HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS

23rd ANNUAL INSTALLMENT

EDITED BY
JAN-OLA ÖSTMAN
JEF VERSCHUEREN

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Handbook of Pragmatics
23rd Annual Installment

Handbook of Pragmatics

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Handbook of Pragmatics

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Editors' note

This year's Annual Installment of the *Handbook of Pragmatics*, the 23rd edition, brings you two articles on methods and traditions that have played and keep playing an important role within the scope of linguistic pragmatics, one on methods in language-attitudes research (Tore Kristiansen), the other about Membership Categorization Analysis (Karin Idevall Hagren). In addition, a variety of pragmatic topics is dealt with: one is grammar-oriented (on argument structure, by Adele Goldberg), three concentrate on aspects of interaction (Emily Hofstetter and Leelo Keevallik on embodied interaction, Salvatore Attardo on humor, and Aino Koivisto and Jarkko Niemi on institutional interaction), and one on the socio-politically relevant notion of hegemony (Hartmut Haberland). Of these five, only the humor article (Salvatore Attardo) is an update of an earlier text. The others supplement different *Handbook* articles in a variety of ways. Argument structure (Adele Goldberg) is related to an older article on information structure (by Jeanette Gundel and Thorstein Fretheim). Embodied interaction (Emily Hofstetter and Leelo Keevallik) significantly adds to a more philosophically oriented article on embodiment (Liesbet Quaeghebeur). Hegemony (Hartmut Haberland) relates to texts on ideology (Simo Määttä and Sari Pietikäinen) and language ideologies (Paul Kroskrity). Institutional interaction (Aino Koivisto and Jarkko Niemi) further substantiates an article on social institutions (Richard Watts). Furthermore, to the many *Handbook* articles that focus on aspects of variability (such as Bernard Comrie's contribution on typology, and Klaus Schneider's on variational pragmatics), we now add one on pluricentric languages (Catrin Norrby, Jan Lindström, Jenny Nilsson and Camilla Wide) and one on universals (William McGregor). Finally, highlighting the way in which a well-known but little-understood notion functions in relation to language and communication in a non-western context, this volume offers an article on caste and language (by Rukmini Bhaya Nair).

For readers less familiar with the Handbook, a few words about its history and development may be useful.

When we launched the idea of a ***Handbook of Pragmatics*** under the auspices of the **International Pragmatics Association** (IPrA; https://pragmatics.international) in the early 1990s, we wanted to create a format that would be indefinitely moldable for and by the readership. The very essence of scientific research is that scientific insights change constantly. In a field like pragmatics, with the functioning and use of constantly changing styles and registers of language as its focus of research, we did not want to produce a single book as the ultimate 'handbook of pragmatics.' Since we saw this venture as a task

that would take decades, if we wanted to do it properly, we also did not want to start with categories and traditions beginning with "A" and after a couple of decades finally reaching "Z".

At that time, we settled for a loose-leaf publication format, relatively unorthodox in the humanities and social sciences. The idea was that this would enable us to gradually build up a changeable and expandable knowledge base for the users of the Handbook. Moreover, each individual reader would be able to group and re-group the entries according to his or her own preferences and particular interests, which no doubt would themselves be changing over time. So, with every three or four annual installment of the Handbook, the subscriber received a new ring binder in which to collect and order the new entries. The series of loose-leaf installments was preceded in 1995 with a hardback bound **Manual** which provided background information on a wide range of traditions and research methods underlying much of the pragmatic research described in the more topical entries of the annual installments. Needless to say that also this background information has evolved and has necessitated numerous new entries on traditions and methods in the loose-leaf installments. So far we have published 22 installments of some 300 pages each, in addition to the 658-page Manual. Subscribers to the loose-leaf version of the *Handbook of Pragmatics* should by now have a bookshelf filled with Manual plus 7 ring binders, reflecting the state of the art in the science of language use.

Meanwhile, the world has gradually become more and more digital. In the early 1990s hardly anyone could have foreseen the radical changes that have come to take place on the publishing scene. The *Handbook of Pragmatics* quickly followed suite, went online, and is available for readers as, precisely, the *Handbook of Pragmatics Online* (https://benjamins.com/online/hop/). The online version has been continuously updated with new material whenever and as soon as a new installment of the Handbook was published; and in cases where an entry has been totally rewritten, the older version has been retained in the Archive – all in the interest of giving readers a feeling of how the discipline itself has changed and evolved over the decades.

It is also the case that the online version has become the most often used version of the Handbook, both by individual scholars (especially by members of the International Pragmatics Association), and by many of their institutions and universities. The loose-leaf version on paper was seldom subscribed to by individuals, but we are happy to say that it did attract libraries and research groups. It is, however, challenging for libraries to make loose-leaf versions of books available for the general readership in a shape where all leaves/pages are physically "a-loose".

Faced with this situation, we decided in close discussions with John Benjamins Publishing Company to produce further installments of the ***Handbook of Pragmatics***, from the 21st installment onwards, in the form of bound publications, of which the one you are now holding in your hands is the third volume. One consequence of this change was that there was no installment in 2017. The annual regularity has meanwhile been restored

from 2018 onwards. We are convinced that this makes the Handbook easier to handle and more attractive not only for libraries, but also for scholars who still cherish the feel and satisfaction of reading a concrete book. Meanwhile, the online version continues to integrate all additions and changes.

The gist of the User's Guide for the *Handbook of Pragmatics* and its online version largely remain the same as before – see below. As in the loose-leaf version, we have a cumulative index (at the end of each volume), covering not only the present installment, but linking it to the entire *Handbook of Pragmatics*.

Acknowledgments

A project of this type cannot be successfully started, let alone completed, without the help of dozens, or even hundreds, of scholars. First of all, there are the authors themselves, who sometimes have had to work under extreme conditions of time pressure. Further, most members of the IPrA Consultation Board have occasionally, and some repeatedly, been called upon to review contributions. Innumerable scholars could have been added, whose input was essential for authors of the individual contributions.

Last but not least, the present editors want to make sure that the contribution made by the co-editors of the Manual and the first eight annual installments, is not forgotten: Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen were central to the realization of the project. Similarly, Eline Versluys acted as editorial assistant for a five-year period ending in 2009. Our sincerest thanks to all of them.

We hope the 23rd installment of the Handbook will serve your needs and inspire your future work.

Uppsala & Antwerp, June 2020.
Jan-Ola Östman & Jef Verschueren, editors

User's guide

Introduction

For the purpose of this publication, ***pragmatics*** can be briefly defined as *the cognitive, social, and cultural study of language and communication*. What this means exactly, and what it entails for the scientific status of linguistic pragmatics, was explained in detail in the introductory chapter, 'The pragmatic perspective' by Jef Verschueren, of the **Manual** (*Handbook of Pragmatics: Manual*, edited by Jef Verschueren, Jan-Ola Östman & Jan Blommaert, 1995).

The overall purpose of the **Handbook of Pragmatics** is that it should function as a tool in the search for *coherence*, in the sense of cross-disciplinary intelligibility, in this necessarily interdisciplinary field of scholarship. The background of the Handbook and its historical link with the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA), as well as its basic options, were described in the preface to the Manual. The Handbook format, although described in the same preface, will be presented anew in this **User's Guide** for the sake of clarity.

The **Handbook of Pragmatics** will continue to be available *online* (see https://benjamins.com/online/hop). The printed version will continue to be expanded with *new articles* and will also incorporate *revised versions* of older entries. *Updates* that require minimal changes will be published only in the annual online releases. In addition, ***Highlights*** from the Handbook have been published in ten thematically organized paperbacks (in 2009, 2010, and 2011; cf. https://benjamins.com/catalog/hoph), making the contents accessible in an affordable way for use as practical teaching tools and reading materials for a wide range of pragmatics-related linguistics courses focusing specifically on general pragmatic, philosophical, cognitive, grammatical, social, cultural, variational, interactive, applied, or discursive aspects, respectively.

The handbook format

The printed edition of the **Handbook of Pragmatics** contains three clearly distinct parts: the *Manual*, the *Handbook* proper, and the *Cumulative index*.

In addition to a preface and a general introduction, the ***Manual*** gathers basic instrumental information that the authors and readers of all the articles and entries in the

Handbook proper should be able to rely on, thus eliminating repetitions and extensive digressions. The following three areas are dealt with in the Manual:

i.   The major *traditions* or approaches in, relevant to, or underlying pragmatics, either as a specific linguistic enterprise or as a scientific endeavor in general. The articles in this section give an overview of the traditions and approaches in question, with historical background information and a description of present and potential interactions with other traditions or approaches and the field of pragmatics as a whole.

ii.   The major *methods of research* used or usable in pragmatics or pragmatics-related traditions.

iii. Different kinds of *notational systems*, including the most widespread transcription systems.

Obviously, these areas are closely interrelated and cannot be separated for any other than presentational purposes.

Even though methods change and traditions get reinterpreted constantly, the topics dealt with in the main body of the Handbook find a relatively stable frame of reference in the Manual; hence the bound format of the Manual. Yet, already at the time of its publication we were aware of a number of gaps which we are constantly – due to the changing field itself – trying to fill systematically. Therefore, the Installments of the Handbook over the years have also contained loose-leaf sections labeled in accordance with the three sections of the Manual: *Traditions*, *Methods*, and *Notational systems*. Articles in these sections were marked (in the upper right corner of the title page) '*TRADITIONS update*', etc. In the volumes that are to be published in bound format in the future, there will be separate TRADITIONS (etc.) sections whenever relevant, in addition to an alphabetically organized topical HANDBOOK A-Z section.

The main body of the **Handbook** consists of articles of various sizes, organized around entry-like key-words, alphabetically presented. They range in generality: some provide a general overview of a particular field (which cannot be captured under the label of a 'tradition'; see above), others discuss a specific topic in quite some detail. They present a state-of-the-art overview of what has been done on the topic. Where necessary, they also mention what has not been dealt with extensively (e.g. acquisitional and diachronic aspects), thus suggesting topics for further research. Important research in progress is mentioned where appropriate. In addition, some references to major works are given; these reference lists are kept reasonably restricted because of space limitations.

A different type of article in the body of the Handbook is devoted to the contributions made by an individual influential scholar and may contain interesting biographical information as well.

The Handbook attempts to document pragmatics dynamically. Consequently, a *loose-leaf* publication format was initially chosen for maximum flexibility and expandability (see the Editors' Note above) – properties that are even more characteristic of the

Handbook of Pragmatics *online*, which has therefore taken over that specific functionality to the point of rendering the loose-leaf printed format superfluous and replaceable by bound annual installments. By definition, there is no point in time when it is possible to say that the main body of the Handbook will be complete, though a reasonably comprehensive overview could be said to have been obtained after the eighth annual installment published in 2002, so that from then onwards, in addition to further *expansion*, there have been regular *revisions* and (in the online version) *updates* of older contributions. In the case of articles that are being replaced completely, the older versions are kept in the Archive section of the online version.

Even though we are now giving up paper publication in loose-leaf format, the very idea of continuous flexibility and expandability is retained. Being a vibrant field, pragmatics sees new openings and coherent subfields emerging constantly. Thus, every annual installment of the **Handbook of Pragmatics** will naturally also contain entries on such new directions of research.

About the cumulative index

At the end of each printed annual installment of the *Handbook of Pragmatics*, you will find a complete index, with all necessary cross-references to ensure easy access to the available information (which continuously accumulates over the years). The index thus does not only contain references to concepts and matters to be found in the annual installment at hand, but cross-references to all Handbook entries that have appeared in the *Handbook of Pragmatics*. Needless to say, this cumulative index is also continuously updated in the online version of the Handbook, where it also contains direct links to relevant articles.

In addition to references to specific handbook entries, the index also contains lists of terms which are not used as entry headings but which do occur as alternative labels in the literature, with an indication of where exactly the topics in question are treated in the Handbook.

Methods

Methods in language-attitudes research

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1.   The contested interest of 'language attitudes'

When students of 'attitudes to language' reflect on the methodological approach to apply in an investigation, they can choose from a number of both quantitative and qualitative methods. Like in any scientific endeavour, the choice of methods depends on *research interest* (the goal of study) and the *theory about the object* of study. I shall devote the first part of the chapter to elaborating on these primary issues (Sections 1–2), before moving on in the second part to dealing with concrete methods (Sections 3–6).

The issues of 'what we want to study' (research interest) and 'how we understand it' (theory of the object of study) are largely interconnected, but we may in a first step ask whether 'language attitudes' is at all relevant to shedding light on what we want to know about language. Only if the answer is positive, does it make sense in a next step to focus on how our theory of 'language attitudes' as an object of study confines the questions we ask about it, and the methods we use to study it.

Given that language is a tool of communication, it seems only natural that a first basic distinction in terms of research interest can be made between those scholars who focus on the tool (as an abstract autonomous structure), and those who focus on the tool's functioning (in concrete communication among humans in their communities). It goes without saying that there is no interest in 'language attitudes' in the former group. Within the latter group, i.e. scholars interested in the language–society interface, a second basic distinction can be made between those who are mainly interested in (describing and potentially solving) *social issues*, and those who are mainly interested in (describing and potentially explaining) *linguistic issues*. Interest in 'language attitudes' appears as an irregular ingredient of both the society-oriented approach (as in *the sociology of language* and *the social psychology of language*) and the language-oriented approach (as in *anthropological linguistics* and *sociolinguistics*).

Where do we find *pragmatics* in this picture? Any browse of subject indexes in textbooks and other relevant literature in the discipline (including this handbook) will reveal that 'language attitudes' is not considered an interest of pragmatics. This is as expected when work is conducted in accordance with a 'narrow' definition like: "Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are *grammatical-*

ized, or encoded in the structure of language" (Levinson 1983: 9; emphasis in original). However, as the breadth of scope (and hence the boundaries to neighbouring disciplines) has always been an open issue in pragmatics (as it indeed is in the first and last chapters of Levinson 1983), one might have expected 'language attitudes' to fall within the scope of approaches that build on 'broader' definitions like: "pragmatics is the study of the conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society" (Mey 1993: 42). If 'language attitudes' seems to fall outside the scope even of society-oriented pragmatics, the reason is likely to be found in a view of language-attitudes research as an approach that collects and analyses data which at best sheds light on superficial and rather uninteresting aspects of social norms.

In contrast to such a view, I find it arguable to consider 'language attitudes' to be not only "conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society", but very important such conditions. Mey qualifies his definition by adding the need to distinguish between a *societal* context which is primarily determined by society's institutions, and a *social* context which is primarily created in interaction. In harmony with this distinction, it is indeed a central concern of language-attitudes research to study how language-related values and evaluations are reproduced and changed as part of the social pressures that vibrate in the dialectic relationship between the levels of institutions (societal context) and ordinary everyday life (social context).

Since I write this chapter for the *Handbook of Pragmatics* as a social-psychologically oriented sociolinguist, it may be appropriate to stress, in the interest of avoiding erroneous expectations, that my conception of language-attitudes research is that it investigates 'attitudes to language' (cf. the title of Garrett 2010). It is not an investigation of the many ways attitudes can be expressed in or through language – which may be a default understanding among scholars in pragmatics.[1]

Yet, even if I have made this introductory claim that 'language attitudes' is a worthwhile object of study, and I have announced that it is (methods used to study) this object – in the sense of 'attitudes to language' – that is to be the theme of the chapter, we cannot ignore that, indeed, there seems to be a tendency for 'language-as-an-object-of-attitudes' to disappear the more pragmatics-oriented people (including social psychologists and sociolinguists) are, in their approaches to the study of language. While the contested relevance of language-attitudes research constitutes an overarching theoretical issue in the chapter, Section 2 explicates and discusses that issue in some detail, as

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1. The background for this comment is that I was invited to write a chapter on "Methods in (language) attitudes research", and accepted without taking much notice of the parentheses around *language*. Only towards the very end of my work on the chapter have I come to realize that the parentheses may have been a way of signalling a demand for a chapter which (at least to some extent) would deal with the pragmatic focus on how attitudes are expressed in or through language. That is not what this chapter is about. It is about methods used to study 'attitudes to language'.

a general backdrop to the later overview of methods. Readers with a sole interest in the overview might want to go directly to Sections 3–6.

2.   Language-attitudes as an object of study

There are a number of different ways of understanding and defining 'attitudes', and there are many and diverse ways in which 'language' can be conceived of as a potential target of attitudes. As to the understanding of 'attitudes', there is in particular an issue of *explicit* vs. *implicit* attitudes (levels or degrees of consciousness/awareness) to take into account (2.2), but first there is a distinction to be made between a *mentalist* approach and a *discursive* approach (2.1). Connected to the approaches and views concerning 'attitudes', there is, with regard to 'language', a first issue concerning the scope of social valorisation: are there limits to which aspects of language *can* be attitudinal objects? (2.3), and a subsequent issue concerning which aspects of language to focus on as attitudinal objects (2.4).

2.1   Attitudes: Mentalist vs. discursive approaches

The study of attitudes is the remit of *social psychology* and *social cognition*, and the research focus on 'attitudes to language' is associated with the sub-discipline called *the social psychology of language.*

The traditional approach to the study of attitudes in social psychology is of a *mentalist* kind, which assumes that attitudes exist as relatively stable and durable psychological structures in the brain. In Allport's (1935: 810) classic definition, an attitude is "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related". The cognitive processing of experiences is dealt with in much social psychological theory (intergroup theory in particular) in terms of *categorisation*, which implies *comparison*, which implies *evaluation* (routinely favouring 'us' in comparison with 'them'), which (may) lead to corresponding differential treatment in *behaviour* (Hogg & Abrams 1988). It should be pointed out that the question of how mental entities are linked to actual behaviour has always been disputed; it was famously demonstrated already by LaPiere (1934) that there is no necessary connection from what people say about how they will treat others to how they treat them in practice. Anyway, the disposition to respond (the state of readiness) is typically described in the mentalist tradition to have three aspects, relating to cognition, affect and behaviour (Garrett 2010: 23). Applied in concrete study design, this conception of attitude – as a tri-componental mental construct in the brain – invites ponderings on which component(s) to focus on, combined

with reflections on the capacity of available methods to ravel out the targeted (aspect of an) attitude from the conceptual realm.[2]

Emerging in social psychology in the late 1980s, the *discursive* approach moved attitudes as an object of study from the brain to language. This does not mean that linguistic issues became the focus of interest as opposed to social issues (in the sense of this distinction in Section 1 above). Potter & Wetherell (1987) take care to state this in the introduction to their pioneering book *Discourse and Social Psychology. Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour*: "it is important to emphasize that our concern is not purely with discourse per se; that is, we are not linguists attempting to add social awareness to linguistics through the addition of the study of pragmatics. We are social psychologists expecting to gain a better understanding of social life and social interaction from our study of social texts" (p. 7). Characterising human life in general, they make the point that "a large part of our activities are performed *through* language; our talk and writing do not live in some purely conceptual realm, but are mediums for action" (p. 9; emphasis in original). Beyond the central objects of study in traditional social psychology ('beyond attitudes and behaviour') – focus is put on language as a tool for interactional performance and the construction of social relations and identities. These identities should not be conceived of as something we *have*, to be unravelled from a conceptual realm; it is something we *do*, with language. To study this object, we need methods developed to study linguistic performance. Potter & Wetherell (1987: 149) determined the object as *interpretative repertoires*, i.e. "[…] recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena". When people are asked about their attitudes, they do not express 'themselves' (there is no 'self' to express), but draw on a pool of socially established, ready-available 'systems of terms'. This explains why people often contradict themselves (express different 'attitudes') – an observation which is the basic warranty of the discursive/social constructivist approach.

2.2   Attitudes: Explicit vs. implicit

Since the discursive approach has taken us 'beyond attitudes' and assumes that all there is to find is to be searched for in linguistic performance, it goes without saying that the

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2. It may be useful to point out here that 'attitudes' in this conception becomes a cover term for all kinds of 'subjectivities': opinions, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, experiences, expectations and prospects. The aptness of this may be questioned, of course. Within language-attitudes research, Preston (2010) has suggested the use of 'language regard' as a cover term, about which some of his co-workers say: "The primary advantage of describing this type of work as research on language regard rather than using existing terms like *language attitudes* or *language ideologies* is that it reflects the fact that language regard encompasses a range of phenomena including language attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and ideologies […]" (Evans, Benson & Stanford 2018: xix; italics in original). In this chapter, 'language attitudes' is used to include a similar range of subjective phenomena from the conceptual realm.

distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes evaporates as irrelevant, in the radical sense of having no existence.

To the mentalist approach, however, it is a highly relevant issue, which has been widely investigated and debated particularly in the field of *social cognition*, both in the perspective of determining the existence of a double cognitive process – an automatic (associative) process yielding implicit attitudes and a controlled (deliberative) process yielding explicit attitudes (e.g. Greenwald & Nosek 2008) – and furthermore in the perspective of determining the nature of explicit and implicit attitudes in terms of consciousness or awareness (e.g. Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2006). The evidence and argument in this literature testify to the existence of cognitive/evaluative processes that produce implicit attitudes that differ from explicit attitudes. For students of language attitudes, the consequence in terms of study design must be that there is an issue to consider regarding which process(es) to focus on, combined with reflection on which methods can be used, and how they can be used, to elicit explicit and implicit attitudes, respectively.

Indeed, that issue was actually central to both *the social psychology of language* and to *variationist sociolinguistics* from the very beginning. The development of the influential Matched Guise Technique (MGT) (see Section 6.2.1) by Canadian social psychologists at the end of the 1950s was based on the idea that people in Montreal held 'private' (implicit) attitudes towards English and French that differed from their 'public' (explicit) attitudes (Lambert et al. 1960; cf. Garrett 2010: 42–43). A few years thereafter, in his pioneering sociolinguistic studies in New York City in the 1960s, Labov used the MGT in order to tap into the informants' "unconscious subjective reactions" (implicit attitudes) which he assumed to be different from their "general attitudes and aspirations" (explicit attitudes) (Labov 1972: 162).

In both cases, and in subsequent traditions, the wish to operate with the explicit/implicit distinction derives from the assumption that implicit attitudes may not only be different from explicit attitudes, but also that they will be more interesting in relation to the research goal – and in that sense more *real*. While social psychologists typically engage in language-attitudes research with the goal of illuminating the role of language differences in the arousal and functioning of social stereotypes, the engagement of (variationist) sociolinguists is focused on illuminating the role of attitudes as a driving force in language variation and change. In relation to both these goals of study, it will typically be seen as an advantage if evaluative reactions can be protected from so-called *social desirability bias*: "This bias is the tendency for people to give answers to questions in ways that they believe to be 'socially appropriate'. In other words, the respondents tell you about the attitudes they think they ought to have, rather than the ones they actually do have" (Garrett 2010: 44). A special issue of *Linguistics Vanguard* (2019) deals with the explicit/implicit issue in language variation research.

2.3   Language: Which aspects of language *can* be attitudinal objects?

The *can* question in the heading refers to the problem which emerges when we open up for the possibility that attitudinal differences towards linguistic entities may be dependent on levels (or degrees) of consciousness/awareness about them: the scope of social valorisation in the domain of language becomes an issue. The views on that issue cover no less of a gamut than the views on attitudes.

At one end of the gamut, evaluation is seen as ubiquitous, for instance in the sense of being a concomitant of the fundamental cognitive process of categorization (as touched on above). In that case, there is strictly speaking no scope to delimit: the social valorisation approach to language becomes a *perspective* of the same kind that Verschueren (1987) has described for pragmatics. From the ubiquity-of-evaluation point of view, the following quote makes no less sense if 'pragmatics' is replaced by 'social valorisation' (or language attitudes). Having rejected to see pragmatics as "another component of a theory of language with its own well-defined object", Verschueren continues: "Rather, pragmatics is a *perspective* on any aspect of language, at any level of structure ... the *pragmatic perspective* centres around the *adaptability of language*, the fundamental property of language which enables us to engage in the activity of talking which consists in the constant making of choices, at every level of linguistic structure, in harmony with the requirements of people, their beliefs, desires and intentions, and the real-world circumstances in which they interact" (Verschueren 1987: 5; emphasis in original).

In the same vein, from a sociolinguistic variation perspective – with due discussion of the 'fuzzy boundary' between pragmatics and variation – Eckert (2019) states that: "In fact, social differences lie in the fact that people don't all say the same things, and what we think of as variables simply constitute the extreme performative end of a continuum of social-indexical resources – a continuum of diminishing reference and increasing performativity" (p. 757). She concludes by saying: "My main point in this article is that social meaning is built into linguistic practice at every level of the linguistic system [...] Social indexicality permeates the linguistic system because language exists to articulate social practice, and social practice is change" (Eckert 2019: 769).

At the other end of the gamut, it is noteworthy that Labov has always insisted that "[i]n speaking of the role of social factors influencing linguistic evolution, it is important not to overestimate the amount of contact or overlap between social values and the structure of language" (1972: 251). Thirty years later, he begins the *Social Factors* volume of *Principles of Linguistic Change* – a three-volume summary of what he has achieved and learned – by stressing the narrowness of the interface between language and society. Having pointed out that "[a]t one point in the development of sociolinguistics, it was not uncommon for scholars to suggest that the social and linguistic aspects of language were coextensive in the sense that each linguistic element had a social aspect or evaluation", Labov continues: "Yet the actual situation seems to be quite the reverse. For the

most part, linguistic structure and social structure are isolated domains, which do not bear upon each other […] The force of social evaluation, positive or negative, is generally brought to bear only upon superficial aspects of language: the lexicon and phonetics" (Labov 2001: 28).

Moreover, as a consequence of his failure to find empirical evidence of 'covert' (unconscious, implicit) values in his MGT experiments, Labov's belief in a role for social evaluation in language variation and change has been strongly reduced. Instead, the role of 'interactional frequency' has been upgraded, with reference to Bloomfield's *principle of density*: "The principle of density implicitly asserts that we do not have to search for a motivating force behind the diffusion of linguistic change. The effect is a mechanical and inevitable one; the implicit assumption is that social evaluation and attitudes play a minor role" (Labov 2001: 20). (Kristiansen 2011 is a discussion of this development in Labov's work.)

The issue sketched out above has attracted attention especially from sociolinguists who are interested in the role of attitudes in processes of language variation and change. Besides Labov's discussion (2001: 25–28), we may notice that Milroy (2007) has discussed why some sound changes are more accessible than others in terms of a distinction between *under-the-counter* changes, which require regular face-to-face contact through participation in local networks, and *off-the-shelf* changes which are of a supra-local kind and seemingly of greater cognitive accessibility as no constant primary interaction is needed for their transmission. Not least should mention be made of a longstanding engagement with the accessibility issue from the viewpoints of *perceptual dialectology* (Preston 1989a) and *folk linguistics* (Niedzielski & Preston 1999/2003). Including reference to work by Silverstein (1981), Preston (1996) offered a comprehensive discussion of what aspects of language lie inside and outside of what people can consciously access: recognize and evaluate. In subsequent work, Preston has dealt extensively with this issue in discussing the structures and processes that make up what he calls the *attitudinal cognitorium*, or *regard cognitorium* (e.g. Preston 2009, 2010, 2015). It is a main point of his theorizing that the consciousness/awareness aspect of linguistic phenomena should not be treated as an either-or issue, but as a more-or-less issue (as signalled by a notable 'revision' in the preface to the paperback version of *Folk Linguistics* (Niedzielski & Preston 2003)). We should add that there are discussions of the notion of *salience* in the literature that are highly relevant to the issue (see e.g. Trudgill 1986; Auer et al. 1998; Kerswill & Williams 2002).

Also Eckert (2019) discusses the continuum of social-indexical resources ("a continuum of diminishing reference and increasing performativity", mentioned above) in terms of salience and awareness. It is "a continuum from the expression of what one might call external, or public, information – public facts – to expressions of one's 'inner self', or affective states. And we move from the most explicit to the most implicit expression of meaning" (p. 757). With regard to sociolinguistic variables, their assumed

perceptual salience and accessibility to conscious control ranges them on a 'cline of interiority': "This cline begins with morphosyntactic variables since, although their indexicality is detached from their reference, their referential status makes each occurrence more salient. The cline then moves through phonological variables whose orders of indexicality emerge from the speakers who are seen as their users. I then move to iconic variables, beginning with segmental iconicity, and moving to prosody and voice quality at the extreme of interiority" (p. 758). Eckert says that "[o]ne might [...] see the cline of interiority also as a cline of intentionality" – and refers to research on the role of control/automaticity in the process of speaking, as well as research on the role of attention to speech according to situation – before concluding: "I would say that speakers are primarily aware of the persona they are trying to convey, and that speech style, and the individual features that constitute the style, may emerge more automatically" (p. 758). Although it is not clear to me how this view is consistent with the view that "social meaning is built into linguistic practice at every level of the linguistic system", it must be registered as interesting that Eckert and Labov to a large extent seem to agree on claiming that what happens in interaction is that language varies and changes mechanically/automatically, with little or no role played by awareness and evaluation (Eckert & Labov 2017 is a co-authored article of high relevance to the issue). And, hence, there would be hardly any need for language-attitudes research.

Before we leave the accessibility-to-awareness/evaluation issue, it should be noticed that there is a change aspect to be taken into account. Described as an event at the level of interaction: "If a North of England "luck" and "look" merged speaker wishes a South of England hearer "Good luck," both might become aware of a vowel merger for the very first time. In other words, there are things about linguistic competence and performance that may not normally be above the level of awareness but have been made so by sociocultural, experiential factors" (Preston 2019: 2). At the societal level, this may best be illustrated by recalling how linguistic variables in Labov's work are distributed on three categories depending on whether and how consciousness or awareness is involved in terms of social evaluation: variables without any social awareness/evaluation attached are *indicators*; variables with some (largely implicit) social awareness/evaluation attached are *markers*; variables with strong (explicit) social awareness/evaluation attached are *stereotypes* (see e.g. Labov 2001: 196). It is a central aspect of Labov's theorizing that the relationship between linguistic variables and awareness/evaluation is subject to change, at the levels of both individuals and communities. Typically, variables that exist 'below consciousness' as indicators, become markers as they rise in terms of social awareness, and may end up as stereotypes. But change in the opposite direction is also possible. Based on empirical evidence, McKenzie & Carrie (2018) argue that implicit and explicit evaluations of Northern English and Southern English speech in England do not change at the same rate, and suggest that the explicit/implicit relationship may change

over time. (Kristiansen 2018 offers a general discussion of the relationship between language awareness and language change.)

My task here is not to take a stance on the accessibility-to-awareness/evaluation issue, but to point out that there is a stance-taking to reflect on and decide on, with potential methodological consequences. So, having considered the issue of how attitudes relate to language – in a profound/ubiquitous or superficial/restricted way – we now turn to consider whether and how this difference has implications in terms of what aspects of language to focus on as attitudinal objects.

2.4   Language: Which aspects of language to focus on as attitudinal objects?

From the pragmatic perspective, Labov's stance and the MGT approach can only be seen as addressing 'superficial aspects' of language (he says so himself). Rampton (2010) characterizes Labov's "distributional approach" (to the notion of 'speech community') as follows: "As in the pragmatic perspective, social norms are thought to have profound influence on the shape and interpretation of speech, but rather than taking this as a cue to *explore the relation of language to normative expectations across many dimensions of socio-cultural organization*, analysis homes in on the *shared evaluative rating (of the speech) of different subgroups*, which is seen as the central principle structuring linguistic variability and as a key element constituting speech community itself" (p. 276; my emphasis).

I am not sure Labov thinks of social norms as having 'profound influence' – he talks of influence on 'superficial aspects' – but that is not my point here. I am concerned with what is said about difference in methodological approach, which I think is to be seen as a consequence of the difference between a 'profound influence' view versus a 'superficial aspects' view of how social evaluations relate to language.

With regard to the 'superficial aspects' view, it seems fairly straightforward to operationalize a research design aimed to study *shared evaluative rating (of the speech) of different subgroups*. The 'speech slot' in the design may be 'narrowly' specified as some variants from the lexicon or phonetics, in accordance with what Labov has suggested, and also has effectuated in his own projects. Probably more studies, however, both in sociolinguistics and social psychology, have used a 'holistic' approach (instead of the 'specific-variant' approach), which means that the 'speech slot' is specified as some whole varieties (languages, dialects or accents).

By putting the 'speech slot' in parentheses, and thereby linking 'rating' directly to 'subgroups', Rampton probably refers to the common inclusion of (subgroups of) speakers within a 'broader' understanding of language as a target of attitudes. In other words, language attitudes are seen as attitudes towards people who speak in particular ways just as much as attitudes towards linguistic variants or varieties per se. In the introduction to the seminal book on *Attitudes towards Language Variation. Social and Applied Contexts*

(Ryan & Giles 1982), it is said that "'language attitude' will be taken in a broad, flexible sense as any affective, cognitive or behavioural index of evaluative reactions toward different language varieties or their speakers" (Ryan, Giles & Sebastian 1982: 7). In the pioneering book on *Folk Linguistics* (Niedzielski & Preston 2003), it is said in the introduction that "A language attitude is, after all, not really an attitude to a feature of language; it is an awakening of a set of beliefs about individuals or sorts of individuals through the filter of a linguistic performance, although, admittedly, association with a linguistic feature and a group may be so long-standing that the attitude appears to be to the linguistic feature itself" (p. 9). Perception and evaluation of linguistic performance is also filtered through people's knowledge of 'how to behave' in various contexts (people know that 'you don't curse in the church'), so societal and situational contexts are to be included in the 'broader' understanding of language as the object of attitudes (Giles et al. 1987; Garett 2010: Chapter 8), and will have to be taken into account in the operationalization (and interpretation) of concrete investigation.

If we now turn to the 'profound influence' view, it seems less transparent what it takes in terms of operationalization to *explore the relation of language to normative expectations across many dimensions of socio-cultural organization*. Does it take something else than in our case above? The 'normative expectations across many dimensions of sociocultural organization' can hardly be understood as something radically different from 'attitudes towards ways of speaking in specific contexts'? If there is a significant difference, it lies in the first part of the formulations, which seems to point to the difference between a *survey* approach and an *ethnographic* approach.

In a survey study, based on interviews and/or experiments (cf. Sections 3–6), we can picture the sharedness/variation in many peoples' attitudes towards 'superficial aspects' of language. In an ethnographic study, based on participant observation, the researcher's notes in a diary may include language attitudinal data which – when analysed together with other observational data – may arguably be seen as reflecting language values and evaluations at more profound levels of social group- and identity-formation. However, to the extent that considerable amounts of language attitudinal data are collected in studies applying the ethnographic approach, it will be through the use of interviews and/or experiments.

In ethnographic studies that are strongly social-constructivist/discursive in their orientation, data on language attitudes will not be conceived of as data that can be collected and analysed as independent data (i.e. data other than language-use data); the social valorisations of language can only be studied in language, not in people. It may be more than an arguably unfortunate wording that Rampton's object of study is defined as the relation of *language* to normative expectations, not as the relation of *people* to such expectations.

Eckert, who has pioneered the change in variationist sociolinguistics from the labovian 'distributional approach' to a more constructivist 'social meaning-making' approach,

finishes an influential description of 'the three waves of sociolinguistics' by saying: "The third wave locates ideology in language itself, in the construction of meaning, with potentially important consequences for linguistic theory more generally" (Eckert 2012: 98).

One consequence is in the cards: the use of methods aimed at searching for language-independent attitudinal data loses its sense. Language-attitudes research loses its sense.

The treatment of methods in the next, second part of the chapter (Sections 3–6) is based on the assumption that language-attitudes research and its methods do make sense and can advantageously be used by scholars interested in the language–society interface, whether the interest consists in describing and potentially solving *social issues*, or describing and potentially explaining *linguistic issues.*

3. The three methodological approaches of traditional language-attitudes research

Overviews of traditional language-attitudes research typically distinguish between three methodological approaches: the *analysis of societal treatment* approach, the *direct methods* approach, and the *indirect methods* approach (see e.g. Ryan, Giles & Hewstone 1987; Garrett 2010: Chapter 3; Kircher & Zipp forthc.). Basically, this division is motivated by whether and how informants are involved.

The *analysis of societal treatment* approach does not involve elicitation of data from informants, but collects and analyses all other kinds of data that may shed light on how languages and varieties are treated in the society. The direct and indirect methods both involve informants, but differ in terms of how the data are elicited/offered (by the researcher/informants): directly or indirectly. The *direct methods* approach elicits data by subjecting the informants to tasks that prompt them to offer language-related attitudes *directly*, typically by asking about beliefs, feelings etc. with regard to the languages or varieties in focus. The *indirect methods* approach elicits data by subjecting the informants to tasks that prompt them to offer attitudes that relate to languages or varieties *indirectly*, typically by asking for evaluative reactions to speakers of the languages or varieties in focus (instead of evaluative reactions to 'named' languages and varieties).

One might argue that the singling out of three different approaches makes sense only because the focus is changed from *data-analysis* (societal treatment) to *data-elicitation/offering* (direct and indirect methods). All data can of course be characterized in both of these perspectives. Nothing prevents us from treating data that have been collected and analysed in a societal-treatment perspective in terms of either directly or indirectly language-related reactions. The targets of complaint-tradition discourse, for instance, will often be directly named ('dialect X is awful to listen to!'), but it may

also happen that the message about language in such discourse is to be read indirectly between the lines ('who is responsible for allowing newsreaders like Ms. X on the air-waves?!'). And the other way round: Nothing prevents us from treating data that have been collected and analysed with the aim of describing (groups of) people, in studies based on either direct or indirect elicitation/offering, as data that shed light on societal treatment. Not only the content of what is said, but also the tendency for informants to answer and react in ways that they believe to be 'socially appropriate' (the *social desirability bias*, see Section 2.2) certainly reveal something about how the languages or varieties in focus are treated in the society.

In the same vein one might go on and argue that the distinction between direct methods and indirect methods is unfortunate because it tends to be used to refer both to the distinction between *explicitly (consciously)* and *implicitly (subconsciously)* offered attitudes, and to the distinction between *interviewing* and *experimentation* as methodological approaches. To operate with a parallelism between these distinctions is problematic, as will be pointed out.

In what follows, I shall nevertheless retain the traditional tripartite division into analysis of societal treatment (4), directs methods (5), and indirect methods (6).

4.   Analysis of societal treatment

As was mentioned in Section 3, the *analysis of societal treatment* collects and analyses data that may shed light on how languages and varieties are treated in the society – typically at the level of institutions in the main societal domains of education, media and business. The treatment of languages and varieties in such institutions is evidenced in their editorial and linguistic practice, and some may have formulated their language policy in guidelines and regulations. Normally placed in this category is also the general public debate about language in the institutions, as represented not least by the activity of complaining about 'misuse' of language in the letters-to-the-editor genre ('wrong' language, 'bad' language, etc.), felicitously referred to by Milroy and Milroy (1985) as the 'complaint tradition'. For a balanced appraisal of the social functions of such 'verbal hygiene' activities, see Cameron (1995).

The societal contexts in which the treatment of language realities can be studied do of course vary immensely around the world, but basically we are always and everywhere dealing with value-systems that organize these realities in terms of domination and subordination. Investigations of the status and use of languages (major and minor) and varieties (standard and non-standard) in societal institutions are a characteristic of disciplines that aim at solving some *social issue* (especially work in the traditions of *the sociology of language* (beginning with Fishman 1972) and *the social psychology of language* (beginning with Giles & Powesland 1975; Ryan & Giles 1982), including disciplines

or perspectives such as *bilingual education, multilingualism, language and ethnicity, language planning, maintenance* and *revival.* From the point of view of the institutionally subordinated languages and varieties, there is always and everywhere a battle to be fought for the right to be used and heard in the public domains of society.

To the extent that the critical traditions of *ideological criticism* and *critical discourse analysis* (CDA) engage with the issue of how language is treated in the society, their main point is to unveil how ideologies of 'appropriate' and 'good' language functions in the institutions of, say, education and business life (Fairclough 1992; Cameron 2000). The distinction between explicit and implicit valorisation is highly relevant to such analyses. In a book-length investigation of how the 'dialect vs. standard' issue was treated in primary education in Denmark in the 1960–1980s, Kristiansen (1990) found very little about this in the large quantities of texts that was studied, from all relevant text genres, but very much could be read between the lines.

5.   Direct methods

The method commonly associated with the direct approach is the *interview*. An interview is probably most readily thought of as a *spoken* interaction, but can of course also be completed in *written* form. Thus, use of a *questionnaire* will not be treated here as a separate methodological approach, but as a way of interviewing if it stands alone, otherwise as a written tool used in spoken interviewing (5.1). Besides the interview, several recognition or evaluation tasks (or tests) will be treated under direct methods (5.2).

5.1   Interviewing

As mentioned (Section 3), the *direct methods* approach is normally defined as eliciting language-attitudes data by subjecting informants to tasks that prompt them to offer attitudes where it is aspects of language that are in focus – not speakers or anything else. If the interview includes questions about speakers and contexts of use, we are already in problems with our definition of the direct method as purely language-related. This is probably one reason why the common conception of the *direct methods* approach tends to include a stance on the awareness issue: the interviewee is *aware* that the interview topic is attitudes to language (regardless of what the interviewer and interviewee are talking about). Another reason is the constructed contrast to the common, no less problematic, conception which links the *indirect methods* approach to *experimentation* and elicitation of *subconsciously offered* attitudes. If we stick to a crucial role for awareness (explicitness vs. implicitness) in these definitional matters, it seems reasonable to say that the interview can function as an indirect method if it can be constructed so that the

interviewee remains unaware of language attitudes as its objective, or if language-related interview/discourse data can be analysed in ways that unveil implicit attitudes.

If we compare interviewing and experimentation in terms of relationship and commitment to *control*, the characteristic ideal in experimentation is full control, whereas varying degrees of control make up the basis for distinguishing between different types of interviews. Basically, for an interaction to count as an interview, it must include question-answer sequences, and an asymmetrical power relationship between the one who asks and the one who answers. This basic structure may be administered in various ways in concrete interviewing. It is commonplace to distinguish between structured and unstructured interviews, with semi-structured interviews somewhere in-between.

5.1.1   *Structured interviews*

Structured interviewing aims at achieving a high degree of control. At the designing stage, this requires the construction and compilation of questions that are formulated as precisely and clearly as possible with regard to the aspect(s) of language attitudes we want to focus on. Following our discussion of language attitudes as an object of study (Section 2), these questions will seek to address the interviewee's *attitudes* in terms of cognition, affect and behavioural disposition towards *language* in terms of varieties, features, speakers and contexts. Targeting specified aspects of language, the questions may ask the interviewee about opinions, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, experiences, expectations and prospects. If data are collected from several samples to allow for comparison across different groups or contexts, there may be a considerable problem involved in asking the 'same' question, in a way that will be understood in the 'same' way by everybody. In the interest of statistical treatment and comparison at the stage of analysis, the choice of answers will as a rule be predetermined and restricted (close-ended), but it is of course possible to include open-ended questions within a structured interview.

At the data-collecting stage of structured interviewing, the control imperative requires that the questions be delivered in exactly the same form, and also in the same order since the answer to a question may well depend on the nature of preceding questions. This necessitates the use of a questionnaire. However, there is no guarantee against 'questionnaire-external' influence on the answers. If the questionnaire is distributed for private written response (by use of mail or the web) there is little control of 'external' influence on the answers that are given. The room for 'external' influence may actually be no less in data-collection situations where the investigators are present while many people fill in their questionnaires simultaneously – say in school classes and university auditoria. Even if we have put much effort into formulating precise and clear questions, there is no way to do anything about it if (or rather when) there is a need for clarification of what is meant by such and such a question. Therefore, it is commonly thought that the optimal way of conducting structured interviewing is to meet with people individually (face-to-face or by telephone), read them the questions exactly as worded in the ques-

tionnaire, and endorse the potential need for clarification and elaboration in a nondirective way. There is of course an issue of practical possibilities and time consumption involved here. Structured interviewing is typically used for survey purposes, and the aim is to collect large amounts of data. Collection by way of individual interviews may not be an option.

Finally, language-attitudes data collected according to survey design and procedures that secure satisfactory control in terms of how they have been 'measured' (reliability) can at the data-analysis stage be submitted to statistical treatments allowing for comparisons of language attitudes across groups of speakers and types of context.

An approach of this kind was used in a telephone survey which collected attitudes towards the influence from English in a sample of some 5,800 respondents distributed across seven Nordic speech communities (The MIN-project[3] included Iceland, The Faeroes, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Swedish-language Finland, Finnish-language Finland). A strongly limited number of nine questions were asked (read) by professional survey institute employees, targeting use of and attitudes towards English. The study certainly illustrates the difficulties of asking the 'same' question – in seven different languages and societal contexts (reported in detail in Scandinavian languages in Kristiansen & Vikør 2006; a presentation in English can be found in Kristiansen 2010).

5.1.2   *Unstructured interviews*

In terms of commitment to control, the unstructured interview is the antipode of the structured interview. Without pre-prepared questions and pre-fixed procedures, the interaction will resemble an everyday conversation. Of course, for the conversation to make sense as a data-collection session in language-attitudes research there has to be an agreement that the talk will circle around language-related topics. But the goal will be to let the interviewee talk freely about the topics from their own point of view, without being victim of any kind of interviewer-influence. The most obvious data-elicitation context for trying this approach in language-attitudes research (at least as part of sociolinguistic projects) may be the *group conversation*: after having presented language attitudes as the topic to be discussed, perhaps specified in a few intriguing statements, the interviewer leaves the group (of no more than 3–5 people) – and hopes for interesting data to emerge in the audio-recording of their discussion. In general, data resulting from unstructured collection will seldom lend themselves to quantification and survey type of comparison and generalization; the aim is to achieve richer interpretations and deeper understanding through qualitative analyses of the data.

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3. The MIN-project (Modern Import words in the languages in the Nordic countries) was initiated by the then existing Nordic Language Council (*Nordisk Språkråd*), was led by Professor Helge Sandøy, University of Bergen, and was financially supported by various sources in the period 2000–2010.

5.1.3   *Semi-structured interviews*

The gamut from approximately full control to approximately no control is wide. In-between, there is room for much variation in terms of more-or-less control. In other words, semi-structured interviewing may differ quite considerably in terms of the extent and kind of structuring that is invested.

Most interviewing in work of ethnographic and sociolinguistic nature will be found in the less-structured end, where free talk is the goal. For the approach to interviewing used in his projects (known as the *sociolinguistic interview*), Labov developed detailed guidelines (described in Labov 1984). The interviewer should in advance construct a graphic network of the themes to be covered, with crisscrossing lines drawn between the nodes to indicate presumed natural ways to move through and cover the whole field of themes. In our case of language-attitudes research, the themes inserted in the nodes of such a pre-prepared network would, like in the structured interview/questionnaire, appear as a selection of questions targeting opinions, beliefs, thoughts, feelings, experiences, expectations and prospects with regard to specified aspects of language. About the use of this network in the interview, Labov says: "The network is a guide for the interviewer as he or she constructs a simulated conversation which follows principles quite similar to the unfocused conversation of everyday life. The interviewer does initiate topics, often with questions; this is an expected role. But there is no rigid insistence upon a preset order of topics, and ideally the interviewer plays a part in the conversation which approaches that of any other participant: volunteering experience, responding to new issues, and following the subject's main interest and ideas wherever they go" (Labov 1984: 34f.). Since Labov's main aim with the semi-structured interview was to elicit free speech (not language attitudes), the extent to which his guidelines for interviewer-behavior should be followed when the goal is elicitation of language attitudes, may be questionable and is probably best seen as a matter for consideration in the designing of concrete investigations.

Towards the more structured end of semi-structured interviewing it is possible to consider a variety of combinations of questionnaire and free talk. Such a combination was used in another of the MIN-project's several approaches to the study of attitudes towards English in the Nordic countries (mentioned in Section 5.1.1). In each of six communities, a total of somewhere between 24 and 48 informants (sampled to cover four *life-styles*; see Pedersen 2010; Thøgersen & Pedersen 2012) took part in extensive in-depth interviews based on answering the questionnaire from the telephone survey, plus a large number of extra questions concerning the use and status/valorisation of language(s) in various domains of society. The answering process was completed in interactive cooperation with the interviewer, who was the same throughout all interviews in each of the communities. This whole approach allowed for the development of many and rich combinations of quantitative and qualitative analyses, including much valu-

able reflection in relation to the interview as a method of data-collection (Mattfolk 2005; Nyström Höög 2005a; Thøgersen 2005; Östman & Thøgersen 2010).[4]

When a small group (again of some 3–5 people) is participating as informants in semi-structured interviewing, we have the so-called 'focus group interview', which just like the individual semi-structured interview can vary considerably in terms of the extent and kind of structuring and control that is invested.

5.1.4   *The issue of explicitness/implicitness in discourse data*

As mentioned (Section 3), there is an unfortunate tendency in language-attitudes research to think of implicitly (subconsciously) offered attitudes as data elicited in experiments (indirect methods), and explicitly (consciously) offered attitudes as data elicited in interviews, or more generally in 'what people say' (directs methods). This conception of things should not overshadow the potential benefits of studying implicit attitudes in interview or discourse data.

Implicit attitudes as an ingredient of 'folk linguistics' has long been a concern of Preston's. In the concluding chapter 6 of *Folk Linguistics* (Niedzielski & Preston 2003), a distinction is made between two kinds of metalanguage. *Metalanguage 1* refers to "overt comment about language [...] such folk metalanguage is conscious. That is, it is not directed to a phenomenon which a speaker is unaware of, but to one which he or she has focused on in some way" (p. 303). But the authors "believe there is more to it than that [...]. For us, the richest territory to mine for folk belief about language has been the presuppositions which lie behind *Metalanguage 1* use. They are, we believe, sorts of unasserted beliefs which members of speech communities share. We will call such shared folk knowledge about language *Metalanguage 2*, although we are aware that such underlying beliefs do not literally constitute a 'language' or a specific kind of language use. [...] Such deeply-rooted folk beliefs about language as those represented in Metalanguage 2 may also be thought of as forming a cultural model" (p. 308). (In case you consult Preston (2004), notice that *Metalanguage 2* is treated as *Metalanguage 3*.)

Preston recently entitled a paper "How to trick respondents into revealing implicit attitudes – talk to them" (Preston 2019). He argues that "[t]he key to the relevance of a possible implicit interpretation of discoursal data lies in the contrast between assertions (consciously intended) and the implicated and presupposed elements in discourses about language, which involve relatively nonconscious activity in many cases" (p. 3). Besides offering an exemplary analysis of an interaction along these lines, Preston lists a large number of pragmatic concerns (with reference to Levinson 1983) which might

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4. Readers of Scandinavian languages may consult book-length reports on the in-depth interviews of the MIN-project, regarding Iceland (Óladóttir 2009), The Faeroe Islands (Jacobsen 2012), Denmark (Thøgersen 2007), Sweden (Nyström Höög 2005b), Swedish-language Finland (Mattfolk 2011), and Finnish-language Finland (Tamminen-Parre forthc.).

qualify as entrances to implicit attitudes in talk: "personal deixis, conversational implicature, maxims, cooperative principle, presupposition, implication, entailment, speech acts, indirectness, felicity conditions, discourse, conversation, interaction structure, information structure, rhetorical and genre structure" (p. 5). Expressed in the paper abstract (p. 1), its strong claim is that "established pragmatic and discourse techniques can uncover features of language use (e.g. implicature, presupposition) that just as surely reveal implicit characteristics of a speaker's beliefs and regard for language and variety as any of the long-standing (e.g. matched guise) or more recently developed [...] experimental techniques that seek to uncover implicitness in this area".

The relevance of addressing the issue of implicit attitudes in language use is certainly no novelty to pragmatic scholarship (Östman 1986, 2005; Verschueren 2004), but the focus has been on implicitness in linguistic expression of attitudes in general, not on implicitness in linguistic expression of attitudes to language.

Östman operates with what he calls a PIA toolkit (where PIA stands for 'Pragmatics as Implicit Anchoring') and says that "[i]t is the task of pragmatics, especially as conceived of in terms of Pragmatics as Implicit Anchoring [...], to investigate how interactants manage implicit communication and implicit anchoring, and how implicit choices are made" (2005: 193). The PIA model operates with three pragmatic parameters or 'anchor points' – called Coherence, Politeness and Involvement – in terms of which the toolkit gets a handle on implicit communication. The three anchor points – representing the (sub)culture, the interaction, and the self – is the model's attempt to "tie down what other approaches loosely refer to as 'context'" (p. 196). They are all thought of as present in any piece of discourse, "and since they are present for the interactants, they can be systematically studied by the pragmatically attuned discourse linguist [...] we need to address the way interactants implicitly anchor their communication (1) to their society and culture at large; (2) to their relation to their co-participants in an interaction, or to their relationship in terms of text-producer and text-consumer; and, (3) to themselves, their feelings, attitudes, and prejudices" (p. 197, 196).

Östman's PIA has similarities with Preston's *Metalanguage 2*, but the approach does not include the same focus on language as object. Nothing would prevent such an inclusion, I guess. This seems to be confirmed by a recent study by Ekberg & Östman (2020). Although the theoretical framework is not presented as PIA, the study must be said to have its main focus on implicitness at the level of 'cultural models'. The study analyses data collected in interviews and focus-group discussions with eight first and second generation Bosnians living in the rural municipality of Närpes in Swedish-language Ostrobothnia (Österbotten) in Finland. The similarities between the immigrant group and the traditional local group are stressed by the authors, but "[s]till, despite all these similarities, there is something that keeps the two groups implicitly apart – and this difference is what we want to look at in more detail in this study" (p. 4). The complexity of the local linguistic situation (including Bosnian, Närpes dialect, Finland-Swedish standard

and Finnish standard) forms an important part of the context the immigrants find them-selves in. Many aspects of this linguistic complexity are addressed in Ekberg & Östman's analysis, for instance: "With respect to dialect acquisition and dialect use, we focus both on participants' expressed opinions and implicit attitudes as these evolve in discussions, and on the (local) linguistic features that immigrants use or refrain from using" (p. 3). Thus, it seems we can include *pragmatics* among the disciplines that study 'attitudes to language'. Or maybe not. The authors state that "[t]he approach of the present study is broadly speaking sociolinguistic" (p. 3).

5.2   Recognition and evaluation tasks

In language-attitudes research, quite a few different tasks or tests can be administered to informants, either as separate tasks or as tasks included in an interview. The tasks that are dealt with in this section may have the character of experiments, but are included under direct methods because the informants are consciously aware of relating to language as they carry out the task.

If we endorse the social-psychological view that the cognitive and affective aspects of our relationship with the world (including language) are two faces of the same coin, there will always be both cognitive and affective aspects to our relationship to language. Even if tasks are constructed to target only one of the aspects, any answer will include (and may be analysed as) expressions of both (re)cognition and evaluation. In the same way, even if such tasks may be constructed to target either 'self' or 'others', categorizations of 'self' and 'others' are intertwined with processes of recognition/evaluation so that any answer will include (and may be analysed as) recognition/evaluation of both 'self' and 'others'.

In view of the interconnectedness of recognition and evaluation, it may be con-sidered a general problem with these tasks that there often is little or no control over whether subjects recognize the 'things' they evaluate in the same, or even similar, way.

5.2.1   *Mental maps*

The task of 'drawing a dialect map' is associated in particular with the work of Preston as a *perceptual dialectology* technique, developed with the purpose of shedding light on where people think linguistically distinct places lie, and what they think about them? Answers to these questions are obtained by giving people a blank map, for instance of the United States as in Preston's studies, and asking them to first encircle what they believe to be distinct dialect areas and then attach some characterizing label to these areas. For a study of perceived English dialect areas in Wales, Garrett, Coupland & Williams (2003: 92) adopted a somewhat different approach: based on piloting work that pointed to eight as an optimal number, they asked their respondents to outline a maximum of eight English dialect areas, followed by the usual invitation to label and characterize the

areas identified. The technique provides insight into the language-in-space categories people operate with, in terms of both geographical expanse and associated value representations. (For illustrations of the mental-map technique and its results in Preston's work, see e.g. Preston 1989a; 1999; Niedzielski & Preston 1999/2003).

5.2.2 *Ranking tasks*

In so-called Label Ranking Tasks (LRT), a list of names or labels for different 'ways of speaking' is presented to subjects in questionnaire form together with some format for assessing the conceptualized speech styles.

A small number of labels make it possible to simply ask subjects to rank them according to some criterion, e.g. 'likeability' ('which variety do you like the best, next best etc.?'). This was the approach adopted in the Danish LANCHART[5] studies, where the label-ranking tasks administered to the subjects of five research sites included between 7 and 10 labels (Kristiansen 2009). Ranking has also been used by Preston (1989a) in studies of how the accents of the 50 United States (plus Washington DC and New York City) are evaluated in terms of 'correctness' and 'pleasantness'.

With a large number of labels, ranking becomes a rather absurd task, and rating scales are used instead. Thus, in another study by Preston (1989b), subjects rated the many state names for 'correctness' and 'pleasantness' on ten-point scales. In a classic study within this approach, Giles (1970) operated with sixteen different labels for English accents (regional, social, and foreign) which were rated on seven-point scales for 'status content', 'aesthetic content', and 'communicative content' (a measure of perceived ease of interaction with the speaker). In a more recent online survey, more than 5,000 informants from across the UK rated 34 such labels on two seven-point scales in terms of 'prestige' and 'pleasantness' (Coupland and Bishop 2007). The experimental nature of these studies made it possible to treat a subset of the 2007 study as a near-replication of the 1970 study, thus accomplishing a real-time comparison of language attitudes (Bishop, Coupland and Garrett 2005).

5.2.3 *Self-reports*

In sociolinguistics, self-report tests have been used to investigate the relationship between, on the one hand, what people say that they say, and, on the other hand, what they actually do say. For instance, subjects may be presented with two different ways of

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5. The LANCHART centre (http://lanchart.hum.ku.dk/) was initiated and financed by the Danish National Research Foundation (grant DNRF63) for the ten-year period 2005–2015, directed by Professor Frans Gregersen, University of Copenhagen. The centre continues as part of UCPH's Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics. LANCHART investigates 'LANguage CHAnge in Real Time' and has re-interviewed as many as possible of the informants who participated in sociolinguistic studies in the 1970–1980s. Many kinds of language-ideological data have also been collected.

pronouncing a word and asked to indicate which pronunciation they themselves use. The research interest lies not so much in whether the self-report is linguistically correct or not, but rather in the interpretive implications when it is wrong: what does the phenomenon of over- or under-reporting tell us about the system of social values that imbues and surrounds variation in use? The classic examples of the use of self-report tests are from Labov (1966), who found a general tendency for New Yorkers to 'over-report' (i.e., people reported themselves to speak more standardly than they actually did), and from Trudgill (1972), who found an opposite tendency among Norwich men to 'under-report' (i.e., they reported themselves to speak more non-standardly than they actually did). In linguistic insecurity tests, another of Labov's 'field experiments' (Labov 1984: 45), the research interest lies in the differences that emerge when people are first asked to indicate which one of two word pronunciations they think is correct, and then to do the same with regard to their own pronunciation. The difference is taken as a measure of 'linguistic insecurity' (Labov 1966: Chapter 12). The phenomena of 'over-reporting' and 'under-reporting' and 'linguistic insecurity' certainly invites to considerations of how language variety is treated in the society.

The underlying logic of self-report testing is that people 'place' their own speech in relation to some other speech. Accomplishing the placement task clearly involves processes of both recognition and emotion. In Denmark, this double-sidedness of the placement task has been exploited to design a self-evaluation experiment which has been used in a number of very different research sites to highlight how language variety and associated values interconnect as a crucial ingredient of social identification processes among youngsters in their local communities. It is assumed that these processes, in any local community, constitute a 'normative field' defined by three 'norm ideals for speech'. In the experiment, this three-poled normative field is presented to informants (i) on paper as a large triangle with a small circle at each of the three angles, and (ii) on audiotape as three speakers representing each of the small circles at the angles of the triangle (i.e. a CONSERVATIVE and a MODERN version of Standard Danish, plus a version of the relevant 'locally coloured' speech, LOCAL). Having listened to the speakers, the informants' task is to place their own speech wherever they think appropriate, either within one of the circles (indicating similarity with the corresponding voice) or somewhere within the triangle indicating degrees of judged similarity and difference in relation to the three field-defining voices or even outside the triangle if that is judged appropriate. On the assumption that social identifications (categorizations/ evaluations of the self and others) involve accentuation of resemblances and differences in relation to in-groups and out-groups, respectively, the experimental situation is assumed to provoke stereotyping thought processes such as: "I'm young, so my language is like ... and not like ...", or "I'm from town, so my language is like ... and not like ...", etc. In other words, the interesting question is not so much whether people assess their own speech correctly from a purely linguistic point of view, but rather which patterns of social meaning emerge. With large

samples subdivided in social subgroups, the subjects' placements of their own language may be submitted to quantification and statistical analysis, and if the results show significant correlations between self-evaluations and social groups, such patterns can be taken partly as testimony to (the subjects' recognition of) the existence of norm ideals in the speech community and partly as testimony to (the subjects' assessments of) the social meanings that are involved. If the placement task is administered to subjects as part of an interview and made the object of commentaries and discussion in the interview, comparison of subjects' self-placement and commentaries may allow the development of richer pictures, and better understanding, of the norm ideals for speech that define processes of social identification in the community under study, not least in terms of tensions between explicitly and implicitly offered attitudes (Kristiansen 2004; Kristiansen et al. 2018).

6.   Indirect methods: Speaker evaluation experiments

Tasks where subjects are asked to recognize or evaluate the speech of others come in many formats. They will typically be constructed as experiments, using tape-recorded speech as stimulus material, and are most often thought of as indirect methods because the focus is on speakers, not directly on language. As already pointed out, such experiments are also often considered to yield implicit (subconsciously offered) attitudes. However, very strict measures of control are required in order to secure that subjects do not become aware of the attitudes-to-language purpose of the experiment they take part in. To the extent that there is no intention of securing such non-awareness, or no success in controlling for the non-awareness condition of elicitation, speaker evaluation experiments (SEEs) cannot be said to yield implicit (subconsciously offered) attitudes. (For a discussion of the relation between direct/indirect methods and explicit/implicit attitudes, see Pharao & Kristiansen 2019.)

6.1   SEE at the level of variants

SEEs may be designed to gather assessments either of 'whole' varieties or of variants of a particular variable (cf. Section 2.4). If we want to focus on particular variables, the stimulus tape has to be created by 'cutting and pasting' different values of the variable under study into short versions of the same sentences.

Originally, this was done by Labov in his New York study (Labov 1966: Chapter 11), where he used the cut-and-paste method to study the social evaluation of postvocalic (r) and four other phonological variables: (oh), (eh) (th) and (dh). The stimulus speakers appeared several times on the tape, in random order, each time reading a sentence which concentrated examples of one of the variables investigated. In addition, each speaker

read a 'zero sentence' with no variables of interest. The judges' evaluations of readings with a high concentration of examples of the variables investigated could thus be analysed as either upgrading or downgrading the speaker in comparison with evaluation of the zero sentence.

The usual measuring instrument in SEEs is some kind of scale. Labov (1966: 282–3) used a 'job-suitability' scale. Subjects were asked to imagine themselves in the position of a personnel manager, interviewing people for a large corporation. The task was to indicate whether the speech of the stimulus speakers would be acceptable for: Television Personality–Executive Secretary–Receptionist–Switchboard Operator–Salesgirl–Factory Worker–None of These (which "meant that the speech was so poor that the person could not even hold a factory job"). In his Philadelphia project, Labov also used a 'friendliness' scale. Subjects were asked: "If you got to know this speaker well, how likely is it that she would become a good friend of yours?" Responses were given on a 7-point scale with the two extremes labelled "Very likely" and "Not very likely" (Labov 2001: 216). The scales of 'job suitability' and 'friendliness' may be said to represent a more fundamental value distinction, treated by social psychologists in terms of competence versus sociability, or status versus solidarity (Ryan, Giles & Sebastian 1982: 8). Labov wanted to test if the friendliness scale reversed the direction of responses to the job suitability scale, but found that "the friendship and job suitability scale tap the same set of responses in this experimental setting" (2001: 217). Subject awareness in the setting is arguably an issue here (Kristiansen 2011).

In a web-based experiment, Plichta and Preston (2005) used an analysis/resynthesis technique to prepare a stimulus variable which was a 7-step continuum of monophthongisation of the phoneme /ay/ in the word *guide*. This was part of Preston's studies of folk perceptions of the north–south dimension of US English, so the measurement scale was a geographical continuum of nine sites representing this dimension from Saginaw, Michigan in the north to Dorthan, Alabama in the south (see also Preston 1989b). The respondents reacted to the 42 randomised tokens of *guide* they listened to (three tokens for each of the seven steps for two voices, one male and one female) by assigning them site numbers on the geographical continuum from 1 through 9. The results showed regularly increasing mean scores for monophthongisation on each step of the geographical continuum. The perfect and statistically robust discrimination of monophtongisation steps appeared as a subconsciously produced pattern at the group level, as respondents generally commented that they did not feel capable of discriminating the varying degrees of monophthongisation presented on the tape. In addition, for the same synthesized /ay/ qualities, the subjects as a group ranked the male voice as 'more southern' than the female voice, again in a perfect and statistically robust way across all seven steps of monophthongisation, thus nicely illustrating the intertwined and complex nature of cognition and evaluation in processes of social category identification.

Variation in the pronunciation of /s/ has been the object of attitudes research in several languages in recent years, and has often been found to play a role in social categorization in terms of gender and sexuality. Pharao et al. (2014) investigated the social meanings of /s/ variation among young Copenhageners in a SEE where the stimulus material consisted of 4 short speech samples, produced spontaneously by 4 young males, 2 with MODERN prosody (characteristic of young Copenhagen standard) and 2 with STREET prosody (characteristic of multiethnic youth style), each of which was produced in two versions, one spliced with alveolar [s] and one spliced with fronted [s+], yielding a total of 8 samples, in a classic 'matched guise' design (cf. 6.2.1). In a first experiment, an open-response format was used: the 116 informants from two high schools (one inner-city school with few immigrant students and one suburban school with many immigrant students) were asked to write down in a few words their immediate impression of the speaker behind each sample. The responses could be grouped into two categories: 'foreign/immigrant' which was ascribed to the four samples with street prosody, and 'gay/feminine' which was ascribed to the two MODERN males in their [s+] versions. In a subsequent study, 1½ year later with 234 new informants from the same high schools, responses to the same 8 samples were measured on a number of scales that reflected the categorization from the open responses. The results showed an evaluation pattern which depended on variants of /s/ and prosody in the same way as in the first experiment. These patterns were subconsciously offered, as both experiments were conducted without any informant becoming aware of the attitudes-to-language purpose. The authors argue: "These results indicate that the informants have more difficulties distinguishing the two types of (s) in the STREET guises than in the MODERN guises. Since it was the same tokens of [s+] and [s] that were used, this result suggests that the linguistic context (in this case prosody) not only plays a role for the social meaning potential but also for the fundamental recognition of certain variants" (Pharao et al. 2014: 26).

6.2   SEE at the level of varieties

The contextual interplay of linguistic features that is evidenced in the example above may in itself seem a weighty argument for (also) targeting social evaluation at the level of varieties. In any case, the 'holistic' approach effectively imposes itself as soon as a stimulus voice speaks for more than a few seconds. In the social psychological tradition, and mostly also in sociolinguistics, SEEs are carried out at the level of varieties. At this level, SEEs are divided into two types, known as the 'matched guise technique' and the 'verbal guise technique'. The difference between the two techniques lies in whether one and the same speaker is used to speak in two (or more) varieties (MGT), or different speakers are used for each variety (VGT) (6.2.1). Whether the data that are produced with these techniques should be characterized as consciously or subconsciously offered is a contested issue (6.2.2). Normally carried out in 'laboratory-like' settings (very often with

audiences of students or pupils), MGT/VGT-based SEEs have little ecological validity; some attempts at moving SEEs to natural, everyday situations are described in (6.2.3).

6.2.1   *The matched guise technique (MGT) and the verbal guise technique (VGT)*

The MGT was originally developed to study attitudes to language at the level of varieties, and this is how it was used in language-attitudes research as this discipline emerged and developed in *social psychology* in the last century (Lambert 1967; Giles & Coupland 1991, Chapter 2). It is an experimental technique designed to measure evaluative reaction to linguistic varieties (in terms of difference in form), with no influence from extra-linguistic factors (such as difference in linguistic content, speaker's voice quality and speech delivery). In order to secure full control of such possible confounding influence, one and the same speaker is used to read one and the same text, delivered in exactly the same way (as far as possible) – except for the change of variety/varieties. That is, the same speaker appears in different 'guises'. Listener-judges mostly remain unaware of this because the guises appear on the tape they listen to with some distance between them and with filler voices in between (these also read the same text). The recorded voices are kept equal in terms of duration; most excerpts used in SEEs are some 20 to 50 seconds long.

The MGT is often felt to produce data that suffer heavily from being 'unnatural' in many respects (the data are not 'ecologically valid'). The matched guise voice is not the least of such problems. A bilingual person may be able to speak naturally in two coexisting languages, like when the matched guise voice in Lambert et al.'s (1960) study in Montreal spoke English Canadian in one guise and French Canadian in the other. Most people will probably also be able to include or exclude some common ('naturally occurring') borrowings, like when the MIN-project (which also included a MGT-based SEE amongst its several approaches to investigating attitudes to English in seven Nordic communities; see 5.1.1 and 5.1.3) used 'English-coloured' versus 'pure national' guises in terms of a handful of lexical and grammatical features (Kristiansen 2006, 2010). However, when it comes to dialects and accents, including variation in phonetics, it may prove difficult and simply impossible to find a person who is able to speak naturally in the varieties we want for our stimulus tape. Kristiansen (1991) reports about his SEE in Næstved (Denmark) at the end of the 1980s that he had to give up on finding a person who was able to speak naturally in the three varieties (MODERN, CONSERVATIVE and LOCAL) assumed to be an ingredient of the social-identification processes that permeated young people's everyday life in the local community.

The only solution is to use different speakers, thus achieving a SEE design which is no longer based on 'matched' guises, but on what have been called 'verbal' guises (initially suggested by Cooper 1975: 5). When the VGT is used, control of the influence from extra-linguistic factors can still be achieved by using two or more voices for each of the varieties to be evaluated. For us to argue that variety differences have a decisive role in

such evaluations, the result pattern must indicate that voices representing the same variety have by and large been treated the same.

The repeated readings of the same text constitute another of the MGT features that is likely to make the SEE seem strangely 'unnatural' to listener-judges. Therefore, instead of using speakers who read the same text aloud, VTG-based SEEs normally use speakers who speak 'naturally'. In an attempt to maintain some control over influence from content, the speakers will speak either about one and the same topic, or about any 'neutral' topic.

Most SEEs in Denmark, including the studies of the LANCHART-project (see footnote 3) have applied a VTG-approach as described (Kristiansen 2009). It goes without saying that the VGT-relaxations of control over speakers and content yield data that need to be examined and analysed with a sharpened sensitivity to how multiple factors interact when speakers and their speech are socially evaluated.

The usual measuring instrument in SEEs is some kind of scale (see also Section 6.1 above): either bipolar adjective scales, known as semantic differentials (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957; Osgood, May & Miron 1975) ('How do you find this speaker?' fascinating – boring), or unidimensional scales ('How fascinating do you find this speaker?' not at all – very much). Typically, the number of steps on these scales is either five or seven, leaving open the possibility for subjects to choose the 'neutral' midpoint. If several scales are used, the scale ratings may be factor-analysed in order to discover underlying evaluative dimensions. It is considered a well-documented finding of language-attitudes research that all such scales load into one of only a couple of dimensions: status and solidarity (Ryan, Giles & Sebastian 1982), or superiority, attractiveness and dynamism (Zahn & Hopper 1985). In concrete research projects, scales are often chosen to represent these dimensions because of their established position in previous research. An alternative to choosing scale items along well-known lines is the 'keywords' approach. It simply refers to an open-ended questioning format which invites subjects to write down all their immediate impressions, or maybe better their first three impressions, as they listen to the speakers on the tape. The resulting material may not only be analysed in its own right, but also used to find the 'right' labels for evaluative scales (Garrett, Coupland & Williams 2004; Maegaard 2005; see also the description of the Pharao et al. (2014) study in Section 6.1).

6.2.2   *The issue of explicitness/implicitness in experimental use of the MGT and VGT*

The experimental use of the 'guise technique' is no doubt thought of as the 'indirect methods' approach par excellence, and, as already mentioned, indirect methods are often thought to produce *implicitly (subconsciously)* offered attitudes. It should be stressed, however, that this is not automatically accomplished by using MGT/VGT-based SEEs – but it allows for this possibility, depending on how the investigation is designed and carried out.

In fact, SEEs are rarely designed and carried out in ways that allow for elicitation of implicit language attitudes. The first prerequisite for this to be possible is not to inform the subjects about the nature of the experiment until after its completion (at which point they should be debriefed and invited to withdraw their completed questionnaire if they wish to). Next, we must take care that the nature of the experiment is not revealed by the stimulus material itself. If you are asked to evaluate voices speaking in different languages, or clearly different dialects or accents, it would be strange not to think that 'this is about my language attitudes'. However, as long as the stimulus voices are kept within the 'natural' range of variation for the speech communities under study, our experience in Denmark (using CONSERVATIVE, MODERN and LOCAL) reveals that subjects do not become aware that they are evaluating accent differences. As to the measurement instrument, questions addressing the speakers' language in any way, for instance in terms of 'correctness' or 'dialect colour', must be avoided, as such questions bring us into direct questioning and far from the realm of implicit attitudes to language.

In variationist sociolinguistics, the interest in investigating a possible difference between explicit and implicit attitudes lies in their potentially different role in processes of language change. In contrast to what Labov found in Philadelphia (see Section 6.1), our nation-wide studies among youngsters in Denmark show a consistently reversed ranking of the locally relevant accents when the evaluation is moved from the awareness condition (LRT, see Section 5.2.2) to the non-awareness condition (VGT-based SEE). The same kind of reversal has been found also in other countries in Europe (see studies in Kristiansen & Grondelaers 2013). Because the implicit ranking is the one that accords with the advance of MODERN and the retreat of LOCAL, we can argue that implicit attitudes play an important role as a driving force in language change processes in Denmark (Kristiansen 2009, 2014; Maegaard et al. 2013). Similar results regarding the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes and their influence on use were found in the MIN-project (Kristiansen 2010, 2015).

The importance of addressing the issue of a potentially different role for explicit and implicit attitudes is obvious if the interest is to contribute to solve social problems. Adams (2019), for instance, investigates and discusses "The relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes to British accents in enhancing the persuasiveness of children's oral health campaigns".

6.2.3   *SEE in natural, everyday contexts*

Even if we succeed in maintaining a lack of awareness with regard to the object of study, our subjects who participate in 'laboratory-like' settings will always know that they are taking part in an experiment. The data collection is an 'obtrusive' event in, say, normal school-day activities. If we want to pursue unobtrusively collected data, we need to find an everyday setting where the manipulation of stimulus voices can go unnoticed while reactions can be reliably registered and background variables controlled at the same

time. There are few examples of such studies, no doubt because they are rather difficult both to design and to execute.

There are examples of studies that build on the idea of asking for help or cooperation in different varieties of language, and register whether and how the readiness to help or cooperate changes as the language changes. This approach has been exploited in studies using field researchers who shift between two linguistic codes as they address people on the street and ask for some information: 'Where do I find...? How do I go to...' (Rosenbaum et al. 1977; Bourhis 1984). If the reactions to the differently spoken addresses are measured in terms of 'readiness to help', the results may lend themselves to interpretation in terms of language attitudes.

If we want to use tape-recorded stimulus voices in unobtrusive SEEs, we will have to operate in social situations where public address systems are 'natural'. The loudspeaker system in a Cardiff movie theatre was used by Bourhis and Giles (1976) to ask audiences to help plan future programs by filling out a questionnaire form. The announcement was presented in four matched guises, one per evening: RP, mildly and broadly South Welsh-accented English, and Welsh. The same method was adopted in Kristiansen's Næstved study, but with a verbal guise design in that the announcement was read out by four different speakers: in MODERN and CONSERVATIVE standard, and in mild and broad LOCAL dialect (Kristiansen 1991, 1997, forthc.; Kristiansen & Giles 1992). In both studies, the degree of cooperation was measured as the ratio of questionnaires completed to tickets sold, and was interpreted as an expression of language attitudes.

The theatre-audience method is a way of collecting language-attitudes data in a completely naturalistic (real-life) setting. It does not involve any self-reporting on the part of the respondents, who are totally unaware of participating in an investigation of language attitudes. It can be said to address all three dimensions of attitudes: cognition, affect, and behaviour (not only as mental disposition but as actual practice). To the extent that the differences in reaction to the differences in language can be interpreted as language attitudes, they are unquestionably to be seen as implicitly (subconsciously) offered.

7.   Concluding remarks

More methods could be put into the tool-kit of language-attitudes research. The socalled Implicit Association Task (IAT), for instance, developed in the field of *social cognition*, is assumed to capture implicit attitudes (even if the attitude object is apparent to the person doing the evaluation), and has recently found some application in *sociolinguistics*. However, since the IAT, and other methods that rely heavily on technical developments, take us further down the experimental alley and thereby probably further away from a pragmatic perspective and interest, I shall leave such methods out of consideration here (for descriptions and discussions, see Campbell-Kibler 2012, 2013; Pantos 2015,

2019; Preston & Niedzielski 2013) and finish off with some concluding remarks concerning 'the contested interest of language attitudes' that was raised as an issue in the introduction to the chapter.

As foreshadowed in the introduction, we have indeed found a tendency for 'language-as-an-object-of-attitudes' to disappear the more pragmatics-oriented scholars are in their approach to the study of language. Within social psychology, we saw 'language-as-an-object-of-attitudes' disappear completely as attitudes were erased from the conceptions of 'self' and 'identity', which in a radical social-constructivist discursive approach became pure products of language (Potter & Wetherell). Within sociolinguistics, the interest in 'language-as-an-object-of-attitudes' which existed in the traditional survey approach to the study of language (Labov) is clearly yielding ground, in ethnographic-oriented approaches, to an interest in how 'self' and 'identity' find expression in language (Rampton, Eckert).

Where, at the end of the day, does this leave me and my proclaimed intention to defend language-attitudes research? Well, whether it targets techniques of interviewing or experimentation, there is no doubt in my mind that much of the discursive/social constructivist critique of traditional language-attitudes research is both pertinent and valuable – but I continue to believe in the existence of attitudes as something in the brain, and in the existence of attitudes-to-language as something that can and should be investigated in their own right, whether the interest is to describe and potentially solve *social issues* or describe and potentially explain *linguistic issues*.

I join in with Garrett (2010: 30) when he rejects it as overly restrictive to confine the research in social evaluation to the qualitative analysis of individuals' talk in interaction, and when he goes on to say: "There is much to be gained from taking an open view of research methods and interpretation and to allow approaches that aim at reaching generalisations about community-level phenomena". In fact, there is a strong tradition in language-attitudes research for using several methods in combination, in particular in sociolinguistic projects where the aim is to shed as much light as possible on the language-ideological situation in a speech community. The LANCHART and MIN projects have reoccurred several times in the chapter in order to signal the possibility and advantage of applying a variety of methods in a project, in many combinations (see also Soukup 2015 on 'mixed methods research').

Let me finish by referring to Coupland, who is arguably the scholar in linguistics who has published most high-profile research with roots in both of the traditions we are dealing with (e.g. Giles & Coupland 1991; Garrett, Coupland & Williams 2003; Coupland 2007). Coupland (2010: 256) notes about the social psychological intergroup and language-attitudes approach "[…] that its emphases are more cognitive than pragmatic, more experimental than discourse analytic, and that it subsumes a vast amount of cumulative, theory-driven empirical research on intergroup relations. Its main thrust is, however, that our social worlds are indeed structured, pervasively, through group-

relevant perceptions, and that these mediate our social relations and communication practices". As it appears, the characterisation is offered in contrast to the pragmatic, discourse analytic perspective, and Coupland asks and answers: "Can these perspectives be reconciled? I suspect they can not, but that it would be unwise to force them into simple opposition with each other, as if one is 'more correct' of 'less naïve' than the other". Elsewhere he says: "[…] it would seem sensible to come at the issue of social meaning from both available directions – from ethnographic and conversation-analytic study of situated interaction *and* from the social surveying of social groups and communities (Coupland and Jaworski 2004: 26; emphasis in original).

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Traditions

Membership categorisation analysis

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1.   Introduction

Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) is an approach to gain knowledge about how social and moral order is performed and made sense of in the everyday activities of people (Housley & Fitzgerald 2009, Fitzgerald & Housley 2015). More specifically, MCA is used for the empirical analysis of explicit and implicit categorisation in language – spoken or written – and the close examination of how categories are described, how they go together in collections, so called *Membership Categorisation Devices* (MCD), how they pair up with other categories, for example as contrasting or standardized relational pairs, and how they perform social norms telling us how members of certain categories should behave.

While categorising ourselves and others, we perform common sense knowledge. Categories' capacity to store and organise cultural knowledge is emphasized by Hester and Eglin (1997) when referring to MCA as an analysis of *culture-in-action*. Categorisations can be thought of as the performance of norms, obligations and expectations that are valid for members of different social categories in a given speech community. Doing categorisation is at the same time the *doing* of culture, the locally occasioned *doing* of norms. In addition, categories are *inference-rich*; participants in the given community share the same taken-for-granted knowledge about categories, and once a person is thought of as a member of a category, everything assumed of that category is applied to that person (Sacks 1992: 40–41, Schegloff 2007: 469).

MCA is a pragmatic and context-dependent approach, oriented to practical action (Leudar & Nekvapil 2004: 244). Categories are accomplished in interaction. They are locally negotiated and emerge in the sequential order of the members' spoken or written utterances. Moreover, the cultural knowledge that categories make relevant is recognisable *in situ*, in the given time and place. Thus, through the empirical study of situated interaction, the doing of social structures can be exposed. The analyst's task is to uncover those contexts that participants in interaction make relevant.

2.   Historical note

The roots of MCA can be found in Harvey Sacks' early work on social interaction (Sacks 1972), showing how people use categorisation for making sense of the world. With Sacks' work as a starting point, MCA was further developed in ethnomethodological and conversation analytic research, in the pioneering work by Jayyusi (1984), Hester and Eglin (1997), Watson (1997) and Silverman (1998) (for a more thorough review of MCA's historical background, see Fitzgerald 2012). Housley et al. (2017: 570) explains that

> the ethnomethodological roots of MCA mean that its starting point is different from other forms of "discourse analysis" that are concerned with ideological or larger discursive formations such as "neo-liberalism" and other social, economic or historical framings. (Housley et al. 2017: 570)

This means that the analytical focus is on practical action rather than on "representational or semiotic aspects of discourse" (Housley et al. 2017: 570). The concern, thus, is how we *do* social life (Garfinkel 1964, Turner 1974, Zimmerman 1978). This doing is a communicative action; social order is verbally performed, and it happens in natural occurring language (Watson 2009).

MCA's interest in social knowledge and identity, and its Sacksian roots, have led to a great scope of research within the field of Conversation Analysis, CA (see for example Stokoe 2003, Schegloff 2007, Evans & Fitzgerald 2016, Whitehead & Baldry 2018). However, the approach is not exclusively relevant for CA or for spoken interaction, but for any discipline focused on social life and experience, and any kind of interaction where categories appear (Fitzgerald 2012: 307, Stokoe 2012). Thus, MCA has engaged scholars from within the fields of sociology, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, social psychology, and educational science, to name a few.

Most work on MCA is concerned with personalized membership categorisation devices, such as gender, institutional identity or profession, and how they organise our common-sense knowledge about people. However, there is a branch of research focusing on non-personal categorisation devices (see for example Collet 2009). A specific interest has developed around categorisations concerning place and geographical location (McHoul & Watson 1984, Housley & Smith 2011, Myers & Lampropoulou 2013). For instance, public buildings have been studied as a membership categorisation device, collecting categories such as "firestations" and "courthouses" (McHoul & Watson 1984).

3.   Analytical tools

According to leading researchers within the field, MCA is not a methodology in the sense that it provides a systematically designed model that can be applied on any data.

Rather, MCA can be considered "a collection of observed practices employed *by members*" (Fitzgerald & Housley 2015: 6). Thus, the analytical tools used are really the members' own means to make sense in their everyday lives and social interaction. However, research have shown some significant patterns in the categorisation work members do, and thus a conceptual framework for membership categorisation analysis has developed over the years (see Stokoe 2012). In this section I will introduce the key concepts.

Membership categorisation device (MCD) refers to the organisation of member categories into collections, and displays the cultural and common sense knowledge about which categories that go together. According to Sacks, MCD's consist of two parts: *collections of categories* and *rules of application* (Sacks 1992: 238).

Collections of categories are locally accomplished. For instance, the device family is evoked when categorising members as "mothers", "fathers", "daughters" and "sons". The device stage-of-life is evoked when categorising members as "adults", "children" or "retiree". Some devices can be understood as *omni-relevant* (Sacks 1992). This means that in a certain context, some devices and collections of categories are always present, such as "doctor" and "patient" in a health care situation, "student" and "teacher" in a school context, or "coach" and "player" in a basketball training situation (Evans & Fitzgerald 2016). Any action within this context can potentially invoke the omni-relevant devices and categories, and once invoked, they affect the organisation of the interaction (Evans & Fitzgerald 2016: 208).

Another aspect of the analysis of MCD's is that devices also could be heard as being categories of another membership categorisation device. For instance, Watson (1978) analyses how the categories "punks" and "hippies" go together through the membership categorisation device "types of youth subcultures", and how "punks" and "hippies" also form collections of membership categories, such as different kinds of "punks".

In the common sense-making members perform in their everyday activities, various MCD's are often found to interact. In a study of a family therapy session concerning problems at school, with the family of an adolescent diagnosed with autism, O'Neill & LeCouteur (2014) show how the devices "disability", "family" and "stage-of-life" alter and intersect in the interaction, as part of a problem solving activity. The parents categorise their son by the device stage-of-life, as an adolescent, and not only by the device disability, as autistic. Hence, the parents provide an alternative narrative, suggesting the problems at school might concern being an adolescent on his way to become an adult, rather than being disabled. The collaborative negotiation, including negotiations of categories to make sense of the situation at hand, gives the boy a better opportunity to align with the school's behavioural requirements, and thus solve the initial problem (O'Neill & LeCouteur 2014: 281f.).

MCDs can also intersect to highlight certain social phenomena, for example when using the category "woman" from the device gender and the category "doctor" from the device profession to categorise someone as a female doctor. In addition, categorising

someone by saying "she is a woman, but she works as a doctor", creates what Sacks calls a *puzzle* (Sacks 1979, Idevall & Bellander 2014: 48). The conjunction *but* indicates that there is something puzzling about combining the two categories female and doctor, and this creates cultural knowledge about what people normatively assume about doctors and their gender.

Categories within MCDs form relationships in interaction. Categories can be heard as going together in *standardised relational pairs* (Stokoe 2012: 282). For instance, "husband" and "wife" can be heard as making up a pair, as well as "wife" and "wife" or "husband" and "husband". "Father" and "son", on the other hand, can be heard as forming a *hierarchical relationship*, which also could be the case with "teacher" and "student". "Girls" and "boys" could be heard as a *contrasting pair*, indicating a discourse about gender differences. Moreover, "centre", "forward" and "goal keeper" are categories that most people in our society hear as part of a *team* (Stokoe 2012: 282). The relationship between categories is not pre-existing, but situated. It emerges in interaction, while people try to make sense of their world.

The relationships between categories are not always explicitly expressed. For instance, Collet (2009) analyses how the category "civilised world" implicitly evoke the not mentioned category "*uncivilised world", the two forming a standardised relational pair. The unmentioned category is implied by the use of category bound predicates, such as "terror" and "war against civilisation", which are the opposite of those used to describe the civilised world. (Collet 2009: 490)

Category-bound predicates are the properties, activities, obligations and expectations that are tied to a certain category (Stokoe 2012). For example, Hughes and King (2018) map the predicates used to describe the category "older LGBT people" (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) on different websites, and find that the predicates constitute two different orientations towards the category. The first, celebratory predicates, describe members of the category as "friendly", and as "understanding and celebrating the diversity of genders, bodies, sexualities and relationships of older Australians" (Hughes & King 2018: 133). The other, constraint predicates, focusing on the obstacles that older LGBT people meet, were for instance to suffer from "stigma, family rejection and social isolation" and to be "more likely to be single and more likely to live on their own than heterosexual people" (Hughes & King 2018: 133). Category-bound predicates thus construct different representations of the category they describe. Used like this, MCA is a proper method to explore how different perspectives on social phenomena are produced in the public press, and how these perspectives position members.

Collections of categories are one aspect of MCDs, whilst the other are the rules of application (Sacks 1972). When analysing MCDs, the analyst becomes aware that members create collections of categories according to two rules of application: the *economy rule* and the *consistency rule* (Sacks 1972, 1992: 238f.). The economy rule states that participants choose one category and that this category is sufficient for the present pur-

pose. One example is how the category "council house" is sufficient for an interviewee to describe the kind of house where they grew up (Myer & Lampropoulou 2013: 347). Another example is how the category "teacher" might be enough when talking about who gave you your homework; in this context you do not necessarily have to ascribe the person a gender, age, civic status, appearance, etc. in order to make your point.

The consistency rule states that "if some population of persons is being categorized, and if some category from a device's collection has been used to categorize a first member of the population, then that category or other categories of the same collection may be used to categorize further members of the population." (Sacks 1972, reprinted in Turner 1974: 224). For instance, if someone introduces themselves as a teacher, it is likely that others also use the device "profession" to introduce themselves.

The reason why this is "likely" is what Sacks (1972, 1992: 239, 259) calls the *hearer's maxim*, which means that "if two or more categories are used to categorize two or more members of some population, and those categories can be heard as categories from the same collection, then: hear them that way" (Sacks 1974: 219–220). This is why categories are "heard" as going together, for instance. Further on, the *viewer's maxim* states that if someone "sees a category-activity being done, then, if one can see it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, then: See it that way" (Sacks 1974: 225). This hearing and seeing is ultimately situated and context-dependent.

In Table 1, an overview of the analytical aspects discussed in this section is presented. The table is a remodelled version of an overview published in Idevall Hagren & Bellander (2014).

Table 1. Analytical key concepts of MCA.

Membership categorisation device, MCD			
	Connections between categories	**Category –relevant descriptions**	**Intersection between collections or categories**
Collections of categories	Standardised relational pair Contrasting pair Hierarchical organisation Team	Activities Properties Obligations Rights Expectations Beliefs Entitlements etc.	Puzzles Contradictions Distance Causes etc.
Rules of application and categorisation maxims	Economy rule Consistency rule The hearer's maxim	The viewer's maxim	

Categorisation work is a sequential phenomenon, since categories are locally accomplished in members' (spoken or written) interaction. Utterances are prospective and retrospective, i.e. they initiate categories addressing some earlier utterance, and they answer to previous categorisations (Stokoe & Attenborough 2015).

For the analysis of sequentiality in spoken interaction, Conversation Analysis has a very well-developed set of conceptual tools, e.g. the study of turn taking, back-up and repair (Heritage 2005). However, the instances where categories are made are not always sequentially organised in the same manner as spoken interaction (Idevall Hagren & Bellander 2014), i.e. with direct address to previous turns. To analyse the sequential position of categories in text with a more monologue character, such as student essays or newspaper reports, *intertextuality* could be a useful conceptual tool (Idevall Hagren 2019, Leudar & Nekvapil 2004). In a study of media dialogical networks, Leudar and Nekvapil (2006) analyse a newspaper article and show how a network is formed in the text when the journalist writes about some political episodes. The journalist uses verbs of communication to summarise the dialogical events, for instance by writing that someone produced "demands" in a TV debate, and that these demands were "rejected" by someone else (Leudar and Nekvapil 2006: 31). These dialogical events appeared in different times and settings, but are connected in the dialogical network of the newspaper article by intertextual references. The journalist "brought the actions together as dialogically contingent and he did not do this arbitrarily, but because of politicians' own obvious and expressed relevancies" (Leudar and Nekvapil 2006: 31).

4.   Analysing categorisation work

This section aims to illustrate the practical application of the method in research. Three themes will serve as empirical examples: categorisation and identity, categorisation and media, and categorisation as a moral matter. Identity and morality are aspects that are intrinsic to categorical order in general, while media rather concerns a common site of categorisation work. These different, but not necessarily separate, themes in categorisation analysis are selected to illustrate different methodological aspects.

The first section concerns how MCDs work to form social and personalised identities and to do social structure. The second section concerns media as a context of categorisation and the intertextual aspects of sequential positioning. The last section shows how moral order is maintained in categorisation work, focusing on descriptions of categories and their resonance with social norms.

Moreover, this section will give an overview of the different kinds of data and various research problems that MCA analysts have been concerned with.

4.1 Categorisation and identity

Identity is a pragmatic matter, since social identity "is something people in society do, achieve, negotiate, attribute things to and act upon as part of their daily lives" (Housley & Fitzgerald 2015: 2–3). This doing of identity is also a matter of categorisation, in the sense that people are categorised as members of identity categories, e.g. as women, Swedes, professors, adolescents, and so on. The MCDs that collect the identity categories can be of an institutional character, such as the staff within a medical institution, collecting categories and social identities such as "midwife", "nurse" and "surgeon", or as parties in a police interrogation, including categories and social identities such as "police officers" and "victims of crime". They can also be of a personal character, when categorisations draw on devices such as gender (Stokoe 2003, 2010), race (Whitehead 2012, Shrikant 2018), sexuality, and age (Hughes & King 2018).

Identity categories are made in different ways, for example through the explicit mentioning of a category. Stokoe (2010) analyses the category-based denials in police interrogations by suspects of assaulting women, and shows how they deny membership in the category "the kind of men who hit women". In one police interrogation, the police officer asks a woman if her husband hit their neighbour, and she answers "my husband would never hit a woman" (Stokoe 2010: 65). In this utterance, as a response to the officer's question, she makes explicit categorisations of her husband, as a man, and of the neighbour as a woman. In addition, she expresses a recognisable category activity combination: "men" + "hitting" + "women", and uses it to deny that her husband is that kind of man, and thus not guilty of the crime he is suspected of (Stokoe 2010: 65).

Categories are not always mentioned, but can be implied by mentioning category-relevant descriptions. For instance, gender is evoked when telling someone to stop being "so testosterony" (Stokoe 2012: 286). Behaving "testosterony" in the given example includes activities that were tied to the category "man" previous in the interaction, such as not letting someone know you like them, not calling them after the first date and not seem so needy (ibid). The gender categorisation is locally accomplished in the interaction by members making certain activities relevant.

In addition, the mentioning of one category can be a way to imply another category, e.g. when the category "women" is used to make claims about "feminists" (Eglin 2002). The categorisation appears in an article commenting on the Montreal massacre – a mass shooting at an engineering school in Montreal in 1989, where fourteen women were killed – in the sentence "Women across Canada are speaking of the massacre as both symbolic and symptomatic of a society that creates misogyny and tolerates it" (Eglin 2002: 821). The context-dependent interpretation of this categorisation states that women (and not men), talk about the massacre in this way, and that these women are of a certain kind, namely women within a field of knowledge about that kind of language to speak about society. The professional identities given by the activity to speak

about the massacre as "symbolic and symptomatic of a society that creates misogyny and tolerates it" are tied to feminist organisations, an interpretation that is due to the analyst's common-sense knowledge about feminist discourse in Canada at the time (Eglin 2002: 822). Thus, "women", in this case, evokes the category "feminists".

An analysis of membership categorisation not only tells us something about the identity of specific individuals, but it shows us the social norms and structures that individual makes sense of.

For instance, the analysis of how members do gender in interaction will display gender as a social structure, since the gendering categorisation work evokes participants' common sense knowledge about women and men in the given context (Stokoe 2003: 339). Participants "construct, and manage their conduct in relation to, conventional expectations for women and men's behaviour and character" (Stokoe 2003: 339). In the example above, where not calling after the first date and not seeming so needy are behaviour tied to men, social norms about gender are emphasised as a set of recognisable "rules" that men can play according to, or ignore (if they "stop being so testosterony") (Stokoe 2012: 286).

MCA is a suitable approach to explore the complexity of identities, since it offers a method to analyse how members select several categories for their doing of identity. Women can do female gender in different ways by making relevant other MCDs and categories as well, such as mother, young, feminist, heterosexual etc.

The complexity of identity is shown by Higgins (2009) in an analysis of how multilingual speakers manage different identities – linguistic, ethnic and religious – in category work. Higgins (2009) analyses a conversation between two journalists in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to see how they propose, resist and alter categories. The two participants categorise themselves as members of different religious categories, "Hindu" and "Christian". This intercultural difference becomes an obstacle to develop topical talk based on common experiences. Thus, one of the participants makes relevant another category, as "someone who helps others in need", and invites the other one to accept membership in this category in order to create a common ground for topical talk about charity. However, he resists this category. Resistance is made by giving minimal response to the categorisation offered, by code switching, from Swahili to English, and by making other categories than "someone who helps people in need" relevant, such as "businessperson involved in a barter" (Higgins 2009: 129 ff). The study illustrates how identity is managed by the delicate categorisation work where participants strive to create a common ground for interaction, based on shared experiences of belonging to a certain category, at the same time as they express belonging to identity categories that might create a difference between them.

4.2   Categorisation and the media

Categorisation is a way to make sense of the world, and one context where knowledge about the world is constantly reproduced and negotiated is the media. Different aspects of the society are construed in television, online news reports, radio and social media. Categorisation in the media is a well explored field, focusing on political discourse (Housley & Fitzgerald 2003, Leudar & Nekvapil 2004, Housley & Fitzgerald 2009), categorisations of victims and perpetrators (Eglin & Hester 2006), media debates and discussions (Idevall Hagren 2019, Housley et al. 2017, Rautajoki 2012) and reports on breaking news (Rapley et al. 2003, Sowińska & Dubrovskaja 2012, Stokoe & Attenborough 2015).

Housley and Fitzgerald (2003) argue that the media is a context for political discourse, where categorisation is central to "generate debate, represent public views and feelings and bring elected representatives and decision-makers to account" (Housley & Fitzgerald 2003). To categorise is a way to "do" media, and in this doing, categorisation is situated. For instance, the categorisation of victims and perpetrators in news reports about violent acts are part of a sense-making in a local practice (Eglin & Hester 2006). This means that people in interaction, by doing and responding to categorisations, create ideas about who is vulnerable, who is most likely to be a perpetrator, and what behaviour we can expect from perpetrators and victims.

According to Nekvapil and Leudar (2006), media texts, either spoken or written, are dialogical in character, and form dialogical networks where reports are responding to previous texts as well as addressing expected replies.

Categories are dialogically managed in media text, that is, categories that are made relevant in the initial text are elaborated on in the comments that follow. Categories can be confirmed, renegotiated or contested in the dialogical network. For instance, Idevall Hagren (2019) analyses how membership in the category "racist" is negotiated and denied in a media debate concerning a famous Swedish Youtuber using a racist slur. The debate escalates when a guest in a live show suddenly leaves the studio after criticising the TV channel for collaborating with the Youtuber. In the initial reports about this incident, the Youtuber is not categorised as a racist, but she is assigned activities such as posting a racist video and using the n-word (Idevall Hagren 2019: 100325). Responding reports show that these activities are heard as resonant with the category "racist". For instance, a reply to one of the initial articles states that the Youtuber "is not a racist. She has repented, apologised and promised never to use the n-word again." (Idevall Hagren 2019: 100325). Similar to the denials of being a man that hits women (Stokoe 2010), the categorisation racist is explicitly being resisted. In addition, activities tied to a "non-racist" are used to describe the Youtuber: to repent, apologise and promise never to use the racist slur again. Since racism, in particular accusations of someone being a racist, is a delicate matter to discuss, implicit categorisation becomes a way to position someone as a racist without using the word "racist". In the media network, such implicit categorisations are made explicit in

responding reports. Thus, the sequential ordering of media comments create a common sense knowledge about social categories which are present in the particular media context (cf. Stokoe & Attenborough 2015:56).

The dialogical relations between categories and category-resonant descriptions can be reproduced through intertextuality, e.g., direct quotes of previous reports or reformulations of what has been stated in other media. For instance, the activity to apologise for the racist slur, mentioned in the example above, appears initially in a statement by the TV channel, when defending their decision to collaborate with the Youtuber (Idevall Hagren 2019:100325). This phrase becomes an intertext that not only makes the category non-racist relevant, but that positions the one using it as an ally with those claiming that the Youtuber is not a racist.

In a media context, some categories are omni-relevant, such as host and guest in a talk show. To these institutional categories, certain obligations and activities are tied. When someone is identified as a member of a category, they must act according to the expectations of the category. The host is expected to lead and control the discussion, and one way to accomplish this is to place the guests in different member categories, urging them to act in certain ways (Rautajoki 2012). In a media setting where people meet eye-to-eye, there is a discrepancy between the pre-structured plotline and the unpredictability of the guest's utterances in the interaction (Rautajoki 2012). Using MCA to analyse a Finnish talk show discussing the 9/11 terror attacks, Rautajoki (2012) shows how the pre-structured script unfolds in the introductions of the guests. The host positions the guests in opposing cultural membership categories – Americans and Afghan – in order to create contradiction and debate. The guests categorised as Americans are directed towards a position of defence, where they come to speak for the whole American nation.

MCA is in particular an adequate method for the analysis of media reports of breaking news, since descriptions of incidents and people will expose categorisations that accomplish causes, responsibilities, perpetrators and victims (Stokoe and Attenborough 2015:60). In our time, using internet and social media to broadcast every happening of interest, news are more interactional and sequential than ever before (Stokoe and Attenborough 2015:60).

Stokoe and Attenborough (2015) analyse the first news that were published after the terror attack at Utøja and Oslo in Norway, in 2011. The descriptions of the course of event and of the suspects were prospective and led to conclusions about islamists being guilty, which proved to be wrong. When the information reached the media, that the perpetrator was blond with blue eyes, the conclusion – later also proved to be wrong – was that he was a radicalised Muslim convert. Being Muslim and blond with blue eyes is a *puzzle* – the category Muslim and the attributes of the appearance do not match according to current norms – and to solve the puzzle, the perpetrator had to be categorised as a convert (Stokoe & Attenborough 2015:66).

4.3   Categorisation as a moral matter

Categorisation displays social norms, including moral obligations and expectations tied to categories. As Jayyusi (1991) states, "the use of even mundanely descriptive categories, such as 'mother', 'doctor', 'policeman', for example, makes available a variety of possible inferential trajectories *in situ*" (Jayyusi 1991: 241). Sacks' (1974) classic example from a child's story, the sentence "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" contains the implicit moral assessment that mothers should pick up their babies when they cry; the baby cries, therefore the mother (heard as this particular baby's mother) picks it up, since that is an activity that is expected from the category mother.

Moral concerns can also be managed explicitly when describing or making claims about mothers, when certain activities are revealed as tied to the category, such as putting her children to bed in appropriate time, and some are not expected, such as not disciplining her children (Stokoe 2003: 324–325). Even absent activities make moral claims, e.g. when a mother is not described with activities and attributes that are normally tied to a good motherhood, but instead is described as someone who, for instance, is not present or can't control her children (Stokoe 2003: 326, cf. Sacks 1992: 505). Describing a mother with attributes deviant from those expected from a good mother will ascribe the person a negative moral identity (Stokoe 2003).

Understanding the world and why bad things happen involves managing moral matters (Rapley et al. 2003, Clifton 2009, Eglin & Hester 2006). To explain why someone commits violent crimes and hold them morally responsible is an instance of categorisation work. This is at stake in a study by Rapley et al. (2003), in an analysis of news articles concerning a mass shooting in Port Arthur in 1996. The sole gunman was described by the press as "a nut", "a psycho" and "a mental ill" – categorisations drawing on psychiatric discourses. But in order to hold the gunman morally accountable in a way that someone with a mental illness cannot be held, the psychiatric categorisations were modified; for instance he was categorised as "personality disordered" but not insane (Rapley et al. 2003: 439–440). Thus, categorisation do the work of explaining something that for most people is inconceivable, and making moral judgement that justify the punishment of the perpetrator.

When two categories that normally are tied together do not align in the expected way, or when expected duties and rights diverge from a member's actions, there might be a case of moral discrepancy (Clifton 2009, Housley 2002, Housley & Fitzgerald 2003). In an analysis of the recordings of the negotiations between the FBI and the cult leader David Koresh during the Waco siege, Clifton (2009) shows how moral discrepancy is talked into being by Koresh in order to position himself as a victim. Koresh categorises the FBI as part of the government and highlights a discrepancy between the expected category-resonant predicates, e.g. respect of property and the rule of law, and the actual acts of the government, in this case non-respect of property and a will to fight. These *de*

facto predicates categorise the government as the perpetrator, making the other category of this standardised relational pair, the victim, relevant for Koresh himself. Moral discrepancy thus becomes a means to do subversion (Clifton 2009).

5. Suggestions for future research

The field of MCA is constantly developing, spanning into every research area interested in the pragmatics of everyday sense making. As shown in this chapter, MCA is indeed an approach suitable for polyphonic contexts, where different voices and world views meet to negotiate. One such context is the media, and future research will most likely continue to explore the media and the developing means for communication in our society. Considering the impact of images, still and moving, in our media climate, future studies might find MCA a suitable approach to analyse categorisation in multimodal settings.

Another possible trajectory for MCA concerns the interest in non-personal, inanimate categories. MCA is already used for the analysis of material categories, such as buildings and places (Housley & Smith 2011, Myers & Lampropoulou 2013). This interpretation of membership categorisation might develop into analyses of the material semiotic meaning making that people perform while interacting with objects, for instance in their professions, while playing or while doing their everyday activities in the household. For instance, a combination of MCA and Actor Network Theory (Law 2009), both sharing their roots in ethnomethodology, might give further insights into the complex workings of categorisation of members of different kinds.

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Handbook A–Z

Argument structure

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1.   Introduction

Every language provides multiple formal means to express basic scenes of human experience including who did what to whom, what happened, how something has changed, how someone feels. But *why* do languages allow more than one way to express a particular propositional meaning? In this chapter we see that different formal patterns are used in different pragmatic contexts, as each conveys a different construal, or an emphasis on a different aspect of a scene, or a different way of relating the information to the larger discourse structure.

First it is worth clarifying some terminology. The number and type of actors and entities involved in the interpretation of basic event types are described as the event's ARGUMENTS. The ARGUMENT STRUCTURE of an event captures how these arguments are related to one another semantically. For instance, "something acted on something else," "something underwent a change of state" are distinct semantic argument structures. The associations between argument structures and their formal expression, described here in terms of canonical grammatical relations for simplicity, are referred to as ARGUMENT STRUCTURE CONSTRUCTIONS, but can alternatively be described as *valences* or *subcategorization frames.* Oftentimes linguists refer to the combination of semantic argument structures and their formal expression simply as *argument structures*, but we use argument structure constructions here to acknowledge that different languages convey the same semantic argument structure using distinct formal means (Croft 2001, Haspelmath et al. 2005). Several English argument structure constructions are represented in Table 1. It is important to appreciate that scenes in the world do not directly determine which argument structure construction a speaker chooses. Commonly, the same event can be described with a variety of distinct argument structure constructions. For instance, imagine that a tiger preys on llamas and an event of this type occurs. A speaker can choose to describe such an event using a number of different argument structure constructions, as illustrated in Table 2.

Which argument structure construction is chosen depends on how the event is construed, how much information the speaker wishes to convey, which aspects of the event she wishes to make prominent in the discourse, and how the utterance fits into the

larger discourse. For instance, the transitive sentence explicitly mentions the actor (*the tiger*) and the undergoer (*a llama*) as subject and object, respectively. The periphrastic causative implies that the tiger was only indirectly responsible for the llama's death. The double object construction includes mention of the intended recipient of the llama meat. The resultative construction specifies the manner in which the llama was killed, in the main verb (*maul*) and the death, in a secondary predicate. The "nice-of-you" construction includes the speaker's evaluation of the tiger's action (Goldberg and Herbst, to appear). If the speaker wishes to deemphasize the victim, the undergoer argument can be omitted in the "deprofiled object" construction. The intransitive ("unaccusative") makes the undergoer a likely ongoing topic of conversation.

Table 1. Sample English Argument Structure Constructions

	Form	Prototypical meaning
Transitive	$(Subj_X)$ V Obj_Y	X ACTS on Y; X EXPERIENCES Y
Periphrastic causative	$(Subj_X)$ MAKE Obj_Y VP	X CAUSES Y to V
Double object	$(Subj_X)$ V $Obj_{1\text{-}Y}$ $Obj_{2\text{-}Z}$	X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z
Resultative	$(Subj_X)$ V Obj Pred	X CAUSES Y to BECOME Z_{pred}
« way » construction	$(Subj_X)$ V $[poss_X$ *way*$]$ $Oblique_{path}$	X CREATES PATH & MOVES Z_{path}
Nice-of-you	(It BE) Adj_P $[of NP_Y]$ VP_{toZ}	SPEAKER JUDGES Y's Z_{ACTION} P
Caused-Motion	$(Subj_X)$ V Obj $Oblique_{path}$	X CAUSES Y to MOVE Z_{path}
Removal	$(Subj_X)$ V Obj $Oblique_{source}$	X CAUSES Y to MOVE from Z

Table 2. An example of different possible argument structure construction descriptions of a scene

Transitive	The tiger killed a llama.
Periphrastic causative	The tiger made the llama die.
Double object	The tiger killed her cub a llama.
Resultative	The tiger mauled a llama to death.
Nice-of-you	It was terrible of the tiger to kill a llama.
Deprofiled object	The tiger killed again.
Intransitive (+ reason)	The llama died because of the tiger.

2.   Conventional pragmatics

The term PRAGMATICS is sometimes used to describe non-conventional inferences that arise in context, but in the context of argument structure constructions, *conventional* pragmatics is more relevant. The distinction between non-conventional and conventional pragmatics is gradient. This is clear because inferences that are initially non-

conventional can become conventionalized through a process of "pragmatic strengthening," as listeners come to associate an inference as an essential aspect of the construction's function (Traugott 1988, Hopper and Traugott 1993, DuBois 1987; see also Hawkins 2007). In this way, constructions can be conventionally associated with certain genres, register, or dialects. They can also require that certain information is presupposed, more or less topical in the discourse, or more or less prominent, and at times can implicitly convey the speaker's attitude. An open-ended range of pragmatic variables can be conventionally relevant to constructions (Birner 2018, Hampe and Gries 2018, Cappelle 2017, Goldberg and Ackerman 2001, Hoffman and Bergs 2018, Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996).

In the case of argument structure constructions in particular, the most common way that conventional pragmatics is relevant relates to how information is "packaged." Three notions are central to the packaging of information or INFORMATION STRUCTURE: TOPIC, FOCUS DOMAIN, and BACKGROUNDEDNESS, all of which relate to the listener's and speaker's shared knowledge or common ground in the context of the discourse (Halliday 1967, Chafe 1976, 1994, Clark 1996, Clark and Haviland 1977, Erteschik-Shir 2007, Gries 1999, Gundel et al. 1993, Hilpert 2014, Latrouite and Riester 2018, Lambrecht 1994, Leino 2013, Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996, Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, Van Valin 2008). A distinct but related dimension involves the degree of "givenness" or "accessibility" in discourse (Ariel 1988, 1990, Chafe 1987, Dryer 1996). These ideas and their relation to one another and to whether or how arguments are expressed are detailed in Sections 3–4.

3.   Topicality and givenness

A sentence topic can be defined as a "matter of current interest which a statement is about and with respect to which a proposition is to be interpreted as relevant" (Lambrecht 1994: 119). Topics are more likely to be animate than inanimate, for the simple reason that people are interested in talking about people (Osgood 1980). In simple active clauses in English, the grammatical subject is commonly the topic. It is not accidental that grammatical subjects are termed *subjects*, since a subject is the person or thing under discussion. However, classic tests for grammatical subjects across languages select either for topics or for actors. In languages like English that treat the actor as the default topic, subject is a useful category, but the status of grammatical subjects in many other languages is less straightforward (e.g., La Polla 1993).

Topicality is not the same as ACCESSIBILITY, which describes how easily an argument can be identified by the listener (Ariel 1988, Chafe 1987, Dryer 1996). In particular, arguments can be GIVEN, ACCESSIBLE, or NEW. We can see that these dimensions are distinguishable by observing that all of the cells in Table 3 are filled.

Table 3. Arguments with accessibility as topic or within the focus or backgrounded domains.

	Topic	Within focus domain	Within backgrounded phrase
Given	*She saw the tiger.*	*She saw him.*	*The person who met them*
Accessible	*Her mother saw the tiger.*	*She called the police.*	*The person who met your mother*
New	*A woman saw the tiger.*	*She saw a plumber.*	*The person who knew a plumber.*

At the same time, as discussed in the following section, topics that are brand new (as in e.g., *A woman saw the tiger*) are very rare (Chafe 1987, DuBois 1987, Francis et al. 1999).

4.   Focus domain and backgrounded phrases

The FOCUS DOMAIN of an utterance refers to the expression of content that is asserted or treated as informative (Halliday 1967: 204, Lambrecht 1994: 218). The majority of utterances involve "topic-comment" information structure in which some "comment" is made about the topic. In this case, the focus domain ("comment") is the predicate or verb phrase. Arguments within the focus domain may be new, accessible, or given (see middle column of Table 3). In the examples in (1), the focus domain is the verb phrase (underlined). Note that sentence accent falls on the final word unless the final word is given (e.g., *him* in 1a), as indicated by capital letters.

Topic-comment (Predicate focus)
(1)   a.   *She SAW him.*
      b.   *She saw his MOTHER.*
      c.   *She saw a CHILD.*

When a sentence is negated without special intonation, the content of the focus domain is negated. For instance, the negated sentence in (2) denies that the man was seen (by her). The focus domain is distinguished from BACKGROUNDED aspects of a sentence, which are presupposed to varying degrees. The relative clause in (2) is backgrounded and note that the negation does not deny that a man lives upstairs.

(2)   *She didn't see the man who lives upstairs.*

Less commonly, the subject argument as well as the predicate falls within the focus domain. Lambrecht (1994) calls this case a SENTENCE FOCUS (SF) CONSTRUCTION, and notes that it is used to introduce a new entity or event into the discourse (see also Sasse's 1987 event-central thetic sentences). In English, the SF construction is indicated with pitch accent on the logical subject rather than the predicate phrase, as in (3).

English sentence focus construction
(3) [What happened?]
    a. *KNUD called.*
    b. *Her BIKE broke down.*
    c. *My SHOULDER hurts.*

Speakers generally prefer to introduce a new topic before separately commenting on it (DuBois 1987), so that even in sentence focus constructions, the subject argument tends to be accessible and not brand new (Lambrecht 1994). EXISTENTIAL CONSTRUCTIONS, as in (4), provide a way for speakers to introduce a new topic and allow it to be commented on separately by a secondary predicate (e.g., Lakoff 1987, McNally 2016).

(4) *There was a bolt of lightning that struck the farm.*

Argument structure constructions combine with SENTENCE-LEVEL CONSTRUCTIONS that provide more unusual or "marked" ways of packaging information within discourse (e.g., Lambrecht 2001). For example, the simple transitive argument structure construction can combine with the cleft construction (5), a left-dislocation construction (6) or a topicalization construction (7).

(5) *It was a peach that nobody wanted to buy*$_{\text{COCA SPOK2016}}$ It-cleft

(6) *The peach, nobody wanted to buy it.*   Left-dislocation

(7) *The peach, nobody wanted to buy.*   Topicalization

In an extensive analysis of the Switchboard corpus of spoken language, Gregory and Michaelis (2001) documented the functions of English left-dislocation and topicalization constructions, finding subtle distinctions between them. The initial noun phrases in the left-dislocation construction have generally not been previously mentioned but do persist as topics. The initial noun phrases in the topicalization construction display the opposite tendency: the majority have been previously mentioned and do not persist as topics. Thus, the left-dislocation construction is topic establishing, whereas the topicalization construction tends to be used for "moribund topics" (Gregory and Michaelis 2001).

5. Unexpressed arguments

Because language is used to convey information, the following modest pragmatic generalizations hold cross-linguistically:

(8) Pragmatic Mapping Generalizations (Goldberg 2004, 2006):
    A. Linguistically expressed arguments must be relevant to the intended message
    B. Arguments that are relevant & non-recoverable from context must be indicated

The generalization in (A) follows from the fact that expressing an argument that is irrelevant to the message being conveyed would be misleading. The generalization in (B) is required in order for the speaker's intended message to be interpretable.

Languages also tend to convey information *efficiently.* This motivates the fact that languages allow certain recoverable or irrelevant arguments to be unexpressed in certain circumstances (Brown and Dell 1987). Many languages, including Inuktitut, Tzeltal, Japanese, Lao, and Russian, routinely omit given or accessible arguments unless they are contrastively focused (Allen 2008, Clancy 1980). Examples from Korean, Thai, and Hindi are provided in (9–11)

(9) *ni3 gei3 yi2 …   ao ni3 gei3 ya 2PS*
    give auntie …   EMP 2PS give EMP … gei3
    'You give auntie (the peach)…Oh you give (auntie) (the peach)… (I) give (you)
    (some peach)'   (Chinese; Mok and Bryant 2006)

(10) **A:** <Do we need spoons?>
    B: (nodding) *ca   dai tak   dai ngai kha*
                 PART get scoop get PART Sentential_Ending
                 'So (we) can scoop up (food).'
                     (Thai, Theeraporn Ratitamkul, personal communication)

(11) *toRii   hae*
    break-SG.FEM.PRF be-3.SG.PRES.
    '(You) broke (it)'   (Hindi, Narasimhan, Budwig, & Murty 2005)

Although English often requires arguments to be expressed, there exist English constructions that allow normally required arguments to be unexpressed. These include short passives (e.g., *The llama was killed*) and the "deprofiled object construction" (e.g., *Tigers only kill at night*) (Goldberg 2000, 2005, Lemmens 1998, 2012). In addition, Ruppenhofer and Michaelis (2010) analyze certain written genres of English that regularly allow arguments to be unexpressed, including recipes, labels, and diaries (12a–c).

(12) a. Recipes: *Serve ( ) cold.*
    b. Labels: *( ) Contains alcohol*
    c. Diary entries: *( ) Stayed home today*
                     (Ruppenhofer & Michaelis 2010)

Less commonly discussed is the fact that English allows first, second, or third person subject arguments to be omitted in casual ongoing speech as a type of clause-chaining device, and first-person subjects often can be omitted in expressions of welcome or farewell as well. These cases are illustrated with the attested examples in Table 4 from the COCA corpus (Davies 2008).

Table 4. Attested examples of unexpressed subjects in spoken English

Casual Speech (1st, 2nd, 3rd person)	( ) Bet you wish you could have shot me. COCA SPOK 2016
	I'm still shaking. ( ) Went out, and they were all screaming fire. COCA SPOK 2017
	( ) See that? COCA SPOK 2017
	( ) Didn't leave a forwarding address. ( ) Told me if anyone came around asking for her, I should tell them she left town COCA FIC 2016
	( ) Took a look at my photos and said I had an eye. ( ) Offered me a job right there on the spot as his assistant COCA MOV 2015
	He was old. ( ) Died last year. COCA FIC 2017
Welcomes & Farewells (1st person)	( ) Appreciate you coming on and sharing your views. COCA SPOK 2017
	( ) Hope you can join us. COCA SPOK 2017

Recall that the pragmatic mapping generalization in (8B) requires only that relevant, non-recoverable arguments be "indicated." This allows for constructions to express a semantic argument by the verb as happens in INCORPORATION constructions such as that in (13):

(13) *Ngoah ko   oaring*
       I   grind coconut
       'I am coconut-grinding.'   (Mokilese [Micronesian, Austronesian], Mithun 1984)

Incorporation can be a matter of degree, with arguments optionally being additionally expressed (e.g., see Mithun 1986).

6.   Ellipsis constructions

Certain constructions allow multiple arguments or the predicate to be unexpressed. These ELLIPSIS constructions require that the relevant information be recoverable either on the basis of a preceding clause (Hankamer and Sag 1976, Katz and Postal 1964) or on the basis of the nonlinguistic context (Dalrymple 2005, Culicover and Jackendoff 2012).

Table 5. Common English ellipsis constructions

Verb phrase ellipsis	I survived and they can too. COCA MAG 2015
Sluicing	They just said they would pay for it … they didn't say how COCA NEWS 1993
Gapping	She makes it her squat and him her quarry. COCA MAG 1995
Stripping	It's about a mood music record but not a cheesy one. COCA SPOK 2017
Comparatives	I belong here more than her. COCA FIC 1993

7.   Social context

As argument structure constructions express basic scenes of human experience, they are rarely confined to certain social contexts. However, an argument structure construction that does seem to be restricted in this way is the *IS-TO* construction as in (14) (Goldberg and van der Auwera 2012).

(14)   *You are to shoot twice: once as a warning* _{BNC-H9C-FIC}

The construction conveys a range of related interpretations, but when it is used as an indirect command as in (15), it implies that the speaker enjoys strict control over the situation. This effectively restricts its indirect command use to a more formal register. That is, it would be inappropriate for a child to use the indirect command when speaking to a parent, or for a student to use it to address a teacher. The infelicity of the context is indicated by the "#" (Goldberg and van der Auwera 2012).

   Adult son or daughter to parent.

(15)   *#You are to be home by 9 pm.*

Student to teacher:

(16)   *#You are to comment on our assignments.*

Thus, the conventional pragmatics of argument structure constructions can influence when constructions can be used felicitously. Other times, conventional pragmatics influences which constructions can felicitously combine with one another. Such a case is reviewed in the following section.

8.   Information structure and the double object construction

The double-object construction statistically constrains its recipient argument to be more given and shorter than its theme argument (Arnold et al. 2000, Bresnan et al. 2007, Collins 1995, Dryer 1986, Erteschik-Shir 1979, Givón 1979, 1984, Goldberg 1995, 2006, Green 1974, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2008, Oehrle 1976, Thompson 1990, Ono & Thompson 1995, Wasow 2002). Because of this soft constraint, if the recipient argument is newer to the discourse than the theme argument, an alternative such as the "to-dative" (or "caused-motion") construction is preferred (preference is indicated by the inequality " >"); cf. (17).

(17)   a.   *Sally told <u>her</u> a story.*
       b.   *Sally told <u>the story</u> to <u>the little girl</u>. > Sally told <u>a little girl</u> the story.*

We have already observed an inverse correlation between topicality and newness: the primary topic is rarely new. In the double-object construction, we see that the recipient argument is also rarely new. In fact, the recipient argument has been argued to be a secondary topic (Erteschik-Shir 1979, Goldberg 2006). Notice that the recipient is not typically interpreted as part of the focus domain because it is usually unstressed. That is, when a double-object construction is negated, some part of the action is negated. For instance, in (18) the "kicking-the-ball" event is negated rather than the intended recipient.

(18) *She didn't kicked 'em the ball.*
      #Oh, she kicked the ball to someone else?

The idea that the double object constrains the recipient argument to be non-focal helps account for how the double object construction interacts with long-distance dependency constructions, the passive construction in English, and scope properties (Goldberg 2006: chapter 6). In particular, notice that the recipient argument of the double object construction cannot readily appear in a long-distance dependency relation (19–20) (Fillmore 1965, Oehrle 1976), whereas the "theme" argument can (21–22).

(19) [??]*Who did Chris give the book?*

(20) [??]*It is that girl that Chris gave the book.*

(21) *What did Pat give Chris?*

(22) *It is that book that Pat gave Chris.*

Conversely, the recipient argument can passivize, as in (23), but the theme argument resists passivization, as in (24).

(23) *Pat was given the book by Chris.*

(24) [??]*The book was given Pat by Chris.*

These facts can be explained by appealing to the difference in discourse function of the two arguments in the two types of constructions (Erteschik-Shir 1979, Goldberg 2006, 2013). Long-distance dependency constructions typically require that the fronted element be focused. Thus, the infelicitous sentences in (19–20) result from a clash in information structure: the recipient argument, which is constrained to being topical, cannot appear in the focus position of a long-distance dependency construction. The recipient argument *can* readily appear as the subject of a passive because subjecthood is eminently compatible with topicality.

This proposal predicts that the recipient argument can appear as the dependent element in a topicalization construction, since as reviewed in Section 4, topicalization tends to be used for elements that have been topical in the discourse (and which are likely to

cease continuing to be topics). Therefore, topicalization of the recipient argument of the double object should present no clash, and we find the attested example in (25) cited by (Prince 1998).

(25)   [She had an idea for a project. She's going to use three groups of mice. One, she'll feed them mouse chow,[1] just the regular stuff they make for mice. Another she'll feed them veggies.] *And the third, she'll feed junk food.*

Here *the third* is topical in that it refers to the last of three groups of mice under discussion. It does not, therefore, present a clash of discourse constraints to topicalize this recipient argument, and as predicted, the sentence is acceptable. It remains to be seen whether this type of discourse-based explanation can explain the full range of facts, but research into the role of information structure in motivating constraints on long-distance dependencies represents a growing trend (Abeillé et al. 2019).

Finally, a recognition that the recipient of the double-object construction is a secondary topic and not part of the focus domain can explain certain of its scope properties. First note that topicality and having wide scope are closely related notions; i.e., a wide-scope interpretation of a variable is one in which the variable is fixed or given and other variables with more narrow scope are interpreted within the domain created by the wide-scope variable. This is a good description of "topic – focus domain" structure: a topic is generally already under discussion (given or accessible) and the focus-domain is interpreted within that context (Goldberg 2006: Section 7.12).

Given this, we can explain why the recipient of the double object construction prefers wide scope over the theme (26), while the "to"-dative paraphrase is less constrained (27).

(26)   *The doctor gave a student every pamphlet.*   (double object construction)
       ($\exists$ student) ($\forall$ pamphlets) : one student gets all the pamphlets

(27)   *The doctor gave a pamphlet to every student.*   (*to*-dative)
       ($\exists$ student) ($\forall$ pamphlets)
       or
       ($\forall$ pamphlets) ($\exists$ student) : each pamphlet can go to a different student

As already noted, the double-object construction statistically constrains the recipient argument to be more topical than the theme argument. Therefore, in the rare cases with indefinite recipient and themes (such as example 26), the recipient is required to be interpreted as definite or fixed and the theme argument is interpreted within the context it provides.

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1. The recipient argument can also be coreferential with an initial noun phrase in the left-dislocation construction (as in *One, she'll feed them mouse chow*), since the left-dislocation construction is not generally subject to long-distance dependency constraints (Ross 1967, Gregory & Michaelis 2001).

9.   Variation across dialects

We have just described the fact that in standard American English, the double-object construction strongly prefers the theme argument to be less given and longer than the recipient argument. This predicts that the third person pronoun, *it,* should be dispreferred as the theme in a double object construction, and this prediction holds (Green 1974); see example (28).

(28) ?*She gave him it.*   (infelicitous in Standard American English)

At the same time, the dispreference is significantly weaker in certain British English dialects. That is, the dispreference exists, but the relative bias against using *it* as theme in the double-object construction is reduced in comparison to English. This is clear in Table 6, which compares tokens of *give me it* and *give it to me* in large corpora of American and British English (Goldberg 2019).

Table 6. Token frequencies of *give me it* and *give it to me* in American and British varieties of English. The distribution in these dialects is distinct.

Corpus	Double-object *Give me it*	To-dative *Give it to me*	% of double-object expressions
COCA American English (520 m)	8	412	1.9%
BNC-British National Corpus (100 m)	26	80	24.5%

Hughes, Trudgill and Watt (2013) observed that the order of recipient and theme roles can be reversed in certain dialects of Northern English as in (29a–b) (see also Siewierska and Hollmann 2007).

(29) a.   *She gave the book him.*   (Hughes, Trudgill and Watt 2013:16)
      b.   *Give it me.* BNC corpus

Certain non-standard dialects of American English have taken other sorts of liberties with the double-object construction. Webelhuth and Dannenberg (2006) note that many English speakers in the southern US use the double-object construction as in (30).

(30) a.   *I love me some cheesecake.* NOW corpus
      b.   *I'm gonna get me a burger.* NOW corpus

This extended use of the double-object construction has been dubbed the "Southern double-object construction" and it highlights the subject argument's involvement in the event or state denoted by the verb, without necessarily implying real or metaphorical transfer (Webelhuth and Dannenberg 2006). Still other differences in the double-

construction in English spoken in India are discussed by Hoffmann and Mukherjee (2007), and for discussion of Australian English see Bresnan and Ford (2010).

The double-object construction is of course not the only construction subject to dialect variation and historical change (see e.g., Barðdal, et al. 2015, Rohdenburg and Mondorf 2011, Traugott and Trousdale 2013, Wulff, Stefanowitsch and Gries 2007). Western Pennsylvania English speakers use certain verbs (*need, wash*) with a verbal past participle in a way that is not acceptable in Standard American English, as in (31) (Tenny 1998: 592, Murray and Simon 1999, Kaschak 2006).

(31)   *it's something that needs addressed.* NOW corpus

Appalachian English speakers allow a "split subject" construction in which the subject position is filled by a non-referential subject (*there* or *they*) and the logical subject is expressed as a quantified phrase appearing after the verb; cf. (32).

(32)   a.   *They didn't nobody live up there.*   (Zanuttini and Bernstein 2014)
         b.   *There can't nobody ride him.*   (Montgomery & Hall 2004)

These differences are systematic within each dialect, and therefore can give rise to pragmatic inferences about speakers who use them (Eckert 2000).

10.   Conclusion

Returning to the question we posed at the outset, why do languages provide alternative ways to express similar meanings? We have seen that alternative choices of argument structures are conditioned in part by pragmatic differences; that is, alternations often provide different ways of packaging information. We have seen that as long as pragmatics is interpreted to mean "relevant to context or felicitous use" it is often highly conventionalized and relevant to argument structure constructions. For instance, the way in which an utterance relates to the larger discourse context and whether all semantic arguments are expressed is strongly influenced by pragmatic factors. We have also seen that information structure, a type of conventional pragmatics, plays a role in explaining how argument structure patterns combine with other sentence-level constructions to give rise to constraints on long-distance dependencies and scope relations. In these ways, conventional pragmatics play an important role in determining which argument structure construction is most appropriate for expressing a particular message in a particular context.

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Caste and language

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The idea of caste is so extraordinarily widespread and resilient in India, a country with a population of over 1.7 billion, that the phenomenon seems to demand explanation in terms of 'language in use', not to mention 'language in us'. Caste and its categories, in short, seem integral to the ways in which the Indian 'self' is – and has been – defined (Cox 1948; Srinivas 1962; Das 1977; Shukla et al. 2010).

That 'caste' is so closely identified with being Indian is particularly ironic given two indisputable facts. One, that the word 'caste' is not indigenous to the Indian languages at all, but a catchall term meaning 'chaste', first used by 16th century Portuguese explorers to present their 'outsider' view of sociolinguistic norms on the Indian subcontinent – and subsequently reused to great effect by the British colonial administration. Two, that the postcolonial Indian state made a most remarkable move after it gained independence in 1947. Its forward-looking Constitution (1950; see Bakshi 2014) totally "prohibited... discrimination" on grounds of caste (Article 15); and declared caste "untouchability" (an inventive translation of the Sanskrit word *achhoot*; see Section 2 below for a detailed discussion) "abolished." Sternly stating that anyone practicing untouchability would be "punished in accordance with the law" (Article 17), the august Constitution of India thus sought to eradicate this defining – and peculiarly malevolent – aspect of caste by juridical fiat.

But have these radical postcolonial measures resulted in the erasure of caste? Not so, according to a large representative national survey 42,152 households conducted in 2011 (Thorat & Joshi 2015). This sampling showed that about one-third of the Indian population still openly admitted to practicing 'untouchability'; that the 160 million Dalit (untouchable) population of India was widely subject to physical assault across the country, with two Dalits being murdered and two Dalit homes being torched everyday. Furthermore, inter-caste marriages were confined to less than 5.5% of the population. Caste, both as precept and practice, thus appears to continue to flourish in 21st century India 70 years after it was formally banned. So what accounts for this enduring appeal of caste? What *is* caste?

Very few academics have dared directly define the hydra-headed phenomenon of caste since its manifestations are so dauntingly variable across the regions and languages of India. Caste, researchers agree, escapes strict definition; it can only be illustrated via

a deictic method, by repeatedly pointing to its manifold instances – and that, indeed, is the strategy I have adopted in this entry. Nevertheless, I will try and list six of key structural features of caste below, so that we have some kind of working description, if not a definition, with which to begin a discussion. In this particular essay, I will focus on the last two of these aspects (**e., f.**).

Caste as a social system is: **a.** marked by hierarchy and stratification; **b.** typically endogamous; **c.** conferred at birth and non-transferable; **d.** based on concepts of pollution and purification that often have ritual aspects; **e.** distinguished by the unique practice of 'untouchability' that imposes rules of physical and cognitive distancing; **f.** characterized by a set of linguistic terms that have evolved from ancient 'Hindu' roots in the Rig Veda (circa 1500) over long periods of time, especially during the colonial and postcolonial periods (the late 18th to late 20th centuries) until they have reached their present forms and functions in the 21st century. One sociologist puts it like this:

> Caste survives as a resource, positive and/or negative, a kind of social capital that reproduces inequalities in different spheres of life in contemporary India.   (Jodhka 2020)

India's "social capital" – in particular, its linguistic capital – is legendary. It has 22 official languages that span at least four different typological groups (Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Tibeto-Burman and Australo-Asiatic); it has about a sixth of the entire count of the world's languages; and it has perhaps the greatest number of living scripts in a single country (at least 13) that each account for millions of users. The astonishing thing about caste is that it cuts across these multifarious and distinct linguistic and cultural boundaries. Even religious groups that do not identify as Hindu, such as Muslims all over the country, as well the Christians of Goa, have embraced caste classifications (Robinson 1994; Viswanathan 1993; Ballhachet 1998).

Metaphorically, too, notions of caste have long vaulted over language barriers, showing up, for example, in phrases such as 'Boston Brahmins' to indicate elite status. Conversely, the word 'pariah', indicating a social outcast, also derives from Indian caste terminology, denoting a low caste person who had to be shunned. As a common noun in English, we find its use everywhere, including on the Internet today: for example, Scott Galloway, discussing the current crisis in education brought into relief by Covid-19, refers more than once to 'caste' in US universities (Galloway 2020). These customs, he says, take their cue from university systems of caste in Europe! No mention is made of India at all in such a commentary, demonstrating that caste is by now a concept that is ubiquitously international (see Section 2 for an elaboration of this point).

Not surprisingly, then, its productive complex of semantic features makes caste the single most studied subject among sociologists and anthropologists of India (Karve 1961; Beteille 1969; Gupta 2000). Caste, indeed, is so generative a concept that it can be handily used today to illustrate even the workings of a phrase that has only just entered the English language in 2020: namely 'social distancing'. Here is a description by the wife of

a Christian missionary from the mid 19th century, cited by the political historian Robin Jeffrey:

> … a Nair can approach but not touch a Namboodiri Brahmin: a Ezhava (Thiyya) must remain thirty-six paces off, and a Pulayan slave ninety-six steps distant. A Ezhava must remain twelve steps away from a Nair, and a Pulayan sixty-six steps off, and a Parayan some distance farther still. Pulayans and Parayars, who are the lowest of all, can approach but not touch, much less may they eat with each other.   (Jeffrey 1976: 9–10)

Social distancing today may not be measured in 'paces' but it remains embedded in Indian cognitive space. Imagine for a moment a counterfactual situation in which all of India's roughly one billion adults were engaged in a complex polyphonic conversation (see Nair 2006, 2011 on 'impliculture'). Quite a few participants in this imagined conversation would not be literate, many would be below the age of 25 given India's youthful demographic – but all of them would be able to take turns in this conversation, competently coming in at various 'transition relevant points'. This is because chances are that each one of them would be familiar with both the basic vocabulary and lived experience of caste as it is practiced in India. Whichever one or more of India's approximately 700 languages they spoke, whether they lived in rural or urban locales and whatever their socio-economic status, they would all know words such as ***achhoot, Dalit, gotra, Harijan, jati*** and ***varna*** – or their related cognates. The second half of this entry will gloss these key terms in caste vocabulary and relate them Goffman's ideas about 'stigma'; it will also discuss the cognitive dimensions and the possible renewed global appeal of the concept of caste in the 21st century.

In the first half of this essay, I will start by filling in some of the background and history of caste in India with especial reference to the colonial and postcolonial use of the word. This is because it is impossible to understand the concept of caste minus its diachronic aspects. It had been pointed out that caste was part of an old Indo-Iranian system of class divisions mentioned even by Plato (Dumezil 1930; Popper 1945). However, I will not go into these ancient antecedents here; instead, I will focus on India as a cultural region where the linguistic evidence on and experience of caste belongs to the 'modern' period.

My general contention is that the language of caste could prove to be a fertile field for current pragmatic analysis. One reason for this is a very practical one. Much of the archival as well as theoretical literature on caste is actually in English since it was first codified by British colonizers in India and then theorized by Western researchers from Dumont (1966) to Dirks (2001). This makes several of the standard resources on caste readily available to international researchers. True, a serious interest in caste might entail learning at least one Indian language; but one could go quite far without this, since any group of Indians at any tea stall would be more than willing to energetically debate the

subject in some variety of Indian English and thus give pragmaticists unlimited amounts of spontaneous conversational data to analyze.

Researchers interested in cross-cultural pragmatics and translation, in Gricean implicature and Austinian performatives, in the basic speech-acts of naming and referring, in metaphor, irony, jokes and other literary tropes, in narrative co-constructions, in cognitive patterns of verbal and non-verbal gestural behavior, in proxemics, embodiment and stereotyping, in gender discrimination, in language and affect, in the qualitative inferences that can be made from large quantitative data sets such as census counts, and in the postcolonial pragmatics of political margins, to name just a few areas, should find much to explore in the ever proliferating language of caste.

1.   Caste in colonial and postcolonial India

1.1   Race and caste

In the Indian colonial annals, the terms 'race', 'caste' and 'census' have long constituted an unholy trinity. The insight that the conjunction of these three concepts contributed to an almost indelible notion of 'Indianness' during the high colonial period (circa 1757–1947) is not new. Indeed, it is almost a truism among historians to assert that the fluid categories of caste in India were ruthlessly homogenized via the strategic instruments of the 'civilizing mission' of colonialism (see Macaulay 1835). Foremost among these tools were census counts that insisted on caste surnames being added to in-use first names, a strategy that resulted in 'freezing' the nomenclatures of caste (Appadurai 1993, Cohn 1984, Kaviraj 1993). It is widely accepted today that such a 'codification' of caste via the census was part of an apparatus of conquest whereby a 'divide and rule' policy could be implemented in a terrain already rich in hierarchical linguistic and racial distinctions. This question as to whether 'caste' and 'race' are epistemological cousins in that both led to similar forms of social stratification pace Weber (1921–22, 1978) and Durkheim (1912) remains to this day a standard one in almost all university exams on the sociology of South Asia, indicating that these concepts remain somehow naturally entangled (de Reuck and Knight 1969; Berreman 1972).

As we know, the English word 'race', already laden with its own heavy etymological burdens of hate, fear and suppressed desire was from the 18th century on, following the philologically motivated 'discovery' of Sanskrit by William Jones in 1789, roughly correlated with the notion of 'caste' (see also Jones 1784, 1993; Young 1995; Nair 2002). Interestingly, the long durée of the psychological conflict that ensued from this ambivalent overlap between 'race' and 'caste' is to be found in the idiom of the colonized as much as that of the colonizers, the word 'race' being freely used by many prominent leaders of the Indian nationalist movement. From Rabindranath Tagore, poet of burnished Brahmin

ancestry, to B.R. Ambedkar, chief framer of the Indian Constitution and unquestioned leader of the 'untouchable' castes, the mysterious 'problem of race' was identified early as perhaps India's most pernicious social evil.

Were 'race' and 'caste' then synonymous concepts for Indians fighting for freedom from British racial domination? A degree of confusion prevails on this count because the word 'race' as used by Tagore and, sometimes, by Ambedkar often signified not so much the visible difference between themselves and the 'white men' who were their rulers but the ineffable, internalized differences between the manifold *castes* of India. What is most interesting, though, is the manner in which a strategic use was made, in context, of the conceptual overlap between these words to serve different goals.

Tagore (1917), for example, proudly defended the ancient practice of caste on the Western proscenium as India's unique solution to the 'race issue', while simultaneously condemning in local/national forums the shameful epistemic as well as physical violence inflicted by caste hostility. Ambedkar's use of the notions of race and caste was more specific. He rejected the theory of a dominant 'Aryan' race that dominated the upper echelons of the caste hierarchy and thought of caste as a terrible but in fact soluble problem created by Hinduism's far too strict adherence to endogamy. If Hindus could only being themselves to intermarry among castes and with other religions, the caste problem could be neatly resolved. But Ambedkar was a realist; he knew it was utopian to demand exogamy. So he chose the political route of demanding no less than the total "annihilation of caste" (1936) while at the same time arguing that, in all fairness, it was unjust to demand of the majority of the Indian population, who were Hindus by birth, that they give up a belief in caste and its ritual rules of embodied pollution because that would amount to asking them to give up their religion (Ambedkar 2002). However, this difficult self-positioning put Ambedkar, who himself belonged to the community of Dalit (meaning 'crushed/oppressed') 'broken men', in a moral cleft stick while framing the remarkably liberal Indian Constitution. For, it meant that various 'depressed' castes and tribes of India had to be faithfully listed in the Constitution so that they could be 'assisted' to 'rise'; yet, this very move would simultaneously reify and perpetuate the caste hierarchy. And that, prophetically enough, is exactly what has happened. The castes of India have grown apace since Ambedkar's time and many 'other backward classes' (OBCS) have been added to the original Constitutional list.

If irony (which literally means 'a turning') is an essential aspect of language, it seems manifest throughout in linguistic twists and turns of the history of caste in India.

The subsections below presents four textual sources that illustrate, not without irony, the complex colonial/postcolonial history and narrativization of caste: namely, the Census of India (1872–1911); the ethnographic work, *The People of India* by Herbert Hope Risley (1908); a couple of verses from *The Poets of John Company* by Theodore Douglas Dunn (edited, 1921); and the philological development of the word 'caste', as traced in the encyclopedia *Hobson-Jobson* by Yule and Burnell (1886).

1.2   Census and caste

This section on the largest source of aggregate information on caste in India – that is, the 'Census of India' – is in two parts: the first relates to caste numbers in postcolonial India; and the second to the 'racial' genesis of this contemporary exercise in the colonial period.

1.2.1   *The census in contemporary India*

In 2011, the Government of India conducted a countrywide "Socio-Economic and Caste Census" (SECC) in addition to the regular Census of India. The figures for this first-ever 'Caste Census' in independent India are still being analyzed and the 'errors' corrected – that said, they do seem pretty robust. They are also very revealing since they clearly show the intersections of **caste** with **religion** and **class**. In more or less the language first introduced in the Constitution of India, the caste structure of the total Indian population looks like this in the year 2020:

Castes	Percentage of population
Dalits (untouchables) who belong to the Scheduled Castes (**SC**)	19.7%
Other Backward Classes (**OBC**)	41.5%
Upper Castes or General Category (**GC**) This category includes Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and hundreds of sub-castes)	30.3%
Scheduled Tribes (**ST**)	8.5%
Total	**100%**

Four points should be noted about this table:

First, it is always important to reiterate that when a population of over a billion people self-report on their caste affiliations, the figures arrived at have to be approximations – and do in fact vary from Census to Census (the next full Census is due in 2021).

Second, most strikingly, 'non-Hindus' (the 20% of the total Indian population who not formally fall within the caste system) still readily seem to ascribe a caste group to themselves. The biggest segment (16.5%) of this 'non-Hindu' grouping are **Muslims** (total population 14.2%) and **Christians** (total population 2.3%). These groups ascribe caste to themselves in a similar fashion: **Muslims** mostly categorize themselves belonging to the **OBC** (39.2) or **GC** (59.5%), while **Christians** also mostly self-report as **OBC** (24%) and **GC** (33.3%), with the remaining 12.22% percent of Christians saying they are either **SC** or **ST**. This means that the bulk of the Muslims and Christian populations of Indian (at least 70%) self-classify as belonging to the 'backward classes'.

The remaining 5.5% of the 'non-Hindu' population comprise Sikhs (total population 1.77%) who see themselves as almost evenly divided between **SC/OBC** (52.4%) or **GC** (46.1%); **Buddhists** (total population 0.7) who overwhelmingly see themselves as **SC** or **ST** (97%); **Jains** and **Zorastrians** (total population 0.36 %) who see themselves as belonging to the **GC** (well over 80% on average); while 'Others' (total 2.6%) classify themselves as **ST**. This means that slightly over half of the remaining 5.5% of "non-Hindus' also perceive themselves as 'backward' – and like the Hindus, they mostly practice endogamy, not intermarrying with the groups above or below their own.

Third, by the above rough 'Caste Census' as well as comaparable figures reported in the general Censuses of India (2001, 2011), it is noticeable that a staggering **70%** of the Indian population, inclusive of non Hindus, self-report as '**backward classes'**.

Fourth, although the formal terminology followed in the Censuses of India is always 'Other Backward *Classes*', these economic classes are widely, as the 2011 'Caste Census' or SECC makes clear, identified with *caste* groups in India. This explains the constant – and quite rational – desire to be classified as OBC (see Thorat and Joshi, 2015 on this point) since this move usually calls up legal provisions for state assistance such as 'reservations' in education, jobs in the government sector.

Several official commissions have been appointed from time to time since 1950 to resolve the acrimonious issues raised by the divisive structure of caste. The most famous of these is probably 'The Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission' (SEBC, 1979–1983) or 'Mandal Commission' as it is popularly known. This influential document suggested that since the 'backward classes' appeared to consist of maybe 51% or more of the Indian citizenry, they should have about the same percentage of seats in colleges and jobs in government 'reserved' for them. When the federal government sought to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1990, however, violent, widespread protests broke out, especially in Delhi, the national capital – including horrifying self-immolations by upper caste (GC) students. As it turns out, the thirty years that have elapsed between 1990 and 2020 have in fact gradually witnessed the implementation of between 30–50% reservation (or some other form of extra 'help') for the underprivileged in government institutions – but the topic remains deeply divisive.

Today, there is not an aspiring student or government official in India who is not acquainted with the acronyms **SC, ST, GC, OBC**, etc. Most understand how crucial are the antinomies of **caste reservation** (roughly equivalent to 'affirmative action') versus **merit** (the position that objective measures like exam scores rather than caste background should be the sole determinant of whether a person gets a university place or government job) in their everyday lives. A special semi-official vocabulary has been developed to capture these perceived iniquities; one example being '**the creamy layer**' (meaning the thin upper layer among the OBC that is economically privileged anyway and tend to grab all the concessions that should go to the poorest in their caste), which

is used both in popular parlance and legal discourse. More such terms to describe the predicaments and privileges of caste are literally invented everyday other day. This is precisely what makes the pragmatics and sociolinguistics of caste such a rich field of language analysis.

I turn now to the language and conceptualization of the ur-document that laid the foundation for the modern Census of India: namely, the colonial census.

1.2.2   *The colonial census of India*

The colonial 'Census of India' was initiated in 1872, regularized in 1881, revised in 1891 and attained its full-fledged avatar in 1901. We could begin by looking briefly at the 'House Registers' of the Census of India (data from The Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2010–2011). Here, we find a revealing display of tweaks to the ideas of 'race' and 'caste' from 1872 on (when the colonial Census of India was first instituted) to 1951 (when the Census was conducted for the first time in independent India), where these terms suddenly lose their 'registered' status and become, instead, starting points for a discussion for how independent India should remedy the various injustices of caste.

1872: Item 5. Caste or Class. Item 6. Race or Nationality or Country of Birth
1881: Item 7. Religion. Item 8. Caste, if Hindu; sect, if of other religion
1891: Item 4. Caste or race – Main caste. Item 5. Sub-division of caste or race
1901: Item 8. Caste of Hindus & Jains; Tribe, or race of others
1911: Item 8: Caste of Hindu and Jains, tribe or race of those of other religions
1921: Item 4. Religion. Item 8. Caste, Tribe or Race
1931: Item 4. Religion and Sect. Item 8. Race, Tribe or Caste
1941: Item 3. Race, Tribe or Caste. Item 4. Religion
1951: No itemized list of 'Race', 'Caste' or 'Tribe' (India is now independent)

From the above, a certain set of semantic collocations emerge, showing how the simple speech acts of naming and referring (Searle 1969) constituted a seven-decade long experimentation with the sociolinguistics of caste in India in order to make it administratively malleable. We note that the term 'Caste' is introduced in the very first Census (1872) and remains a constant throughout the colonial period.

Unlike present times, caste in the colonial Census is invariably associated with being 'Hindu' (1881) and, later, with being 'Jain' (1901, 1911). In effect, the Census tells us that Hindus (and Jains) have 'caste' while 'others' (1881, 1901, 1911) have 'race' and/or belong to a 'tribe'. A significant but confusing identification seems to be made between early on between 'Caste or Race' (1891); confusing because we cannot be sure whether the conjunction 'or' is being used here in an inclusive or exclusive sense. However, once the word 'Tribe' is introduced (1901), the triad 'Caste, Tribe or Race' gains ascendancy (1921, 1931, 1941), suggesting that it is the exclusive 'or' that the Census-makers have in mind.

'Religion' as a category is also separated out during the consecutive middle years of the Indian census and, again, the rationale for such a decision is never quite clarified. Hence, the itemized 'House Registers' of the Census of India seem to offer prima facie evidence for the ambiguous semantics of the word 'caste' from the earliest attempts made by colonial administrators to map 'Indian identity'. It has, of course, long been known that it was Herbert Hope Risley (see section 1.3. below) who specifically made 'caste', with all its confusions, the structural foundation of the 1901 Census of India but, as far as I know, the stark terminology of the Census House Registers has not before been shown to mirror Risley's ideas. Nor has his influential ethnographic text *The People of India* (1908) been hitherto read in tandem with his conduct of the Indian Census in order to reveal the epistemic bases of his analysis (also see Nair 2012a). It is to this key text that I turn next.

1.3   The 'People of India' project

This section pertains to the powerful stereotype of 'Indian-ness' in terms of the intertwined categories of 'caste' and 'race' that emerges from a massive project helmed by Herbert Hope Risley, Chief Ethnographer of India. Risley was born in 1851 and obtained his undergraduate degree from Oxford University. He then came to India in 1873 at the youthful age of twenty-two and married an erudite 'German lady' who, we are informed, got him interested in matters of language, race and class. By the time the second edition of his ambitious work *The People of India*, based on his investigations for the Indian Census, was published in 1915, Risley was a famous man and William Crooke could justly write in his Preface:

> The value of Risley's work on the ethnology of India has been so widely recognized that it is unnecessary to discuss it in detail. He was a pioneer in the application of scientific methods to the classification of the races of India.   (Crooke 1915: xvi)

What were these "scientific methods" that Risley pioneered with respect to "the classification of the races of India" and how do they pertain to ideas of caste?

In order to answer this question, we need to situate Risley within the linguistic universe of his times. As Chief Ethnographer and presiding authority (along with Mr. E.A. Gait, now long forgotten) over the 1901 Census of India, he was acquainted with Friedrich Schlegel's *The Language and Wisdom of the Hindus* (1808, translated 1849). He was familiar with Herder, Humboldt, and other German thinkers on historical linguistics and had read James Frazer's vast study of comparative religion *The Golden Bough* (1890). His knowledge of linguistic, anthropometric and ethnological theory in the 19th century was, moreover, impressively up-to-date (Risley 1891). It is also crucial to note that George Grierson's major project of mapping the languages of the subcontinent in the *Linguistic Survey of India* (see Grierson 2005) was launched almost at the same time (1903–1928)

and was part of the colonial Zeitgeist of Risley's work (see Harvey 2001). All of this meant that he was able to take on even as renowned an authority on India as Max Muller. Risley writes:

> Nearly twenty years ago…the late Professor Max Muller sent me a long letter, since published in his collected works, in which he protested against "the unholy alliance" of the two sciences of ethnology and comparative philology.   (1908:7)

According to Max Muller, it was unacceptable to make inferences from 'ethnology' (read, the anthropological study of race and its origins) to 'philology' (read, the linguistic study of words and their origins). Risley, however, strongly counters Mueller on this point by quoting Sir Henry Maine (1906), a brilliant scholar of the legal texts of the ancient world (Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Indian), to the effect that it was in fact "the study of the sacred languages of India" that had "given to the world the modern science of Philology and the modern theory of Race" (for a more recent understanding of these themes concerning language and race, see Gould 1981; Cavalli-Sforza 2000; Joseph 2018). In other words, far from being "unholy," Risley's suggestion was that the alliance between modern studies of race and modern studies of language was in fact sanctioned by ancient texts and, in particular, the "sacred" traditions of India. This clever move leaves him free to 'scientifically' examine the linguistic terminology of 'caste' and the physical phenomenon of 'race' in tandem.

In his search for an overarching conceptual architecture to explain the interrelation of race, caste and language in India, Risley then goes on to devise a 'classification' based on 'scientific measurements' of the differences between what he assumes are the racially differentiated 'high' and 'low' castes. The scheme he consequently chooses as the basis for the official Census of India, backed by the full administrative might of empire, seeks to differentiate physical 'types' and match them with sociolinguistic 'evidence' pertaining to caste. The main elements of this categorization are listed below.

Physical types
Social types
Caste in proverbs & popular sayings
Caste in marriage
Caste in religion
Origin of caste
Caste and nationality

Risley's entire text is fascinating and, in my view, has not received as much textual attention in critical postcolonial studies as it deserves but, for reasons of space, I will here confine myself to the 'findings' from Risley's research on only the first three of these categories. His studies are in fact quite meticulous; at the same time, they are highly over-determined in that they inevitably lead to his desired correlation between 'Physical

Types' (i.e. racial/biological categories) and the various 'Social Types' related to 'Caste' (i.e. sociolinguistic categories). 'India' is thus racially organized and constituted from the very start of the 'People of India' project. Risley's methodology is based on the 'objective' measures that the science of his time recommends such as the well-known 'cephalic index' (see Slemon 1993; Bates 1995). In addition, he also utilizes 'nasal' and 'height' indicators, as in the following descriptions:

> PHYSICAL TYPES: THE NASAL INDEX:
> The distinctive feature of the type, the character which gives the real clue to its origin, and stamps the Aryo-Dravidian as racially different from the Indo-Aryan, is to be found in the proportions of the nose. The average index runs in an unbroken series from 73.0 in the Bhuinhar or Babhan of Hindustan and 73.2 in the Brahman of Bihar to 86 in the Hindustani Chamar and 8.87 in the Musahar of Bihar.   (Risley 1908: 39–40)

From the above measures, Risley then concludes without a shadow of self-doubt or irony:

> The order thus established corresponds substantially with the scale of social precedence independently ascertained. At the top of the list are the Bhuinhars, who rank high among the territorial aristocracy of Hindustan and Bihar; then come the Brahmans, followed at a slight but yet appreciable interval by the clerkly Kayasths with an index of 74.8; while down at the bottom the lower strata of Hindu society are represented by the Chamar, who tans hides and is credibly charged with poisoning cattle, and the foul-feeding Musahar who eats pigs, snakes, and jackals, and whose name is popularly derived from his penchant for field-rats.   (Risley 1908: 40)

In other words, 'broad' noses are discovered by Risley to be typical of the lower castes!
    The 'objective' height-index, predictably, points to a similar hierarchy:

> THE HEIGHT INDEX:
> The statistics of height lead to a similar conclusion. The mean stature of the Aryo-Dravidians ranges from 166 centimetres in the Brahmans and Bhuinhars to 159 in the Musahar, the corresponding figures in the Indo-Aryan being 174.8 and 165.8. The one begins where the other leaves off.   (Risley 1908: 40)

Not for a moment does Risley entertain any question of prejudice when he makes the stunningly exact calculations above, quite failing to see what may appear so apparent to us now, who operate within a different ideological framework and possess, moreover, the benefit of hindsight. Rather, Risley's ensconced placement within the colonial project seems to produce in him a particularly virulent form of 'mind-blindness' (Baron-Cohen, 1995) because it renders him oblivious to an obvious flaw in his research design, which is that there could be a pronounced 'selection' and/or 'confirmation bias' in his population sample since it conforms with such suspicious neatness to a predetermined pattern (see

in this connection the voluminous and important surveys also, rather confusingly, called *The People of India* by Singh et al. (see Singh 2002) conducted in postcolonial India circa 1998 – perhaps as an attempt to reclaim the terrain of caste and describe it in a less stratified manner).

The pioneering Indian sociologist G.S. Ghurye, who in fact shares many of Risley's assumptions about the merits of measurement as a scientific method, gives the game away when he writes with seemingly innocent puzzlement in his own tome *Caste and Race in India* (1932):

> We may thus take our measurements on Brahmins and compare them with those on Chamars. But the data show us that neither Brahmins nor Chamars among themselves have a uniform physical type. (Ghurye 1932: 115)

For Risley, the colonial administrator, 'race' was a primary category and the imperative to fit caste into a racial classification meant that the project of the colonial census simply could not admit Ghurye's foundational problem – namely, the impossibility of ever being able to assign 'uniform types' to the caste groups of India. Thus, he confidently augmented his 'scientific' conclusions, presented above, with linguistic data culled from the 'natives', as in the following sample:

> CASTE IN PROVERBS AND POPULAR SAYINGS
> Kayasths, Khatris, and cocks support their kin; Brahmans, Doms and Nais destroy theirs.
> Bribe a Kayasth; feed a Brahman water paddy and betel; but kick a low-caste man.
> A Turk wants toddy; a bullock wants grain; a Brahman wants mangoes; and a Kayasth wants an appointment. (Risley 1908: 141)

The socio-politics of caste antagonisms, the clear naming of, and divisions between, the lower and upper castes as well as the 'insider-outsider' distinction indicated by the presence of the 'Turk' in Risley's selection of 'Indian' proverbs, further illustrates Risley's pragmatic argument that the useful social distinctions of caste are embedded within the Indian languages. But is this sufficient evidence that caste enmities are motivated by racial distinctions?

At this point, Risley, who has already made the case for the dichotomy between the 'Indo-Aryan' (prototypically 'North Indian') and 'Aryo-Dravidian' (prototypically 'South Indian') races based on his 'objective' measures of the cephalic, nasal and height indices, does not bother with further supporting arguments. He deems that his case has been amply proven according to both objective scientific measures and the ethnographic observation of cultural speech practices. Hence, he contents himself with pointing out another 'unique' feature of the caste system of India, namely, its prejudicial index of 'untouchability':

> Below these more or less respectable members of rural society, we find a number of groups, village menials, or broken tribes some of whom pollute the high-caste man even at a distance, while others are guilty of the crowning enormity of eating beef. Among these the Chamar, the tanner, shoemaker, cobbler, and cattle-shoemaker and poisoner, is the subject of a number of injurious reflexions. Though he is as wily as a jackal, he is also so stupid that he sits on his awl and beats himself for stealing it.   (Risley 1908:137)

> He laments that he cannot tan his own skin. He knows nothing beyond his last, and the shortest way to deal with him is to beat him with a shoe of his own making…"Stitch, stitch" is the note of the cobblers' quarter; "stink, stink" of the street where the tanners live. The Chamar's wife goes barefoot, but his daughter, when she has just attained puberty, is as graceful as an ear of millet.   (Risley 1908:137)

We observe in such passages an interesting early use of "broken tribes" pre-Ambedkar. We also note that although Risley's pen is merely supposed to be a recording instrument in these passages, it does more; it eloquently, even poetically, transcribes the contempt of the upper castes towards untouchables almost as his own.

Nor should we miss the reference to the "Chamar's daughter" at puberty, "graceful as a ear of millet" for we shall have occasion to consider it again in a darker context in Section 2 of this essay on the reprise of caste hatreds in the 21st century. It is indeed 'humanness' or, rather, 'dehumanization' (the "Chamar's daughter" may be beautiful but she has about as much volition as a "ear of millet" and anybody can pluck her) that is at the crux of the debates around 'caste' and 'race' in colonial India. This is a process that obviously involves the struggle for control over history and memory, connecting Risley's 'scientific' treatment of the relation between caste and race to more complex forms of literary evidence. It is to such genres that I turn next.

1.4   Literary expressions

I have argued elsewhere that the enormous quantities of verse produced in colonial India, where everyone from the Governor General Warren Hastings to the humblest clerks of the East India Company were composing poems, could have contributed to forming the imagination of empire long before Great Britain legally marked its takeover of the 'jewel in the crown' in 1858 following the First War of Indian Independence or the 'Sepoy Mutiny' of 1857 (Nair 2002). In such poems, it was de rigueur to compare the role of the English in India to that of the classical Greeks and Romans and use to 'caste' as a metaphor for the social and cognitive distance between the rulers and the ruled. Hutchins (1987) calls this "the distance between the two races, distance in every sense of the term." The two fragments of Anglo-Indian poetry from the 19th and early 20th centuries (in Dunn 1921; see also Deen Mahomet 1794 for the reference in the last line of the first poem below) seem, once again, to offer compelling evidence of the conflation of

caste with race. The first of these is a satirical description by an anonymous poet of the early 19th Century:

> Here the natives of India to caste do so cling
> You can scarcely get two to perform the same thing
> One puts on a stocking, one holds a serie
> Another with chillumchees stands ready by
> A third has a mirror he brings to your view
> A fourth fellow's tying the string of your shoe!
> Or perhaps if undressing, a bearer's undoing
> Your shoes or your cravat, there's another shampooing
> Your arms or your legs, whiche'er he may light on
> As famed Dean Mohamed shampoos you at Brighton!

The confounding of the categories of caste and race that we observed in the section on Risley's very serious 'scientific' exposition of the hierarchical ordering of the 'people of India' is repeated in the mocking, playful, genre of the poem above.

In it, the explicit reference to the 'natives of India' can be thought of as a homologue of Risley's 'peoples of India', where 'caste' is totally constitutive of their life-world. The representational body of the Englishman being metaphorically 'dressed' and 'undressed' by clinging (but always entirely silent) hordes of native servitors renders it a fine rhetorical site for the play of the enigmatical 'caste politics' of India. The homoerotic racial relations between Indian and English players in the colonial drama, is refracted in this poem through the 'othering' lens of caste. In such verses, we find the fantasia of caste being played out as an ideological rather than a 'real' phenomenon. After all, however complicated the caste-rules of Indian society, it can safely be said that never were there castes in India whose sole occupation it was to 'put on stockings' or 'hold a mirror up'! It is in this sense that one might argue that caste reflects race and vice versa in the magic mirror of colonial poetry.

Horace Hayman Wilson's (1786–1860) poem 'The Ganges' provides us with another nice example of the story of 'caste and race' nestling in the innocuous annals of 19th Anglo-Indian century verse:

> Grave in the tide the Brahman stands,
> And folds his cord, or twirls his hands
> And tells his beads and all unheard
> Mutters a solemn mystic word.
> With reverence the Sudra dips
> And fervently the current sips
> That to his humbler hopes conveys
> A future life of happier days.
> But chief do India's simple daughters

> Assemble in these hallowed waters
> With vase of classic model laden
> Like Grecian girl or Tuscan maiden…

The disconcertingly partitioned silence of the 'natives of India' going about their servile tasks in a manner dictated by the inherently divisive structures of 'caste' in the previous poem is complemented in Wilson's verse by the exotic silences of the learned Brahmin and the artless Indian maiden (compared, as usual, to her Attic counterpart). We cannot miss the reproduction of the same key tropes in both poems: the pairing of the high caste 'Brahmin' and the low-caste 'Sudra' who can never 'touch' each other and the English-man whose gaze alights on 'India's simple daughters' but who cannot touch them either – at least in theory. These issues of pairing and distance, difference and taboo, will engage us again in the final sections of this essay.

1.5   Lexicology

In this section, I move on to a final linguistic illustration of the troubled social history of caste, via the etymology of the word 'caste' as it is presented in Henry Yule and Arthur Coke Burnell's *Hobson-Jobson* (1886). Despite its jocular and less than politically correct title (derived, they confess, from an "Anglo-Saxon version" of the "Mohammedan" chant "Ya Hasan! Ya Hosain" during the procession of "Moharram", 1886, 419), this extensively annotated work remains one of the most cited encyclopedias documenting Anglo-Indian language transactions in the 19th century. The entry for the word 'caste' in this dictionary is lengthy and philologically revealing. This is how it goes:

> **CASTE**, s. "The artificial divisions of society in India, first made known to us by the Portuguese, and described by them under their caste, signifying 'breed, race, kind', which has been retained in English under the supposition that it was the native name".
>
> (Yule & Burnell 1886: 170)

Noteworthy is the fact that authors of *Hobson-Jobson* point out at the outset a fundamental mistake in the British 'colonial' understanding of this word. 'Caste', they tell us, was "retained in English under the supposition that it was the native name". Later, in an entry that they trace to the early 19th century, they produce a further philological speculation.

> **1820.** – "The Kayasthas (pronounced Kaists, hence the word caste) follow next." –W. Hamilton, Descr. of Hindostan, i. 109.   (Yule & Burnell 1886: 171)

Now 'Kayastha' is an important North Indian caste to this day. But is this phonological similarity enough evidence that word 'caste' derived from it? Yule and Burnell make it clear that they are skeptical of this hypothesis. Rather, they emphasize that not only was

the word 'caste' misunderstood from the moment of its birth into the English language, it was also not specifically related to India in the initial Portuguese usage. They write:

> We do not find that the early Portuguese writer Barbosa (1516) applies the word casta to the divisions of Hindu society.   (Yule & Burnell 1886: 170)

Hobson-Jobson goes on to track the philological history of the word 'caste' in Europe from as early as c. 1444 onwards. It points out that the word is current in 19th century French (1842. – "II est clair que les castes n'ont jamais pu exister solidement sans une veritable conservation religieuse – Comte, Cours de Phil. Positive, vi. 505)" but is nowhere as central in the French language as it is in the Portuguese. Early on, the word is simply used to refer to a person's religion. *Hobson-Jobson* provides a reference from 1561 for such usage: "Some of them asserted that they were of the caste (casta) of the Christians – Correa, Lendas, i. 2, 685)".

In the Indian case, what emerges from the detailed philological notes in this volume is that 'caste' as a sociological phenomenon was mainly observed via Portuguese accounts located in the southern provinces of Malabar and Goa rather than in northern India. By 1572, *Hobson-Jobson* records that caste has become important enough in the Portuguese consciousness to be the subject of a poem by the Portugal's greatest poet, Luis de Camoes, who we know from other sources had actually visited India (Saramago 1998)

1572. –

"Dous modos ha de gente ; porque a nobre

Nairos chamados sao, e a menos dina
Poleas tem por nome, a quem obriga

A lei nao misturar a casta antiga." – Camoes, vii.37.

(Yule & Burnell 1886: 171)

According to Hobson-Jobson, these verses were translated that very same year by Sir Richard Burton who we also learn from his diaries had had certain rambunctious adventures in Goa, thus:

> Two modes of men are known; the nobles know
> The name of Nayrs, who call the lower Caste
> Poleas, whom their haughty laws contain
> From intermingling with the higher strain.   (Yule & Burnell 1886: 171)

By the late 16th century the narrative of caste as a hierarchical social arrangement is firmly established, anachronistically anticipating Dumont's famous 20th century description of the Indian caste system in *Homo Hierarchicus* (1962). The *Hobson*-Jobson entry for caste goes on to amplify the above-mentioned poetic interdictions on the

"intermingling" of "Castes" who, they inform us "are, according to Indian social views, either high or low". Finally, they proceed to give us the 19th century English perspective on the matter:

> **1876.** – "Low-caste Hindoos in their own land are, to all ordinary apprehension, slovenly, dirty, ungraceful, generally unacceptable in person and surroundings. […] Yet offensive as is the low-caste Indian, were I estate-owner, or colonial governor, I had rather see the lowest Pariahs of the low, than a single trim, smooth-faced, smoothwayed, clever high caste Hindoo, on my lands or in my colony." – W.G. Palgrave, in Fortnightly Rev., cx.226.
> (Yule & Burnell 1886: 171)

"My lands…my colony": it does not need much acumen to discern the implicature of passages like the one above. The "Hindoos", whether belonging to the low or high castes, are irremediably immoral. "Low caste Hindoos" are confined to their "own land" because they are "dirty" but "high caste Hindoos" who can move freely are also a nuisance since they simply cannot be trusted! We may infer from such passages that colonial takeover involved not just territory but a very virtuous shouldering of the 'white man's burden'.

In the Madras Presidency of the colonial administration, castes are also described as 'Right-hand' and 'Left-hand', according to *Hobson-Jobson*. This, they tell us, is an ancient and highly productive distinction:

> **1612.** – "From these four castes are derived 196; and those again are divided into two parties, which they call Valanga and Elange [Tam. valangai, idangai], which is as much as to say 'the right hand' and 'the left hand'".
> (Yule & Burnell 1886: 171)

Hobson-Jobson assures us that Sir Walter Elliot, writing in the scholarly *Journal of the Ethnological Society* in 1869, confirms this view, considering this 'right-left' feud to be: "nothing else than the occasional outbreak of the smouldering antagonism between Brahmanism and Buddhism, although in the lapse of ages both parties have lost sight of the fact" (Yule & Burnell 1886: 172). That established European traditions of heraldry and the 'bend sinister' may have informed his own reading of 'India' is, it goes without saying, "lost sight of" by Elliot in this passage.

To sum up, caste is invoked throughout the 19th century as a gift-granting semantic genie. It can explain pretty much everything from the "smouldering antagonism" of religion and race to the physical distribution of 'handedness' to cognitively internalized forms of social hierarchy. Further, it reproduces itself and grows in the manner of the demonic legions, as the rather remarkable time-line of entries under the heading 'caste' in *Hobson-Jobson* illustrates:

> **1613.** – "The Banians kill nothing ; there are thirtie and odd severall Casts of these that differ something in Religion, and may not eat with each other." – N. Withington, In Purchas, i. 485; see also Pilgrimage, pp. 997, 1003.

1630. – "The common Bramane hath eighty two Casts or Tribes, assuming to themselves the name of that tribe…" – Lord's Display of the Banians, p. 72.

1673. – "The mixture of Casts or Tribes of all India are distinguished by the different modes of binding their Turbans." – Fryer,115.

c. 1760. – "The distinction of the Gentoos into their tribes of Casts, forms another considerable object of their religion." – Grose, i.201.

1763. – "The Casts or tribes into which the Indian are divided, are reckoned by travelers to be eighty-four." – Orme (ed. 1803), i. 4.

1878. – "There are thousands and thousands of these so-called Castes; no man knows their number, no man can know it; for the conception is a very flexible one, and moreover, new castes continually spring up and pass away." – F. Jagor, Ost-Indische Handwerk und Gewerbe, 13.

From four limited castes in antiquity, the castes of India have reached "thousands and thousands" in European eyes by the end of the 19th century. Thus, going by the philological account, caste assumes a chimerical, preternatural, spirit-world status: "no man knows their number; no man can know it". Indeed caste seems to belong in this last entry quoted by *Hobson-Jobson* to an order of nature that the 'Western' imagination can barely comprehend, and over which it admits to having no control.

It could be argued that in this respect, we find in the detailing of dates in the etymological history of caste, the linguistic obverse of Risley's determined effort to 'scientifically' document the castes of India, to capture them in a grid of tables and measures. From the evidence of this philological search, consisting in simple dictionary-entries, caste turns out to be 'essentially' uncontainable by the time *Hobson-Jobson* arrives at its final conclusion. Caste is the measure not only of man but of nature in that "new castes continually spring up and pass away". It is emblematic of the universe in its 'flexibility' and unpredictability. Little surprise, then, that *Hobson-Jobson* is moved to observe that:

> Caste is also applied to breeds of animals, as 'a high-caste Arab.' In such cases the usage may possibly have come directly from the Port. Alta casta, casta baixa, in the sense of breed or strain…The Indo-Portuguese formed from casta the word castico, which they used to denote children born in India, of Portuguese parents; much as creole was used in the W. Indies. (Yule & Burnell 1886: 172)

Successive entries for 1638, 1653, 1657, 1661, 1699, 1701, 1702 to 1726 appear then to lead to an all-inclusive conclusion. Caste is universal. *All* races must eventually be included within the order of caste, including the children of miscegenation as well as the 'blacks' and 'Moors' (1726 "[…] or the offspring of the same by native women, to wit Mistics and Castices, or blacks […] and Moors." – Valentijn, v.3.)." Thus, the array of colonial thoughts in the 19th and early 20th century on caste as an encompassing semantic category pave the way for Dumont's very famous and resounding 20th century conclusion

that "caste is a state of mind" (Dumont 1966:180). But what kind of a 'state of mind' is caste? In my second section, below, I attempt to address this troubling question.

2.   Caste in contemporary India

2.1   The cognitive paradox of 'untouchability'

Taking a sharp turn away from the archival investigations of caste, race and language undertaken in the previous section, this section of my entry considers the manifestations of caste in contemporary India, veering towards questions that have lately been categorized as belonging to the domain of "cognitive philology" (see Pollock 2009, 2010 who calls it "future philology"). Whether we call it by this name or some other phrase more suited to pragmatic studies, cognitive philology, as I see it, deals with the mental states of individual and societies enveloped in a net of words and concepts. It studies the socio-cognitive consequences of such situated-ness within a 'linguistic body'. As a disciplinary orientation within studies of language use broadly construed, it concerns itself with the transmission of a variety of forms of language: oral and written, literary and quotidian, ancient and modern. In this section, I ask from the viewpoint of cognitive philology, how the old and creaky notion of 'race', never quite banished from popular consciousness and resituated in India as 'caste', is adapting today to new global conditions.

Can our understanding of 'local' forms of prejudice such as caste discrimination be extended to a more general analysis of racial stigmatization and embodied cognition?

Can philological investigations, based on the study of widely available narratives that enact embedded cultural phenomena such as 'caste untouchability' help us understand new patterns of racial prejudice as we enter a millennium where the familiar discourses once associated with the cultural politics of nationhood and decolonization are being redefined under 'neo-colonial' circumstances?

Can an analysis of the 'innocent' sensory category of touch, given to us by biology – a species resource shared between mothers and children, lovers, friends, everyone – help explain those 'sinister', stigmatizing narratives of race and caste that have long been formulated in different cultural contexts?

The method of 'cognitive philology' attempts to answer questions such as the ones outlined above. I begin with a list of half-a-dozen words that are foundational to the vocabulary of caste in India – a lexicon with which most citizens of India, literate or illiterate, rich or poor, urban or rural are, as mentioned earlier, alarmingly familiar. The descriptions below consist in my own brief glosses on these words.

varna: This word literally means 'colour' in Sanskrit and is a polymorph of the word *varnan* which means 'description'. Scholars agree that the word *varna* seems prima facie to relate to skin colour and might (or might not!) indicate the 'racial' difference between

so-called fair-skinned 'Aryans' and those dubbed 'Aryo-Dravidians' by Risley in *The People of India*. It is part of 'common knowledge' in India that there is an abstract four-fold *varna*-system in Hinduism consisting in hierarchical order of: Brahmins (scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants) and Shudras (the low-born). At the bottom of the ladder are the *avarna*, such as the Dalits ('untouchables' or 'broken men'). The *Adivasi* ('original inhabitants') such as the 'forest' and other tribes (Bhils, Gonds and so on, listed in the Indian Constitution as 'Scheduled Tribes' or STs) are also considered *avarna*. This entire system of the four castes, as well those who belong outside the order of these castes is however never to be found in a pristine form anywhere. Instead, it translates, as *Hobson-Jobson* and virtually all anthropologists of India have observed, into hundreds of locally defined sub-castes across the subcontinent.

jati: Refers to 'birth and profession', the Sanskrit being cognate with the Latin word 'genus'. One can belong to a *neech* (low) or *ucch* (high) *jati*. The latter, the *ucch jati*, are supposed to be *dvija* or 'twice born', once at birth and then again when the caste status of males is ritually affirmed through a 'thread ceremony' at puberty. In everyday usage, it is this word that most closely corresponds to the English word 'caste'. There are several hundreds of *jati* across India of which certain professions such as weavers, oil-pressers, leather-workers and so on belong to the Shudra caste among the 'backward' classes.

gotra: Refers to lines of descent from seven or eight original 'sages' who were supposed to have fathered various Brahmin clans during the Vedic period (circa 1500–500 BCE). Like the proliferation of 'castes', *gotra*, too, have multiplied across time; they are no longer restricted to the Brahmin castes and are estimated to number around fifty in present-day India. Despite the fact that *gotra* lineages are based on oral and remembered knowledge with no verification procedures whatsoever, they remain critical in determining social relationships, since intermarriage or endogamy is forbidden between members of the same *gotra*, leading to this day to 'honour killings' and revenge scenarios when such intermarriage interdiction are perceived to have been violated (Sawhney 2012)

achhoot: Means 'one not to be touched' on account of his or her very touch being polluting. This word refers to the 'untouchable' or *avarna* classes by tradition. Any other category of 'outsider' such as, say, an Englishman, is also considered *avarna* in this sense as he stands outside the caste structure by definition and is thus 'untouchable'. The Vedic caste system is believed to have invented the special category of *mleccha* (barbarian) for this category of *avarna* person.

Harijan: Coined by Gandhi to refer to 'untouchables', this proper noun literally means 'God's children' (and appears to belong to the basic 'parent/child' paradigm of touch in the 'cognitivist' vein, as I shall argue later in this section). Arousing continuous debate ever since Gandhi made it a part of India's political vocabulary, the contentious history of the word 'Harijan' is perhaps best illustrated by the famous debate between Gandhi and Tagore centering on a massive natural calamity. This was the 'Great Earthquake of 1934' measuring 8.0 points on the Richter scale that killed thousands on January

15, 1934 in Himalayan foothills of Nepal and Bihar (including, as it happens, my grandfather and several members of my family back then). Gandhi at the time chose to interpret this natural event as a sign that the gods themselves were punishing the people of Bihar for their sins of caste discrimination; or, as he put it in his public statement, the earthquake was "divine chastisement for the great sin we have committed against those whom we describe as Harijans". Tagore's response to what he called "this unscientific view of things" then appeared, at his request, in the pages of the journal founded by Gandhi titled *Harijan*, on February 16, 1934. Tagore argued that he was as much against the horrors of caste as Gandhi but that no one should "associate ethical principles with cosmic phenomena." The problem is that, 84 years later, it indeed seems to be the case that caste in India is to its citizens something like a "cosmic phenomenon", so overarching is its influence and so long its memory. Thus, a commentator can write in a national paper today that the old Gandhi-Tagore debate on caste and calamity "holds significance in the times of the Covid-19 virus when a large number of public personalities have expounded unscientific and superstitious positions" (Singh, *Indian Express*, March 2020).

Dalit: Coined by the social reformer Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, one of the main architects of the Indian Constitution, this word means 'crushed, broken, oppressed' and has largely replaced the term 'Harijan' offered by Gandhi that held so much sway over most of the 20th century. The Constitution itself explicitly refers to 'depressed classes' in a special list of Scheduled Castes and Tribes – to which many new categories, ironically, still continue to be added such as the OBCs (Other Backward Classes), in a manner that recalls the despairing entry in *Hobson-Jobson* cited earlier.

Remarkably, we find that not a single one of these six common keywords in the Indian vocabulary of caste occurs as an entry in the Anglo-Indian dictionary *Hobson-Jobson* (although 'Pariah', literally meaning 'outsider', a word for certain 'untouchable castes' does merit a separate entry). Despite the elaborate exposition of the etymology of this word by Yule and Burnell, taking a cognitive philological approach to the exploration of the meaning of 'caste' reveals that it is almost as if this concept has two quite separate and mutually exclusive existences: one in the 'exoticizing' imagination of 'the West' and the other in the lived experience of Indians, just as Said (1978) might have argued (see also Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993).

What cannot be denied is that the idea of 'caste' continues to be ineradicably associated with the very being of India, whatever the angle of vision. The 'cognitivist philological' answer to the continuing hold of caste categories, I suggest, would be to contend that the concept lies at the intersection of three powerful systems:

a. The physical and embodied system of **vision** or 'what [you think] you see' (**colour**/*varna*)
b. The physical and emotive system of **affect** or 'what [you believe] you feel' (**touch**/*chuachuut*)

c.   The system of the **social imaginary** or 'what you [learn to] infer' (comprising, inter alia, of semantic categories such **Brahmin, Shudra**, *achoot*, **Harijan, Dalit** etc.)

Of these cognitive systems, racial discrimination in countries such as the USA have typically been associated with the visual system, since race in the stereotypical case is clearly marked or 'stamped' upon the skin (but see also Hobbs 2014, on the phenomenon of 'passing' in this society). Caste discrimination, on the contrary, is subject to the dilemma to which Risley seemed blind but which Ghurye succinctly stated: namely, that caste categorizations in India cannot be visually identified or 'measured'. Therefore, they must depend on other markers.

The 'stigmatizing' practices of 'untouchability' in India, that is, require independent corroboration within a sociolinguistic matrix (see Guru and Sarukkai on the everyday experience of living within this matrix, 2019). A 'cognitivist philology' would begin by drawing attention to the age-old recognition that the skin is the most extensive human organ, covering all of the body, and most fully developed at birth. As Aristotle (4th century BCE) put it: "The primary form of sense is touch, which belongs to all animals." The sociobiologist Robin Dunbar, whose work would also fall broadly within a cognitivist framework, repeats much the same sentiments in contemporary times when he writes:

> A touch is worth more than a thousand words. …the intimacy of touch catapults communication into another dimension, a world of feeling and emotion that words can never penetrate.
> (Dunbar 2010: 61)

To reuse Dumont's phrase, it is this evocative, emotive, "state of mind" that touch and its social boundaries seem summon up within the Indian caste system. Ghurye (1932), whose work I have referred to earlier, discusses a number of societies both ancient and modern (Egyptian, Greek, Celtic, Polynesian, Brazilian) and comes to the conclusion that hierarchical systems such as the one manifested in the caste system of India were – and are – quite common but what distinguishes India's particular version of the general 'homo hierarchicus' model is its unique recourse to 'untouchability'.

> Only the practice of untouchability is peculiar to the Hindu system. It will be clear from the history of the factor of caste […] that untouchability and unapproachability arose out the idea of ceremonial purity, first applied to the aboriginal Shudras in connection with sacrificial rituals and extended to other groups because of the theoretical impurity of certain occupations.
> (Ghurye 1932: 180)

Studying cultures such as those on the Indian subcontinent that have developed distinctive and complex codes of 'untouchability', both verbal and non-verbal, could therefore significantly aid our understanding of social stigmatization and race taboos across cultural contexts (see in this connection the excellent work on the themes of both race and touch by Montagu 1950, 1971). In India, touch and its socio-cognitive dimensions con-

stitute a new field of research (see Jaaware 2018). Thus the research in this area done by Priyanka Agrawal and myself on 'touch' as a crucial developmental index in the Indian setting is quite exploratory but it may be worth mentioning briefly (see Agrawal 2011; Krtner et al. 2007, Nair 2012a).

In our work, we analyzed in detail twenty video-recordings of Indian mother-infant interactions at the ages of 3 months and then again at 19 months. The hypothesis we tested, based on fine-grained 'touch codes' that we developed involving contact with various parts of the body (fingers, torso, head, hands, mouth, legs, fingers etc.) between mother and child was that at the beginning of life (say, around three months), the adult caregiver usually has control over the entire 'touch area' of the child's body. As a child grows and develops agency and power of her own body, the 'ownership' of touch gradually passes to her. By the time she is about one-and-a-half years old, a child can move about freely on her own and is not dependent, at least physically, on her mother's absolute control of the distance between them.

A further socially-oriented hypothesis I then developed on the basis of this primary research, was that the basic non-verbal and 'untutored' patterns of touch that we observed in our mother child data-sets, based on parameters of distance and affect, are replicated in the larger abstract patterns of 'untouchability' in Indian caste practices. In such a paradigm, an upper caste person is the 'adult in room' while the lower caste person is the child who strays. The further she strays, the more she is stigmatized or rendered 'untouchable'. Thus the 'innocent' biological category of touch may indeed structurally underwrite the 'sinister' narrative philology of 'race' in certain well-defined cultural contexts. I will return to an elaboration of this point but first want to relate it to the compelling theoretical framework of 'stigma' outlined by Erving Goffman (1963).

2.2   Stigmatized bodies

Goffman's theory of stigma seems to be well fitted, in its broadly philological and psychological orientation, to an analysis of race/caste distinctions in India. Goffman begins by tracing the concept of 'stigma' back to what he sees as its 'Greek' roots (we may recall that these classical Greek antecedents are also stressed in the colonial literature on caste in India mentioned Section 1). Goffman writes:

> The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, criminal, or a traitor – a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places. [...] The dwarf, the disfigured person, the blind man, the homosexual, the ex-mental person and the member of a racial or religious minority are often considered socially 'abnormal', and therefore in danger of being considered less than human. Whether some people react by rejection, by over hearty acceptance or by

plain embarrassment, their main concern is with such an individual's deviance, not with
the whole of his personality.   (Goffman 1963:1)

As we have noted, a powerful abstract system of caste and race categorization exists in
India and is demarcated in several of India's languages. However, since these distinctions
are neither measurable (despite Risley's best efforts) nor visible, they constantly need to
be *made* visible. It is here that Goffman's notion of stigma can be helpful. Touch and its
'management', as Goffman suggested could be robust cognitive indicators of social rela-
tionships that seek to reinforce 'difference'. Goffman makes a set of related points about
stigma that I will try to systematically relate to the Indian case, as follows:

1. Stigma "is […] a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype mark-
    ing a symbolic distinction between the stigmatized individual and 'we normals'".
    Goffman suggests that an 'attribute' would consist in perceptible characteristics like
    an English accent or in skin colour, a beard, a long nose, blonde hair, educational
    qualifications, etc. while a 'stereotype' might include categories such as Asian, Ter-
    rorist, Jew, Hollywood actress, University Professor, etc.
    In Indian national discourses, across languages, applying Goffman's theory, we could
    say that the attribute is 'uncleanliness' or filth and the stereotype is of the 'untouch-
    able'. However, while this distinction might be 'symbolically' marked between high
    and low castes, it is obvious that low caste people are by no means more *visibly* dirty
    or filthy than the upper castes. Therefore, this attribute must be 'socially conferred'
    on them. How? Well, for example, via the common social practices of clearly demar-
    cating areas usually on the outskirts of villages/towns without access to clean water/
    wells or sanitation to be lived in by untouchable communities; and by the traditional
    assignment of certain 'dirty' professions to low caste communities such as tanning,
    the carrying away of human waste from the homes of the higher castes etc. These
    social relationships serve to make visible the underlying symbolic power of stigma-
    tized 'untouchability' in India.
2. Stigma, according to Goffman, is conventionally related to an embodied and visible
    sign (blindness, blackness, a hijab) that is deemed "deeply discrediting".
    In the Indian case, these 'embodied signs' are often linguistic. For example, most
    Indians can make an informed guess about the caste identity of a person based on his
    or her surname. 'Caste' names such as Dom, Tuli, Mondal are understood to signify
    'lower caste' status while names like Chaturvedi, Mukherji, Sanyal, Namboothiri,
    Nair, Rai and so on designate the 'upper castes'. As indicated in Section 1, this is
    where the colonial Census of India and its subsequent reification of caste within the
    postcolonial Indian state has played a significant part.
3. Stigma symbols (the 'scarlet letter', the leper's bell, the tattered clothing of a beggar,
    the Nazi swastika on the arm of a former SS officer), Goffman points out, are to

be contrasted with prestige symbols within cultures (the diamond ring, the general's medals).

In the Indian context, this symbolic embodiment is exemplified, for instance, by the Brahmin's caste-mark on his forehead or the 'sacred thread' that he wears. Different denominations of caste Brahmins (e.g. Shaivite/Vaishnavite) wear differing caste masks. This cultural phenomenon is in fact so common in India that it often passes unnoticed even in urban, modern India: for example, a former Chief Election Commissioner of India sported his Brahmin's caste-mark on his forehead throughout his tenure but no one even remotely considered the possibility that wearing such a 'prestige symbol' might influence his official judgments.

4. Stigma, Goffman emphasizes, causes the stigmatized individual to be seen only in terms of his or her perceived disability (stereotyping through attribution). A person's stigma attribute thus robs an individual of the 'wholeness' and 'complexity' of his or her 'personhood', since it is, in a cartoon-like fashion, often blown up out of all proportion.

    Thus, in the Indian case, the point has been made that 160-million Indian citizens can summarily be referred to by the single homogenizing epithet 'untouchable', reducing their individuality to it alone (see Jadhav 2007).

5. Stigma disables or 'spoils' identity so severely that it has to be socially 'managed' via strategies of 'information control' by both 'normals' and those stigmatized. These strategies, Goffman states, may include: **i.** hiding or changing one's stigmatized attribute; **ii.** jokingly or seriously rejecting the relationship between stereotype and attribute as when a crippled man tells a story against himself or wins a race; **iii.** initiating social movements or writing against stigmatizing practices in newspapers, novels and poems, art, the sciences, in institutions. All these strategies for 'managing' social identity via 'information control' can be copiously observed in the Indian caste context, but I will consider only the last of these strategies as an illustration.

2.3   The fiction of caste

Nobody denies that caste stigmatization is achieved early in Indian society via tales told at the mother's knee, during the 'sensory-motor' stage of a child's life and then repeated ad infinitum by teachers in schools, in school curricula and so forth. Such stories of caste cruelty standardly include, for example, the story of the tribal *avarna* archer Eklavya in the Mahabharata whose skill was unparalleled but whose Brahmin teacher (guru) Dronacharya demanded as his tribute from Eklavya that he cut off his right thumb so that he could never actually use his expertise to challenge his upper caste 'superiors'; or the Hindu myth of the origin of the races where Brahmins were formed from the head of Brahma and the Shudras from his feet.

Modern literary texts have sought to produce a counter-narrative to such 'stereotypical' tales of caste discrimination but, given the stigma format of 'casteism' in India and the untouchable's almost total lack of 'voice' in canonical texts, even liberal thinkers often succumb to the temptation to regard 'the untouchable' as cognitively incapable of telling his own tale (see Nair 2010). A well known literary case in point is E.M. Forster's Preface (1940) to Mulk Raj Anand's moving novel *Untouchable* (1935). Forster writes:

> *Untouchable* could only have been written by an Indian who observed from the outside. No European, however sympathetic, could have created the character of Bakha, because he would not have known enough about his troubles. And no untouchable could have written the book, because he would have been involved in indignation and self-pity. Mr. Anand stands in the ideal position, by caste he is a Kshatriya, and he might have been expected to inherit the pollution complex. But as a child he played with the children of the sweepers attached to an Indian regiment, he grew to be fond of them, and to understand a tragedy which he did not share. He has just the right the mixture of insight and detachment.
>
> (Forster, in Anand 1940: vi)

This passage from the famed author of *Passage to India* shows exactly why there was such an effective collusion between the colonizers and the upper castes of India, even when they were well intentioned and supportive of Indian aspirations to be free of colonial tyranny. Both "insight and detachment" are gifts that the upper castes seem to possess by birthright while untouchables are condemned to inarticulate "indignation and self-pity".

Likewise, a very real fear in India among Dalits is that the language of 'globalisation' and 'free trade' today may support a neo-colonial take on race, where once again privileged upper castes, bureaucrats and academics speak passionately for the "broken men" of India and bask in international approval for their advocacy of the rights of untouchables.

Meanwhile, the narrative of the Dalit remains untold and untellable. A reprise of the forms of 'racist' knowledge via the agency of postcolonial bureaucracies could in these circumstances merely serve to recode and mimic early modes of 'racial profiling' such as Risley's. Inevitably, too, these multiple 'local' narratives of race lead to a homogenized and highly emotive 'global' understanding of racial difference to which 'postcolonial selves' are subject (see Teltumbde 2018). Again, this is where nuanced and non-partisan pragmatic studies could be relevant.

Extending Goffman's notion of stigma to Indian 'caste consciousness', it often seems that despite the 'positive' changes sought to be enacted through law (via, for example, state 'reservations' for the 'backward castes'), as well as through literature (books of fiction like Anand's *Untouchable* or non-fiction like Narendra Jhadav's biography of his father, *Untouchables*), the corporeal as well as metaphoric body of the 'untouchable' remains a deep locus of stigma. Primal atavistic fears still appear to summoned up for the upper-castes by the polluting touch of the untouchable – which perhaps explains why

this trope so unfailing returns whenever a crisis occurs. Bloomberg journalists Pandya and Alstedter, for instance, reporting in 2020 on COVID-19, state: "The intense fear around the virus has created a new class of untouchables in India, with the infected and their families being shunned by their neighbors or shunted out of rented apartments."

Such "shunning", an intrinsic part of the connotative semantics of untouchability, leads us to a final contradiction that a cognitivist approach to the complex pragmatics of caste in India must attempt to answer.

2.4   Gender and caste

Despite the focal untouchability of the Dalit, a chief means of keeping the Dalits 'crushed' continues to be the endemic rape of Dalit women by upper-castes. So how come the untouchable can be intimately touched in this sexual respect?

The answer to this intriguing question emerges from the analysis of both our child-mother touch analysis and the prevalent social caste-stigma narratives in India just mentioned. Risley in colonial India also explicitly refers the influential translation of the 'Institutes of Manu' by William Jones (1784, 1993: 437). These 'laws' of Manu are an important part of popular caste discourses today and widely quoted on social media. A couple of examples:

> As women cannot utter the Veda mantras, they are as unclean as the untruth.
>
> Manusmriti IX-18

> A Brahmin, Kshatriya or Vaisya man may sexually use any Shudra woman.
>
> Manusmriti IX-2

Prahlad Gangaram Jogdand (1995) has pointed out that traditional statutes like this perpetuate the belief that "lower caste women [are seen as] 'impure' or 'lacking in virtue'". He asserts, plausibly, that:

> In several instances, the rape of Dalit women may not be considered as rape at all because of the customary access that upper-caste men have had to Dalit women's sexuality. In almost all regional languages in India, the word for rape is equivalent to 'stealing the honour of' and since lower caste women by virtue of their double-oppression have virtually no 'honour' to speak of, the right to redressal is often denied [by the police, law, executive and other organs of state].   (Jogdand 1995: 30)

Jogdand's argument is supported by newspapers reports that appear every other day across India. Here is one such:

> Dalit Sthree Sakthi (DSS), which has brought to light the kidnap and gang rape of 15-year-old Dalit girl by a landlord and policemen in West Godavari district, has demanded stringent action against the culprits and compensation to the victim […]

> On coming to know about the police complaint, Ravi Chandra [the landlord] took the girl to Hyderabad where he threatened her against revealing the truth. She was then brought to Yelamanchili police station on May 15 and produced before the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Narsapur who issued orders to shift her to Juvenile Home in Hyderabad. Instead of being shifted immediately, she was detained in the police station for the next three days and allegedly raped by the Sub-inspector and three police constables.
>
> (*The Hindu*, Hyderabad, 13.6.2009)

The silent performative of the typical 'Dalit rape' narrated above shows that, within the structural format of caste in India, the rape of the outcaste woman is lost in mimicry even as it is being enacted. This is a stereotypical stigma manifestation. The Dalit woman, in the popular psyche, does not own her body. It belongs to another, so the question of a violation of her 'rights' simply does not arise. It is in this sense that Dalit rape is socially erased by silent consensus even as it is reported.

When within postcolonial theory, Gayatri Spivak asks 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' (Spivak 1988), I believe that it is to issues such as this that her interdisciplinary theory can be applied. The untouchable subaltern cannot speak because she is held not to own a body, let alone a tongue. She is the analogue of the infant in the mother-child touch paradigm explored in Agarwal's research (2011). Like an infant (we should recall here that *infant* derives from the Latin *in-fans*, literally 'without speech') dependent on her caregiver, the Dalit too is 'loved' and 'protected' by the caste system as long she stays within its fold and does not question the authority of her guardians. The unspoken secret, of course, is that a hierarchical system like caste conceptually *requires* lower castes for its own propagation and survival, just as the 'mother' in the 'mother-child' dyad needs her child to maintain her own identity as a mother. In brief, within the highly patriarchal Indian caste hierarchy, we may postulate that the Dalit is like an infant, socially deprived of speech and without control over her bodily self: a nobody, a **no body**. As such, relative to the upper caste who are somebodies and possess substantive bodies, the untouchable has as little claim as an infant over his/ her own body.

Further, since the Dalit is, in practice, kept in a permanent state of 'infantilization' without access to literacy and other rights, the ownership of his/her body never really passes over to him, as it does in the 'natural', 'innocent' case of the upper classes. In other words, the untouchable seems the reverse image of the stereotypic 'chaste' or pure infant within the Indian caste system. The upper caste child has the promise of future freedoms of speech and action. She need not always be subject to maternal/paternal authority, unlike the 'untouchable' who remains permanently fashioned in Indian caste discourse as a 'powerless' infant.

Following Goffman, we may infer that the Dalit is constructed not just as a powerless infant but as one who fits what he calls the mould of a 'spoilt/spoiled' child (not in the conventional sense of being over-indulged but rather as one who asks for privileges to which one is simply not entitled). As a logical consequence of the caste system, a Dalit

is, from birth, deserving of punishment. Her body has continually to be re-stigmatized through upper-caste practices like rape. Rape is one such punitive form but there are many others. Once again, the 'sinister' narratives of race – traditional, colonial and post-colonial – coalesce around this 'difficult' low-caste figure of silent and ineffable 'resistance' (see Illaiah 1996)

Dalit spokesmen often assert that it is impossible to write about Dalit problems and lower-caste life in the highly Sanskritised idiom of the upper classes. They are silenced by the very act of having to use these unsuitable languages. Hence they insist on the import of the first person, autobiographical mode as a primary act of self-knowledge (Poitevin 2002), the space between fiction and lived experience. To write in canonical Hindi or Gujarati or Marathi is willy-nilly to assume an upper-caste linguistic disguise and to succumb to the pressure to 'fake' their emotions and perceptions. As Dalit writers, they therefore have to 'invent' new languages or recoup 'old' oral modes – Caliban languages – in order to speak of their experiences.

So far, these efforts at inventing 'new languages' among the Dalits and backward classes have been varied. They have extended, for example, to fostering within the Dalit community of Anbur untouchables (Vincentnathan 1993), a subculture of belief in a set of 'origin' myths where 'everyone is equal' while at the same time appearing to conform to the usual caste-pollution norms in their everyday lives. They have also included the bold and imaginative introduction of the ironically 'liberating' new 'Goddess English' into their pantheon by the Dalits of Banka village in Uttar Pradesh in 2010 (see Nair 2012b). As I see it, some of the most exciting debates in India, especially within linguistics, philological and cognitive studies, will arise out of the struggle of groups such as the 'untouchables', and in particular 'low-caste' women, to insert their own texts and, more importantly, theories of text, into the traditional canon (see also Gupta 2016).

To return, then, at the end of this entry to the idea of 'radical philology' mooted by the Sanskrit scholar Sheldon Pollock (1910), I believe this linguistically motivated essay on the intersections of caste, race and gender in India suggests the following thought. Thinking in terms of 'cognitive philology' may be the bridge from the classical Sanskrit literature on caste, through colonial codification, to the intellectual world of modernity. Pollock argues that philology in relational to an ancient language like Sanskrit is a discipline that relies on rich interpretations of language to answer the question 'what does it mean to be human?' What could therefore be pragmatically most valuable about the philological method advocated by Professor Pollock is its capacity to attend to the point of view and voice of the 'other' – whether that 'other' voice belongs to the remote past or, as in the Dalit case, to the devastating present. Or to put it metaphorically, cognitive philology and pragmatics should always enable spaces wherein the brash new 'Dalit' Goddess English is able to engage in no-holds-barred conversations with the well-bred old Sanskrit Goddess Saraswati (traditionally, the goddess of learning) invoked by Pollock.

From the evidence of the most arcane theories of racial and cultural stigma to the most basic theories of mother-infant sensory touch perhaps the most obvious inference for us as students of 'language in use' from the Indian case of caste and 'untouchability', is that it may be time for us to reconsider our very paradigms of research and to reflect on how we might have constructed our theories of 'knowledge' itself. We need, that is, in the final analysis, to ask ourselves what topics, methods and problems we privilege as 'touchable' or stigmatize as 'untouchable' within our trans-cultural academic and political systems today – and why. It is this question that is at the heart of the philological linguistic quest for new solutions to old cognitive conundrums. With this hope in mind, I end with the words of the Dalit poet, Namdev Dhasal (1981) who puts the matter like this in his poem 'A New World':

> It is three o' clock at night as I write this
> Though I want to have a drink
> I don't feel like drinking.
> I only want to sleep peacefully
> And tomorrow morning see no *varnas*.

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Embodied interaction

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1.   Introduction

Studying interaction as embodied means that, in addition to verbal information, we take into account the contribution of the participants' bodies. On the one hand, speaking itself is embodied, as language is produced in the vocal tract and with a variety of functional prosodies. On the other hand, we also use gesture, posture, gaze and movement to make sense to each other, often with the support of the materialities in the environment. Embodied interaction analysis centrally targets the question how human beings use their available bodily and material resources to bring about *social action* that is treated as meaningful by other participants (Streeck, Goodwin and LeBaron 2011). It dissects both the verbal and embodied methods of action formation at various occasions, and thus does not inevitably treat language as the most important vehicle of meaning. This approach accounts for a wider range of human activity, by covering the embodied aspects of everyday conversation, but also by elucidating the role of language in highly embodied activities.

Social action is the central focus of attention in this kind of research, as established from the perspective of participants. Thus, in contrast to pre-existing categorizations of "what people do with language", such as speech acts, the understanding here relies on how participants treat what is happening in each moment in interaction. In other words, actions are considered to emerge in a *situated* manner and to make sense in real time for current participants (C. Goodwin 2000b). Recordings are necessary in order to analyze the minute verbal and bodily details of actions, and video recordings particularly reveal how bodies and other materialities contribute to the constitution of action at every concrete instance.

Language theories that incorporated the body emerged as early as 1910 with Mead's work in symbolic interactionism. This concern to include the body as part of language continued in several trajectories over the decades, including sociological studies of everyday life (Goffman 1956), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967), studies of gesture (see McNeill 2005), and kinesics (Birdwhistell 1970, Kendon 1990). All of these inspired the developing stream of research known as *conversation analysis* (pedagogically summarized in Clift 2016), which targeted the inherently sequential nature of human action.

Conversation analysis' central contribution is to demonstrate that everything we say builds on what was uttered before and at the same time delimits the options for what can follow. Any utterance, turn or action is understood in its sequential context (Schegloff 2007). In examining co-present interaction, it soon became clear that the exclusive analytic focus on verbal production was insufficient, as bodily practices can significantly contribute to meaning as well as to the organization of interaction. The field that departed from the solely sequential nature of action and focused on its embodied aspects has come to be known as *multimodal conversation (interaction) analysis* (Stivers and Sidnell 2005, Deppermann 2013, Streeck and Jordan 2009). It has developed explosively alongside the increasing availability of high-quality video recordings and gained analytical vigor by close attention to embodied behavior that evolves moment-by-moment in real time, contributing to what social action is taken to be (which is markedly different from the branch of semiotics that is also called *multimodal interaction analysis* and is practiced by, e.g., Kress and van Leeuwen 2001). One can even talk about an "embodied turn in research on language and social interaction" (Nevile 2015), which among other things problematizes the hitherto taken for granted analytical boundary between language and the body (Keevallik 2018a). The most recent developments of the field target the multisensory aspects of action, such as smelling and touching (Mondada 2019a), moving yet further away from the logocentric approach to action, and recognizing the central role of the body.

In the following, we will present examples of the intricate relationship between language and the body in embodied interaction. The embodied nature of language production itself will remain mostly untouched upon (e.g. vocal chords, diaphragm). Studies of interactional prosody (starting from Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 1996) have already formed an influential stream of research, with a focus on action formation and turn-construction. Likewise, studies on the co-production of talk and gesture is a powerful branch by itself (e.g., Kendon 2004, Streeck 2009), in particular targeting deixis and reference (Mondada 2009a, 2009b, Eriksson 2009). This research cannot be adequately surveyed in the current chapter that focuses on the organization of interaction. We begin with the principle 'keys' (Sidnell 2010) of conversation analysis, that is, the earliest noted sites of conversational organization – turn construction, turn taking, and sequence. We document how analysis has increasingly incorporated the body in these keys, such as how embodied actions feature in sequences and beyond sequences, and finally finishing off with recent examples of how analysis has incorporated bodily sensation. Throughout, we provide examples from the literature and our own corpora, with the embodied conduct transcribed using various systems, including the Goodwin system (Extracts 3, 10), the Mondada system (Extracts 2, 5, 7, 9), and others (1, 4, 6, 8).

2.   Turn construction

Conversation progresses in the exchange of turns by different participants. Turns are conversational units that speakers demonstrably orient to and that are regularly built of linguistic materials. A turn is also an essentially temporal structure, which is to be described accordingly in terms of turn-beginning, progression, and completion (Schegloff 1996). In addition to being merely verbal productions by single speakers, turns have also been shown to arise from embodied interaction between participants, flexibly adapting to the evolving contextual contingencies moment-by-moment. Legendarily, Charles Goodwin (1979, 1981) showed how a regular utterance, *I gave up smoking cigarettes one week ago today actually*, emerges across changing participation frameworks. Every next segment of the utterance is tailored to a different recipient, who is gazing at the speaker at that very moment, depending on whether the recipient is knowing or unknowing about the reported event. The utterance was neither planned, nor produced, as a single coherent proposition. Instead, the grammar involved in adding the adverbial phrase 'one week ago today' can be seen as a method of emergently building on a prior utterance that has turned out to be inadequate for the new recipient, who now holds mutual gaze with the speaker. We can thus see how the bodily behavior of recipients can have a crucial impact on how the turn emerges. In a similar vein, Iwasaki (2009, 2011) has shown how clausal turns in Japanese emerge as a result of dynamic interactive processes, which include "interactive turn spaces" – places where the speaker of the unit-in-progress invites the recipient to co-participate in the building of the action. For example, in one case when a speaker states that one of the reasons why he moved to the US was his interest in drugs, the speaker creates interactive turn spaces for his recipient to react. These spaces emerge after the first phrase *doraggu kee* 'drug stuff', as well as the second one *mo kyoomi ga* 'also interest' (see Example 1). The speaker invites recipient collaboration by gazing at him, smiling and nodding, while the recipient produces response tokens and nods, thereby actively participating – with the body and voice – in the emerging grammatical structure.

(1)   Multimodal micro-collaboration within a clause (Iwasaki 2009, 2011). ITS = interactive turn space.


```
        ((gaze to Isa))------------------------------
INT:   =[kiita    koto] aru to omotta.
        hear-PT N      have QT think-PT
        'I though I have heard of ((it)).'


        ((LH touching his chin))
        ((tilt head slightly))              ((smiling face))
        ((gaze away))
ISA:   =[demo ano:- ]                       (0.6)
        but    um
        'But um:-                           (0.6)

    INT            ISA

        demo ano:-  omotta.    (0.6)
```



```
                    ITS                              ITS
        2       3        4          5      6      7              8
((smiling face))         n↘                n↘    n↘             n↘
......I----to INT--------------  n↗    ↘    ((LH down))
ISA:  doraggu kee{::, (0.8)  [mo kyoomi ga:] (0.6)  [ha:i.]     [a(h)ri(h)(h) ma(h)shi(h){ta hh    (0.6)
      drug    stuff          also interest NOM       yes        have-PT
                                                                ((I)) was interested in drug stuff, too.'
((gaze to Isa))--------  N↗{↘    {n↗↘              n↘    n↘  n↘ n↘
INT:                     ,,,,,,,,,I........I---     {u [:n   ] {un {un {un [un
                         {a a:: {(::::m
                         I(0.5) I-(0.7)----------I

        doraggukee::, (0.8)  aa::::::m
```

Alternatively, a speaker may abandon a turn-in-progress as soon as the action has been treated as complete through the recipient's bodily-visual response (Ford, Thompson and Drake 2012: 206).

Turns and turn-constructional units (TCUs) are achieved not only through prosody, pragmatic action, and (language-based) syntax, then, but through embodiment as well. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that all these elements are coordinated into locally situated gestalts (Mondada 2014c). Not only do language and gesture complement each other when making meaning in so-called *composite utterances* (Enfield 2009), but embodied displays can take actual syntactic positions and act in a similar way to lexical units. Prior studies have shown how a grammatically incomplete structure can be completed with an explanatory gesture, which is useful in word searches (Hayashi 2003) and second language conversation (Olsher 2004, Mori and Hayashi 2006). Even more substantially, an embodied demonstration may occupy a grammatical and temporal slot within the emerging syntax (Keevallik 2013). A Swedish example from a dance class in

Lindy Hop is given in (2). One of the teachers is explaining a leading technique in the dancing couple and the consequences of a wrong move for the followers ("ladies" in the transcript). The complex conditional structure in lines 4–5 involves two embodied demonstrations, each of which completes an initiated clause, *om killarna gör* 'if guys do', and *så kommer ju tjejerna att göra* 'then the ladies will do'. They constitute two separate syntactic-bodily units, where the demonstrations fill an essentially "syntactic" slot.

(2) Syntactic-bodily units in dance instruction (author's corpus).

```
1   Lead:    Och det är VÄLdigt väldigt väldigt viktigt. (0.2)
             and it  is very    very    very    important
             'And it is really really really important.'

2            hos dem   som FÖR. (.) initialt. (.) för    det är
             for those who lead     initially     because it is
             'For those who lead. (.) Initially. (.) Because this'

3            DET  som   kommer att sprida sig på: TJEjer  också.
             this which FUT       spread REF  to  lady-PL too
             'is what is going to be transferred to the ladies too.'

4            För     *om KILlarna  gör – (2.0)*
                     *d e m o n s t r a t i o n*
             because if  guy-PL-DEF do
             'Because if the guys do'

5            Så  *kommer ju TJEjerna    att göra – (0.3)#Fig.1(1.0)*
                 *d e m o n s t r a t i o n           *
             then FUT     PAR lady-PL-DEF to  do
             'then the ladies will do'

6            eftersom de   följer. Eller hur.
             because  they follow or    how
             'because they follow. Right?'
```


Figure 1. Lead instructor demonstrating what the girls do, bodily completing the syntax of the utterance "Så kommer ju tjejerna att göra..." ('Then the ladies will do...')

After the second syntactic-bodily unit has come to a completion at the end of line 5, the turn is continued with another subordinate clause, the causal 'because they follow'. The resulting structure involves an initiation of a conditional clause + embodied demonstration (line 4), followed by another clause initiation + embodied demonstration (line 5), to which a causal clause is incrementally added (line 6), well-timed with the embodied demonstration, not the previous verbal segment. In this way embodied demonstrations participate in the temporal evolution of a complex multimodal structure, while the verbal segments on their own would be incomplete and incomprehensible for the participants.

Syntax can be discontinued for an embodied demonstration after verbs, copulas and quotatives, but also after adverbial phrases, adjectives, articles and subjects (Keevallik 2015). In perhaps the most extreme cases, contrastive conjunctions and prepositions can be used in between two embodied demonstrations, indexing that the body is currently launching a contrasting action. For example, the Swedish compound preposition *istället för* 'instead of' as well as the English *instead of* are used to launch an incorrect performance in contrast to what has been going on so far, a demonstration of a correct one (Keevallik 2017). Thus, a preposition does not necessarily project a verbal noun or verb phrase, as a logocentric grammatical account might suggest. Instead, a dance teacher's turn may evolve through the interchangeable deployment of grammar and the body.

During a turn, speakers can produce talk simultaneously with embodied displays, including gestures, but they may also perform embodied displays without simultaneous talk, as was shown in Example (1). Furthermore, embodied displays may constitute separate turn-constructional units (TCUs) within ongoing turns, perhaps especially when accompanied by a vocalization (Keevallik 2014). Example (3) comes from a meeting at an Estonian theater workshop and shows a turn where the artist explains her idea about twirling pieces of cloth. In lines 1–5 she argues that it is important to make the cloth's structures appear and disappear through rotation. In the middle of this complex turn (in line 4) she produces a demonstration that involves a non-lexical vocalization *drrrrr* with a distinct pitch contour and a gesture.

(3)   Embodied demonstration as a TCU, theater workshop (Keevallik 2014).

```
1 Artist: A   see on     just      SEE lahe et,
           but it  be-3SG precisely it  cool that
           'But the thing that is cool is that'
```

assistant   artist

head

Figure 2. "SEE 'this'"

```
2         ta k- nagu TEkib       vata. (.)
          it    like appear-3SG PAR/look:2SG
          'it appears, y'see'
3 Head:   °[a],°
          'uh'
4 Artist: [d]rr↑rrrr,
5         ja  sis  tõmbub TAgasi nii.
          and then retract-3SG   like.this
          'and then retracts like this.'
```


Figure 3. Pitch contour on "drrrrrr".[1]

---

1. There may be a slight reflection of the head's *a* at the beginning of the pitch curve but his voice is very low in relation to the artist's voice, which suggests that the contour is nevertheless reliable.

Figure 4. "dr"

Figure 5. "-rrr-"

There is a transition relevance place (where a next speaker may take a turn) at the end of line (2), where the syntax and the action are complete, and intonation falls. The addressee, the head of the workshop who is responsible for building the props, has turned his gaze toward the computer and responds with a minimal *a* 'right'. However, the artist has lifted her hands (as shown in Figure 2) and continues with an embodied demonstration accompanied by a vocalization *drrrrr*. The vocalization is done as a separate prosodic contour that iconically goes up at the beginning and falls slightly at the end (Figure 3). It follows the speaker's hands that move upward, opening up, and then turning downward (Figures 4–5). The hands represent the fabric that moves from hanging position to plate-like structures when twirled, and back to hanging, in a kind of a "modeling gesture" (Enfield 2009: 113–148). After the gesture + vocalization element the speaker adds another clause, a new turn-constructional unit (line 5). The embodied display thus constitutes an element quite similar to an incrementally added manner adverb at the end of the clause in (lines 1–2), and the upcoming *ja* 'and'-prefaced syntactic structure also builds on the display. However, it would reduce the specific accomplishment of the embodied element to force it into a regular syntactic analysis of what other materi-

als could have occurred instead (after all, a separate clause is an option too in this turn-position). An embodied display is simply a qualitatively different kind of element that also employs turn-space in real time. In contrast to language, it is predominantly iconic, a depiction (Clark 2016). The body and the grammar are communicative tools used in parallel and sometimes interchangeably. Crucially for grammar, it is not adequate to analyze *ja sis tõmbub tgagasi nii* 'and then retracts like this' as if being coordinated with the previous clause *ta k- nagu tekib* 'it appears', because the embodied display is temporally, prosodically, as well as content-wise a part of the emerging structure. Instead, we can propose multimodal patterns where embodied demonstrations are interwoven with grammar. Example (3) thus demonstrated how a turn is constructed through its embodied production, involving not only words and grammar, but also crucially prosody and body movement.

In summary, speaker turns evolve in embodied interaction, reflexively related to recipients' bodily actions, and may include vocal as well as bodily depictions. Furthermore, other participants' bodies are involved in the unfolding turn construction, particularly with respect to managing whose turn it is to act, which will be the subject of the next section.

3.   Turn-taking

Concurrently to constructing turns, participants must manage whose turn it is to act, and they mutually monitor each other to determine opportunities for and projections of turn endings (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974). Of the bodily resources that are involved in turn management, we will discuss gaze, body positioning, and gesture (for the latter, see also Streeck's 2019 entry on "Gesture"). Gaze has long been associated with turn taking or 'floor apportionment' (Kendon 1967). A speaker can also gaze at one specific recipient out of multiple recipients in order to indicate that the turn is addressed to them, and doing so at TCU boundaries selects that recipient as the next speaker (Auer 2017). This is visible in the next example, a non-scripted, casual conversation occurring in a lab with eye-tracking glasses. Michael is discussing a film. His gaze shifts to Tobias (lines 3–4), and Tobias takes the next turn, responding to Michael (lines 5–6).

(4)   Gaze shift achieving speaker selection (Weiss 2018: 31).
       (1) 01.07.2016 (00:08:36–00:08:45)

S1→ 01   M: `ich WEIß nich;`
                I don't know;

02   `johnny depp is⌈AUCH so ne stimme-`
                johnny depp is also one of those voices-

03   `die du⌈normalerweise echt sofort erKENNST glaub ich.`
                you normally recognize immediately I think.

04   `Oder?`
                isn't he?

S2→ 05   T: `⌈ja aber da: der hat so ne ZAHNlücke g:habt?`
                yes but there: he had like a tooth gap?

06   `(-) dieser HUTmacher?`
                (-) this hatter?

More recent work has found that the use of gaze may be culturally variable (Rossano, Brown and Levinson 2009), for instance, with some cultures listening to stories without the recipient directing gaze to the storyteller. Rossano (2012) presents evidence that a more robust explanation of gaze direction is action, and that gaze is organized according to the actions being made relevant. Seeking the gaze of recipients increases the relevance of a response (Stivers and Rossano 2010), and certain actions, such as questions, regularly solicit gaze and orient to gaze as an indication of recipiency.

The redirection or withdrawal of gaze accomplishes much of the work involved in closing turns and sequences. Rossano (2012) found that sustained gaze at potential sequence closures prolonged the sequence, resulting in additional turns, whereas withdrawal of gaze permitted sequence closure. The use of speaker gaze helps to distinguish between closing and continuing a TCU when the syntax is ambiguous (Walker 2012). Similarly, the convergence of a hunched body posture, soft voice, and indeterminate sequence position with gaze aversion by the speaker provide resources for participants to orient to current talk as self-talk (and thus not response relevant) (Keevallik 2018b). With respect to longer sequences and activities, gaze withdrawal can demonstrate reduced engagement and eventually converge with other resources to achieve closure of sequences and/or tasks (Mondada 2015, Robinson 1998). The timing of the gaze withdrawal alongside other embodied resources is key, as gaze can be withdrawn to achieve other actions, such as displaying a spatio-temporally displaced orientation for reenactment (Sidnell 2006).

Gaze is only one embodied resource for managing turns. Turn management can also be supported through body positioning and gesture. According to Schegloff (1996: 92–93), interactionally relevant behavior in pre-beginnings includes turning the head towards a potential recipient, lip parting, coughing, and a hearable inbreath. Leaning forward with the body can be used to initiate repair (Rasmussen 2014) or insert questions into an ongoing sequence (Li 2014). The 'reverse' (not just literally leaning back, but making oneself physically less available) can be a way to cease bidding for a speaking turn (Oloff 2013). As will be developed more below (see Section 5), the coordination of multiple bodies produces participation frameworks (C. Goodwin 2007) and embodied formations (Kendon 1990) that become a resource to draw on when accomplishing social action.

With respect to gesture, some of the clearest examples that assist turn-taking are in institutional interactions, such as hand-raising or pointing in the classroom (Käntä 2012, Sahlström 2002, Mortensen 2008), floor-allocation to discussion groups (Mondada, Svensson and van Schepen 2017), or 'relinquishing' the floor in music instruction (Reed 2015), where gestures are used to select next possible speakers. Gestures are also used for indicating availability to take a turn (hand-raising above) or claiming the next turn (Mondada 2007). Since gestures can co-occur with or overlap others' talk, they are especially useful for indicating next-speakership before a turn reaches possible completion (Deppermann 2013, Streeck and Hartge 1992). Embodiment thus supports joint transition to next speaker (Fasel Lauzon and Berger 2015). We now move to discussing sequence.

4. Embodied sequential actions

Sequentially relevant actions can be accomplished without language, as easily seen in certain responsive actions. For example, a request can, and often must, be granted in an embodied manner, such as providing a requested object. In co-present settings, requests for concrete objects are typically granted without verbal acceptance (Mondada 2014b, Rauniomaa and Keisanen 2012), and responses to instructions in activities such as air traffic control training are necessarily embodied (Arminen, Koskela and Palukka 2014). Responses to compliments can also be embodied (Keisanen and Kärkkäinen 2014). Interestingly, embodied and verbal responses may diverge in their functions. As Stivers (2008) has shown for English, the recipient's nodding in mid-telling indicates access to the teller's stance, while vocal continuers simply align with the activity in progress. Accordingly, they are positioned and treated differently, with nodding in particular used when the storyteller has revealed her stance and allowing her to move to the next component of the telling.

Embodied responses are far from rare or vague; they are as capable as verbal turns at accomplishing actions in a sequence. Among other things, when a conditionally relevant embodied response to a first action has been produced, the next turn can still be formatted as a 'sequence-closing third', as described for verbal-only sequences (Schegloff 2007: 118, 123–127). An example of these sequence-closing thirds in French can be found in Mondada (2014c: 142). She discusses sequences in a surgical team consisting of an instruction, an embodied instructed action, and the affirmative particle *ouais* 'yeah'. As shown in Example (5) the surgeon produces the instruction to take a piece of tissue (line 1), the assistant accomplishes the required action with his pliers, marked with asterisks, after which the surgeon ratifies it with a *ouais* (line 4).

(5) An acknowledging 'third' after an embodied response: Surgeon and an assistant (adapted from Mondada 2014c: 142).

```
1    SUR:    .h reprend plus *pros   lá::*
                      Take closer there again
2    ast:                    *drops previ*
3               *(0.2)
     ast:       *takes tissue -->>
4    SUR:    ouais
                Yeah
5               (0.5)*
6    ast:        -->>*
```

This kind of instruction sequence frequently occurs in teaching activities, as classically described in classroom interaction: initiation by teacher – response by students – feedback by teacher (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975, Walsh 2011: 17–20). When the student response is embodied, the teacher's feedback is reactive to, and timed with, the embodied response, and not with any prior spoken utterance. Embodied responses to verbally initiated actions are relevant in many co-present settings and some of them are mediated by technology, such as when students react to suggestions by a spellchecker during collaborative writing tasks (Musk 2016).

Embodied actions can furthermore launch action trajectories, and prompt responses that are positionally sensitive. Entirely embodied initiating actions have so far been identified in repair initiations, directives, and offers. Seo and Koshik (2010) describe how two body postures, the "head poke" and the head tilt, can be used to initiate repair in a classroom. Mortensen (2016) has noted the cupping of a hand behind the ear, showing how it functions as an initiating turn at talk when produced at a transition relevance place in second language classrooms. The ensuing vocal action accomplishing the repair is, in these cases, grammatically fitted to the embodied initiating action, and is structurally limited in ways similar to responses to verbal repair initiations expressing hearing trouble. That is, they feature repetitions and reformulations.

Besides instruction, another group of initiating actions that has drawn attention is requests and, more broadly, recruitments. Recruitments have been conceptualized as ways in which assistance may be sought or in which we perceive another's need and vol-

unteer assistance (Kendrick and Drew 2016), and many of those methods require no language at all. Along similar lines, Rossi (2014) argues that requests can be accomplished without language when the requested action is projectable from the advancement of an activity. Below (6), we can find an instance when an embodied first action occasions an inquiry: Lucio apparently does not understand what is requested from him by embodiment only, described in line 3. His following turn, a clarification question, is grammatically sensitive to the fact that an initiating action, some kind of a request, has already taken place: it is a first-person modal interrogative. He complies with the requested action only after the clarification sequence has been terminated (in line 8), so the adjacency pair in lines 5–6 can be seen in parallel to a verbal insertion sequence. Here it is "inserted" into an embodied recruitment sequence (Lines 3, 8).

(6) A clarification sequence after an embodied initiating action: Filling out forms (adapted from Rossi 2014: 321–322).

```
1           (4.7)
2    Flora  ((adds her signed forms to the pile))
3           ((places blank form and pen on the table next to Lucio))
4           (1.0)
5    Lucio: cosa devo    fare
            what must-1SG do-INF
            'What should I do?'
6    Flora: eh  anche tu    devi    scrivere  il  tuo  nome
            PAR also  2SG-NOM must:2SG write-INF the your name
7           firmare  e   la  data
            sign-INF and the date
            'Well you too must write your name, sign, and (put) the date'
8           ((pushes form closer to Lucio))
9    Lucio  ((grabs form and pen))
```

Recently, studies on various service institutions have revealed grammatical regularities of requests that are contingent on the physical distance between the participants or co-occur with the manipulation of an object. In Finnish kiosk encounters, requests for tobacco products take the form of a noun phrase when the client is already standing at the kiosk counter, but they use full clauses when still approaching the counter (Sorjonen and Raevaara 2014). The study contrasts phrases such as *Pieni punainen ällämmä.* 'Small red LM.' (p. 248) with clauses such as *Anna pieni punainen ällämmä.* 'Give (me) a small red LM' (p. 254). Similarly, at an American shoe-repair shop, requests formulated as inquiries about the repairability of shoes are accompanied with minimal manipulation of the object, while requests formulated as solutions are accompanied by manipulations of the shoes to visibly reveal a solution (Fox and Heinemann 2015). Grammatical choices are thus systematically made in terms of the physical context where they are deployed; they are fitted to features of space as well as to ways of sense-making with focal objects. Directives beyond requests have attracted interest in terms of the choice between embodied and verbal devices, primarily in family interaction (Tulbert & Goodwin 2011). For example, Cekaite (2010) has shown that when verbal directives prove to be unsuc-

cessful, parents can resort to physical "shepherding" as a means to orient the child towards the required routine task. Thus, verbal actions can be alternatives to embodied ones.

While previous sections explained how embodied behaviour can be a component in a turn, and manage turn taking, this section has shown how embodied behaviours can also perform initiating, responding, and pursuing actions in their own right, fulfilling sequential slot contingencies. We will next turn to discussing how embodiment provides opportunities for modifying the local unfolding ecology of the interaction.

5.   Multimodal formations

Since embodied actions can be sustained over longer timeframes than speech (although they can, of course, also be shorter), participants are able to use these relatively durable 'formations' (Kendon 1990) for accomplishing action. This section will discuss how participants organize multimodal resources into recognizable, temporary formations, and how these formations of action become a part of the local ecology as a further resource.

As already seen in this chapter, participants holistically achieve actions through the coordination of multiple, multimodal resources in a relatively flexible time frame (Mondada 2015). Authors have variously referred to these as 'multimodal gestalts' (Mondada 2014a), or 'multimodal action packages' (C. Goodwin 2007, Hayashi 2005, Iwasaki 2009). Any single component of the gestalt does not have meaning or achieve action on its own. Part of this apparent additive convergence of resources arises from participants needing to constantly manage the dynamic, emerging interactional scene (Mondada 2014d: 140). It takes the full arrival of the multimodal components for the gestalt action to be available. As Schegloff (1984: 291) argued for gestures and talk, so too for all resources in a gestalt:

> We regularly get their sense and contextual fit only when the bit of talk they [gestures] were built to accompany arrives. These bits of behaviour render the scene in which the talk arrives a prepared scene; the talk, in turn and in retrospect, renders the bits of behaviour their coherence as preparation.

Multimodal gestalts can manage interactional organization (e.g., turn completion) and action, but they may also become conventional practices within a community or activity, such as the hammer strike to conclude an auction sale (Heath and Luff 2013). In many board games, a 'complete game-turn' (a turn-at-play, rather than at-talk) is a gestalt, often completed by the placement of a token on the board (Hofstetter in press a). Sometimes, as in Monopoly, one may do further action after placing a token, such as optionally purchasing the property on which one placed the token. Below (Example 7), Jessie places his token an available property (lines 2–4) but does not purchase it. In leaning away

from the table, he is withdrawing and restricting his own availability to take actions on the board, which is one way to end a game-turn. Steve is telling a story concurrently to Jessie's board game turn (lines 1, 5, and 7).

(7) Projecting completion of a game-turn gestalt (author's corpus, collected by Heidi Kevoe-Feldman).
G Monopoly_15:20
((Steve is re-enacting a conversation in his utterances L1-7))

```
1    STEV:   hhY+eah, (0.2) Are you going,
2    jess:       +moves token-->
3               (0.2)+(0.3)+
4    jess:           -->+,,,,,+
5    STEV:   Yep.
6    JESS:   +.t[k
7    STEV:      [I'll  b+e there:_   +
8    jess:   +leans back+toss gesture+leans back>>
9    STEV:   Y*ou don't want it,*
10   stev:    *...............*collects dice-->
12   JESS:   °Nahh°
13               (.)*(0.3)
14   stev:       -->*rolling-->
```


Figure 6. Jessie does a 'toss' gesture with his right hand, leaning back and away from the board, indicating he is passing doing further action. Steve's hand has already begun to lift to pick up the dice.

In this example, we can see that the convergence of multimodal resources (the leaning away and 'tossing' gesture, Figure 6) is not quite sufficient to achieve the gestalt of ending Jessie's game-turn (his opportunity to move pieces and do game-based-actions like buying properties). Since Steve initiates repair to check (line 9) if Jessie is finished, we can see that Steve is unwilling to treat Jessie's deployment of resources as conclusively evident of the gestalt. This is one example of how participants can be accountable for completing a gestalt. However, Steve designs his repair to display an expectation that Jessie *has* finished the turn, and begins preparing for his own turn before Jessie has responded (line 10); Steve even begins raising his hand to take up the dice before he initiates repair. He thus projects that Jessie has finished, which suggests that Jessie's 'gestalt' of finishing the turn at least partially projected a turn closure in the game.

Aspects of these actions stretch the conception of actions as bounded units, instead showing them to be emergent, multimodal phenomena that appear on prepared ground; Jessie's withdrawal from board accessibility can only achieve turn closure in an activity where accessing the board is relevant for taking a turn. This 'ground' has also been termed the 'local ecology' (Mondada 2014d) of embodied gestalts (alternatively see 'contextual configurations', C. Goodwin 2000b), and is continually changing and dynamic. It provides a temporarily existing set of resources that are available for participants to modify, act upon, and act with.

Bodily formations provide one kind of 'ground' or configuration (Kendon 1990), displaying an orientation in space and relationships with other objects and people in the environment. Against this ground, participants can make sense of emerging action and coordinate resources such as language. Relatively static formations can become part of the local environment and used for action. As one example, the physical position of students in the classroom can be used as a resource for managing a 'round robin' of turn-taking (Mortensen and Hazel 2011; see also Section 3 above). Formations, as we are discussing them, typically unfold over multiple turns, and are oriented to as relevant for accomplishing actions and being cooperative (C. Goodwin 2007). Analyses that look at how the body is positioned across this time scale (multiple turns) can help address how multimodal practices 'transcend turns-at-talk' (Stukenbrock 2014: 82). Grammar is responsive to this temporality as well; for example, Nishizaka (2016) has demonstrated how different syntactical forms of instructions are accountably positioned relative to both the activity timing and the projectable sensations of the instruction (see Section 6 below). Similarly, sensitive to the evolving timespace, De Stefani and Gazin (2014) have found that driving instructors included verbs in instructions that were 'early', whereas 'late', urgent instructions did not contain verbs, and Keevallik (2012) has shown how Estonian 'no' temporally prefaces turns-at-talk that formulate the just-occurred mistakes of students in dance classes.

When it comes time to move from one formation to another, or to be in continuous motion, careful coordination is required between participants. For example, walking

together imposes a time constraint on talk or activities occurring at the present location, projecting imminent closure of topics or sequences (Mondada 2014b). Starting a new movement is typically timed to occur with a new sequence, task, or topic (Broth and Mondada 2013), especially since mobility often removes the objects for reference (Broth and Lundström 2013). Upcoming mobility is projected through micro-scale, step-wise procedures, and partners incrementally adjust their movements until collaborative mobility is achieved. Even in dance classes, where music at some point 'begins', there is a projectable opening to mobility, and a transition from a static observers' position into increased synchrony between partners (Broth and Keevallik 2014). These practices "display a commitment to a concerted departure" (vom Lehn 2013: 80), i.e., to a collaborative, joint undertaking of mobility. In Example (8), a subtle shift of the foot by one party (M in black) is shortly followed by another foot movement in the same direction from the other party (P in white), which unfolds into the two moving on to the next painting together.

(8)   Step-wise initiation of mobility in a museum visit by a couple (vom Lehn 2013: 73).


```
1 M -|----<P ------------------------x<S----------
2
3 lft| ft -------x-------------------------x--
4 rgt| ft --------|------x------------------
```

```
5 P <|P          ---------<S/------------------------
6
7    l|ft ft --------x/------------
8    r|gt ft -------x/------------
```

```
<P/S - look to painting/sculpture

lft ft/rgt ft - Left and Right Foot
x     - onset of movement
```

A common way to extend the local ecology of a turn into a longer sequence, and delay transition, is to 'hold' the body in some way, that is, freeze the body in some position. This has been noted, for example, in hand gestures, wherein holding a gesture across a turn boundary displays that intersubjectivity has not been yet achieved (Sikveland and

Ogden 2012), or, in a 'provisional home position', that the speaker will re-uptake their previous topic or story (Cibulka 2015). Held hand positions can also display the suspension of an incipient action, such as displaying 'thinking' before completing a game move (Hofstetter in press b). In other words, holding the body's formation is a way to treat an element as not-yet-complete.

Instead of transitioning to a new activity or sequence, participants can display multiple engagements with the body. 'Body torque' in particular has been demonstrated to suspend engagement with one action trajectory in order to accomplish another trajectory, while simultaneously displaying incipient return to the first trajectory (Kamunen 2019, Schegloff 1998). The body is almost necessarily involved in any multiactivity scenario, because the vocal channel has fewer means by which to achieve multiple simultaneous engagements (Haddington et al. 2014), whereas the body combined with vocal resources creates a myriad of avenues for simultaneous action (Mondada 2014a).

Material elements of the ecology are also critical resources for action: decisions can be formalized by writing them on a communal white board (Mondada 2011), and objects can serve as mnemonics for maintaining intersubjectivity concerning the progress of an activity (Lynch, Livingston and Garfinkel 1983). However, this chapter limits itself to the resources the body itself provides. This is, by no means, a straightforward distinction; bodily formations frequently need to adapt to material contingencies to accomplish tasks, for example, in making accommodations for robots (Pelikan and Broth 2016). Bodies themselves are also sometimes oriented to *as* objects, such as when surgical patients transition from consciousness to unconsciousness (Hindmarsh and Pilnick 2002) and thus from being an interactive co-participant to a body receiving surgery. There is no clear boundary between bodily and material resources.

6.   Multisensoriality

The above research has, mostly, treated embodiment as a matter of bodily movement or positioning. However, bodies are also sensing organs, and sensory experience occurs through real-time, situated interaction. To be an embodied agent is not only to move various parts of the body, but also to manage its sensory experiences in social interaction. Despite a now large corpus of research in multimodal interaction analysis, few studies have addressed how sensation is intertwined with action (Mondada 2019b), and many earlier studies presupposed sensation to occur based on visual evidence in the video. Part of the reluctance to undertake an examination of the senses stems from the belief that senses are individual, physiological, private occurrences that are unavailable to recording-based analysis, so such analysis was limited or avoided (Heritage 1990). Even when actively analyzing sensory work, the use of video recordings encourages the continuation of a verbal and visual bias in interactional research (Streeck 2003). Newer work

nevertheless examines how bodily sensation is oriented to, coordinated, and even constituted through interaction.

One focus of multisensory research has been to analyze how the senses are organized and mutually constituted through interaction. This was a key finding in one of the earliest interactional studies of sensing; Heath (1989) demonstrated how medical patients organize their pain displays at moments that are appropriate to the diagnostic interaction at a doctor's office. He particularly emphasized (p.124) that "the actual experience of unpleasant physical sensations may be reflexively embedded in the local structure of participation". Liberman (2013) reported the same reflexive relationship between interaction and sensing in his analysis of coffee tasting sessions. Through interacting with other tasters, as well as coffee descriptions from box labels or menus, tasters 'find' sensations. For example, when one is presented with the label 'chocolate' (p.218):

> Even if you don't find the chocolate, you will find yourself oriented to tastes that work in that region of flavor. It is as if the taste descriptor is … orienting your taste to be particularly sensitive to a certain area of the taste spectrum. And with it you are able to discover those tastes. Those tastes are objectively there, but the subjective orientation – and even the language and conceptualization ("chocolate") – affects the experience.

Through successive descriptions, the coffee tasters socially objectify their tasting experiences into intersubjective phenomena – a process that is not a one-way street, but an exchange between sensation and social engagement. Sensation is even objectified through tools (taste charts) and professional vocabulary, as further demonstrated by Mondada (2019b, 2020) in examining beer tasting sessions.

Another focus has been to examine how the action of sensing is organized sequentially, as Mondada (2018) exemplifies in an analysis of tasting cheese at a Finnish shop. This can be seen in the following example, where a customer is offered an opportunity to taste a piece of cheese to decide whether to purchase it.

(9) Sequential process of making space to sense cheese before purchase (Mondada 2018: 754).

```
(9) (FRO_FIN_HEL_1704_CLI33_2-02-16_ragusa) (Finnish)
 1  SEL    ragusaan on tää on tota toi ragusan  maakunnan kaikista
           Ragusa is this is umm that Ragusa county of all
 2         *perinteisij    juus[to Sisiliasta*+
           most traditional chee[se from Sicily
 3  CUS                        [joo
                               [yeah
    sel    *gives one bit on her scraper-----*
    cus                                      +takes it->
 4         •(1.2)
    sel    •looks down--->
 5  SEL    tää on+ %tämmönem  pastoroimaton+ (0.8)# ääri- tais sis: hy- hyvin#
           this is like that  non-pastorized (0.8) extre- or   I mean ve- very
    cus       ->+puts entire bit in mouth--+chews vigorously-->
    cus            %looks away--->
    fig                               fig.14#fig.15a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h-----#
```

Figure 7. The buyer chews and tastes the sample, his gaze away from the seller. Adapted from Mondada (2018: 754).

In line 5, the customer (to the right) puts the cheese in their mouth, and chews it while holding their gaze away from the seller (see Figure 7). The customer thus has interactional space to engage in active tasting, and it is only once the customer exits that space by re-engaging with the seller's gaze and evaluating the cheese that the two progress the selling interaction forward.

In a similar vein to sequence, many studies have focused on how sensation is key in achieving actions. M. H. Goodwin (2017) demonstrated how touch is used in actions such as reconciling and comforting, as well as 'doing' intimacy with children. Many of the bodily formations are accountably specific to certain activities, such as the combined use of talk and touch for controlling children (Cekaite 2015) or a head-to-head formation in soothing (Cekaite & Kvist Holm 2017).

A third way to focus on sensoriality has been to examine how a sensation is achieved, assessed, and/or made accountable. One example is Gibson and vom Lehn (2020: 90), who demonstrated how the institutional procedures used in optometry assessment "regulat[e] the ways that vision is achieved as a measurable and accountable phenomenon." Similarly, Goodwin (2000a) has demonstrated the achieved (rather than absolute) nature of sensation through an analysis of archaeologists using a colour chart to label a soil sample's colour. The colour of the soil, with reference to the standard, is a complex task involving joint positioning of the sample, the bodies of the archaeologists, and lengthy discussion of which numerical category to use as a label.

(10)   Determining colour perception is a social coordination (C. Goodwin 2000a: 29,
       Figure 4B)


```
                          ((Points))
      29    Pam:    How bout, (0.4) three four.
      30                  (3.2)
      31    Jeff:   How bout, three si:x.
      32                  (0.5)
      33    Pam:    Three six,
      34                  (2.0)
      35            Hmm ((high pitch sung))
      36                  (0.4)
      37            S:- Is it yellowish (like that?)
      38                  (2.4)
      39    Jeff:   Three six is what I would say.
      40    Pam:    Oka:y. ((reluctantly))
      41                  (2.5)
      42    Jeff:   Ya have another preference? *hhhh
      43                  (7.8)
      44    Pam:    I would think it's (maybe), (0.5) three fo:ur.
```

Despite looking at the same sample, Pam and Jeff do not agree on the visual quality of
the soil; it is not a straightforward matter to categorize it. The archaeologists are not
only accountable for describing the soil appropriately for non-present, future readers of
their research – their very sensations of the soil's visual qualities are accountable to each
other in the moment of perception. In looking at moments of accountability for sensa-
tion, researchers can see procedural and moral expectations that surround sensory work.

Collectively, these studies of multisensoriality are already demonstrating a key shift
in our understanding of how the senses function: they are not purely reactive, internal
experiences but socially organized social events. In exploring the situated nature of see-
ing (as a sense), Nishizaka (2000: 121) wrote, "What one sees is embedded in the activ-
ity one is engaged in…I saw my colleagues at a faculty meeting today, but did I see their
eyelids?" Sensing is a local achievement, not a physiological certainty, and both subject
to and a contributor to the social actions occurring. Furthermore, these studies continue
the process of re-establishing the central role of the body in interaction, now as a per-
ceiving entity as well as a mobile actor. There is much to be done still in establishing
the relationships between the sensing body and linguistic resources, and how these may
again redefine what we must theorize as part of language itself.

7.   Conclusion

Embodied behavior permeates every layer of interactional organization: from turn design and grammar, to turn taking and turn transition, to sequences and activities. In everyday interaction verbal and bodily resources may be intertwined to the degree that effaces the boundary between them. This has become increasingly clear through the unprecedented access to the moment-by-moment procedures of human sense-making permitted by rapidly developing video technology. By examining the embodied nature of interaction, we can ground linguistic theory in episodes of actual ecologically situated speaking. Future research should aim both to uncover further fusion between body and language, potentially even how they mutually constrain and enable each other across various activities, as well as to rectify past verbal, visual, and disembodied biases in definitions of language. By theorizing language as situated in the living, interacting body, language studies will better grasp the range of language's expressive and agentive capacities, and even grammatical systematicity.

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Hegemony

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1.   Introduction

Some time in the 1990s, at a symposium on bilingualism at Harvard, a student asked the participants to relate to the 'hegemony of English' in the nation's public school. A professor is reported to have asked 'what is hegemony?'. The same professor is said to have discouraged one of his students from quoting Antonio Gramsci by saying "It is bad pedagogy to drop names of esoteric authors that one accidentally stumbles upon." (Macedo, Dendrinos and Gounari 2016:1–3). What does this anecdotal evidence show? Although Gramsci's concept of hegemony had had an "enormous impact" (Haug 2004:2) since the 1970s,[1] this impact was still not acknowledged by all in language studies in the 1990s. A decade later, when Macedo et al. was published (originally in 2003), the situation had changed so radically that 'hegemony' had become a household word that apparently did not even need a definition any more.

In English, the term *hegemony* is attested since 1567 in a very general sense in John Maplet's *Natural history* ('Keeping our selues free from blame in this Aegemonie or Sufferaintie of things growing vpon ye earth', OED) and *hegemonic* in Thomas Stanley's *History of Philosophy* of 1656 as 'the Supream or Hegemonick part of the Soul' (OED, Williams 1976:117), but first became common in the 19th century in the meaning of 'political, economic, or military predominance or leadership, esp. by one member of a confederacy or union over other states' (OED). Similar developments can be seen in other European languages; Latin *hegemonia* is attested since 1513, German *Hegemonie* since 1765, Italian *egemonia* since 1799, and French *egimonie* since 1815, in 1840 as *hégémonie*,[2] respectively. In the second half of the 19th century, the TIMES of London quotes it as a fancy German expression for 'leadership':

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1.   This is supported by Google NGram searches for *hegemony, hégémonie*, and *Hegemonie.*

2.   According to Baumgartner-Médard 1996, French *hégémonie* in the sense of « suprématie » is attested since the 19th century.

> No doubt it is a glorious ambition which drives Prussia to assert her claim to the leadership, or as that land of professors phrases it, the 'hegemony' of the Germanic Confederation.
> (OED, source: TIMES of London May 1860)

It is only in the 20th century that the term achieved a specific meaning in political and social philosophy through the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937); in language studies it was not common before the late 1980s.

However, even Gramsci uses the term 'hegemony' occasionally in the historical sense of simply 'dominance', cf. the 'hegemony of the North [of Italy]' (PN1, §149).[3]

2. Hegemony from Ancient Greece to Gramsci

The Greek word ἡγεμονία 'hegemony' referred to the relationship between Athens and its vassals, built not only on the supremacy of its naval power but also on its political prestige and the trust that it had earned with its weaker allies during the Persian wars. According to Thucydides, a representative from the island of Lesbos justifies their apostasy from the alliance with Athens saying,

> Yet we entered not such a league as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes [i.e. Persians]. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal: but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid.
> (Peloponnesian War III, 10)

Here, 'led us' is a verb of the same root as 'hegemony [i.e. leadership]'. This is echoed by Xenophon in his *Ways and Means*,

> No one, I dare say, contests this; but there are some who wish the state to recover her ascendancy, and they may think that it is more likely to be won by war than by peace. Let such, in the first place, call to mind the Persian Wars. Was it by coercing the Greeks or by rendering services to them that we became leaders [literally: gained hegemony] of the fleet and treasurers of the league funds? Further, after the state had been stripped of her empire through seeming to exercise her authority with excessive harshness, did not the islanders even then restore to us the presidency of the fleet by their own free will, when we refrained from acts of injustice?
> (Poroi 5.5f.)

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3. I refer to Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* by PNn (where n is the number of the notebook), and by paragraph. Excerpts from notebooks 1–8 are quoted after Buttigieg's English edition (Gramsci 1992–2007), while excerpts from notebook 11 are my own translation.

Haug suggests that Plato did not use the term ἡγεμονία because of its military connotations and talks instead of 'justice' that warrants "consensus-driven stability of power" (2004: 4). The latter may be a very Gramscian, but welcome, reading of Plato.

Hegemony came to be considered as the dominance of a particular city or state with respect to others, early examples being Sparta, Athens, and Thebes. Later the Italian marine republics of Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Amalfi built up similar leading roles vis-à-vis their allies.

In his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Hegel stressed that hegemony in Ancient Greece contained aspects of both force and voluntary acceptance. It was the imbalance between the two aspects that was at the bottom of conflicts like the Peloponnesian wars. According to Haug (2004: 7f.), Hegel severed the concept from its military-strategic anchoring when he, for the final stage of history, talks about "a hegemony of self-conscious thought" (Hegel 2019: 468).

In general, European political philosophy has for a long time seen the relationship between force (coercion) and acceptance (consensus) as central for political rule (without necessarily using the term 'hegemony'), such as discussed in Macchiavelli, Hobbes, Hume and Marx (Haug 2004).

In the Russian Social Democracy of the 1890s the concept of *gegemonija* (mainly in the writings of Plechanov) became central in a transferred sense: the leadership of a social class in the fight against the autocracy. This fight required not only leadership but also consensus between *all* the allied oppositional democratic movements, a concept that later became central for Antonio Gramsci. This Russian concept гегемония was one of the sources of Gramsci's later concept of *egemonia* (Haug 2004: 10f., Ives 2004: 43). With Gramsci, the term relates to strategy discussions of Marxist and left-wing parties at least since the time of the 3rd International. Lucien Sève maintains that Gramsci's 'hegemony' stands in contrast to the 'dictatorship of the proletariat': « Certes, le concept gramscien d'hégémonie – dont on n'entreprendra pas ici d'examiner le sens political global – constitue un important déplacement de la notion léninienne de dictature du proletariat. Il substitue à l'idée de rôle dominant celle d'influence dirigeante, à l'idée d'instance coercitive et répressive celle de force expansive, de ‹ rapport pédagogique › visant à établir non un alignement mais un consentement. »[4] (Sève 1980: 583).

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4. In English (my translation): "Admittedly, Gramsci's concept of hegemony – whose broader political meaning we will not go into here – is an important departure from Lenin's notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He replaces the idea of dominant role by that of leading influence, and the idea of the coercive and repressive instance by that of an embracing power and 'pedagogical companionship' aiming at consent rather than alignment."

3.   The sociolinguistic and political sources of Gramsci's concept of *egemonia*

Antonio Gramsci was born in Sardinia in 1891 and studied from 1911 to 1915 in Turin; one of his professors was Matteo Bartoli. Gramsci took care of Bartoli's lecture notes in 1912–1913 and as a speaker of Sard (Sardinian) he was of special interest for Bartoli as an informant (Rosiello 1986: 237f). During his studies he became familiar with the work of Graziadio Isaia Ascoli (1829–1907) and his critique of Alessandro Manzoni (1785–1873), who had imposed an elite dialect spoken by hardly anyone (the Florentine dialect) as the national Italian language.

The term used by Ascoli and Bartoli was 'prestige' (*prestigio*) (and French *prestige* by Meillet) and not 'hegemony' (*egemonia*). That Gramsci himself later used the term *egemonia* is probably due to his acquaintance with the use of *gegemonija* by Plechanov and especially Lenin (Rosiello 1986:246, more cautiously Lo Piparo 1979: 105).

Gramsci came to the conclusion that glorification of a unified national language and the celebratory discourse of the romantics on dialects failed to see both in their dialectical mutual dependence. Manzoni did not see that a national language would remain artificial if not in contact with, rather than superimposed on, the spoken dialects; the romantics, on the other hand, could not see the parochial and limiting aspects of the dialect. In the interest of internationalization Gramsci pointed out that if not everybody had the opportunity to learn a foreign language they would at least have to learn the national language since international exchanges are only possible through national languages, not dialects (PN11, §12, note III; Rosiello 1986: 248).

Ascoli, in contrast to Manzoni, did not "believe in linguistic hegemonies decreed by law" (PN1, §73, also PN23, §40). After the decline of Florence, Italian had turned into a "language of an exclusive caste which has no contact with a historical spoken language" (PN1, §73, cf. Boothman 2011: 64). Interestingly, Gramsci here uses 'hegemonies' in a slightly different way from the way he developed the term in the very same first *Prison Notebook*; one would expect "hegemony by decree" to be a *contradictio in terminis*.

Gramsci expressed very similar objections against the project of Esperanto in a number of articles in *Avanti!* and *Il Grido del Populo* in 1918. Esperanto was for Gramsci a language "bereaved of cultural foundation and participation." According to Gramsci, "The International Language, scientifically, is a nonsense" and with reference to Ascoli's critique of Manzoni's artificial solution to the problem of a unified *national* language, Gramsci criticized the Esperantists for an artificial solution to the problem of a unified *international* language (Rosiello 1986: 240).[5]

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5. In 2008, the *Sennacieca Asocio Tutmonda* (the organization of pacifist and left-wing esperantists) published a collection of Gramsci's papers in translation together with comments and criticism, *La Itala socialismo kaj Esperanto* ['Italian socialism and Esperanto'] (Bourlot et al. eds. 2008).

4.   *Egemonia* in the *Notebooks*[6]

Given the conditions during his incarceration, it would be wrong to expect from Gramsci a systematic outline of a theory of hegemony. Rather, Gramsci moves slowly forward, covering more and more historical periods where hegemony in some way has shown itself. Hegemony is not a pre-developed and ready-made theoretical concept to be applied to different historical situations and phenomena, but an analytical tool that itself is developed in the course of its application. According to Barfuss and Jehle (2014: 15), he did not leave behind "a closed œuvre, but an open workshop".

There appear to be at least two different but connected aspects of hegemony in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks.

First, Gramsci asks the question of the relationship of a social class and the associated political movements to their allies. Is there a difference between the situation before this class seizes power and the situation afterwards? Surprisingly, not really. "A class is dominant in two ways, namely it is 'leading' (*dirigente*) and 'dominant' (*dominante*). It leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes." (PN1, 44). Gramsci immediately reformulates 'political leadership' (*direzione politica*) with 'hegemony' (*egemonia*), as he replaced Bartoli's and Meillet's 'prestige' with 'hegemony'. So when a class comes to power, its leadership (i.e. hegemony) consists of a "combination of force and consent which balance each other so that force does not overwhelm consent but rather appears to be backed by the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion" (PN1, §48), it is "government by consent of the governed" (PN1, §47).

Gramsci applies the concept of hegemony also to Fordism, where he sees the force aspect in the crushing of trade unions (in his view, the American trade unions were not necessarily "progressive", however), and sees the persuasion aspect in the higher wages paid (PN1, §61).

It is important to note that Gramsci develops his terminology always in connection with his analysis of concrete historical situations – like the Italian *Risorgimento*, Hegel's experience of the French Revolution, French Jacobinism or American industrial relations (Fordism).

The second aspect is the *senso commune* 'commonsense' of the people, which is closely connected to the consent with which they accept the given circumstances as 'natural' and 'the way things are'.[7]

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6. This section is partly based on, and can be supplemented by the reading of, Fairclough 2013 [1995], Haug 2004, Barfuss and Jehle 2014, and Määttä and Pietikäinen 2014. See also, among many others, Thomas 2009 and the chapter 'Ascendancy and Hegemony' in Eagleton 1995.

7. Raymond Williams writes Gramsci's term 'commonsense' in order to distinguish it from the ordinary 'common sense', a suggestion which I will follow here.

Gramscis's concept of 'commonsense' belongs to an Italian tradition going on the one hand back to Gianbattista Vico's *senso commune*, a "judgment without any reflection, sensed by a class, a people, a nation or the whole of humanity" (Vico 1968: 63–64; Jehle 1994: 164) and on the other to Alessandro Manzoni, who in *I promessi sposi* distinguished between 'commonsense' and 'good sense' (PN11, §56, Jehle 1994: 165). But while Vico saw the 'commonsense' as accumulation of past wisdom and as a counterweight to the abstract rationalism of the philosophers, and Manzoni on the contrary maintained that 'commonsense' is not necessarily 'good sense', Gramsci saw a triad of "religion, common sense, philosophy" (PN8, §204) as "intellectual orders". For him, 'good sense' was the "healthy nucleus" of 'commonsense' (PN11, §12), to which he conceded a critical potential, although he later saw philosophy as the only "intellectual order", its task being the critique and superseding of both religion and commonsense (PN11, §12, Jehle 1994: 166). Thus Gramsci avoids both the urge to save the manipulated masses by enlightening them from above and sacrificing intellectual analysis from the viewpoint of a romantic "trust in the masses" (Jehle 1994: 166).

'Commonsense' and 'consent' are close neighbors, and in Simon's words, hegemony is also the "organisation of consent" (Simon 1982: 21).

A further aspect is the relationship between hegemony and the concept of civil society (one of the other influential notions first formulated by Gramsci), which I will not go into further here since few of the linguists who have worked with hegemony seem to have taken it up (with the exception of Fairclough 2013: 58–61).

5.   Post-Gramscian theories of hegemony (Williams, Laclau and Mouffe, Hall, Guha, Robinson)

Kate Crehan describes her discovery of the discrepancy between the Gramsci of the Notebooks and the references in anthropological literature and asks "Why should an anthropologist read Gramsci? All too often anthropologists seem to assume … that when Gramsci refers to culture he means what they mean by culture." (Crehan 2002: 3)

There has been indeed a surge in the reception of Gramsci from the 1970s on in literary studies, anthropology and sociolinguistics, but, as Michel Foucault wrote in 1984 in a private letter to Joseph Buttigieg, "C'est un auteur plus souvent cité que réellement connu" (quoted in Buttigieg 1992: xix).[8]

Raymond Williams is probably the most influential post-Gramscian scholar writing on hegemony. In his influential *Keywords* from 1976 he stresses the cultural (rather than merely political) aspect of hegemony. He writes that hegemony unlike historical uses of the term in English "is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to

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8.   In English (my translation): "This is an author more often cited than actually known."

describe a more general predominance which includes … a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships." (1976: 118) Unlike ideology, hegemony does not only depend "on its expression of the interests of a ruling class but also on its acceptance as 'normal reality' or 'commonsense' by those in practice subordinated to it." (ibid.) In this sense, he stresses the transmission of the 'common sense' but makes no mention of the balance of coercion and consent.

Kate Crehan considers this a significant reduction and talks about "Gramsci 'lite'" (Crehan 2002: 176).

Another influential development of the concept of hegemony is in the writings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In an interview given in 1982 they criticize practically everybody else's view of Gramsci's 'hegemony' as reductionist: a Lukácsian or Althusserian view of "symbolic violence", i.e. the imposition of the ideology of the dominant class, or as a mechanism of "legitimization" as in Perry Anderson (Laclau and Mouffe 1988: 143). However, they themselves tend to reduce hegemony to a discursive phenomenon.

Stuart Hall takes point of departure in what he calls "Gramsci's question in the Notebooks": what went wrong around the First World War, when many expected a socialist revolution in Western Europe, for which all conditions seemed to be present? "Here was a historic reversal of the revolutionary project, a new historical conjuncture, and a moment which the Right, rather than the Left, was able to dominate." (1988: 228) In particular, Hall uses the concept of hegemony to explain the success of Thatcherism, which is not so much Thatcher's reconstruction of the Conservative Party ("The hard-faced, utilitarian, petty-bourgeois businessmen are now in charge, not the grouse-shooting, hunting and fishing classes."), but a new agenda in British politics. Thatcherism was an assault on the welfare state, a "historic contest, not just for power, but for popular authority, for hegemony" (1988: 230). She succeeded not just because she crushed the Trade Unions but also because she could build sufficient consent around her new agenda.

The concept of hegemony has, among others, been applied by Ranajit Guha (1997) to the analysis of colonial situations. In India, power is simply a historical series of inequalities between colonial and post-colonial rulers and ruled, between classes, strata, and individuals. In Guha's view, hegemony is something that occurs when persuasion outweighs coercion in the configuration of power, so for him, hegemony is simply a historically variable way of organizing dominance: while coercion can be brute, persuasion implies consent. In India, dominance worked without hegemony, since coercion rules supreme, both in colonial and post-colonial times (see also Haberland 2009). Similar observations have been made by Eagleton (1995) about another colonial setting, that of Ireland; when rulers and ruled are wide apart, consent to being ruled is hard to win.

Important is the notion 'historically variable'. It is an empirical question whether a particular dominance relation can be analyzed as hegemonic or not, and if it can, what exactly the balance between the two elements is. Hegemony is variable and its presence

and composition have to be ascertained by empirical scrutiny of a concrete historical situation (on historical variability of hegemony cf. also Phillipson 1997: 238).

In a Gramscian reinterpretation, Robinson (2005) sees history not so much as the order of the succession of hegemonic powers as of their associated successive hegemonic projects. Recent such projects are the liberal international economy (1789–1873) under British leadership, the era of rival imperialisms (1873–1945), and the post-World War II era of Pax Americana since 1945, under US leadership (Robinson 2005: 561). This makes it possible to disconnect linguistic hegemonies (see below) from (nation) states as their bearers, for two reasons. They do not necessarily have to have a single center (although multiple centers could form a 'block' in the sense of Gramsci), and there seems to be a time lag of linguistic hegemonic projects after associated political or imperial hegemonic projects, as showed itself clearly for Latin and English. The empire vanished, the language lingered on – often through cultural institutions (in the case of Latin in Europe, the Catholic church and until the 19th century, the universities) (Haberland 2009: 27f.).

6.   Hegemony in linguistics from the mid-'80s

While we have seen that the subject of hegemony was extended from states and later nation states to social classes and political movements, as part of the surge of Gramsci reception after the 1970s we observe a use of the term in connection with language studies, in two ways:

On the one hand, there is talk first of linguistic hegemony and, as an extension, of the hegemony of one of more languages in a given situation. In this case (quite in the same way as in Gramsci's own writings) there is always talk about *languages*, since several languages are seen as competing for leadership.

On the other, some linguists consider the role that *language* (in the singular) plays within hegemony, often cultural hegemony. Since the language under discussion often indeed is English, even in authors from outside the English-speaking countries writing in English, it might look as if there were a particular connection between hegemony and English, even where no hegemony of English over other languages is involved – there is of course no such necessary connection.

This means that there are two kinds of hegemony discussed by linguistics; their difference is hardly ever discussed but they are usually kept apart. Even in contributions to a publication resulting from a major conference on 'linguistic hegemonism' (Christidis ed. 1999b), hegemony is discussed in both senses, but never in the same paper.

Although 'hegemony' from the second half of the '80s on is used increasingly more in linguistic and language-related literature, the ordinary use of the term continues. It is illustrative to look at a book that sociolinguists quote in connection with the weighting of international publication languages in science, but which is not sociolinguistic in

itself, Thackray et al. (1985). They talk about "American hegemony in chemical science" (1985: 161f.), "German hegemony in dyestuffs" (1985: 557), even the hegemony of US government agencies (1985: 130), and "American contributions have become steadily more visible in the world output of chemical publications, attaining hegemony since World War I" (1985: 154).

Hegemony of languages, or of varieties of languages

As far as I can see, it was Kathryn Woolard, who first talked about 'linguistic hegemony' in an article of 1985. But she does not point out any language in the area she is discussing (Catalonia) as hegemonic, since she found two competing linguistic hegemonies: the hegemony of Castilian and the hegemony of Catalan.

In his analysis of English linguistic imperialism (1992), Robert Phillipson refers to Gramsci (1992: 72) but quotes mostly from Raymond Williams (1973, 1977). He states that "The values and norms of dominant groups are transmitted by hegemonic processes" (1992: 72). He also points at the 'naturalization' aspect implicit in Gramsci's 'common sense' when he says "Hegemony refers to dominant ideas that we take for granted." After that he takes an important step by talking about the hegemonic position of a specific language (which Woolard did not): "English has a hegemonic position in many former colonies" (1992: 72) and extends this to "English linguistic hegemony" (1992: 73) in English language teaching.

This is important, too. For Gramsci 'hegemony' was a descriptive term; the attempted hegemony of the Russian Social Democrats over the peasants in the 19th century fell under the concept in the same way as Fordism's cooptation of the American working class in the 20th. But when you talk about imperialism, even linguistic imperialism, you are bound to have a critical stance. When Phillipson (with reference to Bocock 1986: 63) makes clear that hegemony does not imply a conspiracy theory, and does not mean the pursuance of policies which are in "the direct, narrow interest of capitalists", but rather "can be presented plausibly as in the interest of the whole people" (1992: 74), then the theme is set: hegemony is a technique of the ruling class to corroborate its power and dominance. Gramsci would have agreed that it is *also* that; but historically, it has also been a lot else. In connection with imperialism (and linguistic imperialism), one has to remember that "imperial powers often co-opt and strengthen the power of local elites in order to secure their rule. The history of most colonial projects cannot be understood simply as the rule by one country over the members of another territory but involves complex relations and complicities amongst all those involved" (Ives 2004: 43). For the critical scholar, the task is exactly to analyse these complex- and complicities.

Already from the mid-1990s, 'hegemony' seems to have become a household word, which most authors just assume as an analytical background without defining it (because they assume that everybody knows it), but as I understand it, they use hegemony in the

sense of the transmission of values, norms and language ideologies of a dominant group of language users, where these values, norms and ideologies are considered as not in need of justification, since they appear as 'natural'.

This applies to the following studies (a list that could be supplied with many more references):

Dua (1994) analyses the hegemony of English in post-colonial India, Macedo, Dendrinos and Gounari (2016 [2003]) the hegemony of Standard English in the USA and of English as a foreign language, mostly in Europe, and Makoni (2011) the "hegemony claims of different minority language groups in Zimbabwe". There are several studies of hegemonial standard language ideologies, like Harrell (1993) for China and Silverstein for the USA, who states "the existence of Standards is very much a function of having hegemonic institutions, such as those that control writing/printing and reading" (1996: 286) (here 'hegemonic' seems to mean 'controlling'). Horst and Gitz-Johansen (2010) write about the 'monocultural hegemony' in the education of minority children in Denmark. Karrebæk, Madsen, and Møller (2015: 3 *et passim*) talk about the hegemonic role of Danish in the Danish educational system and Vogl about standard language ideology in Europe which "is usually regarded as hegemonic ideology" (2018: 190).

Occasionally it is not clear if the term hegemony just refers to domination or implies a colonial cultural leadership. When Christidis (1999a) in his overview of the history of the Greek language talks about Macedonian political hegemony in Antiquity, he uses the term in the traditional sense of domination, but mentioning the ensuing linguistic hegemony of Greek – which made large parts of the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East and Central Asia diglossic (1999a: 35) – he implies a spread of culture that was not necessarily only by brute force.

Harking back to the concept of common sense, a part of the linguistic common sense in many parts of the world today – maybe an element of the folklore of English – is the assumption that English is 'the' global language spoken everywhere. However, this again is less a matter of fact than one of hegemonic thinking: we are not only persuaded to accept a leading role of English, but also to consider it 'natural'. In recent global language politics, the ideology of globalism, i.e. of the rule of the market (Beck 2000, Steger 2009), and the assumption that English is the language of globalisation seem to be a strong tool for inducing a consent that largely can manage without coercion. This is where globalism and hegemony touch, and where the linguistic component of globalism becomes relevant for linguistic hegemonic thinking (Haberland 2009, 2010)

The role of language in hegemonic structures

One of the scholars who has worked intensively with the concept of hegemony not in the sense of competing hegemonies between languages or dialects, but in the sense of an analysis of the role of language in hegemonic dominance, is Norman Fairclough. He

is remarkable because he actually appears as one « qui ne pas seulement cite Gramsci, mais le connaît »,[9] to vary the Foucault quote above. To start with, Fairclough gives a very good first introduction to Gramsci in his book on *Critical Discourse Analysis* (2013: 61–67, 127–131, originally 1995).

Important for Fairclough's use of 'hegemony' is the aspect of hegemonic thinking that makes the given circumstances look 'natural', which is part of the 'common sense' that makes consent and consensus possible: "naturalized orders of discourse are a form of hegemony" (Fairclough 1992: 10). Fairclough works with the three levels of *texts, discourse practices* and *social practices* and aims at combining "a theory of power based upon Gramsci's concept of *hegemony* with a theory of discourse practice based upon the concept of intertextuality" (2013: 94), or rather interdiscursivity. In this sense, the concept of hegemony can be applied to analyze how power produces discourses and how discourses (or discourse orders) reproduce power.

> One can also conceptualise intertextual processes and processes of contesting and restructuring orders of discourse as processes of hegemonic struggle in the sphere of discourse, which have effects upon, as well as being affected by, hegemonic struggle in the wider sense.   (Fairclough 1992: 103)

It is noteworthy that Faiclough published this in the same year as Phillipson wrote about hegemony of English, and in the same year when Bessie Dendrinos introduced the term 'educational hegemony' in the context of foreign language teaching. Dendrinos states,

> […] achievements of hegemony are not to be taken for granted as being stable. Constant struggle has to be made to integrate rather than to simply dominate subordinate groups. A key strategy in this struggle is the construction of 'common sense' through which ideologies become 'naturalized.' When ideas of dominant groups are accepted as common sense, the struggle is won while the ideological work is disguised.   (1992: 84)

In Dendrinos, the term is closely tied to the transmission of ideology in the sense of Althusser, which is echoed by Jef Verschueren, who twenty years later wrote:

> Whereas this term originally refers to the influence of one state over another, in this context it bears on relations of dominance and power between different strata of a society. In the context of discussing ideology, its use is based on the observation that dominant classes may be able to avoid coercion by obtaining the consent of the oppressed, i.e. by successfully making certain patterns of meaning or frames of interpretation (e.g. pertaining to the unequal structure of society) seem natural, by turning them into common sense. Hegemony in this sense involves the internalisation of the authority one may be subjected to.   (Verschueren 2012: 12)

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9. who not just cites Gramsci but knows him

7.   Perspective

We have seen that the term 'hegemony' and equivalents in other languages[10] has shifted its meaning and expanded its range from political powers (and later nation states) to social classes (also in political movements) and finally to languages, both in relationship to each other and within languages between standard or national languages and minority languages and dialects. The original meaning of 'leadership' (the Ancient Greeks, loth of reification, still preferred to use the verb 'to lead') required a subject and an object of hegemony, at least implicitly. When the use of the noun 'hegemony' (and its equivalents in other languages) spread, these subjects and objects tend to disappear. There is a discursive tendency to treat hegemony (like power) as a condition of society without saying who wields hegemony or power over whom; the terms 'hegemonic' and 'hegemonism' at least call for a subject.

Kasuya's (2005: 68) warning should be heeded that a term like 'linguistic imperialism' should not be based on a traditional concept of language and if languages are called hegemonic, one should not forget that languages themselves internally are constructed hegemonically:

> Le processus par lequel une varieté de langue et un discours en viennent à représenter l'ensemble de la langue n'est autre que le problème de pouvoir social inhérent à une langue. Car une langue n'est pas une entité qui échappe à l'histoire mais bien un ‹ bloc historique › (Gramsci) qui se crée par l'effet du pouvoir social.[11]

Acknowledgements

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10.   Chinese seems to have two terms for 'hegemony', one for the general political sense of leadership, lǐngdǎoquán (领导权), and one for the critical sense of imperialist imposition, bàquán (霸权), the latter also in the context of cultural hegemony, wénhuà bàquán (文化霸权) (Xie Chaoqun, personal communication).

11.   In English (my translation): "The process by which one variety of a language and one discourse come to represent the whole of the language is nothing but the problem of social potential (power) inherent in a language. Because a language is not an entity that escapes history but rather a 'historical block', which is created by social potential (power)."

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Humor

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1.   Introduction and definition

The conceptual field of 'humor' is broad and only few areas within it are well deter-mined. Attempts at defining and subcategorizing areas within the field such as 'humor' vs. 'comedy' or 'ridicule' have by and large failed. Lexicographic studies have only high-lighted the differences and fluidity of the classifications used by various languages (Attardo 1994: 2–7; Hempelmann 2017). The term 'humor' has emerged as technical term to be intended as covering anything that is (or may) be perceived as funny, amusing, or laughable (Attardo 2020a). This does not preclude the possibility of establishing subcat-egorizations in certain specific areas, e.g., tendentious humor, or 'genres' such as puns, jokes, etc. It should be noted, however, that terms such as 'pun' and 'joke' are not tech-nical terms and are ultimately fuzzy. On these grounds, some have challenged the pos-sibility of providing a unitary account of humor (e.g., Ferro-Luzzi 1990). A case for an essentialist account of humor, and a refutation of the arguments against it, is presented in Attardo (1994). By and large, linguists (as well as scholars from most disciplines) have operated on the assumption that humor is universal (cf. Apte 1985).

The history of humor research has a long and prestigious gallery of scholars trying to describe and explain the phenomena surrounding humor. Going back to Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and including Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Bergson, and Piran-dello, the history of reflection on humor looks surprisingly like the history of western culture itself. Certainly humor has been an open question for two millennia. Reviews of the history of humor research can be found in Keith-Spiegel (1972), Morreall (1983; 1987), Raskin (1985), and Attardo (1994). The latter has a particular focus on linguistic issues.

2.   Referential and verbal humor

Linguistics – and before it the reflection on language – does not contribute much to research on humor until the '80s. Before then, with few exceptions, puns and other wordplay were the only subjects deemed interesting to or treatable by linguistics. The

distinction between referential and verbal humor (introduced by Cicero and rediscovered by more or less every scholar since then under different terminologies) captures the difference between puns, which involve a reference to the surface structure of the linguistic expression, and other forms of humor which do not. The reference to the signifier can take many forms: the most common is similarity (paronymy) and its limit case identity (homonymy), other rarer forms include alliteration and syntactic ambiguity. What seems to have been lost on most researchers is that beyond this reference to the surface form of (part of) the text, verbal and referential humor share the same deep semantic and pragmatic mechanisms. Overviews of linguistic research about puns and related phenomena can be found in Sobkowiak (1991), Attardo (1994) and Hempelmann and Miller (2017). The topic has recently enjoyed quite a renaissance, as evidence by the appearance of a scholarly book series entirely dedicated to puns (*The Dynamics of Wordplay*) edited by E. Winter-Froemel (see for example, volume 1: Zirker & Winter-Fromel 2015).

3.   Semantics

Psychologists and other cognitively oriented scholars elaborated a model of the cognitive processing of humor known as the 'incongruity-resolution' (IR) model (see Forabosco 1992 for a review of the research). The concept of 'incongruity' has a long history in the psychology of humor, where it is taken as basic. A typical definition (McGhee 1979: 6–7) for example reads:

> The notions of congruity and incongruity refer to the relationship between components of an object, event, idea, social expectation, and so forth. When the arrangement of the constituent elements of an event is incompatible with the normal or expected pattern, the event is perceived as incongruous. The incongruity disappears only when the pattern is seen to be meaningful or compatible in a previously overlooked way.

The 'resolution' phase of the humorous perception has been called '*justification*' (Aubouin 1948), 'local logic' (Ziv 1984), and 'sense in non-sense' (Freud 1905). All the works on the resolution phase of the IR model emphasize that the resolution is not 'complete' (i.e., the incongruity persists after the resolution) and often stress the playfulness or even the fallacious nature of the resolution. A common conceptualization is to view IR models as 'two stage' (Suls 1972) models. The two stages involve giving the text a first interpretation which is then rejected in favor of a second interpretation. The two interpretations must coexist, at least to the extent that they are to be judged incongruous.

3.1   The isotopy-disjunction model

An approach to humor which is entirely compatible with the IR model emerged from European structural semantics and narratology in the work of Greimas (1966) and Morin (1966). Widely influential in Europe (see a survey of its influence in Attardo 1988, 1994 and Al Jared 2017) it has been by and large ignored in the US (with few exceptions). The model, which Attardo et al. (1994) dub the *Isotopy-Disjunction Model* (IDM), is based on the concepts of isotopy and of narrative function. The text of a joke is seen as developing one isotopy and then switching to a second isotopy. From a narrative viewpoint, the text of the joke is divided in three functions, which set up, complicate and resolve the narration, respectively. Within the text of the joke, the IDM distinguishes two significant elements: a connector, the (optional) ambiguous or paronymic element which allows the passage from the first to the second isotopy, and the disjunctor, which causes the passage from one isotopy to the other. The connector is present only in verbal humor. The IDM, in its original formulation, runs into several problems, due to the loose definitions of the central concepts of isotopy and (narrative) function.

3.2   The script-based semantic theory of humor

Quite independently from the IDM, in the late '70s, a new approach to the semantics of humor was presented by Raskin (1979, 1985), based on the concept of 'script.' Scripts are intended as a cover term for such AI originated concepts as 'frames,' 'schemata,' 'daemons,' and 'scripts'; on script-based semantics see Raskin (1985, 1986), Fillmore (1975, 1985) and in general the papers in the roundtable published in *Quaderni di Semantica* (Raskin 1985b). For surveys see Petruck (1996), Attardo (2020b). The Semantic Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) advocated a new approach to humor theory and presented a falsifiable theory of humor based on two conditions: 1) the text be (at least in part) compatible with two scripts; 2) the two scripts are opposed, in a technical sense, i.e., they are local antonyms. A list of typical oppositions is provided, which include 'actual vs. non-actual' and 'normal vs. abnormal' and such subtypes as 'good vs. bad' 'sex vs. no-sex,' etc. The SSTH also introduces terminology to account for the linguistic element causing the switch from one script to the other (script-switch trigger). The SSTH's rigorous presentation and theoretical baggage ensured its success and it has been widely applied to various forms of humor (although it was conceived as applying to jokes). A review of the SSTH's applications can be found in Attardo (1994: 195–229) and Raskin (2017).

The limitations of the SSTH were immediately pointed out by Raskin himself in a series of papers and conference presentations (see Attardo 1994: 214–219 for a review) and eventually led to its revision in Attardo and Raskin (1991). The General Theory of Verbal Humor (GTVH) is presented as an expansion of the SSTH which it accepts as a significant part of its theoretical apparatus. Essentially, the GTVH addresses three basic

issues which the SSTH does not highlight: (1) the fact that the SSTH is explicitly limited to handling jokes; (2) the fact that some jokes are perceived as being more or less similar to others; and (3) the fact that verbal and referential humor differ (although not semantically). To account for these issues the GTVH introduces other Knowledge Resources (KR) beyond the basic script opposition/overlap (symbolized SO). These include, the LAnguage of the joke (i.e., its surface structure) significant for puns, but also for the placement of the punch line), the SItuation, which includes the 'subject matter' of the narrative of the text, the TArget, (roughly, the butt of the joke), the Narrative Strategy, corresponding to the 'genre' of the text (e.g., question and answer, knock-knock joke, etc.), and the Logical Mechanism, which is the mechanism whereby the SO is introduced and may correspond to the 'resolution' phase of the processing (see a suggestion to that effect in Forabosco 1992:59). Most of Attardo and Raskin (1991) is dedicated to ranking the various KRs to determine which ones affect more directly the perception of similarity among jokes. The final ranking is (from most to least significant) SO, LM, SI, TA, NS, LA. Empirical support for the GTVH is presented in Ruch et al. (1993) and Forabosco (1994). Extensive debate and critical assessment of the SSTH/GTVH can also be found in the papers collected in Attardo (ed. 2004) and in Attardo (2017a) and references therein. Partial alternative approaches to the analysis of humor can be found in Ritchie (2004; 2018), Dynel (2009), and in the work of cognitive linguists and relevance theorists reviewed below.

3.3   'Longer' texts

The SSTH and GTVH have been so far primarily confined to jokes (with some exception, e.g., Chlopicki (1987). This area of research appears particularly difficult because of the intersection of fields of research as disparate as narratology, natural language processing, literary criticism, and text linguistics, not to mention humor research. Some work has seen the development of an extension of the GTVH directly tailored to the analysis of long humorous texts (Attardo 2001, 2002a; see also Tsakona 2003). Despite promising analyses such as Corduas et al. (2008) and Vincent (2010), the approach has not been widely adopted. Alternative approaches are presented in Chlopicki (1987, 2001); Ermida (2008), Triezenberg (2008). A survey of the research can be found in Chlopicki (2017). By and large, it seems fair to assess that this area of research has merged with more promising approaches, such as stylistics (Simpson and Bousfiled 2017).

4.   The cooperative principle and humor

4.1   Grice and Gricean analyses

All jokes involve violations of one or more of Grice's maxims (Grice 1989). The claim that jokes could be viewed in terms of flouting of conversational maxims dates back to Grice himself, who considers irony (as an example of implicature), and a (complex) pun. A review of the applications of Grice's insight to humor analysis can be found in Attardo (1994: 272 ff. and Attardo (2017b). An analysis of irony in Gricean terms would be out of place in this context (but see Attardo 2000 for a literature review), but puns fall squarely under the realm of humor. There have been some mostly inconsequential attempts at arguing that humor is not a violation of the cooperative principle or the maxims; they are reviewed in Attardo (2017b). The most interesting one is Goatly (2012: 235) who claims that humor is "a flout delayed by violation," i.e., a short-term violation.

4.2   Humor as non-bona-fide communication

Raskin (1985: 100–104) brought a new concept to the analysis of the pragmatics of humor: by defining humor as a *non-bona-fide* (NBF) mode of communication he excluded the possibility of accounting for it straightforwardly within the realm of 'serious' non-humorous language. Essentially, Raskin distinguishes, as does Grice, between a bona-fide type of communication, in which the speaker is committed to communicating in the most effective way, as clearly as possible, etc., in short follows the CP. Humor, just as lying, involves a different mode of communication which does not abide by the CP (i.e., is NBF). In the case of jokes, the perlocutionary goal of the speaker is not to convey information but rather to elicit a humorous reaction in the hearer. It can be overt or consist merely of the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention. Note that the use of 'hearer' and 'speaker' does not imply that these remarks are limited to spoken language(s).

Raskin, to better illustrate the difference between NBF modes (such as humor) and other modes governed by Grice's CP, provided a set of 'maxims for joke-telling' directly paraphrased from Grice ("Give as much information as is necessary for the joke"). Raskin immediately proceeded to deny any theoretical interest in these maxims: they "do not really provide an explicit account of the semantic mechanisms of humor" (1985: 103–104). Despite this explicit warning, the four joking-maxims have been widely quoted at face value in the literature.

The fundamental insight of Raskin's discussion is that jokes do not merely flout but violate a maxim. When the joke teller introduces a first script he/she deliberately misleads the hearer into believing that that script is central to the processing of the text, only

to reveal again deliberately at the end of the text that the script was in fact incompatible with the one introduced by the script-switch trigger/disjunctor.

Attardo (1994: 271–286) has systematized this approach, for example by showing that violation of any maxim can produce a joke, and has argued against two possible strategies that deny that any 'real' violation of the CP takes place in jokes by arguing that the violation is only mentioned, and not actually performed in the text (cf. Yamaguchi, below).

This approach to humor as CP violation runs into an obvious problem: jokes are often perceived as not being totally devoid of communicative effect, while the violation theory would seem to predict that no communicative import could follow a violation of the CP (Attardo 1994: 274–275). The apparent paradox is solved when one considers that jokes communicate on the basis of the presuppositions that the text may have independently of its humorous nature, on the basis of metamessages (of the kind, "I think that it is an appropriate situation to be facetious"), or on the basis of the suppression of the incongruity (i.e., the hearer takes the joke at face value, refusing to interpret it as non-cooperative; this is common in teasing, cf. Drew 1987).

4.3   Relevance-theoretic approaches to humor

Sperber and Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory (RT) has been one of the most successful post-Gricean approaches to pragmatics. Relevance theoretic accounts of humor necessarily have to contend with the basic awkwardness of the postulate that the principle of relevance (RP) is exceptionless (Sperber and Wilson 1986), since humor is based on a violation of the CP or the RP.

For example, Yamaguchi (1988) acknowledges that jokes violate Grice's conversational maxims. He then proposes the 'Character-Did-It' hypothesis, based on the 'mention theory' (Sperber and Wilson 1981), which places the responsibility for the violations of the CP (at least in part) on one of the characters in the text (Yamaguchi 1988: 327). This hypothesis has been refuted in Attardo (1994: 278–282), but Yamaguchi's work is interesting in his elaborate description of the strategies used. Yamaguchi notes also that the violation of the maxims is hidden away in the text in a paradoxical attempt at dissimulation bound to failure, since the joke will inevitably foreground the violation so laboriously dissimulated in the text. In this respect, Yamaguchi joins the research on the 'unsaid' in humor (see below).

Jodlowiec (1991) presents an IR theory of jokes recast in relevance theoretic terms. While her model does not depart significantly from other IR models, she emphasizes that the interpretation of the second sense is done on the basis of the principle of relevance, just like the first one. She also emphasizes the fact that some jokes rely more than others on implicit information. Unfortunately, Jodlowiec's work is uneven and some of her claims are patently incorrect (such as those that no 'generalizations' can be found

about verbal jokes or that jokes do not 'breach' the CP). On Jodlowiec's work see also Chlopicki (1994).

Curcó's work (1995, 1996a, b, 1998) is much more carefully presented. She also presents a two stage IR model formulated in RT terms. In her terminology, the hearer entertains a 'key assumption' (essentially a proposition consistent with the first interpretation of the text) and subsequently a 'target assumption' (a proposition consistent with the second interpretation of the text). By noting that the target assumption "typically represents an attributable thought" (1996b: 62), Curcó manages to connect her theory of humor to RT's 'echoic' (formerly known as 'mention') theory of irony. As mentioned above, Curcó's theory is carefully hedged and she calls attention to the fact that in its present state it is not meant to account for all humorous utterances.

An account of RT-based accounts of humor can be found in Yus 2003, 2016). Yus also adopts an IR approach (2016: 94). Yus's contribution lies in a taxonomy of incongruities, which are divided first in discourse- and frame-based incongruities and then in discourse-, frame- and -implication based resolutions. This yields a complex and interesting 12-way classification (2016: 103). Other classification introduce further elements such as intentionality, predictions and manipulation of the speakers' interpretations, and more. Consistently the inferential engine underlying the analyses is of course relevance, but the quantity of effort plays a very significant role, because it is responsible for the switching from the first to the second interpretation of the text. His is by far the most accomplished RT account of humor.

Let us note that, as one would expect, all RT accounts place more emphasis on the process of interpretation than on the text itself. Finally, attention has been drawn on the 'metarepresentational' aspect of irony (i.e., the idea that irony involves a representation of another representation (Curcò 2000, Colston and Gibbs 2002, Yus 2016).

4.4   Informativeness approach to jokes

De Palma and Weiner (1990, 1992), Weiner and De Palma (1993), Weiner (1996, 1997) have developed an account of humor (in riddles, but the model is extensible to many other types of humor), which is in part based on the SSTH, and assumes the basic IR model, but seeks to enrich it with the idea of 'accessibility' based on the notions of prototypicality (à la Rosch 1973), salience (for example, a salient feature of chairs is that they are used for sitting), and of parallelism (i.e., the tendency to continue in the same 'frame' be it semantic, syntactical or pragmatic once one has been activated). The first 'script' is highly accessible and based on a neutral context, whereas the second script is much less accessible and strongly context dependent. Once the first script has been activated the tendency to parallelism will tend to keep the hearer/reader within the first script until this becomes impossible because of the occurrence of the punch line. This account improves the SSTH's 'oppositeness' requirement by making it more specific (high vs. low

accessibility, neutral vs. specific context) and by dispensing with the list of 'hardwired' oppositions.

Independently from De Palma and Weiner's work, and in part against it, since she is critical of the oppositeness requirement of the SSTH, Giora (1991) sets out to explain the 'surprise effect' of humor. Her theory states that a well-formed text should start with the least informative material and gradually introduce more informative material. Informativeness is defined in terms of reduction in the number of alternatives. Great informativeness will thus correspond to least predictability and hence surprise value. Furthermore, Giora introduces the concept of 'marked informativeness' to design the marked members of a set (those that fit less well a particular category). Thus, if, after declaring that one has seen a bird, one specifies that one saw a penguin one is being not only informative, but markedly so.

Giora can then define jokes as texts that do not gradually introduce more informative material but that in fact end with a markedly informative element. The rest of Giora's model corresponds more or less to the IDM, although Giora stresses the 'abrupt' passage from the first to the second sense/interpretation of the text (471). If one 'fills in' the gap between the two interpretations with information that gradually brings about the second one, the joke is no longer perceived to be funny (475).

This point has great significance because it may provide a tool to solve the notoriously complex issue of how to distinguish humor from other types of texts which also include a 'punch line' and the ensuing IR effect but are nor perceived as humorous (e.g., detective stories, cf. Navon 1988: 209, Wenzel 1989, Giora 1991: 482–483; Weiner 1997). Also, this is clearly related to the issue of the 'unsaid' in humor (cf. Dascal 1985: 98–99, Guagnano 2013, Attardo 2017b: 186–187). In order to preserve the element of surprise the text of the joke must not allow the second interpretation/script to become available until the punch line.

Giora's analysis is also clearly compatible with the functional sentence perspective analysis of jokes punch line as the rheme of the last sentence of the text in which they occur (Attardo et al. 1994). In fact, Giora herself points out the similarities between her approach and FSP (Giora 1988: 550n). Giora's approach has been fully articulated in Giora (2003). Besides Giora's own psycholinguistic work, empirical support for her theory (and some aspects of the GTVH) has been provided by Vaid et al. (2003).

4.5 Two-stage processing of humor

It should be noted that the IDM, the SSTH/GTVH, the 'violation of the CP,' most of the Relevance Theoretic, and the informativeness theory approaches to humor are (just like the IR model to which they ultimately subscribe) 'two stage' processing theories (Suls 1972). In the 1990s the two stage approaches to humor came under attack from a psycholinguistic perspective (cf. Gibbs 1994 and references therein) tied to a parallel attack

on the notion of literal meaning. The discussion is technical (see Giora 2003 for a synthesis). Psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic research has confirmed the IR models, to a significant exited, even providing results consonant with the time-lapse of the perception of the incongruity and its subsequent resolution, the predicted differences between verbal and referential humor (roughly, puns and non-puns), and even some evidence in support of different logical mechanisms. See Lòpez and Vaid (2017) and Chen et al. (2017), for reviews of the psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies, respectively.

5.   Conversation analysis

Conversation analysis (CA), here taken as a cover term for discourse analysis and research informed by ethnomethodology, is probably the most active field of the linguistics humor. Overviews can be found in Sherzer (1985), Norrick (1993: 139–164), Attardo (1994: 293–331, 2015a), Kotthoff (1996), Glenn (2003), and Glenn and Holt (2013, 2017).

When considering the CA of humor a distinction between canned and conversational jokes is often introduced: essentially, a canned joke is a joke that has less contextual ties than a conversational one and thus can be recycled more easily (see Attardo 1994: 295–299 for references). Canned jokes prototypically exist in written or oral 'repertoires,' while conversational jokes are improvised. It has been argued convincingly (Zajdman 1991) that the distinction is in fact a continuum that can range from (almost) total lack of contextual ties to the point where the joke is indistinguishable from the rest of the non-humorous discourse (in this case, obviously, the speaker does not signal that humorous nature of the joke).

5.1   Canned jokes in conversation

The most influential work in the CA of jokes is without discussion Sacks'. Sacks describes what he calls the 'sequential organization' (1974: 337) of joke-telling in conversation. He finds that it breaks down into three parts: the preface, the telling, and the reaction.

Preface

Canned jokes are (mostly) narratives and hence they need to be introduced in the flow of conversation, for example so that the narrator may be granted the floor for an extended turn. The preface has three main functions: securing the acceptance of the joke-telling form the audience, negotiating the acceptability of either the joke or the telling of one, and clueing the audience on the correct (i.e., humorous) interpretation of the text.

Telling

The telling being a narrative, consists of only one turn, by one speaker. Other turns within this part will generally be perceived as interruptive (although there are exceptions, e.g., interactive jokes, such as knock-knock jokes, which require the audience's intervention). Sacks' sees the telling of the joke as the setting up of a 'puzzle' for the audience, a sort of 'understanding test.' This idea, albeit widely accepted in the literature (e.g., Norrick 1993, Glenn 2003) seems to be in need of serious revision (Attardo 1994: 305–307; 1995: 81–82; 2020a: 270–271).

Response

The literature in CA analyzes three classes of responses: laughter, delayed laughter, and silence. Of these, laughter has received by far the greatest amount of attention (see Attardo 1994: 307–309 for references). Significantly, laughter is not an uncontrolled reaction to the humorous text (Jefferson 1985) and can be used for a variety of purposes. For example, laughter is used to negotiate the humorous interpretation of the text by the speaker, who 'invites' laughter by laughing at the end of the telling (Jefferson 1979).

Delayed laughter is explained by the presence of two conflicting desires in the audience: display understanding of the text and check the rest of the audience's reactions. Silence can manifest the audience's disapproval of the materials in the telling or can be used by the joke teller to 'keep in character' with the narrative convention whereby a narrator should believe what he/she tells. In other words, the teller is giving his/her audience time to get the joke.

5.2   Conversational humor

Conversational humor has been the most active field of humor research in linguistics, since the mid-nineties to date. Methodologically, it looks at humor from the perspective of interactional practices and performance, rather than from the text-oriented competence perspective developed so far. Two strands of research have emerged: quantitative and functional. Sacks' original work tipifies the functional approach, which tries to describe the various functions to which humor can be put and emphasizes detailed analysis of single cases. More quantitatively oriented work, such as Tannen's and Holmes' (see below), relies on larger corpora and tends more toward generalizations. Needless to say, this distinction is purely classificatory and authors incorporate quantitative data as they are available (although see Schegloff 1993: 103–104 and Glenn 2003): 38–39 for an argument against quantitative data, or at least indiscriminate quantitative data).

5.2.1   *Functional conversational analyses*

As opposed to canned jokes, conversational humor is improvised and with great contextual ties. Puns have been the object of some research in CA. Sacks (1972) noted that puns

may occur in 'proverbials' (i.e., formulaic expressions). Sherzer (1978, 1985, 1990, 1993) has much broadened the scope of analysis to include anthropological, psychological, and ethnological considerations that put puns in an area that includes speech play and verbal art (see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1976 and Sherzer 1992). Sherzer's (1978) analysis is based on the idea that puns are 'cohesive' since they often sum up, or conclude a topic (given their occurrence in proverbials). While unintentional puns tend to be cohesive and do not imply linguistic manipulation, intentional puns will be disjunctive and manipulative. On puns in CA, see Attardo (1994: 311–317) and Norrick (1993: 161).

Norrick (1993) analyzes a corpus of familiar conversations. His most interesting point is that "spontaneous joking serves many functions in our everyday talk" (129) and is thus an important and significant component of conversational interaction. Overall, his analysis of the social functions of humor follows the 'humor as social facilitator' and as 'social corrective' lines of thought (cf. Long and Graesser 1988; Bergson 1901). For an overview of Norrick's work, which has developed steadily in the intervening decade, see Norrick (2003). Glenn (2003) departs somewhat from the typical perspective of humor research in CA because it focuses on laughter and not humor. Glenn embraces a social/ communicative theory of laughter, i.e., that sees laughter as controlled, at least in part, by the laugher and exploited for communicative purposes. For example, shared laughter is initiated via an 'invitation-acceptance' sequence. The speaker may place laughter particles within or after his/her turn. The hearer, in turn can accept or decline the invitation to laugh. Shared laughter tends to be short lived and that speakers need to 'renew' shared laughter. Methods for doing so include, renewing laughter, repeating the cause of laughter, or saying something else funny (cf. Hay 'humor support', below). Turning to the more strictly functional approach, Glenn finds that "laughing along, while not outright affiliative, makes more of the same laughable (teasing or impropriety) relevant and may lead to clearer displays of affiliation" (131). However, laughter can also be used to resist affiliation (i.e., to reject the implicit offer of in-group membership extended by the joker). Analyses of humor along the functional paradigm have been performed also on German texts, see Kotthoff (1996, 1998, 2000, 2003), Branner (2003).

Along the same lines of inquiry, Everts (2003) introduces the idea of 'family humor style' (see below on 'humor style') in which family members are shown to share characteristics in humor, such as imitation and impersonation, to establish and foster intimacy. On the functions of humor in interactions, see also Priego-Valverde (2003), and also Attardo (1994: 322–330), Long and Graesser (1988) and Graham et al. (1992). A more sociological, but very significant work on the functions of humor is Mulkay (1988). Finally, it should be noted that Attardo (2002b) has claimed that all linguistically accessible functions can be performed by humorous means, except of course when prohibited by context, a conclusion also reached by Priego-Valverde (2003).

5.2.2 *Quantitative conversational analyses*

In contrast to Sacks' analysis of one single occurrence of a joke in a conversation, Tannen (1984) records and analyzes all the humorous occurrences in the conversations held at a Thanksgiving dinner (it should be noted, in passing, that humor was not her central focus). Tannen (1984: 130) claims that "One of the most distinctive aspects of any person's style is the use of humor" and provides a detailed analysis of the style of humor of each of the dinner guests.

Quantitative analyses of the Thanksgiving conversation reveals that humor has a larger role than expected in conversation. It appears that two speakers had 11% of their turns counted as humorous. The lowest figure, i.e., the speaker with the least humorous conversational turns, was 2%. These results are somewhat surprising, as it seems that the presence of humor in conversation has been downplayed in analyses of humor as a 'deviation' from a 'serious' norm. The use of humor in conversation is found to 'stand out.' Tannen sums up by saying that "humor makes one's presence felt" (1984: 132).

The most significant development in the field has been the work of the New Zealand-based sociolinguists, associated with the work of Janet Holmes. Both Hay's work and Holmes' are based on large corpora consisting of hundreds of instances of spontaneous humor and many hours of recordings. Hay (1994) is one of the few studies that deals with failed humor, but most analysts merely ignore the issue or when they are aware of it, dismiss it for simplicity's sake (cf. Holmes 2000: 163). Hay (2000) finds women more likely to use humor for solidarity than men; men use humor to solve conflicts. Hay (1995, 2000, 2001) has investigated 'humor support' i.e., conversational strategies used to acknowledge and support humorous utterances, among which figures prominently the production of more humor.

Holmes' work on humor revolves around a large study of conversation in the workplace (see Holmes and Stubbe 2003, for an overview). Her approach is functional, for example she concludes that "in work contexts humour can be used by subordinates as a subtle (or not so subtle) license to challenge the power structure, as well as by those in power to achieve the speaker's goal while apparently de-emphasizing the power differential." (Holmes 2000: 176). The same 'subversive' function of humor, along with the more conventional expression of friendly feelings and positive politeness is found in another study (Holmes and Marra 2002). However, because of the quantitative focus Holmes can make extremely significant generalizations: "the overall amount of humour produced by the women is greater than that produced by the men" (Holmes et al. 2001: 93). This finding flatly contradicts folk humor theorists and two decades of feminist research which both contended that women produce less humor (since there is no reason to believe that New Zealand women are funnier than their American or European counterparts). Similarly significant findings concern to social status: "the chair [of a meeting] makes a disproportionately high contribution to the humour in most meetings" (2001: 96) (32% of instances, overall) This is true also of multi-turn humor.

Another area in which Holmes' and her associate's work has a significant impact is the study of humor and politeness and impoliteness. Holmes and Schnurr (2005) is a good example of their work. Recent reviews are Schnurr and Plester (2017), Shardakova (2017), Sinkeviciute (2019). The work by Haugh on teasing in particular has been very central to this strand of research; for a synthesis see Haugh (2017).

Overall, the CA of humor was largely unaffected by the research in humor studies, including in linguistics, until fairly recently when some mutual awareness seems to have developed, for example in the issue of failed humor and the study of the reactions to humor (see Bell 2015, for example). Early exceptions are Antonopoulou and Sifianou (2003) a particularly interesting study, based on spontaneous humor in Greek telephone conversations, which is informed by recent theoretical work in humor research, and Norrick (2003) which attempts a synthesis precisely of CA and humor research.

5.3   Ethnomethodological approaches to humor competence

A recent development is the appearance of several proposals to augment the GTVH with various contextual and metapragmatic components. Canestrari (2010) argues for the addition of a "meta" knowledge resource including "the signals that refer to the speaker's intention of being humorous and to the hearer's recognition of such intention" (p. 330). Tsakona (2013, 2020) proposes the addition of a "Context" Knowledge resource including both what participants need to know about the sociocultural context of the text to derive meaning from it; and the speakers' metapragmatic stereotypes on humor. Ruiz-Gurillo (2012, 2016), suggests "modifying" (2012: 40) the KRs with a (meta)pragmatic component, including but not limited to register and genre information, (meta)pragmatic markers, etc. See a more complete discussion in Tsakona (2020) which includes an outstanding synthesis of the research and an original proposal for a Discourse Theory of Humor. Tsakona's methodology proceeds from a ``saturation'' approach which consist of collecting all available sources within a discourse community, usually online, that pertain to a given thematically-related cluster of humor (in a broad sense, inclusive of memes, conversational humor, artifacts, videos, etc.) and then interrogating the data to infer the metapragmatic system upheld by the speakers. For example, in an analysis of Greek jokes about the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the speakers evaluate positively joking about those topics; they consider the jokes to be a pretty accurate representation of reality; and they consider humor as a coping mechanism.

Somewhat ironically, Attardo (2017c, 2020a) has opposed expanding the GTVH instead arguing that the GTVH is merely the competence component of a broader theory that should include an equally developed performance component, which he identifies in a Gumperz/Hymes ethnomethodological approach. For example, Pickering et al. (2009). Gironzetti et al. (2016a, 2016b) explore the significance of smiling as a contextualization cue finding that increased smiling intensity and synchronicity (i.e., matching

the smiling activity of the interlocutor) are cues of humor, rather than just the presence of smiling or laughter. These studies apply instrumental acoustic and eye tracking analyses to the conversational data and more generally share an interest in prosodic and paralinguistic features (gaze, smiling, facial expressions more generally, gestures, etc.). For example, Williams, Burns, & Harmon, (2009) show that gaze aversion (i.e., avoiding eye contact) is associated with sarcasm. See also for other studies, Attardo et al. (2003; 2013), Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori (2006), Kaukomaa et al. (2013), Ikeda and Bysouth (2013), Tabacaru and Lemmens (2014), Brône and Oben (2015), Bujàn (2019), Tabacaru (2019).

6.   Variationist sociolinguistics of humor

As Gasquet-Cyrus (2004) rightly argues, the relationship between sociolinguistics and humor research can be characterized as "having mutually missed the boat." In fact, one could argue that before Norrick (1993) and Attardo (1994: ch. 10) the interplay had been virtually nonexistent (with the obvious exceptions of anthropological work, e.g., Basso 1979, Beeman 1981a/b; see also Beeman 2000). Despite some promising publications, such as Gasquet-Cyrus' own work on urban dialectology in Marseilles, in which humor is central (2004), Davies (2010) on social class, Crawford's and Kotthoff's work on gender and humor (see Section 6.1) , overall it is fair to say that this remains an under explored field (see a recent review in Davies, 2017).

6.1   Gender differences

Lakoff's provocative claim that "women have no sense of humor" (1975: 56) opened the way for serious study of gender-related differences in humor appreciation and production. Most of the research on gender-based differences on the use of humor in conversation seems to converge on the idea that the type of language used by women directly influences the type of humor that they use and appreciate.

An excellent synthesis of research on humor and gender comes from anthropology. Apte (1985: 67–81) argues that women are prevented from engaging in the same range of humorous exchanges by men, who thus "emphasize their need for superiority" (1985: 81) and that "restrictions on the kinds of humor in which women can engage offer an important avenue to social control" (Ibid.). Crawford (1989, 1995: 129–169) reviews the scarce literature on the subject and presents an interesting discussion criticizing the bulk of psychological research on the gender-based differences in humor and advocating the use of CA (among other tools) as a way to overcome the andro-centric approach of much psychological research on humor and gender.

Jenkins (1985) and Ervin-Tripp and Lampert (1992) have noted that women are more likely to create cooperative humor ('stacked humor') and that both male and

female speakers change their joking styles in mixed-gender groups. Specifically, women decrease the number of self-targeted humor Ervin-Tripp and Lampert (1992): 116). Kothoff (1986) and Tannen (1986, 1990, 1994) report various examples of gender-based differences in the use of humor. For example, women tend to tell less jokes than men in mixed-gender groups and prefer smaller audiences than men (Tannen 1990: 89–90). There is a growing literature on humor and gender from a feminist – but not necessarily linguistic – perspective, collected and reviewed in Nilsen (1993: 23–28). A review of the research on gender and humor can be found in Crawford (2003), which is however unaware of the findings in Holmes et al. (2001), discussed above. Generally speaking, corpus-based research on gender and humor has shown that the conceptualizations of gender differences are not as obvious or salient as feminist research has assumed. A definitive survey is Martin (2014) who comes to the conclusion that the differences between genders are relatively small. An important strand of research is the "subversive" use of humor by women, especially in performance. A good example of this trend of research, with a good synthesis of the research is Ruiz-Gurillo and Linares-Bernabeu (2020).

6.2   Ethnicity and humor

Under this heading we can classify two strands of humor research: one that investigates the 'targets' of humor (and this is the common understanding of the phrase 'ethnic humor') and one that investigates the differences in sense of humor across cultures.

The study of ethnic humor is the province of folklorists, anthropologists, and sociologists. Beyond the synthesis in Apte (1985: 108–148), the classical reference is Davies (1990) which presents the stimulating hypothesis that ethnic humor is targeted at 'geographical' outsiders, i.e., groups of people who live at the boundaries of whatever happens to be the 'homeland' of the group doing the joking (e.g., in France the jokes about Belgians, in Canada about Newfoundlanders, etc.). Apte notes that ethnic humor is the result of urbanization, since prevalently rural societies do not have enough contacts with other ethnic groups to make such humor possible, for example because the necessary stereotypes will be missing. Incidentally, it should be noted that the stereotypes on which ethnic humor is based are entirely mythical (on the concepts of 'ethnic group' and 'stereotype' see Apte 1985).

The study of cross-cultural variation in sense of humor is largely anecdotal and consists of isolated descriptions of the humor of a given society. Ziv (1988) presents a collection of articles covering mostly European states. Morain (1991) describes a study contrasting ESL students' and American students' ratings of New Yorker's cartoons and underscores the necessity to possess a given cultural script to be able to understand the humor, let alone appreciate it. An exception is the study of puns, which are widely documented in a great variety of languages (cf. Hausmann 1974 and Sobkowiak 1991 for a bib-

liography). However, the universality of puns has been challenged (Sherzer 1996: 134). Guidi's (2012) cross-cultural comparisons of puns in many completely unrelated language families strongly supports the claim of the universality of humor (and of its mechanisms).

7.   Computational humor

Since the 1990s a strand of research in the computational treatment of humor has appeared. Early efforts were focused on the generation of humor, often using templates. At best, humor generation is only slightly better than random text associations. More recently the field has moved away from generation and toward recognition, mostly using the so-called "bag of words" approach (i.e., using large data sets to train a neural network). Some results are encouraging, but for the time being, it appears that little significant 'artificial intelligence' is used in any of the systems. Taylor (2017) is a good survey. Related research is concerned with how the appearance of the internet and social media have affected humor (Chiaro 2018), Vásquez (2019).

8.   Cognitive linguistics and humor

Since the 2000s, work in cognitive linguistics has begun to appear which seeks to apply cognitive linguistics to humor. For example, blending (see Coulson and Oakley 2000), has been used to analyze humor (Coulson 1996, 2001). It is clear that blending, i.e., the creation of a new 'mental space' (domain, idea) out of existing, and not necessarily related, other mental spaces, can account for some aspects of some types of humor (insofar as it corresponds to the script overlapping aspect of the SSTH). However, it is not clear, and no claims have been made to that effect, that it can provide a general account of humor. The problem for cognitive linguistic approaches to humor is not just to show that they are making claims that are empirically and/or theoretically distinguishable from those of the previous theories, but that the aspects that they are focusing on are in fact those triggering the humor. Consider metaphors: it is fairly obvious that some metaphors are humorous, while others are not. So the problem becomes distinguishing between humorous and non-humorous metaphors, while the mechanisms of how metaphors work may or may not be relevant to the question of their humorousness (Attardo 2015b). On metaphors and humor, in CL, see Krikmann (2009), Goatly (2012), Dynel 2009; Kang (2016), Piata (2016).

Another mechanism that has received a lot of attention is trumping: Veale et al. (2006) define it as a form of "adversarial humor" which functions by subverting "the linguistic forms of the exchange" (Veale et al. 2006: 306) or to put it in a simpler manner,

consists of "turning the tables" on the interlocutor. However, the subversion of the linguistic form has to be accompanied by the use of "parallelism" because trumping is "impromptu wit whose humor arises, at least in part, from our appreciation of an agent's verbal mastery" (Veale et al. 2006: 312). The following is an example

Daughter: I'm trying!

Father: Yes, very trying!
in which the father deliberately mis-reads the daughter's protestation of goodwill (I am trying [to do what you want me to]) into an admission of being a difficult [trying] child. Note the repetition of "trying."

Embodiment

Historically, neurological analyses have been used to argue for and against the IR models, with the evidence seeming to support IR models (e.g., Derks et al. 1997; Goel and Dolan 2001; Coulson and Kutas 2001); see a review in Attardo (2020a). A new development, tied to the cognitive linguistic approach, is to consider the embodied nature of the humorous phenomena. At a basic level, there have been claims that humor is embodied because it is largely expressed linguistically and language itself is embodied (Bergen & Binsted 2015). At a more interesting level Gibbs et al. (2018); Samermit & Gibbs (2016) argue humor processing involves "embodied simulation processes" i.e., physical rough-and-tumble play. From a different perspective, Attardo (2019) has argued that sustained humor (extended sequences of humorous turns) may involve the activity of mirror neurons and the "contagious" nature of laughter.

More detailed reviews of cognitive approaches to humor include Brône and Feyaerts (2004) , Brône et al. (2015), Brône (2017), Dynel (2018), and Attardo (forth).

9.   Metapragmatics of humor

One of the most interesting and recent developments of the linguistics of humor is the study of its metapragmatics. Ruiz-Gurillo (2016) and Tsakona (2020) are the most developed. Tsakona's analysis shows for example that speakers evaluate the humor along several categories (entertaining, clever, etc.) but also significance (how "accurate" the humor is); they consider humor a coping mechanism, but also whether it is appropriate to laugh about a subject (hence a normative category); they use humor to build identifies for themselves; and finally, they use their metapragmatics views as an argument to assert the correctness of their views (Tsakona 2020: 62–63).

10.   Conclusion

While humor research has accomplished much in the last 30 years, it is clear that there is still much to be done and that, while some of the central questions have been tackled, we are still far from having a complete, let alone satisfactory, view of the problem. But if we look at how much new research has appeared in the ten years that have passed between the writing of the first version of this entry and its update, which has seen, for example, the emergence of the cognitive linguistic and variationist sociolinguistic approaches, the challenging of some deeply entrenched beliefs in the gender differences of humor, and some significant results in the broadening of the linguistic approaches to texts other than jokes, it becomes clear that the field of humor research is definitely taking a pragmatic perspective and that significant findings can be expected in the future. In fact, the integration between the text-oriented, competence-based theories such as the GTVH, the cognitive linguistics proposals, or Yus' recent work, and the performance oriented, interactionist approaches advocated by Ruiz-Gurillo (2016), Tsakona (2020), and Attardo (2020) promise a truly pragmatic perspective on humor.

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Institutional interaction

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1.   Introduction

When the participants in an interaction discuss matters connected to at least one of the participants' work-related tasks, the interaction can be described as institutional. In contrast to everyday sociable conversations, there is in institutional interaction a purpose that participants try to achieve, for example when a person with a cold books an appointment with a medical doctor. However, the difference between everyday conversation and institutional talk is not straightforward or self-evident but rather a result of the participants' orientations to the situation, manifested in the design of their talk (e.g. Drew & Heritage 1992: 22). Consider the following two examples, which both demonstrate a 'how are you doing' sequence in an opening phase of a doctor's appointment in Finland.

(1a)   Doctor-patient interaction (Raevaara, Ruusuvuori & Haakana 2001: 25)

```
01 DOC:    mitäs kuu[luu.
           how are you doing
02 PAT:         [.hhh no nyt on semmonen vaiva ollu
                  PRT now I have had a problem probably
03         vissii kesästä lähtie< et mua painaa, (0.2) tähä.
           since summer that I feel pressure (0.2) here
04 DOC:    joo:=
           yes
05 PAT:    =ja h- niinku hengittäessäki - -
           and   like even when I breath - -
```

(1b)   Doctor-patient interaction (Raevaara, Ruusuvuori & Haakana 2001: 25)

```
01 DOC:    no nii:n ja mitäs kuuluu,
           PRT PRT and how are you doing
02         (.)
03 PAT:    hhh >no< kuule mulle kuuluu niin paljon kuule
           PRT I am doing very well
04         hyvää tiä[ksää ny mä juur tossa kerroin
           you know as I just told there
05 DOC:         [no?
                  PRT
06 PAT:    .hh[h minä olen jo iso <mummu> hh[hh
           I am already a great grandmother
07 DOC:      [nii:?                [ihanko totta=
             yes                    really
08         [onneks £olkoo:£,]
            congratulations
08 PAT:    [joo:: hhhh heh]
            yes
```

In Example 1a, the patient receives the doctor's *how are you doing* question (line 1) as a solicitation to describe the problem that brought her to the doctor's appointment, and she initiates an immediate description of symptoms (line 2). However, in Example 1b, while the physical setting of the interaction as well as the doctor's *how are you doing* question are similar to those in Example 1a, the patient's response conveys another type of interpretation, and does not provide a problem description but rather news about her personal life. Thus, in Example 1a, the patient orients to the institutional purpose of the meeting, whereas in Example 1b, the patient adopts a more conversational orientation to the *how are you doing* question. In this manner, the patients' differing answers to basically the same question in the same physical context contribute either to the "institutional" (Example 1a) or "conversational" (Example 1b) character of the interaction during the opening phase of a doctor's appointment.

Examples 1a and 1b showcase a typical analytical perspective on institutional interaction within conversation analysis (CA). From very early on, CA has worked on interactions in institutional settings, beginning with Sacks' study on calls to a suicide prevention center (Sacks 1967). The interest in the specifics of certain institutional contexts began in the 1970s (Atkinson & Drew 1979 on courtroom context; Mehan 1979 on classroom context). From the 1990s onwards, the array of different institutional contexts under study have become manifold (see examples in Heritage & Clayman 2010: 1). Institutional CA has thus established itself as the "other main line of investigation in CA research" (Clift, Drew & Hutchby 2006) or "the second type of CA" (Heritage & Clayman 2010: 16). Some of the most extensively studied contexts – besides courtroom and classroom contexts – are emergency calls and help lines, doctor–patient interaction, and mass communication (see Heritage & Clayman 2010).

This chapter offers a conversation analytic (e.g. Clift 2016) and interactional linguistic (Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 2018) approach to research on institutional interaction. Our approach differs from, for example, a strictly sociological perspective to work-related interaction in that it focusses on linguistic practices and grammar in institutional interaction. First, we offer a brief introduction to the premises of Institutional Conversation Analysis (Section 2). Then, in Section 3, we focus on a specific institutional context, sales interaction, by analyzing and comparing convenience store encounters and business-to-business sales meetings. This section demonstrates how the design of linguistic practices in talking about service or product price vary, and how this variation is related to the difference in the overall purpose of the sales meeting as well as to the participants' orientations to it.

2. Institutional CA

In this section, we will review research on institutional interaction from a conversation analytic (CA) and interactional linguistic point of view.[1] This means that we adopt a particular perspective on the relationship of institutional roles, practices and the use of language. According to this view, language is not necessarily considered institutional just because of the actual institutional roles of speakers (representatives of institutions and their clients) or the location of the interaction (e.g., a doctor's office, a classroom). For example, professionals and clients can embark on a casual conversation inside the institutional setting, thus putting their institutional roles aside. On the other hand, speakers can use language that is characteristic of a specific institutional situation regardless of the location of the interaction or the actual professional roles of the speakers, e.g., a family member may be "interrogated" at a breakfast table. (See, e.g., Drew & Sorjonen 2011: 192.) The key issue is whether or not the participants orient to their institutional roles in a given situation and how "institutions are enacted and lived through as accountable patterns of meaning, inference, and action" (Drew & Heritage 1992: 5). In a similar vein, institutionality does not refer so much to the stable institutional settings (e.g., medical, educational, legal) and their specifics but to the local and transformable product of the participants' own actions (Drew & Heritage 1992: 19), that is, how institutions are "talked into being" (Heritage 1984: 290).

Another key aspect of the CA approach to institutional interaction is that it is being compared to ordinary conversation. That is, ordinary/mundane conversation (i.e., casual conversation between friends or family members without goal-orientation) is seen as the primary form of social interaction, which means that the study of institutional talk builds on the findings of the research on everyday talk (Heritage 1984: 238–240). The central difference is that institutional talk involves different kinds of restrictions or specifications as compared to what people do when interacting with their friends and family (e.g., Heritage & Clayman 2010: 16). Drew & Heritage (1992: 22; see also Heritage 1997) present three central features of institutional interaction: (1) the conversation has an institution-specific goal, (2) participation in the conversation involves specific constraints, and (3) the participants resort to institution-specific inferential frameworks.

An illustrative example of the difference between institutional and ordinary talk is the fact that professionals in for example medical, legal and news-interview contexts typically withhold the expression of sympathy, agreement or surprise towards what the layperson says. Withholding these in professional contexts may be expected, while in everyday talk it would be considered disaffiliative. (Cf. Drew & Heritage 1992: 24.)

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1. For other perspectives such as sociolinguistic, speech act and discourse analytic perspectives, and for the general development of the field, see, e.g., the overviews by Drew & Heritage (1992: 6–16) and Drew & Sorjonen (2011: 194–196).

Similarly, customers in telemarketing calls do not volunteer a positive evaluation of a salesperson's "good news", such as *with that your* ((investment)) *is therefore multiplied by five*, but rather offer a neutral acknowledgement (e.g. *mhm*). In everyday conversation, however, "good news" are generally received with a positive evaluation (e.g. *oh that's good!*, Mazeland 2004).

On the level of specific linguistic practices, we can consider how question-answer sequences are constructed. It has been observed that while acknowledging an answer to a question with the particle *oh* is very common in everyday talk, one rarely finds it in institutional contexts (Heritage 1985, Drew & Heritage 1992: 41–42, Heritage & Clayman 2010: 18). On the other hand, the questioner's evaluation of the correctness of the answer (e.g., *that's right*) is characteristic of a specific institutional context, classroom or other educational interaction, while in everyday talk that would be considered "bizarre" (Drew & Heritage 1992: 40–41; see Mehan 1985). In fact, it has been suggested that each institution has its own "fingerprint" when it comes to the typical linguistic and interactional practices that are employed to fulfill their institution-specific tasks (Drew & Heritage 1992: 26, Heritage & Clayman 2010: 18). Thus, when observing language use in institutional settings, we can see that the participants' conduct is shaped and constrained by their orientations to their institutional roles as, e.g., a professional and a client in a specific institution, and the ways in which they manage their institutional activities (Drew & Heritage 1992: 5, Drew & Sorjonen 2011: 212).

Despite the fact that each institutional context has its unique "fingerprint", research has identified several general dimensions of interaction that can be put to service for institutional goals across different contexts. According to Drew & Heritage (1992: 29; see also Heritage 1997: 225, Arminen 2005: 53–56) these are (1) lexical choice, (2) turn design, (3) sequence organization, (4) overall structure, and 5) social epistemology and social relations. These are thus areas that research may focus on. Institutionality is managed through these dimensions (ibid.); basically any feature can be at its service. Taking a somewhat more linguistic perspective, Drew & Sorjonen (2011: 196) identify aspects such as *verbal conduct*, e.g., turn taking, and *the use of linguistic resources* such as person reference, lexical choice and grammatical construction, through which participants orient to their institutional roles and tasks. Perhaps the most recognizable and most widely studied example of the interactional dimensions that can and is adjusted to serve institutional goals is turn-taking. That is, some institutional contexts – such as classroom or courtroom – have been characterized as *formal* based on their restricted turn-taking system as compared to everyday conversation, i.e., turns are preallocated between the participants. (E.g., Drew & Sorjonen 2011: 196–199, Heritage & Drew 1992: 25–27, 39.) In these formal institutional interactions, preallocation may generally concern the distribution of turns, i.e., who is allowed to speak and when, but also the turn types that each participant is expected to use. Drew & Heritage (1992: 39–40; see also Drew & Sorjonen 2011: 197) point out that many of the institutional interactions, also the less for-

mal ones, are mostly built on sequences of questions and answers, and it is the professional who typically asks the questions and the layman (clients/patients/pupils etc.) who provide the answers. This unequally distributed question-answer patterning is an example of *asymmetry* between the participants typical of institutional interaction (see Drew & Heritage 1992: 49, Heritage 1997: 236–240).

CA research on institutional interaction has been conducted on many different contexts (see e.g. *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis* chapters on classroom interaction (Gardner 2013), doctor-patient interaction (Teas Gill & Roberts 2013), news interviews (Clayman 2013), courtroom interaction (Komter 2013), and psychotherapy interaction (Peräkylä 2013)). This chapter describes research on a work-related context that has begun to receive more attention in CA, interactions between a salesperson and a customer (e.g. Llewellyn 2015, Mondada & Sorjonen 2016, Lindström et al. 2017, De Stefani 2018, Stokoe et al. 2020). Research in this area has, for example, studied rapport building in business-to-business sales meetings (Clark, Drew & Pinch 2003, Kaski, Niemi & Pullins 2018), accounting for the reason for the visit, or the on-going action at a convenience store (Haakana & Sorjonen 2011, Raevaara 2011), and the salesperson's prelimary actions in alluring the customer to align with the ensuing business proposal (Mazeland 2004, Humă, Stokoe & Sikveland 2019).

In what follows, we analyze selling and buying in two related yet very differently organized settings, convenience store encounters and business-to-business meetings. As an example of Institutional CA, we compare one recurrent and even mandatory phase of these encounters, the announcement or negotiation of product or service price across these two settings. We will show that the general institutional task of the encounter, its overall structure and the roles of the participants are essential when considering the ways in which the price of the purchase is announced or negotiated and how this activity is sequentially located. Comparing different situations brings to the surface the similarities and differences between the interactional practices in different settings and also what kind of aspects of the situation itself the practices are related to (Lindfors & Raevaara 2005).

3. Analyzing institutional talk: Examples from sales encounters

In this section, we study how the service or product price is handled in salesperson-customer interaction. What we present here is based on our previous individual studies that we now bring together to shed light on the relationship between linguistic practices and context-specific institutional tasks and orientations (see Koivisto & Halonen 2009, Halonen & Koivisto 2009, Halonen & Koivisto forthcoming, Niemi & Hirvonen 2019). We demonstrate that the topic of price is dealt with in different ways in convenience stores and in business-to-business sales interaction: in convenience stores, the price is

mostly announced by the salesperson after the customer has decided to buy something (Section 3.1), whereas in business-to-business sales interaction, the price is requested by the customer before he or she has made up his or her mind on whether to make a purchase or not (Section 3.2).

3.1   Salesperson announces the price

We will start the analytic part of the chapter by discussing sales interaction in Finnish convenience stores/kiosks ("R-kioski"). As the central characteristic of this type of institutional interaction, they all embody a fairly stable overall structure; on the whole, the interactions are short and extremely routinized. The typical overall structure can be schematized as different phases as follows (see also Raevaara & Sorjonen 2006: 127–128, Koivisto & Halonen 2009: 122–123, Halonen & Koivisto forthcoming; S = salesperson, C = client):

1. **S:** greeting
    C: greeting
    ----

2. **C:** request(s)
    S: ((grants the request(s)))
    -----

3. **S:** inquiry for possible additional purchases (*tuleeko muuta* 'come-Q else-PAR' "something else?")
    C: negative answer, i.e., claiming no further purchases ('no')
    S: announcement of the price
    C: ((hands the money over to the salesperson))
    S: ((goes to cash register, comes back with the change))
    -----

4. **C:** Thank you
    S: Thank you
    (+ Goodbyes)

The core of the encounter is the verbal or nonverbal request by the client and its fulfillment by the salesperson (phase 2), and the paying phase (phase 3). After the payment has been successfully accomplished, the encounter comes to its end. Within this overall structure, we will now pay closer attention to the payment phase and the design of the price announcement turn. In fact, the paying phase has its own sequential structure and logic. Previously it has been claimed (Koivisto & Halonen 2009, Halonen &

Koivisto forthcoming) that the key point for moving from the request phase to the payment phase is the salesperson's inquiry for possible additional purchases, i.e., the 'something else' inquiry (in Finnish typically *tuleeko muuta* 'come-Q else-PAR'). Koivisto & Halonen 2009 (see also Halonen & Koivisto forthcoming) argue that this question is not so much a genuine request for additional purchases (even though it offers the last opportunity for making them) as it is an indication of the salesperson's preparedness to receive the payment. In addition, it reflects the salesperson's interpretation of the completion of the request phase: at this point, the client has most likely listed all his/her requests.[2] The paying phase consists of a fixed four-part sequence: (1) the 'something else' inquiry (2), a negative answer, (3) an announcement of the price, and (4) paying. This routinization suggests that the 'something else' inquiry indeed paves the way for paying. Example 2 is a case in point.

(2)   (Halonen & Koivisto forthcoming; Kotus, T516)

```
       C comes into picture holding his wallet
01 C:  hyvää huomen[ta.
       good morning.
02 S:             [>(no)< hei.
                    PRT hello.
03           (0.2)
04 C:  kym↑menen sarjal #<lip:[pu>;
            ten-trip ticket.
05 S:                       [Helsingin
                             Inside Helsinki (area.)
       sisä[inev °(vai)°;]
06 C:     [↓joo:       ] sisäi+ne.
            yeah. Inside.
                             +S reads barcode
07       *(2.6)
       *C takes a note from the wallet
08 S:  ja  sittem    muuta.h=
       and then something else.
09 C:  =ei *#muuta; (.) °tällä [kertaa°.
       nothing else; (.) this time.
            *starts handing the note
10 S:                         [kakstoista ja
                               twelve and
11     kahdeksan↑ky+mmen#tä kiitos:;
       eighty thank you;
                      + salesperson takes the note
12     (5.4) S WORKS AT THE CASHIER
13 S:  (ja) sei:tsemän kakskymmentä ole hyvä.
       and seven twenty here you are.
14 C:  kii↑tos:;
       thank you
```

After the client's negative answer (line 9) to the 'something else' inquiry (line 8), the salesperson announces the price of the purchase in the form of an NP ('twelve and

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2. In a previous study (Halonen & Koivisto forthcoming) it was observed that in a typical encounter, the client takes out the money at the point when he/she has made their last request. This then may function as the clue for the salesperson that the client is ready to move on to the paying phase. As noted, this interpretation is confirmed by the negative answer to the 'something else' inquiry.

eighty' in lines 10–11). It is followed by 'thank you' without a prosodic break. The video recording reveals that the client hands over the money simultaneously with the announcement; thus, the salesperson is able to grab the money and say 'thank you' immediately after the price announcement. This shows that the turn functions as an indication for the readiness to receive and thus as an *announcement* of the price rather than as a *request* for payment. This is also reflected in the turn's minimal design, the NP. By contrast, if the client is not ready and prepared to pay immediately, the salesperson may give the price in a longer format (a full clause or an NP accompanied by turn-initial particles), thus giving more time – as it were – for the client to pay (see Halonen & Koivisto 2009; cf. also Sorjonen & Raevaara 2014). That is, the design of the price announcement turn reflects the salesperson's observation of the client's preparedness to pay on time or with a delay, i.e., their multimodal behavior. In either case, the price announcement is typically a non-problematic routine part of the encounter.

In this section, we demonstrated how a routine sales interaction, an encounter at a kiosk, follow a specific overall structure and how the paying phase is organized within it. We also saw that the price is rather announced than requested, and this happens in a simple noun phrase format. We will now proceed to sales encounters that involve a more complex negotiation of the price of a purchase.

3.2 Customer requests for the price

Whereas convenience store encounters tend to be short and have a relatively fixed overall structure, business-to-business sales meetings between a sales representative and a prospective customer last longer and the overall structure has more variation. However, it is possible to observe the general phases of the meeting opening (often referred to as *the approach* in the marketing literature), a service or product presentation, customer's questions or objections, and the closing (cf. Dubinsky 1981). Within this overall structure, price discussions occur after a salesperson has described the service and demonstrated how it can be applied in a context similar to the customer's business.

In contrast to the convenience store interaction, in business-to-business sales interaction, the service or product price is requested by a customer. The customer's price request initiates a three-part sequence that consists of the price question, a salesperson's price informing, and the customer's price receipt. However, before the price informing, a salesperson as a rule initiates an insert expansion (Schegloff 2007:106–109) to tailor the price to the customer and to create value (Niemi & Hirvonen 2019; on the concept of value, see e.g., Grönroos 2011).

Example 3 demonstrates a case in point. In it, we join a technology-mediated sales meeting. The salesperson has called the prospective customer at a mutually agreed upon date and shared a computer screen view with her. He utilizes the shared screen to give slide shows as well as to demonstrate the service offered in practice. The salesperson rep-

resents a company that offers a project management and work-time tracking solution, and the customer represents an organization that operates in the construction business. The customer has asked about a detail of the service, and the salesperson is just wrapping up his answer (line 1).

(3)   A business-to-business sales meeting (Niemi & Hirvonen 2019)

```
01 S:    mut se [löytyy täältä listalta kuitenki.
         but you'll find it in the list anyway.
02 C:           [°joo°.
                  yes.
03 C:    joo. juuriki.
         yes. right.
04 S:    joo.
         yes.
05 S:    .mt .hhh yes hh.
                      yes
06 S:    [tota tota.]
          well well.
07 C:    [aika    ] ↑pienet on meijän (.) meijän tarpeet
          our needs are (.) are quite modest
08       mut toi,
         but ehm
09       (3.0)
10 S:    [joo-o.
          u-huh.
11 C:    [kyllä tämmönen,
          surely this kind of (thing)
12       (2.0)
13 C:    minkäs ↑hintanen tämmönen ↑olis.
         what would be the price for this kind of (thing).
14 S:    .hhh tää on tota >niin niin< (1.8) teit oli (.)
          this is erm um um (1.8) you were (.)
15       montako käyttäjää teitä kaiken kaikkiaan oli.
         how many users you had again altogether.
16 C:    joku (.) al↑le ↓kymmenen.
         around (.) under ten.
17 S:    alle kymmenen eli #öö# sanoitko (.) #ö#
          under ten so      did you say (.)
18       seittemän käyttäjää #suurin piirtei#.
          roughly seven users.
19 C:    (vai) kahdeksa.
         (or) eight.
20       (.)
21 S:    kaheksa. (0.2) #joo.# odotas hetki.  .hhh meillä on
          eight. (0.2)   yes.  wait a moment.      we have
22       sillä >tavalla että meillä on< perusmaksu tällä
         it in  that way that we have the basic fee for
23       meijän palavelulla kolkytäyheksä euroa (.)olemassa.
         our service thirty-nine euros          being.
24 C:    mm:?
25 S:    kuukausitasolla ja sitte (.) seittemän euroa per
         on a monthly level and then (.) seven euros per
26       <käyttäjä> kuukauessa. tarkottaa sillon että,
         user per month. then it means that (0.2)
27       (0.2) .hhhh kuu↑kausihinta  teille on >yheksäkytä
               the monthly price for you is ninety-five
28       viis euroa kuukauvessa. hh
         euros per month
29       (0.4)
30 C:    ↓joo.
          yes.
31       (0.2)
```

```
32 S:    eli (.) ei (.) ei paha. (.) missään nimessä.
         so (.) not (.) not bad (.) in any ways.
```

After the customer's and salesperson's collaborative transition (lines 3–6) to a new phase within the meeting, the customer describes his company's needs as being modest (line 7) and indicates his interest (*mut*, 'but', line 8, and *kyllä tämmönen*, 'surely this kind of thing', line 11). The following price question (line 13) is a full clause question-word interrogative (QWI) that seeks for the price of the service. With the enclitic particle *-s* in the question word *minkäs* the customer marks a beginning of a new but agenda-related sequence, and it indicates that he orients to his task as a customer (cf. questions presented by an official in Finnish social insurance services, Raevaara 2006).

While the customer's price questions are rare in a convenience store interaction, when such a question occurs, it is generally presented in a phrasal form (e.g., *paljonko* 'how much'; Halonen & Koivisto 2009: 157). The phrasal question implies that the customer is ready to pay. In Example 3, the customer's full clause question (*minkäs hintanen tämmönen olis,* 'what would be the price for this kind of (thing) be', line 13) avoids such an implication. Furthermore, the conditional mood in *olis*, 'would be', implies that the price is under negotiation and might affect the customer's decision to buy.

A further difference between the price discussion in convenience stores and business-to-business sales interaction is that if the client in a convenience store asks for the price, the salesperson most often provides a phrasal response (*kaks euroo* 'two euros'; Halonen & Koivisto 2009: 157). This type of answer is in line with the observation that in everyday English conversation, after a question-word interrogative, a phrasal response is a default or 'no problem' answer (Thompson et al. 2015: 23–28). Indeed, a salesperson's phrasal price informing is as a rule followed by a transition to payment. Yet in Example 3, the salesperson begins to formulate his price informing as a clause (*tää on*, 'this is', line 14). Instead of completing the utterance, he then initiates an insert expansion in which he seeks information about the number of people that would use the product within the customer's organization (lines 15–16). Only after the salesperson has received the customer's estimation of this number, he continues his price informing. It is produced in three parts: first, in a clausal form, he mentions the basic monthly fee (lines 22–23), second, the fee that depends on the number of people that use the application (lines 25–26), and third, the combined sum of parts 1 and 2 per month (lines 27–28).

By giving the price in an expanded clausal response, the salesperson displays the price as consisting of certain parts and as tailored individually for the customer (*teille*, 'for you', line 27). Thus, by using an expanded clausal response, the salesperson orients to the customer's indecision and to the on-going sales work. We note that the salesperson could also have given the price using a phrasal formulation such as 'thirty-eight euros per month plus seven euros per user'. However, had he done this, he would have provided information on their general pricing policy instead of the price that is tailored for the current customer. After the salesperson's answer, the customer acknowledges the price

informing with the most common price receipt in our data, *joo* 'yeah' (line 30). With this third position *joo*, the customer registers the price informing and claims understanding of it, but does not evaluate it (cf. Sorjonen 2001: 154–157). Here, after some further discussion, the customer agrees to try the salesperson's service for a test period of one month.

We have seen that in business-to-business sales interaction, a price discussion differs in many ways from the common way in which price discussions occur in convenience stores (see Section 3.1). The most striking difference is that in convenience stores, the price is commonly announced by the salesperson, whereas in business-to-business meetings, it is requested by the customer. In addition, there are differences in the design of the turns during the price discussion. First, the customers in business-to-business sales interaction use full clause questions instead of phrasal ones, thus implying a lack of decision to buy. Second, a salesperson's response to a customer's price question is delayed by a pre-second insert expansion. The salesperson uses this expansion to customize the price informing to the customer and to show what he or she would gain in return for his or her financial sacrifices, or in other words, to create value for the customer. Finally, the salesperson offers an expanded clausal answer that orients to the on-going sales negotiation. Overall, in a kiosk and probably in other low-value business-to-consumer interactions as well (e.g., Vázquez Carranza 2017), if the customer asks for the price, s/he does this after s/he has decided to buy a product, but in a business-to-business context, such a decision is yet to be made. These differences are reflected in the design of the customer's and the salesperson's turns in price negotiation.

Example 2 showed a typical case in kiosk encounters. In it, the salesperson announced the price at the point when all the necessary preparations for receiving payment (reading barcodes from the products) had been accomplished and the completion of the request phase had been confirmed (with the client's negative answer to the 'something else' inquiry). In some convenience store encounters, however, more explicit negotiation about the price of the products and/or the transition to the paying phase may be needed. Example 4 illustrates a rare case that involves negotiation about the price. We will show that in this case, the overall structure of the interaction and participant roles differ from the typical case demonstrated in Example 2. Before the extract, the customer has put a candy bar on the counter saying 'I'll take this', which constitutes his first request. Then (line 1) he asks the salesperson whether they sell cigarette lighters at the kiosk.

(4) (Kotus, T594; Koivisto & Halonen 2009: 138)

```
01 C:    >ja sitte tota< onks sul jotai sytyt:timiä.
         and then uhm do you have some kind of lighters.
02       (1.2) S stops reading the barcode, puts candybar back on the counter
03 S:    siitä #löytyy# ↑se[mmo(nen); points at the lighters on the counter
         there is one (of that kind)
04 C:                      [joku halpa;h
                            some cheap
```

```
05        (0.2)
06        ihan halpa;=
          really cheap
07 S:     =↑tää on <yks:>; points at lighters behind her
          this is one
08        (.)
09 C:     >paljo se< maksaa,
          how much is it
10        (.)
11 S:     >yks eu°ro°<. Looks at C
          one euro
12        (0.2)
13 C:     yks euro.h
          one euro.
14 S:     mm.
          mm.
15 C:     .hh no mä otan niit kaks (sitte)h.
           PRT I'll take two of them then.
16 S:     onks väril välii.
          does the color matter.
17 C:     ↓e:i.
          no.
18        (2.4) s takes the lighters out of a box behind her
19 S:     °(--)°
20        (0.8)
21 C:     ja sit toi. points at the candy bar on the counter
          and then that one.
22        (0.8)
23 C:     *se on sillo,
          that's then,
24        *S reads the barcode
25        (0.8)
26 S:     <se_on *sitte> k:ol(o)me' euroa [°tasan°.
          that's then three euros exactly.
27            *S hits the cash register
```

The salesperson first points at lighters located close to the client, at the counter. However, the client ignores this and specifies his request: the lighter needs to be very cheap (lines 4, 6). The salesperson then offers the ones behind her back, arguably referring to their price ('this is one', line 7). Apparently not grasping "one" as the price of the lighters, the client then inquires about their price in a full clause QWI ('how much is it', line 9). The salesperson provides the answer by giving the price in NP format, thus orienting to the price as a non-problematic and non-negotiable fact ('one euro', line 11). This is a clear difference to what we saw in business-to-business sales interaction (Example 3). However, asking for the price of the lighters does not constitute a transition to the paying phase (cf. Example 2), since the decision to buy has not been made at this point. After an understanding check and a confirming response, the client makes an explicit decision to buy the product ('I'll take two of them then', line 15). The particle 'then' in his turn marks the turn as being based on the previous exchange. This completes the negotiations of the products/price. However, the request phase continues with the salesperson asking an additional question about the client's preference for the color of the lighters (line 16). After the completion of this sequence, the client starts the transition to the paying phase on his own initiative. This is done by a repetition of the first request ('and then that one', line 21) and a pointing gesture, which suggests that he does not want anything else. After

that, he explicitly asks about the (total) price of the purchases by producing a syntactically incomplete structure ('that is then', line 23) for the salesperson to complete. The salesperson then responds by announcing the total price of the purchases ('that's three euros exactly then', line 26).

In this kiosk encounter, the transition from the request phase to the payment phase is exceptionally initiated by the client. The fact that this is done by the client instead of the salesperson can, however, be explained by the discrepancy between the timing of the salesperson's activities and that of the client. We saw that in the typical encounter (Example 2) the salesperson takes the initiatives of moving on to the next phase based on his/her own preparedness and his/her judgement of the client's preparedness. In the present case, however, the client does not wait until the salesperson has completed her tasks (i.e., read the barcodes from each product, which is a prerequisite for receiving the payment) but makes the transition on his own initiative. This creates an impression of being in a hurry. The discrepancy of the participants' activities is reflected in the design of the salesperson's price announcement turn that is produced in response to the client's incomplete utterance ('that is then'). That is, the salesperson does not merely complete the client's syntactic incomplete utterance with an NP and thereby align with the client's pace, but produces the price after a delay in a full-clause format ('that's then three euros exactly', line 16). In fact, at this point, she is still performing the last tasks of the request phase (hits the cash register, line 24). The delay and full clause format of the price turn seems to serve two functions: first, it "buys more time" for the salesperson to complete her tasks. Second, it can be heard as doing resistance to the fact that the client sets the pace for the encounter. By using an independent clause, she makes the price announcement part of her own agenda, instead of just giving an answer to the client (Koivisto & Halonen 2009).

In contrast to business-to-business sales encounters, price negotiations at kiosks are thus not a "natural" phase in the overall structure of the encounter, but constitute a departure from it. Moreover, Example 4 above shows how departures from the typical overall structure and the participants' expected behavior may be handled. We also saw how the turn design of the price announcement reflects the routine vs. non-routine course of the encounter. That is, when the participants break the routine for one reason or another, they typically resort to more elaborate formulations in their institutional talk. The speakers thus make a selection, so to speak, of how they formulate their turns in order to advance some specific institutional goals (e.g. Heritage 1997: 234).

4.   Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the conversation analytic and interactional linguistic approach to institutional interaction. We have seen that rather than having a

fixed setting, institutional context can be understood as a moment-by-moment production by the participants, involving constant implicit negotiation about the general goal of the interaction and the participants' roles. Linguistic choices are also a product of these implicit negotiations, while also reflecting the specifics of the institutional situation that the participants orient to.

Whereas earlier research on institutional interaction have discussed various contexts of talk at work and studied their constitutive actions, our comparison of convenience store encounters and business-to-business sales negotiations have demonstrated that even within a context of buying and selling, a constitutive phase of the encounter – talk about the price of the product – may be organized differently depending on the institution-specific tasks. High-value business-to-business sales involves explicit negotiations about the price, which precedes the customer's decision to buy. The linguistic design of the customer's price inquiry (full-clause QWI's) as well as the salesperson's multistep, full-clause price informing reflect a lack of the customer's decision to buy. Furthermore, they demonstrate that the participants orient to the price discussion as a possibility to negotiate the deal.

In more routinized kiosk encounters, where the value of the purchase is lower, the clients have made a decision to buy prior to the payment phase, and the price announcement happens on the salesperson's initiative. We also saw that while in business-to-business interaction, the price is announced in a full clause format, in kiosks, the salesperson typically uses the "non-problematic" NP, even when the client has initiated the paying phase by asking for the price (see Example 4). Full-clause responses in kiosks are reserved for special purposes that involve a departure from the main line of talk, while phrasal responses orient and contribute to the routinized character of the convenience store interaction. The difference in the composition of the paying phase/price negotiation thus stems from the different goals of the interaction that affect their overall structure and the roles that the salesperson and the client orient to.

Future research on institutional interaction could involve similar in-depth comparisons between the constitutive parts of institutional contexts that are broadly of the same type but differ with respect to their general goals and the roles that participants orient to. Studies like this have been done at least within psychotherapy research, where different frameworks such as psychoanalysis and cognitive psychotherapy have been compared (Weiste 2015). Another future direction in institutional CA that will most likely attract increasing interest – boosted by the covid-19 pandemic – is technologically mediated interactions such as interactions in different kinds of chat services or video-mediated consultations (e.g. Stommel & Molder 2015, Stommel, van Goor & Stommel 2019).

Acknowledgements

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Pluricentric languages

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1. Introduction

Many languages are *pluricentric* in nature, i.e. they exist as a national or official language in more than one nation. They range from languages diffused widely across different continents, such as English or Spanish, to languages predominantly used in neighbouring countries, such as Dutch or Swedish. In the following we introduce readers to both foundational and more recent research on pluricentric languages, as well as current debates in the field. While the first attempts to describe the conditions typical of pluricentric languages appeared in the 1960s, it took until the 1980s for the field to establish itself, through theoretical as well as empirical accounts of pluricentricity. From early on, there have been accounts of the power relationships between different varieties of pluricentric languages, in particular with regard to power asymmetries between national varieties, often expressed as dominant versus non-dominant varieties. Among other things, this has resulted in extensive research into the varying status of non-dominant national, or sub-national, varieties, an endeavour which also draws attention to language ideologies and linguistic rights of national (and other) varieties of pluricentric languages. A related issue here concerns whether descriptions primarily should follow national borders or deal with regional variation within a language, often subsumed under the headings pluricentricity and pluriareality, respectively.

Parallel to such theoretically motivated inquiry, there has been substantial empirical research from the outset. The early, foundational work in the field was primarily concerned with the description of linguistic structural differences, such as phonological, morphological or lexical variation between varieties of pluricentric languages. This interest has hardly abated, but it has been complemented by other perspectives in more recent years. In particular, there has been an increasing emphasis on pragmatic and interactional variation. The shift in interest to include pragmatic variation can to a large extent be credited to work within the field *variational pragmatics* (Schneider 2010), where pluricentricity is treated as a case of regional variation. While studies in variational pragmatics have explored micro-pragmatic variation, based on both experimental and actual discourse, more recently others have focused on the sequentiality

of authentic interactional data from the perspective of conversation analysis and interactional linguistics. Even though some methodological differences exist between variational pragmatics and the interactional paradigm, they also have much in common and there has been cross-fruition between the two.

The article is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an account of research into the relationships that exist between varieties of pluricentric languages, introducing central concepts and theoretical underpinnings of pluricentric research, covering power relationships, expression of identities and attitudes as well as the debate on pluricentricity vis-à-vis pluriareality. In Section 3, we turn to the foundational work in the field, in particular concerning linguistic structural differences between varieties. In Section 4 we describe work on pragmatic variation, and in Section 5 interactional variation in pluricentric languages is addressed. Finally, Section 6 offers a conclusion and outlook followed by a bibliography.

2.   Relationships between varieties of pluricentric languages

2.1   Central concepts

The scholarly interest in pluricentric languages can be traced to the work by the sociolinguist William Stewart who launched the terms *monocentric* and *polycentric* for describing national multilingualism in the 1960s (Stewart 1968). In particular, he used these terms to describe the different paths of standardisation of a language. In the monocentric case, there is a single set of universally accepted norms and any variation in use is downplayed, whereas in the polycentric case different sets of norms exist concurrently and may undergo separate codification. Polycentric standardisation in Stewart's sense may involve codification of variation within a nation, or refer to the variant use of the same language in different nations. In the latter case, the standardisation is either *endonormative*, i.e. based on models of use within the nation in question, or *exonormative*, i.e. modelled on the use in other nations.

Stewart used *polycentric*[1] to refer to standard varieties of a particular language both within a nation as well as in different nations. Ulrich Ammon (1995: 97) refers broadly to a language with more than one centre as pluricentric, including national as well as subnational, regional centres of a language. However, most research to date has focused on differences between standard varieties of pluricentric languages used in separate nations. Michael Clyne, with reference to Kloss (1978: 66–67), defines a pluricentric language as

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1.   The term *polycentric* was used in earlier work to describe a language with more than one centre, but has since largely been replaced by *pluricentric* – a term introduced by Michael Clyne in the 1980s in his work on varieties of English (Australian English) and German (Austrian German).

one that has "several interacting centres, each providing a national variety with at least some of its own (codified) norms" (1992:1). As pointed out by Peter Auer (2014:19), much of the research interest in pluricentric languages has thus concerned structures associated with normatively installed national standard varieties, leaving out any actual variation in language use which is not recognised as part of the codified national standard norm in a political entity.

2.2   Power relationships: Dominance and non-dominance

In research on pluricentric languages it is common to differentiate between *dominant* and *non-dominant varieties*, a distinction which captures the asymmetrical power relationships which almost invariably exist between different national varieties of a pluricentric language. In other words, there is a certain "pecking order" (Clyne 1992b: 455) where dominant varieties exert much more influence over non-dominant varieties than vice versa, both in terms of language structure and attitudes. The power imbalances are also inscribed in the different treatment of the national centres: national centres of dominant varieties have often been taken as core areas whereas national centres of non-dominant varieties have been seen as more peripheral. All national standard varieties have some of their own norms; but dominant varieties take the lead as primary norm-setting centres, while non-dominant varieties are secondary norm-setting centres further underscoring asymmetries of power.

Factors that signal power relationships include: the relative population size of the nations involved; their respective economic and political power; their historical role as a core or peripheral area; their position as an official language (*de jure* or *de facto*) or as a regional or minority language without official recognition, and, finally, whether it is a native or a nativized[2] variety of the nation (Clyne 1992b ibid., see also Muhr 2012a: 26ff.). Accordingly, a dominant variety is typically the language of the majority population of a nation, and therefore it also tends to be a variety with a large number of speakers. Non-dominant varieties, on the other hand, may be spoken by a numerical minority within a nation, as is the case with Swedish in Finland: Swedish is a national, official language in Finland, alongside Finnish, but it is the first language of only about 5% of Finland's population. Compared to Swedish in Sweden, spoken by some 85% of the population as a first language, Finland-Swedish then is the non-dominant national variety of Swedish.

An investigation into non-dominant varieties brings to the fore issues of language policy and planning. The division into *status planning* (selection and implementation of a specific variety for official, public use) and *corpus planning* (codification and func-

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2. *Nativized variety* is used for referring to a variety of a language which has been introduced into a community (e.g. as an official language or co-official language) through colonisation or immigration, and over time acquired native speakers.

tional elaboration in new domains) associated with the work by Einar Haugen in particular (e.g. Haugen 1983) is useful for describing the relative vitality of a variety. Rudolf Muhr (2012a: 32–35) suggests a list of eight stages of pluricentricity at different levels of development. At one extreme end we find languages with varieties that have no territory of their own and which lack any official recognition through status or corpus planning. Muhr illustrates this fragile, incipient stage of pluricentricity with West-Armenian, a variety linguistically distinct from East Armenian: there is a large diaspora of Armenians dispersed into several countries through migration, but their language lacks recognition in the receiving countries. Steps 2–4 all involve restrictions on the acceptance of pluricentricity, from varieties with no recognition at all (e.g. Russian in the Baltic states), to those lacking appropriate status as a state or regional language (e.g. Hungarian in Slovakia, Romania or Serbia), or those being denied pluricentric status by the dominant variety (characteristic of languages with a high level of centralisation, e.g. French or Italian). The critical dividing line goes between steps 4 and 5: from step 5 onwards, "the pluricentric status and the national norm of a variety is *acknowledged and accepted by the language communities*, and serves as a *means of identity building* (p. 34, emphasis in original) resulting in the codification and promotion of national norms.

2.3   Problematic hierarchies

The division of national varieties into a binary dichotomy of dominant or non-dominant does not, however, capture the nature of pluricentricity fully. Ulrich Ammon suggests that a pluricentric language may display different degrees of symmetry (1989: 91). Based on whether a national standard variety takes its models and rules from within the nation (endonormativity), or from outside the nation (exonormativity) Ammon (ibid. pp. 90–91) distinguishes four types of national centres: *full centres, nearly full centres, semi centres* and *rudimentary centres*. A full centre displays full endonormativity and a rudimentary centre full exonormativity with the other two representing positions inbetween. While this may be helpful for identifying levels of (a)symmetrical relationships between national varieties, the description of different types of centres is still hierarchical in nature, and indeed the word 'centre' suggests that a periphery exists as well.

English provides an illustration of a language with degrees of asymmetrical relationships between its national varieties. As a colonial language English spread world-wide from England of course, but it would make little sense to consider British English as the sole dominant variety today, or Britain as the core area (cf. Leitner 1992: 207). Applied to English, both Britain and the United States are full centres in Ammon's sense, displaying fairly symmetrical relationships, while nativized varieties, e.g. Indian English or Singapore English, are the least dominant, with other national varieties, such as Australian, New Zealand and South African English, somewhere in-between. However, power relationships between different national varieties are not static, but may change over time

due to economic, political and demographic changes. Take for instance standard Australian English, a national variety which has gained internal and external acceptance leading to increased prestige despite its numerical and economic relative insignificance on the world scene. To a large extent, this has been achieved through intensive codification, aided also by overseas marketing of Australia as a destination for travel and higher education. Kretzenbacher (2012) draws our attention to the fact that national standard varieties may be dominant and non-dominant at the same time, and cites Australian standard English which has a dominant role in the Pacific region while it is non-dominant in relation to e.g. American English. Furthermore, English also stands out through its role as the global lingua franca (ELF) for international communication – providing a super-national variety of sorts and further complicating a binary dominance/non-dominance model.

2.4   Pluricentric languages and identity

Yet another dimension of pluricentricity concerns the role a variety has for expressing national, ethnic and cultural identities. In his ground-breaking work on pluricentric languages Michael Clyne makes the point that "[p]luricentric languages are both unifiers and dividers of peoples. They unify people through the use of language and separate them through the development of national norms and indices and linguistic variables with which the speakers identify" (Clyne 1992a: 1). Arguably, any language – monocentric or pluricentric – serves such identity purposes, but in the case of a pluricentric language where the linguistic distance between the national standard varieties is comparatively negligible, the identity function becomes particularly salient.

On the one hand, a national variety needs enough unique linguistic and pragmatic characteristics for it to be understood as a separate variety; on the other hand, it needs to share enough features with other varieties to be perceived as part of the same language. Accordingly, a pluricentric language with at least two varieties is a development based on the *Ausbau*[3] principle where even slight differences, e.g. in pronunciation, vocabulary, grammar or spelling serve as symbols of shared national/cultural identity, while at the same time marking difference to other national varieties.

For political and ideological reasons, even minor linguistic differences between varieties can be the target for codification and standardisation in order to maximize distance between national varieties. Sometimes such a process is the first stage towards a separate language. The (ongoing) development of Serbo-Croatian into several separate languages in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing formation of new nation states

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3. Kloss (1967) coined the term *Ausbau languages* for related languages made different by functional development (e.g. Danish and Swedish) in contrast to *Abstand languages* that are linguistically unrelated languages (e.g. Finnish and Swedish).

serves as a relatively recent illustration of an ideologically and politically driven differentiation process. On purely linguistic grounds Serbian and Croatian are (still) mutually intelligible varieties, but of course, through continued differentiation they may well cease to be so. A parallel, but less frequently cited example, is Meänkieli, a variety of Finnish spoken in the Torne Valley of the border region between Finland and Sweden. In Sweden, Finnish and Meänkieli are both recognised as minority languages with regional official status (Hyltenstam 1999) while the closely related varieties of Meänkieli spoken in the Torne Valley in Finland are seen as dialects of Finnish (Vaattovaara 2012).

2.5   Attitudes and perceptions

A further dimension of the asymmetrical relationships between national varieties concerns speaker attitudes and perceptions. For instance, speakers of dominant varieties have been found to show less interest in, and have poorer knowledge of, non-dominant varieties than vice versa, or to be ignorant of their existence altogether (Clyne 1992b: 460). In turn, this behaviour is linked to the inclination among members of dominant nations to view their own national variety as *the* standard, while they may regard other national standard varieties as "deviant, non-standard and exotic, cute, charming and somewhat archaic" (Clyne 1992b: 459). Awareness of characteristics of the dominant variety is also generally much greater than for other varieties. For example, Clyne, Norrby & Warren (2009: 145–146) found that the participants they interviewed from Finland generally displayed much greater knowledge of linguistic and cultural features associated with Sweden than vice versa: only 3% of Finland-Swedish participants claimed to lack such awareness whereas as many as 40% of participants from Sweden claimed to be ignorant of Finland Swedish.

Speakers of dominant varieties also sometimes confuse national variation with regional variation, showing little understanding of the identity function and symbolic power other national varieties have for their users. Speakers of dominant varieties may also believe that linguistic diversity exists only in spoken language, but not in the written standard (Clyne 1992b: 460). At the same time, speakers of non-dominant national varieties may converge towards the dominant national variety in intercultural settings when communicating with members of dominant national varieties, whereas the opposite is rarely the case. This further underscores the norm-setting prerogative of dominant varieties. They also tend to have more resources at hand for the dissemination of their national standard varieties – through extensive codification in grammars and dictionaries, the production of materials for foreign language teaching programmes overseas, or simply by being more globally available for large audiences through electronic and print media (Clyne 1992b: 459–460). Rudolf Muhr adds to the list of characteristics that linguistic change in the dominant variety is seen as a natural process, eventually leading to codification, while change initiated in non-dominant varieties is "more or less seen as

secessionist and a danger to the unity of the language" (Muhr 2012a: 29). In turn, such behaviour has been associated with a monocentric view, typical of dominant varieties, whose speakers tend to regard themselves as the true custodians of the correct norm and their nation as the true home of the language (Muhr ibid. p. 27).

2.6   Pluricentricity or pluriareality

Yet another question in research on pluricentric languages concerns whether the documented linguistic variation is best described from a pluri-*centric* or a pluri-*areal* perspective. A pluricentric perspective emphasises variation between different national standard varieties of a language, whereas a pluriareal perspective prioritises variation in language use in the entire geospatial space where the language is spoken, constituting a dialect continuum which does not stop at national borders. The latter has been applied particularly to the German-speaking area, which, for example, shows variation in use which follows north-south as well as east-west borders that cross the national borders of Austria, Germany and Switzerland (e.g. Auer 2014, Pickl et al. 2019). In other words, a pluriareal approach puts emphasis on cultural (dialect) borders and regional centres rather than political (national) borders and national centres.

The pluriareal approach has not been without its critics. The focus on linguistic form – particularly on lexical similarities across a continuous area which traverses national borders – downplays the symbolic value of national standard varieties for expressing unity and shared social identity. The controversies over pluricentricity versus pluriareality have largely been confined to the domain of the German language, and it has been argued that the concept of pluriareality threatens how national standard varieties of German are valued and that the pluriareal approach adheres to an axiom of a single standard German (Dollinger 2019a, 2019b).

Leaving controversies aside, it is probably fair to say that researchers representing dominant varieties have been more occupied with variation per se, downplaying national difference, whereas those committed to non-dominant varieties have prioritised difference from the dominant nation(s) in a bid to raise greater awareness of, and increased linguistic capital for their national varieties. Accordingly, there has been a call for *pluricentric linguistic justice* between varieties of pluricentric languages (Oakes & Peled 2017). Using French, and in particular Quebec French as their example, Oakes and Peled argue that pluricentric theory and practice need to move beyond empirical description in favour of an exploration into "the normative issues that transpire from the tension between a pluricentric reality and a monocentric ideology and consider possible policies that may be developed and applied in response to this tension" (Oakes & Peled 2017: 105). In particular, they discuss the emergence of Standard Quebec French and the challenges involved in justifying its existence, both in relation to English, the nationally

dominant language in Canada, and Standard French in France as the dominant and "correct" norm, as well as local spoken varieties in Quebec.

3.   Foundational work on pluricentric languages

Research on pluricentric languages can be traced back to the 1980s (e.g. Clyne 1985) and includes both theoretical and empirical accounts of pluricentricity. A large body of the existing pluricentric work to date concerns the status of varieties, especially non-dominant varieties, evident in edited volumes such as Clyne (1992d), Muhr (2012b, 2016a, 2016b), Muhr et al. (2013, 2020), Muhr and Marley (2015), Muhr and Meisnizter (2018). Another theme dealt with in many studies on pluricentric languages is structural-linguistic differences between dominant and non-dominant varieties. The focus is typically on the non-dominant variety or varieties, describing what differences can be found on various levels of language compared to dominant varieties. For example, the seminal edited volume by Clyne (1992d) offers overviews of linguistic differences within pluricentric languages for most of the languages included. The focus in these overviews is mainly on phonology, morphology, syntax and lexis, but for some languages (e.g. Portuguese, Swedish, Korean) pragmatic differences are also commented on briefly.

The extent to which differences between dominant and non-dominant varieties have been explored and documented systematically varies between languages. For example, Portuguese comes forth as a very well-documented pluricentric language (cf. Baxter 1992). Phonological, morphological and lexical traits of some non-dominant varieties, such as Finland Swedish, have been documented systematically for a long time (cf. Ivars 2005, Reuter 2005) whereas non-dominant varieties of some much larger languages, such as German and French, have been documented less (cf. Clyne 1989, 1992c; Lüdi 1992).

Much of the work of documenting features of pluricentric varieties has been carried out within the realm of language planning, which typically aims at addressing speakers of a particular language or even a particular (non-dominant) variety of that language on a national level. Such documentation may be difficult to access, not the least due to language obstacles. One of the main purposes of the 1992 volume on pluricentric languages was hence also to gather "comparative data on the situation of a representative selection of pluricentric languages throughout the world" (Clyne 1992a: 2). This has also been the purpose of the Working Group on Non-dominating Varieties of Puricentric Languages (NDV) established in 2010. The NDV network has organized conferences on an annual or biannual basis, which has resulted in several volumes documenting pluricentric languages, especially non-dominant varieties, from a number of perspectives (see references above). Among studies not dealing explicitly with the status of pluricentric varieties, comparisons of pronunciation and vocabulary dominate in the NDV volumes. Some studies analyzing syntactic features can be found, many of which concern Por-

tuguese (e.g., Bazenga 2012, Duarte et al. 2018). In addition to this, there are some studies on the use of pronouns and terms of address (Kretzenbacher et al. 2013, Henricson et al. 2015, Mendes et al. 2015) as well as a few dealing with discourse or interaction in a broader sense (e.g. Norrby et al. 2012).

Comparing pluricentric languages and varieties cross-linguistically is not a completely straight-forward task. Despite showing many similar features, each pluricentric language and pluricentric variety is embedded in a historical and societal context of its own. In some cases, comparisons between pluricentric languages and situations have, however, turned out to be feasible and fruitful. This is the case with, for example, the non-dominant varieties of Dutch spoken in Belgium (Flemish) and Swedish spoken in Finland (Finland Swedish). As shown by Bijvoet and Laureys (2001), Flemish and Finland Swedish share a number of features. Being spoken in bilingual countries both varieties make use of loan words from the other language spoken in the same country (French, Finnish). Archaisms and dialectal words and forms are more typical than in the dominant Dutch and Swedish varieties in the Netherlands and Sweden, respectively. Speakers of Flemish and Finland Swedish also show a similar ambivalence towards the dominant variety and norm centre in the neighbouring country at the same time displaying tendencies of purism and hypercorrection.

While the pluricentric constellations in the Dutch- and Swedish-speaking areas (in Europe) are fairly similar and enable direct comparisons at various levels of language, the socio-historical and linguistic context of other pluricentric languages may look quite different. This is the case not the least with German, which is spoken in a larger number of countries than Dutch and Swedish, and in addition also displays a fair amount of variation within these countries. As discussed in Section 2, some scholars have accordingly argued that German should be described as a pluriareal language rather than a pluricentric one. Nonetheless, studies have shown that some typical differing features can be found on a national level also for German, not only concerning levels such as pronunciation, morphology and vocabulary (Clyne 1992b), but also pragmatic levels of language use (Muhr 2008), including, for example, address patterns (Kretzenbacher & Schüpbach 2015: 33–53).

4.   Development of the field: From structural to pragmatic variation

As is evident from the above, most research on pluricentric languages has focused on structural differences. In a bid to broaden the scope of research on pluricentric languages, *variational pragmatics*, first introduced by Anne Barron and Klaus P. Schneider in the mid-2000s, has been developed. Variational pragmatics is situated at the interface between pragmatics and variational linguistics (Schneider & Barron 2008a, 2008b: 1) and the aim is basically to 'dialectologize' pragmatics and 'pragmaticize' dialectology

(Schneider 2010). Studies within this field typically focus on how different pragmatic routines and speech acts vary between varieties of a language (see e.g. Schneider & Barron 2008a and the contributions therein). As such, variational pragmatics could be seen as a sub-discipline of intercultural pragmatics, but rather than investigating pragmatic differences between languages, variational pragmatics highlights pragmatic variation within one and the same language.

In variational pragmatics, five levels of possible analysis are proposed: (1) *the formal level* (e.g. discourse particles and mitigators), (2) *the actional level* (the realisation and modification of speech acts), (3) *the interactional level* (how speech acts are combined into larger stretches of discourse, such as sequences and phases), (4) *the topic level* (e.g. topic selection and development, but also what topics are considered suitable in various social contexts), and (5) *the organisational level* (how pauses, overlaps and backchanneling cues are used). More recently, stylistic variation and non-verbal behaviour (e.g. prosody and bodily conduct) have been added to the list of levels for investigation of pragmatic variation (Schneider 2019).

Research on pluricentric languages is in general concerned with national varieties of a language, and treat geographical space in terms of nation. Within variational pragmatics, geographical space is more often discussed in terms of region. While traditional dialectology has focussed mainly on describing regional variation within a nation, variational pragmatics treats region as a variable which can be examined across national borders and where national variation is subsumed under regional variation (Schneider & Barron 2008b: 17). In this respect, variational pragmatics is similar to the pluriareal approach where regional variation takes precedence over national variation.

Besides geographical space, variational pragmatics includes social space in its scope of inquiry. This enables a systematic investigation of the interrelationship between *macro-pragmatic* variation at the societal level, referring to different socio-historical developments between nations, and *micro-pragmatic* features of language interaction and use (cf. Muhr 2008). Social factors which may play a role in micro-pragmatic variation are, in addition to nation/region, aspects of age, gender, socio-economic status and ethnic identity. In much research on pluricentric languages, speakers of a national variety have been considered a homogeneous group, and little importance has been given to inter-individual variation between speakers of a variety. In response to this, variational pragmatics sets out to "redress a traditional bias in cross-cultural and intercultural pragmatics which viewed languages implicitly as homogeneous wholes with macro-social variation largely abstracted away" (Barron 2015: 450).

In the early variational pragmatic work the focus was predominantly on regional (mostly national) variation rather than social variation (see e.g. Schneider & Barron 2008a and the contributions therein). However, macro-social factors, such as age and gender, form an important part in understanding more fully pragmatic variation between different data sets (see e.g. Schneider 2012). A study on address practises in the

pluricentric languages English, German and Swedish (Clyne et al. 2009) showed how the choice of address forms is sensitive not only to the variable nation, but also that several other factors such as social distance, age, speaker status, domains and medium are equally important, thus problematizing the notion of nation in the study of pluricentric languages. Norrby et al. (2019) compared reported preferred introduction routines in first encounters at international conferences among speakers of American, Australian and British English. Overall, they found national variation with the American respondents favouring the most formal, and the Australians the most informal introductions with the British respondents in-between. However, all displayed similar situational sensitivities, preferring the least formal style when introducing oneself, and the most formal when introducing others. In addition, age/seniority and hierarchy were important factors for determining what style of introduction to use, suggesting that nation is only one variable among several that determine pragmatic variation.

In contrast to some pragmatic traditions, studies in variational pragmatics are firmly based on empirical data. Here, both experimental data, such as discourse completion tasks (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989), as well as naturally-occurring data, have been utilised. In the latter case, existing large electronic corpora of spoken discourse have been extensively used. Much of this research has been quantitative in nature, although qualitative studies also exist (Barron 2017), and often focus on the realisation of various speech acts such as requests, apologies, promises, thanking etc., across pluricentric varieties. A growing body of pragmatic research has taken an increasingly interactional perspective by studying how speech acts are combined in longer stretches at talk in data drawn from recordings of face-to-face interactions in different contexts. Félix-Brasdefer (2015), for instance, investigated service interactions in Mexico and the USA with a focus on the organization of interactions between staff and customers, e.g. the opening and closing of exchanges, requests and responses (see also Placencia 2008, Félix-Brasdefer & Placencia 2019 and contributions therein).

5.   Pluricentric languages from the perspective of social interaction

As outlined in the previous section, variational pragmatics offers an avenue to compare pragmatic variation in pluricentric languages at various levels of discourse. Some studies have also focused more specifically on the sequentiality of real-time social interaction and deployed methods from Conversation Analysis (CA) and interactional (socio)linguistics. The basic tenet is that actions are sequentially organized through turn-taking and co-constructed by the participants. The central quest is to study how speakers understand and respond to the actions they produce in interaction with one another, and how and why participants make use of certain forms of action at a given point of talk. In the context of investigating pluricentric languages, the analyst thus needs to operate on two

levels: (1) focusing an interactional practice (e.g. the action of making a 'request') and the methods the participants use to produce a recognizable (or typical) action, and (2) identifying the macro-social meanings that are reflected by the forms of action that recur among the speakers of a variety.

Studies in this interactional vein suggest that varieties may differ in the way actions are sequenced. Using data from theatre box interactions, Lindström & Wide (2017) compared the sequencing of requests among Finland-Swedish and Sweden-Swedish customers. The Finland-Swedish customers tended to initiate the purchase with a pre-request concerning the availability of tickets (e.g. *Do you have tickets to Hamlet?*), formulating the proper request (e.g. *I would like to have two*) only after the salesperson had confirmed availability. By contrast, the Sweden-Swedish customers favoured a request formulation in one turn, and thus a preference for a more direct interactional style. Flöck's (2016) study of requests in British and American English also suggests differences of this kind, as the British speakers in her data displayed a slightly higher preference for preparatory request strategies. As regards thanking sequences, we can note Grahn's (2017) study of Sweden-Swedish and Finland-Swedish doctor–patient interactions. Reciprocity in thanking was clearly preferred among the Sweden-Swedish participants, while the Finland-Swedish participants responded in various ways, not necessarily by returning a "thank you". Such differences may affect the smoothness of communication in cross-variety interaction if a speaker of one variety experiences reciprocity in thanking being noticeably absent.

There are reports on differences in interactional style that go beyond sequencing of actions. Haugh (2017) compared mockery and (non-)seriousness in interactions between previously unacquainted Americans and Australians, and concluded that some differences seem to exist between American English and Australian English speakers in what is considered appropriate objects of jocular mockery. For example, it is suggested that ethnicity and race are usually not acceptable subjects for teasing and mockery among Americans, whereas there could be other problematic subjects among Australians.

Interactional style is also at issue in a study by Bergen et al. (2017) on British and American patients' resistance to doctors' treatment recommendations in primary care situations. They found differences between the two varieties of English in the patients' expectations of medical prescriptions: The British patients showed a resistance to recommendations for any treatment as well as tended to display an expectation of restricted prescription, whereas the American patients tended to resist recommendations for non-prescription treatment and display an expectation of prescription treatment.

In another study of similarities and differences between American English and British English, Reber (forthc.) examines the forms and functions of elliptical constructions deployed in the opening question–answer sequences of British and American post-match interviews, and found that elliptical nominal constructions are much more

common in the British English data set. She discusses whether the preference for an elliptical style in the British English post-match interviews is reflective of a higher routinization and affectivity of the genre in this culture, possibly pointing to a British English rhetoric of praise compared to an American English "rhetoric of factual description" (Edwards 2000) in this genre.

Also, the way in which feedback tokens are produced may differ as shown by Henricson & Nelson (2017) in a study on giving and receiving advice in a higher education setting. They found that the Sweden-Swedish students responded more often and in a more elaborate way to the academic supervisors' comments on a text assignment, whereas the feedback tokens produced by the Finland-Swedish students were sparser. These observations seem to align with the findings by Lindström et al. (2019) on task-completing assessments in Swedish service encounters. The study reports that assessments in sequence closing third turns are a common feature of request–compliance sequences (viz. request–delivery–assessment). However, the speakers of the two national varieties of Swedish displayed different preferences for assessing: the Finland-Swedish customers predominantly assessed with low-grade terms (e.g. *good*) while the Sweden-Swedish customers tended to use high-grade assessments in the third turn (e.g. *super good, splendid, brilliant*). The cumulative evidence from a large number of service encounters thus suggest that the speakers from Sweden and Finland respectively operate on a different interactional metric in their assessment behavior.

Studies of the above kind demonstrate that systematic analyses of interactional routines in varieties of the same language in separate cultural settings can yield new insights into possible universal and culture specific patterns for communication and how these are mediated through linguistic means. Such an interactional perspective also draws our attention to the fact that "nation" or "region" do not affect speakers of those nations and places to speak in a certain way, but rather that the speakers of varieties in those places create and re-create pragmatic patterns together in interaction. In this manner, Conversation Analysis offers an orderly method for making discoveries of participants' micro-social conduct in real-world encounters (rather than reported usage), enabling a uniform scrutiny of the underlying norms regulating action formation. Future research will add to our understanding of these processes, possibly also involving other areas of social interaction than the participants' lexical and syntactic output. Prosody in conversation provides intriguing avenues of research for comparisons between varieties. For example, in a study on prosodic patterns in *other-repetition*, Couper-Kuhlen (2020) found some differences in how American English and British English speakers deploy prosody in the delivery of the repetition turn in expressing repair or unexpectedness. Differences may also surface in embodied conduct. Nilsson et al. (2018) report in a study of greeting sequences that, although sequentially identical, the duration and timing for mutual gaze in relation to a verbal greeting differed between the speakers of Finland Swedish and Sweden Swedish.

As in all fine-grained studies of social interaction, the challenge is to create an understanding of how tendencies in the micro-level of interaction are relevant for explaining differences in the macro-level socio-cultural contexts of a pluricentric language. The qualitative nature of conversation analytic methodology also poses a challenge for data sampling in a pluricentric framework. The researcher must pay attention to representativeness or possible skewings as regards the participants' age, gender and regional background.

6.   Conclusion and outlook

Research on pluricentricity has largely – as the name suggests – focused on varieties of languages that have the status as principal or official languages in at least two countries. However, there has also been considerable work from a pluriareal perspective, where regional variation is the primary concern. This entails that the significance of concepts such as nation and national borders for variation are downplayed in favour of the import of regional variation, which can traverse national borders. In particular, pluriareality has been applied to situations of dialect continua, where the same word forms and vocabulary items are diffused over a larger continuous area irrespective of any national borders. A consequence of a pluriareal approach is, of course, that it also accounts for regional variation within a nation. As outlined above in Section 2, a somewhat heated debate has been played out between the proponents of pluricentricity and those who advocate a pluriareal approach. Whatever the future holds with respect to this debate, it is probably fair to conclude that the argument to date mostly has been a concern of linguists from the German-speaking countries. The symbolic significance of standard national varieties as means for expressing unity and a shared socio-cultural identity is usually played down in pluriareal approaches. As a result, a certain lexical item may be the standard norm in one nation, but a non-standard, dialect form in another nation.

The different positions can also be traced back to the asymmetrical power relationships that exist between different varieties of pluricentric languages. A pluricentric language is often described in terms of dominance where there is a hierarchical ordering with one dominant variety, and one or several non-dominant varieties, with the dominant variety exerting more influence over the other varieties than vice versa. However, in reality the power relationships are often much more complex, and are a result of the particular historical and socio-cultural circumstances of each pluricentric language. For example, globally diffused languages, such as English or Spanish, are present in many national standard varieties where it is not possible to order these hierarchically with one national variety as the unquestioned dominant one. In post-colonial contexts a nativized variety may be used as a national language, and be assigned high status on the national linguistic market, while at the same time lacking such prestige on a global market. Gen-

erally speaking, there is also substantial internal variation within national varieties where individual speakers differ in their linguistic output. In short, a focus on standard national varieties by necessity emphasises commonalities at a fairly abstract level while downplaying the considerable variation that exists in concrete language use.

Much work on pluricentric languages to date concerns linguistic-structural differences between different national varieties. In particular, there has been a keen interest in documenting the structural characteristics of non-dominant varieties, and how they differ from dominant ones. The focus has typically been on language as a system, but more recently we have also seen a growing interest in pragmatic and interactional variation of pluricentric languages. Such a shift to include also aspects of language in use is beneficial to the pluricentric field at large, as it facilitates a fuller description of the differences (and similarities) found between different varieties. More importantly, however, such a shift in research focus also advances the pluricentric field theoretically and methodologically. Moving the object of inquiry from the macro-level of dominance hierarchies and status relationships between national varieties to the micro-level of interactional data, enables a detailed investigation of how participants express and respond to various social actions (e.g. requests, assessments, compliments, etc.) in actual communication. Such a micro-perspective is standard practice in interactional (socio)linguistics and conversation analysis, but when incorporating these theoretical frameworks into pluricentric research the challenge is to relate the micro-level variation between different national varieties to the macro-level social organisation of the respective communities. How members of a certain community (e.g. a nation) express and understand social actions, what they talk about and not, are also key to their overall normative sociocultural orientations. From this follows that micro-level analyses of interactional data may advance our understanding of the sociocultural norms that are in place in the respective societies under investigation.

In terms of future development of the field, we are likely to see more research into the overall relationships between varieties of pluricentric languages. Recently there has been a call for investigations of pluricentric linguistic justice between standard national varieties of pluricentric languages. Many nations still operate according to a monocentric ideology of one nation – one language, but encounter a pluricentric reality within their borders. In the wake of globalisation and increased transnational mobility, intercultural and cross-cultural pragmatics might offer insights that will prove useful also for describing pluricentric relationships. The accumulated knowledge of structural, pragmatic and interactional differences between varieties of one and the same language may also be valuable for applied research in business, education, tourism and the service industry where speakers of different national varieties of a language are likely to come into contact.

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Universals

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1. Introduction

One of the hallmarks of human language is diversity, which is present at all levels (phonetic, phonological, lexical, grammatical, semantic, pragmatic). Indeed, diversity might arguably be instated as a "design feature" of human language, alongside arbitrariness, discreteness, displacement, productivity, rapid fade, interchangeability, etc. initially mooted by the American linguist Charles Hockett in an attempt to situate human language in an evolutionary context (Hockett 1960). Structural and functional variety and variation is a trait both within particular languages (as per Firth 1957: 29) and cross linguistically (as per Evans and Levinson 2009). The variation is however not without limits. The field of linguistic typology, broadly conceived, is concerned with discovering and explaining the extent of variation across languages and limitations on this variation (Comrie 1989: 33–34, 1994: 1). To capture this dual focus the field is sometimes referred to as (language/linguistic) *universals and typology*. Universals are those properties common to all (absolute) – or in a weakened sense (non-absolute), the majority of – human languages. Two types of universals are commonly distinguished in linguistic typology, non-implicational (possession of a feature) and implicational (where there is a relation of implication between two linguistic properties) – see further Comrie (1989: 17–18, 1994: 2).

The present paper is concerned with identifying and evaluating potential universals of pragmatics. The need for a dispassionate examination of such universals is pressing. A not infrequently voiced criticism of pragmatics as it has been traditionally practised is that it is English-based, Anglo-centric or at least is founded on a presumed WEIRD model of communicative practices – see e.g. Keenan (1976: 67); Wierzbicka (1991: 25); Comrie (1994: 6); Hanks, Ide and Katagiri (2009: 2); Senft (2014: 189); Ameka and Terkourafi (2019: 73). A closely related critique highlights the theoretically and/or philosophically driven nature of pragmatics (e.g. Verschueren 1985: 3, 1989: 8, fn.3), which can be expected to reflect the theoretician's cultural expectations of interaction. A number of the above cited works attempt in one way or another to take alternative, non-Anglo or non-WEIRD, viewpoints seriously and incorporate them into the foundations of pragmatics.

If we are to address the viability of pragmatic theories seriously they need to be tested on and in a diverse range of languages and cultures – to the extent to which this is possible in the modern world – not just a few languages spoken in a small selection of post-industrial societies, whose norms are implicitly presumed culturally neutral. The sample of languages selected for the testing of universals should be not only linguistically and culturally diverse, but also representative, in line with current practice in linguistic typology (see e.g. Rijkhoff and Bakker 1998; Bakker 2011 on language sampling methodology). I thus fully concur with Jef Verschueren's caution:

> Especially – but by no means only – in the domain of linguistic (inter)action or verbal behavior, the only safe starting point in this quest is an *assumption of minimal universality*: nothing should be considered a universal until conclusive evidence stemming from wide-ranging comparative research has been obtained. (Verschueren 1989: 8)

This does not, however, mean that we should adopt the putative "atheoretical" or "theory neutral" approach currently dominant in linguistic typology. Data is only data in relation to some theory. As Firth (1968: 43) put it, "a *fact* must be technically stated and find a place in a system of related statements, all of them arising from a theory". Nor does it imply that typology (including universals) is – or should be – "data-driven rather than theory-driven" as suggested by Comrie (1994: 1). To the contrary, I have argued (McGregor in press) that what is required is an approach to linguistic typology and universals that combines theory-driven and data-driven approaches, as implied by Firth's continuation of the above sentence "and found applicable in renewal of connection in experience".

The field of pragmatics is immense in scope, as revealed by the range of topics treated in handbooks such as this one and Horn and Ward (2004) (see also Verschueren 2012). It would be impossible to do justice to all the subfields within the scope of a single article. Accordingly in what follows I focus attention on a selection of what I consider to be the major subfields and topics of greatest interest and significance, especially in regard to the issue of universals. These are: speech acts (§2), the Gricean cooperative principle and its maxims (§3), deixis (§4), reference (§5), and politeness and honorifics (§6). The final section, §7, winds up the paper with a brief conclusion.

2. Speech acts

Fundamental to the theory of speech acts are two notions: first that utterances of all types are acts, and second that a distinction must be drawn between the meaning expressed by an utterance and the way in which it is used (its 'force') (Sbisà 2006: 3). There is ample evidence that certain types of speech act are culturally specific in terms of: (i) how they may be or are typically realised linguistically; (ii) under what conditions

they are felicitous; (iii) the type of response that is expected or appropriate; and indeed (iv) whether the particular speech act type exists at all.

As to (i), greetings and farewells are, for instance, realised linguistically via a range of rather different strategies both within and across languages and cultures. In a number of Australian Aboriginal societies of the Kimberley region of the far north west of the continent greetings are typically initiated with an utterance that translates as 'where (are you going)?' (and this is typically how they are phrased in the local English-lexicalised creole). To speakers of Standard Australian English, where this linguistic formulation is not typically used in greetings, the utterance is apt to have the perlocutionary force of a question, and they are often felt by non-Aboriginal people to be very intrusive.

Regarding (ii), compliments, complaints, criticisms and questions might be felicitous under very different circumstances in different socio-cultural contexts. One wonders for example about the felicity of a question from a speaker who knows – and believes the addressee is aware that they know – the answer. Such a question is felicitous in the educational context in Western societies, but might not be in any context in a hunter-gatherer society.

As to (iii), the type of response that is deemed appropriate or acceptable to a speech act of a particular type may vary across cultures. Vague responses such as 'downwards' or 'to the east' are perfectly appropriate and normal responses to the greeting 'where (are you going)?' in Kimberley languages. By contrast, however, in Kilivila (Austronesian) spoken on the Trobriand Islands such a response to a similar greeting initiation 'where (are you going)?' is dispreferred, and the most appropriate response is as exact as possible (Senft 2014: 1).

It is generally presumed in conversation analytic work that certain pairings of speech act types are universal preferences, including e.g. invitations and acceptances/declines, offers and acceptances/rejections, and questions and answers. In an investigation of a range of languages and cultures, including hunting-gathering, agricultural and industrial, Stivers et al. (2009) find support for the view that questions select answers as preferred next speech act types, and that addressees regard themselves as accountable by either answering or accounting for non-answer responses. Again the universality of these expectations has been challenged in the context of Indigenous Australian languages. It has been observed that in a number of Australian Aboriginal societies questions are often not responded to, or are responded to after a very long interval (perhaps even months or years), and that there is indeed "no obligation on the addressee to answer a question" – non-answering does not, that is, solicit additional interactive work (Eades 1982; see also Walsh 1997; Gardner 2010). Questions in these societies may also differ in terms of their felicity conditions and/or in terms of their perceived imposition on the addressee (their degree of threat to the negative face of the addressee), such that in certain more sensitive circumstances they may tend to be avoided, or phrased less directly. Thus information seeking may be modelled more on an exchange of information than direct seeking of it.

To solicit information one might instead of a direct question employ a statement – thus providing information – in the expectation or hope of receiving the desired information in an elaborating or extending response that for example fills in missing details. For instance a speaker might make an incomplete statement such as "From there they went to …" in the hope that the addressee would fill in the item of information; or they might employ an indefinite "From there they went somewhere" in the hope that the addressee fills in the identity of the place. (Adjacency pairs of these types are of course well known in Conversation Analysis.)

Finally, in regard to (iv) there is a speech act type of naming a ship in English, but not, to the best of my knowledge, in any Aboriginal language I am familiar with. It is perhaps also the case that there is no speech act of thanking in these languages. See further e.g. Wierzbicka (2003: 25–65); Ameka and Terkourafi (2019: 74–75); Senft (2014: 29–31) on the cultural specificity of speech act types. It is widely presumed that basic speech act types such as statements, questions and commands – sometimes masquerading under the labels declarative, interrogative and imperative (terms I prefer to restrict to grammatical categories of mood) – are good contenders as universals (e.g. Velupillai 2012: 345; see also Searle 1969: 64), as are wishes, requests, and offers. Whilst such claims appear to be plausible, the range of basic universal speech act types bears further empirical examination, as does the line between them and non-basic speech act types.

Searle (1976: 2) proposes a classification of speech act types according to a range of dimensions of variation, including the illocutionary point, direction of fit, and expressed psychological state. He proposes a taxonomy of five basic illocutionary act categories (Searle 1976: 10): representatives (with word to world direction of fit, including acts of asserting, stating, concluding, describing), directives (world to word direction of fit, including commanding, asking, challenging), commissives (world to word direction of fit, including promising, pledging, threatening), expressives (no direction of fit, e.g. thanking, apologising, welcoming) and declarations (both directions of fit, e.g. nominating, appointing, christening, firing, etc.). The application of this classification scheme to some non-Western cultures has been challenged by some investigators (e.g. Rosaldo 1982 and Duranti 1988). Various other classification schemes have been proposed by scholars, including refinements of Austin's and Searle's schemes, classifications that pay attention to linguistic characteristics such as speech act verbs (e.g. Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981; Verschueren 1985, 1989) and modal verbs (Zaefferer 2001). It is not clear to me whether any of these alternative schemes yield more viable universals of speech act types – though this is the goal of some (e.g. Verschueren 1989).

Among the alternative classification schemes it may be worth briefly discussing a somewhat different classification scheme, namely the one suggested for English by Halliday (1985: 68–70). This classification of speech acts – which Halliday refers to as "speech functions" (apparently in a bid to distance himself from the discipline of pragmatics) – identifies two axes: the commodity exchanged (information vs. goods-

&-services) and the role in the exchange (giving vs. demanding). (The former axis correlates to some extent with 'direction of fit' in Searle's scheme.) This scheme is intended to account for the grammatical system of clausal mood in English: moods are effectively grammaticalisations of the corresponding speech function types. (Indirect speech acts are accounted for as instances of grammatical metaphor.) However, Halliday evidently sees this classification as more widely applicable, commenting that languages generally do not develop special grammatical resources for the expression of goods-&-services speech functions, and are more likely to develop grammatical systems for information speech functions, which he sees as the more marked type of speech act, that is acquired later by the child.

Matthiessen (2004: 610–625) deploys the Hallidayan scheme as an underpinning for his typology of grammatical mood systems, which effectively assumes categories of declarative, polar interrogative and imperative as universals (Matthiessen 2004: 611). It is however an empirical fact that not all languages distinguish these three modal categories, and may instead distinguish categories that do not correspond in any unmarked fashion to the Hallidayan speech function categories.

For instance, Gooniyandi (Bunuban, Australia) appears to lack both polar interrogatives and imperatives as separate grammatical categories (McGregor 1990: 369, 382–383). Instead it has an emically distinct exclamative mood (McGregor 1990: 383) that contrasts with an assertive (perhaps declarative) mood and two other non-assertive moods, subjunctive and factive, which effectively mark the proposition as something entertained or assumed as fact – and thus beyond questions of truth or falsity (McGregor 1990). The lack of separate interrogative and imperative moods does not, it must be stressed, mean that Gooniyandi people do not employ and recognise speech act types of question or commands. They manifestly do. However, these speech act types are typically realised as clauses in the assertive/declarative mood, a mood that is far less specific in its meaning than the declarative of a language that contrasts declarative with interrogative and imperative moods. And whereas a declarative used to ask a question in English would represent an indirect speech act, this would not necessarily be the case in Gooniyandi, where other indexes of indirection (e.g. in terms of the expressed content) would need to be present.

To sum up, it seems possible that there are some basic speech act types that could be claimed to be universal, including possibly statements, questions, and commands; many other less 'basic' speech act types are almost certainly not universal. The typical or unmarked linguistic realisations of the basic speech act types is likely to show considerable variety across languages and cultures, as are the circumstances in which the act types are felicitous and the meanings conveyed by indirect speech act types. The possibility of a universal classification scheme for speech act types seems somewhat dubious.

3.   Grice's cooperative principle

To account for the logic of conversation Grice (1975, 1989) proposed the Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange" (Grice 1989: 26). This principle is characterised in terms of four maxims – Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner – which guide the inferencing of those aspects of the meaning of an utterance that are not actually coded in linguistic form. See Levinson (1995) for arguments that not all of the meaning of an utterance is coded, that a significant part must be inferred. For this to be possible, it is of course necessary that the principles whereby inferences are drawn be shared by interlocutors.

The cooperative principle and maxims were proposed by Grice as universals (though all of his examples are in English), and are widely assumed to be so in the pragmatics literature (e.g. Levinson 2000: 15; Horn 2004: 8), including in most textbooks. However, there have been many dissenting voices, especially from researchers working in ethnographic linguistics, who have argued that the Gricean system is or may be inapplicable in certain non-Western contexts (see e.g. Keenan 1976; Matsumoto 1989; Lakoff 1994: §3; Senft 2014: 37–39; Ameka and Terkourafi 2019: 75–76). The first challenge, Keenan (1976), was based on her ethnographic fieldwork on Malagasy (Austronesian, Madagascar). Keenan (1976: 70) observes that Malagasy speech interactants regularly violate the maxim of Quantity, specifically the submaxim "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)". She remarks that interlocutors "regularly provide less information than is required by their conversational partner, even though they have access to the necessary information" (Keenan 1976: 70). Furthermore, the failure to provide specific information is not normally taken by the addressee to imply that the speaker is unable to provide that more specific information: "The implicature is not made, because the expectation that speakers will satisfy informational needs is not a basic norm".

Since Keenan (1976) other challenges have been voiced to the universality of Gricean maxims, including the maxims of Quality and Manner. For example, Senft (2008) argues that neither of these maxims holds for certain highly ritualised forms of Kilivila speech, or for the default style of indirect speech, called *biga sopa*. (One might wonder whether Quality holds in all speech styles in the West, for instance, whether it holds in bullshitting, where the truth or falsity of the uttered proposition is irrelevant – Frankfurt 2005: 55.) More recently, Ameka and Terkourafi (2019: 76) have proposed that the maxim of Manner "Be perspicuous" is not adhered to in a number of African cultures. They suggest that in many African cultures "Be opaque" is the appropriate maxim, with submaxims "Be obscure [Use veiled speech]", "Be ambiguous", "Be long-winded", and "Be circuitous" (Ameka and Terkourafi 2019: 76).

Critiques such as these have not been ignored in mainstream pragmatics. Various scholars have concluded that in fact Keenan's findings support the Gricean Cooperative Principle and its maxims (e.g. Prince 1982; Brown and Levinson 1987:288–289; Smith 1999, cited in Horn 2004:27; Horn 2004:8, 27 fn.8). The qualification is invoked that expected standards of informativeness are culture-specific – that in the Malagasy case "as informative as required" invokes a lesser degree of informativeness than in the case of Western cultures. (See also e.g. Clyne 1994 who suggests a rider to the maxim of Quantity to the effect 'within the bounds of the discourse parameters of the given culture'.) Laurence Horn puts his Gricean rejoinder as follows (see also Prince 1982:5 for a similar remark):

> Keenan's depiction of cases where the maxim of quantity is overridden by cultural taboos in fact supports rather than refutes the Gricean narrative, since her evidence shows that it is just when the maxims are predicted to be in operation that they can be exploited to generate implicata.   (Horn 2004:27, fn.8)

I side with the opponents of universality of the Gricean maxims. It seems to me that if a particular norm is represented in certain conditions in a given language and culture, such as e.g. 'be opaque', then it is the flouting of this norm that will invoke implicatures, not its observance, as predicted by Gricean pragmatics. In the African case referred to by Ameka and Terkourafi (2019) this would mean that being opaque does not cause the interlocutor to infer any particular meaning, though flouting this norm and speaking plainly would. Similarly in the case of Malagasy the implicatures referred to by Horn above are expected to be drawn when the Gricean maxim of quantity is actually observed rather than when it is flouted. The norms of the society and language in particular interactional contexts are surely crucial in the inferencing processes.

Another rather different potential challenge to the universality of the Gricean maxims comes from the existence of culturally specific language ideologies that might adversely impinge on their operation. For example, Danziger (2006:261–262) documents a philosophy of language within the Mopan (Mayan) community in which linguistic expressions "transcend the volition of those who use them", and there is an unwillingness to construct hypotheses about speaker's intentions or states of mind. It would be expected that the type of inferencing process exemplified in standard illustrations of Gricean pragmatic inferencing that invoke the construal of speaker's intentions – ruminations such as "what could B have had in mind that he or she wants me to see would make Y in fact relevant to X?" (Grice 1989:51) – would be avoided in Mopan society.

Nonetheless, Danziger (2006:266) maintains that Mopan exchanges appear to invoke the assumption of compliance with the Gricean maxims. She suggests that in fact "maxim–compliant–compatible interpretations of utterances do not require recourse to guesses about what the speaker must have in mind, but only to inferences about what

is "naturally" entailed by the remark in its symptomatic relation to maxim compliance" (Danziger 2006: 267). Thus she suggests (Danziger 2006: 267) that the exchange A: *I am out of petrol;* B: *There is a garage around the corner* (Grice 1989: 51) can be understood without imputing any reasoning process to the interlocutor: "Speaker X ruminates "Y's remark B seems irrelevant to my own prior remark A. But it can't be [by maxim of relevance]. So *what could be the case that* would make A in fact relevant to B?" Answer (from A's own knowledge): A garage will have petrol to sell." The Cooperative Principle and its maxims do not require the construal of intentions or a theory of mind to generate implicatures.

The above-mentioned challenges to the universality of the Gricean maxims do not necessarily imply that the Cooperative Principle itself as such is not universal. There seems to be abundant evidence that cooperation is the default for human interaction (from outside of the field of pragmatics, e.g. Tomasello 1999, 2008, 2014), and that competition occurs within a matrix of cooperation. Indeed, the African anti-Manner maxim 'be opaque' can be readily interpreted as fundamentally cooperative.

Finally, it might be worth remarking that Grice drew a distinction between generalised conversational implicatures (GCIs) that are invoked regardless of and independently of the context and are invoked unless there are exceptional features in the context that disqualify them, and particularised conversational implicatures (PCIs) that are invoked by particular features of the context of the utterance. The status of this dichotomy has been widely debated, and there is much disagreement on how default interpretations – such as the inference from *some students are lazy* that not all students are lazy – should be treated (see Jaszczolt 2006 for discussion). Levinson (2000) refers to these default interpretations as "presumptive meanings", and defends the Gricean position that they should be treated as GCIs. To account for GCIs he proposes, instead of the Gricean maxims, a set of three heuristics or principles of linguistic reasoning that are followed by speech interactants encoding their utterances and in drawing inferences from them. These are: the Q-principle ('What isn't said isn't so'); the I-principle ('What is expressed minimally is stereotypically exemplified'); and the M-principle ('What is said in a marked (abnormal) way isn't normal – marked message, marked situation').

Levinson (2000) evidently considers his three heuristics to be universals. And indeed the case for universality of the heuristics would seem on the face of it to be more plausible than for the universality of the Gricean maxims. I am not however aware of the heuristics having put to the empirical test of a wide range of non-Western languages or cultures (although some interesting work has been done by Levinson and his colleagues in the domains of spatial language and positionals – e.g. Levinson 1999; Hellwig 2003; and the contributions to the special issue of *Linguistics* volume 45 issue 4/5 edited by Felix Ameka and Stephen Levinson). In this context it would be interesting to know whether the African anti-Manner maxim 'be longwinded' of Ameka and Terkourafi (2019) has a counterpart in an anti-I heuristic 'What is expressed maximally is

stereotypically exemplified'. Or whether the Q principle fails to operate in drawing GCIs Malagasy – could 'some' for instance not preclude 'all' as its default interpretation?

4.   Deixis

Another field prominent in pragmatic research is the domain of deixis, which "concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the *context of utterance* or *speech event*, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance" (Levinson 1983/1992: 54). Deixis is normally considered to fall into a range of distinct fields, including person, place, time, discourse and social deixis (on which see §6). These fields are organised around an origin or centre from the perspective of which a given referent is "located". This origin is typically the here-now of the speech situation, involving the speaker-hearer dyad, their present location and the time of the utterance. In many languages this origin can be shifted to the here-now of another speech situation in certain circumstances, such as reported speech, or to the protagonist as origin for person or spatial deixis in a narrative.

As Levinson (2004: 112) observes, it seems likely that deictic categories such as person, place, time and discourse are universal – every language presumably shows lexical and/or grammatical means of expressing them. However, the modes and systems of expression in grammatical and lexical categories are quite variable across languages, as will be seen below. Levinson (2004: 112) also notes two other important cautions. First, the (semantic, coded) meaning of deictic expressions is often poorly specified and "rarely properly investigated" in descriptive grammars and dictionaries. And second, typologies are scarce, though the situation has perhaps improved somewhat in the past decade (see e.g. Levinson et al. 2018 and Coniglio et al. 2018) for recent cross-linguistic work on demonstratives).

Systems of person deixis differ markedly across languages in terms of the distinctions that they make, their grammatical loci (e.g. as separate words, segmentable bound morphemes, or inflectional differences) and how and when they are employed in speech. The majority of languages distinguish three person categories, first, second and third. However, there is some doubt as to whether this represents an absolute universal, as briefly discussed below.

a.   It has sometimes been suggested that sign languages lack pronouns entirely, and employ gestures instead (Evans and Levinson 2009: 431, 435). The evidence from many sign-language sources, however, attests to the systematicity of signs distinguishing person categories in many sign languages – that they are not mere off-the-cuff gestures but comprise grammaticalised systems.

b.   Some Southeast Asian languages such as Thai apparently lack free as well as bound first and second pronouns (Levinson 2004: 112, citing Cooke 1968; cf. Enfield 2019: 173). Instead, titles such as 'servant' and 'master' are employed instead of first and second person pronouns.

c.   The secret initiate's language Damin of the Lardil people of northern Queensland shows a two term opposition between first person *n!a* and non-first *n!u* (Dixon 1980: 67); this however is almost certainly an invented language.

d.   Similar claims have been made at various times for a number of deaf sign languages (e.g. Meier 1990 for American Sign Language (ASL) and Engberg-Pedersen 1993: 133–136 for Danish Sign Language (DTS)) – that is, that they do not distinguish between second and third persons. However, more recent research indicates that there are certain differences between the signs for second and third persons in various sign languages, depending on features of eye gaze and the direction of pointing (Todd 2009; McGregor, Niemelä and Jepsen 2015: 216).

e.   A number of languages reportedly lack third person pronouns, and instead employ demonstratives or determiners in a pronoun-like fashion in reference to non-speech act participants (see Benveniste 1946/1971). Some languages – e.g. Gooniyandi and Nyulnyul (Nyulnyulan, Australia) – employ a third person singular form that is homophonous with a demonstrative, but which is revealed to be a distinct item by virtue of its case inflections, which follow those of other pronouns (not nominals, as in the case of the demonstrative).

f.   Lastly, it may be observed that there are systems of pronouns that distinguish more than three persons, such as the four person systems found in a number of languages including Rembarrnga (Gunwinjguan, Australia) (McKay 1978) and Nyulnyulan languages (e.g. McGregor 1989b, 2004: 113–114), which distinguish a separate person category comprising the speaker and hearer (and possibly others). In such systems first person is a rather different category to the first person of three person systems.

Systems of spatial deixis typically select an origin at the location of the speech interaction, often more specifically the speaker, and make two or more distinctions in terms of relative distance from that origin. As in the case of pronouns, a range of expression loci exist, including such prototypical ones as demonstrative determiners (pronominal and adnominal) and adverbials, as well as bound morphemes of various types (e.g. clitics, affixes) in some languages.

Two term systems of spatial deixis are quite common cross-linguistically, and typically distinguish proximal (a region relatively close to the speaker) from distal (a region more remote from the speaker) (Diessel 1999: 38). They are not, however, universal. There are languages (e.g. German and Danish) with one term demonstrative systems, where relative distance from the origin is not indicated, although in these languages deic-

tic adverbials do make a proximal/distal contrast, and may be employed in combination with the demonstrative.

On the other hand, many systems distinguish more than two degrees of distance. While it seems to be usually the case that one of the terms specifies proximity to the speaker, it seems that there is considerable variation in terms of what is marked by the other terms of the opposition, including different degrees of distance (mid vs. far; far vs. very far; distal vs. unmarked) and proximity to the addressee vs. distance from both interlocutors. Some systems have been said to distinguish visibility vs. non-visibility in the distal demonstrative. This has been widely reported from the indigenous languages of North America. Visibility seems somewhat questionable in a number of languages, including Yélî Dnye (Papuan, Rossel Island) (Levinson 2004:117) and Western Desert varieties (Pama-Nyungan, Australia), where the putative 'invisible' demonstrative appears not to be a spatial deictic at all, but instead is an endophoric determiner (a discourse dietic). Spatial deictics often mark other distinctions as well, including number, gender or class, category, and information on the spatial frame of reference (e.g. cardinal directions, elevation, upstream/downstream) – see further Diessel (1999). Suggestions have sometimes been made that the number of spatial deictic terms in a language relates inversely to the degree to which the environment is humanly constructed (e.g. Denny 1978:80). This has however been disputed.

As well as location in regard to relative distance from an origin, systems of spatial deixis can specify direction of movement with regard to the origin, again prototypically the speech situation or speaker. Many languages have verbs of 'coming' (towards the deictic centre) and 'going' (away from the deictic centre). But these are not universal. A considerable number of languages employ 'hither'/'thither' particles, clitics or inflections. And verbs 'come' and 'go' vary widely in terms of their coded meanings (see Wilkins and Hill 1995).

Time deixis is typically centred on the 'now' of the speech interaction, the moment of utterance, as the point of origin. The most common exponents of time deixis are probably tense systems and temporal adverbials; but there are often in languages a range of other means of specifying temporal deixis, including via spatial metaphor. Again neither systems of tense nor temporal adverbials are universal. As is well known, many languages – e.g. Mandarin Chinese (Sino-Tibetan, China), Malay (Austronesian, Malaysia) and Hopi (Uto-Aztecan, USA) – lack tense completely. Tense systems come in a wide variety of types, including absolute (with origin at the moment of speech) and relative (with an origin at some textually determined moment). Distinctions range from two (e.g. past/non-past; future/non-future) to around ten or so (where the categories may distinguish more or less precise spans of time such as 'earlier today' vs. 'yesterday' vs. 'prior to yesterday'). Tense systems are not always "pure" in the sense that they specify only temporal deixis: often aspectual and modal information is implicated, sometimes coded.

Temporal adverbials often distinguish absolute or relative time with respect to some origin, distinguishing prior, simultaneous and subsequent. These and other expressions may also make further distinctions in terms of natural units such as days or months (defined by the moon), or non-natural ones such as weeks. Some languages – for instance, Yucatec (Mayan, Mexico) – apparently lack both tense and relative time adverbials (Bohnemeyer 1998).

The term 'discourse deixis' – which also goes under the rubric endophoric reference (Halliday and Hasan 1976) – refers to indexical relations established within discourse, to items that have been previously mentioned or will be subsequently mentioned. The items referred to may be segments of the text or external entities that are established in the discourse. Presumably discourse deixis of both types is found in all languages. However, many languages – including English – do not have special grammatical resources for the encoding of discourse deixis. Instead spatial demonstratives and pronouns are employed, as well as expressions involving special lexical items (e.g. *the above discussion, the aforementioned*). On the other hand, there are languages with separate systems of endophoric determiners, that are employed exclusively in making reference within texts, to both stretches of text and to entities established within them. Thus Yélî Dnye has a single such determiner, which is employed anaphorically only and contrasts with spatial demonstratives that can be used cataphorically in endophoric reference (Levinson 2004: 119). Gooniyandi has two endophoric determiners, that contrast partly in terms of relative distance from an origin located at the present moment in the unfolding of the discourse (McGregor 1990: 144–145).

Speech is frequently accompanied by bodily gestures, which can be tightly integrated within it – to give just one example, in Guugu Yimithirr (Pama-Nyungan, Australia) a negative gesture preceding a positive statement can serve to negate that statement (Levinson 2006: 55). Indeed, the gesture theorist David McNeill has argued that speech and gesture go together to comprise a single unified system in human cognition (McNeill 2005). The pointing gesture is a likely universal deictic gesture, and appears to be employed in all human societies. Its realisation is not however universal: the index-finger point is disfavoured in some societies, perhaps to the point of not being employed at all; other pointing gestures are made with the eyes, puckered lips, the middle finger, the open hand, etc. See Wilkins (2003) for further discussion.

5.   Reference

We use language to talk about phenomena in the real or some imagined world. Reference is the process of identifying or selecting a particular entity or individual that one wants to talk about, where this might be a person, another living thing, an inanimate object, a place, an event, or whatever. There is a clear connection between reference and deixis.

The term reference as I employ it here concerns a type of act that speakers intend to achieve when speaking; this might be considered to be a sub-act in regard to the speech act types that we discussed in §2. Deixis by contrast does not refer to a type of act, but to one of the means that speakers employ to carry out an act of referring, by locating the intended phenomenon with respect to an assumed reference point, the origin. For example, time and spatial deixis can be employed in the act of identifying events; person and space deixis in the identification of people and other animates; spatial deixis in the identification of places; and time deixis in the identification of times. In this section I restrict attention to reference to people, this being one of the domains of reference that has attracted a good deal of attention in ethnographic linguistics in recent years.

A wide range of linguistic expression types are employed cross-linguistically in making reference to people. These include grammatical items such as pronouns and demonstratives – whether bound or free – and a range of lexical items including personal names, human classificatory terms (e.g. distinguishing people according to age, gender, occupation and the like), kinship terms, terms linking people to geographical regions and social groups, and so on. To this list we should also add ellipsis, the non-use of any overt linguistic item, which can also count as an act of referring – perhaps construed as an act of using a formal nothing, perhaps as a meaningful silence.

More precisely, it is the noun phrase (NP) that plays a central role in acts of reference, not the just mentioned linguistic units as such: it is when they are integrated into utterances in the shape of NPs (perhaps as the sole members) that these lexical and grammatical resources are typically employed referentially. McGregor (in press: chapter 3) argues for the universality of the category NP. There are of course exceptions: many languages show bound lexico-grammatical elements that are employed outside of NPs in making reference. For instance, in many languages bound pronominals – whose loci may e.g. be in the finite verb or in Wackernagel's position in the sentence – are deployed in acts of referring.

Many of the items referred to above are shared across languages – pronouns and demonstratives are presumably universal (see §4), as are presumably personal names, and names for social groups, though the range of subtypes and the categories they distinguish are likely to differ significantly across languages. However, it is well known that languages differ significantly in terms of how they (typically) employ lexico-grammatical units of the types mentioned above in achieving reference. For instance, in many (perhaps all) Indigenous Australian societies personal names (especially the most personal and individual of these, which are characterised in different ways in different Indigenous societies, but often referred to as *bush name* in the local English-lexicalised variety) were used more circumspectly than in the typical European society, where they are normally quite freely used. By contrast, in Indigenous Australian societies kin terms were widely employed in reference to everyone in the social universe (they were typically "universal" systems of kinship in the sense of Barnard 1978), not just members of one's close family.

Building on the Conversation Analytic treatment of person reference in Sacks and Schegloff (1979) (reprinted in Sacks and Schegloff 2007), Stivers, Enfield and Levinson (2007) propose a neo-Gricean social interactional theory of the phenomenon. Sacks and Schegloff (1979: 16–17) identify two interactional principles underlying the formulation and interpretation of expressions employed in discourse-initial reference in English conversations. The first is the preference for use of a recognitional form – a form that permits the recipient to identify who is being referred. This principle guides the speaker to choose a mode of reference that is appropriate and adequate for the interactants in the speech situation to identify the intended referent. The second is minimisation, the principle whereby a single or minimal reference form is preferred over multiple expressions. This principle may be seen as a manifestation of the Gricean maxim of Quantity (see §3). These two principles were proposed by Sacks and Schegloff (1979) to account for reference in English conversation, but assumed to apply more generally to other languages. Cross-linguistic support for them comes from ethnolinguistic studies including a number included in the edited volume Enfield and Stivers (2007); Blythe (2009, 2012) on Murrinh-Patha (Southern Daly, Australia); Garde (2013) on Bininj Gunwok (Gunwinjguan, Australia); and Hill (2018) on Umpila/Kuuku Ya'u (Pama-Nyungan, Australia).

Some additional principles have been proposed to account for the means of formulating initial reference cross-linguistically. For instance, Levinson (2007) proposes a principle of topic-fittedness whereby a speaker will fit lexical choice to the topic of the conversation – for instance, depending on the topic, the same individual might be referred to by a range of terms such as *woman, physicist, mother, Pole, Nobel Prize winner*, and so forth. Hill (2018) underlines the relevance of this principle in Umpila/Kuuku Ya'u narratives. Levinson also identifies what he refers to as a principle of circumspection to account for culturally based restrictions on use of certain types of expression such as personal names in certain contexts. This principle Garde (2013) accords primacy of over the principle of recognitionals in Bininj Gunwok, where it is often "not expected that the addressee should be able to achieve identification" of the intended referent (Garde 2013: 209).

As we saw for Levinson's heuristics, although there is suggestive evidence for the universal applicability of these principles of reference, we are a long way from having a secure case for universality. And here again it would be interesting to know whether in any of the languages where the Gricean maxims have been challenged there might be corresponding challenges to any of the referential principles. Could it be that in some of the African societies described by Ameka and Terkourafi (2019) the preference for minimisation needs to be replaced by a preference for non-minimal expressions?

6.   Politeness and honorifics

The most influential theory of politeness – proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) – is grounded in the Gricean cooperative principle and its maxims, to which it adds Goffman's notion of face (Goffman 1967). Among other things, this theory attempted to account for indirect speech acts (see §2) in terms of an assumed inverse relation between directness and politeness. The universality of this direction of association has not gone unchallenged (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1987; Kasper 1996:12; Ameka and Terkourafi 2019:76), plausible as it may appear in accounting for the use of certain indirect speech act types in Standard Average European (SAE) languages such as English (e.g. *it's cold in here* as a request to shut the window). (See also Wierzbicka 1985, who suggests that directness to speakers of Slavic languages may connote sincerity and straightforwardness rather than represent impositions on their negative face.)

The universality of the Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) theory of politeness has been widely questioned. For example, Matsumoto (1988) proposes that, while the notion of face may be universal, its components are culturally specific. She suggests in particular that the notion of negative face is problematic in the Japanese context, where "[a]cknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position of others, rather than preservation of an individual's proper territory, governs all social interaction" (Matsumoto 1988:404). (See also Ide 1989 and Kasper 1996:5–7; for a contrary view see Fukada and Asato 2004, who argue that it is possible to account for the Japanese facts in a manner consistent with the framework of Brown and Levinson 1987, once relevant cultural characteristics are taken into account.) More recently, Ameka and Terkourafi (2019:76–77) question whether the phenomenon of politeness is the same in the West, the East and Africa in terms of the individualistic orientation to the concepts of positive and negative face (Brown and Levinson 1987). And specifically in reference to the African context Nwoye (1992) and De Kadt (1998) propose that social or group face is the most relevant consideration.

Honorifics are conventionalised linguistic means of signalling politeness and deference, and thus represent social deictic elements (see above §4). (Strictly speaking, these should be specified as linguistic honorifics, as signs from other modalities may also be employed, sometimes accompanying linguistic ones.) This means, as (Irvine 1995: 2) observes, that honorifics belong to sentence-meaning whereas politeness concerns utterance-meaning in terms of Levinson (1995). And just as systems of clausal illocutionary mood may be seen as grammaticalisations of speech act types (as per §2 above), honorifics may be regarded as crystallisations of pragmatic politeness phenomena in the systems of particular languages.

The politeness or deference of honorifics may be directed from the speaker towards the addressee, to someone or something referred to, or to a bystander, a party present in the wider context of situation of the speech interaction who is not the addressee. Rarely,

another person's perspective is adopted other than the speaker, who may perform the act of deference on another's behalf (Irvine 1995: 11).

Honorifics show a wide range of different linguistic manifestations. Perhaps the most familiar example is in honorific pronouns. In a considerable number of languages including familiar ones such as French and Russian, as well as a number of Indigenous Australian languages and languages from other parts of the world, second person plural pronouns are employed in indexing deference to a single addressee. (The contexts of this deference are quite different – in the Australian case it is typically shown to an addressee in an avoidance kinship category, such as an in-law, "actual" or imputed.) Third person pronominal forms – or forms derived from them – are employed for this purpose in some languages, including Spanish, German and Amharic (Afro-Asiatic, Ethiopia), among many others. Both strategies are attested in some languages, e.g. Gooniyandi, where a closer avoidance kinsperson might be addressed with a third person form, a more distant one by a second person plural form. (One's closest avoidance kin might not be addressed at all.) While neither of these pronominal usage phenomena seems universal, both are quite widespread.

Another way in which number is deployed honorifically is illustrated by ChiBemba (Niger-Congo, Zambia) (Irvine 1995: 5–6). Nouns with singular human reference may be shifted from what is traditionally labelled class 1 (singular-human) to class 2 (plural-human) to index respect. Ordinary class 1 assignment of the noun may signify disrespect, while assignment to a non-human class (associated with large or small size or singularity) may be pejorative. For example, the nominal stem -*kaši* 'wife' used with singular reference may be assigned to at least five different noun classes: class 1 (ordinary singular human class) conveying a disrespectful sense, class 2 (plural-human class) with an honorific sense, class 12 (small size non-human class) with an insulting sense 'insignificant wife', class 7 (large size non-human class) with the pejorative sense 'gross wife', and class 5 (a singular non-human entity class) with a slightly derogatory sense '(egregious) wife'.

Another common mode of expressing honorification is via separate lexicon(s), e.g. the sets of graded lexical alternants of Javanese, and the special avoidance vocabularies of some Australian languages, including the widely known Dyirbal avoidance register Jalnguy in which virtually every lexeme of the ordinary language is replaced by a different form. Jalnguy is in fact an extreme case, and more frequently avoidance lexicons in Australian languages are quite restricted in size and semantic scope. Morphological expression of honorifics is also common, as also is phonetic or phonological variation of some sort. For instance, it is not uncommon in Indigenous Australian languages to find phonotactic differences between avoidance registers and the ordinary lexicon. In Gooniyandi (and a number of other languages) avoidance lexemes tend to be longer and to show more consonant clusters than ordinary lexemes (McGregor 1989a). Prosodic features also frequently distinguish avoidance registers from ordinary speech, including e.g. loudness and speed of delivery.

Connections between greater size of the linguistic sign (phonological, morphological or syntactic) and lessened specificity, precision or degree of individuation (plurality over singularity, and more general meanings) seem to be widespread in honorific systems, and are perhaps motivated.

7.   Conclusions

Evans and Levinson (2009) (see also Levinson and Evans 2010) argue that there are "vanishingly few" absolute universals of human languages, properties that are exhibited by all human languages without exception. The primary focus of these two articles is on linguistic form, on universals of language structures and systems. (Like a number of commentators, I feel that they are too ready to reject certain promising candidates as non-universals, for example the noun phrase – see above §5.) Evans and Levinson (2009) say little about pragmatics and issues of usage.

Levinson (2006), however, makes a quite compelling case for a 'human interaction engine', "a core universal set of proclivities and abilities that humans bring, by virtue of human nature, to the business of interaction" (Levinson 2006: 40). This interaction engine includes arguably pragmatic components such as Theory of Mind (the attribution of a mind to interlocutors, including a 'theory' of its 'contents' – the other's goals, intentions and so on – see e.g. Baron-Cohen 1998; Frith and Frith 2005; Astington 2006; Apperly 2011; cf. however the remarks of Danziger 2006 cited in §3 above), attention sharing and the Gricean cooperative principle, and is at least partly separate from both culture and language. Thus according to Levinson, the Gricean cooperative principle is not restricted to language, but applies pre-language, and informs our interpretation of e.g. nonce gestures. As we have seen in §3, however, the evidential basis for universality of the Gricean maxims is rather weak, and certainly does not measure up to the requirements of Verschueren (1989: 8). Nor does any other putative pragmatic universal discussed above. Much more intensive research on a diversity of languages and cultures is necessary before any proposed feature can be taken as a secure universal.

As indicated in the introductory section, I do not believe that this should inhibit us from postulating universals – though it does imply that there is a strong need for depth research on many languages. It seems to me that we will never be in the position of having complete sets of empirical data from all languages, allowing us to test pragmatic universals exhaustively. Part of the support for a universal will surely always be theoretical. Motivation or non-arbitrariness is also a consideration that could weigh on the possible strength of a putative universal. Thus there seems something plausibly iconic in Levinson's heuristics (e.g. more form more meaning), and perhaps to some of the connections between form and meaning in the domain of honorifics (more form greater degree of politeness).

As mentioned in §1, Evans and Levinson (2009) and Levinson and Evans (2010) propose diversity as a fundamental feature of human language. Their conception of diversity however is by and large limited to cross-linguistic diversity. I would add that intra-lingual diversity is also a central feature of human language; as J. R. Firth put it:

> Unity is the last concept that should be applied to language. Unity of language is the most fugitive of all unities, whether it be historical, geographical, national, or personal. There is no such thing as *une langue une* and there never has been.   (Firth 1957: 29)

Inter- and intra-lingual diversity is a good candidate for a Hockett-style design feature (McGregor in press). In this context one wonders whether such things as the Gricean cooperative principle and its attendant maxims hold sway across all socio-cultural contexts in which a given language is spoken – as hinted at for bullshitting in so-called "Anglo" societies in §3. Perhaps we should seriously consider changing focus from the search for universals of language structure and use to identifying and understanding their variety.

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Cumulative index

This index refers to the whole of the *Handbook of Pragmatics*, its **Manual** as well as the 22 installments (the present one included), and it lists:

i.   all labels used as entry headings in some part of the Handbook, with an indication of the part in which the entry is to be found, and with cross-references to other relevant entries;

ii.   labels for traditions, methods, and topics for which separate entries have not (yet) been provided, indicating the entry-labels under which information can be found and the part of the Handbook where this is to be found.

The following abbreviations are used:

(MT)   the Traditions section of the Manual
(MM)   the Methods section of the Manual
(MN)   the Notational Systems section of the Manual
(H)   the thematic main body of the loose-leaf Handbook or (from the 21st installment onwards) of the specific annual installment (marked as H21, H22, etc.)
(T)   the Traditions update/addenda of the printed Handbook (further specified for the bound volumes as T21, T22, etc.)
(M)   the Methods update/addenda of the printed Handbook (further specified for the bound volumes as M21, M22, etc.)
(N)   the Notational Systems update/addenda of the printed Handbook (further specified for the bound volumes as N21, N22, etc.)

References in the index may take the following forms:

"**Label (section reference)** (abbreviated as above)" — for labels which occur only as headings of an autonomous article
"**Label (section reference)**; label(s)" — for labels which occur as article headings and for which it is relevant to refer to other articles as well
"**Label** label(s)" — for labels which do not (yet) occur as article headings, but which stand for topics dealt with under the label(s) indicated
"**Label** → label(s)" — for labels that are considered, for the time being and for the purposes of the Handbook, as (near)equivalents of the label(s) following the arrow; a further search must start from the label(s) following the arrow

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