EDITED BY ROBERT M. HENDERSHOT AND STEVE MARSH

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
and the INTANGIBLES *of* 'SPECIALNESS'

Culture matters

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Anglo-American relations and the intangibles of 'specialness'

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MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

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CONTRIBUTORS

Dana Cooper is a professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State University in Nacogdoches, Texas, USA. Specializing in women's, gender, diplomatic, and transatlantic history, she has presented papers in Austria, Canada, England, and Germany, and has published with presses in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States. She is the author of *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations* (Kent State University Press, 2014), which led to her interview on the Finestripe documentary, *Million Dollar American Princesses*, that appeared on the Smithsonian Channel in 2015. She is the co-editor of *Transatlantic Relations and Modern Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Examination* (Routledge, 2013), *Motherhood and War: International Perspectives* (Palgrave, 2014), and *Motherhood and Antiquity* (Palgrave, 2017). She offers classes at the undergraduate and graduate level on a range of topics including a history of feminism, diplomatic history, women and race, the first ladies, the first families, and a history of motherhood.

Alan P. Dobson is currently an honorary professor at Swansea University and has held chairs at Dundee University and St Andrews and fellowships at the Norwegian Nobel Institute (senior research fellowship) Saint Bonaventure University (Lenna), and Baylor University (Fulbright). He has written extensively on Anglo-American relations, international civil aviation, and the Cold War strategic embargo. His most recent book is *A History of International Civil Aviation* (Routledge, 2017). In 2014, he won the Virginia Military Institute's Adam's Center annual Cold War Essay prize. He founded the Transatlantic Studies Association in 2002 and is editor of both the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, which he founded in 2003, and the *International History Review*.

Sam Edwards is a senior lecturer in American history at Manchester Metropolitan University, where he is also head of history. Sam's research explores the cultural history of twentieth-century conflict, war memory and commemoration, and transatlantic relations. His first book, *Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration, c.1941–2021* (Cambridge University Press, 2015) was shortlisted for the Royal

Historical Society's Gladstone Prize. He is co-editor of three volumes examining various issues in memory, film, and transatlantic relations, and he has published articles in the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, the *International Journal of Military History and Historiography*, and *Northern History*. Sam's research has been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the US–UK Fulbright Commission, and the US Army Military History Institute. He often contributes expertise and commentary to various media outlets, including BBC Radio and Television, and he is currently researching a book about the presence in Britain of the American Expeditionary Force between 1917 and 1919.

Robert M. Hendershot is a professor of history in the Department of Social Sciences at Grand Rapids Community College, USA. Specializing in the historical influence of culture, identity, public opinion, and collective memory upon Anglo-American relations, his works include *Family Spats: Perception, Illusion, and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (VDM Verlag, 2008), *Gerald Ford and Anglo-American Relations: Re-Valuing an Interim Presidency* (co-authored with Steve Marsh and Tia Culley, University of Michigan Press, forthcoming), as well as journal articles and various chapters in edited volumes on British and American foreign policy. In addition to teaching a range of classes on world history, US foreign policy, and Latin American history, he also serves as an editor (with Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh) for the McGill-Queen's University Press series on transatlantic studies.

Steve Marsh is a reader in international relations at Cardiff University, UK. His books include *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (Routledge, 2017) and *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Routledge, 2013) (both co-edited with Alan Dobson), *The European Union in European Security* (co-authored with Wyn Rees, Routledge, 2012), *US Foreign Policy Since 1945* (co-authored with Alan Dobson, 2nd ed., Routledge, 2006), *International Relations of the European Union* (co-authored with Hans Mackenstein, Pearson, 2006), and *Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil* (Palgrave, 2003).

Thomas C. Mills is a lecturer in diplomatic and international history and Deputy Director of the Centre for War and Diplomacy at Lancaster University. He is Vice-Chair of the Transatlantic Studies Association, and an editorial board member of the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*. His first book, *Post-war Planning on the Periphery* (Edinburgh University Press, 2012), explored Anglo-American relations in South America during the Second World War. He has previously published articles in *International Affairs, Diplomacy and Statecraft*, and the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* on various aspects of British and American foreign policy towards Latin America, as well as several book

chapters on Anglo-American diplomatic and economic relations. His most recent book, *Britain and the Growth of US Hegemony in Twentieth Century Latin America* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2020), is a collection of essays co-edited with Rory Miller. His current research includes a study of the role of British and American business groups in the reconstruction of international trade in the 1940s, and a project exploring the doctrine of free trade in the United States and Great Britain throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A strong believer in applying historical knowledge to contemporary affairs, he has collaborated on policy-orientated projects with think tanks including the British Foreign Policy Group, and provided comment to media outlets including Sky News and BBC Radio Five Live.

Finn Pollard is a principal lecturer in American history and College of Arts director of academic development at the University of Lincoln. He has previously published *The Literary Quest for American National Character* (Routledge, 2009), and chapters on George Washington and Elizabeth Monroe. He is currently working on British fictional representations of the United States in the twentieth century and has published chapters on the James Bond novels of John Gardner and Raymond Benson, and British novels dealing with the Anglo-American relationship on the eve of the Second World War by J. B. Priestley and Aldous Huxley. The chapter in the current volume is part of a larger projected study exploring Wodehouse and the Anglo-American relationship. He has contributed book reviews to *US Studies Online* and the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, and hosts the Past Prologue radio show on the university radio station Siren FM.

David Ryan is a professor of modern history at University College Cork, Ireland. He has published extensively on contemporary history and US foreign policy, concentrating on interventions in the post-Vietnam era. His books include *Not Even Past: How the United States Ends Wars* (edited with David Fitzgerald and John Thompson, Berghahn Books, 2019), *Obama, US Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention* (co-authored with David Fitzgerald, Palgrave, 2014), *US Foreign Policy and the Other* (edited with Michael Cullinane, Berghahn, 2015), *America and Iraq: Policy-Making, Intervention and Regional Politics* (edited with Patrick Kiely, Routledge, 2009), *Frustrated Empire: US Foreign Policy from 9/11 to Iraq* (Pluto Press, 2007), *Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and Ghosts* (edited with John Dumbrell, Routledge, 2007), *The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Longman, 2003), *US Foreign Policy in World History* (Routledge, 2000), *The United States and Decolonization* (edited with Victor Pungong, Macmillan, 2000), and *US–Sandinista Diplomatic Relations: Voice of Intolerance* (Macmillan, 1995). He is

also the author of numerous articles. He is currently completing a monograph titled *Collective Memory and US Intervention Since Vietnam.*

Jonathan Stubbs is a professor in the Faculty of Communication at Cyprus International University. His research focuses on the representation of history in film, the economic and cultural relationship between Hollywood and the British film industry, and the history of media in Cyprus during the British colonial period. He is the author of *Hollywood and the Invention of England: Projecting the English Past in American Cinema, 1930–2017* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019) and *Historical Film: A Critical Introduction* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). His work has also appeared in various journals, including the *Historical Journal of Film and Television*, the *Journal of Popular Culture*, the *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, and the *Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History.*

Srdjan Vucetic is an associate professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. He holds a PhD in political science from the Ohio State University. His research interests are in international hierarchy and international security. In addition to multiple journal articles and chapters in edited volumes, he is also the author of *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford University Press, 2011). He is currently working on a book on postwar British foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION

ROBERT M. HENDERSHOT AND STEVE MARSH

Culture, both as a focus of analysis and as an applied methodology, has long been marginalized in the study of the Anglo-American special relationship in favor of (neo)realist and functionalist analyses centered upon power, interest, and mutual utility calculations. The product is a substantial (and increasingly conspicuous) historiographical gap in the field, and within the extant literature frequent but unsatisfying allusions to the influence of 'sentiment' and anecdotal emotional ties within relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. By embracing the 'cultural turn' in international studies and applying its important lessons and avenues of analysis to the special relationship, this book contributes to our collective understanding of its history and especially its so-called 'Lazarus-like'[1] capacity to endure through, and recover from, severe strains. In revealing the range and depth of US–UK cultural interpenetration and illuminating the broader cultural context in which Anglo-American diplomacy has functioned, we seek to demonstrate the myriad ways in which culture has been more important in sustaining the special relationship than previously allowed.

This introduction contextualizes the substance of our edited volume in three sections. The first section locates the book within important debates about the history of the special relationship and illuminates why an expanded consideration of culture is important to the field. The second section introduces the main ideas and benefits of the 'cultural turn' in diplomatic history and international relations, which has operationalized culture as a key to understanding the behavior of states in the global system and inspired multiple analytical approaches – a number of which are found throughout this book. Finally, the third section explains the volume's structure and central themes as well as introducing the individual chapters, which illuminate the mosaic of cultural

connections that have simultaneously influenced elite decision-making and sculpted popular attitudes toward and expectations of the special relationship.

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE FIELD OF DEBATE

Much has been written about the Anglo-American special relationship since its inception during the Second World War,[2] and this vast academic corpus has routinely engaged a series of interrelated research questions designed to probe the relationship's specialness. For example, when and why did Anglo-American relations become special? For whom were they special? What (if anything) has kept Anglo-American relations special over time? Will the special quality of relations endure? If special, how did their relations differ from those with other nations? And even if certain aspects of their relations could be so deemed, did it really warrant the accolade special for the relationship in general? All worthy questions to be sure, but as the concept of specialness itself is a culturally subjective idea, it is surprising that cultural analysis has not figured more prominently in the pursuit of answers.

While the literature that propagated and sought to answer the questions above is too extensive to survey fully in this introduction, it is important to note a few major analytical viewpoints that have animated, and hitherto dominated, academic debate. Some see the special relationship as a 'natural relationship,' born of shared history, democratic principles, and kinship all leading on to habits of cooperation and shared attitudes about how to deal with international issues.[3] Others see it as a relic; David Reynolds, for example, described the special relationship as a British diplomatic device to help manage the United Kingdom's relative decline, and Andrew Gamble defined the relationship as a British psychological crutch used to cushion the blow of power lost.[4] Still others deny the very existence of the special relationship and criticize attempts to dress up Anglo-American relations in such a 'myth.'[5] The theory of neorealism or structural realism, which holds that any state's relative power, self-interest, and structural constraints are the most important causal factors directing its foreign policy,[6] has been particularly influential in the field. In this school of analysis, the special relationship is generally portrayed as developing from shared and overlapping national interests that formed a utility-based partnership. Numerous accounts focus on one or more aspects of this functional dynamic, particularly defense, nuclear and intelligence cooperation, and entwined economies.[7] Moreover, the logic of this conceptualization of Anglo-American relations is that even if one accepts a temporal claim to specialness, relations will only continue as special so long as common interests abide and each side can be of persuasive importance to the other. As a result, periodically since 1945 numerous structural realists have declared, or predicted, the end of

the special relationship. For some this would owe primarily to Britain's relative military and economic decline. For others, the reason would be the systemic change catalyzed by the end of the Cold War, which would remove the necessity of close relations between the United Kingdom and the United States. For still others, increasingly divergent strategic interests would pull the erstwhile partners apart and reduce the quantity and quality of interaction opportunities that were so important to the relationship's unique status.[8]

Of course, it is not the case that the role of culture in shaping Anglo-American relations has been completely ignored. Considerable and significant work has been done on *longue durée* British and American cultural exchanges, particularly those taking place between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, through his analysis of the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the American Civil War, Kevin Phillips has charted the powerful role of religious trends and identities in the evolution of the transatlantic cultural entity he has fittingly termed Anglo-America.[9] Scholars such as Stuart Anderson, Reginald Horsman, and Srdjan Vucetic have extensively analyzed the ways racialized Anglo-Saxon identity eventually contributed to the late-nineteenth-century friendly realignment of the United States and the United Kingdom.[10] Lynne Murphy has assessed the significance of historical divergences in British and American uses of the English language.[11] One could go on, if the spatial constraints of the volume did not prohibit it.

Suffice to say that the power of culture to influence the comparatively modern diplomatic special relationship of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has received relatively less attention from specialists in the field. There are, as always, some notable exceptions to this[12] – several of whom are contributors to this volume – yet the overall field of debate has remained largely dominated by the interest-based interpretations discussed above and has proven notably resistant to interdisciplinary research. This is a surprising state of affairs, particularly given the consistency, frequency, and vigor with which the American and British governments have proclaimed their shared culture to be a key foundation of the special relationship.

In 1946, Winston Churchill first deployed the phrases 'Anglo-American special relationship' and 'fraternal association of English-speaking peoples' in his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, which helped to solidify the previous wartime narrative that hailed shared language, history, and values as the bedrock of the US–UK alliance.[13] Subsequently, policy actor claims that cultural connections sustained the special relationship became ritualized, forming an Anglo-American mantra performed habitually at diplomatic summits and joint press conferences. Even during periods in which the relationship experienced great tensions, foreign policy elites continued to claim there was more to the Anglo-American relationship than the mutual utility of strategic and economic cooperation. For example, in 1967, as it became clear that the United

Kingdom would not commit forces to the American war in Vietnam and as the British government charted a course toward membership of the European Community, US ambassador to the United Kingdom David Bruce wrote of the special relationship as being 'little more than sentimental terminology.' But in the same sentence, he immediately qualified that idea by acknowledging that the relationship's 'underground waters' would continue to 'flow with a deep current.'[14] Other diplomatic leaders were typically less enigmatic and more effusive about the roles of culture and emotion in Anglo-American relations, as in 1976 when another US ambassador, Anne Armstrong, addressed a British audience at Westminster Abbey and argued that, 'as we examine the unprecedented and enduring relationship between Britain and the United States, it is clear that affection is the cement which binds us.'[15]

Despite the passage of time, massive changes in the international system, and the arrival of new leaders, the tradition of naming culture as a causal factor of close Anglo-American partnership has remained a fixture of diplomacy into the twenty-first century. For example, in the spring of 2009, as then prime minister Gordon Brown stood beside the newly elected US president in Washington, DC, Barack Obama underscored to reporters why the alliance with Britain was special and simultaneously dismissed the concerns of those who had wondered if his African heritage would somehow undercut traditional Anglo-American bonds:

> The special relationship between the US and the UK is one that is not just important to me, it's important to the American people. And it is sustained by a common language, a common culture … And by the way, that's also where my mother's side of the family came from, so this notion there is anything less of that special relationship is misguided. The UK is one of our closest and strongest allies. There is a link, a bind, there that will not break.[16]

In March of 2010, a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Anglo-American relations stated that Britain and America have 'an extremely close and valuable relationship. The historic, trading, and cultural links are profound; and the two countries share common values in their commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.'[17] Giving evidence to this committee, David Manning, who had served as British ambassador to the United States from 2003 to 2007, explained that 'sentiment' still has the power to produce positives for Britain in the special relationship, and added, 'I don't think one should disguise the fact that warmth between the two countries can help us.' At the same time, a research study conducted for members of the US Congress revealed that similar perceptions continued in America as well. The report declared that Britain is 'Washington's staunchest and most reliable ally' and attributed much of their bilateral cooperation to 'a shared sense of history and culture.'[18]

Even in the era of Donald Trump's presidency, when the tradition of friendly working relationships between presidents and prime ministers appears to have lapsed, the notion of deeper cultural connections uniting the nations continues to find expression. When Trump visited the United Kingdom for a meeting with then prime minister Theresa May in the summer of 2018, the chosen venue was the birthplace of Winston Churchill, Blenheim Palace. In this way, Trump's recent public criticisms of May and her government's handling of the Brexit process were to be camouflaged by 'a glittering display of pomp and ceremony' designed to conjure collective memories of the special relationship's Churchillian glory days. 'A lot of thought went into the choreography,' one unnamed senior British official told the *Washington Post*: The purpose for the presidential visit 'was not to make it about personal chemistry, it was to make it about national chemistry, and the national chemistry, it's very, very good.'[19]

Significantly, academic studies of the special relationship have tended to echo rather than analyze this elite discourse regarding the power of culture. Prominent British historian H. C. Allen, for example, wrote that 'sentiment' was a source of the special relationship's strength and that 'the intimacy of Anglo-American relations … has manifold links embedded deep in the lives of both peoples.' However, his analysis tended to accept the existence of such links as axiomatic instead of treating them as subjects worthy of meticulous analysis.[20] Later works continued to acknowledge, often by way of brief remarks in their introductions, that friendly sentiments and cultural connections mattered to Anglo-American relations. H. G. Nicholas wrote of 'a common cast of mind' and the 'parallel styles of action and reaction' that benefited US–UK cooperation.[21] John Dumbrell argued that interests were the most important factors guiding the alliance, but he likewise conceded that 'shared history, culture and language do count for something.'[22] However, just what that 'something' is, or exactly what the 'common cast of mind' entails, has remained up for debate.

To be fair, D. C. Watt went further down the cultural path than most by focusing on the social and cultural context of foreign policy decisions as well as the individual perceptions of the decision makers.[23] Mary Ann Heiss's work has likewise broken new ground by highlighting the roles of racial and gender constructs in Anglo-American policies toward Iran.[24] And while a handful of other works have engaged the ways in which British and American cultural perceptions and biases influenced their relations with third parties,[25] the significance of cultural matters to the Anglo-American special relationship itself has remained an idea frequently observed but consistently underexplored. Consider in this light, for example, the claim by Jorgen Rasmussen and James McCormick that while close relations between national leaders and other government elites are important, such 'contacts are more examples or instances of the special relationship than they are the substance of it.'[26] Similarly, William Wallace and Christopher Phillips note – but do not explore – that

the political dimension of the alliance rests 'partly on sentimental assertions of shared values.'[27]

This volume owes its existence to the need for more meticulous examinations of culture and all the allusions, both elite and academic, to its importance to the special relationship. Past references to the sentiments, affections, mindsets, unbreakable bonds, national chemistries, underground waters and currents, and the deeper substance of Anglo-American relations now appear dated, or at least, out of step with some of the more innovative developments in the fields of diplomatic history and international relations. By embracing the new theories and methodologies of the 'cultural turn,' we may hope to better recognize and analyze elements of the cultural ether in which diplomacy, like all other human activity, must operate. As the following section illustrates, fresh analyses of cultural symbols, discourses, representations, ideologies, memories, and identities, for example, have made significant contributions to many fields, and offer the study of the special relationship the potential to transcend its traditional limitations, fill important gaps in our collective understanding of Anglo-American relations, and expose new analytical spaces in which we can reevaluate the relationship's strengths and weaknesses.

A NEW FRONTIER IN THE STUDY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE 'CULTURAL TURN'

The 'cultural turn' in the study of history began its acceleration in the late 1970s, largely as a reaction to the previous dominance of Marxist-driven socioeconomic interpretations of the past. Among the most widely acknowledged instigators of the new cultural history were E. P. Thompson, who introduced culture to the field of labor history, and perhaps even more importantly, Clifford Geertz, whose work redefined academic understandings of culture itself.[28] An anthropologist, Geertz conceptualized culture as the 'webs of understanding' and the 'system of symbols and meanings' that impose structure in the world, shape group identities, and influence behavior. In this view, both culture and its meaning were publicly visible in the form of words, images, behaviors, rituals, symbols, and institutions, which allowed the researcher to observe how 'people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one another.'[29]

As an exciting new method of interpreting the ways people think, identify, act, and react, Geertzian theories were taken up, debated, and adapted across numerous historical fields. A new focus on cultural representation inspired investigations into how ideas, identities, communities, power dynamics, and history itself were represented within and through cultural artifacts. However, these ideas were notably slower to appear in the comparatively conservative fields of diplomatic history and international relations, which continued to

gravitate toward economic arguments, game theory, rational action theory, and formal modeling.[30] While this helps to explain the initially delayed arrival of cultural theory and analysis in studies of the special relationship, it is important to note that the 'cultural turn' has continued its interdisciplinary march and internationalist cultural history has been in full flower for several decades.

Few would dispute that Akira Iriye has been the greatest engine of this transformation. Among the first to point out that the 'cultural turn' raised the 'fundamental question of the relationship between a country's cultural system and its behavior in the international system,'[31] Iriye has been a steadfast advocate for the merger of cultural studies with diplomatic history, and his calls to interrogate the relationship between culture and power, as well as the roles of nonstate actors in the international system, have not gone unanswered. Likewise, his view of the relationship between culture and international relations has become a key operational starting point for many studies (this volume included): 'Culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays particular attention to this phenomenon.'[32] Iriye and others, perhaps most notably Alexander Wendt, have argued that a more thorough understanding of historical causation can emerge by placing the hard realities of geopolitics into context with the cultural discourses that shape identity and imagination.[33]

The arrival of the 'cultural turn' in diplomatic history and international relations has led to thought-provoking developments throughout these fields. For example, many researchers began by fusing cultural analyses with the study of Cold War-era state propaganda policies, identifying connections between the battle for hearts and minds, American hegemony, and the transmission of cultural narratives.[34] More recently, however, studies have labored to demonstrate the ways in which socially constructed ideas of race, gender, ethnicity, ideology, and religion have influenced foreign policy elites, and others have focused on formerly overlooked agents of diplomacy – the media, charities, rights activists, artists, musicians, sports teams, and more.[35] Still other works focus on popular culture's role in international identity shifts, such as Americanization, Westernization, and globalization, as well as the power of popular culture to shape prevailing political identities.[36] Political scientists in particular have explored the relationships between culture and the strategies states employ to achieve their goals. 'Strategic culture' remains a field healthily contested within international relations studies, but generally entails the analysis of how historical experiences and long-time strategic preferences impact a state's choices and constrain its responses to shifts in the international system.[37] Finally, by demonstrating that accounts of the past are better understood as socially constructed narratives rather than realities, the study of memory has opened up yet another fascinating new frontier of cultural analysis. As Robert

McMahon wrote, the collective memory 'forged by societies of critical international events almost inevitably exerts a powerful impact on subsequent foreign policy decisions. Scholarship on public memory insists that we need to understand the complex – and invariably contested – process by which societal remembrances are formed.'[38]

Holistically, cultural approaches have benefitted the study of diplomatic and international history in four key ways. First, they significantly broadened the scope of these fields, particularly by reconceptualizing the question of agency in foreign affairs and impressively expanding the types of evidence consulted in the search for answers to important questions. Second, they revealed the ways nations have attempted to harness and wield culture as a diplomatic tool, as well as the results of such tactics. Third, this scholarship demonstrated the diverse ways in which culturally constructed perceptions of the world can influence the process of policy formulation. And fourth, cultural studies enhanced our understanding of influential cultural connections that exist beyond the official apparatus of national governments. As Peter Jackson has argued, 'this scholarship has contributed in important ways to the wider move away from studying the state, its machinery and its elites as the sole source of understanding when it comes to international society.'[39]

Based on the substantial advantages cultural studies have brought to the fields of diplomatic history and international relations, it is logical to imagine that the study of the special relationship has much to gain and little to lose by embracing the 'cultural turn,' and it only stands to reason that expanding our analyses of Anglo-American worldviews, discourses, representations, and collective memory will produce similar benefits. Accordingly, this collection is designed to go beyond the previous disciplinary boundaries of the study of the special relationship by incorporating many of the cultural approaches described above. No single volume could hope either to span the culture chasm in the field or to cover the gamut of Anglo-American cultural connections. Nevertheless, the carefully selected chapters of this book do represent a thought-provoking move in these directions and showcase the advantages of combining the study of history with the study of culture in order to better understand the 'specialness' of Anglo-American relations.

STRUCTURE, THEMES, AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS

Developing a multiauthor investigation at the intersection of culture and the special relationship should come with the warning 'editors beware.' Pitfalls abound. Give contributors free rein and the work becomes in consequence so broad and diverse in coverage that it risks dismissal as a sweeping pastiche or an incohesive collection of perspectives. Alternatively, temporally bind

contributors – such as to the post-Second World War era – and the book risks drawing arbitrary lines that may reasonably reflect epochs in international history but that make little sense in culture. Likewise, confine contributors to consideration of high culture and it may be asked why not popular culture, and vice versa. And then what mode of representation is it reasonable to exclude from the cultural tapestry of Anglo-American relations? Focus on just visual, or just written, or just musical avenues of cultural transfer and exchange, and only a small part of culture's significance may be illuminated.

Our response to these conundrums is threefold. First, recognizing that there is no common definition of culture shared across all academic disciplines, we elected as a shared baseline Iriye's classic definition of culture as 'the sharing and transmission of memory, ideology, emotions, life-styles, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols.'[40] This definition effectively serves as the industry standard in the field of diplomatic history, and although the chapters that comprise this volume are by design interdisciplinary, this essential understanding of culture unites them all. Second, we elected to develop the volume around five selected themes: literary representations, screen representations, political representations, representations in memory (commemoration), and the influence of cultural connections and constructs. Chapters are consequently presented in delimited pairs in order to punctuate the multiplicity of analytical opportunities within each theme. Third, we treat the Anglo-American special relationship as a pan-societal multiauthored cultural narrative that has developed across time and through a variety of semiotic resources. This means that the book is interested primarily in an inclusive approach to culture in terms of variety, authorship, time, and space, which we consider to be essential given the intertextual construction of cultural representations. The meanings of one text or artifact are dependent on their being read in conjunction with other texts and artifacts – and their larger significance is derived by identifying interactions, connections, and flows between and among populations over time. In this way, the volume's goals become dependent upon its being comprised of diverse chapters.

Topical and methodological diversity is intentional – contributors were encouraged to explore the significance of shared culture to the special relationship from within the theoretical orientation of their respective disciplines. Even a cursory glance at this book's table of contents reveals the consequent variety of cultural matters explored in the pages that follow and the array of research questions engaged therein. For example, what can trends in popular novels teach us about identity changes that reshaped Anglo-American relations between the Great Rapprochement and the First World War? Did Anglo-American collective memory influence the decisions to use military force in Kosovo and Iraq? Did trends in British pop music help alter American society in the 1960s? What do school textbooks reveal about the cultural

underpinnings of the special relationship? What have television dramas and the film industry to do with the history of US–UK relations? How have the royal family, memorials to George Washington, and the doctrine of liberalism contributed to Anglo-American 'webs of understanding' that influence the operation of the foreign policy?

As with other scholars who have labored to demonstrate the roles of culture in international relations, our intention is 'to open up analytical spaces, not close them down.'[41] It is not enough simply to foreground the importance of culture to the history of the special relationship. Rather, the book seeks also to operationalize the study of culture as a way of breathing new life into debates that have long preoccupied scholars of Anglo-American relations. To this end all of the book's chapters, in their own ways, examine the sharing and transmitting of consciousness between the United States and the United Kingdom that has contributed to enduring perceptions of the relationship's specialness. And collectively, however inherently displeasing it may be to those of a quantitative and/or functionalist disposition, the chapters of this volume form a shared intellectual statement about the need to recognize and evaluate anew the contribution that intangible cultural discourses shaping Anglo-American identity and imagination have made to the evolution and resilience of the special relationship.

Turning to our chapters, the analysis of literature has long been an intricate and rewarding field of cultural inquiry, as words can serve to mirror realities as well as alter them, and so we found it only natural to open with two chapters addressing literary influences on Anglo-American relations. Analyzing P. G. Wodehouse's early twentieth-century fiction, in Chapter 1 Finn Pollard charts the evolution of the famous British author's portrayals of the United States and its people from his initial use of common archetypes to much more complicated themes and character relationships, including Anglo-American friendships as well as romantic entanglements. Pollard delves into the period influences that contributed to this evolution, including the boys' school story, the nature of London theatre, and Anglo-American romance novels, and seeks to illuminate why Wodehouse's British and American characters mingled with increasing ease, were at times treated as interchangeable, and asserted a mutually positive relationship. Pollard's work is paired here with Chapter 2, by Srdjan Vucetic, which also explores a specific literary genre, albeit a very different one. Building upon his previous work on the cultural infrastructure of British society, Vucetic analyzes the meanings of America embedded in British school textbooks published throughout the period of the special relationship. As textbooks directly shape, and are shaped by, the discourses of national identity, this source material is fertile ground for the assessment of representations of the United States, and by extension Anglo-American relations, which exist in the British national consciousness. Together, the chapters by Pollard

and Vucetic demonstrate the myriad ways literary sources can be mined for answers to key questions about the cultural underpinnings and resilience of the special relationship.

The following two chapters highlight the ways in which analysis of screen representations can contribute to our understanding of Anglo-American identity and cultural interconnection. Film and television media have unparalleled power to reach vast audiences and impact popular perceptions, and with the abilities to reenact and reinterpret Anglo-American relations both visually and through narrative, they must be understood as key threads of the cultural tapestry woven between the United States and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 Jon Stubbs engages with the complex relationship between the British and American film industries on multiple levels, demonstrating their dynamic but highly asymmetrical interaction through history, the resulting energetic cultural dialogue between the two nations, and the ways in which economic interests and government policy have influenced cultural representation. In Chapter 4, Dana Cooper tackles the equally challenging task of assessing the cultural power of television in her analysis of Anglo-American narratives within the PBS series *Downton Abbey*, which became a financial success as well as 'a cultural phenomenon' following its launch in 2010. Pointing out that the show's aristocratic central family is inspired by the historical 'dollar princesses', the hundreds of wealthy American women who married British men between 1865 and 1945, Cooper scrutinizes how the fictional characters, their dialogue, and their biases reflect American perceptions of themselves and their cultural cousins, and vice versa, and questions just how Anglo-American identity differences transitioned over time from sources of tension to sources of popular entertainment. In this pairing, the analyses of Stubbs and Cooper exhibit two distinct but equally rewarding ways of engaging screen media as a lens through which to assess the modern dynamics of cultural interpenetration and popular engagement with Anglo-American relations.

In our third pair of chapters, Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh question how political representations and mentalities, which involve perceptions and ideologies that shape British and American foreign policies, are formed within a larger cultural context. To probe the role of shared ideology in Anglo-American relations, in Chapter 5 Dobson addresses the idea of a common Anglo-American political culture. Via a nuanced analysis of key works of philosophy, economics, and political theory that have shaped the perspectives and histories of both countries across two centuries, he interrogates the British and American versions of liberal political doctrine and explores the impact of cultural ideas and values that transcend national boundaries. In Chapter 6, Marsh further explores political culture by foregrounding the contribution that diplomatic pageantry has made to the official representation and popular reception of Anglo-American relations. Through analysis of bilateral summit meetings

between presidents and prime ministers, the informal ambassadorship of the British royal family, and the forthcoming 400th anniversary of the *Mayflower* voyage in 2020, Marsh investigates the ways diplomatic events are influenced by considerations of political culture, including the ways such events are choreographed to maximize elite, media, and popular attention. While the political dimensions of the special relationship have been the focus of numerous previous studies, both of these chapters place the dynamic of shared culture at the center of their analyses, and demonstrate how a fresh analytical perspective can shed new light on classic areas of interest.

Representations of Anglo-American relations in collective memory, observed through public commemorations and artwork, provide another new vantage point for dual assessments of British and American perceptions of historical and cultural interconnection. In Chapter 7, Sam Edwards describes the period 1890–1925 as the first age of transatlantic memory diplomacy, a period in which the potential of commemoration as a mechanism through which to strengthen Anglo-American ties was first explored. Focusing on British efforts to re-Anglicize George Washington, of particular interest to Edwards is the agency of both government elites and nonstate actors, particularly the US National Society of Colonial Dames, and he perspicaciously dissects the intersections of gender roles, racial constructs, social class, strategic objectives, and patriotic identities that determined the goals and methods of commemoration in this era. His chapter is paired here with Robert Hendershot's investigation of a broader pattern of Anglo-American 'places of memory' on both sides of the Atlantic, which assesses the role of historical markers, statues of historic figures, and churches in the creation of an Anglo-American imagined community. Exploring the government agendas behind (and popular reception of) a hegemonic Anglo-American narrative designed to celebrate US–UK cooperation and cement perceptions of collective culture, in Chapter 8 Hendershot questions how a heavily manipulated but thoroughly disseminated version of the past has influenced the special relationship.

The final pair of chapters in this collection may at first sight appear to be a strange mix. Yet, in much the same way that former US president George W. Bush and former UK prime minister Tony Blair were dubbed the 'odd couple' in their early acquaintance, they are strongly bonded.[42] Rather than engaging with the cultural representation of Anglo-American relations per se, both chapters turn a spotlight instead upon the powerful influence of shared Anglo-American culture on society as well as diplomacy. In Chapter 9, Tom Mills considers the impact of transatlantic cultural crosscurrents though analysis of the Beatles' 1964 conquest of the American popular music market and the apex of the cultural phenomenon known as 'Beatlemania.' Placing the uniquely high degree of Anglo-American musical transference into context with US consumer capitalism, the bourgeoning youth movement, and increasingly turbulent gender

and racial politics, Mills explores the diverse consequences arising from the intersections between the transatlantic pop music industry, changing social norms, and general American perceptions of the British. Finally, in Chapter 10, David Ryan tracks a very different but no less important kind of cultural impact by assessing the ways in which the Western military interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) were influenced by Anglo-American efforts to manipulate collective memory. Focusing on how narratives of the special relationship employed by then prime minister Tony Blair and presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were augmented by civilizational discourse and memories of past Anglo-American partnership, Ryan investigates how strategic concerns, foreign policy, and domestic politics were shaped by the systems of meaning shared by British and American leaders.

NOTES

1 Steve Marsh and John Baylis, 'The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus of International Relations,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17:1 (2006), 173–211.
2 Although the Second World War is commonly seen as the zenith of US–UK cooperation and Churchill launched the nomenclature 'special relationship' in 1946, scholars have also traced the roots of the special relationship further back into history. See, for example, Iestyn Adams, *Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' 1900–1905* (New York: Taurus Academic Studies, 2005).
3 For example, see H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783–1952* (London: Odhams Press, 1954); Henry Butterfield Ryan, *The Vision of Anglo-America: The US–UK Alliance 1943–46* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
4 David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Gamble, *Britain in Decline* (London: Macmillan, 1994).
5 Edward Ingram, 'The Wonderland of the Political Scientist,' *International Security*, 22 (1997), 53–63; Max Beloff, 'The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth,' in Martin Gilbert (ed.), *A Century of Conflict: Essays for A.J.P. Taylor* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), 151–171.
6 For more on the theory of structural realism/neorealism, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
7 For example, Alan P. Dobson, *The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship* (Sussex, UK and New York: Wheatsheaf and St. Martin's, 1988); John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1984: The Special Relationship* (London: Macmillan 1984); Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UK/USA Countries* (Hemel Hempstead, UK: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

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9   Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

10 Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

11 Lynne Murphy, *The Prodigal Tongue: The Love–Hate Relationship Between American and British English* (New York: Penguin USA, 2018).

12 See Sam Edwards, *Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Christopher Hitchens, *Blood, Class and Empire* (New York: Nation Books, 2004); Dana Cooper, *Informal Ambassadors: American Women, Transatlantic Marriages, and Anglo-American Relations, 1865–1945* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2014); Mark Glancy, *Hollywood and the Americanization of Britain* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017); Stephen Bowman, *The Pilgrims Society and Public Diplomacy, 1895–1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018); Dianne Kirby, 'Anglo-American Relations and the Religious Cold War,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 10:2 (2012), 167–181; Robert M. Hendershot, *Family Spats: Perception, Illusion and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008).

13 Truman Presidential Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Box 99, Winston Churchill, 'The Sinews of Peace.' See also Robert M. Hendershot, 'Manipulating the Anglo-American Civilizational Identity in the Era of Churchill,' in Dobson and Marsh, *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, 64–95.

14 Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, NSF Country File, Box 208–209, Folder: UK memos. Vol. xiii, 1/66–7/66, US Embassy London to State Department and Box 210–212, Folder: UK memos. Vol. xi, 4/67–6/67, Bruce to Rusk.

15 Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Robert T. Hartmann Files, 1974–77, Counselors to the President, Charles Ritcheson, '"One People Oration" Given by Ambassador Armstrong at Westminster Abbey, London,' 29 July 1976.

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38 Robert J. McMahon, 'Remembering, and Forgetting, the Vietnam War,' *Diplomatic History*, 35:1 (2011), 163–164; Suny, 'Back and Beyond,' 1487.

39 Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu,' 155–159.

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41 Caso and Hamilton, *Popular Culture and World Politics*, 13.

42 See, for instance, Lexington, 'The Odd Couple,' *The Economist*, 13 March 2003, www.economist.com/united-states/2003/03/13/the-odd-couple (accessed 18 February 2019).

TOWARDS *SOMETHING FRESH*?

P. G. Wodehouse, transatlantic romances in fiction, and the Anglo-American relationship

FINN POLLARD

The United States and Anglo-American relations first became central themes in P. G. Wodehouse's fiction in his 1909 novel *Psmith Journalist*, in which a visiting Englishman becomes a muckraking journalist in New York City and brings down a slum landlord. That treatment then evolved through Wodehouse's next four novels, *A Gentleman of Leisure* (1910), *The Prince and Betty* (1912), *The Little Nugget* (1913), and *Something Fresh* (1915). Gradually, during those novels Wodehouse retreated from the (for him) tough engagement with social problems that featured in that first novel, and from familiar tropes for Anglo-American relations like American gangsters marauding at a British public school, to more complex interactions in New York City and English aristocratic castles. He also complicated the personal interactions – both through buddy relationships building on that between Englishman Psmith and American editor Billy Windsor in *Psmith Journalist*, and in romantic entanglements. Most notably, in *A Gentleman of Leisure* and *Something Fresh*, Wodehouse introduced potential marriages between British aristocrats and American money, appearing to mirror a significant contemporary phenomenon in the relationship, only to frustrate those unions – a narrative strategy that contrasted both with reality and rival fictional narratives of the period.

Wodehouse's development of the Anglo-American theme in his writings intersected with the contemporary fictional genres of the boys' school story and the transatlantic romance. As he deepened and complicated his fictional transatlantic representation, he was also building a transatlantic literary career and the beginnings of living arrangements dividing his time physically between the two nations, a process connected to the London theatre of the time. This chapter will achieve two things. First, it places Wodehouse's fictional representation of Anglo-American relations in the context of other contemporary

cultural engagements, showing how he borrowed and challenged these alternative approaches. Second, it evaluates the significance of Wodehouse's imagining, practicing, and advocating for closer Anglo-American relationships in these years, relationships that he saw in largely positive terms. His career and writings speak suggestively to Frances Hodgson Burnett's claim in her 1907 Anglo-American romance *The Shuttle* that, among the many elements shifting attitudes, 'Books … did perhaps more than all else.'[1] How far his perspective matched his readers is difficult to quantify, but his increasing success suggests it was not unwelcome. Bradford Perkins's claim of a Great Rapprochement in these years has been questioned, not least in the political sphere.[2] But Wodehouse's career and writings to the First World War personified it.

A word is first necessary about the existing literature on Wodehouse and on Anglo-American relations. He has not lacked for biographers but there remain lacunae. Wodehouse himself wrote a humorous account of his first visit to New York City in 1935, which is chiefly instructive about the likely business motivations.[3] The best biography is the most recent by Robert McCrum published in 2004. McCrum thoroughly documented the facts of the American dimension of his career and described him as 'an American and a British writer' but his consideration of 'why America' leaves questions unanswered.[4] Similarly, while he acknowledged the presence of American themes and characters his literary analysis is variable and from the point of view of the scholar interested in Anglo-American matters there are some maddening gaps, for example a passing, unexplained mention of 'anglicizing' the 1926 musical *Oh, Kay!* (Wodehouse wrote the book with Guy Bolton) for its London opening.[5] Barry Phelps was keenly alive to the transatlantic nature of Wodehouse's career and his chapter on Wodehouse and the United States is suggestive.[6] Richard Usborne's *Wodehouse at Work to the End* and Owen Dudley Edwards's *P.G. Wodehouse* are richer in their literary analysis. Usborne is perceptive about Wodehouse's fiction as a bridge between the two countries and Dudley Edwards gave detailed attention both to *Psmith Journalist* and to Wodehouse's general treatment of race but neither of them examined the origins of the connection and its development through Wodehouse's early fiction in depth.[7] More recently, Paul Giles included a section on Wodehouse in his study of 'the American tradition in English literature' but this focuses on the period from the Second World War onwards and does not address Wodehouse's early contacts with or fictions of the United States.[8] One other angle of criticism must be noted. There is a division in interpretations of Wodehouse's fictional world. Evelyn Waugh in 1939 regarded him as a writer of fantasy, claiming (in a line often quoted on the backs of old Penguin editions) that Wodehouse's fictional world 'cannot become dated because it never existed.'[9] David Cannadine, by contrast, saw Wodehouse as very much reflecting aspects of the late Victorian/Edwardian world of his youth.[10] McCrum has a tendency to hedge his bets on

this question, jarringly in some cases, for example when discussing 1938's *The Code of the Woosters* he first notes the satire of Oswald Mosley through the character of Roderick Spode only to assert that the novel is another case of Wodehouse writing of what he called his 'artificial world.'[11] Wodehouse cannot in fact be straightforwardly categorized by either of these positions and *Psmith Journalist* is a particularly good instance of this.

With regards to Anglo-American political and diplomatic relations, Wodehouse came of age in a period commonly regarded as a watershed. The threat of war over a border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895–96 instead ushered in a period that the historian Bradford Perkins termed the Great Rapprochement. The late nineteenth century also saw the phenomenon of the so called 'dollar princesses' – put most simply the marriages of American money to British aristocracy – but historians have paid less attention to what was happening in the wider cultural relationship and how these two strands affected each other.[12] H. C. Allen, the pioneering historian of the relationship, argued that we can only fully understand it by considering its multi-faceted nature (he listed diplomatic, financial, emotional, cultural connections) and this chapter attempts to respond to that call.[13]

Turning first then to those three areas where Wodehouse clearly encountered, or might have encountered the United States prior to his own substantial fictional engagement with it – the boys' school story, the London theatre, and the transatlantic romance.

THE BOYS' SCHOOL STORY

Publishing for boys had undergone a transformation in the years immediately preceding Wodehouse's crucial period of schooling at Dulwich College, London from 1894 to 1900. He was part of a generation whose collective literacy rate was higher than before, and who benefitted from technical advances enabling a mass expansion of publishing to feed that literacy. Much of the literature that resulted had a strong moral agenda well indicated by the Board of Education's 1905 pronouncement that students 'should feel the splendour of heroism, the worth of unselfishness and loyalty to an ideal, and the meaning of cruelty and cowardice.'[14] Wodehouse was aware of and, mostly, playful about this tone, something particularly well illustrated in the last of his school-based novels *Mike* (1909, originally serialized in two parts under different titles in *The Captain* from April 1907) where Mike is being introduced to new boy Psmith: '"Are you the Bully, the Pride of the School, or the Boy who is Led Astray and takes to Drink in Chapter Sixteen?" "The last, for choice," said Mike.'[15]

Although these stories are primarily situated within the narrow geographical environment of a variety of boarding schools, the inculcation of these

characteristics in the schoolboy could also take place through encounters with and, often, in contrast to national others as children were prepared for their role in the imperial mission. This has been particularly explored by Kathryn Castle in relation to Africa, India, and China.[16] The United States was a trickier nation to engage with in this regard, by this date long outside but having once been inside the empire. Yet it does appear. Among the occasional American texts that school boys are pictured reading are James Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking novels and on at least two occasions these become an inspiration for rebellion on home turf.[17] This was a genre that Wodehouse occasionally made throwaway references to in his early fiction but did not deploy as a central theme.[18] We also find examples of a disparaging tone towards America and Americans – for example on them playing golf in Ian Hay's *'Pip'* (1909): 'They are playing very keenly, but they are thinking, not of the game, but of some entirely new and original way of winning it.'[19]

That the United States was more of a factor in school life, specifically at Dulwich, than the fictional genre suggests, is revealed via the Dulwich school magazine, *The Alleynian*, and a 1902 Wodehouse column in the *Public School Magazine*. The latter includes a recollection from 'my first years at school' of 'an American youth [who] achieved a certain measure of fame by … his attitude towards the staff.'[20] The existing histories of the school do not identify such a student, and nor do Wodehouse's biographers comment on this point, though Raymond Chandler's period at the school after Wodehouse's time is frequently remarked upon.[21] *The Alleynian* both shows the United States as a point of reference and suggests another intriguing real-life connection. Thus, in October 1894, shortly after Wodehouse's arrival, the United States figures in an account of a debate on the merits of the Conservative Party as an example either to be emulated or avoided, depending on the other nation's disputed character. In 1895 mention is made of a boy participating in an athletics meet in New York and in 1897 a report is carried from an old boy studying in California.[22]

Most significant, however, is the periodic commentary on a rival publication (part of a semi-regular column noticing such) – the American *Penn Charter Magazine*.[23] Notices in the earlier portion of Wodehouse's time at the school are critical, one segment in September 1896 concluding dismissively 'the magazine itself is not very interesting to English readers.'[24] By 1900, when Wodehouse had joined *The Alleynian*'s team of editors, the tone noticeably softened. Where an earlier columnist denounced the inclusion of adverts as 'ludicrous and in some cases vulgar' the 1900 writer is more charitable, noting some 'sweet things in advertisements … mostly written in a chatty style, as who should say: "We are men and brothers, let not our business relations interfere with our friendship." ' There is perhaps mockery lurking when the writer, having praised the same issue's football report as being in 'best American journalism' then refers to its author as 'a modern Homer,' and the suggestion

that the reported American practice of arguing the referee's decisions 'at great length' might be imported to Dulwich College is probably a joke but the whole suggests an amused interest in the contrasts between the two school worlds and an ease with the idea of their mingling or influencing one another anticipatory of Wodehouse's subsequent fiction.[25] As with most contributions to *The Alleynian* these columns are anonymous, but there is a turn to some of the phrases that suggest Wodehouse's hand, for example: 'The Feltstedian is like eight hours at the seaside. The whole magazine simply rollicks and fizzes (we hope we convey a definite impression to the minds of our readers).'[26]

The most sustained representation of the United States in the genre occurred in the two magazines *The Gem* and *The Magnet*.[27] The former features a narrative of a journey to the United States by the schoolboy heroes spread across five issues commencing Christmas 1908. The latter sees the introduction of a new American schoolboy, Fisher T. Fish, in the Christmas 1910 edition, who then remains as an ongoing part of the secondary ensemble.

Wodehouse cannot have been directly influenced either in his approach to the school story or his treatment of Anglo-American relations within it because his first writings in both respects predate *The Gem* and *The Magnet*. However, there are similarities both in the ways these magazine stories represent Americans and the Anglo-American encounter, and in the general tone that are suggestive of a common inheritance of characterizations of Americans and debates about Anglo-American relations. The *Gem* epic sees Tom Merry, the hero of the paper, invited by his uncle, resident in the Far West, for a visit. We tour through New York City and Chicago before finally arriving in Arizona. The narrative mingles three elements: a travelogue through the United States (an approach sometimes also seen in the romance novels discussed below), adventures in American settings the narratives of which are repeated in other locales elsewhere in the genre (like the kidnapping of Earl's son Augustus in New York City) and occasional passing comments on aspects of American society regarded as problematic in comparison to Britain.[28] In the *Magnet* story 'The Yankee Schoolboy' the encounter is transposed to English soil and the relationship explored through Fish, and the English boys (Harry Wharton and his four closest friends), as national representatives.

Commonalities between the Edwards and Wodehouse representations of Americans cover a number of areas. We are told in *The Gem* that 'Tom Merry & Co.' are very familiar with Broadway and the theatre – though there is no development of the detail of theatre life equivalent to early scenes in Wodehouse's *The Gentleman of Leisure*. The previously mentioned kidnapping of the Honorable Augustus in New York City in *The Gem* is revisited by Wodehouse in *The Little Nugget* with the nationalities transposed – so it is now a wealthy American heir schoolboy facing an attempted kidnap by his fellow countrymen on British soil. Augustus's infatuation with a beef magnate's

daughter in Chicago mocks the very idea of romance in a standard way (for the school story genre), as well as poking fun at the dollar princess/marriage market phenomenon – again Wodehouse was to take up this theme.

Two aspects are of more significance – a struggle to best the American other (in which the Britons are usually successful) and how these illuminate both the broader characters of the two nations and their peoples, and the overall character of Anglo-American relations. We see this in action during Fisher T. Fish's first appearance. 'Fish's manner,' we are informed, 'was not wholly taking.' He was 'sufficient until himself, in whatever circumstances he might chance to fall, and if he had been stranded in China or the Cannibal Islands, he would have swanked there as if ... [they] were private property of his.' British school boys are supposed to have a self-reliance and resourcefulness, but there is an arrogance to Fish's that is not favorably regarded. Moreover, it is not an arrogance justified by his actual abilities. He challenges the Famous Five (as Wharton and his chums are known in the series) to a walking match from the station back to Greyfriars School, and is quickly 'left.' Even then, he only partially concedes defeat: 'But I'm not in good form now ... When I'm in form I'll walk you off your legs.' This sets the tone for the relationship throughout the serial. Fisher T. Fish is often allowed to join in a general Greyfriars triumph as secondary support to the Famous Five but the humiliation of his swank is rather more common – often in relation to some scheme he has unwisely proclaimed the certain triumph of when it has scarcely begun – a good example being his short-lived dry goods shop.[29]

Behind the accounts of these particular schemes is a broader argument concerning Anglo-American relations. This is most clearly expressed in that first appearance of Fisher T. Fish. Nugent, another of the Famous Five, purports to explain the American Revolution as an unpleasant business that the two nations can now transcend: 'These colonies became independent, and became a great and glorious Republic, famous for freedom and slavery, and canned beef, and all sorts of things in tins, and so on. Since then it has been the aim of every British statesman worthy of the name to draw closer the ties of kinship ... and the bonds of friendship with these blessed colonies ... This dodge is called "Hands Across the Sea."' There's a similarity of tone here to a later Wodehouse treatment of the same idea that we'll come back to. The question of closer ties between the two nations was prominent in British diplomacy and politics in this period and is frequently referenced with varying attitudes in the fictional representations. Here, aside from the overall comedic tone (Nugent earlier opines that the cause of the breakdown 'couldn't have been postage stamps, because ... philatelists are awfully peaceable people') there is finally some question as to whether the whole thing is to be taken seriously – for Nugent proposes that they use this grand idea as a dodge to get out of a maths lesson by going to meet Fish at the station.[30]

Overall there is a fundamental point of difference between the treatment of Anglo-American relations in *The Gem* and *The Magnet* and by Wodehouse. In the Wodehouse novels the relative power of Briton and American is much more finely balanced. For example in *Psmith Journalist*, it is Psmith, the Briton, who brings down the American slum landlord, yet he is working through an American publication, he has an American editor as an ally, and, when held at gunpoint by the mob he is reliant on rescue from an American boxer. Psmith cannot, in other words, do it all alone. By contrast, in these school stories, while amity between representatives of the two nations is possible, the more normal narrative is a triumph for the home team against the Yanks. Thus, for example, the occasions previously discussed when Fisher T. Fish gets left behind by his British rivals, or the instance in *The Gem* when Tom Merry proves able to tame a Mexican mustang on his uncle's ranch that all the presumably more experienced ranchers have failed with.

This sense of superiority is also in evidence on the rare occasions when the boys confront American society beyond the school walls. The most striking example of this occurs during Tom Merry & Co.'s visit to Chicago when they are taken round Packingtown and witness many unemployed queueing for work, most of them fated to be unsuccessful. The British visitors are quite certain the same situation could not obtain back home. As Augustus puts it (in his rather wearisome affected manner): 'Somethin' ought to be done … The Government in England is dealin' with the question of the unemployed. Somebody told me this was a fwee countwy. I pwesume that means that a man is fwee to starve if he can't find work.'[31] Yet, despite Tom Merry feeling that 'it would be long ere he forgot the sallow, miserable faces of the unemployed' the group are soon happily sightseeing again. By contrast, Wodehouse, at least initially through Psmith, wades in where even Americans have feared to tread to right the wrongs of New York City slum dwellers. But the Britain of Tom Merry remains not only confident in its superior social order, but without feeling that their concern for the American unemployed requires action.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ROMANCE NOVELS

The second literary genre where Anglo-American relations are engaged with in a manner that intersects with Wodehouse's early novels is the romance novel. Anglo-American romances were, arguably, the most visible aspect of the relationship of the period following the sequence of marriages between American money and British aristocrats. The theme had been treated in the British novel at least as far back as Anthony Trollope's *The Duke's Children* (1880) and its romance between Lord Silverbridge and Isabel Boncassen.[32] They also turn up elsewhere in British fiction in these years, and, given that

Wodehouse was evidently a Conan Doyle reader, the most likely place for him to have encountered the theme is the 1892 Sherlock Holmes story 'The Adventure of the Noble Bachelor' in which the aristocrat–American alliance is frustrated.[33] But Richard Heindel in his *American Impact on Great Britain* identifies a little flurry of seventeen such novels and short-story collections appearing between 1897 and 1911. These are mostly penned by now forgotten authors, the best known being Frances Hodgson Burnett.[34] Several of them had complex Anglo-American connections, for example Burnett had emigrated there with her family at the age of fifteen, and C. N. Williamson's wife (and co-author) was born in America.[35] Stylistically these novels lack the lightness of touch of Richards or Wodehouse, but the parallels and contrasts in represen-tation are significant.[36]

A central aspect of their engagement with the United States is often, as in the *Gem* sequence discussed earlier, the travelogue. For example in C. N. Williamson's *Lady Betty Across the Water* (1906) we follow our heroine through the sea voyage, encounters in New York City, and thence out West. Williamson repeated the pattern, though throwing his protagonist into rather different milieux, the second-rate hotels and theatres that are the lot of struggling touring players, in the following year's *Lord Loveland Discovers America* (titles are not the strong point of this genre). In the pre-film and mass travel age, it seems plausible to argue that such descriptions may at least have offered British readers important glimpses of a country many of them were not likely ever to see. There are two points of contrast to Wodehouse. First, Wodehouse's early transatlantic novels do not trouble themselves with these kinds of tour guide descriptions. Second, Wodehouse makes transatlantic exchange seem effortless. Compare the single paragraph explaining Mike and Psmith's presence in New York City in *Psmith Journalist* with the lengthy opening chapter of Burnett's *The Shuttle* justifying and explaining the transatlantic nature of her story.[37] In further contrast at least to the Wodehouse of *Psmith Journalist* and *Gentleman of Leisure*, and to the *Gem* sequence, the romance novels avoid engagement with social questions of poverty and corruption, though Wodehouse moves much closer to the latter position by the time of *Something Fresh*.

In terms of the actual romance plot, these novels also contrast with Wodehouse, nearly always focusing on connections between American wealth and impoverished British aristocrats, and avoiding the variant pairings developed by Wodehouse discussed further below. The romance novel courtships are never wholly straightforward, with a variety of barriers being erected between the prospective partners. Lord Loveland needs to learn the value of hard work through temporary poverty to be worthy of his American love, Lady Betty's wealthy true love is disguised as a poor man (unconvincingly as far as this reader was concerned) and Mrs. van Rees (in W. E. Norris's *The*

Flower of the Flock (1900)) simply cannot decide whether she wants to remarry at all.[38] Obviously this is partly a matter of the requirements of the genre – if your narrative is a romance you can hardly unite the lead couple much before the concluding chapter. The already mentioned contrast in style is also a factor here. But these drawn-out struggles toward marriages are also reflective of ambivalence about these marital Anglo-American alliances. Thus, part of the reason Lady Betty and Lord Loveland have to go through these tribulations is to bring them to a better understanding of the country with which they, ultimately, wish to become connected and, indeed, their potential life partner who embodies that country.

Further, some of the alliances finally achieved feel like a critique of the principle despite the particular success – for example Mrs. van Rees's decision to marry the scapegrace Charlie Strode – who has defrauded a trust fund, dallied with another young woman's affections and shows no sign, having returned from a not so nice little imperial war, of actually settling down to learn how to support himself – hardly strikes the reader as a ringing endorsement of American judgement.

Even Burnett, the clearest believer among these authors in a deepening Anglo-American relationship, shows a lead pair stumbling to an understanding of each other drawn out over five hundred pages. This underlying doubt about the connection is further evidenced in the general treatment of the relationship in these novels. As with the couples, the novels' attitudes on this are various. The most positive endorsement comes from Frances Hodgson Burnett's *The Shuttle* (1906) who clearly sets out her agenda in the opening chapter on 'The Weaving of the Shuttle': 'But while the two worlds held apart, the Shuttle, weaving slowly in the great hand of Fate, drew them closer and held them firm, each of them all unknowing for many a year, that what had at first been mere threads of gossamer, was forming a web whose strength in time none could compute, whose severance could be accomplished but by a tragedy and convulsion.'[39] But Burnett marries this to the most extreme portrait of disaster, through her account of the disastrous Anglo-American marriage of Rosalie Vanderpoel (elder sister of her heroine Bettina) to the villainous Sir Nigel Anstruthers. It is a comment on American lack of judgement that, 'By many people [Burnett means American society here] Sir Nigel was not analysed, but accepted.'[40] Obviously this is intended to reinforce her view of positive progress in relations but the conventions of the genre and limitations of Burnett's style leave an unsettled feeling. Others are prepared to admit that such alliances may not always end happily, as is the case for Amber Roan and Walter Bassett in Israel Zangwill's short story 'Chassé-Croisé'.[41] But we do not find frustrations of these alliances or alternative match-ups of Britons with Britons and Americans with Americans facilitated by the transatlantic encounter comparable to those in the Wodehouse narratives. As with the real-life dollar

princess marriages then, a notable strain of ambiguity as to the appropriateness of these alliances endures, a strain that Wodehouse transcended, and to a more enduring audience.

WODEHOUSE: FROM TRANSATLANTIC THEATRE TO TRANSATLANTIC FICTION

The third point of intersection between Wodehouse and British representations of the United States in these years is to be found in the West End theatre. This became the third strand of Wodehouse's burgeoning career, alongside general literary jobbing in London and the writing of school-set short stories and novels. The key moment in this regard was Wodehouse being taken on as resident lyricist at the Aldwych in March 1906 by the actor-manager Seymour Hicks, which in turn brought him into contact with the American composer Jerome Kern. Wodehouse joined this world when a significant change in the balance of relations between British and American musical theatre was in progress. Andrew Lamb has charted this, identifying the complex interconnections between, in particular, London and New York City. These included the gradual shift to American companies producing their shows in London and becoming dominant in the Anglophone musical theatre world where British teams, beginning with Gilbert & Sullivan, had previously held sway. Lamb shows a world in which shows were revised, with different interpolated numbers and perhaps other revisions depending which side of the Atlantic they were playing. He also identifies other ways in which American popular music of the day could make its way to British audiences – particularly via minstrel shows.[42] None of Wodehouse's biographers have explored his early connection with the stage and how that might link to his development of representations of the United States in detail. Instructive points are these. Amid usually classical fare it seems likely that Wodehouse performed the Irish emigrant song 'Off to Philadelphia' at a Dulwich College concert.[43] Although music figures sparingly in the school story genre there are a small number of references that suggest an awareness at least on the part of the authors of the world of the minstrel show. Thus in Harold Avery's *The Triple Alliance* (1906) a boy with a banjo, itself suggestive, is asked for a song: '"something with a good swing to it. I feel like kicking up a row." Gull tuned up, struck a few chords, and then launched into a rattling nigger song with an amount of "go" and clatter sufficient to inspire the hearer with an almost irresistible urge to get up and dance.'[44]

One of the first pieces Wodehouse published following his first trip to the United States was a review of *The Prince of Pilsen*, a New York City show due for transfer to London in which piece Wodehouse comments extensively on the challenges involved in that transfer.[45] This awareness of the Anglo-American

musical theatre connection informed some of the earliest engagement with the United States in Wodehouse's fiction, to which we now turn.

From the very outset of his writing career – when he was combining jobbing work for a large number of London-based publications with his day job at the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank – references to the United States began to creep into his publications (mockery of Theodore Roosevelt and his pledges to deal with the trusts is the most frequent). But the two most significant early engagements are a ragtime musical performance in *The Head of Kay's* (Part 1, October, 1904) and the short story 'An International Affair' (September, 1905) both published in *The Captain* magazine. The latter appears in a series of Tales of Wrykyn where Mike and Psmith, the latter Wodehouse's first major hero, were to meet three years later. In the first instance schoolboy Fenn follows a performance of Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata with the Coon Band Contest (probably a reference to an Arthur Willard Pryor ragtime piece from 1899) provoking the following response from his fellows:

> 'He's gone mad,' gasped Kennedy.

> Whether he had or not, it is certain that the gallery had. All the evening they had been stewing in an atmosphere like that of the inner room of a Turkish bath, and they were ready for anything. It needed but a trifle to set them off. The lilt of that unspeakable Yankee melody supplied that trifle … Feet began to stamp in time to the music – softly at first, then more loudly.[46]

The concert ends in disarray. In 'An International Affair' we are on more familiar ground. The owner of Ring's Come-One Come-All Up-to-Date Stores has an hour to kill in the sleepy country town and is appalled by the shop windows: 'There was no dash, no initiative about them. They did not leap to the eye and arrest the pedestrian's progress.' The story sets up a contrast between American 'modern hustle' and British tradesmen who, at least in Wrykyn, have 'for years … jogged along in their comfortable way,' a theme picked up in later British fiction on the relationship, for example J. B. Priestley's 1939 novel *Let the People Sing!*[47] Ring duly sets up a branch of the American firm in Wrykyn and offers schoolboy teas, anticipating a roaring trade and, incidentally, the ruin of the old established tea room of Cook's (run by a 'Soudan' [*sic*] veteran). The lead schoolboy, Dunstable, rejects the newcomers: 'I don't want any of your beastly Yankee invaders. Support home industries. Be a patriot. The band then played God Save the King, and the meeting dispersed.' He treats a quintet of boys to tea at Ring's, laces the tea with a concoction designed to cause temporary illness and is then assisted by the school doctor who, easily led to blame the Americans, protests 'Why can't you boys eat good English food?'[48] The story is on one level an interesting reinvention of the standard tale of plucky British schoolboy overcoming the foreign threat, more usually

played out by depositing said schoolboy on a passing imperial battlefield. It is unusual in Wodehouse's early treatments of the United States in taking an essentially negative line towards the country and engineering a pretty complete defeat for it. It also anticipates the standard Anglo-American narrative of *The Magnet* wherein cocky Fisher T. Fish will embark on some venture that ends in him getting his, apparently deserved, comeuppance at the hands of the British boys. As we've seen Wodehouse's real-life American connections were already more complicated than this at the time of its publication. This suggests that the story tells us less about Wodehouse's own attitude to the United States in late 1905 and more about the kinds of stories about the relationship that were current and that Wodehouse was working through in moving towards his more sophisticated treatments.

This would fit with the fact that by the time of the next extended treatment in *Psmith Journalist* (serialized in *The Captain*, October 1909–March 1910, and subtitled there 'His Adventures in New York') things have moved on considerably. This is the first fiction with a wholly American setting – and indeed such an experiment is not repeated again in the period under consideration in this chapter. The novel follows Mike and Psmith, whose adventures at public school and as theoretically aspirant bankers Wodehouse had already chronicled, to New York City where Mike is on a cricket tour (the subject of transatlantic sporting relations hinted at here and in a number of the boys magazines could be the subject of a whole other chapter). Seeking an occupation commensurate with his talents while Mike is on the field, Psmith takes up journalism, and through the periodical *Cosy Moments* leads a crusade against a slum landlord and finds himself embroiled in gang warfare. To some extent it repeats the scenario of 'An International Affair' (and incidentally of the earlier Psmith novels). Psmith disposes with ease of gangland New York as he did of riotous schoolboys in *The Lost Lambs* (the second half of the serial version of *Mike*) and Dunstable did of the intruding businessman in 'International Affair.' However, the stakes are far higher and, while one might draw comparisons to Sherlock Holmes solving American crimes the Americans themselves have failed with, Holmes is only involved when the criminals operate on British soil, Psmith is taking up these matters on the Americans' home ground. And Psmith's principal partner, in the absence of the cricket-occupied Mike, is an American. Billy Windsor, the subeditor temporarily in charge of *Cosy Moments*, is by no means a negligible figure. Their strengths are contrasted – Psmith a man of words, Windsor a man of physical action. But Psmith is dominant, a fact strikingly documented by Windsor's reaction to Psmith's plan to transform *Cosy Moments*: 'He was trying to assimilate this idea. So far the grandeur of it had dazed him. It was too spacious, too revolutionary.'[49] The reoccurrence of the idea of revolution, previously seen with the playing of the Coon Band Contest is suggestive. Which is the revolutionary country? Might both have revolutionary elements

that could benefit the other? The novel also gives us further hints at what may have drawn Wodehouse to the United States – Psmith talks about having heard so much of the country, and claims that he will be considered 'hot stuff' in Cambridge upon his return. True, Wodehouse undermines this with a final scene showing Mike and Psmith falling asleep by the fire in their digs, distinctly not surrounded by an audience eager for their American report, but in this case there was clearly a gap between their experience and Wodehouse's with his tales (including their American dimension) increasingly finding a transatlantic audience.[50] The novel is also unique both in Wodehouse's early fictional treatments of the United States, and indeed in his pre-First World War fiction in its direct engagement with a social ill. There's an unusual somberness of tone to the description of the New York City tenements: 'It was indeed a repellent neighbourhood … The New York slum stands in a class of its own. It is unique. The height of the houses and the narrowness of the streets seem to condense its unpleasantness … Psmith said nothing. He was looking thoughtful. He glanced up at the grimy buildings on each side … The imagination jibbed at the thought of the back rooms.'[51] *Psmith Journalist* finally presents a possibility of further Anglo-American novels Wodehouse might have written – slums in New York City were not the only troubled New World milieux his hero could have attacked with talk. But instead Wodehouse turned from engagement with social problems, which had the effect, whether clearly planned is not clear, of making Anglo-American understandings ultimately easier to achieve.

This shift takes place across the four novels Wodehouse published between 1910 and 1915: *A Gentleman of Leisure* (UK)/*The Intrusion of Jimmy* (USA) (1910), *The Prince and Betty* (1912), *The Little Nugget* (1913) and *Something Fresh* (UK)/*Something New* (USA) (1915). As indicated titles could vary depending on place of publication, and this was also on occasion the case with nationalities of characters, about which more in a moment. For clarity the British titles are used in what follows. *A Gentleman of Leisure* is a clearer stylistic step forward being the first novel to combine British and American settings alongside British and American characters. Both New York City and the criminal element are softened compared to *Psmith Journalist*, Dreever Castle anticipates Blandings Castle – first seen in *Something Fresh* and the setting for one of Wodehouse's most enduring fictional series, for further Anglo-American encounters, and the last hurrah of Psmith. *The Prince and Betty* experiments with another fairly common approach to fictional Anglo-American relations – the mediation of the duo's relationship by the introduction of a third country – in this case a small island in the Mediterranean. It is worth noting that Wodehouse's own later transatlantic career was to be similarly mediated as, for much of the 1930s, he split his life between New York City, London, and Le Touquet in France. *The Little Nugget* is a step backward not only into the school story but at times into a melodramatic adventure of the sort that dominated the more run-of-the-mill

writing for boys. *Something Fresh* arrives at Blandings but with an American hero and heroine as the central romance. Three points are key – the alterations in nationalities of key characters; the changing engagement with American criminality, violence, and non-romantic Anglo-American relations; and the emergence of Anglo-American romance as a major theme.

The alteration of nationalities is notable across *Gentleman*, *The Prince*, and *Something Fresh*. For the British edition of *Gentleman of Leisure* Wodehouse alters the nationalities of three significant characters making English the hero Jimmy Pitt, the heroine's father John McEachern, and, technically because it is made clear that her father's actual national origins have not been disclosed to her prior to the novel and she was born and raised in the United States, McEachern's daughter Molly.[52] The devices used to effect this imply an even easier intermingling of the two nations than the central plot. Thus both Jimmy and a minor character Mifflin (also turned English here) have made careers in the United States with apparent ease; it is perhaps worth noting that Mifflin has done so in the theatre. Similarly, McEachern, in this rendering, has achieved place and fortune in the New York City police, despite having been expelled from Eton for stealing. *The Prince and Betty* went through three different magazine versions – US, UK, US – with characters and locations changing nationality (again the hero takes the nation of the place of publication), and with the second US iteration incorporating much of *Psmith Journalist* (to that date unpublished in the United States) but with the characters of Psmith and Mike omitted, and the Westerner Billy Windsor translated into an Easterner, Harvard-educated Rupert Smith.[53] Finally, in *Something Fresh*, the central pair of lovers, Ashe Marson and Joan Valentine, again have their nationalities matched to the nation of publication. To explore the complexities of these changes would require another separate chapter, but some contentions may be advanced here. First, making the nationality of central characters match the expected nationality of the majority of readers of a particular publication or edition would be an obvious approach to encourage reader identification with those characters. Second, however, the stylistic simplicity with which Wodehouse switches those identifications – often with the variation or addition of a few words – poses a question as to how readers may have interpreted those identifications, and indeed how seriously they can be taken, when they can be switched around with relative ease. Yet this also reinforces a fundamental emerging Wodehouse argument about a common identity, one that of course, by the time of these novels, Wodehouse in his own transatlantic lifestyle was personally coming to embody. As we've seen he was not unique in making this argument, but he did so with far more ease than Burnett, and to a rather wider audience than other transatlantic writers of the period such as Henry James.[54]

These novels also see a change in the treatment of particular aspects of the United States. Thus, in the early New York scenes in *Gentleman*, something of

the rough world of Psmith's encounter with the city lingers, but the overall tone has changed. In *Psmith Journalist* the violence, or potential violence, can create a genuinely threatening effect – most notably in the scene when Psmith finds himself a prisoner at gunpoint.[55] When the hero of *Gentleman*, Jimmy Pitt (in both his American and English guises), finds himself in a similar position he has already demonstrated his physical superiority over the gunman by throwing him to the ground and any danger is further neutered by the description of the gunman's face as possessing 'suggestions of a latent good-humor.'[56] And indeed, Pitt and gunmen Spike Mullins are soon firm friends. American corruption is again present in the form of the heroine Molly's father, Captain of Police John McEachern. But his dishonest enrichment is balanced from the start by his being Molly's father and, while he may not achieve his ends with respect to her marriage, he is in no danger of a loss of position comparable to the corrupt landlords of the earlier novel – indeed for the English McEachern the United States has enabled him to recover that position. In this way, the United States is here rendered safer and more presentable (particularly for readers of the English edition), while readers of the American edition are being shown an ease of interaction between the two nations – all the American characters in that version, albeit problematically in the case of Mullins, can function among these English aristocrats, it is more difficult to imagine the Westerner Billy Windsor (of *Psmith Journalist*) doing so. Having the slum problem solved by an American in the first iteration of *Psmith Journalist* published in the United States (when it forms, as earlier noted, a second half to *The Prince and Betty*) was arguably a deft handling of potential American sensibilities. Similarly, in the American edition of *Gentleman*, the friendship between the American Pitt, and the British impoverished aristocrat Lord Deever, offers a softer uniting than that between Psmith and Windsor, with the alliance this time cemented by Pitt's exposure of British corruption – the fact that the incredibly expensive jewels Sir Thomas has given his wife that everybody is trying to steal (we are close to Blandings Castle territory here) are in fact paste. Anticipating a later Jeeves remark Deever warmly declares: "'I don't know what to say. If it hadn't been for you – I always did like Americans. I always thought it bally rot that that fuss happened in-in-whenever it was. If it hadn't been for fellows like you," he continued, addressing Sir Thomas once more, "there wouldn't have been any of that frightful Declaration of Independence business. Would there, Pitt, old man?" '[57] This could be seen as a fairly simple reversal of relations – in contrast to *Psmith Journalist* the corruption is now British and the location of power to deal with it now American. But there are more complicated things going on. As with the lightening of the violence, the domestication and personalization of these problems renders the whole thing safer and more susceptible to resolution from the beginning. Sharp disconnections of a Declaration kind no doubt remain beyond the walls of Deever Castle but it is a secure common space for

Britons and Americans. The twin audience Wodehouse was developing can find both heroes and villains of their own nationality and rest secure that in each case, if we overlook the unpunished corruption of McEachern, the good will triumph. Such a dual audience could not have so easily united behind a work like *Psmith Journalist.* Precise data on those early audience reactions is thin on the ground.[58] Preliminary investigations in the American regional press suggest that his books began to circulate more widely from *The Intrusion of Jimmy* onwards (with stores located as far apart as Texas and South Dakota advertising it for sale).[59] This coincided with the success of the stage adaptation that opened in New York City in August 1911 and by March 1913 had been seen in Bridgeport (Connecticut), Chicago, San Francisco and Washington, DC, though given the adaptation was under the English title, *A Gentleman of Leisure*, and no reference mentions both, this may have been chance.[60] Beyond acknowledging the play's success, and in one case complimenting an actor's performance as 'a silly ass Englishman' there is no more information on the reaction from readers or audiences.[61] Book reviews are few (it is worth noting that no reference to either of the dedicated Psmith books has yet been found in the US press), and only occasionally comment on the Anglo-American angle. A 1910 *Manchester Guardian* review of *Psmith in the City* sees Psmith's language as influenced by the American George Ade complaining, 'For English boys his influence is pernicious. Americans may make a new language if they please.'[62] A *New York Times* interview from November 1915, an opportunity probably resulting from the serialization of *Something New* in the *Saturday Evening Post*, argues that 'something which seems distinctively American' has entered into his work in American magazines, and that *Something New*'s publication 'has increased his American audience.'[63] Phelps notes that Wodehouse's work appeared in at least twenty US publications between 1905 and 1916, and his publications in Britain were similarly voluminous, so he was clearly successfully building a dual audience.[64]

Ratcliffe argued that these successes were partly because he appealed to each nation through his portrayal of the other (so Americans enjoyed his portrayal of the English and vice versa) but two pieces of evidence raise questions about this, at least for this stage of his career. First, Wodehouse's comment to his American-based friend Lesley Havergal Bradshaw about trying to sell *The Prince and Betty* to American magazines emphasizing: '*All* the characters are Americans.'[65] Second, the account of an interview in the *New York Sun* in April 1916, again probably resulting from the success of *Something Fresh* stating 'Wodehouse now terms himself an American writer despite his name and his accent.'[66] This suggests, as with some of the changes of nationality of characters, that Wodehouse's transatlantic success may have required playing up the relevant host nationality rather than the other, or the relationship between the two. At the same time this was a still a practical instance of

positive Anglo-American relations, the novels still took an increasingly easy and positive view of the Anglo-American encounter and apart from the catty tone of the *Guardian* review there is no other evidence that his approach to the relationship hurt his career.

As an aside, the manner in which Pitt's Englishness is recalled in the English edition is worth noting here: '"I always did like Americans." "I'm not one," said Jimmy; but his lordship went on, unchecked.'[67] Such dialogue is suggestive perhaps of the shallowness of these national identities, but also of the ease with which nationality in these environments can be transcended. Or, of course, it may simply be that Wodehouse was producing in a hurry and spent no longer than actually necessary to amend the particular versions for their particular markets.

Finally, there is the theme of transatlantic romance. As noted earlier this was the obvious Anglo-American theme for the period, and Wodehouse shows his awareness of that context in several asides in these novels. Yet both play against that example, and indeed apparently against that deeper relationship that Wodehouse's overall mood and particular statements such as Deever's above would seem to be creating. In both *Gentleman* and *Something Fresh* the central romantic triumphs unite people of the same nationality – Molly McEachern and Jimmy Pitt in the first (though her English origins are very buried indeed), and the impoverished pair of Ashe and Joan in the second. And in both cases the dollar princess–aristocrat match-up is frustrated. Molly, despite those origins in the English edition is effectively an American heiress and does not marry Dreever, the Hon. Freddie Threepwood does not marry heiress Aline Peters. Indeed, in the latter case, to add insult to the matter, she goes off with a go-getting American businessman type with almost boundless contempt for Britain (except perhaps as a business market). But there is more to it. In the American editions, Wodehouse shows us united American couples who would never have become united but for British settings and challenges bringing them together. A link is formed, thanks to Anglo-American relationships, more durable than would have come had they stayed in the United States, or been ruled by mercenary intentions like at least some of the dollar princesses and aristocrats. While less overt in the British editions, the entanglement of British pairs with Americans in various contexts remains crucial to their attainment of their own happy endings.

As with readers' reactions, documentary evidence for why Wodehouse represented this theme as he did is thin. But a theory can be suggested. The most conspicuous dollar princess–aristocratic marriages often suggested a mercenary quality to the match-up, a lack of understanding. Wodehouse's pairings are united by processes that bring them to a better understanding of each other than they possessed at the start, and the transatlantic interaction is an important element in that. Wodehouse's own marriage is also suggestive here, for his bride Ethel Wayman, though born in England, had after the death of two husbands survived financially by theatre work in New York City, and it was there in 1915 that she and Wodehouse met and married.

CONCLUSION

The publication of the first instalment of *Something New* in the *Saturday Evening Post* in late June 1915 with its American hero stepping out in sunny central London clearly indicates a significant cultural convergence. Wodehouse by this point was practicing an increasingly prosperous writing career, in a variety of forms, on both sides of the Atlantic that, with the occasional adjustment of character's nationalities, appealed to a joint readership. Strikingly, this role was coming to fruition for him at the same time as notable contemporaries were making claims for a common literature as part of the transatlantic movement to celebrate the centennial of Anglo-American peace, a movement symbolic for Bradford Perkins of how far the Great Rapprochement had progressed.[68] But those celebrants seem to have regarded that common literature as a unifying inheritance rather than an engine to build unity, and instead focused their efforts on revision of textbooks, the sharing of industrial know-how, and the possible erection of statues. Wodehouse and other contemporary fictions exploring Anglo-American interactions went apparently unnoticed. And there were contrary experiences. Not all were enamored of the centennial celebrations. The two nations were no longer likely to go to war, but nor was formal alliance close, and the United States hedged when war broke out. Foreign Secretary Grey's remark in his memoir on transatlantic relations that 'in the years from 1905 to 1912 there was not much in the handling of public affairs … that retains sufficient interest to be described here' might speak for a continued reserve as much as a special relationship or a Great Rapprochement.[69] It may not be possible to say precisely whether Wodehouse, his fictions, and his increasingly easily transatlantic characters, or the perhaps more cautious, calculating diplomats and politicians were the more representative of the Anglo-American relationship in 1915 or to exactly determine the effect of the cultural links documented here on those policy makers. But Wodehouse, with his 'stirring adventures' of that relationship, and the growing transatlantic audience for them, was a powerful statement of potential, of possibilities. As Psmith had hoped for himself, Wodehouse had indeed become transatlantic 'hot stuff'.[70]

NOTES

1 Frances Hodgson Burnett, *The Shuttle* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, [1906] 1907), 51, but the whole section (pp. 51–53) is an instructive take on influences in deepening relations at this period.

2 Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1969).

3 P. G. Wodehouse, 'The First Time I went to New York,' in Theodora Benson (ed.), *The First Time I …* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1935), 265–279.

4 Robert McCrum, *Wodehouse: A Life* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 68.

5   *Ibid.*, 174.

6   Barry Phelps, *P.G. Wodehouse: Man and Myth* (London: Constable & Company, 1992), 93–103.

7   Richard Usborne, *Wodehouse at Work to the End* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1978), see esp. 46–85, 146–148, and 158–165; Owen Dudley Edwards, *P.G. Wodehouse: A Critical and Historical Essay* (London: Martin Brian & O'Keeffe, 1977), on *Psmith Journalist*, see 63–68. Earlier in the same chapter Edwards has striking things to say about Wodehouse's treatment of race.

8   Paul Giles, *Atlantic Republic: The American Tradition in English Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 201–222.

9   Evelyn Waugh, 'An Angelic Doctor: The Work of Mr P.G. Wodehouse,' in Donat Gallagher (ed.), *The Essays, Articles and Reviews of Evelyn Waugh* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1986), 255 [originally published in *The Tablet*, 17 June 1939].

10   David Cannadine, 'Another "Last Victorian": P.G. Wodehouse and His World,' *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 77:4 (1978), 470–491.

11   Wodehouse to William Townend, 13 November 1938, quoted in McCrum, *Wodehouse*, 256.

12   On the dollar princesses, see Maureen E. Montgomery, *'Gilded Prostitution': Status, Money, and Transatlantic Marriages, 1870–1914* (London: Routledge, 1989), which is alive to the literary representations of the phenomenon, though does not mention Wodehouse. See also Ruth Brandon, *The Dollar Princesses* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980); and Charles Jennings, *Them and Us: The American Invasion of British High Society* (Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2007).

13   H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783–1952)* (London: Odhams Press, 1954), 17–210; Anne Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1896– 1956* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996), 9–41 is also instructive. The most recent general survey of the relationship, Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World: The Story of Britain and America* (London: Little, Brown, 2007) is thin on the cultural dimension. On Anglo-American interconnections in this period beyond the political-diplomatic, see also Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904* (London: Associated University Presses, 1981); Richard Heindel, *The American Impact on Great Britain, 1898–1914* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940); Brook Miller, *America and the British Imaginary in Turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century Literature* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and the contemporary investigation, W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World or The Trend of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Horace Markley, 1901).

14   Kathryn Castle, *Britannia's Children: Reading Colonialism through Children's Books and Magazines* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 5.

15   P. G. Wodehouse, 'The Lost Lambs,' *The Captain*, April 1908, chap. 3. This and all subsequent references to periodical contributions identified as Wodehouse's are taken from the invaluable website Madame Eulalie's Rare Plums, www.madameulalie.org/captain/lost_lambs_01.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

16   See in addition to Castle on school stories: P. W. Musgrave, *From Brown to Bunter: The Life and Death of the School Story* (London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1985), which has instructive comments in relation to transatlantic connections on W. H. G. Kingston and Baines Reed's *Reginald Cruden* (1885); Jeffrey Richards,

Happiest Days: The Public Schools in English Fiction (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 124–141 [on Wodehouse]; Patrick A. Dunae, 'Boys' Literature and the Idea of Empire, 1870–1914,' *Victorian Studies*, 24:1 (1980), 105–122; Patrick A. Dunae, 'Making Good: The Canadian West in British Boys' Literature, 1890–1914,' *Prairie Forum*, 4 (1979), 165–181.

17 See Harold Avery, *Mobsley's Mohicans* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1902, previously published as a serial in 1897), esp. 113–115, which details the boys' fascination with Cooper's *Last of the Mohicans*; Charles Edwardes, *Dr Burleigh's Boys* (London: Griffith & Farran, 1897). See also inclusion of Cooper in the school library in William Patrick Kelly, *Schoolboys Three* (London: Downey & Co., 1895), 22.

18 See, for example, P. G. Wodehouse, 'An Afternoon Dip,' *Pearson's Magazine*, September 1904 (UK not US publication), www.madameulalie.org/PublicationsMenu.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

19 Ian Hay [John Hay Beith], *'Pip': A Romance of Youth* (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1907), 303. There is also a dismissive reference a couple of pages earlier to the Schenectady putter, which was to cause a divergence between the golf rules of the US and UK rules bodies in 1910.

20 Jack Point [P. G. Wodehouse], 'Under the Flail,' *Public School Magazine*, March 1902, www.madameulalie.org/PublicationsMenu.html (accessed 14 January 2019).

21 Jan Piggott, *Dulwich College: A History, 1616–2008* (London: Dulwich College, 2008) comments on the presence of non-British boys in the Edwardian period but does not locate any Americans (p. 183). Neither A. W. P. Gayford, *History of Dulwich College* (London: Dulwich College, 1950) nor Sheila Hodges, *God's Gift: A Living History of Dulwich College* (London: Heinemann, 1981) elucidate the point further.

22 See 'Debating Society,' *The Alleynian*, XXII:157 (October 1894), 262–264; 'Occasional Notes,' *The Alleynian*, XXII:165 (October 1895), 250; 'Life at an American University,' *The Alleynian*, 178 (May 1897), 69–72.

23 It seems likely (though this is not conclusively established) that this was the magazine of the William Penn Charter School in Philadelphia. Their alumni page references a 1934 edition of a school magazine of the same title, www.penncharter.com/alumni/alumni-society (accessed 25 February 2019). It is also not clear how the connection between the schools arose – no mention is made of the American school in the histories of Dulwich College.

24 'Our Contemporaries,' *The Alleynian*, XXIV:173 (September 1896), 257. See also same column March 1895.

25 'Our Contemporaries,' *The Alleynian*, XXVIII:200 (February 1900), 37.

26 'Our Contemporaries,' *The Alleynian*, XXVIII:202 (May 1900), 144.

27 On the cultural history of these and other contemporary magazines for boys, in addition to sources already cited, see Kelly Boyd, *Manliness and the Boys' Story Paper in Britain: A Cultural History, 1855–1940* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and E. S. Turner, *Boys Will Be Boys* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1975). One suggestive angle for future research here is S. Clarke Hook's series of adventures of Jack, Sam, and Pete (an Englishman, an American, and an African) – not explored here partly for reasons of space and partly because it is an adventure not a school serial.

28 *The Gem*, 2:46 (26 December 1908)–2:50 (23 January 1909), http://friardale.co.uk/Gem/Gem.htm (accessed 20 January 2019).

29 All quotations, Charles Hamilton [Frank Richards], *The Magnet* 5:150 (1910), 8/8–9/10, http://friardale.co.uk/Magnet/Magnet.htm (accessed 20 January 2019).

30 *Ibid.*, 5.

31 Martin Clifford [Frank Richards], 'Tom Merry in Chicago', *The Gem*, 2:48 (1909), 9.

32 Anthony Trollope, *The Duke's Children* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1880). See on Trollope and his immediate British literary predecessors on this theme, Edgar F. Harden, 'The American Girl in British Fiction, 1860–1880', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 26:3 (1963), 263–285.

33 Wodehouse's extensive references to Conan Doyle and Holmes in his early work are exhaustively chronicled in John Dawson, 'Conan Doyle/Sherlock Holmes Primary References in the Early Works of P.G. Wodehouse (through 1922)', www.madameulalie.org/grp/pgwconandoyle.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

34 On Burnett, see Ann Thwaite, *Waiting for the Party: The Life of Frances Hodgson Burnett* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1974); Phyllis Bixler, *Frances Hodgson Burnett* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1984).

35 Burnett is an earlier example of a writer who built an audience on both sides of the Atlantic and future work comparing their careers and fictional treatments of the relationship could be illuminating of both and the transatlantic cultural relationship more broadly.

36 Heindel, *American Impact*, 343–350.

37 Wodehouse, *Psmith Journalist*, 18; Burnett, *Shuttle*, 1–11.

38 C. N. Williamson and A. M. Williamson, *Lady Betty Across the Water* (London: Methuen & Co, 1906). Her love to be is originally glimpsed by her in steerage from the first class deck above (p. 36), saves a drowning child (pp. 39–40), and is eventually revealed as wealthy (p. 304). W. E. Norris, *The Flower of the Flock* (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1900) – the entire novel tracks this indecision, for example her considering encouraging one suitor (pp. 41–42), asserting to another friend she doesn't want to remarry (pp. 140–141), and finally agreeing to marriage (p. 319).

39 Burnett, *The Shuttle*, 1–2.

40 *Ibid.*, 5.

41 Israel Zangwill, 'Chassé-Croisé' in *The Grey Wig: Stories and Novelettes* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1903), 44–74.

42 Andrew Lamb, 'From Pinafore to Porter: United States-United Kingdom Interactions in Musical Theatre, 1879–1929', *American Music* (Spring 1986), 34–49. See also Peter Bailey, '"Hullo, Ragtime!" West End Revue and the Americanisation of Popular Culture in Pre-1914 London', in Len Platt, Tobias Becker, and David Linton (eds), *Popular Musical Theatre in London and Berlin: 1890–1939* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 135–152. W. MacQueen-Pope, *Carriages at Eleven: The Story of the Edwardian Theatre* (London: Robert Hale & Co., [1947] 1972) includes a chapter on the American manager Charles Frohman, possibly the most prominent American in the London theatre world of this period. See also on Frohman, Isaac Frederick Marcosson and Daniel Frohman, *Charles Frohman: Manager and Man* (London: Bodley Head, 1916). Several contributions in Michael R. Booth and Joel H. Kaplan (eds), *The Edwardian Theatre: Essays on Performance and the Stage* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) deal with Anglo-American connections in passing. See also on the broader Edwardian theatre context, A. E. Wilson, *Edwardian Theatre* (London: Arthur Barker, 1951).

43 Anon, 'The Concert', *The Alleynian*, XXVIII:200 (February 1900), 19. The title of the song is not specifically identified but the singer's proposed destination is. A previous edition (189, October 1898) records a performance of 'Off to Philadelphia' (this time

specifically identified as such) at the annual Old Alleynian dinner. It seems plausible to suggest it may have been the same song.

44 Harold Avery, *The Triple Alliance: Its trials and triumphs* (London: Nelson & Sons, 1899), chap. XII. See also a similar episode in H. Barrow-North, *The Boys of Dormitory Three* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1899), 128.

45 P. G. Wodehouse, 'Theatrical Invaders,' *Daily Chronicle*, 14 May 1904, www.madameulalie.org/dchron/Theatrical_Invaders.html (accessed 14 January 2019).

46 P. G. Wodehouse, *The Head of Kay's*, chap. IV. The boys' fascination with American tunes is also referenced in *The Luck Stone* (serialized in *Chums* 1908–09) (Abe Holzmann's 'Smoky Mokes' and 'Bill Simmons' are name checked) here performing the kinder service of bringing the boys into greater sympathy with the hitherto unloved German master, www.madameulalie.org/captain/CaptainMenu.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

47 See on this, Finn Pollard, 'An Inescapable Relation: J.B. Priestley, Aldous Huxley and the United States in British Literature on the Eve of World War Two,' *Symbiosis: A Journal of Anglo-American Literary Relations*, 17:1 (2013), 39–56.

48 All quotations, P. G. Wodehouse, 'An International Affair,' *The Captain*, September 1905, www.madameulalie.org/captain/CaptainMenu.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

49 P. G. Wodehouse, *Psmith Journalist* (London: A. & C. Black, [1915] 1923), 32. The original magazine version of the story is also accessible at Madame Eulalie's Rare Plums website (the page for *The Captain*).

50 *Ibid.*, 12.

51 *Ibid.*, 38.

52 Compare P. G. Wodehouse, *The Intrusion of Jimmy*, 3, 23–28, 31 with the same segments at Madame Eulalie's Rare Plums website. The editors of the website make valuable comments on this, www.madameulalie.org/titbits/The_Intrusions_of_Jimmy_01.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

53 The differences between the three magazine serial versions can be tracked via the editions reproduced by the Madame Eulalie's Rare Plums website.

54 My attention has been drawn to comments in James's correspondence, which speak to his embrace of transatlantic convergence, but the theme undergoes much more troubled treatment in his fiction. There is a separate history of American writers in Britain whose relationship to the subjects of this chapter could be further explored. Suggestive of the range of authors that could embrace is Stanley Weintraub, *The London Yankees: Portraits of American Writers and Artists in England, 1894–1914* (London: W. H. Allen, 1979).

55 Wodehouse, *Psmith Journalist*, 207–214.

56 Wodehouse, *Intrusion*, 36–37.

57 *Ibid.*, 280.

58 For the period covered by this chapter I have surveyed the databases of the *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, *Financial Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, *New York Times*, *The Observer*, *Washington Post*, and regional American papers via the *Chronicling America* database, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov (accessed 20 January 2019).

59 For adverts listing *The Intrusion of Jimmy* for sale/loan see 'Library Notes,' Hot Springs *Weekly Star* [South Dakota], 20 October 1910, 8; 'Advert for Currans Books,' El Paso *Herald*, 1 October 1910, 2.

60 The most detailed existing summary located of the various iterations (page, stage, and film) of *A Gentleman of Leisure* can be found in Brian Taves, *P.G. Wodehouse and Hollywood: Screenwriting, Satires and Adaptations* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland

& Company, 2006), 149, but it notes only the New York City and Chicago runs. McCrum gives a figure of seventy-six performances for the Broadway run, terming it 'modest'. McCrum, *Wodehouse*, 97. For the other cities see *Evening Star* [Washington DC], 21 July 1912, 23, advert and preview for the Poli Players in 'The Big New York and Chicago Hit'; 'Poli's', Bridgeport [CT] *Evening Farmer*, 22 August 1912, 8, which mistakenly refers to 'P.C. Wodehouse'; San Francisco *Call*, 12 December 1912, 10, which claims, 'It had a brilliant run in Broadway and a very profitable season on the road'. All newspapers consulted on the *Chronicling America* database.

61 'New Comedy and an Old Favourite Week's Offerings at the Theaters', *Washington Post*, 21 July 1912, MS3.

62 'Christmas Books for Boys: School Stories and Others', *The Guardian*, 19 November 1910, 6.

63 Joyce Kilmer, 'War Will Restore England's Sense of Humor', *New York Times*, 7 November 1915, SM13.

64 Phelps, *Wodehouse*, 97. Phelps does cite other critics in support of the Anglo-American take, but with the exception of the Kilmer interview all date from the 1930s. He also states that Wodehouse's transatlantic sales success was only equaled by Agatha Christie but cites no specific data in support (p. 99).

65 Wodehouse to Lesley Havergal Bradshaw, 19 January 1911, in Sophie Ratcliffe (ed.), *P.G. Wodehouse: A Life in Letters* (London: Arrow Books, 2013), 80 (emphasis in original). See p. 72 for Ratcliffe's take – this evidences how Wodehouse represented Americans in one of these early novels but not how audiences on either side of the Atlantic reacted to them.

66 'Wodehouse: An American Humorist Out of England', *New York Sun*, 29 April 1916, 8.

67 Wodehouse, 'The Intrusions of Jimmy, Part 12', *Tit-Bits*, 27 August 1910, www.madameulalie.org/titbits/The_Intrusions_of_Jimmy_12.html (accessed 20 January 2019).

68 See for views of an American, a Briton, and a Canadian, Oliver Bainbridge, *The Lesson of the Anglo-American Peace Centenary* (London: Heath Cranton & Ouseley, 1914), 29, 66, 107, and 141. On the meaning of the moment more broadly, see Perkins, *Great Rapprochement*, 296–301; and Geoffrey Hicks, 'Peace and War: Anglo-American Centenary Projects and the Lincoln Statue Controversy, 1910–1927', in T. G. Otte, *The Age of Anniversaries: The Cult of Commemoration, 1895–1925* (London: Routledge, 2018), 126–146.

69 Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years: 1892–1916* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1926), Vol. II, 85. The whole chapter (pp. 83–98) is instructive on the relationship. See also David G. Haglund, 'Is There a "Strategic Culture" of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations', in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012), 26–51; and David G. Haglund, 'What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept', *International Journal*, 59:3 (2004), 479–502.

70 Phrases borrowed from Wodehouse's description of Psmith's wishes from his American trip, Wodehouse, *Psmith Journalist*, 17.

2

AMERICA IN 'BRITISH' HISTORY TEXTBOOKS[1]

SRDJAN VUCETIC

Always far more special in London than in Washington, the so-called Anglo-American (i.e. UK–US) special relationship has greatly influenced British foreign policy for at least seven decades, and it continues to influence it under the conditions of 'Brexit' and the radical presidency of US president Donald Trump. This is most clearly evident in Britain's strategy and operations in security and military matters, including the British nuclear deterrent, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. How do we explain this phenomenon? In a recent study, I have argued that the special relationship is rooted in a broader cultural infrastructure of British society.[2] Using constructivist international relations theory as my starting point, I examined a set of symbols and practices of everyday national life in contemporary Britain as a way of gauging the degree of consent for British foreign policy orientations vis-à-vis the United States. What I discovered is that British national identity discourses, whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, have a tendency to configure 'America' as either complementary to, or an extension of, Britain and its interests. Neither 'France' nor more broadly 'Europe' came close to occupying this position.

This was a pilot study in which I focused solely on the year 2010. In this chapter I expand on this project by examining aspects of continuity and change in the meanings of America in the discourses of British national identity in the entire period in which the special relationship has been claimed to exist. I do so using a corpus of text drawn from a sample of 'British' – that is, mostly English – school history textbooks published in roughly ten-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. History textbooks are an apt choice for this purpose on both pragmatic and principled grounds. Pragmatic, because history textbooks are a relatively accessible source of data, and because their content can be easily analyzed via text-interpretation techniques. Principled, because they directly shape, and are

shaped by, the discourses of nationhood. Put differently, history textbooks are specifically constructed and curated with an eye on the national history curriculum, which, in turn, deliberately aims to inculcate a shared sense of national identity – who we are, where we come from, and where we are going.

Analysis indicates the persistence of three top 'images': America as a superior world power, America as the avatar of capitalist modernity, America as an ally and close friend. Certainly, the meanings of some of these have shifted over time – the notion of Pax Americana owing something to Britain's sacrifice in the Second World War dissipated by the 1970s, for example. Yet there is a remarkable continuity and consistency in the construction of 'America' as close and mostly positive in relation to Britain. Thus, while America oscillated between being subsumed under the 'Self' and being an 'Other,' France, Germany, and 'Brussels' were always primarily Others. These findings, I would argue, are useful information for anyone interested in exploring the cultural and sociopolitical taproots of UK support for the special relationship in the postwar period.

The rest of the chapter consists of five parts. The first looks at the purpose of history textbooks and history textbook research. The second part considers methodological issues, including the study's sampling rationale and the preference for a more inductivist discourse analysis and for human coding over machine coding. The third part presents the main results, and the fourth discusses them with respect to two literatures: on the special relationship and on the constructions of Europe in British school history. I conclude with a reflection on the value of history textbook research in the scholarship on the cultural underpinnings of the special relationship and of foreign policy and international relations more generally.

WHY TEXTBOOKS?

One of the central purposes of state-sponsored school history is to legitimize the state and nation – to explain how our present makes sense in light of our past. History textbooks are a key means for achieving this goal since they are designed not simply to present facts, but also to serve as 'sites of national memory.'[3] One could also call them a transmission belt for citizenship.[4] According to Foster, 'in countries across the world textbooks remain potent vehicles to render a particular, "official," version of the nation's past to young people. Nations rarely tell "the truth" about themselves, rather in history classrooms and in history textbooks students often encounter narratives that dominant groups choose to select and remember as representations of the national story.'[5] Foster's observation is based on numerous empirical studies: Textbooks around the world have long worked hard to turn students into co-nationals, following the scripts of nationhood provided by 'dominant

groups.'[6] For example, in the settler states of the so-called Anglosphere – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States[7] – indigenous students in primary and secondary schools have traditionally learned nothing about their own traditions, to say nothing about the history and legacies of dispossession and genocide. Instead, they have been have asked to learn about the achievements of European culture and civilization and the successes of visionary Europeans who founded these countries.[8] Racialized and ethnic minority students are exposed to similarly lopsided narratives, the outstanding case in point being an entire century of misinformation regarding slavery in US textbooks.[9] This is not merely an Anglosphere phenomenon of course. History textbooks in, for example, contemporary China also produce and reproduce mostly positive, feel-good stories about the nation's history while also cementing Han-centric views of the Chinese national identity.[10]

The apparent universality of these findings should not be surprising. The study of the national past in primary and secondary schools was part and parcel of the European nation-state model that has over the last two hundred years diffused around the world.[11] One rationale for developing national mass education systems was to make sure that 'our children' learned 'our history,' which, as Foster puts it, 'often is a watered-down, partial, sometimes distorted, and sometimes a fictional view of the national past based upon cultural, ideological and political selection.'[12]

Research shows that state-sponsored history education frequently fails in transmitting national ideologies and identities to 'our children.'[13] This is due to the power of 'pre-existing conceptions' and 'initial historical knowledge' as well as of familial and community teachings, all of which are sometimes in contradiction with state-sponsored history.[14] Furthermore, state-sponsored education is always in flux. For example, in parts of the Euro-American world, school history has undergone a profound change over the past sixty years thanks to the rise of the feminist movement, Black Power, decolonization, postcolonial immigration, and regional integration. International advocacy, such as the mandates of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Council of Europe, have had a significant influence as well. Elsewhere, 'democratic backsliding,' 'the rise of nativism,' and corollary developments are at play, and are accordingly moving history textbooks away from 'liberal' or 'globalist' themes and towards 'patriotic' ones.[15]

School history is now routinely enveloped in 'history wars' and even broader 'culture wars.'[16] According to Phillips, the modern history of history wars in the United Kingdom began in the 1960s in a confrontation of political and social historians over the degree to which the next generation of textbooks should emphasize issues of class, race, gender, and various 'critical' perspectives that accompany them.[17] Another war was over appeals for multinational ('not just English') history, which subsequently spilled over to similar contestation over

the need for multicultural, European, and global approaches. History wars marked the 1970s and the 1980s as well. For instance, as UK curriculum makers began to turn toward the interrogation of primary sources, there emerged a vigorous debate about the purpose and distinctiveness of history ('the new history') vis-à-vis other fields (e.g. women's studies) as well as about the putative trade-offs between 'skill' on the one hand and 'knowledge' and 'content' on the other. Devolution policies, which began in the late 1980s, naturally caused further rethinking of history curricula that led to, among other things, England's adoption in 1991 of its first 'National Curriculum' for history. (In England, the main battlefields are curriculum reforms rather than textbook production partly because of the existence of multiple examination boards who often recommend different textbooks.) Suffice it to say, curricula in the United Kingdom are being transformed yet again in the wake of both the Scottish independence referendum and the Brexit vote.

One way to observe history wars in UK history education in real time is to follow the recent and ongoing debate over the meanings of the British Empire – from the controversy surrounding England's 2013 National Curriculum guidelines to, at the time of this writing, the uproars over the 'Rhodes Must Fall' protest movement, the 'Ethics of Empire' project, or the treatment of the Windrush generation.[18] As Mycock observes, virtually every state that once did the formal colonizing suffers from a condition variously called 'postcolonial amnesia,' 'conspiracy of silence,' 'postcolonial melancholia,' and 'selective myopia.' This, as he defines it, is a social–cognitive–affective structure that prevents postcolonizing states and societies from critically evaluating their colonial histories.[19] For example, many if not most UK history educators still insist on, first, separating the domestic from the imperial, and, second, on depicting the latter as both universal and, on balance, beneficial.[20] Similarly, while 'slavery' appeared as a National Curriculum topic in 1990, it was in fact not covered in curricula and textbooks until the late 2000s.[21] The same goes for postcolonial perspectives: Though they have long been articulated from either the former colonies or from within the postcolonial Britain, these are almost entirely absent.[22] School history perspectives on the British Empire are yet to catch up with the perspectives advanced in the field of 'new imperial history,' for one.[23]

In sum, history textbooks are important sources of the symbols and discursive practices that purvey a particular view of a nation's past. In addition to configuring the meanings of 'home,' textbooks also shape students' understanding of key Self–Other relations 'abroad' – that is, of their country's main friends and allies, rivals and enemies, as well as of key international institutions, global governance structures, transnational advocacy groups, and the like.[24] This is why it matters for us to understand how British history textbooks narrate 'America.'

WHICH TEXTBOOKS?

To build a corpus of textbooks, I based my research on the work I conducted under the auspices of the Making Identity Count (MIC) – a large multinational project revolving around a series of discourse analyses of select national identities.[25] I began with 'popular' textbooks on modern English or British history that were most likely to have been used at the time in private and state secondary schools across the United Kingdom, but primarily those in England. This explains the title of the chapter in which the adjective 'British' appears in quotation marks. In addition to the fact that England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales did not share a common educational program in British history in the period under study, the textbooks selected were either produced in England or centered on England. However, I am not using 'English' in this context because, first, some of the textbooks selected for analysis were *probably* popular in Northern Ireland and Scotland as well. Second, as other researchers have noted, English textbooks in this period have had a tendency to construct 'the political actorship and identity' as British, not English.[26]

I acknowledge that history teachers in the United Kingdom began to use textbooks in the history classrooms in large numbers only at after the introduction of the history General Certificate of Education Exam (GCSE) and the National Curriculum initiative in the late 1980s.[27] That said, the fact is that numerous textbooks – and 'topic books' – existed and circulated even before the specification of curriculum needs, purveying historical information to teachers and helping students prepare for standardized tests.[28] With this in mind, for each decade under study I selected two textbooks that would have been popular among students studying for history GCSE and history A Level exams (more advanced qualifications generally required for university entrance) or their closest historical equivalents (CSE/O level and A level) – that is, for students between the ages of fourteen and nineteen. I used only the hard copies, not the CDs and e-books that became available at the turn of the millennium.[29] In the earlier period under study, approximately from the 1950s through the 1980s, history textbooks tended to have a longer shelf life than in the later period. As a general rule, I selected the editions published in years nearest to the beginning of the decade – 1958 or 1959 for the 1960s, for example. Also, if one of the two textbooks covered only a short period of history and/or was exceptionally short, as in the 1990s sample, I added a third textbook.

Given that reliable data on textbook usage are nonexistent for most years under study, I determined popularity in a given time period by combing through the materials made available by the History in Education Project at the Institute of Historical Research[30] and the Historical Association;[31]

contemporary and historical reviews and discussions in the professional journals for history teachers (*Teaching History*, established in 1969, and *History of Education Review*, 1971), and in other specialist literature.[32] In addition to 'usage,' my other selection criterion was sufficient treatment of 'modern Britain,' a popular exam theme in secondary school for most of the period under study. I defined 'modern Britain' simply as 'the preceding hundred years,' which I think is defensible from the perspective of research on knowledge acquisition and specifically the finding that learners are more likely to privilege events 'occurring in the last 100–150 years.'[33] Explicitly England-focused books were included as well. For example, I allowed for the second edition of Barker, Aubyn, and Ollard's *A General History of England 1832–1960*, but analyzed only the chapters covering the period from the 1860s onwards.[34]

Together, the selection criteria yielded a 'primary corpus' of fifteen textbooks. As a check on generalizability of the findings, I created a 'secondary corpus' consisting of five popular 'non-high school' British history textbooks in use during the same period – each of these catered either to primary school students, university students, or the general audience but not explicitly to high school students. Table 2.1 lists all twenty textbooks by author(s), title, edition, and the time period of usage.

Table 2.1   A sample of British history textbooks, 1950–2010 (N = 20)

Decade	Textbooks	
Primary corpus: fifteen high school-level history textbooks		*Code*
1950s	Carter and Mears. *History of Britain*. 2nd ed.	CM
	Rayner. *Short History of Britain*. 2nd ed.	RA
1960s	Barker, Aubyn, and Ollard. *General History of England*, 1st ed.	BA
	Strong. *History of Britain and the World*, 1st ed.	ST
1970s	Titley. *Machines, Money & Men. 1700 to the 1960s*, 1st ed.	TI
	Larkin. *English History for Certificate Classes*, 1st ed.	LA
1980s	Hill. *British Economic and Social History*. 4th ed.	HI
	Sked and Cook. *Post-War Britain: A Political History*, 1st ed.	SC
1990s	Kavanagh and Morris. *Consensus Politics*, 1st ed.	KM
	May. *Economic & Social History of Britain*, 1st ed.	MA
	Connolly and Phillips. *Britain 1900–1939*, 1st ed.	CP
2000s	Walsh. *Modern World History*. 1st ed.	WA
	Culpin and Turner. *Making Modern Britain*, 1st ed.	CT
2010s	Lynch. *Access to History Britain 1945–2007*, 1st ed.	LY
	Collier and Rowe. *AQA History AS Unit 1 Britain, 1906–1951*, 1st ed.	CW

Table 2.1 *(continued)*

Decade	Textbooks	
Secondary corpus: five non-high school history textbooks		*Code*
1960s	Unstead. *History of Britain: A Century of Change* Bk. 4 (Pre-K12)	U1
1970s	Unstead. *Britain in the 20th Century.* Bk. 5 (Pre-K12)	U2
1980s	Richards and Hunt. *Illustrated History of Britain, 1760–1980*	RH
1980s	Webb. *Modern England* (University level, American author)	WE
1990s	Williams and Ramsden. *Ruling Britannia* (University level)	WR

Notes: Code plus page number is used for citations in this chapter, e.g. CM-213.

See the Appendix at the end of the chapter for full bibliographic details.

The coding proceeded on the basis of the interpretive recovery of national identities and identifications via discourse analysis of popular texts developed in the MIC project. The basic unit of analysis is 'the identity category,' defined here as the classifications attached to the nation and members of the nation. These categories could be political, moral, cultural, historical, geopolitical, religious, ethnic, racial, gendered, or miscellaneous – including the category of 'significant Others.' Only the basic text was coded, not primary material excerpts or, ironically given my reliance on image theory, visuals. The focus was on the categories from paragraphs, sentences, or sentence clauses with 'America' or 'American' (or US) deployed either in direct relation to Britain or more generally. Each category was coded in terms of both valence (positive, negative, neutral, ambiguous) and hierarchy (America as either more advanced or lagging behind culturally, economically, or politically). In line with project guidelines, coders performed the same codings for all 'significant Others' mentioned in the texts: 'Europe,' 'Ireland,' 'Victorian Britain,' etc. This technique enabled direct multiway comparisons and a rank ordering of Britain's *most* significant Others. In light of the interest in the UK–US special relationship, close attention was also paid to any differences between a general America on the one hand and Britain's political or diplomatic relations with America on the other.

The analysis was conducted by either myself or by coders I trained in the discourse analytic procedures of the MIC project. We did not follow a codebook but allowed the national identity categories to emerge inductively from the text, without pre-theorizing content.[35] Once the categories were collected I clustered them into stereotypical 'master images,' 'master frames,' or 'gestalts.'[36] Rather than a sum of specific identity categories, these are integrated mental constructs or 'frames' that convey information and experience-based knowledge about the Other's capabilities (stronger/weaker), intentions (friendly/

hostile), status within international society (superior/inferior), and trust-
worthiness (high/low). Images of the Other, which like identity discourse are at
once cognitive and affective, are ubiquitous in all human societies as they help
actors situate themselves in the social world, thus enabling individual and insti-
tutional action and interaction, including in foreign policy.

This approach undertaken here is a departure from the existing analyses of
the constructions of America in British history textbooks, which tend to be
based on the predetermined choice of extracts. For example, in their *History
Lessons*, Lindaman and Ward examine what America means in British and
other foreign textbooks through a string of excerpts on major historical events
and themes specified by the editors themselves.[37] While in many ways eye-
opening due to a wide cross-national comparative scope, their account never-
theless offers only a small slice of available meanings.[38] Thanks to its inductivist
orientation, the present approach casts the analytical net much more widely to
consider all relevant discourses, narratives, and strategies of representation of
America in British history textbooks. It also does this in a properly longitudinal
fashion, across seven time periods.

TEXTBOOK AMERICA

British school history is a heterogeneous object that has undergone dra-
matic changes since the middle years of the twentieth century. Yet, when it
comes to the image of America, my analysis of twenty textbooks published
over the course of seven decades points to continuity, not change. To begin
with, simple frequency counts of identity categories indicate that America
is Britain's most significant Other. America is a top category in thirteen out
of fifteen textbooks in the primary corpus, with 'Europe' dominating only
in two textbooks (BA, SC). The second most frequent category is 'Europe,'
either as a stand-alone, vague category, or in the more recent textbooks as
the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Union (EU).
Among specific European countries, France and Germany are configured
as Others more frequently than any other European nation. 'The British
Empire/Commonwealth' and 'the Western' were also salient, typically as
extensions of the British Self rather than as Others.[39] Analysis of the sec-
ondary corpus affirms these findings.

The other main finding is that 'textbook America' coalesced into four master
images: America as a superior peer, America as the avatar of capitalist mod-
ernity, America as a friend and ally, and America as an exceptional democracy.
I concentrate only on the first three for reasons of space and also because each
three more consistently appeared and reappeared in textbooks than the fourth,
exceptional democracy image.

The superior world power

According to the textbooks published from the late 1940s through the late 1950s, Britain had every reason to feel good about itself relative to its international peers. The main reason was the Second World War: the British were once again the victors, with the Germans once again the vanquished (RA-513). The feat is all the more significant in light of the fact that Britain 'stood alone' in combat against the Nazis after the surrender of France in June 1940.

The other main reason was the empire, which was still strong and stable. 'Britain and the Dominions … are the areas where democracy has proved reasonably successful and where men have been the most free'; as such, they were 'the best hope for the future progress of mankind,' especially in the new nuclear era (CM-1031; see also BA-282; ST-330).

While victory and the empire were ubiquitous in later textbooks, too – even in the 1990s, British students read that '[at] the end of the war Britain was the only imperial and West European state with the status of a world power' (KM-5); the dominant perspective on British greatness was that of nostalgic contemplation. Already in the late nineteenth century – the 1870s to be specific – it was evident that 'Britain would eventually be caught up and passed' in medicine, steel production, manufacturing, financial capital, and most new technologies (CM-896; BA-65; TI-189, 226, 243; U2-16; WR-292).

The Second World War thus merely accelerated Britain's decline. Frequently mentioned manifestations of this new reality were Britain's dependence on American power in the war (WA-285) and, in the postwar period, subordination to the Americans in the nuclear domain (BA-283; U1-200; WE-596) and in the domain of 'Anglobal' governance:

> In Greece, Americans acted as observers during the Greek elections and, in February 1947, when Britain was no longer able to afford support, President Truman announced that America would take over this commitment in Greece as part of a policy to aid 'free peoples' against totalitarianism. (U1-198)

> British and Commonwealth units served in Korea but most of the troops and equipment were American. (U2-218)

The remarkable continuity of this narrative is evident in the following selection of excerpts taken from textbooks published in, respectively 1977, 1979, 1980, 1987, 1997, and 2008:

> The war of 1939–45 radically altered Britain's position in the world. She was no longer a Great Power, in a globe in which only the USA and the USSR were Great Powers. She was dependent on American credit for survival. (HI-282)

> The 'Big Three' powers, however, were in fact the big two – the USA and the USSR – plus Great Britain. (SC-55)

> After the Second World War, the world only knew about two main powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. (WE-584)

> However financially indebted to the Americans the British might be, there were those who argued patriotically, but not unrealistically, that she could still hold her head high. Thus the *Economist* wrote: Our present needs are the direct consequence of the fact that we fought earliest, that we fought longest, and that we fought hardest. In moral terms we are creditors. (MA-378)

> The USA and the USSR had emerged from the war as the two superpowers. In the 1930s other countries such as Britain and France had been as important in international affairs. However, the war had finally demoted Britain and France to a second division. (CT-253)

> Britain's imperial decline was symbolised by the events of 1947, with the decision to withdraw from India, and the humiliating dependence upon financial aid from the United States. (CR-144)

The image of the Second World War-induced decline and the corollary dependence on the United States was subject only to minimal variations. Some authors of older textbooks were more likely to begrudge the too-smooth rise of American power after 1945, implying that Pax Americana was predicated on Britain's wartime sacrifice. Others located decline in other factors, including the decisive role of the First World War. For example, the German U-boat campaign 'almost brought Britain to her knees' before the United States joined the fray; 'Ever since the war the United States had enjoyed a standard of living that was the marvel and the envy of the rest of the world' (U1-137, 146; U2-67; WR-37; WE-523; cf. WA-286, 357).

The avatar of capitalist modernity

US superiority vis-à-vis Britain was never absolute. Several textbooks constructed the United States as a source of new forms of politics and policy (CP-2). Yet, many of these forms were morally and politically unattractive to the British. 'Race relations' are one case in point; universal healthcare another; in each case, Britain had nothing to learn from America, and America had everything to learn from Britain. The tendency to critically evaluate aspects of the American society was also more common in the more recently published textbooks.

With respect to industrial capitalism, there was no contest, however. A textbook published in 1960 explains that the rise of American power had everything to do with the advent of the 'third stage of the Industrial Revolution,' namely '[a]tomic energy, electricity, and internal combustion engine … aluminum, steel, concrete and plastic' (BA-65). British decline relative to the United States was a century-old phenomenon that had to do with factors including

the inefficient use of capital, lower productivity, short-termism of British managers, traditionalism (i.e., the relative lack of 'social depth of demand'), and the pervasiveness of 'gentlemen's agreements' as opposed to formal rules (MA-54, 284−288, 295).

No textbook missed an opportunity to comment on the size and scale of Britain's transatlantic competitor: 'Around 80 per cent of the vacuum cleaners sold in Britain were made abroad, one American brand leading many people still to talk of "hoovering the carpet," irrespective of the make of vacuum cleaner they employ' (MA-335). And when the Americans 'stopped buying and lending abroad … the Great Slump reached Britain and spread round the world' (U1-146).

As the leader of the modern world, America was a useful benchmark to evaluate the sensibility of British policies during the Cold War; why, for one, would 'Britain's defence expenditure in 1952 [be] higher in per capita terms than that of the United States' (KM-95)? Of all the authors in the primary corpus, the most critical of British policies is Trevor May. Tellingly, however, two of his main reflections on British decline are through American voices:

> If Britain was the first country to enter an industrial world, is it possible that she might be the first to enter a post-industrial one? Such a possibility was discussed by the American economist John Kenneth Galbraith in a BBC interview in 1977: 'Your real problem is that you were the first of the great industrialised nations, and so things happen here first. You are living out the concern for some more leisurely relationship with industrial life that the other people have been discussing for 50 years or more.' In the following year, the London correspondent of the *Washington Post* wrote that 'Britons … appear to be the first citizens of the post-industrial age who are choosing leisure over goods on a large scale.' And in the last week of the decade, the *Sunday Times* wrote: 'As the Seventies began Britain exported £150 worth of manufactures for every £100 we imported. Today we export just £115 for every £100 of imports. We have become self-sufficient in North Sea Oil, but the envy of our industrial rivals has given way to more practical sentiments; selling us their cars, calculators, video recorders, and digital watches. Pessimistic commentators argue that Britain's relative decline may become an absolute decline, as swathes of our manufacturing industry become obliterated by foreign competition. But if the balloon does go up, we shall at least be able to watch and record it in colour, and time it to one-hundredth of a second.' (MA-277)

> As well as having social and economic ambitions, politicians (and others) have diplomatic ones. Britain might have solved her economic problems more easily had she accepted sooner the fact that she had emerged from the war a greatly diminished power, no longer in the same rank as the Soviet Union or the United States. Her leadership of the Commonwealth did not prove an adequate counterweight. In 1962 the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, declared, 'Britain has lost an empire, she has not yet found a role.' That role might have been the leadership of a new Europe, but Britain awoke late to the idea of a European

> Community, and did not in fact enter the European Economic Community until 1973. Politicians found it hard to explain to the public Britain's economic, strategic and global position. Not only did they promise more than they could perform; the public demanded more than it was prepared to pay for. (MA-414)

In this reading, the British, the ruling elites, and masses alike, were victims of their own historical success as well as their own illusions of grandeur.

The only other great power that comes close to America on the modernity front was Germany. The beloved National Insurance Act of 1946, explains a textbook from 1960, was essentially an adaptation of German social legislation introduced in the Bismarck era (BA-151). Indeed, '[i]n 1908, Lloyd George went to Germany to study the practical details of their system of social insurance' (CR-19). German musicians historically influenced English ones (ST-287), and the West German plastic industry impressively reassumed its world-leading position within eight years (ST-323). By the 2000s, Germany was the most important country in Europe (LY-168) and one of the world's leading economies (LY-24).

The French Other can be found in this rubric, too, albeit as an exception that proves the rule: '*Even* France was outpacing us in motor vehicle production' (TI-170, emphasis added). None of the textbooks sampled, not even those from the Attlee years, showed any interest in French dirigisme, or state-led economic development, as a model for negotiating capitalist modernity. To the extent that Britain imagined its capitalism as 'liberal,' 'market-oriented,' or 'Anglo-Saxon,' this finding, too, helps explain the favorable attitude towards America relative to Britain's European peers.

Friend and ally

Apart for select 'old Commonwealth countries,' Britain viewed itself as having only one close friend and close ally: the United States. This was evident in all textbooks that mentioned either diplomacy or America. Five textbooks deployed the term 'special relationship,' and did so either positively or neutrally (MA, LY, KM, CT, SC).

Typically, this friendship/alliance/special relationship was presented as a function of 'military realities as well as on sentiment and diplomatic expediency' (SC-106). In all but two cases, the phenomenon was dated back to the Second World War and specifically to the destroyers-for-bases and lease-lend agreements. The sole American-authored book foregrounded the immediate period *after* the war instead: 'Knowing that the struggle with Communism was worldwide and that her own powers were limited, the United States expected Britain to shoulder its share of the burden of peace-keeping not only in Europe but in the Mediterranean and in vast expanses east of Suez where responsibility

still came naturally to the British' (WE-584–585). But these military realities could have taken a different path. Two excerpts from Unstead:

> During the critical years Britain remained the close ally of the United States; this was not necessarily inevitable because, from 1945 until 1951, there was a Labour Government in Britain and Labour had for a long time tended to be suspicious of America and sympathetic towards Russia. (U2-216)

> Russia's inflexible attitude drove Bevin to abandon his hopes of establishing good relations with the Soviet Union and to work ever more closely with the United States. (U2-227)

The same author also emphasizes personal friendships between select British prime ministers and American presidents – Roosevelt and Churchill, Kennedy and Macmillan – and even some generals, like Montgomery and Bradley (U1-184, 188; U2-246). When such friendships were not there, the alliance suffered – 'President Truman had not previously shared the innermost secrets of the Anglo-American alliance, and for the time being, he had to rely upon the views of his States Department and Service chiefs' (U1-193). It was the same situation for when secrets were kept as opposed to shared, as in the Suez Crisis (U1-222).

The notion that the alliance was a function of shared culture and social ties was generally secondary to military and diplomatic goings-on. Exceptionally, one textbook located the origins of the Anglo-American friendship in the nineteenth century, citing British emigration and ideas about racial affinity as causes (WR-305). Looking at the same period, another put an accent on civil society connections ('many Americans saw Britain as a spiritual home') alongside common banking interests and shared imperial goals in the Far East (WE-450). In the same vein, a point was sometimes made that Churchill and/ or Macmillan had American – not 'American-born' – mothers (WR-446).

Crucially, not all textbooks equated the alliance with friendship, and most of them spelled out that Britain was a rule taker. Faced with limited strategic choices, Victorian-era policy makers consistently appeased the Americans, from the 1850 Clayton–Bulwer Treaty onwards (WE-451). The Second World War only deepened the trend. Lend-Lease was 'a mixture of friendly generosity and hard-as-nails business dealing' (MA-370; see also U2-188; RH-253; WR-442), Roosevelt was suspicious of 'British intentions' (WE-571), and American trade policies were hypocritical:

> The Americans adopted what in retrospect appears to be a curious double standard over questions of international trade. They violently objected to the British system of imperial preferences and to the sterling balances accumulated by Britain during the war; yet they felt entirely free to defend their own high tariff barriers at a time when they had no possible economic rivals. (SC-59)

As one textbook from 1989 puts it, 'a high-level consensus remains at both elite and popular level about the Atlantic Alliance. Membership of the EEC commands wide acceptance, if little enthusiasm, and the same is probably true of the Commonwealth' (KM-108).

To be sure, there were times when the Atlantic Alliance commanded little enthusiasm. If the British people had known that the British generals were so often sidelined during the Second World War, they would have shown more resentment towards those 'overpaid and oversexed' American troops stationed in the United Kingdom (WR-443). The United States was not cheered on during the Vietnam War (WE-600) or at Greenham Common, a twenty-year-long and largely women-driven protest against the stationing of American nuclear cruise missiles at a Berkshire air base (a 'graphic example of the extraparliamentary protests against government policy that were a feature of late twentieth-century politics,' as LY-237 describes it). As in the case of the superior world power image, the alliance and friendship with the United States were not absolute.

IMAGES OF SPECIALNESS

Britain's 'textbook America' was at once more powerful (politically, economically, and militarily), more advanced (economically and sometimes culturally), and therefore more respected in international society (as a superpower and leader of the West) than Britain itself. What is more, these images persisted throughout the period under study.

Select empire/Commonwealth polities were configured as Britain's close friends in a similarly consistent fashion. *All* textbooks from the 1950s and 1960s were *explicitly* favorable to the 'old' Commonwealth, as were *most* textbooks published in later decades. Consider Richards and Hunt's *Illustrated History*, whose third or 1983 edition is in the secondary sample. There, the authors dedicate an entire chapter to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, arguing that 'Britain's membership of the EEC has made trade with Commonwealth countries less important to her and has made serious difficulties for some of them' (RW-346).

However, America hardly lagged behind in closeness and trustworthiness to the 'neo-Britains' like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 'Most of the hard-working, sturdy British men and women mainly emigrated to Australia and New Zealand, to Canada and to the United States, for Africa had not yet begun to exert its fascination upon white settlers' (U1-87; see also WA-285). Indeed, if we go by some of the textbooks in the sample, Churchill's mid-century argument about the 'fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples' was not a fantasy.[40]

Beyond this Anglosphere circle, there was only France, but always as an ally, rather than a friend. Indeed, the surveyed textbooks configured Britain's relationship with 'Europe' as an extension of the French alliance, which in turn was understood as inseparable from the German Question (e.g. SC-80). One textbook presented Britain's position between Europe and America as zero-sum: 'Britain's attitude to Europe at the end of the Second World War was haughty, and reflected feelings that were themselves a compound of sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth and a desire to foster the "special relationship" which it was thought existed with the United States' (MA-402). Related, while the meanings of 'Europe' were always diverse, in politics the Anglo-European relationship was narrated as deeply fraught. 'Brussels,' meaning the EEC and the EU, represented a centralizing, anti-democratic force, with a historic tendency of anti-British behavior, as epitomized in the figures of Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Delors (SC-299; WA-64–65, 152). Indeed, only once the reasonable Georges Pompidou succeeded the intransigent de Gaulle, observed one textbook author, could Britain and France normally cooperate; the codevelopment of the Concorde supersonic passenger jet being an example (TI-173, 255).

Existing research on how British history textbooks construct Europe and European integration largely confirms the findings. Consider Medrano's *Framing Europe*. First, unlike the equivalent German and Spanish textbooks, British textbooks never once constructed the EU as a desirable counterweight to the United States. Second, they were much more likely to see the EU as inefficient, over-bureaucratized, unaccountable, and, especially 'threatening to national identity.' Third, the lack of identification with Europe was related to the strong identification with 'the lands and peoples of the British Empire.'[41] Indeed, 'the hierarchy of proximity that one finds in Spanish and German contemporary history textbooks – Nation, Europe, the Rest of the world – is not so clearly delineated in British contemporary history.'[42] Last but not least, Europe was never once presented as superordinate to Britain; quite the contrary.[43]

Sakki's analysis of history and civics textbooks published in England since the 1980s finds that Europe and specifically European integration carried a high degree of ambivalence – whether to be in or out or threatened or not. Among different facets of European integration only the economic side is presented as positive, while all others are evaluated as either neutral or, more commonly, negative. Indeed, Sakki concludes that 'in the English textbooks the story of European integration is either silenced or controversial,' and that 'the British are portrayed as the outsiders of Europe.'[44]

Sakki's analysis of the temporal transformation of the English textbooks since the 1980s finds this ambivalence to be fairly constant. The following observation is entirely in line with the above discussion: 'The European integration process is approached through a metaphor of an island, and through two different kinds of geopolitical positionings: Britain's difficult relations with

France and its special relations with the United States. Europe appears as a French construction; it is objectified and personified in France and in its former president Charles de Gaulle.[45] Sakki also finds that the history textbooks are harder on Europe than civics textbooks: While historians represent European integration as functional, they also construct Europe as 'difficult and ambivalent.'[46] This is in sharp contrast to the equivalent French representations, which are less determined by the language of national interest instrumentality and more by references to a shared postwar collective memory, shared values, and a common European heritage.

Equally relevant are the following conclusions in Sakki's study: (1) that 'the EU–US relations were characterized as an alliance in the English textbooks and as an economic rivalry in the French textbooks';[47] and (2) that the French textbooks constructed Europe as a French project 'in light of the post-war context where France had lost its superpower status in world politics, and Europe was seen as a way of restoring it.'[48]

A similar claim might be made about British textbooks in relation to the positive construction of America. Britain spent much of the period under study declining relative to other states and fretting about that decline. An exceptionally special alliance with America could therefore be seen as a way of halting the decline since it provided Britain with a means to pursue a world power role even if it involved some compromises on 'independence.' This would suggest that it is a desire for greatness that drives support for the view of the United States as a cross between a friendly and superior Other on the one hand, and an extension of the British Self on the other. From this perspective, Britain's 'textbook America' is partly about Britain's great power status, not simply about any number of individual or integrated stereotypical images.

Research on 'popular nationalist British Euroskepticism' in history also confirms the findings of the study. Daddow has argued that Euroskepticism thrives in the context of a 'history industry' that glorifies military history and of historical empiricism, while suppressing interest in popular peacetime history and, among mainstream historians, in (postmodernist) reflexivity.[49] The 'textbook America' reconstructed here can be safely placed within these coordinates. What is more, as Daddow suggests, there may well be a zero-sum relationship in modernist national history between (less positive) attitudes to Europe and (more positive) attitudes to America.[50]

Moving on the question of causation, rather than being correlationally and/or mechanistically linked to an effect, discourses constitute reality in the sense that they shape what is intelligible, thinkable, and imaginable at any given moment. This is why the findings presented in this chapter could be useful to both historians and social scientists: as part of broader social knowledge, images and identity discourses contain preconceptions that structure policies and daily practices, specifically by shaping what is or is not taken for granted.[51]

This has direct implications in a number of areas. For example, in international affairs, research shows that nations who continuously represent each other as friends are far more likely to develop loyalty and trust towards each other, a dependable effect of which is the maintenance of more cooperative relations.[52] All this being said, images and identity discourses should be seen as but one part of the 'emergent' configuration of ideas, institutions, networks, practices, events, agents, and structures that impact political outcomes. Indeed, research that aims for greater determinacy in explaining the relationship between the constructions of America in British history on the one hand, and the UK government's support for US foreign policies on the other, would likely have to borrow from not only multiple theoretical traditions in international relations, but also from multiple traditions in conceptualizing causation itself.[53]

As for the 'stickiness' of images, this is rooted in cognitive biases; a tendency to ignore, put aside, or temporize contradictory pieces of information being a common one. Related, national identity discourses change slowly, if at all, because they are naturalized via everyday social representations and practices and also because they are distributed across so many individuals, especially among the masses. Indeed, from America's abrupt termination of Lend-Lease to the Suez Crisis to the Vietnam War to the Nixon Shock to George W. Bush, there has been no shortage of uncertain, emotionally charged and therefore potentially image-changing developments. However, it appears that successive generations of textbook authors refused to use *any* of these developments to *significantly* modify their textbook Americas.[54] However, it could be that the real shock is only taking place at the time of this writing: the radical US presidency of Donald Trump. Either alone or in conjunction with 'Brexit,' the Trump presidency has led many commentators to lament the damage to, and even the collapse of, the so-called rules-based international order, of which the special relationship was a key part. One way of assessing the influence of this shift on Britain's perceptions of America would be to look at British – or just English? – history textbooks from the 2020s.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to contribute to the study of the cultural and sociopolitical underpinning of the UK–US special relationship by analyzing how 'America' was constructed in British history textbooks from the 1950s to the 2010s. My main finding is a dependable reoccurrence of three mainline images: America as a superior peer, America as the avatar of capitalist modernity, America as an ally and close friend. While many constructions, both within and outside these three images, have shifted over time and across issue areas, America was

consistently evaluated as less distant and less negative than France, Germany, and more broadly Europe. Only the 'old' Commonwealth was comparable to America on valence.

This is an important finding if we agree with those who argue that domestically held ideas influence the constitution of alliances, including the special ones. After all, policy makers will find it easier to marshal domestic support for certain foreign policies when these are consistent with the prevailing notions of how we are, who they and others are, were, or aspire to be. But if a foreign policy is inconsistent with a country's identity discourses, decision makers will find it hard to receive support for them from their publics and electorates.

Future research could consider British history textbooks published in the first half of the twentieth century or even before Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. This study would be of use to those interested in the pre-Second World War 'origins' of the special relationship since it would help localize the time period in which American superiority, leadership, and friendship all became taken for granted in British school history.[55] Another promising research direction would be to expand and situate these textbook-based observations against the equivalents derived from analyses of leadership statements, news media, novels, cinema, television, public opinion, and other sources. The more we get to know about stereotypical patterns of Othering in the British society over time, the better our chances of understanding British foreign policy, including the persistent support for the special relationship.

NOTES

1 For excellent research assistance, I am thankful to Abby Caldwell, Kazim Rizvi, and Erin van Weerdhuizen; for comments and criticisms, to Andrew Mycock, Robert M. Hendershot, Steve Marsh, and the anonymous reviewers. All errors remain mine.

2 Srdjan Vucetic, 'British National Identity and the Anglo-American Special Relationship', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 14:3 (2016), 272–292.

3 Dan Porat, 'A Contemporary Past: History Textbooks as Sites of National Memory', *International Review of History Education*, 4 (2002), 36–55. On the relationship on memory and history in this context, see Andrew Mycock, 'After Empire: The Politics of History Education in a Post-Colonial World', in Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, and Maria Grever (eds), *Palgrave Handbook of Historical Culture and Education* (New York: Palgrave, 2017), 391–440, 400.

4 Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith (eds), *The Politics of the Textbook* (New York: Routledge, 1991); James Arthur, Ian Davies, Terry Haydn, David Kerr, and Andrew Wrenn, *Citizenship Through Secondary History* (London: Routledge-Falmer, 2001); Maria Grever and Tina van der Vlies, 'Why National Narratives Are Perpetuated: Promising Reorientations in History Textbook Research', *London Review of Education*, 15:2, 286–301; and Helen M. Madeley, *History as a School of Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920).

5 Stuart Foster, 'Dominant Traditions in International Textbook Research and Revision,' *Education Inquiry* 2:1 (2011), 7.

6 Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, and Maria Grever, 'Introduction: Historical Cultures and Education in Transition,' in Carretero *et al.*, *Palgrave Handbook of Historical Culture and Education*, 2, 16.

7 Sheryl Lightfoot, 'Selective Endorsement without Intent to implement: Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere,' *International Journal of Human Rights*, 16:1 (2012), 100–122. See also Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); and Srdjan Vucetic, 'The Anglosphere Beyond Security,' in Ben Wellings and Andrew Mycock (eds), *The Anglosphere: Continuity, Dissonance and Location* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 77–91.

8 Anne Hickling-Hudson and Roberta Ahlquist, 'Contesting the Curriculum in the Schooling of Indigenous Children in Australia and the United States: From Eurocentrism to Culturally Powerful Pedagogies,' *Comparative Education Review*, 47:1 (2003), 64–89; Mark Sheehan, 'The Place of "New Zealand" in the New Zealand History Curriculum,' *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 42:5 (2010), 671–691; Anna Clark, 'Teaching the Nation's Story: Comparing Public Debates and Classroom Perspectives of History Education in Australia and Canada,' *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 41:6 (2009): 745–62.

9 Compare 'How Texas Teaches History,' *New York Times*, 21 October 2015; Stuart J. Foster, 'The Struggle for American Identity: Treatment of Ethnic Groups in United States History Textbooks,' *History of Education*, 28:3 (1999), 251–227; and Lawrence D. Reddick, 'Racial Attitudes in American History Textbooks of the South,' *Journal of Negro History*, 19:3 (1934), 225–265.

10 Foster, 'Dominant Traditions,' 13. See also Yiting Chu, 'The Power of Knowledge: A Critical Analysis of the Depiction of Ethnic Minorities in China's Elementary Textbooks,' *Race Ethnicity and Education*, 18:4 (2015), 469–487.

11 Carretero *et al.*, *Palgrave Handbook of Historical Culture and Education*, Part I.

12 Foster, 'Dominant Traditions,' 13.

13 Dan Porat, '"It's Not Written Here, But This Is What Happened": Students' Cultural Comprehension of Textbook Narratives on the Israeli–Arab Conflict,' *American Educational Research Journal*, 41 (2004), 963–996; Maria Grever, Terry Haydn, and Kees Ribbens, 'Identity and School History: The Perspective of Young People from the Netherlands and England,' *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 55:1 (2008), 1–19. See also Maria Grever, Terry Haydn, and Kees Ribbens, 'Pupil Perspectives on the Purposes and Benefits of Studying History in High School: A View from the UK,' *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 42:2 (2010), 241–61.

14 Carretero *et al.*, 'Introduction,' 19; Rhys Andrews, Catherine McGlynn, and Andrew Mycock, 'Students' Attitudes Towards History: Does Self-Identity Matter?,' *Educational Research*, 51:3 (2009), 365–377; and Grever *et al.*, 'Pupil Perspectives.'

15 Deutsche Welle, 'Turkey, Hungary and Poland: The Politics of School Textbooks,' 19 October 2017, www.dw.com/en/turkey-hungary-and-poland-the-politics-of-school-textbooks/a-41032191 (accessed 18 February 2018).

16 Carretero *et al.*, 'Introduction,' 2.

17 Robert Phillips, 'History Teaching, Nationhood and Politics in England and Wales in the Late Twentieth Century: A Historical Comparison,' *History of Education*, 28:3 (1999), 351–363. See also Denis Shemilt, 'The Caliph's Coin: The Currency of

Narrative Frameworks in History Teaching,' in Peter N. Sterns, Peter Seixas, and Sam Wineburg (eds), *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 83–101.

18 For forays into these debates, see, for example, Robert Guyver, 'Michael Gove's History Wars 2010–2014: The Rise, Fall and Transformation of a Neoconservative Dream,' *Agora* 49:4 (2014), 4–11; for 'Ethics and Empire,' see 'An Open Letter from Oxford scholars,' *The Conversation*, 19 December 2017, https://theconversation.com/ethics-and-empire-an-open-letter-from-oxford-scholars-89333 (accessed 20 December 2017).

19 Mycock, 'After Empire.'

20 *Ibid.* See also Carretero *et al.*, 'Introduction,' 20.

21 Sheldon, 'History Textbook,' 6. Postcolonial amnesia can be found in assorted practices of collective guilt, shame, atonement, and denial as well as key UK institutions and laws.

22 Susanne Grindel, 'The End of Empire: Colonial Heritage and the Politics of Memory in Britain,' *Journal of Educational Media, Memory and Society*, 5:1 (2013), 33–49; Matthew L. Wilkinson, 'The Concept of the Absent Curriculum: The Case of the Muslim Contribution and the English National Curriculum for History,' *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 46 (2014), 419–440.

23 See Tony Ballantyne, 'The Changing Shape of the Modern British Empire and its Historiography,' *Historical Journal*, 53 (2010), 429–452; and Tina van der Vlies, 'Echoing National Narratives in English History Textbooks,' in Carretero *et al.*, *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*, 243–258.

24 Foster, 'Dominant Traditions,' 13.

25 More information is on the project website, see https://nationalidentitydatabase.wordpress.com (accessed 21 December 2017). This database is likely to be of interest to textbook researchers, too, for as van der Vlies has argued, narrative continuity and discontinuity in history textbooks are predicated not simply upon state intervention in history curricula, but also, intertextually, on the broader circulation of popular cultural forms, such as poems and movies. Van der Vlies, 'Echoing National Narratives.'

26 Inari Sakki, 'Raising European Citizens: Constructing European identities in French and English Textbooks,' *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 4:1 (2016), 444–472, at 466, n. 1.

27 Nicola Sheldon, 'History Textbook from 1965–2010,' *History in Education Project*, June 2011, 1–2, www.history.ac.uk/projects/research/history-in-education (accessed 21 January 2018).

28 Marjorie Reeves, *Why History?* (London: Longman, 1980), 52, 67–8.

29 Juan Diez Medrano selects one textbook for each decade between the 1950s and 1990 that adhered to O Level and GCSE examination guidelines, but his sample (of five textbooks) does not overlap with mine, however. Juan Diez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 271, 275.

30 David Cannadine, Jenny Keating, and Nicola Sheldon, *The Right Kind of History: Teaching the Past in Twentieth-century England* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2012).

31 For details, see www.history.org.uk (accessed 21 January 2018).

32 Keith A. Crawford and Stuart J. Foster, 'The Political Economy of History Textbook Publishing in England,' in Jason Nicholls (ed.), *School History Textbooks Across Cultures: International debates and perspectives* (Oxford, UK: Symposium Books, 2006), 93–105. It was only *after* I assembled my sample that I discovered the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and its excellent catalogue of textbooks.

33 Carretero *et al.*, 'Introduction,' 20.

34 Alyssa Maraj Grahame did the text selection for the 2000s, I did the rest.

35 For details, see Srdjan Vucetic, 'A How-to Guide for Project Contributors,' December 2015, https://nationalidentitydatabase.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/srdjan-how-to.pdf (accessed 21 July 2017). On where this project falls in terms of (positivist) validity–reliability trade-offs, see Bentley Allan, 'Recovering Discourses of National Identity,' in Ted Hopf and Bentley Allan (eds), *Making Identity Count: Building a National Identity Database* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 20–44; and in terms of scholarship on 'everyday nationalism,' see Srdjan Vucetic and Ted Hopf, 'Everyday Nationalism and Making Identity Count,' *Nationalities Papers*, forthcoming. Many researchers in sociocultural history and comparative education have analyzed textbooks via discourse analysis, either alone or in conjunction with other methodologies. See, for example, Sakki, 'Raising European Citizens.'

36 Richard K. Herrmann, 'Perceptions and Image Theory in International Relations,' in Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 403–433.

37 Dana Lindaman and Kyle Ward, *History Lessons: How Textbooks From Around the World Portray U.S. History* (New York: New Press, 2004).

38 Their analysis also deals with only four British textbooks published between 1998 and 2001, one of which is a treatment of Tudor Britain.

39 For more on these counts and their interpretations, see the series of 'British National Identity Reports, 1950–2010' that I authored or co-authored under the auspices of the MIC project, https://srdjanvucetic.wordpress.com/research/id (accessed 21 September 2018); and Srdjan Vucetic. *Greatness and Decline: National Identity and British Foreign Policy* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021). My use of the clunky phrase empire/Commonwealth is meant to capture the variation in the ways the British world was configured over time. For one, only textbooks published in the 1940s evaluated the empire positively. All others either minimized imperialism or declared it an economic and/or moral folly. For example, Winston Churchill declared, 'I see little glory in an Empire which can rule the waves and is unable to flush its own sewers' (MA-93).

40 For context, see Srdjan Vucetic, 'The Fulton Address as Racial Discourse,' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017), 96–115.

41 Medrano, *Framing Europe*, respectively, 253, 255, 258, and chap. 8. 'Decline,' in contrast, does not seem to be related to anti-EU frames, 254.

42 *Ibid.*, 223.

43 *Ibid.*, 225.

44 Sakki, 'Raising European Citizens,' her sample of textbooks (N = 9) does not overlap with mine.

45 *Ibid.*

46 *Ibid.*, 463.

47 *Ibid.*, 464.

48 *Ibid.*, 456.

49 Oliver Daddow, 'Euroscepticism and History Education in Britain,' *Government and Opposition*, 41:1 (2006), 64–85.

50 *Ibid.*, 67. See also Oliver Daddow, 'America, Britain and European Integration: Exposing the Cracks in the "Special Relationship,"' in Agnès Alexandre-Collier (ed.), *La 'Relation Spéciale' Royaume-Uni/Etats-Unis: Entre mythe et réalité* (Nantes: Éditions du Temps, 2002), 66–82.

51 See, for example, see Medrano, *Framing Europe*, 5–7, 65, 256–8.

52 Felix Berenskoetter, 'Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International,' *Millennium* 35 (2007), 647–676; and David Haglund, 'Is There a "Strategic Culture" of the Special Relationship? Contingency, Identity, and the Transformation of Anglo-American Relations,' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Contemporary Anglo-American Relations: A 'Special Relationship'?* (London: Routledge, 2013), 26–51.

53 On the former, see Srdjan Vucetic, 'Identity and Foreign Policy,' *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (2017), http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-435 (accessed 22 November 2018); on the latter, see Marie E. Desrosiers and Srdjan Vucetic, 'Causal Claims and the Study of Ethnic Conflict,' *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 3:4 (2018), 483–497.

54 Contrast this with controversial historians who argue that the special relationship is a scheme to turn Britain in what George Orwell used to call 'Airstrip One.' See Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–1957* (New York: Harcourt, 1995); and Edward Ingram, 'The Wonderland of the Political Scientist,' *International Security*, 22:1 (1997), 53–63.

55 I am one of those, see Srdjan Vucetic, 'A Racialized Peace? How Britain and the US Made Their Relationship Special,' *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7:3 (2011), 403–421.

APPENDIX

A note on textbook selection and textbook bibliography

The four textbooks representing, respectively, the 1950s and 1960s were selected for their focus on 'recent British history,' meaning dealing with England and/or 'Britain in the world' in the period from the middle years of the nineteenth century onwards. All four were used in grammar schools and secondary modern schools – retrospective names for academically oriented secondary school types – in England and Wales.

For the 1970s, which in England and Wales included the rise of comprehensive schools, I selected David Titley's *Machines, Money and Men*, the first edition of what was then a path-breaking textbook covering social and economic history of Great Britain from 1700 to the 1960, and Patrick Larkin's *English History for Certificate Classes*, which covered the 1789–1939 period and catered to 'the examination work in English history studied by Grammar and Secondary schools up to G.C.E. Ordinary level … [and] students working to Advanced level' (p. 7). For this selection, 'tractability' played a role in the sense that I was unable to source, in either quick or reasonably inexpensive fashion, the following sources: Richard Cootes's *Britain Since 1700* (Longmans, 1st ed., 1968), Peter Mauger and Leslie Smith's *The British People 1902–1968* (Heinemann, 1st ed., 1969), and John Ray's *Britain and the Modern World* (Heinemann, 1st ed., 1969).

For the next decade, I went with the fourth edition of C. P. Hill's *British Economic and Social History*, and the first edition of Alan Sked and Chris Cook's *Postwar Britain: A Political History*. Both textbooks were widely used throughout the 1980s. Thematically they completed each other: The former focused on 'British economic life, in trade, industry, agriculture, and finance' (p. 236), and the latter on political institutions and policies. Tractability played a role here, too, in the case of Paul Richardson's *Britain, Europe, and the Modern World, 1918–1977* (Heinemann, 1977). I also 'audited' Tony Howarth's *Twentieth Century History: The World Since 1900* (1979; 2nd ed. by Josh Brooman, 1987).

Published by Longman, and 'by arrangement with the British Broadcasting Company' as a television series for schools, the Howarth textbook was probably the most popular history textbook in the 1980s but I did not use it here because of the dearth of British content – none of its forty-eight chapters covered exclusively Britain and only one of the corresponding BBC series programs was entitled 'Britain Alone,' which was a mere section in chapter 30.

For the 1990s, I selected, first, *An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1760–1970* by Trevor May, a new textbook by Longman that appeared on the market in 1987; second, a short pamphlet by Peter Connolly and Barry Phillips, *Britain 1900–1939*, published in 1989 by Spartacus Educational Publishers; third, *Consensus Politics from Attlee to Major* by Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, two professors of politics, published by Blackwell in 1989. I selected three items instead of two because the last two were short and covered non-overlapping twentieth-century periods. All three aimed to help secondary school students with modal examination topics, such as 'the social problems of industrialization' and 'the return to gold in 1925' (May) or 'the mixed economy' and 'the welfare state' (Kavanagh and Morris). In retrospect, I would have replaced Connolly and Phillips and Kavanagh and Morris with a single secondary school textbook, specifically Howard Martin's *Britain's Since 1800: Towards the Welfare State*, published by Macmillan in 1988.

For the 2000s, the textbooks selected were Ben Walsh's *Modern World History*, a full-color, first edition core text for GCSE published in 1996, and Christopher Culpin and Brian Turner's *Making Modern Britain: British Social and Economic History from the 18th Century to the Present Day*, a core text covering all GCSE British economic and social history syllabuses published by Collins Educational in 1997 (its first edition appeared in 1987). In the Walsh case, the focus was on the Britain chapters (chapters 2 and 3, focusing on the 1906–18 period) by Walsh (2001), and in the Culpin–Turner case on the coverage of the twentieth century only.

For the 2010s, the selection was done by my collaborator Alyssa Maraj Grahame. She selected *Access to History Britain 1945–2007* by Michael Lynch (2008) and *AQA History AS: Unit 1 Britain, 1906–1951* by Chris Collier and Chris Rowe (2008). Both textbooks were used for exam specifications at GCSE (fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds) and A levels (seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds), which were, and are, qualifications for advancement in education in England and Wales.

Selection for the secondary corpus followed fewer rules other than evidence of high usage in history teaching. Two selections are elementary school (pre-K12) textbooks by Robert Unstead, a well-known twentieth-century author; two are university-level textbooks – one by Robert Webb, the only American author in the sample, one by John Williams and Glyndwr Ramsden – and one is an illustrated textbook used in both primary and secondary schools.

PRIMARY CORPUS: FIFTEEN HIGH SCHOOL-LEVEL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Barker, W. A., G. R. St Aubyn, and R. L. Ollard. *A General History of England 1832–1960*, 2nd ed. London: A & C Black, 1960.

Carter, E. H., and R. A. F. Mears. *A History of Britain 1876–1953*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.

Collier, C. *AQA AS History Britain 1906–1951: Unit 1*, ed. S. Waller. Cheltenham, UK: Nelson Thornes, 2008.

Connolly, P., and B. Phillips. *Britain, 1900–1939*. Southwick, UK: Spartacus Educational Publishers, 1989.

Culpin, C., and B. Turner. *Making Modern Britain: British Social and Economic History from the 18th Century to the Present Day*. London: Collins Educational, 1987.

Hill, C. P. *British Economic and Social History 1700–1975*, 4th ed. London: Edward Arnold, 1977.

Kavanagh, D., and P. Morris. *Consensus Politics from Attlee to Thatcher*, 1st ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

Larkin, P. J. *English History for Certificate Classes 1789–1939.* London: Hulton Educational, 1964.

Lynch, M. *Access to History: Britain 1945–2007*, 1st ed. London: Hodder Education, 2008.

May, T. *An Economic & Social History of Britain: 1760–1970.* 1st ed. Harlow, UK: Longman, 1987.

Rayner, R. *A Short History of Britain.* London: Longman, 1948.

Sked, A., and C. Cook. *Post-War Britain: A Political History*, 1st ed. Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, 1979.

Strong, C., and C. Frederick. *History of Britain and the World, Book Five: The Twentieth Century and the Contemporary World*, 2nd ed. London: University of London Press, 1956.

Titley, D. P. *Machines, Money & Men.* London: Hart-Davis, 1979.

Walsh, B. *GCSE Modern World History*, 1st ed. London: John Murray, 1996.

SECONDARY CORPUS: FIVE NON-HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Richards, D., and J. W. Hunt. *An Illustrated History of Modern Britain 1783–1980*, 3rd ed. Essex, UK: Longman, 1983.

Unstead, R. J. *A Century of Change Bk. 4*, London: A & C. Black, 1963; reprinted with corrections 1967.

Unstead, R. J. *The Twentieth Century: Looking at History Bk. 5*, London: A & C. Black, 1966; Reprinted with corrections 1970.

Webb, R. K. *Modern England: From the 18th Century to the Present*, 2nd ed. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980.

Williams, G., and J. Ramsden. *Ruling Britannia: A Political History of Britain, 1688–1988*, 1st ed. London: Longman, 1990.

3

FILM FOLLOWS THE FLAG

Cultural and economic relations between the British film industry and Hollywood

JONATHAN STUBBS

In March 2009, just months after the world's financial systems began to unravel, Prime Minister Gordon Brown traveled to Washington to meet President Barack Obama. Despite their common interests, the disparity between the two leaders at this point in their careers was quite apparent: Obama was highly popular both at home and abroad, whereas Brown had been badly damaged by the economic crisis and would be out of office the following year. Surely recognizing that he had the most to gain from their meeting, Brown presented Obama with an ornamental penholder carved out of timber from a Victorian 'anti-slavery' ship, HMS *Gannet*. The gift was intended to complement the Oval Office's iconic desk, which had been built out of oak from HMS *Resolute*, a British Navy vessel of the same era. Adding historical resonance, the desk itself had been a British gift: it was presented under rather different circumstances to President Rutherford B. Hayes by Queen Victoria in 1880. For good measure, Brown also gave Obama a first edition of Sir Martin Gilbert's seven-volume biography of Winston Churchill. In return, Obama presented Brown with a set of twenty-five Hollywood films on DVD.[1] To make matters worse, it was likely that Obama's DVDs would have been unusable outside North America due to region-locking software – a tool designed to give American media corporations greater control over the global distribution of their intellectual property.

The stark asymmetry of this exchange was not lost on commentators in the British press, and for some it provided further evidence that Anglo-American relations were once again in terminal decline. Indeed, the event resonated with Alex Danchev's description of the 'special relationship' as the 'exploitation of history for the present purposes, practiced religiously … by the weaker partner.'[2] Brown's apparently hapless offering sought to evoke a period when Anglo-American relations were closer and more mutually rewarding, but this appeal

to a shared past was apparently snubbed. However, Obama's political use of Hollywood films might also be seen as a tacit acknowledgment of Hollywood's prominent informal contribution to American diplomacy and soft power over the past century. His choice of films – based on the American Film Institute's 'greatest American films of all time' list – also highlighted the particularly close relationship between American and British film culture. Four of the twenty-five films had British-born directors (Charlie Chaplin, David Lean, and Alfred Hitchcock twice) and three of them were filmed using British studios (*Star Wars* (1977), *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1967), and *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962)).[3] Thus, while Brown's gifts located the 'special relationship' in the late nineteenth century and the Second World War, Obama's gift evoked (quite unintentionally, it's fair to assume) a different Anglo-American relationship, one based in the long-term economic interaction and cultural exchange between the British and American film industries.

This chapter looks closely at this dynamic but highly uneven interaction. The specter of Hollywood features strongly in writing about British cinema history, but Britain has generally been given a lower profile in historical accounts of American film. In part, this reflects the general imbalance of Anglo-American cultural and economic relations in the twentieth century and beyond. But it is also evidence of a broader tendency to overlook the extent to which American film production has been embedded within transnational forces. The relationship between British and American filmmaking has often been mutually beneficial. The British export market and British-controlled distribution networks were essential for Hollywood's global expansion, and American finance has frequently been a vital resource for the undercapitalized British film production sector. The representation of America in British cinema, and vice versa, has also contributed to an energetic cultural dialogue between the two nations. Most notably, Hollywood representations of British culture – from *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1935) and *Mrs Miniver* (1942) to *Mary Poppins* (1964) and *Braveheart* (1995) – have been a commercial mainstay in the American film industry. At the same time, while American film exports have generally dominated British cinemas, the lucrative US market has generally been out of reach to British film companies. More recently, British policies designed to attract and accommodate American investment have effectively transformed much of Britain's film sector into a service industry catering to high-budget Hollywood productions.

The first two sections of the chapter examine the international growth of the American film industry in the period following the First World War, the popularity of Hollywood films in the lucrative British and British Empire markets, and the development of retaliatory policies designed to protect the British film industry from being overrun by American imports. The third section looks at the impact of the Second World War on Anglo-American film relations, particularly the use of cinema in securing a political alliance between the two

nations. The fourth section examines America's postwar assault on protectionist film policy as US capital flowed into Britain and Hollywood exporters rebuilt lost markets. In parallel, the fifth section addresses the postwar internationalization of the American film industry and the development of government policy that incentivized the outsourcing of Hollywood production to Britain. Finally, the chapter examines contemporary American film and the continuing effects of US investment in Britain's film industry. In this way, the chapter appraises the intersecting cultural and economic forces that have regulated Anglo-American relations in the film industry. It is a relationship that has been played out on the screen, but also in the off-screen negotiations that make cinema such a rich site of cultural exchange.

THE FIRST TRANSATLANTIC CROSSINGS

The close relationship between the American and British film industries can be traced back to the very beginning of the twentieth century. At a time when European films still dominated nickelodeons in the United States, Britain became the staging post for the American film industry's global expansion. American films were exported to Britain, where they proved highly popular, and local agents used the nation's well-developed shipping routes to re-export them to the rest of the world. London was thus at the center of American international distribution between 1909 and 1916 and it remained the principal point of access to the European market even after this. As a result, American manufacturers were the leading force in the British film market even before the First World War put film production on hold across the continent.[4] As Kristin Thompson notes, the popularity of American films brought short-term profits for British films agents. However, this dependence on imports stymied the development of the British film industry in the longer term by concentrating investment in the lucrative distribution and exhibition sectors at the expense of film production.[5]

In the years that followed, American film producers relocated to California and transformed their manufacturing businesses into vertically integrated corporations, which in turn attracted finance capital from banks. Through their control of the enormous US market, which consisted of an estimated 22,000 cinemas, American producers were able to amortize the costs of film production through domestic admissions alone. International markets nevertheless remained vital to the industry's expansion, bringing in around 35 percent of their revenue during the 1920s.[6] Within this, the largest share consistently came from exports to the British market, which contained around four thousand cinemas by the mid-1920s plus many more screens in imperial territories.[7] American films tended to be dominant in Britain, and this in turn inhibited

the development of domestic film production. In addition, the trade in films moved largely in one direction: American distributors had little incentive to import films from Britain. The relationship between the emerging British and American film industries may thus have been close, but their disparity of size meant that exchange between them was highly uneven from the outset.

The ability of American film companies to compete so strongly overseas was to a large extent facilitated by US government policy. In particular, the Webb–Pomerene Act of 1918 exempted American export associations from antitrust regulation that applied to American companies in their home market. American firms operating in Europe were thus permitted to form cartels and to fix prices. As Victoria De Grazia notes, 'the American film industry has been the bill's greatest beneficiary and remains its most affectionate supporter.'[8] The Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), the film industry's trade association, proceeded to establish a Foreign Division that maintained close contact with both foreign governments and the US State Department with the aim of keeping international distribution channels open and advising studios about foreign censorship.[9] American film producers also benefitted from the laissez-faire attitude of the Federal Trade Commission, which elected not to intervene as the film industry was consolidated as a highly anti-competitive oligopoly, and from trade policies that imposed tariffs on foreign film imports, further protecting the industry's control over its domestic market.[10] This high level of state support was inconsistent with the American government's stated support for free trade, but it tied in with the growing belief that the export of American film was valuable not only as a commodity but also as a means to stimulate the trade of other US goods. The MPPDA were certainly eager to promote the notion that their work aligned with America's broader economic and political goals. In a 1928 report they described the output of the film companies that they represented as 'indirect and undesigned propaganda.' Moreover, the report continued, 'when Rome was mistress of the whole world she had no such method of purveying to her outlying provinces and colonies in Africa, Britain and elsewhere a knowledge of the might, majesty and dominion of Imperial power.'[11] The contradiction between the US government's support for free trade policies overseas and their protection of their domestic market was perhaps not surprising. As Higson and Maltby note, 'American policy-makers denounced state-supported monopolies which inhibited American economic expansion, but they understood the American domination of an economic field to be a demonstration of the triumph of freedom and private enterprise.'[12]

In Britain, meanwhile, the cultural impact of America's dominance in the screen trade became the focus of public debate. As Michele Hilmes put it, Hollywood 'came to stand in for a wide array of culturally denationalizing forces, both within and outside national borders, in the minds and policies

of national gatekeepers.'[13] In this discourse, Mark Glancy notes, the issue of 'Americanization' was 'so inextricably linked with films that no one seemed to recall that it had ever been discussed without reference to the cinema.'[14] In a parliamentary debate from 1925, Lord Newton summarized the concerns shared by many British politicians: 'The Americans realised almost instantaneously that the cinema was a heaven-sent method for advertising themselves, their country, their methods, their wares, their ideas, and even their language, and they have seized upon it as a method of persuading the whole world, civilised and uncivilised, into the belief that America is really the only country which counts.'[15] In the same year the London *Morning Post* warned that 'film is to America what the flag once was to Britain. By its means Uncle Sam may hope someday, if he not be checked in time, to Americanize the world.'[16] As these remarks imply, Britain's capacity to maintain sovereignty over imperial territories was a recurring feature in the debate. At the 1927 Colonial Office Conference the President of the Board of Trade lamented the 'enormous increase of foreign films, and that is almost exclusively American films, on the screens in this country and throughout the Empire,' noting that this provided 'the greatest possible medium through which ideas could … be passed on to the public.'[17] At the same time, such elite criticism did little to diminish the appeal of American films among the British public. Indeed, a case might be made that the egalitarian, individualistic, consumerist values found in many American films of the period allowed audiences – particularly those from working-class backgrounds – the imaginative means to escape the stultifying stratification of British society. As Richard Maltby and Ruth Vasey suggest, 'the use of American idioms and semiotic systems in general offered European audiences the imaginary possibility of an evasion of class distinction.'[18] Something along these lines was implied in 1921 when the British fan magazine *Picturegoer* declared: 'We are partly American. And it is the part of us that should have been American years ago!'[19]

The British government made a decisive and much anticipated intervention in the film market in 1927 with the Films Act. The terms of the Act outlawed the widespread practice of 'block' or 'blind' booking, in which renters provided popular films to exhibitors on the condition that they also accept a series of unseen or even unmade films.[20] These practices enabled American firms to occupy the schedules of British cinemas for one or two years in advance, reducing the space available for British films.[21] The Films Act also imposed quotas on film distributors and cinemas in Britain: distributors were now obliged to carry 7.5 percent British films, while cinemas had to dedicate 5 percent of screen time to British films. These quotas were designed to be increased incrementally until they reached 20 percent in 1936.[22] American distribution companies operating in Britain were thus forced to handle British films, although in some cases they met these requirements through 'quota quickies': ultra-cheap films

produced by the British subsidiaries of American firms in order to pad out their distribution portfolios with the lowest possible outlay.[23] The legislation was also intended to improve the capitalization of the British film industry. As the demand for domestic productions increased, banks and insurance companies found cinema to be a more profitable investment, which in turn helped to create large, vertically integrated film companies such as Gaumont-British.[24] Gaumont-British's control of cinema circuits gave them a certain degree of bargaining power in America, contributing to an increase in the number of British films released in the United States in the 1930s. As Sarah Street notes, 'the fate of British films in America became intertwined with Hollywood's anxiety to maintain access to British screens.'[25] Through government intervention, the relationship between British and American film finally gained a degree of reciprocity.

PLEASING ENGLAND

The introduction of sound in 1927 did little to alter the fundamental dynamic of the Anglo-American film relationship. Whereas the need to supply alternate language versions complicated exports to other territories, American exports to Britain and much of the British Empire faced no such barrier. However, the continuing strength of the British export market, combined with the capacity for sound films to signify national location more clearly than silent films, increased the influence of British culture in Hollywood during this period. Fox Films' *Cavalcade* (1933), adapted from a Noël Coward play, proved to be a key release. Depicting the 'cavalcade' of British history between 1899 and the early 1930s, the film was specifically designed to appeal to British audiences and proceeded to take in an international gross of $4 million, the bulk of which came from Britain and the British Empire.[26] This remarkable success demonstrated the enormous value of the British market, which by the mid-1930s was estimated to make up 30 percent of Hollywood's foreign revenue, and provided a clear incentive for American studios to produce films that appealed to British audiences.[27] The most reliable method for doing this proved to be the representation of Britain and British history, and so the schedules of Hollywood studios during the 1930s began to fill with British-themed material, including *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1935), *The Adventures of Robin Hood* (1938), and *David Copperfield* (1935).[28] Producer David Selznick later claimed that the latter film had been developed at MGM due to 'its inherent appeal to the British market.'[29]

Studio correspondence from the 1930s is littered with similar recommendations. Producing an adaptation of Rudyard Kipling's *Kim*, Louis Lighton stated, 'we want to please England with this picture.'[30] Working on a King Arthur film, Albert Lewin stated that the production 'had a good chance

of recovering its negative cost in England alone' because 'the picture is even more patriotically British than [*Mutiny on the*] *Bounty* or [*Lives of a Bengal*] *Lancer*.'[31] However, it is unlikely that so many British-themed films would have been made in America during this period if they did not also appeal to audiences in America. Representations of the British Empire proved to be particularly popular in the United States, partly due to their incorporation of genre conventions from the Western. In a 1936 review of *The Charge of the Light Brigade* – which creatively relocated Tennyson's poem to India's north-west frontier – the critic of the *New York Times* declared, 'England need have no fear of its empire so long as Hollywood insists on being the Kipling of the Pacific. The film city's pious regard for the sacrosanct bearers of the white man's burden continues to be one of the most amusing manifestations of Hollywood's Anglophilia.'[32] At the same time, British politicians and censors were often skeptical of Hollywood's escapist representation of the British Empire. The same film was described as 'a travesty of history' by the British Board of Film Censors while British administrators in India lobbied Warner Bros. to prevent its release.[33]

As American companies took aim at the British market, the flow of film exports in the opposite direction also increased. A total of 2,393 foreign films were imported into the United States between 1928 and 1939, 428 of which were British.[34] A common language was evidently an advantage. The most celebrated British import of the era was *The Private Life of Henry VIII*, directed by Alexander Korda, which broke box office records in New York in 1933.[35] The film gained access to American cinemas through United Artists (UA), who actively sought British product to fill their roster.[36] Korda subsequently signed a contract for sixteen further films with UA and in 1935 he became a partner in the company, providing British filmmakers with a reliable path to the American market for the first time.[37] However, the greater visibility of British films in America led to many of the industry's most talented filmmakers – notably Korda and Alfred Hitchcock, as well as actors such as Laurence Olivier and Vivien Leigh – to take up contracts in Hollywood. In this way, success in America deprived the British film industry of some of its most marketable personnel.

Legislation reshaped the British film industry once again in 1938. A new Films Act incentivized the production of higher-budget films in Britain by enabling producers to obtain multiple quota credits from single productions. MGM proceeded to dedicate resources to the production of prestigious films with international appeal using studios and personnel in Britain. Productions such as *The Citadel* (1938) and *Goodbye Mr. Chips* (1939) demonstrated that Hollywood technical and managerial practices could be successfully transposed to foreign studios, but once again the practice increased the influence of American companies over the British film industry.[38] The impact of the new

Films Act was ultimately limited by the outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, cultural and economic relations between British and American film had already reached a point of significant depth and complexity. As the effects of war were felt around the world, the political dimensions of this relationship were also bought into sharper focus.

MOVIES GO TO WAR

War affected the American film industry long before the United States officially ended its neutrality, forcing the cancellation of production plans and disrupting export markets in Europe. More and more territories became inaccessible as the conflict escalated, and by 1944 only the British Empire and Latin America, plus a few neutral territories, remained open to American films.[39] However, Britain's wartime policies were often unfavorable to American film companies. In particular, the first Anglo-American Films Agreement in 1939 aimed to ease pressure on the British economy by limiting the amount of revenue that Hollywood companies were able to transfer from Britain to America.[40] These 'blocked' revenues remained in Britain, where American film companies were obliged either to wait out the embargo or to invest the money locally. Subsequent revisions to the agreement reduced the impact of the embargo and in 1942 the restrictions were removed entirely. As Street notes, 'the need to win American support against Hitler, and secure and maintain the financial security of Lend-Lease, outweighed arguments about the need to discriminate against American films.'[41] Nevertheless, this hard-line approach towards the imbalance of Anglo-American film trade set a precedent to which later governments would return.

The Second World War also highlighted the political value of cinema and the belief among lawmakers that films had the ability to positively influence public opinion. Several high-profile figures in the American film industry made efforts to stand against Nazism while America remained isolated from the conflict. However, they were constrained by the MPPDA's Production Code Administration (PCA), which prohibited attacks on foreign governments.[42] Previewing a screenplay of the controversial Warner Bros. film *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939), a PCA reader cautioned: 'To represent Hitler only as a screaming madman and a bloodthirsty persecutor, and nothing else, is manifestly unfair, considering his phenomenal public career, his unchallenged political and social achievements and his position as head of the most important continental European power.'[43] Studios also feared losing access to the valuable German market and alienating the strong isolationist faction in American society. At the same time, anti-Nazi and pro-interventionist elements in Hollywood were exploited as part of a cross-media British propaganda campaign in which, as

Nicholas Cull notes, almost all of the information that Americans received about the war passed through London.[44] Cull suggests that film may have been the weakest link in this operation, but it is clear that Hollywood nevertheless played a significant role in the effort to shape American public opinion.[45] The phalanx of British actors and other personnel already established in Hollywood thus acquired an unexpected political potential. According to Lord Lothian, Britain's ambassador to the United States, 'The maintenance of a powerful nucleus of older actors in Hollywood is of great importance to our own interests … because the continuing production of films with a strong British tone is one of the best and subtlest forms of British propaganda.'[46]

British directors who had relocated to Los Angeles were indeed among the first to make films commenting directly on the war. Hitchcock was widely derided in Britain as a deserter following his departure in 1939, but his second Hollywood production *The Foreign Correspondent* (1940) was unambiguous in its cultivation of American support for the British war effort. In its final scene, the film's hero, an American journalist in London, broadcasts a radio message to American listeners amid a German bombing raid: 'Keep those lights burning, cover them with guns, build a canopy of battleships and bombing planes around them, and, hello, America, hang on to your lights, they're the only lights left in the world.' As the screen fades to black to strains of 'The Star Spangled Banner,' intervention is reframed as a patriotic act. Alexander Korda's American output included *That Hamilton Woman* (1941), which adapted the story of Lord Nelson and his lover Emma Hamilton in order to warn against the present-day dangers of appeasement and isolationism. In an address to the British parliament, Nelson declares: 'Napoleon can never be master of the world until he has smashed us up, and believe me gentlemen, he means to be master of the world. You cannot make peace with dictators, you have to destroy them.' The message was not lost on contemporary viewers. According to the *Time* reviewer, 'with the subtlety of a sock on the jaw, it is more concerned with informing US cinema audiences of the parallel between Britain's struggle against Napoleonic tyranny and her current tangle with Hitler.'[47] There is also evidence suggesting that Korda's contribution to the war extended to espionage, and that he used his Hollywood offices to covertly fund and coordinate a network of Allied operatives.[48] Numerous British films also made the case for American involvement in the war. Among them, Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger's *The 49th Parallel* (1941) was produced with direct financial backing from Britain's Ministry of Information.[49] The film depicted a hostile German crew seeking refuge in neutral America after the sinking of their U-boat in Canada. Retitled *The Invaders* for its American release in 1942, the film carried a clear message about the immediacy and proximity of the Nazi threat.

The political commitment evinced by some Hollywood studios did not escape the notice of America's isolationist lobby. In the opinion of Republican Senator Gerald P. Nye, the major studios had become 'the most gigantic engines of propaganda' and were conniving 'to influence public sentiment' in order to drive the nation into war.[50] A 1941 survey suggested that only 16 percent of those polled were 'annoyed by any propaganda in the feature films.'[51] Nevertheless, the complaint was taken to the Committee of Interstate Commerce and in September 1941 a subcommittee was formed to investigate. There was perhaps a case to make against the Hollywood studios, but the committee was compromised by bad press and lack of support from the Senate. Matters were not helped when Charles Lindbergh, the leading figure in the anti-interventionist movement, made remarks linking British propaganda to Jewish 'ownership' of the media.[52] Public opinion gradually turned against the isolationist movement, although American involvement in the war only became certain after the Pearl Harbor attacks. By this point, as Cull notes, the United States had joined a war that it 'knew principally through British eyes.'[53]

After December 1941 the American government took a direct role in the production of war propaganda. The importance of Hollywood was underlined by its inclusion under the mandate of the Office of War Information (OWI), a government agency made responsible for the dissemination of war-related information in all forms of media. The OWI's Hollywood office followed the precepts established by Britain's Ministry of Information by mandating that the conflict be depicted as a 'people's war' between fascism and democracy.[54] Under this rubric, the depiction of Britain itself became a delicate matter. According to the conventions that Hollywood had devised over the previous thirty years, Britain was grand and unchanging; it was defined by its traditions and ordered by a class system that extended from every household to its far-reaching empire. Naturally, such representations did not suit a propaganda operation that sought to cast America's former colonial rulers as like-minded allies. Their policy towards Britain was outlined in the *Government Information Manual for the Motion Picture Industry*, which they sent to film studios in 1942: 'There is a tendency to be critical of the British, their past imperialistic policies, and the purposes of certain elements in Britain. But the British people are putting up a magnificent battle. Where would we be today if Britain had not continued to resist in the critical year when she stood alone, unprepared, and without allies, against the Axis?'[55] For obvious reasons, American films depicting British imperialism were deemed highly inappropriate. An OWI report concerning the film *Forever and a Day* (1943) set out OWI policy for representing Britain in more detail. The statement criticized Hollywood filmmakers for their focus on England's aristocratic culture instead of 'the real people of England, the workers and shop-keepers and miners … who were the backbone of England in its darkest days.'[56] As Glancy has suggested, 'the best

way of portraying Britain was to make it more like the United States' own pre-
ferred vision of itself: family-centered, classless and energetic.'[57] In the effort to
align British and American interests and to position the two nations as allies,
American popular culture was thus synchronized with its wartime propaganda.
It was not always successful: in 1945 the American war film *Objective Burma*
ignited controversy in Britain by framing the Allied campaign in Burma as an
American-led exercise at the expense of British and Indian troops. Following
vituperative protest from British newspapers, Warner Bros. withdrew the film
from cinemas in Britain.[58] Nevertheless, relations between Hollywood and the
British film industry during the Second World War stand apart from other
periods due to their focus on cooperation rather than competition over trade.
In the period that followed the war, however, relations returned to their ori-
ginal economic footing and the need to assert political continuities between
Britain and America receded.

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL

In the aftermath of the Second World War American industries moved quickly
to restore foreign trade. Bolstered by Marshall Plan aid, the nations of Western
Europe offered valuable markets for American products as well as potentially
cheaper labor costs for American manufacturing. The influx of aid and invest-
ment also emboldened US corporations and the US government to mount an
assault on the Europe-wide protectionist policies that had constrained the
expansion of US businesses in the past. The American film industry was at the
forefront of these endeavors and its trade association took on new leadership –
Eric Johnson, former chairman of the US Chamber of Commerce – in order to
make the most of the situation. The MPPDA was rebranded the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) and its Foreign Branch took on an expanded
role as the Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA). As before, the MPEA
acted as the sole export agent for its members (which included all of the major
American film studios) and it was able to set film prices centrally and to make
arrangements for their global distribution.[59] As Guback put it, the organization
was 'legally empowered to monopolize export business for its members.'[60] Eric
Johnson would later boast about the level of political access afforded to the
MPEA in Europe:

> Our pictures fill about 60 percent of the screen time in foreign countries. When
> one of them wants to impose restrictions I can go to the Finance Minister, not
> threateningly, but to simply state that our films keep more than half of the
> theatres open. This means employment and a bolstering factor for the economy
> of whichever country is involved. And I can tell the Finance Minister of the tax
> revenue which these theatres yield.[61]

In other respects, however, Hollywood stood at a disadvantage compared to other American industries. In October 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by twenty-three nations, including America and Britain, committing them to reduce or eliminate trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas on a reciprocal basis. While other industries were exposed to free market forces, the GATT signatories agreed that films ought to be treated differently due to their 'unique capacity to diffuse political values.'[62] Thus, while the GATT negotiations led to the abolition of the quota on film distributors in Britain, the agreement effectively sanctioned the continuation of Britain's screen quota.[63] In the process, and over the objections of the MPAA, the agreement acknowledged that film was not simply an economic commodity and could not be treated like other tradable goods or services. The timing was surely significant: the events of the Second World War had made the political capacity of film abundantly clear.

The film trade came to the fore again during Britain's balance of payments crisis in 1947 and 1948. America's booming economy postwar produced huge surpluses in their dollar reserves, which led in turn to a shortage of dollars in various other countries, including Britain. The Board of Trade responded by restricting the operations of American businesses that they deemed to be non-essential. The film industry, whose revenue from the British market in 1947 they calculated to be $70 million, was among them.[64] In August 1947 a 75 percent *ad valorem* (according to value) tax was imposed on the earnings of all foreign film companies in Britain. Known as the Dalton Duty, the tax was effective in stemming the flow of dollar revenues and in the process it gave the British film industry an entirely unprecedented level of protection from foreign imports. However, the severity of the tax antagonized the American film industry and the MPAA immediately put an embargo on the export of American films to Britain. With competition from Hollywood eliminated, British film producers had a golden opportunity to reclaim their domestic market. Their output did increase during this period, rising from 107 films in 1946 to 170 in 1947.[65] But they lacked the capital to fully meet demand from Britain's cinemas, presenting exhibitors with a potential crash in supply and the government with a loss of revenue from entertainment taxes.[66] With the film industry in a far more volatile state than it had been before the duty, it fell to the Board of Trade to negotiate a settlement with the MPAA.[67] The government's attempt to dictate the terms of their relationship with the American film industry had proven largely counterproductive.

The resulting Anglo-American Films Agreement of March 1948 removed the Dalton Duty and restored American film imports to Britain. At the same time, Britain's continuing trade deficit made the complete liberalization of the British film market undesirable. As a compromise, the Board of Trade revisited their 1939 policy by restricting the earnings that American film companies,

treated as a block through the MPAA, could repatriate. Under the new policy, a maximum of $17 million could be remitted to America per year, plus a sum in dollars equal to the earnings of British films in America.[68] The remaining earnings, which the board estimated to be around $20 million a year, were 'blocked' or 'frozen': they remained the property of the companies who earned them, but they could not be converted into dollars and removed from the country.[69] The Board of Trade intended that the money would be invested in Britain and the agreement specified twenty-seven permissible uses, including the acquisition of film rights for literary properties and the payment of film distribution costs. The blocked money could also be used to purchase real estate such as film studios, although investment in British exhibition facilities was prohibited in order to protect British cinema chains. But above all, the Board of Trade directed the money towards British film production. A new Anglo-American Film Agreement in 1950 further sweetened the deal for American producers: additional blocked currency could now be remitted as a bonus equal to 23 percent of expenditure on film production in Britain.[70] For the Hollywood companies, such investment offered a neat way around the currency block: their earnings could not be repatriated directly, but they could be used to produce films that could then be exported and made to earn back their investment. For the British film industry, the scheme promised to inject much needed capital into the production sector. As Street has remarked, it represented a continuation of the Board of Trade's long-established policy of 'looking to America to solve the British industry's chronic financial problems.'[71]

As American exporters adjusted to the shifting conditions imposed by their most valuable overseas market, British film producers sought to make further inroads in the United States. They were helped during this period by the declining output of the American studios. The American film industry had once created sufficient supply to meet the demands of the exhibitors, but from the 1950s onward they came to rely to a greater extent on imports from Europe, particularly Britain.[72] The 1950 Anglo-American Film Agreement provided further incentives by allowing American film companies to repatriate 50 percent of the money they spent on the distribution rights to British films. The export of British films to America yielded several high-profile successes. In particular, *Henry V* (1944) was among the highest-grossing films of 1946 and played at cinemas in New York for three years.[73] The film's success provided a blueprint for the American promotion of similarly prestigious British films, including Laurence Olivier's follow-up *Hamlet* (1948), which became the first non-American film to win the Academy Award for Best Picture, and *The Red Shoes* (1948). Of the Hollywood studios, UA continued to be the most closely involved in the distribution of British films. After Korda left the company in 1944, UA made a new distribution deal with the Rank Organisation, which became Britain's dominant film company during the postwar era.[74] Rank also signed a

distribution contract with Universal, providing a further outlet for British films in the American market, and between 1948 and 1955 the company distributed sixty-three British films. Between 1955 and 1958, however, Universal handled just fifteen films, provoking Rank to form their own distribution subsidiary in America, Rank Film Distributors of America.[75] This effort to bypass American distributors and reach the American market directly was nothing if not ambitious, but Rank's subsidiary collapsed within eighteen months.[76] The control exerted by American film companies was such that the US market remained a fortress to British and other foreign distribution companies.

MADE IN BRITAIN

American engagement with foreign markets, of which Britain was still the largest, was also motivated by more immediate economic pressures. Television and suburbanization rapidly reshaped US leisure activities, and weekly cinema admissions declined from a peak of 84 million during the war to just 49 million in 1951.[77] Conversely, many European markets were expanding at a rate that allowed Hollywood producers to compensate for this decline. Foreign markets thus became ever more essential to the American film industry's financial survival. As Eric Johnson noted in 1953, 'no other major United States industry is perhaps so heavily dependent on exports for its economic health.'[78] The need to make money in Europe also became closely tied to the practice of actually producing films in Europe. During the 1950s Hollywood filmmaking was outsourced to foreign studios and locations on an unprecedented scale. So-called 'runaway production' took advantage of lower costs in numerous locations, but Britain was by far the most popular destination: more runaway productions were filmed there between 1949 and 1957 than in the rest of Europe combined.[79] The initial wave of Hollywood production in Britain was motivated by the practice of extracting blocked earnings by investing in British filmmaking. However, the efficiency of the MPAA and the Hollywood studios was such that this inducement was short-lived: as early as 1953 it was reported that the majority of the money blocked in Britain had been used.[80] Instead, the outsourcing of films was incentivized by a new subsidy created by the UK government. Better known as the Eady levy, the British Production Fund aimed to provide British filmmakers with an increased share of the revenue collected at the box office.[81] The tax on British cinema tickets was increased by 1/4d and the proceeds were paid into a central fund. British producers were then able to apply for payments from the fund in proportion to the box office gross of their films. The more popular the film, the greater the payment its producers received. The money available was potentially vast: in the Eady levy's first nine years of operation, payments

to British-registered films were worth on average 44.3 percent of their box office gross.[82]

Because the Eady levy was paid by viewers of all films in Britain, the scheme was initially unpopular with Hollywood companies. According to the *New York Times*, some American producers believed their films would be 'in effect subsidizing British producers.'[83] However, the MPAA soon realized that the scheme actually presented their industry with the opportunity to boost earnings in Britain. The terms of the levy made no distinction between wholly British producers and subsidiary companies that were operated by Hollywood studios but incorporated under British law. As a result, runaway productions made in Britain with American finance could be registered as British films in the same way as films made by entirely British firms. For example, MGM used its MGM-British subsidiary based at the Borehamwood studio north of London to produce a series of Eady-eligible films, including *Ivanhoe* (1952) and *Knights of the Round Table* (1954). Warner Bros. operated their British subsidiary at the nearby Elstree facility.[84] In both cases, these subsidiaries dated back to the 1930s – they had been established by American studios in order to make films for the quota system and then revived as a means to use blocked currency. In its roundabout way, the Eady levy taxed American films to generate funding for British film production. But because the government's definition of a British film was so liberal, American producers were also able to benefit, so long as their films were made in Britain. The arrangement made runaway production in Britain a highly attractive proposition, and between 1950 and 1959 around 170 Hollywood films were outsourced to the United Kingdom.[85]

The American stake in British production and thus in the Eady levy rose massively between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s. In 1953, the share of the Production Fund taken by American film companies was just under 10 percent of the total.[86] By 1966, *Variety* reported that the American share of the fund had increased to 80 percent.[87] As these figures suggest, American investment effectively overwhelmed the British film industry during the 1960s. The trend can be attributed in large part to the huge success of three relatively low-budget films released in successive years: *Dr. No* (1962), *Tom Jones* (1963), and *A Hard Day's Night* (1964). All were produced in Britain by mainly British personnel with funding from UA. As new expressions of popular culture transformed Britain's image overseas – including fashion, theatre, and pop music – British-made films became highly marketable in America.[88] Other Hollywood studios expanded their operations in Britain in response, and by 1967 the National Film Finance Corporation (NFFC) reported that 90 percent of all production finance in Britain came from American sources.[89] This financial surge transformed the British film industry, raising both the costs and the commercial expectations for much of their output. British-made films were among the highest-grossing releases of the decade, among them *Lawrence of Arabia* (1962), *Goldfinger*

(1964), *Thunderball* (1965), and *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). More modestly budgeted productions such as *A Man For All Seasons* (1966), *Alfie* (1966), and *To Sir, with Love* (1967) also proved to be phenomenally successful.

For many British filmmakers during this period, American investment was more forthcoming than financing from local sources, and it came with the added bonus of guaranteed distribution in the United States. The thorny issue of how British films might access the American market thus became, to a certain extent, moot. In the process, however, American money muddied the line that separated 'British' and 'Hollywood' filmmaking. By the end of the decade, few high-profile films made in Britain could be identified as unambiguously 'British.' In some cases, the practical influence of American finance was limited. It is likely that *Tom Jones* and *A Hard Day's Night* would have been much the same if they were funded entirely by British sources. But the grand epic films of David Lean and the cosmopolitan escapades of James Bond, to give just two examples, made a striking departure from the parochialism that characterized British film production in previous eras.

The influx of American capital during the 1960s was largely motivated by fashion and short-term economic conditions and it was by no means a long-term commitment to the British film industry. The NFFC sounded a note of caution in 1967, warning that 'reliance upon American finance might lull the British industry into a false sense of security which could be painfully shattered were American film production return to Hollywood or to go elsewhere.'[90] This proved to be prescient. A series of high-profile box office failures at the end of the decade, combined with the retrenchment and corporate restructuring of many American film companies, precipitated the rapid withdrawal of US capital from the British film industry. American investment fell from a peak of £31.3 million in 1968 to just £2.9 million in 1974.[91] With little commercial or state support available to fill the gap, the British film industry entered a lean period. The cinemagoing audience also began to contract: in 1970 Britain ceased to the most valuable market for Hollywood exports and in 1973 it fell to fourth place.[92]

If the experience of the Dalton duty demonstrated the inability of the British government to dictate terms to Hollywood, the success of the Eady levy highlighted their ability to use legislation to create favorable conditions for American investment and the outsourcing of production. This success, however, was provisional and it made the British film industry dangerously dependent on forces outside their control. The highs and lows of the 1960s established a pattern that has largely remained in place ever since. No longer capable of competing against the all-powerful American film industry, the British film industry sought instead to compete against other nations to attract investment from Hollywood. As Guback put it in 1969, the British film industry became 'part of the organism it sought to hold at arm's length.'[93]

ACCOMMODATING HOLLYWOOD

American film companies continued to come to Britain during the 1970s and 1980s. With indigenous production in the doldrums, two-thirds of British film investment in 1983 came from US sources.[94] But as the British market became less valuable, the incentive to make films that appealed specifically to British audiences by representing British culture diminished. Thus, the highest-profile British-made films of the era included science fiction and fantasy films such as *Star Wars* (1977), *Superman* (1978), *Alien* (1979), and *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (1981). The continued outsourcing of production to Britain was now motivated by the increasing value of the dollar against sterling and by a government tax shelter that allowed investors to receive a 100 percent tax write-off against the costs of film production.[95] Cinema attendance in Britain remained in a slump, declining from a peak of 1.6 billion admissions in 1946 an all-time low of 54 million in 1984.[96] As a result, the Eady levy became less and less valuable. In 1966 *Thunderball* received a payment from the fund of $2.1 million, but the payment to the Bond film *Never Say Never Again* in 1983 was just $363,000.[97] Chronically underfunded, the NFFC was also unable to serve its intended purpose and in 1980 it provided financing to just two films.[98] As the main elements of state support for British film production began to fail, the screen quota became almost impossible to enforce, simply because so few British films were available to fulfill it. In 1983, a year in which just thirty-seven films were registered in Britain, the quota was put on hold.[99] Two years later the Conservative government proceeded to abandon the British film industry to the free market entirely, dismantling the Eady levy and the screen quota and replacing the NFFC with a private company, British Screen.[100] The British film industry was thus unprotected from American imports for first time since 1927.

Despite the industry's overall decline, British films continued to be sporadically successful in the America, the highest-profile examples being *Chariots of Fire* (1981), *Gandhi* (1982), and *A Room with a View* (1985). In the same period, television serials such as *Brideshead Revisited* (1981) and *The Jewel in the Crown* (1984) also reached a broad and appreciative American audience. The popularity of these imports made it clear that a certain version of the British (or most typically English) past remained highly marketable in the United States. For many American consumers, images of England were bound up with a manicured representation of its past, which was coded as white, genteel, and aristocratic. Antoinette Burton has linked this appeal to broader issues in American society, arguing that 'Britain for export has in fact been a whitewashed Britain, a commodified balm for a certain segment of the American public seeking relief from racial tension and ugliness.'[101] However, the success of British films and TV serials can also be explained by the fragmentation of the American media market. As Jim Collins has suggested, the popularity of British-made literary

adaptations in the 1980s 'signalled the emergence of a growing audience for quality alternatives to mainstream mass entertainment and a commercial infrastructure to serve that audience.'[102] The dominance of the American film industry's core product during the 1980s and 1990s – the action or science fiction blockbuster – helped create a market for a 'quality' alternative, particularly among older cinemagoers. The demand for variety was fueled by the growth of new media delivery systems: multiscreen cinemas, cable television, and VHS. According to Collins, the literary adaptation effectively displaced the art film as the main alternative to the Hollywood blockbuster during this period.[103] New production companies such as Miramax were at the forefront of this trend. The firm initially imported British and other European heritage films for American distribution. But as they grew, they took tropes from these films and adapted them to create cross-over productions such as *Shakespeare in Love* (1998). As the American film industry sought to cater to multiple audiences, the perception of quality that surrounded certain British imports functioned as a form of product differentiation in an increasingly crowded market.

At the end of the 1990s a new raft of British government incentives succeeded in bringing a greater number of large Hollywood films to UK studios. In particular, the Section 42 tax relief program stimulated investment in big-budget films by allowing investors to limit their exposure to British taxes.[104] The benefits were potentially vast: investments in a range of British-made films, including several instalments of the *Harry Potter* franchise, enabled the Royal Bank of Scotland to defer an estimated £1 billion in taxes between 1998 and 2007.[105] The scheme was abandoned in 2004 in favor of a new tax credit system that provided film producers with rebates based on money spent in Britain. After initial concern, this new system proved well suited to Hollywood studios and to the production of large-scale films in particular. Producers of British qualifying films were able to claim a cash rebate worth up to 20 percent of UK expenditure and were entitled to further tax relief on the remaining 80 percent. In addition, films were able to qualify for the rebate by spending as little as 25 percent of their budget in Britain, allowing producers to combine work in Britain with production elsewhere. At the insistence of the European Commission, the system for determining whether a film qualified as British included, for the first time, a 'cultural test': to receive the tax credits, films were scored on their 'cultural content' and their 'contribution' to British culture.[106] Films set in Britain or based on British material, such as the *Harry Potter* franchise, appeared to have an advantage. However, the looseness of the cultural test was demonstrated when numerous other Hollywood films, including *The Dark Knight* (2008), *Thor: The Dark World* (2013), and *Star Wars: The Force Awakens* (2015), qualified for the British rebate in the same way.[107] Generous government rebate schemes have thus ensured relatively steady employment for film workers in Britain. At the same time, this has resulted in a filmmaking

infrastructure that is largely suited to the needs of large-scale Hollywood films rather than those of smaller-scale, local productions. It is also unclear how much return the UK economy receives on the billions of pounds of public money it rebates to American film productions. The money ensures that Britain retains an economic and perhaps a cultural stake in the global production of Hollywood films, and also enables it to compete against other nations who offer similar incentives to American producers, but it also serves to heighten the dominance of the American film industry.

CONCLUSION

For the American film industry, Britain has principally served as an export market and an offshore production base. The British government took steps to impede American expansion in the short term, but UK policy has more generally been shaped by the desire to attract US investment. The Second World War stands apart as a period where American and British interests were more closely aligned, and where the production and trade of films rose above economic concerns. Britain has also served as subject matter for American filmmakers. The prevalence of American films depicting British culture could once be explained by the high value of the British market, but their continuing presence in Hollywood's output points to a connection that goes beyond economics. In a sense, the representation of Britain has become a kind of textual habit for an industry that continually seeks to return to its own, storied history.[108]

For the British film industry, on the other hand, the relationship with America has generally been more complicated. British audiences developed a taste for American films at the beginning of the twentieth century and this has never shown signs of changing. As a result, the American film industry has been a powerful rival to British film producers in their fight to retain a stake in their domestic market. At the same time, this foreign rival has often been the British film industry's main source of production capital. Financing from the British state has not made British film production self-sufficient in the long term, and so American production companies have frequently made up the shortfall. At present, dependence on American investment has effectively turned the British film industry into a client of Hollywood, hosting runaway blockbusters in an economic relationship sweetened by government subsidy. In addition, America has never been a dependable or accessible market for British filmmakers. Numerous British films have been highly popular in America, but no British production company has been able to transform short-term success into a permanent presence in the US market. The asymmetry of the relationship between British and American film is perhaps starker than ever. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that no other nation has ever fared better over the past hundred years in their attempt to counter or contain Hollywood's

cultural and economic power. There are, however, signs that this may be changing. Today, Hollywood's most valuable export market, by a wide margin, is China. Chinese corporations have already made significant investments in American film companies, and Chinese state policy, which closely regulates American film imports, has already begun to reshape the American film industry.[109] As US political and economic power recedes and Chinese influence grows, it remains to be seen how Hollywood will adapt to this new relationship. The evidence from presidential gift-giving offers few clues: when Obama met President Xi Jinping for the first time in 2013, he presented him not with DVDs but with a wooden bench.[110]

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4

DEBATING *DOWNTON*

Anglo-American realities and relations[1]

DANA COOPER

The PBS historical drama *Downton Abbey* enjoyed significant success world-wide following its launch beginning in the United Kingdom in 2010 and following in the United States in 2011.[2] Depicting varying elements of English history between 1912 and 1926 and located in a Yorkshire estate leisure-class setting, the series provided notable commentary upon international events from the sinking of the *Titanic* to the outbreak of the Spanish flu, from the rise of the English working class to the looming decline of the British aristocracy. To describe it as an international phenomenon is a serious understatement. Over the course of six seasons, *Downton Abbey* garnered over 170 nominations and took home an astonishing fifty awards, including accolades from the Screen Actors Guild Awards, the British Academy Television Awards, Golden Globes, Emmys, and even a Guinness World Record. Recognized as the most successful drama since *Brideshead Revisited*, which appeared some thirty years before in the 1980s,[3] at its height premiers of *Downton Abbey* matched other major broadcasting accomplishments such as *Breaking Bad* and *Scandal* while surpassing other successes like *Homeland*, *Mad Men*, and *Game of Thrones*.[4] Watched in over two hundred countries and regions – from Sweden to South Korea, Brazil to the Middle East – the show quickly became an astonishing cultural achievement in its five years on television.[5] As the drama came to an end in 2015, some 10.9 million Britons watched the opening episode of the final season, marking an all-time high.[6] Still, as the series tended to enjoy a broader following in 'the colonies,' this British viewership was dwarfed by the estimated 26 million Americans who tuned in for the same episode as they began the long goodbye to the most successful and celebrated British period piece in decades.[7] By providing 'comfort in the familiar' with yet another British costume drama, *Downton Abbey* epitomizes 'television heaven – the kind of stuff [Great Britain] does best.'[8]

DISSECTING *DOWNTON*

By using *Downton Abbey* as a cultural microscope for Anglo-American connections and clashes, we are able not only to enjoy an artistic achievement in the twenty-first century but an opportunity to debate the facts and perhaps exaggerated fiction of the British aristocracy, perceptions of Americans abroad, and a new way in which to understand the cultural norms and 'special relationship' between these two countries. Through a close examination of the television program personalities and dramatic dialogue of British and American characters, the series serves as a vessel to dissect the rhetoric of a script, analyze Anglo-American cultural mores, and reconsider the resulting political upheaval due to the decline of the British aristocracy as the long nineteenth century came to an end, which effectively pulled the rug out from generations of landed gentry. As viewers and scholars, we have the opportunity to reevaluate the historic 'special relationship,' decades before it was dubbed as such, while at the same time scrutinizing the collision of cultures in blended British–American families.

At the heart of this Anglo-American program is the fictional Crawley household: Robert, the Earl of Grantham, a British husband, father, and aristocrat with a heart;[9] American heiress Cora Levinson, now Lady Cora Crawley, who produced no cherished British sons but rather three Anglo-American daughters; Lady Mary, whose marriage will determine the future of the family estate and who epitomizes the ultimate snobbishness of a proud British aristocratic family; Lady Edith, whose second-born status (though a daughter) closely mimics the competing notions of freedom and frustration experienced by second sons throughout the United Kingdom until she finally finds herself as an advocate for women's rights and progressive politics; and finally, Lady Sybil, the youngest of the Crawley daughters, who greatly resents her titled position and comfortable life and chooses to throw caution to the wind by marrying her true love, who just happens to be the family chauffeur, and after receiving an unenthusiastic blessing from her parents, the couple elopes to Ireland. It is difficult to miss the English irony with that turn of events. As the *Daily Mail* summarized of the first season, all the 'stereotypes are present and correct.'[10]

CONTEXTUALIZING THE SCENE

The launch of *Downton Abbey* took place against a notable background of events in both the United Kingdom and the United States. While the first episode of *Downton Abbey* aired in September 2010, Prince William proposed to his long-time girlfriend, Kate Middleton, the next month, and the engagement announcement followed in November of the same year.[11] The attention of the world suddenly focused on all things British and the impending royal wedding

that followed the next spring. Between this development and the success of a new series based in England, the eyes of the world seemed to focus on Great Britain. Additionally, the slogan of 'Cool Britannia' returned to London when the city hosted the 2012 Olympics. This phrase has ebbed and flowed in Britain beginning in 1967 with the Bonzo Dog Doo-Dah Band's song by the same title and resurfaced again in the 1990s with Tony Blair's New Labour Party.[12] The term was revived to generate excitement and build hype around London's host status as athletes and sports fans from around the world descended upon the city. From every angle, the world seemed increasingly fixated on all things Union Jack.

While these two events influenced popular culture in relation to Great Britain, other political and economic movements marked these years as a time of unrest and upheaval. *Downton Abbey*'s laser-focused theme of inequality, which was consistently evident throughout the series, mirrored an increasing awareness in the United States of economic inequalities, which President Barack Obama addressed in numerous speeches during his eight years in the White House. Just as Tom, the chauffeur turned son-in-law, presents his understanding of 'American capitalism' as a place '[W]here a hard-working man can go right to the top, all the way in a single lifetime,' he predicts that change will come to England 'in the not-too-distant future.'[13] Such a comment mirrors the same ideology presented by President Obama in 2011 when he addressed inequality arguing, 'America was built on the idea of broad-based prosperity – that's why a CEO like Henry Ford made it his mission to pay his workers enough so that they could buy the cars they made.'[14] This unrest and tension revealed itself through the Occupy movements, most prevalent in 2011 and 2012, seemingly 'paradoxical in these times … ' but perhaps were 'custom made for the present sociopolitical morass.'[15] Described by the *Washington Post* as a 'leaderless movement without an official set of demands,' its participants were united by the belief that 'the 99% will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%.'[16] This so-called 'laboratory for participatory democracy' active in the twenty-first century could be seen in the early twentieth-century setting in *Downton Abbey* as characters debate everything from the Fabian Society, socialism, Russian revolutionaries, class warfare, and the right for women to vote.[17] The unease and resentment between the aristocratic and working classes in *Downton Abbey* seemed incredibly familiar to many a viewer experiencing the economic challenges and political tensions that seemed to overwhelm society in the early years of the twenty-first century. Throughout the six seasons of *Downton Abbey*, political representation and economic disparities remained frequent themes voiced by many different personalities on-screen.

Finally, the nature of media consumption during the *Downton Abbey* years proves noteworthy as viewers made interesting choices in selecting their sources of information and entertainment, specifically regarding television

consumption in the United States. The success of this historical drama occurred alongside a wider trend in television at this time as it coincided with the 'Britishification of American TV.'[18] From Ricky Gervais hosting the Golden Globes and Piers Morgan taking over Larry King's long-time talk show on CNN, Americans watched more and more Britons on television.[19] Poignantly, hit shows such as *The Office*, *Shameless*, and *All in the Family* were actually series adaptations from British television.[20] Shunning the 'predictable' scripts of existing shows, Americans eagerly consumed the 'faster … wittier … [and] cleaver [*sic*] repertoire' of British television.[21] In short, 'when Americans turn on their TVs, it's as though England has come to them.'[22] Rather than viewing Britain as a quaint historical artifact or considering the nation through a highly political lens, *Downton Abbey* provided Americans an opportunity to connect on a more personal level. Moreover, American viewers desired greater cultural intimacy with their cousins across the pond as they chose to invite the English into their living rooms on a daily basis.

Given its tremendous success, it was simply a matter of time before the PBS series was expanded to the big screen. The full-length movie version of *Downton Abbey* opened in theatres across the United States in September 2019.[23] Despite the negative reception of some critics, Americans rushed to the box office, spending some $31 million buying tickets to see familiar faces and reconnect with comfortable story lines. The movie version of *Downton Abbey* beat out other notable films in its opening weekend including Brad Pitt's *Ad Astra* and yet another reboot of Sylvester Stallone as the ultimate tough guy in *Rambo: Last Blood*. But as one American film review contends, 'neither of those films had a substantial tiara and/or wig budget.'[24] Whether there is any harm done by the packaging and selling of one level of British life is debatable. Nevertheless, Americans and other *Downton* fans have voted and done so decidedly with their wallets. The movie made over $70 million in the United States alone and more than $130 million worldwide. This success quickly resulted in discussions of a second *Downton Abbey* movie less than a month after the release of the first.[25]

HISTORICAL REALITIES

Given the myriad of political, economic, social, and contemporary events that placed England, and specifically *Downton Abbey*, in the media spotlight, the attraction for both American and British viewers may lie in the union at the center of the show, which is based on historical events. Just as Americans and Britons were drawn together at the turn of the twentieth century by political and economic forces, history seemed to repeat itself with a cultural magnetism in the twenty-first century. The Anglo-American marriage of Robert and Cora

Crawley, two of the main characters on *Downton Abbey*, serves to highlight a cultural and historic phenomenon of its own. Based loosely on the marital trend of hundreds of American-born, British-wed women who left their homeland during the long nineteenth century, these assumed economic trophy wives were carefully selected by aristocrats to prop up the English landed nobility with an influx of American money for (hopefully) another generation or maybe two – if they were strategic and perhaps just a bit lucky.

Between 1865 and 1945, some six hundred American women wed British men, which included numerous prominent marriages that united American heiresses to British aristocrats and changed the world of Anglo-American relations forever. Given the increasingly intertwined political and economic interests as byproducts of Anglo-American marriages, the influence of American-born, British-wed wives resulted in these women functioning as informal ambassadors for decades as they had the eyes and ears of leading British leaders on a near daily basis. Such nuptials included the unions of Jennie Jerome in 1876 to Randolph Churchill, who served as a member of Parliament for many years, which provided Lady Churchill the opportunity to flex her own political prowess in England; Mary Endicott in 1885 to Joseph Chamberlain, the staunch Anglo-American proponent whose position as colonial secretary allowed their marriage to take on significant meaning for US–UK relations; Mary Leiter in 1895 to George Curzon, whose selection as viceroy of India catapulted Lady Curzon to her new role as vicereine of India, making her the highest-ranking American woman in the history of the British Empire as she represented the United States to England and England to the crown jewel at the height of its imperial moment; Consuelo Vanderbilt in the same year to the ninth Duke of Marlborough, whose nickname 'Sunny' was misleading to the point of false advertisement; and finally Nancy Langhorne to Waldorf Astor in 1906. In her candid life as Lady Astor, she was eventually elected to Parliament and was the first woman in British history to take a seat in Parliament.[26] High-profile Anglo-American marriages occurred with such consistency that by 1914, approximately 17 percent of the British aristocracy enjoyed (or endured, depending on the transatlantic perspective) an 'American connection.'[27]

Historians have taken different opinions as to the influence of such marriages on the overall tone of Anglo-American relations during this period. Charles S. Campbell argued that such nuptials created 'an extraordinary galaxy of American women married to British governmental leaders. One might almost stop with that in explaining the rise of friendly feelings between America and Britain.'[28] Taking a very different attitude, Bradford Perkins considered these unions of little 'political importance' because in 'very few cases … did the husband gain a leading position.'[29] Based on this historic debate between two esteemed Anglo-American historians, we, as scholars, have a choice. We can dismiss these transatlantic marriages as little more than tactical unions of

mutual political, social, and economic interests reflective of the Gilded Age and deterioration of the British aristocracy. Or, we, as academics and researchers, can reconsider such strategic matrimonies as the oldest form of diplomacy as practiced in the ancient, modern, and contemporary eras.[30]

ANALYZING THE RHETORIC OF PAST AND PRESENT

Historicized versions of events in the past, such as those depicted in *Downton Abbey*, and of carefully selected transatlantic marriages, allow viewers around the world to ostensibly learn about Anglo-American alleged beliefs and assumed notions. A closer and more informed analysis of the scenes and seemingly trivial commentary from *Downton Abbey* enlighten viewers of countless Anglo-American traits and characteristics. Such lessons teaching stereotypes began immediately in the program. In the first episode from season one, Lady Cora Crowley and her daughters enter a room in the midst of a heated conversation. Lady Crowley inquires, 'I hope I don't hear the sounds of a disagreement.' Her mother-in-law, Violet Crawley and ever the Dowager Countess of Grantham, responds, 'What? Is that what they call discussion in New York?'[31] From the first episode, Lady Cora was identified as the American, and by default, the outsider.

While such a comment may seem minor, this ostensibly innocuous exchange represents the ever-present boundary between English and American women functioning at the center of the Anglo-American world. Such constant reminders by native-born Brits to American women served as frequent prompts that while they may live in Britain, they would never be British. Mary Curzon's letters home serve as an example of such experiences. In 1895, she wrote to her family, 'Just tell the dear [American] girls … *never never never* to marry away from home … it is always a sorrow to be an alien – and 50 years in a new country never alters your nationality … I shall never be an Englishwoman in feeling or character … oh! The unhappiness I see around me here in England amongst American women.'[32] Granted this letter was written in the first year of her marriage and may have been nothing more than a sign of a difficult transition to her new life as Mrs. Nathaniel Curzon and extreme homesickness upon leaving her homeland. On the other hand, many American-born, British-wed wives found that becoming ladies and mothers to future leaders in the British Parliament did little to change the overall perception of them as yet another woman living in the American colony abroad courtesy of her father's chequebook.

These types of open conversations about strategic marriages happened early and often in both the United States and the United Kingdom at the turn of the century. In writing her initial thoughts about her future husband, Lord Randolph Churchill, the young, beautiful, and impetuous Jennie Jerome fell

hard and fast. Immediately drawn to Jennie, Lord Churchill told a friend that he 'meant, if he could, to make the dark one his wife.'[33] Randolph proposed three days after meeting Jennie. Head over heels in love, Jennie shared her good news with her mother, expecting her to share in her joy. Much to her daughter's surprise, Mrs. Jerome spent the next several months attempting, but failing, to end the engagement. Concerned that her daughter must not settle for anything but the best transatlantic union, Mrs. Jerome recoiled at the notion of her daughter marrying anyone but a firstborn son and future duke, complete with the family estate.[34]

Keenly aware of her position as well as his, Jennie noted in her personal correspondence her initial thoughts. She admitted her all but immediate attraction to Randolph but concerns arose over his position as the third son rather than firstborn, to whom the family estate and fortune generally would be transferred one day. Given the fortunes that Jennie's father, Leonard Jerome, seemed to create and lose on a continual basis, in addition to Randolph's birth-order status, both families balked at their impending nuptials and expressed significant anxiety as to the financial stability of the future couple. This situation was eventually addressed following their hasty engagement when Jennie's father announced his intentions to provide 'pin money' for his precious daughter.[35] Ever candid with his daughter, Leonard expressed confidence in Jennie's selection of a fiancé, writing to her: 'You are no heiress and it must have taken heaps of love to overcome an Englishman's prejudice against "those horrid Americans." '[36] In reality, Leonard was simply happy to know that his daughter was not engaged to a 'Frenchman or any other of those Continental Cusses.'[37]

In the end, both sets of parents got what they wanted in negotiations leading up to the wedding of Lord Randolph and Jennie. The Marlboroughs used the engagement as an opportunistic ploy to motivate their unambitious third son to run for, and win, a seat in Parliament as he had shown little interest in a profession or much of anything, save Jennie, until this point. Thanks to a small army of his bankers and lawyers, Leonard supported the Anglo-American union while protecting his daughter with a significant financial agreement that included a settlement worth approximately £50,000 in assets in stock investments, a $300,000 mortgage, and an additional £2,000 yearly income for the newlyweds. Most important to Leonard, he included 'pin money' in the amount of £1,000 to be used solely at the discretion of his daughter.[38]

Clearly, Jennie and Randolph's engagement and path to marriage was certainly a family affair, with parents on both sides weighing in heavily on their ever so brief courtship. These obvious tensions over money and manners appear to have accompanied the majority of transatlantic marriages in this period and extended into multiple episodes of *Downton Abbey*. The continuing concern for Mary's marriage options appears throughout the first season. In an early episode, Lady Cora and Mary engage in a fierce argument over her potential

marriage to Cousin Matthew Crawley as a strategic means to keep the family money together. Aghast at the notion of marriage for economic practicalities, Mary pushes back against her mother's persuasions for her to consider such a match. With her ever sharp tongue, Mary retorts, 'I don't have to think about it. Marry a man who can barely hold his knife like a gentleman?' Lady Crawley chides her daughter and responds, 'Oh, you exaggerate.' In a telling comeback, Mary replies, 'You're American, you don't understand these things.' Given the Anglo-American history of such marriages and Cora's union specifically, this is a nearly hysterical reply based on Lady Crawley's marriage to Mary's father for the very same reasons – in the interest of money. Never one to back down, Mary continues and asks, 'Have you mentioned this to Granny? Did she laugh?' Surprising her daughter and certainly getting in the last laugh, Cora responds, 'Why would I? It was her idea.'[39]

The focus on Mary's marital options continues in the first season as Violet, her ever-present and involved grandmother, remains focused on finding a suitable match for her. Expressing her grandmotherly concern that Mary would not accept Matthew, the Dowager explains to Lady Crawley that they must move quickly in finding a match for Mary, 'before the bloom is quite gone off the rose.' Cora and Violet candidly weigh the numerous considerations involved with other potential husbands and verbally vet the status of each family, their respective economic stability, and other pertinent factors. Robert, Mary's father, eventually chimes in and chides his mother's interest and persistence. 'Mama, you've already looked him up in the stud books and made inquiries about the future. Don't pretend otherwise. Are you afraid someone will think you're American if you speak openly?' Quick to put her son in his place, she retorts, 'I doubt it'll come to that.'[40] While the Britons resented American inspecting of their aristocratic families for social status, the British viewed their own discussions regarding marriage and relevant economic considerations as a practical necessity.

As a recurring theme throughout the first episode, Mary's marriage prospects served as the focus of many a conversation. After all, as the first-born child, her union determined the future of Downton and the continuation of the family's elite status. Marrying just any man for love simply was not an option, a fact that Lady Crawley tried to impress upon her daughter when she tried to reason with Mary that perhaps by marrying Matthew, there was 'an answer which would secure [Mary's] future and give [her] a position.'[41] As her mother learned when her American money married into the Grantham family and Downton, '[T]he money isn't mine any more. It forms part of the estate.'[42] When it appeared that Mary would simply not cooperate with her mother or grandmother on this serious issue, Lady Crawley suggests that perhaps she send Mary over to visit her aunt in New York. After all, American girls traveled to England frequently to attend the London Season and increase

their pseudo-capital on the transnational marital market. Perhaps a trip to the United States would enhance Mary's allure back at home. But the Dowager Countess of Grantham quickly nixes such a proposal by succinctly stating, 'Oh, I don't think things are quite that desperate.'[43] In the Dowager's view, what was good for the American goose was *not* good for the British gander.

But for all the concern over Mary's matrimony drama, she was not the first daughter to marry or leave Downton. Rather the youngest and most rebellious, relatively speaking when considering an aristocratic family in the early twentieth century, Sybil chooses to become a nurse and leaves Downton for further training. Watching her youngest leave, Cora sentimentally comments, 'The first one to leave the nest … ' and tearfully leaves the room. The second daughter, Edith, observes, 'Poor Mama. She always feels these things so dreadfully.' Ever the wisest in the room, Mary smugly replies, 'That's her American blood.'[44] When Lady Mary blames her mother's 'outburst' on her emotional heritage, much is conveyed about Anglo-American culture, and specifically standards for sentiment by women, on both sides of the pond.

EMOTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

The notion of the overly emotional Americans extended throughout the period of Anglo-American marriages. Following her forced marriage to the ninth Duke of Marlborough, Consuelo Vanderbilt felt the need to clarify the involuntary nature of the union to her new husband as they traveled by train on their honeymoon. Explaining that the marriage was not her idea but her mother's, Consuelo went on to explain to 'Sunny' that she was actually in love with someone else. Briefly looking up from the stack of congratulatory telegrams, the duke looked up, shared that he was in the same boat, and concluded of his new wife's true love, 'I take it he was an American. I don't see the much point in discussing it any further.'[45] The Duchess of Marlborough spent the majority of the next ten years in tears, a fact that her new in-laws found mysterious, even confounding, but they rarely did much to make her feel at ease in her new homeland. In their eyes, the overly emotional American was lucky to join their aristocratic world and simply needed to assimilate fully to prescribed standards of English normalcy, which did not include open expressions of mawkishness or public affection.[46]

Both on-screen and in these historical marriages, the women often worked feverishly to find their place and sense of purpose in society. Through her work as a nurse, Sybil continues to evolve as a person and begins to find her herself outside the boundaries of Downton Abbey and her family name. When things take a radical turn – again, relatively speaking – when Sybil expresses the desire to marry Tom Branson, the family chauffeur, the Earl of Grantham

blames such a development on their 'spoiling her.' He rattles off a number of concerns that arguably led to this point. 'The mad clothes, the nursing. What were we thinking of?' Ever the American, Cora responded, 'That's not fair. She's a wonderful nurse, and she's worked very hard.' Upset at his perceived change in his daughter, Robert surmises that 'in the process, she's forgotten who she is.' At this point, Cora suggests an alternate possibility. 'Has she, Robert? Or have we overlooked who she really is?' Livid by such a candid (in his mind) response by his wife, Robert retorts, 'If you're turning American on me, I'll go downstairs.'[47] When the Britons had enough Americanism, with the exception of finances, they simply shut down the conversation and (literally or figuratively) walked away.

The idea of what made one an American and what made one truly British was a recurring theme throughout these marriages that marked the turn of the twentieth century. Similar to Sybil, Consuelo Vanderbilt Marlborough began to find herself in Britain following the birth of her two sons. Once faced with the reality of her sham marriage and never being able to please her demanding in-laws, she chose to take the path less traveled, and certainly so by British standards. She began speaking out on a number of issues – namely politics and the rights and roles of women – which proved to be quite the evolution from the young girl who spent the majority of her early years in a back brace forcing the utmost in posture. As she became more confident in herself, and her intersectional realities based on her gender, class, and nationality became more pronounced, she remarked on her observations of differences across the Atlantic. She once asked, 'is it surprising that an American girl who held democratic views found it difficult to accept the assumption that birth alone confers superiority?'[48] Many Americans would agree with such a conclusion, while most wealthy Britons of the era would arguably have laughed off such ideas of parity over patrimony.

The cultural differences between Americans and Britons are noted frequently throughout the series. When Sybil initially expressed her desire to attend school in order to learn something 'apart from French and how to curtsy,' she shocks her family and incurs the sharp tongue of her grandmother who begins interrogating her newfound desires. When Cora attempts to intercede in the increasingly heated conversation, she calmly offers, 'Things are different in America.' The Countess of Grantham quickly quips, 'I know. They live in wigwams.' Finally perturbed by the exchange, Lady Crawley hotly retorts, 'And when they come out of them, they go to school!'

The notion of frequently insulting Americans by their backward ways occurred on the set of *Downton Abbey* as well as in real life. As the pioneer for Anglo-American marriages, Lady Churchill often found her comments and deportment reflected widely on other American-born, British-wed wives. In her written reflections on her early years in England, Lady Churchill remarked,

'[I]n England, as on the Continent, the American woman was looked upon as a strange and abnormal creature, with habits and manners something between a Red Indian and a Gaiety Girl.'[49] And yet, exceptional behavior and demeanor incurred curt and speculative remarks. On more than one occasion, Lady Churchill regularly received the 'compliment' of, 'I should never have thought *you* were an American.'[50]

PATRONAGE AND POWER

While some Britons expressed an open disdain for Americans, they certainly enjoyed the family fortunes of American heiresses that made their aristocratic lifestyle possible in an era when this was becoming far more difficult to maintain. Such is portrayed in season three when the Crawley family presses Lady Cora to ask her family for more money after Robert invested heavily in an unsuccessful railroad company in Canada, which failed. In order to maintain Downton, Mary pressures her mother to implore her father for more money to maintain the family estate. Resistant to such an inquiry, Cora questions her daughter, 'What are you so afraid of? If we sell, we move to a smaller house and more modest estate.' Horrified at such a possibility, Mary replies, 'You don't understand!' Cora points out that many Britons live in smaller houses than in years past. In a haughty retort, Mary explains her reasoning. 'Which only goes to show that you're American and I am English. I shall be Countess of Grantham one day, and in my book, the Countess of Grantham lives at Downton Abbey.'[51]

The resentment and dependency upon American dollars to support a leisurely life for Britons often came with considerable tensions. In the case of George and Mary Curzon, their need for more financial support occurred at the very time that her family could not supply more funding. In 1898, Queen Victoria selected thirty-eight-year-old George Curzon as her next viceroy to India, a monumental honor of any Briton, but particularly one so young and one married to an American woman. But this recognition came at an untimely moment as (soon-to-be vicereine at all of twenty-eight years old) Mary Curzon's family suffered a financial fallout. Her brother, Joseph Leiter, the so-called 'King of the Wheat Pit,' had tried, and failed, to corner the wheat market, which resulted in a loss of some $1.5 million of the family fortune.[52] Hearing the rumors that George might become viceroy, Mary had shared the good news with her family, and her father promised the monetary support that would be needed to sustain a lifestyle expected of a viceroy and vicereine. But given this unexpected turn of financial events, her family could no longer deliver on such a promise.[53]

Tenuous interactions between Britons and American families were a consistent element in Anglo-American relations during this period. As a result,

these Anglo-American tensions received substantive commentary in the third season of the series with the introduction of a new character. When Cora's mother, played by the larger than life Shirley McClain, makes the transatlantic trip ostensibly to attend Mary's wedding to Matthew, the ladies of Downton converse about her impending arrival. On one occasion, Violet tells her daughter-in-law, 'I'm so looking forward to seeing your mother again. When I'm with her, I'm reminded of the virtues of the English.' Wisely, Lady Crawley says nothing. Confused by the latent backhanded 'compliment,' Cousin Matthew (now Lady Mary's fiancé) asks, 'Isn't she American?' Without hesitation, the Countess of Grantham replies, 'Exactly.'[54] Once again, a British voice reminded the American of her forever *other* status in a world to which she would never fully belong.

Almost immediately upon her rather dreaded arrival, Martha Levinson quickly puts every resident of Downton Abbey in their place with pithy one-liners. She tells the lead servants it seems strange to think of the English embracing change. To Sybil, who is now expecting, Martha commands her granddaughter to 'tell me all about the arrangements for the birth. We do these things so much better in the States.' To Edith, she comments, 'Still no one special? Well, never mind. You must take a tip from the modern American girl.' And finally, to her eldest granddaughter on the eve of her wedding, she quips, 'Ah, Mary, dearest Mary. Now, you tell me all of your wedding plans and I'll see what I can do to improve them.'[55] Comments such as these leave little wonder as to why the Britons in this period considered Americans arrogant, brash, egotistical, impetuous, and shockingly abrasive – and that was before they walked in the front door. But just as these harsh stereotypes and expectations shaped Anglo-American relations in the early 1900s, the very same perceptions and behavior functioned as dramatic fodder for international entertainment a century later.

Just moments later in the episode, Martha and Violet engage in a conversation about customs and social mores, which is only slightly veiled commentary about who does it best and is right in the twentieth century. The Countess of Grantham attempts to put her American family patron in her place by stating, 'You Americans never understand the importance of tradition.' Martha quickly retorts, 'Yes, we do. We just don't give it power over us.' As the benefactor of Downton and much of what Downton had provided the Crawley family since Cora's marriage to Robert, the holder of the purse strings continued to share her thoughts. 'History and tradition took Europe into a world war. Maybe you should think about letting go of its hand.'[56] While Martha's summation of the First World War may have a point, her words clearly present a distinctly American view of a European experience.

Such competing notions of the past, patronage, and power reside at the heart of these Anglo-American marriages. Lady Mary's wedding provided an

ideal opportunity to travel to Britain out of love of family. In reality, Martha Levinson makes the journey to visit her daughter to see how the American family's wealth is supporting the British leisure class. At one point, she brashly walks into a room and announces herself by saying, 'Oh! Well, the gang's all here I see.' The Dowager mockingly replies, 'Is that American for "hello"?'[57] In a conversation with Matthew's mother about the work she had done for the community during and after the war, Martha immediately asks, 'So, you want me to contribute?' Embarrassed, her daughter gently comments, 'You don't have to give money after every conversation, Mother.' Feigning surprise, Martha replies, 'No? Isn't that what the English expect of rich Americans?'[58] The double-edged sword of money cut both ways in this transatlantic battle, which lay at the heart of so many Anglo-American relationships in this period.

Martha's brief, but significant, appearance in the third season of *Downton Abbey* signifies the historic accuracy and commentary presented by the show. Arguably based on the stories of Alba Vanderbilt, Consuelo's mother, Martha's character embodies the exact 'pushy momma' persona epitomized in history by the forwardness of hundreds of American mothers who watched their daughters marry for title and, in many cases, leave their homeland forever.[59] As a prime example of American boldness, Alva's Vanderbilt's assertiveness in the United States laid the foundation for her daughter's marriage into British circles. Years of such behavior, which were rewarded when her daughter became a duchess, merely confirmed that might makes right – at least in social circles. Why would she abstain from decisiveness after such a coup? If anything, her boldness only increased after 1895, which earned her a wealth (pun intended) of enemies on both sides of the Atlantic. Ironically, it was that very same forcefulness and uncomfortably direct candor that helped to end her daughter's marriage and eventual annulment after twenty-six years and two sons.[60] The patronage of American dollars resulted in significant social power in Britain in this period. But the same method of influence resulted in severe cultural resentment toward Americans as well.

CONCLUSION

In many, if not most, Anglo-American marriages that occurred between the end of the Civil War and beginning of the First World War, wives experienced a significant degree of cultural dislocation and severe unhappiness in their lives abroad. But these experiences over a century later are often depicted in *Downton Abbey* as brief moments of sentimentality that are typically handled with a witty comeback or saucy one-liner, which serve as commentary about the stereotypical stiff-upper-lip Briton and emotionally boorish Americans sharing a home and the screen. But just as Anglo-American relations have evolved in the last century, so have the perspectives of the individuals portrayed. The

lived, and often painful, experiences of women and wives over a century ago now serve as humorous entertainment to millions around the world. Given the centrality of brides and mothers to this particular piece of Anglo-American history, combined with the overwhelming female viewership of the series, it is little wonder that many of the pithiest and biting lines in *Downton Abbey* are dished out by female characters.[61]

Throughout its insightful episodes, *Downton Abbey* provides ample occasions to explore Anglo-American relations and realities in a way that was not possible a decade ago. Debating the stereotypes and veiled commentary offers the chance to sift between fact and fiction … and all that exists in between. This phenomenally successful program presents boundless opportunities for scholarly reflection and public debate as scenes explore aristocratic norms in Britain, American perceptions of themselves and their cultural cousins, and Anglo-American life understood through a wealth of special relationships. Viewers around the world can debate the veracity of the past due to compelling characters and superb script writing. Thanks to the phenomenal success of *Downton Abbey*, yet another chapter has been written in the evolving cultural history of Anglo-American relations.

NOTES

1 This chapter would not have been possible without the efforts of two exceptional graduate students, Allison Grimes and Heaven Umbrell. Many thanks to both of them for all of their research assistance.

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5

ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE

ALAN P. DOBSON

INTRODUCTION

In the scholarship of Anglo-American relations, and it is very extensive, there is surprisingly little written about the political culture that the two countries might share. Perhaps this is because at first sight differences rather than commonalities appear to predominate, especially in the institutional sphere. Often claims are made that the United States is more libertarian, laissez-faire economically, socially conservative on the death penalty, abortion, the right to bear arms, health provision, and gay rights, and traditionally more right wing and anti-socialist than Britain. There have also been radical departures over slavery and empire and colonialism, and the consequent ideological positioning of the two countries has not always drawn interpretative consensus. For instance, a recent historical analysis, which centers on the idea of America succeeding Britain as an international hegemon, contends that in the nineteenth century Britain was a liberal but not a democratic state while the United States was democratic but illiberal, most obviously evidenced in slavery and attitudes towards indigenous peoples.[1]

However, when one looks deeper one can indeed discern foundations of a shared political culture. Viewed in a historical perspective it is clear that British and American politics exhibit similar debates about matters of central and common concern. These debates have primarily though not exclusively been conducted within the respective British and American versions of liberal political doctrine and philosophy, particularly in the domestic economic sphere. Furthermore, these debates manifest temporal progressions such that it is reasonable to suggest the existence of a transatlantic political dialogue. In other words, as this chapter will demonstrate, British and American traditions of

political thought overlap to such an extent, and are so central to the experience of both countries, that they transcend national boundaries to form a plausible Anglo-American political culture centered on, but not exclusively consisting of, liberalism.

LIBERAL IDEOLOGY AND ITS SCOPE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

To develop the contention that liberalism is so rich and pervasive in both countries – and not simply in its own right but also in the way that it has infected other political doctrines and largely set parameters for political debate – that it provides the foundation for a shared political culture, it is first important to have some understanding of how liberalism as an ideology is used here. What are its family concepts, its understanding of the political world, and its scope and impact? Sophisticated political doctrines of this kind are not primarily concerned with truth but with political action. They turn the adage of seeing is believing on its head: What one believes determines what one sees and more importantly deems to be valuable – on the basis of such values political action is prescribed. Ideologies confer a hierarchy of value and significance on the world, which to a nonbeliever will not seem plausible, though that is not to say that some claims will not resonate. They will not, however, resonate to the point of evoking a coherent ethical or world view, so while they may resonate to the point of prompting discrete political actions they will not prompt the nonbeliever into promoting the ideology's full program. One of their radical characteristics is that ideologues claim to be able to explain the human condition and agency better than, and in a different way to that of, an individual who does not share the ideology. An ideology provides claims to truth and insight into the human condition and prescriptions for improving it. Put simply, the ideologue can claim to explain an individual and their place in society better than she can explain herself. The most obvious example of this is the socialist idea of proletarian false consciousness in the pre-revolutionary stage, but similar points can be made of all ideologies. Only once a person has been converted can the full light of the ideological explanation be grasped. These are rather contentious and perhaps overly abstract points for our present purposes, but it would be beneficial to keep them in mind as the narrative progresses.

Like any other ideology, one has to understand the moral assumptions of liberalism for it to make sense. Whatever the starting point, and John Locke is probably as good a starting point as any, all liberals foreground a conception of the individual and liberty protected by government with the individual valued as an end in itself.[2] No individual should be sacrificed against their will for a

greater good, and all individuals should be free to make of themselves what they will, providing that they do not infringe on the rights of others to do the same. This position owes much to the Kantian view that human beings are unique by virtue of their abilities for reflective thought and making ethical decisions in accordance with universal laws or moral imperatives. Such individuals must not be constrained by external force, be it exercised by another individual, a group, or government itself, except insofar as to prevent them from interfering in other people's rightful freedom of action. As Kant put it: 'There is only one innate right, freedom, insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law.'[3]

Once liberals acknowledged the need for government in order for individuals to thrive in freedom their perennial questions became: How far should the realm of government extend? And how can it be held in check? From this it follows that power in whatever form needs to be checked and balanced to prevent oppression and that such balance can be provided in various forms, which are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps the overriding mechanism is law promulgated by the 'people' (however that might be defined over time) and implemented by an impartial judiciary to protect the rights of individuals. In addition, liberals have sought to check and balance power through distinct roles apportioned to different branches of government and through its devolution to local and regional structures, civic groups, charities, and other types of groups commonly found in civil society.

Such a view of liberalism allows for different iterations of doctrine aimed at similar practical consequences, but justified in different ways that cannot be wedded together into a coherent whole. In other words, while individual iterations of liberalism are indeed coherent, collectively they are not. There are, in short, many roads to the same broad liberal objective. Locke's fundamental reliance was on the will and intention of God, which provided a very distinct stage on which to defend freedom and limited government ruled over by laws that reflected the rationality of the Good Maker. According to Locke, government was instituted in order to act impartially to promote the interests and protect the rights of its people, particularly the right of ownership of person and property. If government departed from that rationale, then the people had the right to rise up in revolution and reinstate legitimate government. In contrast, the stage for later liberals was more secular, though there were significant differences to be found among them on other issues. For example, the protection of individuals for Kant consisted of the exercise of freedom in accordance with universal law. In contrast liberalism in the guise of utilitarianism rested on the principle of greatest happiness for the greatest number of people: a principle that seems to contradict the value of the individual as it adopts a means–ends argument justifying the sacrifice of minority rights for the benefit/happiness of the majority. The stage for liberal idealists differed

again resting on promoting moral agency. And for welfare liberals objectives were to provide necessary health, education, and welfare services so people could enjoy what to them seemed a meaningful notion of liberty. Within the liberal mansion there are many rooms and that characteristic has encompassed both British and American political cultures.

So, to reiterate, the main contention flowing from the above is that liberalism in its various guises was hugely influential in both countries and to an extent that it provides a core for the plausible assertion that they share a common political culture. Of course, one can immediately imagine four possible challenges to this:

(i) Political culture is not just about political ideas, but also about institutions and the United States and Britain have such different institutional frameworks that the idea of a common political culture is not plausible.

(ii) What of important omissions here such as conservatism and socialism? How can one try to iterate a political culture on such a narrow basis as liberalism and without taking other influential political traditions of thought into account?

(iii) What about the widely disseminated view of American exceptionalism and, more specifically for our concerns, its incarnation in Louis Hartz's hugely influential thesis *The Liberal Tradition in America*? Therein it is contended that the United States is unique and categorically different from the Old World of Europe: 'It is not accidental that America which has uniquely lacked a feudal tradition has uniquely lacked also a socialist tradition.'[4] If he were correct, then American political culture is so unique that it could not possibly be mirrored in Britain or, indeed, any other country.

(iv) Are there not unique and illiberal experiences in both countries, which more divide than conjoin them, most notably in the nineteenth century with slavery and the treatment of indigenous peoples in the United States and imperialism in Britain?

Let us respond to each of these points.

There is little doubt that the institutional frameworks of government in Britain and the United States are different and have caused significant divergences in the way that political issues have arisen and been dealt with. The governmental structure in the United States created a central, ongoing, and different form of political struggle than was germane to British experience. It arose from the idea of divided sovereignty, something very alien to the British unitary state in which parliamentary supremacy became ever more embedded as the nineteenth century progressed. In contrast, federalism divided sovereignty and pitched states' rights against the power of the Washington

government. Nothing like this really existed in Britain until the framework of devolution was created in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.

US federalism set a context that seemingly nurtured a different kind of political struggle than was possible in Britain. In hindsight one can identify three great phases: the prologue to and experience of the Civil War to deny states a right to secede from the Union; the New Deal to superimpose national regulation and taxation on the states to create a more national economy and one more supportive of the disadvantaged; and the struggle in the Supreme Court and the Congress in the 1950s and 1960s to nationalize the federal Bill of Rights, which among other things extended federal standards to the criminally accused, established civil rights enforceable by federal law for all including ethnic minorities, and created a limited right of abortion for women.

Prima facie such developments seem distant from British experience, where the focus was not centered on a struggle between central and local or regional government, but between the major political ideologies of liberalism and conservatism and later socialism. However, in some ways, more important were the struggles within those three ideologies between libertarianism and forms of social welfare collectivism. Much of this revolved around questions about the appropriate scope of government and arguments were played out in practice between and within the main political parties. All of this resulted in a gradual expansion of government regulation and provision of health, education, and welfare as the social welfare ethos slowly progressed.[5]

Looked at in this way one can see that while there were indeed differences in the form of political debates in the United States and in the United Kingdom, their actual content and dynamics were not dissimilar. Both countries engaged in similar fundamental debates about the role and scope of government, its relationship to the individual, what constituted liberty, how individuals could best prosper, and what rights needed to be accorded to them. In the United States, these debates took place largely within the context of the struggle between state and federal government and in Britain largely within liberalism and between it and conservatism and later socialism. In short, when British and American political experiences are seen in this way, it is clear that their political cultures were and always have been speaking to each other, or at least progressing in parallel.

Regarding possible challenges (ii) and (iii) to my thesis, the main argument here is not that the political experiences were and are identical. Rather, the overall trajectory has been and still is liberal and that liberalism has predominantly set the boundaries within which politics is played out in both Britain and the United States. Liberalism can countenance ideologies such as conservatism, or at least British and American versions of conservatism, and indeed socialism, though it could clearly not live side by side with communism, national socialism, or fascism. This ability to cohabit with versions

of conservatism and socialism and yet remain the dominant doctrine will become well illustrated in the body of this chapter. And in demonstrating that point, it will also become persuasively demonstrated that Louis Hartz's thesis of American liberal exceptionalism cannot stand.

The final objection to the thesis presented here is that there were important differences in substantial issues and perhaps this is the most telling critique of the four. In Britain William Wilberforce led the campaign that abolished British participation in the slave trade in 1807 and then slavery itself in 1833. By contrast, in the United States, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 sought to accommodate the continuance of slavery in the states. Even so, friction between free and slave state continued. In 1828 with the 'Tariff of Abominations' such friction became intense because the tariff protected northern industry and discriminated against the South's agricultural economy, which happened to be based on plantation slavery. For the next thirty years, American politics were dominated by the arguments about slavery and freedom; there was no counterpart in Britain to such writers as William Lloyd Garrison, J. C. Calhoun, and George Fitzhugh.[6] Similarly different in Britain for much of the nineteenth century was an obsession with empire that was not reflected in the United States – unless one sees westward expansion as comparable. Certainly, there was no one in the United States like Cecil Rhodes or Benjamin Disraeli. Towards the end of the century things began to change with the strategic ideas of sea power promulgated by Alfred Mahan and the eruption of the Spanish–American War, but major differences remained.[7]

The substance and the nuances of those differences do not need to be assessed here: Simply, the point is made that some strains of political thought and morality in both the United States and Britain seemed patently anti-liberal and such strains had different foci and content, which differentiated their respective political experiences. However, it is worth noting that liberalism toyed with both imperialism and slavery, even if in a rather convoluted manner. John Stuart Mill, for example, envisaged Britain with a duty to nurture and educate India toward political independence. It may sound oxymoronic, but there were those who were dubbed liberal imperialists. And in the United States the defenders of plantation agriculture and slavery, or at least some of them such as J. C. Calhoun, did so vis-à-vis the federal government by asserting a liberal form of autonomy, which eventually led to secession in a way similar to Locke's argument that consent was only compelling to a legitimate government. Louis Hartz had much to say on this use of liberal concepts by defenders of the South and of what he saw as the destructive paradox at the heart of the Southern enterprise, namely oppression of slaves on the one hand and the insistence on the liberal-sounding importance of freedom – from an 'illegitimate' – federal government on the other. And, while he takes this too far, there is an interesting partial truth in his analysis. So, it is one thing to acknowledge

different preoccupations with slavery and empire, but quite another to claim that such differences were either defining non-liberal characteristics of both systems or that these strains of thought and values were potent enough to divide them in such a way as to deny the possibility of a shared political culture with liberalism at its heart.

THE CONTINUITY OF LIBERALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

In the beginning in the United States, contra Hartz, more important than not existing under vestiges of feudalism (and that claim itself is contentious), was a continuance of stability via the Common Law and other inheritances from Britain via colonial government and the influence of Locke and Enlightenment thinking ranging from Hume to Montesquieu. The form of government and the ideas that informed it were little more than logical developments from British political experience, albeit embodying some practices in statutory form or making explicit what was often implicit in Britain, or developing and furthering what was the norm in Britain. This claim is demonstrable through examining four key liberal features of the new American system: the founding principle of the republic, representation, checks and balances, and judicial review.

Clearly there was something radical sounding to the phrase 'We the people of the United States' as the foundational principle of government, but it was in fact little different from the civil society creation myth articulated by Locke and that had provided justification *ex post facto* for the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Locke argued in the *Second Treatise on Government* that men in a state of nature come together to contract government for a civil society and institute laws that will overcome the problem of people being judge and jury in their own cases when violence and disorder erupt in the state of nature. The new order will thus protect the rights and promote the interests of the people and must do nothing contrary to those principles.[8] The American liberals were being more explicit than their British counterparts, but substantive difference there was none, except for a more broadly cast definition of who the 'people' were, i.e. those who made and carried out government. Here there was a significant difference in practice and indeed had been for decades within the colonial system. Men generally in the American colonies had more say in government than in Britain, but the principle of representation was alive and well in both systems and as time passed experience in Britain gradually caught up with practice in the United States and in the early twentieth century overtook it with the enfranchisement of women.[9] Furthermore, and unmentioned so far in this context, is slavery in the United States and that a slave was to be legally counted as three-fifths of a free man. Britain was not the only country to have significant anomalies in representation, which compromised the notion of a

liberal state. In the United States, not only were men not all treated as equal, some were not seen as being fully human and that was embedded in law.

Checks and balances were more extensive and formalized than in the British system with clear institutional divisions between the executive, the judiciary and the legislature (though with overlapping authority), a bicameral legislature with the House of Representatives elected by the people (defined variably in the constituent states of the Union until after the Civil War and generally restricted to property ownership and being male) and senators chosen by state legislatures (until 1913, thereafter elected by the people of their respective states), and the division between federal and state powers. US forms of representation and checks and balances were clearly more in harmony with the liberal obsession with preventing the emergence of arbitrary power wielded by any section or group of people, but it had its non-liberal anomalies. For decades after the Civil War Jim Crow laws discriminated against black Americans and poor whites. The US Electoral College does not meet the equality principle of 'one person one vote,' nor does the allocation of two senators per state irrespective of population, nor does the procedure for determining the outcome of a hung presidential election. One might argue, too, that neither does the first-past-the-post election principle (an anomaly also evident in British parliamentary constituencies). Even so, one might argue that compared with the power of royal prerogative, the nonelected House of Lords, the more restricted franchise, and the much looser framework of checks and balances in Britain in the nineteenth century that the two countries were qualitatively different: one clearly embodying the principles of liberalism and the other only partially so, with strong strands of conservatism, royal autarchy, and the vestiges of a feudal order compromising the possibility of a liberal state. And there is some truth in this, but British checks and balances still worked, albeit imperfectly, and strengthened as the nineteenth century progressed with the decline of the royal prerogative, the withering of feudal vestiges, the consolidation of a robust two-party system, extensions of the franchise, and the continuing authority of the judiciary.

But, of course, the role of the judiciary in the United States and British politics have always been significantly different because of the principle of judicial review. In the United States, at least since the benchmark case of *Marbury v. Madison* in 1803, the Supreme Court has claimed the right to determine what the law is, or more specifically what it can and cannot be. This is a logical consequence of a written constitution: if the Congress and president create a law that is incompatible with the constitution, then the Supreme Court can declare it null and void. In Britain, judicial review of this kind has never been exercised in the face of parliamentary sovereignty. Courts can only apply judicial review, largely through the concept of ultra vires, to determine whether or not laws are being carried out appropriately. In Britain, the constraints on legislative

powers are exercised by debate in the Commons and the Lords and the force of traditional restraint and conventions, empowered increasingly over time by the public media. One might say that all of that does not really amount to much as a form of check and balance, but then while judicial review is a potent force of restraint on the US government, one might remind oneself of Stalin's quip about the Pope: How many divisions does he have? The same, metaphorically, could be asked of the US Supreme Court. In other words, much of this judicial restraint is about creating public messages of improper government action. In the United Kingdom, the judiciary cannot perform that role as effectively as in the United States, but there are other sources of restraint and of signifying when the government is overreaching itself.

THE DEVELOPING LIBERAL TRADITION

One might ask: Could a war of independence with battle cries that included the reassertion of the traditional rights of Englishmen create something so different from the mother country that the idea of a shared political culture could be severed overnight? If the arguments above are persuasive, then clearly not, but that is not to ignore that by 1783 the two countries were positioned differently on the liberal spectrum with the United States in many ways in the lead. It is, however, arguable whether the United States retained its relative position during the nineteenth century, and of course up until the 1860s there was always slavery. Certainly, in terms of influential liberal ideas there was much more creative energy in Britain. From the last quarter of the eighteenth century until 1860 the roll call of liberal writers and those who influenced them directly is dauntingly impressive: Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776); Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principles of Population* (1798–1826 in six editions); Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1781) and a plethora of other published works stretching into the 1820s and beyond; David Ricardo, *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817); and John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859). These thinkers laid much of the foundations for liberalism to flourish in the nineteenth century, but they addressed different challenges to those engaged by Locke and the earlier British and continental contributors to the liberal tradition.

Locke had primarily focused on how God-given liberty could be enjoyed by freeing people from the shackles of an autocratic and arbitrary government. However, by the late eighteenth century, George III and his attitude to the American colonies notwithstanding, a civil society with constitutional safeguards had emerged in Britain and the liberal focus now shifted to releasing people from the shackles of guilds, institutional monopolies, and other restrictive practices, improving the lot of the people, and protecting the

value of the individual from the coercive dangers of mass opinion. This was a time when in both Britain and the United States capitalism began to thrive and industrialization moved forward apace. The free market as envisaged by Smith and Ricardo had much in common with the mechanistic universe of Newton with ideas of movement towards equilibrium and balance through a free interplay of market forces. The idea that the state should simply be a 'night watchman' to keep order gained strong currency. Under its benevolent inactivity, liberty could be realized through the interplay of free individuals and untrammeled economic forces could proceed efficiently. The result was an outpouring of innovation and industrial and wealth expansion never seen before. But in the midst of all this, liberal voices of caution, warning, and questioning arose.

John Stuart Mill warned of the dangers of a uniformity of coercive opinion emerging from mass industrial society that would erode the possibility of individualism. That in effect would destroy the most precious thing for liberals: the autonomous individual and its dynamic creative motor force, without which society could not sustain itself never mind progress. However, there was an equally disturbing problem in that the market was indifferent to the human needs of the working population and the condition of the great industrial cities. That prompted reformers and creative artists alike to address and to portray the human misery spawned there. What could liberty mean in practice to those workers who toiled often for over twelve hours a day, were illiterate and inarticulate, ill nourished, poorly clothed, and suffering ill health in squalid housing conditions? Furthermore, there was an infectious uniformity – a lack of differentiation among the industrial masses – evident here, caught from poverty that contradicted the very idea of individual personage.

All this raised the question of the efficacy for the liberal agenda of the night-watchman state. For some liberals, the answer was to depart from that concept and invoke the idea of an empowering state. For others, the answer was to adhere even more strongly to the night-watchman state. In doing so they employed the authority of Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) to bolster their arguments about the need for freedom from coercion and the 'fact' that humans had to survive in an essentially competitive environment. And so began a debate about positive and negative freedom that has been in various guises dominant not only in liberalism but generally in modern democratic societies ever since. No Western democratic party or thinker could or can avoid responding to that debate and it clearly deeply infected both American and British versions of conservatism and socialism, as well as liberalism.

Herbert Spencer led the way in developing Darwin's ideas into what became known as Social Darwinism and his ideas resonated even more strongly in the United States than in Britain. Spencer argued that liberalism had lost its way because its conception of the good was no longer seen as an end to be indirectly

gained by relaxation of restraints, but as the end to be directly gained. Instead of creating an environment in which humans could individually pursue their own conception of the good, the state now interposed itself directly by defining and furthering well-intentioned goods, such as limitations on the freedom to contract, providing welfare and education, and so on. What modern liberalism had failed to note, according to Spencer, was that this would lead to government oppression and the demise of liberty.[10]

His American acolyte, W. G. Sumner, captured an essential truth of the new doctrine when he said that the drunk in the gutter was where he naturally should be. Couching such sentiments in more general terms, he wrote: 'In general, however, it may be said that those whom humanitarians and philanthropists call the weak are the ones through whom the productive and conservative forces of society are wasted. They constantly neutralize and destroy the finest efforts of the wise and industrious, and are a dead-weight on the society in all its struggles to realize any better things.'[11] Sumner wrote in the Gilded Age, a time of rampant individualistic, domestic laissez-faire capitalism. As Richard Hofstadter put it in his classic work on the American political tradition: 'There is no other period in the nation's history when politics seems so completely dwarfed by economic changes … in politics the reformers were both isolated and sterile.'[12] Any idea that government should regulate anything in order to achieve a form of distributive justice or set standards of public welfare seemed alien. Above everyone else the Scottish-born American industrial giant Andrew Carnegie epitomized the worship of industrial wealth and progress untrammeled by government regulation. He declared, 'Upon the sacredness of property civilization itself depends' and that 'individualism, private property, the law of accumulation of wealth, and the law of competition … these are the highest results of human experience.'[13] This was the 'Gospel of Wealth.' Carnegie however differed in some ways from the doctrine of W. G. Sumner in that he believed that the wealthy had an overriding moral imperative to help those less well off in society, but this could only come from voluntary action: it could not be coerced by the state. Unfortunately, not all the hugely wealthy were as philanthropically disposed as Carnegie thought that they should be and there lay the rub.

Intellectual critiques and any countering practical political response to such ideas were far weaker in the United States than in Britain, but critical voices did arise and had become potent by the 1920s and 1930s especially in the face of a major failing of capitalism. Idealists such as Henry Thoreau and Walt Whitman, Edward Bellamy and his scathing critique of capitalism in *Looking Backward*, Populists such as William Jennings Bryan, Henry Demarest Lloyd, and Progressives such as Eugene Debs, Herbert Croly, Woodrow Wilson, and Theodore Roosevelt started things off and all attacked laissez-faire capitalism and the Gilded Age. Perhaps one of the most radical critics of American

capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century was Henry George, who committed the blasphemy of challenging property ownership, or at least the benefits of ownership. He argued that poverty deepens as wealth increases, and wages are forced down while productive power grows, because land, which is the source of all wealth and the field of all labor, is monopolized.[14] His answer was not to nationalize land, but to appropriate rent through taxation. In some ways, his view of land ownership was comparable to that of the English philosopher Thomas Hill Green. He did not see land ownership as sacrosanct either. It was simply a creation of civil society and should be changed, altered, modified as and when required for the benefit of that civil society.

The impact of the critics of America's Gilded Age was not comparable to the impact of the welfare liberals and the rise of the Labour Party and its ideologues in Britain, but they did have influence and prepared the way for the Pragmatists. In many ways, the intellectual summation of concerns and ideas in America about the shortcomings of contemporary society culminated in what many see as the only distinctive American school of philosophy – *pragmatism* – nowhere better expressed than in the work of John Dewey. But before turning to Dewey and the rise of American social 'welfare-ism', it is important to examine what came first in Britain.

There is insufficient space to do justice to all those who took up such arguments in Britain but the contributions of John Maynard Keynes and Thomas Hill Green well illustrate developments. John Maynard Keynes, who was hugely influential in the United States and almost everywhere else in the world, wrote in 1926:

> Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which from time to time, *laissez-faire* has been founded. It is *not* true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in their economic activities. There is *no* 'compact' conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or those who Acquire. The world is *not* so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is *not* so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is *not* a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally *is* enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does *not* show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.[15]

Coming from the preeminent economist of his day this was pretty damning stuff for those still wedded to the idea of laissez-faire, the Gospel of Wealth and the night-watchman state. Keynes, of course, went on to argue for the need of government regulation and for adjustments to the free market: arguments that still set much of the parameter for contemporary discussion of government

management of the economy in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

For his part, Green was not uninterested in economics, but his emphasis was always on ways to nurture a moral society. His starting point was this: 'The danger of legislation, either in the interests of a privileged class or for the promotion of particular religious opinions, we may fairly assume to be over. The popular jealousy of law, once justifiable enough, is therefore out of date.'[16] In short, the concerns of Locke and his arguments about the need for great caution about the power of government were no longer so relevant. Green argued that it was now safe for government to be more active in the life of the nation and address deficiencies in society. 'Without a command of certain elementary arts and knowledge the individual in modern society is as effectually crippled as by the loss of a limb or a broken constitution. He is not free to develop his faculties.'[17] Green held a very different conception of freedom to that espoused by Locke, Mill, and above all Spencer. Green argued specifically about freedom:

> Though of course there can be no freedom among men who act not willingly but under compulsion, yet on the other hand the mere removal of compulsion, the mere enabling a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom. In one sense no man is so well able to do what he likes as the wandering savage. He has no master. There is no one to say him nay. Yet we do not count him really free, because the freedom of savagery is not strength, but weakness. The actual powers of the noblest savage do not admit of comparison with those of the humblest citizen of a law-abiding state. He is not the slave of man, but he is the slave of nature.[18]

So, Green believed that simply ensuring that people could enjoy their lives free from interference, even when born with so-called inalienable rights, was not enough to ensure that people would be truly free or that society would necessarily be good. He challenged the idea that negative rights – freedom from – were sufficient for the good society. Green wondered, for instance, what use it was to oppressed workers to have negative rights when the reality of the mass of the people was that they were largely undifferentiated because of poverty and as far from the ideal of a rational individual as one could fear to get. So, Green, in order to continue the liberal love affair with individualism felt obliged to take a different tack to the issue of freedom. Green felt that the masses needed help if they were to become true individuals and only government could do this. The night-watchman/minimalist state would now have to give way to a more powerful and interventionist government that would liberate them from the shackles of circumstance through provision of health, education, and welfare, and regulations that would protect them from exploitation by the rich and powerful.

> No contract is valid in which human persons, willingly or unwillingly, are dealt with as commodities, because such contracts of necessity defeat the end for which alone society enforces contracts at all … This is most plainly the case when a man bargains to work under conditions fatal to health, in an unventilated factory. Every injury to the health of the individual is, so far as it goes, a public injury. It is an impediment to the general freedom; so much deduction from our power, as members of society, to make the best of ourselves.[19]

For Green, and, as we shall see shortly, for Ronald Dworkin – a much more recent American thinker – society should be composed of free women and men who find themselves within a framework that supports their self-willed pursuit of moral improvement and in doing so they will create a moral society. They cannot be compelled to be moral, but the infrastructure that facilitates moral improvement can and should be supplied by the state. Unlike Margaret Thatcher, who declared that there is no such thing as society, Green emphasized the importance of society for the nurturing and development of the individual. Indeed, in his view if any single individual fails to reach fulfillment then that damages society and hence us all.

The development of a form of social welfare-ism in the United States moved in delayed tandem with ideas that had been articulated in Britain in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century and that culminated in the ideas of the Pragmatists. John Dewey, for example, recognized the way in which liberalism as articulated in Britain had developed along two incompatible paths: humanitarian and philanthropic leading naturally into welfare liberalism; and laissez-faire economics and political libertarianism leading to advocacy of the limited night-watchman state and the prescriptions of Social Darwinism.[20] In attacking the defenders of the US economic status quo in 1935 Dewey clearly declared the superiority of the former over the latter and intellectually committed himself to a form of liberal welfare-ism.

> If one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a given time, one has to examine what persons *can* do and what they *cannot* do … liberty is always a social question, not an individual one … No one can do anything except in relation to what others can do and cannot do … It is a nonsense to suppose that we do not have social control *now*. The trouble is that it is exercised by the few who have economic power, at the expense of the liberties of the many.[21]

Two years earlier, in a groundbreaking study, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means exposed changes in corporate capitalism in such a way that it demonstrated just how radically capitalism had evolved in the previous half century such that it now required new forms of regulation. These ideas had impact on both sides of the Atlantic: Berle worked for the Roosevelt administration and in Britain the message of Berle and Means was mediated through a

variety of sources influential upon both the Conservative and Labour Party, notably in the latter on Labour revisionist intellectual C. A. R. Crosland. There was some deference to socialism in the Labour Party with more talk of brotherhood and the need for material equality than was the case among liberals, where the emphasis was on the concepts of moral equality and equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, the ideas of welfare liberalism and equality of opportunity also infused the Labour Party and impacted on Conservatives as well. Following the Second World War Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States, accepted the implementation of welfare and education policies that were derived generally from the prescriptions of welfare liberalism. The fact that these things happened in both countries more or less at the same time and as the result of ideas emanating from a liberal political culture that spanned the Atlantic directly challenges Hartz's idea of an exceptional liberal tradition of experience in the United States. In Britain, there was also the radical development of the National Health Service (NHS), something that was absent from the US scene. Nevertheless, Lyndon Johnson's introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s as part of his reforming Great Society program may have been more modest than the NHS but the reasoning behind it was similar. In the twenty-first century President Barack Obama built further on those initiatives.

The postwar onward march of welfare liberalism ground to a halt, and then went into reverse, in the 1970s when Keynesianism appeared to have no solution to the concurrent experience of rising prices and falling output, commonly known as 'stagflation.' The electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan the following year ushered in a lengthy period of governance for Conservative parties. But to see them as traditional Conservatives would be wrong: they owed more to the liberal than to the conservative tradition. Not for nothing was the term 'neo-liberal' coined. These so-called Conservatives drew on those aspects of the liberal tradition derived from Spencer, Social Darwinism, and the concept of the night-watchman state to influence hugely both American and British politics. Reaganomics and Thatcherism fed off the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, sometimes directly and sometimes via Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics. Hayek was an Austrian-British economist and political thinker who had argued publicly against Keynes and his version of economic management in the1930s. Hayek sounded a clarion call for protection of individual freedom. By this he meant that freedom is the protection of the individual from coercion by others. Individuals would then flourish in pursuing their own conceptions of the good life and in so doing they would create a good and free society. The state should not dictate the kind of lives that its citizens lead and the law must not favor one view of the good life over another: laws must be neutral in this respect. As Raymond Plant aptly put it: 'It is central to Hayek's theory of justice and law that the laws of a free society should be framed independently of a particular view of human purposes and

goals.'[22] In trying to demonstrate the perniciousness of collectivism Hayek wrote much about freedom and coercion and the free market. In *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) and his later work *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960), he tried to demonstrate the inextricable link between and interdependency of economic and political freedoms: without economic freedom there can be no political freedom and vice versa. This was one of the strongest articulations of the theory of negative rights that was to appear in the mid-twentieth century and these ideas were adopted in varying degrees as the mantra of contemporary British and American Conservative parties during and long after the Reagan–Thatcher era.

When Reaganism and Thatcherism in turn ran into difficulties because of their inability to meet the needs of ordinary and disadvantaged people, and in light of increasing polarity between rich and poor, the pendulum swung again with modernized versions of Green's social welfare-ism in both the United States and Britain under President Bill Clinton and Labour prime minister Tony Blair respectively. This was dubbed 'the Third Way,' but in fact it was simply dressed up nineteenth-century liberal social democracy with the debate between positive and negative freedoms once more center stage. This is not to suggest that the Labour Party had metamorphosed into a new progressive Liberal Party. Rather it is to demonstrate that the two strands of liberalism that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century had made by the late twentieth and early twenty-first century a major impact on both Conservative and left-of-center/Socialist parties in Britain and the United States. The doctrinal narrative of liberalism in all its richness, including the promotion of either positive or negative rights, was ubiquitous in all leading British and American political parties. And this was so largely because of the existence of a common Anglo-American political culture.

THE SHIFT IN THE LIBERAL DEBATE TO THE UNITED STATES

In the nineteenth century, it had clearly been British thinkers who had been most dynamic and original in the progression of liberal doctrines. Now, somewhat ironically given the generally more conservative hue in the United States, it was there that the most complete version of the controversy between negative freedoms/libertarianism and positive freedoms/collectivism developed with John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy State and Utopia*. Rawls tried to square the circle of positive and negative rights by a theory that would encompass economic competition, individual liberty, and distributive justice to provide health, education, and welfare. He argued that this is the kind of society that any rational person would choose in a state of ignorance of his or her own situation and talents, i.e. in an original position

behind a veil of ignorance before society is created. Nozick forthrightly rejected this: 'Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.' Sitting somewhere in between, though far closer to Rawls, was Ronald Dworkin, another American scholar, who interestingly split his time mainly between Oxford and London on the one hand and New York on the other.[23]

Dworkin did not believe that Rawls's original position was a plausible foundation for a theory of justice. In Dworkin's view, Rawls derived the original position from a substantive view of the individual that requires equality of concern and respect from all others. In this sense, the original position is not original: it presupposes and is premised upon a principle of equality of concern and respect for all individuals. The question then becomes what justifies this principle?

Dworkin said of liberalism: 'Its constitutive morality is a theory of equality that requires official neutrality amongst theories of what is valuable in life.'[24] The state must accord equal respect and concern for all individuals because no one can ever achieve a position from which to demonstrate that their version of the good is superior to another's. 'No self-respecting atheist can agree that a community in which religion is mandatory is for that reason finer, and no one who is homosexual that the eradication of homosexuality makes the community purer.'[25] It behoves government to acknowledge that 'equality justifies the traditional liberal principle that government should not enforce private morality of this sort.'[26]

This seems a desirable position to support, but it has problems because we end up with a society that seemingly cannot promote any substantive good. As we shall see in a moment, this leads one contemporary philosopher to dub this liberal position 'the procedural republic.' Dworkin is not insensitive to such criticisms and tries to avoid a position of radical skepticism. He takes this issue on directly in an article entitled: 'Can a Liberal State Support Art?' In other words: Can the state support what prima facie appears to be a substantive good, i.e. the arts?

In that essay, he develops an argument in harmony with his more general position premised on the idea that the good life is determined by how well we meet life's challenges. Consequently, he believes that the state has a duty above and beyond the traditional night-watchman role to help everyone develop their life skills to meet such challenges, but in doing so it must not privilege any one notion of the good life over another. Perhaps rather surprisingly then, he comes down in favor of the state subsidizing the arts, though he tries to maintain that this does not involve supporting a substantive good. In his view, the state cannot subsidize specific needs, but only the arts more generally. He concludes:

But art qualifies only on a certain premise: that state support is designed to pro-
tect structure rather than to promote any particular content for that structure
at any particular time. So the ruling star of state subsidy should be this goal: it
should look to the diversity and innovative quality of the culture as a whole rather
than to (what public officials take to be) excellence in particular occasions of that
culture.[27]

For some even this is problematic in that it seems to privilege diversity and
innovation as substantive goods in themselves, more importantly for others
this remained too esoteric and failed to provide for a cluster of common goods
around which individuals could rally to form a robust society.

No one has put this argument better than Michael Sandel. In his book *The
Limits of Liberalism* Sandel launched what is now conceived of as the commu-
nitarian attack on modern liberalism as primarily exemplified by Rawls and
his work *A Theory of Justice*, but also the ideas of Dworkin. Sandel's argument
resonates with many traditional conservative notions and is centered on his
critique of the liberal notion of the antecedently individuated self. For Rawls
this is the individual behind the veil of ignorance, a self that is prior to and sep-
arate from any goals, attachments, or achievements that the self may choose.
The individual in this sense is first and foremost an autonomous rational choice
maker and it is this that is of paramount importance for the liberal. It defines
personhood and following Kant distinguishes human beings from all else.
Following on from this Sandel also attacks the liberal requirement for justice,
namely the idea that the state should be neutral as between its citizen's choices
of the good life – tantamount to saying rights are more important than the
good. It is more important that people have rights than whatever they actually
might do with them.

Sandel does not believe that liberals present a plausible account of the indi-
vidual and that furthermore such individuals are not really capable of what
we normally take to be moral judgements. For example, so far as politics
and the theory of justice for governing the state are concerned, the Rawlsian
individual is not constituted, not made up, by what she does, the goals she
pursues, or the engagements she makes. They do not and cannot be consti-
tutive of the individual as they would then affect and compromise the play of
free-will decision-making that is the key characteristic of humanity according
to liberals. Furthermore, individuals would then be defined not by their ability
to exercise will and make decisions, but by the outcomes of such decision-
making. But this would involve recognizing them as encumbered by notions of
the good. In other words, if I decide to be a Christian individual, or a vegetarian
individual, or a pacifist individual, in other words if my very notion of what it
is to be an individual came to rest on being a Christian, vegetarian, or pacifist,
then government that protects and nurtures individuals would be obliged to

nurture and protect particular types of individuals who see Christianity, vege-tarianism, and pacifism as aspects of the good life. But if government starts to do that then it ceases to be neutral between conceptions of the good life and becomes engaged in the difficulty of privileging some concepts of the good life at the expense of others, which then means that not everyone is being treated as if they merited equal respect and valuing. If government cannot accord equal respect and valuing to all conceptions of the good life, and it cannot as some are radically at odds with each other, then it cannot conceptualize indi-viduals as being constituted by the ends that they pursue but only by their ability rationally, through exercises of will, to decide to pursue ends whatever they might be.

For Sandel and other communitarians this does not make a lot of sense. The starting points of political life for them is what Sandel calls the *situated and encumbered self*, which entails a living together on the basis of shared beliefs, experiences, culture, and interests. Moral values are acquired or absorbed from family and social environments and human beings are not *tabula rasa* upon which to lay a variety of moral values and goals rationally chosen by the individual. For Sandel, good government is self-government directed by substantive values of what the good society should be. Only this kind of society can provide the glue that binds people together in a political community capable of taking decisions on behalf of the collective. In con-trast, the neutral-state liberals aim to prioritize rights over any necessarily contested conceptions of the good. It is this privileging of procedure over substantive notions of the good that Sandel dubbed the *procedural republic* and to his mind it produces such a morally desiccated terrain that the state cannot sustain itself amid moral skepticism.[28] It produces a society that cannot answer two of the most pressing issues of the contemporary world. 'One is the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives. The other is the sense that, from family to neigh-bourhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unravelling around us ... These two fears – for the loss of self-government and the erosion of community – together define the anxiety of the age.'[29] By refusing to talk in substantive terms about the good society, as opposed to individuals pursuing their own conceptions of the good, Sandel believes that the United States has lost its ability effectively to self-govern. The will of the people is trumped by rights that prevent legislation and other measures that would move America forward towards a common and good goal. Furthermore, and as a logical consequence of prioritizing the claim that we cannot reach a common notion of the good, a form of moral relativism permeates American society and prevents moral decision-making, meaning an inability to declare right from wrong. Sandel asks, just how plausible is the liberal conception of the indi-vidual? He replies:

> Despite its powerful appeal, the image of the unencumbered self is flawed. It cannot make sense of our moral experience, because it cannot account for certain moral and political obligations that we commonly recognize, even prize. These include obligations of solidarity, religious duties, and other moral ties that may claim us for reasons unrelated to a choice. Such obligations are difficult to account for if we understand ourselves as free and independent selves, unbound by moral ties we have not chosen. Unless we think of ourselves as encumbered selves, already claimed by certain projects and commitments, we cannot make sense of these indispensable aspects of our moral and political experience.[30]

Sandel is challenging the idea that the self is solely constituted by what we choose to be, or that we can imagine a state where we can make choices divested of characteristics and commitments that we have acquired, not by choice but simply because of where we were born and what family and social values and conventions we have acquired. This is not to say that there is no room for rational choices. It is simply to say that individuals are not wholly made up of rational choices, nor can they revert to an imaginary state where only rational choice is possible. They are always encumbered, partly made up of family and social values particular in time and place.

CONCLUSION

It is neither fanciful nor implausible to suggest that there is and always has been an Anglo-American tradition of political ideas underpinning a shared political culture centered on debates generated by liberalism and its impact on both conservatism and socialism. British and American political cultures are and always have been speaking to each other.

Liberalism drew the parameters of debate in an acute form in Britain in the nineteenth century with Spencer and the likes of Green, and their ideas were reflected in the United States by Sumner, the Gospel of Wealth, and the idealist and progressive reaction. The debate was then carried forward in both countries in the early and mid-twentieth century with Pragmatists, Keynesianism, and social welfare democrats on both sides of the Atlantic.

Sandel's work illustrates well the force of liberalism and its impact on other ideologies. One can discern resonances with the traditional conservative position regarding the organic state and the limitations of rationalism, particularly in the sphere of moral decision-making. Yet there is also a pervasive concern with the welfare of society and with substantive goods, some seemingly eminently liberal, and with the individual, albeit conceived of differently to the prevailing contemporary liberal idea of the individual. Consider Sandel's defense of same-sex marriage not so much as an individual right but as a value more broadly cast and respected by society.[31]

The economic developments that produced Thatcherism and Reaganism challenged welfare liberalism but the pendulum swung again in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. Ideas of liberalism that pitched negative against positive rights set parameters for the debate to reach an apogee in late-twentieth-century America in the intellectual tumult stimulated by John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice.* Perhaps most important of all, the likes of Rawls, Dworkin, and even Sandel, though he would decry any label of liberalism, demonstrate that the liberal tradition of thought continues to set the agenda and contours of political debate in Britain and the United States. It is thus apt to use the phrase *an* apogee rather than *the* apogee of liberalism in the context of Rawls for it would not be a wise person who ruled out the reaching of further heights of achievement in this transatlantic debate.

NOTES

1　Kori Schake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

2　John Locke, *Second Treatise on Government* (1689), ed. Crawford B. Macpherson (Cambridge MA: Hackett, 1980).

3　See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), ed. and trans. Mary McGregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 30.

4　Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 6.

5　The most detailed exposition of this thesis is by William H. Greenleaf, *The British Political Tradition, Volume II: The Ideological Heritage* (London: Methuen, 1983).

6　William Lloyd Garrison, *Selections from the Writings and Speeches of William L. Garrison* (Boston, MA: R. F. Walcutt, 1852); John C. Calhoun, 'The South Carolina Exposition and Protest' and 'A Disquisition on Government,' both in Richard K. Cralle (ed.), *The Works of John C. Calhoun* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1851–56 [in multiple vols.]); George Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South: Or the Failure of a Free Society* (Richmond, VA: A. Morris, 1854); and George Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All: Or Slaves Without Masters* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).

7　Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783* (New York: Dover Publications, 1987).

8　Locke, *Second Treatise.*

9　Women over thirty years of age with certain property qualifications were enfranchised in Britain in 1918. In 1920 the United States stole the lead again with the Nineteenth Amendment that enfranchised women on the same basis as men: It was not until 1930 that similar steps were taken in Britain.

10　Herbert Spencer, *The Man Versus the State* (Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, [1884] 2009).

11　William Graham Sumner, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 1978), 19.

12　Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 163 and 174.

13 See for these and other remarks on wealth and the duty of the rich, see Andrew Carnegie, 'Wealth,' *North American Review*, CXLVIII, June 1889.

14 See Henry George, 'Progress and Poverty' [1881], in Andrew M Scott (ed.), *Political Thought in America* (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1959), 333–342.

15 Quoted from Greenleaf, *Political Tradition*, 173–174, cited in John M. Keynes, *The End of Laissez-Faire* (London: Hogarth Press, 1926), 39–40 (emphasis in original).

16 See Thomas Hill Green, 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract,' in Richard L. Nettleship (ed.), *Works of Thomas Hill Green, Volume III* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1888), 370–376.

17 *Ibid*.

18 Thomas Hill Green, 'Liberal Legislation,' in Paul Harris and John Morrow (eds), *T.H. Green Lectures: On the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 199.

19 Thomas Hill Green, 'Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract,' in Nettleship, *Works of Thomas Hill Green, Volume III*, 373.

20 'Future of Liberalism,' John Dewey, *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 126.

21 John Dewey, 'Liberty and Social Control,' in *Problems of Men*, 113 and 114 (emphasis in original).

22 Raymond Plant, *Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 80.

23 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Robert Nozick, *Anarchy State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), ix; Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Duckworth, 1996), chap. 6; Justine Burley (ed.), *Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

24 Ronald Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 203.

25 *Ibid*., 206.

26 *Ibid*.

27 *Ibid*., 233

28 Michael Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

29 *Ibid*., 3.

30 *Ibid*., 13–14.

31 Michael Sandel, *Reith Lectures 2009: A New Citizenship*, BBC Radio 4, 16 June 2009, transcript, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/20090616_reith.pdf (25 January 2018).

6

PAGEANTRY, LEGITIMATION, AND SPECIAL ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

STEVE MARSH

INTRODUCTION

Anglo-American relations assumed their modern form as a result of pre-existing sentiment, interests, and shared experiences being given shape through discourse and, especially, their encapsulation in a simple, easily identifiable, and preferential nomenclature: the special relationship. Yet there is an anomaly in play. On the one hand, the term is nowadays instantly recognizable shorthand for Anglo-American relations. On the other, it gained political and popular traction only from the 1950s onwards, after the objective peak of what it is supposed to symbolize had passed – namely the extensive and intimate cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom that occurred during the Second World War. This begs an obvious question of how form and function have been maintained within a modern special relationship across time and through major systemic changes.

Most accounts of the special relationship attribute its longevity to mutual utility and how this has evolved such that Anglo-American relations retain relevancy despite their asymmetry and new international conditions. This chapter, however, argues that culture provides an important buttress to realpolitik and that attention needs consequently to be given to an ongoing multimodal renewal of the special relationship. Through aural, linguistic, spatial, textual, and visual resources the special relationship is brought to life via its elite presentation as a cultural reality – an ideal of the special relationship packaged for mass consumption. Primary producers are government officials and media and their dissemination is directed to both those physically co-present and to the much larger and more diffuse audience further afield. The product is multiple representations via many mediums of Anglo-American relations that while at

times indistinct or even contradictory, collectively contribute to the public's general impression of a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

This proposition is investigated here via contributions made by set-piece pageantry to the special relationship. Three examples are selected knowing their relevant sociohistorical context and on the basis of their being 'telling' of Anglo-American relations,[1] namely Anglo-American bilateral summit meetings between presidents and prime ministers, informal ambassadorship by the royal family, and the forthcoming 400th anniversary of the *Mayflower* voyage in 2020. The objective is to complement traditional readings of pageantry by treating it also as an act of cultural sharing. Thereby, and consonant with Iriye's classic definition of culture, elites send messages to Anglo-American – and other – audiences by manipulating cultural artifacts, evoking emotions, appealing to particular symbols and lifestyles, sharing selected aspects of collective memory, and so forth.[2]

The product is a multiauthored narrative of special Anglo-American relations that, by blending past, present, and future, endows them with a timeless quality – continually re-legitimizing the special relationship such that it evolves rather than breaks as generations pass and circumstances change. Moreover, as Ryan notes in this volume (Chapter 10), such constructions work most effectively within cultures that can read the symbols, accept the resonance of the language, and share in the emotion. Hereby it is not unreasonable to suggest that a key strength of the special relationship is that it has become embedded in the cultural fabric of the United States and United Kingdom, with elite and mass constructions of Anglo-American relations being in an ongoing cultural dialogue. Indeed, this is one reason why elites who have stepped outside of this cultural frame in representing Anglo-American relations have failed.[3]

EXPANDING HORIZONS: THINKING BEYOND THE FUNCTIONAL CALCULUS

This chapter is an empirically developed demonstration of how pageantry has been used to help animate and legitimize a public narrative of special Anglo-American relations. However, before proceeding to analyze the three selected examples it is necessary to say a few words about the ideas and concepts drawn upon to do so. The starting point is the failure of dominant modes of explanation to account for the special relationship. This is not meant in any way to belittle the large and in many cases excellent scholarly literature on post-Second World War Anglo-American relations. Self-evidently many publications thereof deal with particular events in Anglo-American history or with specific aspects of

cooperation and competition; they are designed to provide insight into what occurred rather than to explain why Anglo-American relations might be seen as being special. It is the case, too, that historical studies and theoretically based research approach the question of 'special' relations in different ways. In the parlance of Hollis and Smith, the former is an 'inside' way of dealing with behavior, developing an explanatory narrative through evidence-based reconstruction. In contrast, the latter is an 'outside' way of accounting for behavior, modeled on methods of natural science.[4]

Nevertheless, these caveats noted, neorealist assumptions about national interest and calculations of mutual utility have dominated traditional explanations of why Anglo-American relations might be seen as being special. These works are valuable but have limitations as an explanation of special relations. First, the intrinsic logic is that relations will inevitably cease to be special at the point where mutual utility no longer justifies Britain and the United States behaving towards one another in ways different to how they relate to their other allies. It is this logic that has spawned the numerous, to date inaccurate, predictions of Anglo-American relations being 'special no more.'[5] Second, this approach is reductionist in the sense that consideration of Anglo-American relations is confined principally to calculations of power. It thereby removes from significance the potential influence of agency and of other such less quantifiable factors, including history, culture, and sentiment. Indeed, in many respects this highlights the Manichean divide between interest and sentiment that runs through much of the literature on Anglo-American relations.[6] It also speaks to a predominance of single-discipline studies where the central tenets thereof maintain interpretations of Anglo-American relations within expected parameters. Fortunately, in more recent times, new approaches to the study of Anglo-American relations have begun to enrich their historiography with new interpretations.[7]

This chapter continues in this vein. Its focus is the ongoing legitimation of special Anglo-American relations through pageantry, the act of which is self-evidently agentive. Authors of acts of pageantry seek to encourage through them a sense of Anglo-American affinity such that the special relationship is both continually legitimized and might, potentially, be instrumentalized in support of some particular action. In doing so, acts of pageantry blend interest and sentiment in ways similar to Churchill's original construction of the special relationship in his 1946 'Iron Curtain' speech.[8] Furthermore, they serve a vital function in the animation of the special relationship for, as Barthes cautions, 'it is human history which converts reality into speech, and it alone rules the life and the death of mythical language.'[9]

Similar to commemoration, pageantry is performance and has long been used by states as an element of their public diplomacy, mobilizing historical memory in support of particular goals. However, pageantry is more than

commemoration. It may feature commemorative aspects but it is not necessarily bound to particular temporal moments or experiences. The examples in this chapter are selected in demonstration of this; only the Mayflower 2020 celebrations are temporally dependent. It is important to acknowledge, too, that acts of pageantry are multimodal experiences where, in the context of Anglo-American relations, aural, linguistic, spatial, textual, and visual resources are combined to package for mass consumption an ideal of the special relationship. This speaks to the distinction made elsewhere between special Anglo-American relations of 'practice' and those of 'sentiment' – the latter being termed by Hendershot as the 'sentimental myth of the special relationship.'[10]

British and American government elites normally co-author and co-produce the pageantry events that celebrate the special relationship. This entails careful negotiation, planning, and choreography to produce a shared narrative.[11] Indeed, pageantry may be seen as in part an exercise in cultural transfer, the signs, symbols, discourse, and so forth being tailored for the consumption of multiple public and elite audiences, both co-present and what is sometimes termed 'overhearing.'[12] It helps create 'in-groups' and 'out-groups.' Those that that can read the symbols, empathize with the language, and share emotion will tend to identify positively with the Anglo-American narrative while others will not. Enemies of the United States and United Kingdom are confronted with demonstrations of Anglo-American commitment to a shared way of life and solidarity in its defense against all-comers. British and American peoples are reminded of their familial relationship and of their long-entwined histories, culture, and common language. Core Anglo-American values are reaffirmed and those of domestic and international challengers to them 'othered' in ways that reinforce the distinctiveness of the intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the special relationship.[13] In many respects this results in an internationalization of Anderson's 'imagined communities' and, rather as Churchill proposed in 1946, potentially provides an extended linkage, too, between the special relationship and other English-speaking countries.[14]

Of course, these acts of pageantry are developed in full awareness that the crafted messages about Anglo-American relations will be subsequently remediated. Politicians and government officials sometimes lament media pre-occupation with the atmospherics of Anglo-American relations[15] but they also play to it. Winston Churchill was one of the earliest leaders to recognize the media as a communicative resource and the potential influence that its personalization of politics within mass-based representative democracies could afford him. For instance, Marchi *et al.*'s interdisciplinary analysis of three of Churchill's summit meetings with Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, 1950–54, established there to be within newspaper coverage of them a metonymic relationship between Churchill and Britain. Clear markers of political personalization – Churchill's cane, cigar, and hat – appeared regularly in the reports

and various meanings were drawn from these.[16] This enabled the prime minister to leverage his tremendous personal popularity in the United States to British ends.[17]

The variety of semiotic resources employed to convey impressions of specialness through pageantry, together with the different types and conditions of receiving audiences, make interpretation of the production, reception, and impact of particular acts a complex task. It is one, also, that lends itself to multi- and interdisciplinary approaches – in contrast with the predominantly single-discipline studies that characterize scholarship on the Anglo-American relationship. This chapter does not pretend to cover all of these bases. However, it makes a start by drawing upon diplomatic history and historical discourse analysis within a case-study approach to suggest how conceiving of pageantry as a cultural exercise helps illuminate how Anglo-American relations and, by extension, US and British actions to support/defend them, are continually renewed.[18]

PRESIDENT−PRIME MINISTER SUMMITS

Churchill introduced the term summit to the diplomatic lexicon and was such an assiduous cultivator of bilateral meetings between British prime ministers and US presidents that by the 1960s these had become an expected part of Anglo-American diplomacy.[19] Archival records demonstrate that both countries put considerable value on them as fora in which to establish personal relations and conduct business, even if their timing was sometimes inconvenient[20] and career professionals often fretted that their political masters might 'go off message.'[21] However, it is the public face of summits, the pageantry thereof, which is most significant in the continual renewal of the special relationship narrative.

The simple fact of summits being such an established feature of Anglo-American bilateral diplomacy immediately locates them as being a part of a political tradition rather than as simply being a meeting at which to transact business.[22] Sometimes prime ministers and presidents make explicit reference to this. For example, President John F. Kennedy described his talks with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in April 1961 as 'another happy milestone in the long series of meetings which have existed between the United States and Great Britain in previous years.'[23] In fact, summits become over time woven into the cultural fabric of Anglo-American relations. Media, for example, often places a summit within a continuum of such events and thereby keeps current in the minds of their audiences connections between Anglo-American relations past and those present. For example, one commentator wrote of the meeting between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush at the onset of the

Iraq War in March 2003 that 'the choreography of the Camp David war council, so reminiscent of the FDR–Churchill meetings on that very spot, seemed to echo the greatest moments of the Anglo-American Alliance.'[24] More generally, the media trend towards the personalization of politics, coupled with politicians' responses to this, reinforced the metonymy between national leadership relations and the special relationship. As Rachman notes, 'Every time a British prime minister visits Washington, he knows that he will be measured against sepia photos of previous "special relationships" between British prime ministers and US presidents: Churchill and Roosevelt, Thatcher and Reagan, Blair and Bush.'[25]

Officials frequently use summits to construct discursively the conduct of Anglo-American relations as being somehow different, qualitatively special, compared to other international relationships. This involves frequent implicit and explicit reference to distinctive cultural markers. Consider, for instance, how Prime Minister Wilson used remarks to the National Press Club in January 1975 to have media carry his version of the special relationship as being natural and unusually effective. Characterizing his talks with President Ford at the White House as 'very, very relaxed' and 'free flowing,' Wilson explained that, 'We don't have, you know, to spend about fifty minutes in every hour arguing about first principles, arguing about trying to convince one another. They are thoroughly practical and that's why you get six times as much results out of an hour of discussions such of the kind we've had.'[26] Sometimes, officials speak more directly to the wider bonds of Anglo-American relations too. Addressing the Pilgrims Society in March 1975 Elliot Richardson, the US ambassador to the United Kingdom, stated that 'these special relationships of ours of language, of culture, of cast of mind become vital, because however power shifts, whatever the complexities of balance between nations and forces, the value of an old and easy partnership away from the conference table, sharing the same assumptions and aspirations, is inestimable.'[27] Alternatively, synonyms of special relations are regularly deployed in prime minister and president discourse – such as 'quite extraordinary' relations,[28] 'unique partnership,' and 'our unbreakable alliance'[29] – as are familial inferences, such as meeting on an 'intimate and personal basis'[30] and conducting discussions 'with the freedom and frankness permitted to old friends.'[31]

Summits, especially through set-piece speeches such as toasts and after-dinner speeches, are further used by key officials to perform publicly the tropes of special relations that help to renew that narrative by connecting Anglo-American relations past, in form and function, with those of the present day and, often, those anticipated in the future. Herein the longer progeny of the special relationship is often invoked in support variously of familial reference, capacity to overcome difference and steadfastness in common endeavor. For instance, Prime Minister Thatcher declared in February 1985

that her meeting with President Reagan 'is a special one because 1985 marks the 200th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States. And I think I can safely say that our relations now are better than when John Adams presented his credentials to King George III.'[32] Alternatively, Anglo-American relations past are invoked to underscore their continuity in change. When visiting Washington in 2009 to meet with President Obama, Prime Minister Brown noted that 'past British prime ministers have travelled to this Capitol building in times of war to talk of war. I come now to talk of new and different battles we must fight together; to speak of a global economy in crisis and a planet imperilled.'[33] Furthermore, cultural referents abound in how the special relationship is discursively constructed at these summit meetings as being somehow timeless, irrespective of systemic changes and the relative power of the United Kingdom and United States. Consider in this vein President Clinton's remarks of welcome to Prime Minister Blair in February 1998: 'T.S. Eliot, who has been variously claimed by both our countries, once wrote in the "Four Quartets," "The end is where we start from." At the end of a century of friendship, let us pledge to connect our storied past to the unwritten promise of our future. Mr. Prime Minister, welcome to the United States.'[34]

The importance of summit meetings as expressions of Anglo-American cultural entwining attained new heights of importance after the first live televised debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon during the 1960 presidential election race demonstrated the salience of nonverbal communication, i.e. through gesture, facial expression, tone, and body movement.[35] Summits now project to media and directly into households via television, the Internet, and so forth impressions of familial relations between leaders, cultural referents such as the exchange of gifts, and traditional imagery of Anglo-American shoulder-to-shoulder solidarity in times of crisis – an image particularly important to US leaders after the Vietnam War.[36] Indeed, it is illuminating how in the wake of 9/11 Anglo-American discourse referenced not just solidarity but the depiction of the attacks as an assault on a shared way of life. British prime minister Tony Blair summoned powerful Anglo-American collective memories, for example, when drawing analogies between Britain's experience of the Blitz during the Second World War and the post-9/11 devastation in New York, and promising that in the same way the United States had stood beside Britain in her hour of need, so now Britain would stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with the United States.[37]

Of course, the discourse and choreography of summits is developed cognizant that principals' verbal and nonverbal messages about Anglo-American relations will be remediated post-delivery by an ever-attentive media. For example, and harking back to Rachman's point about historic comparisons, consider how the press used the cultural familial theme in Anglo-American

relations to critique Prime Minster Gordon Brown's first meeting with President Barack Obama in the Oval Office. According to *The Guardian*, 'the minimalist programme and their uncertain rapport was a far cry from the heady days of the Bush–Blair double act … While Tony Blair was invited to Camp David for dinner, an overnight stay, lunch, and more than four hours of talks for his first tête-à-tête with President George W. Bush in 2001, Mr Brown was given only a half-hour meeting and a working lunch.'[38]

A particular focal point of media scrutiny is the exchange of gifts at summit meetings between presidents and prime ministers – a customary part of the summit pageantry and often strongly bonded in Anglo-American culture as a vehicle to symbolize the long and intimate association between Britain and the United States. At their first official meeting as president and prime minister in 1981, Thatcher gave Reagan a rare map of North America dated 1744, which showed the president's home state – California – as an island. And in March 2009 Gordon Brown presented Obama with a penholder made from the wood of HMS *Gannet*, which was HMS *Resolute*'s sister ship and served as an anti-slavery vessel in the late nineteenth century. Alternatively, though, gifts can be selected to symbolize modernism and renewal within Anglo-American relations. For instance, in a choreographed exercise for their July 2010 summit Obama and Cameron exchanged artwork; the prime minister received a lithograph by Ed Ruscha and the president a canvas by Ben Eine. The symbolism of these gifts lay in their modernism, the artwork highlighting a vibrant Anglo-American pop art culture and thereby emphasizing by association the vitality of the modern special relationship.

In sum, summit meetings have become culturally embedded in the tapestry of Anglo-American relations, especially in the United Kingdom. They are an iconic and expected representation of the special relationship. Moreover, their public face, as media events, is designed to send messages and frequently this includes strategic celebration of Anglo-American cultural entwining.[39] Indeed, that such time and effort is invested in their pageantry speaks volumes to the perceived value and utility of shared culture in support of more functionalist aspects of Anglo-American relations. This has perhaps never been more the case than currently when Brexit and the unorthodox Trump administration cast new uncertainties upon traditional core facets of Anglo-American cooperation. Take, for instance, the May–Trump summit in the summer of 2018. This was consciously designed to drown out disquiet about the US president through its invocations of Churchill as an embodiment of the special relationship and considerable investment in a spectacular display of pomp and ceremony. As one senior British advisor confided, 'A lot of thought went into the choreography,' the objective being 'not to make it about personal chemistry, it was to make it about national chemistry, and the national chemistry, it's very, very good.'[40]

INFORMAL AMBASSADORS

An under-recognized source of Anglo-American cultural reinforcement comes through visits to the United States by members of the British royal family. The Queen enjoys remarkable poll results; CNN declared in 2012 on the eve of her sixtieth anniversary on the throne a US public approval rate of 82 percent.[41] The previous year 23 million Americans watched the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton. More recently the British royalty has been a major theme on American television and on Broadway and in the columns of magazines such as *In Touch* and *Vanity Fair.* Consider, for instance, the success of series such as *The Crown* on Netflix and *Victoria* on PBS, together with plays including 'King Charles III.' Neither is this popularity newfound. Prince Charles and Princess Diana drew enormous attention when visiting Washington in 1985, not least because of the latter's dance with John Travolta at President Reagan's White House gala. In 1939, President Roosevelt hosted King George VI and Queen Elizabeth at Hyde Park, the first time a reigning British monarch had visited the former US colony. This visit made headlines when the royals ate their first hotdogs – a moment memorialized in the 2012 movie *Hyde Park on Hudson.* Even as long ago as 1860, Prince Albert Edward (the future King Edward VII) enjoyed a surprisingly successful American tour, including Chicago, Albany, and Detroit.[42] This was particularly remarkable given it predated significantly the Great Rapprochement of the 1890s.

The royals are sometimes de facto informal British ambassadors to the United States. Often their trips to America include several set-piece functions. These may be choreographed for specific purposes – President Roosevelt's hosting of King George VI in June 1939 conveyed a powerful image of British and American unity shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War – or they may simply be styled to encourage broad-ranging US interest in Britain. As one academic noted of the visit to the United States by Prince William and Kate Middleton in August 2014, 'There is a special relationship between the peoples of Britain and America, and this visit will help to support and kindle that.'[43] Prince Harry's 2018 marriage to America's own Meghan Markle ensured that this high royal profile in the United States would be maintained for the foreseeable future.

One of the best examples of royals contributing to the general well-being of the special relationship is the visit of Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip to the United States in July 1976 during the American bicentennial celebrations. The timing was impactful. First, the normal influence of an official royal visit was ratcheted up even more by American agreement to schedule it to coincide with the height of the bicentennial celebrations. Second, the royal tour of

the United States was politically valuable in helping to cement a post-Nixon recovery of Anglo-American relations navigated under the helmsmanship of President Ford and Prime Minister Wilson.

Prime Minister Heath was not as anti-American as is often claimed[44] but his primary goal had been negotiating British entry to the European Economic Community (EEC), which President Nixon appreciated but found nevertheless unhelpful at a time when US leadership was being questioned abroad and at home.[45] Conversely, once Britain acceded to the EEC in 1973, it had become embroiled in EEC–US differences, notably over Kissinger's Year of Europe[46] initiative and the Yom Kippur War – the latter causing the United States to disrupt Anglo-American intelligence cooperation.[47] On a bilateral basis too relations were strained, particularly as the secretive style of the White House both cut across normal Anglo-American cooperation through the State Department and evinced a penchant for unilateral actions, such as the Nixon Shock that presaged the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the opening to China and the raising of the US nuclear alert during the Yom Kippur War to defense readiness connection (DEFCON) III. Indeed, Heath noted privately in November 1971 that 'the present method of conducting foreign relations, political, military and economic, has completely undermined confidence in the United States and is threatening in all three spheres to damage the whole Western world.'[48]

Matters began to change once Nixon left Office. British prime minister Wilson was regarded in Washington as 'a tested ally of the United States'[49] and President Ford was keen to re-energize the special relationship. A US policy paper set out why this was the case in October 1975. Great store was set in the fact that the United States shared 'with the British a similar outlook and common assumptions in international affairs.' It flowed from this that the United States ought to maintain 'the closest possible bilateral relationship' as a means of 'nurturing the common outlook we share and encouraging HMG support for our interests and policies around the world.' Specific roles envisaged for the United Kingdom remained substantial. These included continued British involvement in support of US positions beyond Europe, Anglo-American cooperation in multilateral fora to address economic challenges especially, and maintaining 'the helpful UK posture in the European Community.' Responding to problems under the previous administration, a number of confidence-building measures were recommended, such as high-level bilateral meetings, maintaining the yearly series of geographic regional consultation and other regular working-level contacts, and ensuring that 'HMG is cut in early on USG policies being developed that are of interest to them.' Interestingly, too, there was concern about wider British public opinion, notably a perceived need to 'increase Briton's confidence in our ability to deal positively with crisis and change.'[50]

For their part the British were likewise anxious to revitalize the special relationship, not least because of grave economic challenges and severe pressure on defense and overseas spending. US ambassador to Britain, Walter Annenberg, reported in April 1974 that the Wilson government 'apparently wants to revive something closely akin to Britain's erstwhile "special relationship" with the United States. We can only welcome this and should seize the opportunities it affords to further our policy objectives in a wide range of fields.'[51] That same month the British ambassador to Washington told Nixon that 'Harold Wilson felt that the British/American partnership was the cornerstone of their foreign policy.'[52] British deeds followed upon words. The Mason Defence Review respected the most urgent US requests to preserve particular British military commitments and assets.[53] British efforts in August 1974 to mediate the Cyprus crisis following Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island were warmly appreciated in Washington.[54] And when in September 1974 President Ford hosted Foreign Secretary Callaghan, he was advised that 'you mention the excellent relationship and superb cooperation between our two governments, for which he, Callaghan, deserves much credit.'[55]

Both sides were evidently pleased when in January 1975, prior to the first summit meeting between Wilson and Ford in Washington, Anglo-American relations were considered 'excellent just now' and that 'there are no rpt [*sic*] no irritants whatsoever.'[56] Still, though, improved elite relations needed to be celebrated publicly and wider public opinion had to be engaged in a sense of renewed Anglo-American amity. Revealingly, London and Washington both looked to the American bicentennial celebrations as a prime way to achieve this. The aforementioned US policy paper of October 1975 recommended specifically that the United States 'promote respect for and appreciation of American intellectual and cultural achievements [and] using the Bicentennial as a vehicle, increase and intensify ties created by our common cultural and intellectual heritage.'[57] Meantime the British government was looking increasingly to soft power and Anglo-American cultural connections to help safeguard the special relationship against the relative decline of British hard power especially.[58] The bicentennial was therefore an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the extensive and accelerating Anglo-American cultural interpenetration and to showcase to the world a selective narrative of the uniquely close historical relationship between the world's two leading English-speaking countries.

It was considered vitally important in London that the British contribution to the bicentennial celebrations be memorable and not upstaged by any other country. The British were evidently delighted therefore when US vice president Nelson Rockefeller declared at the opening of an American-sponsored exhibit on Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in London that this was the 'centerpiece of our Bicentennial celebration overseas.'[59] Still more important, though, was British participation in the United States itself. Ultimately, the

most unique British contribution was the loan to the American Congress of an original copy of the thirteenth-century Magna Carta. Displayed in the Rotunda of the US Capitol building for one year, this signified shared Anglo-American values, political traditions, and histories. Yet arguably the event that most captured the American public imagination was the royal visit.

The Ford administration discerned quickly the importance that the British government attributed to royal participation in the bicentennial celebrations: 'It is very apparent tremendous emphasis is being placed on this visit by the British with no doubt considerable interest on the part of the Queen. It is her first official visit here in 18 years and the British want it to be as effective as possible.'[60] The United States tellingly reciprocated. The White House agreed to invite the royal couple to Washington during the most intense period of bicentennial festivities, July 1976. US officials also noted the high priority accorded by Ford to the Queen's visit: 'Scheduling has, in fact, pretty much blocked out the July 7–11 time frame in order that the President might make himself generally available for any events that might occur in connection with the Queen's visit.'[61]

Archival records show that the White House was inundated with requests for and suggestions about where the Queen should visit during her time in the United States.[62] Ultimately she arrived first in Philadelphia on 6 July 1976, where she inaugurated the Liberty Bell – the British people's gift to the American people. It was the official state dinner at the White House on 7 July, though, that provided the best opportunity for elite rehearsal of the narrative of Anglo-American special relations. Moreover, with PBS making this the first state dinner broadcast live on American television, as well to the United Kingdom via satellite, the transatlantic 'consumer base' ready to ingest and interpret the symbols and discourse of Anglo-American 'specialness' was huge. Neither President Ford nor the Queen disappointed.

When first welcoming the Queen on the south lawn of the White House, Ford hailed her visit as symbolizing 'our deep and continuing commitment to the common values of an Anglo-American civilization' and drew attention to the entwined history of Britain and America, assuring that 'the wounds of our parting in 1776 healed long ago' and that Americans now 'admire the United Kingdom as one of our truest allies and best friends.'[63] At the actual state dinner Ford waxed lyrical in his toast about America never forgetting two hundred years of British heritage and that theirs – Britain and the United States – was a 'very remarkable relationship between two sovereign nations.' The expected mention was made of shoulder-to-shoulder fighting: 'The ties that bind us together have, through two great wars, served as a bulwark in the defense of liberty and the dignity of man himself.' Ford even invoked Edward Heath's preferred description of Anglo-American relations – the natural relationship – albeit with more fulsome intent than did the former prime minister: 'Our reconciliation, our friendship and firm alliance seem, in retrospect,

to have been natural for two nations that share the same fundamental devotion to human dignity.'[64]

The Queen reciprocated this sentiment and replicated Ford's style of connecting Anglo-American relations past with those present, and future. Note, for instance, how strong symbols of former enmity were smoothly subsumed within, and served to augment, the modern narrative: 'History is not a fairy tale. Despite the good intentions, hostility soon broke out between us – and even burst into this house. [Laughter] But these early quarrels are long buried. What is more important is that our shared language, traditions, and history have given us a common vision of what is right and just.' The Queen spoke, too, of 'interdependence,' the strength and permanence of Anglo-American friendship and to a common and ongoing responsibility in the wider world: 'May it long continue to flourish for the sake of both our countries and for the greater good of mankind.'[65]

The aftermath of the state dinner was also carefully choreographed to underscore the shared values and durability of the Anglo-American alliance. President Ford and the Queen attended church together the following day and dedicated the Washington Cathedral in memory of Winston Churchill – principal architect and icon of the modern special relationship. Reverend Francis B. Sayre paid due tribute as a one thousand-year-old stone from London's Westminster Abbey was lowered: 'We put that English stone in yon western entrance which is our tribute and memorial to Sir Winston Churchill, who in the blood of his parentage was rooted on either side of the sea and whose dauntless defense of liberty was our glory and our salvation on both sides of the Atlantic.'[66]

One final note of interest regarding the Queen's visit is that not only did it symbolize popular Anglo-American amity but it also became yet another referent point in the constantly evolving narrative of the special relationship. An especially noteworthy example of this is the Queen's Christmas broadcast in 1976. Here she used the bicentennial visit as the lead-in to the speech and developed from it her core theme of reconciliation at Christmas.

> In 1976 I was reminded of the good that can flow from a friendship that is mended. Two hundred years ago the representatives of the thirteen British Colonies in North America signed the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia. This year we went to America to join in their Bicentennial celebrations. Who would have thought 200 years ago that a descendent of King George III could have taken part in these celebrations?

The Queen went on to emphasize that, 'Wherever we went the welcome was the same, all the way to Boston, where the first shots in the war between Britain and America were fired.' Furthermore, the Queen suggested that the prize of reconciliation and regained mutual understanding could be immense: 'The United

States was born in bitter conflict with Britain but we didn't remain enemies for long. From our reconciliation came incalculable benefits to mankind and a partnership which, together with many countries of the Commonwealth, was proved in two world wars and ensured that the light of liberty was not extinguished.'[67]

As an informal ambassador, therefore, the Queen was able to exploit royal pageantry to reach an American, and British, popular audience that few politicians could. US fascination with the British monarchy especially transcended party politics, enabling the Queen to contribute handsomely both to underscoring President Ford's message of renewal of the American nation and to the rehearsal of unique Anglo-American relations. The outpouring of American affection for the royal couple stimulated politically valuable public expressions of Anglo-American cultural affinity. It also underscored to Anglo-American elites that their cultural affinity, and high-profile public rehearsals thereof, were increasingly among the most significant forces providing for the resilience of the modern special relationship.

COMMEMORATION AND RENEWAL

The year 2020 marks the 400th anniversary of the Pilgrims' voyage aboard the *Mayflower* to the Americas. The British government has pledged £500,000 through the Arts Council to support celebrations[68] and Plymouth Council, the city leading Mayflower 400, has declared spending plans of a further £5 million[69] plus completion of 'the Box,' a £37 million attraction, gallery, and museum complex that will open as the flagship building for the Mayflower 400 celebrations. Prince Charles has been invited to be patron of the celebrations and royal visits are anticipated – as is a US presidential visit, though probable protests against Donald Trump would hardly chime with the theme of Anglo-American amity to which the *Mayflower* commemoration aspires.[70]

Mayflower 2020 is officially promoted as a 'transformational programme of events … linking people and communities through shared heritage, culture, education and science.' However, the underlying political value of the celebrations has already been acknowledged by government and organizing committee officials. In August 2017 John Glen, British minister for arts, heritage, and tourism, declared it to be 'a wonderful project' that will 'celebrate centuries of shared history between the UK and US.' Charles Hackett, chief executive of Mayflower 400, was more expansive: 'The *Mayflower* voyage of 16 September 1620 … lies symbolically at the heart of the special relationship between Britain and America – that started with the profound values of personal liberty and freedom first expressed in Magna Carta – now securely woven into the Constitution of the USA.'[71]

Even under normal circumstances the 400th anniversary of the Pilgrims'
voyage would have produced rich Anglo-American pageantry through
which to re-emphasize the special relationship to elites and publics alike.
However, Mayflower 2020 has acquired additional salience within Anglo-
American relations because it will publicly celebrate a distinctive Anglo-
American history in a politically turbulent time for the United Kingdom
and the United States. The onset of the celebrations in November 2019,
marked by the Illuminate festival of thanksgiving and light, preceded the
UK's departure from the European Union (EU). Similarly poignant is that
the closing events of the *Mayflower* celebrations are scheduled to coincide
with the next US presidential elections, at which point the American elect-
orate will pronounce verdict upon the nationalistic and neo-isolationist
Trump administration. Furthermore, with 'brand Trump' and the president's
Twitter diplomacy complicating normal avenues of public demonstrations
of Anglo-American amity, Mayflower 2020 offers alternative and important
succor for avowed political commitment to renewal of the special relation-
ship. Indeed, four hundred years ago 102 disaffected Pilgrims plus crew fled
the shores of the United Kingdom for a better life in North America. Now
an entire post-Brexit nation is destined to relocate its interests and identity
within a world transformed many times since those first Pilgrim settlements.
The common denominator to both of these experiences is the United States.
For the former, America offered the chance of freedom and an escape from
the religious intolerance of the British state. For the latter the United States
offers a touchstone in a new elite narrative of the United Kingdom in inter-
national affairs.

There is little doubt about the enduring attraction of Atlanticism within
British public opinion and that British popular affiliation continues to defy
geographic proximity. Britain joined the EEC as an institution in 1973 but con-
sistently through to the present Eurobarometer polls have demonstrated its
citizens to feel little attachment to 'Europeanness.' May 2017 poll results, for
instance, revealed that 43 percent of British respondents had no sense of EU
citizenship and that 51 percent tended to distrust the EU. Conversely, British
public attitudes towards the United States have demonstrated consistently
high levels of affiliation. In February 2017, an Opinium poll revealed that from
thirteen options, 50 percent of respondents selected the United States as being
Britain's most important ally; the second most popular answer was Germany
with just 9 percent of the vote. This was particularly striking given that the
same poll showed 64 percent to consider Trump to be a threat to international
stability, 56 percent to rate him as untrustworthy, and 54 percent to expect him
to be a below average (10 percent) or awful (44 percent) president.[72]

Brexit has thrust British identity and culture into the foreground of
debate. Former prime minister May argued that the British people ought to

seize upon 'this great moment of national change to step back and ask ourselves what kind of country we want to be.'[73] With leading leave campaigners during the EU referendum citing the potential of the Anglosphere, including Michael Gove, David Davis, and Daniel Hannan, for some the constellation of domestic and international politics had moved in favor of an Anglospheric future for Britain.[74] Brexit marked popular British rejection of a European identity and an affirmation of the distinctiveness of British political culture. As May proclaimed in her first speech on Brexit in January 2017: 'Our political traditions are different. Unlike other European countries, we have no written constitution, but the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is the basis of our unwritten constitutional settlement … supranational institutions as strong as those created by the European Union sit very uneasily in relation to our political history and way of life.'[75] Moreover, the May government reached back to Britain's distinctive past to help establish a narrative of continuity rather than of change for post-Brexit Britain. The chosen mantra of 'Global Britain' rested on the country's internationalist history and culture, its global trading tradition, and, albeit supplemented with new partnerships such as the so-called golden era with China, essentially the same circles of influence enunciated by Churchill in 1948 and modernized by Blair in 1999 in his characterization of Britain as a pivotal power.[76]

For many people the notion of an Anglosphere remains fanciful, if not objectionable, irrespective of how Bennett *et al.* have sought to modernize it by eschewing some of the more objectionable elements of the original nineteenth-century ideas, especially those pertaining to Anglo-Saxon racial superiority.[77] Nonetheless, though 'Global Britain' is less exclusive than the Anglosphere concept, it still depends quite heavily on the states and associations commonly positioned within it and their collective international influence – and none more so than on the United States. May was quick to contrast Trump's endorsement of Brexit with Obama's warning of Britain falling to the back of the queue for a trade deal in the event of its leaving the EU. Less hyped but still clear was the positive comparison between Trump's self-proclaimed Anglophilia and Obama's heritage (in)famously foregrounded by then Foreign Secretary Johnson.[78] Furthermore, as the first world leader to meet Trump in the Oval Office, May addressed on the same visit Republican members of Congress, summoning from the bowels of shared Anglo-American history, culture, and values not only the post-Second World War special relationship that 'defined the modern world' but also a shared duty to 'pick up that mantle of leadership once more, to renew our special relationship and to recommit ourselves to the responsibility of leadership in the modern world.' In rapid succession the Founding Fathers, 'principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world,' ties of kinship, language, and culture, and the American Declaration of Independence were all discursively

enlisted in evidence of what she termed 'the unique and special relationship that exists between us.' Still more, her closing remarks explicitly connected Anglo-American relations past with renewal present and shared leadership future: 'As we renew the promise of our nations to make them stronger at home – in the words of President Reagan as the "sleeping giant stirs" – so let us renew the relationship that can lead the world towards the promise of freedom and prosperity marked out in parchment by those ordinary citizens 240 years ago.'[79] Invoking Reagan in this way was perspicacious for it served to foreground popular memories of the iconic Reagan–Thatcher relationship – a classic symbol of familial Anglo-American solidarity during a period of intense international uncertainty.

Historio-cultural opportunities to celebrate and reaffirm Anglo-American connections are frequently useful politically. Churchill's funeral in 1965 drew the largest American television audience then on record and public expressions of Anglo-American kinship were carefully enabled: Churchill's wartime friend Dwight D. Eisenhower served as an official American representative, St. Paul's cathedral, where the ceremony was held, doubled as the 'Parish Church of the British Commonwealth' and home to the American Memorial Chapel, and proceedings included a British Army band rendition of the Star-Spangled Banner.[80] However, Mayflower 2020 promises to be particularly important. It follows upon four years of international events running between 2014 and 2018 in commemoration of the First World War – a conflict increasingly considered significant in the emergence of the special relationship.[81] It provides an expression of Anglo-American amity that circumvents, at least partially, political problems of association with the Trump White House. And perhaps most important of all, Mayflower 2020 will draw forth multiple performances of the special cultural connections between the colony and the motherland at a juncture when the domestic and international politics of the United States and the United Kingdom, and of the special relationship itself, are in an unusual state of flux.

THEORY: A FINAL WORD

The notion of pageantry being used to construct a narrative of legitimation for the special relationship has been implicit in the consideration of each of the examples above. It is worth, however, to now take pause to make this explicit by applying theory to the practice of pageantry. Herein van Leeuwen offers an interesting framework for analyzing how discourses construct legitimacy for social practices in everyday interaction and public communication. He suggests that this framework comprises of four, non-mutually exclusive categories of (de)legitimation, namely: 'authorization,' 'moral evaluation,' 'rationalization,' and

'mythopoesis.' Authorization is (de)legitimation 'by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested.' (De)legitimation by moral evaluation occurs by means of '(often very oblique) reference to value systems.' Rationalization is (de)legitimation 'by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalized social action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity.' Finally (de)legitimation by mythopoesis entails the use of 'narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions.' Each of these categories includes several types. For example, authority legitimation can be invoked through custom (conformity or tradition), authority (personal or impersonal), and commendation (expert or role model). Similarly, moral evaluation legitimation can be of three types: evaluation, abstraction, and comparison (negative or positive).[82]

In what follows these ideas are applied to two extracts from the previously cited speech made by President Obama to the British House of Parliament in May 2011 during his state visit to London. First, though, some particularly salient aspects of context need to be outlined. In March of the preceding year the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFAC) had concluded that the special relationship was 'over.'[83] According to the committee 'the use of the phrase "special relationship" in its historical sense, to describe the totality of the ever-evolving UK–US relationship, is potentially misleading, and we recommend that its use should be avoided.'[84] The following May, Prime Minister Cameron and President Obama had pushed an alternative nomenclature for Anglo-American relations. In an open joint letter to *The Times* the two leaders opined that 'the reason why this is such a natural partnership, is because it advances our common interests and shared values … And the reason it remains strong is because it delivers time and again. Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship – for us and for the world.'[85] Both the HCFAC Report and the 'essential relationship' drew forth considerable media comment and criticism.[86] At the same time, though, practical Anglo-American cooperation continued, the most temporally salient example being the House of Commons approval by 557 to 13 votes on 21 March 2011 to support UN-backed military action in Libya alongside the United States and other allies.

The immediate thing to note about Obama's speech to the British Parliament is that at no point did he use the phrase 'essential relationship.' He did, though, use the nomenclature 'special relationship,' as did Cameron in a joint press conference. Evidently president and prime minister had decided to retreat before political tradition. Indeed, although Obama and Cameron penned a follow-up on the 'essential relationship' in the *Washington Post* in March 2012,[87] the White House Press release that had announced Cameron's forthcoming visit featured only archetypal special relationship prose:

The visit will highlight the fundamental importance of the US–UK special rela-
tionship and the depth of the friendship between the American people and the
people of the United Kingdom, as well as the strong personal bond that has
developed between the two leaders and their families. It will also be an oppor-
tunity to recall the valor and sacrifice of the US and British armed forces and their
long tradition of standing shoulder-to-shoulder beside each other in defense of
our liberties and shared values.[88]

Turning attention to the substance of Obama's speech, after several words of
greeting the president opened thus:

I have known few greater honors than the opportunity to address the Mother
of Parliaments at Westminster Hall. I am told that the last three speakers here
have been the Pope, Her Majesty the Queen, and Nelson Mandela – which is
either a very high bar or the beginning of a very funny joke. I come here today
to reaffirm one of the oldest, one of the strongest alliances the world has ever
known. It's long been said that the United States and the United Kingdom share
a special relationship. And since we also share an especially active press corps,
that relationship is often analyzed and overanalyzed for the slightest hint of stress
or strain. Of course, all relationships have their ups and downs. Admittedly, ours
got off on the wrong foot with a small scrape about tea and taxes. There may also
have been some hurt feelings when the White House was set on fire during the
War of 1812. But fortunately, it's been smooth sailing ever since. The reason for
this close friendship doesn't just have to do with our shared history, our shared
heritage; our ties of language and culture; or even the strong partnership between
our governments. Our relationship is special because of the values and beliefs
that have united our people through the ages.

Returning to van Leeuwen's analytic framework, it is clear that Obama imme-
diately established his personal authority to speak to the special relationship
by locating his status, however humorously, alongside the Pope, the Queen,
and Mandela. Moral evaluation legitimation is evident in the contrast drawn
by Obama between Anglo-American fracas of the past and the 'smooth sailing'
of the modern special relationship. This, as seen in other examples provided
above, is a regular feature of Anglo-American elite discourse, emphasizing as it
does the entwined histories of motherland and (former) colony, their reconcili-
ation, and subsequent remarkable joint custodianship of the Anglo-American
way of life. In addition, Obama developed authorization legitimation in his
opening remarks through his direct referencing of shared Anglo-American
traditions, customs, values, and beliefs. Moreover, his words made explicit that
the ideal of a special Anglo-American relationship is comprised not just of
'the strong partnership between our governments' but also, and with the infer-
ence of this being of even more importance, of 'our people,' united as they are
'through the ages' by shared values and beliefs.

The second instructive extract comes from a little later in his speech, where Obama declared:

> There are few nations that stand firmer, speak louder, and fight harder to defend democratic values around the world than the United States and the United Kingdom. We are the allies who landed at Omaha and Gold, who sacrificed side by side to free a continent from the march of tyranny, and help prosperity flourish from the ruins of war. And with the founding of NATO – a British idea – we joined a transatlantic alliance that has ensured our security for over half a century.

Again the 'side-by-side' metaphor, joint sacrifice, and invocation of the Second World War experience are stereotypical prose of the special relationship. However, applying van Leeuwen's framework foregrounds their legitimation function. Authorization is evident in Obama's commendation of Anglo-American words and deeds in their common defense of democratic values. Moral evaluation comes in the positive contrast between values of democracy and those of tyranny. Rationalization is developed in reference to the goals of defending democracy and building peace through war if necessary. Finally, legitimation by mythopoesis comes through a narrative of the good (Anglo-American) freeing 'a continent from the march of tyranny' (punishing non-legitimate actions) and helping 'prosperity flourish from the ruins of war' (reward for legitimate actions).

CONCLUSION

President–prime minister summit meetings, royal visits, and transatlantic celebrations of defining moments in a shared Anglo-American history all draw attention to, and constitute a part of, the special relationship. Each of the events considered in this chapter are different. They differ in their relative overt politicization, in the primary audiences they would reach, and also in their frequency and rationale. Mayflower 2020 is determined by a commemorative frame with a specific temporal location. In contrast, the royal visit to the United States in 1976 capitalized upon the bicentennial but also formed part of a wider tradition of visits. Still more frequent are Anglo-American summit meetings and their scheduling, which can be driven not only by commemorative occasions but also by mutual convenience and by international and/or domestic imperatives. What these three examples all have in common, though, is twofold. First, they are media events where choreographed set-piece pageantry helps to relay publicly a selective narrative of Anglo-American relations that legitimizes their encapsulation in the preferential nomenclature 'special relationship.' Second, they each feature culture in action. Elites underpin their political messages

using cultural artifacts, emotions, symbols, heritage, and collective memory, and all of this works so effectively because of the culturally embedded nature of the special relationship itself.

The application of van Leeuwen's framework to just two brief extracts from a single speech by Obama reveals the tip of a transatlantic iceberg of cultural discourses that construct legitimacy for the special relationship and, by extension, actions in support and defense of it. The principal authors of pageantry events seek to convey particular meanings and representations of special Anglo-American relations to those people co-present and to the wider overhearing audience. Over time their manipulation of aural, linguistic, spatial, textual, and visual resources in doing so has become increasingly sophisticated. What is put forward for public consumption, especially from the more tightly controllable environments of summit meetings, is thus an elite-packaged ideal of the special relationship. At the same time, positive assessments of these messages appears to depend upon their staying reasonably within culturally set parameters of representations of Anglo-American relations.

Technology and education, and their growing accessibility, have increasingly created something of a paradox for producers of this ideal image of the special relationship. On the one hand, the reach of their message is expanding ever further courtesy, especially, of the Internet and social media. On the other hand, their control over its remediation is weakening as it is no longer simply media that perform this function. Instead, individuals using mobile phones and so forth can capture and stream live, uncontrolled, images of events. Whether this so-called citizen journalism[89] strengthens or weakens the elite-desired legitimation of special Anglo-American relations is an open question.[90] What it does undoubtedly do, however, is to close the physical space between British and American users and to facilitate thereby an intensifying transatlantic exchange of political and cultural ideas wrapped around the notion of a special Anglo-American relationship.

NOTES

1   J. Clyde Mitchell, 'Typicality and the Case Study,' in Roy F. Ellen (ed.), *Ethnographic Research: A Guide to General Conduct* (London: Academic Press, 1984), 228–241, at 239.

2   Akira Iriye, 'Culture,' *Journal of American History*, 77:1 (1990), 100.

3   Steve Marsh, '"Global Security: US–UK Relations": Lessons for the Special Relationship?,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 10:2 (2012), 182–199; Steve Marsh, 'Beyond Essential: Britons and the Anglo-American Special Relationship,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, forthcoming.

4   Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). See also Charles Reynolds, *Theory*

and Explanation in International Politics (London: Martin Robertson, 1973); 'Explaining the Cold War,' in Alan P. Dobson, Shahin Malik, and Graham Evans (eds), *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), 44–66.

5   Steve Marsh and John Baylis, 'The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus of International Relations,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17:1 (2006), 173–211; John Dickie, *Special No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994).

6   Contrast, for instance, Henry C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783–1952* (London: Odhams Press, 1954); Coral Bell, *The Debatable Alliance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (London: Macmillan, 2001); Christopher J. Bartlett, *The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992).

7   Steve Marsh and Anna Marchi, 'Churchill, Fulton and Anglo-American Relations: Setting the Agenda?,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 14:4 (2016), 365–382; Robert M. Hendershot and Steve Marsh, 'Renewing the Narrative of "Special" Anglo-American Relations: Commemoration, Performance and the American Bicentennial,' *Journal of Cold War Studies*, forthcoming; Sam Edwards, Michael Dolski, and Faye Sayer, *Histories on Screen: The Past and Present in Anglo-American Cinema and Television* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Sam Edwards, *Allies in Memory* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015); M. Todd Bennett, 'The Spirits of '76: Diplomacy Commemorating the U.S. Bicentennial in 1976,' *Diplomatic History*, 40:4 (2016), 695–721.

8   For a detailed analysis of this speech and its implications for Anglo-American relations, see Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017).

9   Roland Barthes, 'Myth Today,' in John Storey (ed.), *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader* (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2006), 293.

10 Marsh, '"Global Security: US–UK relations"; Robert M. Hendershot, *Family Spats: Perception, Illusion and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008).

11 Steve Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations: A Political Tradition of Special Relationship(s),' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Toward an Anglo-American Political Tradition?* (New York: Berghahn, forthcoming); Steve Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations and the Past Present: Insights into an (Ongoing) Mythologisation of a Special Relationship,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 17:1 (2019), 310–340.

12 See, for instance, John Heritage, 'Analyzing News Interviews: Aspects of the Production of Talk for an "Overhearing" Audience,' in Teun van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Volume III: Discourse and Dialogue* (London: Academic Press, 1985), 95–117.

13 For othering, see, for instance, Fred Dervin, 'Discourses of Othering,' in Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie, and Todd Sandel (eds), *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction* (New York: Wiley, 2015).

14 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

15   For example, in 2009 Richard LeBaron, US diplomat and chargé d'affaires at the American embassy in London, reported that 'British media and contacts are busy over-reading perceived signals for evidence of tensions in the relationship. This over-reading would often be humorous, if it were not so corrosive.' *The Telegraph*, 4 February 2011,www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/ 8305152/THE-BRITISH-ASK-IS-OUR-SPECIAL-RELATIONSHIP-STILL-SPECIAL-IN-WASHINGTON.html (accessed 24 June 2019).

16   Marsh and Marchi, 'Churchill, Fulton and Anglo-American Relations'; Steve Marsh, Anna Marchi, and Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, 'Churchill's Inter-Subjective Special Relationship: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Approach,' in Dobson and Marsh, *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, 171–201.

17   For interplay between politicians and media see, for example, Olivier Driessens, Karin Raeymaeckers, Hans Verstraeten, and Sarah Vandenbussche, 'Personalization According to Politicians: A Practice Theoretical Analysis of Mediatization,' *Communications*, 35 (2010), 309–326; Ana Inés Langer, 'Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the Print Media: The British Prime Ministers (1945–1999),' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60:3 (2007), 371–387; Lauri Karvonen, *The Personalisation of Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Democracies* (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2010).

18   The discourse historical analysis is characterized by four levels of context, namely linguistic analysis (the actual use of language or text), discourse theory (the inter-textual/interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, discourses, and genres), mezzo-theories (the extra-linguistic sociological and institutional variables), and grand theory (the wider sociopolitical and historical contexts that exert influence upon discursive practices). Ruth Wodak, 'The Discourse-Historical Approach,' in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds), *Methods in Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage, 2001), 63–74; Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, 'Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse Historical Analysis,' *Discourse Studies*, 1:1 (1999), 83–118; Gilbert Weiss and Ruth Wodak (eds), *Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and Interdisciplinarity* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

19   David Reynolds, 'Summit Diplomacy: Some Lessons from History for 21st-Century Leaders,' https://vimeo.com/69470505 (accessed 24 June 2019); Steve Marsh, 'Personal Diplomacy at the Summit,' in Dobson and Marsh, *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship*, 116–141.

20   President Johnson, for instance, allegedly once told an aide in reference to British prime minister Wilson that 'we got enough pollution around here already without Harold coming over with his fly open and his pecker hanging out, peeing all over me.' Cited in John W. Young, *Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, 1963–79* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 133.

21   For instance, prior to a Churchill–Truman meeting in January 1952 the US State Department was determined to resist any attempt by Churchill to overly personalize Anglo-American relations – so much so that Jock Colville of the British Private Office wrote that 'the White House and the State Department clutched their lifebelts and prepared to repel boarders.' US National Archives (USNA), RG 59, Box 2769, Memo. R. B. Knight to Matthews, 'Conversations Between President Truman and Mr Churchill – U.S. Objectives,' 10 December 1951; John Colville, *Footprints in Time* (London: Collins, 1976), 233.

22 See Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations.'

23 'Remarks at the Reading of the Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan,' 8 April 1961, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8048&st=macmillan&st1= (accessed 20 April 2019).

24 Andrew Sullivan, 'Winds of War Are Blowing Britain Away from Europe,' Sunday Times, 30 March 2003, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/comment-andrew-sullivan-winds-of-war-are-blowing-britain-away-from-europe-sc3c87pztct (accessed 14 May 2020).

25 Gideon Rachman, 'Cameron's "Essential" Relationship with Obama,' 13 March 2012, http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2012/03/camerons-essential-relationship-with-obama (accessed 20 April 2019).

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'A GREAT ENGLISHMAN'

George Washington and Anglo-American memory diplomacy, c.1890–1925[1]

SAM EDWARDS

In the summer of 1921, the Marquess of Cambridge presided over the public opening of Sulgrave Manor, a modest property deep in rural Northamptonshire. The house, a Tudor farmstead, had been recently restored, and the opening ceremony drew a sizeable crowd of local parishioners and, more unusually, a quota of Anglo-American dignitaries and diplomats. The presence of the latter was due to Sulgrave's special distinction: It was the ancestral seat of the Washington family, a scion of which had been elected the first president of the newly formed 'United States of America' in 1789. Reflecting on this history, and perhaps conscious of certain challenges vis-à-vis contemporary Anglo-American relations, the Marquess told an audience gathered on the manor's lawn that Sulgrave would soon become 'a centre from which sentiments of friendship and goodwill between the British and American peoples will forever radiate' (see Figure 7.1).[2] Another of those in attendance, Lord Fairfax of Cameron, echoed these remarks. Stood in the shade cast by the broad branches of an ancient walnut tree, Fairfax explained to a sea of behatted Britons that 'the United Kingdom and America are tightly bound together by custom and culture, and Sulgrave Manor, by illuminating the origins of America's most famous family, helps us to understand how this came about.'[3] Equally illustrious speakers expressed the same ideas just a few days later, during the dedication of a newly erected statue of the first president near Trafalgar Square, with the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord Curzon, remarking that he was proud to 'accept this wonderful statue of a great Englishman.'[4] By 1922, therefore, when former US president Howard William Taft visited Sulgrave the sentiments he expressed were entirely familiar. If anything, he was perhaps a little too effusive, declaring that Washington 'was an Englishman by descent, by tradition,

Figure 7.1 Under the walnut tree: the opening ceremony at Sulgrave Manor, 21 June 1921.

[he] valued the English qualities, the English firmness, the English courage, the English common sense, the English sense of proportion.'[5]

These efforts to commemorate the American Cincinnatus were not without precedent. As Barry Schwartz, Edward Lengel, and Karal-Anne Marling have all explained, the victor of Yorktown was already the subject of mythologization while still alive, and on his death in 1799 such endeavors found new energy. By the end of the nineteenth century, Washington had become an 'American symbol' with both his birthplace and long-time residence established as national shrines.[6] Yet, as these activities themselves imply, this cultural work was very much an American affair, a product of ongoing efforts to construct and consolidate a viable national identity.[7] This chapter therefore charts a distinct path, turning attention to some of the ways in which this preeminently 'American symbol' has also been 'used' elsewhere, especially in Britain. Powerfully shaped by transatlantic ideas of race, gender, ancestry, and identity, this process of appropriation was at root part of a broader turn-of-the-century project to create what Duncan Bell has called an Anglo-American 'utopia.'[8] To date, however, the specific role played by carefully choreographed commemorations in

this project has not received full or focused attention. In unraveling the politics of such commemorations this chapter also furthers our understanding of early-twentieth-century Anglo-American relations, an era much less examined when compared to the voluminous literature discussing the post-1945 period. For the events explored here should rightly be understood as part and parcel of an important – but under-appreciated – era of cultural diplomacy. Indeed, although it is often assumed that the 'diplomacy of ideas' only properly began during the 1940s,[9] the activities examined here clearly anticipated such endeavors by over twenty years.[10]

This period even produced something of an innovation in the field of international cultural relations – what Brian Etheridge has termed 'memory diplomacy.'[11] While contemporaries never themselves used such language to describe their activities, the term aptly defines both the process and purpose of the work discussed in this chapter. In essence, this 'memory diplomacy' was a newly emerging brand of transnational cultural activity operating among and between the spaces traditionally occupied by 'state' and 'private' actors and, at least in this instance, led by an influential body of transatlantic elites: politicians, diplomats, ambassadors, civil servants, philanthropists, and specially formed private associations including, significantly, women's patriotic societies. Eager to bolster transatlantic relations in the present, such elites trawled the past for figures and events that they could claim – and commemorate – as indicative of a uniquely close Anglo-American bond.[12] The important role played by such activities in the post-1945 era has certainly received attention.[13] But by examining the period from the Anglo-American rapprochement of the 1890s through to the fraying relationship of the mid-1920s, this chapter considers a neglected precedent, that is, the *first* age of transatlantic memory diplomacy.

Here, in short, is a revealing window on those early efforts to establish friendly Anglo-American relations before the arrival of mid-twentieth-century government agencies, and before the rhetoric and romance of the 'special relationship.' The well-known disagreements between Washington and London notwithstanding (over the peace settlement, German reparations, and, later, naval disarmament), this chapter nonetheless argues that many influential political and cultural actors committed themselves to the cultivation – and public celebration – of the very same 'sentiment' later central to the transatlantic relationship in the age of Churchill.[14] Painstakingly researched ancestral blood ties, imagined racial connections, perceived cultural affinities, and both actual and assumed historical links all came to the fore. As such, while David Woodward has rightly contended that the 'failure to achieve a true Anglo-American partnership during and after the [First World] War … represented a great setback to world stability,' at locations such as Sulgrave the rhetorical basis for just such a partnership was sketched out, and, crucially, rehearsed.[15] Such rehearsals could never deny the reality of contemporary disputes, particularly as the 1920s

wore on. But Anglo-American arguments surely became less problematic if, on another day, all those involved could doff hats, shake hands, and celebrate those deep connections joining John Bull and Uncle Sam.

RACE AND RAPPROCHEMENT: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1890–1914

The groundwork for the hearty handshakes of the post-1918 period was laid during the Anglo-American rapprochement of the 1890s, a diplomatic development connected to changing global power politics and, especially, to the resolution of various long-standing disagreements, foremost of which was the settlement in 1896 of the Venezuela boundary dispute. As a result, transatlantic tensions that had simmered since the Revolution finally dissipated.[16] Yet the resurgent sense of unity that followed was not just a product of trade and treaty. A revived sense of a common culture, language, and history were all equally important, and so too were emerging ideas of race. Indeed, the age of Anglo-American rapprochement was also an age of increasingly racialized diplomatic discourse.[17] For those who favored this sort of language, 'Anglo-Saxon' values were on the march across the world. In the antipodes, Anglo-Saxon colonies had forged liberty-loving representative government. In Africa, a similarly Anglo-Saxon colony waged war against the outdated reactionary restrictions of the Boers in order to ensure equality of opportunity for British settlers and to protect Victoria's supposedly child-like charges, the native people.[18] And in the United States, four decades of manifest destiny had spread self-declared Anglo-Saxon constitutional culture across the Western hemisphere, dispossessing the 'inferior' and civilizing the 'savage' along the way.[19] By the late 1890s, domestic concerns in both Britain and the United States further intensified the specifically transatlantic quality to this racialized rhetoric. In the United States, this was the era of so-called 'new immigration' in which invading 'aliens' were perceived by some as representing a critical challenge to – if not corruption of – the national body politic.[20] In Britain, meanwhile, ongoing discussion and debate concerning the permanently unresolved 'Irish Question' similarly infused and energized contemporary Anglo-Saxonist sentiment.[21] In both London and Washington, these were also years in which growing German power – economic and military – began to be felt, with the result that in due course older references to the supposed 'Germanic' or 'Teutonic' qualities of both Britons and Americans were increasingly supplanted by the idea of a special, distinct, and uniquely generative 'Anglo-Saxon' and 'English-speaking' culture.[22]

In concert with this racialized reading of contemporary geopolitics came corresponding historiographical revisions to American history. To be sure, among turn-of-the-century academics understandings of the American Revolution remained heavily influenced by the monumental scholarship of

those such as George Bancroft, who found in the War of Independence an expression of providential exceptionalism.[23] A similar exceptionalism was apparent in the famous Frontier Thesis (1893) of Frederick Jackson Turner, who took great pains to make clear that due to their collective regeneration out 'West' Americans could no longer be defined as 'English.'[24] Nonetheless, in other quarters a historical narrative more attentive to the common dates and details of the wider 'English-speaking' world began to emerge. Beginning with the work of those such as Charles Dilke (1868), such histories of the 'English-speaking' peoples became a feature of early twentieth-century historiography, providing accessible takes on the common Anglo-American past.[25] Elsewhere, similar ideas were present in the publication of Lord Bryce's affectionate history of the US constitution, *The American Commonwealth* (1888) as well as in resurgent American interest in the English past.[26] This latter development was more than apparent in a spate of Anglophilic travelogues published before and after the First World War, many of which provided a sentimental homage to the motherland very much in the mold of Nathanial Hawthorne's *Our Old Home* (1863).[27] The same efforts to cultivate a sense of transatlantic 'Anglo-Saxon' identity were apparent across contemporary political culture, producing such periodicals as Lady Randolph Churchill's *Anglo-Saxon Review* (1899–1901),[28] as well as associations such as the American Society in London (1895), the Pilgrims Society (1902), and the International Magna Charta Day Association (1907).[29] That a significant number of the transatlantic elites involved in these enterprises (including of course the Churchills) were, by family and marriage, literally 'one,' only further aided their collective sense of political cohesion, cultural commonality, and familial obligation.

Another facet of this rapprochement concerned efforts to construct a coherent political community by celebrating suitably 'Anglo-American' figures.[30] Just as the Victorian state devoted time and energy to the veneration of various national heroes (Cromwell, Boudica, Alfred), so too did a transatlantic political elite now turn to history, genealogy, and ancestry to find a useable 'origins myth' peopled with attractive prophets, martyrs, and saviors.[31] Activities connected to the figure of Abraham Lincoln provide a case in point. First memorialized in Britain with a statue in Edinburgh in 1892, Honest Abe duly became an increasingly popular figure, a development only accentuated by the confirmation in 1909 of his English ancestry[32] as well as the publication in 1916 of Lord Charnwood's widely acclaimed biography.[33] In 1919, for example, city authorities in Manchester dedicated a statue of Lincoln, while the very same year also saw the unveiling of a Lincoln bust in Hingham, Norfolk (his ancestral parish). At all these various commemorative ceremonies, the dedicatory rhetoric was peculiarly consistent. In Edinburgh (1892), the lead American at the ceremony – Consul Wallace Bruce (surely a name those Scots in attendance appreciated) – gave full vent to contemporary Anglo-Saxonist

sentiment: 'We celebrate today – the very centenary of the utterance – by unveiling a monument to the last great martyr in the cause of Saxon freedom – an honest man who saved us in the hour of our peril. May it stand to all time as a memorial to … another bond of widening love and friendship between Great Britain and the United States of America.'[34] Twenty-five years later, as a similar audience gathered in Hingham for the dedication of the new bust, the same rhetoric was on show. The American ambassador, John W. Davis, remarked that the bronzed head of Lincoln offered an 'image of a great man of the Anglo-Saxon race, whose stock is rooted in this very soil, and in whom you have, with us, an equal ground for pride.'[35]

But Lincoln was not the only American president subject to such Anglicization; George Washington, foremost of the so-called 'founding fathers,' was likewise appropriated by those keen to cultivate closer Anglo-American affinities. Significantly, too, both the chronology and catalyst for this appropriation were remarkably similar: turn-of-the-twentieth-century genealogical research.

THE CENTENNIAL OF PEACE AND THE ANGLICIZATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1912–21

Like Lincoln, George Washington had always paid little attention to the details of his ancestry.[36] Among those nineteenth-century scholars obsessed by the details of birth and bloodlines, however, Washington's 'roots' were fascinating. Interest in the first president's English ancestors had already emerged in the 1790s when Sir Isaac Heard – an 'officer of arms' – began research into the Washingtons of Northamptonshire. Further information emerged in the 1860s, largely due to the diligent work of the pioneering American genealogist Joseph Lemuel Chester, and by the end of the 1880s many of the key details had been pinned down. Even so, the decade either side of 1900 still witnessed persistent interest in the first president's 'pedigree.' In autumn of 1894, for instance, the letters pages of *The Times* saw a lively correspondence between those then pursuing some of the still unsolved questions regarding Washington's English lineage, a correspondence that resurfaced again in 1901 and 1904, and then again in 1913.[37] By the eve of the First World War, these efforts had resolved several of the outstanding genealogical issues, and the roots of the first president were now firmly traced to four corners of England: Washington (Durham), Sulgrave (Northamptonshire), Warton (Lancashire), and Purleigh (Essex).[38]

For many Anglo-American political elites, the proven fact of Washington's English roots made perfect sense. Even during the American Revolution, and as Troy Bickham has explained, 'the press in Britain portrayed the commander of the rebel army as a model of citizen virtue and an ideal military leader.'[39]

This sympathetic view was possible due to a combination of factors. First, parliamentary debate prior (and during) the Revolution had already established space for the idea that American colonists were Englishmen with legitimate complaints worthy of consideration, an idea that some colonial leaders similarly espoused.[40] In the hands of those such as Thomas Jefferson, for example, the Revolution was an assertion of the ancient rights of Englishmen against a usurping – and German – monarchy.[41] In turn, such ideas enabled a certain view of the colonial leadership. For if the cause was legitimate and the actions identifiably 'English' then it required little initiative or invention to see the Revolution's leader – George Washington – as something akin to an eighteenth-century English 'baron' contesting the restrictions imposed by a foreign king. Certain facts of Washington's life aided this work of creative interpretation. He was a Virginian planter rather than a New England radical and, as such, he was familiar – or, rather, perceived to be familiar – to country gentlemen in England, a powerful political constituency. He was a former soldier who had once defended British interests in North America. He was distant and aloof from some of the much-criticized machinations of the Continental Congress. And he was well conditioned to the codes of conduct and manners of behavior contemporaries deemed crucial to the status of gentleman. Even his very home – Mount Vernon – was English in name; it had been rechristened by his brother Lawrence in the 1730s in homage to an obscure but heroic captain in the Royal Navy.[42] In short, born and bred into a loyal English colony, raised as an Englishman abroad, and at one point even destined for an education in England,[43] Washington looked and acted just as those of his class in Britain expected. In the 1750s, in fact, he had actively sought to 'imitate the style of an English country gentleman,'[44] while even a decade later his Anglophilia was such that he still 'ardently desired' to go to the mother country, and still yearned for a Royal Commission in His Majesty's Army.[45]

The feeling appears to have been mutual, especially once the Revolution was done. When news of Washington's death reached Britain in January 1800 'the white ensigns of the British fleet … were lowered to half-mast' and those American sailors docked at the port of London 'attended a memorial service at St. John's Church, Wapping, dressed in naval mourning.'[46] The London press, meanwhile, paid homage to a 'truly great man.'[47] Little wonder that during the centennial of the Declaration of Independence one Briton could suggest that Washington was as much an English hero as Cromwell, and as deserving of a prominent place among the street names of the capital.[48] Yet as a new century dawned, Washington had still not secured such 'prominence' (even though none other than William Gladstone thought him the 'purist figure in history').[49] All this would change in the early twentieth century in large part because of an eagerly anticipated anniversary.

The anniversary in question was the Centennial of the Treaty of Ghent, the moment marking one hundred years of peace between the 'English-speaking peoples.' Plans for an organized commemoration originated in the United States in 1911 with the formation of an 'American National Committee,' and a year later it was joined by a parallel British Committee.[50] Significantly, both committees included some of the most influential transatlantic political actors of the age. For Britain, Earl Grey, the former governor general of Canada was the central figure, while on occasion, too, the Earl's namesake – Sir Edward Grey, then foreign secretary – was also active. Another key figure was Harry Brittain, at the forefront of various efforts to forge closer Anglo-American connections and one of those who had founded the Pilgrims Society in 1902. For the Americans, those involved included steel tycoon and wealthy philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, former president Theodore Roosevelt, former secretary of state Elihu Root, and Joseph Choate, a former ambassador to Britain. Such illustrious names ensured that the two committees quickly agreed an ambitious agenda for the anniversary, including an 'Anglo-American' exhibition at the White City in London, a Great Ball in New York (December), a ceremony of remembrance and thanksgiving in British churches (Christmas), and a celebration in Ghent to mark the signing of the treaty itself (June 1915).[51] In the midst of these plans, however, another idea also came to the fore: the transatlantic exchange of commemorative sculpture, a form of public art very popular among this Anglo-American patrician class. For the Americans, there was to be a bronze bust of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, for his namesake city of Pittsburgh (ultimately unveiled in 1922), and a statue of Edmund Burke, eighteenth-century defender of American colonists, for Washington, DC (also dedicated in 1922).[52] For the British, meanwhile, there were likewise two figurative statues, this time of the most famous American presidents: the ever-popular Abraham Lincoln, and the squire of Mount Vernon, George Washington.

The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 understandably derailed these plans, especially as the attention of those such as Sir Edward Grey now lay with the 'lamps going out all over Europe.'[53] However, the overall project was not discarded, and following American entry into the war in April 1917 interest returned. After all, the two nations were now closer than ever before. In London and elsewhere, Britons welcomed doughboys with march-pasts, processions, and parties, while in *The Times* correspondents enthusiastically debated exactly how best to greet the new ally.[54] And with the Yanks finally 'over here,' various ceremonies explored the increasingly well-worn themes of Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, often with a nod towards George Washington. In February 1918, for instance, a gathering of American and British naval figures saw all present declare their mutual commitment to the 'memory of George Washington.'[55] Such sentiment ensured that not even Independence Day offered

an obstacle to expressions of Anglo-American unity. On 4 July 1918, King George V attended a special baseball match in London featuring teams from the US Army and US Navy,[56] while across his empire the Stars and Stripes flew atop government buildings.[57] *Punch* saw fit to mark the anniversary with a cartoon of Uncle Sam and John Bull in the uniforms of their respective militaries, marching in step with flags at shoulder,[58] and in London the *Daily Chronicle* gushed that those same flags, blowing in an English breeze, looked like they had become 'hopelessly entangled in what looked from below like a serious love affair.'[59] The very same day, and while attending – of course – an Anglo-Saxon Fellowship Meeting, none other than Winston Churchill took the opportunity to hold forth on American Independence. Invoking a rather Jeffersonian taken on the Revolution, the most famous 'Anglo-American' of the twentieth century declared that Britons were 'glad to know that an English colony declared itself independent under a German King.'[60] A year later, now talking to the recently formed English-Speaking Union, Churchill would rehearse the same idea, remarking that Washington 'was an English gentleman who fought against a German king; and defended his country by the aid of men of British blood against a very considerable number of Hessians and Hanoverian mercenaries.'[61]

This was the context in which plans to celebrate the centennial of the Treaty of Ghent returned. For powerbrokers in London, increasingly aware that the British position in the world now depended as much on decisions made in the White House as it did on those made in Whitehall, demonstrating an appreciative understanding of American history and staking a claim to some of the heroes who marked its pages was surely a sensible strategy. This was a difficult moment for Britannia's agents, one in which they encountered the realities of the peace: an economy creaking, an Empire crumbling, a trade deficit growing, debts rising, and a former colony – the United States – now preeminent. The fact that the president of this old colony – Woodrow Wilson – was himself an Anglophilic historian and that his relationship with Lloyd George was just then souring, surely provided yet further impetus to any activity that might encourage friendly expressions of historical connection rather than frustrated outbursts of contemporary resentment.[62] Perfectly sensible then that a group of British diplomats had pointedly made a pilgrimage to Mount Vernon in May 1917,[63] nor is it surprising that American efforts to establish 7 December 1918 as 'Britain's Day' were warmly appreciated in London.[64] With the war concluded, therefore, the Anglo-American committee formed back in 1911–12 was re-established and the original plans were dusted down. As an editorial in the *Journal of the Anglo-American Society* put it: 'The war disturbed our plans; but it immeasurably confirmed our purpose and the worth of our labours.'[65]

The focus of such 'labors' quickly returned to the two commemorative statues originally contemplated back in 1914: one of Lincoln, and the other of Washington. Both figures were perhaps even more attractive now. For this was

the moment in which British politicians – particularly Lloyd George – declared a new found commitment to 'democracy,' and that made commemorating both the man who nobly fought for 'inalienable rights' and the man who fought to 'free the slaves' especially appealing. That said, designing and dedicating commemorative statues is rarely the product of unanimous agreement, for such work engages the energies and passions of different groups who duly vie for the right to define how an event or figure will be marked for posterity. As explicitly transatlantic projects involving various powerful individuals, and as projects tasked with the (unspoken) work of quasi-official memory diplomacy, the establishment of both the Lincoln and Washington statues was no exception and the planning process for each was beset by various arguments. For Lincoln, and as I have written about elsewhere, the central issue concerned exactly how the Great Emancipator should be depicted given his placing in the very heart of establishment London, with the 'winning' statue – erected just outside the Palace of Westminster – offering an image of Lincoln as noble statesmen.[66] When it came to George, the disputes were a little different, and concerned the precise location on which he was to stand.

Indeed, whereas it was the style and aesthetic of London's Lincoln that produced a very public debate, all seem to have agreed in contrast that the statue of Washington offered by his home state of Virginia was eminently fitting.[67] An exact copy of one that had stood in the Virginia State Legislature since 1796, and executed by celebrated French sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon, this statue had been widely praised for depicting Washington in the great and grand tradition of heroic sculpture (see Figure 7.2). A life-size George stands in military uniform with right hand on a walking cane – the symbol of gentlemanly domesticity. The left hand rests atop a thirteen-columned fasces of state, on top of which is draped a cape and sword. To the back of Washington stands a plough, signifying the life of pastoral tranquility that Washington left when offered command of the Continental Army, and to which he returned after retiring from the presidency in 1797. Here was a powerful expression of Washington as 'a liminal figure suspended between public and domestic life,' between war and peace.[68] In detail and aesthetic, Houdon's statue was thus well suited to the diplomatic task it had been set: here was George as warrior-come-farmer, soldier-come-statesman. Even so, there remained serious disagreements over the precise *spot* most appropriate for a monument to the 'father' of the United States.

Originally, and as discussed back in 1914, George was to be placed on ground outside the National Gallery, close to Trafalgar Square. The records indicate that all had agreed to this, including the trustees of the National Gallery.[69] But when the project was rejuvenated in 1918, the National Gallery rescinded their agreement. Their concern was that the site chosen would produce an 'imbalance' in the gallery's exterior, something they feared might

Figure 7.2 The George Washington statue (Antoine Houdon), dedicated on 30 June 1921.

later be invoked in order to establish yet more statues nearby (a development they were loath to countenance).[70] As the trustees explained in a letter to the first commissioner of works, they also felt 'unanimously that to place a monument to George Washington within the precinct of the National Gallery and at the head of Trafalgar Square, would certainly give rise to adverse criticism and controversy from all sides.' Further criticisms followed, including the fact that Washington was 'in no way connected with the fine arts' as well as the suggestion that if the project went ahead as planned it would be a 'grave aesthetic blunder to violate the special character of the empty lawn in front of this building [the gallery].'[71]

An increasingly terse exchange of correspondence duly followed between the Office of Works and the National Gallery, with the former insistent that the matter had been discussed and decided in 1914, agreed by the King, and that the original decision must therefore stand. While practicalities were central to the case made by the Office of Works they were also very aware of the symbolism at stake. As they explained to the trustees of the gallery, 'the Board feel that any reconsideration of the site would amount to a breach of faith and create a very regrettable feeling in America.'[72] This would certainly be the case, they explained, if one of the gallery's suggested alternative locations was accepted: Westminster. For while the Dean of Westminster had once been keen on the idea,[73] and while it was clearly appropriate that the author of the Gettysburg Address stood near Parliament, the home of British democracy, the Office of Works had decided that there was no place or space for Washington for it would 'give serious offence to Canada.'[74] The British ambassador in Washington had even let it be known to the Foreign Office back in 1914 that 'he had received representations from Canada that it would be painful to the sentiment of loyalty felt by Canadian subjects of His Majesty if rumour were confirmed that the statue was to be placed at Westminster Abbey.'[75] Such a view remained in 1920, when the gallery began questioning the issue of location.

At this point, the dispute was escalated by the involvement of Lord Curzon, secretary of state for foreign affairs, a trustee of the gallery, and a man with some experience organizing the details of commemorative form and ritual (he had been chair of the committee that planned the dedication of the Cenotaph in 1920). The Office of Works suggested to Curzon that 'were the decision of 1914 to be reversed now, it would have a very deplorable effect throughout America,' a fact of which he was surely sensitive given his public office.[76] In due course, the trustees of the gallery suggested yet another alternative site, this time close to that originally agreed in 1914 but on a rather more discreet 'strip of lawn.'[77] After inspection, the Office of Works made clear that this would 'never do' as it would 'cause mortal offence to the Americans' if they saw that their greatest president had been 'placed in a hole and a corner.'[78] In response, the gallery accepted the statue in the enclosure originally agreed in 1914, but on an exact spot chosen by Curzon. When the Office of Works learnt of this, there was yet further dispute, with the first commissioner making it known that he 'cannot accept his [Curzon's] alteration of the site.'[79] Rather uncharacteristically, Curzon attempted to placate, and explained to the board his various reservations. But the Office of Works was not persuaded, with the secretary, Lionel Earle, making clear that he 'should oppose to the death' any attempt to place the statue other than on the site previously agreed, although in a deft maneuver the reasoning now offered was a 'question of artistic placing.'[80] The strategy backfired, however, with Curzon and the trustees responding that unless the Office of Works 'submitted to his [Curzon's] site' they would

'veto the statue going anywhere within the National Gallery grounds at all.'[81] Frustrated, and aware that Curzon had the power to take the matter to the cabinet, the first commissioner eventually submitted to the demands made.[82]

All was now on track for the dedication. Following transportation from the United States, the statue itself arrived in Britain in the spring of 1921, and the enclosure near the gallery was suitably prepared.[83] At this point though, yet another protest emerged, this time from an interested member of the public outraged at 'such a monstrous exhibition of the misuse of public authority.' As this person – C. L. Hales, a minor author of the 1920s – explained in a complaint to the Office of Works, the project would surely be 'highly wounding to national feeling.' As Hales continued: 'George Washington was a rebel against the Crown, the slayer of thousands of British troops, the cause of ruin to hundreds of loyalists, and the harsh executioner of Major Andre [a young British officer executed for espionage by Washington's order].' Not finished, and still spitting, Hales went on to declare that to 'excite national feeling by putting up a statue of such a person is an act of official dementia.'[84] Such opinion was not without precedent. Writing in the *Literary Digest*, one British editor had even cynically suggested in 1914 that funds might reasonably be sought for a monument to Paul Kruger, leader of the Boers. After all, Kruger had the same 'two necessary qualifications' as Washington: 'He was the mortal enemy of England, and he persecuted a British population.'[85]

Revealingly, this seems to have been a minority opinion.[86] To be sure, Curzon, well known for his temper, was clearly fussy with the siting and irritated by the various demands made. Yet he was also secretary of state for foreign affairs and, as a man who twice married American heiresses, ultimately knew what side his bread was buttered when it came to Anglo-American relations (just then being strained by disputes over naval disarmament).[87] Moreover, the protests offered were easily countered. The Office of Works gently pointed out to Hales that commemorating a rebel against the Crown was by no means without precedent – Cromwell, Hampden, and William III had all been marked in stone.[88] But the deciding factor was surely what one British official referred to as the 'evolution of time and sentiment.' For so much had 'happened since the time of Washington, and so intimate have become our relations with the United States owing to our Alliance during the War that public feeling towards the United States had undergone a notable change.'[89] As such, this official continued, there had emerged a 'growing desire to throw into oblivion past episodes which divided two great branches of the English-speaking world.'[90]

Having negotiated the choppy waters of the Atlantic *and* of contemporary British opinion, the statue of Washington was dedicated on 30 June 1921. Those in attendance noted the significance of the site selected: stood just to the east front of the gallery, George was keeping good company – nearby were monuments to 'great spirits like Nelson, Napier, Gordon and Nurse Cavell.'[91]

For one of those Americans present, these were fitting associations to draw. As the president of Washington and Lee University, Dr. Smith, explained in what was surely a rather florid dedication speech:

> With our unmatched English tongue now clearly destined to become the chief treasury and vehicle of the world's civilization; and with our wealth of English literature, centring in and radiating from our English Bible; with our common reverence for purity of womanhood, the sanctity of the home, and the rights of the weak; with our common admiration for unselfishness and the spirit of service, our universal Anglo-Saxon instinct for justice and passion for liberty, our common recognition of the imperative of conscience, the rights of the individual, the fatherhood of God, and the essential brotherhood of man – with these multiplied and mighty bonds, so recently softened in the furnace of common suffering and welded anew on the hard anvil of war, this is a world of friendship that has come to stay, and may the God of England and America doom to speedy destruction every effort and agency that attempts to weaken or undermine it.[92]

Dr. Smith concluded by stating that the 'English-speaking nations, with a common racial kinship, a common religion, and similar ideals of character and conduct … constituted today the most homogenous group of nations ever known on earth.'[93] The lead Briton in attendance, Lord Curzon, reciprocated in kind, all dispute over the statue's placing now forgotten. Curzon remarked – to loud cheers – that the 'very fact of setting up this statue here was a sign that the two great branches of the English-speaking race were now indissolubly one.'[94] Shortly after, Curzon, who had accepted the statue as a 'symbol and sign' of the Anglo-American bond, told the American delegation that he was happy to 'gratefully and proudly accept this wonderful statue of a great Englishman.'[95]

SULGRAVE MANOR, THE COLONIAL DAMES, AND A HOME FOR THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING FAMILY, 1918−41

A month before Curzon received this statue, a bust of the first president's head was quietly unveiled in the crypt at St. Paul's Cathedral,[96] and another was similarly established in the Town Hall at Liverpool.[97] At the former, a letter was read out from President Woodrow Wilson in which the man recently so keen to make the world safe for democracy happily noted that 'Washington was an Englishman by birth and tradition before he became leader in founding the new Anglo-Saxon nation of this Continent.'[98] In Liverpool, meanwhile, a city that had famously hosted the arrival of General Pershing's American Expeditionary Force in June 1917, the Lord Mayor hoped that the Washington bust 'would mark a new epoch in which the two English-speaking nations

would work for the good of the entire world.'[99] A third bust, again of the same mold (by Houdon), was to be placed at Sulgrave Manor.[100]

Sulgrave's connection to the Washington family was firmly established during the genealogical research noted above, and by spring of 1912 those involved in celebrating the 'centennial of peace between the English-speaking peoples' had identified the manor as a potential acquisition, to be established as a 'shrine' to Anglo-American amity.[101] Purchase of the property was approved in August 1912,[102] so that by 1913 plans for the centennial events were focused around the statues to Washington and Lincoln discussed above, as well as the renovation of Sulgrave Manor.[103] By November 1913, having authorized the signing of the cheque to complete the purchase, the Executive Committee dispatched to Sulgrave one of the great architects of the age – Reginald Blomfield, shortly to be in demand as a designer of war memorials – to undertake an inspection and advise on any necessary repairs.[104] The purchase was completed in January 1914, and plans to celebrate the centennial continued apace.[105] In February 1914, the Duke of Teck (brother to Queen Mary) took Viscount Bryce – a former ambassador to the United States (1907–13) – for a visit to the newly acquired property, later returning in July with Walter Hines Page, the American ambassador. While pleased with their purchase, all seemed concerned that the manor remained in a very bad state of repair.[106]

Soon after, however, and with an understated poignancy now so arresting, the minute books record not the denouement of the centennial events, but their postponement. The day after war was declared, an enquiry from the American Centennial Committee received a solemn reply from their British counterparts lamenting that they had been drawn 'reluctantly … into hateful war,' before reiterating the British Committee's belief that 'Anglo-American friendship [was the] best security against militarism and for resurrection of international peace.'[107] Such an ambition ensured that for the first two years of the war both committees paid close attention to maintaining contact, and in 1916 American members were still declaring that it was 'essential to maintain the continuity of the movement.'[108] Clearly reassured, their British counterparts considered pursuing various other activities, including commissioning textbooks on US history for British schools and colleges,[109] as well as a lecture tour in the United States to outline the 'peace-record of the English-speaking peoples.'[110] Although some of these endeavors met limited success, financial problems occasioned by the war nonetheless proved a serious hindrance, even resulting in the secretary – Harry Brittain – taking-up 'half-time engagement in propaganda work' (such an easy shift in role suggests the extent to which the British–American Peace Committee was itself an agent of quasi-propaganda or, rather, of informal 'cultural diplomacy').[111] Many of these challenges subsequently were eased by American entry into the conflict in April 1917, a development that understandably brought to the committee a renewed purpose. In

May, a motion was discussed to reconstitute as an Anglo-American 'league of friendship' or 'union of English-speaking peoples.'[112] A month later though, and on advice of Hines Page, the British Committee in fact decided to 'suspend its activities till the end of the war,'[113] and in October 1918 this suspension became permanent, with the committee winding up its role and devolving its original responsibilities to the 'Anglo-American Society' and the 'Sulgrave Committee.'[114]

Fortunately for the Sulgrave Committee – or 'Sulgrave Institution' as it was also known – as the parent association began to founder, their efforts to sure up Anglo-American relations *and* improve ongoing financial troubles were powerfully assisted by the support of an 'historic-patriotic organization' indispensable to realizing all the future plans: the National Society of Colonial Dames.[115] Founded in 1891, and with seven thousand members by 1913,[116] the Dames was one of several women's patriotic societies that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, among which were also the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR, 1890), the US Daughters of 1812 (1892), and the Daughters of the Confederacy (1894). While such groups initially shared some of their members with progressive-era women's reform movements, by the First World War, and in the era of a vocal, virulent, and Jim Crow-infused nativism, many had become increasingly conservative advocates for '100 percent Americanism.' Among the leadership of the DAR, for example, gender equality, unchecked immigration, subversive political ideologies, and various forms of perceived moral degeneracy (especially miscegenation) all represented 'un-American' threats to the established idea of 'separate spheres' upon which they understood American identity and integrity to be based.[117] According to this powerful Victorian construction, 'Woman's attributes – physical weakness, sentimentality, purity, meekness, piousness – were said to disqualify her for traditional public life';[118] the home, and especially motherhood, were the 'natural' realm and true vocation for women, a place and role in which their inherent virtue could ensure the nation's continued well-being by raising good Christian citizens. Seen from this perspective, patriarchy and patriotism were mutually reinforcing values, and all started and ended in the home.

Yet with an ironic twist, such an idea then led to the emergence of a public role for these same women: they became guardians of patriotic memory. Such a role could be rationalized because caring for familial memory – the important dates, family lore – had long been firmly within the 'women's sphere'; extending such duties to the national 'family' was merely a logical progression. As Frances Morgan has explained, such 'women-centered' nationalists posited a 'moral superiority' over men that, from their perspective, actually necessitated their various public commemorative endeavors, all of which furthered the 'large imagined community that they called the United States.'[119] To this end, organizations like the Dames invested their money and

energy in various types of traditional monument celebrating 'great' figures and events from the national past, but they also asserted the patriotic value of other forms of material culture, including food and furniture. It thus did not take long before preserving historic homes, especially those connected to the pre-eminent American patriarchs – the Founding Fathers – also emerged as central to their mission.[120] These were highly visible *domestic* shrines to patriotic memory and therefore obvious focal points for a generation of women activists committed by class and politics to furthering contemporary nationalism. Here was a powerful instance of what Amy Kaplan has similarly demonstrated with regard to nineteenth-century Westward expansion: Such imperialist and 'masculine' endeavors did not proceed independent of contemporary discourses of femininity. The two 'spheres' were not, in fact, 'separate.' Quite the contrary, and as Kaplan explains, a key part of the cultural work performed in the nineteenth century by the ideal of domesticity was to 'unite men and women in a national domain and to generate notions of foreign against which the nation can be imagined as home.'[121] As domestic defenders of both patriarchy and patriotism, therefore, white middle-class women logically emerged as public guardians of the historic homes in which both these values were understood to be grounded.

In performing this role, the Dames were never as aggressively antiradical or anti-immigrant as those like the DAR, and they were always the much smaller organization. However, with regard to their turn-of-the-century origins, impetus, and agenda, the two groups held much in common, especially in terms of the historical and racial exclusions through which they conceived of the nation. As Morgan has explained, when it came to inclusion in the American body politic 'descent rather than consent' was the fundamental matter; bloodlines denoted belonging.[122] And where the DAR, by fact of their very designation, tied such 'belonging' to the moment of political severance with Britain (the Revolution), the Dames found their origins in a still older moment in which the colonies and motherland were one.[123] To be a member, indeed, one must demonstrate a direct ancestral line back to the colonial era. In turn, this attention to ancestry provided an important shaping influence on the historic sites that they drew into their protection,[124] and certainly helps explain why they were willing to dispatch a cheque for £1,000 to the Sulgrave Institution in 1915, which was followed by another £1,500 in July 1916 (in both instances the money was to be used for repair and renovation work).[125] After all, the ancestral home of the nation's 'Father' was in disrepair, and was thus a worthy recipient of their largess. In dispatching such support, the Dames also betrayed their commitment to an increasingly Anglo-centric reading of American history, which was itself coterminous with simultaneous efforts elsewhere to assimilate new immigrants through an assertive program of 'Americanization.' For as Randolph Bourne had already pointed out in 1916,

such an ostensibly 'progressive' program was in fact implicitly (and often explicitly) focused on an exclusionary reading of American identity very much Anglo-Saxonist in tone and tenor. In this sense, the Dames were complicit in a contemporary anglicization of American culture energized by nativist concerns regarding the alleged threat to 'Anglo-Saxon' power and privilege posed by 'new immigrants,' new ideas, and 'new negroes,' and further intensified by Jim Crow segregationism. Put rather more simply, by supporting the preservation of Washington's ancestral English manor the Dames delivered a powerful public statement regarding the nation's assumed cultural, political, and racial origins.

Commemorative endeavors of this sort were not mere appendices to the 'hard' realities of contemporary transatlantic diplomacy. Quite the contrary; given that the Churchillian dream of formal Anglo-American political federation was always just that, a 'dream,' the only way in which a viable Anglo-American community could ever actually be realized was via just the sort of acts of 'imagination' that Benedict Anderson has identified as crucial to nineteenth-century nationalism. But without a state to sponsor such activities, the work of 'imagining' a transatlantic and 'Anglo-Saxon' community of thought and deed naturally fell to private actors, agents, and associations. Moreover, in taking on this role, the Dames were in fact continuing an already established tradition of American women's commitment to transatlantic cultural diplomacy. It was, we recall, Winston Churchill's American mother who founded the *Anglo-Saxon Review* in 1899, while the fact of Lord Curzon's two marriages to American heiresses has similarly already been noted. As Dana Cooper has eloquently explained, such women were powerful 'informal ambassadors' who worked without pay or recognition as influential transnational envoys.[126] Sustained by a contemporary discourse of 'manifest domesticity' *and* by the idea that when it came to international relations 'sentiment' (the feminine sphere) was as valuable as the 'cold processes of legal reasoning' (the masculine sphere), organizations like the Dames thus now assumed a crucial ambassadorial role.[127] Their agency was still further facilitated by the very discourse informing these relations. For numerous diplomats had long discussed Anglo-American relations with reference to a host of familial phrases and metaphors: brothers, cousins, mother, and daughter. When combined with efforts to establish the Washington ancestral home as a shrine to the English-speaking 'family,' such a diplomatic discourse ensured that the agency of the Dames was not only possible, but in many respects actually necessary if the site was to realize fully its role as institution of, and for, Anglo-American memory diplomacy.

The Dames revealed such a fact during their first official visit to Sulgrave, in the summer of 1925. The manor itself had been officially opened in an impressive ceremony held four years earlier, during which banners, bunting, and the Stars and Stripes 'enlivened all the streets of the village.'[128] Starting with

a processional march to the parish church for a service of thanksgiving, the
day culminated with the great and the good – the mayor of Northampton, the
American ambassador, the Marquess of Cambridge – exchanging the usual
expressions of Anglo-American faith and fidelity, and all before a flag-draped
table carrying a newly executed bust of the first president (see Figure 7.3).[129] But
it was the arrival of the Dames in 1925 that teased out a more nuanced reading of
Sulgrave's significance and of Washington's place in Anglo-American memory,
a reading that went beyond the by now familiar racialized rhetoric. Committed
to a view of American history that assumed that 'early colonists sowed the
seeds from which the nation sprung,' the Dames emphasized the idea that
amid the pastoral tranquility of the manor and its grounds 'history clings to the
soil.' As Mrs. Lamar, their president, remarked in the keynote speech given on
another sunny July afternoon:

> We speak of our affections as cold or warm; we describe a man's intellect as keen
> or sharp, or dull, and when we would express our idea of the ties of blood and
> of family, we think of a dwelling, we talk of the House of Washington or the
> Houses of York and Lancaster; and we quote the phrase 'A house divided against
> itself cannot stand.' And so when we would give tangible expression to the ties of
> friendship, to the deep sense of unity of race and religion; of language and laws;

Figure 7.3 The unveiling of the Washington bust, Sulgrave Manor, 21 June 1921.

and of the ideals of government, which bind the English-speaking peoples, we find ready to our hand this old house.[130]

With all due care and reverence, continued Mrs. Lamar, this house would in time become a 'home' in which 'the two great English-speaking nations may learn to live together … and to realise under this roof, as nowhere else, that we are one family.'[131] When the speeches were finished, the visiting Dames – who numbered over a hundred – 'wandered delightedly over the lawns, marvelled at the flower beds thick with hollyhocks and lavender, and crowded through the quaint sized rooms of the Manor House.'[132] Later, when all was done, Mrs. Lamar was heard to tell a reporter that she and her fellow 'pilgrims' – as they had been dubbed in the national press – 'would carry back the vivid memory of this day to [their] homes all over the United States' (see Figure 7.4).[133]

By establishing this 'home' for the English-speaking 'family' the Dames had explicitly domesticated conventional diplomatic discourse in just such a way as their class, gender, and commitment to the patriotic defense of patriarchy demanded. In doing so, they had also skillfully helped to reassert the 'liminal' nature of Washington so famously implied by Houdon's sculpture,

Figure 7.4 Mrs. Lamar, president of the National Society of Colonial Dames, Sulgrave Manor, 25 July 1925.

dedicated back in 1921. When erected outside the National Gallery, within sight of Trafalgar Square, many (male) commentators attending the dedication ceremony had focused upon Washington's soldierly connections to the British imperial heroes nearby. At locations such as Sulgrave, however, the Dames refocused ideas of the first president, turning public attention back (literally, in the sense of where the plough was positioned on the sculpture) to the importance of connecting Washington's life to the world of farms and fields, to the domestic sphere that he left – with regret – to do his patriotic duty. Indeed, much like the Mount Vernon Ladies Association (custodians of Washington's Virginian home), the Dames – with the keen support of the four British women on the executive – ensured that the restored manor was brought to life with authentic period furnishings, a fact reported with approval in the pages of such illustrious titles as *The Cabinet Maker* and *The Tatler*.[134]

With the perspective shifted from martial glory to domestic quietude, the rhetoric and ritual deployed by the Dames in 1925 (and after) also deepened traditional understandings of Washington's much vaunted patriotism. That Washington loved his country was well known. But the Dames' pilgrimage to Sulgrave and their ongoing support for its commemorative mission now implied that 'Washington Country' could also be found in the fields and lanes of Northamptonshire, as much as in Virginia itself. The fact that Washington had never seen the farm at Sulgrave, nor even set foot on English soil, duly became minor details of history. The more important thing was that Washington had loved the peace and quiet of Mount Vernon, and it was here that his patriotism was first cultivated. From this, the logic became inescapable: Sulgrave was Washington's ancestral farm, the land of his English origins, and so it was here that his very family tree found roots. Through blood and background, therefore, American patriotism was deeply rooted in, and nourished by, English soil, and the rebellion that George led to victory was not therefore an act of rejection but, rather, the fullest expression possible of how his roots had drunk deeply from the first land of liberty. His American soul and his ancestral soil were one. Even the very masonry of the manor seemed to confirm such an idea. For carved into the lintel above one of the doors, and consisting of both bars and stars (in red and white), was the Washington family crest; a heraldic design that had long been connected to the ultimate symbol of American patriotism – the flag.[135] Thus, whereas the statue outside the National Gallery had 'anglicized' Washington by staking a racialized claim to his heroic bloodline, the final component of the post-1918 Anglo-American cult of Washington – Sulgrave Manor – consolidated the English image of George still further. At this once dilapidated but now restored farmhouse, Cincinnatus was returned to the timeless peace and pasture of a domesticated English landscape, a landscape that duly became 'Washington Country' and the 'Cradle of American Independence.'[136] By implication, this 'shrine' also became symbolic

of the project at the very heart of all these various post-1918 endeavors – the 'imagining' of a unified Anglo-American 'family,' a transatlantic community bound by race, culture, and custom.

The Dames' hopes for such postwar Anglo-American unity were of course dashed, and already by 1919 American political leadership had in fact turned 'inward and sought to defend American interests independently of other powers,' including Britain.[137] By 1921, some British politicians, including Lord Curzon, were so disillusioned by resurgent American isolationism and the return of popular Anglophobia that they had even initiated a 'new foreign policy' based on robust support for France, as well as support for the League of Nations more broadly.[138] In the absence of official government investment, therefore, and as transatlantic tensions emerged around the postwar peace, war debts, and naval disarmament, retired diplomats and dignitaries worked with Anglo-American associations and patriotic societies like the Dames to perform crucial work creating (and sustaining) the very ideas that Churchill would so famously revisit in the 1940s. Indeed, through their carefully planned memory diplomacy, organizations like the Dames actually helped clear the path for the far more overtly gendered diplomatic phraseology of the post-1945 period: the special relationship. While this specific phrase was certainly a product of the Second World War, the ideas upon which it was based nonetheless had a deeper history in the post-1918 activities of those building statues to the likes of Lincoln and Washington, and especially in the work of those keen to create a 1920s Anglo-American 'shrineland' in which the preeminent place of pilgrimage was Sulgrave Manor.[139]

CONCLUSIONS: MEMORY DIPLOMACY AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

In the years before the Second World War, and just as economic problems, shifting global priorities, and a resurgent American isolationism strained transatlantic relations, Sulgrave Manor's George Washington connection remained at the heart of elite-sponsored memory diplomacy. In 1932, the bicentennial of Washington's birth drew attention in the British press, and the anniversary involved various ceremonies at Sulgrave. As one British scholar explained during these events, Washington was a 'typically reserved English gentleman.'[140] Clearly inspired by such beliefs, in 1936 the innovative film production arm of the London Midland and Scottish Railway Company developed a film about 'Washington Country' (aimed at American tourists),[141] while two years later the BBC collaborated with CBS to air a special Independence Day broadcast from Sulgrave, a feat repeated again in 1941.[142] Soon after, and with the two English-speaking peoples again joined as allies in another global conflict, Washington

Country received yet more visits from a new generation of American pilgrims, many of whom wore the uniform of Uncle Sam.[143] Hardly surprising that in the post-1945 period, and just as well-known Washington relation, Winston Churchill, devoted his considerable energies to furthering a 'special relationship,' Sulgrave Manor had a still important role to play in maintaining transatlantic 'sentiment.' In February 1946, for example, Clement Attlee became the first serving British prime minister to visit Sulgrave. Broadcasting to America on the occasion of Washington's birthday, Attlee, anticipating the tenor – if not the tone – of Churchill's speech at Fulton a month later, explained that Washington was a 'defender and champion of liberty; and a passion for liberty was still the strongest bond that united the English-speaking peoples.'[144] Indeed, as a new generation of postwar British scholars began asserting a historiographical claim on early American history, Washington the defender of English liberties was a useful corollary to the story many of them wished to tell. This was often a story of a distant land settled by daring and devout Englishmen, of a continent conquered by Englishmen, of a country made by Englishmen. A story, in short, of special friends and special relations.[145] Even some American scholars got in on the act, with one penning in 1955 a thoughtful assessment of Washington's links to Albion under the title 'George Washington: An Anglo-American Hero.'[146]

Little wonder that among the heroes of Churchill's own *History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (1956–58) was George Washington (not that 'German' monarch, George III).[147] Or that the preeminent postwar biographer of Washington was an Englishman, Marcus Cunliffe.[148] Or that the newly founded American Museum in Bath chose to replicate the gardens at Mount Vernon as a memorial to the first president.[149] At Bath, in fact, where the Washington Memorial Garden was opened in 1962, all the sentiment and symbolism came full circle. Inspired by a local link centered on Sally Fairfax, Washington's first true love, the garden blossomed each June from cuttings taken at Mount Vernon (while the layout itself was an exact replica of the Virginian original). But, with a twist that ensures such cuttings were bedded in *very* hospitable soil, some of these plants were the genetic offspring of seeds originally sent to Washington, by Sally, back in the 1790s. Somerset seeds, taken to Virginian soil, and then returned 'home' two centuries subsequent.[150] A fitting metaphor for contemporary efforts to cultivate the sentiment central to the 'special relationship.' And the key organization involved in realizing this memorial garden, this Eden for the Anglo-American alliance? Who else, but the Colonial Dames.

American Cincinnatus, destroyer of His Majesty's North American Empire, victor of Yorktown, rebel against crown and country, patriot without equal. Washington was all this, but he was also of English ancestry, and for much of his life had thought (and declared) himself an Englishman. Powerfully reasserted in the years before and after the First World War, this fact ensured

he had a special resonance for those Britons and Americans keen to explore the potential of memory diplomacy as a mechanism through which to bolster transatlantic ties, if not to establish an English-speaking empire of 'sentiment.' With a statue at Trafalgar Square and a bust in St. Paul's, George was firmly and publicly anglicized, appropriations that decades of genealogy had made acceptable, if not necessary. At Sulgrave, meanwhile, Washington's bloodline – his family tree – was returned to English soil, while his patriotism was returned to an English home. Here in 'Washington Country,' as memories of the First World War faded, and just as the transatlantic balance of power began to subtly shift, commemorative rituals provided invaluable forums in which influential Anglo-American elites 'imagined' their common history, asserted their contemporary comradeship, and, above all, paid due homage to George Washington, American hero and English gentleman.

NOTES

1   My thanks to Steve Marsh, Robert M. Hendershot, Gervase Phillips, and Michael Cullinane for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

2   *Daily Chronicle*, 1 July 1921, Sulgrave Manor Archives (hereafter SMA), SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

3   *Ibid.*

4   *Ibid.*

5   *Daily Telegraph*, 1 July 1922, SMA SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

6   See Barry Schwartz, *George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol* (New York: Macmillan, 1987); Edward Lengel, *Inventing George Washington: American's Founder in Myth and Memory* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011); Karal Ann Marling, *George Washington Slept Here: Colonial Revivals and American Culture, 1876–1986* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Seth Bruggeman, *Here, George Washington was Born: Memory, Material Culture and the Public History of a National Monument* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008).

7   Peter Karsten, *Patriot-Heroes in England and America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 83–95.

8   Sulgrave Manor has recently received some attention. See Thomas Otte, '"The Shrine at Sulgrave": The Preservation of the Washington Ancestral Home as an English 'Mount Vernon and Transatlantic Relations,' in M. Hall (ed.), *Towards World Heritage: International Origins of the Preservation Movement, 1870–1930* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 109–138; and Michael P. Cullinane, '100 Years of Peace Among English-Speaking People: Anglo-American Cultural Diplomacy, 1909–1925,' article forthcoming in *Peace and Change* (2020). However, I take a different tack by focusing specifically on how the Sulgrave Institute (and linked bodies) appropriated and remade an ostensibly 'American' hero – George Washington – into a suitably *transatlantic* figure. As such, this is a study of transatlantic memory-making. For Bell's work, see Duncan Bell 'Dreaming the Future: Anglo-America as Utopia,

1880–1914,' in Ella Dzelzainis and Ruth Livesey (eds), *The American Experiment and the Idea of Democracy in British Culture, 1776–1914* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 197–210.

9   Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

10 For American cultural diplomacy, see Michael L. Krenn, *The History of United States Cultural Diplomacy: 1770 to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen Bowman, *The Pilgrims Society and Public Diplomacy, 1895–1945* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).

11 See Brian Etheridge, 'The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America,' *Diplomatic History*, 32: 2 (2008), 207–238. See also M. Todd Bennett, 'The Spirits of '76: Diplomacy Commemorating the US Bicentennial in 1976,' *Diplomatic History*, 40:4 (2016), 695–721; Robert D. Schulzinger, 'Memory and Understanding US Foreign Relations,' in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 336–352; and Penny M. von Eschen, 'Memory and the Study of US Foreign Relations,' in Michael J. Hogan and Frank Costigliola (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 304–316.

12 For the official/private dynamic in American commemoration, see John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Michael Kammen, *The Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993). For the emergence in and around the First World War of an Anglophilic and Atlanticist foreign policy elite in the United States, see Priscilla Roberts, 'The Anglo-American Theme: American Visions of an Atlantic Alliance, 1914–1933,' *Diplomatic History*, 3:21 (1997), 333–364; Priscilla Roberts, 'Paul D. Cravath, The First World War, and the Anglophile Internationalist Tradition,' *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 6:50 (2005), 194–215.

13 See Brian Etheridge, *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016). See also Sam Edwards, *Allies in Memory: World War II and the Politics of Transatlantic Commemoration, c.1941–2001* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

14 For the role of sentiment in Anglo-American relations, see Robert M. Hendershot, 'Manipulating an Anglo-American Civilizational Identity in the Era of Churchill,' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2012), 52–81.

15 David Woodward, *Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917–1918* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993), 220.

16 Bradford Perkins: *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); Edward P. Crapol, 'From Anglophobia to fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American Relations in the early Twentieth Century,'

in Hans-Jurgen Schroder (ed.), *Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900–1924* (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993), 13–32.

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18 Stuart Anderson, 'Racial Anglo-Saxonism and the American Response to the Boer War,' *Diplomatic History*, 2:3 (1978), 220.

19 Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Exceptionalism* (London: Harvard University Press, 1981); Anna Martellone, 'In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom, for Empire and For Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920,' in David K. Adams and Cornelius A. van Minnen (eds), *Reflections on American Exceptionalism* (Keele, UK: Keele University Press, 1994), 83–96; Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

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22 Martellone, 'In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom,' 84.

23 George Bancroft, *History of the United States of America, From the Discovery of the American Continent* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1854–78).

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26 Hugh A. Tulloch, *James Bryce's American Commonwealth: The Anglo-American Background* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1988), esp. 44–48.

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34   Wallace Bruce, *The Lincoln Monument in Memory of Scottish-American Soldiers, Unveiled in Edinburgh, August 21, 1893* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1893).

35   *Eastern Daily Press*, 16 October 1919.

36   Ron Chernow, *Washington: A Life* (London: Penguin, 2010), 3.

37   See the sustained debate involving various correspondents under the heading 'The Pedigree of George Washington': *The Times*, 29 August 1894 (p. 8), 31 August 1894 (p. 8), 8 September 1894 (p. 8), 13 September 1894 (p. 2), 22 September 1894 (p. 6), 4 October 1894 (p. 4), 15 October 1894 (p. 14), 24 October 1894 (p. 3), 29 October 1894 (p. 13).

38   See Sam Edwards, 'Warton, George Washington, and the Lancashire Roots of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, *c.*1880–1976,' 55:2 (2018), *Northern History*, 206–234.

39   Troy Bickham, 'Sympathizing with Sedition? George Washington, the British Press, and British Attitudes During the American War of Independence,' *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 59:1 (2002), 101.

40   *Ibid.*, 102–105; Eliga H. Gould, 'The American Revolution in Britain's Imperial Identity,' in Fred M. Leventhal and Roland Quinault (eds), *Anglo-American Attitudes: From Revolution to Partnership* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 23–37. See also National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, *1776: The British Story of the American Revolution* (London: Times Newspapers, 1976).

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42   Chernow, *Washington*, 9.

43   *Ibid.*, 5–9.

44   *Ibid.*, 71.

45   *Ibid.*, 105, 67–75.

46   Reginald C. McGrane, 'George Washington: An Anglo-American Hero,' *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 63:1 (1955), 8.

47   *Ibid.*, 9.

48   *The Times*, 8 February 1876, 7.

49   *The Times*, 13 February 1885, 7; William Gladstone, 'Kin Beyond Sea,' *North American Review*, CCLXIV (September–October 1878), 179–212.

50   SMA, 'Minutes of the Executive Committee, 21/2/12 to 17/10/18, 1st Meeting of the Executive Committee (British),' 21 February 1912.

51   SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 29 June 1914.

52   For the Chatham statue in Pittsburgh, see *ibid*. For the Burke statue, see Cullinane, '100 Years of Peace Among English-Speaking People.'

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54 *The Times*, 15 May 1918 (p. 7), 30 May 1918 (p. 7), 31 May 1918 (p. 9), 3 June 1918 (p. 9), 4 June 1918 (p. 9), 13 June 1918 (p. 9), 14 June 1918 (p. 5).

55 *The Times*, 23 February 1918, 5.

56 Jim Leeke, *Nine Innings for the King* (Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland, 2015).

57 Woodward, *Trial by Friendship*, 182.

58 *Punch*, 3 July 1918, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923'.

59 *Daily Chronicle*, 5 July 1918, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923'.

60 'Independence Day 1918', Churchill Archives, Cambridge, CHAR 9/56.

61 *The Times*, 24 February 1919, 6.

62 For a sense of Wilson's Anglophilia, see Andrew Wilson, *An American President's Love Affair with the English Lake District* (Windermere: The Lakeland Press Agency, 1996).

63 *The Times*, 1 May 1917, 7.

64 Bowman, *The Pilgrims Society and Public Diplomacy*, 135–140. See also Hendershot, 'Manipulating the Anglo-American Civilizational Identity', 64–70

65 *Journal of the Anglo-American Society and of the Sulgrave Institution*, 1 June 1919, 1

66 Edwards, 'From Here Lincoln Came', 22–46.

67 United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter NA), Works 20/123, 'R. Paget (on Behalf of Sir Edward Grey) to Secretary to the Office of Works', 24 June 1914.

68 Schwartz, *George Washington*, 125.

69 See various correspondence in NA, Works 20/123, esp. 'Buckingham Palace to Lionel Earle Esq. Secretary, Office of Works', 14 July 1914 and 'National Gallery to Lionel Earle Esq. Secretary, Office of Works', 15 July 1914. See also 'Governor H. C. Stuart, Commonwealth of Virginia, to Sir Cecil Spring Rice', 2 December 1914.

70 In fact, in 1948 the Washington Statue was relocated and a statue of James II added to provide 'balance'. In 1957, the statue of James II was then replaced by one of Sir Walter Raleigh, with those involved arguing it was fitting to have two statues with a Virginian connection in close proximity. See 'A. E. Coules to M. Cunliffe, 23 April 1960' and NA, T1/12570/21416.

71 NA, Works 20/123, 'Keeper of the National Gallery to First Commissioner of Works', 9 June 1920.

72 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to National Gallery', 11 June 1920.

73 SMA, '5th Meeting of the Executive Committee', 6 August 1912.

74 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to Lord Curzon', 12 June 1920.

75 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to Bradshaw', 3 May 1933.

76 *Ibid*.

77 NA, Works 20/123, 'National Gallery to Lionel Earle Esq. Secretary, Office of Works', 12 June 1920.

78 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to National Gallery', 24 June 1920.

79 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to Mr. Connolly', 30 July 1920.

80 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to Lord Curzon', 12 August 1920.

81 NA, Works 20/123, 'Secretary, Office of Works to First Commissioner', 13 August 1920.

82 *Ibid*. See also NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to National Gallery', 22 September 1920.

83 NA, Works 20/123, 'Customs and Excise Surveyor to Office of Works', 27 April 1921. See also NA, Works 20/123, 'Earl Curzon to Office of Works', 30 May 1921.

84 NA, Works 20/123, 'C. L. Hales to the Office of Works', 19 May 1921.

85 'Washington Not Wanted in Westminster Abbey,' *Literary Digest*, 28 March 1914, 689–690.

86 *Ibid.*

87 Peter Yearwood, 'A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations': Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 21:2 (2010), 159–174.

88 NA, Works 20/123, 'Office of Works to C.L. Hales,' 23 May 1921.

89 *Ibid.*

90 *Ibid.*

91 *The Times*, 1 July 1921, 13.

92 *Ibid.*

93 *Ibid.*

94 *Ibid.*

95 *Ibid.*

96 *The Times*, 30 May 1921, 12. See also *John O'London's Weekly*, 18 June 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.' Many thanks to Joseph Wisdom at St. Paul's Cathedral Library for his assistance in uncovering details about the bust of George Washington.

97 *Liverpool Echo*, 28 May 1921; *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, 25 May 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

98 *Westminster Gazette*, 30 May 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

99 *Liverpool Daily Post* and *Mercury*, 25 May 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

100 My thanks to Helen Clark, archivist at Sulgrave Manor, for all her assistance during the research for this chapter.

101 SMA, '4th Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 26 June 1912. See also Millicent May, 'An English Shrine for American Pilgrims: The Northamptonshire Homes of the Washington Family,' *Country Home*, February 1912, 221–226.

102 SMA, '5th Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 4 August 1912.

103 SMA, 'Report of the International Conference for the Consideration of the Commemoration of the First Century of Peace Between the United States and the British Empire,' held in New York, 5–10 May 1913.

104 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 19 November 1913. Purchase of Sulgrave Manor was completed in January 1914. SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 22 January 1914.

105 SMA, *British-American Peace Centenary (1814–1914)*, reprinted from *The Times*, 7 October 1913.

106 *Daily Graphic,* 23 February 1914; *Northampton Independent*, 16 August 1914, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

107 See SMA, *British-American Peace Centenary Committee: Secretary's Report Subsequent to the Commencement of the War* (April 1915).

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109 *Ibid.*

110 *Ibid.*, H. S. Perris, Secretary of the British-American Centenary Committee and of the Committee of Sulgrave Manor, 'The War as Viewed by a Liberal Englishman,' Lecture at Cornell University, 30 October 1917.

111 *Ibid.* See also Stephen Bowman, 'An Englishman Abroad and an American Lawyer in Europe: Harry Brittain, James Beck and the Pilgrims Society During the First World War,' *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12:3 (2014), 258–281.

112 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 17 May 1917.

113 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 11 June 1917.

114 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 17 October 1918.

115 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 14 April 1915. See also *National Society of the Colonial Dames of America: Its Beginnings, Its Purpose and a Record of its Work, 1891–1913* (Printed for the Society, 1913), 7.

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119 Morgan, *Women and Patriotism*, 1, 3.

120 *National Society of the Colonial Dames of America*, 13–23. See also Mrs. Joseph Rucker Lamar, *A History of the National Society of the Colonial Dames of America, from 1981 to 1933* (New York: Walter W. Brown, 1934).

121 Amy Kaplan, 'Manifest Domesticity,' *American Literature*, 70:3 (1998), 582.

122 Morgan, *Women and Patriotism*, 10.

123 *National Society of the Colonial Dames of America*, 7–13.

124 *Ibid.*

125 SMA, 'Meeting of the Executive Committee,' 16 July 1916.

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128 *Banbury Guardian*, 23 June 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.'

129 *Ibid.*

130 SMA, 'Mrs. Lamar, President of the National Society of Colonial Dames, Sulgrave Manor,' 25 July 1925.

131 *Ibid.*

132 *Sunday Times*, 26 July 1925, 9. See also *The Times*, 27 July 1925, 9.

133 *Ibid.*

134 *The Cabinet Maker*, 1921. Exact date unknown; *The Tatler*, 22 June 1921, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923.' A British women's committee was formed in July 1914 to support the purchase and dedication of the manor, but it later merged with the main executive. See SMA, 'Minutes of the Executive Committee, Meeting of Women's Committee,' 13 July 1914.

135 See, for example, *Manchester Courier*, 16 July 1887, 1; *St. James' Gazette*, 3 July 1903, 5.

136 *The Graphic*, 8 July 1922, SMA, SULGM 1583, 'Newspaper Clippings, 1914–1923'.

137 Woodward, *Trial by Friendship*, 220.

138 Yearwood, '"A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy,"' 159–174.

139 Muirhead, *American Shrines*, 83.

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142 SMA, SMBA1-F9/1–107, 'Correspondence Between BBC Midland Film Unit and Sulgrave Manor Board,' esp. May–July 1938. See also NA, FO371/26257.

143 At least two thousand US Servicemen visited the manor during the war. See *Chronicle and Echo*, 19 February 1945. See also SMA, SULGM1591, F8, 'Visit of USAAF Personnel'.

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145 H. C. Allen, *The Anglo-American Relationship Since 1783* (London: A & C Black, 1959); Frank Thistlethwaite, *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959); H. C. Allen and Roger Thompson, *Contrast and Connection: Bicentennial Essays in Anglo-American History* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1976); E. Underwood and J. Underwood, *America in England* (London: Frederick Muller, 1949).

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149 See 'Somerset to Mount Vernon and Back: The Opening of the Mount Vernon Garden at the American Museum,' *America in Britain* (Journal of the American Museum), 1:1 (1963), 5–8. My thanks to Cathryn Spence at the American Museum in Bath for providing information about the Mount Vernon Gardens.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN NARRATIVES IN PUBLIC SPACE

Evaluating commemoration and generational transmission of the special relationship

ROBERT M. HENDERSHOT

INTRODUCTION

Visitors to the furthest ends of North Carolina's Outer Banks, a popular tourist destination along the state's Atlantic coastline, will find local signs directing them to the area's British cemeteries. These small plots of land on the islands of Hatteras and Ocracoke contain the remains of six British sailors who died when their ships, the *Bedfordshire* and the *San Delfino*, were torpedoed by German forces while on anti-submarine duty along the US coastline in 1941 and 1942. The sailors' bodies washed ashore the islands' beaches and were buried by local villagers, but the gravesites became far more than memorials to individual lives. Though the cemetery on Ocracoke is maintained by the US Coast Guard and the cemetery on Hatteras is cared for by the National Park Service, local communities likewise commemorate the gravesites with memorial plaques, British and American flags, and annual ceremonies.[1] In this way, these British cemeteries serve as physical representations of a hegemonic narrative of the Anglo-American alliance that exists within collective memory, and it is in this context that government agencies and the public celebrate them.

Every year on the anniversary of the sinking of the *Bedfordshire*, representatives of the US Coast Guard and the British Royal Navy place wreaths on the graves, local citizens read the names of the dead aloud, 'Taps' is quietly sounded, and a twenty-one-gun salute honors the sacrifice of the British servicemen. The website of the local chamber of commerce notes that many locals and visitors attend this ceremony, 'standing quietly by and honouring the fallen heroes,' and implores future tourists to 'take a moment to visit the British cemeteries and pay respect to the sailors who fought for American freedom.'[2] Close inspection of the cross-shaped headstones in the

British cemeteries reveals that more than official commemoration takes place at these graves. Each marker is laden with carefully placed coins, seashells, stones, rosaries, and pieces of jewelry – individual tokens of respect left behind by a public acculturated to view Britain and its people in a specific cultural context. Significantly, it is no coincidence that the worldviews and public discourses that permeate such activities in the Outer Banks directly echo the official diplomatic rhetoric that British and American leaders have consistently employed to describe the Anglo-American special relationship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[3]

The monuments and associated services in Ocracoke and Hatteras are not unique; rather they fit a much broader pattern of Anglo-American memorials and commemorations on both sides of the Atlantic. When analyzed cumulatively, this pattern reveals the existence of a distinct Anglo-American identity as well as a version of history that depicts the British and Americans as, in a multitude of ways, one people. As the Anglo-American alliance intensified in the twentieth century, both nations experienced the proliferation of public building projects that were designed to venerate the shared history and values of the United Kingdom and the United States, celebrate Anglo-American cooperation, and cement perceptions of a collective culture and transatlantic community identity. As a result, both countries are replete with public spaces that reflect the perceptions and agendas of the builder generations and simultaneously entrench these same discourses within the worldviews of subsequent generations. Monuments, sculptures, plaques, churches, cemeteries, museums, tourism schemes, even celebrated pieces of furniture, reveal a dominant narrative of the special relationship embedded in the landscape of each nation – a story of two nations that, united through divine providence, remain natural partners and a force for freedom, democracy, and general good in the world.

The next brief section on theory places public space and memory in context and introduces the key concepts of generational transmission and an Anglo-American 'imagined community.' The following sections go on to analyze the diversity and messaging of Anglo-American places of memory, with particular attention given to the three interlinked spheres of public memorialization most consistently used to deploy the narrative: historical markers (including birthplaces and graves), public statues of historic figures, and churches. A final section further explores the relationship between government agendas and popular reception of the Anglo-American narrative. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that this specific narrative, though largely rooted in a constructed mythological version of history, has become physically as well as rhetorically ambient in both nations, and its influence and popularity have been important to preserving the Anglo-American special relationship.

A WORD ON THEORY: PLACES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN MEMORY

Within the broad arena of cultural history, the study of memory and commemoration has long been, as Alon Confino has noted, 'a fragmented field.'[4] And while this is not the place to delve deeply into the theoretical schools that have alternately inspired, divided, and bewildered academics, it is sufficient to note that the relationships between memory, society, space, and time have been well established, and that this chapter draws particularly upon several important ideas. Maurice Halbwachs, for example, firmly established the connection that exists between the cohesion of social groups and their collective (or public) memories. This link between identity and memory is an elemental concept here, as it has been in so many cultural studies.[5] John Bodnar's analysis of the relationship between collective memory and contemporary understanding is likewise key. Put succinctly, his work has established that collective memory is best understood not as the preservation of facts but rather as 'a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future.'[6] Finally, Pierre Nora's conception of monuments, gravesites, and so on as *places of memory* provides a methodological framework. Through analysis of the spaces and artifacts where, Nora argues, 'memory crystallizes and secretes itself,'[7] those interested in collective memory and its impact can gain a better understanding of societies' perceptions of the past and expectations for the future, as well as their perceptions of one another. In this way, the many statues, monuments, plaques, and graves cited in this chapter are not merely relics of past eras of the Anglo-American alliance. Rather, such places of memory are instrumental in the creation and preservation of a collective Anglo-American view of the special relationship. These places and their common narrative suture together American and British mentalities, at least as they relate to the nations' relationship, and sharing such a collective memory about the past fosters perceptions of Anglo-American connection and camaraderie through time.

It is further important to note that the use of public space to transmit historical narratives has multigenerational implications. As Einstein's theses and the philosophies of Kant and Heidegger have established, the concepts of physical space and time are fundamentally linked.[8] Monuments are ostensibly erected in public space to commemorate that which is behind us in time, in our collective past, but as the living can only engage such spaces in their present, they repetitively encounter the past over and over again. In this way, the lived experience of active repetition may be understood to shape what is continually before us as well. Jo Labanyi has described this function of memory – whereby the past continues to influence the present and the future – as 'generational transmission.'[9] When populations encounter and internalize collective memory via contact

with memorials, the Anglo-American narrative gains the power to influence subsequent generations, which in turn continue to transmit the narrative and, often, expand or reconsecrate older memorials as well as build new ones. It follows logically that those sharing this collective memory would likewise share an expectation of continued Anglo-American unity in the future. As Sam Edwards has noted in his groundbreaking work on various American war memorials, cemeteries, and statues in England, such acts of commemoration provide 'invaluable forums in which to call for, perform and *imagine* Anglo-American unity.'[10]

This power of collective memory to forge a layer of shared identity is likewise well established. As Eric Hobsbawm has explained, shared perceptions of history and communal ceremonies became essential to the creation of national cohesion in the nineteenth century, and in this way the 'invention of traditions' was key to the creation of modern states.[11] In their corollaries to Hobsbawm's thesis, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson demonstrated that the construction of popular notions of 'imagined community' was the most important aspect of nation-building throughout the last two hundred years.[12] These arguments have long been foundational for scholars of public memory and memorialization. John Gillis, for example, defined national memory as something 'shared by people who have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard themselves as having a common history,'[13] and Nuala Johnson has explored the ways that memorials and statues, which give universality, longevity, and validity to a particular worldview, reveal the ways 'in which national "imagined communities" are built.'[14] Each of these important works have focused on the ways in which nations and nationalisms are constructed, but their theses may also be extrapolated upon in order to shed light on the Anglo-American relationship, which is similarly constructed on the basis of an 'imagined community,' though a transatlantic rather than a national one.

The British and American governments, increasingly committed to perpetuating US–UK friendship since the late nineteenth century, have served as the primary agents responsible for the construction of this imagined community as well as many of the places of memory that help give it life. Drawn to the use of public space as a function of cultural diplomacy, both governments sought to secure their relationship by memorializing the idea that Britain and America are natural allies, sharing one history and one common set of values, who sacrifice together and ultimately achieve strength and safety together. This was important work because, as Marcel Proust wrote most eloquently, 'Remembrance of things past is not necessarily the remembrance of things as they were.'[15] Indeed, the idea of smooth, intimate, fruitful, friendly, and equal cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom has been more sentimental myth than historical reality. But the work was done well; places of memory communicating the Anglo-American narrative have helped

inspire notions of a transatlantic imagined community for generations and form an important part of why the special relationship has been characterized by impressive resilience in both Britain and America.[16]

However, just as memory itself cannot be reduced to mere political or strategic concerns,[17] the generational transmission of this narrative yields more than important insights into government agendas. The issue of popular reception has been described as 'that ogre that awaits every cultural historian,'[18] but evidence of the Anglo-American narrative's reception is indeed detectable in the historical record. As demonstrated in what follows, the British and American populations have largely internalized government discourses, and local communities, businesses, and individuals often enact them independently of government influence and propagate the Anglo-American narrative in yet more public spaces. Also revealing of the prevalent acceptance of this narrative is that, in an era of growing public protest and debate over which historical themes and individuals are worthy of commemoration,[19] Anglo-American memorials have remained largely uncontroversial.

Significantly, a plethora of places of memory in both the United Kingdom and the United States testify to the existence of a transatlantic imagined community reinforced via generational transmission. The nations' memorials also markedly mirror one another's purposes and themes, effectively magnifying the cultural reverberation of their message. Thus to appreciate fully the encompassing nature of the Anglo-American narrative and community identity constructed in public spaces, it is not sufficient to examine two or three examples. Here Aby Warburg's mode of considering the 'full spectrum of artifacts' in order to draw contextualized conclusions is highly instructive.[20] Only through broadening our scope can the transatlantic nature and multigenerational influence of this narrative become clear.

HISTORICAL MARKERS: ANGLO-AMERICAN NARRATIVES IN PUBLIC SPACE

Throughout the United States and the United Kingdom, hundreds of historical markers referencing Anglo-American connections form both the most heterogeneous and the most geographically dispersed form of commemoration analyzed in this chapter. Whether placed to commemorate and emphasize notable moments of the shared Anglo-American past or to honor the lives of individuals, these markers tend to reflect the dominant diplomatic discourse at the time of their placement and frequently symbolize deliberate efforts to shape the public narrative surrounding the historical relationship in both countries.

The *Mayflower* memorial markers at the harbor of Plymouth, England, provide an excellent example of these dynamics as their evolution was directly correlated

with major developments in the nations' diplomatic relationship. Significantly, the spot of the Pilgrims' famous 1620 departure for America was not commemorated until 1891, a period in which both strategic convenience and the popularity of racialized Anglo-Saxonism were nudging Britain and the United States toward the cordial diplomatic realignment that Bradford Perkins labeled the Great Rapprochement.[21] In this period of burgeoning Anglo-American friendship, the city of Plymouth dedicated both a memorial stone inscribed 'Mayflower 1620' and a corresponding plaque reading: 'On the 6th of September 1620 in the Mayoralty of Thomas Fownes, after being "kindly entertained and courteously used by divers Friends there dwelling," the Pilgrim Fathers sailed from Plymouth in the *Mayflower*, in the Providence of God, to settle in NEW PLYMOUTH, and to lay the Foundation of the NEW ENGLAND STATES.'[22] This late-nineteenth-century memorial made no reference to the religious persecution that the English Calvinists had been fleeing in 1620 and instead portrayed a much warmer, contemporary, and diplomatically convenient story of Anglo-American connection, emphasizing kindness, friendship, and the 'Providence of God' that united Plymouth with communities bearing English names across the Atlantic.

The physical expansion of the *Mayflower* memorial in subsequent generations was similarly correlated with later developments in Anglo-American relations. During and after their alliance in the First World War, various British leaders regularly expressed their belief that Anglo-American camaraderie would be of tactical advantage to the United Kingdom in the future.[23] Winston Churchill, for example, was among the most vociferous on this point and argued that the 'comradeship and reconciliation' of the United States with Britain would likely form 'the mainstay of the future of the world' in the postwar period.[24] In 1934, as tensions rose in Europe and the British government began to place ever-greater value on American friendship, the city of Plymouth erected a larger monument at the site of its 1891 memorial. Exhibiting the connection between historical commemoration and contemporary diplomacy, the city was keen to have Rollin Winslow, the US consul and a descendant of one of the original Pilgrims, present at its unveiling.[25] The expanded memorial's design also enhanced the narrative of Anglo-American connection; its canopy of Portland stone incorporated four Doric columns, creating an obvious visual similarity between the Plymouth memorial and the larger American portico that had been built in 1920 at Plymouth Rock, Massachusetts, to mark the *Mayflower*'s original American landing place.[26]

During the Cold War, as their shared history and culture were routinely lauded by Anglo-American leaders as the bedrock of the special relationship, more historical markers were placed around the portico in Plymouth. US ambassador to Britain, Walter Annenberg, unveiled a new plaque at the site in 1970 to mark the 350th anniversary of the sailing of the *Mayflower* and the state of North Carolina dedicated yet another plaque at the site in 1984 to mark the

400th anniversary of Sir Walter Raleigh's North American colonies. Further cementing the association between the nation's bilateral relationship and the historic spot, flagpoles were installed on either side of the *Mayflower* memorial to display the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes on equal level.[27] In sum, the historical markers that have spread around the original 1891 memorial at Plymouth represent a century of Anglo-American commemoration and exemplify the multigenerational transmission and reinforcement of a narrative that celebrates the shared heritage of an Anglo-American community.

London's famous blue plaques exhibit a similar pattern and provide an instructive example of how the narrative of Anglo-American intimacy emerges through long-term and geographically dispersed public commemoration schemes as well. Over 920 blue plaques, which commemorate significant individuals on the exterior of the London buildings in which they once lived, have been installed in the greater metropolitan area since the program was initiated over 150 years ago. Liberal MP William Ewart first proposed the idea in the House of Commons in 1863, which fitted the general liberal democratic principle of using public funds and commemoration for educational purposes.[28] The first four blue plaques, chosen by a new government committee and unveiled in 1866, adorned the former London homes of Lord Byron, Lord Nelson, Sir Joshua Reynolds, and Benjamin Franklin, who was chosen for this honor less than a hundred years after he had lived in London as US ambassador and a full generation before the Great Rapprochement.[29] This commemoration of Franklin, the first foreigner to receive a blue plaque, was a portent of things to come.

While the blue plaques would represent other national populations in time as well, American honorees have appeared more frequently throughout the city, inspiring *The Guardian*'s Kathryn Hughes to remark upon the 'plenty of resident Americans' who have been so honored throughout the life of the program.[30] In addition to their disproportionate representation, the diversity of Americans commemorated in blue plaques serves to emphasize the wide array of cultural and historical connections between the British and American populations. Indeed, an afternoon walk through modern London could easily take one past the plaques of American political giants (such as John F. Kennedy), activists (Frederick Douglass), journalists (Edward R. Murrow), writers (Mark Twain), actresses (Ava Gardner), and musicians (Jimi Hendrix).[31]

While the London blue plaque program has recently come under increased criticism for its underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities,[32] the scheme's public representation of Anglo-American cultural intimacy has remained uncontroversial. Indeed, Britons and Americans have remained attentive to the historical narrative embedded within these markers, and even a small deviation from the expected Anglo-American narrative has been enough to attract diplomatic and media attention. In 2014, the American Ambassador

to Britain, Matthew Barzun, noticed an unofficial blue plaque on a London townhouse near the US Embassy commemorating Benedict Arnold as an 'American patriot.' The ambassador publicly expressed both amusement and curiosity about this description of a man normally vilified as a traitor to the American Revolution: 'I think it's important to the health of a living, breathing partnership between the UK and the US that we don't paper over the cracks in our common history. The more authentically we regard it, the more we can both appreciate the unique nature of our special relationship.'[33] *NBC News* took up Barzun's challenge to explain the existence of this unofficial marker and the sentiments behind it, and ultimately identified its creator. British citizen Peter Arnold had erected the plaque in 1987 because of his belief that Benedict Arnold, his distant ancestor, had been treated unfairly by history: 'His heart was in America and he felt that what he was doing was in the interest of America as a country and the people who lived there. And at the end of the day he didn't think we should be divorced from England and the king.'[34]

It is noteworthy that reinterpreting Benedict Arnold's life as a way of emphasizing Anglo-American linkage has been neither an isolated occurrence nor an exclusively British phenomenon. Arnold's grave at St. Mary's Church in Battersea, for example, has been marked by Americans with similar motives multiple times. An elaborate stained-glass tribute to Arnold was donated to the church by American Vincent Lindner during the 1976 US bicentennial and former Connecticut state senator Bill Stanley erected a new 160-pound head-stone at the grave in 2004. Stanley had been impressed with Arnold's years of victorious service in the Revolutionary Army before his famous duplicity and felt that he had 'saved America, before he betrayed it,' and so it was only appropriate that a new headstone commemorate Arnold as an Anglo-American soldier whose life foreshadowed the eventual special relationship: 'The Two Nations Whom He Served in Turn in the Years of Their Enmity Have United in Enduring Friendship.'[35] When he was informed of the reasoning behind Arnold's unofficial blue plaque and these related commemorations, Ambassador Barzun told the media that he was happy to see history being debated, marveled that 'We did really used to be enemies,' and seized the opportunity to praise contemporary Anglo-American partnership: 'Now look at the work we're doing … We're working together on what to do about what's happening in Ukraine, and what's happening in Syria. And we're doing it US–UK, shoulder-to-shoulder.'[36] As indicated by the example of Benedict Arnold's shifting role in historical commemorations of US–UK relations, the modern narrative of Anglo-American unity has proven sufficiently powerful to subsume older narratives of Anglo-American enmity within its purview.

A similar phenomenon has characterized the cultural role of historical markers in the United States, where reminders of America's colonial past can be found throughout the country. Hundreds of American communities

large and small borrow their names from British communities – there are, for example, twenty-three US cities called Manchester and eighteen called Plymouth alone[37] – but Americans live among other more specific reminders of their shared history with the British as well. Most US states' historical marker programs reference the United Kingdom and British people more regularly than any other European country.[38] Even in states such as Florida, where one might reasonably expect more attention to be paid to the region's historical relationship with Spain, British connections are emphasized along the state's 'British Heritage Trail.' Equally notable are the associated guidebooks published by the state's Division of Historical Resources; although Spain ruled Florida for 250 years and Britain for only 20, the state's guidebook for its 'British Heritage Trail' is considerably longer and more detailed than the guidebook for its 'Spanish Heritage Trail.'[39]

Of course, many of the state historical markers found throughout the United States logically relate to the era of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, but a public narrative emphasizing the nations' past hostility has been subsequently diluted by their later cooperation and the memorial building of more recent generations. As international tensions rose during the 1930s and America's need for reliable allies became increasingly apparent, public commemorations emphasizing Anglo-American peace and friendship rather than conflict became increasingly common. For example, during this period public spaces in Washington, DC and Old Fort Niagara, New York received new historical markers commemorating the Rush–Bagot Agreement of 1818, which resolved earlier Anglo-American tensions and demilitarized the Great Lakes shared by the United States and the British Dominion of Canada.[40] As Anglo-American themes of friendship and shared culture continued to dominate memorial building throughout the twentieth century, the Anglo-American conflicts of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries ceased to be a problematic part of the Anglo-American past. In the era of the special relationship, memory of past Anglo-American conflicts may emphasize shared historical experience but do little to inflame old hatreds. Indeed, as quaint, unthreatening, and even amusing anecdotes, references to the conflicts of their distant past have been routinely employed as humorous icebreakers at even the highest level of diplomatic functions. When British prime minister David Cameron visited the White House in 2012, President Barack Obama was able to make a joke out of the fact that the British Army had burned down the building in 1814, noting that Cameron's countrymen had been there before and had once 'really lit the place up.'[41]

Perceptions of shared historical experience have also been reflected in public markers that note the birthplaces and ancestral origins of significant individuals related to British and American history. As with the other examples discussed above, these too have proliferated as Anglo-American friendship

intensified in the twentieth century. To list but a few examples, the birthplace of Thomas Paine was marked in Thetford, Norfolk in 1909, the estate of George Washington's English ancestors was commemorated in Northamptonshire in 1921, the childhood home of Jennie Jerome (later Lady Randolph Churchill) in Brooklyn, NY, received a bronze plaque in 1952, and the birthplace of American naval hero John Paul Jones was honored at Arbigland, Scotland in 1953.[42] Rather than emphasizing the violence of past conflicts, public celebration of such birthplaces serves to emphasize perceptions of a united transatlantic community and the interconnected roots of both societies.

In a similar vein, cemeteries, as memorials to death rather than birth, may have even greater power to maintain perceptions of an Anglo-American imagined community in the present as well as to inspire future partnership. There is a large body of scholarship that explores the political lives of dead bodies, particularly of those who died in the service of their nations during wartime.[43] Such gravesites not only allow societies to commemorate their past, but also to glorify the societal ideals of patriotism and national sacrifice. As Diane Barthel has explained, 'Sacrifice is an important concept and considered crucial to a nation's survival … Commemoration serves to encourage future acts of sacrifice, as it promises the would-be heroes that they will not die in vain and that they will be remembered by future generations.'[44] Yet when a nation's war dead are buried and honored in another nation, as in the case of the British cemeteries of North Carolina and American military cemeteries in Britain, the veneration of soldiers' graves serves to stoke more than mere nationalism – it also promotes the idea that sacrifice for one nation was and is a sacrifice for both. As Edwards has argued in his analyses of the American military cemeteries in England as well as the hundreds of American memorials in East Anglia, 'allies in war became allies in memory.'[45] Indeed, the message of conjoined transatlantic identity is not only implied by the location of such cemeteries in one another's nations; it is literally carved in stone. For example, the Cambridge American Military Cemetery, which holds the remains of over 3,800 Americans who died during the Second World War, features multiple messages designed to inspire future generations of visitors to honor the sacrifice and uphold the values of their allies. The base of the cemetery's 72 ft. tall flagpole is inscribed with a line from John McCrae's poem 'In Flanders Fields': 'To you from failing hands we throw the torch – be yours to hold it high,' and the 472 ft. long Wall of the Missing, which records the names of over five thousand servicemen whose bodies were never recovered, bears the following monumental inscription: 'All who shall hereafter live in freedom will be here reminded that to these men and their comrades we owe a debt to be paid with grateful remembrance of their sacrifice and with the high resolve that the cause for which they died shall live eternally.'[46]

As the living generations of Americans and Britons continue to encounter such narratives of mutual sacrifice and Anglo-American camaraderie in a multitude of public spaces, the worldviews and goals of the builder generations achieve cultural reverberation in the present. In turn, this generational transmission of collective memory contributes to both the continuing perceived validity of an Anglo-American imagined community and commitment to the special relationship. The new 4,000 sq. ft. visitor center installed by the US government at its Cambridge cemetery in 2014 exemplifies this ongoing process. Through its 'interpretive exhibits that incorporate personal histories, photographs, films, and interactive displays,' the center employs modern museum technology to perpetuate the classic historical narrative of the Anglo-American alliance, leading visitors to 'gain a better understanding of the British–American partnership that contributed to the Allied victory in Europe in World War II.'[47]

PUBLIC STATUARY: MUTUAL EXCHANGE AND APPROPRIATION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN ICONS

Among the more distinctive trends in the history of Anglo-American commemoration is the mutual ability of the United States and the United Kingdom to claim one another's national heroes for themselves and to use the images of such foreign individuals to promote civic consciousness and facilitate political education, without controversy, within their respective national contexts. In this way, the numerous statues of Americans, such as Abraham Lincoln, in Britain and statues of Britons, such as Winston Churchill, in the United States provide evidence of a distinctive cultural intimacy between these two allied nations. In addition, the presence of statues honoring one another's historical icons in public spaces has added another layer of narrative in the story of Anglo-American unity, for if the honored heroes of one people's past are the same as those of another, the message conveyed is that their history and values are essentially the same. When such elements of national and cultural identity become more closely aligned, two distinct peoples can more easily perceive one another as members of one larger community.

British statues of Lincoln, for example, form a useful case study of this pattern. In 1892, as racial Anglo-Saxonism reached its zenith and the nations' diplomatic rapprochement began to accelerate, Edinburgh became the first city in the United Kingdom to honor the former US president in this way.[48] However, Lincoln continued to be a popular subject for public commemoration in the United Kingdom in the early twentieth century – additional statues and other memorials to Lincoln were erected in Manchester and at his ancestral family home in Norfolk in 1919 and in London in 1920. Observing the prevalence of this trend, George Bernard Shaw remarked upon the apparent 'cult'

of Abraham Lincoln that thrived in the United Kingdom during the interwar period and that emphasized Lincoln's descent from British stock.[49]

Lincoln's statue in Parliament Square was the first monument erected there for a leader with no direct connection to Britain. Yet its location in the heart of the British capital, standing adjacent to Westminster Abbey and directly facing the Houses of Parliament, has always told a story of American history and values being thoroughly enmeshed with British history and culture. Lord Bryce emphasized this point in his speech at the statue's 1920 dedication, theatrically turning to Elihu Root, the leading American representative at the event, and proclaiming, 'He is ours, sir, almost as much as he is yours!'[50] Interwar British efforts to Anglicize Lincoln by laying claim to his values as well as his genealogical roots served, as Adam I. P. Smith has written, as 'a way of "domesticating" the larger meaning of "America"' and thus providing the comfortable 'reassurance that the rising power of the United States was an extension, not a threat, to British cultural and political power.'[51]

In a classic example of how historical commemorations of one generation influence their successors, the statue of Lincoln in Parliament Square took on renewed meaning during the Second World War. Though still conveying its general story of Anglo-American connection, Lincoln also became a contemporary symbol of joint Anglo-American resistance to tyranny.[52] During the war, all the statues of Parliament Square were removed for their safety except for those of Lincoln and Oliver Cromwell, which the British government considered the most powerful representations of democracy and resistance to totalitarianism. Significantly, neither statue was damaged during the war, and as Smith has stated, 'Like the miraculous survival of St Paul's Cathedral when all around it was in flames, the symbolism did not go unnoticed.'[53]

The postwar period witnessed a wave of Anglo-American commemoration in the United Kingdom, as well as the creation of new statues dedicated to American leaders. Just as Lincoln had served as a symbol of the Anglo-American alliance during the war, Franklin Roosevelt's statue, placed outside the US Embassy in London's Grosvenor Square in 1948, would play a similar role as the Cold War began. Though the Pilgrims of Great Britain handled planning for the statue, the British public paid for its cost. Despite the nation's postwar economic exhaustion and the continuation of rationing, 160,000 people contributed five shillings each in less than a week of fundraising – a remarkable demonstration of popular investment in the narrative of Anglo-American unity. The statue's dedication was likewise embraced as a dramatic opportunity to enact the special relationship for a public audience. Eleanor Roosevelt, accompanied by King George VI as well as by Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill, unveiled the statue as news films declared that the square, which had served as a nexus of allied cooperation during the war, would 'remain a corner of Britain that was forever American.'[54]

Subsequent generations would continue to use Roosevelt's image in this way even as the nature of the diplomatic relationship changed again after the Cold War ended. For example, despite the Clinton Administration's interest in shifting the focus of US foreign policy away from the Atlantic and towards Asia and the Middle East, and the associated British fears of reduced influence with the Americans,[55] public statuary continued to promote the classic narrative of Anglo-American unity. *Allies*, a new life-size statue of Roosevelt and Churchill, was unveiled by Princess Margaret in London's Bond Street on the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in Europe (VE) Day in 1995. Depicting the historical icons chatting happily while seated on a city bench, with just enough room between them for a person to sit, the statue effectively encourages the living to insert themselves literally into its historical narrative. British-American sculptor Lawrence Holofcener specifically desired to convey Anglo-American intimacy with this artwork,[56] and Roosevelt's relationship with the British continued to serve as a powerful symbol of the special relationship for his contemporary audience. Indeed, the emotional message of *Allies* was not unique in this period of transition, and despite the complexities of international relations, diplomatic rhetoric continued to extol the same version of history. When President Clinton was in Britain for the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day, he invoked the popular narrative of Anglo-American wartime closeness: 'At every level, Yanks and Brits worked together like a family.'[57] The new statue in Bond Street, as a physical manifestation of these sentiments, quickly became a popular tourist attraction. When *Allies* was renovated and rededicated in 2017, Robert Davis, the city government's cabinet member for business, culture, and heritage, offered a frank assessment of the artwork's role as well as of its continuing popularity with twenty-first-century tourists: 'Good public art should be meaningful and engaging. Lawrence Holofcener's statue is an important symbol of our friendship with our friends in the United States while offering today's visitors a great opportunity for a selfie.'[58]

Just as Britain appropriated American leaders like Lincoln and Roosevelt, the United States freely adopted the image of Churchill in similar fashion. From the end of the Second World War until his death in 1965, Gallup polling consistently revealed that Churchill was the most admired foreign person among Americans. Furthermore, American affinity for Winston Churchill remained statistically correlated with American preference for Britain in general, revealing the extent to which Churchill had become a personification of the special relationship and an enduring icon of Anglo-American partnership.[59] On 9 April 1963, President Kennedy, with specific authorization from both houses of Congress, officially branded the British icon as an 'honorary American citizen' and explained that this was merely 'a formal recognition of the place he has long since won in the history of freedom and in the affections of my – and now his – fellow countrymen.' Significantly, Churchill was the

first person ever to be honored by the Americans in this way.[60] Following his death in 1965, his continuing popularity in the United States led to widespread commemorations – in the form of statues, busts, plaques, and portraits – which overtly stressed his connections to the United States and the special relationship. For example, the Smithsonian began displaying its Churchill statue in 1966 and the same year witnessed the erection of another Churchill bronze at the edge of the British Embassy in Washington. With one foot on British soil (figuratively and literally, as some was imported for this purpose) and another on US soil, the statue waves the iconic 'V for Victory' gesture toward the traffic on Massachusetts Avenue.[61] In testament to the builders' intention that their memorial would have a role to play in the future, beneath the statue is a time capsule, placed by the English Speaking Union, to be opened on the centenary of Churchill's American citizenship in 2063.[62]

In the same time period, Fulton, Missouri, the site of Churchill's famous 1946 Iron Curtain speech, became home to several statues of Churchill as well as America's National Churchill Museum and Memorial. Visited by between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand people each year, the museum presents an overwhelmingly positive narrative of the British statesman, emphasizing his role in the Second World War and his firm stance against communism at the start of the Cold War.[63] Former president Harry Truman turned the first shovelful of dirt at the groundbreaking ceremony, and subsequent presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson supported the memorial and served on its board as well.[64] In 2009, the US Congress issued a resolution granting the museum its national status, and commended 'its efforts to recognize the importance of the historic legacy of Sir Winston Churchill and to educate the people of the United States about his legacy of character, leadership, and citizenship.'[65] This flattering memorial may be viewed as a microcosm of America's historical relationship with Churchill, remembering him exactly as he would have wished to be remembered by Americans – a triumphant symbol of Anglo-American connection and victory. As long as Americans memorialize Churchill in this way, without complexity, securely within his wartime context, and certainly not as the aristocratic politician who once called for the sterilization of the poor or as the pro-empire stalwart who stood against Irish and Indian freedoms, the special relationship is made more secure than it otherwise would be. Strongly indicating the continuing political potency of the special relationship and the memory of Churchill in the United States, his memorial in Fulton remains a routine stop for politicians on the campaign trail during national elections.[66]

The British government was pleased as American communities continued to build statues to Churchill in the postwar period. Seeing diplomatic value in America's appropriation of and affinity for the former prime minister, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as well as embassy and

consular officers regularly did whatever they could to assist. For example, when the people of Kansas City unveiled their statue of Churchill and his wife in 1984, FCO staffers were convinced that the artwork, *Tribute to Married Love* by Oscar Nemon, 'will be for many generations to come a great source of pride to Kansas Citians and a substantial token of Anglo-American friendship.'[67] To help promote the narrative of enduring Anglo-American unity, the FCO arranged to have members of the Churchill family at the dedication as well as a special message read from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: 'It is entirely appropriate that this memorial should be set up in the very heart of the United States … This statue, made possible by the generosity of the citizens of Kansas City, will be a reminder of the enduring friendship between the British and American people to which Sir Winston Churchill himself devoted so much effort during his own lifetime.'[68]

CHURCHES: BUILDING DEVOTION TO AN ANGLO-AMERICAN NARRATIVE

Shared religious culture and biblical imagery have regularly served as diplomatic tools to underscore Anglo-American similarities as well as to conjure a poetic sense of destiny for an alliance preordained by a higher power. Even before America's entry into the Second World War, the Religious Division of Britain's Ministry of Information had begun securing support for Britain's war effort from Christian groups in the United States.[69] Churchill, likewise, used religion to bolster his relationship with Roosevelt during their famous Atlantic Conference in August of 1941. The prime minister personally selected the hymns and Bible readings for the joint Anglo-American church service aboard HMS *Prince of Wales*, designing the service to, as Jon Meacham has written, work 'a kind of magic, which is one of the points of liturgy and theater: to use the dramatic to convince people of a reality they cannot see.' The Americans and the British sang 'Onward, Christian Soldiers' and listened to a reading from the Book of Joshua: 'As I was with Moses, so will I be with thee: I will not fail thee, nor forsake thee.' After the service, Roosevelt called it the 'keynote' of the meeting and told his son Elliot, 'If nothing else had happened while we were here, that alone would have cemented us.'[70]

Publicly lauding a shared religious tradition likewise served as a key way of emphasizing Anglo-American familiarity as well as contrasting their shared culture with the secular ideologies of both fascism and communism. President Harry Truman and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, for example, initiated a trend in Cold War propaganda as they worked together to present containment of the Soviet Union as a crusade to save Christianity from atheism.[71] Given the

historical influence of religious co-identity within the special relationship, it is perhaps unsurprising that churches in Britain and America have often been used to legitimize the narrative of Anglo-American unity. By bringing other aspects of commemoration, such as graves, statues, and historical markers, together within the tapestry of shared religious culture, the cumulative effect is amplified.

In Fulton, for example, the Churchill statues and museum are found beneath the Church of St. Mary Aldermanbury. Built by Sir Christopher Wren in 1677, the church was bombed in London during the Blitz and, beginning in 1964, moved brick by brick to Missouri to serve as a monument to Churchill and the special relationship.[72] Significantly, the church had no direct connection to Churchill before it was moved, but its modern placement at America's National Churchill Museum has united American commemoration of the man with the Anglo-American narrative of shared history and culture. The Wren church is conspicuous in the Midwestern United States, with its steeple towering over the other local buildings, and tells a clear story of British history and culture embedded in the center of America.

In the US capital, the Washington National Cathedral is a similar example of a religious structure that also preserves a specific narrative about Anglo-American relations. Though technically an Episcopal church, the building was always intended to be a 'house of prayer for all people' and a 'spiritual home for the nation.'[73] Since its construction began in 1907, the cathedral has successfully become both a potent national symbol as well as a symbol of historical and cultural links between the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, the building's planners made the conscious decision to base the gothic design of the National Cathedral on Westminster Abbey, and its role was likewise intended to be similar – as a national shrine and a stage for the expression of collective emotions, such as celebrations for national triumphs or communal mourning for the deaths of significant American leaders.[74] Though full of symbolic stones from many nations, there are many more from the United Kingdom than anywhere else. These pieces of British history and culture are also more prominently displayed within the church, such as the stone from St. David's Cathedral in Wales, the stone cathedra from Glastonbury Abbey, and the Canterbury Pulpit, made with stones from Canterbury Cathedral.[75]

It took over eighty years to complete construction of the cathedral, and consequently the building offers considerable evidence of generational transmission as the structure's implicit Anglo-American narrative grew over time. For example, during Queen Elizabeth II's state visit in July 1976, she and President Gerald Ford attended services at the National Cathedral to help install yet another American commemoration of Churchill. During the ceremony, workmen lowered a one thousand-year-old stone, this time from Westminster Abbey, into the building's new 'Churchill porch' as Reverend Francis Sayre

waxed poetic about the special relationship: 'We put that English stone in yon western entrance which is our tribute and memorial to Sir Winston Churchill, who in the blood of his parentage was rooted on either side of the sea and whose dauntless defense of liberty was our glory and our salvation on both sides of the Atlantic.'[76] Bagpipers of the Scottish Black Watch and a crowd of ten thousand were on hand to join in singing Churchill's favorite American song, 'The Battle Hymn of the Republic,' at the culmination of the dedication. Afterwards, thousands of onlookers cheered as President Ford led Queen Elizabeth down the front steps of the church.[77] By incorporating a specific memorial to Churchill, the National Cathedral has enshrined a narrative not only of Anglo-American cultural connection, but of the special relationship as well.

Churches in Britain have done the same. In London's St. Paul's Cathedral, for example, the American Memorial Chapel is located in the chancel, just behind the High Altar. After that section of the Cathedral was bombed during the Blitz, it was rebuilt beginning in 1945 as a memorial to the 28,000 Americans who died while stationed in the United Kingdom during the war. Like the postwar statue of Roosevelt in Grosvenor Square, the American Memorial Chapel was funded by millions of Britons who responded to the invitation to contribute 'their pennies, their sixpences or their pounds' to the project.[78] All aspects of the chapel's design would pay homage to the United States – its wood and metalwork, its stained glass incorporating American plants and animals, the individual symbols of the fifty US states – and at the center of the chapel a five hundred-page book listing the names of the dead.[79] The chapel was officially dedicated in 1958, only two years after the Suez Crisis had created a temporary rift in US–UK relations, 'a clear attempt,' as Edwards has argued, 'to bolster and celebrate the much vaunted special relationship.'[80] Indeed, the new chapel would soon figure prominently in diplomatic pageantry as the allies attempted to put Suez behind them. On his first trip to Britain since the debacle in Egypt, in August 1959 President Eisenhower attended a ceremony at St. Paul's with Prime Minister Macmillan to recognize officially the American memorial. Despite the recent tensions that had plagued the diplomatic partnership, belief in the special relationship remained strong in Britain and thousands turned out to participate in the event, which surprised both the president and the prime minster.[81] Recalling the journey to the ceremony in his memoirs, Macmillan noted that 'the crowds were so great that we changed into an open car' to make the most of the wonderful public relations (PR) opportunity.[82]

St. Paul's, of course, is hardly the only church in Britain with chapels or windows dedicated to American servicemen – there are scores of churches in East Anglia that commemorate the US 8th Air Force[83] – but Westminster Abbey may be the best example of a religious structure in either nation that sanctifies the narratives of Anglo-American cultural intimacy and friendship.

Steven Petersheim has written that 'Westminster Abbey has served for centuries as a historical site of distinctly national concerns and broad cultural implications.'[84] Yet within the iconic structure, which is a quintessential monument to British history, government, faith, and artistic genius, the subject of Anglo-American intimacy is also given prominent space. Among all the monuments and memorials that adorn the cathedral, the United States and its people are commemorated far more than the citizens of other foreign countries.[85] Moreover, the prominence of the Anglo-American narrative must also be noted. For example, Poets' Corner in the south transept is famous for its memorials to authors who have made distinctive contributions to British culture, and memorials to prized American writers are included here as well. Since 1884, a life-size marble bust of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, perhaps best remembered for his poem about the American Revolution, 'Paul Revere's Ride,' rests on a pillar placed by his 'English admirers' near Geoffrey Chaucer's tomb. In the twentieth century, Henry James and T. S. Eliot were likewise honored with memorial slabs embedded among those of native doyens of British literature such as Lewis Carroll and Alfred Lord Tennyson.[86]

Beyond representations of interlinked Anglo-American culture, overt symbols of the nations' historical alliance are displayed in the Abbey as well. Just inside the western entrance of the nave, the British Unknown Warrior's US Congressional Medal of Honor has been displayed on a pillar near his black marble tomb since 1921, when General John Pershing presented it with special permission from the US Congress.[87] Significantly, this was the first time the US government conferred its highest military honor on a foreign soldier, an act that inspired King George V to reciprocate diplomatically with a similar first, awarding the Victoria Cross to the American Unknown Soldier the following month.[88] By posting the American medal near the Warrior's tomb, which serves as a memorial to the one million Britons who lost their lives in the Great War, the Abbey effectively added another layer of historical narrative to hallowed ground, merging a story of British patriotism and sacrifice with one of Anglo-American cooperation and mutual respect.

As in the Washington National Cathedral, the process of generational transmission has expanded the Anglo-American narrative within Westminster Abbey over time. In 1948 a stone tablet honoring Franklin Roosevelt as a 'faithful friend of freedom and of Britain' was erected by the British government on the west wall of the nave, not far from the Unknown Warrior's tomb. This was the first time the Abbey had ever commemorated the head of state of a foreign nation, and Churchill and Attlee worked together to fast-track this breach of precedent, each keen to help perpetuate a narrative of Anglo-American alliance and friendship in the postwar period. As Attlee said at the dedication, 'in this ancient shrine wherein so many famous men … have been laid to rest, we are setting on record the gratitude and admiration which the

British people feel for the man who was their trusted friend in their time of need.'[89]

As a holy site featuring the combined narratives of Anglo-American sacrifice and friendship, the west end of the Cathedral has been the location of continuing diplomatic ritualization of the special relationship for more recent generations as well. During a 2011 visit to Britain, for example, President Obama made a special visit to the Abbey to lay a wreath on the Unknown Warrior's grave,[90] and in 2013 the US Congressional Medal of Honor Society (CMHS) bestowed its flag on the Unknown Warrior. As a result, the Abbey once again expanded its exhibition of unique Anglo-American unity by mounting this flag directly beneath the original 1921 medal. Also displayed there is the letter from the CMHS that accompanied the flag – a message from a contemporary society motivated to enact and expand an inherited historical narrative: 'While the presentation of the Medal of Honor to a warrior of a foreign nation by U.S. General Pershing on 17 October, 1921 was an unprecedented act, so too is this presentation of the flag of the Congressional Medal of Honor Society to the British Unknown Warrior. We feel that it is a right and due tribute and welcome him to the ranks and his brothers in arms of the Society.'[91]

AGENCY AND RECEPTION: HISTORICAL MANIPULATION AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY

As the range of examples in this chapter demonstrates, a wide array of agents constructed public commemorations of Anglo-American ties and shared culture, and their reasons for doing so varied. Service organizations and charities sought to advance historical education; veterans wished to honor the sacrifices of their comrades; city and regional governments, local community organizations, and professional organizations wished to locate their experiences in a larger historical context. Yet the worldviews, agendas, and efforts of such agents were routinely influenced by, and functioned within, the dominant narrative engineered by the British and American governments; a narrative grown sufficiently hegemonic as to shape the worldviews and actions of multiple generations. Understanding commemoration as a dimension of propaganda helps us to understand why the British and American governments have remained committed to constructing their dominant narrative in public spaces, emphasizing similar themes via similar methods, and often taking a direct role in the management of commemorations. As Sanford Levinson has argued, 'Public monuments that designate communal heroes or sacred communal events throughout time have been ways by which regimes of all stripes take on a material form and attempt to manufacture a popular consciousness conducive to their survival.'[92] In this way, a symbiotic relationship formed

between government intent and the dominant historical paradigm, in that the Anglo-American narrative has served as a security tool for government elites as well as become a popular concept reinforced by its widespread acceptance.

During the Cold War, for example, commemorating the allied unity of the Second World War became an explicit concern of the US government; a way of ensuring the Atlantic alliance would remain steadfast in the face of perceived Soviet aggression. The main objective of building memorials and cemeteries for American war dead in Britain was, in the view of Secretary of State George Marshall, to 'dramatize the bonds joining America and Europe.'[93] Accordingly, a new government agency, the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), was created to achieve this goal. Even the smallest memorials to the US 8th Air Force in East Anglia, though often initiated by local communities and veterans' organizations, were increasingly controlled by the ABMC and its desired narratives of harmonious Anglo-American friendship, shared sacrifice, and the mutual defense of freedom. In the context of the Cold War, entrenching these narratives was far more important than historical accuracy, and in consequence the region's memorials convey a simplistic and heavily manipulated version of the past that excludes inconvenient truths, such as the tensions between the US personnel and local communities or British frustrations with the American military's policies of racial segregation.[94]

The British government likewise used commemoration and historical manipulation as tools of diplomacy. During the 1976 US bicentennial celebrations, Britain's leaders labored to prevent the anniversary of a violent Anglo-American schism from negating the preferred narrative of shared Anglo-American heritage and the modern special relationship. Responsibility for planning Britain's role in the bicentennial was given to a special group within the FCO, the British Bicentennial Liaison Committee (BBLC). It is clear from the detailed minutes of the BBLC's meetings that commemorations of the American Revolutionary War were to be used to 'show how this evolved into a joint victory for English-speaking people on both sides of the Atlantic.'[95] Official gifts were to generate 'an unconscious influence on the American public's attitude towards this country [Great Britain].'[96] Cultural exchanges and programs had to be tailored to 'result in great benefit to Anglo-US relations.'[97]

The 'centerpiece' of this work was an original 1215 copy of the Magna Carta, which the British Parliament loaned to the American Congress for display in its rotunda throughout the bicentennial. In addition, the United Kingdom gave the United States a permanent replica of the document. This gift was perfect for Britain's diplomatic goals as it nicely sidestepped inconvenient chapters of Anglo-American history while emphasizing the key elements of identity and culture that Britons shared with their most powerful ally. The Magna Carta represented freedom and rights, key aspects of American identity being celebrated in 1976; it symbolized a deep connection between the allies that

predated the Revolutionary War; and its presence in the United States for the year seemed appropriate as well as generous, though the actual costs involved – including a specially commissioned display case and a golden replica of the document – were affordable despite Britain's contemporary economic crises.[98] By taking advantage of widespread American veneration of this medieval document,[99] the preferred British message permeated elite and popular levels of American society. The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Carl Albert, hailed the document as the 'most significant part of our Bicentennial celebration'[100] and over one million visitors to the Capitol rotunda viewed Britain's showcase during the bicentennial.[101]

While the bicentennial replica remained on display in the Capitol,[102] the US government expanded use of the Magna Carta to emphasize the same narrative of Anglo-American connection. Since acquiring an original 1297 copy of the Magna Carta during the mid-1980s, the US Archives building on the National Mall has physically presented the document as the foundation of America's most cherished ideals.[103] Before visitors view the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution, they first pass through a large exhibit designed around the Magna Carta. Government curation of the document is equally noteworthy, as the ways cultural objects are represented in museums convey significant messages about both history and identity.[104] For example, modern visitors to the National Archives (and its website) learn that the British document has always been an 'inspiration for Americans': 'During the American Revolution, Magna Carta served to inspire and justify action in liberty's defense. The colonists believed they were entitled to the same rights as Englishmen, rights guaranteed in Magna Carta. They embedded those rights into the laws of their states and later into the Constitution and Bill of Rights.'[105] In these ways, public presentation of the Magna Carta over the past forty years serves to demonstrate the British and American governments' selective use of historical evidence to propagate the dominant narrative of Anglo-American relations.

The success of such multigenerational governmental efforts to ensure the preferred narrative's dissemination and stability has also inspired another type of agent to engage in its perpetuation. Seeing the sentimental narrative of Anglo-American friendship and shared culture as popular and reliable enough to justify financial investment, private businesses have created jobs and earned profits by selling this version of history to willing consumers. Costumed Pilgrim tour guides and historians find work around Plymouth's *Mayflower* memorial by emphasizing Anglo-American connections.[106] Dwight D. Eisenhower's former apartments at Scotland's Culzean Castle, given to him in thanks for his successful command of Allied forces in the Second World War, have been transformed into a luxury hotel, 'The Eisenhower.'[107] Tour companies in East Anglia delight customers with a warm narrative of allied solidarity in

the Second World War that is more in tune with the ABMC's Cold War-era monuments than historical reality.[108]

Even in areas of the United States where Anglo-American historical influence is not readily available, communities have gone far out of their way to construct such influence artificially. Lake Havasu City, in western Arizona on the edge of the Mojave Desert, has been the home of the London Bridge since American businessman Robert McCullock purchased the 1831 structure from the City of London in 1967. McCullock's goal was to create something special in a new property development that would attract homebuyers; his community actually had no need for a bridge, but an iconic British attraction that would distinguish his development from its competitors would soon prove indispensable. His planned city had stagnated after its creation in 1964, but after the bridge's reconstruction was completed in 1971 the city became a success as well as one of the state's major tourist destinations.[109]

As the community blossomed around the London Bridge, the city's planners recognized that it was American interest in British culture and history that had made their financial gambit a success. As a result, the community tied its identity to the dominant narrative of Anglo-American relations and other British-inspired elements were incorporated into the city's design, including a miniature version of Stonehenge and a shopping district modeled on York, England, called Shambles Village. Every year since 1971 thousands of people boost the city's economy as they attend its London Bridge Days festival and parade in October, which incorporates an English-style Quit Rents ceremony beneath the bridge.[110] In 1997 the Havasu Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution erected a large historical marker on site to commemorate 'British–American Friendship' and praise the 'historic ties between the United States and Great Britain.' The marker also prominently quotes Benjamin Franklin's statement after signing the treaty ending the Revolutionary War: 'We are now friends with England and with all mankind.'[111] Having built a unique Anglo-American monument and tied the fate of their city to the dominant narrative of Anglo-American relations for no specific reason other than consumer demand and its associated profitability, the community at Lake Havasu serves as an enduring testament to how attractive and natural it has become for many Americans to find meaning and identity in their perceptions of shared culture with Britain.

Analysis of this long tradition of Anglo-American commemoration and the widespread acceptance of its dominant narrative may well give pause to those specialists, such as William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, who have doubted 'that there remains across the Atlantic a special and sentimental attachment to Britain.'[112] Indeed, to escape the influence of the dominant Anglo-American narrative or to alter the associated themes of commemoration has become very difficult over time, for even though modern leaders

may recognize an artificially constructed cultural narrative when they see one, they can still nevertheless be constrained by that narrative's popular reception. President Obama's administration, for example, was regularly plagued by rumors purporting that the president had snubbed the British people and the special relationship by choosing to send the White House's bust of Churchill, on display since the 1960s, back to the British Embassy. This was untrue; the Churchill bust remained on prominent display outside the Treaty Room and a special section of the White House's website was dedicated to dispelling the rumor in 2012. The website was ineffective, however, and concerned people continued to contact the White House demanding its return. In another attempt to settle the matter and appease all parties concerned, the White House posted a picture on its website showing Obama and Prime Minister Cameron closely admiring the bust together in the residence.[113] The president also, like so many of his predecessors, continued to use the famous Resolute Desk, an 1880 gift from Queen Victoria to President Rutherford Hayes and the other potent symbol of Anglo-American connection to occupy prominent space in the Oval Office.[114] But this too was not enough; hypersensitivity to the location of Churchill's bust remained strong in the United States, even inspiring Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney to seek votes in 2012 by promising to honor Churchill and the special relationship properly by moving the bust from the residence to the Oval Office.[115] Obama too felt compelled to glorify Churchill and the narrative of Anglo-American unity throughout the remainder of his presidency. Again standing beside Cameron in 2016, he stressed to the assembled press that he looked at the bust every day and stated bluntly, 'I love Winston Churchill, I love the guy.'[116] In the latest acknowledgment of American preoccupation with this symbol of Anglo-American unity, Donald Trump pointedly moved the bust to the Oval Office following his 2017 presidential inauguration.[117]

The recent history of this particular artifact demonstrates that the dominant narrative of Anglo-American relations has become so entrenched that to alter it in any way, or indeed, to be perceived as altering it, entails political jeopardies. The US Congress appeared to have learned this lesson well in 2013 when, amid the controversy over the White House bust, it revealed yet more public art honoring the special relationship. The US Capitol Building's new bust of Churchill was implanted among statues of the country's Founding Fathers, resting on a large pedestal memorializing the British leader as a 'defender of freedom' and an 'honorary US citizen.' Also carved there were old words meant for contemporary and future audiences – a quotation from Churchill's speech to the Congress on 26 December 1941: 'In the years to come, the British and American peoples will, for their own safety and for the good of all, walk together in majesty, in justice and in peace.'[118] In a show of bipartisan support for the special relationship, the new artwork's

unveiling featured speeches from Democratic House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner, who afterward posted a video of the ceremony to his YouTube channel to help ensure maximum exposure. The event culminated with a performance by the Who's Roger Daltrey, who elected to sing Ben E. King's 'Stand by Me' to signify 'the enduring relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.' As the British rock god sang the classic American song, he added new lyrics to the final verse, which like the erection of the new bust itself, suggested that the only way to deal with the dominant narrative of Anglo-American relations is to perpetuate it:

> Won't you, forever, stand by me?
> Stand by your brother, stand by your sister, and stand by each other,
> I stand by your side, side by side, we're family.
> If we all stand together, we'll survive stormy weather,
> Shoulder to shoulder, come on, stand by me,
> Shoulder to shoulder, we will always … stand free.[119]

CONCLUSION

The American and British governments have consistently told themselves, each other, and their respective populations that the special relationship is positive, necessary, natural, and indestructible. Arguing that this sentimental myth of Anglo-American relations is indeed the reality, both governments have also seen public spaces across their nations filled with enduring and high-profile physical manifestations of their preferred historical narrative. Monuments, historical markers, and other public artifacts focus collective memory on shared historical experiences and deemphasize inconvenient facts. Cemeteries used to remind the living of the mutual sacrifice of past generations inspire contemporary sentiments of Anglo-American camaraderie. National cathedrals and churches enshrine the narrative amid the holy symbols and eternal truths of a shared religious culture. Statues of shared heroes, such as Lincoln in Britain and Churchill in the United States, stand in testimony to Anglo-American cultural intimacy and the perception of shared values. Businesses and tourism schemes harness and package the Anglo-American narrative and sell it to eager consumers.

In all of these ways, such places of memory have helped to insert the dominant Anglo-American narrative into the collective memory of multiple generations. The many Americans and Britons who have engaged with these spaces in the era of the special relationship have been taught to see the mythical version of US–UK partnership as the reality. The result has been a

cyclical dynamic whereby this perception of the past inspires contemporary commitment to the mythology, resulting in expectations that the special relationship will endure, and, indeed, in more commemorations. As long as this narrative remains carved in stone and prominently displayed across both nations, it is logical to conclude that the influential ideas of Anglo-American community, friendship, and partnership will continue to reverberate through British and American culture.

NOTES

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2 'British Cemeteries,' Outer Banks Visitors Guide, www.outerbanks.com/british-cemeteries.html (accessed 15 October 2018).

3 For more on the diplomatic rhetoric and culture of Anglo-American relations, see Chapters 6 and 10 in this volume by Steve Marsh and David Ryan respectively. See also William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, *The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Ruike Xu, *Alliance Persistence within the Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Post-Cold War Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

4 Alon Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History,' *American Historical Review*, 102:5 (1997), 1387.

5 Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See also Confino, 'Collective Memory and Cultural History.'

6 John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 15.

7 Pierre Nora, 'Entre Mémoire et Histoire,' in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 23–43. See also Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

8 Albert Cook, 'Space and Culture,' *New Literary History*, 29:3 (1998), 553.

9 Yannis Hamilakis and Jo Labanyi, 'Time, Materiality, and the Work of Memory,' *History and Memory*, 20:2 (2008), 8.

10 Sam Edwards, 'The Architecture of a Myth: Constructing and Commemorating Churchill's Special Relationship,' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2017), 203 (emphasis in original).

11 E. Hobsbawm, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914,' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 263–307.

12 See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1998); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

13 John Gillis, 'Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship,' in John Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7.

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BEATLEMANIA AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF 1960s AMERICA[1]

THOMAS C. MILLS

At 1.35 p.m. on 7 February 1964 Pan Am flight 101 touched down at New York's recently – and poignantly – renamed John F. Kennedy airport. Among the passengers descending the stairs to the runway below were John Lennon, Paul McCartney, George Harrison, and Ringo Starr. The crowd of over ten thousand screaming fans, held back by police cordon, along with a vast array of photographers, dwarfed any reception the four Liverpudlians had experienced in the previous three years of touring Britain and Europe. Thus began the Beatles' 'conquest' of America and the apex of mass hysteria that the group generated known as 'Beatlemania.'

During the brief two-week visit that followed, the Beatles played concerts in Washington and New York and in making two appearances on the *Ed Sullivan Show* performed to the largest ever recorded television audience in the United States to date. By the end of the year, the group had completed a further sell-out tour of the country, released a blockbuster movie in the form of *A Hard Day's Night*, and in April 1964 achieved the unprecedented feat of simultaneously occupying all of the American *Billboard* magazine's top five places.[2] Through their recordings, movies, live performances, and other public utterances and appearances, the Beatles had a profound effect on American culture and society throughout the 1960s.

Cultural exchange has, of course, long been a facet of Anglo-American relations. In the twentieth century, cultural flows tended to travel predominantly from west to east, reflecting the dominance of the United States in new popular forms such as motion pictures and popular music.[3] The traffic was never one way, however. The development of popular music in particular has long been the product of cultural crosscurrents across the Atlantic.[4] The influence of British popular music in the United States did not reach its climax,

however, until the 1960s. Led by the Beatles in 1964, the years that followed saw the so-called 'British invasion' gain full traction as a wave of British bands including Herman's Hermits, the Dave Clark Five, the Kinks, and the Rolling Stones achieved significant commercial success in the United States.[5]

None of these groups was able to outshine the Beatles, however, either in terms of commercial or critical acclaim. Reflecting this status, the Beatles have spawned an immense body of literature, including scholarly works in disciplines ranging from musicology to literary studies.[6] When studied in terms of the group's cultural and political significance, the dominant tendency has been to analyze the Beatles in their local and national setting.[7] There are, however, exceptions to this, including several articles examining the cultural significance of the Beatles in the United States. Two of these are of particular relevance to the focus of this chapter. Sam Lebovic has analyzed the Beatles' success in the United States as an example of cultural globalization, usefully making clear the international hybridity of influences on the group, as well as the diverse ways in which they were received in the United States.[8] Ian Inglis's study focuses specifically on the Beatles' initial reception in America in 1964, seeking to provide alternative explanations for the group's success beyond the traditional (and rather simplistic) narrative of providing an antidote to the collective grief experienced in the country following President Kennedy's assassination the previous November.[9] This chapter seeks to build on these works by analyzing the onset of Beatlemania within the context of the political and cultural trends present in the United States at that time. It focuses primarily on the Beatles' initial impact in the United States following their first brief visit in February 1964, while making occasional reference to later events, particularly when the subject matter discussed is best understood as the beginning of a trend that only fully emerged later in the decade.

The popular memory of the 1960s in the United States – and indeed throughout large parts of the Western world – is of a decade of protest. In reality, the 1960s in America was characterized both by forces of conservatism and of attempted (and in some cases achieved) radical societal change.[10] Against a backdrop of consumer capitalism and a conservative political culture, various groups sought to challenge a set of postwar social norms on race, gender, and political participation. Young Americans – organized in groups such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) – acted in tandem with the broader New Left to attempt a radical overhaul of American politics and society. Although still in its early stages when the Beatles first set foot on American shores, the second wave of feminism was also beginning to emerge in the United States at this time. This movement sought to transform the role of women in society from that of passive housewives to active participants in the nation's social, economic, and political fabric. Perhaps most prominently, the onset of Beatlemania coincided with the height of the civil rights movement, as

African Americans sought to end segregation and secure legal equality in the United States.

On the face of it, the Beatles had little to do with the efforts of these countercultural forces to transform American society. Indeed, viewed as unthreatening entertainers that formed part of a multibillion-dollar industry, some scholars have argued that the Beatles did much to bolster dominant societal structures in the United States.[11] While it is certainly true that elements of Beatlemania complemented established power structures in the United States, the Beatles failed to conform to traditional conceptions of popular performers present in the country at the time. Moreover, this chapter argues that the more profound impact of the Beatles' crossing of the Atlantic in 1964 was to augment the ethos and ambitions of those groups intent on rupturing societal norms within 1960s America. In their anti-authoritarianism and focus on personal liberation as a means to broader societal change, the Beatles complemented some of the central themes of the youth movement in the United States. Likewise, the subtle subversion of gender norms present in the Beatles' music and the broader phenomenon of Beatlemania echoed the emerging critique of patriarchal America voiced by the women's movement. Finally, the Beatles' challenge to racial segregation – both overtly in public statements and implicitly in their music – complemented the core aims of the civil rights movement. The Beatles thus represented a British cultural phenomenon that had a remarkable resonance with cultural trends present in the United States. As such, the onset of Beatlemania in 1960s America attests to the importance of cultural transfers in postwar Anglo-American relations.

THE CONSUMER SOCIETY

The onset of Beatlemania came at the peak of the so-called 'golden age of capitalism.' This period of sustained economic growth, high employment, and low inflation lasted from the end of the Second World War through to the early 1970s. And while the 'long boom' was felt across the Western world, it was experienced nowhere more strongly than in the United States. Here, the country's immense industrial base was converted from wartime production to the creation of vast amounts of consumer goods, serviced by an ever-expanding market driven by rising living standards and a growing population.[12] Between 1947 and 1960 personal disposable income in the United States rose (in real terms) by 17 percent, while the population increased from 141 to 181 million.[13]

Middle-class consumers in the United States were able to spend their newfound wealth on a variety of new products, from automobiles to washing machines to television sets (the last of which were present in nine out of ten households by 1960). Part of the growth of a consumer society in postwar

America was the emergence of the teenage market. Movies of the 1950s like *Blackboard Jungle* and *Rebel Without a Cause* ensured that the teenager was an established fixture in American culture by the early 1960s. The teenager was also big business. Consuming increasing amounts of clothes, beauty products, and fast food, *Life* magazine estimated the value of the teen market in 1959 at $10 billion – $75 million of which was spent on pop records.[14]

That the Beatles would have such resonance in what was the largest consumer market of the postwar era, as well as the home of popular music, might in hindsight appear inevitable. But just months prior to the Beatles' departure for the United States, such an outcome was far from certain. While the Beatles had secured three successive number one singles in the United Kingdom, beginning with the release of 'Please Please Me' in January 1963, none of these records had made any significant impact across the Atlantic. The general attitude of American record executives was that the plentiful indigenous talent in the country negated any need to market British imitators of what they regarded as 'American music.'[15] The experience of British acts that had previously tried to make an impression in the United States seemed only to reinforce this view. While Cliff Richard had caused a minor sensation in Britain in the late 1950s, his subsequent tour of the United States saw him playing low on the bill and failing to make any real progress in *Billboard* magazine's top one hundred.[16]

Since then, however, the first wave of American rock 'n' roll – fronted by the likes of Elvis Presley, Buddy Holly, and Little Richard – had passed. The pale imitations that followed in these artists' wake failed to generate anything like the same excitement.[17] It was in this context that the Beatles' manager, Brian Epstein, visited New York in late 1963. During this visit Epstein finally convinced Capitol Records to issue the Beatles' latest single, 'I Want to Hold Your Hand.'[18] Capitol also financed a mass-marketing campaign supplying radio stations with the Beatles' back catalogue and pre-recorded interviews, as well as adverts in the music press.[19] The Beatles were touring in France when news reached them that 'I Want to Hold Your Hand' had reached number one in the United States just in time for their inaugural visit to the country. Even so, doubts lingered as to the Beatles' prospects in America even on the plane across the Atlantic. As Paul McCartney remarked en route, 'They've got everything over there. What do they want *us* for?'[20] Any such doubts were seemingly quashed by the rapturous reception granted the Beatles on arrival in New York.

By this time the initial stirrings caused by 'I Want to Hold Your Hand' had evolved into near hysteria. As Beatlemania hit the home of consumer capitalism, American entrepreneurs quickly realized the vast economic potential that the phenomenon represented. Not only did the Beatles quickly break all previous records for music sales (selling 25 million records in the United States in 1964 alone), but the group's popularity also generated a whole subindustry of Beatles-themed merchandise.[21] American fans could soon buy Beatle dolls,

badges, egg cups, bubble gum, and of course, the ubiquitous Beatle wigs. The *Wall Street Journal* predicted that American teenagers would spend $50 million on such items before the end of 1964.[22]

In one sense, then, Beatlemania chimed perfectly with American capitalism as the presence of the group in the country reinforced the consumer boom. This is certainly the view taken by David Fowler who has described the Beatles as 'young capitalists who, far from developing a youth culture, were exploiting youth culture by promoting fan worship, mindless screaming and nothing more than a passive teenage consumer.'[23] But it was clear from the outset that while the Beatles may have represented a boon to American capitalism they also challenged established notions of popular entertainers present in the United States at the time.

Immediately on their arrival, there was much speculation by the American media about the 'secret formula' behind the Beatles' success.[24] In reality, the Beatles had not been manufactured according to any formula. On the contrary, one of the things that marked the group out from other pop sensations in the United States was their sense of authenticity.[25] This was immediately evident in the unscripted and spontaneous fashion of the Beatles' engagement with the American media during the press conferences that greeted them on arrival in New York. With all four Beatles effortlessly fielding questions, the air of irreverence and quick wit that had become a common feature of these affairs was clearly on display. When John Lennon was asked by a reporter at Kennedy airport if his family had been in show business, he immediately responded: 'Me dad used to say me mother was a great performer.'[26] During the next session with the assembled media in their Plaza Hotel, one slightly snobbish female journalist asked George Harrison why he wasn't wearing a tie. 'Why aren't *you* wearing a hat?' George snapped back.[27]

This sense of spontaneity and authenticity also permeates *A Hard Day's Night*, the Beatles' first motion picture, released (by the American studio United Artists) to commercial and critical acclaim in August 1964. Rather than adopting the convention established by Elvis Presley of playing characters in somewhat contrived romantic plots, the Beatles performed as themselves, with their experience of Beatlemania the overarching context for the movie. Possibly as a result of the Beatles having failed to learn their lines for the film, the American director, Richard Lester, relied to a large extent on the group's improvisations, allowing their natural wit to come to the fore. The result was a seemingly intimate portrait of the Beatles presented as if in real life, again adding to the sense of authenticity that marked the group out.[28]

The Beatles' music was also distinguished by an authenticity lacking in much of the popular music American audiences were accustomed to. The most obvious facet of this was the fact that much of the Beatles' output was composed by the group themselves – specifically by Lennon and McCartney,

either collectively or individually. This again set the Beatles apart from the biggest American pop sensation to date – Elvis Presley – as well as many other acts prominent in the United States at the time who relied on professional songwriters to compose their material.[29] The fact that the Beatles wrote their own songs also allowed them to compose much more introspective lyrics. Songs like Lennon's 'I'll Cry Instead' and McCartney's 'Things We Said Today' presented American listeners with an honest and sometimes dark insight into the personal relationships of the songs' composers uncommon in popular recordings of the time.[30]

Alongside original compositions, the Beatles also included a large number of cover versions, both in their live and recorded material from this time, primarily by American artists like Chuck Berry and Little Richard. Like the vast majority of British groups of the era, American music was a heavy influence on the Beatles in their formative years, and this remained evident as Lennon and McCartney developed their own songwriting style.[31] But unlike more derivative British acts, like Billy Fury and Adam Faith, the Beatles were able to synthesize a wide variety of American styles (including rock 'n' roll, country, soul, and gospel) alongside a distinctive 'Mersey beat' resulting in a style that sounded wholly fresh and original to American listeners.[32] Indeed, on first hearing 'I Want to Hold Your Hand,' Bob Dylan praised the Beatles' originality. 'They were doing things nobody was doing,' commented Dylan. 'Their chords were outrageous, just outrageous, and their harmonies made it all valid.'[33] Both as musicians and in their collective persona, then, the Beatles appeared refreshingly (or even alarmingly) authentic when measured against conventional expectations of popular performers present in the United States in 1964.

The Beatles also at times articulated a conscious (if somewhat ironic) awareness of their status as commodities in the popular music industry. Asked by a reporter to respond to a somewhat outlandish claim that the group were part of an international communist conspiracy, Paul McCartney replied: 'We're the world's number one capitalists.'[34] Similarly, engaging directly with the notion of the Beatles as a commodity, when asked at a press conference whether the Beatles would sing something for the gathered media, Lennon replied: 'We need money first.'[35] In their music, the Beatles displayed an ambiguous attitude towards the consumer culture prevalent in the United States. Whereas the March 1964 single 'Can't Buy Me Love' eschewed material possessions, declaring 'I don't care too much for money,' the group's cover of Barrett Strong's 'Money (That's What I Want)' (released in the United States on *The Beatles' Second Album* in April 1964) espoused the opposite sentiment. In reality, the Beatles (at this stage of their career at least) were every bit as materialistic as other aspiring pop groups of the time. As John Lennon told the *New Musical Express* in February 1963, his professional ambition was 'to be rich and famous.'[36] What distinguished them was a willingness to articulate,

if not quite a critique, at least a self-awareness of the Beatles' status as a commodity in the American consumer culture of the early 1960s.

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

While on the one hand a market to be exploited, the throngs of teenagers gathered to meet the Beatles at Kennedy airport in February 1964 had also recently begun to be viewed as a potential threat to the status quo in the United States.[37] Two years earlier, in June 1962, SDS issued a wide-ranging critique of American society in their famous Port Huron Statement.[38] In late 1964 students in Berkeley, California initiated a free speech movement aimed at loosening the restrictive rules on political expression then common on American university campuses.[39] As part of the broader New Left protest movement of the 1960s, groups like SDS sought to harness youthful energies to liberate American society from the alleged oppression of the capitalist system and create a truly participatory democracy that would allow individuals to realize their creative potential.[40]

Politically aware folk artists like Pete Seeger, and most prominently Bob Dylan, provided the soundtrack for the New Left. In comparison to Dylan's *Freewheelin'* album of the previous year – which featured 'protest songs' targeting racial segregation and the arms industry – the Beatles' output in 1964 seemed positively anodyne. Almost the entirety of the Beatles' early lyrical content was based on variants of teenage romance, from 'She Loves You' to 'All My Loving.'[41] Brian Epstein had worked hard to sanitize the Beatles' public image more generally, most visibly in the adoption of matching Saville Rowe suits that contrasted starkly with the leather outfits previously sported by the Beatles during their performances in Hamburg's red light district and the Cavern Club. Epstein also placed a ban on the Beatles commenting publicly on controversial political issues, which was largely observed during the early part of their career.[42] In private, John Lennon in particular was much more forthcoming. Joining the Beatles on their summer tour of the United States in 1964, the journalist Art Schreiber found Lennon to be very knowledgeable about a variety of contemporary issues in American politics, including civil rights.[43] However, the Beatles' failure to engage directly with the politics of protest espoused by youth groups in the United States at this time has led authors like Oded Heilbronner to label the group 'a conservative cultural phenomenon' that 'embraced anti-revolutionary and anti-anarchist views.'[44]

But as Marcus Collins has argued, the Beatles are better characterized, even in this early period, less as apolitical and more as embodying an anti-political stance. The Beatles consistently displayed an antipathy and disdain towards politics and politicians that blended with a more general anti-authoritarianism.[45]

Reluctance on the part of politicians themselves limited the group's chances of engaging with such figures of authority during their first trip to America. For the British prime minister, Alec Douglas-Home, the Beatles' arrival in the United States in February 1964 was seemingly nothing more than a minor inconvenience to his own travel plans. The prime minister had been due to fly to America for a meeting with President Lyndon Johnson on the same day as the Beatles but decided to postpone his departure until the subsequent day to avoid the chaotic scenes that greeted them in New York. Lyndon Johnson's sixteen-year-old daughter Luci reportedly tried to persuade her father to arrange a meeting with the Beatles during their visit, but was rebuffed by Johnson on the grounds that such trivialities were inappropriate so soon after President Kennedy's death.[46] The only subsequent mention of the Beatles during the meeting between the heads of government was when Johnson quipped that he liked Douglas-Home's 'advance party' but didn't he 'feel they need haircuts?'[47]

But while Johnson and Douglas-Home may have had no interest in trying to use the Beatles' popularity to their advantage, the British embassy in Washington was apparently not above such things. On advice from their press agent Brian Sommerville, the Beatles attended a charity ball at the British Embassy during their stay in Washington. The evening started well enough when the Beatles were introduced to the British ambassador, Sir David Ormsby-Gore, but quickly turned sour when John Lennon refused to draw tickets for the raffle. The evening reached its low point when a female guest helped herself to a memento by cutting off a lock of Ringo's hair.[48] Understandably, this encounter only bolstered the Beatles' antipathy towards figures of authority. They subsequently declared their unwillingness to participate in any such official events in the future and limited contact with government officials and politicians.[49]

The Beatles' usurpation of authority figures also emerged as the central theme of *A Hard Day's Night*. Be it in the group's evasion of their manager in order to go out partying rather than stay in their hotel room, or Ringo's arrest and subsequent escape from the police, the image portrayed of the Beatles is consistently one at odds with authority. As Walter Shenson, the film's producer, commented on his intentions for the movie: 'We want to put over their non-conformist, slightly anarchist characters.'[50] Shenson would not have been disappointed when the *Village Voice* concluded in its review of the movie: 'The Beatles are a sly bunch of anti-Establishment anarchists.'[51]

This facet of their collective personality was clearly recognized by those who encountered the group. As the Beatles' long-time producer, George Martin, put it: 'They were always anti-establishment … Even when I first met them in 1962, it was them against the world. And anyone who existed in authority was someone they wanted to be contemptuous of. It was part of their makeup.'[52] Similarly, as a contemporary American Beatles fan recalled: 'The Beatles made fun of authority, made it all seem absurd, even laughable.'[53]

In their anti-authoritarianism, the Beatles aligned themselves with the youth movement in the United States. Rejecting the orthodoxies of conservatism and the 'old left' of trade unionism and socialism, the youth movement in America was suspicious of all traditional forms of authority. Indeed, the youthful protestors of 1960s America were much less concerned with challenging traditional class-based power structures than their predecessors. Instead, influenced by the humanist psychology prevalent in the United States at the time, the youth movement sought to contest 'the mechanisms of physiological and cultural domination' present in society.[54] In so doing they sought to unleash every individual's 'unrealized potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity,' thereby allowing people to achieve 'meaning in life that is personally authentic.'[55]

The Beatles focused similarly on personal liberation as a means to broader societal change. This became evident more explicitly in their later recordings. Songs such as 'Tomorrow Never Knows' (from the *Revolver* LP of 1966) opened with the instruction to listeners to 'Turn off your mind, relax and float downstream.' Similarly 'Revolution' eschewed traditional challenges to institutions of political power, instead admonishing listeners: 'You'd better free your mind instead.'[56] These recordings came later in the decade, as the counterculture gained momentum in the United States, but the theme of personal liberation through introspection was present from the earliest stages of the Beatles' work. Lennon's composition, 'There's a Place' (released in the United States as the B-side to 'Twist and Shout' in April 1964) described assertively the solace found from daily sorrows by retreat into one's inner world. While not at this stage linked to broader ambitions of a shift in societal consciousness, the liberation identified through introspection in this composition was a vital first step towards the kind of liberation of consciousness that became so prevalent both in popular music and in the youth movement of 1960s America later in the decade. As Ian MacDonald noted in his assessment of the song, 'There's a Place' marked 'a minor milestone in the emergence of the new youth culture' of the 1960s.'[57]

Moreover, while the Beatles' lyrics and public utterances of this time may have contained little overtly political content, there was present throughout the Beatles' music a more intangible spirit of enthusiastic optimism – what Marcus Collins has described as 'three-minute utopias designed to delight and inspire.'[58] In this sense, the Beatles' early work seemed wholly to complement the outlook of the youth movement in the United States. Just as the Port Huron Statement described 'a yearning to believe there *is* an alternative to the present, that something *can* be done to change circumstances,' Paul McCartney later reflected that what made the Beatles' music a 'positive force' in its era was the songs' power to 'encourage people to do better and have a better life.'[59]

A broad sense of optimism about the future was prevalent throughout American society in the 1960s. As recorded in a Gallup poll of 1962, 55 percent

of respondents thought that life for people would get better, as opposed to 23 percent who thought it would get worse.[60] The general optimism of Americans in the 1960s was of course severely tested with the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963. Kennedy's death had a traumatizing effect on the nation as a whole and in particular on the younger generation. American teenagers in the early 1960s had not witnessed the economic hardships of the Great Depression or the fear induced by the rise of Nazism in Europe. President Kennedy seemed to embody the youthful optimism through which American teenagers viewed the world and their place in it. This rosy outlook was shattered with the assassination of the president and the nation subsequently embarked on a process of collective grieving.[61]

The Beatles' arrival in the United States three months after Kennedy's murder has come to be seen as marking the symbolic end of this period of grieving and the cathartic return of a more optimistic outlook. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that a sense of joyful optimism is particularly prevalent in the song that finally brought the Beatles to the American public's attention. While no obvious message is present in the unremarkable lyrics of 'I Want to Hold Your Hand,' the sheer exuberant energy of the soaring melody and fourth-dominated harmony certainly conveyed a sense of carefree optimism, telling its listeners to discard the restrictive norms and expectations of mainstream American life. This was certainly the effect the record had on the poet and harbinger of the beat generation, Allen Ginsberg, who on first hearing the song in a New York nightclub shocked his intellectual friends by getting to his feet and dancing.[62] In their anti-authoritarianism, a focus on personal over societal liberation, and a more general ethos of utopian optimism, the Beatles had much in common with the youth movement in early 1960s America.

GENDER POLITICS

Aside from their youth, another obvious feature of the crowds that greeted the Beatles throughout their public appearances in the United States was that they were overwhelmingly female. The women's movement was still in its infant stages in the United States when the Beatles first arrived on the scene, and most of the young women swept up in Beatlemania would most likely have been impervious to the writings of authors like Betty Friedan, who published her seminal work, *The Feminine Mystique*, in 1963.[63] One of the key themes of the feminist movement that followed in the wake of Friedan's work was to challenge the traditional roles and attributes designated to men and women in society. As the National Organization for Women's Statement of Purpose put it in 1966, modern feminists rejected the common assumption that 'a man must

carry the sole burden of supporting himself, his wife, and family,' whereas the 'home and family are primarily [the] woman's world and responsibility.'[64]

Reflecting the gendered norms of their working- and lower-middle-class upbringings in 1950s Liverpool, the Beatles showed little obvious sign of embracing female emancipation. In the Beatles' song lyrics from this period, women tended to be portrayed in conventional terms, either as innocent objects of affection or as vindictive harlots. Examples of the former include 'I Saw Her Standing There,' and 'Hold Me Tight.' More malign portrayals of femininity appear in songs like 'Not a Second Time' and 'Anna,' which portray women as dishonest and cheating. Perhaps most threatening is the danger posed by the subject of 'Devil in Her Heart,' a woman who, while 'her eyes they tantalize,' will 'tear your heart apart.'[65]

The traditional attitude towards women present in the Beatles' lyrics was reflected in their personal relationships. The Beatles' first tour of America in February 1964 was notable for including among the entourage John Lennon's wife, Cynthia, in defiance of the normal practice of wives and girlfriends staying away from life on the road.[66] While Cynthia reveled in experiencing the mania that greeted the Beatles on their first American visit – notwithstanding mishaps like being locked out of the group's hotel at one stage – John seemingly regretted the invitation. When the Beatles returned to America in August 1964 as part of a world tour that took up much of the second half of the year, John was keen that Cynthia returned to her duties as mother of their young child Julian.[67] Paul McCartney also struggled to come to terms with his then-girlfriend Jane Asher's more liberated approach towards gender roles. An aspiring actress, her job often took her away from home for extended periods while on tour – something that Paul railed against.[68]

But while the Beatles may have reinforced traditional roles for women in their lyrics and personal lives they did not conform to standard notions of masculinity. Certainly, the four young men that arrived in the United States in 1964 bore little resemblance to previous pop 'heartthrobs,' such as Elvis Presley and Frank Sinatra. Indeed, with their Cuban heel boots and uncommonly long hair – as well as the distinctly un-masculine falsetto vocal style employed in songs like McCartney's rendition of 'Till There Was You' – the Beatles seemed to some Americans positively androgynous.[69] Susan Douglas experienced Beatlemania as a teenager in America in the 1960s. As she later recalled: 'When we watched these joyful, androgynous young men, we saw not just a newly feminized, distinctly friendlier form of manhood. We saw our *own* reflection.'[70]

The Beatles also challenged traditional gendered identities with their marked willingness to cover songs originally recorded by female artists, particularly black American 'girl groups.' Several of the songs that commonly featured in the Beatles' live sets and in their recorded output had originally been released by female artists, including 'Chains' (the Cookies) and 'Please Mister Postman'

(the Marvellettes). The influence of the girl group style can also be heard in the Beatles' own songwriting. The lyrics of 'She Loves You' adopt a format common to this genre of providing advice to a friend on matters of the heart: 'You think you've lost your love / Well I saw her yesterday.'[71]

Perhaps the most striking influence of the girl group genre on the Beatles was their cover of the Shirelles' song 'Boys.' Something of a showcase for Ringo on lead vocals, 'Boys' was a regular feature of the Beatles' live set in their summer tour of the United States and featured as an album track on *Introducing the Beatles*, their first American LP. Whereas in other covers of girl group songs (and in the verse of 'Boys') the Beatles followed the convention of changing the gendered pronouns to suit the male singer, the same approach was not possible in the chorus of 'Boys,' which revolved around a lyrical phrase declaring the joys of the song's title. Ringo therefore stayed true to the original lyrics, enthusiastically singing the climax of the chorus: 'Well, I talk about boys, now / What a bundle of joy!'

The subtle subversion of heterosexual norms apparent in this rendering of the song may not have reflected an intentional desire by the Beatles to challenge societal norms around sexuality, but it did reveal a somewhat liberal attitude on the group's part towards these issues. As Paul McCartney later explained: 'It was a Shirelles hit and they were girls singing it, but we never thought we should call it "Girls," just because Ringo was a boy. We just sang it the way they'd sung it and never considered any implications.'[72] It is hard to imagine more conventionally masculine pop singers of the era taking a similarly relaxed view.

The broader phenomenon of Beatlemania that swept the United States on the Beatles' arrival also augmented the goals of the emerging feminist movement. As well as challenging the roles prescribed to women by society, the feminist movement critiqued patriarchal society on the basis that traits commonly ascribed to women were viewed in a negative light. As leading feminist Kate Millet put it in her book *Sexual Politics*, patriarchal society was based in part on 'the formation of human personality along stereotyped lines of sexual category, based on the needs and values of the master class and dictated by what he would cherish in himself and find convenient in an underclass.'[73] Chief among the alleged feminine personality traits in postwar America was outward displays of emotion. Whereas society was said to benefit from the innate rationality of men, women were deemed unsuitable for leading roles as a result of their penchant for irrational emotionality.

In many respects the essence of the phenomenon termed Beatlemania was a mass and very public display of emotion, primarily by young women. As Philip Norman described the reaction prompted by the Beatles: 'Girls had screamed at pop stars before, but never quite like this – hunched into a foetal position, alternately punching their sides, covering their eyes and stuffing handkerchiefs

and fists into their mouths.'[74] As the phenomenon of screaming young women became a regular occurrence whenever the Beatles appeared in public, the effect was to normalize such public displays of emotion. As the 1960s wore on there was an increasing tolerance for outward displays of emotion, and, as such, a trait traditionally attributed to women in a wholly pejorative sense was increasingly seen in a more positive light.[75] As the *New York Times* put it, Beatlemania was a 'happy hysteria.'[76]

So, while the Beatles never wholly broke free of the gendered norms they grew up with, there were elements of the group's music and the broader phenomenon of Beatlemania that did represent early challenges to traditional orthodoxies around gender that were confronted directly by the women's movement later in the decade.

RACIAL POLITICS

Alongside the burgeoning youth and feminist rebellions present in the United States in the early 1960s, another important change underway was that pertaining to the status of African Americans in the country. When the Beatles first arrived in the United States the civil rights movement was at its height. 1964 saw the passing by Congress of the landmark Civil Rights Act, the award to Martin Luther King of the Nobel Peace Prize, as well as the murder of three black activists engaged in registering African Americans to vote in Mississippi.[77] This was also the social movement, which on the face of it, had the least to do with the onset of Beatlemania.

The civil rights movement had its own musical accompaniments, sharing some of the same folk artists connected to the youth movement – as well as the long-standing gospel singing common in many black churches. The Beatles made no apparent reference to the civil rights movement in their lyrics. Moreover, the broader phenomenon of Beatlemania was a largely white affair in terms of the ethnicity of the majority of the group's American fans.[78] The group themselves, however, took a strong interest in the US civil rights movement, fed by the censorious coverage of race relations in the British newspaper press.[79]

Moreover, the Beatles did engage directly with the issue of Jim Crow segregation as their summer tour of the United States took them to the American South. Booked to perform in September at the Gator Bowl in Jacksonville, Florida, the Beatles were shocked to discover that the venue was racially segregated, with black audience members being confined to the upper balcony area. The group opted to take a stand against racial segregation in this case by refusing to perform unless the venue was desegregated. Moreover, the Beatles made their position on the matter public, announcing in a press

release: 'We will not appear unless Negroes are allowed to sit anywhere.'
John Lennon elaborated, stating: 'We never play to segregated audiences
and we aren't going to start now.' As with much of the American South,
Jacksonville had been the location for tense civil rights protests during the
summer of 1964 and the Beatles were subject to hostile press coverage as a
result of their stance on the issue. For example, the *Florida Times-Union*
disparaged the Beatles as 'hirsute scourges of Liverpool' in the immediate
aftermath of their press release. The promoter for the concert nevertheless
relented and agreed to desegregate the venue, allowing the Beatles' perform-
ance to go ahead.[80]

In this instance, then, the Beatles did deviate from their general stance of
avoiding engagement with political controversies. Paul McCartney subse-
quently reflected on the Beatles' motivation for speaking out on civil rights,
explaining in 1966: 'We never wanted to play South Africa or any places where
blacks would be separated. It wasn't out of any goody-goody thing; we just
thought, "Why should you separate black people from white? That's stupid, isn't
it?" '[81] While such a characterization of racial segregation may have trivialized
the issue somewhat, it was perhaps the Beatles' lack of experience of racial seg-
regation in the United Kingdom that allowed them to adopt a moral, if some-
what simplistic, attitude towards the issue. In so doing, the Beatles stood out
from the vast majority of popular entertainers in the United States at this time,
who – perhaps because of their closer proximity to the vexed issue – avoided
engagement with civil rights.[82]

There was also a broader sense in which the Beatles were relevant to racial
politics in the United States. Like the majority of British groups of their
time, black American artists heavily influenced the Beatles in their formative
years. Rock 'n' rollers like Chuck Berry and Little Richard featured heavily in
the Beatles' cover versions.[83] The latter was a particular hero to the Beatles.
Having met Richard when performing together in Hamburg and Liverpool,
McCartney was inspired to develop an eminently passable impersonation of
the singer captured on record on the EP 'Long Tall Sally.'[84] The Beatles also
admired soul and Motown artists, again recording a confident cover version of
Smokey Robinson and the Miracles' hit, 'You Really Got a Hold on Me.'

While Lennon and McCartney's original compositions synthesized a variety
of musical styles, the Beatles' own music still bore strong influences from black
American artists – particularly in the early stage of their songwriting career.
With the mass commercial success the Beatles found in the United States, the
group were able to present black American music to a much larger segment of
the white audience in the United States than the original composers had been
able to reach themselves. This of course left the Beatles open to the charge of
cultural appropriation. Such a case was indeed made by Louie Robinson in the
pages of *Ebony* magazine. Noting the vast wealth accrued by white performers

influenced by black artists, Robinson accused the Beatles, and others, of 'strik[ing] it rich with the brown sound.'[85]

Similarly, reflecting on the Beatles' career upon the breakup of the group in 1970, cultural critic Craig McGregor derided the Beatles in the *New York Times* as 'white imitators … who exploited the black man's music.'[86] This criticism struck a nerve with John Lennon, resulting in the publication of a letter responding to McGregor's article. 'The one thing we always did,' stated Lennon in reference to the Beatles' covers of black artists, 'was to make it known that there were black originals, we loved the music and wanted to spread it in any way we could.'[87] A more charitable interpretation, then, is that by embracing black music and presenting it to largely white audiences, the Beatles were in fact subtly subverting the racial segregation that the civil rights movement was fighting overtly to dismantle.[88]

CONCLUSION

It is clear, then, that the arrival of the Beatles in America in 1964 reinforced both conservative and transformational cultural trends present in the country at that time. As the largest and most developed market for consumer capitalism (with a burgeoning teen market), the United States was the perfect setting for the Beatles to launch what became the most commercially successful enterprise in popular music history. The more marked impact of the Beatles and the broader phenomenon they generated, however, was to complement and further stimulate those various currents present in American society that sought to alter the status quo. Whether as part of the youth rebellion, the changing attitudes towards gender, or the civil rights movement, Beatlemania broadly aligned with social movements emerging in the United States in the early 1960s that fundamentally challenged the social norms of the time.

One final question this raises is whether Americans perceived the Beatles in these terms at the time. There were certainly some commentators who viewed the Beatles as an alarming threat to established values in the United States. The conservative evangelist Billy Graham, for example, described the Beatles in 1964 as 'symptoms of the uncertainty of our times.'[89] But these views tended to exist on the margins. Generally, the bastions of middle-class values in the United States regarded the Beatles either as mildly ridiculous or as wholly non-threatening and somewhat adorable entertainers. The most common theme in the questions at the Beatles' initial press conferences in the United States were humorous, if not slightly patronizing, references to the groups' haircuts.[90] When one reporter deviated from this theme to ask whether the Beatles were 'part of a social rebellion against the older generation,' John Lennon's mocking reply that such rumors were 'a dirty lie' seemed wholly sufficient to calm any

such fears.[91] Perhaps most reassuring was Ed Sullivan's famous description of the Beatles as he introduced them to the nation as 'four of the nicest youngsters we've ever had on the show.'[92]

If, as has been argued above, the Beatles did in fact represent a challenge to the status quo in America, why then were they not recognized as such by Americans at the time? Partly, the answer to this is that any subversion of established values that the Beatles embodied was consistently masked by the ubiquitous humor employed by the group in their public appearances and on film.

More important was that the Beatles were British. On the one hand, this meant that the political, social, and cultural bonds of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' ensured Americans did not see the Beatles as wholly 'foreign.' Thus the 'British invasion' that the Beatles were said to be part of was never really greeted with serious trepidation.[93] On the other hand, as Lebovic has argued, the very fact that the Beatles were one degree removed from American culture by way of their Britishness meant that American commentators tended to view the group through a cultural lens somewhat distorted by assumptions and caricatures of Britishness common in the United States at the time. Foremost among these was the idea of British respectability – an image no doubt enhanced by the presence of Alec Douglas-Home in 10 Downing Street in early 1964, a man his predecessor Harold Macmillan referred to as 'the old governing class at its best.'[94] When viewed as part of a broader caricature of Britishness based on the royal family and afternoon tea, it was inconceivable for many American commentators to view the Beatles as a threat. Whereas the overtly black roots of American rock 'n' roll and Elvis Presley's menacing sexuality denoted a recognizable threat to middle-class white Americans, the subversive elements present in Beatlemania were sufficiently masked by the group's alien cultural background to make them seem harmless.[95]

The impact of Beatlemania in 1960s America is therefore characterized by something of a transatlantic irony. While the Beatles embodied sufficiently recognizable cultural reference points for the group to resonate with countercultural trends present in the United States at this time, the British 'otherness' through which Americans perceived the Beatles prevented them from seeming a threat to the status quo. As the 1960s progressed, though, the Beatles' subversiveness was more easily recognizable within the American cultural context. With their embrace of psychedelic drugs and songs like 'A Day in the Life' promising 'to turn their listeners on,' the Beatles became ever more closely associated with the counterculture of the mid to late 1960s.[96] The Beatles' increasingly subversive nature brought them into direct conflict with conservative American norms, most famously in the uproar caused by John Lennon's 'more popular than Jesus' comments in 1966.[97] While harder to discern in the earlier part of their career, this chapter argues that from the outset of their

engagement with American cultural politics the Beatles, and the broader phenomenon the group generated, resonated with and contributed to those forces within the United States that posed a challenge to established norms.

Marcy Lanza was a Beatles fan from New York swept up in the mania that greeted the group when they arrived in America in 1964. Her reflection on that experience sums up well the impact that the Beatles had on American cultural politics: 'There was something about the Beatles that went way beyond the Beatles.'[98] Marcy was right. In strengthening the disruptive cultural trends present in 1960s America, the Beatles provide an important example of the impact of cultural exports within Anglo-American relations.

NOTES

1 I am grateful for the insightful comments provided on an earlier draft of this chapter by Martin Farr and Simon Mills, both of Newcastle University. The responsibility for any errors is mine alone.

2 Ian MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head: The Beatles' Records and the Sixties* (London: Pimlico, 1995), 77n. The Beatles were aided in their domination of the American charts by the simultaneous release of different records by a variety of minor US labels. Ironically, the multiple ownership of the Beatles' catalogue that facilitated this unusual development was the result of Capitol Records having previously sold their initial rights on the songs, reflecting the earlier lack of interest in the group in the United States. See Sam Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere": The Beatles, America, and Cultural Globalisation, 1964–1968,' *Journal of American Studies*, 51:1 (2017), 52.

3 Recent representative studies in these areas include: Mark Miller, *Some Hustling This! Taking Jazz to the World* (Toronto, ON: Mercury Press, 2005); Neil A. Wynn (ed.), *Cross the Water Blues: African-American Music in Europe* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007); Mark Glancy, *Hollywood and the Americanization of Britain: From the 1920s to the Present* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2013); Adrian Horn, *Juke Box Britain: Americanisation and Youth Culture, 1945–60* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

4 Laura E. Cooper and B. Lee Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism: Popular Music Interchanges Between the United States and Britain, 1943–1967,' *Journal of Popular Culture*, 27:3 (1993), 61–78; William L. Schurk, B. Lee Cooper, and Julia A. Cooper, 'Before the Beatles: International Influences on American Popular Recordings, 1940–63,' *Popular Music and Society*, 30:2 (2007), 227–266.

5 Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 69.

6 Examples include: Walter Everett, *The Beatles as Musicians: The Quarry Men Through Rubber Soul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); John P. McCombe, 'Not "Only Sleeping": The Beatles and a Neo-Romantic Aesthetic of Indolence,' *Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature*, 44:2 (2011), 137–152; Matthew Schneider, *The Long and Winding Road From Blake to the Beatles* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

7 See, for example, Peter Atkinson, 'The Beatles on BBC Radio in 1963: The "Scouse" Inflection and the Politics of Sound in the Rise of the Mersey Beat,' *Popular Music and Society*, 34:2 (2011), 163–175; Marion Leonard, 'The "Lord Mayor of Beatleland": Popular Music, Local Government, and the Promotion of Place in 1960s Liverpool,' *Popular Music and Society*, 36:5 (2013), 579–614; Oded Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles,' *Cultural and Social History*, 5:1 (2008), 99–115; Marcus Collins, '"The Age of the Beatles": Parliament and Popular Music in the 1960s,' *Contemporary British History*, 27:1 (2013), 85–107.

8 Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere."'

9 Ian Inglis, '"The Beatles Are Coming!"' Conjecture and Conviction in the Myth of Kennedy, America, and the Beatles,' *Popular Music and Society*, 24:2 (2000), 93–108. Further studies of the Beatles in an American context include Brian Ward, '"The 'C' Is for Christ": Arthur Unger, Datebook Magazine and the Beatles,' *Popular Music and Society*, 35:4 (2012), 541–560; Michael Roberts, 'A Working-Class Hero Is Something to Be: The American Musicians' Union's Attempt to Ban the Beatles, 1964,' *Popular Music*, 29:1 (2010), 1–16. Of the various 'biographies' of the Beatles, Jonathan Gould's *Can't Buy Me Love* attempts most successfully to locate the group's career in the broader historical context of both Britain and the United States. See Jonathan Gould, *Can't Buy Me Love: The Beatles, Britain, and America* (New York: Harmony Books, 2007).

10 Rebecca E. Clatch, *A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

11 Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles'; David Fowler, *Youth Culture in Modern Britain, 1920–1970* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2008).

12 John Patrick Diggins, 'A Decade To Make One Proud,' in Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman and Jon Gjerde (eds), *Major Problems in American History, Volume II: Since 1865* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 296.

13 Hugh Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books, [1985] 1999), 589; Michael J. Heale, *The Sixties in America: History, Politics and Protest* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 32.

14 '*Life* Magazine Identifies the New Teenage Market, 1959,' in Robert Griffith and Paula Baker (eds), *Major Problems in American History since 1945*, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, [1991] 2001), 122–123. See also Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 45–8.

15 Philip Norman, *Shout! The Beatles in the Their Generation*, revised and updated ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, [1981] 2005), 225; Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 51.

16 Inglis, '"The Beatles Are Coming!,"' 93; Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 68.

17 Inglis, '"The Beatles are Coming!,"' 96; Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 65.

18 Norman, *Shout!*, 227. Capitol Records was the American subsidiary of the British company EMI, which owned the Beatles' label Parlophone. See Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 51.

19 Inglis, '"The Beatles Are Coming!,"' 103–4.

20 Quoted in Norman, *Shout!*, 245.

21 'Beatles Record Sales Around the World,' www.beatlesradio.com/beatles-record-sales (accessed 30 January 2019).

22 Bill Harry, *The Encyclopedia of Beatles People* (London: Blandford Press, 1997), 584; Norman, *Shout!*, 242–243. It is worth noting that due to a poor deal struck by Brian Epstein's lawyer, David Jacobs, with the US company established to sell Beatles merchandise in the United States (Seltaeb), the Beatles themselves received very little of the revenue generated by this market. See *Shout!*, 231–234.

23 Fowler quoted in Marcus Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 16:2 (2014), 292. Fowler's view echoes the contemporary verdict passed on the Beatles by Paul Johnson of the *New Statesman*. Writing in February 1964, Johnson compared the Beatles to a 'mass-produced mental opiate,' catering to 'a generation enslaved by a commercial machine.' See Paul Johnson, 'The Menace of Beatlism,' *New Statesman*, 28 February 1964,' in June Skinner Sawyers (ed.), *Read the Beatles: Classical and New Writings on the Beatles, Their Legacy and Why They Still Matter* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 51–55.

24 'Beatles Press Conference: American Arrival 2/7/1964,' www.beatlesinterviews.org/db1964.0207.beatles.html (accessed 30 January 2019).

25 The contrast became most apparent with the appearance in 1966 (on-screen and on record) of the Monkees, a group modeled on the Beatles but lacking the authenticity of their British counterparts, having been manufactured by film producers Rob Rafelson and Bert Schneider. See Glenn A. Baker, *The Monkees: Monkeemania*, 3rd rev. ed. (London: Plexus, [1986] 1999).

26 Norman, *Shout!*, 247.

27 *Ibid.*, 252 (emphasis in original).

28 Steven D. Stark, *A Cultural History of the Band that Shook Youth, Gender, and the World*, (New York: Harper Entertainment, 2005), 159–161.

29 Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 69. There were of course exceptions to this, including Buddy Holly, Chuck Berry, and Carl Perkins.

30 Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 164.

31 Lebovic, ' "Here, There and Everywhere," 48–49; Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 63–6.

32 Inglis, ' "The Beatles are Coming!," ' 95–96; Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles,' 105.

33 Quoted in Clinton Heylin, *Bob Dylan: Behind the Shades, Take Two* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 148.

34 Quoted in Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 69. In contrast, McCartney later referred to Apple Corps (the Beatles' media company created to subvert traditional practices in the music industry) as 'a kind of Western communism.' See Philip Norman, *Paul McCartney: The Biography* (London: Orion Publishing, 2016), 301.

35 'Beatles Press Conference: American Arrival 2/7/1964,' www.beatlesinterviews.org/db1964.0207.beatles.html (accessed 30 January 2019).

36 Quoted in MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, 67.

37 Marwick, *The Sixties*, 50.

38 For more on SDS, see Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 135–138; Marwick, *The Sixties*, 53–54; Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 161–165.

39 Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 138–139; Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 160–161.

40 Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 136; Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 159 and 161.

41 Sheila Whiteley, '"Love, Love, Love": Representations of Gender and Sexuality in Selected Songs by the Beatles,' in Kenneth Womack and Todd F. David (eds), *Reading the Beatles: Cultural Studies, Literary Criticism, and the Fab Four* (New York: State University Press of New York), 61.

42 The apparent conformity of the Beatles' public image contrasted sharply with that of their principal British rivals, the Rolling Stones. See Norman, *Shout!*, 278.

43 Philip Norman, *John Lennon: The Life* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 372.

44 Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles,' 100–101.

45 Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' 293–294. See also Sheila Whiteley, 'The Beatles as Zeitgeist,' in Kenneth Womack (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Beatles* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 208.

46 'Johnson Snubbed Beatles White House invite,' www.contactmusic.net/beatles/news/johnson-snubbed-beatles-white-house-invite_1224266 (accessed 22 November 2019).

47 Hunter Davies, *The Beatles*, 40th anniversary ed. (London: Ebury Press, [1968] 2009), 301.

48 Davies, *The Beatles*, 300; Norman, *Shout!*, 255–256.

49 There were, of course, subsequent exceptions to this, including the Beatles' appearance with Harold Wilson at the Variety Club Awards in March 1964 and, more prominently, the group's reception with the Queen to receive their MBEs in 1965. Such occasions also indicate the undimmed desire of politicians to associate themselves with the Beatles for their own purposes. See Collins, '"The Age of the Beatles,"' 94–95; Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' 296.

50 Quoted in Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 158.

51 Andrew Sarris, '"A Hard Day's Night," *Village Voice*, August 27, 1964,' in Skinner Sawyers, *Read the Beatles*, 59.

52 Quoted in Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' 293–294.

53 Quoted in Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 154.

54 Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 15 and 137. See also James J. Farrell, *The Spirit of the Sixties: The Making of Postwar Radicalism* (London: Routledge, 1997), 205–208.

55 'The Port Huron Statement, 1963,' in Griffith and Baker, *Major Problems in American History Since 1945*, 327; Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 136. These sentiments echoed Normal Mailer's invocation to 'set out on that uncharted journey into the rebellious imperatives of the self' from his 'White Negro' essay of 1957. See Norman Mailer, 'The White Negro (Fall 1957),' www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-white-negro-fall-1957 (accessed 30 January 2019).

56 When released as the B-side to 'Hey Jude' in August 1968, Lennon's 'Revolution' antagonized the more radical youth movement that had emerged in the United States by then with its criticism of violent tactics: 'But when you talk about destruction / Don't you know that you can count me out.' The lyrics on the album version of the song released later in the year (but recorded prior to the single version) equivocated: 'you can count me out, in.' For an in-depth discussion of the politics of 'Revolution,' see John Platoff, 'John Lennon, "Revolution," and the Politics of Musical

Reception,' *Journal of Musicology*, 22:2 (2005), 241–267. See also Whiteley, 'The Beatles as Zeitgeist,' 212–213.

57 MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, 47.

58 Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' 305.

59 'The Port Huron Statement,' 326 (emphasis in original); McCartney quoted in Collins, 'The Beatles' Politics,' 305.

60 Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 9.

61 Gould, *Can't Buy Me Love*, 216–221.

62 MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, 77–79.

63 Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 142–145; Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 149–150.

64 'National Organization of Women (NOW), Statement of Purpose, 1966,' in Timothy Patrick McCarthy and John McMillan (eds), *The Radical Reader: A Documentary History of the American Radical Tradition* (New York: New Free Press, 2003), 423–424. See also Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 149–150.

65 Ironically, this was a cover version of the original 1962 version 'Devil in His Heart' recorded by the American girl group the Donnays. For further discussion of the gender politics of Beatles' song lyrics, see Whiteley, '"Love, Love, Love,"' 55–69; Whiteley, 'The Beatles as Zeitgeist,' 210; Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles,' 107; Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 169.

66 The only Beatle to be married at this time, John and Cynthia wed in August 1962 shortly after discovering that Cynthia was pregnant.

67 Norman, *Shout!*, 344 and 363; Cynthia Lennon, *John* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2005), 175–185.

68 Norman, *Paul McCartney*, 308–309; Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 167.

69 Inglis, '"The Beatles Are Coming!,"' 100–101; Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 56; Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 68; Whiteley, '"Love, Love, Love,"' 58.

70 Quoted in Richard Crawford, *America's Musical Life: A History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 803.

71 Whiteley, '"Love, Love, Love,"' 60–61.

72 Quoted in 'Boys,' www.beatlesbible.com/songs/boys (accessed 30 January 2019).

73 Kate Millet, 'Sexual Politics: A Manifesto for Revolution, 1970,' in McCarthy and McMillan, *The Radical Reader*, 434.

74 Quoted in Inglis, '"The Beatles Are Coming!,"' 69.

75 The tendency towards public displays of emotion reached its peak in the so-called 'summer of love' of 1967. While certainly drawing criticism at the time and since, the professed 'humanization of the American man and woman' attempted by the counterculture can subsequently be viewed as a turning point in the United States and western societies generally towards a more tolerant attitude towards public displays of emotion. See Farrell, *The Spirit of the Sixties*, 218–224.

76 Quoted in Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 58.

77 Heale, *The Sixties in America*, 118–120.

78 Crawford, *America's Musical Life*, 802.

79 Ward, '"The 'C' Is for Christ,"' 548; Norman, *John Lennon*, 372. For British press coverage of the civil rights movement, see Brian Ward, 'Civil Rights and Wrongs,'

The Guardian (16 November 2007), www.theguardian.com/education/2007/nov/
16/research.highereducation (accessed 30 January 2019).

80 Bruce Mirken, '1964, Civil Rights – and the Beatles?,' http://greenlining.org/blog/
2013/1964-civil-rights-and-the-beatles (accessed 30 January 2019); Bill Demain, 'All
Together Now: Civil Rights and the Beatles' First American Tour,' http://mentalfloss.
com/article/30477/all-together-now-civil-rights-and-beatles-first-american-tour
(accessed 30 January 2019). See also Ward, '"The 'C' Is for Christ,"' 548–549.

81 Quoted in Mirken, '1964, Civil Rights – and the Beatles?'

82 Demain, 'All Together Now.'

83 MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, 71n and 88n. See also Lebovic, '"Here, There
and Everywhere,"' 59.

84 Norman, *Shout!*, 180–181; MacDonald, *Revolution in the Head*, 88–89.

85 Louie Robinson, 'Rock 'n' Roll Becomes Respectable,' *Ebony*, November 1965. See
also Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 155; Marwick, *The Sixties*, 48–49; Isserman and Kazin,
America Divided, 150–151.

86 Craig McGregor, 'So in the End the Beatles Have Proved False Prophets,' *New York
Times* (14 June 1970), www.nytimes.com/1970/06/14/archives/music-so-in-the-
end-the-beatles-have-proved-false-prophets.html (accessed 30 January 2019).

87 Quoted in Hugh Willett, 'How the Beatles Reinterpreted Black Music,' 11 March
2015, http://werehistory.org/the-beatles (accessed 30 January 2019).

88 Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 67. Paul R. Kohl has
made this argument more broadly with reference to white rock 'n' roll artists of the
1950s popularizing black music. See Paul R. Kohl, 'A Splendid Time Is Guaranteed
for All: The Beatles as Agents of Carnival,' *Popular Music and Society*, 20:4
(1996), 82–83.

89 Quoted in Cooper and Cooper, 'The Pendulum of Cultural Imperialism,' 69.

90 Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 56.

91 Davies, *The Beatles*, 298.

92 Lebovic, '"Here, There and Everywhere,"' 59.

93 Gould, *Can't Buy Me Love*, 250–251.

94 D. R. Thorpe, *Alec Douglas-Home* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), 301.

95 For the full development of this argument, see Lebovic, '"Here, There and
Everywhere,"' 56–60. See also Heilbronner, 'The Peculiarities of the Beatles,' 100;
Marwick, *The Sixties*, 49.

96 Crawford, *America's Musical Life*, 802.

97 Ward, '"The 'C' Is for Chris,"' 541–560.

98 Quoted in Stark, *Meet the Beatles*, 153.

CULTURE AND RE-MEMBERING THE ALLIANCE IN KOSOVO AND IRAQ

Anglo-American ironies under Clinton, Blair, and Bush

DAVID RYAN[1]

INTRODUCTION

Culture matters – it united Clinton and Blair, then Blair and Bush. They inherited and shared a political discourse, shared memories constructed on the 'special relationship,' a shared propensity to lead, a cultural affinity, and personal friendships. When British prime minister Tony Blair entered 10 Downing Street in 1997, his close relations with US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush began another chapter in the affinity between US and UK leaders built on the famous relationship that Churchill coined as 'special' in Fulton, Missouri in 1946, as he talked of 'sinews of peace' and the 'Iron Curtain.' Blair lasted ten years (1997–2007) in Downing Street; Clinton (1993–2001) and Bush (2001–09) both served two full terms as US president. To quote from Charles Dickens's 1859 novel, *A Tale of Two Cities*, albeit in a very different context, these three leaders shared 'the best of times, [and] the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity.'[2] The Anglo-American relationship flourished after troubled waters in the early 1990s – the ties that *bind* were secured once more; yet it was also the 'worst of times,' for cultural affinity facilitated strategic disasters. Ties could *blind*. In war, sometimes policy was driven by 'belief,' frequently incredulous, it 'was the age of foolishness.' All three protagonists overplayed memories, narratives, and analogies that were rooted in Anglo-American culture, and that helped facilitate the path to war in both 1999 and 2003.

Western military interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) were controversial and divisive on both sides of the Atlantic. In both cases the British prime minister Tony Blair forged close personal relations with the respective

US presidents, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush. Though both cases were multilateral, the narratives of the transatlantic 'special relationship' were augmented by memories of the World Wars, and especially evocative of the Roosevelt–Churchill affinity.

After the Vietnam War, burden sharing was important to US policy makers; indeed, for some in the Pentagon it was a prerequisite[3] – Washington would not 'pay any price' or 'bear any burden' alone, as President Kennedy had promised before the lessons of Vietnam were crafted years later. Yet even if some of the 'warriors' were reluctant in 1999 and 2003, there was a trace in the executives in London and Washington, of taking up the 'white man's burden,' with the gendered and racial undertones of civilizational discourse. Such constructions played on recreating nostalgic certainty in the post-Cold War period by invoking a period glorified in the popular depictions of Churchill and Roosevelt, the fraternal vein, the alliance, their vision for the future.[4] Such constructions asserted the importance of reading these interventions through suggested frames, sustained by a shared culture.

Neurobiologist Steven Rose purposely inserted the hyphen in 're-membering' to emphasize the process of cultural reconstruction in collective memory by social agents in a given time and space; their intended purpose is not so much to recall the past as much as to instill an emotion that the memory evokes in the present.[5] Their use of the past is constructed for particular purposes. Such constructions work most effectively within cultures that can read the symbols, accept the resonance of the language, and share in the emotion.

Ideology, understood as culture as opposed to a set of political ideas or beliefs, the historian Michael Hunt writes (adapting Geertz) in his *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, provides 'integrated and coherent systems of symbols, values, and beliefs,' which emerge from 'socially established structures of meaning' associated with culture. For Hunt, 'ideological constructs … serve as a fount for an instructive and reassuring sense of historical place, as an indispensable guide to an infinitely complex and otherwise bewildering present, and as a basis for moral action intended to shape a better future.'[6] In Kosovo and in Iraq there appeared to be an opportunity for all three protagonists – Clinton, Blair, and Bush – to cultivate constructions from the past that were familiar to their audiences. After the indecision and delayed action on Bosnia, a war that engaged ethnic cleansing between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs in the early 1990s, on Kosovo, and then after 11 September 2001 they took guidance from the cultivated analogies, the reconstructed lessons from the past, and all in various ways sought to 'shape a better future.' This *sense* of responsibility and 'progressive' civilizational discourse permeated the US and UK leaders' rhetoric in a shared language, harking back to shared images of the Anglo-American past. Yet, perhaps this shared culture coupled with their visions and enthusiasm to widen the agendas and take on burdens produced an elite

discourse, in which little was 'lost in translation,'[7] but also advanced a shared myopia.

This chapter examines such cultural constructions in the Anglo-American relationship. It will analyze the uses of collective memory to galvanize support for intervention in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) by deploying cultural narratives and memories that instinctively evoke the cultural appropriation of the Munich analogy, civilizational discourse, the special relationship, and its exceptional proposition in the Anglo-American partnership.

CLINTON, BLAIR, AND BUSH

Clinton dithered over the Bosnian crisis throughout his first two years in office. Only after the rough coincidence of three factors did he move to take more concerted action, although Presidential Decision Directive 25 had cautioned on intervention in regional conflicts.[8] In France, President Chirac had replaced Mitterrand in 1995 and on a visit to Canada had pointedly declared that the seat for leadership of the free world was vacant; candidates could file applications. The massacre of over seven thousand at Srebrenica in July 1995 outraged public opinion.[9] The US secretary of state recounted that, first, the Serbs had overreached; second, Croatian successes undermined Milošević's confidence; and finally, in Madeleine Albright's words, 'Clinton's willingness to lead'[10] made a difference. Anthony Lake, the national security advisor, warned Clinton that inaction in the face of such atrocity could become a liability, a credibility problem for the United States and for his leadership, especially as the 1996 presidential election season loomed.[11]

For all of Blair's humanitarian fervor on Kosovo and later Iraq, Clare Short, head of the UK Department of International Development and a cabinet member, noted that 'Blair had no record of any interest in foreign policy prior to becoming leader of the Labour Party' in 1994. He did not join a 'considerable group' of Labour MPs who called for a more robust British stance on Bosnia.[12] His later enthusiasm for intervention belied this past.

Clinton and Blair's rhetoric, leading to the bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999, repeatedly invoked, implicitly through choice of phraseology and explicitly, both the Hitler and Munich analogies juxtaposed with invocations of moral responsibility in the face of brutality, the need for resolution and the need to stand up to dictatorial oppressors. If conversion there was (poignantly writing in 2018) on the road to Damascus, it was not exclusively related to the humanitarian concerns for the death of others, but it also related to their domestic politics, their needs, and agendas.[13] For his part, Blair identifies his foreign policy awakening with Kosovo.[14] Moreover, he and Clinton found in each other a willing accomplice. In so doing they would play heavily on the

'mystic chords of memory'[15] and the cultures of Anglo-American diplomacy, the 'special relationship,' and the 'good war.' These shared cultures would echo and augment, at times in mythical form, the relationships of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; Blair and Clinton were another incarnation of such fidelity and they harvested the images and emotional triggers that such memories invoked.

For some, the 'evangelists' as Danchev had them, these depictions of the 'special relationship' relied on 'revelation' rather than 'examination.' There was the Grand Alliance and the war, the attributes of the 'good war' and the 'greatest generation' resonated later. Churchill was the 'evangelist in chief' with his 'natural Anglo-American special relationship,' and the 'fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples'[16] was taken as a given, a natural order, deeper 'blood' ties that resurfaced after periods of opposition, othering and enmity before the Great Rapprochement.[17]

A considerable part of Clinton's indecision related to then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former national security advisor, and later secretary of state Colin Powell's reticence to send troops to Bosnia and other memories of Vietnam. After the Vietnam War the United States needed allies. It was not just a question of burden sharing – that attempt by the United States especially since the 1970s to pressure allies to assume a greater burden, to accept a redistribution of costs – it was also political. The Pentagon was reticent about going to war alone; securing partners in a multilateral process became one of its preconditions for intervention. Moreover, multilateralism offered a veneer of legitimacy, albeit with costs, especially in the cases of Kosovo 1999 and Iraq 2003 where the necessary UNSC Resolutions were not forthcoming.[18]

If these two partnerships were those of necessity, they were also based on long-term institutional cooperation, culture, and a personal affection. Beyond the domestic prerogatives, the institutional demands, and strategic necessities there was a genuine affection between these leaders, Clinton and Blair, Blair and Bush. In Clinton's huge and laborious memoir, Cherie, Hillary, Tony, and Bill went to a restaurant in a restored warehouse along the Thames; 'We felt like old friends from the start,' he wrote. The press were fascinated by the similarity of their philosophies. That sense of affinity runs through the memoir on Iraq, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo. The men worked closely. Clinton acknowledged Blair's strong support in his times of difficulty.[19]

Blair did not only reciprocate, he was a strong advocate for intervention; the *New York Times* talked of his 'combative campaign.'[20] Blair recounted in his memoir, as they considered ground troops in the forthcoming military action,

> By this time, my relationship with him [Clinton] had become close. We were political soulmates. We shared pretty much the same analysis of the weakness of progressive politics. We were both quintessential modernizers. We were both

informal in style and young in outlook for our age. And both of us were at one level easy-going; but when you reached right down, there was a lot of granite providing foundation.[21]

The affection was repeated with Blair and Bush. On 12 September 2001 Bush had gone to the White House at his usual time, 7 a.m., to return calls from foreign leaders. Blair was first on the list; after expressions of shock, he indicated that 'he would stand with America "one hundred percent" in fighting terror.' Bush recalled 'There was no equivocation in his voice. The conversation helped cement the closest friendship I would form with any foreign leader. As the years passed and the wartime decisions grew tougher, some of our allies wavered. Tony Blair never did.'[22]

Days later, Blair was invited by Bush as a special guest to attend his speech to the joint session of Congress, just as Churchill had been there, in Washington, with Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor. Blair received a private briefing on the war plans atypically including the use of ground troops. Bush wrote, 'He reiterated that Great Britain would be at our side. America's closest ally in the wars of the last century would be with us in the first war of a new century.'[23]

Earlier, even before the crisis, Bush had invited Blair and his wife Cherie to Camp David; the first foreign guests under this administration, which was 'a tribute to the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain.' Unsure of what to expect, Bush knew he was some sort of 'left-of-center' prime minister, a good friend of Bill Clinton's. After dinner they watched *Meet the Parents* and Bush knew they would get on. They were 'candid, friendly, and engaging.' In the summer reciprocations took place at Chequers, Bush recounted, a 'creaky house filled with rustic, comfortable furniture.' The times spent together cemented their respect, 'over the years, he grew into my closest partner and best friend on the world stage.'[24]

The US needed friends, allies, or willing partners in various coalitions. After the Vietnam War a key lesson was that 'never again' should they go it alone; the British would remain stalwart friends. Of course, many other lessons were drawn, debated, and distilled into what became the Weinberger principles of 1984, an essential list of criteria that had to be met before the United States actively put 'boots on the ground' or entered into conflict. Named after Reagan's secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, these principles were later adapted to form a variant in the Powell doctrine. These powerful figures in the Pentagon were reluctant to expose the United States to war without support, but also reluctant to place troops in 'harm's way.' In many ways Powell epitomized the 'reluctant warriors' of Recchia's research on this period.[25]

Of course it was the then secretary of state, George Shultz, a towering yet comparatively moderate figure in the Reagan administration who blasted Weinberger for announcing such principles. He understood that the threat

of force was necessary for effective diplomacy; it should not be ruled out or governed by lists. Shultz thought Weinberger's 'was a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis.' Shultz later wrote, 'This was the Vietnam syndrome in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of leadership.' In his memoir, *Turmoil and Triumph*, he reprinted a cartoon with Shultz explaining to a diminutive Weinberger: 'The Burden of statesmanship is to be ready to use force.' Weinberger, clutching a black umbrella responds: 'Let's take a poll on it ... ' Weinberger's shadow is that of the umbrella; Shultz's is that of Churchill, the cigar pointing at the umbrella. The cartoonist, Hy Rosen, inserted a little figure of himself explaining, as though it was necessary, but just for good measure: 'Shades of Chamberlain and Churchill.'[26] And, in case it is necessary, Chamberlain, having made his 'infamous deal with the devil' that allowed Hitler to annex a portion of Czechoslovakia, 'returned to a hero's welcome in England. Carrying the black umbrella that would later become a symbol of shame,' waving the Munich agreement, he proclaimed ' "peace in our time." '[27]

There were frequently other dominant voices within and often outside the Pentagon that echoed Shultz in thinking that the Pentagon was too cautious. They sought to downplay the infamous 'Vietnam analogy' or its ghosts, the 'lessons,' and the inhibiting memory of the war. For them – Madeleine Albright or Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, or indeed the executives too, Tony Blair or George W. Bush – the imperative was to overcome inhibitions and to act with resolution and decision; to overcome the vacillation that had become synonymous with Munich and appeasement. But unlike Vietnam, to intervene with more and major allies. Rumsfeld reinforced the point in his memoir, recalling the coalition that joined the United States in its invasion of Iraq he wrote, 'It would mean less burden would fall on the United States and, in particular, on our military. I agreed with Churchill's formulation. "There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies," he observed, "and that is to fight without them." '[28] There are no famous wartime photographs of Presidents Kennedy or Johnson that reflect the solidarity of Roosevelt and Churchill, or those of Clinton and Blair, Blair and Bush.

The lines, categories, and institutional affiliations are not always straight and well contained but the Pentagon exercised a voice of caution. In part, Recchia's thesis contends that apart from caution and the 'blessing' of international organizations, the Pentagon put pressure on the White House to secure legitimacy for intervention through multilateralism. Given the rising pressures on the White House across the 1990s to intervene to address ethnic cleansing or widespread human rights abuse, inaction might haunt the president in terms of his credibility or through accusations of appeasement. To avoid such debilitating accusations civil–military relations necessitated appeasing the generals, the 'reluctant warriors.'[29]

Multilateralism and the imprimatur of a significant international organization, preferably the United Nations (UN), more problematically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), conveyed legitimacy. Force was supposed to be the instrument of last resort under the UN Charter, diplomacy was supposed to have been exhausted, and if a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution could be extracted so much the better. The UNSC did not vote to legitimate war unless the Soviets were absent (Korea 1950) during the Cold War or if the Soviets were present (Gulf War 1990–91), the Cold War had ended. UNSC resolutions were passed across the autumn of 1990 prior to the military action that a large international coalition exercised against Iraq in January 1991. It was certainly unlikely to work in action against Serbia in 1999 when the Russians were wary about Clinton's motivations. French, German, and other transatlantic tensions made UN approval difficult in 2002 and 2003 before the United States and its UK ally, and others, marched into the quagmire on the Euphrates, the quicksand that would mire the reputations of both Bush and Blair.

Multilateral approval signaled benign intent and acted to placate domestic opposition.[30] Where such legitimacy was conveyed the 'international community' had spoken, the threat was apparent, and the perception of the danger shared; action was necessary. Of course, the downside to securing such agreement is represented in terms of compromise, settling for something less than the central protagonist was after, and of time. Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, observed to Recchia: 'Multilateralism is hell, and it can be a real pain in the neck. Getting a consensus takes a long time. It often drives you toward the lowest common denominator. There is a lot of logrolling, and one may end up with not very sensible outcomes that are necessary to keep everybody on board.'[31] President George H. W. Bush's Gulf War coalition took months to build, inducements to secure, and even during the war there were difficulties in its maintenance.[32]

On Kosovo, with Russia's relationship with the Serbs, a UNSC resolution was unlikely. By September 1998 there was greater cohesion in Washington on the need for decisive action, 'despite Russian objections if necessary'. Thus NATO was pivotal and the National Security Council principals argued that NATO's agreement should be secured at their 7 October 1998 meeting based on 'limited air option and the phased air campaign.'[33] Even if Blair contemplated more, Clinton and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder were wary. They had to be kept on board because without them NATO action would be out of the question. The National Security Council concluded: 'The United States should discourage allies from seeking a further UN resolution specifically authorizing the use of force.'[34]

Blair was invaluable to both Clinton and Bush; he represented a solid friend in Downing Street with a shared set of objectives, shared culture, and personal

affinity. Danchev captured the fidelity, writing that 'the friendship is essential rather than circumstantial, dedicated rather than calculated, persistent rather than evanescent. It does not wait on time and tide, terror and tyranny, suicide attack or simmering stockpile.'[35]

Yet it is perhaps the facility of friendship that paved the way to war in Kosovo in 1999 and in Iraq 2003. The nations of the world were not united on these cases at those times. The UNSC could not be persuaded to unite. NATO would have to act, for the first time 'out of area,' and not in its traditional role of defense. Its purpose was expanded after Cold War containment and was widely viewed with a skepticism outside transatlantic circles. If there were doubts, there was also friendly reassurance; a shared culture that bound Washington and London, a tale of two cities, created great expectations – it would be the best and the worst of times, cheek to jowl.

When the US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, presented her arguments for action as the last resort if the Serbs did not accept the ultimatums advanced at Rambouillet, not all agreed that negotiations had been exhausted. Her immediate tactic, and one that she had rehearsed in her first major foreign policy speech on assuming office, was to invoke Munich. In 1997, upon assuming office, she made clear her reference point was Munich not Vietnam;[36] it was intended to send a signal that under her watch US foreign policy would be more assertive and resolute. In 1999 she pressured her hesitant interlocutors with: 'This is London, remember, not Munich.'[37] Implicitly, London was shorthand for Churchillian resolution and Munich for Chamberlain's appeasement. Within a short period of time the highly controversial bombing began. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that the bombing was both a success and a failure. It forced a Serb withdrawal and 'stopped the systematic oppression of the Kosovar Albanians.' Yet, 'the intervention failed to achieve its avowed aim of preventing massive ethnic cleansing. More than a million Kosovar Albanians became refugees, around 10,000 lost their lives; many were wounded, raped or assaulted in other ways.' Published in 2000, the Commission concluded 'many of the basic problems that precipitated the conflict still plague the region.' NATO had won the war but the UN still had to win the peace. Just under five hundred fatalities eventuated directly from the bombing. Finally, 'it was also a serious mistake by the NATO countries not to foresee that the bombing would lead to severe attacks on the Albanian population.'[38] In their findings they observed 'that the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate.' Thus 'the intervention failed to achieve its avowed aim of preventing massive ethnic cleansing.' Milošević remained in power, albeit indicted. 'Kosovo was lost.'[39]

For Blair, NATO intervention was imperative. He stated days before the bombing commenced in March 1999 that 'Britain stands ready with our NATO allies to take military action. We do so for very clear reasons. We do so primarily

to avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.'[40] In his address to the British House of Commons, he outlined the catastrophe that engulfed the region. He warned that the suffering would not end 'overnight.' But in his judgement 'the consequences of not acting are more serious still for human life and for peace in the long term.'[41] A month later in a speech delivered in Chicago, ultimately labeled the 'Blair doctrine' he reemphasized that the war was necessary because of values, not territorial ambition.[42]

Blair also revealed an ideological tendency, recognized broadly as a form of zeal. Doris Lessing described him as 'not very bright in some ways,' but that despite his intelligence he was intuitive: 'He believes in magic. That if you say a thing, it is true.' Widely noted for his 'conviction' politics, Roy Jenkins, one of the founders of the Social Democrats, indicated that Blair 'has almost too much [conviction], particularly when dealing with the world beyond Britain.' He was 'too Manichaean … seeing matters in stark terms of good and evil, black and white.'[43] That intuitive and instinctual tendency kicked into place again on 11 September 2001. Despite other statements of support and solidarity from the French and the Germans among many others, Bush phoned Blair first shortly after he arrived at work on 12 September 2001. Blair provided unequivocal support. That evening in London at Downing Street he promised that 'we here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends.' Yet well-intentioned resolute solidarity had its consequences. In the words of McSmith of the *Independent* (London), 'That unwavering commitment was arguably the most important decision that Tony Blair ever made. It was also, arguably, the worst. It defined the remainder of his premiership, and would pursue him in his semi-retirement.'[44] For Blair it was a pivotal and decisive moment. Wheatcroft writes: 'He loyally followed Washington into a conflict that, as he well knew, was not wanted by most British people, by most Labour MPs, or, in their hearts, by many of his cabinet colleagues.' Ironically, he might have been *one* voice that could have influenced Bush to some degree. Washington did not need the British militarily, or even diplomatically, albeit that helped, 'but practically speaking, it would have been far more difficult for Washington to embark on the war if Blair had publically voiced the misgivings of the country he leads.'[45]

Yet culture, friendship, and instinct mattered. The United States decided that the UN route was untenable, even though the efforts in 2002 had been, in part, to ease Blair's political position. Despite British official policy to contain Saddam and Iraq as opposed to the US policy since 1998 to liberate Iraq and to remove him, 'Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by mid-March,' the Chilcot Inquiry noted. The inquiry concluded that by March 2003 diplomatic efforts and options 'had not at that stage been exhausted. Military action was therefore not a last resort.' Blair sided with the United States against the majority opinion and position of the UNSC. But at least in Britain, at that

stage Parliament endorsed Blair's decision 'to invade and occupy a sovereign nation,' without UNSC authorization.[46]

'The UK's relationship with the US was a determining factor in the government's decision over Iraq,' so the Chilcot Inquiry began its section on the Anglo-American relationship. Despite their broad policy differences on Iraq, Blair took the decision to support Bush for long-term strategic reasons, believing the friendship might be damaged were they not to join and because he believed that influence from within the tent might be more effective. The strategic alliance was recognized by the Chilcot report as a cornerstone of UK foreign policy since the Second World War. That long-term 'special relationship' was enhanced by Blair's decision to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with Washington. Blair reinforced this position in his memoirs. But the Chilcott Inquiry, though stressing the importance of the relationship and its strategic necessity, observed: 'Although there has historically been a very close relationship between the British and American peoples and a close identity of values between our democracies, it is an alliance founded not on emotion, but on a hard-headed appreciation of mutual benefit.' The Chilcott Inquiry indicated Blair was right to weigh up the importance of the relationship; its gravitas was immense: 'A policy of direct opposition to the US would have done serious short-term damage to the relationship, but it is questionable whether it would have broken the partnership.' There had been serious disagreements in the past; Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, Grenada, Bosnia, the Arab–Israeli dispute, and Northern Ireland had all caused deep rifts or disagreements, but the relationship endured. The French and German opposition to the US-led invasion did not do lasting damage to those countries. Chilcot's report indicated 'the Inquiry does not consider that this would have led to a fundamental or lasting change in the UK's relationship with the US.' They recognized Blair's prerogative to take a different view.[47]

Blair's decision to support Bush despite the opposition and misgivings around him speaks to his conviction and instinctual sentiment, aroused immediately after 9/11 in an obviously charged atmosphere. Peter Burke makes the distinction between 'mentality' and 'ideology,' which helps to understand key intersections with culture. In his analysis, ideology refers to the structure of ideas, in this case the shared ideas and outlooks between Clinton, Blair, and Bush. The shared sense of modernizing progressives (at least as they saw it) in the first couplet, the shared sense of burden, responsibility, and civilizational struggle in the second couplet, with Blair acting as the lynchpin, pivot, and continuity between the two. Religious outlook has also been considered in the cases of Blair and Bush.[48] 'Mentality' is more closely associated with the wider culture, the worldviews, the shared cultural experience of policy makers and the wider audiences within which they operate and with whom they communicate. For Burke, *mentality* is 'the history of ideas, provided that the phrase is

understood as the history of everyone's ideas rather than the ideas of the most original thinkers of a given epoch.'[49] The potent intersection arises from the deployment of ideas, images, rhetoric, analogies, and metaphors that the wider culture can immediately recognize.

THE WINSTON FRAME: ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, AND THE 'GOOD WAR'

As Bush moved into the White House he attended to office rearrangements. He kept certain portraits that Clinton and his father had in the office and he added busts of Lincoln, Eisenhower, and Churchill, 'a gift on loan from the British government courtesy of Prime Minister Tony Blair.' Bush had previously expressed his admiration for Churchill. After 9/11 Bush wrote that he realized that the three busts 'all depicted wartime leaders. I certainly didn't have that in mind when I chose them.'[50]

Blair decided that 9/11 was a pivotal moment in world history and it was important for the British to be by the side of the Americans in this period of calamity. Both the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French president Jacques Chirac also reacted quickly. Schröder told the Bundestag that the country's 'full solidarity' would be exercised. Chirac was the first foreign leader in New York a week after the attacks, where he declared: 'France, I can tell you, will not stand aside in a fight against a scourge that defies all democracies.' Their support on 9/11 was given, if not *a* given, but obviously Iraq was a separate question even as 9/11, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein were soon conflated in Bush's rhetoric on the 'war on terrorism,' and on the 'terrorists and the tyrants.'[51]

Blair was keen to influence. He told the British Parliament that Bush had proceeded with care; he 'did not lash out.' They did not strike and think later, they were deliberate in their actions. He feared Bush might do 'something irresponsible.' But there was calculation in Blair's proximity. Political friendships between Downing Street and Pennsylvania Avenue were strategically important: Churchill and Roosevelt, Thatcher and Reagan, Blair and Clinton, Blair and Bush – the political value and kudos of being in and being seen to be in the White House (let alone in the bathtub) paid dividends. Before Bush addressed Congress on 20 September 2001, he welcomed Blair to Washington, took time to talk in the White House Blue Room, even in the immediate period before the speech, which famously laid down the gauntlet on being either with the United States or not. Blair enquired on whether Bush needed time to prepare. Bush said he 'appreciated the company of my friend.'[52]

There was something beyond the political expediency. Nations and narratives exist in symbiotic relationships; nations in Renan's famous assessment are

about 'getting [their] history wrong.'[53] But there is also a sense, especially in the discourses on foreign policy, in which certain narratives transcend particular nations and the particularity of cultures. If at one level particularity and difference might explain the strained periods of the Anglo-American relationship – Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, and Grenada to identify a few from recent decades – affinity and shared culture might also explain the intertextual fluidity of the memories of the Second World War and the Reagan–Thatcher relationship. Of course, memory and especially collective memory is imbued with selectivity and forgetting – it is premised on stipulating how the relationship ought to be understood, it is advanced through clear signals, analogies, reference points; the intertextual communications echo, in times of crisis, in the same language within a self-referential shared culture; nothing is lost in translation. Clinton, Blair, and Bush were keen to use the language, the analogies, and the images of *solidarity past* to build on the present. Of course 'Munich' and 'Hitler' stood by ready to be mobilized.

If there was a certain lack of direction in the early months of the Bush administration, 9/11 changed that. Blair was aware of the moment's potential and his role within it. There was something Kiplingesque about the long moment. In April 1999, in the speech that became known as his doctrine, Blair first set Kosovo within the contexts of 'global interdependence,' 'globalization,' and 'international security'; here was a moment of crisis deliberately being set within the 'extended now,' the structures of thought, institutions, multilateralism, and relationships that were pivotal to both countries and would be pivotal in Kosovo. In concluding his speech in Chicago, he ended with a 'final word on the USA itself.' In that narrative they were a great and powerful country, the richest. They had much to give and to teach and a little to learn. Blair understood, perhaps like Kipling or Churchill, that 'it must be difficult and occasionally irritating to find yourselves the recipient of every demand, to be called upon in every crisis, to be expected always and everywhere to do what needs to be done.' The insertion of 'richest' was important because the Biblical twist was predictable: 'Yet just as with the parable of the individuals and the talents, so those nations which have the power, have the responsibility.' Blair warned against isolationism; the world needed US engagement. 'And realise,' he concluded 'that in Britain you have a friend and an ally that will stand with you, work with you, fashion with you the design of a future built on peace and prosperity for all, which is the only dream that makes humanity worth preserving.'[54]

At that time few had direct experience of Munich; Madeleine Albright was an exception. But even as she highlighted the reference point, the lessons so deeply shared and perpetuated in US policy discourse and culture,[55] she wove within its use on Kosovo, Rasmussen writes, the 'entire history of Western security cooperation defined by setting up collective security institutions

(such as NATO and the EU) after the Second World War.'[56] In this observation what Rasmussen is arguing is that decision makers are not only situated in certain moments '*in* history' but that they are also '*of* history': 'History constitutes a narrative that defines who they are, and how they should act in a given situation.'[57] Whatever the particulars that academics might take from their histories, historiographies, and the 'lessons literature,' by using certain powerful analogies, politicians are playing on a shared culture within which these reference points have given meanings. They are intended to impact some future debate or decision.[58] William James's 'stream of consciousness' or Henri Bergson's 'memory as duration' are variations on the concept of the 'extended now,' a past prompted by an object that still has the capacity to resonate in the present. Hustvedt writes, 'Memory haunts the present as a ghost of the past, a double of what was, happening again in an extended now, but it is always distinct from immediate perceptual reality.'[59]

Despite Chamberlain's desire to buy time for Britain in 1938, despite his quest for 'peace in our time,' despite Roosevelt's note of support – 'good man,' he cabled Chamberlain – and even though the United States was not directly involved, 'Munich' has become synonymous with 'appeasement,' 'naivety,' 'weakness,' irresolution, if we do not stand firm *now* further blood will be required later. Historians Logevall and Osgood argue that '"Munich" has retained its power in American political discourse for more than seventy years largely because of electoral calculations.' Presidents could little afford the charges of appeasement that accompanied diplomacy involving compromise with constructed tyrants like Saddam Hussein, or any number of other Cold War opponents, or Slobodan Milošević.[60]

The deployment of direct citation or rhyme or echo are numerous. To select a few: In Clinton's 19 March 1999 news conference, after recounting Serb atrocities and recalling Bosnia, the echoes of the infamous lesson were unmistakable: 'Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggression in the Balkans, hesitation is a licence to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.'[61] When the bombing began:

> Sarajevo, the capital of neighbouring Bosnia, is where the First World War began. The Second World War and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars, Europe was slow to recognise the dangers, and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflicts. Just imagine if leaders back then had acted wisely and early enough, how many lives could have been saved, how many Americans would not have had to die.[62]

The British journalist Wheatcroft wondered whether a more accurate account of the 1930s could ever 'penetrate public consciousness, against the

version Churchill so successfully if spuriously imposed of his lonely voice against the craven appeasers who failed to enlist other nations and the German generals to thwart Hitler's aggression.' Lost in contemporary memory is the fact that the United States did not want to enter the war or join the fight in 1939 or June 1940, but waited till they had no choice after Hitler declared war on them in December 1941.[63]

The Vietnam analogy was juxtaposed with that of Munich after the 1960s; after 9/11 (and after the Gulf War), it was briefly thought that the Vietnam analogy might be redundant. Bosnia and Somalia in 1993 and then the Iraq War 2003 onward revived the Vietnam analogy. Even if both analogies were extensively used and deployed in the debates on Kosovo, the Vietnam analogy was less obvious in late 2001. Moreover, the Munich analogy had more stability and resonance because there is and was widespread agreement on what Munich meant in history and culture, even as the meaning of Vietnam was still very much a contested issue, bringing more heat to debates, rather than clarity and light to a culture eager for explanation and a familiar framework within which to operate.[64] Robert Kaplan draws some interesting distinctions between the two analogies that are pertinent to the situation and to the characters involved in this study. For Kaplan, 'Munich is about universalism,' about taking care of the world and others,[65] just as Blair appealed to the American audience in Chicago, they were, not in his words, indispensable. Why? In Blair's words, 'We need you engaged. We need the dialogue with you. Europe over time will become stronger and stronger, but its time is some way off.'[66] Whereas as for Kaplan, Vietnam is about caution, realism, and a domestic concern with casualties. 'The Munich crowd is a configuration of aggressive liberal internationalists and neoconservative interventionists … Vietnam is about limits; Munich about overcoming them.'[67]

On the positive side of the Munich analogy is the figure of Sir Winston Churchill. Earlier, the Churchill aura had permeated the rhetoric in 1999. When Blair came to Washington, Clinton offered him options of staying either in the White House or in Blair House. If the former, Clinton told Blair, 'You can sleep in the same bed as Churchill did.' Blair responded: 'I hope it's appropriate.' Clinton warned him: 'As long as you don't parade around naked before the bath. You're too young and too trim.'[68]

Churchill held transatlantic currency on war and in the debates leading to war. The idealization of Churchill and the cult of the figure so pervasively represented in diplomatic language was born, according to Wheatcroft, about fifteen years after the Second World War. A twenty-seven-part series, *The Valiant Years*, based on Churchill's book *The Second World War*, was screened in the United Kingdom throughout 1960 and 1961. Despite detractions, a stream of films have been produced that have reinforced the imagery associated with the 'bulldog,' the larger than life character, 'with the scowls and the jowls, the

hats and the cigars,' the slur in his voice invoking infamous inebriation even when he was sober. For collective memory, this is the Churchill that matters and that will resonate. Any number of learned studies, texts, journal articles that might reinforce or criticize, or undermine such imagery is outweighed by the thousands 'whose knowledge of him comes from cinema and television.'[69] That is the Churchill that contemporary public diplomacy, rhetoric, and imagery seeks to evoke and of course that is the Churchill that will provoke an emotional response. He was a symbol of resolution, robust resistance, and the personification of courage.[70]

When cultural affinity endures, metaphor and analogy reverberate and communicate far more effectively; they are self-consciously and frequently deployed. They matter for several reasons. In a study on metaphor and linguistic evolution, Lakoff, writing on the 1991 Gulf War, put it succinctly: Metaphors 'limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with.'[71] In Roland Paris's analysis, adapting Aristotle, they help us to see things that we otherwise do not perceive. Above all the provision of an intelligible framework is essential. In the case of Kosovo and the wars after 9/11 the predominant reference for Clinton, Blair, and Bush was the 'good war,' itself an invention of the 1980s. Churchill stood for resolution, Hitler for evil personified, Munich and appeasement for weakness, and Roosevelt for foresight and solidarity. Of course the diplomatic history is far more complicated and has been explored extensively, not least by the likes of Warren Kimball and Lloyd Gardner.[72] But instead of providing any credible insight from history, leaders opt rather for 'storytelling' that 'evokes widely remembered experiences from the past in order to make sense of the present.'[73] What is frequently taking place in the culture of a shared transatlantic experience, or at least a shared sense of purpose and values, is that the story is moving from the 'episodic' and 'configurational' dimensions of narrative, that is stories grounded in chronology, events, and an order to the second dimension centered on 'emplotment,' which is what transforms the narrative into story, providing it with a greater meaning. According to Wertsch, what this process does is '"grasps together" the detailed actions or … the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole … [and] extracts a configuration from a succession.'[74] Effective narratives on national security need to engage 'deeper identity narratives … people *are* eager for a rhetoric that would help return them to that ordered narrative state.' Storytelling is a key to the search for cultural stability and identity. It was difficult on Kosovo, yet there was little immediate skepticism of the rhetoric immediately after 9/11.[75]

Almost a year before the Kosovo intervention began, the Clinton administration had passed an Executive Order (13088) that identified the 'unusual and extraordinary' threat the situation posed to the United States because it was feared that the conflict might destabilize the region. Thus Paris argues that

apart from the more dominant metaphors, the 'powder keg' and its associ-
ation with the Balkan region and the First World War were also frequently
operative in the language of policy makers. Added to this the Holocaust was
invoked to kindle reaction to the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Milošević;
Vietnam as a cautionary tale, Munich as appeasement. Clinton's language
conflated the two: The powder keg threatened the peace and stability of the
region and as he stated in October 1998, 'what is already a humanitarian dis-
aster could turn into a catastrophe.'[76] When Clinton took to building public
support the Hitler analogy entered the frame. He asked a crowd of union
members, 'What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to
Adolf Hitler earlier? How many people's lives might have been saved, and how
many American lives might have been saved?' On another occasion, invoking
appeasement he warned, 'The dangers of acting must be weighed against the
dangers of inaction.'[77] Clinton invoked the memories of the Second World War
and the need to keep Europe, safe, secure, free, and united. Moreover, in his
call to action he reverted to practicality, assuming that the diplomatic track had
been exhausted, 'If we don't do it now, we'll have to do it later, more people will
die, and it will cost more money.' Bosnia was after all 'a genocide in the heart of
Europe. It did not happen in 1945; it was going on in 1995.' It could be repeated
in Kosovo.[78] Both Clinton and Blair invoked NATO credibility and the import-
ance of the alliance: 'And we ought to consider what would happen if we and
our allies were to stand aside and let innocent people be massacred at NATO's
doorstep. That would discredit NATO because we didn't keep our word.'[79] The
situation was now part of a larger emplotment; echoes of the Second World
War, security, stability, and cohesion seasoned their rhetoric. Clinton took it
further than just NATO; there was a need to safeguard 'a Europe, safe, secure,
united, a good partner for trade, and someone who will share our burden in
solving the problems of the world.'[80] So long as Tony stood by, Kipling could
be considered.

Of course, the rhetoric in part created a trap. Clinton and Blair had no long-
term plans at that stage; they understood that the bombing might go on for a
few days, but certainly not the weeks that eventuated. Wesley Clark, NATO's
supreme allied commander, had stated that Milošević's retribution against the
Kosovo Albanians was entirely predictable.[81] As the NATO bombing began,
however, the repeated Clinton message on resolution was questioned in the
New York Times and elsewhere. R. W. Apple observed that airpower in pursuit
of political goals had rarely worked, 'unless combined with resolute action on
the ground.'[82] Clinton repeatedly ruled ground troops out, absent a 'permis-
sive environment':[83] 'I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a
war,' both reassuring US opinion, but also providing Milošević with 'incentive
to hang on,' according to Apple.[84] Despite the proximity of the 50th anniver-
sary of NATO, US resolution was questioned by Senator John McCain: 'What

you'll get is all the old Vietnam stuff, bombing pauses, escalation, negotiations, trouble.'[85] Clinton made clear that the bombing was also 'to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo.'[86] Yet of course, without ground troops that was not the case and the violence on the ground intensified as Serb forces took advantage of the 'permissive environment' as they saw it.[87] A 'ranking officer' in Brussels argued that airpower was the only option because no one was willing to put in the ground troops 'that they thought it would take to keep the Serbs from having their way with the 1.8 million ethnic Albanians in the province.' Clinton told *CBS News* that introducing ground troops worried him for fear 'of never being able to get them out.'[88] The point here is not to reopen the debate on tactics, credibility, and NATO's purpose and anniversary, but rather to juxtapose the references on resolve and credibility, the invocation of genocide, the Holocaust, and the need to resist, but only *partially*; the rhetoric invoked Munich, the practice Vietnam. The Pentagon spokesman, Kenneth Bacon, went on record and indicated: 'In the Pentagon, in this building, we were not surprised by what Milošević has done. I think there is historical amnesia here if anyone says they are surprised by this campaign.'[89] The Independent Commission on Kosovo concluded that: 'NATO also underestimated the obvious risk that the Serbian government would attack the Kosovo Albanians.'[90] The diplomatic option that might have avoided this had not been exhausted. But once deployed the analogy is difficult to retract. Gillespie writes that 'such glib equations necessarily preclude any sort of diplomatic or non-military settlement of the Kosovo matter. You don't negotiate peace with a Hitler. Unconditional surrender and total capitulation are the only acceptable terms.'[91]

Historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto was outraged at the language used by Clinton and Blair: 'On the NATO side, the war of abuse is designed to justify the war of bombs. If you want to bomb, you first erect a target, create a Hitler, invoke a holocaust.' The war was 'horrible enough' without the 'ludicrous' lies. While Fernández-Armesto moved to rebuke the analogies, he also observed that the comparison was counterproductive because it would be difficult to understand the enemy, Milošević, by fusing Serb motivations 'with other instances of undifferentiated evil.' Further, 'the language-gerrymandering subverts NATO by bringing the alliance into disrepute.' Finally, the lies focus attention on NATO's weak legal position; they did not have the authority to act against a sovereign country, especially in a counterproductive and selective manner. There was no such humanitarian outrage or compulsion in East Timor, Burma, Rwanda, Kurdistan, or Tibet.[92]

Despite pressures from Blair and in part because of the pressures of the Vietnam syndrome Clinton avoided ground forces. In any case German chancellor Schröder made it clear that he would veto such an option in NATO, 'he described the alliance's disagreement as "this specifically British debate."'

John Keegan, the military historian, told the *New York Times* that Blair was taking immense risks. He was not experienced in war, yet the public supported him, but it was a populist support, most likely to be influenced by the defiant narratives and metaphors: 'Those who cheer him on do so in the spirit of football supporters.' Even if Blair wanted to extend the depth of the burden, apart from Schröder, Clinton did not want ground troops in harm's way. Anthony King, professor of government at the University of Essex, indicated that Blair's conduct was historically typical of British diplomacy. Churchill had made the war 'a very personal affair and went in for great personal symbolism.' He posed with bowler hats and Tommy guns, visited the bomb sites, the wreckage. Blair was doing what he thought was right. Certainly a deep communication with and working on US presidents was a part of this culture after 1938: 'British prime ministers have been in the business of trying to influence American presidents for a large part of this century … Churchill regarded wooing and winning over Franklin Roosevelt as a prime mission of his life, Attlee was always busy with Truman, and Thatcher made it her business to work on both Reagan and Bush.'[93]

The ties that bind and the sinews of the 'special relationship' that all three protagonists played on were a larger part of the Anglo-American relationship. In their communications, in their friendships, in the process and policies that they advanced, they were doing so within a well-founded culture. They talked about NATO's future and credibility, they set their rhetoric in the broad spectrum of postwar activity, and they invoked burdens and occasionally the discourse on civilization and clearly saw themselves as a kernel within the larger Western nut. There was, at a personal level, genuine friendship and affection, acknowledged by all in their memoirs. Within the broader culture they spoke the same language, not just literally, but figuratively. If Blair struggled to get Clinton to accept ground troops in Kosovo, on Iraq, even if he sought broader legitimacy, he did not have to struggle.

CULTURE MATTERS: FOUNDATIONS AND WINDMILLS

How special was the 'special relationship'? Of course the historiography has several clusters of interpretation, of those who emphasize and those who denigrate, those who see bridges and those who see oceans. Those who recognize its existence but argue that the whole affair is up and heading for divorce and those who insist that despite patterns of waxing and waning, that the enduring aspects of a certain shared culture and outlook will endure. Famously, there are those who suggest that the notion of 'special' is more important for middle powers or declining powers, seeking to craft relations that will perpetuate UK power and influence; cultivating the 'special' in the relationship is a part of

grand strategy. Reynolds, for instance, argues the relationship was of British strategic importance to benefit from US power.[94] On the cases considered above, if the United States was the indispensable power, Tony Blair saw Britain as the 'pivotal power.' The idea was repeated several times, succinctly put, while visiting India in 2002, and a draft of his speech advanced the idea:

> It is using the strengths of our history, our geography, our language, the unique set of links with the United States, Europe, the Commonwealth, our position within the UN and NATO, the skills and reputation of our armed services and our contribution to debt and development issues to be a pivotal player, to be that force for good for our own nation and the wider world … I have been clear for some time that that is our role, and it has been clearer still since the events of September 11. It's a role we should embrace with real confidence, resisting nostalgia and refusing to retreat into isolationism.[95]

Assessing Blair's role in the Anglo-American relationship and the war in Iraq, Danchev writes: 'The special relationship is an unusually self-conscious one. It creates its own myths and propagates its own legends. What is special about it is its capacity to do this – to invent and reinvent itself, to exploit its mythical potential – which may be as close as we get to its occult essence.'[96] Certainly there was both invention, a propensity to reference the legends, to reinvent roles and friendships, and of course in the Blair doctrine and Clinton rhetoric reference to the potential that the partnership had to offer to tackle world problems or to fashion new orders. Exaggerated as the metaphors, analogies, and rhetoric were, Clinton, Blair, and Bush also self-consciously operated within readings of their shared culture and diplomacy that rhymes in history. In part it was the echo of these rhymes that informed the content of their rhetoric. There is little that is lost in translation when the images and rhetoric of Churchill or Roosevelt are played or played on again; even if it is not *Casablanca* December 1941, the injunction remains: 'You must remember this.'[97] Clinton, Blair, and Bush recalled moments of tense but affectionate solidarity, they recalled the personal affiliation of Roosevelt and Churchill; in this they stretched when they transposed it to the crisis in the Balkans. Despite exaggeration in the charged atmosphere of September 2001 few contested their words. On Iraq, they simply deceived, perhaps themselves, certainly others.

But, that political rhetoric would not have worked had there not been some substance within and behind their words. Dobson makes an important point in a digression on methodology. Adapting Einstein, he argues that change happens in any relationship, yet there is a tendency to think in *static* terms. Still, there is little need to move to extreme relativism and suggestions of constant or frequent reinvention, there must be some wavering stability to our forms of knowledge: 'It is not to suggest that Anglo-American relations can

only be explained in as many ways as there are people who take an interest, all of whom have different perspectives.' One cannot impose 'preconceived' and 'artificial patterns' onto any period of the transatlantic history 'that are not true to the way the historical actors perceived of the way things were at the time.'[98]

Certainly Blair, Clinton, and Bush held particular interpretations and understandings of the 'special relationship' and they all at the various points discussed above reached out to play on these understandings. Blair reached more than the others, but that would also be typical of a weaker power seeking access and influence and perhaps he too confused 'access' with 'influence'. In his mind he had made certain calculations on Iraq and had convinced himself, even in the face of opposition all around him, to push the case on war. And if the Chilcot Inquiry argued that the relationship most probably would have survived Anglo-American disagreement, just as relations were quickly repaired after Suez between 1957 and 1961,[99] Blair thought it inconceivable not to stand with his friend. The costs were enormous.

Yet the affiliation and the proposition of standing shoulder to shoulder would not have been possible without the sense of a shared culture, not just a set of shared interests or objectives. The 'spat' over Suez in 1956 revolved around interests; the reconciliation involved both interests and culture. The advent of Obama's election and subsequent pivot to Asia prompted Dobson and Marsh to reassess the relationship and contextualize those who suggested the relationship was in terminal decline. Without rehearsing their interpretation of the post-2009 period, their central objective (among others) was to assess the weight of history. In doing so they necessarily recount the periods of affiliation and of aggravation. H. C. Allen is observed to say in 1959: 'I cannot but ask myself whether the Anglo-American relationship, if it could survive the Suez crisis, can not survive anything.' Soon after the British were given access to Polaris in 1962, earlier in 1958 they signed the Mutual Defence Agreement. National security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, and President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) bemoaned the absence of the British in Vietnam; Bundy wanted a brigade, LBJ would have settled for a 'platoon of bagpipers.' Tellingly, the utility of the British role was emphasized to LBJ by the secretary of state, Dean Rusk before a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1967: 'Tell him we must have reliable allies. Congress and American people will not permit us to stand alone.' Of course there are the strains of these years, the tensions of the Heath period. The Thatcher–Reagan relationship was infamous for its composure and closeness despite tests in 1982 and 1983 in the South Atlantic and the Caribbean. Differences dogged the Clinton–Major years on Bosnia and other issues.[100] According to Dobson and Marsh the 'catalyst for another "bounce-back" was Blair's election in 1997.' There were shared ideas and political outlooks and agendas, there was a warmth and personal reliance in the friendships. They conclude from their reading of history that the relationship

is frequently and repeatedly deemed to be on its deathbed, and 'Lazarus-like' it is resurrected, 'to reinvent itself, and to confound those who seek to consign it to history.'[101]

Though Dumbrell centers his analysis in defense, intelligence, and foreign policy, without lapsing into sentimentality, he argues, culture does matter. He quotes Geertz to the effect: 'The concept of culture denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conception expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about attitudes towards life.'[102] Even if US orientalism[103] and American exceptionalism[104] pull against affiliation and shared cultural experience, especially at the elite level of diplomatic history and especially during and after the Second World War, the relationship has remained outside the solicitors' offices, even if at times temporary separation is required, it has not ended in divorce. In part the Cold War and the narrative and institutions of the West maintained their relevance, but beneath that and within those relationships and institutions, the cultural affiliation suggests that more is shared diplomatically, in defense, and in intelligence than with other allies. The glue that united Clinton, Blair, and then Bush were not just the crises that they faced, in which the British were indispensable to the Americans, but the 'pattern of meaning' held within their minds, the 'inherited conceptions' of the past, indeed their interpretation of that inheritance, and their knowledge of and attitudes towards that legacy. That they chose so frequently to invoke the metaphors, the language, the images of Churchill and the 'good war' spoke to their realization of the likely resonance that such rhetorical disposition might evoke.

Moreover, Dobson and Marsh argue that 'there is an enduring narrative of Anglo-American relations that carries this self-reinforcing dynamic between sentiment and interest across time, borne variously by Churchillian sentimentality, cultural sinews, and US–UK public diplomacy.' The Camp David meetings, the Bush–Blair reclusion days before war in 2003, symbolically and immediately resonant of the Roosevelt–Churchill wartime collaborations; these 'elites convey frequently an impression that Anglo-American interests and mutual affection march together in a shared destiny.'[105] Of course the Iraqi quagmire is not what they had in mind, but at that time their minds were filled with an illusionary destiny, built on sentiment and belief, built on the pursuit of a mirage that for them perhaps reflected the order that Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman, and then Mac and Jack built.[106] Their illusions were built on the foundations of collective memory.

'Values, shared histories, and cultures do matter' the duo continue, 'they are genuinely ties that bind Anglo-American relations, not only because they generate trust and affinity, but also because they encourage shared interpretations of the world and how the world should be.'[107] In that sense, the stability of

culture across time provides for an important interpretive framework or para-digm, without which the life of ideas would be nasty, brutish, and short.[108] Of course, it is also imperative to note that there is reinvention, rhythm, and rhyme in history. The methodologies of history, diplomatic history, and the history of hegemony and empire have changed dramatically since the 1940s on both sides of the Atlantic.[109] Some of these have invited us to understand the world and the Anglo-American structures of order in very different ways, including issues of leadership, a prescribed destiny, order, and burden, many of which are ana-chronistic. But Blair was in the moment and under such circumstances, for a conviction politician, 'fixed in his folly, may think, he can turn the wheel on which he turns,' as T. S. Eliot wrote in *Murder in the Cathedral.*[110] To adapt Roger Chartier, he was perhaps too fixed in the *mentalité* of the Anglo-American relationship.[111] Ironically, Blair, Bush, and Clinton played on the stereotypes of Churchillian resolve and resistance; they did so in the *static* frames that they knew their respective publics would absorb. When the images of history are on your side there is little need for revisionists. In 1940 Churchill observed, 'If we open up a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future.'[112]

Dobson and Marsh argue that 'the most important, if difficult to quantify, reciprocity for Britain within the special relationship is the United States' ability and willingness to continue supporting and shaping an international system that Roosevelt and Churchill largely crafted and in which Britain has profound vested interests. Long ago the British calculated that supporting the United States would best preserve their interest.'[113] Odd that Blair would fall into the long-term patterns and trends. Dobson and Marsh quote him from December 2001 presciently: 'This is a moment to seize. The kaleido-scope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder this world around us.'[114] Of course Blair did not envisage a Britain without the United States, but he did see the British as the pivotal power between Washington, Europe, and the Commonwealth. The vision was perhaps a product of illusion as the United States and its allies entered into one of its most significant strategic debacles in the last half-century.

Potentially Blair's pivotal position could also be a lonely position. The 'spe-cial relationship' perhaps deceived Blair into believing there was a transatlantic alternative to Europe, unlike Guy Mollet, French prime minister after Suez, who took heed of German chancellor Konrad Adenauer's remark, that 'Europe will be your revenge.'[115] Even before Kosovo or 9/11 and Iraq, Kathleen Burk identified dangers of 'supporting the US even when the US does the seemingly insupportable' simply to ensure that Britain remained the indispensable ally,

in the expectation that Washington will reciprocate.[116] Sometimes, it is worth holding on to your bagpipes. Culture binds; culture blinds.

CONCLUSION

Blair played a pivotal role in cementing affiliations within broader coalitions that took the United States and the United Kingdom to war in 1999 and 2003. The leaders of the Anglo-American-dominated coalitions formed personal friendships that were no doubt deep and sincere, which also paved the way to cooperative and hasty arrangements for war in Kosovo and Iraq. Their shared culture, their shared language, their shared wartime histories propelled the three protagonists to rush into wars, one producing ambivalent outcomes, the other a disaster for the countries and peoples involved. Though there were coalitions, both institutional and of 'the willing,' the military interventions were very much directed by the United States with 'pivotal' British support. In both cases there was transatlantic opposition and a deep reticence on going to war. Yet within the United States, especially after the Vietnam War, multilateralism and burden sharing was deemed essential by the so-called 'reluctant warriors' in the Pentagon; in these cases the British were indispensable. It was not just a case of shared perception and belief, Blair, Clinton, and Bush built on a shared culture, a history of 'partnership' in war augmented by the cultural narratives, analogies, and shared histories of the Second World War, frequently invoking Churchillian rhetoric to legitimize their stance. They also built on the history of the Anglo-American 'special' relationship. The analogies deployed not only helped galvanize public support but also framed the wars in various ways. The word 'frame' not only conjures up a framework that suggests a particular way of looking at things, but also the negative connotation 'to frame' or to set up.[117] The cultural binds facilitated the passage to war; to some extent the protagonists were blinded by the shared cultural frame.

NOTES

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107 Dobson and Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations,' 688.

108 Ernest Gellner, *Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 113.

109 David Ryan, 'The US Postcolonial e/Empire: The Case of the Missing Upper Case Empire,' in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh (eds), *Anglo-American Relations and the Transmission of Ideas: A Shared Political Tradition?* (New York: Berghahn, forthcoming).

110 T. S. Eliot, *Murder in the Cathedral* (London: Faber & Faber, [1935] 1976), line 289.

111 Roger Chartier, *Cultural History: Between Practices and* Representations, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), 34.

112 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, 'A Star Is Born,' *New York Review of Books*, 65:1 (2018), 23.

113 Dobson and Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations,' 689.

114 *Ibid.*, 689, citing 'Blair Quoted by Jack Straw, Speech at the Royal United Services Institute,' December 11, 2001.

115 David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2000), 128–130.

116 Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 13.

117 Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (London: Verso, 2016).

CONCLUSION

Culture, 'specialness,' and new directions[1]

ROBERT M. HENDERSHOT AND STEVE MARSH

> It is special. It just is. And that's that.
>
> Margaret Thatcher[2]

The fundamental objective of this project was to make a simple, perhaps seemingly self-evident point: culture matters to the vitality of the Anglo-American special relationship and to our understanding of it. By adopting a suggestive rather than prescriptive approach to how culture matters, the chapters of this volume have done more than illuminate myriad Anglo-American cultural interconnections. Rather, through their diverse methodologies and topics, they have also expanded the boundaries of investigation into Anglo-American relations and opened up new analytical spaces in which to evaluate their operational dynamics.

Mine down into this headline achievement and it becomes evident that, as a collective, the chapters in this volume also reveal three more detailed things about the intersection between culture and the reputed 'specialness' of US–UK relations. First, they demonstrate the ambient nature of cultural perceptions of a special Anglo-American relationship, as well as the power of these perceptions to influence diplomacy. For example, Finn Pollard's exploration of the popular novels of P. G. Wodehouse establishes that readers in both the United States and the United Kingdom were increasingly exposed to a new, influential, and warmer narrative of Anglo-American relations in the period preceding the Great War. Via an impressive dissection of the novels as well as the historical and literary context in which Wodehouse created them, Pollard's work clearly establishes a correlation between shifts in popular cultural perceptions and shifts in diplomatic relations. Furthermore, his work intimates that the causes of the 'Great Rapprochement,' Anglo-American wartime alliances, and

the subsequent special relationship have more to do with widespread cultural understandings of international relationships than previously allowed. These ideas are further supported by Srdjan Vucetic's inductivist discourse analysis of British history textbooks, which identifies three 'master images' of the United States that have been mostly positive, exhibit impressive continuity over time, and have the ability to influence the cultural underpinnings of the special relationship. In revealing how specific readings of the relationship are embedded into the formal education of children, Vucetic's work explains how perceptions of special Anglo-American relations have been tied to British national identity, and thus how expectations of continuing Anglo-American friendship have remained pervasive over time.

The contributions of Jonathon Stubbs and Dana Cooper advance similarly the extensiveness of Anglo-American cultural interaction and popular perception of special relations. Stubbs' examination of how the British and American national film industries grew intertwined in the interwar period, the Second World War's impact on Anglo-American film relations, and the postwar protectionist policies and internationalization of the movie business, establishes a US–UK film industry relationship that was long unequal but nevertheless financially and culturally entangled. His analysis of the influence of cinema in shaping public opinion during the Second World War is especially revealing of the entertainment industry's power to form united British and American perceptions of international events, which in turn has facilitated conjoined action. For her part Cooper skillfully uses the *Downton Abbey* television series and its historical subject matter, the 'dollar princesses,' to both illustrate how popular media can impart a narrative of intimate Anglo-American relations on a massive transatlantic audience and to justify her assertion that these lines of investigation represent 'a new way in which to understand the cultural norms and "special relationship" between these two countries.' Through her analysis of mutual British and American engagement with the show, Cooper demonstrates how its dialogue and storylines prompt modern audiences to address issues of Anglo-American identity and difference, but always against the cultural backdrop of *Downton*'s blended Anglo-American family.

The second important finding arising from our exploration of the impact of culture upon Anglo-American relations is that the chapters expose repeatedly cultural contributions to the unusual durability and longevity of the US–UK relationship. In some cases, as Steve Marsh demonstrates, traditional diplomatic acts sound strong and carefully modulated cultural resonances. The diplomatic pageantry of Anglo-American summits – including the symbolic use of cultural artifacts – and associated media coverage have contributed to the public's general impression of a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. Moreover, official deployment of a selective narrative at these events has served to methodically (re-)legitimize Anglo-American

cooperation and embed culturally the concept of the special relationship. Very different, but equally important, are the nonpurposive consequences of the transatlantic transmission of ideas. Consider, for example, Alan Dobson's persuasive exposition of how British and American versions of liberal political doctrine are so central to both nations' political traditions that they have transcended national boundaries. Indeed, given that British and American political cultures have been locked in a long-standing transatlantic dialogue, Dobson establishes the logicality of how two cultures with a shared ideology and a common political culture would continue to form like-minded views and experience similar reactions to outside stimuli. As such, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the special relationship owes its durability in part to the likelihood that similar US–UK cultural worldviews will normally render not dissimilar Anglo-American interpretations of even massive changes in the international system.

The studies of commemoration and collective memory contained in this volume underscore further the importance of culture to the special relationship's adaptability and durability. For example, Sam Edwards reveals how 'memory diplomacy' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was effectively utilized to cultivate closer Anglo-American ties. In particular, his analysis of the placement of a new statue of the first US president outside London's National Gallery as well as the rededication and memorialization of Sulgrave Manor, Washington's ancestral family estate in Northamptonshire, demonstrates how commemoration has impacted perceptions of US–UK connections. By re-Anglicizing George Washington, the British also reformulated memory of America's 1776 Revolution, promoting a new story in which the act of rebellion against Britain was de-emphasized and the successful transatlantic transplantation of democratic principles uniting Britain with the United States was correspondingly emphasized. Robert Hendershot's chapter demonstrates similar themes. Analyzing a broader pattern of Anglo-American 'places of memory' on both sides of the Atlantic, his work reveals how historical markers, statues of historic figures, and churches have been used to create and preserve, via generational transmission, an Anglo-American imagined community. Revealing the government agendas behind (and popular reception of) a hegemonic Anglo-American narrative designed to celebrate US–UK cooperation and cement perceptions of collective culture, Hendershot's chapter illustrates how a heavily manipulated but influential version of the past has become physically as well as rhetorically ambient in both nations.

The third important finding to emerge from the chapters is how US–UK cultural connections have been sufficiently powerful to make major social impacts on these countries, as well as to influence the operation of their diplomatic partnership. While each contribution to the volume has informed this conclusion, the chapters by Thomas Mills and David Ryan engage this point

most directly. In his analysis of the Beatles' impact on capitalist consumer culture as well as gender and racial politics in the United States, Mills reveals how the band and Beatlemania fundamentally influenced the social norms of the era. His work also illustrates the complexities arising from Anglo-American familiarity and cultural interpenetration, for the British rock band was able to change the United States even while the group's humor and charm, as well as American perceptions of British respectability, helped to mask the Beatles' culturally subversive elements from the white American middle class. As to the direct influence of Anglo-American cultural sharing on the formation of US and UK foreign policies, Ryan's chapter evidences the ways in which British and American leaders can and do manipulate historical memory and employ specific narratives of the special relationship to rationalize and organize military interventions. By explaining how in the contexts of wars in Kosovo and Iraq these narratives were augmented by civilizational discourse and memories of past Anglo-American partnership, Ryan reveals how strategic concerns, foreign policy, and domestic politics were shaped by shared systems of meaning with the ability to both empower and constrain, and bind or blind, British and American leaders.

The special relationship is, then, more than merely a convenient shorthand term referencing functional cooperation between the American and British governments; it is also an intangible but influential cultural construct that exists in the consciousness of both societies. As represented through innumerable artifacts, including but not limited to books, films, television programs, monuments, churches, and Beatle wigs, the concept of a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom has become an element of social reality shared by Britons and Americans. Grounded in conjoint ideologies, sustained by constructed but nevertheless collective memories, and periodically renewed by mutual government performance, the special relationship has always been greater than the sum of convergent diplomatic, economic, and strategic concerns.

It is thus tempting at this point to stop and declare mission accomplished: culture matters. Yet this would be as misleading a representation as the famous 'Mission Accomplished' banner that formed the backdrop to President George W. Bush's speech aboard USS *Abraham Lincoln* on 1 May 2003.[3] This book may have made the case for considering culture more centrally within interpretations of the Anglo-American relationship, but its chapters reveal also how much more can and needs to be done to appreciate fully the breadth, depth, and influence of the cultural tapestry that through time has done much to weave and bind Britain and American together. For example, many of the chapters engage the abilities of diverse nonstate actors, from the US National Society of Colonial Dames to the Beatles, to influence the relationship between Britain and America. Various chapters address, too, the roles of the news

media, private businesses, philosophers, authors, movie studios, and artists, but there is so much more opportunity for analysis in each of these areas. And one might logically wonder, what of all the other types of nonstate actors not engaged herein?

The contributions of Cooper, Edwards, Hendershot, Marsh, and Ryan each examine the power of collective memory to shape the special relationship, but there are more veins of memory to be mined, and of course, memory is ever-changing. There are also many other areas of culture that deserve further investigation and analysis. Mills and Edwards both engage the importance of racial constructs and racism to Anglo-American relations, but there are innumerable questions surrounding these issues that warrant future books and articles. For example, how did American racism and segregation policies influence British evaluations of their special partner in the Cold War? Comparably, Mills and Edwards, along with Cooper and Pollard, consider gender norms in the course of their arguments, but this is another field of culture where there remain many more questions than one book can answer. For instance, how has the growing gender and racial diversity of the Anglo-American foreign policy elite influenced the operation of the special relationship? Has attachment to the special relationship been influenced by shifting physical and demographic centers of electoral power? Similarly, Hendershot's chapter gives a taste of the religious dimension of Anglo-American relations but as shared religious perspectives have long been regarded as an essential component of an Anglo-American worldview, more study of this topic can only be beneficial. For instance, has the decline of churchgoing in Britain and its growth in the United States in recent generations impacted the special relationship? Do shared religious perspectives exert the same influence on contemporary Anglo-American positions as they did during the early Cold War?

Consider, too, issues such as political culture and class. Dobson has established a platform on which other scholars can build by seeking answers to related questions of ideology and the transatlantic transference of ideas, assumptions, and prejudices. For instance, further study is needed of how Britain's comparatively stronger engagement with socialism has been received in America and potentially influenced the special relationship. The varying British and American approaches to social class, long a significant difference between these societies, also call out to be placed into context with the special relationship. Cooper and Mills both engage with issues of social class in this volume, and Stubbs's chapter notes how the ostensibly classless nature of US society portrayed in film has served as a powerful magnet for the British working class, but again there remains much work to be done. How have these nations' historically competing concepts of hierarchy and equality influenced Anglo-American cooperation? Have British and American stereotypes based on perceptions of social class impacted public opinions of the

special relationship? What about the cultural biases of Anglophobia in the United States and anti-Americanism in the United Kingdom – how have these affected and been affected by the special relationship? The subject of cultural differences between the United States and the United Kingdom, and their significance to Anglo-American partnership, could easily become the focus of another new edited volume, and undoubtedly should be.

It has taken a long time for the study of culture, as opposed to frequent and uncritical passing reference to it, to establish even a toehold within the voluminous work on Anglo-American relations and the special relationship. Yet as Britain heads into the turbulent and unchartered waters of Brexit, and the United States plunges toward another potentially polarizing presidential election, now is a particularly poignant time to reflect upon what culturally divides, as well as unites, these two nations. It is therefore our sincere hope that this volume encourages more scholars to research the cultural frontiers of Anglo-American relations. Thoroughly mapping each of them will take determination and time, for in-depth engagement with 'the sharing and transmission of memory, ideology, emotions, lifestyles, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols'[4] is complex and difficult work. But the work is important. It moves us toward a more nuanced and holistic understanding of what the special relationship was, is and how it operates, because in all the ways explored here and more, culture matters. It just does. And that's that.

NOTES

1 We wish to acknowledge our indebtedness to our contributors for their expertise, insights, and professionalism in delivering this ambitious project – not to mention also their unfailing good humor about and tolerance of our editorial queries.

2 Margaret Thatcher, 'Speech at British Residence (banquet)', 20 February 1985, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105971 (accessed 14 May 2020).

3 Kathleen T. Rhem, 'President Bush Proclaims End to Major Combat Ops in Iraq', American Forces Press Service, 1 May 2003, US Department of Defense, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29032 (accessed 14 May 2020).

4 Akira Iriye, 'Culture', *Journal of American History*, 77:1 (1990), 100.

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