

Thetics and Categoricals

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Volume 262

Thetics and Categoryals

Edited by Werner Abraham, Elisabeth Leiss and Yasuhiro Fujinawa

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Preface

The papers collected in this volume were presented at the workshop *Thetics and Categoricals* at the 51st Annual Meeting of Societas Linguistica Europaea in Tallinn, Estonia, on 30 August, 2018.

INTRODUCTION

What this volume is about

Werner Abraham

What are categorical and thetic¹ judgments? Going by the most explicit conclusions in the present book and taking exception to those who do not think that any clear definitions can be achieved, there is one negative, yet strong restriction: a thetic sentence is not a predication in the Kantian sense (i.e. predicating a property or eventuality of an object or person). Beyond this negative constraint, the most explicit conceptualization of thetics expressed in the present volume is “a not necessarily truth-functionally operable, yet syntactically well-structured sentence with speech act status, formally occurring with subject inversion or broad sentential focus”. The present collection determines in more detail and with respect to different languages what this constraint might be linguistically speaking. To demystify the old logical concepts of categorical and thetic judgments, the authors in this volume had to open grammatical concepts such as logical judgment vs. sentence, topicality vs. rhematicity, topic subject vs. inverted subject, clausal prefield vs. middle field, verb valence vs. focus valence, narrow vs. broad focus, existential vs. presentational, propositional (dis)anchoring by space and time (Bühler’s origo vs. anti-origo), exclamative vs. reportive and descriptive, propositional truth vs. felicitous utterance, communicative vs. solipsistic exclamative, unaccusative vs. intransitive subject, common ground vs. ungrounded, contrastive vs. default sentential accent, and a couple of other notions. With respect to the topic addressed in the present collection of articles, the authors were pressed by an even less promising outlook as is expressed in the following quote.

The identification and distinction of categorical and thetic utterances, which has been increasingly discussed for two decades, has not led to a conclusion in any of the available studies such that it would justify further attention and research energy to this problem.

(translation from Meyer-Hermann (2010: 40f.) by Werner Abraham)

1. Note that ‘thetic’ has nothing to do with ‘thetical’ as used in the writings of Heine, Kaltenböck, and Kuteva derived from ‘parenthetical’.

As proponents of categoricity and theticity start out from what the founders of this topic had to say, i.e. (simple vs. double) judgments, the realm the discussion had to roam made the task even trickier: philosophy and logic at the hands of people like Franz von Brentano, Anton Marty, Hermann Lotze, Friedrich Schelling, and Roland Sigwart, among others.

The judgment, then, is the surge of the mind as it resolves something into its ontological character and mode, but the thing may be in an order of real beings, of fictions, projects or privations, or some other manner or condition of being and non-being. Indeed, it is in a variety of ontological modes. (Schmitz 1974: 501)²

Thetic vs. categorical judgments were prominent topics in the philosophy of Realism and of logic in the 19th century, particularly represented by impersonal sentences (Sigwart 1888). Except for Ladusaw (1994), this topic has virtually found no reaction in modern linguistics and logic until the Japanese linguist Kuroda took it up.

This theory assumes, unlike traditional or modern logic, that there are two different fundamental types of judgments, the categorical and the thetic. Of these, only the former conforms to the traditional paradigm of subject-predicate, while the latter represents simply the recognition or rejection of material of a judgment. Moreover, the categorical judgment is assumed to consist of two separate acts, one the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject. With this analysis in mind, the thetic and the categorical judgments are also called the simple and the double judgments (*Einfaches Urteil* and *Doppelurteil*).

(Kuroda 1972: 154)

In their contributions to this volume, the authors addressed all of the semiotic-pragmatic notions in great detail to derive conclusions about logical (Kant's) categoricity and (Brentano's and Marty's) theticity, on the one hand, and Japanese linguistics and pragmatics (Kuroda), on the other hand.

Leading ideas and main concepts

Given the work, amongst others by Clark et al. (1991); Stalnaker (2002); Roberts (2012), the major aim of the present volume is to show that thetic utterances cannot be described solely linguistically. This holds at least as long as the main empirical triggers and distributions under which categorical sentences are produced cannot

2. Marty, referring to Brentano, uses repeatedly the notion *Urteil* 'judgment' in the sense of *Anerkennung oder Verwerfung eines vorgestellten Inhalts* 'confirmation or repudiation of an imagined content'.

come to the fore at all in typically thetic environments. Nor does the reason become apparent why it is linguistically important to speak of the distinction between thetics and categoricals. The main tenets and linguistic conclusions of the discussions in the present volume describe expressive thetics as well as reportive categoricals in linguistic terms. Thetics are unique in anterior anchoring. The very fact that we can speak about linguistic phenomena in dismantlement from specific space and time anchoring proves its cognitive importance. By highlighting this, I subscribe to the following claim in the sense that the dealings in the present volume have indeed permeated boundaries to what appeared opaque in earlier dealings, specifically, for example, on expressions of pain with nonnominative (“quirky”) subject (see Tanaka as well as Abraham, both in this volume).

Whether by analyzing the grammar of pain we could in any way contribute to the practical alleviation and management of pain I do not know. It might seem odd even to raise such a possibility. But I do believe that in order to understand any complex aspect of the human condition it is helpful to think about it grammatically. The boundary between the semiotic and the material worlds is by no means totally impermeable. (Halliday 1998: 2)

Let us see what the contributions to this volume are about before the background sketched above.

Part 1. Logic and philosophical background

As Leiss points out in ‘Categorical versus thetic propositions as essential part of a Realistic Universal Grammar’, prime awareness of the notion theticity goes back no further than to the 19th century according to Hatch (2014). However, the notion of theticity is much older, i.e. part of a long tradition since antiquity, especially in the philosophy of Realism. Appearing mainly under the label of impersonal judgments, thetic judgments became essential components of theories of the copula. The copula relates not only subject and predicate in well-defined ways, but it is also the basic building block of the philosophy of Realism and its Theory of Universal Grammar omnipresent even in the architecture of the mental lexicon with its hierarchical structure (see also the fine discourse on the tradition of the discussions of the copula and its function up to modern linguistic times in Moro 1997). The copula relates reality and concepts, that being an essential part of any feature matrix of the lexicon. Furthermore, it enables these feature matrices to refer to objects in time and space (Zimmermann 1986). As a relator between subject and predicate, the copula is present even in predicates that are unrelated, this being the case in thetic utterances (simple judgments). Thetic propositions presuppose the structure of

categorical sentences (Lotze 1843/1989: 70–74), thus being equally structured and related to reality even outside of a pre-context. In other words, there is no way out of thetics linking to reality. It seems that, in particular, the contributions of Okamoto and Abraham are difficult to be put in line with this view given that both authors see the thetic utterance outside of propositional truth-functionality.

Part 2. Impersonal constructions and types of copula

This part links directly to the previous one in highlighting linguistics peculiarities of existential sentences and presentationals often using the copula. Strong focus lay on impersonal constructions in the 19th century in the framework of discussions of thetic and categorical judgments and their linguistic forms (Lotze, Sigwart, Schelling beyond the founders Brentano and Marty).

“Die Impersonalien und Existenzialsätze waren von jeher das Kreuz der wissenschaftlichen Logik”. (“Impersonal and existential propositions have always been the cross of scientific logic.”) Martin Heidegger in 1912/1978 *Frühe Schriften*, edited by Friedrich Wilhelm von Hermannisten. Complete edition I. Frankfurt: Klostermann.

In modern English grammars, an *existential sentence* is a sentence that asserts the existence or nonexistence of something. For this purpose, English makes use of constructions introduced by *There* (known as the “existential *there*”). The verb most often used in existential sentences is a form of *be*, though other verbs (e.g., *exist*, *occur*) may follow the existential *there*. In the present discussions, a principled distinction is drawn between existential assertions and its presentational function. It seems that the thetic function exists only on the basis of the presentational speech act function. Furthermore, agreement in English existentials is not the final criterion in determining which of the two candidates (*There* or *you*) has subject function (Kučanda 1990). See *There *are/is always just you*_{PLURAL}. In German, for example, the inverted subject invariably determines agreement: *Es bist/seid immer nur du/ihr*. It_{EXPL}-are_{SG}/are_{PL} always-just-you_{SG}/you_{PL}. Like in English, the topic expletive is a nonreferential local in Dutch and Norwegian, but the equally nonreferential neutral pronoun *Es* ‘it’ in German as is highlighted by Belligh “The encoding of theticity in Dutch” and Hellan/Beermann “Presentatives in Norwegian and German.” The clause initial items *det* and *es* are pursued in presentational, impersonal and extrapositional constructions, and uses of expletive *det* and *es* in object positions and, beyond that, ‘light reflexives’ such as *seg* and *sich* in their interaction with presentationals. Apart from their analysis in the respective grammatical systems, *theticity* is shown to be a common factor to the constructions, with associations

to partial typologies of (in)transitivity. By contrast, Belligh draws, on the basis of an extended corpus investigation, the conclusion that none of the erstwhile identified five Dutchthetic and sentence-focus constructions grammatically encode theticity and sentence-focus in terms of non-defeasible semantics (explicitly discussed in Breul 2004, Abraham 2020). They are thus not taken to be independently encoded grammatical categories of Dutch but rather categories of discourse and (normal) language use. This will be a topic recurrent in the remainder of the discussions in the present volume culminating in the question “What is the good of thethetic-categorical distinction for modern grammars?”. Due highlighting is cast on the role of the copula and its different functions by Sumbatova in “Copulas and information structure in Tanti Dargwa” in the Tanti dialect of Dargwa (Nakh Dagestanian (= East Caucasian), Most independent clauses in Tanti are headed either by the identificational copula or a finite verb form. There are four existential copulas. The identificational copula is a feature of categorical sentences; the position of the copula points at the focused constituent. The existential copulas tend to headthetic structures. Copulaless converbal clauses are often interpreted as mirative sentences, which may also count asthetic, but differ from the existential structures by the moment when the speaker obtains knowledge of the situation.

Part 3. From logic content to linguistic form

This part is devoted to components of what is perhaps the most relevant subtopic of thetheticity-categoricity discussion: the transition from *judgment* to *sentence* and other linguistic categories. We note, first, that Isaka, drawing on Wöllstein-Leisten 2001), shows in “Infinitive constructions and theticity in German” that incoherent constructions are less preferred for the purpose of expressingthetic judgments with *keiner* ‘no one’. In this avoidance of incoherence for theticity, there is a correspondence of form with content to the extent that athetic judgment, which is also called simple judgment because of its indivisibility into constructional components, incoherent constructions consisting of two clauses seem to be less suitable. This insight due to Isaka is far from trivial. We note, second, that, given that Chinese, in contrast to German, signals reference strength not in terms of articles as there are no articles in Chinese. However, as Lee discusses in her ‘Strong and weak nominal reference inthetic and categorical sentences: Sampling German and Chinese’, strong and weak reference inthetic and categorical sentences in both German and Chinese are also distinguished if held against Carlson’s (1977) semantic event types of stage-level/SL- and individual-level/IL-predicates. This discussion also puts emphasis on Chinese correspondents of indefinite and bare nouns in German on personal pronouns. We note, third, that, according to Muroi’s “Adjective and predication type:

Psych adjectives in attributive and predicative usage”, the German psychadjectives *glücklich* (happy) and *traurig* (sad) and their Japanese correspondents *shiwase* and *kanashii* allow free attributive combinations of noun and adjective. By contrast, predication by adjective (in a copula construction) is subject to linking rules. With regard to thethetic/categorical discussion, attribution has a structure isomorphic with thethetic sentence. Predication can be used in all predication types (thetic, categorical, stage-level, and individual-level). In cases with the object as the only clausal argument, the semantic structure is changed entailing the restriction of the predication type to the individual-level and, thus, categorical predication. We note, fourth, from Irwin’s “Existential unaccusativity and new discourse referents” how both external subject arguments, unaccusative and subject inverted, differ in that unaccusativity is based on verbal inchoativity, while subject inversion is independent of this criterion. The analysis contributes to components of the theory of intransitivity before the background of claims made by Du Bois (1987) that languages organize information such that new discourse referents are established as objects of transitive sentences and subjects of intransitive sentences. Irwin’s analysis suggests that Du Bois’ generalization holds for a structurally distinct subset of intransitives in English in sharing the discourse function of introducing new discourse referents. In sum, it seems that the present discussion contributes to an *extended theory of verbal intransitivity*.

Part 4. The logic-linguistics relation across languages

The pursuance of thetics vs. categoricals across languages is not only of typological interest. Given the scarce relevance of modern linguistics for the existential type of sentences and the role of the copula one may assume that thethetic-categorical topic and their linguistic forms and properties would have remained forgotten, had it not been dug out by the Japanese linguist Kuroda. The reason is simple. In German and the majority of other Indo-European languages, theticity plays no categorical grammatical role. Its forms do not in any obvious way relate to specific grammatical categories and functions. It took the step of a native speaker of a topic prominent language, Japanese, to see the linguistic importance of the language-philosophical discussions of the 19th century about impersonal constructions and their discourse-functional standing.

The interesting moment about this investigative history is that we are able to detect essential building blocks about thetics only when looking at the phenomena through the eyes of a Japanese linguist. The reason is that the Japanese linguist is more sensitive to Information Structure/IS-triggers that lie at the bottom of thetic sentences. It pays off to look at the German thetic patterns with IS-trained Japanese

eyes. The present part pursues exactly this goal. The strongest property conducive to theticity is the total lack of discourse integration, which is again implemented by the fact that thetic sentences disallow the selection of German modal particles and Japanese sentence end particles. In Abraham's "From philosophical logic to linguistics. The architecture of information autonomy: Categoricals vs. Thetics revisited", the question is central "Thetic- vs. Categorical: How are such sentential types to be distinguished, what is common about them?" In our search for an answer, we can be guided by the distinction in Japanese, i.e. through the use of the particle *ga* for thetics and *wa* for categoricals. In German, the German equivalents are marked by accent mark and information structural word order. Syntactically, thetics are represented by VP incorporation of all arguments including the subject. The arguments are not subject to syntactic probing mechanisms but follow semantic preference principles. Fujinawa's "Are there "pseudocategorical" sentences? A German-Japanese contrastive approach to a syntax-semantics-asymmetry" capitalizes on the fact that the majority of thetic sentences are ambiguous between theticity and categorality since thetics cannot be unambiguously identified and held apart from categorality (*n*-place predication). Fujinawa's point can be highlighted especially by the fact that *da* 'to be' hardly appears as an existential verb in *ga*-marked, but only in *wa*-marked sentences. Interestingly, the same also holds true for correspondents to German optatives.

While in Abraham's discussion topicality, common ground, and anteriority anchoring (and, consequently, lack of any addressee) are given the major roles in keeping apart categorical and thetic utterances, Okamoto, in "Perception description, perception report and thetic statements: Roles of sentence-final particles in Japanese and modal particles in German", observes that thetic statements are generally associated with predicates of temporary states, verbs of existence, or verbs of appearance. Exploiting this, he argues that perception description (as opposed to perception report) is a key concept for thetic statements. The author proposes a common framework to capture commonalities and differences of (Japanese) Sentence Final Particles/SFPs and (German) Modal Particles/MPs which lead to the speech act hypothesis in reports directed to addressees (i.e. perception report).

While the lack a common ground update is the key actor for identifying thetic utterances in Abraham's and (indirectly) Okamoto's discussions, Wilson's "The thetic/ categorical distinction as difference in common ground update: with application to Biblical Hebrew" takes the opposite position suggesting that thetics present a unique type of update which explains why sentences such as *It is raining*, prosodically inflected sentences (known as those with broad sentence focus), existentials, and presentationals have been called thetics. The author draws the conclusion that the thetic/categorical distinction is no longer helpful within a description of natural language. Instead, these phenomena can be placed within the increasingly

robust frameworks which bridge the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interfaces. He applies this proposal to a construction type in Biblical Hebrew (labelled *thetic* construction in his earlier writings (Wilson 2018, 2020)).

Part 5. Lexical links to attitudinality

In German, as well as in other Germanic languages as well, expressions of distress, pain, and surprise play a special linguistic role to the extent that recipients of emotion appear in non-nominative, “quirky” cases. They are thetic by all relevant criteria: they are expressives out of the blue, un presupposed (“antiorigo”) exclamatives (i.e. *Kundgaben* ‘enunciatives’), and, as such, non-truth valuable, but, as speech acts, subject to specific felicity conditions. I see it as a very felicitous finding that the very same utterances of feeling carry clear thetic morphology, as is, going back to Onoe (1973), described in detail by Tanaka in “b-grade subjects and theticity” highlighting classes of predicates which, counter to their information structural stance, take subjects marked with “-*ga*”. These subjects appear as predicative arguments in the following predicate typing: (1) as an entity in the existential sentence, (2) as an object of the feeling, (3) as an object of the capability, (4) as an entity of a spontaneous event, and (5) as the point of a physical sensation. Syntactically, these are VP-internal subjects and can be best marked morphologically with “anti-information structural *ga*”, which, according to Kuroda (1972), marks typically thetic judgments. In contrast, marking these emotional subjects with “-*wa*”, the marker of the categorial judgment, results either in odd sentences or, if acceptable in the first place, in a discourse contrastive reading.

The fact that such enunciative specials marked morphologically as antiorigo thetics has not only been unobserved hitherto as a criterion of Japanese topic prominence. It adds separate and independent categorial status and grammatical relevance to the notions of theticity and categoricity that have no such extra status in the grammars of German and other Indo-European languages.

Why does the topic about thetics and categoricals matter? With topic and focus, for instance, an answer to a *wh*-question is ok with focus not with topic. Thetic utterances are topicless. How do we recognize thetics? Thetics come in the form of subject inversion (subject integration) or broad sentential focus. Narrow foci, by contrast, occur in categorial sentences. How does one find out if a sentence is thetic? Thetics initiate texts and dialogical sections. While categoricals are open for the selection of modal particles, thetics are not. Thetics are both topicless and deselective of modal particles and other attitudinal operators. All of this may be captured by the following definition: ‘A thetic sentence marks a not necessarily

truth-functionally valid, yet syntactically well-structured utterance with specific speech act status organized formally in terms of subject inversion (subject VP-integration) or broad sentential focus.’

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PART 1

Logic and philosophical background

Categorical versus thetic sentences in the Universal Grammar of Realism

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The aim of this paper is to outline that the notions of thetic versus categorical sentences are characteristic of a long tradition of philosophy, especially of the philosophy of Realism. Characteristic of Realism is a highly developed theory of the copula. Sentences consist of a subject, a rather abstract copula, and a predicate. Thus, the structure of any sentence and of any judgment is conceived as being triadic in nature. The copula appears – overtly or covertly – in synthetic sentences as well as in analytic sentences, both of which are categorical sentences (Roger Bacon 1240/2009: 70), whereby the analytic copula differs from the synthetic copula with respect to the mode of signifying reality. It will be evidenced that the function of analytic sentences is to build up a shared system of knowledge (mental lexicon), whereas synthetic sentences represent a technique to socialize individual experiences. According to the philosophy of Realism, the copula appears even in thetic sentences. Sentences without a copula are meant to be inconceivable. The working hypothesis is that in contrast to categorical sentences, thetic sentences are not triadic, but dyadic in structure. According to the Realist philosopher Lotze, thetic sentences consist of a copula and an amalgam of linguistically unstructured impressions, compressed in the predicate. In line with the philosophy of Realism, thetic sentences are conceived as some premature stage in the evolution of language. Thus, thetic sentences represent an embryonic stage of a categorical sentence as well as of thought (Lotze 1874/1989: 70–74). Thetic sentences are able to imitate the structure of categorical sentences (pseudo-subject – copula – pseudo-predicate). The conclusion is that thetic sentences are pseudo-structured “intransitive” judgments. They consist of a copula and one single chunk of “intransitive experience” only.

Keywords: Realism, Universal Grammar of Realism, categorical sentence, thetic sentence, analytic sentence, copula

1. Universal Grammar (Philosophical Grammar) in the paradigm of Realism

The notions of categorical sentence andthetic sentence (impersonal sentence) were of utmost importance in the Philosophy of Realism in the 19th century, especially in the work of Anton Marty (1940/1965), Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Franz Brentano (1966/1972). Characteristic of the Philosophy of Realism is that the structure of the sentence is held to be tripartite. It consists of a subject, a copula, and a predicate. This in stark contrast to the less complex and more widespread subject-predicate dichotomies. It is interesting to note that the presence or absence of a more or less abstract copula in the design of a language theory is a good predictor of whether the philosophy of language behind it belongs to the paradigm of Realism or not.

Philosophers and linguists who developed a Theory of Language within the paradigm of (non-naive) Realism are Avicenna (Ibn Sin), Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, as well as all authors of Universal Grammars in 13th and 14th century – the so-called *Modistae*, who wrote treatises on the modes of signifying.¹ This type of grammar is also referred to as “Philosophical Grammar” or “Speculative Grammar” (*grammatica speculativa*). Note, that the attribute “speculative” was not derogative. It derives from Latin *speculum* ‘mirror’. Language is defined as a tool that is able to mirror the world (see Kelly 2002). Language mirrors reality in ways that it becomes conceivable by the mind of the human species. In other words, language (and language only) enables the kind of cognition that is characteristic of the human species.

The mirror metaphor helped to explain the function of language. It was inspired by the new discipline of optics, developed by Arabian scientists and considered as one of the most prestigious paradigms at that time (see Smith 2001 on Alhacen’s (= Ibn al-Haytham’s) theory of vision), as well as Bacon 1996. We know since Lakoff/Johnson (1980) that the most prestigious and inspiring metaphors are derived regularly from the latest achievements in science. This holds even for scientific publications in linguistics (see Naumann/Plank/Hofbauer 1992), who outlined the impact of geological metaphors in linguistics in the 18th and 19th century, when geology became one of the most esteemed disciplines).

The Philosophy of Realism as well as the “Speculative” Universal Grammars conceived within this paradigm² were based on the philosophy of Aristotle, optimized by Avicenna – who was considered as the Aristotle of his time (see Bertolacci 2009). At the center of Aristotelian Universal Grammars, we find the tripartite

1. see for instance: Michaelis de Marbasio 1995: *Summa de modis significandi*; Radulphus Brito (1980): *Quaestiones super Priscianum Minorem*;

2. See Radulphus Brito’s *grammatica speculativa* published in the series “grammatica speculativa” by the Frommann-Holzboog Publishing House. Edited by Heinz W. Enders and Jan Pinborg.

structure of the sentence. The semiotic triangle, which we owe to Aristotle, reflects this structure. Its tripartite structure is characteristic of (almost) all symbolic forms. It is constitutive of categorical sentences, however not of thetics. The tripartite structure of categorical sentences consists of a subject, a copula, and a predicate, this in contrast to the subject-predicate-dichotomy, which later will dominate the *Universal Grammaire de Port-Royal* (17th century) as well as the Universal Grammar of Chomsky and his followers. As a consequence of the loss of the central status of the copula, the difference between the function of meaning versus that of reference (*Bedeutung* vs. *Bezeichnung*) became opaque. Centuries later, Frege reintroduced this opposition, using however different terminology: *Sinn* (sense) for *Bedeutung* (meaning), and *Bedeutung* for *Bezeichnung* (reference). Interestingly enough, Frege not only revitalized the difference between meaning and reference, he also reintroduced the copula as the most basic building block of any sentence, judgment or thought. According to Frege, the copula transforms individual associations into thoughts. In contrast to subjective associations (*Vorstellungsassoziationen*, Frege 1882/2001: 23), thoughts consist of features that are intersubjective in nature. A central argument of Frege is that mere impressions or individual associations are neither true nor false. In contrast to subjective impressions and associations, thoughts are assertible as true or not true. In other words, the copula is the linguistic tool that transforms mere associations into intersubjective and potentially truth-veridical thoughts. Frege is very explicit about this in his posthumously published *17 Kernsätze zur Logik*: The linguistic expression of a thought is the sentence³ (*Kernsatz/kernel sentence* 8). A sentence can be true or false only if it is the expression of a thought⁴ (see kernel sentence 9).⁵

The reintroduction of the difference between meaning and reference/denotation is closely related to the insight that there are two types of copulae. The copula is an essential part of analytic sentences as well as of synthetic sentences. Both types of sentences are subtypes of the categorical sentence. The common denominator of the copula in analytic and synthetic sentences is finiteness. It is extractable from any full verb and even from auxiliaries such as *have* that are decomposable into a copula and additional grammatical functions. Summing up the function of the copula, we see that it cannot be reduced to overt *be*. All finite verbs contain covertly some

3. “Der sprachliche Ausdruck des Gedankens ist der Satz.” (Frege 1882/2001: 23)

4. “Ein Satz kann nur dann wahr oder unwahr sein, wenn er Ausdruck eines Gedankens ist.” (Frege 1882/2001: 23).

5. Note that the notions of thought, judgment, and sentence are interchangeable synonyms, due to the axiomatics of Realism. These notions fall apart as soon as the rationalist claim *cogito ergo sum* appears. Lotze, Marty and Brentano unified these notions again.

functional correlate of a copula, e.g. expressed by the category of person (Frege 1882/2001: 23) and additional grammatical categories that transform BEDEUTUNG (meaning) into BEZEICHNUNG (reference).

The authors of Universal Grammars in the tradition of Realism decomposed sentences into subject, copula, and present participle. The notions of copula and present participle represent overt as well as covert uses of well-defined functions. The present participle was chosen to symbolize that the predicate is understood to be inherently infinite, no matter whether it appears overtly as finite verb/verbal construction or not. The copula only is finite. Thus, the copula may appear overtly in so-called copula sentences. According to the philosophy of Realism, the copula appears also covertly in predicates as indicator of finiteness. There exists simply no sentence without a copula. This holds for categorical sentences as well as for thetic sentences. The copula can even be represented by sentence particles, such as *wa* and *ga* in Japanese (see Kuroda's work on *wa* as an indicator of categorical sentences/judgments, and of *ga* as an indicator of thetic sentences/judgments (Kuroda 1972 and 2005; Tanaka 2017 and 2018; Abraham, Leiss & Tanaka (eds) 2020)). The copula is a relator in the first place. It relates any sentence/thought/judgment to reality. This will be outlined in more detail in the sections on analytic versus synthetic categorical sentences versus thetic sentences below. Summing up the characteristics of a Realist Universal Grammar (RUG), we find that

1. RUG is a functional approach to the science of universals of language.
2. RUG defines a strict demarcation line between the functions of the mental lexicon versus that of grammar.
3. The function of the mental lexicon is to transform percepts into concepts (BEDEUTUNGEN).⁶
4. The function of mental grammar is to make concepts refer, i.e. to transform BEDEUTUNGEN into BEZEICHNUNGEN.

This reintroduction of a functional difference between meaning (composed by the mental lexicon) and reference (composed by the deictic and referential techniques of grammar) has important consequences: Hence, it becomes logically impossible to transfer “irregular” matter from grammar to the lexicon. From a functional point of view, irregular grammar remains grammar. With respect to RUG, the programmatic invention of Construction Grammar by Adele Goldberg (2006) and her followers fails to take account of the functional difference between mental lexicon and mental grammar. The same holds for Chomsky's suggestion

6. I prefer the use of the German notions *Bedeutung* and *Bezeichnung*, as they are more precise than alternative English terminology.

to transfer irregular grammar to the lexicon, the latter being conceived as rather unstructured and idiosyncratic, this without any sound explanation. Counter to these approaches, Realist Universal Grammar holds the function of the lexicon to be universal, as is the function of grammar. From this follows, that the mental lexicon is not reducible to an immense store of all regular and irregular linguistic units, be they grammatical or lexical in kind. Consequently, lexical units cannot be defined as indecomposable units.

Children decompose lexical units into features as soon as with 18 to 24 month of age. This is the stage where children overcome the stage of protolanguage (in terms of Bickerton 2014) and enter the stage of vocabulary explosion (Rämä, Sirri & Serres 2013). This post-protolinguistic stage begins with the organization of lexemes in semantic fields. The entrance into this stage depends on an understanding of the function of analytic sentences. Analytic sentences are also defined as categorical sentences, this on a par with synthetic sentences. In the sections which follow, the function of analytic sentences will be explored first. Second, the function of synthetic sentences will be outlined. Finally, thetic sentences will be defined as non-triadic structures. Thetic sentences are protolinguistic structures, consisting of a copula plus a non-decomposable unit. Thus, thetic sentences imitate the structure of categorical sentences in various forms, however not in function.

2. The function of the copula in analytic categorical sentences

Analytic sentences are a linguistic tool to define lexical features. Parents use this tool to teach the meanings of words to their children. Lexical features are entities whose function is to build up characteristic feature matrices. Note that each lexical item of the mental lexicon consists of a feature matrix that differs from any other feature matrix. This is the very reason why clear synonyms are quite uncommon. The advantage of a feature-based mental lexicon is its non-holistic structure. Holistic memory has its capacity limits, which do not show up in feature-based mental lexicons.

The function of analytic sentences is to build up a mental lexicon. The mental lexicon consists of linguistic structures that transform percepts into concepts. This tool tames and organizes subjective impressions by transforming them into intersubjective meanings. The architecture of meaning consists of characteristic feature bundles in the first place. In contrast to subjective impressions or associations, feature-based meaning units are intersubjective in nature. Children acquire semantic feature bundles by listening to analytic sentences produced by their parents and others communicators in their surroundings. A child that points at a ball and utters *apple* will be informed by some sentence like “This is not an apple. You cannot eat it. It is a ball.” The information can be paraphrased by analytic sentences, such as

- (1) *Balls are not eatable.*
- (2) *Apples are eatable.*

Alternative answers could be: “It is a ball. Balls are toys. Apples are fruits”. The function of analytic sentences is to extract and define features. The analytic sentences (1) and (2) extract the feature [\pm EDIBLE]. This feature becomes part of the feature matrix of the lexeme *apple* [+EDIBLE] as well as of the lexeme *ball* [-EDIBLE]. Lexical features bundles are a human-specific technique to categorize a potentially infinite universe. In other words, lexical feature matrices tame and categorize the rich world of percepts to which children are exposed. Lexical feature matrices transform percepts into concepts, thus reducing and mastering the richness of the incoming data. This overflow of perceptual data, which is characteristic of the human species, is due to a weakening of instinct based categorization. The partial weakening of instinct amounts to a partial loss of inborn categorization. In contrast to Steven Pinker’s definition of language as an instinct (Pinker 1994/2000), the view presented here is that language is a means to overcome instinct, at least partially and in important ways. Language-driven categorization via the mental lexicon is much faster when it comes to adapting to changing environments. This is a clear advantage with respect to more instinct-driven animals. The analytic storage of feature bundles paves the way to a human-specific architecture of the mental lexicon, which consists of semantic fields and of recursive structuring of hyperonymy and hyponymy. Semantic fields begin to organize in children around the age of 18 to 24 months (see the priming study of Rämä, Sirri & Serres 2013). The organization of lexemes in semantic fields coincides with the vocabulary spurt (i.e., vocabulary explosion). As is well known, the vocabulary spurt coincides with the feature-based organization of the mental lexicon. The economy of feature-based vocabulary enables a potentially infinite growth of vocabulary.

There is an additional side effect of a feature-based lexicon, which matters enormously with respect to a theory of the copula in the philosophical paradigm of Realism. First, it is possible to add and to subtract features, whereby the addition of features enables the hyponymic organization of the mental lexicon. This kind of addition of features is recursive and potentially infinite. In other words, with respect to hyponyms, the mental lexicon is potentially infinite by using finite means. Chomsky did not notice that infinite recursivity is not restricted to grammar only. Infinite recursivity holds also for the mental lexicon. It is self-evident, that this lexical kind of recursivity is restricted to hyponymic structuring. Infinite recursivity is not present in hyperonymy, where the subtraction of features ends in one final feature. According to the philosophy of Realism, this final entity of the mental lexicon is the same in all feature matrices of the languages of the world. It is the copula, which consists of one remaining feature only. The copula appears in

different forms and is not reducible to the overt use of a copula. Its function can appear in various disguises.

Turning back to analytical sentences, the interesting question is: What remains when we subtract recursively all semantic features but one? Is the remaining semantic field still definable as semantic field? Is the ultimate lexeme still definable by a plus/minus feature matrix? Characteristic of all semantic fields is that relations of sameness and difference structure them. Each lexical unit consists of a unique matrix of plus-features and minus-features. However, the remaining feature in the ultimate semantic field is bare of any relationship to other features. It relates to reality.

The analytic copula is the result of successive neutralization of all lexical features but one. As a consequence of this neutralization of features, the analytic copula appears, which is nothing more and nothing less than the final feature, which cannot be subtracted anymore. It comprises the maximum of possible extension. In other words, the complete minimization of features correlates to a maximum of extension of the respective classes, and vice versa: the maximization of features correlates to a minimization of extension of the semantic classes. In Realism, in terms of extension, the ultimate lexical unit comprises the whole of Reality. This confronts us with the interesting paradox that the feature matrices of the languages of the world differ in many ways, whereas the final hypernym remains the same in all languages. A logical consequence of this architecture of hypo- and hypernymic organization of the mental lexicon is the ubiquity of the ultimate feature. This feature is pervasive and part of all levels of semantic field organization, this without any exception. It can be paraphrased by [BEING] or by [REALITY] or [THE WHOLE OF REALITY]. In other words, we cannot escape reality. We are part of reality, and reality is part of us; or as Schmitz (1974: 494) puts it: “Nothing *interven*es between knowing and being”; and “the copula shows itself to be the *actual* unity of thought and being”.

Lexical features are the result of classifying incoming data, the latter consisting of percepts. Compared with concepts, percepts are closer to reality. On a par with concepts, percepts are definable as filters of reality. These first filters are species-specific. In fact, all living beings – beginning with monocellulars and ending with the human species – are definable as species-specific filters of reality. Each species can be defined by the sum of real features (percepts) retained and processed. Each living being is such a container and processor of real data. In other words, living beings are definable as more or less rich models of the world. Compared with percepts, concepts represent additional, human-specific filters. Concepts are language-specific and socially shared filters. They represent the knowledge of a linguistic community. These knowledge systems converge with a weakening of instinctive categorization in the human species. In fact, human beings invent additional filters with respect to the species-specific perceptual filters. This is meant by

Schmitz's "Nothing *intervenens* between knowing and being". The very reason is that the mental lexicon and its feature-based analytical structure consists of nonarbitrary and motivated relations with respect to reality. Analytic sentences represent a human-specific tool to construct language-specific representations of knowledge or "knowledge signs" (Schmitz 1974: 493). Nevertheless, the architecture of these knowledge signs remains the same for all languages: hyponymy, hyperonymy, and the copula. According to Schmitz (1974: 493), it is the task of science to re-unify the different language-specific models of reality. Following Schmitz (1974: 494), we can hold that the mental lexicon represents an intersubjective ontology of knowledge. This ontology is based on the transformations of percepts into concepts. In contrast to percepts, concepts are memorizable and communicable. There are close relations between semantic memory and the mental lexicon. In fact, semantic memory consists of the mental lexicon and its interactions with the hippocampus, the latter being present already in the reptilian brain.

Until now, we understand that the function of analytic categorical sentences is to define lexical features. These lexical features can be bundled together in feature matrices with plus- and minus-values. These mental feature bundles are organized in semantic fields. Here, the different lexical units relate to each other with respect to their respective amount of similarity (number of plus-features) and dissimilarity (number of minus-features). This is the first step of organization of meaning that children acquire. The advantage of feature-based analytic structuring consists of an immense acceleration of activation of meaningful units in discourse. Each feature activated in a lexical unit co-activates the same feature present in all units of the same semantic field, thus accelerating the production of lexemes that are already "warmed up" (Bickerton 2014). Those priming effects were tested and verified by Rämä, Sirri & Serres (2013). Holistic storage of units, which is devoid of internal structure, cannot produce this accelerating effect.

In sum, the theory of copulae of Realist Universal Grammar presented here starts with a theory of the copula in analytic sentences. Analytic sentences classify. Classification, however, is devoid of the function of reference. Classes are not rooted in time and space. In contrast to analytic sentences, synthetic sentences do refer. They "enrich" the analytic copula with time-space-indices and additional indices, thus transforming it to a different kind of a copula. This process will be developed in more detail in the section on the function of synthetic sentences. In contrast to the "unenriched copula" in analytic sentences (Schmitz 1974), the copula of synthetic sentences is enriched with grammatical categories.

3. The function of the copula in synthetic categorical sentences

The copula of synthetic sentences transforms classes (Bedeutungen) into individuals (Bezeichnungen). Whereas analytic sentences generate knowledge shared by a linguistic community, synthetic sentences format individual experiences in ways that they become communicable and socializable. It is well established that children start with the acquisition of the mental lexicon (knowledge) before they acquire grammatical categories. The function of all grammatical categories is to establish reference. Grammatical categories such as aspect, tense, mood and epistemic/evidential modality provide the human species with a tool that transforms meanings into denotations. This tool is prerequisite to encode reference to personal experiences. Without grammatical categories, it would be impossible to communicate experiences that happened distant from the natural Origo.

Grammatical categories are perspectivizers in the first place. They “enrich” (in the sense of Schmitz (1974) the (abstract) copula by adding and communicating the specific perspective of the speaker. The unmarked perspective is identical with the natural Origo (see Bühler 1934/1982 and 1934/2011) of a speaker, which consists of the features [+HERE] [+NOW] [+EGO]. The natural Origo is the natural point of departure to refer to distant objects, this with the means of natural deixis (pointing). The function of grammar is to construct perspectives that deviate from the presupposed and therefore unmarked natural Origo. For instance, the grammatical category of aspect enables the human species to construct inner aspect [+HERE] versus outer aspect [-HERE] (imperfective aspect versus perfective aspect), this irrespective of the factual viewpoint of the speaker. The grammatical category of tense also signals deviations from the natural Origo. Tense signals and specifies different displacements from the natural temporal point of view [+NOW]. Irrealis and optative, which belong to the grammatical category of mood, signal possible worlds, which implies that the speakers distance themselves from the actual world and refer to worlds within the reach of imagination. Finally, modality encodes the degree of (un)certainly of information given by a proposition (epistemic modality); finally, the category of modality specifies the Origo of the person who is the source of the information (evidential modality). The combination of both modalities (epistemicity as well as evidentiality) is acquired as late as the age of nine years (see Doitchinov 2007). The possibility to grammaticalize certainty and uncertainty (epistemicity) with respect to the source of information (evidentiality) is the most complex form to encode distance from the natural Origo, as far as we know.⁷

7. It is an interesting “Gedankenexperiment” to try to imagine an additional level of grammatical metaphorization of the notion of [±DISTANCE]. This additional evolutionary step remains out of reach of my imagination.

The common denominator of the four grammatical categories aspect, tense, mood, and epistemic/evidential modality (ATME) is the feature of distance. The notion of distance can be enriched in several stages, which are irreversible in terms of language acquisition: aspect is acquired first,⁸ and then comes tense, followed by mood, and modality. Of course, distance is not part of reality. Distance characterizes the viewpoint taken. Aspect, tense, mood, and epistemic/evidential modality are a means to construct and signal the viewpoint of the speaker (see Okamoto 2020 with respect to Japanese markers of epistemicity, present only in categorical sentences). In other words, grammatical categories encode perspectives on real data. They do not encode reality. This was common ground for the authors of universal grammars written in the 13th and 14th century: perspectives are not part of the world. The speaker encodes the viewpoint taken by himself in order to create a system of coordinates that allows the hearer to refer to the same context as the speaker. This system enables the location of personal experiences in a rich net of coordinates. In other words, reference to other places, times, possible worlds, and even more or less reliable worlds, becomes possible. These nets of coordinates enable the hearer to locate single events and to refer to them when communicating with others. Grammatical categories enable the members of the human species to refer to distant experiences made by other members of the linguistic community. Subjective experiences, such as inventions and insights, become transformable into intersubjective achievements (technique) and common ground (culture). All grammatical categories (including definiteness/indefiniteness, number etc.) enrich the system of coordinates in order to orient the hearer with respect to the viewpoints and perspectives taken by the speaker.

The next question to answer is: What is a fully functional grammatical category? A grammatical category enables the speaker to choose between different members of a grammatical category at the same syntagmatic slot in a sentence. To give just one example: Gender and case are lost in English. Gender and case are not lost in German, but they are nonfunctional relics. Gender and case were fully functional when it was still possible to choose between subjects in the nominative versus genitive, as well as between genitive and accusative objects, to give just one example. In other words, grammatical categories that are fully functional offer a choice between different perspectives taken by the speaker. Relic categories can still

8. Aspect appears overtly (as in Russian) or covertly as in German (in detail in Leiss 2000). Note that even in languages where aspect is encoded overtly (Russian), aspectual forms were labelled as tenses, this for centuries. The German Universal Grammarian Johann Severin Vater (1805) was the first to introduce the notion and definition of aspect into the grammar of Polish and Russian. Consequently, the number of tenses in Russian diminished significantly (for more detail, see Leiss 1992: 28–29)

serve as instruments of agreement. This syntagmatic function has nothing to do with the paradigmatic function, which is the core function of grammatical categories. The paradigmatic organization of grammatical categories enables to choose between multiple perspectives.

Summing up the essential points, we see that the common denominator of analytic and synthetic sentences is that they are categorical sentences. Analytic sentences define the features of the mental lexicon. They define concepts that are independent from innate concepts as we find them in animals. Analytic sentences are the tool that defines the knowledge of a linguistic community. Knowledge is saved, processed and socialized by the semantic memory (in the sense of Tulving 2005; Leiss 2017). In contrast to analytic sentences, synthetic sentences are a tool to communicate individual experiences to other individuals. They signal the viewpoint taken by the speaker, thus creating a new shared viewpoint. Synthetic sentences communicate our experiences. They are processed and saved by the episodic memory (Tulving 2005; Leiss 2017). We know that language acquisition starts with phonology, followed by the mental lexicon based on analytical sentences and organized in semantic fields. As soon as this technique is available, the way is paved for the acquisition of synthetic sentences. In contrast to analytic and synthetic sentences,thetic sentences are not in the center of linguistic research. They are still not fully understood with respect to their function.

4. The function of the copula inthetic sentences

Lotze (1874/1989) characterized thethetic impersonal sentence, which differs in many ways from the categorical judgment, as follows:

- a. There is no subject, but rather a void (*leere Stelle*/empty slot), which remains unfilled.
- b. The whole content of perception is amalgamated in one single chunk, this together with the predicate.
- c. The linguistic structure ofthetic sentences keeps only formally apart what fuses into an indecomposable whole, where subject and predicate are indiscriminable. Form is not yet related to specified functions.
- d. Thetic sentences differ in essential ways from a *Naturlaut*, the latter being a non-linguistic utterance expressing an unstructured impression (Lotze (1874/1989: 70). Thus, a linguistically unstructured expression of pain does not qualify as functionally equivalent to athetic sentence, but rather as a functional precursor ofthetic.

- e. Prototypicalthetic sentences are so-called impersonal sentences (*It is cold*, French *Il fait froid*) and existential sentences: There is an essential difference between non-linguistic expressions (*Naturlaute*) andthetic sentences. Mere expressions are devoid of structure, whereasthetic sentences contain already an embryo of linguistic structure.
- f. According to Lotze, this embryo of linguistic structure enables already *Denkarbeit* ‘an activity of thinking’ (Lotze (1874/1989: 70).

Lotze definesthetic sentences as fossils that document the first step of structure-driven human-specific thinking. According to Lotze, the human-specific kind of thinking is generated by linguistic structure. Thus, with respect to structure,thetic sentences qualify as evolutionary precursors of categorical sentences. Thetic sentences transform impressions, which would fade away, into memorable entities.

Characteristic of mere impressions is that they are unstructured. Devoid of structure, the expression of impressions cannot qualify as thought. From the point of view of Realism, the structure of mental representations is implemented by language. In other words, the Cartesian axiom *cogito ergo sum* was challenged. According to Realism, human-specific thinking is based on linguistic structure: *Loquor ergo cogito*. The structure of language enables the structuring of impressions, and this structure is the foundation of human-specific thought.

Meanwhile we find first steps in linguistics to identify linguistic fossils in language. This time the emphasis is not on the phylogenesis, but on the ontogenesis (acquisition) of language. Jackendoff (2002: 264) suggests “that certain design features of modern language resemble ‘fossils’ of earlier evolutionary stages”. Children do not start the acquisition of language with finite categorical sentences. They start with “thetic proto-predication” (Casielles & Progovac (2012: 43) which are characteristically “Focus only”-sentences. “Focus only sentence” seems to be a good denominator for allthetic sentences. Casielles/Progovac (2012) refer to Jackendoff (2002) who diagnosed “Agent first”, “Focus last” and compound nouns as protolinguistic entities. According to Casielles & Progovac (2012: 29) the structure “Focus only” is older than “Agent first”. Therefore, they hold that proto-predication begins withthetic sentences (Casielles & Progovac 2012: 43):

We have shown thatthetic unaccusative structures are simpler syntactically, prosodically, semantically and informationally, and have suggested that this is due to the fact that syntactic evolution progressed from a stage withthetic statements (with no argument, such as *It is cold*, or with only one argument, typically unaccusative, such as Spanish *Ha llegado Juan* (has arrived John) or Serbian *Pao sneg* (fallen.PP snow)) to more complex categorical assertions, involving agents and a syntactic and intonational separation between subject and predicate.

It would be interesting to research the rise of theticity in language acquisition in full detail. Such research does not exist yet.

In sum, thetic sentences consist of two constituents only: a copula and a pseudo-structured lump of language. This indecomposable unit consists of a pseudo-subject and a pseudo-predicate. From a functional point of view, thetic sentences consist of a copula and a holophrastic Focus-only construction. There are first suggestions that thetic sentences are phylogenetic as well as ontogenetic precursors of categorical sentences. Those who suggest such a parallel scenario, such as Jackendoff (2002) and Casielles & Progovac (2012: 29), do not work within the framework of Realism. Consequently, the notions of an overt or covert copula are lacking completely.

5. Outlook

The common denominator of thetic sentences and categorical sentences is the copula. There is no sentence conceivable without a copula. The function of the copula in thetic sentences differs from the copula in analytic sentences; and the function of the copula in analytic sentences is not the same as in synthetic sentences. The common denominator of the three qualities of a copula is that they are relators. To be more specific: They relate to reality. The thetic copula relates exclusively to the part of reality that is in focus. The analytic copula relates perceptual data of reality to distinctive features that are either similar or dissimilar. This technique of classification enables the human species to relate to a shared model of reality. Additionally, this technique enables different degrees of resolution of reality via the technique of hyperonymy and hyponymy. The result is that analytic sentences enable fast adaptation to a continually changing environment (*Umwelt*). The mode shared by these different resolutions of reality is the mode of BEING, which is necessarily present in all lexemes of the mental lexicon. Finally, the function of the synthetic copula is to relate classes (reality reduced with respect to complexity) to individuals.

The synthetic copula is enriched (in the sense of Schmitz 1974) by a system of coordinates that enables the human species to refer directly to individuals and not to classes. This enrichment is based on the inborn toolkit of grammatical categories. This toolkit is the most complex part of Universal Grammar. Analytic sentences classify. Classification, however, is devoid of the function of denotation/reference. Classes are not rooted in time and space. Synthetic sentences enrich the analytic copula with time, space, and additional indices. In contrast to the unenriched copula in analytic sentences, the enriched copula in synthetic sentences does refer. Both types of sentences are categorical sentences/judgments.

Analytic sentences are linguistic tools to build up a system of knowledge for a linguistic community. Synthetic sentences generate a tool that allows communicating personal experiences to others. Without synthetic sentences, the human species would not be the most socialized species known to us. It suffices to make an invention or discovery only once so long as it is communicable.

Language acquisition does not start with a lexicon and deixis. Children start with a cry or a proto-utterance, which may be a signal of distress, anger, hunger or surprise, happiness, and so on. In any case, these cries refer to states of the inner world of the child. They are “intransitive”, which means that they refer to internal feelings of the child and not to the outer world nor to an addressee. The child cries when it is hungry; it does not yet point to the world. It is itself “Focus only”. There is no deixis and no reference to the outside world. Deixis appears as soon as the child is able to point at some source of food when it is hungry. The ability to point at something transcends the intransitive mode of communication of the child. It creates the natural *Origo*, which paves the way for embryonic stages of transitive communication. Transitive communication implies a scenario where an interaction begins between the speaker and the world, and finally between the speaker and another speaker or hearer. This development of transitivity is based on the acquisition of more and more complex grammatical categories.

Finally, it is interesting to note that linguistic theories that favour the tripartite structure of subject – copula – predicate also favour a tripartite model of the linguistic sign, which is the semiotic triangle, which goes back to Aristotle (see Coseriu 1969 and Leiss 1998) and has been elaborated by Peirce (see Peirce 1982ff and Leiss 2009/2012: 47 as well as Leiss 2014). Peirce was often misunderstood and characterized as a “triadomaniac”. The same holds for Zemb (1978 & 1984), who used the notion of “phema” instead of copula (see Leiss 2018). In contrast to triadic linguistics, dyadic linguistic theories, such as the semiotics of Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/1967), are unable to distinguish between meaning (*Bedeutung*) and reference/denotation (*Bezeichnung*). Most of the introductions into linguistics still mirror this drawback. At least, it is a drawback from the point of view of the Philosophy of Realism.

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PART 2

Impersonal constructions

Are theticity and sentence-focus encoded grammatical categories of Dutch?

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This article examines whether theticity and sentence-focus can be considered to be encoded grammatical categories of Dutch. After providing some background about theticity and sentence-focus, the concept ‘encoded grammatical category’ is operationalized along the lines of Integral Linguistics or Coserian Structural Functionalism. In order for a functional category to qualify as an encoded grammatical category of a language, the language should have at least one construction that encodes the category as a non-defeasible semantic property. The article provides a qualitative investigation of both corpus-based and constructed examples of five Dutch constructions that have hitherto been recognized in the literature as thetic or sentence-focus constructions. It is shown that none of the previously identified Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions grammatically encode theticity and sentence-focus as their non-defeasible semantics. All Dutch constructions have uses that are categorically opposed to the categories theticity and sentence-focus. Theticity and sentence-focus are therefore no independently encoded grammatical categories of Dutch, but rather categories of discourse and (normal) language use.

Keywords: Dutch, encoded grammatical category, information structure, sentence-focus, theticity

1. Introduction

A wide variety of typologically diverse languages has been analyzed as possessing some linguistic means to express the category theticity (Ulrich 1985; Sasse 1987, 1995; Rosengren 1997; Matic’ 2003; Sasse 2006), or the – closely related – category sentence-focus (Lambrecht 1987, 1994; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000). Also, in Dutch a number of sentential structures have been assigned the function of conveying the categories theticity and sentence-focus. Hitherto at least five Dutch sentential constructions have been identified as thetic and sentence-focus constructions, viz. the Syntactic Inversion with Filler Insertion Construction (SIFIC)

(1), the Non-Prototypical Cleft (NPC) (2), the Existential Construction (EC) (3), the Perception Verb Construction (PVC) (4), and the Prosodic Inversion Construction (PIC) (5) (cf. Elffers 1977; Kirsner 1979; Schermer-Vermeer 1985, 1987; Pardoën 1998; Lambrecht 2000; Vandeweghe 2004; Sasse 2006; Belligh 2018; Belligh in rev.).

- (1) *Er loopt iemand op het dak* (Vandeweghe 2004: 1019)
there walks someone on the roof
'There is someone walking on the roof.'
- (2) *Er is een man die over de sporen loopt* (Belligh 2018: 28)
there is a man that over the tracks walks
'There is a man walking on the tracks.'
- (3) *Er is een doorbraak in het onderzoek naar kanker* (Belligh 2018: 40)
there is a breakthrough in the research on cancer
'There has been a breakthrough in cancer research.'
- (4) *Ik zag daarnet iemand voorbij rijden op een kameel.* (Belligh 2018: 40)
I saw just someone by ride on a camel
'I just saw someone riding by on a camel.'
- (5) *De BEL gaat.* (Schermer-Vermeer 1987: 124)
the bell goes
'The bell rings.'

While the categories *theticity* and *sentence-focus* have been evoked in the analysis of the function of various structures in a wide variety of languages, it can be questioned whether presumably universal categories such as *theticity* and *sentence-focus* are truly 'encoded grammatical categories' of specific natural languages. The debate concerning the encoded grammatical status of various information structural categories in natural languages, including 'theticity' and 'sentence-focus' (Matić 2003) but also 'focus', has recently received much input (Zimmerman & Onea 2011; Matić & Wedgwood 2013).

In this article I draw on the conception of 'encoded grammatical category' as it has been developed in Integral Linguistics or Coserian Structural Functionalism (Coseriu 1974[1958], 1975[1962], 1985, 1987, 1989, 1992, 2000[1990], 2007; Willems 1994, 1997; Coene 2006; Van der Gucht et al. 2007; Willems 2011; De Cuyper 2013; Willems 2016), and to some extent neo-Gricean Pragmatics (Levinson 1997, 2000, 2003). Building on these theories, I will argue that for a functional category to be a full-fledged encoded grammatical category of a given language, there has to be at least one construction in the language, either on the morphological, lexical, phrasal, or clausal level, that unambiguously encodes the functional category as a non-defeasible semantic property. If, by contrast, no such non-defeasibility can be established, then the category under scrutiny can still be

a relevant category of discourse and language use, but it is not, strictly speaking, a category of the language's grammatical system.

A number of studies over the past 25 years have cast doubt on the idea that various language-specific constructions in a variety of languages grammatically encode thcticity or sentence-focus as their non-defeasible semantics (cf. Sasse 1995; Matic 2003; Sasse 2006; Matic & Wedgwood 2013; Karssenbergh 2016; Karssenbergh et al. 2018). Also, with regard to Dutch the question has been raised whether thcticity and sentence-focus are language-specific encoded grammatical categories or rather general categories of discourse and language use (Belligh 2018). On the basis of a study of the constructional semantics and pragmatics of the Dutch SIFIC it has been argued that thcticity and sentence-focus are not part of the encoded, non-defeasible semantics of this specific construction, but are conveyed as pragmatic default senses (Belligh in rev.).

However, given that Dutch has a number of constructions that can be used to express thcticity and sentence-focus in addition to the SIFIC, it remains possible that the Dutch language system encodes thcticity or sentence-focus as a grammatical category. Hitherto there has been no comprehensive study of all relevant Dutch structures that can convey thcticity and sentence-focus in order to determine whether Dutch has thcticity and/or sentence-focus as encoded grammatical categories.

In this article a qualitative study of all previously identified Dutch thctic and sentence-focus constructions is conducted to shed light on this question. For the investigation both corpus data and examples constructed on the basis of native-speaker intuition are used. On the basis of a qualitative analysis every Dutch thctic and sentence-focus construction is first evaluated in its own right before a general conclusion about the Dutch language system and the expression of thcticity and sentence-focus is put forward. By reporting on the grammatically encoded or non-encoded status of the categories thcticity and sentence-focus in Dutch, the article not only elucidates the specific situation of Dutch, but also contributes to the discussion regarding the grammatically encoded or general conceptual nature of the categories thcticity and sentence-focus in general.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background of the study. The article starts off by elucidating what the categories thcticity and sentence-focus are (2.1), by defining encoded grammatical categories, and by specifying how they differ from other categories of function and meaning that are relevant in the study of language (2.2). Section 2.3 reviews the state of the art regarding the encoded grammatical or general conceptual status of thcticity and sentence-focus. Section 3 summarizes the research on thcticity and sentence-focus in Dutch and discusses all previously identified Dutch thctic and sentence-focus constructions. Section 4 examines each previously identified Dutch construction in order to establish if any of these constructions encode thcticity or sentence-focus

as their non-defeasible semantics, and hence whether they can or cannot be said to be dedicated to the expression of theticity and sentence-focus. Finally, Section 5 closes the article by providing a general conclusion about Dutch and the status of the categories theticity and sentence-focus.

2. Theoretical background: theticity, sentence-focus and encoded grammatical categories

2.1 Theticity and sentence-focus

2.1.1 *The categories theticity and sentence-focus*

The origins of the category theticity can be traced back far in the history of Western philosophy and in the intellectual history of universal grammar (Leiss 2020). Theticity played a particularly important role in the work of Rudolf Lotze, albeit under a different name (cf. Leiss 2020), and became fully articulated in the work of Franz Brentano and Anton Marty (Marty 1918). Brentano and Marty were interested in the transformation of Aristotelian predicate logic. More in particular they questioned the Aristotelian idea of the “articulation of the judgment in subject and predicate” (Haberland 1994: 4605). They argued that some judgments are to be considered simple or thetic, whereas others are double or categorical. The categorical judgments, which correspond to the classic Aristotelian judgments, require both the recognition of some entity and the act of affirming or denying a predication about that entity. It therefore “consists in predicating (or denying) some property of some entity” (Lambrecht 1987: 3). In this case there are two subsequent judgments involved and this operation can be formalized as ‘A is B’ or ‘A is not B’. Thetic judgments, on the other hand, only involve the recognition or rejection of some judgment material, without predicating this judgment of some independently recognized entity. These judgments therefore attribute something to a situation as a whole and can be formalized as ‘A is’ or ‘A is not’. Some examples from Marty (1918) can be found below:

- | | | |
|-----|---|----------|
| (6) | <i>Gott ist</i>
God is
'God exists.' | (thetic) |
| (7) | <i>Es regnet.</i>
it rains
'It is raining.' | (thetic) |
| (8) | <i>Es findet ein Markt statt.</i>
it takes a market place
'There is a market taking place.' | (thetic) |

- (9) *Dieses Pferd ist ein Schimmel* (categorical)
 this horse is a gray-horse
 ‘This horse is a gray horse.’

In the long run the approach of Brentano and Marty was dwarfed by the success of the alternative approach to modern logic created and developed by, among others, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, who disposed of the notion of subject and predicate in a logical sense altogether. However, the idea of thetic judgments regained attention when the primarily logic-oriented endeavor was transferred to the realm of linguistics in a seminal paper by Kuroda (1972).¹ Kuroda claimed that evidence for the importance of the thetic-categorical distinction as a theory of human judgment could be found if a language showed a “direct reflection” of the two types of judgment in its sentence structure. According to Kuroda (1972), this is the case for Japanese, which in his analysis marks the thetic and categorical judgment by means of the *joshi -ga*, used for thetic judgments, and *-wa*, used for categorical judgments. After Kuroda’s (1972) introduction of theticity into the field of linguistics, Ulrich (1985) drew on the category theticity to characterize a number of constructions marked by the inversion of the morphosyntactic subject and verb in various Romance languages, including Italian, Spanish and Romanian. The final breakthrough for the category theticity in linguistic analysis followed shortly after, when Sasse (1987) applied it on a typological scale. Sasse (1987) argued that the category could in fact be felicitously applied in the analysis of a very large number of structures in typologically diverse and unrelated languages. In the typological literature, theticity has remained to this day a category that is often used to characterize the function of a great variety of constructions (cf. Section 2.1.2).

Sasse (1987) furthermore reinterpreted the logical category theticity in more discourse-based terms. In his new conception the distinction between thetic and categorical is interpreted as the distinction between two specific points of view from which a state of affairs can be regarded. Whereas in categorical sentences a state of affairs is described from the point of view of a separate “predication base” and a “predicate”, the state of affairs is presented as a non-predicative unanalyzed whole in thetic sentences.² While redefining theticity in discourse-based terms, Sasse (1987) also criticized approaches that aimed to make an analysis of thetic sentences in

1. Mathesius (1929) had already applied the distinction in a linguistic context, but his effort was not recognized or taken up in later work by other scholars (cf. Lambrecht 1987; Sasse 1987; Haberland 1994).

2. If the terms “topic” and “comment” are clearly defined in terms of relational givenness, i.e. in terms of aboutness (Gundel 1988[1974]; Lambrecht 1994; Gundel 1999; Gundel & Fretheim 2004), it is correct to equate these terms with Sasse’s (1987) “predication base” and “predicate”.

terms of given and new information (e.g. Kuno 1972; Schmerling 1976). More in particular, Sasse (1987) took issue with the idea that the choice for a certain construction could directly be attributed to the contribution of the contextually old and new constituent parts of the sentence. He convincingly argued that if in a certain setting both the subject and predicate are “contextually unbound”, i.e. referentially new, the speaker is not forced to use athetic construction, but still has the choice to take athetic or a categorical perspective. From this point of view, it follows that categorical all-new sentences exist (cf. Haberland 1994).³

In addition to thethetic approach, an alternative analysis for many structures that were analyzed asthetic was proposed by Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000). According to Lambrecht the essential trait characterizing so-calledthetic constructions is their specific focus articulation that encompasses both the subject and the predicate. In Lambrecht’s view these constructions should therefore rather be analyzed as “sentence-focus constructions”. Lambrecht’s perspective can thus be considered as an approach that studies the issue at hand in terms of relational givenness and is insofar related to the discourse-based conception oftheticity proposed by Sasse (1987). However, Lambrecht uses the focus-background dimension, rather than the topic-comment dimension of relational givenness in his analysis. These two related components of relational givenness frequently interact but are not identical (Molnár 1993; Lambrecht 1994; Rosengren 1997). Lambrecht’s specific definition of focus is based on a Stalnakerian account of communication (cf. Stalnaker 1973, 1999, 2002)⁴ and formulated in terms of discourse-based assertion and presupposition:

FOCUS: the semantic component of a pragmatically structured proposition whereby the assertion differs from the presupposition. (Lambrecht 1994: 213)⁵

Lambrecht’s theory distinguishes three possible focus categories, which are considered universal categories that are in some way or another reflected in the grammars of the world’s languages. The three types of focus construal are labeled

3. The issue raised by Sasse is closely related to the distinction between relational givenness and referential givenness (cf. Chafe 1976; Gundel 1988[1974]; Prince 1992; Chafe 1994; Lambrecht 1994; Gundel 1999; Gundel & Fretheim 2004; Krifka 2008).

4. The discourse-based approach to assertion and presupposition defines these terms by means of reference to the common ground between interlocutors (Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Stalnaker 1999, 2002), rather than by reference to a necessary logical precondition of existence as in the classic approach to assertion and presupposition (Strawson 1950).

5. This discourse-based definition of focus is not incompatible with more formalized definitions, such as “indicator of alternatives” as favored in formal semantics theories, such as structured meanings (Krifka 2008) and alternative semantics (Rooth 1992), cf. Matić (2015).

predicate-focus, argument-focus, and sentence-focus, and the constructions structurally marking these kinds of construal are labeled predicate-focus constructions, argument-focus constructions, and sentence-focus constructions, respectively. In predicate-focus construal the scope of the focus is limited to the predicate, with the subject falling within the scope of the presupposition, as in (10). Alternatively, the scope of the focus can be limited to the subject only, with the predicate falling within the scope of the presupposition, which is the case in argument-focus construal, see (11). Thirdly, it is also possible that both the subject and the predicate fall under the scope of the focus operator, which is then said to be an instance of sentence-focus construal, e.g. (12) (Lambrecht 1987, 1994; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000):⁶

- (10) What did John do? John went to the LIBRARY.
 (11) Who went to the library? JOHN went to the library.
 (12) What happened? JOHN went to the library.

2.1.2 *Thetic and sentence-focus constructions*

Linguistic constructions that can be used to convey the categories theticity and sentence-focus can be found in a large number of languages across the globe (Sasse 1987, 1995; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000; Matic' 2003; Sasse 2006). In nearly every Indo-European language one or more thetic or sentence-focus constructions have been identified, e.g. Italian (Venier 2002), Spanish (Meullemann 2012), French (Lambrecht 1994), Romanian (Ulrich 1985), English (Lambrecht 1987, 1994) and German (Lambrecht 1987, 1994; Abraham 2018). Also in radically different languages, such as Japanese (Kuroda 1972), Egyptian Arabic (El Zarka 2011), Fulfulde (Apel 2013), Wolof (Fiedler 2013), Buli (Schwarz 2016), Tagalog (Dery 2007), Trio (Carlin 2011), Sikuani (Queixalós 2016) and Jaminjung (Schultze-Berndt 2008) thetic and sentence-focus constructions have been found.

The forms that the constructions can cross-linguistically take are very diverse. They range from prosodic accentuation of the subject constituent (e.g. English, German and Turkish), over the inversion of the morphosyntactic subject and predicate (e.g. Italian, Spanish, Romanian, Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, Russian and Chinese), subject incorporation into the verb (e.g. Boni) and the use of clefted syntactic structures (e.g. French and Egyptian Arabic) to the insertion of specific discourse particles (e.g. the *joshi -ga* in Japanese) (Kuroda 1972; Ulrich 1985; Sasse 1987; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000; Matic' 2003; Sasse 2006). The

6. For a discussion regarding the difference between broad focus on the whole sentence and the simultaneous presence of two separate foci and the respective licensing factors, see Abraham (2020).

fact that these formally very divergent constructions are cross-linguistically studied as the same kind of constructions thus solely depends on the assumed similarity regarding the category they can express. Furthermore, in the majority of languages that have hitherto been examined, more than one construction seems to be available to express theticity and sentence-focus (Sasse 1987; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000; Matic' 2003; Sasse 2006). For example, in French various constructions have been identified as thetic and sentence-focus constructions, including the *il y a* cleft, the *j'ai* cleft and the perception verb construction governed by inflected forms of verbs such as *voir* ('to see') (Lambrecht 1994).

Regarding the relation between a structure fulfilling a thetic or sentence-focus function and the qualification as a thetic or sentence-focus construction, there is a relevant difference between the two categories. For the category theticity, the existing literature tends to consider all the possible structures a language has to convey theticity as the thetic constructions of that particular language. For the category sentence-focus matters are somewhat more complicated. A construction that is used to convey sentence-focus construal is considered a specific focus construction only if the construction also structurally indicates its construal (Lambrecht 1987, 1994, 2000). In Lambrecht's theory this structural marking is done in terms of marking the paradigmatic contrast with one of the other universal focus types. More specifically, Lambrecht considers the declarative and predicative sentence structure with a predicate-focus construal (see (10)) as the most unmarked type of construction for every language. Argument-focus (11) and sentence-focus constructions (12) need to be structurally different from this unmarked construction pattern to be classified as such.

A construction used with sentence-focus construal is therefore only considered to be a full-fledged sentence-focus construction if it is structurally different from the predicate-focus constructions in the same language. For Lambrecht displaying sentence-focus construal is thus a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the status of sentence-focus construction. Typically, a sentence-focus construction is characterized by the formal marking of the subject constituent as focal and non-topical (Lambrecht 1987; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000). Lambrecht (1987, 2000) excludes thetic sentences such as (13), which clearly have sentence-focus construal, from the status of sentence-focus construction, because they are structurally indistinguishable from predicate-focus constructions with pronominal subjects that carry presuppositions, such as (14).

(13) (What is happening outside?) It is raining. (Lambrecht 2000: 619)

(14) (What is wrong with the roof?) It is leaking. (Lambrecht 2000: 619)

Furthermore, sentence-focus constructions are defined exclusively with regard to the focal or non-focal status of the subject constituent and the predicate constituent. If there are constituents within the broader predicate constituent that are not in focus, this does not bear on the classification of the sentence as sentence-focus. This is an important qualification, because many researchers that have followed Lambrecht's lead seem to have assumed that sentence-focus simply means focus on the whole sentence. However, for Lambrecht this is not necessarily the case, as shown by his analysis of Example (15). The sentence serves as an answer to the question what happened to a certain woman.

- (15) *L'ha lasciata il marito* (Lambrecht 2000: 648)
 Her's has left the husband
 'Her husband left her.'

While the clitic direct object, which is fronted in this Italian sentence, is clearly topical, presupposed and coreferential with the woman mentioned earlier, this sentence nonetheless is classified as a sentence-focus construction by Lambrecht, since both the morphosyntactic subject (*il marito*) and the predicate as a whole are in focus. The non-focal direct object (*l'*), only a part of the broader predicate constituent (*l'ha lasciata*), has no bearing on the classification of the sentence as a sentence-focus construction, because it is neither the subject, nor constitutes the entire predicate.⁷

2.2 Encoded grammatical categories

2.2.1 *Encoded grammatical categories and other linguistic categories*

The discussion at hand about linguistic categories focuses on the meaning/function side of language, and not on the form/expression side of language.⁸ Categories that relate to meaning or function are referred to as 'functional categories' in this article, as they are used to capture the functions or, in the broadest sense, the meanings of linguistic forms. In this article I will adopt a difference established within the broad group of functional categories between 'grammatically encoded categories' and 'categories of discourse and language use'. The distinction between various, qualitatively different types of functional categories has been convincingly argued for by

7. The importance of specific syntactic constituents for the definition of sentence-focus is arguably due to Lambrecht's conception of focus as mapping directly onto specific syntactic constituents (Matić 2003).

8. Of course, a discussion about which categories truly belong to the grammatical system of specific languages and which categories are merely useful tools to compare languages is highly relevant for both the analysis of form/expression and the analysis of meaning/function (cf. Haspelmath 2010).

proponents of Integral Linguistics or Coserian Structural Functionalism (Coseriu 1974[1958], 1975[1962], 1985, 1987, 1989, 1992, 2000[1990], 2007; Willems 1994, 1997; Coene 2006; Van der Gucht et al. 2007; Willems 2011; De Cuypere 2013; Willems 2016), and neo-Gricean Pragmatics (Levinson 1997, 2000, 2003). While there are notable differences between these two theories (Belligh & Willems in rev.), they share the view that identifying a certain function or meaning that can be conveyed by a linguistic structure is not to be equated with identifying the function or meaning that is lexicogrammatically encoded by that linguistic structure, and that making such a distinction is of primary importance to arrive at a coherent and comprehensive understanding of language and language use.

Grammatically encoded categories are those functional categories that have a dedicated formal counterpart in the language system. While there is an endless set of functional categories, as there is an endless set of possible functions and meanings, only a small subset is reflected in forms of a language system. A functional category thus only counts as grammatically encoded if it is co-extensive with a linguistic form, and vice versa. Therefore, if there is a change in the functional category one wants to express, there also must be some change in the form of the language one wants to use. Given the strict requirement of interdependence of form and function, it follows that, for a functional category to be a grammatically encoded category, it must be impossible to cancel the meaning or function captured by the functional category while maintaining the same linguistic form. In other words, a grammatically encoded functional category necessarily captures the non-defeasible meaning or function of a lexeme, a function word, or any other construction in a given language.

Grammatically encoded categories are therefore assumed to form the essence of the structural component of a language, viz. they constitute the core meanings or functions of the full-fledged signs that make up the lexicon and grammar of a language. Using general world knowledge, knowledge of discourse traditions, and inferential capacities, language users can move from the grammatically encoded functions and meanings to all kinds of functions and meanings. Grammatically encoded functions and meaning therefore form the basis for all inferred functions and meanings that can be found in language use.

Consider for example the French preposition *avec* ('with'). In language use it can be found with various functions and meanings, including indicating the 'instrument' as in (16), the 'matter something consists of' (17) and the 'attitude that accompanies an action' (18) (Coseriu 1989: 9).

- (16) *Je coupe le pain avec le couteau.*
 I cut the bread with the knife
 'I cut the bread with the knife.'

- (17) *Ce gâteau est fait avec du sucre et de la farine.*
 this cake is made with of-the sugar and of the flour
 ‘This cake is made of sugar and flour.’
- (18) *Je le fais avec plaisir.*
 I it do with pleasure
 ‘I do it with pleasure.’

Although each of the aforementioned functions aptly characterizes the use of *avec* in a particular setting, none of the three functions captures the essence of the function of this preposition. In fact, every single one of these functions is cancelable (defeasible) when the context changes, as demonstrated by the examples. There is therefore no counterpart in linguistic form for any of these categories, hence they are not grammatically encoded categories. The general function ‘copresence’ on the other hand has been suggested as the encoded function of *avec* (Coseriu 1989). This function underpins all various senses attested in usage and cannot be cancelled in any setting. Hence, it is non-defeasible. If there would be a change in function, for example from ‘copresence’ to ‘absence’, there would be a change in linguistic form, resulting in the use of the French preposition *sans* (‘without’).

Functional categories that can only be used to describe the various uses of a construction do not lose their status as useful linguistic categories, nor their relevance in analyzing linguistic data. However, since they describe possible uses of linguistic items in contexts, they are ‘categories of discourse and language use’, rather than ‘encoded grammatical categories’. Both kinds of categories are equally important, but they differ qualitatively: the latter categories capture properties of the lexicogrammar of the language, while the former capture properties that necessarily relate to what speakers/hearers infer in instances of language use.

Although categories of discourse and language use are always to some degree context-dependent, this does not entail that they only cover uses tied to specific settings. Both Integral Linguistics and Neo-Gricean Pragmatics have developed specific terminologies to distinguish uses that are recurrent and instances of highly conventionalized (so-called “normal”) language use from uses that are tied to particular communicative settings. These two kinds of categories of language use are referred to as *Normbedeutungen* (‘default senses’) versus *Redebedeutungen* (‘one-off interpretations’) in Integral Linguistics, and as Generalized Conversational Implicatures (henceforth: GCIs) versus Particularized Conversational Implicatures (henceforth: PCIs) in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics, respectively.

2.2.2 *Identifying encoded grammatical categories of languages*

In order to be a full-fledged encoded grammatical category of a given language, the language needs to have at least one construction, on the morphological, lexical, phrasal, or clausal level, that unambiguously encodes the functional category as its non-defeasible semantics. To examine whether a language system has a certain functional category as an encoded grammatical category or not, it is therefore necessary to study the meaning/function of all relevant structures. To determine this, a number of steps need to be taken. By taking the functional category of interest as an onomasiological point of departure, one can identify the various constructions in a language that can be used to designate that particular category. Once all relevant constructions have been identified, one has to turn to examining each of these constructions in its own right from a semasiological point of view.

For the semasiological step it is necessary to study the various senses of every construction that are attested in naturally occurring language use. This allows to determine whether all of the attested uses are compatible with the functional category originally hypothesized as the encoded meaning/function. For this to hold, it has to be plausible that, on the basis of general world knowledge, discourse knowledge, and human inferential capacities, the attested uses can be constructed out of the encoded meaning/function. If this is the case, it can be concluded that the language has a dedicated structure for the functional category and that the category therefore is grammatically encoded in the language. If, on the other hand, the various attested uses cannot be reconciled with the hypothesis of the functional category as the encoded meaning, this is indicative of the non-encoded and non-dedicated status of the category in the language under scrutiny. Furthermore, it must not be possible to exchange the hypothesized encoded function or meaning with another function or meaning without having any accompanying change in linguistic form.

The two possible situations are visualized in Figures 1 and 2. The color yellow is used to indicate a functional category, blue is used to refer to the various linguistic constructions that can be used to denote that category. Green is used to signal that a specific construction grammatically encodes the functional category as its non-defeasible semantics, whereas red is used to show the opposite, viz. that the construction does not grammatically encode the functional category.




Figure 1. The process of identifying an encoded grammatical category




Figure 2. The process of determining that a functional category is not grammatically encoded

2.3 Are theticity and sentence-focus encoded grammatical categories?

Since theticity and sentence-focus are functional categories, it is necessary to determine whether they are encoded grammatical categories of specific languages or rather categories of discourse and (normal) language use. With regard to the category theticity, various indications in the seminal work of Marty (1918) are relevant for the issue at hand. Marty’s theory of judgments is about thinking and not, or not necessarily, about linguistic structure. According to Marty, thetic and

categorical judgments are logical categories of language-mediated thinking that can be expressed by linguistic means without there necessarily being linguistic structures unambiguously encoding these types of judgment. Kuroda (1971) maintains that this discrepancy in the work of Marty can be explained by taking into account Marty's theory of speech, which distinguishes inner speech form (in accordance with Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of language) from formal surface structure. While traditional logic supposed, generally speaking, that grammars reflect the structure of the underlying logic judgments, modern analytic logic maintains that the structure of a sentence does not altogether represent the structure of the judgment underlying the sentence. In the work of Marty, a mid-way position is defended: while the existence of two formal linguistic structures is taken to be functionally motivated by two underlying judgments, this does not entail that every instance of a sentence conforms to this pattern (Kuroda 1972). This is a clear indication that theticity could very well turn out to be an important category of discourse and language use, without however being a grammatically encoded one.

In the linguistic work of Kuroda (1972) there are already indications that one and the same linguistic structure can be used to express different kinds of judgment, and hence different functional categories. Although Kuroda (1972) was in search of a "direct reflection" of the categories of Marty⁹ in the grammar of Japanese, he admits that there are sentences marked by *-ga* that can convey both thetic judgments and judgment material without a specific judgment form, and that the *joshi -wa* has a broader discourse function than merely indicating categorical judgments.

Sasse (1987) does not bear directly on the issue of the grammatically encoded status of theticity, but emphasizes the universal nature of theticity and categoricity, which he compares to other basic linguistic categories such as the declarative, interrogative and imperative. In Sasse (1995, 2006) on the other hand, the extreme "polysemy" of the thetic constructions in various languages is stressed. First of all, many thetic constructions exhibit other pragmatic uses than merely the thetic use, such as narrow focus construal on the verb and contrastive argument focus, uses which are mutually exclusive (cf. Sasse 1987). The uses of the constructions that are thetic are furthermore often characterized by language-specific traits. Matic' (2003) proposes a similar analysis, which considers theticity to be an emerging interpretative consequence of specific constructions, distinct from their grammatically encoded function. The attested polysemy of thetic constructions can be considered as an indication of the non-encoded nature of theticity in various languages. If a

9. Kuroda's (1972) thetic-categorical distinction is furthermore not completely identical with Marty's thetic-categorical distinction. In particular their analyses differ for the universal statements, which are analyzed as negative thetics in Brentano and Marty's judgment theory, but are categorical for Kuroda.

construction that can be used to convey theticity can also denote other categories that are incompatible with a hypothetical grammatically encoded theticity function, it cannot be said to encode theticity in a strictly grammatical fashion.

According to Rosengren (1997), the thetic-categorical distinction is conceptual and not linguistic in nature. This view entails that theticity is a possible reading that is inferred on the basis of linguistic structures, but not itself grammatically encoded as the function or meaning of those structures. Information structural categories such as focus and topic, on the other hand, seem to be part of the language system itself and are hence encoded in Rosengren's approach. Under this view, sentence-focus could potentially be a grammatically encoded category of languages, whereas theticity would be a category of discourse and language use. A similar position has been defended by Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000), who claims that theticity is a category of discourse and language use, not a grammatically encoded one. The category theticity is therefore not always reflected in a corresponding grammatical form, which creates a discrepancy between the logical content and grammatical form. As Lambrecht correctly points out, this is entirely consistent with Marty's (1918) original claims regarding the nature of theticity. From a conceptual perspective, a sentence such as (19) is as much thetic as (20).

(19) (What's happening?) It is raining.

(20) (What is going on?) My NECK hurts.

By contrast, from a structural perspective (20) stands in a paradigmatic contrast, in this case prosody-based, with the canonical prosodic topic-comment sentence form *My neck HURTS*, whereas (19) does not (cf. Section 2.1.2). Accordingly, Lambrecht maintains a very strict – basically structuralist – view of what constitutes the object of linguistic analysis proper:

Pragmatic structure without corresponding grammatical structure cannot be captured with rules of grammar and lies therefore outside the domain of linguistics proper. (1987: 373)

Lambrecht therefore excludes theticity from the domain of grammar and instead proposes sentence-focus as the real grammatically encoded function of thetic constructions that are formally distinguishable from predicate-focus sentences. While the grammatically encoded function of these constructions, i.e. sentence-focus, is purely defined in terms of assertion and presupposition scope, various other pragmatic functions sometimes associated with sentence-focus constructions, such as unexpectedness and surprise, are analyzed by Lambrecht as categories of discourse and language use which are pragmatically constructed uses out of the encoded function of indicating sentence-focus.

However, Lambrecht's alternative strand of analysis is not without problems either. In numerous cases sentence-focus constructions also exhibit other kinds of focus construal, a finding that could undermine the idea of sentence-focus as the grammatically encoded function of sentence-focus constructions. Since the various categories of focus construal are defined paradigmatically in contrast to one another, it is hard to explain how a construction with one type of focus construal as its encoded function could allow for other kinds of focus construal as one of its derived uses. When confronted with this difficulty, Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000) resorts to the idea of homonymy. Lambrecht readily admits that there is often ambiguity between argument-focus and sentence-focus construal, as demonstrated in (21) and (22), but he considers this ambiguity not due to an underspecified meaning or function underlying both sentence-focus and argument-focus construal, or to a genuine case of polysemy, but rather to the homonymy of sentence-focus and argument-focus constructions.

(21) (Who is sick?) Her HUSBAND is sick. (Lambrecht 2000: 618)

(22) (What is happening?) Her HUSBAND is sick. (Lambrecht 2000: 618)

Additionally, also predicate-focus constructions can sometimes exhibit sentence-focus construal. For this case Lambrecht does not invoke homonymy but tries to explain it as being a consequence of the "neutral" or unmarked position of predicate-focus constructions in the language system. Lambrecht (1987) furthermore specifies that a predicate-focus construction can only exhibit sentence-focus construal if it does not have a full NP subject. To account for the structural blurring between sentence-focus and predicate-focus construal in pronominal sentences (cf. Section 2.1.2), Lambrecht adds the proviso that the presence of a full lexical subject NP is needed for a construction to qualify as a sentence-focus construction. If a speaker wants to use a sentence with a full NP subject and sentence-focus construal, he/she is forced to use a full-fledged and formally marked sentence-focus construction.¹⁰ Lambrecht's theory of focus types is thus characterized by a fair share of homonymy and ambiguity. The only type of focus ambiguity that is explicitly excluded as a possibility in his system is a sentence-focus construction exhibiting predicate-focus construal (Lambrecht 1987: 375).

Lastly, some recent studies have challenged the dedicatedness of constructions analyzed as boththetic and sentence-focus constructions, although often these

10. To illustrate this point, Lambrecht (1987) uses the English example sentence *It is raining*. This predicate-focus construction can be used with sentence-focus construal, only because it has a pronominal rather than a full nominal subject. In languages such as Japanese where a similar meaning is always expressed using a full noun (*ame*), the sentence must be formally marked as a sentence-focus construction according to Lambrecht (1987).

studies do not frame the discussion in terms of the presence or absence of an encoded meaning/function, but rather in purely descriptive terms of multifunctionality. Two prominent thetic and sentence-focus constructions, the French *il y a* cleft and the Italian *c'è* cleft, were shown to have various information structural uses that are radically different from theticity and sentence-focus in Karssenbergh (2016) and Karssenbergh et al. (2018), respectively. Deguchi (2012) argues that the Japanese *joshi -ga* and *-wa*, the constructions also discussed in the work of Kuroda (1972), do not “uniformly represent” the thetic and the categorial judgment, respectively. Fujinawa (2020) provides a similar analysis of the multifunctionality of *-wa*, but maintains that the multifunctionality does not apply to *-ga*, which in his view unambiguously indicates theticity.

3. Theticity and sentence-focus in Dutch

3.1 The Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions

In the current literature on Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions, five major constructions have been identified as possible thetic and sentence-focus constructions, viz. the Syntactic Inversion with Filler Insertion Construction, the Prosodic Inversion Construction, the Existential Construction, the Non-Prototypical Cleft, and the Perception Verb Construction (cf. Elffers 1977; Kirsner 1979; Schermer-Vermeer 1985, 1987; Pardoën 1998; Lambrecht 2000; Vandeweghe 2004; Sasse 2006; Belligh 2018; Belligh in rev.).

The Syntactic Inversion with Filler Insertion Construction (henceforth: SIFIC) is formally characterized by a syntactic pattern in which the canonical Dutch syntactic subject and predicate order is inverted and the adverbial particle *er* is inserted as a ‘filler’¹¹ element for the position of the canonical morphosyntactic subject, as in (23). The SIFIC is arguably the best-studied Dutch thetic and sentence-focus construction and it has been explicitly recognized in the most recent typological overviews of both thetic and sentence-focus constructions, cf. Sasse (2006) and Lambrecht (2000), respectively.

- (23) *Er zong een merel.* (Schermer-Vermeer 1985: 66)
 there sang a blackbird
 ‘There was a blackbird singing.’

11. By using the term “filler” I do not suggest that the adverbial pronoun *er* would be devoid of meaning and serve as nothing more than a filler element. See Kirsner (1979) and Grondelaers (2000) for a critique of the view that *er* would be a mere filler and for an account that argues for the view that it has a specific (procedural) meaning of its own.

The Prosodic Inversion Construction (henceforth: PIC) is formally characterized by a shift of the prosodic pattern, in comparison with the pattern in unmarked, topic-comment and predicate-focus clauses. The main prosodic accent, indicated by pitch prominence, shifts from a position within the predicate to the subject,¹² (24) is an example. The PIC figures prominently in the typological overview ofthetic constructions by Sasse (2006), but is not explicitly recognized in the overview of sentence-focus constructions by Lambrecht (2000). However, the PIC clearly corresponds to the definition of a sentence-focus construction proposed by Lambrecht. Furthermore, various counterparts of the Dutch PIC in closely related Germanic languages, in particular German and English, have been recognized as sentence-focus constructions (Lambrecht 1987, 1994; Lambrecht & Polinsky 1997; Lambrecht 2000).

- (24) *EEN ZWAAN dreef op de vijver.* (Vandeweghe 2004: 1024)
 a swan floated on the pond
 ‘There was a swan floating on the pond.’

The SIFIC and PIC are widely recognized as the dominantthetic and sentence-focus constructions in Dutch, but this is not the case for the remaining three constructions. They were explicitly identified for the first time in Belligh (2018), on the basis of an experimental elicitation task designed to triggerthetic and sentence-focus constructions. The elicitation task confirmed the frequent occurrence of the SIFIC and PIC in Dutch, while also bringing to light a number of other sentential constructions, which had previously not been explicitly recognized as possiblethetic and sentence-focus constructions.

A third Dutch construction that has been identified as athetic and sentence-focus construction, is the Dutch Existential Construction (henceforth: EC), e.g. (25). The EC is introduced by the adverbial particle *er*, functioning as an expletive, followed by an inflected form of the Dutch existential copula *zijn* (‘to be’), in turn followed by a NP which functions as the pivot of the existential construction (cf. Francez 2007). The EC is clearly closely related to the SIFIC, as they are both introduced by the adverbial particle *er*, immediately followed by an inflected verb, which in turn is followed by a NP. However, given the various specific traits, both formal and functional, that are cross-linguistically only found with existential constructions (see Francez 2007; McNally 2011; and Bentley et al. 2015 for discussion), it was decided to treat the EC as a construction in its own right rather than as a special subtype of the SIFIC that is tied to a specific verb (cf. Belligh 2018).

12. For a more in-depth discussion of the prosodic characteristics of the construction see Belligh (2018).

- (25) *Er is een doorbraak in het onderzoek naar kanker* (Belligh 2018: 40)
 there is a breakthrough in the research to cancer
 ‘There has been a breakthrough in research on cancer.’

A fourth Dutch thetic and sentence-focus construction is the Non-Prototypical Cleft (henceforth: NPC), which formally consists of an existential combined with a relative clause, as in (26). The relative clause has as its antecedent the pivot NP that is part of the matrix existential clause. The NPC is considered to be ‘non-prototypical’ both due to its formal and its functional traits. Formally, the NPC’s clefted syntactic structure is introduced by the adverbial particle *er* rather than by the pronoun *het*, which is used in prototypical Dutch clefts (Van der Beek 2003, 2005). Also, functionally the NPC is to some degree ‘non-prototypical’, since it can be used to indicate sentence-focus construal, rather than the argument-focus construal commonly associated with prototypical clefts (cf. Lambrecht 1994).

- (26) *Er was een hond die mijn sleutels heeft meegenomen* (Belligh 2018: 44)
 there was a dog that my keys has taken
 ‘There was a dog that took my keys.’

Lastly, the Perception Verb Construction (henceforth: PVC) has been identified as the fifth Dutch thetic and sentence-focus construction. The PVC formally consists of a main clause and a subordinated clause. The matrix verb of the main clause is a perception verb functioning in a weak-verb like fashion. In fact, the most important pragmatic function of the verb is not to convey the message that the speaker is seeing, hearing or sensing something.¹³ The perception verb is rather used as a convenient way to introduce the relevant new information which is expressed in the subordinated clause. In French a similar construction had already been identified by Lambrecht (1994) as a productive sentence-focus construction.¹⁴ The embedded clause can be both a prototypical relative clause as in (27), or an infinitival relative clause, as in (28).

- (27) *Ik hoorde dat er treinstakingen zullen zijn.*
 I heard that there railway-strikes will be
 ‘I heard that there will be railway strikes.’

13. For an in-depth discussion of weak verbs, alternatively called parenthetical verbs, see Willems & Blanche-Benveniste (2014).

14. The PVC has alternatively been referred to as “a presentational construction”. This is also the case for the other four constructions discussed in this overview (cf. Lambrecht 1987, 1994). When describing these constructions as presentational, the focus is mainly on their function to introduce referentially new entities into the discourse world, rather than on their topic-comment structure and focus-background articulation.

- (28) *Ik zag daarnet iemand voorbij rijden op een kameel* (Belligh 2018: 40)
 I saw just someone by ride on a camel
 ‘I just saw someone riding by on a camel.’

3.2 The grammatically encoded status of theticity and sentence-focus in Dutch

The Dutch constructions discussed in the previous section have often been identified by means of an onomasiological approach posing the question what the structures in Dutch are that can convey the categories theticity and sentence-focus. In Belligh (2018) the onomasiological bias is explicitly discussed and the question is explicitly raised whether theticity and sentence-focus are encoded grammatical categories of Dutch or rather general categories of discourse and language use. On the basis of a study of the constructional semantics and pragmatics of the SIFIC it was shown that theticity and sentence-focus are not part of the construction's encoded semantics, but instead conveyed as default senses or GCIs (Belligh in rev.). However, given that Dutch has several constructions that can be used to express theticity and sentence-focus in addition to the SIFIC, it is still possible that Dutch encodes theticity or sentence-focus as a grammatical category. The article therefore now turns to an investigation of all relevant Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions.

4. Assessing the status of theticity and sentence-focus in Dutch

4.1 Methodology

To address the research question whether Dutch as a language system grammatically encodes the categories theticity and sentence-focus, the general strategy outlined in Section 2.2.2 was followed. The first step of the procedure, viz. identifying the relevant constructions by means of the onomasiological approach, was considered to be sufficiently dealt with in the existing literature. The five thetic and sentence-focus constructions discussed in Section 3.1 were therefore taken as the constructions of interest that needed to be the object of a subsequent semasiological study.

In order to evaluate whether these five constructions encode theticity or sentence-focus in a non-defeasible manner, the semasiological investigation was targeted at finding uses of the constructions that are odds with the hypothesis of theticity and sentence-focus as the encoded function or meaning. Three uses in particular were considered to bear on the question whether the category logical

theticity, the category discourse-based theticity and the category sentence-focus, are grammatically encoded in any of the Dutch constructions. If a construction is found with a logically categorical reading, then logical theticity cannot be the encoded meaning of the construction, because logically thetic and logically categorical are defined in mutually exclusive terms with regard to one another. If a construction is found with a topic-comment structure, rather than an all-comment structure, then discourse-based theticity cannot be the encoded meaning of the construction, because absence of a topic constituent is a logical prerequisite for an all-comment structure. Finally, if a construction is found with an argument-focus or predicate-focus construal, then sentence-focus cannot be the encoded meaning of the construction, because the three types of focus construal mutually exclude each other.

The reason for adopting the aforementioned criteria is twofold. First, given that thetic and categorical judgments, and the different kinds of focus construal, are defined negatively in relation to one another,¹⁵ it is highly implausible that language users, using world knowledge, discourse knowledge and normal inferential processes, would get from an encoded category to a category that is negatively defined in relation to the former. While this is arguably not completely impossible, it is far more plausible to assume that another encoded meaning underpins the various uses. Second, if it is possible for one construction or form to have two radically opposed meanings depending on the context, it follows that each of these two meanings can be cancelled without having any impact on grammatical form.¹⁶ Given that interdependence of form and function is indispensable for grammatically encoded categories, these meanings or functions cannot be considered to be grammatically encoded.

In order to find a sufficient variety of uses of the constructions that are relevant for our purposes, the study draws on both corpus data and constructed examples. All corpus examples are extracted from the SoNaR corpus, alternatively known as the Stevin Nederlandstalig Referentiecorpus. The SoNaR corpus was made available in 2013 and can be considered to be the most recent reference corpus of contemporary Dutch, with all texts in the corpus stemming from the period between 1954 and 2002. It is a large-scale, annotated reference corpus that contains 505,000,000

15. While true of both the thetic and the sentence-focus approach, this is especially evident for the three kinds of focus construal central to Lambrecht's theory. Lambrecht (1994) in fact explicitly acknowledges the Saussurean idea of paradigmatic contrast ('opposition') that lies at the basis of his distinction between the various types of focus constructions and focus construal.

16. The potential homonymy solution proposed by Lambrecht to avoid this way of reasoning will be discussed in Section 4.7.

words. The corpus contains both Dutch from the Netherlands and Belgian Dutch, with Belgian Dutch comprising 78.24% of the entire corpus. It consists of a collection of written Dutch from various sources and text types, including newspaper articles, books, magazines, social media data, chatroom data and the transcription of speeches. Hence, texts written to be read and texts written to be spoken are both included in the corpus. The SoNaR corpus was accessed using the OpenSoNaR software, an online program that allows to easily extract data from the SoNaR corpus (Oostdijk et al. 2013).

In order to illustrate uses not directly attested in the corpus material, the study also draws on sentences constructed on the basis of native-speaker intuition. The author of this text used his native-speaker intuitive knowledge of Dutch to construct a number of examples with specific contexts to demonstrate specific uses of the constructions. In order to ensure that the constructed examples are not merely part of the idiolect of the author or in any other sense of a questionable nature, the acceptability was cross-checked with the intuition of two native speakers without any specific training in linguistics. The two native speakers were presented with the constructed examples and their specific contexts and asked to rate their acceptability on a five point scale, with the values ‘not acceptable’, ‘questionable’, ‘neutral’, ‘acceptable’ and ‘fully acceptable’. Only those examples that were rated by both informants as ‘fully acceptable’ were used for further analysis in this study.

4.2 The Syntactic Inversion with Filler Insertion Construction

The SIFIC can be used in numerous ways that are incompatible with the hypothesis of either theticity or sentence-focus as the encoded meaning/function of the construction (Belligh in rev.) First of all, there are several uses that are characterized by a categorical reading, both when adopting the logical conception of theticity as well as the discourse-based conception of theticity. More in particular this is the case with numerous examples found in the corpus where the clause-initial *er* does not function as an expletive, but functions anaphorically, viz. referring back to a previously mentioned place, illustrating the use of so-called locative *er*, as in the corpus Examples (29) and (30), or to an entity, illustrating the use of so-called prepositional *er*, as in corpus Examples (31) and (32).

- (29) *Baden-Württemberg is een hooggeïndustrialiseerd gebied.*
Er draaien vier van de in totaal 17 Duitse kerncentrales.
 there turn four of the in total 17 German nuclear-power-plants.
 ‘Baden-Württemberg is a highly industrialized area. The area contains four of the in total seventeen German nuclear power plants.’

- (30) *Het gebied ten westen van de Mississippi was grotendeels terra incognita.*
Er leefden geen olifantachtige Mastodonten.
 there lived no elephant-like mastodons.
 ‘The area west of the Mississippi was largely terra incognita. There were no elephant-like mastodons living there.’
- (31) *De Algemene Moslimraad van België werd op 25 maart 2005 opnieuw verkozen.*
Er zetelen 34 Franstalige en 34 Nederlandstalige moslims in.
 there seat 34 French-speaking and 34 Dutch-speaking Muslims in.
 ‘The elections for the General Muslim Council of Belgium were held on the 25th of March 2005. In the council there are 34 French speaking and 34 Dutch speaking Muslims.’
- (32) *De Rules of Engagement waren in principe wel bij iedere militair bekend.*
Er vloeide bijvoorbeeld uit voort dat er weinig kon
 there flowed for-example out from that there little could
worden ondernomen.
 be undertaken
 ‘The rules of engagement were in principle clear to all military personnel. The rules had for example as a consequence that little could be done.’

The adverbial particle *er* at the left end of the construction is the topic constituent of the clause.¹⁷ It requires the recognition of the place (locative use) or entity (prepositional use) *er* is anaphorically referring back to before the logical evaluation of the predication expressed in the clause can take place.

Given that sentence-focus constructions are defined with regard to the focal status of the morphosyntactic subject, it is necessary to find examples of a SIFIC with a non-focal subject in order to demonstrate that there is no one-to-one relationship between this construction and the sentence-focus category. If one maintains that the clause-initial *er* is the morphosyntactic subject of the SIFIC, then the previous uses also constitute evidence against the claim that sentence-focus is the encoded meaning/function of the SIFIC. However, in the literature the post-verbal NP is widely recognized to be the real, albeit displaced, morphosyntactic subject of the clause, with the clause-initial *er* only being a particle occupying

17. Although the most prominent type of Dutch *er*, the so-called expletive *er*, is always non-topical and non-anaphorical, this is, importantly, not the case for other types of Dutch *er*, such as locative *er* and prepositional *er*, which also occur sentence-initially. While the thetic uses of the Dutch SIFIC are characterized by the presence of expletive *er*, there are also many cases of SIFICs with locative and prepositional *er*, resulting in categorical judgments and topic-comment sentences (Belligh in rev.).

the canonical position of the Dutch subject (Kirsner 1979; Schermer-Vermeer 1985, 1987; Vandeweghe 2004). Following this strand of analysis, there are also examples of the SIFIC with a postverbal subject NP carrying various referential and relational presuppositions, as in the corpus Example (33) and the constructed Example (34).

- (33) *En nu maar hopen dat die decanen op hun scholen enthousiaste verhalen aan de leerlingen vertellen, zegt Leijen, want het is moeilijk om aan matrozen te komen. Er stoppen er meer met varen dan er nieuwe bijkomen.*
 there stop there more with sailing than there new-ones join
 ‘And now we have to hope that those deans tell positive stories to their pupils in their schools, says Leijen, because it is hard to find sailors. There are more sailors quitting the business than there are new sailors joining.’
- (34) *Kan u ons nog iets meer vertellen over de bootvluchtelingen? Over de bootvluchtelingen?*
Er komen er iedere dag aan op de verschillende eilanden in de Egeïsche Zee.
 Aegean Sea.
 ‘Could you tell us something more about the refugees coming by boat?’
 ‘About the refugees coming by boat? Every day they arrive on the various islands of the Aegean Sea.’

In these examples the otherwise full postverbal NP is replaced by an anaphoric *er*, which illustrates the use of the so-called quantitative *er*. The quantitative *er* is functionally different from the expletive or locative *er* that occurs at the beginning of the clause (Haeseryn et al. 1997; Grondelaers 2000) and functions here as the topic-constituent of the clause with a non-focal status.

4.3 The Prosodic Inversion Construction

In addition to the uses where the main prosodic peak on the subject indicates theticity or sentence-focus, there are other possible uses of a prosodically dominant subject in Dutch. First of all, a prosodically dominant subject can indicate focus on the subject, rather than on the sentence as a whole, as in the constructed Examples (35) and (36).

- (35) *Wie had de beste punten voor die toets?*
PIETER had de beste punten.
 Peter had the best grades
 ‘Who had the best grades on that test?’ ‘PETER had the best grades.’

- (36) *Ik weet niet wie de dader is, maar ik verdenk Anneke, Julia en Sofie.*
SOFIE is de dader.
 Sophie is the culprit
 'I don't know who the culprit is, but I suspect Anneke, Julia and Sophie.
 'SOPHIE is the culprit.'

The focus category involved in these examples is clearly argument-focus rather than sentence-focus. Furthermore, also for the two possible conceptualizations of the category theticity it is clear that these examples illustrate non-thetic uses. As regards the logic-based conception of theticity, there are two separate judgments involved in Example (35), viz. first the judgment that there is someone in a certain context with the best grades, and secondly the judgment that this person happens to be Peter. In addition, regarding the discourse-based conception of theticity it is clear that rather than the absence of a topic-comment relation within the clausal domain, one finds an inverted topic-comment relation, viz. the subject is functioning as the new information about the topical proposition with one variable left open.

Furthermore, there are uses where a prosodically dominant subject highlights a topic constituent of a topic-comment clause and distinguishes it from another topic constituent, as in the constructed Example (37). In (37) we find a construction with a prosodically dominant subject that can be characterized by topic-comment structure, predicate-focus articulation and a logical categorial judgment. In fact, the new information, both focus-wise and comment-wise, is to be found within the predicate rather than with the subject. Logically speaking there also two judgments involved, viz. the recognition of the two subjects and the respective predications about these subjects.

- (37) *Wat doen Karel en Willem qua beroep?*
KAREL is piloot en WILLEM is ingenieur.
 Carl is pilot and William is engineer
 'What is the profession of Carl and William?' 'Carl is a pilot and William is an engineer.'

These examples show that the Dutch PIC can not only be used to convey thetic judgments, all-comment sentences and sentence-focus articulation, but also categorial judgments, topic-comment sentences and predicate-focus and argument-focus construals. However, an important caveat is in order. There is a long tradition in information structure studies that treats prosody on a purely intuitive basis, i.e. solely relying on the judgment of the author(s) to describe the prosody of sentences. The accounts are generally limited to indicating where the prosodic peak of a sentence can be found according to native speaker intuition. While it is true that native speakers have an intuitive understanding and knowledge of the prosodic structure

of sentences, it could turn out that there are more fine-grained distinctions between the various uses of a sentence with a prosodically dominant subject. By using technological innovations and adopting a perspective in line with the latest findings in the field of prosody, there is hope that such distinctions will eventually be revealed. It could be that there are actually various subject dominant prosodic constructions in Dutch and other languages, each with its own information structural properties and specific prosodic contour. However, since such a detailed investigation falls outside the scope of this contribution, I leave this issue for future research.

4.4 The existential construction

If the Dutch existential construction is used as athetic or sentence-focus construction, it can plausibly be characterized as an entity-central kind of thetic (cf. Sasse 1987, 1995, 2006). However, as is the case for the SIFIC, there are uses of the EC that cannot be characterized as thetic or sentence-focus, respectively. First of all, there are instances where the clause-initial *er* refers back to either a location (locative use of *er*) or an entity (prepositional use of *er*). In those cases, the EC does not qualify as a logical thetic sentence, or an all-comment sentence, but rather as a categorical or topic-comment sentence; (38) and (39) are corpus examples.

- (38) *De maandagse kermisprijs van de Betserse Sportvrienden is al decennialang een sportieve hoogdag in de regio.*
Er zijn 16 rondes van 9 km, 144 km in het totaal.
 there are 16 rounds of 9 km, 144 km in the total
 ‘The Monday Fair Price of the Betser Sport Friends has been a special day for sports in the region for decades. There are 16 rounds of 9 km, amounting to 144 km in total.’
- (39) *Op Ketnet Freezz kunnen de kinderen zich onder meer uitleven op de reuzengrote bandenglijbaan ‘Tube-Thrill’, het hoogteparcours en de indoor-ijspiste.*
Er zijn ook dagelijks optredens van de Ketnet-gezichten.
 there are also daily shows of the Ketnet-faces
 ‘On Ketnet Freezz children can have a great time on the giant slide ‘Tube-Thrill’, the high altitude trail and the indoor ice skating. There are also daily shows with the celebrities of Ketnet.’

The EC can still be said to function as an existential in these contexts, at least under broad definitions of ‘existential’ (cf. Francez 2007; McNally 2011). Alternatively, it can be considered to be a presentational construction, in contradistinction to existential constructions in the more precise and narrow sense. In fact, such sentences

indicate the presence of something in a context rather than only stating the existence in the strict ontological sense. For theticity, however, both in its logical and its discourse-based conception, these kinds of examples cannot be incorporated. The locative *er* at the beginning of the construction functions as a topic constituent that forces to logically recognize some judgment material before evaluating the judgment contained in the clause itself.

There are also cases where the pivot subject carries one or more presuppositions, as in the following two constructed examples.

- (40) *Zouden er everzwijnen in de bossen zitten?*
Er zijn er zeker.
 there are there for-sure
 ‘Would there be wild boars in the forests?’ ‘Certainly there are.’
- (41) *Denk je dat er nog koekjes in de keuken liggen?*
Ja, er zijn er.
 yes, there are there
 ‘Do you think there are still cookies in the kitchen?’ ‘Yes, there are cookies in the kitchen.’

As was the case for the SIFIC, the postverbal subject is here an anaphoric *er* of the quantitative kind. The quantitative postverbal *er* refers back to a previously mentioned or evoked entity, functions as the topic-constituent of the clause and has a clearly non-focal status.

4.5 The non-prototypical cleft

First of all, it has to be pointed out that, even in its thetic and sentence-focus uses, the NPC is somewhat special. In fact, while on the level of the entire clause the NPC can function as a logical thetic, all-comment and sentence-focus utterance, there is always a kind of predicative structure present between the NP pivot introduced by the existential and the relative clause that has the pivot as its antecedent. Furthermore, with the NPC, the same logical categorical and topic-comment uses can be found as with the SIFIC and the EC, as illustrated in constructed Examples (42) and (43).

- (42) *De Efteling is werkelijk een fantastisch pretpark.*
Er zijn attracties die je nergens anders ter wereld vindt.
 there are attractions that you nowhere else in-the world find
 ‘The Efteling is truly a tremendous theme park. It has attractions that cannot be found anywhere else in the world.’

- (43) *Het oosten van Sicilië is momenteel erg gevaarlijk.*
Er is een vulkaan die op het punt staat uit te barsten.
 there is a volcano that on the point stand out to erupt
 ‘The east of Sicily is currently very dangerous. There is a volcano that is about to erupt.’

Also, regarding the potential predicate-focus uses of the construction, a similar situation applies as with the SIFIC and the EC, as illustrated in the constructed Example (44).

- (44) *Wat denk je van ambtenaren?*
Er zijn er die hun werk goed doen.
 there are there that their work well do.
 ‘What do you think about civil servants?’ ‘There are civil servants that do a good job.’

4.6 The perception verb construction

The Perception Verb Construction can almost by its very nature be used for logical categorical, topic-comment, and predicate-focus purposes. Since the construction has a first-person subject, an inflected verb and then a subordinated clause containing new information, the logical categorical, topic-comment and predicate-focus uses seem quite natural. In fact, thethetic and sentence-focus uses are very specific uses that can only be read into the construction if the main verb of the construction is not interpreted with its full lexical meaning but with a weak sense as a parenthetical verb (cf. Willems & Blanche-Benveniste 2014). The same verbs that enter the construction as weak verbs to express theticity and sentence-focus are also found as full verbs that express new information about what a certain perceiver is perceiving. Consider the following two constructed examples.

- (45) *Wat kan je zien?*
Ik zie dat er iemand voorbij rijdt op een kameel.
 I see that there someone by rides on a camel
 ‘What do you see?’ ‘I see someone riding by on a camel.’
- (46) *Wat heb je gehoord?*
Ik heb gehoord dat er vertragingen bij het spoor zijn.
 I have heard that there delays at the railways are
 ‘What did you hear?’ ‘I heard that there were train delays.’

Given the fact that the PVC can be used for boththetic and categorical uses and for both sentence-focus and predicate-focus purposes, it should be obvious that it is no dedicated construction that grammatically encodes theticity or sentence-focus.

4.7 Intermediate conclusion and possible objections

The finding that each of the five previously identified Dutch thctic and sentence-focus constructions can be used with categorical judgment, topic-comment structure, and predicate-focus construal supports the conclusion that thcticity and sentence-focus are not grammatically encoded categories of Dutch. However, three important caveats are in order. First of all, as already pointed out, it is necessary to study the prosodic properties of the PIC and its various uses in greater detail. Secondly, it is possible that, although more than just the two predominant Dutch thctic and sentence-focus constructions have been studied, there still exists a Dutch construction that grammatically encodes thcticity or sentence-focus that has thus far remained unidentified.

Thirdly, on a theoretical level, it must be pointed out that there is a possible alternative to the present account. One could argue that the uses of the various constructions illustrated in the previous sections qualify as the meanings or functions of several homonymous constructions rather than as different uses of one and the same construction. As pointed out in Section 2.3, this is exactly Lambrecht's strategy when confronted with the various focus articulations many sentence-focus constructions can exhibit. However, while this alternative strand of analysis is logically speaking sound, it has three major disadvantages when compared to the analysis put forward in this article.

Homonymy is a solution that should be used with caution in general. If used in an unconstrained fashion, it leads to a proliferation of new constructions, viz. a construction for every single sense that can be identified (Lyons 1977). Hence, if we follow Lambrecht's homonymy solution, the analysis of the grammatical system of Dutch would be characterized by rampant homonymy. In addition to the homonymy between sentence-focus and argument-focus constructions acknowledged and discussed by Lambrecht (1987, 1994, 2000), it would seem that there are also formally identical predicate-focus and sentence-focus constructions in Dutch. This would entail that we would have to assume homonymous constructions for each of the three negatively defined focus-categories proposed by Lambrecht.

Furthermore, the homonymy between sentence-focus and predicate-focus is a form of homonymy that Lambrecht himself explicitly excluded and emphatically did not want to entertain in his system of focus categories (Section 2.3). It therefore hardly seems a solution to adopt once more a homonymy analysis to account for the fact that a single construction can display both sentence-focus and predicate-focus. Finally, the very *raison d'être* of the system of focus categories proposed by Lambrecht was to provide a better alternative for thcticity on the level of grammatically encoded categories of languages. Precisely because thcticity was considered not to be sufficiently reflected in grammatical form, sentence-focus

was proposed as an alternative. If one is forced to accept rampant homonymy to make this solution plausible, the sentence-focus approach turns out to be hardly any better than the original thetic approach it searched to supplant.

5. Conclusions

This article examined whether theticity and sentence-focus are grammatically encoded categories of Dutch. After providing a brief overview of the history of the two categories and providing workable definitions, the article turned to discussing the notion of grammatically encoded category. Based on work in Integral Linguistics or Coserian Structural Functionalism and Neo-Gricean Pragmatics, grammatically encoded categories were distinguished from categories of discourse and language use within the broader array of functional categories. I outlined a methodology for determining whether a language has a certain functional category as an encoded grammatical category that consists of first identifying all relevant constructions that can be used to convey a certain category (the onomasiological perspective). Subsequently, each of the constructions needs to be studied in its own right (the semasiological perspective), to check whether their various uses can be aligned with the hypothesis of the functional category under scrutiny as the encoded meaning or function of the construction.

I then discussed all previously identified Dutch thetic and sentence-focus constructions, before turning to an in-depth semasiological investigation that was specifically geared to finding uses that are particularly hard to bring in line with the hypothesis of theticity or sentence-focus as the encoded meaning/function of the constructions. The analysis of the examples discussed in this contribution supports the view that theticity and sentence-focus are not grammatically encoded in any of the Dutch constructions I have analyzed, as they are also used with categorical judgments, topic-comment structures, and predicate-focus construal. The conclusion must therefore be that theticity and sentence-focus are no grammatically encoded categories of Dutch, but rather logical and discourse phenomena that are best conceptualized as categories of discourse and (normal) language use.

In addition to being relevant for the grammatical description of Dutch, the findings of the study contribute to the general discussion about the encoded grammatical or general conceptual status of theticity and sentence-focus. Strictly speaking, the present article can only make the case that the two categories are no grammatically encoded categories in Dutch. In fact, it is possible that some natural language grammatically encodes one of these two categories, or both. It is therefore highly relevant to study thetic and sentence-focus constructions in as many as possible languages to cast light on this issue. At the same time, this article raised a

number of arguments in favor of the claim that theticity may not be grammatically encoded in general. This claim is based on the genesis of the category theticity and on the conclusion in a number of previous studies that thetic and sentence-focus constructions in other languages are often non-dedicated. This points to the conclusion that theticity is in general a category of discourse and language use (and thinking, for that matter) rather than a grammatically encoded category of language systems. A similar line of thought was already defended by Lambrecht:

The point is that Marty's cognitive contrast between thetic and categorial judgments is not necessarily expressed in grammatical form. As Marty himself has repeatedly pointed out (against various contemporary philosophers and grammarians), there is no one-to-one relationship between grammatical structure and logical structure. (Lambrecht 1987: 369)

The analysis presented here fits well with the position adopted by Lambrecht. Yet, at the same time it takes issue with the alternative analysis put forward by the same author. It seems that the category sentence-focus is in a number of cases subject to similar problems as the category theticity. For various constructions there is no one-to-one relationship between grammatical structure and focus category. It would seem, then, that the only way of maintaining the three universal focus categories proposed by Lambrecht as grammatical categories is to assume a large number of homonymous constructions. For reasons specified in the previous section, however, this is neither a desirable nor a viable outcome. It is much more plausible to regard the three universal focus categories proposed by Lambrecht as categories of discourse and language use, rather than as grammatically encoded categories.

It has to be emphasized that even if theticity and sentence-focus turn out to be no grammatically encoded categories, this does not at all mean that they are irrelevant categories for linguistic research. Categories of discourse and language use are as relevant in linguistic analyses as grammatically encoded categories, as long as the specific nature of both types of categories is recognized. Theticity, as has been argued from the very beginnings, is a relevant property of propositions which however can be conveyed without necessarily having categorically dedicated form-meaning pairings in the language system. The focus categories of Lambrecht, including sentence-focus, defined on the basis of a Stalnakerian account of discourse, remain in any case highly relevant to understand discourse and language use. These categories can interact with linguistic structure, without necessarily having to be encoded in linguistic structure. Functional categories that are not grammatically encoded in any linguistic system can still be conveyed, and conceptualized, by language users who always go beyond the categories that are grammatically encoded in the languages they speak (Coseriu 1974[1958], 1975[1962], 1987, 1989, 1992, 2000; Willems 1994, 1997; Levinson 1997, 2000, 2003; Willems 2016).

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Presentational and related constructions in Norwegian with reference to German

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This paper investigates constructions in Norwegian and German with an expletive pronoun in subject position, and for Norwegian also in object position. The discussion covers presentational, impersonal and extrapositional constructions in both languages, and in Norwegian also the 'light reflexive' *seg* in its interaction with presentationals. We relate the discussion to a parameter of *theticity*, whereby sentences with an expletive subject will count as *thetic* while sentences with a content-full NP subject will count as *categorical*. Also sentences with expletive object are argued to have a *thetic* value. *Categorical* sentences on their side are ranked according to a parameter of *transitivity*, accounting for constraints on presentational constructions in Norwegian, and seen as constituting an opposite dimension of constructional values to that of *theticity*.

Keywords: expletive subjects, expletive objects, transitivity, *theticity*, *categoricity*, presentationals, light reflexives

1. Introduction

This paper investigates constructions in Norwegian and German with an expletive pronoun in subject position, and for Norwegian also in object position. The discussion will cover presentational, impersonal and extrapositional constructions in both languages, and in Norwegian also the 'light reflexive' *seg* in its interaction with presentationals. We relate the discussion to a parameter of *theticity*,¹ whereby sentences with an expletive subject will count as *thetic* while sentences with a content-full NP subject will count as *categorical*. The concept of *theticity* here taken as basis is as

1. The notion dates back at least to Brentano 1995 and Marty 1918. Its grammatical relevance is discussed for instance in Kuroda 1972; Drubig 1992; Ladusaw 1994; Sasse 1995, 1996. It is generally argued to manifest itself in different ways and differently across languages, and thus with different accompanying properties across languages.

follows: The expression of a sentential content can, but need not, choose a participant (or argument) as *prominent* – when it does, by whatever means the grammar of the language puts to its disposal, the mode of expression will count as *categorical*, and when not, the mode of expression will count as *thetic*. In the languages in question the grammatical function of *subject* is one through which a participant can be given prominence. When that function, in its standard realization, is *not* used for expressing a participant (i.e., is expletive), then the construction will count as thetic; thus presentational, impersonal and extrapositional constructions in the two languages fall into this category. The notion of prominence here considered is not to be equated with values of information structure or other parameters, but is just a notion for a mode of grammatical expression.

What we have said so far coincides with Hellan and Beermann's (2019) suggestion that presentationals encode a thetic expression mode, the aspect of the notion invoked being that of a sentence expressing a predication without at the same time providing a *bearer* of the predication – its counterpart, the *categorical* mode, in addition highlights a 'bearer' of the situation. Their discussion and analysis of presentationals will here be carried further. However, also sentences with *expletive object* will here be addressed, and be argued to have a thetic value. Pursuing a line of argumentation in our analysis of presentationals, we will also extend the view of *categorical* sentences to represent a dimension of possibilities of *transitivity*, with what we call a *strong transitive axis* involving two prominent participants on the one extreme, and zero on the other extreme. While the notion of transitivity here invoked is by itself well established, it is presently informed by the constructions with expletive objects and light reflexives to be discussed.

In this introductory section we first recapitulate well-known patterns from Norwegian and German for presentational, impersonal and extrapositional constructions, and then present in more detail the general issues for discussion.

1.1 Extraposition and impersonals

Recapitulating from Hellan and Beermann (2019), and in essence following Pütz (1975), examples of Extraposition and Impersonals are exemplified for both languages in (1)–(4), with *es* in German and *det* in Norwegian as 'formal subjects'. Extraposition is illustrated in (1) (for German) and (2) (for Norwegian); for all of the examples, there is a possible paraphrase where the proposition is expressed as subject, a position which may be seen as reflecting its role as 'logical subject'.²

2. The gloss 'EXPL' throughout stands for the features '3SG.Neut.EXPL'.

'Non-extraposited' versions are indicated in (i) and (ii) for the respective sentences:

- (1) Es ist wichtig dass er komm-t.
EXPL be.PRES important COMP 3SG.Masc come-3SG.PRES
'It is important that he comes'
- (2) Det er viktig at han komm-er.
EXPL be.PRES important COMP 3SG.Masc come-PRES
'It is important that he comes'

Impersonal constructions have their name reflecting the lack of participants in the situation expressed:³

- (3) Es regne-t. (German)
EXPL rain-3SG.PRES
'It rains'
- (4) Det regner. (Norwegian)
EXPL rain-PRES
'It rains'

That the German *es* in (1) and (3) is a subject is indicated by the circumstance that it undergoes subject-verb inversion, as indicated in (5a, c), and appears when the clause is embedded as a subordinate clause, as in (5b, d):⁴

- (5) a. Warum ist *(es) wichtig dass ich komm-e?
why be.PRES EXPL important COMP 1SG come-1SG.PRES
'Why is it important that I come?'
- b. Ich weiss dass *(es) wichtig ist dass ich komm-e.
1SG know.PRES COMP EXPL important be.PRES COMP 1SG come-PRES
'I know that it is important that I come'

-
- (i) dass er kommt ist wichtig
(ii) at han kommer er viktig

In the Transformational model, where 'logical subjecthood' would often be construed as subject in 'Deep Structure', a transformation is assumed moving the clause from subject to sentence final position, thus to an 'extra'-position. It should be noted that in Norwegian, where prepositions can govern subordinate sentences, examples like (iii) are not amenable to such a construal, since this would leave the preposition *til* 'dangling' in Deep Structure. We still use the term *Extraposition* as an established label also of this version of the construction type.

- (iii) Det ser ut til at han kommer
It look-PRES out to COMP he comes
'it seems that he comes'

3. For discussion of impersonals from a typological point of view, see Creissels (2007).
4. See Pütz *op. cit.* for ample demonstration of these points.

- c. Regnet *(es)?
rain-3SG.PRES EXPL
'Does it rain?'
- d. Ich weiss dass *(es) regnet.
1SG know.1SG.PRES COMP EXPL rain-3SG.PRES
'I know that it rains'

For Norwegian *det*, the corresponding examples indicate likewise:

- (6) a. Hvorfor er *(det) viktig at jeg kommer?
why be.PRES EXPL important COMP 1SG come-PRES
'Why is it important that I come?'
- b. Jeg vet at *(det) er viktig at jeg kommer.
1SG know.PRES COMP EXPL be.PRES important COMP 1SG come
'I know that it is important that I come'
- c. Regner *(det)?
Rain-PRES EXPL
'Does it rain?'
- d. Jeg vet at *(det) regner.
1SG know.PRES COMP EXPL rain-PRES
'I know that it rains'

1.2 Presentationals

Presentationals are exemplified in (7) (German) and (8) (Norwegian). One commonly recognizes an item in the clause as being 'presented', often called the *presented NP*, henceforth abbreviated as *NPpres*, in the examples below marked in italics.

- (7) a. Es sitz-en nur *drei Person-en* im Nachtexpress.
EXPL sit-3PL only three person-PL in night express
'There sit only three persons in the night express'
- b. Es erwarte-ten den *Minister schlechte Nachrichten*.
EXPL await-3PL.PAST Masc.SG.ACC minister bad.PL news.PL
'There awaited the minister bad news'
- c. Es wurden insgesamt *drei Portion-en* gegessen.
EXPL be.PAST altogether three portion-PL eat.PRTC
'There were altogether eaten three portions'
- d. Es wurde getanzt.
EXPL be.PAST dance.PRTC
'It was danced'

- (8) a. Det sitter bare *tre personer* på nattoget.
EXPL sit-PRES only three person-PL on nightexpress-DEF.SG
‘There sit only three persons on the night express’
- b. Det ventet ministeren *dårlige nyheter*.
EXPL await-PAST minister-DEF.SG bad.PL new.PL
‘There awaited the minister bad news’
- c. Det ble til sammen spist *tre porsjoner*.
EXPL be.PAST altogether eat-PRTC three portion-PL
‘There were altogether eaten three portions’
- d. Det ble danset
EXPL be.PAST dance-PRTC
‘It was danced’

In both languages *NPpres* can be perceived as a kind of ‘demoted’ subject, in that in a corresponding non-presentational construction it would occur as subject.⁵ It can be preceded by another NP, as in the (b) cases. The clause can be in passive, with *NPpres* in the same position as it might have had as an object in the corresponding active sentence, as in the (c) cases.⁶ In passive cases there may be no *NPpres*, as in the (d) cases, in which case they may also be counted as ‘impersonal passives’.

There are however differences between the languages. German *es* in presentationals, as in (7) above, is not a subject, as indicated by the circumstance that it does not undergo subject-verb inversion, as indicated in (9a), and does not appear when the clause is embedded as a subordinate clause, cf. (9b):

5. For the respective cases:

- (i) a. Nur *drei Personen* sitzen im Nachtexpress.
‘Only three persons sit in the night express’
- b. *Schlechte Nachrichten* erwarteten den Minister.
‘Bad news awaited the minister’
- c. *Drei Portionen* wurden insgesamt gegessen.
‘Three portions were altogether eaten’
- (ii) a. Bare *tre personer* sitter på nattoget.
‘Only three persons sit in the night express’
- b. *Dårlige nyheter* ventet ministeren.
‘Bad news awaited the minister’
- c. *Tre porsjoner* ble til sammen spist.
‘Three portions were altogether eaten’

6. Nearly all passive constructions in Norwegian allow for this alternative mode of expression, provided the definiteness criterion is met (see (11) below); we however do not discuss this option much in the following.

- (9) a. Hier sitz-en (*es) nur drei Person-en im Nachtexpress.
 Here sit-PL EXPL only three person-PL in night-express
 ‘Here there sit only three persons in the night express’
- b. Ich weiss dass (*es) nur drei Person-en im Nachtexpress
 I.SG know COMP EXPL only three person-PL in night
 sitz-en.
 express sit-PL
 ‘I know that there sit only three persons in the night express’

By the same criteria, the presentational *det* in Norwegian, in contrast, is indeed a subject, undergoing subject verb inversion like standard subjects in Norwegian as in (10a),⁷ and being retained as subject in an embedded clause as in (10b):

- (10) a. Her sitter (det) tre mennesker.
 Here sit-PRES (EXPL) three person-PL
 ‘Here (there) are three persons sitting’
- b. Jeg vet at *(det) sitter tre mennesker her
 I.SG know.PRES COMP EXPL sit-PRES three people here
 ‘I know that there sit three people here’

The status as ‘formal subject’ of *det* in Norwegian thus extends across all the three construction types, whereas for *es* in German it holds only for extraposition and impersonals.

Further differences regarding presentationals in the two languages are that in Norwegian, both of the restrictions [A] and [B] hold, while neither of them applies to German:

- [A] *NPpres* must be indefinite; illustrated by (11a, b) below (instantiated also in the examples in (8)), with German contrasts in (11c, d).⁸
- [B] There cannot be a full NP corresponding to the Direct Object of a non-presentational clause co-occurring with *NPpres*; this is illustrated by (12a, b),

7. The version *without* expletive can be related to a version where the ‘deep’ subject is simply *tre mennesker*, as in *Tre mennesker sitter her* ‘Three persons sit here’. When an auxiliary verb is added, such that the NP behind the main verb cannot be construed as subject, the expletive is indeed obligatory as an inverted subject, as in (i):

- (i) Imorgen vil *(det) komme en inspektør.
 Tomorrow will there come an inspector

8. The exact nature of the definiteness factor has been subject to extensive discussion. See Mikkelsen (2002).

where *en dieselbil* – the putative object – is excluded whether it precedes or follows *NPpres* (German contrasts are given in (12c, d)):⁹

- (11) a. Det vil komme en inspektør/ *inspektøren i morgen.
EXPL will come INDEF.SG.Masc inspector/ inspector-DEF tomorrow
'There will come an inspector/the inspector tomorrow'
- b. Det venter ham en ulykke /*ulykken.
EXPL await-PRES him INDEF.SG.Masc accident/ accident-DEF
'There awaits him an accident/ the accident'
- c. Es wird morgen ein/der Inspektor kommen.
EXPL will tomorrow INDEF.SG.Masc/ DEF.SG.Masc inspector/ come
'There will come an inspector/the inspector tomorrow'
- d. Es erwartet ihm ein/ das Unfall.
EXPL await-PRES him INDEF.SG.Neut /DEF.SG.Neut accident
'There awaits him an/the accident'
- (12) a. *Det kjøpte en ny diesel bil en
EXPL buy-PST INDEF.SG.Masc new diesel car INDEF.SG.Masc
mann i går.
man yesterday
'There bought a new diesel car a man yesterday'
- b. *Det kjøpte en mann en ny
EXPL buy-PST INDEF.SG.Masc man INDEF.SG.Masc new diesel
dieselbil i går.
car yesterday
'There bought a man a new diesel car yesterday'
- c. Es kaufte gestern ein neues Dieselauto
EXPL buy-PST yesterday INDEF.SG.Neut new diesel car
ein Mann.
INDEF.SG.Masc man
'There bought yesterday a new diesel car a man'
- d. Es kaufte gestern ein Mann ein
EXPL buy-PST yesterday INDEF.SG.Masc man INDEF.SG.Neut
neues Dieselauto.
new diesel car
'There bought yesterday a man a new diesel car'

9. Cf. Askedal 1986; Lødrup 1999; Mikkelsen 2002, to mention some who have discussed this. See discussion below.

1.3 Issues

From an information-structure perspective, both extraposition and presentationals may be seen as instantiating a strategy of placing ‘comment’ (or ‘new’) material late in the clause, applied to structures where what is ‘new’ is what would otherwise have served as logical subject relative to the predicational structure. Seeing presentationals as constructions where a speaker “call(s) the attention of an addressee to the hitherto unnoticed presence of some person or thing in the speech setting.” (from Lambrecht 1994) is moreover a representative discourse-structural view of this construction type. While any occurrence of these constructions obviously has a discourse- and information-structural role to play, even a cursory look at coherent text samples, however, shows that this role may vary from case to case, for presentationals including cases where there can hardly be talk of introduction of participants in a narrative.¹⁰ The thetic-categorical distinction, at least as we perceive it here, is independent of such factors, lying much closer to a perspective of grammatical structure, and we will not in the following address possible discourse- and information-structural aspects of the constructions treated.

Among the main grammatical issues to be discussed is that in Norwegian presentationals, *det* and *NPpres* may both be seen as aspiring to the status as *subject*, *det* fulfilling formal criteria such as those mentioned, *NPpres* meeting criteria of semantic role and certain other subject characteristics to be addressed below. On the assumption that a clause can have only one subject, a question is what status to assign to the respective items. Section 2 argues that *NPpres* is not an object, and Section 3 proposes a way of construing it as a subject. The discussion will amongst others involve the status of ‘light reflexives’.

In Section 4 we address expletive *objects*, surveying some construction types where expletive pronouns may be seen as representing a thetic construal of embedded situations.

In Section 5 we assess the proposals made relative to a typology of *transitivity*, and suggest some connections between such a typology on the one hand and aspects of what may be seen as grammatical correlates to the thetic-categorical distinction on the other.

10. Like obviously when the predication is negated, as in *Es geht keine Katze ins Haus* (‘There goes no cat into the house’), or *Det fins ingen løsning på dette problemet* (‘There is no solution to this problem’), or embedded under a modal verb.

2. Norwegian *NPpres* not having status as object

Generalization [B] may invite to a classification of *NPpres* simply as Direct Object: given that there can be only one Direct Object (DO), the clashes of occurrences in (12) would be accounted for, assuming that *en dieselbil* is a DO already. In a similar vein, in examples like (8b), an NP can precede the *NPpres*, inviting to an analysis where the first NP is *indirect* object (IO) and *NPpres* a DO. This would of course be a *positionally* anchored terminology, which is not in general a requirement on GF notions.¹¹ The issue has been extensively discussed at least since the 1800s, with recommended terms such as *innholdssubjekt*, *logisk subjekt*, *subjektobjekt*, *objektssubjekt*, to mention some – the resistance to call it simply ‘direct object’ has been strong. Nevertheless, notable contributions within generative syntax have construed the *NPpres* as something close to a DO, under the assumption that presentational constructions constitute an *unaccusative* module within an otherwise nominative-accusative language – proposals and discussion of proposals, including more general Scandinavian perspectives, include works such as Vikner (1995, 1997), Åfarli (1992); Sveen (1996). Recognition of classifications of verbs and verb types have followed from this tradition, but hardly a consolidated conclusion as to the GF status of *NPpres*. From a different perspective, Lødrup 1999, 2000, also considering *NPpres* as a DO, discusses the construction as an exception to the LFG ‘Mapping Theory’ as far as possible semantic roles for an object go.

Contrary to these views, we now consider presentational constructions where arguably an object – in the sense of direct object – does occur, but where this object is not *NPpres*.

2.1 Presentationals with light reflexives

Here we address two construction types, that of ‘light reflexives’, and ‘object predicative’ constructions.

In Norwegian a ‘reflexive’ can be characterized as a simple personal pronoun with the form *seg* in 3. person, both sg. and pl., *meg* in 1. person sg., *deg* in 2. person sg., *oss* in 1. person pl., and *dere* in 2. person pl., of which all but the form *seg* can also be used in non-reflexive functions. When occurring by itself we refer to it as the *light reflexive*, or *simple reflexive*.¹² It contrasts with the item referred to as

11. Cf. Börjars & Vincent (2005). ‘GF’ for ‘Grammatical Functions’, in the sense of Bresnan (2001), following Tesnière (1959):

12. A feature of the syntactic behavior of the simple reflexive is undergoing the kind of clustering with an adjacent preceding verb typical of ‘light’ personal pronouns, known, e.g., under the name ‘object shift’. As mentioned below, this is not a property relevant to the analysis that follows.

the *selv-reflexive*, where either of the pronoun forms mentioned is followed by *selv* (a form obviously related to English *self*, German *selbst*, and others). For general description and analysis of *seg* and *seg selv*, see Hellan 1988.

The simple reflexive is instantiated pervasively throughout the Indo-European languages. In Norwegian, among 264 verb construction types, 36 of the types have the simple reflexive as a distinctive element, and relative to a valence lexicon with 12,913 entries, where an entry is constituted by a verb and one construction type/valence frame in which the verb can occur, 1578 entries have a simple reflexive as a distinctive element in the construction/frame.¹³ The criterion for this status is essentially that the form *seg* can occur without the *selv*,¹⁴ and an intuitive rule of thumb is whether the verb is ‘naturally associated’ with the simple reflexive. Some verbs allow only the simple reflexive in the position where it occurs in the relevant construction, like the one headed by *skamme* in (13a),¹⁵ but among most of the 670 entries with the pattern ‘NP Verb *seg*’, *seg* is substitutable, as illustrated in (13b vs c), the difference here being that (b), with a *selv-reflexive*, expresses a relation between two participants with the claim that the second participant is identical to the first, whereas (c) rather expresses a one-participant act which somehow revolves around this participant; contexts illustrating these uses are given in (13d, e):

13. These figures are from the computational grammar *Norsource*, cf. Hellan & Bruland (2015), and <https://typecraft.org/tc2wiki/Norwegian_HPSG_grammar_NorSource>.

14. With proviso for cases where *seg* is ‘long distance bound’; cf. Hellan op.cit.

15. Further examples, representing different construction patterns, are given in (i):

- (i) a. han oppfører seg pent. (“he behaves well”)
 he behaves REFL well
- b. han undrer seg hvorvidt du kommer. (“he wonders whether you will come”)
 he wonders REFL whether you come
- c. han oppholder seg i haven
 he stays REFL in the garden
- d. han finner seg i å vente (“he accepts having to wait”)
 he finds REFL in INF wait
- e. han lister seg ut. (“he tiptoes out”)
 he tiptoes REFL out
- f. han dummet seg ut. (“he made a fool of himself”)
 he fooled REFL out
- g. han viser seg å komme. (“he turns out to come”)
 he shows REFL to come
- h. det viser seg at han kommer. (“it turns out that he comes”)
 it shows REFL that he comes
- i. han foresetter seg å komme. (“he plans on coming”)
 he [foresetter] REFL to come

- (13) a. Kari skammer seg.
Kari shame-PRES REFL
'Kari is ashamed'
- b. Ola beundrer seg selv.
Ola admire-PRES REFL SELF
'Ola admires himself'
- c. Ola beundrer seg foran speilet.
Ola admire-PRES REFL before mirror-DEF
Ola admires himself before the mirror
- d. Ola vasker seg selv først, og så barna.
Ola wash-PRES REFL SELF first and then child-DEF.PL
Ola washes himself first, and then the children
- e. Ola vasket seg først, og så la han seg ned.
Ola wash-PAST REFL first and then lay-PAST he REFL down
Ola washed (himself) first, and then he laid down

The pattern 'NP Verb *seg*' will serve as background for the following discussion.

2.1.1 *Presentationals with light reflexives*

The construction type *presentationals with light reflexives* is illustrated in (14) (*seg selv* is excluded from these contexts:¹⁶

- (14) a. Det setter seg en katt på trappen.
EXPL set-PRES REFL INDEF.SG.Masc cat on stair-DEF.SG
'There sets itself a cat on the stairs'
- b. Det vasker seg en flokk pilegrimer i bassenget
EXPL wash-PRES REFL INDEF.SG.Masc flock pilgrim-PL in basin-DEF
i haven.
in garden-DEF
'There wash themselves a group of pilgrims in the basin in the garden'

Sette and *vaske* are general transitive verbs.¹⁷ Since most of the verbs able to take a light reflexive can alternatively occur with a full NP as object, there is nothing

16. Although reflexives have forms in all persons and numbers, only the 3. person form *seg* can occur in the presentational context, presumably since an antecedent in any other person would be definite, and thus violating condition [A].

17. Examples of presentationals with a non-substitutable reflexive are given below:

- (i) Det oppholder seg en muldvarp i haven. ("there is a mole in the garden")
there stays REFL a mole in the garden
- (ii) Det smyer seg en mann ut. ("there is a man tiptoeing out")
there tiptoes REFL a man out

in their meaning generally suggesting that they are semantically unable to occur with an ‘object’ participant. It can thus be proposed that in (14), the reflexives are the items that should be analyzed as objects, not the *NPpres*. A consequence is then that *NPpres* is generally not to be analyzed as an object.

We suggest that what the principle phrased as [B] excludes is rather constructions carried by what we may call a *Strong Transitive Axis* (STA), namely the emanation of force hitting a target point (cf. the discussion of transitivity in Hopper and Thompson 1980, and the construal of transitivity of Creissels 2016, rendered in Section 5 below). Verbs frequently used with reflexive presentationals like *sette*, *smyge*, *smette*, *stikke*, with no targeted patient distinct from the emanator, will not sustain a STA, and so are able to occur in constructions such as (14).

Thus, our proposal is that in these cases of reflexive objects, the constellation is transitive, however not the semantics. In contrast, the ‘prototypically transitive verb’ expresses impact and effect, and requires thereby a distribution of roles where the participants are conceptually really distinct. Exactly that is not the case for the light reflexive objects. This is what allows for reflexive presentational constructions in Norwegian.

This general analysis of light reflexives, extending also to non-presentational constructions, complies with a proposal by Frajzyngier (2019) to the effect that across many languages, such reflexives code *the point of view of the subject*, which he phrases as ‘*instructs the listener to consider how the event concerns the subject*’. Such a functionality allows for the lack of a STA effect with these verbs, without entailing that the reflexive as such be relegated from the status as object.¹⁸

18. For light reflexives such as the one in (i),

- (i) Det setter seg en katt på trappen.
‘It sets itself a cat on the stairs’

one could perhaps invoke that in some sense it has been ‘moved out of the way’ relative to the following *NPpres* – *en katt* – undergoing the kind of clustering with an adjacent preceding verb typical of ‘light’ personal pronouns in Norwegian and other Scandinavian languages. The precise account of such clustering, also referred to as cliticization, is by itself a moot issue, ranging from undergoing of a putative rule ‘Object shift’ in the line of accounts following Holmberg 1986, to involving no movement at all, as in Hellan 2012 (see also, e.g. Hellan & Platzack 1999, and Kiss (ed) 2005)). However, regardless of approach, an equally ‘light’ personal pronoun such as the non-reflexive use of *meg* in (ii) will block a presentational, such that whatever kind of clustering may be involved in such constructions is irrelevant to an account of why (i) is grammatical:

- (ii) *Det setter meg en venn på trappen.
‘It sets me a friend on the stairs’

2.1.2 Presentationals with light reflexives in secondary predicate constructions

A Secondary Predicate ('SCPR') can in principle be either subject oriented or object oriented. SCPR with a light reflexive is exemplified in (15):

- (15) a. Det drakk seg i hjel et eksternt styremedlem.
EXPL drink.PAST REFL dead INDEF.SG.Neut external board member
'There drank himself dead a board member'
- b. Det kjørte seg ihjel en formel 1-kjører.
EXPL drive-PAST REFL dead INDEF.SG.Masc formula one driver
'There drank himself dead a board member'
- c. Det hadde satt seg fast en beltebil.
EXPL have-PAST set.PRTC REFL .stuck INDEF.SG.Masc belt wagon
'There had gotten stuck a belt wagon'
- d. Det hadde drukket seg full en nordlending.
EXPL have-PAST drink.PRTC REFL drunk INDEF.SG.Masc northerner
'There had drunk himself drunk a northerner'

In (15a), is *ihjel* predicated of *seg*, or of the *NPpres*, and similarly for the other constructions? Since *seg* and *NPpres* have the same referent, meaning is here not a guiding criterion. Verbs that in general allow the non-presentational *seg* + SCPR causative construction, include (cited from a general valence base not based specifically on trying out this construction):¹⁹

- (16) *Drikke* 'drink', *gå* 'go', *holde* 'hold', *hoppe* 'jump', *kjøre* 'drive', *løpe* 'run', *snakke* 'talk', *sove* 'sleep', *spise* 'eat', *syng* 'sing', *vokse* 'grow'.

These frames can be seen as instances of the highly productive construction type 'object oriented causative SCPRs', whose verb frame instances in non-presentational constructions with full NP objects count more than 960 verb entries (out of nearly 13000 verb entries).²⁰ From this it is reasonable to also construe *seg* in (15) as the predication target of *ihjel/fast/full*, and counting as DO.

This supports the treatment of *seg* as direct object also in (14) (*Det setter seg en katt på trappen*). The *NPpres* occurring there is thereby not a DO. That suggests that also in (12a, b), the *NPpres en mann* is not a DO, so that the illformedness of (12a, b) is not due to a clash of two DOs.

19. From the Norsource lexicon (Hellan & Bruland 2015; webdemo: <<http://regdili.hf.ntnu.no:8081/linguisticAce/parse>>; website: <https://typecraft.org/tc2wiki/Norwegian_HPSG_grammar_NorSource>)

20. From the Norsource lexicon (Hellan & Bruland 2015; webdemo: <<http://regdili.hf.ntnu.no:8081/linguisticAce/parse>> website: <https://typecraft.org/tc2wiki/Norwegian_HPSG_grammar_NorSource>)

2.2 Double full NPs in presentationals

The *NPpres* can follow a full NP in object position, as exemplified in ((8b), (11b)), and further illustrated in (17a vs. b, c vs. d).²¹

- (17) a. Det ventet ministeren *dårlige nyheter*.
 EXPL await-PL.PAST minister-DEF.SG bad.PL new.PL
 ‘There awaited the minister bad news’
- b. Dårlige nyheter ventet ministeren.
 bad.PL new.PL await-PAST minister-DEF.SG
 ‘bad news awaited the minister’
- c. Det tilkommer ministeren 3 milliarder euro.
 EXPL come.to-PRES minister-DEF.SG 3 billion-PL euro
 ‘there become-available-for the minister 3 billion Euro’
- d. 3 milliarder euro tilkommer ministeren.
 3 billion-PL euro come.to-PRES minister-DEF.SG
 ‘3 billion Euro become-available-for the minister’

As two-NP constructions, (17a, c) are clearly not SPA, and hence have a construction profile that our construal of [B] would allow. Relating to the status of *NPpres*, however, some proposals (as mentioned above) suggest that (17a, c) are indirect-direct object-constellations, from which it would follow that *dårlige nyheter*/3 milliarder euro in these cases are direct objects. In (b, d) *ministeren* is clearly a direct object, which counts against such a suggestion, as it would imply a reassignment of GFs despite no change in semantic functions. Counting against the suggestion is also that this ‘double NP’ construction is allowed only for a few verbs, and only in the presentational construction. None of these verbs moreover are among those generally counted as ‘double object’ verbs, like *gi* ‘give’. There is thus little reason to count (17a, c) as indirect object constructions, and thus no reason to count *dårlige nyheter* in (17a) and 3 milliarder euro in (17c) as direct objects. If there is an object at all in the constructions, that must be *ministeren*.

Semantically, as said, (17a, c) are representations of eventualities where the subject participant has little intention or will, and hardly counts as an initiator, or ‘proto-agent’ in the sense of Dowty 1991). This suggests again that what is ruled out in a presentational construction is the expression of a strongly asymmetric two-participant eventuality. This is then what prevents (12a, b), and admits (17a, c), just as it admits the reflexive constructions in (14).

21. The construction type is addressed in Platzack 1983; Hellan 1986; Åfarli 1992; Bjerre & Bjerre 2008b, to mention some.

2.3 Semantic role of *NPpres*

In addition to these considerations against classifying *NPpres* as an object, it should be mentioned that *NPpres* can freely take on roles of a highly agentive character; thus all of the verbs in (16) (which can be used in presentationals also without a SCPR) have agentive subjects, a role also carried by *NPpres* in presentational constructions. This is an obvious further reason not to count *NPpres* as object.²²

3. Status of *NPpres* in Norwegian as subject

The *NPpres* is obviously not an adjunct. Having established that it is not an object, is there any other recognized non-subject GF with which it could be associated?

Many linguists have perceived *NPpres* as a kind of 'free' post-verbal NP with subject properties. As subject properties of *NPpres* one can count the agentive role with many intransitive verbs, binding of reflexives (cf. (14) and (15)), and agreement, as in (18) below, which exemplify Norwegian *subject predicatives* in (a) and a *pseudo-coordination* in (b). In both cases the predicates agree with *NPpres*, not with the expletive.

22. Some further phenomena may support the treatment of *NPpres* as not DO. Sentences like (i), i.e., presentational passives with an adjectival SCPR predicated of the *NPpres*, are on the whole not quite well-formed (their active counterparts, where the subject will be a standard and the object a standard object, are OK):

- (i) a. ?Det ble malt et hus blått ('there was painted a house blue')
- b. ?Det ble kjent en anklaget uskyldig. ('there was pronounced a prosecuted unguilty')

If one hypothesizes that the *NPpres* is here not an object, and that object-oriented predication is tied to the exact status as direct object of its predication target, then the slight oddity of (i) will follow.

For completeness of the argument, it may also be noted that *NPpres* cannot be passive-promoted, a test we rather consistently apply for object status. So, although *sitte* can in principle be used in passive form, one cannot promote the NP in a construction like (ii) to subject position:

- (ii) a. Det sitter tre personer på nattoget. ('there sit three persons on the night express')
- b. *Tre personer blir sittet på nattoget. ('three persons are sit [intransitive] on the night expressed')

This factor being mentioned, it ought to be noted that verbs like those in (17) are not passivizable even in non-presentational form. The same holds for light reflexive verb constructions of the type in (13). The latter, however, holds verb-independently for reflexives of any kind, even NPs with a reflexive possessive, possibly because the required binding by a subject then fails.

- (18) a. Det sitter en skogkatt på trappen, myk(*t)
 EXPL sit-PRES IND.SG.Masc forest-cat on stair-DEF soft.SG.Masc/*Neut
 og fin(*t) i pelsen.
 and fine.SG.Masc/*Neut in fur
 ‘there sits a *skogkatt* on the stairs, soft and fine in its fur’
- b. Det sitter flere katter på trappen og ser meget
 EXPL sit-PRES IND.PL cat-PL on stair-DEF and look very
 fine/*fint ut.
 fine.PL/*Sg.Neut out
 ‘there sit many *katter* on the stairs and look very fine’

This is the agreement patterns one also finds in German presentationals, and is a lead for parallel analyses between the languages also for this construction.

For Norwegian the first challenge of analysis is that, as said, there are two items that can reasonably be called subjects, *det* and *NPpres*. Whether one works in formal or less formalized frameworks, there are two general principles that ought to be followed, (i) one’s descriptive vocabulary should cover all phenomena, and (ii) whenever two phenomena are distinct, they should be named by different terms. *Det* and *NPpres* are obviously distinct due to their position and formal and semantic properties, and, as noted, they have accordingly been named with terms like ‘formal subject’ and ‘content subject’ (‘innholdssubjekt’)²³ in various traditions. In German, as noted, *es* is not a subject in presentationals, and thus one here doesn’t have the conflict just noted for Norwegian; but an obvious question is what status to assign to presentational *es*, and more concisely, which GF to assign to *es*, given that principle (i) be taken as a demand that at GF level, all sentence constituents receive a GF term, at POS level, all words receive a POS term, etc.

First considering Norwegian, a sketch of representation of the circumstance that both *det* and *NPpres* have subject properties goes as in Figure 1 below, proposed in Hellan & Beermann (2019). This is an attribute-value structure (AVM), where the attribute ‘GF’ represents the GF status of the NP, and the value *subject* stands for grammatical rules in the grammar corresponding to *criteria* and *properties* that reflect ‘subject behavior’. The boxed ‘[1]’ represents *det* and *katter* as having subject properties in common, in this case actually distinct but mutually compatible properties (‘subject’ position and undergoing subject-verb inversion for *det*, agent role, binding of reflexives and agreement target for *katter*), constituting the set generally taken as criterial of subjects. One may think of *subject* as naming a super-type or the full set of these properties.

23. In Diderichsen (1946), this term means that the item occurs in the ‘innholdsfelt’ as opposed to the ‘forfelt’, and so in this tradition is a distributional term, but nevertheless a term distinct from the one used for *det*.




Figure 1. Representation of *det* and *katter* as instances of the notion ‘subject’

If this strategy is pursued to also represent the whole sentence in an AVM format, the NPs in the tree must be introduced by different attributes (again in line with principle (ii) above), for instance in the style of Functional structure in LFG. Thus the status of *NPpres* must have a different GF attribute than *det*, so that if, e.g., *det* is entered as SUBJECT, then *NPpres* cannot be as well. Suppose we then invoke a new attribute – ‘PRESENTED’.²⁴ An AVM representing *sitte* for the frame of *det sitter katter* may accordingly look as follows:²⁵




Figure 2. Attributes-values for *det* and *NPpres* in an AVM, expanded from Figure 1

24. Zaenen et al. (2017), who also argue for subject-like status of presented NPs in Icelandic and Swedish, use the attribute ‘PIVOT’.

25. If one were working in a feature system where *attributes were typed*, one could have had a ‘super-attribute’ SUBJECT and sub-type attributes like ‘FORMAL SUBJECT’ for *det* and ‘LOGICAL SUBJECT’ for *NPpres*, whereby the shared subject status of *det* and *NPpres* would

Sketchy as these structures are, the format of representation highlights differences in analyses like those addressed above. They contrast with a standard LFG analysis for the sentence *det sitter tre katter*, given in Figure 3, where *det* is represented as SUBJECT, and *tre katter* as OBJECT, in accordance with one standard view mentioned in 2, but presently argued to be wrong.²⁶

ED		'sitte<[69:katt]>[83]'					
TNS-ASP	<u>88</u>	TENSE pres, MOOD indicative					
ADJUNCT	<u>64</u>	{	<u>10</u>	PRED 'her'		}	
				ADV-TYPE loc			
				PRED		'katt'	
						PRED '3'	
OBJ	<u>69</u>	SPEC	<u>34</u>	NUMBER	<u>35</u>	AGRGEND <u>21</u> MASC +, FEM -, NEUT -	
						NUMFORM tre, HEADNUM pl, DIGVALUE 3, AGRNUM pl	
				NTYPE	<u>78</u>	NSEM <u>24</u> COMMON count NSYN common	
				GEND	[21]		
						NUM pl, REF +, PERS 3, DEF-MORPH -, DEF -, CASE obl	
				NTYPE	<u>85</u>	NSYN pronoun	
SUBJ	<u>83</u>	GEND	<u>84</u>	NEUT +, MASC -, FEM -			
				REF -, PRON-TYPE expl_, PRON-FORM det, PERS 3, NUM sg			
				VTYPE main, STMT-TYPE decl, PRESENTATIVE +, VFORM fin			

Figure 3. Web demo view of LFG analysis of *det sitter tre katter*

had been captured. We are not aware of systems providing such a possibility, though – even Typed Feature Systems like the one described in Copestake (2002) provide only for typing of values of attributes (which is on the other hand a design where the analysis indicated in Figure 2 could be accommodated, as it also could within LFG, which also uses unification, although without types).

26. From the LFG webdemo of Norwegian. <<http://clarino.uib.no/iness/xle-web>> (7 September 2019).

The corresponding HPSG webdemo for Norwegian <<http://regdili.hf.ntnu.no:8081/linguisticAce/parse>> does not display GFs, but rather a simple logical form as in (i), where 'katt' is the only argument of 'sitte'; it may be noted that *det* is here treated as a situation introducer, thus not semantically empty, but also not an argument of *sitte*. (Accessed 27.09.2019.)

- (ig) ltop=h0, index=e1, h3:_expletive_pron_rel([arg0:x2]), h4:_expletive_q_rel([arg0:x2, rstr:h5, body:h6]), h7:_sitte_v-intrPresnt_rel([arg0:e1, arg1:x8]), h9:intro-sit-rel([arg0:u10, arg1:x2, arg2:h7]), h11:_card_rel([carg:3-rel, arg0:u13, arg1:x8]), h11:_katt_n_rel([arg0:x8]), h14:_plurindef_q_rel([arg0:x8, rstr:h15, body:h16])

As for the placement of *NPpres*, it follows objects (reflexives as in (14), and non-STA objects as in (17)), and it can either precede or follow a SCPR, as in (15), hence it may be said to have a relatively 'free placement' within the argument field of the VP, but after the NP arguments.

Then consider the *es* in German presentationals. If not a subject, what could it be called? In an LFG grammar webdemo, as shown in Figure 4 below, it is called TOPIC, a classification possibly motivated by the circumstance that this is a position generally taken by topic constituents.²⁷

PRED		'sitzen<[2:Katze], [1:hier]>'			
TOPIC	<u>10</u>	PRON-TYPE	expl_		
TNS	<u>9</u>	TENSE	pres, MOOD	indicative	
OBL	<u>1</u>	PRED	'hier'		
		ADV-TYPE	loc		
		PRED		'Katze'	
		SPEC	<u>7</u>	NUMBER	<u>8</u>
				PRED	'drei'
				NUMBER-TYPE	card
SUBJ	<u>2</u>				
		NTYPE	<u>5</u>	NSEM	<u>6</u>
				COMMON	count
				NSYN	common
		PERS	3, NUM	pl, GEND	fem, CASE
					nom
		VTYPE main, PASSIVE -, CLAUSE-TYPE decl			

Figure 4. Web demo view of LFG analysis of *es sitzen drei Katzen*

As an analysis displaying *functions* (this being an *f*-structure), it may seem to conflict with established uses of the notion 'topic', which is a content-full constituent. However, both *es* and *det* being counted as *expletive* elements, i.e., forms without the kind of meaning normally carried by the forms, if we are allowed to call the presentational *det* a *subject* despite its lack of the content one normally associates with subjects, it may then also be allowed to call the presentational *es* a *topic* just because it formally behaves like a topic constituent. This would seem logically consistent. Following this line, a notion of formal/expletive *objects* will also be conceivable. We explore this possibility in the next section, then restricting our attention to Norwegian.

27. From LFG webdemo for German. <<http://clarino.uib.no/iness/xle-web>> (7 September 2019).

4. Expletive pronouns as object

In this section we consider expletive pronouns occurring as objects. In calling them ‘expletive’ rather than ‘empty’, they are not to be misinterpreted as ‘null objects’, ‘implicit objects’ or ‘dropped objects’ – they are fully ‘visible’, only lacking referential content. In many of the examples they could possibly have an alternative referential reading, but we here focus only on the expletive function, similar to what the item has in an impersonal, presentational or extraposition construction. For reasons of space the discussion is restricted to Norwegian, a comparison with German remaining for another occasion.

4.1 Constructions with expletive pronouns as object

Well-known constellations involving expletive objects are exemplified in (19), discussed especially in the generative literature (e.g., under the notion ‘raising’) since the early seventies:

- (19) a. Vi hørte det regne.
 We hear-PAST EXPL rain
 ‘We heard it raining’
 b. Vi anså det for å være mulig å krysse grensen.
 We view-PAST EXPL for INF be possible to cross border-DEF
 ‘We viewed it as possible to cross the border’

The ‘raising’ approach in the case of (19a) would be to apply the transformational rule ‘Raising’ to *det*, whereby its status as expletive would be enforced in the input structure as subject of *regne*, an impersonal construction, and the Raising transformation would carry it on to the object position of the matrix verb. The construction is thereby treated on a par with *accusative with infinitive* (AcI) in general. Likewise the *det* in (19b) can be seen as the subject of an extraposition construction in underlying structure, with the clausal ‘logical’ subject of the extraposition structure serving as ‘raised’ item in an AcI.²⁸

28. Raising with non-expletive ‘raised’ items is exemplified for the respective structures in (i):

- (i) a. Vi hørte henne synge
 ‘We heard her singing’
 b. Vi anser at hun vil komme for å være umulig
 ‘We regard that she will come as impossible’

Constructions like (19b) and related ones are discussed for English, for instance, in Postal and Pullum 1988 and Kim and Sag 2005, the latter with examples such as (example number ‘5’ in their paper): (5) a. *Sometimes I find it difficult to read my own writing.* b. *She’s put it in their mind that it’s going to be really tough.* c. *I take it for granted that there will be an appeal.*

While there is thus some intuition of the expletive objects in (19) as syntactic derivatives of expletive subjects, through association with AcI with verbs of perception and assessment, their status as objects is nevertheless clear, both positionally and in terms of tests like ‘passivization of objects’, as illustrated in (20):

- (20) a. Det ble hørt regne mot blikktaket.
 EXPL be.PAST hear-PRTC rain.INF against tin roof-DEF
 ‘There was heard to be raining against the tin roof’
 b. Det ble ansett for å være mulig å krysse grensen.
 EXPL be.PAST regard-PRTC INF be.INF possible INF cross border-DEF
 ‘It was assumed to be possible to cross the border’

A more non-derivative status of expletive objects is exemplified in (21), which are constructions where an expletive *det* cannot be associated with a putative syntactic rule like AcI. (21a) is a case of embedded caused impersonal, induced through a causative SCPR construction; *det* is to be read as an expletive element, not as a referring item; the form *det* is neuter, and here glossed as such since there is agreement with the SCPR adjective *rent* ‘clean’. (21b) is an SCPR construction with an extraposition *det*, also causative but here with the causation expressed by the lexical causative *gjøre* ‘make’:

- (21) a. Vi spylte det rent ute og inne.
 We flush-PAST EXPL.NEUT clean-NEUT outside and inside
 ‘We flushed so that it became clean inside and outside’
 b. Vi gjorde det mulig å krysse grensen.
 We make-PAST EXP possible to cross border-DEF
 ‘We made it possible to cross the border’

In (21a) the string *det rent ute og inne* is a ‘small clause’ version of *Det er rent ute og inne* ‘it is clean outside and inside’. *Det* here has the same position in the syntactic pattern of object-oriented SCPR as full NPs otherwise have, as in (22).²⁹

- (22) Vi spylte huset rent.
 We flush-PAST house-DEF.NEUT clean-NEUT
 ‘We flushed the house clean’

Similarly for (21b) with its understood ‘small clause’ *Det er mulig å krysse grensen*. ‘it is possible to cross the border’.

29. This role of expletive *det* as object in a SCPR construction will seem unexpected in the light of general theories of the SCPR construction, according to which such an object must be referential and ‘fully affected’. See for instance Rothstein 2004 for discussion.

The passivization test for the *det* in these cases is illustrated in (23)–(23a) a passive version of (21a) and (23c) a passive version of (21b). The illformedness of (23b) shows that (23a) cannot alternatively be analyzed as an instance of ‘impersonal passive’, since in impersonal passives the ‘active’ constellation inside the VP can be generally preserved, also when there is an object. (23c vs. d) illustrate the same point for the construction (21b).

- (23) a. Det ble spylt rent ute og inne
 EXPL be.PAST flush.PRTCPL clean.NEUT outside and inside
 ‘It was flushed clean inside and outside’
- b. *Det ble spylt det rent ute og inne.
 EXPL be.PAST flush.PRTCPL EXPL clean.NEUT outside and inside
- c. Det ble gjort mulig å krysse grensen.
 EXPL be-PAST make-PRTC possible INF cross border-DEF
 ‘It was made possible to cross the border’
- d. *Det ble gjort det mulig å krysse grensen.
 EXPL be-PAST make-PRTC EXPL possible INF cross border-DEF

Having shown the possibility of *det* of impersonals and extraposition to appear as expletive objects, what about the *det* of presentationals? (24) is a standard example of this possibility with a verb of perception in an ACI construction, (24b) indicating passivizability of *det* and (24c) indicating that the result is not an ‘impersonal passive’, analogous to (23b, d):

- (24) a. Vi så det sitte et spøkelse i stolen.
 We see-PAST EXPL sit.INF a ghost in chair-DEF
 ‘We saw there sitting a ghost in the chair’
- b. Det ble sett sitte et spøkelse i stolen.
 EXPL be.PAST see-PRTC sit.INF a ghost in chair-DEF
 ‘There was seen sitting a ghost in the chair’
- c. *Det ble sett det sitte et spøkelse i stolen.
 EXPL be.PAST see-PRTC EXPL sit.INF a ghost in chair-DEF
 ‘There was seen it sitting a ghost in the chair’

Notably, though, the illformedness of (25b) suggests that there is no way of embedding a presentational like (25a) into a causative SCPR, thus no analogue to the ‘non-ACI-related’ constructions in (21):

- (25) a. Det er mange hjemløse i Afghanistan.
 EXPL be.PRES many homeless in Afghanistan
 ‘There are many homeless in Afghanistan’
- b. *Amerikanerne bombet det mange hjemløse i Afghanistan.
 American-DEF.PL bomb-PAST EXPL many homeless in Afghanistan
 ‘the Americans bombed there many homeless in Afghanistan’

The *det* of impersonals has one further way of appearing as object, namely through *incorporation* applied to structures like that in (21a). Norwegian has in general many instances of ‘incorporation’ of a secondary predicate into the verb, as exemplified in (26), corresponding to (22), with *ren* incorporated into *spylte*.

- (26) Vi renspylte huset.
‘We clean-flushed the house’

This construction type provides the possibility of retaining the expletive pronoun in a construction like (21) as an object – cf. (27), where *renspyle* is the incorporation counterpart of *spyle rent* ‘flush clean’, and *det* – aside from a possible referential reading – can be interpreted as an expletive. The examples in (27b, c) show, in analogy to (24b, c), that this expletive *det* can be passive-promoted, and thus also here fulfills a test used for objecthood.

- (27) a. Vi renspylte det ute og inne
We cleanflush-PAST EXPL outside and inside
‘We clean-flushed outside and inside’
b. Det ble renspylt ute og inne
EXPL be.PAST cleanflushed outside and inside
‘It was clean-flushed outside and inside’
c. *Det ble renspylt det ute og inne
EXPL be.PAST cleanflushed EXPL outside and inside

With these examples of possible and less possible patterns of expletive objects in Norwegian, we in the next subsection consider some formal consequences of the construction types just seen. In Section 5 we in turn make some typological reflections about them together with the constructions considered in the earlier sections.

4.2 Some formal consequences: Secondary predicate constructions (SCPR), and notions of ‘licensing’

In a standard SCPR construction such as (22), repeated,

- (22) Vi spylte huset rent
We flush-PAST house-DEF.NEUT clean-NEUT
‘We flushed the house clean’

the object – *huset* – will be said to be the target of the object predicative, instantiating a ‘skewed’ syntax-semantics linking, in that the object carries its GF status relative to the verb, whereas its semantic role holds relative to the secondary predicate, typically portrayed as in Figure 5 in the AVM style representation instantiated above. Here ‘ACTNT’ is a level of ‘semantic argument structure’, a representational format close to that of predicate logic as adopted into linguistic semantics through

Montague 1974 and ensuing adaptations as made in Situation Semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983) and Bach (1986), and grammar frameworks such as HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994; Copestake et al. 2005; Hellan 2019) and LFG (Fenstad et al. 1985; Dalrymple 2001).




Figure 5. Representation of ‘skewed’ syntax-semantics linking, with the item with referential index ‘[2]’ as syntactic object of *spyle* but semantic argument of *ren*

Since *det* in (21a), repeated,

- (21) a. Vi spylte det rent ute og inne.
 We flush-PAST EXPL.NEUT clean-NEUT outside and inside
 ‘We flushed so that it became clean inside and outside’

putatively lacks a referent, it is less clear if it makes sense to say that the secondary predicate ascribes a semantic ‘role’ to it. If there is an intuition that (21a) and (22) nevertheless both instantiate the ‘object oriented’ SCPR pattern, characterizing this pattern as ‘skewed linking’ is then not quite appropriate – *skewed licensing* may be a better term. An accompanying question is whether *det* in (21a) should then have the status of ACT1 in a formal representation corresponding to the ACTNT level in Figure 5 – that would conflict with tacit assumptions by which ‘arguments’ have referential or otherwise participant-like status (vague as these notions may be). The question of course applies to expletive subjects as well, and is not something we will try to resolve here.³⁰

30. The reasoning applies correspondingly for the extraposition case. The transformational ‘Raising’ account, which involves a syntactic underlying level but no logical representation, steers clear of this issue. Even more of a transformational apparatus may be relevant for aligning incorporation cases (26) and (27a) with SCPR constructions, but exactly how that could be implemented we leave open.

5. Theoretical considerations: Transitivity and theticity

In the discussion in 4 we have used the term ‘object’ in a way that could also have been phrased as ‘formal object’; and one might indeed object to calling such an item ‘object’ at all. As argued above, a terminology of ‘formal subject’, ‘formal object’ and ‘formal topic’ is inherently consistent enough. Moreover, in calling the expletive *det* in the constructions discussed in Section 4 an object, we follow a widely pursued strategy of combining a perspective of ‘true’ semantic content with formal syntactic patterning, for instance as formulated in Creissels (2016):

- Prototypical transitive events (or events characterized by the highest possible degree of transitivity) involve a change of state or position undergone by one of the two participants (the patient) and triggered by the action of the other participant (the agent); moreover, prototypical transitivity implies that the action of the agent is conscious and voluntary, and aims at changing the state of the patient or controlling its position. (p. 18)
- The sets of transitive verbs of the individual languages are universally defined as including a particular semantic class of verbs, the *core transitive verbs*, defined as bivalent verbs that can head clauses encoding events characterized by a maximum degree of semantic transitivity as defined [above]. (p. 19)
- The term *transitive verb* without further specification refers to verbs whose construction includes two terms coded like the two arguments of core transitive verbs, whatever their semantic roles. (p. 20)
- The basic transitive coding is a construction involving a verb and two NP’s designated as A and P, whose coding is identical to that of the agent and the patient when the verb heading the construction is a core transitive verb. (p. 21)

Thus, the notion ‘prototypical transitive events’ (first line of the quote) corresponds to what we have called ‘STA’ (‘strong transitive axis’) in the discussion in Section 2, and the stipulation (third paragraph of the quote)

The term *transitive verb* without further specification refers to verbs whose construction includes two terms coded like the two arguments of core transitive verbs, whatever their semantic roles

will allow for the notion ‘transitive’ to be applied also to constructions with expletive items as objects. Thus, in the latter case, we are applying a formal extreme of the notion ‘transitive’, while in drawing on the STA factor in Section 2, we are drawing on a content-centered aspect of the notion.

The content-centered notion of transitivity presupposes a clear agent of the situation expressed, and thus a clear ‘bearer’ of the predication by which the situation is described, hence complying well with what counts as a *categorical* mode

of expression. The ‘formal’ extreme of transitivity as here considered involving expletives, could one generalize the notion of *thetic* to also subsuming these object expletives?

Since they involve a secondary predicate constellation, and occur in the position where this predicate would normally find its bearer (as a ‘full’ object), the criterion of theticity which we have adopted is here descriptively satisfied. Thus, the ‘expletive object’ constructions now reviewed may count as thetic.

This being so, it may be tempting to try to summarize our proposals in terms of one cline of *transitivity*, and an opposite cline of *theticity*. In terms of the notion ‘transitive construction/verb’ we can count the following parameters, which have all been addressed in the above discussion:

Table 1. Transitivity parameters

P0: Presence of object	– yes/no.
P1: Degree of effort/dynamics of event	– values from ‘high’ to ‘low’.
P2: Referentially distinct participants	– values: (a) two distinct individuals; (b) one individual but in two different roles; (c) one individual in one role.
P3: Role asymmetry of participants	– values from ‘high’ to ‘low’.
P4: Event content realized	– values: (a) through one verb exclusively (‘unique’), (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (‘Incorporation’).
P5: Each participant being realized	– yes/ no (the latter: ‘implicit argument’).
P6: Syntactic object expressing participant	– yes or no (the latter: ‘expletive object’).
P7: ‘Non-Skewed’ licensing	– yes/no.
P8: Syntactic subject expressing participant	– yes/ no
P9: The GF subject being uniquely realized	– yes/ no

If we ‘rank’ construction types relative to their ‘score’ along these parameters, where the assignments

<‘yes’ (P0), ‘high’ (P1), ‘2’ (P2), ‘high’ (P3), ‘unique’ (P4), ‘yes’ (P5), ‘yes’ (P6), ‘yes’ (P7), ‘yes’ (P8), ‘yes’ (P9)>

count as increasing the total transitivity value, a ranking of some of the constructions considered above can come out as follows (suggested assignments for the individual construction types are given in the Appendix):

Table 2. Informal ‘transitivity score’ of a set of construction types

Transitivity Points	Table in appendix	Construction type with example
10 pts	Table 1	<i>Prototypical transitive construction</i> “Hun sparker ballen.” (‘she kicks the ball’)*
8 pts	Table 3	<i>Secondary predicate construction (SCPR)</i> “Vi spylte huset rent.” (‘we flushed the house clean’)
8 pts	Table 2	<i>Light reflexive construction</i> “Hun vasker seg.” (‘she washes herself’)
7 pts	Table 10	<i>Presentational with full object</i> “Det venter ham en ulykke.” (‘there awaits him an accident’)
6 pts	Table 8	<i>Presentational with reflexive</i> “Det setter seg en katt.” (‘it sits itself a cat’)
6 pts	Table 4	<i>SCPR with reflexive</i> “Hun synger seg glad.” (‘she sings herself happy’)
5, 5 pts	Table 6	<i>SCPR with expletive object and incorporation</i> “Vi renspylte det inne.” (‘we clean-flushed it inside’)
5 pts	Table 9	<i>Presentational with reflexive and SCPR</i> “Det kjører seg ihjel et styremedlem.” (‘there drives himself dead a board member’)
5 pts	Table 5	<i>SCPR with expletive object</i> “Vi spylte det rent inne.” (‘we flushed it clean inside’)
4 pts	Table 7	<i>Presentational</i> “Det sitter en katt.” (‘there sits a cat’)
3 pts	Table 11	<i>Impersonal</i> “Det blåser.” (‘it blows’)

* As an aside it may be noted that among transitive verbs in Norwegian, those with this profile have a larger tendency to occur with multiple frames than verbs with a lower score for P1 but otherwise identical to this type.

Constructions featuring the expletive *det* here dominate the lower half of the list (4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11), and so a ‘converse’ construal of the ranking could be seen as a ranking according to *theticity*.

What a typology like the present highlights is obviously a rather marginal portion of construction types cross linguistically, and it may well be that Norwegian represents a ‘thetic extreme’ in a more worldwide perspective.³¹ This may hold for German as well, modulo the differences concerning *es/det* in presentationals and with provisos for how German aligns relative to the constructions discussed in Section 4. Discussions along these lines, however, cannot be pursued here.

31. Holen (2007) notes that while for most languages pronoun resolution algorithms will be defined for subject as a first choice, this is not so for Norwegian, given the likelihood that the subject may be an expletive.

6. Concluding remarks

Relative to the use of *det/es* as expletive element, we have considered three types of constructions in Norwegian and German – impersonal, extraposition and presentational, where the expletive element occurs in clause-initial position, and – for Norwegian – AcI constructions and Secondary Predicate constructions (SCPR), where the expletive element occurs in object position. We have (re)stated salient differences between Norwegian and German concerning the status of the clause-initial items *det*, resp. *es*, in *presentational* constructions.³² In German, the ‘would-have-been’ subject appears post-verbally with all essential grammatical properties of being a subject, while *es* has no grammatical function, whereas in Norwegian, the place-holding clause-initial *det* has enough of the formal distributional properties of a standard subject to warrant calling it a subject, albeit often qualified as a ‘formal’ subject. At the same time, also the NP occurring post-verbally – here referred to as *NPpres* – has such essential subject properties that it must be analyzed as subject, and not, for instance (as has been proposed both in the GB literature and the LFG literature), as object. Although being in a post-verbal position where also objects generally occur, the *NPpres* fails to have properties criterial of objecthood such as semantic status and passivizability. Moreover, a crucial point in the argumentation for the non-object status of *NPpres* in Norwegian is that objects, in the sense of direct objects, indeed occur in presentational constructions, in the first place as light reflexives, and second as full NPs in sentences not constituting what we have called a ‘strong transitive axis’ (cf. Section 2). The status as ‘object’ in presentationals is thus at any rate reserved for other items than *NPpres*.

Assuming (as in most formal frameworks based on feature structures) that the same function is not instantiated twice relative to a verb, an analytic challenge is to accommodate the apparent duplicity of subject status. We have proposed (in Section 3) that the two items have their function defined in terms of the functional criteria they fulfill, rather than in attribute names; but details of such an analysis remain to be worked out.³³

We have suggested *theticity* as a common feature of all the types of constructions in Norwegian and German mentioned above involving expletive pronouns in clause initial and object position. That amounts to saying that while in a standard sentence design a predication combines with a *bearer* of the properties or activities

32. Differences sometimes overlooked in more broadly typological overviews, like Gast & Haas (2011).

33. Note that there being no reasons for counting the *NPpres* as objects, there is, for constructions like those discussed in 2.2, no basis for construing a possible ‘two-object analysis’ analogous to what we have proposed for subjects in presentationals, as indicated in Figure 2 in Section 3.

expressed, in thethetic design there is no bearer expressed in that syntactic configuration. *Categorical* being the term used for the opposite mode of expression, one may count a 'prototypical transitive' construction in the construal rendered in Section 5 as also a 'prototypical categorical' construction. The ranking of construction types suggested in Table 2 according to transitivity could thus also be read as a ranking according to categoricity, and read in the opposite direction from below, as a ranking according to theticity. However instructive such an exercise may be – by itself, or in relation to other and larger typologies or hierarchies – it summarizes parameters of similarities and differences between Norwegian and German, in ways that may open for broader comparisons, as well as diachronic investigation of how the various similarities and differences have developed.

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Appendix

We here show the assignments relative to parameters P0-P9 of Table 1 of the text to the construction types ranked in Table 2 of the text, according to ‘transitivity’ (‘NA’ for ‘non-applicable’):

Ranked 1. Table 1 ‘*Prototypical transitive*’ construction “Hun sparker ballen.” (‘she kicks the ball’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	2
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	High
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	Yes
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 10 pts

Ranked 2. Table 3 *Secondary Predicate (SCPR)* “Vi spylte huset rent.” (‘we flushed the house clean’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	2
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	High
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Verb plus another predicate
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	No
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 8 pts

Ranked 2. Table 2 *Light reflexive construction* “Hun vasker seg.” (‘she washes herself’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1, in subject-viewpoint 2 roles

P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	'Non-skewed' licensing	Yes
P8	The GF 'subject' expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF 'subject' being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 8 pts

Ranked 4. Table 10 *Presentational with full object* "Det venter ham en ulykke." ('there awaits him an accident')

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	Low
P2	Referentially distinct participants	2
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	Low
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	'Non-skewed' licensing	Yes
P8	The GF 'subject' expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF 'subject' being uniquely realized	No

Score: 7 pts

Ranked 5. Table 8 *Presentational with reflexive* "Det setter seg en katt." ('it seats itself a cat')

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	Low
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	'Non-skewed' licensing	Yes
P8	The GF 'subject' expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF 'subject' being uniquely realized	No

Score: 6 pts

Ranked 5. Table 4 *SCPR with reflexive* “Hun synger seg glad.” (‘she sings herself happy’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1, in subject-viewpoint 2 roles
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Verb plus another predicate
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	No
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 6 pts

Ranked 7. Table 6 *SCPR with expletive object and incorporation* “Vi rensplyte det inne.” (‘we clean-flushed it inside’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Incorporation
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	No
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	No
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 5,5 pts

Ranked 8. Table 9 *Presentational with reflexive and SCPR* “Det kjører seg ihjel et styremedlem.” (‘there drives himself dead a board member’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Verb plus another predicate
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	Yes
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	No
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	No

Score: 5 pts

Ranked 8. Table 5 *SCPR with expletive object* “Vi spylte det rent inne.”
(‘we flushed it clean inside’)

P0	Presence of object	Yes
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Verb plus another predicate
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	No
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	No
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	Yes

Score: 5 pts

Ranked 10. Table 7 *Presentational* “Det sitter en katt.” (‘there sits a cat’)

P0	Presence of object	No
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	Low
P2	Referentially distinct participants	1
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	Yes
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	NA
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	Yes
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	Yes
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	No

Score: 4 pts

Ranked 11. Table 11 *Impersonal* “Det blåser.” (‘it blows’)

P0	Presence of object	No
P1	Degree of effort/dynamics of event	High
P2	Referentially distinct participants	0
P3	Role asymmetry of participants	NA
P4	Event content realized (a) through one verb exclusively, or (b) through verb plus another predicate, or (c) both (incorporation)	Unique
P5	Each participant being realized	NA
P6	Syntactic object expressing participant	NA
P7	‘Non-skewed’ licensing	Yes
P8	The GF ‘subject’ expressing participant	No
P9	The GF ‘subject’ being uniquely realized	NA

Score: 3 pts

Copulas and information structure in Tanti Dargwa

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The paper describes the basic types of independent clauses in the Tanti dialect of Dargwa (Nakh-Dagestanian (= East Caucasian), Russian Federation). Most independent clauses in Tanti are headed either by the identificational copula or a finite verb form. Less frequently, we meet sentences headed by one of the four existential copulas. There are also some independent clauses headed by a non-finite verb form or a non-verbal predicate and containing no copula. The paper shows that the basic difference between the sentences with different copula types and without any copulas is the type of information structure of the relevant sentence. The identificational copula is a feature of categorical sentences; the position of the copula points at the focused constituent. The existential copulas tend to headthetic structures. Copula-less converbal clauses are often interpreted as mirative sentences, which can also be analyzed asthetic, but differ from the existential structures by the moment when the speaker obtains the knowledge of the situation.

Keywords: Nakh-Dagestanian, Dargwa,thetic sentences, existential sentences, mirativity

1. Introduction

The information structure of the East Caucasian languages has been discussed in many descriptive and theoretical works, but the only category from this domain that has received sufficient attention from the researchers is the expression of argument focus. Many Nakh-Dagestanian (East Caucasian) languages (Dargwa, Lak, Tsakhur, Udi, among others) have very interesting and very similar cleft-like techniques of argument focus marking, which have been widely discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Kazenin 2002; Harris 2002; Testelets 1998; Sumbatova 2004). At the same time, very little is known about other types of information structure – sentence

focus, verificational focus, etc. This information is very scarce even in the modern grammars of the East Caucasian languages and in the survey (Forker to appear).

In this paper, I would like start a discussion of the techniques that are used to mark a sentence as a sentence focus (thetic) structure in Dargwa. To be more precise, I will describe two classes of independent clauses, which are used in sentence focus utterances: (1) the clauses headed by existential copulas and (2) the clauses with no overt copulas. Although they are not functionally identical, both are used to express thetic information structure. I cannot argue that these two classes of clauses exhaust all possibilities of marking theticity; more than that, marking theticity is not their only function. I will try to describe and partly explain the basic functions of these two constructions. However, in this paper, I will not be able to provide a thorough syntactic analysis of the constructions in question: this is a separate task, which would require some additional research and a lot of additional space.

The paper is based on the data of Tanti Dargwa, which were collected in course of field work in the village of Tanti in 2009–2019 and partly published in (Sumbatova; Lander 2014). I use both elicited data and examples from the corpus of oral texts, which Yury Lander and I collected in Tanti (most of the texts are published in (Sumbatova; Lander 2014: 661–723)). More information on Dargwa and Tanti will be given in Section 2.

When discussing information structure, I will mainly use the classic framework by Knud Lambrecht (1994). Lambrecht introduces three basic types of focus articulation: predicate-focus, argument-focus and sentence-focus. The predicate-focus structures are believed to be the most common and least marked sentence type. They consist of a topical subject and the focused rest of the sentence, which includes the predicate, as in (1a) (from Lambrecht 1994: 223). The argument-focus structures are the sentences where the focus consists of an argument of the predicate or another constituent that does not dominate the predicate – for example, an adjunct or a part of an argument/adjunct (e.g. a possessor), cf. (1b). The sentence-focus structures are the sentences where the whole sentence is focused (1c).

- (1) a. (What happened to your car?)
My car/It broke DOWN.
- b. (I heard your motorcycle broke down?)
MY CAR broke down.
- c. (What happened?)
My car broke down. (Lambrecht 1994: 223)

I will adopt this classification with some minor changes. First, all sentences with *any* topical argument and the focused rest of the sentence will be treated as predicate-focus structures; in Lambrecht's work, the predicate-focus structures have a topical subject. My decision is partly motivated by the fact that Dargwa is

an ergative language where the subject properties are distributed across several different NPs. On the other hand, the topic function in Dargwa is not rigidly tied to a syntactic position.

My understanding of argument-focus is the same as in (Lambrecht 1994): in an argument-focus construction, the whole predication is presupposed with the exception of only one argument or any other constituent (adjunct, part of an argument/adjunct).

In the sentence-focus structures (more frequently labelled *thetic*, see, in particular, (Sasse 1995, 1996)), focus coincides with assertion, since these sentences have no non-trivial pragmatic presuppositions (Lambrecht 1994: 233). However, in this paper, I will take into account a slightly different approach from (Lambrecht & Polinsky 1998): “SENTENCE-FOCUS CONSTRUCTION: Sentence construction formally marked as expressing a pragmatically structured proposition in which both the subject and the predicate are in focus. The focus domain is the sentence, minus any topical non-subject arguments.” This is a broader definition of sentence-focus than the usual one: a sentence-focus (thetic) structure is allowed to have some topical elements including topical non-subject arguments.

The definition of sentence-focus (thetic) structures that I use in this paper lies between the classic definition in (Lambrecht 1994)¹ and the approach from (Lambrecht & Polinsky 1998) cited above. In this paper, sentence-focus structures are understood as sentences where the whole predication (= the predicate and all its arguments) is in focus but the sentence can have one or several scene-setting adverbials.

(2) Sentence-focus: {Scene-setting adverbials} [_{FOCUS} PREDICATION]

Lambrecht (Lambrecht 1994: 118) describes scene-setting adverbials as a type of a topic. Most usually, they are situated on the left periphery of the sentence. There is also a different approach suggested in (Andréasson 2007) with a ternary opposition of *rheme* – *ground* – *scene*. In her terms, the scene is presented by the “constituents that relate the proposition to a temporal, spatial or circumstantial context, that is not under discussion”. This approach implies that the scene-setting adverbials may be known, referentially accessible or new for the hearer.

A possible example of a sentence-focus structure with a scene-setting adverbial is (3) from Tsez (Nakh-Dagestania; (Lambrecht & Polinsky 1998)):

- (3) hon-ʔ'o ʃadalaw oqoχosi zowsi
 hill-SUPERESSIVE fool.ABS living was
 ‘On the hill lived a fool.’ (NOT: ‘The fool lived on the hill.’)

1. See also (Sasse 1995).

The three sentence types (predicate-focus – argument-focus – sentence-focus) do not exhaust the range of possible information structures (there are, for example, sentences with verificational focus or TAM-focus). However, here I am not discussing any sentence types other than the basic three.²

The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, I give necessary information on the grammar of Tanti Dargwa including a short description of the clause structure. In 3, I will show the main technique of focus marking in Tanti Dargwa and illustrate how it works in predicate-focus and argument-focus structures. Section 4 describes the functions of the existential copulas and the semantic/pragmatic properties of the clauses headed by these copulas. In Section 5, I analyse the most enigmatic type of independent clauses in Tanti – the so-called “unmarked” clauses, which are headed by a converb and have no overt copulas. The last section contains conclusions and formulates new questions to be answered in the future.

2. Tanti Dargwa: Necessary information

2.1 General

Dargwa is spoken in the central and eastern part of the Republic of Dagestan (Russian Federation). It constitutes a separate branch of the Nakh-Dagestian (East Caucasian) language family (Alekseev 1998; Friedman 2010). The general number of the speakers of Dargwa is almost 500,000 (census 2010), but many small dialects including Tanti Dargwa are now endangered.

Dargwa is known for its dialectal variation, so that many authors prefer to treat Dargwa as a group of related languages rather than one language. However, in this paper, I will not discuss this problem and will refer to Tanti as to a dialect of Dargwa. This lect is spoken in the village of Tanti, which is situated in the Aqusha district of Dagestan. The village is inhabited by approximately 800 persons; some speakers of Tanti also live outside the village. This dialect is mentioned in (Abdullaev 1954: 8); a short lexicon can be found in (Comrie & Khalilov 2010); a grammatical description with special emphasis on the syntax is (Sumbatova & Lander 2014).

Typologically, Dargwa is a morphologically ergative language, with basically left-branching, but free word order, and very rich agglutinative morphology both in the nominal and verbal domain. Like most languages of the Nakh-Dagestian family, Tanti Dargwa has gender agreement in the NPs and clauses. Dargwa has three genders in the singular (masculine, feminine, non-human) and three in the

2. Some information on the verificational sentences in Tanti can be found in (Sumbatova & Lander 2014: 376–378).

plural (human, non-human, plus a special gender for the NPs of the 1st/2nd person plural). Gender markers appear as prefixes, suffixes or even infixes depending on the agreement target. In most cases, gender agreement is triggered by a certain morpheme (most verbal roots, some roots of adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns; all non-negative copulas; certain suffixes). Besides, a suffixal gender marker appears in the essive form of different adverbials (locative forms of nouns, spatial adverbs and postpositions). For example, in (4), there are four gender markers (shown in bold): two prefixes in the complex verb ‘approach’, a suffix in the identificational copula and a suffix in the essive form of the noun ‘pocket’:

- (4) bus:aʔt dila kisna=**b** arc
 now I:GEN pocket:LOC=N money(ABS)
b=al-ʕaʔ-**b**=ič-ib-le=sa=**b**³
 N=approach-NEG-N=LV.PFV-PRET-CVB=ID.COP=N
 ‘The money in my pocket has run out.’ (oral text)

In most cases, gender is controlled by the absolutive NP of the same clause; in (4), the controller is the non-human singular noun *arc* ‘money’. In a transitive clause, gender can also be controlled by the ergative NP (see (Sumbatova & Lander 2014) for more detailed rules of agreement control).

Unlike most languages of the Nakh-Dagestanian family, Dargwa also shows well-developped person agreement (Sumbatova 2011). Person is usually expressed on the predicate of the clause. The control rules for person are based on the personal hierarchy. In an intransitive clause, person is controlled by the S-argument (in the absolutive case). In a transitive clause, the choice of the controller is based on the personal hierarchy: if one of the core arguments is 3rd person and the other one is 1st or 2nd person, it is the 1st/2nd person argument that controls agreement (5cde); if both core arguments are 1st/2nd person, the person agreement is controlled by the P-argument (5ab). The 3rd person is unmarked (5f).

- (5) a. dali ʕuʔ uc-ib=de
 I:ERG you.SG(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET=2SG
 ‘I caught you.’
 b. ʕaʔli du uc-ib=da
 you.SG:ERG I(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET=1
 ‘You caught me.’
 c. dali hit uc-ib=da
 I:ERG that(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET=1
 ‘I caught him.’

3. See the list of abbreviations.

- d. ʕaʕli hit uc-ib=de
 you.SG:ERG that(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET=2SG
 ‘You caught him.’
- e. rasul-li ʕuʕ uc-ib=de
 Rasul-ERG you.SG(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET=2SG
 ‘Rasul caught you.’
- f. rasul-li hit uc-ib
 Rasul-ERG that(ABS) (M)catch.PFV-PRET
 ‘Rasul caught you.’ (3rd person form, unmarked)

The nouns in Dargwa inflect for number and have a branched system of cases. The case forms can be classified into grammatical cases (absolutive, ergative, dative, genitive, comitative, adverbial) and several dozens of locative (= spatial) forms.

The verb system includes a whole number of finite and non-finite verbs forms (converbs, participles, infinitives, deverbal nouns). Most finite forms can be viewed as periphrastic: they consist of a non-finite form (most frequently, a converb or a participle) plus a copula and, in the 1st and 2nd person forms, a clitic person marker (=de for the 2nd person singular, =da for the 2nd person plural and 1st person, singular and plural); cf. (5a)–(5e) and (6) below. In the past tense, the periphrastic forms do not express person: in the position of the person clitic they have the past clitic =de (homonymous with the 2SG clitic). Most usually, the copula is omitted if a person or past clitic is present, but can always be restored.

Sentences (6a)–(6d) illustrate the structure of periphrastic forms. In all of them, the lexical verb is in the form of a simple converb. In (6ab), the verb is in the present tense. In (6a), the converb attaches the identificational copula =sa=r; in (6b), we have a 1st person form optionally modified by the copula and obligatorily – with the 1st person clitic =da; the copula is frequently, but still optionally omitted; (6cd) illustrate the past progressive forms with the past clitic =de: the copula is usually omitted, the person is not expressed.

- (6) a. rurs:i r=us:-un-ne=sa=r
 girl(ABS) F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=F
 ‘The girl is sleeping.’
- b. (du) r=us:-un-ne=sa=r=da / (du)
 I(ABS) F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=F=1 / I(ABS)
 r=us:-un-ne=da
 F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=1
 ‘I am sleeping.’
- c. rurs:i r=us:-un-ne=sa=r=de / rurs:i
 girl(ABS) F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=F=PST / girl(ABS)
 r=us:-un-ne=de
 F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=PST
 ‘The girl was sleeping.’

- d. (du) r=us:-un-ne=sa-r=de / (du)
 I(ABS) F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=F=PST / I(ABS)
 r=us:-un-ne=de
 F=sleep:IPFV-PRS-CVB=PST
 'I was sleeping.'

The copula and the clitic person/tense markers are also used in nominal predicate clauses and argument focus structures where they modify non-verbal constituents; for more details see below (this section).

Along with periphrastic forms, Dargwa has some synthetic finite forms. This group includes future, past habitual, irrealis and a number of forms that head non-declarative sentences: imperative, optative, prohibitive. These forms morphologically express person by person suffixes as shown in (7ab):

- (7) a. r=us:-u-d
 F=sleep.IPFV-TH-1
 'I (F) will sleep' (future, 1st person)
 b. r=us:-u-t
 F=sleep.IPFV-TH-2
 'You (F, SG) will sleep' (future, 2nd person)
 c. r=us:-an
 F=sleep.IPFV-TH
 'She will sleep' (future, 3rd person (unmarked))
 d. r=us:-e!
 F=sleep.IPFV-IMP
 'Sleep!' (imperative, 2nd person only)
 e. r=us:-ab!
 F=sleep.IPFV-OPT
 'Let her sleep!' (optative, 3rd person (unmarked))

Tanti has two types of copulas: an identificational copula (masculine: =sa=j, feminine =sa<r>i or =sa=r, non-human singular and human plural =sai or =sa=b, 1st/2nd person plural and non-human plural =sa<d>i or =sa=d)⁴ and a set of existential copulas: *le=w*⁵ 'exist (close to the speaker/hearer or in an undefined place)' ~ *te=w* 'exist (far away from the speaker)' ~ *č'e=w* 'exist (higher than the speaker)' ~ *χe=w* 'exist (lower than the speaker)'.⁶ The negative counterparts of the copulas are the negative identificational copula =ak:u and the negative existential auxiliary *w-a^hk:u*. All non-negative copulas and the negative existential auxiliary have a slot for gender agreement.

4. Below, the copulas with a gender marker slot are cited with the masculine gender marker =j, =w or w=.

5. With other gender markers: *le-r*, *le-b*, *le-d* (plus parallel forms of the other copulas).

6. More information on the existential copulas will be provided in Section 4.

Morphologically, both identificational and existential copulas cannot be viewed as verbs, first of all because the verbs in Dargwa have a very small set of possible root structures (=VC,⁷ =VLC, VC, VLC, LVC, very rarely C) whereas the roots of all non-negative copulas have the structure of CV=. The copulas don't inflect for most verbal categories; on the other hand, they still have some typically verbal forms – a converb (*le=b-le*, *sa=b-le*), a participle (*le=b-se*, *sa=b-se*) and a deverbal noun (*sa=b-ni*).

All copulas can head nominal predicate clauses: the identificational copula is used in the clauses expressing identity, property or possession (8)–(11)), whereas the existential copulas express different varieties of existential meaning (Example (12)), see Section 4 for more details). Exactly as in the verbal clauses, the identificational copula is usually omitted in the presence of a person or past marker (10).

- (8) hit dila t:at:i=sa=j
that(ABS) I:gen father=ID.COP=M
'That one is my father.'
- (9) ʔaʔʂat-la durħa⁶ duχ:u-se=sa=j
Ayshat-GEN son(ABS) smart-ATR=ID.COP=M
'Ayshat's son is smart.'
- (10) du ʔaʔlim(=sa=j)=da
I(ABS) scientist(=ID.COP=M)=I
'I (M) am a scientist'
- (11) a. hiž mašina dila=sa=b
this car(ABS) I:gen=ID.COP=N
'This car is mine.'
- b. hiž mašina dila=ak:u
this car(ABS) I:gen=NEG.ID.COP
'This car is mine.'
- (12) a. dila mašina le=b
I:gen car(ABS) EXST.COP=N
'I have a car' (lit. 'There is car of mine').
- b. dila mašina b=a⁷k:u
I:GEN car(ABS) N=NEG.EXST.COP
'I have no car.'

As mentioned before, it is the identificational copula that is most frequently used within the periphrastic verbal forms; the existential copulas are also grammatical in this position, but limited to certain special functions that will be discussed in Section 4.

7. '=' points at a slot of a gender marker.

2.2 Types of clauses

2.2.1 Independent clauses

Copular clauses

In the previous section, I mentioned that the periphrastic verb forms and nominal predicates contain a copula and, in some cases, a person or past clitic (Examples (6) and (8)–(12)). The clauses with the predicates of this type are the most common type of independent clauses in Tanti. We refer to them as *copular* clauses.

The declarative copular clauses contain a copula and/or a clitic person or past marker. Interrogative independent clauses contain an additional clitic that immediately follows them, i.e. an interrogative particle (polar question marker =*i/=j*, constituent question marker =*a*, rhetoric question marker =*wara*).⁸ One more clitic that can occupy this lot is the “actualizing” clitic =*q’ale*, which appears when the speaker reminds the addressee on a fact that (s)he is supposed to know or attracts his/her attention to a known fact.

As a result, in a copular clause, we can have a chain of up to three auxiliary elements that we call *predicative markers* (PMs). In a clause, the predicative markers cannot be separated from each other and always go in a fixed order as shown in Table 1 (clitics of Class 1 in the leftmost position).⁹ Most usually, the clitics attach to the main predicate of the clause as shown in Example (6); other options will be regarded in Section 4.

Table 1. Classes of predicative markers in Tanti

Class 1		Class 2		Class 3	
<i>identification, existence</i>		<i>person, tense</i>		<i>interrogativity, actualization</i>	
= <i>sa=j</i>	identificational copula	= <i>de</i> past	= <i>i/=j</i> , = <i>a</i> ,	question markers	
		= <i>da</i> 1SG/PL, 2PL	= <i>wara</i> , = <i>anne</i>		
<i>le=w</i> , <i>te=w</i> ,	existential copulas	= <i>de</i> 2SG	= <i>q’ale</i>	‘but’ (actualization marker)	
<i>č’e=w</i> , <i>χe=w</i>					
= <i>ak:wara</i>	negative copula				
<i>w=a^lk:u</i>	negative existential verb				

8. The same syntactic slot can be occupied by the indirect question marker =*anne*.

9. It can be shown that each class of predicative markers heads an own functional projection:

[_{CP} [_{TP} [_{FocP} [_{VP} *ʃa^lli* *rurs:i* *quli=r* *r=alt-un-ne*]
 2SG:ERG girl(ABS) at.home=F F=leave:IPFV-PRS-CVB
 =*sa=j*] [_{DP} =*d*] =*i*]
 =ID.COP=M =2SG =PQ
 ‘Are you leaving your daughter at home?’

However, a syntactic analysis of the clause in Tanti Dargwa lies beyond the scope of this paper.

A chain of predicative markers can modify words of different classes: in (13), it modifies a noun, in (14) – an adjective, in (15) – a genitive form of a personal pronoun, in (16) – an adverb; in (6) and (17), the clitic chain attaches to non-finite verb forms. The only open lexical class that cannot be modified by a copula are synthetic finite verb forms.

- (13) a. *rasul* $\text{ʔa}^{\text{ʔ}}\text{lim}=\text{sa}=\text{j}=\text{i}?$
 Rasul(ABS) scientist(ABS)=ID.COP=M=PQ
 ‘Is Rasul a scientist?’
 b. *rasul* $\text{ʔa}^{\text{ʔ}}\text{lim}=\text{ak};\text{ara}=\text{j}?$
 Rasul(ABS) scientist(ABS)=NEG.ID.COP=PQ
 ‘Isn’t Rasul a scientist?’
- (14) $\text{ʔa}^{\text{ʔ}}\text{ʃat-la}$ *durħa*° *duχ:u-se=sa=j*
 Ayshat-GEN boy(ABS) smart-ATR=ID.COP=M
 ‘The son of Ayshat is smart.’
- (15) *hiž* *mašina* *dila=sa=b*
 this car(ABS) I:gen=ID.COP=N
 ‘This car is mine.’
- (16) *t:ura=b* *c’ab-le=sa=b*
 outside=N dark-ADV=ID.COP=N
 ‘It is dark outside.’
- (17) *hil* *birgada* *b=arq’-ib-le,* *astarχan-ni-ja*
 this brigade(ABS) N=make:PFV-PRET-CVB Astrakhan-OBL-SUPER
ag-ur-sa=da *du* *šitir*
 go:PFV-PRET-ATR=1 I(ABS) for.a.walk¹⁰
 ‘After they have organized this brigade, I went to Astrakhan to have some fun.’
 (oral text)

The class of copular clauses comprises both the nominal predicate clauses and the clauses with a verbal predicate in a periphrastic form. In most cases, the properties of the copulas and other predicative markers do not depend on the lexical class of the predicate.

Verbal clauses

As mentioned before, the copulas are incompatible with synthetic finite verb forms. The indicative synthetic finite forms can be modified by predicative markers of class 3 (interrogative and actualizing particles), as shown in (18), but not by the copulas and person/past markers. The non-indicative finite forms are incompatible with any type of predicative markers (19).

10. The word *šit:ir* is an adverb with a purposive meaning.

- (18) [niʃi:c:ele le-w=q'-a'-t:]=i? ʃaʃ-q'-aʃ-d
 we-COMIT HITHER-M=GO-TH-2=PQ NEG-go.IPFV-TH-1
 'Are you going with us? – (No,) I'm not going.'
- (19) w=aʃ-e q'adi-ʃ:u
 M=walk.IPFV-IMP qadi-AD
 'Go to the judge!' (oral text)

Unmarked clauses

All clause types mentioned so far express tense, most of them also express person. However, Tanti Dargwa also has several classes of sentences that cannot attach a full chain of predicative markers. At first sight these sentences look as if they are headed by a non-finite verb form or a non-verbal lexeme without any predicative markers. If we confine ourselves to non-past, affirmative, 3rd person clauses with a non-finite predicate, we find that some of such clauses do not contain any copulas, cf. (20):

- (20) umra herk'-li-ʃ:u q'-aʃn-ne
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'The neighbor is walking to the river.'

Clauses of this type (I call them *unmarked*) are not homogenous – neither structurally nor semantically. We will return to them Section 5.

2.2.2 Dependent clauses

Most dependent clauses in Dargwa are headed by non-finite verb forms, cf. Examples (21)–(23) where the subordinate clause is headed by a participle, a con-verb and an infinitive, respectively.

- (21) hit bajaki [ʃaʃli rurs:i r=ič:ib-se] durʃaʃ
 that the.same you.SG:ERG girl(ABS) F=give:PFV-PRET-ATR boy(ABS)
 buk'un=sa=j
 shepherd(ABS)=ID.COP=M
 'The boy to whom you gave you daughter is a shepherd.' (oral text)
- (22) [ħaʃz-li-ž b=irq-u-le] ʔaʃ-b=irχ-ar=nu
 game-OBL-DAT N=hit:IPFV-PRS-CVB NEG-N=be.able:IPFV-TH=CONTR
 'You never hit somebody in jest.' (lit. 'Hitting in jest is impossible') (oral text)
- (23) ʔaʃp:aʃsi-li [ʃahi b=arq'-iž] b=irχ-u=q:alle,
 abazi-ERG shahi N=make:IPFV-INF N=be.able:IPFV-PRS=when
 [b=ebč'-iž] ʃaʃ-b=irχ-u-se=j?
 N=die.PFV-INF NEG-N=be.able:IPFV-PRS-ATR=PQ
 'If an abazi¹¹ can give birth to a shahi, then cannot it die?' (oral text)

11. *Abazi* (*appasi*) is a coin first issued by the Persian shah Abbas. The coins with the same name were also used in Georgia before up the early 19th century. An *abazi* consisted of four *shahi*.

Finite dependent clauses are only possible in reported speech. These are indirect questions introduced by the predicative particle =*anne* (24) or finite clauses marked by the quotative particle *ible* (25).

- (24) [čina q'ₒ-aʳn-senne¹²] ʃaʳ-b=alχ-un-ne hil kulki-ž
 where go.IPFV-POT-ATR+IQ NEG-N=know.IPFV-PRS-CVB this thief-DAT
 ‘This thief did not know where to go.’ (oral text)
- (25) malla nasrat:in simi-w=ačʳ-ib-le,
 Mullah Nasreddin(ABS) angry-M=LV.PFV-PRET-CVB
 ʃaʳsi-w=iχ-ub-le ča-r-ħela-w-iž-ib-le=sa-j
 mad-M=LV.PFV-PRET-CVB ON-EL-BEHIND-M-sit.PFV-PRET-CVB=ID.COP=M
 [[sun-ni=ra b=irq-i-d] ible]
 self-ERG=ADD N=hit.IPFV-TH-1 CIT
 ‘Mullah Nasreddin got angry, turned round, and thought: ‘I’ll hit him myself!’’
 (oral text)

Narrative texts in Dargwa are structured as chains of converbial clauses formally dependent on a finite main clause (the latter can contain a copula or a finite verb form). The clauses in such a chain are often same-subject, as in (26), where all clauses in the chain have the same A/S-argument ‘thief’, but this is not obligatory. For example, in (27), four converbial clauses (in square brackets) have the same S-argument – ‘two mullahs and the thief’, but the final finite (copular) clause is an impersonal clause ‘it got dark’.

- (26) [b=elχ-un-ne hil-i-li čuja], [d=arqʳ-ib-le
 N=stab.PFV-PRET-CVB this-OBL-ERG ram(ABS) NPL=make.PFV-PRET-CVB
 dig-be], [haqʳ-ur-le χinkʳ-a-c:e],
 meat-PL(ABS) UP+throw.PFV-PRET-CVB khinkal-OBL-INTER
 [χinkʳ-e=ra d=elš:aq-un-ne],
 khinkal-PL(ABS)=ADD NPL=boil.PFV-PRET-CVB
 [gu-r-haʳ-ib-le gul-e=ra], sun-ni=ra
 UNDER-EL-UP+reach.PFV-PRET-CVB child-PL(ABS)=ADD self-ERG=ADD
 b=aχ:un-ne=sa-j χinkʳ-a-li
 HPL=feed.PFV-PRET-CVB=ID.COP=M khinkal-OBL-ERG
 [At night, the thief went to the cattle-pen.] He stabbed a ram, butchered the
 carcass, put some meat (in the pot), prepared khinkal, woke up the children
 and fed them with khinkal.’ (oral text)

12. –*se* + =*anne* > –*senne*.

3. Copulas and focus marking

As in many languages, the focus in Dargwa can be marked by intonation and/or word order: typically, the focused constituent takes the preverbal position. In this paper, I only discuss morphosyntactic techniques of focus marking. Dargwa widely uses copulas or, to be more precise, chains of predicative markers, to mark the position of the focused constituent. This strategy is very typical of the languages of the East Caucasian family.

In Dargwa, the focused constituent is marked by the position of the identificational copula, which, as we know, is part of the chain of predicative markers. The whole chain is placed on the right edge of the focused constituent.¹³

In the predicate-focus structures, where the focused part of the sentence includes its main predicate, the predicative markers usually occur after the main predicate as in (29a) and in all examples of copular clauses above ((6), (8)–(12), etc.). In argument-focus structures, the chain of predicative markers modifies the focused constituent, which does not include the main predicate. For example, in (29b), the focus is the ergative NP *pat'imatli* 'Patimat', which is modified by the identificational copula =*sa:r*:

- (29) a. *pat'imat-li q'aʎl-e ic:u-le=sa:r*
 Patimat-ERG COW-PL(ABS) milk:IPFV-PRS-CV=ID.COP=F
 'Patimat is milking the cows.'
- b. *pat'imat-li=sa:r q'aʎl-e ic:u-se*
 Patimat-ERG=ID.COP=F COW-PL(ABS) milk:IPFV-PRS-ATR
 'It is Patimat who is milking the cows.'

In (30) from an oral text, the focused NP is again the ergative argument, but in this case it is marked by the past clitic =*de* (in the presence of the past clitic, the copula is optionally omitted):

- (30) *halt:u-r-dale hat'i zahidat-li=de hit:i li:dʌil=ra*
 there-EL-DOWN then Saidat-ERG=PST that:PL all<NPL>(ABS)=ADD
c'aʎ-ka-d=arq'ib-se
 disgrace-DOWN-NPL=LV.PFV-PRET-ATR
 'After that, it was Saidat who betrayed all of those (secrets).' (oral text)

In (31), the focused NP in the post-lative case is marked by the 1st person clitic =*da* (again, the copula is omitted):

13. Different strategies of argument-focus marking differ semantically: the syntactic marking of argument-focus is typical of exhaustive and/or contrastive focus (Drubig, Schaffar 2001).

- (31) hat'i hit-a-la=hela le=w=al=da š:i-li-c:ε=w,
 then that-OBL-GEN=since EXST.COP=M=still=1 village-OBL-INTER=M
 uc:u-le mas-ħaʃjwan-t-a-hiti=**da** pastajanna du
 work.IPFV-PRS-CVB sheep-cattle-PL-OBL-POST=1 constantly I(ABS)
 'Since that, I live in the village, I care ABOUT THE CATTLE.' (lit. 'it is after the
 cattle that I care') (oral text)

I would like to emphasize that the syntactic focus marking requires an identificational copula. It is either overtly present (as in (29)) or omitted, which is normal in the presence of another predicative marker (person/past clitic, interrogative/actualization marker). However, in the latter case, the copula is always restorable. For example, sentence (30) would also be grammatical as in (32):

- (32) <...> zahidat-li=sa=r=**de** <...>
 Saidat-ERG=ID.COP=F=PST
 'After that, **it was Saidat** who betrayed all of those (secrets).'

An important limitation is that in case of syntactic focus marking, the finite verbal forms are only allowed in the focused part of the sentence. This condition results in the fact that finite verb forms are not grammatical in the sentences that are overtly marked as argument-focus structures. In most cases, the verb takes a participial form as in (29b) and (30).

A further consequence is that the argument-focus structures express less TAM-oppositions than the predicate-focus structures. Argument-focus marking is impossible in the sentences headed by synthetic finite verb forms – first, in the non-indicative modalities (imperative, prohibitive and optative); second, in the declarative sentences headed by indicative synthetic verb forms like future, past habitual, etc. If a speaker wants to focus an argument of, say, a future verb, he needs a participle that would correspond to this future form. However, Tanti has no participle that would have the same range of TAM-meanings. The semantically closest *potential* participle covers a broader range of TAM-meanings than the finite form: it can express obligation, possibility, habituality as well as different varieties of the future. Cf. (33a), which is a predicate-focus sentence with a simple future form as a predicate and the argument-focus construction (33b) where the predicate is expressed by a potential participle:

- (33) a. dali ʃaʔt hiž ʔaʔp:aʔsi luč:i-d
 I:ERG you.SG:DAT this abazi give.IPFV-TH-1SG
 'I'll give you back this abazi.'
 b. dali ʃaʔt=**da** hiž ʔaʔp:aʔsi **luč:an**
 I:ERG you.SG:DAT this abazi give.IPFV-POT
 'It is to you that I will give the abazi.'

The independent clauses headed by an identificational copula and those headed by a morphologically finite verb do not exhaust the whole range of possible clause structures. At the same time, the range of possible information structures is not exhausted by the predicate-focus and argument-focus sentences.

Even if we confine ourselves to declaratives, we will find that Dargwa has several classes of independent clauses that do not contain an identificational copula. Let us compare the following simple sentences:

- (34) a. umra herk'°-li-š:u q'°-a°n-ne=sa=j
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=M
 'The neighbor is walking to the river.'
- b. umra herk'°-li-š:u=sa=j q'°-a°n-se
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD=ID.COP=M go.IPFV-PRS-ATR
 'It is to the river that the neighbor is walking.'
- c. umra herk'°-li-š:u q'°-a°n-ne χe-w
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=M
- d. umra herk'°-li-š:u q'°-a°n-ne
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 (cd) 'The neighbor is walking to the river.'

These sentences differ by the presence/absence, position and choice of the copula: in (34a), the verbal predicate consists of a converb and the clitic identificational copula =sa=j. In (34b), the copula is placed after the NP *herk'°liš:u* 'to the river'. We know that (34a) is the most neutral, most probably predicate-focus structure where 'the neighbor' is the topic, and 'is going to the river' is the focus. We easily recognize (34b) as an argument-focus sentence where *herk'°liš:u* 'to the river' is focused. So, both (34a) and (34b) are categorical structures, which can be divided into two principal parts.

In (34c), instead of the identificational copula, we have an existential copula *χe=w*. Example (34d) is an *unmarked* independent clause (Section 2.2.1): its predicate is a bare converb, without any copula. Although I ascribed the same English translation to (34a), (34c), and (34d), all of them are pragmatically different. In the following sections, I will describe the functions of the clauses illustrated here by (34cd) and try to show that the two less standard types of independent clauses can function as a variety of sentence-focus constructions.

Examples (35)–(39). The deictic oppositions are neutralized in the negative statements with the negative auxiliary *w-aʃkru* (sentence (12b) in Section 2.1).

Unlike the identificational copula, the existential copulas have only one argument. This is the absolutive NP referring to the object that is declared to exist. Normally, both the fact of existence and the existing object belong to the focused part of the sentence. Many existential sentences are sentence-focus structures in the sense introduced in Section 1: they either consist of the focus only or contain a focused existential predication plus one or more scene-setting adverbials. For example, (35) is most probably all-focused, the same may be true for (36), whereas in (39) we observe an external possessor *hilt:alla* they-GEN ‘by them’ as a scene-setting adverbial; in (38) – the comitative adjunct *damc:ele* ‘with me’.¹⁴

So, the basic usage of the existential copulas presupposes three important semantic/pragmatic components:

1. existence: the existential copulas assert that an object exists,
2. spatial deixis: these copulas point at the location of the existing object with reference to the location of the speech act participants;
3. theticity: the whole existential predication is part of the focus (= the sentences headed by an existential auxiliary are often thetic).

4.2 Verbal predicate clauses with existential copulas

It is not uncommon to meet an independent clause with a verbal predicate (a converb) modified by an existential copula:

- (40) *bazar-li-ja=d hiš-t-a-li se.sat:enne as:ib-le*
 market-OBL-SUPER=NPL this-PL-OBL-ERG something take.PFV-PRET-CVB
le:te
 EXST.COP+NPL+PST
 ‘They have bought something in the market.’ (oral text)

In the sentences like (40), the existential copulas seem to function like identificational copulas within periphrastic verb forms. In the chains of predicative markers,

14. It is not the case that all sentences that express existence are thetic; a NP may belong to the presupposed part of an existential sentence, if, say, there is a discussion on its existence. In these cases, the speakers of Tanti prefer to use the sentences headed by the identificational copula that governs a constituent headed by the attributive form of an existential copula; such sentences literally mean ‘X is existing’:

allah čʷe-w-s:a=j
 Allah EXST=M-ATR+COP=M
 ‘Allah exists.’ (lit. ‘Allah is existing.’)

they take the same slot that the identificational copula. However, their properties are not consistently parallel to those of the identificational copula. In particular, an existential copula cannot be moved to mark focus. Sentences (41a) and (41b) are parallel to (29a) and (29b) above: in both (29b) and (41b), the copula modifies the ergative NP. The only difference is that this is an existential copula, which makes the sentence (41b) ungrammatical.

- (41) a. pat'imat-li q'a'l-e d=irc:-ib-le te=r
 Patimat-ERG COW-PL(ABS) NPL=milk.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=F
 'Patimat has (already) milked the cows.'
- b. *pat'imat-li te=r q'a'l-e d=irc:-ib-se
 Patimat-ERG EXST.COP=F COW-PL(ABS) NPL= milk.PFV-PRET-ATR
 (intended meaning: 'It is Patimat who milked the cows.')

Semantically, the verbal constructions with existential copulas are not absolutely homogeneous, but all varieties retain at least one semantic component characteristic of their basic usage as heads of non-verbal existential sentences. The three main varieties of these constructions will be described in Sections 4.2.1–4.2.3.

4.2.1 *Verbal predicate clauses retaining the existential meaning*

Sentences of this type are illustrated by (42b) as compared to (42a). Formally, the two sentences differ by the choice of the copula. The semantic difference is that in (42b), the referent of the patient NP 'ring' is supposed to be in the speaker's possession at the moment of speech, whereas (42a) says nothing on that.

- (42) a. neš-li dam t'ulek:a č:-ib-le=sa=b
 mother-ERG I:DAT ring(ABS) give.PFV-PRET-CVB=ID.COP=N
 '(My) mother presented me a ring' (and I have it now).
- b. neš-li dam t'ulek:a č:-ib-le le=b
 mother-ERG I:DAT ring(ABS) give.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=N
 '(My) mother presented me a ring' (and I have it now).

In (43) from an oral story, the speaker (a shaikh) wants to convince the hearer that he now has a new coin (=shahi) that was born by the abazi (= a bigger coin that belongs to the hearer):

- (43) ŋe'la ʔa'p:a'si-li šahi=ra b=arq'-ib-le
 you.SG:GEN appasi-ERG shahi(ABS)=ADD N=make:PFV-PRET-CVB
 te=b=de
 EXST.COP=N=PST
 'Your appasi gave birth to a shahi.' (oral text)

Sentence (44) is taken from a description of a picture. Generally, this text contains many existential sentences where the speaker tells what he sees in the picture. In

(44), the speaker simultaneously informs the hearer(s) on the existence of a man (who is saddling a horse) and on his actions:

- (44) ca tawariš-li murgul-li urči-la gule.q'abta
 one comrade-ERG man-ERG horse-GEN saddle(ABS)
 če-d-irx:-u-le χe=w <...>
 ON-NPL-put:IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=M
 [Describing a picture:] 'There is a fellow saddling a horse.' (oral text)

The semantics of the verbal sentences with the existential component retains the deictic meaning encoded by the copula. For example, in (45), the fox speaks about a place (the dragon's house) located far away from the interlocutors and chooses the distant existential copula *te=b*:

- (45) hilt:u-r-kale ka-b=iž-ib-le te=b hil=κuna ca
 here-EL-DOWN DOWN-N=sit.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=HPL this=LIKE one
 buk'un=ra talqan-na rurs:i=ra,
 shepherd(ABS)=ADD padishah-GEN girl(ABS)=ADD
 ka-b=iž-ib-le te=b=nu
 DOWN-HPL=sit.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=HPL=CONTR
 [The fox went to the dragons from there and said:] 'There are a shepherd and the padishah's daughter who settled there; they settled there.' (oral text)

As far as information structure of the verbal clauses with an existential component is concerned, I have too little information on that matter, but it seems that these sentences are not obliged to express a certain type of information structure. For example, in (46), taken from an oral text, the subject *ša'la rurs:i=ra sa=j=ra* 'your daughter and he' has been mentioned in the previous discourse. The NP referring to the shepherd is the free pronoun *sa=j*, which is also used as a reflexive and logophoric pronoun (it is also homonymous and probably cognate with the identificational copula); when used as a pronominal, it refers to pragmatically important referents.

- (46) hat'i ša'la rurs:i=ra sa=j=ra ha'na
 then you.SG:GEN girl(ABS)=ADD self=M(ABS)=ADD now
 ka-b=iž-ib-le te=b aždah-un-a-lla
 DOWN+HPL=sit.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=HPL dragon-PL-OBL-GEN
 quli
 house:LOC
 [The fox went to the padishah and said: "The boy to whom you had given your daughter, is just a shepherd. He has no gold, no wealth at all, just a couple of sheep."] 'Now *he* lives (=can be found) with your daughter in the dragon's house.' (oral text)

The verbal clauses with an existential component impose certain limitations on the TAM-meaning of the sentence. For many transitive predicates, the existence of their P-arguments presupposes the existence and, hence, relevance, of their results. The meaning of the perfective clauses of this type is close to perfect or resultative. Imperfective verb forms with an existential copula show that the relevant object is or was present in the relevant situation as in (44).

4.2.2 *Thetic sentences*

Another important group of verbal clauses headed by the existential copulas are sentences with thetic information structure. In (47), a dependent converbal clause in the first line is followed by two juxtaposed independent clauses, both headed by an existential copula. These clauses describe what happened to the speaker when she was trying to separate milk. The whole contents of these two clauses is totally new for the hearer.

- (47) *ħaˀna ca duč:a nig d=irq-u-le d=aˀq-iž,*
 now one night milk(ABS) NPL-hit.IPFV-PRS-CVB NPL=beat.PFV-INF
mašina b=al-ħaˀ-b=irk-u-le le=b=de,
 machine(ABS) N= work-NEG-N=LV:IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=N=PST
ħaˀr.ħaˀr-d=ikˀ-u-le q:ač-ne=ra le=te
 cry-NPL=LV.IPFV-PRS-CVB calf-PL(ABS)=ADD EXST.COP=NPL+PST
 ‘One night when I was trying to separate milk, the separator wasn’t working,
 the calves were mooing.’¹⁵ (oral text)

As explicated in the Introduction, our approach to sentence-focus constructions allows them to have scene-setting adverbials. For example, sentence (48) is taken from a story about the shepherds. The translation of several previous sentences of the story (given in square brackets) shows that the genitive NP *ħilt:alla* ‘their’ (corresponding to the subject in the English translation) refers to the topic of the episode. The rest of the sentences including the predicate and its only argument *ħinišse awlaq* ‘green meadow’ is in the focus:

- (48) [*ħil-t-a-lla*] *ħiniš-se awlaq=ra le=b=de*
 this-PL-OBL-GEN green-ATR meadow(ABS)=ADD EXST.COP=N=PST
 se-kˀal če-ħaˀ-b=uq-un-se
 what-INDEF(ABS) ON-NEG-N=COME:PFV-PRET-ATR
 [And then, in less than 5–10 minutes, **people** came therefrom on tractors, on motorbikes. **They** had sticks, hayforks, maybe, they even had guns in their

15. The calves were accustomed to separated milk. When the separator broke down, they remained hungry.

pockets, but we couldn't see it. **They** came there and drove our cattle. **They** wanted to mix our cattle – we had six separate flocks, **they** wanted to mix them into one. **They** didn't want to just take a sheep, **they** wanted to harm these shepherds. But it is difficult to drive hungry sheep when they stuck to the grass.] 'They had green meadows, which nobody trampled down' (= meadows where they did not graze cattle). (oral text)

Similarly, Example (49) begins with the scene-setting spatial adverb *tura=b* 'outside':

- (49) *tura=b b=us-u-le te=b*
 outside=N N=rain:IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=N
 'It is raining outside.'

Examples (49)–(51) present the class of weather statements, which are very frequentlythetic:

- (50) *beri ha-b=ulq-un-ne te=b!*
 sun(ABS) UP-N-go.IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=N
 'The sun is appearing already!'
- (51) *hajda š:it:ir, arɁ ʕaʕ-se te=b, ber=ra*
 come.along for.a.walk weather(ABS) good-ATR EXST.COP=N sun(ABS)=ADD
ha-b=ulq-un-ne
 UP-N-go.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'Go in the fresh air! The weather is good, and the sun is appearing (from behind the clouds).'

Thetic sentences with existential copulas are quite common in narrative texts, see Examples (47)–(48) and (52) below.

- (52) *haʕna talqan le-w=qʕ-un-ne te=w,*
 now padishah(ABS) HITHER-M-come.IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=M
sun-ni-la ʕʕala-se ʕaʕskar=ra sa=j=ra
 self-OBL-GEN big-ATR army(ABS)=ADD cam=M=ADD
 'Now the padishah is coming here with his big army' (lit. 'his big army and himself') (oral text)

Semantically,thetic sentences introduce a totally new situation; they tell us about the *existence* of a certain situation in a real or possible world. In this respect, the use of an existential copula is understandable.

The sentence-focus articulation is quite compatible with the existential meaning described in the previous section. For example, sentence (44), which was cited in the previous section as a sentence retaining the existential meaning is at the same timethetic; similarly, thethetic Example (52) informs the hearer on the presence of the padishah in a certain place.

More than that, there are verbal sentences that retain all the three semantic components of the existential sentences listed in Section 4.1 – existence, spatial deixis, and theticity. I speak of the *presentative* constructions with ostensive meaning: these are sentences that introduce a new situation, which is taking place at the moment of speech and is observed by the interlocutors; presentational sentences use deictic elements to locate the situation in the space with respect to the interlocutors. The speaker points at the scene of the situation or at its participants, often using ostensive elements like the French copulas *voilà/voici*, Russian words *vot/von*, etc. In Tanti, sentences of this type are structured as standard verbal sentences with an existential copula. The ostensive meaning is encoded by the choice of the copula and, optionally, – by deictic adverbs and verbal prefixes.

In (53), the speaker chose the copula *te=r* because the situation is taking place far away from the interlocutors; the verbal prefix *le-* ‘hither’ points at the movement towards the speaker.

- (53) x:un-ne-ħe-r-se ruci le-r-q³-un-ne te=r
road-OBL-IN-EL-HITHER sister(ABS) HITHER-F=GO.IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=F
‘There is my sister going along the road over there.’

The presentative sentences inform on the existence of an object or a situation that can be directly observed by the hearer. Second, they orient this situation with respect to the interlocutors, which is expressed by the choice of the existential copula and other deictic elements. Finally, they introduce an all-new situation in the discourse.

4.2.3 Exclamatives

One more function of existential copulas is heading exclamative sentences:

- (54) hiž dewgale q’uħa-se le=r!
this very beautiful-ATR EXST.COP=F
‘How beautiful she is!’ (exclamation)

If we replace the existential copula by the identificational one, the sentence turns from an exclamation to a declaration, cf. (54) and (55):

- (55) hiž dewgale q’uħa-s:a-r
this very beautiful-AT+ID.COP=F
‘She is very beautiful.’ (opinion)

The reason why exclamatives share certain formal features withthetic sentences is probably the fact that, likethetic sentences, they do not oppose topic vs. focus. For example, (Michaelis 2001: 1041) views exclamative sentences as expressing a pre-supposed open proposition and expressing, in particular, “affective stance toward

the scalar extent”. In the influential paper (Portner, Zanuttini 2003), the exclamatives are presented as having a presupposed set of alternative propositions.¹⁶

The exclamative clause of the type presented in (54)–(56) encodes the presupposed proposition. The affection, which the speaker expresses towards the high extent of the property encoded by the main predicate, is implied by the whole exclamative construction, not by a certain part of the exclamative clause. The whole clause remains presupposed. In a certain sense, the exclamatives are opposite to thethetic sentences, for they are based on known information: at the same time, they are similar to them in not expressing the topic vs. focus opposition.

Interestingly, this exclamative strategy seems to be unknown in typology. The paper (Zevakhina 2013), which presents a survey of exclamative strategies in 45 languages, does not mention any strategies of this kind. The closest strategy found in some Austronesian languages (Tagalog, Volio, Rapanui) is the so-called “existential nominalization” where an existential marker introduces a NP. The Tanti Dargwa strategy discussed in this section makes use of an existential copula, but shows no traces of a nominalization. On the other hand, Tanti has a nominalizing strategy of exclamation, but that does not have any existential elements (cf. (56a) vs. (56b)).

- (56) a. ʔaʔbraʃ r=ams:-ur-le le=r=da!
 INTERJECTION F=get.tired.PFV-PRET-CVB EXST.COP=F=I
- b. waj dila r=ams:-ur-dix!
 INTERJECTION I:GEN F=get.tired:PFV-PRET-NMLZ
 (ab)‘Oh, how tired I (F) am!’

5. Non-finite independent clauses without a copula

5.1 Independent converbal clauses: Mirative and thetic

5.1.1 *New for the speaker*

As mentioned in 2.2.1, Tanti Dargwa has several groups of unmarked independent clauses: these clauses are headed by a non-finite verb or non-verbal predicate and do not contain any predicative markers. These converbal clauses are not part of a complex syntactic structure. In particular, they can be used without any preceding context or as a separate remark in a dialogue.

16. C. Beyssade (2009) provided a number of arguments showing that in the exclamations, we do not deal with true presuppositions; they rather express a speaker-oriented expressive content (“a content which is presented as committing the speaker and herself only”). However, in her work the main proposition of an exclamative remains holistic.

A nice example of an independent converbal clause comes from a funny oral story that my language consultant Magomed Mamaev first told me in Russian. Magomed lives in the village of Tanti and works as a teacher in the local school. One day, his colleagues gathered in the school office to celebrate the end of the school year by eating and drinking some spirits. Theoretically, this is not allowed at school, but in a small village there is nobody to control. Suddenly, one of the colleagues looked in the window and saw the head of the regional department of public education (referred to by the Russian abbreviation *zavrajono*), who was approaching the school. In that situation, it was an unpleasant surprise. This colleague uttered sentence (57),¹⁷ which, at that moment, was a news for himself:

- (57) *zavrajono* le-r=q'-un-ne!
 department.of.public.education.head(ABS) HITHER-F=GO.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'Zavrajono (F) is coming!' (oral story)

In (57), the speaker immediately observes a situation that is new for him and, what's most important, verbalizes the situation at the very moment when he observes it.

If we add an existential copula to (57), the utterance remains a news, but it will presuppose that speaker is acquainted with the proposition P = 'Zavrajono is coming' before he decides to tell it to the hearer. It is quite possible that the speaker learned it a second ago, but still – the speaker informs the hearer on what he already knows.

In (57) and other unmarked clauses of this type, the speaker learns and verbalizes a certain proposition P on the spur of the moment; in these circumstances, the presence of a hearer is not obligatory at all. Another clear example is (58): the speaker (a shepherd) imitates his reaction to what he observed in the sheepfold when he was suddenly woken up in the middle of the night. It is not clear whether there were any people there to listen to his words.

- (58) *jaallah, čuma-lla haq' čaq,-n-a-cje* **ɤudur-b=ič-ib-le,**
 wallahi ram-GEN flock sheep-PL-OBL-INTER(LAT) mix-N=LV:PFV-PRET-CVB
d=erh-ib halt:u-r-ka.le haq' sa-r-b=a'q-ib-le
 NPL=hit:PF-PRET here-EL-DOWN flock front-EL-N= hit:PF-PRET-CVB
 'Wallahi, the flock of rams mixed with a flock of (female) sheep, and they ran
 down from there, the rams drove the flock of sheep.' (oral text)

The sentence consists of two converbal clauses, which are not preceded or followed by a finite clause with a copula or morphologically finite verb form.

17. In fact, I asked my language consultant to reproduce the words of his colleague in Tanti. Of course, it is possible that he did not remember them exactly, but he found an utterance that would fit the situation.

The meaning of the copula-less converbal predications can be interpreted as a variety of *mirative*. Mirativity, as defined in (DeLancey 1997), is ‘the grammatical marking of unexpected information’. In a later work, the same author gives a broader definition of mirativity: “Mirativity marks whether the information represents knowledge which is new to the speaker, or knowledge which is already integrated into the speaker’s picture of the world” (DeLancey 2001: 379). The label *mirative* covers the situations presented as unexpected or surprising – as if the speaker is not quite ready to embed the new information into his knowledge – the situations that are just new for the speaker, without any additional connotations (for numerous examples see (Aikhenvald 2012)).

The most basic component of the mirative meaning in Tanti is that the speaker verbalizes what he observes/realizes in his/her current circumstances, at the very moment of speech (“recency restriction” in (Rett & Murray 2013)). More than that, the copula-less mirative sentences in Tanti are not obliged to have a real addressee: the speaker can be triggered by his/her inner needs. If an addressee is present, the mirative sentences are often used as hot news, a warning or an indirect imperative (pointing at a situation that requires certain activities from the addressee):

- (59) ha^hpu le-b-q^h-un-ne!
 dog(ABS)¹⁸ HITHER-N=GO.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 ‘A dog is coming!’ (warning)
- (60) nig če-r-q^hw-a^hn-ne
 milk(ABS) ON-EL-GO.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 ‘The milk is boiling over!’
- (61) telefon za^hnɛ-b-ik^h-u-le
 telephone(ABS) ring-N-LV.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 ‘The telephone is ringing!’

The mirative situation is not limited to a certain aspect: it can be perfective (58), continuous ((57), (59)–(61)), resultative (62)–(65), etc.

- (62) patiška χ^hwala r-aɛ-ib-le!
 Patishka(ABS) big F=reach.PFV-PRET-CVB
 ‘Patishka has grown up!’
- (63) za^hřip-ka-jč-ib-le!
 ill-DOWN-(M)fall.PFV-CVB
 ‘He fell ill!’

18. This word for ‘dog’ is used in the children’s speech.

- (64) herk^w χ^w ala b=a K -ib-le
 river(ABS) big N=reach.PFV-PRET-CVB
 ‘The river has flooded!’
- (65) q’ar duqu d=i χ -ub-le
 grass(ABS) yellow NPL=become.PFV-PRET-CVB
 ‘The grass is now yellow.’

If a mirative sentence is 1st or 2nd person, the person clitics should be present, but the copula is not allowed:

- (66) dali b=erq:-ur=da
 I:ERG N=remember.PFV-PRET=1
 ‘I remembered (it)!’
- (67) fu^c χ^w ala r=a K -ib-le=de!
 you.SG(ABS) big F=reach.PFV-PRET-CVB=2SG
 ‘You have grown up!’
- (68) za^hip-ka-jč-ib-le=de!
 ill-DOWN-(M)fall.PFV-CVB=2SG
 ‘You are falling ill!’
- (69) du kerk-u-l=da
 I(ABS) DOWN-(M)fall.IPFV-PRS-CVB=1
 ‘I am falling down.’

As we know, the identificational copula is usually omitted in the presence of the person clitics. Of course, we cannot distinguish between an omitted copula and absent copula. As a result, in the 1st and 2nd person forms, the difference between standard categorical sentences and mirative constructions is neutralized. However, we still can be sure that the mirative meaning is possible in the sentences that have no copula, but have a 1st or 2nd person clitic.

Some examples of mirative sentences can be found in the narrative texts, but they are not part of the main narrative line. In most cases, they appear where the narrator reports the words, thoughts or feelings of the characters;¹⁹ they are quite common after the words like ‘X saw/found [...]’.

In a narrative text, the mirativity is oriented towards the protagonist: the contents of an unmarked independent clause are new for the protagonist, not for the current speaker. For example, in (70), the characters of the story are the great-grandfather and great-grandmother of the narrator. Due to some funny

19. These cases include reported speech, but are not always structured as reported speech ((70)–(71)).

circumstances, they suddenly ran out of their house. Sentence (70) describes what they found when they returned. The final finite clause ‘they found’ is the last element of the narrative chain, the clauses corresponding to ‘a pot of khinkal boiled over, it stained the oven, the whole room got dirty’ (in square brackets), which describe what the great-grandmother and great-grandfather saw, are independent and unmarked. A similar case is (71).

- (70) ča-r-b-it-iž-ib-le, duc’-le ag-ur-le
 ON+UP-EL-HPL=THITHER-sit.PFV-PRET-CVB running-ADV go.PFV-PRET-CVB
 quli, ʕeʕr-ʔ-an-ne: [χink’-a-lla q:azan
 house:LOC look-LV.IPFV-TH-COND khinkal-OBL-GEN pot(ABS)
 če-r-ag-ur-le, piš=ra ħaʕʕaʕr-b=arq’-ib-le, liil
 ON-EL-go.PFV-PRET-CVB oven(ABS)=ADD dirty-N=LV.PFV-PRET-CVB all<N>
 qali=ra ħaʕʕaʕr-b=iχ-ub-le] -
 house(ABS)=ADD dirty-N=LV.PFV-PRET-CVB
 b-arčʕ-ib-le=sa=b hit:-a-li
 N=FOUND.PFV-PRET-CVB=ID.COP=N that+PL-OBL-ERG
 ‘After they returned home, after they ran into the house, they saw: a pot of
 khinkal boiled over, it stained the oven, the whole room got dirty – that was
 what they found.’ (oral text)

- (71) ca zamana ʕeʕr-b-urk’-an-ne: buc’ar-se ber=ra
 one time look-HPL=LV.IPFV-TH-COND warm-ATR day(ABS)=ADD
 b=ač’-ib-le hil-t:-a-lla
 HPL=COME.PFV-PRET-CVB this-PL-OBL-GEN
 ‘At a certain time, they see: the weather is hot.’ (oral text)

DeLancey in (DeLancey 2001: 380) notes that the mirative is typically the marked category, while “old or integrated information is presented in the unmarked clause type”. This is only partly true of Tanti: the mirative is certainly marked in the sense that it is a relatively rare and uncommon clause type, but mirative sentences lack the copula and look formally simpler than the most standard categorical sentences.

5.1.2 *Mirativity and around*

Mirativity is a verbal meaning that is closely tied to indirect evidentiality. In many languages, it is expressed by the same markers (DeLancey 1997, 2001; Aikhenvald 2012; Rett & Murray 2013). At the same time, it has obvious connections to two other grammatical domains: illocutionary force and information structure.

In Dargwa, the indirect evidentiality (both quotative and inferential) is marked by the auxiliary verb *kalg-/kalug-* ‘stay’, which governs the converbal forms of the main verb or a non-verbal predicate. For example, in (72) the whole sentence is

a hearsay (it is part of a story on the events that the narrator has not witnessed); the predicate of the main clause consists of the converb *bik'ule* 'saying' and a periphrastic form *kalg-un-s:ai* of the auxiliary *kalg-/kalug-* 'stay', which, in its turn, consists of the perfective participle *kalgunse* and the identificational copula =*sai*.

- (72) χ̣:ala χ̣:ala.t:at:ri-li-ja barɣula-maʰhaʰmma
 big grandfather-OBL-SUPER Badhula-Magomed(ABS)
 b=ik'-u-le kalg-un-s:ai,
 N=say.IPFV-PRS-CVB DOWN+stay.PFV-PRET-ATR+ID.COP<N>
 χ̣:alaba-ja haʰjsun-abis
 grandmother-SUPER Haysun-Abis
 'My great-grandfather's name was Bargula-Magomed, my grandmother's name
 was Haysun-Abis.' (oral text)

The same auxiliary *kalg-/kalug-* 'stay' can be found in the mirative clauses, but here it appears as a bare converb heading an independent clause ((73) and (74)). In such sentences, mirativity is double-marked by the evidential auxiliary and sentence structure (the absence of the copula). The evidential auxiliary seems to add a note of surprise or inexpectation to the pure mirative meaning of the non-finite construction, but this needs a more detailed research.

- (73) murad-li žiq'inara b=irq-u-le kalg-un-ne!
 Murad-ERG accordion(ABS) N=play.IPFV-CVB stay.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'Murad is apparently playing accordion!'
 (74) ʃaʃj, ustur-li-gu=b k:ata kalg-un-ne!
 oh table-OBL-SUB=N cat(ABS) stay.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'Oh, there is a cat under the table!'

On the other hand, the mirative sentences in Tanti express a special type of the speaker's intentions: they are rather aimed at verbalization of an observed situation than at informing the hearer, and, hence, their function can be interpreted as a type of illocutionary force.²⁰

Finally, the mirative sentences always express a certain type of information structure: the function of copula-less converbal clauses is marking new vs. given information from the speaker's point of view. This meaning normally implies theticity: if a situation is totally new for the speaker, it automatically means that the interlocutors have no common ground; the speaker cannot have any presuppositions on whether the hearer knows certain elements of the situation. More than that, the

20. Mirativity is viewed as illocutionary in (Rett 2009, 2011; Rett & Murray 2013).

mirative structures arethetic in the strictest sense of the term: they are all-new and do not contain any scene-setting adverbials as we allowed for the thetic structures with an existential copula.

5.2 Other types of unmarked sentences

The unmarked sentences of the mirative type are not the only class of unmarked sentences in Tanti. Another important group are coordinate constructions expressing comparison or contrast, like (75) and (76).

(75) murgul suq:ur, x:unul ʔa'nc'a'
 husband(ABS) blind wife(ABS) deaf
 'The husband is blind, the wife is deaf.'

(76) če:b>a'h-il ʃa's:ala – gu:b>a'h-il niš:ala=nu
 up<N>-ATR.CONTR YOU.PL:GEN DOWN<N>-ATR.CONTR WE:GEN=CONTR
 [How shall we divide the lake? – they ask. – No problem, we will pull a rope in the middle, they say.] 'The upper part is yours, the lower is ours.' (oral text)

Unlike the mirative constructions, sentences of these type do not allow any predicative makers including person markers (77) and the negative copula (78):

(77) ʃu' načal'nik, du abdal
 YOU.SG boss(ABS) I fool(ABS)
 'You are a boss – I am a fool.'

(78) q.aj-te χ:ala-te dali ka-d=irx:-u-le –
 large-ATR.PL big-ATR.PL I:ERG DOWN-NPL= put:IPFV-PRS-CVB
 dimʔa'n-te gu=d-d=urk:-u-le
 small-ATR.PL UNDER=NPL-NPL= find.IPFV-PRS-CVB
 'I put big notes (under the pillow) – I find small ones.' (oral text)

(79) a. *du suq:ur=ak:u, ʃu' ʔa'nc'a'=ak:u
 I blind=NEG.ID.COP YOU.SG deaf=NEG
 (intended translation:) 'I am not blind – and you are not deaf.'
 b. du suq:ur=ak:uda, ʃu' ʔa'nc'a'=ak:u-t
 I blind=NEG.ID.COP:1 YOU.SG deaf=NEG-2
 'I am not blind; you are not deaf.'

Sentence (79b), with the 1st and 2nd forms of the negative copula, is grammatical, but it is a standard declarative sentence without emphasizing the contrast.

Another important difference between the unmarked sentences of the two types is that the mirative structures are always headed by a converb whereas contrastive sentences allow any type of a non-finite head. For example, the mirative

sentence (76) is intended to mean ‘The grass is (now) yellow’, but the only way to say it is by using a converbial head;²¹ at the same time, Examples (75)–(77) with a nominal head are quite acceptable.²²

The information structure of the contrastive structures is not quite clear. The distribution of the topical and focused parts in these sentences is similar to that in causal sentences of the type ‘As you are a boss, ...’. The first part is known to both interlocutors, the second part is new. However, each of the two conjuncts is either totally new or totally known. In this sense, these structures also support the idea that the categorial structures require an identificational copula. However, the properties of these contrastive structures and, more generally, unmarked independent clauses need a more thorough study.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, I presented the basic types of independent clauses in the Tanti dialect of Dargwa and tried to show that these sentences perform important discourse functions that in most cases imply a special type of information structure.

In Section 2.2, I introduced the basic clause structures, which are most common in Tanti. Prototypically, an independent sentence is headed either by a morphologically finite verb form or by a chain of 1–3 predicative markers. The latter case is much more frequent. Independent clauses of this type (= copular clauses) can have a non-finite verbal or a non-verbal predicate. If we deal with a present declarative copular clause of the 3rd person, it has no person or past markers, no interrogative particles; most usually, the only predicative marker in such a sentence is the identificational copula =*sa=j*. Tanti also allows similar clauses headed by an existential copula and – less frequently – similar sentences without any copula. Let us return to the three sentences that we discussed in Section 3 (repeated here as (80)).

- (80) a. umra herk’-li-š:u q’-a’n-ne=*sa=j*
neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB=ID.COP=M
- b. umra herk’-li-š:u q’-a’n-ne χe=w
neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB EXST.COP=M
- c. umra herk’-li-š:u q’-a’n-ne
neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD go.IPFV-PRS-CVB
(abc) ‘The neighbor is walking to the river.’

21. Saying just **q’ar duqu* ‘grass yellow’ (parallel to (75)) would be ungrammatical.

22. This shows that the mirative sentences and the contrastive sentences are very different syntactically. However, their syntactic analysis is beyond the goals of this paper.

Example (80a) is a neutral declarative sentence. Most probably, it is a predicate focus structure that provides new information on ‘the neighbor’: ‘[The neighbor_T] [is going to the river_F].’ In particular, it could be used as an answer to the question ‘What is the neighbor doing?’²³

By placing the copula after an argument or another constituent, we can construct a sentence with morphosyntactic argument-focus marking as in (80d) with focused locative NP *herk’lišu* ‘to the river’:

- (80) d. umra herk’-li-š:u=sa=j q’-a’n-se
 neighbor(ABS) river-OBL-AD=ID.COP=M go.IPFV-PRS-ATR
 ‘It is to the river that the neighbor is walking.’

Both (80a) and (80d) are categorical sentences, which oppose the presupposed part vs the focused part of the sentence.

Sentence (80b) seems to be structurally parallel to (80a): the only obvious difference is the choice of the copula: in (80b), we observe the existential copula $\chi e=w$ ‘exists (below)’. The prototypical function of the existential copulas is introducing sentences that inform on the existence of a certain object. In Section 4, I discussed the functions of the verbal clauses headed by existential copulas and tried to show that they retain one or more semantic features characteristic of the existential sentences: the existential meaning, the spatial deixis and/or thethetic information structure. In accordance with that, thethetic interpretation is possible for (80b): this sentence could be used, in particular, when the proposition ‘[The neighbor is going to the river_F]’ is a hot news that the speaker is sharing with the hearer. For example, the speaker sees the neighbor in the window, a minute later the hearer enters the room, and the speaker informs him on what he has seen.

Finally, I turned to copula-less structures like (80c) and found that their most probable interpretation is mirative: such sentences can be used as full-fledged utterances when the information that they express is brand-new for the speaker himself: the speaker utters them to verbalize a situation that he observes at the very moment of speech.

In a certain sense, the formal features differentiating the three clause types are consistent with their functions. If a speaker just verbalizes a situation that he observes, the utterance cannot be viewed as a true assertion. If we postulate that copulas express assertion, the absence of the copula in the mirative sentences becomes quite understandable.

23. Another possible interpretation of this sentence is the argument focus structure with the focused locative form *herk’lišu* ‘to the river’: ‘The neighbor is walking to THE RIVER’. In this case, the focus is not marked by morphosyntactic means, only by the word order.

The identificational copula, whose basic function is ascribing a characteristics to an object (or, in more traditional words, ascribing a predicate to a subject), appears in bipartite *categorical* structures. The position of the copula marks the logical predicate, i.e. the focus of the sentence. That is why the identificational copula is characteristic of categorical sentences, i.e. declarative and interrogative sentences with a clear opposition of presupposed vs. focused part of the sentence.

The existential copulas have originally expressed existence, but a live grammaticalization process is now converting them into auxiliary elements that are used in all situations when a copula is obligatory for syntactic reasons, but the semantics of the sentence is not compatible with the identificational copula. These are, in particular, presentational,thetic and exclamative sentences (Section 4.2).

I do not want to say that this reasoning explains the historical development of different sentence structure or the syntactic structure of the three types of independent clauses; I am just trying to emphasize the fact that in certain respect Tanti Dargwa shows a very clear and transparent technique of expressing information structure.

It is important that the means of morphosyntactic marking of different information structures that are characteristic of Tanti (and, at least partially, of other dialects of Dargwa) have not been discussed in typological work. To the best of my knowledge, existential auxiliaries as theticity markers and copula-less structures as a mirative marking strategy have not been attested in typology. However, it is quite probable that these techniques will be found in other dialects of Dargwa and, possibly, in other East Caucasian languages.

Another important problem is the syntactic structure of the clause types discussed in this paper. The facts mentioned in Section 5.2 show that the clauses that I initially called *unmarked* are not only functionally, but also syntactically different. Hence, all varieties of unmarked independent clauses should be studied in much more detail. The same is true of the existential structures (Section 4). We really need a syntactic model of different clause types of Dargwa.

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Abbreviations

A-argument	the (ergative) agent of a transitive verb	INDEF	indefinite pronoun
P-argument	the (absolutive) patient of a transitive verb or the stimulus of an affective verb	INF	infinitive
S-argument	the absolutive argument of an intransitive verb	INTER	localization 'in a solid substance'
1, 2, 3	1st, 2nd, 3rd person	IPFV	imperfective
1/2PL	1st/2nd person plural marker	IQ	indirect question
ABS	absolutive	LIKE	particle expressing similarity
AD	localization 'domain functionally associated with the object'	LOC	irregular localization
ADD	additive particle	LV	light verb
ADV	adverb	M	masculine (gender)
ATR	attributive	MSD	masdar, deverbal noun
BEHIND	preverb 'behind'	N	non-human (gender)
CIT	citative marker	NEG	negative
COMIT	comitative	NPL	non-human plural (gender)
COND	conditional	NMLZ	nominallization suffix
CONTR	contrastive particle	OBL	oblique stem
CVB	simple converb	ON	preverb 'on'
DAT	dative	OPT	optative
DOWN	preverb/suffix 'down'	PFV	perfective
EL	elative	PL	plural
ERG	ergative	PQ	polar question
EXST.COP	existential copula	PRET	preterite
F	feminine (gender)	PRS	present
GEN	genitive	PST	past
HITHER	preverb 'hither'	POST	localization 'after'
HPL	human plural (gender)	POT	potential
ID.COP	identificational copula	SG	singular
IMP	imperative	SUB	localization 'under'
IN	localization 'inside a container'	SUPER	localization 'on'
		TH	thematic element
		THITHER	preverb 'thither'
		UNDER	preverb 'under'
		UP	preverb 'up'

The sign '=' separates a gender marker from the morpheme that triggers its presence.

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PART 3

From logic content to linguistic form

Infinitive constructions and theticity in German

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In this research, I examine the correlation of coherent/incoherent constructions with thetic/categorical judgments in modern German, based on ideas put forward by Isaka (2020). Coherence/incoherence is a syntactic distinction first studied extensively by Bech (1983), while theticity/categoricity is a semantic distinction discussed by Marty (1918). An analysis of authentic data of the verb *wagen* 'dare' with subject *keiner* 'no one' and *er* 'he' reveals that incoherent constructions are less preferred for the purpose of expressing thetic judgments with *keiner* 'no one'. In this avoidance of incoherence for theticity, there is a correspondence of form with content. To express a thetic judgment, which is also called simple judgment because of its indivisibility, incoherent constructions, consisting of two clauses, seem to be less suitable.

Keywords: thetic judgment (simple judgment), categorical judgment (double judgment), incoherent construction, coherent construction, third construction, correlate *es*, pre-field *es*

1. Introduction

In this research, the correlation of coherent/incoherent constructions with thetic vs. categorical judgments is examined, based on ideas put forward by Isaka 2020. In this section, I will provide an authentic example from the online corpus of the *Leibniz-Institut für Deutsche Sprache* (IDS) (Institute for the German Language)¹ and introduce some important terms such as “coherence” and “incoherence” on the one hand, and “theticity” and “categoricity” on the other hand, after which I will present the main research questions.

1. The corpus is accessible through the following link: <<https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/>>

Let us start by considering the following sentence:

- (1) Aber es wird doch wohl niemand zu behaupten wagen, daß ...
 but it will still probably nobody to claim dare that
 ‘But nobody will probably dare to claim that ...’

(Z75/OKT.00111 Die Zeit, 10.10.1975, S. 20; Den Dolch im Gewande)

In sentence (1), the *zu*-infinitive, *zu behaupten* ‘to claim’, appears on the left of its governing verb, *wagen* ‘dare’. This word order is typical of a coherent construction. The contrast between a coherent and incoherent construction is illustrated in (2) and (3):

- (2) Sie hat ihn zu trösten versucht.
 she has him to console tried
 ‘She tried to console him.’
 [_{CP} Sie hat ihn zu trösten versucht]: coherent construction
- (3) Sie hat versucht, ihn zu trösten.
 she has tried him to console
 ‘She tried to console him.’
 [_{CP} Sie hat versucht [_{CP} ihn zu trösten]]: incoherent construction

The sentence in (2) has a coherent infinitive construction, while the sentence in (3) has an incoherent one.

Referring again to the sentence in (1), the neuter personal pronoun *es* ‘it’ on the left of the finite auxiliary *wird* ‘will’ is not the subject of the sentence. The subject, *niemand* ‘nobody’, appears later, after the finite auxiliary, in the middle field of the sentence. The pronoun *es* in (1) is so-called “pre-field *es*.” It is an expletive as it does not carry any semantic meaning and has no verbal argument status. Because the pre-field in German declarative sentences always has to be filled syntactically, *es* plays the role of a placeholder without any concrete meaning.

A beginning in story-telling is one example of the typical usage of the pre-field *es*, as in (4):

- (4) Es war einmal ein König.
 it was once a king
- (5) There was once a king (Sasse 1987: 531)

The corresponding expression in English is the sentence in (5). The beginning of the sentence is held by the placeholder *es* in the German sentence and by the placeholder *there* in the English sentence, while the subject *ein König* or *a king* appears later in both sentences. Sasse (1987: 531) describes this phenomenon as subject inversion used as a typical means to expressthetic judgments.

Before going back to the sentence in (1), I would like to briefly explain the concept of theticity as opposed to categoricity by referring to Anton Marty's (1918) discussion on the distinction between thetic and categoricity judgments. A categoricity judgment is a judgment on an entity whose existence has been already presupposed. According to Marty (1918), every sentence in (6) expresses a categoricity judgment:

- (6) a. Dies ist rot
 'This is red'
 b. Diese Blume ist blau
 'This flower is blue'
 c. Mein Bruder ist abgereist
 'My brother left/has already left' (Marty 1918: 227)

All of the subjects in (6a–c), *dies* 'this', *diese Blume* 'this flower' and *mein Bruder* 'my brother', refer to an entity whose existence has been presupposed. Even if the sentences are negated, the negation does not influence the existence of the entities. On the other hand, a thetic judgment describes a certain entity or event whose existence is not presupposed, as in (7), for example:

- (7) a. Gott ist
 'God exists'
 b. Es regnet
 'It is raining' (Marty 1918: 272)

While a categoricity judgment can be divided into two parts, i.e., the entity whose existence is presupposed and the predication about the entity, a thetic judgment can be interpreted only as a whole. Therefore, the former is also called double judgment, and the latter simple judgment. For further details, see Fujinawa (2020) in this book.

Let us consider the sentence in (1) again:

- (1) Aber es wird doch wohl niemand zu behaupten wagen, daß ...
 but it will still probably nobody to claim dare that
 'But nobody will probably dare to claim that ...'

This sentence has a coherent infinitive construction ([_{CP} es wird doch wohl niemand zu behaupten wagen]) and the pre-field *es*, which indicates that the sentence expresses a thetic judgment. Thus, the combination of coherence/incoherence and theticity/categoricity in (1) is as follows: a thetic judgment is expressed in the form of a coherent infinitive construction.

Since we have two kinds of judgments and two kinds of infinitive constructions, there are, in theory, four different combination patterns of coherence/incoherence and theticity/categoricity. The question is, which combination is actually available grammatically? Is there any preference in the choice of the combination?

2. Coherence vs. incoherence

In order to investigate the combinations of coherence/incoherence and theticity/categoricity, this section will examine the distinction between coherent and incoherent constructions more closely.

In his extended research on coherent/incoherent constructions, Bech (1983) focuses mostly on the position of verbs in word order.

- (8) a. Er hat jedenfalls (zu arbeiten versucht).
 he has anyway to work tried
 ‘He tried to work anyway.’
- b. Er hat jedenfalls (versucht), † (zu arbeiten).
 he has anyway tried to work
 ‘He tried to work anyway.’ (Bech 1983: 76)

As in (8a), the construction is coherent when the governing verb, *versucht* ‘tried’ follows the *zu*-infinitive and forms a unit of the predicative combination. The parentheses show that the governing verb and the *zu*-infinitive stay in the same “schlußfeld” ‘sentential end-field’ (Bech 1983: 60 ff.). The sentence in (8a) has only one “kohärenzfeld” ‘coherence-field’ (Bech 1983: 60 ff.). On the other hand, in the sentence in (8b), the *zu*-infinitive follows the governing verb. The symbol † marks the border of the coherence-fields. According to Bech (1983), the sentence in (8b) has two coherence-fields, and consequently, it is called incoherent construction.

The criterion proposed by Bech (1983), however, seems to be less satisfactory if one considers another pattern such as in (9), the so called “third construction” (Wöllstein-Leisten 2001).

- (9) Sie hat ihn versucht zu trösten.
 she has him tried to console
 ‘She tried to console him.’
- (2) Sie hat ihn zu trösten versucht.
 she has him to console tried
 ‘She tried to console him.’
- (3) Sie hat versucht, ihn zu trösten.
 she has tried him to console
 ‘She tried to console him.’

The sentences in (2) and (3), cited again, show the contrast between a typical coherent construction, as exemplified in (2), and a typical incoherent construction, as exemplified in (3). Since the word order of verbs in (9) is similar to that in (3), the sentence in (9) seems also to have an incoherent construction. However, according to Wöllstein-Leisten (2001), the third construction is, in fact, coherent. She claims that coherent constructions consist of only one clause, while incoherent constructions can be decomposed into two clauses. After examining syntactic phenomena such as case conversion, movement of personal pronouns to the Wackernagel position, and the binding effect, she concludes that the third construction is indeed coherent.

In summary, there are three patterns of verb order but only two types of constructions, as in (10).

- (10) Coherent construction: [_{CP} Sie hat ihn zu trösten versucht].
 Coherent (third) construction: [_{CP} Sie hat ihn versucht zu trösten].
 Incoherent construction: [_{CP} Sie hat versucht [_{CP} ihn zu trösten]].

I concur with Wöllstein-Leisten (2001), since the occurrence of the correlate pronoun *es*, which comes in the matrix clause to indicate that a constituent clause is following, is permitted neither in the coherent construction nor in the third construction.

- (11) a. Sie hat (*es) ihn zu trösten versucht.
 she has it him to console tried
 b. Sie hat (*es) ihn versucht zu trösten.
 she has it him tried to console
 c. Sie hat es versucht, ihn zu trösten.
 she has it tried him to console

While the correlate *es* cannot appear in the typical coherent construction, as in (11a), or in the third construction, as in (11b), it can emerge in the incoherent construction, as in (11c). Based on the non-occurrence of the correlate *es*, it is clear that the typical coherent construction and the third construction can both be classified into the same group.

Because the correlate *es* can only appear in the incoherent construction, as seen in (11), it functions as an indicator of incoherence. This can be a crucial factor when the construction type of the sentence is not clear.

- (12) a. Sie wagte, eine Tabufrage zu stellen.
 she dared a taboo-question to put
 ‘She dared to ask a taboo question.’
 b. [_{CP} Sie wagte [_{VP} eine Tabufrage zu stellen]].

- c. [_{CP} Sie wagte [_{CP} [_{IP} PRO [_{VP} eine Tabufrage zu stellen]]]].
- d. Sie wagte es, eine Tabufrage zu stellen.
- e. [_{CP} Sie wagte es [_{CP} [_{IP} PRO [_{VP} eine Tabufrage zu stellen]]]].

The sentence in (12a), the object of which is not a personal pronoun but a noun phrase, can be analyzed in two ways: as a coherent construction, as in (12b), or as an incoherent construction, as in (12c). However, with the correlate *es* as in (12d), the construction is clearly incoherent, as in (12e).

3. Research target

In this section, after presenting the main ideas and unresolved challenges from my previous research (Isaka 2020), I will clarify my research target. For this purpose, I again cite the sentence with the pre-field expletive *es* in (1), which triggers a thetic sentence.

- (1) Aber es wird doch wohl niemand zu behaupten wagen, daß ...
 but it will still probably nobody to claim dare that
 ‘But nobody will probably dare to claim that ...’

The sentence in (1) has a coherent infinitive construction ([_{CP} es wird doch wohl niemand zu behaupten wagen]). Now let us consider the sentence in (13a), which also has pre-field *es* and expresses a thetic judgment. The question is, does the sentence in (13a) have a coherent infinitive construction or an incoherent one?

- (13) a. Wehe, es wagt jemand, von „unserer neuen Republik“ zu sprechen, ...
 woe it dares someone of our new republic to speak
 ‘It will have negative consequences if someone dares to talk about “our new republic” ...’
 (Z91/JUN.00177 Die Zeit, 14.06.1991, S. 14; Man spricht deutsch)
- b. [_{CP} es wagt jemand von „unserer neuen Republik“ zu sprechen ...]
 - c. [_{CP} es wagt jemand [_{CP} [_{IP} PRO [_{VP} von „unserer neuen Republik“ zu sprechen ...]]]]

In the case of (13a), the construction type of the sentence is not clear. If it is analyzed as in (13b), it consists of only one clause and has a coherent infinitive construction. If it is analyzed as in (13c), it is composed of two clauses and has an incoherent infinitive construction.

Isaka (2020) discusses the correlation between theticity and coherence based on authentic data with pre-field *es*, including the sentences in (1) and (13a). For the other sentences with pre-field *es* researched by Isaka (2020), it is also unclear, as in (13a), which construction they follow. Since no clearly incoherent constructions

were found in the research but only potentially coherent ones and one clearly coherent one, Isaka (2020) argues that for thetic judgments, coherent constructions are preferred to incoherent constructions.

Of particular interest to me is that there are no clearly incoherent cases with correlate *es* in the research on constructions with pre-field *es* (Isaka 2020). If the sentence in (13a) had the correlate *es*, as in (14), it would be clear that the construction is incoherent.

(14) [?]Es wagt es jemand, von „unserer neuen Republik“ zu sprechen, ...

However, the sentence in (14) is unacceptable to native German speakers. What leads to the unacceptability? One possible answer is that the unacceptability arises from the double appearance of the pronoun *es*. Although each of these takes a different syntactic position and there is theoretically no problem, it seems that sentences which have both the pre-field expletive *es* and the correlate *es* in the same clause are dispreferred.² Another possible answer is that the undesirable combination of theticity and incoherence affects the acceptability, as argued by Isaka (2020); the form of the incoherent construction, which is composed of two divided clauses, can pose a contradiction to a simple, thetic judgment.

To remove the possible influence of the double *es* and to support the notion posited by Isaka (2020), I will analyze new data in the following part of this research. Firstly, in order to avoid the possible influence of redundancy, I avoid using data with pre-field *es*. Secondly, I analyze sentences not only for thetic judgments but also for categorial judgments. Specifically, I include sentences with the subjects *keiner* ‘no one’ and *er* ‘he’ for thetic and categorial judgments respectively. According to Marty (1918: 229), when the subject of a sentence is a personal or demonstrative pronoun, or the subject at least includes a demonstrative or a possessive pronoun, it is definitely a case of categorial judgment, because as mentioned in Section 1, the existence of an entity is presupposed. On the other hand, the existence is not presupposed in the thetic judgment, in which the existence itself is the important matter. For this reason, sentences with *keiner* ‘no one’ and *er* ‘he’ are suited to clarify possible influence of theticity/categoriality.

2. The following example sentences (i–ii) are suggested by a reviewer: (i) *Es würde sicherlich keiner ES wagen, diese Frage nochmal zu stellen.* ‘Surely, nobody would dare to ask this question again.’ (ii) *Es wagt derzeit TATSÄCHLICH niemand es, sich offen bei einem Strassenfest auszuleben.* ‘At present, nobody actually dares to live it up openly in a street festival.’ (Note: CAPS indicate STRESS; English translation by the present writer) As in (i–ii), when the pronoun *es* comes right next to the subject and the sentence has a sentential adverb, occasionally also a specific stress pattern, sentences with double *es* seem to be acceptable. However, the second pronoun *es* in (i–ii) is, in my opinion, different from the correlate *es*. The correlate *es* cannot stay in the VP but must move to the Wackernagel-position. According to the definition proposed by Oppenrieder (2006: 908), the correlate *es* must be realized in the weak form and cannot be stressed or focused.

The studied verb is *wagen* ‘dare’, which is suitable for the research because it allows both coherent and incoherent constructions.

4. Research methodology

This section details how my research was conducted. As stated in Section 3, sentences of the verb *wagen* ‘dare’ with the subject *keiner* ‘no one’ or *er* ‘he’ were investigated. Unlike in the previous research carried out by Isaka (2020), the pre-field of the research sentences in this study was not filled with pre-field *es*, but with another word or phrase, for example, the time adverbial *heute* ‘today’ as in (15):

- (15) a. Heute wagt es keiner ...
 today dares it no.one
 b. Heute wagt keiner ...
 today dares no.one
 c. Heute wagt er es ...
 today dares he it
 d. Heute wagt er ...
 today dares he

I collected sentences both with correlate *es* and without correlate *es*, as in (15), from an online corpus and attempted to answer the following questions: (I) Which combination is actually available, athetic judgment in a coherent construction, athetic judgment in an incoherent construction, a categorical judgment in a coherent construction, or a categorical judgment in an incoherent construction? (II) Is there any tendency in the choice of the combinations? If coherence/incoherence and theticity/categoricity are irrelevant, the number of cases of the four patterns should be almost the same. If theticity cannot be appropriately combined with incoherence, as argued by Isaka (2020), the number of cases should be different. Supposing that this idea is correct, my expectation was that for thetic judgments with *keiner* ‘no one’, incoherent constructions would be fewer, or would be absent.

For the study, sentences collected from *Die Zeit* (1965–2015), the online corpus of IDS, were analyzed. In total this included 71 sentences of *keiner* ‘no one’ for thetic judgments, and 148 sentences of *er* ‘he’ for categorical judgments.

Some examples of my analysis are as follows:

- (16) Erst Monate später hat er das laut zu sagen gewagt.
 only months later has he that loud to say dared
 ‘Not until some months later, did he dare to say that loudly.’

(Z85/MAI.00313 *Die Zeit*, 17.05.1985, S. 73;
 Wiederbelebung einer Mannschaft)

The sentence in (16) is a typical coherent construction according to the word order of the verb *wagen* ‘dare’ and the *zu*-infinitive.

- (17) a. Dabei hat er nur gewagt zu sagen, was Amerikaner, Türken und
 then has he only dared to say what Americans Turks and
 auch Araber in dieser Krieg-in-Sicht-Phase tun.
 also Arabs in this war-in-sight-phase do
 ‘Then, he only dared to say what Americans, Turks, and Arabs are doing
 in this war-in-sight phase.’

(Z03/301.00342 Die Zeit (Online-Ausgabe), 09.01.2003;
 Ansprüche [S. 2])

- b. [_{CP} Dabei hat er nur gewagt zu sagen ...]
 c. [_{CP} Dabei hat er nur gewagt [_{CP} [_{IP} PRO [_{VP} zu sagen ...]]]]

Regarding the sentence in (17a), the construction can be coherent as in (17b) since it can be compared to the third construction, or it can be regarded as incoherent as in (17c).

- (18) a. Heute wagt keiner, seinen Namen zu nennen.
 today dares no.one his name to call
 ‘No one dares to say his name today.’

(Z73/AUG.00012 Die Zeit, 03.08.1973, S. 5; Biermanns Lied)

- b. [_{CP} Heute wagt keiner seinen Namen zu nennen].
 c. [_{CP} Heute wagt keiner [_{CP} [_{IP} PRO [_{VP} seinen Namen zu nennen]]]].

The sentence in (18) is also an unclear case. There are two possibilities: it can be coherent as in (18b) or incoherent as in (18c).

- (19) Erst in den siebziger Jahren wagt er es, nach Leo zu forschen.
 only in the seventies years dares he it for Leo to search
 ‘It is not until the seventies that he dares to look for Leo.’

(Z02/203.01504 Die Zeit (Online-Ausgabe), 14.03.2002;
 Das Wiedersehen von Belgorod [S. 64])

Because the sentence in (19) has the correlate *es*, it is clear that the construction is incoherent.

In addition to the correlate *es*, other personal pronouns can also be a deciding factor.

- (20) Und dennoch hat er nicht gewagt, sie einzusetzen.
 and nevertheless has he not dared them in.to.put
 ‘Nevertheless, he did not dare to use them.’

(Z91/FEB.00315 Die Zeit, 15.02.1991, S. 1; Wirklich ein gerechter Krieg?)

The construction in (20) is clearly incoherent because the personal pronoun *sie* ‘them’, object of the *zu*-infinitive, stays after the negation. This is a criterion which was pointed out by Bech (1983: 71). In German, weak personal pronouns must move to the Wackernagel position within the same clause. In the case of (20), the pronoun *sie* ‘them’ would be placed to the right of the subject *er* ‘he’ if the sentence were a coherent construction.

- (21) a. Und im Grunde unseres Herzens wissen wir das – nur wagt es
and in.the bottom our heart know we that only dares it
keiner laut auszusprechen.
no.one loud out.to.speak
‘And in the bottom of our hearts we know that – but no one dares to say
it loudly.’
(Z88/MAR.00012 Die Zeit, 04.03.1988, S. 13;
“Das Rad des Todes dreht sich”)
- b. [_{CP} nur wagt es_i keiner [_{VP} *t_i* laut auszusprechen]]

In contrast to (20), the construction is coherent in the case of (21a). After moving to the Wackernagel position, as illustrated in (21b), the pronoun *es* as object of the *zu*-infinitive *auszusprechen* ‘to speak out’ occupies the position on the right of the finite verb *wagt* ‘dares’. This indicates that the sentence is made up of only one single clause.

5. Results

The results of the corpus research are as follows: With regard to the sentences with *keiner* ‘no one’, 10 out of the 71 cases have a clearly incoherent construction, five have a clearly coherent construction, and 56 are unclear. With the subject *er* ‘he’, 76 out of the 148 cases have a clearly incoherent construction, six have a clearly coherent construction, and 66 are indeterminable. While the usage of clearly incoherent constructions for a categorical judgment with *er* ‘he’ amounts almost equally to half of the total usage (76 of 148; 51%), clearly incoherent constructions are less often used for athetic judgment with *keiner* ‘no one’ (10 of 71; 14%).³

From the considerable difference in the occurrence rate of clearly incoherent constructions as seen above, it is obvious that while there is no avoidance of clearly incoherent constructions for categorical judgments, such constructions are chosen less often for thetic judgments.

To summarize, I will answer the questions mentioned above in Section 4 as follows: To the first question, “Which combination of coherence/incoherence and

3. The percentages have been rounded off.

theticity/categoricity is available?” the answer is that all of the patterns are available. The second question was, “Is there any tendency in the choice of constructions?” to which the answer is yes. Clearly incoherent constructions are avoided in case of the thetic judgment.

6. Conclusion

As the corpus research shows, for describing a thetic judgment, clearly incoherent constructions are less frequently chosen than coherent or potentially coherent constructions. This result can be interpreted in the following way: Incoherent constructions, comprising two clauses, are less preferred in describing a thetic judgment or a simple judgment, which cannot be divided into two and must be interpreted as a whole. Although further research is needed to provide data on other verbs, this paper shows that the semantic distinction between theticity and categoricity can affect the choice of coherent or incoherent constructions, a phenomenon usually analyzed merely from a syntactic point of view. This could constitute additional proof that form and content in language have a close relationship to each other.

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Online corpus

Die Zeit (Deutsche Referenzkorpus (DeReKo) of the Leibniz-Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS)), accessible through the following link: <<https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/>>

Strong and weak nominal reference inthetic and categorial sentences

Sampling German and Chinese

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In this paper, it will be discussed how, in both German and Chinese, strong and weak reference inthetic and categorial sentences are expressed if held against Carlson's (1977) semantic event types of stage-level/SL- and individual-level/IL-predicates. This article will put emphasis on correspondents of indefinite and bare nouns in German on personal pronouns, the construction *zhè/nà* (this/that) (+Num)+CL(assifier)+N or the repetition of DP, which can only express the strong reference of the subject. The problems arise from the fact that Chinese, in contrast to German, signals reference strength not by articles as there are no articles in Chinese. In order to come to a comparison, we will use the Carlsonian reference option as a criterion.

The article is structured as follows: Section 1 introduces the definition of the strong and weak nominal reference. The second section will discussthetic and categorial constructions in German and Chinese. The third section deals with the interplay of SL- and IL-predicates,thetic/categorial sentences, and the nominal reference of subjects, whereby the SL- and the IL-predicate are each described in a separate section. Section 4 concludes this paper with a summary of the results obtained in the previous sections.

Keywords: bare noun, classifier, strongly referential,thetic and categorial sentence, weakly referential

1. Definition: Strong and weak nominal reference

The term *referential* means to refer to something. Following Lyons (1999), I assume that both a definite and an indefinite term potentially refer to something. The definite specific¹ DP refers to ‘this specimen’, while the indefinite specific DP refers to ‘such a specimen’. Reference objects occur as nouns – often in conjunction with a determiner (in English e.g. *a book, the book, this book, my book*) or with a pronoun (in English *she, that, something*) – and they are clearly identifiable. This means, using them the speaker talks about a particular single individual and enables the listener to pick out from a lot of same things which individual is meant. Determiners fulfill the uniqueness condition (Russell 1905; Strawson 1950). In other words, unique reference is regarded as strongly referential.

However, there are also NPs that do not refer to any particular reference object, which Aguilar-Guevara et al. (2014) regard as *weakly referential*. The authors take them as definite and indefinite DPs that differ from directly introducing or selecting an individual referent in the common ground, i.e. in the common understanding background of the discourse. To illustrate the phenomenon of weak referentiality, Aguilar-Guevara et al. provide the following English Examples (1a, b):

- (1) a. *I'm looking for a book.*
 b. *It is new.* (Aguilar-Guevara et al. 2014: 2)

In Example (1a), the indefinite DP *a book* has two readings. One of them is the strong reading, namely an indefinite specific reading. The other one is the weak reading that is an indefinite nonspecific reading. In the strong reading, *a book* refers to a specific, individual book whereas it would be interpreted as any book with a specific property (contents, title etc.) in the weak reading. Sentence (1a) can be continued with (1b) only in the strong reading. The pronoun *it* takes up the specific referent from the previous sentence. The weak reading of the NP is regarded as weakly referential (see Aguilar-Guevara et al. (2014: 1f.)). However, the DP *a book* presupposes the existence of a book. So, a book doesn't need to be referred to as a particular, clearly individually identifiable book.

In German the indefinite DP with the article *ein-* also has two interpretations: a specific and a nonspecific reading. The indefinite nonspecific reading is regarded as weakly referential in terms of properties. This is illustrated in the following

1. According to Hellan (1981) and Ioup (1997), specific is understood here, when the speaker call a particular individual and only this one as a referent. The nonspecific reading refers to any and only individual identified by property that therefore cannot be pointed at.

Example (2). The DP *ein Buch* in the weakly referential reading, in contrast to the referential indefinite specific reading, can't have a continued sentence like (2b).

- (2) a. *Ich suche ein Buch.*
 I look for a book
 b. **Es ist neu.*
 it is new

The pronoun *es* in (2b) would have to resume the unique reference of an individual book. However, such referential uniqueness is not present in (2a). The expletive usage of *es* in *Es gibt Haue* 'You will be beaten up for that' and *Es darf gelacht werden* 'It's time for laughter' and the so-called weather-*es* in *Es regnet* 'It is raining' barely have reference. These and the DPs in idiomatic usage such as *Es geht um die Wurst* 'It's do or die' are disregarded in this contribution as they are no entities of "reality" as reference in these three forms. They are called non-referential in the weather case and expletive in the former example.

Further weakly referential examples are found, according to Aguilar-Guevara et al. (2014: 2), in the bare noun without an article or in the incorporated noun. An incorporated noun is here understood as an argument which forms a fixed unit and presents no independent reference as in (4a). Such nouns can't refer to an individual. The appropriate examples in German are found in sentence (3) and (4a) with the bare noun and sentence (5a) with a bare plural.

- (3) *Ich lese jeden Tag Zeitung.*
 I read everyday newspaper
 'I read newspaper every day.' [wR]
- (4) a. *Sie geht Wäsche waschen.*
 she go laundry wash
 'She goes to do the laundry.' [wR]
 b. *Sie geht die Wäsche waschen.*
 she goes the laundry wash
 'She goes to do the laundry.' [stR]
- (5) a. *Er ist am Schuhe schnüren.*
 he is p shoes lace up
 'He is lacing up his shoes.' [wR]
 b. *Er schnürt die Schuhe.*
 he laces up the shoes
 'He laces up his shoes.' [stR]

These three examples are about NPs that refer to an unidentified individual. The noun without article in (3) as well as in (4a) is fixed usage² such as *Tee trinken* ‘drink tea’, *Fahrrad fahren* ‘ride a bicycle’, *Zigarre rauchen* ‘smoke a cigar’, *Geige spielen* ‘play the violin’ or *Radio hören* ‘listen to the radio’ and so on. The difference between singular and plural is neutralized here (Aguilar-Guevara et al. 2014: 9). (5a) is about the so-called *am*-progressive in which the continuation of the action is placed in the foreground. The NP *Schuhe* ‘shoes’ can’t express any referential meaning in this case. Therefore, these three NPs in ((3), (4a) and (5a)) are weakly referential. They are unable to introduce a referent into the discourse. By contrast, the DPs in (4b) and (5b) refer to the specific laundry and specific shoes. Therefore, they are strongly referential.

The referentiality of DP reflects itself in the distinction between weak and strong forms of the definite article after a preposition. According to Schwarz (2009), the preposition merged with the specific article is weakly referential. This form presents a nonspecific reading. (6a) is about an entity that fulfills the essence of the house and which is a specific house that is picked out from a lot of houses. However, this house can’t be clearly identified by the speaker. Definite marking by the article indeed acts like an indefinite noun. Like an indefinite noun, it can express a weakly referential reading. Thus, it is identified as a weak definite noun in such a case. By contrast, the unmerged form (6b) with strong article is anaphorically applied when the DP resumes a one-time given reference in the discourse.

- (6) a. *Hans ging zum Haus.* (Schwarz 2009: 7)
 Hans went to the house
 b. *Hans ging zu dem Haus.* (Schwarz 2009: 7)
 Hans went to the house

Another example for a not clearly identifiable NP can be found in (7a). This sentence can also mean: ‘Maria went to more than one supermarket’. However, the weakly referential interpretation disappears with the addition of a restrictive modification³ (Carlson et al. 2006: 181; Aguilar-Guevara & Schulpen 2014: 237) as shown in (7b).

2. These article-less singulars in argument positions are described by Dobrovie-Sorin et al. (2006) as a predicate modifier.

3. According to Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010) and Aguilar-Guevara & Schulpen (2014: 237) not all adjectives can prevent the weakly referential reading, e.g. most of the kind-level adjectives are compatible with the weakly referential reading, as the following example shows:

- (i) Lola went to the psychiatric hospital/the alternative doctor/the organic store and Alice did too.
 (Lola and Alice could have gone to different hospitals/doctors/stores.)
 (Aguilar-Guevara & Schulpen 2014: 237)

- (7) a. *Maria ging zum Supermarkt / *zu dem Supermarkt.*
 Maria went to the supermarket to the supermarket
- b. *Maria ging zum größten Supermarkt.* (Schwarz 2009: 72)
 Maria went to the largest supermarket
 Let us take a look at an another German Example (8).
- (8) a. *Die Zeitung wird jeden Morgen von dem Briefträger gebracht.*
 the newspaper AUX every morning from the postman bring
 ‘The newspaper is delivered every morning by the postman.’
- b. *Die Zeitung wird jeden Morgen vom Briefträger gebracht.*
 the newspaper AUX every morning from the postman bring
 ‘The newspaper is delivered every morning by the postman.’
 (von Heusinger 1997: 15)

The prepositional object in (8a) refers to the same supermarket. In (8b) the prepositional object presents the existence of the postman. It’s not important whether the prepositional object is about a specific postman or many individual postmen. It could be different individual postmen.

There is also another special case in thetic (all-rheme-) sentences which refers to not yet mentioned information as in (9).

- (9) a. *Es sind momentan Frauen im Garten.*
 it are currently women in the garden
 ‘There are currently women in the garden.’

The indefinite subject in plural *Frauen* in the weak/presentational⁴ reading as in (9a) is regarded as weak subject (German ‘schwaches Subjekt’; Jäger 2001: 96). This doesn’t refer to a specific woman, because there is no assumption for reference. The weak subject can be located in the right middle field (‘topic-about’) or in VP (‘non-topic’; cf. Abraham³2013: 606).

In order to give an overview about the definitions of the strength of reference, all the factors are summarized in the Table 1.

Now we turn to the topic of thetic sentences which have no afore-mentioned information in discourse. In German generally a definite article will not be used for their subject (within VP).

4. In the present contribution, the term *presentational* is used instead of *existential*, although the Chinese existence marker *yǒu* is applied terminologically in such sentences. The term *presentational* is about introducing something or introducing something into the discourse, while the term *existential* express the actual existence. These two terms are not identical conceptually.

Table 1. The factors of strong and weak referentiality

Strong referentiality	Weak referentiality
identifiable individual:	not identifiable individual (presupposes the existence of a reference object):
<i>der Gauner</i> the crook	<i>ein Gauner</i> a crook
indefinite specific DP:	indefinite unspecific DP:
<i>ein Gauner aus Wien</i> a crook from Vienna	(<i>irgend</i>) <i>ein Gauner</i> some crook
preposition not merged with the article:	preposition merged with the article:
* <i>zu dem (Schließen)</i> to the close	^{OK} <i>zum (Schließen)</i> to the close
–	bare noun (the contradiction Sg. vs. Pl. is neutralized): <i>(die/*eine)Ehre ≠ *(die) Ehre der Katharina</i> the an honor the honor GEN. Katharina
–	indefinite position-inverted subj. in thethetic sentence): <i>Es ist ein Mann im Garten.</i> it is a man in the garden ‘There is a man in the garden.’

2. Thetic and categorial in German and Chinese

The terms *thetic* und *categorial* come originally from the German philosopher Brentano (1874/1924) and have been introduced into modern linguistics by Kuroda (1972) und Sasse (1987). Kuroda (1972: 154) explains both terms as follows: A thetic sentence contains a simple judgment and is regarded as topicless. Its typical structure goes with subject inversion as in (10c), on the one hand, or with broad sentential focus as in (10b), on the other hand. According to Abraham (2020, in this volume) a simple judgment is a proposition containing no discourse reference. It represents a suitable answer to out-of-the-blue questions like *What’s going on?* or *What has happened?* There are three such event-reporting sentences (Lambrecht 1994: 137) in (10). (10a) it a topicless sentence. (10b) is strongly referential while (10c) weakly referential. By contrast, a categorial sentence (11) offers a double judgment. This means that it consists of a topic and a comment (see Hockett 1958). Lambrecht (1994: 77f.) states that the property [+identifiable] is generally assigned to the topic reference as a basic character. This means that

the topic must always be referential and is understood either as contextually old information or as common knowledge. (10a–c) arethetic sentences which aren't involved in the discourse. By comparison, (11) is a categorial sentence with a topic and a comment.

- (10) a. *Es schneit.*
it snows
'It's snowing.'
- b. *Das Handy klingelt.* [stR]
the cell phone rings
'The cell phone rings'
- c. *Es liegen Handys auf dem Tisch.* [wR]
it lie cell phones on the table
'There are cell phones on the table.'
- (11) a. [_{TOP} *Ein Handy*] [_{COM} *liegt auf dem Tisch.*]
cell phone lies on the table
'A cell phone lies on the table.'
(TOP=topic/theme, COM =comment/rheme)

In (11), according to Molnár's (1993) view, *das Handy* is the object of the sentence or the circumstance that a statement is made about in the sentence. The comment *liegt auf dem Tisch* is the comment of the sentence. The questions *Was ist los mit den Handys?* 'What's up with the cell phones?' is a suitable template for an answer like this, but the question *Wo ist das Handy?* 'Where is the cell phone?' is not. Chomsky has also commented on this:

[...] we might define the Topic-of the Sentence as the leftmost NP immediately dominated by S[sentence] in the surface structure, and the Comment-of the Sentence as the rest of the string. (Chomsky 1965: 221)

This means that the topic (or theme) belongs to the core sentence, which is structurally located on the left of the prefield in the sentence / SpezCP. By contrast, the topic-about and the anaphoric topic are in the thematic area of the German sentence field, in the left and right midfield of the sentence.

In contrast to German, Chinese is a topic prominent language. In Chinese, both VO and OV exist. The VO-order after the topic, i.e. T-V-O is considered as unmarked, neutral, and default. According to Li & Thompson (1981: 20) and Lyons (1999: 88), the subject with a bare, article-less noun in a topic position in Chinese is interpreted as definite (12a) (or generic (13)) and is usually the topic-about of the sentence. (12a) refers to a specific mobile phone and is thus strongly referential. (12b) shows that the bare subject can be replaced by a pronoun. (13) is weakly referential and refers to the class of dinosaurs.

- (12) a. 手機在桌上。 [stR]
Shǒujī zài zhuō shàng.
 N V N P
 cell phone lies table on
 ‘The cell phone is on the table.’
- b. 它在桌上。 [stR]
Tā zài zhuō shàng.
 Pron v N Postp
 it lies table on
 ‘It is on the table.’
- (13) 恐龍絕種了。⁵ [wR]
Kǒnglóng juézhǒng⁵ le.
 N V change of state.PART
 dinosaur extinct change of state.PART
 ‘The dinosaur is extinct.’
 or: ‘(The) dinosaurs are extinct.’

However, (12) and (13) can also be read as event-reporting topicless sentences, i.e.thetic sentences, if there is no common background for understanding. In contrast to (12) and (13), the examples in (14), the Chinese translations of (10a) and (10b), are only topicless sentences, because there is no common background required.

- (14) a. 下雪了。 [THT]
Xià xuě le.
 V N change of state.PART
 fall snow change of state.PART
 ‘It is snowing.’
- b. 手機在響。 [THT/CTG]
Shǒujī zài xiǎng.
 N prog.PART V
 mobile phone prog.PART ring
 ‘The mobile phone is ringing.’

(14a) is a thetic statement, which in Chinese is characterized by the sequence of the words instead of an sentence-initial expletive as in German *Es läutet* ‘it is ringing’. Example (14b), on the other hand, can also be interpreted as a categorical sentence if there is a short break or an interjection like *a, ma, ne* and others between the noun

5. According to Li & Thompson (1981: 141), *juézhǒng* ‘extinction’ here can be considered as an adjectival verb. Such verbs are intransitive and therefore the subject is added as the only argument.

das Handy and the progressive particle *zài* (see also Tsao 1979). The interjection or the short break marks the topic.

There are two possibilities in Chinese in the OV-order: (i) an object can be placed before the verb with *bǎ* (see (15a)) and (ii) an object is moved to the first position of the sentence (see (15b)).

- (15) a. 我把手機放在桌上。 [THT/CTG]
 Wǒ bǎ shǒujī fàng zài zhuō shàng.
 Pron PART N V P N Postp
 I PART cell phone lay on table above
 'I put the cell phone on the table.'
- b. 手機, 我放在桌上。 [CTG]
 Shǒujī, wǒ fàng zài zhuō shàng.
 N Pron V P N Postp
 cell phone I lay on table above
 'As for the cell phone, I put it on the table.'

(15a) can be read both as a thetic and as a categorial sentence. For the thetic interpretation, (15a) is the answer to the question *What is going on?* Conversely, (15a) as a categorial proposition can be an answer to the question *What are you doing?* (15b) contains a marked word order and can only function as a categorial sentence. What is being expressed is: As far as the mobile phone is concerned, I put it on the table, where *Shǒujī* is the topic and *wǒ fàng zài zhuō shàng* is the comment. A comma is inserted between the topic and the comment. There may be a short break or an interjection to mark the topic.

In summary, the topic of the categorial sentence both in German and Chinese occurs at the beginning of the sentence. In thetic German sentences, there are often expletives at the beginning of the sentence, if it is in a presentational function. In Chinese, however, a sentence can be both thetic and categorial in an unmarked order of the phrase, except when the verb appears at the beginning of the sentence, i.e. V-S-O-structure, which can only be read as a thetic sentence.

3. Nominal reference with the stage-level and individual-level predicates in thetic and categorial sentences

Before introducing nominal reference in thetic and categorial sentences, I will give an overview about stage-level and the individual-level predicates (SL and IL predicates). It is assumed that the origo-specific SL and IL predicates produce content-related access of reference where Chinese lacks the article identifications.

Similar to the discourse terms topic and comment, Stage Level/SL and Individual Level/IL predicates can also be related to the types of nominal reference. SL predicates are event predicates (see Hallab 2011: 150; according to Abraham³2013: 607 eventuality predicates) and IL predicates are property predicates (Hallab 2011: 150; according to Abraham³2013: 607 essential predicates). The distinction is due to Carlson (1977). SL predicates are connected involve space-time configuration [+*hic-et-nunc*] according to Bühler's Origo (1934/1982). They come as adjective predications not fixed to individuals such as *be tired* or *be drunk* and verbs like *sleep* or *run*. They generally express transitory properties that can be determined against the background of time and place, whereas IL predicates denote permanent and essential, individual properties (unconfigured in space and time). IL predicates thus have the characteristic [-*hic-et-nunc*] and e.g. include the adjectives *intelligent*, *blond*, *selfless* and verbs like *know*, *love*, *to be called* (Abraham 2014).

In the next section, the nominal reference with the SL predicates will be introduced first, and their coding in German and Chinese will be discussed. Then the nominal reference with the IL predicates will be introduced.

3.1 Nominal reference with the stage-level predicates

Carlson (1977) suggests that a weak subject (as much as a zero plural subject) in SL predicates is ambiguous between a generic and an existential reading. For thetics in English, only the weakly referential NP is allowed as a subject. See (16).

(16) *There are (*the) firemen available.*

In German, the zero plural subject also has two readings. In a generic reading (17), the subject *firefighters* holds in a general sense (i.e. as a property) and is thus weakly referential. This sentence (17) can be boththetic and categorical. In the presentational reading, the sentence assigns a simple judgment. The zero plural subject is also weakly referential in this case.

(17) *Feuerwehrleute sind momentan verfügbar.*
 firemen AUX currently available
 [THT/CTG, generic., wR] or [THT, presentational, wR]
 'Firemen are currently available.'

In (18), the subject is in the right middle field position. The sentential prefield is filled by an expletive. (18a) and (18b) also present thethetic sentences, in which the both subjects are weakly referential. The subject in (18a) refers to firemen in a general sense as a profession, while (18b) expresses that firemen as individuals are (as opposed to the other group) currently available.

- (18) a. *Es sind momentan Feuerwehrleute verfügbar.* [THT, wR]
 it are currently firemen available
 ‘There are currently firemen available.’
- b. *Es sind momentan die Feuerwehrleute verfügbar.* [THT, wR]
 it are currently the firemen available
 ‘There are currently the firemen available.’

Let’s translate the Examples (17) and (18) into Chinese.

SVO-structure

See at first (19).

- (19) a. 消防員目前可供調遣。 [THT/CTG, generic, wR],
 [CTG, definite, stR] or [THT, wR]
Xiāofángyuán mùqián kěgōngdiàoqiǎn.
 N ADV ADJ.V
 firemen currently available
 ‘There are currently firemen available.’
 or ‘(The) firemen are currently available.’
- b. 消防員目前是可供調遣的。 [CTG, generic, wR] or [CTG, definite, stR]
Xiāofángyuán mùqián shì kěgōngdiàoqiǎn
 N ADV AUX ADJ
 firemen currently are available
 ‘(The) firemen are currently available.’
- c. 有消防員目前可供調遣。 [THT, presentational, wR]
Yǒu xiāofángyuán mùqián kěgōngdiàoqiǎn.
 existm N ADV ADJ.V
 have firemen currently available
 ‘There are currently firemen available.’
- d. 有消防員目前是可供調遣的。 [THT, presentational, wR]
Yǒu xiāofángyuán mùqián shì kěgōngdiàoqiǎnde.
 existm N ADV AUX ADJ
 have firemen currently are available
 ‘There are firemen who are currently available.’

The subject in (19a) with a bare noun in Chinese is considered either as generic or definite. In the generic reading, the subject is weakly referential referring to the whole class of firemen. The sentence can be both thetic and categorial. On the other hand, on a definite reading, the subject in a categorial sentence can be strongly referential, while in a thetic reading it is weakly referential. In other words, in terms of category, (19a) refers to the specific group of firemen. Regarding the thetic option, (19a) expresses that a particular group of firemen (but not other objects or groups) are currently available. In (19b) the cleft construction *shì ... de*

is used indicating focus according to Shyu (2011). This sentence can only be interpreted categorically, whereby the subject can either be generic or definite. (19c) and (19d), on the other hand, can only be read asthetic sentences and cannot contain a topical subject. However, the subjects with the existence marker *yǒu* refer only to undetermined, i.e. a group of firemen. This means the existence marker resolves the categorical interpretation of the bare nouns. The difference between (19c) and (19d) is that in (19c) the firemen are brought into focus, while (19d) focuses on the condition of part of the firemen. The same results can be obtained in (20) with the verb *zài* 'to be located':

- (20) a. 消防員在花園裡。 [THT/CTG, generic, wR], [CTG, definite, stR]
or [THT, wR]

Xiāofángyuán zài huāyuán lǐ.
N v N Postp
firemen be located garden inside
'(The) firemen are in the garden.'
or 'There are firemen in the garden.'

- b. 有消防員在花園裡。 [THT, presentational, wR]

Yǒu xiāofángyuán zài huāyuán lǐ.
existm N v N Postp
have firemen be located garden inside
'There are firemen in the garden.'

- c. 花園裡有消防員。 [THT, presentational, wR], [CTG, wR]

Huāyuán lǐ yǒu xiāofángyuán
N Postp v N
garden inside have firemen
'In the garden there are firemen.'

It is especially remarkable that the difference between (20b) and (20c) is that (20c) can bethetic or categorical depending on the contexts while (20b) can only read as athetic sentence. In (20c) the locative adjunct is moved to the topic position. Therefore (20c) can be regarded as an answer to the question *Was ist los im Garten?* 'What is going on in the garden?'. By contrast, (20b) isn't an appropriate answer to this question and is purely presentational.

The comparison of (21a, b) shows that the indefinite subject in singular form can be read as weakly referential or strongly referential depending on the topical common ground.

- (21) a. *Ein Feuerwehrmann ist momentan verfügbar.*
a fireman is currently available
'There is a fireman currently available.' [THT, presentational, wR] or
'A fireman is currently available.'
[CTG, presentational, stR] or [CTG, count, wR]

- b. *Es ist momentan ein Feuerwehrmann verfügbar.* [THT, stR/wR]
 it is currently a fireman available
 ‘There is a fireman currently available.’
- c. *Es ist momentan der Feuerwehrmann verfügbar.* [THT, stR]
 it is currently the fireman available
 ‘The fireman is currently available.’

(21a) can be presentationalthetic. In this case, the sentence presupposes the existence and the count status of the discourse referent without identifying it. However, this sentence can also be categorial. As a categorial sentence *ein Feuerwehrmann* can be regarded as a specific fireman who can be identified by the speaker but not by the reader. In a count (transnumeral) reading, however, it is adequate as a response to the question *How many firemen are currently available?* Furthermore, the article *ein* ‘a(n)’ as a number, i.e. ‘one’, takes focus accent. By contrast, (21b) is athetic sentence whose subject can be interpreted as specific as well as non-specific depending on the context. (21c) shows that a strongly referential subject can also occur in the presentational construction, whereby the sentence remains topicless.

Let us now compare the Chinese equivalents in (22).

- (22) a. 有(一)個消防員目前可供調遣。 [CTG, presentational, stR]
 or [THT, presentational, wR]
Yǒu (yí) ge xiāofángyuán mùqián kěgōngdiàoqiǎn.
 existm NUM CL_{piece} N ADV ADJ.V
 have a CL_{piece} fireman currently available
 ‘A fireman is currently available.’
 or ‘There is a fireman currently available.’
- b. 有(一)個消防員目前是可供調遣的。 [CTG, presentational, stR]
Yǒu (yí) ge xiāofángyuán mùqián shì kěgōngdiàoqiǎnde.
 existm NUM CL_{piece} N ADV AUX Adj
 have a CL_{piece} fireman currently is available
 ‘A fireman is currently available.’
- c. 一個消防員目前可供調遣。 [CTG, QNT, wR]
Yí ge xiāofángyuán mùqián kěgōngdiàoqiǎn.
 NUM CL_{piece} N ADV ADJ.V
 one CL_{piece} fireman currently available
 ‘One fireman is currently available.’
- d. 一個消防員目前是可供調遣的。 [CTG, QNT, wR]
Yí ge xiāofángyuán mùqián shì kěgōngdiàoqiǎnde.
 NUM CL_{piece} N ADV AUX Adj
 one CL_{piece} fireman momentan is available
 ‘One fireman is currently available.’

- e. *個消防員目前是可供調遣的。

Ge xiāofángyuán mùqián shì kěgōngdiàoqiǎnde.

CL_{piece} N ADV AUX Adj
 CL_{piece} fireman currently is available

There is no difference between the existence marker *yǒu* with a bare classifier construction (without a numeral) and the one with the numeral classifier construction (with numeral) in (22a). If it is athetic reading, then the subject is weakly referential. In a categorical reading, however, the subject can be read as indefinite specific, whereby an interjection or a pause can often occur between the topic and the comment. By contrast, (22c) is a count reading. In this case, the existence marker is not selected. The numeral classifier construction indicates the count status countability of the reference object. (22d) is intended to make clear that the bare classifier construction is not selected by itself in the topic position.

OSV construction

Let us now turn to the OSV construction in Chinese (23a). If an object in the form of a bare noun is moved from its basic position (generally in the rheme-comment section) to the beginning of the sentence, this is a marked sequence. The NP acts as a focused topic-about to the whole sentence and is definite and strongly referential. At the same time, the sentence can also be read categorically. However, if we insert an existence marker at the beginning of the sentence in front of the object, the result is an ungrammatical sentence (23b). The existence marker is regarded as a marker of indefiniteness and can't occur with a preposed object in the form of a bare noun in topic position. When an indefinite object appears at the beginning of a sentence, it must be understood as strongly referential, which is expressed by the form *yǒu* (+NUM)+KL+NP (singular and plural) (23c) and *yǒu* (+one)+*xiē*+NP (plural only) (23d).

- (23) a. 襯衫他很想買。 [CTG, stR]

Chènshān tā hěn xiǎng mǎi.

N Pron ADV MV V

shirt he very would like to buy

'He would really like to buy the shirt/the shirts.'

- b. *有襯衫他很想買。

**Yǒu chènshān tā hěn xiǎng mǎi.*

existm N Pron ADV MV V

have shirt he very would like to buy

- c. 有(一)件襯衫他很想買。^o [CTG, stR]
 Yǒu (yí) jiàn chènshān tā hěn xiǎng mǎi.
 existm NUM CL_{clothes} N Pron ADV MV V
 have a CL_{clothes} shirt he very would like to buy
 ‘He would really like to buy a shirt.’
- d. 有(一)些襯衫他很想買。^{o6} [CTG, stR]
 Yǒu (yí)-xiē⁶ chènshān tā hěn xiǎng mǎi.
 existm Quant N Pron ADV MV V
 have some shirt he very would like to buy
 ‘He would really like to buy some shirts.’

The example above shows that *yǒu* can only be selected with indefinite nouns (confirmed by Huang 1987: 239). Whether the nouns after *yǒu* are specific depends on the context and the word order.

In construction with weather verbs, the thetic sentence begins with the predicate and is event-reporting, as (24a) shows. The bare noun *yǔ* is weakly referential due to its position. By contrast, (24b) is a categorial sentence. The topic *Regen* is strongly referential due to its position. We can understand the sentence like this: the rain that you have been waiting for is finally coming.

- (24) a. 下雨了。^o [THT, wR]
 Xià yǔ le.
 v N change of state.part
 fall rain change of state.part
 ‘It’s raining.’
- b. 雨下了。^o [CTG, stR]
 Yǔ xià le.
 N v change of state.part
 rain fall change of state.part
 ‘The rain is coming.’

If the subject in a thetic sentence occurs after the weather predicate, then it is weakly referential, while in a categorial sentence it is strongly referential in the position before the weather predicate.

6. In current literature, here e.g. Li & Thompson (1981: 112), it is assumed that the word *yixiē* consists of the numeral *yí*, ‘one’ and the CL *xiē*, which indicates the plurality or indefinite number. *xiē* is in the position of the CL. It looks like *xiē* could replace a CL. However, the numeral in the CL construction can also take on a different number besides the number *one*. For *xiē*, only the numeral *one* is allowed. In the topic position, *xiē* can’t stand alone, except in coconstruction with the existence marker. Therefore, I consider *yí* and *xiē*, contra the assumption of Li & Thompson, as a separate word, namely as a quantifier.

3.2 Nominal reference with the individual-level predicates

Weak subjects inthetic clausal status can't appear with an IL predicate but only with a SL predicate. Therefore, (25a) is ungrammatical. According to Carlson (1977), weak subjects with IL predicates can only have the generic reading as in (25b), whereby the sentence can be regarded as a categorical sentence, and the topic *firemen* is a weakly referential subject.

- (25) a. **There are firemen altruistic.*
 b. *Firemen are altruistic.* (Abraham 2014: 4)

In German, the subject in thethetic sentence is in the right midfield. However, this position is not filled by a weak subject with the IL predicate (26a). In (26b) the subject *firemen* has generic topic status, and the sentence denotes a property of firemen.

- (26) a. **Es sind Feuerwehrleute selbstlos.*
 Pron AUX N ADJ
 it are firemen altruistic
 b. *Feuerwehrleute sind selbstlos.*
 N AUX ADJ
 fireman are altruistic
 ‘*Firemen are altruistic.*’ [CTG, generic, wR]

Finally, let's take a look at the Chinese examples.

SVO construction

- (27) a. 消防員是無私的。 [CTG, generic, wR]
Xiāofángyuán shì wú sī de.
 N AUX ADJ
 firemen are altruistic
 ‘(The) Firemen are altruistic.’
 b. 消防員很無私。 [CTG, generic, wR]
Xiāofángyuán hěn wú sī.
 N ADV ADJ.V
 firemen very altruistic
 ‘(The) firemen are altruistic.’
 c. 有消防員是無私的。 [THT, partitive, wR]
Yǒu xiāofángyuán shì wú sī de.
 existm N AUX ADJ
 have firemen are altruistic
 ‘There are firemen who are altruistic.’

- d. 有消防員很無私。 [THT, partitive, wR]
 Yǒu xiāofángyuán hěn wúsī.
 existm N ADV ADJ.V
 have firemen very altruistic
 ‘There are firemen who are altruistic.’

(27a) and (27b) have the same meaning. Both are categorial sentences, and the subjects *xiāofángyuán* are topics. In other words, the subject with a bare noun can only be interpreted as a generic reading in the IL predicate and refers to the entire class of firemen. (27c) and (27d) show the following: If *yǒu* is inserted before the bare noun in a sentence with an IL predicate, a presentational reading results. In this case, the subject can be understood as a part of the firemen and their existence is in the focus of the sentence.

If an indefinite NP in singular in German appears at the beginning of a sentence in the topic position and the predicate is an IL predicate, the sentence can be boththetic and categorial (see (28)). In athetic reading, the indefinite subject singular is weakly referential. In the categorial reading, the subject can be a weak or a strong reference. If the subject *ein Feuerwehrmann* appears as a weak reference in the categorial sentence, the interpretation of the indefinite subject doesn't concern the existence of the individual but instead its count status.

- (28) *Ein Feuerwehrmann ist selbstlos.*
 a fireman is altruistic
 ‘A fireman is altruistic.’ [THT, wR] or [CTG, stR/wR]

(29a, b) show that in Chinese it doesn't play an important role for the interpretation whether an indefinite NP in singular after the existence marker contains a numeral. (29a) occurs only in the categorial sentence status and can be read as strongly referential. (29b), on the other hand, is weakly referential and can only occur as athetic sentence. However, the sentences without the existence marker in (29c) and (29d) with an adjectival predicate place the count status in the foreground. They are categorial sentences.

- (29) a. 有(一)個消防員是無私的。 [CTG, stR]
 Yǒu (yí) ge xiāofángyuán shì wúsīde.
 existm NUM CL_{piece} N AUX ADJ
 have a CL_{piece} fireman is altruistic
 ‘A fireman is altruistic.’
- b. 有(一)個消防員很無私。 [THT, wR]
 Yǒu (yí) ge xiāofángyuán hěn wúsī.
 existm NUM CL_{piece} N ADV ADJ.V
 have a CL_{piece} fireman very altruistic
 ‘A fireman is altruistic.’

- c. 一個消防員是無私的。 [CTG, wR]
Yí ge xiāofángyuán shì wúsidē.
 NUM CL_{piece} N AUX ADJ
 one CL_{piece} fireman is altruistic
 'One fireman is altruistic.'
- d. 一個消防員很無私。 [CTG, wR]
Yí ge xiāofángyuán hěn wúsī.
 NUM CL_{piece} N ADV ADJ.V
 one CL_{piece} fireman very altruistic
 'One fireman is altruistic.'

The example sentences above speak against the assumption of Wu (1992: 282) that *yǒu* can't be selected inthetic sentences in Chinese. In his contribution, sentence types and meanings were insufficiently taken into account as the author missed to account for sentences with bare nouns and only analyzed sentences with the numeral classifier construction and SL predicates. As a matter of fact, the existence marker can be found both inthetic and categorical sentences. An indefinite NP in the singular with SL predicates can have two readings, while with IL predicates it can only be found inthetic sentences.⁷

4. Conclusion

Based on the distinction of SL and IL predicates, reference strength of the nominal phrase was examined in boththetic and categorical sentences. The results show that the bare plural subjects with SL predicates in German are weakly referential both inthetic and categorical sentences. The Chinese bare nouns with SL predicate can be interpreted as definite or generic depending on their position. As subject inthetic sentences, they are always weakly referential, whereas they appear as generic (viz. weakly referential) or definite (viz. strongly referential) nouns in categorical sentences. If the existence marker is added before the nouns, the sentences can only bethetic because the subjects in the sentences have weak reference.

From the German examples of indefinite subjects in singular, we conclude that they have weak reference when they are at the beginning of thethetic sentences with SL predicates. But they can have strong or weak reference in categorical sentences. In the right middle field, however, they can be both weakly or strongly referential, while the sentence is athetic sentence. In Chinese, the indefiniteness of the subject in the singular is denoted by the existence marker *yǒu* + numeral classifier

7. The Cleft construction *shì ...de* here is disregarded because it marks the topic.

construction, existence marker *yǒu* + bare classifier construction, or a numeral classifier construction. In the variants with the existence marker, the subjects in categorial sentences are strongly referential, and they are weakly referential in thetic sentences. The subject is read as weakly referential in the numeral classifier construction. The focus of the sentence is on the count status of the subject item.

In conjunction with a weather verb, the different word order leads to different interpretations. If the bare noun occurs after the verb, then it is not referential, and the sentence is topic-less and thetic. If the noun appears before the verb in the topic position, then this noun is the topic of a categorial sentence and is strongly referential as well.

In German, weak subjects with IL predicates can only construct generic categorial sentences. They do not refer to specific individuals and are thus generic names. In Chinese, a bare noun is used with an IL predicate. If we place the existence marker at the beginning of the sentence, the interpretation is changed from generic to partitive in the cleft-construction as well as in the construction with the adjectival predicate. The subject is weakly referential.

For singular indefinite subjects in German, the sentence with IL predicates can be both thetic and categorial, while the subject has weak reference in the thetic reading and is ambiguous between strongly and weakly referential in the categorial reading. By means of the existence marker *yǒu*+ numeral classifier construction, or the existence marker *yǒu*+ bare classifier construction, weak reference in Chinese is displayed in the thetic sentence with the adjectival predicate, while strong reference is shown in categorial sentences with the cleft-construction. The bare numeral classifier construction as subject yields neither a generic nor a specific, but only a count reading. The subject is weakly referential.

Our examples and analyses contradict Zhu's (1982) assumption of that the existence marker *yǒu* has a function that makes an indefinite NP as subject occupy the topic position. Our result shows that the numeral classifier construction without an existence marker can only appear as a subject, albeit only in the categorial sentence. Furthermore, it is weakly referential. *Yǒu*+NP in a thetic sentence is always weakly referential, while it never appears in a categorial sentence.

Bare nouns with stage-level predicates can occur in thetic and categorial sentences and are ambiguous between the weak and the strong reference interpretation. With the individual-level predicates, bare nouns can only occur in the categorial sentence. Bare nouns with an existence marker can only be found in the thetic sentence. Its occurrence with an SL or an IL predicate doesn't have any influence on their referential status. In German, the bare plural subject indicates weak reference, while *ein*+N is ambiguous between referential strong and weak interpretations.

In the following table, the different reference validities in German and Chinese are compiled again between subjects in the thetic and categorial sentence.

Table 2. Implementation forms in German and Chinese

SL predicate	Subject in German		Subject in Chinese	
	Thetic	Categoric	Thetic	Categoric
strong reference	– Definitum (definite) (10b) (21c) – ein+N (21b)	– ein+N (presentational) (21a)	– bare N (14b)	– bare N (definite) (12) (14b) (19a) (19b) (20a) (24b) – <i>yǒu</i> +(Num)+CL+N (22a) (22b)
weak reference	– bare plural subject (17) – bare plural subject (18a) – Definitum (category) (18b) – ein+N (presentational) (21a) – ein+N (21b)	– bare plural subject (17) (count) (21a)	– bare N (13) (19a) (19b) (20a) (19c) (20b) – <i>yǒu</i> +bare N (19a) (19c) (20b) – bare N after a verb (14a) (20c) (24a) – <i>yǒu</i> +(Num)+CL+N (22a)	– bare N (19a) (19b) – Num+CL+N (22c) (22d)
IL predicate	Thetic	Categoric	Thetic	Categoric
strong reference	–	– ein+N (28)	–	– <i>yǒu</i> +(Num)-CL-N (29a)
weak reference	– Definitum (generic) – ein+N (28)	– bare plural subject (26b) – ein+N (28)	– <i>yǒu</i> +(Num)+CL+N (29b) – <i>yǒu</i> +bare N (27c) (27d)	– bare N (27a) (27b) – Num+CL+N (29c)

5. Final outlook

At the beginning, we asked ourselves whether we could build bridges of reference strength in article-prominent German and topic-prominent, article-less. German is subject-prominent and refers to reference strength by means of article forms. Chinese has no articles. Compared to German, it is not subject-prominent, but topic-prominent. The main difference between German and Chinese with respect to the issues discussed here is that German is numeral while Chinese is transnumeral. As an intermediate result we were able to show that Chinese identifies referential strength on the subject despite its lack of articles.

Strong nominal reference with a topic is positioned in the early sentence range (prefield, SpecCP) both in German and in Chinese. In German it is realized by a definite and indefinite DP in the singular. By contrast, in Chinese it is signaled by bare nouns or *yǒu*+(Num)+KL+N. As background information at the beginning

of a sentence, it will always be marked with a break or an interjection in front of the subject. Bare nouns in Chinese are interpreted as subjects and are definite or generic. However, if they appear as foregrounding information, then the existence marker *yǒu* will be inserted before the nominal reference, i.e. before the bare nouns, so that the nominal reference doesn't appear in the topic position.

Weak nominal references, on the other hand, occur in German as well as in Chinese in the serially late sentence range. In German it is in the right middle field. In Chinese, *yǒu* is positioned at the beginning of a sentence, or the subject is located behind the predicate when it has the function of a bare noun.

According to the examples discussed so far, we can conclude that reference strength in German and Chinese is encoded in both languages. However, this occurs in different ways. What they have in common is that strong identification reference of the nouns in both languages is located in one of the topic positions and the weak one is in the rhematic area of the sentence.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the illustrations:

CTG	(categorial)	wR	(weak reference)
THt	(thetic)	stR	(strong reference).

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Adjectives and mode of expression

Psych-adjectives in attributive and predicative usage and implications for the thetic/categorical discussion

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The German psych-adjectives *glücklich* (happy) and *traurig* (sad) and their Japanese counterparts *shiiwase* and *kanashii* are considered here with regard to their semantics, the hierarchy of thematic roles, and the mode of expression. The attributive usage has a semantic structure with broad focus on the entire structure, which shows a similarity to thetic judgments despite its nonpropositional status. By contrast, the predicative usage with the subject/topic as the stimulus denotes a permanent property of the entity evoking the emotion and consists of two components respectively with narrow focus, which corresponds to the double judgment of categoricals. This structure is possible owing to the property of the copulative predication that it gives the sentence definiteness, but does not give any semantic role to the arguments.

Keywords: argument structure, attribution, broad focus, copulative predication, individual-level, narrow focus, predication, predication force, psych-adjective, stage-level

1. Introduction

In this paper, the distinction between thetic and categorical judgments and their linguistic forms will be compared through attributive vs. predicative structures. Even though the attribution does not have the status of a proposition, the broad focus on the entire structure for attribution and thetics without decomposition is clearly distinct from a predication and categorical sentences whose arguments carry a narrow nominal focus. This analogy between thetics/categoricals and attributions and predications presupposes and requires a careful discussion of the differing attribute and predicate structures. This will form the core of the discussion that follows. How are psych-adjectives such as *happy* in German and Japanese semantically

structured and syntactically distributed to point exactly to nondecomposable (broadly focused) *thetic* as opposed to decomposable (narrowly argument-focused) categorical sentence structures?

To achieve this, I will first discuss the relation between the semantics of the adjective and the mode of expression. Under the mode of expression I understand the way events and properties are expressed, namely syntactic means such as attribution, predication, and copula predication, on the one hand, and, on the other, predication types such as *thetic* and categorical judgments (where the latter can be either stage- or individual-level statements (Ladusaw 1994: 226)). The starting point is the difference in distribution of certain psych-adjectives both in German and in Japanese. Interesting semantic and distributional properties are observed: in attributive usage, adjectives can modify a wide range of nouns, whereas in predicative usage, they can co-occur with only a specific class of nouns. Furthermore, in predicative usage, the adjective is regarded as an individual-level-predicate, if the STIMULUS or OBJECT¹ of emotion functions as the subject or topic of the sentence. These phenomena can be explained as the result of interplay among the semantic structure of the adjective, the hierarchy of thematic roles, and the mode of expression.

Once this matter has been discussed in detail, I will turn to the distinct *thetic* and categorical structures. The conclusion will be that, as hypothesized, the attributive semantics without specific role assignment and the predicative semantics, especially with the OBJECT/THEME argument in subject/topic position, indeed echoes, in valence and focus structural terms, the distinction between *thetic* and categorical judgments and their linguistic forms.

The first part accordingly deals with the German adjectives for emotion *glücklich* (meaning *happy*) and *traurig* (meaning *sad*) and their Japanese correspondents *shiwase* and *kanashii*. They are adjectives with two arguments. One of them is the EXPERIENCER, and the other is the OBJECT of emotion.

- (1) Peter ist über sein-e Ehe glücklich.
 Peter be.3SG about his-F.ACC marriage happy
 ‘Peter is happy about his marriage.’

In this sentence, *Peter* refers to the EXPERIENCER and *seine Ehe* to the OBJECT of emotion.

1. Among psych-adjectives there are those which do not denote emotions evoked by an entity, but are directed to an entity such as in *auf etwas hungrig* (hungry for something). Discussions concerning the linking problem show furthermore that psychological processes are observed from different points of view. Therefore, I prefer the neutral term “OBJECT” to “STIMULUS” that focuses the effects of the entity on the EXPERIENCER.

- (2) Peter ist über d-as Ereignis traurig.
Peter be.3SG about DEF-N.ACC occasion sad
'Peter is sad about the event.'
- (3) Watashi wa kono kekkon de shiawase da.²
1SG TOP DEM marriage INS happy COP
'I am happy about this marriage.'²
- (4) Watashi wa sono dekgoto ga kanashii.
1SG TOP DEM occasion NOM sad
'I am sad about the event.'

Both in German and in Japanese, psych-adjectives appear in specific constructions. It is well known that linguistic expressions of psychological phenomena are often realized in ways that are syntactically different. Muroi (2016b: 162–164; 2020b: 221, 226) points out that there are five constructions in German and in Japanese respectively where psych-adjectives appear. As for German *glücklich* and *traurig*, the EXPERIENCER appears as the subject and the OBJECT appears in a prepositional phrase with the preposition *über*. As for Japanese adjectives, the EXPERIENCER consistently appears as the topic³ encoded with the particle *wa*. In the case of *shiawase*, the OBJECT is encoded instrumentally with the particle *de*, and in the case of *kanashii* nominatively with the particle *ga*.

I will present relevant data in Section 2. Section 3 is concerned with the characteristics of modes of expression (attribution, predication, and copula predication), followed by a detailed observation of the relations between the semantic structures and the predication types (thetic/categorical and individual-/stage-level distinctions). In Section 4, the discussion is summarized and some prospects are presented.

2. Data

2.1 Attributive usage

In attributive usage, the noun modified by an adjective can refer both to the EXPERIENCER, as in (5) and (6), and to the OBJECT, as in (7), (8), (9), and (10).

2. In Japanese, there are two types of adjectives. The first type, to which *kanashii* belongs, is capable of being a predicate without any copulative element. The second type, to which *shiawase* belongs, can constitute a predicate only with the copula *da*. (cf. also Muroi 2016a: 251–252).

3. In this paper, topic concerns nominal topic unless otherwise noted.

- (5) Peter ist ein glücklich-er/traurig-er Mann.
Peter be.3SG INDF.M.NOM happy-M.NOM/sad-M.NOM man
'Peter is a happy/sad man.'
- (6) Tarô wa shiawase-na/kanashii otoko da.
Tarô TOP happy-ADN/sad.ADN man COP (ADN = adnominal form)
'Tarô is a happy/sad man.'
- (7) Peter führ-t ein-e glücklich-e Ehe.
Peter lead-3SG INDF-F.ACC happy-F.ACC marriage
'Peter has a happy marriage.'
- (8) D-as ist ein-e traurig-e Nachricht.
DEM-N.NOM be.3SG INDF-F.NOM sad-F.NOM news
'That is sad news.'
- (9) Tarô wa shiawase-na kekkon o shi-teiru.
Tarô TOP happy-ADN marriage ACC do-PROG
'Tarô has a happy marriage.'
- (10) Sore wa kanashii shirase da.
DEM TOP sad.ADN news COP
'That is sad news.'

Furthermore, the noun can refer not only to the arguments of the adjectives, but also to such nouns as stand in an adverbial relation to the adjectives, for example, temporal or local nouns, as in (11)–(14):

- (11) Heute ist ein glücklich-er/traurig-er Tag.
today be.3SG INDF.M.NOM happy-M.NOM/sad-M.NOM day
'Today is a happy/sad day.'
- (12) Kyô wa shiawase-na/kanashii hi da.
today TOP happy-ADN/sad.ADN day COP
'Today is a happy/sad day.'
- (13) Dieses Land ist ein glücklich-es/traurig-es Land.
DEM land be.3SG INDF.N.NOM happy-N.NOM/sad-N.NOM land
'This land is a happy/sad land.'
- (14) Koko wa shiawase-na/kanashii kuni da.
here TOP happy-ADN/sad.ADN land COP
'This is a happy/sad land.'

2.2 Predicative usage

In predicative usage, the subject position in German and the topic position in Japanese are occupied primarily by an EXPERIENCER, and the other syntactic position governed by the adjective is occupied by an OBJECT, as in (1)–(4).

If the EXPERIENCER is not focused and remains in the background, the OBJECT occupies the subject position.

- (15) Peter-s Ehe ist glücklich.
Peter-GEN marriage be.3SG happy.
'Peter's marriage is happy.'
- (16) D-ie Nachricht ist traurig.
DEF-F.NOM news be.3SG sad
'The news is sad.'
- (17) [?]Watashi no kekkon wa shiawase da.
1SG GEN marriage TOP happy COP
'My marriage is happy.'
- (18) [?]Sono shirase wa kanashii.
DEM news TOP sad
'That news is sad.'

In the case of German *glücklich* and *traurig*, the OBJECT can occur in the subject position without any problem, as in (15) and (16). However, Japanese sentences with a topic in the semantic role OBJECT, as in (17) and (18), sound somewhat unnatural, though they are not entirely unacceptable. Sentence (18) is especially interesting. Japanese psych-adjectives of the first type have the characteristic that the selection of the topic position is restricted to the speaker (in an interrogative sentence to the hearer). Therefore (19) is treated as unacceptable. If one uses a Japanese psych-adjective of this type with an EXPERIENCER as topic referring to a person other than the speaker, an evidential marker must be added to it, as in (20) (Aoki 1986).

- (19) *Kare wa kanashii.
3SG.M TOP sad.
'He is sad.'
- (20) Kare wa kanashi-sô da.⁴
3SG.M TOP sad-outlook COP
'He seems to be sad.'⁴

4. The evidential marker *sô* derives a second type of adjective in combination with the stem of an adjective.

Although the topic in (18) is neither the speaker nor an EXPERIENCER, (18) is better than (19), which has a topic EXPERIENCER in the third person. The low acceptability of (18) cannot be reduced to the restriction of topic to the speaker. It remains to be investigated why an OBJECT as topic is more acceptable than an EXPERIENCER who is not the speaker. Nonargument elements, for example, temporal or local nouns, cannot appear in the subject position (in Japanese topic position). In the predicative usage of the adjectives discussed here, the German subject position and Japanese topic position are reserved exclusively for arguments. This can be shown with Examples (21)–(22).

(21) *D-er Tag ist glücklich/traurig.⁵
 DEF-M.NOM day be.3SG happy/sad.
 ‘The day is happy/sad.’

(22) *Sono hi wa shiawase da / kanashii.⁶
 DEM day TOP happy COP / sad
 ‘The day is happy/sad.’

3. Mode of expression and semantics

Generally speaking, in predicative usage, the relation between the adjective and the noun is more restricted in comparison with attributive usage. What the difference is based upon invites further inquiry.

In Muroi (2020a: 262–263), I suggest that the behavior of psych-adjectives observed above can be reduced to the predication force. The predication force should be understood as the degree to which a linguistic expression is definite with regard to agreement, tense, voice, and modus and to which the argument assignment is determined. Attribution associates the adjective with the noun, but in contrast to predication, the relation between the elements is not specified. In the present paper, I would like to discuss this hypothesis in more detail and to argue that the difference is due to the semantics associated with the respective syntactic structure and to the correspondence of semantic structure to the type of judgment.

5. In case of temporal modifications, in Sommerfeldt/Schreiber (1974: 407), *traurig* with temporal modifications appears only in attributive usage. In the entry of *glücklich*, there is no mention of temporal modification.

6. If an EXPERIENCER is contextually premised and the topic is understood as adverbial, then (22) is acceptable.

3.1 Contradiction with polysemy theory

My hypothesis presupposes that the adjectives treated here are monosemous in all constructions. It seems to be possible to explain this behavior without postulating monosemy. One could assume that the adjectives treated here are polysemous. The four adjectives have three readings: In one reading, they refer to the mental state of the EXPERIENCER. In another reading, they refer to a property of the OBJECT that evokes a certain human mental state. And the last reading is concerned with circumstances associated with emotion. But this theory faces a severe problem. If the adjective has these three readings, it is difficult to explain the restrictions observed in predicative usage. Ad hoc rules must be developed, and they have to be able to explain why adverbial modifications are allowed only in attributive usage and omitted in predicative usage. However, such rules seem to be impossible to postulate.

A variant of this theory could be developed in accordance to Pesetsky's zero morpheme approach to English psych-verbs (Pesetsky 1995). In the case of the OBJECT role as attributed noun or subject noun, a causative morpheme without sound form is supposed. Yet this theory is also difficult to maintain. Firstly, it is hard to assume a causative adjective. Causation is a kind of accomplishment in which the causer effects a change of state in the causee. This type of process is expressed typically by verbs, and neither in German nor in Japanese is there an adjective with causative semantics. Secondly, this theory fails to explain the third reading, because temporality or locality cannot accommodate the arguments of the adjectives examined here. As discussed in the following sections, the distributions must be considered in relation to semantics and the thematic/categorical distinction. A monosemous theory therefore has two tasks: (1) a derivation process of semantic structures must be developed, and (2) the relation of the syntactic and semantic structures to the thematic and categorical statements must be explained.

3.2 Attribution and predication

Unspecified relations between adjectives and nouns can be also observed with regard to other adjectives. For example, the German adjective *lecker* and Japanese *oishii* mean that something has a good taste. They belong to psych-adjectives in a broader sense, but denote the property of the OBJECT. Unlike *glücklich* and *traurig*, *lecker* has an OBJECT in the subject position. As for Japanese *oishii*, the topic position is occupied by the OBJECT if there is only one argument realized in the sentence without any specific context (Muroi 2020b: 226-227). These adjectives properly refer to food and drink. But as in (23) to (26), they can characterize restaurants and other eating places, local determinations that do not have the status of an argument of the adjectives.

- (23) Kenn-st du hier ein lecker-es Restaurant?
 know-2SG 2SG here IND.N.ACC delicious-N.ACC restaurant
 'Do you know a delicious restaurant here?'
- (24) Chikaku ni oishii resutoran o shi-tteru?
 near LOC delicious.ADN restaurant ACC know-PROG
 'Do you know a delicious restaurant nearby?'
- (25) D-as Restaurant ist lecker.⁷
 DEF-N.NOM restaurant be.3SG delicious
 'The restaurant is delicious.'
- (26) Kono resutoran wa oishii.
 DEM restaurant TOP delicious.
 'This restaurant is delicious.'

One could suppose that the local determinations here are used metonymically and the eating place in this case stands for the foods served there. But that is not the case, because the verbal expression with the same meaning is unacceptable, either in attributive usage, as in (27), or in predicative usage, as in (28).

- (27) *Kenn-st du hier ein gut schmecken-d-es Restaurant?
 know 2SG here INDEF.N.ACC good taste-PRS.PART-N.ACC restaurant
 'Do you know a good-tasting restaurant here?'
- (28) *D-as Restaurant schmeck-t gut.
 DEF-N.NOM restaurant taste-3SG good
 'The restaurant tastes good.'

The structural nonspecificity of adjectives observed here cannot be explained either solely semantically or syntactically. It is a specific phenomenon of adjectives and must be investigated in relation to the difference in mode of expression (attribution/predication, *thetics/categoricals*) and the characteristics of the adjective or copula.

In Japanese, there is no verbal expression that refers to the sense of taste. But a phenomenon which reveals that attribution allows flexible relations between adjective and noun and that the verbal expression underlies stricter restrictions than the adjectival one can be recognized. I take a psych-adjective of the second type, *suki*, and its verbal correspondent, *suku*.

- (29) Tarô ga suki-na Hanako
 Tarô NOM dear-ADN Hanako
 'Hanako who likes Tarô' or 'Hanako whom Tarô likes'

7. According to my German informant, sentence (25) is often heard, but it sounds incorrect to her.

This nominal phrase modified by an adjective is ambiguous. It means either that Tarô likes Hanako or that Hanako likes Tarô. To avoid this ambiguity, one can use the accusative marker *o*.

- (30) Tarô *o* suki-na Hanako⁸
 Tarô ACC dear-ADN Hanako
 ‘Hanako who likes Tarô’

It is curious that the accusative marker is used in combination with an adjective. In predicative usage, the accusative marker cannot appear in principle.

- (31) Tarô wa Hanako ga suki da.
 Tarô TOP Hanako NOM dear COP
 ‘Tarô likes Hanako.’ Or, in certain contexts, ‘Hanako likes Tarô.’
- (32) *Tarô wa Hanako *o* suki da.
 Tarô TOP Hanako ACC dear COP

Sentence (31) is ambiguous, but only in a restricted sense. In a normal context with unmarked prosody, *Tarô* is the EXPERIENCER and *Hanako* the OBJECT. In this case, the accusative marker cannot appear instead of the nominative marker *ga*, as in (32). On the other hand, in the context where there is common knowledge that someone likes Tarô, but it is not known who it is, one can ask, for example, as in (33).

- (33) Dare ga Tarô *o* suki desu ka?
 who NOM Tarô ACC dear COP.POL Q (POL = polite form)
 ‘Who likes Tarô?’

For disambiguation, the accusative marker *o* is used also in predicative usage. (31) can be used as an answer to this question. In this context, the role assignment is changed: *Tarô* is the topic, though its semantic role is the OBJECT, and *Hanako* takes on the EXPERIENCER role. In an unmarked context, the topic is assigned to the EXPERIENCER, the higher argument in the thematic role hierarchy. In a marked context, the topic can be an OBJECT by contextual force. The role of arguments is determined in the question asked in the previous context and the answer in (31) inherits this constellation. Therefore, it is not necessary to mark the OBJECT with the accusative marker *o*, which is properly incompatible with an adjective. To sum up, the adjective *suki* in predicative usage has a preferred argument assignment, but it can be changed.

The verb *suku* behaves differently. This verb, which is normally used in the progressive form, has a fixed argument assignment. The argument marked with *o* is always the OBJECT and the one marked with *ga* is always the EXPERIENCER.

8. This example is provided by Megumi Kawamori in a personal communication.

- (34) Tarô wa Hanako o sui-teiru.
 Tarô TOP Hanako ACC like-PROG
 ‘Tarô likes Hanako.’
- (35) Tarô wa Hanako ga sui-teiru.
 Tarô TOP Hanako NOM like-PROG
 ‘Hanako likes Tarô.’

The data presented here show differently strong constraints of linking. Attribution by an adjective is free from the linking rules in many cases that are valid for predication. Verbal constructions are subject to a strict linking rule: the EXPERIENCER role is assigned to the noun in the nominative and the OBJECT role to that in the accusative.

Predication by an adjective appears in the copula construction. The relation between adjective and noun is relatively loose in contrast to verbal constructions. It is subject to weak constraints: the subject position in German or the topic in Japanese is occupied by an argument, the EXPERIENCER or the OBJECT, while the EXPERIENCER is preferred, as in (15)–(18) and (31). But some other entities whose essential property is described by the adjective can be also predicated, as in (25) and (26).

These facts indicate that the adjectival copula construction has a different status from other verbal constructions.⁹ To search for what underlies this difference I will introduce another example of the predicative usage of psych-adjectives.

3.3 Types of predication

Now I will discuss predicative usage in relation to predication types. If the subject or the topic of the adjectives concerned here refers to a person, namely the EXPERIENCER, the sentence can appear in all types of predication. It can be eitherthetic or categorical. Whereas thetic sentences are not further classified and cannot be individual-level statements by definition, there are two types of categorical sentence, those that are stage-level and those that are individual-level predications (cf. Ladusaw 1994).

The OBJECT can occur as the subject or as the topic, as in (15)–(18), although the corresponding sentences sound a little unnatural in Japanese.

- (15) Peters Ehe ist glücklich.
 (16) Die Nachricht ist traurig.

9. Maienborn (2003) ascribes a specific semantic status to copula sentences.

- (17) [?]Watashi no kekkon wa shiawase da.
 1SG GEN marriage TOP happy COP
 ‘My marriage is happy.’
- (18) [?]Sono shirase wa kanashii.
 DEM news TOP sad
 ‘That news is sad.’

It is interesting to observe that the sentences with an OBJECT as the subject or the topic express a permanent property of the OBJECT. Namely, they are categorical and individual-level predications. According to Kratzer (1995), a stage-level predicate governs an event argument, while an individual-level predicate does not. This difference appears in the different behavior concerning the spatiotemporal adjuncts. A stage-level predicate localizes the event in a spatiotemporal space, and local or temporal adverbials can therefore co-occur with it. Without an event argument, an individual-level predicate does not accompany any such adverbials. The circumstances can be shown with Examples (36)–(39).

- (36) *Peter-s Ehe ist heute glücklich.
 Peter-GEN marriage be.3SG today happy.
 ‘Peter’s marriage is happy today.’
- (37) *Watashi no kekkon wa kyô shiawase da.
 1SG GEN marriage TOP today happy COP
 ‘My marriage is happy today.’
- (38) *Peter-s Ehe ist im Büro glücklich.
 Peter-GEN marriage be.3SG in.DEF.N.DAT office happy
 ‘Peter’s marriage is happy in the office.’
- (39) *Watashi no kekkon wa kaisha de shiawase da.
 1SG GEN marriage TOP office LOC happy COP
 ‘My marriage is happy in the office.’

In Muroi (2020a: 258–259) I observe that the individual-level of the predication with an OBJECT as the subject has a different semantics. Now I would like to assume that it can be explained by a reorganization of the semantic structure under the weak predication force.

The semantic structure of *glücklich* looks like (40). It has three arguments, one for the EXPERIENCER, one for the OBJECT, and one for the EVENT.

- (40) $\lambda y \lambda x \lambda e$ [*glücklich*(e) & EXP(e, x) & OBJ (e, y)]¹⁰

10. This format of notation is adapted from Maienborn (2011).

A structure in which the subject is occupied by the OBJECT has no place for the EXPERIENCER. This is demonstrated by the following examples:

(41) Die Ehe ist *ihm / ?für ihn glücklich.
 DET marriage be.3SG 3SG.M.DAT / for 3.SG.M.ACC happy
 ‘The marriage is happy for him.’

(42) Die Nachricht ist *ihm / ?für ihn traurig.
 DET news be.3SG 3SG.M.DAT / for 3SG.M.ACC sad
 ‘The news is sad for him.’

In case of psych-adjectives that properly have an OBJECT as the subject, for example, *angenehm* (comfortable), the EXPERIENCER appears in the dative. The dative is the proper case for the EXPERIENCER in German (Wegener 1985). But in (41) and (42) the dative form is excluded, and even if the EXPERIENCER stands in an oblique case, the sentences sound unnatural. Here the EXPERIENCER is not an argument of the adjective, but lies outside of its argument structure. *Glücklich* and *traurig* with the subject in the OBJECT role are not concerned with the person in whom the emotion arises. Furthermore, it is assumed that these adjectives are no longer regarded as psych-adjectives, but that they refer to properties of the OBJECT that are independent of any other entities. If that is so, the adjectives can no longer be used in athetic sentence or as the stage-level predicate in a categorical sentence, but are restructured to an individual-level predicate. Because the structure of an individual-level predicate has no event argument, it can be assumed that the semantic structure (40) is reorganized to (43) by the suppression of the EXPERIENCER argument and the deletion of the EVENT argument.

(43) λy [glücklich (y) & OBJ(y)]

Muroi (2020a: 259) argued, following Kageyama (2009), that the individual-level predication observed above is an effect of the flatness of the semantic structure. Here I would like to present a supporting argument.

3.4 Reorganization of the semantic structure

There are verbal constructions that are relevant for our inquiry. They are constructions which contain a transitive verb whose internal argument occurs as the subject. Because they no longer have transitivity, I call them detransitive constructions. The relevant detransitive constructions are the *sein zu* infinitive construction in German¹¹ and the possibility construction in Japanese. It is characteristic of these

11. Muroi (forthcoming a) discusses also the *sich lassen* infinitive construction as in *das Problem lässt sich lösen* in this regard. However, I do not treat this in the present paper, which is primarily concerned with copulative constructions.

constructions that the subject/topic position is occupied by the THEME argument. A further common property of these constructions is that they have a modal sense and are an individual-level predication (Muroi forthcoming a). (44) is an example of a transitive construction, shown here with its semantic structure.

- (44) Peter lös-t d-as Problem.
 Peter solve-3SG DEF-N.ACC problem
 ‘Peter solves the problem.’
 $\lambda e \lambda x \lambda y$ [lösen(e) & AGENT(e, x) & THEME(e, y)]

The *sein zu* infinitive construction is a derivation that develops from loss of transitivity. In this construction, the AGENT cannot appear (Holl 2001: 227), which shows that the semantics of this construction does not contain an AGENT argument, but only a single argument THEME. It does not denote an intra-subjective ability, but rather extra-subjective circumstances that enable a corresponding action (Muroi forthcoming a). The derived predicate therefore obtains modality.¹²

- (45) D-as Problem ist zu lösen.
 DEF-N.NOM problem be.3SG to solve.INF
 ‘The problem can/must be solved.’
 λy [zu lösen(y) & THEME(y)]

(45) denotes the property of the *Problem* that it can be solved or it raises the general requirement to be solved. It can be supposed that the suppression of the AGENT argument reorganizes the transitive predicate to a single argument predicate independent of particular activities, which brings about the deletion of the EVENT argument. Because the modal character can be reduced to the combination of the infinitive with the particle *zu* (Holl 2001), *zu lösen* in (45) stands for the predicate representing the property of the THEME from which the modality arises.

The same analysis can be applied to the Japanese possibility construction, which is composed of a transitive verb and the auxiliary *-reru/-rareru* or morphologically of the stem of a transitive verb and the suffix *-eru*.

- (46) Sono mondai wa tok-eru.
 DEM problem TOP solve-POSSIBILITY
 ‘The problem can be solved.’
 λy [tokeru(y) & THEME(y)]

Japanese *toku* (solve) is transitive and *tokeru* in (46) can be treated as the derived intransitive form¹³ of *toku* that has a modal reading of possibility. In this reading,

12. As for the relation between the property and the modality, cf. also Leiss (2002: 89).

13. *Toku* and *tokeru* are often treated as two lexemes that constitute a transitive/intransitive pair.

the only argument is the THEME and the predicate denotes the property of the THEME that it can be solved.¹⁴

The parallelism of these constructions to psych-adjectives is obvious. In the case of two arguments located differently in the thematic role hierarchy, it is the rule that the higher-located argument occupies the subject position. If the lower-located argument appears as the subject and the higher-located argument appears in an oblique case, it would be a violation of the rule. Therefore, the higher-located argument cannot appear in an argument position. Namely, the higher-located argument fades into the background and only the lower-located argument is focused on. Then it is natural for a copula construction with a focused entity to be interpreted as a description of this entity.

This effect is not observed in the case of passivation. In the passive, the fact is seen from the viewpoint of the affected participant, but the semantic structure of the predicate is not affected. It is assumed that due to the principle of contrast, other raising constructions are subjected to a reorganization of the semantic structure. Thus, a general hypothesis is to be made: There is a tendency for a predicate with multiple thematic positions to become an individual-level predicate if the subject position is occupied by a lower argument.

3.5 Implications for the thetic-categorical discussion

As observed in 3.2, attribution allows diverse semantic relations between the noun and the adjective. The modified noun can be a person as the EXPERIENCER, an entity as the OBJECT of the emotion, or a temporal or local modification where the emotion takes place. The relations here are differentiated neither semantically nor syntactically. It can be assumed that they are interpreted rather pragmatically. The noun and the adjective are put together without any rules that specify the semantic relation between them. The phrase is treated as a unity, and the thematic relation is imposed on it by a hermeneutical process. The attributive combination of the adjective and the noun is semantically unspecified, and, therefore, its structure is

14. Contrary to the German detransitive construction, the Japanese possibility construction has a reading with the AGENT as in:

Watashi ni wa sono mondai ga tok-eru.
 1SG DAT TOP DEM problem NOM solve-POSSIBILITY
 'For me, it is possible to solve the problem.'

As to this difference, it should be pointed out that in this case, the topic-particle *wa* indicates a contrast ("not for others, but for me"). Furthermore, it could have to do with the characteristics of the Japanese passive, which is not an exact correspondence of the passive in European languages.

not configurational. I propose a schematic representation of the structure of attribution as in (46), where a stands for an adjective and underlining means that the thematic role is not specified and is linked pragmatically.

$$(47) \lambda x [a(x) \ \& \ \underline{\quad}(x)]^{15}$$

Attribution in (47) has a structural character in common with the thetic judgment, because its components are juxtaposed simply and none is distinguished from another. The structure of a thetic judgment is characterized by a single assertion, which implies that the subject does not have any special status compared to the other arguments. I propose the structure of single argument predicates in a thetic judgement schematically as follows:

$$(48) \lambda x \lambda e [p(e) \ \& \ A(e, x)]^{16} \text{ (} p \text{ stands for a predicate and } A \text{ for a thematic role)}$$

In (48), all components stand in juxtaposition, and the subject x is not more salient than the other components.

In opposition to this, a categorical judgment provides a double judgment and is therefore divided into two structural components. The first component postulates the existence of the entity on which a judgment is made by the second component (cf. Sasse 1987: 512). For categorical judgments, a two-part architecture is supposed that consists of the first component corresponding to the existential postulating of the entity and of the second component corresponding to the predication. Furthermore, categorical judgments can be realized in two types, in stage-level sentences with the EVENT argument, as shown in (49), and in individual-level sentences characterized by its absence, as in (50).

$$(49) \lambda e \lambda x [[A(e, x)] \ \& \ [p(e)]]^{17}$$

$$(50) \lambda x [[A(x)] \ \& \ [p(x)]]^{18}$$

The extraposition of the subject x in the structures represents extensional postulating and the second component represents the predication.

15. Because attribution does not exclude temporal or local modifications, for example, *der heute glückliche Mann* (“the today happy man”), the structure with the EVENT argument is possible. It looks like (47) $\lambda x \lambda e [a(e) \ \& \ \underline{\quad}(e, x)]$.

16. The structure of predicates with two arguments looks like this: $\lambda y \lambda x \lambda e [p(e) \ \& \ A_1(e, x) \ \& \ A_2(e, y)]$ The structure of thetic judgments without the EVENT argument looks like this: $\lambda x [p(x) \ \& \ A(x)]$, and for the structure with two arguments: $\lambda y \lambda x \lambda e [p(x, y) \ \& \ A_1(x) \ \& \ A_2(y)]$.

17. The structure with two arguments: $\lambda y \lambda e \lambda x [[A_1(e, x)] \ \& \ [p(e) \ \& \ A_2(e, y)]]$

18. The structure with two arguments: $\lambda y \lambda x [[A_1(x)] \ \& \ [p(x, y) \ \& \ A_2(y)]]$

Attribution is characterized by structural flatness, in which no component is more salient than the others, which is the common structural characteristic with athetic judgment. By contrast, predication can be used to express either athetic judgment or a categorical judgment. Which judgment is made depends upon the textual disposition that is reflected in the selection of the article (Ladusaw 1994: 225) and, especially for Japanese, the selection of the postpositional particle between *wa* (the topic marker for thetics) and *ga* (the nominative marker for categoricals) is decisive (Kuroda 1972: 161). Sasse (1987: 527–529) confirms the relevance of prosody and argues that in German thetic sentences, only the subject is accented, while in categorical sentences, the subject and one element of the predicate are accented. The single prominence in thetic judgments indicates that the focus lies broadly on the entire structure and the double prominence in categorical judgments shows that each component is focused narrowly, which corresponds to the structural unity of the thetics, as in (47), and the duality of the categoricals, as in (49) and (50).

The duality of the categoricals, especially of the individual-level predicates correlates with the definiteness of the subject and the topic. The copula predication of a psych-adjective with an OBJECT as the subject in German and as the topic in Japanese and detransitive constructions have a specific status. As discussed in 3.3 and 3.4, they are used independently of temporal and local circumstances. Those who may feel the emotion or accomplish the process are regarded as irrelevant and do not appear in the semantic structure. In contrast to the unmarked usage of the adjective or the verb, this structure has no more than a predicate and an argument. Furthermore, it is specific to this kind of predication that its semantic structure has no EVENT argument. This kind of predication is suitable to express the permanent property of the OBJECT or the THEME. If a permanent property is referred to, the bearer of it is presupposed and must be determined in advance, because to confirm the permanence of the property, the identity of the bearer must be retained throughout time and place. This condition demands a structure with a double component of the type in (50), namely that of a categorical judgment, as its linguistic correspondence. There is indeed empirical evidence for this. Muroi (2020a: 256) notes that the subject in the predication concerned is contextually profiled and definite in principle. Definiteness of the subject is an indication of individual-level predication, which belongs to categorical judgment (Ladusaw 1994: 221). In Japanese, the OBJECT or the THEME appears as the topic marked by *wa*. The topic is the element that is referred to in the preceding context and therefore indicates a categorical judgment (Kuroda 1972: 161–164).

As to the attribution and the predication with the OBJECT/THEME as the subject/topic, the semantic structure and the mode of expression correlate closely with each other. They have a simple structure, which consists of merely an adjective and an argument. Thethetic characteristics and the nonspecificity of the attribution

are based on its semantics, as shown in (47), which associates with the nonconfigurational property of attributive constructions. Formulated in focus semantic terms, the semantic architecture determines that the focus lies broadly on the entire structure. By contrast, the categorical characteristics of the predication concerned are an effect of the semantic structure derived by the occupation of the subject/topic position by the OBJECT argument accompanied by the suppression of the EXPERIENCER or the AGENT. This construction is the minimal categorical and individual-level sentence, composed of the only argument in the sentence and a predicate. In this case, the role OBJECT or the THEME is assigned to the subject/topic noun, as in (43), (45), and (46), but its status is radically changed because it loses its relation to any concrete EXPERIENCER or AGENT. The predicate corresponds no more to an emotion of the EXPERIENCER or an activity of the AGENT, but the internal property of the OBJECT that evokes the emotion or of the THEME that enables the activity that is focused on. Focus semantically, a narrow focus is laid on each component according to the semantic architecture. Both in the attribution and in the predication concerned, the mode of expression, i.e.thetic or categorical (and the individual-level), is determined by the semantic framework that corresponds to the simplicity of their syntactic forms, whereas in unmarked predication the mode of expression is determined mostly by textual conditions.

4. Summary and prospects

Specific semantic architectures are linked with specific modes of expression. The attributive psych-adjectives have the semantic structure shown in (47), with a broad focus on the entire structure, which corresponds to thethetic judgment. This linking is self-evident because the semantic, syntactic, and judgment structure are isomorphic with each other.

By contrast, the predicative psych-adjectives with the OBJECT in subject position in German and in topic position in Japanese have the semantic structure shown in (50), with a narrow focus on each component, which corresponds to the double judgment of categoricals. Furthermore, the absence of the EVENT argument makes this predicate individual-level. For this linking to be possible, the rule that the subject position is occupied by the higher-located argument in the thematic role hierarchy must be invalidated. In the copulative predication, the exclusion of the EXPERIENCER from the semantic structure is allowed, whereas in verbal predications this is not the case. This different behavior can be explained by the predication force. In opposition to verbal predications whose force is so strong that any restructuring is not possible, the force of copula predication is not particularly strong, so the argument structure can be changed.

In this paper I have only been able to make a rudimentary proposal for explaining the relation between the weak predication of the copula construction and the change of semantic structure. However, the parallelism in German and Japanese suggests that the effects of mode of expression may have a universal character. A more detailed discussion is to be reserved for further investigations.

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Unaccusativity and theticity

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This chapter examines theticity in intransitive sentences. Starting with the assumption that the function of a thetic sentence is to introduce a referent into a discourse (without predicating anything of it), two requirements are proposed to characterize thetic intransitives: (A) the sole argument of the sentence must be vP-internal; and (B) the sole argument must be interpreted as a property. Both requirements have precedents in previous work: (A) incorporates Guéron's (1980) observations on what she called the Presentation LF; and (B) builds on McNally's (1998a) work on the semantics and discourse function of existential sentences. These requirements show that theticity cannot be explained by lexical verb or verb class; what matters for theticity is syntactic structure and semantic interpretation. It is then shown that the thetic/categorical distinction cuts across a commonly-accepted distinction in intransitive sentences, the unergative-unaccusative distinction. Specifically, only a subtype of unaccusative sentence, those with the "existential unaccusative" structure (Irwin 2018a), satisfies (A) and (B). By contrast, change-of-state unaccusatives pattern with unergative sentences in not being thetic.

Keywords: thetic sentences, intransitive predicates, argument structure, unaccusative, unergative, presentational sentences

1. Introduction

This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of the thetic/categorical distinction in the domain of intransitive sentences, with special attention to theticity. After a brief introduction to the notions of thetic and categorical, this chapter will focus on intransitive sentences and the notion of theticity. Starting with the assumption that the function of a thetic sentence is to introduce a discourse referent into a discourse, without predicating anything of the referent, two structural requirements are proposed to characterize thetic intransitives. These proposed requirements capture the observation that theticity cannot be explained by lexical

verb or verb class. Using diagnostics such as *there*-insertion and PP extraposition, it is shown that the *thetic/categorical* distinction cuts across a commonly-accepted distinction in intransitive sentences, the *unergative-unaccusative* distinction, such that only sentences whose *vP* is a subtype of *unaccusative* – the *existential unaccusative* structure (Irwin 2018a) – should be considered *thetic*.

1.1 Background

Although the *thetic/categorical* distinction goes back to the nineteenth century philosophers Franz Brentano and Anton Marty, Kuroda (1972) and Kuno (1972) are credited with bringing this distinction into modern-day linguistics. Work on the *thetic/categorical* distinction reminds readers that the terms *thetic* and *categorical*, strictly speaking, refer not to particular sentence forms or sentence types, but to “judgment” types in the mind of a listener (Kuroda 1972: 154).¹ In this way, sentences are not themselves *thetic* or *categorical*; a sentence uttered by a speaker can only form the basis for a *thetic* or *categorical* judgment in the mind of the hearer.

A *categorical* judgment is said to involve a “double judgment”: the act of recognizing the the subject, and “the act of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject” (Kuroda 1972: 154). This notion is analogous to familiar concepts like *topic-comment*, *subject-predicate*, and *theme-rheme*, and such asymmetries within the clause have been much-discussed. In Kuroda and Kuno’s work on the *thetic/categorical* distinction in Japanese, sentences with the “*topic-marker*” *-wa* are prototypically *categorical*.²

A *thetic* sentence, in Kuroda’s words, involves a “simple” or “single” judgment; a *thetic* sentence “represents simply the recognition or rejection of material of a judgment” (Kuroda 1972: 154; also quoted in Ladusaw 1994). Building on his earlier work, Kuno refers to *thetic* sentences as “neutral description” sentences; these sentences have *-ga* as their subject marker in Japanese (though sentences with *-ga*-marked subjects can also have an “exhaustive listing” interpretation) (Kuno 1972: 270). In Jäger’s (2001) analysis, a *thetic* sentence “reports a scene or an event, and the referent of the subject NP might be entirely novel in the discourse” (Jäger, 2001: 105).

Characterizing the *thetic* judgment has been more challenging, perhaps because it is less easily assimilated into familiar notions like *topic-comment* or *subject-predicate*. Work on *theticity* since Kuno and Kuroda has sometimes focused

1. Though Anton Marty, Brentano’s student extended the notion to sentence types and “grammatical theory”; see discussion in Kuroda (1972: 154).

2. Sentences with *-wa*-marked subjects have other interpretations too, such as a *contrastive* interpretation (Kuno 1972: 270)

on the status of what the topic of a thetic sentence might be. Some have claimed that thetic sentences are “topicless” (Büring 2011), while others have claimed that the topic of a thetic sentence is the current situation Krifka (2007: 43) or a “here and now” topic (for ideas along similar lines, see Jäger 2001 and Erteschik-Shir 2007, among others). Theticity has also been associated with subject-accented intransitive sentences in languages like English (Sasse 1987; Lambrecht 1994; Zubizarreta and Nava 2011).

Lambrecht (1994) observes that Kuno’s examples of thetic sentences – those marked by *-ga* – are typically intransitive, and in Lambrecht’s words, “presentational”: “containing predicates indicating the existence or coming into existence of some referent, or the appearance of a referent in the external or internal world of the discourse” Lambrecht (1994: 143). Lambrecht contrasts this type of sentence – those that present an entity – with sentences that present an event. As Lambrecht notes, the distinction between entity-introducing (which he terms “presentational”) and “event-reporting” thetic sentences goes back at least to Sasse (1987).

With this brief background in mind, we now turn to the current contribution. Following others who have established the relevance of the thetic/categorical distinction to syntax and semantics (including Ladusaw 1994; Basílico 1998; McNally 1998b; Tomioka 2015, in addition to work already cited herein), I start with the assumption that sentences and utterances themselves can be categorized as thetic or categorical, rather than these terms applying only to judgments in the minds of a listener. This chapter proposes two structural requirements on the form of thetic intransitives: (A) the sole argument of the sentence must be vP-internal; and (B) the sole argument must be interpreted as a property. I will argue that requirements (A) and (B) show that theticity cannot be explained by lexical verb or verb class, but only by syntactic structure and semantic interpretation. The notion of theticity is then shown to cut across a commonly-accepted distinction in intransitive sentences, the unergative-unaccusative distinction. Specifically, only a subtype of unaccusative sentence, those with the “existential unaccusative” structure (Irwin 2018a) – as in predicates like *arrive*, *walk in*, etc. – satisfies both (A) and (B). By contrast, change-of-state unaccusatives (e.g., *break*, *freeze*) pattern with unergative sentences in not being thetic.

The argument that only the existential unaccusative subtype of intransitives should be considered thetic rests on the assumption that the primary function of a thetic sentence is to present a new entity into the discourse. In other words, the discussion of thetic intransitives is confined in this chapter to just those that Lambrecht terms “presentational” – referent-introducing sentences. This function of thetic sentences is assumed by Abraham (this volume), who refers to thetic sentences as “presentative,” and others such as McNally (1998a), who draws on Krifka et al. (1995) in hypothesizing that a predicate must be “presentational” in

order to form a thetic sentence (McNally 1998a: 293). At the end of the chapter, I discuss the possibility that if event-reporting sentences are considered a subtype of thetic sentence (Sasse 1987; Lambrecht 1994), then unergative and change-of-state sentences may fall into this category.

1.2 Proposal: Two requirements for intransitive thetic sentences

Are all intransitive sentences thetic? When we look for a sentence form that might correlate with theticity, one reasonable candidate is intransitive sentences, sentences with a single DP argument. As Lambrecht observes, prototypical thetic sentences in the early literature are all intransitive, with 1-argument predicates such as *arrive* (Lambrecht 1994: 143). Without making further distinctions among intransitive predicates, the hypothesis that all 1-argument sentences can be thetic predicts that all of the sentences in (1)–(2) have the same status as being the basis for a thetic judgment. These sentences all have indefinite subjects, since this is a way for us to judge the extent to which each sentence can be considered presentational, in the referent-introducing sense discussed above:

- (1) a. A vase broke.
b. A vase arrived.
- (2) a. A princess danced beautifully.
b. A princess danced in.

The primary goal of this chapter is to show that not all sentences with 1-argument predicates should be considered thetic and to explain why this is. The following sections provide diagnostics showing that only the (b) examples in (1)–(2) should be considered thetic. These arguments include discourse coherence judgments (discussed only briefly here), the availability of *there*-insertion, and the availability of PP-extraposition. These data show us that there are two requirements for sentence-level theticity, given in (3):

- (3) Intransitive thetic sentences: Requirements
 - A. the sole argument of the sentence must be vP-internal in its origin;
 - B. the sole argument must be interpreted as a property (rather than an individual) and serve as the argument to the predicate *INSTANTIATE*.

The two requirements in (3) have precedents in previous work, such as Guéron (1980); McNally (1998a), and Abraham (this volume), but they have not been brought together in this way before. With these hypothesized requirements in mind, I will show that although the sentences in (1) are prototypical unaccusatives and therefore satisfy (A), only (1b) and (2b) satisfy both requirements (A) and (B).

One diagnostic that we will discuss only briefly here is that of discourse coherence. As discussed in Irwin (2018a) and the experimental findings in Irwin (2018b), many speakers find a contrast between the (a) and (b) examples in (1) and (2) such that the (b) examples sound more natural in “presenting” the indefinite subject and establishing a discourse referent for further discussion. Such presentation is diagnosed by subsequent anaphoric reference to the subject. The judgment that the (a) examples of (1) and (2) are in some sense presentational is shown in the discourse coherence judgments shown below in (4) (with *arrive*) and (5) (with *dance in*):

- (4) A vase arrived....
 ✓ It was made of cut glass.
- (5) A princess danced in....
 ✓ She was wearing an auburn gown.

It will be argued here that sentences like (4) and (5) satisfy both (A) and (B); these are both analyzed as having the existential unaccusative vP structure.

By contrast, subsequent reference to the individual referent of the subject of a change-of-state unaccusative (e.g., *break*) and unergative (e.g., *dance*) sounds degraded, as shown in the discourse coherence judgments in (6) and (7).³

- (6) A vase broke....
 a. ^{??}It was made of cut glass. (*it* refers to individual)
 b. ✓ It made a loud sound. (*it* refers to event)
- (7) A princess danced beautifully....
 a. ^{??}She was wearing an auburn gown. (*it* refers to individual)
 b. ✓ It was a gorgeous sight. (*it* refers to event)

It will be argued that the vPs in sentences like (6) and (7) do not satisfy both (A) and (B). This is so even though, as an unaccusative vP, (6) satisfies (A).

The discourse coherence contrasts above are subtle and require more discussion, so we will set them aside here (for more discussion, see Irwin 2018a and Irwin 2018b). But these contrasts lead to a secondary point concerning the types of intransitive sentences that can be thematic. In discussions of the types of verbs that can function as existential or presentational, it has been shown that it is not possible to predict which verbs can serve this function.⁴ For example, Partee et al. (2011) state that “the verbs that may occur in existential sentences are an open class; some are independently characterizable as existential or perceptual, and others may

3. Another type of discourse referent that might be established by sentences like (6) and (7) is one that refers to the event. This is shown with *it* in the (b) examples of (6) and (7).

4. Birner (1995) makes this point, too, regarding the verbs that allow inversion.

undergo ‘semantic bleaching’” (Partee et al., 2011: 138). In a similar vein, but on an apparently different topic, Guéron notes that it is “not possible to state lexical constraints on PP Extraposition”, where the availability of PP extraposition diagnoses availability of the presentational LF that Guéron proposes (Guéron 1980: 663). The point that I would like to make is that we cannot diagnose predicates as thetic or categorial simply on the basis of verb meaning: vP structure is what matters. This point is suggested by (2), where the main verb is *dance* in both cases, but – as I will show – each sentence passes different diagnostics for vP-internal structure, and only one will be shown to be presentational in the relevant way. I will argue that what matters for theticity is whether a verbal root is interpretable in the vP structure called the existential unaccusative structure (Irwin 2018a).

This explanation is formulated in an approach to verbs and their arguments explicated in Marantz (2013). In this approach, which is couched in Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993) and the Minimalist Program, a “verb” is formed when a category-neutral root (e.g., $\sqrt{\text{dance}}$) combines with a category-determining functional head (e.g., v) (Marantz 1997). This set of assumptions means that any root can, in theory, occur in any argument structure, including the existential unaccusative structure that we will focus on here.⁵ As I will show, this framework is useful for understanding puzzles that involve “verbs” that pass different diagnostics concerning argument structure and unaccusativity. For convenience I will continue to use semantic terms like “change-of-state” (COS) to refer to categories of verbs/roots, though, as I discuss throughout, we cannot predict the syntactic structure that a root will occur in based on our intuitions about the type of event that the verb typically describes.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In §2, I discuss two kinds of unaccusative structures, corresponding to the contrast shown in (1). This example, with the existence-location verb *arrive* in (1b) and the the change-of-state verb *break* in (1a) exemplify a well-known semantic split in the class of unaccusatives. In line with previous work (Irwin 2012), I show that unaccusativity diagnostics reveal different syntactically unaccusative structures: a “simple” complement structure, associated with changes of state, and an existential unaccusative structure, associated with verbs like *arrive*, as well as predicates like *come in*, *walk in*, *dance in*, and so on. It will be argued that only the existential unaccusative structure satisfies both requirements (A) and (B), and that among intransitives, only existential unaccusatives are thetic.

The next section focuses on a diagnostic for presentational sentences discussed by Guéron (1980): PP extraposition from subject DPs. Here we will see a contrast

5. The fact that not all roots occur in all syntactic structures is an active area of research; see

between vPs that satisfy both requirements (A) and (B) of (3) versus those that satisfy only (A). Both change-of-state and existential unaccusative sentences satisfy requirement (A) of (3); but based on the PP extraposition facts, it will be shown that only the existential unaccusative structure satisfies both (A) and (B).

Having considered sentences that satisfy (A) but not (B), the chapter concludes by turning briefly to the types of sentences that might satisfy (B) but not (A). This section is more speculative, as it considers the possible syntactic and semantic constraints on the availability of *INSTANTIATE*, the predicate that can be seen as triggering the establishment of the new discourse referent that is “presented” in the sentence.

2. Two unaccusative structures

The phenomenon of unaccusativity has been analyzed from many different perspectives, and for this reason I would like to clarify the notion of unaccusativity that I assume here. The analysis here assumes a syntactic perspective on unaccusativity, one in which ‘unaccusative’ is a property of sentences, such that: (1) an external argument is not projected (Embick 2004: 138); and (2) the sentence has at least one vP-internal DP argument (see Irwin 2012 for some discussion). As Embick (2004) has pointed out, this definition of ‘unaccusative syntax’ means that passive sentences are unaccusative. The focus here, though, will be on unaccusative (non-passive) sentences. The structural definition also means that unaccusativity is not a property of verbs themselves. In other words, a verb itself cannot be unaccusative – only a vP (or, strictly speaking a VoiceP) can be unaccusative.

The next subsections describe two well-known classes of unaccusatives and the types of syntactic structures that are assumed for each class.

2.1 Change-of-state unaccusatives


The sentences in (1) illustrate two types of sentences that are standardly analyzed as unaccusative. These sentences are repeated below as (8):

- (8) a. A vase broke.
b. A vase arrived.

The verbs in these sentences – *break*, *arrive* – stand in for two well-known classes of unaccusative predicates, often referred to by meaning: change-of-state (COS) unaccusatives, as in (8a), and existence/motion unaccusatives, as in (8b). Irwin (2012) proposes that (8a) and (8b) have different vP-internal (unaccusative) structures,

and these differences explain why sentences with verbs from these two semantic classes pattern systematically differently with respect to unaccusativity diagnostics in English. The tree in (9) shows Irwin's (2012) "simple complement" vP structure, from which an intransitive COS sentence could be derived.

(9) Simple complement vP structure: *A vase broke*



Verbs like *break* that typically denote changes of state (e.g., *open, freeze, melt, clear*) often participate in the causative/inchoative alternation (10). In an inchoative sentence like (8a) and (10b), the theme is the subject; in the causative alternant like (10a), the theme is an object.

(10) Causative and inchoative sentences

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| a. John [broke the vase] | <i>causative</i> |
| b. The vase _i [broke <the vase _i >] | <i>inchoative</i> |

One approach to this alternation has focused on deriving either the causative from the inchoative or the inchoative from the causative, arguing that one of the structures is more "basic" (see references and discussion in Schäfer 2008). But recent work has converged on an analysis in which the vP is the same in both alternants – perhaps a vP like (9) – and the features of the Voice head selecting for the vP determines which alternant is derived (Alexiadou et al. 2006; Schäfer 2008; Alexiadou et al. 2015; Wood 2016).

On this family of analyses, the alternation turns on whether Voice requires an external argument or does not allow an external argument (or, in some versions, whether Voice is merged at all).⁶ This type of analysis explains the long-observed object-like properties of the subjects of inchoatives (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995) – e.g. *the vase* in (10). If Voice_{D} selects for the vP, an external argument is required, resulting in a sentence like (10a). If Voice_{} selects for the vP, no external argument is projected, and in English the object moves to a higher position for EPP, yielding a sentence like (10b).

6. The position of the root in causative/inchoative structures has been the topic of some discussion. On some versions of this analysis, the root modifies the direct object itself (Marantz 2005; Irwin 2012); on other analyses in this tradition, the root modifies *v* and the direct object is the complement of the root+little-*v* complex (Wood 2012, 2015), as shown in (9). The differences between these two analyses are not relevant to our purposes here.

Change-of-state intransitives pass the English unaccusativity diagnostic of resultative predication, as discussed in much detail in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995). In (11), the “resultative” *open* modifies the end state of the vase, whether *the vase* is an in-situ direct object (11a), or a subject (11b).

- (11) Resultatives on direct objects
- a. Mary broke the vase open.
 - b. The vase broke open.

An unaccusativity diagnostic that has been proposed for English that change-of-state predicates do *not* typically pass is *there*-insertion, as shown in (12) with *break* and *open*.

- (12) *there*-insertion with COS verbs
- a. *There broke a beautiful vase.
 - b. *There opened a bottle of wine just in time.

The fact that verbs like these pass some unaccusativity tests (like resultative modification) but not all unaccusativity tests (like *there*-insertion) at one point led people to question whether *there*-insertion really was an unaccusativity diagnostic. Others have pursued analyses in which different unaccusativity diagnostics can diagnose different types of unaccusativity, different syntactic ways of being unaccusative. This is the route taken by, for example, Alexiadou and Schäfer (2009) and Irwin (2012). The next section of the chapter explicates Irwin’s (2018a) “existential unaccusative” structure, a vP structure that allows *there*-insertion, does not allow for causative/inchoative alternation, and can form the basis for a thetic judgment. This analysis shows that what matters for forming a thetic sentence is not verb meaning but structure – specifically, what matters is whether a verbal root can occur in the existential unaccusative structure.


2.2 Existential unaccusatives

Irwin (2012, 2018a) proposes that the other well-known category of unaccusatives – those associated with motion and existence – have a more complex vP structure than the simple complement structure associated with COS unaccusatives. The examples in (13) show sentences that can have the existential unaccusative structure.

- (13) Existential unaccusative sentences
- a. A package arrived.
 - b. A princess waltzed in.
 - c. A little boy ran in.
 - d. A fancy lady walked up.

In contrast to the COS structure, in which the direct object is simply a complement to the verbal complex (i.e., the [v + root]), in unaccusative sentences like those in (13), the complement of the verbal complex is a small clause, implemented in (14) as a PredP. The denotation of the Pred head, discussed below, is an important part of Irwin's (2018a) analysis, since this denotation includes a key property of existential predicates.

- (14) Existential unaccusative vP: *A princess waltzed in.*



The denotation of Pred, given in (15), incorporates parts of the existential predicate from McCloskey's (2014) analysis of Irish existential sentences; for this reason, the Pred head is labeled Pred_{exist}. On the analysis in (15), the predicate INSTANTIATE is part of the denotation of Pred_{exist}; this predicate was first proposed by McNally (1992, 1997) as part of the core meaning of existential BE sentences, and it is a core part of McCloskey's (2014) analysis as well.

- (15) Denotation of the English existential predicate head Pred_{exist}
 (Irwin 2018a: 16, Example (33))
 $[\text{Pred}_{\text{exist}}] = \lambda P \lambda \text{LOC} \lambda e [\text{INSTANTIATE} (\lambda x [P(x) \ \& \ \text{LOC}(x, e)])]$

Informally put, INSTANTIATE is a predicate that asserts the existence of an entity that is described by a DP of property type (rather than of entity or quantifier type, for example). The formal details of the analysis are beyond the scope of this chapter, but what is important here is that INSTANTIATE requires a DP of property type as one of its arguments. The function returns an “instance” of that DP at the location given in the specifier of the PredP projection, PathP. The “location” – which may be implicit – is given the mnemonic variable name “LOC” in the formula in (15). This aspect of the analysis incorporates several lines of research that converge on the role of contextually-determined location in existential sentences (see Partee et al. 2011; Francez 2007, and McCloskey 2014 and references therein for discussion).

An informal paraphrase of *A princess waltzed in* on the existential unaccusative analysis in (14) is given in (16) – note that this paraphrase includes both the PathP specifier of Pred_{exist} in (14), as well as the denotation of the head Pred_{exist}:

- (16) The meaning of *A princess waltzed in*, informally paraphrased:
There's a waltzing event extending along the Path "in," in which a princess is a participant and which ends at a contextually-determined location with an instantiation of a princess.

Although the location LOC may be implicit (unpronounced), the Path to that location must be pronounced in existential unaccusatives. The path requirement is supported by the contrasts in (17):

- (17) Path to LOC must be lexicalized
- a. A princess waltzed.
 ⇒ 'a princess arrived here by waltzing'
 - b. A princess waltzed in.
 ⇒ 'a princess arrived here by waltzing'

Sentence (17a) cannot mean that the princess arrived on the scene at a contextually-determined location by waltzing; (17a) can only mean that there was a waltzing event and a princess was the agent of that event.

There are thus two relevant structural sub-types of unaccusative vP: the COS structure – the “simple complement structure,” where the the root+little-*v* complex take a DP complement, as in (9) – and the existential unaccusative structure, where the root+little-*v* complex take a small clause/PredP as its complement (Irwin 2012).

One argument for the structural difference between COS and existential unaccusative vPs is that COS vPs participate in the causative/inchoative alternation, as we saw in (10). Existential unaccusative vPs, by contrast, do not participate in the causative/inchoative alternation (18)–(19):

- (18) a. Some hippies arrived.
 b. *A van arrived some hippies.
- (19) a. A lady waltzed in.
 b. *A fancy cart waltzed in a lady.

Another diagnostic for distinguishing the two types of unaccusative vP structures in English is *there*-insertion. Unlike COS vPs, as we have seen (12), existential unaccusative vPs allow *there*-insertion (though some speakers judge them as sounding somewhat literary); this is shown in (20):

- (20) There darted into the room a little boy. (Levin 1993: 89)

Irwin (2018a) gives the following examples of *there*-insertion with existential unaccusative vPs (21):

- (21) a. There waltzed into the room a lady.
 b. There pulled up to the curb a cab.
 c. There came over to us a clown.

The availability of *there*-insertion with vPs like those in (21) has never been fully explained, but the analysis in Irwin (2018a) suggests that the availability of *there* is correlated semantically with contextually-determined location (LOC, in the current analysis), and correlated syntactically with Voice_{D} or Voice_{Expl}.⁷

It has long been observed that *there* BE sentences in English can serve the discourse function of establishing a new discourse referent. This discourse function forms a core part of McNally's (1992, 1997) analysis of English existentials. The predicate INSTANTIATE is what gets this work done. In other work on the establishment of discourse referents, McNally (1998a) describes the process as follows: "the introduction of new discourse referents is licensed not directly by an act of reference but rather indirectly via the existence entailments of the sentence containing the predicate" (McNally 1998a: 301).

Given that INSTANTIATE is responsible for the discourse referent-establishing properties of *there* BE sentences, and given that existential unaccusatives have INSTANTIATE as part of their meaning, we would expect that existential unaccusative sentences should serve this function as well. And note that this prediction holds regardless of whether the sentence is an overt *there*-insertion sentence like those in (21), or a sentence with canonical subject-verb word order as in (13) – both types of sentences have INSTANTIATE as part of their vP denotation, according to Irwin (2018a). The shared discourse function of existential unaccusatives with *there* BE sentences is argued for extensively in Irwin (2018a).⁸

7. See Kayne (2019) for compatible arguments that "expletive" *there* reduces to deictic *there*; on this analysis, *there* is merged DP-internally; see also Deal (2009) for a broad discussion of issues related to the merge position of *there* in *there*-insertion sentences; see Irwin (2018a) for relevant discussion of the syntactically-relevant contextual elements in sentences that allow *there*-insertion.

8. Although I call sentences like (13) "existential" unaccusative, they might also be called "presentational" or "presentative" unaccusative sentences. None of these terms is perfect. The use of the term "existential" might lead some to expect these unaccusatives to exhibit definiteness effects or be limited to readings that have been referred to as "existential" readings; "presentational" has the drawback that some authors use it to refer to sentences with a non-canonical word order. One of the reasons I avoid calling these unaccusatives "presentational unaccusatives" is because one of their most interesting properties is the fact that they maintain canonical word order and yet can function to "present" a discourse referent in subject position – contra the given-new contract (Clark and Haviland 1977). As Prince (1981) and Horn (1986) have observed, new information is strongly-disfavored in subject position in English.

I would like to emphasize at this point that the existential unaccusative analysis expands the class of English unaccusative “verbs” (vPs) that are associated with existence and motion. In English, the prototypical verbs in the existence/motion class are *arrive*, *come*, and a few others. On the analysis here, nearly any manner of motion verb in English can be part of an existence/motion vP (*dance in*, *bounce over*, *pull up*, *run in*, etc.). From this perspective, then, verbs like *arrive* are oddball members of this class since they have an incorporated Path morpheme – the Path morpheme in *arrive* (*a*) is always attached to the verbal root (see Moro 1997: 232 for discussion; see also Hoekstra and Mulder 1990). The more typical members of this class of unaccusatives are those with a motion verb and a (non-incorporated) particle.

2.3 Summary

One of the goals of this chapter is to show that the thetic-categorical distinction cuts across unaccusative vPs such that just existential unaccusative vPs – those analyzed in Irwin (2018a) as having INSTANTIATE as part of their denotation – should be considered thetic. Semantically, these vPs are associated with motion/existence, and syntactically they have a structure like that of (14).

By contrast, verbs that are associated with changes of state (*break*, *freeze*, *melt*) are not thetic – they occur in a different vP structure, one that does not have INSTANTIATE as part of its meaning.

One argument that I have made here for the asymmetry in the discourse function of unaccusative sentences with indefinite subjects is the availability of *there*-insertion for vPs with verbs that typically occur in the existential unaccusative structure. This argument is somewhat indirect and abstract, since it relies on the assumption that a shared part of structure and meaning will lead to a shared discourse function (“presentation”), where that discourse function is associated with theticity. In the next section, we consider a more concrete set of data involving PP extraposition that shows the proposed asymmetry in the discourse function of these two types of unaccusative vPs. This section will argue that in contrast to unergatives and change-of-state unaccusatives, only the existential unaccusatives are presentational with respect to their subjects; since presentation of an individual is seen as the hallmark of a thetic sentence, only the existential unaccusatives should be considered as the prototypical basis for thetic judgments based on intransitive sentences.

3. Intransitive sentences, presentation, and PP extraposition

3.1 PP extraposition: Existential unaccusatives vs. unergatives

In the course of exploring the syntax and semantics of English PP extraposition, Guéron (1980) draws a connection between sentences that allow subject PP extraposition and “presentational” sentences. In Guéron’s discussion, presentational sentences include *there* BE sentences like (22) and non-BE *there* sentences as in (23), called “presentational” *there* sentences in Aissen (1975) and “outside verbals” by Milsark (1974).

(22) There was a little boy (who ran in).

(23) There ran into the room a little boy.

Importantly, for existential unaccusativity and its relation tothetic sentences, Guéron also argues that sentences like (24) are presentational – and (24) is an example of a sentence that Irwin (2018a) claims to have the existential unaccusative structure.

(24) A little boy ran in.

Guéron (1980) proposes that these sentences are interpreted with what she calls the **Presentation LF**. The Presentation LF is contrasted with what Guéron refers to as the **Predication LF**. These LFs are shown in (25):

(25) Guéron (1980): Predication and Presentation LFs

a. Predication (_s (NP) (VP)) (Guéron’s (47))

b. Presentation (_s VERB_i (s (NP) (... v_i ...))) (Guéron’s (48))

In Guéron’s Presentation LF, the verb moves at LF to “scope over” (i.e., c-command) the subject NP. In terms of meaning, the Presentation LF denotes “the appearance of the subject in the world of the discourse” (Guéron 1980: 653). According to Guéron, sentences like (24) are among those that are (best) interpreted by the Presentation LF. Note that (24) is analyzed here and in Irwin (2018a) as an existential unaccusative. Note also that Guéron’s Presentation LF (25b) strongly resembles the analysis of existential unaccusatives in (14), where the verb c-commands the DP from which a new discourse referent is instantiated, and the meaning of the whole VP is one of “coming on the scene”.

PP extraposition is one of a whole battery of tests that Guéron proposes as diagnosing the Presentation LF. In subject PP extraposition, for example, an NP-attached PP is separated from the subject NP that it modifies; the relevant judgment is whether the pre-movement interpretation of the PP is still available after this separation. For

example, in a sentence like (26a), the PP *with green eyes* modifies the subject, *a man*. As (26b) shows, this PP cannot occur at end of the sentence and modify the subject NP in the same way it does when it is adjacent to the NP.

- (26) Subject PP extraposition: bad (Guéron 1980: 637)
- a. A man with green eyes hit Bill. (no extraposition)
 - b. #A man hit Bill with green eyes. (PP extraposed)

The Guéron-inspired examples in (27) are sentences in which PP extraposition is acceptable.

- (27) Subject PP extraposition: good
- a. A man with green eyes walked in. (no extraposition)
 - b. A man walked in with green eyes. (PP extraposed)

Although grammatically speaking almost all sentences with vP final PPs are acceptable, only in some of the cases can the PP be interpreted as modifying the subject even after the NP and PP have separated – i.e., as having been extraposed (I will use “acceptable” to describe the cases in which the meaning doesn’t change). The key observation from Guéron is that only presentational sentences have the same interpretation of the PP (i.e., the NP-attached interpretation) both before and after extraposition.

Guéron’s argues these asymmetries are explained by an asymmetry in LF interpretation: (27a) can be interpreted as presentational (presenting *a man*), but (26a) cannot be interpreted as presentational.

It should be clear that predicates like *walk (in)* are analyzed here following Irwin (2018a) – as having the existential unaccusative structure. Let us now return to the prototypical existential unaccusative sentences presented in (13) above and repeated in (28) to see how they fare with PP extraposition.

- (28) Existential unaccusative sentences
- a. A package arrived.
 - b. A princess waltzed in.
 - c. A little boy ran in.
 - d. A fancy lady walked up.

We turn first to versions of (28) in which the subject-modifying PPs not extraposed (29):

- (29) Existential unaccusative sentences (no PP extraposition)
- a. A package in a padded box arrived.
 - b. A princess with a pearl necklace waltzed in.
 - c. A lady with braided hair walked up.

The sentences in (29) all allow PP extraposition from their subjects (30):

- (30) Existential unaccusative sentences with PP extraposition
- a. A package arrived in a padded box.
 - b. A princess waltzed in with a pearl necklace.
 - c. A lady walked up with braided hair.

The sentences in (30) are unremarkable, and they can have the same meaning as the non-extraposed sentences in (29). For example, we can interpret *with braided hair* in both the non-extraposed (29c) and the extraposed (30c) as telling us about the lady's hairstyle. On Guéron's analysis, these sentences present *a package*, *a princess* etc. because they are analyzed with the Presentation LF. On our existential unaccusative analysis, these sentences have a syntactic-semantic structure in which "presentation" (via INSTANTIATE) is part of its vP meaning (part of the denotation of the small clause head). The availability of PP extraposition is thus not directly related to "presentation" but falls out naturally from the syntax. In other words, the availability of PP extraposition with existential unaccusatives is a side-effect of their small-clause structure. On an existential unaccusative analysis, the subjects in (29) are all part of a complement, and as is well known, extraction from objects is generally more acceptable than extraction from subjects (Ross 1967; Chomsky 1973; Huang 1982; Chomsky 2008: 147; Jurka 2010, among others).

If the reason why PP extraposition is acceptable for existential unaccusatives is because the subjects of these sentences are part of a complement, then we expect that sentences with "true", vP-external subjects will not allow PP extraposition in the same way. This is what we see in (31)–(32), sentences that are best analyzed as unergative. These examples show that when the PP is extracted from the subject of an unergative sentence, the only available interpretation is one in which the PP does not modify the subject, or it does so with a different meaning (e.g., alienable) than in the existential unaccusative ones. In (31)–(32), the (a) examples show the PP attached to the subject DP. In the (b) examples, the PP has been extraposed.

- (31) a. A princess with a pearl necklace waltzed beautifully.
 b. #A princess waltzed beautifully with a pearl necklace. (PP extraposed)
- (32) a. A lady with braided hair walked slowly.
 b. #A lady walked slowly with braided hair. (PP extraposed)

A sentence like (31b) is acceptable, but the most salient meaning for it is not that the lady is wearing a pearl necklace but a strange scenario in which the lady's waltzing partner is a pearl necklace. In (32), the non-extraposed meaning in (32a) is that the lady has braided hair; when the PP is extraposed, the sentence can no longer mean that the lady's hair is braided – instead, the most salient meaning is that she is holding some braids (perhaps as she walks to the hair salon).

These contrasts are explained by an analysis in which the structures of the sentences in (31) and (32) are different from those of the existential unaccusative sentences, one in which *a princess* and *a lady* are true external arguments.

3.2 PP extraposition: Change-of-state intransitives pattern like unergatives

But what about the other class of unaccusative structures that we have been considering, the change-of-state vPs? The sentences below, with change-of-state unaccusatives, disallow PP extraposition. In this way, COS unaccusatives pattern like unergatives, in contrast to existential unaccusatives. This section considers the “presentational” potential of intransitive sentences with COS verbs (verbs like *open*, *freeze* and *break*), those that prototypically allow causative and inchoative variants.

The examples in (33)–(35) show COS unaccusative sentences with and without PP extraposition.⁹

- (33) PP extraposition: *open*
- a. A door with a vintage lock opened.
 - b. #A door opened with a vintage lock. (PP extraposed)
- (34) PP extraposition: *freeze*
- a. A lake with brackish water froze.
 - b. #A lake froze with brackish water. (PP extraposed)
- (35) PP extraposition: *break*
- a. A vase from Athens broke.
 - b. #A vase broke from Athens. (PP extraposed)
 - c. A vase with a yellow sticker broke.
 - d. #A vase broke with a yellow sticker. (PP extraposed)

The PP extraposition shown in the (b) sentences in (33)–(35) all sound degraded or anomalous. For example: (33b) conveys that the vintage lock is an instrument used to open the door, not that the door has a vintage lock on it. For (34b) and (35b) it is hard to get any meaning at all, though (35b) sounds like it might be part of a sentence that continues with ... (*from Athens*) *to Paris* (which still does not make much sense). Like (33b), (35d) tends toward an instrument reading of the PP. In none of the PP extraposed sentence in (33)–(35) can the PP easily be interpreted as modifying the subject.

9. In comparing sentences like these to the unergative and existential unaccusative ones in the previous section, the subjects here are all inanimate. Although animate subjects are certainly possible with change-of-state verbs like these, the resulting sentences require a great deal of extra context to sound natural.

3.3 Summary: PP extraposition

This section has presented evidence that unergative and COS unaccusative sentences like (36) and (37) should not be considered presentational. According to Guéron's diagnostic of PP extraposition, they do not pattern like presentational sentences, and more abstractly, neither of them allow for *there*-insertion. By contrast, the existential unaccusative sentence in (38) does allow PP extraposition and does allow *there*-insertion.

- (36) Unergative
A princess waltzed beautifully.
- (37) COS unaccusative
A vase from Athens broke.
- (38) Existential unaccusative
A princess waltzed in beautifully.

These data show that when it comes to intransitives, the discourse function of presentation cuts across the category of unaccusatives: only existential unaccusative sentences pattern like presentational sentences, where "presentation" is defined as presentation of an individual for subsequent discourse reference. This definition of presentation has been the current working definition of a thetic sentence. Change-of-state unaccusatives, by contrast, pattern with unergative sentences in the presentational properties discussed here. For these reasons, only a subcategory of unaccusative vPs – those with the existential unaccusative structure – should be considered thetic.¹⁰

4. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that existential unaccusatives stand apart from both COS unaccusatives and unergatives with respect to *there*-insertion and PP extraposition, two diagnostics for presentation. Table 1 shows this pattern and includes the

10. On the analysis here, some English sentences that have been discussed in the literature as thetic sentences are not, in fact, thetic sentences. For example, Kuroda (1992: 27) discusses a Japanese sentence (with a *ga*-marked subject) translated into English as *a cat is sleeping there*. Although Kuroda notes that his English consultants reject the sentence – they prefer *there's a cat sleeping there* (Kuroda 1992: 24) – he continues to use it as a way to discuss thetic judgments, since it is strictly speaking grammatical in English (which of course it is). But according to the tests proposed here, the English sentence *a cat is sleeping there* does not pattern like any of the thetic sentences we have considered here. For example, starting with *a cat with green eyes is sleeping there*, PP-extraposition yields the creepy sentence, # *A cat is sleeping there with green eyes*.

Table 1. Theticity cuts across intransitive vP types

	∃ unaccusative	COS unaccusative	Unergative
PP extraposition	✓	✗	✗
<i>there</i> -insertion	✓	✗	✗
subject anaphoric reference	✓	(✗)	(✗)

diagnostic of subsequent anaphoric reference, discussed briefly at the beginning of the chapter and acknowledging that more experimental support is needed to confirm those judgments (see Irwin 2018a; b for discussion).

Table 1 shows that the notion of theticity cuts across a commonly-accepted distinction in intransitive sentences, the unergative-unaccusative distinction. It also shows that from the perspective of discourse function and the thetic-categorical distinction, change-of-state unaccusatives pattern like unergatives.

At the start of this chapter, I proposed that in order to form the basis for a thetic judgment, an intransitive sentence must pass the two requirements in (3), repeated below in (39):

- (39) Intransitive thetic sentences: Requirements
- A. The sole argument of the sentence must be vP-internal in its origin;
 - B. The sole argument must be interpreted as a property (rather than an individual) and serve as the argument to the predicate INSTANTIATE.

According to (39), unergative sentences like those in (40) do not pass either of these requirements. (Sentence (40b) is given because of its similarity to the existential unaccusative sentences we have been considering.)

- (40) Unergative sentences
- a. A little boy smiled happily.
 - b. A princess waltzed beautifully.

The sole argument of an unergative sentence is vP-external, where the standard analysis is that the subject is merged to a specifier position above vP, e.g., the specifier of an argument-introducing head like v^* or Voice (Kratzer 1996). Adopting this analysis means that unergatives fail to meet requirement (A). Regarding requirement (B): the specifier of Voice is not typically analyzed as having a property denotation (though we will return to this in a moment).

Both (A) and (B) hold for existential unaccusative sentences like (41), according to the analysis here, based on Irwin (2018a): the subject *a princess* is merged vP-internally (14), in a complement position, and *a princess* is interpreted as a property, as the DP argument to a functional head that includes INSTANTIATE as part of its denotation (15).

- (41) Existential unaccusative sentence
A princess waltzed in beautifully.

It is clear that existential unaccusatives satisfy both (A) and (B). But to be sure that both are required, we must consider sentences in which (A) holds but (B) does not, and cases in which (B) holds but (A) does not. The contrast between COS unaccusatives and existential unaccusatives provide an example of the former: COS unaccusatives like (42) are standardly analyzed as having subjects that are first merged vP-internally, but this subject is not interpreted as a property (at least, no one to my knowledge has made such an argument).

- (42) COS unaccusative
A vase broke.

And according to Guéron's PP extraposition diagnostic, COS unaccusatives like (42) are not presentational.

It is more difficult to find a sentence in which (A) does not hold and (B) does hold. In other words, it is difficult to find a sentence type with a true external argument, where that subject is also interpreted as a property argument to *INSTANTIATE*. This is an interesting and somewhat mysterious situation, and for this reason, this part of the chapter will end a somewhat speculative note.

It may be that (A), the vP-internal requirement is a precondition for (B), the *INSTANTIATE* + properly requirement. There is a persistent intuition across the literature that something like (A) must be the case. Indeed, it is built into Guéron's (1980) LF, which in a sense collapses (A) and (B), and it is also proposed by Abraham (this volume) as a core feature of sentences that trigger a thetic judgment. But if we assume that the two requirements are not dependent on each other, then we can consider them separately.

Considering (B) in isolation leads to the question of the syntactic constraints on the distribution of *INSTANTIATE* – or, assuming the analysis here, the distribution of *Pred_{exist}*. For example, is it possible to trigger *INSTANTIATE* simply by interpreting a DP argument as a property – perhaps by some type-shifting operation – and by having the relevant contextual/locational information in the sentence or context? Although these questions must be set aside here, I hope that future research addresses these questions since their answers will shed light on a particularly interesting corner of the intersection of syntax, semantics, and real-world context.

We turn, finally, to the possibility of event-introducing thetic sentences. As discussed here, the requirements in (39) clearly exclude unergative sentences (since their sole argument in vP-external), and change-of-state intransitives (since the COS structure lacks *INSTANTIATE* – nothing requires the sole argument in this vP to be interpreted as a property). But work on theticity has considered the possibility that

a thetic sentence may be either entity-introducing or event-reporting. Sasse (1987), for example, makes a distinction between “entity-central” and “event-central” thetic sentences (Sasse 1987: 526), where the former is the type we have been focusing on here. Sasse asserts that impersonal and weather statements (43) are thetic statements of the event-reporting type (Sasse 1987: 526–7).

(43) It’s raining.

Another candidate for thetic sentences of the event-reporting type are unergatives and COS unaccusatives (when they have discourse-new subjects). Irwin (2018a) discusses sentences like those in (44) as “scene-setting” sentences:

- (44) a. A stick broke.
 b. A lake froze.
 c. A dog barked.
 d. A horse whinnied.

Intuitively, sentences like (44) serve not to introduce a stick, a lake, or a dog into the discourse. They seem rather to introduce a breaking sound, a freezing event, a bark, and so on. One possible way to determine the discourse function of sentences like these would be to consider discourse coherence judgments like in (45) (from Irwin 2018a), where (45a) picks up on the event from (45), and (45b) picks up on the entity from (45):

- (45) [A horse]_i whinnied in the dark.
 a. ... It_i was an eerie sound.
 b. ... #It_i was probably Misty.

As Irwin notes, the continuation in (45b) sounds odd. Although we must leave discussion of unergative and change-of-state thetics for future work, it is worth noticing that again the notion of theticity cuts across the standard division in intransitive predicates – the unergative/unaccusative distinction. If the ideas here are on the right track, then again we end up with the interesting conclusion that unergatives and a subtype of unaccusative vP (change-of-state vPs) pattern together in discourse function, to the exclusion of another subtype of unaccusative, the existential unaccusative.

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PART 4

The logic-linguistics across languages

From philosophical logic to linguistics

The architecture of information autonomy: Categoricals vs. Thetics revisited

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How are the logical terms ofthetic and categorical judgments to be distinguished linguistically? The key questions are how judgments can be thought of in terms of linguistics and what the deeper lying reason is for distinguishing the two notions. In our search for an answer, we can be guided by the distinction in Japanese, i.e. through the use of the particle *ga* for thetics and *wa* for categoricals. In German, the German equivalents are marked by accent mark and information structural word order. Syntactically, thetics are represented by VP incorporation of all arguments including the subject. The arguments are not subject to syntactic probing mechanisms but follow semantic preference principles. The following sections lead the reader through the paper. (1) What isthetic, what is categorical? What is this difference for? (2) Main working hypothesis: Fromthetic judgment tothetic sentence. (3) Hypothetic definition 1: thethetic sentence in German. (4) Hypothetic definition 2: Thetic – Categorical. (5) Thetics are presentational, not locative and not existential. (6) Accent and information structure. (7) Common ground contents (speech act felicity conditions). (8) Integrational focus: broad and narrow focus (Jacobs 2001). (9) VP-integrated subject ≠ Unaccusative subject. (10) Speaker deixis implied by subject inversion. (11) Special *ga*-subjects after Onoe 1973: The deeper key to thetics? (12) Linkingthetic syntax with Onoe's special *ga*-verb class in Japanese? (13) The origo decision for episodocity and genericity. (14) Typological commonalities. (15) Hypothesis: Passives are near-thetic. (16) Conclusion without a real end: the interface mix. (17) Outgoing: leading ideas and main concepts.

Keywords: narrow and wide sentential focus, Japanese *ga* vs. *wa*, presentational and existential sentence, prosody,thetic – categorical, valence, subject inversion, VP-integrated argument/subject

1. What is thetic, what is categorical?: What is this difference?

According to Brentano (1874) and Marty (1884–1897; see also Ulrich 1985: 57), a thetic sentence is a ‘simple judgment’ / eU (German *einfaches Urteil*). By contrast, a categorical sentence yields a ‘double judgment’ / dU (German *doppeltes Urteil*). The basic assumption of our approach on these terms is this: The simple (thetic) judgment is the propositional idea *sec*, i.e. the proposition without decomposition in into subject and predicate, thus the proposition without any allocation of space and time (= without reference, i.e. without discourse status). As Lotze (1989: 70) expressed it:

So beginnt denken / This is how thinking begins.

According to Marty, thetic sentences are without a subject. There is thus a fundamental difference between ‘simple (thetic)’ and ‘double (categorical) judgment’. Following Lotze, propositional linguistics begins with this distinction.

At the base of the philosophical theories in which thetic and categorical play a role is the notion of judgment, which has been defined in the following way:

The judgment, then, is the surge of the mind as it resolves something into its ontological character and mode, but the thing may be in an order of real beings, of fictions, projects or privations, or some other manner or condition of being and non-being. Indeed, it is in a variety of ontological modes. (Schmitz 1974: 501)¹

Thetic vs. categorical judgments were prominent topics in the philosophy of Realism and of logic in the 19th century, particularly represented by impersonal sentences (Sigwart 1888). Except for Ladusaw (1994), this topic has virtually found no reaction in modern linguistics and logic until the Japanese linguist Kuroda took it up.

This theory assumes, unlike traditional or modern logic, that there are two different fundamental types of judgments, the categorical and the thetic. Of these, only the former conforms to the traditional paradigm of subject-predicate, while the latter represents simply the recognition or rejection of material of a judgment. Moreover, the categorical judgment is assumed to consist of two separate acts, one the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject. With this analysis in mind, the thetic and the categorical judgments are also called the simple and the double judgments (*Einfaches Urteil* and *Doppelurteil*).

(Kuroda 1972: 154)

1. Marty (referring to Brentano, who, in turn, refers to John Stuart Mill) uses repeatedly the notion *Urteil* ‘judgment’ in the sense of *Anerkennung oder Verwerfung eines vorgestellten Inhalts* ‘acknowledgement or repudiation of an imagined content’.

What is amiss in this quote is why today's Japanese linguists should continue this discussion. However, there is even general doubt in the pertinent literature as to the relevance of this topic.

Die seit zwei Jahrzehnten verstärkt diskutierte Thematik der Identifizierung kategorika-ler versus thetischer Äußerungen hat bisher noch in keiner der vorliegenden Untersu-chungen zu einem Ergebnis geführt, das es rechtfertigte, auf diese Problematik weitere Forschungsenergie zu verwenden.

(Meyer-Hermann 2010: 40f.)

The identification and distinction of categorical and thetic utterances, which has been increasingly discussed for two decades, has not led to a conclusion in any of the available studies such that it would justify further attention and research energy to this problem.

(translation W. A.)

The present article sees a new outcome of this discussion. It reaches beyond Kuroda's (1972) basic insight that Japanese indeed distinguishes the two 'judgments' morphologically by using the suffixes *wa* (for categorical) and *ga* (for thetic). Given the absence of morphological means in languages like English and German to draw the same distinction as Japanese, the question arises how Kuroda's main arguments carry over to German and other European languages. Let us make a step towards a predicate-logic resolution of the simple-double judgment in the absence of a sentential subject. What could be considered a dependency, or valence, based understanding of the distinction of simple and double judgment? [eU=einfaches Urteil / simple judgment, dU=doppeltes Urteil / double judgment, thetU=thetisches Urteil / thetical judgment]²

(1) Valence theoretical (predicate-logical) resolution:

(i) $eU =_{\text{def}} \lambda x \lambda P (P(x))$

(ii) $dU =_{\text{def}} \lambda x \lambda y \lambda P (P(x,y))$

Does the following format exist, in the first place: Is it zero place valence and, given the adequate spacio-temporal context *t*, a true 'simple judgment' – e.g. for *It is raining now*.

(iii) $\text{thet}U =_{\text{def}} \lambda P \lambda t (P, t)$

(1i) echoes Kant's (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) definition of a judgment (German *Urteil* literally proto-part) as allowing truth evaluation of an expression consisting of two concepts: a subject and a predicate. There is no mention of a judgment with fewer than these two components. Let us add the following consideration that have played a role in the pertinent literature on the topic.


2. Abbreviations: le(ft) M(idle)F(ield) and ri(ght) MF are clausal fields between *vP* and Comp (German clause field) hosting definite vs. indefinite pronouns; MP=modal particle.

(1') Logical judgment in linguistic terms


- Thetic sentences (simple judgments) are “predicational wholes”. It seems that this is represented by (1iii). What does that mean in terms of morphology, syntax, semantics, the phonetic form, and pragmatics?
- I leave open the question for the time being whether simple judgments need to be subject to spacio-temporal context embedding and, as an obligatory consequence, to truth validation. The main motivation for this idea is the fact that, in contrast to synthetic sentences, analytical sentences, for sure truly categorical ones, are not spacio-temporally embedded. Such a non-truth veridical format would be (iv).

$$(iv) \text{ thet}U =_{\text{def}} \lambda P(P)$$

- What is the categorical status of (iv)? Let us say, as a first proximation, we are dealing with an utterance. Utterances are spacio-temporally unembedded and, thus, not truth-veridical (see, similarly, Pietroski 2019).
- It will be shown later that sentences typical of (iv) often have a reading as (iii). Note that this principled ambiguity empties the notional distinction between simple and double judgment.
- Given the reality of (iii) and (iv), we may have to distinguish between two values of finiteness: purely morphological, on the one hand, and spacio-temporal and, consequently, truth-functional (truth committal), on the other.
- Given one single form (e.g. subject inversion, subject in Spec, CP (the clausal prefield) with non-default accent)), there are always two finiteness readings: a purely morphological one (simple judgment for thetics) and semantic one (double judgment for categoricals).
- As will be shown in the ensuing discussion, thetics and categoricals are divergent with respect to the following affinities: morphological (non-truth validable) finiteness – thetic utterance – zero valence, i.e. (iv) in distinction from semantic (truth-validable) finiteness – categorical sentence – multiple (including one-) place valence like (iii) and (v).



- Both (v') and (v'') are categorical to the extent that the DP-readings of KÜHE ‘cows’ are focus contrasted and are truth-validable. The same forms, however, can also have the reading in (vi), i.e. without t, for finiteness, and truth validability. Consequently, they are thetic utterances. Notice that, in contrast to categorical (v), time anchoring marked by t is missing in thetic (vi).



- From (iii), (iv) and (vi) follows that thetic utterances, i.e. $\lambda x \lambda P(x, P)$ lacking time anchoring as well as subject topicality, the Common Ground is empty. The thetic sentence is not discourse-embedded.
- From (iii), (iv) and (vi) also follows another principled ambiguity. Time-unanchored utterance can be used as a solipsistic KUNDGABE (expression of excitement) which as such is different from the same form used as a declarative and assertion. Note that KUNDGABEN do not prepare or exploit Common Ground as there is no addressee the utterance is directed to. A Kundgabe is purely solipsistic. The speaker does not intend to inform or direct an addressee. By giving away a Kundgabe he does not prepare a Common Ground as a basis for a dialogue or discussion (which is essentially what CG is meant to serve for). In accepting utterances a being unanchored in a communicative act I differ from traditional assumption of the notion of CG (Clark et al. 1991; Stalnaker 2002).
- In short, specific sentential forms, such as subject inversions or non-default-stressed subjects in the sentential prefield, generally have corrolaries expanding declaratives to solipsistic speech acts (Kundgaben) which are typical of thetic utterances,
- What, then, are the typical surface representations of thetics and categoricals for German and across languages? (iii) shares the form with (iv), but it is different with respect to spacio-temporal anchoring and, thus, truth validity.
- What are the linguistic constraints to distinguish thetics from categoricals?
- The present discussion will end with the conclusion that a thetic expression (in clear distinction to a categorical expression) is a sentential structure without propositional meaning (i.e. with anti-origo status), but with clear speech act status (as *Kundgabe* – a solipsistic exclamation). This is in line with (vi), i.e. that $\text{thet}U =_{\text{def}} \lambda x \lambda P(x, P)$. A thetic expression has a clear sentential structure, which is not available for semantic interpretation. It is, in this sense, an proto-intransitive expression.

These questions may be approached under different criteria. I choose three such criteria. See Sections 1.1–1.3.

1.1 Thetics according to text genre?: Modal particle/MP selection as a speech act criterion?

We examine whether MP selection (in parenthesis) is aligned with genre (introducing line of saga, *Nibelungelied*, fairy tale, joke, Old Testament, *Die Buddenbrooks*).

- (2) a. (Es) War (eben) einmal ein König zu Thule
(it) was (MP) once a king at Thule³
- b. 2. Aventure: Nun wird (ja) Siegfried vorgestellt.
2nd adventure: now will (MP: as is known) S. introduced
- c. Habe (doch) heute auf der Toilette 332 Fliesen gezählt.
have (MP: nevertheless) today on the toilet 332 tiles counted
- d. Heiß bist du (vielleicht), Flamme, zuviel (bloß) der Glut.
hot are you (MP: thoroughly) flame, too much (MP: just)
of the glowing fire
- e. Sagt (aber) der Igel zum Hasen: ...
says (MP: but) the hedgehog to the rabbit
- f. Anthonie sitzt (schon) auf dem Schoß ihres Großvaters and rezitiert.
A. is sitting (MP: for sure) on the lap of her granddad and is reciting

1.2 Thetics according to sentential form?

We examine whether MP selection is aligned with sentential form.

- (3) a. (Es) War (eben) einmal V1 – existential⁴ clause?
- b. Nun wird (ja) Siegfried vorgestellt. text introducing
- c. War heute (schon) auf der Toilette. V1 – topic drop – joke
- d. Heiß bist du (vielleicht), Flamme V1 – Islandic saga
- e. Sagt (aber) der Igel zum Hasen V1 – fable
- f. Im Anfang war das Wort. *Faust* (from Old Testament)
- g. Anthonie sitzt (hallo) auf dem Schoß (chapter introducing line from *Buddenbrooks*)

3. Note that the glosses do not have the status of stylistically adequate translations.

4. Notice that I am using this commonly accepted term, although conceptually it is a presentational. See Jenkins 1975.

1.3 Thetics and subject position?

CAPS for focus accent: either default or contrastive.

- | | | |
|--------|---|-----------------------------|
| (4) a. | default position of subject? | prefield of sentence |
| b. | default focus of subject? | head of deepest embedding |
| c. | How about focus on subject? | contrastive? |
| d. | (Die) Elefanten/ELEFANTEN leben in AFRIKA | contrast or default accent? |
| | (the) elephants/ELEPHANTS live in AFRICA | |
| e. | Es leben (die) Elefanten in Afrika | definition – analytic? |
| | ‘There are (the) elephants in Africa | |
| f. | (*Die) ELEFANTEN sind im Garten | type of sentence? |
| | ‘(The) elephants are in the garden | |
| g. | Es sind ELEFANTEN im Garten | existential sentence? |
| | ‘There re ELEPHANTS in the garden.’ | |
| h. | Gott ist (aber) – Zwei and zwei ist (doch) vier | analytic ≠ synthetic? |
| | ‘God is (MP: but) – Two and two are (nevertheless) four.’ | |

We connect to (1) above. What does eU (or thetU) mean on closer syntactic scrutiny? Given valence status, are eU = single-valued and dU = two place or multi-valued? Consider valence attempts in (iii) and (iv). See the following illustrations, (5)–(7). [Caps signal focus accent: either default or contrastive] Suppose that a simple judgment is an undecomposed predication – thus, not single place where an argument such as an external one is predicated on. A good example of this appears to be the undivided *brrr* exclamation of feeling bitterly cold – as an expression for *Mir ist kalt/I am cold* – or *ihhhh* for *Mich ekelt/How disgusting*. [all VP integrated/VP incorporated, i.e. the predication relates to the unity arguments and the verbal predicate].

- | | | |
|-----|---|-------------------------|
| (5) | | Argument integration |
| | | Thetic valence |
| a. | COGNITIVE OBJECT (WITH DEFAULT ACCENT): | |
| | <i>Es regnet (HAGELschlossen)</i> | Arguments VP-integrated |
| | ‘It’s raining (hailstones)’ | thetic, one-place? |
| b. | SUBJECT INVERSION (NONDEFAULT ACCENT): | |
| | <i>Es laufen KÜHE im Garten herum</i> | Subject VP-integrated |
| | ‘There are cows running around in the garden’ | thetic, one-place? |

- c. SUBJECT INVERSION (NONDEFAULT ACCENT):
Es steht (das) WASSER im Garten subject VP-integrated
 ‘There is (the) water rising in the garden’ thetic, one-place’
- (6) a. EMOTIVE EXCLAMATIVE (SUBJECTLESS):
Es GRAUST mir (vor (den) Würmern) Arguments VP-integrated?
 ‘I dread (of (the) worms)’ one-place?’
- b. EMOTIVE EXCLAMATIVE (SUBJECTLESS):
Mir GRAUST (vor Würmern) Arguments not VP-inte-
 ‘I dread (of worms)’ grated? one-place?’
- c. EMOTIVE EXCLAMATIVE (SUBJECTLESS):
Mich SCHWINDELT (beim Balancieren) Arguments not VP-inte-
 ‘I am dizzy (when balancing)’ grated? one-place?’
- (7) a. PRESENTATIONAL (SUBJECT INVERSION):
Es sind/laufen KÜHE im Garten herum subject VP-integrated
 ‘There are cows running around in the thetic, zero place?’
 garden’
- b. EXCLAMATIVE (MARKED SUBJECT ACCENT):
KÜHE laufen im Garten herum subject not VP-integrated?
 ‘Cows are running around in the garden’ one place oder zero place?’
- c. EXCLAMATIVE (MARKED SUBJECT ACCENT):
WASSER steht (kniehoch) im Garten subject not VP-integrated?
 ‘The water is standing (knee-high) in the one-place or zero-place?’
 garden’

As to (6)–(7), one may ask what the valence is compared to (5). Would (5)–(6) not be zero place after all? What does zero place valence represent semantically given that we assume to have all arguments and the subject integrated in P: $\lambda P(P)$? What is (P) when it contains no argument?⁵ Does (P) express valence in the traditional sense? How is thetics in (4a–c) compatible with thetics in (5a–c)? Given *Es regnet* ‘It is raining’, how is the simple logical judgment, $\lambda P(P)$, to be aligned with the syntactic zero valence, when there is a sentential prefield filler: e.g. $\lambda x \lambda P: [P(x) x(ES)]$ – that position that we are used in German to reserve for the subject with unaccentuated status? What is the syntactic status of exclamative (6) and (7) in comparison to the declarative reading? On what level of representation do we find ourselves when thinking of the logical thetic (simple) judgment?

5. In the literature, there are claims to the extent that there is an argument in these sentences (i.e. Ertischik-Shir 2007 “stage topic” and Bently & Cruschina 2018 “subject of predication”). However, it seems that both assumptions can be brought in line with the present assumptions. Note, for example, that “stage topic” does not refer to our valence-motivated “argument status”.

2. Main working hypothesis: From thetic judgment to thetic sentence

Given the most prominent discussions on the topic (Kuroda 1972; Sasse 1978; Sæbø 2012, and others), the distinctive status of thetic and categorical is not diagnosable without reference to information structure. However, given the original philosophical distinction, this is not self-evident. Let us start from the original terms.

2.1 The distinction of thetic and categorical in German (V2-OV, subject as well as topic prominent)

German counts as a subject-prominent language.⁶ If unfocused, German subjects are the only arguments that are assigned to the sentential prefield (SpecCP).⁷ Yet, German is also topic-prominent. It structures its own midfield zone with a separate About-topic position as distinguished from the higher field zone for anaphora and definite DPs. Categorical sentences (with the splintered subject-predicate structure) correspond to Brentano's and Marty's double judgment or, respectively, the topic comment structure (according to Hockett (9)). This results in an event or state reference for the topic, here *my mother* as in (10).

(8) meine Mutter my-mother

(9) ist eine intelligente Frau is-an-intelligent-woman

(10) Meine Mutter ist eine intelligente Frau

As for (10), a multiple prior context (or a talk template / common ground) seems to exist, in which *my mother* and the allocation of *intelligence* play a role. We may also say that (10) is an appropriate reaction to the question-in-discussion of the context ('quaestio', 'question about') "What is going on with my mother?" or "what just happened to my mother?". Thetic sentences, however, concern simple judgments (holistic assessments) about a situation or state of affairs. The whole sentence is as a (usually just very locally anchored) description of a situation comment. See (11) and recall that I argued that there is a categorical (time-space anchored declarative) corollary to this sentential form. Thus, what is at stake is whether or not *Es regnet* is meant as information for an addressee or a Kundgabe utterance. In the latter reading, it is thetic, while in the first it bears the weight of an information laying out some CG (see Wilson, in this volume, for a discussion of this).

6. This is odd. From among all arguments, only the subject appears in SpecCP without focus accent. All other arguments have to be stressed to encode its moved position. Thus, there is reason to typify German as a topic prominent language.

7. See footnote 1.

- (11) a. *Es regnet*
 it rains
 ‘It is raining’
 b. *Die Sonne scheint*
 the sun shines
 ‘The sun is shining’

Here is a completely topic-free construction. The CG is empty. It’s answers to questions like: “What is going on?” or “What happens now?”. Categoricals and thetics often have small word order differences as in (12a, b). [IE = intonation unit, RHE Rhema, TH = topic]

- (12) a. Gerade wird vermutlich [_{IE=VP} [_{RHE} DER NEUE PRÄSIDENT
 just now is presumably the new president
 eingeschworen]] ... thetic („What is just now happening?“)
 sworn in
 b. Gerade wird [_{TH} der neue Präsident vermutlich [_{IE} GEWÄHLT]].
 Just now is the new president presumably elected
 ... categorical („What is just now happening to the new president?“)

Note the diverging typical accent distributions. Kuno (1972) assumes that thetic constructions have no topical subject. See (13a–c).

- (13) a. Es spielt (erfreulicherweise) Erwin Lehn die ganze Nacht hindurch.
 it plays (fortunately) E. L. all night through
 ... presentational
 b. Kam Hans zur Tür herein and [...] ... narratives V1 (often in jokes)
 came H. by the door in and
 c. Es war einmal (ein altes Schloss) ... narrative text inception
 it was once (an old castle)

Note how the about-topic structure in German differs from a true anaphoric topic. Necessary prerequisites for topics are ‘what-aboutness’ and D-linking. However, only the middle field aboutness is focused by the subject inversion construction. See (14) (after Rizzi 2005: 212).

- (14) a. topic: [+ aboutness] [+ D-linking/anaphoric] in the left middle field
 (between Comp and VP)
 b. subject: [+ aboutness] on the left edge of the right middle field
 c. [_{CP} Subj [_C Comp/T ... [_e anaphora/[+definite] [_i Top-about, ADV [_{VP} ...
]]]]]

(14) clarifies why modal particles in German (and Dutch) take the first merge position in topic about on the right edge of the left midfield – and from where they may move only in one single function: as clitics on the subject slot/SpecCP (*Was=(den)n hast du dir dabei gedacht* ‘What-then have you been thinking’).

2.2 Thethetic and the categorical judgment in Japanese (OV and topic prominent)

Japanese is a topic prominent language (distinguishes morphologically between the topic suffix *-wa* – and nontopic *-ga* phrases). Furthermore, it is strictly OV syntactically, i.e. it is nothing else but OV-structured (operator-operand structured) in all clausal and phrasal forms. Nevertheless, it also has strong features of subject prominence. The non-topic external argument is marked by the nominative case marker *-ga*. Notably, this marker is also the discourse marker for rhema status, i.e. non-discourse embedding. By contrast, German does not mark topics or non-topics morphologically, but in terms of sequence of words and focus accent. It is fundamentally OV with the additional V2-property (realizing the distinction between main and subordinate clauses). The predicate is marked by inflection for person, number, tense and mood in the main clause in exactly that place where the subordinate clause locates Comp, i.e. the subordinating subjunction. Japanese does not mark this complementary balance of inflectional morphology and clausal complement status as it has no predicate inflection. Tanaka (2018), in comparing the two OV-languages, Japanese and German, argues that Japanese indicates discourse integration of the sentence corresponding to the first verbal bracket (Comp) in German.

In OV-Japanese, discourse integration is marked by the case suffix *-wa*. Tanaka’s assumption (page 201) that the position and function of the first verb clamp (Comp) in OV-German corresponds to Japanese *-wa* is still a matter of debate. Given the special topic and non-topic sensitivity of Japanese one might ask whether Japanese provides a definite proof of existence of the linguistic status of the categorical-thetics distinction. If we are to believe Kuroda (1972), Japanese indeed does. See (15a) for a thetic sentence as against (15b), which is a categorical.

- (15) a. Hund rennen/dog running
 ‘Es rennt da ein Hund – There is a dog running’
 b. Hund rennen/dog running
 ‘Ein/Der Hund rennt da (herum) – A/The dog is running (there)’

The particle *ga* codes a presently ongoing event of a dog running. We generalize:

- (16) a. *ga* serves the purpose of coding the event as a whole to be relevant and focused.
 b. *wa* is used to code the entity *Hund/dog* as topic, about which the remainder of the sentence is predicated.

Encoding categorical andthetic judgments makes usage of different types of sentences. See (17)–(18) for a general description of state of affairs or properties.

- (17) *John is American*

In (17) we have athetic sentence, which in Japanese is realized with the nominal case particle *-ga*. By contrast, sentences relating to specific events read as categorical sentences. They are coded by the discourse embedder *-wa*.

- (18) *John is reading a book.*

Surprisingly, analytical (generally categorial) statements in Japanese are realized by. They are neverthelessthetic, i.e. in response to the question *Is there something going on / something to report?*

- (19) *(All) Humans are mortal.*

We will return to this.

3. Hypothesis 1: Thethetic sentence in German

Given Section 1, let us try (20).

- (20) Thethetic sentence contains a verbal predicate and an argument with information- structural zero function (i.e. no prior context, no discourse or dialogue embedding). In contrast to that of synthetic sentences, the information analytic statements provide consist of presupposed sociolinguistic semantic knowledge and, as such, they do not contribute something to the common ground, nor do they presuppose a common ground. Theticity in whatever form maps exactly this empty communicative state: there is no CG to negotiate or react to.

Does this account for lexical valence including argument case and semantic theta role distribution? Isthetic syntax equivalent to intransitivity in line with (20)? Note that the double judgment is not equivalent with transitive valence. This leads us to an aporia. There is a fundamental difference between one-place/*iV*/ $\lambda x\lambda P$: *P(x)* for *He is laughing*, with zero-place syntax as for *Es regnet / It is raining*, andthetics such

as *brrr* / *Mir graust* ‘I shudder’ coded as λP : P. What representations are responsible for these three types of construction and their different readings? Above all, what is the difference between syntactic zero valence in *Es regnet* / *It is raining* (leaving aside *Mir graust* / *I am shuddering*), andthetic *Es regnet* / *It is raining* and, by the same token, *Mir graust* / *I am shuddering*? First and most important, consider the definitional constraint: Given (5)–(7) asthetic sentences, this will entail (21a–e).

- (21) a. Lexical verbal valence (verb one place or zero place) by itself cannot be a criterion forthetic.
- b. Simple judgment/eU status is safeguarded for (5) by subject inversion (i.e. argument integration and primary [Argument-Verb]-merge) in vP . In other words, *Es (stehen/sind) Kühe im Garten/Es steht (das) Wasser im Garten* each is one argumental unity, i.e. just P.
- c. Comparing (2)–(3a), boththetic, and (3b) (nonthetic), seems to speak for the fact that athetic subject cannot be agentive. It must be a theme.
- d. Notably (4a) makes us conclude that accentuation plays a determining role forthetic valuation (Sæbø 2007).
 d1 Accent on the subject plays the determining role fortheticity, while deaccentuation in the clausal prefield marks categoricity. See (4b, c).
 d2 Subject inversion (subject in VP) yieldsthetic status as in (4a).
- e. The distinction between (1) and (3a, b) yields that argument and predicate are in a c-command relation or have to be positionally adjacent (see also Jacobs 2001).

See also the generalizations in (22a–e) and compare them with the generalizations in (21a–e). [#-marking means use betweenthetic and categorical, each depending on a specific context, but formally not clearly decidable.]

- (22) a. *KüHE laufen im GARTEN (/im Garten ums HAUS) herum
 cows run in the garden (/in the garden around the house) around
- b. KÜHE laufen im Garten herum...
 clausal default accent on the most deeply embedded head
 (Cinque 1993), categorical/ eventive (stage level)
- i.thetic (accent integrated), eventive (stage level)
- ii. contrastive (presupposing other animates in the garden)
- c. *KÜHE laufen im GARTEN herum
 cows run in the garden around
 ... analytic/generic/definitional and essential-predicative
 (individual level/Eigenschaftszuordnung) → *thetic
- d. Es sind KÜHE im Garten
 there are cows in the garden
 ... ≠ (3a):thetic (rhematic, referentially weak subject)

- e. Es sind die KÜHE im Garten
 there are the cows i.t.g.
 ... ≠ (3a): categorical (referentially strong subject)
- f. Da sind KÜHE im Garten ... locative or 'existential'
 there are cows i.t.g.

We argued that it can be derived from (22a, c) that the predicate must carry accent. Notice that this does not agree with (22b). Admittedly, (22b) is not VP integrated and thusthetic (without context), but it admits also a reading with contrastive accent (presupposing 'Other critters roam in the garden'). In other words, with subject inversion as in (22d, f), the verb need not carry an extra accent (against Sæbø 2007: 17). This means that (22f) has either a spatial, locative reading or an 'existential' one, apparently without accent distinction. Is there a syntactic distinctness to this semantic difference? How would it be motivated? Does 'existential' mean "something exists", or does it mean "something is presented" – the latter in the sense of 'Figure' and 'Ground'? We note in passing that German postverbal subjects obey Diesing's (1992) Mapping Hypothesis.

Benincà (1988) claimed that for subject inversion and the seemingly empty sentential prefield (for a locative or temporal constituent), Romance languages required the assumption of a null locative in the pre-verbal position comparable to what had been called locative inversion (Pinto 1997; Tortora 1997, 2001, 2014; Sheehan 2006, 2010, 2016; Corr 2016). The covert locative argument was meant to add a deictic interpretation of spatial and temporal reference. See the Italian Example (23), a rhematic sentence announcing the arrival of Maria at the location of the speaker.

- (23) È arrivata Maria.
 ist kam Maria
 , 'Maria ist (hier/bei uns) angekommen.'

At first glance, broad focus in subject inversion may correlate with unaccusativity (Perlmutter 1978; Burzio 1986). It is so traditionally assumed that VS is the unmarked word order in unaccusative syntax (Rizzi 1982; Burzio 1986). Upon closer inspection, however, at least some unergative verbs occur in same construction encoding a covert argument in the same way, (Benincà 1988; Saccon 1993; Pinto 1997; Parry 2000, 2013; for German Abraham 1986 et sequ.). For example, Bentley & Cruschina (2018: 2) (24) observed that the unergative verb *telefonare* equally gives rise to Bühler's reference of the speaker's (origo) location.

- (24) Ha telefonato Maria.
 has phoned Mari
 'Maria has called (here/our place).'

The conclusion is that subject inversion with broad sentential focus bears on the difference between event verbs of the stage-level type (event argument appears as a covert subject) and state verbs of the individual-level type (not projecting an origo argument and showing no subject inversion; c.f. Bianchi 1993 building on Kratzer 1995). This confirms our position (Abraham 1986 et sequ.) that subject inversion has nothing to do with unaccusative syntax despite the fact that the subject has external argument status in both cases.

4. Hypothetic definition 2: Thetik – Categorical

Let us summarize.

- (25) Theticity means that information and discourse autonomy is reserved for categoricity, but that it is excluded for thetics. Given their zero place valence, thetic sentences correlate with the context emptying question ‘What is going on, what is new?’. What we are dealing with are contexts ‘out-of-the blue (see Harweg 1968).
- (26) By contrast, categoricity is basically context embedded and, thus, discourse autonomous. Categorical sentences with double accent (including hat accent) receive meaning under the parameter ‘question under discussion’ or ‘What-is-new- about-whom/what?’.
- (27) Focus integration (broad focus: Subject accent takes focus along with the predicate into the entire sentential constituent; cf. (22b, c) and Sections 6 and 8.)
- (28) Focus integration is interpretatively incompatible with separate focuses.
- (29) On the „Figure-Ground“ template, the representations are:
- a. locative *Da ist/sind XP YP*
syntactically as
[_{CP-Figure} *Da*_{LOC} *ist/sind* *der/ein XP* [_{VP-Ground} YP]]
 - b. presentational *Es ist/sind XP YP*
syntactically as
[_{CP-Figure} *Da*_{PRES-EXPL} *ist/sind* [_{VP-Ground} *(*)der/ein XP YP*]]

5. Thetics are presentational, not locative and not existential

In presentational sentences, arguments are hosted only in VP – see (22d, e) as well as (22c, d). Presentationals provide *there* as an Expletive subject, while in locative sentences *there* has adverbial status. See also (22a, b).

- (30) a. Da sind KÜHE (im Garten) ... thetic (presentational)
 there are cows
- b. DA/DORT sind KÜHE ... nonthetic, nonpresentational; locative
 (over) there are cows
- c. Es sind KÜHE ... nonthetic, *Es* referring to
 it is cows complementary set of objects in the garden
- d. Es sind Kühe im GARTEN ... nonthetic, nonpresentational
 it are cows in the garden
- e. KÜHE sind im Garten ... either thetic-presentational or contrastive
 categorical implying complementary set of
 objects in the garden

Presentationals code a speech act. Speech acts may come in different forms syntactically (cf. (31a, e)). Consequently, counter to sentential form, which is syntagmatic in structural build, speech acts classify as paradigmatically structured.

Subject status:

German expletive *Es* ≠ lexical *Es/Das*- Dutch *Het is er ...* ≠ *Het is ...*

- (31) a. *Das ist gut zu sehen*
 this is good to see
- b. **Das ist (*da) gut zu warten/laufen. ...*
- c. *Es ist hier/da gut[?](zu) warten/laufen.*
- (32) a. *Het is (er) om de hoek beter *(om) te wachten*
 ‘It_{Expl} is around the corner better (for) to wait’
- b. *Het/Er is op deze bosgrond goed *(om) te lopen*
 ‘It_{Expl} is on this forest ground good (for) to run’
- c. *Deze bosgrond loopt beter*
 ‘This forest ground runs comfortably’
- d. *Es läuft sich gut auf diesem Waldboden*
 it-runs-REFL-well-on-this-forest ground
- e. **Dieser Boden läuft (sich) angenehm.*
 this ground-runs(-REFL)-comfortably

Conclusions:

- (33) subject is defocussed/VP-integrated (incorporated)
- (34) sentence is propositionally focussed (wholesale perspective: consider *brrr* for *I am cold*)
- (35) derived subject (middle construction, passive): (24c) also yields propositional focus

6. Accent and information structure

Given accent disambiguation, information structure/IS plays the critical role to distinguish categoricity / double judgment andtheticity / simple judgment. Which IS-criteria are there, how do they prove themselves? I am referring to the illustrations in (22) replicated here in (37).

- (37) a. #Kühe laufen im GARTEN (/im Garten ums HAUS) herum
 cows run in the garden (/in the garden around the house) around
- b. KÜHE laufen im Garten herum ... clausal default accent on the most
 deeply embedded head (Cinque 1993),
 categorical/ eventive (stage level)
- i. thetic (accent integrated), eventive (stage level)
- ii. contrastive (presupposing other animates in the garden)
- c. #KÜHE laufen im GARTEN herum ... analytic/generic/definitional
 cows run in the garden around and essential-predicative
 (individual level) → #thetic
- d. Es sind KÜHE im Garten ... ≠ (3a): thetic (rhematic,
 there are cows in the garden referentially weak subject)
- e. Es sind die KÜHE im Garten ... ≠ (3a): categorical
 there are the cows i.t.g. (referentially strong subject)
- f. Da sind KÜHE im Garten ...locative or 'existential'
 there are cows i.t.g.

Generalizations:

- (38) a. (22b) has contrastive accent pointing to a complementary set of objects
 (complementing the cows running around in the garden).
- b. (22c) has hat accent releasing a presupposition in its own right.
- c. (22a) hardly provides a decent reading, although the accent distribution
 is a declarative statement (sentential normal accent) (Féry 1993; Grice &
 Baumann 2000; Truckenbrodt 2006). In other words, normal speech act
 status as a normal statement must be identifiable in terms of information
 structure as normal sentential accent (sentence accent on the most deeply
 embedded head).
- d. From (22a, b, c) follows that accent distributions outside of the sentential
 default presuppose discourse contexts (discourse topic; cf. Tanaka 2018).
- e. Such discourse contexts are identified syntactically by scoping beyond the
 individual sentence (mapped cartographically as a topic category) or as a
 focus category.
- f. Another way of semantic-pragmatic identification is provided by the con-
 tent (presupposed material) of the Common Ground or the 'Question
 under discus-sion').

7. Common ‘Ground contents (speech act felicity conditions)

Which phenomena raise specific Common ground contents in terms of speech act conditions and in addition to contrast accent? How do these affect the relation between categoricals?

- (39) a. Modal particles/MPs, here specifically *ja* and *eben*: Consider *Der ist ja/eben ein Gauner* where speaker assumes that there are sufficient reasons wanting his statement such that Addr will share his claim. Cf. Abraham 2014, 2016.
- b. The same holds for attitudinal adverbials such as *merkwürdigerweise* ‘strangely’, *erstaunlicherweise* ‘surprisingly’, *leider* ‘unfortunately’. The sentence *Der ist leider ein Gauner*. ‘This guy is unfortunately a crook’ provides a common ground with which Sp makes an affirmative statement adding his stance ‘unfortunately’.
- c. Exclamatives, both formally as root and subordinate sentences, are illocutionarily autonomous to the extent that they may select MPs. Consider the wishful speech act ((*Ach*) *Wenn er doch eben Recht hätte!*_{EXCLAMATIVE} ‘If only he would be right’ as against the declarative subordination in *Es käme ihm gele-gen*_{DECLARATIV}, *wenn er *doch *eben/DOCH Recht hätte* ‘It would please him if he would be right’: In other words, the exclamative speech act requires a discourse partner who shares part of the CG and is willing to further negotiate it. See Abraham 2019.

Basically, Japanese final particles presuppose a dialog situation and express a miratives moment pending specific particles. In this respect, they are similar to the German modal particles. In the German V-final, yet illocutionarily autonomous, exclamatives, the MP is occasionally imperative like in *Was er aber /doch/ nur alles kann!* ‘What a wealth he is able to achieve!’ Japanese selects the SEP *yo* in the corresponding case expressing an element of surprise as an exclamative as in *Ame-da-yo!* ‘„Es regnet ja!“ (O god,) It’s raining!’’. Exclamatives can be used in an ongoing context in the form of a dialogue. By contrast, discourse or narrative embedded sentences are basically categorical (predications about something) and consequently nonthetic.

8. Integrational focus: Broad and narrow focus

There is ambiguity between integration / incorporation focus (broad focus) and two narrow (narrow) foci on the same sentence structure. The intended interpretations are indexed in the two focus columns in (39); square brackets indicate

the characteristics in the narrow column in which argument accent presupposes objects complementary or alternative to the subject (at displays in the Common ground). See Roth 1992; Sæbø 2007; Zimmermann & Onea 2011. [#= marked, context-dependent]

(40)	F(ocus)	broad	narrow
a.	[Es wurde CHAMPAGNER serviert] _F it was champagne served 'Champaign was served/There was cham- paign serving'	+	+[-Champ]
b.	[Es stehen KÜHE im Garten] _F it stand cows in the garden 'There are cows standing in the garden'	+	+[-Kuh]
c.	[Champagner wurde serviert] _F	+	+[-Champ.]
d.	##[Champagner wurde serviert] _F	##	+[-Ch, -serviert]
e.	#[Champagner] _F wurde verboten	#	+ (≠(c))
f.	[Kühe] _F stehen im Garten cows are standing in the garden	+	+(=(c))
g.	[Die Kühe] _F stehen im Garten the cows are standing in the garden	-(≠(f))	+[-Kuh]
h.	[Kühe fressen die Blumen] _F cows feed the flowers	+	+([-Kuh, -Blume])
j.	Es fressen (die) KÜHE (die) BLUMEN it feed (the) cows the flowers 'There are (the) cows feeding on the flowers'	+	+[-Kuh, -Blume]

The most striking and most significant in (40) is that when with double-focus (40a, b, c) two contrary meanings are provided.

- (41) a. Given VP-integration (broad focus), the sentence does not project a common ground with respect to *p* making the communication simple.
 b. Given no VP-integration (narrow subject focus), the common ground contains the opposite of *p* making the communication on the basis of *p* more complex.

(42) To make (# 40b, e) acceptable requires particular contexts.

- (43) We think that ontological explanations apply between (40e), on the one hand, and (40c)+(40f), on the other hand. To all appearances, the fact that in the CG cows are said to be available the garden is to be favoured over champagne to be banned. Put differently, the champagne ban does not come to mind as something that is just as likely as the horror of cows trampling around in the garden. Linguistics has little to say on this difference.

- (44) Themes presupposing selection of article resolution as in (40g) and (40j) make ineffective accent conditions. However, this happens under syntactic constraints effective within νP or outside and with scalar salience as is shown in (40g) in contrast to (j).
- (45) Irrespective of accentuation, narrow focus holds also under focus integration (see (39a, f), i.e. [+narrow]=[-integrated]). See (46).
- (46)
- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| | \pm narrow focus |
| a. $[_{CP} Es_{EXPL} [_{\nu P} argument_F V]]_F$ | cf. (39a, b, j) +, thus integrated |
| b. $[_{CP} Es_{EXPL} [_{\nu P} argument_F V]]_-$ | cf. (39a, b) -, thus not integrated |
| (i) $[_{CP} argument_F [_{\nu P} V]]_F$ | cf. (39f) +, thus integrated |
| (ii) $[_{CP} argument_F [_{\nu P} V]]_-$ | cf. (39g) -, thus not integrated |

We draw the following conclusions similar to (25)–(29):

- Athetic subject is defocused. It is VP integrated (incorporated, i.e. without a probed external subject (valence zero placed))
- Athetic sentence is proposition-focused. There is no syntactic subject moved to SpecCP, the clausal prefield.
- For derived subjects (as in middle constructions and passives: see (3c)), likewise, propositional focus holds following the freezing principle “once the subject is suppressed or incorporated (i.e. moved from its default position in the clausal prefield), no return process is possible”.
- A syntactic subject is the lexical external subject which is probed to secondarily merge in SpecCP.
- An external argument is the subject in the lexicon appearing under primary merge inside VP. Every subject comes from an external argument. However, not every external argument is projected as a syntactic subject.

9. VP-integrated subject and unaccusative subject

Since the unaccusative subject has object properties, (47a, b) must hold.

- (47) a. $[_{CP} Es_{EXP} [_{\nu P} argument_F V]]_F$...for thetics, VP-incorporated external argument, primary merge status, i.e. prior to probing
- b. $[_{CP} Es_{EXP} [_{\nu P} argument V_F]]$...for unaccusative categoricals, νP -incorporated external argument, merge status after probing →PF

The difference between (47a) and (47b) is of considerable weight and in alignment with the criteria, in (i)–(iv).


- (i) Primary merge status applies for subject inversion and broad sentential focus. In other words, VP receives the arguments from the lexicon in thematic ranking. Morphological case, specifically nominative, is not assigned to syntactic positions as in the case of nonnominative, ‘quirky’, subjects.

Probing for adequate syntactic positions has not taken place yet. Accordingly, the external argument has not been probed for subject features triggering movement to the clausal prefield.

- (ii) The foci are located differently. For (40a) with subject inversion, broad sentential focus holds scoping over the entire sentence. The inverted subject argument carries presentational, nondefault accent. In (40b), however, default focus on the predicate (head of the most deeply embedded constituent) applies.
- (iii) The properties of unaccusative subjects, specifically their syntactic behavior as transitive objects, are derived from the specific status of the lexical ergative predicate, eV. The special status of eV is basically that of an intransitive resultative. For the specific distributional behavior of eV see (48).

- (48) a. *der gefallene*_{eV} / **geträumte*_{iV} *Soldat* – *der Gefallene*_{eV} / **Geträumte*_{iV}
 the fallen / dreamed soldier the fallen (one) / dreamed
- b. *ist* / **hat gefallen*_{eV} – **ist* / *hat geträumt*_{iV}
 is / has fallen is / has dreamed
- c. *Es wurde (vom Soldaten) *gefallen*_{eV} – *geträumt*_{iV}
 it_{EXPL} was (by the soldier) fallen dreamed
- d. **der Faller*_{PATIENS} – *der Träumer*_{AGENS}
 the faller the dreamer

For other diagnostic properties in German (especially indefiniteness of part-whole conditions of the inverted subject see Burzio’s (Burzio 1986) *ne*-cliticization in Italian; for German see Abraham 1986; see more recently Irwin 2012). (48) concerns the ungrammatical transitive (left) **He fell*_{iV} *the vase* and the grammatical unaccusative (ergative’) (right) *The vase fell*_{eV}.



- (iv) eV-status is verb-inherent (external VP), its subject inversion goes back to the lack of syntactic probing leaving all argument, external as well as internal, in VP. However, subject inversion is basically different from unaccusativity (on the strength of ergative/unaccusative verbs). See (48a, b). Consequently, my position is not in line with Perlmutter 1978; Burzio 1986, and more recently Bentley/Cruschina 2018.⁸
- (v) In Italian, presentational forms are characterized by an empty subject default position. See (49) (adapted from Bentley & Cruschina (2018: 3)).

8. The term ‘unaccusative’ is infelicitously chosen, because it only takes into account the syntactic behaviour of Italian, English and German verbs, but leaves unconsidered links to ergative typology (cf. Abraham 2000). Moreover, there is a host of languages in which accusative case has nothing to do with unaccusativity (as demonstrated in Abraham 2000). I therefore choose the better fitting terminology ‘ergative verb / eV’ obtaining for only for resultative intransitives. This is in clear opposition to nonresultative and imperfective intransitive verbs, but it is in line with the object syntax of transitive perfectives. ‘Unaccusative’ is ill termed in the first place because there is a German adverbial accusative outside the valence structure. Consider *den ganzen Tag lernen* oder *einen Giftgastod sterben* ‘study all day’, ‘die the gas death’. This fact removes the accusative from Burzio’s Unaccusative generalization (‘Only verbs that have a thematic role as subject can assign to also an object accusative’). The accusative case plays no role in the unaccusativity question. Much rather, the aspectual criteria (of (im)perfectivity and Aktionsart ((a)telicity) are the determining and constraining factors of unaccusative and verbal ergativity (Abraham 2000). In a way, a similar argument can be levied against the term anticausative (thrown into the ring by Schäfer 2008 as well as Alexiadou et al. 2006, 2009, 2015). This is so because the term anticausative presupposes pairs of causatives and de- or anticausatives in a language to cover the class of anticausative (unaccusative) verbs. But German alone provides the mighty class of directional particle verbs of movement as exceptions to Schäfer’s notion. Consider verbs of movement which, once a directional verb particle is prefixed, yields a decausative (unaccusative) perfective verb: *ins Ziel EINlaufen* into-the-goal -INrun, to which there is no causative correspondent. I think there is more than sufficient reason to let the terms *unaccusative* and *anticausative*, disappear as past theoretical and empirical misunderstandings. What we deal with is not only a specific verb class (I called them *ergative verbs*; see Abraham), but, what extends the notion beyond that of a lexical property, intransitive perfective phrase, which, by its structural implications, includes also the necessary condition of broad phrasal and sentential focus (which is left unmentioned as a requirement by Irwin 2012, 2018, 2019). Note, furthermore, that Irwin’s syntactic-semantic notion of (*eventual*) *instantiation* seems to be covered by the structural category of perfective-resultative aspect as the prime requirement of ergativity (both language typological and verb classification). The existence of directional verbs of movement alone makes superfluous any lexical classification of the notion we deal with. It has to be a phrase-structural resultative notion as much as of that Irwin’s ‘existential unaccusative’ (Irwin, this volume) is a sentence-structural resultative notion. Needless to say that the latter notions require perfective and imperfective aspect to obtain well-argued categorial positions in syntax (Abraham 1986, 2000, and sequels).

- (50) a. [_{SubjP} Subj [_{TP} T+V ... [_{VP} ...DP...]]]
 It is assumed that a covert speaker-oriented locative constituent (*here* as origo identified, in the interest of the speaker) fills this position. See (50b) with respect to the ‘Event argument approach’ (after Bianchi 1993: 61; see also Bentley & Cruschina 2018: 5). The event argument takes the position of the subject and is linked to the time projection of the past (‘Past’ calculated from the Speaker’s origo).
- b. [_{Subj} (∃e) (Past(e))] [_{Präd} è capitato un incidente a Gianni in e]
 Corresponding German with expletive subject: *Es ist dem Gianni ein Unfall passiert* ‘Gianni had an accident.’

Unaccusative syntax connects to the passive voice (*die* does not passivize) and ergative typology. By contrast, subject inversion does not. See unaccusative distributions in (47) (Abraham 1986, 2000).

Hypothesis 3 drawn on the basis of (40a–i)

- (51) a. A thetic judgment corresponds syntactically to integrational focus (broad focus), i.e. with one single focus for an intransitive predication or adjective+copula (not auxiliary), consequently [_{VP} external argument, predicate]_F.
- b. A categorial judgment is given on syntactic criteria by separate foci distributed over the two arguments of a transitive predicate, i.e. given F1≠F2 as in [_{SpecCP} [argument]_{F1} [_{VP} argument predicate]_{F2}].
- c. For (40b) see the special case in (40j), where even a transitive predicate with two argument accents as in [_{CP} Es fressen [_{VP} (die) KÜHE (die) BLUMEN fressen]] yields a focus integrated reading.
- d. Adverbials and cognate objects (*hail stomes*) do not break VP-integration. See (1).
- e. Syntactically, focus over predicate and argument is possible only for a theme argument (Jacobs 2001; Sæbø 2007: 30). See (40c).
- f. A thetic sentence is subject to the absence of both a topic and a CG (see the pertinent point in (1)). In other words, a thetic sentence is in clear information structural opposition to the categorial sentence. See also (41a, b).
- g. Under semantic valence criteria, (40a–j) seems to require that verbs in thetic sentences project theme arguments. Verbs with agent subjects are excluded to the extent that verbal agency remains unfocused in favor of broad presentativity.
- h. With the exception of COPULA+ADJ, the thetic theme argument projects as a local constituent. This constraint is mirrored in Japanese (see Fujinawa 2017).

- i. Simple as well as double constituency are not the only determining factors for distinguishingthetic and categorical sentences. What is imperative as well are discourse or dialogue embedding. This constraint is covered by Kuroda's morphological distinction of *wa*- and *ga*- sentences. See (52).
- (52) a. ame-ga futteiru. 'It is raining'
rain-ga is raining
- b. soto-wa ame-ga futteiru. 'It is raining outside'
outside-wa rain-ga is raining

Given the *wa* /-*ga*-diagnosis (52a) should bethetic and (52b) categorical. However, both sentences are more or less synonymous although (a) sounds more monological or taken out of a narrative. *Soto-wa* 'out there' is added only, if speaker and addressee are in the same room and can look outside. While (52a) sounds monological, with the addition of a SEP the sentence is fully context embedded.

- (52a') ame-ga futteiru-yo.
rain-ga is raining-MP

(52b) and (52a') are near-synonymous (Tanaka, p.c.) although different stylistically: ((52b) is written Japanese and purely descriptive, whereas (52a') is colloquial and meant as a report.

10. Speaker deixis implied by subject inversion

We follow Bianchi's (1993) 'Event argument hypothesis' (Bianchi 1993, Example (9), here (53b)) assuming for German a speaker-deictic component in the expletive subject position. The locative track in VP is speaker-origo *here*.

- (53) a. Es stehen KÜHE im Garten (hier, in unserem Garten)
it_{EXPL} stand cows in the garden (here, in our garden)
- b. [_{SubjP} Es_{LOC,speakerdeictic} [_{TP} T+V ... [_{VP} ... DP...e_{LOC,speaker deictic}]]]

However, I don't follow the event hypothesis to the extent that I observe a speech act difference between (53) and (54). While (53) is an exclamative, (54) is a normal declarative. (53) isthetic, whereas (54) is categorical. This applies no matter whether Speaker deixis involved in (54). The speech act difference is relevant.

- (54) [_{Subj} (∃e) (PAST(e))] [_{Pred} è capitato un incidente a Gianni in e]
is happened an accident to Gianni in
- German with expletive subject (speaker is worrying):
Es_{EXPL} ist dem Gianni ein Unfall passiert.

10.1 Our main hypothesis confirmed

It appears that thetics and categoricals cannot be diagnosed conclusively without reference to information structure: categoricals are [+topic], thetics are [-topic]. The diagnostic tests are the questions *Was ist los?* ‘What’s going on?’ as well as a declarative focusing the subject without reacting to *Wer/Was macht etwas?* ‘Who is doing something?’ lead to a thetic answer.

10.2 How do you leave a sentence without any context?

Thetic sentences appear as the beginning of a book chapter, stage direction, declarative V1 (first line of a song „*Kommt ein Vöglein geflogen, ...*“ comes-a-birdie-flown, first line of a joke or fable „*Sagt der Hase zuthe nominative suffixm Igel*“ says-the rabbit-to-the-hedgehog, fight report in Nordic sagas „*Nun aber erhob seine Lanze zum Wurf Egil...*“ now-then-raised-his-lance-for-throwing-Egil... (see Leiss 2000).

By contrast, there is no V1 in Japanese since word order is not functional. In its stead, as for the stage directory, the case suffix *-ga* is used.

- (55) Macbeth(Makubesu)-ga toujou-suru. (Tanaka, p.c.)
 Macbeth-ga enter.INF

In (55), the verb takes the Japanese basic form (nonfinite), which is very rare in use except for the first person giving expression to the specific intention of the speaker.

11. Special *ga*-subjects after Onoe 1973: The deeper key to thetics?

Kuroda’s generalization that thetic sentences correlate with Japanese sentences with *ga*- subjects leaves open whether generally *ga*- subjects determine thetic sentences. Let us pursue this question further in Japanese. Onoe (1973) introduces a number of “improper” *ga*-subjects, the so-called “B-class subjects”). See (56)–(59) (according to Tanaka, p.c. as well as ITanaka in this volume).

- (56) *Existential (since defining sentence) while grammatical as presentational:
 (soko-ni) neko-ga iru.
 da-LOK Katze-ga sein
 „Da ist eine Katze. Es ist da eine Katze, Es gibt da eine Katze.“
 ‘There is a cat.’

soko-ni is used for profiling a specific place. Note that the speech act of an existential claim is basically different from a speech act of presentativity (the speech act relating to putting something on the table; new storage in the CG-file; new Question under Discussion/QuD)

- (57) Object of one's own competence or ability:
 (Watashi-wa) chugokugo-ga dekiru.
 I-TOP Chinese-NOM able
 'I know Chinese/ I am a speaker of Chinese', where in Japanese "Chinese" is subject.
- (58) Entity of „spontaneous rise of emotion:
 Furusato-ga natsukasii.
 Home country-ga nostalgia raising
 „I remember my home country;“, with "my home country" is coded as subject in Japanese
- (59) Seat of sensation:
 Atama-ga itai.
 head-ga does pain
 „My head is aching.“ (cf. (60a–c): *(*sich*) *ein Bein brechen* 'to break a leg')

We may ask whether propositional focus is equivalent to the nominalization of the entire sentence as „*Katzenpräsenz*“, 'the presence of my cat', „*meine Chinesischkenntnis*“, 'my Chinese competence' „*meine Heimatnostalgie*“ 'my home nostalgia', „*mein Kopfweh*“ 'my headache'? Are these part-whole correspondences similar to (60a), but unlike (60b).

- (60) a. Er bricht sich ein Bein? ≠ (60b, c)
 he breaks himself a leg
- b. ##Er bricht ein Bein
 he breaks a leg
- c. *Ein Bein wird (**sich*) durch ihn / **sich* gebrochen.
 a leg is (himself) by him / himself broken

Note that *sich ein Bein brechen* to-break-a-leg (≠*ein Bein brechen*, but = *break a leg*). The sentence can be decomposed into subject and predicate, thus syntactically (60a). (61a–c) lists pseudo transitive sentences and pseudo subjects all of which are not subject-focused, but proposition-focused. See the respective subject emphasis. [SMALL CAPS for emphasis]

- (61) a. [_{CP} Es brach [_{VP} ER sich ein BEIN]] ≠ [_{CP} Er (zer)brach [_{VP}
 it_{EXPL} broke he himself a leg he broke-up
 ein Bein]]
 a leg
- b. [_{CP} Es sehne [_{VP} ICH mich nach meiner HEIMAT]]
 it_{EXPL} long i. myself for my home country
- c. [_{CP} Es kannst [_{VP} DU CHINESISCH]] or [_{CP} Es bist [_{VP} DU
 it_{EXPL} can you Chisese it_{EXPL} are you
 DES CHINESISCHEN kundig]]
 of Chinese able
- d. [_{CP} Es tut [_{VP} MIR DER KOPF weh]]
 it_{EXPL} does me the head pain
- e. MIR ist KALT – ICH habe es KALT
 me is cold I have it cold
- f. ICH habe HUNGER – ICH bin HUNGRIG (Latin)
 I have hunger I am hungry
 ‘(BEI) MIR ist HUNGER(/MIHI FAMES est)’

(61a–c) signal part-whole subjects. Viewing normal transitivity and passivation, no property transfer of the subject to the object takes place (see Abraham (2010) for the generalization ‘Semantic transitivity trigger for passivization’). Is there a link to Onoe’s (1973) typical *ga*-verbs?

All of Onoe’s B class subjects have a clear affinity to the clausal *-ga-* projection. They can be combined with *wa* only with difficulty. This means that Onoe’s subjects are basically “thetic subjects” (something that has been completely ignored by Kuroda 1972), i.e. they are VP integrated subjects and the entire sentence is focused. The subject has not undergone probing, but still has the status of an external argument on. Normal subjects with *-wa* are basically CP-subjects, i.e. subjects of the unmarked topic type (Lambrecht 1994). Nontopical subjects accent must be marked. This leads to the concept of the prosodic prominence of focus subjects.

12. Linking thetic syntax with Onoe’s special *ga*-verb class in Japanese?

What is it that might contribute to an independent appreciation of Onoe’s *ga*-verb classification in semantic and/or pragmatic terms (possibly similar to Truckenbrodts (2006) approach)? What connects Kuroda *ga*-syntax (subject incorporation, external argument status with theta roles, primary merge status) with Onoes special *ga*-verb class?

Conclusion 2 (in consideration of all details): Thetic status implies

- A. no sentential prefield, no discourse status („VP-integration“)
- B. no topic / no ‘about-topic’, but apt text starter (cf. (G))
- C. propositional focus / „Urpropositionalität“ (Lotze 1989 „the thought as such/der Gedanke schlechthin“/brrr = simple judgment \approx marked accentuation / marked prosody)
- D. *Es*-presentational, syntactically autonomous (= has its own and specific FORCE/Speech act-operator as a presentational)
- E. Valence zero place = ‘Superintransitivity’ (cf. Abraham 2010: ‘there is no proto-transitivity.’)
- F. Certain thetic sentences have typical exclamative status (in German also beyond the formal root constraint; no CG); but see (G).
- G. CG(thetic) = question-under-discussion/QuD *What’s going on?*
- H. (G) \neq CG(categorical) = QuD *What’s going on with XP?*
- I. A new distribution between form and function holds for the morphological thetic-categorical distinction in Japanese (Deguchi (2012: 233f.) generalizing and extending beyond Kuroda 1972):
 - i. There are two types of *wa*-sentences and, likewise, two *ga*-sentences covering the two types of judgment, thetic and categorical.
 - ii. ‘Neutral *ga*’ and ‘contrastive *wa*’ equally reflect simple ‘thetic’ judgment, whereas the ‘exhaustively accounting *ga* and the ‘thematic *wa*’ equally reflect the double categorical judgment.

If, as usually in the literature, *-wa* applies as a topicmarker, it is assumed that *-ga* is available as a focus marker. This prompts the conclusion that the usual case mapping for *-ga* as ‘nominative’ is derived: probably from the semantic role of ‘agent’. This is in turn consistent (although not in direct accordance) with the thetic-rhematic association of the constructional *-ga* set. Note that it is not directly related to the speech association as a declarative or exclamative. Alternatively, we might take nominative case to be derived in the first place. Assume that *-ga* categorizes as nominative case insofar as the *ga*- phrase is assigned the status of the most salient argument in the action-event hierarchy. Thus, *-ga* prefers to be linked with the focus as well as with the agent of a sentence. The second highest structural case is that which most closely connects with the patient. i.e. *-ga*. The other Japanese case particles as *ni* ‘to’, *kara* ‘of on/off’, *de* ‘n / on’ or *yor* ‘compared to’ are lexical cases that have more or less specific lexical meanings like prepositions in present-day German.

Finally, consider the question: “What does focus have to do with thetics?” Let us restrict ourselves to focus (as ‘center of attention’) linked to syntactic VP-integration rather than the vaguer notions ‘sentence as a whole’ or ‘sentential idiom’. Both the structural and the lexical case particles are captured in the overall sentential scope.

They relate to each other as links in terms of syntagmatic relations. Following basic ideas of Jakobson (1958), Włodarczik (2005: 51f.) interprets the difference between *-wa* (for “identity”) and *-ga* as that between paradigmatic against syntagmatic ordering status. There is thus the *ga*-type and the *wa*-type of modal sentence-end particles in Japanese. *Ga* can be combined with the case particles *o* “nouns”, *ni* “into”, *de* “so” e “image” to “; *kara* “because”, *yor*i “compared to”, *made* “image” among others. By contrast. *wa* goes together with *mo* ‘also, even’, *koso* ‘exactly’, *sae* ‘sogar’, *dake* ‘only’, *shika* ... *nai* ‘except for’, *nomi* ‘exclusively, only’, all of which are classified in Japanese linguistics as *toritate joshi*, i.e. the class of grammatical morphemes, further as adverbial concepts of comparison, of exclusion and concession. Apart from **ga* + *wa*, the SEs can be combined in the order *ga*-type << *wa*-type. SEs of the *wa*-type plus a nominal can cooccur with any SE of the *ga*-Types. In conclusion, one can say that the *wa*-particle type is activated in paratactical or paradigmatic linking, while the *ga*-particle type occurs in syntactic, i.e. syntagmatic linking.

In addition to the case particles, there are a number of topic particles (*toritate Joshi*) such as *wa*, *mo* ‘Also’, *koso* “of all” etc. These can be combined freely with case particles except for the combination **ga*+*wa* and **wo*+*wa*. In today’s Japanese, the structural cases can also be activated together with *-wa*, somewhat less readily with *mo* and *koso*. This confirms the classification of *-wa* as paradigmatic and *-ga* as syntagmatic. Syntagmatic sentential status classifies formations of constituents as wholes, while paradigmatic classifies entities in relation to alternatives. This yields subject inversion or subject integration-in-VP as a primary step of verb valence status in the process of merging from the lexicon into sentence syntax. I see this as a concretization version of the Distributed Morphology Hypothesis (in the sense of Halle Marantz, Embick, etc.).

Onoe’s semantic constraints on the *ga*- only verbs are very much in line with the semantic constraints found to hold on Icelandic quirky subjects (Jónson 2003: 159) as oblique case cannot be assigned to subjects of:

- a. agentive verbs of any kind,
- b. psych-verbs denoting strong positive feelings,
- c. (psych)-verbs which canonically take animate objects,
- d. strictly intransitive motion verbs and
- e. verbs denoting entity-specific change of state.

For German, we found oblique case in topic position to hold for affected humans. In the tradition and mental awareness of the German speaker, such obliques are never felt to be subjects but rather affected objects. This is evidenced by the fact that they disallow passivization (on the basis of failure of semantic transitionness; Abraham 2003). Needless to say, many issues require further study, e.g. the hypothesized division of lexical subject case into semantic case and idiosyncratic case.

13. The origo decision for episodicity and genericity

13.1 Thetic valence and origo deixis

Assume the following hypothesis of distinguishing thetic vs. categorical judgments (see Abraham 2018): Thetic sentences (simple judgments) are ungrammatical for direct origo deixis (thus, for *here, there, now, tomorrow* etc.). Thetics counts as unepisodic. Origo deixis extends the simple judgment to the double judgment and episodics. This means that the distinction of thetic and categorical becomes palpable with predicate logical means. See (62).

- (62) a. double judgment, categorical:
 $\lambda x \lambda y: p(x,y)\{\text{cows}(x) \wedge \text{in the garden}(y)\}$
 $\lambda x \lambda y: p(x,y)\{\text{referentially strong/weak subject noun}(x) \wedge \text{place/Time}(y)\}$
 $[_{\text{SpecCP}} \text{ cows } [_{\text{C}} \text{ are } [_{\text{VP}} \text{ in the garden}]]]$
 $[_{\text{TOPIC}} \text{ cows } [_{\text{PHEMA}} \text{ are } [_{\text{COMMENT}} \text{ in the garden}]]]$
- b. simple judgment, thetic:
 $\lambda x \lambda y: p(x)\{\text{cows}(x) \wedge \text{in the garden}(x)\}$
 $\lambda x \lambda y: p(x)\{\text{referentially weak subject noun}(x) \wedge \text{place}(x)\}$
 $[_{\text{SpecCP}} \text{ Es } [_{\text{C}} \text{ are } [_{\text{VP}} \text{ cows in the garden}]]]$
 $[_{\text{TOPIC}} e [_{\text{PHEMA}} \text{ are } [_{\text{COMMENT}} \text{ cows in the garden}]]]$

Following Guéron's argumentation (Guéron 2006: 13, see also Irwin (this volume)), an episodic sentence is indexed for origo-related place and time. Chinese, for example, indicates this morphologically in the sense of existentiality. See (62).


- (63) A dog is barking/Ein Hund bellt (gerade)/Es bellt ein Hund.
 (episodic⁹ – CL-marked)¹⁰
 Yǒu yī zhī gǒu zài jiào
 Exist Num CL N Progr v
 have a CL dog Progr bark

9. Due to the origo-episodic *gerade* 'just now' the sentence rating should be categorical. Without the time adverb, however, the presentative or existential sentence expresses a thetic statement ('There is a dog barking'). This is shown by word order (without filling the sentential prefield) and the weak, indefinite subject (*a dog*). A similar semantics can be found in the introduction of the joke: Comes-a-man-into-a pub-and-orders-a-beer. As for the content, the sentence is episodic and would thus be categorical. However, it gets thetic status thanks to its genre-technical narrative.

10. Episodicity does not necessarily have to be marked by CL to represent the situation ('HUNDE BELLEN dogs-are-barking') as a whole (i.e. with broad focus). In its stead, one may say that a dog exists and is barking (i.e. marking existential + presentational): *You gou zai jiao*. EXIST 'Hund PROGR bellen' (p.c. J. Jang, MunTaipe, Taiwan).

The structure of (6) has an iterative TP/TP_{iterative}. The lower T signals present tense (different from the speaking time index 1 in COMP). The higher T, T_{iterative}, has the index 0. The topic (theme) is divided into two parts. The higher DP, DP_{iterative}, contains a filled D and NUM. It features the concept of the lexical entry *Hund/dog*. The deeper DP has an empty D and a filled NumP: the term refers to the individual instantiation of the *dog* concept in the speaker-listener discourse world (common ground). I outline a preliminary structural analysis of CL in (62a) and a more detailed one in terms of Guéron (2006) in (62b). The purpose of this comparison is to represent the categorial status of the strong DP-CL and record the episodic labelling on the TP_{iterative}. This cocategorical status is confirmed by the referentially weak DP marking without CL and sentential generics without TP_{iterative}. Cf. (62a, b).

(64) a. [_{CP} haben ein [_C CL Hund [_{VP} Progr bellen]]]
 have a dog barking



The core of the episodic structure is the separation of the subject as about-topic T_{iterative} and as the topic argument of the predication, SpecTP. Consider the functionally equivalent sentential variant *As regards the dog, this dog is (just) barking*. Another point is that, given the weakly referential subject-DP, the time indexing as TP_{iterative} is assigned to for the episodic status of the sentence.

It is important to note that predicate-logic representation (64b) does not offer a syntactic resolution insofar as the VP-Incorporation of the subject argument is not represented. As a consequence, what is lost in (64b) is the rhematic status of

all arguments; furthermore, the special status of the subject as unmarked topic as compared to the other arguments; the effect of stress accent to discriminate thethetic and the categorical reading: the reference state (strength vs. weakness) of the DP arguments to decide betweenthetic and categorical readings. This was bypassed syntactically by argument-VP incorporation as in the German equivalent with subject inversion, *Es bellt ein Hund*, in (62).

This deserves extra highlighting again:thetic sentences are not episodic declaratives (indexed for time and space). In terms of origo criteria, they are fundamentally different from categorical sentences. This means also thatthetic sentences are not true judgments (in the sense of truth evaluation; cf. Tanaka 2018) nor are they assertions. They function as exclamations or presentationals and, consequently, statements with a speech act quality their own. Only topic-comment structures are truth-validating judgments (much, as I see it, in the sense of Kant's understanding), i.e. categorical judgments or assertions. It is on the same line of argument that in Japanese conditional and causal sentences are classified differently. Conditional sentences are *wa*-marked, while causal ones are marked by *ga* (Tanaka 2018). On Tanaka's interpretation this is so because conditionals (with *wenn-dann/if(-then)*) are removed from reality, while causals (with *weil-denn/because, since*) are not. They are involved in reality.

13.2 Episodic in contrast to generic: Tense in DP? Referential biographies

It is easy to see that episodic events should be coded differently than generic states. Episodic sentences should be time-indexed, whereas as generics are independent of time allocations. Following Guéron/Hoekstra (1998); Guéron (2006) suggested that generic and episodic sentence structures have different syntactic structures. A sentence is episodic in the case that its time indexing is positive. Generic sentences, by contrast, carry a zero time index, or no index at all. Guéron illustrates this with sentences like (62) and (64a). 1*), These structures are ambiguous between the episodic structure in (65a) and generic interpretations as (65b).

(65) *Der Hund bellt* 'The dog is barking/barks'

(66) a. *Hör, wie Der Hund bellt* / **wie Hunde* / **ein Hund bellen/bellt*
listen how the dog barks / how dogs / a dog bark(s)

[_{CP} C₁ [_{TP} der Hund T¹ [_{VP} bellt]]]

'Hör, der Hund bellt.' / 'Listen, the dog is barking'

b. *Der* / *Ein Hund bellt* / *Hunde bellen*
the / a dog barks / dogs bark

[_{CP} C₁ [_{TP} der Hund T⁰ [_{VP} bellt]]]

'(*Hör) der Hund bellt.' / '(*Listen,) the dog barks'

The crucial observations in our discussion on DPs are on the special relations between topic-DP and predicate types. Our goal is to represent it as clearly as possible sentence episodics and generics. The discussion was also expected to yield what is the most common approach to Chinese classifiers. Let us first turn to the connections between aspect and topic-DP. Guéron (2006), e.g. the author's (33) ff.) drew the following comparison between subject reference and predicate types: a noun identified as perfective or bounded DP can act as a subject of a predication. By contrast, weak or unbounded DPs as in (66a, b) are not suitable topics for essential (individual level) predicates/ILPs. In other words, ILPs have a strong DP as a subject, whereas event (stage-level) predicates/SLP are suitable for strong as well as weak DP subjects.

- (67) a. *Ein Mann ist groß. \neq ^{OK} Ein Mann ist menschlich
 a man is tall a man is human
 – analytic/generic/ILP indeoendent of predicate adjective
- b. *Männer sind blond. \neq ^{OK} Männer sind menschlich
 men are blond men are human
 – analytic/generic/ILP indeoendent of predicate adjective

Adjectivals seem accessible only for a subject-sorted IL predication. (67) and (68) further down show that a weak DP does not work as subject of an Individual level predicats/ILP. Referentially weak DPs were added in the ungrammatical illustrations with bare plurals, (67) (Guéron 2006: e.g. (34)) to confirm the generalization about the class of referentially imperfective, i.e. unbound DPs. Bare plurals behave like weak subject nouns. Predicative adjectives such as *traurig* 'sad' and *hungrig* 'hungry' can be selected only in coconstruction with referentially strong subject nouns (represented by determiners like *die / fünf/alle/viele* 'the / five/all/many' etc.). The conclusion is that bare plural and weak subject nouns are backgrounded in discourse. Respective distributions are illustrated in (67)–(68) (similarly, Guéron 2006: (35)–(37)).

- (68) a. *Ärzte sind traurig. 'doctors are sad'
 *strong/ILP-NP/generic: **alle Ärzte(traurig)* 'all doctors(sad)' without place and time reference
- a' *Ein Arzt ist traurig. 'a doctor is sad'
 *weak/ILP-NP/generic: **jeder Arzt(traurig)* 'every doctor(sad)' without place and time reference
- b. *Kinder sind hungrig. 'kids are hungry'
 \neq ^{OK}*Kinder sind immer hungrig* 'kids are always hungry' – grammatical since anchored for time
- b' *Ein Kind ist hungrig 'a kid is hungry'
 \neq ^{OK}*Ein Kind ist oft hungrig* 'a kid i soften hungry' – grammatical since anchored for time

- (69) a. *Es sind (*die) Kühe auf dem Rasen/*hier.* – expletive subject,thetic
 there are (the) cows on the grass/here
- b. *Es rinnt (*die) flüssige Butter vom Tisch/*da runter* – expletive subject,thetic
 there runs (the) fluent butter from
 the table/there down

Place anchoring seems possible for thetics as shown by the examples in (69a)). What seems impossible is direct deixis in relation to local adverbs (*hier* ‘here’). Bare plurals or mass subject nouns are acceptable albeit only in presentational constructions (‘thetic’ in Kuroda’s terminology; cf. Guéron 2006: the author’s Example (36)). See (69). As before, we have focused on thetic expletive constructions in German.

- (70) a. *Es lagen Bücher^{OK} auf dem Tisch/*dort/*hier*
 ‘There were books on the tble/there/here’
- b. ***Bücher waren dort/hier/da//^{OK}BÜCHER waren da*
 books were there/here/there/books were there
- c. **Es ist Wasser^{OK} im/#in diesem Krug.*
 ‘There is water in-the/in the jug’
- d. **Es bleibt Butter auf^{OK} dem/*meinem Teller stehen*
 it stays butter on the/my bord stand
- e. **Es liegen (#die) Karten in der Schublade*
 it lie (the) tickets in the drawer

The samples in (69) are in contrast to (70). Stars for ungrammaticality refer to thetic sentence status. SpecCP occupation goes hand in hand with contrastive accent or hat prosody. This excludes presentationality and thetics. There is no simple judgment. See (71a, b).

- (71) a. Books were everywhere//*Es waren überall Bücher / *Bücher waren überall*
- b. Men are present in the hall//*Es sind Männer da / *Männer sind da*
- c. Sharks are visible quite close//*Es sind Haie in Sicht / *Haie sind in Sicht*
- d. Tickets are available at the booth//*Es sind noch Tickets erhältlich /*Tickets sind noch erhältlich.*

Based on such examples, Guéron (2006) points out that a bare plural subject or a mass topic is grammatical in an episodic sentence where movement is possible only if the atoms of the plural items or parts of the mass entity are distributed across the entirety amount and exclude direct deixis such as in (71). The situation described by an episodic sentence must be anchored in discourse time (such as through *always, often*) and discourse location (such as *anywhere in the room*). As is demonstrated (following Guéron 2006) by the distribution of the weak and strong topics, presentationals are anchored in discourse due to the referential biography

of the subject. Strong or definite bounded subject nouns have such a referential biography, whereas weak, referentially unbound DPs do not. You have no such referential biography.

14. Typological commonalities

There's an interesting intersection between discourse-unselectedthetic sentences and speech acts: presentationals as exclamatives. The class of presentationals withthetic character includes terms of feeling like *Mir ist nicht gut* me-is-not-good 'I don't feel good', impersonal passives as *Es wird fleißig getanzt* it-is-diligently-danced 'There is diligent dancing' and impersonal presentationals constructions such as *Es sind Kühe im Garten* it-are-cows-in the garden 'There are cows in the garden'. Thus, we consider expressions of *feeling*' and other presentationals in the broadest sense. Intransitive body part predications such as *Er brach sich ein Bein* he-broke-a leg do not appear as easily identifiable as presentationals. Nevertheless, I think that the missing discourse integration warrantsthetic status of such sentences. It should be noted that, due to the reflexive predicate with *sich*, the direct object in *ein Bein brechen* break-a-leg does not allow an anaphoric interpretation. Furthermore, the sentence has no agentive reading. It cannot be passivized. I conclude from this that such part-of constructions count as VP-integrations (subject inversion).

In what follows, commonalities and differences of the phenomena we looked at are summarized. See (72)

- (72) **Thetic commonalities** (Dut=Dutch, Ger=German Isl=Icelandic, Swe=Swedish, upper case=stress accent)

Topic German <i>es</i>	expressive unit
subject VP-integration	DP-substitution
thetic operator <i>es</i>	VP-integration: (P)
valence: λP (P)	DP-derivation
prosodic unity	
a. Ger <i>Es brach_i [_{VP} er sich ein Bein t_i]</i> – [_{VP} er sich ein Bein brech-]	
b. <i>dass (*es) er sich ein BEIN brach</i>	– <i>sein BEINbruch // das AUTSCH</i>
that (it) he himself a leg broke	his legbreach // the ouch
d. <i>dass es regnet</i>	– <i>das REGNEN // der REGEN // das IHHH</i>
that it rains	the raining // the rain
e. <i>dass mir SCHLECHT ist</i>	– <i>meine ÜBELKEIT // das BRRR</i>
that me sick is	my sickness
f. <i>dass GETANZT wird</i>	– <i>das TANZEN // das TANZI-TANZI</i>
that danced is	the dancing // the dance

- g. *dass GOTT ALLMÄCHTIG ist* – *der ALLMÄCHTIGE GOTT // GOTTALLMACHT*
 that god allmighty is the almighty god // god's
 allmightyness
- h. *dass KÜHE in den Blumen stehen* – *die KÜHE in den BLUMEN // die BLUMENkühe*
 that cows in the flowers stand the flowercows
- i. *dass ZWEI und ZWEI VIER ist* – *der ZWEIUNDZWEIvierer*
 that two and two four is the twoandtwofourer
- j. *dass die WINKELSUMME des Dreiecks zwei rechte WINKEL sind* – *das ZweirechteWINKELdreieck*
 that the angle sum of the triangle two square angles are the twosquareanglestriangle
- k. *dass der LÖWE ein TIER ist* – *das LÖWENTier*
 that the lion an animal is the lionanimal
- b'. **Dut** *dat hij (er) 'n been brak* – *z'n BEENbreuk*
- f. *er wordt gedansd* – *het DANSEN // de DANS*
- f. **Isl** *að *(Pað) verið dansað*
- f. **Sw** *att *(det) dansas*

Any VP integration (subject inversion) can be represented as a nominalization without any major loss compared to thethetic design with expletive *es* 'it' in subject-topic position. VP-integration (subject inversion) collects all arguments in premerge position including the subject, which raises only later, out of the primary merge position in VP, to SpecCP. Thethetic subject inside VP appears coded as a lexically external argument, yet probed already for subject agreement due to the finite predicate. We note that subject VP-inversion and its preprobe status substantiates what Kuroda (1972) and Sasse (1987) envisioned to be an 'entity-central' and 'unasserted judgment' (see Tanaka (in this volume); compare also, Page 13; see also "holistically presented situation" in Hellan & Beermann (in this volume)). The same holds for Lotzes (1956:13, 70) concept of *Prädikatesunstructureiertheit* 'astructural predicatehood' (see Leiss (this volume)).

My attempt at the syntactic specification of thetics as VP integration of the subject (subject inversion) has as its background the Modistic Scholastic tradition (Leiss 2010, 2018) in which each sentence is decomposed as the copula as a carrier of tense and (agreement) inflexion.

- (73) a. KOP [Subj V_{STEM} -end/ $V_{INFINITIVE}$ seind {OBJ, ADV}]
 or, respectively,
 b. Expl [$_{VP}$ [Subj [$_{VP}$ *V]]]
 where *V is a V-lexeme ist in present participle orm (in the status of ADJ or N governed by the copula, COP). See (73).

- (74) LF: [_{SpecCP} [_{VP} Es [_{V'} sind [_{VP} Kühe stehend im Garten →
 → PF: [_{SpecCP} Es [_{C'} stehen [_{VP} Kühe im Garten]]]

Nevertheless, the question remains how tense, mood, and agreement apply in VP as long as goal probing through SpecCP is non-existent. However, ever since Haider (1993a, b, 2000, 2010) and Vikner (2001) it is considered that predicate inflection in German as well as other head-final languages is directly projected out of the lexicon. In contrast with VO languages like English and Icelandic, the German predicate discharges ('merges') its arguments in declining (left-directed) form along the VP-chain. Consider the main points of this assumption for head-final languages in (i)–(iv).

- i. There is no displacement V-to-I for OV languages (such as German). Predicate inflection is projected directly from the lexicon through successive merge.
- ii. In contrast to the exploratory probe-goal relation, in head-final languages such as German there is no congruence projection triggered under c-command (Haider 2000, 2010).
- iii. Case checking starts from the predicate head in sentence-final position with leftward direction.
- iv. The oblique ("quirky") subject inside VP has external (rather than internal) argument status. The syntactic status of the VP-internal subject is that of a DP without raising to the clausal prefield (SpecCP) and licensing by the predicative verb. The modalic status of the external argument is not syntactic but semantic. The utterance conceptually follows valence syntax, which for German as a right-headed language is leftward directed regardless whether the predicate V activates finite or nonfinite morphology.
- v. The fact that the thematic subject (integrated in VP) must generally be weakly referential (excluding definite reference) stands in clear contrast to the categorial sentential status. Subject inversion is in line with the empirical facts of the thematic sentence, i.e. it signals definitional and generic status, Nominalization in terms of states (by way of neuter gender infinitives) signal nonindividuality, i.e. mereologically [+homogeneous, –divisible, –additive]. See *expressive unit* in (71).
- vi. Subject inversion (integration in VP) for thematic warrants the exemption of discourse binding. See (71)–(73). The formal structure of subject inversion fills the gap that descriptions like 'sentence as a unit' leave behind. All information-structural and formal thematicity conditions are met here.
- vii. What would be the deeper ontological reason for the divorce of thematic and categorial? Lotze (1989: 71) takes the position against Marty (1924–1994) that thematic (simple judgment) precedes categorial (double judgment) as a source of derivation. It represents the origin of any successful (though not truthvaluable)

presentational (though still not necessarily of propositional status). This holds also with respect to first language acquisition and the proto-language. I adopt this position. In L1 as well as in protolanguage, the expression *brr precedes* the utterance *I am cold*. Likewise, *Ouch* comes before *I hurt myself*. The speech act status of *brrr* and *ouch* is as strong as that of *I am cold* and *I hurt myself*.

- viii. According to Kant, judgments are limited to relations between two terms, i.e. a *predicandum* (operandum) and a *predicans* (operator). Following Kant, there is no simple judgment in the Brentano-Marty sense (similarly Kuroda 2003, clearly withdrawing his position from 1972). Given that thetics do not belong to the judgments, what could it then be such that we remain within the conceptualizations of modern linguistics? What seems accountable in terms of speech acts alone without propositional truth valuability is the presentational utterance (as a sort of exclamative).

Given that, as we have seen, German OV controls thetic structures differently from VO languages, namely critically in the lexicon, the question arises, how different thetics will be structured and identified in other languages. We have seen that Kuroda's simple equivalence with *ga-* morphology in Japanese (Kuroda (1972) cannot be maintained (Deguchi 2012; Włodarczik 1998, 2005; Wilson 2017, a.o.s). On the other hand, the typological patterns discussed by Ulrich and Sasse seem to confirm that thetics occupy a functionally important position across languages. It is above all two phenomena that are in line with my assumptions. For one, in all VO languages the definiteness effect applies in presentationals, while it has only weak validity in German. See (75a, b).

- (75) a. *There is John/the cat in the garden ... English
 b. Es ist HANS/die KATZE im Garten ... German

I have added the essential points of stress marking for thetics in German, which has been ignored in many treatments of the topic (Sorrenti 2015). The second observation concerns the fact that *sein* 'be' and *haben* 'have' alternate differently across even closely related languages and dialects.

- (76) a. Mir **ist** kalt – Es ist mir kalt Standard German
 b. Ik **heb** 't koud – *Er is mij koud Dutch
 ich **habe** es kalt – es ist mir kalt
 c. I **hon**=s kalt 'Ich hab's/habe es kalt' High Alemannic (Montafon, Austria)
 d. Es **sind** KÜHE im Garten – Es **hot**/***sen** KÜA im Gaarta Austria
 e. Er **zjin** koeien in de tuin – *Het heeft koeien ... Dutch

- (77) a. **Ist** (*es) mir kalt? – **Sei kalt!
 b. **Hon** i's kalt? – **Hon's** I(CH) kalt?! – **Hon's** kalt! 'Hab's/Habe es kalt!'
 habe ich=s kalt – hab=s ich kalt
 c. **Hot's** KÜA im Gaarta? – ***Hot** Küa's im Gaarta?

Montafon/Alemannic dialect

In (76)–(77), distributions are displayed, which show the difference between the two presentational auxiliaries *SEIN* and *HABEN*. The following data in (78) extend the range of variants.

- (78) a. dass (*es) getanzt wird that-(it)-danced-is 'that there is dancing'
 b. dat (er) gedansd wordt
 c. ađ *(Pađ) veriđ dansađ
 d. att *(det) dansas

(78a–d) invite the conclusion that the OV languages, German and Dutch, are distinguished with respect to the VP-head: Dutch has a pre VP-functional head, while German either has a post-VP-functional head without activating a Spec-projection (subject position) or no such head in the first place (Bayer 2004: 51). As to Haider (1993), German projects no IP, while C selects VP directly with predicate finiteness features together with the subject. With reference to (77), Bayer (2004: 51) sees reason for the conclusion that Chomsky's universal hypothesis, the *Extended Projection Principle/EPP* (Chomsky 2001) that for all languages, a subject position is structurally available, is untenable for German.

15. Hypothesis: Passives are near-thetic

Assume that passives with derived subject are near-thetic as opposed to corresponding agentives. This assumption seems to require that there is no definiteness effect in languages providing definite vs. indefinite articles. The main argument in favor of this assumption is the thesis that passivization is subject to property (action effect) transfer from the agent subject to the patient object (receiver of effect). Consequently, if, for an agentive structure, such a property transfer is blocked the respective structure cannot undergo the passivizing process (Abraham 2006). Nonpassivizability (in terms of lack of an agent instigator) of a structure implies rhematic discourse status. See (79). [p-focus=proposition focus, accent displayed only for contrast focus, default focus remains unmarked]

(79)	<i>p</i> -focus =thetic as <i>Brrr!</i>	Passive- subject- morphology	Rethema- tization
a. Ein HUND ₁ wird (e ₁) geschlagen a dog is hit	+//–	+	+
b. Es ₁ wird hier ₁ getanzt it is here danced 'There is dancing here'	+	–/+	+
c. Es ₁ läuft sich ₁ hier gut	–/+	–/+	+
d. Er ₁ bricht sich ₁ ein Bein ₁ he breaks REFL a leg	–/+	–/+	+
e. Mir ₁ /Mich ₁ graust (es ₁) davor me _{DAT/ACC} shudders (it) of	–	–	+
f. „Heinrich, mir graut vor Dir“ Henry! I dread to look on thee	–	+	
g. KÜHE ₁ sind im Garten ₁ cows are in the garden	–//+	–	+
h. Es wird ein Hund geschlagen 'There is dog beating'	+	–	+

(79a–g) mean as much as *Hundeschlagen/-geschlage*, dog beating, *Getanze/Tanz(erei)* 'dancing', *Gelaufe/Lauf(erei)* 'running', *Beinbruch* 'breach of leg', *Grausen* 'feel horror, dread', *Gartenkuhpräsenz* 'presence of a garden cow'. From this follows that proposition nominalization cannot go back to subject focus. It seems essential to note that this type of nominal unification does not derive from episodic Individual events like *der Schlag/Tanz/Lauf/Bruch* the beat-hit/dance/breach/run etc. It seems that such individual (masculine) nouns cannot be derived in the first place as their mereological characteristic should be (+homogeneous, +inside perspectivization (inner aspect), +divisible, +additive, +imperfective) and, consequently, neuter by gender.

The most obvious conclusion under evaluation of all empirical phenomena is to assume subject suspension meaning that the traditional subject properties of German (unmarked in the clausal prefield/SpecCP, subject suppression under passivation, nominative marker, different coreference types etc. – see Barðdal et al. 2018) are deactivated.

Subject suspension type 1 applying to sentences with *es*-expletive under inversion of the subject into VP, thereby leaving the sentential prefield/SpecCP unoccupied by an argument. This applies to full passives and impersonal passives in a direct way.

Subject suspension type 2 involving German predicates of the Onoe type (verbs of emotion and sensation) governing oblique subject arguments put as subject, whose case valence is purely lexically determined (dative *Mir graut vor dir* me grieves in-front-of you, accusative *Mich schwindelt* me feel queasy). The oblique argument meets no formal subject status after the formal distribution tests (passivation, various coreference tests).

Subject suspension type 3. This type is not limited to a specific verb class, but applies with full liability to diathetic changes as in the passive *Ihr wird gedankt* she. DAT is thanked – *Ihrer wird gedacht* she.GEN is remebered. It also applies to middle constructions, where the covert subject is identified by the reflexive: *Es läuft sich hier gut* it runs REFL here well.

Suspension type 4 refers to the subject of pseudo transitives emerging with part-of subjects: *Er_i bricht sich_i, ACC ein Bein_i, ACC. sich_i-ACC* Subject suspension arises from the part-of relationship between *sich* himself and *ein Bein* a leg. The formal subject has no no syntax of its own (*passivation) and no semantics (*agent): ***Ein Bein wird (sich) (von ihm) gebrochen* ‘a leg will (be) broken (by him)’.

16. Conclusion without a real end: The interface mix

16.1 Is it easy in Japanese to recognize and to encode thetics?

Yes, it is. The subject in thetic judgments is coded by the suffix *-ga*. Thus, thetic sentences in Japanese are identified morphologically. This does not apply for German as it is not even beyond doubt that the so-called existence clause (*there is/are...*) has the presentational function that typically hold for thetics. As we have seen, subject reference expressed by the definite article plays an identifying role in German, but not in Japanese as there is no article there. Furthermore, word order (subject inversion), diathesis (passive, especially impersonal passive) are relevant. There is an interesting intersection between the discourse-independent thetic sentences and speech act status: exclamatory presentationals capturing also expressions of empathy such as *Mir ist nicht gut* ‘I don’t feel alright!’. The latter German expressions are matched by Onoe’s Japanese sentences of feeling (among which with *weird* subjects), by impersonal passives as *Es wird hier fleißig getanzt* ‘There is quite some dancing over here’ and other impersonal presentational constructions. An important role is played by part-whole expressions with one’s own body parts as *Er brach sich ein Bein* he-broke-himself-a-leg, which are islands with respect to passivization despite their transitive valence. They are less easily indentified as exclamative presentationals. Nevertheless, thetic status of such expressions offers itself due to

missing discourse integration. Note in this context that in the part-whole expression *sich ein Bein brechen* oneself-a-leg-break the direct object *oneself* has no anaphoric reading due to the part-whole relationship to the subject. Anaphoricity is clause internally swallowed disallowing binding beyond the sentence boundary. The subject has no agent status. Is there any reason to speak of VP-incorporation in such cases?

All of this suggests that, in contrast to Japanese, German uses a comprehensive list of identifying alternatives for thethetic function. It seems justified to expect that also the grammar of Japanese submits its simple *ga*-product, much in the sense of the Germanthetic phenomena, to a new investigation, not least in terms of the findings by Włodarczik (1989, 2005).

16.2 Deep grammatical interfaces for thethetic-categorical distinction

What has been discussed in some detail above, can be summarized in the following two rough complementary lists in (79)–(81). The approach is functional-semasiological (from meaning to form).

- (80) THETICS: coded in Japanese by *-GA*, subordinate clause of the core (eventive, non-peripheral) type, presuppositional, paradigmatic module, non-default stressed in prefield position or subject inversion (all verbal arguments are VP-integrated), primary merge of the argument including the subject (i.e. intact case morphology, but not probed for position in the clause, i.e. subject argument not probed for clausal position; premerge (unprobed for nominal case, transferred from lexicon), paradigmatic module, speech act status (mainly presentational/German *Kundgabe*), no CP with fully merged status, no topic – just comment capturing the entire sentence.
- (81) CATEGORICALS: coded in Japanese by *-WA*, root clause, assertion, default unstressed subject in the clausal prefield/SpecCP or moved into VP under contrastive accent, arguments merged secondarily (subject argument probed for clausal position), syntagmatic module, declarative, CP, topic next to respective comment.

In contrast to (80) and (81), from a morphological point of view, the following relations can be listed up.

- (82) Both *GA* and *WA* are selected in peripheral dependent sentences//PDS, whereas in core dependent sentences/CDS only *GA* is selected.

Viewed from the principled division of dependent sentences, we can conclude this. See (83).

- (83) a. The Japanese root clause is ambiguous between categorical (*wa-*) andthetic (*ga-*) status.
- b. The distinction between core adverbial sentence (linked e.g. by *als* ‘when’, *solange* ‘as long as’) and peripheral adverbial sentence (*weil* ,because’, *obwohl* ,whereas’) is coded morphologically the difference being that:
- c. CDSs are more strongly root linked (integrated) like an eventive adverbial, while PDSs are less strongly linked (integrated), but, in compensation, is illocutionsarily autonomous (i.e. eligible for MP-selection).
- d. SEP does not have the same illocutionary force as MP.
- e. DS-presupposition status scopes out illocutionary force. This is why in German CDSs and PDSs prompt different MP-selections.

Under the criterion of divergent SEP- and MP-selection, (84) holds.

- (84) SEP is selected only in root clauses, while MPs are selected also in PDSs (logical integrators e.g. adversative *while*-clauses), not, however, in CDSs (local-temporal integrators, e.g. temporal *while*-clauses).

On this type of criterion, thus, Japanese and German are clearly different. Given that MPs are licensed by logical (triggered by *because*, *whereas* etc.) illocution irrespective of dependent syntax, our distributions show that SEPs are licensed only by main clause illocution. There is no illocution in its own right in dependent clauses of Japanese. Notice that this confirms Haegeman’s fundamental division of dependency syntax. Logical sentence linking (as with peripheral subordinations) is more independent illocutionarily than event linking (core dependence triggered by *when*, *as long as* etc.).

17. Outgoing: Leading ideas and main concepts

Let us remind ourselves of what this paper is about.

- Categorical sentences/CATs are linguistic forms based on categorical, i.e. double judgments.
- Thetic sentences/THETs are linguistic forms based on thetic, i.e. simple judgments.
- CATs have a linguistic form that must be fundamentally different from that of THETs.
- The fundamental difference between CATs and THETs is contextual embedding. From this absence of context reference, important consequences follow. First, no illocutionary operators can be inserted like German (and

Dutch) modal particles and illocutionary adverbials. Second, tetic utterances characterized correspondingly have a specific status in genres: They typically function as text starters, in stage entries, and jokes – and not elsewhere. Third and foremost, their linguistic status is that of utterances devoid of truth worthiness and truth commission, but prominently functioning as a speech act of *Kundgabe* (solipsistic expression of surprise and excitement). Fourth and following from the absence of contextual anchoring, theticity works without contextual grounding between communicative partners (no question-about, no common ground). Fifth, it is to be noted that one of the empirical triggers bears weightily on Diesing’s findings about indefinites inside VP (cf. our syntactic space and terms “right” as opposed to “left middle field”).

- Given the exclamation *brrr* for feeling cold, one may think of this uttered as a purely solipsistic exclamation or as a communicative act intended to entice help from hearers. Such an utterance (*Kundgabe*) may be seen on the basis of origo anchoring or without that. In the anti-origo case, there is no address to communicative partner *here-and-there-and-other than ego*. Let us call this an *anti-origo utterance (solipsistic Kundgabe)*. It is like somehow *stepping into a mole hole* rather than uttering *Ouch* saying.
- Interestingly, both the generic “My head aches” and “My head is aching” are possible. But only the first one is thetic as expression of direct observation, whereas “My head is aching” categorical not fitting as expression of direct observation. Thus, “Ouch, it is hurting.” is odd given that you try to express sudden pain. Halliday’s Erläuterung ist in seinem Modell befangen und nicht so verständlich. See Halliday’s (1989: 18) explanation: “[In] *my knee* hurts, ‘pain’ is functioning [...] as a process in the structure of the clause; with the part of the body as (active) Subject.”, while (Halliday 1989:19) *my knee’s hurting* [...] is the unmarked form of the present tense in material processes, which typically have clear beginnings and endings.” In addition (Halliday 1989: 20), in “*It hurts here*, the ‘pain’ is construed as an existential process of the ‘existing’ type, with the sense of ‘there’s (a) pain (here)’; cf. it stinks ‘there’s something fishy here’, it echoes ‘there’s an echo here.’” In sum, we may say that what is thetic about expressions of pain and dismay of whatever linguistic form carries the anti-origo structure of featureless [-ægo/-ahere/-anow] in the sense that there are no negative opposites. In particular, there is no other as opposed to ego. The expression is solipsistic. Essentially, I take this anti-origo property to be characteristic of thetic utterances. In particular, all kinds of subject suspension are subject to this latter generalization: the anti-origo property of thetics.
- Notice that the notional characteristics of anti-origo bridges the gap to corresponding philosophical notions. For example, it seems to be the only entirely opposing notion to Kant’s predication consisting of at least a subject and a


property assigned to it. It is in this very sense that thetic valence goes even a step deeper than verbal zero valence (Abraham 2018). Zero valence refers to verb valence (e.g. for *It is* [RAINING]_{FOC} – *Elefanten leben in der* [SERENGE-TI]_{FOC}) with narrow default focus on *raining* and *Serengeti*. Thetic valence, by contrast, is broad focus, i.e. focus on the entire sentence ([*It rains*]_{FOC} – [*Elefanten leben in der SERENGETI*]_{FOC}) irrespective of how this is realized in terms of accent placement. Verbal zero valence, in this respect, has the same accent distribution as thetic sentential valence (on the head of the most deeply embedded clausal component).

- It seems that the thetic-categorical discussion is a promising opening to a theory of intransitivity – one that, given a missing agent subject, lacks the essential and typical property of ‘semantic transitivity’, i.e. the transfer of properties or power from subject to an object (the semantic prerequisite for passivization; Abraham 2006).
- The parts-whole constraints (nonpassivizability of *I broke my leg, he strained his mind*) not only is part of the semantic transitivity constraint, but, in a more general way, of subject suspension, broad focus sententiality, Okamoto’s (this volume) ‘descriptive perception’, and radical intransitivity (object as only clausal topic; compare *Mir ist schlecht* (to) me_{OBJECT-CASE}-is-sick, which is radically different from *Ich*_{SUBJECT-CASE} *bin schlecht* ‘I am bad’) (‘object-subject case’ in the sense developed by Halliday (1989) as ‘topic case’ and ‘rhema case’).
- None of the previous discussions on the thetic-categorical topic concerns itself with the question in which ways the phenomena they describe are to be derived grammatically. The present paper does this leaning towards the framework of (what is known already) in Information Structure Theory. As a first step, it seems natural to assume that ‘thetic’ is reconstructed as ‘utterance’, in which nothing is ‘given’ (cf. the Focus-Givenness Theory (or Alternative Semantics Theory) as developed in Sæbø 2006, 2007).
- A sentence of the form SUBJECT-UNDER STRESS + PREDICATE (like *COWS are in the garden*) always has a thetic reading as it is marked with respect to default stress distribution (as the subject is the only argument that has to be unstressed in topic position by default). See the illustrations in (v”) and (vi”). The principled option in free inversion languages such as German (and Italian; see Longobardi 2000) is that superficially postverbal subjects (due to subject inversion) may occupy also a higher (preverbal and, actually, left-peripheral) position. Given the same (thetic) reading, this goes along obligatorily with non-default accent on the subject nominal. Evidence for this conclusion is based primarily on the (‘existential’-presentational/generic) interpretation of bare nouns and overt indefinites. It supports in broad ways Diesing’s (1992) Mapping Hypothesis.


- To the extent that Common Ground/CG (linked itself to the Question under Discussion/QuD, the main topic pursued; Ground Management is a general pragmatic domain, i.e. the management of “mutually ostensive knowledge” (as defined by Clark et al.1991; Stalnaker 2002 Roberts 2012, Wilson & Sperber 2013 and others). It is at the base of contextual linking. The main function of CATS is updating, i.e. meaningfully accepting or refuting, i.e. extending or correcting, the CG.
- It follows from the absence of subject topicalization by default and the absence of CG, that the focus projected by thetics is broad, encompassing the entire utterance as an undecomposed whole. By contrast, CATS project narrow focus, i.e. focus on one or more of the clausal phrases.
- By contrast, THETs, as being unembedded in context, have no CG. There is nothing to hook up to with respect to previous contexts nor to update from or to be updated upon. This claim about thetic CGlessness is discussed and refuted in Wilson (in this volume). Referring to Roberts (2012) and his questions-under-discussion stack, Wilson’s claim is that there is no any sentence without common ground.
- The main diagnostic criteria for context or discursive (or dialogical) embedding are provided in German by modal particles/MPs. As concrete instantiations of the semantic-pragmatic CP-extension of About-topic, MPs are typical CG-manipulators.
- In sentences out of the blue (i.e. contextually unembedded), MPs are deselected.
- By far, not all languages have the category of MPs. Japanese, however, has in the form of sentential end particles/SEPs.
- We assume that typological OV is the prerequisite for both MPs and SEPs to unfold as in Japanese, while for OV-German it is the particular structure of the clausal middle field/MF to give form and function to MPs.
- The logical double judgment is coded linguistically as a predication-about (usually the subject referent). By contrast the simple judgment is not a predication-about, but only a predication-sec, i.e. a restricted sentential entity.
- THETs come to linguistic life through forms like presentational (wrongly existential) sentences/PRESs in that they restrict their form to a VP (i.e. predicate with all its arguments including the subject). In the PRES- form, the subject does not adopt its canonical position in the topic category of CP (which exempts the entire sentence of contextual embedding).
- The clause-initial position in the PRES does not have subject status as there is no semantic content meeting the argument status of the predicate of the PRES-sentence. The subject appears in inverted position inside of VP.
- Another way to exempt a sentential structure of contextual embedding is to mark the subject in such a way that it loses topic status. In German, this is

achieved through extra accent marking on the subject referent which deploys a non-topic subject rendering broad sentential focus in German.

- The closest THETs can be argued to be in terms of speech act status is *Kundgabe* (free, i.e. CG-deselecting exclamation). As such, THETs are not truth-evaluable. However, given their ambiguity and read as declarative assertives, they are truthvaluable.
- In Japanese, both dependent sentences and THETs are marked by structural *-ga*. The structural marker *-wa* signals categorical, context-discourse embedded status. Given that the nominative case marker *-ga* marks also presuppositional and illocutionarily dependent status, the best explanative commonality is that the PRES-form collecting all arguments inside VP has the looks of primary merge (i.e. secondary merge with syntactic probing and feature raising has not yet taken place). But, of course, presentationals have an assertive reading also and are truthvaluable as such.
- Burzio's assumption that unaccusative subjects are of external argument stature satisfying νP is maintained by my assumption that THETs subjects meet VP-structure status. This is in line with the semantic status of unaccusatives as intransitive perfective-resultative predicates whose probing and feature checking positions are higher than those of imperfectives.
- Thethetic-categorical distinction cannot be equivalent to Carlson's individual-stage distinction for the simple reason that either thetics and categoricals can be of the individual or stage sort. The syntactic characteristic of subject inversion is typical of thetics, but in no way of either individual or stage.
- As was shown in the discussion, thetics and categoricals are divergent with respect to time anchoring.



- Both (v') and (v'') are categorical to the extent that the DP-readings of *KÜHE* 'cows' are focus contrasted and are truth-validable. The same forms, however, can also have the reading in (vi) , i.e. without t , for finiteness, and truth validity. Consequently, they are thetic utterances. Notice that, in contrast to categorical (v) , time anchoring marked by t is missing in thetic (vi) .



- From (iii), (iv) and (vi) follows that thetic utterances, i.e. $\lambda x\lambda P(x, P)$ lacking time anchoring as well as subject topicality, the Common ground is empty. The thetic sentence is not discourse-embedded.
- For Japanese linguistics, it stands to be shown what the details are parallel to the parameters meted out for categoricals and thetics in German (subject inversion, Kundgabe, time anchoring, nondefault accent, (in)definiteness reference) or whether these German parameters can be shown to be confluent in the *wa-ga*-opposition. One relevant question in this context may be what the result might be with respect to a complexity count of the CAT-THET opposition in the two languages and, consequently, how easily, or less easily, these opposing notions and their consequences might be acquired (as L1) or learned (as L²) and how this might turn out with respect to the division between Interpretable and uninterpretable features (Radford 2000; Trudgill 2011; van Gelderen 2011), foremost for the question whether the assumption of uninterpretable features might be superfluous in the first instance (Tsimpli & Dimitrakopoulou 2007; van Gelderen forthcoming).
- Given the work by Clark et al. (1991); Stalnaker (2002); Roberts (2012), and others, my major aim was to show that as long as the main empirical triggers and distributions under which categoral sentences are produced and cannot come to the fore at all in typically thetic environments, thetic utterances cannot be described linguistically. Nor does the reason why it is linguistically important to speak of the distinction between thetics and categoricals become apparent.
- Is there affinity to Pesetsky's notion of 'exfoliation'? Is my explanation of a thetic utterance even a prototype of exfoliation? See Pesetsky (2019) who assumes that clauses come in different sizes and flavors: finite vs. non-finite, introduced by a complementizer vs. complementizerless, nominal vs non-nominal, etc.? Pesetsky's work posits that many of these distinctions are not the result of distinct morpho-lexical material chosen for clause building (the standard theory in almost all frameworks), but instead are the consequence of a derivational process of "Exfoliation" that strips away one or more outer layers of a clause as a precondition for extraction of its subject. I leave this for further discussions.
- Thetic sentences/utterances are solipsistic, therefore the respective CG is empty with respect to assertions (see Abbot's (2008) criticism of Stalnaker 2002). Only communicators' presuppositions are involved as assertions that bring in new information are not part of CG.
- Theories in conflict: the *Unaccusativity-thetic hypothesis* (see Casielles & Progovac 2012; Zubizarreta & Nava 2011; Irwin (this volume)) vs. Anti-origo hypothesis, from which everything else follows for thetic sentences/utterances. See the following table.

Table 1. Hypotheses and their founding properties

Hypotheses and their founding properties			
Category		Unaccusativity is verbal (Casielles/Progovac, Zubizarreta/Nova, Irwin)	Theticity is sentential
XP or V		Lexical	Phrasal-clausal
Composability		Decomposable sentence	Undecomposable (CP-whole)
CP or VP		Verb	Sentence or utterance
	Valence	only intransitive („unaccusative”)	No constraint
	Aspect	only perfective V, no imperfectives	No constraint
	Syntactic derivations	V-derivational con-straints (among which *passives: * <i>He was died</i>), nominal derivation (* <i>Sterber- *dier</i> from the verb <i>die</i>)	No such constraint; inper-sonal passives are typical of VP-integration (<i>Es wird getanzt</i>)
	VP-inte-gration	No such constraint	Typically, VP-integration (incorporation)
Prosody	Syntactic scope	If at all, only narrow focus applies (DP-arguments, V)	Broad (sentence) focus (Sæbø, Jacobs)
	Default sentential	No constraint	Subject accent (unlike default accent (Cinque 1993))
Argument	Subject	External argument	VP-Integrated argument
		Theme or Patient	No such constraint
	Direct object	No DO since indirect V (valid for English, not for German since not all accu-satives have DO-status)	No constraint
Merge		Subject = VP-external argument (←probing from SpecCP)	Subject VP-integrated (no probing from SpecCP, no movement before Merge)
Discourse status	Topicalization	Subject may be topic irrespective of theta status	Subject is never topic since VP-integrated

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Hypotheses and their founding properties			
Common ground	New information	Assertable as new information	Non-assertable, presuppositional (see Abbott vs. Stalnaker)
	Speaker-addressee	No constraint	No addressee
Speech act status		No constraint	<i>Kundgabe</i> (solipsistic exclamation)
Perspective	Constituency	Syntagmatic perspective	Paradigmatic perspective
	Me-space-time/ego-hic-nunc coordinates	No constraint	Anti-origo perspective ('Ego' as opposed to 'other' is missing) as the focused CP in <i>I am sick of your permanent</i> [_{CP} <i>Mir tut alles weh</i>] _{FOC}

- While the assumption of athetic stage in the evolution of syntax is plausible given our discussion so far, such a hypothesis is not in line with what is known about unaccusativity. On the criteria of unaccusativity, the present discussion on thetics is thus in clear and fundamental contrast to Zubizarreta/Nova 2011; Casielles/Progovac 2012, and Irwin (this volume). The same holds for the criterion of the Common ground/CG contents for determining thetic status. Instead of following the Stalnaker (2002) position in assuming that athetic sentence is just a CG filled with thetic-specific assertions and presuppositions, I have taken the position that that, as no new information is asserted in CG (see Abbott 2008), CG is empty. All of this is summarized in the above table.
- As much as non-finite phrases in L1 and early L2 have been assumed to be part of proto-language, thetic phenomena can be taken as candidates for prototypes in evolutionary language for the very reason that structural decomposability is no prerequisite for speech act autonomy (see Zubizarreta/Nava 2011 as well as Casielles/Progovac 2012).
- It seems that everything in the formation of theticity follows from one single condition: *Kundgabe* as a solipsistic speech act. This implies that there is no topic, no addressee; there is focus encapsulation of a single clause, but there is no CP or phrasal decomposability; there is an empty CG, and a paradigmatic perspective rather than a syntagmatic one. And, as there is no addressee to receive new information, Bühler's Me-here-now configuration does not apply.
- In a nutshell and underwriting Table 1, we could say "thetic is a not necessarily truth functionally valid, yet syntactically well-structured utterance with speech act status with most typically Subject inversion or Broad sentential focus".

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Pseudocategorical or purely thetic?

A contrastive case study of how thetic statements are expressed in Japanese, English, and German

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According to Marty (1918), thetic statements differ from categorical ones in making a simple existential recognition or rejection rather than a predication. In Japanese, where two subject particles, *ga* and *wa*, are presumably available for this differentiation (Kuroda 1972), the point can be expounded especially by the fact that *da* ‘to be’ hardly appears as an existential verb in *ga*-marked, but only in *wa*-marked sentences. Moreover, the same holds true for German optatives. I conclude from these observations that thetic statements find their expression not only pseudocategorically, as originally assumed by Marty (1918), but also in a purely thetic manner in natural languages, provided (at least) there is no personal deictic agreement at work between a syntactic subject and a syntactic predicate.

Keywords: predication, existential recognition or rejection, negation, personal agreement, VP-external subject

1. Introduction

Kuroda (1972) was the first to specify that the distinction between categorical and thetic statements proposed by the Swiss German philosopher of language Marty (1918) has a linguistic reflex in two different particles for syntactic subjects in Japanese.¹ As illustrated in (1), *wa* marks the subject of a categorical statement,

1. Originally, Marty (1918) spoke of two types of “judgment (*Urteil*)” instead of a “statement,” as did Kuroda (1972). However, I prefer a “categorical/thetic statement” in order not to be too philosophical, except when citing Marty (1918) himself. My terminology also differs from Sasse’s (1987: 518) in that I do not use the term case-by-case, but reserve it consistently for referring to the logico-semantic aspect of a linguistic utterance made by a sentence.

by which the property of “having broken down” is predicated of a certain, already identified “car,” while *ga* serves to make athetic statement in which, instead of such a predication, a “car” and its “having broken down” are simultaneously recognized. For languages such as English and German, the same difference can, according to Sasse (1987, 2006), be expressed by several means, above all by non-subject vs. subject accentuation (henceforth: non-SA and SA) as in (2)–(3):

- (1) a. Kuruma *wa* koware-ta.
 car *wa* break.down-PF
 b. Kuruma *ga* koware-ta.
 car *ga* break.down-PF
- (2) a. My car broke DOWN.
 b. My CAR broke down.
- (3) a. Mein Auto ist KAPUTT.
 my car is broken
 My car broke DOWN.
 b. Mein AUTO ist kaputt.
 my car is broken
 My CAR broke down. ((2) and (3) cited from Sasse 2006: 264)

However, Kuroda’s (1972) and Sasse’s (1987, 2006) simple, rather superficial equation “*wa*/non-SA = categorical, *ga*/SA = thetic” raises complications that merit critical examination.

On the one hand, concerning existential and universal statements expressed in sentences like (4) that Marty (1918) declared correspond to thetic statements, i.e., statements without any subject in a logical sense (see 2.3), Kuroda (1972) claims that they still represent categorical ones:

- (4) a. God is / exists.
 b. All triangles have 180 degrees of interior angles.

According to Kuroda (1972: 158f., 180ff.), *God* as well as *all triangles* should not merely be regarded as expressing “themes” or “topics” in the sense of an information structure, but also stand for true logical “subjects.” Nevertheless, the only fact Kuroda (1972) provides as evidence for his view is the linguistic one that the syntactic subjects of such sentences are marked by *wa* instead of *ga* in Japanese, as in (5). This argument is simply circular:

- (5) a. Kami *wa* sonzai-suru.
 God *wa* exists
 God exists.

- b. Subeteno sankakukei *wa* 180 do no naikaku no wa
 all triangles *wa* 180 degree of interior.angles of sum
 o *yuusuru*.
 ACC have
 All triangles have 180 degrees of interior angles.

Sasse (1987), who concurs with Kuroda (1972) in this regard and also acknowledges statements like (4) as categorical, is indeed not circular by virtue of his own formal criteria (accentuation, word order, and nominalization), but his argumentation is possible only at the cost of abandoning Marty's (1918) original definition of what is categorical/thetic in a logical sense in favor of some functional sentence perspective.²

On the other hand, with the above-mentioned equation, both Kuroda (1972) and Sasse (1987, 2006) fail to take into account a possible discrepancy between logical or semantic and syntactic structures, although Marty (1918) repeatedly emphasized existing "pseudocategorical" sentences, i.e., mismatches between form and meaning that should exist, especially in the case of (4b) and (5b).³ This failure casts some doubt even on the validity of the distinction between (1a)–(3a) on the one hand and (1b)–(3b) on the other, for it is by no means clear whether (1b)–(3b), allegedly "thetic sentences" in Japanese, English, and German, respectively, are in fact expressed in a merely pseudocategorical or purely thetic manner.

In the present paper, starting from Marty's (1918) original definition of categorical and thetic statements (Section 2), I will elucidate English and German SA sentences like (2b) and (3b) as pseudocategorical expressions as predicted by Marty (1918), versus Japanese *ga*-sentences like (1b) that exemplify purely thetic expressions where logico-semantic theticity appears without any syntactic sign of categoricity, i.e., VP-external (potentially) deictic argument (Sections 3–4). This distinction, however, will subsequently be relativized for German by virtue of the existence of a purely thetic sentence type – an optative. In this mood of German, whose subject is basically indefinite, no referential subject can be externalized – in the same way as in Japanese *ga*-sentences (Section 5). Overall, I will argue that thetic statements find their expression not only in a pseudocategorical, but also

2. I do not mean that a functional sentence perspective is not useful for linguistic analysis. What I mean is only that the terms "categorical" and "thetic" would not be worth introducing if they only replicated already established notions such as "theme-rheme-structured" or "all-focused."

3. In Marty's (1918: 311ff.) view, whether a statement is categorical or thetic is independent of its information structure ("psychological subject and predicate" in his terminology). Thus, theme-rheme-structured statements such as (4b) and (5b) may well be thetic in nature (see 2.3 for details).

in a purelythetic manner in natural languages, provided (at least) no personal deictic agreement exists between a syntactic subject and a syntactic predicate. This result suggests that the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) of Chomsky (1982), according to which every sentence has its own syntactic subject, is valid only as the result of an interface condition between syntax and semantics, and not by virtue of an autonomous syntax (Section 6).

2. “Categorical,” “thetic,” and “pseudocategorical” after Marty (1918)

As mentioned in Section 1, the opposition “categorical” vs. “thetic” has so far been accepted in linguistics not in the sense in which Marty (1918) defined it logically, but rather in a cognitive or functional sense as revised by Kuroda (1972) and Sasse (1987, 2006). Under these circumstances, it is imperative to clarify what Marty (1918) originally meant by the relevant terms. These include not only the pair “categorical” and “thetic,” concerning the types of “judgment,” i.e., statements as issues of *meaning*, but also the term “pseudocategorical,” which applies to sentence *expressions* that formally have a categorical appearance but semantically represent thetic statements.

2.1 Categorical statements

“Categorical judgment (*kategorisches Urteil*),” also referred to as “double judgment (*Doppelurteil*)” by Marty (1918) himself, is often characterized by its “bipartiteness” (Sasse 1987: 512; see also Haberland 2006: 676, Kuroda 1972: 154, Sornicola 1995: 73). In German and other European languages, however, this formal property might be merely the consequence of an existing personal agreement requiring both a subject and a predicate expression. What is crucial for a categorical statement to be considered a semantic issue is the condition that each of their two parts has its own logical status.

According to Marty (1918: 227ff.), categorical statements most clearly find their expression in sentences like (6) whose syntactic subject consists of a personal or demonstrative pronoun (6a–b), or at least contains such an element as its determiner (6c–d):

- (6) a. Ich bin wohl.
 I am fine
 I am fine.
 b. Dies ist rot.
 this is red
 This is red.

- c. Diese Blume ist blau.
 this flower is blue
 This flower is blue.
- d. Mein Bruder ist abgereist.
 my brother PF leave.PP
 My brother has left.

(Marty 1918: 227)

The very deictic type of subject expression in these sentences offers a privileged recognition of someone or something as the first part of a categorical statement. His/her or its existence holds irrespective of whether or not it is predicated of by the property expressed in the predicate as the second part of the same statement. Conversely, the latter part can only be considered valid on the basis of the former. Marty (1918: 228) himself calls this asymmetrical relationship a “one-sided separability (*einseitige Abtrennbarkeit*),” which in my view best corresponds to Strawson’s (1950) idea of the (logical) subject being existentially presupposed. Applied to (6c), for example, the fact that “this flower,” i.e., the instance of the subject expression *this flower* exists, follows not only from the very statement in an affirmative form, but also from its negative counterpart: *This flower is not blue*. In contrast, the existence of something “blue” is confirmed only when (6c), the whole statement, holds.

Note that the subject of a categorical statement does not always appear in a deictic form. Marty (1918) counts sentences like (7) as expressions of categorical statements insofar as their subject refers to none other than the existing city of “Prague” or the twelve “apostles” of Jesus Christ, who (at least presumably) existed:

- (7) a. Prag ist eine Stadt an der Moldau.
 Prague is a city on the Vltava
 Prague is a city on the Vltava.
- b. Alle Apostel (= Die Apostel alle) sind Juden.
 all apostles the apostles all are Jews
 All the apostles are Jews.

(Marty 1918: 229f.)

Meanwhile, sentences like (8) are ambiguous. Depending on the context, they can be paraphrased as either (9) or (10):

- (8) a. Einige Vereinsmitglieder sind erkrankt.
 some society.members PF get.ill.PP
 Some society members have gotten ill.
- b. Kein Pferd ist geflügelt.
 no horse is winged
 No horse is winged.
- (9) a. Some of the society members have gotten ill.
 b. None of the (existing) horses is winged.

(Marty 1918: 229f., 264)

- (10) a. There are some society members that have gotten ill.
 b. No winged horse exists.

In Marty's (1918: 229f., 264) view, it is in the sense of (9) that (8) can be regarded as expressing categorical statements. In this case, the whole group of "society members" or the species "horse" is predicated of by the property of having "someone got ill" or "nothing winged" among them. The membership of that group or that species, i.e., their existence, is defined independent of how many of their members have gotten ill or are winged.

This is not the case when (8) means (10), which contains no nominal expression referring definitely. Concerning (8a), suppose there are no more than two persons ill in the given context, but neither of those who are ill is a society member, (8a) in the sense of (9a) can still be valid, provided, for example, that they had indeed been society members until the society was dissolved. Contrariwise, (8a) in the sense of (10a) turns out to be an invalid statement even in the same context. In other words: As soon as (8a) is interpreted as (10a), no existential presupposition holds for what is represented by the syntactic subject of (8a), *Vereinsmitglieder*, 'society members'. The same holds true for (8b) as well in the sense of (10b), according to which no "horse" can be recognized at all among the winged entities if the statement is true (see also Fujinawa 2020: 182f.). Both paraphrases in (10) are truth-conditionally to be distinguished from those in (9) as categorical statements.

2.2 Thetic statements

The two statements we have just confirmed as non-categorical are, in fact, based on the "thetic judgment (*thetisches Urteil*)" or "single judgment (*einfaches Urteil*)," after Marty (1918). Its special feature lies in lacking a predication in the sense that it has no presupposed subject topicalized in order to refer to one and the same person or thing even if negated. In this respect, Marty (1918: 283) says the expression of thetic statements manifests most typically in existential sentences like (11), as *Gott*, 'God', and *ein Markt*, 'a market' in (11a–b), apparently serving as subjects, no longer refer to anyone or anything when the whole sentence is negated:

- (11) a. Gott ist / existiert.
 God is / exists
 God is / exists.
 b. Ein Markt findet statt.
 a market takes place
 A market will take place.
 c. Es gibt gelbe Blumen.
 EXP gives yellow flowers.ACC
 There exist yellow flowers.

- d. Es gibt keine schwarzen Blumen.
 EXP gives no black flowers.ACC
 There do not exist any black flowers. (Marty 1918: 272)

All these sentences have in common syntactic predicates arising existential verbs such as *sein* ‘to be’, *existieren* ‘to exist’, or *stattfinden* ‘to take place’. Such semantically bleached verbal expressions can hardly ascribe a substantial property to someone or something. Moreover, the construction with *es gibt* ‘there is’ in (11c–d) stands out for its nominal expression: *gelbe Blumen* ‘yellow flowers’ as well as *keine schwarzen Blumen* ‘no black flowers’ do not have any status of subject, as is apparent from their VP internal position, accusative case, and lack of agreement with a predicate verb in person and number.

Besides (11), Marty (1918) also counts non-existential but impersonal sentences like (12) as examples ofthetic statements:

- (12) a. Es regnet / donnert.
 EXP rains thunders
 It is raining / thundering.
 b. Es schlägt zwölf.
 EXP strikes twelve
 It strikes twelve. (Marty 1918: 272, 293)

While a semantically full NP is combined with an (almost) meaningless VP in existential sentences like (11), impersonal sentences like (12) conversely have an expletive pronoun, *es* ‘it’, as their syntactic subject and retain the meaning of their VP.

Given that only one substantial concept underlies existential and impersonal sentences such as those in (11)–(12), the nature ofthetic statements cannot consist in a predication, but only in a recognition or rejection of that single concept.

2.3 Pseudocategorical sentences

As mentioned earlier, the opposition “categorical” vs. “thetic” in the sense of Marty (1918) concerns the types of statements. The two statements differ based on whether their commitment to truth is two-fold (referring to someone or something as a subject + predicating a property of it) or single-fold (only recognizing or rejecting the existence of someone or something such as “a market” or “flowers,” possibly attributed to some other property, say, “yellow” or “black”). Therefore, a categorical statement requires both parts of a sentence expression, i.e., its syntactic subject and predicate, to be meaningful, whereas in the case of athetic statement, one of the two parts might have no substantial meaning, as in (11)–(12). The latter condition for athetic statement, however, is not a necessary but a sufficient one. In this regard, athetic statement may appear in a form in which both sentence parts are meaningful, just as in a categorical statement.

Indeed, such a mismatch between form and meaning, i.e., a situation in which a sentence expression consisting of two meaningful parts (a syntactic subject and a syntactic predicate) represents a single-fold statement, has already been identified: the sentences in (8), which serve asthetic statements when they mean the same as the positive or negative existential sentences in (10). In addition, universal sentences like (13) count as such, according to Marty (1918):

- (13) a. Alle Dreiecke haben zur Winkelsumme zwei Rechte.
 all triangles have as sum.of.angles two right.angles
 All triangles have 180 degrees of interior angles.
 b. Jeder Winkel im Halbkreis ist ein rechter.
 any angle in.the semicircle is a right.one
 Any angle in a semicircle is right. (Marty 1918: 260f.)
- (14) a. Not all triangles have 180 degrees of interior angles.
 = Some triangles do not have 180 degrees of interior angles.
 b. Not every angle in a semicircle is a right angle.
 = Some angles in a semicircle are not right angles.

Contrary to (7b), which also has a syntactic subject quantified by *alle* “all,” but expresses a categorical statement, the statements made by (13) do not restrict themselves to existing “triangles” or existing “angles in a (particular) semicircle.” Since they represent some law or principle or provide some definition, being valid not particularly but generally, their subject matter includes all possible “triangles” or all possible “angles in an (arbitrary) semicircle.” Thus, they can never be referred to exhaustively or constantly. Therefore, no existential presupposition applies to the subject expressions in (13). This is indeed obvious from the fact that what is meant by (14), the negative counterparts of the sentences in (13), are figures in non-Euclidean spaces, which, by definition, cannot be identical to those described by “all triangles” and “any angle in a semicircle” in (13).

Under these circumstances, Marty (1918: 260ff.) argues that the meaning of (13) can best be explicated as in (15):

- (15) a. There is not any triangle that does not have 180 degrees of interior angles.
 b. There is not any angle in a semicircle that is not a right angle.

The paraphrases in (15) each constitute a negative existential sentence (*there is not any...*), which at the same time contains another negative element in its nominal attribute (*that does/is not...*). This type of double negative existential statements giving rise to sentences like (13) is quite suitable for rejecting an impossible idea of something that is *not* existent (“a triangle that does *not* have 180 degrees of interior angles,” for example). It is only on this basis of a covered double negativity that sentences like (13) can serve as analytically true statements.

In the face of such a far-reaching consequence, Marty (1918: 277ff.) introduces the term “pseudocategorical.” In its narrower sense, this term applies to sentences whose form and meaning are mismatched as in (13).⁴ In its wider sense, however, it includes typical expressions of thetic statements such as (11)–(12) as well. This wide terminology of Marty’s (1918) quite clearly shows his ambivalent stance on the relation between logic and language. From a logical point of view, categorical and thetic statements can be distinguished from one another. Linguistically, however, not only the expression of the former (“double judgment”) but also that of the latter (“single judgment”) rely on one and the same “*Verbum finitum* (finite verb),” which, conjugated in a certain person and number, apparently “involves both a pronominal subject and a verbal predicate” (Marty 1918: 272).⁵ In this respect, however progressive and universal a logician he might have been, Marty (1918) as a language researcher was finally a traditional European grammarian. The possibility of sentences being construed in a purely thetic manner, i.e., entirely free from a subject-predicate relation, even in European languages appears only when they are compared to non-European languages such as Japanese.

3. *Ga*-sentences and SA-sentences as expressions of thetic statements

In this section, I will examine if and to what extent Marty’s (1918) definition of theticity really holds for sentences that have been regarded so far as representative “thetic” expressions as opposed to their “categorical” counterparts in the linguistic literature: *ga*- in contrast with *wa*-sentences in Japanese (Kuroda 1972) as well as SA- as against non-SA-sentences in English and German (Sasse 1987, 2006).

4. Marty (1918: 279) also called this type of sentence “categoroid.”

5. Marty’s (1918: 272) own formulation is: “Der Schein der Kategorie entsteht vielmehr lediglich, indem ein vollsinniges *Verbum finitum* in der dritten Person des Singulars die Täuschung erweckt, als ob es [...] sowohl ein pronominales Subjekt als [auch] ein verbales Prädikat involviere, während es in Wahrheit **nur den Namen eines Vorgangs** nebst dem Zeichen der Anerkennung oder Verwerfung involviert [...] (Rather, the categorical look [of sentences like (12)] can be attributed to an existing finite verb in the third person singular, which merely acts as if it involves both a pronominal subject and a verbal predicate [...], while in reality, it involves **nothing but the name of an event** together with the sign of recognition or rejection, [...])” (emphasis in the original, translation by YF).

3.1 *Ga*- as opposed to *wa*-sentences in Japanese

According to Kuroda (1972), the reason why *ga*-sentences like (1b) should be recognized as expressingthetic statements lies in the fact that their subject expression, unlike that of *wa*-sentences like (1a), does not refer to a specific “definite” item “whose identity has been established prior to the utterance of the sentence” (Kuroda 1972: 164). By this, Kuroda (1972) obviously means that what is represented by the syntactic subject of *ga*-sentences does not fulfil the existential presupposition along the lines of Strawson (1950).

Kuroda’s (1972) observation can be confirmed by the action of *ga*-sentences in case of negation, which is fundamentally different from that of *wa*-sentences:

- (16) a. Kuruma *wa* koware nakat-ta.
 car *wa* break.down NEG-PF
 The car did not break down.
- b. Kuruma *ga* koware nakat-ta.
 car *ga* break.down NEG-PF
 There was something not broken down: the car.
- c. Kuruma *ga* koware-ta no de wa nai.
 car *ga* break.down-PF NML be *wa* NEG
 There was not anything broken down to be identified with the car
 (*lit.*: “the car having broken down is not”).

While the *wa*-sentence (1a) is negated simply by inserting *nai* (> *nakat*) ‘not’ into the predicate verbal complex as in (16a), the negation of the *ga*-sentence (1b) cannot be expressed in a parallel way by (16b), which indicates that there was something that did not break down to be identified with “the car.” In this regard, (16b) less represents a negative than an affirmative statement over the existence of something (described with the negative property “not broken down”). Instead of (16b), the negation of (1b) is expressed via extra *no*-nominalization of the predicate verb plus *de*, the verb of being in an adverbial form, as in (16c).⁶ The whole process required for negating the *ga*-sentence (1b) quite clearly shows that (1b) never makes a predication of “the (existentially presupposed) car,” but recognizes this at the moment of the recognition of “something broken down.” Therefore, the meaning of the *wa*-sentence (1a) and that of the *ga*-sentence (1b) can appropriately be represented and contrasted as follows:

- (17) *Meanings of the wa-sentence (1a) and the ga-sentence (1b)*
- a. “The car (identified prior to the utterance) broke down.”
- b. “There was something that broke down and was identified with the car (simultaneously to that event).”

6. See also Shibatani (2017) for *no*-nominalization.

As is shown by the paraphrase in the form of an existential sentence “there was something ...” in (17b), it is not only in the sense of Kuroda (1972), but also in the sense of Marty (1918) that *ga*-sentences like (1b) representthetic statements.

Note, however, that the *ga*-sentence (1b) can also be negated by means of the *wa*-sentence (16a). In other words, (16a) has two meanings, (18a) and (18b), to which (17a) and (17b), respectively, correspond as their affirmative counterparts:

- (18) *Two meanings of the negative wa-sentence (16a)*
- a. “The car (identified prior to the utterance) did *not* break down.”
 - b. “It is *not* the case that there was something that broke down and was identified with the car (simultaneously to that event).”

This fact means that, contrary to what Kuroda (1972) assumed, *wa* does not restrict itself to merely making a categorical statement about some already identified subject along the lines of (17a/18a). The same particle can also serve to construct a “pseudocategorical” sentence in the sense of Marty (1918). As a sentence belonging to this category, (16a) represents a negativethetic statement (18b), where the notional subject of “broke down” is explicated by an explicitly unspecific relative construction, *something that*, and thus never regarded to be existentially presupposed before negated by “it is *not* the case.”

The idea that *wa*-sentences are possibly pseudocategorical and as such also representthetic statements in the sense of Marty (1918) is confirmed by the fact that the particle *wa* also attaches to an explicitly non-referential indefinite pronoun like *dareka* ‘someone’ in (19a), which, as an overt expression of an existential operator, unambiguously leads to athetic statement:

- (19) a. *Dareka wa hataraitte iru.*
 someone *wa* work PROG
 Someone IS working.
- b. *Dareka ga hataraitte iru.*
 someone *ga* work PROG
 Someone’s working.
- c. *Daremo hataraitte i. nai.*
 anyone work PROG NEG
 There is no one working.

As is clear from the capitalized “IS” in its English translation, the *wa*-sentence (19a) emphasizes the validity of the statement made by the corresponding *ga*-sentence (19b). It is an instance of so-called “verificational focus” or, in the terminology of Höhle (2018), “*Verum-Fokus*.” I believe that this effect emerges because (19a) rejects (19c), the negation of (19b) expressed obligatorily without *ga*, by virtue of its complex meaning explicated in (20):

(20) *Meaning of the wa-sentence (19a)*

“It is *not* the case that there is *no* one working.”

It is this covered (double) negativity that makes (19a) pseudocategorical (see also Fujinawa 2020: 204ff.).

In addition, as already mentioned in Fujinawa (2017: 19ff.), *wa*- and *ga*-sentences differ from each other in that the latter disallow the verb of being, *da*, from acting as an existential verb supplemented by a locative complement:

(21) a. Sensei *wa* tosyokan da.

teacher *wa* library be

The teacher is in the library.

b. *Sensei *ga* tosyokan da.

teacher *ga* library be

Not valid in the sense: “The teacher is in the library.”

c. *Sensei *wa* tosyokan de nai.

teacher *wa* library be NEG

Not valid in the sense: “The teacher is not in the library.”

Unlike the *wa*-sentence (21a), the corresponding *ga*-sentence (21b) cannot be accepted in the sense: “The teacher is in the library.” Should (21b) be acceptable at all, it is only in another, rather unreal sense: “The teacher, and nothing else, is a library.” Note, however, that (21a), also a *wa*-sentence, behaves alike as soon as it takes a negative form. Thus (21c) is hardly acceptable except in the sense: “The teacher is not a library,” where it at most has a metaphorical meaning, say: “He doesn’t know everything you want to know.”

Now, how can the peculiarity of (21) be accounted for? In my opinion, the conflicting action of *wa*- and *ga*-sentences toward the potential copula *da* functioning as an existential verb lies in their different logico-semantic structures:

(22) *Meaning of the wa-sentence (21a) and the ga-sentence (21b)*

a. “It is *not* the case that anyone that is in the library and is identified with the teacher (simultaneously to the utterance) does *not* exist.”

b. “Anyone that is in the library and is identified with the teacher (simultaneously to the utterance) exists.”

Based on (double) negativity along the lines of (18b) and (20), as well as the fact that the locative complement in an affirmative form implies something existent, pseudo-categorical *wa*-sentences like (21a) represent nothing but the denial of a contradiction: “Anyone or anything that is in some space and is identified with some person or thing (simultaneously to the utterance) does *not* exist.” Therefore, the meaning of (21a) is explained as illustrated in (22a), for example. It is not surprising

that such an analytically true statement cannot be negated to simply yield the very contradiction to be denied. In contrast, *ga*-sentences like (21b), lacking (double) negativity, result in a tautology like (22b). Because this type of statement pragmatically makes no sense, *ga*-sentences like (21b) can in fact hardly be accepted.

Finally, let us examine whether it is at all possible for a *ga*-sentence to make a categorical statement. Although this possibility was never considered by Kuroda (1972); Deguchi (2012) argues that it may very well be the case:

- (23) a. Taroo *ga* gengogaku o senkoosite iru.
 T. *ga* linguistics ACC major PROG
 TAROO is majoring in linguistics.
- b. Gengogaku o senkoosite iru no *wa* Taroo desu.
 linguistics ACC major PROG NML *wa* T. be
 It is Taroo that is majoring in linguistics.
- c. Gengogaku o senkoosite iru no *wa* daremo i nai.
 linguistics ACC major PROG NML *wa* anyone exist NEG
 Nobody is majoring in linguistics.

((23a–b) cited from Deguchi 2012: 229, 230)

According to Deguchi (2012: 228ff.), *ga*-sentences also represent categorical statements so long as they are interpreted in the “exhaustive-listing” reading (Kuno 1973: Chapter 2), i.e., as an instance of “argument focus,” in which case the focus is only on their *ga*-marked subject in order, for example, to answer the question: “Who is majoring in linguistics?” as in (23a). As evidence, Deguchi (2012) indicates that this kind of *ga*-sentence is synonymous with a *wa*-sentence like (23b).

Note, however, that in such a *wa*-sentence, the particle *wa* is attached not to the expression of the notional subject, but to the nominalization of the verb that functions as a syntactic predicate in the corresponding *ga*-sentence. It is uncertain whether such a nominalized verb, even though marked with *wa* and thus representing a theme in an information-structural sense, really represents the subject of a categorical statement. In fact, what is denoted by the *wa*-marked nominal is by no means existentially presupposed. As is evident from (23c) as a possible denial of (23a–b), there is nobody at all to be identified with some person majoring in linguistics. It is obvious that *wa*-sentences like (23b) are semantically not categorical butthetic in the sense of Marty (1918), and so are *ga*-sentences like (23a) functioning as their synonyms (see also Fujinawa 2020: 218ff.).

To sum up this subsection, *wa*-sentences in Japanese not only represent categorical statements, as assumed by Kuroda (1972), but they may, as “pseudocategorical” sentences in the sense of Marty (1918), very well also representthetic statements. On the contrary, *ga*-sentences are reserved exclusively forthetic statements, not being deniable in the usual way by simply adding the negative element *nai* ‘not’ to

the syntactic predicate. This difference between *wa*- and *ga*-sentences, originating from their different logico-semantic structures (i.e., covered (double) negativity of *wa*-sentences vs. overt and consistent positivity of *ga*-sentences), is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that *ga*-sentences, as opposed to *wa*-sentences, hardly allow the verb of being *da* to co-occur with a locative complement to act as an existential verb.

3.2 SA- vs. non-SA-sentences in English and German

According to Sasse (1987, 2006), SA-sentences in English and German are supposed to be functional equivalents of *ga*-sentences in Japanese (although he (1987: 525) admits that SA-sentences are almost always restricted to intransitive predicate verbs). This is confirmed by the fact that all the discourse functions in which SA-sentences are used as per Sasse (2006: 280ff.) – the “annuntiative,” the “descriptive,” and the “explanative” function (24a–c), among others – require *ga*-sentences like (25a–c) when translated into Japanese:

- (24) a. FULBRIGHT erkrankt.
FULBRIGHT (got) sick.
b. Ein BLIZZARD nahte.
A BLIZZARD was approaching.
c. Da trat ein jäher Wendepunkt in meinem Leben ein: meine SCHWESTER kam zur Welt.
Then, there was a drastic change in my life: my SISTER was born.
(all German examples and their English translations
cited from Sasse 2006: 283, 286, 287)
- (25) a. Fulbright *ga* byooki.
F. *ga* sick
b. Burizaado *ga* tikaduite i-ta.
Blizzard *ga* approach PROG-PF
c. [...] imooto *ga* umare ta no da.
sister *ga* be.born PF NML be

This general discourse-functional correspondence between SA- and *ga*-sentences indicates that SA-sentences are also based onthetic statements in the sense of Marty (1918), i.e., positive or negative existential statements.

This fact about the function of SA-sentences, however, does not necessarily mean that they are also syntactically constructed in the same way as *ga*-sentences. While there is in fact one property SA-sentences like (2b) and (3b) have in common with *ga*-sentences like (1b), i.e., SA-sentences cannot simply be negated by adding

the appropriate negative element, (*do*) *not* or *nicht*, they further require the main accent to be removed from the core of their syntactic subject, yielding non-SA-sentences like (26):

- (26) a. No, your car didn't break DOWN.
b. Nein, dein Auto ist nicht KAPUTT.

Accented this way, (26) is comparable to the *wa*-sentence (16a) in Japanese, which, as an alternative to the *ga*-sentence (16b), is adequate in the same context.

However, English and German apparently lack expressions structurally equivalent to (16c) in Japanese, i.e., the other construction without the *wa*-marked subject for negating (1b), in which the negative element scopes over the whole sentence kernel in a single nominalized term (**the car having broken down is not*). This situation suggests that SA-sentences in English and German differ from *ga*-sentences in Japanese in that they are, even in an affirmative form, not purelythetic but only pseudocategorical, just like non-SA-sentences in negative form such as (26).

This idea is supported by (8b) in German, repeated here as (27b), as well as its English counterpart (27a):

- (27) a. No HORSE is winged.
b. Kein PFERD ist geflügelt.

Both sentences, negative-existentially quantified by *no/kein*, are most naturally subject-accented.⁷ This accentuation, however, does not change the fact that they possibly mean (10b) and thus are pseudocategorical sentences according to Marty (1918) (see also Section 2 for the relevant discussion).

Another point to support our idea is provided by (28):

- (28) a. PETER is at home.
b. PETER ist zu Hause.

In (28), the verb of being in English and German, *is* and *ist*, respectively, readily acts as an existential verb with a locative complement. In this regard, SA-sentences like (28) – no matter whether they are all-focused or only argument-focused over *PETER* – are less comparable to the *ga*-sentence (21b), which is hardly acceptable because of its puretheticity implicating a tautology, than to the entirely acceptable pseudocategorical *wa*-sentence (21a), i.e., the denial of a contradiction.

7. Subject-accented, (27a–b) not only mean an argument-focused but also an all-focused statement while in case of an accented predicate (WINGED/GEFLÜGELT), they are restricted to an argument-focus.

In summary, SA-sentences in English and German also mean thetic statements, according to Marty (1918), and thus lead to their characteristic discourse functions in the same way as *ga*-sentences in Japanese do. Contrary to *ga*-sentences, however, SA-sentences do not count as purely thetic expressions, but, rather parallel to *wa*-sentences, as pseudo-categorical ones.

4. Where does pure theticity come from?

The results of the previous section on how thetic statements are expressed in Japanese, English, and German partially agree, but disagree somewhat with what Marty (1918) argued about the issue. What coincides with his view is, first of all, the fact that Japanese *wa*-sentences also, contrary to Kuroda's (1972) claim, not only represent categorical but also thetic statements. In line with Marty's (1918) opinion, it also seems apparent that thetic statements find their expression only in a pseudo-categorical manner in English and German.⁸ The latter, however, being valid only for two of the three languages, implies that not all expressions of thetic statements in Japanese are pseudocategorical but only some of them, i.e., *ga*-sentences are purely thetic. This conclusion can hardly be expected from Marty (1918). Because of this complication, our next task is to clarify what it is for a sentence to be a purely thetic expression and where this property comes from.

Since both *ga*-sentences in Japanese and SA-sentences in English and German logico-semantically represent thetic statements in the one and the same sense as Marty (1918), the essential condition determining whether they are pseudocategorical or purely thetic expressions is assumed to be rooted in their diverse syntactic structures. As seen in 3.1, *ga*-sentences are conspicuous for their way of negation. Therefore, the *ga*-sentence (16b) accompanied by *nai* 'not' does not act as sentence negation of the *nai*-less *ga*-sentence (1b), contrary to the corresponding *wa*-sentence (16a). This fact suggests that *ga*-sentences are assigned a different syntactic representation from *wa*-sentences:

- (29) *Syntactic representations for ga- and wa-sentences with nai*
- a. [_{IP} — [_{I'} [_{VP} [_{DP} *ga*] ... V *nakat-ta*] O]]
 - b. [_{IP} [_{DP} *wa*]_i [_{I'} [_{VP} *t_i* ... V] *nakat-ta*]]

As shown in (29a), *nai* (> *nakat-*) in *ga*-sentences like (16b), clustered together with the temporal auxiliary *ta*, remains inside the VP. This VP, for its part, contains the *ga*-marked subject as its specifier on the one hand, but on the other, it is also governed by a covert positive auxiliary in the IP head position (symbolized by O

8. But see Section 5 for an existing exception in German: optatives.

for some positively asserting “operator”), by virtue of which a *ga*-sentence is never interpreted as a negative existential statement (see the relevant discussion in 3.1). In contrast, *nai* in *wa*-sentences like (16a), together with *ta*, occupies the position of I, as illustrated in (29b). This is because *wa*-sentences neither positively nor negatively predetermine that head position. Subsequently, such a neutral head of the sentence causes the *wa*-marked NP to move up to its specifier position, as is required for the very subject of a (possibly) categorical statement, existentially presupposed and thus freed from any sentence negation.

Further evidence of a *ga*-marked subject DP remaining strictly in situ and thus never going out of the VP up to the SpecIP position, in contrast to a *wa*-marked subject DP, comes from the action of polarity-sensitive indefinite pronouns such as *daremo* ‘anyone’:

- (30) a. $[_{IP} \text{ } [_{I'} [_{VP} \text{ Daremo } [_{V'} \text{ hataraitte } i]] \text{ nai }]]$. [= (19c)]
 anyone work PROG NEG
 There is no one working.
- b. $[_{IP} \text{ } [_{I'} [_{VP} \text{ Daremo } ga \text{ } [_{V'} \text{ hataraitte } iru]] O]]$.
 anyone *ga* work PROG
 Everyone is working.
- c. $[_{IP} \text{ } [_{I'} [_{VP} \text{ Daremo } ga \text{ } [_{V'} \text{ hataraitte } i \text{ } \text{nai }]] O]]$.
 anyone *ga* work PROG NEG
 Everyone is not working.
- d. $[_{IP} \text{ Daremo}_i \text{ } wa \text{ } [_{I'} [_{VP} \text{ } t_i \text{ } [_{V'} \text{ hataraitte } i]] \text{ nai }]]$.
 anyone *wa* work PROG NEG
 Not everyone is working.

As mentioned in 3.1 relating to (19c), repeated here as (30a), *daremo* is never accompanied by *ga* as long as it serves to deny an existential statement made by a *ga*-sentence with *dareka* ‘someone’. As soon as it is used for a different purpose, i.e., for making a universal statement, however, the same indefinite pronoun simply accompanies *ga* as in (30b–c). Remarkably, even (30c) with overt *nai* can neither mean the same as (30a), a negative existential statement, nor the denial of the universal statement (30b), “not everyone is working.” If such a statement is meant, *wa* instead of *ga* is in order, as in (30d).

The examples cited above, especially (30a), (30c), and (30d), show how the method of marking the subject DP – zero, *ga* or *wa* – reflects the configurational relationship between polysemous *daremo* and *nai*, and therefore determines the meaning of the whole sentence in question. In this syntactic system of Japanese, a *ga*-marked subject DP consistently remains in VP, leaving the SpecIP position entirely empty. In contrast, English as well as German lacks this option, at least in the core system of syntax. As far as declaratives (and also interrogatives) are concerned, the VP-external subject position must be occupied, either overtly or covertly.

In English, the expressions that correspond to (30a), (30c), and (30d) are syntactically analyzed as follows:

- (31) a. [_{IP} There [_{I'} is [_{VP} no one [_{V'} working]]]].
 b. [_{IP} Everyone_i [_{I'} is [_{VP} *t_i* [_{V'} not working]]]].
 c. [_{IP} Not everyone_i [_{I'} is [_{VP} *t_i* [_{V'} working]]]].

While the three sentences in (31) have their negative element, *no* or *not*, in a respectively different position just as in Japanese, all of them have their SpecIP position overtly filled, quite unlike in Japanese.

As for German, where a finite verb moves further to the head of the CP as a result of V2, such indefinite nominals as *keiner* ‘no one’ and *alle* ‘all (people), everyone’ quite commonly stay inside the VP (see also Diesing 1992).⁹ Indeed, this positioning is recognized in (32) by virtue of the fact that *ja*, a so-called “modal particle” appearing at the border between IP and VP (Abraham 2018; Frey 2006: 168ff.), precedes the very indefinite nominals:

- (32) a. [_{CP} Da [_{C'} arbeitet_j [_{IP} *pro*_i ja [_{VP} *keiner*_i [_{V'} *t_j*]] *t_j*]]].
 there is.working MP no.one
 b. [_{CP} Da [_{C'} arbeiten_j [_{IP} *pro*_i ja [_{VP} *alle*_i [_{V'} nicht *t_j*]] *t_j*]]].
 there are.working MP all.people not
 c. [_{CP} Da [_{C'} arbeiten_j [_{IP} *pro*_i ja [_{VP} nicht *alle*_i [_{V'} *t_j*]] *t_j*]]].
 there are.working MP not all.people

Insofar as not only the (negative) existential quantifier *keiner* but also the (positive or negative) universal quantifier (*nicht*) *alle* can remain in the VP, German at first glance might seem to profoundly differ from English rather than from Japanese. Superficially, it looks like the SpecIP position is left unoccupied just as in the case of Japanese non-*wa*-sentences like (30a–c). This view, however, is not correct. As is generally assumed in German syntax literature (Grewendorf 2002; Lohnstein 2014: 179f., for example), the position is occupied by an invisible pronoun, which, on the one hand, reflects the personal-deictic property of the finite verb through agreement and, on the other, shares its nominative case with *keiner* or *alle* (technically by means of a co-indexation).¹⁰ Owing to the presence of such an invisible pronoun, symbolized by *pro* in (32), the indefinite nominals in question are unable

9. In recent theories of Generative Grammar, the domain in question governed by I is split into *vP* and VP. Accordingly, I should speak instead about *vP* than VP, but for the sake of simplicity, I refrain from such a differentiation.

10. Note, however, that this view is not shared by Haider (2010: 72ff.). He relates the necessity for SpecIP to be filled with an expletive, whether overtly or covertly, to the underlying VO/OV word order.

to move to SpecIP as shown in (33a), but can at most be displaced to SpecCP as in (33b), i.e., to the *Vorfeld* “prefield,” as is traditionally called in German linguistics, at which a constituent in any grammatical function can land:

- (33) a. * $[_{CP} \text{Da } [_C \text{ arbeiten}_j \text{ } [_{IP} \text{ nicht alle}_i \text{ ja } [_{VP} \text{ } t_i \text{ } [_V' \text{ } t_j \text{ }]] t_j \text{ }]]]]$.
 b. $[_{CP} \text{ Nicht alle}_i \text{ } [_C \text{ arbeiten}_j \text{ } [_{IP} \text{ } pro_i \text{ ja } [_{VP} \text{ heute } t_i \text{ } [_V' \text{ } t_j \text{ }]] t_j \text{ }]]]]$.
 Not all.people are.working MP today

In view of their VP-external subject position, although sometimes covertly but always occupied, sentences in German, in fact, structurally have more in common with those in English than in Japanese.

The fact that the use of VP-external subject position varies from language to language – “possibly left unoccupied in Japanese” vs. “always occupied in English and German declaratives (and interrogatives)” – finally accounts for the different actions of the verbs of being in these languages. As observed in 3.1, *da* in Japanese does not combine with a locative complement to function as an existential verb as long as it occurs in *ga*-sentences like (21b), repeated here as (34a), whereas their functionally equivalent expressions in English and German like (28a–b), repeated here as (34b–c), have no such effect:

- (34) a. #Sensei *ga* tosyokan da. [= (21b)]
 teacher *ga* library be
 Not valid in the sense: “The teacher is in the library.”
 b. PEter is at home. [= (28a)]
 c. PEter ist zu Hause. [= (28b)]

The peculiarity of (34a) in Japanese can be attributed to the fact that it means nothing but a tautology on the lines of (22b), illustrated here again in (35):

- (35) *Meaning of the ga-sentence (34a) = (21b) [= (22b)]*
 “Anyone that is in the library and is identified with the teacher (simultaneously to the utterance) exists.”

In Japanese, the verb of being *da* obviously represents “exists” in (35). This means that the concepts represented by the *ga*-marked DP and by the locative complement are readily unified into a single notion of “anyone that is in the library and is identified with the teacher” before operated over by that verb for “exists.” The prerequisite for the possibility of this kind of interpretational procedure is the fact that in Japanese, both the elements relevant to the unification – the *ga*-marked DP as well as the locative complement – remain in a single lexical domain of VP, governed by *da*.

On the contrary, a similar procedure fails in English and German because the syntactic subject DP must be related to a designated functional position external to the VP: the SpecIP position. Accordingly, even in case of thetic statements, this

obligatory position, overtly or covertly occupied in English and German, provides an effect as if there were provisionally someone already present to be predicated of so that this person must be the one denoted by the syntactic subject DP. The meaning of (34b–c) is thus explained as follows:

(36) *Meaning of (34b–c)*

“Provided there is someone at home, then it is Peter who this very person is identified with (simultaneously to the utterance).”

It is because (36) does not correspond to a tautology that (34b–c) in English and German are, as opposed to (34a) in Japanese, completely acceptable.

5. Optative – A purely thetic expression in German

By comparing how thetic statements are expressed through declarative (and interrogative) sentences as core grammatical phenomena in Japanese, English, and German, I have so far explained that the essential difference between *ga*-sentences in Japanese on the one hand and SA-sentences in English and German on the other lies in the former’s pure theticity as a result of their VP-external syntactic subject position being left unoccupied. In English and German, this option is lost because any finite verb used in such sentences is inherently associated with a personal deictic category. In what follows, however, details of my previous work (Fujinawa 2017: 26ff.) on German optatives will relativize the interpretation insofar as this rather peripheral type of sentence in German corresponds to a purely thetic expression in our sense.

Optatives in German like (37) are syntactically realized by a present subjunctive in a non-*wh*-marked V2 word order, although this form per se can also represent declarative sentences in (free) indirect speech like the underlined ones in (38):

- (37) a. Lang *lebe* der König / München!
 long live.SBJ the king Munich
 “Let the king / Munich live long!”
- b. Man *nehme* ein Pfund Mehl.
 one take.SBJ one pond flour
 “Take one pound of flour.” (In a recipe)
- c. Gott *segne* dich.
 God bless.SBJ you.ACC
 “God bless you.”
- d. Hier *seien* einige Beispiele *genannt*.
 here PASS.SBJ some examples cite.PP
 “Some examples are given here (as is demanded).”

- e. Vor Plagiaten *sei* (*es) ausdrücklich *gewarnt*.
 against plagiarism PASS.SBJ EXP expressly warn.PP
 “A warning against plagiarism should be done expressly (*lit.*: Against plagiarism be warned expressly).”
 (Fujinawa 2017: 26, 27)
- (38) a. Damals glaubte man, sie lebe noch.
 at.that.time believed one she live.SBJ still
 “At that time, people believed she was still alive.”
- b. Karl war entschlossen: Er nehme an der Reise teil.
 K. was determined he take.SBJ at the trip PART
 “Karl decided: He would take part in the trip.”

Semantically, optatives differ from indirect declaratives in that they express a sort of request or demand by themselves, i.e., without the aid of verbs such as “request” or “demand,” which would, in English, license a *that*-clause in the present subjunctive (for example: “We demand that every member *inform* himself of these rules,” cited from Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: 51).

Such a request or demand – often characterized as “heischen” in German grammar (Zifonun et al. 1997: 610, for example) – is by no means explicitly directed at the hearer who is actually present at the time of utterance, but only implicitly to those who are potentially responsible for bringing about the event or state described by the sentence. Thus, optative sentences never have a personal pronoun as their subject, and the underlined parts in (38), even if they appear in isolation, cannot mean (at least in modern German): “Let her live long!” or “He should take part in the trip.” In addition, definite DPs other than personal pronouns hardly behave as canonical subject expressions. DPs with a definite article or proper nouns such as *der König* ‘the king’ and *München* ‘Munich’ in (37a), for example, cannot move to the primary position of the sentence without an accent (although this is usually possible and probable for definite subject DPs) and consequently must remain behind. The only accentless subject nominals that are allowed to enter that “prefield” position of an optative sentence are *man* ‘one’ in (37b) and *Gott* ‘God’ in (37c), both of which are non-referring expressions without any (definite or indefinite) determiner. In this regard, the subject’s lack of personal deixis is crucial for optatives in German to be distinguished from indirect declaratives in an apparently identical form.

Furthermore, in contrast to their structural counterparts in English (*God bless you*, for example), which function almost formulaically “as wholes” (Quirk & Greenbaum 1973: 51), optatives in German are still productive expressions even though they are stylistically restricted. Such an aspect of German optatives is, in my opinion, most clearly reflected in the productivity of passives like (37d–e). In these examples, neither an actor appears as a subject responsible for the described

event, nor is another definite nominal expression derived from an underlying object so that the desired state in question could be attributed to it. In particular, (37e), an impersonal passive, lacks any subject expression, even *es* ‘it’ as an expletive pronoun. This fact suggests that in German optatives, the SpecIP position is left entirely unoccupied.

At this point, one might object that no expletive pronoun at all surfacing in an impersonal passive is true in German as well for declaratives (and interrogatives) as in (39):

- (39) a. Für Kinder muss (*es) gesorgt werden.
 for children must EXP look.after.PP PASS
 “Children must be looked after (*lit.*: after children must be looked).”
 b. Vor Plagiaten ist (*es) ausdrücklich zu warnen.
 against plagiarism is EXP expressly to warn
 “A warning against plagiarism is to be done expressly (*lit.*: Against plagiarism is to warn expressly).”

As we have already seen in Section 4, the external subject position of declaratives (and interrogatives), even though apparently empty, is still assumed to be occupied by an invisible pronoun, *pro*. The same should be, one would think, applicable to optatives as well.

This objection, however, is not compelling, for what fails to appear in the very subject position of optatives is not only true personal pronouns such as *er* ‘he’ or *sie* ‘she’, as we have noted in this section, but also the overt expletive *es*, which otherwise is never omitted when lexical impersonal verbs such as *regnen* ‘rain’ and *es gibt* ‘there is’ are used:

- (40) a. #Es regne.
 EXP rain.SBJ
 Not valid as an optative: “May it rain.”
 b. #Auf der Erde gebe es Frieden.
 on the earth give.SBJ EXP peace
 Not valid as an optative: “Let there be peace on the earth.”
 (Fujinawa 2017: 27)

Both of the V2-sentences in present subjunctive in (40) are most probably interpreted as declaratives in indirect speech, but scarcely as optatives except as putative archaisms.¹¹ Considering that there is nothing wrong with the intended optative

11. Note that the optative use of present subjunctive V2-sentences with a personal pronoun subject was still possible in the 18th century: *Er komme*, “He shall come.”

readings, as is evident from the English translations, the reason for the incongruity of the optative readings of (40a–b) must be sought in their syntactic structure. It is because no personal agreement occurs in optative sentences that the pronoun *es* can neither referentially nor expletively occupy SpecIP. As even *es* as an unmarked expletive is not allowed in optatives, it is hardly conceivable that their VP-external subject position is available just for that marked and invisible pronoun *pro*. In other words, instead of being pseudocategorical, optatives in German are purelythetic expressions.

Our view is indeed supported by an additional fact. In optative sentences in German, the verb of being, *sein*, cannot serve as an existential verb with a locative complement, just as in Japanese *ga*-sentences. This is illustrated by (41)–(43):

- (41) a. Mein Name *sei* Gantenbein.
 my name be.SBJ G.
 “Let my name be Gantenbein.” (a novel title)
- b. A *sei* eine beliebige Menge.
 A be.SBJ a arbitrary set
 “Let A be an arbitrary set.”
- c. Glücklich *sei* der Mensch, der...
 happy be.SBJ the person who
 “May the person be happy who ...”
- (42) a. Hier *stehe* nur ein Beispiel.
 here stand.SBJ only one example
 “Here shall stand only one example.”
- b. Gottes Segen *liege* auf deinen Handlungen...
 God’s benediction lie.SBJ on your acts
 “May God’s benediction be on your acts.”
- (43) a. #Hier *sei* nur ein Beispiel.
 here be.SBJ only one example
 Not valid as: “Here shall be only one example.”
- b. #Gottes Segen *sei* auf deinen Handlungen...
 God’s benediction be.SBJ on your acts
 Not valid as: “May God’s benediction be on your acts.”
- ((41a–c), (42a–b) and (43a) cited from Fujinawa 2017: 29)

As shown by the optative sentences in (41), *sei*, the verb of being in present subjunctive at the V2-position, can in principle serve unrestrictedly as a copula, either as an identifying (41a) or a qualifying one with a predicative noun (41b) or adjective (41c) (see Geist 2006: 3f. for a detailed functional subclassification of the copula). In addition, (42) indicates that the optative mood does not prevent verbs

of location such as *stehen* (> *stehe*) ‘stand’ and *liegen* (> *liege*) ‘lie’ from functioning as such verbs. Nevertheless, *sei* is unable to replace these verbs of location. The sentences with *sei* in (43), formally corresponding to (42), can only be valid as declaratives in indirect speech. In other words, German optatives are similar to Japanese *ga*-sentences like (21b).

To summarize: Even in languages such as English and German, whose finite verbs are in principle characterized inherently by a personal deictic category and therefore require the VP-external subject position filled with some actually or potentially referring expression to agree with that personal deictic category, purelythetic sentences may still emerge, provided (at least) no such personal deictic agreement is at work in a subsystem of the same language as in the case of German optatives.

6. Concluding remarks

In the present paper, I examined how the properties of being categorical andthetic, accepted so far in some information-structural or cognitive sense in the linguistic literature, are characterized in a logico-semantic and syntactic sense, respectively, and how both the aspects match or differ from each other. In accordance with Marty (1918), even though in a more modern fashion, categoricity in a logico-semantic sense was defined as predicating some property of a subject whose referent is existentially presupposed on the lines of Strawson (1950), while no such predication holds in the case of athetic statement. Consequently, syntactic structures most suitable for expressing categorical andthetic statements, respectively, are distinguished from each other based on whether their syntactic subject appears outside or inside the VP as a (potential) negation domain. Based on these definitions, I indicated that, contrary to Kuroda (1972), Japanese *wa*-sentences can also representthetic statements, whereas no *ga*-sentences with their syntactic subject inside the VP represent categorical statements. Evidence for such a contrastive behavior is the fact that the verb of being *da*, when functioning as an existential verb together with its locative complement, represents either the negation of a contradiction or the affirmation of a tautology, depending upon whether a *wa*-marked subject DP occupies the VP-external subject position or a *ga*-marked one remains inside the VP, leaving the same functional position completely empty. Furthermore, my previous work on optatives in German (Fujinawa 2017) was cited to elucidate that sentences in this mood of German with their never personal deictic and thus never existentially presupposed subject DP are not pseudocategorical but purelythetic expressions, just as *ga*-sentences in Japanese are.

Overall, the results obtained in the present paper suggest an asymmetric relation between syntactic and semantic structures cross-linguistically. While the syntactic structure suitable for making categorical statements in any of the three languages – Japanese, English, and German – can also serve to expressthetic statements as pseudocategorical sentences, purelythetic sentences are given if and only if no personal deictic agreement exists between a syntactic subject and predicate expression in the relevant linguistic (sub)system. This strongly suggests that the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) of Chomsky (1982), according to which every sentence has its own syntactic subject external to VP, is hardly an a priori matter of an autonomous syntax, but is valid only as an interface condition between syntax and semantics and thus has to be learned a posteriori. In this regard, the present paper may be considered an empirical contribution toward developing Non-Cartesian Linguistics on the lines of Leiss (2009).

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Abbreviations

The abbreviations used for glossing the examples in the present paper are as follows:

ACC	accusative	PASS	passive auxiliary
DAT	dative	PF	perfect auxiliary
EXP	expletive	PP	past participle
MP	modal particle	PROG	progressive
NEG	negative	SA	subject accented
NML	nominalizer	SBJ	(present) subjunctive.

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The thetic/categorical distinction as difference in common ground update

With application to Biblical Hebrew

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The distinction between thetics and categoricals in natural language has been observed in more and more languages recently. The theoretical discussion about the thetic/categorical distinction has also become increasingly relevant. This article presents a few challenges to an assertion/judgment-based analysis of the thetic/categorical distinction and offers instead an analysis based on common ground update within a theory of alternative semantics. In this approach, I follow Murray (2009, 2010, 2014) and Roberts (2012) that each sentence offers different kinds of update to the common ground based on the question(s) under discussion (or *at-issue/not-at-issue* content). I suggest that thetics present a unique type of update which explains why sentences such as *It is raining*, prosodically inflected sentences (known as those with sentence focus), existentials, and presentatives have been called thetics. Each statement contributes to (or updates) the information interlocutors use, and this common ground shapes the assertions they make. I ultimately propose that the thetic/categorical distinction may no longer be helpful for a description of natural language. Instead, these phenomena can be situated within the increasingly robust frameworks which bridge the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interfaces. Finally, I apply this proposal to a construction type in Biblical Hebrew which I previously labelled a thetic construction in Wilson (2017, 2019).

Keywords: thetic, categorical, Ancient Hebrew, update, common ground, at-issue, not-at-issue, alternative semantics

1. Introduction

The intersection of different linguistic interfaces is simultaneously fascinating, complicated, and increasingly essential for explaining natural language phenomena. One important priority in the evolving field of modern linguistics is to evaluate

and reevaluate assumptions which have framed discussions about linguistic phenomena in ways that illuminate their true nature. In this article, I intend to suggest a reevaluation of the notion of the *thetic/categorical* distinction with insights from research in alternative semantics and notions of update and common ground. The interesting phenomena discussed in this volume as well as in previous studies on the *thetic/categorical* distinction may be framed in a way that captures the nuances more precisely than was possible with the philosophical notion of *judgment* (which gave linguists the idea of *theticity*) or with earlier models of information structure. In the first section I will present a short history of *theticity*, especially reviewing its beginnings in philosophy. In the second section, I will describe a few problems with how the notions of *theticity* and *categoricity* have been used to describe natural language phenomena. In the third section, I will present insights from recent semantics research which capture the phenomena more precisely. In this section I will make my proposal for where a discussion of *theticity* should rightly be situated. In the final section I will update the analysis of a Biblical Hebrew construction I identified as *thetic* in Wilson 2017 and 2019 with this new proposal.

2. Background to *thetic/categorical* distinction

The first mention of the *thetic judgment*, (*thetisches Urteil*) comes from the philosophical lectures and writings of Fichte in the last decade of the 18th century. Fichte was arguing against Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant proposed the use of logical concepts – including that of *judgment* – as the appropriate method for understanding the limits of human knowledge. Fichte argued that the *Wissenschaftslehre* (the science of science) is the foundation for logical theory and not vice versa. According to Fichte, the logical theory assumed by Kant cannot be taken for granted; it must be proven first by a more transcendental line of inquiry: *Wissenschaftslehre*. Fichte then needed to outline what the first principles of this line of inquiry should be. It is in this quest that Fichte recognized a new logical form of judgement. He said,

For, just as there were antithetic and synthetic judgments, so there ought, by analogy, to be *thetic* judgments also, which should in some respect be directly opposed to them. For the propriety of the two former types presupposes a ground, indeed a double ground, firstly of conjunction, an secondly, of distinction, of which both could be exhibited, and both would *have* to be exhibited, if the judgment is to be warranted sound...A *thetic* judgment, however, would be one in which something is asserted, not to be like anything else or opposed to anything else, but simply to be identical with itself: thus it could presuppose no ground of conjunction or distinction at all: the third thing, rather, which as a matter of logical form, it must still

presuppose, would be simply the *requirement* for a ground. The first and foremost judgment of this type is “I am,” in which nothing whatever is affirmed of the self, the place of the predicate being left indefinitely empty for its possible characterization. (Seidel 1993: 82–85)

By introducing the thetic judgment, Fichte was revising Kant’s analysis of judgment forms which all require a minimum of two concepts. In existential predicates like *Gott ist* (God exists), according to Kant, God is being posited as an object which stands in relation to the concept of God in the mind of the speaker. Fichte disagreed with this relation and argued that these singular existential judgments are simply asserted, or posited (from Greek *tithēmi* ‘to put, pose’). For a thorough history of other philosophers who followed Fichte’s revolution in logical thought on this subject, see Martin 2010.

Among the other philosophers who followed this revolution in the taxonomy of judgment types Brentano (1870–1877) and Marty (1908) carried the concept of theticity closer to a discussion of human language until it was adopted by Kuroda (1972) in his influential articles on Japanese. As the other contributions to this volume have covered, in these articles, Kuroda claimed to have found the thetic/categorical distinctions (though revised in several important ways from Brentano and Marty) in the grammar of Japanese, specifically in the distribution of the particles *wa* and *ga*.

- (1) *Inu ga hasitte iru*
A/the dog is running
- (2) *Inu wa hasitte iru*
A/the dog is running

The judgment in Example (1) is the simple recognition of an event (a thetic sentence) whereas the judgment in (2) is a double judgment (a categorical sentence). Perhaps the most thorough study of thetics in natural language was carried out by Sasse (1987, 1996). Sasse undertook an extensive typological study of thetic sentences, identifying syntactic forms and discourse functions which are common cross-linguistically. In addition to those languages included in the cross-linguistic study of Sasse, thetics have been identified in many other languages such as Albanian, Greek, and Serbo-Croat (Matić 2003), Irish (Shkapa 2012), Russian (Shkapa 2012), Buli (Schwarz 2016), Lelemi (Schwarz 2016), Ancient Greek (Bailey 2009), Sumerian (Zólyomi 2014), Biblical Hebrew (Wilson 2019), and Tanti Dargwa (Sumbatova 2011).

Recently, Macías (2016) has provided a detailed history of the concept of theticity and how it has been applied in linguistic research. One unique aspect of this dissertation is a determination of the less-disputed subtypes of thetics. Macías notes

that some thetic subtypes have had more consensus as to their status as bonafide thetics than others, including existentials, weather statements, presentatives, physical sensation statements, and hot news statements (Macías 2016: 53). He provides examples for each of these sub-types in (3).

- (3) a. Existentials (e.g. *There are three Tasmanian devils in the zoo*).
 b. Weather statements (e.g. *It is snowing*).
 c. Presentatives (e.g. *HERE's John*).
 d. Physical sensation (e.g. *My HEAD hurts*).
 e. Hot news statements (e.g. *The POPE died*). (Macías 2016: 5)

Theticity, according to Macías, is “an information structure configuration that either introduces an entity in the discourse or points to a state of affairs as a whole (i.e. not establishing a syntactic subject-predicate distinction” (Macías 2016: 51). This definition is more-or-less consistent with the definitions put forward in other treatments of theticity. This definition and the examples which are used to illustrate the thetic/categorical distinction are not without problems, however, which I will discuss in Section 3.

3. Problems with the thetic/categorical distinction

Sasse acknowledges that the concept of theticity has not found favor with empirical linguists since its non-linguistic background seems to be out of touch with the features of natural language (Sasse 1996: 3). In one of the most thorough treatments of the concept Sasse says,

One of the main faults of previous research on theticity (including my own) was failing to clearly distinguish between form and content as such, and, more specifically, between universal and language-specific aspects of both. Basically, nobody has ever tried to make explicit what kind of animal “theticity” really is and on what level of linguistic analysis it has to be dealt with. (Sasse 1996: 10)

This acknowledgement exposes the root of some of the problems with the thetic/categorical distinction: it is important to know what level of linguistic analysis best explains the phenomena.

One problem we encounter in the research on thetics is that theticity is described as a unified proposition (or single judgment) in comparison with a topic-comment structure (double judgment), but the examples given mute important distinctions. For example, often weather expressions (i.e. *Es regnet* ‘It is raining’) are juxtaposed with prosodically-marked sentences (i.e. *The BUTter melted*). This is unhelpful,

however, because both sentence types do not have categorical corollaries. *It's raining* can only be a single judgment, while *The butter melted* has both thetic and categorical interpretations. If there are examples which cannot help but be unified propositions, either there are words/constructions with inherent theticity or our understanding of what is happening in these sentences needs to be changed.

Another problem with the distinction concerns the notion of a categorical sentence. Most of the studies which make reference to this distinction discuss a construction which is presumably conveying a thetic judgment which can be contrasted with a supposed default construction type: the categorical. What is missing in this type of analysis is a precise description of what a categorical judgment is and what kinds of constructions can and cannot rightly be called categorical. For example, it is not clear whether the thetic/categorical distinction applies in the case of questions, commands, and other non-declarative speech acts. If it does not, this means that whatever the thetic/categorical distinction is, it is a restricted phenomenon. The same criticism could be leveled at the discourse-level observations about thetic sentences. Sasse identifies the different discourse contexts in which thetic sentences are commonly found, noting that this follows from their nature as unified assertions (Sasse 1997). There is no discussion, however, about the discourse contexts in which categoricals are found and exactly what their contribution is to a discourse. Sasse identifies five discourse functions that thetic statements fulfill: Annuntiative, Introductory, Interruptive, Descriptive, and Explanative (Sasse 1996: 32ff). It is not apparent from Sasse's article, however, that categorical statements – whatever they are – are precluded from serving these same functions. If the thetic/categorical distinction is to hold, there needs to be a more precise description of what a categorical statement is and how it differs in use and interpretation from thetic statement.

Despite these problems, the research on thetics and categoricals have made some important observations. One important observation concerns the relationship of a thetic sentence to the surrounding context. Thetic sentences have been called “topic-less” sentences in the sense that their grammatical subject does not serve as the topic as typically happens in categorical sentences. Instead, the contextual domain functions as the topic for thetic sentences. This has been called “inner speech form” (Kuno 1972: 154), “neutral description” (Kuroda 1972), utterance with a “rhematic subject” (Sasse 1987: 516), “sentence focus” (Lambrecht 1994), “stage topic” (Ertischik-Shir (2007). Recently, Bentley and Cruschina have stated that the spacio-temporal context is the true *Subject of Predication* for these sentences (Bentley & Cruschina 2018). This pattern is important for demonstrating where in linguistic analysis I believe the thetic/categorical distinction should be situated.

4. Situating theticity and categoricity

In this section I will attempt to show how the distinctions between thetic and categorical sentences can be explained as side effects of a larger notion of common ground update. Recent research in the pragmatics of speaker addressee dynamics have established a more thorough research program based on natural language which is better suited to explain the thetic/categorical phenomena.

One of the weaknesses mentioned in Section 3 is that the definition of what constitutes a categorical is somewhat vague and empirically unsupported. Studies which have claimed that thetics function as introductions, interruptions, etc. do not offer any examples of the role of categoricals in discourse and how they differ from that of thetics. What is needed is a description of how each statement contributes to (or updates) the information interlocutors use which shapes the assertions they make, what types of updates there are, and whether there is some overlap with what has until now been described as the thetic/categorical distinction.

Many describe a thetic as an “unstructured whole.” This term is conceptually descriptive but perhaps less helpful for discovering more empirical information about thetic sentences and how they differ from language to language. *Sentence focus* (Lambrecht 1994) is equally as opaque and underspecific as a label for thetics. Fortunately, more developed work in the semantics of information structure has provided a better framework for describing how each statement contributes to the information interlocutors use which shapes the assertions they make. I will introduce three concepts from work within these frameworks which will be useful for the present issue. The first idea – which has gained increasing acceptance for modeling pragmatics – is called *common ground*. A simple definition is provided in (4).

- (4) Common ground (CG): any information the interlocutors take for granted in a conversation.

Stalnaker (1978) introduced the concept stating that the CG is the common or mutual knowledge between participants in conversation. This is information which is assumed for the sake of dialogue. Stalnaker states that it is propositions which are presupposed in the common ground, but a more fundamental way of representing what is presupposed is not a set of propositions, but rather a set of possible worlds recognized to be “live options” relevant to the conversation, which he calls the *context set* (Stalnaker 1978:151). The CG is dynamic in the sense that it is updated with every new move in the conversation. Roberts (2012) adds that the CG is a superset of the common ground for any previous move in a discourse which preserves this information. Roberts suggests that we even keep track of questions and assertions which were proposed but rejected and this explains things like denials and corrections. One of the ways that CG gets updated is through the proffering of

propositions which an interlocutor can either accept or reject. The content which is proffered can be described as *at-issue* versus *non-at-issue* content. The differences will be discussed under my review of *update* below. The *at-issue* content which is proffered has also been referred to as a felicitous answer to the *Question-Under-Discussion* (QUD).

Roberts introduces this concept as an ordered set of all as-yet unanswered but answerable, accepted questions. At a given point in discourse, there is a “push-down store” known as the *question-under-discussion stack*. When interlocutors accept a question, they add it to the top of this stack, which bears a relationship to any question previously on the top through a combination of relevance and logical constraints on how the stack is composed. For example, interlocutors often pursue an accepted question by addressing a subquestion first which answers part of the larger QUD (Roberts 2012: 15–16).

It is important to note that all nonquestion moves (e.g. assertions) are, in this framework, seen to be at least partial answers to the accepted QUD at the time of the utterance. Roberts states that this follows from how relevance is defined in this framework. She defines relevance as follows:

- (5) A move m is *Relevant* to the question under discussion q , i.e., to last (QUD(m)), iff m either introduces a partial answer to q (m is an assertion) or is part of a strategy to answer q (m is a question). (Roberts 2012: 21)¹

In accordance with this definition of relevance, Roberts states, “Each move in a felicitous discourse, one with proper information structure, will be Relevant to the question under discussion at the time of its utterance” (Roberts 2012: 21).

By means of illustration, Roberts applies this alternative semantics framework to prosodic focus in English. She insists in this description the limits of her intentions, “I am explicitly confining myself here to discussion of the role of English prosodic focus and hence am not making claims about some universal linguistic phenomenon, Focus” (Roberts 2012: 28). Just as well, she also adds, “the persistent intuitions on the part of researchers that there are universals of information structure (topic, focus, theme/rheme, etc.), plus the persistent linkage of focus with the question/answer paradigm, need to be explained” (Roberts 2012: 28).

1. Roberts makes a note here how her notion of relevance differs from that of Sperber & Wilson (1986). She states that their program is reductionistic in its attempt to account for all the original Gricean conversational maxims, while Roberts does not attempt this. Secondly, Sperber & Wilson, Roberts states, do not make Relevance dependent upon the interlocutor’s immediate intentions or goals, even denying the existence of a common ground. Roberts’ notion of relevance is completely dependent, however, on the question-under-discussion which is shaped by the interlocutor’s goals (Roberts 2012: 21 n. 14).

She says that prosodic focus in English presupposes the type of question under discussion.

- (6) a. Who did Mary invite?
 b. Mary invited [nobody]_F.
 c. *Mary [invited]_F nobody.
 d. *[Mary]_F invited nobody. (Roberts 2012: 34)

Examples (6c) and (6d) are infelicitous answers to the question in (6a). (6b) is congruent with the QUD and felicitous.²

The QUD enables the addressee to reconstruct that question along with other contextually given clues in the common ground and connect it to the strategy pursued by the speaker. (Roberts 2012: 8). Not all information is explicit in this “game.” Often in discourse an interlocutor presupposes a question or assertion which has not yet been accepted into the common ground; but when no interlocutors object to this presupposition, they all behave as if this information was in the common ground all along. (Roberts 2012: 8). This fact will be very important for our understanding of thetics. Roberts continues, “The goal of discourse is only partly to offer more information and partly to achieve consensus about the value of the information contributed. So some rhetorical structures are intended principally to convince one’s hearers that they information offered is worth adding to the common ground, e.g., by showing how it follows from or explains other known facts, etc.” (Roberts 2012: 63).

The third concept which is necessary for our purposes is that of *update*. Recent research by Murray (2010, 2014) has provided a theory of update which describes the different contributions every utterance makes to the common ground. She states,

Several natural language expressions seem to require an analysis that distinguishes semantic contributions further than what is asserted, what is presupposed, and what is implicated. In particular, there are phenomena that do not fit into our traditional categories of presupposition and implicature, that have more in common with assertion, but yet are not quite what we would like to call “asserted.

(Murray 2014: 1–2)

Murray sets forward evidentials as an example of this phenomena. I will provide a short review of Murray’s analysis of different types of update by describing how she understands evidentials. In Example (7), called a “slifting” construction, which is a way of accomplishing evidentiality in English, there are two propositions. The first proposition is within the scope of the evidential and is the *at-issue* content, which can be challenged by the response in (7b). The second proposition is the

2. Examples (6c) and (6d) are felicitous if the intended response is to correct the initial question. The prosodic focus in these contexts would exist in order to inform the initial questioner that they brought up an invalid question and there was a more relevant question to ask.

evidential proposition itself, which adds *not-at-issue* content and cannot be directly challenged (7b').

- (7) a. *Kathy sang, I hear.*
 b. *No, she didn't (sing). She danced.*
 b'. **No, you didn't (hear that).* (Murray 2014: 2:4)

Another example comes from English appositives as in (8).

- (8) a. *Tom, who is a lawyer, bought a new car.*
 b. *No, he didn't (buy a new car).*
 b'. **No, he isn't (a lawyer).*

As Murray points out, the *not-at issue* content in these sentences is not directly challengeable, but can be challenged in other ways, e.g. *Hey wait, he isn't a lawyer!* (Murray 2014: 2:4). The distinction between *at-issue* and *not-at-issue* content is fundamentally a distinction between information directly added to the common ground versus information proposed to be added the common ground (Murray 2009, 2010, 2014: 4).

According to Murray, every sentence potentially contributes three types of update to the common ground. The first kind of update is the proposal that a new discourse referent (the *at-issue* content) be added to the common ground. The second kind of update is a direct update of *not-at issue* information to the common ground (if there is any). The third kind of update is a structuring update of illocution, which is accomplished via mood (declarative, imperative, interrogative, etc.) (Murray 2014: 43).³ Figure 1 is taken from Murray as a means of illustrating how each sentence updates the common ground. The sentence in (9) is a simple English sentence with no *not-at-issue* content.

- (9) Floyd won the race




Figure 1. Updates for simple English sentence (no *not-at-issue* content) (Murray 2014: 17)

3. How mood structures the type of update according to Murray is quite fascinating but is outside the scope of the present article. This is especially important for providing a description of information structuring outside the indicative mood.

In (9) the illocutionary mood is declarative, and the proposition is simply that Floyd won the race. In the first square, the initial common ground which presumably includes some information is represented by the context set p_0 . In Roberts' terminology, the QUD stack is included in the context set. The shading represents the context set at each stage of update. In the second square, a discourse referent is introduced for the *at-issue* content q which can be the main point of the sentence, the topic of discussion, or response to a question under discussion. The third square shows the illocutionary relation (\leq_q) which is the structural update that proposes to add that q is true to the common ground. The fourth square shows the updated and reduced context set p_1 once q has been added (Murray 2014: 17–18).

In sentences where *not-at-issue* content is being added to the common ground, the picture is more complicated. Figure 2 below models what updates are at work in English evidential parentheticals, such as Example (10).

(10) *Floyd won the race, I hear.*




Figure 2. Updates for English evidential parentheticals (Murray 2014: 19)

Similarly to Figure 1, the solid line on q represents a discourse referent (dref) which is being proposed as an update to the common ground. In Figure 2, dotted line is the *not-at-issue* proposition which updates the common ground directly restricting the context set to p_1 . No discourse referent is introduced by the evidential proposition, but the context set has been reduced to worlds where $\text{heard}(i,q)$ is true. In the third square the propositional argument of the illocutionary relation is different. Instead of proposing (as in Figure 1) that q is true and should be added to the common

ground, the structural update is that q is possible ($\leq_{\delta q}$). The new context set p_2 in the fifth square reflects that q might be true and that q might not be true, which is the *at-issue* content. The *not-at-issue* content restricts the context set in which q is asserted and, if adopted into the common ground, still allows that q might not be true. Murray distinguishes between *not-at-issue* content and presuppositions saying, “This (*not-at-issue* restriction) contrasts with presuppositions, which I take to be constraints on the input context” (Murray 2014: 9)

One more example demonstrates another way *not-at-issue* content can reduce the context set. Murray provides (11) as an example of an English appositive and then models it with Figure 3.

- (11) *Tivi, who is a cat, likes to chase her tail.*




Figure 3. Updates for English appositives (Murray 2014: 20–21)

This example differs from the one modeled in Figure 2 because the anchor of the appositive is a nominal and not the *not-at-issue* proposition.

The distinction Murray has identified for types of update and *at-issue/not-at-issue* content can explain what has been witnessed in the research on thetics and categoricals. Though she does not refer to them as thetics and categoricals, Murray includes two examples which capture the distinction commonly made between thetics and categoricals.

- (12) Who won the race last night?
I heard that Sandy won.

at-issue: q; not-at-issue: heard(i,q)

(13) What did you hear?

I heard that Sandy won.

at issue: heard(*i*,*q*); *not-at-issue*: *q*

(Murray 2014: 16)

As Examples (12)–(13) demonstrate, the *at-issue* content is directly affected by the QUD. The common ground is the assumptions shared by interlocutors based on world knowledge and the previous moves in a conversation or text. The QUD determines felicity for content which is proposed as an update to the common ground. The common ground is (minimally) updated by both *at-issue* and *not-at-issue* content of each statement. These three concepts form the foundation for what is happening in the *thetic/categorical* distinction.

Fundamentally, I believe the *thetic/categorical* distinction should be situated as follows: a *thetic* sentence is an update to the common ground which a speaker expects to be assumed by the addressee for subsequent moves in the discourse. The *at-issue* content of a *thetic* sentence is the entire proposition. As I quoted earlier, often interlocutors will presuppose a question or assertion which has not yet been accepted into the common ground, but when no interlocutors object to this presupposition, they all behave as if this information was in the common ground all along. (Roberts 2012: 8). When a speaker/writer uses what has been identified as a *thetic* construction, she is inviting her interlocutor to behave as if the information was already in the common ground so that it can be built upon in subsequent moves. The QUD of these sentences places no restrictions on what content should be proposed for addition to the common ground. This is why the most common question underlying *thetic* constructions is “What happened?” This is why Sasse identified that *thetic* sentences are most commonly found introducing new individuals or making assertions “out-of-the-blue.” This is why the literature has been consistent in labeling the spacio-temporal context as the topic or the subject of *thetic* sentences. A *thetic* sentence is a spontaneous common ground creator.⁴ After a *thetic* sentence has been uttered the common ground is restricted by the context set defined by that sentence. This analysis was anticipated by Sasse, though he did not have the precision of the current frameworks. In one of his most well-known papers, Sasse includes the following list of *thetics* (14) and *categoricals* (15) which include intonation patterns which are infelicitous.

- (14) a. (What’s new?) HARry’s coming/*HARry’s COMing.
 b. (How’s the weather?) The SUN’s shining/*The SUN’s SHINing.
 c. (What was that?) The CAT miaowed/The CAT miAOWED.

4. Technically, every sentence is a common ground creator because every sentence adds new content which updates the common ground. *Thetic* sentences are different, however, because when used, the speaker is presupposing content which has not yet been accepted as a means of initiating common ground and doing so spontaneously.

- d. (What's wrong with you?) My TOOTH hurt/*My TOOTH HURTS
- e. (What's that noise?) The SOUP is boiling/?The SOUP is BOILIng
- f. (What's the matter?) Your HAIR's on fire/*on FIRE.
- g. (Why are you so sad?) My DOG is sick/*My DOG is SICK
- (15) a. (What's going on outside?) HARry's SINGIng/*HARry's singing
- b. (What has happened?) The PRINCESS SNEEZED/*sneezed
- c. (Why is Harry so mad?) ANna LIED to him/*lied to him.
- d. (Has anything changed?) Yes, HARry's stopped SMOKING/*smoking
- e. (I've got to tell you something) ANna's fallen in love with HARry/*Harry
- (Sasse 1987: 521).

Sasse provides the following explanation for these data:

I think the explanation lies in the assumptions about the type of information expected by the hearer, based on very subtle differences in the form of the questions and/or the general situation... As a first approximation, the function of the intonational difference between [14] and [15] can therefore be defined as follows: subject accentuation signals communicative separation of an element denoting an individual and an element denoting an event, the triggering factor for the choice between the two ways of presenting information being expectation [sic] on the hearer's part.

(Sasse 1987: 522)

What Sasse was observing overlaps with the kind of work Murray and Roberts have been doing. Each context set is updated with new information which interacts with assumptions held by both participants. In the example: (How's the weather?) The SUN's shining/*The SUN's SHINing, the second option is infelicitous because of presupposition failure. The QUD restriction has been violated. The second option adds information about the sun, when the context set did not yet concern the sun. Thetics and categoricals are distinguished by the *at-issue* content proffered and the kind of update they make to the common ground.

This analysis also explains the other sentence types which have been labeled thetic. The reason that sentences such as *It is raining* can be included with thetic sentences which are marked via prosodic focus is precisely because they accomplish the same kind of update. It is possible that other sentence types, such as verbs of quantized change and unaccusatives which have been noted for their interaction with thetic sentences are more prone to provide this similar type of update (Bentley & Cruschina 2018). So what we may have is a scale of construction types which are more likely to be used for updating the common ground in this way.

This theory of update is also confirmed by the observation made by many about the grammatical structure of thetic sentences. Sasse identified that, on the whole, languages use strategies which help diminish the grammatical predicativity of thetic sentences by nominalization, incorporation, intonation, and similar devices which blur the strict subject – predicate division of corresponding categorical sentences

(Sasse 1987: 519). This has also been called *detopicalization* by Lambrecht and Polinsky (1997). These sentences assert an event or entity upon a spacio-temporal context blocking the grammatical subject from serving as the topic of the sentence through marked syntactic or prosodic structuring. The lack of referential agreement in these sentences iconically supports the hypothesis that the speaker is presupposing the content and requesting the addressee to do the same for the sake of common ground creation. Existentials across languages often display dummy elements which have no referential index:

- (16) a. There are some books on the table (English)
 PROFORM COPULA PIVOT CODA
- b. Ci sono dei libri sul tavolo (Italian)
 PROFORM be.3PL some books on-the table
- c. Il y a des livres sur la table (French)
 EXPLETIVE PROFORM have.3SG some books on the table
- d. Hay unos libros sobre la mesa (Spanish)
 have.3SG-PROFORM some books on the table
 ‘There are some books on the table.’ (Bentley et al. 2013: 1)

Existentials iconically point to the fact that the QUD does not refer to any previously established discourse referent but instead offer the *at-issue* content (the whole clause) as an addition to the common ground which will be accepted by the addressee.

Weather expressions, such as *It is raining* have a non-referring dummy element as well. One interesting example comes from Bezhta, a Nakh-Daghestanian language found in the Caucasus mountains of the Russian Federation and Georgia. Weather expressions in this language lack an overt argument, but the predicate still expresses agreement in gender. Comrie *et al.* note that the noun *mex* meaning ‘time, day’ is gender IV and can be understood based on the agreement marking on the predicate, though this noun is not expressed.

- (17) *že hoʎoʔ y-äččö gey*
 now here IV-cold be.PRS
 ‘Now it is cold here.’ (Comrie et al. 2015: 543–544)

This gender marking has no referential index with any preestablished entity in the common ground. Instead, the referent is assumed and the dialog can continue with this new update.

While they have not yet been linked tothetic constructions, pseudo-cleft constructions in English such as *What happened was...* (called happen-clefts) have a similar effect. I introduce this construction to illustrate how the present analysis

with alternative semantics and common ground update could help us identify additional constructions which can be considered thetic. Consider Example (18) from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2015).

(18) Q: Whenever we've talked, I always ask if you received the call from Mick that it was time to hit the road again. So when did this call come?

A: What happened was that, starting in late 2012, the band celebrated its 50th anniversary, and we started late that year and did a couple of shows at the O2 Arena in London and did three shows in the Northeast...

(Davies 2015, accessed 11-05-19)

(19) Q: So when did this call come?...

A: #What happened was, at 5 pm.

As Example (19) demonstrates, a direct answer to the question cannot follow the happen cleft. This construction signals to the interlocutor that the speaker would like to invite him to accept as presupposed the update that is being made. On the basis of this new update to the common ground, the QUD will be answered. Another example is provided in (20).

(20) RIVERA: Michael, let me cut to the quick. Was the ring...

Mr-COLE: Sure.

RIVERA: ... an engagement ring?

Mr-COLE: Well, we'll never know, shall we? What happened was that during their cruise, they went ashore at – at night in Monte Carlo and they went to a branch of this jeweler which opened up for them.

(Davies 2015, accessed 11 May 2019)

As I mentioned earlier, often in answering the larger QUD, subquestions will be introduced and then answered. The happen-cleft in Examples (18) and (20) sets up a subquestion which is related but not built off previously established common ground. The happen-cleft is a signal to the interlocutor that there will be some spontaneous common ground creation following which requires the interlocutor to accept the content as already established. The signaling function of happen-clefts in English is found in other languages when they set up this kind of common ground update as well. I recently described one construction in Biblical Hebrew as having this function.

5. Update in Biblical Hebrew

In my doctoral thesis (Wilson 2017) I aimed to account for all the uses of the finite form of the Hebrew BE-verb *hyh* in the Hebrew Bible. One of the most common uses of this verb, however, functioned neither to link constituents nor to license TAM features, but as an isolated verb at the beginning of a sentence. Previous research on this construction labelled it a discourse marker which serves to anchor or update the reference time (van der Merwe 1999; Hataav 1997, 2018).⁵ After looking at every occurrence of this form in the Hebrew Bible, it was clear that these earlier proposals did not quite capture what this form was doing in all cases. Taking into account its unique syntax, the discourse contexts in which it appeared, and some interesting cross-linguistic parallels, it seemed like this construction was used as a signal that the sentence which followed should be understood as athetic judgment. This is what I argued in Wilson (2019). In the course of learning from the previous literature on the thetic/categorical distinction, however, it became clear that there needed to be a better description of what is happening in thetic sentences in general. The present article aims to provide a new proposal for analyzing thetic and categorical sentences under a broader view of common ground update, as well as revise the recent proposal for Biblical Hebrew in Wilson 2019. In this final section, I will review the argument in Wilson 2019 and demonstrate how this new analysis affects my interpretation of this construction in Biblical Hebrew.

The isolated BE-verb has some unique syntactic features which distinguish it from standard copular constructions. First, the BE-verb is never inflected for phi-features, assuming a default 3MS inflection. Example (21) demonstrates the mismatch in agreement, while Examples (22)–(23) show that true copular constructions must agree with their subject.

- (21) וַיְהִי יָדָיו יְמוּנָה עַד־בָּא הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ
wayhî yādāw ʿemunâ ʿad boʿ
 CONJ.COP.PRET.3MS hand.3FDL.3MS faithful.FS until come.down.INF.CSTR
haš-šāmeš
 ART-sun
 ‘It happened, his hands were steady until the sun went down’ (Exodus 17.12)

5. It is important at this point to distinguish how I am using the term *update* following Murray from how it has been used in previous research on this construction; e.g. van der Merwe and Hataav both use the term *update* to refer to the Reference Time (van der Merwe 1999) or Topic Time (Hataav 2018).

- (22) וַתְּהִי יַד־יְהוָה אֶל־בְּעִיר
watt-hî yad yəhwāh bā'îr
 CONJ.COP.PRET.3FS hand.GEN YHWH in.ART.city
 'The hand of YHWH came against the city.' (1 Samuel 5.9)
- (23) כִּי־הָיוּ יָדָיו כִּדְמוּת יְדֵי־עֵשָׂו אָחִיו שְׂעֵרָת
kî hāyū yādāw kîdê 'ēšāw
 for COP.PFV.3CPL hand.3FDL.3MS like.hand.PL.GEN Esau
 'āhîw šā'iroṭ
 brother.3MS hairy.FPL
 'For his hands were hairy like the hands of Esau his brother.' (Genesis 27.23)

Second, the BE-verb occupies the highest position in the left-periphery, even preceding Left-Dislocated constituents, as Example (24) demonstrates:

- (24) וְהָיָה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר־יִבְחַר יְהוָה הוּא הַקֹּדֶשׁ
wəhāyā hā -iš 'āšer yibḥar yhw hū' haq-qāḏōš
 CONJ.COP.IRR.3MS ART- man who choose.IMPF.3MS YHWH 3MS ART-holy
 'It will be, the one whom YHWH chooses, he is the holy one.' (Numbers 16.7)

In the Hebrew Bible there are 748 examples of this construction. 634 of these examples are directly followed by a temporal adverbial (85%). 54 examples have a clause of another type immediately following the BE-verb (7.2%). 59 examples are not followed by any adverbial, temporal or otherwise (7.8%). There are 11 examples in reported speech, which demonstrate that this is not merely a literary construction. With these statistics, it seems as though there is a correlation between the initial BE-verb and the temporal framing of an event or situation. It is important to know if the temporal adverbial is dependent upon the isolated BE-verb or on the matrix sentence which follows. The evidence that the adverbial is not dependent on the isolated BE-verb is found in examples such as (25)–(26)

- (25) וַיְהִי בְּהַיּוֹתָם בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיִּקָּם קַיִן אֶל־הֶבֶל אָחִיו וַיַּהַרְגֵהוּ
wayhî bi-hyōtām baš-sādê way-yāqom
 CONJ.COP.PRET.3MS when-be.INF.3MP in-DET.field CONT-rise.PRET.3MS
qayin 'el heḇel 'āhîw way-yahargehū
 Cain to Abel brother.3MS CONT.3MS.kill.PRET.3MS
 And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel and killed him. (Genesis 4.8)

The temporal adjunct in Example (25) already includes an infinitive form of the BE-verb with person agreement. The isolated BE-verb has a closer relationship to the matrix sentence than the adverbial clause.

- (26) הָיָה כְּאֲשֶׁר-בָּא עֲלֵיכֶם כְּלִי-הַדָּבָר הַטּוֹב אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֵלֵיכֶם כִּן יָבִיא יְהוָה
עֲלֵיכֶם אֶת כְּלִי-הַדָּבָר הַרָע
wahāyâ ka-āšer bā' āleḵem kol had-dābār
CONJ.COP.IRR.3MS just.as come.PFV.3MS upon.you all DET-thing
haṭ-ṭōb āšer dibber yhwh 'alōheḵem āleḵem ken
DET-good which spoke.PFV.3MS YHWH god.2MP to.you thus
yābī' yhwh 'aleḵem 'eṭ kol had-dābār hā-rā'
3Ms.bring.IPFV YHWH upon.2MP DOM all DET-thing DET-evil
It will be, just as all the good things that the LORD your God promised concerning you have been fulfilled for you, so the LORD will bring upon you all the evil things. (Joshua 23.15)

Example (26) is additional evidence that the initial BE-verb is in relationship with the matrix clause rather than the adverbial since they represent difference temporal reference. The matrix clause uses the verb form designated for future temporal reference, while the adverbial is clearly past. In fact, Wilson (2017, 2019) has demonstrated that the isolated BE-verb mirrors the TAM of the matrix verb in every example of this construction.

It is important to note that though temporal adverbials frequently follow the isolated BE-verb, this is not obligatory. The temporal adverbial may also follow the matrix sentence as in (27).

- (27) וַיְהִי שְׂאוֹל עֹן עֵינָיו אֶת-דָּוִד מֵהַיּוֹם הַהוּא וְהָלָאָה
wayhî šā'ul 'āwōn 'ōyēn 'eṭ-dāwid me-hay-yôm
CONJ.COP.PRET.3MS Saul eye eye.PTCP.MS DOM-David from-DET-day
ha-hú' wa-hāl'ô
DET-3MS CONN-beyond
It happened, Saul watched David from that day on. (1 Samuel 18.9)

There may also be two temporal adverbial clauses on either side of the matrix sentence as in (28).

- (28) וַיְהִי כַעֲבֹר הַצֶּהֳרָיִם וַיִּתְנַבְּאוּ עַד לְעֹלֹת הַמִּנְחָה
wayhî ka-ābōr haš-šāhārayim
CONJ.COP.PRET.3MS when-pass.INF DET-midday
way-yiṭnabb'û 'ad la-ālōṭ ham-minḥâ
CONN-prophecy.PRET.3MP until to-offer.INF DET-oblation
It happened, as midday passed they prophecied until the time of the offering of the oblation. (1 Kings 18.29)

These data demonstrate a correlation between the initial BE-verb and a fronted temporal adverbial, though this adverbial is not required. They also demonstrate that the isolated BE-verb mirrors the TAM of the matrix sentence. This construction, then, signals that what follows in the matrix sentence should be assumed as part of the common ground so that subsequent moves can be built off of it. The QUD places no restrictions on what content should be added to the common ground, and the isolated BE-verb signals this fact in a way quite similar to the happen-cleft in English.⁶ This commonly occurs with a fronted temporal adverbial in Biblical Hebrew because often the fact that an event happened is usually framed with respect to surrounding events. In fact, the adverbial phrase can be described as *not-at-issue* content like I introduced in Section 4. We can use Example (29) to illustrate:

- (29) וַיְהִי אַחֲרֵי הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה וַתִּשָּׂא אֶת־עֵינֶיהָ אֶל־יֹסֵף
wayhî aḥar had-dəbārīm hā-`ellê wat-tiśśā`
 CONJ.COP.PRET.3MS after ART-things ART-these CONJ-lift.PRET.3FS
 `ēšet ʾădōnāyw eṭ `ênêhā `el yōsēp
 wife.GEN master.3MS DOM eyes.3FS to Joseph
 It happened, after these things, the wife of his master lifted her eyes to Joseph.

According to Murray, *not-at-issue* content cannot be directly challenged, but may be challenged through other means.

- (30) a. After these things, the wife of his master lifted her eyes to Joseph.
 b. No, she didn't.
 b'. #No, it wasn't (after these things)

In order to challenge the *not-at-issue* content, one would need to use other means, such as *Hey wait, wasn't it before?* The isolated BE-verb signals that the QUD is open to new common ground creation; the temporal adverbial updates the context set with the *not-at-issue* content, and the matrix sentence adds the *at-issue* content which answers the QUD which, broadly speaking, is “What happened?” Figure 4 shows how Example (29) can be modeled using Murray’s models for update.

As a revision to the earlier hypothesis of Wilson (2017, 2019), I am proposing that rather than merely calling the sentences which follow this isolated BE-verb thetic, they are creating common ground, inviting the addressee/reader to accept the proposition as assumed content. This event often needs to be presented in relation to surrounding events, which is while there is often a temporal adverbial. In these cases, there is common ground with respect to previously-mentioned

6. An important assumption I am making here is that common ground update in text operates similarly to common ground update in speech.




Figure 4. Updates in isolated BE-verb clauses in Biblical Hebrew

events and characters. The isolated verb creates the expectation that what follows will need to be accepted as common ground in order for additional moves to be relevant.

The other types of clauses (causal, conditional, etc.) which follow the isolated BE-verb also provide *not-at-issue* content which restricts the context set where the *at-issue* content is true.⁷

6. Conclusion

The preceding discussion is a recommendation that we move past the binarism of the *thetic/categorical* distinction and refine the previous information structure treatments of *thetics* using alternative semantics and Murray's (2010, 2014) varieties of update. Previous intuitions about how some sentences appear to be unified assertions were accurate, but perhaps the shape of assertions in a discourse are

7. We may also use this formulation to describe the 4 Hebrew examples which reflect the volitive mood of the matrix sentence: 2 Samuel 5:24, 1 Samuel 10:5, 1 Chronicles 14:15, Ruth 3:4. Murray references Starr (2010) and states the illocutionary relation in imperatives is a preference for how the world should be. This is a structuring update which is a preference relation restricting the context set to which the *at-issue* content is added.

intimately related to the assumptions shared between interlocutors. This refinement moves the discussion of thetics and categoricals past a binary discussion of two assertion types (or judgment types) into a broader conversation about the variety of ways interlocutors update the common ground. Perhaps what has been called a thetic statement is just a specific type of update where the QUD is unrestricted and the *at-issue* content proffered by the speaker is an invitation to act as if it was part of the common ground all along. This type of update allows the interlocutors to build off a new common ground. One issue for further research in this line of thinking is a demonstration of the different kinds of update so-called categorical sentences may make. It may be determined that the thetic/categorical distinction may no longer be helpful for a description of natural language.

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PART 5

Lexical links to attitudinality

B-grade subjects and theticity

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This study investigates the linguistic subject in categorical and thetic sentences. In the “subjectless” thetic sentence, as Kuroda (1972) pointed out, we have a nonprototypical subject, a B-grade subject, which is preferably combined in Japanese with the nominative marker *ga*. By contrasting B-grade subjects in Japanese with their corresponding expressions in German (and other languages), we discover two types of subjects, internal and external. In Japanese, B-grade subjects are realizations of internal subjects, which are verbalized differently in other languages as a subject, as a dummy subject, or an object. Comparing different realization forms of weather expressions crosslinguistically, we suggest that the language-specific realizations of B-grade subjects correspond to three types of thetic judgments: entity-central, event-central, and mixed type of both.

Keywords: subjecthood, thetic judgment, categorical judgment, Japanese, German, topic

1. Introduction

A state of affairs can be verbalized as either a unit (thetic judgment) or a relation between two entities (categorical judgment). This thetic-categorical distinction was first made at the turn of the 20th century by two German-speaking philosophers, Franz Brentano and Anton Marty. After being disregarded for a long time in philosophical and linguistic discussion, the distinction was introduced again into linguistics by the Japanese linguist Shigeyuki Kuroda. Kuroda argues that “... the grammatical structure of Japanese gives substantial support for the claim that there are two basic types of human judgments” (Kuroda 1979: 3). This “substantial support” is the existence of the particles *ga* and *wa*, which typically mark sentence theticity and categoricity, respectively. The following are some examples.

- (1) a. **Thetic:**
inu-ga *neko-wo oikake-teiru-* (*koto*).
 dog-**ga** cat-wo chase-PROG-(that)
 ‘A/the dog is chasing a cat.’
- b. **Categorical:**
inu-wa *neko-wo oikake-teiru*.
 dog-**wa** cat-wo chase-PROG
 ‘/The dog is chasing a cat.’

In the following sections, we examine the thetic-categorical distinction and its manifestations in Japanese and German. Concretely, we shed light on a series of predicates that take the so-called “B-grade subjects” in Japanese (Onoe 2017). B-grade subjects have a conspicuous affinity with theticity, a marked counterpart of categoricity, whereas “normal” subjects set the predicate base for the categorical judgment in terms of a normal ‘subject-verb’ predication.

We also compare Japanese manifestations of Onoe’s B-grade subjects¹ with those in other languages, particularly German. Our comparison demonstrates the following:

- In Japanese, the particles *ga* and *wa* unambiguously distinguish theticity and categoricity, whereas in German, a marked accent subtly codes this difference.
- B-grade subjects have different crosslinguistic realizations as subjects, objects, or dummy subjects (such as expletive, non-argumental *es*).
- B-grade subjects and their correspondences are internal arguments that get their cases assigned in the frame of verbal valence. Thus, these B-grade subjects form a unit with its predicate and have a strong affinity with theticity.
- B-grade subjects, as nonprototypical subjects, reflect the three types of theticity realizations: entity-central, event-central, and mixed type of both.

From these observations and generalizations, we then draw a further implication about the functional universality of the notion of a subject. Kuroda’s reintroduction of the thetic-categorical distinction is motivated by the tremendous diversity of the notion of a subject. Kuroda, as a syntactician, was acutely aware of the differences between the subjects in Japanese and European languages.² His attempt to reintroduce the thetic-categoric distinction led him to reconstrue parts of the theory

1. The name “B-grade subject” has been proposed by Onoe. “B-grade” is named as such because its Japanese term, *B-kyu*, derives from the *B-kyu-gourmet*, which refers to a type of food that is cheap and simple but delicious. Onoe associated the nonprototypical subjects with the nonprototypical *gourmet* foods.

2. The *shugo* (subject), which was introduced into Japanese grammar in the second half of the 19th century from English and German grammars, has two different markers *wa* and *ga*. These markers have no direct correspondence in the European languages. Given these differences, a not

of the linguistic subject (Andersen 1975; Keenan 1975; Li 1975). Specifically, he differentiated between subjectful (categorical) and subjectless (thetic) sentences. Thus, in this paper, and in the spirit of Kuroda, we further expand this distinction with one type of nonprototypical subject, the B-grade subject. We claim that subjects can be distinguished into internal and external subjects, where only external subjects function as the predication base in a categorical judgment.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we outline the basic characteristics of thetic and categorical judgments, as realized in Japanese. In Section III, we introduce a series of predicate types that have a strong affinity with thetic judgments. The subject of predicates of these types are named B-grade subjects. In Section IV, we investigate corresponding German expressions where the B-grade subjects are mainly verbalized as nonsubjects. In Section V, we discuss how subject types can possibly be distinguished in German in terms of accent patterns. In Sections VI and VII, we investigate B-grade subjects that result from the unitedness of the thetic judgment, where such subjects can be grouped into the entity-central, event-central, and mixed thetic types.

2. Thetic and categorical judgments

We first outline the basic characteristics of thetic and categorical judgments. A thetic judgment is a simple judgment that merely expresses the existence of an event or entity. By contrast, a categorical judgment comprises a topical and comment judgment. According to Kuroda, this thetic-categorical distinction is explicitly marked in Japanese by the particles *ga* and *wa*. The *ga* particle signals that the noun preceding *ga* represents an undecomposable unit with the following predicate, whereas *wa* presents an entity as a topic, which is further developed in the predicate. This distinction is illustrated with the aforementioned Examples (1a) and (1b).

Thetic judgment (*einfaches Urteil/simple judgment*):

inu-ga neko-wo oikake-teiru.

Categorical judgment (*Doppelurteil/double judgment*):

inu-wa ← *neko-wo oikake-teiru.*

Figure 1. Thetic-categorical patterns in Japanese

insignificant number of Japanese linguists maintain that Japanese subjects cannot be compared with their counterparts in European Languages. See, for example, Mikami (1972).

3. “B-grade subjects” in Onoe (2017)

In Tanaka (2020), I argued that thethetic judgment is verbalized crosslinguistically in marked constructions, whereas the categorical judgment is realized unmarked in the canonical form of sentences.³ In Japanese, a categorical judgment is expressed with the *wa* particle. By contrast, a sentence with *ga* occurs in marked contexts, for one, in a subordinate clause (2a) or, secondly, with a contrastive focus with the meaning that is expressed by “exhaustive listing” (2b).

- (2) a. *inu-ga neko-wo oikake-teiru-node.*
 dog-**ga** cat-wo chase-PROG-because
 ‘Because the/a dog is chasing a cat.’
 b. *inu-ga neko-wo oikake-teiru.*
 dog-**ga** cat-wo chase-PROG
 ‘It is a dog that is chasing a cat (not a fox).’

However, according to Onoe (2017), there is a class of predicates which has a particularly strong affinity with subjects marked by *ga*.⁴ He names subjects of this type B-grade subjects, a name that suggests its nonprototypical characteristics. This subject appears in the following predicate types:

3. Regarding the marked status of theticity, Sasse (1987: 565) said that “...thetic expressions in subject-prominent languages may be viewed as *linguistic strategies serving to remove the predication base/predicate dichotomy*... [emphasis added].” Marty (1918:268) argued that the categorical judgment precedes thethetic one in the process of judging: “*Vor allem ist sicher, daß Doppelurteile zeitlich allen diesen Einfachen Urteilen vorausgingen.*”

4. In addition to the verb class discussed here, other factors influence thethetic-categorical distinction in Japanese. Among these factors, Tsunoda (1992: 51f) noted that Silverstein’s Noun-Phrase Hierarchy (Silverstein 1976) is relevant in terms of the interpretation of the noun phrase: a noun located higher in the hierarchy is likely to be understood as a topic [as illustrated in Example (i)], whereas a noun lower in the scale is marked strongly [e.g., the contrastive interpretation in Example (ii)].

- (i) *watashi-wa benkyo-shi-tei-masu.*
 I-TOP study-do-PROG-POLITE
 ‘I am studying.’
 (ii) *ame-wa fut-tei-masu.*
 rain-TOP fall-PROG-POLITE
 ‘It is raining, but (we...)’

The noun in Example (i), the personal noun *watashi*, being located at the leftmost position in the hierarchy, is likely to be interpreted as a normal topic. However, the noun in Example (ii), *rain*, refers to an inanimate entity. Because this noun is located further right in the hierarchy, it is strongly contrasted with other possibilities.

This observation suggests that, in terms of ourthetic-categorical discussion, the more to the left a noun is located in Silverstein’s scale, the more likely it is being used in a categorical judgment.

1. Subject as an entity in an existential sentence

- (3) a. *neko-ga iru.*
 cat-ga be
 ‘There is a cat.’

2. Subject as an object of the feeling

- (4) a. *urusato-ga koishii.*
 hometown-ga miss
 ‘I miss my hometown.’

3. Subject as an object of capability

- (5) a. *doitsugo-ga dekiru.*
 German-ga capable
 ‘I can speak German.’

4. Subject as an entity of a spontaneous event

- (6) a. *urusato-ga omoi-dasareu.*
 hometown-ga remember (spontaneous)
 ‘I am reminded/This reminds me of my hometown.’

5. Subject as the point where a physical sensation occurs

- (7) a. *atama-ga itai.*
 head-ga ache
 ‘My head is aching.’

In these sentences, the nouns with *ga* have no marked interpretation, that is, no exhaustive listing. By contrast, marking these subjects with *wa* results in a strong contrastive reading.

- (3) b. *neko-wa iru.*
 cat-wa be
 ‘Cats are there (but not dogs).’
- (4) b. *urusato-wa koishii.*
 hometown-wa miss
 ‘I miss my hometown (but not its people).’
- (5) b. *doitsugo-wa dekiru.*
 German-wa capable
 ‘I can speak German (but not Chinese).’
- (6) b. *?urusato-wa omoi-dasareu.*
 hometown-wa remember (spontaneous)
 ‘I remember my hometown (but?).’

- (7) b. *atama-wa itai.*
 head-wa ache
 'I have/am having a headache (but not a fever).'

Marked by *wa*, the predicates of B-grade subjects induce a strong contrastive reading. If a situation is such that the contrastive meaning is not immediately available, the sentence – for Example, (6b) – sounds odd.

In addition to the B-grade subjects noted by Onoe, there are another series of predicates that behave similar to predicates of the B-grade subjects. Some predicates in this series, weather verbs and verbs of (dis)appearance, are the following.

6. Weather verbs

- (8) a. *ame-ga fut-teiru.*
 rain-ga fallen-PROG
 'It is raining.'
 b. *ame-wa fut-teiru.*
 rain-wa fallen-PROG
 'It is raining (but it is not cold).'

7. Verb of (dis)appearance

- (9) a. *hi-ga kie-ta.*
 fire-ga vanish-PAST
 'The Fire went out.'
 b. *hi-wa kie-ta.*
 fire-wa go-out-PAST
 'The fire went out (but something else is possibly dangerous).'

The B-grade subject is not an entity separate from the rest of the sentence but it is a component of the predication. In this sense, the B-grade subject behaves like an object and is thus an integral part of predication. This can be illustrated with the following examples.

- (10) a. *Pan-wo taberu.*
 bread-wo(ACC) eat
 '(I) eat bread.'
 b. *Pan-wa taberu.*
 bread-wa eat
 '(I) eat bread (and nothing else).'

The object in (10b), being marked by *wa*, gets a strong contrastive meaning.

This contrast suggests that Japanese has a system where the internal and external arguments are explicitly distinguished. The B-grade subjects and objects are internal arguments, which are marked by case markers such as *ga* (nominative) or *wo* (accusative), whereas the external arguments are marked by *wa*.

We summarize our observations thus far.

Table 1. *wa-ga* distribution

	Unmarked usage	Marked usage
Other subjects	<i>wa</i> : topic reading (1a)	<i>ga</i> : exhaustive listing ((1b) = (2b))
B-grade subjects	<i>ga</i> : neutral description ((3)–(9a))	<i>wa</i> : strong contrastive reading ((3)–(9b))
Direct objects	<i>wo</i> : neutral description (10)	<i>wa</i> : strong contrastive reading (10a)

In general, a Japanese sentence is usually introduced with the topic particle *wa*, if the topic is embedded in the context. By contrast, *ga* can be used in a marked context, such as at the beginning of a text. Otherwise the particle leads to a marked interpretation: i.e. in the form of an exhaustive listing (i.e. individual denotation). Conversely, sentences with B-grade subjects are used with *ga* in an unmarked situation; when marked by *wa*, the B-grade subject gets imbued with a strong contrastive meaning. In this respect, the B-grade subjects behave exactly like direct objects: the B-grade subjects get their cases assigned lexically from the verb. Thus, the affinity between *ga* and theticity, which was pointed out by Kuroda, is supposed to be a consequence of the internal character of arguments with *ga*.

4. B-grade-subjects in German?

This remarkable character of B-grade subjects can be best observed if they are contrasted with corresponding phenomena in other languages. We now turn to some examples of analogous B-grade subjects in corresponding German sentence types.

1. As the object in an Existential sentence

- (11) a. *Es gibt da eine Katze.* (accusative object)
 it gives there a cat

2. As the object of Feeling

- (12) a. *Ich sehne mich nach meiner Heimat.* (prepositional object)
 I yearn REF for my-hometown.GEN

3. As the object of capability

- (13) a. *Ich bin des Deutschen kundig./Ich kann Deutsch.* (gen/acc obj.)
 I am the-German.GEN knowledgeable

4. As a spontaneous event

- (14) a. *Ich entsinne mich meiner Heimat.* (genitive object)
 I remember REF my-hometown.GEN

5. As a physical sensation

- (15) a. *Ich habe Kopfschmerzen.* (accusative Object)
 I have headaches

In German, most of the corresponding elements of B-grade subjects are not realized as a subject but as an object. Some elements (e.g., (12a), (13a), (14a)) have an oblique case marking (either a genitive or prepositional object). Other correspondences can also be coded as nominative subjects, as illustrated in the following examples.

- (11) b. *Eine Katze ist da.*
 A cat is there.
- (14) b. *Meine Heimat kommt in Erinnerung.*
 My hometown comes to memory.
- (15) b. *Mein Kopf tut weh.*
 My head does pain.

In summary, corresponding elements of B-grade subjects in German are marked differently – either as oblique objects or nominative subjects. In other words, since B-grade subjects are supposed to be arguments within the verb phrase (VP), no German morphological markers distinguish internal and external arguments as unambiguously as the Japanese *ga* and *wa* particles.⁵

5. Restriction on the specific indefinite subject

We have seen that there are two types of subjects, which are explicitly distinguished in Japanese but not in German. This situation can be best expressed with a statement by Abraham (2013: 402): “*Subjekt ist also nicht einfach gleich Subjekt...*” (“Subjects, then, are not simply subjects.”). In other words, in German, the internal and external subjects are not unambiguously distinguished. However, as Abraham (2013: 428ff.) demonstrated, differences between intransitive and transitive subjects in German can also be observed, although less explicitly than Japanese morphological marking strategies.

- (16) a. *Fred believes that a cow was in the garden.*

5. Perfect auxiliaries (*haben, sein*, and corresponding elements in other languages) partly mark VP internality or externality. However, the selection of the auxiliaries has varying histories and crosslinguistic differences.

- (17) a. **Freddy glaubt, dass eine Kuh im GARTEN ist.*⁶
 Freddy thinks that a cow in-the garden is
 b. *Freddy glaubt, dass eine KUH im Garten ist.*

In English, a subject noun – whether specific or nonspecific – takes the position immediately ahead of the verb (16). However, this is not the case in German. In German, an object–verb (OV) language, the local adverb *IM GARTEN* signals the border of the VP. Only a specific subject, a subject signaling a concrete entity, can take the position left of the border (i.e., outside the VP). Thus, a sentence with a normal accent – that is, an accent on the deepest embedded element – is inappropriate (17a). However, with the help of an accent on the subject (*eine KUH*), the word order becomes appropriate (17b). With a marked accent on the subject, the subject is interpreted as a specific subject. For example, the subject (*Freddy*) has “a certain cow” (*eine bestimmte Kuh*) in mind.

This effect of specificity marking through an extra focusing on the subject is limited to intransitive verbs. In transitive verbs, the subject in the left of the middle field can be unspecific as well as specific (Abraham 2013: 431).

- (18) *Judith glaubte, daß ein Mann den Hund geschlagen hatte.*
 Judith thinks that a man the dog beaten had

In (18), the sentential default accent is on *geschlagen*. The difference in specificity marking observed is based on the verb-related transitive – intransitive distinction, not on the structural difference between the externality and internality of the subject, as marked by the Japanese B-grade subject.⁷

6. Capital letters indicate that the the words concerned get a contrast accent.

7.

- (20a) *Freddy glaubt, dass eine Kuh auf der WIESE schläft.*
 Freddy thinks that a cow on the meadow sleep
 (20b) *Freddy glaubt, dass eine KUH auf der Wiese schläft.*

The indefinite subject in the subordinate clause in (20a) (*eine Kuh*) cannot admittedly be a specific one, but it can be interpreted as a generic one (a cow is an animal which generally sleeps in the country). In (20b), with an extra accent on the subject, the subject gets a specific interpretation, similar to (17b).

6. Two types of Theticity: Entity-central and event-central

The observations so far indicate that types of subjects are distinguished in German in terms of referential strength, although in a manner different from that in Japanese. The subject of the existential sentence in Example (17a) is a B-grade predicate and thus restricted with respect to its position. This subject can only be made grammatical with the use of a marked accent compensating subject indefiniteness, as illustrated in Example (17b). Prototypical external subjects – such as those of transitive verbs – have no such restriction. We saw that the intransitive predicates do not typically take an indefinite subject. This restriction is stronger with the predicates of B-grade subjects. Among the predicate types taking the nominative subject, only those in the existential sentence – for example, in (19a) – can be used with an indefinite subject, especially when accompanied with a marked accent on the subject. The following are some examples of such B-grade subjects.

- (19) In an existential sentence (same as (11b))

Eine KATze ist da.

A cat is there.

- (20) As a spontaneous event

?Eine HEImat kommt in Erinnerung. (spontaneous event)

In English: a hometown comes to memory.

- (21) As a physical sensation

?Ein KOPF tut weh.

In English: a head does pain.

The marginal acceptability of indefinite subjects with internal subjects in (20) and (21) results structurally: as the internal subject builds a unit (i.e. theticity) with its predicate, the subject and predicate cannot be separated grammatically and semantically. The subject is involved in the domain of the entire predication. For example, *weh tun* ‘ache’ entails a certain body part that would be marked by a definite or possessive article, such as *der Kopf tut weh* or *mein Kopf tut weh* ‘my head aches’.

The involvedness of such subjects can be attributed to the necessarily close relationship between a subject and its predicate. As the predicate *weh tun* takes a subject only from a restricted domain such as the set of body parts, there are only a few candidates that *tun weh* ‘ache’. The subject has a part-whole relationship with its predicate.

Sasse (1987: 554ff.) subclassified the thetic sentence into the event-central and entity-central types. Event-central theticity is when an event is depicted without specific participants. Event-central theticity has therefore no specific subject – either an expletive subject, such as *Es regnet* ‘it is raining’, or a subject that has an

intrinsic relation with its predicate. The cognate subject of the weather expression in Turkish, as illustrated later in Example (24), is a special case of this type. In these cases, the subject is determined by its predicate, which makes it unlikely that the subject is indefinite.

By contrast, entity-central theticity is a simple judgment with one participant and no specific event. Entity-central theticity is about the existence or nonexistence of an entity. As such, entity-central theticity typically takes a specific entity as subject. The specificity effect observed in (17) can arise in sentences that have entity-central theticity. Sentence (19) is well-formed only with the marked accent on the subject.

7. Discussion: Crosslinguistic realization forms of the B-grade subjects with examples from weather verbs

We now summarize our observations thus far. Despite differing degrees of prominence, we have subclassified some types of subjects. The first is B-grade subjects, which are tightly combined with their predicates. Such subjects exhibit a clear affinity with theticity, whereas other subjects are used as the predication base in the categorical sentence. The B-grade subjects, as internal subjects, exhibit the following similar characteristics beyond language-specific diversity.

- The German correspondences of Japanese B-grade subjects get their cases assigned lexically in terms of verbal valence such that lexical diversity is foregrounded. As we saw in Examples (11) to (15), the “subjects” are realized by different morphological cases.
- The internal versus external distinction is determined lexically. However, if required in context, the internal case can be moved out of the VP. This distinction is differently marked across languages: in Japanese, such marking is through the particles *wa* or, in the case of an exhaustive listing, *ga*, and in German, it is through an extra stress accent.⁸
- Theticity is closely related to VP-internal subjecthood. The *ga* particle, a nominal case marker, serves to mark the VP-internal subject, thus indirectly standing for theticity.

8. However, this restriction in German is not for internal subjecthood but for intransitive verbs in general. Some predicates expressing event-central theticity are subject to more strict restriction in that they cannot take an indefinite subject, as shown in (20) and (21).

As the B-grade subject is as a VP-internal argument in the periphery of subjecthood, the realization of the B-grade subject varies across languages. This can be well illustrated with the realization of weather predicates, a predicate type of the B-grade subject. Ogawa (2012: 202ff.) dealt with weather verbs crosslinguistically. The following are realizations of the weather expression.

(22) **German, dummy subject**

Es regnet.

it rains

(23) **Italian, zero subject**

Piove.

rains

(24) **Turkish, cognate construction**

Yagmur yagar.

rain.N rain.v

(25) **Japanese, dummy verb**

Ame-ga furu.

rain-NOM fallen

A state of affairs ‘*it is raining*’ is a unit phenomenon and as such it expressed most directly with athetic construction. In English, German, and Italian, this state of affairs is verbalized as a sentence that has event-central theticity lacking a contentful subject. In Turkish, the subject and the predicate form a combination of cognate words, whereas in Japanese, a (quasi-)dummy-verb construction is used in which the content is expressed with the subject, and a function verb with minimal content is used in the verb phrase. This can be regarded as a type of the event-central theticity.

Thus, Ogawa (2012) proposed the following scale of weather predicates

dummy or zero subject – cognate construction – (quasi-)dummy verb

Figure 2. Ogawa’s Meteoscale (Ogawa 2012: 203)

This scale illustrates the gradual realization of the weather phenomenon as an example of theticity, in which the phenomenon (rainfall) is preferably expressed as a closed unit. In these cases, the speaker has three options. In the first, the subject is contentless and realized as a dummy or a zero item. In the second, the predicate, being a function verb, is contentless. The third option is a mix of the first two options. Specifically, both subject and predicate have their own content, and these contents have an intrinsic relationship, particularly a part-whole relationship. In cases where the part and whole coincide, the construction is cognate. A cognate construction

can be regarded as a special case of the mixed type in which the predicate, as an intrinsic element of the subject, determines the subject.

Because Japanese lacks a dummy subject such as *it* or *es*, thetic constructions are of only two types. The first type features entity-central theticity, as exemplified in the weather predication with a dummy verb in Example (25).⁹ The second type features use of the existence predicate, as exemplified by the dummy verb (of disappearance).

In other B-grade subjects and their predications (e.g., of feeling, capability, spontaneity, physical sensation, and weather expression), another type of thetic construction exists: the mixed type in which both elements of the sentence – subject and predicate – have a part-whole relationship. In this type of theticity, the subject and its predicate preferably form a unit, which is marked with the particle *ga*.

This study's nuanced observation of B-grade subjects thus reveals regularity in the realization forms of “subjectless” thetic sentences. Such sentences are, more precisely, sentences without an external subject.

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9. As noted by Ogawa (2012), the verb for ‘rainfall’ in Japanese, *furu* (to fall from the sky), is not fully contentless despite lacking meaning. It is not a full dummy verb. Some Japanese weather verbs also have a cognate construction, as exemplified by the following.

Example (25) can be classified as an example of mixed type theticity, similar to *atama-ga itai* ‘the head aches’ in Example (7a), where the predicate is applied only to a few candidates that can ache. Because only a few substances can ‘fall from the sky’ (*furu*), the subject (*ame*) and predicate (*furu*) have an intrinsic relation.

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Perception description, report and thetic statements

Roles of sentence-final particles in Japanese and modal particles in German

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This paper aims to explain the relationship between thetic statements and two groups of particles, i.e. Japanese sentence-final particles (SFPS) and German modal particles (MPs). Thetic statements are generally associated with predicates of temporary states, verbs of existence or verbs of appearance. By examining the properties of predicates in thetic statements, I argue that perception description is a key characteristic for theticity. I propose a common representational framework (Pragmatic Function Representation; PFR) and a distributional map (Spectrum for Persons Involved and Reference Points; SfPI&RP) to capture commonalities and differences of SFPS and MPs. What is common in the use of SFPS and MPs is that they both can contribute to form a speech act directed to addressees (report), so that the sentences thus formed are non-thetic. Most SFPS contribute to convert private expressions into public ones, which is not the case in German MPs.

Keywords: description, report, thetic statement, sentence-final particle, modal particle, private and public expression

1. Introduction

Suppose that someone sees a dog run and says “A dog is running”, an example that Kuroda (1972: 162) starts with, a native speaker of Japanese would say (1a), with the particle *ga*, not (1b) with the particle *wa*. Kuroda claims that both (1a) and (1b) have the same syntactic subject *inu* ‘dog’, but differ only in the selection of the particle. The difference corresponds to “the distinction between the thetic (subjectless) judgment and the categorical judgment, i.e., the judgment that has

the subject-predicate structure” (Kuroda 1972: 161). His explanation of (1a) is cited below:

- (1) a. Inu ga hasitte iru. = (7.1) in Kuroda (1972: 161)
 b. Inu wa hasitte iru. = (7.2) in Kuroda (1972: 161)
 (2) A dog is running.¹
 (A/the dog is running.) = (9) in Kuroda (1972: 162)

In such a situation a Japanese speaker would use the sentence (7.1) with the particle *ga*. One might analyze the judgment underlying this statement as follows. One notices an event of running; an act of running necessarily involves the actor of the action, and this actor being recognized as a dog is referred to by the word *dog*.

Kuroda (1972: 162)

Kuroda (1972) claims that (1a) includes only one judgment, while (1b) includes two kinds of judgment. Athetic judgment² includes only one judgment and lacks a subject-predicate structure, while a categorical judgment contains two kinds of judgment: discerning a subject entity and predication.

Even though Kuroda (1972) sheds new light on the analysis of the two particles, there are still at least three problems as to the use of the particle *ga*.

- (3) Three Problems of *ga* in Kuroda’s analysis:
- a. The particle *ga* as a nominative marker has two functions and only one of them is relevant forthetic judgment.
 - b. The relevant use of the particle *ga* depends on the property of predicates in the sentence, i.e., typically depicted in the use of stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates.
 - c. Thetic judgment is descriptive, which is supported by the construction *ga ... teiru* in the case of verbs of action, not by the mere use of *ga*.

From the perspective of language use, (1a) can also be regarded as perception description, i.e., the speaker describes what (s)he perceives directly in a speech situation. I will show the sentence again as (4a) with my gloss. Note that sentence (4b) has a sentence-final particle *yo* at the end of the sentence, which is the only difference compared with (4a). The use of *yo* presupposes the presence of an addressee and the information provided by the sentence is not yet shared by the addressee. Sentence (4b) is thus meant as a perception report made by the speaker and directed

1. To avoid some awkwardness in (1) in isolation, one can add an attention catcher *Look* at the beginning of the sentence to imagine the context Kuroda (1972) introduced: *Look, a dog is running*.

2. The conceptual distinction betweenthetic and categorical judgment originates from the 19th century philosopher Franz Brentano and his follower Anton Marty, cf. Werner Abraham’s introduction to this book.

As we have seen in (4b), the SFP *yo* is not blocked in thethetic statement. Other SFPs such as *ne*, *sa*, *wa*, *zo* can also occur in the same environment, even if their roles in conversation seem to be similar to those of MPs. How is this cooccurrence possible and what would be hidden behind this compatibility? Okamoto (2020a; 2020b) argue that thethetic statements, if combined with SFPs (, as well as MPs), have no more semantic and pragmatic properties oftheticity and are no longerthetic.

The aim of this paper is to explain mechanisms of this pseudo-compatibility betweenthetic statements and Japanese SFPs and German MPs. To achieve this goal, we need to examine Kuroda's (1972) initial attempts to characterizethetic statements using the particle *ga* in Japanese. At the same time, the status of SFPs should be illustrated more deeply in comparison with that of MPs. The key concepts in understanding the phenomena are perception description and report.

This article is organized as follows: In Section 2, I discuss three problems of *ga* as briefly sketched in Section 1. Section 3 deals with commonalities and differences of SFPs and MPs. Functional similarities are widely observed, particularly with regard to speaker's attitudes and speech acts. To capture commonalities and differences, I propose a common representational framework called Pragmatic Function Representation (PFR). It is shown that SFPs cover a wider range of involved participants in expressing speaker's attitude. Section 4 introduces Hirose's model for language use, particularly important is the distinction between private and public expression. It is argued that only with the help of addressee-oriented expressions including SFPs, can Japanese sentences be used communicatively. In contrast, the roles of MPs would be located in interpersonal relationships in the domain of public expression. Section 5 discussesthetic statements and the roles of SFPs and MPs, where I propose a basic mechanism behind the pseudo-compatibility betweenthetic statements and Japanese SFPs and German MPs. In Section 6 some of the consequences of this analysis are presented as concluding remarks.

2. Three problems of *ga*

2.1 Two functions of *ga*

Kuno (1973) proposes that there are three different uses of the particle *ga*. *Ga* in (8) serves to indicate that the preceding noun is a nominative, while *ga* in (9) the preceding noun is an accusative.⁷ Instead of citing Kuno's simplified gloss, I give my own gloss for each example.

7. The use of *ga* as an accusative marker is limited to the sort of the predicates in the sentence, such as *dekiru* 'be able to', *hosii* 'want', *suki* 'like'. Since it is not relevant for the present discussion, I do not deal with it here.

- (8) a. *John ga kita.*
 John NOM came
 ‘John came.’ neutral description
 ‘It was John who came.’ exhaustive listing
- b. *John ga gakusei desu.*
 John NOM student COP
 ‘John and only John is a student.’ exhaustive listing
 ‘It is John who is a student.’ Kuno (1973: 60)
- (9) *John wa eigo ga dekiru.*
 John TOP English ACC can-do
 ‘John can (speak) English.’ Kuno (1973: 61)

As the corresponding translations of Kuno (1973) indicate, (8a) has two readings: one for neutral description (ND) and the other exhaustive listing (EL). This distinction and the conditions for the distribution is, as Kuno (1973: 38, fn.2, 50, fn 10) mentions, due to Kuroda (1965). The term neutral description is given by Kuno, whereas Kuroda (1965: 38) uses “non-predicational description” to refer to the usage of ND. Kuno (1973: 51) states: “Sentences of neutral description present an objectively observable action, existence, or temporary state as a new event.” The term “exhaustive listing” is proposed by Kuno (1973: 52). By the use of *ga* in this usage, the sentence exhaustively lists elements which are picked up by the predicate. A corresponding question to (8b) is *Dare ga gakusei desu ka?* ‘Who is a student?’ and the answer should include all elements satisfied by the predicate. If John, Sue, Bill, the speaker and the addressee are in the current universe of discourse, and John and Bill are students, then (8b) with *ga* is an inappropriate answer, because Bill is lacking. Important observations concerning ND and EL is that the selection between them is controlled by semantic properties of predicates in the sentence in question. Kuno’s (1973: 60) summary for *ga* as a nominative marker goes like (10).⁸

- (10) Kuno’s (1973: 60) summary for *ga*
- Ga* marks the subject of the sentence in either *neutral description* or *exhaustive listing*.
 - If the predicate represents an action, existence, or temporary state, the subject with *ga* is ambiguous between neutral description and exhaustive listing.
 - If the predicate represents a stable state, the subject with *ga* can receive only the exhaustive-listing interpretation.
 - However, when the subject contains a numeral or quantifier, the neutral-description interpretation is possible even with a stative predicate.
- Kuno (1973: 60), (iv)–(vii)

8. Examples for each class of *ga* in Kuno (1973: 60) are omitted here.

2.2 *Ga* and property of predicates

Kuno (1973) assumes that certain properties of predicates determine interpretations of the subject noun. If we compare conditions of (10b)–(10d) with each other, it is evident that (10c) is the strongest, since it presupposes a one-to-one relation. Kuno (1973: 53) explains (10c) with its EL interpretation in a different way:

When stative verbs and adjectives and nominals of more or less permanent states are in the predicates, only the exhaustive-listing interpretation of *ga* results.

Kuno (1973: 53)

Judging from this explanation and examples he gives (*sitteiru* ‘know’, *ookii* ‘big’, *gakusei* ‘student’, *senzo* ‘ancestor’), we can conclude that the class of expressions discussed here resembles that of individual-level predicates (Carlson 1977). On the other hand, types of predicates listed in (10b) do not seem to be treated in a unified way, since they are ambiguous as to the selection of ND and EL. Remember our example (8a) *Kare ga kita*. The EL interpretation can be translated into English as “It was John who came.” The cleft-sentence is used to show the focus of this sentence and the subject *kare* ‘he’ is obviously an argument of the predicate *kuru* ‘come’. The ND interpretation is, however, not particularly connected to the subject of the sentence; rather, to the whole event the sentence expresses. This interpretation leads to the relevance ofthetic judgments in Kuroda (1972). Thethetic judgment is generally connected to predicates of temporary states (i.e. stage-level predicates), verbs of existence or verbs of appearance (Krifka 1984; Ladusaw 1994; Okamoto 2020a).

To make the point clearer, let us take a stage-level predicate for example; *yopparat-teiru* ‘be drunk’. If it is the case that of all the people we are talking about, John and only John is drunk, then (11a) yields the EL interpretation. If we have an interjection typically associated with surprise like *Att*⁹ ‘Wow’ at the beginning of the sentence, it helps us interpret (11b) as a ND. The sentence is by itself new at the informational structure. This fits the characteristics ofthetic statements.

- (11) a. John *ga* *yopparat teiru*.
 John NOM drunk STAT
 ‘(Of all the people we are talking about) John (and only John) is drunk.’
 Exhaustive listing \approx DRUNK (John)
- b. *Att*, John *ga* *yopparat teiru*.
 Wow John NOM drunk STAT
 ‘Wow, John is drunk.’ Neutral description \approx $\exists e$ DRUNK (John, *e*)

9. The interjection *att* is a combination of the interjection *a* with an unreleased stop /t/ at the end ([aʔ]). The sound is called *sokuon*, a special mora consisting usually of consonants like /k, s, t, p/ and the following stops or fricatives. Orthographically, it is written in a small *kana*-letter. The stop is also realized as [aʔ], which is now less observed.

As I have outlined in (3), Kuroda (1972) does not mention the difference between two kinds of *ga* explicitly. This fact is also pointed out by Deguchi (2012). However, Kuroda (1965) already made the distinction of ‘non-predicational description’ and ‘predication’ in explaining different uses of *ga*, and yet his main concern was rather to explain the difference between *ga* and *wa*.

Let us turn back to example (8b), which has only an EL interpretation, i.e. the sentence is not allowed to have a ND interpretation. If we know, for instance, that John enrolled at Penn State University last September and try to describe what he is now, it is appropriate to use (12a) with *wa*, not to use (12b) with *ga*. One might imagine that the “neutral description” (ND) is the basis for a standard description, but it is not the case. The ND using the particle *ga* is more restricted. To describe something in Japanese, it is more common to use usual topic-comment structures with the help of the topic marker *wa*, like (12a).

- (12) a. John *wa* gakusei desu. (neutral description)
 John TOP student COP
 ‘John is a student.’
- b. *John *ga* gakusei desu. (neutral description)
 John NOM student COP
 (Only EL is possible.)

Thus, the following examples in (13) are not acceptable as an ND. The exhaustive listing interpretation with *ga* is possible, if one could imagine that there are elements which share the same property of the set in question. In sum, an ND interpretation is generally more restricted and difficult to establish.

- (13) a. *Tokyo *ga* ookii. (neutral description)
 Tokyo NOM big
 ‘Tokyo is big.’ Kuno (1973: 53)
- b. *Saru *ga* ningen no senzo desu. (neutral description)
 monkey NOM mankind GEN ancestor COP
 ‘Look! A monkey is the ancestor of mankind.’ Kuno (1973: 53)
- c. *John *ga* nihongo *ga* dekiru. (neutral description)
 John NOM Japanese ACC can-do
 ‘John can speak Japanese.’ Kuno (1973: 53)

So far, we have seen that only the nominative marker *ga* has two interpretations: ND and EL. And only the ND interpretation is relevant for thetic judgments, which is determined by the property of the predicate in the sentence.

2.3 *Ga ... teiru* construction for description

The last problem in this section is that the particle *ga* by itself does not make the sentence descriptive. Compare the following two sentences. As we have seen in (4a), repeated here as (14a), this is regarded as perception description, which is athetic statement. Sentence (14b), on the other hand, is almost ungrammatical as an independent sentence.¹⁰ As a note to the translation attached to (14b) suggests, this sentence cannot be interpreted as generic. The generic counterpart must take *wa* instead of *ga* (*inu wa hasiru* ‘Dogs run.’).

- (14) a. *inu ga hasit teiru.*
 dog NOM run STAT
 ‘A/the dog is running.’
- b. **inu ga hasiru.*
 dog NOM run
 ‘A/the dog runs.’ (not generic)

We need to provide special contexts to rescue (14b): one is to put it in a subordinate clause like (15a),¹¹ the other is to supply an imaginary small world, in which dogs are about to run, probably some other animals are also scheduled to run afterwards. To make this situation clearer, one could supply a time adverbial *tugini* ‘next’ at the beginning of the sentence like (15b). Then it could be interpreted as an announcer reporting a race.¹²

- (15) a. *mosi inu ga/*wa hasire ba neko ga oikakeru.*
 if dog NOM/TOP run then cat NOM chase
 ‘If a dog runs, the cat will chase him/her.’
- b. *tugini inu ga hasiru.*
 next dog NOM run
 ‘A dog is about to run next.’

The difference between (14a) and (14b) is the presence of the form *teiru* attached to the preceding verb. It consists of the verb form ending *-te* and the copula *iru*, but the complex form functions like a suffix to let activity verbs express a progressive

10. Kuroda (1972: 170) also claims, with regard to parallel examples including (14a) here: “These forms are not grammatical as independent sentences in ‘neutral contexts.’”

11. This is generally formulated as a constraint in that the topic marker *wa* should not usually occur in the subordinate or embedded clause.

12. Kuroda (1972: 171) claims that some kind of focus could rescue the sentence and yet even in that case, the paraphrase *hasiru no wa inu da* ‘The ones that run are dogs.’ would be far better from a practical point of view.

state. When combined with change-of-state verbs, their result state is expressed.¹³ This means that (14a) is a descriptive statement, only if there is *teiru* attached to the verb *hasiru* ‘run’. In some cases in which verbs themselves are not stative, we need to have this form *teiru* in addition to the particle *ga*.¹⁴

As for stative verbs, the ND interpretation is possible without *teiru*. In comparison with the sentence with *wa*, however, another characteristic appears prominently. Compare (16a) and (17a) with (16b) and (17b), respectively. In (16a) and (17a), *ga* is used and just for this reason, the utterance situation is vividly described and these sentences give the impression that the speaker is out there in the described situation.

- (16) a. Sora ga aka-i. Kuroda (1965: 53)
 sky NOM red
 ‘The sky is red.’
 b. Sora wa aka-i.
 sky TOP red
 ‘The sky is red.’
- (17) a. Att, tonari ga kazi da. Nitta (1989: 20)
 INTJ neighbor’s NOM fire COP
 ‘Wow, the neighbor’s house caught fire.’
 b. Att, tonari wa kazi da. Nitta (1989: 20)
 INTJ neighbor’s TOP fire COP
 ‘Wow, the neighbor’s house caught fire.’

Nitta (1989: 19) defines *gensyo-byosyabun* (=phenomena-descriptive sentence), in which the speaker confirms the phenomena in the situation through visual, auditory and other perception and verbalize it. If Japanese native speakers unexpectedly witness the fire of the neighbor’s house, they utter (17a), the sentence with *ga*, and never come up with the utterance of (17b). *Wa* in (17b) can be a description which is reported from a complete objectivist point of view and made by the speaker not involved in the incident.

13. (Si)*teiru* is often classified as having meaning of indicating (i) durative states, (ii) resulting states, (iii) simple states, (iv) experience, (v) repeated actions. cf. Kindaichi (1976), Onoe (2001: 379–383). Sadanobu (2006) and Sadanobu and Malchukov (2006) argue that there is also a use of evidentials.

14. One might assert that the sentence *inu wa hasit teiru* is also stative because of the presence of *teiru* and therefore can be thetic, but in this case, the subject noun *inu* is usually interpreted as “a definite dog whose identity has been established prior to the utterance of the sentence” and thus the sentence is categorial. Kuroda (1972: 164).

Nakagawa (2005: 194–197) explains the phenomena by defining *seken* (\approx an imaginary local world accessible both to the speaker and the addressee) in contrast to *sekai* (\approx objective world). The sentences with *ga* correspond to *seken*, while those with *wa* to *sekai*. Thus, (16a) is an utterance made by the speaker who is just observing the sky whose color is turning crimson with the sunset. (16b) can be a contrastive statement used by the speaker who attempts to turn his/her addressee's attention to the sky. Nakagawa (2005) argues that the difference between *seken* and *sekai* is widely present in Japanese vocabulary, where the concept of *seken* can be characterized as intuitively perceptive, concrete and individualistic and that of *sekai* as logical, abstract and collective. From this perspective, we can claim that sentence (4a) (*Inu ga hasit teiru.*) is also a description of this sort, i.e. the speaker is there in the local situation and observes the event directly.¹⁵

3. Commonalities and differences of SFPS and MPS

3.1 General view

There is no doubt that language serves as a tool of communication, but communication itself is not a mere transmission of information. Various kinds of messages are linguistically exchanged in actual situations, and only one of them is propositional information. Other messages are interactional and intersubjective. In order to accomplish efficient communication, we need to have a device that joins two sentient beings together. As Maturana and Varela (1992: 196) put it, “Communication takes place each time there is behavioral coordination in a realm of structural coupling”. And coordinated behavior can be regulated interactionally and intersubjectively through various sorts of expressions in particular languages. SFPS in Japanese as well as MPS in German should belong to such a class of words. It is true that there are languages which has a variety of such particles on the one hand (Germanic languages like Dutch, German and Swedish), and almost no equivalent words on the other (Roman languages and English), but one might still speculate that there are universal pragmatic phenomena that contribute to this aspect of communication (cf. Müller 2014: 8).

15. In connection with direct perception, it is interesting to observe the phenomena known as Locative Inversion Construction in English. They are said to have some “rhetorical effects” which give the reader a perspective of direct perception. cf. *On the wall hangs a portrait of Mao* (Hooper & Thompson 1973: 467). See also Shizawa (2015).

3.2 Commonalities of SFPS and MPS

From the viewpoint of language typology, German and Japanese are obviously not related, but as seen in Table 1, MPS in German and SFPS in Japanese share some basic features.

Table 1. Comparison of features shared by MPS and SFPS

	MPS in German	SFPS in Japanese
uninflected	✓	✓
unaccented	✓	✓
unable to build constituents	✓	✓
combinable	✓	✓
fixed position in sentences	middle field	sentence-final
no lexical meaning	✓	✓
speaker-oriented functions	✓	✓
wider scope	✓	✓

Table 1 shows that representative features of MPS summed up by Müller (2014) can also be applied to SFPS. MPS and SFP are uninflected classes of words (morphology), both of them are unaccented (with some exceptions in German) (phonology) and unable to build constituents (syntax). Some of them are, however, combinable and there are certain sets of syntactic/semantic rules responsible for the combination, which is not treated here (cf. Rinas 2007; Coniglio 2011; Müller 2018). MPS and SFPS appear in a fixed position: MPS basically in the middle field and SFPS at the end of the sentence. Both groups of particles have no lexical meaning, even though they are in some way products of grammaticalization (Traugott 1989; Abraham 1991; Burkhardt 1994; Autenrieth 2002; Molnár 2002; Ferraresi 2014). Their original corresponding lexical items have evidently lexical meaning which is said to have been lost in the process of grammaticalization. MPS and SFPS are speaker-oriented and function as showing some speaker's attitude and modifying speech act characteristics in some cases. They have a wider scope, in other words, do not have a scope over single words or phrases.

In addition, sentence mood (and sentence types in the case of MPS) plays a crucial role in determining distribution of particular particles. Interaction with sentence accent and intonation is another topic which has not yet been pursued sufficiently (cf. Okamoto 2017, 2020a).

(‘ozyosama-kotoba’, e.g. *-koto* in *kono yakiimo (wa) oisii koto*), how country people talk (‘inaka-kotoba’, e.g. *-nou* in *kono yakiimo (wa) oisii nou*), or how snobbish young men talk (e.g. *-ze* in *kono yakiimo (wa) oisii ze*), etc. Expressions of RL, which include not only SFPS, but also interjections, adverbs, personal pronouns and certain combinations of particles, are regarded as products of social prejudice and do not really reflect reality. They are, nevertheless, also an economical way to introduce particular persons in the discourse.

3.4 A common framework for MPS and SEPS: Pragmatic Function Representation

With differences in mind, let us sketch a common representational framework for MPS and SEPS, which I call Pragmatic Function Representation (PFR). Roughly speaking, MPS have been explained either on the basis of speaker’s attitude and/or speech act, where a kind of shared knowledge and belief of the speaker/addressee (e.g. Common Ground) is often taken into consideration. As is often pointed out, both speaker’s attitudes and speech act are not always transparent even in actual situations. Take, for instance, B’s utterance in (19) which includes the MP *doch*. As a result, the utterance can be interpreted as *Vorwurf* ‘reproach’ or *Korrektur* ‘correction’. Or both ways of interpretation seem to be possible at the same time (cf. Müller 2014: 36). Speech act and speaker’s attitude are not always bound in a one-to-one fashion. Thus, I propose to represent an attribute-value pair like [ACT: x, ATTITUDE: y] where values are in some cases possibly unnamed.¹⁷ ACT represents the speech act of the utterance in question, whereas ATTITUDE represents speaker’s attitude with regard to MPS or SFPS. From the point of view of speakers, there must be a trigger to use particles in their utterances. I call this trigger a reference point. (19A) is represented as (20) and (19B) as (21).

- (19) A: Peter kommt auch mit.
Peter comes also with
‘Peter will also come.’
B: Er liegt doch im Krankenhaus.
he lies MP in-the hospital
‘He is in hospital.’

Karagjosova (2004: 48)¹⁸

17. Speaker’s attitudes as well as speech acts cannot sometimes be named properly, yet there should be one in some way. In that case, the value is represented by an underscore “_”.

18. The gloss and translations are mine.

- (20) A: [ACT: assert, ATTITUDE: _]
reference point: [S knows that H does not know that p.]
p: Peter will come.
- (21) B: [ACT: assert, ATTITUDE: critical]
or [ACT: correct, ATTITUDE: confirmatory]
or [ACT: remind, ATTITUDE: confirmatory].
reference point: [S knows that H does not remember that q.]
p: Peter will come. q: Peter is in hospital.
(S's inference: If q, then \neg p.)

In (22) a corresponding conversation of (19) in Japanese using SFPs¹⁹ is given and (23) is a PFR parallel to (20) and (21).

- (22) A: Peter mo issyo-ni kuru yo. ↓
Peter also together come SFP
'(I'm telling you,) Peter will also come.'
- B: Ee↗, kare (wa) nyuuinsi teiru yo. ↓/yone.²⁰ ↓↑
INTJ he TOP be_in_hospital STAT SFP/SFP
'Is that so? (I must remind you that) he is in hospital.'
- (23) A: [ACT: assert, ATTITUDE: confirmatory]²¹
reference point: [S knows that H knows that p.]
p: Peter will come.
- B: [ACT: remind, ATTITUDE: confirmatory]
or [ACT: correct, ATTITUDE: confirmatory].
reference point: [S knows that H does not remember that p.]
p: Peter will come. q: Peter is in hospital.
(S's inference: If q, then \neg p.)

19. This paper adopts four contour-patterns of sentence-final intonation proposed by Koyama (1997: 99); (i) slight-fall and sudden-rise contour typically observed in questions, (ii) rise (and sometimes flat) contour characteristic of calling attention, (iii) fall contour for declaratives and (iv) (prolonged) rise-fall contour for calling attention and expressing speaker's emotional attitudes. I use arrow symbols to represent these four contours; ↓↑ for fall-rise contour, ↗ for rise contour, ↓ for fall contour, and ↑↓ rise-fall contour. For the discussion of distinction of intonation contours, see Kori (1997, 2015), Venditti (2005) and Oshima (2013, 2014).

20. *Yone*, a combination of two particles, is assumed to function here as a single SFP, with which the speaker requests the addressee to call for confirmation in establishing agreement between the speaker and the addressee. Unlike *ne* with a fall-rise contour, it cannot be used in the speech act PROMISE (Katagiri 1997: 252).

21. In contrast to (20), (23A) has a value 'confirmatory' for the attribute ATTITUDE because of the SFP *yo*. Occasionally *yo* is said to mark that the informational content of the utterance lies on the side of the speaker, while *ne* presupposes that both the speaker and the hearer know the content of the utterance. If so, the combination *yone* should be excluded. It is, however, used quite often.

(19) and (22) are structurally similar as a kind of conversation consisting of one assertion and its implicit refutation. There are four differences between (19) and (22), which are not captured fully in the framework of PFRs.

(24) **A representative comparison: Four differences between (19) and (22)**

D-1. In the case of the Japanese example, the SFP *yo* is almost obligatory, that is, without using it, the utterance remains private expression, which will be discussed in the next section. Addressee-oriented SFPs such as *wa* (F. S.) and *zo* (M. S.) can also be used instead of *yo*.

D-2. The interjection *ee* at the beginning of (22B) signals that the speaker received unexpected information. It is often phonetically prolonged to stress the speaker's surprise. Without this interjection, it is hard to reject the content of A's assertion explicitly. Of course, one can deny the statement by saying *Tigau-yo* 'That's not true' instead.

D-3. The interpretation of the SFP *yo* differs according to the intonation contour. *Yo* with falling tone usually indicates that the speaker tries to give new information to the addressee or tries to direct the attention of the addressee to something else. The fall-rise intonation of *yo* can be pronounced longer to insinuate that you are not aware of what I am saying.

D-4. The difference between (19B) and (22B) is mainly due to the use of the MP *doch* and the SFP *yo*. On the level of PFRs, they are minimally differentiated; what is not present in (22) is the pair [ACT: assert, ATTITUDE: critical]. This means that one cannot commit the act of criticizing by using *yo*, even if this SFP gives the impression of one-sidedness in communication. Ogi (2017: 129) calls this aspect of *yo* "the speaker's monopolistic attitude".

In case of an utterance with *doch* in (19) and of an utterance with *yo* in (22), the reference points are within the dimension of knowledge and belief. If we observe closely contexts in which particles are used, their triggers can also be found in actual speech situations. The reference point of the MP *doch* in (25a) is the addressee's behavior in the situation; (s)he seems to hesitate to take a seat. (25b) presupposes no previous context and the unexpected appearance of the brother who is soak wet is perceived by the speaker and triggers the MP *ja*. In the same situations, SFPs can be used, as seen in (26).

- (25) a. [A guest comes into the room. After greeting, (s)he doesn't seem to take a seat. The speaker says:]
 Setzen Sie sich *doch*!
 set you yourself MP
 'Take a seat.'

- b. [A brother of mine comes home. As the speaker opens the door, (s)he sees him and says:]
 Du bist *ja* ganz nass!
 you are MP completely wet
 ‘You are soaking wet.’
- (26) a. [A guest comes into the room. After greeting, (s)he doesn’t seem to take a seat. The speaker says:]
 Maa suwatte kudasai *yo.* ↓
 anyway sit.Imp Pol SFP
 ‘Please take a seat.’
- b. [A brother of mine comes home. As the speaker opens the door, (s)he sees him and says:]
 Oyamaa, bisonure ni nattya *tte!* ↓
 wow get-soaked Pstp become SFP
 ‘Wow, you got soaked completely.’

Each PFR can be located in a distributional map (Figure 1), which is called Spectrum for Persons Involved and Reference Points (SfPI&RP) in communication. It consists of persons involved in the pair of acts and attitudes and reference points, which are either located in the dimension of shared knowledge and belief, i.e. the upper dimension, or in that of external situations, i.e. the lower dimension.




Figure 1. Spectrum for Persons Involved and Reference Points (SfPI&RP)²²

22. The figure I presented at the talk was called ‘Spectrum for Intersubjective Speaker’s Attitudes’ (SISA) and did not presuppose PFR constituted by attribute-value pairs of ACT and ATTITUDE.

Relevant examples we have seen so far, are listed in (27).

(27) **Locations of examples in SfPI&RP**

K-1:

K-2: DE:²³ *doch* in (19B), e.g. [ACT: assert, ATTITUDE: critical]

JP: *yo/yone* in (22B), e.g. [ACT: remind, ATTITUDE: confirmatory]

K-3:

S-1: JP: *naa/ya/kanaa* in (18a), e.g. [ACT: exclamation, ATTITUDE: surprise]

S-2: DE: *doch* in (25a), e.g. [ACT: request, ATTITUDE: _]

DE: *ja* in (25b), e.g. [ACT: exclamation, ATTITUDE: surprise]

JP: *yo* in (26a), e.g. [ACT: request, ATTITUDE: _]

JP: *tte* in (26b), e.g. [ACT: exclamation, ATTITUDE: surprise]

S-3: JP: *wa* (F. S.)/*zo* (M. S.) in (18b), *desu-na* in (18c), e.g. [ACT: exclamation, ATTITUDE: surprise]

The list above is not meant to be exhaustive, yet it seems to offer some clues from which generalizations can be made. As is indicated in 3.3, some SfPIs mark sentences as (i) soliloquy, (ii) gender-specific expressions and (iii) expressions specific to certain (fictional) groups of people. K-1 as well as S-1 are a case of soliloquy. It has been pointed out that Japanese native speakers talk to themselves quite often and soliloquy is one of the characteristic ways of language use observed in Japanese (e.g. Washi 1997: 65; Nakagawa 2005: 16–17). The reference points are usually located in actual speech situations, i.e. the speakers perceive something as a trigger for their self-talk. This phenomenon is closely related to characteristics of private expressions in Japanese, which will be treated in the next section.

The absence of K-3 could be justifiable in a different way. The function of gender-specific and role-language markers is mainly to evoke in the addressee a particular sense of belonging to a particular group of people. By using such expressions, the speaker is more conscious of herself/himself in the face of the addressee. In this respect it is more effective to make use of triggers perceivable to both of them in the external situations.

As for soliloquy in German, there are at least three types of constructions; (i) rhetorical questions, (ii) remembering-things-temporarily-forgotten utterances and (iii) independent *ob*-subordinate clauses. (28a) is an example of rhetorical questions possibly associated with the speaker's attitude of *Ratlosigkeit* 'helplessness' (cf. Helbig 1990: 190), whereas the *MP nur/bloß* is said to indicate the 'urgency and intensity of the question'. Rhetorical questions are characterized as pseudo-questions, questions which do not expect an answer. They are generally made to achieve some

23. In this list, "DE" represents German examples, and "JP" Japanese ones.

effect and there is often a statement hidden behind them (e.g. behind *who knows?* is the hidden statement *nobody knows*). (27a) is a rhetorical question, insofar as it does not need to be answered. It is, however, not clear that there is a hidden statement behind (27a). It can be uttered without any addressees around the speaker and the presence of the addressee is a matter of debate (e.g. Bublitz 1978: 70; Thurmair 1989: 179). On the contrary, it is easier to assume the existence of the addressee in (27b), even if it is also a similar w-question with an MP. It sounds like a term of reproach and can be also uttered as a soliloquy (cf. Helbig 1990: 103, 190–191).

- (27) a. Wo habe ich *nur/bloß* meinen Schlüssel?
 where have I MP/MP my key
 ‘Where do I have my key?’
 b. Warum ist er *nur/bloß* nicht gekommen?
 why is he MP/MP not come.pp
 ‘Why has he not come?’

The MP *doch* is used in remembering-things-temporarily-forgotten w-questions, as (28). This is functionally the same as (27a) and *doch* occurs often followed by time-adverbials such as *gleich* ‘soon’, *noch* ‘soon after this’, *rasch* ‘quickly’. In a situation, where people try to remember a name, people tend to talk to themselves, uttering something like (28). The speaker does not necessarily expect someone around herself/himself, but the use of *doch* shows the addressee that the speaker is trying to retrieve information from her/his mind which has been temporarily forgotten (Bublitz 1978: 108–109; Helbig 1990: 114; Thurmair 1989: 117).

- (28) Wie heißt die Katze *doch* gleich?
 how be-called the cat MP soon
 ‘I can’t remember how the cat is called.’

(29a) is a case of independent *ob*-subordinate clauses, typically accompanied by the MP *wohl*. The subordinate conjunction *ob* ‘whether; if’ is normally used with the main clause, e.g. *Ich weiß nicht* ‘I don’t know’, like (29b). Unlike the corresponding direct question, (29a) is understood as a soliloquy. It is, however, possible that there is an addressee in the speech situation, listening to the utterance (29a).²⁴

- (29) a. Ob ich *wohl* die Prüfung bestehe.
 whether I MP the test pass
 ‘I wonder if I could pass the test.’

24. cf. Thurmair (1989: 143) claims that the speaker expects, in the case of this independent *ob*-clause, the reaction of the addressee. For further discussion, see Meibauer (1989), Altmann & Hahnemann (2010: 163), Zimmermann (2013: 90) and Okamoto (2020a).

- b. Ich weiß nicht, ob ich wohl die Prüfung bestehe.
 I know not whether I MP the test pass
 ‘I don’t know if I pass the test.’

Considering the data mentioned above, soliloquies in German could be located in K2 or S2, in some cases also in K1 or S1. As Hasegawa (2017: 27) has observed, it is relatively easy to recognize soliloquies in transcribed Japanese texts, while it is not so easy in transcribed English ones. We assume from this observation that this is also the case in German, i.e., it is essentially difficult to recognize one particular utterance as a case of soliloquy, in the strict sense that there is no addressee, since this is context-dependent and it cannot be interpreted as such only from the expressions themselves.

4. Private vs. public expressions

The idea of “public and private expressions” developed by Y. Hirose was briefly sketched in Section 1. His initial idea has been developed in a series of works²⁵ and is now integrated in his *Three-Tier Model of Language Use* (cf. Hirose 1995, 2000, 2002, 2015; Hasegawa & Hirose 2005; Hirose & Hasegawa 2010). This model is based on “the concepts of *public* and *private self* as two aspects of the speaker” (Hirose 2015: 12).

The public self is the speaker as the subject of communicating, i.e. the speaker who faces an addressee or has one in mind, while the private self is the speaker as the subject of thinking or consciousness, i.e. the speaker who has no addressee in mind.
 (Hirose 2015: 122)

The unique point of this model is that the speaker can be deconstructed into the public self and the private self. The model consists of *situation construal tier*, *situation report tier* and *interpersonal relationship tier*, hypothesizing that “languages may differ as to how the three tiers are combined” (Hirose 2015: 121). Each tier is characterized by Hirose as follows:

- (30) a. Situation construal tier: The speaker as private self construes a situation, forming a thought about it.
 b. Situation report tier: The speaker as public self reports or communicates his construed situation to the addressee.
 c. Interpersonal relationship tier: The speaker as public self considers his interpersonal relationship with the addressee. Hirose (2015: 121–122)

25. His initial research of “public and private expressions” can be traced back to Hirose (1988).

According to Hirose (2015: 122): “English is a public-self-centered language, whereas Japanese is a private-self-centered language.” Hirose (2015: 122) defines public and private expression in terms of the public and private self as follows:

The public and private self are the subjects of two different levels of linguistic expression called *public* and *private expression*. Public expression corresponds to the communicative function of language, and private expression to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language. Thus public expression requires the presence of an addressee, whereas private expression does not.

As Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989) point out, it is almost impossible to communicate in Japanese without paying attention to interpersonal relationships. This means that even when one attempts to report something objective, the relationship between the speaker and her/his addressee should be taken into account. In terms of the three-tier model, the situation report is unified with interpersonal relationship in Japanese. The striking difference between (31a) and (31b) is that (31b) is, even if it is almost a literal translation of (31a), only a private expression and thus not used to convey a message to an addressee.

- (31) a. Today is Sunday.
 b. Kyou wa nitiyoubi da.
 today TOP Sunday COP
 ≠‘Today is Sunday.’
- (32) a. Kyou wa nitiyoubi da yo.
 today TOP Sunday COP SFP
 b. Kyou wa nitiyoubi desu.
 today TOP Sunday COP.Pol
 c. Kyou wa nitiyoubi degozaimasu.
 today TOP Sunday COP.SuperPol

cf. Hirose (2015: 122)

In contrast to (31b), all sentences in (32) are meant to be reports, because they include addressee-oriented expressions; (32a) contains the SFP *yo*, (32b) and (32c) are ended with a polite form of a copula which presupposes the existence of an addressee. On the contrary, the situation construal and the situation report is unified in English, independent of the interpersonal relationship. In other words, public expression is in English at default setting.

As a consequence of the unity of situation construal and situation report, the information gained through direct perception is also a public expression in English, while it remains in the domain of private expression in Japanese. Compare (33) and (34).

- (33) a. (*The speaker is looking out the window.*) Oh, it's raining.
 b. It's raining (, because they are walking under their umbrellas).
 c. A: What did John say?
 B: It's raining. Shizawa (2015: 162)
- (34) a. (*The speaker is looking out the window.*)
 Att, ame ga fut te(i)ru.
 Oh rain NOM fall STAT
 'Oh, it's raining.'
- b. (*Seeing people walking under their umbrellas through the window:*)
 Ame ga fut {*te(i)ru / te(i)ru nda}.
 rain NOM fall STAT / STAT SFP
 'It's raining.' (as speaker's inference)
- c. A: John wa nan te itta no?
 John TOP what Quo said SFP
 'What did John say?'
 B: Ame ga fut {*te(i)ru / te(i)ru tte}.
 rain NOM fall STAT / STAT SFP
 'It's raining.' (as speaker's hearsay)
 cf. Hirose (2017: 13)

Regardless of the fact that the utterance is made on the basis of the speaker's inference or hearsay, the expression *It's raining* can be constantly used in English. The corresponding Japanese utterance *Ame ga fut teiru* is private expression and can only be used as a consequence of direct perception. If you infer from another scene that it is raining, the SFP *nda*,²⁶ which is a contracted form of *noda*, can be used, as in (34b), to indicate that the information thus obtained is not based on the direct perception of the speaker. The SFP *tte* in (34c) functions as a quotation marker and without this SFP the utterance cannot be used as an answer to the question *John wa nan te itta no?* 'What did John say?' From this observation Shizawa (2015: 163) claims that the bare form in (34a) expresses the speaker's firsthand perception. Unlike (33), Japanese speakers have to make use of markers which indicate speaker's inference or hearsay information. To put it another way, (firsthand) evidential information has to be negatively marked in Japanese.

26. The grammatical status of *nda* (= -n; *ndesu*, *ndearu*, *noda*; *nodesu*, *nodearu*) has been much discussed in literature; cf. Alfonso (1966: 405), Kuno (1973: Chapter 19), Kunihiro (1992); Horie (1998); Otake (2002); Okamoto (2020b), to name a few. Most of the Japanese grammarians take it only as a combined expression and do not regard it as an SFP.

5. Thetic statements and roles of SFPS and MPS reconsidered

5.1 Thetic statements and roles of SFPS

It should be now clear that our example (1a) *Inu ga hasit teiru* at the beginning of our discussion is not quite equivalent to Kuroda's (1972: 161) translation *A/the dog is running*. To resume the discussion, sentences (1) and (2) are repeated here as (35) and (36).

- (35) a. Inu ga hasit teiru.
 dog NOM run STAT
 b. Inu wa hasit teiru.
 dog TOP run STAT

(36) A dog is running.

Sentence (35a), as characterized in the previous section, is a result of direct perception by the speaker. The speaker observes the situation in which the/a dog is running and utters it, most likely without any addressee. It is, in terms of Three-Tier Model of Language Use, a private expression. As is discussed in Section 2, in case of activity verbs like *hasiru* 'run', the use of the nominative marker *ga* is not enough to make the sentence descriptive. The *teiru*-marker is necessary to guarantee the sentence be descriptive. In addition, the function of *ga* is dependent upon the character of predicates in the sentence in question.

Now we see the complex background of sentence (35a), which is summarized below in (37).

- (37) The sentence *inu ga hasit teiru* is characterized as:
- i. direct perception of the speaker (i.e. evidential),²⁷
 - ii. private expression (not directed to any addressee),
 - iii. having a property of temporal state thanks to the *teiru*-marker,
 - iv. having *ga* as a use of neutral description,
 - v. having *ga* as a marker of local accessibility for the speaker and the addressee.

Some of the features mentioned above could be overlapped and reduced, but the list should stay as it is, since the purpose is to capture the overall view of this sentence.

As we recall, thetic statements are connected to predicates of temporary states (i.e. stage-level predicates), verbs of existence and verbs of appearance. As Kuroda

27. Note that sentence (33a) is almost equivalent to the sentence *inu ga hasit teiru no ga mieru* 'I see a/the dog running', in which the subject/speaker is hidden behind the scene, cf. 'subject construal' in cognitive linguistic literature.

(1972: 161) puts it, (35a) is “subjectless” in the sense that it lacks subject-predicate structure, which is present in (35b). In (35b) the subject noun *inu* is marked as a topic. It is, at the same time, the target of predication in a logical sense. The entity denoted by *inu* is recognized by the speaker and is the argument of the predicate *hasiru* ‘run’. In (35a) there is no such predication present. Sentence (35a) is thus doubtlessly a thetic statement.

What could have happened if we attached an SFP like *yo* at the end of the sentence, like *Inu ga hasitte iru yo* (=4b)? I argued in Section 1 that Japanese SFPs are seemingly compatible with thetic statements, yet resulting sentences are no longer thetic. From the observations I have made so far, this mechanism in Japanese can be characterized by description-report conversion mechanism in (38).

(38) **Description-report conversion mechanism: (Japanese)**

(a) **Description through direct perception**

Description through direct perception is thetic.

(b) **Addressee-directedness of SFPs**

i. SFPs are mostly²⁸ directed to the addressee.

ii. They play certain roles in interpersonal relationships.

iii. They contribute to converting private expressions into public ones.

(c) **Perception report as speech act**

i. Once SFPs are used, certain speaker’s attitudes to the addressee are established.

ii. Utterances thus made gain features of perception report at the level of speech act.

According to the characterization of (38a), I can also conclude that some private expressions in Japanese are thetic, even if they do not include the nominative marker *ga*. Sentences in (39) are recognized as thetic in this sense.

- (39) a. Watt, kusa-i!
INTJ smelly
‘Yuck, it stinks.’
- b. Att, ame da!
INTJ rain COP
‘Wow, it’s raining.’
- c. Kono ringo wa kusat teiru.
this apple TOP rotten STAT
‘This apple is rotten.’

28. There are also non-addressee oriented SFPs, as explained below.

In Japanese, direct perception using adjectives is typically expressed using an appropriate interjection and a bare *i*-adjective.²⁹ The interjection *watt* in (39a) ranges over a wide variety of surprise in general. Note that with this kind of utterance the subject noun must not appear on the surface; the sentence *tamago ga kusai* ‘the egg stinks’ is valid as contrastive description (with *ga* as an EL), but never used to express one’s direct perception. Sentence (39b) is a copula construction using a bare noun. This kind of assertion is also typical in case of direct perception description. Sentence (39c) is a contrastive statement implicating that there are other apples somewhere. The speaker picks up one of the apples and describes it as a result of direct perception. Deguchi (2012: 232) also claims that the use of contrastive *wa* does not lead to categorical judgments.

The term description is defined as a detailed account of something in words³⁰ and understood as a kind of verbal action. In the context of this research, one could claim that human beings perceive something in actual situations and express it by using their native language. This action is usually done in English or some other European languages like German and French, to convey information as to what one perceives. As Section 5 has illustrated, however, native speakers of the Japanese language construe a situation and express a thought about it without intending to convey information to someone else. In other words, they form private expression first. To make private expression public, Japanese speakers have to use frequently addressee-oriented words and phrases, such as some SFPS (*-yo*, *-ze* ‘I tell you’), various polite forms of a copula (*-desu*, *-masu*), some vocative expressions (*-nee*, *-oi* ‘hey’, *-nee* ‘look’), hearsay expressions (*-sooda*, *-tte* ‘I hear’) and other phrases (Hasegawa 2010: 159–160; Hirose 2013: 7). What is needed is a basic means to convert description into report. Perception report is, like the definition of situation report above, made by the speaker to report or communicate her/his construed situation to the addressee.

As is characterized in (38c), we can change the status of sentences. Sentence (11b), repeated here as (40a), is thetic, but by adding *yo* at the end as in (40b), it turns out to presuppose a particular addressee, becomes public and can be interpreted as perception report.

- (40) a. Att, John ga yopparat teiru.
 INTJ John NOM drunk STAT
 ‘Wow, John is drunk.’ Neutral description $\approx \exists e$ DRUNK (John, *e*)

29. Japanese adjectives ending with “*i*” like *kusa-i* ‘smelly’, *mabusi-i* ‘dazzling’, *urusa-i* ‘noisy’, *kara-i* ‘hot’ and *ita-i* ‘achy’ are called *i*-adjectives, in contrast to *na*-adjectives (adjectives ending with “*na*” like *genki-na* ‘active’, *siawase-na* ‘happy’ and *sizuka-na* ‘silent’).

30. *Oxford Dictionary of English* [3rd edn] (2010: 474) gives as a definition for the verb *describe* “give a detailed account in words of”.

b. Att, John ga yopparat teiru yo.↓

INTJ John NOM drunk STAT SFP

‘Look, John is drunk, I’m telling you.’

perception report $\approx \exists e$ DRUNK (John, e) & REPORT (Speaker, e)

[ACT: remind, ATTITUDE: confirmatory]

The predicate REPORT above in (40b) corresponds roughly to I SAY TO YOU in Performative Analysis in Ross (1970), i.e., in English every declarative sentence has in its underlying structure a higher performative clause. To put it another way, every declarative sentence of Japanese does not have such a higher performative clause, provided that there are no addressee-oriented words and phrases (Hirose 2015: 128).

It should be noted, however, that not all SFPs are addressee-oriented, e.g. *naa*, *ya* and *ka-na* are exclamatory and usually connected with soliloquy (Hasegawa 2010: 160). There are also interjections which are not addressee-oriented; soliloquial exclamatory interjections for soliloquy (*waa*, *watt*, *yaa*, *oo*, *maa*, *kyaa*, *waai*, *otto*, *att*), exclamatory, skeptical sounding interjections for soliloquy (*e? ee? are*, *ara*, *oya*, *areare*, *aa*) and thinking process representing interjections for soliloquy (*etto*, *doredore*, *dore*, *aa*, *uun*, *hahaa*, *huun*). (Nihongo-Kijutsubunpou-Kenkyukai 2012: 160–164)

One question arises as to the significance of non-addressee-oriented SFPs: Why is it that, for instance, the SFP *naa* or *ya* is used, even if the original sentence is by itself private expression and is interpreted as soliloquy? As is in (18a) noted, sentence (41) is an affirmative conformation and functions as an exclamation, without supposing any addressee.³¹ If such an SFP is not present, the sentence is usually not exclamatory.

(41) Att, John ga yopparat teiru *naa/ya*.

INTJ John NOM drunk STAT SFP

‘Wow, John is drunk.’

Neutral description $\approx \exists e$ DRUNK (John, e)

[ACT: exclamation, ATTITUDE: surprise]

5.2 Thetic statements and roles of MPS

In view of the mechanism in the previous subsection, compatibility of German MPS with thetic statements can be reconsidered. Marty (1918: 272) gives (42a) and (42b) as thetic statements. These sentences are, as we examined the sentence *it is raining* in Section 4, not necessarily results of direct perception. Take (42a) for example and

31. It might be hard to imagine that people utter expressions of exclamation in public, even if there are no addressees around. Such exclamations are called *eitan* in Japanese and are common among native speakers of Japanese.

let me give parallel examples of (32) as (43). As (43) shows, the German counterpart of *it is raining* can also be used as inference and hearsay statement. In this sense, (42a) and (42b) have wider readings than (33a) *Att, ame ga fut te(i)ru* in Japanese.

- (42) a. Es regnet.
it rains
'It is raining.'
- b. Es donnert.
it thunders
'It is thundering.'
- (43) a. (Der Sprecher sieht aus dem Fenster:) Ach, es regnet.
(the speaker sees from the window) Oh it rains
'The speaker is looking out the window: Oh, it's raining.'
- b. Es regnet. Die Straße dort sieht nämlich nass aus.
it rains the street there looks namely wet V_{par}
'It's raining. Actually the street there looks wet.'
- c. A: Was hat Thomas gesagt?
what has Thomas said
'What did Thomas say?'
- B: „Es regnet.“ (Dass es regne.)
it rains (That it rain.SBJ)
'It is raining.'

Considering these facts, it is not at all strange that impersonal sentences in (42) are compatible with MPs, as in (44). Appropriate contexts can be found if we think that there is an addressee with whom one is engaged in a conversation about rainy days or about something which could be ascribed to the bad weather.³² With a particular MP, each sentence in (44) presupposes the presence of an addressee and the statement is not a description through direct perception. It is rather an assertion of some sort.

- (44) a. Es regnet {ja/doch}.
it rains {MP/MP}
'It is (MP) raining.'
- b. Es donnert {ja/doch}.
it thunders {MP/MP}
'It is (MP) thundering.'

Compare two existential sentences in (45). Die MP like *ja* or *doch* can appear in (45a) according to the context and the subject noun *die Schwalben* 'the swallows'

32. See, for example, a short conversation in which Evelyn said: "Ich muss jetzt nach Haus," and Bully replied: "Es regnet doch." (Source: A song text by Bully Buhlan and Evelyn Künneke)

is the argument of the predicate *auf dem Dach sein* ('be on the roof'). It includes a usual subject-predicate structure and is thus a case of categorical judgment. But if we place an accent on the subject noun as in (45b) or put the expletive *es* at the beginning of the sentence as in (45c), it gets a thetic interpretation and is no longer compatible with MPs.

- (45) a. Die Schwalben sind (*ja/doch*) auf dem DACH. (categorical)
 the swallows are (MP/MP) on the roof
 'Swallows are (MP) on the roof.'
- b. SCHWALBEN sind (**ja/*doch*) auf dem Dach.³³ (thetic)
 swallows are (**MP/*MP*) on the roof
 'Some swallows are (**MP*) on the roof.'
- c. Es sind (**ja/*doch*) SCHWALBEN auf dem Dach. (thetic)
 it are (MP/MP) swallows on the roof
 'There are (**MP*) swallows on the roof.'

The contrast between (45a) and (45b) becomes clearer, if we take their prosodic structure into consideration. In (45a) the focus of the sentence is the noun *Dach* 'roof', while in (45b) the noun *Schwalben* 'swallows' is focused. Sentence (45b) is in accordance with Theticity Constraints by Abraham (2017b), since the sentence by itself gives only new information, i.e. is rhematic and does not allow any MP. It should be also noted that the focused subject noun is one feature of thetic statements.³⁴ If we assume a question *Was ist los?* 'What's going on?' which normally induces a sentence-focus reply, the incompatibility of MPs with the thetic statement would be more easily traceable, e.g. (46a) and (46b).

- (46) a. (Was ist los?) SCHWALBEN sind (**ja*) auf dem Dach.
 (What is going-on?) Swallows are (?MP) on the roof
 '(What's going on?) SWALLOWS are (, as you know,) on the roof.'
 (thetic)
- b. (Was ist los?) Es sind (**ja*) SCHWALBEN auf dem Dach.
 (What is going-on?) it are (**MP*) swallows on the roof
 '(What's going on?) There are (, as you know,) SWALLOWS on the roof.'
 (thetic)

33. According to a colleague of mine who is a native speaker of German, extreme contexts can save sentence (45b): the roof caught fire and is burning, but some swallows are still there.

34. A famous pair of examples for accented nouns is: (i) Truman DIED vs (ii) JOHNSON died. Sentence (ii) is appropriate as an answer to the question *What happened?* If the nation expected that Truman would sooner or later die, (i) would be possible. The point is that (ii) is a presentative, i.e. a thetic statement. cf. Schmerling (1976: 90), Krifka (1984: 19), Sasse (1987: 523), Büring (2016: 211–215), Okamoto (2020a).

Interestingly, the definiteness of the subject NP does not affect the grammaticality in this kind ofthetic statements.

- (47) (Was ist los?) Die SCHWALBEN sind (*ja) auf dem Dach. (thetic)

The NP *Die Schwalben* ‘the swallows’ in (47) would usually be interpreted as referring to entities presumably present in the shared knowledge between the speaker and the addressee.

The focused NP is supposed to guarantee, on the level of information structure, that the information delivered by the sentence is all new. If this observation is correct, it is predicted that the following examples given by Krifka (1984: 19) would also not be compatible with MPs. In this case the subject NPs are not stressed (and the preceding question in the bracket is not present), the subject NPs are topics of the sentences and the sentences become categorial.

- (48) a. (Wie ist das Wetter?) Die SONNE scheint.
 (how is the weather) the sun shines
 ‘(How is the weather?) The sun is shining.’
 b. (Was war das?) Die KATZE hat miaut.
 (what was that) the cat has meowed
 ‘(What was that?) The cat meowed.’
 c. (Was ist das fürn Geräusch?) Die SUPPE kocht.
 (what is that for-a noise) the soup boils
 ‘(What kind of noise is it?) The soup is boiling.’

As seen in (44a) and (44b), MPs can be used if the sentence in question is not descriptive, but assertive. In general, the use of MPs presupposes that there is some kind of speech act going on behind the sentences, such as report, assertion, reminding, etc. It is the same effect of in (38c) that makes the occurrence of MPs possible, i.e., (44a) and (44b) are notthetic.

Is the mechanism that permits MPs in such cases the same as that of SFPS in (38)? The answer to this question is basically in the affirmative. The difference between Japanese SFPS and German MPs lies rather in their relative functions and in the pragmatic typology of the two languages. In contrast to (38), I formulate a description-report conversion mechanism in German in (49).

(49) **Description-report conversion mechanism: (German)**

- (a) **Description through direct perception**
 Description through direct perception isthetic.
- (b) **Addressee-directedness of MPs**
- i. Some MPs are directed to the addressee.
 - ii. They play certain roles in interpersonal relationships.

(c) Perception report as speech act

- i. Once MPs are used, certain speaker's attitudes to the addressee is established.
- ii. Utterances thus made gain features of perception report at the level of speech act.

Unlike Japanese SFPs, it is not clear to what degree German MPs are directed to addressees. What contribution would the MP *halt* or *eben* have, for instance, in respect of addressee-directedness? One could argue that even those MPs have certain roles in interpersonal relationships. In contrast, by adding some MPs like *doch* or *ja*, sentences are explicitly directed to addressees, i.e., they become clearly interpersonal. As discussed above, the German language can be also regarded as a public-self-centered language, declarative sentences without MPs belong to, at default setting, public expressions and can be either descriptive or reportive.

This circumstance is illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In the case of Japanese, private expressions are used in order to describe something in external situations. In order to convey information to addressees, Japanese speakers have to use addressee-oriented words and phrases, such as SFPs, various polite forms of a copula, vocative expressions, etc. This makes private expressions public. Resulting expressions belong to a kind of report at the level of speech act and are not compatible with thetic statements. German, on the contrary, is a public-self-centered language and any declarative sentence can be used to communicate information to addressees, i.e. public expression. Thetic statements are, like the case in Japanese, descriptive, and through the addition of MPs the sentences become reportive at the level of speech act, and are no longer thetic.




Figure 2. Relationships between thetic statements and Japanese SFPs




Figure 3. Relationships between thetic statements and German MPs

6. Concluding remarks

In this paper, I have shown that there are two factors which block the occurrence of SFPS and MPS inthetic statements. The first factor is associated with the descriptive nature ofthetic statements. I first examined Kuroda's (1972) attempts to characterizethetic statements using the particle *ga* in Japanese. It was revealed that the mere use of the particle *ga* does not guarantee thetheticity of a sentence. In the case of activity verbs like *hasiru* 'run' the attachment of the *teiru*-marker is necessary to ensure the descriptive property of the sentence. The particle *ga* with (temporary) stative predicates, however, indicates that the speaker's description is brought about through direct perception. The description through direct perception is, according to Hirose's model of language use, private expression. To make private expression public, Japanese speakers have to use addressee-oriented words and phrases, such as some SFPS, various polite forms of a copula, vocative expressions, hearsay expressions and other fixed phrases. German MPS are also regarded as addressee-oriented, but in view of Hirose's model, the German language is a public-self-centered language and the roles of MPS are, unlike Japanese SFPS, not compulsory in communicative situations.

The second factor is that the use of SFPS or MPS introduces speech acts into the sentence. In the case ofthetic statements, perception description cannot be maintained if those particles are inserted. In other words, any sentence directed to addressees is in itself a speech act, such as report, and no longer compatible with SFPS and MPS. If SFPS or MPS are combined with such sentences, they are nonthetic.

To sum up the differences, the roles of SFPS are greater than those of MPS, because they convert private expressions into public ones, have many persons involved in their usage and trigger mainly reference points in external situations.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the gloss of this article:

ACC	accusative	Pstp	postposition
COP	copula	Quo	quotation marker
GEN	genitive marker	SFP	sentence-final particle
INTJ	interjection	RL	Role-Language (<i>yakuwari-go</i>)
Imp	imperative	SBJ	subjunctive
Loc	locative marker	STAT	stative marker
NOM	nominative marker	TOP	topic marker
Pol	polite form	VI	intransitive verb
MP	modal particle	Vpar	verb particle.
SuperPol	super-polite form		

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Thetics and Categoricals do not belong to the categories of German grammar. Thetics were introduced in logic as impersonal and broad focus constructions. They left profound and extensive traces in the logic of the late 19th century. For the class of thetic propositions, the criterion of textual exclusion plays the major role, i.e. the absence of any common grounds and of any anaphorism and background. In the foreground are sentences with subject inversion, subject suppression and detopicalization. These and only these are suitable for text beginnings, jokes, stage advertisements and solipsistic exclamatives, thus speech acts without communicative goals – free expressives in the true sense of the word. The contributions in this volume not only guide the reader through the history of philosophical logic and distributions of impersonals in contrast to Kantian categorical sentences, but also the correspondences in Japanese and Chinese which, in contrast to German and English, sport specific morphological markers for thetics as opposed to categoricals.

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