MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY

TAIWANESE PHILOSOPHY

Traditional Foundations and New Developments

Edited by Jana S. Rošker

Modern and Contemporary Taiwanese Philosophy

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Editor's Foreword

Jana S. Rošker

The present book is related to an unusual chapter of Chinese intellectual history. Largely, it is a collection of translations of texts on modern Taiwanese philosophy, which were originally written in Chinese, and mainly deal with traditional Chinese thought. However, this philosophy did not originate in mainland China, that is, in some supposedly logical "centre" of Chinese culture, but on its alleged "periphery," namely on the beautiful island of Taiwan. The main reason for compiling this book is thus to show to the wider circles of Western readers that Taiwanese philosophers have played an important role in the development of modern Chinese philosophy, and especially in the second half of the 20th century. Therefore, the book also includes several pioneering Western studies regarding the work of different modern and contemporary Taiwanese streams of thought.

In contrast to the mainland, Taiwanese philosophy of that time had almost no connection with either Marxism or any of the many streams of post-Marxist philosophy. While theorists from the PR China were mainly been dealing with various forms, issues and innovations in the field of the sinization of Marxism, those working in Taiwan devoted themselves to the exploration and adaptation of other forms of Western modernity, especially those deriving from Kant and German classical philosophy. They wanted to modernize their own (i.e. Chinese) traditions through the ideas of the European Enlightenment. While in the 1950s the Chinese conceptual tradition (in particular, Confucianism) on fell into disfavour and was often

prohibited, or at least severely criticized, on the mainland, Taiwanese philosophers were constantly striving for its preservation and development.

However, at issue was not only the preservation of tradition; in the second half of 20th century several complex and coherent philosophical systems emerged in Taiwan. The creation of these discourses is proof for the great creativity and innovativeness of many Taiwanese theorists. Here, it is particularly important to highlight the Modern or New Confucianism and its most famous Taiwanese representative, Mou Zongsan. But in post-war Taiwan we can also witness many other forms of investigating and upgrading traditional Chinese thought. In this regard, the Neo-Daoist current and the Taiwanese Buddhist studies are certainly worth mentioning. Besides, modern Taiwanese philosophers have also enriched and advanced the originally Western medieval scholastic thought by establishing a specific school of the so-called Taiwanese Neo-Scholasticism, which was founded at Fu-jen Catholic University. However, the rich palette of philosophical thoughts that emerged in Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century cannot be limited to these few streams of thought.

The book opens with my introduction in which I present the conditions that have shaped the second half of the 20th century in Taiwan and highlight the contribution of Taiwanese philosophy for the preservation and development of traditional Chinese thought during this period. This introduction is followed by four chapters, each of which includes several articles fitting into the overall chapter theme.

Chapter one deals with Taiwanese Modern Confucianism. It contains four articles, written by Lee Ming-huei, Jong-Mo Jung, Tak-lap Yeung and Téa Sernelj. The chapter begins with the contribution written by Lee Ming-huei, who is certainly among the most well-known representatives of contemporary Taiwanese Confucianism. This paper was originally

published in Chinese as a part of the book *Confucianism and Modern Consciousness* (*Revised and Enlarged Edition*) [*Ruxue yu xiandai yishi (zengding ban)* 儒學與現代意識 (增訂版)] (2016), and translated by Jan Vrhovski. In this article, the author offers a critical survey of the contemporary debates on the re-interpretation of the ancient Chinese concept of inner sage and external ruler (*neisheng waiwang*). The second paper critically presents the great variety of contemporary Taiwanese discussions and controversies in relation with the problem of Confucian Orthodoxy (*daotong*). This chapter was translated from Korean and represents a good example of the Korean research in Neo-Confucianism through the lens of the cultural consciousness in contemporary Taiwan. In the third and the fourth papers of this chapter, the authors Tak-lap Yeung and Téa Sernelj critically examine the philosophy of two famous representatives of the second generation of Modern Confucianism, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan, respectively.

The second chapter is entitled *Research on Daoist Philosophy* and consists of three papers, written by the representatives of the Taiwanese contemporary Daoist current. The chapter opens with a contribution written by Chen Guying, who is one of the most renowned specialists in Daoist philosophy at the international level. His paper analyses Laozi's view on and application of three of the most debated binary categories which shaped the methodology of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely the categories of Presence and Absence, Movement and Stillness, and Essence and Function. The second paper in this chapter was written by one of his former students, namely Wu Hui-ling, who explores the principle of mutual complementarity, which defines the theoretical structuring of such binary categories. The third paper in this chapter is Ye Hai-yen's article on the Neo-Daoism of the Wei and Jin Dynasties.

Chapter three is devoted to Taiwanese studies in logic and methodology. In his paper, Jan Vrhovski offers a critical and very coherent survey of the origins of Taiwanese studies in modern logic, focusing upon the logical thought of Mou Zongsan and Yin Haiguang. Lee Hsien-chung, the author of the second paper, is Taiwan's most well-known expert on traditional Chinese logic, who is also developing his own, innovative methodology for researching Chinese philosophy. In his essay, he discusses some crucial problems related to concepts in philosophical thinking.

The fourth and last chapter deals with modern and contemporary Taiwanese philosophy from the East Asian and global perspective. It opens with a paper written by Huang Chun-chieh, who is well known in Taiwanese academia for his pioneering contributions to the contemporary research of East Asian Confucianism. In this paper, he focuses on the history and methodology of the intellectual interactions and exchanges between China and Japan. The second paper in this chapter also explores and compares Chinese and Japanese intellectual production, but this time through the lens of a concrete comparison between the philosophies of Tang Junyi on the one side, and Nishitani Keiji on the other. This paper was written by Huang Kuan-min, who is particularly well known for his studies of phenomenology. Last, but not least, there is Nevad Kahteran's informative and important paper on the project of Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans, which was carried out in cooperation with the famous Taiwanese-American scholar Tu Weiming.

As we can see, the present book is focused on the connective role played by Taiwanese philosophy, and it also presents its intercultural dimensions. In this sense, it can doubtless be seen as a bridge that links different discourses across time and space by illuminating and exposing various otherwise neglected traditions of Chinese philosophical thought. I believe

that this book will show that this connective function and dialogical nature is precisely the greatest significance of contemporary Taiwanese philosophy, and hope that it will raise awareness of this significance among wider circles of Western readers.

Jana S. Rošker

INTRODUCTION

THE ROLE OF TAIWANESE PHILOSOPHY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

JANA S. ROŠKER

Introduction

In the second half of the 20th century, the philosophers in mainland China were mostly investigating Marxist and Leninist theories, aiming to adapt them to specific Chinese conditions. In this process, they had to deal with ideological directives from the Communist Party of China (CPC). Hence, while on the mainland, the Chinese ideational tradition was being exiled to the graveyards of "feudal ideologies" up until the 1980s, Taiwanese theoreticians—similar to those in Hong Kong—were developing, upgrading and modernizing mostly Confucian and partly Daoist thought.

Without the continuity that was sustained, preserved and developed by Taiwanese theoreticians, a lot of important research topics would have faded into oblivion, as it would not have been possible for them to keep developing. This interruption of knowledge could certainly have had catastrophic consequences for the development of new methodologies for researching Chinese philosophy. Besides, Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century was also a place of highly innovative philosophers, who developed their own theoretical systems and are among the most important personalities of Chinese philosophy in the last century. At this point, we must not overlook Mou Zongsan, who, in the eyes of academia, is one of

the astounding masters of Modern Confucian philosophy, which was—prior to him and his contemporaries—being shaped by great minds such as Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan. Besides some of his contemporaries, who also belonged to the Modern New Confucian intellectual movement, several of his younger colleagues who only passed away at the turn of the millennium, such as Liu Shu-hsien, were also important figures.

The importance of Taiwanese philosophy for maintaining and developing the methodology for exploring Chinese philosophy, as well as Chinese intellectual traditions in general, is not well known outside the region. That is why one of the main goals of this chapter is to fill this gap in knowledge.

Specific political and intellectual situation of Taiwan after 1949 and the maintaining of continuity in the research of traditional philosophy

The contribution of Taiwanese philosophy was of particular importance in the field of Confucian philosophy, which was in the first twenty-five years of the People's Republic—at least on the explicitly formal level—silenced. Its crucial ideas and main approaches were developed further mostly by Taiwanese and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong-based theoreticians. Unlike the People's Republic of China, where Confucianism was treated as an "ideology of outlived feudalism" up until the 1980s, many intellectuals in Hong Kong and Taiwan, which were both (each in its own way) defined by the social discourse of post-colonialism, had defied the ever growing Westernization of their societies. Because of this culturally, nationally and politically multi-layered context, Taiwanese intellectuals played an important role in this process from the very beginning.

They warned that the dependency of the island on colonial forces was by no means limited to culture alone. After the victory of the CPC and

founding of the People's Republic of China, the seat of the exiled government became Taiwan under the ruling Nationalist Party (*Guomindang*), and because of this the small island desperately needed foreign aid for its political and economic survival. During the first decades after the war, the Taiwanese government practiced a mild autocracy. In this period American donations, which became a regular part of the country's "anti-communist" strategy after the Korean War, were a crucial and necessary condition for Taiwan to maintain its economic and political stability. Taiwanese dependence on US capital investments, technology and markets did not stop even after the official end of American aid in 1965. Shortly afterwards, American donations and investments were joined by Japanese ones, as Japan regained its former economical supremacy over the island. Together with the US, it established effective control over Taiwanese industrial development and foreign trade. By this time, American and Japanese capital presented 85% of all Taiwanese investments (Lai Ming-Yan 1995, 103).

This supremacy of American and Japanese capital meant that the oppositions between labour and capital were often interpreted as parallel or analogous to the opposition between the Chinese and foreigners. Instead of a "class awareness" it was "national identity," as defined by the yearning for national autonomy and independence, that developed faster in these conditions among the Taiwanese people. This shift is conditioned by the fact that we can understand Taiwanese modernization better if we look at it through the lens of post-colonialism.

The nature of the new Taiwanese identity was always uncertain. The island, originally inhabited by different Pacific tribes, was under the control of colonial forces from 1683 until the start of Second World War, and arguably beyond this (Day 1999, 9). The first Han Chinese immigrants were already inhabiting parts of Taiwan in the 17th century, which at the time

was still under Dutch colonial rule. After the defeat and departure of the Dutch, the island came under the rule of Manchurian government of mainland China. When the Japanese defeated the Chinese in 1895, they took over the island as one of their colonies. The largest wave of Han Chinese migrants (about one million people) came to Taiwan after the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists, at the beginning of the People's Republic of China. When the original, earlier "indigenized" inhabitants were confronted with these newcomers, a new "Taiwanese" ethnic and cultural identity began to be shaped and strengthened. During the last decades of the 20th century, a differentiation between Taiwanese and Han Chinese (mainland) identity had a great influence upon political and intellectual developments of the island, the modernization of which was accelerating (with a lot of help from foreign investments). The Nationalist Party, which remained the only ruling political party in Taiwan until 2000, was all the while promoting the idea of the political unity of China, and a Han Chinese cultural and national identity, while the second most important party that won the elections in the same year (*Minjin dang*) was emphasizing a separate "Taiwanese" identity.

This is the context within which Taiwan, as a place of refuge for the defeated Nationalist government after the civil war, represented that part of "modern" China where the emerging philosophy of Modern Confucianism found its most fertile ground. Chinese philosophers who lived and worked in Taiwan after 1949 (and whose functions and contributions will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter) did not deal with the questions of the sinization of Marxism and its diverse connotations, but were instead confronted with problems of modernization and capitalism much earlier than their mainland colleagues. In this way, they were continuing to pursue a constant discursive development that started in China

as early as by the end of the 19th century and was interrupted "only" by the turbulent events of the war with Japanese and then the civil war on the mainland (ibid.). Hence, a profound desire for solving urgent practical problems in the areas of politics, society, economy and culture can clearly be seen in the works of such philosophers. Because of the "generous support" from the Western countries who were, led by the US, trying to preserve the Taiwanese "democratic alternative" as a counterbalance to Chinese communism, and also in Hong Kong because of its colonial status, these two societies started a period of intense Westernization in the 1950s. The process of their integration into the world of modern capitalism was in an ideological sense accompanied by traditional Confucian ethics based on a hierarchical system of obedience to authority. As such, it had already proven itself in Japan as an ideology which is very compatible with the demands and often intolerable social conditions of early capitalism.

Moreover, such trends can be seen in not only Japan but also the other "Asian Tigers," namely South Korea and Singapore, as week Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose successful modernization was often seen as "the victory of Confucian capitalism" (Wang 2000, 19).

It is not surprising that from the very start Modern Confucians based their research mostly on the thesis by which the Confucian thought is perfectly compatible with capitalistic development. Elements that enable this combination are diverse. Most Chinese scholars see this compatibility as primarily the result of a general willingness to engage in cooperation and the so-called "communicative method of action" (Trauzettel and Moritz 1993, 65), which is supposedly typical of Confucianism. Besides the abovementioned hierarchical structure of society at the formal and interactional levels, which is also the basis of the traditional Confucian view of interpersonal relations in society, we can also mention here the meaning

of personal, intimate identification with one's own clan as a basic unit of the individual's social environment. The concept of such identification is in the process of capitalistic production transferred from one's own clan to one's company, and this transfer allows for a very efficient integration of the individuals employed by the firm. In connection with the absolute and uncritically accepted obedience to authority, based on a specific modification of original Confucian teachings which took place in the autocratic reform during the Han Dynasty, the transformation of this concept of identification can lead to a surplus in production and profit.

In the 1950s there was a polemic between the Modern Confucians of Hong Kong and Taiwan on the one hand, and the liberals among the Taiwanese intellectuals on the other. The latter were led by Hu Shi, who was an established scholar and politician. The polemic, which will be discussed in more detail later, mostly revolved around the question of whether traditional Chinese culture, and especially Confucian thought, was suitable for the development of science, technology and a democratic political system of the Western kind. Modern Confucians claimed that even though such elements were not present in the traditional Confucianism, this fact alone did not mean that the Confucian tradition was suppressing the development of a modern society. The liberals, however, were convinced of the opposite. They emphasized that in order to become a modern, technologically developed and democratic country, China needed to eliminate all remnants of Confucian thought. In this polemic it turned out that although Modern Confucians recognized the difference between politics and morality, they still linked political liberty with moral liberty at the theoretical level. The representatives of the liberal camp rejected the assumption that political liberty should be based on morality, because in their view, this would—even in a best case scenario—lead to a "totalitarian

democracy." In this context, the modern Taiwanese philosopher Lee Ming-huei highlights (2001, 89–129) the difference between "positive" and "negative" liberty which was described by Isaiah Berlin in the book *Four Essays on Liberty* in 1969. Lee also writes in this context that this idea was already mentioned earlier by Chang Fo-chüan in his book *Liberty and Human Rights* (*Ziyou yu renquan*) published in 1954. Following this conceptual pair, Taiwanese liberals developed the idea that a democratic order can only be established on the basis of "negative liberty." In their opinion, the introduction of "positive liberty" would lead to totalitarianism. Modern Confucians, on the other side, not only advocated negative liberty, but were also certain that such liberty was still lacking in Chinese culture. Nonetheless, they emphasized that negative liberty should, on a theoretical level, be conditioned by positive liberty and that, in practice, negative liberty alone would not be enough to prevent totalitarianism (Lee 2001, 78).

Numerous theoreticians have highlighted the idea that negative liberty is necessarily conditioned by positive liberty (Taylor 1985, 221–229). The representatives of the liberal current, however, were persistently upholding the sole significance of negative liberty; this implied that they followed the paradigm of individualism, which is based on the idea of the individual as a subject, totally divided from his or her community, ergo on the idea of an "unencumbered self" (Sandel 1984, 81). Some theoreticians even think that in this polemic Modern Confucians were closer to communitarianism than may seem at first glance (Lee 2001, 78). That which they were searching for could be summed up with the term "Confucian liberalism," a kind of liberalism which should "naturally" evolve in the context of the Confucian tradition.

Philosophical currents and key figures

This section will help us understand how Taiwanese scholars have contributed significantly to the preservation of the continuity of Chinese traditions, and specifically Confucian, Daoist, as well as Mohist, Nomenalist and Buddhist traditions, in Sinophone academic circles.

Taiwanese scholars also played an important role in establishing and developing various connections with the history of Western philosophy, while on the mainland this was allowed only to a limited extent. This mostly involved research, presentations and extensions of German classical philosophy (particularly regarding the three main critiques of Immanuel Kant) as well as certain works of American pragmatism.

We should also mention the importance of the liberal current (*Ziyou pai*), particularly of its central representative Hu Shi, already mentioned above, and who became the first director and academic leader of the Academia Sinica, after it was moved to Taiwan.

Numerous important dialogues with Western philosophy were also nurtured by the Taiwan-born scholars who moved abroad, predominately to the US. Let us mention at least a few of these key researchers of comparative philosophy. Some of them have already passed away, for instance Fang Dongmei (Tomé Fang), Tang Junyi (Tang Chün-i), and Liu Shu-hsien; then, there are the still active representatives of the older generation, such as Cheng Chung-ying, Tu Wei-ming, Liu Shu-hsien and Wu Kunru. Here, we should also mention two of the prominent figures of the younger generation: Shen Qingsong and Fu Peirong (Wang Qishui 1998, 70).

Established and developed at the Catholic Fu-jen University (*Furen daxue*), the Taiwanese Neo-scholastic philosophy (*Xin shillin zhexue*) made a particularly important contribution to the field of modern Taiwanese

philosophy. Luo Guang, the most important pioneer and representative of this school of philosophy, was important not only because he was spreading knowledge of and dismantling the prejudice towards scholastic philosophy and its history, but also because he developed a number of innovative guidelines for the development of the methodology of Chinese philosophy, especially its hermeneutic aspects. Lao Siguang (Lao Sze-kwang) also made important contributions in this field.

Probably the most well-known school of Taiwanese philosophical thought is the Modern or New Confucianism (*Xin ruxue*) one. Its main Taiwanese representatives are Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan and Liu Shu-hsien.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the various other discourses developed in Taiwan. We have already mentioned the Taiwanese Neo-scholastic philosophy, which was most active at Fu-jen University. Modern Daoism (*Xin daojia*) is another such example. Its most prominent representatives are Lin Yutang, Yu Peilin, Yan Lingfeng and his younger colleague Chen Guying. The latter has gained somewhat of a reputation in mainland China as well, and has been a regular lecturer at China's most famous university, the University of Beijing (*Beijing daxue*) for many years. Chen's legacy also includes a number of young researchers, such as the young associate professor Wu Hui-ling. Under the guidance of Professor Lee Hsien-chung, she is not only examining Modern Daoism, but also the pre-Qin logics and the methodology of Chinese philosophy. We should also mention Zhang Qidiao, a member of the younger generation of philosophers who are studying Daoism and were also engaged in its popularization.

In the last few years, a group of philosophers studying the philosophy of the *qi* has also been gaining importance. They call themselves *Qi Pai* ("the current of *qi*") and are led by Yang Rubin from the Tsinghua University

(*Qinghua daxue*) from Xinzhu. As an interesting fact, let us mention the German philosopher Fabian Heubel (He Fabi), who is also part of this group, and has been living in Taiwan for over 20 years. He studied Sinology in Germany and went on to become a full member of Academia Sinica (*Zhongyang yanjiu yuan*), Taiwan's leading academic and research institution. A number of other extraordinary scholars of Chinese and Taiwanese philosophy are currently active at the Academia Sinica as well: Huang Kuan-min, for instance, is mostly known for his studies on hermeneutics, as well as Lee Ming-huei and Mou Zongsan's student Lin Yueh-hui, an outstanding female scholars with many notable international achievements.

At National Taiwan University (*Guoli Taiwan daxue*, NTU), several extraordinary theorists are advancing research in Chinese philosophy. Several professors at the department for Chinese Language and Literature (*Zhongwen xi*) are prominent in this field, but even more important in this regard is the Department of Philosophy (*Zhexue xi*), with a large number of experts in Chinese hermeneutics, such as Lin Ming-Chao, and in Buddhist studies (such as Duh Pao-ruei).

One also cannot overlook the achievements of the long-standing head of this department and the current vice dean of the Faculty of Arts at the NTU, Professor Lee Hsien-chung. His importance is not only evident in his outstanding and internationally acclaimed publications in the area of classical Chinese (especially Mohist, Nomenalist and Confucian) logics, but also in his innovative studies on the development of methods of researching Chinese philosophy. Professor Lee gained international recognition by establishing a new methodological system, based on the method of "thought units" (*sixiang danwei*). Professor Lee is also the editor of the leading Taiwanese philosophy journal, *Philosophy and Culture* (*Zhexue yu wenhua*)

and the president of the most important Taiwanese philosophical organization, the Taiwanese Academic Society for Philosophy (*Taiwan zhexue xuehui*).

The National Taiwan University is also home to the Institute of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (*Renwen shehui gaodeng yanjiu yuan*). Its long-standing head is Professor Huang Chun-chieh, a former full member of the Academia Sinica. He is important for his contributions in methodology, history of ideas, hermeneutics of classical Chinese, especially regarding the philosophy of Mencius and Confucianism in East Asia. In this context, he is very active in researching and evaluating the work of Xu Fuguan, a great cultural historian, who we have already mentioned and who is also a prominent representative of Modern Confucianism.

The Taiwanese members of this school of thought belong, as noted above, to the most important and most famous theorists of the modern age. In the next chapter, we shall therefore briefly examine Modern Confucianism, its main goals, methodology and distinctive features.

Modern Confucianism (*Xin ruxue*) as the main intellectual movement of the preservation of Chinese tradition

The present introduction of this important and world-renowned branch of modern Chinese philosophy is rudimentary and represents only an outline of its most important approaches, its representatives as well as its achievements. This presentation is meant to remain simple, chiefly because there are already many books and articles on this topic. Therefore, I will limit this section only to the most significant information about its main contributions to the development of modern Taiwanese philosophy.

The central theses of the Modern Confucian philosophers follow their conviction that Confucianism, as the foundation of a specifically Chinese system of social, political and moral thought, can—of course in a modernized form which answers the requirements of the contemporary era—function as a basis for establishing an ethical meaning of life, and as a mental cure against alienation, which they understand as a side effect of a capitalist glorification of competition and its unlimited pursuit of profit.

Hence, they were following an aspiration for the reconstruction of those main approaches of traditional (Confucian) thought, which would be able to surpass the prevailing ideological trends and preserve the Chinese cultural identity, while at the same time contributing to the continuous development of philosophical and theoretical dialogue among Euro-American and Chinese cultures. After 1949, this branch of thought came to define the spirit of Taiwanese philosophy and later (at first only partially and in an obscured fashion) also that of mainland Chinese modernization. All these endeavours manifested themselves in extensive attempts to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought with the help of new impulses derived from Western theoretical systems. The spirit of German idealism also played a key role in the search for these synthesizes, but certain theories and approaches created by the Viennese circle also drew much interest. But for the Modern Confucians, the most important alternative to the developments which have in Asia, as elsewhere, led to social alienation and the aforementioned "vacuum of values," was to be found predominantly in the framework of the classical Confucian thought.

Modern Sinology counts as members of this philosophical current all prominent Chinese philosophers who were from the beginning of the 20th century on searching for possibilities of reviving the main methodological and theoretical aspects of the Chinese tradition, and particularly of

premodern Chinese philosophy, which emulated the Neo-Confucian theoretical renovation. Alongside Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan, who were the most notable among the representatives of the so-called "first generation" of this current, we also have to mention Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai and He Lin.

The Taiwanese contribution to the preservation, development, and improvement of Chinese philosophy is most evident within the second generation of this idealistic branch, since two of its four representatives mainly lived and worked in Taiwan. These four philosophers were Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi, and Fang Dongmei. The first two chose Taiwan as their second home after 1949. Their philosophy is therefore to a great extent defined by the particularities of the cultural and political background which marked Chinese social reality between 1950 and 1980. Both were students of Xiong Shili, who is acclaimed by many as the greatest pioneer of the Modern Confucian renovation (see, for example, Yu 2002, 127). Despite this, their works differed greatly from those of Xiong; even though they stayed loyal to their teacher in matters of fundamental methodology and basic orientation, they still fundamentally modified and improved upon his teachings – each in their own way, of course (Feng 1992, 227).

The representatives of the second generation generally desired a revitalization of their cultural identity in the sense of "replanting the old roots" of their tradition, for they saw this as the only possibility for the survival of the cultural tradition from which they originated when confronted with the challenges of Western culture. However, this renovation of "roots" was not meant only for survival, but would, if conducted conscientiously and thoroughly, ensure an active and innovative

role of Modern Confucianism or modern Chinese thought in the international dialogues of modern societies (ibid.).

Important modern philosophers of this philosophical current also include the aforementioned theoretician Liu Shu-hsien (1934–2016), who according to most scholars, belonged to the third generation of Modern Confucianism, as well as the (mostly still active) members of the fourth generation, such as Lee Ming-huei and Lin Yueh-hui. Liu Shu-hsien, who was also a researcher of the Academia Sinica, passed away a few years ago, while Lee and Lin still work in this institution. However, if we follow the famous saying that contemporary masters always stand on the shoulders of giants, it is important to study their most significant Taiwanese predecessors. Hence, in order to understand the work of the contemporary members of the Modern Confucian current, we must first familiarize ourselves with the main philosophical contributions of Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. Because of space limitations, we will limit ourselves only to a short presentation of the basics of Mou Zongsan's philosophy. Even though Xu Fuguan also belongs among the giants of modern Taiwanese theory of the second half of the 20th century, his work fits more into the field of cognitive history than the field of philosophy in a narrower sense. On the other hand, Mou Zongsan is one of the rare Chinese philosophers of that period who developed their own innovative theoretical system. In this sense, we can state that his work is the best, most exemplary and at the same time symbolic, depiction of what Taiwanese philosophy actually means for the wider field of Chinese theory.

But before that, let us take a brief look at the work of the Taiwanese branch of Modern Daoism, since our image of 20th century Taiwanese philosophy would be imperfect without the documentation and evaluation of this important aspect.

Theoretical and methodological contributions of Modern Taiwanese Daoism (*Xin daojia*)

The research on Daoist philosophy carried out by Taiwanese philosophers is certainly worth mentioning, because of its supplementary and frequently oppositional role in its relation to Confucianism. This was the tradition role of Daoism, and a similar role is played by Daoist research within the contemporary discourses of modern and contemporary Taiwanese philosophy.

The period second half of the 20th century saw the release of more than a hundred books which discussed the work of two main philosophers of classical Daoism, i.e. Laozi and Zhuangzi (see Zhang Jinghua 1999, 51). One of the pioneering works in this regard was Qian Mu's *Redaction of the Studies of Zhuangzi* (*Zhuangzi zuanjian*), which came out in 1951.

In the 1960s and early 1970s we witnessed the publication of several works discussing different aspects of Daoism in detail. The most prominent authors of Modern Daoism of this period were Chen Guying, Yan Lingfeng, Wang Shumian, Xiao Chunbo, Cai Mingtian, Lai Rongxiang, Zhou Shaoxian, Feng Siyi, Zhao Jingzhang, Ding Yanzhi, Zhang Chengqiu, and Chen Guanxue, among many others. The Taiwanese production of research on the subject of Daoism was already quite rich at the end of the 1970s, especially between the years 1976 and 1979 to be precise, since many works about Laozi's and Zhuangzi's philosophy came out every year.

Many researchers believe that it is no coincidence that the contemporary branch of research into Daoist philosophy seems to be less relevant than the investigations of Confucianism performed by Modern Confucians, since Daoism was traditionally less relevant than Confucianism in China. However, the prevailing opinion among Taiwanese researchers is that the

discourses of both schools were mutually and inseparably connected in the pre-Qin period (ibid.):

> Many Daoist ideas were later adopted by Confucians, that is why the research on Daoism would be beneficial for the propagation of Confucianism. But even more importance was placed upon the political function of Daoism in actual social reality.

> 道家的某些思想也曾为以后的儒家所吸取，研究道家有利于宏扬儒家。但主要是着眼于道家哲学对现实社会的政治作用 (ibid.).

Yan Lingfeng, who lectured at NTU, was an important public figure in the last decades of the 20th century. In 1979 he re-released his main work about Daoist philosophy with the title *Research on Laozi and Zhuangzi* (*Laozhuang yaniju*). In the conclusion, he wrote the following:

> Currently, our people are facing historical changes. Even though the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi is mostly apolitical, we can nevertheless assess that their principals of "absolute emptiness" and "preservation of silence" are much more positive in comparison to the vulgarity of many other ideas.

> 方今我国族正遭空前的历史巨变　一老庄之学虽无施于治道。然˴致虚，、守静，之理，容有裨于薄俗也 (Yan Lingfeng 1979, 21).

Li Shiji believes that this is an indirect critique of the ever-worsening isolation of Taiwan in the international geopolitical space (ibid., 24–25). He also believes that the same can be said for Zhang Qidiao and his work *The Philosophy of Laozi* (*Laozi zhexue*), which was published in 1977. Zhang also wrote critically on the subject of Taiwan at the end of the 1970 in the last chapter. He metaphorically described its position as one of a "sickly

state" (*bibing*) and emphasized that "Daoist philosophy can provide an incredibly effective medication for this illness" (ibid.). However, this can by no means lead us to the conclusion that the author has this statement tried to covertly criticize the Taiwanese government and politics. Apparently, Li Shijia used a considerable amount of imagination when interpreting this sentence.

Taiwanese research on Daoist philosophy reached an even greater peak in the 1980s. It is within this period that we can actually speak of the creation of the Modern Daoist current in Taiwan.

In the 1980s, research into Laozi's and Zhuangzi's philosophy experienced an unexpected blossoming in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Several young scholars began appearing in this field, and they began to publish the most varied works, with which they substantially enriched the previous publications in this field. Their research is much more extensive and systematic when compared to the works done in the past and managed to reach many more readers. In this way, we paid witness to a new peak of such studies, which are by no means comparable to the work of the acclaimed branch of "Modern Confucianism." In this sense, we could also speak of the branch of "Modern Daoism."

80 年代台港地区对老子、庄子道家学说的研究，取得了十分可观的进展，涌现出了一批中青年学者，出版的各类著作非常丰富，研究比以前更加深人，更为系统，也更为普及，出现了一个新的高潮。在海外 " 新儒家 " 思潮一波又起之际，给人的印象是似乎也产生了一个 " 新道家 " 的思潮 (Zhang Jinghua 1999, 51).

In recent years, there has been a noticeable tendency to theoretically unify Daoism and Confucianism. Many theoreticians stress the fact that the categorization of pre-Qin philosophy to individual schools is artificial, and

that it was not formed until the Han Dynasty. These philosophers, who mostly also derive from Daoist studies, stress the importance of mutual interactions between the paradigms of Confucian and Daoist ideas. Yang Rubin, for instance, belongs to this group. In 2016 he released a controversial book on the subject called *Zhuangzi as a Member of the Confucian School* (*Rumen neide Zhuangzi*), which caused quite a stir in academic circles.

Chen Guying also works ever more intensively on the unifying paradigms underlying the neo-holistic discussions of classical discourses. As early as in 1955, he already published an article entitled "Early Daoisation of Confucianism" (*Zaoqi Rujiade daojiahua*). However, it is beyond any doubt that Chen is among the most significant representatives of Modern Daoism.

Conclusion

Beside the abovementioned scholars, numerous other Taiwanese philosophers have also assumed extremely important roles in the context of preserving and developing the Chinese philosophical tradition, even though their contributions are still widely unknown. The main goal of this chapter was to present the key currents and trends that determine the work of modern and contemporary Taiwanese scholars of Chinese philosophy. I have tried to place them into the context of the political, economic and ideational circumstances that prevailed in Taiwan during the second half of the 20th century.

As we have seen, the role of Taiwanese philosophical research was especially decisive in the period between 1949 and the late 1990s. During this period, the philosophical production in mainland China was largely dominated by censorship, and the official governmental guidelines called

on scholars of philosophy to focus on the sinization of Marxism, thus avoiding investigations of the Chinese philosophical tradition. These guidelines were especially influential in the realm of Confucian philosophy, for Confucius was subjected to sharp criticism in the then prevailing ideology, and the Confucian discourses were mainly seen as reactionary products of the "class of exploiters."

Therefore, the present chapter emerged from the desire to clearly demonstrate the reasons and the importance of maintaining the continuity in the study of traditional Chinese conceptual history in Taiwan. The theoretical work that took place on this island during the second half of the 20th century was of vital importance to contemporary Chinese philosophy. Without the constructive role of Taiwanese philosophers, such studies (that were written in Chinese) would have remained muted for nearly half a century, which would result in great damage to the philosophical explorations and modernization of Chinese intellectual tradition in its native cultural and linguistic context.

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MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY CONFUCIANISM

THE PROBLEM OF "INNER SAGELINESS AND OUTER KINGLINESS" REVISITED: ON THE CONTROVERSY RAISED BY YU SHIYING'S WORK *ZHU XI'S HISTORICAL WORLD*

MING-HUEI LEE

The expression "inner sageliness, outer kingliness" (*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王) originates from the "*Tianxia* 天下" chapter of the *Zhuangzi*. In the later ages, however, the expression was often borrowed with the intention to highlight the special characteristics of Confucian tradition, and even transformed into the very notion of Confucian self-identity. In fact, it is very appropriate to epitomize the characteristics of Confucian tradition with the phrase "inner sageliness, outer kingliness" in order to distinguish it from the two schools of Daoism and Buddhism. This is also the reason why scholars have rarely objected to it over the centuries. Nevertheless, in the past, Confucian scholars offered different interpretations of the essential meaning of the expression "inner sageliness and outer kingliness," which have become even more diverse until the present day.

In 2003, Yu Yingshi published two colossal volumes of *Zhu Xi's Historical World – A Study of the Political Culture of Scholar-Officials in the Song Dynasty* (*Zhu Xi de lishi shijie – Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu* 朱熹的歷史世界——宋代士大夫政治文化的研究) (Taibei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gongsi, 2003), which attracted great interest in both domestic and international academic circles, along with numerous reviews.

Although these touched on a wide range of issues, only two critical commentaries, those of Liu Shuxian (劉述先) and Yang Rubin (楊儒賓), also addressed the question of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness," contending against the views presented by Yu, who in turn also responded to their criticism. Although Yu's replies cleared up a number of misunderstandings, some questions still remained unanswered. Here I shall first enumerate the documents exchanged in the discussion. Listed in order of exchange of critiques and replies, these included:

(1) Liu, Shuxian. 2003. "A Critique of Yu Yingshi's Book *Zhu Xi's Historical World – A Study of the Political Culture of Scholar-Officials in the Song Dynasty* [Ping Yu Yingshi *Zhu Xi de lishi shijie – Songdai shidafu zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu* 評余英時朱熹的歷史世界——宋代士大夫政治文化的研究]." *Jiuzhou xuelin* 九州學林 1(2), 316–334.

(2) Yu, Yingshi. 2004. "'Extraction, 'Turn' and 'Inner Sageliness and Outer Kingliness' – A Reply to Mr. Liu Shuxian" [*'Chouli', 'huizhuan' yu 'neisheng waiwang' – Da Liu Shuxian xiansheng* 「抽離」、「迴轉」與「內聖外王」——答劉述先先生]." *Jiuzhou xuelin* 九州學林 2(1), 301–310.

(3) Liu, Shuxian. 2004. "A Reply to Professor Yu Yingshi [*Dui Yu Yingshi jiaoshou de huiying* 對余英時教授的回應]." *Jiuzhou xuelin* 九州學林 2(2), 294–6.

(4) Yu, Yingshi. 2004. "A Preliminary Discussion of the Overall Scheme of Confucianism – After Reading Mr. Liu Shuxian's 'Response' [*Shishuo Rujia de zhengti guihua – Liu Shuxian*

xiansheng 'Huiying' du hou 試說儒家的整體規畫——劉述先先生「回應」讀後]." *Jiuzhou xuelin* 九州學林 2(2), 297–312.

(5) Yang, Rubin. Nov. 2003. "If the 'CopernicanTurn' Was to Be Made Once More [*Ruguo zai huizhuan yici 'Gebaini de huizhuan'* 如果再迴轉「哥白尼迴轉」]." *Dangdai* 當代 195, 125–141.

(6) Yu, Yingshi. Jan. 2004. "Have I Destroyed Zhu Xi's World of Values? – A Reply to Mr. Yang Rubin [*Wo cuihui le Zhu Xi de jiazhi shijie ma? – Da Yang Rubin xiansheng* 我摧毀了朱熹的價值世界嗎？——答楊儒賓先生]." *Dangdai* 當代 197, 54–73.

(7) Yang, Rubin. Feb. 2004. "We Need More Paradigm Shifts – A Reply to Mr. Yu Yingshi [*Women xuyao gengduo dianfan de zhuanyi – Jing da Yu Yingshi xiansheng* 我們需要更多典範的轉移——敬答余英時先生]." *Dangdai* 當代 198, 97–105.

(8) Yu, Yingshi. Feb. 2004. "A Simple Explanation [*Jiandan de shuoming* 簡單的說明]." *Dangdai* 當代 198, 70–71.

In his debate with Liu and Yang, Yu corresponded twice with each one of them. Following their first publication, Yu's responses (2), (4), and (6) were included as an appendix in his book *Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism and Political Culture* (*Song-Ming Lixue yu zhengzhi wenhua* 宋明理學與政治文化). The central part of the book consists of the "Introductory Explanations" (*Xushuo* 緒說) section of his earlier book *Zhu Xi's Historical World,* which is extended with the text "An In-depth Exposition on Neo-Confucianism and Political Culture in the Ming Dynasty" (*Mingdai Lixue yu zhengzhi wenhua fawei* 明代理學與政治文化發微). In addition to the above reviews, Jin Chunfeng's（金春峰）critical commentary entitled

"Inner Sageliness and Outer Kingliness as Two Sides of the Same Substance
– Reading Yu Yingshi's *Zhu Xi's Historical World – A Study of the Political
Culture of Scholar-Officials in the Song Dynasty*" (*Neisheng waiwang de
yiti liangmian – Du Yu Yingshi Zhu Xi de lishi shijie – Songdai shidafu
zhengzhi wenhua de yanjiu* 內聖外王的一體兩面——讀余英時《朱熹的
歷史世界——宋代士大夫政治文化的研究》) also touched on the
problem of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness." At this point, I will
discuss Jin's article together with other texts mentioned above.

In this text, I do not intend, nor is it necessary, to recount in detail the
entire course of the polemic. In any case, the interested reader may consult
the entire content of the documents listed above on their own initiative.
Instead, the present discussion focuses on questions related to the idea of
"inner sageliness and outer kingliness." To this end, we must first give an
overview of the main motives and basic viewpoints of Yu's book on the
question of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness." Yu stated his main
motive for writing the book in the "Introductory Explanations." According
to his explanation, by emphasizing "political culture" he wanted to respond
to the approaches adopted by the "modern historians of philosophy"
(*xiandai zhexueshi jia* 現代哲學史家) in their research on *daoxue* 道學
("learning of the Way"). Since the "modern historians of philosophy"
followed the example of European philosophy, Yu believes that in their
studies of *daoxue* they carried out a process of double "extraction" (*chouli*
抽離): "First, they extracted *daoxue* from Confucianism, and, subsequently,
they also extracted the concept of the "reality of the Way" (*daoti* 道體, also
"metaphysical reality") from the former. As far as the connection between
scholars of the *daoxue* and their practical style of living is concerned, this
has never entered the field of vision of historians of philosophy." (Yu 2003

I, 33). In Yu's opinion, the approach of "modern historians of philosophy" is a "modern incarnation" (*xiandai huashen* 現代化身) of the "grand narrative (*da xushi* 大敘事) of post-Song Dynasty 'discourse on the -transmission of the Way' (*daotong lun* 道統論)" (also briefly called "the grand narrative of the 'orthodox transmission of the way'"). He explicitly pointed out that two main reasons why the approach adopted in the work *Zhu Xi's Historical World* fundamentally differed from that adopted in such "grand narrative":

> Firstly, in the "grand narrative" the notion of "innate moral nature and life" (*daode xingming* 道德性命) (or "inner sageliness" (*neisheng* 內聖)) denotes a form of spiritual reality (*jingshen shiti* 精神實體) which transcends time and space, and which consequently is also called the "reality of the Way" (*daoti* 道體, "metaphysical reality"). While this noumenal substance (*shiti*) of the spirit represents eternal existence, it is completely irrelevant whether it is perceived as such by humans or not. Based on this understanding, in their treatment of the emergence and formation of the *daoxue*, the researchers who abide by the paradigm of the "grand narrative" usually also adopt a trans-temporal and -spatial approach, which does not touch upon the concrete historical circumstances. … Secondly, since the researchers following the paradigm of the "grand narrative" regard the idea of "innate moral nature and life" as a completely self-sufficient isolated substance, they not only categorically separate *daoxue* from the history of Northern Song Dynasty, but even go as far as to completely delineate *daoxue* from Confucianism, as if the *daoxue* had suddenly sprung out of nowhere. Because there is only one short leap from the idea that "the Heaven awakes the moral consciousness in a sage" (*tian qi sheng zhong* 天啟聖衷) to Mencius' notion of mind (*xin* 心), one eventually ends up revisiting the "innate moral nature and life" in the sense of "being in the same stream as

Heaven above and Earth below" (*shang xia yu Tian di tongliu* 上下與天地
同流) (*Mencius* "Jin xin 盡心" I) (ibid., 156–157).

As for what exactly Yu meant by the so-called "modern historians of
philosophy" or "modern incarnation" of the "grand narrative of the
'orthodox transmission of the way'" is not clearly stated anywhere in the
book. Jin Chunfeng, however, managed to get to the heart of it by making
the following remarks: "Who are the representatives of the 'grand narrative'?
Yu was not willing to mention any names, but I still think that no harm
would be done by pointing these out straightforwardly. Probably, the most
typical representative, and at the same time the most theoretically and
academically influential figure, was Mou Zongsan (牟宗三)" (Jin 2004,
300).

With this aim in mind, Yu Yingshi emphasized that he intended to "carry
out a conceptual 'Copernican turn'" (*Gebaini shi de huizhuan* 哥白尼式的
迴轉), the significance of which was described in the following manner:

> This book advances the view that the overarching trend of Song Dynasty
> Confucianism was the restoration of order (*zhixu chongjian* 秩序重建), the
> starting point of which was the "way of governance" (*zhidao* 治道) –
> political order. Although the distinguishing feature of *daoxue* had been
> manifested in its notion of "inner sage[liness]" (*neisheng* 內聖), the ultimate
> objective of this "inner sageliness" was not that all people were to turn into
> sages or virtuous personages. Nevertheless, it still represented a
> reconstruction of a rational order amongst people. If we rephrase this using
> the language of original Confucianism, [this trend] signified a change from
> "non-prevalence of the Way under the Heaven" (*tianxia wu dao* 天下無道)
> to "prevalence of the Way under the Heaven" (*tianxia you dao* 天下有道)
> (Yu 2003 I, 170).

In the concluding lines of the "Introductory Explanations" of *Zhu Xi's Historical World*, Yu recapitulated his main views as advocated in the book in the following manner:

> I am not denying that the members of the School of Principle (*lixuejia* 理學家) engaged in an earnest pursuit for the "original meaning" (*benyi* 本義) of the original classics with the intention to "establish contact with Confucius and Mencius" (*shangjie Kong, Meng* 上接孔、孟). I am also not denying that, in the same manner, they were genuinely attempting to set up a metaphysical system. In the final analysis, however, regardless of whether it was to "establish contact with Confucius and Mencius" or metaphysical systems, neither represented the endpoint of their pursuits. Moreover, both were only in service of the ultimate objective of the restoration of order. While, by virtue of the former, such order would be provided with a foundation in Confucian classics, the latter would serve as a guarantee for its transcendence and timelessness. To put it briefly, even though to "establish contact with Confucius and Mencius" and set up a metaphysical world were indeed important goals, within the entire system of the Learning of the Principle (*lixue* 理學) they were only able to occupy a second order (*dier xu* 第二序) position; whereas the first order status was reserved solely for the restoration of order (ibid., 251).

The way Yu used notions such as "Copernican revolution," "first order" and "second order" in the two excerpts presented above eventually gave rise to the "misunderstandings" (*wujie* 誤解) of Liu Shuxian and Yang Rubin, who maintained that his intention was to overturn the idea of hierarchical order that subsisted between the "inner sageliness" and "outer kingliness," by making the outer kingliness primary and inner sageliness secondary. To be fair, Yu's manner of expression and his attitude in countering the "grand narrative of the orthodox transmission of the way" could objectively cause

such "misunderstandings." In the subsequent course of discussion Yu solemnly elucidated that:

> 'inner sageliness' and 'outer kingliness' constitute a continuum, which absolutely cannot be divided into two separate parts. The 'turn' (*huizhuan* 迴轉) I am talking about does not constitute a turn from 'inner sageliness' to 'outer kingliness', but rather a revolution of 'inner sageliness and outer kingliness' as a whole (Yu 2004a, 339).

He further stressed that: "outer kingliness" (or "restoration of order") does not specifically denote political order at all. On the contrary:

> the 'reconstruction of order' I speak about is reckoned from the most basic unit of society – the family. In other words: throughout one's entire life one is placed within "orders" of many different layers and circles, where every single "order" can be subjected to "reconstruction" (*chongjian*) (ibid., 350).

In addition, he also specifically enunciated that his use of the expressions "first order" and "second order" was not consistent with the use of the same expressions in logic (ibid., 388–389):

> … what I truly meant was that "inner sageliness and outer kingliness" was a continuous and unceasing active process, which ultimately results in realisation of a rational (*heli* 合理) order between people. Expressed with the words of original Confucianism: to transform "non-prevalence of the Way under the Heaven" (*tianxia wu dao* 天下無道) into "prevalence of the Way under the Heaven" (*tianxia you dao* 天下有道) by means of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness." What I call "to find one's final destination in the restored order" (*guisu yu zhixu chongjian* 歸宿於秩序重建) corresponds roughly to the meaning of Confucius' saying "if the way prevailed under the Heaven, I would not get involved in changing it." When

in my original book I stated that "the first order status was reserved solely for the restoration of order" I was referring to the same meaning (ibid., 395).

To put it briefly, Yu regarded the "restoration of order" (i.e. "outer kingliness") as the "ultimate objective" of the continuity that extended from inner sageliness to outer kingliness, which is also why it was given the first order position.

In accordance with the basic points outlined above, Yu's intention was to carry out a historical reconstruction of the Confucian political culture in the Song and Ming Dynasties. He summarized the development of the political culture of Song Dynasty scholar-officials (Confucianists) in three main stages: the first stage was the "establishment period," which reached its climax during the reign of the Emperor Renzong. In this stage the leading figures of Confucianism started to gain the support of the Emperor by expounding the ideal of "surpassing Han and Tang Dynasties and returning to the Three Dynasties" (*chaoyue Han, Tang, huidao Sandai* 超越漢、唐，回到三代). The representative figure of this stage was Fan Zhongyan (范仲淹). The second stage was the "period of finalization," which reached its peak during the time of Emperor Shenzong, when Wang Anshi (王安石) put into motion the so-called "Xining reform" (*Xining bianfa* 熙寧變法). These represented one step further towards the implementation of the motion to "surpass Han and Tang Dynasties and return to the Three Dynasties," an endeavour in which the scholar-officials and Emperor would "jointly decide on national policy" (*gong ding guoshi* 共定國是). The third stage was the "period of transformation," which occurred in the time of Zhu Xi in the Southern Song Dynasty. Because at the time Wang Anshi's political ideal of "being appointed by the ruler to practice the Way" (*de jun*

xing dao 得君行道) still appealed to the scholar-officials, this stage can also be called the "post-Wang Anshi period."[1]

According to Yu's research, after Zhu Xi and his contemporary Neo-Confucians examined and recognized the failures of the Xining reforms, they redirected their criticism towards the inadequacies of Wang Anshi's exposition on the idea of "inner sageliness," or, more precisely, the fact that this was permeated with Buddhist teaching. In consequence, the Northern Song Dynasty Neo-Confucian scholars devoted their efforts to the project of re-establishing the learning of the "inner sageliness." Although, at the same time, the main objective of their re-establishment of "inner sageliness" was still to pursue the realization of "outer kingliness." Hence, Yu wrote that:

Speaking from the angle of political culture, I have only intended to point out the following important fact: namely that, even though the most representative Neo-Confucian scholars, such as Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan (陸九淵), had never questioned the idea that the eternal contribution of Confucianism resided in the aspect of "inner sageliness," and through their entire lifetimes they still always bore in mind their final pursuit for the realization of "outer kingliness." More importantly, because they had changed their initial stance towards the proposition that "inner sageliness" was principally a preparation for achieving "outer kingliness," they espoused a deep belief that "outer kingliness" had to be established on the basis of "inner sageliness" in the first place. This exceptional argument was the actual cause of the discrepancies that emerged between the political

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[1] With regard to this three-stage division readers can further refer to Yu's *Zhu Xi's Historical World,* Volume I, 18–19.

cultures of the third and second stages, and as such also a greatly significant change (ibid., 22–23).

This is precisely the reason why Yu regarded "outer kingliness" (restoration of order) as being of the "first order." His reconstruction of Zhu Xi's historical world was established on the very same basic presupposition.

In order to explain this point, Yu particularly analysed the relationship between the three concepts of *daoti* 道體 ("reality of the Way; metaphysical reality"), *daotong* 道統 ("transmission of the Way") and *daoxue* 道學 ("learning of the Way"). He indicated that: the concept of *daoti*, as interpreted by the Neo-Confucians, denoted "a kind of eternal and universal spiritual reality, which not only pervades the entire universe, but also rules over and regulates the myriad things" (ibid., 53). The *daoti* was discovered by the sage kings from antiquity (from Fuxi 伏羲, Shennong 神農, The Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝), Yao 堯, Shun 舜, down to the Duke of Zhou 周公), who established order amongst people in accordance to it. Through the transmission of *daoti* from one ruler to the other, its genealogical line was formed, that is the *daotong* ("orthodox transmission of the way") (ibid.). According to Yu's analysis, Zhu Xi intended to classify *daotong* and *daoxue* as two separate historical stages: The age before the time of Duke of Zhou, when the virtuous had also held their rightful place in society, and the inner sageliness and outer kingliness formed an integral whole, belonged to the *daotong* stage. In the period of time after the Duke of Zhou, the inner sageliness and outer kingliness split into two and the virtuous were not given their rightful position. In response to this, Confucius rose and initiated the *daoxue*. Yu also pointed out that what was directly inherited by the Song Dynasty Confucianists Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤), Zhang Zai (張載) and the Chen brothers was the *daoxue* founded by Confucius,

and not the *daotong* passed on between the sage kings of old. This view persisted until Zhu Xi's disciple and son-in-law Huang Gan (黃榦, courtesy name Mianzhai 勉齋, 1152–1261), who started using the expression *daotong* as a term amalgamating both stages of *daotong* and *daoxue* spoken about by Zhu Xi, creating a continuous genealogical line extending from the sage kings Yao and Shun down to Zhu Xi. In this way the implications of *daotong* were changed to refer exclusively to virtuous yet non-established (*wuwei* 無位 "to hold no position of power") sages, as opposed to the "lineage of rule" (*zhitong* 治統 "succession of rule") reserved exclusively for monarchs.[2] By means of analysis of the concepts *daoti, daotong* and *daoxue*, Yu tried to reveal their implications for the history of political culture, namely that: "following the division between the way (*dao*) and the rule (*zhi* 治), the rulers were only able to succeed to the *daotong* of the ancient sage kings through controlling the *daoti* ("reality of the Way"). Of course, this was not possible from them to achieve without asking for the assistance of the *daoxue*" (Yu 2003 I, 58).

As mentioned in the foregoing discussion, after the publication of the book *Zhu Xi's Historical World*, Yu further composed the essay "A Detailed Exposition on Neo-Confucianism and Political Culture in the Ming Dynasty" which served as a supplement to the former. The aim of this text was to expound on the political culture of Ming Dynasty scholar-officials, contrasting it against that of the scholar-officials from the Song Dynasty. The presentation of such a contrast has an important historical background,

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[2] On the transformation of *daotong* and *daoxue* in the Song Dynasty see ibid., 42–44. However, in his book Yu mistook Huang Gan 黃榦 for Huang Gan 黃幹. Among the disciples of Zhu Xi there also existed a person called Huang Gan 黃幹. See Chen 1982, 259.

namely that in order to consolidate their political power, the Song Dynasty monarchs treated scholar-officials with exceptional courtesy, while the Ming Dynasty monarchs treated the scholar-officials with extreme contempt and brutality. Subsequently, Yu Yingshi also pointed out that having taken the ideal of "inner sageliness and outer kingliness" as their foundation, the Ming Dynasty Confucian scholars had not at all abandoned the sense of mission to reconstruct order among the people, but the special political circumstances of the Ming Dynasty made them also recognize the infeasibility of "inducing the[ir] ruler(s) into practicing the way." As a consequence, they turned their focus to the people, placing their hope of reaching the ideal of "outer kingliness" on "awakening the people for practicing the way" (*juemin xingdao* 覺民行道). As a matter of fact, Yu had previously expressed a similar view on many occasions. Thus, for instance, already in his article "Review of and Prospects of Modern Confucianism – A View on the Modern Developments in Confucianism from the Perspective of the Qing-Ming Transformation of Intellectual Basis" (*Xiandai Ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang – Cong Ming-Qing sixiang jidiao de zhuanhuan kan Ruxue de xiandai fazhan* 現代儒學的回顧與展望——從明清思想基調的轉換看儒學的現代發展) Yu stated that under the influence of the autocratic regimes of the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the most significant feature of the intellectual basis of these two dynasties was the replacement of the upward approach (*shangxing luxian* 上行路綫) of "inducing the ruler into practicing the way" to the downward approach (*xiaxing luxian* 下行路綫) of "awakening the people into practicing the way" (see Yu 1996, 30–34).

In his current research Yu's interest has shifted to the interpretation of Wang Yangming's (王陽明) "Longchang enlightenment" (*Longchang zhi*

wu 龍場之悟) and his theory of "extension of original knowing" (*zhi liangzhi* 致良知 "extension of the innate knowledge of the good") from the perspective of political culture. In other words, Yu's research investigates how the shift in the direction of the concept of "outer kingliness" also entailed a change of implication with regard to "inner sageliness." Quoting from the Qing Dynasty Confucian scholar Jiao Xun's (焦循) "Treatise on Intuitive Knowledge," Yu contrasts Zhu Xi's theory of "investigation of things and extension of knowledge" (*gewu zhizhi* 格物致知) against Wang Yangming's theory of "perfection of intuitive knowledge":

> While Zhu Xi's '*gewu zhizhi* 格物致知' regards the "scholar" (*shi* 士) as the [chief] object of establishing a school, the doctrine of Yangming's '*zhiliangzhi* 致良知' extends to the common people bellow the rank of the "scholar" (*shi*)… (Yu 2004a, 301).

According to Yu's interpretation, the main reason why Wang Yangming countered Zhu Xi's theory of "investigation of things and extension of knowledge" and replaced it with his theory of "perfection of intuitive knowledge" was:

> According to Wang Yangming's understanding, what Song Confucians referred to as "the principle" (*li* 理, "pattern") or "the heavenly principle" could only be attained by a person who engaged in a long-term pursuit for the "knowledge" (*zhishi* 知識) about "Heaven and earth and the myriad things" (*tiandi wanwu* 天地萬物). As regards the aftermath of such attainment, nothing is greater than the "original knowing of the virtuous nature" (*dexing zhi liangzhi* 德性之良知), this still is a secondary problem. However, when it comes to the activities pertaining to the pursuit for the external "principle" (*li*), these are necessarily confined to the domain of the

"scholar" (*shi*) who specializes in "knowledge," and cannot be expected of the "working people" (*nonggong shanggu* 農工商賈 "farmers, workers, shopkeepers and merchants"). From this is follows that, if one accepted Zhu Xi's explanation of "*gewu zhizhi* 格物致知," one would not be able to arrive at the conclusion that "the streets are filled with sages" (*man jie doushi shengren* 滿街都是聖人), while the undertaking of "awakening the people into practicing the way" would have also been rendered into a dead-end. Only by having switched to his [Wang Yangming's] theory of "perfection of intuitive knowledge," [could one concede] that "a person selling firewood" (*maichai ren* 賣柴人) would also be able to take part in "investigation of things" (*gewu* 格物), for "even though for day and night he is engaged in selling goods, this does not impair his being a sage or a person of virtue" (ibid., 319).

This led Yu to the conclusion that Wang Yangming's concept of "original knowing" (*liangzhi* 良知) had two different levels of social implications. At the first level it implied a "liberation of 'the principle' (*li*) from under the monopoly of the scholars (*shi*), [and its subsequently] becoming something which everyone is able to possess"; whereas at the second level it implied that "'common' (*gonggong* 公共) 'principles' (*li*) were dispersed amongst all people," thereby facilitating the consciousness of individual (see ibid., 319–325).

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A Debate on Confucian Orthodoxy (道統觀) in Contemporary Taiwanese Confucian Thought

Jong-Mo Jung

"Stage a comeback (*juantu chonglai*, 捲土重來)" and "my *Dao* is heading south (*wudao nanyi*, 吾道南矣)" in 1949

External Works of the two Cheng brothers (*Er Cheng Waishu*, 二程外書), a collection of teachings of Cheng Hao (程顥, 1032–1085) and his brother Cheng Yi (程頤, 1033–1107), introduces an ancient event about Cheung Hao and his disciple Yang Shi (楊時, 1053–1135). The episode reminds readers of another scene from ancient history where Huineng, the Sixth Patriarch (六祖慧能), leaves for the south to spread out the spirit of Daman Hongren, the 5th Patriarch (五祖弘忍) as follows:

> When Cheng Hao was in Yingchang (the Eastside of Xuchang city in Henan Province at present, 潁昌), Yang Shi paid a visit and received a lesson. Yang was bright to understand Cheng's teaching at all time. When it was time Yang had returned to his hometown, Jiangnan, Cheng walked him out and told his people, 'my Dao (way) is now carried on to the south (吾道南矣)' (Cheng and Cheng 2004, 428–429).

In this passage, the phrase "*wudao nanyi* (吾道南矣)" refers to the initiation of teaching from a master to a disciple within the Neo-Confucian circle. In this paper, I adopt this notion and use it as a code to understand the cultural consciousness in contemporary Taiwan. In Taiwan, studies on

Sinology and Confucianism started with the retreat of the Kuomintang party (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, from mainland China in 1949. Indeed, the consensus has been that modern scholarship in Taiwan could be seen as starting with the establishment of National Taiwan University in 1928 under Japanese rule. But a more notable factor was the transfer of academic culture from mainland China to Taiwan during the Republican Period. The base of the "transition (*zhuanyi* 轉移)" is founded on two factors in general, both of which took place under the project of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT. One is the transportation of the items which were kept in the Beijing Palace Museum to Taiwan, and the other is the relocation of eminent scholars in every discipline, including literature, history and philosophy to Taiwan. As more scholars moved to Taiwan and settled in university and research institutes, the overall characteristics and scale of Sinology and Confucianism studies were built up, resulting in the status as it stands today. Therefore, a correct approach to contemporary Sinology and Confucianism studies should be made within the frame of "100 years of Republican China."[1]

The retreat of the KMT from Taiwan is reminiscent of another event, which occurred around 900 years ago, when Yi Luoxue's (伊洛學) Confucian orthodoxy (*daotong* 道統) moved south as the northern

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[1] For example, Yang Rubin (楊儒賓) discussed the way in which humanities studies in Taiwan has developed since 1949, focusing on the intersection of the Han Chinese cultural and Taiwanese consciousness in the course of their fusion and contact. He reviews the hundred years of history through which humanities studies has progressed in Taiwan, noting in positive terms how continuously and appropriately the tradition has progressed. Another way of approaching the characteristics of humanities studies in Taiwan is following the thread of Confucianism. Chen Zhaoying (陳昭英), for example, sheds fresh light on the localization of Confucian studies in Taiwan rather than their transfer during the Republican era in order to examine the history of Taiwanese Confucian studies. She addresses the work of Xu Fuguan and Tang Chun-I, as well as their roles in the history, in her extended context (see Yang 2012, and Chen 1995).

territories were occupied and re-established by the Southern Song Dynasty. The movement of treasured items and relocation of intellectuals, led by the KMT, can be considered in the metaphoric context of "moving southbound (*nanqian* 南遷)," as well as the transition of a "*Dao* (道) in Chinese culture" to the south. It is well known that Chiang put an exceptional effort into not only the transfer of items but also the bringing of eminent scholars to Taiwan, including Chen Yinke (陳寅恪, 1890–1969), Hu Shi (胡適, 1891–1962) and Fu Sinian (傅斯年, 1896–1950). The attempt reflects his mindset that regarded scholars as the ambassadors of Chinese culture and civilization, even more so than as teachers or sages. As such, this event will offer a key to the way we understand some characteristics and the progress of Taiwanese Sinology (*hanxue* 漢學), as well as Taiwanese Confucian studies, both of which have often been misunderstand. The key here is to take the following two factors into consideration: one is that Chiang aimed for a "cultural transfer" from mainland China to Taiwan, regardless of the result in the territorial, political and military struggle, and the other is that he perceived this project in association with distinctive interior and scholastic styles of the immigrant intellectuals.

This paper examines the conflicts amongst the scholars in Taiwanese Confucian studies with regard to the issue of how to interpret the term "my *Dao* (*wu dao* 吾道)." The paper focuses on the way in which the disagreement was created and developed. To do this, the paper does not aim to comprehensively grasp the progress and flow of post-1949 Taiwanese Confucian studies as a whole. Rather, it is specifically concerned with the split and disagreement between the scholars of intellectual history and the philosophers. Each of them had different ways of reading Confucian studies, which can be explored in depth using the term "Confucian orthodoxy

(*daotong* 道統)." With regard to the scholars of intellectual history, Qian Mu (錢穆, 1895–1990) and Yu Ying-Shih (余英時, 1930–) will be addressed, whilst Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995) and Liu Shuxian (劉述先, 1934–2016) will be addressed for the comparison with philosophers. Although they share the same root of cultural conservatism or modern New Confucianism, which has been around since the May Fourth Movement, the debates have been intense over the years as to whether there is a valid existential ground of the "my *Dao* (*wu dao* 吾道)" as well as the transference method used. By looking at the conflict and struggle between the two camps, the paper aims to rectify one of the "persistent low voices (*zhiniu diyin* 執拗低音)"[2] inside the academic history of Confucian studies in Taiwan.

The significance of "A Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture (中國文化宣言)" (1958) and a philosopher's Confucian orthodoxy

Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) was originally from the area where Ningbo, Zhejiang is currently located. Huang Zongxi (黃宗羲, 1610–1695) and

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[2] The term was adopted from the Japanese political scientist Masao Maruyama's concept, which originally refers to a phrase that persistently repeats in the same pattern of voice and pitch throughout the background of music. In his study of intellectual history, Masao attempts to identify the quality of "being Japanese" in the sense of "*basso ostinato*," that means a persistent low voice. Borrowing the context in which he used the term, I would like to focus on the different approaches from a philosopher's side and a historian's side when they regard the question of how to understand Taiwanese Confucian studies. The paper will postulate the comparative reading of two sides as an essential methodology in order to understand Taiwanese Confucian studies. Recently, in 2014, Fan Sen Wang (王汎森), who is Yu Ying Shih's (余英時) student, adapted Masao's notion in his reading of modern and contemporary Chinese intellectual history (Wang 2014).

Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1472–1529) were from the nearby area, too. Given the fact that both Huang Zongxi and Wang Yangming were "*ruzhe* (Confucianists, 儒者)" who were exceptional with regards to both literary and military skills, it is not difficult to imagine how easy it would have been for Chiang to be interested in the *Song Yuan Xue an* (*The Records of Song Yuan Scholars*, 宋元學案) and *Ming Ruxue an* (*The Records of Ming Scholars*, 明儒學案) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. These two books on the philosophies and intellectual histories of mainland China had an influence on Chiang, who later became the nation's military leader. Perhaps, one could assume, this background might have inspired him when he ordered the transfer project in 1949, and thus perhaps he may have been motivated by the ambition to adopt "the *Dao* (the Way)" of Chinese civilisation to Taiwan. It is not a bold claim that Confucian studies in Taiwan after 1949 were established on such an affirmation *Dao*. Regardless of what kind of expectation Chiang had in mind, Confucian studies in Taiwan are bound to be understood in relation to the cultural and vocational particularities of the country, created by the feeling of loss that ran through the general sentiment in the immigrant intellectuals of that time.

Retrospectively speaking, Huang Zongxi's attempt to "stage a comeback (*juantu chonglai,* 捲土重來)" was abandoned as his project of an armed struggle against Qing Dynasty to revive the Ming Dynasty (反清復明) failed. Nevertheless, he still pursued the possibility of "*wudao nanyi* (吾道南矣)" through his two books (*The Records of Ming Scholars* 明儒學案, *The Records of Song Yuan Scholars* 宋元學案). In the preface to *The Records of Ming Scholars*, he states, "mind fills in the sky and ground. The mind cannot exist without being divided into myriad things because it is impossible to fathom how the mind changes. There is no substance in mind;

the substance is the point where the study reaches at in the end" (Huang 2008, 7). This statement can be read as his confession about his previous, turbulent life, and also as the expression of his will to continue the spirit of China by succeeding the "transfer of *Dao* (*dao tong* 道統)" while preserving the principle (*siwen* 斯文) despite the occupation of the Qing Dynasty. Critics tend to claim that Huang Zongxi took a passive and soft attitude towards the Qing after the failed project of armed struggle. Nevertheless, could it not be viewed as a result of his deliberation on how to sustain Chinese culture throughout the Qing era, rather than as a compromise with or defiance against the Qing? One of the effective ways to read this movement is to examine Huang's revisionist strategy in order to maintain and secure the cultural and moral identity of his country. A similar approach can be made with regard to the immigrant intellectuals, as the Confucian scholars were able to implant the line of cultural conservatism and Sinological tradition in Taiwan, possibly hoping for the revival of "*wudao nanyi* (吾道南矣)."[3]

A prominent issue that has loomed large in this historical context since 1949 amongst the Confucian scholars in Taiwan is the way in which their

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3 Meanwhile, Chen Yinke chose not to leave for Taiwan in the end. Several assumptions on the probable reason have been made in academia. My own is that there may have been a plan for the *Wudao nanyi*—heading south—when he decided to go to Hong Kong's Ling Nan University and Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China, rather than National Taiwan University. If one reads the accounts in *The Last 20 Years of Chen Yinke* by Lu Jiandong, presumably Guangzhou was the shelter where he could maintain his integrity as an intellectual as well as the freedom of his research while keeping some distance from the politics in Beijing. The sentiment and inner life of his later years bore fruit as a seminal text in contemporary Confucian studies. If *The Last 20 Years of Chen Yinke* allowed us to access the inner life of Chen Yinke with the aid of valuable resources and interviews, *Late Chen Yinke's Writings* by Yu Ying Shih attempts a dialogue with Chen Yinke by reading the hidden messages in his poetry.

self-consciousness about "Confucian orthodoxy (道統 意識)." The crisis that the Confucianist tradition in Taiwan faced as an illegitimate line of Chinese culture throughout the history of Westernization, as well as Communist influence, led the scholars to shape their identity as an objective academic discipline inseparable from the self-consciousness that they should also continue and express the Confucianist tradition in the course of their studies. This duality was both a sign of potential and limitation in the Confucianist studies in Taiwan. This becomes even more striking if one recalls the historical fact that the Confucian studies in Taiwan inherited not only the ideological legacy of the May Fourth Movement, but also the long-lasting effect of "the Debate between Han Learning and Song Learning (漢宋之爭)." Given this circumstance that spanned through the 20th century, the historical consciousness and identity the Taiwanese scholars shared as immigrant intellectuals is a fruitful topic with which to examine the characteristics of Taiwanese Confucianist studies. In the following section, the paper will focus on the case of "A Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture (中國文化宣言, 1958)."

As noted above, "A Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture (1958)" refers to "A declaration on Chinese Culture to an audience around the world (爲中國文化敬告世界人士 宣言)" written by Zhang Junmai (張君勱, 1887–1969), Xu Fuguan (徐復觀, 1902–1982), Tang Junyi (唐君毅, 1909–1978) and Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995). It was published in various academic journals, including *Minzhu pinglun* (民主評論) and *Zaisheng* (再生) (Mou 2001). After 1949, many Chinese intellectuals moved to Hong Kong and Taiwan, followed by the formation of the New Confucianism camp in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The Manifesto, which came out under this context, was a sign that announced the commencement of New Confucianism

in Hong Kong and Taiwan led by Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. Tang Junyi wrote the draft, and thus the tone reflects his affirmation of the significance and value of that which constitutes the essence of Confucianism today. Cai Renhou (蔡仁厚) points to three key aspects of the Manifesto as *daotong* (Confucian orthodoxy, 道統), *xuetong* (academic orthodoxy, 學統) and *zhengtong* (political orthodoxy, 政統). He argues that the significance of the Manifesto lies in its attempt to return to the root and to renew Confucian traditions (返本改新).[4] Indeed, it is not a daring claim to suggest that the Manifesto should be described as a 20th century version of *Yuan dao* (原道), an essay by the Tang philosopher Han Yu (韓愈), or *Zhongyong zhangju xu* (中庸章句序), an essay by Zhu Xi (朱熹). These two earlier essays aims and influence over the following generations are reminiscent of what the Manifesto attempts to achieve.

Although the Manifesto did herald the later declaration of the establishment of New Confucianism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, it also sparked the flame of an internal split within the modern Confucianist camps. The strongest backlash was made on the side of the cultural conservatives. This camp was unhappy about the way the writers of the Manifesto presented themselves as the defenders of Confucian orthodoxy. Qian Mu (錢穆)'s refusal to participate in the signing of the document made clear the conflicts amongst the New Confucian scholars, and it later became a symbolic incident that indicated the internal disagreement between the philosophers and historians in terms of the different views about Confucian orthodoxy and its current status. The book *Qian Mu and New Confucianism*

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[4] In 2009, National Central University, Taiwan held a conference to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Manifesto. The results were published as a collection of 30 essays (see Li 2009).

(錢穆與新儒家) by Yu Yingshi, Qian Mu's student, explores the ideological significance represented in the conflict between the Tang Junyi camp and Qian Mu at that time. For further discussion, it is necessary to understand the Confucianist view that is represented in the Manifesto.

The Manifesto comprises two parts. The latter part is concerned with the matter of how to bring together Chinese cultural tradition and Confucian ideals with Western science and technology, as well as democracy. To put it in Mou Zongsan words, the question is deeply related to the establishment of academic orthodoxy (學統), which is concerned with how to lead Chinese civilization in order to meet the challenges of science and technology. It is also related to the establishment of the political orthodoxy, which is concerned with how to absorb the idea of democracy within the cultural and historical tradition of China.[5] However, as the first part of the Manifesto suggests, scholars such as Tang Junyi thought that such a tradition could be built up by the expansion and affirmation of the Confucian orthodoxy that had been steadily progressing without losing its vitality. According to the Manifesto, the reception of democracy and scientific development in Chinese culture could not be settled by external force. This reception became tangible when the Confucian intellectuals' sense of responsibility for the national crisis met the Confucian ideal of "*neisheng waiwang* (內聖外王, inner sageness and outer kingliness)." As the Manifesto states:

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[5] For further research about Mou Zongsan's attitude towards Confucian orthodoxy, political orthodoxy, academic orthodoxy and the scholar's relationship with the Manifesto, refer to the 5th chapter of Mou Zongsan's biography (牟宗三評傳) by Lin Duansheng in 2009 (see Lin 2009, Chapter 5).

We consider the Chinese history and cultural scholarship as something that represents the objective spiritual life of Chinese. Where is, can we claim then, the core of the spiritual life is rooted? We could say it is amidst the centre of Chinese ideology or philosophy, which does not yet mean that they are the ultimate determiner of Chinese culture and history. Instead, they should be understood as a starting point that one takes to identify the meaning of spiritual life manifested in Chinese culture and history. (......) What it means by the characteristics of Chinese culture in this context refers to the oneness (一本性) in its root. (......) China has always followed the 'unification for the great oneness (大一統)' as a basic principle (常道)'. Furthermore, the political split and integration failed to exert any influence on the wide current of the cultural and academic ideology. This is what we declare as the transmission of Confucian orthodoxy (道統) (see Mou 2011, 229–31).

As seen from the above, scholars such as Tang Junyi noted the realization and expression of the objective spiritual life, as well as a sense of purpose in Chinese culture. This passage is reminiscent of Hegelian logic, which argues for the externalisation (*wai hua* 外化) of objective spirit. It is well known that Tang Junyi was an ardent admirer of Hegel, as Mou Zongsan was of Kant. Here, the Manifesto examines the root and transmission of Chinese culture at the level of spiritual substance, revealing a deep-rooted conception that the material history and culture reflects a distinctive ethnic philosophy of a country. Scholars such as Tang Junyi understood the unique philosophy or spiritual entity of a certain ethnic group as an equivalent to the term Confucian orthodoxy in the field of Confucian studies. The Manifesto, a key component of Confucian orthodoxy, discusses the original Confucian idea about immanent transcendence that affirms the harmony (oneness) between nature and

human beings (mankind) (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一) within the practice of ethics and morality. It also addresses the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (*xin xing zhi xue* 心性之學) that bases its lesson on the idea of immanent benevolence (*ren yi* 仁義). As the Manifesto states:

> Ranging from Confucius and Mencius (*kongmeng* 孔孟) to Confucianists in the Song and Ming, the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (心性之學) in China teaches that the human being is the founding principle on which a person practices morality. The depth of one's study corresponds to the depth of one's life that practices morality. (......) The doctrine (心性之學) naturally includes one metaphysical system, which is close to the Kantian sense of so-called moral metaphysics; the Kantian metaphysics is based upon the practice of morality, and by the practice, the metaphysics is proved and actualized (Mou 2011, 247).

Scholars including Confucius and Mencius (孔孟) and those from the Song and Ming have a shared consciousness, namely: (1) That the "conduct (*xing* 行)" of morality and the "awareness (*zhi* 知)" of enlightenment progress interdependently. (2) That every moral practice regarding the external world occurs by the human will to exert the best of a person's innate nature. This means that the practice is performed by a constant self-request urged by our own mind. (3) That, since one can exert the best of one's innate nature, it is possible to "form a triad with Heaven and Earth (與天地參)" or to "unite Heaven with virtue (與天地合德)" by mastering Heavenly virtue (*tian de* 天德), Heavenly logic (*tian li* 天理) and Heavenly mind (*tian xin* 天心). This is the tradition of the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (*xin xing zhi xue* 心性之學) (Mou 2011, 248).

Scholars such as Tang Junyi set out the idea of a "moral metaphysics (道德形而上學)"—which is based on the tradition of the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature, and the notion of the harmony between nature and human beings (天人合一)—as the essence of the transmission of Confucian orthodoxy. Historically speaking, this approach is reminiscent of Zhu Xi's (朱熹) remark to Zhou Lianxi (周濂溪). Zhu Xi asserted the re-enactment of Confucian orthodoxy that had been severed since Mencius by praising Zhou Lianxi about his insight; Zhou Lianxi understood that the "*dao ti* (the substances of the Way, 道體)" was immersed in Chinese civilization and history.[6] To put it another way, if a certain view regards the essence of

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[6] In his book 隆興府學濂溪先生祠記 Zhou Dunyi comments on the probable meaning Zhou Lianxi had in mind when using the term Dao Ti as follows: "The nobleness pitched its profound peak at the point where there is no pole means there is a great pole (無極大極) which, however, does not separate from the everyday life. The refinement pitched its peak at the point where it seeks Yin and Yang and the Five Phases, which, however, does neither separate from cardinal virtues of benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), wisdom (*zhi*), and propriety (*li*) nor from the stains of rigidness, softness, good and evil. Nobody had reached the principle that "intrinsic reality and function are a single source; there is no gap between the apparent and the subtle" (體用一源，顯微無間) since the Qin (221–207 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties. In fact, the lesson does not deviate from the teaching of the *Four Books and Five Classics* including Six Channels Theory (六經), Analects of Confucius (論語), Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) and Great Learning (大學). The term "Supreme Ultimate" (*tai ji* 太極) refers to an integrated name of the principle (*li* 理), which runs through all things in the universe. The "Supreme Ultimate" neither has device nor shape, and yet it embraces the principle of all things in the universe. This accounts for the phrase "no hierarchy is to be absolute (無極而太極)." In the same manner, it does not have any shape and device, which accounts for the phrase "be absolute is because there is no hierarchy." How can it become an object if it gets apart from the common people's everyday life? The harmony of Cosmic Dual Forces (or *yin–yang*) and Five Elements is attributed to the principle; the logic is the origin of values such as benevolence, justice, courtesy and wisdom (仁義禮智), as well as that of characteristics such as rigidness, softness, good and evil (剛柔善惡). Those who comfortably settle in the logic by accepting it as their nature are called sages, whilst those who recover the logic and capture it are called great people of the past (贤人).

Chinese civilization as the spiritual substance represented in the moral metaphysics and the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature, and if it also regards the revival and actualization of the spirit as the transmission of Confucian orthodoxy, then the project is not much different from the New Confucian studies movement in the Song Dynasty led by Zhou Lianxi. In this context, it is not a coincidence that Mou Zongsan anticipated the 20th century re-enactment of Neo-Confucianism that was prevalent with his theory of the three-step development in Confucian studies (儒學 三期 發展論).

The way in which Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan understand Confucianism, as represented in the Manifesto, calls to mind the effort of Zhu Xi who asserted the confirmation of Confucian orthodoxy and its development. As he highlighted in Zhou Dunyi's *Taijitu shuo* (太極圖說), he thought the fundamental premise on which to realize Confucianist ideology was the recognition of the "Supreme Ultimate (*taiji*, 太極)" or the "natural order of things (Heaven's law, *tianli*, 天理)." However, in terms of Neo-Confucianism, the two concepts are the reality that surrounds the exteriors of the human mind, that is, the objective world. For Zhu Xi, order (*li* 理) is not something that is achieved self-sufficiently by embracing the subjective mind. Therefore, he approved the proposition that the mind has a moral principle (心具理), while also emphasizing the investigation of things and understanding principles (格物窮理), and external cultivation for dealing with everything properly at the same time. For Zhu Xi, mind and order do not form a mutual identity (相即) but a circulatory relationship. According to Zhu Xi, We can enhance the ethical motivation and ensure the existence of a moral nature in mind by exploring and accumulating the orders that have been scattered in Chinese civilization, history and texts.

However, given the academic performance and philosophical structure of Mou Zongsan in the later years, it should be stated that the tradition of the Neo-Confucianism of the Lu-Wang School (陸王學) since Xiong Shili (熊 十力, 1885–1968), who Mou Zongsan succeeded, was uninterested in the *Dao ti*'s mediating role in Chinese history and culture, as Zhu Xi stressed. Rather, Xiong Shili maintained the system of introvert monism by emphasizing phrases such as "x*in ji li* (the mind is principle, 心卽理)," "x*in wai wuli* (there is no principle outside the mind, 心外無理)," and "x*in wai wuwu* (there is no object outside the mind, 心外無物)," As discussed above, the line ranging from the Lu-Wang School (陸王學) to Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan underestimated the role of history and culture as a mediator of the succession of Confucian orthodoxy. In this regard, the Manifesto can be read as a departure from Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism and return to the Lu-Wang School's Confucianism.[7]

Qian Mu and New Confucianism (1991) and a historian's Confucian orthodoxy

Now one could elucidate the reason why Qian Mu (錢穆) was against the Manifesto although he was willing to adopt the principles of Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucianism (朱子學). His refusal to sign it can be understood as a result of his own idea about the way in which *dao ti* (the substance of the Way, 道

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[7] Regardless, the base of Xu Fuguan's view differs from those of Tang Chun-I and Mou Zongsan. Although he signed the Manifesto, Xu Fuguan did not consider the potential of religious transcendence – or immanent transcendence – as the core of Confucian orthodoxy. Since it exceeds the range of the subject this paper covers to discuss Xu Fuguan's view in a separate sense from Tang Chun-I and Mou Zongsan's view, I suggest those who are interested in Xu Fuguan's idea on religious transcendence and the succession of Confucianism should consult the preface of his book *History of Chinese Humanity (Pre-Qin)* (see Xu 2003).

體) exists. Qian Mu holds the same view as historians and critical historians on Confucian orthodoxy (*dao tong* 道統). As the Huineng, the Sixth Patriarch, secured the doctrines he was passed on from his master when retreating to the south, should the *dao ti*, in the Confucianist sense, be something exclusive to a specific individual or group's awakening? If so, might there be any danger in that kind of succession, in case it becomes inclined to elitism and oblivious of the capacity of the entire culture and its great history? These questions led Yu Yingshi to criticize Mou Zongsan and his camp; Yu made blunt remarks such as "arrogance of innate moral knowledge (良知)" in his book *Qian Mu and New Confucianism*. Yu Yingshi's perspective is useful to explicate the division between the philosophers and historians with regard to the debate on Confucian orthodoxy.

Qian Mu and New Confucianism (錢穆與新儒家) (1991) was published as a commemoration of Yu Yingshi's teacher Qian Mu, who passed away in 1990. In this book, Yu is strongly against the scholarly circle rising at that time which attempted to incorporate Qian Mu into the camp of modern New Confucianism. His writing contains a provocative interrogation about whether it is correct to relate his master with Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, who directly inherited the spirit of the Lu-Wang School. Opening up his argument, Yu starts with the topic of "sectarian bias (門戶之見)" and raises the old debate between Han Learning and Song Learning (漢宋之爭). He used this approach to explicate the relationship between Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan with his teacher Qian Mu in a theoretical and constructive manner. Yu clarifies Qian Mu's academic standpoint by calling it "the viewpoint of a historian (史學立場)," as seen in the following passage:

Master Qian Mu first started from the study of literature and soon his reading ranged over literary works (集部). He entered New Confucianism (理學) after acquiring knowledge through texts (因文見道), then he stepped up to the study of classics (經學), pre-Qin philosophy (子學), and last, he covered Evidential Studies of the Qing Dynasty. (......) Since he took such pathway, the ultimate destination of his academic journey was history. When he was trying to resolve the conflict between the Modern Script School and Ancient Script School (今古文經學) during Han Dynasty, Qian Mu based his stance on that of a historian. We believe that the 'historian's standpoint (史學立場)' offered Qian Mu a transcendental perspective, and therefore, it enabled his extensive reading of numerous kinds of the documents, including Confucian classics, history, philosophy and literary works (經史子集). His passion led him to the following understanding: if one is confined to a certain sect (門戶), he is unable to understand his own sect. Qian Mu struggled to end the hostility between the various sects throughout his life, and he did not attempt to set up any either, which reflects his profound belief (Yu 2006, 29).

While abolishing the distinctions of 'sectarian bias (門戶之見)', he (Qian Mu) also respected the disciplines of modern scholarship. (......) What the master constantly strived after was as follows: those who pursue Chinese scholarship, whichever sect he is from, should be conversant with the overall picture of the culture, and with other sects around then. Only in this way one can stop the fatal consequence of narrow sight as well as the absence of a big picture amongst the sects (ibid., 31).

As suggested in the passage, the historian's standpoint in Yu Ying-shih's words refers to a status beyond the mere standpoint of a historian. The makes a clear contrast with the phrase "the hostility between the sects (門戶之見)." It is used as a pithy comment on the Lu-Wang School who had regarded themselves as modern, orthodox New Confucianists. As is

generally known, Qian Mu supported the vital power of Chinese culture as well as the value of orthodox scholarship, the existence of which was threatened by the whirlwinds of Westernization (全般西化論) and Marxism-Leninism. Similar to the Xiong Shili (熊十力) line, he protested against the methodology of evidential research and positivism. Given this historical record, it might seem possible to categorize him in the modern New Confucianist camp.[8] However, one should not overlook a real issue here before making a hasty judgment on his standpoint. There was a discrepancy between the standpoints of both sides at that time, regarding the matter of how to sustain the vital power (life force, *sheng ming li* 生命力) of Chinese culture. To put it simply, for Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, this power was clearly represented in the tradition of the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (心性之學). For them, the case could be read as a continuation of the transmission of the moral mind as stated in the *Preface to the Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean* (中庸章句序). Yu Yingshi did not agree with the view that the vital power of Confucianist studies and the essence of Chinese culture are transmitted in an isolated, closed manner. Yu thus summarized Qian Mu's view and suggested a solid ground, as follows:

> Given the standard established as a result of the divergence (分期) in the history of Chinese scholarship, two features are suggested if one could read the way in which Master Qian Mu understood the history of Confucianist studies. First, he thoroughly stood on the bases of the divergence and context of the internal shift throughout the academic history of China, and he did not

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[8] In fact, Liu Shuxian nominates Ch'ien Mu as one of the core members of the New Confucianist circle, considering his scholarship in the New Confucian frame (see Liu 2004, 135).

attempt to make any reference to the western countries in his account. Secondly, he also did not confine the status of Confucianist studies within the discipline of "philosophy"; he rather discovered it in the process of development and expansion (Yu 2006, 45).

One could state that the term orthodoxy, a much-debated topic in the Song and Ming Dynasties, was bound to be controversial as it was subjective, a single line transmission. If orthodoxy is defined in this way, it is prone to break the broad flow of history, if not, it is exposed to isolation, being fragile and easy to be interrupted. One may call it a breakable orthodoxy, which is then, in fact, an orthodoxy fraught with fallacy. A true orthodoxy should speak about a great tradition (大傳統) of culture and history with a clear, comprehensive awareness. By illustrating it this way, orthodoxy can be viewed in a relatively objective manner, and by doing so it can overcome the limitation of single line transmission without warning of interruption (ibid., 46–7).

The first passage is from Yu's account, and the second is from Qian Mu's remark in his book *Zhongguo xueshu tongyi* (中國學術通義). Here, Qian Mu refuses the single line transmission of Confucian orthodoxy (道統觀) as Han Yu (韓愈) or Chanzong (禪宗) suggested. The reason is that they narrowed down the existential grounds of orthodoxy to an arbitrary discipline, namely, the "doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (心性之學)." Their account can be described as a closed recognition (認可) between them amongst many other possible forms of transmission from generation to generation while sustaining the orthodoxy's dogmatic life. But for Qian Mu, Confucian orthodoxy (道統) is inherent in a broad stream of cultural tradition and history; it is something that flows continuously, openly and

endlessly. [9] It is neither occupied exclusively under the supervision (contemplation) of individual philosophers, nor intermittently revisited by a genius or elite after some interruptions. For this reason, Qian Mu and Yu Yingshi rejected the genealogy in the modern New Confucianist camp. As suggested in the Manifesto, in Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan's view the spiritual life in Chinese culture was analogous to a product of intuition that cannot be found without self-acquirement, according to the teaching of the "doctrine of Mind and Nature (心性之學)." In contrast, in Qian Mu and Yu Yingshi's view as historians, Confucian orthodoxy exists sporadically around the reality and within the great tradition throughout history and culture. To put it metaphysically, their view is more active in adapting the idea of "*liyi fenshu* (a theory that pursues correspondence between one principle and many manifestations, 理一分殊)" from an open respect for cultural history, whilst refusing to adopt Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming's view. The Heavenly order and Confucian orthodoxy cannot exist separate from reality; because of this very point, orthodoxy can be found in the concreteness and realities (manifestation) of energy (*qi* 氣), rather than a subjective mind. The two scholars' refutation can be further

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[9] In terms of methodology for the field of intellectual history research, two papers are recommended for further work on Yu Ying Shih's view with respect to the notion of continuity: "On the History of Sui Dynasty Thoughts from the Development of Confucianism in the Song and Ming" (從宋明儒學的發展論清代思想史) and "A New Explanation of the History of Sui Dynasty Thoughts" (清代思想史的一個新解釋). Both papers are included in Yu Ying Shih's monograph *On Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng* (戴震與章學誠). Whilst Mou Zonsan defines the 300 years of the Qing Dynasty as a dark phase of Chinese intellectual and Confucian history, arguing that the Confucian orthodoxy was interrupted in this period, Ch'ien Mu and Yu Ying Shih claimed that its history was implicitly continued and developed in this era, acknowledging the survival of orthodoxy.

explicated if the points discussed above are fully explained and taken into consideration.

In *Qian Mu and New Confucianism*, Yu illustrates the relationship between Qian Mu and Xiong Shili (熊十力) and also how they differ in temperament as well as academic style. A contentious point in his book is where he stresses the anti-Confucianist aspect of Xiong Shili as revealing his "savage (猖狂恣肆)" attitude, never mind pointing out the blind spot in his arbitrary studies of the Classics. Yu's tone against Xiong Shili is blunt enough for the reader to suspect a deliberate provocation targeted at Xu Fu Guan, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, all of whom were the students of Xiong Shili.[10]

> There are "more differences than similarities" between the second generation New Confucianists and Master Qian Mu. They even do not have a shared language. The language of the second generation such as the account from Kant and Hegel is neither familiar to Qian Mu nor acceptable to him. In this respect, their relationship is even more distant than the relationship that the first generation had with Xiong Shili, in terms of the shared idea. (......) The sect called "New Confucianism (新儒家)" today is established through "A Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture (中國文化宣言)" published in 1958. (......) As far as I know, the 'Neo-Confucianism' that Qian Mu acquired in his late years in Taipei indicates the Xiong Shili line only. Xiong Shili respected Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming (陸王) in terms of Neo-Confucianism. In contrast, Qian Mu succeeded the Confucianist tradition that has integrated numerous disciplines since the Northern Song Dynasty, despite his recognition of the unique contributions

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[10] Defending Xiong Shili, Liu Shuxian rejects Yu Ying Shih and his critical tone (see Liu 2016, 64–65).

some newly emerging sects of Confucianism made. The reason why he especially respected Zhu Xi in the Song Dynasty out of any other sages was also because Zhu Xi not only made a "comprehensive survey of *Lixue* (the study of principles, 理學)," but also continued and developed the scholarly tradition of classics, history and literature since Ouyang xiu (歐陽脩). (......) The declaration at the outset of the Manifesto is the awareness that "the school of Mind and Human Nature is located where the spiritual essence of Chinese culture lies in." This statement only reveals Xiong Shili's particular viewpoint. Of course, his viewpoint may serve as an unchanging truth amongst the Neo-Confucianists (Yu 2006, 55–6).

With this sarcastic and mocking tone that targets the Xiong Shili camp, Yu continues to argue that their obsession with the doctrine of Mind and Nature confined the Confucian orthodoxy within a "dogmatic (*jiao* 教)" system, and consequently blocked the possibility of further "academic (*xue* 學)" pursuit that set its base on a pluralistic and relative view of true principles. Addressing this as an ill consequence of "arrogance of innate moral knowledge (*liang zhi* 良知)," he states that "the followers of scientism are proud to think they have a privilege to access the truth, which implanted an 'arrogance of intellectual knowledge' in them." In the same manner, he continues to criticize, the followers of moralism as being proud to think they have privileged access to "the substances of the Way (*dao ti* 道體)," which implanted "arrogance of innate moral knowledge (良知)" (see ibid., 78, and Yang 1998).

As a historian of Chinese history and thought, Qian Mu and Yu Ying-Shih's translation of Confucian orthodoxy clashes with the *xin ji li* (the mind is principle, 心即理) line of Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, if not the modern New Confucianist line. Reading in this way allows us to shed fresh

light on the parallel incidents in the history that are frequently addressed in this paper, where Qian Mu refuses to sign the Manifesto and its concurrent announcement. Meanwhile, Lee Ming-huei (李明輝), a student of Mou Zongsan, defended the "philosopher's view of Confucian orthodoxy" in response to Yu Ying-shih's criticism of the Xiong Shili camp, while in favour of the historian's Confucian orthodoxy. In his essay "Confucian orthodoxy in New Confucianism (新儒家的道統論)" (Lee 2013, 214–246), he acknowledges that Xiong Shili and his camp succeeded the Lu-Wang School line and that they considered the affirmation of the universal and transcendental substance of mind (*xin ti* 心體) as a key that enables the transmission of Confucian orthodoxy. Nevertheless, Lee Ming-huei also states that Zhu Xi's Confucian orthodoxy is close to a "philosopher's concept" rather than a historian's concept. Thus, the Confucian orthodoxy stated by Mou Zongsan and his camp should be read as an "acknowledgement that they were consciously taking responsibility of the manifestation of the orthodox. It does not mean that the orthodoxy is under the control of a few sages" (Lee 2013, 236). Regarding the depth and width of discussion presented in the book, it is difficult to claim Lee's writing presents a full objection against Qian Mu and New Confucianism. Nevertheless, looking at this thread of debates starting from the Manifesto to Qian Mu and New Confucianism—and then further to Lee's refutation—provides an essential clue to a delicate understanding of the contentious point surrounding Taiwanese Confucian studies. To continue the discussion, the following section will supplement the argument of this paper by considering Yu Ying-Shih's *Zhu Xi's Historical World* (2003).

Zhu Xi's Historical World (2003): an unfinished debate on Confucian orthodoxy

The five-volume *Zhu Xi anthology* (*Zhu zi xin xue an,* 朱子新學案, 1971) by Qian Mu and *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Human Nature* (*Xin ti yu xing ti*, 心體與性體, 1970) by Mou Zongsan are two seminal studies amongst those published in 20th century Taiwan. *Zhu Xi anthology* is acclaimed for its articulate survey of concepts and subjects, and *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Human Nature* meticulously examines the formation of Neo-Confucianism and its philosophical limitations, particularly in book III. The books offer a chance of comparative reading since both are on Neo-Confucianism, and yet they are written from the perspective of School of the Chengs and Zhu Xi, and that of the Lu-Wang School line, respectively. Therefore, the "Introduction (導論)" in *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Human Nature* is worth paying particular attention to, as it gives a supplementary explanation about Confucian orthodoxy and the term "the substance of the Way (*dao ti lun* 道體論)" as embodied in the Manifesto. In the book, Mou argues that Zhu Xi considers the notion of principle (reason, order, *li* 理) as an objective substance that "merely exists, but does not operate/is not active (即存有不活動)," which makes his view differ from the orthodoxy of Confucius and Mencius (別子爲宗).[11] According to Mou, the chain towards *dao ti* (the substance of the Way), which "exists and is active at the same time (即存有即活動)," is the core of Confucius and Mencius' theory of Mind and Human Nature. The chain operates if one acknowledges the fundamental

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[11] The idea is repeatedly addressed in the book *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Nature* (心體與性體, 1970) (see Mou 2012, 113–128).

accordance of the substance of mind (*xinti* 心體) and the substance of human nature (*xingti* 性體). Therefore, the "Introduction (導論)" in his book is analogous to the concept of Confucian orthodoxy; it is now reconceived from a philosopher's point of view, which implies a subversion of Zhu Xi's take on Confucian orthodoxy.

It was in 2003 that a full argument started to rise against Mou's "philosopher's Confucian orthodoxy," as represented in his book; that year was when Yu Yingshi published *The Historical World of Zhu Xi* (朱熹的歷史世界) in Taiwan.[12] Whereas *Zhu Xi anthology* (朱子新學案) does not move far from the established structure of an academic book (學案), *The Historical World of Zhu Xi* directly confronts Mou's viewpoint by raising Confucian orthodoxy as a topic, as the author attempts to understand it in the sense of the broad stream of cultural tradition – namely the political culture amongst scholars. His view is distinctive from the principles of the

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[12] In South Korean scholarship, Min Kyung-Wook's essay "Yu Ying Shih's scholarly ideas: a study examined through his relationship with Chen Yinke" is the only one available at present. Min discusses the significance of *The Historical World*, focusing the related tendencies in terms of the critical methodologies adopted by Chen Yinke and Yu Ying Shih. To briefly add to Min's approach, it would also provide a useful frame to trace the intellectual and ideological relationship between Chen Yinke and Yu Ying Shih in the sense of Confucian orthodoxy. Given Yu Ying Shih's deep understanding of, and meticulous research on Chen Yinke, not only the comparative study of Ch'ien Mou and Yu Ying Shih but also that of Chen Yinke and Yu Ying Shih offers a worthwhile topic to examine historians' and intellectuals' different approaches to the orthodoxy. Since this topic is beyond the range of what this paper covers, further discussion will be left for the future. However, I would like to point out one historical fact, which is that Chen Yinke published "A Study of Han Yu (論韓愈)" in 1954, after a thorough reflection on current affairs in his time. In this paper he attempted to express his concern about the Confucian orthodoxy as well as Chinese cultural identity. For further research on the historical significance and Chen Yinke's implication in the book, refer to the following books written from the perspective of historical consciousness: *Independence and Freedom*: *Chen Yinke's theory* (獨立與自由: 陳寅恪論學) by Wang Zhenbang (王震邦) published in 2011.

doctrine of Mind and Human Nature. The "Introduction (序文)" and "Preface (序說)" of the book can be read as a counter-counter argument of a philosopher's Confucian orthodoxy that is represented as the substance of mind and the substance of nature. As such, it is not difficult to recall the persistent debates amongst the Yu Ying-Shih line, Xiong Shili line and Mou Zongsan life. Yu continues to consider such long-existing concerns in his preface, as follows:

> The philosophical achievement in the studies of Neo-Confucianism (*lixue*, 理學) for the last century has been highly salient. The "philosophization (*zhexue hua* 哲學化)" of Neo-Confucianism required a high cost. Metaphysical contemplation in Neo-Confucianism started to split independently from the entire New Confucianism camp, and furthermore from the deep tradition of Confucianism. I attempted to restore the idea of Neo- Confucianism to the origin of the historical context under the holistic point of view. The attempt should be understood as a movement to equilibrium, with an additional provision of a new reference system, so that the Confucian studies can progress towards a status of dynamic equilibrium, without having to replace "historization (*lishi hua* 歷史化)" with "philosophization" (Yu 2015, 13).

In this passage, Yu repeatedly stresses the different conceptualizations of orthodox between the historians and philosophers. If Qian Mu and New Confucianism were the criticism that targeted the Xiong Shili line from a passive standpoint in defence of Qian Mu, *Zhu Xi's Historical World* can be described as a full-scale criticism of a "metaphysical interpretation of Neo-Confucianism" or a "philosopher's orthodoxy" as presented in *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Human Nature*, with its own interpretation of Neo-Confucianism. What Yu argues with terms such as

"historical context" and the "political culture amongst Confucian scholars" is that Qian Mu's orthodoxy sought the existence of the orthodox within the historicity and concreteness of the full stream of cultural history, which Yu attempted to succeed. What follows is a look at the contents of his forward. Studies of intellectual history should recognize the "inner logic," which is why I made added the subtitle "the examination of political culture in Confucian scholars of Song Dynasty" under the title "Historical World (歷史世界)." The aim is to examine how the studies of the *Dao* were formed and progressed within the framework of the historical and political history of the era. Since the 20th century, studies of the *Dao* have been heavily inclined towards philosophical history, while losing the historical context that motivated the very progress that is being considered. Therefore, such studies lost their broad view. To overcome this, I explained the proliferation and change of Confucianism in terms of cultural history and the reformation movement of Confucianism in terms of political history, and these two aspects then come together in an integrated view. In the Song Dynasty, principles were established to "rule together (共治天下)" with the Emperor as Confucian scholars emerged as a political subject.[13] Wang Anshi, Sima Guang and the two Cheng brothers are not an exception, and in the end they sacrificed themselves for the realization of "outer kingliness (外王)." The elaborate theory of Mind and Human Nature made by the New Confucian

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[13] Throughout, Yu Ying Shih maintains the same attitude in his discussion on the heart of the cultural and intellectual history of China. Examining the ideological history from the ancient to contemporary times, he focuses on the shared view of culture and history as well as the collective consciousness within the intellectual circle, rather than the metaphysical discernment represented as *dao ti*. For further research on the scholar's achievements and views, refer to his book *The Study of the History of Chinese Thought* (我與中國思想史研究) published in 2008 (see Yu 2008).

school during Song Dynasty or the prioritization of Confucianism are just a secondary structure designed for an ideal political order. A discussion focused only on philosophy cannot serve as a valid approach to a clear rectification of the scholars during the Song Dynasty. Bearing this stance in mind, Yu puts forward his straightforward argument towards the issue of *dao ti* (道體), as follows:

> Philosophers' studies are bound to be focused on different arguments from New Confucian scholars concerning *dao ti* (the substance of the Way, 道體) because it is the only subject that surpasses the standard assessment of "philosophy." *Dao ti* is the most abstract part in the New Confucian studies, and the New Confucian studies are the most creative part in the entire Confucian tradition in the Song Dynasty. The scholars of philosophical history attempt to interpret *dao ti* in a modern fashion, which seemingly deepens our knowledge of the tradition of Chinese philosophy, but in fact, the approach breaks away the significance of the concept twice in the sense of the entire Song Dynasty's Confucian traditions. First, the approach separates New Confucian studies from entire Confucian traditions, and then again it separates "*dao ti*" from the "New Confucian studies." Therefore, the relationship between New Confucian Scholars and their actual lifestyles failed to attract the attention of the historians of philosophy (Yu 2015, 45–6).

In Yu's view, the philosophers' view of Confucian orthodoxy failed to explain the real condition of Confucianist studies during the Song Dynasty, if not that of New Confucian studies, as a consequence of the obsession with *dao ti*. Without considering the context of the grand history of Chinese culture, the philosophers' view mistakenly disassembled the Song Dynasty Confucianist studies within the narrow bonds of ideas, namely, the school of Mind and Human Nature. Yu highlights that the "philosophers' view of Confucian orthodoxy" causes a metaphysical "grand

narrative (大敘事)" as a result of their understanding through ideals. By doing so, he proposes that the view stirred the misunderstanding that the scholars in the Song Dynasty would only "value the metaphysical substances of morality (道德性命)." Although he did not explicitly point out the subject of his criticism, the example of the "grand narrative" can be found in the substance of Mind and the substance of Human Nature. For example, the way they distinguish the legitimate line from the illegitimate line by the measure of whether the *Dao ti* is active, and the further categorization of the genealogy in the history of Song and Ming Confucianist studies into three lines can be seen as a restatement of history through the philosophers' view. Yu thus demonstrates the problem that this "grand narrative" causes, as follows:

> Since this book is concerned with Zhu Xi's historical world, I can neither make a hasty review of the "grand narrative" here nor even a criticism of religion. I am mentioning this "grand narrative" only because it is unavoidable; the "grand narrative" is different from the point of my book. There are two basic differences. First, the metaphysical substance of morality in the 'grand narrative' refers to a sort of super spatial-temporal spiritual substance. Sometimes it is called "*dao ti* (道體)." This spiritual substance is infinite, disengaged from whether it is fulfilled or awakened by the human. Due to this kind of understanding IN the background, the researchers who accept the "grand narrative" model often choose the super spatial-temporal approach when discussing the formation and origin of New Confucian studies. In doing so, they neglect the historical circumstances in detail. (......) Also, the researchers who accept the "grand narrative" model view the "metaphysical substance of morality (道德性命)" as a self-sufficient entity, which not only leads them to sharply divide the New Confucian studies and the history of Northern Song Dynasty, but also make

them to segregate New Confucian studies from the entire Confucian studies in the end. Suddenly, New Confucian scholars are treated as if they originated from nowhere (Yu 2015, 170–171).

Yu thus shows his discontent with the "grand narrative" theory that only sets importance on ideals away from the specific space and time. In an interview, he stated that the existing Song and Ming Confucian studies are too immersed in the conflict between the views of *xin ji li* (心即理) and *xing ji li* (性即理) causing a dilution as if there were nothing else than the doctrine of Mind and Human Nature (心性之學) in New Confucian studies (see Yu 2012, 21–7). Yu's views, as presented in the "Preface (序說),"[14] attracted many reviews and active debates. The reviews by Liu Shuxian (劉述先) and Yang Rubin (楊儒賓) are most noteworthy, as they go deep into the discussion and called forth responses from the author (Yang 2003). Given the subject of this paper, Liu's review holds more relevance since his account covers both Mou Zongsan and Qian Mu's scholarship,[15] With Liu agreeing with the former (Liu 2010). To summarize Liu's point, scholarly inquiry always involves a process of abstraction; thus the history of philosophy is destined to trace the origin and context of philosophy and ideals. At this level, Cheng Hao's (程顥) understanding of *daoti* and Wang Anshi's (王安石) understanding of the same are bound to diverge and

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[14] In agreement, Ge Zhaoguang (葛兆光) published *A Sequel to the Lectures on the History of Thoughts* (思想史研究課堂講錄續編) in 2012, discussing the impact that *Zhu Xi's Historical World* had and the critical focus in the ideological history of Song Dynasty.
[15] Liu Shuxian comprehensively assesses Ch'ien Mu's bibliographical achievement and Mou Zongsan's philosophical achievement in his study of Neo-Confucianism, combining *Zhu Xi anthology* and *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Nature*. For further research, refer to the preface of his book *The Development and Completion of Zhu Zi's Philosophical Thought* (Liu 1995).

impossible to reconcile. Also, for the New Confucian scholars, the "metaphysical substance of morality (道德生命)" or the independent value of "inner sageness" should be prioritized as naturally including a religious aspect. The topics cannot be put aside as a secondary issue that belongs to the project of "re-establishment of order." Liu clarifies his view as follows: "there is evident ground that makes the elder Yu Ying-Shih build up the context of political culture and "outer kingliness (外王)." However, one cannot replace the aspect of "internal sage (內聖)" if one only attempts to fix a one-sided inclination, as it will cause another inclination to the other side, eventually becoming prone to losing balance" (Liu 2016, 269).

Although Liu recognizes Yu Ying-Shih's creative contribution to the studies of New Confucian traditions in the Song Dynasty, he still holds a position that values the matter of inner sageness on top of outer kingliness, and consequently, he refuses the fundamental premise of Yu who emphasized the precedence of "political culture (政治文化)." Liu, like Mou Zongsan, supports the validity of the philosophers' view of Confucian orthodoxy (道統觀.) One could read the context and source of *The Historical World* (歷史史世界, 2003) more clearly by a comparative reading of the Manifesto (中國文化宣言, 1958), *The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Human Nature* and *Qian Mu and New Confucianism.* The contrasts they form offer a significant thread to understand the trend and characteristics of contemporary Taiwanese Confucian studies. In my view, it would be a rash decision to judge the winner of the disagreement between the philosophers (哲學者) and scholars of intellectual history (思想史家). The arguments between two parties reflect the long-running opposition between the orthodox tradition of the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle (*Cheng Zhu lixue* 程朱理學) and Lu-Wang School, if not the

studies of the Han and Song Dynasties, all of which arise around the topic of Confucian orthodoxy. In this sense, the focus should be on the constructive features and continuity of Chinese intellectual history that such arguments reflect. It is only with this mindset that one can understand what the arguments between the parties point to – that they are the result of heightened concerns about the value and significance of Confucianism today. Adopting such a mindset offers a precious chance to ponder the "lively view of *dao tong* (道統觀) by now deceased New Confucian scholars."

Conclusion

The last chapter of Mencius (*Mengzi,* 孟子) reveals his desire to dedicate himself to the sustenance of "*siwen* (the culture of ours, 斯文)" as well as his awareness of the genealogy of orthodoxy from Emperor Yao to Confucius.[16] Mencius's vocation and responsibility motivated the revival and innovation of Confucian studies, as his ideas were represented in different forms, ranging from "The Origin of Way (*Yuan dao*, 原道)" by Han Yu, *New Forms in the Ming Dynasty Confucian Orthodoxy* (*Ming dao xingzhuang* 明道行狀) by Cheng Yi and "Preface to the Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean (*Zhong Yong zhang ju xu*, 中庸章句序)" by Zhu Xi. Confucian orthodoxy has thus served a catalyst for creation and

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[16] Although Mencius himself did not use the word "orthodoxy," the origin of consciousness of orthodoxy can be traced back to Mencius as scholars such as Chen Rongjie (陳榮捷) pointed out. As to the origin of the term "Confucian orthodoxy," Qian Daxin (錢大昕), an expert in the Qin Dynasty, identified in his historical research that the term first appears in Li Yuan Wang's (季元網) *Chart of the Achievements of Confucius and His Disciples* (聖門事業圖,) published in 1172 during the Song Dynasty (Qian 2011, 355).

commendation through the transmission from Mencius to Zhu Xi, and on to the next generation.

The retreat of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and the KMT made the Confucian scholars combine their consciousness of Confucian orthodoxy with their scholarly performance. This corresponds to the forward movement for the reinterpretation of Confucianism and the awakening of Chinese culture, as well as the psychological crisis presented in the emigrant intellectuals such as Huang Zongxi (黃宗羲) and Gu Yanwu (顧炎武) during the Late Ming and Early Qing Dynasties. One could claim the scholars' sense of responsibility and dedication caused the background of intense confrontation amongst themselves with the issue of orthodoxy. The publication of "A Manifesto to the World on Chinese Culture" was an event that triggered a split between the "philosophers' camp" and "historians' camp." The reflections and conflicts of the two camps are still on-going, imbuing Confucian studies in contemporary Taiwan with a motivating energy. Although the subject of this paper, the Confucian orthodoxy, cannot comprehensively cover the core of Confucian studies in Taiwan, it still provides a key to interpret and thus understand the scholarly trends in Taiwan, as it is like a "persistent low voice" that runs through such studies. Considering that the custom of master-student transmission still exists in Taiwanese scholarship, and that each division spreads different methodologies and viewpoints of different intellectuals and philosophical history, the discussion made in this paper provides a window to examine the origin, characteristics and future of Confucian studies in contemporary Taiwan.

Translated by Eugene Kim and Byoung Yoong Kang

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A Phenomenological Interpretation of Mou Zongsan's Use of "Transcendence" and "Immanence" and his Contribution to World Philosophy

Tak-lap Yeung

Introduction

It is known that Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 introduced "transcendence" and "immanence" as a key concept pair to reinterpret the special character of Chinese philosophy. However, his interpretation is controversial in many regards.

For example, Roger Ames, while admiring Mou's penetrating and unconventional interpretation of classical Chinese tradition, also criticizes his rather casual use of Western terms which unnecessarily reinforce certain familiar misunderstandings of Chinese culture. What is worse for Ames is that Mou's usage of "transcendence" encouraged a new generation of Chinese scholars to search for the common foundation between classical Western thought and Chinese cultural traditions, which, in Ames' eyes, exhibits an excessive identity complex (Ames 2002, 39). Although Ames rejects the use of the Western term "transcendence" in the case of interpreting classic Chinese philosophy, he admits that Mou's makes better use of the term "immanence" to illustrate the Chinese view of order. Just like the contrast between the absolute and relative is submitted to a dichotomic worldview, the contrast between transcendence and immanence,

Ames believes, presents similar limitations when it comes to understanding early Chinese philosophy better (Ames 2002, 46).[1]

Lee Ming-huei systematically responded to Ames' criticism of Mou. In "Self-transformation of contemporary confucianism" (當代儒學的自我轉化, 1993) and "A repeated discussion on the question of Confucian 'immanent Transcendence'" (再論儒家思想中的 「內在超越性」問題, 2002), Lee defends Mou's appropriation of these terms by providing two aspect of consideration. First, he suggests that we should understand the nature of Confucianism and the renewal of this made by New-Confucianism within the context of the discussion of the "inner sage and outer king (*neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王)." He basically defines the nature of Confucianism by its transcendence, which is, according to Yu Ying-shih 余英時, with whom Lee agrees, rooted in the spirit (「魂」（精神)) of Confucianism, in terms of the embodiment of the spiritual value in the concept of *ren* 仁 (benevolence). The nature of Confucianism consists not only its transcendent characteristic, but also its immanent character in contrast to Western culture. Thus, many scholars refer to Confucianism using the terms "transcendent and immanent 超越而內在" and "immanent transcendence 內在超越性" (Lee 1993, 62–63). Second, Lee argues that David Hall's and Ames' criticism of New-Confucianism (especially of Mou) is based upon a "misunderstanding," because Mou did not employ "transcendence" in the two authors' sense of "strict transcendence." He believes that the concept of "transcendence" and "immanence" do not logically contradict each other

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[1] The criticism of Mou's appropriation of "transcendence" can be traced back to David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames' work "Thinking through Confucius" published in 1987. I employ a more recent monography rewritten by Ames in 2002 which included his response to Lee Ming-huei's comment in "Self-transformation of Contemporary Confucianism."

(Lee 2016, 245). Hall and Ames' conception of transcendence is on the one side too narrow, on the other side too board (Lee 2016, 249).

Is Mou's appropriation of these terms a desirable strategy for the modernization of Chinese philosophy? In what sense can we say that Mou's appropriation advanced or harmed the mutual understanding between Western and Eastern philosophy? The debate between Ames/Hall and Lee about the rightfulness of Mou's use of the concept "transcendence" is a wonderful entry point for us to re-examine not only Mou's thinking, but also the validity of adopting alien concepts for cultural renewal.

To judge whether Ames's observation is correct and whether Lee's response could successfully defend Mou's ideas, we not only need to know how Mou frames his usage of the terms but also what he presupposed in his use of them. Thus, in the following, we will start with a review of Mou's use of this conceptual pair, and then examine the influence of phenomenology on Mou. Following this we will return to the argument between Ames and Lee regarding the appropriateness of Mou's employment of these concepts.

Mou's illustration of the special character of Chinese philosophy by his appropriation of the terms "transcendence" and "immanence" from the West

As one of the most important New Confucian philosophers, Mou made special efforts to carry out effective communication between Western philosophy, especially Kantian philosophy, and Chinese philosophy in general. However, few researchers have paid attention to his understanding and criticism of phenomenologists, particularly Heidegger. According to Lau Po-hei, researchers into Mou's philosophy typically believe that the relationship between Mou and Heidegger is weak, and Mou himself stated

that the aim of his work was reinterpreting and renewing the tradition of Chinese philosophy through communication with the philosophy of Kant. This has established a fixed view of Mou's work, with and thus scholars have ignored the inner connection between Mou's philosophy and phenomenology (Lau 2015, 153–155). However, echoing Lau's insights, I believe that Mou's late philosophical project was in various aspects very much impacted by Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, and thus we should consider his use of "transcendence" in terms of the influence of phenomenology and Heidegger's philosophy.

What do I mean when I claim that phenomenology influenced Mou in his late works? We can examine this idea in two dimensions. On the one hand, Mou struggles with the idea of Heidegger being the true successor of Kantian philosophy by arguing that the transcendent aspect of human beings represents not only a constitutive element of finite human existence, but also of the possibility of infinite morality. On the other hand, he criticizes both Kant's and Heidegger's denial of the true possibility of intellectual intuition and, as a result, the restriction of the concept of thing-in-itself as well as noumenon to merely its negative usage. To improve the Kantian philosophy, Mou argues that we need insights from Chinese philosophy in general (including Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism), which basically admits the possibility and significance of intellectual intuition.

Through his reconstructive works, Mou aims at establishing a successive relation between Western and Eastern philosophy and advancing Kantian philosophy to a new level. The key to success, in Mou's opinion, lies in his reinterpretation of the concept of thing-in-itself and intellectual intuition, which are closely related to the concepts of transcendence and immanence in the tradition of Kantian philosophy and phenomenology. In the following, we will unfold this relationship in three aspects.

a. Mou on transcendence and immanence through the concepts of the *Way of Heaven* (天道) and *Heart-mind* (心)

To better understand Mou's argumentation, we primarily need to know how he understood the concepts of transcendence and immanence and how he related these with the character of Chinese philosophy. We must note here that the terms transcendence and immanence do not exist originally in traditional Chinese philosophy. Mou thus borrows them from the Western philosophical tradition in order to 1.) capture the special character of Chinese thought in contrast with Western thought, and 2.) modernize the philosophical concepts in Chinese philosophy.

As Jana Rošker puts it, "[t]he focus on ontological questions can thus be seen as a specific reaction of traditional Chinese philosophy to modernization" (Rošker 2016, 131). In his fourth lecture of *The Special Character of Chinese Philosophy* (中國哲學的特質), Mou raises the concepts of "immanent and transcendent" to describe the essence of the Heavenly Principle (*tianli* 天理) or the Way of Heaven (*tiandao* 天道) in Chinese thought.[2] The Way of Heaven, as the highest principle of Chinese thought in general, has its transcendent meaning in being ontologically different from the principle of the mundane world. However, at the same time, the Way of Heaven has its immanent characteristic, since the place of

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[2] The translation of *tian* (天) as Heaven is problematic in many senses. Ames promotes the idea of "letting the Chinese philosophy speaks on its own terms" (at least for the key terms). As a result, Ames and Hall choose not to translate *Tian* as Heaven because the term has misleading associations drawn from the Abrahamic tradition and these "theological associations are largely irrelevant to the Chinese experience, but they have, nonetheless, often overwritten Chinese cultural practices with presuppositions that are alien to them" (Hall and Ames, 2003, 55–56, 63–67). However, since the primary purpose of this paper lies in an introduction of the connection among different philosophical traditions, I take the common translation of *Tian* as Heaven in order to accommodate those English readers who are less familiar with Chinese philosophy.

its manifestation is nothing other than the mundane world. Thus, for Mou, the Way of Heaven should indeed be "immanent and transcendent," which retains both religious (the transcendent) and moral (the immanent) significance in connection with the idea of the "interrelation and unification of Heaven and Human (天人感應、天人合一)."[3]

Such an interrelation is one of the most important assumptions in Chinese philosophy, which represents a special ethics-cosmology regarding the relation between the will of Heaven and the ethical behaviour of all living things, especially of human beings. The quotation below is most important textual evidence of Mou's view, as quoted by scholars:

> 天道高高在上，有超越的意思。天道貫注於人身之時，又內在於為人的性，這時天道又是內在的（immanent）。因此，我們可以康德喜用的字眼，說天道一方面是超越的（transcendent），另一方面又是內在的（immanent 與 transcendent 是相反字）。天道既超越又內在，此時可謂兼具宗教與道德意味，宗教重超越義，而道德重內在義。

> The Way of Heaven stands above all existence, it possesses its transcendent meaning. When the Way of Heaven is instilled in human embodiment, and [is understood] as the nature of human being innately, it is simultaneously immanent. Therefore, we may employ Kant's preferred terminologies to express that the Way of Heaven is transcendent on the one side, on the other side immanent (immanent and transcendent are opposite terms). The Way of Heaven is transcendent as well as immanent. It harbours both religious and moral implication. Religion emphasizes the transcendent meaning, morality emphasizes the immanent (Mou 2003c, 22).

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[3] Other common translations include "oneness of man and nature," "combination of nature and human," "unity between man and universe," and "harmony between man and nature."

In Mou's explanation, on the one hand, the Way of Heaven stands above all existence, which means it possesses a different and also higher ontological status than all existence under Heaven. Thus, it is transcendent because it *ontologically* transcends all existence. On the other hand, when the Way of Heaven "instils" (貫注)—regardless what this means here—the value into the human heart-mind (*xin* 心) and manifests itself through the conduct of people, the Way of Heaven is in this sense *normatively* immanent.[4] Thus, by borrowing Kant's terms, Mou asserts that the Way of Heaven can be understood as both immanent and transcendent including both religious and moral significance (Mou 2003c, 22).[5]

Here we can see that Mou bestowed a new meaning on this conceptual pair by inviting us to look at the *two aspects* of the Way of Heaven. The Way of Heaven is both immanent and transcendent because it can be observed and experienced in at least two ways. On the one hand, based on by our power of understanding, we understand that the Way of Heaven *theoretically* stands upon or beyond the "ten thousand things" (*wanwu* 萬物) (also known as "the Myriad Things"). On the other hand, experienced through our moral deeds, we confirm that the Way of Heaven *practically* "lives in" and can be implemented through the human heart-mind. Therefore, it can be seen as immanent. In this sense, similar to Lee's

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[4] This view concerns the argument of "the Way of Heaven and human nature regarding limitation in life are interrelated (*tiandao xingming xiang guantong* 天道性命相貫通)," which is a special topic in Chinese philosophy that we are not able to discuss in this paper. What we need to know here is the assumption of the interrelation between Heaven and humans that is deeply rooted in Chinese culture.

[5] Key passage, quoted: "天道高在上，有超越的義。天道貫注於人身之時，又內在於人而為人的性，這時天道又是內在的（immanent）。因此，我們可以康德喜用的字眼，說天道一方面是超越的（transcendent），另一方面又是內在的（immanent 與 transcendent 是相反字）。天道既超越又內在，此時可謂兼具宗教與道德的意味，宗教重超越義，而道德重內在義。"

understanding of Mou, "transcendence" and "immanence" do not contradict each other logically because they are not employed in a strict Kantian sense or as "strict transcendence" in Ames' sense. Instead, we may legitimately say that Mou provides a *two-aspect interpretation* instead of a *two-world interpretation* of the Way of Heaven by an appropriation of the "immanence" and "transcendence" from the West.

b.   Confucianism as an immanent and transcendence religion

Since both Confucianism and the religious beliefs in ancient China emphasize transcendence, thus, in Mou's view, Confucianism in a certain sense can be regarded as a kind of religion, or in other words, Confucianism does include religious elements that cherish transcendent values. Furthermore, from a moral point of view, the religion of Confucianism wins over Christianity since it emphasizes the immanent deed being due to the self-determination of the will instead of being determined by a transcendent God's will, which in principle "stands against" the moral subject. The religious element in Confucianism does not lead to a confrontational view towards the separation of the transcendent and the immanent. On the contrary, Confucianism comprises both transcendent and immanent elements since, on the one hand, it admits the reality of the Way of Heaven as the cosmic-transcendent principle and, on the other, emphasizes the immanent moral awareness through human practices. Thus, Confucianism as a religion can be viewed as an "immanent and transcendent" one (Mou 2003c, 18–19, 22–24, 37–39).

As a comparison, Mou claims that Christianity focuses on the transcendent will and the divine testament which sets God as the highest and final ground of moral rules and morality. God is ultimately responsible for retributive justice and the distribution of happiness. The proportionate

distribution between moral deed and happiness, according to Kant, can only be grounded in hope (*Hoffnung*) which is rooted in practical reason (*die praktische Vernunft*). In contrast, according to Mou, the proportional distribution between moral deed and happiness, namely *summum bonum*, is never a problem for Confucianism. Confucianism, especially with Mencius' interpretation, strictly distinguishes the realm of the righteousness of action, *yi* (義) and the limitation of life, *ming* (命).[6] *Ming* is about the givenness of life, with which we are restricted by the principles of the physical world and the social-historical situation. However, though we are all primarily situated beings in the world, this does not mean that we are all determined merely by our own *ming*, since we are at the same time moral beings who can live and act according to righteousness, *yi*. Indeed, we have no grounds to expect that reality must be changed in accordance with our will or moral deeds, but this fact would not affect the moral value of the righteous action.[7] Righteousness cannot be deduced from the phenomena of the physical world (Is-Ought distinction) but only be grounded by the *a priori* power to act according to one's self-imposed moral law, namely the freedom of will. This stand, obviously, echoes Kant's deontological ethics. The only difference is that for Kant the origin of this power is practical reason, and for Mou it is the heart-mind, *xin*.

In this respect, Mou obviously adopted Kant's distinction between the theoretical and practical domains of human experience, with which the causality of nature and causality of freedom can be ascribed to different

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[6] Please note that *yi* and *ming* are rich concepts that can hardly be covered by any translation. I use "righteousness of action" and "limitation of life" mainly to capture the possible conflict between (internal) moral reason for action and (external) finitude of situation.

[7] With regard to the distinction between *yi* and *ming*, please refer to Lao Sze-Kwang's interpretation of Confucian's ethics (Lao 2010, 100–108, 142–150).

foundational human powers, namely the cognitive power governed by understanding and the moral power founded on the good will, respectively. This distinction echoes Confucian ethics because it likewise emphasizes the autonomous side of human moral action that disregards the naturalistic explanation of the determining factors in its origin.

However, Confucian ethics is not completely the same as Kantian ethics, although not because it employs another name to describe the same foundation or origin of the moral action. It is Confucian because it does not presuppose a transcendent God as the "outer," "external" final cause in order to explain the practical need of being moral. When we understand the decree of God in a determinative way, Western religion and culture are unavoidably understood as a "transcendent as well as external (超越而外在)."[8] In contrast, the religiosity of Confucianism is profoundly rooted in the belief of the interrelationship between the Way of Heaven and human nature (see footnote 4) that presupposed the single and holistic view of the world. As Rošker writes:

> Immanent notions, which are essential to defining Chinese philosophy, are necessary outcomes of the holistic worldview. If there is no separation between two worlds (material/idea, subjective/objective), it is difficult to define which of the two is more important or absolute. This also explains why transcendent notions, which are generally perceived as transcending on and proceeding into another (usually higher) sphere, are also immanent in most traditional Chinese philosophical discourses (Rošker 2016, 132).

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[8] Many scholars adopt the distinction between "transcendent as well as internal/immanent (超越而內在)" and "transcendence as well as external." I think this is another source of confusion in the argumentation of whether we should adopt "immanent transcendence" as the special character of Chinese philosophy.

Nothing exists outside the world and is not included in the "ten thousand things." The manifestation of the Way of Heaven is different from the manifestation by a personal God who passes his will directly by his voice from Heaven or indirectly by prophets. The Decree of Heaven (*tianming* 天命) can be heard and understood only within the phenomenal world and the human heart-mind, and be manifested by moral practices in the human world. Therefore, the Way of Heaven or the Heavenly Principle (*tianli* 天理) is as good as the Human (moral and ethical) Principle in a regulative sense (and not a determinative one). Kant caught this insight and thus he promotes moral theology instead of natural theology and theological morality, but, in Mou's view, Kant's understanding of human morality was still not as transparent as the Confucian one. Since Kant's God and freedom are both postulated in a regulative sense, he has to admit the "externality" of God's transcendence and thus this leads to the difficulty of communicating the realm of transcendent and immanent. The Confucian understanding of the Way of Heaven and morality is not subject to the external-internal or transcendent-immanent distinction. Once the morality of the heart-mind emerges (*chengxian* 呈現), the Way of Heaven is manifested and confirmed simultaneously (Mou 2003a, 186–187). Thus, in this sense, Confucian religion and morality can be generally understood as "transcendent as well as immanent (超越而內在)."

c.   Mou's confrontation with Kant and Heidegger regarding the problem of transcendence and human finitude

As we have shown, one of the main differences between Kant and Mou lies in the understanding of the nature and origin of morality. For Kant, practical reason is the origin and foundation of the moral law, which autonomously

determines the maxim of moral action. Through the application of moral law, we can confirm and prove our freedom *regressively*.[9] Nevertheless, since human understanding is by nature "discursive," Kant refuses the possibility that people have intellectual intuition, which can "directly" determine the knowledge and existence of an object. Therefore, although moral will can *a priori* determine the moral law, it cannot guarantee the corresponding outcome, by which the moral agent may be disappointed. Therefore, we need "hope" (for the highest good, *summum bonum*) to amend the discontinuity between the realm of freedom and the realm of nature. Fundamentally speaking, in the realm of theoretical philosophy Kant admits the *phenomenal immanence* and rejects the *cognitive transcendence*, but in the realm of practical philosophy, he admits the *noumenal transcendence* and rejects the *moral immanence*.

For Mou, there is a theoretical loophole between phenomenal immanence and noumenal transcendence in Kantian philosophy. The key difficulty lies in Kant's rejection of the positive meaning of intellectual intuition for human knowledge. He states that Kant cannot *positively* assert the cognitive meaning of the "thing-in-itself" and "noumenon."[10] The concepts of thing-in-itself or noumenon can only be *negatively* understood as a limiting concepts describing the realm that we cannot cognitively justify. Such a conceptual arrangement leads to two problems. First, the concept of thing-in-itself becomes an ambiguous, unstable (*bu wen* 不穩)

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[9] Searching for the conditions of possibility (*Möglichkeitsbedingungen*) is the character of transcendental philosophy. The method of the transcendental philosophy is commonly termed "transcendental argument." It is a regressive approach to find an uncontentious starting point of human understanding. C.f.: (Stern 2019).

[10] For Mou, the "thing-in-itself" is basically a synonym for "noumenon" in Kantian philosophy, which are interchangeable in most cases.

concept in the entire system of critical philosophy. It will lead to inconsistency due to the antagonism between human cognition and morality; second, the proof of the communicability between the sensible and supersensible world is a difficult task for Kant. Even he tried to solve it by introducing the power of reflective judgment in *Critique of Judgment*, the problems of the communicability of the two worlds and primacy of practical reason are still in many ways unresolved for numerous Kant scholars.

On the other side, Mou criticizes Heidegger's interpretation of Kant that confuses the concept of "transcendental object = X" and the "thing-in-itself." Indeed, while he appreciates Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of "transcendental object = X" by the concept of *Spielraum* (room for manoeuvre), which is similar to Husserl's concept of *Horizont* (horizon), he refuses to agree that Heidegger's concept of *Traszendenz*, as the fundamental constitution of being, can reconcile the gap between theoretical and practical philosophy or the causality of nature and the causality of freedom.[11] Heidegger interprets the spontaneous action of the transcendental apperception by the term *Transzendenz*, with which human *Dasein* executes and constitutes its understanding of being. Such a process of *Transzendez* is one of making sense (*Sinn*) of one's own existence, including the cognitive and moral activity in one's own "world" (in a Heideggerian sense). The difference between cognition and morality is once again blurred in terms of the activity of meaning constitution, and thus the cognitive or moral transcendent must likewise happen within the phenomenal immanence.

However, for Mou the process of *Transzendez* is nothing other than that of "objectification" (*Objektivierung*) that is presupposed and restricted by the

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[11] Heidegger's interpretation of the "transcendental object = X" can be founded in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Heidegger 1991, 121–122). For Mou's comments see: Mou 2003b, 55–63.

finitude of human cognition. In Mou's words, it is just the "transcendence of the understanding's apperception (知性統覺底之超越性)," which cannot be confused or replaced by "the lightening of the transcendence of human existence" (*Aufhellung der Transzendenz des Daseins*) in a Heideggerian sense. Heidegger wrongly extends the premise of human finitude from the cognitive perspective to an ontological-existential perspective. Mou points out the Kantian presupposition is valid only from the cognitive perspective. Heidegger over=-emphasized Kant's philosophical premise of human finitude, which consequently leads to the deprivation of the infinitude of humanity. As a phenomenologist, Heidegger, similar to Kant, cannot *positively* affirm the ontological value of the "thing-in-itself" or "noumenon." He can only speak about the constitution of meaning in the realm of the phenomenon. Therefore, on the one hand, Heidegger's interpretation does not agree with Kant's distinction of the sensible and supersensible realm, and on the other hand, cannot justify the moral value of humanity in the manner of transcendental freedom.

From Mou's perspective, Chinese philosophy, which can positively assert the thing-in-itself by the real possibility of intellectual intuition, can help to deal with the above difficulties. Since Confucianism, as the representative of Chinese thoughts, does not in advance antagonize knowledge and value, the problem of their communicability is not the real problem in the tradition of Chinese philosophy. We can illustrate this point in two steps. First, as mentioned above, *yi* and *ming* are cognitively two different concepts without determinative relation to each other in the Confucian tradition. The moral value of an action does not depend on the consequence and thus would not be bounded by the limitation of life at all. The determinative ground of morality stands solely upon the autonomy of the heart-mind. Second, since the heart-mind is not a cognitive Self like

Descartes's *res congitans*, Kant's *ich denke*, or Husserl's *transcendental ego*, the heart-mind does not primarily constitute the meaning in a naturalistic, value-free approach in connection to nature. At the end of the day, Chinese philosophy does not hold a purely naturalistic view of nature. Instead, nature, including Heaven, Earth, humans and all other beings, is an organic whole which is a primarily embedded intrinsic value.[12] Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism all agree with the understanding of the world as a whole with sentiment and affection – a "world of sentient beings (有情世間)." Humans as one of the beings in the world are inseparable with other beings *ontologically* and *sentimentally*. Therefore, the pre-established gap and antagonism between the self and world, the object and subject, the immanent and transcendent does not exist in the same manner in Chinese philosophy, and does not lead to the similar forms of difficulty.

The phenomenological elements of Mou's use of "transcendence" and "immanence"

Above we showed that Mou's use of "transcendence" and "immanence" is not only affected by Kant, but also by the phenomenological tradition during his argumentation against the phenomenological interpretation of Kant, especially against Heidegger's. To further examine the inner connection of the use of the terms, we first need a short review of the conceptual development of these terms in Western philosophy.

We know that Kant upholds the contrast of "transcendence" and "immanence" in order to argue that transcendent knowledge is not

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[12] In the context of Chinese philosophy, *ziran* 自然 is in most of the cases translated as "nature." On the other hand, *wanwu* 萬物, which literally means "ten thousand things," is popular in conversation and discussion and also suitable for illustrating the above idea.

justifiable by human understanding, and that valid human knowledge should be established based upon human "transcendental" condition. Therefore, Kant places the "transcendence" and "immanence" on the same ontological level, which in this sense conforms to the theological tradition. As Hall and Ames state:

> The contrast of "transcendence" and "immanence" is rooted in the theological tradition. Most theological and philosophical understandings of God relative to the Judeo-Christian tradition employed these binary concepts in the attempt to characterize the independence of God from the world while also affirming God's providential relatedness to it (Hall and Ames 1998, 191).

Although the "contrast" of the terms is rooted in the medieval theological discourse regarding the debate about the relation between God and the world, the "use" of the ideas, especially the "transcendence," did not begin with Judeo-Christian theology. According to Hall and Ames, the Greek philosophical tradition implicitly appealed in various ways to transcendence as a means of developing numerous worldviews. Parmenides' idea of Being and not-Being, Plato's distinction between the visible world and the intelligible world and many other similar approaches showed the basic idea of the dualistic cosmology. Such a two-world view presupposed, on the one hand, the independent status of the two worlds and, on the other hand, a hierarchic relation between them. Such a dualistic worldview prepared a foundation for the later discourse about God's transcendence and the relation between God and the mundane world.

Generally, in the philosophical or theological discourses, the object to be transcended or surpassed is the "world" we live in. Although with varying connotations in its different historical and cultural stages, such "transcendence" basically refers to the object that is independent of the

human world – a physical, imperfect, mundane world. In a different formulation, according to Ames, "strict transcendence" in the context of the Western discourse means "an independent and superordinate principle A originates, determines, and sustain B, where the reverse is not the case. Such transcendence renders B absolutely dependent upon A, and thus, nothing in itself" (Ames 2016, 3).[13]

The "strict transcendence" provides a convenient conceptual tool for defining the attribute of God and positioning the relationship between God and humanity. The term "transcendent" denotes something that does not exist "in" the physical world. Those things that do exist "in" the physical (or phenomenal) world are contrastingly called the "immanent." In this sense, transcendence and immanence are thus formed as a mutually exclusive conceptual pair denoting different objects in the philosophical and theological discussion. "Transcendent" as the nature of God indicates His extraordinary status, which is ontologically and normatively superior to those things that are created.

Although Kant adopts the basic usage of "strict transcendence," he introduces new perspectives to the discussion. Kant strictly demarcates between "transcendent" and "transcendental." The latter is the logical space within which he grounds the *a priori* conditions for the possibility of human understanding, and simultaneously delimits the boundary of human knowledge. By Kant's modification, the "transcendent" is no longer exclusively used to describe God's nature. The coining of the word "transcendental" absorbed a part of the usage of the "strict transcendence."

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[13] A similar but simpler expression can be found in an earlier text from Hall and Ames, see: "Strict transcendence may be understood as follows: a principle, A, is transcendent with respect to that, B, which it serves as principle if the meaning or import of B cannot be fully analyzed and explained without recourse to A, but the reverse is not true" (Hall and Ames 1987, 13).

The "transcendent" does not play the role of the origin or the determinant of the "immanent" objects in the Kantian philosophy. Transcendence and immanence become the limiting concept of human knowledge and experience. "Transcendental" has taken up the job of the "transcendent," which is to give the ground of communication between the material and immaterial worlds. With these terms, Kant profoundly replaces the ontological presupposition of the Platonic two-world view with the epistemological presupposition of the cognitive subject. The antagonism stands no more on God and world, but on the subject as the (inner) mind, and the totality of objects as the (outer) world. The meaning of the "immanent" and "transcendent" is thus defined by "within" or "without" human knowledge and experience. In this sense, the transcendence and immanence return to the same categoric and ontological level denoting different objects.

Kant's conceptual revolution not only brought a radical change of terminology but also a shift of focus from the relationship between God and the world to self-consciousness and the world. Once again through Neo-Kantianism's development of Kant's ideas, the concept of transcendence plays a unique role in explaining how consciousness can go beyond itself and reach the objective world. As one of the core ideas of the Marburg Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge, a theory of objective validity is also a theory of the "transcendence" of the object. (Heis 2018) However, for Husserl, such an interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of the consciousness phenomenon. As we have seen, in the Kantian tradition, "immanence" and "transcendence" contrast each other on the same categoric and ontological level. Therefore, from the Kantian perspective, it is basically nonsense to put them together in order to form a term like "immanent transcendence" or "transcendent immanence." Nevertheless, through Husserl's modification

of the terms, "immanent transcendence" or "transcendence in immanence" becomes a sensible expression, since they the two concepts do not denote the opposite entities on the same ontological level anymore. The term transcendence (*Transzendenz*) was introduced in *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1907) and its various forms have also been discussed in *Ideas I* (1907) and in *Cartesian Meditations* (Moran and Cohen 2012, 327).

Husserl speaks of "transcendence" from different perspectives in the above works, but we are not going to discuss them one by one here. Instead, we will only focus on the Husserl's modification of the Kantian usage of the terms. For Husserl, all the meanings or the act of constituting meaning can only be *immanently* grounded in "intentionality" (*Intentionalität*), even when regarding the transcendent object or the transcendence, e.g. God as a "transcendence" (*Ideas I*, § 58). According to Husserl's transcendental idealism, "transcendence" in every form is an *immanent* characteristic which is constituted in consciousness. Parallelly, "immanence" can only be illustrated correctly after the phenomenological reduction. Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen put explain as follows:

> Husserl contrasts immanence with transcendence and speaks of phenomenology as proceeding in immanence. After the reduction, the entities in consciousness and even the ego itself has to be understood as a 'transcendence in immanence' or 'immanent transcendence' (*immanente Transzendenz*). […] Husserl claims phenomenology offers a new conception of immanence and of 'transcendence within immanence' (CM Hua I 169) (Moran and Cohen 2012, 161–162).

This conceptual pair is for Husserl inseparably interconnected. With the above illustration, we see how Husserl transforms the opposition of transcendence and immanence to the reconciliation. They are not opposing

each other on the same categorical level. The "immanence" includes primarily the "transcendence," and the "transcendence" makes the "immanence" possible because all the intentional objects can be meaningfully described *for us*, not *in itself*.

This conceptual pair is once again modified by Heidegger from the existential-ontological perspective. Transcendence becomes the fundamental constitution of *Dasein* that *ontologically* grounds the constitution of the meaning of *Dasein*'s world because his basic interest is fundamentally different from Husserl's, who concentrated on the intentional act and the intentional consciousness. For Heidegger, Husserl's phenomenology is still confined in the scope of cognitive subjectivity. Instead, he aims at a more primordial phenomenological description of the emergence of meaning regarding the question of Being in general (*Seinsfrage überhaupt*). He tries to replace Husserl's analysis of pure consciousness and intentionality by the analysis of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalytik*). With Heidegger's modification, transcendence becomes a "fundamental constitution of being" (*die Grundverfassung des Seienden*). As he explains:

> Transcendence in the terminological sense to be clarified and demonstrated means something that properly pertains to human *Dasein*, and does so not merely as one kind of comportment among other possible kinds that are undertaken from time to time. Rather it belongs to human *Dasein* as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs priori to all comportment (Heidegger 1976, 137–138).[14]

Transcendence, as the fundamental constitution of being, indicates the "exceeding" and "going-out" (*hinausgehend*) character of human existence

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[14] "On the Essence of Ground," translated by William McNeill, in *Pathmarks* (Heidegger 1998, 107–108).

in terms of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). *Dasein* is a being called "ability-to-be" (*Seinkönnen*) in the dimension of time. For example, a stone has no possibility "to be." It cannot choose the mode of being itself and live "as" something. A stone has no history but the past. The now and the future is for a stone insignificant unless it is "used" by the being that can "shape" its existence in the dimension of time. The mode of existence of a stone is passive and inertial. However, *Dasein* is the "ability-to-be" because *Dasein* is "essentially" transcendence. *Dasein* can transcend one's own being and "become" something throughout time.

We may now go back to the discussion of the phenomenological elements of Mou's employment of the terms. Obviously, Mou adopts Kant's employment of the terms on the one hand, on the other he absorbs the result obtained by Husserl and Heidegger that unleashes the tension of the strict confrontation between transcendence and immanence. For the phenomenologists, those terms are compatible because they are not bound by the usage denoting the entities on the same ontological level. Mou, similar to Heidegger's demarcation between ontic and ontological, admits the ontological difference between the Way of Heaven and the ten thousand things. He refuses to cut them off by the fixed view founded on the traditional distinction between the inner (immanent) and the outer (transcendent), but he also does not interpret their relationship in the same way as the phenomenologists who tried to cancel the inner tension of this conceptual pair by referring them to the process of meaning constitution. Instead, Mou uses them to illustrate the different aspects of one universal Way of Heaven. He invites us to understand the concept to the Way of Heaven with a two-aspect instead of a two-world interpretation. If we inspect the Way of Heaven in two different aspects, it is a noumenon that is "both immanent and transcendent." This interpretation can be related to the

model of "one heart-mind opening two doors (一心開二門)" in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana* (大乘起信論).[15]

In response to Kant and Heidegger, Mou reinterprets Chinese philosophy in general through his "two-level ontology (兩層存有論)": "ontology of attachment (執的存有論)" and "ontology of non-attachment (無執的存有論)." He tries to expand our imagination of the limit of knowledge which is limited by Kant's view of human knowledge. Mou opens up a new horizon that allow us to redefine the relationship between being and non-being that cannot be captured by representational thinking – which is also strongly criticized by Heidegger.

To understand Mou's idea, we primarily need to ask: What does "attachment" (執 [著], or "fixation") mean? Attachment is a concept that originates from Buddhist philosophy. Mou determines scientific knowledge as the knowledge of attachment. According to Buddhist philosophy, all beings that belong to the realm of consciousness will be considered as an attachment. Since scientific knowledge is the knowledge of consciousness, it belongs naturally to the knowledge of attachment (Mou 2003d, 274). The aim of scientific knowledge is to convert quality into quantity (化質歸量), and it succeeds through the process of abstraction, which basically is an attachment – trying to fix or capture the changing phenomenon by scientific law or principle (Mou 2003d, 277).[16]

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[15] For a better understanding of this topic, the reader may read the fourteenth lecture of "The Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy" (中國哲學十九講) C.f. (Mou 2003d, 283–312).

[16] He also discussed two kinds of attachment. One is psychological and the other is logical attachment. The logical attachment is like the concept of "positing" in Western philosophy, in particular frequently used by Fichte. In Buddhist philosophy, both attachments are included because of its all-inclusive characteristic.

According to Mou, Western philosophers do not talk about attachment since they lack another kind of knowledge, namely the knowledge of non-attachment（無執之知）, as a reference. Taking Kant as an example, although he admits that there are two of kinds of knowledge that are either based on sensible intuition or intellectual intuition, he rejects the possibility of having intellectual intuition in human understanding. The intellectual intuition belongs only to God or a God-like intellectual being. Thus, he basically divides and opposes two kinds of being who possess different kinds of knowledge. The Chinese thought, for Mou, is different, since Chinese philosophy fundamentally and positively admits the possibility of the human subject having intellectual intuition. Thus, both kinds of subject, or more precisely, both dimensions (cognitive and normative) of subject can be dissolved into one subject, without a contradiction. The human subject possesses conscious knowledge (識) and is also able to convert conscious knowledge into wisdom (轉識成智 *Zhan shi chengzhi*) (Mou 2003d, 278). Mou explains Buddhism's insight:

> 執是病，不執是無病，故『除病不除法』也。法是客觀的，執不執是主觀的。執是識，不執就是智。

> Attachment is sickness, without attachment has no sickness. Thus, 'removing sickness, not removing dharma (*fa* 法)'. The dharma is objective, attachment or non-attachment is subjective. Attachment is knowledge, without attachment is wisdom (Mou 2003, 422).

Kant's problem originates from his understanding of the nature of knowledge. He is limited by his cultural-historical background, determined by the Hellenic way of thinking and scientific development of his time (e.g. Newtonian physics). Mou claims the core theme of Chinese philosophy and

mode of thinking lies not in scientific knowledge, and therefore the Chinese did not run on the track of contemporary science (Mou 2003d, 280). The crisis of knowledge in the West lies in its different nature, with which it develops naturally towards pan-scientism and pan-technologism (泛科學主義及泛科技主義), leading to the crisis of self-destruction. "This is the trend of modern civilization" (Mou 2003d, 280), Mou said, and the view echoes with Heidegger's criticism of the crisis of science and technology in many senses.

For Mou, one of the possible ways to solve this crisis lies in the wisdom of Buddhism. Since Buddhism concerns not only the knowledge of attachment, but also the knowledge of non-attachment. In the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana*, the theme of "one heart-mind opening two doors" opens up the possibility to dissolve the antagonism of phenomena and noumena in Kantian philosophy. Knowledge is not limited in the realm of phenomena because Buddhism acknowledges both scientific knowledge as "the convenient usage of conscious knowing (識心權用)" and "real usage of heart-mind as wisdom (智心實用)." Therefore, there is a two-level ontology corresponding to two kinds of knowledge. This model is very much similar to Heidegger's conception of the ontological difference, with which the realm of beings (*Seinenden*) and Being (*Sein*) is divided but not cut off completely. Human *Dasein* has knowledge of beings because of the pre-given understanding of Being. Such an understanding of Being is in a certain sense the knowledge of non-attachment, because it likewise serves as the condition of the knowledge of beings, the only difference lies in the explanation of its origin. Heidegger takes it as the facticity of *Dasein*'s existence; Mou explains it by the real possibility of intellectual intuition embodied in Chinese philosophy in general.

Conclusion

With what has been set out above, we may now return to the Hall's and Ames' criticism on Mou's employment of "transcendence" and "immanence" and his disagreement with Lee. As we mentioned in the introduction, although Ames admits that Mou's interpretation is meticulous, unconventional and plausible in view of its inspirational creativity and contextualization, he criticizes his unnecessary usage of Western concepts in the case of reinterpreting Chinese philosophy (Ames 2002, 39). Ames, who has repeatedly presented the idea of *Ars contextualis* (the art of contextualizing) in different texts, suggests that a proper way to translate and interpret Chinese philosophy should bring the reader back to the original context of the Chinese ideas and try to let the traditions present themselves "on its own terms":[17] "*Ars contextualis*, as a practical endeavour, names that peculiar art of contextualization that allows the focal individual to ally herself with those contexts that she will constitute and that in turn will constitute her" (Hall and Ames 1998, 40). In this sense, Mou has chosen an improper way to establish his reinterpretative work for modernization of Chinese ideas and culture. In the discussion of the special character of Chinese philosophy, Mou's use of the Western concepts does smuggle many inappropriate presuppositions for the reader who has long been immersed in Western culture and terminologies. This may bring unnecessary fantasies or even distortions to those who are new to Chinese philosophy and, worse, to those who come after and are keen on finding a way to present the special characteristics of Chinese philosophy to a broader audience. In *Thinking from the Han*, Hall and Ames maintain:

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[17] I have heard a similar expression from Ames in a seminar. The citation can be found at: Franke 2016, 67.

The seriousness of this problem is evidenced by the stature of the scholars who perpetuate it, and the influence they have on the way in which China is understood. These otherwise distinguished who continue to use the Western language of transcendence, thereby recasting classical Chinese philosophy in terms familiar to the Western academy, do not seem willing or able to see the world without it. They do not always use the language of transcendence consistently, and seem unaware, or at least unconcerned about, its rather profound philosophical implications. The irony arises when this distortion, occasioned by attributing a kind of foundationalism to classical Chinese philosophy, is being perpetuated by the collaboration of contemporary Chinese philosophers who are willing to risk misunderstanding in order to bring the sophistication of Continental, principally German, philosophy into play (Hall and Ames 1998, 220).

To me, those non-specific accusations in this passage are in many ways suitable for Mou's works, which not only involve a large amount of the language of transcendence in his reinterpretation of Chinese philosophy but also make use of German philosophy, mainly Kant, as a tool to reinterpret Chinese philosophy in the manner of the foundationalism – moral foundationalism established on the concept of heart-mind. However, although Ames' concern does make a lot of sense in the case of translating and introducing Chinese philosophy to a global readers, it may not be always right in the case of *academic* discussion, especially when considering the case of Mou who was facing the influx of Western conceptions and technological culture and, more pertinently, the sorrow about the loss of cultural vitality of the Chinese way of thinking in his time. What is more significant is Mou's works did build a solid textual and conceptual foundation for the conversation between Western and Eastern academics. Even Ames would not deny the fact that it is impossible to avoid a certain degree of "distortion" and "misunderstanding" in the process of

translation and adoption of foreign ideas and terms. What is more important is to provide a sufficient and qualified "interpretative context"—Ames' term—for the conversation, which transcends, in the ideal context, semantics. Mou's interpretations and attempts regarding the modernization of Chinese philosophy are philosophical, not semantic or literalistic. Mou brings more than just an introduction of Chinese philosophy to global, yet he is also an example to show how a modernized and unavoidably Westernized Chinese thinker thinks using the Chinese and Western philosophical resources in a harmonious way. Mou never limits himself as an interpreter of Chinese philosophy, instead, he elevates himself to the level of world philosopher in order to conduct a possible and fair conversation between Eastern and Western philosophical cultures. Therefore, in response to the questions I raised at the beginning of this text, I would say that although Mou's appropriation of these terms is not necessarily an ideal strategy for the modernization of Chinese philosophy, his works do advance the mutual understanding between Western and Eastern philosophy.

So, am I saying that Lee has successfully defended Mou's use of these terms? Yes and no. One the one hand, Lee believes that Ames' criticism is unfair because Mou does not employ these terms under the meaning of "strict transcendence." Thus, Mou should not be subjected to Ames' criticism. I think Lee's comment is fair. Mou's use of these terms can basically be understood as a "creative transformation (創造性的轉化)" of them. He bestows a new meaning on the alien terms within the context of Chinese philosophy. He is thus creating a new context for further discussion. His use serves to create a new target that has never been used in previous discussions of traditional Chinese philosophy, since he was facing a cultural crisis rooted in the influx of Western technological and material culture, and

in the cultural destruction done by the Communist Party. He was creating a new vocabulary in order to deal with the new context and problems. The use of "transcendence" and "immanent" can thus be taken as one of the key creative transformations that occurred in this context.

On the other hand, we should be aware that Mou's use of the transcendent language does bring some risk to comparative studies. The loss of modesty and prudence of some philosophical adventurers is what Ames worries, about and I share the same feeling. Lee maintains that the argument between Hall and Ames and New Confucianists regarding "transcendence" is largely a matter of wording (Lee 2016, 249), but I have another opinion. Lee correctly indicates that even in the Western context the use of "immanent transcendence" is not unthinkable. He takes John H. Berthrong's argument in his book *All under Heaven: Transforming Paradigms in Confucian-Christian Dialogue* as an example to support his view about the real possibility of interpreting both Confucian and Christian tradition by "immanent transcendence." However, Lee's defence cannot completely remove the doubt raised by Ames because, although the example does show the communicability of Confucian and Christian tradition, the transcendental language still brings more confusion in understanding Chinese philosophy than translating Chinese insights to explain some aspects of Western culture. Chinese scholars have been facing, as Kwong-loi Shun puts it, an interpretive asymmetry in the case of comparative philosophy between the East and West:

> [T]here is a trend in comparative studies to approach Chinese thought from a Western philosophical perspective, by reference to frameworks, concepts, or issues found in Western philosophical discussions. This trend is seen not only in works published in the English language, but also in those published in Chinese (Shun 2009, 470).

In face of this trend, it is reasonable to demand that today's Chinese scholars should pay extra attention to their use of language in dealing with their precious philosophical assets. Moreover, even if this demand may not apply to Mou because of his special historical context, we, as a new generation who are keen on communication between different cultures, should be cautious to our use of Westernised philosophical language and the constantly changing interpretative context.

If we want to protect Mou's heritage, we should keep the door open for a new interpretation in relation to different comparative perspectives. As an example, I take the two-aspect interpretation of the Way of Heaven, inspired by Henry Allison's interpretation of Kant, as one of the most important contributions of Mou's idea to world philosophy because it provides a way out of the classical antagonism between the sensible and intelligible world, human and God, mind and world, etc. On the other hand, Mou's conversation with Kant and Heidegger shows his use of the terms "transcendence" and "immanence" has already run through and transcended, as Ames mentioned, the meaning of "strict transcendence" in a Western context. He does elevate the Eastern perspective to the discussion of world philosophy. Based on the discussion presented in this paper, I believe we can not only see the basic differences of various philosophical thoughts rooted in different cosmos-metaphysical worldviews, but also the necessity and significance of a transcultural conversation. By emphasizing the influence of phenomenology on Mou, I believe we may gain some new resources in the future study on his philosophy at the level of world philosophy instead of the modernization of Chinese philosophy.

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Modern Confucianism and the Methodology of Chinese Aesthetics: Body and Mind in Xu Fuguan's Theory[1]

Téa Sernelj

Introduction

The present chapter deals with the philosophic theory and epistemological methodology of the Modern Confucian Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), an important Taiwanese thinker of the 20th century, whose theoretical contributions are presently in the center of academic interests in China and Taiwan, while they are still almost completely unexplored in the West. The chapter is mainly focused upon Xu's interpretation of the concepts of bodily recognition and the creative potential *qi* that are forming the basis for the unification of body and mind as a fundamental method of traditional Chinese perception of reality.

Xu Fuguan and the second generation of Modern Confucianism

Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–1982) was a Chinese intellectual and historian who made important contributions to Modern Confucian studies. Hence, it is not coincidental that he belonged to the philosophical current of Modern

Confucianism (新儒學). This stream of thought has mainly been developed during the 20th century in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It still forms the most influential and important stream of thought in contemporary Chinese theory. It is distinguished by a comprehensive attempt to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems (see Rošker 2013, 18). It is defined by a search for synthesis between Western and Chinese traditional thought, aiming to elaborate a system of ideas and values, suitable to resolve social and political problems of the modern, globalized world.

Since Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world, I follow in my research the presumption, according to which Modern Confucianism (as a discourse in which the "signposts" for a rehabilitation of traditionalism were most clearly expressed), can be considered as originating with the famous *Declaration for a renewed valuation of Chinese culture as a world heritage* (為中國文化敬告 世界人士宣言)*,* which was published by a group of philosophers from Taiwan and Hong Kong, on January 1, 1958 (ibid., 20). Besides Xu, whose aesthetic and epistemological work will be introduced below, the key under signers of the declaration were Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 張君勱, 1887–1969), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978). These theoreticians are still widely regarded as the founders of Modern Confucianism, understood as a system which provided a more systematic reinterpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy based on a profounder and more integral command of the foundations of Western, especially Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian, thought. Most of them are regarded as representatives of the so-called second

generation of Modern Confucians which includes—according to most prevailing categorizations—the following theoreticians:

1. Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995),
2. Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978),
3. *Xu Fuguan* 徐復觀 (1903–1982) and
4. Fang Dongmei 方東美 (1925–1948).

They were extensively dealing with problems, linked to the Chinese modernization. This process was seen by the majority of them as a rationalization of the world. In searching its philosophical basis they mostly focused upon the question of ontology which they usually met in the frame of the newly investigated Western systems of thought. Generally, they derived from the premise that the questions of innermost reality of the universe, of the substance of being and of the Absolute are the questions that determine the meaning of life. As such, these questions were essential for the establishment of new value systems, adjusted to the requirements and conditions of modern societies and, on the other hand, for the preservation of the integrated, unalienated cultural and personal identity of the individuals in China.

The intellectual stream of Modern Confucianism emerged from the attempt to synthesize Western and traditional thought. However, these attempts were defined with the crisis of both types of discourses. The ideals of Modern Confucians were not limited to the attempt for revitalization and rehabilitation of ideological traditions from which they derived; in this respect it was obvious that they could entice the modernization of Confucianism only on the basis of its fusion with ideas "imported" from

abroad, i.e. from the very areas in which the modernization processes were emerging.

Their efforts were not merely following the striving to solve their own tradition, but also the wish to find a solution for this foreign ideological tradition, which has been irrevocably entangled into its own philosophical traps.

In general, the members of the second generation have attempted to find new methods for a revitalization of their own cultural identity in the sense of "transplanting old roots" of their own tradition, because in their view, such a revival was the only possible way for the survival of the cultural tradition, from which they were a part, and which suffered under pressures and challenges of Western cultures. This renovation of the "roots" should not merely serve for the survival of their own cultural identity, but should— if carried out conscientiously and accurately enough—also offer the stream of Modern Confucianism an active and innovative role of becoming the leading current of modernized Chinese thought as well as the leading force in intercultural dialogues between contemporary societies.

The complementary relation of body and mind

For Xu Fuguan, the traditional Chinese interconnection of body and mind was closely linked to the concept of anxiety (*youhuan yishi* 憂患意識) which also belongs to the central problems, investigated in his theoretical work (Sernelj 2013, 650). This connection can already be seen in several quotations from Zhuangzi 莊子 who represented one of Xu Fuguan's favorite ancient philosophers:

三患莫至，身常無殃。

If one manages to escape from the three forms of concern, his body will always remain free from misfortune (*Zhuangzi* s. d., Waipian, Tiandi: 6).

In another important ancient Daoist work, namely in Laozi's 老子 *Daodejing* 道德經 for instance, we also come across the following statement, implying the same connection:

吾所以有大患者，為吾有身，及吾無身，吾有何患？

What makes me concerned is the fact that I own a body. Without having a body, what concerns could I have? (Laozi s. d.,13).

In his main work *The Spirit of Chinese Art* (*Zhongguo yishu jingshen* 中國藝術精神), Xu Fuguan has also repeatedly pointed out that body is also in the center of Confucian interest; most of the Confucian philosophers found their theoretical models upon the direct presence of the body and physical discipline, although they always end with their central attention directed towards men's social duties (Liu 2008, 578). Mengzi 孟子, for instance, laid stress to the fact, that the body is the beginning of all human existence, including their social worlds:

天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。

Man always links the world, the country, and the family together when he talks; the world is based on the country and the country on families, while family is based on the body (*Mengzi* s.d., Li lou shang: 5).

A similarly fundamental role has been prescribed to the body in the *Book of Rites* 禮記 (*Li ji*), one of the most important Confucian classics. In this work, we also often come across its relation to the mind (in the sense of *xin*, i.e. 心 hearth-mind or consciousness):

心正而後身修，身修而後家齊，家齊而後國治，國治而後天下平。

Only after the hearth-mind has been properly settled, the body can be cultivated. The cultivation of the body makes then the regulation of the family possible, which preconditions a good government. A good government, again, is a precondition for the world peace (*Li ji* s.d., Da xue: 2).

This quotation shows very clearly, that the mind was seen as having priority (or being more fundamental) to the existence, as the body. Similar statements can be found throughout the entire Chinese intellectual history, although in denoting the body, the concept *shen* 身 has mostly been replaced by the concept of *qi* 氣 that has been very precisely and in great detailed investigated by Xu Fuguan in his abovementioned work (2001).

Because of the differences in the linguistic and philosophical development, the traditional Chinese concept of body differs from the one that has been established in the Western historical development. It can be expressed in multifarious ways, implying numerous different semantic connotations which cannot always exactly match to the Western ones. The abovementioned notion *shen* 身, for instance, can denote a (human or animal) body. In addition, however, it can also denote the individual or a personality. In its verbal form, it can even mean personal experiences of some individual human being, his or her life, or even his or her own moral character and ability respectively (see CTP Dictionary). The body in the Western sense, however, could be even better translated with the notion *xueqi* 血氣, as it can be seen in the following quotation from the *Book of Rites*:

夫民有血氣心知之性。

Now, in the nature of men there are both the physical powers and the intelligence of the mind (*Li ji* s. d., Yie ji: 27).

Here, the binary anti-pole of the concept *xueqi* (literary: blood and vital energy) has been represented by the notion *xinzhi* 心知 (literary: heart and knowledge).

That which is in the center of Xu Fuguan's interest, however, is the relation between the concept *qi* 氣 in the sense of an organism (i.e. an organic body) and the concept *xin* 心 in the sense of consciousness or human heart-mind respectively. Although the earliest missionaries who were in China translating the philosophical works of the Chinese tradition, have mostly translated it as a form of matter, i.e. a pure physical entity (Rošker 2012, 275) it is evident that the concept *qi* can hardly be understood as matter in the "Western" sense. In fact, the Neo-Confucian philosophers defined it as something which is not necessarily substantial, for air or even a vacuum (the Great void 太虛) is composed of it. Thus, it represents a concept which could be more appropriately defined as creativity, or a potential that functions in a creative way and which can appear in material sphere, but also in the abstract realm of ideas:

氣之聚散於太虛由冰釋於水。

In the Great void, *qi* condenses and dissolves again. This can be compared to ice dissolving in water (Zhang Zai 1989, 389).

As noted, the majority of traditional European and American sinologists have translated this concept as "matter" (Graham 1992, 59). To illustrate this aspect, we can quote the translation of this passage by the well-known French sinologist from the beginning of the 19th century, Le Gall, in which the notion *qi* is clearly understood as atom(s):

Le condensation et les dispersions des atomes dans la T'ai-hiu peuvent se comparer a la fonte de la glace dans l'eau (Le Gall, quoted by Graham 1992, 60).

Such translation of the concept *qi* is questionable, because it derives from profoundly incorporated criteria, of the model of Cartesian dualism. Although Zhang Zai's comparison with water explicitly states that *qi* is a continuous state, and not an aggregate of atoms, the analogy with matter was so deeply rooted in Le Gall's perception, that he automatically saw the notion *qi* as an entity which contains or is composed of atoms (Rošker 2012, 276). Hence, for centuries, Le Gall and other sinologists who followed his interpretations have misled scholars regarding the question whether traditional Chinese philosophy applied the concept of atomicity (Graham 1992, 61).

This creative potential, which can, as already mentioned, appear in both, the material, as well as in the ideal sphere, and which has been most often denoted in contemporary esoteric New Age literature simply as "energy," or at the most, as a "vital energy," could possibly be understood as a kind of dynamic organic potential or—depending on the context—an organic body, i.e., an organism. Given the fact that all Modern Confucians, including Xu Fuguan, were proceeding from the onto-epistemological notion of the immanent transcendence, the concept *qi* could, in this understanding, be viewed as possessing a double ontology. Thus, when appearing in the concrete sphere of life it is incorporated in the sense of a living body, and at a transcendental level it manifested itself as a creative potential, enabling and preserving physical life.

Since in Chinese philosophy, central concepts seldom appear alone or independently, but rather in the framework of the so-called binary

categories (*duili fanchou* 對立範疇) (Rošker 2012, 280), the concept *qi* has also mostly appeared linked to an anti-pole, as for instance within the binary category *qi-zhi* 氣志 (vital or creative potential and human will, as applied by Mengzi and 孟子 Xunzi 荀子), or *li-qi* 理氣 (structure and creativeness, as applied by Zhu Xi 朱熹). In the present context which regards the relation between body and mind, it has naturally been applied in a binary *qi-xin* 氣心, whereas the former could be (rather freely, of course) associated with the body, and the latter with the mind.

Although binary categories always function in a mutually complementary way which means that they are interdependent and mutually completing one another, the primary role among them has in Chinese tradition most often been prescribed to the concept of mind or heart-mind (*xin* 心). This has been exemplified in the above cited quotation from the chapter *Daxue* 大學 of the *Book of the Rites* which clearly showed that the cultivation of the body was preconditioned by a "proper state" of the (heart-) mind. Similarly, Mengzi 孟子 also exposed the primarily role of the will in connection to the body, pointing simultaneously to the relation between the two aspects of the body, namely of *qi* 氣 in the sense of a vital creativity which revives the physical body (*ti* 體).[2]

夫志，氣之帥也；氣，體之充也。

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[2] In classical Chinese worldview, *qi* 氣 as the principle of organic creativity was seen as the very vital potential which animated the physical body *ti* 體 and which actually brought it to life.

The will is the leader of the vital organism, which pervades and animates the (physical) body (*Mengzi* s. d., Gonsong Chou: I).

When introducing into this binary relation with the heart-mind the concept *qi* 氣 (in the sense of an organism), the former concept mostly still remains placed on a prior position throughout the entire Chinese intellectual history.

In his famous *Chun qiu fanlu* 春秋繁露, for instance, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 has clearly stated:

凡氣從心。心，氣之君也。

Qi is always following the heart-mind. The heart-mind is the ruler of the *qi*.

This priority, however, did by no means remain limited to Confucian sources. Even the egalitarian Daoist philosophers have often pointed out that

心之所之，則氣從之；氣之所之，則形應之。

Wherever the heart-mind is pointing, the *qi* has to follow it; and wherever the *qi* is pointing, the form has to adjust to it (*Wen shi zhenjing* s. d., Wu yan: 15).

On the other hand, however, the heart-mind has thoroughly been seen as a part of the body. Its ability to "think" comes from the body's changing of its function from that of a physical organ to that of a mental organ (Liu 2007, 579). See, for example, Mengzi's 孟子 view on this relation:

耳目之官不思…心之官則思。

> The organs such as the ears and eyes cannot think. . . the function of the heart is to think (*Mengzi* s. d., Gaozi shang: 15).

It is quite obvious that the heart-mind (i.e. the consciousness and the central cognitive tool) was understood as one of the (although highly developed) bodily organs.

In this regard, the relation between body and mind (or *qi* and *xin*) can still be considered as a complementary structured unity.

Bodily Recognition and Embodiment of Moral Subjectivity

Xu Fuguan was practically the only representative of the second generation of Modern Confucians who considered that metaphysics and ontology were not appropriate instruments for understanding ancient Chinese thought, and much less for the development of its interpretation, because, according to him, its pragmatic nucleus has never led to any composition or any structured and coherent conception of a metaphysical system, as has been established, for instance, by the ancient Greek philosophers (see Xu 2005, 43ff). Instead, ancient Chinese philosophers have developed an idea of ethics, based on the "divine or heavenly" essence of human beings, directly from the "primitive" state of religious and mythological society (Sernelj 2013a, 73).

Xu argued that we can't find anything similar to the Western metaphysic tradition in Chinese philosophy, on the contrary, one of the basic characteristic of Chinese philosophy is immanent transcendence which means that everything that appears in the abstract sphere, can exists—at least possibly—also exist at the physical level. He places the binary category of the heart-mind on the one, and the body at the other, at the center of both, human reasoning and the cosmos. He states:

Although the 'heart' mentioned in Chinese culture refers to a part of the five physiological organs, China regards the heart's functions as where life's values originate, as we regard our ears as where our sound - hearing and color –distinction originate. Mencius takes ears and eyes as 'small bodies' because their functions are of small significance, and heart as a 'great body' because its functions are great. Great or small, however, they are at one in that they are all parts of human physiological functions. Can we then talk of this physiological part as a mind of Western idealism? Does the West's idealistic mind refer to our physiological part? There may be traces left of our heart if we relate 'heart' in China to Western materialism, for physiology is something materialistic and the heart's functions are works of physiology, yet there would be no trace left at all of the heart if we relate it to idealism (Xu 1975, 243, in: Huang 2010).

He suggests that Chinese philosophy and the heart-mind culture should be considered as a mesophysics rather than metaphysics not only because of the above mentioned characteristics of Chinese philosophy, but also because of the physiological basis and implications of the heart's functions for value (and moral) judgments (ibid.).

Xu followed Mencius distinction between great man (*junzi* 君子) and small man (*xiaoren* 小人) which includes understanding of the body and its functions as a great (*dati* 大體) and small parts (*xiaoti* 小體) of the body in the following way:

公都子問曰：「鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？」

孟子曰：「從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。」

曰：「鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？」

耳目之官不思，而蔽於物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思
則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者
弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣.

The disciple Gong Du asked, "Though equally human, why are some man greater than others?"

Mengzi answered: "He who is guided by the interest of the parts of his person that are of greater importance is a great man; he who is guided by the interests of the part of his person that are of smaller importance is a small man."

The disciple asked: "Though equally human, why are some men guided one way and others guided another way?"

Mengzi replied: "'The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man'" (Mengzi 2013, Gaozi I).

What Mencius called the great body is the reasoning performed by our bodily heart-mind which consist of the enduring quest for self-improvement and self-cultivation. This self-cultivation is regarded as a cultivation of the body. Ito Togai exposed:

When people have this heart, there will be this affair. When there is this affair, it can be out of this heart. Is there a shooting? It is this heart shooting. Riding? It is this heart riding. Writing letters? It is this heart writing. However, if we merely concentrate on this one heart, pondering on how to

train it, without the body exercising such affairs, we would end up being unable to shoot, ride or write letters, while the heart remains their lord and leader. So, the sage's teachings often talk about the body without talking about the heart, because within the talk of the body there naturally are the heart's operations. Thus, what they say about humanity, rightness, ritual – decency and music, is all about affairs of cultivation of the body (Ito in: Huang 2010, 32–33).

In Mengzi's words, if we want to become a great man, we should think with our bodily heart-mind and avoid perceiving the world only by senses. In such way, the body becomes the manifestation of spiritual cultivation:

君子所性，仁義禮智根於心。其生色也，睟然見於面，盎於背，施於四體，四體不言而喻」.

That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, rightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words (*Mengzi* s. d., Jin xin shang: 21).

Since according to Mengzi, our body and its complexion are given to us by Heaven, only a sage can give his body complete fulfilment (Huang 2010, 33). Xu Fuguan also argues that Confucius obtained the Decree of Heaven or moral decree through bodily recognition (*tiren* 體認). According to him, *tiren* is a retrospective and active process in which "the subject uncovers moral subjectivity from the pseudo-subjectivity of human desires and affirms it, develops it." One reveals one's own moral nature through "overcoming the self" and "reducing sensual desires." By freeing oneself from these constraints, the subject lets the original mind emerge. The way to determine what desires and inclinations need to be overcome is the same

as the way to reveal moral subjectivity: bringing whatever feelings and ideas that one experience before the light of moral subjectivity in one's own heart-mind, and seeing whether one can still take the feelings and ideas at ease (Ni 2002, 289).

Xu agrees with the Cheng brothers and with Wang Yangming that there exists the identity of the Heaven and the human heart-mind which can be directly experienced through bodily recognition. If so, the Heaven and its moral implications are not something abstract to human beings, but rather something implemented in our physiological and psychological structure. Therefore, we are able to reduce the sensations and feelings that are not following the way of the heart-mind to achieve the unity of the Heaven as the moral instance and the human nature (Ni 2002, 289). The method of achieving such unity is the learning for the self (*weiji zhi xue* 為己者學) which is not the learning merely to understand others but rather serves for discovering, opening, transforming and completing oneself through which one turns the biological self into moral, rational and artistic self.

Conclusion

For Xu Fuguan, who has thoroughly laid stress upon the role and the function of the ethical nucleus of ancient Chinese worldview, the reduction of pure sensory perception was a central factor which enabled humans to achieve higher levels of self-completion. According to him, humans become able to reduce such purely instinctive perception, because their bodies are inherently connected with their heart-minds. This unity enabled them to follow the "significant," i.e. benevolent, justified, ritualized and wise paths of social practice, instead of following the "insignificant," i.e. instinctive, egoistic and egocentric ways of individual benefits. Because for him, *tiren* (bodily recognition) is a method of achieving the complex manifestation of

the moral character and the realization of *ren* 仁 (humanness), this kind of perception is one of the central features dividing humans from other living creatures.

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RESEARCH ON DAOIST PHILOSOPHY

Laozi's View of Presence and Absence, Movement and Stillness, and Essence and Function

Guying Chen

Introduction

The theory of *Dao* (*dao lun* 道論) is the core of Laozi's 老子 philosophical thought, which involves the origin of the creation of the Myriad Things, the basis of existence, value(s) of life and other features. The main categories which constitute Laozi's philosophical system, such as Presence and Absence (*you–wu* 有無), Movement or Motion and Stillness (*dong-jing* 動靜), and Essence and Function (*ti–yong* 體用), all encompass two dimensions, i.e. *Dao* 道 and the Phenomenal World (*xianxiangjie* 現象界). Regarding the question of Presence and Absence, Laozi promotes them into the highest ontological category; with regard to his view of Movement and Stillness, on the one hand metaphysical was of thinking about Stillness in Movement unfolds before us, and at the same time Laozi puts forward an outlook on life and a political standpoint of mutual cultivation of Movement and Stillness, which warns of Rashness or Recklessness and advocates Stillness. Finally, Laozi implicitly raises the question of the Essence and Function of *Dao*.

In the 6th century BCE, just at the end of the Spring and Autumn Period (Chunqiu 春秋; 770–476 BCE), Confucius was developing the system of patriarchal ethical thought of the Yin 殷 (16th–11th cent. BCE) and Zhou

周 Dynasties (11th cent. BCE–221 BCE) as a bridge between the past and future, and became an epochal figure unparalleled in the history of Chinese culture, both before and after. In the same era Laozi 老子 set up unprecedented positions in philosophical theory and raised the curtain on the classical Chinese "philosophical breakthrough." The core of Laozi's philosophical thought is the theory of *Dao* (*dao lun* 道論), which involves the origin of the creation of the Myriad Things, the basis of existence, value(s) of life and other features. With regard to philosophical categories, he discussed the questions of Presence and Absence (*you–wu* 有無), Movement or Motion and Stillness (*dong–jing* 動靜), Emptiness and Fullness (*xu–shi* 虛實), among others. This article will provide an explanation of his views on Presence and Absence, Movement and Stillness, and Essence and Function, which will reveal theoretical features of Laozi's philosophical thought.

View of Presence and Absence

Presence (*you* 有) and Absence (*wu* 無) as a category of binary relations in philosophical history originates from Laozi. In the current version of *Laozi*, two significant statements are formed by using this binary category, as follows Firstly, "Presence and Absence give birth to each other (*you wu xiang sheng* 有無相生)," and secondly, "Presence is born from Absence (*you sheng yu wu* 有生於無)."

Laozi, a pioneer of this form of Chinese philosophy, promoted Presence and Absence into the highest ontological category, and at the same time they also became indispensable concepts in cosmology.

Thinkers before Laozi all concentrated on investigating problems within the framework of Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things. It was only Laozi who opened the world of the *Dao* 道 and the realm of things, and provided a systematic theoretical explanation for them. He applied the same language symbols of *you* 有 (Presence) and *wu* 無 (Absence) to different dimensions of the *Dao* and other things, which led to different interpretations by later generations, among which deliberate or unintentional misinterpretations also emerged. Therefore, first of all we must clarify Laozi's distinction according to these levels, i.e. the Presence and Absence of the essence of the *Dao* (*dao ti* 道體), and the Presence and Absence of the Phenomenal World (*xianxiangjie* 現象界). We can take Chapter 1 of *Laozi* as an example for the former and Chapter 11 for the latter. Chapter 1 states: "Absence names the beginning of Heaven and Earth; Presence names the mother of the Myriad Things." Here Presence and Absence make reference to different tendencies of the *Dao* as the source of all existence. The *Dao* is formless and boundless, hence it is "Absence." But the formless *Dao* also exists in reality, and thus it is "Presence." Presence and Absence in this Chapter refer to the dimension of the essence of the *Dao*. As Chapter 11 explains:

> Thirty spokes come together in a hub, but in its Absence there is the functionality of the wheel. By mixing clay we make a vessel, but in its Absence there exists the functionality of the vessel. We cut doors and windows to make a house, but in its Absence, there lies the functionality of the house. Therefore, the Presence is for our convenience and the Absence brings functionality into play.

This speaks about the mutually dependent relationship of Presence and Absence on the level of the Phenomenal World. Laozi also expresses this in the statement "Presence and Absence mutually give birth to each other."

From the viewpoint of correlative complementarity (*xiang fan xiang cheng* 相反相成) this indirectly reveals Laozi's holistic outlook and view of harmony.

With regard to the question of Presence and Absence, records of different ideas can be found in Chapter 40 of the current version of *Laozi* and on the bamboo slips from the Guodian 郭店 version. The latter maintains that "The Myriad Things under Heaven are born from Presence and (they are) born from Absence (*tianxia zhi wu, sheng yu you, sheng yu wu* 天下之物, 生於有, 生於無)." Presence and Absence jointly refer to and denominate the essence of the *Dao*, which is probably quite close to the original edition of the text. In addition, there is also a connection with the meaning and connotations of Presence and Absence in Chapter 1. As for the statement "The Myriad Things under Heaven are born from Presence and Presence is born from Absence *(tianxia wan wu sheng yu you, you sheng yu wu* 天下萬物生於有，有生於無)," which can be found in the current version, it contains one more character, *you* 有 (Presence), which was probably added by later generations. Nevertheless, this version has already been handed down and circulating for more than two thousand years. From the Wei-Jin Period 魏晉 (220–420) through to the Song 宋 (960–1279) and Ming Dynasties 明 (1368–1644) various interpretations have emerged of the statement "Presence is born from Absence," which indicates that regarding both concepts a long philosophical history of misreading or misinterpretation has been taking place. On the basis of this statement, in the current version of *Laozi* the concept of Presence is close to the that of the Presence which is talked about in the book *Heng Xian* 恒先 (*In the Primordial State of Constancy*), and is regarded as an intermediary through

which the formless *Dao* works downwards to implement tangible things. Hence this Presence is not the Presence of all existence (*wan you* 萬有).

View of Movement and Stillness

Laozi's view of Movement or Motion (*dong* 動) and Stillness (*jing* 靜) can also be discussed by distinguishing the two dimensions, the essence of the *Dao* and the Phenomenal World. If we speak about the essence of *Dao*, on the one hand, Laozi holds that it is in Constant Movement,[1] as he wrote that the "Circulation (or Returning) is the Movement of Dao *(fan zhe dao zhi dong* 反者道之動)" (Chapter 40) and that "it is moving circularly, but it does not exhaust itself or stop *(zhou xing er bu dai* 周行而不殆)" (Chapter 25); on the other hand by using the terms, such as Eternal or Eternity (*chang* 常) and Constant or Permanent (*heng* 恒), Laozi emphasizes the stable basis in the alteration of the *Dao* and laws in the changing Movement. For instance, in Chapter 16 he says, that "Return to the Roots (or Source) is called Stillness, Stillness is called Return to the nature of life, Return to the nature of life is called Eternity," which explains the Stillness in Movement (*dong zhong zhi jing* 動中之靜) of the essence of *Dao*.

Laozi's view of the Movement of the essence of *Dao* or Returning to the Roots, which is called Stillness, is regarded as related to the statement that on the level of the Phenomenal World "Movement and Stillness mutually give birth and cultivate each other (*dong jing xiang yang* 動靜相養)." Chapter 15 states: "Who can in the midst of murkiness (of unrest) slowly

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[1] Zhu Qianzhi 朱謙之 explains: "Because '*Dao*' is a general name for change. It moves through time and corresponds to the changes of things. Although there is change, there is also the unchangeable, which is called Eternity ... Lao Dan's so-called *Dao* is always changing, it Circulates through the six voids and it is neither Eternally unchanging Dao nor Eternally unchanging Name" (Zhu 1984, 4).

settle it by Stillness? Who can in Tranquility slowly bring it to giving birth with Movement?" where he extends the "Stillness in Movement or Motion" of the essence of *Dao* to the sphere of human life and expounds his view on the mutual bearing and cultivation of Movement and Stillness. Laozi's theory of mutual bearing and cultivation of Movement and Stillness found its continuation in Huang-Lao thought (*Huang-Lao sixiang* 黃老思想). For instance, in the book *Huangdi si jing* 黃帝四經 (*Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor*) there are statements which are precisely echo and extend the meaning of Laozi's theory. The chapter "Guo Tong 果童" takes the view that "Stillness and Doing mutually give birth and cultivate each other," while the chapter "Xing zheng 姓爭 (Surnames and fighting)" notes that "Stillness and Doing need to be in accord with the (heavenly) time." And with regard to the level of the Phenomenal World, through the teaching of the mutual bearing and cultivation of Movement and Stillness in the dimension of human life, and also according to the idea that "Circulation (or Returning) is the Movement of Dao," Laozi emphasizes the relation of Emptiness and Movement between Heaven and Earth. For example, in Chapter 5, where he says of the *Dao* that "it is Empty, yet it cannot be exhausted; it Moves and evermore comes out," he talks about an endless Circulation of the Myriad Things in Emptiness. In addition, because Laozi lived in times of great turmoil, in respect to the teaching about the mutual bearing and cultivation of Movement and Stillness on the level of human life, he warns of Rashness or Recklessness and advocates Stillness. As he asserts in Chapter 45: "Purity and Stillness put everything right under Heaven," and he states in Chapter 26: "Stillness is the lord of Rash Movement." In both instances he expounds on his teaching warning of Rashness or Recklessness and advocating Stillness. Laozi says in Chapter

48: "Seeking Dao means reducing day by day." By reducing preconceived ideas, greed and desires we can attain Tranquillity and realize the Way. This theory of Laozi's, which advocates Stillness and Non-Doing (*wu wei* 無為), is derived from the meaning of unreckless or unrash actions of the hexagram "*Wu wang* 無妄 (Innocence; lit. Without Rashness)" from the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經). In the politics of the later periods it inspired a position of refraining from disturbing people. In the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, all fields ranging from politics to human life were impacted by the reverberation of the sounds left by Laozi's advocating of Stillness.

View of Essence and Function

When Sima Tan 司馬談 discussed the Daoist School and stated that "Emptiness and Absence are regarded as the Root of its method and following Spontaneity as the Function," he brought to light the binary category of relations of the Root(s), Basis or Origin (*ben* 本) and Function (*yong* 用). Later, Wang Bi 王弼 was the first who put forward the pair of Essence (*ti* 體) and Function, which probably emerged with the transformation of the concepts of Root(s), Basis or Origin and Function. The Root(s), Basis or Origin (*ben*) in Sima Tan's proposition are Zhuangzi's 莊子 so-called Root(s) or Origin (*bengen* 本根), and so this explains the essence of *Dao*. The proposition that "Emptiness and Absence are regarded as the Root of its method and following Spontaneity as the Function" can be traced back to Laozi. Chapter 4 of *Laozi* states: "Dao is Empty, yet its Functions are inexhaustible." Here he describes the Emptiness (empty state) of the essence of the *Dao* and inexhaustibility of its Functions. Laozi

implicitly speaks about the Essence and Function of the *Dao* in many places. For instance, in Chapter 40, where he states that "Weakness is the Function of Dao," he speaks about the Function of *Dao*. And in Chapter 45 he observes: "With the most perfect things it seems there is something lacking, yet their Functionality cannot be exhausted; the Fullest things seem Empty, yet their Functionality is limitless." Here he refers precisely to the question of the Essence and Function of the *Dao*.

In addition to discussing the question of Essence and Function on the level of the *Dao*, Laozi refers to this issue on the level of the Phenomenal World. In Chapter 11 he states: "in its Absence (in the centre of the hub) there is the Functionality of the wheel." Here he talks about Function on the level of the concrete functions of objects.

Laozi did not address the matter of Essence and Function through thematization, and they began to develop into a distinct category of relations only with Wang Bi. Wang Bi distinguished the Essence of *Dao* and the Function of things on the basis of Laozi's implicitly taken view of Essence and Function – Absence is regarded as Essence, Presence is regarded as Function. The most representative proposition can be found in his commentary on Chapter 38 of *Laozi*:

> Although its virtues are sage-like, its causes are great and an abundance of Presence (or existence) embraces Myriad Things, each one still gets its virtue. Although someone is noble, he takes Absence as his Function and he cannot part with Absence as his Essence.

Thus, in case of Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things, Absence is regarded as Function (*yi wu wei yong* 以無為用) and Absence is regarded as Essence (*yi wu wei ti* 以無為體). Although Wang Bi's views of Presence and Absence, Root(s) and Branch(es) (*ben-mo* 本末), and Essence and

Function further developed in the School of Mysteries (*Xuanxue* 玄學) and Buddhism during the years of the Wei-Jin, Sui 隋 (581–618) and Tang Dynasties 唐 (618–907), it received the most attention in Cheng Yi's 程頤 statement that "Essence and Function spring from the same Source (*ti yong yi yuan* 體用一源)," which represents a direct continuation of Wang Bi's ideas. And along with the others who discussed Essence and Function through the ages, we are compelled to the impacts back to Wang Bi's School of Mysteries.

Conclusion

Laozi's view of Presence and Absence, Movement and Stillness, Essence and Function all encompass two dimensions, i.e. the *Dao* and the Phenomenal World. With regard to the question of Presence and Absence, the teaching that "Presence and Absence mutually give birth to each other," which refers to the level of the Phenomenal World, shows Laozi's dialectical thinking of correlative complementarity. Presence and Absence on the level of the *Dao* originally point to and denominate the two tendencies of the essence of the *Dao*, namely its boundless formlessness as well as its existence in reality. However, from the statement that "Presence is born from Absence" which can be found in the current version of *Laozi*, Wang Bi concluded, that Absence refers to and names the metaphysical *Dao* and Presence points to all phenomenal existence. As such they have undergone further interpretations during the Sui, Tang, Song and Ming Dynasties, and therefore with regard to the matter of Presence and Absence a long philosophical history of misreadings or misinterpretations has taken shape. With respect to Movement and Stillness, on the one hand Laozi unfolds before us a metaphysical view of Stillness in Movement on the level

of the *Dao*, and at the same time he extends this to the level of phenomena and puts forward a view on life and politics that advocates the mutual cultivation of Movement and Stillness, which warns of Rashness or Recklessness and advocates Stillness. As for Essence and Function, Laozi implicitly raises the question of these, which was later thematized by Wang Bi, who brought forward important propositions such as "Absence is regarded as Essence" and "Absence is regarded as Function," while during the Northern Song Dynasty (Bei Song 北宋; 960–1126) this was further elucidated in the Neo-Confucian Cheng Yi's argument that "Essence and Function spring from the same Source."

Translated by Živa Petrovčič

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Characteristics of Laozi's "Complementary Opposition" Thought Pattern

Hui-ling Wu

Introduction

The majority of scholars' research on the *Daodejing* emphasizes the *Dao* and focuses on the source of its meaning and metaphysics. While a minority of the scholars examining the book consider the methods of thought it expresses, most of these focus on Laozi's dialectical thinking, in terms such as "straight words seem to be their opposite" and "reversion is the action of *Dao*." Moreover, they take "straight words seem to be their opposite" as a key characteristic of the thought pattern in *Daodejing*. However, I believe that using "complementary opposition" to explain Laozi's thought is helpful to clarify its characteristics, his use of it, and its impact. Moreover, Laozi not only uses the analytical thinking of "straight words seem to be their opposite," but also believes that the opposite things or ideas are complementary, rely on each other and are fluid, such as beauty and ugliness, as seen in quotes like "presence and absence generate each other," "difficulty and ease complete each other," "long and short contrast each other," "high and low lean on each other," "front and back follow each other," "fortune and misfortune rely on each other," and so on. Firstly, this article uses the analysis of the "nameless" and "named" to illustrate the oppositional concept of Laozi between *Dao* and all things; Secondly, within the "named" this article discusses how Laozi clarifies the concept of

oppositional pairs, their mutual reliance and complementation. Finally, through differentiating between the opposite of "conceptuality" and the opposite of "positionality," it can be explained why the importance of "complementation" is highlighted when Laozi discusses "opposition."

Traditional research into the thought pattern in *Daodejing*[1] often pays special attention to the concept of *Dao* as proposed by Laozi, and then analyses and explore the connotation and meaning of *Dao*. For example, such studies use extracts such as "The Dao generated one; one produced two; two produced three; three produced all things" to explain the root meaning of *Dao* and its role *Dao* in generating everything.[2] The study of the method of thought in the *Daodejing* is a relatively rare, however. According to this research approach, the "dialectical thinking" of the *Daodejing* is often emphasized, as seen in quotes such as "straight words seem to be their opposite" and "*Dao* proceeds through contrasts."[3] In terms of research into Chinese philosophy, some scholars apply Western

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[1] Regarding the issue of the author and book the *Daodejing*, the author mainly follows the research of Hu Shi and Chen Guying and agrees that the writings about the question of the identity of Confucius and Laozi in *Records of the Historian, Laozi Biography* and *Confucius Hereditary House* are all credible. There is Laozi and other people who are authors of the *Daodejing*. And in *Zhuangzi, All the World*: "Lao Dan says: 'He knows his masculine power, but maintains his female weakness,-- becoming the channel into which all streams flow. He knows his white purity, but keeps his disgrace, becoming the valley of the world.'" The contents of the record can be traced to the *Daodejing* and be compared to it. Therefore, the author regards the *Daodejing* as the work through which we can interpret Laozi's thought. See: Hu 1986a, 43–46; Chen 2005, 5–24.

[2] All annotators of the past agree that the *Dao* in *Daodejing* shall be to regarded as the root source of all things; Wang Bi explained the *Dao* with "absence" and opened up a new way of interpretation. At present, there are is an abundance of relevant research results on the metaphysical significance of Dao by scholars that possess the interpretational framework, such as Chen Guying, Yuan Baoxin, Ye Haiyan, Zheng Kai and others. See: Chen 2005; Yuan 1997; Ye 1997; Zheng, 2003.

[3] For example, Zhang Xiaomang in the chapter "straight words seem to be their opposite – Laozi's Arguments, Thoughts and Methods" believes that the Dao in *Daodejing* has a way of thought that unites the opposites (Zhang 2011, 49–64).

methodologies, such as hermeneutics and logic, while others try to apply methods that are derived from Chinese philosophy, such as Duh Bau-Ruei's "Four Square Framework" and Lee Hsien-chung's "Thought Unit Research Method"[4]. Moreover, Hu Shi believes that every philosophy has its own logic of thinking, stating: "The logical method of 'The School of Names' is the method of thinking about knowledge" (Hu 1986b, 3). In an earlier work I used the "Thought Unit" research method proposed by Professor Lee Hsien-chung to reconstruct the thinking pattern of "pushing *tiandao* to clarify people" in the *Daodejing*, as well as its characteristics (Wu 2017, 37–51). I believe that in the relation between "*tiandao*" and "people," the concept of "name" in *Daodejing* can be further discussed. With regard to "name" it can be said that this approach gives different names to the observed objects, and therefore "name" may correspond to an existing "thing," such as a table or a chair; "name" may also represent a concept, such as large, small, beautiful or ugly. What is special in the *Daodejing* is there are often pairs of relational concepts, and the texts often uses the fluidity and complementary opposition of the relational concepts to explain the changes of all things, such as "difficult and easy complete each other."[5] Consequently, in this paper I will use the analysis of "named" and "nameless"

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[4] Professor Lee Hsien-chung collated and analysed the methods of contemporary Chinese philosophy, and further developed the research method of "thought units." Contemporary scholars have developed many different research methods in Chinese philosophy, based on the goals they want to achieve. For example, the statistical comparative methods of Wu Yi and Li Shaokun, the leading theme methods of Xiang Tuijie, and the research on the basic source of Lao Siguang, Duh Bau-Ruei's Four Square Framework method, Hong Kong Feng Yaoming's method of Analytical Philosophy, mainland Chinese scholar Zhang Liwen's Chinese Philosophy Logical Structure Research Method, Tang Yijie's Chinese Hermeneutics, and the American Chinese Fu Weixun's Creative Hermeneutics Method, etc. (Lee 2007, 8).
[5] "Difficult and easy complete each other" comes from "Laozi, Chapter Two" – the original text of the *Daodejing*, the main references: Zhu and Ren 1985; Chen 2003; Liu 2006; Lin 2004.

to explain the appearance of the oppositional concepts of Laozi between *Dao* and all things. Then, within the "named," I will discuss how Laozi explains in which ways pairs of relational concepts rely on and complement each other. Finally, through differentiating between the opposite of "conceptuality" and the opposite of "positionality," it can be explained why the importance of "complementation" is highlighted when Laozi discusses "opposition."

The "named," the "nameless" and *Dao*

I believe that the analysis of the "named" and the "nameless" presented in this work will help explain Laozi's relationship with *Dao* and all things, because Laozi's "named" and "nameless" are obviously a return to the idea of people's understanding of all things. In the first chapter it is said: "The *Dao* that can be spoken of is not the unchanging *Dao*; the name that can be named is not the unchanging name. The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the nameable is the mother of all things." With regard to this passage, Wang Bi uses the following punctuation: "the nameless, is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the nameable, is the mother of all things."[6]

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[6] In addition, Wang Anshi claims that the sentence is 「無，名天地之始；有，名萬物之母」 "The absence is what bestows name on the origin of all things; presence is what bestows name on the mother of all things," "presence" and "absence" all refer to the *Dao* and "name" to the verb "naming, bestowing name upon." Lin Peiyu explains that in 「無，名天地之始；有，名萬物之母」, both "presence" and "absence" mean the *Dao*: "We look at it, and we do not see it, and we name it 'the Equable.' We listen to it, and we do not hear it, and we name it 'the Inaudible.' We try to grasp it, and do not get hold of it, and we name it 'the Subtle.'" (Chapter 14), it's not a concrete thing, so it can be called "absence" (this "absence" is not equal to "zero"); but the *Dao* has "images," "things" and "spirit" (Chapter 21), and they can produce everything in the world, so they can be called "presence." In these words, "absence" points to the "body of the *Dao*," "presence" means "the function of the *Dao*." "Body" must precede the use of "function," so "absence" precedes "presence." Chapter 40 states: "All things under Heaven were born from presence; presence was

"Nameless" and "named" can be understood at the level of *Dao* and all things, because Laozi thinks that the root of all things is *Dao*, no matter whether the *Dao* is named or nameless, it is the beginning of all things, the mother of all things. However, in the real physical world, we can give a corresponding name to any item or thing, such as a mountain as the "mountain" and Heaven and Earth as the "Heaven and Earth," and this is sufficient as long as people accept the names through common practice, because these names are convenient for people's need to communicate and understand each other.

Laozi thinks that apart from those things that can be named, there are also some that "cannot be named" or are "unnameable." For example, *Dao* itself is "unnameable" or it "cannot be named," and therefore it is proposed to describe *Dao* by the term "nameless." It can thus be said that Laozi is reminding people of the limitations of knowledge and their cognitive ability by putting forward the concept of "nameless." For example, Chapter 32 says:

> The *Dao*, considered as unchanging, has no name… As soon as it proceeds to action, it has a name. When it once has that name, (men) can know to rest in it. When they know to rest in it, they can be free from all risk of failure and error.

This is consistent with the viewpoint of Chapter 1, where Laozi states that people can bestow names based on their understanding of all things, but

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born from absence." This sentence uses "absence" to name the origin of all things and uses "presence" to name the mother of all things, so it is a before-after relationship between "Heaven and Earth" and "all things," and it is not known. After Wang Bi, the ancient people read it as "nameless" and "named." It was not until Wang Anshi that the reading has been "absence" and "presence." Through the name life is shaped, the formed origin has a name, but the *Dao* has no form, so how can it have a name? If it has a name, how can it become the mother of all things? Here I will not take Wang's notes, but will use Jinggong's method of breaking it up, so that "absence" and "presence" are nouns, and "name" is a verb." See: Lin 2004, 1–3.

that it is difficult to fully understand the Dao, and thus only based on a partial understanding of the Dao can they bestow names, so it is often said that *Dao* is "unnamed." While people are defining various names for all things, they are gradually becoming aware of the limits of activation; because people gradually establish a process of understanding of their own limits of activation, they at the same time gradually establish a system that is acceptable to everyone. Therefore, at the level of individual initiative, this system is the criterion for the activation of the individual in society; at the passive level, the system is the norm that binds people.

Therefore, we can further analyse the problems of "presence, absence" and "named, nameless" by referring to Chen Gu-ying's argument, as follows:

> Laozi's presence-absence, activity-stillness, substance-function and other concepts all include two aspects: that of the *Dao* and that of the appearance of things. Regarding the problem of presence and absence, at the aspect of appearance there is the idea of "presence and absence generate each other," which shows Laozi's dialectical thinking of complementary opposition; while at the aspect of *Dao*, presence and absence represent two aspects: the body of *Dao* and the infinite and formless real existence, but in the generally used version there is the crucial problem of "the presence generates from absence." With regard to Wang Bi's claim that "absence" is the metaphysical *Dao* and "presence" is the universal appearance, because of the lack of interpretations throughout the Sui, Tang and Song, Ming Dynasties, the issue of presence and absence has had a long misunderstood philosophical history (Chen 2005, 99).

That is to say, according to Laozi's crucial point, that "the presence generates from absence," the concepts of "nameless" and "named" are also a reflection on the level of appearance. Laozi calls the "named" what people call the *Dao*, which is the source of all things, while he uses the term

"nameless" to highlight the limitations of human language and cognition. Therefore, Laozi's "nameless" and "named" are not two concepts of separation and rupture. They are reflections of people's knowledge under the thinking patterns that "reversion is the action of *Dao*" and "presence and absence generate each other," and represent the limits and boundaries of people's cognitive ability (Liu 2006, 461).

Therefore, from the analysis of the concept of "name," it is evident, that Laozi believes that the *Dao* as the root of all things is not far from the existence of all things, but closely connected with all things, as the following passage from Chapter 34 says regarding the *Dao*:

> It clothes all things as with a garment, and makes no assumption of being their lord; it may be named in the smallest things. All things return (to their root and disappear), and do not know that it is it which presides over their doing so; it may be named in the greatest things. Hence the sage is able (in the same way) to accomplish his great achievements. It is through his not making himself great that he can accomplish them.

Laozi says of the *Dao* that "it clothes all things," but it does not want to interfere with all things. Therefore, compared with those people who have desires, the absence of desire of the *Dao* is very insignificant; the *Dao* is the return to the source of all things. However, the *Dao* is not the master of all things, so for all the things the *Dao* is great. Moreover, Laozi thinks that the greatness of the *Dao* is precisely because it does not think that it is great and so it achieves its greatness. That is to say, Laozi believes that when people bestow names, they will not only bestow names based on their understanding of things, but will at the same time also consider the usage of this thing for people. As such, it is difficult for people to bestow names on the *Dao*, because people can only understand a part of it. For example,

people's understanding of the role of the *Dao* is not comprehensive. Therefore, when people understand that the *Dao* does not interfere with all things, they will think that Dao is insignificant; but when people realize that Dao will not declare itself as master of all things, they think the Dao is great. Although at the level of appearance, "insignificant" and "great" seem to be two opposite concepts, when describing the *Dao* these two opposing concepts can be used at the same time. From this, we can understand that Laozi uses oppositional concepts to describe the *Dao*, it is not that Laozi does not pay attention to the contradiction of oppositional concepts, but instead that he highlights the limitations of language, words or concepts, which is important because people use language and words and classify or define all things via concepts. However, when people get accustomed to language and words, they ignore their limitations and mistakenly believe that language and words can define all things. But the *Dao* is not a metaphysical thing, there are still parts of it which people cannot understand and cannot define, so language and words cannot fully include the *Dao*, which Laozi thus calls "nameless."

In the *Daodejing*, Laozi often discusses the relationship between the *Dao* and all things, such as in Chapter 1, "The nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; the nameable is the mother of all things." Or "the *Dao*, considered as unchanging, has no name" and "as soon as it proceeds to action, it has a name." Laozi compares all things that can be named with the *Dao* that cannot be named, although it is forcibly named, and within the relationship between the Dao and all things he highlights the limitations of people's cognitive ability and use of language.

Therefore, the question of presence and absence and whether it is or it is not within the boundaries of *Dao* or "things" is still controversial. However, with regard to discussions about the named and the nameless, it is possible

to understand relatively clearly that Laozi describes the *Dao* using the term "nameless" and uses the "named" to describe people's understanding of things. Therefore, "named" and "nameless" can be regarded as Laozi's complementary oppositional pattern thought with regard to the *Dao* and "things" and between abstract and concrete. Laozi's limitation of "nameless" implies that people have a limited understanding of "things." In the end, people still cannot fully understand the *Dao*, so it is "nameless." However, all things come from the *Dao* and therefore the concrete "things" seem to be oppositional to the abstract *Dao*, but they are dependent on the *Dao* to be generated; and concrete "things" are destroyed, but after they disappear, they will return to the *Dao*.[7]

"Opposition," "mutual reliance" and "mutual complementation"

Laozi believes that a "name" is not absolute, unalterable, and unchangeable. A "name" can come from our naming of a certain "thing" or categorizing a certain identity. Therefore, I will further explore why in the *Daodejing* many relational concepts are put forward, such as in the second chapter, which states:

> All in the world know the beauty of the beautiful, and in doing this they know what ugliness is; they all know the good of the virtuous, and in doing this they know what good is. So it is that presence and absence give birth to one another, difficulty and ease generate each other; length and shortness form each other, height and lowness arise from one another, musical notes

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[7] Chapter 42: "The *Dao* generated one; one produced two; two produced three; three produced all things. All things leave behind them the darkness, and go forward to embrace the brightness, while they are harmonized by the breath of vacancy." Chapter 40: "Reversion is the action of the *Dao*, weakness is the function of the *Dao*. All things under heave are born from presence, presence is born from absence."

and tones become harmonious through each other and before and behind follow each other.

Beauty and ugliness, high and low, long and short, difficult and easy, all these relational concepts at the same time possess a paired "opposition," and the paired concepts have the characteristic that they can be "transformed" into each other. Using "opposition" that can be "transformed" to illustrate the connection between relational concepts is a general explanation, because such as beauty and ugliness, good and bad, presence and absence, difficulty and ease, long and short, high and low, before and behind, fortune and misfortune, and so on, explain that the "positive" and "negative" relational concepts are all "generating each other," "complementing each other," "forming each other," "relying on each other," "harmonizing each other," "following each other," "depending on" and "leaning on" in the process of oppositional transformation. On this point, according to Chen Guying and Bai Xi's compilation of concepts of oppositional pairs in *Daodejing*, there are about than 80 pairs:

> The concepts of oppositional pairs can be found everywhere in the book of *Daodejing*. In addition to the above-mentioned beauty and ugliness, presence and absence, there are also skilful and clumsy, active and still, full and empty, partial and whole, twisted and straight, hollow and full, little and many, worn out and new, female and male, pure and disgraced, light and heavy, calm and restless, inspiration and expiration, weak and strong, abandonment and flourishment, receive and give, valuable and worthless, bright and pearl, progress and retreat, fully developed and incomplete, to dispute and to accept, cold and hot, misfortune and fortune, loss and profit, right and odd, gentle and firm, empty and solid, open and close, pure and impure, exist and disappear, close and distant, subject and object, beginning and end, orderly and disorderly, success and failure, presence and absence

of action, presence and absence of situations, presence and absence of the *Dao*, etc. (Chen and Bai 2002, 169–170).

In particular, these opposite concepts exist through the comparison between the two sides, and therefore losing one side means losing both. For example, if there is no "ugliness," it is not easy to highlight "beauty"; without "impurity," it is difficult for "purity" to manifest itself; without the "object," how can one call himself "subject," and so on. Through the understanding and comparison of the world, Laozi explains his understanding of the performance of the *Dao* with the help of the oppositional pairs and opposite concepts. The "dependency" of the paired concepts indicates the possibility that the relational concepts "transform" each other. Moreover, the rules of this not only apply to the understanding of all things in nature, but also involve many aspects of social life, such as economics, politics, the military, ideology, moral cultivation, and interpersonal relationships.[8]

These paired opposite concepts in the *Daodejing* are not only used to compare the two sides, but are also mutually dependent and coexistent; moreover, the concept of pairings exhibits the rules of "opposition" and "transformation." For example if we compare A and B, A is "long" and B is "short"; but if A is compared with C, A is "short" and C is "long." So it can be observed that A has at the same time both "long" and "short" qualities. That is to say, the emergence of relational concepts occurs when we make a comparison of things, and therefore the relational concepts are

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[8] Chen Guying and Bai Xi wrote: "The oppositional concepts enumerated by Laozi include many aspects from different disciplines and fields, such as astronomy, geography, mathematics, physics, biology and other natural sciences and economic, politics, military, ideological, moral cultivation, interpersonal relationships and other aspects of social life. They touch on a wide range of fields, subtle observations, and the incisiveness of the arguments are all amazing. This is rarely seen in the history of ancient Chinese thought" (Chen and Bai 2002, 169–170).

not absolute, but will be defined through the comparison. As such, the "transformation" of the oppositional concepts does not lie in the "transformation" of the characteristics or specifics of this particular matter, but it may lie in the expansion of our understanding regarding the scope and the object. Looking back at the reasons for the emergence of relational concepts, we give a relative position to all things under the condition of being able to "name" them, and obtain the result that A is "long" and B is "short." However, this result is not an absolute answer, because when we compare A with C, we get another result, A is "short" and C is "long." The concepts of "long" and "short" thus seem to be unified in A; however, this unity is not a relational concept, which becomes uniformity, undifferentiated unity, but it is the uncertainty of our realization of relational concepts and the connection between them, and our achievement of the unity of relational concepts above our thinking. [9] It follows that the oppositional pairs have the possibility of "complementary opposition" and "negative and positive mutually transform each other." [10] This kind of

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[9] Liu Xiaogan used the paired oppositional concepts' dialectics to claim that: "The dialectic method argues that the oppositional sides are united. The basic premise of this theory is to see the opposite aspect in the common things and in seemingly unitary things seeing the opposing two sides. Laozi is very good at thinking and asking questions from the perspective of the opposite relationship. The richness of dialectics in Laozi's thought is first manifested in the concept of positive and negative pairs he often uses. In Chapter 81 of *Laozi*, half of the chapter consists of pairs or relative concepts, such as presence and absence, strength and weakness, profits and losses, cleverness and stupidity, rich and poor, subject and object, advance and retreat, positive and negative, strange and right, empty and solid, favoured and humiliated, difficulty and ease, fortune and misfortune, etc., which are mentioned at least 80 times in total" (Liu 2005, 150–151).

[10] In the sayings "complementary opposition" and "positive and negative transform each other," Lao directly sets the rule where the *Dao* is interpreted through "negative, saying: "Considering the *Dao*, the general rule is that things and images all circle around it, therefore, things rely on the meaning of the *Dao*." However, why is this rule present? Laozi solves it by the "negative"; the "negative" has both meanings: "complementary opposition" and "positive and negative transform each

oppositional dialectic thinking can be observed in *Yijing (The Book of Changes)*, such as "weak is above and strong is below, they influence each other and respond to each other," in the *Treatise on the Tuan*, "beforehand distress and obstruction, afterwards joy," in *Fou gua*, "Things cannot have a free course until the end and hence they are followed by restriction, things cannot be forever restricted and hence are followed by 'Tong ren'," and in *Xu gua*, among other texts. There are many examples in *Yijing* that indicate that no matter whether a situation is good or bad, it cannot be eternally unchangeable, and therefore there is no deeper argumentation about how the oppositional concepts are evolving in reality. In the *Daodejing,* Laozi introduces the evolution of oppositional concepts.[11]

It is worth noting that in the paired oppositional concepts, Laozi points out the importance of the "opposite," as explained by A. C. Graham's twelve groups of oppositional concepts in the *Daodejing* (Graham 1993, 259–260):

A: Something（有）Doing something（有為）Knowledge（有知）Male（雄）
B: Nothing（無） Doing nothing（無為）Ignorance（無知）Female（雌）
A: Full（實） Above（上） Before（前） Moving（動） Big（大）
B: Empty（虛） Below（下） Behind（後）Still（靜） Small（小）
A: Strong（強） Hard（堅） Straight（直）
B: Weak（弱）Soft（柔）Bent（曲）

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other" (Lao 1999, 252–253).

[11] Regarding the connection between *Yijing* and *Laozi*, Chen Guying has many related remarks. For example, he states in "Yi Chuan and the Daoist Thought" that "In the hexagram statements in *Zhou Yi* there is the seed for the simple dialectic point of view, but for the high development of Laozi he established an unprecedented dialectical system of thought" (Chen 1995, 69).

Group A contains active and positive concepts, and Group B passive and negative concepts. Graham believes that Laozi always prefers the "opposite," and will choose the negative concept instead of positive, passive rather than active. He also believes that Laozi stresses the idea of "opposite," which is almost entirely absent in Zhuangzi's philosophy, and this is probably deeply connected with Laozi's "*guirou*" thought, because the passive (the concepts in group B) represents the basis for the development of the active (the concepts in group A).[12]

From daily experience, Laozi found that people are accustomed to the pursuit of "positive" concepts in the relational pairs, such as "beauty," "high," and "fortune," and forget that these only exist in relation to their opposites – "beauty" is relative to "ugliness" and "high" is relative to "short" and "fortune" is relative to "misfortune." Therefore, "All in the world knows the beauty of the beautiful and in doing this they know what ugliness is" means that "beauty" and "ugliness" must exist at the same time. The loss of one side causes the loss of both. For example, "beauty" without the existence of "ugliness" cannot manifest its "beauty." This was discussed

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[12] Graham writes: "The most characteristic gesture of Lao-tzu to overturn accepted description is the reversal of priorities in chains of oppositions. … In instructing the weak in the strategy of survival, Lao-tzu regularly advises him to prefer B to A, passive to active－in the terminology soon to become standard (but used only once in the text), Yin to Yang. This inversion is hardly found in Chuang-tzu but astonished and impressed readers of Lao-tzu from the beginning. In contrasting different philosophies Hsün-tzu says: "Lao-tzu had some insight into drawing in, none into stretching out" (Another of his lists has "Chuang-tzu saw no farther than Heaven and did not know man"). A list of doctrines in the Lü Spring and Autumn has "Old Tan valued weakness (= yielding)." For the modern reader too the most distinctive impression made by this philosophical poem is likely to be of a pattern running through everything which is the reverse of the one with which he is familiar. It exposes a cycle by which whatever becomes strong, above, and something, has been and in due course will revert to being weak, soft, below and nothing. The passive member is the foundation on which the active rises. It is the passive which is vital, fluid, fecund" (Graham 1993, 223~224).

above, when it was noted that when paired relational concepts lose one side, both sides cease to exist. This is also the concept of "opposition," and is also "mutually dependent" existence.

Therefore, the paired oppositional concepts are not only a "circular repetition"[13], but also highlight the pursuit of the value of "opposition."[14] As such, the relational concepts are further divided into "positive and negative rely on each other" (including "positive and negative generate each other"), "positive and negative transform each other," "positive and negative reveal each other" (including "the negative reveals the positive") and "search for the positive with the negative," in other words, all four levels are there to be explored (Liu 2005, 155–173). Firstly, the case of "positive and negative rely on each other" (including "positive and negative generate each other") shows that the positive and negative sides of things interact as both cause and effect, such as the idea of "presence and absence generate each other" in Chapter 2. Secondly, with regard to "positive and negative transform each other," this can be said to mean "circular repetition," which includes the meaning of "when things reach the extreme, they turn into their opposite," (Chen and Bai 2002, 155–173) like as the idea that "when things become strong, then they get old" in Chapter 55, or "misfortune is found by fortune's side, fortune is concealed by misfortune" in Chapter 58, which shows that when one side of the relational concept develops to the extreme, it will develop towards the other side;. Thirdly, "positive and negative reveal each other" (including "the negative reveals the positive") means that

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[13] "Circular repetition" is the term used by Cai Renhou in his "Overview of Laozi's Philosophy" to point out the meaning of "straight words seem to be their opposite" in Laozi's philosophy (Cai 2007, 13).

[14] According to Graham's argument, and those of Chen, Bai, andLiu arguments, Laozi's pursuit of value is to seek the "negative" (weak, empty, etc.) values rather than pursuing "positive" (strong, solid, etc.) values.

a relatively complete thing should contain some kind of a negative element[15], such as "great achievements have deficiencies" in Chapter 45. In short, the positive form that contains negative elements means that "the opposites complement each other."[16] Fourth, "search for the positive within the negative" means pursuing the value of the "opposite," if it can surpass the side of "positive," as in "the soft overcomes the hard; and the weak the strong" (Chapter 36), which means searching for the positive within the negative.

"Searching for the positive within the negative" is the most widely examined idea in Laozi's thought, and it is even believed that Laozi is a hypocrite.[17] In the earliest quotation, which is Han Feizi's – "Yu Lao" citation of the *Daodejing* "if you want to collect it, you must first spread it out; if you want to weaken it, you must first strengthen it,"[18] Han Fei sees

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[15] Liu Xiaogan claims that "positive and negative reveal each other" is a unique viewpoint in Laozi's dialectics: "I think that a relatively wholesome thing should contain some kind of negative elements. This kind of viewpoint is used to describe facts or rules, this can be called 'positive and negative reveal each other'" (Liu 2005, 164).

[16] Liu Xiaogan further states: "In summary, in the idea of positive and negative that reveal each other, the theory where the negative reveals the positive believes that the more flexible state is the positive form, that has accommodated the elements of the negative form, and the positive ones include the negative components or characteristics. This is a wiser and higher positive, a greater positive and is worth pursuing, it is the positive that has the ability to avoid failure" (Liu 2005, 167).

[17] Throughout history, many thinkers claim that Laozi is a hypocrite. Liu Xiaogan pointed out in his book *Laozi* that Han Fei and Zhu Xi's misunderstood Laozi's thoughts; Xu Kangsheng also pointed out in the book *Laozi Studies* that Zhu Xi in *Zhuzi yulei* researches Laozi's thought, although the fomrer used this to attack Laozi's thoughts. He claims that Laozi's living below and having a later position was to achieve a certain purpose among the people. He states: "Laozi always shows that he is a weak person and states that he is purposely content to be lower than the people, he is in a place of humility. However, his willingness to live lower than the people is just to use this as a means to achieve his goal of living above the people." See: Liu 2005, 168–169; Xu 1993, 163.

[18] "Han Feizi - Yu Lao": "越王入宦於吳，而觀之伐齊以弊吳。吳兵既勝齊人於艾陵，張之於江、濟，強之於黃池，故可制於五湖。故曰：『將欲翕之，必

"guarding mildness" as a method. He believes that Goujian can turn defeat into victory, because he is good at using the "soft and weak" attitude to loosen the enemy's defences and taking the opportunity to strengthen himself, thus achieving his goal. In order to clearly analyse why Han Fei views the meaning of "softness" in this way, here the vocabulary of the oppositional pairs in the *Daodejing* is further divided into "conceptual" opposition and "positional" opposition.

Discussing opposition "conceptually," such as difficulty and ease, beauty and ugliness, length and shortness, etc., means comparing a pair of things in a range that can be compared. Length and shortness are based on a comparison of two things in space, beauty and evil are a comparison in aesthetics, difficulty and ease are a comparison within a practical range, and this can all be understood as "positive and negative rely on each other," "positive and negative transform each other" and "positive and negative reveal each other," which are all conceptual discussions of "opposition."

However, in contrast to the "positional" argument, there are examples like "sages support people," "big country supports small country," "mother supports child," and so on, such as in Chapter 3:

> Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people
> from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to
> procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; not to show them
> what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from
> disorder. Therefore, the sage, in the exercise of his government, empties
> their minds, fills their bellies, weakens their wills, and strengthens their

固張之；將欲弱之，必固強之。』晉獻公將欲襲虞，遺之以璧馬；知伯將襲仇由，遺之以廣車。故曰：『將欲取之，必固與之。』起事於無形，而要大功於天下，是謂微明。處小弱而重自卑謂損弱勝強也" (Han Fei 1967, 120–121).

bones. He constantly [tries to] keep them without knowledge and without desire, and where there are those who have knowledge, he keeps them from presuming to act [on it]. When there is this abstinence from action, good order is universal.

From this, we can see that Laozi proposed different norms of conduct according to different positions. In the position of sages, Laozi believes that the way to rule a country is to keep the people modest and make them not fight each other. And he believes that increased intelligence will make it difficult for people to follow the rules, so it is not advantageous to the rule of the country, as he notes in Chapter 66: "The difficulty in governing the people arises from them having much knowledge." Thus, Laozi believes that when two people seem to be in opposite positions, everyone can handle matters based on their own position. The best situation is when people get along with each other and handle matters harmoniously.

Chapter 7 states:

> Therefore a sage has said, "I will not act, and the people will be transformed by themselves; I will be fond of keeping still, and the people will by themselves become correct. I will take no trouble about it, and the people will by themselves become rich; I will manifest no ambition, and the people will by themselves be modest."

This shows that sages govern the country with a self-disciplined attitude, and the common people have space to develop in peace and the ability to recuperate and multiply. The condition for obtaining such harmony is based on the fact that people of different positions respect and complement each other; common people respect the role of sages as rulers and do not presume that the sages will behave in ways that harm them, but will maintain a modest life; the sages understand how to respect the people, they would not

arbitrarily expand their desires and allow the people to live and work in peace and contentment. From this, we can see that when we talk about "opposition" from the positional perspective, the importance of "mutual complementation" can be more clearly demonstrated.

Another example is "big country" versus "small country." Here Laozi believes that different national situations must have different ways of governance, and points out that "governing a great country is like cooking small fish," and notes "small country, small people." In the face of "great countries," the rulers must understand how to respect the established atmosphere and order and must not often disturb this, because disrupting the original order may stir social unrest and cause the common people to lose their sense of security, therefore he uses the phrase "cooking small fish" to describe the circumstance of governing big countries. [19] For the "small country," Laozi believes that the rulers should know how to keep the common people's lives simple and modest, not to compel the people to change the rhythm of their life and not to mistakenly ask the people to make rapid progress. [20] When a "big country" meets a "small country," the

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[19] Chapter 60: "Governing a great state is like cooking small fish. Let the kingdom be governed according to the *Dao*, and the manes of the departed will not manifest their spiritual energy. It is not that those manes do not have that spiritual energy, but it will not be employed to hurt men. It is not that it could not hurt men, but neither does the ruling sage hurt them. When these two do not injuriously affect each other, their good influences converge in virtue."

[20] Chapter 80: "In a little state with a small population, I would so order it, that, though there were individuals with the abilities of ten or a hundred men, there should be no employment of them; I would make the people, while looking on death as a grievous thing, yet not remove elsewhere [to avoid it]. Though they had boats and carriages, they should have no occasion to ride in them; though they had buff coats and sharp weapons, they should have no occasion to don or use them. I would make the people return to the use of knotted cords. They should think their [coarse] food sweet; their [plain] clothes beautiful; their [poor] dwellings places of rest; and their common [simple] ways sources of enjoyment. There should be a neighbouring state within sight, and the voices of the fowls and dogs should be heard all the way from

important point is that "each gets what it desires," meaning that when a "big country" can understand the needs of a "small country" that seeks protection, and when it can treat the "small country" with moderation, then the "small country" wants to join the "big country." [21] Therefore, the seemingly opposing "great countries" and "small countries" can achieve a harmonious state, when "each gets what it desires" and they understand each other's positions and fulfil each other's needs.

Next I will discuss Han Fei's methods of applying softness and weakness. In "Han Feizi - Yu Lao," Yue Wang and Wu Wang are not only divided into two countries, but also represent the relative positions of the two countries. The state of Yue has defeated the state of Wu, and Wu has inflicted a crushing defeat on Yue, and the history of war and opposition between these two states has been very long. Laozi believes that such opposites can reach a harmonious situation because of mutual dependence and complementation. On the other hand, Han Fei sees that the two states have reached the possibility of mutual dependence and complementation. Therefore, he recommends that one of them use the method of weakness and softness to achieved their own interests. Hence, we can see that Han Fei was inspired by Laozi's observation of the opposite position. He believed

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it to us, but I would make the people to old age, even to death, not have any intercourse with it."

[21] Chapter 61: "What makes a great state is its being a low-lying, down flowing stream; it becomes the centre to which all the small states under heaven tend. To illustrate from the case of all females: the female always overcomes the male by her stillness. Stillness may be considered [a sort of]) abasement. Thus, it is that a great state, by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over to them. In the one case, the abasement leads to gaining adherents, in the other case to procuring favour. The great state only wishes to unite men together and nourish them; a small state only wishes to be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it desires, but the great state must learn to abase itself."

that when it is already impossible to reach the state of "mutual complementation," methods could be applied by the two sides in order to achieve their own goals, such as the restoration of the state by the King of Yue. Therefore, although Laozi inspired Han Fei, he did not follow Laozi's idea with regard to handling things.

Summary

This article proposes that from the argument of "named" and "nameless" in the *Daodejing* we can clearly understand that Laozi is describing the *Dao* with "nameless" and uses "named" to describe people's understanding of things. Laozi's limitation of "named" implies that people have a limited understanding of "things," and thus ultimately people cannot fully understand the *Dao*. Therefore, the Dao is "nameless," and from the relationship between the concrete "thing" and abstract *Dao*, Laozi's model of thought regarding opposite but mutually reliant and mutually generating *Dao* and "things" is explained. Then, within the "named," the mutually reliant relationship between the two paired concepts, and the evolving and transforming mutually complementary relationship between the positive and negative, is explained through the opposition of the positive and negative concepts. Finally, by distinguishing between the opposition of "conceptual" and the opposition of "positional" this article illustrates Laozi's thinking about "complementary opposition." Not only can we explain the paired oppositional concepts, but we can also articulate Laozi's view of a harmonious society. Because Laozi thinks that if the opposite two sides of the "position" have the ability to recognize each other's differences and respect each other, they can achieve a harmonious state through mutual achievement and fulfilment. Moreover, by discussing opposition through "position," the influence of Laozi on Han Fei can be explained. Han Fei did

not inherit the idea of Laozi that the opposite position can be mutually reliant and complementary. Instead, he believes that in the state of oppositional position one of the sides can use the method of weakness and softness to defeat the other party in order to obtain their own interests and reach their goals. Therefore, the intention of how ("by which means") to solve a problem has an impact on the forming of one's thought pattern.

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A General Survey of Taiwanese Studies on the Philosophy of the Wei-Jin Period in the Last Fifty Years of the 20th Century

Hai-yen Ye

As a term denoting a historical period, the expression "Wei-Jin 魏晉" refers to the era extending from the Three Kingdoms period (*Sanguo shidai* 三國時代) started by the usurpation of the Han (漢) Dynasty by the emerging Cao Wei (曹魏) Dynasty, down to the Western and Eastern Jin Dynasties. Since it completely disregards the contemporary Sixteen Kingdoms of China founded by Five Barbarian peoples, it constitutes a historical perspective centred exclusively on the Han ethnic group. Apart from time of Buddhist treatises, the later Northern and Southern Dynasties (*Nan-Bei chao* 南北朝) period is only rarely included in inquiries into the thought of *xuanxue* 玄學 ("profound/mysterious learning"). What the term "Wei-Jin philosophy" (*Wei-Jin zhexue* 魏晉哲學) thus generally refers to is the philosophy of the Wei-Jin period, which alongside the Daoist philosophy of medical powders and cures to ensure immortality, as inherited from the Qin and Han Dynasties, also absorbed the Buddhist learning of the Eastern Jin Dynasty. However, since the Buddhist aspect has already been discussed extensively in other specialized treatises, here we shall only discuss it briefly.

Concerning the philosophical investigations from the Wei-Jin period, and as regards the main protagonists of such studies, these include figures such as Liu Shao (劉劭), He Yan (何晏), Wang Bi (王弼), Ruan Ji (阮籍), Mi Kang (嵇康), Guo Xiang (郭象), Pei Wei (裴頠), and Ge Hong (葛洪), among others. The texts that were created as a result of these investigations include those such as Liu Shao's *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* (*Renwu zhi* 人物志); Wang Bi's *A Commentary on Laozi* (*Laozi zhu* 老子注), *General Introduction to Laozi* (*Laozi zhilüe* 老子指略), *General Remarks on the Changes of Zhou* (*Zhouyi lüeli* 周易略列), as well as the *Commentary to the Changes of Zhou* (*Zhouyi zhu* 周易注), which was later completed by Han Kangbo (韓康伯); Ruan Ji's "Treatise on Music" (*Yuelun* 樂論), "Treatise on Comprehending the Changes" (*Tong Yi lun* 通易論), "Treatise on Comprehending the Laozi" (Tong Lao lun 通老論), *"*Understanding the Zhuangzi" (*Da Zhuang lun* 達莊論), and "A Biography of the Great Man" (*Daren zhuan* 大人傳); Ji Kang's "Treatise on Nourishing Life" (*Yang sheng lun* 養生論), "Musical Sounds Contain Neither Sorrow Nor Happiness" (*Sheng wu aile lun* 聲無哀樂論), "Refutation of the [Zhang Miao's Essay on the] Natural Joy of Learning" (*Nan ziran haouxue lun* 難自然好學論), and "Treatise on Dispelling Self-Interest" (*Shi si lun* 釋私論); other notable works included Guo Xiang's *Commentary on Zhuangzi* (*Zhuangzi zhu* 莊子注), Ouyang Jian's "On Expressivity of Language" (*Yan jin yi lun* 言盡意論), Pei Wei's "Exalting [Phenomenal] Existence" (*Chongyoulun* 崇有論), and Ge Hong's *Master Who Embraces Simplicity* (*Baopuzi* 抱樸子). With regard to their main research topics, these included "the theory of praising nothingness

(nonexistence)" (*guiwulun* 貴無論), "transcending the doctrine of names and relying on spontaneity" (*yue Mingjiao ren ziran* 越名教任自然), "discourse on the exaltation of somethingness (existence)" (*chongyoulun* 崇有論), "discourse on the distinguishing between language and meaning" (*yan yi zhi bian* 言意之辨) and so on.

Over the past 50 years [ed. from roughly 1949 to 2000], Taiwan has experienced three major political and cultural changes, and in a definite but often rather subtle manner, these three changes also influenced the development of philosophy. The earliest such stage occurred between the years 1949 and 1970, when Taiwan was confronted with a significant political rupture and grappled with innumerable challenges. During these decades the island was in a seminal stage in cultural terms, and in a state of longing and exploration, while at the same time it also maintained a continuity with its earlier era, through which the results of those studies carried out prior to 1949, and the KMT's arrival on the island, had also been inherited. The next stage occurred between 1971 and 1987. In these years significant educational reforms were carried out in Taiwan. The nine-year programme of compulsory education continued, but as the island's economy started taking off this caused a great increase in the number of newly established universities. At the same time, there was also a rapid increase in the number of philosophical departments at Taiwanese universities, a sign of both the rise of academic research in general, as well as an indication that studies of human thought had entered a more mature stage on the island. The focal point of scholarly discussions at the time was investigations of Western existential philosophy, while the cultural exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland were usually of a private rather than professional or official nature. Moreover, in the later part of this period, as Taiwan's

desire for freedom grew ever stronger, research into the *xuanxue* of the Wei-Jin period became some sort of a spiritual demand, as well as an academic requirement. The last stage of political and cultural change took place between 1988 and 2000, after the lifting of martial law in 1987, followed by increased academic exchanges with the mainland as well as other countries, which facilitated a more vigorousness and diverse intellectual discourse. The quest for roots on the one hand and response to the current age on the other, were both the requirements and significant phenomena of this period. In the same years, the understanding of Wei-Jin *xuanxue* in Taiwan was clearly influenced by academic research conducted in mainland China, as well as scholarly exchanges and other interactions with the continent, which also led to a significant increase in the number of related publications.

In the following review Taiwanese research on the *xuanxue* of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, I have carried out my interpretation of the published results and main topics in relation to the specific intellectual contexts of the three periods outlined above.

1. Concerning the Research Results

Divided in accordance with the contemporaneous situation with regard to the publication of papers in periodicals, histories of philosophy and monographs in these three periods, the results of the research can be summarized in the following manner:

1.1. The Research Results of the Initial Stage (1949–1970)

The academic development in the period between the years 1949 and 1970 was the seminal period of scholarship on the Wei-Jin Dynasties. It can be divided into three separate sections, based on periodicals, monographs, and treatises on the history of philosophy.

(1) Journal Articles and Theses

With regard to the quantitative aspects, the research results published in periodicals can be divided into two major categories: the first are studies presenting a general introduction to the period in question, whereas the second are concerned with the thought of individual figures.

(a) General Overviews of the Historical Period

Altogether 82 articles were published, in these years with title containing the keyword "Wei-Jin" (魏晉), while titles with the term "Northern and Southern Dynasties" (Nan-Bei chao 南北朝) accounted for 81 articles. At the same time, a total of 134 articles where published with titles mentioning both Wei and Jin Dynasties as well as Northern and Southern Dynasties. Generally speaking, these overviews all delivered plentiful results in terms historical research, and for the most part extensively covered topics such as the gentry (*shizu* 世族), literature, education and fine arts. In terms of philosophy, the most representative works of this era included Mou Zongsan's (牟宗三) essay "The Wei-Jin Theories of Names and Pre-Qin School of Names" (*Wei-Jin mingli yu Xianqin mingjia* 魏晉名理與先秦名家) from 1959, and the articles "The Rectification of Names in Theories of Names from Wei and Jin Dynasties" (*Wei-Jin mingli zhengming* 魏晉名理正名) and "The Renowned Scholars from Wei and Jin Dynasties and the Theory of Names of their Profound Learning" (*Wei-Jin mingshi jiqi xuanxue mingli* 魏晉名士及其玄學名理). The most representaive amongst graduate theses from the 1950s is He Qimin's (何啓民, Ho Chi-min) work entitled *Discourse of the Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao de tanfeng* 魏晉南北朝的談風).

(b) Studies of the Thought of Individual Figures

Altogether 44 articles were published examining the ideas of individual figures, with some striking omissions: none on the thought of Wang Su (王 肅), four on He Yan, 16 on Wang Bi, 10 on Ruan Ji, four on Ji Kang, none on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (*Zhulin qixian* 竹林七賢), two on Xiang Xiu, three on Guo Xiang, one on Ge Hong, and one on Fan Zhen (範 縝). Apart from these, the period also saw the publication of three volumes of studies on the *Baopuzi* (抱朴子). The most representative and philosophically significant works were those of Mou Zongsan, who devoted most of his attention to the *xuan* (玄) rationality of Wang Bi's scholarship on the *Book of Changes*, as well as Fan Zhen's theory of body and soul, having consequently strengthened the position of Wang Bi in the philosophy of Wei and Jin Dynasties. Mu Qian's research, on the other hand, focused on the textual problems related to the studies of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.

(2) Monographs

In the same period, Taiwanese academic circles witnessed the publication of two classic works, which remain key texts to the present day. One of these was Tang Yongtong's (湯用彤) *Essays on the Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue* (*Wei-Jin xuanxue lungao* 魏晉玄學論稿), which was first published in 1957 in Beijing. The other was Mou Zongsan's work *Inborn Human Nature and Xuan Principles* (*Caixing yu xuanli* 才性與玄理), first printed in Kowloon in Hong Kong in 1962. Although at the time these two works did circulate among Taiwanese intellectuals, unfortunately they still were not widely available or read. Tang Yongtong's book saw its first reprint by a Taiwanese publishing company only in 1972, whereas Mou

Zongsan's was first officially published by the Taiwan Student Publishing House (*Taiwan Xuesheng shuju* 台灣學生書局) in 1974. However, these two books undoubtedly had inspired much of the early research into Wei and Jin philosophy in Taiwan. Zhou Shaoxian's (周紹賢) book *An Account on Pure Conversations of Wei and Jin* (*Wei-Jin qingtan shulun* 魏晉清談述論) from 1966, represented one of only a few monographs on "pure conversations (*qingtan* 清談)" from the time. He Qimin's *A Study on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove* (*Zhulin qixian yanjiu* 竹林七賢研究) appeared in the same year, while yet another book entitled *Thought and Discourse in the Wei and Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin sixiang yu tanfeng* 魏晉思想與談風) was published one year later. In 1968, the first Taiwanese edition of Rong Zhaozu's (容肇祖) *Naturalism of the Wei and Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin ziranzhuyi* 魏晉自然主義) was the earliest contemporaneous treatise which took the concept of *ziran* 自然 ("nature," "spontaneity, self-so") as its main subject.

Between 1939 and 1942, the period when Tang Yongtong was at the Southwest Associated University in Kunming, and concurrently held the post of the head of the Graduate Institute of Humanities at Beijing University, his writing of the main parts of his *Essays on Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue* initiated the organization of a course on Wei-Jin period *xuanxue*, and as a result also launched the subsequent research on the same topic. When the book was published, it claimed that the central question of Wei-Jin period thought in general had been "What kind of personality ought an ideal sage possess?" and posited that the main discursive topic in the period had been the distinction between "spontaneity" (*ziran* 自然) and "ethical formalism" (*mingjiao* 名教, literally "doctrine of the names"). On the other

hand, other works during this period [1949–2020] proposed that Daoist classics such as the *Laozi* (老子) and *Zhuangzi* (莊子), along with Buddhist *Prajñā* literature, constituted the basis for the conversations on the arcane (*xuan* 玄) between the Han and Jin Dynasties. These were subdivided into four separate branches: the first was the teaching of Wang Fusi (王輔嗣), which in Buddhism used to be referred to as "the truth of the original nonbeing" (*benwu yi* 本無義). The second was the teaching of Xiang Xiu and Guo Xiang, which corresponded to Zhi Daolin's (支道林) theory of "matter as such" (*jise* 即色) in Buddhism. The third was the "theory of non-existence of mind" (*xin wu yi* 心無義). And the fourth was the "theory of the emptiness of the unreal" (*buzhen kong yi* 不真空義). Tang maintained that in the framework of the latter two the scholars expounded on the discourse on the difference between existence and non-existence. In addition to that he also indicated that:

> People generally regard the *xuanxue* 玄學 as an appendage to the school of Laozi and Zhuangzi, forgetting that it also represented a metamorphosis of Confucianism. As many people know, Wang Bi was very fond of Laozi, and he elaborated on Daoist philosophy, however, only a minority are also aware of the fact that Wang hardly ever disparaged the way of the sage or actually abandoned the classics. If one studies his entire life, it is possible to say that he was a pure adherent of Daoism, while in truth he also valued Confucianism very much. … in the same way as many Confucian scholars from the Han Dynasty had highly regarded the teaching on *yin* and *yang*, in the Wei-Jin period the study of Confucian classics (*jingxue* 經學) blended into the arcane conversations (*xuantan* 玄談) (see Tang 1943).

Tang's research approach adhered closely to the focal period of time as the main frame of reference, advancing the discussion from the perspectives of textual criticism and argumentation. The very same manner of research was also the main reason why, although the researchers in the field were all well aware of the significance of Tang's work, in the period of the first and the second developmental phases, the main impact of Wei-Jin philosophy was on Taiwan's literary circles. Its influence on philosophical circles was thus inferior to that achieved by the strong emphasis of the realm of human life as conveyed in Mou Zongsan's book *Inborn Human Nature and Xuan Principles*, which became the object of great interest of contemporary scholars.

In the preface to the third Taiwanese edition of this book, Mou Zongsan wrote: "In addition to explicating on the whole story of the journey of 'temperament' (*qixing* 氣性) within the question of human nature, this book focuses on the Wei-Jin period's '*xuan* principles' (*xuanli* 玄理). The '*xuan* principles' as promoted in the period of the Wei and Jin Dynasties were actually the '*xuan* principles' of pre-Qin Daoism." Consequently, the topics within the research scope of the book included human character and ability, Wang Bi's discourse on Laozi and the *Book of Changes*, Xiang Xun's and Guo Xiang's commentaries on Zhuangzi, notable scholars from the Wei-Jin period and the principles of names of the profound learning, the rectification of names of the theory of the principles of names, Ruan Ji, Ji Kang, the discourse on exaltation of being and so on. The gist of the treatise resided in highlighting the Daoist "metaphysics of the forms of spiritual states" (*jingjie xingtai de xingshangxue* 境界形態的形上學), while with regard to the Buddhist scholars of this period, however, Mou pointed out:

The arcane principles (*xuanli* 玄理) and arcane wisdom (*xuanzhi* 玄智) can be regarded as the bridge through which China assimilated Buddhism and made the first contact with its *prajñā* doctrine… it allowed Sengzhao (僧肇) to explain and expound on 'the emptiness of the unreal' and 'the wisdom (*prajñā*) as ignorance' (*bore wuzhi* 般若無知) using the terms of Laozi and Zhuangzi without having to abandon his Buddhist standpoint and become the 'most eminent in understanding emptiness' (*jie kong diyi* 解空第一) (see Mou 1963).

Although its manner of research still emphasized doctrinal argumentation, in so doing it nevertheless particularly accentuated human life, inner spiritual states (*jingjie* 境界, also the "inner realm," "state of mind"), and subjective [moral] effort (*zhuguan gongfu* 主觀功夫), which were all related to the spirit of the period of second stage of development [1971–1987]. In cohesion with the scope of treatises on the history of Chinese philosophy, and dealing with the same perspective, Mou's study jointly predetermined the establishment of the range of Wei-Jin *xuanxue* and Wei-Jin philosophy in the subsequent Taiwanese intellectual circles.

Zhou Shaoxian's monograph *An Account on Pure Conversations of Wei and Jin* was a philosophical work, which was highly significant for thought on the Wei-Jin period in contemporary Taiwanese academia. The special feature of the book was its combining the topic of "pure conversations" with investigations into human character (*renwu* 人物). In addition to this, the book also contains a few other characteristics which distinguished it from other works from the period, which illustrated a contemporary trend in relation to the Jin-Wei era: firstly, the content of the chapter on "On Conversations Beyond the *Three Arcane Treatises*" (*Sanxuan er wai zhi tan* 三玄而外之談) included *yin* and *yang* divination, the Way of the Celestial

Masters (*Tianshi dao* 天師道), Buddhism, the interpretation of dreams and other topics; at the same time, the discussion of another chapter, "Literature in the *Xuanfeng*" (*Xuanfeng zhong zhi wenxue* 玄風中之文學), exhibited a philosophical style which did not discriminate between literary, historical and philosophical forms of enquiry.

In the period of its publication, He Qimin's book *A Study on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove* was the only monograph published in Taiwan dealing with the thought of a particular scholar from this historical period. In the book, aside from probing into the background, ideas and code of conduct of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove from the perspective of a historiographer, He also inquired into their relationships with the contemporary discourse (*tanfeng* 談風). Beside his explanation of the ideal source and historical background of the discourse, another special feature of the book was its articulation of the crucial point that the philosopher Xun Can (荀粲) had been a part of the shift in the discourse of the Wei-Jin period. In the sixth chapter of the book He states:

> What was conversed on in the Wei-Jin discussions were the way of the Heaven (*tian zhi dao* 天之道), the way of the Earth (*di zhi dao* 天之道), and the human way (*tian zhi dao* 人之道) and not Heaven, Earth and humanity. In light of the preceding argumentation, he [Xun Can] made use of these Heavenly, Earthly and human ways deriving them from the form of commentaries and treatises, which was not a mistake. However, in this place I would like to advance a new hypothesis in relation to the content and problems addressed by the discussions, in order to explore the relationships between them and their variations. … Approximately at the time when Xun Can first came to the capital, the subject under discussion at the sittings of the masters changed from human affairs and the appearances of things (*wuxiang* 物象) to the "*li* 理" (the principle, pattern) (He 1966, Ch. 6).

(3) Historiographical Treatises and Specialized Chapters on
     Philosophy

In the period under discussion, the representative works on the history of
Chinese philosophy were the authored by Hu Shi (胡適) and Feng Youlan
(馮友蘭). Apart from those writings, there also existed a slightly less known
yet still quite influential treatise, namely Tang Junyi's (唐君毅) *On the
Origin of Chinese Philosophy: Introduction* (*Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun:
daolun pian* 中國哲學原論：導論篇).

Feng Youlan's *History of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhongguo zhexueshi* 中
國哲學史) was published in 1934. Upon its first publication it was
examined and revised by Chen Yinke (陳寅恪, Chen Yin-ko) and others in
order to be eventually classified as part of the Qinghua Collectanea. The
first edition of the book printed in Hong Kong appeared in 1956. In this
work, the philosophy after the Han Dynasty is listed as the classical period,
whereas the part on *xuanxue,* designated as the *xuanxue* of the Northern and
Southern Dynasties, was given only around 60 pages of discussion. Having
incorporated the *xuanxue* into the classical period, the treatise explained that
figures such as He Yan, Wang Bi, Guo Xiang and others had merely been
commenting on and explaining the thought of Laozi and Zhuangzi. While
from the perspective of the form of the writings this may well have been
correct, with regard to them having been the works of individual thinkers it
neglected the subjectivity of the philosophers of the Wei-Jin period. Aside
from *xuanxue*, the section on Northern and Southern Dynasties also
contained a chapter interpreting the Buddhist philosophy in the same period.

Hu Shi's (胡適, Hu Shih) *A Short Intellectual History of Medieval China*
(*Zhongguo zhonggu sixiang xiaoshi* 中國中古思想小史) was originally a
manuscript of teaching materials, which were written between 1931 and

1932, when Hu was teaching a course on *The Intellectual History of Medieval China* (*Zhongguo zhonggu sixiangshi* 中國中古思想史) at the Institute of Humanities at Beijing University. As far as the period of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties was concerned, Hu transformed one part of it into the first stage of the medieval period, i.e. the period between 200 and 300 CE, while the later part he made into the second stage of the medieval period, that is the period between 300 and 1000 CE. As regards the part on the Wei-Jin *xuanxue* in its narrow sense, the book scarcely devoted any attention to it. It is only mentioned in the seventh chapter, at the conclusion of the discussion of the early medieval stage, where Hu notes:

> (of *xuanxue* scholars from the Wei-Jin period) … and others revered Laozi and Zhuangzi, and subsequently started what the historians refer to as the age of pure conversations (*qingtan* 清談). By having completely adopted the Daoist thought, in discussions on the universe they advocated nature (*ziran* 自然) and worshiped emptiness and nonbeing; in conversations on politics they advocated "letting go and leaving alone" (*fang ren* 放任) and opposed any interference; in their expositions on human life they advocated adaptive freedom and accepting recklessness. … The general atmosphere of the pure conversations was an extremely good preparation for Buddhist thought (Hu 1931–32, Ch. 7).

In 1964, Zhang Qijun (張起鈞) and Wu Yi (吳怡) together published the book *The Story of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhongguo zhexue shihua* 中國哲學史話), which contained four separate chapters on the scholarly thought of the period of Wei-Jin and the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The main aim of the work was to separately enumerate and expound on the ideas of Daoist philosophy (*Daojia* 道家, also "Daoist lineage of the way"), the

religious Daoism (*Daojiao* 道教, also "religious Daoist teachings of the way") and Buddhism in the focal historical period, where the part on Daoist philosophy only discussed Wang Bi and He Yan, leaving out figures such as Ruan Ji, Ji Kang, Guo Xiang and others. Nevertheless, the noteworthy aspect of the work is that it already pays attention to elucidation of the philosophy of religious Daoism from this era.

The main concern of Tang Junyi's treatise on Wei-Jin philosophy was in discussing the concepts *li* 理 ("the principle; pattern") and *ming* 命 ("Heavenly mandate; destiny"). In the aspects discussing *li* 理, Tang maintained that Wei-Jin conversations on the principles of names (*mingli* 名理) constituted a major change in direction for the advancement of Chinese intellectual history. This shift originated in the Han Dynasty custom of non-assessment of human character, which in turn gave rise to theories regarding the difference between "language" (*yan* 言) and "meaning" (*yi* 意, "ideas, thought"), prescribing the concept of *yi* 意 as the nucleus of Wei-Jin philosophy. That is the idea that everything those from the Wei and Jin Dynasties spoke about could be considered the "principles within the meaning" (*yi zhong zhi li* 意中之理), and not the physical principles by which the thing in itself exists. The "principle" (*li* 理) accessible through "meaning" (*yi* 意) was, exceeding by far the principles marking out particular material objects, an intuitively grasped principle. Regarding the concept *ming* 命, Tang focused his discussion on Liezi and Guo Xiang, positing that both spoke about *ming* 命 ("destiny") in terms of "chance" (*yu* 遇, "encounter by coincidence"). With respect to Liezi, Tang emphasized the duality of *li* 力 ("effort; strength, potency") and *ming* 命, asserting that the meaning of the concept of *ming* in Liezi's thought was the

same as the Daoist idea of *ming*, and hence "[It was] the self-drive (*zitui* 自推) and spontaneity (*ziren* 自任 "acting in self-reliance") of everything, and thus more an alternative term for fate's nonexistence (*wuming* 無命)." It embodied the idea of getting rid of and eliminating all "reasons of thusness" (*suoyiran* 所以然, "the way things are, *raison d'être*") and "causes" (*gu* 故). *Ming* 命 thus denoted "whatever is encountered (*yu* 遇) by the human by chance (*yu* 遇), and whatever is not-chanced to be when something is not encountered. It does not further seek that by which something is destined to be so ruled over by. It is an immediate and momentary fate (*ming* 命)."

Although in the first stage, from 1949 to 1970, the abovementioned works did exist, within the initial period of the philosophical awakening the enquiries into Wei-Jin philosophy still constituted only a minority of all publications. On the one hand the reason for this is the relative scarcity of treatises on the history of philosophy, while on the other hand this was so because more attention was still focused on investigations of pre-Qin philosophy.

1.2. The Research Results of the Second Stage

The second stage of development refers to the years between 1971 and 1987. The academic developments of this period constitute a time that saw the maturation of scholarship on the Wei-Jin period. In the following part, I will expound on the results of this stage, as published in the literature, by discussing the articles published in periodicals, monographs, and treatises from this period.

  (1) Journal Articles and Theses

In comparison with the initial period, in quantitative terms there was a significant rise in the number of studies published in the form of journal articles. The number of master's thesis and doctoral dissertations also grew from only two in the first stage, 1949 to 1970, to 15 doctoral dissertations and 37 master's theses. This is a clear sign that in the years from 1971 to 1987 substantial results were yielded by the expansion of university-level education. In the periodicals of this time 139 articles were published, whose titles were in some way related to the Wei-Jin period (*Wei-Jin*). The titles of another 98 articles contained the keywords "Northern and Southern Dynasties" (*Nan-Bei chao*), while altogether 188 articles were published, which were concerned either the Wei-Jin period or the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The articles whose titles mentioned individual figures from the period included: five whose titles mentioned Wang Su, eight mentioning He Yan, 20 on Wang Bi, 20 on Ruan Ji, 10 on Ji Kang, one on Xiang Xiu, 13 on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, nine on Guo Xiang, 18 on Ge Hong, one on Fan Zhen, one on Sun Sheng (孫盛), and two on Tao Hongjing (陶弘景). There were also 11 studies on *Baopuzi* and 10 studies on *Treatise on Human Character and Ability*. Here, I shall separately discuss general overviews of the period and monographs devoted individual figures, as follows:

  (a) General Overviews of the Historical Period

The doctoral dissertations that are of significant importance from this time included Huang Qingxuan's (黃慶萱) *An Investigation into the Lost Studies on the Book of Change from the Period of Wei-Jin and Northern-Southern Dynasties* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao Yixue kaoyi* 魏晉南北朝易學考佚) from

1972, Lin Lizhen's (林麗真) *A Study of the Themes in Wei-Jin Period Pure Conversations* (*Wei-Jin qingtan zhuti yanjiu* 魏晉清談主題研究) from 1977, Li Fengmao's (李豐懋) *The Relationship Between Literati and Religious Daoism in the Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties Period* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao wenshi yu Daojiao zhi guanxi* 魏晉南北朝文士與道教之關係) and Zhang Renqing's (張仁青) *A History of Literary Thought in the Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties Period* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao wenxue sixiang shi lun* 魏晉南北朝文學思想史論) from 1978, Jian Boxian's (簡博賢) *An Investigation into the Lost Records of the Surviving Studies of Confucian Classics from the Three Kingdoms and the Wei-Jin Period* (*Jin cun Sanguo Liang Jin jingxue yiji kao* 今存三國兩晉經學遺籍考) from 1980, and Jiang Jianjun's (江建俊) *A Study on Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue and Xuanfeng of Wei-Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin xuanxue yu xuanfeng zhi yanjiu* 魏晉玄學與玄風之研究) from 1986. Notable Master's theses from 1971 to 1987 included Lu Jianrong's (盧建榮) *Ideas of Nature in the Wei-Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin ziran sixiang* 魏晉自然思想) from 1980 and Yan Guoming's (顏國明) *A Study on Confluence of Confucian and Daoist Thought in the Wei-Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin Ru-Dao huitong sixiang yanjiu* 魏晉儒道會通思想研究) from 1986. In the same period, there was also a gradual increase in studies on aesthetics and art.

In the category of journal articles, in 1978 Li Fengshu article "The Relation between Tales about Laozi and the Immortals of the Religious Daoism in the Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin Laozi shenhua yu shenxian Daojiao zhi guanxi* 魏晉老子神話與神仙道教之關係) and Lin Xianting's (林顯庭) "Twenty Major Titles of Wei-Jin Pure Conversations – *Xuan*" (*Wei-Jin qingtan ershi da mingti* — Xuan 魏晉清談二十大名題—玄). In 1981, Mou

Zongsan published his "Eleventh Lecture on the Outline of Chinese Philosophy and Its Implicit Problems: Themes in Wei-Jin *Xuanxue* and the Content and Value of Its *Xuan* Principle" (*Zhongguo zhexue zhi jianshu yu qi suo yunhan de wenti di shiyi jiang: Wei-Jin xuanxue de zhuti jiqi xuanli neirong yu jiazhi* 中國哲學之簡述與其所蘊涵的問題第十一講：魏晉玄學的主題以及玄理內容與價值). In 1983, He Qimin published his article "Thought and Gentry Mentality in the Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin sixiang yu shizu xintai* 魏晉思想與士族心態). In 1985, Wu Meng (吳甿) published his essay entitled "Discourse on Language and Meaning and Principles of Names in the Wei-Jin Period" (*Yan yi zhi bian yu Wei-Jin mingli* 言意之辨與魏晉名理) (1-7), and Zhou Shaoxian published his article "Did the Flourishing of *Xuanfeng* in the Wei-Jin Period Affect Confucianism?" (*Wei-Jin xuanfeng xingsheng shifou dui Ruxue you yingxiang* 魏晉玄風興盛是否對儒學有影響). And in 1986 Cai Huiming (蔡惠明) published the article "Buddhism in the Time of the Wei and Jin Dynasties" (*Wei-Jin shidai de Foxue* 魏晉時代的佛學), and in 1987 Chen Chibin (陳熾彬) published his paper "An Analysis of Character Judgment in Wei and Jin Dynasties" (*Wei-Jin renwu pinjian yanxi* 魏晉人物品鑒研析). These works indicate that the topics of interest in academic circles during these years included pure conversations, the discourse on the difference between language and meaning, the principles on names, *xuanfeng* 玄風 (often translated as "mysterious/profound movement") and mentality of the gentry. At the same time, it can also be discovered that in addition to the *xuanxue* of the Wei-Jin period, some attention was also paid to the relationship between *xuanxue* and Buddhism, religious Daoism and Confucianism, as well as the concept of "nature" (*ziran* 自然).

(b) Studies of the Thought of Individual Figures

In 1973, Lin Lizhen submitted his doctoral dissertation entitled *Wang Bi and His Learning of the Book of Changes* (*Wang Bi jiqi Yixue* 王弼及其易學). Other notable master's theses from the period included: Xiao Dengfu's (蕭登福) *A Study about Ji Kang* (*Ji Kang yanjiu* 嵇康研究) from 1974, Jiang Jianjun's *A Study on Liu Shao's Treatise on Human Character and Ability* (*Liu Shao Renwu zhi yanjiu* 劉劭人物志研究) from 1975, Xu Lixia's (徐麗霞) *A Study on Ruan Ji* (*Ruan Ji yanjiu* 阮籍研究) from 1979, Zheng Huanzhong's (鄭煥鍾) *A Study on Guo Xiang's Thought* (*Guo Xiang sixiang yanjiu* 郭象思想研究) from 1984, and Yu Baobei's (余寶貝) *A Study on Ruan Ji* (*Ruan Ji yanjiu* 阮籍研究) from 1985.

The most representative journal articles from the time were those concerned with Wang Su, including Huang Qingxuan's article "Wang Su and His Commentary on the *Book of Changes*" (*Wang Su jiqi Zhouyi zhu* 王肅及其周易注) published in 1972, Li Zhenxing's (李振興) article "An Overview of Wang Su's Study of Classics" (*Wang Su zhi jingxue gaishu* 王肅之經學概述) from 1977, Jian Boxian's "Wang Su's Studies of the *Book of Rites* and His Essential Points of Criticism against Zheng Xuan" (*Wang Su Liji xue jiqi nan Zheng dayi* 王肅禮記學及其難鄭大義) from 1981, and Huang Zhongshen's (黃忠慎) "An Investigation into Zheng Xuan's and Wang Su's View on Deities" (*Zheng Xuan, Wang Su tianshenguan de tantao* 鄭玄王肅天神觀的探討) from 1986. Articles on Wang Bi included Cai Meizhu's (蔡美珠) "Analysing Wang Bi's Notion of 'Nonbeing' through a Comparison with Laozi's Idea of 'Nonbeing'" (*Wang Bi zhi "wu" touguo Laozi zhi "wu" wei bijiao fenxi* 王弼之「無」透過老子之「無」為比較分析) from 1971, Jian Boxian's "A Study on Wang Bi's Learning

on the *Book of Changes*" (*Wang Bi Yixue yanjiu* 王弼易學研究) from 1979. In the same year, the article "Chinese Philosophers – Wang Bi" (*Zhongguo zhexujia* – Wang Bi 中國哲學家一王弼) was published in the *Zhexue wenhua* 哲學文化 journal. In 1980, Lin Congshun (林聰舜) published the article entitled "Realisations about Confucius and Laozi in Wang Bi's Commentary on the *Book of Changes*" (*Wang Bi Yi zhu dui Kong Lao zhi tiren* 王弼易注對孔老之體認), while 1984 saw the publication of Li Zeng's (李增) "The Metaphysics of Wang Bi" (*Wang Bi zhi xingshanxue* 王弼之形上學) and Zhang Chengqiu's (張成秋) "Nonbeing and Namelessness in Wang Bi's Learning on Laozi" (*Wang Bi Laoxue zhi wu yu wuming* 王弼老學之無與無名) and "The Way and Nonbeing in Wang Bi's Learning on Laozi" (*Wangbi Laoxue zhi dao yu wu* 王弼老學之道與無). Studies on He Yan included Su Xinwu's (蘇新鋈) "A Tentative Discussion on the True Meaning of He Yan's Idea of the Absence of Four Types of Emotions in a Sage" (*Shilun He Yan shengren wu xinuaile zhi zhenyi* 試論何晏無喜怒哀樂之真義) from 1973, Jian Boxian's "He Yan and His Explanation of the *Book of Change*" (*He Yan jiqi Zhouyi* jie 何晏及其周易解) from 1979, Wu Wanju's (吳萬居) "Ideas from Laozi and Zhuangzi in He Yan's *Collected Explanations to the Analects*" (*He Yan Lunyu jijie zhong zhi Lao-Zhuang sixiang* 何晏論語集解中之老莊思想) from 1984, and Gao Lifen's (高莉芬) "*Xuanxue* Thought in He Yan's *Collected Explanations to the Analects* (*He Yan Lunyu jijie zhong zhi xuanxue sixiang* 何晏論語集解中之玄學思想) from 1986. Only one study was published on Xiang Xiu between 1971 and 1987, namely, "A Philosophical *Shuowen jiezi* – The Chinese Philosopher Xiang Xiu" (*Zhexue Shuowen jiezi – Zhongguo zhexuejia Xiang Xiu* 哲學說文解字一

中國哲學家向秀). Studies on Ruan Ji included: Huang Jinhong's (黃錦鋐) "Ruan Ji and His 'Understanding the *Zhuangzi*'" (*Ruan Ji he ta de "Da Zhuang lun*" 阮籍和他的「達莊論」) and Chen Fangji's (陳芳基) "A Study on Ruan Ji" (*Ruan Ji yanjiu* 阮籍研究) from 1977, the article "Chinese Philosophers – Ruan Ji" published in the *Zhexue wenhua* 哲學文化 journal in 1981, and Su Junhua's (蘇俊華) "A Study on Ruan Ji's Thought and His Seventeen 'Poems Expressing My Feelings'" (*Ruanji sixiang he ta de shiqi shou "Yonghuai shi" yanjiu* 阮籍和他的十七首詠懷詩研究) from 1982. Studies on Ji Kang included Zhang Huoqing's (張火慶) "A Discussion on Ji Kang" (*Ji Kang lun* 嵇康論) from 1978, Li Fengmao's "Studies on Ji Kang's Thought on Nurturing Life" (*Ji Kang yangsheng sixiang zhi yanjiu* 嵇康養生思想之研究) from 1979, He Qimin's "Ji Kang – One of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove" (*Ji Kang – Zhulin qixian zhiyi* 嵇康一竹林七賢之一) from 1980, and Zhuang Wanshou's (莊萬壽) "An Account on Ancestors and the Clan of Ji Kang" (*Ji Kang xianshi ji jiazu kaoshu* 嵇康先世及家族考述) from 1981. In these years, the only studies on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove were He Qimin's article "The Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove and the Political Situation during the Wei-Jin Period" (*Zhulin qixian yu Wei-Jin zhengju* 竹林七賢與魏晉政局) from 1974. Articles on Guo Xiang included: Liao Minghuo's (廖明活) "Analysis on Guo Xiang's Parallel Use of Confucian Teachings in his Commentaries on *Zhuangzi*" (*Zhuangzi Guo Xiang zhu canyon Ru yi zhi fenxi* 莊子郭象注參用儒義之分析) from 1983, Jiang Jianjun's "Guo Xiang's Metaphysical Thought" (*Guo Xiang zhi xingshang sixiang* 郭象形上思想) and Fu Weixun's (傅偉勳) "Lao-Zhuang, Guo Xiang and Chan Buddhism" (*Lao-Zhuang, Guo Xiang yu Chanzong* 老莊、

郭象與禪宗) from 1985, and Xie Daning's (謝大寧) "On Guo Xiang's and Zhidun's Teaching on Carefree Wandering and the Origins of the Theories of Zhidun" (*Lun Guo Xiang yu Zhidun zhi xiaoyou yi ji Zhidun yi zhi yuanyuan* 論郭象與支遁之逍遙義及支遁義之淵源) from 1987. The works on Ge Hong from 1971 to 1987 included You Xinxiong's (尤信熊) "Ge Hong's Confucian Thought" (*Ge Hong de Rujia sixiang* 葛洪的儒家思想) from 1977 and Lu Jianrong's "Ge Hong – A Social Critic from the Mountains and Forests" (*Ge Hong – Shanlin zhong de shehui pipingzhe* 葛洪一山林中的社會批評者) from 1979, as well as Lin Lixue's series of articles entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Inner Chapters of the *Baopuzi* – Studies of Ge Hong" (*Baopuzi neipian sixiang xilun – Ge Hong yanjiu* 抱樸子內篇思想析論一葛洪研究) (1-3) published between 1977 and 1980. Studies on Fan Zhen included Chen Guying's (陳鼓應) "Fan Zhen's Treatise on Mortality of the Human Soul" (*Fan Zhen de Shenmie lun* 範縝的神滅論). Studies on the *Baopuzi* were Feng Shangli's (封尚禮) "Baopuzi's View on the Universe" (*Baopuzi de yuzhou* guan 抱樸子的宇宙觀) from 1973, You Xinxiong's "Daoist Thought of Baopuzi" (*Baopuzi de Daojiao sixiang* 抱樸子的道教思想) and Lin Lixue's series of texts entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Inner Chapters of the *Baopuzi*" (*Baopuzi neipian sixiang xilun* 抱樸子內篇思想析論) (1-3) published between the years 1977 and 1980. Moreover, papers on the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* included Peng Zhenqiu's (彭震球) "The Principal Argument of the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* and Its Time-Related Background" (*Renwu zhi lunzhi jiqi shidai beijing* 人物志論旨及其時代背景) from 1971, and Yan Changfan's (顏承繁) "The Value of the

Treatise on Human Character and Ability in the Context of the Learning of Human Nature" (*Renwu zhi zai renxingxue shang zhi jiazhi* 人物志在人性學上之價值) from 1979.

Judging from the research approach of these journal articles, and aside from the increase in number, we can also find that they show a great diversity of research topics. This was the case not only with regard to studies of individual figures, extending to the scholars of *xuan* learning from the Wei-Jin period, but also at the level of the topics under discussion, where there was an increase in studies of religious Daoism, as well as questions related to the notions of "nourishing life" (*yangsheng* 養生) and the relationship between body and soul (*xing-shen* 形神) in the *xuanxue*. In addition, there was also an increase in the number of papers dealing with comparative issues.

(2) Monographs

Among the principal monographs was Lu Jianrong's work *Ideas of Nature in the Wei-Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin ziran sixiang* 魏晉自然思想) from 1970. In the introduction, Lu divided the thought of the Wei-Jin period into seven major schools. He further explained that the scope of his investigation into the concept *ziran* 自然 covered the scholars Wang Bi, Guo Xiang and Zhang Zhan (張湛), who possessed a theoretical interest in the concept. These three figures were considered to have belonged to the same category, their common point being that they all considered "the domain of the artificial (*renwei* 人爲) to be included within the domain of the nature (*ziran* 自然) ." In their philosophy, the notion of "nature" (*ziran*) denoted "what enables things to be such by themselves." Subsumed into the other category of scholars were Ruan Ji and Ji Kang, whose definition of "nature" (*ziran*) was

"only the self-so of the objects opposite to those made by humans (*renwei* 人爲, 'artificial')."

In 1971, the Muduo Publishing House published the book *Nature and Ethical Formalism* (*Ziran yu Mingjiao* 自然與名教). This work primarily treats "nature" (*ziran*) and "ethical formalism" (*Mingjiao*) as one pair of philosophical concepts, probing into the sources of their original ideas. The main idea of the book lies in shedding some light on how the though in the Wei-Jin period underwent a transformation from "ethical formalism" to "nature."

The year 1978 saw the publication of the monograph *Ancient Chinese Thinkers – Ji Kang, Wang Bi, Ge Hong, Guo Xiang, Daoan, Huiyuan, Zhu Daosheng, Kou Qianzhi* (*Zhongguo lidai sixiangjia – Ji Kang, Wang Bi, Ge Hong, Guo Xiang, Daoan, Huiyuan, Zhu Daozheng, Kou Qianzhi* 中國歷代思想家一嵇康、王弼、郭象、道安、慧遠、竺道生、寇謙之). In 1980, Lin Congshun's *A Study on Xiang Xiu's and Guo Xiang's Learning on Zhuangzi* (*Xiang Guo Zhuangxue zhi yanjiu* 向郭莊學之研究) was published, while 1987 saw Jian Boxian's *An Investigation into the Lost Records of the Surviving Studies of Confucian Classics from the Three Kingdoms and the Wei-Jin Period* (*Jin cun Sanguo Liang Jin jingxue yiji kao* 今存三國兩晉經學遺籍考). The special feature of the book resided in it pointing out the fact that, in the era under discussion, the exegesis of Confucian classics had changed in accordance with the "*xuan* principles" (*xuanli*). In 1982, Jiang Jianjun published *The Learning of the Seven Masters of the Jian'an Era* (*Jian'an Qizi xueshu* 建安七子學術), while Tao Jianguo's (陶建國) *Daoist Thought in the Two Han Dynasties and the Wei-Jin Period* (*Liang Han Wei-Jin zhi Daojia sixiang* 兩漢魏晉之道家思想) was first published in 1987.

A noteworthy treatise on a special topic was Jiang Jianjun's *The General Principles of Human Character Appraisal in the Late Han Dynasty* (*Hanmo renlun jianshi zhi zonglize* 漢末人倫鑑識之總理則), from 1984. This book was primarily aimed at studying Liu Shao's *Treatise on Human Character and Ability*, and its methodological principles related to the theory of governance and learning about people by observation (*zhi ren guan ren* 知 人觀人), and further critically analyses the theory and techniques of its discourse on these matters. At the same time, the book also divides the philosophical thought of the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* into those aspects considering ontology, epistemology, theory of inherent human nature, and theory of moral self-cultivation. The work represents a necessary key-reference for studies on the work *Treatise on Human Character and Ability.*

(3) Works on the History of Philosophy

In the category of works on the history of philosophy, three representative publication can be listed: the first is Lao Siguang's (勞思光) *Balanced Inquiries into Philosophy* (*Zhexue lunheng* 哲學論衡), the second Luo Guang's (羅光) *History of Chinese Philosophical Thought* (*Zhongguo zhexue sixiang shi* 中國哲學思想史), and the third Wei Zhengtong's (韋政 通) *History of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhongguo zhexue shi* 中國哲學史).

The second volume of Lao Siguang's *History of Chinese Philosophy* (*Zhongguo zhexue shi* 中國哲學史) was completed in 1971, although only about 40 pages are devoted to the discussion of Wei-Jin period *xuanxue*. Lao maintained that the thought in this period could hardly be regarded as "learning" (*xue* 學) in the strictest sense, although an exposition on this

period was essential for the "history of philosophy" (*zhexue shi* 哲學史). The distinguishing feature of the book resides in its approach towards discriminating between and analysing the concepts of inherent human nature and the principles of names by means of question forms and philosophical concepts. The section of the book devoted to Buddhism focusses on linking together the original Buddhism with the Buddhist scholarship from the Sui and Tang Dynasties, and does not make the key figures from Wei and Jin Dynasties and Northern and Southern Dynasties the principle axis of its exposition on the topic.

The part of Luo Guang's *History of Chinese Philosophy* concerned with the period of Early and Late Han Dynasty and the Northern and Southern Dynasties was first published in 1978. The volume on the Wei-Jin period and Sui and Tang Dynasties, on the other hand, was published in 1980. Luo discussed Daoism from the Six Dynasties period separately from the Buddhist thought of the Wei-Jin period and Northern and Southern Dynasties. While his exposition on the former occupies only about 80 pages, the discussion of the later extends over approximately 112, which, in the context of this monumental work, can still be considered quite simplified and reduced in form. Its main proposition was that "Daoist thought constituted the principal ideology of the period of Northern and Southern Dynasties, whereas the Daoist school from the time had not anymore been the pure Lao-Zhuang thought. Blended with the theories of *yin* and *yang* and the five agents (*wuxing* 五行), it transitioned from Laozi's emphasis on the formless (*wuxing* 無形) *dao* 道 down to paying special attention to the material (*youxing* 有形) *qi* 氣" (Luo 1978, 601). He further noted that "Due to a fashionable trend propagated amidst the scholars of the Wei-Jin period and Northern and Southern Dynasties, Confucian and Daoist thought were

rendered compatible with each other. The same trend had further made Buddhist thought conform with Daoist thought, and finally also caused Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism to unite within a single person" (ibid., 647). For to this reason, the discussion on thinkers from Wei–Jun era also encompassed Ge Hong, something rarely encountered in the historical accounts of Chinese philosophy from this time.

Wei Zhengtong's *Chinese Intellectual History* (*Zhongguo sixiangshi* 中國思想史) was published in 1985. In comparison with other contemporary works on the history of Chinese philosophy, the discussion in the book paid considerable attention to the thinkers from the period of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties. While the most impressive part of the book is its exposition on Fan Zhen's theory of immortality of the human soul, its weakest feature is related to its failure to expound on Ge Hong as an important thinker from the period.

1.3. The Research Results of the Third Stage

The period between the years 1988 and 2000 was one in which studies on Wei-Jin philosophy entered a phase of vigorous development.

(1) Journal Articles and Theses

In this period, there was a great surge in the number of journal articles. The main reason for this is simply that in Taiwanese academic circles of the day great importance was attached to research into the Wei-Jin period and the Northern and Southern Dynasties. Another reason was the frequency of academic exchanges between the island and mainland China, which, apart from causing an increase in the number of articles by scholars from the mainland being submitted to and published in Taiwanese periodicals, also stimulated the rapid growth in the publication of academic papers general.

Although in counting the research results published in Taiwan in this period I have also included those by scholars from the mainland, in the subsequent discussion of the most representative and significant research results from the period, I shall list only those published by scholars and postgraduate students from Taiwan. In the period from 1988 to 2000, a total of 40 doctoral dissertations and 146 master's theses were submitted in Taiwan.

Among the journal articles, 201 titles contain the keyword "Wei-Jin," whereas 102 include "Northern and Southern Dynasties" (*Nan-Bei chao*). Thus, in total, 249 article titles have either the words Wei-Jin or Northern and Southern Dynasties in them. Of those journal publications issued only between the years 1991 and 2000, 239 contain keywords related to the Wei-Jin period. Treatises whose titles mention individual figures from the period include five mentioning Wang Su, three on Fu Xuan (傅玄), one on Zhong Hui (鍾會), 12 on He Yan, 62 on Wang Bi, 23 on Ruan Ji, 33 on Ji Kang, three on the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove, four on Pei Wei (裴頠), six on Xiang Xiu, 24 on Guo Xiang, 15 on Ge Hong, two on Fan Zhen, five on Zhi Daolin, 18 on Daoan (道安), 10 on Zhu Daosheng (竺道生), 16 on Sengzhao, 18 on Huiyuan, four on Tao Hongjing, and two on Sun Sheng. In addition, there were also 16 studies on *Baopuzi* and 11 studies devoted to the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability.*

(a)   General Introductions to the Period or Studies on Specific Topics
The few doctoral dissertations whose research was of considerable significance include Xiao Zhenbang's (蕭振邦) *A Meta-Aesthetical Discussion of the Extent of Confucian and Daoist Aesthetics from the Pre-Qin to the Wei-Jin Period* (*Cong houtou meixue lun Xian-Qin zhi Wei-Jin Ru Dao meixue guimo* 從後頭美學論先秦至魏晉儒道美學規模) from

1989, Lin Chaocheng's（林朝成）*A Study on Views on Nature and Aesthetics of Nature in the Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue* (*Wei-Jin xuanxue de ziran guan yu ziran meixue yanjiu* 魏晉玄學的自然觀與自然美學研究) from 1990, Lin Dengshun's (林登順) *A Critical Examination of Currents and Developments in Confucianism of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao Ruxue liubian zhi xingcha* 魏晉南北朝儒學流變之省察) from 1995, Wu Guanhong's（吳冠宏）*Reexploring Discourses on Xuan and Scholarly Customs in the Wei-Jin Period – With the Concept "Qing" as the Connective and Interpretative Approach* (*Wei-Jin xuanlun yu shifeng xintan – yi "qing" wei weihe ji quanshi jinlu* 魏晉玄論與士風新探一以「情」為縮合及詮釋進路) from 1996, and Li Lingzhu's (李玲珠) *A Study in the Trend of Thought on Nature in the Wei-Jin Period* (*Wei-Jin ziran sichao yanjiu* 魏晉自然思潮研究) from 1999. The notable master's theses of the 1990's include Zhou Daxing's (周大興) *A Study on the Question of Relationship between Nature and Ethical Formalism in the Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue* (*Wei-Jin xuanxue zhong ziran yu mingjiao guanxi wenti yanjiu* 魏晉玄學中自然與名教關係問題研究) from 1989, Liu Shengxiang's (劉繩向) *The Wei-Jin Discourse on Language and Meaning and Wei-Jin Period Aesthetics* (*Wei-Jin yan yi zhi bian yu Wei-Jin meixue* 魏晉言意之辨與魏晉美學) from 1991, Zhang Chaoran's (張超然) *A Study on The Method of Visualisation in School of Supreme Purity in Religious Daoism from the Six Dynasties Period* (*Liu Chao Daojiao Shangqing jingpai cunsifa yanjiu* 六朝道教上清經派存思法研究) and Song Longfei's (宋隆斐) *Focusing on the One and Concentration the Thoughts – Initial Exploration of Exchange of Ideas between Buddhism and Daoism in the Six Dynasties Period* (*Shouyi yu shouyi – Liu Chao Fo-Dao*

sixiang jiaoliu chutan 守一與守意一六朝佛道思想交流初探) from 1998,
Zheng Qiyu's (鄭琪玉) *A Study on the Idea of Heavenly Book in Numinous
Treasure Texts From the Six Dynasties Period* (*Liu Chao Lingbao tianshu
guannian zhi yanjiu* 六朝靈寶天書觀念之研究), Xu Limei's (許麗美) *A
Comparison between the Idea "Consciousness" in Consciousness Only
Learning and the Idea of "Soul" in Theory of Immortality of the Human
Soul from the Six Dynasties Period* (*Weishixue zhi "shi" yu Liu Chao
shenbumie lun zhi "shen" de bijiao* 唯識學之「識」與六朝神不滅論之
「神」的比較), Lin Liling's (林莉翎) *A Study on the Concept of Visible
Form of Objects in the Six Dynasties Period* (*Liu Chao wuse guannian
yanjiu* 六朝物色觀念研究) and Huang Mingcheng's (黃明誠) *A Study on
the Theory of Inborn Human Nature in the Wei-Jin and Northern and
Southern Dynasties* (*Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao caixinglun yanjiu* 魏晉南北朝
才性論研究) from 1999, and Guo Guotai's (郭國泰) *A Study on the
Relationship Between Body and Soul in Six Dynasties Aesthetics* (*Liu Chao
meixue zhong xing-shen guanxi zhi yanjiu* 六朝美學中形神關係之研究)
from 2000.

The most representative publications in the category of journal articles
were Pu Muzhou's (蒲慕州) article "Daoist Immortals and High Monks –
An Essay on the Religious Mentality of the Wei-Jin and Northern and
Southern Dynasties" (*Shenshan yu gaoseng – Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao
zongjiao xintai shitan* 神山與高僧一魏晉南北朝宗教心態試探), Tang
Ximing's "A Look on the Content of the Wei-Jin Pure Conversations from
the Perspective from the Tales of the World" (Cong *Shishuo* kan Wei-Jin
qingtan zhi neirong 從世說看魏晉清談之內容) (1-2), and Zeng Chunhai's
(曾春海) "An Exploration of the Essence of Wei-Jin Polemics on Nature

and Ethical Formalism" (*Wei-Jin ziran yu mingjiao zhi zheng tanyi* 魏晉自然與名教之爭探義), all from 1990. In 1991, Lin Xianting published an article entitled "On the Theory of Four Roots of Human Nature from the Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin shidai de caixing siben lun* 魏晉時代的才性四本論), while in 1993 Xin Qi (辛旗) published "The *Prajñā* Doctrine and Six Schools and Seven Lineages under the Wei-Jin Period *Xuanxue*" (*Wei-Jin xuanxue xia de borexue yu Liujia Qizong* 魏晉玄學下的般若學與六家七宗). 1994 saw Lin Ruihan's (林瑞翰) "Wei-Jin Period Confucianism" (*Wei-Jin de Ruxue* 魏晉儒學), and the next year Zhuang Yaolang's (莊燿郎) "A Critical Analysis of Wei-Jin Period Anti-*Xuan* Thought" (*Wei-Jin fan-xuan sixiang xilun* 魏晉反玄思想析論). In 1996 Chen Xiuhui (陳秀慧) published "On the Common Practice of Concocting Magical Powders in the Time of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties" (*Lun Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao fusan zhi fengqi* 論魏晉南北朝服散之風氣). 1997 then saw the publication of Xie Yueling's (謝月玲) "Re-examining the Term "*Xuan*-ization of Confucian Studies of Classics" and the Meaning Behind Its Phenomenon" (*Dui jingxue xuanxuehua yici yu qi xianxiang beihou yiyi zhi chongshen* 對經學玄學化一詞與其現象背後意義之重審), Liu Jiancheng's (劉見成) "Body-Soul and Life-Death – The Polemics on Body and Soul from the Time of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties" (*Xingshen yu shengsi – Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao shiqi de xing-shen zhi zheng* 形神與生死—魏晉南北朝時期的形神之爭), Zhuang Yaolang's "Probing into the Aesthetics of the Human Body in the Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin xingti meixue shilun* 魏晉形體美學試論), and Zeng Meiyun's (曾美雲) "Education Thought in Wei-Jin Period *Xuanxue* and Its Distinguishing Features" (*Wei-Jin xuanxue zhong de jiaoyu sixiang jiqi tese* 魏晉玄學中

的教育思想及其特色). In 1998, Zeng Chunhai's "Retrospective and Prospect of Wei-Jin Period *Xuanxue* and Past 50 Years of Research in Taiwan" (W*ei-Jin xuanxue ji Taiwan jin wushi nian lai yanjiu zhi huigu yu zhanwang* 魏晉玄學及台灣近五十年來研究之回顧與展望) and Cai Zhongdao's (蔡忠道) "On the Teachings on Sages in Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin de shengren lun* 魏晉的聖人論) were published. In 1999, Ye Haiyan published the article "The Modern Meaning of the Theory of Human Nature in the *Xuanxue*" (*Xuanxue renxinglun de xiandai yiyi* 玄學人性論的現代意義), and, in 2000, Liu Guijun published "Development of Buddhist Thought in the Wei-Jin Period" (*Wei-Jin Foxue sixiang zhi kaizhan* 魏晉佛學思想之開展).

(b) Studies on Individual Figures

The most relevant doctoral dissertations from the period were Zhuang Yaolang's *Wang Bi's Learning on Xuan* (*Wang Bi Xuanxue* 王弼玄學) from 1991, Guo Lihua's (郭梨華) *A Critical Analysis of Wang Bi's Question of "Nature and Ethical Formalism"* (*Wang Bi "ziran-mingjiao" wenti zhi tanxi* 王弼「自然一名教」問題之探析) from 1994, Zhou Daxing's *Wang Bi's Xuanxue and the Evolution of Concept of Ethical Formalism in Wei-Jin Period* (*Wang Bi Xuanxue yu Wei-Jin mingjiao guannian de yanbian* 王弼玄學與魏晉名教觀念的演變) from 1995, Cai Zhenfeng's *An Investigation into the Question of Matching Meanings in Wei-Jin Period Buddhism – A Study Focused on Daoan* (*Wei-Jin Foxue geyi wenti de kaocha – yi Daoan wen zhongxin de yanjiu* 魏晉佛學格義問題的考察—以道安為中心的研究), Lu Guizhen's (盧桂珍) *Studies of Huiyuan's and Senghzhao's Learning on Sages* (*Huiyuan, Sengzhao shengrenxue yanjiu* 慧

遠、僧肇聖人學研究) from 1998, and Zhong Zhulian's (鍾竹連) *A Study on the Thought of Guo Xiang* (*Guo Xiang sixiang yanjiu* 郭象思想研究) from 1999. The most significant master's theses from the period include Zheng Abi's (鄭阿碧) *Studies on the Thought of the Fan Zhen's Theory of Mortality of the Human Soul* (*Fan Zhen shenmielun sixiang yanjiu* 範縝神滅論思想研究) and Xu Lizhen's (徐麗真) *Musical Aesthetics of Ji Kang's "Non-Emotiveness of Musical Sounds"* (*Ji Kang "sheng wu aile lun" zhi yinyue meixue* 嵇康「聲無哀樂論」之音樂美學) from 1990, along with Chen Lijun's (陳黎君) *Exploring the Meaning of the Concept of Nature in Guo Xiang's System of Philosophy* (*Guo Xiang zhexue tixi zhong ziran gainian zhi tanyi* 郭象哲學體系中自然概念之探義) from 1997.

Among the most representative and significant journal articles from the period are one on Wang Su, namely Huang Zhixiang's (黃志祥) "A Historical Outline of the Polemics between the Zheng Xuan's and Wang Su's Schools of Learning" (*Zhengxuan xue, Wang Su xue zhi zheng shilüe* 鄭玄學、王肅學之爭史略) published in 1991, and Yang Jinlong's (楊晉龍) "The Reign of the Gods and the Reign of the Sage – An Exploration into Zheng Xuan's and Wang Su's Diverging Interpretations of "the Doctrine of Miraculous Birth" (*Shentong yu shengtong – Zheng Xuan Wang Su "gansheng shuo" yi jie tanyi* 神統與聖統—鄭玄王肅「感生說」異解探義) from 1993. Studies on Fu Xuan included Chen Huiling's (陳惠玲) "Fu Xuan and the Germination of the Anti-Xuan Thought" (*Fu Xuan yu fan-xuan sixiang de mengfa* 傅玄與反玄思想的萌發) from 1999, and Zhang Beibei's (張蓓蓓) "Exploring the Mysteries of Master Fu" (*Fuzi tanze* 傅子探賾) from 2000. On Wang Bi 1988 saw Lin Lizhen's "On Laozi in Wang Bi's *Resolving Problems in Interpreting Analects*" (Wang Bi *Lunyu*

shiyi zhong de Laozi yi 王弼論語釋疑中的老子義), while 1991 brought Dai Lianzhang's (戴璉璋) "On Profound Thinking in Wang Bi's Learning on the *Book of Changes*" (*Wang Bi Yixue zhong de xuansi* 王弼易學中的玄思), 1994 Zhuang Yaolang's "An Examination of Wang Bi's Theory of Compatibility between Confucianism and Daoism" (*Wang Bi Ru-Da huitong lilun de xingcha* 王弼儒道會通理論的省察), 1995 Huang Zhongtian's (黃忠天) "The Scholarly Background and Value of an Incomplete Scroll of Wang Bi's Commentaries on the *Book of Changes* from Dunhuang" (*Dunhuang Zhouyi Wang Bi zhu canjuan de xueshu Beijing yu jiazhi* 敦煌周易王弼注殘卷的學術背景的價值), 1997 both Yan Guoming's "From the Theory of Complying with Schemes of Power to Doctrine of the Truth of the Principles of Suchness: On the Differences in Ideographic Stiles of Laozi and Wang Bi" (*Cong ying jiquan shuo zhi ru li shi shuo: Laozi yu Wang Bi zai biaoyi fangshi shang de chayi* 從應幾權說到如理實說：老子與王弼在表意方式上的差異) and Tang Yiming's (唐翼明) "Discussing the Guiding Principles and Discursive Strategies in Wei-Jin *Xuanxue* from Wang Bi's Answer to Pei Hui" (*Cong Wang Bi da Pei Hui wen lun Wei-Jin xuanxue de gangling yu lunshu celüe* 從王弼答裴徽問論魏晉玄學的綱領與論述策略). Further significant works on Wang Bi from this decade include Zeng Chunhai's "Comparing Wang Bi's *Book of Changes* and Cheng Yi's Commentary on *Book of Changes* and Ontology" (*Bijiao Wang Bi Zhouyi yu Cheng Yi de Yi zhu ji bentilun* 比較王弼周易與程頤的易注及本體論) from 1998, and Du Baorui's (杜保瑞) "An Investigation into Wang Bi's Philosophical Method" (*Wang Bi zhexue de fangfalun tanjiu* 王弼哲學的方法論探究) from 1999, while 2000 saw the publication of Zhou Daxing's "Wang Bi's Discourse on the Proximity of

Human Nature in 'Naturalization of Feeling'" (*Wang Bi "xing qi qing" de renxing yuanjin lun* 王弼性其情的人性遠近論), Lin Lizhen's "The Basic Differences between Wang Bi's *Xuanxue* and Huang-Lao Learning" (*Wang Bi xuanxue yu Huang-Lao xue de jiben qiyi* 王弼玄學與黃老學的基本歧異), and Cai Zhenfeng's "Interpretational Methods of Yan Zun's, Heshang Gong's and Wang Bi's Commentaries on Laozi and Their Explanations of the Way" (*Yan Zun, Heshang Gong, Wang Bi sanjia Laozi zhu de quanshi fangfa jiqi dui dao de lijie* 嚴遵、河上公、王弼三家老子注的詮釋方法及其對道的理解). With regard to doctoral dissertations on He Yan, 1997 saw Wu Guanhong's "A Tentative Interpretation of He Yan's Theory of Non-Emotivity – With a Parallel Discussion on the Polemics on Wang Bi's Theory of Emotionality of Sages" (*He Yan wuqing shuo shijie – jian lun guanyu Wang Bi shengren youqing shuo zhi zhengyi* 何晏無情說試解—兼論關於王弼聖人有情說之爭議), while Zhou Daxing's "A New Discussion on He Yan's *Xuanxue*" (*He Yan xuanxue xinlun* 何晏玄學新論) was published in 1999. Studies on Xiang Xiu included Wu Ming's (吳明) "Wang Bi's, Xiang Xiu's and Guo Xiang's 'Discourse on Natural Morals'" (*Wang Bi, Xiang, Guo zhi "ziran daode lun"* 王弼、向、郭之「自然道德論」) from 1997, and Wang Shuhui's (王書輝) article "Collated Compilation of Xiang Xiu's *Commentary on Zhuangzi*" (*Xiang Xiu Zhuangzi zhu jijiao* 向秀莊子注輯校) from 1999. Studies on Ruan Ji included Gao Boyuan's (高柏園) "The Aesthetic Awareness in Ruan Ji's 'Treatise on Music'" (*Ruan Ji "Yue lun" de meixue yishi* 阮籍樂論的美學意識) from 1992, Dai Lianzhang's "Ruan Ji's View on Nature" (*Ruan Ji de ziran guan* 阮籍的自然觀), and Zhou Daxing's "A Critical Appraisal of Confucian and Daoist Concept of Human Temperament in Ruan Ji's

'Treatise on Music'" (*Ruan Ji "Yue lun" de Ru-Dao xingge pingyi* 阮籍樂
論的儒道性格評議) from 1993, Lin Yankuan's (林晏寬) "An Analysis of
Ruan Ji's Thought on Nature and Ethical Formalism" (*Ruan Ji ziran
mingjiao sixiang xilun* 阮籍自然名教思想析論) from 1999, and "A Study
on Ruan Ji's 'Comprehending the *Book of Changes*'" (*Ruan Ji 'Tong Yi lun'
yanjiu* 阮籍通易論研究) (2000). Studies on Ji Kang between 1991 and
2000 included Zeng Chunhai's "An Analysis of Ji Kang's 'Non-
Emotiveness of Musical Sounds' from the Perspective of Confucian and
Daoist Theory of Music" (*Cong Ru-Dao yuelun xilun Ji Kang de "sheng wu
aile lun"* 從儒道樂論析論嵇康的「聲無哀樂論」), and Gao Boyuan's
"On Zhuangzi and Ji Kang's 'Treatise of Nourishing Life'" (*Lun Zhuangzi
yi Ji Kang de "Yang sheng lun"* 論莊子與嵇康的養生論) from 1989, Zhou
Daxing's "Surpassing Ethical Formalism and Giving Free Rein to Nature –
Moral Transcendence of Ji Kang's 'Treatise on Dispelling Self-Interest'"
(*Yue mingjiao er ren ziran – Ji Kang "Shi si lun" de daode chaoyue lun* 越
名教而任自然—嵇康釋私論的道德超越論) from 1991, Cen Yicheng's
(岑溢成) "Ji Kang's Way of Thinking and Wei-Jin *Xuanxue*" (*Ji Kang de
siwei fangshi yu Wei-Jin xuanxue* 嵇康的思維方式與魏晉玄學) from 1992,
Dai Lianzhang's "Principles of Names and Principles of *Xuan* in Ji Kang's
Thought" (*Ji Kang sixiang zhong de mingli yu xuanli* 嵇康思想中的名理
與玄理), and Zeng Chunhai's "A Study on Ji Kang's Social Thought" (*Ji
Kang shehui sixiang yanjiu* 嵇康社會思想研究) from 1994, along with
Chen Zhaoming's (陳昭銘) "Ji Kang's View on Ethical Formalism and
View on Nature" (*Ji Kang zhi mingjiao guan yu ziran guan* 嵇康之名教觀
與自然觀) from the same year. Works on Guo Xiang published between
1991 and 2000 included Chen Rongzhuo's (陳榮灼) "Differences and

Similarities between Wang Bi's and Guo Xiang's *Xuanxue* Thought" (*Wang Bi yu Guo Xiang xuanxue sixiang zhi yitong* 王弼與郭象玄學思想之異同) from 1992, Dai Lianzhang's "Guo Xiang's Theory of Self-Generation and Xuanming" (*Guo Xiang de zisheng shuo yu Xuanming lun* 郭象的自生說與玄冥論) from 1995, Zeng Chunhai's "An Investigation into Guo Xiang's Theory of Human Life" (*Dui Guo Xiang rensheng lun de kaocha* 對郭象人生論的考察), and Wu Ming's "Wang Bi's, Xiang Xiu's and Guo Xiang's 'Discourse on Natural Morals'" (Wang Bi, Xiang, Guo zhi ziran daodelun 王弼、向、郭之自然道德論) from 1997, Zhuang Yaolang's "Guo Xiang's View on Ethical Formalism" (*Guo Xing de mingjiao guan* 郭象的名教觀) from 1998, and Wu Xiaoqing's (吳曉青) "A Discussion on Guo Xiang's Philosophy of Life from the Perspective of Vocabulary of Spaciality" (*Cong kongjianxing cihui lun Guo Xiang de shengming zhexue* 從空間性詞彙論郭象的生命哲學) from 1999. Studies on Ge Hong included Wang Zongyu's articles (王宗昱) "A Critique on Ge Hong's Theory of Relationship between Confucianism and Daoism" (*Ping Ge Hong lun Ru-Dao zhi guanxi* 評葛洪論儒道之關係) from 1993 and "Probing into the Results of Ge Hong's Study of Medicine" (*Ge Hong yiyaoxue chengguo zhi tanjiu* 葛洪醫藥學成果之探究) from 1994, Li Jun's (李軍) "A Colossal Achievement in the History of Chinese Religious Education – A Study on Daoist Theory of Education in Ge Hong's *Baopuzi*" (*Zhongguo zongjiao jiaoyushi shang de yi zou fengbei – Ge Hong Baopuzi Daojiao jiaoyu lilun tanxi* 中國宗教教育史上的一座豐碑—葛洪抱朴子道教教育理論探析) from 1997, Liu Jun's (劉君) "Researching the Ideas of Transformation Daoist Immortals in the Wei-Jin Period – Looking from the Perspective of the Inner Chapters of Ge Hong's *Baopuzi*" (*Shitan Wei-Jin shenxian*

Daojiao zhi bianhua sixiang – yi Ge Hong Baopuzi neipian guan zhi 試探
魏晉神仙道教之變化思想—以葛洪抱朴子內篇觀之) from 1999, Guo
Xiaodong's (郭曉東) "The Social Thought of Ge Hong's 'Outwardly
Confucian and Inwardly Daoist'" (*Ge Hong "wai Ru nei Dao" de shehui
sixiang* 葛洪「外儒內道」的社會思想) from 2000. Research on the
Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove published in this decade included Yang
Guojuan's (楊國娟) "An Investigation of the Ethos of the Seven Sages of
the Bamboo Grove in *A New Account of Tales of the World*" (*Shishuo xinyu
zhong de Zhulin Qixian fengmao tanyan* 世說新語中的竹林七賢風貌探
究) from 1993, and Liu Rongjun's "A Study on the Idea of Unrestrained
Behaviour and Distraction of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove"
(*Zhulin Qixian de rendan xingwei yu qi fendao yangbiao zhi tantao* 竹林七
賢的任誕行為與其分道揚鑣之探討) from 1999. Studies on *Baopuzi*
included: Zhang Weiling's (張煒玲) "A Study on the Learning on
Nourishing Life in the Inner Chapters of the *Baopuzi*" (*Baopuzi neipian
yangsheng xue zhi tantao* 抱朴子內篇養生學之探討) from 1991, Chen
Feilong's (陳飛龍) "Exploring the Concepts '*suan'*, '*ji*' and '*gongde*' in the
Baopuzi" (*Baopuzi 'suan', 'ji', 'gongde' guannian zhi tantao* 抱樸子「算」
、「紀」、「功德」觀念之探討) from 1995, Rao Zongyi's (饒宗頤)
"Prudence, Meticulousness, Proficiency – A Critique of Yang Mingzhao's
Annotated Critical Edition of the Outer Chapters of the Baopuzi" (*Shenshen,
jingxi, boqie – ping Yang Mingzhao Baopuzi waipiao jiaojian* 審慎、精細
、博洽—評楊明照抱朴子外篇校箋) from 1998, and Zeng Chunhai's
"*Xuanxue* and Idea of Human Personality in the Outer Chapters of *Baopuzi*"
(*Xuanxue ji Baopuzi waipian zhong de lixiang renge* 玄學及抱朴子外篇中
的理想人格) from 1999. There were also same studies on *Treatise on*

Human Character and Ability, such as Lai Lirong's (賴麗蓉) "Why was the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* Included into the School of Names" (*Renwu zhi heyi ru Mingjia* 人物志何以入名家) from 1995, Zhuang Yaolang's "Reading the Theory of Hero and Heroic Character in the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability*" (*Du Renwu zhi de yingxiong lilun ji yingxiong renwu* 讀人物志的英雄理論及英雄人物) from 1996, and Gao Boyuan's "The Philosophical Basis of the Discourse on Human Nature of the *Treatise on Human Character and Ability* and the Tradition of Discussion on Human Nature" (*Renwu zhi lun xing zhi zhexue genju yu lun xing chuantong* 人物志論性之哲學根據與論性傳統) from 1999.

(2) Monographs

Owing to the frequent academic exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland between 1991 and 200, and wide circulation of academic works, the research methods and topics applied and pursued in Taiwan were increasingly compared and aligned with those in the mainland China. In this period, two works by two scholars from the mainland triggered deep concern regarding the issue of "how?" (*ruhe shi* 如何是) in "philosophy" (*zhexue* 哲學) amongst researchers of human thought. The first was Yang Yijie's (楊一介) *Guo Xiang and Wei-Jin Period Xuanxue* (*Guo Xiang yu Wei-Jin xuanxue* 郭象與魏晉玄學) (this book was completed in 1981 in Beijing, but the Taiwanese reprint only appeared in 1987). The special characteristics of the book resided in its attempt to scientize Chinese philosophy. In the introduction Yang raised four issues in order to explain how one would be able to carry out this process, as follows. (1) Researching the development of philosophical thought and revealing the inner logic of its development is the most important problem for the scientization of

research into the history of Chinese philosophy. (2) Studying the developmental history of concepts and categories to reveal the fundamental pathways of the developmental rules of theoretical thinking. (3) The method of studying how philosophers from a certain period were establishing the methodological systems of their philosophies is very important for the understanding of the level and specific characteristics of the development of philosophy in the same period. (4) Studying the relationship between the transmission of foreign intellectual cultures with the intellectual culture of the original culture constitutes an important method for understanding the special features and developmental level of the intellectual culture of the native tradition. [1] The second book was *The Developmental History of Chinese Philosophy – Wei-Jin Northern and Southern Dynasty Period* (*Zhongguo zhexue fazhanshi – Wei-Jin Nan-Bei chao pian* 中國哲學發展史一魏晉南北朝篇) (published in 1998 in Beijing), edited by Ren Jiyu (任繼愈). The special feature of this work was its comprehensive discussion of culture, economy, *xuanxue*, Daoism, Buddhism and natural scientific thought in the time of the Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties, as well as the contests and syntheses among three doctrines, carrying out the discussion from the perspective of developmental history. By integrating the social background of the period into the discussion, the book divided the developmental history of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern period philosophy into three stages: "the first stage was the period of *xuanxue*, the second was the period of *xuanxue* and Buddhist *prajñā* doctrine, and the third was the period of formation of studies of the Buddhist canon" (see Ren 1998, 2). In addition to this, the book proposes that the intellectual investigations of the entire period revolved around the central problems of

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[1] These four points were extracted from Yang 1981, 1–8.

the time, namely: "under the historical circumstances in the time between Han and Wei Dynasties, to set up a form of regular feudal system and bring about the large-scale unification of the nation, while the critical point consisted of strategic thought. In other words: they wanted to design an optimal plan to properly handle the relationship between the political power of the state and the powerful clans and influential aristocrats, and the great figures and eminent scholars who acted on it" (ibid., 35).

Apart from this, a total of 59 monographs on specific topics and overviews were published between 1991 and 2000, all of which indicates the fairly substantial results of Taiwanese academics with regard to studies of Wei-Jin philosophy. Thus, in the year 1992, Tang Yiming published the book *Wei-Jin Period Pure Conversations* (*Wei-Jin qingtan* 魏晉清談). This was followed by Cai Zhenfeng's *Eminent Scholars from the Wei-Jin Dynasties and Pure Conversations of the Xuanxue* (*Wei-Jin mingshi yu xuanxue qingtan* 魏晉名士與玄學清談), published in 1997, and Lu Yaodong's（祿耀東）*Thought and Social Basis of Wei-Jin Period Historiography* (*Wei-Jin shixue de sixiang yu shehui jichu* 魏晉史學的思想與社會基礎) from 2000. Moreover, three volumes of collected papers from the Conference on Literature and Thought of Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties, organized by the Institute of Chinese Literature at the National Cheng Kung University, were published, in 1991, 1993, and 1997.

As regards more specialized studies, Lin Lizhen's book *Wang Bi* 王弼 from 1988 represents one of the few such monographic publications on individual historical figures from the time. In the book, the author delivers a profound and lucid introduction to the life of Wang Bi as a thinker, while

at the same time also gives an exhaustive presentation and discussion of the main characteristics of the thought found in Wang Bi's writings.

Another distinguished example of a specialized study on a scholar from the period is Zhuang Wanshou's *A Study of Ji Kang and a Chronicle of His Life* (*Ji Kang yanjiu ji nianpu* 嵇康研究及年譜) from 1990. This proposed that "in contemporary academic research, one cannot any more regard the time and space one is separated from as the framework of the scientific method … in historical material related to humanity, the data that belong to the domain of the individual and can also be periodized should all be collected into a compendium of chronicles" (see Zhuang 1990). Comprehensively regarding Ji Kang as a thinker, author and artist, as well as presenting an overview of Ji's life and thought, the treatise also provides a chronicle in which it gives an accounts of the historical events which occurred in the focal years, the particularities of Ji Kang's life as extracted from various documents, as well as the works that appeared in the years under discussion. The work is indeed a masterpiece of profound erudition.

In 1994, Zeng Chunhai published the book *Ji Kang* 嵇康, which in the form of a specialized monograph comprehensively discusses Ji Kang as a thinker. The work further advocates that among the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove only Ji Kang combined the imagery of four implicit meanings symbolized by the form of bamboo. These four connotations are: uprightness, modesty, integrity, and elegance.

In 1995 Guo Lihua published *Wang Bi on Nature and Ethical Formalism* (*Wang Bi ziran yu mingjiao* 王弼自然與名教). Using philosophical concepts and logical composition, the book combined the ideas of "existence-nonexistence" (*you-wu* 有無) and the conceptual opposition between "language, visual form and meaning" (*yan-xiang-yi* 言一象一意)

in Wang Bi's thought under the common topic of "nature versus ethical formalism" (*ziran – mingjiao* 自然一名教). In its final sections the book also presented an aesthetic view of the "functional" (*yong* 用) by shedding some light on the intermingling and circulation of the ideas of "exalting the root and putting aside the end" (*chong ben xi mo* 崇本息末, also "to emphasize essential and disregard the marginal") and "exalting the root and reaching the end" (*chong ben ju mo* 崇本舉末) in Wang Bi's thought.

In 1998, Zhuang Yaolang published the book *Guo Xiang's Xuanxue* (*Guo Xiang xuanxue* 郭象玄學), an analysis of Guo Xiang's commentaries on the *Zhuangzi* and the original text of the *Zhuangzi.* It points out the main characteristics of Guo Xiang as a thinker, and delves into Guo's system of ideas from the perspective of various pivotal concepts, such as carefree wandering (*xiaoyao* 逍遙), existence and nonexistence (*youwu* 有無), ethical formalism, nature, self-generation (*zisheng* 自生), singular transformation (*duhua* 獨化), *xuanming* 玄冥, and so on.

In 1999, Sun Liangyong's (孫良永) *A Study of Ruan Ji's Aesthetic Thought* (*Ruan Ji shenmei sixiang yanjiu* 阮籍審美思想研究) was published, which principally aimed at examining the topic of appreciating the arts (*shenmei* 審美, "aesthetics") from a literary and philosophical perspective. With respect to the content of aesthetics, the work emphasized nonverbal bodily expression, drinking wine, playing stringed instruments, and literary creation, whereas in terms of aesthetics, it emphasized the fundamental genuineness of life. While its intellectual process consisted of melancholy aesthetic appreciation (*bei mei* 悲美), its chief characteristic was profound beauty (*xuan mei* 玄美). Contrary to the criticism of Mou

Zongsan, the work expresses a form of sympathetic praise for the thoughts and deeds of Ruan Ji.

2. Concerning the Topics of Research

After the survey of the three phases of Taiwanese studies of the philosophy of the Wei-Jin period presented above, we now consider the variations with regard to the research topics covered. Thus, from representative research subjects we can discover the material used and directions of research in each respective stage of development. A common phenomenon of all three stages was that the majority of scholars engaged in such studies were from literary circles, although there were also many historians, while much less work was done by philosophers and religious scientists. Thus a fairly large amount of the material used to explore individual research topics was related to history, literature and art, and even those studies of ideas from the Wei-Jin period were mostly conducted by scholars with literary and historical backgrounds, rather than a philosophical one.

During the first stage, from 1949 to 1970, studies in the category of overviews or general introductions particularly emphasized "principles of names" (*mingli* 名理), "eminent scholars" (*mingshi* 名士) and "discursive trends" (*tanfeng* 談風). Methodologically, the studies in first phase inherited the academic trends of textual exegesis of classical texts from Republican China, and further expounded on the special qualities of their argumentations. With regard to the studies specialized on individual figures and those on special topics, the great majority were devoted to Wang Bi, while in the research on Guo Xiang most studies ignored the bulk of his ideas. The most praiseworthy feature of this period was that special attention was already given to the relationship between scholars of *xuanxue* and

scholarship of classics (*jingxue* 經學). The other treatises and studies on philosophical ideas, which started to emerge in this period, all provided a general discussion on certain characteristics of some scholar's thought. As a result, the studies in this period still belonged to the stage of pioneering explorations in the field.

In the second stage, from 1971 to 1988, the research on the Wei-Jin period experienced an increase in the number of topics related to religious Daoism (*Daojiao*). Additional attention was also given to ignored and lost documents from the period. Although, at this stage, pure conversations (*qingtan*) and *xuanfeng* 玄風 ("movement of the profound") were still among the central themes, the attention of scholars started to turn in the direction of the concept of *ziran* 自然 as a special characteristic of the thought from the Wei-Jin period, while in some studies more attention was given to the convergence of Confucianism and Daoism. The surge in research focusing on Buddhist figures from the focal period was related solely to Sengzhao, to whom 22 papers were devoted from 1971 to 1987. However, the most commendable aspect of these studies was that, in general, they already recognized the connection between Buddhism and *xuanxue*. With respect to studies on specific topics, most interest was devoted to enquiries into the binary opposition "existence–nonexistence" (*you–wu* 有 無). Another focal point was the question of "emotionality–unemotionality of sages" (*shengren youqing – wuqing* 聖人有情一無情). Apart from that, scholars also continued their research into the "body–soul" (*xing–shen* 形 神) question in Wei-Jin thought, as well as the theory of Buddha-nature (*Foxing* 佛性).

In the third stage, from 1988 to 2000, there was a substantial increase in research into philosophical concepts. The main theme of this period were

studies examining the thought of the masters from Wei-Jin period that emphasized the perspective of "ethical formalism" (*mingjiao* 名教) and "nature" (*ziran* 自然, "spontaneity"), and in the final instance also investigated how these masters actually confronted the problems of the time as well as how, in their scholarly way, they faced the existence of "ethical formalism." In this period, more attention was also given to research into the Daoist classics, while concepts like "nourishment of life" (*yang sheng* 養生), musical aesthetics, "the anti-*xuan* movement" (*fanxuan* 反玄) were also focal points.

Overall, looking at the roughly 50 years covered by this study, the main research on subjects related to the Wei-Jin period can be roughly summarized as follows: pure conversations, the discourse on distinguishing between language and meaning (*yan yi zhi bian* 言意之辨), the emotionality and unemotionality of sages, "exalting existence" (*chongyou* 崇有) and "praising nonexistence" (*guiwu* 貴無) in the discourse on "existence and nonexistence" (*you-wu*), the theory of inborn human nature (*caixing* 才性), ethical formalism (*mingjiao*), *xuanxue*, and the "body-soul" (*xing-shen*) problem. From the year 1970 up to the year 2000, a total of 16 papers and theses were written on the topic of the discourse on language and meaning (*yan yi* 言意), among which the series of writings by Wu Meng were the only ones to have systematically expounded on the positions of the thinkers from the Wei-Jin period. Furthermore, only one article was devoted to Ouyang Jian, namely Bai Enji's (白恩姬) "A Study on the Discourse on Language and Meaning in Wang Bi and Ou Yang Jian" (*Wang Bi yu Ouyan Jian de yan yi zhi bian yanjiu* 王弼與歐陽建的言意之辨研究). In total, three treatises were devoted to the issue of the "emotionality/unemotionality

of sages," and 10 treatises to the topic of "inborn human nature" (*caixing* 才性), while 23 looked at ethical formalism (*mingjiao*). Altogether 94 treatises examined the topic of *xuanxue*, whereas only five were devoted to the "body-soul" problem, nine focused either on the topic of "exalting existence" (*chongyou* 崇有) or "praising nonexistence" (*guiwu* 貴無), while six examined the "mortality of the human soul" (*shenmie* 神滅). What these numbers reveal is that research into issues related to the philosophical ideas of the Wei-Jin period still requires further development. As for the research on Buddhist and Daoist philosophy, it can only be said that in the last 51 years [ed. from 1949 to 2000], only a small window has been opened, so that the task of conducting further ground-breaking research in the field remains to be carried out by later scholars.

In the framework of current academic exchanges and interactions, different views regarding the main "questions of the time" (*shidai wenti* 時代問題) of the Wei-Jin period have emerged. One such view emphasizes that the question of compatibility between Confucianism and Daoism constituted the focal point of the scholars in that period, while another stresses that the central concern of the same scholars was rather the question of "nature" (*ziran*) versus "ethical formalism" (*mingjiao*). In their argument the advocates of the former view emphasize the circumstances and phenomena of the scholarship of the era, pointing out the phenomenon of the parallel existence of *xuanxue* with an anti-*xuanxue* current of thought, thereby indicating that the confluence between Confucianism and Daoism was in fact still disputed at the time. In contrast, the latter emphasized the urge for spiritual freedom and the necessity of social existence as the main "existential" (*shengcun* 生存) predicaments which made the thinkers of the

Wei-Jin period establish a dialogue with the age they lived in, and to go as far as to rebel against it.

3. Conclusion

This study's review of Taiwanese research of Wei-Jin period philosophy from 1949 to 2000 reveals that scholars from both literary and historical academic circles constituted the majority of contributors to the field. In terms of studies on intellectual history, their seminal contributions have truly given Taiwan a key place in research into the Wei-Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties, and provided the essential ingredients which fuelled the development and enabled the blooming of such work on the island. However, more work on these issues needs to be done by philosophers. We have also discovered two major tendencies with regard to the research methods applied in the study of ideas in this context, both of which have their own distinguishing features: the first is the traditional doctrinal exegesis, which attaches major importance to collecting material and interpreting and explaining the argumentation in the texts. Its special features in the focal studies were an abundance of material and the great interest such studies attracted, as well as the ability to offer a complete exposition of the thinker's intellectual landscape. In the second methodological approach the researchers' training in Western philosophy was applied to their studies of Chinese philosophy. This method emphasized the logical structure of concepts, while often applying the tools of logical thinking gained from studies in Western philosophy in their reflections on the questions arising from Chinese philosophy. The special feature of this method, as applied in the years examined, was its proficiency with regard to analytical evaluation, due to which it also attracted great interest, as well as its persistent ability to innovate. The pivotal point of such research

resided in emphasizing the "analysis of thought" (*sixiang bianxi* 思想辨析) with regard to the individual thinkers under examination, while at the same time it also investigated in what way their thought could be aligned with the modern age. Thus, for example, Xiao Zhenbang discussed the aesthetics of the focal historical period from a postmodernist perspective. Ye Haiyan, on the other hand, considered the question of modernization of the discourse on human nature in *xuanxue*.

With respect to research topics, a few important figures from the period still remain understudied. These include, for instance, Guan Lu (管輅), Xiahou Xuan (夏侯玄), Sun Sheng, Zhong Hui (鍾會), Fu Xuan, Xun Can, Song Zhong (宋衷), and Ouyang Jian. In the category of writings on specific topics, more research is needed on *xuanxue* and classical Confucian scholarship (*jingxue* 經學), the philosophy of religious Daoism (*Daojiao*), and research on *xuanxue* and Buddhism. Another key topic that requires more work is the question of what are the requirements shown by the "*xuanxue* 玄學" in this period? When everything is integrated within the requirements of the science of *xuan* 玄 ("the arcane"), will it also reveal what exactly was the requirement of the time? For the research on the history of philosophy, it is essentially a philosophical demand to advance investigative work in philosophy. Furthermore, in what way can an examination of the question of "inborn human nature" (*caixing* 才性) also be an investigation into the "school of names" (*mingjia* 名家)? How did the question of "character judgment" (*renwu pinjian* 人物品鑒) become a topic of discussion in the Wei-Jin period? Moreover, do the Wu strips from the Three Kingdoms period (*Sanguo Wujian* 三國吳簡) discovered in Changsha, apart from their benefits for historiography, also contribute to

our understanding of the intellectual trends in the time of their creation? Have the discoveries of the silk text of *Laozi* from Mawandgui (馬王堆), the silk manuscripts containing Huang-Lao thought, the Guodian Chu slips (Guodian Chujian 郭店楚簡), and so on., apart from their benefits for the study of *Laozi,* already clarified certain issues that are crucial for our understanding of the commentaries on *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi* from the Wei-Jin period? Today's researchers should devote more efforts to finding the answers to these questions.

On the other hand, past works such as Lin Lizhen's "Retrospect and Prospect of the Wei-Jin Period *Xuanxue*" (*Wei-Jin xuanxue de huigu yu zhanwang* 魏晉玄學的回顧與展望) and Zeng Chunhai's "Retrospective and Prospect of Wei-Jin Period *Xuanxue* and Past 50 Years of Research in Taiwan" (*Wei-Jin xuanxue ji Taiwan jin wushi nian lai yanjiu zhi huigu yu zhanwang* 魏晉玄學及台灣近五十年來研究之回顧與展望) have already proposed their own suggestions and statements regarding these questions. Apart from suggesting that the interactions of *xuanxue* with other cultures deserve to be examined more closely, Professor Lin also pointed out that it is worth engaging in more research about *xuanxue* in Eastern Jin Dynasty. Moreover, he has also encouraged researchers to integrate historicity (*lishixing* 歷史性) into their studies of *xuanxue*, and create more in-depth logical analyses or comparisons between Chinese and Western philosophy. Professor Zeng, on the other hand, has suggested that research into Wei-Jin philosophy can complement and learn from the contemporary spirit of stressing democracy and liberty. Zeng has also encouraged researchers to draw on hermeneutics and thus open up new horizons in Wei-Jin philosophy. Finally, as we were able to discover in producing this survey, many people are already fully aware that under the currently existing circumstances we

are unavoidably exposed to the impact of Western philosophy and the research approaches used by the scholars from the mainland. However, at present, our most important task is to find a way to advance a more profound and more comprehensive philosophical discourse.

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LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY

Qinghua School of Logic and the Origins of Taiwanese Studies in Modern Logic: A Note on the Early Thought of Mou Zongsan and Yin Haiguang

Jan Vrhovski

1. Introduction

This text aims to illuminate and expound on one aspect of the historical link between the developments in the academic discipline of modern logic in the early Taiwanese period (1949–1950s) and the renowned "Qinghua School of (Mathematical) Logic." We will try to show that this continuity, which hypothetically existed between the Qinghua School of Logic and the developmental trends in Taiwanese studies of modern logic had been established through important intermediaries like Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995) and Yin Haiguang (殷海光, original name Fusheng 福生, 1919–1969), who had been educated or influenced by members of the above-mentioned school, and had already during their studies in China reached a relatively high degree of mastery and erudition in the field. To confirm the existence of such a continuity, we will outline the main characteristics of the early thought of the above two scholars. An attempt will thus be made to show that both had adopted the same **notions** and **attitudes** towards **modern logic** as advocated by most notable members of the Qinghua circle of logicians.

In the first part of our discussion, we will deliver a short overview of Mou Zongsan's early (pre-1949) contributions to the spread of ideas from modern logic (symbolic or mathematical logic), as well as to current public discussions that touched upon the nature of logic. A short summary of Mou's logic-related activities in the pre-1949 period will then be combined with a brief examination of the early writings of Yin Haiguang, all in order to convey a general image of how the influence of Qinghua school of logic manifested itself in their early notions of modern logic.

2. "Qinghua School of Mathematical Logic": A Short Historical Introduction

By the late 1920s, various forms of modern Western logic had already been widely established throughout the most progressive Chinese intellectual and academic circles. During the May Fourth movement in 1919, the significance of notions like mathematical, pragmatic and dialectical logic had been constantly increasing in public intellectual debates and Chinese academia. At the same time, each of the above-mentioned notions of logic – generally associated with contemporary advances in Western science and philosophy, underwent its own institutional and discursive development. In contrast to pragmatic and dialectical logic, whose portrayal was almost exclusively connected to the propagation of the two corresponding philosophical worldviews in China,[1] the notion of mathematical logic (also referred to as

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[1] In the case of the former, the notion of "pragmatic logic" was introduced to broader intellectual circles after the renowned pragmatist philosopher John Dewey arrived at Peking University, in an attempt to provide the main philosophical tenets of the pragmatist philosophy of education, worldview and so on, as expounded by Dewey, with a sound methodological machinery. Naturally, one of the leading figures behind the public exposition of the so-called "pragmatist logic" was Dewey's former student Hu Shi, who had earned his doctorate in philosophy at Columbia for a thesis entitled *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China* (1917), which

symbolic logic, logistic, etc.) was concurrently developed both as a philosophical notion and scientific discipline. While as a philosophical notion it was first introduced to Chinese intellectual circles as an integral part of positivist philosophy and Western scientific worldview [2] as propagated by Bertrand Russell, who arrived to China in late 1920, the foundation of its institutional life at Chinese academic institutes only started in the late 1920s, when, in the wake of the reorganisation of the Qinghua College into National Qinghua University, Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 and others set up the first modern department of philosophy in China. Eventually, also owing partially to the prestige attached to analytical philosophy by the most progressive Chinese philosophers, mathematical logic came to occupy an important position at the newly founded Qinghua Department of Philosophy. Thus, in the years following its official establishment in 1928, the department

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saw its first publication in China in 1922. In his dissertation Hu espoused the view that in their intellectual or philosophical history the Chinese had essentially developed a pragmatic variety of logic, the most illustrative example of which had been the so-called Mohist and Neo-Mohist logic. As a consequence, Hu also believed that Gongsun Long 公孫龍, Hui Shi 惠施 and others were members of the same school of logic as initiated by Modi 墨翟.

[2] One of the most significant exponents of the notion of mathematical logic in early 1920s China was Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (originally called 張嵩年), who at the time also made his name as the greatest Chinese expert on Russell's philosophy. Later, as a result of Zhang's strong proclivity towards creating an all-encompassing, comprehensive view of reality, he devised an idea of "greater objectivity," which would synthesize the subjectivist traditional thought on one side and the objectivist scientific outlook on the other. Throughout his remaining career as a philosopher and a political activist, Zhang repeatedly attempted to reconcile the two main contesting objectivisms of the time. While his first attempt was aimed at reconciliation of the two opposing sides in the "worldviews" debates at the beginning of the 1920s, the most notable of which was the debate on Science and the View on Life (*Kexue yu renshengguan* 科學與人生觀) from 1924, in later years, when Zhang started more ardently advocating dialectical materialism, his propensity for comprehensiveness also materialized in his attempts to reconcile dialectical materialism on one side and mathematical logic (as one of the main methods of Western science) on the other.

selectively hired a number of philosophers, whose academic renown had in any way been associated with either analytical philosophy (at the time mostly referred to as New Realism, *xin weishi zhuyi* 新唯實主義) or modern formal logic (symbolic or mathematical logic). Consequently, by the early 1930s the elementary curriculum at the department grew to include several individual specialised and general courses on logic. At both graduate and undergraduate levels the first course devoted exclusively to mathematical logic was organised immediately following the appointment of Zhang Shenfu as a lecturer at the department. Eventually, by the time when the first generation of Qinghua-trained modern logicians concluded their studies at the department, the Qinghua School of Philosophy became also known as the "Qinghua School of Mathematical Logic" and, as a result, the academic centre of analytical philosophy in China, too. Although, with time, the original torchbearers of modern logic at the department, such as Jin Yuelin and Zhang Shenfu, had gradually left the realm of deductive logic for more general philosophical topics, the way towards China's complete appropriation of the field was paved by the future generations of their graduates. Through their efforts, modern logic became an integral part of, at first, the science of philosophy, and later also research in mathematics and technology at Chinese scientific and academic institutes.

In the late Republican period, the Qinghua Department of Philosophy directly or indirectly trained the following logicians, who contributed significantly to the development of modern formal logic in China: Shen Youding (沈有鼎, Yu-ting Shen, 1908–1992), Wang Xianjun (王憲鈞, Wang Sian-jun, 1910–1993), and Wang Hao (王浩, Hao Wang, 1921–1995), among others.[3] However, the Qinghua School of Modern Logic and Analytic

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[3] Shen Youding graduated in 1929 and, subsequently, continued his studies in

Philosophy in its later form, especially in the late 1930s and in its wartime state, would also turn out to be the original cradle of modern logic and analytical philosophy in post-1949 Taiwan. Beside Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995), whose early interest as well as concrete engagement in studies of modern formal logic (mathematical logic) have already been more or less taken into account in the recent studies of his philosophical thought,[4] in the late 1930s and early 1940s Qinghua University was also the training ground of another future Taiwanese philosopher who can be credited for having transmitted the knowledge and, most importantly, the sense of significance of studies in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy to the new institutions of higher education to Taiwan. There, after the final capitulation of the Republican government in 1949, the first foundation stones of what was to become Taiwanese academic philosophy were laid. This original member of Qinghua Department of Philosophy and the future pioneer of studies of modern logic in Taiwan whom we are referring to here is Yin Haiguang (殷海光, originally called Yin Fusheng 殷福生, 1919–1969). Yin spent his formative years studying philosophy and logic under Jin Yuelin,

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modern formal logic at Harvard. In 1934, he returned to his *alma mater*, and remained teaching until the breakout of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Wang Xianjun completed his graduate studies shortly before the start of the war (1936) and in the year 1937 travelled first to Berlin and after that to Vienna, where he studied logic under the world-famous mathematician and logician Kurt Gödel. He returned to China in 1938. Finally, Wang Hao, undoubtedly the most famous Chinese logician of the 20th century, concluded his studies at the wartime Qinghua university (National Southwest Associated University) in 1945. Upon graduation, Wang continued his postgraduate education at Harvard and subsequently spent his entire career in the West.

[4] Most notable monographies, which touch on Mou's logic-related thought include: N. Serina Chan's *The Thought of Mou Zongsan* (2011), in its retrospective view Jason Clower's *Late Works of Mou Zongsan* (2014), and most importantly Rafael Suter's *Logik und Apriori zwischen Wahrnehmung und Erkenntnis: Eine Studie zum Frühwerk Mou Zongsans (1909–1995)* [*Logic and the Apriori between Perception and Cognition: A Study in Mou Zongsan's Early Work (1909–1995)*] (2017).

Shen Youding and Wang Xianjun at the wartime Qinghua Department of Philosophy (Southwest Associated University). Unlike his older colleague Mou Zongsan, who despite a strong initial interest in logic did not devote his remaining career either to analytical philosophy or modern logic,[5] after having left Qinghua University Yin Fusheng remained as it were "loyal" to his former field of studies and his past mentor Jin Yuelin. Apart from his in new homeland in Taiwan, Yin was one among many promising young Chinese philosophers whose early academic influences and achievements— at least for the greater part of the 20th century—were beclouded and pushed into obscurity by the destructive winds of war and the change of regime in 1949 that radically redefined China, overturning both its future development as well as the image of its past.

3. From Mou Zongsan to Yin Haiguang

When, in 1947, the renowned expert on Hegel's philosophy and lecturer at both Qinghua and Peking universities, He Lin（賀麟，1902–1992）, published a retrospective analysis of the main developmental trends in Chinese philosophy in last few decades, he also indicated that since the beginning of the century China had produced some concrete results in the most advanced branch of Western logic, a field which was generally referred to as "mathematical logic." Furthermore, he also gave a list of those Chinese "logicians" and philosophers who had made the greatest contributions to Chinese advances in the field. In He Lin's opinion, these included the first Chinese expert in the field, Yu Dawei (David Yule), the famous

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[5] Irrespectively of his early studies in logic, he became most famous as the crucial representative of the second generation of the Modern Confucians (*Xin rujia* 新儒家), see for instance Lee 2014, 9 and Sernelj 2014, 84–85.

professor and philosopher Jin Yuelin, Wan Zhuoheng 萬卓恆, the brothers Shen Youding and Shen Youqian 沈有潛, the Chinese historian of logic Wang Dianji 汪奠基, the philosopher Zhang Yinlin 張蔭麟, the Qinghua logician Wang Xianjun and the future leading name of, as it were, "socialist" mathematical logic in China, Hu Shihua 胡世華. This list did not include Zhang Shenfu, who, mainly for political reasons, had been ostracised from the echelons of Qinghua logicians in 1936. Nevertheless, already in the years before that, as a lecturer in analytic philosophy and mathematical logic at Qinghua and Peking universities, Zhang was standing out from the rest of the philosophers at the department. One feature which made him so different from the others was his passionate advocacy of dialectical materialism, and even more peculiarly, a synthesis of mathematical logic and materialist dialectics. Even though Zhang was later expelled from academic life and, after the war, also excluded from the ranks of the CPC (Communist Party of China), the fact nevertheless remains that for a decade before these developments Zhang had been the key propagator of analytic philosophy and mathematical logic among Chinese intellectuals. Besides having written about the notion of mathematical logic, Russell's main contribution to philosophy, from as early on as 1919, Zhang was also the first lecturer at Beida and Qinghua to have organised a course devoted exclusively to mathematical logic at both universities' departments of philosophy. Furthermore, his appointment at Qinghua Department of Philosophy lead a series of modifications in the basic curriculum, which subsequently contained more courses on logic. Consequently, Zhang inspired many young scholars to focus their studies on logic and Western analytic philosophy. According to the reminiscences of many future Chinese logicians, who at that time were students of philosophy either at

Peking or Qinghua universities, another such influence which essentially overshadowed Zhang's was Jin Yuelin's textbook *Logic* (*Luoji* 邏輯), published in 1935.

3.1. Mou Zongsan, Mathematical Logic and the Philosophy of New Realism at Qinghua University, 1933–1940s

As a freshman at the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, in 1929, Mou Zongsan was one of the many young philosophers who were influenced by Zhang Shenfu's lectures on mathematical logic, Russell and Wittgenstein. Thus, according to Mou's recollections, his favourite subjects in the framework of undergraduate studies at Peking University were the philosophy of New Realism, the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and mathematical logic (Mou 1993, 41–43). At the same time, he also became interested in the thought of the renowned English mathematician and philosopher, and the co-author of Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947). Moreover, as his later writings on logic reveal, in the years following his graduation in 1933, Mou was also closely following Jin Yuelin's philosophical thought and sympathized with the ideas of other established Qinghua logicians, like Shen Youding.[6]

Whilst Mou was discovering other sources of inspiration in both Western and traditional Chinese philosophy, the differences between his ideas and those of his first teacher of mathematical logic and the principles

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[6] In his autobiography, Mou reminisced that during the years of study at Beida, he was greatly influenced by Zhang Shenfu's lectures on mathematical logic and Russell and Jin Yuelin's lectures on miscellaneous problems from cotemporary philosophy, with a special focus on New Realism. Furthermore, outside the university the greatest influence on Mou was Zhang Dongsun. With regard to Zhang's lectures on mathematical logic he further noted that even though they were rather simple, they were still the first example of such a specialized course on the topic at Chinese universities (ibid., 43).

of analytic philosophy, Zhang Shenfu, were steadily increasing (Chan 2011, 14). His ideas about logic approached those common among the main circle of logicians at Qinghua University. An important motivating factor behind Mou's shifting views on logic was the rise of fierce public debates on dialectical materialism, in which the proponents of Marxist dialectics and dialectical materialism, like Ye Qing (葉青, real name Ren Zhuoxuan 任卓宣, 1896–1990), Li Da (李達, original name Tingfang 庭芳, 1890–1966) and others, applied established Marxist critiques of formal logic—mainly Plekhanov's and later also Lenin's and others' views on formal logic—to refute the methodological basis of the contesting philosophical currents in China. As a strong opponent of Marxism, Mou eventually joined the ranks of the most outspoken defenders of a notion of logic that was advocated in Western analytical philosophy and assumed in contemporary studies in logic. In the early years (1931–1936) the Marxist attacks on the so-called "formal logic" (comprising contemporary symbolic and traditional Aristotelian logic) mainly revolved around three laws of thought. Therefore, apart from the general notion of logic, in his open defence of logic Mou mostly discussed the correct meaning of these three laws. Here it needs to be noted that the importance of these debates on logic from early 1930s derived from the fact that, as the methodological foundation of philosophy, logic was more or less understood to be the pivotal source of the objectiveness of a philosophical worldview, and hence also as one of the major battlegrounds between contesting ideologies.

With respect to the definition of logic, Mou Zongsan's writings from this period were more or less in line with the views of the representatives of New Realism in China, such as Shen Youding. In his article from 1934, entitled "Logic and Dialectical Logic (Luoji yu bianzheng luoji 邏輯與辯

證邏輯),” Mou advocated a monistic notion of pure logic: as one objective, absolute, formal and normative logic. Among three contemporary philosophical outlooks on logic (Russell's logicism, Hilbert's formalism and Brouwer's intuitionism) discussed in the article, Mou expressed his greatest admiration for mathematical logic and logicism, because of which he also furnished his discussion with a detailed introduction to some major concepts from the *Principia Mathematica*. While pure logic as manifested in the cutting-edge logical systems known at the time, like example mathematical logic, was deemed by Mou as the only example of logic as such, Mou's refutation of "dialectical logic" drew from an assertion that, from its beginnings on, dialectics could only be described as a methodology or in most extreme case a "special logic (*teshu luoji* 特殊邏輯)" or "applied logic (*yingyong luoji* 應用邏輯)," as opposed to pure or general logic.

Mou's main point of criticism against the Marxist notion of dialectical logic was stated in the third and last part of his article from 1934. The focal argument revolved around the Marxist understanding of the three basic laws of logic. As in all previous points made by Mou, in this argument against dialectical logic he also assumed a position which was in accordance with the views prevalent amongst Qinghua followers of New Realism. What Mou thus emphasized was that the main flaw of the so-called dialectical logic resided in its misinterpretation of identity, especially when it came to propositions and concepts. This flaw was also evident in the way it defined the laws of identity and contradiction.[7] With respect to the real meaning of

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[7] Mou's reasoning probably evolved from earlier writings by the members of the Qinghua circle, like Jin Yuelin's "Identity, Equality and Experience" (*Tong, deng yu jingyan* 同、等與經驗) from 1927. His treatment of the notion of contradiction was further aligned with the approach taken by both Jin and Zhang Shenfu in their articles "On Self-Contradiction" from 1927. How passionately Mou followed his teacher Zhang Shenfu's thought on logic becomes evident from his writings from

these laws, Mou pointed out that logical laws are all based on the aprioristic nature of the human intellect, and can neither be proved nor disproved. In this sense, Mou was a proponent of the idea of pure logic, which assumes that logical propositions do not necessarily have a positive link to reality (the non-positive proposition). In light of his adherence to the Qinghua School of Logic, in the 1930s' debates on logic Mou finally also took the standpoint that "alternative" logics, such as dialectical logic, could neither be a form of logic nor methodologies, but "theories" focusing on analysing facts.[8]

In the same 1930s debates Mou also stood out as one of the main proponents of the mathematical variety of formal logic associated with Bertrand Russell – the other was Shen Youding.[9] His special position rested on the fact that, from 1932 on, Mou had also published a series of articles on modern logic, which were in great part also based on concepts and

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the early 1930s, in which he echoes Zhang's strong emphasis on the use of Russell's theory of types, as well as the adoption of Wittgenstein's language-philosophical notion of tautology when dealing with contradictions – this was also indicated in Zhang's article from 1927. A good example thereof is Mou's article "Contradiction and Theory of Types" from 1933.

[8] A similar point was emphasized by Jin in his discussion with Zhang Dongsun in the late 1930s, early 1940s. In 1939, Zhang published a relatively lengthy text in the *Yanjing xuebao* entitled "Different Types of Logic and Culture – Discussed Together with Chinese Neo-Confucianism," in which he developed his idea of culture-based systems of logic, claiming that his views were in accord with Jin's exposition on different systems of logic in his earlier writings. Jin's elaborate answer to Zhang's apparent misunderstanding of the theory of systems of logic, as outlined in the former's 1935 book *Logic*, was published no earlier than in 1941. In the article entitled "On Different Types of Logic (*Lun butong de luoji* 論不同的邏輯)" Jin pointed out that Zhang did not correctly understand the difference between logic and science of logic. While logic as such is essentially universal and unitary, there may be many different sciences of logic.

[9] This was also noted by the "opposite" side. In 1939, Li Da, who at the time took over the role of the leading discussant on the Marxist side of the debate, described Mou Zongsan as the main representative of the school of "mathematical logicians" (Li Da 1939, 112).

theories from what was known as mathematical logic.[10] In following both Jin Yuelin and Zhang Shenfu, Mou took an interest in the theory of mathematical logic as outlined in Russell's and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. Apart from that, his views were also influenced by Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and logic, one of the leading Chinese exponents of which was also his former professor, Zhang Shenfu.[11] His reproduction and interpretation of mathematical logic and analytic philosophy was, however, paralleled and subsequently also superseded by his strong interest in the philosophy of mind on the one hand, and traditional Chinese philosophical thought on the other. It could be claimed that a strong propensity towards resolving philosophical issues using the methods applied in German classical philosophy (with Kant, Hegel, etc), epistemology, traditional Chinese cosmology (*Yijing* 易經, *The Book of Changes*) and Neo-Confucianism ultimately dissuaded Mou from becoming a logician, and led him in the direction towards shaping his future identity as a "Confucianist" philosopher.

Nonetheless, Mou's relation with logic did not end with his early meditations on mathematical logic, but persisted long after his focus had shifted to other philosophical questions, which constituted the heart of his later philosophy. A great deal of his early excursions into the realm of modern logic and analytic philosophy were summarized in his first major work on logic, *Logical Paradigms* (邏輯典範), which was first published with the Commercial Press in 1941. Although the book basically represents an exhaustive overview of certain aspects of logic from the philosophical

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[10] See also: *The Thought of Mou Zongsan* (Chan 2011, 17). For an extensive analysis of Mou's early logic-related ideas see: Suter 2017.

[11] Zhang not only lectured on Wittgenstein but also created and published the first Chinese translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1927).

perspective (epistemology, Kantian notion of pure reason, and so on), and can also be seen as simply a textbook exercise in the philosophy of logic, in its final section Mou made one decisive step forward. In an attempt to inter-bridge mathematical logic and epistemology (pure mind), Mou combined the knowledge gained in his past encounters with Russell's philosophy and mathematical logic (especially *Principia Mathematics*) with his new understanding in the domain of *a priori* and the notion of pure reason (*chunli* 純理). By probing into the epistemological shadowlands of logic, Mou threaded further away from the purely technical realms of modern logic. Herewith, Mou also managed to circumvent some pivotal and demanding theoretical problems in contemporary logic, like many-valued calculi, details of formalist axiomatization, the theorems of Gödel, and so on. Still, generally speaking, in the above-mentioned section on "Mathematics, Logic and Pure Reason" Mou introduced and expounded on a number of highly technical concepts from *Principia Mathematica* and other concepts related to mathematical logic, including the axiom of infinity from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers, and more.[12] In parts related to the mathematical logic of the *Principia*, Mou reconstructed and explained concrete excerpts from Russell's monumental book. Furthermore, Mou also made great effort to demonstrate that mathematics, to which in contemporary science logic was shown to be inextricably linked, was founded on pure reason and inherently contained both a logical and an

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[12] In his autobiography Mou indicated that at the time his interest in logic revolved around the *Principia Mathematica*. His intense study of the book eventually led him to write his *Logical Paradigms*. Mou also mentioned that, while he exerted great efforts to master the *Principia,* one of his blind spots was the symbolic logic of C. I. Lewis, especially the concept of strict implication (Mou 1993, 67–8). In the early 1930s, Lewis' theory of logic was the main focus of Jin Yuelin. In these years, Jin's focus slowly shifted towards the Harvard School of Logic and in turn also the notion of induction in logic.

intuitive basis. In accordance with the epistemic philosophical views Mou chose to espouse, he was consequently also highly sceptical about the so-called "axiomatisms" (*gongli zhuyi* 公理主義) of Hilbert's school of formalism, which after Gödel's ground-breaking discoveries in the 1930s had slowly lost its former appeal among Western logicians. This was also in line with Mou's tendency towards intuitionism.[13]

The *Logical Paradigms* were not the final product of Mou's early work in logic. After his retreat to Taiwan Mou did not completely severe his contact with the science of logic, but continued teaching it at the reorganised National Taiwan Normal University. In 1955, following his appointment as a member of the Academic Review Committee at the Taiwanese Ministry of Education, Mou published his second, upgraded textbook on logic entitled *Lize xue* 理則學 (*Studies in Logic*) (Chan 2011, 18). As Mou later reminisced, in this later book his understanding of logic was superseded only with regard to certain concepts from C.I. Lewis' theory of logic (Mou 1993, 68). Nevertheless, the most important point here for us is that even in a time when his mind was occupied with other dimensions of philosophy, at least in the initial period, Mou retained his contact with logic as taught in the framework of the so-called "Qinghua School of Logic" from late 1920s and through the early 1930s.[14] In this way, the fact that in his Taiwanese period Mou still lectured about "mathematical logic" together with elements of New Realism could be seen as a continuation of the very same notion of

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[13] In addition to this, the book *Logical Paradigms* contains a series of relatively unique attempts to subject the foundations of modern logic to an epistemological evaluation, and at the same time illustrates Mou's deep understanding of some particular aspects of modern logic. Therefore, the work most definitely deserves a more thorough examination in an individual study.

[14] Strong interest in C. I. Lewis, for instance, was typical for Jin Yuelin's studies in the early 1930s etc.

logic in Taiwan, while Mou could be considered as one of the key figures who helped set down the foundations of the Taiwanese academic discipline of logic, linking the future development of logic in Taiwan with the past trends associated with the study of logic at Beida and Qinghua universities in the 1930s and 40s.

The renowned logician and political philosopher Yin Haiguang was another key intellectual who also contributed significantly to the transmission of the so-called Qinghua School of Logic to the newly forming Taiwanese institutes of higher education. This was important as after the final victory of the Communists in 1949 the Qinghua School of Logic succumbed to the winds of ideological change and was soon condemned as a form of Western idealism in the early 1950s.

3.2. Yin Haiguang: On the Making of the Future Taiwanese Expert on Logic

Yin Haiguang, whose original given name was Fusheng 福生, was exactly ten years younger than Mou. Like Mou, Yin's interest in logic emerged early on in his educational path. However, in contrast to Mou over time his interest in logic was not replaced by any other theories or problems related to philosophy. Moreover, from the beginning Yin's deep affinity for researching logic was established in connection to the "more technical" aspects of logic, and to a lesser degree to the philosophy of logic. It is more than possible that this was a direct consequence of emergence of an entirely new outlook on modern logic, which was imported to Qinghua by the younger generation of its graduates, who, as newly made experts in the field, returned from their postgraduate studies in the West (Europe and the US) with new ideas and energy. This influx of fresh trends in the field caused the center of attention in the studies of logic at the department to shift from

Russel's *Principia*, Lewis' symbolic logic, New Realism, and so on, to topics like many-valued logics, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems and the like. Apart from the wartime Qinghua University, with the return of Hu Shihua to his homeland in early 1940s and the series of advances in the field made by a circle of mathematicians from Wuhan University, a more technical variety of mathematical logic started to form at Peking and Wuhan universities. Those young professors who revitalized research in logic at Qinghua were Shen Youding and Wang Xianjun. According to biographical accounts, Yin was influenced by both (Qi Yudong 2013, 29; Yang Shaojun 2009, 1).

However, Yin Haiguang's academic liking for logic was born in the early 1930s, when as a young student at the secondary school in Wuchang (武昌中學) Yin first read the (at the time relatively popular and commonly used) textbook *The ABC of Logic* (*Lunlixue ABC* 論理學 ABC) by Zhu Zhaocui (朱兆萃).[15] Two years after *The ABC of Logic* was first published as a part of the popular ABC series, Yin found his new source of inspiration in the incomparably more advanced *Logic* by Jin Yuling (1935), in which, in contrast to the earlier textbook, Yin made his first extensive contact with the mathematical logic of the *Principia Mathematica* (ibid.). Under the

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[15] The textbook was published in the *ABC* basic textbooks series by the Shijie shuju 世界書局, which aimed at providing a series of essential/introductory readers for senior secondary schools. Basically, as a result of the first major Republican educational reform in the late 1920s, logic was prescribed as an obligatory course at senior secondary level schools. In a subsequent wave of reforms, the urge for creating new, updated teaching materials for reformed secondary as well as university-level education was stressed, which greatly spurred the generation of new-style textbooks and handbooks on Western science. Zhu Zhaocui contributed two textbooks for the *ABC* series: *The ABC of Logic* (1933) and *The ABC of Educational Psychology* (*Jiaoyu xinlixue ABC* 教育心理學 ABC) (1931).

influence of Jim's 1935 textbook, at the age of 15 Yin delved into the realm of mathematical logic for the first time.

After he graduated from secondary school in Wuchang, Yin enrolled into the comparatively progressive Wuhan University. Here, Yin was soon given the chance to undertake new research in the field.[16] Not much later, the profound impression Jin's book left on Yin's young mind materialized in his first contribution to advancing Western logic in China. Already one year after Jin's *Logic* had first been published, Yin produced a long essay entitled "What Exactly are Logic and Science of Logic?" (*Luoji yu luojixue jiujing shi shenme* 邏輯與邏輯學究竟是什麼), in which he presented a general definition of logic based on his reading of Jin's textbook as well as the contemporary American textbook *The Fundamentals of Logic* (written by Frank Miler Chapman and Paul Henle and published in 1933). Although the core of Yin's understanding of the nature of logic as outlined in his article from 1936 was to some extent based on Chapman's and Henle's attempt to lay down definite boundaries between Aristotelian syllogistic logic or traditional formal logic and the earliest forms of modern formal logic, i.e. mathematical or symbolic logic, his understanding of the latter, as demonstrated in the article, was undoubtedly also derived from his encounters

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[16] The biographical accounts and accounts of reminiscences of Yin's early acquaintances betray some inconsistencies with regard to Yin's early years at Wuhan University. Some authors in their biographical accounts even completely disregard the period between secondary school and 1938. A significant discussion of the fact that Yin was first at Wuhan can be found in Li Wenxi 2013, 41–45. If Yin indeed was at Wuhan University sometime between 1935 and 1937, he would have had the chance to study modern logic in the framework of Wan Zhuoheng's (萬卓恆, 1902–1948) regular courses on logic (elementary and advanced). Wan, who graduated from the Qinghua Department of Philosophy and completed his graduate studies at Harvard, was a professor at the Department of Philosophy at Wuhan between 1931–1948. Under the influence of the trends at his *alma mater*, in 1932 Wan organized the first course in logic at Wuhan University, which included mathematical logic and was based on the *Principia Mathematica*.

with Jin's 1935 textbook,[17] as was his perception of the notion of logic. Thus, already in 1936, and similarly to Mou Zongsan, Yin maintained an idea of "pure logic," which he distilled from these books. One immediate result of his reading of Chapman's and Henle's *Fundamentals*, and just a few months before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, was that Yin published his Chinese translation of this textbook.[18]

In 1938, Yin's ambition to study logic under China's leading experts in the field had finally started to be realized, as he was admitted to the wartime provisional National Southwest Associated University in Kunming (Guoli xinan lianhe daxue 國立西南聯合大學, henceforth referred to as Lianda 聯大). At the wartime Lianda, the departments of philosophy of Qinghua, Peking and Nankai universities were conjoined into one single Department of Philosophy and Psychology. As a freshman at the Department of Philosophy the young Yin was able to attend lectures delivered by Jin Yuelin, with whom Yin eventually also established a closer relationship. Jin, who also served as Yin's mentor, later advised him to attend advanced classes on modern logic taught by the young experts Shen Youding and Wang Xianjun. Beside logic Yin also attended a number of selective courses on Western analytic philosophy, while he allegedly disliked subjects like Hegel's philosophy (Yang 2009, 1). Yin completed his undergraduate studies in philosophy in 1942, upon which he continued his studies at the

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[17] Chapman's and Henle's textbook was divided into three parts: classical logic, contemporary symbolic logic (i.e. mathematical logic) and scientific method. In the second part the authors outlined the most important results in mathematical logic, revolving mainly around the calculi of propositions and classes from Russell's *Principia*, including the fundamental concepts of its system.

[18] Yin's translation was published under the Chinese title *Luoji jibed* 邏輯基本 by the Zhengzhong publishing house (*Zhengzhong shuju* 正中書局).

Qinghua Graduate School in Philosophy, studying logic under the supervision of Jin Yuelin.

Yin published a revised version of his 1935 article on the nature of logic in his second year at Lianda. This time the essay was entitled "The Fundamental Characteristics of the Science of Logic (Luojixue de jiben xingzhi 邏輯學底基本性質)."

Apart from a few hints distilled from various narratives from the time, we are not familiar with Yin's experience in wartime Qinghua. Regardless of that, what we do know is that both Jin Yuelin's and Yin Haiguang's reminiscences confirm the fact that gradually a profound teacher-student relationship had developed between them. While Yin's focus had apparently been on the *Principia Mathematica*, during his graduate studies he also devoted some effort to learning about current advances in the philosophy of logic. Regarding his intense studies of Russel's work, Jin Yuelin reminisced that, in the years when Yin was studying under him, his understanding of the *Principia* had developed to the degree that he could enlighten his mentor about some "theoretical problems" which occurred in the former's textbook *Logic* from 1935, especially those related to the part devoted to "systems of logic," while at the same time he was also able to provide systematic corrections to those problems (Liu Peiyu 1994, 393). Apart from that, it seems that Yin had also worked together with other Qinghua logicians, such as Wang Xianjun, in cooperation with whom he prepared the first Chinese translation of Rudolf Carnap's *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (first published by the Commercial Press in 1946). Above all, Yin's erudition in logic came to expression in his short book *Talks on the Science of Logic* (*Luojixue jianghua* 邏輯學講話) from 1943,[19] in which, although it was

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[19] The book was reprinted three year later, in 1946.

intended for the "layman," Yin set out to explain some important concepts from formal logic, which he tried to put down in simple terms. In his *Talks,* where the essentials of logic were illustrated with an abundance of practical examples from everyday dialogues, Yin adopted a more "philosophical" approach. In other words: he attempted to bring down the pure notion of logic to its ontological foundations and describe it in connection with, for example, the principle of causality, and so on. In addition, in a fairly modern manner (following Russell) Yin also aimed at introducing to his "common" reader the concepts of class, (logical) relation, proposition, paradox, type, variable, etc. and thus in a rather abrupt manner led the layman deeper into the more technical domains of logical algebra, propositional calculus and so on. While on this logical journey, which Yin prepared for the reader, one almost unknowingly and constantly crosses between the domains of traditional and modern formal logic, thus encountering the essentials of logical reasoning, while in the final stage of the journey Yin directed the reader's attention to the question of the notion and nature of logic.

Akin to his previous meditations on logic (1935), as well as indicating his future orientation towards logic, in his *Talks on Science of Logic* Yin adopted a notion of logic which was consistent with the views espoused by the Qinghua circle of logicians, the so-called notion of pure logic. Thus, even a superficial analysis of his writings from his early period reveals a direct continuity with his major propaedeutic work on logic from the Taiwanese period, most notably his two earliest publications that more or less inaugurated the publishing of books on logic in Taiwan: the textbook *What Exactly is Logic*? (*Luoji jiujing shi shenme*? 邏輯究竟是什麼?) from 1953, which conspicuously echoed his first article on logic from 1935, and a revised university textbook from 1957, *A New Introduction to Logic* (*Luoji xin yin* 邏輯新引). The notion of logic espoused in these writings can in

general be seen as extremely devoid of any epistemologically or ontologically positive aspects. In the same manner as, for example, Shen Youding, Yin also recognized that as an aprioristic notion logic possessed concrete boundaries, which separated its essence from thought as such. Similarly, logic also cannot be considered as synonymous with the scientific method, dialectics, metaphysics, general science of inference, etc. [20] And in accordance with that, logic was seen as possessing its inner nature, epitomized within the characteristics of formality, universality and consistency. Again, as already mentioned before, this view was typical for how the Qinghua adherents of New Realism viewed logic (see Hu Weixi 2002, 137–140).

In 1944, his final year at the university, Yin published an article which outlined a retrospective of the main currents in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics (mainly formalism and intuitionism).[21] This was Yin's last publication on logic before those he released in Taiwan. In the same year, Yin also finally severed his ties with Qinghua, for in midst of the intensive political campaign to recruit new soldiers from the ranks of university students Yin ultimately decided to leave the institution (Yang 2009, 2). Even one year later, when the war with the Japanese was over and he was allowed to return home, he did not decide to finish his studies at Qinghua. Instead, he devoted his energy to political causes and started writing articles which incited national awareness and criticized Marxism. As an intellectual with strong ties with the Kuomintang (KMT) he became the editor and the leading pen of the official KMT newspaper the *Central Daily News* (*Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報), and later (Taiwan) also an editor of the

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[20] For a more detailed exposition of Yin's notion of logic see Xia Weiguo 2008.
[21] "A Survey of Contemporary Mathematical Philosophy (*Xiandai suanli zhexue gaiguan* 現代算理哲學概觀)."

nationalist periodical *The Nation* (*Minzu bao* 民族報) (ibid.). After the victory of the Communists in 1949, and because of his open association with the Nationalist government, Yin was forced to retreat to Taiwan together with the remaining members of the KMT.

In the two decades following his relocation to Taiwan, he worked a professor at the National Taiwan University (NTU), where he was able to greatly influence the development of studies of logic in Taiwan (see Dai Ningshu 2012). At NTU, Yin not only educated the majority of future Taiwanese experts in logic (ibid., 133–134), but, even more importantly, also set down the foundations of the discipline in Taiwan, and consequently also significantly influenced the future image as well as the developmental trajectory of logic on the island. In contrast with Mou Zongsan, in his role as a professor at NTU Yin focused almost exclusively on modern logic and its complementary philosophical theories, as taught in the Qinghua circle. Thus, beside symbolic logic, he further lectured on logical positivism, the philosophy of language, Russell's philosophy, and the philosophy of logic and science, among other subjects. Thus, Yin continued the tradition he became deeply immersed in during his studies at the wartime Qinghua University, which included not only a specific notion of logic, but also promulgated a certain philosophical apparatus supporting its espoused logical science, based predominantly on the mathematical logic of the *Principia* and to a lesser extent on more recent developments in the field. By the virtue of propagating the above-mentioned notion of science of logic, first through textbooks on logic published in Taiwan, Yin succeeded in embedding the former Qinghua image of the discipline into the underlaying

tissue of Taiwanese academia, which at the time was still in the process of being formed.[22]

4. Conclusion: The Question of Continuity and Succession

As we have tried to show in the foregoing analysis, both the figures of our interest, Mou Zongsan and Yin Haiguang, shared a deep and on-going connection with the so-called "Qinghua School of Logic" and could consequently, each in his own regard, be considered as descendants of this school. In addition, along with a marked affinity for topics in mathematical (also symbolic) logic, which in the early 1930s revolved mainly around Russell and his *Principia Mathematica*, their pertinence to the Qinghua School of Logic was also manifested in their preference for a certain philosophical foundation accompanying and critically defining the inherently technical apparatus of logic. In that way, in their early years, they both espoused a notion of "pure logic," which at the time was advocated by the most important members of the Qinghua circle, such as Jin Yuelin and Shen Youding, who were also important influences in the academic developmental path of both men. As a consequence, due to the respective roles both these scholars had in formation and establishment of Taiwanese academic philosophy, it can be conjectured that, especially through the specialist Yin Haiguang, a certain degree of continuity existed between the manner in which the science of logic as a philosophical discipline was treated in the early Taiwanese period (1950s and 1960s) on the one side, and the ideas of the Qinghua School on the other. Since, in his Taiwanese years, Mou gradually turned away from his previous interests in logic, his role in this process consisted mainly in disseminating the focal notion of logic through

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[22] See: Wang Wenfang 2010 and Dai Ningshu 2012.

his early pedagogical work in Taiwan. In this context, we might also assume that Mou's strong association with the Qinghua School of Logic did not simply cease to exist in the year 1949, in the eyes of both his students as well as his colleagues. Thus, even though in his later years Mou followed a completely different philosophical path, in the crucial few years following 1949 he was still known as a former "member" of the Qinghua circle, as well as a formerly prolific writer on the topic of modern logic. In these years, which were vital for the formation of Taiwanese studies of logic, Mou was undoubtedly one of the island's leading experts in modern logic as expounded in the framework of the Qinghua School.[23]

Through the above-mentioned connections, Qinghua-type philosophical outlooks on logic retained a central role in later Taiwanese studies in logic – especially those of New Realism, the Vienna School, and so on, while in mainland China the change of regime and ideology in 1949 helped to speed the trend of the "mathematization" of modern (mathematical) logic, and initiated its ultimate conversion into a purely technical discipline in the framework of new socialist science. Even though this trend had actually originated from the internal developments in the field, and in China had already started to take shape in the 1930s, when a group of mathematicians

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[23] We do not assume, however, that Mou invested great effort to disseminate this notion of logic, or that he deliberately propagated it. What we have in mind is rather the idea that the notion of logic, which Mou adopted in his early years, appeared to him as a natural and self-evident definition of logic as such, and not as a particular notion of logic associated exclusively with the Qinghua School of Logic. In this sense, even when Mou eventually departed **from logic** or even if he were to negate logic as such, in so doing he was still maintaining the same notion of logic. This is also the reason why we understood the transition from Qinghua to Taiwanese studies of logic to have occurred mainly by means of continuation of the Qinghua School's **notion** of logic. Moreover, a notion of logic is not only a matter of its (as it were) **inner** definitions, but more so a matter of complexly interwoven epistemological concepts, ontology, philosophical views on science and nature, and so on.

started researching set theory and Hilbertian ideas regarding axiomatization of mathematics, it could be argued that the revolution of 1949 forcefully ended a line of development which can be identified in the Qinghua School of Logic, while drastically affecting the development of the idea and discipline of modern logic in future Chinese science.

The fact that the regime change of 1949 also marked the moment in history when the Qinghua School of Logic suddenly ceased to exist – at least in the public or official academic sphere – brings us to another important question: Could the early period of Taiwanese academic discipline of logic be considered a direct successor of Qinghua School of Logic? In other words: Did important agents of the Qinghua School, like Yin Haiguang, continue the work of their former mentors at Qinghua? Or could the shape of academic research in logic in the early Taiwanese period be considered a result of mere natural development, which had its source in the current developments in the international research in mathematical logic? Of course, this question is immensely complex and would most certainly require another, incomparably more extensive comparative study, in which more light would be shed on the content of concrete results, curricular changes, and the scope of philosophical influence of early Taiwanese studies in modern logic. However, in the current text we can claim with much certainty that while the theoretical consistency (continuity) between the "schools" is more or less clear, in light of the drastic shift in Chinese studies of modern logic from the 1950s on, the emerging Taiwanese logic was very much in line with the former Qinghua tradition.[24] While, naturally, the most important driving force behind this transmission or alignment with

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[24] We do not claim that the Qinghua School of Logic represented the only source for logic as an academic discipline in Taiwan, but that it is most likely the earliest and most natural source.

the Qinghua School in Taiwan were intermediaries like Mou Zongsan and Yin Haiguang, who in their years of academic training in China were not only strongly influenced by the members of Qinghua School, but at the same time also contributed significantly to the philosophical and scholarly research into modern logic in China. While at the heart of this transitory period, what connected Taiwanese logic with Qinghua was not loyalty to schools or teachers, but a specific, modern notion of logic, that was believed to be objective, universal and, most of all, useful.

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Discussing the Functions and Limitations of Conveying "Concepts" in Philosophical Thinking

Hsien-chung Lee

Introduction

By investigating the formation, classification, functions and limitations of concepts (*gainian* 概念) and through differentiation of concepts, groups of concepts (*gainianqun* 概念群), first meaning concepts (*di-yi yi gainian* 第一意概念), conceptual systems (*gainian tixi* 概念體系) and categories (*fanchou* 範疇) in the history of Chinese philosophy, we can explain the relations between concepts of various levels and thought units (*sixiang danwei* 思想單位), with the latter being a unit of meaning of philosophical theory. Through relationships between the concepts and thought units we can understand how the concepts constitute philosophical theory. A thought unit is like a skeleton, the concepts of all levels are similar to flesh and blood, and thus they constitute an organic whole of the history of Chinese philosophy. Each thought unit contains certain "structural patterns (*li* 理)." "Structural patterns" of various fields are interrelated and linked through groups of concepts, which are dominated by the first meaning concepts. The concepts must reveal their meanings in all contexts and thought units. They can also constitute a conceptual system as representative of the related thought units.

1. Formation and Classification of Concepts

1.1. Formation of Concepts

In Chinese antiquity concepts (*gainian* 概念) were called Names (*ming* 名) and were regarded as representatives of the Reality or Actuality (*shi* 實) of cognitive objects. If we observe this topic in the literature from the pre-Qin period, we can learn more about ancient Chinese perspectives on the relationship between Names and Reality or Actuality by consulting the Mohist Dialectics (*mo bian* 墨辯)[1] of the later Mohist School, as seen in the chapters "Ming shi lun 名實論 (Discourse on Names and Actuality)" in *Gongsun Longzi* 公孫龍子 (*Master Gongsun Long*) and "Zheng ming 正名 (Correct use of Names or Rectification of Names)" in *Xunzi* 荀子 (*Master Xun*).

With regard to the aspect of the formation of Names the chapter "Jing shang" in *Mozi* 墨子 (*Master Mo*) first points out the function of human sensory organs, the function of contemplation and rational systematization for obtaining knowledge.[2] The affirmation of these sensory and rational

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[1] The Mohist Dialectics (*mo bian* 墨辯) refers to six chapters, i.e. "Jing shang 經上 (The Canon 1)," "Jing xia 經下 (The Canon 2)," "Jing shuo shang 經說上 (Exposition of the Canon 1)," "Jing shuo xia 經說下 (Exposition of the Canon 2)," "Da qu 大取 (Major Illustrations)" and "Xiao qu 小取 (Minor Illustrations)" (Zhou 2004, 97).

[2] "Jing shang": 3. "Intelligence is wisdom or intellectual ability." "Jing shuo shang": "Intelligence as wisdom or intellectual ability is a faculty to perceive things, therefore a man with intelligence certainly has wisdom. It is like clear eyesight." 4. "Cognition is seeking knowledge." "Jing shuo shang": "Cognition: Cognition is seeking knowledge with intelligence, but one will not necessarily acquire it. It is like casting a sidelong glance." 5. "Intelligence is connecting (with objects)." "Jing shuo shang": "Intelligence: Intelligence means that one comes into contact with an object through one's perceptual ability and is able to describe its image, which is like seeing it with one's own eyes." 6. "Wisdom is clarity (of understanding)." "Jing shuo shang": "Wisdom: Wisdom refers to discussing about objects by means of intelligence and thus knowledge or understanding of them clarifies. It is like clearness of eyesight" (Wang 2011).

cognitive abilities through the cognitive process of seeking better perception by coming into contact with object or by their appearance forms the Names. The function of Names lies in indicating or reflecting (*ju* 舉; lit. raise) Reality or Actuality, which are precisely the object or its nature, its essence, and is the result of cognition. The chapter "Xiao qu" states: "We use Names to indicate or reflect (*ju*) Reality." "Jing shang (31)" informs us: "Indicating or reflecting (*ju*) refers to the imitation of Reality." While "Jing shuo shang" explains: "Indicating or reflecting (*ju*): When we tell (something) by using the Name (or language), we indicate its Reality." "We use Names to indicate or reflect Reality" means imitating the so-called thing by using the images and symbols of language. As is written in "Jing shuo shang (81)": "That, which something is called by, is its Name. What is called so, is Reality." On the one hand this Reality means the objective nature of things and on the other hand it refers to what is understood by the cognitive subjective "wisdom" (*zhi* 智). Therefore, the so-called Reality can point at individual things and can also sum up a particular "class or sort" or some other abstract principle or reason.

Thus the chapter "Ming shi lun" in *Gongsun Longzi* states: "Heaven and Earth and what is produced by them, are things. A thing is a so-called thing and nothing more which goes beyond that (*bu guo* 不過). This is Reality (or Actuality). Reality is the so-called Reality, which is not empty and vast, but has a position (*wei* 位)." Heaven and Earth, and the Myriad Things (all existence) which they generate, are precisely the objects of our cognition and a cognitive subject can associate, describe and define these objects; in addition, the use of human cognitive functions objects can also reveal a variety of their characteristics. "Nothing more (which goes beyond that) (*bu guo*)" indicates that an inherent nature of a certain thing emerges, because

it is formed without any adding and reducing. This is precisely the Reality or Actuality. When Reality is represented using the method of Names, the connotations of its concepts by no means reduce the content of Reality. This is the position (*wei*) of matching between Names and Reality. Hsiao Teng-fu (Xiao Dengfu) 蕭登福 has given a few examples of this, such as:

> If we speak about tangible concrete things, that, which has a nature of a horse, is a horse. If we add characteristics of a dog to the nature of a horse, it means there is exceeding (*guo* 過). Since it goes beyond the Reality of a horse, we must no longer call it a horse. If we talk about formless intangible matters and regard "Loyalty" as fulfilling one's duty to a certain person or matter, this makes the "Reality" of loyalty. If we add specific characteristics of Filial Piety to the peculiarities of Loyalty, then we have already exceeded the "Reality" of Loyalty and we can no longer encompass it with one word "Loyalty," but have to call it Loyalty and Filial Piety together (Hsiao 1984).

Xunzi asserts:

> When Reality (object) is not understood, we name it. If by using the Name, it is still not comprehended, we provide a convention. When the convention does not make it clear, we give an explanation (*shuo* 説). If the explanation is still not understood, we employ dialectics or distinction *(bian* 辨) (*Xunzi* s.d., "Zheng ming").

If we provide an object and its concept when communicating with people and assess that we have not yet enabled them to understand, we need to explain and illustrate the principles of why it is so with a short passage. If an "explanation, teaching or theory (*shuo*)" still does not cause them to comprehend, in that case we must make them understand by using the method of "distinguishing or dialectics (*bian*)." Thus, in the whole process of communication the Name is the most fundamental symbol of naming the

Reality. Chapter "Xiao qu" in *Mozi* explains: "We use Names to indicate or reflect Reality, we use Propositions or Phrases (*ci* 辭) to express Conceptions, we employ Explanations or Theories (*shuo*) to bring out Reasons or Causes." This viewpoint is similar to the one found in the chapter "Ming shi lun" from *Gongsun Longzi*, which states that "a Name has to be identified by (or in accordance with) its Reality."

The formation of Names or concepts depends on human cognitive functions. The "connotations or intention (*neihan* 内涵)" of the concept is formed through functions of human sensory organs and reason. The so-called "intension" of the concept refers to all the elements, which constitute the concept, and emerged through human cognitive functions. And the "extension (*waiyan* 外延)" of the concept indicates the totality of objects the concept points at (Chang 1978, 18). For instance, the intension of the concept "cattle or Bovinae (*niu* 牛)" is constituted of characteristics or qualities such as: it has horns, it is an artiodactyl, it has a stomach with four compartments, it can carry a heavy load on its back, etc. The aspect of communication is related to the extension of the concept. On account of the amount of intension elements there are the referential objects of extension are formed. For example, the extension of the concept of "cattle" includes: ox, water buffalo, dairy cattle, yak, etc. Thus, the concept exists in the realm of human thought and the intention is formed by using cognitive functions; the extension of the concept exists in the realm of expression or communication and means a word or a phrase, which reveals the intension of the concept. The meaning of a word or phrase is established by convention formed through long social practice and makes up a function of expressing with words or communication among people.

1.2. Classification of Names in Various Schools
of the Pre-Qin Period

The Names can be divided into (personal) names (e.g. a name and surname of a certain person), "names of concepts (*gainian zhi ming* 概念之名)" and "names of words and phrases (*yuci zhi ming* 語詞之名)." Chinese traditional thought of the Correct Use of Names or Rectification of Names (*zheng ming sixiang* 正名思想) refers to the names of words and phrases and the names of concepts, but not to the (personal) names (Zhou 1996, 148–151). In his section we will address the analyses regarding the names made by the Nomenalist School or the School of Names (*ming jia* 名家), the Mohist School (*mo jia* 墨家) and Xunzi 荀子 of the pre-Qin period.

When we try to acquire knowledge about a thing and we grasp the nature of its Reality or Actuality, we have to use a suitable Name to refer to it and call it by. After we compare the similarities and differences of various Realities, we have to express them by using different Names. There are different types of Names. For instance, Hui Shi 惠施 explains in his "observation and analysis of the meaning of things (*li wu zhi yi* 歷物之意)" which can be found in the chapter "Tianxia 天下 (All under Heaven)" from *Zhuangzi* 莊子: "Being greatly alike is different from being partially alike. This is called the minor similarities and differences. The Myriad Things are all alike, but they are all different. This is called the major similarities and differences." In Hui Shi's view the Names are differentiated into large and small types according to similarities and differences, where various small types can also be combined into concepts of large types.

In addition, the chapter "Dadao shang 大道上 (Great Dao 1)" in *Yin Wenzi* 尹文子 (*Master Yin Wen*) divides Names into three types:

The first type (includes) the Names, which designate things (*ming wu zhi ming* 命物之名), such as square, round, white, black; the second type are the Names of praise and blame (*hui yu zhi ming* 毀譽之名), such as good, evil, noble, lowly; the third type encompasses the Names of comparative designations *(kuang wei zhi ming* 況謂之名), such as foolish, wise (or worthy), love, hate.

Among these, the Names that designate things are the Names which are set according to the characteristics of the object's appearance. They must be the kind of objects which can be grasped by the senses of sight, touch, etc., and should be concrete tangible items. Hence the forms and colours, such as square, round, white and black are taken as the basis of naming. The Names of praise and blame are the Names which are set by the subjective evaluation of objects. The latter include abstract, formless intangible states; moreover, they also involve the subjective criteria of appraisal of the one who sets the Names. Therefore, we can take the concepts of value, such as good and evil, and of social positions, such as noble and lowly, as the basis of naming. As for the Names of comparative designations, they encompass the subjective evaluation of the object and relative attitude based on and developed in accordance with this evaluation. Hence they include relative concepts of evaluation, such as wise (or worthy) or foolish, and subjective good or evil, love or hate, which are taken as the basis for naming. So the classification in *Yin Wenzi* contains concrete, abstract and relative concepts. In addition, it points out the relationship between concrete and abstract concepts. For example, the chapter "Dadao shang" states: "Good *(hao* 好*)* is a general or common designation for things; ox is a fixed form of a thing; if we follow fixed objects by using the common term, we cannot reach the limits." "Good" as the "Name" which describes objects can be joined together

with numerous things, for example: good ox, good horse, good man, good book ... Therefore he says "we cannot reach the limits" (Lee 2012, 150–151).

This issue of the Chinese learning of Names (*mingxue* 名學) was also raised in the famous proposition of Gongsun Long 公孫龍, that "a white horse is not a horse (*bai ma fei ma* 白馬非馬)." In "Bai ma lun 白馬論 (Discourse on the White Horse)" he states:

> A horse (*ma* 馬) is that which denotes a shape; white (*bai* 白) is that which denotes a colour. That which is used to name a colour is not the same as that which denotes a shape. Therefore I say: 'A white horse is not a horse.'

Although *Yin Wenzi* states that *"we follow fixed objects by using the common term," Gongsun Longzi*, according to the principle of one Name for one Reality, emphasizes that "Realities" which are referred to by different Names are not the same. "White(ness)" and "horse(ness)" can by no means be viewed as equal. In addition, a compound of "white" and "horse" cannot be equated with a "horse" either.

In *Mozi* the following classification of "Names" can be found: universal Names (*da ming* 達名), class Names (*lei ming* 類名) and private Names (*si ming* 私名). Universal Names refer to Names with the largest extension, private Names indicate Names of specific objects and class Names point to Names of things of various kinds between universal and private Names. So the dimensions of intension and extension of a concept are taken as classification criteria.

Furthermore, in *Mozi* the nature of cognitive objects is also regarded as a criterion for the differentiation of "Names." They can be divided into those named according to their shapes and appearances (*yi xing mao ming zhe* 以

形貌命者), and those which are not named on the basis of their shapes and appearances (*bu yi xing mao ming zhe* 不以形貌命者). For instance, the chapter "Da qu" explains:

> (In case of) those named according to their shape and appearance, a certain object must be known to us, to know which one it is. (In case of) those, which are not named on the basis of their shape and appearance, although we don't know the concrete image of a certain object, which the Name refers to, we can still know which one it is.

Those which are named after their shape and appearance are cognitive objects where we can observe their concrete form and appearance, such as mountain, hill, room, temple and other similar things. Those that are not named according to their shape and appearance are cognitive objects where their concrete shape and appearance cannot be observed, such as the colour "white" or the sizes "big" and "small." *Mozi* also notes a difference between specific characteristics of concepts. For instance, the chapter "Da qu" states: "If this stone is white, it is still white, even if it is broken into pieces. Although this stone is big, when it is broken into pieces, we cannot name it in the same way as big, since big is a relative term." Thus it can be seen that the Names "big" and "small," which refer to the stone, are relative. However, the Name for the colour of the stone, "white," is not relative.

Xunzi distinguishes Names on the basis of the amount of words and phrases and the extension of concepts. Thus he uses single Names (*dan ming* 單名) and compound Names (*jian ming* 兼名); he provides further explanation of the broad general Names or Names of greatest generality (*da gong ming* 大共名) and largest specific names (*da bie ming* 大別名). The chapter "Zheng ming" in *Xunzi* explains:

After this we give Names in accordance with it: If things are the same, we give them the same Name; if they are different, we name them differently. When a single Name is sufficient for understanding, then we use a single Name; when a single name is not enough for understanding, then we use a compound Name. If in case of the single and the compound Name there is no need for mutual avoidance, we can use a general Name. Although it is general, it will not cause any harm. We know that different Realities are given different Names, therefore, for each different Reality we use a different Name, which cannot cause confusion, just as if we give the same Name to the same Realities. Although the Myriad Things are numerous, there are occasions when we wish to express them collectively or summarize them, hence we call them things. Thing(s) is the Name of greatest generality. On the basis of this reasoning we give general names to objects. These again have more general Names and we continue until we get to the point that we cannot generalize further, then we stop. There are occasions when we want to partially express or summarize things, so we call them birds and beasts. Birds and beasts are the largest specific Names. On the basis of this reasoning we give the largest specific Names to objects. When we distinguish among them and we continue differentiating until we get to the point when we cannot differentiate further, then we stop.

"(To be) enough or sufficient for understanding" refers to the efficiency of expression or communication, "when we wish to express them in general" and "when we want to partially express them" indicate a subjective wish or demand. Xunzi explained the classification of Names of words and phrases and Names of concepts by using these expressions.

From the above analysis of Names by various schools of thought we can see that classification of Names involves cognition, comparison, classification, communication and other factors. The criteria of classification are: cognitive functions (concrete or tangible, formless or intangible), thought process

(similarities and differences, comparative designations, praise and blame), intension of concepts (universal, class, private) and demand for expressing (single, compound, broad general, largely specific). These functions and processes are dynamic. In accordance with a cognitive subject they can express situations of the initiative, passivity or interdynamics of objects, and are always changing to a certain extent.

2. Levels of Concepts

The functions of "Names" are very complex. They can refer to single concepts, which emerged through cognition, such as a certain table or a chair. They can be general concepts, which include many objects, such as furniture and stationery. They can also represent a common designation for a group of concepts, such as happiness and virtue (they can encompass various kinds of happiness or good fortune and moral conduct). A Name can be a concept of ideological or thought content and it can also be a pre-set structure of thought – a category (*fanchou* 範疇). We will continue by analysing the concepts through their different levels.

2.1. Concrete and Abstract Concepts

The so-called concrete concepts (*juti gainian* 具體概念) refer to concepts where we can return to the original form of concrete objects, such as table, chair, mountain, hill and other aforementioned Names of appearances, where we can find corresponding things in the real world. Abstract concepts (*chouxiang gainian* 抽象概念) indicate concepts, which are formed through the function of abstraction, such as cattle/ox species, sheep/goat species, animals with horns, animals, living beings, etc. We can look for corresponding positions of these concepts only in the world of thought, but

we cannot find concrete corresponding objects in the real world. The formation of abstract concepts is related to the elements of "objects." In addition to the material objects, these objects also refer to psychological objects. For instance, "moods" such as nervousness and anxiety, "emotions or feelings" such as happiness, anger, sorrow and joy, "judgements" such as kind, bad, evil and right, "ideas" such as good, bad, suitable, contrary, etc. Through induction of specific psychological conditions we can abstract the concepts of higher levels. Since matter and spirit are interrelated, abstract concepts of a spiritual nature often come from material conditions or behavioural expressions, which can be observed. For instance, abstract concepts of the spiritual states of wisdom, humaneness and courage come from different specific spiritual or mental states of wisdom, humaneness and courage. These different individual spiritual states of wisdom, humaneness and courage again come from corresponding different expressions of actual behaviour. The emerging of thought content depends precisely on the combinations of these concrete and abstract concepts of various levels.

2.2. Group of Concepts, Conceptual System and First Meaning Concept

The classification of concrete and abstract concepts has been analysed through "cognitive" processes. If we investigate from the viewpoint of the ways of proceeding into "thinking," we can ascertain the following: if we want the miscellaneous concepts, which are entering the world of thought, to constitute a systematic thought or theory, connections and relations of subordination or dependence among all the concepts must be established. In each series of these relations of subordination there is a first meaning concept (*di-yi yi gainian* 第一意概念), which brings up the essential points. Only when there is a domination by the first meaning concept can a group

of concepts or concept group (*gainianqun* 概念群) form a conceptual system (*gainian tixi* 概念體系). For instance, Tang Junyi 唐君毅 says in his book *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: Yuan dao* 中國哲學原論： 原道 (*Fundamental Discussions of Chinese Philosophy: Original Dao*) that Confucius' (Kongzi 孔子) thought takes up "Humaneness or Benevolence (*ren* 仁)" as the first meaning concept and Mozi's thought "Righteousness (*yi* 義)."[3] Another example can be found in Fung Tat Man's (Feng Dawen) 馮達文 work, where he discusses various stages of development of Confucian teaching in the Song 宋 (960–1279), Ming 明 (1368–1644) and Qing 清 (1644–1911) Dynasties by using the theory of the formation of virtues, which advocates "Knowledge (*zhi* 知)" and "Will (*zhi* 志)," the theory of the spheres (*jingjie* 境界), which emphasizes "Feelings (*qing* 情)," epistemological empiricism, which focuses on the "Function (*yong* 用)" and other ways of formulation, as well as by means of the method of the first meaning concept (Fung 1997, 93–341). However, this theoretical construction of the first meaning concept is related to the comprehension of the interpreter and the method of his or her theoretical reconstruction. For instance, the first meaning concept in Mohist teaching includes three different views, i.e. the central theories of "Heaven and Ghosts (*tian gui* 天

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[3] The following concepts are interrelated under the concept of "Humaneness" of the Confucian School (*Rujia* 儒家): Loyalty (*zhong* 忠), Trustworthiness (*xin* 信), Ritual Propriety (*li* 禮), Wisdom (*zhi* 智), and Courage or Valour (*yong* 勇). And the concepts under domination of the concept of "Righteousness" of the Mohist School (*Mojia* 墨家) are: Universal Love or Inclusive Care (*jian'ai* 兼愛), Condemning Offensive Warfare (*feigong* 非攻), Econimizing Expenditures (*jieyong* 節用), and Condemning Music (*feiyue* 非樂). See the chapters "Kongzi zhi ren dao 孔子之仁 道 (Confucius's Way of Humaneness)" and "Mozi zhi yi dao 墨子之義道 (Mozi's Way of Righteousness)" in Tang Junyi's work (Tang 1973, 71, 173).

鬼)," "Universal Love or Inclusive Care (*jian'ai*)," "Righteousness (*yi*)," etc (Cui 1997, 88–111). Therefore, in the process of transformation from a group of concepts into a conceptual system there can be several significant concepts in the interpreter's realm of thought, which compete among each other in his or her mind. The so-called group of concepts refers to a group of several important concepts which are regarded as guiding concepts. It consists of elements of thought which have not yet been systematized. And the first meaning concept is a core theoretical concept of the text, which is reconstructed by the interpreter. In view of this first meaning concept all the relations among various concepts are summed up and further integrated into one systematic thought, which causes the group of concepts to be transformed into a conceptual system. The group of concepts is a predecessor of the conceptual system; and the conceptual system is a systematic thought, where the first meaning concept is regarded as dominant. It exists in the realm of interpreter's thought and gradually universalizes through expression, communication or dialogue, and becomes a model of understanding of a certain school or group.

2.3. Concepts of Thought Content and Concepts of Pre-Set Structure of Thought

The so-called concepts of thought content (*sixiang neirong gainian* 思想内容概念) refer to concepts which reflect the subject's cognition, thinking, experiences, responses and include the concrete concepts, abstract concepts, and so on. With regard to the concepts of pre-set structure of thought (*sixiang yushe geju gainian* 思想預設格局概念), they refer to "categories (*fanchou* 範疇)." As Chang Tung-sun (Zhang Dongsun) 張東蓀 explains:

A category is certainly a concept. Concepts are of various types and among them there is the so-called highest concept. Each of the various branches of learning can sum up its research results into one or two concepts, which are exactly the so-called highest concepts ... however it must be understood that the category is by no means the result of research. On the contrary, when we conduct research, it is set up in advance (Chang 2014, 217).

Chang Tung-sun holds that all languages have such a structure of tacit consent, i.e. the category of thought. For example, *Lunyu* 論語 (*The Analects*) states: "The Filial Piety and Fraternal Duty (*xiao-ti* 孝悌), are they not the Root (*ben* 本) of Humaneness?" We can find three concepts here: "Filial Piety and Fraternal Duty (*xiao-ti*)," "Humaneness (*ren*)" and "Root(s), Basis or Origin (*ben*)." "Filial Piety and Fraternal Duty" and "Humaneness" represent the concepts of results or consequences, and the "Root(s)" is the concept of the pre-set structure, namely the category. The author sets up beforehand that there are Root(s) (*ben*) and Branch(es) (*mo* 末), so that he can use this to regulate or specify the relationship between Humaneness and Filial Piety and Fraternal Duty. Chang Tung-sun found 18 groups and 36 categories in Chinese thought.[4] Moreover, Zhang Liwen 張立文 holds that a category refers to a concept which reflects the most

[4] Chang Tung-sun identified the following 18 binary categories: Presence-Absence (*you-wu* 有無), Identity-Difference (*tong-yi* 同異), Root(s)-Branch(es) (*ben-mo* 本末), Fullness-Emptiness (*shi-xu* 實虛), Oneself-Other(s) (*zi-ta* 自他), Divide-Unite (*fen-he* 分合), Inside-Outside (*nei-wai* 內外), Principal-Subordinate or Lead-Follow (*zhu-cong* 主從), Beginning-End (*shi-zhong* 始終), Before-After or Front-Back (*xian-hou* 先後), Agreeable-Contrary or Follow-Oppose (*shun-ni* 順逆), Deviation-Norm (*li-chang* 離常), Oppose-Restore (*fan-fu* 反復), Positive-Negative (*zheng-fu* 正負), Up-Down or Upper-Lower (*shang-xia* 上下), Public-Private (*gong-si* 公私), Essence-Function (*ti-yong* 體用), and Subject-Object (*neng-suo* 能所) (Chang 2014, 225).

general law of objective things, is a fundamental concept of each discipline and does not indicate all the concepts (Zhang 1989, 6–7). According to his view there are three broad, nine middle-sized and 25 small categories in the logical structure of Chinese logic, which he uses to explain the development of the history of Chinese philosophy. The system of logical structure of Chinese philosophy, which he put forward, encompasses three large categories: a category of the Nature of Images or Forms (*xiangxing* 象性), a category of Fullness (*shixing* 實性) and a category of Emptiness (*xuxing* 虛性). These include nine categories: Form-Form, Form-Fullness, Form-Emptiness, Fullness-Form, Fullness-Fullness, Fullness-Emptiness, Emptiness-Form, Emptiness-Fullness, Emptiness-Emptiness. These nine categories again contain 25 categories, such as Five Phases (*wu xing* 五行), Heaven (*tian* 天), *qi* 氣, *dao* 道, Essence-Function (*ti-yong*), and so on (ibid., 56–57). He attempts to use this system of categories in order to sum up complex connotations of the entire Chinese philosophy, because he mainly holds that ancient Chinese philosophy already has its own logical structure. Precisely this structure is a prerequisite that the system can exist. In addition, the system is the necessary development of the structure. Therefore, the emergence of the entire structure can establish a system. The logical structure of Chinese philosophy is constituted based on the above-mentioned categories.

A category or a structural concept is different from the first meaning concept. The function of the first meaning concept is to integrate the group of concepts which it dominates into a structure of one meaning, i.e. each concept in the group of concepts is directly or indirectly related to the first meaning concept and the connotations of the structure of principal and subordinate are formed. Categories are various structural concepts in a

certain system of meaning, although this system of meaning has only one first meaning concept. For instance, the categories of the Daoist School (*daojia* 道家) are Presence-Absence (*you-wu*), Root-Branch(es) (*ben-mo*), Beginning-End (*shi-zhong*) in Before-After or Front-Back (*xian-hou*), and so on, and in all cases "*Dao*" is regarded as the first meaning concept. On the other hand, the first meaning concept also has the nature of a category and is a pivot which dominates all structural concepts. All the categories are mutually related with the first meaning concept from their distinct structural positions and in various ways. As, for instance, in Mohist thought Benefit-Harm (*li-hai* 利害), Public-Private (*gong-si*) and Universality-Partiality (*jian-bie* 兼別) are all interrelated with "Righteousness."

2.4. Differentiation of Contents and Levels of Polysemantic Concepts

From the point view of expressing situations by using "one Name for multiple Realities" and "the same Name with different expressions," a certain concept can be a component element of a group of concepts and it can also be the first meaning concept; it can be a concept that reflects the thought content and it can perhaps also be a name of a category. Therefore, we have to confirm the concept's position in different contexts and related threads. Among these concepts the first meaning concept is often a representative concept, which answers a certain series of philosophical questions, such as: what is the origin of the cosmos, how are the Myriad Things (all existence) changing, what is the direction of change? "*Dao*" is the answer to the aforementioned questions, and it also dominates many concepts which provide answers to these questions.

If we observe a category from the perspective of its relative position in the thought hierarchy, it can be a class Name of a "structural pattern (*li*

理)." [5] In the cognitive process we can abstract and classify concrete concepts, for instance: plants, animals, living beings, things, etc. We can also classify concepts of spiritual nature, such as nervous, irresolute, anxious, and melancholic. We can also further grasp, classify and give Names to "structural patterns" in changing development of phenomena. For instance, *dao*, Virtue (*de* 德), Heaven (*tian*), Nature or Character (*xing* 性), Mind (*xin* 心), and *qi*. A category is different from a concept of thought content and is a structural concept, where the structure shows the construction of meaning, which must be rational (lit. it must fit the structural pattern). Therefore, a category is often the Name of a certain "structural pattern." As a result of different understanding and different ways of classification of structural patterns in various schools of thought, the Names of categories of different schools are not entirely the same either.

How can we, faced with this situation, arrange all previous systems in the history of Chinese philosophy and grasp the evolution of thinking in various schools? We can attempt by using the analysis, construction and integration of "thought units (*sixiang danwei* 思想單位)." "Thought unit" is a meaningful or significant thought situation. To form this situation means to transform objective things in perceived circumstances into a subjective thinking situation or to change an understanding of the objective written

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[5] The issue of the concept *li* has been thoroughly discussed in the following works: Rošker, Jana S. 2012. *Traditional Chinese Philosophy and the Paradigm of Structure (Li* 理*)*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; Brook, Ziporyn. 2013. *Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents*. New York: State University of New York Press; Brook, Ziporyn. 2013. *Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and coherence in Pre-Neoconfucian Chinese thought*. Albany, New York: SUNY Press. Jana S. Rošker translates the character *li* 理 as "structure" and Ziporyn Brook as "coherence." In addition, the translation "structural pattern," which is used in the present article, has also been gaining recognition.

language in literature into one's own explanation. However, "thought unit" is not thought content, but refers to a significant thought situation, which is "significant," because it's thought content encompasses some fundamental key elements: what exists (phenomenon), what is (position), why (reason), what kind of development will follow (expectation), how should or will we respond or act (solving). That is, the content of the thought situation has to more or less answer these questions (Lee 2017b, 79–80). We can thus discern the "thought unit" in the answers to these questions. Comprehension of phenomenon and positioning of thought is a "construction of the situation (*qingjing gouzuo* 情境構作)." The reason, expectation and solving refer to "dealing with the situation (*qingjing chuli* 情境處理)," which sometimes only means to give the reason, to explain why a phenomenon is as it is, and it is not necessary to discuss it in the light of expected developments. When the "construction of the situation" and "dealing with the situation" are compatible and suitable, there is "harmonization of the situation (*qingjing ronghe* 情境融合)" (Lee 2017a, 43). These three tendencies constitute one "thought unit." Thus we can express one "thought unit" by using the method of related questions and answers or a series of those.

A "thought unit" helps to clarify the meanings of the group of concepts, because the first meaning concept is often the answer to a certain original question or a representative which responds to the group(s) of concepts. The groups of concepts under domination of the first meaning concepts separately belong to various categories, structural patterns of different levels or types and form conceptual systems through relations in a series of questions and answers. Thus, the thought unit of each school assists in developing the first meaning concept. We can find the concepts of the pre-set structure of each school or the existence of its theoretical categories, and

then through the levels of structural patterns approach objectivity and universality. Through the various fundamental key elements of "thought unit" we can examine the position and function(s) of a certain concept in the realm of thought. Next, we will investigate the functions and limitations of conveying concepts in philosophical thinking through the studies of the history of Chinese philosophy.

3. Functions and Limitations of Concepts

If we want to investigate the functions of concepts, we must first understand the properties of "Names." By analysing studies of the School of Names or the Disputers we can discern them into: referential nature (*zhishexing* 指涉性), conventionality (*yuedingxing* 約定性), defining quality (*jiedingxing* 界定性), interactiveness (*hudongxing* 互動性), growth property (*zengzhangxing* 增長性), and ambiguity (*hanhuxing* 含糊性) (Lee 1992, 195–198). They will be briefly explained below.

1. The referential nature (*zhishexing*) of Names indicates that "Names" have to be related to "Reality" and only then they have meaning. A completely independent symbol is not sufficient to become a "Name." For instance, the "Name" "horse" refers to the "Reality" of a "horse."

2. Conventionality (*yuedingxing*) implies that the referential and expressive function of a Name have to observe a common convention in order to reach it. However it often has a definite scope. For example, the chapter "Zheng ming" from *Xunzi* explains: "Names do not have inherent appropriateness, they have been named by convention or agreement. When a convention is established and it turns into a custom, then it is called suitable. If it is different from

the (Name) agreed, then it is called unsuitable."

3. The defining quality (*jiedingxing*) points out that the meaning and connotations or intension of a "Name" have a definite scope. On the one hand it presents a cognitive object, on the other hand it also determines the limits of this object. For instance: "It cannot be learned, it cannot be made, yet it resides in man. It is called inherent nature (*xing* 性)." This is Xunzi's definition of the meaning of "inherent nature or character (*xing*)."

4. Interactiveness (*hudongxing*) denotes that "Names" respond to the changes of "Reality" and that the transformation of what one is expressing causes changes in the meanings of Names. For instance, with regard to the Name "oneself, one's own, personal (*ji* 己)" in Confucius's statements "practicing of Humaneness is from the man himself (*ji*)" and "restrain oneself (*ji*) and restore or return to Propriety," the connotations of the what is "called" are different. The former "*ji*" refers to the moral subject and the latter to the subject with desires.

5. Growth property (*zengzhangxing*) means that in case of the meanings of some Names it is through actual use that their connotations unceasingly increase along with the needs of the user. For instance, the chapter "Zheng ming" in *Xunzi* states: "That which is within a man that he can (*neng* 能) use, is called (inherent) ability (*neng*). Ability joined with the use in accordance with a certain situation is called capability (*neng*)." Here the meaning of "*neng* (can, able, capable, ability, capability)" refers to proficiency as well as use.

6. Ambiguity (*hanhuxing*) means that through actual use of Names we can encounter situations, where there is "the same Name with

different expressions," or there are "different Names with the same expression," or when the Name is not sufficiently included in the related threads, we are not able to determine its meaning. For instance, "Righteousness (*yi*)" and "Interest or Benefit (*li* 利)" are opposite to each other in Confucian thought, but in "Jing shang" of the Mohists "Righteousness (*yi*)" is explained precisely as "Interest (*li*)." However, in different contexts "Benefit or Interest (*li*)" can refer to private interest (*sili* 私利), public interest (*gongli* 公利), large benefit (*dali* 大利), and so on, which causes ambiguity of the Name "Benefit or Interest (*li*)."

The roles of concepts depend on the functions of representing things, carrying meaning, conveying meaning, operating thinking, communicating through debates, etc. We will investigate these from the standpoint of two schools of thought, the Mohist's and Xunzi's.

3.1. Functions of Concepts

3.1.1 Representing Things and Carrying Meaning

In the chapter "Xiao qu" in *Mozi* states: "We use Names to indicate or reflect Reality, we use Phrases or Propositions to express Conceptions, we employ Explanations or Theories to bring out Reasons or Causes." The "Name" in "we use Names to indicate or reflect Reality" appears as a symbol of "Reality." On the other hand, the "Name" is also a concept, and this not only reflects the "Reality of things," but can also reveal the relations between things and results of the comparison of things. There are similarities and differences among things. We group those which are similar into one

category and give it one "Name." When "we use Names to indicate or reflect Reality" we explain "what exists" in a situation of an object.

The reason for the concepts to be able to carry meanings is that, in addition to the objectivity, commonality and conventions of words and phrases in the realm of cognition, they also touch upon the ways of structuring words and phrases, namely, on grammatical questions and are subordinate to the conventions of sentences. The emergence of concepts in the realm of thought comes from cognition and thinking. There are positions of concepts of various levels, such as concepts of content, structural concepts, first meaning concepts, and so on. The relations of interconnectedness among concepts, representativeness of inner and outer objects with various concepts and other factors cause the concepts to be able to carry meanings.

3.1.2   Conveying Meaning

The relations of interconnectedness among concepts indicate that Phrases or Propositions (*ci*), which are constituted of two or more Names, can carry the meanings of the utterer's cognition, experiences, judgements, etc. The formation of "Names" involves the cognitive function; the function of "Names" can also be to indicate Reality and to express it. In addition, through organization of "two or more Names" the "Propositions or Phrases (*ci*)" can be constituted. For instance, in the chapter "Xiao qu" it is stated: "We use Phrases or Propositions to express Conceptions." And the chapter "Jing shang" explains that "getting the meaning by listening is an observation of the mind" and that "grasping the said and expressing one's view's means debating by using the mind (*bian* 辯)." It is thus evident that observation and debating by using the mind is expressed through Propositions or Phrases. When "we use Phrases or Propositions to express Conceptions," we explain "what is" this situation or a specific object in the

situation. We can analyse the contents of this explanation and point out the concept contained in a pre-set structure — a category. Because people have the same brain anatomy and similar structure of the realm of thought, the concepts of various categories, levels and positions can be analogous as well. Moreover, with regard to the meanings conveyed by the group of concepts we can say that in addition to its meanings, which indicate the naming of each Name and Proposition, this group of concepts as experienced by the utterer as "one whole" can also include his or her meanings. For instance, the reader of the book *Laozi* 老子 can in the case of a group of concepts, such as *Dao*, (That) Can be Spoken (*ke dao* 可道), Eternal *Dao* (*chang dao* 常道), Returning or Circulation (*fan* 反), Elusive or Equable (*yi* 夷), Rarefied or Inaudible (*xi* 希), Infinitesimal or Subtle (*wei* 微), Presence (*you*), Absence (*wu*), etc., grasp the meanings by crossing or breaking free from the rational boundaries and go from cognition to comprehension; i.e. the group of concepts may convey non-linguistic meanings.

3.1.3   Operating Thinking and Communicating through Debates

The statement "we employ Explanations or Theories to bring out Reasons or Causes" explains "why," namely the causal relationships between situations or between elements of the situation. Names (*ming*), Propositions or Phrases (*ci*) and Explanations or Theories (*shuo*), and Debates or Disputes (*bian*), they are all constituted of concepts. "Debate or Dispute" can reveal "how will the subject (respond or act)" as well as the subject's perspective and inference or speculation regarding the development "how will the situation be." Through that which is constituted by concepts, i.e. Names, Propositions or Phrases, Explanations or Theories and Debates or Disputes, the meanings of human cognition, experiences, responses,

attempts, actions etc. can be conveyed. In the subject's realm of thought the thinking operations are carried out by using methods of concepts, words and phrases, argumentation, questions and answers, etc. When there are different opinions among various subjects (people), communication is carried out through argumentation and debate in order to attain one's objective. As Xunzi's idea of the Correct Use of Names or Rectification of Names (*zheng ming sixiang*) reveals in the chapter "Zheng ming" from *Xunzi*: *"Names refer to assembling various Realities by using a convention."* Xunzi regards the "Names" as terms for "Realities" of the same kind. In the process of communication, the nature of a Name is to reflect the Reality of an object. The initial role of Names lies in the statement *"We use Names to indicate or reflect Reality."* By accumulating numerous Names we can form sentences and writings to achieve an exchange of ideas among people. Through operations with concepts in the human realm of thought a few wise men formulated different Names in order to denote various objects and situations, and then they distinguished between noble and lowly, high and low social classes. In addition, they made a distinction between similarities and differences of all kinds of objects. Only in this way can the will and ideas of people be mutually communicated and understood, and only then the public affairs of all people can be accomplished through cooperation. If there would be no "Names" on Earth or if "Names" would exist yet we would be unable to communicate, then it could be as Xunzi stated:

> If different people mutually explain their different ideas, and if in case of different objects they disorderly tangle up the Names and Realities, then the noble and lowly positions are not clear, and similarities and differences are not distinguished. If so, intentions to explain clearly (and/or understand) will surely encounter trouble, and affairs will certainly suffer from difficulties and ruin because of abandonment.

From the perspective of "distinguishing between similarities and differences (*bian tong yi* 辨同異)" the "Names" have a role of providing knowledge and ideas; from the viewpoint of "clarifying noble and lowly (*ming gui jian* 明貴賤)" we can with regard to the function "Names" play in the real world ascertain that they also have a role in political ethics; and viewed from the standpoint of "intentions to explain clearly (and/or understand) (*zhi yu* 志喻)" they have a communication role or effect as well.

Individual concepts have their own individual meanings, connections between concepts constitute the meanings of sentences, numerous sentences reveal a group of concepts, which in dynamic contexts also carries the meanings of this concept group as a whole. The functions of concepts on various levels mutually support and also restrict each other.

3.2. Limitations of Concepts

3.2.1   Segmenting Nature of Names

Wang Bi 王弼 explains in his *Laozi zhilüe* 老子指略 (*Outline Introduction to the Laozi*):

> Names have to be differentiated, Designations (*cheng* 称) must have Reasons. If Names are differentiated, then they are not inclusive; if there is a Reason, then a Designation does not completely encompass the meaning. As (a Name) is not entirely inclusive, then it would greatly differ from the truth; as it does not completely encompass the meaning, then we cannot use the Name.

The connotations of the concept of "Names" come from human cognition and understanding. Human cognition is incapable of grasping every single detail of everything that is contained therein, and grasped phenomenon also cannot encompass the entirety of all the phases of change.

"Designation" is an expression of subject's meaning, which contains comprehension of the causal relationships between various objects in the changing phenomenon. But because the phenomenon is not understood in its entirety and it is also not possible to limit the causal relationships. Therefore, when the cognitive subject observes "what exists" it expresses it by using "Names," i.e. segments continuous phenomena and presents dynamic continuous objects in a fragmentary static way. This kind of cognitive segmentation also brings about the fragmentary nature of concept formation. If in the case of a certain phenomenon each observation of "what exists" is different, it signifies that the construction and understanding of the situation by different subjects will not be completely the same. If the observations of the "phenomenon (*shi* 事)," i.e. of "what exists," are different, then understandings of "the structural pattern in the phenomenon (*li* in *shi*)" will vary as well, which will probably also have an effect on the differences in thought positions with regard to the phenomenon as a whole, or to what "are" the people, matters and things in the phenomenon.

3.2.2 Limitations of Expressing Metaphysical Meanings

The first chapter of *Laozi* states: *"Dao that can be spoken, is not the eternal Dao. Name that can be named, is not the Eternal Name."* It is not possible to fully express metaphysical *"Dao"* with a "Name." The reason lies in the fact that emergence of Names originates from objects in the empirical world, *"Dao"* however is regarded as the origin of the Myriad Things in the empirical world, as the law of the movement of change, which goes beyond Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things and we cannot find all the proper connotations which would sum up all that would need to be expressed about it. With regard to the limitations of expressing the metaphysical meanings of "Names" Feng Youlan observes:

Positive (*zheng* 正) and negative (*fu* 負) method are by no means contradictory, on the contrary, they complement each other. One complete metaphysical system should begin with the positive method and end with the negative method. If it does not end with the negative method, it cannot achieve the final apex. But if it does not begin with the positive method, it is lacking as an essential distinct philosophical thinking (Feng 2001, 288).

If we distinguish between Names and analyse structural patterns, this positive method has its limits and we need the support of other approaches. And how should we then implement Feng Youlan's so-called "negative method"? As Gao Chenyang 高晨陽 points out:

Feng Youlan's so-called 'negative method' is precisely one type of intuitive methods, which we can divide into a 'method of affirmation of language through its negation' (*yi yan qian yan fa* 以言譴言法)' and a 'method from learning to understanding (*you xue er wu fa* 由學而悟法)'. 'Negative method' mainly refers to the 'method of affirmation of language through its negation' (Gao 2000, 143–144).

In other words, to express yourself in such a way that by using the negative method of covering up and negation of a thing indicated by a "Name," we explain what the object is not and thus reveal what it is, as for instance when using a technique of painting the clouds to set off the moon.

3.2.3 Impossibility to synchronize concepts by promoting rational criteria

In the process of interpreting texts and conducting research there are four kinds of different rational criteria, i.e. rational criteria of cognition, comprehension, explanation and demonstration (Lee 2016, 1). "Rational criterion of cognition" indicates that people regard "structural patterns,"

which sum up their cognitive experiences, as a criterion. "Rational criterion of comprehension" represents a rational criterion, which involves comprehension of the original versions of philosophical texts. People set "rational criterion of explanation" after they understand these original texts, and it is a rational criterion of explaining or directing towards the correct explanation of the object. "Rational criterion of demonstration" refers to a fundamental criterion of judgement, which can be established by combining the cognition, comprehension and explanation. We can distinguish between three types of demonstration: demonstration with physical evidence, demonstration with quotations and demonstration with argumentation.

Rational criteria emerged because we must think by using language and concepts. The language springs from cognition and cognition comes from the segmentation of continuous phenomena and relative, partial views of the whole. Viewed from the perspective of the cognitive subject, the inertia of segmentation of continuous phenomena is different in the case of each person. From the standpoint of the utterer, searching for a suitable concept and phraseology restructures the object of cognition, so the choices and ways of expression also vary. And from the perspective of the receiver of the message, the language transforms into a thinking situation, which also differs from the process of returning to the formation of the primary phenomenon. This is related to our previous experiences of transforming the same language. All these "differences" are related to rational criteria (ibid., 16). Because "Names" have a defining quality (*jiedingxing*) and referential nature (*zhishexing*), it causes the connotations of concepts to have the limitations of subjective connotations. Although determined through objectivization of the conventions (*yuedingxing*), which enables the connotations of concepts to be as clear as possible, they are only suitable for use in demonstration with argumentations and partially with quotations

according to "rational criterion of demonstration." If we would employ concepts as a tool in demonstration with physical evidence, we would be unable to reach the rational criterion of demonstration with physical evidence. In this case we must explore the non-linguistic meanings of dynamic groups of concepts.

In order to avoid the limitations created by the segmenting nature of "Names" and return to the original continuity of the changing phenomena, there are many categories in Chinese philosophy which are binary concepts, such as Root(s)-Branch(es) (*ben-mo*), Essence-Function (*ti-yong*), *Dao*-Utensil (*Dao-qi* 道器), Movement-Stillness (*dong-jing* 動靜), One(ness)-Multiplicity (*yi-duo* 一多), and *Yin-Yang* 陰陽. The formation of relative concepts involves the whole, change, transformation of views, integration of positions and other cognitive processes, through which we derive binary concepts. However, if we view this only from the perspective of the emergence of "concepts," no matter whether they are single concepts or binary categories, all of them are not enough to explain the contents of philosophical thought. Through the composition of elements of these concepts we have to form a conceptual system, and only then this is sufficient to carry and convey the contents of philosophical thought. The manifestation mode of the conceptual system can often be transformed into several basic forms of questions and answers, such as: what exists, what is, why, how, how should (we respond or act), how will (we respond or act)?

Therefore, in the case of each concept or category it is necessary to return to the origin and integrate it into the situational context from which it emerged, especially into the situation at the location of its "structural pattern," i.e. to return to the original "structural pattern sphere." Only in this way we can grasp the holistic connotations of Chinese philosophy.

4. Relationship between Concepts and Philosophical Theory

Through the above investigation we gained understanding of the formation and classification of concepts, different concepts of various levels, relationships between groups of concepts, conceptual system, first meaning concepts and thought unit, and the functions and limitations of concepts. Among them the thought unit represents an element of philosophical theory, which can be analysed, and the relationship between concepts and thought units can contribute to our understanding of relationships between concepts and philosophical theory.

What is meant by a theory? A theory is a theory because those who construct it examine and seek out the principles in changing phenomena. In addition, it can be expressed systematically by using spoken and written language. Thus, the constitution of a theory comprises of the following main fundamental theoretical conditions (Lee 2003, 211).

1. Describes examined phenomenon. (What exists? What is?)
2. Interprets causal (ethics, interests, structure,...) relations among objects of the phenomenon. (Why?)
3. Speculates about the future development of a situation in the phenomenon. (How /will it be/?)
4. Handles or solves a problem found in the phenomenon. (How should /we respond or act/? How will /we respond or act/?)

Chinese philosophy is a branch of learning which investigates the "structural patterns (*li*)" of the cosmos and life. The original meaning of the character "*li*" is the striation pattern or vein lines in jade. Jade must be carved according to its vein lines or texture, therefore the noun "*li*" holds

the meanings of order, gradation, levels, orderliness or proper arrangement of objects. For instance, the chapter "Ru xiao 儒效 (Effects of Confucian Teaching)" in *Xunzi* states "Oh, (he is) methodical, methodical! He possesses (the laws of) order (*li*)." Furthermore, the verb "*li*" means to cut and polish jade. As can be seen in the chapter "He shi 和氏 (Mr. He)" from the book *Han Feizi* 韓非子: "So the King made the jeweller cut and polish (*li*) his uncut jade (*pu* 璞) and thus he got a gem." The third chapter "Qin ce 秦策 (Strategies of Qin)" in *Zhanguo ce* 戰國策 (Strategies of the Warring States) explains: "People of the state of Zheng call the jade, which is not processed, *pu*." If we extend this meaning to the times when we face the loss of order or disorder in situations and phenomena, it also encompasses meanings such as arrange, govern, administer, manage and so on. And chapter "Da qu" in *Mozi* maintains: "Debates are born out of Reasons, elucidated according to structural patterns (*li*) and developed by using categorisation. If a Proposition (*ci*) is formulated, but the Reason out of which it is born is not known, it is unfounded." Thus, in the context of this meaning "*li*" also signifies "to infer" or "to deduce." We will use the chart below to illustrate the system of structural patterns in the thought unit:[6]

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[6] The chart is taken from the author's article which is titled "Xian-Qin luoji sixiang yanjiu fangfa tanxi 先秦邏輯思想研究方法探析 (Analysis of Research Methods of the Pre-Qin Logical Thinking)" (Lee 2017b, 84). Its content has been somewhat modified.

The System of "Structural Patterns (SP)" in the Thought Unit:

What exists? → SP 1 → Therefore (it) exists   │

What is?   → SP 2 → Therefore (it) is │ > How should (we respond)?

How will (we act)? Subjective → Objective

Why? → SP 3 → Why (it) exists? Why (it) is? │ > Internal → External /

Interpolation (SP 5) \ Choice

How? → SP 4 → Future Development   │   \ Extrapolation (SP 6) /

             │ (How will /it be/?)

Among these, "what exists" is constituted of groups of concepts. Its "structural pattern" is related to a cosmology and theory of life, and corresponds to structural pattern 1. "What is?" consists of groups of concepts, which belong to categories. Its structural pattern involves an ontology, theory of life, and theory of spheres (*jingjie*), and corresponds with structural pattern 2. "Why?" is made up of conceptual systems, which belong to various categories under domination of the first meaning concepts. Its structural pattern serves as an essential condition of various theoretical levels of cosmology, theory of life, ontology, theory of spheres, and epistemology, and corresponds to structural pattern 3. "How?" refers to that which may exist and be in the future. It is equivalent to structural pattern 4 and it is an extension of structural patterns 1 and 2. "How should (we respond or act)?" recalls the cognitive subject's value criteria. The structural pattern of interpolation involves the theory of self-cultivation and time, and corresponds to structural pattern 5. The structural pattern of extrapolation of "How will (we respond or act)?" covers the practice of self-cultivation

and time, or according to various fields of this practice includes political philosophy, ethics ,and so on. It correspond to structural pattern 6. "How will (it be)?" refers to the result of a chosen activity, the sphere of time and self-cultivation, or some kind of ideal; it is often a peripheral space of one thought unit with a practical nature and it is not necessarily clearly presented.

From the viewpoint of the whole, there is interrelatedness between all structural patterns and the structural pattern of "why?" (structural pattern 3) is regarded as dominant with regard to various structural patterns, so that the structural patterns may be set up. For instance, constitutive elements, laws of change and forms of interaction in the cosmos have an effect on the regulation of human body and spirit; the reason why it is thus in the theory of time is because it is related to cosmology; the reason for promoting the subject in the theory of self-cultivation and its ultimate goal is that they are also related to cosmology and the theory of spheres, i.e. structural patterns 5 and 6 are based on structural pattern 3 and interrelated with structural patterns 1 and 2.

Moreover, one must also pay attention to the shifts in the lines of reasoning inside the thought unit. Chapter "Xi gong shiliu nian 僖公十六年 (Duke Xi, Year 16)" in *Chunqiu* 春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals)" states: "In the year sixteen, in spring, in the King's first month, on the wushen day, fell the stones on Song, five of them. In the same month six herons flew backward and over the capital of Song." In the eponymous chapter of *Gongyang zhuan* 公羊傳 (Gongyang's Commentaries) it is stated:

> Why does (Chunqiu) first say that they fell and only then that they were stones? 'Fell the stones' is a record of what was heard and the falling noise was heard. When they saw them, they knew that they are stones. And when they examined them, they found out there were five of them... Why does

(Chunqiu) first speak that there were six of them and only then that they were herons? 'Six herons flew backward' records what was seen. When they saw them, they noticed there were six of them. When they observed them, they realized they are herons and after longer inspection they found out that they are flying backward" (Chiang 1989, 111).

Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 comments on this in the chapter "Shen cha ming hao 深察名號 (Profound Examination of Names and Designations)" in *Chunqiu fanlu* 春秋繁露 (Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals):

> *Chunqiu* distinguishes between structural patterns of things in order to correctly use or rectify their Names. It names things according to their nature, it does not make mistakes, not even for the tip of an autumn hair. Therefore, when naming the stones, which were falling, it states that they were five afterwards and when it is talking about the herons which flew backwards, it states that there were five of them first.

If we take this as an example, the description in the quoted passage from *Chunqiu* is the structural pattern 1 of "what exists." However, *Gongyang zhuan* does not explore the structural pattern of "why" at all: why were there stones falling, why could the falling stones fall to the ground and why can migratory birds fly backward? But rather it places the focus on the reasons "why is it expressed in this way?" by the writer(s) of *Chunqiu.* It is stressed "what was their cognitive process?" and how did it turn around the epistemological aspect of cause and effect? Then Dong Zhongshu in the chapter "Shen cha ming hao" from *Chunqiu fanlu* points out that it concerns the precision of the "Correct use of Names or Rectification of Names (*zheng ming* 正名)." Therefore, in case of systems of "structural patterns," in these thought units we cannot observe only the form of development of a single

line, but we also need to investigate the shifts in the lines of reasoning in various contexts and on many levels. This is the part where we must be careful when dealing with Chinese philosophical materials.

Now we will take the School of Mystery (*Xuanxue* 玄學) from the Wei-Jin 魏晉 (220–420) period in the history of Chinese philosophy (Fung in Guo 2005, 230–319) as an example and show one comparatively large-scale thought unit:

1. What exists in the world? Heaven, Earth and the Myriad Things (all existence), natural phenomena, teaching of Names and laws of ceremonial rites or rules of etiquette (*mingjiao lifa* 名教禮法).

2. What is the basis or origin of the Myriad Things (all existence)? Absence (*wu* 無) (Wang Bi), *Qi* (Ruan Ji 阮籍, Ji Kang 嵇康), Presence (*you* 有) (Guo Xiang 郭象, Pei Wei 裴頠).

3. Why? The Myriad Things (all existence) take Absence as their Basis or Root(s) (*ben*) (Wang Bi), the Myriad Things are becoming through transformations of *Qi* (Ruan Ji, Ji Kang), Absence cannot give birth to Presence, things spontaneously create themselves and are not dependent of anything outside them (Guo Xiang), the whole of mingling Roots is the highest *Dao*, the multitude of Presence is becoming through mutual support and accentuation (Pei Wei).

4. How? The teaching of Names and laws of ceremonial rites are parts of Reality (*shi*), which encompasses numerous different forms or images (*xiang* 象).

5. How will (we respond or act)? We will arrange and systematize this diversity.

The teaching of Names (*mingjiao*) stems from Nature (*ziran* 自然), revere the Roots (*ben*) and nourish the Branches (*mo*), we must not reject the Roots in order to chase the Branches; we will include the diversity of images or forms into Reality (Wang Bi).

Go beyond the teaching of Names and follow Spontaneity (lit. Nature), get in touch with the feeling of various situations and act accordingly (Ruan Ji, Ji Kang).

The teaching of Names is Authentic (lit. Natural); maintain integrity and do not imitate others, each of the Myriad Things has entirely its own Nature and separately wanders free and unfettered (Guo Xiang).

If viewed from the standpoint of the relations between the "teaching of Names" and "Nature (Naturalness, Spontaneity etc.)," involving "how will (we respond or act)?" can have an impact on the choice, analysis and comprehension of the phenomenon, i.e. of "what exists," and positioning of the concept of basis or origin, i.e. of "what is," therefore in a similar atmosphere of the times we can find different theoretical positions and approaches, such as: the teaching of Names stems from Nature, go beyond the teaching of Names and follow Spontaneity (lit. Nature), the teaching of Names is Authentic (lit. Natural). The philosopher's bitter experiences, emotional input, practice or demonstration with physical evidence can cause him to make some kind of attempt in respect of "how" and "how will (it be)," and then he moulds, seeks for or arranges arguments or grounds with regard to "what exists," "what is" and/or "why?"

In addition, because of the segmenting nature of "Names" and non-comprehensiveness of the reasons or grounds for "Designations (*cheng*)," the limitedness of functions of concepts means that in the subject's self-constructed thought unit the handling of the situation and harmonizing of situations both contain his motives or attempts. This reveals that human

responses to changes in this world are a process of moving from passivity to activity. It encompasses the following course of development: passive → active → passive → active...

Moreover, because the theory or philosophical teaching of a certain school can explain certain phenomena, clearly present the values, objectives, meaning of life, etc., it can elevate the realm of human life to a certain extent. As a result it can have many supporters and followers; people often have the tendency to universalize, rationalize and absolutize a teaching or theory, which they themselves maintain to be true. On the one hand, on a spiritual level they have a thirst for conquering others and assimilating different races or nations, and they are not willing to drop a theory which they believe to be the truth; on the other hand, in the process of seeking the truth, when people are constantly facing change and they have to solve new problems, they have no choice but to make modifications through other stimulations and challenges in order to test and verify a theory's universality, rationality and absoluteness, and so the theory also must adjust. Because of the tools which mankind uses to express ideas, i.e. the concepts, its effects are limited. In order to maintain the validity of a theory it can happen that supporters expand the meanings of the concepts used in the related literature, which supports it, and offer a rational reinterpretation. However, when the external environment and internal state of mind impact the change to reach a certain level and old theories are already unable to explain new phenomena, then some theories and philosophical thoughts are replaced by newly emerging philosophical theories. When researching the development of the history of Chinese traditional philosophy we must especially take note that when old thought falls into disuse and new thought rises, this is also a turning point when the meanings of concepts transform or new concepts emerge.

5. Conclusion: Possible Method of Constructing the Conceptual System in the History of Chinese Philosophy

By conducting an observation of the courses of numerous research methods in Chinese philosophy, we can roughly divide them into four phases (Lee 2007):

1. First, we define words, phrases, sentences and chapters of a classical work and build the understanding of ideas;
2. next, understanding the meaning of writings is followed by theoretical construction;
3. then, after the classical text is transformed and constructed into a theory, comparison and evaluation is conducted;
4. finally, we do a creative philosophical reflection and integrative research.

Each among these phases, which are conducted to achieve the aim of research, have to be the object of research of "Chinese philosophical methodology." But in the above research process the history of Chinese philosophy must also pay attention to the inheritance, relatedness and influences of philosophical thoughts through the ages. Especially after the construction of theories of various schools of thought, the development of thoughts, similarities and differences among problems, and different viewpoints in the presented solutions, are revealed through the related thought units. To be able to conduct all of these processes, the clarification of the meanings of the concepts, groups of concepts, conceptual systems and the first meaning concepts are required. Below we will examine the functions and limitations of concepts in research into the history of Chinese philosophy according to the above-mentioned order.

First, the phase of establishing and understanding the text is about grasping the meanings of the groups of concepts. 1. Constitutive concepts in the original version of the classical text. For instance, the concept of "Humaneness (*ren*)," which appears in *Lunyu* more than one hundred times. 2. The groups of concepts for explanation. If we observe the integration of meanings in various contexts through "Humaneness," it is explained as: "the relationship, which a Human Being, who exists between Heaven and Earth, should have with himself, with others and with Heaven." At this moment, the first meaning concept is still in a phase of vagueness, and all sorts of attempts are still being made to clarify it.

Second, in the phase of explanation and reconstruction of theory, which involves constructing a conceptual system, the theory is reconstructed by using three methods: consequential reconstruction, referential reconstruction, expansive reconstruction (Lee 2015, 117–140). Each establishes a different conceptual system.

Third, the phase of comparison and critique, which involves comparison between concepts, categories and problems, as well as critique touching upon presuppositions, the first meaning concepts, theoretical points of view and confrontations between positions.

Fourth, the innovative phase involves newly expanded meanings of concepts, innovative renaming or redefining of concepts, and construction of a new philosophical theory by using new connotations of concepts and thought content. It seems as if this "innovation" is not a step which needs to be the concern of the history of Chinese philosophy; however, how certain philosophers' thoughts in the history of Chinese philosophy were innovative, is also an important point for those of us who research the history of Chinese philosophy. Such examples of creative explanation are Wang Bi's interpretation of *Laozi* and Guo Xiang's interpretation of *Zhuangzi*.

The concepts must be placed in contexts and only then can we discern their meanings; nouns in sentences, in paragraphs, in chapters and in a book. Concepts manifest meanings in groups of concepts, conceptual systems, systematic theories and thought units. Answers to the fundamental original questions are inevitably related to the first meaning concept. A conceptual system is formed from the groups of concepts which are dominated by the first meaning concepts. A systematic theory contains many thought units, and by fusing various thought units some small ones form middle-sized thought units, and these again constitute a large thought unit; a thought unit includes a number of questions and answers to how's and why's. The relatedness of questions and answers constitutes a systematic theory.

By presenting the fundamental Buddhist (*fojiao* 佛教) thought we will show its thought unit, as follows:

1. What exists? Various Phenomena or Things (*zhu xing* 諸行), Dharma Realms (*fajie* 法界, Sanskrit: *Dharmadhātu*).

2. What is? All Phenomena or Things are Impermanent (*wu chang* 無常), Suffering (*ku* 苦).

3. Why?

    3.1 All Things and Phenomena are causally related and linked, the Cause of Suffering (*ji* 集) is Desire or Attachment.

    3.2 Illusion or Ignorance (*wuming* 無明; Sanskrit: *avidyā*) regarding the facts that "All Dharmas (Phenomena or Things) are without Self (*zhu fa wu wo* 諸法無我)," Attachment to the Self (*wo zhi* 我執, Sanskrit: *ātma-grāha*).

4. How will (we respond or act)? Break the Attachment to the Self, the (Eightfold) Path (*Dao*).

5. How will (it be)? Tranquillity, Nirvana (*jijing niepan* 寂靜涅槃),
   Cessation of Suffering (*mie* 滅).

Such a thought unit integrates in it the concepts of doctrines of "Three Dharma Seals (*san fa yin* 三法印; Sanskrit: *trilaksanā dharmamudrā*)" and "Four (Noble) Truths (*si di* 四諦; Sanskrit: *catvāri āryasatyāni*)," such as Suffering, Cause of Suffering, Cessation of Suffering, Path or Way (*Dao*), etc. We can extend these concepts to the contexts of other Buddhist thoughts as well, establish relations between various thought units, form a system of thought, and then grasp the levels of concepts and their meanings.

Thus, a possible method of constructing a conceptual system in the history of Chinese philosophy lies in transforming the thoughts of various schools through the ages into large and small thought units. Because the structures and key elements of various thought units are similar, we can compare them with each other, draw similarities, preserve differences, and connect them with each other. Next, we place significant concepts of various schools into contexts of thought units to position meanings, and distinguish between concepts of content, structural concepts and first meaning concepts. Metaphorically speaking, the thought unit is a skeleton, the concepts of various levels are flesh and blood, and they constitute an organic whole of the history of Chinese philosophy. Each thought unit contains certain "structural patterns," and the "structural patterns" of various fields are interrelated and linked up by the groups of concepts under domination of the first meaning concept. If we take "*Dao*" from *Laozi*, Confucius's "Humaneness," "Heaven" from *Mozi*, Han Fei's 韓非 "Law (*fa* 法)," Wang Bi's "Absence," Guo Xiang's "Presence" as examples, we can see that all of these first meaning concepts dominate their respective groups

of concepts, but these concepts must undergo the series of questions and answers in thought units, and only then can they bring into play the rationality of conveying meanings, form a systematic structure and constitute a philosophical theory. Although there are many written works about the history of philosophy which use major concepts as the chapter headings, these are just designations of certain conceptual systems or representatives of thought units.[7] In short, the concepts have to match other research methods and only then can they bring into play the functions of conveying concepts in philosophical thinking. After that they constitute conceptual and theoretical systems that can be the subject of research.

Translated by Živa Petrovčič

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[7] For instance, Lao Sze-kwang maintains in the third and fourth chapter of his work that Confucuis' fundamental theory refers to the following three concepts, Humaneness (*ren*), Righteousness (*yi*) and Ritual Propriety (*li*), and that he extends the theory to Loyalty (*zhong*), Reciprocity (*shu* 恕), Uprightness (*zhi* 直) and Correct Use of Names (*zheng ming*); Laozi's thought refers to three groups of concepts, i.e. 1. *Dao*, Eternity (*chang* 常), Return or Circulating Movement (*fan*); 2. Non-Doing (*wu wei* 無為), Nothing is not Done (*wu bu wei* 無不為); and 3. Guarding What is Soft and Tender (*shou rou* 守柔), Not Striving or Not Struggling (*bu zheng* 不爭), Small Community or Small Country with Few Inhabitants (*xiaoguo gua min* 小國寡民). Through explaining the mutual relations between various concepts on the level of meaning he constitutes Confucius' and Laozi's systems of thought and demonstrates the positions of thought of the pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist school in the history of Chinese philosophy (Lao 2011, 108–130, 227–242).

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TAIWANESE PHILOSOPHY FROM THE EAST ASIAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

How is it Possible to "Think from the Point of View of East Asia?": Focusing on the Experiences of Chinese-Japanese Intellectual Exchange

Chun-chieh Huang

This paper deals with the problem of methodology within East Asian studies by focusing on the experiences of the Japanese-Chinese intellectual exchange.

It is made up of four parts. In the first part it describes how the argument 20th century East Asian intellectuals put forward about the future prospects of the region was based on the conflict of two views – the doctrine of "exiting Asia" and the doctrine of "reviving Asia" – and that these two views, though opposite, both dealt with either abolishing or building up the East Asian identity.

In the second part the paper examines the way in which East Asia is simultaneously a political and a cultural system. For thousands of years the relationships of political influence and the cultural exchanges between East Asian countries occurred in a state of political and cultural asymmetry between the "centre" and "periphery." Due to this, any time the "centre" became weakened, the "periphery" asserted itself and tried to change the "actual Asia" into a future "ideal Asia." In the cultural sphere of premodern East Asia, China played the role of the "significant other." However from the second half of the 19th century onward the West assumed the role of the "absent significant other" within the exchanges between East Asian

countries, and thus established its all-encompassing influence on the political and cultural trends of the region.

In the third part the paper sets out the argument that in order to achieve "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" in the 21st century we have to adopt a horizon of cultural-historical comparison between China and the West and focus on the "universal" and the "particular" of East Asian cultures, their mutual influences, tensions and conflicts. The last, fourth part, is the conclusion.

Introduction

In the 21st century, a time of globalization, Asia's sudden rise to prosperity has a momentum that is getting stronger by the day. We have data for the growth of different Asian economies, but an even better indicator of this trend is the rate of increase of the number of airline passengers between different countries from 1996 to 2005. While the number of passengers flying between the countries of Europe increased by a mere 36%, and between Asia and America, Asia and Europe and America and Europe by 50 to 60%, the number of passengers within Asia increased by as much as 109%.[1] The promotion of Asia has been a significant trend since the end of the 20th century up until the present day. Such promotion and development of Asia has been closely connected to the sudden rise of China, which in 2011 surpassed Japan to become the country with the second largest economy in the world. Moreover, China joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN 10 + 1) transformed ASEAN into a trade system of over two billion people. Under such developments, while in this

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[1] Based on statistics in: *Shûkan tôyô keizai* 週刊東洋経済 [*Eastern Economy Weekly*]. In the present article cited from: Zhang and Gu 2007, 108–109.

new era studies in humanities need to pay attention to the relationship between cultural tradition and the political and economic situation in Asia, before contributing to studies from what can be called the East Asian standpoint, it is essential that we look back at 20th century Asian intellectuals' views on Asia.

The second half of the 19th century was a time of great upheaval in the histories of many Asian nations. Using their military might, the Western industrialised countries and imperialist states invaded many such nations, but the greatest victim was for a long time China. In 1894, in the first Sino-Japanese war (the Tonghak Uprising), the Qing Dynasty was defeated and Taiwan became a colony of Japan, which was itself emerging as an Asian imperialist state. After that, in the 1920s, the Japanese view of China went from contempt to disregard (Yong Dongliang 2012, 103–190), and Japan's relationship with China changed from Japan being in a neighbourly role to that of being a patron (Tao 2007, 1–28).

Among the 20th century Asian intellectuals, two views of Asia were prevalent. One is that the states and people of the region needed to leave the nest of Asian tradition and head in the direction of the advanced European-American civilization. This is the so-called "exiting Asia" doctrine. The most famous proponent of this was probably Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834–1901). Fukuzawa, was one of the most important demystifiers of modern Japan's "Westernization movement,"[2] created over 68 literary works during

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[2] Inside Japan Fukuzawa Yukichi argued that "Heaven created no man above man, created no man below man" (Fukuzawa 1996), but about the people of the newly colonized Taiwan he said: "The islanders are crafty. While facing our great soldiers, they pretend to follow order for a time, but when they feel our military might waning, they instantly rebel and fall into a frenzy. Such stupidity should perhaps be pitied, but if such stubbornness and ignorance are their basic human characteristics and they can never wake up from this, then we have to accept there is no other way than a total annihilation and sweep away the wrongdoers with one sweep." See: Fukuzawa

his lifetime, and claimed that his most influential work, *Gakumon no susume (An Encouragement of Learning)* was read by one in six of the Japanese population (Fukuzawa 1942). With his famous slogan "exit Asia, enter Europe," Fukuzawa argued that it was necessary to say good-bye to Asia and to join the advanced European civilization. Among the proponents of this doctrine were also Shiratori Kurakichi (1865–1942), a Japanese Sinologist from the first half of the 20th century, and Naitō Konan (1866–1934), who otherwise thought that the Chinese civilization after the year 1000 CE was something truly splendid. However, even though Naitō emphasized the advanced state of post-Tang and Song Chinese civilization, he also thought European civilization should be taken as a model. He can therefore be considered a proponent of the "exit Asia" doctrine in a broader sense. Proponents of this implicitly advocated for a future based on civilizational advancement. With his slogan "making European civilization the goal" (Fukuzawa 1995, 9–29) Fukuzawa meant that the civilizationally lagging Asia had to develop in the direction of the advanced European civilization.

On the other side there were 20th century Asian intellectuals who opposed the power of the European and American states and advocated for a revival of Asia. In the year 1883, the "Association for the Development of Asia" civil organization was formed and in 1883 it became the "Asian Association." Man intellectuals belonged to the group of proponents of the "develop Asia doctrine," and on the spectrum of modern East Asian politics they held different positions. For example, in his 1924 speech in Kobe, Sun

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1896 and Fukuzawa 1961, 359. For the Chinese translation, see: Chen 1991. I have in the past already written about the paradoxical relationship between Fukuzawa Yukichi's statements on Taiwan and the ideology of democratic rights that he was a proponent of. For a more detailed argument, see Huang 2007, 39–70.

Wen (1866–1925) pointed out that after the successes of the Meiji Reform Japan was at a historical crossroads and the Japanese people would soon have to make a choice: either to return to the politics of the "kingly way" that represented the ideal of Asian culture, or to keep engaging in the style of political governing developed by the imperialist cultures of Europe.[3] Li Dazhao (1889–1927), one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, advocated the "principle of New Asia" (Li 2006, 269). Similar to Sun Wen's "principle of great Asia," Li Dazhao primarily emphasized the unification of Asian people and criticized Japan's ambition of invading China, and thus their "develop Asia doctrine" represented an opposition to Japan's own policy in the first half of the 20th century, "the leader of the East doctrine." In his memoir titled *Sanjūsan no yume* (*Thirty-year Dream*), Sun Wen's Japanese friend Miyazaki Tōten (1871–1922) touched on his friendly feelings towards the leader of the Chinese revolution. Miyazaki was also a proponent of the "develop Asia doctrine," who at the same time supported the Chinese revolution (Miyazaki 1967).[4]

During the one hundred years of the 20th century Asian intellectuals struggled in anguish to decide between the two—the "exit Asia" and the "develop Asia" doctrines—but unfortunately Japan, which was the most influenced by Western civilization and the most developed among Asian states, followed the way of the imperialist cultures of modern Europe. After the successes of the Meiji Reform, Japan, which became Asia's s greatest military power, started looking down on others. It put out its slogan of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," attacked China, occupied

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[3] I have already discussed this question. For a detailed argument, see Huang 2012a. Also Yamamuro 2011, 111–148.
[4] Here from the Chinese translation: Miyazaki 1984. For more on Miyazaki Tôten see Nomura 1999, 115–170.

Taiwan, spread its influence all the way to the Indonesian peninsula, and took Hong Kong and Singapore. During the period of the Second World War, Japan not only used its doctrine of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" to attack the arguments of other Asian states for "same culture, same species" when it came to putting into practice the "develop Asia doctrine," but as the "Eastern hegemon" that also thoroughly managed to "exit Asia" it advanced wars of invasion, conquered many Asian countries and charted out a resistance against Europe and America. Even so, it was exactly the dream of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" that brought the end of Imperial Japan and created a historical memory in which the blood and tears of Asian people were mixed and which has an influence on the political development of East Asia even today.

In this way the two doctrines of "exiting Asia" and "developing Asia" represented two poles on the spectrum of discourse of modern East Asian intellectuals on the topic of East Asia, but both ends were related to the question of the independence of Asian culture. Most of the proponents of the "exit Asia" doctrine thought that the independence of Asian culture should be abandoned. Fukuzawa Yukichi, in proclaiming "to make Western civilization the goal" (Fukuzawa 1995) emphasized what were called the central values of modern Europe, such as "democracy," "science," "freedom" and "human rights." The most radical example of such thinking was probably the leader of the Chinese group of the "doubters of history," Qian Xuantong (1887–1939), who argued: "If we plan to abandon Confucius' school, we first need to abandon classical Chinese. If we want to abandon childish, uncivilized, stubborn ideas of the common man, we must first

abandon classical Chinese."[5] In China at the time of the May 4th Movement there was a period when an atmosphere of sharp anti-traditionalist idealism was spreading (Lin 1979). In Japan, Mori Arinori (1847–1889), who during the end of the Shogunate studied in Europe and America, was connected with the establishment of the Meiroku Association, was later made the Minister of Education and in the end was assassinated by ultranationalists, published in 1874 an essay titled "Eigo kokugo karon (Arguing for a change to English as the state language). In it, he presented his opinion that education in Chinese script and the Japanese language should be abandoned and that there should be a move made to English as the state language. In 1874 Nishimura Shigeki (1828–1889), who was also connected to the establishment of Meiroku, following the ideas of the Movement for Westernization of Japan, argued that the system of writing has to be reformed, the Chinese script and derived Japanese scripts should be abandoned, and the English alphabet be used instead (Nishimura 1874, 10–12). He even argued the idea that Japanese people should marry Western Europeans on the basis of racial eugenics.[6]

In contrast with this, the proponents of the "develop Asia" doctrine maintained that the individuality of East Asia had to be preserved and reformed, and that the core values of East Asian traditional culture, such as "the difference between rightness and profit," "humaneness" and "ritual reverence" needed to be protected. The proponents of the "develop Asia" doctrine also argued for the many advantages of the Chinese script. After the end of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, in the midst of shouts of

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[5] In the original: 「欲廃孔学、不可不先廃漢文。欲駆除一般人之幼稚的野蛮的頑固的思想、尤不可不先廃漢文」. Lu Xun also presents a similar view (Lu 1989, 159).

[6] This thesis was even more influentially presented in Takahashi 1884, 79–137.

racial superiority, Kaneko Kentarō (1853–1942), a politician who once helped write the Japanese constitution, presented his doctrine on Japanese racial superiority (Kentarō 1898), and there were also others who criticized western culture and spread the idea of Japanese superiority (Sakurai 1901). Looking at the development of both doctrines, the proponents of each focused on the question of whether the individuality of East Asian culture should be abandoned or built up.

The East Asian intellectuals of the era had a rich historical consciousness. When they each present their own view on the future of East Asia, either on the basis of the "exit Asia" or on the basis of "develop Asia" doctrine, they always reference both an interpretation of the "past" as well as the understanding of the "present." Consequently the confrontation of different historical-interpretative systems and the clash of history-interpreting authorities on the topic of the "exit Asia" and the "develop Asia" doctrines can be seen again and again in the discourse of modern East Asian intellectuals.

What is East Asia?

(1) East Asia as a political system

The question we first have to ask ourselves is: "What is East Asia?"

As pointed out by Yamamuro Shinichi, "Asia" is not a geographical noun that Asian people themselves established, but rather a vacant noun created by Europeans (Yamamuro 2001, 1). Nevertheless, before the modern "assigned Asia" ever came to be, the peoples of Asia lived on a continent called Asia, piling up bitter experiences, nurturing a common history and managing to build up the structure of a "created Asia." During its long history, East Asia must first be seen as a political unit that in the

premodern era was its own political system, formulated around the order of Han-Barbaric difference as the foundation of the Chinese Empire's tributary system (Fairbank 1968). In the process of historical development East Asia as a political unit went through the following several steps.

The first step of the historical development of East Asia was the time up until the 20th century, the time of the order of Han-Barbaric difference, which was centred around the Chinese Empire. In the paintings of Yan Liben (601–673), a Tang Dynasty artist, we can see the image of a ruler of the great Tang Empire interviewing delegates of different East Asian countries. One of the delegates is bringing with him a goat, while others are offering up valuable treasure with both hands to pay tribute. From the 7th century onward, China was the leading power in Asia, as well as the centre of world politics. It can certainly be said it was a force visited by all nations. The paintings on the walls of the excavated tomb of the Crown Prince Zhanghuai (654–684) show a scene in which the Prince is holding an audience with foreign delegates in Chang'an. Before the modern age it was the Chinese Empire that represented the political centre of East Asia, with classical written Chinese its lingua franca. That is why intellectuals of different countries like Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan all used Chinese script to write Chinese songs, expressing their individual emotions and nurturing mutual friendly feelings.

The second step was taken within the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," which was built around the Japanese Empire, but left a historical memory of bitter hardship in the many East Asian countries that Japan had occupied. The East Asia of the third stage was developed after the end of the Second World War and the unconditional surrender of Japan in 1945, when the order of East Asia became the America-centred order of the Cold War. The fourth stage was the great Chinese economic sphere that has

formed in the last thirty years, after the Chinese economic reform – China's Asia, whose influence on the whole world is growing clearer day by day.

If we were to look at the political system of East Asia described above from the point of view of these historically experienced four stages of change, then it can be said that for thousands of years these political interactions and mutual influences went on under asymmetrical conditions of a political "centre" and "periphery" states. This political asymmetry, with the Chinese Empire representing the political "centre" of East Asia, shows itself, for example, in the records from Korean (Joseon) emissaries to the Ming court (1368–1644) titled *Chaotian lu* [*Records from Chaotian*] (Kwon et al. 1978), or records from Korean delegates who were sent to the Qing court, titled *Yanxing lu* [*Records of trips to the capital*] (Lin 2001) or those left by the Vietnamese emissaries (Zhongguo fudan daxue wenshi yanjiu yuan 2010).

At each stage the political influences in East Asia also changed, so that every time the political and military centre of power would decline, rising political and military energies would each present their political views, and through political action and diplomacy, or in extreme cases even through war, try to change the past "real East Asia" into the future "ideal East Asia." The same historical pulse of moving from a "real East Asia" to an "ideal East Asia" can be felt in recent years in the sovereignty disputes of several Asian countries over the islands of the East and South China Sea.

(2) East Asia as a cultural system

Other than just an objective political unit, looking at it from a wider angle, East Asia is also a single cultural system.

If we want to consider East Asia as a single cultural system, we have to first answer the challenge set by Tsuda Sōkichi (1873–1981). Tsuda is one

of the great Japanese scholars of the 20th century, but he argued that there is no such thing as "Eastern culture" or "Eastern civilization" and he considered Chinese and Japanese cultures to be completely different (Tsuda 1965, 195). Tsuda was a proponent of methodological individualism and at the time he was presenting his views Chinese national power was at its weakest. In such an atmosphere of the 1920s and 1930s, many Japanese intellectuals, including Tsuda, were contemptuous of China and emphasized the differences between Japanese and Chinese cultures.

Compared to the European culture, East Asia as a cultural system also possesses a developmental integrity and structural similarities. Among the elements common to the many regions of the East Asian cultural sphere are "Confucianism," "Buddhism," and "Chinese script." Confucianism began in the Chinese Shandong peninsula, and its essence is gathered in several important classical works, namely the *Lunyu* (*Analects*), the *Mengzi* (*Mencius*), the *Daxue* (*Great Learning*) and the *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*). After the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–200 CE), the *Wujing* (*The Five Classics*) were held in the greatest esteem, but after the year 1313 the basis for the Chinese civil service examinations became Zhu Xi's (Hui An, 1130–1200) *Shishu zhangju ji zhu* (*Compilation of the Four Books in Chapter and Verse with Collected Commentaries*). While the principle topics of the Five Classics, the scholarship of how to rule an empire, reflected a medieval society, the principle topics presented in the Four Books, on the methods and the processes of growth in individual people's lives, were overflowing with the characteristics of modern society (Uno 1952, 1–14). From the 14th century onward, avid readers in East Asia shared the common values of Confucianism, based on Zhu Xi's teachings. In the year 1600, in Tokugawa Japan, Fujiwara Seika (1543–1616) put on Confucian clothes and asked for a meeting with Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616). This can be seen as the

formation of concrete Confucian consciousness in Japan. Itō Jinsai (1627–1705), a Confucian scholar belonging to the 17th century School of Ancient Learning in Japan, was making a night journey when he encountered a robber who demanded all his possessions. In turn he was respectfully offered Jinsai's clothing as well. As the surprised robber asked Jinai about his occupation, Jinsai answered his occupation was Confucianism and told the robber about the *Dao* of humaneness. In this manner, Jinsai and the robber's dialogue was an instance on "teaching a person through the *Dao* of humanity" (Hara 1816, vol. 4, 213). This is clear Confucian consciousness, shared between Confucians of East Asian lands.

The second common element of East Asia as a cultural system is Buddhism. With its transmission to the East, Buddhism became a very important constituent element of Chinese culture, but it was also influenced by Chinese culture itself, and so brought forth the three branches of Chinese Buddhism: the Huayan, the Tiantai and Zen Buddhism. It was then further transmitted to Korea and Japan and became an important faith among others in East Asia. Tokugawa period Japan often sent emissaries to Korea (Joseon), who brought back Buddhist scriptures that were carved there; and in the 16th century the monk Tenkai (1536–1643) had great influence on the Tokugawa bakufu (Ooms 1984).

The third common element of East Asia as a cultural system is Chinese script. As Latin was the common written language of medieval Europe, Chinese script was the cultural grounding for intellectuals in the East Asian world from the 17th until the end of the 19th centuries. Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese intellectuals skilfully used literary Chinese, wrote and composed poetry in it. In July 1857, when American Admiral Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794–1858), commanding his warships, penetrated into what is now Tokyo Bay and in Yokohama brought an end to the national

isolation system, the treaty that Perry signed with the Tokugawa bakufu was written in literary Chinese. Also, during the period when Perry was in Japan and Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859), a patriot of the closing days of the Shogunate, wrote him a letter under a false name, asking Perry to bring leave Japan, the letter was also written in literary Chinese. Shōin's letter is now kept at the American Yale Library (Tao 2005). In this manner, Chinese characters really were a *lingua franca* that before the 20th century spread across all of East Asia.

The fourth common element within the East Asian cultural sphere is traditional medicine. Chinese medical theory is centred around the notion of *qi*. The Mawangdui medical texts, excavated in Changsha Province in 1973, are also concerned with the theory of *qi* and include a diagram on "activating and guiding *qi.*" Traditional medical texts of Japan and Korea are also based in the theory of *qi.*

However, even with all the above presented commonalities among the cultures of East Asian countries there also exist parts that are different. The main point of difference within the East Asian cultural sphere is the non-reconciliation of "political" and "cultural" identities. Yamazaki Ansai (1619–1682) once inquired of his disciples: "If the Chinese army came to attack Japan, with Confucius as the general and Mencius as his second in command, what should we, who follow Confucius' and Mencius' teachings, do?" The disciples could not answer and posed the question back to their master. Ansai answered: "If misfortune befell and we should face such disaster, I would put on armour and take up a spear. I would fight and I would capture them and by this repay my debt to my country. That would be the way of Confucius and Mencius" (Hara 1816, vol. 3, 4–5). This episode shows that while East Asian Confucian intellectuals shared the common values and ideals of Confucius and Mencius, they were in terms of

political identity each still Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese. There clearly existed a tense relationship between their "political identity" and their "cultural identity" (Huang 2007).

The second point of difference within the East Asian cultural sphere is the political system. The Chinese Tang Dynasty did not have a feudal system, but it did have civil service examinations, while Japan in the Tokugawa period had a feudal system, but did not have civil service examinations. In Imperial China studying the Confucian scriptures were steps to achieving political power, but in the Japanese society of the Tokugawa period, Confucians were no more than ordinary public intellectuals (Watanabe 1997, 115–141).

Looking from the point of view of East Asia as a cultural system, it can be said that for the surrounding countries (Korea, Japan, Vietnam) Chinese culture for a thousand years carried out the role of the "significant other." Confucianism and the culture of Chinese writing originate from China, were transmitted to countries such as Japan and Korea, and before the 20th century became the common cultural grounding for intellectuals of different lands. Buddhism, which arose in India, was also transmitted to the East by way of China and for Koran and Japanese societies became an essential religious belief.

Nevertheless, when entering modernity the cultural exchange between the East Asian and the European cultures prospered. From the second half of the 19th century, with major Western powers entering many East Asian countries, European culture deeply permeated the region, and in the development of modern East Asian culture became the "absent significant other." Meanwhile this "absent other" swayed the culture and thought trends of the "present self" of each country in a comprehensive manner. Now that we have moved to the 21st century, this state of European culture's control

over East Asian culture will have to be modified. And it is here that the necessity of advocating for "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" arises.

How to think from the point of view of East Asia?

Yamamuro Shinichi differentiates the notions of "being in Asia" and "becoming Asia" (Yamamuro 2011, 113–114), the first being a static notion and the second a dynamic one. In the second part of this paper the historical development of East Asia both as a political and as a cultural noun is described, but isn't the question we must think most deeply about in the 21th century's era of globalization precisely that of "how to think from the point of view of East Asia?"

(1) The point of view of cultural-historical comparison between China and the West

First, in the method of presenting the problem of "thinking from the point of view of East Asia," there is a potential for a kind of cultural-historical comparative point of view. The main reason that "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" is one of the topics of 21st century studies in the humanities is that in a lot of the past research "Western" or "European" was taken "universal," and the kinds of theory that had been formed within the historical cultural experiences of Europe were seen as the standard in the sense of "release it to the four seas, the standard of all." The special characteristics of East Asian historical cultures were neglected and the independence of East Asian culture was suppressed. Which is why, to moderately regulate and correct past research's blind spots, it is essential that we emphasize "thinking from the point of view of East Asia."

Only by properly emphasizing and deeply understanding the originality and independence of East Asian culture can we for the first time have a constructive dialogue with the intellectual world of Europe. But here I have to point out the following. What is here called "properly emphasizing and deeply understanding the originality and independence of East Asian culture" is in no way a kind of "reflexive orientalism." "Reflexive orientalism" emphasizes the special characteristics of an "Orient," as differentiated from an "Occident," but an Orient that is formed from European people's stereotypical views of the East. In other words, "reflexive orientalism" is nothing more than a derivative of the "orientalism" found in the European intellectual world.

The "special characteristics of East Asian culture" that we are speaking of contain within them a cultural-historical comparative horizon. The reason why this is so is because cultural "special characteristics" can only be made clear through a comparison with the "other." In truth, in the development process of the modern East Asian historical culture Europe has always continued to be the significant "other." Even now, European culture is the main reference system in many discussions of present-day Asian scholars. Below, I will try to give a short explanation of this through the example of the study of the Chinese method of thinking.

The "Chinese method of thinking" was one of the principal research subjects of many scholars. In the 20th century Nakamura Hajime (1912–1999), a Japanese scholar, conducted detailed research into the methods of thinking of the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans and Tibetans, and produced a large four-volume work titled *The Methods of Thinking of Asians* (Hajime 1988). With an abridged translation having been made under the guidance of the distinguished intellectual historian Philip P. Wiener (1905–1992) (Nakamura 1984) and Xu Fuguan's (1902–1982) abridged Chinese

translation (Nakamura 1991), this work has had a clear influence on the academic world of China and beyond. Nakamura believed that the Chinese way of thinking prizes the concrete sensation, particularities and special characteristics of things, and does not concern itself with the abstract and universal, but prefers the complex diversity of concrete forms (Nakamura 1984, 175–203). In such thinking he seems to be in agreement with his older colleague at the University of Tokyo, the Sinologist Yoshikawa Kōjirō (1904–1980). In his lecture at the Tokyo Imperial University in March 1943, Yoshikawa pointed out that the Chinese speculative method relies on intuition, aims at the disunity of things and has no interest in the uniformity of abstract principles (Yoshikawa 1968, 269–359, especially 277). [7]

Taken in a broad sense, such a theory seems both reasonable and logical. But if we look at it from a stricter viewpoint of cultural-historical comparison, we discover that while all along the Chinese method of thinking pays attention to the concreteness and special characteristics of phenomena and things, it cannot be said that Chinese people are not interested in the abstract and universal. I have recently used the example of historical treatises among scholarly works on Chinese history to argue that the Chinese method of thinking progresses from the "particular" to the "universal." [8] Chinese historical scholarship itself has a long history, and it is usual for historians to append to historical descriptions historical treatises in which they extract historical lessons and moral propositions from historical events. From historical treatises such as *Zuo zhuan* (*Zuo's Commentary*), *Shiji* (*The Records of the Grand Historian*), *Hanshu* (*Book of Han*), *Sanguo zhi* (*Records of the Three Kingdoms*), *Zizhi Tongjian*

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[7] For the Chinese translation, see Yoshikawa 1996.

[8] I have discussed this problem in my recent work. See Huang 2012b.

(*Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance*)*,* to Wang Fuzhi's (1619–1692) *Song Lun* (*On the History of the Song Dynasty*) and *Du Tongjian Lun* (*On Reading the Tongjian*), Chinese historians explained "structure" based on "matters," they followed the traces and looked for the source, described matters and looked for the structure. Here the form of integration of historiography and philosophy in traditional Chinese scholarship can be seen.

The work demonstrated by "historical treatises" in Chinese historical writings, in the sense of the "universal" being abstracted from the "particular" of historical reality, i.e. the "universality" in Chinese historical treatises, is used to expose the "concrete universals" mentioned by Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) (Hegel 2010, 537, 585). [9] Such "concrete universals," possessing the characteristics of Chinese culture, can only be easily understood from a comparative cultural point of view between China and the West. The characteristic unity of "literature," "history" and "philosophy" in Chinese scholarship appears most often in the historical literary genre of "historical treatises."

Accordingly, it is possible to confirm that the "universality" that traditional Chinese schools of thought abstracted from the "particular" is a kind of "concrete universal" only from a comparative point of view, and it becomes possible to grasp the significance of this precisely through "thinking from the point of view of East Asia."

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[9] For a Chinese translation, see Hegel 2009a, 276–338. Hegel considered the Chinese "five elements" to represent the "concrete universal" (Hegel 2009b, 110).

(2) "Universality" in the "particularity" of East Asian culture

Next, the method of presenting the problem of "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" is connected to similarities and differences between the cultures and way of thinking of different East Asian countries. Seen from the point of view of cultural elements common to many East Asian states, such as Chinese characters, Buddhism, Confucianism and schools of traditional medicine, the East Asian cultural sphere can certainly be distinguished from the unity and similarities of European cultures. But seen from the point of view of the differences between countries like China, Japan and Korea, we would probably not able to exhaustively cover either "common features" or "points of difference." That is because, as pointed out by Yamamuro Shinichi, the East Asian cultural sphere is a place linked by both a way of thinking as well as a system of organization, a space where different nations competed among and interacted with each other, as well as a field in which many countries and nations met both in hostility as well as in cooperation (Yamamuro 2001, 1–30). Many essential ideas of value, philosophical and political propositions, born inside the East Asian cultural sphere, originated in China, but were after transmitted to countries like Korea and Japan, fused with the local intellectual and cultural climate, developed into thoughts and cultures endowed with the characteristics of each land and in the end gave birth to a state of affairs that in Zen Buddhism is described as "one bloom, five petals" – where in spite of all the "common features" between the cultures of East Asian countries, the "points of difference" cannot in the end be exhaustively covered. When speaking of "thinking from the point of view of East Asia," we cannot only survey the universals of the cultures of different East Asian countries; only when we also understand the particularities of the culture of every country, can we say that for the first time we do so without prejudice.

If we try to express the universality and particularities of East Asian thought, we can cite as the most representative example the Confucian value ideal of "humaneness" and its development in Tokugawa era Japan. In my recent research I have shown that "humaneness" is the most essential, core Confucian value. Zhu Xi, the great Confucian of the Southern Song, wrote his *Ren shuo* (*Treatise on Humaneness*), in which, through constructing the theory of the structure *li* and the generative force *qi*, he presented his new discourse on "humaneness," and by doing so added greatly to the nobility and depth of human existence. In his *Shishu zhangju ji zhu* (*Collection of the Four Books in Chapter and Verse*) he redefined "humaneness" as the "virtue of the heart-mind, the structure of love." But when transmitted to Japan, Zhu Xi's theory drew a significant reaction. The Tokugawa era Japanese Confucians tried to respond to Zhu Xi's treatise on humaneness through a myriad of divergent opinions, but in two general directions. The first was aimed at the metaphysical structure. When discussing "humaneness," many Japanese Confucians opposed Zhu Xi's theory of on the topic, because it was based on the notion of *li*. For example, in the 17th century Hayashi Razan (1563–1657) stated:

> Perhaps the virtue of the original heart-mind is the substance, and filial piety and brotherly love are the function. When establishing humaneness, then filial piety and brotherly love are the substance and being humane to people and kind to creatures is the function (Kyōto shiseikikaihen 1979, 832).[10]

Another Zhu Xi School scholar, Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714), wrote: "The way to establishing humaneness is in deepening the ethical relations

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[10] In the original: 「蓋本心之德是体、孝弟是用也。為仁則孝弟是体、而仁民愛物都是用也」.

with people and nothing more than that" (Kaibara 1973, 4).[11] The School of Ancient Learning scholar Itō Jinsa, wrote his own *Jinsetsu* (*Treatise of Humaneness*), when just 32 years of age and still under the influence of the Zhu Xi School, but by his middle years he had completely grown out of that school and embarked on the way of explaining "humanness" through love, emphasizing the practice of the value ideal within concrete "everyday human relations" (Itō 1901a, 37 and Itō 1901b, 239). Furthermore, the School of Ancient Words and Phrases scholar Ogyû Sorai (1666–1728) interpreted "humaneness" as the "virtue of pacifying the people" (Ogyū 1901, 37). On the basis of such positions, whether they defended Zhu or opposed him, many of the Tokugawa Confucian Scholars, who could not agree to the formulation of *li* as a single metaphysical structure within concrete virtuous acts or deeds, tried earnestly to deconstruct the foundations of Zhu Xi's teachings. If we say this using traditional terminology, they opposed the ideas of *li* scholarship in Zhu Xi's teachings of humaneness based on the foundations of the theory of *qi*. [12] In the other direction, Japanese Confucians offered new interpretations of "humaneness" within socio-political life. They not only offered counterarguments to Zhu Xi's *li* based theory of "humaneness," they also opposed the explanation of "humaneness" on the basis of "enlightenment" and emphasized that it exists only as something that can be found inside "love." Itō Jinsai wrote: "The virtue of love is far and is near, is inside and outside, it perfectly pierces everything, it has no end – this we call humaneness" (Itō 1901a, 26).[13] but

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[11] In the original: 「為仁之道在厚人倫而已」.

[12] Yang Rubin has recently, in his newer publications, examined the school of *qi* as "a trend of thought counter to the school of *li*" in modern East Asia and shown how the school of *li* and the school of *qi* compose two indivisible sides of the Confucian world. See: Yang Rubin 2012.

[13] In the original: 「慈愛之德、遠近内外、充実通徹、無所不至、之謂仁」.

also stated: "Humaneness (…) after all stops with love. Love is the truth of virtue. Without affection such virtue cannot be seen (Itō 1901b, 98)."[14] In this way he interpreted "humaneness" in the mutual meeting of a person with a person. Ogyū Sorai thus stated: "Humaneness is the virtue of pacifying the people" (Ogyū 1978, 192).[15] In this way he interpreted "humaneness" within a political context. We can in such new interpretations and criticisms among the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians, through which they opposed Zhu Xi's School of Humaneness, see a common trend of practical teachings within Japanese thought, but by deconstructing the metaphysical foundation of Zhu Xi's teachings on humaneness, they also lose the depth and nobility of life that Zhu's Chinese teaching possesses (Huang 2012c).

Considered from the above point of view, we now understand that "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" does not mean to only seek out "common features," but also "points of difference" of the different regional cultures within the East Asian cultural sphere. Considering them from the point of view of mutual influences and conflicts inside East Asia, can we not for the first time grasp both the universality and particularities of the different East Asian regional cultures?

Conclusion

This paper has explored the idea of "how to think from the point of view of East Asia," but also confirmed that East Asia, whether as a "political object" or as "ideological development," could not escape from the fetters of the

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[14] In the original: 「仁（…）畢竟止於愛。愛、実徳也、非愛則無以見其徳也」.

[15] In the original: 「仁、安民之徳也」.

enormity of the political influence and cultural hegemony established over thousands of years of political and cultural imbalances between the different East Asian countries within the history of their interactions.

In the 20th century humanities and social science research in East Asian countries has, regardless of their awareness of various problems or use of different research methods, been permeated and controlled by Euro-American academic disciplines. However, humanities and social sciences theory abstracted as the basis of the special experience of Europe and America, when applied to the context East Asian research, like the Procrustean bed of Ancient Greek mythology, has to be forcibly kept in step and cannot escape the bad practice of "marking the ship to find the sword." Within East Asian studies in the last century, the "Western" has continued to represent an "absent" significant other in the research processes of scholars. Which is why East Asian researchers put importance on only those East Asian phenomena that resemble or could be compared to European and North American experiences. Seen from this perspective, it is certain that "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" is a task that 21st century East Asian researchers have put definite value on. I have in the past already argued that East Asian research of the history of intercultural exchange should not only emphasize the static "results," but must also respect the dynamic "processes" of such exchange (Huang 2010 and Huang et al. 2013). In this text I went one step further and tried to examine the "process" of the history of East Asian exchange within the context of comparative studies between East and West, as well as among East Asian countries.

However, I have also pointed out that the "thinking from the point of view of East Asia" presented in this text is by no means a sort of "reflexive orientalism," but rather in the context of contrasting Eastern and Western cultures and of comparing the cultures of various East Asian regions, and

noted that by simultaneously seeking the differences we can grasp the universality and particularity of the regional cultural traditions, and by doing so we can avoid falling into the existing patterns of cultural and political nationalism. I will be happy if the main point of the present discussion hits its mark, and there are no omissions in the argument.

Translated by Marko Ogrizek

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BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: TANG JUNYI AND NISHITANI KEIJI'S SPECULATION ON MODERNITY

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Under the shadow of wars that cannot be erased, through a state of tragic social change, but also unbroken cultural exchanges, the entire crisis of modernity was made apparent. In philosophy Heidegger (1889–1976), through Nietzsche's (1844–1900) critique of the genealogy of Christianity, tried to face European nihilism and answer the problems of modernity. Heidegger's attempt to dismantle metaphysics in this way gave birth to Jacques Derrida's (1930–2004) deconstructivism and encouraged enquiries by the likes of Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995). Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1995) strongly criticized Heidegger's Nazi tendencies, but there is no doubt that speculation on modernity itself forces a re-examination of the relations among philosophy, politics, ethics and religion.

In this article I consider whether by examining the two models (Tang Junyi's and Nishitani Keiji's) that both raise the issue of nihilism in order to answer the problems of European modernity it is not also possible to obtain a result with regard to the issue of "East Asian modernity." Of course there are considerable differences between the Chinese (Tang Junyi) and Japanese (Nishitani Keiji) contexts. While Tang Junyi (1909–1978) offered his answer to the question of modernity based on considerations of Confucian values, Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990) engaged in his enquiry from

the point of view of Japanese Buddhism. Nevertheless, when drawing a portrait of East Asian modernity from a philosophical standpoint, can answers that come from these two kinds of religious background nonetheless help to construct a new philosophical dialogue?

In this sense I would like to point out three things. First: going from East Asian modernity back to European modernity. Even though they had to face the challenges of cultural collision in differing time periods, such a return can still give birth to new meanings in the present world. Second: among the answers to modernity, by examining the two examples of China and Japan it is possible to make clear the respective philosophical methods of thought belonging to Confucianism and Buddhism, and moreover the differences in their attitudes concerning East Asian modernity. Third: through the two philosopher's methods of responding based on religion, we can from a universal point of view reflect anew on the present-day relations between philosophy and religion, and thus shine a new light on the way of our own philosophical research.

1. The crisis of humanism in modernity and nihilism

Tang Junyi and Nishitani Keiji lived in the 20th century, a stormy time for East Asia—a time when traditional values were being replaced by new European ones—and so they had to face the challenge of the revaluation of values. Previously in Europe, Heidegger had investigated the shock caused by nihilism to traditional European philosophy and examined the crisis of modernity and humanism. I would thus like to start this study there.

1.1. Heidegger and nihilism

Heidegger saw Nietzsche's thought as a perfected form of nihilism. It had such significance because it made clear the displacement and covering up

of being within the history of metaphysics. According to Nietzsche's formulation, nihilism should be seen as the "devaluation of the highest values" (Ger. *Entwertung der obersten Werte*) (Heidegger 1961, 45; Nietzsche 1952, 11), and at the same time as a revaluation (Ger. *Umwertung*) or the establishment of new values. Heidegger saw this revaluation of values as actually occurring inside the history of European metaphysics, holding an important position within it as well as defining European metaphysics' universal completion (end, Ger. *Vollendung* (Heidegger 1961, 34, 45)). However, the thinking that the "revaluation of values for the first time considers being as value" (ibid., 35) also includes "nothing," and "being" becomes obscured by "value." The establishment of new values brings about a domination of values, and this in turn leads to the will to power (ibid., 89). On the conceptual axis of "will," the father of modern philosophy, René Descartes (1596–1650), brought about a conversion to a philosophy of autonomy, while Nietzsche, also inheriting this history of philosophy of autonomy, brought about the completion of the history of metaphysics. When Heidegger affirms that "nihilism is obviously the history of this, our own era," he is speaking about a history that urgently demands something from "us (Europeans)," a history that impacts "the way in which we stand and walk, in which we are" (Ger. *die Art und Weise, wie wir stehen und gehen, wie wir sind* (ibid., 86)). When Heidegger asks "In what way do we exist?" this means "In what way are we us?" or "In what way can we be us?" But in this there also hides a kind of paradoxically ironic meaning. That which connects "being" or "existing" is "nothing," meaning that "to be" and "to exist" are made up of "nothing" and "nothingness."

Overcoming nihilism needs to be thought of through the will to power. Heidegger inherits Nietzsche's view of the will to power and calls the preservation and the enhancement of it "power-preservation and power-

enhancement" (Ger. *Macht-Erhaltung und Macht-Steigerung* (ibid., 102). Also built into the logic of the will to power is a transcendental overcoming of nihilism. Heidegger bases his thought on nothingness and through considering how it can separate from being, how it can bring about being's failing to appear (Ger. *Ausbleiben*), its concealing (Ger. *Verbergung* (ibid., 354)), its withdrawal (Ger. *Entzug*) and its abandonment (Ger. *Seinverlassenheit des Seienden* (ibid., 355)), reveals "nothing" as the place of being. From the place-ness of being, he formulates the human essence thusly: "This place-ness as the space of being is being as such. This place-ness is the human essence" (ibid., 357). [1] Human essence can in no way be connected to autonomy. In other words, not only is such essence incapable of possessing but, since it is also incapable of control and operation, it also welcomes the arrival of being. Man's being here (existence, Ger. *Da-sein* (ibid., 358)) connects the "here" with the place-ness of being.

The logic of "overcoming" and of "nothing" lead to one another. Heidegger repositions the overcoming of nihilism on top of the logic in which "nothing" and "being" are interwoven. True nihilism and untrue nihilism are made one inside the essence of nihilism – when being is declared as value, the failure of being to appear as being (Ger. *das Auslassen des Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen* (ibid. 361)) is ignored. But even if this essence of nihilism is not something destructive in the absolute sense, it certainly extends to human essence (Ger. *die Sache des Wesens des Menschen* (ibid., 363)). "Human essence" exists based on being as such (ibid., 365), while being, under its mode of failing to appear, demands of human essence that it accommodates (Ger. *Unterkunft*) being and in this

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[1] *Die Ortschaft des Ortes des Seins als solchen ist das Sein selber. Diese Ortschaft aber ist das Wesen des Menschen.*

place of accommodation brings about the arrival of the unconcealing of being (Gr. *aletheia*). Between the place of accommodation and arrival (Ger. *Ankunft*), the game of freed place-ness and temporality—of the future (Ger. *Zukunft*)—is repeated. To overcome nihilism in no way means to resolve it, but rather to experience and bring it to completion. Heidegger calls this special relationship "seeing through being's failure to appear." The succession of the two verbs *auslassen* (to see through, to remove, to erase) and *ausblieben* (failure to appear) always brings with it the meaning of *aus* (out of) as in "moving out of a topological position," and for such "moving out" and "moving away" "nothing" is a double omission. Man accepts being, but also opposes being and oppresses it. In other words, man cannot withdraw from such a relationship with being. In this sense there is always a part of overcoming nihilism that cannot be overcome (ibid., 371). This is not only the essence of modern man, but also the "fate" (Ger. *Schicksal*, *Geschick* (ibid., 369)), "secret" (Ger. *Geheimnis*) and "puzzle" (Ger. *Rästel* (ibid., 372)) of the modern European man. Man cannot but single-mindedly cling to his desire to overcome nihilism (Ger. *Überwindenwollen* (ibid., 375)).

In his *Letter On Humanism* Heidegger opposes Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905–1980) existentialism and redefines the notion of "humanism." Citing Friedrich Hölderlin's (1770–1843) poem *Homecoming* he points out that the absence of a home to which we could return to is the oblivion of being (Ger. *Seinsvergessenheit* (Heidegger 1959, 26)), that homecoming means drawing closer to the source (Ger. *Ursprung*), and furthermore, that it is crucial that we grasp from the essence of history of being the fact that modern people, including Nietzsche, have lost this home to which they could return (ibid., 25). In other words, humanism has got to grasp that man exists by freeing himself (Ger. *Ek-sistenz*), and then has to move away from

being as such (Ger. *vom Sein selbst her* (ibid., 31)). Ethics "is" also a kind of ontology (Ger. *Ontologie* (ibid., 41)) and ethical life (*êthos* (ibid., 39)) means a peaceful accommodation, but through contemplation even this peaceful life yearningly remembers being (Ger. *das Andenken an das Sein* (ibid., 42)). Such contemplation in no way builds a house of being in which to retire and not work; it still encounters resistance to turning to nothingness within historical existence (Ger. *die geschichtliche Eksistenz*). Against "non-being," the "no" of negation that appears on the basis of "nothingness" is an affirmation (ibid., 43).

Gianni Vattimo (1936–) follows Heidegger's position, taking the crisis of humanism as part of the overall crisis of metaphysics (Vattimo 1988, 40) and affirming that there is *a means for a critical 'overcoming'* (It. *un 'superamento' critico* (ibid., 2)). At the same time, he says that the epochality of the notion of "overcoming" (Ger. *Verwindung*), because it is not a simple breakaway, has multiple positive meanings, such as in recognizing attribution, healing illnesses and accepting responsibility (ibid., 39, 172). As Heidegger says, "overcoming" extends to the control of the "en-framed" (Ger. *Ge-stell*) modern science and technology, and returns to the metaphysical limitations of the subject, while the influences of modern science and technology relate to artistic expression. Through a coupling of hermeneutics and of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo further explains the response of post-modern thought, even discussing the so-called problem of the "retirement of God (the death of God)," but he observes that it is the "traces"—science and technology—that are the actual starting point of the transformation of real human nature. Accordingly, Vattimo stresses aspects of secularism (ibid., 179) and brings up a re-consideration of religion, science and humanism.

European modernity brought about a double crisis of humanism. 1.) "Human essence" takes on the features of "nothingness" and makes the concealment of being a feature. On this basis "true human nature" is formulated. 2.) At the same time, "non-Europeanness" was also placed in crisis. The world of East Asia, a part of which were also Nishitani Keiji and Tang Junyi, can think from the opposite direction, but from a universal point of view that possesses differentiation, we cannot but engage in the criticism of the "human essence and its crisis" declared by European modernity.

1.2. Nishitani Keiji and nihilism

In *Nihilism* (1949) Nishitani Keiji attempts to face the history of Europe and the world. According to Nishitani, the significance of Nietzsche's thought is that is a conversion from Platonism, and such significance can in no way be limited to metaphysics. Because it also extends to ethics, this revaluation of values is understood as a conversion in which "the whole of the Platonist-Christian system loses its historical clout" (Nishitani 1990, 70; Nishitani 2001, 188–189). Nishitani's speculation involves two phases. Phase one is about the re-establishment of European philosophy's inner system of values and the presentation of a new form of "self-overcoming" of nihilism; phase two is about trying to find the opportunity to respond to European nihilism in relation to Nietzsche's understanding of Buddhism.

We can say about the first phase that Nishitani grasped well enough the duality of Nietzsche's personal experience of nihilism. Only when within itself nihilism is brought to its utmost limits, is there born for the first time the opportunity for a "self-overcoming" – as it turns into affirmative nihilism and in eternal recurrence affirms the unity of suffering and happiness. Diverging on this point from Kierkegaard (1813–1855), who endorsed Christianity's position, the religious position that affirms the

suffering of Dionysius in Nietzsche can be said to be a kind of anti-Christian life-affirming pan-theism (Nishitani 1990, 65; Nishitani 2001, 100).

In the second phase Nishitani adopts different levels of "laughter" in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and in his explanations compares them to the "laughter" in Zen Buddhism. Zarathustra possessed a yearning to laugh a lot, but he also wanted to become an "overman." By contrast the laughter in Zen can be seen, for example, in the poem that the Tang Dynasty governor Li Ao (772–841) presented to Yaoshan Weiyan (745–828): "Sometimes I climb to the top of the lonely peak, and there, beneath the moon amidst the clouds, let out a long howl" (Nishitani 2001, 102; Keitoku dentōroku). It also is said of Baizhang Huaihai (749–841): "Baizhang picked up a hatchet and stood as if to strike Huangbo. Huangbo hit him. Baizhang laughed and went back to his room (*Eryin Mi chan shi yu lu*)." Xuedou Chongxian (980–1052) wrote a eulogy to Yangshan Huiji (804–890): "When his laughter ended, where did he go? Only the winds of tragedy stir eternally." Furthermore, Nishitani cites "to be foolish" as a religious feature related to "laughter," and sees both "ignorance" and "foolishness" as something that expresses the depth of religious experience.

Such a Zen Buddhist understanding is in no way a simple elaboration of Nietzsche's "European form of Buddhism" (Nishitani 1990, 62; Nishitani 2001, 96), but is something peculiar to Nishitani. Still more important is such an affirmative attitude. Nishitani borrows Max Stirner's (1806–1856) "creative nothing (Ger. *das schöpferische Nichts* (Nishitani 1990, 106; Nishitani 2001, 112)), discusses the creativity of "nothing" and gives judgement on the "original unity between creative nihilism and finitude" (Nishitani 1990, 172; Nishitani 2001, 174) that Heidegger concentrated his efforts on.

When in Japan the German Jewish philosopher Karl Löwith (1897–1973), who during the Second World War had to flee his country, criticized European nihilism, Nishitani used this to position Japan within world history and conduct his own investigations into the crisis of Japanese culture. He then discovered a method to "fundamentally overcome this crisis" (Nishitani 1990, 174; Nishitani 2001, 176). Together with the progress of Europeanization and Americanization, the post-Meiji generations had lost their "spiritual core," and by the middle of the 20th century this gave birth to a fundamental vacuum. Nishitani believes this is where the crisis of Japanese culture had sprung from, and says the solution to this could, on the basis of "nothing," reposition Japanese culture on the scales of world history. Nishitani borrows the awareness of responsibility towards one's ancestors that Nietzsche emphasized and explains the necessity of "facing the future, to return to the ancestors," pointing out that this is in a true sense the "root will" (Nishitani 1990, 177; Nishitani 2001, 180–181) to freedom.

In this sense, nihilism brought two things to modern Japan. Firstly: it helped the Japanese people to realize the existence of nothingness and understand that nothingness is in fact the historical reality of Japan. Doing so, it managed to lead the Japanese to a kind of Nietzschean "affirmative nihilism." Secondly: it managed to overcome the "inner void" and the "spiritual hollowness" of the Japanese and helped them to preserve contact with themselves (Nishitani 1990, 178; Nishitani 2001, 182).

It can probably be said that by facing Europe Nishitani managed to return to the origins of Japan. Following Löwith's "being oneself among others" he deepened the understanding of "becoming oneself." Löwith emphasized the existence of the other and the necessity of facing the other as the openness and creativity by which Greek culture, as the root of European culture, could absorb foreign cultures. Nishitani again saw

"becoming oneself" in the sense of returning to tradition, but two more circumstances can be read into his case. Firstly, when reconsidering East Asian culture Nishitani conducted a thorough critique of the "past." Additionally, he took tradition as the end (*eschaton*) of Westernization and stated: "Our tradition must be appropriated from the direction in which we are heading, as a new possibility, from beyond Nietzsche's 'perspective.'" (Nishitani 1990, 70). The overcoming of nihilism will be realized by facing the future from the standpoint of the Eastern world's traditions, especially the standpoint of Buddhist "emptiness," and in doing so by also facing the past.

2. Tang Junyi and the crisis of humanism

On the opposite side, Tang Junyi was interested in the problem of values and the notion most representative of his idealism (idealist spiritualism) is that of "spiritual values." Chinese modernity was facing a crisis of culture and a crisis of values. More specifically, these were due to the division of the country after the outbreak of Civil War in 1949 as well as the shock of communism to the traditional system of values.

In *The Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit* (1955) Tang Junyi sees the core of the problem in the collision of Chinese and Western cultures. The Chinese experience of failure is related to the European historical experience of failure, but the problems of European modernity were brought about by the spiritual shortcomings of modern Western culture. Tang Junyi points out that in relation to imperialism, capitalism and the iron-fist-of-the-state doctrine, there are two points that need to be reconsidered. First that the extreme lust for power comes from a tendency for expressing *dveṣa* (anger or hate). Second, that "we have forgotten to respect people's true

humanity and people's idealist-rational spirit, and have thus fallen into a kind of spirit of realism and naturalism" (Tang, 155–158).

On the basis of these two points, Tang Junyi comes to the following solutions:

1) A critical rebuilding of the rational humanistic spirit

Tang Junyi took Confucian humanism as the common factor and conducted a double critique in relation to the development of Chinese and Western humanism. The aim of his critique was firstly to face the history of mutual exchanges between modern Europe and China and to highlight the flaws of European culture's modernity, and through this to create a kind of different dimension in which he could provide the possibility for a "reconstruction" of the humanistic spirit. He also criticized the internal weaknesses of modern Chinese culture, claimed there was a need to absorb Western (European) culture, and aimed at bringing Chinese culture to a new form.

The two critiques brought a new cultural vision. After 1949 Tang Junyi lived in Hong Kong—a colony of Great Britain, which he stood opposed in the Cold War—a kind of insecure place, filled with divisions. The notion of "spiritual formation" that Tang used meant establishing a new value space and opening up a place for new discussions of the possibility of the revaluation of values. Nishitani Keiji's drive for conversion expresses the idea of facing tradition at the same time as heading towards the future, but in Tang Junyi's case it is about trying to shed light on the future through the crisis of humanism. This also meant "going back to the roots and opening up a new position" (ibid., 21). For the future of modern China Tang Junyi demanded democracy and science, but he all the more problematized Christianity. Communism was a concrete result of European modernity, and by criticizing a certain kind political awareness Tang Junyi opposed the

domination brought about by science and technology. Even though Tang built upon the trend born from the spirit of European culture of dividing religion and science (ibid., 88), he also believed science's demand for the truth is what invites the troubles of modernity. This is because it is based on the naturalism of the struggle of appetites (ibid., 158). On the other hand, he stated that when the nihilism of science reaches its utmost limits a kind of religious sense is born. When Tang writes "The border between gods and demons is also the border between life and death" this is in no way a simple allegory; he was rather trying, through this state where the limits of suffering appear, to shift to a religious position described this way: "With the heart-mind of humaneness, create the master." Affirming that "the heart-mind of humaneness is the root of people's value awareness," Tang had in mind the revaluation of values based on this idea (ibid., 132).

2) A presentation of the religious experience

In his unique way Tang Junyi tried to decipher culture. He interpreted the Christian relationship between God and man as equal to the relationship between Heaven and man in China, then on the basis of man's relationship with a transcendent being in a complex way brought together the teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, as well as the monotheistic religious teachings of Christianity and Islam, and thereby attempted to construct a new system of values. On the basis of the "going back to the roots and opening up a new position" model, he tried to re-examine Eastern thought from the roots up, which had been held under by the collision of Western religions, and to change the context of religion in two different senses. On the surface Tang's religious culture-related valuation is conservative, but it hides a fierceness on the inside. If such an attitude of opposition and confrontation with capitalism, the iron-fist-of-the-state

doctrine and imperialism was born within the overcoming of crisis, then Tang Junyi had lifted the stage of such confrontation even above religion.

Tang Junyi and Nishitani Keiji thus unexpectedly took a similar position of religious critique, but against the problem of East Asian modernity each formed their unique valuation and attitude.

3. The choice between religion and philosophy – differences, tensions, conversions

3.1. Nishitani Keiji: The position of emptiness

In 1961 Nishitani Keiji published *What Is Religion?*, and in it examined how the necessity of religion appears when the negationality of nihilism comes into operation (Nishitani 2011, 9; Nishitani 1974, 5). Nothingness appears when the self is made to behold the "great doubt" and a kind of mechanism of conversion is thereby opened. In other words, it becomes that which "opens the place of nothing" (Nishitani 2011, 34; Nishitani 1974, 26), while at the same time the "faith that the conversion from this sin will mean salvation" (Nishitani 2011, 40; Nishitani 1974, 31) is opened. This is also the "moment of conversion from dying to being born, the moment where absolute negation and absolute affirmation are one" (Nishitani 2011, 44; Nishitani 1974, 34). Religion is actualized in this conversion[2] of being-ness, but such a conversion is in a way the change of a foundation without foundation, or of a foundation which takes nothing for its foundation. The process of faith in religion is specifically the embodiment of a conversion from real existence to nothingness. And this is again a conversion to the

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[2] In the German translation the two terms *Umkehr* and *Umwandlung* are used for "conversion" (Nishitani 1982, 43). The term that is used more often is *Umkehr*.

wisdom of faith, or in other words, a process of "the alteration of consciousness and the completion of wisdom."

Nishitani preserved a constant distance from the theism of Christianity. He kept pushing the atheism of nihilism to its utmost limits, and draws nihility into his considerations of sacredness. Nishitani believed that Nietzsche's nihilism was even more thorough than Sartre's, because Sartre was under the restrictions of humanism. The key to this is in being aware of the self's turning to nihility, as the self that frees itself in ungroundedness[3] (ecstatic self-detachment, *ekstasis*). Nishitani again went by a different way to the conventional one and tries to resolve and blend nihilism with Christianity. Using the mystic Meister Echart's (1206–1328) differentiation between god and godhead (Ger. *Gottheit* (Nishitani 2011, 81; Nishitani 1974, 71[4])), he assigned to the human being and freedom a different basis from god (Nishitani 2011, 85; Nishitani 1974, 77). Such an understanding links the nihility within god to Christ's abasement (Ger. *Herablassung* (Schelling SW 7, 429)) or "*kenōsis*" – "said in the Eastern way, this is the non-Self" (Nishitani 2011, 77; Nishitani 1974, 67). Nishitani reads the Christian notions of non-Self or self-emptying (making the self empty) as corresponding to the Buddhist "voidness." That he went to contrast the "absolute nothing" in Eckart's theory with Nietzsche's "position of relative absolute nothing" means that he managed to find a new possibility of overcoming nihilism on the basis of Christian mystery. Through Heidegger, Nishitani stated that god and man are together independent beings, but it has be recognized that "independent being is established through ecstatic self-

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[3] It is clear that this explanation takes the thought of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, (1755–1854) as its foundation, but Nishitani goes even further back to Maester Eckhart (Nishitani 2011, 21). About Schelling's notion of *Ungrund*, see: Schelling SW 7, 406.

[4] See also: Schelling SW 7, 357.

detachment" (Nishitani 2011, 90; Nishitani 1974, 78). The conversion between god and man is the mutually occurring conversion between faith in revelation (the revelation spoken of here is close to Schelling's notion of "god's self-revelation[5]) and grace. In this way, Nishitani re-defines "conversion" 回心 as *existential conversion* 実存的転換 (or even 存在的転換) (Nishitani 2011, 92; Nishitani 1974, 81) and thus goes beyond the Christian doctrine of the personal God. Nishitani again turns his eye from Christianity towards Buddhism, and as the origin of personal being takes the "absolute nothing-sive-something." Said in a Buddhist way, "it is established as the 'middle' between the posited and emptiness" (Nishitani 2011, 94; Nishitani 1974, 82). It has to be said that it is because of Schelling and Heidegger's influence that Nishitani does not follow the model of church theology, sets aside the way of religious philosophy and gets to the heart of the matter from the angle of mysticism. And even if he did lean on Christianity, he managed to penetrate to the gist of the Christian doctrine and construct a logic of "conversion."

Emptiness is the field of absolute transcendence. Moreover, rather than into nirvana, it is a field that is much more than us open into our world. This opening also means a conversion that should be called the absolute death-sive-life (…) (Nishitani 2011, 113; Nishitani 1974, 103).

"Conversion" depends on "immediacy" (Nishitani 2011, 119; Nishitani 1974, 109),[6] but is understood as a double conversion, in other words, a conversion from life to death and a conversion from death to life. If on the

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[5] *Selbstoffenbarung.* See: Schelling SW 7, 347, 428.
[6] For example, in the system of *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*s (*Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya [The Heart Sutra]*) it says: Form is (immediately) emptiness and emptiness is (immediately) form. On the basis of the three appearances of the posited, of emptiness and of the middle, the Tendai sect of Buddhism also concretely develops the logic of "immediacy."

one hand it is tied in the direction of life (past religions, Christian grace, for example), it on the other hand leads in the direction of death (things such as science and nihilism) and conversion again occurs inside a kind of emerging (Nishitani 2011, 115; Nishitani 1974, 104) – in the way of what Heidegger calls "original transcendence" (Ger. *Ur-sprung*). What is being actualized inside this intersection of life and death, or instead, inside this meeting of the material and the personal, is precisely "emptiness."

From Nishitani's point of view, the position of emptiness can be expressed as "something-sive-nothing, form-sive-emptiness" or as the impartiality of "death-sive-life" (Nishitani 2011, 117; Nishitani 1974, 107), non-attachment (non-abidance). These two being on either side of "immediacy" not in a simple confrontational relationship, and not only in a simple reciprocal negation, an even co-existence, not mutually bound (Nishitani 2011, 119; Nishitani 1974, 109). Building upon the "logic of place," developed by Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Nishitani made "emptiness" the place where conversion can occur.

Emptiness is where self-awareness of our true own-being or own-being as the true nature of self-awareness and all the various things-in-themselves in this true suchness are simultaneously or rather as one, or even identically established (Nishitani 2011, 129; Nishitani 1974, 120).

Through the means of breaking free, emptiness gives being to the so-called "things-in-themselves." This is a kind of self-awareness that takes self as its basis, appearing by taking the form of the "basis" and of "being based" (Nishitani 2011, 130, 193[7]; Nishitani 1974, 183). Nishitani attempted to explain what is called fire-in-itself—what to fire is the self-identity of

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[7] In the Chinese translation for the notion of "being based" (*motozuku)* the term *benju* is used.

fire—through the example of: "Fire does not burn itself" (Nishitani 2011, 140; Nishitani 1974, 130).[8] That some things collect themselves in themselves, rather points to an absence of intrinsic nature – it becomes the provisionally apparent aspect of things (Nishitani 2011, 149; Nishitani 1974, 139). With such a concentration the heart-mind (the original heart-mind) goes over the place of awareness and penetrates into the place of non-Self's "fixity." The fixity of "samadhi" (Nishitani 2011, 155; Nishitani 1974, 145) is the thesis of place-ness, a return from the negation of nihility to affirmation. By such means, it brings things from dispersion and dissolution of nihility to the "concentration of collecting themselves within themselves" and returns things themselves to "virtue."

Only by seeing it from the angle of "emptiness" do we overcome nihility for the first time; and only from the point of Buddhist "emptiness" can we overcome modern nihilism. The grounds for such a position were Nishitani's own experience of Zen meditation, it wasn't Buddhism that was preserved within a system. [9] Japanese Zen Buddhism was able to reappraise the significance of Christian mysticism's "absolute nothing" and to transform it into a "place of emptiness."

Japanese modernity had to overcome the universal world problems brought about by European nihilism, and it managed to show that the key to this was the "position of emptiness." In this it actually came back to Europe and showed a way to overcome the difficulties that could not be overcome within Europe. Expressed from a religious point of view, the "religion of emptiness" converted the difficulties of the traditional split between

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[8] Nishitani believes that for example "that fire does not burn fire and water does not wash water, and that the eye does not see the eye" is one of the "circumstances to which we in the East have always paid attention to."
[9] Compare Phillips 1987, 76.

European philosophy and religion and at the same time opened new possibilities within East Asian religion (Buddhism).

4. Tang Junyi's critique of Confucianism

The religion that Tang Junyi discussed is based on a humanistic spirit – religion is included in the activity of the humanistic spirit. In his understanding, Chinese religion of the reverence of Heaven can "supplement the insufficiencies of Western religion" and become the foundation of a "new religion of the future." He stated that by means of the "spirit of Chinese religion (especially worshipping Heaven, Earth and the ancestors)," two aspects of religious ritual, the "reaching of higher authorities"—man's gratitude and returning to the first ancestors, "the great gratitude to the source and the first ancestors" (Tang Junyi 1953, 52–53)— and "receiving" – facing the human world and the other ten thousand things, are made concrete.

Without in any way denying transcendence, Tang Junyi admitted that the belief that "the good supervises the objective universe" is composed of two principles of justice, namely, that "the suffering of the innocent is always made up for" (ibid., 428) and that "if we are sinful, we have to accept suffering, we have to accept punishment for our sins, so that both the sins and the suffering will be removed together" (ibid., 428). However, transcendence as he understands it, is not all this in isolation (ibid., 450). There is a relationship of mutual sympathy, and within there are differences of direction; in other words, there is sympathy of the other, sympathy of the self, sympathy of the natural world, sympathy of Heaven. Through the means of the Heavenly virtue of "growing and multiplying without end," the sympathy of different kinds of people is embedded in the relationship of the mutual sympathy of nature's ten thousand things (ibid., 454). Without

excluding transcendence, the Chinese belief in Heaven and Earth possesses immanent characteristics (ibid., 458). The idea of the traditional worship of "Heaven, Earth, accomplished people, parents and masters" affirms neither authority nor the appeal of a leader (*charisma*), it affirms the patterned way of how the personal world is (ibid., 464). Within his analysis of the three occasions of worship (the ritual of Heaven and Earth, the ritual of the ancestors, the ritual of the sages and the worthies (Tang Junyi 1988, 382)), Tang Junyi was well aware of the great conversion between tradition, the present and the future. This is above all the reason why Tang Junyi spoke of a religion of the future.

Tang Junyi criticized the Confucians of the Song and Ming (Tang Junyi 1953, 530), and while he put the foundations of religion in the sympathizing heart-mind of humaneness (the objective heart-mind of Heaven that penetrates nature, the heart-mind of self and the heart-mind of others), such a reason-based present day religion is very different from former tradition and is turned towards the future, and Tang was strongly aware of this (ibid., 533). Being continuously aware of the differences between Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity, Tang argued for the idea of having respect for different teachings from the angle of universality (wholeness of culture) – in other words, he argued for the importance of tolerance (ibid., 541). Because of its approval of other religions, Confucian thought possesses a character of crossing teachings and develops in the direction of uniting different kinds religions. In other words, it possesses the character of a "harmonious teaching." This kind of reference to the future prospects of the state of religion can be said to at the same time be turned to already existing religions, as a valuation and a critique of them.

Unlike Nishitani, the formation of Tang Junyi's thought occurred on the basis of Kant (1724–1804) and Hegel's (1770–1831) genealogy. Under such

influences, he speculated on the rational foundation of religion and from the starting point of the subject's self-transcending (Ger. *sich überwinden*, *transzendieren*) attempted to prove the establishment of transcendental being. In his *Cultural Awareness and Moral Reason* he discussed reason (which possesses transcendence and supervision-ness), spirit, moral awareness, and the work of the self-transcending of one's own-self (Tang 1986, 17–18). He based his ideas on the position of a philosophy of "autonomy" that is very different from Heidegger's criticism of philosophy of autonomy that Nishitani supported (the self, self-in-itself is fundamentally different from the subject and the substance).

In his text *Ten Forms of Religious Consciousness* (ibid., 189–196)[10] Tang Junyi discussed various stages of self-awareness that correspond to a kind of process of genesis, but this in truth also has to do with a change of values. Religious awareness that has its basis in personality and stands on a foundation of "self-aware action towards moral values" (ibid., 207), is in its ultimate form "a form of the deepest moral awareness" (ibid.). A

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[10] The ten forms are categorized as follows. 1) Religious consciousness of deist faith, which seeks help in satisfying the desires of the self; 2) Religious consciousness of the faith in a finite anthropomorphized God or a supernatural, infinite personal god, which seeks to conform to desires; 3) Religious consciousness that in God seeks the fulfilment of the wish for a life after death; 4) Religious consciousness that protects the righteousness of the world; 5) Religious consciousness that seeks the imperishability of the soul or to achieve through penance and asceticism a liberation of the soul; 6) Religious consciousness that tries to overcome desires and to perfect virtue; 7) Religious consciousness of Hinayana Buddhism, which does not believe in any god, is not captured by the self and focuses on mediating on karma and emptiness; 8) Religious consciousness of Mahayana Buddhism, which takes on itself the suffering for the sins of humanity and all living things and preserves all values within an eternal world; 9) Religious consciousness of the community of monks or a church that has the authority of the bodhisattvas or God and through worshiping those who have realized or have become aware before, takes on itself the suffering for the sins of humanity and all living things; 10) A pure personal religion, involving devoutly turning to the worship of sages and worthies, of individual and national ancestors (national gods).

harmonious form of religion at the same time possesses both the layer of a "transcendental god" as well as the layer of holy wise personalities, who "forget such godliness." But Tang argued that if one of these layers were temporarily negated, this would be a "religious offence."

Returning to the religious spirit of pre-Qin Confucianism, Tang Junyi believed that opposition to worshipping ancestor gods in Christianity and Islam (ibid., 200), or the opposition to Chinese religious service for Heaven and Earth in Song Confucianism, are both very far from such a religious form. Through reviewing tradition he conducted a reconsideration of the ranking of various forms of religion. If we go back to the consciousness of Ancient Greece, the consciousness of Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Löwith, it is easy to imagine reconsidering present-day religious consciousness from there.

In his later years in *The Existence of Life and the Limits of the Mind* Tang Junyi offered a revaluation of his own modern thought. Philosophy, morality, religion, Buddhism, the one God doctrine and Confucian thought are positioned inside a single value system. In his final text, *The Objective Limits of the Over-master*, he adopted the three fields—the Western one God doctrine (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), Mahayana Buddhism and Confucian thought—and discussed them in relation to dialectical sublation. The reason why the flowing activity of Heavenly virtue in Confucian thought is positioned even higher than the two fields of *Ātman* and *dharma* in Buddhism is that the process of the passing of life itself involves a kind of principle of a "transcending of oneself that cannot be seized" (Tang 1977, 161). Life itself affirms the inner goodness of humanity and can thus transcend itself and take away attachment. It explains "attachment to self" and the "attachment to dharma" from the already established truth of life. "The overcoming of self" again gives birth to a kind of "wisdom of death"

– a wisdom of coming to grips with the natural end of life and of not being uselessly attached to preserving it (ibid., 167, 169). The good that is inherent in the life-force transcends natural life and death, transcends individual limitations and reaches a state of sympathy with the other (things and persons existing outside, as well as the personalities of the sages and worthies and the hypostasis of the sacred). Setting forth the three layers— self-overcoming, original good human-hood and mutual sympathy—Tang Junyi assessed the Confucian doctrine of human disposition (ibid., 178, 502; also Tang 1953, 145), took Confucian good human-hood as the original human-hood of the first meaning, and the Buddhist attachment to self as the original human-hood of the second meaning. However, he at the same time affirmed that Buddhism is the teaching of "getting free of suffering and of observing emptiness" (Tang 1977, 179) and claimed that while this is different to the Confucian teaching of completing order (following the good of the original human-hood and accepting the creative process of the will of Heaven as it is), in terms of their purpose they are united. Through comparing the two, Tang Junyi confirmed the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism, while on the other hand praising the harmonious teachings of Tendai, Kegon and Zen Buddhism and leaving behind a way for the two teachings to come together. We can say he focused on both sides – of distinctions and of coming together. In this way he aimed to avoid new separations born of distinctions.

The highest value established by Tang Junyi takes Confucianism as the standard, but also turns its eye to the values of other beliefs and affirms them. Concerning philosophy, he believed that the objective was to "build up new teachings for the sake of the world" (ibid., 519). That is, to make clear the limits of philosophy, to surmount them and turn to establishing a religion. Nishitani Keiji also took philosophy as the foundation, and tried to

overcome the crisis of culture by means of religion. Both of them saw between philosophy and religion a relationship of mutual connection as well as aspects of difference. Nishitani's "facing the future, to return to the ancestors" was aimed at clearly expressing the "self" that is established inside tradition by means of a fundamental will—an awareness of our responsibility to our ancestors—and at establishing the "self" within the continuity of the past, present and future. What makes this possible is the "position of emptiness." Through the mechanism of conversion, emptiness makes the self the self. As Tang Junyi also tried to establish the moral self as an eternal being by means of self-transcendence, we can in truth say it is a matter of the same goal but with a different style.

5. In place of a conclusion, a community of differences – new challenges for East Asia

Nishitani Keiji and Tang Junyi dealt with the shock of Western modernity deeply, and as thinkers did everything they could to answer the problems that modernity contains, while their interests reached towards historical tradition and its modern renewals. In truth they both preserved their distance from tradition and offered critiques of it. On the other hand, together with absorbing the high accomplishments of Western culture, they tried to answer the problems contained therein through the key of tradition, and to face the "future." It can be said of both of these East Asian philosophers that they—one on the foundation of Buddhism and the other on the foundation of Confucianism—laid out models of how to answer the problems of modernity – models (as Nishitani puts it) of "overcoming modernity."

In contrasting East Asian with the present-day European self, Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) worked to show the self-identity of the European self as loose. Through analysing the double meaning of the notion of the cape

(Fr. *le cap*)—both as capital (Fr. *le capital*) or as a capital (Fr. *la capitale* (Derrida 1991, 21))—Derrida understood "Europe" as being open and turned towards otherness (Fr. *altérité*). Not only is it open to other capes' other shores (Fr. *s'ouvrir sur l'autre rive d'un autre cap*), he states that because it is also the other of the cape in general (Fr. *l'autre du cap en général*) it needs not open itself to the other (Fr. *sans s'ouvrir de lui-même sur un autre* (ibid., 74). Such openness that brings with it a feeling of responsibility makes the self-identity of European culture something that "in an irreplaceable way inserts the universal into the singular (Fr. *l'irremplaçable inscription de l'universel le singulier* (ibid., 72)).

Rémi Brague (1947–), on the other hand, analyses Europe by means of its Roman characteristics. From the point of view of civilization, Roman culture is positioned after Greek culture (Brague 1992, 92) and from the point of view of religion the New Testament, on which Christianity is based, is positioned after the Old Testament of Judaism (ibid., 60). Brague says that such secondary (Fr. *secondarité*) formed a way of being specific to Rome, one that against the *appropriation* (ibid., 103)) of other cultures demanded a clear difference between Europe and other cultures. In this way both of these modern European philosophers face otherness and discuss Europe's self-identity from the point of view of opening up.

Despite the problems of modernity Brague believes that Europe cannot shut itself away within itself (ibid., 182). Derrida also stressed "taking on" the future, and stated that the democracy Europe has inherited needs to go hand in hand with "the structure of taking on" – the recollection of someone who is at this very moment taking on the future (Fr. la *mémoire de ce qui porte l'avenir ici maintenant* (ibid., 76)). Vattimo, who through Heidegger's analysis of "recollection" (Ger. *An-denken*) re-arranges the philosophical foundations of post-modernism, believes that "re-collecting" overcomes the

forgetting of being brought on by metaphysics, and, relating to "tradition (Ger. *Überlieferung*) and fate (Ger. *Ge-schick*)" (Vattimo 1988, 173, 175)), and the "overcoming" (Ger. *Verwindung*) of the domination of science and technology as well as their en-framing (Ger. *Ge-stell*)—as the final form of metaphysics—is complete. If we borrow Brauge's Roman model, going back to the Europe of Roman tradition in no way means reversing back to Antiquity, but by means of a new opening of the self, collecting the self within the experience of the other. In Derrida's model, the wholly transformed Europe does not place the "self" in a superior position.

But on the other hand, Derrida and Vattimo also mentioned the religious significance that concentrates on the traces. This is the religious form after the retirement (the death) of God – that follows in the footsteps of this retired God. Brague discussed the possibilities for Europe from the point of view of Christianity, which together with being historical possibilities of the past, were also possibilities for the future. Like Derrida, who conducted a study concerning the "capital" and proposed regarding Europe as a new place (Derrida 1991, 47), Brague, while suggesting that "Europe needs to be preserved as a place of separation of church and state, or rather it has to become such a place anew, or even still, a place of peace between church and state – where both sides acknowledge each other's legitimacy" (Brague 1992, 186–187), also recognized that man and God have a close engagement and acknowledges the place of physical bodily human-hood as a place of concrete relationships between people. After it adopted Christianity, Europe sketched the relationships between man and the absolute, man and man, man and nature, on the basis of a differing form of community. In Christianity, unlike in Marcionism (Fr. *marcionisme*), the relationship between the one God of goodness and the world was never tense, and salvation was not about abandoning the world. It can be said that in this

respect it does not differ that much from the doctrine of the value of all living things in Mahayana Buddhism or the Confucian idea of Heaven's virtue.

From the attitude that Nishitani Keiji and Tang Junyi were developing towards modernity, we can see two models, which correspond to the differences within East Asia. Inside Asian modernity the diversity contained within Asia appears as a mutual otherness, but when turned towards European otherness, Asia as such possesses openness.

So, what is the future that East Asian tradition is turning towards? Nishitani Keiji and Tang Junyi, even when criticizing the renewal of tradition achieved by modernity, set their sights on universal human-hood. Since early times the East Asian community in different ways tried to answer the problems of each era. Even now to present from the point of view of self-awareness so different a model to such a community of differences would pose a problem of commonalities. The internal distinctiveness of East Asia points to an openness that welcomes the other. Even if within the common, universal demand, European nihilism and the crisis of humanism should try to show up by a different face , the challenge of the present-day will again become the problematization of such a crisis, which is exactly the obligation we have to take on ourselves, when we face the legacy left by these two thinkers, who both lived in the same age.

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THE GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINESE/TAIWANESE PHILOSOPHY IN A PROJECT ON ISLAMIC-CONFUCIAN-DAOIST DIALOGUE IN THE BALKANS

NEVAD KAHTERAN

In memory of my wife Amira who passed away on March 4 this year (2020).

(Photo source: Author's personal archive)

Introduction

The author of this paper was invited as a visiting professor by the Harvard-Yenching professor Tu Weiming (1940–), who was born in Kunming, mainland China, grew up in Taiwan, and pursued his graduate studies in the United States. Tu is one of the best representatives of the third generation of the Confucian revival, and the author was invited to join him in the summer of 2010 at his newly-established Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies (Peking University, from 5 July to 5 August 2010), upon his leaving Harvard to serve as professor of philosophy and the founding dean of the IAHS. The research produced insightful perspectives on the core values of Confucian humanism with a view of the future.

Tu's revitalization of the Confucian discourse is an indication that a new vision of *Chineseness* from pluralistic, tolerant, and dialogical perspectives is emerging on the horizons with full recognition of the values of openness, cultural diversity and self-reflexivity, with the hope that with this newly-established "Chinese subjectivity" (Professor Luo Yulei's phrase) China will become an integral part of a diverse world in search of shared values and universal ethics, taking into account that Tu believes that China, including *huaqiao* (the overseas Chinese), will be a major spiritual resource for rethinking the role of humanity in the global community. Thus, by emphasizing cultural roots, Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and North America hope to build a transnational network for understanding the meaning of being Chinese within a global context. According to Professor Tu in his work *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China*, 2010, the meaning of being Chinese is basically not a political question; it is a human concern rich with ethical-religious implications. This is the reason why the project

also includes Daisaku Ikeda (池田大作, born in 1928), who is president of the Soka Gakkai International Buddhist network, which actively promotes peace, culture and education, with membership from more than 190 countries, including Professor Tu.

The author is indebted to Professor Tu for his kind help during the writing of his own research from that academic year, titled on *A Platform for Islamic-Confucian-Daoist Dialogue in the Balkans*, which aimed to pave the way to religious-cultural communication will broaden our philosophical horizons. That a project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place at this conference was an unexpected grace of Heaven.

The cultivation of a new spirit of philosophy that transcends the classical borders and opens its understanding of "universality" to a multitude of cultural and intellectual histories is the subject of the recently published *Nove granice kineske filozofije* (*New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy*), and the knowledge that is very much needed in Bosnia Herzegovina to enhance young scholars working in the Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian language in the Balkans was encouraged by bringing another distinguished scholar, namely Lee Ming-huei (1953–), from Academia Sinica in Taipei, to deliver his series of public lectures in the country. Finally, the importance of Islamic works in the language of the Neo-Confucianists, i.e. *Han Kitāb*, and Tu's' contribution to the work on Liu Zhi, which further attracted me to him, represents a deep interpenetration of the Confucian and Islamic traditions, without any kind of syncretism.

I will start with Mou Zongsan's idea that in every cultural system there is philosophy. Otherwise, it would not succeed in being counted as a cultural

system.[1] Philosophers have always been busy comparing various views within their own tradition or in a cross-cultural fashion. In this regard, comparative philosophy is a kind of dialogue among philosophers. The importance of the task undertaken by comparative philosophers becomes is increasingly evident, and being a "comparativist" (i.e., a practitioner of comparative philosophy)[2] means that you are at the same time an interpreter, a commentator, a critic, a connoisseur of good philosophical arguments and interesting ideas, an educator, and a communicator – with the main object to help each of the interlocutors to understand the positions of the others. So, all three philosophers mentioned in this paper are of contemporary importance in this regard, and these thinkers can be especially helpful in finding bridges to non-Western philosophical traditions. In addition, those acquainted with Islamic languages will find a wealth of terminology that will help bridge the gap between the Islamic and the Confucian conceptual universes, especially reading the book the *Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic thought in Confucian terms* by Sachiko Murata, William C. Chittick and Tu Weiming (Murata et al. 2009).

In addition, comparative philosophy is a historically necessary project for establishing a critical discourse between different philosophical systems aimed at broadening our philosophical horizons and possibilities for better understanding – with a special task of establishing international peace in a specific manner. But at the same time it is an intellectual endeavour within multicultural communities for developing awareness of the need for inter-traditional, intercultural, inter-system, integrative and global studies, beyond the prevalent cult of the nation and with the idea of the philosophical

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[1] Mou, *Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi*, quoted according to Weber and Gassmann 2018, 4.
[2] See Bo Mou's article (Mou 2010).

resonance and complementarity of different philosophical positions at its core, and thus it represents our care for a discourse rid of domination in the dialectics of intercultural logos. That the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place in this conference in the centennial year of Ljubljana University[3] is an unexpected grace of Heaven, or to quote Zvi Ben-Dor Benite:

> … At the dawn of the 21st century, this dialogue takes new shape as Western scholars join it and, most notably, it acquires a new locus in the Balkans.

> The joining of the Balkans to the ongoing Islamic-Confucian dialogue is most significant and most exciting. The Balkans was always a major zone of engagement where Islam and other cultures and religions met exchanged and contended. Balkan scholars, bringing in Balkan heritage and legacies are best suited to bring in new insights, new angles, and fresh perspectives. It is exciting to think that a major Muslim Community from what was once the westernmost Islamic frontier joins a dialogue begun by an Islamic community from easternmost Islamic frontier. This volume, therefore, should be seen as just beginning of new phase in the ongoing dialogue. And a most promising one (Ben-Dor Benite 2010, 144; see also Ben-Dor Benite 2005).

Or as Jana Rošker puts it:

> Recognizing the comprehension, analysis and transmission of reality based on diversely structured socio-political contexts as a categorical and essential postulate always offers the prospect of enrichment. It also protects us from the tyranny of universalized unidimensional ideologies. This is why we need

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[3] Ljubljana University with its rich tradition was founded in 1919.

Chinese philosophy to become an indispensable part of our globalized intellectual world (Rošker 2018, 421).

And this is also what makes this book so immensely important: it offers us possibilities for fruitful fusions of hitherto unknown horizons. In our time, it is also especially meaningful that it was created and published in a place which enables these new horizons to emerge on the fruitful crossroads of many different histories, cultures, ideologies and religions.

Tu Weiming 杜维明

Professor Tu Weiming is the world's leading Confucian scholar who has played a key role in the creative development of modern Confucianism as a global intellectual discourse, spending more than six decades in an ongoing dialogue with other Axial Age civilisations and indigenous spiritual traditions, engaging himself in the re-appreciation of traditional values and thinking in contemporary China, and particularly Confucianism, because of his focus on the significance of religiosity within Confucianism and what he calls "anthropocosmic unity" (vision of the unity between Heaven and Humanity).

Active in many public bodies, Professor Tu is the author of 19 books in English, 13 in Chinese, and well over 100 articles and books chapters.

Tu Weiming, who has taught at Princeton University, the University of California at Berkeley, and Harvard University, is one of the most famous Chinese Confucian thinkers of the 20th and 21st centuries, and a prominent member of the third generation of "New Confucians."[4]

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[4] Tu Wei-Ming's official website: http://www.tuweiming.net. 杜维明的中文博客: http://blog.sina.com.cn/weimingtu.

He is professor of philosophy and Dean of Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University, and a research professor and senior fellow of the Asia Center at Harvard University. He was born on 6 February 1940 in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China, and he is a Harvard-Yenching Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and of Confucian Studies, Emeritus, at the Asia Center of Harvard University.[5] As someone who grew up in Taiwan and obtained a BA in Chinese Studies at Tunghai University (1961), he is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Tu is a leading expert in Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. In 2009, Tu left his professorship at Harvard University for Peking University's Department of Philosophy, where his mission was to contribute to the reform of Chinese humanistic education against a tide of rising nationalism and anti-globalization.

Tu's assertion is that Confucianism can learn something from Western modernity without losing recognition of its own heritage, and by engaging in such "civilizational dialogue" he hopes that different religions and cultures can learn from each other in order to develop a global ethic. From this, it is obvious that Tu's perspective, the Confucian ideas of *ren* ("humaneness" or "benevolence") and what he calls "anthropocosmic unity" to designate this holistic, correlative vision of Heaven, Earth, and Man, can make powerful contributions to the resolution of issues facing the contemporary world. He thus coined the term "spiritual humanism" (see Tu 2013), in opposition to secular humanism, a defining characteristic of the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West. According to Tu, the

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[5] See the following websites about this Institute: http://iahs.en.pku.edu.cn/; https://www.iep.utm.edu/tu-weimi/. The inauguration of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies (IAHS) was held in Shouren International Studies Center on September 28, 2010.

Enlightenment mentality is the justification for secular humanism, and, as an emerging global discourse, it is attempting "to situate the universal call of ethics in an open, integrated and harmonious house in which body and spirit, the individual and society, humanity and nature, the secular and the sacred are all welcome, and to provide human rather than abstract solutions to the many problems we face." [6] As a form of spiritual humanism, Confucianism's project for human flourishing involves four dimensions: self, community, Earth, and Heaven. As Tu states:

> The time is ripe for us to rethink the human in the 21st century. We are in need of a comprehensive spiritual humanism capable of integrating the four inseparable dimensions of human flourishing: self, community, Earth, and Heaven… The cultivation of a spirit of caring for the earth is widely recognized as a universal principle of global citizenship. Therefore, it is imperative that all citizens of the world take part in the ongoing dialogue among civilizations to facilitate this vision.

In 1949, Tu moved to Taiwan to study at the Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School and later enrolled at Tunghai University. This is an obvious reason for him to be regarded as Taiwanese, taking into account the differences between the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong, philosophical and otherwise (Rošker 2019; 2016; 2013).

What attracted me to this philosopher is his ongoing dialogue with non-Confucian religions and social theories, as well as his strong emphasis on inter-cultural, inter-religious, inter-disciplinary, and inter-civilizational dialogue as one of the defining features of his Confucianism, with Tu coining the term "anthropocosmic" to designate a kind of humanism that is

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[6] See http://tuweiming.net/ and information about a recently held conference: 11–13 June 2019, *Confucianism in Dialogue with Cultures and Religions*, A Conference in Honour of Professor Tu Weiming, Georgetown University.

compatible with and sympathetic to an ecological consciousness. Through such a civilizational dialogue, Tu believes that Confucianism can both renew itself and become a valuable resource for the world. And through acknowledging the fact that Tu is, as a modernizer of Confucian thought, a champion of Confucian engagement with non-Confucian traditions, especially including the Islamic philosophical legacy in China (for example, see Petersen 2011), I am personally deeply convinced that we are moving in the right direction concerning his legacy, because Tu's vision has proved influential, and a theological approach to Confucianism will remain a strong one in the years to come.

Collaborative project with Daisaku Ikeda (池田大作), New Horizons in Eastern Humanism: Buddhism, Confucianism and the Quest for Global Peace[7]

Having introduced Tu Weiming, now I would like to turn to Daisaku Ikeda (born in 1928), president of the Soka Gakkai International Buddhist network, which actively promotes peace, culture and education, with membership from more than 190 countries. Both authors have a deep belief that dialogue can transcend the borders of ethnicity, religion and ideology, and that it is

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[7] See my previously published review of this work (Kahteran 2014). Daisaku Ikeda is viewed as a campaigner for peace and his specific contribution to peacebuilding is seen as the central emphasis he has placed on the significance of dialogue. At the same time, Ikeda is the author of more than 100 books on Buddhist themes, and the winner of more than 300 academic awards given by universities from all over the world. He has written a large number of books in the form of dialogues, focusing on leaders and scientists from various fields, including, among others, British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Ji Xianlin, Ba Jin, Chang Shuhong, Jin Yong, and other prominent Chinese personalities. For more information on his organization promoting world peace, Soka Gakkai International (SGI), visit: http://www.sgi.org; whereas information about Ikeda himself can be obtained at http://www.sgi.org/sgi–president/president–overview.html, or at his own website http://www.daisakuikeda.org/.

certainly the best and surest method to achieve a peaceful solution to any problem, since it includes a continuous discussion with various world leaders and others, representing various culturological, educational and religious organizations. This is why this book opens with a statement derived from a conversation between these two figures: that the 21st century represents a Chinese era, and, in accordance with Arnold J. Toynbee's view, the belief that China holds the key for the future solidarity of people around the world, namely that this great country will contribute significantly to this through its culturological strength and power. As a matter of fact, this book, written as a series of conversations between Tu Weiming and Daisaku Ikeda, tells of the dialogue between civilizations concerning globalization and culturological pluralism, that is, it discusses the importance of dialogue as a mechanism for conflict resolution between civilizations, stressing the constant engagement and effort within the civilizational dialogue as a path towards social and cultural reform.

Aligned with the above-stated, both authors agree about three essential issues in leading a dialogue to affirm and respect cultural diversity: 1) a true listening to what the dialogue partner has to say; 2) the importance of direct dialogue; and 3) studying and embodying the wisdom of our predecessors in philosophy, since the *kanji* (the Japanese sign that uses the Chinese characters for a sage, *shengren* 圣人) is written so that it unifies the signs designating the ear and mouth, put above the element designating the ruler, or, in other words, a sage is a ruler who only responds after listening well. In the process of achieving such wisdom, Professor Tu stresses the importance of his mentor Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) (1909–1995), and Mr. Ikeda of his mentor Jōsei Toda (戸田城聖) (1900–1958) who fought against Japanese militarism, thus introducing us to the sources of Confucian

humanism, Confucian renewal and return, stimulating the spiritual renewal throughout Asia. These two renowned thinkers, one from the Confucian and the other from the Buddhist Mahayana tradition, try to explore this renewal of Confucian ethics in terms of the most urgent issues of the modern world, such as: Chinese–Japanese–American relationships, the transformation of societies through education and dialogue, and the role of major religions in promoting human happiness and welfare. This is why the pages of this book mirror fascinating the correspondences between Confucian and Buddhist worldviews in discussing Mencius, Zhang Zai, Spinoza, Gandhi, Max Weber, Levinas, Tang Junyi, Habermas, and others. Their research and views focus on vital aspects of dialogue culture and peace culture, as well as the reforms they offer to the modern world — through the process of dialogue and more than meticulous textual analysis, namely interpersonal and intercultural exchanges based on respect of differences, openness and tolerance.

The function of this dialogue is not only the search for sameness or uniformity, but also an enriching way to learn how to be human. Through dialogue we cultivate the art of listening, the ethics of caring and the feeling of self-discovery through the meeting of various lifestyles. We are all children of the Enlightenment, and this fact is especially important in inventing a new paradigm of thinking in international relations, as well as inventing a new vision for the rising world order of harmonic coexistence, since it is obvious that we must redirect the modern world to liberate it from its obsession with progress and individualism, inspired by Enlightenment itself. This opens the issue of a build-up of a dialogical civilization for the total global community. Opposed to this intention is Huntington's dichotomy "West and the rest," which includes ethnocentrism, chauvinistic nationalism, culturological imperialism, expansionism, and religious

fundamentalism. If there is an imminent danger of a clash of civilizations, then the promotion of dialogue among civilizations, at least in the sense in which these two thinkers advocate, is imperative and an urgent need.

Here we reach the insight that an original understanding of culturological diversity demands the art of listening, the cultivation of which might require years. This is the first step in realization of a true dialogue and the building of a culture of peace in the present radically complex world of conflicting hatreds, contradictory interests and conflicts. In it, at least in the opinion of these two thinkers, the most significant bilateral relationship in constructing a healthy world order is the Sino-American connection, whereas the view that China is only a threat truly and significantly hinders such efforts.

Further on, in this series of dialogues between Tu Weiming and Daisaku Ikeda, a new ethos of understanding and cultivating the civilization of dialogue is being developed, since the true philosopher and religious leader destroy the conventional barriers to create pioneering new forms of thinking and new ways of acting. Of course, they realize that religion plays a crucial role in the 21st century, namely that the religious leaders have to take a greater responsibility for the welfare of the global community, and not allow the relegation of such issues to the private sphere, in spite of the fact that secularization is often marked as a defining characteristic of modernization. Yet, religions continue to be present in the modern world as an important aspect of contemporary society, having a powerful influence on the economy, politics and culture. No doubt, we shall have to learn and demand criteria to evaluate religious spirituality which gives a philosophical basis for coexistence, and thus find the standards that are necessary for the religion of our age, which implicitly include the building of peace as the prime responsibility of world religions. The realization of such demands and

criteria necessitates the promotion of intercultural dialogue and creation of a worldview of harmony and coexistence, overcoming the extremely negative history of such exchanges.

This is because the secular humanism of the European Enlightenment marginalized religion as a vibrant power in modern Western political culture, so we have to drift away from the already worn-out dogma that human history advances from religion (prejudice) to philosophy (metaphysics) and science (rationality) which is still prevalent in many parts of the world and in the academic community, too, even in philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who take it for granted that religion, as a thing of the heart, has to be relegated to the private sphere, out of the political process, that it should not be an issue in public discourse. On the other hand, the present day has obvious tendencies towards the desecularization of society, and a discussion of how the spiritual resources which religions possess must be activated to revitalize today's civilization and the philosophical and theological bases for the building of a harmonious society of peaceful coexistence, great harmony (*datong* 大同) or the harmony of differences, with the aim of achieving and building a society on a more hopeful basis of (the here strongly advocated) dialogical civilization, to be contrasted to Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations.

An example of such efforts is the above-mentioned Confucian revival, whose complete acceptance came only in 1987, after centuries of rupture with this ancient tradition, when it became a legitimate subject of serious scientific research due to the work of thinkers such as Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), and Tang Junyi (1909–1978). Moreover, 28 September 2019 was actually Confucius' 2570th birthday, which obviously shows the temporal depth of this tradition that is deeply embedded in the soul of the Chinese people (let us remind ourselves here that Voltaire also

praised Confucius as a supreme model, and Kant considered him the "Chinese Socrates," while Dewey himself spent two years in China, spreading the influence of American pragmatism there). For instance, the Confucian golden rule ("don't do to others what you would not want to be done to yourself"),[8] expressed in a negative way, considers the existential situation of the Other. Therefore, this seemingly passive principle includes an active view of the welfare of others through acknowledging and honouring the ideas they advocate, i.e. promoting the welfare of others through Confucian reciprocity and the Chinese ideal of self-ennoblement, that is, "interior wisdom and exterior kingdom" (*naisheng waiwang*). Moreover, this insistence on caring for others could be connected to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), a modern Jewish thinker, through the inclusive philosophy of "radical otherness" which advocates the promotion of culture of peace (Levinas 1987). What Levinas means by "the face of the Other" is summarized in a philosophy which does not originate in metaphysics, but in a sense of obligation that arises from the encounter with the Other ("the face of the Other"), and develops into a form of ethics that he calls the "first philosophy":

> [T]he face [is] a source from which all meaning appears (Levinas 1961, 297).

> The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation (Levinas 1961, 201).

> [T]he Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me (Levinas 1961, 207).

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[8] Or the law of reciprocity, which is the principle of treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself. It is a maxim of altruism seen in many religions and cultures.

> In the face the Other expresses his eminence, the dimension of height and
> divinity from which he descends (Levinas 1961, 262).

These dialogues address the issue of globalization and anti-globalization too, and it seems that it is the only possible and practical solution, as well as a balance of the global integration which does not limit culturological diversity. The disease of modern society can be healed only through a spiritual revolution in human hearts and minds, since an opposite action can only be artificial, superficial, of a controlling character, or mere imitation. This is an important question for the development of a culturological pluralism *hic et nunc* to stand against the prevailing narrow images of the world and the parochial consciousness of the small-town philosophy, or the philosophy of a Muslim residential alley.[9] For these reasons, this is much that is simpler and more feasible from the perspective of Confucian or Buddhist humanism, which is not anthropocentric or anthropological but anthropocosmic.

But are we participants in the same kind of humanism advocated by Sakyamuni and Confucius, namely the one about widening the conversational circle, that is the developing of "dialogical community"? Unfortunately, that is not the case. In spite of the already established Confucian institutes in the region, we fail to use such an opportunity because we do not want to be part of an established network and such an indispensable cooperative conversation, although it is an imperative of a deeper understanding.[10]

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[9] See Konstantinović 1969, a philosophical treatise.

[10] We live in a rapidly changing global environment where intercultural interaction is a fact of life and these are the imperatives of understanding within the complexities of intercultural communication.

Finally, one needs to take into account the fact that, in the last three decades, the leading Neo-Confucian thinkers (Qian Mu from Taiwan, Tang Junyi from Hong Kong and Feng Youlan from China) have independently concluded that the most important contribution Confucian tradition can offer to the global community is precisely the idea of the unity of Heaven and the human race, that is, the vision of an anthropocosmic worldview in which man is put into the cosmic order, rather than one in which man is alienated, either because of his own choice or because of ignoring nature. According to this, the remark of Daisaku Ikeda and Tu Weiming that Chinese philosophy deepened and caught in language this feeling of symbiosis seems to us quite interesting, namely, that the essence of this philosophical tradition is contained in the concept of *tian ren heyi*, or Heaven and humankind as one. It did not come as a surprise that FISP (Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies[11] did not miss this development, and it decided that its previous world congress took place precisely in Beijing (XXIX WCP, Peking University, 2018), due to, among other things, Professor Tu who is one of its most eminent members and advocates of cooperative conversations between Neo-Confucian thinking models and Western philosophy.[12]

Finally, let me express my extraordinary pleasure at being able to witness such activities at the initial stage of his Institute for Advanced

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[11] See their website: http://www.fisp.org/index.html.

[12] The very initiative to host the congress in Beijing and indeed the theme of the Congress itself, "Learning to be Human," came initially from Professor Tu Weiming of the Peking University, a member of the Steering Committee of FISP. On Saturday, 18 August 2018, Professor Tu gave an invited Wang Yangming Keynote Lecture 王阳明讲座 during the 24th World Congress of Philosophy. The title of the lecture was "Spiritual Humanism: Self, Community, Earth, and Heaven." See Jeziorek 2018 (video link).

Humanistic Studies at Beida (Peking University, 2010) as a guest professor, as part of the exchange at Tu's personal invitation, an activity that was already announced by the appearance of his work *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China* (Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, 2010), while the book that is here revisited only serves to prove that the time has finally come for Chinese intellectuals (from the mainland and overseas) to transcend the Western–oriented modernist mentality and formulate their own cultural identity. They need to completely acknowledge the value of openness and culturological diversity and revitalize Confucian discourse, especially living according to the golden mean, the philosophy of the middle way or golden middle way (*zhongyong*), in accordance to the mandate of Heaven. We hope that China will create a new spiritual culture of symbiosis and harmony adapted to the needs of the global society of the 21st century, and in accordance with the teaching of the three contemporary inheritors of this Chinese wisdom: Ji Xianlin from China, Jao Tsung-I-ju from Hong Kong, and Tu Weiming, the Harvard–Yenching professor of Chinese history and philosophy, and undoubtedly the leading Neo-Confucianist of this third generation.

Ming-huei Lee 李明輝 [13]

Ming-huei Lee is one of East Asia's most prominent authorities on Kant and Confucian scholars, born in Taipei, Taiwan, with a PhD from the University of Bonn. He is a long-time distinguished research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica (the Taiwanese

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[13] See: http://www.litphil.sinica.edu.tw/people/researchers/Lee,%20Ming-huei, http://as.ff.uni-lj.si/datoteke/azijski/Dokumenti/Raziskovanje/lee-cv.pdf.

Academy of Sciences in Taipei). His scholarly work has focused on classical and modern Confucianism and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Undoubtedly, he is one of the most renowned scholars in the field of contemporary Confucianism and at the same time a representative of this philosophical school of thought – a leading proponent of what is often called "contemporary new Confucianism" (*dangdai xin rujia* 當代新儒家).

In addition, Lee is currently a professor of the Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University, Taipei, as well as a professor of the Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Central University, Chungli, Taiwan. He was also a Changjiang Scholar Chair Professor of Philosophy at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China, as well as a two-time winner of the "Distinguished Research Award" (philosophy) from the Taiwanese National Science Council (1998; 2002). Professor Lee's special fields include Kant's philosophy, traditional Confucianism, and modern Confucianism. His main works include *Das Problem des moralischen Gefühls in der Entwicklung der kantischen Ethik*, *Konfuzianismus im modernen China, Rujia yu Kangde* (*Confucianism and Kant*), *Ruxue yu xiandai yishi* (*Confucianism and Modern Consciousness*), *Kangde lunlixue yu Mengzi diode shikao zhi chonhjian* (*Kant's Ethics and the Reconstruction of Mencius' Moral Thinking*), *Dangdai ruexue zhi ziwo zhuanhua* (*The Self-transformation of Contemporary Confucianism*), *Siduan yu qiqing: guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao* (*The Four Buddings and the Seven Feelings: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation of Moral Feelings*), and *Rujia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang* (*Political Thought from a Confucian Perspective*).

Confucianism has re-emerged as a rising ideology since China's "reform and opening up" in the 1980s, and Lee's recent book *Confucianism: its roots and global significance* (Lee et. al. 2017), published as the inaugural volume

in the University of Hawaii Press's new series, *Confucian Cultures*, explores ways in which contemporary Confucianism can challenge and change the international order, as well as looking at past shortcomings and areas of future growth for Confucianism, seen simultaneously as various distinctive local traditions and as pan-Asian and potentially global. We can discover in this single volume the work of one of Taiwan's most distinguished scholars, which undoubtedly adds significantly to Confucian scholarship. He is deeply convinced that Confucian traditions can still function as a main resource for cultural *Bildung* and sees good prospects for Confucianism in the 21st century in governing the country and pacifying the world. He also opens up another aspect of Confucianism, that is, an intellectualized Confucianism, and only through such exchanges can Confucianism claim to be a globally relevant philosophy. In many ways, this is the meaning of Lee's goal of bringing Confucianism to the contemporary world.

Professor Lee Ming-huei (李明輝), a distinguished research fellow of the Academia Sinica Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, visited us in Sarajevo in late September 2017, when he delivered a series of public lectures, taking Kant's concept of the "ethical religion" as the starting point of a new reflection on the problem. Contemporary new Confucians also speak of "Confucian humanism," but do not agree on its characteristics, because this kind of religion is one without the structure of a religion, and is more like what Thomas Luckmann calls an "invisible religion" (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In Professor Lee's opinion, Immanuel Kant's concept of an "ethical religion," originally suggested with respect to Christianity, offers an extremely worthwhile point of reference. For this reason, Lee used Kant's view of ethical religion as a reference point to reflect on the question of Confucianism as a religion, noting that it followed a different course of

development than Western thought, and so avoided the dilemma faced by Kant's ethical religion. This is neither ideology nor state religion, but "a main resource for cultural *Bildung*, i.e. for education, formation, and cultivation of self and society," and here Lee focuses on the cross-cultural dimension of modern Confucianism and, in this context, Confucian traditions assume a distinctive contemporary relevance and may be a force for challenging and a peaceful changing of the international order. In particular, he surveys the prospects Confucianism still has as a cultural resource for the modern world and constantly reminds us that all philosophy should be truly comparative. Following this line of thinking, Lee's work is a significant contribution to the Confucian project in English-speaking countries across the world.

In addition, as in Professor Lee's case, comparative philosophy is not an exclusively Western undertaking, as some may think, since many non-Western philosophers have been engaging in their own approaches and development of methods.

In this regard, Lee's *project "Spiritual Confucianism" – a Phenomenon of the Dialectics of Modernization?* is very interesting, as well as his *A Conceptual History of Religion in Ancient and Medieval China* from 2010. Lee particularly emphasizes the fruitful results of an ongoing dialogue between Confucianism and Kant and other German philosophers (Lee, it should be remembered, received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Bonn (Lee 1986)).[14] In this context, "spiritual humanism" here means an emerging global discourse.

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[14] Also, I would like to stress the existence of the corpus of his non-Chinese writings published in German.

In addition to this, Lee Ming-huei was a student of one of the great masters of contemporary Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, and he himself has emerged as one of its major spokespersons. In Lee's view, Confucianism has proven itself by going through what calls "its self-transformation," as "not merely a passive response to external challenges, but also a self-conscious choice and reorientation." This project deserves much attention from those both inside and outside all schools of contemporary Confucianism identifying *neisheng waiwang* 內聖外王 (inner sageliness and outer kingliness) (Mou 2009, 31) as the unchanging or unchangeable essence of Confucianism. In fact, Lee has provided us with a concise and precise statement of one of the most important contemporary Confucian projects.[15] It is noteworthy that the focus of his work is the role of Confucianism for both today's China and for the rest of the world (see Makeham 2003).

Lee concluded his Sarajevo and Banja Luka[16] public lecture with this statement:

> It may not be inconvenient for Confucianism to stay invisible. On the contrary, it can better meet the diversified demands in the modern society and provide a set of methods for people to live in the world. As for the roles of Confucianism in politics, society and culture and other external dimensions, Lee would not give a prolonged discussion in this thesis but deliberate them in other texts.

For me as a philosopher-comparativist, it is extremely important to see his insistence and opening debate on the New Confucians in terms of the

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[15] About his willingness to engage with scholarship across cultures see: Fong 2017.
[16] See http://www.unsa.ba/događaji/ciklus-javnih-predavanja-profesora-leea-ming-hueija-konfucijanski-humanizam-i-religije and
http://as.ff.uni-lj.si/raziskovanje/raziskovanje/raziskovalni_projekti/modern_and_contemporary_taiwanese_philosophy/history.

relationship between traditional Confucianism and modern democracy, as well as the quest for global peace through cross-cultural dialogue or collaborative conversation, because many Confucian scholars argue that Confucianism is a form of humanism, hence the term "Confucian Humanism" with regard to exploring the possibilities for mutual intellectual enrichment.

The term "Confucian Humanism" is a commonly acknowledged in contemporary New Confucianism, but views differ as to its characteristics. This idea is, however, explained in a remarkable two-volume work *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World* (Steineck et. al. 2018).[17] The first volume on China and Japan includes an article by Professor Lee, "Reviewing the Crisis of the Study of Chinese Philosophy – Starting from the 'Legitimacy of Chinese Philosophy' Debates," and this is really a nice connection with the essence of my own contribution in this regard.

The importance of *Tianfang* Trilogy as a Paradigm

Chinese Muslims (*Huihui*, or Sinophone Muslims: Chinese: *Huizu* 回族) developed their unique tradition of Islamic teachings during the mid-7th century, introducing Islam into China. There are over 35.000 mosques in China, 40,000 Islamic religious leaders (imams), more than 400 Islamic associations in the entire country, and 13 Islamic institutes. More than 90% of Chinese Muslims are Sunni, while only 1.3% of them are Shiah. Islam in China keeps good relationships with other religions, and among the 55 Chinese minorities in China there are 10 observing Islam, namely the Hui, Uyghur, Kazak, Khalkhas, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Dongxiang, Sala and Baoan,

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[17] The essays assembled in two volumes deal, each in their own way, with the question of what philosophy is when one turns to China, Japan, India and the Islamic World.

mainly inhabiting the northwest provinces of Xijiang, Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai, and the southwest province of Yunnan, while individual Muslims live almost in every city in the country. The Islamic presence in China is as old as Islam itself, and with over 1,400 years of Sino-Islamic relations, ranging from the early efforts of the Prophet's companion, Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqās (who died 674 AD in Guangzhou, China), to the pioneering journeys of the greatest naval commander in Chinese history, Admiral Zheng He (鄭和; 1371–1433 or 1435). In addition to the fact that there are over 23 million Muslims living China today, Islam and Chinese Muslims have made significant contributions to China and Chinese civilisation, and vice versa, and without doubt we can say that Muslims have a rich and unique relationship with China (Mi and You 2004).

Philosophy needs to increase its engagement with Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Islamic traditions in order to live up to its own aspirations. Understanding the distinctive traditions of Chinese Muslims and the Islamic heritage in China, as well as its relevance to understanding both the evolution of the Chinese history and culture, and appreciating the complex, multi-ethnic influences on modern China, is now quite achievable.[18] This multifaceted cultural heritage continues to the present day, because Muslims in China are scattered all over the country and have adapted to the local cultural circumstances, while continually adhering to their Islamic traditions.

To summarize, this is, in a way, *art without borders*, to paraphrase the very title of Ben-Ami Scharfstein's well-known masterpiece (Scharfstein 2009), which elucidates human thinking about art in all its facets, a philosophical exploration of art and humanity, the entire idea of an open

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[18] See especially Garnaut 2006, an expert on Muslim Chinese culture: anthony.garnaut@anu.edu.au. Also, there is my own translation of *Islamic Art in China* by Yang Guiping (China Intercontinental Press, 2013) – to be published.

aesthetics, and this is extremely important for a deep understanding in such an urbanized and modern society as today's China, where mosques undoubtedly offer a brilliant landscape in skyscraper-crowded cities. Moreover, to memorialize the sages who introduced Islam into China in the early years, Chinese Muslims have not only built up exquisite mosques, but have also constructed amazing *khanqahs*, *qubbahs*, *mazars* and mausoleums dedicated to their Sufi masters or those who have made significant contributions to Islam.[19]

That a project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place at this conference should be applauded in this cacophony in the post-9/11 world, with the rise of interest in Islam and Islamic matters across the globe, necessitating an explanation of the authentic teaching of this religion anew in light of the challenges of the present-day situation not only in the EU, US and China, but worldwide.

As for the relationship between the Islamic thought and Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, which is part of my paper, it is a newly-discovered continent now being studied in depth for the first time in European languages, especially by Sachiko Murata, William Chittick, Osman Bakar, Tu Weiming and others, with the indirect presence and influence of the late Toshihiko Izutsu-sensei (see Kahteran 2016).

I initiated this pioneering project to introduce recent remarkable scholarship in philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy to the

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[19] See especially in this regard: Murata, Chittick, and Tu 2009, Harvard-Yenching monograph series; the volume on Liu Zhi, ca. 1670–1724, one of the most important scholars of Islam in traditional China, and above all, his *Tianfang* trilogy (Frankel 2009, 46–54). Liu Zhi's work represents the most systematic and sophisticated attempt to harmonize Islam with Chinese thought and provides a glimpse at Chinese Islamic metaphysics. Liu Zhi found in Sufi theories a bridge between the religio-philosophical traditions of East and West. The most methodical scholar of the *Han Kitāb*, Liu Zhi's bibliographies reveal a significant debt to medieval Sufi literature.

philosophical circles of the ex-Yugoslav countries for the purpose of exploring how philosophical ideas and approaches from this area (such as Islamic philosophy) and those from the Chinese philosophical tradition can learn from each other and make joint contributions to the common philosophical enterprise. The focus has been on new frontiers of contemporary philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy, now published as *Nove granice kineske filozofije / New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy* (Kahteran and Mou 2018, 432), followed by my own translation of the pioneering work in this field *Islam and Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue*, by Osman Bakar and Cheng Gek Nai (Bakar and Nai 2018, 318).

These published materials have tried to answer some of the questions raised in this paper and offer a vista onto the world of Chinese Muslim literati who produced the primary source material of their educational network, i.e. *Han Kitāb* (*Han ketabu* 汉克塔布), a collection of over one hundred texts of canonical status, the basic curriculum within the Chinese Muslim learned community and their own education. This corpus presents the essence of the Chinese form of Islamic knowledge, the rise of the intellectual current in China, which was done through successful "Sinicization" and accommodation. It is our hope that these materials will help to generate a new interest among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ex-Yugoslav countries in the comparative study of Islam and Confucianism in their own quest for a new Asia and points of convergence, recognizing religious pluralism and multiculturalism and the urgent need for sharable, common values and arguments for pluralism rather than exclusivism, especially among our academic and scholarly community. Or, as Professor Chung-Ying Cheng himself points out:

We need to ponder whether Confucian culture and Islamic culture could indeed form a union, on the one hand to meet the challenges of Western domination and on the other to foster a greater mutual understanding, thereby presenting a model of postmodern pluralistic form of intercultural and international life (Cheng 1997, 121).

Taking into account that in recent years there has been an increased academic interest in the long history of Islam in China, as well as its interaction with the Chinese culture and civilization, the study of Islam and Muslims in China has to be promoted from a cross-disciplinary approach with the understanding that the interlinking of these traditions would be very helpful to scholars interested in this field, taking into account that the *Han Kitāb* itself is the product of a remarkable, centuries-long period of intense intellectual interaction between Islam and Confucianism, and this is the very reason why Professor Tu Weiming is convinced that it is a major contribution to Neo-Confucian thought from a comparative philosophical perspective,[20] as well as that those acquainted with these issues will find a wealth of possibilities that will help bridge the gap between the Islamic and Confucian conceptual universes[21] "to interpret the thought of Islam through Confucianism," "to make a supplement to Confucianism by Islam" and "to achieve flourished development of both Islam and Confucianism" (Liu 2008).

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[20] In his "Epilogue" to *The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi* (Murata et. al. 2009, 598).
[21] Chinese term for Confucianism is "scholarly tradition (*rujia*)," which is primarily intended to mean the school as a philosophical movement of thought with regard to humanism. See Mou 2009, 31.

In conclusion

I hope this paper is a clear indication that a new vision of Chineseness from a pluralistic, tolerant, and dialogical perspective is emerging, especially with the inclusion of the Chinese-Muslim heritage. The thinkers mentioned in this paper expressed full recognition of the value of openness, cultural diversity, and self-reflexivity, revitalizing the Confucian discourse. It is crucial to stress the emergence of a "common awareness" (*gongshi*) among Chinese intellectuals throughout the world hoping to build a transnational network for understanding the meaning of being Chinese within a global context (Tu 2010, 23). For Professor Tu himself, the meaning of being Chinese is basically not a political question, but is a human concern rich with ethical-religious implications (ibid.).

Finally, I will end with a quote from Tu Weiming's about a major contribution to Neo-Confucian thought from a comparative philosophical perspective, considering Liu Zhi's approach as presenting Islam in Neo-Confucian terms:

> This is, so far as I know, a significant event even in Islamic theology. It has often been assumed that Arabic and the languages that employed the Arabic script – Persian, Turkish, and Urdu – were the languages for expounding original Islamic thinking before the nineteenth century. If classical Chinese could also facilitate such a subtle and sophisticated task in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it means that Islam is more than a regional phenomenon in philosophy. It also means that the classical Chinese can extend its scholarly community beyond the so-called Confucian cultural area…. (Murata et. al. 2009, 589–590).

Some preliminary efforts in these directions have been made, but, for the moment, perhaps on a smaller scale, much remains to be done, because

the very notion of philosophy has to be interpreted in a wider sense when applied to the Islamic context and Sino-Muslim intellectual evolution from the time of the *Han Kitāb* until today. Apparently, there has been a plurality of philosophical approaches in the Islamic world and, in consequence, in the Chinese context too.

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