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Translation and Affect

Kaisa Koskinen

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Translation and Affect

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Translation and Affect. Essays on sticky affects and translational affective labour
by Kaisa Koskinen

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Essays on sticky affects and translational affective labour

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Acknowledgements

This volume pushed itself onto my desk and laptop at a time when I really did not have any resources for a project that required extensive amounts of free time and energy to devote to thinking, reading and writing. Perhaps because of this, it has become very dear to me, and I have developed a very affective relationship to it. The manuscript was written over several years and in the interstices of academic life. Its completion has therefore relied upon invitations that allowed me to get away from my office and everyday responsibilities and provided me with opportunities to give talks related to the topic and get feedback from different audiences. I wish to express my gratitude for these invitations to Hannu Kemppanen (University of Eastern Finland), Yvonne Lindqvist (Stockholm University), Ji-Hae Kang (KATS), Smiljana Narančić Kovač (University of Zagreb) and Estefanía Muñoz Gómez (University College Cork).

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This book builds on my earlier research. Some of this research is explicitly co-authored, all of it is a result of collaboration. I wish to thank my co-authors and colleagues in translation studies and beyond collectively for an academic ecosystem that has always been constructive and inspiring. During the writing process I have received a lot of encouragement and support. I am particularly grateful

for the enthusiasm from the field. The comments and feedback from professional translators and interpreters on many aspects of the affective in their work have given me faith in the relevance of this book project in times of self-doubt and impostor feelings. Many thanks to Pia von Essen and Tiina Kinnunen in particular for their insights and encouragement. Colleagues have read and commented draft sections of the manuscript and helped me clarify my thinking: many thanks to Tytti Suojanen, Mary Nurminen, Anne Ketola and Kristiina Abdallah. Sari Hokkanen's revision of the final manuscript was invaluable, and her incisive editorial reading improved my argumentation. Ninni Vaaranka assisted with the bibliography.

For me, this monograph is no ordinary academic book. It represents a balance sheet of my academic career, a summary of what I have accomplished and how I see my contribution to the study of translational phenomena. For long I understood it as an effort at consilience within my own oeuvre; it was only during the revision process that I realized consilience is a more extensive aim as well. I aim to bring together a number of areas and approaches in the study of translation and interpreting through the concept of affect. Given that consilience is a concept I have borrowed from the thinking of Andrew Chesterman, it seems appropriate to use this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge Andrew's extensive mentoring and influence in my academic career, from the 1990s onward. I also want to acknowledge the role of Douglas Robinson's pioneering thinking on the affective in translation in my thinking, from the lecture on the somatics of translation in 1988 – my first contact with translation theory – to his more recent publications. They still give me the same mixed sense of excitement and bafflement I felt as a first-year student in 1988, an academic affect I love and hate.

One person requires a very special acknowledgement, both for her contribution to this book project and to my academic life in general. Outi Paloposki generously read all chapters as I was progressing, some of them repeatedly. Without her positive feedback and constant encouragement, I would not have had the stamina to push this through. The same may well be true of my career. I cherish the academic sisterhood we have had over the decades, and I dedicate this book to Outi. Affectionately.

Preface

Living with translation

> It is certain, however, that to gain an exact idea of a science one must practice it, and, so to speak, live with it. That is because it does not entirely consist of some propositions that have been definitely proved. Along side of this actual, realized science, there is another, concrete and living, which is in part ignorant of itself, and yet speaks itself; besides acquired results, there are hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments so obscure that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that they sometimes dominate the whole life of the scholar.
>
> Émile Durkheim 1893/1933. *The Division of Labour in Society*.
> Clencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

The above quotation of Durkheim came my way quite accidentally, in an article by Anne Warfield Rawls (2003: 220) where she offers a critical analysis of the limited success of sociology in fully acknowledging the legacy of Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel. In the article, she sees the (then) contemporary sociology far too focused on institutional and systemic thinking; on rules, norms and beliefs, and too eager to reach generalizations to appreciate the messy details of lived situations. For her, the focus in the quotation cited above is on propositions and practices; for me, it is on "hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments". Goffman, Garfinkel and other sociologists taking a microanalytical view of social life were acutely aware of the embodied and emotional aspects of situatedness, and their analyses of everyday encounters placed the lived interaction of communication partners under close scrutiny.

According to Rawls, sociology had not, at least not by the year 2003 when the article was published, been able to overcome the false dichotomy of micro- and macroanalysis and to fully appreciate the revolutionary power of Goffman's and Garfinkel's approaches. I am not in a position to judge the validity of Rawls' 2003 argument, or to assess its relevance for today's sociology with its affect turns and practice turns. Instead, what caught my attention in the quotation, and in Rawls' discussion of sociology, were the similarities with a field closer to my heart. Translation studies, as we know the discipline today, has grown its roots in numerous directions. Some of its origins can be traced back to the (applied) linguistics of the 1950s, to the machine translation initiatives and research of the same era, and to its strong ties to the creation of multilingual international and intergovernmental organizations (the UN, the EU) and the building of training facilities for

translators and interpreters for these organizations as well as for the local needs of globalizing nations. This disciplinary history has contributed to giving the study of translation a modernist, functional and pragmatic outlook.

Histories of translation studies tend to emphasize the role of applied linguistics, to give translation studies a longer historical pedigree, but the *independent* field of translation studies was largely brought into being through the systemic and norm-focused paradigm of descriptive translation studies (DTS) from the 1980s onward, with a strong input from scholars with backgrounds in literary theory and comparative literature. Although the rise of the discipline in the 1990s coincided with a postmodernist, poststructuralist and postcolonial phase that eschewed technocratic approaches and favoured emancipatory stances and politically and ethically attuned researcher-positions, the descriptive approach, with its systems-theoretical basis and a tendency to seek generalizations and provable propositions, proved more influential and has had a more sustained effect on the field. This influence was further institutionalized by the foundation of the journal *Target* (in 1989) and in the long-standing series of CETRA summer schools (from 1988 onwards), which served as tools for disseminating the research agenda and for training new generations of TS scholars in the paradigm.

The legacy of DTS was, and still is, of crucial value in terms of providing a sustainable scholarly base for the budding discipline, but it also directed research in ways that overshadowed other potentially relevant viewpoints that have been coming to the fore only recently. Indeed, in addition to understanding the structures of translation (fields, production networks, institutional hierarchies, etc.) and to seeking laws of translation, be they universal or probabilistic, we also need to "live with" translation, attuned to its "concrete and living" nature, and the often obscure "hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments" of the people involved, translation and interpreting scholars included. In short, to fully understand translation, one also needs to understand its *affective* side, the ways in which it forms a part of the lives of those involved with it. This book seeks to explore the many faces of this involvement.

There is also another underlying reason for opening this monograph with a quotation from Durkheim, one of the founding figures of the discipline of sociology in the late 19th century. Affect was one of the key areas of study in early sociology, in such disciplinary milestones as Durkheim's own work on anomie, Georg Simmel's analysis of living in the city, and C. Wright Mills' studies of the workplace. While this book does not follow a strict theoretical model, and the viewpoints and supporting arguments presented in it derive from many disciplines, I see it primarily as a contribution to the subfield that we have since the early 2000s began to label as the sociology of translation. In tracing emotions and affects, my

focus is on social and interactional aspects more than on neuropsychological, cognitive or individual ones. Parallels to sociology are therefore a good place to start.

The affective side of translatoriality is a multifaceted issue with permanent relevance and fascination, but it is also a pressing topic. The technological advances of automated translation have changed the translatorial landscapes dramatically, and machines are taking on routine translation tasks. What remains for the human to deal with, at least for now, is the affective and the ethical decision-making in multilingual communication. We do not yet have a full picture of what that entails. Although a number of scholars have discussed the notions of affect and emotion in translation studies, there is no comprehensive account of translation and affect available as of yet, and this book thus proposes to chart the terrain. In this book I aim to provide a holistic overview of the various ways in which affect can be usefully studied in translation studies. Each semi-autonomous chapter targets an area of interest and opens into different theoretical and methodological directions. At the same time, they each develop the core argument of the book: affect is ubiquitous in life and in translation, some affects are particularly sticky and influential, and translators and interpreters are affecting and being affected in their work in myriad ways. Most chapters also report on empirical findings with the aim of indicating different opportunities for further study.

This book has been a long time in the making, and it builds on my sustained interest in the role of affect in various translation-related issues. In many ways, I am returning to most of my earlier research interests, now looking at issues such as translators' agency, workplace culture, institutional translation practices and retranslation specifically and explicitly from the point of view of affect. Indeed, a reader familiar with my previous work will find recognizable elements from my previously published texts. Here, they reappear in rewritings and new combinations. Some chapters also report on entirely new research as well as findings and results previously published only in Finnish; the section on translator training builds on my own experiences. None of the chapters is a reprinted or translated version of previously published articles. Rather, in this book I develop my earlier ideas further and bring them into new constellations through a sustained focus on the affective.

It has been argued that academic texts on the topic of affect tend to be rather devoid of emotion (Probyn 2010: 74). Indeed, that may be the case here as well, but I have aimed for writing differently. But writing affectively *and* academically is not that easy, and the resulting style not necessarily successful. Regardless of the outcome, this writing process has definitely not been without its affective ups and downs, quite the contrary. It was therefore opportune that when I was deep in the writing-cum-thinking process for this book, already having hopelessly missed my first deadline, I had an appointment with a psychologist to discuss the problems

I had with sleeping. To find the root cause for this bodily reaction to a number of simultaneous challenges in my life at the time, she asked me to keep a diary of how I feel at any given moment of my everyday life and where in my body these emotions are making themselves sensorily felt. I did not reveal the book project to her, but I was grateful for the reminder to be reflective of my own affects and embodiments at a time when I was emphatically focusing my cognitive efforts to understand and explain those of others. These reflections allowed me to be more attuned to the various affects involved in the project: It has made me feel insecure and frustrated, and struggling for clarity and understanding, making my chest feel heavy. I have been giddy with the lightness of writing when things have gone smoothly. I have also felt anxiety in my stomach at the thought of ending up only reporting what everyone else already knew, revealing my imposture. And I have been heart-warmingly grateful to those numerous colleagues who have supported me during this process, and thankful for those many insightful writers whose texts have allowed me to see things more clearly, and even more so for those who have muddled my over-simplified preconceptions. Writing is a corporeal activity and it affects bodies, as Elspeth Probyn (2010: 76) reminds us. The writing of this book has affected and keeps affecting me. The book that you are now reading is, in its incompleteness, very dear to me. In the pages that follow I have tried to capture, in an accessible form and in pragmatic terms, many of the most important takeaways of my research career so far, seen through the lens of affect. I can only hope it will also succeed in affecting your body, one way or another.

The two central premises of the book I can trace back to my PhD project (Koskinen 2000), and even beyond, to the very beginning of my academic endeavours. The first premise is a mind-set: that of avoiding binary, dualistic set-ups and embracing the more complex logic of both/and. Regarding the notion of affect, discussed in the next chapter, I deliberately refuse definitions that would force a choice between body and mind; I work to accommodate both intrinsic and extrinsic elements of emotions, taking both individual and the social aspects into account; I try to cater for both translating and interpreting, avoiding a common strategy of dealing only with one or the other. The second premise is best explained as a research question, and it is the one I keep trying to answer in all of my research activities: what kind of an activity is translating, and what is the task of the translator? Affect, as a flexible and open-ended concept, allows me once more to reflect on the endlessly fascinating practice of translation from a new angle.

CHAPTER 1

Affecting and being affected

On the names and nature of affects

It is not a new revelation that emotions and affects are relevant to our being in the world. It is our human condition. It also has a long history in scientific thought. Aristotle already pointed out that our affective sensitivities are necessary for an appropriate perception of significant events and features in our environment. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle (n.d.) argues that emotion is "that which leads one's condition to become so transformed that his judgment is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure and pain." Indeed, as Aristotle's understanding of the interplay of personal sensitivity and the surrounding context makes clear, affect has a dual character as both an internal, bodily phenomenon (of pleasure or pain) and an interpersonal force with the capacity to affect our condition and judgement. This wide scope makes affect a fascinating object of study, but it – and the multitude of different approaches to handling it – has also led to much confusion.

The first confusion is conceptual and terminological: different scholars and different approaches and disciplines prioritize "feeling", "emotion" or "affect", or some other related concept such as "mood" or "atmosphere", and it is seldom clear whether the same term denotes the same concept in different usages, or whether a different term also implies a different conceptualization. I will discuss this terminological jungle at length in Section 1.3. For now, suffice it to say that of these terms, I have chosen to foreground "affect". I have two main reasons: First, among competing terminologies affect is regularly used in connection with the turn in the social sciences and cultural studies that my theoretical framework is indebted to (the affect turn). Second, I have begun to favour unordinary words for theoretical concepts in my research as they allow us to overcome familiar meanings and interpretations and conceptualize familiar terrain in novel ways. In particular, in recent years I have swayed from studying "translation" towards having "translatoriality" and "translatorial action" as my object of study. This shift allows me to stretch the boundaries of our object of study beyond currently prototypical understandings of the phenomenon. In a similar manner, "affect" allows me to incorporate biological sensations, cognitively felt emotions and social constructions of acceptable

emotional responses within one framework and under one bridge concept, without getting lost in the maze of different categorizations.

Having said that, I need to acknowledge that this decision creates a bit of tension between my vocabulary and that of two main sources of my ideas, Sara Ahmed and Arlie Russell Hochschild. Sara Ahmed, whose idea of the stickiness of affects runs through this text, has explicitly stated her reluctance to use the word affect, explaining that she picked up emotion as her word partly because she wanted "to use the word that is used in everyday life; that my mother would use when she was describing her feelings or her situation. She would think of it in terms of emotion while the word affect didn't have that kind of everyday resonance" (Ahmed in Schmitz & Ahmed 2014: 108). Ahmed chooses "emotion" because it resonated with everyday parlance; I opted for "affect" to avoid too close connection to it. But she, too, emphasizes that the phenomenon we are trying to capture encompasses more than what everyday usage readily allows for: "We assume to know what it means – emotion is about having a feeling in response to something – however, it is much more complicated and socially mediated than that" (ibid.: 97). Her basic argument is that emotions are a social practice. Similarly, it has become customary to say that translation is a social practice. And as a social practice, I argue, it is also an affective practice (Wetherell 2012). This bundle of practices is at the heart of this book, as are the sticky affects often combined with translationality in the recurrent narratives of love, trust and fidelity, for example.

Sara Ahmed (2004) also talks about affective economies, in the sense of certain bodies or objects and the emotions around them being able to create affective value. This aligns with Arlie Hochschild's well-known concept of emotional labour, which highlights the economic aspects of affective labour (1983; see Chapter 2). Hochschild's approach builds on the idea of complex social negotiations over expected and acceptable affective performances for different professionals, and the labour of constructing adequate emotional set-ups at work. Again, in this book my chosen terminology favours affective labour over emotional labour. Since the first publication of Hochschild's book, a number of competing approaches to affective labour have emerged (see esp. Hardt 1999). Some current usage differentiates between the two, defining emotional labour as internal management of one's own emotions, and affective labour as producing or modifying emotions in others. However, these two often blend together, and both elements are indeed present in translators' and interpreters' work. For my current purposes it seems more useful to cast my net widely and allow different viewpoints to enrich my discussion than to follow an orthodox theoretical path and rigid categorizations.

In a recent paper, Andrew Chesterman (2019) maps the four core foci of translation studies – linguistic, cultural, cognitive and sociological research – looking for opportunities to reduce disciplinary fragmentation and increase consilience,

for example, through the use of bridge concepts. Affect, I propose in this book, can function as one such bridge concept, crossing over the various orientations in translation studies and also cutting through different contexts and modes of translatorial action. Hence, the chapters in this book travel across linguistic-textual analysis, the mind of the translator, socio-technical and cultural environments and spaces of translation, and oral, written and multimodal modes of communication. I readily acknowledge that for a single-authored monograph this kind of spread creates vulnerabilities: I am not an expert in all the fields I discuss, and there are gaps in my knowledge. What I hope to achieve is not a full coverage of the affective in translation in any of the areas discussed but a compelling argument for a continued exploration of what we can do with affect in translation studies. Readers more familiar with any particular area will have ample opportunities for criticism. This I have to accept: any project aiming for consilience across the spectrum of approaches in translation studies will have to begin by accepting that everyone's viewpoint is partial and that everyone is grounded in particular epistemologies, methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Hence also the space given to the personal both in style and in content throughout this book.

1.1   From neural to social: The spectrum of affect

Affect is an eternal human question, but it is also a trendy topic. In many ways we are living in an age that foregrounds the affective. Understanding the emotions and affects of oneself and others is an asset and a commodity. It has always been beneficial to be socially skilful, and it certainly is now in the current cultural climate. Social media is feeding on our affective reactions, from thumbs up and showers of hearts to trolling, orchestrated outrages and click-bite journalism. Politics, always the art of persuasion, is getting more and more openly emotion-based, often to the detriment of factual content. In our personal life, we focus on creating in our body and our mind the states we desire, or the looks that others desire. It is only logical that researchers, too, are paying increasing attention to the many roles of affect in our lives.

Heightened interest in affects and emotions is also related to technological advances, in particular, to artificial intelligence and deep-learning machines. The more invasive the role of AI in our lives, the more we need to understand both what makes human action different from machines, and how machines can become more sophisticated in imitating humans. The answer to both lies in understanding affect, both intrapersonally and interpersonally. One of the fields that have a long history with increasingly pervasive technology is translatorial activities. The question of affect is therefore pressing in translation studies. It has to become a central

element of translator training, to equip human translators with skills that allow them to operate in areas where translation technology as it is today is unable to perform and to thrive in a constantly shifting professional terrain. We also need to better understand the role of affective reasoning in translatorial decision-making in order to train the machine to translate better. And we also need to understand the sticky affects evoked by translation technology in translators and others, and to chart the dramatic societal changes in how translatoriality is being experienced in its current technologized form.

This attention to affects, emotions and experiences also signals, in particular in the natural sciences, a return of suppressed topics of research. As opposed to earlier work in many fields, mainstream 20th-century science shunned emotions as too subjective, too irrational, too vague and too unscientific for empirical study (Damasio 2000: 12; Sanfey 2007). In contrast, neuroscience now steers away from previous rationalist stances and posits that affect is closely intertwined with cognition, that there is no emotion without cognition, and no cognition without emotion (Lane et al. 2000: 6). Emotion, when understood as an evaluation of the extent to which we are content with a particular situation or interaction with our environment, is seen to be inseparably intertwined with cognitive appraisal:

> [F]ew if any perceptions of any object or event, actually present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and subsequent feelings, however feeble.   (Damasio 2004: 93)

In contrast to the excessive emotionality of our times, I am fond of the focus on also the weak and feeble affective responses in Damasio's quotation above. Valence, that is, a positive or negative evaluation, may vary in its intensity, but the human approach to objects and events seems to be constructed through some kind of affective appraisal. This neuroscientist view also resonates with Silvain Tomkins' classic psychological affect theory where he describes affects as amplifiers (1995: 20): positive or negative affective engagement makes us feel more intensely. The notion of affective valence as a gradient value, and of affective response as an amplifier allows us to appreciate the fundamental role of affect in decision-making. It is therefore not surprising that fields dealing with decision-making, such as economics and game theory, have begun to incorporate affective elements into their modelling of human behaviour. The image of a rationally calculative, cost-conscious and self-serving *homo economicus* prevalent in classical and neo-classical economics has been accompanied by *homo sentiens* (or, 'emotional man') as an alternative vision of human cooperation and decision-making. Emotional man, a term originally proposed by Helena Flam (1989), aims to model decision-making in a way that also takes into account our emotional ties to others and the

role of different sentiments such as love, loyalty or resentment. Similarly, game theory is looking into the ways in which affective factors play an important role, particularly in bargaining and competitive games where decision-making is social by nature (Sanfey 2007). Brain-imaging studies of interaction have discovered, for example, that reciprocal cooperation rewards participants with more intense positive feelings than do financial gains (ibid.: 600). In the opposite case, players may find punishing the unfair and nonreciprocal partners quite satisfactory even when this leads to a financial loss on their own part (ibid.).

Brain imaging and other empirical methods for measuring bodily sensations have directed research focus to the visceral, biological side of affect, and the new findings in the natural sciences have also been incorporated in cultural theories of affect. Damasio and Tomkins, in particular, are both household names also in socio-cultural affect theories. Their views will be discussed further in Section 1.3. One of the benefits of the concept of affect is that while "emotion" tends to be understood primarily as an identified, cognitively processed inner state, "affect" is less rigidly defined. It therefore allows for an understanding that covers the full spectrum from neural functions to social interaction, from body to mind and beyond. We humans are social animals, and affect, even though grounded in the neurobiology of our bodies, is both a response to outside impulses and a force that aims to mobilize others in interaction. In interaction, we screen for clues of the other's affect and interpret the situation through our own affective responses, and we modulate our affective stances to match and balance them to the other's stances, searching for the right tone for the situation.

In the social sciences, an interest in affect re-emerged during the 1990s and has become more pronounced during the 21st century. Logically, in these studies, the social elements of affect are foregrounded. Patricia Clough (2007), for example, sees affect both as an incorporeal, bodily potential that extends our consciousness and as an interpersonal force. She compares affect to electricity, flowing among and between people, making us do things and instigating changes in the environment. Brian Massumi's view of affect is similar to Clough's in focalizing affect as an event of felt transitions, but he also further emphasizes its political – or proto-political – dimension. Affect is "politically oriented from the get go", he argues (2015: viii). This is also Sara Ahmed's basic argument in her book *The Cultural Politics of Emotions*: she underlines that emotions are not psychological states but social and cultural practices (2014: 9) and they therefore "involve a stance on the world, or a way of apprehending the world" (ibid.: 7). Affects may be (also) private and personal, but as decades of feminist thought has taught us, the personal is political. It is through personal emotional investment, that is, affective economy, that particular objects become saturated with affect, sticky (ibid.: 11). This stickiness of affect increases in social circulation and over time, creating attachments

between bodies and accumulating affective value. Sticky affects give rise to familiar affective narratives, and these familiar narratives, Ahmed reminds us, deserve close and careful reading (ibid: 1).

Anyone trying to work with the concept of affect will encounter this abundance of meanings and categorizations. Sensations, feelings, emotions and affects are understood in different ways for different analytical and methodological purposes. I am in Sara Ahmed's (2014: 6) camp in thinking that the distinctions can only be analytic conceptual reifications of an interplay of the internal and external, the unconscious and conscious, the biological and cultural. The body, the mind, and the interpersonal and socio-cultural environment form a complex field of affective forces. Categorizations can help us disentangle some elements in this field, but they are always reductions. One way of working around the polarity of biology and interaction is to focus on the role of affect in *bridging* bodily, cognitive and social phenomena. Because of the double bind of the internal and the contextual, affect is essential for making sense and appraising our environment. According to Margaret Wetherell, affect is in fact synonymous with "embodied meaning-making" (2012: 4). Affect gives us bodily signals on how to interpret the situations we find ourselves in, and it can therefore be defined as an interface between the self and the surrounding context, as "the participants' emotional and bodily-experienced response to and interpretation of their lived experience, as a hinge between the self and the world" (Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016: 83). Ahmed, however, reminds us that the binary logic of the person and the context is not tenable. The movement is not only outside-in, nor inside-out. It is more constitutive: through how we affectively respond to objects and others we create the very boundaries of in and out, and "emotions are crucial to the very constitution of the psychic and the social as objects" (Ahmed 2014: 10). Hinge is indeed perhaps not the best metaphor to capture the role of affect in interacting with the world (in the article we ended up using it for want of a better one). But both the idea of an interface between the affected individual and the object of affective interpretation or an affectively laden context, and the idea of an amplifier reinforcing what we encounter and making it more felt, signal an understanding that affect can also be used as a tool that helps us experience and understand our life-world. It is therefore also a relevant perspective to job satisfaction and motivation, and it contains pedagogical repercussions. These will be discussed in later chapters.

The understanding of affect as an interface between the self and the environment emphasizes the dynamic interplay of more or less conscious psychobiological inner processes and our surroundings and social interaction. This double entendre combines the subjective and the social and forms the backbone of this book, but it leans decisively towards the social. While each chapter bring to the fore a different aspect of affect, the overall emphasis is on its complex social and interpersonal

nature. It follows that in the following pages social and cultural theories of affect will be emphasized. Although references to neurocognitive and psychological research will be relied on in order to not lose sight of the bodily side of affects, what I am aiming for is comprehensive *sociocultural* theorization of the roles of affect in translatorial activities.

1.2   Affects in translation studies

Translation studies in the 21st century has foregrounded human actors. The label of the sociology of translation and its early slogan of translation as a social practice, first promoted by Michaela Wolf (2002), captured the zeitgeist of the translation studies community, and the past two decades have witnessed a flood of new research on different social contexts of translation work, on translators' habitus, on collaborative practices and on user responses to translation. Earlier descriptive translation-studies approaches had already paved the way for this "humanizing" of translation studies (Pym 2009) by way of bringing to the fore the strategic decision-making inherent in translation and providing a wealth of textual evidence of ideological, political, cultural and societal manipulation in different case studies. Obviously, any manipulative decision-making will also have an affective layer: issues such as self-censorship of taboo elements will entail a negotiation of the affective elements in the source text, the translators' and other agents' personal and professional stances towards them, the values, rules, norms and expectations of the receiving context and the affects involved in the reception of the target text. All languages have developed a plethora of resources for managing, modulating and manipulating affects, and in translation these resources are matched against one another (in the languages involved) and against the contexts of the texts in question. The matching, managing, modulating and manipulation, however, require human assessment and decision-making. The humanizing of translation studies therefore logically presumes also taking a closer look at the many roles of affect in translation.

In cultural studies, the study of affects and emotions has gained momentum so forcefully that some scholars already talk about an affect turn (Clough & Halley 2007). While I do not wish to claim to start yet another turn in translation studies, I argue that there is indeed merit in taking stock of the recent findings across the social sciences and to reassess the relevance of affective factors for translation studies. It is not a new revelation as such. Some pioneering scholars have long recognized the role of affect in translation and interpreting studies. Douglas Robinson's somatic translation theory from 1991 is an early example of an affective approach in theoretically oriented translation studies, and he has since published extensively

on the topic. Somatics is explicitly physiological. Robinson (1991: x) describes it as "the ways in which our body 'signals' to us what we know and how we should act on it," so that we "know in our gut" what we have to do and say. The "knowing in the gut" is a liberating message to translators, whose gut reactions and playing by the ear are given theoretical validation. This physiological layer can be studied empirically with tools such as the EEG, tomography and pupillometrics, bringing questions of affect in contact with recent process studies (see O'Brien 2011: 5–6).

Indeed, the role of affect has long been recognized in process studies, at least by some scholars and at least tangentially (cf. Muñoz Martín 2016: 12). A number of early studies aimed to uncover translators' personality traits and characteristics such as their confidence levels (Laukkanen 1996), their degree of personal engagement (Jääskeläinen 1999) and risk-taking patterns (Künzli 2004). This line of research has been gaining increased attention, and a number of recent articles have focused on the explanatory power of different affective elements in understanding translator performance (e.g., Hubscher-Davidson 2013a on emotional intelligence and Hubscher-Davidson 2013b on intuition; Lehr 2014 and Rojo & Ramos 2016 on the effect of positive and negative feelings, and Apfelthaler 2014 on empathy; see also Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 31–34). A more pronounced approach to affect has been evolving in recent years, side by side with the process of writing this book, under the label of cognitive translatology, inspired by an approach to translatorial cognition called the 4E & A – that is, embodied, embedded, extended, enactive and affective (Muñoz Martín 2016). For the time being, my reading of the evolving cognitive translatology group is that the embodied and embedded aspects have been emphasized: the recent emphasis on ergonomics (e.g., Ehrensberger-Dow & O'Brien 2015) focuses on bodily and environmental challenges in translation work, and Hanna Risku's longstanding agenda has systematically built an embedded or situated understanding of translation (e.g., Risku 2002; Risku et al. 2016). In contrast, the focus on affect is budding but not yet flourishing (see also Lacruz & Jääskeläinen 2018: 7). Although the cultural studies ethos that runs through this book is epistemologically quite different from the empirical tradition of cognitive translation studies, I hope researchers in this group will find some inspiration into giving the A of 4E & A a more prominent role in the future.

Descriptive translation studies has always given a central role to translation norms. As a social system of control, norms have a strong affective element embedded in them. The affective and the normative engage in a complex interplay, where emotions produce particular behaviour and that behaviour in turn produces emotions. Both norm compliance and norm breaches induce affective appraisals from all parties involved. Some norms also explicitly address emotions, as sociocultural "feeling rules" (Hochschild 1979: 563) either predispose us to feel in particular

ways (or to express particular feelings, fake or real) or prohibit particular emotions (forcing us to hide them if necessary). This set of socially shared but rarely formally codified rules "delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling" (ibid: 565). Like any social norms, feeling rules can be obeyed or broken, the latter at varying costs. The term affect itself (or emotion) is not found in the index to the revised edition of Gideon Toury's classic treatise, but the key term of acceptability can be seen to contain an affective undertone. Acceptancy is defined as adherence to the norms prevailing in the target culture (Toury 2012: 79), that is, an acceptable translation evokes neutral or positive affects and familiarity in the target readers, and allows the translator to be free of anxiety or shame.

Later research stemming from a DTS tradition and building on the sociology of translation framework mentioned above has concentrated on issues such as translators' social role, status and habitus. Again, the explicit focus is rarely on the affective or the emotional. However, issues of social standing and perceived status with respect to other colleagues (e.g., Dam & Zethsen 2009), job satisfaction (Dam & Zethsen 2016), corporate culture and identifications (Koskinen 2008) and other similar endeavours position translators within a social environment, also measuring their affective atmosphere. One element of translation work that has generated heated discussions is translation technology. It will be discussed at length in Chapter 7, so I will not go into details here, but it is surely worth noting that translatorial work has already become cybernetic in ways many other professions are only beginning to experience. This development has to be taken into account in any attempt that tries to capture experiences and affects of translating and interpreting. In translation, interactive and cybernetic machines have indeed become "a new prosthesis integrated into our bodies and minds and a lens through which to redefine our bodies and minds themselves" (Hardt 1999: 95).

As the above discussion aims to show, the notion of affect has never been fully absent from the study of translation and interpreting. Still, it has rarely been the direct object of scholarly analysis. The issue has gained momentum as a number of neighbouring fields have brought forth new theoretical and empirical findings, and as translation studies has increasingly turned its attention to the various human issues involved. So far, the most extended effort to this endeavour has been dedicated by Séverine Hubscher-Davidson. In her monograph *Translation and emotion* (2018), she tackles the issue of translator personality and emotions in detail. She applies psychological research on emotions to the study of translation and translators in order to "shed light on particular aspects, or stages, of translators' emotion processing" (ibid.: 13). The book takes three different viewpoints to emotions: perception, regulation and expression. Its most extended discussion, however, deals with more permanent personality traits, in particular emotional

intelligence. The core thesis is that certain personality traits, such as emotional intelligence, are helpful for successful translating, while some others are detrimental to it (ibid.: 15). This is an interesting, and also plausible, claim, but since translating is a wide area of activity, and each individual is a complex bundle of traits, dispositions and moods, causal links from personality traits to desired performance are not likely to be straightforward. Even so, some of the early results in this line of inquiry have indeed been interesting. For example, the study by Caroline Lehr (2014) indicated that translators' commitment correlates with increased creativity whereas negative feelings such as anxiety correlates with accuracy. Similar research on suitable personality traits has a longer history in interpreting studies, starting as early as 1974 (see Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 29 for an overview of studies on interpreter personality).

In translation studies research, affect has more often been present implicitly than explicitly. Most existing research focused on affect has been conducted within cognitive translation studies. Its historical development, building on psychological perspectives, leaning towards the natural sciences in its epistemology and methodology, and traditionally focussing on the mind (rather than the body or the socio-cultural context), has led to a psychologically oriented view of affects. Current research therefore emphasizes the view of affect or emotion as something residing inside a person rather than moving in the world, and is prone to use empirical testing and statistical reasoning in its argumentation. This is all well and good, but not the whole story. This book aims to complement these on-going projects with a view that emphasizes theorizing from social and cultural theories, uses qualitative methods and aims at capturing the socio-cultural workings of affect.

1.3   Now, what is affect (and does it matter)?

Affect has been theorized in many ways, in different disciplines. So have emotions. This has resulted in a multitude of competing approaches and terminologies. Working my way through the deep and muddy waters of varied terminology and contested definitions has tested my abilities of thinking in ways no other theoretical challenge has before (and this confession comes from a person whose academic career started with trying to conceptualize deconstruction). In the above sections, I have tried to give you a reasonably workable summary of the theoretical background of this book. This section gives the interested reader an opportunity to follow my path through the marshland to an understanding of affect. Still, I do not claim to have produced a comprehensive overview; the literature is so overwhelming that the task has been deemed impossible by many

(e.g., Anderson B. 2014: 4), but I have tried to provide some signposting. If you are not fond of complex conceptual analyses, you can skip this and move directly to Section 1.4.

In this book, I take a holistic approach, dedicating each chapter to a different aspect of affect, without pledging full allegiance to any particular school of thought or aiming to steer the course of the discipline of translation studies in any one direction. What remains constant is a sociological perspective: how affects affect translation, how translation as a social practice is affectively scripted, how translations are borne out of an affective engagement in translating and also produce affects in reception, and how also these are often normatively and affectively scripted. My aim is complementary to Hubscher-Davidson's, in the book mentioned in the above section. Our choices of key words (emotion for Hubscher-Davidson; affect for me) can be read as a signal of a difference in emphasis. As will soon become clear, neither of the two terms has been given a conclusive definition in scientific literature, and they are often used interchangeably. However, since vocabularies also signal particular schools of thought, our preferences can be taken to symbolize affinity with some approaches and a distancing from some others. More specifically put, Hubscher-Davidson's approach is theoretically and methodologically aligned with psychology and focuses on the psyche of the translator. The prototypical scenario in her approach is that of a professional translator encountering an emotionally challenging source text (e.g. 2018: 120) In contrast, this book leans towards cultural studies and the social sciences and aims to capture the social environment and interaction with the other actors involved as well as the subjectivity of the translating or interpreting person. I also try to steer away from extreme, turbulent and sensational affectivity, and focus on "ordinary affects" (Stewart 2007), to also shed light on the everyday, routine and habitual aspects of translation and affect. As Margaret Wetherell (2012: 13) underlines, affect is not only chaotic but also practical and organized; it is "about sense as well as sensibility". It would therefore be misleading to only focus on "affect's dramatic and turbulent qualities" (ibid.). Similarly, Ben Anderson (2014: 14 and passim.) emphasizes that affect is not only about irrational excess, and that the "unruly dynamics of living" are also organized through conditioning structures of feeling, and that both power and engagement with the world work through affect, making it a transformative societal force.

As said above, I see our approaches as complementary, not as competitive. They aim to tackle the complex interplay of affects and emotions in translation from different directions and with different sets of methodological and theoretical tools, but the quest, I feel, is the same: to advance our understanding of the human condition in the context of translating and interpreting. While I obviously cannot

vouch for Hubscher-Davidson's choice of words,[1] in my case, the final selection of terminology was also, and to a significant degree, affectively based. A gut reaction. In the end, a gut reaction it also had to be. Anyone interested in how our affective involvement with each other, our environment and events around us has been philosophized, theorized and empirically researched, soon realizes that they have entered a terrain that is dishearteningly difficult to navigate. As will have become evident by now, different authors and different research traditions have emphasized different aspects of affect or emotion. These different viewpoints and understandings stem from varied ontological and theoretical suppositions. These suppositions can be mutually contradictory, but they are also often internally convoluted. It has been commented that all fields struggle to define emotion as a distinctive phenomenon, and many scholars have come to argue that the term is not a unitary concept defining a single object of study at all (Franks 2007: 41). In their introduction to *The Affect Theory Reader*, a key publication in theoretical discussions on affect in social and cultural studies, Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth list eight main orientations of theorizing affect, starting from different sets of concerns and aims, and with varying initial premises (Seigworth & Gregg 2010: 6–8). And, I might add, with varying terminological preferences. In the conceptual jungle surrounding affects and emotions, the same term can be used to mean different things, and confusing synonyms abound. In a handbook article in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, the difficulties connected with affect are summarized as follows:

> 'Affect' names a conceptual problem as much as a tangible thing. As such, it is best understood as an umbrella term that includes related, and more familiar, words such as 'feeling' and 'emotion', as well as efforts to make distinctions among them.
> (Cvetkovich 2007: 13)

It is as an umbrella term, or a bridge concept, that affect is used in this book, to sidestep the conceptual problems one encounters in reading previous work on affect and emotions. One often finds people quoting Spinoza on saying that "affect is a confused idea", because that is how it easily feels. In the general definitions section of Part III of *Ethics* (1665/2004: 83), Spinoza indeed uses that phrase to explain what affect is:

> An affect that is called a passion of the mind is a confused idea through which a mind affirms of its body (or of some part of it) a greater or lesser force of existing than it had before – an idea which, when it is given, makes the mind think of one thing rather than another.

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1.   For Hubscher-Davidson's discussion of the vocabulary and her terminological and typographical choices (affect is always italized), and on her decision to treat emotion, affect and feeling as synonyms, see 2018: 10–13; for a differentiating definition of affect, emotion, and, by extension, feeling, see ibid.: 108.

Spinoza is well-liked and often quoted in contemporary discussions because according to him, affects, passions of the mind, are states of dialogue between the mind and the body, and this antidualism fits in with much contemporary thinking in cultural studies. Affects also work in interpersonal ways, so that the positive or negative affects of others – or, to be more precise, our imagining of the affects of others – will have an influence on our affects, either towards pleasure or unpleasure. The various potential set-ups and outcomes are enumerated by Spinoza (ibid., Part III). Significantly, Spinoza's idea of affect revolves around change: there is a change in the body, and a change in thinking in the mind. The change in thinking, Spinoza clarifies, is desire. So, affect is a body–mind complex that directs a person towards a desired state of affairs through a process of change. Affect, in Spinoza's often quoted phrase, is all about "affecting and being affected". It is significant that the connector is 'and' and not 'or': that the one affecting is also affected, that there is a transition in both (Massumi 2015).

Affect, understood in Spinoza's terms, is about being in the world. Hence the focus on places and spaces and their affective affordances in Chapter 6. The body – our sensory, somatic and visceral existence – is crucially important in grounding us in place. A phenomenological understanding sees the body as the "point from which our social world unfolds … our point of view in the world" (Thomas & Correia 2016: 6–7). Building on Spinoza's work, political scientist and philosopher Brian Massumi defines affect as a transversal concept: it involves body and mind simultaneously in "thinking-feeling", it transcends any objective/subjective dichotomy and it is fundamentally relational in nature.

Massumi's research position is radically open-ended. Philosophers may find it relevant to create complex and open-ended conceptual models about matters of body, mind and soul; in the hard sciences such as psychology and neuroscience, the idea of complexifying rather than aiming to reduce is alien. Instead, affect theorists in these fields aim to provide operationalizable categorizations that allow for modelling and empirical testing. In these models, the bodily and the cognitive tend to be kept apart, creating a terminological and methodological need for tenable distinctions. In the resulting reductive models, the focus of interest has been in the bodily states linked to affective appraisals.

In practice, various approaches travel across disciplinary boundaries, creating crossovers that are sometimes rather unorthodox. For example, in cultural theory, Eve Sedgwick's (2003) work is very much aligned with Massumi's,[2] but it

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2. Seminal essays by Sedgwick and Massumi in 1995 allow these two scholars to be posited as the pioneers of the current interest in the affective in cultural studies by Seigworth and Gregg (2010: 5). For a critical review of Massumi's and Sedgwick's approaches, see Wetherell (2012: 10–11; 19–21).

also builds on the complex psychological affect theory developed by Silvain Tomkins. Tomkins represents a traditional psycho-biological view that assumes that all humans share a universal set of basic emotions. His well-known typology consists of nine primary affects, with a high or low degree of intensity: enjoyment-joy, interest-excitement, fear-terror, distress-anguish, anger-rage, shame-humiliation, disgust, dissmell (avoidance/contempt), and surprise-startle. These affects form an innate signalling system that helps us navigate in our lives, deciding what we want to reinforce and what we want to avoid (Tomkins institute n.d.). In this framework, affect is understood as the biological response to external stimuli; awareness of affect, in turn, is named as feeling; whereas feeling combined with the memory of our previous experiences of similar feelings is called emotion (ibid.; Nathanson 1994: 49).[3]

From our own life experiences, we can easily recognize that affective states often include a bodily element. We have had butterflies in our stomach in anticipation of an exciting and challenging event; we may have trembled with fear, or our heart has bounced with joy. We are also more or less capable of consciously recognizing and interpreting these body-states and using them to make navigational judgements. Working within the neurosciences, Antonio Damasio defines emotions as these brain representations of body-states, introducing yet another conceptualization. He explicitly builds on Spinoza's philosophy, but his terminology, and his approach, is different. In Damasio's conceptual system, the term emotion is generally used to refer to the non-conscious but observable physiological elements of appraisal (affect in many other approaches). It is opposed to feeling (emotion for some), which in his vocabulary is the mental experience of emotion, and considered to be unobservable by interacting partners. (Damasio 2000: 15, 20–21; see also Lane et al. 2000: 8) In Damasio's model, feeling remains on an unconscious sensory level, and the point when it becomes conscious is the "feeling of feeling" (Damasio 2000: 20–21). Affect, in this conceptual system, only refers to "the entire topic of emotion and feeling, including, of necessity, the subjacent processes of motivation and the underlying states of pain and pleasure" (ibid.: 16).

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3.   For a reassessment of Tomkin's approach from a cultural studies perspective, see Sedgwick (2003: 97–108).

Table 1. Terminological grids: Tomkins vs. Damasio vs. Massumi

	Neurobiological, preconscious, bodily	Awareness	Interpreted	Social	Global/ overarching
Tomkins	affect	feeling	emotion	–	–
Damasio	emotion	feeling	feeling of feeling	–	affect
Massoumi	affect	feeling		emotion	affect

Table 1 provides a crude comparative typology of the terminologies of Massumi, Tomkins and Damasio. Out of the dozens of affect theories available across disciplines, I am not singling out these three to indicate they are the best sources, or even to indicate that they are the most central for me or this book (although I have been greatly inspired by them all), but to illustrate the terminological complexities with the help of three research agendas representing three different fields of study that have been influential in social and cultural theories of affect. The table aims to show four things: one, that across fields of study, researchers examining affect tend to share an interest in the pre-conscious, visceral and embodied demonstrations of emotional arousal; two, that they may focus their attention differently across the continuum of potential foci of interest; and three, that they may use contradictory terminology to explain similar phenomena. And finally, four, to fully understand the topic at hand, one needs to be willing and able to move across the spectrum, from the neural to the social, and sometimes also to turn a blind eye to terminological mismatches. To this end, we need many different approaches, epistemologies and methodologies. Categorizations are necessary tools, created for analytical purposes, but as Sara Ahmed reminds us, the world these categorizations are introduced to is fluid and its boundaries porous:

> We have a course "Gender, Affect and the Body" and I've just changed how it is taught because my impression was (from essays that students were delivering) that there was a great degree of confidence that affect was this over here and emotion was that over there and that this distinction mapped onto different bodies of work. But the distinction was actually obscuring the histories of how certain bodies of work came to exist in the first place. I encourage my students to think about it more in terms of separation as an activity. You can break an egg to separate the yolk from the white, but you have to separate what is not separate. Separation is an activity, not a noun. And I think that in some contributions to affect studies the concept has come to replace the thing. So affect is treated as an agent that is doing things on its own accord. I think you can separate affect and emotion, you even can have a rationale for doing that, but it needs to be understood as a method allowing you to do certain things and not as corresponding to a natural distinction that exists in the world. The world we are describing is messy – if we

> have clear distinctions we're actually losing our connection to that world. Clear distinctions for a messy experience or a messy situation are neither helpful for a better understanding of reality nor interesting for the debate.
>
> (Ahmed in Schmitz & Ahmed 2014: 98–99)

The messy terminology can be taken to signal that the area under study does not easily fall into distinct categories. The feeling human body/mind embedded in social and cultural structures does not cut nicely into tight categories capturable by the means of linguistic labels. Rather, we are dealing with a complex phenomenon and fluid continuums. But the varied scholarly approaches also allow us to appreciate that the complexity stretches from neurobiology through cognition/interpretation to the interpersonal/social, and that it needs to be understood both form the perspective of microevents (such as barely noticeable facial microexpressions referred to in Chapter 5 below) and macrolevel cultural stances (such as the culturally conditioned dualistic understanding of translating discussed in Chapter 4 below). What is significant is that each approach expands on the middle ground; on the subjectively felt, recognized and interpreted emotions that allow a person to state "I am happy/sad/angry" or any number of other emotional states. This potential for expanding is the promise of theorizing affect in any discipline, opening up avenues for inquiry beyond cognition and beyond the identified emotions of individuals, both towards physiological and pre-cognitive sensation and towards the sociocultural embeddedness of affects.

The choice of focus in the complex landscape of affect is based on each researcher's personal preferences but also on disciplinary affiliations. Massumi represents cultural theory and the political sciences, and he therefore quite naturally leans towards the social effects of affects, and their biopolitical aspects. Tomkins, in turn, comes from psychology and Damasio from neuroscience, and in accordance to their respective disciplinary traditions, they both present a more individualized understanding of the biological, visceral or somatic states on the one hand (i.e., the body), and our cognitive-mental recognitions of those states, on the other (i.e., the mind). Whereas Massumi zooms out, Damasio and Tomkins zoom in. They focus on affects as a body-internal issue, as a biological and physiological phenomenon. This view is far from solipsist, however, and Tomkins builds heavily on (involuntary) facial expressions of affect in interpersonal encounters, creating a rich area of shared interest with interaction research and studies on face-work. He has even argued that the face – and not the brain – is the principle organ for affect:

> If, as I believe, the affects are the primary motives of man, and if, as I also believe, the face is the primary site of the affects, then the face is the man. Every man has always been interested in faces, fallen in love with a face, repelled by some faces, comforted by others, bored by some faces, but psychologists have nonetheless been the last to know.
>
> (Tomkins 1995: 263)

But even when considered within interpersonal encounters, the bodily view of affect still focuses on the person being in a state of affect. In interaction, affect can then be seen as a "fifth columnist" beyond our control and at least potentially working against our wishes:

> Affect gives you away: the telltale heart; my clammy hands; the note of anger in your voice; the sparkle of glee in their eyes. You may protest your innocence, but we both know, don't we, that who you *really* are, or *what* you really are, is going to be found in the pumping of your blood, the quantity and quality of your perspiration, the breathless anticipation in your throat, the way you can't stop yourself from grinning, the glassy sheen of your eyes. Affect is the cuckoo in the nest; the fifth columnist out to undermine you; your personal polygraph machine.
> (Highmore 2010: 118)

The above quotation also seems to imply that the physiological, measurable indicators of affect are more trustworthy than our narrations of our affective stances; that they tell the true tale. Our perspiration levels, pupillometric measurements or pulse are the polygraph machine against which the accuracy of our reported emotions and value judgements can be measured. Indeed, some researchers want to see the turn to emotions as a turn away from the language- and discourse-oriented phase of poststructuralist social sciences, emphasizing that "words are the one thing that emotions are not" (Franks 2007: 39, citing Katz 1999; cf. Clough 2010). Undoubtedly, there is more to affect than our verbal awareness allows us to account for, and bodily felt information is relevant in itself, not only in its translations into discourse. And as anyone with experience of interactive research methods such as interviewing will know, any verbal reports are themselves subject to affective conditioning of the new interactive event they are part of.

In social and cultural research, emphasis on the bodily aspects of affect brings to the forefront elements that may have previously escaped scholarly attention. For some, this has been the most exciting element of affect theories, and a welcome move away from the previous linguistic turn and the predominance of discourse analysis. Still, the kind of theorizing of affect that entirely eschews talk and text seems unnecessarily restricted in general, and undesirably narrow for studying such text- and talk-based activities as translating and interpreting in particular. Indeed, we are often affecting and being affected by verbalizations, as Margaret Wetherell (2012: 19) points out: "it is the discursive that very frequently makes affect powerful, makes it radical and provides the means for affect to travel." When affect needs to travel across linguistic and cultural boundaries, translation and interpreting become embedded in the process, and it will depend on their success how powerful, radical, or even mobile the affect in question is and what kinds of changes are instigated.

Emphasizing the complexity of affect, Wetherell (2012: 62; italics in the original) sums up the current psychological-neuroscientific understanding of affect as follows:

> The picture that psychology and neuroscience typically now paints of affect is of a highly dynamic, interacting *composite* or *assemblage* of autonomic bodily responses (e.g. sweating, trembling, blushing), other bodily actions (approaching or avoiding), subjective feelings and other *qualia*, cognitive processing (e.g. perception, attention, memory, decision-making), the firing and projecting of neural circuits (e.g. from the thalamus to the cortex and the amygdala), verbal reports (from exclamations to narratives) and communicative signals such as facial expressions.

Although the view described by Wetherell above takes into account both bodily and mental processes, and both experienced and reported affect, it still keeps affect primarily as a person-internal matter, one that is only expressed or narrated to the outside world. Even when scholars acknowledge the role of one's sociocultural environment in emotions, the focus often tends to be on the individual reacting to and learning from the surrounding context (Damasio 2000: 17).

At its core, the debate about language is over meaning versus sense. In meaning-making we verbalize, report and narrate, whereas sensing is preconscious, nonverbal, experienced. As such, neither side can win. To be more precise, neither must win, if we want to have a global understanding of the phenomenon. Wetherell's own approach that sees affective practices as tangles of activities that are constantly in motion is appealing in its flexibility. Affective practices can be improvised or trained, or regulated repetitions; they can be habitual and conventional or creative and elastic. Importantly, affects are not seen as objects inside the self but as responses to a situation and therefore relational by nature. This relationality and intersubjectivity makes the self a nexus that connects the various forces, both verbalized and non-discursive:

> The individual is a site in which multiple sources of activation and information about body states, situations, past experiences, linguistic forms, flowering thoughts, etc. become woven together.   (Wetherell 2012: 22)

The individual, however, is not a solipsistic creature. It makes sense that researchers in the *social* sciences and cultural studies emphasize the social nature of affect and our mutual interdependency on the affective states of others. Another field of research into the social nature of emotions is the sociology of emotions. This line of inquiry goes back to the 1970s. Sociologists had, of course, not been oblivious to the role of emotion in social reality before, but the programmatic reaffirmation that "emotions very frequently result from real, imagined, anticipated, or recollected outcomes of social relationships" (Kemper 1978: 30) launched a new

paradigm within sociology (Bericat 2016). Emotions are present in all social phenomena. The idea that the context of our social relations is where our emotions emerge, are experienced and have meaning lead to the realization that sociology needs to study the affective structures and emotional dynamics of social life (ibid.: 7). In other words, the sociology of emotions needs to study both the social nature of emotions and the emotional nature of social reality (ibid.: 5):

> Loneliness, envy, hate, fear, shame, pride, horror, resentment, grief, nostalgia, trust, sadness, satisfaction, joy, anger, happiness, frustration and a myriad of other feelings emerge in specific social situations, expressing in the individual's bodily consciousness the rich spectrum of forms of human social interaction and relationships. Understanding an emotion means understanding the situation and social relation that produces it. … any description, explanation or sociological understanding of a social phenomenon is incomplete, and therefore false, if it does not incorporate the *feeling subject* into its study of structures and social processes.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(Bericat 2012: 3–4; italics in the original)

Are you confused yet? I confess I was, and to an extent I still am. For quite some time, defining affect seemed like being trapped in a maze. In my early writings on affect and the affective in translation, one can follow a trajectory where I desperately try to pin the discussion on one affect theory or another, shifting grounds with different datasets and research questions, but where I also lose my bearings and try to regain them as I go along. I was also feeling increasingly undecided about selecting between the words "affect" and "emotion", and one can observe how I waver between the two in my publications. Two texts helped me gain my bearings. The first one, an article by Claudia Wassmann (2016), made me realize that the essence of the matter was perhaps in danger of getting lost in translation. In her article, "Forgotten Origins, Occluded Meanings: Translation of Emotion Terms", she discusses the convoluted trajectory of terms such as affect, emotion and feeling as translations of various core texts were produced between German and English. The translation strategies highlighted different aspects of the concepts, depending on the aims and aspiration of the scholars-cum-translators. This kind of reframing in translation should not come as a surprise to us translation scholars, as many of us have worked on identifying similar translation trajectories in other texts. Still, coming across this article was a relief for me: it allowed me to fully appreciate that the struggles over appropriate definitions and the turf fights over acceptable terminology are, at least to some (and probably significant) extent, issues of translation, of cultural and indeed affective attachments and appropriations of particular paradigms and dominant languages.

Many of the conceptual networks Wassmann studies in her article were originally coined in German and only travelled into English in translation. In today's

world of academic endeavours, the uncontested dominant language is English, and researchers working with (also) other languages find themselves in a situation where they need to map these other languages onto a terrain already charted and signposted by the English lexicon, in this case working to differentiate between affect, emotion and feeling. Hence also my struggles in my native language, Finnish. In my language, unless one wants to revert to the handy loan words of *affekti* and *emootio*, one is left with mapping the most obvious parallel term *tunne*[4] with one of the three and then trying to innovatively sort out the remaining two (that could have equally well been translated with *tunne*) with somewhat forced solutions such as *tuntemus* or *tunnetila*. Still, it took Wassmann's article for me to trust my own gut feeling that the various categorizations I kept reading about and trying to sort out were perhaps not fully sortable because they were based on fundamentally arbitrary linguistic expressions and categorizations of an equally fundamentally intertwined complex of the human psyche and interpersonality. With this, I do not wish to imply that it would be unnecessary or pointless to use precise terminology, accurate translations and careful definitions. What I do wish to say is that no matter how much energy we spend teasing out differences and similarities, at the end of the day one scholar's feeling will be another scholar's affect, and the borders between the bodily, the mental, the cognitive and the interpersonal and the social are man-made methodological shorthands to disentangle a complex that does not respect these, or any, boundaries. What is more important is to pay attention to the concepts being discussed, and whether the author is making claims that concern neural activity in the amygdala, or a consciously recognized and narratable/narrated state of mind, or interpersonal flows of energy, or all of these, or something else.

The other text which helped me sort out my own thoughts is the book *Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding* by Margaret Wetherell (2012). This is a reference I have already cited numerous times above. It is not a kind book, in the sense that it is very straightforward in its criticism of the "wrong turns" the author sees affect studies have taken, but it proved invaluable to me in providing both an overview of the terrain and signposting on how to navigate, and in offering a global perspective I could relate to. The focus on affective practices discussed above allows one to sidestep some longstanding debates such as the primariness of body versus mind, and individual versus social, as well as the role of narration and interpretation. Instead, these can be seen as a bundle of relations that interact with each other within an affective practice. It also leaves the more pragmatic questions

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4.   From the general verb *tuntua,* with a wide range of meanings, from having emotions and feelings to a sensation or a hunch.

of data and methodology open-ended, and does not predetermine either philosophical theorizing or empirical testing.

The impulse to separate what is bodily felt from what is cognitively recognized or verbally or otherwise expressed reflects the long rationalist tradition of keeping "the body" and "the mind" firmly separate, going back to Cartesian dualism (for an overview see Muñoz Martín 2016). It can also be seen as a methodological inheritance from the hard sciences, where the somatic level is seen to offer possibilities for new measurements and hence new discoveries. To explore whether this promise can lead to new insights in the human sciences as well, the somatic and the cognitive levels need to be methodologically disintegrated (Damasio 2000: 19). Interdisciplinary empirical studies may indeed lead to new discoveries about human interaction. However, the desire for analytical duality also testifies to how modern Western science has often found the mysterious or more hidden layers of affect difficult to handle. Affects may well affect our being in the world in many ways that we do not know or cannot recognize. Although contemporary Western science operates with tight and objectifiable categorizations, this holistic view is not that alien to earlier understandings. Current psychology, for example, is empirically and somatically oriented, but in the etymology of the word psyche one finds the meaning of "soul". In today's disciplinary understandings, the soul seems to be a hopelessly non-scientific concept, but to understand how affects affect us and how we affect others through affects, we need to operate with fuzzy categories, working less with readily defined objects and more like explorers finding their way into a topic that is complex and deeply relational.

One of the complexities is the role of the body in affect. Affect is (also) embodied, that much largely everyone agrees. But what this embodiment entails has degrees. First, there is the issue of body versus mind, and the problem of understanding how cognitive processes take place. Neuroscience focuses on the brain, and brain of course is a bodily organ, and any approach centred around cognitive brain functions, be it in the cortex, hippocampus, thalamus or hypothalamus or elsewhere, is by definition dealing with the body. But since we usually conceive the brain as the residence of the mind, the issue of the brain versus the lived body tends to create a division where the body is the non-brain. For some, this focus on the bodily, on the visceral layer, is the core of affect and the main rationale for any affect theory, and they are eager to plunge into the "murky connections between fabrics and feelings, between the glutinous and the guffaw (for example)" (Highmore 2010: 119). For others, the body appears as kinetic, dynamic and situated in space and time – a body that moves as it feels and feels itself moving, and while moving affects other bodies and is affected by them (Probyn 2010: 77). Some philosophize even more open-ended and unbounded definitions for the bodily. Deleuze's (1988: 127) summary of Spinoza's thinking is that the body "can

be anything: it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity."

The spectrum of understandings of what bodies can be seems to be similar to the person-internal–social continuum discussed above. A body can refer to anything, from a contained and measurable biological organism to a fluid relational collectivity, and it can be human or non-human. There are bodies with organs, and those without. Deleuze and Quattari (in a fairly dense English translation by Brian Massumi) ask not what a body is but what it can do and with whom:

> We will never ask what a [body without organs] means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge.
>
> (Deleuze & Quattari 1987: 4)

To answer these questions, the body is perceived as a constellation of unstable and changing relationships, an assemblage. These material and machinic assemblages of physical objects (ibid.: 7) and their affective capacities open up a radically expanded horizon for exploring affects. A particularly interesting interface of bodies with and without organs for our times is that between a human body and technology, and the assemblages they can enter into (see Chapter 7). I am tempted to propose that we need to apply a holistic approach not only to the study of affect but also to our understanding of the body, and consequently, to our thinking of embodied affect. And as the embodied affect is also embedded, the spatial and material relations and their affective qualities also need to be acknowledged (see Chapter 6).

The kind of interpretive flexibility that postmodern cultural theories such as Massumi's exhibit may be difficult to accommodate in fields with different traditions of thinking, such as psychology. One significant and recurrent difference between the terms "emotion" and "affect" is that while emotion, as a primarily psychological term, tends to foreground the individual, the use of affect, especially in the social sciences, tends to be connected to a view of affect as an interpretable and narratable state and as a social force. In other words, while the former tends to take emotion or affect as a noun, the latter also builds on the idea of affect as a verb. Although this is not a clear-cut division and terminologies vary, as my brief discussion of the various usages above aims to show, it is clear that researchers interested in emotion or affect position themselves differently on the spectrums between the biological and the non-organic, the mental and the cognitive, and the interpersonal and the social. I acknowledge that with my own background in the sociology of translation, with a longstanding investment in thinking through

issues such as translation ethics and translators' agency, my research interests are at the more social end of the continuum from the biological and individual to the social and collective. In the chapters that follow, I emphasize the interpersonal and the social elements of *affecting* and being *affected.*

I acknowledge my significant shortcomings in the clinical research traditions required for serious engagement with the biological study of the human body, and in none of the following chapters will you find me interpreting brain images, perspiration levels or pupillometric data. This is not to be seen as a willingness to ignore the bodily side of affect. On the contrary. With notions such as bodily capital (Chapter 5), I wish to encourage researchers to also consider the relevance of translators' and interpreters' corporeality, the fact that also bodies matter, and that they matter affectively. We affect and are affected through our bodies as well as our minds, and we are conditioned by our material and virtual spatiality that directs us and modifies our ability to affect. This is more easily recognizable in the case of interpreters whose embodied situatedness in interaction has a direct bearing on how the situation evolves. Interpreters also operate orally, that is, they use their body as their instrument. In contrast, the affective layers of written translation may appear less central. This, however, is a misperception: the loss of the bodily layer in written communication only reinforces the relevance of affectivity on the textual level. These two modes simply operate differently, and highlight different aspects of affect. Having said that, I also want to emphasize that although translations come to readers in a textually transmitted, non-bodied form, human translators also have an embodied existence, which affects their life and work in a number of ways. They, too, are located in specific places, and are bodily affected by their translation work.

Translating and interpreting do not affect only translators and interpreters. "Bodies are empowered and disempowered by their interactions with other bodies," as Tim Rayner (2014) summarizes Spinoza's argument, and "from the nature of this affect, we can tell whether or not this interaction is good, or healthy, for us, or not." This is where questions of affect come very close to my other long-standing topic of interest, ethics. The activities of translating and interpreting are foundationally relational and interpersonal, and the experience, good or bad, of "living with translation" extends to all parties involved. Here is how Primo Levi – in a translation by Harry Thomas – describes the embodied feeling of being translated:

> When the author comes across a passage of his work translated into a language he knows, the author feels – one at a time or all at once – flattered, betrayed, ennobled, x-rayed, castrated, flattened, raped, adorned, killed. It is rare that an author remains indifferent toward a translator, however renowned or unknown, *who has stuck his nose and fingers into the author's guts*: the author would like to send the

> translator – one at a time or all at once – the author's heart (carefully packed), a check, a laurel wreath, or the mafia's enforcers.   (Levi 2017; emphasis added)

To sum up, affect affects translating and interpreting in multiple ways. Some of these are sticky and immediately recognizable, and they bear witness to the notion of translating and interpreting as affective labour, as activities that are fundamentally inscribed with managing emotions. This argument will be elaborated in Chapter 2.

1.4   What can we do with affect?

We teach young scholars to define their core concepts. Above I tried to practice what I preach. Since it is evident that we are dealing with a potentially confusing concept that has acquired multiple meanings in different research paradigms, a discussion of theoretical affinities is necessary to allow the reader to see which elements are foregrounded in this book, and also to judge which are pushed aside. Still, more important than answering the question "what is affect" may well be to respond to other kinds of questions. I sympathize with how Sara Ahmed (2014: 4) describes the task she has given herself in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*:

> So rather than asking 'What are emotions?', I will ask, 'What do emotions do?' In asking this question, I will not offer a singular theory of emotion, or one account of the work that emotions do. Rather, I will track how emotions circulate between bodies, examining how they 'stick' as well as move. … I will not offer a full review of this history [of thinking on emotions], which would be an impossible task. … In the face of this history, my task is a modest one: to show how my thinking has been informed by my contact with some work on emotions.

Looking at different aspects of translating and interpreting through the lens of the affective, I have posed myself the following question: what can the focus on the affective add to our existing understanding of translatorial practices? This is what I aim to give at least tentative answers to in the different chapters of this book. In the social sciences, the 21st-century scholarly focus on affect has sometimes been seen as a move away from challenging issues, as an escape route (Hemmings 2005). The affect turn has also often been hailed as a new departure away from the earlier poststructuralist obsession with language (Wetherell 2012: 19). In translation studies, I see no such need for escape, but a lot of promise. In any case, the move away from language is difficult to agree with and needs to be qualified in the context of studying language-based activities. While I agree that focussing on affect creates new openings that enable us to escape the non sequiturs of poststructuralism, I argue that while affect can indeed be defined as either preconscious bodily

reactions (when taking an individualistic and anthropocentric approach) or as a form of energy flowing between persons and things (when taking a situated view), language still remains one central vehicle for transmitting affects and affecting others, and verbalizations are also our main method for describing, explaining and interpreting the experiences of affect we and others have. In a book that discusses language-based activities such as oral and written translation, the roles of language cannot and will not be overlooked. Rather, I see affect as one lens through which we can revisit many elements familiar from previous translation and interpreting research, from textual analysis, translation strategies and aesthetics to reception studies, translational workplace studies and process research.

But why should we worry about affect? Does it matter? I believe it does. For theorists, the role of affect in "living with translation", at all stages of production and reception, with all the involved complexities and situationalities, offers challenges that are not yet sufficiently resolved in TS literature. The recent rise of affect theory in cultural studies highlights the necessity to take affect into account in culturally oriented translation research as well. Even more compelling is the evidence from recent neuroscience: if we agree that translating is decision-making and if we now know that a large part of that decision-making is guided by affective factors, and that these factors largely operate under the radar of our consciousness, affect provides a significant explanatory factor we are yet to fully uncover. The lens of affect is also a good antidote to a tendency sometimes found in translation studies to automatically place translators and interpreters in the "good-guys" category, assuming them to always be virtuous, ethical and rightminded in communication, building bridges for others and never seeking their own. Affecting and being affected is decisively undecided in terms of moral value and positivity. Affects may be joyful, virtuous and good, but they may also be unwanted, and lead to poor outcomes and suffering. Gut-reactions may lead you to make right choices, or then not. Affect is both/and.

Currently, there is no general theory of affect (although there is something called affect theory both in cultural studies and in psychology), and it is thus perhaps not too surprising that there is no shared understanding of affect within translation studies either, or necessarily a need for one. Affects are muddy, vague and hard to capture (as soon as a bodily felt affect is verbalized, for example, one can argue that it is no longer an affect but something else). Affects can be seen as either individual or collective, and they are a shifting and changeable phenomenon rather than an absolute, on/off switch; a process rather than a fixed position. The same can be said of affect theory: it, too, is muddy, vague and changeable, both methodologically and conceptually. But the notion of affect can lend us new and valuable viewpoints into translating and into the reception of translations. I am convinced that a thicker affective layer needs to be added to our descriptions

of translational phenomena, functioning as a set of explanatory mechanisms for why translations turn out the way they do, as well as why readers react to them the way they do, and how and why translations circulate and make waves (or not) in a particular cultural context; for explaining the public service interpreters' precarious position in interaction and in society; for understanding the discontents of industry–translator relations; and for the changing cultural status and social spaces of translations, and many other issues pertinent to translation and interpreting research and practice.

Methodologically, this affective layer can be approached via various research paradigms. One option is to take the route of the natural sciences, operating with tools such as the EEG, tomography, skin conductance measurements and pupillometrics (pupil size, for example, is known to respond to positive and negative affects), and to bring the questions of affect in contact with recent process studies, or cognitive translation studies (see O'Brien 2011: 5–6 and *passim*; Muñoz Martín 2016). Another course of research is to study experiences, both as they unfold and those in the past or in the future, in the form of memories, perceptions or anticipation (see the examples discussed in Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016). In recent usability research, increasing focus has been placed on user experience, and methods developed in that area may be used to uncover both the experiences of translators and those of the users of translations (Suojanen, Koskinen and Tuominen 2015a). A third route will involve a return to literary and cultural theories, that is, a renewed engagement of translation studies with theories of aesthetics, combined with a continued engagement with cognitive stylistics (see Boase-Beier 2006). Undoubtedly, other avenues can also be found. Whichever route one selects, an increased understanding of the role of affect in translating will enhance our knowledge of what translation is about.

It would be premature, I think, to start constructing a paradigm or research model for studying affect in translation studies, and given the complexity of the phenomenon under study, it may be permanently too restrictive to commit to any single line of enquiry and all its concomitant presuppositions. I admit that several years ago when I first started building an interest in affect, and even in 2016 when I first started writing this manuscript, I had a vision of mastering the topic and providing a fixed model for future research. Failing to arrive at solid conceptualizations was a source of great frustration to me for quite some time. The more I have delved into the literature in a number of fields, however, the more I have learned to appreciate and value the multitude of views I have encountered. In this introduction and in the following chapters, I have very consciously avoided proposing any unified research model, or even elaborating a strict theoretical framework to be consistently applied across the chapters of this one book. Instead, I

have traced the various aspects and contexts of translating and interpreting to tease out the affective resonances in many commonly discussed areas of study. I very much agree with Seigworth and Gregg's (2010: 4; italics in the original) understanding that the promise of affect theory lies in illuminating the various "belongings to this world":

> Because affect emerges out of muddy, unmediated relatedness and not in some dialectical reconciliation of cleanly oppositional elements or primary units, it makes easy compartmentalisms give way to thresholds and tensions, blends and blurs. … [A]ffect's impinging/extruded belonging to worlds, bodies, and their in-betweenness – affect in its immanence – signals the very promise of affect theory too: casting illumination upon the "not yet" of body's doing, casting a line along the hopeful (though also fearful) cusp of emergent futurity, casting its lot with the infinitely connectable, impersonal, and contagious belongings to *this* world.

The chapters that follow are an attempt to map ways of theorizing these belongings in the context of translating and interpreting. Although the primary aim is theoretical, my approach is also empirical and pragmatic. With the exception of Chapter 2, which lays further theoretical ground for the rest of the book and Chapter 8 which is based on reflections on my own teaching experience from the perspective of affect, the various chapters advance the theoretical argument also through reports on findings from empirical data, teasing out some potential avenues for future study into the various belongings to the worlds of translating and interpreting. Chapter 3 is the most directly textual chapter in its orientation, focussing on appraising and modulating affects in the textual processes of translation. It looks into source text analysis, translation strategies and reception from the interlaced perspectives of affects and affinity. Chapter 4 engages with experienced affect in literary translation, studying autobiographical material provided by a famous literary translator, Pentti Saarikoski. Chapter 5 investigates the affective and bodily capital of public service interpreters and discusses professional normative expectations from these perspectives. The core concepts of Chapter 6 are space and place, and they are examined in connection with translators' workplaces, the spaces available for translation within artistic performances and the playful spaces of translation in the cyberspace. Chapter 7 discusses current and future translation technology from the point of view of affect, and in Chapter 8 I try to tackle the repercussions of all of the above in translator training as well as the affects of the trainers themselves. Chapter 9 concludes the book.

Each chapter contributes to the main argument put forth in the book, but they are also written in a manner that allows readers to choose according to their individual interests. In addition to the affect theories discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, a number of different theoretical frameworks are brought into play, from appraisal

theory (Chapter 3) and work engagement (Chapter 4) to the concepts of social capital and performativity (Chapter 5), Doreen Massey's theorization on space and place (Chapter 6), and the many forms of empathy (Chapter 8). These theories are introduced within the chapter in question. The more general theoretical background introduced in this chapter and the next one informs all of the discussion that will follow.

CHAPTER 2

Affective labour and sticky affects

2.1   Affective labour

The main argument that runs through this book is that translating and interpreting are (among other things) forms of affective labour, and that engaging with affect is therefore of extreme value in understanding translating and interpreting as complex, interpersonal, situated and embodied forms of human communication. Translational activities are fundamentally meditational, and translators and interpreters participate in communication that is not their own, speaking for others. This entails listening empathetically to understand what others are trying to express, sounding the context of reception to navigate potential rocky patches and then performing the actual communicative act with an air of detachment while at the same time communicating trustworthiness and professionalism. All this requires constant management of felt and performed affects, that is, affective labour.

Several different concepts and approaches have been developed to capture the role of affects and emotions at work since the early contributions of a number of mid-20th-century sociologists. For example, C. Wright Mills (1951) analysed the alienation of the modern work force, and Talcott Parson's classic study (1951) identified affective neutrality as a core element of modern professionalism. Another core reference of the time is Erving Goffman, and his thesis *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959). The term emotional labour is often associated with *The Managed Heart,* a classic treatise by Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983/2003), in which Hochschild analyses the role of managing emotions in particular occupations, namely those where the employee is either in a face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with clients, with the task of evoking particular emotions in them, and in which the employer manages the employees' emotional conduct through training and supervision (Hochschild 1983/2003: 147). To illustrate the different features of emotional labour, she analyses the expected conduct, facial expressions and friendly customer service of flight attendants.

To be consistent with my chosen terminology, below I will mainly use the term affective labour (rather than emotional labour). This terminological choice also creates ties to its well-known collaborative usage by two political theorists, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (e.g., 2001). The term affective labour was originally promoted by Hardt (1999), who situated affective labour within the framework of immaterial labour, that is, the production of services, knowledge, communication as well as affects. The creation and manipulation of affects, the production and distribution of feelings, and the management of affinity or distance, all require affective labour. According to Hardt (ibid.: 90), capitalist postmodernization has foregrounded immaterial labour, placing affective labour, in particular, "at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of labouring forms". It has spread across the labour force and to all kinds of tasks (ibid.: 97). Hence, it has also acquired significant subversive and biopolitical potential in the sense of power to create, manage and control populations and to produce collective subjectivities (ibid.: 98). Also in the study of translating and interpreting, the economic and political aspects of affective labour cannot be overlooked. This is where affective labour ties together with the cultural politics of affect and affective economy (Ahmed 2014).

Affective economy is also Hochschild's core point; the subtitle of her book is *Commercialization of Human Feeling*. An essential element of emotional labour is that while the aim is to *appear* authentic, it is manufactured and staged, as well as bought and sold. The airline hostesses and other professional hospitality workers are expected to learn the feeling rules applicable to their trade and to regulate their feelings accordingly, performing being flight attendants. Human interaction, in Erving Goffman's classic view, is performative. That is, as participants of a given occasion, we act in a manner which serves to influence the other participants and to give them a given definition of the situation at hand (Goffman 1959/1990: 26, 231). We also act in a manner we expect others to find acceptable, to be able to maintain a "veneer of consensus" by asserting commonly shared values (ibid.: 21). Goffman talks about the art of impression management and the requirement of dramaturgical discipline to avoid gaffes and blunders. The focus of this discipline is both affective and embodied, as the performer needs to control the face and the voice: "Actual affective response must be concealed and an appropriate affective response must be displayed" (ibid.: 211).

Impression management may sound devious, but it is a regular part of social interaction. In everyday life we constantly manage the impressions of our selves and succumb to our pre-assigned social roles either consciously or sub-consciously. Goffman's argument is built on theatre metaphors. If all the world is not a stage, Goffman says, it is not easy to specify how it is not, as "life itself is a dramatically enacted thing" (1959/1990: 78; cf. p. 246). The expectations concerning a given social role tend to become institutionalized in abstract stereotypes, and

actors entering a particular occupational role will usually need to adapt to existing front expectations. In their performance, the occupational setting and stage props will provide the scene. For some occupations, the correct scene and props are crucially important (think of the operating theatre or shop floor, or the interpreting booth, for example); for others, there is more flexibility. Regardless of the setting, the "personal" front of elements such as gender, age and racial characteristics, size, looks, posture, speech patterns, gestures and facial expressions, forms the actor's essential "expressive equipment" (ibid.: 34). Some of this equipment is more transitory, others are quite fixed, and some we are born with.

Some scholars want to maintain a clear difference between affective labour and emotional labour. For example, James J. Thomas and Jennifer G. Correa (2016: 10–11) signal the latter to be about individual reactions to existing cultural contexts whereas the former produces those cultural contexts. The issue of how much contexts determine individual behaviour and to what extent individual behaviour can forge a change in the context is a repetition of the long-standing structure versus agency debates in sociology, or the nature versus nurture ones in biology. It may be impossible to determine which is more dominant, and it may make more sense to see people as "suspended in webs of significance they themselves have spun," to quote Clifford Geertz's famous line (1973: 5).

While it may sometimes be advantageous to maintain a differentiation between emotion (in the sense of individual, psychological phenomenon) and affect (in the sense of either a precognitive bodily event or a contextual force), too-rigid categorizations may also hinder our ability to observe and understand the many roles of affects in everyday contexts. The difference between emotional labour and affective labour is, to my mind at least, more a question of focus than of kind. Both concepts were first developed in response to the move from manufacturing to service society, which was seen as one of the underlying causes for the rising dominance of affective or emotional labour. They also share a critical stance towards the capitalist ethos of monetarizing affectivity and emotions. The Hochschildian perspective indeed focuses on appearances and modulation of personal emotion display, but the purpose of this personal activity is to produce and distribute affects, either collectively or vis-à-vis an individual client. In the same vein, Hardt (1999: 96) emphasizes the human quality of affective labour even if it would not happen in person. Both approaches also frame the phenomenon similarly, in the sense of identifying particular occupations that are oriented towards affective behaviour such as caring, comforting, welcoming, reassuring and entertaining. For Hochschild, typical examples of emotional labour are to be found in service activities; Hardt underlines the role of communication and affect in the contemporary knowledge-intensive economy, which he labels "informational economy". We might just as well choose to call it affective economy.

> The term service here covers a large range of activities from health care, education, and finance, to transportation, entertainment, and advertising. The jobs, for the most part, are highly mobile and involve flexible skills. More importantly, they are characterized in general by the central role played by knowledge, information, communication, and affect. In this sense, we can call the postindustrial economy an informational economy.   (Hardt 1999: 91)

In this new economy, Hardt (1999: 96) argues, affective labour is embedded in the moments of human interaction and communication, where it produces intangible effects: "a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion – even a sense of connectedness or community". In multilingual contexts, this is the sphere of translating and interpreting.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to finecomb the similarities and differences in the various approaches to emotional and affective labour and their historical trajectories. Instead, following the logic of consilience and bridge concepts discussed in Chapter 1, I use the concept of affective labour in a broad sense, to denote labour that aims to produce and modulate affects in either personal interaction (such as most interpreting scenarios) or in textually transmitted communication (in translation). Affective labour also refers to the performance in and through which particular affects (such as fear of betrayal) are being managed and particular affects (such as competence and trustworthiness) are put on display. This approach will effectively render all professions and occupations as affective labour. While this may seem like an unwanted outcome of a classification project, I feel it makes perfect sense: as humans we bring our affects to any endeavour we engage in and to all our interactions with others and ourselves. While accepting affectivity as a part of the human condition, the notion of affective labour allows us to analytically explore what kinds of affective displays and which strategies of affect management, and to which degree, are typical to particular occupations and working-life scenarios, translating and interpreting included.

If we consider affective labour to be related to the management of affects and emotions of oneself and others, and if we accept the view of translating and interpreting as forms of interpersonal, situated and embodied human communication, with the resulting affective and emotional complexities involved and also bodily felt, we also need to acknowledge the role of affective labour in successful professional performance. Or rather, its *multiple* roles, as affectivity comes into play in many shapes and forms. We can perhaps begin by stating the most obvious connection first: translation and interpreting are modes of language work, and the affective layer of language is the raw material that translators and interpreters process on a daily basis. In addition to its propositional content, each utterance also carries attitude or emotion, conveyed with either lexical and grammatical means or paralinguistically, for example, with intonation or capital letters and emoticons.

If affect is an essential element of language, it is easy to argue that affects and affect modulation also play a role in all writing, reading and, therefore doubly so, in translating (Davou 2007). In translation, elements such as politeness strategies, hedging, expressions of stance and appraisal, and signals of emotional stage are interpreted and contrastively analysed, leading to judgements over how best to convey them or, if necessary, how to modulate them for the new readership with the help of particular translation strategies. And in the resulting translation, various affective elements are deployed, to accomplish the desired outcomes. Naturally, texts do not only contain affects, they often also aim to cause particular kinds of affects in their readers. Similarly, the translator can and is often expected to modulate the readers' affective engagement (see Chapter 3).

The notion of affective labour put forward in this book goes beyond the linguistic level, and beyond the translator's task of analysing, reproducing or modulating textual affects. As discussed above, affective labour can in fact be seen as a redundant term, as we can consider all human endeavours through their affective valence. However, with regard to some activities, affective aspects are more pronounced, and expectations for particular affective stances or emotional performances are more explicit and durable than in some others. Some of these durable affective aspects are particularly "sticky", to use the term created by Sara Ahmed already referred to a number of times in Chapter 1. As the objects of emotion circulate, in this case translation and interpreting, they become "sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension" (Ahmed 2014: 11; see also Ahmed 2010). Ahmed (2014: 44) also emphasizes that we are not always aware of how we feel, and that repression plays a significant role in making objects sticky and making an affect stick to them.[5] Translating and interpreting, although arguably the written and oral forms of the same activity, are curiously antagonistic in terms of the affective expectations placed on them and the affects that stick to them. In interpreting, normative expectations of professional conduct centre around the concept of neutrality. In translation, the parallel term has traditionally been fidelity, and this variation in central terminology for ethical conduct has valorized the two interlinked professional spheres differently. The role of affective capital and the expectations for affectively acceptable performances in interpreting will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5; in the following, I take a brief look at the history of sticky affects on translation.

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5.   I will return to this deep psychological argument of unconscious affects briefly in Chapter 8, through Jung's concept of shadow work.

2.2   Love as a sticky affect in translation

Allured by the readily available allusions to sexual relationships in defining translation practice, commentators have resorted to numerous related metaphors, typically gendering translation as the feminine and the source text as the masculine partner and discussing translation in terms of prostitutes and pimps (Robinson), breaking the hymen (Derrida), violent penetration (Steiner), or giving birth (Schleiermacher), and then setting boundaries to acceptable behaviour. Perhaps the best known and most long-lived adage is the notion of *les belles infideles*, the idea of the beautiful translation always being an unfaithful one. It was originally coined to deride the free translation style prevalent in 17th- and 18th-century France, and it is built on the idea that translations, like women, can either be pretty or faithful, but not both. Even in today's parlance this idea is often evoked, typically to signal that we may need to accept some ugliness in translation in order to get a faithful re-rendering of the original. Lori Chamberlein's article from 1988 provides a powerful overview of this discourse that tends to establish a hierarchy in which translation and the translator are subservient to the original and a set of accepted affective responses to this hierarchy.

In the 1990s, feminist translation scholars hijacked this patriarchal and often misogynist imagery for their own purposes. For example, Susanne de Lotbinière-Harwood (1991) turned the French adage on its head by adding a prefix and calling her own translation practice rebelliously as "re-belle and infidèle". In the same year, Luise von Flotow (1991: 82) praised Lotbinière-Harwood's hijacking translation practices and put forth an agenda that would make changes to "the habitual 'missionary' position assigned to translation". While the rhetoric of the second-wave feminist translators was belligerent, their actual practices were often quite amicable in the sense of translations produced in perfect understanding of likeminded authors. Publications describing the Canadian context, in particular, tell a continued story of a closely-knit collectivity, and while the texts were moving across languages (between French and English), the socio-cultural distance between the author and translator was not very long. In contrast, the translational relationship between radically different realities that Gayatri Spivak depicts in her early and influential text "Politics of Translation" speaks of intense intimacy and passion between the translator and the text but also of the loss of identity and the limits of fully understanding a foreign reality:

> To surrender in translation is more erotic than ethical. In that situation the good-willing attitude "she is just like me" is not very helpful. In so far as Michele Barrett is not like Gayatri Spivak, their friendship is more effective as a translation. In order to earn that right of friendship or surrender of identity, of knowing that the

> rhetoric of the text indicates the limits of language for you as long as you are with the text, you have to be in a different relationship with the language, not even only with the specific text.
> (Spivak 1993: 183)

While notions of love and friendship have lived on in the discourses of translators, many modern translation scholars have tended to either steer away from such statements or regard them as misguided – indeed, among my own early publications was a passionate (sic!) column in a university magazine against the idea of seeing translation as a labour of love (Koskinen 1995). Translation research in the 21st century has also moved away from an essayistic style, and to other kinds of questions. With hindsight, I now think that centuries of analytical thinking of translation in terms of relationships is indeed worth listening to if one wants to understand how and why particular affects stick, regardless of whether you agree with the imagery chosen to describe it. First, the long history of normative statements about fidelity testifies to a fear of translators not being so, and this fear or worry is clearly the driving force behind normative calls for neutral and faithful rendering. The translator as traitor is another recurrent imagery, and a source of drama in many fictional depictions of translators and interpreters (Kaindl & Spitzl 2014). Interestingly, in her analysis of such fictional works authored by translators themselves, Jean Anderson (2005) uncovers a wealth of portrayals of a marginalized professional group whose members can be seen as treasonous and transgressive. Linking these narratives directly to the affects involved in literary translation, she depicts a number of ailments from feelings of displacement and loss of identity to a nagging sense of derivativeness. Indeed, we can hypothesize that through fiction these translators are able to tap into and process the dark side of their vocation, working on its shadowy elements.

It is no wonder that authors may wish to be loved, or at least not hated and betrayed by their translators. The idea of the translator and author as lovers, friends or soul mates also provides an image of translation that translators themselves may find pleasing. However, it is also necessary to ask, "why is it assumed to be better to do the same thing if it is done *out of love*?" (Ahmed 2014: 124). Love, if anything, is a sticky affect with extensive cultural conditioning, and the argument is therefore hard to resist. The idea of loving translation also resonates with the current cultural climate where knowledge workers are expected to love their work (and hence to accept precarious conditions or low pay) (Tokumitsu 2015). Dedicating one's time and effort to a text one utterly dislikes or fundamentally disagrees with, or to a client one does not see eye to eye with, is emotionally taxing. Although one rarely encounters translators ranting about these matters in public, backstage venting among colleagues is a well-known pressure valve. In contrast, a sense of unison and intimacy can indeed be quite rewarding, be it a translation of a literary work you value or the production of documentation needed for a cause you believe in.

The advice to choose your authors, given by Wentworth Dillon, the 4th Earl of Roscommon, known for his blank verse translation of the *Ars Poetica* (1680), may therefore make sense even today:

> Examine how your *Humour* is inclin'd
> And which the *Ruling Passion* of your Mind;
> Then seek a *Poet* who *your* way does bend,
> and chuse an *Author* as you chuse a *Friend*;
> United by this *Sympathetick Bond*,
> you grow familiar, intimate and fond;
> your *Thoughts*, your *Words*, your *Stiles*, your *Souls* agree,
> no longer his *Interpreter* but *He*.   (Dillon 1684 in Reynolds 2011: 127)

Again, my earlier attitude to this poem has been quite negative, focusing on the last line of this stanza which I saw as an anti-empowering demand for the translator to diminish themselves to portray someone else. Reanalysing it through an explicitly affective reading, I now interpret the poem as much more benign to translators. In fact, in Dillon's world of men not "compelled by Want to prostitute their pen" as another line of the poem goes, the poet–author is the less agentic party, waiting to become selected. The first two lines repeat an argument I make in Chapter 8: in order not to be swayed by the sticky affects one needs to develop self-awareness and abilities for listening to one's own affective and embodied reactions. Even the last line can equally well be interpreted as the author being subsumed by the translator through intimacy, familiarity and fondness, or seen as a psycho-analytical process of identification (Ahmed 2014: 126). The idea of the source text (author) and the translation (translator) being tied together through a bond of love also resonates with a fear of loss and a prospect of grief: "love announces itself most passionately when faced with the loss of the object" (ibid.: 130).

The idea of the sympathetic bond was born in and from the developing Romantic spirit of divinely inspired authorship, but, similar to gendered imagery, it has lived on in translation theory and in the minds of those involved in literary translation. The translator and translation scholar Lawrence Venuti took issue with this mind-set, re-labelled as *simpatico*, in his influential book on translators' invisibility (Venuti 1995: 273–306). After quoting the same fragment of Dillon's poem as I did above, he gives an anecdote of the early days of his own career as a translator of poetry, recounting the advice he was given by a senior colleague who effectively repeated the advice on a sympathetic bond, but with an additional twist of finding a poet who is your contemporary so that your translation career can develop side by side with your author's. In his typical style of refraining from straight-forward statements, Venuti explores the potential and the limits of the idea of merging the identity of the translator with that of the author, coming to

a conclusion that the whole notion of *simpatico* is an illusion, produced with the help of Venuti's pet enemy, the fluent translation strategy:

> Most crucially, [*simpatico*] conceals the fact that in order to produce the effect of transparency in a translated text, in order to give the reader the sense that the text is a window onto the author, translators must manipulate what often seems to be a very resistant material, i.e., the language in which they are translating. … Transparency occurs only when the translation reads fluently, when there are no awkward phrasings, unidiomatic constructions or confused meanings, when clear syntactical connections and consistent pronouns create intelligibility to the reader. … These formal techniques [of poetry translation] reveal that transparency is an illusionistic effect: it depends on the translator's work with language, but hides this work, even the very presence of language, by suggesting that the author can be seen in translation, that in it the author speaks in his or her own voice.
> (Venuti 1995: 286–287)

Venuti goes on to explain how his own English translation of the Italian poems by Milo De Angelis betrays the target culture expectations of fluency and transparency, but that only in so doing it is able to achieve fidelity to the source text, if only in an abusive manner, through excess and supplementarity. These, in turn, are not too alien to the speculative poetry in question. In a way, the *simpatico* model he just renounced because of the attached values of fluency and transparency now returns through another, more resistant and hence more desired translation strategy. In her reassessment and rehabilitation of the concept of *simpatico*, Anna Strowe (2011: 55) defines it as "a perceived affinity between translator and author – be it personal, emotional, or stylistic – that is created, reinforced or manipulated by the translator." In my reading of the *simpatico* critique, Venuti the translator-cum-theorist is in fact doing just that: starting from personal affinity, he moves on to creating and reinforcing stylistic and, I'd like to argue, also emotional affinity. He is not denouncing the idea of loving your author; he is simply criticizing a particular translation strategy and proposing a rougher kind of love. I let Leonard Cohen (*I'm your man*, 1988) summarize:

> If you want a lover
> I'll do anything you ask me to
> And if you want another kind of love
> I'll wear a mask for you.

Indeed, a mask is what is needed for professional performance. Neutral mediation, the goal of fluent strategies and the ethical requirement posed to translators and interpreters alike, is not a given; it is performed, and achieved through active engagement in affective labour by all participants in interaction. According to Anthony Pym (2012: 80–81), the professional role of the interpreter or translator

is like a mask, creating trust and providing a shelter underneath which the interpreter or translator can complete the task.

It is good to remember that not only the interpreter but also the translator puts on a mask in the sense of giving her voice to the other, and also the translator's "I" belongs to the author (and the translator's own voice, if needed to be heard, is conventionally marked out as a separate translator's note). In translation, the mask is mainly produced via verbal means, and fluent, non-estranging translation strategies are a core method for translators to put on a mask of professional neutrality. Non-fluency, in turn, poses a risk to either professionality (the risk of appearing incompetent) or neutrality (too much visibility drawn to the translator). In interpreting, the mask is worn in a more bodily manner. Similar to translation, fluent delivery devoid of an unwanted accent is one element of the interpreter's mask as well, but especially in face-to-face interpreting modes, the mask is also produced through gestures and mimics, or rather by way of *not* displaying them, and by displaying professional conduct through the outer habitus, in terms of clothing, posture and behaviour (see Chapter 5).

Translation studies has tended to emphasize the bridge-building qualities of translational activities, and many scholars have openly advocated for the empowerment of translating agents. The affective emphasis placed on either being friendly and loving towards your author and the more than mildly contradictory desire for being perceived as a neutral middleman can also be understood as a mirror image of the sticky fear of not being, or appearing to be, so. Much as we in the field may dislike the *traduttore, traditore* adages that draw attention to the risk of treason in translation, we may still need to accept the potential of failure in translation as an important element of our disciplinary self-understanding. The discourses of sympathy and love, and the practices of putting on masks, may well have their origin in the fear of ill treatment from the part of those being translated, but they also bear traces of translators' darker affects and shadows: the anxiety of potential embarrassment, shame or guilt over not managing to be amicable or fair in one's re-rendering, of being caught not succeeding (see Chapter 4). The same phenomenon may also have a role in translators' notoriously apologetic style in writing prefaces, discursively anticipating criticism even when it has not (yet) been voiced (Robinson 1991: xii). The affective commandment to build trust, through cultivating sympathy or disinterestedness, can be seen as the core affective task underlining all other layers of translatorial affective labour (Chesterman 2016: 178).

2.3   Affects and network economy

Traditional notions about the task of the translator, and the affects involved, tend to have a bipolar focus on either the author and the translator, or the source

text and the translation. This line of argument is also visible in the above discussion. These two protagonists (with or without an explicit addition of a reader figure) are not, however, the only actors in a translation process. Translating and interpreting are professional activities performed in teams. The contemporary, networked translation industry provides constellations of mutual dependence where translators, project managers, revisers, terminologists and IT people and other parties are in constant, albeit often virtual and indirect, contact. The communicative situations entail multiprofessional expertise, and translators and interpreters need to bring their professional mediational competences to the common table and secure a firm footing among other experts. These networks of relations provide a second layer of affective labour, tangential but not directly derived from the contents of the translatorial task at hand. An early contribution to the emerging field of translatorial workplace studies was Hanna Risku's book on translation project management in 2004. It did not quite make the waves in translation studies it should have (it was also a pioneering work on ethnography in translation studies), but the findings – that project management is all about the management of people – brought into the limelight a special trait of the then emerging new translatorial profession, the specificities of which are not necessarily always appreciated. Project managers surely engage in affective labour as they balance between the hopes and demands of clients and service providers while negotiating a tight financial line: "Managing someone else's formerly managed frustration and anger is itself a job that takes emotional labor" (Hochschild 1983/2003: 118).

Managing, modulating and manipulating affects is indeed hard work, and the multiprofessional playgrounds, network economy, technological advances and tightening financial constraints are a constant source of negative affects in the current translational landscape. The creation of the translation industry from the 1990s onwards is a powerful example of the restructuring of a professional field through the creation of a service culture and information economy Hardt (1999) discusses, and the current networked business model has created new sticky affects around translation. Rather than expecting love or fearing betrayal in a manner still prevalent in the context of literary translation, the business transaction partners of the current world of language service provision focus on capitalizable traits such as loyalty, commitment and malleability. The research by Kristiina Abdallah has significantly advanced our disciplinary understanding of the affective economy of translation production networks. In an article on agency theory (2010), she looks at some of their prevalent shortcomings, such as information asymmetry, adverse selection and goal conflicts, and the resulting asymmetries of commitment and moral hazards. Abdallah emphasizes that agency is always emotionally generated. Referring to the Australian sociologist Jack Barbalet (1996), she provides a list of emotions that contribute to agency: (1) confidence to act on behalf of self, (2)

trust, that is, the feeling of acting together with others, and (3) loyalty, that is, the feeling of acting on behalf of an institution (Abdallah 2010: 29).

Trust and loyalty are affects that have a long history of sticking with translatoriality, and they are also common concepts in translation studies; confidence to act, in turn, is a logical component of agency. In a network economy, all of these may suffer, leading to ethical stress, lack of motivation and loss of self-respect. With the help of interview data, Abdallah (2010: 29–30) identifies how translators manage "without being able to trust the intermediary principals and without being able to feel loyalty towards the production network they have been part of, and how, as a consequence, they have developed various coping strategies in order to retain their sense of agency." Coping strategies such as neck-saving through documentation, tit-for-tat retaliation to protect the self, rationalizing unethical behaviour, and, in extreme cases, exit from the network (cf. Abdallah & Koskinen 2007) are all humanly understandable although not necessarily optimal for the individual or healthy for the network in question (see also Section 6.2.1). It is of course the task of those responsible for the network to make sure that the conditions do not encourage opportunistic behaviour and lead to unwanted coping strategies among participants.

Since translating and interpreting networks are typically hierarchical, and translators and interpreters often in a peripheral position with limited negotiation power, their best options may well be to first be careful about choosing which networks they wish to join and, second, to cultivate emotion regulation skills and develop a wide arsenal of healthy coping strategies. This necessity has also led some scholars to hypothesize that recruiters might do well in trying to select students according to their emotional traits, and that emotional stability and low levels of negative affectivity might help students develop better coping strategies and abilities to alleviate stress and anxiety (Bontempo & Napier 2014).

Séverine Hubscher-Davidson devotes one chapter (2018, Chapter 3) to emotion regulation and discusses the emotional labour involved (ibid.: 122–127). She focuses on two opposing coping strategies that individuals have when faced with emotionally taxing situations and a consequent need to down-regulate their emotional engagement: suppression and reappraisal. Suppression concerns a modulation of response, a decrease in expressing felt emotions (ibid.: 109), whereas reappraisal refers to a cognitive process of reassessing what goes on to reduce the intensity of the negative feelings (ibid.: 110). Suppression has not fared well in empirical research: it has been found to lead to problems such as reduced cognitive functioning (impaired memory is a particularly relevant risk for interpreting), feelings of inauthenticity and deteriorating social relations. Reappraisal, in turn, has been found to improve well-being (ibid.: 110). I am tempted to also link it to

empathy and the ability to change perspectives, skills that help translators and interpreters in their mediation task (see also Chapter 8).

As the above examples also indicate, workplace studies (and this may well be true of psychological emotion regulation literature as well) have perhaps had a tendency to emphasize negative affects and the necessity to control and down-regulate negative emotions. It is good to remember that work also gives us a multitude of positive affects, and translators do indeed love many aspects of their work (Koskinen 2014b; Dam & Zethsen 2016; see Chapter 4 on the ups and downs of translation). It may also be that some professionals excel in up-regulating positive emotions in translating and interpreting, for example, by using engagement strategies. Sometimes it may also be wise to up-regulate negative emotions, for example, when entering a new network that raises doubts, as up-regulating anxieties may support navigation in a terrain expected to cause difficulties.

Managing up- and down-regulation is easier said than done. The emotional compass, for most of us, is not optimally calibrated. We may over-react to minor matters and overlook significant issues. This is where the corporeal side of affect may bring additional viewpoints. One significant difference between affect theories and other research agendas is that a focus on affect brings bodily aspects into the sphere of analytic attention. An increased focus on corporeality also allows us to theorize about translating and interpreting from a post-human perspective, discussing translators as cyborgs, the translator's body as non-bounded and meshing with technology, for example, by seeing translation memory tools as a case of extended cognition. As new forms of organizing translatorial labour emerge, it is also becoming ever more important to look at issues of ergonomics from the point of view of the limits of the body and of corporeal fatigue caused by unhealthy working conditions, for example, in the context of digitalized translating and interpreting platforms, many of which transform translatorial work into poorly paid microtasks, and translators and interpreters into task rabbits hanging around waiting for the next microgig and competing to be the fastest bidder.

Each subfield of translating and interpreting has its own peculiarities, and the exact forms of affective economies vary, but the current business models that place most practitioners in the position of a self-employed entrepreneur encourage the transformation of affective capital flexibly into economic capital since forms of affective capital such as the ability to please the client, to appear trustworthy and reliable, or to keep one's foreignness in control will make it more likely for the customer to return. This Foucauldian idea of the entrepreneurship of the self has been identified as a current societal megatrend, supported by the shifting employment structures (Foucault 2008; Lahikainen & Harni 2016: 26–27). In today's world, this line of thinking argues, we are expected to think of ourselves and of

our bodies through the concept of capital and to make our bodies and lives into businesses that we shape and mould to meet the needs and expectations of the prospective clients. In this kind of an economic climate, multilingual proficiency, performances of cultural authenticity, intercultural competences – and the affective labour involved in all of these – can be and is converted into economic capital. The new affective economy has brought along new sticky affects that are generated by the business model and network roles more than the translatorial tasks at hand. The issues of choosing your author lovingly and being loyal to the source text have given way to affective issues such as choosing your network cunningly, not being a sucker for working for too low fees and respecting the confidentiality requirements of NDA clauses. "What sticks?" is a question Sara Ahmed poses in her book (2014: 11), asking why social transformation is so difficult to achieve. The affective shift with regard to translation is worth noting; the changed emotional intensities are a powerful signal of a radical restructuring of the practice. Attention to affects and the ways in which they stick, providing readily available scripts for everyone involved, and also the ways in which they may become less sticky in time, allows us to understand the stability and changeability of the social organization of practices:

> This analysis of how we 'feel our way' approaches emotion as a form of cultural politics or world making. My argument about the cultural politics of emotions is developed not only as a critique of the psychologising and privatisation of emotions, but also as a critique of a model of social structure that neglects the emotional intensities, which allow social structures to be reified as forms of being. Attention to emotions allows us to address the question of how subjects become *invested* in particular structures such that their demise is felt as a kind of living death.   (Ahmed 2014: 12)

Words and affects move, stick and slide, and "we move, stick and slide with them" (Ahmed 2014: 14). Culturally powerful affects are sticky, and we get attached to particular objects through them. Even when we wish to challenge our affiliations and investments, we may find ourselves stuck. But transformations are also possible, as the shifting affective setups of translation indicate: "There is hope, of course, as things can get unstuck" (ibid.: 16). One way of getting things unstuck is through affective labour. The view presented by Hochschild is largely strategic, and the emerging picture of affective labour calculative and manipulative, but it can also be seen differently, in a more transformative light: in addition to the performative side of displaying the kinds of affects a particular occupation requires, affective labour can also be understood as working towards understanding and regulating one's own affective responses in various situations. Through this kind of affective labour, one could become more reflexive and more self-aware and analytically

observe the prevalent cultural and affective conditionings around translating and interpreting as social practices, become better able to recognize the kinds of negative forces that unconsciously work against the professions and more attuned to subtle changes in affective economies and therefore better able to adapt to changing situations and to be part of those changes.

Appraising and modulating affective valence in translation

"Thinking, writing and reading are integral to our capacities to affect and to be affected." This quotation from Elspeth Probyn (2010: 77) emphasizes the role of written language in our interaction with each other and the world, and summarizes the focus of this chapter, which looks at the role of affectivity in translation as reading and writing (and thinking). Probyn builds on a duet between writers and readers, developing a vision of affect as an interpersonal force, a force that is able to affect. In the case of translation, of course, this duet is broken into two parts, as the translator enters the scene first as a reader attuning herself to the written text in one language and then as a writer matching and modulating the affects she interpreted and experienced into a new text in another language. This chapter is divided into three sections that follow the logic of a linear translation process: Section 3.1 discusses text analysis from the perspective of appraising affects, Section 3.2 explores the issue of translation strategies from the point of view of affective modulation, and in Section 3.3 the affective undercurrents of reception are discussed.

Primary affects are, according to the definition by Silvain Tomkins discussed in Chapter 1, innate and non-conscious. But cultural, social and personal conceptions of acceptability, preference and desired effects make us (attempt to) control and regulate both whether and to what extent we allow particular affects (feelings and emotions in Tomkins' vocabulary) to surface in our cognition and behaviour, and what kinds of affects we try to induce in others. Affect regulation is in fact a central aspect of child development, socialization and acculturation (see Fonagy et al. 2004: 92–96). Languages are the main medium for humans to communicate their inner thoughts, feelings and beliefs to others and also to affect the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of others. It is thus not particularly surprising that affects and their appraisal and modulation can also be seen to occupy a central role in the production and reception of texts. The entire fields of semantics and pragmatics can be seen to be largely devoted to issues falling into this category, and much of translation studies, in turn, explores the limits and possibilities of their cross-cultural transfer. I will largely bypass this vast area of linguistic research here; not

because I do not value what it has to offer but to make room for other aspects less often discussed but equally fundamental to translating and interpreting: social and affective practices. This decision also rests on my firm belief that in current translation pedagogy and translation research, questions such as register, politeness strategies or semantic prosody, and their cross-cultural differences, are well-covered, and need not be rehearsed here (for an overview see, e.g., Malmkjær 2005). What I aim to provide instead is an overarching affective perspective on translatorial decision-making involved in choosing between alternatives with varying affective valence.

3.1   Appraising affects

In the psychological study of emotions, affective valence refers to the intrinsic value of a feeling on the scale of positive (e.g., joy) versus negative valence (e.g., sorrow).[6] Similarly, situations, materials and everyday objects have valence (Lebrecht et al. 2012). The study of assigning affective value to mental concepts and "attitude objects" has a long tradition. Thus, certain persons, places, words or things are associated with a particular attitude; for example, prison has a strong negative valence and fiancé a positive one. Lebrecht et al. expand the notion of valence to all objects and suggest that although valence can sometimes be very subtle and near-neutral, even this "microvalence" is still automatically perceived and incorporated into our mental representations of objects, together with a multitude of other kinds of information such as contextual experience, semantic and conceptual knowledge and memories. These spontaneous associations feed into what becomes the microvalence of the perceived object. To an extent, this information is subjective and situational, but Lebrecht et al. also report on findings that are quite consistent within and across respondents indicating that valence is not assigned randomly and that it is not entirely individualistic. In addition to learned associations that the researchers call "high-level" ones, positive or negative valence is also affected by "low-level" perceptual features of the object, such as shape, colour, material or functionalities. All this links affective valence to both aesthetics and preference.

Lebrecht et al. (2012) focus on the visual perception of everyday objects. In this chapter, the same thinking is applied to texts. Like everyday objects, all

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6.   It needs to be emphasized that this balancing and comparison of valences is to be understood in the psychological sense of the term, not in the linguistic meaning of valence.

textual products (texts, words, concepts, genres) have a more or less subtle valence to us, and this valence feeds into how we perceive texts. Similar to the tendency in psychology to focus on strongly-valenced objects (a bloody weapon is used as an example by Lebrecht et al., while a coffee mug is an example of more subtle valence), research in translation studies has largely focused on situations with strong valence. These include textual elements with strong positive valence such as humour or wordplay (e.g., Chiaro 2010), and those with strong negative valence such as taboos (Robinson 1996) and censorship (Merkle 2010). In a similar vein, error elimination and revision research and translation quality assessment literature can be interpreted as attempts to eliminate mistranslations and mistakes, that is, the elements of translation that have a strong negative valence. The relevance of all these high-valence and high-risk issues is intuitively easy to appreciate, and I have no desire to challenge that. Still, the main function of this chapter is to make the case for also appreciating the processes of appraisal and modulation of textual elements that are closer to the middle ground of the valence scale.

Lebrecht et al. (2012: 4) emphasize the role of microvalence in optimizing our ability to make decisions in our everyday life. Many of these myriads of decisions are fully or largely unconscious, and microvalence supports the processes of judgement and choice involved. Lebrecht et al. (ibid.) conclude:

> [W]e contend that our perception of the world is always colored by our experiences and predispositions. We are social creatures that, through a variety of contextual experiences, create a visual world animated with affect. As observers we must decode the multitude of perceptual, affective, and semantic information presented to our senses. To solve the affect part of this equation we evaluate the valence of all visual objects across the scene. Much in the same way that we automatically perceive the shape, size, or color of objects, we cannot help but perceive the valence in objects. In this sense, valence is not a label applied after the fact to perceptual entities, but rather is an intrinsic element of visual perception with the same mental status as other object properties.

Affects, as we know from our everyday experiences, can be contagious: both positive and negative affects tend to spread easily across populations. In translation, as in writing and reading in general, affects are transmitted *textually*, and the source text author, translation client and the translator alike have their aims and hopes regarding the affective aspects of the reception. The capacity to affect, this chapter argues, depends on skills in modulating texts and their affective elements in appropriate ways. This is where affective valence comes into play. Affective valences inform all textual activities of a translation event from source text production through source text analysis to the translation process, including both subconscious choices and strategic decision-making, and finally to the reception

of the translation. Importantly, the decision to translate and the choice of the target language(s) are also affective: the availability (or not) of texts in a language you feel affinity towards and have access to is in itself significant on an emotional level, in feelings of inclusion or exclusion, and in identity formation, in terms of belonging and of ancestries that are either being recognized or not.

3.1.1   Affective valence and appraisal

Any translator is first a reader of a text, and typically (self-translation notwithstanding) that text was produced by someone other than the translator and comes to the translator's desk through some mediating parties. The idea of a writer actively shaping the affective properties of the text is not new. Its long history goes back to Aristotelian rhetoric and the art of ethos and pathos and runs through centuries of comparative stylistics and intercultural pragmatics to genre studies as well as literary and linguistic theories of representing and communicating emotion. Political discourse is a prime example of the modulation of affect, propaganda and agitation being extreme cases of processes that are used by all writers to different degrees and more or less consciously with the aim of securing the desired outcome. It follows that to be able to make informed decisions about suitable translation strategies and appropriate equivalent expressions, the translator needs to get attuned to the affective elements in the source text and the motivations behind them, and also to assess how these will be received in the new context of use. This has long been known in translation studies. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gideon Toury's (2012) classic division between adequacy and acceptability, for example, is fundamentally an affective categorization, and acceptability is a judgement of whether the applied translation solutions carry a socially acceptable affective valence.

Still, affect and affective valence are not among the most commonly used vocabulary in translation classrooms and workplaces. We much more often talk about other issues such as semantic accuracy, the skopos and function of the text, cultural norms and culture-specific expectations. Affect-based reasoning such as "this does not sound right" or "I just like this solution better" is likely to be perceived as wishy-washy, non-scientific and non-professional. The discourse, unanalytical as it may be, signals the importance of affects in translatorial decision-making. Translatorial *gut* reactions (Robinson 1991), *tasting* the different options and translating by *ear* are all evidence of the embodied affectivity of translation. This discourse also signals the need to develop more analytical vocabulary and methods for analysing and describing affective elements in texts.

One approach that offers a comprehensive framework for analysing the affective strategies used by writers is appraisal theory. In the next section I will

demonstrate its usability in source text analysis for translation. Appraisal theory is a tool developed by two Australian genre researchers, Peter Martin and Jim White (2005), to examine the interpersonal features between writers and readers in texts written in English and the ways in which the writers are present in their texts. It provides a systematic way of attuning to the ways in which the author demonstrates approval or reproach, excitement or ennui, and gives praise or blame. It also allows us to examine how the writers position themselves with respect to the readers and what kind of intended reader or ideal readers they construct (Martin & White 2005: 1). Martin and White explicitly link their approach to Hallidayan systemic-functional linguistics. Appraisal theory can be seen as a fine-tuned and multi-directional application for analysing the interpersonal layer and tenor of texts (ibid: 33; see also Koskinen 2008: Chapter 6).

3.1.2   Appraisal theory in text analysis

To demonstrate the use of appraisal theory, in this section I will analyse a blog entry drawn from an institutional setting.[7] The genre has been intentionally selected to highlight affective elements, but my argument extends to all kinds of texts, with different degrees of affective valence. My approach here is data-driven, and theoretical elements are brought into play only to the extent that they are deemed relevant for the text at hand. An interested reader is advised to also go back to the original source (Martin & White 2005) for a fuller account of the appraisal framework. The blog post under observation here represents institutional communication, a longstanding interest of mine. More specifically, we will look at an example of implementing the European Commission communication strategy at a time when the institution was responding to new requirements and opportunities for more dialogic interaction with various constituencies created by advanced technology (the transition to what is called Web 2.0), as it also needed to enhance its PR activities in order to win the hearts and minds of the Europeans after a challenging enlargement period (Koskinen 2008, Chapter 4; Koskinen 2010a). The cabinet, lead by José Manuel Barroso (2005–2009), that took power at the time was exceptionally attuned to language policy, multilingualism and communication issues, and Margot Wallström from Sweden was appointed as the first European Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy. In a parliamentary hearing preceding her appointment to this newly created post, Wallström emphasized the need to create a more dialogic and democratic communication strategy. More specifically, she promised to

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7.   A more extensive version of this analysis has been published earlier in Finnish (Koskinen 2014a).

work for reaching out to European citizens, for creating a European public space and for localizing communication to adapt it to different local contexts (Wallström 2004). She also underlined the importance of talking *with* people rather than hierarchically communicating *to* them from above. In short, she envisioned a communication strategy that aimed at creating and supporting active and affective citizenship (Koskinen 2008: 64–66).

To achieve the aims of the policy, the European Commission adopted a number of new social media practices (see Koskinen 2013), among them blogging. Wallström's blog was started in January 2005, and she was the first commissioner to blog; others (or in practice, their PR teams) followed suit so that by the end of their period, ten members of the cabinet had some kind of blog presence. Below, I will take Wallström's very first blog post (13 January 2005) under scrutiny (see Figure 1). The new communication policy of democracy, dialogue and debate (what was called Plan D; European Commission 2005) that the blog needs to be seen as a tool for, foregrounded affectivity. Across time, this has been typical of political texts, of course (Protevi 2009), but it had been less common for administrative organizations and bureaucratic texts. The Web 2.0 world has changed this for many public institutions, also beyond the European context, and explicitly affective forms of communication have become mainstream, especially in social media platforms in which these institutions have become active. Institutional translation has always struggled to balance reader-orientedness with the combined weight of legalese, terminological consistency and administrative traditions, and it has often been a losing battle for readability (Koskinen 2008). With CAT tools and now machine translation solutions, the balance between institutionalization and readability is becoming even harder to achieve, but at the same time there is new and increased pressure to turn the tables. In addition to issues of readability and accessibility, also questions of affect need to be brought into the picture more dominantly than before.

This is where appraisal theory and other approaches attuned to the emotive and affective elements in texts and communication can assist. In appraisal theory, the focus of attention is traditionally on how affects are communicated and mediated. In political texts and by extension in institutional blogging, such as Wallström's post in question, the viewpoint needs to be changed to also emphasize the *production* of affects, that is, the linguistic elements and microstrategies utilized to achieve higher-level political goals. Considering the explicit communication policy, and the role of the first blog entry, posted less than two weeks into the term and as the first major opening in putting the policy into practice, it makes sense to analyse the entry, and the blog infrastructure around it, from the perspectives of talking with people rather than to them, and of

creating a feeling of dialogic interaction and positing an affective and active role to the readers.

The blog is a computer-mediated genre, defined and delimited by the available technological affordances. Among inherent features of blogs are: chronology and the idea of a continuous flow of new updates, dated entries and contemporaneity, links between blogs and the blogosphere created by them, possibilities for interaction with commentators, and the potential global reach created by an on-line presence (publicity is a prototypical feature, although blogs can also be private). Some genre characteristics, however, are not technology-driven. Among them are the centrality of text (as opposed to sound or image), the dominant role of the writer in both creating personalized expression and in controlling the content and the interaction with others as well as the need to adjust and ration the degree of intimacy. No wonder blogging has also been defined as self-expression and identity work (Miller & Shepherd 2004) – in the context of this book we might also call it affective labour.

Although blogs were first interpreted as a digital form of the personal diary (e.g., McNeill 2005), they were soon adopted for business communication purposes as well, making the label of affective *labour* even more pertinent. Beyond personal use, blogs and other social media tools are adopted to create more affective ties with consumers or constituencies, and the blogger is not only managing their own personality and intimacy levels but doing this professionally for customer-relations management and brand maintenance.

Among social media genres, blogging is less interactive and more author-centred than most. Its inherent *non*-democratic nature is particularly well suited for institutional contexts as the author controls the topic and the points raised and is able to delimit and moderate others' commenting. In spite of its apparent dialogism, blogging therefore allows the institutional author to maintain the "star player role" identified as a feature of institutional communication (Koskinen 2008: 144) and keep other participants on the sidelines. The comment function is therefore a two-edged sword: it opens up possibilities for dialogue and interaction but diminishes institutional control over that interaction. Moderation is needed, but excessive moderation is easily seen in a negative light.

At the same time, however, genre expectations call for the creation of affinity by humanizing and personalizing content also in institutional blogging, especially when the blog is designated to a named individual (Wyld 2007). This was the case with Wallström's blog, which was very clearly signalled as her personal communication tool, and in a number of posts she also provided motivations for her blogging and expressed her personal enjoyment in writing them. The blog was regularly updated, and 265 entries had been posted by December 2009 when the

blog was discontinued as the term of the Barroso cabinet ended. An impressive-sounding 3.3 million visitors were reported to have found the site during 2005–2009. The blog is still fully available in an archived form.[8]

The very first blog post, dated 1 January 2005 (see Figure 1), is a logical object of analysis because of its crucial position. It was the beginning of term for the cabinet and for the commissioner, and the launch of a new communicative tool was in line with the goals of the new communication policy. It is reasonable to assume that in this particular entry, the topics, the register, the tone of voice and interactive elements with readers were carefully considered and intentional. The title "Tsunami, Barroso Commission, Fado music" shows an intention to meet genre expectations of both contemporaneity (tsunami) and confessionalism (personal preference to Portuguese fado). The first three paragraphs deal with the tragic tsunami in Asia at the end of 2004. EU-related items are located in the middle part of both the title and the text itself, and they are treated lightly and from a human-interest point of view. Shifts between public and private appear somewhat accidental and associative. For example, in the following extract, the line of thought seems to ramble from the heaviness of EU work to a mundane thought of gaining weight.: "The new constitution for Europe is another *heavy* task awaiting" … "Have you put on *weight* during the Christmas holidays?" (italics added).

Figure 1. Wallström's first blog post

8.   Available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/blogs/wallstrom/index.html [accessed 12.10.2019].

Managing interpersonal relations is fundamental for institutions and organizations to maintain their legitimacy. Appraisal theory provides a framework for studying how the construction of the roles of writer, reader and other personae is realized in text-based communication (Martin & White 2005, Chapter 3). It is easy to see that this construction is a crucial element in Wallström's blog entry, but it is not straightforward. The text begins with an inclusive *we*, but later in the text *we* is used to refer first to her family, then the Commission and finally the ministers. The writer's *I* is unexpectedly dominant (10 tokens) and might at first glance appear to foreground the author excessively. A closer scrutiny, however, reveals that it is used quite dialogically. Expressions such as *I wonder if*, *I think* and *I disagree* construe a reader who may not necessarily (need to) agree with the author (ibid.: 104). Expressions that explicitly report the writer's state of mind (*personally, I am glad*) can be seen to even challenge the reader to take a stand (ibid.: 6). In contrast, *totally* and *of course* are used to construe a like-minded reader in the expression *I totally disagree of course!* (ibid.: 122). The reader is directly addressed only once, in the aforementioned question: "Have you put on weight during the Christmas holidays?" It is followed by Wallström's emphatic exclamation: *I have!* The combination of *you* and *I* thus functions as a connector between the writer and the reader, creating a shared and embodied circle of everyday experiences. This kind of constructed unity is an example of a "we-attitude", an element of communication recently identified and labelled by Tytti Suojanen (2018) as a companion to a more widely known "you-attitude" in business and technical communication.

Interpersonal relations can also be studied from the perspective of the implied writer/reader, an approach originating in literary studies. The same short extract was also analysed by Suojanen, Koskinen and Tuominen (2015b: 153–154) with the aim of bringing to the fore the kinds of presuppositions writers may intentionally or inadvertently install in their texts:

> Implied readers can be discovered by analyzing a number of features in the text, such as the ways the reader is being addressed, or presuppositions which reveal some of the reader's personal characteristics and the expected level of the reader's previous knowledge. As an example, let us take a look at the following short extract of a blog text: "Have you put on weight during the Christmas holidays? I have!" (Wallström 2005). In this case, the implied reader comes from a background where Christmas is celebrated, is affluent enough to have overindulged over the holidays, has issues with self-image, and is potentially more likely to be female than male. In addition, the writer has created a sense of familiarity and lack of distance by referring to supposedly shared experiences and attitudes.

The first blog text contains a number of features that tend to be interpreted as feminine. The tsunami crisis is addressed through family, relationships and emotions, as well as through an emphasis on friendship between women. EU matters

are dealt in a light and personal, even gossipy, tone, and bureaucratic jargon is carefully avoided. A large number of personal pronouns (see above) has also been associated with a feminine writing style (Herring & Paolillo 2006).

The blog text is also explicitly heteroglossic (Martin & White 2005: 93), and the voices of others alternate with that of Wallström herself. The tsunami section is told in indirect reported speech of a colleague in its entirety (*she says …*). Even Wallström's concluding statement to that section is attributed to the colleague: "my friend asks herself: what does it mean to be European?" A less positive voice is reserved for the former colleague Chris Patton, whose critical view of fado and cod is established only so that the writer can emphatically oppose it. Martin and White (2005: 119) discuss this strategy from the perspective of externalising the negation away from the writer-reader dyad by attaching it to a third party. A heteroglossia of sorts can also be identified in the ending *2004 sucked!* It is a clear break away from institutional talk, towards youthful expression. Heteroglossia could be assumed to support interactivity, but in this text, a surface-level multiplicity of voices does not seem to open spaces for numerous viewpoints (see ibid.: 102–108). Somewhat unexpectedly we can conclude that while the explicit *I* turns out to be quite dialogic, explicit heteroglossia is used in a manner that does not invite readers into a dialogue.

Finally, an analysis of vocabulary shows that the text foregrounds emotions and affects. *Paradise*, *hell*, *dream*, *love*, *eager*, *sentimental*, *disaster* and *absurd* mediate affective states. Another feature that builds affectivity is the saturating prosody created through a repetition of similar features (Martin & White 2005: 24). A prime example of this can be found in the third paragraph where the lack of comfort is repeated three times: *There is very little comfort … Nature does not offer any comfort … Not even for the media is there any comfort. …* The visible role of emotions and the strong personal presence of the writer who engages in dialogue and avoids dominant positions indicate a writing style that deliberately breaks free from expectations for institutional communication.

3.2   Modulating affects

In the analysis of the blog text in the previous section, the context of translation was hypothetical. At the time of its writing, the new communication strategy and the concurrent adoption of social media tools were combined with a slackening multilingualism policy in the external communication of the European Union (Koskinen 2013). Similar to most social media accounts during the period in question (and beyond), Wallström's blog remained largely English-only, and her first blog post analysed above has to my knowledge never been translated into any

other language. The decision of non-translation is, of course, in itself a significant affective decision: the questions of who is addressed with which language, who is excluded and whose identity is endorsed are core issues in any language policy, and these decisions often remain beyond the translators' influence. The European Union, too, with its ambitious policy of official languages but an exceedingly varied linguistic map and a necessity to address local constituencies but also to create a shared public space, is placed between a rock and a hard place with its translation policy and practices (Koskinen 2008, Chapter 4).

In more general terms, translating institutional and business blogs is a regular task for professional translators, and in that sense the scenario is not at all unrealistic. The necessity of having theoretical and methodological tools for analysing the interpersonal and affective skopoi of the source texts as well as their pragmatic features is also quite tangibly relevant in the professional world. The effects of the shifting technological landscape of translation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, but it is perhaps relevant for the current topic to reiterate the argument that with advanced automation of routine translation, human translation work will increasingly migrate from more technical and repetitive kinds of documents towards an increased dominance of argumentative, persuasive and creative texts and contexts, where hitting exactly the right tone and affective valence cannot be left for the machine to figure out. Blogs are an example of these kinds of genres.

This chapter is organized in a linear manner, proceeding from text analysis to translation to reception. In real life, these processes of are more integrated and overlapping, but for clarity we now approach them one by one. The middle step in the translation process, then, builds on the source text analysis and on a sounding of the target context. The matching of source text elements to optimally functional target-text elements and the necessary adaptations involved in the process due to linguistic, pragmatic or cultural differences between the receiving contexts are a standard feature of translation work. In translation studies, a number of typologies of translation strategies have been produced to map the spectrum of options translators have, either generally (e.g., Chesterman 2016: 85–113) or with respect to a particular textual element (e.g., allusions; Leppihalme 1994) (for a review of strategy models, see Pym 2016). As decision-making has been found to be based on emotional and visceral responses to an equal degree as on cognitive reasoning, abilities related to affective responses are a significant resource for the translator. To make informed decisions, translators either consciously or unconsciously rely not only on their linguistic expertise and world-knowledge but also on their own affective responses to the source text and to their different potential translation solutions, aiming to regulate their own emotions and those of the other participants (Lehr 2014).

Emotion regulation has been defined as the process by which people influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them (Hofmann 2014). Regulation can be achieved at different phases of emotion generation: by selecting the situation or by modifying it, by deploying attention, by modifying our cognitive appraisal and our framing the situation, and by modulating our response to it (ibid.). In translating, affect regulation can be defined as a process by which the translator influences which emotions the translation conveys and triggers, how they are expressed and, as much as the translator can, how these emotions are experienced. This regulation can be achieved at different phases and by different means: by selecting a suitable source text, by deploying attention, by modifying the cognitive appraisal of the translation, by reframing the source text and by modulating the textual features to affect the translation's reception.

Research in translation studies has revealed numerous examples of selectivity. Non-translation, as in the case of the blog post above, is an extreme case. In a communicative situation where the source text is deemed to cause more harm than good, it may be decided that it is advantageous not to provide a translation. A number of reasons may lead to this decision, and they are of course not all related to emotional regulation. But often they are. In the case of Wallström's blog discussed in the previous section, it was most likely seen as a tool for creating a joint public space since the desire to make us all European citizens at heart was an explicit affective aim of the policy. This goal would have been seriously hampered with the creation of too many monolingual social media bubbles.

On a smaller scale, when translators make in-text decisions, omission is a well-known standard selective strategy at their disposal for dealing with items that are deemed not to travel well. Omission is linked to censorship and taboo, but because it is a drastic move, more subtle strategies of modification and modulation are far more wide-spread forms of sheltering readers from negative affects. This modifying and modulating impulse is commonly known in translation research through the concept of shifts. These "small linguistic changes occurring in translation" (Munday 2001: 55) are so commonplace that they have been identified as the most likely candidate for a universal feature of all translation (Toury 2012: 80).

The term "shift" was coined by J. C. Catford (1965) who defined shifts as departures from formal correspondence between the source text and the target text. In other words, shifts account for all differences between the two. Many accounts on shifts are rather technical in nature, listing dozens of linguistic moves translators have at their disposal. This approach has never been appealing to me personally. Perhaps that is why I have always found Douglas Robinson's (2011) term "sway" more inviting. Robinson frames sway in the direction of bias, mistranslation and error (hence the word "problem" in the title of his book) – a perspective I do not fully share – but he also, and importantly, foregrounds the somatic and affective grounding of translatorial choices that sway the translation in a particular

direction. Sara Ahmed (2014: 14) uses the word slide to talk about the same movement: affects slide, and we slide with them. We are swayed by our bodily and emotional responses to different stimuli, and our swaying makes the outcomes of our actions, in this case translations, sway as well.

For understanding the affective nature of shifts, or swaying, the definition by Anton Popovič (1970: 79) is also useful: "[a]ll that appears new with respect to the original, or fails to appear where it might have been expected, may be interpreted as a shift". Popovič introduces the interpretive aspects of shifts and focuses on reception: all that *appears* new, or is different from what *was expected*, may be interpreted as a shift. Shifts are thus not only a function of the relationship between the source text and the target text, or of the subjectivity of the individual translator, but also a function of the relationship between the target text and the readers' expectations (cf. Robinson 2011: 13 on sway as a group dynamics). We will return to this crucial issue of expectations and their affective grounding in the next section. Another valuable element in Popovič's definition is that it allows us to appreciate the role of shifts regardless of their degree of intentionality or voluntariness (cf. Blum-Kulka 1986/2000: 312). Shifts happen. And with them so does affective modulation and swaying, intentional or accidental.

To stay within the EU context already introduced in this chapter, I will now re-examine an analysis of shifts in the drafting and translating process (into Finnish) of one EU document. The analysis was earlier published in Koskinen 2008 (Chapter 6). What follows is a very selective and narrow rereading only, rehearsed here to provide an illustrative example of how shifts function as affective modulators. A reader interested in a fuller picture is advised to consult the original source. My keywords of the time did not include modulation (nor affect, for that matter). In keeping with the general aims of the research project reported then, I focused on *interpersonal* shifts, looking into aspects such as hedges, boosters, directives, self-mention and ingroup–outgroup classifications that have been identified as techniques for creating and negotiating distances and affinities (Hyland 2005). In other words, without explicitly saying "affect" I was exploring issues closely related to it, as textual distances and affinities are fundamentally affectively felt – a point I will discuss at more length in the next section.

In the original analysis, particular attention was placed on the implied institutional writer and implied reader construed in the various text versions, both of the source text and of the translation. In practice, this was accomplished "by analyzing how the Commission as the institutional writer presents itself, and how it addresses the readers, how the writer relates to other actors and to the ideational content of the text, and what it expects from the others" (Koskinen 2008: 124). Three groups of shifts were found to be particularly relevant in this respect: the bureaucratization of the style, the omission of the words marking an evaluation or appraisal and the loss of metaphors.

Increased bureaucratization of style from one version to the next in both the drafting and translating processes prompted me to propose a law that I now posit may well apply universally to text work in institutional contexts: the law of growing institutionalization (Koskinen 2008: 141). Basically, it assumes that the longer a text is being processed within the institutional machinery, the more it loses any traits that might signal a personal writer, and the more the institution and the institutional phraseology push themselves to the forefront. This tendency will have obvious consequences for the affective engagement with readers who are not within the inner institutional circle and will therefore likely find the style alienating.

The frequent omission of different markers of evaluation was a finding worth mentioning here. Lost indications of attitudes included: "potential" [in: potential benefits], "just" [the proportion was just 60.3%], "genuinely" [making learning genuinely available to all], "tend to" [measures tend to be piecemeal → are], "much" [much more open], "more actively" [promote more actively], "risk" [risk limiting → limit], "particularly", "in particular", and "as far as possible". The result is that the reader loses cues for interpreting the writer's attitude and degree of engagement towards the propositions.

Finally, the rerendering in translation of one feature was found to introduce modulation in all language version: metaphors (Koskinen 2008: 137). It seems somehow very apt, considering the topic of this book, to concentrate on one metaphor in particular: the heart. The opening statement in the English original document that was analysed proclaims as follows: "People are at the heart of this communication." Since heart is a metaphor with very strong positive affective valence, and the attention-grabbing positioning also marks it as a powerful statement, and since the proposition is explicitly attuned to the communication policy in place, it is interesting to see what happens to the heart in translation.

Table 2. Translations of "heart"

	Heart
DA	det centrale
DE	im Zentrum
ES	el núcleo
FR	au centre
IT	al centro
NL	gaat over mensen
POR	no cerne
SV	i centrum
FI	etusijalla [in a priority position]

Table 2 shows that in none of the other then 10 official languages (Greek was excluded from analysis) the heart or any other equally warm-hearted expression was maintained. While the images of the centre or the nucleus can also be seen as metaphoric, they lack the affective connotations of the heart, which the English language can pick up from its standard repertoire to serve the new policy emphasis on the citizens. The shift away from the heart does not result in a "wrong" translation in any language, as languages tend to commonly employ different metaphors, and standard idioms are construed differently in different languages. One can also argue that the heart has lost much of its semantic meaning in its metaphorical usage and also much its emotional valence, in particular for native English-speakers. This does not change the outcome that the tenor of the text is shifted in a way that reduces its positive affective valence. We can debate whether this swaying of the translations is significant or not. My argument is that microdecisions such as these do matter.

On a more general level, research has identified a potential tendency towards a reduced use of metaphors in translation and posited different reasons as potential explanations, such as adhering to target norms, aiming to minimize translation effort or favouring accuracy over appropriateness (Sidiropoulou 2004: 80–81; see also Toury 2012: 108). Be that as it may, for my present purposes it is more interesting to ponder how this demetaphorization strategy affects the readers' relation to the text. Although we are only looking at a single metaphor, its prominent position in the text and its positive affective valence make it stand out, especially in an institutional text where the expectations are perhaps geared towards the non-affective and non-metaphorical. The element of positive surprise is therefore effective, and its loss in all language versions can be considered detrimental to the communicative aims of the institution. The loss of metaphoric language also works towards the same effect as the omission of evaluative markers and the bureaucratization of style: an overall flattening of the text, making it more tiresome to read and, consequently, harder to comprehend and less easy to feel affinity towards.

It needs to be emphasized that the document analysed above is in no way distinctive among EU texts. It was subtracted from the flow of paper trail randomly, according to pre-set external criteria (Koskinen 2008: 119). This underlines my core message: affective modulation is a regular and normal part of translation work, not an exceptional decision to be taken under extraordinary conditions. Reframing and modifying cognitive appraisal are in fact ingrained in translation in the sense that translation in itself is a reframing process, and the cognitive appraisal of overt translations is automatically modified in the sense that the reader is aware of the translatorial nature of the text they are reading and this knowledge has a bearing on its appraisal.

This idea of reframing by translating takes us to Erving Goffman's work. He is best known in translation studies for his concepts of facework and footing, both mainly used in studying the interpreter's role. Here I would like to draw attention to two other concepts that may be used to illuminate translation work in both written and spoken contexts: keying and framing. These two related strategies that Goffman identifies in our everyday social behaviour are also very clearly at play in translation. To arrive at keying and framing, we need to take a closer look at modulation. I originally borrowed modulation to the world of translation research from its current usage in psychological affect studies, where it has been an element of standard vocabulary since the 1990s, signalling the ability to identify and adapt emotional states and responses according to environmental cues (Koskinen 2012a). However, the notion of modulation also has a prior history in translation studies, as it was originally proposed by Vinay and Darbelnet (1958) in their classic comparative stylistic analysis of French and English. In their taxonomy of shifts, Vinay and Darbelnet define modulation as a strategy of changing the point of view of the message without altering the idea or meaning of the text, often with the aim of providing readers with a familiar and fluent, natural-sounding rerendering (see also Chesterman 2016: 98–104). Examples of modulation might include turning negative into positive (e.g., this is not bad → this is good), passive into active (the shop window was smashed by a passer-by → a passer-by smashed the shop window) or shifting who or what is being foregrounded in the text.

Modulating is not the only music term in Vinay and Darbelnet's taxonomy: they also include transposition (change of pitch), with which they mean the shift from one grammatical category to another (e.g., translating a noun by a verb). Transposition is also included in Chesterman's classification (2016: 93). While I choose to foreground the music reference here (i.e., I am keying Vinay and Darbelnet's terminology in that direction), it needs to be mentioned that transposition is a term used in many fields with slightly varied meanings. It is also relevant to mention that in their model, equivalence is – without any direct music allusion – also related to modulation, and arguably more so than transposition. Equivalence is often understood to indicate literal rerendering or word-for-word solutions, but in Vinay and Darbelnet's taxonomy it denotes a complete structural change used to achieve semantic correspondence (e.g., idioms, slogans) and is therefore close to what in today's parlance is called transcreation and is often understood as the complete opposite of equivalence.

Modulation, equivalence and transposition all bear similarities to what Erving Goffman called keying, with an explicit analogy to music (1974: 44). In music, modulation is a synonym for keying: it is the act of changing from one key to another. These subtle changes are an essential element of musicality, affecting the

tone, mood and energy levels of the piece. Similarly, in texts – and for Goffman in everyday-life "strips of doing" (ibid.: 47) – keying introduces more or less subtle changes of tone, mood, energy and interpretation. Keying introduces a systematic transformation of the activity, a new frame. Although this transformation may be subtle, it dramatically alters the participants' understanding of what is going on (ibid.: 45). For example, a playful key applied to fighting, or a staging key applied to marriage vows, will radically alter the expectations of the participants and the consequences of the action. Goffman (ibid.: 48) proposes a list of five core types of keys: make-believe (e.g., playing and acting), contests (sports), ceremonials (rituals; performative displays; practicing an activity), technical repetition and, finally, regroundings (performances that have a radically altered reason or motivations from those of ordinary actors). These kinds of keys, and the endless rekeying possibilities that they offer, produce a transformation of the keyed activity, and provide a new framing to what is going on.

Framing something as translated or interpreted can also be seen as a form of keying. Goffman (1974: 79) mentions this in passing, but recognizes the possibilities of multiple keyings. Indeed, a translatorial key may focus on make-believe, for example, in the sense of a suspension of disbelief or legal fiction in the case of a multilingual legal instrument where the various language versions are to be taken as one intent (Šarčević 1997). Or it can be keyed ritually as in the case of frozen translations of set phrases in a bilingual meeting (Koskela et al. 2017). Keying translation as a technical reproduction is an obvious keying option, and one that is embedded in many cultural practices such as the marketing of literary translations and coding of interpreter's professional practice (see Chapter 5 below). Regrounding, then, is an interesting case from the perspective of translatoriality: it is defined as "the performance of an activity more or less openly for reasons or motives felt to be radically different from those that govern ordinary actors" (Goffman 1974: 74). In a way, all overt translation can be seen to fall into this category (their reasons and motivations not being identical to the source text), but the idea of radicality is not necessarily in place. Still, domestication and localization would seem to be forms of adaptive keying that fall into this category, breaking away from the key of technical repetition.

Every frame and key also have affective consequences, and all modulation also operates on an affective level and is often initiated by affective concerns. Adequate affective engagement and its regulation is also an expectation that governs reception. Acceptance, as well as the limits of acceptability, of a particular key is fundamentally (also) affective by nature, as are the adherence to and the normative role of local traditions, agreement over exemplary representations, and so on. Keying sets the tone, and the tone sets the affective valence of a particular strip of activity or text. Sway with me.

3.3   Reception, affinity and affect

Translators' modulation strategies are often designed to meet certain known or assumed expectations of the future target text readers. Translation studies has been target-oriented in its outlook since the early days of its disciplinary gestation, and the notion of acceptability was firmly embedded in the early classic of Gideon Toury (2012), originally published in 1980. Still, it is only during the past fifteen years or so that reception studies have really gained prominence in translation studies. What happens at the reception stage, or what kind of a user experience the translations offer, is tightly connected to affects. Translation operates on managing degrees of affinity and familiarity, two elements with strong affective valence. As is well known, much of theorizing in translation works through the perspective of adequate or acceptable degrees of foreignness in the target text, on the one hand, and adequate or acceptable levels of adaptation to the local expectations, on the other. In this section, I will first discuss this issue briefly within the context of EU translation, the theme that runs through this chapter, but I will then move to another area of translation where I have invested significant research input together with my colleague Outi Paloposki over the years: retranslation. I will report on some of our findings to discuss the role of cultural expectations and readers' affective engagement in the reading of retranslations. From the perspective of affect, both EU translation and retranslation are illustrative domains as they both need to operate along axes of difference and distance. In the case of the EU, we are looking at an alien institutional system, located outside the national borders, that wants and needs to be felt acceptably familiar to legitimize constant interference in national affairs; in the case of retranslation the distance is not only cultural but also temporal, and difference is necessary to manifest itself in the face of apparent similarity with the preceding translation. There is a limit as to how different a new translation of the same source text can be, but to rationalize its existence it needs to be different enough.

The creation of difference and distance is a central element of affective labour. James M. Thomas and Jennifer Correa (2016: 1) begin their book titled *Affective Labour: (Dis)Assembling distance and difference* with a reminder that the two concepts are conjoined through practice, "conjuring material, symbolic, discursive and affective realities for us as we move through everyday life." Difference produces (somatic, affective, ideological) distance, and distance is determined by (spatial, social, political, historical) difference. Thomas and Correa underline the affectivity of everyday life. The affective valence of everyday objects was discussed above (in Section 3.1). Neuroscience observes the same phenomenon from a cognitive perspective and posits that affect is closely intertwined with cognition and

that we actually *bring* emotions into all our contacts with objects, assigning affective valence to them:

> [F]ew if any perceptions of any object or event, actually present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and subsequent feelings, however feeble. (Damasio 2004: 93)

In psychology, consistent findings show that unconscious preferences exert more influence on our thoughts and actions than we realize (Franks 2007: 39). When this is combined with the mere-exposure effect (also known as the familiarity principle), a well-known psychological tendency to respond favourably to people, statements and objects that are familiar to us, we can begin to hypothesize that affective predispositions also play a role in how translations are received. I have argued for a rethinking of Lawrence Venuti's concepts of domestication and foreignization, claiming that instead of, or at least in addition to, viewing those two strategies as inhabiting opposing poles on the axis of cultural distance, they should be seen from the point of view of emotional affinity and familiarity.

> [R]egardless of the translation strategies, and without necessarily pre-valorizing either domesticating of foreignizing strategies, we experience the translations as either affectively positive (familiar, pleasant, aesthetically pleasing) or negative (strange, confusing, aesthetically unpleasant or uninteresting), depending on what our own tendencies are, what kinds of previous experiences we have had, and how our acculturation has predisposed us towards particular aesthetic solutions. In other words, emotional distance need not have anything to do with cultural distance: if I am predisposed to favour foreignizing translations (as all the great scholars seem to advise us to be), I feel close to those kinds of translations, and I orient myself towards those kinds of aesthetic solutions, and vice versa. (Koskinen 2012a: 21)

Venuti's (1995, 1998) theorization of foreignization, domestication, minoritizing and resistance is quite complex, accounting for a bundle of normative expectations, cultural relations and familiarities as well as the situated realities of target readers. His concept of foreignizing closely resembles *ostranenie*, or defamiliarization, an intentional alienation effect used as an artistic device (Koskinen 2000: 52). As Venuti's terminology has gained currency in translation studies, the approach has become somewhat reduced, and foreignizing and domesticating are often used to mean simplified strategies of source versus target orientation in the translated text. As a result, the concepts have lost much of their connection to the idea of relational aesthetic qualities and of negotiating the degrees of familiarity between particular translation solutions and a distinct audience.

The simplified version harks back to the images created by Friedrich Schleiermacher and argues that domesticating strategies bring the text to the reader, or that foreignizing translations make the reader cross the distance. This spatial imagery of a *physical* distance, with either the reader or the writer being asked to bridge that distance through textual manoeuvres, may obscure the fact that we are actually dealing with degrees of *emotional* affinity more than with degrees of physical, or even cultural, affinity. In Venutian theorization, foreignization aims to create an intentional rupture in the readers' *affective* affinity and alignment with the artwork (Koskinen 2012a; see also Ahmed 2010: 37). This affective affinity allows us to re-evoke spatiality, but not as an intertextual relation but as an internalized disposition of the reader to a particular translation:

> [W]e are *touched* and *moved* by things that we like, some of them are even *close* to our heart, and those that we do not like make us turn away or we push them back or aside. In short, rather than – or in addition to – cultural or geographic distance, we are dealing with *affect*.　　　　　(Koskinen 2012a: 17)

The case of early Finnish EU translations in the mid-1990s, pre- and post-accession in 1995, illustrates this point (see Koskinen 2012a: 21–23). At the time, the felt threat of excessive foreign influence in institutional Finnish lead to a policy of an extremely 'Finnicizing' strategy for translating lexical items. It was dictated that if any term or word had a native Finnish equivalent, it was to be preferred over a loan word, regardless of whether the loan word was the more standardized option and notwithstanding the potential obscurity of the ur-Finnish equivalent. As a result, a report was not to be called "raportti" but "kertomus" ('story'), and co-ordination was not to be "koordinointi" but "yhteensovittaminen" ('adjusting together'), and so on. As one can see, the preferred choice tended to avoid affinity with the source expression, even if the loan word was the one normally used in the Finnish language. This principle has since been relaxed, but for the first few years this was the institutionalized translation strategy for all genres in the Finnish section of the translation service of the European Commission. For the readers, these extremely Finnicized translations, although not "wrong", appeared unnatural and strange – that is, foreignizing. In other words, the attempted *domesticating* strategy was experienced as *alienating* and *foreignizing*. At the same time, syntax and genre features were expected to follow the non-natural-sounding foreign examples. These, too, were experienced as foreignizing. Discontent lead to heated discussions, letters to the editor, and finally an official report on the quality of Finnish EU translations. This debacle nicely highlights the affective nature of affinity: the two strategies of, on the one hand, ultra-localized lexis and, on the other hand, alien syntax, macrostructure and genre features were diametrically opposed to one another. Still, they were both experienced as foreignizing.

Retranslation, too, is entangled with the dialectics of affinity. The affinity that immediately comes to mind is that with the source text, and the readily available cultural assumption that the new translation is closer to the original than the old one. Critics and regular readers alike seem to approach retranslation not only analytically but also emotionally. Together with Outi Paloposki, we have studied this reception and found some affects that seem to be remarkably sticky and durable. A bundle of recurrent, sticky, positive affects seems to circle around what could best be labelled as presentism (Koskinen & Paloposki 2015a: 220–231): we humans have a tendency to foreground our own perspective, our embodied position in history and in the world. Hence the desire to think that our age can correct the shortcomings of the past and arrive at complete and full interpretations. We are also quite quick to condemn past moral agendas and their effects in translation decisions, but we are less likely to critically review our own ideological biases. Hence the desire for retranslation: we are confident that we can do better. And when the retranslation is critiqued, the literary critic is predisposed to assume that it outsmarts the predecessors. The reviews indeed tend to follow a regular discursive pattern where the new translation is welcomed and praised for its "fullness", "freshness", "contemporaneousness" or "accuracy", and a segment of a previous translation is often played against the new one, only to show how much more successful the new one is (ibid.: 231–245). As discussed in Chapter 2, Sara Ahmed (2010: 29) emphasizes the stickiness of affects, defining affect as that "what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects". Positive affects towards retranslation are indeed quite sticky, and a presentist cultural pattern is easily activated in the brain of the critic and the regular reader alike.

Researchers have followed suit. The best-known retranslation theory, the Retranslation Hypothesis was based on the ideas first formulated in German Romanticism and then elaborated in an early key text on retranslation (the essay "La retraduction comme espace de la traduction" by Antoine Berman from 1990), and finally adapted to conform to the structure of a hypothesis (Chesterman 2000). Berman's main thesis maintains an affinity to the idea of constant betterment that underlines presentism as it positions subsequent translations on a line that proceeds from an assimilationist first translation (i.e., one too tied to the expectations of the target readers) to a retranslation that stays closer to the original (i.e., is more foreignizing for the readers who can now accept a more alienating version). The hypothesis has been tested a number of times. While some cases have indeed followed this pattern, it has been proved not to be a reliable prediction of what goes on in different translation–retranslation pairs as many other options are also possible (see, e.g., Paloposki & Koskinen 2004). But it is also clear by now that both the degree of textual similarity to the source text and affective affinity to

the intended readership are indeed factors that can be used to categorize different retranslations, although their order of appearance does not dictate the level of their assimilation or alienation.

As the titles of some of his best-known books (*L'épreuve de l'étranger* 1984; *La traduction et la lettre ou l'auberge du lointain,* 1999) amply illustrate, Berman's extensive work on translation and ethics revolves around questions of distance and affinity, and how these should be managed. Berman (1984: 17) is clear in his preferences, and he calls ethnocentric translation that does not convey the foreignness of the foreign text simply bad translation.[9] This tends to be the value judgement of those who approach translation from a perspective of foreignness: their desire is to maintain a degree of alienation. It is not only an affective but also an aesthetic preference. Or rather, aesthetics, the encounter of the sensual work and the sensate body, is all about affect (Highmore 2010: 121). Values, understandings of beauty and moral judgements change, and this creates the need for retranslation. Affect indeed plays a significant role in retranslation, both in the decision to publish a new translation (i.e., the current reception of the previous translation, and the problems or shortcomings associated with it) and in the reception of the new one. It is also an element in the life of the retranslator, and of the first translator whose work is subjected to reappraisal by retranslation. For the retranslator, the most worrisome affinity may often be with the previous translation, and accusations of plagiarism or dependence can create anxieties of influence that colour the retranslation process (Koskinen & Paloposki 2015b).

Newness is a selling point for retranslations, but among readers, nostalgia and emotional attachment also have a role to play. This is particularly true of texts that play ritual roles in social situations. New translations of the Bible, for example, have encountered resistance because particular wordings are engrained in our minds and evoke memories. Douglas Robinson describes how the familiar Bible translation may resonate in our body:

> There is, in fact, a kind of bodily reassurance in a translation like the KJV [King James Version]: "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want" may sound to Eugene Nida like a lack of desire for God … but of course for the Christian who memorized those words in childhood the "normal" somatic response, the response to the words if heard on the street, is massively overridden by the somatics of security. When I say these words, my world feels stable and safe.
>
> (Robinson 1991: 225)

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9.   "J'appelle mauvaise traduction la traduction qui, généralement sous couvert de transmissibilité, opère une négation systématique de l'étrangeté de l'oeuvre étrangère."

Affect memory, that is, an emotionally expressed feeling that recurs when recalling a significant experience, is what we respond to in listening to a recital of a translated ritual text; we are reconnected to the affective valence of the contexts where we have previously heard it. A new translation will encounter resistance, as the ritualistic affective experience gets broken. The reception of the Finnish retranslations of the Bible are an example of how affective memory unsettles easy interpretations of domestication and foreignization:

> Some readers still prefer the familiar 1938 translation of the Bible to the most recent, fluent and domesticated Finnish version from 1992, not so much in spite of, but precisely *because* of its more foreignizing style that lends the text a more elevated and ceremonial aura *and* because this more foreignized version (itself a retranslation) of the text is more familiar to them than the newer retranslation. There are passages that we have learnt by heart such as "Ja tapahtui niinä päivinä…," the opening words of Luke 2 – in the 1938 version – which have traditionally been read out in school Christmas celebrations and at other events, as well as in many homes on Christmas Eve. Because of their ritual role, passages like this resonate emotionally in ways that other versions may be unable to echo. The technically more foreignizing earlier retranslation is thus, for these readers, more domesticating than the overtly more accessible new version. In spite of its fluent and "domesticated" translation strategy, the new version remains foreign to readers who had already responded emotionally, creating a bond with the previous version.
> (Koskinen 2012a: 24–25)

Another nostalgic genre is children's literature. Children's classics are a prime example of how affect memory affects the intergenerational reader experience: a new translation may well be objectively seen as 'better' or more accurate or 'closer' to the original than the previous one, but many adult readers prefer a version that repeats their childhood experiences (Koskinen 2012a: 24). Classic children's books also constitute an affective intergenerational chain that accentuates the dual audience aspect always present in children's literature. Interestingly, our memory may also fail us, and the fond memories we harboured may become shattered at an actual encounter with the old translation. The classics get retranslated when the parental and grandparental wish to ritually pass on the cultural capital vested in them meets with some resistance because of the changed expectations and preferences of the new child readers or because of new visual or textual aesthetics and ideologies of the literary field, including the parents themselves. In such a clash, the classic can be salvaged through what Goffman might call regrounding: a radically altered rationale or motivations in comparison to the previous translation, that will allow the text to be to transformed, downplayed, cut or censored to avoid the unwanted elements. These retranslations often balance between sameness and difference. To function in the cultural memory role, the new

translation needs to bear the same identity with the previous version although it at the same time parts ways with it to a significant degree. Key characters' names, for example, may need to be kept in their already familiar form, while some other textual elements, cultural references or ideological underpinnings may (need to) be radically altered to meet contemporary preferences. Ahmed (2010: 30) calls those elements that are non-conforming and non-fitting in the "drama of contingency" as "affect aliens". In the everyday drama, those who have alien affects may be affect aliens, and so are those who cause affects we find non-fitting and alien. Sometimes a once-accepted textual element can become affectively alien as times change. A good contemporary example is racialized vocabulary, found in many classics and increasingly felt to be an affect alien to many contemporary readers. The resulting alienation makes some words saturated with affect. The most obvious contemporary example of a word sticky with affect is the n-word, that is, the vocabulary denoting black-skinned persons that has become affectively so alien and taboo that it has become commonplace to shorten it to the first letter only. The metonymic affective economy around this word is creating new sticky affects of censorship and taboo that also travel across cultures, making waves of moral outrage that repeat the same patterns across borders. Once these kinds of affective intensities have gained force, their often vague and undetermined beginnings may be easily forgotten (Bertelsen & Murphie 2010: 139). For translators, the changing affective politics and the travelling outrages often create problems in translating classics from a different era, displaying different affective constellations that are difficult to reproduce in the current climate but also difficult to avoid without censorship which, too, is affectively problematic. Researchers are not exempt of being affected. For me personally, researching the translation history of the n-word into Finnish has functioned as a test case to my own abilities of academic risk-taking. I currently have a finalized research article on the topic on my computer, but, much to my shame, I hesitate to submit it for publication, because I do not feel I am ready to handle the potential outrage from readers whose views I may offend in the text. I have always had the self-image of a fearless researcher, and reaching the limit of my fearlessness, and experiencing the affects involved in this case, has been a sobering experience indeed.

* * *

Affects are indeed social. And they are also bodily and cognitive. The comparative relevance of body and mind is one of the most central lines of division in affect studies, and some approaches eschew any discursive and textual elements, seeing them as a layer of codification that prevents us from accessing the true realm of affects, and emphasizing the preconscious and non-representational aspects that

go beyond language (see Wetherell 2012: 52; cf. Ahmed 2014). For this present book, the point is moot. We can appreciate the role of the bodily sensations in appraisals and the ways bodies are involved in affecting and being affected, and we can value the notion of affect as a free-flowing social force, but to understand affect in the realms of translating and interpreting, we also need to acknowledge and appreciate affect in its textual and discursive manifestations. Affect may well also take non-representational forms, but as translating and interpreting are decisively representational and discursive at heart, it would be foolish to overlook the textual to understand the affective. The ways in which affects are "narrated, communicated, shared, intensified, dispersed, modified and sometimes re-awoken" (Wetherell 2012: 53) are crucially relevant to translatorial activities. Regulating and modulating affects in and through discourse is a central part of translatorial affective labour.

The misery and splendour of translating

Translating is about affecting, but it is also about being affected. This chapter focuses on the concept of the translator's experiencing self (Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016) and looks at the rich variety of affects provoked by the process of translating in the translators themselves. It is quite easy to vision that translating content related to violence or trauma or contrary to one's own ethical convictions or religious views can be emotionally taxing. It is also sensible to assume that emotionally skilled translators fare better in these kinds of conflicts, that supporting translators' skills in emotion management will help them protect themselves from these harmful effects and that it is ethically advisable to avoid these commissions if possible. What is perhaps less often seen as an interesting object of study is the everyday affective involvement of translators with the material they are translating.

As Séverine Hubscher-Davidson (2018: 31) observes, translators' own emotions have lacked visibility in translation studies literature. Affects are, I argue, not a special case, related to exceptionally taxing translation tasks, but a normal, humane response to any activity we engage in, including translation: we are excited or anxious about the task ahead; pleased with or worried about our performance; we enjoy a flow or get annoyed if not making any progress and so on. As we go about our daily life, we do not necessarily pay too much attention to these passing affective states unless they are for some reason intensified, or something in the process triggers us into reflection. The more upset we are, the more likely we are to pay attention (hence the emphasis on the traumatic). In my own professional career, I too have sometimes experienced these moments of intensification. As a young translator, I was assigned to translate a textbook on art therapy. It contained compelling narratives of cases where art therapy had been successfully applied in practice. Some of these stories, especially those involving children, made me cry. So, my daily routine developed into something like this: translate until you are in tears, cry your eyes out, repeat for six to eight hours, and then unwind and regain balance by watching a daily dose of *The Bold and the Beautiful*. Mental health issues, one might say, clearly fall into the category of potentially emotionally touching content to be translated. But it was less the actual content, I think, than the combination of a difficult situation in the family and my immersion into

the text that resulted in my emotional reaction, and in its outwardly visible physiological manifestation. We can discuss my emotion management and regulation skills at the time, and find them lacking, but the anecdote also emphasizes the holistic nature of human activity. Translation processes are interlaced with the translator's life as it takes shape, and the combinations can be unpredictable. In translation studies, it has become a cliché to say that translations always exist in a context. In the past decades, the cultural, ideological, poetic and, most recently, economic and technological aspects of that context have been brought under scrutiny. Translators, too, exist in their context, both socio-cultural and personal. The current trend favours focusing on the translators, and a large body of research now exists on the translators' habitus, that is, the ingrained and embodied dispositions they have acquired in dialogue with their context (Vorderobermeier 2014). This context extends beyond the translation task, to the lived personal experiences within which the translatorial activities are embedded.

As exemplified by the tears discussed above, affects can be manifested in bodily reactions. These may be observable and measurable, or only felt by the experiencing persons themselves. Witness a spontaneous Facebook comment made by a translator who had just completed a translation on dental health:

> Helpotuksen huokaus. Nyt ei tarvitse hetkeen katsella suuhun mädäntynyttä purukalustoa edes kuvista, sillä sain äsken valmiiksi kariesta käsittelevän käännöksen, jonka tekeminen oli yhtä hammasten kiristystä. Ihan kuin olisin aistinut vihlontaa ja tuntenut plakin leviävän… Onneksi kävin vajaat kaksi viikkoa sitten hammaslääkärissä kuulemassa, että kaikki on kunnossa.
>
> (anonymized Facebook status update 7.3.2018)

> Phew. No need to look at mouths filled with rotten teeth for a while, not even in pictures, as I have just finished a translation on tooth decay. Its completion was pure gnashing of teeth. I felt like my own teeth were aching and the dental plaque was spreading… Luckily, I had just visited a dentist two weeks ago, so I knew everything was alright.   (my translation)

The above status update refers to the content of the translation task. Translators may also respond affectively to their authors (remember the demand to only translate for love discussed in Chapter 2). Feelings of love and friendship can of course occur, but the intimacy of the translation task may also bring to the fore other, more negative affects. My most recent published translation is a collection of articles by the American sociologist Erving Goffman (2013). He has a number of annoying habits as an author: He will lead you on, presenting a commonly acceptable view, in a fairly complex manner, until suddenly changing course, revealing the untenacity of the view you thought the two of you were construing in agreement. He is sarcastic, at times even mean towards his readers. Not a

lovable personality, and he keeps his translator on her toes. During the translation process I was often upset and annoyed. Once – by his shrewd observations on the marriage tactics, and consequent behaviour, of young American women, and the pointlessness of giving them career opportunities because of this – he made me push the laptop away from me and jump to my feet in outrage: you just cannot say that! But of course, he could, and he had, and I could not deny his observations in the US of the time of his writing. So, I translated, with absolute unwillingness.

If we tied translators to a number of clinical equipment, measuring heart rate, blood pressure, perspiration, pupillometrics and so on, we could observe the bodily manifestations of the affective states as they unfold during any translation task. This has, to my knowledge, not been done yet, and it is beyond my areas of expertise to do so. For the time being, we are mainly left with translators' own narratives of their affective involvement (Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016). Hence also my recourse to my own memories above. It would be interesting to invite translators to recount similar memories of affectively critical incidents in a manner akin to intercultural competence training. These stories could then be used both in research and in classroom discussions.

Narrating translation work is a well-known genre with a long history, particularly in literary and academic translation. Narratives such as prefaces and essays on translation can even be seen to form the pre-disciplinary backbone of translation theory. The tradition of explaining one's principles in paratexts has continued until modern times, and some contemporary scholars, too, have constructed their theoretical arguments around their own translation work (see e.g., Venuti 2003/2013). This chapter is built around another kind of narration: the published diaries of a Finnish translator, that is, autobiographical writing (Kaindl 2017). This chapter reports on the findings of an analysis of this translator's diary entries from the point of view of reported affect and emotion. Affects are an elusive object for study. It needs to be underlined that I do not expect the narrated expressions to report directly back to emotional experiences, but I do indeed believe that the systematic thematization of expressions of feeling reported below will allow us to analyse how these microlevel elements connect together to build meaningful affective configurations, or socially experienced "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977: 132; Sharma & Tygstrup 2015: 5).

4.1 Translator Saarikoski and his diaries

My data originates from the published diary of a renowned Finnish poet and translator, Pentti Saarikoski (1937–1983). Saarikoski is one of the key figures in

the history of literary translation in Finland. He had rigorously prepared himself for a career as an author from the age of 14, and he also has a significant body of his own prose and poetry. As a translator he was productive and versatile. Between the age of 21 and his untimely death, he published some 70 translations from Greek, Latin, English, Italian, Swedish, Norwegian and German. The texts vary from classical Greek poetry to contemporary North-American fiction. He is not the most prototypical translator figure in that he was a celebrity and a high-profile actor in the literary scene. But as I hope to demonstrate, the sentiments and affects he experienced during translating are perhaps not alien to other translators either.

Saarikoski is known for his bold and creative translations. The term "Saarikoski syndrome" has been used in the Finnish literary field to refer to translating in an excessively self-asserting and exaggerated manner. This image of boldness originates from some of Saarikoski's debated and high-profile translations and the media attention that surrounded him. His *Ulysses* translations (both Joyce's and Homer's) were considered classics in themselves; *Catcher in the Rye* made him a celebrity among the youth; the translation of Henry Miller's *Tropic of Cancer* in 1962 brought the publishing house a lawsuit that Saarikoski turned into a media circus. Saarikoski yearned for public recognition, and his four marriages, his left-wing political stances, his recurring depressions and his worsening alcoholism were widely known. Translating and writing continued side by side throughout his career, sometimes blending into one another (some known pseudotranslations are actually his own poems) (Koskinen 2007a). Translating was a way to earn a living, but he also liked it and it gave him satisfaction. While he is known to have submitted some less than refined translations of what he considered minor texts, he invested a lot of effort in those translation tasks he found personally interesting and culturally important. He also often translated in a manner that is more modest than his bold image would allow one to expect.

All this makes Saarikoski an interesting object of study. I have previously written a translator profile of him and an overview of his Joyce translation (Koskinen 2007a, 2007b), looked at his translation of the Gospel of St. Matthew from the point of view of retranslation (Paloposki & Koskinen 2004) and his more recent role as the overshadowing first translator exerting his presence in retranslation processes (Koskinen & Paloposki 2015b). For my present purposes, however, his special traits and unique talent are less important than his manic autobiographical writing, which offers a wealth of data for my analysis. Saarikoski was a Knausgårdean author who depicted the nitty-gritty details of his own life and of those near him in his texts. The diaries I will be analysing in this chapter were written with publication in mind from the start. The book where they are collected and which I use as my data, *Suomentajan päiväkirjat* ("Translator's diaries", ed. H. K.

Riikonen and Janna Kantola) only came out in 2012, but the diaries contain references to publication plans, which indicate they were never written for exclusively private use.[10]

> [En voi] olla ajattelematta että tämä joskus julkaistaan. Tämä pitäisi käsittää jonkinlaiseksi romaanin ensimmäiseksi luonnokseksi: vetelen viivoja sinne tänne ja katson tulisiko tästä jotakin.   (p. 15–16)

> I cannot avoid thinking that this might be published one day. This should be understood as a first draft of a novel: I draw some lines here and there and see if anything comes out of it.[11]

As one can see from the quote above, Saarikoski also refers to the text as a first draft of a *novel*, that is, a fictional work. It is therefore an open question as to what extent the translating protagonist or other characters in the diaries equal the real life of Pentti Saarikoski or those around him. Still, as far as I can tell, all factual information is accurate, and to my knowledge those depicted in the diaries have not objected to the reported events after publication. I am leaning on Philippe Lejeune's (2009: 201) well-known theorizing of the diary as antifiction, as a genre "hooked on truth" . I am also inclined to take at face value Saarikoski's desire for brutal honesty, even in the context of creating a narrative identity (Ricoeur 1991), and I will proceed from the expectation that the material in his diaries is not written with a polished public image in mind:

> Minulla on joskus mielessä että saisin tähän kesävihkoon mahtumaan niin paljon lauseita, että niitä kun hölskyttäisi saisi kuvan siitä millainen minä nyt olen.
>   (p. 14)

> I sometimes think that it would be good to fit so many sentences into this summer notebook that if you shake it you can get a picture of me as I am now.

In analysing this data, one needs to keep in mind the stated intentions to go public (at the same time remembering that this intention was itself revealed to us readers within the narrative structure of the diaries). The public/private distinction is not, however, considered an essential defining feature of diaries (Lejeune 2009). Even if the diaries were indeed written for private use only, the narrative form limits the access to internal affective states: via narratives we can only gain knowledge of those affects the individual can be conscious of and is able and willing to also express. This may be considered a handicap, but it also captures

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10.   In an end note, the editors inform the readers that the diaries are published "as such" (p. 507).

11.   All translations of the data are mine.

the dual nature of affect. It is not only private and internal but also collective and social. Narrated affect demonstrates the kinds of affect we are able to identify and willing to share. Saarikoski's shameless style of sharing adds to the value of his diaries as data for my purposes. Diaries also capture "the day-to-day process of self-construction" (Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016: 83). The experiencing self is not a solid and permanent construct but a work in progress, and the diary entries are composed accounts in and of that process (Holstein & Gubrium 2000: 107), less likely to depict a fixed identity than to show fragmentations and fluctuations. Saarikoski's diaries do not give us a stainless window to his affective states but they are naturally occurring data in the sense that the data has not been provoked by the researcher, nor produced with the purpose of focusing on emotions, feelings and affects in mind.

From the book-length publication (440 pages of diaries plus afterwords etc.), I have selected the first four sections for detailed analysis. Together they stretch to 124 pages – that is, one fourth of the diary material – and cover the time frame from Summer 1970 to Winter 1971. During this time Saarikoski was mainly working on Homer's *Ulysses* but he also finalized Christy Brown's *Jonnekin päivästä pois* (orig. *Down All the Days*) for publication and started working on John Barth's *The Floating Opera*. Several other translations are also briefly mentioned in some entries. Some of the entries are long (several pages) and undated; others are short commentaries (a couple of lines) of a particular day. Although the publication is titled as a *translator's* diaries, the entries are not restricted to translation topics only. On the contrary, sometimes the writer focuses entirely on other issues such as on the political situation and his own political ambitions, on his family life and the lives of friends and neighbours, and on how his own writing for the next book advances, or rather how it does not.

The first three parts on my data focus on the summer of 1970, which Saarikoski and his family and entourage spent on a summer cottage[12] (in the fourth section they are back in Helsinki). The section discusses the successes of mushroom picking in the nearby forest; whose turn it is to heat up the sauna by the lake; how much he and others drank on a particular day and what they consumed; whether he has had sex or quarrels with the wife and whether the baby daughter he is tending to allows him to work or not during a particular day. Life,

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12.   Writing this book piecemeal in a string of locations across Europe and beyond (I am writing this note in Torrevieja as an addition to a section I first started putting together in Cork) perhaps makes me more attuned to the affective relevance of place than normal. Tracing the image of home, in general, and summer cottage or vacation home, in particular, in translators' narratives would allow for a fascinating window to the spatialities involved in translating (see also Barthes 2005: 9 and Chapter 6).

in more detail than we care to know about. Sometimes with direct reference to translating, sometimes not.

From these diaries I have extracted all propositions that I interpreted as containing (1) some affective stance, and (2) a reference to translation. I then placed them into a separate Excel file, and classified them first according to the theme and then according to positive versus negative valence. The classification proceeded iteratively, as I started creating themes at the same time as I started collecting data, and the classification scheme was fine-tuned as I went along. A number of propositions contained more than one theme; if there were more than two, I split the proposition into several segments to keep the analysis controllable. The total amount of these segments is 103, which means that on average there was almost, but not quite, one affectively laden proposition concerning translation per page. When I stopped, having felt my data begin to saturate in the sense of not needing additional primary themes – I had identified thirteen primary themes related to affective stances towards translation. These were: *self-confidence, satisfaction with oneself, satisfaction with translation product, satisfaction with the translation process, satisfaction with translation work, absorption in work, conditions surrounding work, relation to source text, embodied aspects of translation, shame, trust, gratitude,* and finally, *affects of others*. Many entries contained elements of more than one theme, as there were additional themes coming up in a secondary position or zoomed into after a more general remark. In addition to the ones mentioned above, I listed activities such as *comparison to other translators*, and *comparison of translation to other activities, comparison of translation to source text* and affects such as *attention seeking, insecurity* and *defiance*. These secondary elements also have some bearing in the analysis that follows, although it is mainly based on the primary themes.

As one can see, my inductively produced classification model is more a working heuristic than a fully consistent or extremely clear roster for repeatable analysis. The secondary items, in particular, are more of a shorthand than a consistent set of classes, and the primary ones are not a tidy lot. Still, I feel quite confident that, had I continued with further diary entries, most of the new propositions would have continued to fall into those eight persistent classes which form the backbone of my analysis below. In the following section, I will not proceed from one theme to another. Instead, I have regrouped the positive and the negative affects together and will discuss and interpret them one after the other, starting with the negative ones as they were more prevalent in the data (it contained 48 primarily negative propositions and 41 positive ones).[13]

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13.   Fourteen propositions were classified as neutral or ambivalent.

In what follows I will use some raw numbers to give an overview of the extent to which individual themes came up, but I wish to emphasize the qualitative nature of this content analysis, and the limits of quantifying. Simply being mentioned more of less often cannot automatically be interpreted as signalling relevance. Nevertheless, the recurrences do give us some idea of what kinds of topics occupied the mind of this translator and compelled him to jot them down. Limiting my data to the first four sections in the book was a decision I made as the data seemed to have become saturated in the sense that entirely new themes no longer emerged after that point. It may well be that some interesting one-off topics are therefore not represented in the analysis, but I trust the overview is not entirely skewed. In the following I present my findings, a portrait of a translating man. The analysis proceeds largely through direct quotations, both to allow the translator to have his own voice heard also in the original Finnish, and also to provide opportunities for readers to assess the validity of my analysis.

4.2   Impostor syndrome as a translatological malaise

The diary is a person-focused genre. It invites the author to reflect on what *I* think, how *I* feel and how *my* day has been. Still, it was a bit unexpected that *self-confidence* (31 occurrences) is the most recurrent theme in this data. When it is combined with closely related themes of *satisfaction with oneself* (16), *with the translation product* (5) and *with the translation process* (7), the picture becomes very self-centred. The translator returns to contemplating whether he is up to the task and whether he likes what he is doing. Self-confidence is the only of these four themes where positive affective evaluations outnumber negative ones, and even there only barely (15 to 14). In all three themes revolving around satisfaction, negative stances are more prevalent than positive ones, to the extent that the analysed diary sections contain no positive appraisals of the translation at hand whatsoever. In each theme, a couple of propositions are neutral or ambivalent, but the general tone tilts heavily towards negative appraisals.

Looking at the theme of self-confidence in more detail, we find that at the beginning of the process of translating Homer, the translator is optimistic but also realistic. A number of comments relate to Saarikoski's trust that he will be fine:

> En pidä mitään kiirettä nyt. Teen sitä mukaa kuin miellyttää.   (p. 9)
>
> I am not going to rush things now. I will work at a pace that feels good.

The diary contains continuous neutral commentary of how many stanzas have been translated and how the project will proceed. These were not included in

the data as they were not considered affectively laden, but they do of course provide a positively attuned background hum of satisfaction to counterbalance the more negatively valenced comments. The translator is also quite cheerful about accepting that the plans may need to be readjusted, with no signs of faltering confidence:

> Mahdollista on että tämä aikataulu brakaa täydellisesti; ihme olisi jos kaikki joskus menisi kesällä tehdyn suunnitelman mukaan.   (p. 20)

> It may well be that this schedule goes totally bonkers; it would be a miracle indeed if anything for once actually went as planned in the summer.

Although a number of things such as the meter of the translation remain undecided, the translator appears to be confident about eventually finding the solutions – or at least about finding a solution that will outsmart the previous Homer translator (cf. retranslators' anxiety of influence discussed in Section 3.3):

> En ole vielä päättänyt, millaista rytmiä käytän, enkä haluakaan päättää sitä etukäteen, uskon että se ensi talven aikana hahmottuu mielessäni.   (p. 77)

> I have not yet decided what kind of rhythm I will use, and I don't even want to decide it in advance, I believe it will become clear to me over the winter.

> Otto Mannisen yritys matkia heksametriä on mieletön, en voi ollenkaan ymmärtää mitä järkeä siinä on.   (p. 77)

> Otto Manninen's [Homer: *Odysseia*, 1924] attempt to imitate the hexameter is insane; I cannot understand the point of it.

As the summer and the translation task progress, some of the positive and optimistic statements, too, begin to comment on earlier uncertainty. It is as if the translator allowed himself to also accept and confess doubts only after having resolved them, as the diary entries reveal a continued self-questioning alongside statements of self-confidence.

> En minä oikein uskonut, että Homeroksesta mitään tulisi, kun kreikankielen taitonikin oli jo niin ruosteessa, mutta nyt tiedän että se menee, ei helposti mutta menee kuitenkin.   (p. 85)

> I did not really believe the Homer translation would work out, not with my Greek being so rusty and everything, but now I know it will; not easily, but it will.

> *Odysseian* kääntäjänä minun pitää olla uusi runonlaulaja, eikä yrittää palauttaa runoa sen "alkuperäiseen" muotoon. Kyllä minä onnistun.   (p. 91)

> As a *Ulysses* translator I need to be a new poet, and not to try to return it to its "original" form. I will succeed.

Homer is not a typical case of literary translation, as it requires philological expertise and special skills. With his classical education that included ancient Greek language and literature, and with his own poetic practice, Saarikoski was in many ways an optimal person for the task. The challenge still felt intimidating to him, and he sorely felt lacking in his academic expertise:

> Jos olisin tarpeeksi oppinut, haluaisin rakentaa oman versioni Odysseiasta, antaisin siis kaikkien myöhempien laitosten olla ja lähtisin käsikirjoituksista ja kokoaisin säilyneistä säkeistä eepoksen vaikkapa yhtä omavaltaisesti kuin Lönnrot Kalevalan. … Nyt noudatan Victor Bérardin käsitystä.   (p. 10)

> If I were learned enough, I would like to build my own version of *Ulysses*; I would leave all later editions aside and I would begin from the manuscripts and collate the existing rimes into an epic as single-handedly as Lönnrot did with *Kalevala*. … Now I just follow the interpretation of Victor Bérard.

> Kello on 17.15 kun tänään lopetan työt; alan tulla IV laulun puoliväliin, jossa Bérard kovasti järjestelee vakiintunutta Homeros-tekstiä uudelleen, ja minulla ei ole edellytyksiä ottaa kantaa. Entäpä jos uudemmat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet että B:n tekstinsiirrot ovat täysin perustelemattomia? No, minä käännän B:n mukaan, katson miltä se vaikuttaa, jätän kysymyksen avoimeksi.   (p. 40)

> It is 5.15 PM when I call it a day today; I am approaching the second half of song IV where Bérard radically reorganises the accepted version of Homer, and I have no ability to take a stand. What if more recent research has proven that B's reshufflings are entirely ungrounded? Oh well, I'll translate according to B, see how it looks, and leave this question open.[14]

> Homerosta vähän, ja masentava tietoisuus että en ole tarpeeksi oppinut suoriutuakseni kunnolla tästä työstä.

> A little bit of Homer, and the depressing knowledge that I am not learned enough to perform this task properly.   (p. 91)

Saarikoski studied widely but never graduated from university, and this may have contributed to the nagging sense of not being worthy of Homer.

> Kun minulta kysytään, mitä nykyään teen, sanon kääntäväni "yhtä amerikkalaista romskua": en kehtaa sanoa kääntäväni Homerosta!   (p. 97)

> When people ask me what I am working on, I say I am translating "a piece of American lit": I am embarrassed to say that I am translating Homer!

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14.   Saarikoski's worry was not unfounded. Later research has not been kind to Bérard's interpretations, and Saarikoski's reliance on Bérard has consequently been seen to diminish the value of his translation (Hosiaisluoma 1998: 118).

Saarikoski's lack of academic credentials also added to his self-doubts. Although the diaries were explicitly written with publication in mind, the intimate and instantaneous format of diary writing shows us the insecurities and anxieties Saarikoski's other, more directly public writings steered away from. Saarikoski exerted, both in his translations and in his original fiction, a significant modernizing influence in Finnish as a literary language (Koskinen 2007a). He also forwarded his agenda in a series of essays in the Finnish literary journal *Parnasso*. The public debate over meter can also be read in this light, as another manifesto for a new modern aesthetics, steering away from the clumsy poetics of the preceding generation. But a comparison of its belligerent tone with the self-doubts expressed in the diaries also suggests another explanation: a forceful attack against the academic translation style can be seen as (over-)compensation for Saarikoski's own anxieties.

The diaries reflect anxieties and self-doubts also beyond the Homer translation. A large body of Saarikoski's translation work consists of American fiction. He translated Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, Henry Miller and many others. His classical training did not, however, give him a firm footing in this task, and critiques of his translations often pointed to his shortcomings. The diaries show that he was acutely aware of the limits of his language skills and cultural competence and the need for continuous improvement:

> Täytyisi lukea, kreikkalaista filologiaa (etteivät ne pääse hyppimään nenälle sitten kun Odysseia on valmis), englantilaista ja amerikkalaista kirjallisuutta (että olisi hyvä edes yhdessä kielessä)   (p. 102)

> I should read, Greek philology (so that they cannot carp when the Homer translation is finished), English and American literature (so that I would be good in at least one language)

> En osaa amerikanenglantia niin kuin kääntäjän pitäisi, mutta kuinka kauan pitäisi Amerikassa elää että oppisi tuntemaan kielen sielun?   (p. 17)

> I do not master American English the way a translator should, but for how long would one need to live in the States to get to know the soul of that language?

The critical voices against Saarikoski have become more prominent over the years and were at least partially responsible for the decision to commission a retranslation of *The Catcher in the Rye* in 2004 (Koskinen & Paloposki 2015b). While some shortcomings in the case of *The Catcher*, for example, are undeniable, the critics also have a flair of knocking a dominant predecessor down from his pedestal. The diaries make it clear that Saarikoski was quick to raise these critical points himself:

> minulla kun on aina sellainen (oikea) tunne että vedän lukijoita nenästä.   (p. 17)

> I always have this (accurate) feeling of pulling the readers' leg.

An invitation to a James Joyce Symposium in Trieste spiralled Saarikoski into ago-
nizing over the tasks of socializing with others and of speaking English in public,[15]
and he foresaw a massive failure on a number of fronts: failing to behave and to
control his drinking, failing to speak English and failing to meet the expectations
of expertise in Joyce:

> Minä siellä sitten kännissä sönkötän että minä en ole enää mikään James Joyce
> Fan, kun nykyään käännän Homerosta.   (p. 26)

> I will be totally wasted and will go around stuttering that I am no longer a James
> Joyce Fan, as I am translating Homer now.

In contrast to the image emerging from the diaries, Saarikoski's public demeanour
was arrogant and self-asserting, as the above discussion on the Homer meter indi-
cated. He responded to critiques of his poor English skills with detailed descrip-
tions of a careful source text analysis and thought-out solutions, and he sometimes
attacked previous translators vehemently. The diaries, too, contain a number of
belligerent and defiant statements whose passive-aggressive tone seems to be writ-
ten to appease inner conundrums. Amidst beating himself up for unsatisfactory
language skills in English, he found solace in reminding himself of his successful
translation of Joyce's *Ulysses*:

> Mutta onnistuihan Ulysseskin jotenkuten, vaikka osaankin englantia huonom-
> min kuin joku vastavalmistunut fil.kand.   (p. 91)

> The Ulysses translation is not too bad either, although my English is poorer than
> that of a newly graduated MA.

> Kai tapaan siellä sen japanilaisen professorinkin joka Dublinissa sanoi että Ul-
> ysseksen kääntämiseen menee vähintään 500 vuotta. Pyhäinhäväistystä se niissä
> piireissä on että minä käänsin Odysseuksen kahdessa vuodessa.   (p. 26)

> I guess I will also meet the Japanese professor there [in Trieste] who told me in
> Dublin that it will take at least 500 years to translate The Ulysses. It is blasphemy
> in those circles that I translated it in two years.

Professors, and the academic and cultural establishment in general, were Saarikos-
ki's soft spot. His incomplete university studies fed into an inferiority complex
that often manifested itself in personal attacks such as the dispute on hexameter.
In his diary, he was already anticipating criticism and boosting his confidence
accordingly:

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15.   Saarikoski's oral skills in English were notoriously poor, and at least one of his wives had
been known to interpret his public speeches (Hosiaisluoma 1998: 115).

> Vahinko ettei Linkomies enää elä. Se haukkuisi minun käännökseni vielä pahem-
> min kuin Mannisen, ja minä saisin tilaisuuden iskeä takaisin arvoistani vastusta-
> jaa, eikä tarvitsisi nieleskellä jonkun Päivö Oksalan latteita nälväisyjä.   (p. 98)

> It is a shame Linkomies [professor of Latin literature] is no longer alive. He would
> lambaste my translation even more severely than Manninen's, and I would have
> a chance to battle an adversary worthy of me, rather than suffering the mediocre
> naggings of some Päivö Oksala [professor and translator of antique literature].

In spite of the defiant tones in some of the entries – and, one might add, because
of them – Saarikoski's need for external validation is evident in the diaries. He
yearned for praise from those in an authority position, although he himself was
known for using his own position for ruthlessly slaying other translators' work
(e.g., Hosiaisluoma 1998: 113).

> Haavikon pitäisi tulla käymään. … Ehkä se sanoo jonkun tunnustuksen sanan
> Christy Brownin käännöksestä; yritän tietysti kiristää.   (p. 66)

> We are waiting for Haavikko [Saarikoski's publisher] to pop in. … Maybe he'll say
> a few words of praise about the translation of Christy Brown; I'll try to squeeze
> them out of him of course.

A number of entries also indicate a troubled relationship with another authority
figure – his father – and his sense of failure in the eyes of the father.

> Vaikka olenhan minä töitä tehnyt. Mutta kun siitä ei tule hyvä mieli ja tyytyväinen
> olo. Mikä se on mikä aina estää minua, kuin pallo nilkassa? Öisin näen unia joissa
> isä halveksii minua, viime yönä kävi niin että minun piti huutaa isää pelastamaan
> minut suonsilmästä johon olin pudonnut, mutta selvisin sieltä ennen kuin hän
> ehti paikalle; mutta sitten en saanut mistään kuivia vaatteita mennäkseni yliopis-
> tolle jossa opiskelen "kääntämistiedettä", ja isä sanoi että tuleekohan niistä sinun
> luvuistasi yhtään mitään.   (p. 55)

> I have indeed worked. But it does not make me feel good and satisfied. What is it
> that always stops me like an iron ball tied to my ankle? At night I dream about my
> dad despising me, last night I had to call out for him to come and save me from
> a bog, but I managed to get out myself before he arrived; but then I did not find
> dry clothes anywhere so that I could have gone to the university, where I studied
> "translation science",[16] and dad said I wonder if your studies ever amount to any-
> thing.   (p. 55)

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16.   In the dream, that is. In the 1970s, there was no university-level "translation science" in
Finland.

Saarikoski came from an educated and sophisticated, upper middle-class family. Although he promoted an aesthetics based on the contemporary vernacular and favoured the left-wing politics of the working class, he was not a man of the streets (Hosiaisluoma 1998). Perhaps in anticipation of difficulties in gaining recognition from the academia and the cultural elite, he stated that he did not even want it anyways, and that he rather sought popular acclaim. In the diary he repeatedly expressed a worry about his public image, using the metaphor of a "fallen star":

> Minun pitäisi saada tunnustusta kansalta; asiantuntijoiden kiitos maistuu paskalta.   (p. 120)

> I should get recognition from the people; the praise of the experts tastes like shit.

> Mitähän minusta puhutaan? Että olen sammunut tähti?   (p. 72)

> I wonder what people talk about me. That I am a fallen star?

> Ehkä Odysseian suomennos lopultakin lopettaa sellaiset puheet että minä olen pelkkä juoppo ja sammunut tähti.   (p. 85)

> Maybe the Homer translation will finally stop the talk about me being just a drunkard and a fallen star.

The Finnish star metaphor uses the verb *sammua*, which has both the meaning of 'pass out' and 'to be extinguished'. As this citation makes explicit, in Saarikoski's case the two meanings are intertwined. The diaries were written by an acclaimed albeit controversial translator whom many place among the greatest Finnish literary translators of all time, but they were also written by a long-time alcoholic increasingly affected by the illness that would later kill him at the age of 45. The diaries contain numerous reports of the daily dosages and how they oiled his system and enabled his translation work:

> 145 säettä, ja siihen lopetan tältä päivältä. … Konjakkipullo teki hyvää, tänään olen ollut rauhallinen ja hyvässä työvireessä.   (p. 37)

> 145 stanzas, and that's it for today. … The bottle of cognac did me good, I have been peaceful and had a good flow today.

Interpreting the entries on alcohol use, I do not sense either shame or pride in them. They rather appear as factual statements of cause and effect, reporting what was consumed and how satisfied the author was over the effect on the workflow, much like an annotation of the chemical state of the body, kept in order to maintain affective states conducive to translating. This factor, and its effects in the diaries on the one hand, and in the affects he felt and expressed on the other hand, need to be kept in mind in the analysis.

The above discussion of the affective stances towards the translator himself and his expressions of self-confidence can be summarized by one term: the impostor syndrome.[17] It is a popular-psychology shorthand for discussing a bundle of affects such as an internalized fear of success, anticipation of potential shame, self-doubt, the persistent anxiety over failing and being discovered a fake, and the anguish of fraudulence (Vergauwe et al. 2015). In the competitive high-achievement environment of the university of today, the impostor syndrome is a well-known condition. It is not widely discussed in the academic literature of the field of translation studies, but it is easy to recognize it as a pathology that may also threaten translators. I do not assume it to be related to literary translators only, let alone only those translating classics that will be reviewed by highly critical academic readers. In fact, business translators may be even more at risk as they need to develop a skill of grasping the contents and communication styles of many different professional fields and communities of practice, and while they will naturally develop a translation-oriented expertise in any area they repeatedly work in, initially they may know very little and need to learn fast. This is fertile breeding ground for impostor symptoms. Indeed, I have myself repeated the adage "fake it until you make it" to more than one cohort of trainee translators in an attempt to prepare them for the psychological strain of performing with less than optimal situated knowledge. As the case of Saarikoski exemplifies, this is not only an issue novices need to keep an eye on, as no degree of achievement, acclaim or expertise seems to shelter you from nagging self-doubt:

> Kun istuin kivellä talon takana räkimässä, tunsin itseni surkeaksi ja mitättömäksi, mitään en ollut saanut aikaan enkä saisi.   (p. 47)

> As I was sitting on a stone behind the cabin, spitting, I felt I was a sad loser, I had not achieved anything in my life, and neither would I.

The impostor syndrome is often seen as related to gender and race; this achievement anxiety has often been connected to marginalized groups and seen as a feminine trait (Simmons 2016). As the case of Saarikoski implies, also those in a privileged position can suffer from it. Saarikoski was not a typical translator, but his anxieties are recognisable as worries translators might typically entertain. His confidence faltered in a number of areas: he was unsure about his language skills, cultural knowledge and the level of his learnedness; he was nervous about the critical reception of his translation work and even more worried about not

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17. In literature, it is also often called the "impostor phenomenon". While I recognize the folk psychological overtunes of the term syndrome, I prefer to use it to signal its link to the *malaises* of translation.

getting any feedback and recognition at all. In the diaries he did *not* express doubts about his ability to interpret the literary qualities of the source texts nor about his abilities to use the target language creatively to express these in Finnish. This, we may hypothesize, may differentiate him from many other translators. Target language anxiety is likely to be more dominant in translators working into their L2 (linked to foreign-language anxiety in general); and anxieties over interpretative skills might prove to be more prominent in those literary translators who are not also published authors.

4.3   Work engagement and the desire to translate

Saarikoski's faltering self-confidence evident across the diaries and discussed in the previous section raises questions about the desirability of translation work. What is the motivation that keeps the translator going amidst all the doubts? Is translation work also rewarding, and if so, how? The themes of *absorption in work* (the positive feeling of being fully engaged in your work, or a feeling of flow) and *general satisfaction with translation work* (beyond the assignment at hand) may provide some answers. They seem to signal the two faces of work engagement, the momentary (absorption) and the permanent (general satisfaction). Work engagement is a concept in the psychology of work referring to a persistent, positive affective motivational state and a feeling of fulfilment at work, consisting of vigour, dedication and absorption (Schaufeli et al. 2002: 74). It has been studied from the point of view of permanent dispositions (i.e., general job satisfaction) and from the perspective of daily fluctuations (i.e., more temporary feelings of flow). An interesting detail in comparison to my dataset is that the daily changeability of engagement has been studied through diary research (Sonnentag 2003). In their seminal article, Schaufeli et al. (ibid.: 73) place engagement as the antipode of burnout and define it as follows: "Engaged employees have a sense of energetic and effective connection with their work activities and they see themselves as able to deal completely with the demands of their job." As discussed in the previous section, in the current data, the antipode is less explicitly that of burnout than the issue of self-doubt.

Entries related to work engagement figure extensively in Saarikoski's diaries. If we count together propositions classified into the two categories of *absorption in work* and *general satisfaction with translation work,* this combined category of *work engagement* was the most frequent theme together with *self-esteem* discussed in the previous section. In the data, general satisfaction with translation work received 16 comments (8 positive ones, 7 negatives and 1 ambivalent), and items related to absorption in work occurred 14 times, and positive and ambivalent affects (6+3) outnumbered the negative ones (5).

It can be considered significant that both themes were mentioned more often with reference to positive than to negative affects. Translation is a pastime for Saarikoski, resorted to on Sundays to avoid boredom, but it is also a source of happiness. Positive feelings of flow with respect to the on-going translation task are far from ecstatic, however. On the other hand, negative affects are not overly extreme either. The recurrent topos is that of tiresomeness ('jaksaminen'): entries report how translation work has exhausted the translator. These affects are, however, only temporary, and only refer to the day's work or passing bodily feelings. In general, the pull of translation is strong enough to keep the translator in its grip:

> Aamuinen mielenmasennus on mennyt, työ on sujunut hyvin, eikä minulla ole mitään pelättävää.   (p. 47)

> The depression of this morning has been subdued, [translation] work goes smoothly, and I have nothing to fear.

> Mitä tekisin kun on vapaapäivä? Käännän muutaman säkeen huvikseni.   (p. 66)

> What would I do now that I have a day off? I'll translate a couple of stanzas just for fun.

Entries reflecting on translation work in more general terms are more explicitly positive than the ones commenting on the flow of the work at hand. The category *satisfaction with translation work* contains more entries (8) with positive affects than those with negative ones (6), and the valence of the vocabulary referring to translation is clearly positive in its appraisal, talking about *happiness*, *pleasure*, *feeling good*, and *meaningfulness*.

> Jos kaikki menee niin kuin toivon, ensi kesästä tulee hirvittävän raskas ja hirvittävän onnellinen, kun rupean tekemään raakakäännöksestä runoa.   (p. 98)

> If everything goes according to my wishes, next summer will be awfully tiresome and awfully happy as I will begin to turn my raw translation into poetry.

References to the harmoniousness of cottage life, and the role of translation work in creating this idyllic atmosphere, reminds one of the pastoral in literature. Pastoral writing has a long and varied history both as a formal genre and as a thematic feature. Originally songs or poems about shepherds with their herds, the pastoral is typically associated with idyllic landscape settings, elevated simplicity of rustic rural life and harmonious atmospheres (Alpers 1996). In Saarikoski's diaries the translator, on a par with shepherds in terms of low status and regular tasks (ibid.: 27), is set in a rural and rustic landscape of the traditional Finnish summer cottage, creating a perfect fit between the "landscape" and the "shepherd", and ideal conditions for the simple and harmonious task of working on the translation, sentence by sentence.

> Lämmitin kammarini ja nyt täällä on hyvä olla, istua ja kuunnella veden tippumista, etsiä sanoja Liddell-Scottista, kääntää Homerosta rauhallisesti, lause lauseelta.   (p. 15)

> I warmed up the cabin and it now feels good to be here, to sit and listen to the rain, to search for words in Liddell-Scott, to take my time in translating Homer peacefully, sentence by sentence.

We must keep in mind that these diaries were written by a modern author whom we can assume to have been well aware of the trope of the pastoral in literary history. Throughout the text, the imagery of mushroom-picking, the sauna and bonfire nights and other countryside joys is implicitly – and occasionally also explicitly – contrasted with the author's normal urban life, and while the protagonist stays at the cottage, other people are reported to go to town or come from there, as constant reminders of the temporariness of the retreat. This can be seen as a strategic artistic design in an autobiographical text written for publication. But it is tempting to also interpret it, as pastorals have often been interpreted, as a representation of a state of mind (cf. Alpers 1996: 22). Seen in this manner, the diaries reflect the pleasure of translation as a constant that creates a soothing repetitive tempo to the summer days at the cottage and provides intellectual challenge amidst an otherwise blissfully uneventful life.

Many literary translators are also publishing authors. So was Saarikoski. This dual identity causes some affective entanglements of its own, and they surface repeatedly in his diaries. Alongside the idyllic harmony and tolerable temporary miseries of translation, he processes the much more agonizing worries of *not* writing his own texts. In contrast to writing, translating feels easier. The steady progress of the work gives him a soothing sense of accomplishment, and the entries document this progress by accounting daily translation dosages as well as accumulating results, both of the work at hand and throughout his career. Listings of published translations and references to completed translations provide the author with a sense of comfort amidst a writer's block that persists through the material under study.

> Ei siitä novellista taida mitään tulla. … Mutta ehkä minä sittenkin elän ja toimin johdonmukaisesti, siis toteutan itseäni, hautautuessani pariksi vuodeksi Homeroksen alle.   (p. 54)

> The short story is not going to take shape, I think. … But perhaps I do in fact live and work consistently, that is, perhaps I fulfil my aspirations, by drowning myself under Homer for a couple of years.

Saarikoski's affective stance towards translation is characterized by mood swings. One day's modest happiness gives way to almost aggressive antipathy the following

day. The yearning to write both posits translation as a rewarding compensation and gives it the role of a second choice. Even when translation is going smoothly (apparently all the time; in spite of his constant depressive worries Saarikoski never reports serious shortcomings or doubts about the translation in the material analysed here), the joy it gives is tainted by the misery of knowing that while he is translating, he is still not writing.

> Nukuin kai liian vähän, koska tänään olen ollut haluton ja hermostunut. Homeros sujuu kyllä, ei siinä mitään, mutta haluaisin tehdä muuta, kirjoittaa runoja taas.
>
> (p. 12)

> I guess I slept too little because today I have been listless and nervous. Homer is going well enough, but that is not what I want to do; I would like to write poems again.

> En minä pelkällä suomentamisella elä, tarkoitan saa tyydytystä.   (p. 109)

> I cannot live on translation only, I mean, I cannot get satisfaction.

While translation is clearly a compensatory task for Saarikoski, it, and the accompanying identity of a translator, is also affectively desirable in itself, and it would be a mistake to assume it was only a way of earning a living, let alone easy money. Saarikoski acknowledges the difficulties involved in translation, but also contemplates its societal recognition as demonstrated by the modest monetary rewards.

> Työ kuin työ. Tärkeämpää kuin työstä saatu raha on siitä saatu arvostus. Tienaisin paremmin kirjoittamalla Hymyyn kuin kääntämällä Homerosta, mutta mitä minä Hymyn rahoilla tekisin?   (p. 100)

> Any work is fine. Recognition is a more important reward for work than money. I would make more money by writing to Hymy [a popular gossip magazine] than by translating Homer, but what would I need Hymy's money for?

> Se on vaikeata työtä, se vaatii suurta lahjakkuutta, mutta miksi siitä pitäisi maksaa?   (p. 119)

> [Translation] is difficult work, it requires great talent, but why should anyone pay for it?

Translators' habitus, that is, their internalized professional identity, has been the subject of a growing body of research in translation studies (see Vorderobermeier 2014). The question of low remuneration has been seen as evidence of their subservience – a claim famously proposed by Daniel Simeoni in his seminal essay on the topic in 1998 – as it indicates low negotiating power in contract negotiations (Heino 2017). This may well be true, and the diaries also contain entries indicating

less than optimal bargaining skills and annoyed powerlessness, as for example in the extract below where Saarikoski is upset to find out how his fees compare to those of another prominent translator:

> Soitin Juhani Jaskarille ja sain kuulla, että hän saa käännöksistään parempia palkkioita kuin minä, 250 arkilta, kun minä saan vain 200. Se suututti minua tietysti.
> (p. 95)

> I phoned Juhani Jaskari [another literary translator] and heard that his translation fees are higher than mine, 250 per sheet when I only get 200. That made me angry of course.

While monetary compensation is one measure of success and position, it is clear that literary translators also find other rewards that provide motivation for them to continue with the task, and the case of Saarikoski points to some potential answers as to what these might be. It can be assumed that an author-translator's habitus is built differently from a translator who does not also engage in their own writing, and author-translators have more options in positioning themselves in the literary field. These *translator's* diaries, however, provide ample evidence of Saarikoski's primary identification as a translator, and his positive appraisal of this role and of the translator's task. He makes a mental note of the down sides of the occupation such as low pay (see the citations above), and of his destiny as an ambitious translator tied by birth to a marginal linguaculture:

> Minä käännän nyt Homerosta; Ulysseksen olen kääntänyt; suuremmissa maissa riittäisi kumpikin näistä yksinään elämäntyöksi. Aina tämä sama vitutus.
> (p. 59)

> I'm translating Homer now; [Joyce's] Ulysses I have translated before; in a bigger country either one alone would suffice for a life's work – an issue that keeps pissing me off.

The negative affects, however, are passing remarks that pale in comparison to the more constant undercurrent of the pleasures of translation. Indeed, in spite of the difficulties and anxieties discussed in Section 4.2, in these diaries translation clearly emerges as a satisfying source of happiness, whereas authorship is described as a source of an agonizingly unsatisfied desire.

> Kääntäminen miellyttää minua. Teen nyt kykyjeni mukaista työtä.   (p. 17)

> Translating pleases me. I am now working according to my abilities.

In the case of translation work, engagement can be seen to relate to what Antoine Berman (1984: 21) labelled *pulsion de traduire*, desire or drive to translate. The pleasure of translation and the desire to translate are tropes well-known in the

philosophy of translation. According to Paul Ricoeur, this desire to translate stems from a desire to broaden the horizons of one's native language, to discover its potential. This surely is an element Saarikoski would have recognized, but the desire also stems from the overall context of his personal life and from the activity of translating itself.

4.4 The pains and pleasures of translation

The analysis of the most recurrent categories of affect in the data collected from a literary translator's diaries portrays a dualistic profession of intense self-doubt and a deeply satisfying intellectual task. Indeed, in Saarikoski's diaries the emerging picture of translation is bipolar; highs and lows alternate as the translation process moves forward, and job satisfaction and commitment levels fluctuate. We do need to keep in mind that the writer of these diaries was an alcoholic with a history of mental problems. This undoubtedly colours the data, but I argue that the resulting image is more likely to be an intensified than a twisted version of more generally valid experiences, and that the impostor syndrome and translational drive are both central elements of the affective basis of the profession. That is, they contribute to its structure of feeling, to its pervasive and persistent collective mood.

In psychology, the impostor syndrome refers to "intense feelings of intellectual fraudulence, often experienced by high-achieving individuals" (Vergauwe et al. 2015: 565). In a fairly large-scale study across several professional fields, the tendency to be affected by the impostor syndrome was linked to personality traits such as self-efficacy, maladaptive perfectionism and neuroticism, and it tended to correlate with lower job satisfaction but greater continuance commitment (ibid.). In the case of Saarikoski, faltering job satisfaction and the related symptoms of the impostor syndrome seem to fit this picture quite well. I also hypothesize he is not a unique case.

The final element correlating with the impostor syndrome in Vergauwe et al.'s study, *continuance commitment*, adds a twist that is more complex. It comes from a three-part model of organizational commitment, first introduced by Natalie Allen and John Mayer in the 1990s (Allen & Meyer 1991: 67). Continuance-committed employees may become dissatisfied with their work but are nevertheless unwilling to leave the organization either because of secure remunerations or because of a lack of alternative employment and the cost associated with leaving. It contrasts both to *affective commitment*, that is, wanting to stay because of identifying with the work goals and of positive emotional attachment, and to *normative commitment*, that is, the felt obligation to stay out of a sense of duty or of guilt for leaving.

This would imply that those prone to the impostor syndrome might have a tendency to feel that they *must* stay, as opposed to a feeling that they *want* to stay or *ought* to stay.

This picture appears less identifiable with the case of Saarikoski discussed above. While it is true that for an author-translator, translation assignments are clearly linked to remuneration issues, it is equally evident that authorship also opens up other avenues for employment, and deciding to stay with translation is explicitly weighed against other opportunities and then chosen because of an inner motivation to do so. The desire to translate that emerges as a central feature of the diaries rather signals a strong affective commitment, and workaholic tendencies which are considered a pathology of affective commitment are also visible. The entries related to the desire to translate show the rewards and joys of translating that do not fit in with continuity commitment.

Methodologically, this chapter deals with narrated affect, and the nature of that data needs to be kept in mind. Saarikoski himself also reminds the reader that he only writes the diaries when he is too tired to translate. The emerging picture of translation may therefore be excessively gloomy and negatively coloured.

> Minun pitää yhtenään huomauttaa, että kirjoitan tähän vihkoon aina silloin kun en jaksa kääntää, siis kun ajatukseni on väsynyt   (p. 15)

> I need to keep pointing out that I write these notes when I am too tired to translate, that is, when my thought is tired.

In analysing the diaries of a published author and a public figure such as Saarikoski, certain amount of caution is necessary. Conflating authors' biographies with their artistic work is a risk literary scholars have learned to carefully avoid, and our era of selfies and social media presence has made image-building a pastime for the masses. The blending of biography and fiction was also a hallmark of Saarikoski's personal poetics, and he has been described as having been obsessed with revealing aspects of his personal life to the readers, particularly from the late 1960s onwards (Ylitalo 2015: 20). The degree of constructedness and fictionality in the "Pentti Saarikoski" of his autobiographical prose – hence, also in the diaries analysed here – needs to be taken into account, but this does not render the analysis of his commentaries unproductive (ibid.: 11). Even though Saarikoski is in many ways a special case, I am inclined to think that the emerging image of translation is likely to be recognizable to many other translators as well. The potential element of fictionality in his accounts somewhat paradoxically adds to the universality of the emerging portrait.

I am not arguing that looking at one translator's narrated affect we can empirically prove any affective states related to translation as either true or false, either for that one individual or more universally. Instead, I do posit that as an affective

practice, translation in general, and perhaps literary translation in particular, is a dualistic activity, and that this duality crucially conditions how we collectively tend to *feel* translation, and this "structure of feeling" is also evident in Saarikoski's notes. Structure of feeling is a term originating from Raymond Williams (1977: 131), and it designates the collective affective qualities that organize bodies and condition life, the prevailing affective atmosphere (B. Anderson 2014: Chapter 5.3). In their introduction to a collection of articles on Williams' concept, Devika Sharma and Frederik Tygstrup (2015: 1) underline the importance of the experiential and describe Williams' research agenda on the "affective infrastructure" of our lives through the following set of questions:

> What does it feel like to be in a particular situation? How do our propensities for doing this and not that emerge? What fuels our enthusiasm or enhances our wellbeing? How do the little things pertaining to feeling, bodily sensation, and atmosphere inflect, even ever so slightly, the ideas we proclaim and interests we pursue? What we arrive at here is a participants' perspective on culture; that is, not only what was said and done at a particular place and at a particular time, but what it was like to be there.

These structures are often understood to refer to a particular time-space, to a periodization of art or a generational view of artistic style. The duality of affect in translation is more linked to structures of feeling, to a structured affective experience, of a particular translational practice than to the particular response of a given generation or artistic group. As such, it is not a new idea. The many dualities of translation – such as source versus target, free versus literal – are well-known, and many philosophers of translation have pointed out this affective duality as well. Ortega y Gasset (1937) discusses the "misery and splendour" of translation; Paul Ricoeur talks about "translation's great difficulties and small delights" (2006: 3). In more contemporary research, this same persistent dilemma has been investigated through empirical survey designs that aim to uncover what keeps translators motivated and satisfied (e.g., Dam & Zethsen 2016; Heino 2017). The mental landscape of translation is beset with devastating lows but also with gentle and rewarding highs. The above analysis focusses on an individual translator, but its ethos is cultural, not psychological. What we are witnessing in Saarikoski's diaries is a personal account of collectively felt difficulties and delights, and of their constant ebb and flow in the daily work of the translator. In short, a narrative account set in time and space of what it feels like to be engaged in a translation process.

CHAPTER 5

Sticky affects, affective capital and interpreter performance

5.1 The sticky fear of betrayal

Chapter 4 charted one translator's narrated affects during translation work, focussing on his reported feelings and mapping them with a set of culturally conditioned structures of feeling: the binary ways of conceptualizing translation work in terms of pleasure and pain. These structures of feeling are mainly descriptive observations, although they have gained affective value through wide circulation. More normative cultural conditioning becomes visible when we move to study attempts at controlling the work of translators and interpreters. These attempts too, often take a binary form – known to anyone familiar with discourses on translation – between source-orientedness and target-orientedness (e.g., *sourciers* and *ciblistes* in French; or domestication and foreignization in contemporary translation studies parlance that takes its cue from German Romanticism). In interpreting, the desire to control the affective affinities of the interpreter often revolves around notions of neutrality and impartiality.

The pervasiveness of neutrality as a structure of feeling is related to the fear or worry over translators' or interpreters' excessive licence to distort the message one way or another. The threat of them going rogue and not performing their task according to the expectations of the other participants is an "affective fact", to borrow a term Brian Massumi (2010: 54) coined to explain how pre-emptive politics functions and how it revolves around what might have been. Fear, he describes, is "the felt reality of the non-existent, loomingly present as the *affective fact* of the matter" (italics in the original). "If we feel a threat, there was a threat", he continues, "[t]hreat is affectively self-causing." In the same vein, if a communicating partner fears the interpreter might not be properly conveying their intended meanings, this potential shortcoming becomes an affective fact in the conversation, regardless of the actual competence and performance of the interpreter in question. The logic of affective facts rests on them being "so superlatively real" (ibid.: 55) that they override observable, actual facts and render them irrelevant. Things are as they are felt to be. To complicate the matter further, in the case of

translatorial activities, observable facts on the successes or failures of translators or interpreters are often impossible to obtain for most participants, as they may be unable to verify and judge how the mediated style and content relates to the source. The feeling of threat or the feeling of trust is then all there is.

Obviously, the risk of translatorial non-compliance is not entirely unfounded. Translators and interpreters have been known to sometimes fail and also to betray. This makes the feeling of threat even more compelling and contagious. Indeed, the fear of betrayal and the ensuing desire to control translatorial activities to ensure the neutrality of the mediator is a particularly sticky affect, to use Sara Ahmed's (2010, 2014) concept discussed in Chapter 2. It is a recurrent trope in translation literature, and a prototypical source of drama in fictionalized images of translators and interpreters. In reaction to this sticky affective stance among their potential clients, translators and interpreters have been playing the game of building trust by providing various documents that aim to put forward the image of a neutral and unbiased mediator. These codes of conduct aim to regulate acceptable professional performance to match and obliviate the sticky fear. In so doing they, or to be more precise the collective associations tasked to protect and support the profession and issuing these codes, participate in constructing the normativity of a particular affective stance among the professionals: performed neutrality.

In most discussions and codes, translatorial neutrality, or the middle way between leaning too far to either the source or the target side, presents itself as the unbiased, natural option. Friedrich Schleiermacher with his well-known wariness towards the middle ground and the unnatural Blendlinge it breeds is a famous exception. Neutrality, however, is not naturally occurring. As Roland Barthes, who devoted his 1978 Collège de France lecture series to the question of the neutral, reminds us, neutrality, too, is a position to be forcefully taken, rather than a natural outcome of refraining from taking a position: "The desire for the Neutral continually stages a paradox: as an object, the Neutral means suspension of violence; as a desire, it means violence" (Barthes 2005: 13). Barthes also maintains that neutrality is an intense state, and that overcoming the oppositional paradigm is hard work:

> [F]or me, the Neutral doesn't refer to "impressions" of grayness, of "neutrality," of indifference. The Neutral – my Neutral – can refer to intense, strong, unprecedented states. "To outplay the paradigm" is an ardent, burning activity.
>
> (Barthes 2005: 7)

Also in translation, neutrality is not simply the non-choice of not choosing to go to one of the extremes. The ardent, burning activity of outplaying the binary paradigm of source versus target, and the codification of this activity in codes of

practice, is the topic of this chapter. We will look into the hard physical and affective work that is involved in the activity of *performing* neutrality. Neutrality is a position implicitly or explicitly expected in translatorial encounters but often difficult if not impossible to maintain. Working against sticky mistrust by exhibiting a neutral stance is therefore hard work, and this work is fundamentally affective by nature. In Chapter 2, I discussed translating and interpreting as affective labour, arguing that interpreting in particular belongs to a performative group of affective labour, and that certain kinds of affective and bodily capital are therefore particularly intensively involved. In this chapter, these are examined in more detail in the context of public service interpreting (see also Koskinen 2018).

The word capital is not accidental here. It is usefully connectable to a large existing body of literature on the translators' habitus that builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and discusses the triangle of field, capital and habitus in translation (see Vorderobermeier 2014). Habitus, for Bourdieu, signifies the set of attitudes, mind-sets, behavioural patterns, gestures, poses and outlook that we have internalized. Habitus is formed socially, through family ties and social circles, inherited genes, class status, education, professional group and so on. Factors such as these give us an ingrained and embodied understanding of what is "natural", "proper" and "right" (e.g., Bourdieu 1990). The habitus, in other words, is also the source of sticky affects, of the subtle affective mechanisms directing how one is to feel and how one is to act (Schmitz & Ahmed 2014). The term capital also works as a reminder that in a capitalist society, innate and acquired embodied features and affective skills and capacities can and will also be transformed into economic capital, creating an affective economy (Ahmed 2004; Ahmed 2014: 45) where features such as race, ethnicity, language combinations and accents, educational background, age and gender place participants on unequal footing affectively, socially and economically (see also Piller 2013).

5.2   Doing being an interpreter

5.2.1   Performance as doing being

Translating and interpreting are activities performed professionally. In English, the *double entendre* of performance comes in handy: it means both performing a show and the action of performing a task or function. In interpreting literature, it typically refers to the latter; here, I argue that successfully completing the latter presumes elements of the former as well. Norms of translation have occupied a pride of place in sociologically oriented study of translation, but most research has focused on textual norms. This focus makes sense in a text-based activity, but we

should not overlook the more embodied elements of performing, and the norma-
tive and normalizing expectations involved. In her seminal essay on performing
gender, philosopher Judith Butler (1988: 519; italics in the original) discusses the
idea of gender as a continuous state of becoming:

> [Gender] is an identity tenuously constituted in time – an identity instituted
> through a *stylized repetition of acts*. Further, gender is instituted through the stili-
> zation of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which
> bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illu-
> sion of an abiding gendered self.

Butler's argument is that gender is a social construct based on a tacit collective
agreement; it is not a natural fact. Interpretership is perhaps a less central cultural
fiction, but the social construction is not too different. My argument here is that
doing being an interpreter is in a similar manner a process of a stylized repetition
of acts whose continuation develops an air of endurance and stability, and that the
stylization is in many ways embodied. Being an interpreter is, in this sense, a "per-
formative accomplishment" that constitutes an identity "as a compelling illusion,
an object of belief" (Butler 1988: 520). The formulation of *doing being* something
or someone originates form Harvey Sacks' (1984) discussion of ordinariness, and
his emphasis on not simplistically taking ordinariness as ordinary but seeing the
complicated ways in which being ordinary has to be performed. The phrasing of
doing being someone or something has since been borrowed by many. I use it here
to underline that creating a successful performance of being a professional inter-
preter also requires the active doing of that being.

Performances, and the roles we play, presume an audience (Butler 1988: 520).
Also doing being an interpreter anticipates someone watching the performance.
While translators and interpreters do occasionally perform on stage (e.g., reading
their translation, or interpreting a public speaker consecutively), in most every-
day performances (Goffman 1959/1990), also at work, we are both playing along
and watching others play in collective, interactive performances of occupational
emotions. The performances expected from professionals in different subfields of
translation and interpreting are not uniform, and the particular affects they are
assumed to display vary according to the context. As discussed in Chapter 2, liter-
ary translators are often expected to love their work, their source texts and their
authors, and this profound affinity is seen to guarantee their loyalty and therefore
to safeguard the quality of their work. In contrast, interpreters are expected to
remain neutral and unaffected, and this *lack* of affinity is seen to guarantee their
impartiality and therefore to safeguard the quality of their work. Business transla-
tors, in turn, need to deliver their services in a reliable and efficient manner, the
quality of their work often judged by elements such as trustworthiness and timely
delivery.

If we accept the view of doing being an interpreter as affective labour (as defined in Chapter 2 above), it is logical to assume that possessing or accumulating suitable affective capital will boost your career. This argument is similar to that put forward by Séverine Hubscher-Davidson (2018): her book on translation and emotion is built on the premise that emotional intelligence helps translators perform better. To translate this into the parlance of the present chapter, emotional intelligence is one form of affective capital. In any field of practice, varying expectations directed at one's (performances of) emotional stages can feel daunting, and may lead to a sense of inauthenticity or acting, which in turn has been seen as leading to a feeling of a fragmented self and further to stress, demotivation, depression, absenteeism and turnover (Salmela 2009). Emotional intelligence allows one to regulate and control these negative impulses created by the performance itself (Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 24). At the same time, theorists such as Goffman or Butler would not readily accept the idea of there being an "authentic self" to betray. Their theoretical understanding is built on the idea that identities are always already performed, both frontstage and backstage (Goffman 1959/1990). Instead of any elusive notions of authenticity, they might urge us to focus on how *convincing* a performance is. Identities are also always already collective rather than individual, and the performances we participate in are collectively scripted. The innate skills of any one individual (such as emotional intelligence) are, therefore, only one aspect of affective capital. Performances, and accepted displays of capital within them, are constrained by collective social orders and complex sets of values attached to different forms of capital. Norms, expectations and hierarchies of power come into play.

While the argument in this book is that all translating and interpreting can be conceptualized as affective labour, this chapter focuses on public service interpreters as an extreme case. Their occupational performances are laden with affective expectations, and issues of norms, expectations and hierarchies are much more openly visible than in many other forms of translating and interpreting. This subfield therefore allows us to see clearly how affective and bodily capital function in mediated communication. Embodiment is a natural element of interpreting.[18] In spite of the recent rise of remote modes such as telephone and video interpreting, prototypical interpreted interaction puts all actors' bodies in close proximity. Hence, the body of the interpreter is very much part of the performance, bringing the issue of bodily capital in sharp relief. In face-to-face interaction trust is not only built verbally but also through numerous embodied and affective means that allow the interpreter to signal convincing professionality. Translating, in comparison, is much more bodiless. Although the translating body is no less engaged in

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18. Embodiment is even more pronounced in sign language interpreting.

the act of translating than the body of the interpreter in interpreting, the translator's body is typically outside the visual, aural and haptic reach of the user of the translation. Similarly, for translators, the audience is more distant and deferred, whereas interpreters perform a demanding cognitive task instantaneously and in front of a live audience.

The embodied aspects of interpreting are also a reminder that our performances are always constrained by our bodies. Precisely because interpreting (in its non-remote modes) takes place in plain sight and in a shared space, participants may have all kinds of expectations about the interpreter's physical appearance and positioning in space. These are directly linked to affects, since bodily elements (e.g., standing too close) cause affects, and since affects are also bodily felt and expressed (e.g., blushing). An interpreter who is skilled in identifying, interpreting and managing the expression of their own affects and those of the communicating partners possesses an extensive amount of affective capital, but also situationally preferred bodily capital can be transformed into affective capital. A particular kind of body and its normative positioning, as well as a particular kind of speech, are favourably perceived by others and therefore create positive vibrations, supporting the interpreter's possibilities for a successful affective performance in doing being a competent and trustworthy interpreter.

5.2.2   Performing impartiality

Community or public service interpreting (PSI) is arguably the most codified branch of translating and interpreting. Statutes controlling and safeguarding the provision of interpreting in the context of various public institutions have been written in national and supranational law, and numerous organizations have published their own codes of conduct for PSI (Bancroft 2005), regulating the expected behaviour of the interpreter, often in detail. One can indeed pause for a moment to think about why this might be. A Finnish saying *siitä puhe mistä puute* ('what one is missing one talks about') may perhaps begin to explain it. As opposed to other branches of interpreting, PSI lacks a high profile and professional status, and the integrity of this vocational group is constantly at risk because of ad-hoc, volunteer and non-professional practices, widely documented in research literature (see, e.g., Martínez-Gómez 2015). Because languages most in demand in PSI are often not taught at university-level interpreter training programmes, or in any formal training outside the countries of origin, and because other pathways to the profession do not always include extensive training, the practitioners do not necessarily internalize particular norms and conventions through training. The codes perform two functions at the same time: they signal expected behaviour for those working as interpreters

and they present a reliable, legitimate and trustworthy front to the clients. In so doing they participate at a collective level in doing being a professional public service interpreter.

A number of scholars have studied various ethical codes. Some of them have an extremely critical view. "The codes, as they stand, merely represent the prototypical naive lay-person's understanding, and hence expectations, of what we do", argue Llewellyn-Jones and Lee (2014: 146). This is quite a harsh view, and slightly unfounded in the sense that the codes are typically drafted by the profession, not by lay-persons, but also valid from the perspective of the PR function of the documents (Lambert 2018): to alleviate sticky fears, the documents need to address lay-persons' worries. Codes of conduct also need to be understood from the perspective of this particular genre. They are by definition deontological; they are attempts to codify conduct (see also Dean & Pollard 2011: 157). Or, to use Andrew Chesterman's (1993) vocabulary, they are a tool for transforming the "ought" to "is," scripting the desired performance for the actors on the stage to follow in practice. The codes therefore need to be understood from the point of view of their transformativity: "codes are indeed intended to transform the social context where the PSI profession exists and they do this by pointing out elements that earn the profession trust and legitimacy" (Baixauli-Olmos 2017: 251).

It is often underlined that public service interpreters are commissioned for the benefit of both communicating partners. While this is true, it is also necessary to remember that the stakes are not the same for them both. It is typically the non-professional client for whom trust is most acute and personal, as they are relatively powerless in the situation and need to trust their personal matters (such as health issues, immigration status and legal liabilities), in the hands of the mediating participant. British sociologists Rosalind Edwards, Claire Alexander and Bogusia Temple (2006) have analysed the accounts of people with limited English who need to rely on interpreting, examining the contingent and situation-specific processes of actively doing trust in interpreted encounters. Their article is a sobering reminder of the risk always inherent in trust, as trust is only needed when we lack certainty. A sense of familiarity shortens the leap of faith required to trust. A number of case stories recounted by Edwards et al. illustrate the perceived affective benefits of relying on one's friends and family members as interpreters: loyalty, understanding, continuity and commitment. Professional interpreters are not felt to offer similar emotional support. On the other hand, confidentiality issues are acknowledged as a problem in too-close circles, creating a double bind of familiarity and trust. To overcome this double bind and to create an affective economy more favourable to using professional interpreters, "a glimmer of familiarity" (para. 2.4) would also be needed in professionally interpreted

contexts. The structured practicalities of workflow and commissions do not nec-essarily support the affective bonding between clients and interpreters created by repeated contacts, and the clients will simply have to decide to actively trust the interpreter at hand. To quote Jie Chan, one of the interviewees of Edwards et al. (para. 6.10):

> I am telling you one thing. I have been to hospital many times but the interpreter is a different person every time. They do not know my situation, they do not know what disease I have. Even if I met an interpreter who I had met before, they would not remember me. The reason is that they go to different hospitals every day and work for many people, they cannot remember each individual. I've been to hospital more than ten times and there is only one interpreter who has worked for me twice. So it is impossible to make them friends – I have to trust the inter-preter [when I don't know them], there is nothing I can do.

The glimmer of familiarity the client might find reassuring may be precisely what the professional interpreter – and the coordinator organizing the gigs – may wish to avoid. Too close a tie to one of the communicating partners could easily be seen to compromise impartiality. And doing being impartial is a fundamental element of doing being a professional interpreter. This is why impartiality is also enshrined in professional codes of conduct (Baixauli-Olmos 2017: 259), alongside with more or less detailed practical advice on how one should do being an impartial medi-ator. In the Finnish code, for example,[19] affects are linked to impartiality in an explicitly negative manner. Section 7 of the code runs as follows: "The interpreter shall be an impartial mediator of the message and shall not allow personal feel-ings, attitudes and opinions to affect his or her performance." In the more detailed instructions this imperative of not allowing feelings to affect one's performance is discussed in more detail:

> Impartiality means that interpreters' personal opinions and attitudes do not affect the quality of their work. If matters coming to light during the course of interpre-tation are against the interpreter's own ethics or morals, the interpreter does not show this by gestures, tone of voice or choice of words.   (SKTL 2013b: 3)

The instructions indeed emphasize the performativity of impartiality. The mat-ters may well be contrary to the interpreter's own beliefs and values, and the

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19.   The Finnish code of conduct for public service interpreters (SKTL 2013a) consists of twelve numbered sections or principles that have been translated into numerous languages, including English, but the more detailed application guidelines (SKTL 2013b) have only been published in Finnish and are cited below in my own translation.

interpreter's affective stance therefore non-neutral, but the interpreter's *performance* is expected to remain unaffected. No matter how challenging the situation, and no matter how complex their inner feelings, the interpreter's external behaviour is not to expose any inner conundrums. Bodily reactions (gestures, tone of voice) and verbalizations (choice of words) alike are to be controlled.

Indeed, the interpreter's neutral position is performed through active affective labour of controlling one's behaviour. According to Anthony Pym (2012: 80–81), translators' and interpreters' professional role is akin to a mask on their face, its smile arousing confidence and providing shelter for the interpreter to perform interpreting work. The metaphor of a mask functions on the bodily level, signalling not only neutrality and impartiality but also the interpreter's lack of a personal face, that is, lack of personal values, attitudes or emotions. The interpreter is not present in person but in a role. This is also reflected in interpreters' professional discourse of the "alien I", that is, the practise of the interpreters referring to themselves in the third person and preserving the "I" to represent the speaker's first-person pronoun (Pym 2012: 63). The personal "I" of the interpreter is excluded from the communicative situation; the interpreter is not involved in person but only in a role. Although fieldwork-based research has shown that in actual practise, the alien I and the interpreter's I are used much more flexibly than the schematic model assumes (Diriker 2004: 148), the alien I is an internationally acknowledged performance convention in professional interpreting and will be interpreted as a linguistic sign of professional conduct. In contrast, failing to use it will challenge the interpreter's competence (Määttä 2017: 197). Indeed, the alien I is an excellent example of the discursive performance of a professional role.

The alien I also poses an affective and bodily challenge: through the use of the first-person I, the interpreted speech, its tones and affects as well the reported events, are internalized by the interpreter in a manner that requires the interpreter to actively work to distance themselves from the interaction (Bontempo & Malcom 2012: 112). This distancing is one central element of interpreters' affective labour. In some areas of interpreting – for example, court cases, asylum procedures and interpreting in mental health settings – regaining one's balance after interpreting sessions may require extensive restorative work and can cause significant emotional and ethical stress (Määttä 2017: 193). Embodying and internalizing participants' messages through patterns of speech such as the alien I add to the risk of vicarious trauma, especially when the interpreter's own personal history gets entangled with the interaction at hand. The first person I makes the boundary between the interpreter and the interpretee porous, putting them in the position of the victim or the perpetrator, as in the case of the interpreters at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:

> It is they who provided the first-person voices in these stories: "I killed," "I raped,"
> "I was raped", "I slaughtered", "I beat", "I was stabbed," "I was abused," "I was
> beaten", "my child was hacked into pieces", "my mother was buried alive", "all
> my family members were killed". Repeatedly, the interpreters listened, visualised,
> analysed, understood and re-expressed what they heard, [becoming] one of the
> victims, feeling everything they narrated. (Ndongo-Keller 2015: 337)

To gain shelter from the risk of emotional overload, interpreters can prepare by
putting on the mask of professionalism, creating a distance between their own self
and whatever emotional upheavals they may encounter in the professional con-
text. The role can be conceptualized as a coat that one is wise to put on beforehand,
just in case:

> I do that [psych myself up in advance] to prepare for anything, if I do not know
> what to expect. If everything turns out to be fine, I can give it up once I am there.
> But in a way I will then already have my professional cover in place in case I need
> it. If you simply went there with your coat wide open[20] and then you needed to
> start putting on the professional role on the spot while already feeling like this is
> awful and like how can this have happened, or I cannot stand this smell or what-
> ever, so it would be much more difficult.
> ("Maria" in Viljanmaa 2018: 129; my translation)

Intrapersonally, the mask is an emotional process of creating an inner buffer
between oneself and any potentially upsetting elements that may arise. Interper-
sonally, the mask of professionalism is produced in a bodily manner, by using – or
rather, refraining from using – gestures, mimics and voice. As we saw above, the
requirement to hide one's affects is the dominant principle concerning affects in
interpreting. It follows that the ability to manage one's gestures and facial expres-
sions, and to control the external visibility of one's internal states of mind is typi-
cally considered to give the interpreter bodily and, by extension, affective capital
that supports performing being a professional interpreter. This may well be true,
but the situation is more complex. Goffman's concept of facework has been applied
to interpreting since Cecilia Wadensjö's classic treatise (1998), and it, too, is often
considered an essential aspect of successful interpreting. An interesting ques-
tion concerns the mutual applicability of the idea of mask and facework: can a

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20.　This is a literal translation of a common Finnish saying of coming into a situation *takki
auki* which I wanted to preserve because of the reference to coat. The saying denotes reckless
boldness and unpreparedness; in this citation it keeps that idea but also connects to profes-
sional cover and mask, indicating that you leave yourself emotionally vulnerable if you come
to the assignment with your coat wide open.

participant who is required to use a mask also be required to do facework? And is it possible to do so?

The mask is expected to be affectless, but it cannot be impenetrable. Even if we expect the interpreter to hide their own attitudes and value judgements, in the communicative situation participants' gestures and facial expressions control interaction in a multitude of fine-tuned ways (Matsumoto et al. 2010: 212, 224), and the interpreter needs to employ many of them to be able to perform their function, both strategically using their own expressions, and interpreting and adequately responding to those of other participants. The direction of gaze, for example, has been found to be a significant resource for interpreters in managing turn-taking (Mason 2012). Some expressions related to particular core emotions have been found to be universal (Matsumoto et al. 2010: 214, 223), and one can consider these to fall outside the interpreter's remit to verbalize them in face-to-face interaction, as participants can themselves observe and interpret them. But others are more culture-specific, and misinterpreting or overlooking them may lead to communicative dysfunctions. Although interpreting is prototypically understood as the reverbalization and mediation of verbalized content, bodily elements such as positioning, posture, gestures and facial expressions are also modes of communication, and they also contribute to producing the actual content of what is being communicated, either enhancing or contradicting the verbal mode. The ability to adequately read and mediate non-verbal communication and to wisely employ these modes in their own communication are therefore an integral part of interpreters' bodily capital.

To the extent that gestures and facial expressions are voluntary, interpreters can be expected to learn the tricks of the affective labour required to control them. Once we also take into account the involuntary microexpressions that are also known to communicate emotions, the picture becomes more complicated. The codified expectations expect interpreters to hide their moral and ethical conundrums, but research has shown that the involuntary "leakages" of microexpressions and body language are particularly likely to happen in situations where the emotional and cognitive load is heavy (Ekman 2009: 120). Interpreting always entails a significant cognitive load, and once this is accompanied by an affective or ethical load which is bound to be significant in many of the situations where the interpreter finds themselves party of (such as juridical procedures, crisis situations, treatment for trauma), leakages of microexpressions may be impossible to avoid.

In case of strong emotions, it may also be difficult to control one's tone of voice. For example, the prosodies of anger and sadness are quite distinct and recognizable, and they are interpreted largely intuitively and at least partly autonomously from the semantic content of the utterance (Paulmann et al. 2011). It is

fair to assume that an ethically challenging situation might easily lead to feelings of anger or sadness, and in that case their effects on the tone of voice may well be beyond the interpreter's control. Similarly, smiling and laughter are recognizable in the voice. Some situations may be affectively taxing in ways that result in the interpreter bursting into tears. This reaction is likely to be impossible to hide from the interlocutors.

5.2.3   Accuracy and affect

Affects are, of course, also verbalizable and verbally transmitted. The above-quoted Section 7 of the Finnish code prohibits interpreters from betraying their affects in their choice of words. The expectation is that they will always only convey the speaker's affects, and that these are conveyed accurately. Indeed, accuracy is another constant element in interpreters' codes of ethics. Section 6 in the Finnish code is devoted to accuracy, focusing on transmitting the content in full. What accuracy is and what constitutes full transmission is a matter of greater complexity than codification allows. Although not necessarily meant as such, the emphasis on accuracy can be understood as signalling a preference for word-for-word, verbatim interpretations. This is also what many lay people expect from the interpreter. However, research has shown that accuracy is an elusive concept in interpreting (Isolahti 2014) and that practice often deviates from codified and hence normative behaviour, for example, through additions and expansions that trained and qualified interpreters tend to make more than their less-qualified and non-trained colleagues. Sabine Braun (2017: 167) reports on a number of studies attesting to the affective relevance of additions and expansions. They are seen to protect the interpreter's or the client's face, to both promote and to reduce empowerment, depending on the case, and to enhance empathy, cooperation and trust. While senior professionals may well tacitly acknowledge that expectations of accuracy are always relative, novice interpreters may understand the norm quite literally, and consequently end up producing overly verbatim and therefore less than adequate interpretations (Mäntyranta 2018).

Because of the codified expectation of accuracy, excessive literalness can also be used to undermine a speaker. It is well-known that norms of politeness, contextualized expectations of proper interaction and also cultural rules of affect expression may differ significantly between languages and cultures. An affectively accurate interpretation may therefore require a departure from a verbatim approach, and a word-for-word interpretation may well lead to misunderstandings. Because a literal rendering presents itself as a low risk option for interpreters, the interpreter can tacitly exercise power in a morally taxing situation, while ostensibly following the code. This can be achieved by representing the talk of the interlocutor towards

whom the interpreter harbours negative affects in its "raw" form, without adjustments based on language and culture-specific norms of interaction. Literal translations of affectively laden expressions such as insults and swearwords, for example, are known to result in radically altered levels of insult in the target language, and translators are therefore known to actively down-modulate the levels of affect in their translation solutions (Hjort 2009). The norm of literalness allows the interpreter to undermine the speaker's credibility from the cover of the code by adopting a strategy of excessive literalness: if challenged, the interpreter can argue that the interpretation was accurate, as the speaker's exact word choices were respected. This approach also finds support in the application guidelines of the Finnish code: "The interpreter is not responsible for the normative behaviour of the participants and does not, for example, adapt the interpreted message according to expectations" (SKTL 2013b: 3). The guidelines mean to say, "don't shoot the messenger," (cf. Pym 2012, Chapter 2), and rightly so. However, they also absolve the interpreter from the burden of matching cultural norms of acceptable and appreciated behaviour, and they create a loophole for doing harm, intentionally or unintentionally, while appearing to maintain the professional standard.

5.2.4   Prohibition of empathy

The Finnish code is among those who are quite explicit in restricting the role of the interpreter to interpreting only. Section 8 of the code stipulates that the interpreter "shall not act as an assistant or advocate for those being interpreted and shall not be obliged to discharge any duties other than interpreting during the assignment" (SKTL 2013a). The application document adds even more explicit boundaries to the interpreter's tasks during and around the assignment:

> During the assignment, the interpreter shall not assume any other tasks beyond the interpreting task the assignment requires, and shall not, either before, during or after interpreting, give participants any advice or guidance in the matter at hand or discuss the issues brought up in the interpreting. The assignment of the interpreter only consists of the interpreting task in accordance with the interpreting method in use. (SKTL 2013b: 3)

This restriction signals that a successful performance of the role of a competent professional interpreter involves abstaining from any tasks other than "the interpreting task in accordance with the interpreting method in use". The code allows interpreters to draw professional boundaries and shelters them from assuming responsibilities and liabilities they are not expected to shoulder, or from stepping into areas that are restricted to authorized officials. In so doing it also protects the interpreters from situations where they might be perceived as personally attached to one of the communicating partners.

While it is in the interest of all parties that the interpreter does not assume the role of the doctor or the lawyer, offering professional advice or providing a diagnosis, the codification of accuracy, non-advice and non-guidance is more problematic with regard to one element of interpreters' competence: cultural knowledge and intercultural competence. In research literature and in self-concepts as well, translators and interpreters are typically seen as experts in these areas, but it is a matter of considerable debate whether cultural mediation is seen as an entirely separate job description, an integral part of interpreting or something in between. While codes reflect this spectrum of possible understandings, the majority seems to favour prohibitive coding (Wang 2017). This begs the question of how and where interpreters can benefit from and capitalize on their intercultural competence.

Intercultural competence is largely about affects: empathy, position-taking and anxiety management are essential elements of intercultural competence (Bennett 2009; see also Tomozeiu et al. 2016: 261–262). Empathy, the ability to be sensitive to and to understand the feelings, thoughts, and past and present experiences of another allows the interpreter to alleviate potential communication problems. *Cultural* empathy, more specifically, allows interpreters to assess what kinds of cultural explanations are needed for the communicating partners to achieve mutual understanding. With their emphasis of accuracy and restrictions on expanding the role of the translator, codes of conduct tend to prohibit the use of this kind of affective capital. Wang (2017) also questions whether this capital is actively built during training. At the same time, the norm of non-partiality and the advice to abstain from assuming the role of a cultural mediator also encourage exhibiting emotional and bodily distance that the communicating partners may well interpret negatively as non-empathic indifference rather than as displays of impartiality.

Public service interpreting takes place within institutional interaction, which is hierarchical by nature. The participant in need of guidance and support from the interpreter is more likely to be a recent immigrant than the representative of the institution in question who participates in the interaction in their official capacity. In this hierarchy, the interpreter's avoidance of gesturing affinity or empathy towards the lower-status participant in effect results in implicitly seeming to side with the official, who, incidentally, is guided by a similar ethos of impartiality and therefore likely to favour similar performed indifference. From the perspective of the lower-status participant, the interpreter may be perceived as a representative of the institution. This impression is further reinforced by the fact that interpreters are often commissioned by the institution and are therefore easily seen to side with it. In effect, avoiding explicit gestures of affinity, while aimed at maintaining professional integrity and impartiality, may become a root cause of what the idea was to avoid: an experience of partiality.

Another specificity of the interpreter's role is that they are tasked to ensure the success of the affective labour performed by other professionals in the communicative situation. Arlie Hochschild (2003: 151) describes the labour of a doctor as follows:

> Doctors, in treating bodies, also treat feelings about bodies, and even patients who are used to impersonal treatment often feel disappointed if the doctor doesn't seem to care enough. It is sometimes the doctor's job to present alarming information to the patient and to help the patient manage feelings about that. In general, the doctor is trained to show a kindly, trusting concern for the patient.

On an interpreted appointment, the doctor's possibilities of verbalizing "kindly, trusting concern" depend on how well the interpreter mediates the affective message in addition to the semantic content. Kind, empathetic behaviour can of course also be expressed by means other than verbal. In an illuminating article based on observed interpreted doctor's appointments, Jenny Paananen and Ali Reza Majlesi (2018), for example, report how the doctor, the interpreter and the patient coconstruct caring also through sympathizing and empathizing gestures.

Hochschild emphasizes that doctors are *trained* to show kindly concern. In the codes of conduct for public service interpreters, in contrast, such concern appears as a negative trait, and its management (i.e., making it invisible) is seen as an important element of professional performance. Expressing empathy may not be encouraged in the codes, but in real-life situations people, interpreters as well as other participants, are not only performing scripted professional roles but are also human beings, with human emotions and varied emotion management competences and personal styles of responding to emotionally laden situations. Hochschild (2003: 148) points out that while some waitresses and nurses perform emotional labour, others do not. Personal styles are also observable among interpreters, but in addition to personal willingness and ability to show empathy, interpreters also feel constrained by the normative expectations attached to their role:

> Normally I try to remain the person who does *not* do anything else but interprets and I hope someone else will pass on the handkerchief to the client. But I do sometimes feel that I understand the client's situation better and know better how to be there for them, often for example how to relate to them as one woman to another. And I am maybe not afraid of the skin colour or reactions, or how difficult the issue is for the client.… But it often disturbs me because I fee- because I kinda know that **I am not allowed** to participate in their sorrow or agitation even if I wanted to. And then I worry that the client may think I am so cold, that I am not at all interested, that I do not care.
>
> ("Sofia" in Viljanmaa 2018: p. 131; italics in the original, bold added)

The double bind of professional distance and human compassion experienced by Sofia and many other public service interpreters is familiar to many occupations. What may be unique to interpreting is the implicit and explicit negative framing of empathy in normative texts such as the deontological documents discussed in this chapter. The dilemma of combining professional impartiality with human compassion, and the ethical stress produced by conflicting demands, is a recurrent corollary of public service interpreting, arising from the kinds of issues dealt with in asylum interviews, health care appointments, courtrooms and other contexts of PSI work. The normative codification of non-empathy places the burden of this ambivalence on the individual interpreter.

5.3   Embodied affinities and distances

Languages are not on equal footing socially, and strong and weak languages are treated differently also in interpreting (Määttä 2017). This differentiation is visible for example in training possibilities, work opportunities, the predominance of particular interpreting modes and differentiated remuneration practices. This professional hierarchy creates a hierarchy of linguistic capital. Native-speaker capacity is another source of embodied linguistic capital that transforms into affective capital in interpreted interaction. Interaction is always also about saving face. In dialogue interpreting, the interpreter as mediator is at the epicentre of communication, reverbalizing everything being said by the communicating partners. The mask of impartiality allows the interpreter to create distance to the on-going communication and to avoid assuming responsibility for the potentially face-threatening form or content of what is being said. The risk of confusing the interpreter with the actual speaker is likely to be greater when the communicating partners are not experienced in using interpreters, but it is never fully absent. Conveying qualities such as incoherent, substandard or obscene language always pose a risk to the interpreter's face. This risk is greater when interpreting into a language that is not the interpreter's first language, as any nonstandard usage may be taken as a sign of the interpreter's linguistic incompetence. This risk is also greater when interpreting into the first language of the communicating partner who represents the commissioner and is therefore in a position of power. From these two premises it follows that in most cases the interpreters with an immigrant background interpreting the foreign-language speaker's speech to the participant that represents the public service institution face two simultaneous native-speaker disadvantages they cannot circumvent.

A situationally advantageous ethnic background and a matching native-language competence are forms of inherited bodily capital. Linguistically skilled

immigrants can transform their competence into economic capital as PSI is a channel to professional employment in a new country, but within the professional practice their non-nativeness (both linguistically and ethnically) places them in a disadvantageous position. It is important to acknowledge that situationally non-optimal ethnicity can also be a risk factor in performing professionalism, and that a non-immigrant background endows an interpreter with credibility both through ethnic and cultural affinity to the institutional participant and through native-speaker competence in the language the commissioning participant is best placed to assess. One could say that the PSI world orients towards some bodies more than others, and those with whose body the world agrees will find things easier. This is, as Sara Ahmed reminds us, how privilege works:

> In "Strange Encounters" (2000) I work about this most directly. Because I was very interested there in the actual, the everyday way in which an individual body moves and negotiates its relationship to space. It is how we are talking about the constitution of spaces as being for bodies. The book that picked up the argument most is much more "Queer Phenomenology" (2006), which begins to think that it is not just a question of "there are bodies that have orientations towards objects and others", but rather that there are worlds that are orientated towards some bodies more than others. And there are bodies that can be received, the bodies that have the – I use the metaphor "the comfortable chair" – the chair that has received an impression of a body that sits upon it. So the body can find it easier to sit upon that chair. And the way in which privilege can work like that.
> (Schmitz & Ahmed 2014: 100–101)

Another aspect closely linked to verbal, embodied and ethnic affinity is accent. A high-status accent is a valuable asset both for language professionals and others (Piller 2013: 90–91). According to Piller, accents are more valuable in case they match the high-status local usage in the local language, are associated with (Western) high-status varieties in lingua franca languages or, in immigrant languages, assist in performing a valued form of authenticity (ibid.: 88). Ethnicity, and hence also the capital provided by accent, is situational and changeable, as it depends on the ethnic set-up in the communicative situation. To an extent, accent is an intrinsic part of one's habitus, but a flexible repertoire of accents and an ability to adapt to conversational requirements is a valuable form of capital (embodied physically in the speech organs) that allows the interpreter to perform affective labour on the level of speech features.

Accent is only one element of the interpreter's external habitus and situational performative competence. The Finnish guidelines for public service interpreters also emphasize the requirement of normative behaviour and dress code:

> The interpreter is expected to act and perform in accordance with the require-
> ments of each interpreted communicative situation, taking into account the pre-
> vailing norms of behaviour and dressing.   (SKTL 2013b: 3)

Behaving and dressing according to expectations can be seen as outer signals of
trustworthiness and neutrality, as well as ensuring that the interpreters do not
draw attention to themselves. What this embodied situational control also does,
however, is position the interpreter as someone who is familiar with the context
and competent in how to act. This, of course, is precisely the intended effect, but
it may be experienced as alienating by a communicative partner who personally
finds the situation intimidating and difficult to handle. In PSI contexts, the pub-
lic servant is by definition on their own turf, and an interpreter who dresses and
behaves in a manner resembling the public servant will unavoidably be positioned
closer to that communication participant than to the one who is only visiting. In a
sense, this creates a double bind, as in matching her behaviour to the expectations,
the interpreter can be seen to align herself with the dominant participant in the
situation, but if the interpreter does not do so, she may be viewed as suspect and
potentially incompetent by both parties.

The feeling of comfort created by matching bodily capital is transformed into
affective capital in the form of familiarity and feelings of trustworthiness. For the
public servant, interpreting adds a taxing element to the institutional process at
hand, and a feeling of familiarity with an interpreter from the same ethno-cultural
background may alleviate the experience of cultural friction (Määttä 2018; Snell-
man 2018). Ethnic similarity is, however, only one potential cause for a sense of
affinity. Snellman's study of military interpreters, for example, shows that in this
high-risk context an interpreter recruited through the military system and thus
from a shared military culture is perceived as more reliable and easier to work with
than locally recruited interpreters regardless of the ethnic background.

Perceived affinity with one communication participant equals perceived dis-
tance from the other. Some elements of embodied capital will place the interpreter
rather unavoidably on a scale of affinity and distance. An interpreter from the same
ethnic background as the client, for example, may intimidate the representative of
the public service and cause them to be on guard because of the perceived majority
on the other side of the table. A sense of affinity may be comforting for the commu-
nicating participant, but not necessarily for the interpreter. Nor is it always desired
by the participants themselves. Too much familiarity may sometimes, for example,
in small ethnic communities, be awkward, as discussions often deal with personal
matters. In those cases, it is part of the interpreter's affective labour to manage
distancing. This performance of adequate affinity and distance is situational, and it
can be realized through both bodily and verbal means.Interpreters are sometimes

instructed to situate themselves spatially so that they are at an equal distance from all communication partners and thus to embody the principle of neutrality also in spatial terms. In practice, this may sometimes be impossible (Pokorn 2017), and the pre-existing affinities as well as ethnic and cultural expectations of adequate distances may well sometimes require balancing acts and counteractions in spatial positioning to manage situational interpretations of affectivity and neutrality.

An extreme case of managing affective and physical distance concerns the issues of physical contact and bodily harm. The work-related physical and psychological risks of doctors, nurses, social workers and the police are fairly well known, but as the discourse on neutrality and the ideal of invisibility create ideas of a distanced mediator, it is not always fully recognized that interpreters summoned to these same situations are subject to the same risks. Interpreters often consider remote interpreting modes such a telephone or video interpreting cumbersome, as the technology removes the interpreter from the communicative situation, makes the recognition and mediation of tones and nuances more difficult and cuts out or reduces the possibility of also relying on gestural elements. A positive outcome of remote modes, however, is the elimination of physical harm in violent contacts. A careful choice of interpreting technique can shelter interpreters also in other ways – for example, by opting for booth-based simultaneous interpreting over whispered interpreting, the interpreter is not forced to have very intimate contact with the interpretee. On other occasions, remote interpreting may be beneficial for communication in reducing the role of ethnicity or gender of the interpreter, for example, in situations that might otherwise be considered embarrassing for some participants or conflictual enough to create barriers for cooperation if all parties were placed in the same physical space.

5.4   Affective labour, codification and reflexivity

In addition to mastering the cognitive skills and language competences required for interpreting at a professional level, training is also about learning to perform being an interpreter at the bureaucratic and institutional stages of public services (and elsewhere). This includes an awareness of and reflexivity about the embodied and affective labour interpreters are expected to carry out to be convincing in their role. The extent of active labour necessary for successful interpreting will vary according to the situational bodily and affective requirements and the interpreter's innate or rehearsed characteristics and abilities in fulfilling these. In a typical situation, the communicating parties are unable to fully judge elements such as accuracy, coverage and other content-related and linguistic matters – this is why an interpreter is needed to begin with. Because of this, the outer signals of

professional performance easily gain dominance in judging the interpreter's success. Being a professional interpreter plays on a trustworthy and reliable outer appearance; fluent delivery in the language of that partner who is in a position of making recruiting decisions; an ethnicity that matches this partner's expectations and creates a desired degree of familiarity; situationally adequate gender and age; and an accent and tone of voice that does not draw negative attention to itself. The more interpreters are naturally endowed with this kind of bodily capital, the less aware they may be of its role in interaction and of their own privileged position in comparison with some other colleagues. And the converse is also true. The more shortcomings an interpreter has in this regard, the more acutely aware they become of the expectations and the more they need to invest active affective labour in compensating for their lack of bodily capital in order to meet performative requirements. It seems logical to assume that this labour taxes the interpreter's cognitive and mental resources in ways that are detrimental to the overall quality of the service, creating a biased spiral in the sense that the interpreter who already is in a favourable position because of the resources of bodily capital will also be better placed to provide a good interpretation because of being able to focus on the cognitive task in an amicable climate.

Affective labour and affective capital are paradoxically bound together: to be able to do affective labour one needs to have affective capital; a lack of affective capital (transformed from bodily capital or otherwise) creates the need to compensate via affective labour. Interpreters' professional performance revolves around the management of affects: while they are expected to professionally mediate not only the semantic content but also the emotions and affects of other participants, they are simultaneously expected to control and contain their own. To an extent this can be taught and learned, but researchers have also sought ways to test applicants' emotional profiles to be able to identify those with an emotionally stable personality. These candidates might have innate skills in handling affectively challenging commissions and managing work-related emotional stress (Bontempo & Napier 2014).

Baixauli-Olmos (2017: 260) notes that there seems to be a narrowing of roles ongoing, and the boundary work inscribed in the codes and the codification of accepted performance indeed work in this direction. Hochschild (2003: 120) raises the same issue: if training is directed at teaching pre-set behavioural patterns instead of learning to employ one's own situational judgement, the unintended consequence is a deskilling of practitioners. Codification is a professionalization project, but deskilling is surely a counterprofessionalization process. As will be argued at length in Chapter 8, the first step to accessing one's moral compass is creating a sensitivity towards one's affects, and reflexivity towards one's own behavioural patterns and reactions in different situations. Dean and Pollard are

critical of the deontological foundation of codes of conduct and the concomitant assumption of full neutrality. Instead, they call for disciplined subjectivity. In agreement, I quote them at length:

> In pursuit of the practice professional goal of neutrality, that is, the lack of personal bias in one's work product, the ability to distinguish between interpersonal and intrapersonal demands is crucial. We find this process difficult for many interpreters new to the concept of intrapersonal demands. This is largely because many were trained to believe that significant personal reactions conflict with the ethical ideal of neutrality. Thus, rather than acknowledge personal reactions as inevitable (especially given the intense dynamics common in the practice professions), interpreters commonly discount, deny or feel conflicted about such reactions (Heller et al. 1983). Yet, if one does not recognize, and then appropriately deal with potential intrapersonal influences on one's work, there is considerable risk that these internal dynamics will taint one's perception of the interpersonal dynamics taking place in the interpreting situation (i.e., lead to projection and/or countertransference). The frequent consequence of failing to recognize the influence of intrapersonal factors in one's perceptions of the world is expressed in the Talmudic saying, "We don't see things as they are, we see things as we are". Smyth (1984), in discussing this matter as it pertains to teaching, points out that the ideal of perfect objectivity is a myth and instead encourages professionals to strive for 'disciplined subjectivity'.   (Dean & Pollard 2011: 170)

Peter Llewellyn-Jones and Robert G. Lee (2013: 56) summarize the issues of affectivity, affinity and performance through the concept of the interpreter's role-space, and they divide the elements of successful interaction into three categories along similar lines to the discussion above:

> [W]e propose that the interpreter's role not be rules-based but be governed instead by the "role-space" the interpreter creates and inhabits in any given situation. This "space" is determined by a range of factors that can be represented along three main axes:
>
> x: the axis of participant/conversational alignment (sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic)
> y: the axis of interaction management
> z: the axis of "presentation of self"

They continue to argue that these three axes define and delimit the interpreter's room to manoeuvre. Optimistically, they also propose that by "plotting the interpreter's anticipated/actual positioning on these three axes, we can generate a three-dimensional shape, or space, that delineates the appropriate role-space of the interpreter in any particular interaction" (Llewellyn-Jones & Lee 2013: 56). In theory, this is no doubt true. In practice, the complexities of interaction will be likely

to construct such a complex web of forces that it is up to the participants' intuitive skills, empathy and flexibility, or their "informed reflections" (Baixauli-Olmos 2017: 261), how successfully they are able to navigate. Dean and Pollard (2011) discuss this same issue from the perspective of deontology and teleology, arguing that rather than teaching future interpreters to internalize ready-made codes they should be taught how to assess and analyse their role in different contexts from the perspective of desired outcomes and to adapt their performance to the goals of the communication. This may sometimes require a performance of detached neutrality, at other times compassionate stepping out of the professional role to connect more humanely.[21]

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21.   It is also important to keep in mind that empathy and compassion are not a straightfoward issue (see Chapter 8), and that detached and non-compassionate behaviour can be seen to signal respect more than commiserating (Sennett 2004: 30 and *passim*.). Simplified "if in situation x, do y" instructions would be a similar codification project and would fail in similar ways as the current codes.

Translation and the sense of space

The tropes of distance and affinity have come up repeatedly in the preceding chapters. In Chapter 3 the notions of foreignization and domestication were brought up in the context of textual relations, and their nature as degrees of distancing was discussed. Chapter 5 focused on the relations of the interpreter's body and affects, in particular the ways in which the neutrality and trustworthiness of the interpreters are being managed through codifying their affective and bodily performances of appropriate, either mental or physical, affinity to the communicating partners. Distance, affinity and neutrality are all not only affective but also spatial concepts in the sense of positioning the translator (or interpreter) at a particular distance from the reader and source text author with respect to other constituent factors in the translation situation. The issue of whose *side* the translator is on and where their loyalties *lie* may well be the most perennial question of translation. At the heart of the above issues are questions of affect, as I hope to have shown in the preceding chapters. But they are also questions of positioning and spatiality. In this chapter, I build on Gideon Toury's (2012: 47) postulate that cultures allot particular positions for "translations and translators, as well as the activity of translation as such". *Position* is a spatial noun; the focus of this chapter is on the affective dimensions of the *spaces and places* occupied by translators, translations or translating.

In spite of the abundance of spatially motivated metaphors of *trans*lation (bridge-building, overcoming language barriers, etc.), space is not often given a prominent place in translation theories. Anthony Pym's (2012) conceptualization of translators as inhabitants of an *intercultural space*, with their loyalties directed not to any national culture but to the community of intercultural mediators is an interesting explicitation of the spatiality of Schleiermacher's binary view of domestication and foreignization. The flipside of Pym's notion of an intercultural space of and for those specifically detached from surrounding monocultures is that it places the source and target sides as two separate entities. In so doing it differs radically from Michael Cronin's (2006: 68) conceptualization of the multilingual, multi-ethnic space as first and foremost a *translation space*, that is, a space where translation needs to happen for mutual comprehensibility within one shared space

as opposed to mediation between spaces. In a translation space, the translators and the users of translation exist in cohabitation, and the roles are reversible and hybrid. Both Cronin's translation space and Pym's intercultural space have affinities with Emily Apter's concept of a *translation zone*, a term she (2005: 5) employs to "imagine a broad intellectual topography", to signal detachment from methodological nationalism (see also Koskinen 2015). The zone Apter envisions is a place where translation and transnationalism interact. Intercultural spaces, translation zones and translation spaces all assume particular kinds of inhabitants, and the topography only becomes realized through their actions. These spaces are therefore also *translatorial spaces*, a concept derived from Holz-Mänttäri's concept of translatorial action and signalling a space of translation activity (Koskinen 2017).

Regardless of the terminology and theoretical underpinnings, spatial thinking in translation studies has operated on both macro- and microlevels, giving rise to abstract theoretical conceptualizations but also to a wealth of empirical data on the microlevel. Michael Cronin (2012: 65) promotes analytical microspection, that is, "the proper investigation of places and their inhabitants through methods and practices which reveal the full, fractal complexity of human habitation." This kind on microspection has often been conducted in the framework of cities or towns (Simon 2012; Cronin & Simon 2014; d'Hulst & Koskinen 2020), shifting the focus from abstract notions of space to geographically demarcated places and highlighting how the local environment and translation dialogically shape one another. The difference between space and place this chapter builds on needs to be made clear from the start: the leading keyword in this chapter is space, a more virtual and more abstract notion of mental spatial arrangement; place is more directly linked to concrete physical locations. The divisions are blurred as spaces give rise to places and places create imagined spaces, but in the following I try to keep these two analytically distinct: I will be discussing the virtual arrangement of translation work (space) and its physical location (place). Both are relevant, and both contain affective underpinnings.

In what follows I will first briefly discuss the core concepts of space and place (Section 6.1). I will then (Section 6.2) develop the argument further by looking into how spatiality and affect play out in three fundamentally different landscapes of written translation: professional workplace contexts, translation embedded in an art performance, and carnivalistic subtitling practices. These three were selected to probe the question of space, place and affect from many perspectives. The first of the cases is based on quite extensive research both by myself and others; the two latter ones are more recent as objects of study, and my observations are to be considered preliminary and tentative. Similar to all chapters in this book, I do not claim to exhaust the topic. Instead I hope to illuminate the versatile possibilities of further inquiry in the crossroads of affect and matters related to space and place.

6.1   On spaces and places

Both *place* and *space* are terms that have been extensively discussed and debated in anthropology, sociology and human geography. This "spatial turn" in cultural theories has produced a number of competing and complementing theories. In this chapter I draw heavily on Doreen Massey's theorizations of space, particularly her book *For Space* (2005). I find her views on space both meaningful and pragmatic ("prosaic", in her own words; ibid.: 13) in their underlying optimism. In what has become a standard contemporary understanding, she rejects a static and fixed view of space, and instead posits that spaces have a number of dynamic features (ibid.: 9). First, a space is always a product of interrelations and constituted through interactions. Second, it is a sphere of multiplicity, plurality and heterogeneity. Multiplicity and space are co-constitutive: "Without space, no multiplicity; without multiplicity, no space", Massey says (ibid.), indicating a foundational dynamism through which spaces are created. Third, because spaces are constructed by interrelations, and because relations in turn are predicated by changeable material practices, spaces are non-finite and changeable; with their loose ends and missing links they are in a continuous state of becoming (ibid.: 12). Because of their lively nature, spaces are not best understood in opposition to time, as something fixed and stable, but together with time (ibid.: 18). Both space and place, and our affective relations to them, are entangled with time and keep on evolving.

Space is indeed a complex and mobile concept. But so is place. In Massey's research, space and place are difficult to fully distinguish, and both are seen as changeable, contestable and in a constant process of becoming through interactions (see also Cresswell 2001, Chapter 3). In this chapter I aim to proceed pragmatically, adopting definitions that allow me to conceptualize translatorial spaces and places and to make sense of my empirical data. To do so, I part ways with Massey, keeping to her ideas of space but less so of place. Instead, I follow a distinction where *place* is understood as a material and meaningful location (Cresswell 2001: 7),[22] whereas space is more ephemeral and abstract. In other words, places are cognitively constructed (as meaningful), but they are also matters of physical reality. No matter how contestable and changeable a place is, it is still fixed in the sense of being non-mobile or at least only in one location at one time, hence also

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22. Locale, in Cresswell's vocabulary, is the most material layer of place. This is different from Pym's definition of the term locale in the context of localization, i.e., an emergent distinct cultural entity distinguishable by its resistance to distribution of a product in its existing language versions (hence the concomitant need for localization) (Pym 2004: 22). To avoid unnecessarily muddying the conceptual waters in my vocabulary, I do not make Cresswell's distinction.

its connections to stationary affective concepts such as rootedness, belonging and residence, that is, soothing ideas of identity, history and boundaries (Cresswell 2001: 59, 72). In Cresswell's system, when a space is made meaningful by some-one, it becomes a place (ibid.: 7). A particular place is *made* meaningful, whereas a space *emerges* from interrelations. This kind of space is not static, and multiple spatializations with different temporal rhythms can overlap, defining their own spatial frame as they unfold (Harvey 2004). Admittedly, the conceptual classifi-cation between spaces and places is not airtight, and in real life the material, the meaningful and the relational often coexist, but the distinction seems useful for practical purposes, especially in analysing a field such as translation where the most relevant spatial arrangements are not necessarily materially based.

Now, if we take this to the *spaces* and *places* of translation, we will begin to see translators and translations embedded in material, textual and human relations, in non-deterministic contexts that allow for different positionings and outcomes and that are constantly being renegotiated and re-moulded. The *spaces* of transla-tion and translators include the cultural meanings attached to the activity and the organization of translation work, for example, in terms of legal relations and moral binds. The places of translation and translators consist of the actual places of translation work, the digital or material locations where translations are pub-lished, distributed or stored over time, and so on. The conceptual division between space and place is not straightforward, and it is a question of emphasis whether for example the currently dominant production networks and translation platforms are perceived as spaces or places.

Massey (2005: 10–11) emphasizes the political nature of spaces and their power structures; I agree, but I choose to emphasize that spaces are also affec-tive.[23] The various embedded practices that the interrelations are created by, and the negotiations and identity construction work involved, will also shape and be shaped by the affective energies involved. In the heterogeneity of spaces, the political and the affective are particularly intertwined, as spatial structures create opportunities and barriers for difference and diversity, and these are often affec-tively based. The heterogeneity and malleability of spaces, then, makes them open for change. This promise or threat of possibilities for new constellations, for new connections to be made and for existing links to be cut, is inherently political, but it is also affective. At the same time, translators and translations are also located in particular material places, made meaningful by the actors involved in translatorial

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23.   I do not think Massey would disagree. It seems telling that she lets us know that the working title of her book had been "Spatial Delights" (2005: 14).

activities. These places will afford some courses of action and constrain others, and they resonate with particular affects and generate particular affective responses.

6.2   Spaces and places of translation

In this section I will discuss the interplay of space, place and affect in three different cases of translatorial practice: professional workplace contexts (Section 6.2.1), translation embedded in an art performance (Section 6.2.2) and carnivalistic subtitling (Section 6.2.3). These three were selected to probe the question of space, place and affect from several perspectives. The first case looks at the spaces and affects of professional translators in two different organizational constellations. Interview data of in-house translators' workplaces (Koskinen 2008, 2009) and of outsourced translators' positions in virtual translation networks (Abdallah & Koskinen 2007, 2010) are revisited with the help of an analysis of the spatial metaphors the interviewees employ in their talk. The same datasets have earlier given insights into how affective stances such as a sense of belonging (Koskinen 2008), trust (Abdallah & Koskinen 2007) or recognition (Koskinen 2009) bear on translators' work. I will then move to the two other spheres of translational activity, translation in the context of performative art and parody subtitling as a carnivalesque practice. The second case moves the limelight from the translat*or* to the spaces of translat*ion*, and from the affective involvement of the translator to the question of the textual relations between source and target texts as elements of an aesthetic whole. This line of research is continued in the third case which pushes the question of source–target relations to the extreme and forces us to question what translation even is, whether anything occupying the place of translation can count as a translation, and how *we* feel about pushing the definition of translation to a carnivalesque extreme. At the same time, the fun parody subtitles testify to the affective power of humour.

6.2.1   Sense of space in translation work

In the contemporary world, translation is a booming industry, refuelled by two major forces of the turn of the millennium: globalization and digitalization. "Information wants to be free" is a slogan often used by technology activists; the steady rise of translation shows it surely also wants to be available multilingually. The previous chapter looked at the affective and embodied aspects of public service interpreting, which, even with increasingly technology-driven remote modes, focuses on the idea of the communicating partners sharing the same place of interaction. In comparison, translation is a solitary occupation, and the interactions

more delayed, more virtual and more textual in nature. Translation as a profession is not tied to a particular physical *place*. But while it is true that translation work does not require sharing an office with co-workers or face-to-face contact with clients or readers, translators, too, will find themselves located within a network of contacts, and with more or less need to negotiate what, how, when and why they translate. The virtuality of contemporary translation networks, which could be called spaces rather than places according to the current vocabulary, begs the question of how translators and others working in these networks make meaning of this spatial arrangement. How does it become a meaningful place and what kind of a place is it for translators? This is the focus of the first of the three cases that I use for surveying the spaces and places of translation in this chapter.

Professional business (in the sense of non-literary) translation is the prototypical object of most contemporary translation research. It seems fitting to begin the analysis of spatiality from the spaces and places that are typically used to organize this field of translation, or which emerge as a result of such organizing. These are based on logistic, organizational and economic factors. The economy of translation, and the pros and cons of the different business models, can be discussed and debated from many angles (Abdallah 2012; Moorkens 2017). In line with the theme of this book, my current interest lies in the affective elements involved. I wish to explore how translators feel about the spatial positions available to them in these different configurations; what kinds of affective forces get into play and which affects are prone to emerge. I am also curious to find out whether being a translator invites some universal kinds of affects regardless of the spatial and organizational constellation, and the section therefore contains two datasets, one from a production network based on freelancing and the other from a high-end in-house setting. My focus here is less on material workplaces where the networks are being maintained than on the organizational spaces of power, hierarchies and belonging that these networks create. Recent work on workplace ergonomics in cognitive translation studies, and in particular on the socio-technical systems translation work is embedded in (Ehrensberger-Dow & Massey 2017), touches upon many similar interests. Indeed, as an overarching concept affect is one of the points of contact between cognitive and sociocultural approaches to translation. Methodologically, this section uses interview and focus group talk to study narrated affect (Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016) with respect to mental spatial arrangements, identifying representations of affect through discourse analysis. In other words, I am looking at evidence of meaning-making in discourse, or the ways in which participants make sense of the *space* they work in, finding their *place* in it.

Since spaces are formed through interrelations, a crucial configuring element in them are power relations, and each space creates a particular power-geometry (Massey 1991). Similarly, all translation spaces are networks of relations,

and they represent particular power-geometries which afford different actors particular positions. It makes sense to ask how it *feels* to participate in them. Among questions to be asked are, for example, the following: What kinds of affective alignments do these translation networks invite? Can we find some similarities in the spatially induced affects of translation work irrespective of the organizational models, or do different structures produce entirely different pains and pleasures and senses of belonging? How does it feel to be a cog in translation industry processes? Which attachments and which embodied practices do different organizational structures allow for and assume?

I will begin answering these questions by returning to a study I did a while ago together with Kristiina Abdallah (Abdallah & Koskinen 2010). Earlier, we had looked into the issue of trust in production networks that had at the time become a prominent new mode of organizing translation work (Abdallah & Koskinen 2007). As was already discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, trust has often been identified as a central affective element in a translation process, and a touchstone of successful translation. We argued that production networks are structurally challenging for the creation and maintenance of trust, as they are hierarchical and scalable by nature, that is, the network model supports the creation of a few hubs that become obligatory points of passage and that control the flows of information between nodes. In this power-geometry of unequal power, of asymmetric information and of obstacles for communication between actors in node-positions, trust is structurally difficult to maintain.

In a second article (Abdallah & Koskinen 2010), we then looked further into the sense of space in the network model by analysing the spatial metaphors in use in a single-interviewee dataset extracted from the larger pool of interview data Abdallah had collected (for a full coverage of her project see Abdallah 2012). The interviewee in question was a translator working as a freelancer in a production network, and three consequent in-depth interviews had been conducted, two made in 2006 and one in 2007. We used the method of spatial metaphor analysis, borrowed from Susan Ainsworth, David Grant and Rick Iedema (2009) who had applied it in their study of the identity work of middle management at a hospital. Spatial metaphors, Ainsworth and colleagues (2009: 9) argue, can be used to analyse experiences, since social relations are also spatially reproduced. Ainsworth, Grant and Iedema (2009) maintained that *middle* management as an organizatory position is in a fundamental manner spatially defined. Although not all organizational positions are explicitly labelled in such spatial terms, arguably each structure for organizing translation work also becomes a spatial structure, and it is therefore meaningful to analyse how this spatiality is referred to in talking about this work. Ainsworth and colleagues observed spatial metaphors in interview talk to analyse how the interviewees constructed the spatial relations and social processes among

different actors, and how they built their agency and understood their positioning in the hierarchical structure (ibid.: 12).

Kristiina Abdallah and I first got the idea of looking into spatial metaphors through an individual comment by one the interviewees: "translators are not part of that process" (Abdallah & Koskinen 2010: 5; direct quotations are my translations from Finnish). Since the process in question was that of translating, we were intrigued by the lacking sense of belonging as expressed by the core professional in charge of doing the actual translating within that process. As we maintained in 2010, the discursive construction of space through spatial metaphors can be understood as a resource for meaning-making in order to make sense of one's position and situational identity in the spaces created by social relations. Footing and identity are closely linked to affect, as the sense of belonging or not belonging, fitting or not fitting into one's assigned place and role, are grounded in feeling, in having a sense of one's place. Social relations and organizational hierarchies also bring to the fore the politics of affect, that is, "the ways in which emotions fuel identities, worldviews, and their contestations" (Abdel-Fadil 2019: 13; see also Massumi 2015). Observing how affect is performed and what it does in different relational constellations as well as how these spaces can be reshaped and reorganized through the management of affects and their performances (Hochschild 1979) will allow us to deepen our understanding of the spatial organization of translation work.

The interviews from 2006 were made at a time when the interviewee was going through a rough time in the network, and some of our findings were quite revealing in terms of explaining why the times were felt to be rough. As a constellation, a network tends to be depicted as a rhizomatic, horizontal organization. This may be a misrepresentation; as discussed above, many networks rather exhibit a vertical and hierarchical structure. Indeed, the interview data contained a lot of talk that organized things into hierarchical relations of levels: "the next *level*," "the *upper level*," "the *middle level*," and "the *level* where decisions are made." This is not necessarily significant as such, as levels such as these are found in any workplace. What *is* revealing, is that in this translation process all levels seem to be located above the translators, who not only occupy the lowest rank but are also "not able to make their voices heard at the decision-making *level*." The translator expresses a wish of translators "not being *pushed into* their *corner*". The network this translator depicts is a hierarchical pyramid structure with each translator in their own corner of the bottom floor and decision-making at the top. We first got interested in spatial metaphors in this data through a container metaphor of (not) being part of the process. The interviews also depict the translator as "*being put* in impossible situations," and upset about "going to a situation when one can feel one's own powerlessness". The translator feels like a "loose part."

The sense of network verticality is further reinforced in metaphors of movement: things and tasks are "*falling* from the sky," the prices are *falling* significantly, and the situation is "*going downwards*" so that the translator is beginning to wonder "how *low* it can go." One movement is conspicuous in its absence: information does not move, or it does not move towards the translator: "Why can't the information *move*?" The lack of information leaves translators in the dark, as "openness *stops* like it hits a wall." The one thing that is seen to move swiftly in the interview talk is the copyright that moves away from the translator.

The metaphors used by the interviewee are aligned with Abdallah's (2012) more extensive diagnosis of the maladies of many translation production networks that had emerged during the first decade of the 21st century: information was neither flowing down nor moving up; the translators interviewed by Abdallah felt powerless in a situation where they felt their working conditions and their fees were spiralling downwards. The translation industry seemed to have started a race to the bottom – another spatial metaphor. Not all translators are located in translation networks, though. Two years prior to these interviews, in 2004, I had conducted focus group discussions with a group of in-house translators working for the European Union. These tenured, well-paid positions are often considered the most lucrative in the field (see Dam & Zethsen 2012). If we looked at the spatial metaphors in their discourse, would we see indications of a different spatial arrangement reflected in their talk? Could we discern a sense of another kind of space, signalling a different grouping of interrelations?

To find out, I reanalysed the transcript of one focus group of Finnish EU translators (held 17 June 2004) with seven participants (5 women, 2 men) with respect to the spatial metaphors employed in the talk, paying particular attention to features we had observed in the network translator's talk. Although spatial metaphors had not been analysed before, also the original focus group session had been spatially motivated both in that it aimed to uncover translators' cultural *relations* and in that it was guided by a map-like visualization of discussion points (see Koskinen 2008, Appendix 1). The new analysis only covered the segments of discussion related to work issues. The original design also contained more personal questions such as living in Luxembourg, family issues, ties to the home country and retirement plans; these contained a multitude of spatial metaphors, but for simplicity of comparison they are left out here.

The spatial metaphors used by the EU translators were not at all identical to those observed in the network case. Although there was one instance of a way of thinking "coming *from above*", and one mention of a "*higher-level*" decision on terminology (reflecting the universality of up–down relations as work often tends to be hierarchically organized), hierarchy and verticality were not dominant, and the translators did not describe their position in terms of lowness. There was much

more talk about vastness and complexity: the organization felt "*massively huge*" and "*compartmentalized*," and the translators felt isolated and "working *alone*". Translators did not see themselves in the centre of events, but they were still part of the whole, as more than one participant emphatically pointed out: "Are we not organically a part of the commission's organization; so, *we are a part* of the commission!" In the network, translators felt that information was not moving; the commission translators did not mention this at all but emphasized the constant movement of texts instead. In their talk texts were living and changing creatures around which translators organized their work: texts *come*, they *go*, they *visit* other places and then *return* in a changed format; texts come in neat piles and in piecemeal fashion; texts are *thrown away* and *compiled anew* – and thankfully, in this whirlwind of texts, some interim versions are *stopped* from coming. Translation is text-based work. Textual relations and their material movement are therefore central to the constellation of the space.

In their extensive project on Danish translators' experiences of status, Helle Dam and Karen Zethsen (2012) compared the felt status of EU translators to that of Danish company translators. Much to their surprise, their survey results showed very minor differences between this high-profile group and other translation professionals, and the experienced status of EU translators was much lower than they had expected. The spatial metaphors in use indicate that in spite of the translators' self-perceptions, some differences may be found. Translators may be prone to modesty, and a sense of *high* (sic!) status may be alien to their habitus (Simeoni 1998), but EU translators in my focus group data did not demonstrate any of the desperation the network translators in Abdallah's interview study showed, and their metaphors indicate that they saw themselves as meaningful cogs in a big machinery, not as loose parts. Evidence of difference in the sense of space of network translators versus EU translators also comes in an embodied form, in the affects bodily displayed during the interview events. Laughing and crying can be seen as prototypical bodily demonstrations of positive versus negative emotion. In the focus groups of EU translators, laughter was such a predominant feature that it compelled me to analyse it separately (Koskinen 2008: 111–117; Hokkanen & Koskinen 2016: 85–88). In Abdallah's individual interviews with production network freelancers, in contrast, many interviewees cried (Abdallah, personal communication).

Arguably, the focus on the discursive and the metaphorical in the analysis above goes against Massey's theory, which was identified as a starting point in this chapter. Indeed, she emphatically steers away from a representational approach that she sees as taming the spatial into the textual (2005: 20).[24] But she also explains

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24.   For an analysis of the geographical and architectural *place* where the EU translators were located at the time of the field work, see Koskinen (2008, Chapter 4).

the multiplicity of spaces through the co-existence of multiple trajectories and the "simultaneity of stories-so-far" (ibid.: 24). The interview data, too, can be seen as stories told of a particular space at a particular time. What Massey argues against is not textuality in itself but ideological closure brought through hegemonic representation (ibid.: 25). It is therefore the task of the researcher to keep an eye on this element in the narratives, and particularly to avoid reinforcing or producing undue closure in the analysis. Spaces are not only *talked* into being, and not all relevant elements are always discussed. One way of identifying what is left unsaid is to also analyse how various non-human actors such as legal instruments or money define the space in question. The EU translators may feel they are just like any other translators (Koskinen 2008: 91), but we also need to remember that their footing at work is protected by official status, permanent position, high salary and significant social security benefits for the entire family. In contrast, the discontent of the network translators in Abdallah's study was aggravated by their precarious position with little or no negotiation power, loss of copyright and poor pay (see also Moorkens 2017).

We humans have an innate need to understand the subject position we are working in, and we need to be able to develop an attitude towards work that allows us to tolerate the conditions we are in, to preserve our self-respect and to see our role as meaningful and motivating (Alasuutari 2004: 131–132). If this proves impossible, we can use our voice to change things or exit the unbearable situation (see Hirschman 1970 for his influential notions of voice, exit and loyalty). Being part of a process that violates your understanding of quality, being paid less than you feel you deserve and having no voice all contribute to a "sucker effect" (Abdallah 2010), a sense of having been played, creating a sense of resentment and shame. A significant but somewhat unsurprising result of Abdallah's longitudinal interview study of eight translators in more or less precarious positions in their various production networks was the finding that by the end of the interview cycle five of the eight interviewees had exited the network they had been involved in (Abdallah 2012: 50). Staff turnover and recruitment difficulties are a serious obstacle for the success of production networks in a growth business such as translation industry, and exit is therefore an issue with significant economic relevance. My EU study did not include a longitudinal angle of repeated visits, but plans for leaving the institution were discussed in the focus groups. These translators were not leavers, except for retirement plans for those close to that phase of their career. In a more anecdotal manner, I know that exit has been extremely rare among Finnish EU translators, and most professional movement has taken place to a new position within the same organization. In comparison to network translators, these translators were indeed happy campers.

A longitudinal view is a good reminder of the interrelations of space and time. The two are "co-implicated", as Massey (2005: 55) puts it. Space is not a timeless,

static background factor but a shifting constellation. In the three subsequent interviews of the same interviewee analysed in Abdallah and Koskinen (2010), we found a shift in the translator's approach. In the two interviews in 2006, the interviewee was emotionally consumed by her spiralling working conditions and kept wallowing in frustration and incomprehension. In the interview of 2007, the metaphors were different in tone. The big picture remained the same, if not worse: "quality has *collapsed,*" "the *movement* of information *is what it is,*" "it is completely *outside my power.*" But a change was seen in the interviewee's summary of the situation: "One always needs to *navigate* ever *rockier waters*". In the 2006 interviews, the translator positioned herself at the lowest level, as one with no information and no voice; in the 2007 interview, the image was transformed into someone actively sailing rough seas.

A longitudinal aspect offered itself to the EU project as well a few years later. As part of the new communication strategy discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission decided to place some translators in the local "antennas" in the member states, in close contact with the communication officials working in the local office and also closer to the local readership of translations in the home country. As the physical location changed, the scope of the work also broadened, and in addition to continued translation activities, the "language officers" were expected to engage in outreach activities and liaise with universities and ministries (for a fuller account see Koskinen 2009). This move offered a natural experiment to see if and how a change of place affects the translators' identifications and their understanding of their task, that is, their sense of space. The findings from an in-house translation unit in Luxembourg were now complemented with and contrasted to new group-interview data from the three translators selected to be the first ones placed in the Helsinki office. The interview was held in March 2008, approximately halfway through their three-year secondment from 1 January 2007 onwards, and the results were reported in Koskinen (2009).

The results indicate that the institutional space and material place occupied by the translators can indeed drastically affect their experienced status, commitment and job satisfaction even while staying within the same organizational setting. In the translation unit, feedback had been felt to be non-existent; the antenna translators, in contrast, had an abundance of feedback. Motivation had been an issue; the antenna translators loved their work: "The tasks are simply so much fun. I am having a great time here." The core explanatory concept identified in the article was recognition. The translators seconded to the Helsinki antenna were moved from a separate and isolated unit (Koskinen 2008, Chapter 4) to a shared office space with the local communication team, they were given extensive institutional attention and feedback, their tasks put them in regular interpersonal contact with various stakeholders, and their translation assignments were targeted at journalists and

put to immediate use in the local news. All this a made them feel like "full part-
ners", in contrast to their colleagues in the translation unit who were subject to
other kinds of institutionalized patterns of cultural value:

> When, … [institutionalised patterns of cultural value] constitute some actors as
> inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible – in other words, as less than
> full partners in social interaction – then we can speak of misrecognition and sta-
> tus subordination.
> (Fraser 2000: 113)

The interviews and focus group discussions that form the basis of this section were
conducted between 2004 and 2008, that is, a decade or more ago. Change was one
of the findings in both the network models and the EU context. The spaces of
translation were not static, and neither were the spatializations and self-concepts
of the actors. What is, then, the point of returning to such old data and rehears-
ing old arguments? I do think there is some permanence in the vertical versus
horizontal understanding of translation space in networks versus in-house situa-
tions, and the positions available to translators in these two configurations. Hav-
ing said that, it seems evident that the network model, which was more recent in
the mid-2000s than towards the 2020s, has evolved significantly. I do not have
similar interview data from current networks, but my more casual observations
suggest that while the problems discussed by the interviewed translator in 2006
and 2007 have not disappeared, many of the translators working in these produc-
tion networks have learned to navigate. Navigating is an agentic activity where the
agent scans the surroundings to define their location and then moves accordingly,
actively changing their position, affecting a change in the network as well. Massey
(2005: 55) argues that space is an "open, on-going production" and she cites (ibid.:
51) Derrida's views of spac*ing* as a productive, positive, generative force. When
translators navigate, they are opening up and re-spacing the networks they work
in. The change of affective stance and sense of empowerment on the one hand and
the material and organizational changes on the other hand interrelate in multifari-
ous ways, and instigating a change in one can and will also change the other.

Having the power to affect changes requires empowerment, which in turn
requires reflexivity both about the surrounding space and about one's affective
relations to it (see Chapter 8). It may well be that the repeated interviews with
the researcher served as a medium for reflexion or a sort of trauma counselling
for the interviewee discussed above, allowing her to reassess the situation and her
possibilities for action and to therefore produce a change in the affective climate.
Sometimes it may help if one turns the tables. For example, microentrepreneur
translators can perceive themselves as abandoned nods at the outskirts of a mas-
sive translation network, or they can place their one-person company as the cen-
tral hub of their personal network that consists of many agencies and clients as

well as fellow translators. The landscape shifts dramatically, both spatially and affectively. It seems to me that many translators working in production networks may have done just that. Concerted action of individual nodes can also radically alter the space as the interrelations change. For example, the network discussed by the translator in 2006–2007 has since that time been pushed to rethink its operational practices by the combined force of united translators.

Massey (2005: 13) emphasizes the inherent liveliness and anti-essentiality of spatiality. No spatial organization of translation work can claim permanence. In an unjust situation, it is only normal to be drawn into feelings such as anger, anxiety or shame. Healing and empowerment, and change, can begin when we are not paralyzed by these feelings but learn to live with them, allowing negative affects to indicate where things need to be changed and which personal or collective shadows need to be brought to light (on shadows, see also Section 8.3). Affects – even, or perhaps particularly, negative ones – can be turned into a source of energy that allows us to not only be affected by the spatial arrangements and exercise our right to exit, but also to affect these arrangements in ways that allow for a flow of more positive affects.

6.2.2   The spaces of translation in poetry performances

The previous section looked at the senses of space of professional transla*tor*s located in different organizational structures. In this section we turn to another spatial question, that of the spaces and places of translation, and the affectivities involved. In a way, this is a move to an entirely new topic; on a more general level, I continue to explore the contact points of space and affect in translation. The case I have selected for analysis here is that of multilingually performed poetry. Performative arts, and the contemporary arts scene in general, are becoming more and more overtly multilingual. More often than not, these multilingual practices contain translational elements: two or more languages coexist in ways that reflect and repeat content, and this coexistence allows translationality to have more or less independent artistic value. In other words, translation occupies its own space in the performance. What this space can be, and what kind of artistic value it may accumulate, is the question I explore in this section. This discussion will also allow us to begin to explore the contact points of the aesthetic and the affective: the artistic value of translation is closely connected to aesthetic appraisal.

To begin to unravel the spatial positions available for translating in the context of an artistic performance, I present the results of a small-scale fieldwork project. I visited a literature event, the Poetry Marathon in Lahti, Finland, and observed the various translational practices involved in its programme for one day (18 June 2016). Poetry serves my current purposes well, because it is a short literary form.

Within a one-day visit one can observe a set of different practices and solutions. In the entire programme for that particular day, for example, there was only one act where translation played no role (i.e., a Finnish poet recited her poems written in Finnish and performed in Finnish); all other performances had an explicit translatorial connection, and they all had different approaches to tackling with the necessity of translating. Three performances, each containing a distinct approach to translation, were selected for analysis. These are analysed here from the perspective of spaces and places accorded to translation and translators, and the kinds of affective landscapes of translation that were produced. In short, I am analysing the translation spaces created for and during the event.

Among literary genres, poetry has often been seen as the touchstone of translation, as the form and content are so tightly knit together. In the contemporary literary scene, it is also prototypically a written art form, and research into translating poetry has focused more on textual analysis than the various ways of staging poetry translation. The performativity of poetry itself has recently become more to the forefront as poetry slams and other modes of staging poetry have gained popularity. Of course, the close ties between poetry and singing, and its long history of recitals, also link poetry to performing in more permanent ways. The Poetry Marathon Festival, too, is not a recent invention; it has been organized biannually since 1982, before the current fashions. This fairly long history may partially explain the many faces of translation in the event of 2016. What first aroused my research interest was the mixture of different microclimates of translation in the event and the changing affective spaces assigned to translatoriality in each piece. In the following, I will walk you through three of the performances staged in Lahti, describing the spaces as they unfolded and evolved during the event and looking into the affects at play.

The first translatorial act was a bow to the tradition of the Poetry Marathon, as a group of performers from the organizing community Päijät-Hämeen lausujat performed "Finno-Ugric poetry".[25] The introductory speech explained that the poems to be recited were originally written in Finno-Ugric minority languages (Udmurt, Hill Mari and Meadow Mari, and Sami), but they would all be performed in a Finnish translation, and also some Finnish poems would be included. The poems were then performed by several presenters, all of them recited monolingually in Finnish, with no identification of their source language, source culture or translator. Most of the space available was, in other words, given to translation,

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25. The event in 2016 was organized concurrently with the World Congress of Finno-Ugric peoples, and it therefore contained a number of acts that referred to language minorities and Finno-Ugric languages.

but in a less than entirely overt form. The performance was reliant on but indifferent to translation, in what could perhaps be called the traditional way. The process of translation was not flagged, and its consequences to what was on display was not signalled as problematic, interesting or artistically relevant. This approach foregrounded the universality of poetry and the idea of poetry moving fluently across linguistic borders. Poetry was also portrayed as an agentless art form, and the performers remained as nameless as the poets and translators. Affectively, the act downplayed translation and made it insignificant, but it also trusted translation. Moving the poems into a new lingua-cultural space was not seen as a risk that might produce shifts in meaning, style or form that would render the process of translating worth illuminating. Aesthetically, the translations were accepted as *the* poem, not as a second-rate reflection or replica.

The next act was the complete opposite of the first recital. The two poets from the multicultural project Sivuvalo ('Sidelight') had translation fully integrated into their performances. The act consisted of several independent parts, with different translatorial practices. The poet Zoila Forss "from Kerava [a town in Finland], Peru", read her poems first in Spanish and then in Finnish; Polina Kopylova who is originally from St. Petersburg in Russia read her poems in the original language (mainly in Russian, some in Finnish) while the text was projected on a screen in the other language. The texts on-screen appeared to be quite literal translations, but Kopylova emphasized that they were actually not translations at all but simply "reflections in another language." The final piece was Forss' video poem *Maquina*, in Spanish and with Finnish subtitles, that is, with translation in its traditional supportive role.[26]

In this performance, a sidelight was constantly shed on translation, as the coexistence of two languages was its essential element, and the necessity of translation was highlighted by the two performers with an immigrant background. At the same time, the spaces and places of translation were shifting in the different parts of the performance. The forceful and slightly off translations by Zoila Forss flexed the expressive repertoires of the Finnish language, and the Spanish and Finnish versions shed light on one another and were given the floor one after the other, recited as two independent poems. The translation was given a prominent position, but it was always given a secondary place after the original. In contrast, Kopylova's modest and unvoiced "reflections" were not portrayed as independent artistic achievements. Their unadorned style, and the near-obsolete overhead-projector technology employed, was rather a signal of the limits of translation and its role as a mere crutch for grasping the basic contents of the poem, intended

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26. Available at http://zolmarpe.wix.com/zoila-forss#!forss-videopoetry/t26xa (viewed 15.10.2019).

for those in the audience who did not know the original language. On the other hand, while the hierarchy of the two languages for Forss was static, in Kopylova's performance they alternated in the roles of source and target language, signalling the temporariness of their status.

The outcome of the multiple ways of engaging with translation was the creation of a space of foregrounded translation during the two Sivuvalo poets' successive performances. The different parts of the performance shed light on one another's concepts of translation, creating a discussion on the possibility and the limits of artistic translation. The audience was constantly reminded of the movement between languages and invited to contemplate the artistic status of the translations on display. Affectively, translation was portrayed as a necessity and a channel for communication for poets using a language that was not originally theirs. At the same time, their fluent ability to also use the adopted language as an element of artistic expression made the act a powerful performance of personal translatedness. From the perspective of communication, the translation was provided for the audience. For the poets themselves, self-translation and the use of more than one language was part of their artistic repertoire, not a crutch. How they decided to work with the material of translationality differed: with one, we experienced each poem in two languages, with the other, the audience saw a poet with two alternating languages.

The landscape of translatoriality was again very different in the final act of the day, a duet by a Japanese poet Yumi Fuzuki and her Finnish translator Mayu Saaritsa.[27] The translator was both named and visible, and had a central role. In fact, she had two roles: a performing translator reading out her own translations from a published book and the consecutive interpreter to Yumi Fuzuki's talk. On the stage, the two young women stood side by side, and the Japanese and the Finnish versions of the poems proceeded stanza by stanza. For someone like me, with no Japanese, the performance was captivating. The only accessible element of the source text was its foreign, rhythmic tongue, as it was recited to the audience in a lively and varied manner by a young-looking poet in a girly dress and stockings embroidered with poetry. The poems were set in the school environment, and the recitation was full of teenage emotion, the voice conveying haste, passion and terror, and the poet's body resonating with the text. In comparison, the translator looked like her big sister: the gestures were gentler, the voice less agitated, the language more solemn. Her recital was a bit more distanced, like she was

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27. This performance also included a third partner, the Japanese body artist Hikaru Cho, who completed a body paining on the back of a model on stage during the recital. This embodied performance was, in my interpretation, separate from the two performers disussed here, rather than an intersemiotic translation of the poems. Hence, I leave it outside my analysis.

remembering more distant past events. My field notes sound like wine-tasting: gentle and harmonious, spacious ("lempeän seesteinen, laakea"). Together, the two performed a fascinating and emotionally laden dialogue. On the surface level, the translation was a communicative tool that connected the poet and the audience, but it was not a lifeless "reflection" of the original poem. The translation took its visible and audible space as a full partner in creating the aesthetic performance of two artists of equal expressive force. The ensuing dialogue of two personalities allowed the audience to experience two interpretations of the poems, swaying in two directions.

The three consecutive acts capture a continuum of translation spaces, and the role accorded to or taken by translation in the production of the aesthetic experience varied from taken-for-grantedness to centrality, from a communicative support function to independent artistic value. I originally visited the event as a regular member of audience, turning on my observer role as I got interested in the multitude of translatoriality, and became fascinated by how the various translation spaces created in these performances affected reception. The answer to my research question "How were the performance and the audience affected by translatoriality?" seems quite obvious: the more translation was perceived as another artistic medium (as opposed to a merely communicative function and a supportive role) and the more it was put in dialogue with the source material on an equal footing (as opposed to either replacing the original entirely or being left in a shadowy position), the more complexity and interpretive depth it added to the performance. The more the translationality of translation was allowed to impregnate the performance, the more complex and therefore more rewarding the affective experience of translatoriality was. The richness of translation as an aesthetic and affective resource is seldom fully embraced in performative productions, and also in the Poetry Marathon not all translatorial spaces appeared to be a result of careful artistic consideration. But one also needs to acknowledge that the influence of the translation on the performance, that is, its performative value (Apter 2005: xx), was in fact greatest in the first act that seemed to pay no attention to translation. The recital was built on the truism of translation being "the same" as the original but in another language, and the complete non-transparency allowed translation to usurp all performative power. This coexistence of multiple trajectories within the space of poetry translation and its performance, both in general and in the microcosm of one particular event, testifies to space as a sphere of coexisting heterogeneity (Massey 2005: 9).

6.2.3   The space of translation as a playground

The first case above focused on an analysis of the types of spaces that are regularly available to professional translators. The second case investigated the space

afforded or actively taken by translation in the context of a literary event. In this third case we look at how a designated place reserved for translation can be repurposed, or hijacked, for particular affectively laden aims. The place in question is the space reserved for subtitles in audio-visual material, and the affectively laden repurposing that of a memetic recycling of video clips with new captions.

Performative translation as in the poetry event discussed above has a lot of potential for carving out new spaces for translation, but it is not too likely to dramatically unsettle the basic cultural values associated with translation. At least in the Poetry Marathon of 2016 in Lahti, translation was still very much based on assumptions of equivalence of one kind or another (of universality, of semantic content, or of artistic value). Some sub-areas of amateur translation are more radical. Various amateur translation activities such as fansubbing, scanlation and fan translation of song lyrics have become more visible, and most probably also more common, as digitalization has supported both translation practices and the distribution of translations in communities of like-minded aficionados. In these fandom-based communities, affectivity is the bedrock of translation activity (Pérez-González 2016), and translating what you love, discussed in Chapter 2, the rationale for translation work.

While strict expectations of equivalence or accuracy often also prevail in love-based fan-translation communities where the idolization of the source text is often a fundamental motivating factor for the translation activity, in some other translatorial landscapes the entire idea of equivalence is carnevalistically eschewed in favour of exhibiting affective qualities such as fun, wittiness, creativity or activism. I am referring to the practice of introducing new subtitles to certain iconic video clips. These deliberately fake subtitles belong to an emerging genre of "prosumeristic cybersubtitling" (Díaz Cintas 2018). Most internet users have probably come across a version of the most popular memes, but if you are not yet familiar with the genre, you can begin by searching for, for example, "Hitler finds out" or "Shocking interview", and you can find countless specimens of the two examples discussed below. It is accidental but not too unexpected that these two famous cases are also mentioned by Díaz Cintas (ibid.) to illustrate fake subtitling.

Searching for "Hitler finds out" or "Hitler reacts," one will find a number of online caption editors for the "Downfall parody", and numerous results of their use. The editor applications have been designed to help anyone create their own subtitles to a video clip of a scene of the 2004 film *Downfall* depicting Hitler (played by Bruno Ganz) in the last days of the war in the bunker with his staff, becoming increasingly furious as he learns of the failure of General Steiner to ward off the Soviet advance on Berlin. The scene, the climax of the film, is emotionally laden, and the characters' affects are vividly displayed in their tone of voice, facial expressions and body language. The second example discussed in this section, the laughing Spanish man of "the shocking interview," is much more benign and

culturally non-iconic in terms of representation and referencing. The protagonist of this meme is Juan Joya Borja, a Spanish actor and comedian with a very catchy laugh, hence the nickname El Risitas ('The Giggles'). The viral video clip "Pelleras" is originally from a TV interview shot in 2007, and in it El Risitas tells an inconsequential anecdote of working in a seaside paella place. The fascination of the clip is based on the hilarious and contagious giggle first by the interviewee and then also by the interviewer – and the viewer.

The popularity of the Hitler meme builds on the immediate recognizability of the protagonist, and on the idea of the fall of the empire that has become to epitomize evil in generations of Westerners. The humour and the effectiveness of the remixed videos is a result of using the subtitles to mix this original set-up with some more mundane issues, out of proportion with the extreme reaction depicted. The shocking interview meme functions the other way around. The personality of the laughing man and the content of the original interview are inconsequential and not known to many non-Spanish-speaking viewers. The remixability originates from the contagious laughter that can be mixed with all kinds of new content in the subtitles, ranging from the economic crisis in Greece to Apple computers and beyond.

Some might argue that with these parody subtitles we are no longer dealing with translation, particularly because of the required *lack* of equivalence with the original verbalized meaning on which the humour of the meme stands on. The point is not to reproduce but to creatively replace the original content in favour of playful new material. Admittedly, we are not dealing with prototypical translation. Still, the practice retains elements that place it within the area of translationality. First, it utilizes a translation genre of subtitling, and the place designated to inter- or intralinguistic subtitles, as well as the technology designed for translation purposes. Second, as far as I can see, the genre seems to respect the idea of interlinguality: I have not been able to find parody subtitles in German for the Hitler meme or in Spanish for El Risitas. Third, and importantly, while the content is to be changed, the form is expected to follow patterns of speaking in ways that agree with the norms of prototypical subtitling, and one element of success is also how convincingly the subtitles manage to appear *as if* they might be representations of what was actually said. In this they differ from some other cases of "fake" subtitles where subtitling is not tied to any visual or audio text but seems to live a life of its own (for an example of this kind of subtitling, see, the beginning of the film *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* from 1976, and the story of the Swedish møøse [sic] that is run in the subtitles during the credits). Many caption editors support this synchronized form with the help of ready-made timing, saving subtitlers a lot of effort.

This kind of loss of content in favour of other qualities is not entirely unheard of in translation history. In homonymic poetry translation it is the phonetic form that overrides the content; witty funniness is the crucial quality that determines the acceptability of the outcome. Accuracy is nothing; acceptability, and with it, virality, is everything. This genre, extreme as it is, allows us to appreciate the fundamental affective and interpersonal nature of acceptability: if the viewer fails to appreciate both the social commentary underlying the effort and the execution that allows the viewer to be entertained, the clip fails as a translation.

One way of understanding the nature of these subtitles is to think of them as a subcategory of pseudotranslations (also called fictional translations). Toury (2012: 47–59) discusses this phenomenon in literature, identifying a number of typical features such as introducing novelties and literary innovations and avoiding sanctions for norm-breaking publications. The core idea of a pseudotranslation is that it purports being a translation when factually it is not. Toury (ibid.: 47) focuses on how pseudotranslation activates what is called the Source-Text Postulate, that is, the tacit assumption that for a text to be assumed to be translation, it is to be genetically linked to a prior corresponding text in another language. Parody subtitles are different from Touryan pseudotranslation in that they are not defined by a lacking source text. On the contrary, they are presented *together* with the source text, in the physical place reserved for translation. Instead, their success is predicated on the tension they create with another postulate on Toury's list of features of assumed translation (ibid.: 28): the Relationship Postulate. This postulate is tricky to define, as the exact nature of the relationship is open to many interpretations, and the actual translation products may not necessarily comply with prevailing expectations (ibid.: 30). Toury's definition of the Relationship Postulate is vague, and other scholars trying to tackle this same fundamental of translation have also struggled. While the requirement of *a* relationship between source and target texts has been widely accepted as a necessary condition for translationality, translation studies does not have a disciplinary consensus on what forms the relationship can take. Attempts have ranged from Koller's (1979) early classification of five different equivalence relations to Chesterman's notion of relevant similarity (2016: 15). To bluntly sum up the theoretical common ground, some sort of a relationship is assumed between the source and the target text, but its exact nature depends.

The concept of equivalence allows us to begin to untangle the various options for a relationship. Chesterman (2016: 4) identifies equivalence among the supermemes of translation, that is, among powerful and persistent ways of thinking around translation. This makes sense. It is well-known that lay understandings of translation build on a simplified assumption of sameness, and they often imply denotational or semantic sameness. This lay view is not highly valued in

the professional and academic circles. In contrast, the fake subtitles might allow us researchers to probe how far *we* are willing to depart from the expectation of semantic correspondence. Toury does not explicitly mention semantic equivalence as one dominant contemporary realization of the Relationship Postulate, but for many this may be the defining feature in categorizing these subtitles as non-translational: the foundational prohibition on reproducing semantic content to be accepted in this genre violates a norm of assumed translation for many. The meme makers do not work without a source text; they simply do not aim to reproduce its semantic content.

Another theoretical framework that seems particularly apt is that of carnivalism (see also Díaz Cintas 2018). The anonymous meme creators carnivalistically appropriate the original and make it their own. Carnivalism is brought to play in translation theory to signal creative and empowered translation practices, championing creative appropriations. To my knowledge, the most extended exposition of carnivalistic translation is the book *Kääntäjän karnevaali* [Translator's carnival] by Riitta Oittinen (1995). This programmatic manifesto, written for translation students, builds on Mikhail Bakhtin's philosophy of dialogism and evokes his notion of carnivalistic laughter with an explicit aim of empowering the students to steer away from slavish rerenderings. It promotes a fearless and playful approach to translation:

> The carnival of translation, to me, means that the translator laughs benevolently at the original, comes close to it and owns it through profanation.… The carnival means joyful, fearless translating.   (1995: 149; my translation)

The word carnival also alludes to the carnal, bodily side of the carnivalesque. It is not insignificant that the quotation, too, depicts a *laughing* translator, *fearlessly moving to the close proximity* of the original. The embodied terminology underlines the personal, affective stance Oittinen promotes. But let us pause to think through the adverb "benevolently". Oittinen's dialogic carnival depicts a happy and playful encounter with the original. But the emphasis on the goodwill of the carnivalistic translator seems to indicate a difficulty of letting go of the image of the translator as someone who does good things – a feature often seen in metaphors of translation as bridge-building in translation theories. Profanation, a word left – perhaps strategically – unexplained in the above quotation, however, reveals the darker side of carnivalism (and of translation in general). The Merriam-Webster online dictionary gives the following definitions to the word "profane": (1) to treat (something sacred) with abuse, irreverence, or contempt, to desecrate, and (2) to debase by a wrong, unworthy, or vulgar use. If one further follows the link to "desecrate", one finds another similar duo: (1) to violate sanctity of something, or (2) to treat disrespectfully, irreverently, or outrageously. Oittinen's image of a carnivalesque

translator is intended as a model of all (literary) translation. In reality the most carnivalesque translation practices, however, are not necessarily found in serious-minded literary translation but in the cyberspace. The second definitions, such as debasing by vulgar use or treating disrespectfully and irreverently are ill-fitting to the benevolent, loving image of the carnivalistic translator Oittinen depicts, but they seem very apt in the context of the parody subtitles discussed here.

The fake subtitles contain an element of wilful suspension of disbelief familiar from literary theory (Díaz Cintas 2018): the subtitler knows that most viewers know that the subtitles are not a representation of what was actually said, but the whole point is to play along *as if* they were, and to allow the affects displayed in the original footage (the uncontrollable laughter in the case of the Spanish man; the fury of the Führer in the Hitler clip) to blend in with the new meaning introduced in the subtitles. The exuberant display of affect in the clips is the source of their remixability, and the success of the resulting mix rests on the excess of affect that allows for the new meaning to gain force. The idea is to turn things on their head: the funniness of the Hitler memes rests on combining a banal issue with the fury of the Führer; the mindless giggle can be used to bring home political commentary or to promote a particular social view. For example, the "shocking interview", which gained global fame and millions of views in 2015 when it was used to criticize Apple, had earlier been memetized for political aims by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt where the new subtitles were designed to mock president El-Sisi in 2014.

There are numerous examples of pseudotranslations in literary history, but as Toury (2012: 48) points out, for reasons such as tightened copyright legislation and better flows of information, contemporary pseudotranslations are more likely to be found outside the most canonized sectors of culture. He also underlines the relevance of researching them, as they can prove very revealing for understanding the culture in question, and emphasizes that this strategy should not be viewed as a mere curiosity or cheating (ibid.). In the same spirit, I argue that parody subtitles are an important object of study as they highlight "the position and role of translations, or possibly of a particular sub-system thereof, within the culture, which the pseudotranslations are aware of and put to use" (ibid.: 50–51).

The metaphors of cannibalistic and carnivalistic translation question any simple assumptions of a tidy hierarchical duality between "original" and "translation". Commentators have emphasized the ultimate fidelity of the cannibal, in a very radical form, and the idea of devouring as a form of reverence and appreciation (Vieira 1994; Oittinen 1995: 149). This interpretation may be too tame: maybe we should accept and celebrate cannibalism and carnivalism specifically for their radical departure from any notion of fidelity and value them as an ultimate test for arguments of translation being more than a mimetic reproduction of semantic

meaning, and of seeing it as "a technology of literary replication that engineers textual afterlife without recourse to a genetic origin" (Apter 2005: 171).

In their extremeness, parody subtitles allow us to reflect on our own culturally programmed affects towards translation, as readers, translators, translator trainers and researchers. It is a standard view in contemporary translation theories that translation cannot be conceived of from a perspective of producing denotative equivalence only. But how far are we willing to go? Are we able to appreciate and give space to translation that entirely ignores the content? And whether or not we are, what kinds of affective responses does this kind of subversiveness evoke in us? At the most fundamental level, this memetic subtitling activity desacralizes and profanes *translation* itself. The carnivalism of parody translations such as these memetic subtitles not only lies in their disrespectful and wilful mistreatment of the original content of the video clips but also in the carnivalistic overturning of the most sacred premise of translation as sameness. They also turn on its head another "primal truism of translation" (Apter 2005: 159): translation always entails a loss. In these parody subtitles the loss is carnivalistically maximized, and the original intent is cannibalistically devoured and reproduced in a new, twisted form. For some, calling this practice "translation" is indeed outrageous. For others, it is a translatorial playground where the rules of prototypical and professional translation are profanely overturned.

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This chapter has covered lot of space [sic!] and a range of different studies. Here, I try to summarize the main take-aways. First, translation and interpreting are always organized spatially, in the sense of interrelations and positions, and the embodied translators and interpreters are always located in a place, and so are translations in a material sense. Second, translation occupies a socio-cultural, organizational or institutional space. Third, translation also provides a cultural space that can be made meaningful in many different ways and that can be used for different purposes.

The definitions of space and place are not very strict in previous theoretical literature, and my usage is probably also somewhat shaky. To an extent it is necessarily so, because places and spaces are both mental constructions and interpretations. We produce them through meaning-making based on their qualities, factual and otherwise. And we no doubt sway in producing these constructions. Although the definitions are not watertight, it still seems analytically useful to differentiate between physical/material/geographical places, and the virtual and relational spaces that have been the main focus of this chapter. Both enable and constrain translation work, and both are a source of affective involvement. Belonging, recognition, motivation and job satisfaction were among the affects that came up,

as were laughter, playfulness, creativity and carnivalistic fearlessness. The most prevalent social emotion in connection to translation, however, seems to be trust, as also these cases demonstrate. Trust is a relational affect, dialogically connecting the one doing the trusting and the other being trusted. Massey's understanding of both space and place focuses on interrelations, and it is therefore not too unexpected that her thinking gains prominence in analysing translation. But there is more to it. Regardless of the spatial organization of translationality, and regardless of genre or mode, trust seems to push itself to the foreground. Similar to memes of translation (Chesterman 2016) where some memes are so dominant that they can be called supermemes, trust seems to warrant the role of a super-affect in the context of translatoriality. Some spaces and some places support trusting relations; others make them harder to maintain. But few operate in the manner of fake subtitles that radically eschew the expectation of trustworthiness. Indeed, this is precisely the source of their radicalness.

Translation technology and affect

All previous chapters have focused on affect as a human capacity, either as an individual bodily experience or an interpersonal flow of energy. In this chapter this perspective is expanded by also considering the ability of inhuman objects to affect. More specifically, this chapter builds on acknowledging the deeply technologized nature of contemporary translation work and the increasingly nonhuman outlook of translation in the future. Translation has always developed in pace with technological advances, from papyrus rolls to the printing press and word processors, but the speed of development has never been greater than in the past two decades, and we have witnessed the birth of designated translation technologies and an increasingly automated and globalized translation industry. It is only logical, then, that in 21st-century translation studies topics related to translation technology have pushed themselves to the forefront of research. A number of scholars have also looked into attitudinal factors, opening up areas of shared interest with affect-based approaches (e.g., Lagoudaki 2008; Olohan 2011; Marshman & Bowker 2012; LeBlanc 2013; Moorkens & O'Brien 2017; O'Brien et al. 2017). Another emerging approach focuses on usability issues and ergonomics, bringing the physical bodies of translators into sharp focus, but also looking into cognitive ergonomics and the mental load caused by technology (see e.g., Ehrensberger-Dow & O'Brien 2015).

This chapter is divided into two sections, based on two currently dominant technological approaches: the first one discusses computer-assisted translation and the second one machine translation. They are organized slightly differently, but each follows a case study approach in focussing on one study from the perspective of affect. Section 7.1 reports on my earlier work on translators' affective narratives concerning translation technology. Drawing on science and technology studies it looks at the dance of agency (Olohan 2011; Ruokonen & Koskinen 2017) between the human translators and their tools, focusing on affect as a flow between man and machine in an increasingly posthumanist, post-anthropocentric world (Braidotti 2013). I have not done empirical research specifically on machine translation, but the topic is so central to today's translatorial landscape that it could not be left out. In Section 7.2, I therefore rely quite heavily on the work of Läubli

and Orrego-Carmona (2017), reporting on their qualitative analysis of translators' discourse on machine translation in social media. This study begins to chart the many roles of affect in machine translation contexts and utilizes an automated sentiment analysis tool and thus also showcases new methodological opportunities for studying translation and affect. The chapter ends with an attempt to identify and predict some future trends in this rapidly evolving area (Section 7.3).

7.1 Translators' technology-related affects

When new technologies are introduced in a workplace, understanding and managing the emotions of different professional groups is a key to success in their acceptance and adoption of the technology (see e.g., Venkatesh & Bala 2008). For the past two decades, translation workplaces across the globe have been a veritable laboratory for managing technological change, as the translation industry has become an early adopter of large-scale automatization and digitalization, the effects of which are only beginning to be felt in many other fields. As far as I know, there are no large-scale and long-term studies on technology adoption in the translation industry, let alone on the affective elements thereof, so we need to rely on more fragmented pieces of information. The insights discussed in this section have mainly been obtained during an exploratory research project where I asked translators to write love letters or break-up letters to the various elements of their work. In a slightly ironic and decisively playful manner, this method invites the respondents to play along with the idea of the centrality of love as an affect that qualifies translation (see Chapter 2), and to touch base with their inner motivation as well as factors eating away that motivation. The method has originally been designed in usability research to elicit information on the affects users attach to devices and objects (Hanington & Martin 2012: 114; see also Gerber 2012). It proved unexpectedly fruitful also for the purposes of uncovering some traits and trends in translators' attachments, providing a rich and nuanced dataset that has elicited a number of different studies. In addition to the technology-related aspects discussed in more detail below (Koskinen & Ruokonen 2017; Ruokonen & Koskinen 2017), it has given insights for reassessing (and, somewhat counterintuitively) providing support to Simeoni's classic argument of translators' servile habitus (Simeoni 1998; Koskinen 2014b) and prompted an exploration of the role of serendipity in information seeking (Salmi & Koskinen 2018).

The letters were originally solicited in order to find out the relative status and role of technology in translators' mappings of positive and negative emotions. To allow for a variety of responses and to avoid guiding the selection process of the addressees to these letters in one way or another, the guidelines for the task were

very broad, and the respondents were also instructed to trust their first instincts and not to think too analytically before responding. The instructions also focused explicitly on experience and emotions:

> Picture yourself in the space where you normally work with your translation assignments. Try to capture your first, intuitive reaction to the following question: What is the greatest tool or support for you when you are translating? What gives you the most pleasure? What would you be most reluctant to lose?

> Or do some reverse thinking: What is the most annoying hindrance you need to deal with? Which tool, artefact or element is emotionally the most unpleasant? What would you be happy to get rid of?

During Spring 2014, a total of 148 letters were collected from 102 respondents, representing professional translators in Finland and in the European Union institutions as well as translation students in two universities located in Finland and another European country. The instructions were given in Finnish or in English, and the letters were also written in these two languages.

Translators are by definition experienced writers, and the invitation to engage in this playful task of fictional letter-writing was met with enthusiasm. The task was presented as an either/or choice, but as the numbers also indicate, many respondents opted to write two letters (or one letter with both love letter and break-up letter elements in them, and these we split into two for the analysis). This further attests to the ease with which participants were able to approach this slightly unconventional task. To give you a taste of the data, I quote one response in full:

> Dear Internet,
> This is the first time I'm writing to you although my feelings for you have been strong and warm for a long time. I remember when we were both still young and foolish, but since the bubbly infatuation of our first encounters my feelings have gradually deepened as we have both matured and grown to know each other better, and I could no longer imagine a single working day without you.

> I know, my dearest Internet, that some people find you unreliable, but I have learned to take you as you are and act accordingly – after all, there are always two parties to a relationship, and I couldn't require you to be absolutely reliable but must be aware of my responsibility and duty to make an effort and be critical of the sources you offer. It is in this way that we can both keep our relationship rewarding.

> Love,
> (FI-48, translation MR and KK)

The wording allowed respondents to choose any element of their practice as the recipient of their letters. A wide array of objects of love and hate were identified,

and many letters included more than one object (a full picture is given in Koskinen 2014b). Technology was by far the most discussed theme in all letters: of the 148 letters, 106 engaged directly with some aspect of technology, ranging from prototypical translation technologies such as translation memory software and machine translation systems to other software (such as word processors, time management systems and operating systems), search tools and databases, hardware (laptop, mouse, keyboard) and references to computers or IT in general.

In discussions about translators and technology, translators are often seen to have a negative mind-set or resistance towards technological change (e.g., Läubli and Orrego-Carmona 2017: 67; Cadwell et al. 2018; see also Drugan 2013: 24; O'Brien et al. 2017). This view may be a bit unfair towards a group using sophisticated technical tools. Translators may be showing signs of technostress, which is known to be a persistent problem in IT use across fields, observed and verified in multiple studies on information systems (Pirkkalainen et al. 2017). Technostress reduces performance and harms individual wellbeing. To manage their stress levels, IT users may resort to emotional coping strategies such as distress venting and distancing (ibid.). Looking through the (still rather meagre) body of research in translation contexts, and considering the pace and extent of technological change in the translation industry, one can hypothesize that all things considered translators exhibit rather moderate levels of technostress and that they may have been able to also create more proactive coping strategies than venting and distancing.

When collecting the letters, I intentionally promoted venting. The task description quoted above specifically mentions tools, and its tone can easily be seen as an open invitation to rant, and one might therefore expect to see a flood of break-up letters, but in fact, love letters were more dominant both in general and among letters that discussed technology. In 57 letters, technology was seen in a positive light, while 40 manifested a negative attitude towards it. This in itself indicates that translators are perhaps less averse to technology than has sometimes been suggested. On the other hand, the total amount of break-up letters was 56, so that the 40 letters including technology made up more than 70 per cent of all break-up letters. Technological tools were criticized for being slow, unreliable or difficult to use. In other words, translators wanted to break up with usability issues rather than the technology itself. Most of the break-up letters did not signal a desire to get rid of a technological tool entirely. Instead, they were more narrowly addressed to a "slow" or "erratic" Internet connection or to the translator's computer "when it's acting up" (Koskinen & Ruokonen 2017).

There is indeed room for improvement in the usability and user experience of translation tools in order to increase user satisfaction and efficiency in task completion, and usability issues were also what the respondents appreciated in

their tools. In contrast, lack of efficiency and various kinds of system errors ranked highest among negatively valued usability factors (Koskinen & Ruokonen 2017; see also O'Brien et al. 2017). In technology-acceptance models it has been postulated that the user's willingness to use a particular tool or system depends on the perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness, and that attitudes and emotions towards technology are a central element of the belief that using a particular system will be fairly effortless (Venkatesh & Bala 2008). Emotions, attitudes and (perceived) usability all interact and influence the acceptance and adoption of new technology. Obviously, usability issues are not only perceived but can be very real. Research has repeatedly and over a stretch of time confirmed that translators have not felt their needs and preferences being prioritized in the development of translation technology (Lagoudaki 2008; Moorkens and O'Brien 2017). This has been found to result in cognitive friction, that is, an interrupted sense of flow in task completion, causing irritation to translators working in a heavily technologized environment (O'Brien et al. 2017).

Another approach to the desire to break up with technology that fails to perform as the user would see fit is to analyse the co-operation between man and machine as a dance of agency. This concept was first developed by Andrew Pickering (1995) to analyse the interaction of human and non-human agents. It was first applied to translation technology use by Maeve Olohan (2011), and it has later also been applied by Cadwell et al. (2018) as well as Ruokonen and Koskinen (2017). For Pickering, the dance of machinic and human agency is a progressive temporal process of resistance, accommodation and technological development. Technology offers resistance when it fails to function in the way expected by users. Users may then have to accommodate their own behaviour to find a way to bypass the problem. Patching or updating will eventually lead to an accommodation of technology. This pattern of resistance and accommodation – the dance of agency – is the driving force behind scientific and technological innovations. In contrast to the progressive trajectory of Pickering's model, the human and machinic agents in our love and break-up letter data seemed more entangled and in constant movement with one another (Ruokonen & Koskinen 2017). We first analysed how many of the 106 letters on technology assigned some agency to it, and then focused on this subgroup of letters to analyse whether the human and machinic agents were seen as convergent and moving in the same direction, or divergent and pulling in different directions. We further analysed whether these two types were appraised positively or negatively in the accounts, and whether the translators assigned a dominant role to themselves or the machines.

In spite of the letter genre that personifies addressees, the results indicated some reluctance in perceiving technology as agentic. The majority of the 61 letters that did so fell into either convergent/positive ($n = 20$) or divergent/negative group

(n = 32), that is, they were praising technology when it functions according to the user's wishes and blaming it if it does not. This signals the desire for the human to be the leading partner in the dance. The modern translation work, however, is turning this around; in post-editing, for example, the MT technology takes the lead, and the human is expected to follow. This post-anthropocentric move alters our identity as humans and undermines translatorial expertise. In light of this immanent shift across the translation industry, the most interesting implications of our data came from the handful of letters where the dance of agency emerged as a more complex phenomenon and which drew attention to unanticipated affects such as liking to be lead astray by technology or getting annoyed at a too-compliant tool. These respondents reported a tool's divergent agency as a welcome support, or an influence that made the human user's work more varied and enjoyable. Conversely, too passive or compliant a tool was seen to create trouble and annoyance. These outlier responses signal a necessity to move away from overly simplified man-versus-machine conceptions so that we can fully capture the intricate interplay of human and machinic forces in contemporary translation workplaces (Ruokonen & Koskinen 2017: 321).

We were surprised to see that practising translators wrote love letters to technology more frequently than the translation students. Previous research (Dillon & Fraser 2006: 68; Marshman & Bowker 2012: 76) has suggested that the youngest cohort (between 21 and 30 in our data, and consisting mainly but not only of students) would be the keenest to engage with modern technology, but we did not find this to be the case for our respondents. The student group is also the only one in which break-up letters outnumbered love letters, which therefore makes them the cohort expressing the most disaffection both in general and also towards technology. This may be accidental: as professional translators were more willing to write two letters than the student respondents, they ended up expressing a more balanced snapshot of both their positive and negative views. But the tendency towards break-up letters rather than love letters in the student group may also signal an important affective trend of which we may wish to take notice: in the entire sample of letters, students stand out as the group that expresses the most worry about the profession and its future, and also of their own future as part of it (Koskinen 2014b: 82). This may reflect their precarious position compared to those who already have found their professional foothold, but the results also raise questions as to whether future workplaces are being painted in an overly negative light in the training institutions, how translation educators approach technology (MT in particular) and how much attention is given to students' emotional wellbeing and attachment to their future profession during their studies.

7.2   Machine translation and affects

Machine translation received limited attention in the love and break-up letters, and the only group where it was highlighted (as a potentially threatening new tool) was that of students. This was somewhat unexpected, given that the EU data was collected around a time of large-scale integration of MT into the institutional in-house TM systems.[28] The fact that respondents did not highlight MT as an item to write about is all the more unexpected as the EU translator dataset was collected in conjunction with a lecture on the future of translation (technology) which in itself was priming the EU respondents towards selecting technology objects (and machine translation naturally featured significantly in the lecture). The new MT tool was not immediately loved, but neither was it seen as a source of fear or threat. In the literature, the discourse of threat is often prominent, either as a phenomenon empirically identified (Cadwell et al. 2018) or as an assumption the author works against (see, e.g., Bywood et al. 2017). Results from the letter data paint a much less dramatic picture of translators' attitudes towards machine translation.

To explore current attitudes towards machine translation in social media, Läubli and Orrego-Carmona (2017) conducted a qualitative analysis of translators' discourse on Facebook groups and on LinkedIn and then classified a set of 13,150 tweets about MT with the help of an automated sentiment analysis tool (it was not entirely clear from the article whether the tweets were also authored by translators). While the qualitative data indicated a tendency towards predominantly negative attitudes, the more extensive Twitter data seems to have been more balanced, as neutral tweets were found to be the most common subset. Still, the authors report that there were three times more negative tweets than positive ones, which the authors interpreted as an indication of negative perceptions being more dominant than positive ones. They are no doubt correct, but the interpretation needs to be qualified by the memetic nature of social media where a dramatic failure is much more retweetable than incremental improvements of MT. Translators' lives are currently most affected by post-editing tasks, that is, processes through which raw MT results are revised to reach adequate level of accuracy and textual quality. It has been found that the cognitive effort required to produce a usable text via post-editing varies, and not all scenarios make it worthwhile to do so

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28.   One partial explanation may be found in the predominance of Finnish respondents as two of the four subgroups consisted of those with Finnish as one of their working languages. In 2014, and still at the time of writing at the end of 2018, machine translation solutions have not penetrated the Finnish translation market in a significant degree as the technology has been slow to accommodate to the fairly small and syntactically complex language.

(Koponen 2016). These experiences may well be reflected in translators' sarcastic or ironic tweets that laugh at the failures of MT, and they may easily lead the observer to overinterpret the sender's cynical and negative approach. Indeed, it has been found that irony may be a normal feature of organizational talk in ambiguous and difficult situations, creating space for dealing with contradictory demands by allowing for some distance to official policies and normative expectations (Koskinen 2008: 118; Hatch 1997: 281). Cynical humour has been identified as a legitimate expression of felt ambiguities and therefore a positive force: it enables the speakers to recognize the contradictory nature of their work lives without having to attempt to resolve the contradictions; it allows "unresolvables, irreconcilables, and untenables to remain unresolved" (Meyerson 1991: 141). A number of factors may explain the overrepresentation of negative posts in the data, and direct causal links between posts classified as negative and the actual, more durable affective stance or perception of the author need to be drawn with caution.

Social media provides an affectively laden environment that facilitates emotional involvement and identity performances. These performances are realized through affective labour and directed at designated affective publics (Abdel-Fadil 2019). In the social media context, the combination of needing to alleviate anxieties concerning machine translation through sarcasm and to touch an affective chord that will allow one's tweet to be noticed, appreciated and shared will easily make it irresistible to post hilarious MT blunders. Classifying them into boxes of negative/positive is bound to be a crude approximation that will unavoidably miss the subtleties of argumentation. Still, the result that shows such prominence of negative affect towards MT is significant. Hype is clearly overshadowed by doubts.

Laughing at MT is also a good reminder of the wonderfully hilarious and fun uses it has been put to by people's creativity. A great example of this playfulness are, for example, karaoke shows based on retour translating song lyrics with an MT tool and then trying to fit the resulting gibberish into the music.[29] These kinds of activities have increased the cultural visibility of translation in a playful style that can be linked to a wider cultural shift in translation and affect that Yves Gambier (2012) has described as a movement from the denial to the desire to translate. While technology has, for some, began to render human translation obsolete, it has also enabled a cultural revival of translation in technology-assisted platforms that unite engaged fans and volunteers in donating their time and affection through translating (see also Section 6.2.3 above).

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29.   See, e.g., The Tonight Show at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GC83w0z0ec (viewed 19.10.2019)

In discussions of machine translation in the context of professional translation, negative affects such as fear, anxiety and worry tend to dominate, but the discourse also tends to implicitly or explicitly push translators into adopting more acceptable (i.e., positive and optimistic) affective stances. Stepping beyond professional use allows us to also appreciate the societal promise of MT. In addition to being fun, MT is also virtuous. The utopian prospect of MT, of free access and instantaneous availability of fully automated, directly usable high-quality MT, would radically democratize multilingual communication, empowering users. Already now it is delivering a lot of that promise by allowing people to access the information they need or want, independently and instantaneously across language barriers. Professional translators understandably focus on the effect of MT on themselves, and not everybody is affectionate about the changes it is bringing. An empathetic view of what raw MT, rudimentary or not, is offering to many user groups who never had the resources to be clients of professional translators will allow for a more balanced stance.

Läubli and Orrego-Carmona's article focuses on MT attitudes, but their method also gives readers a peek into the current capabilities of sentiment analysis in automated recognition of affects in text. It is clear that this method is not yet very sophisticated, but their methodology also shows that the human assessment that was used to train the engine is equally fallible, especially in reaching a consensus in identifying sarcastic and ironic tones. This is not a minor point. Social media genres are known for their affective loadedness and for the challenges of correctly interpreting and responding to the affects expressed by others as well as expressing one's own. For automated sentiment analysis to be functional, it will need to outperform human assessors, not only in terms of amounts of data but also in terms of interpreting it. Based on the conflicting interpretations of the human assessors employed by Läubli and Orrego-Carmona, humans are not necessarily as far ahead as one might optimistically assume.

7.3 Future scenarios

It can be argued that technology is the repressed other that motivated the writing of this book. My not-so-hidden agenda across this monograph is to argue that translation studies should foreground elements that machines are not yet able to master and that are therefore still the domain of human translators. Hence the focus on analysing, modulating and performing affects. At the same time, it seems prudent to acknowledge that deep-learning artificial intelligence is likely to improve in its ability to identify and interpret user emotions as well, and the next major steps in translation technology may well be taken in the area of affective computing, a field

that studies the connecting points of computing and emotion and aims to create new technological tools for measuring and communicating emotion.

Affective computing is a vast field, and I do not claim to know it well. Even a rudimentary understanding, however, reveals many contact points between translation and currently available solutions. For example, sentiment analysis and opinion mining from large volumes of text discussed in the previous section is a business tool already used to uncover emotional tones and to extract information on people's attitudes on social media sites or in customer feedback systems, creating lucrative business opportunities. Similarly, machine recognition of emotions in speech is already being used to support call centre workers to keep up signalling positive emotions through a smiling voice across the workday and to detect the mood of the caller through their tone of voice. Call centres have been known to be early adopters of new technology. But so is the translation industry. I have no knowledge of emotion recognition software being currently used in remote interpreting, for example, but the idea makes obvious sense and will surely be adopted at some point. There is a lot of hype around this area of research, while even fairly simplistic manipulations have been reported to result in misinterpretations by the tool (such as adding the word "love" to a sentence that would otherwise be interpreted as hate speech; Gröndahl et al. 2018). However, it is not so long ago that machine translation seemed like a too-hyped and unrealistic endeavour, while it is now rapidly developing into a mainstream asset of translation work. It seems only logical to assume that insights from natural-language processing and affective computing might well prove useful for translation technology applications as well, eventually bringing an artificial emotional intelligence into the systems used for multilingual communication. To be able to make the most of the results of this emerging area of research, we also need to fine-tune our understanding of the various human emotions involved in translating and interpreting. In effect, whether we expect computers to take over multilingual communication entirely, or whether we believe humans to be needed to master the human – that is, subjective and intersubjective – elements of natural languages and the movement between them, the argument for an accentuated understanding of the complexities of the affective remains.

In the current AI scene, neural machine translation is often hailed as the greatest achievement so far, trumping other well-known projects such as self-driving cars or social robots. It is indeed undeniable that neural machine translation is currently making fast and significant headway, but it is also realistic to assume it will eventually plateau in a way similar to its predecessor statistical machine translation technology. What level of sophistication it will reach and how well affective computing will eventually be integrated with machine translation are open questions, but for the time being it is also reasonable to believe that translation will be

a dance of human and machinic agency in the future as well. In that tango, the machine is likely to continue to take on a larger role, but also to continue to be better at routine, repetitive tasks, whereas bringing newness to the communicative context is more likely to remain the task of the human partner. This will often be a result of affective reasoning.

This newness factor is not a minor point. Translation is not only about sourcing existing textual evidence and matching expressions in two languages. It is also a creative process of finding unexpected cultural similarities, spanning the boundaries of linguistic expression and judging the necessities of a particular communicative context and adapting the message accordingly. It is no accident that among the fundamentals of translating, tried and tested in numerous empirical studies of human translation in different genres and across historical periods and cultures, one finds such basic strategies as addition, omission and pragmatic adaptations. The computer does not excel in this kind of contextualized strategic decision-making. In fact, the foundational principle of machine translation is the repetition of the commonly used. Importantly, it devours and recycles translation solutions produced outside the realm of automated translation, feeding on human translations it is designed to replace. This logic is common to much of contemporary internet content: it comments, retweets and recycles products and ideas created in and by old cultural institutions whose business models and legitimization the internet culture is dismantling (Lanier 2011: 122; for a prominent example of this mash-up culture, see the discussion on video clip subtitling in Section 6.2.3 above). As opposed to human translators, who will be able to adapt to changing contexts and create new communicative solutions, MT will provide fast but stable solutions and standardization. The more widely raw MT is used, the more common misunderstandings and ensuing conflicts will also be. These errors, as opposed to those made by individual human translators, are instantly scalable. It is easy to see that in addition to the post-editors currently employed to reshape machine-generated translations before they are released so that these conflicts can be avoided, in the not-so-distant future new business opportunities will arise in the area of sorting out problems that have already occurred, these translation crisis and risk managers joining the already vast army of support personnel occupying "the Planet of the Help Desk" that Jaron Lanier (2011: 94), an Internet pioneer turned critical thinker, foresees as the solution for meaningful employment in the techno-future full of computer programs that are by nature "endlessly confusing, buggy, tangled, fussy, and error-ridden".

Similar to translation strategies, another staple in translation studies literature is the perennial question of translation quality and its assessment. Product quality has proven notoriously difficult to define, leading to simplified matrices and error listings in the management of translations and translators in agencies,

and a focus on process quality rather than product quality in ISO standardization. The relative lack of theorizing translation quality from radically divergent angles may be a signal of something essential: the *je-ne-sais-pas-quoi* elements of elegant and appealing translations that we are delighted to encounter but struggle to put our finger to and that resist standardization are perhaps precisely the reason why human translation still matters. The elusiveness of quality definitions may well be a factor that underlines their importance.

In machine translation research, the main bulk of literature focuses on efforts in evaluating and improving the quality of MT output. This is not surprising, as quality variation in MT output is much wider than in professional human translation (Doherty 2017: 134), ranging from perfectly acceptable raw MT to useless material that cannot be salvaged by any post-editing efforts save full and complete retranslation from scratch. A standard method to assess MT success is to compare it to human translation. Among others, this is the logic of BLEU, the dominant form of MT evaluation in the translation industry (Doherty 2017: 137). The set-up is built on the expectation for the machine to achieve quality levels as close to human as possible. In computer science, a classic measurement of artificial intelligence is the Turing test, first proposed by Alan Turing. The basic idea is to create an experiment where a human does not know whether they are conversing with another human or a computer. If the tester mistakes the computer for a human, we know that computers will have reached the maturity that matches or supersedes the human brain. The trick is that there are two ways to this outcome: either the machine's performance improves or the tester lowers their standards on human intelligence (Lanier 2011: 30–33). In MT evaluation, we have an identical situation. There are two ways in which the MT programme may come out as the winner: either it gets good enough to overcome its human counterpart, or we lower our expectations on human translation output until it matches what the computer can produce. This latter scenario will give the MT programmers a Pyrrhic victory.

This scenario is not too far from what is already happening in an industry that has, for the best part of the 21st century, focused on using technology to increase the speed, to lower the cost and to standardize the products of translation. This phenomenon is part of a wider downward spiral in digitalized environments. Jaron Lanier talks about "the digital flattening of expression into a global mush" (2011: 47) and warns that we are already now constantly degrading ourselves to make machines look smart (ibid.: 32). It is easy to see how this is also already happening with translation technology: in order to accept the segmentation capabilities of translation memory tools, for example, human translators routinely forfeit their superior cognitive skills in processing long bits of coherent text, and in order to accommodate the rudimentary abilities of automated quality

assessment tools and the cumbersome communication channels of modern networked and digitalized translation industry, they refrain from proposing radical restructurings of text, let alone omissions, to avoid them being signalled as errors or leading to lengthy (unpaid) explanation and negotiation rounds with the project manager. In effect, this is not too far from Lanier's dystopic view of the digitalized world that is "making people obsolete so that computers seem more advanced" (ibid.: 27). People can make themselves obsolete also through deskilling. This was already briefly discussed in the context of codes of conduct but deserves to be highlighted here as well. Machine translation has a similar effect on two grounds: first, it contributes to the decline in learning foreign languages by creating an expectation of mutual monolingualism being overcome by machinic support, and second, it reduces the professional translator to a supportive role and creates expectations of technological competence over linguistic, cultural and translation competence.

In this scenario, we will all lose. For in spite of all the hype of fully automated machine translation, the computer is entirely dependent on human translation input in its operations, as at least for now it needs to be fed massive amounts of pre-existing human translations for it to learn and to perform. It follows that we are increasingly witnessing a new scenario where translation agencies are being transformed from translation providers to language data markets, reselling their translation data for MT development purposes. For translators, this opens up new ethical and business considerations about whether they have any say as to where and how many times their translations are sold, and at what price they are willing to accept that. The current digital businesses are not structured in ways that are fair to content providers, as Lanier (2011) repeatedly reminds us. This also holds for translation industry.

It also follows that the more limited the human translation input is, the more limited the expressive abilities of the computer will also be. More importantly, the cultural loss of human creativity, and the loss of translators' (as well as authors') individual voices into digital mush will make us all poorer and our cultural products flatter. Or so the current assumptions go. But perhaps the computers will outsmart us on the artistic side as well. Many commentators are positing literary translation, and poetry in particular, as the final frontier of human translation. This depends on what kind of poetry we are talking about, and on what kind of aesthetic expectations we have for its translation strategies. For particular kinds of innovative and experimental poetry, machine translation may well open up new interpretive spaces (Nabugodi 2014).

So, what can one say about the current and future state of translation technology? Misery and splendour. The familiar binarism re-emerges. The promises of MT are great: from serving in routine tasks to democratizing interlingual

communication and to creating new expressive avenues. But the maladies are equally great: flattening of our texts and language resources, multilingual crisis management, unemployed translators, loss of language learning. The choice between positive and negative affects is unstable and deferred. It seems that in today's globalized world that needs to constantly operate multilingually, machine translation is an undecidable *pharmakon*. It is the cure and the poison in the same bottle (Derrida 1968/1981).

Affect and pedagogy

Reflexivity, empathy and empowerment

The main rationale running across this entire book is the view of translating and interpreting as affective labour. Logically, the acceptance of this view also has consequences for translator education. All previous chapters contain elements that can be integrated into the training modules for translators and interpreters. This chapter discusses some of the more general pedagogical principles of an affective view on translator education, and they are accompanied by some practical teaching methods that I have developed over the years for my own courses. These methods could perhaps be best described as tools for supporting the formation of affectively competent and empowered professionals and for helping them foster their flexibility, empathy and reflexivity, and hence also their professional wellbeing, hopefully throughout their career.

One can perhaps more easily see the relevance of such "character-building" elements in primary education. The neuroscientific view of affects has also prompted Antonio Damasio (see Chapter 1), together with a colleague, to contribute to the discussions on education from that perspective:

> In fact, one could argue that the chief purpose of education is to cultivate children's building of repertoires of cognitive and behavioral strategies and options, helping them to recognize the complexity of situations and to respond in increasingly flexible, sophisticated, and creative ways. In our view, out of these processes of recognizing and responding, the very processes that form the interface between cognition and emotion, emerge the origins of creativity – the artistic, scientific, and technological innovations that are unique to our species. Further, out of these same kinds of processing emerges a special kind of human innovation: the social creativity that we call morality and ethical thought.
>
> (Immordino-Yang & Damasio 2007: 7)

Creativity and ethical thought are the cornerstones of the future translation profession. Immordino-Yang and Damasio discuss primary education but to my mind the above quotation also sums up nicely many aims of affectively attuned translator and interpreter education, where repertoires of sophisticated and creative

strategies as well as social creativity for complex situations need to be built, and morality and ethical thought also need to be fostered. One could argue that becoming and being a translator, too, takes place at the interface between cognition and emotion. In addition to human agents, this interface will, and indeed already does, include increasingly intelligent and learning technology (see Chapter 7). In today's and tomorrow's translation industry, routine equivalence-based translation is increasingly executed by machine translation tools, assisted by human translators. The areas where human touch will still be needed in the foreseeable future are related to elements such as intuition, creativity, emotions and ethics. During the past decades, educators have focused on bringing the latest technology into the classroom, and on getting themselves and their students up to speed with the rapidly changing technological landscapes of the translation industry. The next challenge will be to shift training to models that still foster an understanding of the technology (which will keep changing) but at the same time re-emphasize and kindle the transformative power of human creativity and reinforce the moral reasoning skills and empathic intuition of the students. This, I argue, will require integrating affects firmly within translator and interpreter education.

The multitude of connections between affects, embodiment, questions of space and place and many other issues raised in this book and their repercussions to translator education are a topic too vast to be covered within one chapter. In the following, I will focus on two central themes: empathy and empowerment. Specifically, I will discuss how these two can be enhanced, based on my own practical experiences in the classroom since 2001.[30] I do not claim the exercises presented below are radically new or unique. In all likelihood, many educators are quite intuitively incorporating similar elements in their classrooms. This chapter does not aim to showcase best practices, but rather to give an opportunity for those involved in translator and interpreter training to reflect on their current pedagogical practice and perhaps get some new ideas that are not too complicated to integrate into existing modules.

A decisive influence in how this chapter was organized and where its focus lies comes from my involvement in two projects linked to translator training in the University of Eastern Finland. First, in 2011–2013 I was a partner in *Promoting Intercultural Competence for Translators,* an EU-funded project aiming to

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30.   This focus limits the discussion to translator training only, leaving out the training of professional interpreters for the simple reason that I have not been involved in that. Educators working in that field will hopefully find relevant contact points and parallels to draw on. It is also my understanding that in interpreter training the embodied and the emotive have already been integrated into classroom activities much more comprehensively than in translator training (see, e.g., Merlini 2015).

provide translation teachers with readily accessible teaching materials to support the training of future professional translators in the area of intercultural competence. The second project, a four-year (2015–2019) language revitalization project *Kiännä* ("Translation, revitalization and the endangered Karelian language") was an initiative to participate in revitalizing Karelian, an endangered minority language spoken in Finland and Russia, by organizing seminars and workshops on professional translation skills and competences for speakers and learners of Karelian dialects from both countries. In it, my role was fairly minor; as a member of the steering group and a field researcher during its first year of operation I had a peripheral position in the activities and course design. Below, neither of these two projects is discussed in detail. The materials designed for PICT are still all available online, and a reader interested in intercultural competence can turn to the website or other documentation provided by the team (PICT n.d.; Tomozeiu et al. 2016). The lessons learned in Kiännä are being published gradually by the team, and the pedagogical insights will be mainly targeted at those working in revitalization contexts and with non-professional translators[31] whereas the implied reader I have in mind for this current chapter is someone interested in the university training of professional translators. The influence of these two projects is more fundamental. Distilling the main take-away from these two projects into mainstream translator education gives me two terms with clear affective overtones: the key to translators' interpersonal and intercultural competence, I now think, is *empathy*, and the core concept in the context of voluntary L2 translation and language activism such as in Kiännä is *empowerment*. These two are also key to translator training for today and tomorrow. The relevance of empathy in contemporary translator and interpreter education, along with the ways in which it can be enhanced in students, is discussed in Section 8.2. Empowerment will be elaborated on in Section 8.3.

The first section of this chapter (Section 8.1) deals with reflexivity. I see it as a foundational element in both empathy and empowerment in professional practice. Empathy without reflexivity is blind, and empowerment without reflexivity is dangerous. Reflexivity is also a crucial prerequisite of ethical practice, both for practitioners and trainers. This was also the main take-away from my PhD thesis (Koskinen 2000), based on theoretical contemplation. Since then I have learned to appreciate the challenges and shortcomings of reflexivity in real-life situations both as a practising translator and as a translator trainer, moving from theory to praxis. With hindsight I can see that the consecutive involvement in these two

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31. For more on Kiännä, see Koskinen, Kuusi and Riionheimo (2017), Koskinen and Kuusi (2017) and Kuusi, Koskinen and Riionheimo (2019).

projects mentioned above allowed me to broaden my vision of translator training in contexts that were either more global (PICT) or more local (Kiännä) than my regular environment. Otherwise I have mainly been involved in strictly professionally oriented translator education, and apart from brief visits, only in the context of Finnish universities. As the PICT group needed to negotiate between five different training realities from five different countries, the project gave me opportunities to encounter and critically reflect on the national-cultural bias of my thinking that had been created by my exposure to a particular historical trajectory of translator education and disciplinary development. Kiännä, in turn, helped me become aware of the limits of the professional focus I had largely taken for granted. As Kiännä aimed to foster professional translation competences in a language that has virtually no translation market and very few translation tools, and to train translation competences for participants with varying degrees of language skills, it forced everyone involved to reassess their preconceived ideas of what translator training is and should be about, and for whom. Reflexivity such as the kind these projects pushed me towards, is a necessary component of any educator's skill set. It is also a competence students need to develop in order to assess where they stand, whose side they are on and what their actions are doing in the world.

Focusing on the concepts of reflexivity, empathy and empowerment, this chapter offers a number of ideas on how to enhance students' abilities to identify, reflect on, manage and strategically use their affective resources in and beyond the classroom. Section 8.3 will also include a discussion of a continued education workshop for professional translators. In translator and interpreter education literature the emphasis has firmly been on training students to become professionals, but in a rapidly changing world it is more and more obvious that learning needs to take place continuously for professionals to navigate changing career paths and to support continuous growth and motivation. Before discussing empathy and empowerment, I will begin with the concept of reflexivity, building on Michael Burawoy's ideas of the division of academic labour (Section 8.1). This discussion will also be linked to critical pedagogy, an overarching pedagogical framework well suited for dialogic and reflexive teaching methods.

8.1   Reflexivity as a foundational skill

Many translator educators would agree that students may exhibit affective stances that we consider unhelpful or immature and that we therefore try to change. We may find them less than optimally motivated, too quick to judge, or thin-skinned

and poor at taking criticism, for example. Educators' own affects, in contrast, are a more rarely revealed aspect of teaching, but this does not mean they live an affect-less life in the lecture halls and classrooms. On the contrary, educators have positive or negative affects towards students, towards texts worked on, towards theories discussed, technical tools, colleagues, the institutional context and terms of contract, and so on. Educators also enter the classroom with positive or negative affective stances accumulated elsewhere: at home, during the morning jog or while stuck in traffic, in departmental meetings, or coffee room discussions. Finally, in and through teaching, educators wish to affect students in the sense of instigating changes in them. The affective stances of everyone involved create a particular kind of energy field in the classroom, and it has a bearing on how successful the teaching and learning encounter turns out to be. While students are taught to deal with the emotions and affects involved in the translation or interpreting practice in a constructive manner, educators need to be aware of the same need for themselves.

I have become convinced that the key to success in both students' and educators' life (and translators' and interpreters', for that matter) is reflexivity.[32] It is an essential skill to teach to our students, and also something teachers need to practice for themselves. Reflexion is needed on any aspect of education. Following the theme of this book, the focus here is on being reflexive about *affects*. This emphasis is not just an afterthought or a handy twist to create coherence between chapters in this book. The origin for this emphasis actually stems from my own development as a university teacher. My own academic path took an affective turn about a decade ago, and my current understanding of the centrality of affect can be traced back to this personal experience of a career crisis. It had been brought about by two simultaneous neoliberal developments, one towards privatizing the universities and commodifying education (still in full swing, and even aggravated), with the concomitant plight of the humanities in general and languages in particular, and the other towards corporatization, globalization and industrialization of professional translation (that we now call the translation industry), with its concomitant problems related to outsourcing, competitive bidding and a race to the bottom, accompanied and also led by technological developments, particularly the introduction of CAT tools (see Section 6.2.1). The result for me and many of my colleagues was that while we were struggling to understand and to cope with the university reforms and the constant demands for restructuring the training we

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32.   In the literature one finds both reflexivity and reflectivity, with different definitions and sometimes used interchangeably. I follow Burawoy's usage.

provide,[33] we also needed to deal with the growing disillusionment of our students who were trying to come to terms with facing the prospect of a professional life very different from their earlier expectations (see also Koskinen 2010b). The affects were overwhelming. To deal with the resulting emotional stress, I needed to become more reflexive about my own academic life and professional well-being. This lived experience helped me transfer my academic interest in the value of self-reflexivity (Koskinen 2000) to an increasingly explicit agenda for accounting for the ways in which our subjective experiences and social positions affect our teaching, research and translation practice.

In a crisis situation, the affective level tends to be on overdrive, and the stickiness and catchiness of affects is amply on display. That was definitely the case for me. I was losing the sense of a meaningful future in the academia and therefore also my motivation, and I repeatedly found myself thinking of leaving the university and pursuing some other career. An accidental encounter with a Finnish translation of Michael Burawoy's presidential address to the American Sociological Association in 2004 on public sociology was a turning point for me. His discussion of the four different approaches to doing sociology, and his call for re-invigorating his discipline's commitment to social causes by reinforcing research efforts centred on public dialogue allowed me to also reflect on my discipline and, in particular, to recalibrate my own academic activities in the light of Burawoy's ideas of public engagement and dialogic research designs. I was able to acknowledge and value my affects while also responding to them in constructive and meaningful ways. As a result, during the past decade I have exhibited exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970; see also Chapter 6) in my search for a reasonable fit between my academic values and the institutional context of work, reconsidered my research agenda and taken the contemporary professional landscapes of translating and interpreting as an object of study, reinforced my ties to the professional world of translation and interpreting, enhanced my emotion management skills in terms of engaging with student worries and reassessed my personal language policy in publications (increasing my efforts to publish my research in Finnish to counterbalance the current fad of only valuing publications in English).

My adaptation of Burawoy's (2005) model into translation studies has been explained in detail before (Koskinen 2010b), and so have its pedagogical implications (Koskinen 2012b). Here, I will only provide a brief overview and then

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33.   In my current university, translator training has been entirely redesigned in 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2019. At the same time, the number of staff has been reduced by approximately one-third. As a consequence, entry to university posts has become more and more difficult, and the young generations of teachers and researchers are finding themselves in increasingly precarious positions while also required to constantly remodel the context of their teaching and re-invent themselves to fit the changing environment.

focus on the issue of reflexivity. Burawoy has divided the field of sociology into four subfields: professional, critical, policy and public sociology. Each is characterized by a particular combination of audience (academic vs. extra-academic) and type of knowledge (instrumental vs. reflexive). The resulting matrix of the four subfields is shown in Table 3. Although Burawoy addresses his own field, the matrix is adaptable to any discipline. As it works as a typology of academic labour, it also functions as a tool for self-reflection. I have successfully used it in PhD seminars, where it allows participants to reflect on where they locate themselves in the four fields and to understand why others operating within other quadrants may approach their research design, aims and motivations in a completely different manner.

Table 3. Division of academic labour (Burawoy 2005)

	Academic audience	Extra-academic audience
Instrumental knowledge	Professional	Policy
Reflexive knowledge	Critical	Public

The two quadrants on the left form the academic axis of sociology. *Professional sociology* is the scientific field of empirical and theoretical explorations, guided by scientific norms and assessed by peer review. It is the source of tested methods, accumulated knowledge, orienting questions and conceptual frameworks. It is the *sine qua non* for all the other subfields, and its knowledge is instrumental to them, as they build on reflecting on and disseminating knowledge produced by professional sociology (Burawoy 2005: 10; for a critique see Arribas Lozano 2017: 10–11). Its pathologies include rigidity and hermetic closedness to the world, focusing on abstract empiricism or grand theorizing. Its values and research agendas thus need to be constantly re-examined and renewed by *critical sociology*, the heart and the collective conscience of the discipline (Burawoy 2005: 10–11). The pathology of excessive critical sociology, then, is dogmatism, the rote repetition of accepted ideological arguments instead of active critical and reflexive involvement. These two subfields are rooted firmly within academia, and they address academic audiences.

The two subfields located in the other vertical axis of the matrix address extra-academic audiences. *Policy sociology* is the pragmatic service sector, providing research-based practical solutions to the problems of its clients (policy makers, organizations, corporations). In policy sociology, the needs and wishes of the clients are allowed to mould the research agenda, and its pathology is therefore servility and subordination. The more critical and reflexive approach to interacting with extra-academic audiences is called *public sociology*. It is based on a dialogic and activist mode of engaging in conversation with the local communities

outside academia and co-creating new thick knowledge together with designated "publics" through interventions, activities and co-designed research agendas. The pathologies of public sociology include populism and faddishness – and, as some of Burawoy's critics have pointed out, politization (Arribas Lozano 2017: 3). Public sociology can be practiced in its traditional and unidirectional form, which used to be called popularizing, and Burawoy argues for its continued need. At the same time, it is clear that his main emphasis is on organic public sociologies where the approach is more dialogic, allowing knowledge to also flow from the publics to the academic quadrants of the matrix. Although Burawoy is openly advocating for public sociology (also my earlier writings are explicitly written in favour of the public quadrant), any discipline will need to have a balanced combination of all four. Burawoy (2005: 4, 2015) describes these four subfields as antagonistically interdependent: their tasks, aims and the values they are based on are different, and ideological and pragmatic tensions therefore often exist between them, but a healthy disciplinary progress requires them all to be equally vibrant and in balance with one another. Excessive emphasis on any one field of the matrix may push it towards developing a pathological form.

Different socio-cultural contexts and fields are differently placed in terms of the public–policy divides. Within language departments, translator training currently often carries the role of ticking various boxes of employability, market-relevance and catering for societal and industry needs, making its ethos decisively policy-oriented. This emphasis is also visible in the European Master's of Translation project, a European-Commission-led training initiative which has been highly influential in harmonizing translator training in European universities towards an industry-oriented model. In this climate, pleas for an emphatic public translation studies engagement in both education and in research are an absolute necessity: If the goals are set by the employers alone, and if academics only react to the existing (technology- and economy-driven) demands set by the field, the training institution fails in its most fundamental task of educating new generations to not only adapt to existing conditions, but also research, develop and improve them. Instrumental knowledge easily dominates in translator training. To balance the situation, conscious efforts in engaging with the axis of reflexive knowledge are therefore highly relevant.

The divide between instrumental and reflexive knowledge in Burawoy's model resonates with a call for reflexivity. The lower horizontal quadrants of critical and public sociology (or translation studies) are fundamentally reflexive. In the critical quadrant, the object of reflexive analysis is existing scientific work, and in the public one it is the social world. In other words, the former aims to critically assess academic achievements and reflexively redirect research activities if necessary; the latter takes a critical view of the community it studies and aims to instigate positive

changes in it. In a programmatic paper (1998), Burawoy advances a reflexive model of science that is based on engagement rather than on objectivizing detachment. This engagement, and the idea of producing changes, requires a healthy dose of reflexivity as what may seem like progress from one perspective may be a change for the worse from another.

Reflexivity and critical thinking are therefore skills every professional needs to cultivate. The public translation studies approach to teaching emphasizes the role of the educator as a facilitator of independent critical thinking. This vision has affinities with critical pedagogy (see also Koskinen 2012b). These affinities have also been spelled out by Burawoy (n.d.), who lists prominent voices in critical pedagogy such as Freire and bell hooks among his inspirations. Critical pedagogy is not a fixed methodology but rather a loose label for a group of pedagogical principles that include fostering the abilities of critical thinking, personal growth and liberation, and participatory methods and dialogue. In his best-known work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, originally published in Portuguese in 1974 and translated into Finnish in 2005, Paolo Freire explains that critical education is to be based on a problematizing approach and democratic dialogue. In the vocabulary of critical pedagogy, dialogue relates to words, and "word" is a concept with two basic components: reflection and action. Words without actions are verbalism, and words without reflection lead to activism rather than praxis (Freire 2005: 95). The aim is not only to describe and to critique, but also to take action, moving from knowledge to praxis, that is, to a theoretically informed practice.

In the context of translator education, I understand critical pedagogy as a tool to move the focus from practice to praxis, that is, from the instrumentalist focus on techniques and technologies of the current translation industry to a framework that also allows for a critical reflection of these practices and their effects and affects, and allows us to discuss elements such as personal growth or liberation as fundamental goals of education. Becoming a professional should, according to Freire (1998), never be seen as a matter of rote training and technicalities only. Rather, education is fundamentally a matter of self-formation and of creating a historical and ethical understanding of both the society we live in and our own position(s) in it. This kind of reflexive education will then lead to transformative praxis.

But what about affect? Why bring reflexivity and critical thinking into a book on affect? We can begin to answer these questions by looking at the horizontal axis of reflexive knowledge in Burawoy's matrix. Above, I already alluded to the metaphor of heart with reference to critical sociology. Burawoy has given similar metaphors to all quadrants, identifying professional sociology with the brain, policy sociology with hands, critical sociology with the heart, and public sociology with the entire body. Among these bodily metaphors, I associate heart with

affect, and the entire body with embodiment. This places the lower horizontal axis in sharp focus for the purposes of the present topic. An affectively tuned translation pedagogy needs to be a combination of hearty critical thinking and full-body immersion into worldly topics. According to Freire, (2005: 106) each era and each society has its own "thematic universe", consisting of lifestyles, practices, values, conceptions, hopes and developmental needs. This thematic universe also creates a particular space of affective energies. An embodied approach to the thematic universe will allow students to practice engagement, critical reflexion and position-taking in the real world, and work on the affects generated in the process, while they are still sheltered by a student status and supported and mentored by the teacher before entering the professional life.

Critical pedagogy and public translation studies both aim, in the end, at social change, not merely personal and motivational change. While the inclusion of the aspects discussed above may increase the motivation of the teacher or the students, it not enough to be complacent and satisfied with only the gains in personal motivation. Reflexivity on the affects of translation may bring more balanced professional attitudes and create wellbeing at work, and that is fine. But on a more fundamental level, interpreting the affects involved should be accompanied by a desire to use that understanding wisely to also instigate changes in sub-optimal practices. It is not enough to manage and survive the situations that leave us affected; we also need to strive to affect, to engage with the transformative power of affect.

8.2   Empathy and affect

Translation is a mediation profession, providing services to help others communicate across linguistic and cultural barriers. Success in this mediation task presupposes an understanding of what the communicating participants are trying to achieve and what the best ways of achieving this are. As I have argued before (Koskinen 2015),[34] a core element to be included in the training of interculturally competent translators is therefore empathy. As a term, empathy originates from the

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34.   The central focus of Koskinen 2015 is superdiversity, the growing complexity of cultural affiliations in our societies, and the resulting increasingly pressing need for an empathetic recalibration of cultural coding for each communicative context. To accommodate for superdiversity, it is argued, translation pedagogy needs to be developed in a direction that enhances students' abilities for continued intercultural learning and reflexivity, and allows them to develop their ability to constantly adjust their cultural and linguistic knowledge in real-time communication (Messelink & ten Thije 2012: 81).

Greek word *empatheia* (from em- 'in' + pathos 'feeling'), the ability to feel what the other is feeling. It is an ability to identify, understand and resonate the emotions of others, to put oneself in their shoes, that is, to temporarily suspend one's own position and imagine oneself in the position of the other. Translators' and interpreters' own shoes are prototypically placed in the middle ground of the communicative event, and reflexive empathic practice is a tool that allows them to observe the situation from both directions and to make informed and ethically robust choices also when they encounter unexpected and challenging communicative situations. Empathy is also, for now at least, what differentiates between human and machine translators, and the need for empathetic translation will keep humans involved in intercultural communication also in the foreseeable future. Translation as a mechanistic transfer of meaning may well soon become fully automated, but translation as affective labour will still remain the task of human translators. Competence in empathy will be an essential part of human translation, and empathy is therefore at the heart of translators' situational communicative competence.

I use the word empathy above as if its meaning was clear to all readers. It is, however, yet another rather confused concept in the theoretical literature, and researchers base their findings on competing understandings. Cuff et al. (2014) list 29 different definitions and also discuss the varied understandings of the relationship between empathy and some other concepts, notably sympathy and compassion. I find it helpful to see compassion as an emotion, and empathy as a set of skills or practices that one can use in situations that evoke compassion. Empathy can be seen to consist of several abilities: being attentive to the affective "temperature" of oneself and others, taking the other's perspective, withholding judgement, understanding how the other is feeling, communicating that understanding, and being reflexive about one's own feelings and the overall situation.

In this section I will discuss the possibilities of fostering empathy in translator training. In doing so, I have found the following classification of different kinds of ethics by the Finnish scholar Elisa Aaltola (2018) useful. She discusses:

1. projective and simulating empathy
2. cognitive empathy
3. affective empathy
4. embodied empathy and
5. reflexive empathy.

All five types of empathy are relevant for translation as affective labour. Here I will discuss ways in which they can be taught in the context of formal translator training. First, projective and simulating empathy are two opposing ways of identifying with the experiences of the other: one can either project oneself in the other's

position (putting oneself in the shoes of the other; imagining how one would feel if one was in that position) or simulate how it would feel to actually *be* the other one in that position (Aaltola 2018: 30–32). The former is more ego-centric, whereas the latter aims to capture the life-world of the other. Simulating empathy can thus be seen as more valuable, but Aaltola emphasizes the pedagogical value of both (ibid.: 33). They are important tools for learning to observe and assess the positioning and perspective of the other. Narratives and stories have been identified as a great way to understand the qualities and context of the other. Literary translation exercises are also often well-liked by students. Among their many benefits in a translation course one can add that it has been found that literature, and by extension literary translation, supports enhancing skills in empathy and emotion perception and expression (ibid.: 39; see also Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 200–201). Analysing and translating a well-selected fictional text that depicts the inner thoughts and feelings of a character or the nuances of interpersonal relations can be used to enhance projective and simulating empathy in students.

Practising projective and simulating empathy through narratives is useful, but it has its limits. Projective empathy can foster affinities with the already familiar at the expense of being truly open to otherness, and stories can also simplify situations and reinforce existing stereotypes or prevailing ideologies (Aaltola 2018: 41). In trying to get into the head of the other, both projective and simulating empathy focus on otherness from an atomistically individuated perspective and emphasize the mind over either the bodily felt or the contextual (ibid.: 44–45). Here, embodied empathy can bring additional viewpoints. According to this concept, empathy is also about bodies in movement, both spatially and in relation to other bodies (ibid.: 76), highlighting the social embeddedness of the translatorial event. Embodied empathy also shifts the focus from rational knowing to lived experience. My current teaching focuses on translation theory and research skills. In this area, I have found exercises that expose students to fieldwork methods very beneficial for them, not only because ethnography has become one of the regular methods employed in translation studies research, but also from the perspective of embodied empathy. Ethnography is fundamentally about empathy, as understanding the actions, values and cultural habits of the other is at its core: "ethnographic researchers are trying to discover what is going on in a sociocultural scene and to understand how the people involved understand what they are doing" (Lee & Zaharlick 2013: 51). It is also fundamentally embodied, as it requires the researchers to enter the field to be studied and to position themselves with respect to others inhabiting that field. Assignments designed to open the students' "ethnographic eye" in everyday contexts also enhance their reflexive skills. Underlining the difference between emic and etic approaches in classroom discussions allows the students to develop their abilities in empathetic engagement

and also to reflect on the difference between adopting the other's perspective and keeping their own.

Although the classroom context limits the extent of fieldwork to microengagement, many students have found the assignment highly motivating, and reports of fieldwork tend to spark lively debates and discussions in class. Over the years, my students have been asked, for example, to spend a week observing what kinds of translation spaces they inhabit in their own life and to identify and report on a potential topic of research. In other words, they have been asked to observe and reflect critically on their own thematic universe (Freire 2005: 106). Students have identified a number of interesting grassroots projects related to their life outside the university, such as ad-hoc interpreting and cultural mediation to immigrant pupils in the classroom; child language brokering in a sports club, and translating and interpreting practices in multilingual workplaces and hobbies. These themes have then been discussed in class, in a collective attempt at making a move from practice to praxis. The task not only supports an awakening to various contemporary social issues from a public translation studies perspective, but it also brings the students' extensive pool of experiences into the classroom and allows them to relate their academic knowledge to their personal lives (Koskinen 2012b). Personal involvement in the observed events makes it easier to approach them with empathy and understanding, as family ties, affinity and closeness breed affective empathy (Smith 2006). Embedding the assignment in the students' own lives and personal experiences, and thus giving it an additional embodied and affective element, also creates possibilities for embodied learning.

Affective empathy means sharing the experiences and feelings of others so that we begin to resonate the same feelings. In simulated empathy, the focus is in imagining how it might be to be the other; affective empathy more directly tunes us in to the feelings of the other. Aaltola explains that in affective empathy we sway with the feelings of the other like reeds sway with the water (2018: 64; cf. Chapter 3). This skill to be swayed is crucial for ethical behaviour (ibid.: 94), as it evokes in us a felt need to act to alleviate suffering. Affective empathy is for many the prototypical kind of empathy. It can indeed be argued that it is a core element of empathy, as the complete lack of affective empathy leads to personality disorders such as psychopathology and narcissism. On the other hand, excessive affective empathy can also be a burden, and a source of misjudgement. This is probably one reason for the emphasis on professional detachment in interpreting (see Chapter 5). Professional detachment, however, does not need to mean shutting down empathy entirely. Rather, affective empathy needs to be seasoned with cognitive empathy, that is, the ability to recognize and decode the affects of others, to read and to manipulate situations (ibid.: 49; see also Cuff et al. 2014: 7).

Cognitive empathy by-passes the affective layer entirely, valuing rational observation and critical interpretation of the affect-states and circumstances of the participants and then making informed judgements on the best course of action. It therefore allows us to clear our vision and see through attempts at manipulation. But it can also lead to cold calculation and manipulative behaviour. For success in social life, and in translation, cognitive and affective empathy therefore need to be balanced. Excessive amounts of either can get us into difficulty, as will a complete lack of either one. Modulation of affects can be seen as a core translatorial task (see Chapter 3). While one can, undoubtedly, manage the affects of other participants by applying purely cognitive empathy and cleverly manipulating others' emotional states, it seems entirely unsatisfactory to claim that this would be enough for a successful career. Most people have an innate capacity for affective empathy, and a professional ideal that is based on suppressing it entirely would be likely to lead to unhealthy consequences. On the other hand, excessive and poorly managed affective empathy would not bode well for professional well-being either:

> CE [cognitive empathy] is used to negotiate one's way in the complex social world of humans. But if substantial EE [emotional/affective empathy] always occurred with CE the effect (and affect) could be overwhelming. It might distract us from our behavioral goals or motivate altruism that reduces inclusive fitness. Sharing the negative emotions of others may be inherently costly and sharing positive emotions that are not appropriate to one's situation could sometimes be highly distracting. Social expertise in a world of emotional beings requires the ability to understand the minds of others and predict their overt behavior without necessarily sharing their emotions.   (Smith 2006: 6)

Cognitive empathy is clearly a professional skill intercultural mediators and others engaged in affective labour need to fine-tune to be able to perform competently and in an informed manner in different situations. But what they also need to learn is how to take stock of their own affective responses to these same situations. They need to gain practice in being swayed by the situational affects, and by their own affective empathy, and in resisting excessive swaying by also resorting to cognitive empathy. In the classroom, opportunities for practising this are abundant. Below, I describe two variations of an assignment I have used several times. The two exercises both aim to create "an emotionally competent trigger, a situation either real or imagined that has the power to induce an emotion" (Immordino-Yang & Damasio 2007: 7). This emotion – or emotions since they can be many and they also often evolve and change during the translation process – is then subjected to self-reflexive observation from different perspectives: memories, bodily reactions, how and whether the affects affected the translation, and how and whether the resulting translation solutions can be justified, and so on. These will assist the students

to become more reflexive about their own positioning, and the necessary partiality of their own viewpoint just as much as those of the author, commissioner or the reader, allowing them to practice rational assessment of the situation, postponing the judgement of views conflicting with their own, and empathic listening skills.

The first variation concerns a translation task where two texts on the same topic are assigned to be translated at the same time by each student. The idea is to select the texts so that they represent radically opposing viewpoints, forcing the students to also position themselves in the matter at hand. I encourage teachers to choose controversial topics: the opposing sides of an acute geopolitical crisis, abortion rights, transgender issues, alt-right versus ultra-liberal takes on immigration and so on. It is of paramount importance that neither one of the texts is a caricature, and both are to be treated with dignity. While these kinds of choices will expose the classroom to potential conflicts that may be unpleasant for the teacher to manage, they also give room for reflexivity and enable learning to take place. The goal is to give students the experience of being forced to participate via translation to communicating a view one absolutely does not subscribe to, and to contrast that to the other one that is easier to agree with. It also offers an opportunity to guide the students into listening to their affective and bodily responses in both situations. It is fairly easy to feel empathy towards someone who shares your views; it is a much harder task to try to evoke empathy towards someone whose views you oppose. Trying actively to do so – and potentially failing to do so – will allow the students to explore the limits of their professional detachment, preparing them for drawing the lines of their own ethics at work. In other words, they will be given opportunities to enhance their affective and bodily capital (see Chapter 5) and to increase their professional resilience. In classroom discussion, a successful choice of texts will offer an added benefit of listening to the rationales of other students, both in terms of how they have chosen their side among the two texts and in drawing the professional line.

The above exercise is teacher-lead, as the text selection and set-up are laid out for the students, who all encounter the same task, regardless of their personal views and cultural backgrounds. In the course context, this may potentially lead to fruitfully divergent viewpoints, but may also result in challenging situations, as the teacher does not necessarily have full knowledge of the personal traumas in the classroom and may end up selecting a text that is too laden for some and causes pain and hence prevents learning. It is also not optimal if everybody holds the same view on the topic and the discussion ends up condemning the other viewpoint. An even more effective variation can be achieved by asking each student to select a topic they feel strongly about and a source text that represents a stance diagonally opposite to their own (in the past, my students have, for example, chosen to translate an article aimed at gun aficionados and a pro-euthanasia text).

This translation task allows the student to fully immerse in the dilemma of empathizing with your client and the skopos of the translation while at the same time not losing your own grounding in the process.

The two exercises described above – translating two texts with radically opposing views, and translating a text you strongly dislike – have both been designed to push students out of their emotional comfort zone, to encounter and understand views opposing their own (cognitive empathy); to try to resonate the feeling and experiences of this other person (affective empathy); to experience and explore their own affects and potential emotional discomfort (embodied empathy) and, ultimately, to contemplate on translation ethics and the extent to which personal beliefs and opinions should and can be kept from interfering in translation work (reflexive empathy). In either variation, the feedback session to this assignment also needs to include a discussion of bodily aspects, as some students may have experienced unexpected and unpleasant sensations, and these need to be processed so that students can become attuned to what kinds of bodily signals they may listen to in order to identify their personal zones of excessive discomfort and how they can unwind from challenging professional tasks. I also strongly recommend the use of an accompanying reflective commentary, where the students are guided to reflect on the task from the viewpoints of cognitive and affective empathy as well as on their own affective and embodied experiences during the assignment. These personal and collective metadiscussions open the assignment to the sphere of reflexive empathy, that is, to a dialogic movement between the actual case at hand and the various types of empathy involved and a metalevel analysis of one's own affective responses and the socio-cultural mechanisms that condition which interpretations are being foregrounded and which affective responses tend to be positively or negatively sanctioned (Aaltola 2018: 96–97).

In this section, the ability to work with different types of empathy has been portrayed as a necessary form of social capital for a competent professional translator. Being able to understand the affective states of others and to see the world from their viewpoint is a prerequisite for successful affective labour. I have also emphasized that an essential corollary to this is the need to also be able to recognize and reflect one's own affective states and the viewpoints one holds. I have no doubt that this is indeed the case. It has been widely acknowledged that empathy plays an important role in human behaviour, and translating as an intercultural mediation activity is definitely not an exception. Skills in empathy are, at least to some extent, teachable and learnable, and their role will only increase in the future.

In the preceding chapters, the risk of deskilling has been raised in the contexts of prescriptive codes of conduct (Chapter 5) and increasingly automated

machine translation (Chapter 7). This chapter is designed to emphasize counteractions to this tendency. A deskilled but extremely empathic translator is at great risk to become a burned-out translator, if the routes from empathy to task completion are blocked. To counterbalance the risk of excessive affective empathy, I also want to emphasize empowerment. To succeed in their task, translators need to tune in to two directions, but to complete the translation they also need to make decisions even when this means forcing a closure on an aspect that is legitimately open, contradictory or ambivalent, and then be willing and able to stand by these decisions.

8.3   Empowerment

In critical pedagogy, students' empowerment is of crucial importance, and one can argue that the examples of course work given in Section 8.2 also support students' ability to find and exercise their own critical voice. In this section I want to turn to another target group of training: professionals willing to enhance their professional affective skills and take control of their emotion management. In translation studies literature, research reports on the kinds of training offered for those already in the professional world are still rare, but in today's world, continued (life-long) learning is crucial for managing one's career and for keeping up in the rapidly changing environment, and empowerment and self-reflection are equally relevant for professionals as they are for students. In the case of affects, in particular, more senior participants may be in a better position to benefit from reflective and awareness-raising sessions than young students. A positive correlation has been found between age and emotion perception, and the ability to anticipate and respond to emotions is also assumed to improve over time (Hubscher-Davidson 2018: 90). This temporal improvement through maturation clearly signals that we are not confined to whatever abilities we were born with, and that makes it also more likely that explicit training may facilitate this improvement. This is also supported by the findings of Hubscher-Davidson (ibid.: 131–132) that indicate the benefits of education to emotion regulation, and she indeed suggests that it could be actively taught by certain activities while, she argues, the current translator training appears not to contribute to this area of development (ibid.: 199–200). The correlation with age also makes it only logical to not limit affect-oriented training exclusively to students; more mature and more experienced participants may be more inclined to engage in addressing this area of their inner selves, they will be more familiar with the socio-cultural norms and expectations and the affects involved, and

they may also be better able to co-construct a beneficial learning environment that welcomes open reflexion.

For several years now, some of my translator friends have been following my efforts at untangling the relationship between affect and translation with great interest, and they have also given me a lot of support during the writing of this book. For me, an academic interest in affects and embodiment has leaked into my private life in the form of heightened interest in paying active attention to my emotion states and their embodied manifestations as well as pushing my boundaries in terms of engaging in activities that challenge my feelings of complacency and risk-free performance. Similarly, it has been evident among my friends that arousing the awareness of the affective in professional translators and interpreters also awakens their affective tendrils in terms of their own affective conditioning in different professional situations as well as that of others. It therefore seemed only logical that the proposal to organize a workshop on affects specifically for professionals, where they could engage in collective discussion and reflection on the positive and negative affective elements of their work, was first made by a professional translator, Tiina Kinnunen.

In the XVII Symposium on Translation and Interpreting Studies at Tampere University (12 April 2019) we organized a workshop on affective labour for professional translators and interpreters. In addition to Kinnunen, the organizing team consisted of a translator-cum-researcher (Minna Hjort), a lecturer and researcher interested in translators' status and job satisfaction (Minna Ruokonen) and myself. A combination of a short introductory lecture on affect followed by small-group discussions, the workshop was designed to provide professionals with opportunities to reflect on their own affective wiring at work: what kinds of issues bug them and why, how one can use affects and emotions constructively, and what kinds of emotion management strategies might be useful and when. The aim was to empower participants to acknowledge the positive dynamic of affects and to resist their negative elements, hopefully supporting them at becoming more content and balanced in the professional life and less prone to get agitated or upset when confronted with adverse affects either within themselves or in others.

Emotions and affects are often seen as a soft and positive topic, and in the workplace context the focus is typically on either managing and regulating emotions or on finding the keys to happiness or job satisfaction. Although the aims of our workshop can be related to job satisfaction, and the end goal was indeed to increase professional translators' wellbeing at work, we took a somewhat darker approach, and rather than encouraging participants to maximize their positive affects at work, we emphasized the necessity to also acknowledge and work with negative affects. Feelings such as anxiety, shame, anger or envy can be productively

harnessed for exposing and exploring the more uncomfortable issues that we have suppressed from our consciousness.

To provide a conceptual tool for dealing with negative affects, the concept of shadow work borrowed from the psychology of C. E. Jung was briefly introduced at the beginning of the workshop. In Jung's thinking the human psyche contains both the ego, that is, the conscious, accepted self that we hold, and the shadow, that is, those aspects and qualities of ourselves we are unwilling to encounter, and that we therefore deny and suppress to the unconscious.

> The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting itself upon him directly or indirectly – for instance, inferior traits of character and other incompatible tendencies.
>
> (Jung 1991: 285)

The shadow contains our innermost flaws, weaknesses, fears, shames and denials. As the elements placed in the shadow keep thrusting themselves on us, they delimit our possibilities and sabotage our life (Jung 1991: 123). The more we suppress the shadow, the more it possesses us and the heavier our burden becomes. Shadow work, an active probing of the dark and hidden sides of our inner self, allows us to tackle these aspects and bring them to light, reducing their grip on us. In doing so, negative affects function as a signal of the existence of a shadow, asking us to pause to reflect on what triggers them. This creates a link between shadow work and affective labour, as becoming better attuned to one's affective impulses is a core element of shadow work. It is not necessarily that we would not perceive the impulses, but we may not wish to admit them fully and they therefore easily get misconstrued, creating rippling effects of affects:

> Psychoanalysis allows us to show how emotions such as hate involve a process of movement or association, *whereby feelings take us across different levels of signification, not all of which can be admitted in the present*. That is what I call the 'rippling' effect of emotions; they move sideways (through 'sticky' associations between signs, figures and objects) as well as forwards and backwards (repression always leaves a trace in the present – hence 'what sticks' is bound up with the absent presence of historicity).   (Ahmed 2014: 44–45; italics in the original)

Jung lists myths and stories among key sources of information about collective archetypes, such as the shadow. We could also talk about sticky affects. Some elements of translators' professional "mythology" are affectively sticky and catchy in the sense that they tend to trigger predictable and accepted affective responses. Many of them seem to be linked to our socio-cultural programming related to the collective unconscious and the shadows involved. For example, the

biblical myth of Babel, arguably the best-known myth of translation, can be read as bringing to light the burden and annoyance of translation, an aspect effectively downplayed and hidden by the repeated metaphors of bridge-building among the profession.

Archetypes and sticky affects remind us that an important aspect of the shadow is that it is not only individual but also collective. In translation studies, translators' habitus has received a lot of attention. Although studies of habitus may have foregrounded personal trajectories and individual life stories, habitus, too, is fundamentally collective in that it is built and shaped in constant dialogue with the surrounding socio-cultural environment. Putting these together, it could be argued that a translator's ego is the accepted and socially consecrated part of the "professional translator" habitus, whereas the collective professional shadow contains those sides of the profession that are less acceptable, or less easy to deal with where they are allowed to enter the collective consciousness.

The workshop proved so popular that it needed to be moved to a bigger lecture hall to fit everyone in. Some 30 participants were divided into small groups to discuss what irritates, upsets and annoys them at work, and what kinds of shadows can be jointly identified as operating in the background. Discussion was lively. One shadow in particular was repeatedly referred to: the fear of not being appreciated (cf. Chapter 4). This collective professional low self-esteem was identified as the hidden other of the professional ego of translatorial expertise, and it was collectively found to feed into strong negative affects in responding to a client's complaints and correcting mistakes, in being belittled by the client, in comparing oneself to other translators with a different educational background and so on. The same shadow was also seen to get activated in the rush of rage by overhearing a colleague downplaying their professional status and value (for example, calling themselves "only a humanist").

The goal was to empower the participants, and a lot of emphasis was therefore put on discussing coping strategies and ways forward. Participants came up with numerous solutions, for example, wearing a professional mental "uniform" (cf. Chapter 5) rather than burning your own skin, exiting (and picking one's battles), peer support from colleagues, taking a step back and counting to ten, observing one's affective stance rather than being consumed by it, and setting time limits to how long you allow yourself to wallow in a negative issue. Importantly, the usefulness of identifying and understanding the affects of others and moving the focus away from one's own insecurities – that is, empathy – was deemed useful: a "difficult" client may well be dealing with problems or limitations the translator is unaware of and is doing the best they can in a difficult situation.

The Jungian concept of shadow is complex, archetypal and even mystic, and he provides few clear-cut definitions. In a two-hour workshop one can also only

introduce the concept superficially. On the other hand, according to Jung's own experience, in his framework of archetypes, the shadow is the concept people usually find easy to relate to and it is the first to come up in the analysis of the unconscious (Jung 1991: 272). Indeed, even in a superficial form the concept of shadow functions as a heuristic tool that supports us in confronting difficult, angering and embarrassing affects constructively and reflexively, avoiding the risk of merely resorting to collective ranting that would reinforce rather than alleviate the power of the shadow over us. Reflexivity is also the key to empowerment: the more in contact we are with our authentic self, the more balanced our professional demeanour can be. Instead of getting swept away with negative affects when they arise, it is possible to take a moment to observe them, identify their origin and let them be. Identifying and embracing one's shadow requires inward observation, and it may be an extremely uncomfortable process of self-reflexion. It therefore also calls for compassion towards oneself.

Empowerment is not simply about being bold, daring and assertive. It is about having one's two feet firmly on the ground: being in touch with one's emotions and values, having a firm moral grounding, being able to neutrally assess the situation and the best course of action and then firmly defending that choice even in the face of criticism – and also shifting one's position if new and compelling evidence is brought into play. Reflexive work on our affects will help us gain and maintain this position, and the concept of shadow and shadow work can be used to support that reflexion.

<p style="text-align:center">* * *</p>

This chapter has put forward a particular understanding of translator education, one with an idealist bend and overtly resistant to the current tendencies of instrumentalist approaches that emphasize servile employability. This, I believe, is the only route for teachers and students – and ultimately for the translation industry as well – to survive the existing trend of neoliberal policy combined with digitalization, automation and precarization of translators' and interpreters' work. Empathy-oriented approaches to translation are interpersonal by nature, and closely related to ethics and moral behaviour. The issues of empowerment are more individual, but they are outward-oriented in that they focus on bringing forth action in the social world. Approaching empowerment from the perspective of shadow work allows us to balance both the personal and the social. In the training context, it is also necessary to deal with how affects affect. This interpersonal and social orientation is in keeping with the general focus of this book: it is more about how particular affects operate socially and what affects can do in the world than about the cognitive or neurophysiological functions that might explain why translating feels as it does. The component that brings everything together is reflexivity, that

is, a personal skill. Introducing affects, and in particular their felt, bodily signals, in the curriculum will help young professionals to learn to navigate the spaces of translation they encounter, listening to their guts and hearts and using their agency to move things in a direction where both the bodies and minds of all participants can thrive.

Conclusions

Affecting and being affected

The preceding chapters have charted the landscape of translatoriality from the perspective of affect. Regardless of how affect is defined – as a nonconscious visceral reaction or a social force or something in between – it is part of our human condition: our systems of observing and responding to our surroundings are not only rational but also affective, and our affective responses allow us to interpret, assess and judge the developments we witness and take part in. Translating and interpreting as human activities are no exception. On the contrary. This book is an extended argument that to a significant degree they consist of *affective labour*.

The combination of the rational and the affective is one root cause for undecidability in translation, and in life. Many of the shifts, or swaying and sliding, in translation solutions can be attributed to either translators' conscious or unconscious reactions to their affective responses or to an attempt at accommodating for known or assumed affects in reception. This kind of swaying is a constant feature of translations, and an affectively non-swayed translation strategy may also lead to swayed reception due to the change of cultural and social context and perhaps also a change of skopos. The culturally widespread desire for sameness in translation and the swaying inherent in the activity of translating and interpreting feed a sticky fear of mistranslation. This foregrounds trust as an affective element for translators and interpreters to cultivate in and around performing their work.

Affects are in many ways bodily grounded. We can only be affected by what our sensory systems register, and this is constrained by both our bodily capacities and our material location. Virtual and digital spaces are a highly relevant object of study in the contemporary translatorial scene, but it is also important to remember that regardless of the virtual systems of organizing work and the technological solutions therein, human translators can only operate in one physical place at a time, and their performance is constrained by the capacities of their body. Issues such as ethnicity, age and gender are innate and embodied qualities we need to live by. Cognitive constraints such as memory, fatigue or ennui are only marginally adaptable, as possibilities for working around our cognitive processing capacity and biological needs are limited. In comparison, emotions and affects are more

malleable: although we often cannot control what we feel, we can control how we approach it, and we can learn to regulate emotions and to manage how much we sway by them.

Providing elements that improve self-awareness, critical thinking and reflexivity in translator training – and also beyond that in continued professional education – increases the professional skills of future translators, improving their chances of job satisfaction, persistently high motivation levels and happiness at work. But there is more to affect than personal psychological gains. Affects circulate in societies and they stick, creating affective practices and affective economies, and their effects also reach beyond the sphere of the personal. The social and collective side of affects brings to the fore the transformative power of affect: affects are powerful societal forces and living wisely with affects can lead to radically changed structures of feeling and transformed practices.

Affects are linked to embeddedness and embodiment, grounding us in our physical surroundings. Our place-bound existence also entails positionality. We occupy particular positions, and we are able to approach experiences in life from the perspectives these positions allow us to take. This is a crucial question for mediation professions such as translating and interpreting, as they are fundamentally built on the necessity to understand the viewpoints of others. The requirement of empathic and affectionate affinity to the source text author often expected of translators is diagonally opposite to the requirement of impersonal neutrality directed at public service interpreters. This creates tensions towards empathy, which is to be seen as both a necessary and unwanted professional quality. Ambivalence is also at the heart of translators' felt experiences of translating, where the misery and splendour of this activity alternate and are both equally true descriptions of what the task is like.

In this book I have revisited a number of my own previous scholarly works, both research I have carried on my own and that I have conducted with a number of colleagues. Issues related to affect had been bubbling under in my work for quite some time, and taking affect as the focus of attention has allowed me to highlight the topic systematically across a varied set of fields, questions and data. Doing that, I have felt I am teasing out and making visible aspects already implicitly and intuitively known to the translation studies community but also that I am reaching towards "envisionings beyond the already known" (Gibbs 2010: 203) and contributing to the "forging of a new body" (Clough 2010: 207). Regardless of how my attempt at creating foundational work on affect in translation studies for others to build on is received, I remain confident that the topic merits further inquiry. Although I have aimed for clarity, the nature of this object of study and the multifarious bodies of prior research in various disciplines have dictated that during this exploration I have also most probably participated in complexifying

the concept of affect. According to Brian Massumi (2015: x–xi) this is how it has to be, in order to be adequate to the complexity of life itself:

> Such fellow-travelling concepts as "differential affective attunement", "collective individuation", "micro-politics", "thinking-feeling", "bare activity", "ontopower" and "immanent critique" relay the base definition of affect.… Once they introduce themselves, they wend their way through subsequent interviews, taking on greater conceptual consistency, complexifying the concept of affect as they go. This is what a process-oriented exploration does: complexify its conceptual web as it advances. It tries not to reduce. It tries not to encapsulate. It does not end in an overview. Rather, it tries to become more and more adequate to the complexity of life.

So, what can we do with affect? In the preceding chapters I have used affect as a bridge concept. Aiming at a consolidation of various research agendas, I have applied an affective lens to six areas of study within the field of translating and interpreting, trying to tease out the effects of affect for each. I hope this book succeeds in being an invitation for a continued fascination with the complexity of translatorial life and of the ordinary and sticky affects related to translating and interpreting. The preceding chapters do not make any claim of a comprehensive treatment of affect. They are snapshots of a rich area of human action and interaction. Affect is not a research paradigm or a disciplinary turn. It is a dimension of human life. An omnipresent element in everything we engage in, including translating and interpreting. Lived experience.

Affects are also omnipresent in research. In spite of the quest for objectivity and repeatability, researchers cannot escape their humanity. Researchers of affect will find themselves in a double bind: researching affects will, at least in my experience, intensify the felt presence of affects in other spheres of life as well, and affectively intense personal experiences will have a way of protruding into academic texts. In the spirit of also giving visibility to the researcher's affects, I have not excluded the more personal anecdotes when they have seemed illuminating for the case at hand or relevant for the reader to assess my perspective to the topic. I have been writing this book during a time when I have also experienced affective turmoil in my own life. During the past couple of years, I have ticked nearly all the boxes of the top ten stressors in life, turning my life upside down in a process of loss and mourning but also of immense joy, recovery and renewal. All this has also been bodily felt in numerous ways. Amidst all this, the idea of writing an academic monograph is not intuitively the most logical thing to do. I do think the urgency with which it pushed itself into my top priorities and persisted through the writing process is not unconnected with the more personal ways in which the affective insisted on me paying constant attention to it. The combination of the theoretical-analytic and the felt-personal has been rewarding on both sides. I wish

to re-quote the opening citation on the actual science and the other, affective side of science. The affects involved have indeed at times felt "so powerful that they sometimes dominate the whole life of the scholar".

> Along side of this actual, realized science, there is another, concrete and living, which is in part ignorant of itself, and yet speaks itself; besides acquired results, there are hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments so obscure that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that they sometimes dominate the whole life of the scholar. (Durkheim 1993: 362)

According to Spinoza, every interaction changes us; we are affected by it. I was affected by the writing of this book. I can only hope reading it affected you.

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Index

In an age of AI and automated translation, the affective remains a decisively human condition. *Translation and Affect* is a collection of essays that investigate the role of affects and emotions across the spectrum of translatorial activities and areas, from public service interpreting to multilingual poetry recitals, from translator training to translation technology. In an effort at creating a consilient approach that bridges different research traditions in Translation Studies, Koskinen uses affective labour and affects and their stickiness as a lens to understand how it feels to translate and how translations feel. Written in a personal and engaging style, the book encourages readers interested in translation issues to look at translation as an affective practice and to explore and reflect their own ways of living with translation.

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