarian democratic politics where individuals and societies do not wholly succumb to the majoritarian standards and codifications but exist in a process of unremitting mutation or variation. If the quantity of the ways in becoming-minoritarian depends on the number of majoritarian principles in society, then the same applies to becoming-democratic in relation to the various forms or theories of democracy.

Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* ponder the principle of becoming-democracy as a becoming-revolutionary against the current state of affairs. Moreover, becoming-democracy as a kind of becoming-revolutionary necessitates the invention of new philosophical concepts and forms of resistance toward a new plane of existence. The ardent call for resistance against the present is premised on philosophy’s unrelenting antagonism against opinion (*WP* 203). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they claim that philosophy is the enemy of opinion. What is presupposed at this point is that collective and enlightened opinions matter in the *agora* of a democratic society. However, opinion becomes an object of censure when it is merely reduced to the voice of the majority or an abstract humanity,

and hence annihilates its dynamism and creativity (*ATP* 165).⁴⁵ As Deleuze and Guattari write: “Political decision-making necessarily descends into a world of micro-determinations, attractions and desires, which it must sound out or evaluate in a different fashion. Beneath linear conceptions and segmentary decisions, quanta” (*ATP* 220–221).⁴⁶

In countries such as the Philippines, the vicious connivance of anti-intellectualism and populism has vitiated the different sectors of society such as education, industry, and politics. In the realm of politics, for instance, the antiintellectualist and populist mindset of voters has resulted in the election of questionable representatives and the corrosion of Philippine society into an arena of spectacle and one-dimensionality. These are some of the reasons why humanities in general, and arts and philosophy in particular are indisputably underrated in this country. Although arts and philosophy cannot give us luxurious material rewards, their critical and emancipatory imports can inspire us to untiringly seek for greater causes in life and open us to the nonphilosophical aspects of reality.

Like equality, fairness, and freedom, Deleuze asserts in *Negotiations* that philosophy is not a Power in the sense that states, capitalism, and public opinion are. According to him:

Philosophy may have its great internal battles ... but they are mock battles. Not being a power, philosophy can't bathe with the powers that be, but it fights a war without battles, a *guerilla campaign* against them. And it can't converse with them ... nothing to communicate, and can only negotiate. Since the powers aren't just external things, but permeate each of us, philosophy throws us all into constant negotiations with, and a guerilla campaign against, ourselves (*N* vii) [emphasis mine].

The precarious pathway for philosophical opinions and thinking to flourish in society is to actively and critically engage with existing popular opinions and scheme of things that ground the fair or just—the political vocation of philosophy.⁴⁷ What succeeds philosophy's negotiations with the powers that be is the creation of ways to confront different manifold occurrences of dehumanization and pathology at present (*N* 171). In this regard, becoming-democratic as the political vocation of philosophy means counteractualizing the liberal democratic present. By ‘counteractualize,’ I mean to invent philosophical concepts that articulate the on-going movements of relative deterritorialization. To be more specific, it is an act of articulating modifications in people's opinions on basic values in society such as equality and fairness.⁴⁸

The minoritarian subjection of the majoritarian to different types of minority-becomings has broadened the configuration and relevance of democracy. Public institutions and infrastructures are reconfigured to become more politically and culturally accommodating. Restaurants, fast food chains, and restrooms are presently more accessible to people with disabilities; public transportation already provides reserved seats for senior citizens; and universities administered by religious institutions already accept students from different religious orientations. In some parts of the world, women can now join the military; several minorities already enjoy the right to suffrage, and some marginalized groups already participate in political representations, education, and negotiations.

In the Philippines, for example, the party-list system was formulated based on Sections 5(1) and 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Generally, it claims that 20 percent of the House of Representatives' seats shall be allocated to a party-list organization of national, regional, and sectoral characters.⁴⁹ The party-list representation must come from different sectors and groups such as the urban poor, overseas Filipino workers, and indigenous communities. In 1995, the party-list system has increased its legal force through the Republic Act No. 7941, known as the Party-List System Act. As a law, this is a radical feat in the history of Philippine jurisprudence because it serves as a catalyst to Philippine political system, which, since time immemorial, is predominantly acquiescent to the panoptic authority of dynasties and oligarchs.

After some years, the Supreme Court also accommodated national and regional parties and organizations in its membership. *Ako Bicol* (a regional party) dominated the other party-list nominees in the May 2019 Philippine election. In fact, in the said election, regional parties superseded the sectoral or marginalized sectors. Furthermore, in the domain of sexual politics, the emergence of the LGBTQIAP+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual, Pansexual+)⁵⁰ Community attests to our society's more fluid interpretation of gender relations. These are only some of the benefits or legacies of democratic spaces fueled by openness, criticality, and fluidity. These forms of minoritarian-becomings advance one of the significant vectors of becoming-democratic in the contemporary period.

However, vigilance must always be at hand because the novel opportunities, relations, and values crafted through becoming-democracy have likewise created new and molecular forms of exploitations or abuses. The aftermath of the 2019 Philippine Elections inevitably led some critics to argue that the party-list system's noble spirit, that is, allowing the subalterns to represent themselves, has already vanished. The overriding

presence of regional parties in the party-list representation aggravates the preexisting glitch of the system where political parties or personalities would camouflage themselves through marginalized or sectoral organizations. In the case of the LGBTQIAP+ community,⁵¹ the contemporary world's hospitality to gender difference may send a wrong signal to those whose sexual behaviors are evidently deviant or unethical, such as the pedophiles and child molesters. When these individuals are likewise homosexuals, for example, they may instrumentalize their membership in this community as a ploy to their sexual misconducts. Writ large, what I am trying to say is that all new horizons offered to us by becoming-democracy—all the lines of flight spawned via becoming-minoritarian/revolutionary are perpetually haunted by the possibilities of debasement and dehumanization (lines of destruction).

The different vectors or ways of becoming-democratic as becoming-revolutionary portrayed in and outside the Deleuzo-Guattarian political territories would always receive critical oppositions from the very principle they attempt to undermine or differentialize. The capitalist system, which is always operating and overcoming itself, would craft its versions of antagonism and reterritorialization in responding to our minoritarian struggle against several expressions of dehumanization, injustice, and inequality.⁵² Once the dynamic, agonistic, and minoritarian features of political relations and the affirmative conviction of philosophers to counteractualize the intolerable present vanish, everything would be totalized by advanced capitalism, and more human miseries would plague the world. More importantly, the invention of concepts toward a people-to-come and the “conjunction of philosophy or of the concept with the present milieu” (*WP* 100) would merely be an empty vision.

Notes

¹ The existence of dualisms in the Deleuzian philosophy can be observed as early as *Bergsonism*, i.e. with its comparison of ‘difference in kind’ and ‘difference in degree.’ But Deleuze argues that rather than perceiving them through the traditional binary logic of ‘either/or,’ they must be seen as virtually coexistent (*D* 57).

² This is analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that capitalism is not the absolute of the society because, despite its emancipatory character, it is incapable of fabricating a people- and world-to-come.

³ Cf. (*ATP* 480, 482, 486, and 493).

⁴ According to Virilio, the fleet in being is, “[T]he permanent presence in the sea of an invisible fleet able to strike no matter where and no matter when ... it is a new idea of violence that no longer comes from direct confrontation ... but rather from the unequal properties of bodies, evaluation of the number of movements allowed

them in a chosen element, permanent verification of their dynamic efficacy.... Henceforth it is no longer a question of crossing a continent or an ocean from one city to the next, one shore to the next. The fleet in being creates ... the notion of displacement without destination in space and time” (Virilio 2007, 38–41).

⁵ Cf. (K 3).

⁶ Cf. (Virilio 2007, 38–40, 134–145). Aside from the formulation of the term ‘fleet in being,’ Virilio’s *Speed and Politics* is known for the utilization of the principle of speed in relation to revolutionary movements. Speed can both be appropriated by the State apparatus and the nomad, which he equates with revolution. For this reason, he argues that: “Revolution is movement, but movement is not revolution” (Virilio 2007, 43).

⁷ To elaborate this, Deleuze and Guattari explain in *A Thousand Plateaus*, “[I]t is possible to live striated on the deserts, steppes, or seas; it is possible to live smooth even in the cities, to be an urban nomad (for example, a stroll taken by Henry Miller in Clichy or Brooklyn is a nomadic transit in smooth space; he makes the city disgorge a patchwork, differentials of speed, delays and accelerations, changes in orientation, continuous variations.... The beatniks owe much to Miller, but they changed direction again, they put the space outside the cities to new use). Fitzgerald said it long ago: it is not a question of taking off for the South Seas that is not what determines a voyage. There are not only strange voyages in the city but voyages in place: we are not thinking of drug users, whose experience is too ambiguous, but of true nomads” (*ATP* 482).

⁸ The Smiths are the inventors of the holey space. They embody a hybrid or mixed formation such as the metallurgists (*ATP* 415).

⁹ Aside from Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* and *Negotiations*, Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Kafka*, and Deleuze and Parnet’s *Dialogues*, Lundy’s essay stated above is of great help in elucidating the notion of becoming-minoritarian/revolutionary/nomadic in this chapter. My utmost appreciation to him.

¹⁰ See (*D* 130–4, 141–142).

¹¹ Further confusion is added when they define society via the language of micropolitics: “From the viewpoint of micropolitics, a society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular” (*ATP* 216). Again, Lundy’s essay is a good read in clarifying these problems immanent in Deleuze and Guattari’s triadic politics.

¹² For other scholars such as Zourabichvili, the Deleuzian triadic politics is reduced to the dualism between the line of segmentarity and the line of flight. See (Zourabichvili 2010, 179).

¹³ As cited earlier, the following passage would likewise complement the promotion of an ethics of prudence in dealing with the various problems of revolutions. See (*ATP* 216–217).

¹⁴ In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari’s attention is focused on ‘schizophrenia as a process’ as the bearer of the revolutionary potential, not of the schizophrenic himself/herself. But because of some historical events, the revolutionary enthusiasm or intensity from the *Anti-Oedipus* going to *A Thousand Plateaus* has moderated. The former book was published in 1972 during the afterglow of the events of May 1968 before the first “oil shock” of 1974 put an end to hopes for widespread (and

elsewhere); on the other hand, the latter was published in 1980 during the thick of the oil crisis (1974–1981). See (Holland 1999, ix).

¹⁵ See (Critchley 2007).

¹⁶ Aside from Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, see also their *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (see Hardt and Negri 2004).

¹⁷ See (Lundy 2013, 245).

¹⁸ See (Patton 2010b, 162). Most of my discussions here are inspired by Patton's book. Capitalism's influence on democratic states authors more complex forms of dehumanization that are aesthetically concealed by its promises of greater individual liberties, equitable social services, and ethical relations. In fact, advanced capitalism has engendered even some totalitarian and socialist states to reterritorialize into capitalist conduits.

¹⁹ The association of the Marxist critical diagnosis of capitalism with the principles of distributive justice before the 1980s has contributed to the copious efforts of English-speaking scholars to synthesize Marxism and the normative principles of left-liberal political theory. Concurrent with this innovation, the discussion on ethical and political normativity entered the French political grain transition that sparked renewed interest to discourse on equality, human rights, and freedom. One of the contributions of these advancements to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical career is the evolution from the problematic of the State apparatus and nomad toward the discussion on the critical relation between the universal capitalist market, as well as the virtual universality of a global democratic State. From the critique of psychoanalysis, Marxism, capitalism, and the State apparatus, the said intellectual shift from the 1980s onward widened and included engagement with existing social institutions in conjunction with liberal democratic values, especially in relation to human rights and jurisprudence. All of these more manifest and critical engagements with democratic principles and practices are articulated in *What is Philosophy?* along with other interviews and essays such as Deleuze's "Open Letters to Negri's Judges."

²⁰ See (Derrida 1997).

²¹ See (Derrida 1997, 165).

²² Cf. (*N* 169).

²³ See (*ES* 45-46).

²⁴ Deleuze, Gilles, 1996, "G comme Gauche." *L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze avec Claire Parnet*. Paris: DVD Editions, Montparnasse.

²⁵ See (Patton 2010b, 169).

²⁶ See (Thoburn 2003, 142).

²⁷ In relation to this, Deleuze develops his project as a kind of a politics of invention that surpasses the borders of normative or majoritarian politics, as well as antagonizes the capitalist system. When Marx's philosophy of communism is creatively fused with Deleuzo-Guattarian political project, a new materialist ontology of society characterized by difference and virtuality becomes a great possibility.

²⁸ At present, capital has survived the collapse of grand narrative and reconstructs its relation of production into an immanent system and force capable of configuring

its own territory, limits, and overcoming. See (Marx and Engels 1973, 37; Thoburn 2003, 2).

²⁹ See (Mengue 2004, 43).

³⁰ See (Mengue 2004, 107–110).

³¹ See (Lundy 2013, 243).

³² See (Patton 2010b, 162).

³³ It is the principle of equality and the idea that such undeserved inequalities of condition are unjust that underpin Deleuze’s criticism of both capitalism and the liberal democratic states through which its control of populations is exercised. See (Patton 2010b, 169).

³⁴ See (Thoburn 2003, 9, 42).

³⁵ Deleuze, “G comme Gauche,” *L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze avec Claire Parnet*.

³⁶ See (Patton 2010b, 170).

³⁷ For Mengue, the majoritarian democratic politics belongs to the realm of the segmentary line because it is not hospitable to becomings. In relation to political exchanges of dissenting opinions, politics, for him, must reconcile all dissenting voices toward the end (Mengue 2004, 53).

³⁸ See (Patton 2010b, 176).

³⁹ Of course, side-by-side with these judicial or legal developments are cultural initiatives or complements of Postcolonial theorists such as Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak.

⁴⁰ See (Connolly 1995, 103).

⁴¹ See (Patton 2010b, 168).

⁴² See (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 3).

⁴³ See (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002, 4).

⁴⁴ See (Mouffe 1993, 13).

⁴⁵ Cf. (*WP* 4).

⁴⁶ The struggle between popular and philosophical opinions is a quintessential problem in the history of philosophy. As early as Plato’s time, the prevalence of opinions undoubtedly engendered the banality of ethico-political existence of the Ancient people. Such societal debasement became extremely hostile to great thinkers who wanted to search for the truth behind the illusions provided by different opinions. The Ancient triumvirate (i.e., Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) eventually devised their respective philosophical projects to liberate their fellowmen from the yoke of ignorance or deception.

⁴⁷ See (Patton 2008, 189).

⁴⁸ See (Patton 2008, 190).

⁴⁹ See (Panao 2019).

⁵⁰ The “+” in LGBTQIAP+ involves other gender categories such as agender, gender queer, bigender, and gender variant.

⁵¹ For a more comprehensive understanding of the history, politics, and emancipatory causes of this community, see (Wolf 2009).

⁵² In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari lucidly describe capitalism’s immanence and creativity: “the strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous

ones. Capitalism defines a field of immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field. But this deterritorialized field finds itself determined by an axiomatic, in contrast to the territorial field determined by primitive codes” (AO 250).

CHAPTER SIX

GEOPHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTIONARY BECOMING

A. Complexity Politics, Contingency, and Becoming-Greek

A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia is a book on the philosophy of immanence, not merely on capitalism and micropolitics. Throughout this book, Deleuze and Guattari explain immanence in relation to linguistics, arts, geography, and the like.

In Geophilosophy, the prefix ‘geo’ indicates the *topos* of philosophical inquiry in place of a transcendental philosophy, instead of signifying a specific or newly formulated branch of philosophy.¹ As another expression of a philosophy of immanence, geophilosophy elicits a constellation of *geos* such as geography, geopolitics, and geomorphology, without reconciling their differences through a unitarian concept or a centralized system. The interminable *geos* of this Deleuzo-Guattarian immanent philosophy consist of smooth spaces that virtually deterritorialize the unified field of the earth and the segmented structures of State science.²

Inspired by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, geophilosophy is a form of neomaterialism that engages with various aspects of contemporary science to escape the perils of representation, determinism, and vitalism. In addition, it is in this philosophy that Spinozist, Marxian, Nietzschean, and Bergsonian terminologies are consolidated with different scientific research known as ‘complexity theory’ (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 3).³ According to John Protevi and Mark Bonta in *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, “Researchers in complexity theory investigate the way certain material systems in the inorganic, organic, and social registers attain both higher levels of internal complexity and a ‘focus’ of systematic behavior without having to rely on external organizing agents” (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 3).⁴ But before Protevi and Bonta, Manuel de Landa and Brian Massumi already problematized the relationship between the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy and the complexity theory.⁵

Furthermore, geophilosophy is pregnant with geological and geographical vocabularies and elucidations directly or indirectly related to physics, biology, anthropology, and the like. Nevertheless, what precedes all these discussions is the noble aim of creating new philosophical concepts such as ‘cartography,’ ‘deterritorialization,’ and ‘utopia.’ These concepts are apparatuses significant to Deleuze and Guattari’s project of developing a political vocation of philosophy by virtue of geophilosophy as a mode of becoming-revolutionary.⁶

The political dimension of schizoanalysis and minoritarian literature also applies to the concept of geophilosophy, more specifically in relation to complexity theory. As geophilosophy transforms into ‘complexity politics,’ the subject becomes merely comprehended as an operational structure that emerges from numerous low-level mechanisms and components, which Deleuze and Guattari refer to as desiring-machines. Of course, they spend adequate time in *Anti-Oedipus* merely to explicate the five paralogisms of psychoanalysis, specifically the hubristic conception of a sovereign and universal subject. On the contrary, schizoanalysis perceives the subject or the unconscious as a mere “acentered system ... as a machinic network of finite automata” (*ATP* 18).

The subject, which is derived from a plethora of mechanisms and components, is perceived by Deleuze and Guattari as merely subservient to social machines “with various stops in-between, at the institutional, urban, and state levels” (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 6).⁷ Based on this nonanthropocentric political philosophy, signs assume a significant value to material processes, and emergence extends to the subject “from desiring-machines below and from subjectivity to social machines above” (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 6). In this regard, *A Thousand Plateaus* “provides an escape route from the conceptual gridlock of ‘structure’ as either a merely homeostatic self-regulation or a postmodernist ‘signifier imperialism’ and ‘agency’ as a mysterious exception somehow granted to individual human subjects in defiance of natural laws and blithely free of social structure” (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 6).

Moreover, the political engagement between the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy and complexity theory generates a new field of study called the ‘geology of morals’ or ‘geobiosociality.’ In this field of study, ‘bodies politic’ become the object of examination. By bodies politic, I mean material assemblages such as social groups and institutions whose configurations in biological, chemical, and medical registers are politically and ethically analyzed. Primarily, both the material formations and the operations of the dominated and the dominating bodies are analyzed through their despotic creation of territories and codes. In the contemporary

period, for example, employees' body movements are regulated by different capitalist institutions and infrastructures, as well as Statist principles. All these resemble Deleuze and Guattari's characterization of the striated or stratified space manipulated by capitalists or State officials. The employees' superiors polarize all their movements and commodify their experiences and imagination. Sometimes, these authorities even grant pseudo-opportunities merely to amplify the employees' estrangements in the long run.

Advanced capitalism has ingeniously perfected its mechanism of profit generation and continuous fortification by compressing and annihilating the creative tension between time and space through apparatuses of capture such as the five-month labor contract, eight-hour workday, and the one-hour or one-and-half-hour break time. These forms of capture clearly illustrate the central point of Adorno's aphorism on the jitterbug: "For the people to be transformed into insects they require as much energy as might well suffice to transform them into human beings" (Adorno 1941, 48). Although originally referring to the regressive listeners in the age of the Culture Industry, the jitterbug aphorism is tremendously relevant in analyzing contemporary exploitation of bodies. Leisure is no longer viewed as a genuine human activity in the advanced capitalist society. Rather, it merely transforms as a prolongation of mechanized labor (intellectual and manual) and is "sought as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again'.... What happens at work ... can only be escaped from by approximation to it in one's leisure time. All amusement suffers from this incurable malady" (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002, 158–159). Ominously, because of the systemic totalization of the workers' bodies, it becomes more arduous to terminate the aforementioned mechanical activity (let alone advance capitalism) than to extend ways of mechanical labor to the pseudo-activity of leisure time.⁸ As employees metamorphose into docile bodies incarcerated in constricted spaces, their creativity, critical acuity, and ethical sensibility, to name a few, are numbed, therefore preventing them from devising initiatives to eradicate their dehumanizing conditions as workers on the one hand, and as social actors on the other. Simply put, their bodies are stratified and placed at the bottom of a fixed hierarchy or enduring exploitation.

Another example can be taken from *A Thousand Plateaus'* formulation of the organism in relation to natural and applied science. As discussed in Chapter Two, an organism emerges when desiring-production's rhizomic mobility is repressed or oedipalized. In addition, it exists when matter-in-transit and perpetual diversification are subjected to management, anatomization, and manipulation in the fields of ontogenetic

development and medicine, for instance. Biology, embryology, and medicine, Dimitris Papadopoulos adds, “play an equal role with ontogenetic change, gene activity, epigenetic interaction and the environment to produce a coherent story of what an organism is in a particular historical chronotope” (Papadopoulos 2010, 75–76). Notwithstanding the rhizomic movement of amorphous matter and the unformed plane of immanence of the BwO, they are unremittingly faced with the paradox of metamorphosing into an organism. As Deleuze and Guattari explicate:

The organism is not at all the body, the BwO; rather, it is a stratum on the BwO, in other words, a phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized transcendences. The strata are bonds, pincers. “Tie me up if you wish.” We are continually stratified. But who is this we that is not me, for the subject no less than the organism belongs to and depends on a stratum?... [T]he BwO is that glacial reality where the alluvions, sedimentations, coagulations, foldings, and recoilings that compose an organism—and also a signification and a subject—occur.... It is in the BwO that the organs enter into the relations of composition called the organism (*ATP* 159).⁹

Aside from the aforesaid examples, different forms and nuances of stratification or capture permeate in other institutions, sectors, and social phenomena such as in education, architecture, neuroscience, and in the event of migration. Deleuze and Guattari conceive all these predicaments through the concept of the ‘strata’ and ‘consistencies’ (or rhizomes or war-machines). From the exploited conditions of the body or manipulated matter in strata, the body (matter) in consistencies espouses a nomadic movement, as well as the ability to craft assemblages of bodies in constant transformations and connections. Furthermore, the principle of stratification is a process where the inculcation of territories and codified representations breeds oppressive bodies. This is the reason why in the field of geobiosociality, it is crucial to investigate and analyze how dominating bodies carve their territories and codes.

On the contrary, the principle of consistencies seeks to fashion a new earth composed of novel relations and collectivities. Likewise, these productions must be receptive to the creative potentials of material systems to emancipate dominated bodies from various strata.¹⁰ However, not all modes of distribution and spaces that are smooth, dynamic, and free, are beneficial. In the language of micropolitics or becoming-minoritarian, there

is always a possibility that a line of flight may lead to a line of destruction, and that a smooth space may be an offspring of the striated space's deterioration. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the resiliency of an assemblage or relation does not guarantee its exemption from the perils of capitalist reterritorialization or State capture. The same possibility applies to the status of 'minor' or 'nomad' science (*ATP* 362).

Faithful to the principle of becoming-minoritarian, minor or nomad science maintains an immanent relation with State science. However, despite its rhizomic capabilities, the former is always hunted by the possibility of reterritorializing into the processes and configurations of the latter. My view about the status of contemporary science relatively diverges from Papadopoulos's claim that it is merely characterized by fabrication, and nothing more. I admit the fact that several scientific researches nowadays have already been neoliberalized. For example, transnational corporations fund research and create scholarship foundations geared toward the further solidification of their mechanisms and functions. These economic interests are aestheticized by the façade of academic or university infrastructures of promotion and faculty development.

Despite the veracity of this phenomenon, there remains researches unshackled by fabrication. In 2019, a 16-year-old student from the Philippines discovered that the 'aratiles' (Jamaican cherry) offers a possible cure for diabetes—the most common disease in the Philippines. She discovered that that bioactive compounds such as polyphenol and anthocyanin were in the aratiles, and these components may be used as a cure for diabetes.¹¹ Despite my disagreement, I nonetheless agree with Papadopoulos's assertion that technoscience, an acolyte of State science, is currently powered by minor science, specifically "its interventionist, direct, ambulant quality" (Papadopoulos 2010, 79). Some concretizations of this claim can be seen in our "entrepreneurial scientific culture, the neoliberalization of research, and the precarization of intellectual and affective labor" (Papadopoulos 2010, 80). All these inevitable propensities necessitate us to complement the complexity theory's political analysis with an ethical evaluation of the typologies of assemblages as either ascending or descending mode. Ultimately, in relation to the previous discussions, geophilosophy must not only complement itself with political analysis, but also with a self-reflexive genealogical evaluation, including a reconstructed understanding of what materialism is in the contemporary period.

What is Philosophy? is the last work written by Deleuze and Guattari.¹² In this book, they develop their definition of philosophy as the ability to create concepts that can critically engage the present, paving the way for a people- and world -to-come. This very definition indispensably

serves as the guiding principle of schizoanalysis and becoming-minoritarian, to name a few. In *Anti-Oedipus*, they salvage the productive capacity and the social embeddedness of desiring-production from capitalist oedipalization in the nuclear family. Meanwhile, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, they extol the role of geography and spatiality in the conceptualization of ways to apprehend questions and overcome pathologies in the present. Philosophy's relationship with the arts and sciences, and more importantly, its intrinsic relation to the Earth, comprise the primary features of this novel *ethos* of thinking and living. These efforts presuppose Deleuze and Guattari's goal of reorienting philosophy as a materialist, earthy, and spatial endeavor (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 92). Such an initiative or project serves as one of the most concrete ways to articulate the philosophy of immanence and becoming-revolutionary that undergird their entire project. In this sense, geography and spatiality transfigure as groundwork principles of geophilosophy.

In geophilosophy, thinking is no longer limited to the configurations of historicity and temporality. It is "neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth" (*WP* 84). If thinking is inextricably related to territory, then humanity must realize that the earth itself observes its own self-organizing material systems and complexity beyond our rational or philosophical intervention. Similarly, it "constantly carries out a movement of deterritorialization on the spot, by which it goes beyond its own territory" (*WP* 84). Deleuze and Guattari, in fact, dedicate the third chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* titled "10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?)" for an intensive discussion of the earth's self-organizing capacity.¹³

Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari opine that "philosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory from Braudel's point of view" (*ATP* 95).¹⁴ Deleuze's formulation of difference as philosophy's new image of thought is derived from the ruins of the old image of thought. In geophilosophy, the new Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy of materialism or immanence, 'contingency' acts as the new image of thought against the backdrop of Western philosophy's proclivity toward the rational. A philosophy based on the principle of contingency assumes that the birth of philosophy in Greece was not an organized phenomenon. Using Braudel's line of reasoning, Deleuze and Guattari contend that philosophy's natality is an offspring of various contingent socio-economic, political, and geographic tensions or relations.

Greece's freedom from Persian invasion prompts a creative and vigorous 'milieu of immanence' (*WP* 87) in the Greek society. Numerous

kinds of developments, especially in relation to cultural and socio-political aspects of communal living, occurred. However, despite this golden era in Greek society, a period of massive societal progress, it generated a kind of paradox that really challenged philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. While the Greek milieu of immanence provided a congenial and meaningful place for philosophical thinking, it was, nevertheless, unfriendly toward great philosophers such as Socrates. Accordingly, the pre-Socratic thinkers who are nurtured by Egyptian education returned to Greece and imparted their knowledge to the people. On the one hand, the Greek society's deterritorialization of political autonomy and cooperation fashioned novel socio-political values and ideals such as "immanence, friendship, and opinion" (*ATP* 88) that were embraced by philosophy eventually. On the other, it was the arrival of the Egyptian philosophers (as nomads or minor outsiders) into the Greek milieu of immanence that gave rise to the Western philosophical system. Obviously, the principle of contingency (i.e., contingent geographical proximities and historical accidents) plays an indispensable contribution to the advent of Western philosophy. In a nutshell, geophilosophy theorizes that philosophy needs the contingent connection between absolute deterritorialization (of a thought of radical immanence) and a relative social deterritorialization (that constitutes a milieu of social immanence).¹⁵

The trajectory of the discussion on contingency leads to Deleuze and Guattari's claim that philosophy is undeniably a Greek authorship (*WP* 4). Similarly, they claim that one must become a Greek to profoundly understand its merits. In other words, becoming-Greek entails the creative and critical process by which one becomes a philosophical nomad, that is, one becomes a Greek philosopher in a time when becoming Greek is already an impossibility. Becoming-Greek implies becoming a nomad, that is, becoming neither Greek nor non-Greek. Rodolphe Gasché further elaborates this phenomenon of minoritarian becoming in *Geophilosophy: On Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's What is Philosophy?*:

[A]s philosophers, how are they to become Greek in a way that is not to be confounded with what the Greeks were, so as to be able to do something different from the Greeks, something radically new, which however, is not therefore something necessarily un-Greek, something beyond philosophy, but on the contrary, a form of philosophy that adequately responds to the modern and contemporary world? (Gasché 2014, xi)

The problematic of becoming-Greek posited above challenges us to conceptualize a philosophy or to create philosophical concepts that would

satisfy the contemporary democratic and capitalist territories and would allow us to critically engage with them to produce new subjectivities, connections, and values—a becoming-democratic and becoming-Greek. As Deleuze and Guattari radically explicate in *What is Philosophy?*:

The object of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect history but to diagnose our actual becomings: a becoming-revolutionary that ... is not the same thing as the past, present, or future of revolutions. A becoming-democratic that is not the same as what States of law are, or even a becoming-Greek that is not the same as what the Greeks were. The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, “physician of civilization,” or inventor of new immanent modes of existence (*WP* 112–113).

Indeed, there is an important link between the philosopher and the ‘concept’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. In fact, they opine in the same book that the philosopher is the concept’s friend in the Greek sense of the word: “He is potentiality of the concept. That is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products” (*WP* 5). Philosophy involves the creation of new concepts. Even though the act of creation is not an exclusive ability of philosophy, “only philosophy creates concepts in the strict sense. Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies” (*WP* 5). In this vein, the concept of ‘democracy’ cannot be considered as a philosophical concept. Because of democracy’s capitalist capture, it lacks creativity necessary for the invention of new concepts or states of living. Although capitalist axioms bear an intrinsic creativity in converting all subjectivities, objects, and experiences into commodified entities, as well as inaugurate the potentiality for a universal history, capitalism’s version of deterritorialization merely strengthens itself and snubs a world- and people-to-come.

Because philosophy is the concept’s friend and is essentially characterized by creativity, then one must treat it critically and politically. I deem it necessary to distinguish the word ‘critically’ from ‘politically’ because in my view, one may be critical only for self-gratification. Capitalism likewise is incessantly critical of itself; that is why it indefatigably and immanently overcomes its own limits. But, of course, the political vocation of philosophy requires more than that. One’s observance of criticality must always be informed by the noble impetus to transfigure the present toward a world- and people-to-come. As Nietzsche valiantly argues in *The Will to Power*, “[Philosophers] must no longer accept

concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland" (Nietzsche 1967, 409).

B. The Creative Fabulation of a People-to-come

B.1 The Art of Fabulation

The concept of 'people' is one of the most banalized principles in the history of humanity. It was used by some great thinkers to unify a deteriorating nation or to render hope to a colonized society. Concepts such as 'unity,' 'freedom,' 'nation,' and the like are frequently attached to it in order to gain a politico-historical force—the unity of the people, the freedom of the people of Abraham, and the rehabilitation of the African nation are some of its examples. But as time evolves, this very concept also opens the possibilities for deception, colonization, and imperialism. In the first place, the 'people' is an abstract and universal term. Given these attributes, it can serve as a transcendental concept or a majoritarian standard to all individuals regardless of socio-economic, political, and cultural differences and contingencies. However, its metaphysical configuration is undeniably formulated at a particular time, and by a particular circumstance and subjectivities. The problem lies when, to use the language of Adorno, the concept becomes more real than the object it represents.¹⁶ As the term people is transcendentalized, the contingencies surrounding it are disregarded, thus losing its material value. Consequently, it transforms into a device of totalization that disheartens manifold kinds of becoming.

Another problem occurs when the concept of 'people' is instrumentalized as means to an end, and not as an end in itself. In a democratic society, such a concept is oftentimes used and abused by political leaders and would-be politicians. During elections, for example, different techno-media networks and channels would bombard us with political utterances, trivialized advertisements, and whimsical promises in order to dignify aspiring leaders. All of them would deceivably utilize the mantra 'for the people,' 'genuine service to the people,' and the perennial triumphalist adage that 'he/she is the leader the people are waiting for.' A mediocre or one-dimensional individual would easily fall prey to these forms of rhetoric. In this vein, albeit it superficially appears that these political practices prudently treat the concept of 'people' as an end in itself, history would say otherwise—that it is merely used as a ploy in pursuit of political, economic, and narcissistic gains.

In the contemporary playing field, populism serves as the nerve-center of numerous fallacious beliefs and vicious practices. As a concept, populism generally promotes an anti-elitist, -pluralist, and -democratic politics.¹⁷ Like democracy, populism cannot be considered as a philosophical concept primarily by virtue of its exclusionary and devious mechanisms, to name a few. Populist leaders cockily assert that they are the “only” representatives of the people—an authentic, singular, and homogeneous collectivity. President Recep Erdoğan of Turkey is famous for utilizing a populist discourse in confronting his critics: “We are the people. Who are you?”¹⁸

Moreover, an extremist typology of populism is creatively exhilarated by the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. In the 2016 Philippine Presidential Elections, he and his political strategists effectively used the mantra, “Change is coming,” to inculcate in the people’s minds that he is “The” leader who would intrepidly combat elitism, corruption, and immorality, as if they were the only attributes of the previous Benigno Aquino III administration; and more importantly, as if they are linguistically interchangeable from each other.¹⁹ Also, millions of people, especially from the southernmost part of the Philippines (his place of origin) think that Duterte is the “messianic political leader” that they are waiting for. Of course, this fundamentalist and triumphalist belief likewise produced the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the 1970s.²⁰ This is the reason why I think that another significant characteristic of populism is its dissemination of historical amnesia. Because of the Filipinos’ widescale forgetfulness, the Duterte administration efficaciously spearheaded the hero’s burial of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the acquittal of several corruption-related cases of the Marcoses, the recycling of controversial politicians, the protection of bigtime drug lords, and the imprisonment of critics from civil society. This amnesia breeds what Deleuze and Guattari call ethical fascism, where people sightlessly submit themselves to Duterte’s leadership despite its barefaced delinquencies and haughty violation of human rights.

In the field of philosophy, the ‘people’ likewise occupies an important place, especially in the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche.²¹ In particular, the said concept informs their quest for the myth and philosopher of the future. As the great poet Hölderlin claims, myths bear the capacity to invent a people or a Nation.²² Such creative aptitude prompts the whole right-wing German Romanticist, including Heidegger, to use this concept as a regulative principle for all their principles and aspirations. Nonetheless, history teaches us that these myths are also used as devices of trickery and domination. Like the instrumentalization of people in democratic societies, we are all aware that the Nazis also used the

said concept as propaganda for the massive and overbearing promotion of the National Socialist ideology.

As history turns into a fable under different ideological manipulations across time, Nietzsche believes that a glimmer of hope can still be uncovered from its ruins. History as fable “mythifies” or reifies particular historical personalities and occurrences such as revolutionary leaders, political statesmen, and influential class, which are relevant to the present time. In this regard, there exist unsung and forgotten heroes of historical events. However, what lies behind their marginalization in history is the possibility of being protected from internal and external appropriations, and more importantly, of opening the possibility of uplifting people’s lives. Nietzsche formulates the notion of monumental history in order for history to be in the service of life, and not of particular ideology or dominant class. It optimizes past greatness in conjunction with the unexplored spaces and unheard voices of the past to creatively inspire a new generation of incredible achievements (Nietzsche 1983, 62).²³

The brilliance of the human lot no wonder persists across time. But we must not forget that in history, such a positive attribute can anytime be manipulated to benefit a select few and be converted into life-denying values. In “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for life,” in *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche writes: “[T]he great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, that ... unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain peaks ... the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright and great – that this is the fundamental idea of the faith in humanity which finds expression in the demand for a monumental history” (Nietzsche 1983, 68).

Myths and monumental history always carry the potentiality of being transformed into majoritarian standards or what Lyotard calls grand narratives. The peril is that even the marginalized or minorities bear the danger of becoming the next dominant group or authorities. Rather than succumbing to the principles offered by myth and monumental history, Deleuze and Guattari, in the eyes of Mengue, pursue a micropolitics of history whose goal is “to unpack this work of myth, legend, fabulation, and to reveal beneath the large ensembles (of the majorities) the infinite dispersal of causes and small beginnings, the ‘shameful origins,’ as Nietzsche used to say, believing this to be the object of the historical knowledge of academic historians” (Mengue 2008, 222).

The people, furthermore, cannot be explained comprehensively without discussing first the concept of ‘fabulation’—a concept originally borrowed from Bergson.²⁴ In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson defines fabulation or mythmaking as a notable activity in closed

societies. It refers to the natural propensity of human beings to anthropomorphize and attribute intentionality to natural phenomena.²⁵ Social institutions, standards, and religion are some of the anthropomorphic by-products of this instinctual ability. In turn, they operate instinctually and regulate closed societies, which are fundamentally static.

Despite the fact that this widespread anthropomorphism among people of traditional societies generates societal investments and principles, Bergson ponders fabulation as something negative. On the contrary, Deleuze detaches the said concept from the anthropomorphism of these societies and perceives it positively by eradicating the idea of utopia perennially attached to it, and eventually unearthing its creative and political characteristics. Perhaps, one of the reasons that justifies Bergson's abhorrence toward fabulation or mythmaking is that it serves as one of the basic pillars of religion. Fabulation produces illusory or deceptive fictions that numb individuals' critical acuity. Humans are then creatively persuaded to pattern their behavior after religious doctrines and principles. As a result, it actualizes as an instrument of religion to police deviant behaviors and guarantee harmonious and unified actions. In other words, Bergson thinks that religion and fabulation maintain a reciprocal relation in such a manner that both serve as a means of fortifying cohesion in closed societies (Bogue 2006, 204).²⁶

The inextricable relation between fabulation and religion still persists today. However, in the current period, capitalism ascends as the new religion of our times, characterized by new configurations, language, and vigor. After capitalism exploits individuals in multiple ways, it would instantaneously seek the help of its public strategists to fabricate narratives via various channels and media (*AO* xii–xiii). A romanticized portrayal of a happy life or an ideal relationship through the endless consumption of capitalist-laden products is one of the most potent ways to commodify everything that is human. The more people are convinced that they lack something, the more capitalist potency amplifies, and the more the people's critical faculty is numbed and bastardized.

Moreover, fabulation is an activity of the intellect that paradoxically empowers us to antagonize the instinctive propensity intrinsic in our intelligence.²⁷ Similarly, it is also an act that opens human beings to the finitude of existence. The consequent despair people feel after apprehending this fact is neutralized by religion via its benevolent recognition of the finitude and feebleness of humans.²⁸ Evidently, because religion and fabulation support each other in several instances, Bergson infers that the former is simply a “defensive reaction of Nature against that which might

be depressing for the individual and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence” (Bergson 1954, 205).

At this juncture, it is interesting to know why Deleuze sees fabulation as a positive faculty, despite Bergson’s negative portrayal of it. Answering this important query directs us to its opposite—‘creative emotion.’ Going back to Bergson, he argues that fabulation and creative emotion are products of two divergent qualitative processes. This is the reason why it is misleading to comprehend them in the same plane. Genuine creativity, in Bergson’s view, is achieved when we free ourselves from the default concepts and meanings provided to us by society. In the language of Deleuze’s *Bergsonism*, fabulation can be likened to the concept of the ‘possible,’ while creative emotion can be paralleled to the ‘virtual.’ The former pertains to an activity of uncovering what already exists, that is, it is already assured of what will happen in the future (*B* 14). Meanwhile, the latter is a state of existence actualized through self-differentiation by conceptualizing its respective lines of differentiation as an essential condition of its actualization. The virtual informs Deleuze’s theorization of the virtual. This concept involves a process that prompts the existence of events irreducible to any kind of appropriation, that is, to those circumstances that might never have occurred.

The above explanations claim that it is only in the realms of creative emotion and the virtual that genuine creativity exists. Artists who embody genuine creativity audaciously fashion new affects and percepts, intentionally misinterpret majoritarian interpretations, and push the limits of language. More importantly, the exceptional proficiency of these versions of becoming-minoritarian of language can likewise invent “a thought capable of taking on a new aspect for each new generation” (Bergson 1954, 254). This prompts Bergson to associate the realm of creative emotion with the principle of the *elan vital*. Not only is creativity the point of convergence between them because the latter is not merely a principle fueled by creativity. Rather, *elan vital* is likewise a principle that espouses the “inventive becoming of the new, and through mystics that principle finds expression in the vision of a creative self-formation of human society” (Bogue 2006, 208). Its revolutionary characteristics entail that the transition from closed to open societies can only occur as a radical ‘leap forward’ toward the virtual, which engenders its own possibility in its very dynamicity.²⁹

The expression of becoming-minoritarian of language uncovered from Bergson’s principle of genuine creativity leads to an open-ended, emancipatory, and dynamic society and future collectivity. However, such an affirmative consequence is achieved from a Bergsonian philosophy

where fabulation and genuine creation are separated. For Deleuze and Guattari, meanwhile, such an outcome can be achieved through a reconfigured notion of fabulation that includes the principle of genuine creation. And because fabulation and genuine creation find harmony in the Deleuzo-Guattarian canon, then the leap forward initiated by the *elan vital* actualizes as the shock of the event. In this revolutionary moment, fabulation metamorphoses as a principle indispensably contributory to the process of genuine creation and the mapping of a people-to-come.

Further, the close relationship between philosophy and art presupposes the principle of fabulation. Rimbaud and Mallarmé represent the group of kindred spirits whom Deleuze and Guattari refer to every time they discuss the ethico-revolutionary necessity of the people—still waiting to be fabulated. Although the creation of revolutionary affects and percepts is the prerogative of art, it is philosophy that invents concepts, specifically, the concept of a people. In the artists' struggle, this collectivity cannot involve themselves directly with art. However, when a people is fabulated, it establishes an interactive link with art.³⁰ Even though artists appear to create their genuine artworks in solitary state, their crafts implicitly depict the social because of their pursuit to diagram a collectivity or community that does not exist yet.³¹ As Deleuze asserts in *Negotiations*:

When a people's created, it's through its own resources, but in a way that links up with something in art ... or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn't the right concept: it's more a question of a "fabulation" in which a people and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson's notion of fabulation and give it a political meaning (*N* 174).

Although the discussion of the fabulation of a people-to-come immensely revolves around the Bergsonian distinction between fabulation and genuine creation, Foucault also includes it in his political philosophy. According to Deleuze, "Foucault draws from this a very intriguing conception of 'infamous men,' a conception imbued with a quiet gaiety ... the infamous man isn't defined by excessive evil but etymologically, as an ordinary man ... suddenly drawn into the spotlight by some minor circumstance.... It's a man confronting Power, summoned to appear and speak.... The infamous man's a particle caught in a shaft of light and a wave of sound" (*N* 108). Foucault's man of anonymity makes appear what does not, cannot, and should not appear. Like Spinoza, the real-life example of a nomad, Foucault's anonymous man embodies the principle of becoming-minoritarian, "the place that makes it possible for him to survey the entire tribe and to fill himself with the affects necessary for the 'creation of

concept’—the political seer discerns that the people to whom the concept strives to reach is not yet there” (Valentin 2006, 196). This man doubtlessly epitomizes the act of fabulation—the art of summoning forth and creating the people who are not yet there.

Lastly, fabulation promotes the ‘fabrication of giants’: “Percepts can be telescopic or microscopic, giving characters and landscapes giant dimensions as if they were swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain.... It is of little importance whether these characters *are* mediocre: they *become* giants ... without ceasing to be what they are. It is by dint of mediocrity, even of stupidity or infamy, that they are able to become not simple ... but gigantic” (*WP* 171). I think this goal alludes to Nietzsche’s formulation of monumental history. Even though this kind of history gives utmost value to the resuscitation of past greatness, the domain of art, however, is not memory, and “creative fabulation has nothing to do with memory, however exaggerated, or with a fantasy. In fact, the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived. The artist is a seer, a becomer” (*WP* 171). In fact, as early as 1975, Deleuze and Guattari claim in *Kafka* that “the literary machine ... becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come” (*K* 17–18). Affirmatively, the art of fabulation, as a concept embodying the principle of becoming-minoritarian, fashions gigantic images capable of undermining all majoritarian configurations in society toward a new community of radical solidarity.

B.2 The Virtual People

A micropolitics of desire, history or literature maintains a critical relation with the majoritarian configuration or universal concept of a people. It is because the latter is based on the principles of unity, stability, and identity. Deleuze boldly asserts in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* that, “The people are what is missing” (*C2* 215). Such absence is inextricably linked with the notion of a creative minority that he discusses in *Negotiations*. As such, the people’s existence is premised on the principle of minority or becoming-minoritarian; that is why they are absent.

Although I have some reservations with Mengue’s parallelism between Heidegger’s German Romanticism³² and Deleuzo-Guattarian fabulation, I agree with his argument that Deleuze’s project of politicizing fabulation grants politics a reformulated meaning and relevance; and more importantly, it assigns a new function to the people—resistance (art is resistance), which is an offspring of fabulation and art (*N* 174).

The relationship between the people and the artist-minority results in an alliance. If art is resistance and the artist-minority is capable of launching resistance—a creative aptitude the people lack, then the former must inspire the latter. The people lack this power because they are always absent from creation. In this case, the people can only metamorphose into a virtual collectivity, “in so far as it tends to join the creative minority and inasmuch as the creative minority tends to join what the people lack” (Mengue 2008, 226). Of course, since there is no direct and default relationship between the missing people and the artistic minority, fabulation should bridge the existing gap between them. Indispensably, the fabulation of the people-to-come have certain attributes in common with philosophy and art: “books of philosophy and works of art ... contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in common—their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable ... and to the present” (*WP* 110).

Moreover, as fabulation compensates the people’s incapacity to create art, they are able to participate in the very act of artistic fabulation, while art fabulates by addressing itself to a virtual people (*WP* 225–226). The alliance between the people and the artistic minority, and their inclusion in artistic fabulation assumes the Deleuzo-Guattarian politicization of the Bergsonian fabulation. From its previous artistic constitution and function, political fabulation now focuses on the people. These people, of course, are not the actual or territorialized ones. Rather, this collectivity that artists are waiting for the longest time emerges as a virtuality.³³

In *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze delineates the virtual as “real without being actual, ideal, without being abstract” (*PS* 58). To my mind, such a definition is the profoundest primer to understand what he means by the virtual. When associated with the concept people, the concept ‘virtual people’ is then conceptualized. These people are real, but not actual. Whereas Sartre comprehends the existential individual as a being *condemned to be free*, Deleuze defines the virtual people as a collectivity condemned to be “eternally” ‘to come.’ In other words, it cannot actualize as a historical entity because it belongs to the domain of thought or absolute deterritorialization. Unlike the actual, which can assume a concrete historical existence, the virtual people cannot locate anything that would allow itself to be historically translated. Paradoxically, the only way for it to be concretized or connected historically to the actual world is by virtue of its perpetual absence.

Democracy’s theorization of people as *demos* resembles the actual, not the virtual people. The *demos* belongs to capitalism’s historical process of relative reterritorialization. For Deleuze and Guattari, its capitalist

capture through democratic nation-states prohibits it from being elevated to the level of thought—the plane of absolute deterritorialization and revolution. According to them:

The immense relative deterritorialization of world capitalism needs to be reterritorialized on the modern national State, which finds an outcome in democracy, the new society of “brothers,” the capitalist version of the society of friends. As Braudel shows, capitalism started out from city-towns, but these pushed deterritorialization so far that immanent modern States had to temper their madness, to recapture and invest them so as to carry out necessary reterritorializations in the form of new internal limits (*WP* 98)

The monstrosity and malevolence of capitalism lead the *demos* (actual people) to the repressive vacuum of the State apparatus or nation-state. The world- and people-to-come, in other words, cannot be “found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority” (*WP* 108). In fact, anything situated in the landscape of history is converted into capitalist axioms that exclusively reinforce the oppressive machinery, thereby subjugating the *demos*. As Deleuze and Guattari sarcastically opine:

We are no longer Greeks, and friendship is no longer the same.... We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it. This feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them. And there is no way to escape the ignoble but to play the part of the animal (*WP* 107–108).

The insular frontiers and infallible configurations of the capitalist State apparatus can only be challenged by the nomadic war-machine. The nomad’s radical exteriority (in relation to the State apparatus) brings us to a future of virtual people that always suspends its arrival. If ever it arrives in the territory of history, it is always in the form of a becoming-minoritarian—of fleeting, molecularized, and creative resistances, “by a handful of minorities entrusted for a brief instant with carrying out the demands of thought—resistances that are likely to get quickly bogged down” (Mengue 2008, 230).³⁴

Regrettably, Heidegger’s support for National Socialism (Nazism) is founded on the uncritical belief that the Nazis are outside of their time like the Greeks.³⁵ Another error that really upset several scholars and

radicals of his time is his confusion “not only the German for a Greek but the fascist for a creator of existence and freedom.... He got the wrong people, earth, and blood. For the race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race” (*WP* 109). Beyond his so-called blunder or misinformed choice, he chooses concrete people for the process of reterritorialization. In short, Heidegger is incognizant of the fact that reterritorialization, like deterritorialization, transcends all historical configurations and specific ethnic people. Such ignorance or hubris convinces him that the German people is the new Greek people. Pure becoming and infinite thought, as explained earlier, can never find its concretization in any ethnic group or nation’s citizens. The same restriction applies to the people. Thus, Heidegger’s betrayal is based on his uncritical disposition that prevents him from understanding that “the people is internal to the thinker because it is a ‘becoming-people,’ just as the thinker is internal to the people as no less unlimited becoming” (*WP* 109). Furthermore, his betrayal is aggravated because he confines the absolute movement of the process of deterritorialization to the territory of Greece and Germany.³⁶

Some traditional political theorists would inevitably find Heidegger’s initiative as something worthy of noble appreciation, and the Deleuzo-Guattarian project as something unrealistic or whimsical. For them, politics is an immanent discipline that deals with concrete principles and problems, as well as actual people. Foucault, in his “Preface” in *Anti-Oedipus*, calls these people as “the political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse” (*AO* xii). Indeed, these men sightlessly believe that their nation or ethnic class bears the redemptive responsibility and capability to salvage the entire German society, Europe, or the world from the threat of decline. More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari think that deterritorialization, reterritorialization, the world-to-come, and the missing people can be historically materialized and politically problematized.³⁷ However, although their writings can critically engage with actual infringements or exploitations in society, we must not forget that they are forerunners of micropolitics. The new question that must be addressed then is: *how can micropolitics’ aesthetic resistance serves as a middle principle between traditional majoritarian politics and a politics of deterritorialization?* To be more specific, *how can Deleuze and Guattari’s micropolitics obtain determinate and concrete objectives and, at the same time, engage with actual people?*

The *demons* of democracy and Heidegger's German people cannot assume the role of the virtual people. Similarly, a particular ethnic class or collectivity cannot assume the face of Humanity because in the first place, such a gesture would compel us to reactively invent a transcendental fiction that includes abstract Human Rights, Law, and Humanism. The first aforementioned question presupposes that deterritorialization is a process by which all existing links with territory are obliterated, and a form of utter departure from the past. The general accusation that the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy espouses the principle of deterritorialization or lines of flight is already debunked using the concept of the holey space or the principle of becoming-minoritarian. The aforesaid principle informs the *ethos* of prudence and moderation espoused by Deleuze and Guattari's politics. In the context of geophilosophy, it is the theory of the refrain (Ritournelle) that moderates or temporarily territorializes deterritorialization.

The term 'refrain' originally appears in Guattari's book *The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis*.³⁸ Its initial appearance in his book with Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, is associated with music, which serves as the source of its origin. Although originating from music,³⁹ the refrain assumes a wider function posterior to its philosophical appropriation. As a philosophical concept, the refrain is a principle of consistency or territoriality. It fashions momentary landscapes and assemblages comprising of heterogeneous resources, and then deterritorializes again to ceaselessly reconfigure the relations of elements.

Understanding deterritorialization through the refrain mitigates the lines of flight in simply becoming a pure absolute line. In this vein, deterritorialization is now perceived to be constitutive of some striated spaces, segments, milieus, and codes. The partial or fragmentary existence of these things within the principle of deterritorialization gives us a substantial assurance that something will reterritorialize itself along the way. More importantly, the inclusion of the refrain not only moderates deterritorialization, but it also allows this principle to be inexorably complemented by reterritorialization.

Given deterritorialization's transformation, does it mean then that Deleuze and Guattari's politics is already hospitable to the actual people or ethnic class? The answer will only be affirmative if the refrain is said to create permanent territories or configurations. The refrain is an assemblage of consistency that marks a dwelling. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari:

The role of the refrain has often been emphasized: it is territorial, a territorial assemblage. Bird songs: the bird sings to mark its territory.... The refrain may assume other functions, amorous, professional or social, liturgical or cosmic: it always

carries earth with it; it has a land (sometimes a spiritual land) as its concomitant; it has an essential relation to a Natal, a Native (*ATP* 313).

I deem it necessary to accentuate that these territories are temporary. More importantly, the refrain consecutively deterritorializes so that “a territory is always *en route* to an at least potential deterritorialization” (*ATP* 327).⁴⁰ At the end of the day, the refrain remains loyal to the principle of deterritorialization. It is because the former owes its consistency to the latter, as it consolidates all heterogeneous elements without synthesizing all of them. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, “even in a territorial assemblage, it may be the most deterritorialized component, the deterritorializing vector, in other words, the refrain that assures the consistency of the territory” (*ATP* 327).⁴¹

The refrain, as a minoritarian principle, has a power to uncoil hidden potentialities within and beyond a particular dwelling or Natal. However, because of its territorial and assemblagic composition, it likewise promotes the status of the actual people or the ethnic class as the “germinal factor that guides the openings and reterritorializations from its inner source, its inner space” (Mengue 2008, 233). Nonetheless, the recognition of the actual people or ethnic life is also temporary. The absolute deterritorialization of thought calls for a people-to-come or virtual people. Meanwhile, while it is true that the absolute reterritorialization of thought summons a homeland, this form of dwelling, which is really inseparable from philosophy, must be capacitated in restoring “an equivalent of territory, valid as a home” (*WP* 69). Even though this is the case, the value of infinite thought to both absolute deterritorialization and reterritorialization presupposes a virtual territory and people.

The actual people, the proper object of traditional or majoritarian politics, only receive ephemeral recognition in relation to the theory of refrain and the principle of reterritorialization. From a conventional political eye, their singular existence is determined and regulated by their traditions. Their identities are relatively inimical to the process of becoming-other; that is why their movements are sluggish. With the help of fabulation, their limited movements lead them to societal cohesion and grant them a convergent political reality.

Furthermore, the actual people are the subordinate of the virtual people who are condemned in eternity to be absent or missing. These collectivity-to-come or indeterminate people are valuable for Deleuze and Guattari because of their constant absence. But as a holistic project, it is significant to know how does micropolitics perceive or treat the actual people. Rather than merely situating micropolitics at the margins, it should

return the power of fabulation to the actual people. This power is parallel to Adorno's claim that the Enlightenment project abolishes our mimetic relationship with nature. Such a grand philosophical project subjects humanity into *Auschwitz* whose barbarism is beyond normative language. We cannot blame Adorno in saying that, "to write poetry after *Auschwitz* is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today" (Adorno 1997, 34). In the case of the actual people, revolutionaries and artists of today must educate, encourage, and inspire them to become a narrating or storytelling collectivity in order to reactivate their capability to narrate stories. Deleuzo-Guattarian fabulation, as a principle of minority becoming, must concern itself with local stories and minor fictions, "which in the actuality of the present, are the creators of the future (projects, programmes ... sci-fi etc.)" (Mengue 2008, 236).

To further envision an aesthetic community latent in Deleuze and Guattari's theory of fabulation, it would be helpful to borrow some ideas from Jacques Rancière's *Aesthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art*.⁴² One of the important lessons from this phenomenal book is the theorization of a future museum or art gallery that can shelter and cultivate collective assemblage of enunciations, local wisdom, and cultural artefacts. Deleuze and Guattari would support Rancière's theorization and would add that the very presence of this habitat serves as a constant *aide-mémoire* for people to untiringly diagnose and destabilize all systems of capture and subjugation. One of the most concrete features of this struggle is the emancipation of the artwork from the iron-cage of commodification. Such an initiative transforms the artwork into an assemblage of cultural fabrics that champions art's historical rootedness and radical alterity, as well as resurrects people's ability to narrate, create, and relate, which would bring forth the creation of an aesthetic community. As Rancière opines, "Poetry is the flowering of a form of life, the expression of a poeticity immanent to the ways of life of a people and its individuals" (Rancière 2013, 60).

C. Revolutionary Becoming and the Possibility of Utopia

Deterritorialization in the Deleuzo-Guattarian *oeuvre* presupposes the achievement of higher forms of existence posterior to its obliteration of striated spaces in society, and oedipalized subjectivities in the capitalist-regulated nuclear family. However, the emergence of higher kinds of existence is not definitive or guaranteed because the lines of flight can likewise metamorphose as lines of destruction. The inclusion of deterritorialization in the current discussion aspires to delineate the

possibility of resistance (artistic resistance) to produce a detrimental and reactive outcome. Nietzsche calls this event the return of the Same or Identity. Meanwhile, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the anti-productive spirit of disjunctive synthesis can bring forth the total breakdown of connections where an individual enters the state called catatonia (*AO* 135).

Vigilance is necessary because the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization immanent in artistic resistance constantly carry the perils of producing reactive and destructive consequences, identities, and relations. The danger lies in the possibility of restoring transcendence or utopia. As Deleuze and Guattari explain: “In utopia (as in philosophy) there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias” (*WP* 100). In a way, we cannot blame them for saying that utopia is not the right concept to be associated with fabulation. However, the politicization of fabulation constitutes a people with a new function—artistic resistance.

In this sense, it is an imperative to rethink the concept of ‘utopia.’ This concept, in Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, does not automatically direct us to transcendence. Such a clarification licenses us to discuss utopia and fabulation without the quicksand of transcendence. In my view, a politicized fabulation expressed through resistance posits a new kind of utopia that is immanent and revolutionary. In fact, it is philosophy’s Promethean task to “take the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, *turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people*” (*WP* 99). Such a creative and revolutionary beckoning, which emerges from philosophy’s absolute deterritorialization, is also called utopia and revolution.⁴³

Moreover, the plane of immanence serves as the milieu for the absolute deterritorialization of thought. In other words, this plane—*contra* the plane of transcendence, serves as the very soil of philosophy. Philosophy cannot merely stay at the ivory tower of knowledge. As Zarathustra argues in the “Preface” of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: “You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine?... Like you, I must *go down* as the human beings say, to whom I want to descend. Behold!... This cup wants to become empty again, and Zarathustra wants to become human again” (Nietzsche 1969, 1). Although written figuratively, Zarathustra’s principle of going-under parallels with the imperative for thought, as a form of absolute deterritorialization, that is, to be within human grasp. Similarly, thought must maintain a continuous

and creative relationship with relative deterritorialization whose milieu is history and whose concern deals with material configurations and societal contingencies. However, thought's gap with society can only be bridged by utopia. Taking a cue from Deleuze and Guattari, "it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political" (*WP* 99).

As explicated earlier, relative reterritorialization entails a principle of territory or dwelling where the actual people live and interrelate. Because it involves actual people, then it can be said that politics in the traditional sense is hospitable to the actual people. Given its historico-empirical characteristics, relative deterritorialization is a form of immanent politics inseparable from thought's directive—"revolution." As Deleuze and Guattari accentuate, "Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people" (*WP* 101). At the plane of thought, revolution is an Event that radically engages and intervenes in the capitalist-regulated status quo. Specifically, it rekindles people's deadened critical impulse and power of resistance that are subtly yet forcefully debased by capitalism. Micropolitical interventions, therefore, are formulated to antagonize the present capitalist grain.

The virtual people is the absolute reterritorialization adequate to thought. Distinct from relative deterritorialization (capitalism) and reterritorializations (democracy), the deterritorialization of such a mode "does not preclude a reterritorialization but posits it as the creation of a future new earth" (*WP* 88).⁴⁴ While reterritorialization entails a dwelling and an actual people, absolute deterritorialization implies a virtual earth and people. In addition, absolute deterritorialization allows us to conceive of revolution and utopia instantaneously. According to Deleuze and Guattari:

[T]o say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, re-launching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed" (*WP* 100).⁴⁵

To delve deeper into Deleuze and Guattari's notion of revolution or becoming-revolutionary, I deem it necessary to distinguish it from other traditional interpretations of revolution. But before proceeding to such a task, some important guideposts must be mentioned: their preference for the schizophrenic process of permanent revolution than the schizophrenic itself,

and their theorization of the principle of becoming-minoritarian as being dynamically in-between the majoritarian and the minoritarian.

Reformers call themselves revolutionaries. First, for conservative ones, revolution involves the noble restoration of particular values that people of a given society cherish such as freedom, justice, and equality. It can likewise be seen as a restoration of a lost societal cohesion and communal solidarity. In other words, these men pursue revolution to reclaim a lost unity in society, as well as in other subsocietal or institutional spaces such as the family and the school. In the Deleuzo-Guattarian political project, this brand of struggle is problematic by virtue of its presupposition that society is a generalized striated space or closed system. Initially, reformers believe that it is possible to go back entirely to a previous mode of existence or state of affairs, as if a resurgence of the Renaissance Period, or the Philippine's EDSA I Revolution is possible.⁴⁶ The failure of reformers to profoundly comprehend reality as pure difference disables them to think of the 'outside,' that is, to become a creative and nomadic machine that can subject the closed system into a process of becoming-minoritarian/other.

Based on Deleuze and Guattari's proclivity toward the schizophrenic process and becoming-minoritarian, the populist claim of the reformers that they are genuine acolytes of revolution is valid. Of course, a follower of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy would immediately disagree with my argument on the reason that a return to a lost unity as the goal of revolution contradicts their entire philosophical project. However, I deem it necessary to clarify that there exists a distinction between the concepts of 'revolution' and 'becoming-revolutionary' in their political philosophy.

Revolution pertains to those collective struggles ending in societal decline and duress like those initiated by Lenin, Stalin, and Cromwell. According to Deleuze, "They say revolutions turn out badly. But they're constantly confusing two different things, the way revolutions turn out historically and people's revolutionary becoming. These relate to two different sets of people. Men's only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable" (*N* 171). In this vein, conservative reformers are forerunners of revolution and not becoming-revolutionary. Because these men are incarcerated in the old tablet of values and ideals of their society, they become incapacitated in thinking creatively and in fashioning the emergence of new collective assemblages that would equip them in confronting the intolerable—the ever-evolving capitalist system. As a result, what becoming-revolutionary entails "is becoming creative. It entails tapping into a line of flight,

shamelessly asking the right questions, in order to transform the system or assemblage of power” (Bell 2003, 22).

It must be noted at this juncture that, while there are several kinds of utopia, the same is true with being a reformer. While there are conventional reformers, there are also some whose initiatives can be described as either liberal or radical. The difference between a liberal from a conservative reformer is that the former struggles for the actualization of a higher kind of existence in the future. Rather than seeking for the renaissance of past unity or traditional ethical practices, the liberal reformer aims for the creation of a better state of affairs and more just institutions through painstaking, deliberative, and constitutional procedures, than that of the past. In *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Rawls claims that one of the purposes of his philosophy of liberalism is to demonstrate the limits of democracy, especially when a particular society is characterized by “profound and irreconcilable differences in citizen’s reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions of the world” (Rawls 2001, 3).⁴⁷ Rawls commendably depicts the limits of democracy as a form of societal principle. Although his version of liberalism is better than that of the conservatives, his political philosophy does not allocate a space for the principle of the virtual. On the contrary, Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is informed by the creation of new concepts and the mapping of a people-and world-to-come. As Patton opines in *Deleuzian Concepts*, Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, specifically in *What is Philosophy?*, “presents a conception of the political vocation of philosophy with far more radical conception than those acknowledge in Rawls’ realistic utopianism” (Patton 2010, 187).

Furthermore, there is a more radical kind of reformer that resembles the liberal reformer’s future-oriented perspective. Marx calls for the realization of a communist society that would obliterate and overcome all preexisting hierarchies, contradictions, and estrangements authored by modern capitalism. Indeed, his definition and analysis of capitalism as an immanent system capacitated in fashioning its own limits remains as one of the most comprehensive and important characterizations of capitalism for Deleuze and Guattari. However, the teleological inclinations of Marx’s notion of revolution, in conjunction with its radical engagement with the capitalist system only at the majoritarian level of class, consciousness, State, and ideology, tarnish his overall revolutionary project. Like any class-based, teleological, and macropolitical revolution, it will just lead to perdition because it disregards the repressions, tensions, and connections that occur at the micropolitical level, where repression and fascism are the strongest and the most inimical.

Marx's theorization of capitalism as an immanent, dynamic, and self-reflexive system remains relevant to the study of society at present. From a micropolitical perspective, however, one of the rudimentary blunders of Marxism is its misrecognition that repression occurs at the historical milieu where individuals themselves, as Reich puts it, desire their own repression. Consequently, the fascists within individuals themselves are dynamically cultivated. Unless Marxism starts at the molecular segments of individuals as its object of critique, then it will always end up astray.⁴⁸ The same applies if we want to radically transfigure capitalism. In fact, the shattering of closed and disciplinary spaces in today's time, including the grand narratives about history, politics, literature and the like, also leads to the dispersal of microfascism or oedipalization at various molecular spaces. The capitalist adversary becomes more fluid, ambulant, and potent with the advent of the control society, which assumes its new appearance in the contemporary period.

Notes

¹ While geophilosophy was formalized in Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy?*, the said immanent philosophy was already elucidated in *A Thousand Plateaus*.

² See (Chisholm 2007).

³ See (Cohen and Stewart 1994) and (Gleick 1987).

⁴ Cf. (*ATP* 49).

⁵ See for instance (de Landa 1992; de Landa 2000; Massumi 1992). In this book, the discussion of complexity theory is only operational. I only provide a brief discussion of it because my primary goal is to show complexity theory's political dimension that summons a new earth and people—faithful to Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of philosophy as the creation of concepts that would radicalize the present toward a world- and people-to-come.

⁶ For example, deterritorialization is a concept entangled with reterritorialization in all social fields. Deleuze and Guattari describe it in *What is Philosophy?*: “The merchant buys a territory, deterritorializes products into commodities and reterritorialized on commercial circuits” (*WP* 68). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they differentiate the four kinds of deterritorialization, namely positive, negative, absolute, and relative (See *ATP* 508–510).

⁷ See also de Landa's criticism of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy in relation to the statement above in de Landa's *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* (see de Landa 2002).

⁸ See (Jarvis 1998, 75).

⁹ Cf. (Papadopoulos 2010, 76).

¹⁰ See (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 10).

¹¹ See (Adosto 2019).

¹² The project was originally written by Deleuze alone; but it underwent comprehensive revisions during his collaborative years, especially after the publication of *A Thousand Plateaus*. As described by the biographer Francois Dosse, *What is Philosophy?* is “both a very personal project and something of a crowning moment in a philosopher’s life” (Dosse 2010, 456).

¹³ See (*ATP* 39–74).

¹⁴ Cf. (Braudel 1985).

¹⁵ See (Bonta and Protevi 2004, 92–93).

¹⁶ See (Adorno 1973).

¹⁷ See (Müller 2016, 2–3).

¹⁸ Quoted from (Müller 2016, 3).

¹⁹ See (Heydarian 2018).

²⁰ For a colonial genealogy of the Filipinos’ triumphalist or fundamentalist attitude, see for example (Rafael 1988).

²¹ In *Beyond Good and Evil* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, for example, it can be observed how Nietzsche explains how modern nihilism or Christian morality engenders the degeneration of modern humanity and how it can be overcome. See (Nietzsche 1961; Nietzsche 1969).

²² See (Heidegger 1996).

²³ Aside from the definition of monumental history, Nietzsche also distinguishes it from antiquarian (history for history’s sake) and critical (academic/museum) history.

²⁴ Although Deleuze’s usage of the term fabulation is Bergsonian in origin, such a term only appeared in *Cinema 2*, where it is understood as a kind of narration or storytelling closely associated to the powers of the false. See (*C2* 2, 150–155).

²⁵ See (Bergson 1954); cf. (Bogue 2005, 99).

²⁶ Cf. (Bergson 1954, 109).

²⁷ Similarly, even if much of the arts are already commodified nowadays, the fact remains that it can still expose societal ills and contradictions, and in doing so, create spaces for radical interventions and transformation.

²⁸ See (Bergson 1954, 205).

²⁹ See (Bergson 1954, 74).

³⁰ See (Bogue 2006, 202).

³¹ According to Deleuze and Guattari, “Even in the least autobiographical novels we see the confrontation and intersection of the opinions of a multitude of characters ... in accordance with the perceptions and affections of each character with his social situation and individual adventures, and all of it swept up in the vast current of the author’s opinion” (*WP* 170).

³² Despite Heidegger’s valorization of the role of art in politics and in constituting a people, the fact remains that his acceptance of a Rectorship responsibility in a Nazi-administered university is unforgivable and contradictory to his overall existentialist doctrine. See (Mengué 2008, 225).

³³ Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the actual and the virtual people is influenced by Bergson’s distinction between the actual and the virtual. This distinction in kind essentially informs the overall Deleuzian ontology of becoming.

³⁴ In the contemporary period, the Occupy Movement radicals and the initiatives of Edward Snowden, in my perspective, resemble the best examples of this the principle of becoming-minoritarian. One may also look at the ‘Million-People March,’ which sporadically occurred in the Philippines in 2013.

³⁵ Deleuze and Guattari further add: “It is not always easy to be Heideggerian. It would be easier to understand a great painter or musician falling into shame in this way (but, precisely, they did not). It had to be a philosopher, as if shame had to enter into philosophy itself. He wanted to rejoin the Greeks through the Germans, at the worst moment in their history: is there anything worse, said Nietzsche, than to find oneself facing a German when one was expecting a Greek?” (*WP* 109).

³⁶ See (Mengue 2008, 230).

³⁷ Deleuze and Guattari’s proclivity toward the virtual people in relation to politics can be seen in some of their writings both individually and in collaboration. One example is 1979 ‘Open Letter to Negri’s Judges’. See (*TRM* 167–169).

³⁸ See (Guattari 2011, 107–148).

³⁹ Deleuze and Guattari describe the refrain as a musical concept: “Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially territorial, territorializing, or reterritorializing, music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression” (*ATP* 300).

⁴⁰ Cf. (Mengue 2008, 232).

⁴¹ Moreover, according to Guattari, “The deterritorialization of his *Umwelt* has led man to invent diagrammatic operators such as faciality and refrain enabling him to produce new machinic territorialities” (Guattari 2011, 120).

⁴² See (Rancière 2013).

⁴³ See (*WP* 100–101).

⁴⁴ Cf. (Mengue 2008, 228–229).

⁴⁵ For Ernst Bloch, utopian thinking is the normative foundation for revolutionary hope. Utopian thinking is a kind of creative anticipatory consciousness where the still-to-come is conceived differentially. In addition, he notes that the emancipatory potential is not limited to the oppressed, but located in culture. Cultural heritages, which are marginalized by dogmatic Marxists, can also render us utopian images of liberation implanted within the hopes, dreams, and historical struggles of different cultural groups. See (Bloch 1988).

⁴⁶ According to Rigoberto Tiglao, “The EDSA Revolution restored the power of our oligarchs, and the country’s oligarchic structure created by colonial powers, and of course, its ideological superstructure, Spanish Catholicism.... No wonder we have been unable to undertake even the weakest program for population control, making us the Asian country with the fastest-growing population—of mostly poor people.... The cronies and big-business supporters of the dictator, years after EDSA, regained their seats in politics, business, and even media (Tiglao 2013).

⁴⁷ Cf. (Patton 2010, 187).

⁴⁸ Although Marx speaks of the emancipatory potentials of the proletariats, Deleuze and Guattari think that revolution can be launched by anyone regardless of class, race, and gender because oppression is no longer limited to the factory.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EMPIRE AND CARTOGRAPHIES OF SUBVERSION

A. The Control Society and the Dystopian Features of Empire

In the 18th and 19th centuries, discipline and punish were concerned with the practices of surveillance and policing.¹ These forms of disciplinary control augment the production of novel subjectivities and discursive formations. In Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, he demonstrates how institutions such as the prisons, schools, and hospitals convert into apparatuses of social control and subjugation. Surveillance in the disciplinary society is often built into the institution's physical architecture structured to develop and normalize political visibility. It is expressed via the proliferating practices of examination, among others, whereby it transforms into a regulative site of domination by spatially organizing subjects to be presented as objects of observation in the corpus of knowledge. This novel kind of technology or what Foucault terms as disciplinary power renders amplified control and atomization.² However, the contemporary epoch is already governed by the societies of control. This transition from the disciplinary society to the control society is not a simple socio-structural change because the modern disciplinary scheme of modulation and social relations has deteriorated and been annihilated.

The aforementioned transformations are conditioned, if not amplified, by the emergence of globalization—a self-evolving principle and force. As it progresses, the globalization project surmounts its maiden formulation of simply referring to an encompassing economic activity that deals with the dynamism of financial markets. It has gained a life of its own as it becomes a protean cultural process capable of transfiguring various territories, identities, and valuations. Additionally, globalization expands human capacities as it effaces national borders, mobilizes individuals, and frees ideas from egotistical incarcerations.³

Control society has radically emerged in the postwar years, side-by-side with the rise of globalization.⁴ As a new mode of control, the former has pervaded and mutated in the different constellations of the latter from the highly technical activities in the academe, contractualization of workers, and transnational exchanges to the degradation of the environment. In all these circumstances, the individual is caught up in this entropy of rapid human mobilizations, cultural productions, and socio-political totalizations. The objectification of individuals is not anymore reduced to the spaces of enclosure of the school or the asylum. Rather, it is overlappingly distributed in various social spaces operating as a free-floating brand of surveillance by virtue of cybertechnology. Moreover, the control society redefines conventional principles, practices, and relations through accelerated and interconnected networks of control. For example, it liberates power from its incarceration in autonomous spaces, accompanied by augmented integration into our everyday living; in the same vein, it frees labor from its material and economic configuration, hence the emergence of immaterial labor.⁵ In the language of Deleuze:

The various placements of confinement through which individuals pass are independent variables: we're supposed to start all over again each time, and although all these sites have a common language, it's *analogical*. The various forms of control, on the other hand, are inseparable variations, forming a system of varying geometry whose language is digital. Confinements are *molds*, different moldings, while controls are modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another (*N* 178–179).

Michael Hardt's essay "The Withering of Civil Society," furnishes a significant analysis of the society of control. For him, the emergence of the control society must be perceived as a "generalization of the logics that previously functioned within these limited domains across the entire society, spreading like a virus" (Hardt 1998, 31). In other words, this period is characterized by a totalization of the logic of capitalist administration and production, which, from reaching its actualization in the factory, can currently be found in every form of social production (Hardt 1998, 33).

The dislocatory aptitude of advanced capitalism obliterates traditional forms of linkages, local belongings, and kinship structures (Critchley 2007, 116). In this regard, oppression surmounts the confines of the factory, and more importantly, the seat of revolution is no longer proletarianized and/or geographical. Because capitalist practices, processes,

and domination have permeated in all social spaces and material life, then all individuals become potential revolutionaries—provided that this optimism is constantly guided by prudence, criticality, and creativity.

The control society has successfully integrated itself into the social corpus. Currently, registration, licensing, and accreditation are required by various government agencies and other institutions from individuals and organizations. These regulatory mechanisms are implemented and circulated through the Internet's rhizomic networks in pursuit of ascending and limitless proximity, magnitude, and scope in all societies. In the case of China, the government's mode of surveillance such as cyberpolicing, has already been incorporated into the Chinese way of life. More importantly, China has progressively funded, developed, acquired, and fielded advanced cybertechnology in its government, and military and civil sectors since 1991 (Spade 2012, 3). This is a necessary effort on China's part whose goal is to endorse economic and geopolitical expansion, as well as cultivate a cyberwarfare capacity—an asymmetric means to embattle other belligerent countries, especially the superpower blocs such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The Chinese government is cognizant of the fact that cyberspace is a new arena of struggle and agonism, and that cyberpower now ranks with land, sea, and air power in terms of military strength, victory, or defeat (Miller and Kuehl 2009, 2).

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri provide a comprehensive elaboration, historicization, and analysis of the control society. The radical emergence of the control society, or 'Empire' in Hardt and Negri's terminology, is coextensive with the enormous hegemony of advanced capitalism. In a world under the capitalist duress, the forces of antiproduction consider the market as the substratum of operation and the capital as the overarching regulatory principle. According to Hardt and Negri:

Capital works on the plane of immanence, through relays and networks of relationships of domination, without reliance on a transcendent center of power. It tends historically to destroy traditional boundaries, expanding across territories and enveloping always new populations within its processes. Capital functions, according to the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, through a generalized decoding of fluxes, a massive deterritorialization, and then through conjunctions of these deterritorialized and decoded fluxes (Hardt and Negri 2000, 326).

Conventional boundaries such as the dichotomy between private and public spaces, no longer exist. The demarcation between the private and

the public is immensely important to the overall political philosophy of Arendt. She argues that the private realm (*oikos*) is the site where people cultivate their biological necessities. Individuals can only engage into free and genuine political activities in the public realm when they are already capable of mastering and overcoming their natural necessities such as the preservation of one's existence.⁶ However, the 38th parallel preexisting between these spaces has already vanished. With the emergence of nation-states, the survival of the populace—the perennial preoccupation of the private realm, becomes a social responsibility of the social-welfare state.⁷ For Arendt, the socialization of the private realm unfortunately entails the demise of politics.

Whereas Arendt is pessimistic about the dissolution of the demarcation between private and public spaces, Hardt and Negri (like Deleuze and Guattari) maintain an ambivalent stance on this contentious issue. While it is true that the obliteration of modern autonomous spaces brings forth undesirable consequences, it likewise opens doors for a plethora of revolutionary possibilities. The unrelenting construction of shopping malls, as well as the ballooning existence of paid parking areas and gated communities attest to the reality that the public space is already privatized at present. Instead of losing hope, contemporary theorists such as Badiou and Agamben, join Hardt and Negri in claiming that this ill-fated moment should rather inspire us to create a purely radical politics of immanence against the backdrop of Empire's ubiquity and monstrosity.⁸

The demise of modern social spaces also radicalizes the domain of economic production. The transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist mode of production or economic organization decimates the boundaries between a nation-state and another nation-state, as well as the factory and home. Consequently, production is deterritorialized or labor is decentered from major capitalist markets such as the US and is dissipated in other regions, especially in Third World countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. As Paul Passavant adds, the post-Fordist model of production subsisting in the Empire “also makes use of a mobile workforce such as Mexican farm workers in California, or Palestinian or Pakistani engineers in the Middle East oil industry, or Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong, or New York financiers in London” (Passavant 2004, 7). Although resembling the face of enormous power and influence in the past, the United States of America's transnational dispersion of labor already attests to its subordination to the Empire. As Hardt and Negri explain:

The tendential realization of the world market should destroy any notion that today any country or region could isolate or delink itself from global networks of power in order to re-create

the conditions of past and develop as the dominant capitalist countries once did. Even the dominant countries are now dependent on the global system; the interactions of the world market have resulted in a generalized disarticulation of all economies. Increasingly, any attempt at isolation or separation will mean only a more brutal kind of domination by the global system, a reduction to powerlessness and poverty (Hardt and Negri 2000, 284).⁹

Deterritorialized production is circulated in high velocity through novel communication and circulation networks in a global scale. What is likewise new is the production of anonymous, hybrid, and mobile labor force and subjectivities. The Empire's fecund apparatus consists of unified networks that totalize all singularities in the guise of various micropolitical interventions. Amidst this carceral machinery, individuals are turned against each other by upholding simulated cultural differences. This strategy is executed to dishearten all kinds of resistance toward the system. After creatively estranging people, it unremittingly modifies and mutates itself into molecular fashions by even engineering pseudo-redemptive options for them. Indeed, Empire is "a very high-tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organized to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of digital and robotic production)" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 39).

It is only when people are convinced that they are deficient of something such as economic stability, human-rights valorization, national security, and the latest military technology that they can be swayed to consume and produce at the escalating rate the capitalist system requires (Hardt and Negri 2000, 336). There are times when Empire fashions or exaggerates world crises to forge more dependence. In Holland's view, "the debt owed to the capital remains, like that of despotism, infinite, but the system of antiproduction under capitalism has become immanent to the system of production, and has its motive force only further production of surplus-value for its own sake" (Holland 1999, 79). Therefore, consumption (surplus-value's realization) must not be seen as an end in itself but as the means of securing a sustainable capital of reinvestment for social production's incoming cycle.¹⁰ To be specific, Third World Countries are systemically subjugated by Empire by virtue of politico-economic indebtedness that surpasses nation-state borders.

Moreover, the control society or Empire has intensely developed since the Digital Technology or the Internet's advent. From its early inception as a separate and free space, cyberspace has been reconstructed as

the extension of the control society or Empire's malleable fortress. Power in cyberspace entails the ability of countries to connive and subordinate themselves to Empire so as to establish control and exert influence within and through a cyberspace, in support of and in conjunction with the other domain-elements of global supremacy (Spade 2012, 2). This phenomenon becomes possible when the State has adequate resources for this kind of expansion such as the United States of America and China.

From its customary weaponries, Empire fashions organized forms of networked computers, telecommunication infrastructures, and virtual intellectuals. As an innovative realm, the cyberspace reformulates a new hub or device of control where modulation and automation are more subtle and nuanced. As previously argued, the control society or Empire's landscape is digitally extended and perpetually manifested via communication channels. Hence, cyberspace functions as a fecund location for the inestimable advancement of capitalist dominion. Its artificial omnipotence is justified because "it is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, suppressing all alternative paths" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 347). Notwithstanding its nonterritoriality, Empire infinitely regulates global territories and populace, as well as fashions its own virtual terrain, roughly like the Uber Taxi Business, which does not even own an actual transportation vehicle.

The control society digitalizes individuals through credit cards and social security numbers, thus making these quantifications more relevant than the cultural values encompassing ourselves. Accordingly, from the disciplinarity located in our corporeal bodies, the new site of control becomes our incorporeal profiles and what Berardi refers to as the 'soul' (language, creativity, affects).¹¹ In *Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*, Berardi profoundly asserts that the rise of the post-Fordist scheme of production or 'Semiocapitalism' takes the soul as its primary tool for the production of value.¹² Semiocapitalism is originally taken from Guattari's philosophical vocabularies such as 'capital is a semiotic operator' that 'seizes individuals from the inside'¹³ whose goal is the utter control of society. For Gary Genosko, Guattari's statements posit adjacent insights that inaugurate semiocommodity: "situate subjectification at the heart of a subsumption that has turned intensive, thus marking the passage from an incorporative, formal to a real subsumption; and pose the question of resistance within a predicament of massive control that is only superficially blamed on machines (surveillance)" (Genosko 2012, 149).¹⁴

The control society's cunning totalization of digital or cybertechnology's revolutionary potentials and of people's incorporeal

lives ushers the cultivation of a new kind of sensibility. Linguistically speaking, sensibility is a human faculty that capacitates us to comprehend nonverbal languages or semiotic fluxes. Psychologically, it allows us to become emphatic with our fellowmen and to the environment. In my view, empathy is likewise an ethical characteristic, and not merely psychological. However, regardless of our differing views, I agree with Berardi's observation that both the aforesaid human capacities (along with other human capabilities) are already pathologized in the time of control society or semiocapitalism.

Children's formative years are shaped by recurrent engagement with infomachines (from YouTube channels in their iPads, for example).¹⁵ The impoverishment of people's faculties, which can lead to autism in the case of children, is the aftermath of their technical communication with virtual signs and entities.¹⁶ This new and complex experience of estrangement catalyzes the precarity of existence in the period of control society. As Berardi explains:

Precariousness is not only the condition of labor in the age of global deterritorialization, but it is also the fragmentation of the social body, the fracturing of self-perception and of the perception of time. Time no longer belongs to the individual, and the capitalist no longer buys the personal life of individuals; instead, people are erased from the space of work, and time is turned into a vortex of depersonalized, fragmentary substance that can be acquired by the capitalist and recombined by the network-machine (Berardi 2015b, 49–50).

Speaking of labor in the time of precarity, Hardt and Negri share with Berardi's pessimism that immaterial labor or the computerization and informatization of production results in the "real homogenization of laboring processes" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 292). In other words, the deterritorialization of production or the decentralization of labor in the age of the control society, implies the centralization of control and modulation. In Berardi's perspective, immaterial labor can be "transferred, fragmented, fractured, and recombined" (Berardi 2015b, 54) in the abstract and virtual realm of cybertechnology by virtue of its imaginative and informational attributes.

Despite cybertechnology's revolutionary or infinite capabilities in the realm of production, brain functions, and stamina are still configured in the physical body of cognitive workers, and as such remain fragile: "these are the limits of attention, of psychic energy, of sensibility. While networks have produced a leap in the speed and in the very format of the info-sphere,

there has not been a corresponding leap in the speed and format of mental reception.... [H]uman brains are not formatted according to the same standard as the system of digital transmitters” (Berardi 2015b, 54.). Consequently, depression is experienced by individuals when the accelerated production of surplus-value and the intricacy of information flow, as well as the inhumane pressures of production forcibly overpower the human or social brain.

Cyberculture’s global ascendance aggravates the control society’s despotic assimilation of all material and nonmaterial goods. The so-called information highway is converted into a system of disinformation resulting in a kind of information estrangement. The development of the internet freeway is a paradoxical depiction of this.¹⁷ Its invincibility is greatly augmented by dispersed strategies of advanced panoptic devices such as electronic bugs, geographic positioning system (GPS), wireless tracking techniques, and any other fine-grained data-mining software. Of course, these rather fabulous technologies mask the pretext of new yet more perilous disorienting values that persuade people to embrace the digital trend in a socially universalizable fashion.¹⁸

Cyberspace is currently a puppet to the monstrous force perpetrated by Empire. It is totalized by an assemblage of machineries powered by multinational corporations such as Amazon and eBay, acting as mouthpieces for geopolitical amplification and supremacy. In this case, the more the global issues of human-rights violations and terrorism aggravate, the more the control society’s spirit in several societies gains rather normative justifications and infrastructural concretization, both socially and virtually (Deibert 2012, 92). Its indomitable and nontraditional invisibility allows the Empire’s global access, transcendence, and manipulation over the hoard of information circulating in cyberspace. Amidst Empire’s reign, people actualize as participants and victims altogether. Spatialization of knowledge is accompanied by information supervision and business procedures, which harmonize with the individual’s systematization through computer technology.¹⁹ Connection in communication is not only like a line between the transmitter and the receiver, but it is also like a web trapping us within, because to connect is to plug in (Cheng 2008, 24).

B. Neoliberal Capitalism, ASEAN Integration Project, and the Demise of Education

The bourgeoisie took the decline of the USSR in 1991 as an opportunity to redefine liberalism in purely economic terms. From being understood traditionally as a political theory of society, liberalism was ingenuously

utilized as an economico-ideological device to gain political leverage over feudal lords. This event spawned the phenomenon of ‘neoliberalism’—an occurrence that fuels capitalism’s potency and its increasingly forceful entrenchment in the global village.

Neoliberalism is a theory of “political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (Harvey 2007, 22). In the course of time, it has become hegemonic and generalized in all aspects of contemporary life in the form of neoliberal democracy (Harvey 2007, 23). Additionally, in her essay “Capitalism Reorganized: Social Justice after Neo-Liberalism,” Albenaz Azamanova argues that neoliberal capitalism has transformed itself into a new model marked by changes in structures of political economy and political competition that, when combined, induce the deepened commodification of knowledge and labor.²⁰ Its ascendancy has instigated enormous changes in various state policies, interpersonal transactions, and domestic concerns in the form of privatization of lands, monopoly of production, contractualization of labor, and worker retrenchment, which are regulated by transnational companies.

The radical emergence of the control society is coextensive with the enormous hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari characterize one of the three adversaries of Anti-Oedipus as the “poor technicians of desire—psychoanalysts and semiologists of every sign and symptom—who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack” (*AO* xii). The spin doctors of desire or the public strategists of capitalism deceptively articulate that all its principles or policies should be accepted wholesale as important and necessary. These so-called specialists take for granted that human desire is to be interpreted as a ‘lack’ within individuals that requires clinical attention. In the global arena, economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the major pillars of neoliberal capitalism—persuade underdeveloped and developing countries that their deficiency in different resources such as financial stability, national and international security, or the latest educational reform requires immediate attention and solution. They convince these countries that the only way to solve their predicaments is through global cooperation in the form of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.²¹ Such economic policies imposed or enacted across nations or regions would, of course, render the

capitalist hegemony even more invincible and easily enfeeble or nullify all grand and traditional attempts to overthrow it. That is to say, when efforts of resistance remain archaic or uninformed by the rapid currents and complexities of the contemporary period, all of these would simply end up being absorbed by the oppressive system or merely dissipated as futile struggles.

B.1 The ASEAN Integration Project

As argued earlier, when countries allow themselves to be manipulated by organizational technicians of desires such as the IMF and the WTO, they are considered as productive players in the world economy and as epitomes of progress. The ASEAN integration project is the most recent expression of this neoliberal rubric in the Southeast Asian region.

In 1967, the ASEAN was formed by countries, namely Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As a regional organization, it aims to preserve peace and foster socio-economic and cultural cooperation among the member-countries. According to the *IBON International Policy Brief* document “ASEAN Community 2015: Integration for Whom?,” the underlying political and economic impetus that informs the ASEAN project is the prevention of the spread of Communism from China and other neighboring countries.²²

Even though the ASEAN member-countries are geographically adjacent to each other, the formative years of the organization was beleaguered by skepticism and different challenges, especially in relation to divergences in economic status, low levels of integration, and continuous dependence on foreign direct investments from highly industrialized countries. Moreover, the region had been hounded by other socio-political issues such as the ostensibly irreconcilable coexistence of national sovereignty and regional cooperation, as well as between authoritarian societies, multiculturalism, and differences in human-rights valuation.²³

These quandaries resulted in the formulation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. AFTA transformed ASEAN into a “hub of free trade agreement (FTA) networks in East Asia, thus taking the ‘driver’s seat’ in economic integration in the region” (IBON International 2015, 2). Furthermore, the ASEAN community maximizes the geoeconomic potentials of the region. Western transnational corporations have extended and relocated their procurement, production, and sale processes across ASEAN countries by virtue of the cheap labor and rich natural resources that can be found in Southeast Asia and China (IBON International 2015, 2).²⁴ With the advancement of information technology, the ASEAN region

likewise assumed the position of being the center for outsourcing services such as the business processing outsourcing (BPO) industry. At present, the *ASEAN Community 2015* seeks to assert its significance as a regional organization in the midst of global and regional economic contingencies to encourage more foreign investors by using its integrated market as leverage, as well as to guarantee its major role in shaping the different sectors of the whole region.

Three pillars serve as the backbone of the ASEAN Community: “(1) Political and Security Community (APSC), (2) Economic Community (AEC), and (3) Socio-cultural community (ASCC)” (IBON International 2015, 3). The first pillar is geared toward the promotion of order, stability, and democracy within the region, especially in relation to matters concerning defense, law, and transnational crimes. The second seeks to facilitate the ASEAN members’ economic integration, which includes the aspects of free trade, investment, and finance. The third focuses on the construction of a people-centric and socially responsible community involving the sectors of education, science and technology, as well as social welfare and development. However, the AEC overrides the others because it is directly related to the overall commitment of the ASEAN to deepen and broaden economic integration.

The AEC, as a very significant pillar of the ASEAN, further envisions the realization of four fundamental goals that can be achieved by virtue of “the liberalization of trade in goods, services, and investments: (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy” (IBON International 2015, 5). By virtue of this neoliberal capitalist pursuit, the ASEAN creates a single market and production base that would regulate the movement of goods, skilled labor, and professionals. The ASEAN further reinforces the homogenization of its member-countries characterized by different cultures, political systems, and the like. Despite these professed goals, however, a unified voice is, in fact, impossible for the ASEAN community considering that in its draft, the ASEAN’s charter did not include national consultations and the voices of people at the grassroots. Therefore, undemocratic tendencies and practices constantly hound this regional integration.

The ASEAN’s accomplishments throughout the years, most especially its enduring effort to alleviate poverty and achieve inclusive sustainable growth within the region, are indisputably commendable. But as long as it continuously adheres to the neoliberal paradigm of development, perennial problems of its member-countries would recur incessantly or be exacerbated.²⁵

The AEC's totalization of labor and human capital is noticeably reflected in the present condition of Philippine education. Although the ASEAN aspires to be compared with the European Union, the ASEAN must not be oblivious to the idea that some of its member-states are still captives, in one way or another, by their colonial past, thereby making independence a crucial issue. Despite its understated Western and unitarian configurations, several of the ASEAN member-countries are previous colonies and are still socio-economic dependents of big powers such as the United States of America and Japan. In contrast, the member-countries of the EU are able to muster their politico-economic resources to establish a better collective position *contra* the economic supremacy of the US and Japan (IBON International 2015, 6). The EU, consisting of 28 nation-states, has its own institutions, policy agenda, and a certain level of autonomy from its component nations in the same manner that the member-nations can amend existing policies without jeopardizing its sovereignty (Geddes 2004, 56).

B.2 The K to 12 Program and the Commodification of Education

Neoliberal capitalism's creative and efficient permeation in the various aspects of contemporary life allows it to be equated with socio-economic growth. In the eyes of the economist Edberto Villegas, the binary opposites of 'strong and weak states' were exaggerated by capitalist-funded institutions and initiatives to maneuver universities, especially those of the Third World, to the economic programs of transnational corporations, which would translate to further market expansion.²⁶

As argued earlier, the IMF, the WB, and the WTO have popularized the global call for liberalization, deregulation, and privatization as advantageous, especially to countries struggling for comprehensive development and competitiveness in the international arena. Upon the approval of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 1995, transnational corporations discovered that the education sector could serve as an enduringly profitable enterprise (Villegas 2007, 25).²⁷ The global platform for rationalized privatization and deregulation diminished government subsidies, particularly in public higher education.²⁸

The university has been infiltrated by neoliberal capitalism. Transnational corporations' enormous resources enable them to effortlessly fund research and create scholarship foundations geared toward the further solidification of these corporations. These economic interests are aestheticized by the façade of academic infrastructure of promotion and faculty development, and disturbingly, several university officials are

incognizant of this ploy even as they remain impoverished chess pawns of neoliberal capitalism.

The annihilation of modern social spaces in the era of the control society gives birth to a new boss called the ‘corporation’ (N 174). All social institutions are no longer deemed as independent social apparatuses because they converge at a nebulous seat of control—the corporation. In Deleuze’s words: “Just as businesses are replacing factories, *school* is being replaced by *continuing education* and exams by continuous assessment. It’s the surest way of turning education into a business” (N 178). In fact, the emergence of the corporation does not simply supersede the government or nation as the arbiter of power and control. Rather, the current scenario depicts the merging of the corporation and the government until one becomes indistinguishable from the other.

From previously being a site for social critique and emancipatory instruction, the university has dramatically metamorphosed into a subsector of the economy. Its structure is systemically permeated by the principle of capital, and services are conditioned by purely commodified causes. For example, several of the Philippine universities are already partly or wholly owned by corporations; for instance, the National University is now under the supervision of the Sy family (corporation)—the richest family in the Philippines, and the famous owner of all the SM chain of malls in the aforesaid country.

In addition, curricula of universities and vocational courses are corporatized to cater to the needs of the market and to produce docile rank-and-file laborers. The Arts, Humanities, and Social Science courses are merged or phased out because these can foster creative and critical thinking or dissent against the status quo. In turn, STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) courses are prioritized, increased, and enhanced. Because scientific research in the academe benefits corporations such as those involving high-breed crops that would utilize fertilizers and resources produced by capitalist firms, there exists an exaggerated promotion of the natural sciences and an attendant neglect of the former disciplines.²⁹ The privileging of the sciences is the reason why more funding is extended to schools needed by Transnational Corporations (TNCs): schools of engineering in Third World Universities supply the workers for global corporations. So-called techno-parks are built on campuses—as in the case with the University of the Philippines—where private firms would have first access to good graduates and could sell their products to school authorities (Villegas 2007, 24).

A component of the ASEAN integration project is the Commission on Higher Education’s (CHED) implementation of the Memorandum Order

No. 20, known as the ‘K to 12’ Educational Program. This program is mandated through the Republic Act 10533 (The Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013) enacted on 15 May 2013. In the newly formulated and improved educational program, a student is required to undergo kindergarten, six years of elementary education, four years of junior high school, and two years of senior high school. In the academic year 2016–2017, the nationwide implementation of the K to 12 Program began with the institution of the Grade 11 curriculum.

K to 12’s goal is to develop a holistic 21st-century Filipino who can respond to the challenges of the global village. Its adherents resemble what Deleuze and Guattari call the technicians of desire who diagnose the country’s educational problems in terms of a ‘lack’—a symptom that must be remedied immediately. These strategists proclaim the narrative that our educational system is lagging behind other ASEAN nations, which is why the K to 12 is an urgent necessity. According to them, the ten-year educational cycle is insufficient by virtue of its congested curriculum and deficit in the fundamental skills and maturity for employment that it provides its high-school graduates. The additional two years in secondary education are said to prepare students for vocational jobs such as food processing, dressmaking, welding, and the like. The former CHED Commissioner, Patricia Licuanan, admitted that not all students should go to the tertiary level. According to her:

We don’t think that every student should go to college. There are very good programs in the technical and vocational areas or in the area of middle-level skills, and you get jobs when you finish these programs. That option of going into technical-vocational and middle-level jobs is attractive, but in our culture, we have that notion that everyone should get a college diploma. I don’t think that’s necessary (Bencito 2015).

However, although this techno-vocational scheme is promptly rewarding and economically promising, especially for poor Filipinos, it could vitiate or decimate genuine educational reform, comprehensive curriculum instruction, and critical pedagogy, as well as prepare students to become mere technocrats or servants-in-the-making.

Furthermore, in the domain of faculty development, nonpermanent teachers and staff in higher education were retrenched and displaced, e.g., the case of Miriam College. In fact, as early as 2014, various colleges and universities such as the University of Santo Tomas, Adamson University, and St. Scholastica’s College have already informed their faculty members about this matter.³⁰ Around 15,000 faculty members and 11,000 personnel

were affected either by retrenchment, redundancy, or early retirement during the transition period.³¹

Concurrent with the predicaments of the K to 12 program are other educational policies from CHED and infrastructures imposed by global and regional organizations that perpetually and systemically transfigure the internal landscape of the university to become a prototypical corporate workplace. Interpersonal relations are reduced to thing-like relations. For instance, there is a growing obsession among faculty members regarding international publications. *Prima facie*, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this practice. What makes it problematic is that some people even pay fees charged by journal bodies for their articles to be published. Sadly, this practice is performed merely for the sake of rank promotions or out of purely economic reasons. The desire to be read by the local academic community, as well as the goal to push the frontiers of knowledge and create the building blocks of qualitative societal change are besieged by the neoliberal capitalist project of commodifying the research culture and, perhaps, the whole educational system.

Lastly, another important issue is the nationwide implementation of the Outcome-based Education (OBE) in Philippine colleges and universities since 2012. After a year, the University of Santo Tomas, one of the premier universities in the Philippines, shifted to OBE curriculum in Academic Year 2013 to 2014. Up until now, the so-called “Student-centered Learning” slogan of OBE remains as an abstract reality, for it merely marginalizes quality over quantity, as well as privileges fixed outcomes (processes and results) over creative possibilities.

The OBE disregards the reality that not all subject courses are measurable under a one-size-fits-all category. Unlike the STEM-related subjects, the Humanities courses are creative, speculative, and subjective. In these subjects, the joy of learning new pedagogical technologies and possibilities, as well as discovering novel terrains of thinking, are discernibly more important than the determinate outcomes contrived by the market economy. A student of Ethics should be revered after preventing the occurrence of a crime in his or her neighborhood, even after failing a purely objective examination in the said subject. Similarly, the nobility of the architecture and engineering professions are nothing if practitioners only think of money at the expense of displacing numerous indigenous people from their ancestral lands and of engendering environmental degradation. The prestige of universities is not solely dependent on global rankings, accreditation schemes, and board exam results. The university should produce holistic individuals, not unethical employees, estranged workers, and market slaves.

C. Immanent Transvaluations and the Creation of New Weapons

The great poet Hölderlin says that where there is danger, salvation also grows. The control society's networks characterized by the rupture of disciplinary enclosures are always potential for resistance. Because power is already destabilized, then the small spaces where domination subtly operates and mutates can also be converted into spaces of molecularized resistance and minoritarian becomings. As argued in the previous chapters, minoritarian becomings engender both lines of destruction and creativity. The control society spawns manifold kinds of control and emancipatory possibilities. Aside from the fact that vigilance must always be maintained to undermine or neutralize the former, Deleuze also suggests in *Negotiations* that one must attempt to dredge assiduously and creatively for new armaments capable of engaging and antagonizing the control society's domineering aspects (N 178).

The control society or Empire's deterritorialization of capital, production and labor force also authored immanent configurations toward the creation of new revolutionary subjectivities and possibilities. The unification of the global market has produced what Hardt and Negri call 'wage emancipation'—the liberation of the masses from imperialistic servitude, as well as the exodus of laborers in the capitalist production.³² The inclusion of peasants from various social or cultural geographies in the labor force entails "new needs, desires, and demands" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 252). More importantly, their dehumanizing experiences in the new global paradigm allow them to "become infused with a *new desire for liberation*. When the new ... regime constructs the tendency toward a global market of labor power, it constructs also the possibility of its antithesis. It constructs the desire to escape the disciplinary regime and tendentially an undisciplined multitude of workers who wants to be free" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 252).

Despite the multifaceted detrimental qualities of immaterial labor, the idea of cooperation, as Marx claims in *Capital*, is immanent to the labor itself.³³ Hardt and Negri agree with Marx and opine that, "Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social surpluses take the form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic, communicational, and affective networks" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 294). In *Time for Revolution*, Negri associates the optimistic character of immaterial labor to the new mobile, hybrid, and global subject, which he calls the 'multitude.'³⁴ This new subject "is an ensemble of singularities whose life-tools is the brain and whose productive force consists in co-operation. In other words, if the

singularities that constitute the multitude are plural, the manner in which they enter into relations is co-operative” (Hardt and Negri 2000, 294).

The control society’s processes of globalization afford new possibilities and liberatory potentials. Hardt and Negri agree with Deleuze and Guattari in saying that merely antagonizing the capitalist monster is insufficient. In prudence, self-reflexivity, and creativity, the multitude should transvaluate different labor practices and capitalist processes toward new weapons and radical pathways of living. The multitude should formulate a counter-Empire or a minoritarian cultural organization constitutive of molecularized production, flows, and exchanges. This politics of liberation should start with the refusal of work in Hardt and Negri’s perspective.³⁵ In *Empire*, they however, explain the danger of this activity:

[R]efusal in itself (of work, authority, and voluntary servitude) leads only to a kind of social suicide. As Spinoza says, if we simply cut the tyrannical head off the social body, we will be left with the deformed corpse of society. What we need is to create a new social body, which is a project that goes well beyond refusal. Our lines of flight, our exodus must be constituent and create a real alternative. Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal, we need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new community (Hardt and Negri 2000, 204).

Despite its open-ended and revolutionary characteristics and significance, the refusal of work did not escape criticisms from the Marxist circle itself. For Berardi, the said radical project is devoid of creativity, which fundamentally serves as the nerve-center of autonomy. Without creativity, it is impossible to elude and be recalcitrant to the systemic and networked apparatuses of capital, especially of semiocapitalism.

From the theoretical aspect of resistance against Empire, I will now discuss the concrete events in the contemporary world fueled by the magnanimous goal of antagonizing Empire. The cyberspace is pregnant with potentialities by which an opponent might counter the US—one of the reterritorialized zones of Empire. The proto-imperialistic cyberarchitectonics of China (another conduit of Empire) is evidently oppressive. However, this opaque aspect of Chinese governmentality can also act as fuel for its radically affirmative attribute. In other words, its regimented internet culture is also a greatly potent device in antagonizing Empire’s supremacy in the entire society and cyberspace.³⁶ Because the Chinese firewall is supported by Western companies such as Cisco and

Microsoft, it would be easy to infiltrate and mutate itself within the control society so as to create possibilities of critique. One principal instance is China's banning of American YouTube services in favor of their local servers. Likewise, it has blue-penciled some television broadcasting corporations such as the BBC and CNN during the coverage of controversial issues such as its policy in Tibet and Taiwan.³⁷

One of the possible antagonisms *contra* Empire was audaciously instigated by the National Security Agency whistleblower Snowden. His gallant move makes US recurrent condemnation of China's citizenry monitoring a fiction, if not a pretense. As a hoard of information is disclosed by Snowden for public knowledge, US and even UK's intelligence are revealed to have penetrated the systems of more than 50,000 computer networks worldwide. After sharing extremely vital files with *The Washington Post's* Barton Gellman and *The Guardian*, he fled to Hong Kong in May 2013, and then received a temporary asylum in Russia in August 2013. His attempt to expose one of the most bewildering leaks of US' confidential materials makes him a suspect for espionage against America, and such aggravated an already-scorching debate over the clash between national security and online privacy, intelligence-gathering practices, and perennial policing of citizenry. In an interview with *The Guardian* newspaper, Snowden calls the Internet "the most important invention in human history, but I don't want to live in a world where there's no privacy."³⁸ He believes that encryption and the ability to be free of surveillance are fundamental rights. His valor has aided both these aforesaid newspapers in the publications of a series of classified documents specifying the government surveillance programs: "One gathers hundreds of millions of US phone records while searching for possible links to suspected terrorists abroad; the second allows the government to tap into US Internet companies' data to detect suspicious behavior that begins overseas."³⁹

In 2013, a December CNN news reported the latest leak dealing with an NSA headquarters in a UK facility. The site, now officially called Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), has 20 antennae oriented toward global communication satellites over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, Africa, and the Middle East. The said news revealed some 1,000 organizations and individuals under the NSA surveillance. This report includes email addresses and phone numbers related to the "European Commission, the government of Israel, African heads of state, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the NGO Medecins du Monde."⁴⁰ Joining the global criticism of this NSA aggrandizement and complicity by Brazil and Germany are European Commission officers from France and

Spain, calling for a blatant condemnation not only of the US but also of its member-states, specifically the UK.

Despite the Obama administration's hostile attitude toward whistleblowers, a US panel in December 2013 recommends an extensive renovation of NSA surveillance policies that include greater judicial presence and more public transparency in data collection. In a report, the panel says: "The current storage by the government of bulk metadata creates potential risks to public trust, personal privacy, and civil liberty."⁴¹ Hereafter, surveillance must be grounded in genuine security threats, approved at the highest levels.⁴²

Despite the hefty disturbance Snowden brought to the international community and the US, his resistance is equipped with the noble goal of crafting new values and possibilities. Again, in an interview with *The Washington Post*, he said: "For me, in terms of personal satisfaction, the mission's already accomplished. I already won. As soon as the journalists were able to work, everything that I had been trying to do was validated. Because remember, I didn't want to change society. I wanted to give society a chance to determine if it should change itself."⁴³

The control society or Empire's gaseous attribute discourages traditional struggles and conceptual paradigms in dealing with new global contingencies. Even the socio-political and economic protests of activists along various streets worldwide such as the Occupy Movement are now using the web for increased mobilization. An attempt to make sense of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy of becoming-revolutionary politics was spearheaded by the Occupy Movement. In his book *Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and Zapatismo*, Nail explains how the Occupy Movement epitomizes the contemporary face of Deleuze and Guattari's micropolitics. He perceives it as an unrelenting struggle geared to radically confront the dehumanizing effects of global capitalism and the democratic political representation (Nail 2012, 1). Different from past revolutionary activities, it does not adhere to traditional political rubrics where the lobbying of formal demands for negotiations and reforms are practiced. As Nail describes:

The fact that the Occupy movement has not delivered a clearly unified set of demands indicates a deeper mistrust of the very form of political representation itself that would respond to such demands.... Instead of demanding reforms from representatives or even trying to create its own representatives ... the Occupy movement has seized public space and tried to create its own form of direct democracy based on consensus decision-making, equality and mutual aid (Nail 2012, 1–2).

These opportunities necessitate the shaping of an alternative to the present political scheme of things. The alternatives posed by demonstrators are unorthodox in nature so as to elude the totalizing hands of politicians and capitalists.⁴⁴

In this vein, current critical theorizations must adapt to the time's temperament such as the creation of open-source codes, freeware and access to online resources, computer piracy, and propagation of viruses. China and Snowden's brand of resistance must not be perceived as an utter derision of the US, and much more the global Empire. In Snowden's case, his radicalization of the NSA is coupled with the intention of crafting an opportunity for its self-critique and reevaluation. In his interview, he said that "I am still working for the NSA right now. They are the only ones who don't realize it."⁴⁵ Although the ways of diagnostic resistance epitomized by China and Snowden are *prima facie* negative, they evidently offer a possible critique of the Empire's ubiquitous power and influence.⁴⁶ It must, however, be mentioned that while the radical action of Snowden could be seen as a deterritorializing act characteristic of the complexities of the present, the emancipatory space that such an act creates could still become a venue for further control and subjugation.

In a complicated time when people are guilty of ethical fascism, i.e. when they knowingly surrender their reflexivity and creativity (or soul in Berardi's jargon) to the altar of capitalist oppression, *what should contemporary revolutionaries do?* Initially, we should maintain a critical distance from the sphere of market exchange and *demos* because, as Nietzsche argues in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "the people little understand what is great, that is: the creator. But they have a sense for all performers and actors of great things" (Nietzsche 1969, 37). Because of Empire's callous and ubiquitous flagging of our critical, creative, and affective faculties, then all initiatives and philosophies that would rekindle these capacities must be meticulously examined, crafted, and launched.

If capitalist domination seems inescapable to the point that it has already oedipalized, commodified, and banalized the very language people use to relate and understand the world, then our mode of communication (the language we will create and utilize) must be unconventional, unpredictable, and self-reflexive. The multiple valences of rhizomatic pedagogies, nonformal educational practices, paracademic initiatives, for instance, can serve as revolutionary weapons against the professionalization and standardization of education. As Deleuze explains, "Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They're thoroughly permeated by money and not by accident but by their very nature. We've got to hijack

speech. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (N 175). The radical effort to render the becoming-other of language requires us to critically engage and experiment with it, as well as to go against the flow of traditional and technical communication in order to unleash the hidden potentials of revolutionary becoming. In a broader perspective, becoming-revolutionary against Empire necessitates us to press the ‘pause’ button of our life tentatively, to disturb the monotony of everyday, and to consciously isolate ourselves from the interminable operations and processes of control and communication (Bell 2003, 30). And if all radical initiatives have already been exhausted, it is better to do nothing for the moment. Echoing Žižek in *Violence*, “Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do” (Žižek 2008, 217).

Notes

¹ See (Foucault 1975).

² Marcuse theorizes the concept of false needs as a capitalist device for continuous subjugation: “False needs are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice ... the result then are euphoria and unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisement, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category” (Marcuse 1964, 5).

³ See (Burbach 2001, 1).

⁴ ‘Control’ is “the name proposed by Borroughs to characterize the new monster” (N 178). However, Deleuze did not render an extensive explanation about the nature of Borrough’s characterization of control, thereby engendering several criticisms. See (Cheng 2008).

⁵ In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri elaborates the different characteristics of immaterial labor: “The first is involved in an industrial production that has been informationalized and has incorporated communication technologies in a way that transforms the production process itself. Manufacturing is regarded as a service, and the material labor of the production of durable goods mixes with and tends toward immaterial labor. Second is the immaterial labor of analytical and symbolic tasks, which itself breaks down into creative and intelligent manipulation on the one hand and routine symbolic tasks on the other. Finally, [it] involves the production and manipulation of affect and requires (virtual or actual) human contact, labor in the bodily mode (Hardt and Negri 2000, 293).

⁶ See (Arendt 1998, 36–37).

⁷ See (Passavant and Dean 2004, 6).

⁸ See (Badiou 2001; Agamben 1998); cf. (Passavant 2004, 7).

⁹ In the “Preface” of *Empire*, Hardt and Negri claim that “the United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European imperialist powers, but from its differences” (Hardt and Negri 2000, xix–xiv). The US and China, despite their power beyond borders, remain as Empire’s conduits.

¹⁰ See (Munro 2009).

¹¹ See (Berardi 2009).

¹² See (Genosko 2012).

¹³ See (Guattari 1995, 212); cf. (Genosko 2012, 149).

¹⁴ Furthermore, Berardi explains that: “In the sphere of digital production, exploitation is exerted essentially on the semiotic flux produced by human time at work. It is in this sense that we speak of immaterial production. Language and money are not at all metaphors, and yet they are immaterial. They are nothing, and yet ... they move, displace, multiply, destroy. They are the soul of Semiocapital” (Berardi 2015b, 48).

¹⁵ See (Berardi 2015b, 48–49).

¹⁶ See (Berardi 2015b, 48–49).

¹⁷ See (Kaufman and Heller 1998, 14–19).

¹⁸ See (Kelly and Cook 2011). In addition, Internet service providers are technologically capable of conducting a vigilant and interminable monitoring of users’ activity and access in cyberspace.

¹⁹ Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* is a useful instrument in furthering our understanding of the whole control society phenomenon.

²⁰ See (Azamanova 2010, 391).

²¹ See (Villegas 2007, 25).

²² See (IBON International 2015). Most of my explanations of the ASEAN phenomenon are derived from this important document.

²³ See (Anderson 2004).

²⁴ The financial crisis during 1997 until 1998 really disabled the ASEAN community.

²⁵ See (Africa 2006).

²⁶ See (Villegas 2007, 23).

²⁷ In the said article, Villegas accentuates that the transnational corporations under the tutelage of the GATS have engendered enormous financial havoc to Asia, Russia and Latin America from 1997 to 2007 by virtue of its global retail system.

²⁸ The World Bank is very agile in supporting the project of the Global Alliance for Transnational Education (GATE) in pressuring governments to push for the privatization of state universities or to increase tuition, which would slowly liberate governments from educational subsidies.

²⁹ See (Villegas 2007, 24).

³⁰ See (Marcelo 2014).

³¹ See (Geronimo 2014).

³² See (Hardt and Negri 2000, 252).

³³ See (Marx 1976, 439–454); cf. (Negri 1989).

³⁴ See (Negri 2013, 223). Meanwhile, Berardi terms this new subject of immaterial labor as the ‘elsewhere class’: cf. (Berardi 2015b, 78–79).

³⁵ See (Hardt and Negri 2000, 204).

³⁶ The global village is a witness of the geopolitical and cyber conflicts between two of the world's superpowers—the US and China. When the former's aircraft accidentally bombed the latter's Belgrade Embassy in 1999, Chinese hackers defaced the American government websites and American hackers responded in kind.

³⁷ See (Chang 2009).

³⁸ See (Agence France-Presse 2013).

³⁹ See (Hampson 2013).

⁴⁰ See (Lister 2013).

⁴¹ See (Rappler.com 2013).

⁴² See (Rappler.com 2013).

⁴³ See (Mullen 2013).

⁴⁴ In terms of historical influence, the Occupy Movement owes its existence to the Alter-Globalization Movement because of the latter's proposal for horizontal relationships, direct democratic practices, and multifronted struggle—famously organized by the Zapatistas of Brazil. See (Nail 2012, ix).

⁴⁵ See (Mullen 2013).

⁴⁶ Furthermore, the cyberrevolutionary group Anonymous collective is likewise an example that poses critique against some aspects of Empire. The 'hacktivist' collectivity emerged in the limelight in 2008 and 2009. Anonymous' cyberattacks are directed to websites (in the World Wide Web, Deep Web, and Dark Web) supportive of various depravities, hypocrisies, and violations, especially those involving human rights. See (Bernard 2018).

CONCLUSION

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'BECOMING-REVOLUTIONARY'

The overarching goal of this book is to formulate a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary based on Deleuze and Guattari's micropolitics. Furthermore, I elucidated how micropolitics is articulated through the philosophies of schizoanalysis, rhizomatics, becoming-minoritarian, nomadology, geophilosophy, and the analysis of the control society. After presenting and explaining the different aspects and expressions of micropolitics, I explicated how these features operate as vectors of becoming-revolutionary. I added a discussion on Deleuze and Guattari's last collaborative book *What is Philosophy?* to expound the principle of becoming-democratic as a manifestation of becoming-minoritarian and -revolutionary. Such discussion completes the Deleuzo-Guattarian politico-revolutionary project because the said book explicates the vocation of philosophy as the invention of concepts that would radicalize the status quo and eventually summon a people- and a world-to-come.

In Chapter One, I discussed and reconstructed Deleuze's philosophy and politics of difference. Deleuze's direct and indirect diagnosis of Platonism and Hegelianism prefaces his overall critique of transcendental philosophy. However, Deleuze's critical appraisal of transcendental philosophy only achieves comprehensibility in conjunction with his theorizations of immanence, subjectivity, multiplicity, and difference-in-itself, which further preface his politics of difference. From the discussion of fundamental concepts in the Deleuzian differential philosophy, I engaged with Deleuze and Guattari's theory of schizoanalysis in Chapter Two. I elucidated schizoanalysis' internal and external critique of Oedipus. I elaborated and explained the different syntheses and paralogisms of desire in the history of traditional Western philosophy. In addition, I discussed their genealogy of social production that subjects Oedipus and capitalism to historicization and critique.

From desire, the rhizome assumes the figure of the new image of thought in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy. In Chapter Three, I

explicated the importance of rhizome in minoritarian literature and politics, as well as in nomadology and becoming-minoritarian. I underscored the significance of the principle of becoming-minoritarian as a principle of prudence and revolutionary transformation. Moreover, I distinguished the nomad and the State apparatus as a foundation to Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of a history of minoritarian becomings and transversalities. Meanwhile, in Chapter Four, I discussed schizoanalysis as a principle of becoming-revolutionary or as a philosophy of therapeutic and revolutionary transformation. After explaining desiring-production's syntheses and paralogisms in Chapter Two, I elucidated schizoanalytic or permanent revolution's project of emancipation from different kinds of oedipalization and capitalist exploitation, that is, from the nuclear family to various social spaces. Specifically, schizoanalytic revolution's principal goal is to reinstate desire's molecularized, libidinal, and revolutionary potentialities toward a kind of revolution fueled by schizophrenia as a process.

In Chapter Five (a sequel to Chapter Three), I explained the principle of becoming-minoritarian as a vector of becoming-revolutionary. I started with a discussion of nomadic thought's critical and affirmative relation with becoming-minoritarian. It is because the former appeals to a revolution-to-come or virtual revolution *contra* the State apparatus or any expression of State philosophy. Becoming-minoritarian fuels the nomad because it is the very configuration of a genuine revolutionary action. The nomad is a principle capable of carving lines of flight that neither belongs to utopian spontaneity nor to the State apparatus.

Over the years, the principle of becoming-democratic becomes increasingly engaged with material realities or societal predicaments. Informed by micropolitics, becoming-democratic critically diagnoses the formations, analyses, and interpretations of laws, as well as affirmatively inspires the minoritarians in challenging majoritarian principles toward the emergence of new concepts, subjectivities, and relations. Deleuze and Guattari magnanimously acclaim the principle of jurisprudence because its very configuration parallels with the definition of philosophy as the invention of new concepts capable of challenging the status quo. In other words, acting for freedom's sake via jurisprudence is a gesture of becoming-revolutionary.

Becoming-democratic as becoming-revolutionary is not simply concerned with the unending renovation of the socius and undermining of majoritarian principles. Fueled by an ethics of the middle, it likewise underscores the value of institutional spaces and principles that would dynamically support various activities and operations in society. Unfortunately, all our revolutionary efforts are systemically challenged

with the maleficent thriving and supremacy of advanced capitalism. All democratic principles and practices are subsumed under the axiomatic of global capital. The capitalist capture of democracy transfigures becoming-democratic into an anti-democratic philosophy. Becoming-democracy’s self-critical typology promotes the democratization of societal spaces where even subaltern discourses and groups are recognized in the reformulation of laws and policies. As a form of becoming-revolutionary, philosophy creates radical concepts that can differentialize and destabilize all majoritarian codifications and capitalist-regulated democratic practices in society. Once the principle of becoming-revolutionary and the audacious conviction of philosophers, artists, and revolutionaries to antagonize the present are all totalized by capitalism, more kinds of dehumanization would damage our society. More importantly, the summoning of a virtual people and world would be adulterated.

In Chapter Six, contingency becomes the new image of thought. I explored the concept of geophilosophy and becoming-revolutionary through complexity politics, geobiosociality, and global capitalism. Subsequently, I explained geophilosophy’s relation to fabulation, the people-to-come, and the refrain. The assemblage of complexity politics, fabulation, and the virtual people, directs us to the last aspects of geophilosophy—revolutionary becoming and utopia. It is in this sense that geophilosophy becomes a protean site of becoming-revolutionary whose underlying aim is the creation of untimely concepts (against the backdrop of reductively anthropological philosophy and reality, as well as the capitalist-configured democracy, to name a few) capable of mapping a world- and a people-to-come. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words:

The object of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect history but to diagnose our actual becomings: a becoming-revolutionary that ... is not the same thing as the past, present, or future of revolutions. A becoming-democratic that is not the same as what States of law are, or even a becoming-Greek that is not the same as what the Greeks were (*WP* 112–113).

At the plane of thought, revolution or becoming-revolutionary is an Event that critically engages with the current state of affairs or with capitalist-captured socius. It reawakens people’s numbed revolutionary impulse and aptitude of resistance. In this manner, micropolitical interferences are framed to antagonize and schizophrenize the capitalist system. Whereas reterritorialization deals with a dwelling and an actual people, absolute deterritorialization involves a virtual world and people.

Unlike traditional and *passé* revolutions, becoming-revolutionary involves tapping into a line of flight, daringly asking the right questions, and fashioning active relations to radicalize all the polarities of power and blockages of flows conditioned by capitalism and all other expressions of State Philosophy.¹

Lastly, I provided in Chapter Seven, an in-depth explanation and diagnosis of the phenomenon of the control society. Because Deleuze merely provided general blueprints on the entire architecture of the control society, I reconstructed this phenomenon by interfacing it with the principles of Empire, semiocapitalism, and neoliberal capitalism, specifically the ASEAN Integration Project and the K to 12 Educational Program. Lastly, I analyzed the revolutionary potentials immanent in all spaces and zones where the control society dominates, expands, and differentializes. This is the reason why our countermeasures must be unorthodox, rhizomic, and unpredictable. As such, becoming-revolutionary demands intermittent disruptions in our life, receptivity to nonhuman materialities, and openness to virtualities. Taking a cue from Guattari, “Revolutions ... always brings surprises ... they are always unpredictable ... ‘working for revolution’ is working for the unpredictable” (Guattari 2008, 258).

Becoming-revolutionary, in addition, involves the schizophrenization of oedipalized desire in the individual, familial, societal, and cyber spectrums. Against the backdrop of Empire, becoming-revolutionary endorses and underscores the production of revolutionary desiring-machines, as well as the fashioning of nomadic concepts and molecular subversions located at the interstices of Empire. These principles and apparatuses, as Deleuze and Guattari aver, are capable of destabilizing the Empire toward a virtual world and people.

Similarly, becoming-revolutionary advocates the cultivation of new subjectivities and relations irreducible to the repressive, protean, and gaseous frontiers of Empire. Like the rhizome, these subjectivities and relations must embody heterogeneity, connectivity, and rupture. In a world characterized by economic, political, and psychological obscurities, as well as irreversible environmental maladies, these reformulated collectivities and connections must maintain a minoritarian relation to the global community of spasmic experience and accelerating mutation.

More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari’s revolutionary project is characterized by moderation and cautiousness and is prosecuted by anonymous revolutionaries such as environmentalists, hackers, and health workers, to name a few. Any political designation of a single and universal name for the true revolutionaries is undoubtedly estranged from their entire

project. Revolution is not represented by a collectivity whose attributes, objectives, and destinations are already predetermined. As a minoritarian principle, becoming-revolutionary necessitates being a “little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little guerilla” (*LS* 157–158), just sufficient to broaden the crack and obliterate blockages of flows. The sociologist Randy David, in analyzing the EDSA Revolutions, offers us one of the profoundest descriptions of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. According to him:

[I]t follows no definite timetable, has no definable organization or leadership, and follows no predetermined direction.... It draws its courage from the power of its convictions. It is inventive and free, and not constrained by dogma, political correctness or any party line. It is a moral protest elevated to an art. It is not awed by power. It stands up to power, but it disdains power. That is why it has no leaders, only symbols.... It is non-violent and highly disciplined. It is militant but never sad. Indeed, it is festive and celebratory. It is angry at times, but never aggressive. It does not only claim the high moral ground, but it also regards itself as the force of the new, the vanguard of a hopeful future (David 2002, 302-303).

Notwithstanding Snowden and the Occupy Movement’s global recognition, the revolutionary fervor that fuels their struggles and the radical inspiration that guides revolutionaries worldwide have become outdated. This makes Berardi’s question in his book *Heroes* very timely and noteworthy: “*what should we do when nothing can be done?*” (Berardi 2015b, 199–226). His question presupposes that all alternative organizations, revolutionary collectivities, and radical efforts hurled against Empire or semiocapitalism have turned amiss or have been totalized by the oppressive system itself. After all critical strategies have been exhausted, the enemy interminably mutates and fortifies itself in both molar and molecular coordinates and zones, thereby obliterating our critical, aesthetic, and emotional sensibilities. Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, Berardi claims that the task of philosophy today is to “map the territory of the mutation, and to forge conceptual tools for orientation in its ever-changing, deterritorializing territory....” (Berardi 2015a, 11).

However, any solution provided by philosophy in general and by the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy of becoming-revolutionary in particular is inescapably hunted by the possibility of being totalized into another philosophy or ontology of capitalism.² Although difficult, we must admit that philosophy cannot solve this contemporary problem alone. This self-emptying gesture liberates thinking from philosophy’s hegemonic

territoriality. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari avow in *What is Philosophy?* that philosophy, art, and science constitute the three powers of thinking capable of transfiguring life. Albeit these powers are divergent principles, life essentially involves the activity of creation, that is, the creation of concepts and virtual community (philosophy), affects and percepts (art), as well as state of affairs and functions (science). Moreover, these intellectual powers necessitate a dynamic relation “with the *No* that concerns it.... Philosophy needs a *nonphilosophy* that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs *nonart* and science needs *nonscience*” (*WP* 218, emphasis mine).

Beyond the realm of philosophy, other pathologies, directly or indirectly conditioned by Empire, do exist. Agents of ethical fascism such as populism (the ideology that produced Donald Trump and Rodrigo Duterte, to name a few) and “China,” continue to proliferate. Likewise, dire impoverishment, widespread miseducation, and other forms of social injustices continue to dehumanize countless number of people—individuals deprived of basic necessities of life, numbed in comprehending the splinter in their eyes, and incapable of imagining greater causes beyond themselves. Given these wretched conditions, it is blatantly heartless to remain unperturbed and indolent. Aside from reaching out, we should unlearn things with and from these people.³ In other words, we should willingly and critically recognize the importance of their peripheral discourses and immanent understanding of life. Organic life, by and large, is a creative assemblage of cultural geographies, emancipatory possibilities, and nonhuman materialities. More importantly, life, as Deleuze lucidly delineates, is:

[A] haecceity no longer of individuation, but of singularization ... neutral, beyond good and evil.... The life of such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other.... *A* life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects.... This indefinite life does not itself have moments ... but only between-times, between-moments.... The singularities and the events that constitute *a* life coexist with the accidents of *the* life that corresponds to it, but they are neither grouped nor divided in the same way. They connect with one another in a manner entirely different from how individuals connect (*PI* 29–30).

A life of pure immanence, of becoming-imperceptible and -minoritarian, is unquestionably the highest expression of becoming-revolutionary.

Notes

¹ See (Bell 2003, 22).

² 'Posthumanism' or 'Critical Posthumanism' is a more recent philosophical project critical of advanced capitalism. In *The Posthuman*, Rosi Braidotti argues that the human condition is in critical status because of Western philosophy's indifference to the *zoe* (nonhuman life), the complexities posed by robotic superintelligence, and advanced capitalism's cosmopolitan recomposition of man. Against these predicaments, Braidotti proposes the formulation of a new subjectivity that would confront the manifold incongruities of contemporary existence. This new configuration of subjectivity (i.e., interpersonal, embedded, embodied, affective, and responsible) would empower us to create an ethical compass to examine the kind of subjectivity and community we envision. See (Braidotti 2013). Another contemporary theory addressing the problems posed by Empire is 'Accelerationism.' In *Accelerationist Reader*, Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian claim that "Accelerationism is a political heresy: the insistence that the only radical political response to capitalism is not to protest, disrupt, or critique nor to await its demise at the hands of its own contradictions, but to accelerate its uprooting, alienating, decoding, abstractive tendencies" (Mackay and Avanessian 2014, 4).

³ See (Rancière 1991).

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