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Yael S. Aronoff,
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Saliba Sarsar

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL CULTURE

Israel and Beyond



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Cover image description: The sculpture on the front cover is "Noah's Ark," crafted by famed Israeli artist Israel Hadany. Noah is depicted gratefully holding the Dove of Peace after great tragedy and destruction. The authors of this volume grapple with the themes evoked by that image: cultural continuity and change, legitimacy, collective memory, democracy, ethnicity, identity, and the meaning of peace. This imagery also offers a message to us all. In Genesis (9:8–17), the Lord challenged Noah to protect life on Earth for future generations. This challenge—and the commitment, compassion, faith, and hope needed to rise to it—are more urgently needed today than ever before.

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In Honor of
Professor Myron J. Aronoff
Teacher, Scholar, Mentor, Colleague, and Friend

Contents

Introduction

Yael S. Aronoff, Ilan Peleg, and Saliba Sarsar

Politics and culture are two sides of the same coin. Politics pertains to the ways in which values are expressed and power is exercised, especially in public life, while culture relates to the socially constructed structure of meanings that helps people understand their reality and influence their behavior. Legitimacy is constituted by the processes through which relationships of power are transformed into relationships of authority and, conversely, processes through which authority is challenged and undermined.

Hence, when politics and culture interrelate, a key focus is placed on how values promote or challenge political authority, which, in turn, impacts the legitimacy and collective identity of a particular polity at a given time period. Where the political and the cultural meet, we find the citizens, polity, or national community following (freely, hesitantly, or forcibly) set orientations, principles, and standards so as to achieve certain goals or visions.

While political culture tends to have relatively stabilizing elements (e.g., ideologies, myths, rituals, symbols), it is far from static. As history advances, so does political culture. Major internal and external events such as acts of terrorism, wars—particularly those resulting in border changes, occupation, revolutions, and other traumas, including controversial peace negotiations—all turning points or transitions—influence the contours and evolution of political culture in terms of adaptations and change or discontinuities.

This book contains contributions from ten leading scholars and practitioners of politics, political science, anthropology, Israel studies, and Middle East affairs—most of whom are either former students and/or colleagues of Myron J. Aronoff, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Anthropology, and Jewish Studies at Rutgers University, who has devoted his professional career to teaching, scholarly research, and publishing.

This book is both special and unique. It is special as it is a fitting tribute to Professor Myron (Mike) J. Aronoff—our teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend—who has built important conceptual and methodological bridges between political science and anthropology. It is unique as it addresses elements that frame Professor Aronoff's scholarly work, mainly the interplay between politics and culture, especially the role of legitimacy.

It goes without saying that each society or polity has a distinctive political culture or cultures and a variety of subcultures, while perhaps sharing commonalities with others as well. This distinctiveness, resulting mainly from a combination of various factors—national backgrounds, ethnicities, religious affiliations, ideologies, languages, historical experiences, geography, and socioeconomic standing—leads each society or polity to react uniquely to change. For example, Israeli culture and its ebb and flow is shaped by multiple influences, including Jewish culture, Jewish diasporic history, Zionism, as well as the multiethnic, multilingual, and multireligious expressions of the numerous communities that constitute Israeli society. Israel's political culture and governance, in addition, are impacted by security and strategic considerations, given decades of conflict with Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, and decades of internal visions and divisions.[1] The implication is that political culture, in Israel and beyond, is complex and complicated or, as Mike Aronoff states, "contested, contingent, and highly contextual." Hence, care must be taken to ensure its proper explication as related to diverse locales, issues, and relationships.

Each contributor ties her/his analysis to the main theme of continuity and change in political culture. Among the topics covered are the legitimacy of the two-state solution, identity and memory, denationalization, the role of trust in peace negotiations, democracy, majority-minority relations, inclusion and exclusion, Biblical and national narratives, art in public space, and avant-garde theater. Among the countries or regions covered are Israel, Palestine, the United States, the Basque Autonomous Region of Spain, and Poland. Lastly, Mike Aronoff relates his work on various aspects of political culture to each chapter in an integrative essay in the epilogue.

Although there is conceptual and topical overlap among all chapters, there are three major blocs of themes. The first four chapters by Yael S. Aronoff, Saliba Sarsar, Yossi Beilin, and Nadav Shelef address aspects of the conflict and peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, including alternative solutions. The contributions by Naomi Chazan, Ilan Peleg, and Joel Migdal tackle challenges to democracy in Israel, other divided societies, and in the creation of the American public. Finally, Yael Zerubavel, Roland Vazquez, and Jan Kubik focus their analyses on aspects of national memory, memorialization, and dramatization. Sarsar also deals with collective memory and identity.

Professor Yael S. Aronoff leads off with an analysis of the nature of the legitimacy of the "two-state solution" to resolve the century-long conflict

between Israel and Palestine. She argues that, although there have been serious challenges to the two-state solution in recent years, its legitimacy remains. This can be measured by, most importantly, the opinions and desires of Israelis and Palestinians relative to any one other alternative, but also by the almost hegemonic regional and international support for the two-state paradigm. However, Yael Aronoff makes clear that no path is linear or determined, but rather contingent on a set of triggers and conditions that might in the future serve to weaken or strengthen the legitimacy of the two-state solution. These conditions rely heavily on the particular Israeli, Palestinian, and American leaders, individually or in combination—a reality very much in flux at the time of writing, with the results of a third Israeli election in a year still coalescing, a U.S. Presidential election on the horizon, and the emerging Coronavirus pandemic adding another layer of radical uncertainty. The "peace plan" of President Donald J. Trump released on January 28, 2020—just before the third national election to the Knesset within a year—has created additional uncertainty regarding this paradigm for peace. It significantly diverges from the Clinton Parameters for Peace shared with the parties almost twenty years ago, and all sets of serious peace negotiations based on those parameters that have occurred since. It not only did not involve the Palestinians and has understandably been rejected by them, but could be a platform for unilateral annexation on the part of Israel that would undermine the two-state solution. However, there is a significant chance that the legitimacy of the two-state solution will remain viable compared to alternative solutions.

Professor Saliba Sarsar elucidates the roles of the Holocaust and Al-Nakba, respectively, in Israeli and Palestinian collective memory and identity. Each has attained the status of a central political myth in their political culture.[2] Sarsar explicates how a sense of "righteous victimhood" that focuses on the uniqueness of their suffering erases the other's memory and identity tantamount to dehumanizing them. He argues that for reconciliation to occur, the memory of past injustices must be balanced with reciprocal recognition of the other's suffering—essential for the establishment of amity and goodwill. Sarsar examines their memorialization and developments in which Israeli "new historians" revised traditional narratives highlighting Palestinian suffering. By contrast, he finds denial, non-relevance, and/or ignorance of the Holocaust among most Arabs and Palestinians, resulting mostly from historical and political factors, including Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands and the lack of peace progress between Palestine and Israel. It is no surprise that "normalization" of relations with Israel and Israelis is widely opposed in Palestinian circles. Following the second *intifada*, Israeli citizens have been prohibited from entering Area A that is exclusively governed by the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli Nation-State Law is another negative development militating against reconciliation. Yet, peacebuilders and peacebuilding organizations continue to advance understanding by reshaping

memory and identity.[3] Sarsar concludes that Israelis and Palestinians must acknowledge their shared responsibility for perpetuating the conflict. He calls upon both sides to empathize with each other and recognize their mutual dignity and humanity.

Dr. Yossi Beilin examines the cost of misplaced trust in political negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. As a "participant observer" in the negotiations that led to the "Oslo Agreement" of 1993, he is uniquely positioned for this analysis. Beilin, who served in governments led by Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak, has had more experience negotiating with Palestinian leaders than any other Israeli. The central problem, he concludes, is that the trust that was established between the two teams of negotiators was not shared by their leaders and publics. Consequently, implementation of the settlement freeze—central to Palestinian concerns—excluded settlements not funded by the Rabin-led government. When Netanyahu became Prime Minister, he reversed the policy of freezing even government-sponsored settlements. Beilin explains that Rabin qualified the freezing of settlements out of concern that otherwise it would not have been supported by Shas. This would have brought down his government. Beilin is confident that Shas would have accepted the settlement freeze in the form agreed to by the negotiators. If Beilin is correct in his assessment, Rabin's mistrust of his coalition partner had historic consequences.

Professor Nadav Shelef interrogates how groups that once identified as nationalist, deserving political sovereignty, cease to understand themselves in those terms. Most research on nationalism in Israel has focused on the contestation between various forms of Zionism in the displacement of other foci of political identification. In this volume, Shelef focuses on processes of national *de-identification*. Using Israel as a case-study, he develops a conceptual framework to explore alternatives. They are denationalization: (1) by substitution, that is, in activating other identities which might enable support for a one-state solution; (2) by replacing national with non-national identities, for example, religious or universal; (3) downshifting the role of ethnicity which would enable autonomy rather that sovereignty, for example, a consociational arrangement or a one-state solution. After examining the various pathways through which the alternatives might be achieved, Shelef concludes that alternatives to a two-state solution are unlikely to peacefully resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. The reason is that as processes of denationalization are not happening in a serious way, they will lead to violence as opposed to peace.

While the first section of the book primarily emphasizes Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, the second section analyzes articulations of and internal processes and divisions over political culture in Israel. In this regard, Professor Naomi Chazan analyzes Israeli democracy at a critical turning point. She highlights the paradox of the democratic erosion of most liberal

elements with simultaneous signs of democratic rejuvenation. Democratic slippage has involved the growth of illiberalism, neo-authoritarianism, and rising populism. She specifies legislation, government policies, and shifting public discourse employed to undermine democratic rights, institutions, and norms. Chazan contrasts the liberal features in two "Basic Laws codifying Human Rights passed in 1992 with the illiberal Basic Law: Israel the Nation-State of the Jewish People" and "Arrangements Law" passed in 2018. Neo-authoritarianism and populism have undermined institutional checks and balances and democratic norms. She outlines in detail the features and processes explaining Israel's democratic decline. Chazan discusses the democratic "pushback" of segments of civil society, civil and human rights groups, social justice organizations, academics, and cultural and peace movements. She discusses trends, implications, and possible trajectories. Much depends on the nature of the government formed after the March election.

Professor Ilan Peleg employs the case of Israel to explore theoretically and empirically majority-minority relations in societies that are both deeply divided and mostly democratic. He does so within a broad globalized context that is particularly relevant today, given undemocratic, illiberal and populist worldwide trends. His chapter notes that divided polities with democratic aspirations are required to carefully balance the demands of the majority and the needs of the minority, and argues that Israel has failed to fully do so, particularly over the last ten years. The chapter maintains that rather than evolving into a full-fledged, Western-style liberal democracy, Israel's traditional hybrid democracy has increasingly emphasized its ethno-national-religious Jewish character, a polity in the service of only one of its constituent ethnic groups. Since 2009, Israel under the "national camp" has witnessed an assault on minority rights and the freedom of the press, as well as challenges to the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Most interestingly, contemporary Israel has emerged as a worldwide testing ground for liberal democracy, especially in deeply divided societies, for the ability of this prominent regime type to survive in the face of anti-democratic, populist, and majoritarian pressures. The last decade has been particularly challenging in terms of the struggle between the two "souls" of Israel, a struggle between equal, universal, and inclusive citizenship and privileged, particularistic, and exclusivist hegemony. Peleg concludes that the resolution of this tension—evidenced in Israel and Zionism from the very beginning—is still unclear.

Professor Joel Migdal also considers processes of inclusion and exclusion. His case-study is the forging of the American public in the nineteenth century. He examines the sources for the acceptance of implicit rules for social interaction in addressing issues of common concern. Migdal's analysis concentrates on who is included and who is excluded in the creation the "public,"

and how and why these boundaries change over time. He asks how a society of strangers comes to create and adhere to common rules and sustains a sense of the common welfare of a society. Migdal focuses on the role American cities played in the creation of the American public.

While the first section of the book mainly focuses on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the second section highlights divisions and visions in Israeli culture and society, the third section addresses creativity and imagination as they relate to facets of national memory, memorialization, and dramatization. Professor Yael Zerubavel explicates the role of political satire and collective memory in the work of Meir Shalev. She analyzes the mnemonic, artistic, and literary strategies used in the process of turning Biblical narratives into critical social and political critiques of aspects of contemporary Israel. The main techniques are "contemporization" by applying contemporary perspectives to Biblical narratives, and "archaization," that is, drawing from history to satirize the contemporary. Zerubavel conceptualizes this as a "dialogic" process. Shalev utilizes these unique literary strategies to supply new modern interpretations of selected stories to help secular Israelis rediscover the relevance of the Bible for their lives by making the characters flesh and blood. Zerubavel examines Shalev's treatment of the Book of Ruth, the Book of Job, and Ecclesiastes to illustrate Shalev's "bible-lite with a satirical bite."

Professor Roland Vazquez relates how sculpture in public spaces in Basque country has become a virtual "map of memory" of the victims of ETA violence during the armed struggle for Basque independence from Spain. He analyzes the multivocal symbolism and political aesthetic of Cristina Iglesias's monumental sculpture "The Midnight Compass," which he explains is the "ur text" and neurological center of this memorial geography on the grounds of the Basque parliamentary building.

Professor Jan Kubik examines the role that the avant-garde theater played in presenting alternative visions to state socialism, and, after the fall of communism, to the current state-sponsored populist nationalism in Poland. He explains how the theater of Tadeusz Kantor presented a global vision before the era of globalization. Perhaps counterintuitively, Kantor accomplished this through a novel cosmopolitan portrayal of his Polish Jewish village. His extraordinary artistic vision, Kubik argues, offered Poles a new way of thinking and visualizing their collective identity.

Professor Mike Aronoff's Epilogue relates discussion of the aforementioned themes to his own relevant publications. He and Yael Aronoff collaborated on research on the negotiations to resolve a century-long conflict. His analyses of the 2,000 Camp David negotiations relate both to Yael Aronoff's contribution on the continuing legitimacy of the two-state paradigm and to those of Saliba Sarsar and Yossi Beilin. Sarsar cites mutual ignorance or insensitivity of Israelis and Palestinians to their counterpart's core myths. A

prime example is Arafat's rejection of the historic existence of the Temple in Jerusalem. Whereas Beilin demonstrates how misplaced trust among negotiators led to the failure to implement agreements, Mike Aronoff's explanation for the breakdown of the Camp David Summit focused, among others, on distrust between leaders and even within delegations of the participants and mediators. Aronoff relates his study of contested versions of Israeli collective identity to Nadav Shelef's analysis of Israeli nationalism. He discusses his work on the origins and evolution of Israeli democracy in relation to Naomi Chazan's evaluation of the waning of it. Ilan Peleg's exploration of majority-minority relations in deeply divided societies is compared by Aronoff with his analysis of the same subject in the Netherlands, India, and Israel. Aronoff relates his work on the development of a new town in Israel to Joel Migdal's analysis of the American city. He suggests the similarity of Yael Zerubavel's review of Meir Shalev's political satire to his analysis of the satirical challenges to Prime Minister Begin's manipulative reburial of 2,000-year-old bones in a State funeral ceremony. Roland Vazquez's discussion of the map of memory in Basque political culture is compared by Aronoff to his work on the cult of the memorialization of military deaths in Israel. Finally, Jan Kubik's examination of avant-garde theater in Poland exemplifies the approach that he and Mike Aronoff have developed over their close collaboration.

These direct connections only underscore what is already clear in the chapters of all these contributors: Mike Aronoff's deep influence on the work of his students and colleagues, as well as his impact on the fields of political science, anthropology, Israel studies, and Middle East affairs more broadly.

NOTES

1. Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989, 1991).
2. Henry Tudor, *Political Myth* (London: Pall Mall, 1972).
3. See Saliba Sarsar, *Peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian Relations* (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2020).

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Section I

CONFLICT AND PEACE

Chapter 1

Pathways to Peace

Legitimation of a Two-State Solution

Yael S. Aronoff

The paradigm for a Jewish majority state and an Arab/Palestinian majority state existing alongside one another as the resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has existed almost as long as the conflict itself. In July 1937, the Peel Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and, on November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 calling for partition. From that time until 1988, other options including incorporating the West Bank into Jordan were negotiated. While the two-state solution has always faced competition from alternative pathways, the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995 between Israel and what would become the Palestinian Authority made this solution the default one accepted by the mainstream of both parties to the conflict; although never mentioning two states, the Accords were embedded in expectations for this resolution. This has been the main paradigm for solving the conflict ever since, with its legitimacy derived from both popular support on the ground and from international actors. The majority of Israelis have supported this paradigm for most of the past twenty-five years, and a majority of Palestinians have accepted it in certain crucial periods. It has been the basis of a series of serious peace negotiations that often made progress in narrowing the gaps among the two nationalist movements, and it has met with increasing international and regional support over time. Even though the two-state solution (TSS) paradigm was never hegemonic, was always contested, and never attained the support of all Israelis and Palestinians, it has derived significantly greater support and backing than any other one alternative.

Arguably, in the past few years, the two-state solution has faced increased challenges to its legitimacy. Among the reasons for this increasing challenge are a mutually reinforcing set of factors such as the stagnation of the

peace process; decreased public support among Israelis and Palestinians; an emboldened political right in Israel challenging the paradigm; a shift among Israeli political parties away from using the language of two states as often; decreased internal legitimacy of the PA, the PLO, and Hamas, with opposition to these parties (based on a number of factors and issues) expressed through opposition to the two-state formula; Hamas control of Gaza and increased Israeli settlement in the West Bank; the Trump Administration's complete one-sided approach to the conflict, culminating in the unveiling of the Trump Peace Plan that has excluded the Palestinians and is a significant departure from the Clinton Parameters; and decreased prioritization of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for regional and international actors due to turmoil in the Middle East and their perceived more urgent internal and external threats.

Despite increased challenges to the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its legitimacy is still greater than the legitimacy of any other paradigm, and in particular the "one-state" paradigm, which has emerged among some as the leading contender with TSS. In fact, when taking a broader view compared to thirty years ago, as opposed to only examining recent events, TSS has even grown in legitimacy. The two-state solution remains almost hegemonic in the international community. Although public support among Israelis and Palestinians for TSS has decreased, it still is relatively higher than for the one-state solution and shows a plurality of support. The decrease in support for two states is often rooted in a lack of faith that the other side supports it, rather than necessarily a rejection of the paradigm itself. Significant portions of the Israeli right have in some respects shifted to the center, and more parties/factions support TSS than twenty years ago. There is no other paradigm that is as seriously discussed as an alternative by significant numbers of Israelis and Palestinians. While the phrase "one-state solution" might be more common now than in the past, visions of what that "one-state solution" might look like differ wildly between parties, even more so than do visions of a two-state solution. A basic common understanding of what TSS would look like has emerged over two decades of serious peace negotiations, including , most importantly, the Clinton Parameters. In contrast, there is no such corresponding set of cooperative negotiations or plans for a one-state solution. The research findings of many major think tanks as well as individual academics still show relatively greater support for two states.

This chapter will further analyze the conceptual and methodological basis for understanding the legitimacy for the two-state solution paradigm, and elaborate on the arguments and evidence for challenges to this paradigm, as well as the current maintenance of this paradigm in the face of these challenges. Moreover, it will discuss triggers that could strengthen challenges to

the paradigm, as well as opportunities, not only to keep it alive, but also to learn from past lessons to reinvigorate this path.

ASSESSING LEGITIMACY

Myron J. Aronoff has contributed to the conceptualization of legitimacy and to the application of those concepts to political culture in his work that bridges political science and anthropology. He has analyzed how political parties (especially in Israel) have attained, retained, and ultimately lost legitimacy, how governments use ritual and symbols to retain legitimacy, how social movements and rivals challenge this legitimacy, and how varied political cultures contest the legitimacy of the identity of the state. Aronoff argues that the construction of legitimacy is as much a political process as it is cultural. He discusses how the conscious acceptance of legitimating discourses is vital to legitimacy, and does not necessitate complete consensus. The public discourses, public ceremonies, and rituals can be examined to determine different aspects or levels of legitimacy.[1] While Aronoff examines how the "myths of *legitimacy* and social establishment validate the established order, clarify legality and community, and transform power into authority" in the context of domestic politics,[2] here I want to extend Aronoff's terms to examine the legitimacy of potential solutions to international conflict—that is, the way the myths regarding particular pathways to resolving conflict can serve similar purposes, providing validation to international, regional, and domestic engagement in negotiations based on these paradigms. I also build on Aronoff's work examining how the varied perceptions of the Camp David peace negotiations in 2000 within and between the negotiating parties and mediators contributed to the perceived failure of these negotiations, despite the ways in which those negotiations made clear progress toward narrowing the gaps.[3]

This research examines the rhetoric and policies of international and regional organizations and those of regional and world powers that support TSS in a uniform and constant manner. These institutions are invested in a two-state solution. The rhetoric and policies of these institutions, in turn, engage the international norm of self-determination, in which the two-state solution is embedded. The United Nations also influences public opinion as its actions and statements shape "people's expectations as to future developments, viable policy options, opportunities, and constraints."[4]

While examining the support from these regional and international institutions, my research also examines public opinion at the level of surveys, interviews, and discourse that lend support to—as well as challenge—these dominant paradigms. As Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki argue, "public

opinion confers or denies political legitimacy," but leaders and their policies may turn favorable sentiment expressed privately into a collective readiness to implement a plan. They claim that *perceptions* of majority opinion, in addition to polls of individual preferences, bolster legitimacy. As they argue, "Obtaining normative legitimacy constitutes a crucial shift in public opinion from a more favorable sentiment held privately by many people to actual collective readiness for the implementation of a specific policy option."[5] Legitimacy ultimately rests on the perceptions of alternative solutions, relative to each other, by relevant constituencies, and of course in this case most importantly, by Israelis and Palestinians.

In assessing the legitimacy of an idea/paradigm for the solution to a conflict, it is imperative not only to examine that idea in isolation, but to examine it in relation to alternative solutions. As David Baldwin argues in relation to evaluating the effectiveness of economic sanctions, one can only evaluate the effectiveness of policies in relation to their alternatives.[6] Likewise, it would be problematic to evaluate the legitimacy of the two-state solution in isolation, and not to consider the relative legitimacy of alternatives.

CHALLENGES TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TWO-STATE PARADIGM

Israeli and Palestinian Support for Two States Maintained During and in the Immediate Aftermath of the Second Intifada

The majority of Israelis and a plurality—and often a majority—of Palestinians supported the two-state solution, even during the bloodiest years of the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. Hussein Ibish and Saliba Sarsar argue that "one of the most compelling aspects of the two-state solution is that a solid majority of both Palestinians and Israelis have shown, in virtually every poll taken in the past 20 years and more, that they are in favor of peace based on two states."[7] These publics continued to favor negotiations, and their positions became more accommodating.

More specifically, at times the publics supported a two-state solution structured around the Clinton Parameters.[8] These parameters included Israeli withdrawal from the majority of settlements—a position that a majority of Israelis have supported since mid-2001, and which increased after Sharon's announcement of his Disengagement Plan that helped legitimize the dismantling of settlements in the eyes of the public.[9] Before the First Intifada in 1986, about 20 percent of Jewish Israelis were willing to accept a Palestinian state, while in 2006 that was up to 60 percent. In a March 2006 poll, 73 percent of Palestinians and 76 percent of Israelis supported negotiations over unilateral

moves. Sixty percent of Israelis supported entering talks with Abu Mazin to reach a final status settlement. Support for Greater Israel correspondingly declined. At the same time, after the violence of the Second Intifada, the perception that peace would be reached in the next few years declined, down to only a quarter of Israelis in March 2006. In December 2004, 64 percent of Israelis and 54 percent of Palestinians supported the combined overall framework of the Clinton/Geneva framework—a figure that actually had gone up since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. That support was maintained at 64 percent after the disengagement in December 2005. However, after Hamas's rise to power and the firing of rockets from Gaza, in December 2006, this support declined to 52 percent. Shamir and Shikaki conclude that both publics could endorse a permanent two-state solution framework, but that there still were challenges at that time to full legitimacy, since individuals underestimated the actual support for the two-state solution among the other's and their own population—that is, the majority of individuals felt *they* were for TSS, but increasingly doubted if *others* were for it, or if it were possible in the short term. They argue, therefore, that a two-state solution based on the Clinton Parameters, endorsed by both publics, is viable and that an overall future package could receive majority support in both publics.

Further, various answers to the specifics of a plan suggest that the desirable components of a plan and the desire for a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the perceived undesirable parts.[10] In contrast, often polls in 2009 showed that Palestinian support for a one-state solution stood at around 25 percent.[11] After continued stagnation of the peace process, in August 2016, 51 percent of Palestinians and 53 percent of Israeli Jews continued to support the two-state framework, even though they did not think it would be achieved in the near future.[12] In the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University (INSS) National Security Index Public Opinion Survey of 2018–2019, 58 percent of Israelis supported a two-state solution, down from 60 percent in 2015 and 71 percent in 2006.[13] Thus, while faith in TSS declined over time, it still remains the preferred solution among the majority of Israelis.

Recent Decreased Support for Two States among Israelis and Palestinians

Palestinian support for a two-state solution, however, has steadily dropped since 2016. While it stood at 51 percent approval in August 2016, it fell to 47 percent in July 2019, and then to 42 percent in September 2019; it hit a new low of 39 percent in February 2020 after the announcement of the Trump Peace Plan.[14] According to some observers, this decline in legitimacy of TSS reflects less on the solution itself, and more on the political opposition to the

PLO leadership. Some Palestinians are expressing opposition to the two-state paradigm in order to express opposition to the PLO leadership. The lack of progress in the peace process and corruption within the PA are leading challenges to the legitimacy of TSS. There is a legitimacy crisis throughout the Palestinian political system, including both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.[15] In a survey conducted in February 2020, 85 percent of Palestinians surveyed believed that there was corruption in the PA, 65 percent that there was corruption in institutions run by Hamas in Gaza, 62 percent demanded that Abbas resign, and 60 percent were dissatisfied with his performance.[16] Thus the decline in support for TSS may be a reflection in an overall decline in the legitimacy of Palestinian parties and institutions, rather than only or primarily a decline in support for TSS itself.

Rhetoric and Actions of Netanyahu and Israeli Political Parties

Benyamin Netanyahu, especially since the run-up to the 2015 election, has tried to draw votes from other right-wing parties, some of which are further to the right than Likud. In doing so, his rhetoric—which tends to become more inflammatory before elections—undermines the legitimacy of a two-state solution. For instance, before the April 2019 election, he declared that all settlements would remain under Israeli sovereignty.[17] He repeated before the September 2019 elections that he would annex the Jordan Valley in the West Bank, as well as all settlements, if the United States would let him. Since 2000, the idea of Israel, within the framework of a peace agreement, absorbing the few settlement blocs where the vast majority of settlers live, while in turn compensating Palestinians with territorial swaps, has been part of every peace effort and is consistent with TSS. However, building outside of these blocs, and Israel keeping territory in the West Bank outside the blocs where most settlers live is not compatible with TSS. Netanyahu's continued settlements have also grown so that 103,000 Israelis live outside the settlement blocs near Jerusalem in the West Bank.[18] Netanyahu received yet another gift from the Trump Administration before the third set of elections on March 2, 2020, in the form of the unveiling of the Trump Peace Plan, which essentially codified all of Netanyahu's stated desires that Israel would keep all settlements in the West Bank in an eventual agreement. After the establishment of the unity government in May 2020, Netanyahu seemed more determined than ever to unilaterally annex territory in the West Bank.

Not only has Netanyahu started talking about a "Palestinian state minus," the phrase "two states" has recently almost exclusively used by Meretz, and even Blue and White does not use it often as it attempts to gain power by also getting votes from the right. Rather than focusing on the phrasing

"two states," even believers in the TSS like Tzipi Livni and others focus on "separation."[19] While even Labor Knesset members such as Haim Ramon emphasized for decades separation in the two-state solution in order to assure a Jewish majority democratic state, they still used the language of two states alongside the rhetoric of separation. The emphasis of separation and the de-emphasis of two states, by strong adherents of a two-state solution such as Livni, perhaps signify recognition that most Israelis do not expect there to be a two-state solution any time soon.

Loss of American Leadership in Attempting to Seriously Resolve the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

While all U.S. administrations have made mistakes in their attempts to mediate or facilitate a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through negotiating a two-state solution, President Trump has played a uniquely negative role through rhetoric and policies that undermine a viable two-state solution, enacting moves that heavily undermine the capacity to build trust among both parties, or the trust of both parties in the United States as a facilitator.[20] Since taking office in January 2017 President Trump has piled a series of punishments on the Palestinians including cutting aid and shutting down the representational office in Washington, DC. Trump also established a U.S. embassy in West Jerusalem without making a strong, unequivocal statement that East Jerusalem would be part of peace negotiations, or making the move within the context of broader progress made in serious peace negotiations. In addition, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, has broken the precedent of all previous U.S. ambassadors by supporting settlements. He led the successful effort to remove the word "occupied" from U.S. State Department reports on Palestinian territories controlled by Israel and uses "Judea and Samaria" to refer to the West Bank.[21] Trump wavered between advocating a one-state or two-state solution, suggesting in February 2017 that it could be either, claiming in September 2018 that he advocates two states, and then advocating a "two-state minus" peace plan.[22]

The Trump Peace Plan, which was unveiled to help Netanyahu in the March 2, 2020, elections, was a significant departure from all previous U.S. peace initiatives: the Clinton Parameters; the Annapolis Peace Process under Bush; and the peace initiatives under Obama. Ambassador and Professor Daniel Kurtzer correctly calls it an undermining of the two-state solution that could not work, as it incorporates all Israeli settlements into eventual Israeli borders—even fifteen isolated settlements that would be surrounded by the Palestinian state. Even though the plan states that everything will have to be negotiated, it seems to be a recipe for unilateral annexation rather than a peace plan. Kurtzer has described how, through his service under both Clinton

and Bush as Ambassador to Israel, there was a narrow range within which a pendulum could swing from one administration to the other in terms of the U.S. stance toward the process and the contours of the two-state solution. However, the Trump Administration, he argues, has "taken policy off the rails" by appealing only to ideological people within the Administration like Ambassador David Friedman, evangelicals, orthodox Jews in America, and right-wing Israelis. Rather than Israel keeping approximately 3–6 percent of the West Bank with equal swaps from pre-1967 territory, it would now keep sixteen to 30 percent of the West Bank with unequal swaps.[23] The plan does not take into sufficient account the previous twenty-five years of progress in negotiations, does not sufficiently and strongly affirm Palestinians statehood as a product, and seems to minimize the need for direct negotiations.[24] Likewise, Salam Fayyad argues that this is a plan at best for a "state-minus," and is actually a path to nowhere. While Prime Ministers Olmert and Barak were willing to concede significant parts of East Jerusalem, the Trump Plan claims that Jerusalem will remain united under Israeli rule. In addition, Israel would be able to exercise a veto power on who the new Palestinian state could admit as a citizen to its state, and could swap land with "the Triangle"—the region in Israel where a high concentration of Arab Israeli citizens live—for land in the West Bank, without the consent of those Israeli Arab citizens or Palestinian citizens of Israel. Finally, the plan calls for Israel to determine when Palestine was ready for statehood.[25] The Trump Administration and its Peace Plan have undermined the necessary American role as a mediator that can facilitate serious peace negotiations among the parties, and the plan itself has the potential, if it were implemented, to significantly undermine further the legitimacy of the two states.

CONTINUED LEGITIMACY OF TWO-STATE SOLUTION RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVES

Israeli and Palestinian Support for Alternative Solutions is Significantly Lower than for Two States

Although the Trump Peace Plan undermines the legitimacy of the two-state solution and Israeli and Palestinian public support for the two-state solution has declined during the period of stagnation in the peace process, this plurality of support remains significantly stronger than for alternatives. For instance, in a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research on July 7, 2019 that asked the question, "Should the two-state solution be abandoned and demand one state for Palestinians and Israelis?" only thirty-one percent of Palestinians surveyed expressed support for this, while

65 percent opposed. When measured again in mid-September 2019, support for one state only changed from 31 percent to 32 percent. Only a small minority would want to live in Israel, support a "one-state-solution" with equal rights for all, or expect that Israel will ever agree to the idea.[26] As Nadav Shelef also argues in chapter 3 of this volume, "looking over a longer time horizon, between 2003 and 2019, support for the one-state solution among Palestinians fluctuated from a low of 6 percent in 2005 to a high of 35 percent in 2017."[27] Thus, Palestinian support for a one-state solution has actually *decreased* in the last couple of years, from thirty-five percent to thirty-two percent. Confederation with Egypt or Jordan, which includes Palestinian self-government, receives only 9 percent support from West Bankers, 5 percent from Gazans, and 1 percent from East Jerusalemites. A "one-state solution, in which Arabs and Jews would have equal rights in one state from the river to the sea" garners 18 percent of West Bankers' support, 12 percent of Gazans, and 20 percent in East Jerusalem.[28] In addition, despite the disillusionment caused by stagnation in the peace process and continued settlements, some polls show that, when Palestinians are surveyed about making compromises on dividing/sharing Jerusalem, half or more are willing to divide control over the city if it is part of a package deal leading toward a two state solution.[29]

Even at the lowest ebb of support, the two-state solution still maintains the most support relative to other alternatives. In February 2020—after the Trump Peace Plan was unveiled and amid the lowest record for support for the two-state solution (39 percent)—when asked whether the two-state solution should be abandoned and a one-state solution adopted, 59.1 percent of Palestinians disagreed, while only thirty-seven percent agreed. In addition, forty-nine percent of Palestinians surveyed believed that the first, most vital Palestinian goal should be to end the post-1967 occupation and build a state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Phrased in this different way, a plurality (close to a majority) of Palestinians believe that the most vital goals implicitly accept the two-state solution, which in turn belies claims of a significant diminishment in the support for two states. In addition, as compared to 49 percent who delineate a Palestinian state alongside Israel as the most vital goal, only 30 percent in comparison claim that the first goal should be the right of return of refugees.[30] Therefore, when one examines multiple questions, phrased in different ways, and also compares them to support for alternative paradigms, the two-state paradigm maintains relative legitimacy, and significantly more Palestinians prioritize gaining statehood alongside Israel, over the right of return for refugees. This also points to a hierarchy of goals that is amenable to accommodation.

Ghaith al-Omari also argues that the alternative to stagnation in the TSS peace process is not likely to be another one state mobilizing paradigm like one state—rather, the alternative is more likely to be chaos. However, he

argues that both Fatah and PLO identities are inseparable from a two-state solution, and Fatah is inseparable from the Palestinian Authority. Ultimately, any new dynamic is likely to lead back to the two-state solution, after parties have already tried and failed to eliminate the nationalist desires of the other.[31] Saliba Sarsar and Hussein Ibish agree that the two-state solution is the only viable solution as "neither people shows the least interest in either accepting subjugation at the hands of the other or abandoning its own national identity."[32]

Israeli Jews, Nadav Shelef argues in chapter 3 of this volume, are broadly opposed to the idea of a one-state solution; a 2018 poll indicated that only 19 percent of Israeli Jews supported such an outcome.[33] Similarly Zipi Israeli, a public opinion researcher for the Institute for National Security Studies of Tel Aviv University, reports that in the 2018–2019 public opinion survey, 58 percent of Israelis supported a two-state solution, while only 9 percent supported annexing Judea and Samaria and establishing one state. Sixteen percent supported annexing Jewish settlement blocks in Jerusalem, and 13 percent supported the status quo.[34] The Israeli Voice Index for January 2020 found that more Israelis (45 percent) still would support the recognition of a Palestinian state alongside Israel than would oppose it (38 percent).[35] Also, as Ilan Peleg explains in his chapter in this volume, the increase in ethnic nationalism among some Israeli political parties, including the Likud, points to a trend that only supports ethnic nationalism, rather than a trend that would facilitate any future move to bi-nationalism.

By Some Measures, Support for Two States by Israeli Political Parties has Increased

At the same time, support for TSS has in some ways grown, despite the decrease in rhetorical use of the phrase "two-state solution." The Israeli right has in some respects shifted to the center, and several parties/factions support TSS in a way they did not twenty years ago.[36] The Israeli Voice Index for January 20, 2020 showed that while (unsurprisingly) 67 percent of Labor-Gesher-Mertz voters and 65 percent of Blue-White Party supported recognition of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, surprisingly 51 percent of Yisrael Beiteinu voters support such recognition, 44 percent of Joint List voters, 33 percent of United Torah Judaism votes, 33 percent of Likud voters, 23.5 percent of the New Right voters, and 23 percent of Shas voters did as well.[37] Certainly far more supporters of the right today support a two-state solution than did so twenty years ago. In addition, the right no longer views the Palestinian Authority as a threat. While in the 1990s the right argued that the PA needed to be dismantled, in 2019, Naftali Bennett said that the PA is here to stay and does not threaten Israel.[38] Even the current government's policy is that most of the West Bank will be conceded. The Trump

Peace Plan is disheartening because it departs significantly from previous Israeli offers under Barak and Olmert and, therefore, was rejected by the Palestinian Authority. It shows that many on the right are not yet ready to concede what will be necessary to achieve a two-state solution, and also indicates that much of the right is willing to concede over 70 percent of the West Bank.

Importantly, Naomi Chazan rightly warns that the greater support for some version of TSS in some quarters of the political right does not necessarily increase the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm, since several of these versions support a definition of two states that is actually a "state minus" and is not viable.[39] However, even if definitions of two states differ among different parties, the perception of the viability of a Greater Israel has weakened.[40] While 19 percent of Israelis in 1988 thought that Greater Israel was the value that was most important to them, in 2018, only 12 percent supported that.[41] This shift might lay the groundwork for possible greater accommodation in the future under a different President than Trump.

Much Progress Has Been Made in Peace Negotiations for a Two-State Solution

While to my knowledge there have been no official or unofficial negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians that attempt to draft a detailed vision for what one state would look like, much progress has been made over the last twenty-five years in negotiating what a two-state paradigm would look like. Through a series of negotiations in Oslo, Taba, Camp David, 2008, and so forth, a basic understanding of what the two-state solution would look like has been negotiated. As Joel Migdal argues, "The outline of such an agreement has already been hammered out. It can be found in the so-called Clinton Parameters, offered by President Bill Clinton in December 2000 and eventually accepted by both Israel and the PLO, as well as in the near-agreement between Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas in 2008."[42] Similarly Salam Fayyad argues that

> [w]hether on grounds of fairness, legality, practicality, or a combination thereof, there indeed developed a broad international consensus, including in Israel itself, in favor of a two-state vision that both Israelis and Palestinians could live with. That, in a nutshell, was what the various American-led mediation attempts had sought, but failed, to accomplish since Oslo.

Thus, there exists a "record of extensive negotiations and detailed work throughout successive rounds of mediation and diplomacy over the past 25 years."[43] Alternatively, there have been no cooperative negotiations or plans

for one-state solutions, and any visions of "one state" often completely differ on who will dominate that one state.

The Hegemonic Legitimacy of the Two-State Paradigm in the International Community

There is virtual hegemony among the international community that supports TSS, which has been reaffirmed by the UN, the Arab League (especially the Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan), Russia, the European Union, all U.S. administrations (other than Trump) and the U.S. Congress. Ghaith al-Omari argues that "international legitimacy is very strong, there is the realization by almost everyone that it is the only game in town, and so many institutions are invested in the two-state solution."[44] In addition, Hussein Ibish and Saliba Sarsar agree that "the international community, the UN Security Council, and the international legal framework for addressing the conflict are all very clear in their support for an end of conflict based on the creation of a Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace."[45]

Of course, the most important international legitimacy for TSS arises out of its support from the United States and international bodies. Specifically, the "Road Map for Peace"—sponsored by the "Quartet" of the United States, the EU, the UN, and Russia, and outlined by U.S. President George W. Bush on June 24, 2002—called for an independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. Ziad Asali argues that "the majority of world powers, as well as majority of people surveyed globally, have arrived at an international consensus, which has been defined but not implemented, and is known as the 'historic compromise' of the Clinton Parameters."[46]

The hegemony of TSS extends beyond the Quartet. Even when criticizing Israeli policies at the UN, Saudi representatives continually reaffirm their support for a two-state solution and for the Arab Peace Initiative. This Saudi Peace Initiative, which was first unanimously endorsed by the Arab League in March 2002, calls for peace with Israel in return for a full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 and the return of Palestinian refugees. This was modified by the Arab League in March 2007 to imply that a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue would have to be negotiated by both parties, and in 2013 it was further modified to support a future border that would be *based* on the 1967 border with land swaps. This is a dramatic break from past stances of the Arab League, and has significantly bolstered the legitimacy of the two-state solution. It would provide Arab support for tough compromises made by Palestinians, even on sharing/dividing Jerusalem.[47]

The legitimacy of TSS has been maintained, even in the face of the stagnation of the peace process in the past few years, because much progress was made in previous peace negotiations: Oslo, Taba, Camp David, Prime

Minister Olmert's offer in 2008. There is a basic understanding of what TSS would look like based on the Clinton Parameters. Ghaith al-Omari told Abbas that he would get no better deal than the reasonable offer made by Olmert in 2008, and told him that "we are inches away from a peace deal, what Olmert offered is great, and a peace agreement would have changed Israeli elections."[48] Although Abbas told Omari that it was a good offer, Abbas felt he did not have the political cache to deliver, and it would be used to unseat him. According to Al Omari, Abbas is too cautious, but if he is more forthcoming, the public will support him.[49]

This international support for TSS continues, despite the setbacks including Trump's reversal of long-standing U.S. policy. More than thirty former European foreign ministers and prime ministers, in the face of Trump's rhetoric and policies, wrote a letter to the EU to reaffirm their commitment to a two-state solution and to internationally agreed parameters for such a solution. They also reaffirm that "despite subsequent setbacks, the Oslo agreement is still a milestone of transatlantic foreign policy cooperation."[50]

There Is No Serious Alternative One State Paradigm or Solution

Many scholars, including Professor Alan Dowty, argue that "on both moral and practical grounds, the best and perhaps only path out of this tangle is the two-state solution: partition of historic Palestine between Israel and a Palestinian state."[51] Even the minority of scholars who argue that the two-state paradigm has already been lost, such as Professor Ian Lustick, do not argue that it has been replaced by a one-state paradigm or solution. Professor Lustick does not offer a detailed roadmap for such a solution, but argues that over decades this could happen through unintended consequences of alliances that could form through political maneuvering rather than through negotiations. He claims that two states are no longer viable and that they are a fantasy. Yet, in order to bolster the claim for an eventual one state, he relies on less detailed and supported conditions, and claims that somehow they are more likely. Many of those conditions he enumerates are similar to those that would be required for a two-state solution to come to fruition: changing public opinion, leaders that can shift public opinion, greater prominence and alliances with Arab Israelis and Mizrahi Israelis, shifting politics in the United States that would exert more pressure on Israel, and so forth. While deriding incremental change that can create more ripe conditions for two states, Professor Lustick relies on incremental changes *over decades* that would someday bring ripe conditions for one democratic state. The thousands of hours spent on thousands of pages detailing a specific roadmap for creating two states are discarded as "fantasy," and is replaced in his argument by a

fantasy that has no explicit roadmap or admitted "solution," but rather a hope or expectation that the parties could eventually get there, perhaps after much violence in which tens of thousands of people are killed.[52] Hussein Ibish and Saliba Sarsar agree that Professor Lustick's alternative scenarios "require by his own admission decades, if not centuries, to become possibilities, and further Israeli-Palestinian conflict is inevitable. So not only would we have to wait scores of decades, if not centuries, for any of these 'alternatives' to begin to emerge, they could only be the product of further wide-scale bloodshed."[53] In calling for the death of two states, Professor Lustick relies on a consistent, linear expectation for the unfolding of events; he contends that twenty-five years of on-and-off negotiations for two states are sufficient to judge it an impossible failure, since there would need to be a linear progression of success to make it viable, while acknowledging simultaneously that the progress toward a democratic "one state" may take a century. In his preferred case, failure to come about after twenty-five years would not indicate its death toll. While the almost hegemonic international support for the two-state paradigm is almost dismissed as trivial, Professor Lustick claims that there will likely be enthusiastic support from the international community for one democratic state.

Utopian visions of what one state might look like are not only divorced from significant political movements and parties that support it, and often articulated in slogans rather than well-thought-out plans, but also ignore the historical examples of such attempts. As Professor Dowty persuasively argues,

> Binational states have a very poor track record . . . More numerous are the cases in which power sharing has broken downs, as in Cyprus, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and a number of African states . . . Conspicuously missing are any examples of power sharing successfully implemented between parties still at war . . . It is a gigantic leap of faith to believe that warring enemies who are having trouble agreeing on terms of separation will suddenly be able to cooperate on everything.[54]

Likewise, Nathan Brown, argues that "the advocates of a binational state generally fall into the trap of holding out an admirable utopian solution without analyzing what such a state would be like in practice or how entrenched adversaries could ever construct such a state."[55] Furthermore, Hussein Ibish and Saliba Sarsar argue that

> both of these extremes, whether maximal nationalist visions of exclusive domination by one or the other group in the whole of historical Palestine, or the negation of both Israeli and Palestinian national aspirations in a single, undefined

> state, are mistakenly understood by their proponents as principled stances. In fact, they represent unworkable fantasies and, in practice, the demand for either of them abandons the goal of resolving the conflict and ending the occupation in favor or an open-ended struggle in pursuit of what would certainly seem to be impossible goals. These maximalist and minimalist visions for the realization of Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms represent neither principle nor pragmatism, and instead reflect dangerous phantasms and fanaticism.[56]

As Susan Linfield points out, scholars such as Mouin Rabbani, a senior fellow at the Institute for Palestine Studies, have noted that the two-state solution has not failed since it has never been tried and that there is no evidence that it cannot be done.[57]

Many analysts and experts agree that the one-state solution is less likely to happen than the two-state one, and that settlements outside the settlement blocs could be removed. Analysts such as Nathan Thrall, the Jerusalem-based Middle East analyst for the International Crisis Group, argued in 2017, "in fact, Israelis and Palestinians are now farther from a single state than they have been at any time since the occupation began in 1967. From [Menachem] Begin's autonomy plan to Oslo and the withdrawal from Gaza, Israel and Palestine have been inching steadily toward partition . . . . And the supposed reason that partition is often claimed to be impossible—the difficulty of a probable relocation of over 150,000 settlers—is grossly overstated."[58] According to Shaul Arieli, a retired senior IDF officer who is an authority on the settlements, as of 2016 the West Bank is overwhelmingly Palestinian, and most of the dispersed settlements are relatively small. Of the 126 settlements, 111 have a population of fewer than 5,000 people and 60 have fewer than 1,000. Arieli writes, "With the exception of Western Samaria, which is adjacent to the Green Line, and of the Jerusalem area, the Israeli presence in [the West Bank] is negligible in both demographic and spatial terms" and states that the settlement project was "an illusion, rather than a vision . . . a pretentious scheme that failed—and deserved to."[59] Gershon Shafir estimates that 27,000 settler households would need to be evacuated for a viable two-state solution. These demographic facts, he hopes, can "demystify the irreversibility thesis," even though he does not think the conditions for this are likely.[60] Israel did successfully evacuate over 8,000 settlers in five days from Gaza in summer 2005.

Alternatively, there is no evidence to support the idea that the one-state solution is more likely or feasible than the two-state solution. No cooperative negotiations or plans for a one-state solution exist; visions of one state often completely differ on who will dominate that one state. Nadav Shelef persuasively argues in chapter 3 of this volume that

> although denationalization is theoretically possible in both Israeli and Palestinian societies (as it is in any society), its prospects are not particularly strong. One implication of this conclusion is that alternatives to the two-state solution are relatively unlikely to lead to the peaceful resolution of this conflict unless they explicitly address the question of how one or both of the groups currently animated by nationalist legitimating principles will give them up.

Currently, there is also very little support for the idea of confederation, at least any confederation that would not first be preceded by two states, in terms of Israel and Palestinian public opinion, and in terms of regional and international support. No Israeli parties currently support it, and, according to Yossi Beilin, several think tanks reject it because they do not even want to be perceived as searching for an alternative. Beilin himself is working on the idea of confederation within a two-state framework, with creative options regarding citizenship for settlers. He is engaged with nine other researchers who are examining the legal and economic ramifications of confederation.[61]

TRIGGERS AND TRENDS THAT INFLUENCE THE FUTURE LEGITIMACY OF THE TWO STATE SOLUTION

The legitimacy of the two-state solution as the only one that would ensure self-determination for both nations has always been contested. In a protracted conflict, one would hardly expect a purely linear progression along one path to peace, especially when there are so many internal and external dynamic factors impacting legitimacy and when each party to the conflict is itself highly polarized.[62]

While thus far the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm has largely been maintained in comparison to its alternatives, there are several thresholds and trends important to track in assessing whether threats to the paradigm will grow or diminish. Two such triggers would be the ending of security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and/or the collapse of the PA. The first of these conditions has already come, in some degree, to pass: Mahmoud Abbas has, as of this writing in May 2020, declared the end to many years of close security cooperation, in reaction to Netanyahu's declared intention to engage in some unilateral annexations, in a bid perhaps to dissuade Israel from taking such steps. However, as of now, the PA security forces have not been dismantled. Continued and deepening disillusionment with the possibilities for a peace agreement could also lead to further deterioration in public support among Israelis and Palestinians, which could also eventually undermine international legitimacy for this solution. The international community continues to support what is viewed as an

expression of Palestinian aspirations—as one analyst puts it, "as long as the Palestinians want it, they will have an echo chamber in Europe and in the Arab world"—but this also means that the international and regional support is not static and is not divorced from Palestinian expressed desires.[63] As of now, even with Abbas's suspension of security cooperation, he reiterated that the PA stands by the two-state solution and is ready to conduct negotiations under international sponsorship.[64]

While domestic, regional, and international influences can further challenge the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm, there are also many such influences that could maintain the legitimacy of TSS and enhance its progress. These include a leadership change in Israel, and/or elections in the emerging Palestine that could provide greater legitimacy for a leader to compromise. Another enabling factor might be reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah that could create openings. Changes that enhance constructive international participation might also help: a new president in the United States who more constructively engages both parties or greater involvement of key Arab states. These shifts could be coupled with clear statements supporting a two-state solution from Israeli, Palestinian, and American leaders, with visible, concrete steps on the ground that would assure Palestinians and Israelis that this path is still viable. Such steps could include providing more building authority in Area C of the West Bank and, at a minimum, freezing new settlements in the West Bank beyond the large blocs near Jerusalem that Israel is likely to keep in a peace agreement, and to refraining from any unilateral annexations of any parts of the West Bank. These steps may be coordinated with efforts to have PA not fund families of those that have killed Israeli civilians. While this would be a difficult concession for Mahmoud Abbas, who suffers from weak legitimacy himself, polling shows that around half of West Bankers and Gazans agree with the proposition, "the Palestinian Authority should stop special payments to prisoners, and give their families normal social benefits like everybody else."[65] These measures could prevent a further deterioration of trust, and Israel could engage in unilateral assurances that then could be reciprocated.[66] It is likely that any such eventual two-state agreement would put pressure on Hamas to reconcile with the Palestinian Authority, and at least tolerate, if not accede to, an Israel-Palestinian agreement, most likely in the form of a long-term truce with Israel.[67]

Leaders in Israel, Palestine, and the United States, will have a significant influence as to whether the legitimacy of TSS in relation to its alternatives will strengthen or further weaken. While there is no guarantee concerning the direction of the changes of leadership, as of June 2020, it is likely that the new unity government in Israel will restrain Netanyahu more than the previous government would have. At the same time (as of the time of this writing) there is a decent chance that the presumptive Democratic Party nominee Joe Biden will win the 2020 general elections in the United States, given Trump's

mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the disastrous economic consequences of the crisis both on the health of Americans and on the economy, and his characteristically inflammatory responses to anti-black-police brutality and the consequent protest movement that has emerged—responses, which have opened the eyes of many Americans to his authoritarian and racist tendencies.[68]

On March 16, 2020, Benny Gantz, the leader of the Blue and White Party, was asked by Israeli president Reuven Rivlin to form a coalition government, with his coalition holding sixty-one Knesset seats, and Prime Minister Netanyahu only holding fifty-eight. Driven by the overriding desire to oust Netanyahu as Prime Minister, the entire Arab parties' Joint List recommended Gantz be given the opportunity to form a government, including the Arab nationalist Balad Party. (In contrast, it was only five years ago that the Joint List was not willing to sign a surplus-vote agreement with the left-wing Meretz Party.) In addition, Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu Party—who until very recently had refused to be part of a coalition—even supported from the outside, with the Joint List, agreed to be part of such a proposed coalition.[69] However, the chance to form a minority government slipped away with the defection of Knesset members Yoaz Hendel and Zvi Hauser from Gantz's Blue and White Party list, who rebelled against a coalition with the Joint List—even if that coalition was from the outside. Rather than run the risk of having Blue and White do more poorly in a fourth election which polls were predicting—which he feared may be delayed for a year due to the coronavirus epidemic that was hitting Israel hard, and during which time Netanyahu would rule in a right wing government—Gantz made the difficult and controversial decision to try to form a unity government with Netanyahu. Thus, after 507 days of a caretaker government with three inconclusive elections, a unity government was sworn in on May 18, 2020, under which Netanyahu remains prime minister for another year and a half before Gantz rotates in as prime minister. In the meantime Gantz serves as defense minister and vice prime minister, until he becomes prime minister on November 17, 2020; Blue and White Party member Gabi Ashkenazi serves as foreign minister, and Blue and White member Avi Nissenkorn serves as justice minister.

There is some hope that Gantz will be a restraining force in delaying, minimizing, or aborting Netanyahu's desire to unilaterally annex some territory. Gantz is not influenced by the traditional Likud ideology of Greater Israel, and is more likely to be a pragmatist who is more open to the Clinton Parameters and the peace initiatives of prior Labor and Kadima prime ministers. Ghaith al-Omari argues that "Blue and White is fundamentally different from Bibi and Likud, and would be willing to play ball if a Palestinian partner emerges that is willing to do constructive things"; Blue and White, he contends, is not interested in unilateral annexation.[70] Gantz supports the

INSS plan for keeping the two-state solution viable, and indeed may have influenced the plan.[71] While he is not as forthcoming as Olmert was in 2008, he had stated before the formation of the unity government that he would oppose any unilateral annexation that might harm the peace agreement and relationship with Jordan, or the United States in a different administration. In Israel's polarized political environment, Gantz was forced to make appeals to the right in order to gain the support that would enable him to successfully form a coalition, and thereby was hamstrung in his ability to criticize various elements of the Trump Peace Plan unveiled five weeks before the March 2 Israeli election; nonetheless, he made sure to qualify this acceptance by saying that he would not favor taking any measures that would endanger the peace agreement with Jordan. Currently, unilateral annexations would threaten the Israeli relationship with Jordan, and even possibly the peace treaty, as the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem caused the King to face pressures that led him to lift restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood, which increased its power in Jordan.[72] King Abdullah II warned that Israeli unilateral annexation "would lead to a massive conflict with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."[73]

At the same time, Gantz has already disappointed many of his backers in seemingly diminishing the conditions he would put on any annexation in his unity government agreement with Netanyahu. Although the confidence in his ability to abort any annexation has been undermined, it is possible that he will try to delay, minimize and even abort any such annexations. Under the coalition deal with Netanyahu, a resolution to apply Israeli sovereignty to portions of the West Bank can only be brought before the cabinet as soon as July 1 if there is full agreement from the United States for the move; Israel conducts international consultations; and Israel ensures the preservation of existing Israeli-Arab peace treaties.[74] Perhaps unilateral annexation may be averted as the peace agreement with Jordan may be threatened and some in the Trump Administration seem to want to put some breaks on unilateral annexation. On the other hand, Gantz may go along with a limited unilateral annexation of settlement blocs such as Ma'ale Adumim, which in previous peace negotiations were tacitly understood as likely to remain in Israeli hands, offset with equivalent land swaps in any peace agreement. While this likely reduces the projected costs to Netanyahu and some Israelis, doing so unilaterally will undermine trust and have grave consequences: further deteriorating of failing Palestinian hopes for good faith negotiations; the possible dismantling of the PA; increased violence between Israel and Palestine; the possible end of the peace treaty with Jordan; and further delegitimation of Israel around the world. What Ned Lebow ascribes as the greatest long-term danger of deterrence—"its propensity to make the worst expectations about an adversary self-fulfilling"—is true for such unilateral actions as well. Such moves strengthen

the Palestinian perception that Israel is not genuinely interested in a two-state solution and perpetuates a game of chicken in which the Palestinians feel pressured to respond.[75] Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee, has emphatically stated that Israel needs to "stop the threat of annexation and stop settlement activity because it'll choke off any hope of peace."[76] With the state of emergency in Israel, Palestine, the United States, and around the world due to COVID-19, it may be unlikely that at least in the short term there would be attention given to unilateral annexation.

It is yet unknown whether the Trump Peace Plan will end up being a fleeting proposal, soon to be forgotten with a new American leadership, or whether it will have serious consequences in enabling unilateral annexation and seriously undermining the two-state solution. Perhaps, as Yossi Beilin hopes, "when the coronavirus crisis is over, and a new government is formed in Israel, and when Israeli and Palestinian leaders return to the negotiating table, all Trump's 'gifts,' including his almost unnoticed peace plan and the new definition of the Palestinians who live in Jerusalem as 'non-Israelis,' will be gone with the wind."[77] Mahmoud Abbas declared, in May 2020, that he would end this security cooperation, despite eventual possible threats to his own regime.[78] Will responsible Israelis serving in the IDF and intelligence, and some of its political leaders, successfully persuade other political leaders that no unilateral measures should be taken that threaten Israel's peace with Jordan and/or end security cooperation with the PA? In addition, Salam Fayyad argues that, since the Trump Plan claims that "the issues hav[e] to ultimately be resolved in negotiations between the parties themselves," the Palestinians should insist that unilateral annexation cannot happen outside of negotiated agreements. He also argues for Palestinians "to implement a four-year program of action that is anchored on furthering the cause of Palestinian empowerment, beginning with the all-important reunification of the Palestinian polity and fortification of national governance institutions and processes."[79]

In some ways the announcement of the Trump Peace Plan, and its attempt to reframe what a solution would look like, ultimately reaffirmed the regional and international support for a two-state solution. The Arab League, Russia, the EU, and the UN Security Council seem to be rejecting the Peace Plan as threatening rather than bolstering the path toward two states. In that sense, this challenge to the legitimacy of two states can also serve to strengthen and bolster the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm. While the Trump Administration has deemed that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are legal, Congress reaffirmed its support for the two-state solution. House Resolution 246 on July 23, 2019 "reaffirms its strong support for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two states—a democratic Jewish State of Israel, and a viable, democratic Palestinian state."

A letter dated August 27, 2019, signed by twenty-five retired Israel Defense Force commanders and former government security heads and addressed to four U.S. House representatives, reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the two-state paradigm and rejected unilateral steps.[80] Likewise, both the Commanders for Israel's Security (CIS) and the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) warn that any unilateral annexation will have dangerous security consequences, including the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority, with Hamas capitalizing on that vacuum, the cutting off of chances for normalization with Sunni states who are balancing Iran with Israel; and threatening the peace agreement with Jordan. Amos Gilad, former director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs at the Defense Ministry, predicts a diplomatic nightmare.[81]

There may very well be a backlash to the Trump Administration in the next U.S. election, bringing in the moderate Democrat Joe Biden who would want to build on the Clinton Parameters and the peace initiative of Obama. In that case, as Dennis Ross suggests, "if Biden wins and reverses recognition of the annexation and repudiates the Trump plan, there will be no new baseline, especially with no one internationally accepting the Israeli action."[82] In such an eventuality, perhaps Abbas, having seen how much worse things could be than the passed-up 2008 offer from Olmert, will be more likely to seriously entertain and negotiate the contours of the 2008 offer. Similarly the King of Jordan and the Europeans—cognizant of the bullet that might have been dodged—might apply more pressure on Abbas to take a window of opportunity that would be presented with post-Trump ideas.

The recent normalization/ peace agreements between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain were conditioned on Israel suspending any unilateral annexation, by some accounts, for a minimum of four years, and thereby leaving the door open to a two-state solution. However, if President Trump were to be reelected, it remains to be seen whether unilateral annexation would be postponed that long. It would also make it significantly less likely that substantial progress would be made in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. This, in combination with Hamas controlling Gaza, a weakened Mahmoud Abbas, and the possibility that Gantz will not get his rotation as prime minister, could lead to a serious cycle of violence that further undermines trust and faith in any resolution to the conflict. Another four years of deterioration and stagnation would further undermine the support for two states among both Israelis and Palestinians, could lead to the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority and would perpetuate a worsened status quo that probably also would not lead to a negotiated, agreed-upon one-state solution. Even in this tragic and painful scenario, there is not necessarily a linear expectation for the death knell of the two-state solution. Although annexation and its likely aftermath would make the eventuality of a peace

agreement more challenging, territory that is annexed could still be negotiated for peace—just as the Israeli annexation of the Golan did not prevent peace negotiations with Syria, predicated on returning the vast majority of the Golan to Syria for peace. Also, some academics such as Bill Zartman argue that for conditions to be ripe for negotiation, the parties must be war-weary, exhausted, and in a hurting stalemate.[83] While I have always been skeptical of how the measurement of exhaustion can become tautological in hindsight, and further violence could actually bring parties to a breaking point rather than to reconciliation, the realization that the two state solution still has greater relative legitimacy and accounts for each party's aspirations for self-determination, would still eventually draw the parties back to the negotiating table.

In conclusion, the legitimacy of a two-state solution is primarily defined by the individual and collective perspectives of Israelis and Palestinians relative to alternatives, and the regional and international support for these wishes. The stagnation of the peace process, continued settlements, polarized Israeli and Palestinian societies, unstable Israeli coalition governments that make change more difficult, Hamas's rule in Gaza and Fatah's rule in the West Bank on shaky grounds, combined with Trump's new "peace plan" and Netanyahu's declared intent to start unilateral annexations, all work to undermine the legitimacy of the two-state solution. However, there is as of yet no alternative paradigm, and all alternatives have significantly less legitimacy than the two-state solution. There is no linear path to any particular alternative, and the probabilities for changes in leadership that would retain the possibility of a two-state solution are still more likely. Much depends on the results of Israeli, Palestinian, and American politics, to determine whether there will be a continued weakening, or a strong, brave leadership that would continue where Olmert and Abbas left off in 2008. TSS is certainly the path that recognizes both nations' desire for self-determination, rather than turning to a violent jockeying for control within a single state. The alternative would more likely be greater violence and chaos than any utopia.

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Chapter 2

Memory, Identity, and Peace in Palestinian-Israeli Relations

Saliba Sarsar[1]

Palestinian-Israeli relations have been strained for decades. Much has to do originally with the Zionist project that sought the settlement or resettlement of Jews in the Land of Israel and the Palestinian Arab fear of losing their homeland to the Jews. Events surrounding the period before and during the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the resultant Palestinian Nakba (Arabic for "catastrophe" or "disaster") worsened conditions and led to more conflicts and wars than accommodation and peace. Most Palestinians and Israelis continue to cling to their memories and identities, oblivious to the needs and rights of the "other," but hopeful signs are developing in some aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

In this chapter, I examine the interconnections among history, memory, and identity, and illustrate related expressions by reflecting on two crucial events in the respective histories of Israeli Jews and Palestinians: the Holocaust and Al-Nakba. It should be noted at the start that there is no qualitative or quantitative equivalence between these two traumas.[2] Nevertheless, these traumas have deeply influenced how both national communities think, behave, and relate to each other. As Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg argue, "Both events, which differ in nature and in degree, have had a decisive impact on the subsequent history, consciousness, and identities of the two peoples."[3] I conclude the chapter by exploring the potential to calm Palestinian and Israeli Jewish memories and moderate their identities in support of peace.

CONSIDERING HISTORY, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY

History is a record of our journey through life. It is a powerful source for our beliefs and images, which we preserve habitually in our individual and

collective narratives, and on which we depend in our use of myths, rituals, and symbols. It is these elements that build and solidify our communal and national ego and ethos in connection to others, help establish our cultural and national heritage and legacy, and facilitate the transmission of our lessons to future generations.

History is far from static. Its dynamism requires our attention. The better we learn from history, the more prepared we are to address its challenges. Memories—our own and those we share with others—forged by history, are essential for our identity. As Philip Davies reflects, "What is more important about the past than facts? The answer is memory, because memory, whether personal or collective, belongs to us. It is our history. Nor is it a disinterested recollection, but something basic to our identity and our future. Our memory of what we have experienced enables us at each moment to sustain identity."[4]

What does it mean to remember? "*Re-membering* involves putting ourselves back together, recovering identity and integrity, reclaiming the wholeness of our lives."[5] Since memory is dependent on human agency, it is rarely complete or perfect. Moreover, what we remember and the way we respond to what we remember make a difference. We can be confined by memory or gain insight from it. When confined, we view history as a burden, occasionally running the risk of getting trapped in its clutches or being lost in its dark corners. When liberated, our knowledge of the past usually has a redemptive quality to it, which can be creative and empowering. Palestinian theologian Rafiq Khoury explains,

> As a prison, memory could mummify us in a certain time and place and prevent us from getting out of it. According to that meaning, memory . . . paralyzes our vitality and creativity. We ruminate on the past, but we remain unable to imagine the future. We are no more able to invent history. As a prophecy, memory is a stimulant. It helps us, on the basis of our vivid memory, to go forward and invent a new future and a new untold narrative.[6]

As memory is essential for identity, identity is the lifeblood of belonging, of social existence. "The search for identity is a search for the self, and without it the individual cannot identify his [/her] real space, role, and mission in society and life."[7] The same applies to collective identity that brings people together as one community based on their connective tissue of land, history, culture, religion, values, and mutual sentiments, among others. To bolster collective identity and cohesion and to ensure the proper remembrance of its traumas and triumphs, we extend ourselves: developing the common symbols of a national anthem and a national flag; creating national heroes, traditions, and museums; and engaging in rituals as in celebrations and commemorations.

Identity, whether individual or national, embodies various features and dimensions, with each expressed in a binary opposition, such as closed versus open, isolated versus relational, colliding versus dialoguing, static versus dynamic, unilateral versus multilateral, civil versus religious, and local versus international.[8] The assumption is that open, relational, dialoguing, dynamic, and bilateral or multilateral identities are amenable toward involving the other, reconciling, and living in peace. The task is to motivate those who possess the opposite aspects of identity—closed, isolated, colliding, static, and unilateral—which do not support the habits and practice of peace.

The task is an urgent one, especially when bad memories and negative identities intersect. Witness how past and current injustices have lasting harmful effects that breed enmity, hatred, and even a sense of being victimized by the other. As Neil Caplan writes, "The important undercurrent of righteous victimhood . . . animates both Israelis and Palestinians, contributing to each party's almost unique focus on its own suffering, in effect reducing its ability to empathize with and recognize any legitimate claims or fears of the other."[9] Even more so, each party marginalizes or even purges the other's identity and memory from its own memory and psyche. It rushes to beautify its own face, while disfiguring that of the other. As Sami Adwan holds, it tends "to dehumanize the other and to see it as faceless or one-dimensional, thereby justifying the use of all means of force to destroy or oppose it."[10]

Clearly, a change becomes necessary, even if our identities are often fed by incomplete or imperfect memories and by the threat of violent acts and intractable conflicts. "[I]n violent and long conflict . . . at least one party (sometimes both) reconstructs its identity around its victimization by the other side."[11] Any collective identity deconstruction and reconstruction does not happen automatically. It necessitates "internal processes of dialogue . . . on each side, and these will reinforce the external dialogues between the parties in conflict."[12] There is also an urge to promote reconciliation, usually requiring expressions of security or peace, new relationships, regard for the other, truth, justice, mercy, and forgiveness.[13]

Moving beyond victimhood and participating in dialogue and reconciliation can serve as positive, albeit painful, means of reconstructing memory in the service of understanding and of individual and social justice. Dialogue, mainly not about winning or losing but expanding one's worldview, ought not to be threatening. By including all perspectives—not just some at the expense of others—and by being candid about them, dialoguers overcome fear and stereotyping and create trust instead. Similarly, reconciliation efforts ought not to ignore, suppress, or obliterate history and its misdeeds but rather to focus on remembering them in order to be delivered from them. The main task of reconciliation must be to create a balance between past injustices and future goodwill and amity.

The key challenge stems from the justifiable insistence of antagonists or injured parties on forming a basis of equality, symmetry, trust, truth, and justice as a precursor to reconciliation. "Conflict resolution," as a path to reconciliation, "can only be successful if it a healing process for victims as well as perpetrators of violence, and if it takes steps together toward truth and justice."[14] Practically, as Sami Adwan explains, "The victimizers should admit their wrongs to the victims, ask for forgiveness, and . . . be willing to compensate the victims. The victims should forgive and show sincere interest in building peace."[15]

Obviously, these are elusive conditions that are hard to establish and maintain as they require that individuals and national communities struggle with the sensitive issues of opportunity and access to power and resources. Moreover, matters of ideological conviction, group identification, and transitional context usually intrude. A study that followed changes among Israeli Jewish students in stereotypic perceptions, attitudes, and feelings toward Palestinians found out that doves tended to be more positive toward Palestinian people than the hawks. There was also a general tendency for more positive perceptions and attitudes to develop over time. Lastly, whereas doves tended to exhibit a linear trend in becoming more positive toward the Palestinians over time, hawks demonstrated a quadratic pattern, with 1995 and 2000 being less positive than 1990 and 1997.[16]

ADDRESSING THE HOLOCAUST AND AL-NAKBA

Israeli Jews and Palestinians have profound connections to their origins, histories, and cultures. Crucial events in their past and the lives of their ancestors have influenced and are influencing their respective narratives and relationships. Two such events are the Holocaust and Al-Nakba. These traumas have been central to how Jews and Palestinians view reality and act toward each other and the rest of the world. These will be examined in tandem below in an effort to highlight how Israeli Jews and Palestinians have responded to each trauma. It is crucial to observe that not all individuals conform to the general dictates or expectations set by their community, possibly opening new opportunities for transforming relations, including those between Palestinians and Israelis.

The Holocaust (or Shoah in Hebrew) is the systematic persecution and mass murder of six million Jews and the destruction of 5,000 Jewish communities by the Nazi regime and its allies and collaborators between 1941 and 1945. It occupies "an iconic place in modern history . . . (when) [t]he unmentionable was spoken and the unthinkable was committed."[17] It was and remains a deep wound for many, especially Israeli Jews who have been

directly impacted by it. Even those who were/are not directly affected feel its traumatic consequences. As Dan Bar-On explains,

> [T]he culture exerted constant pressure on us to "learn from the Holocaust": We must be strong so that no one can do it to us again. We must demand justice and punish the perpetrators. We must remind the world of what was done to us and educate our people so they will not forget. We must be alert, unlike those who went to the gas chambers "like sheep to slaughter." We must document what happened and seek restitution for our loss.[18]

Israeli Jewish society is regularly reminded of the Holocaust and its lessons through the Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom HaShoah in Hebrew); the national memorial at Yad va-Shem, the "Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance" in Jerusalem; school curricula and fieldtrips to Yad va-Shem and monuments that memorialize the Holocaust; visits to death camps and Holocaust sites in Europe; the media; and political discourse. Although there seems to be a significant difference among Israeli political parties and leaders as to the level of existential threat caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,[19] it can be said that "Jewish-Israelis carry within them a continued fear of annihilation, which, in turn, directly connects it to the Palestinian-Israeli/Arab-Jewish conflict."[20]

In contrast, Al-Nakba marks the devastation that befell the Palestinian community as a result of the events prior to and surrounding the 1948 War between the newly created State of Israel and the surrounding Arab countries and the Palestinians. It is during Al-Nakba that around 590,000 Palestinian Arabs fled and 150,000 were expelled from their homes by the Zionist militias or Israeli forces, leaving only 160,000 (or 17.7 percent of the total Palestinian Arab population) in the parts of Palestine where Israel was created. Moreover, some 550 of their villages and towns were depopulated and demolished or occupied and given new names.[21] Since then, Al-Nakba has come to symbolize "the loss of the homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process of destruction of their culture"[22] Palestinians use it as a significant national marker or divide. For example, in their comprehensive history of the Palestinian people, Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri write of the period before, leading to, and after Al-Nakba.[23] Over the years, it has become "a site of memory"[24] that "solidified Palestinians' self-consciousness, creating among them a psychological bond and a strong feeling of identity and unity, of mutual care and responsibility."[25]

Many Palestinians bemoan "how Palestine became a pawn in the hands of European countries, Jewish Zionists, and Arab leaders."[26] Others blame their predicament on the West and the Jewish Zionists who based their

national project on the disappearance of Palestine and its people.[27] Still others accuse Jews, Zionists, and their supporters of manipulating memory of the Holocaust in order to diminish or dodge Palestinian demands and rights.[28] Whether Palestinians and Jews are accurately perceiving or misperceiving their experiences, they are two peoples who have undergone serious traumas that color their perceptions. As Hussein Ibish explains, "The difference is that the Jewish and Israeli narratives continue to be an epiphany of redemption in the founding and flourishing of the state of Israel, while for Palestinians, permanently dispossessed and living in exile or under occupation, the trauma is enduring and still unfolding."[29] Today, as yesterday, many Palestinians feel cut from their homes, their lands, and denied their freedom, their dignity. The Israeli occupation, the Security or Separation Wall in the West Bank or along the Green Line, the permit regime, the siege of Gaza—all convince them that Al-Nakba has never stopped.

Starting in 1998, Palestinians began remembering Al-Nakba (Yawm an-Nakba in Arabic) on May 15, the day after Israel's Independence Day. But, the two dates do not always follow each other as Israel observes the Hebrew calendar to designate time. They typically demonstrate with many carrying Palestinian flags and wooden keys with "Return" written on them, symbolizing their need to return to their own homes or ancestral homes inside Israel. Countless articles, books, interviews, movies, podcasts, and websites document the Nakba experience. An example is the Nakba Oral History Project of Palestine Remembered.[30] During 2018–2019, mass protests consisting not only of ordinary Palestinians, but also Hamas militants have taken place along the Gaza-Israel border. Called "the Great March of Return," these protests have resulted in hundreds killed and thousands wounded by the Israeli military.

A divergent view of Al-Nakba is voiced by George Deek, a Palestinian Arab Christian Israeli who is currently the Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan. In a lecture at the House of Literature in Oslo on September 27, 2014, when he was Israel's vice ambassador to Norway, he explained that the Nakba has become "a political offensive" as opposed to "a humanitarian disaster." Palestinian commemoration of it calls into question Israel's creation and legitimacy, not the recollection of its tragic events. This is shown by the date selected to commemorate it.

> The Nakba day is not April 9th—the day of the Deir Yassin massacre, or July 13th—the day of the expulsion from Lod. The Nakba day was set on May 15th—the day after Israel proclaimed its independence. By that the Palestinian leadership declared that the disaster of the Nakba is not the expulsion, the abandoned villages, or the exile—the Nakba in their eyes is the creation of Israel. They are saddened less by the humanitarian catastrophe that befell on

> Palestinians, and more by the revival of the Jewish state . . . . By doing so, the Palestinians have become slaves to the past, held captive by the chains of resentment, prisoners in the world of frustration and hate.[31]

Most Israeli Jews commemorate the Holocaust on their own and do not acknowledge Al-Nakba or empathize with its victims. Al-Nakba is not central or relevant to their daily existence. Nur Masalha, a Palestinian historian, born in Galilee, Israel, describes Israeli policy toward the Palestinian refugees as one of denial: "Denial of the existence of the Palestinian people; . . . denial of any historical injustice; denial of the ethnic cleansing of Palestinian[s]; denial of any moral responsibility or culpability for the creation of the plight of the Palestinian refugees; denial of the Palestinian 'right of return'; denial of restitution of refugee property."[32] A similar idea is presented by Ari Shavit, an Israeli Jewish writer, who explains how Israel's miracle is anchored in denial. "The nation I was born into," he writes, "erased Palestine from the face of the earth. Bulldozers razed Palestinian villages, warrants confiscated Palestinian land, laws revoked Palestinians' citizenship and annulled their homeland . . . Israel . . . expunged Palestine from its memory and soul."[33]

The traditional history, as represented in the writings of Shabtai Teveth and Efraim Karsh, speaks of Palestinian flight and dispossession as self-inflicted, meaning that Israel bears no responsibility for Al-Nakba. Since the 1980s, a group of Israeli Jewish or Jewish "new historians," like Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, Avi Shalim, and Simha Flapan, have introduced a corrective argument to the official Israeli narrative by making the case that Israel is culpable to varying degrees as the Palestinians were forced out from their homes and land. While the traditional Israeli account allows Israeli Jews to avoid responsibility for Al-Nakba, at the cost of ignoring evidence, the revisionist history allows them to take some responsibilitybut also enables them to keep the integrity of their national identity.[34]

Similarly, most Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular are caught between denial of the Holocaust and little to no knowledge about it. "[W]hat they do know is often skewed by the perverted prism of Arab popular culture, from the ranting of religious extremists to the distortions of certain satellite television channels to the many ill-informed authors."[35] A related reason pertains to the general Arab and Palestinian struggle against Zionism and Israel, which color how the Holocaust is viewed. As Gilbert Achcar holds, "The Arab World and most of the Third World regard the state that claims to represent the victims of the Shoah from the standpoint of the victims of both the Nakba and Israel's subsequent acts. This fact weighs very heavily on the reception of the Holocaust in the Arab East, which got ever more complicated from the time of the Shoah itself to the time of the Nakba and up to our own day."[36]

Most Israeli Jews and Palestinians loyally adhere to their distinct historical memory and are basically reluctant to acknowledge "the other." Such an acknowledgement implies justifying their superiority and accepting their collective rationale. "For the Palestinians, accepting Jewish pain around the Holocaust means accepting the moral ground for the creation of the State of Israel. For the Israeli Jews, accepting the pain of the 1948 Palestinian refugees means sharing responsibility for their plight and their right of return."[37]

In March 2011, Israel published the Budget Principles Law, known as Amendment #40 and unofficially nicknamed the Al-Nakba Law. It reduces state funding to any organization or entity that engages in activities against the principles of the state, such as commemorating Al-Nakba or commemorating Israel's Independence Day as a day of mourning, as some Palestinian citizens of Israel (and Palestinians) do. A 2008–2012 study by Amal Jamal and Samah Basool, which was published in 2014, found that Israel's five major newspapers—*Yedioth Ahronot*, *Ma'ariv*, *Israel Hayom*, *Haaretz*, and *Hamodia*—interpret Al-Nakba differently. But, the most frequent one of all, except for *Haaretz*, sees it as a threat designed to delegitimize Israel.[38] According to Jamal and Basool, "The view that the Nakba is a threat and delegitimizes Israel is intended to mobilize Israeli public opinion—to mold the public's consciousness against the most central expression of Palestinian identity: the memory of the Nakba"[39] Palestinian historians, such as Salim Tamari, researching Al-Nakba and the Palestinian dispersal have a hard time accessing primary sources—diaries, family papers, and photos—in Israel as most of them are locked away in Israeli archives.[40]

A similar reality happens on the Palestinian side. When Palestinian activist Ghassan Abdallah visited Yad va-Shem in 1999 and 2000, respectively, he was impressed and thought of how Palestinians can learn from Israeli Jews to memorialize their own dead. However, he missed the opportunity to empathize with the deep pain that Jews feel when they come to Yad va-Shem.[41] Instead, he viewed the memorial as a representation to what Palestinians have gone through at the hands of the Zionists and raised the typical Palestinian beliefs about the Holocaust:

> We were never responsible for the pogroms and discrimination against Jews in Europe, neither in the past or in the Nazi era. So why should Palestinians pay for the crimes of Europeans against Jews? . . . What Palestinians and Arabs are up against is modern political Zionism, with its invasion of our historic land and culture, using false myths and pretenses.[42]

A more nuanced perspective is given by Palestinian American poet and writer Ibtisam Barakat who was born in Beit Hanina, near Jerusalem:

> The Palestinians have been victimized for decades, as they were forced to pay—with their homeland, their lives, and their freedom—reparations for the Holocaust, one of the biggest crimes in modern history, but one committed in Europe, not the Middle East. To acknowledge that securing a homeland for the Jews and granting them freedom inflicted grave damages on the Palestinians and their freedom would be a step in the healing direction.[43]

A more theological view is provided by Naim Stifan Ateek, a Palestinian priest in the Anglican Communion and cofounder of Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem. In *Justice and Only Justice*, while he expresses the need for Palestinians to acknowledge the Holocaust, he asks them to "look the Jews in the eye and say that the only justification that they can accept today for the presence of Israel is the Holocaust."[44] Sixteen years later, in *A Palestinian Theology of Liberation*, he explains how the memory of the Holocaust served to trump the claims and aspirations of the native inhabitants of Palestine, and how later Israeli occupation and settlements in the West Bank have contributed to their suffering and oppression.[45]

Achcar attributes these perceptions to either the shock that some feel by "the pro-Israel double standard that is displayed in Western attitudes towards the Middle East" or the "exasperation with the increasing cruelty of Israel's treatment of the Palestinians."[46] However, it should be stated that the aforementioned Palestinian arguments minimize or ignore that Zionism started decades before the Holocaust and is premised, among other things, on the memory that Jews were indigenous to Palestine and had been expelled from their homeland.

EMPATHIZING WITH THE OTHER: FOUR CASE STUDIES

In addition to denying or minimizing the tragedy of the other, each community becomes suspicious of the other's motives when they show empathy toward their pain. Equally, they become accusatory and, at times, even threatening when members of their own community empathize with the other. This is illustrated in four cases studies, arranged chronologically, which relate to Yasser Arafat, Emile Shoufani, Sami Awad, and Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi.

When Yasser Arafat, president of the Palestinian National Authority, visited Washington, DC in 1998, Aaron David Miller, U.S. Department of state advisor on Arab-Israeli negotiations and a member of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Governing Council, presented the idea of having him visit the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. In addition

to creating much anxiety and soul searching, the invitation became controversial as the museum extended it, withdrew it, and extended it again before Arafat's aides turned it down. The fear was that the visit will exploit memory of the dead and compromise the integrity of history. As Walter Reich, former director of the museum, reflected years later, "Elie Wiesel came to my defense in a powerful op-ed. He stressed my belief that the Holocaust must never be used politically and that to me the memory of the victims is sacred, as is the museum itself, and neither should ever be used as a tool."[47] Three months later, Arafat paid a private visit to the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, Netherlands. Wim Kortenhoeven of the Netherlands Israel Public Affairs Committee felt anger, stating "This is no more than a cheap publicity stunt that desecrates the memory of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust."[48] Israeli officials depicted Arafat's visit "as 'meaningless' and a 'gimmick'."[49]

In contrast to the Arafat case, a positive reaction from Jews, Israeli or otherwise, and others was heard when in May 2003 Emile Shoufani led 300 Israeli Arabs and Jews on a multi-faith pilgrimage to the historic Jewish district of Krakow and the Auschwitz-Birkenau Nazi death camp in Poland (the largest of the concentration and extermination camps built by the Nazis, where over 1,100,000 were murdered). Shoufani is an Israeli Arab Greek-Catholic Archimandrite in Nazareth whose grandfather and uncle were killed by the Israeli army during the first Arab-Israeli war and who was deported with his family after Israel's establishment in 1948. The pilgrimage was part of the "Memory for Peace" project that Shoufani initiated to know the other better. The Arab members prepared for this trip by participating in a series of Jewish lectures and talks with Shoah survivors and reflective study at the Ghetto Fighters' House in Western Galilee and at Yad va-Shem in Jerusalem. "We are here to be with the Jewish people, in all its history and all its suffering," Shoufani stated at the inaugural ceremony at the Krakow Temple. He continued, "From the suffering of our people today, we unite with your suffering."[50] The visit was transformative "in the way each one listened and was present with the others. And nobody was the same after coming back from Auschwitz."[51] For his dedication, Shoufani received the 2003 UNESCO Prize for Peace Education. In his acceptance speech, he emphasized the themes of human responsibility, education for peace, and love. "Because this place of death symbolizes the wish to destroy the humanity of human beings . . . because it arose from the negation of the unity of the human race," he stated, "we felt it was imperative to demonstrate that this crime concerns all individuals, regardless of their origin."[52] He added, "This is what education for peace means for me: an operative commitment along the path of love."[53] In 2014, Shoufani was given the annual award of the French Amitié Judéo-Chrétienne for advancing Christian-Jewish and Christian-Muslim understanding.

An equally important example concerns Sami Awad who also visited Auschwitz-Birkenau but returned with a different lesson or observations than Emile Shoufani. A Palestinian Christian from Bethlehem, he is the Executive Director of Holy Land Trust. In childhood, he heard about the killing of his grandfather during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and at age twelve, he began to be inspired by his uncle Mubarak Awad and his work in Palestinian nonviolence resistance against the Israeli occupation. For Sami, nonviolence is essential for creating mutual trust and respect, and becomes the key to advance a Palestinian-Israeli peace based on shared acknowledgement of rights and equality in the historic land of Palestine. In an interview published by Just Vision, he argues that "there is no promised land that God gave one people to take from another; rather there are two peoples who should enjoy full and complete recognition of their rights."[54] Awad has put his faith and vision into action through deep personal transformation and through serious advocacy in Erbil, Iraqi-Kurdistan; India; South Africa; and the United States, among other places. He visited Auschwitz-Birkenau twice, as part of the Zen Peacemakers International "Bearing Witness Retreat," to pray, meditate, and reflect; to sense, see, and chant out names of those who were killed. While the visits impacted Awad in serious ways, he regrets how Israeli guides present the trauma to busloads of Israeli children who are sponsored by the government, telling them, "You see what happened to us years ago . . . by the Nazis . . . if given the opportunity, the Arabs, the Muslims, the Palestinians would do the same thing to us as what happened to our grandparents."[55] Hence, the children internalize this experience not as part of the past but as "their present and their future" (03:06). The Israeli guides, according to Awad, explain why "we have to defend ourselves, and the army is how we do it, and this is why you have to join the army, this is why you have to support the state, this is why Israel was created to prevent this from happening to us, and we have to be strong to prevent them from doing this to us again" (03:17). All in all, Awad regrets how nonviolence is never taught in Israeli society as an option to dealing with "the enemy" (04:10). He is not shy of criticizing Israeli leaders and others who manipulate fear of past traumas in order to achieve their agendas (04:30).

In juxtaposition to the experiences of both Emile Shoufani and Sami Awad is that of Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi. A Palestinian professor and peace activist, he was born in Jerusalem in a well-known family, and is a descendant of Sheikh Ahmad Dajani (1459–1561) who was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan as the custodian for the Tomb of King David Tomb on Mount Zion in Jerusalem. Along with his brother Munther Dajani Daoudi, he cofounded in 2007 Wasatiyya ("moderation"), a Muslim movement that promotes nonviolence, compromise, tolerance, justice, peace, and reconciliation. With a strong interest in learning about the other, he visited Auschwitz in February

2011 with a group of 150 religious leaders from around the world. A few weeks later, he coauthored with Robert B. Satloff, the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an opinion article in *The New York Times*, titled "Why Palestinians Should Learn About the Holocaust." He then organized in March 2014 a trip for twenty-seven of his students at Al-Quds University to visit Krakow and then Auschwitz. This visit was part of an empathy and tolerance program designed in coordination with an Israeli university and a German university, which also took Israeli students to visit Palestinian refugee camps. But the reaction to the Auschwitz visit from many in the Palestinian community was brutal, ranging from insults to accusations of treason and from torching his car to death threats. As he explains in an interview with Mical Polacoo, "The Workers, Staff, and Faculty Syndicate at Al-Quds University fired me from their membership. Nine political student organizations on campus issued a public statement against me titled 'Normalization = Treason.' Students demonstrated against me on campus and delivered a letter to my secretary threatening to kill me if I returned to teach at the university. They later torched my car."[56] "Holocaust denial and distortion," Dajani Daoudi holds, "are morally unacceptable, historically incorrect, factually wrong, and constitute a major threat to ethics and human dignity, as well as to the prospect of reconciliation and peace between Palestinians and Israelis."[57]

Zeina M. Barakat, a Palestinian student who coordinated the Palestinian team and made the visit with Dajani Daoudi was transformed by the experience. She writes of how the Holocaust is "a fact, and we all have a sacred responsibility to ensure that it never happens again to Jews or any other group. I believe our trip made a big crack in the Palestinian wall of ignorance and indifference about the Holocaust."[58] She is not afraid to disagree with those who hold that the unjustness Palestinians are going through is of the same magnitude as what Jews were subjected to in Nazi-controlled Europe. For her, in spite of how "degrading and unfair our situation in Palestine is today—and yes, it is degrading and unfair—it pales in comparison to the dehumanizing horror, depravity, and evil conceived and implemented by Nazis and their collaborators."[59]

Very few Israeli Jews, and even Israeli Arabs or Palestinian citizens of Israel, have visited Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank. Beside fear from Palestinian militants, it is illegal for them to do so. An Israeli military decree, issued in October 2000 during the initial days of the Second Intifada, prohibits Israelis from entering Area A even though a ruling by the Jerusalem district court in April 2013 prevents Israeli civilians from being arrested for ignoring the decree. (According to the Oslo II Accord of 1995, Area A is exclusively governed by the Palestinian Authority, while Area B is administered by both the Palestinian Authority

and Israel and Area C, which contains the Israeli settlements, is controlled by Israel.)

RESHAPING MEMORY AND IDENTITY, ADVANCING PEACE

Individual and group peacebuilding efforts already are reshaping memory and identity. They are advancing peace in terms of the calls for and work on behalf of civic equality, coexistence, mutual respect, tolerance, shared society, and social justice.

At the individual level, there is movement toward learning about each other for the primary purpose of empathy and understanding, not hegemony and security. Individuals learn to value in themselves and the other the dignity of difference[60] and the goodness of similarity. Dajani Daoudi and Satloff, for example, go further in their urging about learning the universal lessons of the Holocaust. They write,

> While it is important for both Palestinians and Israelis to appreciate the historical legacies that have shaped their strategic outlook and national identities, teaching Palestinians about the Holocaust for this reason alone runs the risk [of] feeding the facile equation that "the Jews have the Holocaust and the Palestinians have the Nakba." We urge Palestinians to learn about the Holocaust so they can be armed with knowledge to reject the comparison because, if it were broadly avoided, peace would be even more attainable than it is today.[61]

Though not drawing parallels between the Israeli and Palestinian experiences, Gideon Levy argues, "It is possible and necessary to teach that this glory that is the establishment of Israel also has a dark side—so we can know our history, and understand the wishes of the Palestinians."[62] Practically speaking, as explained above, Emile Shoufani, Sami Awad, Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi, and Zeina M. Barakat already have set a precedent by visiting Auschwitz-Birkenau. Others are following in their footsteps.

At the organizational level, there are multiple initiatives to stir the spirit and soul of both societies. Three are highlighted below. First, there is the Israeli Jewish grassroots organization Zochrot (Hebrew for Remembering; Thakirat in Arabic) that promotes "acknowledgement and accountability for the ongoing injustices of the Nakba . . . and the reconceptualization of the Return as the imperative redress of the Nakba and a chance for a better life for all the country's inhabitants."[63] A result of one of its projects is "The Nakba Map" in Hebrew, which encompasses "the localities in the country that were destroyed between the beginning of Zionist colonization and the 1967 War."[64]

The second is the dual history project of the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME), which is designed to change the way the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is presented and understood by exposing Israeli Jewish readers to the Palestinian version of history and Palestinian readers to the Israeli Jewish version of history. In chapter 3 of *Side By Side: Parallel Histories of Israel-Palestine*,[65] it is interesting to note that while the Israeli narrative examines "World War II and the Holocaust of Europe's Jews," the Palestinian narrative does not, and emphasizes instead the period "From the White Paper (1939) to Al-Nakbah (1948). In chapter 4, while the Israeli narrative addresses "The War of Independence and the Founding of the State of Israel," the Palestinian narrative concentrates on "Al-Nakbah, 1948." The idea of this approach is not meant to develop one connecting narrative but to juxtapose both national narratives so that the readers can "be exposed to the other national narrative in a way that allows them to acknowledge it as new and valuable information for themselves."[66] In the words of Dan Bar-On, the Israeli codesigner of the project, "What we're talking about is the disarming of history, where the teaching of history no longer feeds the conflict." In the words of Sami Adwan, the Palestinian codesigner, "The project aims to break down the stereotypes and build nuanced understandings."[67]

The third includes the activities of the Parents Circle-Families Forum (PCFF)—a grassroots organization of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian families that have lost immediate family members due to the conflict. In addition to being against the occupation and for peace, it reminds everyone through the Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day that "war is not a predetermined fate, but only a human choice." Its Parallel Narrative Project brings "different groups of Israelis and Palestinians together, to learn about the personal and national narrative of the 'other.'"[68] For example, it frequents sites such as Yad va-Shem to learn about the Holocaust and Lifta, a Palestinian village that was destroyed in 1948, to learn about the Nakba, "as a way to provide a concrete context to illustrate the interpretation of historical, personal, and national narratives from both sides and the complexity of the conflict."[69]

The record at the governmental or national level raises concerns. Israelis and Palestinians have competing or conflicting narratives and different approaches for resolving their dispute. Their respective education ministry officials have been unwilling to permit the teaching of the other's "historical truth," that is, the Holocaust in Palestinian schools and the Nakba in Israeli Jewish schools. In Palestine, there is the major split between the secular Fatah in the West Bank and the religiously oriented Hamas in the Gaza Strip and, in Israel, there are those who are pro- and those who are against settlements and annexation. In Palestine, there is a strong anti-normalization campaign with Israel and, in Israel, there is a nation-state law that "excludes Palestinian citizens of Israel from the national identity and demotes Arabic

from its status as an official language."[70] Yet, in April 2015, Lucy Aharish—a Palestinian Israeli Muslim news anchor, reporter, and television host—was chosen to light a torch in the official ceremony opening Israel's sixty-seventh *Yom Ha'atzmaut*, Independence Day celebrations. Some Israeli Jews on the extreme right criticized her for lacking loyalty to the state, while other Jews on the other side of the continuum and Arabs accused her "of playing the obedient Arab, salving Jewish consciences."[71]

Overall, while there is a strong tendency to cling to memories and identities or to turn memories and identities into weapons for victory over the other, there is a fervent call for myth busting, accepting limits, and common ground. In the peace negotiations leading up to the Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians in September 1993, for example, books by the Israeli Jewish new historians were discussed "to convince the Palestinian delegation that there had been a change of attitude in Israel." Interestingly, but perhaps predictably, "Palestinians used the same books in January 2000 [at the Taba Summit] to argue for their ancestral rights to land."[72]

What is evident is that, in addition to the responsibility of European (read British) and regional (read Arab) leaders for what evolved in Palestine during the Mandate years, both Jews (called Zionists by Arabs) and Palestinian Arabs had a shared liability for what happened to them prior to Israel's creation. The same can be said of how Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian relations have progressed or regressed since Israel's creation. Although there are a few instances of accommodation in the form of peace negotiations, accords, treaties, and security coordination, all parties concerned—Israel, Palestine, Arab states, the United States, and others—are at fault for contributing in different ways and at various times to the prolongation of the Israel-Palestine dispute—causing or regenerating bad memories, feeding national myths, poisoning national identities, and breeding distrust.

Israelis and Palestinians must reenvision their relations. "The key is not to dogmatically declare all differences over the past as either reconcilable or irreconcilable, but to identify the exact limits of reconcilability with which the two peoples must learn to live."[73] In *The Arabs and the Holocaust*, Achcar states, "Statist Zionism is a Janus, one face turned toward the Holocaust, the other toward the Nakba, one toward persecution endured, the other toward oppression inflicted . . . . Yet only recognition of both of Janus's faces—of the Holocaust *and* the Nakba—can bring Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs into a genuine dialogue."[74]

Through empathy and generosity of spirit, both Israeli Jews and Palestinians can acknowledge each other's trauma in a multidimensional way—that is, not one trauma at the expense of or in opposition to the other—which will enable them ultimately to recognize the face, identity, and story of the other in their hearts and minds. Through humanity and

dignity, both Israeli Jews and Palestinians can accept each other's existence and rights and understand that their security, peace, and prosperity are assured not by disempowerment, exclusion, belligerence, and pain, but by inclusion, confidence building, mutual trust, compromise, and positive collaboration. These must be expressed not in words only, but deeds as well.

NOTES

1. It is a great honor to have had Dr. Myron J. Aronoff as my professor and mentor. His outstanding research and teaching have shaped my views on culture, politics, and Israeli-Palestinian relations. His superb academic and professional guidance as well as his valued friendship and support have opened many doors for me and inspired me to be a better professor and mentor. As always, "Thank you, Mike." I am also grateful to Dr. Yael S. Aronoff for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Last but not least, I fully acknowledge a 2019 Monmouth University Summer Faculty Fellowship that afforded me the opportunity and time to research and write this chapter.

2. The Holocaust was a genocide that targeted a racial or religious group, while the Nakba mainly resulted from a violent conflict and war between two national movements and their respective paramilitary groups or irregular armies, which evolved to include the military forces of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states fighting each other. While there were instances of killing and terrorism, there was no intentional plan or program to exterminate a group (i.e., the Palestinian Arabs) based on their race or religion.

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Chapter 3

Denationalization in the Israel-Palestinian Context

Nadav G. Shelef

Among Myron J. Aronoff's signature contributions was the insight that contemporary societies can be composed of groups animated by different legitimating principles. Working largely in the Israeli context, he and the scholars following in his footsteps showed how variants of nationalist legitimating strategies operated in daily politics; illustrated the competition for resources, prestige, power, and adherents between groups adhering to these variants; and demonstrated that this competition shaped both the status of these variants and their content.[1]

This chapter builds on these insights to explore the possibility of denationalization—the process by which a group that identifies as a particular nation ceases to do so. The interest in denationalization stems from the observation that many alternatives to the two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian context implicitly assume the denationalization of Zionists, Palestinians, or both. "One state" solutions that envision the dominance of one group over another assume that the dominated population will give up its nationalist aspirations.[2] "One state" solutions built on parity, whether of all individuals or based on group-centered power-sharing arrangements, while perhaps more normatively appealing, rely on an even stronger assumption of denationalization since they require both groups to give up the nationalist dream of complete control over their collective political destiny. Yet, despite the critical assumption of denationalization built into these alternatives to a two-state solution, relatively little attention has been devoted to how it occurs or to its prospects.

As a step toward addressing this gap, this chapter begins by elaborating three forms of denationalization. The chapter then briefly reviews two main pathways through which denationalization could occur. It concludes by reflecting on the prospects of the main denationalization projects promoted in the contemporary Israeli and Palestinian spaces.

THREE FORMS OF DENATIONALIZATION

A nation is, in Benedict Anderson's canonical formulation, an "imagined political community . . . [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[3] These imagined communities are the product of political projects rather than fixed natural objects. As a result, despite the misleading metaphor of nation "building," nationalist projects are never finished. Rather, they continuously fight to maintain their contours in the face of competing national projects and entirely different ways of organizing society and legitimating rule. Projects of denationalization are one of these competitors. They seek to change the imagination of a national community such that this particular "nation" is no longer imagined as the relevant political community, as inherently limited, or as sovereign. Anderson's definition of the nation thus suggests three analytically distinct forms denationalization can take: (1) the substitution of the criteria for membership in the political community with the membership criteria of another nation; (2) the replacement of a political community that is imagined as inherently limited with one that is either imagined but universal or concrete and limited; (3) the downshifting of the collective goal from total control over a group's political destiny (sovereignty) to partial forms of such control.

This, literal, conceptualization of denationalization—as losing one of the elements that renders a group a particular nation—differs from the use of the term to refer to the loss of citizenship, the removal of state control from particular economic sectors, or the rise of trans-border interactions. These would be perhaps more appropriately, if clumsily, labeled "de-state-ification" since they concern the membership, boundaries, and power of the state rather than of the nation. Equating the two risks falling into the methodological nationalist trap of accepting the claim by the nationalist political project that the nation and state are coextensive.

Denationalization by Substitution

The first form of denationalization is a political project that seeks to substitute membership in one national community for membership in another. In denationalization by substitution, the political community is still imagined as inherently limited and sovereign—that is, it is still national—but the criteria defining the bounds of the political community change so much that one could be said to belong to a different nation.

Denationalization by substitution is an integral part of both the assimilationist projects undertaken by nationalizing states and by contemporary movements for national self-determination. The former seek to substitute the

membership criteria of the assimilating nation for those of the assimilated,[4] and the latter seek to substitute the membership criteria of the nation seeking independence for those of the nation from which they seek to separate. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, this is the form of denationalization assumed by "one state" solutions that envision all individuals in the land of this state as equal members of the state without any special status for the groups within it. Implicit in such "Isratine" solutions, to use Muammar Qaddafi's label, is that Israeli and Palestinian nationalists would substitute a self-understanding in which their relevant political community is the "Isratine" nation for their self-understanding as primarily members of the Israeli or Palestinian nations.

The possibility of denationalization by substitution is based on the recognition that individuals can fit into the membership criteria articulated by more than one national project. This recognition extends the distinction between "nominal" and "activated" identities developed by scholars of ethnicity to national identities. Nominal identities include the range of potential identities to which one may belong, while activated identities denote the identities to which one actually belongs at a particular time and place.[5] Since an individual's repertoire of nominal national identities may simultaneously include a number of distinct ones (e.g., French, Spanish, and Basque), denationalization as substitution occurs when a nominal national identity—that is, a nation to which one could theoretically belong—is activated in place of the currently active one.

The fierce competition between alternative nationalist projects for the loyalty of the same individual reflects their tacit acknowledgement that individuals could nominally belong to more than one nation despite the nationalist worldview, which otherwise rejects the constructivist and potentially mutable nature of national identification. In some cases, this competition is explicit. In the run-up to the Czechoslovakian censuses in the first decades of the twentieth century, for example, nationalist movements lobbied to "persuade individuals of their so-called true nationality much as they would in an election campaign."[6] In the waning days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, there were so many disagreements about the national membership of individuals that the Imperial Court of Justice ruled that official investigations of nationality took precedence over an individual's self-declared nationality.[7] In other contexts, nationalist movements fought to categorize children of members of a particular nation, even against the parents' insistence that they belonged to another.[8] The availability of denationalization by substitution was also implied in the battles that occurred in the heyday of Arab nationalism between the "pan" nationalist project that defined the political community in linguistic terms and the "local" nationalist projects that defined the relevant political community in geographic terms.[9]

Denationalization by Replacement

A second form of denationalization involves replacing the national community—which is both imagined and inherently limited—with a community that is either not limited or not imagined as the primarily politically relevant one. Like denationalization by substitution, denationalization by replacement relies on the notion that individuals carry a repertoire of potentially relevant nominal identities. Whereas denationalization as substitution focuses on activating other nominal national identities, denationalization by replacement focuses on activating non-national identities.

The candidates for replacement by a universal rather than national community can, for example, be defined by religious affiliation (as attempted by ISIS) or by a shared humanity (as in the notion of a "global citizenship").[10] Alternatively, the relevant political community could be replaced by one that is concrete rather than imagined, such as one's village.[11] Both Israeli and Palestinian societies evince political projects promoting denationalization by replacement, largely in favor of religious identities. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, denationalization by replacement is usually appealed to by religious Zionists in Israel or Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Palestine, when they argue that individual Palestinians or Jews, respectively, can remain in the state they desire to create as long as they organize their identity along religious or local lines and do not demand a share of political power as a group.

Denationalization by replacement remains a theoretical possibility despite nationalism's dominance because alternatives to the nation have always persisted. Not only do nonnational identities continue to be nominally available in individual repertoires, but there have always been segments of the population that stayed "nationally indifferent" and "aloof from" nationalist mobilization.[12] The challenge of the "integrative revolution" that Clifford Geertz identified as facing new states, therefore, actually faces all national projects all the time, even if the intensity of the challenge varies over time.[13]

Denationalization by Downshifting

A third form of denationalization involves shifting away from the fundamental nationalist goal of achieving collective control of the nation's political destiny. The nation-state, in which the nation is completely sovereign, forms the ideal-typical form of this control to which nationalisms aspire.[14] The aspiration for this goal is what distinguishes nations from ethnic groups. An ethnic group may seek collective rights and protections, but does not seek control over its political destiny; when it does so, it becomes a nation.[15]

In an extreme form of denationalization by downshifting, a group would stop mobilizing for any collective control of their political destiny, effectively calling for the ethnification, or perhaps re-ethnification, of the nation. In a more moderate (and likely) form, groups mobilized to achieve national self-determination downshift their goal from independent sovereignty to autonomy within a state controlled by a different national group. This form of de-nationalization is considerably more relevant for nations that do not yet have sovereignty, though, in principle, it could also occur in already sovereign nations. This is the form of denationalization that is assumed in "one state" solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that envision some version of consociational arrangement between Zionists and Palestinians. Here, the land would remain united, but limits would be placed on the ability of each national group to assert control over its own political destiny.

Although scholars have pointed out important cases of downshifting, such as the Quebecois in the 1980s, the Catalan national movement under Franco, the Sikhs, and citizen Palestinians in Israel,[16] comparative research suggests that it is relatively infrequent. Only 13 percent of groups that demanded independence included in Cunningham's (2014) dataset of self-determination movements subsequently downshifted their goal to seek only autonomy in at least one year.[17] For 40 percent of these groups, moreover, this downshift was only of limited duration (as in the Catalan experience). Similar results are obtained when examining the goals of the 106 (mostly) randomly selected self-determination movements between 1945 and 2012, collected by Samabnis, Germann, and Schädel.[18] This data shows that a similarly modest proportion of self-determination movements (17 percent between 1960 and 2005 and 21 percent overall) downshifted their claims from independence or secession to autonomy in an existing state in at least one year.[19]

PATHWAYS OF DENATIONALIZATION

There are at least two broadly defined, and complementary, pathways through which denationalization takes place, each operating at different levels of analysis. The first is situated at the group level and highlights the consequences of the political contest between movements articulating different legitimating principles. The second pathway focuses on the impact of incentives for denationalization at the level of the individual.

The possibility that the consequence of political competition could shape denationalization is based on the repeated role found for domestic political competition in shaping the meaning and scope of nationalism.[20] Similar dynamics could operate when a political movement engaged in this contest promotes one or more forms of denationalization. If a political movement

advocating a form of denationalization wins the domestic political battle, the version of denationalization it promotes will spread further through the society. In another version of this pathway, again by analogy to how the content of nationalism changes, denationalization can occur unintentionally.[21] Here, a political movement reframes the definition of the political community's membership boundaries or modulates the presentation of their goal for short-term, tactical, reasons. The political success of these modulations can, because they generate political returns that are costly to abandon, trap them into promoting a project of denationalization. In both versions of this pathway, the focus is on the incentives faced by political leaders and movements and the consequences of their actions rather than on the calculations undertaken by individual members of society.

For denationalization to take place through this pathway, its proponents must be organized in a political movement and succeed politically. These twin requirements imply that the mere existence of the "nationally indifferent" or of alternative national and nonnational political projects will not lead to denationalization. The organizational bar, for example, may impede denationalization to the extent that the nationally indifferent are hard to organize.[22] At the same time, the existence of those uncommitted to the national project in sufficient numbers is likely to make a political movement's appeal to their sensibilities much more likely and therefore increases the probability that a denationalization project would enter the political arena.[23]

Since denationalization through political competition depends on the success of a political movement, its prospects are also shaped by the myriad factors that shape the success of any political movement, including leadership, organization, and a political environment sufficiently open to allow it to compete with the national political project. Other factors, such as the perceived economic feasibility of the alternative they offer and support by the international community, could also shape the outcome.[24]

The second pathway emphasizes the incentives individuals face for identification with particular political projects. Here, individuals denationalize by substitution, replacement, or downshifting in response to the perceived benefits of doing so (e.g., in terms of economic opportunity or security) or the perceived costs (limited opportunity, insecurity) of the existing dominant nationalist project.[25] When enough individuals denationalize, the newly activated identity or goal can cascade to become the dominant one in their society.[26] Sometimes, these changes are assumed to take place over generations, if only because children born in new contexts may have a different repertoire of available identities than their parents. Working in the post-Soviet context, for example, David Laitin argued that incentivizing individuals to enroll their children in non-Russian language schools would, over time, lead to the substitution of the titular national identity for the Russian one.[27]

State policies are among the most powerful shapers of these incentives. As Eugen Weber demonstrated in the paradigmatic case of a homogenizing state, the state's control of the educational system, military, domestic political economy, and even the very categories available for social organization through the census can be powerfully deployed to incentivize individuals to denationalize by substitution.[28]

While most of the political science literature concentrates on the impact of material incentives in bringing about such changes, there may be important limits to the ability of material incentives to promote denationalization. One of these is provided by the extent to which nationalism situates itself as a sacred value for its adherents.[29] As a robust psychological literature has demonstrated, because the worth of sacred values is not measured along a materialist metric, the ability of material inducements to trigger their transgression is quite limited.[30] As a result, economic cost-benefit calculations may be less relevant in inducing denationalization among those already committed than in incentivizing the uncommitted to opt for one in the first place.

Another potential limit is posed by the possibility that these incentives are not equally available to all people in a group. For example, the availability of positive benefits to denationalization by replacement with a universalist, globalized, identity may be disproportionately available to those with the education and skills to take advantage of a global marketplace.[31] To the extent that incentives to denationalize are not equally available, the ability of a process of denationalization that relies on these incentives to spread may also be limited.[32]

Finally, both denationalization as substitution and denationalization as replacement are more likely to succeed to the extent that the group into which individuals join fully accepts them.[33] Continued blocked opportunities for mobility and the persistence of invidious distinctions between the groups is likely to inhibit denationalization by making it easier for nationalized political entrepreneurs to argue that continued injustice is linked to their nationality and that to improve their lives they require gaining or maintaining control of their political destiny. In other words, for denationalization to succeed, it must limit the ability of the currently dominant nationalist project to provide a reasonable and resonant explanation of lived reality.

REFLECTIONS ON DENATIONALIZATION IN THE ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN CONTEXTS

As noted above, the Israeli-Palestinian context evinces several projects seeking one or another form of denationalization, either as active political projects or as an implicit requirement of the successful implementation of alternatives

to the two-state solution. In this vein, various one-state solutions tend to assume that such a state would eventually foster the denationalization by substitution of the population that currently conceptualize themselves as Israelis and Palestinians (if they pay attention to the legacies of nationalism at all).

On the one hand, the nationalization tools available to states make this a not unreasonable assumption. On the other, the explicit consideration of the process of denationalization suggests that these tools may not be sufficient. The need to drain the reservoir of support of both nationalisms for which it is seeking to substitute is likely to continue to pose a challenge for a significant period. As noted above, accomplishing this requires the minimization, if not elimination, of systemic differences between the two groups. Lingering inequality or discrimination would make it easier for political entrepreneurs opposing the new alternative to continue to mobilize support around the old nationalisms. These differences can be hard to eradicate. Even Britain, which pursued a policy of integration for about 400 years, has not been able to eradicate Scottish nationalism as an alternative, partially because of lingering economic differences between English and Scottish.

The institutional arrangement of such a state will also shape the prospects of denationalization by substitution. If, as illustrated by the British example, this may be difficult to achieve when politics are organized around ideological principles rather than group loyalties, it is even more difficult in the context of a one-state solution that institutes power-sharing between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. This is the case because power-sharing itself reinforces the returns to identifying as part of the group that shares power and therefore inhibits the elision of meaningful differences between the groups.[34] This version of a "one-state solution" requires, instead, denationalization by downshifting by both groups rather than, or at least prior to, denationalization by substitution.

Both denationalization by substitution and (this version of) downshifting appear at present to require the imposition of such a state from the outside because there is relatively little support for either among Israelis or Palestinians. Israeli nationalists, who would have a lot to lose since they already possess a nation-state, are unsurprisingly, broadly opposed to the idea.[35] More indicative of the lack of support for these denationalization projects is the relatively low support they garner among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who have much more to gain. A July 2019 survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), for example, found that fewer than a third of Palestinians supported demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis, even after being reminded of the failure of negotiations for a two-state solution.[36] Looking over a longer time horizon, between 2003 and 2019, support for the one state solution among Palestinians fluctuated from a low of 6 percent in 2005 to a

high of 35 percent in 2017.[37] While the trend may be moving toward greater support, one-state solutions that require denationalization by substitution or downshifting remain decidedly minority positions even among those who, from the outside, seem to have the most to gain.

There are four other lingering projects seeking the denationalization of the Palestinians: denationalization by substitution for Arab nationalism or the host states of the Palestinian diaspora, and denationalization by replacement with local or religious identities. None of these are particularly viable at present, if only because Fatah, the dominant faction in Palestinian politics since the 1960s, has explicitly and vociferously fought to ensure the resilience of Palestinian nationalism against these alternatives.[38] While some movements in Palestinian politics continue to pay lip service to the principle of Arab nationalism, their relative weakness among Palestinians and the decline of Arab nationalism more broadly mean that this project of denationalization by substitution is relatively marginal. Likewise, although the assimilation of Palestinian refugees into their host societies in the Arab world remains theoretically possible, both Fatah's efforts and the refusal of most Arab states that took in significant numbers of Palestinian refugees to integrate them into their societies have reduced the viability of this denationalization project.[39]

There are two main projects of denationalization by replacement in the Palestinian sphere. The first centers on reorienting Palestinians to their local and religious identities rather than their national one. Prominent proponents of this project seek to do so by "eliminating the hope" Palestinians have of achieving independence.[40] However, the continued political dominance of nationalists in Palestinian politics, the limits on material cost-benefit calculations in driving denationalization, and the international community's broad support for Palestinian independence all suggest that this project of denationalization is unlikely to succeed.[41]

Another project of denationalization by replacement seeks to replace Palestinian nationalism with religious identification. Israel promoted such a project in the 1980s, only to have it backfire (from Israel's perspective) as Hamas replaced the once quietist positions of the Muslim Brotherhood with a religious version of Palestinian nationalism.[42] A different version of this project is currently promoted by the various Salafi groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While it has received some limited backing in the form of recruits and operatives, to date it has relatively little support among the Palestinian public at large.[43] As with other forms of denationalization, its prospects depend on its ability to defeat politically the Palestinian nationalists in Hamas and Fatah, something which they have been unable to do.

There are also a few projects of denationalization in Israel. The most prominent seeks to substitute a civic Israeli national identity, one whose membership criteria are delineated by Israel's borders, for its Zionist identity

as the Jewish state. This political project has been encapsulated in the slogan of turning Israel into "a state for all its citizens."[44] On paper, this project possesses the support of a non-insignificant minority of the Israeli public. Yet, the ethnic, religious, and ideological cleavages between those potentially sympathetic to it have significantly hampered the ability of this project to successfully compete against the dominant Zionist "civil religion."

The most significant basis for this project is found among Israel's citizen Palestinian public. This population, while possessing full civic and political rights is nonetheless excluded from full symbolic membership in the Jewish nation-state (and increasingly so). Despite constituting a significant proportion of the Israeli public (about 20 percent of the Israeli population) and having well-established political organizations promoting this project of denationalization by substitution (most prominently, the Israeli Communist Party), political entrepreneurs promoting this project have been unable to make significant gains in the domestic battle for political power. For example, while maintaining representation in Israel's parliament, parties promoting such a project have never been included in any governing coalition and therefore have been excluded from any political returns that might accrue to their position.

While there is some support for this project of denationalization among the Jewish Israeli public, it is much more limited. Between 1988 and 2015, the proportion of Jewish Israeli respondents who self-identified as either non- or anti-Zionist averaged about fifteen percent.[45] A significant portion of these, moreover, are Haredim.[46] The Haredim, literally the awed ones, are a segment of Jewish society that initially rejected nationalism both because Zionism offered a secular vision of Jewish nationhood and because they saw Zionism as a heretical attempt to accomplish by human hands a task (the ingathering of the Jewish exiles) that could only be accomplished by divine will. While a radical fringe refuses to interact with the Israeli state, including refusing to vote or even to speak Hebrew, most of them engage with the state and use it to meet their instrumental needs.[47]

Citizen Palestinians and the Haredim are often lumped together as a single, unitary, non-Zionist camp. For example, Israel's President Reuven Rivlin did so in 2015, when he voiced the concern that the demographic growth of citizen Palestinians and Haredim "ought to force us, the members of the Zionist public, to ask if we are able to accept that two such prominent groups [i.e., the Haredim and citizen Palestinians], half of the future Israeli population, do not define themselves as that [i.e., Zionist]."[48]

However, cooperation between the citizen Palestinians seeking to substitute a civic nationalism for Zionism and the Haredim has been hampered by the fact that those Haredim that are not Zionist (see below) tend to reject any form of nationalism, including its civic variety. Haredi solidary with Jews as

a people, their perception of Jewish uniqueness, and the tangible benefits of engagement with the state have also made cooperation with Jewish nationalists relatively easier than with citizen Palestinians. While, theoretically, a civic nationalist entrepreneur could overcome these hurdles and forge a unified movement promoting this form of denationalization by substitution, the barrier to doing so is not negligible.

The Haredim, as implied by Rivlin's comment, raise a potential project of denationalization of their own. Indeed, many Israelis are concerned about the potential replacement of Zionism by a non-nationalist religious identity and principle of legitimization.[49] This concern is driven by the fact that the Haredi share of the Israeli population has been growing much faster than the rest of Israeli society. Between 1998 and 2016, for example, the Haredi share of the population more than doubled, rising from 6.5 percent to 14 percent. By comparison, Israel's total population grew by much lower 43 percent during the same period.[50]

While there is no doubt that the demographic growth of the Haredim poses economic, political, and social challenges to Israeli society, the concern about denationalization may be overstated to the extent that it overlooks the transformations that have taken place among the Haredim. Specifically, their growing integration into Israeli society has left its mark on their beliefs.[51] As Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman argued, "for all their contra-acculturative tendencies . . . most of the haredim . . . had become caught up in the apparatus of Zionism and contemporary political life."[52] Other observers noted that, while the Haredim are increasingly assertive in the public realm, they increasingly do so from within the dominant Israeli perspective, "carry[ing] secular Israeli society within their attitudes, selves, and bodies."[53]

Perhaps the most indicative portrayal of the growing closeness of the Haredim to Jewish nationalism has been the emergence of the *Hardal*, or nationalist-Haredi, as a significant and meaningful social and political category. This group maintains Haredi religious practice while adopting a nationalist perspective about the State of Israel and even a hawkish view of the territory it ought to encompass.[54] Survey data suggest that this is not a marginal position in Haredi society. Since 1995, when data on this question becomes consistently available, about half of the Jewish population that self-identifies as Haredi also identifies as Zionist.[55] A similar conclusion is suggested by the attractivenes of mainstream Zionist parties to the Haredi population. Despite the disproportionately fast growth of the Haredim relative to the Israeli public as a whole, the proportion of votes received by Haredi political parties that affirm a non-Zionist platform in the April 2019 elections was virtually unchanged from their vote share in 1996. This is consistent with the possibility that many Haredim are abandoning their anti-nationalist

positions, even if they maintain their religious lifestyle and if their leaders formally continue to adhere to a non-Zionist ideology.[56]

Finally, some have argued that the emigration of upper-class, educated, Jewish Israelis is evidence of another kind of denationalization as Israelis who can "vote with their feet" do so. Avraham Burg, former Knesset member and Chairman of the Jewish Agency, described the phenomenon of upper-class Israelis' willingness to live abroad as a revolt. "[I]t's a quiet revolt of people leaving, getting out. It's a revolt of taking the laptop and the diskette and moving on. So if you look up and look around, you will see that the only people who are staying here are those who have no other option."[57]

Others, importantly, argue against investing emigration from Israel with any ideological meaning.[58] Regardless, even if emigration connotes a decline in Zionism's appeal, its implications for denationalization are not straightforward. Since denationalization requires either the numerical or political triumph of adherents of the new identity over adherents of the existing nationalism, the emigration of the former's supporters renders it, if anything, less likely to succeed. Not only does emigration reduce its weight in the population, but it also denies the denationalization project the human and material capital it could use in its political fight. In other words, a decline in the proportion of nationalists in a society does not, in and of itself, mean the denationalization of society unless alternative nationalisms or non-national principles of legitimization are politically strong enough to win the political battle.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that processes of denationalization—whereby a group ceases to think of itself in (particular) national terms—can be understood using the same processes that led to the emergence of nations and that drive changes in their meaning. Explicit consideration of the various forms of denationalization and the dynamics that shape their prospects are especially important in the Israeli and Palestinian contexts because they constitute some of the main fights shaping the futures of these societies, and because denationalization is a fundamental assumption underlying many proposed alternatives to the two-state solution.

This brief review suggests that, although denationalization is theoretically possible in both Israeli and Palestinian societies (as it is in any society), its prospects are not particularly strong. One implication of this conclusion is that alternatives to the two-state solution are relatively unlikely to lead to the peaceful resolution of this conflict unless they explicitly address the question of how one or both of the groups currently animated by nationalist legitimating principles will give them up.

NOTES

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6. Tatjana Lichtenstein, "Racializing Jewishness: Zionist Reponses to National Indifference in Interwar Czechoslovakia," *Austrian History Yearbook* 43 (2012): 85, doi:10.1017/s0067237811000609.

7. Pavel Kladiwa, "National Classification in the Politics of the State Census: The Bohemian Lands 1880–1930," *Bohemia* 55, No. 1 (2015): 80.

8. See, for example, Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

9. See, for example, Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991); Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," *Daedalus* 122, No. 3 (1993), doi:10.4324/9781315082172-3; Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).

10. While both critics (e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, "Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite." *The National Interest* 75 (Spring,

2004)) and proponents of a global identity (e.g., Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *End of the Nation-State* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000)) assume that they replace national ones, the relationship between them may be more complicated. See, for example, Min Zhou, "Social and Individual Sources of Self-Identification as Global Citizens," *Sociological Perspectives* 59, No. 1 (2015), doi:10.1177/0731121415579281; Brandon Gorman and Charles Seguin, "World Citizens on the Periphery: Threat and Identification with Global Society," *American Journal of Sociology* 124, No. 3 (2018), doi:10.1086/699652.

11. Steve Fenton, "Indifference towards National Identity: What Young Adults Think about Being English and British," *Nations and Nationalism* 13, No. 2 (2007), doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00279.x.

12. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* 69, No. 1 (2010), doi:10.1017/s0037677900016715; L. L. Farrar, Jr., "Aggression versus Apathy: The Limits of Nationalism During the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913," *East European Quarterly* 37, No. 3 (2003); James Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Alexei Miller, "'National Indifference' as a Political Strategy?" *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 20, No. 1 (2019), doi:10.1353/kri.2019.0003.

13. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1978).

14. To be sure, some nationalist movements seek lower-order forms of control, such as autonomy. This was, at times, even the case for parts of the Zionist movement. See, Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times* (Jerusalem: Shikmona, 1970); Dimitry Shumsky, *Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018). These, however, tended to be concessions to the perceived impossibility of full sovereignty and, in any case, largely disappeared after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires that served as the conceptual models for these proposals.

15. Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a . . . ," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, No. 4 (1978), doi:10.1080/01419870.1978.9993240.

16. See, for example, Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics* 45, No. 2 (1993), doi:10.2307/2950658; Albert Balcells, *Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 126–27; Arjun Chowdhury and Ron Krebs, "Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism," *Security Studies* 18, No. 3 (2009), doi:10.1080/09636410903132961; Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2019).

17. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

18. Nicholas Samabnis, Micha Germann, and Andreas Schädel, "SDM: A New Data Set on Self-Determination Movements with an Application to the Reputational Theory of Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, No. 3 (2018), doi:10.1177/0022002717735364.

19. More specifically, this is a shift from the dominant claim by a group being either Independence or Irredentism to Autonomy or Sub-state secession. While their overall identification of the scale of the downshifting phenomenon is relatively similar, the differences between them likely stem from their different case selection strategies. Cunningham relies on the Minorities at Risk data and Samabnis et al.'s samples from a larger universe of self-identified self-determination movements (and oversamples movements that switched from nonviolence to violence at least once).

20. See, for example, Nadav G. Shelef, "How Homelands Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2019), doi:10.1177/0022002719863470; Brendan O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayers, *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008).

21. See, for example, Shelef, *Evolving Nationalism*; Stacie E. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Nadav G. Shelef, *Homelands* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

22. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*.

23. For examples of denationalization by these dynamics in a diverse array of cases see, for example, Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec;" Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*; and Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities."

24. See, for example, Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec"; Balcells, *Catalan Nationalism*, 192–93; and Thomas Ambrosio, *Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York, NY: Praeger, 2001), respectively.

25. For example, David D. Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Boli, "Contemporary Developments in World Culture," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 46, Nos. 5–6 (2005), doi:10.1177/0020715205058627; Zhou, "Social and Individual Sources of Self-Identification;" Gorman and Seguin, "World Citizens on the Periphery."

26. Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence.*

27. David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

28. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). For discussions of the ways censuses have been used to produce and eliminate alternative foci of identification and organization by both states and minority groups, see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Jacqueline Urla, "Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics: Numbers, Nations, and the Making of Basque Identity," *American Ethnologist* 20, No. 4 (1993), doi:10.1525/ae.1993.20.4.02a00080; Lichtenstein, "Racializing Jewishness;" Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 118–21; Kladiwa, "National Classification;" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, eds., *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

29. Anthony D. Smith, "The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, No. 3 (2000), doi:10.1177/03058298000290030301.

30. See, for example, Alan Page Fiske and Philip E. Tetlock, "Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice," *Political Psychology* 18, No. 2 (1997); Philip E. Tetlock, et al., "The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78, No. 5 (2000), doi:10.1037//0022-3514.78.5.853; Jeremy Ginges, et al., "Sacred Bounds on the Rational Resolution of Violent Political Conflict," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104, No. 18 (2007); Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, "Noninstrumental Reasoning Over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Study," *Psychology of Learning and Motivation* 50 (2009); Philip E. Tetlock, "Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions," *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 7, No. 7 (2003), doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9; A. Peter McGraw, Philip E. Tetlock, and Orie V. Kristel, "The Limits of Fungibility: Relational Schemata and the Value of Things," *Journal of Consumer Research* 30, No. 2 (2003); A. Peter McGraw and Philip Tetlock, "Taboo Trade-offs, Relational Framing, and the Acceptability of Exchanges," *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 15, No. 12 (2005), doi:10.1207/s15327663jcp15012.

31. Kenneth Bollen and Juan Diez Medrano, "Who are the Spaniards? Nationalism and Identification in Spain," *Social Forces* 77, No. 2 (1998). For an opposing view, see Gorman and Seguin, "World Citizens on the Periphery."

32. Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity and its Futures*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 301.

33. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Laitin, *Identity in Formation*; Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

34. Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson, "Secessionism in Multicultural States."

35. A 2018 poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) found, for example, that only 19 percent of Israeli Jews supported such an outcome. See https://pcpsr.org/en/node/731.

36. *PSR Survey Research Unit. 2019. Poll No. 72*. https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/761.

37. For the full series of polls, see https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154.

38. Shelef, *Homelands.*

39. The exception is Jordan, which granted Palestinians citizenship. Perhaps as a result, 95 percent of respondents of Palestinian origin in Jordan responded that they were proud or somewhat proud to be Jordanian (see Wave 1 (2006–2009) of the Arab Barometer project): https://www.arabbarometer.org/waves/arab-barometer-wave-i/. This does not mean, however, that Palestinians see Jordan as the appropriate Palestinian state. Support for this idea among Palestinians is virtually nonexistent.

40. See, for example, Hecht, "The Face of Israel's."

41. On international support for the Palestinians and its consequences, see Nadav G. Shelef and Yael Zeira, "Recognition Matters!" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, No. 3 (2016), doi:10.1177/0022002715595865.

42. Shelef, *Homelands.*

43. Aviad Mendelboim and Yoram Schweitzer, *The Influence of the Islamic State on Israel's Arab Citizens and on Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank*, Institute for National Security Studies, 2016, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/influence-islamic-state-israels-arab-citizens-palestinians-gaza-west-bank/.

44. There have been other projects seeking denationalization by substitution inside Israel. The Canaanite movement, for example, offered a vision of an ethnically defined nation-state, but one in which the Canaanite nation (composed of Jews and Palestinians) defined the bounds of national membership. This movement, however, garnered relatively little support. For other "bi-national" projects in Israel, see Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea*.

45. These data are from the surveys conducted by Sammy Smooha since 1988. The specific question asked, "According to the way you understand and define Zionism are you: Absolutely Zionist, Zionist, non-Zionist, or anti-Zionist." Figures reported are the sum of those self-categorizing as non-Zionist and anti-Zionist. Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute.

46. In 2015, for example, 39 percent of the self-identified non- and anti-Zionists in Smooha's survey identified as Haredim. Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute.

47. Samuel C. Heilman and Menachem Friedman, *The Haredim in Israel: Who Are They and What Do They Want?* (New York, NY: Institute on American Jewish-Israeli Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1991).

48. Noam Dvir, "Rivlin: There are 4 Tribes in Israel and the Hostility Between Them is Growing," *Ynet.com*, June 7, 2015, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4665846,00.html.

49. See also Evgenia Bystrov and Arnon Soffer, *Israel: Demography and Density 2007–2020* (Haifa: University of Haifa, 2008); and Ynet.com, "The Secular: a Haredi Majority—A Danger to the Existence of the State," *Ynet.com*, May 5, 2010, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3885660,00.html.

50. Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, "Religious Pressure Will Increase in the Future," *Israel Studies Review* 27, No. 1 (2010); Central Bureau of Statistics, *Working Paper 84: Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Population in Israel 1998–2010*, 2014, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/pw/pw84/pw84.pdf; Central Bureau of Statistics, *Religion and Self-Definition of Extent of Religiosity, Selected Data from the Society in Israel Report No. 10*, 2018, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2018/195/32_18_195b.pdf. For more on estimates of the Haredi population, see Central Bureau of Statistics, *Measurement and Estimates of the Population of Ultra-orthodox Jews*, 2011, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/tec/tec25/tec25.pdf.

51. Kimmy Caplan, *Internal Popular Discourse in Israeli Haredi Society* (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2007).

52. Heilman and Friedman, *The Haredim in Israel*, 15.

53. Shlomo Fischer, "Yes, Israel is Becoming More Religious," *Israel Studies Review* 27, No. 1 (2012): 13. For discussions of the changes in Haredi society in

a variety of realms see, for example, Simeon D. Baumel, "Communication and Change: Newspapers, Periodicals, and Acculturation among Israeli Haredim," *Jewish History* 16, No. 2 (2002), doi:10.1023/a:1015053530941; Caplan, *Internal Popular Discourse*; Nurit Stadler, Edna Lomsky-Feder, and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Fundamentalism's Encounters with Citizenship: The Haredim in Israel," *Citizenship Studies* 12, No. 3 (2008), doi:10.1080/13621020802015388; Nissim Leon, *Gentle Ultra-Orthodoxy: Religious Renewal in Oriental Jewry in Israel* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 2010).

54. Cohen and Susser, "Religious Pressure."

55. These data are from the series of surveys conducted by Sammy Smooha. Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute. Similar results have been found by Israel Democracy Institute's own surveys and those by the Shahrit project, see https://tinyurl.com/y5c26f9k.

56. Leon, *Gentle Ultra-Orthodoxy*.

57. Quoted in Ian S. Lustick, "Israel's Migration Balance: Demography, Politics, and Ideology," *Israel Studies Review* 26, No. 1 (2011): 46, doi:10.3167/isr.2011.260108. See also, Bystrov and Soffer, *Israel*, 61.

58. See, for example, Sergio Della Pergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Contemporary Jewish Diaspora in Global Context: Human Development Correlates of Population Trends," *Israel Studies* 10, No. 1 (2005), doi:10.1353/is.2005.0106; Yinon Cohen, "Migration Patterns to and from Israel," *Contemporary Jewry* 29, No. 2 (2009), doi:10.1007/s12397-009-9012-0; Sergio Della Pergola, "When Scholarship Disturbs Narrative: Ian Lustick on Israel's Migration Balance," *Israel Studies Review* 26, No. 2 (2011).

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Chapter 4

The Ecological Fallacy

"Trust" in International Relations—The Case of the Settlement Freeze in the Oslo Process

Yossi Beilin

Despite the importance of "trust" in politics, especially in international relations, there is a consensus in the Social Sciences that the term has not been defined enough. No theory has been established around it in order for different cases to be studied in its framework.

It is easier to define distrust or mistrust and to refer to their impact on different kinds of relations. When referring to trust, it is, usually, described as very positive and even vital for social life. This chapter refers to the risks of trust, and hopefully, will contribute to a potential theory on that very important matter.

In the words of Christopher Andrejs Berzins,

> Trust is not simply rational expectation nor is it blind faith. Rather, trust can be understood as arising from a combination of individual calculations (bounded by rational choice) and social/normative embeddedness (including collective cognitions, values, and normative obligations); moreover, a mechanism of "suspension" is required, in order for trust to be realized. It is this "leap of faith" that binds the individualistic and social dimensions of trust together. For the purpose of policy prescription, "trust building" in international relations can, thus, be conceived as requiring a "combination" of "risk management" and "relationship management," each involving a set of loosely defined tasks. In other words, trust is not reducible to either risk or relationship management, but demands an idiosyncratic blend of the two.[1]

In *Mafia: The Price of Distrust*, Diego Gambetta writes,

> The importance of trust pervades the most diverse situations, where cooperation is at one and the same time, a vital and fragile commodity: from marriage to economic development, from buying a second-hand car, to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life, to the continuation of life on earth . . . In social Sciences, the importance of trust is often acknowledged, but seldom examined, and scholars tend to mention it in passing, to allude to it as fundamental ingredient, or lubricant, an unavoidable dimension of social interaction, only to move on, to deal with less intractable matters.[2]

One of the reasons for not focusing enough on trust is that this term is very elusive on the one hand, while on the other hand there appears to be a consensus among scholars who address it that it is indispensable for the success of many kinds of human interaction.

Berzins[3] suggests that "trust is created through the dual diplomatic pursuits of risk management (e.g., monitoring and securing individual state interests), and relationship management (e.g., promoting shared goals, institutions, and values)." He cites the German Sociologist Georg Simmel, who said that trust "permits the leap from uncertainty . . . to positive expectation. Rather than 'reasonable doubt,' trust involves giving another, 'the benefit of the doubt.'"[4]

Torsten Michel follows Simmel when he refers to uncertainty as the main need for trust in international relations. In his important paper,

> "Trust and International Relations," he says: "trust becomes possible (for sustained and peaceful interaction necessary) only when a situation arises, in which the intentions of others are unknown, and in which the consequences of their actions would produce harm. The situation of risk in which action and interaction occurs under conditions of limited information, is a basic condition of limited information, is a basic condition for trustful behavior to occur."[5]

Trust is really critical, but the real question is: Trust in what? In the intentions of the other side? In the capacity of the other side to deliver on its promises? In the reliability of the representatives of the other side in the negotiation? My main argument is that some aspects of trust may be dangerous, not when one side is naïve enough to fall into the trap of the other, but when reliance in one aspect of trust is wrongly attributed to other aspects. I will use here the case of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories in the Oslo Agreement of 1993.

When I initiated the Oslo backchannel process, my aim was to tackle, informally, the main impediments that both sides met in the formal negotiations, which took place in Washington. Eventually we solved those issues, but then the question came up of building in the settlements during the five-year period of the interim agreement.

The informal secret negotiation began on January 20, 1993. The small informal groups on both sides didn't need too many meetings in order to develop common trust. None of them had thought that the other would have horns. Both of them wanted very much to solve the problems that had blocked any serious development in the official talks in Washington, and both of them believed in the vital need for each of them to make peace and to live side by side with each other.

But once we succeeded in solving the secondary issues and agreed that all substantial issues would be solved in the context of the negotiations on the permanent agreements, the Palestinian side raised the issue of the continued settling of Israeli citizens in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the coming five years of the Interim Agreement.

The Palestinian negotiators in Norway raised that issue as a major one, and it was imperative for them that one of the principles in the Declaration of Principles would be a clear Israeli commitment to a full settlement freeze. We—the group in Oslo and myself—felt that the demand was more than fair, but that had not been the view of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Rabin led a very narrow coalition of 61 out of the 120 Knesset members. The support of the quite hawkish ultra-Orthodox Shas Party was badly needed for securing our majority. Despite its hawkishness, the Prime Minister succeeded to pass Cabinet decision No. 360 on November 22, 1992 to stop building in the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The resolution referred to buildings and housing units for which construction had been decided upon by previous governments. There were exceptions for constructions and infrastructures, which had not been financed by the government budget.

Rabin told us that, in his view, passing resolution 360 was revolutionary enough and especially important because it was not a result of any outside involvement, but of an Israeli independent and sovereign move. He added that if the freeze on settlements is the result of Palestinian pressure, it would be difficult for Shas to swallow it, and totally unneeded. He assured us that he did not have any intentions to build more settlements, and he expected the Palestinians to understand that, and not "to poke in his eye."

The message was delivered to the Palestinians, and that was very difficult for them to accept. They had been sure that for the new Israeli government, such an obvious Palestinian request would be very welcomed.

This raises the issue of trust. The problem wasn't the lack of trust between two enemies, and the need for a bridge over the abyss. During the long joint sessions, it was not too difficult to build trust between the parties. The point is that trust was not established between the two peoples but between the two negotiating teams.

Trust is not abstract, and cannot be general. It cannot be transferred from the personal feeling that the other side is not deceiving you, and is genuine in

its intentions, to the political unit, on the other hand, which should be responsible for the sustainable implementation of the agreement.

The Palestinian negotiators in Oslo were not happy with Rabin's reaction, but they understood the situation in which he found himself, and—eventually, agreed to a very indirect reference to the issue of building settlements during the interim period (namely, that during the interim period, no party would take steps that might have an impact on the permanent solution).

I must admit that at that moment it seemed to us to be an important achievement: we spared Rabin from a political crisis, we were sure that the Israeli government under him would not build settlements anyway, and we were glad to prove to ourselves and to a very small group of people who knew about the secret channel that there was real trust between the Palestinian group and ourselves.

But, eventually, this episode became the biggest mistake in the Oslo process. The price of trust was very high, and is still being paid. When Benjamin Netanyahu was elected as Prime Minister, a few months after Rabin's assassination, he proudly declared his intention to build many more housing units in the Occupied Territories. The Labor Party, now in opposition, criticized him for that and so did the Palestinian leadership, the Clinton Administration, and many others in the world. Netanyahu was not ready to renege on his decision, and said that despite his harsh criticism of the Oslo Agreement, he meant to implement it by the letter of the agreement, but he did not find any reference to a freeze on settlements. He was told that such a step would breach the spirit of Oslo, but he was not ready to obey spirits. Netanyahu abused the fact that the Oslo Accords did not mention settlements in order to build many more housing units in the Occupied Territories, which contributed significantly to the lull in the Israel-Palestinian negotiations.

The permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians should have been signed by May 4, 1999. Nothing happened on that day. There were no talks at all on the peace treaty, and the issue was hardly mentioned by the media. The corridor (the interim agreement) became the living room. The extremists on both sides succeeded to stalling the process. For the Israeli Right, it became a convenient arrangement: there was an international agreement, which would be replaced only by another agreement, even if it happens in the very far future; the donor countries cover the budget of the small Palestinian Authority, so that Israel occupies the territories for free, and it continues to build new housing units in the territories. This kind of a situation hurts both the Palestinians who feel betrayed and who are not allowed to get their independence, and those Israelis who understand that the only way to assure that Israel is a sustainable democratic state with a Jewish majority is to adopt the two-state solution (maybe through an Israeli-Palestinian confederation)—not for the Palestinians' sake, but for their own interests.

The trust that was achieved during the Oslo process proved to be costly. It should direct us toward a more accurate definition of trust in international relations.

The ecological fallacy refers to the wrong attempt to infer the behavior of a certain collective on all its individual members. In the case of trust, there is an attempt to infer the behavior of individuals (the leaders or the negotiators) on the states or the peoples that they represent.

It is crucial to trust that the other side has good intentions and doesn't intend to deceive you. It is even more crucial to believe that your interlocutors are able to convince their superiors to support the compromises that the negotiators have agreed upon—both during the talks, and in the eventual implementation phase. It is critical to ensure you trust that the agreement is clear enough and that the other side would implement it, despite changing situations, especially a situation of changing government shifts. Since it is hard to be certain, especially if the implementation is gradual, both sides should work on clarifying consequential steps that can be taken by one side, if the other side does not make good on its commitments. While it is important to create trust between the political parties, it is equally important to consider that the current administration, on the other side, might be replaced, and that trusting the current one, may not be enough.

It was a big mistake for the Israeli side in the Oslo process to convince the Palestinian side to just trust us and to replace their demand for a freeze on settlements by a vague commitment about acts that may have an effect on the permanent agreement. Had we agreed on such a freeze (which, in fact, was exactly our policy), I believe that we could have convinced the Shas Party to accept a settlement freeze as a vital component of the Oslo package, and save ourselves more than a quarter of a century of more and more housing units in the occupied territories.

That was—for both sides—the price of trust.

NOTES

1. Christopher Andrejs Berzins, *The Puzzle of Trust in International Relations* (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 2014), 129–130.
2. Diego Gambetta, *Mafia: The Price of Distrust* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 1–2.
3. Berzins, *The Puzzle of Trust*, op.cit.
4. Ibid.
5. Torsten Michel, "Trust and International Relations," *Oxford Bibliographies* (September 28, 2016). DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0192. Retrieved from https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0192.xml

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Section II

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY

Chapter 5

Israel's Democracy at a Turning Point

Naomi Chazan

The beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century marks the most critical moment for Israel's democracy since the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948. After over ten years of democratic erosion—significantly accelerated during the last few years—Israel's democratic form of government has been stripped of most of its liberal trappings. At the same time, the pushback against democratic slippage has broadened, emitting signs of possible democratic rejuvenation. The course of Israeli politics, and perhaps of Israel itself, will be determined by the outcome of the tug-of-war between these opposing forces.

This chapter addresses Israel's current democratic paradox. It looks at the country's political dynamics through a comparative lens, highlighting both the commonalities and differences of the Israeli experience in a democratic world now punctuated by a series of substantial regressions. Specifically, it examines the evolution of Israel's democratic order until the start of the present millennium, the nature of its democratic recession and the evolution of its process, underlying causes, and key results. On this basis, it delves into the reactions to these developments and their implications.

The main contention of this analysis is that the political crisis that came to a head in 2019 was a direct outcome of the interplay between Israel's recent systematic democratic decline and of simultaneously expanding (and decidedly democratically driven) efforts to prevent its total collapse. The critical crossroads in which Israel found itself at the beginning of 2020 were not just a consequence of democratic backsliding, but also a sign of democratic reawakening. The country's future trajectory depends on the way the struggle between these contending trends plays out at this vital tipping point in its democratic existence.

THE SPECIFICITY OF ISRAEL'S DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION

Israel's democratic development has followed a rather unique course. The creation of the Zionist movement in 1897 was accompanied by the establishment of representative institutions that gave voice to the various streams of Zionist thought—from socialist Zionism and its liberal-revisionist spinoffs to religious, cultural, and bourgeois variations. Under the British Mandate, autonomous institutions flourished with strong competitive, participatory, and representative dimensions—although democratic experiences and worldviews were still largely unformed.[1] The transition to formal statehood took place relatively smoothly despite the fact that it occurred in the midst of an armed conflict with Arab states that contested its formation.

In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that during its formative years Israel's democracy was more procedural than structural, characterized by strong political institutions and highly centralized government with few effective brakes on executive power. Thus, from the outset, there were constant tensions between democratic and anti-democratic propensities in the new state. First, the universalistic sources underlying the creation of the state vied with its particularistic, decidedly Jewish, roots. The country's Proclamation of Independence,[2] which underlines Israel's commitment to universal values of equality for all citizens, justice, freedom and peace, also highlights its specifically Jewish history and orientations. Second, the stress on the collective mission of the construction of a new political entity continues to clash with the desire to cultivate individual liberties. Third, the existence of a large, albeit depleted, Arab minority underlines the potential contradictions between the State and its citizens on the one hand and the Jewish character of the nation on the other. Finally, from the beginning there also developed an ongoing struggle between the ideological and emotional fervor driving the founders of the state and the pragmatic necessities critical for its survival. Put together, Israel's early political institutions were designed to contain these tensions through the entrenchment of a formal democracy mostly devoid initially—with the notable exception of portions of the revisionist movement—of strong liberal features.[3]

Indeed, Israel's liberal accoutrements were added on to its democratic framework relatively late, with the gradual introduction of social-democratic elements and, in the 1970s, with the injection of a new emphasis on individual civil liberties and group rights. This process of political liberalization (paralleling the opening of the marketplace) culminated in 1992 with the adoption of two basic laws governing human rights: "The Dignity of Human Beings and their Liberty" and "Freedom of Occupation." By then, the civic landscape, once almost bare, had become populated by a multiplicity of civil

society organizations; the independent media had begun to thrive and diverse voices were raised on a variety of topics and an atmosphere of open—often vehement—debate prevailed.[4]

Yet, even at its peak, Israel's liberalism differed from patterns visible elsewhere in at least four crucial respects. First, Israel has been in a continuous state of conflict with most of its Arab neighbors throughout its existence, raising security considerations to the top of the national agenda. Inevitably, in times of severe stress, security trumps individual rights and adversely affects civil liberties. This is particularly true since 1967, with the persistence of Israeli control over large segments of the Palestinian people against their will and in denial of their basic human rights, not to speak of political and civil rights.

Second, Israel's Arab citizens, one-fifth of its population, share their Palestinian identity with the residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip who, since 1967, have lived under Israeli control. This national minority has been subjected to systemic discrimination within Israel and, while it does possess political rights, has experienced persistent marginalization in Israeli society.[5] The resistance of the Jewish majority to the full integration of the Arab community has unquestionably tarnished Israel's proclaimed liberal credentials.

Third, Israel is the only country in the democratic world that does not place civil law unequivocally above religious dictates. The lack of separation of religion and state and the delegation of all matters of personal law to monopolistic political authorities puts Israeli democracy in a category of its own amongst democratic states.[6]

Finally, Israel's meteoric transition from an underdeveloped to a fully industrialized country boasting membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has come together with the growth of immense economic differentials that largely overlap national, ethnic, religious, geographic, and gender cleavages. Consequently, vast inequalities in access to and control over resources plague social relationships and affect political preferences.[7] These asymmetries have become particularly pronounced as time progressed.

The specificities of Israel's democratic evolution and these unique characteristics make it easier to understand why the country was among the first to exhibit signs of democratic recession in what, since the turn of the twenty-first century, has become a global process of democratic decline.[8] It may also help to explicate why the pushback against democratic slippage has begun to record some (still tentative) gains. Israel's recent record is therefore of broad comparative interest even though, ironically, it rarely receives the attention it is due in the bourgeoning literature on the latest wave of democratic decline.[9]

THE COMPONENTS OF ISRAEL'S DEMOCRATIC EROSION: THE WHAT

The backsliding of liberal democracies involves three analytically distinct components that together combine to create an encompassing syndrome of democratic recession: illiberalism, neo-authoritarianism, and populism. These frequently overlapping elements, most of which occur simultaneously, appear in different proportions and with diverging emphases in all cases of democratic slippage. In Israel, they have been in evidence for over a decade, accelerating tangibly after the 2015 elections that brought Binyamin Netanyahu to office for the fourth time (and for his third consecutive term in office). They appear in the Israeli public domain in fairly equal dosages, coming together to form a complex representation of democratic deterioration.

Illiberalism: The Curtailment of Democratic Rights

Democratic recession, almost by definition, involves chipping away at civil liberties and minority rights—the most salient signifiers of the liberal democratic ethos. For generations, the beginning of liberal democratic decline has been closely associated with the curtailment of political freedoms of both individuals and groups, since these directly address democratic rights. In Israel, as elsewhere, this process has been initiated by duly elected governments with the urging—and frequently the enthusiastic support—of parts of the electorate, associated civil society organizations, and like-minded media outlets. Its targets have always included Arab citizens of Israel as a collective progressive association mostly involved in human rights activities, always women and, with time, any group critical of the right-wing policies and mindset of the Likud-led governments.

The first signs of illiberalism appeared during the first decade of this century, with outright attacks on the Arab community in Israel (the questioning of their loyalty raised as an electoral issue by Avigdor Liberman in 2009 is a notable case in point). These have continued and grown in frequency as the stability of the right-wing coalitions began to wane on the eve of the 2020s and have been reinforced by a series of laws and policies designed to give preference to Jews over Arab citizens in land rights, infrastructure development, education, access to the labor market and, needless to say, incorporation into the official power structure. The culmination of this trend was the adoption of the "Basic Law: Israel the Nation-State of the Jewish People," which for all intents and purposes entrenched Jewish supremacy in the state.[10]

Some acts have also targeted Palestinians beyond the Green Line. The "Arrangements Law" of 2018, for example, allowed for the retroactive expropriation of Palestinian lands on which Jewish settlements were constructed.

Also included are a series of military orders restricting freedom of movement and freedom of association in the occupied territories. The ongoing struggle over Palestinian construction in what is known as area C is also an integral part of a process that has focused primarily, although hardly exclusively, on Jerusalem and its environs.

Perhaps subtler, albeit no less pernicious, has been a series of legislative instruments designed to limit progressive NGOs—and especially human rights organizations monitoring Israeli behavior in the occupied territories. These impose restrictions on freedom of speech ("The Boycott Law") and freedom of association (such as "The NGO Transparency Law" of 2011 and subsequent spinoffs; the "V-15 Law," and amendments to the State Education Law: Prevention of Activity).[11]

In addition, policies limiting subventions to cultural institutions and initiatives have been introduced, along with stipulations about state support for creative ventures critical of government policy. The Council for Higher Education attempted to impose a code of ethics on university lecturers, limiting their political expressions. The list of efforts to constrain dissent has expanded exponentially, although its effectiveness in muzzling criticism is open to debate. These directives have proven to be a powerful deterrent to civic freedoms, reinforcing the adverse effects of silence for democratic robustness. They have also fueled a growing backlash amongst targeted groups, most notably Palestinian citizens of Israel, progressive civil society, disempowered communities such as citizens of Ethiopian extraction, and women. Above all, they have contributed directly to the shaping of a climate of growing distrust and inter-group enmity.

Neo-Authoritarianism: The Undermining of Institutional Checks and Balances

Democratic recession also revolves around the purposeful weakening of liberal democratic structures and institutions—a particularly vital yet usually less noted aspect of the ebb and flow of democratic constructs. There are three elements to this interference in institutional arrangements: tampering with key democratic guardrails (such as constitutions and political parties), emasculating structural checks and balances (notably parliaments and the judiciary) and restraining democratic watchdogs (especially the media and civil society). The result of the purposeful reinforcement of the executive branch at the expense of representative institutions has been to shatter institutional checks and balances, reduce accountability, enhance the centralization of power, and promote its personalization.[12]

Most liberal democracies possess clearly defined parameters that define the boundaries of acceptable political behavior. The most obvious, in the vast

majority of these settings, are binding constitutions. Israel, however, while boasting basic laws with constitutional weight, neither has a constitution nor a tradition of constitutionalism.[13] Consequently, the rules governing the balance between Israel's formal political institutions, in particular the role of its judiciary, are still open to debate.

Another, more vibrant, guardrail of essential democratic structures is political parties, the prime vehicle for political representation and interaction. For several decades now, the country's multiparty system has become not only more fragmented than ever before, but also significantly bifurcated and substantially weaker.[14] As a result, with the possible exception of the Likud, the ultra-orthodox parties (UTJ and Shas) and the predominantly Arab-backed Hadash, the party scene has come to exhibit substantial volatility and instability. For some years, quite consistently, political parties have held the debatable record of being the least admired public institution in the country.[15] The result, needless to say, is that they no longer have the restraining power that they possessed during Israel's formative decades. Opposition parties have been consistently enfeebled and members of the hegemonic Likud have either been cowed or silenced into submission.

Inevitably, this internal and inter-party emasculation has had a direct effect on institutional safeguards. For several years, the opposition in Israel was studiously coopted or marginalized, with the ultimate result of reducing its electoral appeal and encouraging the formation of new—often ephemeral—alliances in order to challenge the decade-long hegemony of the Likud. The Blue and White party is just the latest—and perhaps the broadest—in a series of such formations. More to the point, the stifling of significant party competition has adversely affected the ability of the Knesset, Israel's parliament, to check executive abuses. Indeed, the legislature has not been able to exercise its oversight capacities and has, instead, deteriorated into an extended arm of the government.[16]

The same cannot be said of the judiciary, which despite successive efforts to clip its authority, has succeeded in maintaining its autonomy, if not the entire range of its heretofore unfettered activism.[17] The Israeli court system, and primarily the High Court of Justice, have been the object of increased governmental criticism for some of their decisions (and especially their overturning of certain laws passed by the Knesset), for their composition, and for their independence. The (to date failed) attempt to introduce an override clause exemplifies these efforts. As a result, the legitimacy of the judiciary—and not only its capacity—to stem government abuses has been called into question. In addition, the role of the courts in monitoring government behavior, although still in place, can no longer be taken for granted. The institutional checks and balances have been undermined, rendering executive license freer than ever before.

The accumulation of unchecked power in Israel has become particularly pronounced in light of ongoing efforts to discredit and disband the main institutional watchdogs. The independent media carries out critical tasks in liberal democracies: it mediates between the public and the political sphere, it critiques the actions of the political elites, it assists in shaping the public agenda, it helps mold popular discourse, and it plays a role in shaping opinions. The freedom of the press and of the information it provides, along with its ongoing supervision of those in power, are protected by independent news outlets.[18] The opening of what was originally a party-controlled sphere to greater competition in the 1990s was accompanied by a commercialization that affected the quality and priorities of many new media outlets. Nevertheless, for some time, this diversification flourished. But, for several years now, under successive Likud-led administrations, efforts have been made to both control key media tools and to chip away at those critical of the government. As the second decade of the twenty-first century came to a close, direct attacks on the press from the uppermost echelons of the government became a matter of course. The struggle over control of the media eventually became the linchpin of charges not only of fraud and corruption, but also of bribery against the Prime Minister himself. Under these conditions, it became increasingly difficult for the media to fulfill its watchdog role.

The fate of pluralistic civil society organizations, the mainstay of societal oversight over the public domain, has not been dissimilar. An orchestrated campaign against progressive civil society organizations with the intention of discrediting, de-funding, and de-legitimizing them has been accompanied by the cultivation of competing civil society groups supportive of the government and its policies.[19] The purposeful wedge struck within civil society has had an adverse impact on its capacity to successfully challenge government actions, let alone hold abusive trends in check. These divisions in civil society have contributed considerably to the growth of social intolerance. Tellingly, they have extended political conflicts to the societal level, thus widening and deepening existing schisms.

The attempted manipulation of the media and civil society has weakened their supervisory capacities, even if the government has not succeeded in gaining control over these structures. With these monitors significantly undermined, along with representative and balancing institutions as well as structural gatekeepers, it is hardly surprising that Israel has witnessed the increased concentration of power in the hands of the executive, and especially in those of Binyamin Netanyahu. This process is a prescription for lack of transparency, poor mechanisms of accountability, and, increasingly, corruption in high places. The gradual restructuring of the balance of power in Israel has facilitated the creeping autocratization, as well as the distinct

personalization, of its institutional framework—a vital component of the process of de-democratization.

Populism: The Unraveling of Democratic Norms

The third component of democratic recession, as its name implies, in contrast to illiberalism and neo-authoritarianism, has a very strong popular foundation. Populism may spring from below, but it is an effective tool only when manipulated either by pretenders to power or its occupants as a means to achieving or maintaining political control. Populists pose a concerted challenge to governing elites and the norms they uphold by questioning the values of tolerance, pluralism, and forbearance that underpin liberal democracies.[20] Populism, therefore, breeds on emotions but is sustained by a very clear rational political logic.

Populism in Israel, as elsewhere, breeds on economic inequality and is reinforced by cultural, religious, social, and historical roots specific to particular societies. These may be intensified at specific junctures by political exigencies such as economic crises, demographic shifts or security threats, which encourage a redefinition of the "people" and the norms they represent.[21] Israeli populists, therefore, distinguish between those who subscribe to a particularistic, Jewish, ethnocentric, and hence exclusive view of the state and those who prefer a pluralistic, embracing, and civic interpretation of its nature and its contours. They have, therefore, preyed on existing social divisions and systematically broadened them to suit their needs—often at the expense of sacrificing unifying values (Netanyahu's pandering to other populist leaders with questionable records on anti-Semitism such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Donald J. Trump in the United States deserves mention in this regard).

The latter Netanyahu period has provided a textbook lesson in the purposeful cultivation of populist sentiments. Concern over the growth of political rivals impelled him, first, to come out openly against the Arab citizens of Israel, ultimately calling their leaders "enemies of the state" and even "terrorists." At the same time, he studiously quelled divergent voices within his own party by effectively ridding it of its avowedly liberal members (Michael Eytan, Dan Meridor, and then Benny Begin). During his fourth term in office he went much farther: he deepened his assault on progressive political groups on the left, expanding it to incorporate anyone who did not agree with his policies—especially on the future of the West Bank. These he dubbed "leftists," appending to them characteristics of disloyalty, lack of patriotism, and unreliability, thus skillfully transforming them into a unique social category. By 2018, according to the Israel Democracy Index, this had become the most salient cleavage in the country, even outdistancing the

Arab-Jewish divide, not to speak of constantly widening ethnic, religious, and class divisions.[22]

The mobilization of more traditional, Mizrahi, and poorer socioeconomic groups residing in the periphery was then accompanied by the crafting of what has turned into an all-out assault on the values of equality and justice embedded in Israel's foundational documents. Women of all backgrounds have been the most visible victims of this process.[23] After the presentation of the initial indictments against the Prime Minister, it also assumed a more pointed anti-institutional tone, lashing out against the media and the judiciary and then specifically against law enforcement agencies—especially the police and the office of the Attorney-General. In the process, further doubts were cast on the viability of these authorities and the norms they seek to uphold.

Populism is an extraordinarily forceful weapon against liberalism and the pluralism that lies at its base. It has been maneuvered in Israel and in other countries to prevent the building of bridges across social and political divides. In effect, it creates and breeds on polarization. In Israel, the process it has set in motion has depleted that solidarity that has kept the diverse segments of the country together despite these cleavages. The result has been the brazen entrenchment of a majoritarian worldview devoid of liberal norms of mutual tolerance and compromise.

The backsliding of Israel's democracy via the tripartite introduction of illiberalism, neo-authoritarianism, and populism has struck at the core of the basic liberal mindset: its insistence on the protection of individual and groups against the state and the majorities that control it at any given time. Official disregard of these principles has made it easier to tighten the incumbent coalition's grip on power but has not always cemented its political control. From this perspective, the relatively prolonged and elaborate tale of Israel's democratic decline has also underlined its substantive and operational limitations.

THE PROCESS OF ISRAEL'S DEMOCRATIC EROSION: THE HOW

The dynamics of Israel's liberal-democratic decline—the manner in which its democratic recession has occurred—is closely associated with its contents. This process—as in other similar instances in the democratic world—has been first and foremost political in nature, even as it has instigated broad shifts and wrought significant changes at the societal level. Democratic erosion is carried out from the top-down, although it capitalizes on bottom-up currents and sentiments and skillfully manipulates them to serve those in power. Its success depends on its capacity to transform the rhythm of

democratic politics from competition involving disagreements to open confrontation between opposing worldviews.[24]

As in many other countries in recent years, this transition began in Israel several decades ago with the weakening of overarching ("big-tent") parties incorporating a range of views into narrower bodies that came to closely mirror overlapping social divisions. The Israeli process was expedited by the multiplication of sectarian parties—perhaps the most problematic byproduct of the failed experiment in the direct election of the prime minister. At the beginning of this century what were once fairly large parties (Labor and the Likud) had visibly shrunk and new contenders emerged to fill the political vacuum they left behind. Ironically, both in the case of Ariel Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert, the initiative came from within the then ruling party; Labor breakaways and mergers also followed a similar pattern, although these never coalesced into a ruling electoral alliance. By the time of the return of Binyamin Netanyahu to the Prime Minister's office in 2009, a firm correlation had been established between political orientations, reinforcing socioeconomic characteristics and control of state power.

During the course of the subsequent decade, this linkage was systematically cemented through the masterful employment of a diverse political toolbox. The initial instruments utilized were remarkably standard for a leading party in the coalition: the skillful use of a mixture of legislation, government policy, and official rhetoric. This apparent conventionality obscured the purposes for which these tools were employed: targeting potential pockets of opposition, unhinging institutional constraints on those in power, and mobilizing popular support at the expense of minority groups and ideas. But, since key legislative and policy measures were usually introduced subtly—purposely allowing amendments to attenuate initially even more problematic bills (from the original version of the "NGO Transparency Law" to the first draft of the "Basic Law: Israel: The Nation-State of the Jewish People")—they were adopted with barely token resistance. Only after the 2015 elections, when the legal groundwork for de-democratization had already been laid down, did efforts to prevent these moves increase. By then it was rather late to stem the tide.

The gradual injection of illiberal measures was greatly enhanced by the creative manipulation of public discourse mostly—although not exclusively—by the highly articulate and charismatic Netanyahu. The Likud leader, almost from the beginning, used his oratorical powers not only to expand his support base, but also to deride his opponents. The whispering into the ear of a major kabbalist that "The left has forgotten what it is to be Jewish" is but one example of such linguistic acrobatics that quickly became leading slogans in the battle between right-wing ultra-nationalists and their critics in the center and the left.

The slide away from liberal democracy has also involved the use of other, much more hardball, tactics. These have included not only increasingly vicious verbal attacks on political opponents, but also the studious cultivation of differences between the various groups and perspectives that make up the heterogeneous Israeli mosaic. By the end of what has been dubbed the Netanyahu decade, a new language of anti-Arab enmity and particularly acerbic harangues against the political left had been coined and legitimized, greatly contributing to the perpetuation of societal polarization, which undoubtedly served the immediate interests of the parties in power and of the person who stood at their helm.

Another means to promote (and then prolong) the Likud's hegemony has entailed the systematic takeover of the state apparatus.[25] The replacement of the "old elites" has been implemented through the wholesale dispensation of bureaucratic jobs to administration loyalists (including during the caretaker period in 2019), while constantly rotating ministerial appointments to outspoken sycophants at will. It has also politicized key positions in the civil service (the legal advisors of government ministries, for one) as part of stepped-up efforts to undercut the institutional checks and balances in the system and to tamper, not always successfully, with the constitutional foundations of the state.

In addition, state patronage has been dispersed, when needed, to allies and to possible weak links in the coalition. The ultra-orthodox parties have demanded—and exacted—a hefty price in allocations, positions, and government directives for their continued loyalty. Less reliable partners (Avigdor Liberman's Israel Beytenu, Naftali Bennett, and Ayelet Shaked's HaBayit HaYehudi) requested and received enormous compensation packages in return for their support. The patronage system, building on the control of state budgets and agencies, combined to consolidate a tightly knit power apparatus under the Prime Minister's control with long tentacles into the most remote corners of the public domain.

The use of legal as well as questionable tactics developed slowly, but gathered steam as the threats to the Netanyahu-led government increased with the opening of criminal probes against the Prime Minister and some key ministers. Beginning in 2017, what had commenced as a democratic downslide turned into a free-fall. The use of dirty tricks and shady tactics accelerated noticeably. These have seen the increased use of official resources to aggrandize the leader in snap trips for photo-ops with world leaders at state expense, the mobilization of formal media outlets to cover patently partisan speeches, the issuing of misinformation bordering on outright lies to curtail dissent, and the resort to social media almost on a daily basis to control the public agenda. By this stage, it was well-nigh impossible to separate the objective of liberal democratic curtailment from the means employed to bring it about.

The process of democratic recession in Israel possesses several notable features. First, it has been propelled by a zero-sum view of politics in which the winner takes all, and those excluded are virtually exorcised from the public domain. Second, it is entirely partisan: appeals to the common interest are glaringly absent. Third, as a consequence, it has openly sought to kowtow to the specific political predilections and demands of government supporters at the expense of those of other groups. Fourth, it has frequently and not coincidentally conflated the interests of the ruling coalition with the personal agenda of its leader. Fifth, it is unabashedly designed to gain and maintain power. Sixth, it confuses ends and means in an initially incremental, often imperceptible, sometimes clandestine, process designed to numb the public until it is too late. And finally, it scrupulously proclaims its democratic credentials and highlights its adherence to legalities whilst persistently undermining their inherent meaning.

The result in Israel, as in many other countries that have undergone a process of democratic decline, is the survival of electoral competition and procedural democracy without any of its obvious human liberties or institutional protections. This process not only capitalizes on social cleavages, but also purposefully widens them to create a sociologically and ideologically bifurcated public domain with paralyzing consequences for political stability and governability. And, as the Israeli case exemplifies, this dynamic is sustainable as long as the incumbents can continue to deliver on the ideological, cultural, emotional, and material demands of their backers. The process of democratic recession thus feeds its retrogressive goals.

THE EXPLANATIONS FOR ISRAEL'S DEMOCRATIC EROSION: THE WHY

The growing literature on the current phase of global democratic recession distinguishes between background factors and specific causes for the decline of liberal democracy. In broad strokes, there is an ongoing discussion between interpretations based on economic factors and the distortions of globalization, on social and historical arguments rooted in discrete national contexts, on external reasons related to international involvement (or interference), and on institutional factors related to democratic consolidation and de-consolidation.[26] Each one of these approaches is helpful, up to a point, in accounting for individual instances of democratic erosion, although a close analysis of particular case studies—including that of Israel—requires a multivariate analysis that incorporates a combination of elements drawn from these various schools.[27]

What is equally evident is that none of these explanations—separately or in various combinations—holds true unless activated by political actors working from positions of power or by social forces aspiring to achieve a hold on the state and its resources. Thus, a multi-directional grasp of these power-related elements is vital to understanding how various economic inequalities (instigated by the deepening of the byproducts of neo-liberalism), consequent social inequities, anti-elite sentiments (couched either in class or particular historical-cultural terms), or external grievances are marshaled to support activities that whittle away at the liberal underpinnings of substantive democracies. These political reasons are essential to unpacking the intricacies of both the content and the process of democratic deterioration in the Israeli case.

The basic political argument goes as follows: there is a symbiotic relationship between polarized societies and political aspirants with a well-defined hegemonic project with authoritarian propensities. Since stripping regimes of their liberal characteristics requires popular support (first at the ballot box and then in the continuous maintenance of allied policies), it follows that potential autocrats offer their backers certain favors (these may be of a material, a social, a psychological, or an ideological sort) at the expense of democratic principles.[28] Polarization thus trumps civic virtue, backed by a very rational logic of its own.

This kind of thinking underpins many recent events in Israel. It assists in explaining the development of a climate favorable to democratic backtracking parlayed by right-wing forces at the official and unofficial levels. It helps to understand the continuous electoral support for the Likud and its nationalist-religious coalition in recent years, even when its policies do not necessarily favor large segments of its support base. Moreover, it supplies a clear rationale for the ongoing devotion to Binyamin Netanyahu in large portions of Israeli society.[29]

A political-ideological variant of this explanation underlines not only the strength of the hegemonic-seeking coalition between Israel's nationalist leadership and like-minded constituencies at the expense of other groups and political persuasions, but also the constant conflation of means and ends. In this version, the slide toward a formal democracy verging on authoritarianism is not an objective in its own right, but a critical tool in fulfilling the political project of establishing full Israeli control over the West Bank.[30] Netanyahu has played a critical role in this process, but this strategic enterprise extends well beyond any individual leader to encompass the entire right of the Israeli map. In this version, silencing dissenting voices, ostracizing Arab citizens from participation in decision-making, denigrating liberal ideas, and recasting Israeli identity in ethno-nationalist terms are necessary for preventing the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel and enabling the entrenchment

of Israeli control over the entire area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.

Each aspect of the process of democratic erosion has hence been carefully crafted to promote this broader goal, including direct and indirect annexationist laws (such as the "Nation-State" bill, the "Arrangements Law," and most recently, the ex post facto legalization of heretofore unauthorized settlements) along with the pursuit of policies designed to increase the Jewish presence throughout the area, including settlement and infrastructure expansion. The need to mobilize international support for these moves has cemented an alliance with other avowedly illiberal countries, including, but hardly limited, to Brazil, the Philippines, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, India, and, of course, the Trump Administration in the United States. This gives further credence not only to the additional violation of civil rights and the weakening of institutional safeguards, but also to the moves that advance the remolding of the country in the spirit of the expansionist vision (the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital solely of Israel, the annexation of the Golan Heights, the proposed annexation of the Jordan Valley, and the justification of settlements in defiance of international law). All these moves have been facilitated not only by the rightward turn of the Israeli electorate during the past decade (fueled by the demise of the Oslo process and the loss of hope in achieving a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians), but by ongoing security concerns as well. Because support for an expanded Israel has garnered considerable electoral backing, it has been able to sustain a democratic aura even when it blatantly abuses democratic norms.

This intriguing explanation weds the process of democratic erosion to specific political goals. Its key weakness lies in the intimation that a shift in policy direction might also lead to a rollback of democratic abuses. A third, statist, approach, cast in the same overall framework that brings together societal concerns and leadership pretensions avoids this pitfall. Drawing on state-centered theories, this variant suggests that polarization—one of the main features of democratic recession—enables the takeover of the state by partisan groups, thus reducing the relative autonomy of the state from society and undermining the pursuit of a common, overarching, good. In this version, social and political bifurcation undermines state capacities, enabling democratic slippage that, in turn, substantially reduces its ability to govern equitably.[31] By linking democratic openness to state robustness, this approach suggests that the divestment of Israel's liberalism might be leading to the substantial weakening of the state itself. This could explain, when taken in conjunction with the two other variants of the explanatory framework rooted in the dynamics that develop around attempts to nurture a specific political hegemonic project, both the growing disregard for the rules of the game in expanding parts of Israeli society and the dramatic increase in violence at all levels. The explanatory utility of this set of reasons, however, still needs to

be refined so that it focuses as much on the causes for democratic backsliding as on its consequences.

Common to all these politically rooted explanations, beyond the merger of top-down and bottom-up perspectives, is their emphasis on the close connection between the decline of substantive democracy and the pursuit of radical aims. Taken together, these reasons do offer compelling insights into how alternative socioeconomic, historical-cultural, and external visions are mustered to undermine democratic life and to alter its guiding values. They elaborate on the rhythm, process, and pace of democratic decline in Israel and in other states undergoing parallel, albeit hardly identical, political experiences. They also provide a glimpse of things to come, even if they diverge on the attributes of democratic recession, on its contemporary scope, on its byproducts, and on its consequences. As such, they help point to vital factors that must be addressed if the trajectory of democratic slippage is going to be effectively addressed.

ISRAEL'S DEMOCRATIC PUSHBACK

The purposeful deterioration of democracy in Israel has not gone unanswered. The first signs of democratic slippage were immediately met by pockets of resistance. Initially, these were limited to small circles in progressive civil society and to political parties associated with the Israeli left. During the Netanyahu decade, however, opposition expanded and began to coalesce at both the societal level and in the formal political domain, peaking with—but hardly resolved by—the political crisis of 2019–2020.

The backbone of the democratic pushback has been located in well-defined segments of civil society: civil rights and human rights organizations, a multiplicity of social justice groups, academic networks, cultural associations, and (admittedly dwindling) peace movements. The social protest of 2011, which mobilized hundreds of thousands to argue against the rising cost of living, added heretofore quiescent sectors and expanded the scope of civil activism. Democratically oriented social networks expanded in response to the growth of the ultra-nationalist blogosphere.[32] As time progressed, these efforts not only expanded, but came to focus more squarely on issues related to the country's democratic contraction as well.[33]

The reengagement of multiple groups in a variety of grassroots, associational, and intellectual responses to the assault on democratic spaces has been marked by its diversity. In most instances, initiatives have centered on specific issues, such as the occupation, social policy, geographic marginality, religious pluralism, Palestinian-Israeli society, minority rights, and shared society, which resulted in many particular actions lacking an overall adhesive. Indeed, energies have been devoted primarily to preventing further

deterioration rather than to offering a well-thought out and attractive alternative. Such an undertaking requires a much deeper reconceptualization of the nature of the Israeli state, along with its binding norms, its social identity, and its common aspirations. Although some preliminary efforts in this direction have been launched, these are still in their infancy.[34]

The official political arena was much slower to react to the anti-democratic challenge. The contraction of the parties associated with the traditional left, especially Labor and Meretz, came together with the blurring of their ideological positions on external as well as domestic matters. At first only a smattering of voices in the public sphere came out against the initial signs of democratic slippage. By mid-decade, some reservations were also voiced from within the Likud itself—although most of these liberal voices in the tradition of Ze'ev Jabotinsky are no longer heard within the ruling party. These have gravitated to a series of centrist parties that have now coalesced around the Blue and White agglomeration that speaks to democratic principles, but still lacks a clear counter-vision of Israel, which can contend with the hegemonic ethnocentric nationalism of the ruling coalition that governed during the second decade of this century. In the Arab community, the 2015 decision of all parties to run together under the banner of the Joint Arab list, revived again in September 2019, also followed a like pattern of coming together in a broader coalition designed to enhance electoral potential. The common thread in these realignments has been to stem the growing populist tide.

Nonelected institutions have also played an increasingly dominant role in the democratic response to regressive currents. Key among these structures has been the judiciary, which despite growing attacks on its independence, has nevertheless upheld many individual liberties. It has also solidly backed the ability of particular parties, especially Balad, to contest elections despite multiple attempts to curtail this right. In addition, until 2019, the office of the Comptroller-General continued to systematically oversee government actions and even to instigate criminal investigations of the executive branch.

The combination of party reorganization, continued vigilance of nonelected institutions, and civil society activism has in Israel—as in other historical and comparative cases—succeeded in somewhat mitigating the assault on substantive democracy in the country.[35] It has not, to date, come together into a forceful, value-driven, movement. There has been very little linkage between activities on the two parallel levels of civil society and the formal arena, although civil action contributed markedly to the electoral mobilization of what has loosely been described as the democratic camp in Israel. In the absence of an overall strategy that considers the enormity of the normative and institutional changes that have occurred at the height of the assault on Israel's democratic foundations, the full potential of these various currents has yet to be realized.

As the first full decade of democratic erosion ended, it became evident that the pushback within Israel went well beyond its limited boundaries, extending to the global Jewish community that has been confronting a set of not dissimilar issues. The close connection between progressive worldviews and Jewish identity in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and large parts of Europe has transformed the relationship between Israel and many Jews abroad, adding to the spillover effects of Israel's democratic decline.[36] This growing bifurcation followed that apparent within Israel, where at this juncture the country was almost evenly divided on every major issue, including the state of its democracy (41 percent of Israeli Jews viewed the democratic condition of the country either very good or good; an identical percentage deemed it bad or very bad).[37] The political stalemate emanating from the social divide meant that no side could lay claim to power preeminence.

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

Israel's democracy at the beginning of 2020 had reached a boiling point. The announcement of a third set of general elections in less than a year, scheduled for March 2, 2020, was symptomatic of the deepest political crisis Israel has experienced since independence. The ongoing gridlock, governmental paralysis, and growing instability, although usually attributed to vehement disagreements over the policies, comportment, and leadership style of the longest serving prime minister in the country's history, Binyamin Netanyahu, were—consciously or not—all about what is left of Israel's democracy after ten years of systematic erosion, manipulation, and distortion.[38]

The starting point for alternative interpretations of this critical conjuncture in Israel's democratic fortunes is remarkably similar. The Netanyahu decade has, under a carefully nurtured formally democratic guise, overseen the chipping away of Israel's liberal trappings, leaving its citizens with a competitive electoral system without much of its pluralistic and moderating contents. Civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, association, and protest, have been selectively undermined, as have the rights of key minorities, especially Israel's Arab citizens. The scaffold of institutional checks and balances designed to prevent executive abuses of power has been shaken to its foundations, enabling the autocratic concentration of power in the hands of a select few who have wielded their authority unchecked during a period of growing governmental uncertainty. Representative institutions have been enfeebled, while the media, the judiciary, and civil society—the watchdogs of democratic life—have been relentlessly assaulted. Tellingly, the foundational norms enshrined in Israel's Declaration of Independence have been upended by the purposeful promotion of a populism built on an ultra-nationalist and

ethnocentric definition of Israel's identity, which has excluded both non-Jews and critics of the Netanyahu government.

The result has been an accelerated pattern of democratic recession marked by a yawning societal polarization and the unraveling of overarching norms of social solidarity. Israel on the eve of the third decade of the present century is in the midst of a downward majoritarian maelstrom that leaves limited room for constructive inclusion. Its process of democratic recession has yielded both growing social enmity and debilitating political deadlock. This condition, however, is not immutable. In such an unstable situation, three, quite different, trajectories are possible.[39]

The first option is that the populist-authoritarianism of the past decade becomes entrenched, as has been the case in Argentina and Greece. Just as Peronism has outlived Peron and populism has resurfaced in Greece in different guises (most recently in the form of Alexis Tsipras' SYRIZA), it is unlikely that the political demise of Binyamin Netanyahu alone will be able to uproot the seeds of "Bibism" that have been sown during his tenure. The growing centrality of cultural and redefined national identity, coupled with ongoing security threats and creeping economic uncertainty, may conceivably militate in this direction should another charismatic leader emerge to take Netanyahu's place.

A second alternative is far more disconcerting. For many Israeli citizens—as well as observers and analysts—another iteration of elections after two failed attempts at forming a coalition should be viewed as but an additional step in the steady collapse of Israel's already fast-deteriorating democracy. Israelis are already in a state of extreme electoral fatigue. Their faith in the ballot box has been severely challenged. They have lost confidence in political institutions and in their capacity to make a difference. Their trust in elected officials has waned as they have seen critical policy issues neglected—not least a working budget that can address vital domestic matters or a genuine initiative to reach an accord with its neighbors—while politicians have been preoccupied with their personal fortunes. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that the legitimacy of the system is being questioned.

Under these circumstances, it is argued, the March 2020 plebiscite is the preamble to Israel's complete democratic decline. Should Netanyahu survive the elections and gain immunity from prosecution—a request he claimed to be "a cornerstone of democracy"—then it is reasonable to assume that the downward slide of Israel toward a full autocracy unadorned by democratic accoutrements will continue apace. This process would parallel similar developments in Viktor Orbán's Hungary, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Turkey, and even Venezuela under Hugo Chávez.

A third, diametrically opposite, possibility does exist. In this view, the political crisis of the turn of the decade may be a sign of democratic revival.

From this vantage point, the events of 2019 signified the beginning of a veritable democratic pushback. In April, the right-religious bloc headed by Mr. Netanyahu garnered sixty seats but failed to form a coalition. In September, the Prime Minister's bloc only mustered fifty-five seats. At the same time, the Blue-White alliance—hastily pasted together a year earlier—outpolled the Likud and its allies; the bloc it led reached an impressive fifty-seven seats. These shifts, proponents of this approach insist, point to a decided change in the downward spiral that had become the hallmark of the preceding decade. Instability in the form of a return to the ballot box should therefore be seen not as a mark of further democratic weakness, but as a necessary crisis caused by a widespread democratic reawakening that may pave the way to the creation of a new, redefined, and socially relevant Israeli liberalism.

This approach, drawing on a growing literature on the weakness of new democratically elected autocratic regimes, suggests that democratic decline is far from a one-way street.[40] Indeed, economic uncertainty coupled with ongoing difficulties emanating from the waning charisma of the autocratic leader, a penchant for official corruption, and the mitigation of external threats may together lead to a crisis of legitimacy; autocrats resort to the use of more repressive measures and simultaneously undermine the very popular logic that brought them to power. Recourse to insecurity—military, economic, cultural, and communal—can only fortify autocracies as long as they maintain some modicum of equality; if they, like their liberal precursors, sustain inequities, they become vulnerable to a widening, democratically induced backlash.[41]

This interpretation is supported by the growing use of strong-arm measures by Netanyahu and his cohorts, as well as the consolidation, despite considerable internal differences, of a broad democratic front that has stood solidly together not only in the demand for Netanyahu's ouster, but also in the common call for a liberal, open democracy in the face of growing autocratization. It is also bolstered by the upswing in political participation, especially in the Arab community and in the large urban areas supportive of center-left positions.

Tellingly, in the immediate future, this version of the state of Israeli politics today revolves, like its contrasting alternatives, heavily around election results and how these may affect the political fortunes of Binyamin Netanyahu. But, in the longer term, any democratic turnaround depends on the ability of any new government to set a civic-based vision for the country, lay down a detailed pluralistic agenda, and determinedly pursue the task of building a shared society crucial for democratic reinvigoration. This requires greater sensitivity to multiple concerns and needs across Israel's complex social mosaic, as well as a rededication to the cultivation of a tolerant, civic, and inclusive political culture.[42] After a decade and more of systematic

democratic erosion, this poses multiple challenges to Israel in the years ahead. Israel—and not only its democratic character—is consequently at the most significant crossroads in its brief history.

NOTES

1. Itzhak Galnoor and Dana Blander, *The Handbook of Israel's Political System* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3–34.

2. https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm.

3. For one analysis of this issue, see David N. Myers, "Israel's Very Own 'Illiberal Democracy'," *The Tel Aviv Review of Books*, Winter 2020, https://www.tarb.co.il/ilsrals-very-illiberal-democracy/?fbclid=lwAR31JTWlzN.

4. For excellent recent assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of Israel's democracy, see Alan Dowty, "Democracy in Israel," in *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, ed. Reuven Y. Hazan, Alan Dowty, Menachem Hofnung, and Gideon Rahat (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675585; Binyamin Neuberger, "Democratic and Anti-Democratic Roots of the Israeli Political System," *Israel Studies Review* 34, No. 2 (2019): 55–74; and Yitzhak Galnoor, "Israel's Democracy Under Stress," in *Understanding Israel: Political, Societal and Security Challenges*, ed. Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (London: Routledge, 2019), 29–45.

5. See Sammy Smooha, "The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, No. 4 (2002), 475–503. For one excellent analysis, see Amal Jamal, "Emerging Elites and New Political Elites Amongst Palestinians in Israel," in Peters and Geist, *Understanding Israel*, 149–66.

6. Guy Ben-Porat, "Religion in Israeli Politics," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

7. Ronen Mandelkern and Michael Shalev, "The Political Economy of Israel's Neoliberalism," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885. Also see: Uri Ram, "Sociopolitical Cleavages in Israel," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

8. Larry Diamond, "Facing Up to Democratic Recession," *Journal of Democracy* 26, 1 (January 2015): 141–155.

9. See, for example: Yascha Mounk, *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); David Runciman, *How Democracy Ends* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019); and Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom* (New York, NY: Tom Duggan Books, 2019). It is intriguing that Israel is passed over in this literature, although its democratic deterioration has been amply documented.

10. *Basic Law: Israel the Nation-State of the Jewish People*, https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf.

11. For a complete list see Association for Civil Rights in Israel, *Knesset Roundup*, https://www.english.acri.org.il/in-the-knesset.

12. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York, NY: Random House, 2018), 72–117.

13. Gregory Mahler, "The 'Constitutional' System of Israel," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

14. Reuven Y. Hazan, "Parties and the Party System in Israel," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885; Galnoor and Blander, *The Handbook of Israel's Political System*, 315–351.

15. Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, Ella Heller, and Fadi Omar, *The Israeli Democracy Index 2018* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2018), 100.

16. Naomi Chazan, "The Knesset," *Israel Affairs* 11, No. 2 (2005): 392–416. Also see Chen Friedberg and Reuven Y. Hazan, "The Legislative Branch in Israel," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

17. Menachem Hofnung and Mohammed S. Wattad, "The Judicial Branch in Israel," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

18. This discussion is based on Galnoor and Blander, *The Handbook of Israel's Political System*, 477–530.

19. Naomi Chazan, "Democratic Recession and the Changing Contours of Israeli Civil Society," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 18, Nos. 2/3 (2012): 9–16; Yael Yishai, "Civil Society and Israeli Democracy," in Hazan et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society*, https://www,oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675585.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190675885.

20. Levitsky and Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*, 118–75 lay out these elements in detail.

21. For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon, see William Galston, "The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 29, No. 2 (2018): 5–19.

22. Hermann, *The Israeli Democracy Index 2018*, 136–147. Also see "Israel Profile," *Freedom in the World 2018*, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/israel.

23. Naomi Chazan, "Israel at 70: The Gender Perspective," *Israel Studies Review* 23, No. 3 (Fall 2018): 141–151.

24. Levitsky and Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*, 147.

25. For a general discussion of this technique, see Takis S. Pappas, "Populists in Power," *Journal of Democracy* 30, No. 2 (April 2019): 70–84.

26. This is not the place for an extensive review of these different approaches. For examples of the debate, see Robert Foa and Yascha Mounk, *Democratic*

Deconsolidation in Developed Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies, Open Forum Series, 2018–2019); "A Discussion of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt's, *How Democracies Die*," *Perspectives on Politics* 16, No. 4 (December 2019): 1092–1194; Thomas Carothers, *International Democracy Support: Filling the Leadership Vacuum* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/18/international-democracy-support-filling-leadership-vacuum-pub-79522.

27. For one example of such an analysis see Avraham Diskin, Hanna Diskin, and Reuven Y. Hazan, "Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success," *International Political Science Review* 26, No. 3 (2005): 201–309.

28. Milan Svolik, "Polarization versus Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 30, No. 3 (July 2019): 20–32.

29. For a very systematic analysis of this approach in the Israeli context, see Dani Filc, "Towards a Left Hegemonic Struggle in Israel," *Hazman Hazeh* (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, December 2019), https://hazmanhazeh.org.il/hegemonicproject, Retrieved December 18, 2019.

30. Dahlia Scheindlin, "The Logic Behind Israel's Democratic Erosion," *TCF World* (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, May 29, 2019).

31. Some of these ideas were raised in Naomi Chazan, "Israel and the World: The Democracy Factor," in *Israel in the World: Legitimacy and Exceptionalism*, ed. Emanuel Adler (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 73–96.

32. The full scope of these activities requires a separate article. Only a brief mention of some key directions is discussed here. For a good analysis, see Yishai, "Civil Society and Israeli Democracy."

33. See, for example, the very different work of organizations like the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the New Israel Fund's New Initiatives for Democracy (NIFD), the Israel Democracy Institute, and grassroots movements such as Standing Together.

34. See the work of several recently established progressive think-tanks such as Idea, Molad, and the reinvigorated Berl Katznelson Foundation.

35. Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq, "Democracies Near Misses," *Journal of Democracy* 29, No. 4 (October 2018): 16–30, highlights the significance of these forces in preventing authoritarian takeovers in several historical and contemporary examples.

36. A key intellectual voice in this discussion is Peter Beinart. See his *The Crisis of Zionism* (New York, NY: Times Books, 2012) for the beginning of the current debate.

37. Hermann, *Israeli Democracy Index, 2018*, 67–69. In a later poll, conducted in October 2019, a majority claimed that Israel's democracy is in danger; only 32 percent of those surveyed were optimistic about Israel's democratic future. See Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, *The Israeli Vote Index* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, December 2, 2019), https://www.idi.org.il/articles/28979?ct=t(EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_12_3_2019_8_18).

38. The following section draws on Naomi Chazan, "Round Three: Democratic Death Knell or Turnaround?" *The Times of Israel*, December 16, 2019, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/round-3-democratic-death-knell-or-turnaround/.

39. This analysis follows on Pappas, "Populists in Power," 74–82.

40. Yascha Mounk, "The Dictators' Last Stand: Why the New Autocrats are Weaker Than They Look," *Foreign Affairs* 98 (October 2019): 138–148.

41. Ronald Inglehart, "The Age of Insecurity: Can Democracy Save Itself," *Foreign Affairs* 97 (2018): 20–28. Also see Thomas Carothers, "The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 29, No. 4 (October 2018): 129–135.

42. Galnoor and Blander, *The Handbook of Israel's Political System*, 860.

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Chapter 6

Majority-Minority Relations in Deeply Divided Democratic Societies

The Israeli Case in a Globalized Context

Ilan Peleg

"Everything is foreseen, but free will is given . . . "

Rabbi Akiva, Pirkei Avot 3:15

Most[1] societies in the contemporary world face the reality of deep division among their constituent "identity groups," sociopolitical collectivities that view themselves as distinct from other collectivities living in the same political space.[2] This identity-based sociopolitical division leads frequently to conflict and sometimes to significant violence.[3] While the identity markers of various groups might be diverse—religion, race, and language being among the most prominent of those markers[4]—the conflict among different identity groups is invariably rooted in diametrically conflicting historical narratives and political agendas promoted by the constituent societal identity groups and particularly by their leaders.

My interest in this chapter is in exploring intergroup conflict within what some scholars have called deeply divided societies (DDS).[5] Yet, I would like to take a different approach from most scholars addressing deeply divided societies and focus on deeply divided societies that are also fundamentally democratic or have democratic aspirations. These types of societies are particularly interesting within the contemporary context of challenges to democracies. Divided democratic societies are often vulnerable to the severe tensions between their conflicting identity-groups because they need to carefully

balance the demands of the majority to control "its" polity—majority rule is, after all, a prominent feature of any democratic regime—with the demands of the minority for equality and protection within the democratic system, both as individual members of society and as groups with distinct identity and interests. These tensions could and often do develop into full-fledged conflict, sometimes long lasting and violent; they could even destroy the democratic regime itself.

The dilemmas of conflict between identity groups within deeply divided democratic societies are, therefore, particularly complex, difficult and sometimes insoluble. These dilemmas are especially challenging when the dispute between identity-groups is a "live conflict" and not merely remote historical memory.[6] Moreover, in today's world where public policies are impacted by populist politics and intrusive social media, solutions for inter-group conflicts are even more difficult to find than past socio-political disputes when political elites could sometimes settle conflicts behind closed doors and reach mutually acceptable, so-called "consociational" deals.[7]

The case of Israel is an excellent one for the examination of this set of theoretically crucial and related issues. First, Israel has been from its inception a DDS in numerous ways, but particularly in terms of the deep ethno-national-religious division between Jews and Arabs (or Palestinians), a division rooted in the history of Palestine under the British Mandate and, more specifically, in the 1948 war.[8] Second, Israel has been essentially democratic, despite widespread criticism of the quality of its democracy (including criticisms by a significant number of Israeli scholars),[9] so it is a country that qualifies and exemplifies a deeply divided democratic polity. Third, the long-term public debate in Israel over the correct balance between the majority and the minority has brought out into the open the issues that this chapter is interested in, especially in view of the fact that the state has chosen to define itself as "Jewish and democratic" and given that a full-fledged Kulturkampf (cultural war) between universalist and particularist forces within the Israeli society have emerged in the country over the last few decades.[10] Fourth, the debate over the long-term character of the country is still very much alive as demonstrated by the recent enactment of the controversial July 2018 Nation-State Law. Fifth, with the global political and ideological conflict between liberals and illiberals (or democrats and authoritarians) raging, and with the particular role in this conflict by such prominent Israeli politicians as Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli case might be justifiably perceived as a "test case," maybe even as a major litmus case, for the survivability of stable liberal democracy in DDSs. In other words, current Israeli politics has emerged as a battleground for the global conflict between Nationalist Populism and Liberal Democracy and it could be instructive in terms of the causes, the process, and the consequences of this conflict.

MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

Israel has emerged as an independent state in May 1948 following a long, bitter, and eventually violent clash between two diametrically opposed identity groups residing side by side within Mandatory Palestine, one Zionist and Jewish (both secular and religious) and the other Arab or Palestinian (mostly Muslims but including significant number of Christians). The historical reality of the intense ethno-national confrontation between Arabs and Jews in the pre-State era has determined profoundly the nature of the Israeli society and polity until today: first, it had produced a deeply divided society in every sense of the word, and second, it created complicated and largely conflictual majority-minority relationship from the very beginning. In fact, Israel has emerged in 1948 as a binational, Jewish and Arab society, but with a uninational, Jewish-dominated polity.

In analyzing theoretically and empirically modern Israel, it is crucial to note that in general multinational states, whether democratic or not, can adopt two main strategies in order to manage their own diversity, an accommodationist-inclusive strategy or a hegemonic-exclusive strategy.[11] In the first, the dominant group in the polity, usually but not always the demographic majority, may try to accommodate the weaker group(s) through a set of policies by including it in the system through granting the minority territorial or non-territorial autonomy, federalizing the political system (and granting the minority control over one or more of the federalized states or provinces), sharing power with the minority in what Arend Lijphart called "consociationalism," or adopting multicultural policies that recognize the minority as an important component of the entire polity. By contrast, in the case of the hegemonic-exclusivist system, the dominant group may strive to maintain, enhance and even perpetuate its exclusivist position within the polity. In doing so, the dominant group is likely to use the state (and its various institutions such as the armed forces and security apparatus, the educational system, and the bureaucracy) as instruments for its own control.

Unlike the hegemonic state, the accommodationist state recognizes its own diversity and may even cherish and celebrate it, but, most critically, it accepts most or all of its constituent ethnic groups as legitimate and gives its recognition institutional expression.[12] The hegemonic-exclusivist state, however, tends to be ethnocentric by promoting exclusively the interests of its ethno-national dominant group; at the same time it might also be state-centric by using the state as a powerful instrument of control in the interest of its dominant ethno-national group.

When compared to all forms of hegemonic exclusivism, the accommodationist position is inherently and significantly more sympathetic to various forms of social diversity, including differences in religions, languages, racial

descent, and so forth. Such ethno-diversity might be ignored altogether in an accommodationist polity,[13] a strategy that might be particularly attractive in a form of government that we came to recognize in the contemporary world as "liberal democracy." As a social policy, disregarding ethnic descent might guarantee equality, at least theoretically. Alternatively, the state might adopt a governmental system in which various ethnic groups are formally recognized and their interests are protected institutionally by law, practice, or even both.

Accommodationism is also inherently more democratic than hegemonic exclusionism because it either recognizes the equality of all ethnic groups within a diverse society or, alternatively, it privatizes ethnicity altogether, thus guaranteeing equality to all as individuals regardless of their ethnic descent. Either way, the purpose of accommodationism as an approach to political diversity is to publicly accept the "other"—typically a minority ethnic group as a collectivity or as individuals—rather than devise a system designed to dominate the other.[14] While John Stuart Mill and others have maintained that uni-ethnicity is necessary for democracy and that democracy is incompatible with multiethnic society,[15] an accommodationist approach at least attempts to prove this pessimistic outlook wrong. Given that multiethnicity is a powerful fact of life in most modern countries, including Israel, this is a crucial fact.

Although an exclusivist uni-ethnic polity could be defended as an "effective" control system for a limited time,[16] that is, it can manage a conflict, there are serious doubts as for its long-term stability. The denial of legitimacy and possibly even the existence of an ethnic group[17] is not a recipe for establishing democracy, achieving justice, or guaranteeing stability in a multiethnic society.

The case of Israel since 1948 has been that of hegemonic exclusivity in a binational society with a Jewish majority and an Arab minority.[18] Nevertheless, the country has managed to maintain a democratic polity, even if an imperfect one, a system that one prominent political sociologist has called "ethnic democracy."[19] This system could be characterized as an inherently flawed democracy, but nevertheless a democracy.

The State of Israel was declared "Jewish" on November 29, 1947, by the UN General Assembly resolution that approved the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State on the territory governed between 1918 and 1948 by the United Kingdom. The UN vote was followed in quick succession by a Palestinian-Jewish civil war, the formal establishment of the State of Israel, military invasion by several neighboring Arab countries, and a rather unstable ceasefire and a series of armistice agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Internally, in terms of the territory administrated by the United Kingdom until 1948, the war led to the decimation of the Arab community in Palestine and to

the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. Most importantly in terms of the present chapter, most Arabs who remained in the newly established State of Israel, roughly 156,000 people, were quickly put under Israeli military government. As a group, they were often suspected of disloyalty to the new state.

Understanding this background of intercommunal and regional conflict, particularly the existential 1948 war and its implications, is essential for comprehending the great challenges in establishing a functioning democracy in Israel, as well as sustaining it for the long run. In addition, one must understand the ideological component that the State of Israel was founded upon, the Zionist ideology. Emerging in the late nineteenth century in Europe, Zionism aimed at establishing not merely a state, but a Jewish state. That meant, for most Zionists and despite disagreements among them, a state with a clear Jewish majority, open to Jewish immigration, and representing Jewish culture (including Hebrew as a revived language). So when Israel was finally born, following a long and bloody struggle with the Arabs of Palestine and Arabs out of Palestine, it was quite natural, even inevitable, for its leader, David Ben-Gurion, to establish it not as a neutral Western liberal democracy but, in effect, as an ethno-nationalist Jewish republic.

Even the most cursory review demonstrates that Israel was, from the very beginning, primarily committed to the enhancement of its "Jewishness," however it might be defined, and that it did not develop a commitment to any other ideology, although several ideological alternatives were theoretically possible. First, any commitment to comprehensive, socialist egalitarianism was deserted by MAPAI, the dominant force in Palestine's Jewish community, long before the actual establishment of the state; between the nationalist idea and the socialist idea, the first one emerged as the clear winner even among people who saw themselves as socialists.[20] Second, even though Ben-Gurion and his political associates wanted a Jewish state, they did not want an Orthodox state based on Halachic principles but essentially a secular state with ethnic Jewish character in terms of its population and its culture.[21] Thirdly, and most importantly in the context of this chapter, the majority of Israel's founding fathers, including David Ben-Gurion, did not want to establish a Western liberal democracy based on individual civil rights enshrined in a constitution; they were, however, very much committed to the ideals of representative democracy and to the principle of majority rule. This was the reason that a written constitution and a comprehensive bill of rights were never adopted by the new state.

The early decision by the Israel parliament, the Knesset, not to enact a constitution, was an example of what could be viewed as the strong illiberal inclinations of the Founding Fathers, including Ben-Gurion.[22] The legendary prime minister, who saw himself as a historical nation-builder, did not want to be limited by a formal constitution that will deny him maximum political

leeway. With no constitution, a bill of rights, or an equality clause anywhere in the country's constitutional framework, the Israeli government could and did establish military rule in areas inhabited by Israeli Arabs and expropriated Arab lands on a large-scale basis.[23]

Those first years of the state laid down the framework for Israel's full-fledged ethnic statehood for years to come and in many ways until today. The absence of a binding constitution with a comprehensive bill of rights enforced by a supreme court with recognized judicial review, allowed the government to ignore the country's foundational Declaration of Independence (May 1948) in general and its commitment to "maintain complete social and political equality," in particular. With all state institutions committed to establish a Jewish state, no legal barrier on the rule of the majority controlling both of the executive and the legislative branches, the quality of the country's democracy, and the status of the minority, in particular, were in real danger.

At the same time, it is critical to note that despite the hegemonic control carried out by the government on behalf of the Jewish majority and with full commitment to the Zionist vision of establishing a Jewish Republic, the country developed many democratic institutions and practices and has, therefore, been considered by most analysts as a functioning democracy.[24] Those democratic institutions included a regularly elected parliament (the Knesset) reflecting a highly competitive electoral process, an independent judiciary with a fairly active supreme court,[25] and a free press with increasing level of investigative reporting and a highly diverse spectrum of political opinion.[26] Israel has also adopted a number of democratic practices, including the ability of all citizens to access directly the Supreme Court (in its capacity as High Court of Justice),[27] the ability to protest through public demonstrations (that is, freedom of assembly), the establishment of several key civic organizations (such as the Association of Civil Right in Israel), and so forth.

Israel could, in fact, be described as "hybrid democracy" combining in a highly complex manner strong ethnic elements in terms of Arab-Jewish relations, liberal elements in regard to fundamental "Western" liberties for individuals, and cosociational elements in terms of secular-religious relationships.[28] From the perspective of this chapter, however, it is imperative to emphasize the overall centrality of the ethnic element.[29]

Balancing these characteristics of the Israeli political system, one could argue that it emerged in the late 1940s, and by and large has remained until today, a fundamentally democratic system.[30] Yet, the Israeli polity has been from the beginning, and has remained a democracy with inherent flaws. The single most problematical aspect of the Israeli regime has been the treatment of the members of the Arab minority, and the minority as such, by the state and its institutions. Not only were "Israeli Arabs"—or "Palestinians in Israel"

as many of them prefer to call themselves now—under general suspicion by many members of the majority, but they were placed under military government between 1948 and 1966, despite evidence that they did not pose a serious threat to the security of the state. Moreover, in the first few decades of the state, the Arabs in Israel ended up with control of merely 3.5 percent of the land. The state has used a variety of legal techniques to prevent Arabs from purchasing land, (e.g., holding land by such organizations as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund).

One of the most governmental institutions in terms of liberalizing the Israeli political system and make it ethnically more inclusive has been the High Court of Justice. While the court's rulings met with some success—as in its 1954 decision on freedom of expression[31]—it often avoided considering fundamental problems related to what might be called the "essence" of the state, leaving it in effect in the hands of other governmental institutions. Thus, in March 2000, the High Court of Justice ruled that state lands could not be allocated "on the basis of discrimination between Jews and non-Jews."[32] While the court established the principle of equality, its decision was narrowly construed,[33] leaving to the discretion of the respondents—the settlement of Katzir, the Jewish Agency, and ultimately the State of Israel—to decide whether or not to implement the decision. Moreover, the court stated that its decision does not apply to past practices, knowing full well that past discrimination on the basis of ethno-national grounds was rampant. The historic 2000 decision, while announcing the principle of equality and non-discrimination, did not, in fact, reverse the policy of "Judaizing" the country by transferring the control of land from Arabs to Jews.[34]

Discrimination against Arabs in Israel, unfortunately, has not been limited to land control. It has been prevalent in other areas such as housing, hiring in civil service, the allocation of funds to local municipalities, and education. This policy has been documented heavily by the Arab-Jewish organization Sikkuy ("Chance"), by the Arab legal advocacy organization Adalah, and by many other organizations and individual scholars.[35] There has been a long history of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, preventing serious, discernable movement of the country from ethno-nationalist hegemony to liberal-democratic equality.[36]

All in all, the State has taken an active role in promoting its own hegemonic structure, culture, and policy by ignoring calls by Arabs, Jews, and international observers for the implementation of full civic equality. Writing after the violent clashes between Arab protestors and the Israeli police in 2000, three experts concluded that, among others, the Arab educational system became "a tool for ideological control in the hand of the State."[37] The Or Commission, established by the government to investigate the 2000 events, has heavily criticized the police for using excessive force against rioters and

the government for failing to give fair and equal attention to the needs of the Arab citizens of Israel.[38]

The Israeli regime in its original form or even in its later developments has never met the strictest definition of Western liberal democracy based on complete individual equality before the law, the neutrality of the state toward all social groups (particularly its ethno-nationalist groups), and emphasis on individual rights. Yet, the state of Israel has been much more sympathetic toward individual rights, given to all citizens regardless of their ethnicity, than it has ever been toward group rights. In fact, individual rights in Israel have been generally maintained and even enhanced over time. In regard to group rights, however the state insisted on distinguishing between Jews and Arabs. This emphasis on the state's "Jewishness" has never weakened; on the contrary, it has been strengthened over time, sometimes in reaction to the efforts by elements within Israel trying to liberalize the system. Thus, for example, after the announcement of the so-called constitutional revolution by Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak,[39] more and more Israelis have begun to insist that Israel was "Jewish and democratic." The net result of this "balancing act" has been to enhance the country's particularistic Jewish character, not its universal democratic one.

Several broad generalizations could be formulated in regard to the relationships over the years between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority inside Israel, without a doubt among the most critical issues in determining the nature of the Israeli political system at present and in the future:

1. The policy of the state toward the Arab minority has been often neglectful and for many decades, and on occasion this neglect has deteriorated to clearly discriminatory policy in many different areas, especially employment, education, and housing.[40]
2. In general, some of the most discriminatory policies—such as the 1948–1966 military government—have been eliminated, and other policies have been somewhat moderated; thus, for example, the Katzir ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court established the principle of equality, another ruling was in favor of Arabic road signage and thus strengthening the status of Arabic as one of Israel's official languages, and Arab citizens have been appointed to more public positions (including the High Court of Justice).
3. Nevertheless, there has not been a decisive move, political and public in nature, toward the elimination of any and all discriminatory policies, a move that would have required the erasure of the long established ethno-national character of the state. Moreover, a series of legislative initiatives over the last few years have indicated the hardening of the ethno-nationalist position by most Israeli Jews, especially individuals

and groups (such as political parties) on the Right part of the country's political spectrum.

4. In all likelihood, we will witness in years to come the continuation and the intensification of the political tug-of-war not primarily between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel as between Israeli Jews on the liberal side of the political map and Israeli Jews on the nationalist side of the political map. The focus of this political conflict will be on the dual commitment of most Israeli Jews to both the country's Jewishness and their commitment to the country's democracy, however, these two "essentially contested concepts" are actually defined by the warring parties.[41]
5. The conflict between Israeli Jews over the nature of Israel has been conceptualized in a variety of alternative ways. Thus, for example, Myron Aronoff and Pierre Atlas have seen it as a conflict between "Jewishness" and "Israeliness," that is whether Israel has a Jewish agenda based on the presumed interest of Israel's Jewish majority or, alternatively, an agenda designed to promote the interests of the State of Israel.[42] It seems that for most Israeli Jews there is no difference between the two. Gad Barzilai and Ilan Peleg conceptualized the Israeli divide as being between those who support the "territorial imperative," characterizing the Right, and those who support the "ethnic imperative," characterizing the Center-Left.[43] In this chapter, I suggest that the real distinction in contemporary Israel is between the country's ethno-nationalist agenda and its liberal-democratic agenda, often shorthanded as "Right" vs. "Left."[44]

CHALLENGES TO THE EXISTING FORMULA

The debate over the essence of the State of Israel has been actively pursued for the last quarter-century or so, although its roots could be found in early Zionism and even more so in Israel's formative years. In an effort to avoid the political escalation of this debate, the state and its various institutions have adopted what seemed to have been a compromise solution, defining itself increasingly as "Jewish and democratic."[45] Yet, there is evidence that this formula, problematic on theoretical grounds, has also failed on practical or pragmatic grounds—it has not eliminated discrimination within Israel despite the country's overall democratic structure, it has not led to social cohesion within Israel's Jewish community (let alone between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel), and it has not created political stability. Rather, this dualistic formula has perpetuated the "Kulturkampf" within Israel, which has emerged decades ago,[46] and has even spilled over, generating serious conflict in Jewish communities around the world.[47]

Although the outside world's attention has often been directed toward Israel's relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas as outside forces, as well as toward events in the Occupied Territories, the real battle royal in Israel has been over the essence of the Israeli polity. Many liberal Israelis and others would have liked the country to be transformed into a truly liberal democratic state in which all citizens are equal under the law, a state that belongs not only to its Jewish majority but also to its minorities.[48] The nationalist right, however, supports an Israel that is decisively ethno-religious and belongs pronouncedly to Jews alone, whether they are Israeli or not.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In many ways, majority-minority relations in Israel have not been moving in a positive way.[49] As shown in a 2014 article by Ayelet Harel-Shalev and Ilan Peleg there has been a general trend toward more exclusivity and discrimination rather than inclusivity and equality. From its inception, Israel has been committed to two sets of values—a universal set that has included democratic institutions and a particularistic set that has benefitted only Israel's Jewish population. Over the last several years, there has been a trend toward particularism. The argument that the country is a "liberal democracy"[50] had become less and less sustainable.

In general, the Israeli regime within the so-called Green Line, to distinguish from the territories occupied since 1967, has been a hybrid regime, a complicated mixture of different principles, values, and practices. There has been inherent tension between the logic of equal citizenship, universal and inclusive, and the logic of ethnically based nationhood, particularistic and exclusive, but over the last ten years under Netanyahu the tilt toward increasing ethno-nationality and Jewish exclusivity has been unmistaken.

Over the last several years, particularly under the control of the nationalist Right, the already-imperfect balance has been greatly challenged. Israel has moved toward greater ethnicization,[51] a trend that has put its democracy in real danger, particularly given similar worldwide trends in other countries (see below).

In deeply divided societies with democratic regimes and control over ethnically mixed territories, governments have a variety of available policy options.[52] Under the Likud governments, particularly since 2009, Israel has moved decisively toward enhancing its Jewish character as well as the perpetuation of its control over the territories it conquered in 1967. This fusion of ethno-nationalism and territoriality has caused a decline in the quality of Israel's democracy.

To understand the Israeli reality in 2020, one has to adopt a dynamic perspective. The post-1948 Israel was a hybrid regime, mixing individual rights and some group rights, albeit not on an equal basis. Throughout most of its existence, Israel had pursued a Majoritarian Model in regard to the most principal public policy issues—immigration, citizenship, land control, education, culture, symbols, and so forth. Over the last few years, however, a process transforming Israel from majoritarianism to hegemony seems to have been developing.

Several events and broader processes have contributed to this important transformation toward hegemony: (a) the failure of the Oslo peace process; (b) the second Palestinian Intifada; (c) the large-scale demonstrations by Israeli Arabs (or Palestinian in Israel as many among them prefer to be called); (d) the domination of Israel's government by the "Nationalist Camp"; (e) the decline in Israel of both the traditional left and the liberal center; (f) the rise of the nationalist-religious camp; and (g) the public debate over migrant workers. All of these seem to have strengthened the nationalist forces in Israel and weakened the liberal circles.

While at the center of the move toward hegemony and away from liberal democracy are the problematical relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority, there have been legislative and other initiatives directed toward diverse targets. Here is a partial list of these actions:[53]

1. Amendments to the Citizenship Law were passed by the Knesset and approved narrowly by the Supreme Court. The amendment (2003) has banned Palestinians residing in the occupied territories from entering Israel for the purpose of residence or naturalization even in the context of family unification with Israeli citizens. A further amendment to the law (2007) prohibited spouses from a number of enemy states (including the Palestinian Authority) to receive citizenship in order to live together in Israel with their spouses.
2. Another issue on the agenda has been the repeated demand for an oath of allegiance. While legislating on an oath of allegiance was aimed explicitly at the Palestinian minority, reemphasizing the centrality of the relationships between Arabs and Jews, it has reflected the fear of many Israeli Jews of the growing presence of foreigners and non-Jews in Israel. It is a perception of a dual threat to both the security of the state and its identity.
3. In order to bypass the somewhat revolutionary Katzir ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court, a ruling that prohibited discrimination in the purchase of land, in March 2011 the Knesset passed a law allowing new communities to compel all candidates to go through a selection process. According to the law, candidates that "fail to meet the fundamental views of the community" and its social fabric could be rejected.

4. The Knesset also passed a law enabling the filing of lawsuits against anyone calling for a boycott of West Bank settlements' products and the withdrawal of an NGO's "public institution" status and its tax exemption. According to the law, which passed the Knesset on July 11, 2011, a business publicly declaring that it would not buy supplies manufactured in the territories would be subject to lose its state-sponsored benefits.
5. The Nakba Law in its original version stated that persons publicly commemorating the Nakba Day as a day of mourning shall be sentenced to prison.[54] Although the law was amended (and eventually passed on May 4, 2011) following public protests, the new version targeted municipalities, organizations, and public institutions by reducing their budgets.

These are but some examples of the increasing ethno-national character of the State of Israel under the guidance of a Right-wing coalition, especially transparent after 2009. This general trend has reached a crescendo, an epitome of a sort, in the July 2018 Nation-State Law.[55]

The Law could have far-reaching implications for Israeli politics and the nature of Israeli democracy by legally justifying Jewish privileges and discrimination against non-Jewish citizens of the state. Even Israeli president Reuven Rivlin said that this is a "bad law for Israel and the Jews."[56] In pushing for the law, its proponents wanted to "entrench Israel's exclusive Jewish identity and safeguard the primacy of the already dominant Jewish majority within Israel."[57] Moreover, the Law could also be intended to pave the way for Israel's annexation of part of the West Bank.[58] In the final analysis, this controversial law boils down to one perennial question: Is the State of Israel an ethno-national Jewish republic or is it a Western-style liberal democratic polity.[59] The new Law could be read as declaring that the state belongs to Israeli Jews and non-Israeli Jews, but not to its non-Jewish citizens, including the indigenous Arab population. By adopting the law, Israel has made a decisive shift toward an ethno-nationalist and particularist position and away from a liberal democratic and universalist position.

CONCLUSIONS

In theoretical and comparative terms, it could be argued that while Israel was established in 1948 as a hybrid state—a democracy with strong ethno-nationalist components in the midst of civil war and then regional war—it could have potentially evolved into either a full-fledged, Western-style liberal democracy or into a full-fledged "ethnocracy," a polity in the service of only one of its constituent groups.[60]

In the early days of the state, the Founding Fathers decided not to decide on the big constitutional questions facing the State—they opted to have a series of Basic Laws rather than a real equality-affirming constitution that would have limited their own power and left the borders of the state undefined. It has proven to be a dangerous choice in a polity characterized by the presence of ideological expansionists. Then came the June 1967 War, expanding Israel into the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Expansionist dreams suddenly became a real possibility. Under a series of Right-wing governments, this possibility became a reality.

Hegemonic states, where power rests with one dominant ethnic group, have a variety of options in terms of reformulating the nature of their regimes. They can maintain their overall constitutional order and enshrine the status quo as a permanent feature of the regime, or they may opt to either democratize the polity or further ethnicize it.

In the case of Israel, there is some evidence for efforts to establish a significantly more liberal and slightly more inclusive political system than the one created in 1948. Yet, the essence of the polity as a Jewish Republic has not changed substantively, and it is unlikely to change in years to come. The Founding Fathers preferred organic to civic nationalism as an overall design to the nation-building project that they have adopted. This meant a hegemonic ethnocentric order rather than a liberal democratic order, and it was reflected in the overall character of the regime and the key decisions it had adopted. This approach facilitated the later move away from liberal democracy, the strengthening of ethnocentricity, and, in fact, an assault on democratic institutions after 2009 (including the courts, the press, the police, and even the rule of law).

The move toward ethno-nationalist, majoritarian, and hegemonic democracy that we have witnessed in Israel has been part of a broader, ongoing, anti-democratic, and populist trend that has become a worldwide phenomenon, impacting non-democratic regimes (such as China and Russia), as well as democratic regimes (such as the United Kingdom and the United States), and numerous countries in the middle (Philippines, Brazil, Hungary). Israel has been a hybrid democracy and those championing the strengthening of its ethno-religious character have gained significant political momentum under the Netanyahu regime of 2009–2020. Civil liberties, minority rights, the rule of law, judicial independence, artistic and academic freedoms, and free press—all have been repeatedly challenged.[61] Thus, the country has become one of the states in which democracy—and, more precisely, liberal democracy—has been under assault.[62] At the time of writing, it remains to be seen, how this political drama will end. Or, as better said by one of the wisest Jews who ever lived, "Everything is foreseen, but free will is given . . . ."

NOTES

1. This chapter reflects the thinking of its author for many years and is largely based on several books and articles that have been published by him over the last two decades. The references included in this chapter relate specifically to some of these prior publications.

2. Such collectivities are often ethnic or ethno-national groups. For classification of such groups see Ted Robert Gurr, "People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century," *Africa Today* 49, No. 4 (2000): 143–144 and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 1993).

3. Contemporary examples include Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Turkey, and historical examples might be Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and Spain.

4. See, in particular, Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1971), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986), and *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991).

5. See Adrian Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); Ilan Peleg, "Self-Determination and Majority-Minority Relations in Deeply Divided Societies: Toward Comparative Analytical Framework," *Ethnopolitics* 14, No. 5 (August 2015): 523–530.

6. In many societies ethnic conflicts have been relegated to "historical memory" because they have been decided long ago in favor of a particular group (Australia and New Zealand, for example) or have achieved a constitutional settlement that is, by and large, accepted by the formerly antagonistic groups (e.g., Canada, Alto Adige in Northern Italy).

7. On such consociational settlement, see the numerous publications of Arend Lijphart, particularly his *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

8. The Arab-Jewish divide has been the deepest in Israel, although the country has faced other deep divisions, including the one between secular and religious Jews. On Israeli divides, see Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1989).

9. See Sammy Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, No. 4 (2002): 423–431 (on "low-level democracy"); Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State," *American Political Science Review* 86, No. 2 (1992): 432–443; Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), and Ilan Peleg, "Israel as a Liberal Democracy: Civil Rights in the Jewish State," in *Review Essays in Israel Studies: Books on Israel*, ed. Laurie Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Vol. 5 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), 63–80.

10. Ilan Peleg, "Israel between Democratic Universalism and Particularist Judaism: Challenging a Sacred Formula," *Report to the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies*, 2002–2003, pp. 5–20.

11. This theoretical section of the chapter is based on Ilan Peleg, *Democratizing the Hegemonic State: Political Transformation in the Age of Identity* (Cambridge

University Press, 2007), especially pp. 83–85, while the empirical part draws from pp. 172–179.

12. William Safran, "Non-Separatist Policies Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences," *International Political Science Review* 15, No. 1 (1994): 61–80.

13. A. C. Van der Berghe, "Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Critical Appraisal," in *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Analysis*, ed. R. G. Wirsing (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981), 343–355.

14. Ilan Peleg, "Otherness and Israel's Arab Dilemma," in *The Other in Jewish Thought and History: Construction of Jewish Culture and Identity*, ed. Laurence J. Silberstein and Robert L. Cohn (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1994), 258–280.

15. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations of Representative Government* (New York, NY: New York Liberal Arts Press, 1958 (originally published in 1861)), 230.

16. Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin, TX: University Of Texas, 1980).

17. For example, calling Kurds "Mountain Turks" as the Turkish government has done until 1991 or denying the existence of a Palestinian nation (as some Israelis have done), guarantee the perpetuation of the problems related to the desire of Kurds and Palestinians to achieve self-determination.

18. The minority has constituted between 13 percent and 20 percent of the Israeli population.

19. Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype," *Israel Studies* 2, No. 2 (Fall 1997): 198–241.

20. Zeev Sternhell, *Nation-Building and Model Society: Nationalism and Socialism in the Israeli Labor Movement, 1904–1940* (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1995, in Hebrew).

21. Thus, there has always been a great emphasis on the Hebrew language and, above all, Jewish immigration.

22. Yonathan Shapiro, *Politicians as a Hegemonic Class: The Case of Israel* (Tel-Aviv: Siriat Poalim, 1996, Hebrew), and Yonathan Shapiro, "Where Has Liberalism Disappeared in Israel?," *Zmanim*, Winter 1996, pp. 92–101 (Hebrew).

23. Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs of Israel* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969); Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*.

24. Among prominent analysts who categorized Israel as a democracy were Robert Dahl and Arend Lijphart.

25. This is based to a large extent on the British tradition, but also with Continental influence and, in later years, American traditions (including judicial review).

26. Many of those diverse opinions have disappeared with the decline of the printed press in Israel, a global process.

27. A practice that the State of Israel inherited from the British Mandate's legal practice.

28. See Myron J. Aronoff, "Democratization in Deeply Divided Societies: The Netherlands, India, and Israel," in *Anthropology and Political Science* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2013), 132–150 (especially p. 141 and p. 150).

29. In this regard, Smooha's conceptualization of Israel as an "ethnic democracy" is generally correct, although the other dimensions of Israel's political system ought to be noted.

30. In this respect, I am in disagreement with political geographer Oren Yiftachel and others.

31. Kol Ha'am versus Minister of Interior, decided on October 16, 1953. See Daniel J. Rothstein, "Adjudication of Freedom of Expression Cases under Israel's Unwritten Constitution," *Cornell International Law Journal* 18, No. 2 (Summer 1985): 247–286.

32. Bagatz (HCJ) 6698/95 Qa'adan versus Israel Land Authority, Katzir and others.

33. For two diametrically opposed interpretations of the Katzir ruling by the High Court of Justice, see Alexandre Kedar, "A First Step in A Difficult and Sensitive Road: Preliminary Observations on Kaadan v. Katzir," *Israel Studies Bulletin* 16 No. 1 (Fall, 2000): 3–11 and Gerald M. Steinberg, "The Poor in Your Own City Shall Have Precedence: A Critique of the Katzir-Kaadan Case and Opinion," *Israel Studies Bulletin* 16, No. 1 (Fall 2000): 12–18.

34. Oren Yiftachel and Alexandre Kedar, "Landed Power: The Making of the Israeli Land Regime," *Teoria U'Vikoret* 16 (2000): 67–100.

35. See, for example, David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).

36. Ilan Peleg, "Jewish-Palestinian Relations in Israel: From Hegemony to Equality?," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17, No. 3 (Spring 2004): 415–437.

37. Dan Rabinowitz, Asad Ghanem, and Oren Yiftachel, eds., *After the Rift: New Directions for Government Policy toward the Arab Population in Israel*, November 2000, p. 40.

38. For the text of the Or Commission, see "The official summation of the Or Commission Report," *Haaretz*, August 31, 2003.

39. See Barak's speech on the topic at Haifa University, published in English at the Faculty Scholarship Series of Yale University School of Law under the title of "A Constitutional Revolution: Israel's Basic Laws" (online, 1993). See also Patricia Woods, "The Ideational Foundations of Israel's Constitutional Revolution," *Political Research Quarterly* 62, No. 4 (December 2009): 811–824.

40. Even official Israeli state commissions (e.g., The Or Commission) have accepted this claim, statistics published by the State of Israel confirm this reality, and the vast majority of scholars have agreed as well with this conclusion.

41. On "essentially contested concepts," see W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in *The Importance of Language*, ed. Max Black (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 121–146.

42. Myron Aronoff and Pierre Atlas, "The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to the Dominant Zionist Discourse," in *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Ilan Peleg (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 41–60. For a more nuanced and updated version see Myron J. Aronoff and Ian Kubik, *Anthropology and Political Science: A Convergence Approach* (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2013), 110–131.

43. Gad Barzilai and Ilan Peleg, "Israel and Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic Process," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, No. 1 (1994): 49–63.

44. Some analysts have suggested that nationalist ethnocentricity and liberal democracy might not be entirely irreconcilable. See, for example, Yael Tamir , *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and her *Why Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), as well as David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). The Israeli experience, as well as that of other countries (e.g., Turkey, Sri Lanka) does not support this line of research.

45. This formula—"Jewish and democratic"—has been used in legislation (e.g., the two Basic Laws of 1992), in Supreme Court's rulings, and in academic writings.

46. Ilan Peleg, "The Peace Process and Israel's Kulturkampf," in *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. Ilan Peleg (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 237–263.

47. See, for example, Dov Waxman, *Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), or Peter Beinart, *The Crisis of Zionism* (New York, NY: Picador, 2013).

48. On this point, see Leon Hadar, "Israel in the Post-Zionist Age: Being Normal and Loving It," *World Policy Journal* 16, No. 1 (Spring 1999): 76–86.

49. Ayelet Harel-Shalev and Ilan Peleg, "Hybridity and Israel's Democratic Order: The End of an Imperfect Balance?," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 1, No. 1 (2014): 75–94, and Dov Waxman and Ilan Peleg, "The Nation-State Law and the Weakening of Israeli Democracy," *Israel Studies* 25, No. 3 (Fall 2020): 185–200.

50. Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubinstein, *Israel and the Family of Nations* (Tel-Aviv: Schocken, 2003).

51. Peleg, *Democratizing the Hegemonic State*, especially chapter 6.

52. Ayelet Harel-Shalev, *The Challenge of Sustaining Democracy* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

53. For more complete analysis, see Harel-Shalev and Peleg, "Hybridity and Israel's Democratic Order," 82–89.

54. Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 127–128.

55. See Waxman and Peleg, *Israel Studies*. "The Nation-State Law and the Right Wing Populist Challenge to Israeli Democracy," A paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, September 2019.

56. "Israel's President Reuven Rivlin: Nation-State Law is 'Bad for the State of Israel and Bad for the Jews'," *Times of Israel*, September 6, 2018.

57. Waxman and Peleg, *Israel Studies*.

58. Dahlia Scheindlin, "The Logic Behind Israel's Democratic Erosion," *The Century Foundation*, May 29, 2019.

59. For the crucial distinction between "democracy" and "republicanism," see Peled, "Ethnic Democracy," 1992.

60. Yifthachel, *Ethnocracy*.

61. Waxman and Peleg, *Israel Studies*.

62. Naomi Chazan, "The Erosion of Israel's Democracy," *Times of Israel*, May 27, 2019.

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Chapter 7

Creating the Public in a Society of Strangers

Inclusion and Exclusion in American Cities

Joel Migdal

I sat down to write this chapter honoring Myron (Mike) J. Aronoff at a time when the American public was being torn apart to a degree that I had not previously witnessed. An American president egged on cheering crowds, hectoring United States citizens—indeed, elected representatives—to go back to where they came from. That spectacle reflected, and exacerbated, the fraying of a consensus of what it meant to be an American and who could be part of the larger public. Although Donald J. Trump's exhortations were extreme, this was certainly not the first time that the question arose of who qualified to be a *real* American. From the founding of the Republic on, tensions periodically bubbled to the surface of who was inside—and who outside—the imagined boundaries of the public.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was a particularly contentious period. The rapid growth of cities created a society of strangers in which people regularly had to deal with others whom they did not know personally and likely would never meet again. The Civil War not only ripped the country apart, it also accelerated the industrialization and urbanization that had already begun replacing small-town America. The waves of diverse immigrants who settled in U.S. cities after the war added to the flood of those moving from rural areas. Cities became vast collections of strangers in a strange land.

The United States, the saying goes, was born in the country and moved to the city.[1] The challenge was how an increasingly urbanized population, comprised of people who knew one another fleetingly or mostly not at all—this society of strangers—could transcend the differences of the many diverse groups and uprooted individuals to create a viable American public.

It was within its teeming cities and their clashing cultures that the American public developed, with its imagined boundaries designating who was a *real* American and who was not. Cities were sites of antinomies: the clashing images of them as a space of evil and a place of opportunity. This chapter explores how, as the American public took shape in the decades after the Civil War, cities simultaneously pulled wildly diverse groups toward inclusion and integration while, at the same time, establishing walls of exclusion and segregation.

THE PUBLIC

Before turning to an exploration of the city, let me present some introductory thoughts on the concept of the "public." The word "public" is pervasive in both everyday language and more specialized social science jargon—public opinion, public eye, public space, public sector, public spirit, public figure, public support, public-versus-private, and so forth. A perusal of social science and political science dictionaries and encyclopedias turns up numerous phrases with the term "public" as an adjective, but the noun itself is puzzlingly scarce. How can one understand the adjective without a clear sense of the noun that underlies it?

Other words capture some of what the noun, public, seems to connote—society, civil society, citizenry, nation. But the public differs from all of these. "Society" and "citizenry" are broad, inclusive categories that do not capture the in-and-out, us-and-them, qualities that the word public does. "Citizenry," too, points to a set of formal rights and obligations; "public" conjures up a much less formal and less well-defined set of relationships. "Nation" denotes an aggregate of people who see themselves as bound by blood or a common set of ideas. It shares with the concept of "public" the idea of informal and imagined relations, but it lacks the sense of agency found in the term "public." The term "public" resonates with a sense of responsibility and concern for the general welfare, which is largely absent in the concept of "nation." Like "public," "civil society" is associated with social welfare, but it generally refers to formally organized groups, like the American Heart Association, advocating specific interests. The plural "publics" has been used in some social science literature, but that term, while not necessarily referring to formally organized organizations, does still allude to separate groups with distinct interests.

The public, in my understanding, is characterized by four qualities: (1) its everyday practices guided by an implicit code of rules; (2) social boundaries that mark off those included from those excluded; (3) tension between equality and status differences inside those boundaries; and (4) the transcending

of particular interests to apply influence on government and leaders of social institutions regarding what the common welfare is and should be.

The first quality—everyday practices—is pivotal. A public implies more than people relating to each other through a strongly felt shared identity and sense of responsibility for the general welfare; it includes a behavioral repertoire on how to act in daily situations. In forging the public, cohesion would not come from an instant buy-in to the American credo—high-minded articles of faith such as equality and a broad understanding of personal rights and liberty. Rather, the connections of diverse Americans would have to come through an acceptance of a set of rules for everyday behavior. These largely implicit rules became the foundation for repeated ways of interacting in volunteer organizations, the workplace, shops, downtown streets, social clubs, and parks. Patterns of daily behavior eventually became more than habit; they took on a normative value, marking the right (and wrong) ways to relate to others, including strangers, outside the home and the workplace.

The existence of the public, then, implies an intricate dance of daily behavior as well as a kind of collective deliberation. The public is not simply the aggregation of individuals, just as public opinion should not be thought of as the sum of individual views, with each person given equal weight. As the sociologist Herbert Blumer put it, people's views develop "as a function of a society in operation."[2] The journalist and historian Jill Lepore explained Blumer's intent: "We come to hold and express our opinions in conversation, and especially in debate, over time, and different people and groups influence us, and we them, to different degrees."[3]

I am the first to admit that the notion of the public's interactive deliberation is a slippery concept; it implies people's—sometimes, somehow—transcending their individual and group preferences to have a hand in creating a *common* interest, or what was called in American Revolutionary times, a common cause. It suggests that a large population of people, mostly not acquainted with one another, can in some fashion act and think in a fairly unitary fashion, at least at the broad level of concern about the general welfare, much as the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau posited almost three centuries ago in his treatise on the social contract and the general will.[4]

To be sure, the existence of a common cause does not obviate more particular preferences of various groups and individuals for this policy or that. But it does imply a general understanding of the limits of personal and group aims and a belief in a general good that rises above those particular interests. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville noted the import and power of the will of the American people collectively: "Although the form of government is representative, it is evident that the opinions, the prejudices, the interests, and even the passions of the people are hindered by no permanent obstacles from exercising a perpetual influence on the daily conduct of affairs."[5]

To my mind, then, the public is a collective with broad general interests—somehow transcending particular ones—which is based on rules for interaction with strangers, but strangers about whom members of the public have clear expectations, even a sense of familiarity. These musings about what the term "public" entails and what its principal characteristics are fall short of a precise definition. Indeed, I am reticent about giving it a formal definition. In this, I will fall back on Ludwig Wittgenstein's important point that not all words are amenable to definitions, even though the word is useful and clear.[6]

THE TRIUMPH OF THE CITY

It was in the burgeoning cities of the nineteenth century that the American public took shape. Whether in love or hate, Americans have flocked to huge urban-suburban sprawls, many now with more than a million people, for nearly the last 200 years. If, as Page Smith told us, the small town was the basic form of social organization experienced by most Americans until 1910 or so, then the country's cities and their surroundings became the primary social experience of the rest of the twentieth century and have remained so in the twenty-first.[7] In fact, even by 1910, the United States had experienced more than a half century of very rapid urbanization, and the flame of the small town was already flickering in the last decades of the nineteenth century.[8]

More and more after the Civil War, as industrialization took hold, Americans' social lives inevitably consisted of encounters and interactions with strangers and people they knew only fleetingly. If Americans were to succeed in working out rules and social conventions to preserve social peace and serve as a foundation for democracy in a large and complex society, it would have to be accomplished in the cities, among people who really did not know each other personally. It would have to be constructed in a society without a common religion or ethnicity to fall back on. Indeed, it was in America's heterogeneous cities that the dominant public code of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries gestated and developed.

For Americans, living in an overwhelmingly urban society presented formidable challenges. One writer put it this way, "The tension between old and new, the creative and destructive impulses, the paradox of ordered disorder, of an accessible, securable safety amidst the tense but creative struggle for the soul of the city—the capacity to make oneself at home in the maelstrom—this is what marked the essence of urban space and modern times."[9] Americans now needed to maintain their unique democratic credo in social settings where they had no idea about the details of most others' lives. Americans no longer had the kinds of repetitive everyday relations with familiar others characteristic of small towns. And, to make matters even more difficult, the

population was increasingly made up of differing religions, ethnic groups, and races.

The twentieth century represented the triumph of the city in the United States, but its ascendancy was neither a foregone conclusion nor always cheerfully accepted. The city as a social reality and as an idea was closely linked to the conquest of capitalism and the triumph of liberalism. But the triad of the city, capitalism, and liberalism has historically hit a discordant note among many observers. As one essay noted, "Anti-liberal revolts almost invariably contain a deep hatred of the City, that is to say, everything represented by urban civilization: commerce, mixed populations, artistic freedom, sexual license, scientific pursuits, leisure, personal safety, wealth, and its usual concomitant power."[10]

The rise of cities and capitalism provoked anxiety and tensions. Here, I will focus on three cultural polarities in cities that deeply affected the creation of the American public—the pulls between intimacy and freedom, segmentation and integration, and organic and contractual unity.

INTIMACY AND FREEDOM: THE TRIUMPH OF THE CITY AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICA'S AMBIVALENCE

By the end of the twentieth century, as much as 80 percent of the American population was shoe-horned into only 16 percent of the country's land. Americans had redistributed themselves to live in highly circumscribed land concentrations, most of which connect into two narrow arcs, one from Boston to Miami then curving down along the Gulf Coast to Houston, and a second from Phoenix, sloping west to Los Angeles and then north to Seattle. Together, they join to form a giant U-shape, which frames the vast, mostly empty expanses of middle America. Much of the population in each arc sits in a thin strip that is within hailing distance of the coast. While living first in Boston and later in Seattle, I was always amazed at how few miles one has to drive on I-90, away from the ocean toward America's great middle, to reach open spaces, dotted only with farms and the occasional small town.

What a striking contrast urban America is today compared to the early years of the Republic. In the first U.S. census in 1790, city dwellers were barely 5 percent of the population.[11] In the twentieth-first century, urban America *is* America. Americans have developed what has been called "metropollyanna," the belief that sooner or later everyone will move to the big city and live happily ever after.

But the triumph of the city and its happily ever-after ending has been attenuated by an abiding sense of its failure. It became nearly a cliché in the decades after World War II that U.S. cities were in crisis. Those in what

came to be called the rustbelt seemed hollowed out, while the ones in the sunbelt seemed uncertain about how to fit their pieces together and how to use their newfound prosperity to create a livable whole.[12] Even today, the architectural coldness of cities like Atlanta and Phoenix is palpable. In the last third of the twentieth century, other cities, from Newark to Detroit, faced devastation and despair. Cities have been gutted as much by urban planners and architects as by economic decay. It is not only the crumbling physical state of cities that worries Americans. In popular culture, from *Sister Carrie* to *L.A. Confidential*, cities (and Los Angeles most prominently among them) represent lost innocence, places of personal compromise, and corruption.[13]

Triumph and failure, glitz and grime, cities hold an integral, if equivocal, place in the American imagination. They are at the crux of an abiding tension pulling between intimacy and freedom. And it was in the hollow of that tension that a public code had to develop. The ambivalence of Americans toward the city is rooted in a long tradition of Western writing and experience. Indeed, since the dawn of what Westerners take as human history, cities have prompted contradictory, often bemused, reactions. And those reactions have been carried through time in Western civilization to complicate America's attempts to create a sense of security and shared expectations—in short, a public code—among the city's strangers.

As far back as the Book of Genesis, the city figures in the first evil of man against man. Gripped by his jealousy, Cain murdered his favored brother Abel. In fury, God exiled the shame-faced Cain from the embrace of the Land to a dark world east of Eden, the land of Nod (meaning restlessness). And what was the fate of this cursed killer destined to a rootless existence? He became the father of the first city.

The story adroitly ties the first murderer to a host of related evils—the hubris of human production and creation, itinerancy and exile, and not least of all the founding of Enoch, the first city, named after Cain's son. In subsequent stories, too, the multitudes of cities came to represent a singular evil. When the people of the city of Babel sought to build a tower reaching to the sky, God made a babble of their language. Nothing about cities is more frightening than this babble, an inability to find a common language and shared social conventions among strangers. Later in Genesis, the licentiousness of the people of Sodom and Gomorrah led God to rain a sulfurous fire down on them, obliterating the cities entirely.

But, in the Bible, God also seemed to harbor quite different feelings about cities. Buried in Cain's story is another, kinder vision of them. When God cast him from the security of Adam and Eve's intimate community to the anarchic unknown east of Eden, Cain implored God to save him from being an easy target for others who might want to kill him. Whoever these portentous others were, they certainly were not part of the first family, the familiar

group coming from Adam and Eve—they lived beyond the Garden of Eden, beyond human community. That may have meant that they did not share in the social rules and habits of the first family. Certainly, Cain feared an anarchic world that would leave him vulnerable and unprotected. God complied with Cain's plea by marking him so that potential murderers would know that they would face the vengeance of God if they lay a hand upon him. Here, the new city represented a refuge from endless wandering and harm.

That counter-theme of refuge and security in cities is interwoven throughout the Biblical accounts that follow, especially with the Israelites' establishment of cities of asylum for those who commit manslaughter. Cities represent prosperity as well. When God finally rewarded the Israelites after their forty years of wandering in the wilderness, God presented them with "cities great and good that you did not build" (Deuteronomy 6:10).

To Americans pushed into constructing a renewed public code in their cities of strangers in the decades after the Civil War, the Bible transmitted a dual message: the city held the lurking danger of degenerating into babble, rather than a common language, but it also offered the hope of refuge, of towns great and good, even of streets paved with gold.

The image of the city as a place to escape retribution and gain bounty carries into late medieval Europe where the immediate predecessors of today's European cities first sprouted. It was here that Europeans developed the ideas of what a city should properly be. Burdened with oppressive ties that bound individuals to those above them in a rigid feudal hierarchy, the space within the walls of the city (at least, some select cities, especially in Flanders and Tuscany) became the place to shed the lord-serf relationship that strangled the countryside. The maxim was that "city air makes man free." From that time on, no matter what other negative associations were made with cities in people's minds, cities were tied in the European popular imagination to the concept of freedom. That association of cities and freedom wound its way to America, as well.

Freedom was not simply a state of mind in these European cities in the Middle Ages. The cities provided a new, unfettered social status: a medieval European slave or bondsman or serf who spent a year and a day in a city (or some other comparably delimited period) became a freeman, now considered unbound from his feudal station and obligations. In the words of the great German sociologist Max Weber, "The urbanites therefore usurped the right to violate lordly law. This was the major revolutionary innovation of medieval occidental cities in contrast to all others."[14] By the twelfth century, the city was demonstrating, as it had in classical Greece, its dynamic capacity to be an engine of change in human affairs. These special cities of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (a retreat could already be discerned in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) "represented a historical break that began an emancipation

of common people that had never previously existed."[15] The ideas of a public of equals free of the aristocratic pretensions and power of the past, which were so important to the public code that developed in America, were born in these medieval cities.

For all that freedom, city dwellers back then still faced the problem of creating new sorts of bonds among themselves, if for nothing else than to protect themselves from each other and from potential invaders. Living in a city in an otherwise rural, manor-dominated environment was like living on the edge of a precipice. Cities might help one sever old ties, but they could not exist without creating new solidarity among the urban dwellers. Somehow, city people had to overcome the tendency to fall into mutually indecipherable babble. What could replace the protective (if suffocating) embrace of the lord of the manor or the binding quality of the manorial religious cults, usually based on the worship of a particular saint? As in the United States more than half a millennium later, the new city dwellers faced the challenge of bridging their differences through the creation of a new common public code.

Within the walls of the medieval city, the resourceful burghers employed a number of devices to manufacture binding ties among themselves, including guilds and various associations, to forge the basics of a workable set of rules for daily social relations. Out of their interactions and routine practices, they developed a common law, which became integral in the later transition to the modern world and, eventually, to democracy. But they sought other less formal links, too, ones that held an emotional component, which would generate heartfelt loyalty to each other. New Christian cults were key to the solidarity in these cities, each with the city's own religious symbol, saint, or icon. Local burghers also agreed that everyone share in a meal together once a year as a public sign of enduring commitment and as a form of bonding. That meal was the Lord's Supper.

Because Jews could and would not share in the cult or the meal, the same air that made the burghers breath free led to the exclusion of the city's Jews and ushered in an era of brutal pogroms. The creation of common symbols and social conventions in cities thus bound strangers and acquaintances into a powerful body, the public, but that public excluded as well as included. This new fledgling public—there was no such concept previously—was severely bounded, with lines marking who was in and who was out. Apprentices and other servants, as well as women, gained only mediated participation through their masters, husbands, and fathers.

The new order created a rough equality among the burghers, the privileged core of these early European cities. But, ominously, the emerging order put those who could not or would not share in the new public practices, the rituals and symbols, into a new light. If they could not be controlled (like apprentices and women could be), then these others were viewed as

threatening the newfound safety that the common public code offered. That meant that groups such as the Jews, who were physically inside the city but socially outside, now were at great risk. The subsequent tortured history of Jews in Europe turned on Christian Europeans' continuing ambivalence about whether Jews could ever truly be incorporated within the boundaries of the public.

In medieval cities, as in modern ones, the meaning of the word public contained both a myth of inclusion and a reality of exclusion. Cities have been associated with refuge, freedom, and mystery—contrasting with the intimacy and community associated with small towns and other social groupings grounded in familiarity. In this polarity lay the origins of the skepticism with which many Americans greeted the city's triumph. The horror of the licentiousness found in cities, alongside the exhilarating sense of opportunity that these cities raised in the hearts of many Americans, have roots that go back to antiquity and the Middle Ages. These clashing cultural understandings of the city shed some light on how complex it was for Americans to transform their public code from one grounded in the familiarity of their small towns and local groups to one serving the anonymity of the city. And, like the medieval cities, American urban centers created the kernel of a public with common rules for everyday behavior and, at the same time, kept significant portions of the population on the outside looking in.

SEGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION: STREETS AND QUARTERS

The Jews' plight in the medieval city demonstrates another important facet of those cities that extends into the modern period as well. No group was self-sufficient in the city; the city's essence, in fact, was economic interdependence, leading to extensive relations among its members. In that sense, one can think of the city as an integrated whole. Jews and Christians, for example, had multiple economic interactions despite the many practices and beliefs that divided them, creating an important unity in the city based largely on economic exchange. But, as Jews found out time and again, functional economic integration was not enough.

Cities tended, simultaneously, toward both the *congregation* of all its inhabitants and the *segregation* of particular classes, religious groups, and the like. Jews in many medieval cities were "tolerated" because of the economic functions, such as money lending or petty commerce or long-distance trade, which they performed. But they were consigned to "quarters of tolerance," limiting where they could live, what occupations they could hold, and what rights they had. This sort of segmentation of the city affected housing, the

assignment of land, class distribution, the location of different sorts of activities, and more.[16]

Even in cities, then, a kind of attraction-repulsion existed. Cities drew people toward a set of integrated activities, while pushing them back into segregated communities inside city walls. The attraction dimension, the city's congregation or integration, was represented by the *street*, designed "to gain universal interconnection" inside the city. The repulsion, the city's segregation or segmentation, was signified by the residential mazes of the city's *quarters*, "deliberately made so arcane that the outsider could not pass easily about [them]."[17]

The integration of economic activities compelled diverse groups to develop some common language and set of conventions for the street. But these were limited, and for almost all other activities segregation drove the different populations to develop insular sets of practices and taboos against breaching the walls of segmentation, the separate codes of the quarters. As in the medieval past, U.S. cities of the late nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries faced the rasping tension between congregation and segregation, integration and segmentation, the street and the quarter, the lure of the narrow familiar group and the opportunities among the broad society of strangers.

American democracy was conceived in the heyday of the small town. In contrast to Europe, Americans celebrated the concept of an inclusive solidarity in those towns, even if the reality was that not all actually became part of the town's core. Theorists emphasized the notion that all members of the community (with their official status as citizens) were part of the inner group and should have equal access to the town's public places and institutions.

Creating a public in larger, complex cities would be no easy task. Like medieval cities, the new U.S. cities were built on both integration and segmentation. Industrial and commercial neighborhoods recalled the medieval street—diverse groups interacting economically in defined spaces. At the same time, residential neighborhoods were reminiscent of quarters, separating different ethnic and racial groups from each other. It is not surprising, then, that the public-ness in the burgeoning nineteenth-century American cities—the thought that the public should include diverse groups—was at once liberating and problematic.

Openness added to the complications of creating a new public code in a period of rapid urbanization. This code had to cover more than only the sort of very limited interchanges that, say, Jews and Christians had had in medieval European cities. It had to serve more than only a limited homogeneous group "allowed" into central public space, as in some contemporary nineteenth-century European cities. If the theory of an inclusive public in the United States would be realized in practice, then its public code would have

to tackle a multiplicity of exchanges across religious or ethnic or class lines, from the downtown sidewalk to the new street cars to the public school. Rules and practices had to develop among groups that had had only limited contact with one another.

That imposing challenge raised all sorts of contentious questions: Could a single set of rules work for all the diverse groups in the city? Who would shape these rules and who would be excluded from that process? Who would benefit from the social conventions and who would find them constraining, restrictive, or even exploitative? No ready responses existed to these questions.

The answers were even more difficult to come by because the actual dynamic of creating an inclusive public with cross-cutting rules had to deal, not only with the popular *image* of an open American public, but also with ongoing *practices* of exclusion as well as with partially self-imposed segmentation in American life. Practices of exclusion were written into the Constitution for women and African Americans and then continued inside and outside the law in the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries. And segmentation was reinforced by the multiple public rules and practices that sprouted among the diverse groups in the city.

For all the rhetoric of equality and equal access for a highly diverse public, in fact, the history of American citizenship from the beginning, as Judith Shklar pointed out, has involved as much exclusion as inclusion—a tension carried down from those celebrated medieval cities.[18] Women, for example, faced some of the same difficulties as their European counterparts. In 1879, Sophie Hall carefully recorded her three-month visit to New York City.[19] Like visitors today, she spent her time seeing the tourist sites, shopping, and visiting friends. Even the stores sound familiar—Macy's, Altman's, and Tiffany's. Commercially, the city was already catering to middle-class women like Sophie Hall, with a district named Ladies' Mile that was a consumer showpiece. But she recorded, too, how the city limited her. The unspoken rules dictated that "she never went out alone, nor did she stay out past dark (four o'clock) unless accompanied by her husband. She was not meant to be seen eating or drinking in public. Her activities were all sanctioned by Victorian standards as appropriately feminine. And the locations and setting of these activities in New York had been patterned to make them safe and appropriate for women."[20]

Segmentation in the city was not only imposed through exclusion; it also was reinforced by the many different sets of rules that developed as people poured into urban America. Various groups, including a wide array of immigrants, created their own new public codes in the city, socially segmenting the new urban landscape. The polyglot of codes of behavior set groups off from one another, often rather sharply, and thus magnified the need for a

synthesizing code that would bridge among the city's groups and create the basis for civil behavior across group boundaries. These parochial public codes were not simply transported from wherever these groups originated, inside and outside the United States. They were newly constructed to address the special conditions and problems that the newcomers encountered in the U.S. city. The existence of multiple public codes did not mark American cities off from those of other cultures in history. What did was the breadth and depth of social interactions *across* ethnic boundaries.

The hurdles created by Americans' ambivalence toward their booming cities, existing practices of exclusion that permeated society, and the cities' separate public codes that segmented the population, all complicated efforts to create an overarching informal code of conduct—the rules of the street—in the United States. More than half a century ago, the sociologist Erving Goffman noted how important it is to understand the "rules of conduct in streets, parks, restaurants, theaters, shops, dance floors, meeting halls, and other gathering places."[21] True, but Goffman gave little sense of the struggle or dynamic in creating a synthesizing set of rules and how multiple sets of rules may complicate that process. How could rules be developed and maintained across the boundaries of class, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, and place of origin?

Exclusion and segmentation had created lines of demarcation in nineteenth-century American cities not totally unlike that which separated the Garden of Eden from the frightening land to the east. Cain had feared those to the east because somehow they were beyond the human community, outside the rules for interaction that governed Eden.[22] In the grinding gears of capitalism, Americans faced not only these age-old boundaries of exclusion, which pitted people against others who seemed to exist beyond the human community. They encountered, too, an economy and society that threw them time-and-again into contact with these others, making the need for a common public code all the more palpable.

ORGANIC AND CONTRACTUAL UNITY: THE STRUGGLE OVER WHO WERE REAL AMERICANS

In the bustling and sometimes dangerous urban spaces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, native-born Americans and immigrants of all stripes sought to find some security among strangers and acquaintances. In the absence of a clearly defined common set of informal urban rules for impersonal interactions in the post–Civil War era, they frequently tried to recreate their rural or homeland affiliations—families, neighborhoods, religious groups, and more—in the city. They tried to revive the common practices

and attachments they had known earlier as a basis for their personal security in the city.

At times, those earlier affiliations they believed they were resuscitating were more imagined than real. Whether they had actually existed in the small town or the old country did not matter much; they still provided a modicum of security in the new uncertain environment of the city. In his classic study, *The Kalela Dance*, the renowned mid-twentieth-century anthropologist Clyde Mitchell reported on precisely this sort of construction of new urban rules and groupings in colonial Africa. He found the creation of new super-tribes in the burgeoning cities that drew upon on often-invented previous rural tribal affiliations.[23]

Use of these sorts of practices held its own dangers. Even within the group, not everybody was prepared to accept some of the old practices, especially those who had been disadvantaged by them and saw the city as a way to escape them. And, as noted, this sort of segmentation did not solve the bridging problem across groups thrown together in the dynamic urban economy. Still, the sheer difficulty of diverse people in U.S. cities coming up with and agreeing to a set rules and scripts for public interaction made the use of old, familiar practices attractive, even if they were not common codes for the city as a whole.

Even as many fell back on particular groups, the dynamics of the burgeoning city and the economic interactions among different groups also prompted attempts to construct a broader, cross-cutting public. Two distinct ways of imagining the broader public—ideas about what and who constituted the nation—emerged in the quickly changing environment of the late nineteenth century. Taking its cue from the more narrowly defined groups that had reimagined their old affiliations in the new city, the first set of ideas involved an understanding that grounded the nation in the kindred (usually purported blood) qualities of race and religion. The second perspective had a contractual basis. Here, the defining element of the nation was a person's voluntary agreement and personal qualifications to accept the central principles of the nation. In this view, theoretically (but *not* practically), the public would be open to *any* person no matter what his or her blood origin. This struggle between these contending views for creating a broadly defined American public heated up considerably after the Civil War.

Severe dislocations and breaks in history, like the Civil War, often prompt a rash of efforts to recast a people's narrative about themselves—their understanding of who constitutes the group and who is outside. Priscilla Wald wrote of how an historical break induces a "people" to speak itself into existence.[24] In the United States, the incredible horrors of the Civil War itself, the wrenching dislocations of industrialization, the shift from country to city, and "the challenge posed by the variously unassimilated people" now pouring

into the cities, together constituted such a break and initiated intense efforts to retell the American narrative.[25] The question of who constituted the public and who would write the public rules came to the forefront in increasingly heterogeneous cities.

Various groups have tried in every period of the country's history to define special, organic ties that link people to one another. Particularly, when excluded groups, such as women or African Americans, knocked on the door of the public demanding changes in everyday rules and practices or when old elements felt their hard-earned respect and privileges challenged, there has been murmuring about who is a *Real* American, that is, who constitutes the public or the nation. It is precisely that call to organic unity that Trump issued in telling Congresswomen to go back to where they came from.

After the Civil War, too, claims emerged that real Americans shared an integral core based on Christianity or the white race or some other formulation. Such assertions were not simply the product of a fanatic fringe. They were incorporated into the fabric of politics, trying legally to define who makes up the public. One liberal political thinker demonstrated how U.S. law has "long been shot through with forms of second-class citizenship, denying personal liberties and opportunities for political participation to most of the adult population on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and even religion . . . [Restrictions] manifested passionate beliefs that America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors."[26]

Instances of legislation and Supreme Court rulings limiting voting rights are legion. In the 1890s, for example, Congress repealed a number of laws used in Reconstruction to enforce voting rights. The result was the disenfranchisement in Southern states of African Americans—and poor whites. The court then upheld state elections "even if blacks had unlawfully been intimidated not to vote."[27] In other cases, poor whites and African Americans repeatedly petitioned to the Supreme Court in the early part of the twentieth century to protect their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the court turned a blind eye toward them, preferring to interpret the Amendment in favor of corporations, not individual citizens.[28] Second-class citizenship meant not only limited legal rights; it also translated into a different, less respectful way of being treated in everyday interactions. It meant being called "boy" instead of "sir."

Negative rulings also came on issues of women's and immigrants' rights. Federal courts and Congress, as well as state courts and legislatures, were attempting to narrow the meaning of who constituted the public. The effect was both to ease the creation of a unified public by limiting it to a homogeneous part of the population and to create numerous groups that were legally and socially excluded from being part of that public. Yes, there was an

indivisible nation, but that indivisibility was for a narrowly defined nation, resting on well-grounded rules of exclusion.

At the same time, the rhetoric of liberalism presented a contending vision of the glue holding the nation together, the contractual perspective. Here, the outlook was of a nation constructed through common agreement over a set of beliefs, not through one's heritage or gender or place of birth. Contractual assent to the principles represented in the Constitution would provide the sinews for holding the American public together. While very few people in the 1860s and the decades following were talking in terms of a truly universal citizenship, liberals were presenting a powerful alternative to organic notions about how the nation should be constituted and what its public code should be. That contractual conception, hypothetically at least, opened the door for eventually absorbing into the American nation and its public code the diverse groups populating the burgeoning cities.

In that first period in the nineteenth century, the dominant group faced a giant conundrum as it established and then extended its particular public code. Liberal thought, which had developed in northwestern Europe, particularly England, both influenced the nature of the public code that developed and was, in turn, shaped by that public code. On one side, this group's liberalism led it to establish a set of rules laced with expressions of universalism and egalitarianism. Those qualities conveyed the sense that its rules were intended to apply to everyone equally and that its institutions should be accessible to all. From the Declaration of Independence on, documents, by-laws of organizations, and public laws, often explicitly stated a universal, inclusive basis of membership.

These principles, sincerely adopted, threatened the dominant group's exclusivity and control. So, on the other side, all sorts of qualifiers were added to the universal principles. Birthright (or naturalization) was not enough for one to be a proper part of the indivisible nation; one had to demonstrate the proper qualities of a "citizen"—educated, deliberative, well-mannered, and the like. Being properly civil was the prerequisite to being properly civic. At first blush, anyone, at least in terms of the language used, could develop such civil traits. No inherited caste was entitled to be the only true citizens or could share the mantle of being part of the public. No matter what family one came from, a person was entitled to the privileges of citizenship and the respect of being a full-fledged member of the public.

In practice, though, descent did become a distinguishing factor. In the late nineteenth century, writes an historian, "priority of residence, purity of blood, and pride of Protestantism became benchmarks of social distinction and political legitimacy . . . . Literature of the day abounded in stereotypes and epithets for European and Asian immigrants,"[29] and knotty restrictions in written law applied to African Americans and women. The dominant

group shut others out from the important institutions where public rules were frequently hatched, nurtured, and maintained, from the school boards to the fraternal organizations.

Outsiders encountered a series of unwritten tests that they could only fail, because of their descent or gender. They could not be too aggressive (like Jews), too accepting of outside authority (like Catholics), too impulsive (like Italians), too emotional (like women), or too irresponsible (like the Irish or, generally, the poor without property). No group failed the tests more resoundingly than African Americans. An article in *The New York Medical Journal* in 1886, for example, listed all the types of behavior by African Americans that made them ineligible for participation in the public: Blacks were "naturally intemperate [prone to indulging] every appetite too freely, whether for food, drink, tobacco, or sensual pleasures, and sometimes to such an extent as to appear more of a brute than human."[30]

"Each race was said to reflect a different stage of evolution, the most advanced being Anglo-Saxons and Teutons, and the lowest being south eastern Europeans, Indians, Blacks, and Moslems."[31] Academics spoke of the higher level Teutonic Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, and, of course, English, who "had consciences and self-control that enabled them to enjoy civil and political liberty."[32] If those other "races," those not in the higher level, threatened the existing code and the dominance of the in-group, a variety of formal and informal means were used to keep them out. From the Constitution onward, explicit clauses crept into laws and by-laws excluding certain categories of people from full, equal membership.[33] Social clubs are probably the best-known vestige of this sort of "liberal exclusivism," but it was practiced in universities, corporate board rooms, residential zoning commissions, and many other settings, as well.

It was scary to think about the vulnerability of a nation not held together by ethnicity or religion or some other organic basis for creating a homogeneous public, as many other nations were. At the heart of the strength of the organic view in the struggle over how to define the nation was, as Rogers Smith put it, "the inability of egalitarian liberal republican views to provide an understanding of why Americans should see themselves as loyal members of this society in preference to all others, a task that ascriptive [organic] myths perform well."[34] The anonymity of cities heightened the question of what connection urban strangers had to one another, and familiarity—even an imagined familiarity—helped make people feel that such a connection existed.

The struggle between these contending perspectives, the organic and the contractual, occurred at many levels—in state and federal law as well as in daily social practice. Its outcome was not a clear winner of one over the other. Instead, the result of the vying perspectives was the triumph of a core element that had all the attributes of an organic group—native-born high-Protestant

males of northwest European descent—but one that espoused a republican liberal conception of the nation. Only much later did its own stated principles, its need to feed the capitalist machine that it nurtured, and the sheer growth of the increasingly diverse cities it ruled overwhelm its monopoly in defining the nation and the society's public code.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, struggle over the conception of what it meant to be an American did not involve only divisions over ideology within this dominant group. New groups funneling into the cities did not simply sit on the sidelines viewing an academic debate among elites. They took the American liberal credo seriously. Indeed, one should never underestimate the power of the notion of equality once it enters the popular imagination. American city-dwellers of all stripes groped for a uniform set of unwritten rules of proper street behavior for a diverse population, for ways of blurring the lines of demarcation. For them, an overarching public code could provide an increased sense of security in the huge city, a set of expectations of how others would act. It could be a battering ram to break down the walls of exclusion. The debate over who could be a *real* American and what the public code would be was not at all academic; it would determine their opportunities (and the lack thereof) and practices. It would dictate where they landed on the social ladder, as respect increasingly came to be differentially disbursed on the basis of the reigning public code.

CONCLUSION

The deep strain of ambivalence about cities that meandered through Western culture at once forced the issue in the United States of devising a bridging, public code and raised deeply held suspicions that made it exceedingly difficult to forge the basic rules of such a code. Such incongruity has recreated itself in the personal histories of many Americans. With their wide-open spaces and beckoning frontier, as much as any other people, Americans have felt the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of cities. It was in that uncertain milieu that they faced the challenge of creating a bridging public language, one that could overcome segmentation and lurking evil.

Daniel Drake, who was called the Benjamin Franklin of the West for his role in the building of Cincinnati in the early 1800s, contrasted his path with that of his father. The elder Drake had left Plainfield, New Jersey, as a younger (thus landless) son seeking his fortune on the frontier open for homesteading in the West. He had fled the city for the open countryside. But, unlike his father, an unrepentant Daniel later shunned the rural America in favor of the city. His depiction of the city was one that ignored its rootlessness and licentiousness, the qualities that had driven his father to abandon Plainfield.

"I was in a stage of transition," he wrote, "from one state to another; from the rural to the civic, from the rude to the refined, from obscurity to notoriety!"[35]

Ambivalence about cities—appreciation of the space they provide for personal expression, freedom, and creativity, on one side, and dread of the alienation and corruption they represent, on the other—worked its way from the Biblical narratives to present-day films and novels. It was not simply that these attitudes that took hold in Western culture and through folktales and passed-on wisdom found their way into the heads of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Americans. Social institutions that people encountered every day harbored and promoted attitudes and practices that sustained this ambivalence. The kinds of cultural institutions that thrive in cities, for example—theaters, magazines, opera companies, and the like—created support networks and the image of the city as the place for a star to be born, a Mecca for aspiring writers and performing artists. These institutions embodied the glamour of the city, and, in their products and everyday workings, also represented what was seen to be as decadent morés at odds with those of rural, familiar relations.

The public code that was constructed and became dominant in the second half of the nineteenth century was born in difficult circumstances. It emerged precisely in the nexus of these dueling understandings of the city in American life. The nostalgic attraction of the small town (and the accompanying suspicion of city life) and the pull of segmentation in the city toward parochial, rather than bridging, public rules led to an environment of contestation. A wary urban population, segmented into a host of smaller publics, was suspicious of any purported public code that could unite diverse groups. An accepted, bridging set of rules had to bear the weight of creating the civility necessary for democracy to function and shaping the common expectations and values for a shared credo in a now smoke-stacked America.

The challenge of creating a public with cross-cutting rules for everyday behavior, one that can manage the tensions between citizen equality and socioeconomic gaps and that can transcend narrow interests to express a vision of the common welfare, is not unique to the United States. The new states that came out of the dissolution of the colonial empires and of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century faced similar dilemmas.

Israel, which declared its independence in 1948, is a prime example of the challenge of sewing together an effective public in a society of strangers. Divisions abounded between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, new immigrants and prestate "veteran" Jews, European Ashkenazim and Middle East Mizrahim, religious and secular Jews, and different groups from multiple countries. The notion of different "tribes" in Israel coexisting, but not forging a workable unity, has caught on among academics and public officials.[36] The

president of Israel, Reuben Rivlin, warned in 2015 that a sense of common "Israeliness" is threatened by "tribes" pursuing their own narrow interests.[37] No divide in the country is more prominent than the one between Jews and Palestinian Arab citizens of the state, although some hopeful rays have made their way through the clouds. Whether Israel and other postcolonial states will be able to forge relatively coherent publics is still an open question. The road is long and difficult, and the outcome is far from assured.

As in Israel today, nineteenth-century America was rife with suspicion and segmentation, especially in its burgeoning cities. Remarkably, though, from the middle of the nineteenth century on, a cross-cutting set of rules for everyday life did spread through American society. A dominant set of rules for everyday interaction came to be broadly accepted—sometimes overlaying and sometimes complementing the polyglot of publics and their own rules. Even as the cross-cutting set of rules took root as the dominant public code and even as the boundaries of the public widened, newcomers subtly and continuously reshaped and recharged these public rules as they bought into them and, at times, contested them. They gave the set of rules an extraordinary dynamism and resiliency, allowing it to withstand countless challenges and loud griping. These outsiders simultaneously embraced the rules and continuously remolded them; they accepted, resisted, and reacted to various practices of daily behavior.

Walls of exclusion continued to exist, denying African Americans, recent immigrants, women, gays, and others full acceptance as "familiar strangers," as full participants in the public. Even for these excluded groups, significant cracks in the walls did appear in the latter decades of the twentieth century. But the twenty-first century has presented a much more difficult environment.

A public with implicitly agreed rules for daily behavior and an ability to agree broadly on the common good is an extremely fragile entity. The American public has begun to unravel. The place of immigrants and others as rightful members of the public has been violently and nonviolently challenged, led and symbolized by an American president shouting for them to go back from where they came from.

NOTES

1. Stephan Thernstrom, "Urbanization, Migration, and Social Mobility in Late-Nineteenth Century America," in *Urban America in Historical Perspective*, ed. Raymond A. Mohl and Neil Betten (New York, NY: Weybright and Talley, 1970), 193.

2. Stanford M. Lyman, Arthur J. Vidich, and Herbert Blumer, *Selected Works of Herbert Blumer: A Public Philosophy for Mass Society* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 151.

3. Jill Lepore, "Politics and the Machine: What the Turn from Polls to Data Science Means for Democracy," *The New Yorker*, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/16/politics-and-the-new-machine.

4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, Book, Whole (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1950).

5. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, NY: Library of America, 2004), 219.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted in *Norbert Elias on Civilization, Power, and Knowledge*, ed. Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 257.

7. Page Smith, *As a City Upon a Hill: The Town in American History* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1966).

8. Simmel marks the nineteenth century as the pivotal transformation in which "individuals liberated from historical bonds now wished to distinguish themselves from one another . . . . It is the function of the metropolis to provide the arena for this struggle and its reconciliation." David Frisby and Mike Featherstone, *Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings*, ed. M. Featherstone (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 185.

9. Rogers Silverstone, "Introduction," in *Visions of Suburbia*, ed. Rogers Silverstone (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 4.

10. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, "Occidentalism," *The New York Review of Books* 49, No. 1 (January 17, 2002): 4.

11. Zane L. Miller, *The Urbanization of Modern America: A Brief History* (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1973), 7. This figure represents the percentage of people living in settlements of 2,500 or more. Only two cities, New York and Philadelphia had more than 25,000 people.

12. A number of recent studies by journalists pay particular attention to the bleakness of Western cities. See Timothy Egan, *Lasso the Wind: Away to the New West*, Book, Whole (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

13. Lyn H. Lofland, *The Public Realm: Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory* (New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1998), ch. 5, "Antiurbanism and the Representational War on the Public Realm."

14. Max Weber, *The City* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1958), 94.

15. James E. Vance Jr., *Continuing City: Urban Morphology in Western Civilization*, Book, Whole (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 123.

16. Vance, *Continuing City*, 37.

17. Vance, *Continuing City*, 38.

18. Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion*, Book, Whole (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

19. Sophie Hall's account is taken from Liz Bondi and Mona Domosh, "On the Contours of Public Space: A Tale of Three Women," *Antipode* 30 (1998): 270–89.

20. Bondi and Domosh, "On the Contours of Public Space," 279.

21. Erving Goffman, *Behavior in Public Spaces: Notes on the Social Organizations of Gatherings* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1963), 3–4.

22. Twentieth-century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has argued that the Hebrew Bible itself created the basis for erasing the lines of demarcation by creating a common law for humankind. "Levinas reads every mention of 'Israelite' in the Talmud [the 'oral' exposition of the Bible] as meaning 'human being'." Ira F. Stone, *Reading Levinas/Reading Talmud: An Introduction* (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society, 1998), 34.

23. J. Clyde Mitchell, *The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia*, Book, Whole (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1956).

24. Priscilla Wald, *Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 2.

25. Wald, *Constituting Americans*, 2.

26. Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).

27. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 408–409.

28. "As late as the mid-thirties, less than 10 percent of the Court's decisions involved individual rights other than property rights." This figure grew to over 70 percent in the late 1960s. Charles R. Epp, *The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2.

29. Philip Perlmutter, *Legacy of Hate: A Short History of Ethnic, Religious, and Racial Prejudice in America* (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 105.

30. Quoted in Ta-Nehisi Coates, "The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration," *The Atlantic*, 2015, 105, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/.

31. Perlmutter, *Legacy of Hate*, 105.

32. Perlmutter, *Legacy of Hate*, 106, quoting Columbia University Professor John William Burgess.

33. Smith, *Civic Ideals*.

34. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 471.

35. Quoted in Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 280. Drake was Vance's distant grandfather.

36. Baruch Kimmerling, *Clash of Identities: Explorations in Israeli and Palestinian Societies* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008). Baruch Kimmerling, *The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony (Hebrew)*, Book, Whole (Jerusalem: Keter, 2001).

37. Avi Lewis, *Tribal Schisms Tearing Israel Apart, Rivlin Cautions*, accessed January 9, 2020, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-divided-along-tribal-lines-rivlin-warns/.

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Section III

NATIONAL MEMORY, MEMORIALIZATION, AND DRAMATIZATION

Chapter 8

The Bible Now

Political Satire and National Memory[1]

Yael Zerubavel

Meir Shalev's *The Bible Now* [*Tanach achsha*v][2] was hailed as the forerunner of a new wave of secular interpretations of the Bible upon its publication in 1985. Having originated in a column in the liberal Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, the book was characterized as "the first serious secular commentary (*midrash*) by an Israeli writer."[3] Another critic likened Shalev's writing to wiping the dust off an old piece of jewelry to make it shine again, crediting this makeover as opening the door for secular Israelis to rediscover the Bible as interesting, entertaining, and relevant to their own lives.[4] This chapter examines the special features of *The Bible Now* that contributed to its interpretation of the biblical text and its impact on the mnemonic role of the Bible as a national text that connects the past and the present.

In the Hebrew culture that developed during the formative years of the Jewish society of Palestine, the bible was seen as the repository of Jews' collective memory of their origins and ancient past that supported their national vision. Drawing on the European Enlightenment and its transformed approach to the Bible,[5] Zionist Hebrew culture regarded the Bible as a national literature that offers political and programmatic ideas that legitimized the Zionist project and its future aspirations. In line with Zionist collective memory and its approach to Jews' exilic past, Hebrew culture elevated the status of the Bible as the primary sacred text and marginalized the rabbinic literature and other canonical works that were central to Jews' religious education during centuries, but it was deemed part of the discredited Jewish exilic culture.[6] Zionist Hebrew schools thus emphasized the national framework of the study of the Bible and other works, an approach supported by other, informal educational venues during the prestate and early state periods.[7] Israelis' fascination with archeology in the 1950s and 1960s further demonstrated the significance of Jewish antiquity to modern Israel.[8]

By the time Shalev published *The Bible Now* in the mid-1980s, the Bible had suffered from a period of noticeable decline in Israeli culture. This change could be interpreted as a sign of a more mature society, more assured of its place in the Middle East and preoccupied with the immediate challenges it faced during the 1948 war and its aftermath. Israelis were challenged to shape the foundations of their new state as well as take care of a massive Jewish immigration to their country; they had to face the security issues around the continuing conflict with Arab countries and the Palestinians.

But there were other reasons that contributed to the decline in the status of the Bible. A widening gap between biblical Hebrew and the rapidly developing contemporary Hebrew made the Bible appear more archaic and less accessible to the younger generations, and the reduced time allocated to the study of the Bible in nonreligious public education contributed to the decline of the knowledge of the biblical text.[9] Israeli linguist Gilad Zuckermann underscores the significance of the linguistic gap as he argues that the language Israelis speak, which he names "*Israelit*," is both distinct and different from biblical Hebrew.[10] The publication of a "translation" of the Bible to contemporary Hebrew to facilitate the study of Bible at school provides another sort of acknowledgement that ancient Hebrew has become a "foreign language" for contemporary Israeli youth.[11] Political developments in the post-1967 era further eroded the status of the Bible. The growing internal divisions within Israeli society and the intensifying debates on the future of the occupied territories since the late 1970s impacted the unifying role of the Bible as national literature.[12] Its galvanization in support of an annexationist agenda of the "biblical land of Israel" by the Israeli Right identified the Bible with their agenda, thereby alienating those on the Left from it. Moreover, the increased presence and political power of Orthodox and Ultraorthodox (Haredi) Jews in Israeli political life strengthened their claim for the authoritative interpretation of Jewish religious law (*halakha*) and sacred texts further weakened secular, liberal Israeli Jews' attachment to it.

The growing awareness of the processes that introduced a linguistic, ideological, and political distance between secular Israelis and the Hebrew Bible offers the context for the publication of *The Bible Now* and accounts for the literary strategies that Meir Shalev employs in offering a different approach to the biblical text. As the author's introduction reveals, his goal is to provide a new and modern interpretation of selected biblical narratives to help secular Israelis rediscover the appeal of the Bible and its relevance to their lives. Shalev therefore underscores his departure from those who write the traditional Jewish commentaries to these texts:

> My bible is a different bible. Its writers and characters are flesh and blood. It is not written by God, and its heroes are neither pure nor saintly. I do not have a

> scholar's education or a traditional commentator's motivation. For me, the bible is an exciting and a thought-provoking book which I love to read. It contains sufficient doses of politics, love, faith, and thought to make any reader reflect on what happens around him even today. This is the spirit in which I've written this book. (p. 7)

As evident in the choice of the book title, the key strategy Shalev uses is *contemporization*, namely, the process of taking historical figures and events out of their period and shifting them to the present by applying contemporary perspective and sensibilities to his discussion of the text. This approach demonstrates how the meaning of the text is created through a dialogic process between past and present perspectives, a feature that is keen to the construction of collective memory.[13] Although Shalev privileges his use of the contemporization strategy, the study of his work reveals the occasional use of the reverse strategy of *archaization*, that is, the symbolic reference to contemporary events or figures as if they took place in the ancient past. Either choice introduces an anachronistic framework that defies the conception of historical time as linear and irreversible, highlighting the mnemonic role of the Bible.[14] Thus, the use of these strategies in the process of reinterpreting the biblical narratives shifts them from the domain of history to the dynamic domain of memory.

In his introduction, the author, who was born in 1948, ascribes his love of the Bible to his upbringing in a secular family that was deeply connected to the Bible. His parents turned the biblical narratives and figures into a living part of their lives and a topic of spontaneous family discussions. As a child, Meir considered the biblical heroes, along with fictional characters of European literature he read in Hebrew translation, as part of his inner world. To explain how he learned to internalize the biblical stories, he provides an example of such informal tutoring by his parents during a family trip:

> At school they taught us how David overcame Goliath: The five pebbles that David collected in a stream stood for the five books of the Torah. This is what the rabbinical sages said, and this was what the teacher told me. But my father took me to the Elah stream and showed me where the Israelites camped and where the Philistines stood [. . .] and he selected for me five pebbles. Kneeling down there, in the dry wadi, I felt the cool, smooth touch of the stone that was similar to that which David had used for his weapon. Goliath was the essence of all that was wicked, violent and arbitrary around me. David was a short boy with glasses that held a pebble and overcame the evil force. (p. 7)

This simple act of reenactment created an embodied memory through which the modern Israeli child easily identified with biblical David confronting his

gigantic Goliath. His imagined portrait of David in his own image—a short boy with glasses—adds a humorous touch given the anachronistic attribution of glasses to David and the contrast with the glorified image of the biblical hero as a strikingly handsome youth. Shalev testifies to the impact of this early experience that made a Jewish collective memory become a personal memory.[15] The power of such mnemonic acts practiced during tours of the land and reenactments of biblical narratives was known in the emergent Hebrew culture of the prestate period and continued in the post-independence years during which the author grew up. As I show elsewhere, such practices are still performed today, even if transformed, and are partly cultivated by a nostalgic approach to this earlier Israeli past.[16]

The use of the contemporization and the archaization strategies in *The Bible Now* is hardly novel or unique. A long tradition of Jewish commentators offers interpretations based on their creators' historical perspectives and understanding of the canonical texts. As Galit Hasan-Rokem writes, "texts such as the bible and the midrashic and talmudic literature are part of the taken-for-granted content of the present, and while reading them one has to take into account the history of their reception in our culture." But, at the same time, she notes, "It is impossible to offer an interpretation at the present in which the present is not included in complex and interesting ways."[17] The novelty of *The Bible Now* lies in Shalev's use of contemporization to advance his deliberate secularist agenda and amplify it by embedding satirical elements in his interpretations.

Shalev asserts that readers' responses to his retelling of biblical narratives in *Ha'aretz* demonstrated to him that "religious people tend to see the bible as their private property and not all secular Israelis are ready and know how to stand up for their own rights [to it]" (p. 7). To correct this situation, he deliberately chooses to offer his commentary in contemporary, journalistic style. His use of colloquial Hebrew expressions thus replaces biblical Hebrew as well as the possibility of drawing on a higher literary register and highlights the difference between his rendition and the ancient biblical text. This anachronistic approach is apparent as early as in the table of contents: Shalev introduces contemporary Israeli political terms (such as "deputy-minister" and "opposition"), religious and military expressions (such as "chief rabbi," "military summon," and "decorated hero"), and foreign words adapted into Israeli Hebrew (such as "protection" and "consensus"). These linguistic and stylistic choices make the text of *The Bible Now* accessible to the modern Israeli reader, but no less significantly, they introduce a jarring and humorous juxtaposition between the contemporary and mundane character of Shalev's writing and the ancient and sacred character of the biblical text.

His secularist stance leads the author to examine the biblical narrative from a contemporary, humanistic perspective and to question religious

interpretations offered by traditional Jewish commentaries. The targets of his criticism as well as the intensity of his critique vary across the chapters. Shalev views biblical heroes as people of "flesh and blood" but he also challenges God's role in various narratives; he addresses traditional commentaries and their points of view, or moves beyond them and the biblical text to today's Israel. At times, Shalev keeps a light, humorous tone, while at others he is sharply sarcastic or judgmental. The author assumes the readers' familiarity with their basic outline, if not in the details, of the narratives he discusses and relies on their ability to decipher when his text deviates from the original. Through these linguistic, stylistic, and substantive alterations, anachronistic shifts, and ironic or sarcastic comments, Shalev creates a multilayered interpretive text. The incongruity of *The Bible Now* with the biblical version produces the humor that turns the book into a satirical work.[18]

THE BIBLE NOW: SELECTED TEXTS

A closer look at a few examples of Shalev's use of contemporization in presenting his rendition of the biblical narrative illustrates the move from a more limited to the more radical use of this discursive strategy. The chapter "In the Bethlehem Barn" provides an example of a limited critique that is essentially targeting the traditional interpretations of the Book of Ruth. Shalev characterizes Ruth and Boaz as "another couple in a long line of lovers who made love in the barn" (p. 76), and dismisses the traditional commentators' evasions and rationalizations of the sexual encounter in the barn. He presents the true heroes of this story as "love, schemes, and the enchantment of a summer night which have never failed one" (p. 77). The references to contemporary Israel are minimal in this chapter and appear in the form of ironic side-remarks, such as the comment that "in those days they did not provide returning residents with special privileges," (p. 72) while referring to the economic hardships that Naomi and Ruth faced. The author's major critique targets the traditional interpretations, which he blames for flattening the biblical narrative and depriving their readers from its intricate and colorful plot about a family's misfortune, women's resourcefulness, familial loyalties, passion, survival, and honor codes.

The chapter, titled "The Man from the Land of Uz," addresses the Book of Job and introduces a more radically subversive secularist framework to its interpretation of the biblical narrative. Shalev's commentary replaces the examination of Job, the biblical protagonist, by turning God's role into the major object of his inquiry. Jewish tradition has articulated the struggle to comprehend the moral and religious issues raised by the biblical story of Job, so in itself this perspective is not new. But Shalev's irreverent attitude imbued

with sarcasm departs from earlier attempts to grapple with these issues. His radical use of contemporization is sharp and explicit, alluding to God as a researcher who violates the ethical standards of studying human subjects, and a sarcastic comment that God shows a tendency to be carried away by excessive scientific zeal, referring to the story of the Binding of Isaac. He sarcastically adds that "in the case of Job, there is a significant methodological improvement in the experiment" relatively to the test of Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his son, since all of the children of the tested man are killed in the first phase (p. 107). Shalev further criticizes God's reply to Job, which he labels "communication failure" (*keshel hasbarati*) that he attributes to God's human "speech writers" (p. 109). The chapter ends on a sarcastic note: "We who believe that a mortal being wrote God's answer warmly recommend to the All Mighty that next time he finds better speech writers for himself than those who demonstrated their poor abilities in the Book of Job" (p. 111). The novelty of Shalev's discussion of Job is not in the very act of questioning divine justice that Job raises in the biblical text or the anthropomorphic reference to God as human; it is the author's attitude, ranging from the irreverent to the sacrilegious. It is important to note though that Shalev is not unique in producing a satirical text that displays such attitudes around this time: a more radical example is provided in Hanoch Levin's play, "Job's Passion" [*Yisurei Ee'yov*], which was performed in Tel Aviv a few years earlier.[19]

The two following examples illustrate a more dramatic use of the contemporization strategy that uses the biblical narrative to address contemporary Israeli issues. This approach may be detected in the opening of the chapter "The Burial of the Opposition," which shifts the climax of a biblical episode to present-day Israel without first alluding to the biblical narrative:

> Imagine the following scene: The Knesset is deliberating a vote of no-confidence in the government [. . .]. The Prime Minister walks to the podium to answer his critics. He clears his throat and addresses the assembly as follows: "Mr. Speaker, honorable Knesset members, I request that you all move away from the Opposition benches so that no one gets hurt." (p. 119)

The incredulous members respond to the prime minister in mockery and disbelief, yet then "the chamber floor cracks opens" and a great commotion ensues:

> The entire opposition with all its members, secretaries, speakers and questions is swallowed by the earth. In the deep surrounding silence, only the Prime Minister's slow steps can be heard as he returns to his seat, followed by fearful and amazed looks, especially from the benches of *Agudat Israel* [an ultraorthodox Jewish party].

Following this enigmatic beginning, Shalev reveals that this hypothetical scene is inspired by the biblical text relating to Korah and his people who challenged Moses' leadership: "And the earth opens its mouth and swallows them up with their households, all Korah's people and all their possessions" (Numbers 16:32). In a mock denial, he suggests that he is not comparing the ancient episode to contemporary Israel but only means to show "how they treated the Opposition in those olden good days." The interpretation of the biblical narrative nonetheless draws heavily on contemporization. Unlike the biblical narrative and its traditional interpretations that underscore Moses' faith and the divine miracle that rewards him, Shalev refers to Moses and Aaron as "the government" (*shiltonot*) and calls Korah, Datan, and Aviram the "Opposition." He carries the analogy further as he notes:

> The story of Korah and his company represents the only instance of a meaningful, organized opposition with its own agenda challenging Moses' leadership. For the first time, a democratic note is introduced into the radically theocratic rule of Moses and his family. [. . .] Jewish tradition loathed Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, but a dispassionate analysis reveals that they initiated nothing more than a common political procedure. Clearly, democracy was not in vogue in those days, but the ruling party's response was egregious. (p. 123)

The author goes on to criticize God's intervention on behalf of Moses, which led to the death of thousands of people rather than first try nonviolent measures such as divine miracles. At the end of the chapter, in a surprising move, Shalev reintroduces a second temporal shift, moving from the biblical episode to a sarcastic reference to a recent political moment in contemporary Israel:

> We set aside for now the celebrated case of the opposition that buries itself—a fascinating development in its own right—for which, alas, we find no biblical analogue. (p. 124)

The Israeli reader requires no explanation to understand the contemporary referent: The Israeli Labor Party's loss of power in 1977 and the continuing erosion of its base since then while serving in the opposition. Whereas the earlier use of contemporization in the opening paragraph is designed to illuminate the problematic character of the biblical story, the ending introduces archaization by offering an analogy of the present situation to the biblical past. Shalev keeps this satirical punch about contemporary politics to the end of this chapter, making it appear as a side-remark or an afterthought, but the title of the chapter reveals the significance of this punch line, which may have played a central role in his choice of this biblical narrative.

The last example, the chapter on "An Old and Foolish King," offers a fuller satirical move between the biblical text and the contemporary Israeli political scene. The title draws on Ecclesiastes 4:13, which is fully quoted as the motto for this chapter: "Better a poor but wise youth than an old but foolish king who no longer has the sense to heed warnings." Shalev begins the discussion by pointing to a biblical episode of a young person challenging the elderly but quickly shifts to a Likud Party's advertisement during the 1977 election season that praised its leader's stature thanks to his advanced age and life experience. Shalev disputes this logic, arguing that "longevity does not guarantee greater wisdom" (p. 125), and moves on to explore biblical "gerontological evidence" of his position that contains hints regarding its relevance to present politics. Thus, for example, when he addresses the case of the 85-year old Caleb Ben Jephunneh (Joshua 14:10–11), he offers the observation that "an old leader's physical and psychological state is of a legitimate concern for the public" (p. 128). Similarly, when drawing on the example of aging Moses who could not keep his arms raised up in a gesture that would guarantee the Israelites' victory over the Amalek (Exodus 17:11), his younger aids supported his arms to compensate for his weakness. Shalev sarcastically notes as he builds up the analogy with the present without spelling it out:

> Waving arms have since become a favored practice by Israel's leaders, but the true lesson of this is more important: a leader whose age prevents him from doing certain acts would be wise to find himself help and support among his ministers and colleagues. (p. 129)

The final example he provides for a biblical aging leader focuses on King David:

> King David's last days provide just one example of an aging leader who has difficulty grasping the reality that unfolds around him. Every such ruler is surrounded by schemers who know how to take advantage of his weakness so as to pursue their own agenda.

At this point Shalev explicitly returns to the present-day as he comments on the absurdity of having a legally forced retirement on most professions in Israel while spearing the heads of the state before slyly posing a rhetorical question:

> How is it that the recommendations of the Kahan Committee got into the fourth chapter of Ecclesiastes? I cannot answer this question. Perhaps biblical scholars will be able to look into this issue. (p. 130)

Without mentioning by name Prime Minister Menahem Begin throughout his interpretation of the biblical text, this chapter targets the aging leader's failure to control the scope of the first Lebanon War that his Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, spearheaded, which let Israel's allies, the Christian militia, massacre Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Shatila camps in 1982. The massive demonstrations that occurred in Israel at the time, protesting the expansion of the war beyond its initial goals and the army's failure to stop the Christian Phalange's massacre led to the formation of a special investigative committee headed by the President of Israel's Supreme Court, Justice Yitzhak Kahan. Shalev does not have to spell out this context to his readers, and the reference to the Kahan committee is sufficiently blunt to encapsulate the analogy that *The Bible Now* offers between the biblical past and the present around the theme of aging leaders and their challenge to carry out their responsibilities. The author's "innocent" question reverses the conventional logic of historical causality by embedding the contemporary scene in the biblical text, using this archaization as a springboard for his satirical commentary on Israeli politics.

CONCLUSION

The publication of *The Bible Now* was welcomed as a turning point in Israeli culture, indicating the revival of an interest in the Bible as a meaningful and dynamic site of Jewish memory. *The Bible Now* is by no means a political manifesto, but it presents the author's ideological point of view as a Left-leaning, secular Israeli Jew. The biblical commentary he provides therefore has a direct bearing on Israeli politics of the present, addressing the religious-secular conflict over the shaping of Israeli culture as well as the Left-Right division regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its implications. Meir Shalev explicitly acknowledged his goal to legitimize secular Israelis' right to identify with the Bible and to interpret it, without being bound to a religious viewpoint, to centuries-old commentaries, or to academic training that legitimizes such efforts. Reclaiming secular Israelis' right to the "love of the Bible" that was central to Israelis' education in earlier periods, Shalev employs the strategy of offering temporal shifts by way of contemporization or archaization to support the use of the biblical narratives in order to offer a satirical perspective on the present. Against the backdrop of growing sense of decline in the status and knowledge of the Bible among secular Israelis, *The Bible Now* posits the goal to draw secular Israelis closer to the biblical narratives and appeals to moderate traditional or religious readers as well. As an Israeli critic notes:

> Because of its novelty, there was something provocative and bold in this book that took away from the Orthodox Jews the monopoly over the interpretation [of

> the Bible], which they claim for themselves. Shalev succeeded in contemporizing the bible and showing its relevance today, and especially in using its stories to sting and attack the political and religious establishment.[20]

The use of contemporization as a strategy that offers the interpretation of an earlier narrative from today's perspective, or the alternative strategy of archaization that addresses the present as if it belonged to a remote past, is by no means limited to the interpretation of the Bible or to the Israeli-Jewish cultural milieu. Both strategies construct an analogy between the present and the past, which implies an anachronistic approach that historians might reject yet is typical of the domain of memory. Similarly, while *The Bible Now* was cheered as "the first serious secular *midrash* written by an Israeli writer," as quoted earlier, this evaluation overlooks the multiple poetic and fictional works that can be seen as secular *midrashim* of biblical narratives. The construction of "turning points" that dramatize a historical change that obscures a longer and more gradual process is nonetheless one of the features of collective memory.[21]

The retelling of biblical narrative from a secular perspective, often while using the contemporization strategy, a popular mode, or a humorous framework, had precedents to the publication of Shalev's work. The publication of *Chronicles: News of the Past* (*Divrei ha-yamim: Hadshot he-avar*) in the mid-1950s offers an example. The choice of a newspaper-like format presents the biblical stories through a diverse offering of news, brief articles, cartoons, pictures, maps, letters-to-the-editor, advertisements, and even a gossip column. The "biblical newspaper" was published for four years and included forty-eight monthly issues. Like *The Bible Now, Chronicles* uses an anachronistic journalistic style, language, and form, which introduce jarring juxtapositions that produce a humorous effect. Unlike Shalev's later work, however, *Chronicles* did not pursue a critical or a satirical approach to the biblical text. In the spirit of the 1950s, it articulated the significance of the Bible as a unifying canonical text and was seen as a way to make the Bible more easily accessible and strengthen national values among Israeli youth. The shared understanding of the educational value of this popular rendition of the Bible bridged over political rivalries. Thus, while the series editor, Yisrael Eldad, was a well-known Revisionist-Zionist writer in opposition to the ruling Labor government at the time, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion embraced this project and instructed the army to distribute the *Chronicles* issues to soldiers. The series was also made available in English translation in 1954, and reissued later.[22] Nonetheless, *Chronicles* did not leave its mark on Israeli collective memory, perhaps because of its embracement by the establishment and limited critical scope, and *The Bible Now* eclipsed this earlier experiment.

Nor was *The Bible Now* the first to offer a political satire based on biblical narratives. Political satire was more broadly a familiar, if not a central, genre in Israeli culture and satirical columns appeared in Israeli newspapers and satirical programs featured in other media. A paramount example of more subversive political satire can be found in Hanoch Levin's work in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, where he occasionally uses biblical texts, figures, or themes as the springboard for his biting satire. The Israeli public was not yet prepared to that level of critique and, in 1970, the performance of his play "Queen of the Bathtub" (*Malkat ha-ambatya*) led to its closing due to a strong public response.[23] By the mid-1980s, however, when *The Bible Now* was published, internal critique and debates over values and policies once considered sacred as well as the reexamination of national myths were more prevalent.[24]

The Bible Now's success demonstrated the potential in a contemporary and secular return to the Hebrew Bible. In recent decades, one can observe the rise in interpretive commentaries on the Bible written by public figures and intellectuals who are not biblical scholars and intended for the general public. One cannot ascribe this trend to *The Bible Now*, but it does appear as one of its forerunners. Its publication was among the first signs of a renewed secular claim to what has been named the "Jewish bookcase" (*aron ha-sefarim ha-yehudi*), namely, the Jewish literary canon. This renewed interest in the Jewish canonical texts is evident in the diversity of offerings of public programs and courses by cultural organizations, including the emergence of secular "academies of learning" (*batei midrash hiloniyim*), as well as the proliferation of newspaper columns and television and radio programs featuring commentaries on the Torah portions by writers, scholars, and cultural figures.[25]

The satirical trend and popular modes of contemporization of biblical narrative have also continued after the publication of *The Bible Now*, even if in a limited scope. The publication of a cartoon series in the political weekly magazine *Koteret rashit* in the 1980s presented a more radical political satire based on biblical narratives, and was later reissued in two successive volumes under the title *To Live from the Bible* (*Lih'yot me-hatanach*).[26] A decade after the publication of *The Bible Now*, a television program, titled "Ending the Week" (*Sogrim shavu'a*), included the appearance of a popular standup comic, Gil Koptach, who applied his humorous satirical approach in the presentation of the Weekly Portion of the Torah (*parashat ha-shavu'a*). This popular program, nonetheless, provoked the wrath of religious members of the Knesset who claimed the program was sacrilegious and demanded that the Knesset's Education Committee look into its broadcast. The public protest about this potential censorship and Koptach's successful defense of his right as an Israeli Jew to reinterpret the Bible and his use of humor to deflect the tension averted the crisis.[27]

Within this context, it appears that Shalev's ability to create a delicate balance between symbolic continuities and subversive messages enhanced the appeal of *The Bible Now* in that particular temporal juncture and contributed to its place in Israeli public memory as a turning point in secular Israelis' approach to the interpretation of the Bible. It may be interesting to note that after successfully pursuing other literary genres including novels, children books, and essays in the following two decades after the publication of *The Bible Now*, Meir Shalev returned to another book on biblical narratives, titled *Genesis* (*Bereshit*), in which he addressed themes that appear for the first time in the Bible. In contrast to the promise of novelty implied in the title, this book did not raise the same enthusiastic response as his earlier work that appears to be offering a particular blend of "bible-lite" with a satirical bite that appeared so novel and fresh in the mid-1980s.

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this article was published in Hebrew as "Ha-tanakh akhshav: Ikh'shuv, satira politit ve-zikaron le'umi" [The Bible Now: Contemporizing, Political Satire, and National Memory], in Hagar Salamon and Avidgor Shinan, eds., *Mirkamim: Tarbut, sifrut, folklore le-Galit Hasan-Rokem* [Textures: Culture, Literature, Folklore for Galit Hasan-Rokem], special issue of *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Folklore* 28, No. 2 (Summer 2013): 755–788 (Hebrew). I thank the editors and the journal for the permission to publish this version in English.

2. Meir Shalev, *Tanakh Achshav* [The Bible Now] (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1985). References to the book throughout this essay refer to the English translation of its title.

3. Noyat Barel, "Meir shalev be-shi'ur tanakh meratek" [Meir Shalev in a Fascinating Lesson on the Bible], *Nrg Ma'ariv*, March 4, 2009, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/47/ART1/861/554.html; see also the statement that "*The Bible Now* provoked secular [Israelis'] interest in the Bible that led many readers return to it," in the website "Text," September 2008, http://www.text.org.il/index.php?book=0810091 (both links last accessed October 1, 2019).

4. Avi Garfinkel, *Od Shalev—al Meir Shalev ve'ha-tanakh* [More Shalev— Meir Shalev and the Bible], original in http://www.notes.co.il/garfinkel/48432.asp, October 8, 2008, rpt. https://avigarfinkel.wordpress.com/2008/10/08/יותר-שלו-על-מאיר-שלו-והתנך/, last accessed October 1, 2019.

5. On the Enlightenment influence on shaping new approaches to the Bible, see Jonathan Sheehan, *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

6. On the Zionist reconstruction of the Jewish past, see Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1995), 13–36.

7. Uriel Simon, *Ma'amad ha-mikra ba-hevra ha-yisraelit: Mi-midrash le'umi li-pheshat kiyumi* [The Status of the Bible in Israeli Society: From a National Midrash

to an Existential Literary Interpretation] (Jerusalem: Yeriot, 1999); Yair Zakovitch, "Sof ha-me'ah shel ha-tanakh" [The End of a Century of the Bible], in Israel Bartal, ed., *Ha'agala ha-mele'ah: Me'ah ve-esrim shenot tarbut yisrael* [The Full Wagon: A Hundred and Twenty Years of Israeli Culture] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2002), 110–20; Anita Shapira, *Ha-Tanakh ve'ha-zehut ha-yisraelit* [The Bible and Israeli Identity] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005).

8. Neil Asher Silberman, *Between the Past and the Present: Archeology, Ideology and Nationalism in the Modern Middle East* (New York, NY: Holt, 1989); Michael Fiege, "The Imagined Communities of Archeology: On Nationalism, Otherness and Surfaces," *Democratic Culture* 12 (2011): 7–59.

9. Ye'ira Amit, "Hora'at mikra ba-hinuch ha-kelali: I'yun be-tochnit ha-limudim" [Teaching the Bible in the General (Nonreligious) Public Schools], in Amos Hofman and Izhak Schnell, eds., *Arachim u-matarot be-tochniyot limudim be-yisrael* [Values and Goals in School Curriculum in Israel] (Even Yehuda: Rekhes, 2002), 239–264.

10. Gilad Zuckermann claims that the language spoken in Hebrew, which he calls "Israeli" is a hybrid shaped by Yiddish, which was the native tongue of the majority of early Zionist immigrants, and to a lesser extent by other European languages. See his *Israelit, safa yafa* [Israeli, a Beautiful Language: Hebrew as a Myth] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2008).

11. Avraham Ahuvia, *Tanakh ram le-vatei ha-sefer: Leshon ha-tanakh be-ivrit bat-yameinu* [The Bible: The Bible's Language in Contemporary Hebrew] (Even Yehuda: Reches Educational Projects & Herztliya, Ram Press, 2008). For a critical response to its publication, see Uri Orbach, "Tanakh keshe-safa" [The Bible and Its Difficult Language], in *Ynet*, *Yediot Ahronot*, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3583418,00.html, August 17, 2008.

12. Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989).

13. The dialogue between the past and the present is keen to memory studies and was famously pointed out by Maurice Halbwachs who introduced the concept of collective memory. M. Halbwachs, *La Mémoire Collective*, 1950, translated to English as *The Collective Memory* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1980).

14. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1982); Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2003), 22–24.

15. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72–104. For examples of new rituals intended to shape or transform Israeli collective memory, see Aronoff, *Visions and Divisions*, 54–64; Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*, 41–47, 96–102, 119–133.

16. Yael Zerubavel, "Ha-hazara el ha-tanakh: Ha-tiyul ve-zikhron he-avar basi'ah ha-tayaruti be-yisrael" [Back to the Bible: Hiking in the Land as a Mnemonic Practice in Contemporary Israeli Tourist Discourse], in Meir Hazan and Uri Cohen, eds., *Tarbut, historia ve-zikaron: Be-hokara le-Anita Shapira* [Culture, Memory and History: Essays in Honor of Anita Shapira] (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2012), II, 497–522.

17. Galit Hasan-Rokem, *Rikmat hayim: Ha-Yetzira ha-amamit be-sifrut hazal* [The Web of Life: Folklore in Rabbinic Literature] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1996). See also Samuel C. Heilman, *The People of the Book: Drama, Fellowship, and Religion* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1983), 62–66, 88–90.

18. The unexpected juxtaposition between incompatible elements provides the foundation for humor. See Dan Ben-Amos, "The Myth of Jewish Humor," *Western Folklore* 21 (1971): 112–131; Alan Dundes, *Cracking Jokes: Studies of Sick Humor Cycles and Stereotypes* (Berkley, CA: California University Press, 1987); Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*, 167–76.

19. Hanoch Levin's *Yisurei Ee'yov* [Job's Passion] was first performed by the Cameri Theater in Tel Aviv in 1981. The play is included in his *Yisurei Ee'yov va-aherim: Mahazot 3* (Job's Passion and Others: Plays 3) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Siman Kri'ah [1988], 1999).

20. Garfinkel, *Od Shalev*.

21. Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*, 9–12, 34–35, 228–231.

22. Israel Eldad, ed., *Divrei ha-yamim: Hadshot he-avar* [Chronicles: News of the Past] (Jerusalem: Reubeni Foundation, 1951–54; reprinted in the form of books, Jerusalem: Aaron Roth publication in several printings (1954, 1965, 1979). Drora Baharal notes that the early issues identified the editor as Dr. Israel without revealing his full name in order to dissociate the publication from his known political views; she also indicates that further English translations by Moses Uman were published in the mid-1950s and reissued in mid-1990s. See Drora Baharal, "Divrei ha-yamim: Hadshot he-avar: Ha-shiluv shel avar ve-hove" [Chronicles: News of the Past: Interweaving the Past and the Present], *Kesher* 25 (1999): 115–123.

23. Hanoch Levin, "Malkat ha-ambatya" [Queen of the Bathtub], in *Ma ichpat la-tzipor: Satirot, ma'archonim, pizmonim* [What Does the Bird Care: Satires, Sketches and Songs] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1987), 61–102.

24. The debates on national myths focused both on their historical foundation and their lessons for the present. See for example, Nakdimon Rogel, *Lekah Tel Hai: Ha-Hityashvut u-gevul ha-tsafon* [The Lesson of Tel Hai: Settlement and the Northern Border] (Yad Tabenkin and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1980); Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Hazon, lo fantazia: Likhei mered Bar Kokhva ve-re'alizm medini be-yameinu* [Vision, No Fantasy: The Lesson of the Bar Kokhba Revolt and Political Realism Today] (Jerusalem: Domino Press, 1982). For academic discussions of the reexamination of national myths in Israel, see Myron J. Aronoff, "Myths, Symbols and Rituals of the Emerging State," in Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., *New Perspectives on Israeli History* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991), 175–192, and Aronoff, *Visions and Divisions*. For a fuller discussion of the development of Israeli national myths and the political debates on Masada, the Bar Kokhba revolt, and Tel Hai, see Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*.

25. Rachel Werczberger and Na'ama Azulay, "The Jewish Renewal Movement in Israeli Secular Society," *Contemporary Jewry* 31, 2 (2011): 107–128; Talia Sagiv and Edna Lomsky-Feder, "Me-Halakha le-ma'ase: Ma'avak simli al hon tarbuti be-vatei midrash hiloniyim" [An Actualization of a Symbolic Conflict: The Arena of Secular Academies of Learning], *Sociologia Israelit* [Israeli Sociology] 8, 2 (2007): 269–300.

26. Ephraim Sidon and Avner Avrahami, *Lih'yot me-hatanach* [To Live from the Bible] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1987–1990). Sidon pursued the contemporization approach to the past in his 1996 comic series "*Hatzi Menashe*" [Half Menashe] for the Israeli educational television channel, featuring the Judges period.

27. Alon Gideon, "Diyun al ha-pina shel Gil Koptach" [Discussion on Gil Kptach's Program], *Ha'aretz*, November 6, 1996; *Ha'aretz* Archive, no. 242768); see also a video on Koptach and the discussion on his program at the Knesset's Education Committee at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQzTrn7_4rM, last accessed October 2, 2019.

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Chapter 9

Victim Sculpture and an Aesthetic of Basque Politics

Roland Vazquez

This chapter is about the aesthetic representation of the victims of ETA (*Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna*, or Basque Homeland and Freedom), in the Basque Autonomous Community (hereafter, BAC) juridically located in northern Spain, as seen largely through the dramaturgy surrounding a single sculpture.[1] In it, I proceed from the conviction that "the cultural focus on the semiotic and hermeneutic analysis of the interpretation of meaning is the most important contribution of American cultural anthropology to understanding politics."[2] Likewise, I take as a point of departure the recognition that, when compared to the conventions of research within political science and political sociology, "in essence, the contribution of anthropology to the study of politics is political ethnography."[3] This set of ideas served as a leitmotif of the Political Anthropology graduate seminar that introduced me to Mike Aronoff, subsequently guiding my doctoral research under him. The paths of these ideas readily converge. It is precisely the examination of the soft underbelly of politics in *situ* that allows for the invocation and contextualization of nuance, gesture, subtlety, and symbolic understanding, thereby locating them situationally in the political.

Expressive culture—in this case, via a single sculpture—can matter in the practice of politics. One concept particularly central to this chapter is the idea of an "aesthetic of politics," as invoked by George Mosse. In his study of the rise of Nazi Germany and with special attention to monuments,[4] Mosse qualifies the concept as "the force which linked myths, symbols, and the feeling of the masses; it was a sense of beauty and form that determined the nature of the new political style."[5] He notes that such an aesthetic was "objectified in art and architecture,"[6] to the point wherein "[t]he artistic and the political had fused."[7] Although not in an age of mass politics, such a new political aesthetic served as a model both of and for Basque reality.

BASQUES, ETA, VICTIMS

In its maximalist expanse, the Basque Country consists of seven provinces or historic territories: three to the north of the French-Spanish border and four to the south. The three in France, Labourd, Basse Navarre, and Soule, are subsumed within the *département* of the Pyrénées Atlantiques. The four in Spain account for over four-fifths of population and territory. Three, Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, make up the BAC, the result of a 1979 statute, with its capital city of a quarter million residents, Vitoria-Gasteiz, located in Araba. The fourth, Navarra, comprises its own autonomous community as a result of a subsequent statute.

In the BAC, the Spanish language shares official status with Basque, a non-Indo-European, post-positional language alone in its language family and a strong symbol of cultural exceptionalism. Politically, a long-standing cleavage exists between Basque nationalists, with the avowed goal of independence, and Spanish "constitutionalists," who oppose the idea. Although political and economic interconnections are extensive, as the result of a variety of factors ranging from Basque nationalist utopian dreams to the more mundane transborder economic and administrative cooperation across the Aquitanian corridor,[8] this chapter's geographic focus is largely restricted to the BAC, with the primary ethnographic research carried out in Vitoria-Gasteiz in 2009–2010.

Founded in 1959, as a student intellectual group during the apogee of Francisco Franco's authoritarian regime in Spain, ETA crossed the Rubicon of political violence by taking lives beginning in the 1960s.[9] During Franco's regime, opposition groups throughout Spain accepted ETA's legitimacy, and most Basques saw the organization's violence as less of a threat than that of state security forces. In a history that fluctuated between more socialist and more nationalist ideologies, including factions and splinter groups vying to make off with the symbolic capital of its three-letter acronym, ETA's attacks became more frequent following Spain's transition to electoral democracy in 1977, with yearly mortal victim counts reaching their heights in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. The increasing indiscriminateness of attacks, combined with a socialist revolutionary ideology that was poorly articulated and had lost touch with the Basque population as a whole, contributed to ETA's gradual waning.[10] But, arguably, three events turned the tide against ETA. The first of these was the group's July 1997 kidnapping and summary execution of Miguel Ángel Blanco, a councilperson from the town of Ermua. The commando shot Blanco in the head when the Spanish Government refused to transfer imprisoned ETA members to Basque prisons, killing him immediately. This event brought unprecedented crowds into the street in a massive, extended anti-ETA protest. The second was the September 11, 2001 attacks

on the United States, which shaped understandings and heightened concerns as to the implications of global terror. The third was the March 11, 2004 al-Qaeda train bombings in the greater Madrid area, which left 192 dead and led the European Parliament to declare "11-M" the European Day of Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism.

During my fieldwork in Vitoria-Gasteiz, one pervasive observation was the massive rhetorical shift in the meaning of the word "freedom" (*askatasuna*)—part of ETA's very name. In my earlier BAC research, invocation of the word in Basque presupposed a goal of *collective* freedom—whether invoked by supporters or critics of the concept. In contrast, more recently "freedom" has come to refer almost exclusively to *individual* rights. In the resulting landscape, what could be successfully framed as violence as a means to independence had fallen from the realm of acceptable action. The crisis of ETA's organizational legitimacy included a systematic sea change from a climate of political control of radical Basque nationalism passing through the group to one in which electoral and even legal survival demanded parties explicitly renounce it and any recourse to political violence. Furthermore, given increased police pressure and transborder cooperation, ETA had largely been withering away even prior to its October 2011 declaration of the "definitive end" of armed activity. The group's announcement of its dissolution and abandonment of the armed quest for independence, finally official as of May 2, 2018, seemed a *fait accompli* long before it actually occurred.

In the late and post-ETA reality of the current century, the situation of its victims rose to become the BAC's dominant political issue. One critical development has been the ascendance of a heightened ETA-victim awareness, which has risen from what have retrospectively been referred to as the "leaden years" of the 1970s and 1980s to the formation but marginality of victim-based NGOs into the late 1990s, to a situation wherein such groups have come to influence public policy in the BAC and Spain alike. Such political clout is best symbolized by statements by Jaime Mayor Oreja during his tenure as Spain's minister of the Interior (1996–2001) in the conservative, state government of the Popular Party (PP), and subsequently, that "the victims are always right."

ETA victim reality has dovetailed with and been greatly influenced by a global context having its roots in the Vietnam War and particularly international legal developments beginning in the 1980s,[11] creating a situation wherein the victim has replaced the hero as the fundamental archetype of our times.[12] Victims groups from different countries have met and interacted, leading to a cross-pollination of their discourses and strategies.[13] Furthermore, the general international climate of sensitivity to the plight of victims has greatly resonated in the BAC, to the point that the victims rose to become what might be called "a total institutional fact."

Political work in the BAC on behalf of victims has included institutional recognition of the need for attention to societal and individual healing and memory. One initiative was the Basque Government's 2001 creation of the Office for Attention to Victims. Another was the commemoration of the first "Institutional Ceremony of Homage and Recognition to the Victims of Terrorism" in Bilbao in 2007, with then prime minister Juan José Ibarretxe asking for forgiveness on behalf of Basque society. In June 2008, building upon legislation from 2003 to 2005, the Basque Parliament unanimously approved Law 4/2008, titled "Recognition and Reparation to the Victims of Terrorism." Law 4/2008 comprehensively covered every issue and contingency, be it reimbursement for property, payment for psychological treatment, school visits by victims, affirmative-action job placement, or prosecution of pro-ETA statements. In 2010, the Basque Government declared November 10 "the Day of the Memory of Victims of Terrorism."

THE CALL FOR A VICTIM MONUMENT

In February 2000, a leader in the Basque branch of Spain's socialist party, Fernando Buesa, and his bodyguard Jorge Díaz were killed in a targeted ETA bomb blast in Vitoria-Gasteiz. The next day, in reaction to the deaths of a former colleague and a former student, in an op-ed piece in Spain's *El País* called "A Monument for the Victims of Terrorism," eminent Basque criminologist Antonio Beristain argued "If we truly wish that our response to such terrorist macrovictimization does not remain in empty words, it demands that a public monument be erected immediately in homage to the victims of ETA's terrorism. Only thus will we be able to avoid the social demoralization that having to live with executioners described as heroes creates."[14] Founding director of the Basque Institute of Criminology (affiliated with the University of the Basque Country), Beristain was an internationally recognized scholar. He had long been in the line of fire for his outspoken anti-ETA stance. Beristain's voice, although one of the loudest on this issue publicly, was not the only one.[15]

A monument *was* erected in Vitoria-Gasteiz just over three years later. In 2003, Agustin Ibarrola's "Monument to the Victims of Terrorism" (untitled but consistently referred to as such) was unveiled (See Figure 9.1). Ibarrola's sculpture consisted of a pair of complementary twin curvilinear columns within an extended green space, facing a multiplicity of small, roundish gray cement blocks embedded in the ground. There was one block for each of ETA's victims through the year 2000, with individual name inscribed. Interspersed with the blocks were smaller, white circles, each with the identical image of a multicolored daisy. According to Ibarrola, although the two

projects were very different, one of the inspirations for this work was Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans' Memorial Wall in Washington, DC—specifically, in its lack of form, as well as in the listing of each individual's name.[16]

Yet, Ibarrola's work could not serve as the ur-monument to victims for a number of reasons. One was the extreme partisan division on a city council where the mayor at the time, Alfonso Alonso, was a member of the far right, state-based PP, and the objections of local Basque nationalist representatives were ignored. The project was the fruit of a collaboration with the Collective of the Victims of Terrorism (Covite), the ETA-victim NGO seen by many as having an organic connection to the PP. Furthermore, although Ibarrola had much to recommend him by the way of international artistic reputation,



Figure 9.1 Agustin Ibarrola's "Monument to the Victims of Terrorism," from the position of the inscribed stones. *Source*: Photo by "Zarateman" (Wikimedia Commons).

his own political trajectory brought with it ambivalent baggage. He had been highly vocal in the anti-ETA crusade, in a way that did not render him above the partisan fray. The daisy design within the monument had been created by Ibarrola in 1999 and gifted to Covite, to become that group's logo. Ibarrola had suffered at the hands of ETA. The group's threats to his life had caused him to relocate from the BAC to Avila in central Spain. In addition, perhaps his best-known piece, "the Oma Forest," in which he had painted an enclave of the trees within a Basque nature reserve, had been vandalized by ETA in 2000, and would be again in 2003.[17] Another limitation of Ibarrola's monument was that it was in Vitoria-Gasteiz *qua city*, rather than *qua capital of the BAC*. It thus lacked the symbolic weight that the entirety of the Basque polity might have lent it.[18]

Ibarrola's monument stands in the highly populated Lakua neighborhood of Vitoria-Gasteiz. Lakua is home to some of the Basque Government's administrative functions, with the sculpture situated directly opposite the commissary of the autonomous police force and not far from the government's largest complex. This latter is largely technocratic, however, and the location is much closer to the outskirts of town than any Geertzian "center of the center." Even regardless of the other issues noted above, the artwork is quite simply in the wrong place to serve as *the* Basque sculpture to victims. The example of Ibarrola's sculpture and the symbolic and attitudinal limitations it incurred place what would subsequently come to pass in relief.

FROM GUGGENHEIM TO PARLIAMENT: IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL AESTHETIC

The Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao would influence the ensuing Basque project in a number of ways. One is the manner in which the Basque government had experience in financing and advancing a large project that was an architectonic intervention on the landscape and that had a plethora of implications transcending the intervention itself—in that case, economic, touristic, and regenerative for that city and BAC alike.[19] As a result of the museum's overwhelming success, the so-called "Guggenheim effect" ran rampant throughout Spain, with a multiplicity of urban and other landscapes being altered by local and regional administrators and private interests concerned with finding the signature building that might prove to be the magic elixir in promoting tourism and cementing their personal political reputations and even legacies.[20]

One consequence was the ratcheting up of policy decision-making about the visual transformation of public and institutional space. When looked at from another perspective, the Basque Parliament was a building in "need"

of a sculpture in order to develop and contribute to its institutional aesthetic.[21] Other, recent institutional precedents in Spain, closely tied to the "Guggenheim effect," serve as examples of the general drive to develop such an aesthetic. One is the 1999 placement of a sculpture on the top of the Parliamentary Building of the Canary Islands. Called "Wellspring" (*Alfaguara*) and by the renowned Canarian sculptor Martin Chirino, the large spiral graced the top of the already existing structure. Another is a 2006 project for the Parliamentary Building in Galicia. Called "Dialog" (*Diálogo*), this large, twisting column by the Galician artist Fernando Blanco was installed to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of that Parliament. Both are cases of a parliamentary sculpture on the cusp of or in the twenty-first century, in an autonomous community in which some degree of political and cultural exceptionalism was claimed, designed by a native artist.[22] If in these places, then why not for the Basques? In the BAC's case, the result represented a confluence of the artistic dictates and ideological imperatives of the day.

In contrast to the alacrity with which Ibarrola's sculpture came to fruition, the parliamentary project would take much longer. The roots of the project could be traced to 1999, with the foundation of a parliamentary commission within the Commission for Human Rights and Citizen Inquiries to look into the victim issue. The 1999 commission, however, was boycotted by the state-based parties, rendering any recommendations problematic before the fact. In 2002, in the subsequent legislature, a working group was established within Human Rights, which ultimately morphed into a Special Commission in the midst of its task. Representation included moderate nationalists and state-based parties, with the exercise being boycotted by radical nationalists closely associated with ETA. In June 2003, the Special Commission brought forth a series of recommendations to the full parliament in a non-binding resolution, which was approved unanimously by the sixty-seven members present (absent the boycotting group). Noteworthy is Point 12: "The Basque Parliament agrees to place at the entrance of its seat a monolith in memory of the victims of terrorism and plaques in memory of the parliamentarians assassinated by the terrorists."

The very strength of the commission in terms of legitimacy—its ideological plurality—was precisely what rendered coming to any sort of consensus problematic.[23] The seventh legislature came and went with nothing more than the baseline agreement and no plan enacted. The scope and sensitivity of the issue were daunting, and the work labor-intensive, including listening tours among victims groups throughout Spain and a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland.

The result was a situation wherein rebukes for foot-dragging were frequently leveled against the Basque nationalist members by the state-based parties, with additional accusations of a lack of sensitivity toward ETA

victims and "equidistance" toward victims and victimizers, as the work extended into a second legislative period. The Special Commission officially presented the report to the Parliament in February 2005, reiterating many of the general points made earlier.

FROM PARLIAMENT TO GUGGENHEIM: SCULPTOR, SCULPTURE, TEXT

After nearly four years of deliberation in the multiplicity of victim issues, the Special Commission, in concert with the Parliamentary Speaker, chose Cristina Iglesias as the artist for their charge. Iglesias's Basque roots and reputation in the global art scene rendered her the candidate for the task on what basically amounted to a short-list of one. She had studied art in London, and had pieces in prestigious galleries such as London's Tate Gallery, and in major museums in countries such as Brazil and Taiwan. She had been picked to represent Spain twice in the important Venice Biennialé, receiving special recognition in *Time* magazine on the first occasion in 1985. She had also received Spain's National Prize for Plastic Arts in 1999, awarded in recognition of an artist's vital contribution to the country's cultural patrimony. Her combination of Basque birth, Madrid-area residence, and cosmopolitan experience and exposure was itself highly symbolic of the local/state/European/global conjuncture, thus emphasizing an open, modern, non-tribal Basqueness.

It is at this point that the "Guggenheim effect" reinserts itself into the narrative, with an even greater immediacy. Also on Iglesias's résumé was that she had been the first Basque artist to have had an exhibition dedicated exclusively to her work by the Guggenheim, with the display of twenty of her works occurring first in New York City (June-September 1997) before making its way to Bilbao (November 1998–February 1999). This fact only added to her cachet and near-unique localizability in the local-global artistic nexus but, most importantly, provided the members of the Special Commission with direct familiarity with her work.[24]

Iglesias was an artist whose star was on a meteoric rise. After several years of keeping a low profile,[25] she reintroduced herself to the public art scene in 2007 with her design (at the request of star architect Rafael Moneo) of the doors and access way of the renovated and expanded Prado Museum in Madrid. That project alone led one Spanish art critic to qualify 2007 as "the year of Cristina Iglesias."[26]

Furthermore, in contrast to Agustin Ibarrola and many other Basque artists, Iglesias had been absolutely silent about Basque or Spanish political dynamics. Even with respect to her aesthetic focus, Miguel Ángel Hidalgo Garcia

argues for a lack of external reference in Iglesias's work, except perhaps in technique. This includes reference to politics, such as "national or international terrorism."[27] In form and function alike, her art was above the political fray.[28]

One noteworthy motif in Iglesias's work has been her consistent allusion to memory. For example, within the publication that accompanied the Guggenheim exhibition, art critic Nancy Princenthal invokes Freud's term "screen memories" to qualify the artist's corpus.[29] Along these lines, Iglesias's own estimation of her work in a 2011 interview is resolute: "[m]y works always recall something that we have lived."[30] This gravitation toward memory dovetails with parliamentary desires for the project. For example, the same 2005 non-binding resolution that reaffirmed parliamentary commitment to a sculpture at the building's entrance also stressed "the effective insertion of public recognition into collective memory," as well as proclaiming that "Memory rescues the gaze of the victims."[31]

In spite of her prior Guggenheim exhibition, only two of Iglesias's pieces are part of the museum's permanent collection. Members of the Special Commission would have seen one of these on their individual "museumistic" pilgrimages and it would have made an impression on them: *Untitled: Celosía #2*. The *celosías* represent one of a few prominent Iglesias series. The word *celosía* itself is Spanish. As in the French *jalousie*, there is a double entendre or even multiplicity of meanings, including "jealousy" and a blind or shutter made of a row of angled slats.[32] Iglesias's *celosías* are a type of artistic lattice structure that not only provides intimacy, but also serves as a filter for reality. The aesthetic presentation of these "memory screens" suggests the integration of motifs from other traditions, such as Islamic and Chinese, thus formally providing an open invitation to cultural cross-pollination.

One characteristic of the pieces in Iglesias's *celosía* series—up to that point, at least—is that they were all untitled. Another is the artist's propensity to place texts within the lattice, which provide suggestions as to the piece's meaning. Such texts have come from sources ranging from French poet Raymond Roussel to British science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke. Another tendency in her *celosías* has been the gradual increase in scale, with an evolution from smaller museum pieces to larger, exterior environmental works. The increase in size allows the spectator to become more engaged—to interact with and even walk through the sculpture, exploring its realities and perspectives from a multiplicity of angles—while also rendering the inserted texts more readable.

After the Special Commission decided upon Iglesias as its choice, she provided its members with a number of notes and sketches. A series of meetings was then arranged between the Special Commission and the victim groups, to explain the project and request their input before proceeding. The work was to

be situated outside of the Parliamentary Building, but within the gates enclosing the grounds. The new *celosía* was to have the Basque title *Gauerdiko Iparrorratza*—in Spanish (only secondarily) *Brújula de la Medianoche*—in either case, "Midnight Compass." (See Figure 9.2) It would actually be comprised of three *celosías* of terracotta, in the form of a labyrinth.

As with other pieces in her *celosía* series, Iglesias inserted text within the lattice structure. The excerpt selected was from the 1677 work by Piarres Etxeberri called *This Book is about Sea Navigation*.[33] Etxeberri's book takes as its point of departure an earlier work, originally published in 1579, by Martin Hoyarsabal, with the self-explanatory title *The Adventurous Voyages of Captain Martin Hoyarsabal, inhabitant of [the town of] Ciboure: Containing the rules necessary for a good and safe navigation*.[34] Hoyarsabal's was quite possibly the first book written down to guide transatlantic navigation, to describe places and distances, and was used extensively by sailors making the crossing, especially those from France and Spain in their trips to Newfoundland.

Hoyarsabal's original was written in French. At the outset, however, he apologizes to the reader for potential issues of the problematic readability due to the irregularity of the orthography, citing ethnolinguistic factors:

Figure 9.2 "Midnight Compass" by Cristina Iglesias, with Basque Parliament in the backdrop. *Source*: Photo by Magdalena Vazquez.

"The author of the present work is in no way French, but is Basque from the border with Spain."[35] Although Hoyarsabal writes in French, therefore, the original treatise explicitly disavows French identity, rather embracing Basque identity.

Etxeberri modestly claims that his work is a mere translation into Basque, with "something more added," but it is a volume of more than a few additions. For example, while Hoyarzabal's version devoted eighteen pages and 4,800 words in specific reference to the transatlantic crossing, Etxeberri adds thirty-three pages and 18,500 words, creating a "modern" organization that updates the routes and provides additional information.[36] Prior to the publication of the Etxeberri treatise, most written work in Basque addressed Roman Catholicism. His was one of only two technical manuals written in the Basque language throughout the entirety of the seventeenth century, with the other focusing on veterinary medicine.[37]

Furthermore, Etxeberri's treatise (especially when complemented by his later, 1689 maps) is indicative of a very Basque presence in New France in the seventeenth century through toponyms and other factors—a presence that was largely erased in the subsequent French historiography.[38] Etxeberri's text is the only source documenting the early Basque presence to such an extent in Newfoundland. It shows itself to be in a political field in which a community of Basque sailors sought to defend its collective interests in the face of the more powerful French across continents. It also evidences respect for and positive interaction with indigenous groups—for example, maintaining aboriginal place names wherever these were already in existence.

I would distill the "lessons" embedded in Etxeberri's treatise (and Hoyarsabal's work upon which it builds) into the following:

- a staunch assertion of identity through linguistic affirmation and collective action;
- courage, intelligence, and capacity for exploration where others have yet to tread;
- ability to outmaneuver the more powerful, even from a position of disadvantage;
- respect for and honest treatment of the disempowered, and the willingness to include all;
- an understanding of collective memory, suggesting its endurance and the potential for its recovery, even in the face of perverting forces; and
- most importantly, a sense of how constant awareness of one's bearings is what makes all of the above possible.

All of these elements fold into a symbolism of knowing which way to go (both literally and figuratively) and, on a collective level, a clear moral

compass to be able to steer through trials and tribulations, in order to arrive at the necessary destination. This latter point is highlighted by Iglesias in the title of her sculpture. The fact that this work would be the first in the celosía series to actually *have* a title itself hints at the importance of that title. Moreover, "Midnight Compass" refers to Polaris, the North Star.[39] In the dark of night, when navigation might be rendered its most difficult, this star was seen to provide a fixed point of reference, always allowing the navigator to maintain his bearings. The directional implications of Etxeberri's text and Iglesias's title are accentuated by the way in which the letters from the text are inserted into the body of the celosía, themselves serving the physical function of coordinates by pointing the way.

"MIDNIGHT COMPASS": THE INAUGURATION AND BEYOND

At the April 2008 opening ceremony of "Midnight Compass," Parliamentary Speaker Izaskun Bilbao, in the presence of Cristina Iglesias, Prime Minister Ibarretxe, a variety of dignitaries from across most of the political spectrum, and representatives from ETA victims groups,[40] eschewed any sense of a gray area of ethereal artistic interpretation, roundly declaring what she took the sculpture to mean: "You belong to us, you are our victims."[41]

From the moment of its debut, "Midnight Compass" would become the ur-text of a Basque institutional aesthetic for the current century, as well as subsequently becoming the neurological center for the Basque government's 2011 "Map of Memory" project. That project, unveiled by the Office for Attention to Victims, recognized, catalogued, and promoted sculptures, monuments, parks, and other key "victim landmarks" (including those having preceded Iglesias's celosía) to form an "ethical map" throughout the BAC.

And yet, the sculpture's artistic reality was sublime in its subtlety and ambivalence. It is telling to observe what "Midnight Compass" does not say. The sculpture is in no way a *literal* expression about ETA victims. As such, it lends itself more readily to multivocal interpretation, as well as change through time. It can be about memory but, at the same time, moving forward. When I interviewed Izaskun Bilbao, she reiterated to me what she considered to be the vital potential function of art of "depoliticizing the political." This was to be done by finding a new vocabulary and mechanisms for communication to break old stalemates.[42] She was not even fully comfortable with the term "monolith" used in all the parliamentary discussions, believing it to be too cold. In re-reflecting upon her words, I hear echoes of Mosse's suggestion that the importance of aesthetic concerns is especially great in situations in

which parliamentary politics have broken down and/or are otherwise ineffective or unsatisfying.[43]

Over coffee, the advisor for the BAC's Office for Attention to Victims, Txema Urkijo, once stressed to me (unsurprisingly) how critical the need to address the situation of ETA victims was, in all of its aspects. At the same time, he was resolute that there were other pressing needs. It was just that Basque society was not yet ready to address them; the steps had to be taken in the "proper order." It does not surprise me to see from afar the evolution of the use of the space of "Midnight Compass." The sculpture has since hosted other commemorations, such as a yearly ceremony with the lighting of a flame on International Holocaust Remembrance Day. In 2014, it was the site of a homage to Santi Brouard, a physician and radical nationalist parliamentarian when he was gunned down in his office three decades earlier by right-wing Spanish paramilitaries.[44] Brouard, the last of four Basque parliamentarians assassinated while in office to be so commemorated, had been an ETA sympathizer. Basque society and the BAC institutions finally appeared ready to begin to take the next ritual step in the understanding of victimization, and Iglesias's sculpture was the "natural" place to do so (See Figure 9.3).

For better or worse, there *can* be ways in which the state (or, polity) "sees."[45] Likewise, in which institutions "think."[46] And, even more pertinent here, there are ways in which institutions "feel" and act upon such feelings[47]—in arenas ranging from social programs to expressive culture.

Figure 9.3 "Day of the Memory of Victims of Terrorism" commemoration (2016) at Basque Parliament, in front of "Midnight Compass." *Source*: Photo by Blanca Castillo, courtesy of El Correo.

Holding to such a position is not about the naive imputation of singular motivations upon collective entities. It is, rather, consistent with the recognition of the necessarily dialectical relationship between politics and culture—a relationship forcefully argued for by Mike Aronoff before it was fashionable to invoke "power" at all in anthropological circles or "culture" in any way transcending a template of values in political science.[48] In his book *Art Worlds*, Howard Becker approaches the sociology of art by suggesting that it is not an *individual*, but rather a *community*, that "makes art."[49] I interpret Becker effectively to be saying that it takes a village to raise a sculpture. In the case of "Midnight Compass," however, I would argue that ultimately it is the Basque *polity* that has done so.

NOTES

1. This essay was assisted by a sabbatical from Upper Iowa University and grant #3773 from the Program for Cultural Cooperation, Spain's Ministry of Culture and U.S. Universities. I would like to thank Yael S. Aronoff and, especially, Mike Aronoff for gifting me the opportunity to contribute to this *Festschrift*. In an essay on his own mentor Max Gluckman, Mike notes the intellectual environment fostered by Gluckman allowed for and encouraged an individual evolution in approach and analysis (Myron J. Aronoff, "Freedom and Constraint: A Memorial Tribute to Max Gluckman," in *Freedom and Constraint: A Memorial Tribute to Max Gluckman*, ed. Myron J. Aronoff [Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976], 6). I hope this essay can be read in that spirit. Although it does not come across in this essay's focus on Mike's *intellectual* influence, I feel a sense of personal gratitude for his help at a critical juncture of my life.

2. Myron J. Aronoff, "Forty Years as a Political Ethnographer," *Ab Imperio* 4 (2006): 4.

3. Joan Vincent, *Anthropology and Politics: Visions, Traditions, Trends* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 24.

4. George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991 [1975]), 21–46.

5. Ibid., 20.

6. Ibid., 19.

7. Ibid., 15.

8. Zoe Bray, *Living Boundaries: Frontiers and Identity in the Basque Country* (Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, 2011).

9. When this first happened has itself become a point of contention within twenty-first century Spanish historiography, with the long-believed watershed of ETA member Txabi Etxebarrieta's 1968 mortal shooting of civil guard José Antonio Pardines before himself being killed countered by an anti-heroic narrative of the detonation of a bomb along the railroad tracks in 1960, resulting in the death of two-year-old Begoña Urroz. Current scholarship points away from ETA's implication in

the earlier death (Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla and Manuel Aguilar Gutiérrez, *Muerte en Amara. La violencia del DRIL a la luz de Begoña Urroz* [Vitoria-Gasteiz: Centro Memorial de las Víctimas del Terrorismo, 2019], 43–55, https://www.scribd.com/document/414728249/Informe-Del-Centro-Memorial-de-Las-Victimas-Del-Terrorismo-Muerte-en-Amara-y-DRIL).

10. To give but two examples: the 1987 bombing in Barcelona's Hipercor supercenter killed 21 people; the 1993 Oldartzen Report called for a "socialization of suffering" campaign to implicate the Basque populace in the project of revolutionary nationalism through a surge of violence including collateral damage. Roland Vazquez, "Nationalism without Contentious Conflict: The New Basque Normal," in *Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflict*, Revised and Expanded Edition, ed. Joseph R. Rudolph (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015).

11. Alyson M. Cole, *The Cult of True Victimhood: From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 221, note 93; Caroline Eliacheff and Daniel Soulez Larivière, *El tiempo de las víctimas* (Madrid: Akal, 2009).

12. Pascal Bruckner, *The Temptation of Innocence: Living in the Age of Entitlement* (New York, NY: Algora, 2000), 123–154.

13. One interviewee, an adult man whose father had been shot dead by ETA two decades earlier, began animatedly telling me about exploratory discussions to have the International Congress for Victims of Terrorism in New York City in 2011 for the tenth anniversary of 9/11. (The conference would end up being in Paris that year.) These conferences, the first of which was in Madrid 2004, have brought together thousands of terrorism victims from countries from Algeria to Uzbekistan, with victim groups being especially active. See Association française des victimes du terrorisme, *Program, VIIIth International Conference For Victims of Terrorism*, accessed November 19, 2019, www.afvt.org/program-viiith-international-congress-for-victims-of-terrorism/ for the program of the November 2019 event in Nice, France. The year 2004 also witnessed the foundation of the Spanish Society of Victimology; the organization's 2007 national conference was held in San Sebastián, in the BAC. The 2021 International Symposium of the World Society of Victimology will also be in San Sebastián.

14. Antonio Beristain, "Un monumento para las víctimas del terrorismo," *El País*, Saturday, February 26, 2000, https://elpais.com/diario/2000/02/26/paisvasco/951597621_850215.html.

15. Beristain likened the situation to the German Parliament's arduous ten-year approval process of Peter Eisenmann's "antisymbolic project" (Beristain's characterization) for an abstract, experiential Holocaust memorial in the center of Berlin, which would be completed in 2005. For more on Beristain's trajectory and legacy, see José Luis de la Cuesta, *Antonio Beristain Ipiña: Un maestro ejemplar*, Instituto Vasco de Criminología, accessed November 19, 2019, https://www.ehu.eus/es/web/ivac/beristain-maestro-ejemplar.

16. Eduardo Ortiz de Arri, "Ibarrola esculpirá en Vitoria un monumento en honor a las víctimas del terrorismo," *El País*, Tuesday, May 16, 2000, https://elpais.com/diario/2000/05/16/paisvasco/958506005_850215.html.

17. These incidents served as the focus of Pedro Villora's play *Electra in Oma*, in which the Greek tragedy is recast in an Oma Forest in the midst of destruction (Pedro Villora, *Electra en Oma* [Madrid: Fundamentos, 2008 [2006]]). Dedicated simply "to the victims," the play both won Spain's first ever Beckett Prize in 2005, and was a 2007 finalist for Spain's National Prize for Dramatic Literature. In April 2019, four years after its full restoration from ETA's defacing, the Oma Forest was discovered to have encountered a more formidable foe: tree rot (Mikel Ormazabal, "El Bosque Pintado de Oma enferma por una plaga de hongos," *El País*, Thursday, April 4, 2019, https://elpais.com/cultura/2019/04/04/actualidad/1554370117_986985.html). I managed to speak with Ibarrola once, briefly, just prior to a lecture he gave in Madrid. After hearing about my topic, he rebuffed me gently by saying that he did not wish to mix politics with the ethereal nature of his evening's focus on art. However, several minutes into his lecture, upon seeing the Basque PP regional branch head enter, Ibarrola interrupted himself, extendedly regaling the branch leader as the political savior of the Basques vis-à-vis Basque nationalism. The PP's hardline stance contrasted greatly with those to whom Ibarrola referred when talking to me as *pasteleros*, or "pastry chefs"—by which he meant those not willing to firmly stand their ground. Ibarrola's evolution had taken him from a militant of the Spanish Communist Party who had spent time in Franco's prisons, to an unwavering PP supporter.

18. In November 2018, the monument would be updated to include ETA's victims from the twenty-first century as well as provide general maintenance that included restoring faded name inscriptions (Vanguardia, "El monumento a las víctimas del terrorismo de Ibarrola en Vitoria añadirá los nombres de asesinados por ETA desde 2001," *La Vanguardia*, Wednesday, November 28, 2018, https://www.lavanguardia.com/local/paisvasco/20181128/453221427324/el-monumento-a-las-victimas-del-terrorismo-de-ibarrola-en-vitoria-anadira-los-nombres-de-asesinados-por-eta-desde-2001.html). In keeping with the monument's close association with Covite, the renovation was undertaken in the context of that group's twentieth anniversary celebration.

19. A recounting of the franchising of a Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is beyond the scope of this endeavor. For more on the intricacies of the process, including the leading role of the Basque government in the project, see Joseba Zulaika, *Crónica de una seducción. El museo Guggenheim, Bilbao* (Madrid: Nerea, 1997). One of his ideas of particular interest is that of "architecture as ideology."

20. For a chronicle of this exceptionalism throughout Spain, and the architectonic implications and results of public and private initiatives alike, see Llátzer Moix, *Arquitectura milagrosa. Hazañas de los arquitectos estrella en la España del Guggenheim* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2010).

21. I do not mean to suggest that the building was an aesthetic shell at that point. For a synopsis of the current building's history, including architectural and artistic, such as the image and symbolism of the oak sculpture by renowned Basque artist Néstor Basterretxea in the main chamber, and details of the building renovation carried out by local architects José Erbina and Julio Herrero, see the tab on the Parliament's website, "Espacio parliamentario," Parlamento Vasco, accessed November 19, 2019, http://www.legebiltzarra.eus/portal/es/web/eusko-legebiltzarra/

conoce-el-parlamento/espacio-parlamentario. The Parliament's website also posts the transcripts for all regular meetings; particularly informative for the discussion to follow are those of the full body as well as those of the Commission for Human Rights and Citizen Inquiries from the seventh and eighth legislatures.

22. In both cases, the project was advanced by a government with a regional party in the governing coalition. These two projects met with very different fates, however. The design of Chirino's sculpture was immediately adopted by the Canarian Parliament as its institutional symbol. In contrast, in the face of rust and other condition issues resulting in no small part from the fact that it was never accompanied with any conservation plan or budget, Blanco's artwork was removed and disposed of in 2011 by the next Galician parliamentary governing coalition, absent the regional party. The artist was neither consulted nor even told until after the fact—ironic given the piece's title. Perhaps one of the lessons is the extent to which the cachet of a star artist (which Chirino certainly was) contributed to the success of the former project and the transpartisan commitment to it, with a budget to match.

23. This appeared connected to understandings of the nature the commission's work. For example, while moderate nationalist commission-member Rafael Larreina discussed with me what he saw to have been its meaningful accomplishments, as well as the mutual respect (albeit within a degree of tension) evident in meetings between the commission and victim groups, in a separate interview, PP commission-member Santiago Abascal summarily dismissed the enterprise as "a theatrical representation," stressing victims' disdain towards the body. Parliamentary transcripts from May 2003 gloss over the differences, noting "a certain level of agreement" in the measures to be undertaken.

24. For example, Iñigo Urkullu, then chair of both the Commission of Human Rights and Citizen Inquiries and the Victims Special Commission, subsequently told me that he became familiar with Iglesias's work through the Bilbao Guggenheim.

25. The sudden passing of her husband and fellow artist Juan Muñoz in 2001 was a key factor in her public hiatus. See Artium, *Informazioa bilduz/Documentándonos sobre . . . Cristina Iglesias* (Vitoria-Gasteiz: Artium Centro-Museo Vasco de Arte Contemporaneo, 2010), 3, http://issuu.com/artium_vitoria/docs/iglesiascristina.

26. Miguel Ángel Hidalgo Garcia, *La escultura de Cristina Iglesias. Dar cuerpo a lo imaginario* (PhD diss., Universidad de Murcia, 2008), 13–14, https://www.tesisenred.net/bitstream/handle/10803/10828/HidalgoGarcia1de2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

27. Ibid., 8.

28. Iglesias has elsewhere noted her sense of commitment to some political issues (such as environmental politics) and its interconnection with some of her art. Furthermore, in taking the Basque commission, she placed her work in the very midst of politics, both institutionally and ideologically.

29. Nancy Princenthal, "Screen Memories," in *Cristina Iglesias*, ed. Carmen Gímenez (New York, NY: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1997).

30. Fernando Rayón, "Cristina Iglesias, escultora: 'mis obras siempre recuerdan a algo que hemos vivido'," *ARS Magazine* 9 (2011): 32, https://arsmagazine.com/producto/entrevista-cristina-iglesias/. Iglesias views Princenthal's interpretation of her

work positively (Hidalgo, *La escultura de Cristina Iglesias*, 356–57). At the same time, art critics have tended to note a general *lack* of reference to "history"—a disconnect suggesting a more pliable relationship between the art-object and reference to the past. See also Javier Maderuelo, "Cristina Iglesias: metáforas de la memoria," *Revista del Occidente* 129 (1992); Adrian Searle, "Stained with a Pale Light," in *Cristina Iglesias*, ed. Carmen Gímenez (New York, NY: Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1997), 61.

31. In the latter statement in Spanish, "Memory" is capitalized when not grammatically required. Law 4/2008 also evidences the fact that memory (both collective and individual) has served as one of the pillars of the victim-based initiatives. This connects with a hyper-memorialization endemic within Spanish political culture, exemplified by Spain's Law of Historical Memory, and well-illustrated in recent years by the controversy over the disinterment of the poet Federico García Lorca, but prevalent at every turn. See Jo Labanyi, "The Politics of Memory in Contemporary Spain," *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies* 9, No. 2 (2008); Carlos Jerez Farrain, and Samuel Amago, eds., *Unearthing Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). In the BAC alone, 2016 saw the opening of the Basque Government-sponsored "Institute of Memory, Co-existence, and Human Rights" in Bilbao (see *Instituto de la Memoria, la Convivencia y los Derechos Humanos*, http://www.gogora.euskadi.eus/inicio/, accessed November 19, 2019) and the Spanish central government's "Center for the Memory of the Victims of Terrorism" in Vitoria-Gasteiz (with a supplementary office in Madrid; see *Centro Memorial de las Víctimas del Terrorismo*, http://www.memorialvt.com/, accessed November 19, 2019).

32. "Jealousy" is how the Guggenheim materials have translated the term into English, while Iglesias's own website places such pieces under the general category of "screens" (see Cristina Iglesias, *Screens*, http://cristinaiglesias.com/screens/, accessed November 19, 2019). I prefer to retain the original "*celosía*," however.

33. Piarres Etxeberri, *Liburu hau da itsasoko nabigazionekoa* (San Sebastián: Txertoa, 1985 [1677]), https://klasikoak.armiarma.eus/pdf/EtxebDorreItxasoko.pdf.

34. Martin Hoyarsabal, *Les voyages avantureux du capitaine Martin de Hoyarsabal, habitant de Cubiburu. Contenant les reigles necessaires à la bonne et seure navigation* (Bordeaux: Par Guillaume Millanges, 1633 [1579]), https://archive.org/details/lesvoyagesavantu00hoya.

35. Ibid., physical page 2/e-version page 7.

36. Brad Loewen and Miren Egaña Goya, "Le routier de Piarres Detcheverry, 1677. Un aperçu de la présence basque dans la baie des Chaleurs au XVII^{e} siècle," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amerique français* 68, Nos. 1–2 (2014): 131–132, https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/haf/2014-v68-n1-2-haf01969/1032022ar/.

37. Luis Michelena, *Historia de la literatura vasca* (Madrid: Minotauro, 1960), 78.

38. Loewen and Egaña Goya, "Le routier de Piarres Detcheverry," 141.

39. Midnight had an ancient association with the north—one that is maintained in certain languages such as Polish, in which the word for the two (*północ*) is the same. This point is accentuated in the sculpture's original, Basque title. The first root within the word for "compass," *iparrorratz*, is *ipar*, which means "north." Midnight is also a time of enchantment, a "bewitching" hour, in many folkloric traditions, including

the Basque. Here, the piece's Spanish title is suggestive, with the Spanish word for "compass" (*brújula*) a diminutive of the word for "witch" (*bruja*).

40. This took place with some conservative groups boycotting—a statement of their opinion of Ibarratexe, not the sculpture or its intent.

41. El País, "La 'Brújula de Medianoche' recuerda a las víctimas de ETA," *El País*, Friday, April 11, 2008, http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Brujula/Medianoche/recuerda/victimas/ETA/elpepuesp/20080411elpepunac_16/Tes.

42. Martha Nussbaum similarly argues for the unique role of art in civic education at all levels of society: "We need not and should not rely on the fancy of individuals alone. Institutions themselves should also be informed by 'fancy's' insight" (Martha C. Nussbaum, *Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life* [Boston, MA: Beacon, 1995], xviii). Paul Ricoeur chronicles the work of Saint Simon, who goes so far as to argue for the artist's political role in leading the way to a utopian vision (Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* [New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986], 294).

43. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 215.

44. EITB, "Legebiltzarrak Santi Brouard omendu du lehenengo aldiz," *EITB*, Thursday, November 20, 2014, https://www.eitb.eus/eu/albisteak/politika/osoa/2739524/santi-brouard-omenaldia--legebiltzarrak-lehenengo-aldiz-oroituko-du/.

45. James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

46. Mary Douglas, *How Institutions Think* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

47. Didier Fassin, "Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Policies in France," *Current Anthropology* 20, No. 3 (2005); Didier Fassin, ed., *At the Heart of the State: The Moral World of Institutions* (London: Pluto, 2015).

48. Myron J. Aronoff, "Ideology and Interest: The Dialectics of Politics," in *Ideology and Interest: The Dialectics of Politics, Political Anthropology*, Vol. 1, ed. Myron J. Aronoff (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1980); Myron J. Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993 [1977]).

49. Howard Becker, *Art Worlds* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 34–35.

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Chapter 10

Tadeusz Kantor's Theater as an Antidote against the Excesses of Nationalism and Idiocy of State Socialism

Jan Kubik

AN EVENT

Imagine a large congress hall, dominated by serious, ageing men in formal suits (very few women), professors, writers, artists, and senior politicians.[1] They present and listen to a series of conventional speeches and learned presentations. Then, a speaker wearing a light sports jacket, no tie, with a shock of unruly dark hair, enters the stage somewhat haltingly, looks around apprehensively, and begins rearranging the lectern and the battery of mikes. As he pushes the lectern out of his way, the sound system complains with awful, screeching noises. Some people begin to move around restlessly, straining to see what is happening; others abruptly end their cigarette breaks and rush back to the hall. His impromptu stage-design innovation completed, the speaker begins his presentation: "I have never been behind a lectern and being behind one is against my convictions. I do not like this stage design. I am not going to feel well here, and I must feel good. This undermines my sense of order . . . ."[2]

The speaker was Tadeusz Kantor (1915–1990), a legendary artist, who along with Jerzy Grotowski (1933–1999), was the dominant figure in the Polish avant-garde theater. The occasion was the Congress of Polish Culture, convened in Warsaw on December 11, 1981 to discuss the dismal—the participants' consensual diagnosis—state of Polish culture after thirty-six years of state socialism. The Congress was organized by a committee representing forty-one cultural and professional associations, ranging from the Polish Philosophical Association to the Polish Jazz Association, without any

participation or control by the party-state organs. As the first such independent congress since the 1940s, its objective was to take stock of Polish culture in 1981 and to chart a modest program of reforms for the future.

The Congress would have been impossible without the support of "Solidarity." December 11 and 12 were the last two days of the "carnival of freedom," as someone dubbed the sixteen months of unprecedented political and cultural relaxation in Poland (August 1980–December 1981). This carnival lasted until the communist authorities introduced a martial law regime, designed to crush the Solidarity revolution on Saturday night of December 12, 1981. This action came just hours after the conclusion of the Gdansk meeting of Solidarity's governing body—its National Commission.[3] It also interrupted the proceedings of the Congress of Polish Culture that was supposed to end on Sunday, December 13.

Kantor's performance introduced a dissonant note of artistic irreverence into the politically serious and "academic" tone of the Congress's proceedings. I do not know how it was received by the majority of the participants; I was mesmerized, as were my friends around me. The avant-garde artist, sometimes accused of being ostentatiously apolitical, disturbed the decorum of this solemn gathering not only by redesigning the set, but also by delivering his short speech with a power fueled by an electrifying stage presence and unconventional behavior, rather than his words alone. Although almost all of the other speakers struck a similar tone in condemnation of the state-sponsored "socialist culture," Kantor's performative innovation made quite a difference. A transcript of his presentation reads like a Dadaist collage of disjointed fragments that nonetheless convey a uniform message: utter contempt for the communist authorities: "I would like to read several words at this first free Congress of Culture. I participated in several earlier congresses, at the beginning, in 1946, 1947; I thought that we would manage to convince our authorities, but soon they were just scolding us, then we were just thrown out."[4]

A bit later, he continued:

> There is an opinion, frequently expressed, that most artists, including myself, prefer to stay abroad, work there and do not think about their homeland. Such an opinion is very widespread in Poland, but also in other countries, where it is said that Polish artists leave their country because here they have nothing to do. Since this question was posed very drastically at a recent conference, I will answer not in my name but in the name of art. Artists for centuries and in every country traveled around the world, and not in a comfortable airplane, but cold and hungry, they voyaged from the mountains to the sea. But in their subconscious mind they gazed from a distance, from a perspective, at their place of birth. To leave this place, in order to return, is an innate human trait.

> Nostalgia, a sense of absence, increases the temperature of creativity . . . I do however think that the art is made inside of one's country, traveling outside is only very helpful.[5]

In this chapter I will sketch a possible contextualization of Kantor's 1981 Congress intervention within the Polish artistic and intellectual field (contrasted with some developments in the parallel Soviet field). I will argue that Kantor's life and work constituted a major contribution to what I call *proto-globalization cum cosmopolitanization* of (certain domains) of Polish culture and thus contributed to the relative strength of the broadly conceived liberal strand of that culture. Throughout his life, Kantor seemed to be acutely aware of the dramatic tension between locality (as a source of inspiration and a site of primary identification) and a cosmopolitan/global space of artistic exploration, particularly in the avant-garde genres of art.

AESTHETOSCAPES, NATIONALISM, AND COSMOPOLITANISM

Appadurai's well-known conceptualization of five types of *scapes* (ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes) both improves our understanding of the complexity of globalization and alerts us to the existence of disjunctures among various globalizations (global flows that are not always coordinated and synchronized). Since I am addressing artistic fields and their relationship to political fields, I need to introduce one more scape, *aesthetoscape*, a landscape composed of objects and performances that are constituted by acts of "artistic creation" and "aesthetic appreciation" (thus subjected to specific coding and decoding procedures) by a set of specific actors. They form more or less loosely knit networks, and through a series of gestures and specific actions (such as painting of a work of art," or "writing a critical review," and so forth), they (re)produce artistic fields. Some such fields are more closed, contained within the boundaries of locales or regions or nation-states; some are more global, deliberately set at a transnational level. The degree of their openness depends to a large degree on the type of political regime, a variable that is not usually systematically investigated in the literature on globalization(s).

Friedman, in his analysis of the relationship between globalization, globalism, and cosmopolitanism, focuses on the formation of "international capitalist class," whose cosmopolitanism is a strategy of generating maximum profits from the globalizing economy. Such elites "cosmopolitanize themselves" "during periods of strong globalization," but tend to turn "national" and embrace "the model of national economic regulation" during global

economic downturns.[6] It seems that the cosmopolitanism of avant-garde artistic elites does not follow the same oscillation. The artistic process of avant-garde explorations seems to be relentlessly universalizing and devoid of any fixed mechanism of closure; once (seemingly) completed it can be restarted at any time. Also, an avant-garde re-working of some cultural material often deliberately reveals the mechanism of such an operation; the guts are out, so to speak. Thus, the cultural content it uses as its "material" (e.g., local culture or personal memory) can be, at any moment, reworked afresh and assume a new (aesthetic) form. By contrast, the "nationalistic" logic tends to be conservative; its goal is the creation of a sense of immutable fixity of the national form, so the traces of the cultural-political work that produced that form are carefully concealed.

Communists were completely aware of this tension, as their ideology was principally "international." Without entering a long and complex debate on the relationship between internationalism and nationalism under state socialism, let me observe that (1) this unresolved tension contributed to the eventual collapse of the system[7] and (2) a conservative, nationalistic tendency in some of the state socialist countries was stronger than it is sometimes assumed.[8] The point is that the state-sponsored internationalism of communists was rather rigid and closely controlled; cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is open, funded on experimentation, and vulnerable to—if not welcoming of—contingencies.

The tension between cosmopolitanism and localism is real and the manner in which it is articulated, exacerbated, or resolved is very much a political issue, for collective identities are at stake. Nationalists want to halt the "upward" flow of local cultural "materials" at the level of a "nation." They are in the business of thought control and "where thought control is important, as it has been not least to a number of state apparatuses in history, cosmopolitans are singled out as enemies, and the category is extended to include just about everybody whose horizons are suspected of including ideas from the uncontrollable outside."[9]

Within the nationalistic logic, local and regional variance should add up only to a coherent national whole. Cosmopolitans are thus seen as enemies for they not only want cultural flows to continue until they reach some "global" level, but driven by their (postmodern) aversion to boundaries, they also despise fixity and are happy to continue constructing ever new cultural bricolages, distributed primarily through aesthetoscapes with an apparent disregard for the existing ethnoscapes. In order to do so, they need to construct, occupy, and protect a social niche that is somehow situated outside the existing social structures, preferably in a "third space."[10] In a brilliant overview of intellectuals' situation in the (post)modern world, Pels reminds us that nomadic intellectuals do not really share the same marginal space as

poor migrant workers or displaced refugees. They belong neither to the center nor to the periphery, but to a site whose location and topography need to be carefully delineated.

Hence, we may draw three positions, distinguishing between the dominant center, the dominated periphery, and the "third space" of the "dominated dominants," who occupy positions in the cultural field that is relatively marginal to both the center and peripheries.[11] In this social location, the production of "heretical innovation" that challenges the norms of status quo is still possible:

> Such extraordinary invention still seems the privilege of newcomers or "outsiders within," who are able to forge a delicate but crucial mediating link between periphery and centre. That is why the Deleuzian negation of the centre as "dead and empty, where nothing grows" is equally spurious and deceptive as the reverse romance of dwelling "at the gates of the city, where nomadic tribes halt for a brief pause" (Braidotti). It is precisely the "elite marginality" of the hybrid intellectual, who reflexively acknowledges her dependence on the centre even while struggling against it, which may offer a place where the intricate connection between creativity and estrangement, which is so easily appropriated by the privileged nomads of Western academia, still holds.[12]

The avant-garde artist often occupies this "third space" where the "elite marginality" allows them to propose cultural constructions that bridge the local and the global in novel ways. We tend to think that the local is a site of "cultural traditionalism, social closure and ethnic fundamentalism."[13] While it often is, and certainly appears as such when embedded in nationalistic discourses, we tend to overgeneralize this possibility. As Friedman observes, "Also characteristic of anthropology that has been influenced by postcolonial studies is its tendency to denigrate the dangerous redneck locals, who are associated with nationalism, racism, roots, and the greatest of all evils, *essentialism* (original italics—JK)."[14]

Friedman's hunch is revealing: the local can be embedded in broader cultural frames in various ways, as Kantor's work powerfully demonstrates. Moreover, the local does not enter processes of its discursive construction as a ready-made, prefabricated, essentially fixed whole. Rather, it is co-constituted in such processes whereby the global (cosmopolitan) or the national are also created. It makes a difference if the constructor is Kantor or Kaczyński. No doubt such processes are usually asymmetrical (with the global being dominant), but they often produce complex hybrids, thus—Hannertz argues—creolization needs to be studied at least as seriously as the center-driven homogenization.[15]

POST-COLONIALISM, CENSORSHIP, AND SOCIALIST REALISM IN POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION

It is sometimes argued that the phenomenon of postcolonial cultural dependence on the ex-colonial center (the West)—particularly its dominant discourses—diagnosed for much of the postcolonial world, is also present not only in the post-Soviet situation, but also in the infatuation with the West during the Soviet era. Usually it is argued that at least some elements of postcolonial dependence emerged as the former state socialist countries entered a complex web of relationships with the dominant West.[16] At times, the lingering effects of the (semi-) colonial inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence are scrutinized.[17] The arguments about the cultural dominance of the "West" over the "East" and the post-colonialism inequality need to be carefully calibrated. In many areas of culture, including the avant-garde visual arts, most practitioners were assuming that Eastern Europe was a part of larger European cultural space, even if its position was somewhat marginal. For example, Piotr Piotrowski, a Polish art historian, expressed the following view in an Internet discussion:

> The question of what strategies should be used in the interpretation of East-Central European art is central. However, I'm not sure if adopting a post-colonial viewpoint is the right interpretive strategy. Post-colonial discourses deal mostly with something in the center and something outside the center, the real process of colonialization, the "real" Other. Ironically, East-Central European artists, Hungarian artists dealing with Pop Art, for example, and Polish artists working with Informel, wanted to be colonized. For them, colonialization was a kind of prestige and a resistance against Socialist political oppression. More importantly, East-Central Europeans are used to seeing themselves in a unique position in relation to European culture. What we need in order to discuss this problem is not the notion of the Other, but a related concept, that of the "close" Other, that is to say, the Other that is not the "real" Other, but an Other that we associate, for example, with living in our neighborhood. Again, I am not convinced that a post-colonial strategy is useful for our discussion. The problem lies in the proper contextualization.[18]

Piotrowski's points are well taken; it would be hard to find Polish artists or intellectuals who perceived their location vis-à-vis "Europe" as equivalent to the colonial domination or control, even if they struggled with their peripheral status. The mechanism can be perhaps described like this: When the hegemonic drive that comes from the outside (external power) is to globalize and homogenize, the resistance can be fruitfully couched in various idioms of "localness." But when the hegemonic drive to homogenize comes from

the inside and the homogenization is designed to lock a given culture within a politically decreed boundary (local or national), the counter-hegemonic strategy will often be to reach for global/cosmopolitan themes and connections. Since the Soviet strategy of cultural domination was based on control and homogenization within the camp or even a nation-state ("proper" culture was supposed to be socialist in content and national in form), the strategy of resistance was to seek connections with the outside (most often Western) world. The extreme strategy was to prove that one's culture, or at least one's aesthetoscape, was already "Western" and only temporarily stranded in the "East," behind the Iron Curtain. Jerzy Tchórzewski, an influential painter, while writing about the late 1940s in 2000, observed:

> We talk a lot about the reconnecting Poland to Europe, about the necessity of catching up with Europe, and about the difficulties associated with those tasks. I would venture to claim, that this small group of ours (the Kraków avant-garde—JK) already then, in the late forties, when an attempt was being made to isolate and disconnect us completely from Europe, was maintaining—using its feeble power—a link with the civilized world, of course only within a certain domain.[19]

Yet, as elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, Polish artists were subjected to censorship and—for a period—had to follow the aesthetic precepts of Socialist Realism. Their situation was, however, different from the fate of their counterparts in the Soviet Union. From about 1910 until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, avant-garde movements, including Constructivism, Futurism, and Suprematism, flourished in Russia. The dominant artists, Marc Chagall (1887–1985), Vasilii Kandinsky (1866–1944), El Lissitzky (1890–1941), Lubov Popova (1889–1924), and Kasimir Malevich (1878–1935) were becoming increasingly famous and influential in the artistic circles throughout the world. For a brief period right after the revolution, arguably due to the chaos of civil war and the post-revolutionary exhilaration, a tenuous alliance emerged between the artistic and political revolutionaries.[20] Their goals seemed to be the same: the total reconstruction of the society and its culture. Moreover, the arts were seen as leading the way: "Cubism and Futurism were the revolutionary forms in art foreshadowing the revolution in political and economic life of 1917," declared Malevich.[21] But, despite the initial blossoming of avant-garde during the first few years after the revolution, freedom of expression was short-lived. There were heated debates about the "proper" revolutionary art style and slowly the champions of realism began gaining an upper hand. The Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia (AkhRR) decidedly rejected the avant-garde genres and, with the blessing of the as film, political posters, and architecture.[22] The exodus of the leading artists followed.

By the late 1920s, Joseph Stalin achieved complete control of the Communist Party and introduced further restrictions on the arts. His 1930 speech at the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress succinctly outlined the Party's policy toward art, which would only be tolerated if it were "national in form and socialist in content."[23] Shortly thereafter, the Party published a document titled, "On the Reconstruction of Literary-Artistic Organizations," calling for the formation of unions that would follow the Party-prescribed style of realism, or Socialist Realism. In 1934, Stalin's regime took the final step toward curbing free artistic expression; the doctrine of Socialist Realism was introduced at the First Congress of Soviet Writers, and officially certified by Andrei Zhdanov, the Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of ideological affairs.[24] In 1936, the All-Union Committee for Artistic Affairs was established to lead the art world in the production of Socialist Realism. This spelled not only the end of artistic freedom, but also the beginning of active persecution of "independent" artists; independent art was forced underground and thereby became "dissident/nonconformist art." Several institutions were created as arms of the Party, their sole mission being to promote government-sanctioned art. Among these was the Ministry of Culture that supervised all major museums and operated three art publishing houses; the Academy of Arts of the U.S.S.R., responsible for the education of Soviet artists; and the Union of Artists of the U.S.S.R., which directly employed Party-line artists through commissions, loans, and contributions to exhibitions. The end of World War II did not change much. In fact, the control of the arts was reinforced: the Moscow State Museum of Art was stripped of its international collections, while Soviet art critics were accused of a streak of "cosmopolitanism."

Stalin died in March 1953, but Stalinism survived him by three years. Only during the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 14–25, 1956) did Nikita Khrushchev denounce Stalinist crimes, even then in a "secret speech." A period of "thaw" followed and the artists regained some degree of artistic freedom. Experimentation was allowed. Some ideas of the early Soviet avant-garde were revived in small, isolated pockets; expressionism and impressionism were again acceptable.[25] Painters and sculptors became bolder and, at the December 1962 exhibition "Thirty Years of Moscow Art" (known as the Manezh Exhibition), several artists were invited to show their abstract work. Khrushchev toured the exhibition halls, "visibly annoyed" at some nonfigurative paintings, bur when he entered a small room with more radically abstract works he went ballistic:

> As long as I am Chairman of the Council of Ministers we are going to support a genuine art. Are you pederasts or normal people? I'll be perfectly honest with you. We aren't going to give a *kopeck* for pictures painted by jackasses. History

> will be our judge /. . ./ We'll give you foreign passports tomorrow, and you can get out /. . ./ What's hung here is simply anti-Soviet.[26]

When Leonid Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as the General Secretary in 1964, the change was justified by some key members of the Party as the necessary correction to the laxness and destabilization caused by de-Stalinization, "and hardliners pointed specifically to the arts as a center of disaffection."[27] The Brezhnev reign (1964–1982) was very oppressive, though he did not match the Stalinist terror. The dissidents entered the world stage through the relentless work of several foreign correspondents, but domestically they were continuously harassed. When Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel were sentenced to long terms in labor camps for their "anti-Soviet activities" in January 1965, the period of "thaw" was over. In 1974, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was expulsed and the "First Open-Air Show of Paintings" was closed by the authorities with the help of bulldozers. It entered the history books as "The Bulldozer Exhibition." As Scammell wrote, the 1976–1986 decade was truly the era of stagnation pervaded by "stifling conservatism, reaction, and conformity."[28] Hundreds of artists and intellectuals migrated to the West.

In Poland, the history of relations between the avant-garde artists and the authorities was radically different. During the interwar period (1918–1939), as the Soviet Union was "Stalinized," Polish avant-garde artists were enjoying complete artistic freedom in a country that had recently emerged from 123 years of political nonexistence. They were busy developing original doctrines, trying to maintain a critical distance to cubism, futurism, expressionism, or surrealism increasingly dominant in the West, while wrestling with the same problem: finding novel artistic forms for capturing the rapidly changing reality.[29] For example, Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz (1885–1939) wrote influential *New Forms in Painting* and experimented with new forms of expression, eventually proposing a doctrine of "Pure Form." Leon Chwistek (1884–1944), a painter, philosopher, logician, and mathematician, was a theoretician of a group of "Formists," whose formal radicalism did not last long as it remained highly distrustful of the broader, European trends. By contrast, a younger group, Mieczysław Szczuka, Teresa Żarnowerówna, Henryk Stażewski, and perhaps most famously Władysław Strzemiński (1893–1952) and Katarzyna Kobro (1898–1951), were fully conversant with the radical formal experiments conducted in the West, paradoxically often by the Russian émigrés, El Lissitzky, Kazimir Malevich and Wassily Kandinski. Moreover, Strzemiński's theory of unism was "a fundamental contribution to the history of the world's avant-garde."[30]

During World War II, many "experimenting" artists and artistic milieus, perhaps most prominently in Kraków, continued to work, secretly organizing

discussion sessions, exhibitions, and theater performances. As soon as the war ended, they resumed overt activities and became prominent in the rapidly revitalized artistic community. The years 1945–1948 were very tense: it was the period of consolidation of the communist power and the resistance was intense.[31] Yet, those were also the years of relative artistic and intellectual freedom. On December 19, 1948, after several months of preparations, a group of Kraków artists, art critics, and activists, led—among others—by Tadeusz Kantor, was able to open the First Exhibition of Modern Art. It was not the first large exhibition of the avant-garde art since 1944, but it was by far the biggest and most comprehensive. Thirty seven artists, representing various currents of the avant-garde movement, were represented.[32]

On January 18, 1949, the popular exhibition was closed down, after some mild protests and delays.[33] Two days later, during the Fourth General Congress of the Polish Writers' Union, Włodzimierz Sokorski, a deputy Minister of Culture and the Arts, delivered a keynote address on "the new literature in the process of creation." It was the beginning of the official campaign aiming at the introduction of socialist realism in all domains of art and literature. On February 12–13, 1949, socialist realism was declared the official artistic style at a Conference of Artists, Architects, and Critics in Nieborów. In December 1949, Kantor delivered "About dreaming," his last public lecture for several years. He refused to participate in artistic exhibitions during the socialist realist period.

During this period, artists were tightly controlled and art critics were constantly warned to be "vigilant as there were efforts to smuggle the relics of the bourgeois aesthetics into critical works," as Sokorski put it.[34] Yet, already in April 1954, the same Sokorski expressed very guarded and mild criticism of the current policy that was perhaps too heavy-handed and based on the "lack of trust in the creator."[35] Soon, already at the Fourth Exhibition of Visual Arts (June–November), several somewhat "modernist" works were exhibited, though most of the paintings were still solidly socialist realist.[36] By comparison with the Soviet Union, this is a stunning development: only five years of socialist realism as an unquestioned aesthetic doctrine. In 1958, in Moscow, artists from twelve socialist countries showed their work:

> Next to the works of artists from the Soviet Union, the show included exhibits from Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam. The Polish exposition was unique and indeed very different from anything shown by the other delegations of the states of "people's democracy," which was why it attracted the attention of the public, artists, and officials. According to the spectators, the difference consisted in a distinct emphasis on modernism, sharply contrasting with the otherwise uniform style of the socialist realism. No doubt,

> it was also evidence of a specific attitude adopted with respect to modernity by the Polish communist authorities (.[37]

By the early 1970s, Polish visual artists enjoyed a degree of artistic freedom that was unheard of in other countries of the Soviet bloc: "The Gierek regime (1970–1980—JK) was actually more tolerant toward visual artists than toward other creative and intellectual groups, such as writers. As the records of censorship activities in Poland (published in London in 1977) reveal, the Communists exercised greater control over literature and theater than over visual arts."[38]

The contrast could not be starker: as the Soviet artistic world was entering the Brezhnevite era of stagnation, Polish artists were beginning an unprecedented period of creative experimentation. Kantor, one of the dominant Polish artistic figures since the 1950s, began a new phase of his artistic life. In 1972, his theater groups, Cricot 2, staged *Nadobnisie i koczkodany* [Dainty Shapes and Hairy Apes], based on a text by Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz,

> in which elements of the form of the happening were absorbed into theatrical practice. Three years later, with the play *Umarła Klasa* [The Dead Class], Kantor developed another phase in his theatre, a direction the artist named the "Theatre of Death." It is this phase that includes what are considered the artist's most exceptional and best known productions, including *Wielopole, Wielopole* (1980), *Niech zczezną artyści* [Let the Artists Vanish] (1985), *Nigdy tu już nie powrócę* [I Shall Never Return Here] (1988), and the posthumously produced *Dziś są moje urodziny* [Today Is My Birthday] (1991), the primary motif of which is death, transcendence, as well as memory and the history inscribed in memory. The productions of the "Theatre of Death" highlighted a concept present in Kantor's entire oeuvre, namely, his concept of "Reality of a Lower Order,"[39] "which continuously demands that I examine and express issues through low status substance, the lowest possible, substance that is poor, deprived of dignity, prestige, that is defenseless and often simply contemptible."[40]

KANTOR'S GLOBAL THEATER AND ITS CULTURAL-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

To say of Kantor that he is among Poland's most outstanding artists of the second half of the twentieth century is to say very little. Kantor is to Polish art what Joseph Beuys was to German art, what Andy Warhol was to American art. He created a unique strain of theatre, was an active participant in the revolutions of the neo-avant-garde, a highly original theoretician, an innovator

> strongly grounded in tradition, an anti-painterly painter, a happener-heretic, and an ironic conceptualist. These are only a few of his many incarnations. Apart from that, Kantor was an untiring animator of artistic life in post-war Poland, one could even say, one of its chief motivating forces. His greatness derives not so much from his oeuvre, as from Kantor himself in his entirety, as a kind of *Gesamtkunstwerk* that consists of his art, his theory, and his life.[41]

Kantor's avant-garde aesthetization of the local (in several productions, but particularly in *Wielopole, Wielopole*) was a subtle strategy of cultural resistance. Importantly, he showed that one's resistance options are not simply locked within a dichotomy: a localizing strategy in the face of globalization versus a globalizing strategy in the face of localization (nationalization). As Kantor's productions globalized a specific location (Wielopole and its mosaic of Jewish and Polish elements), the project was articulated in his own, highly original, inimitable artistic language. Significantly, the mode of aesthetization was neither local nor global; it was unique though no doubt influenced by the "global" norms of the avant-garde. He was embedding a piece of Polish-Jewish culture, destroyed in the Holocaust, in his original yet cosmopolitan performative discourse of avant-garde theater and was thereby able to communicate with a potentially unlimited, though in practice perhaps not very broad, "sophisticated," cosmopolitan audience around the world. He crossed many boundaries, but in this he was not unique; quite a few artists from Hungary, Poland, Russia, or Czechoslovakia managed to do so. Like them, Kantor achieved "world" prominence only in a cosmopolitan, avant-garde artistic field.

In Poland, however, his impact was broader, not limited to the domestic artistic field or to his role as an "artistic ambassador." As he invented an original cosmopolitan artistic form that found resonance well beyond the Polish boundaries, he simultaneously produced significant *political-cultural* domestic effects. He found a theatrical idiom for staging the contradictoriness and messiness of his childhood memories—with children, teachers, soldiers, Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and various assorted oddballs caught up in a dream-like, repetitive trance-dance and sometimes frozen in mesmerizing tableaus. At the same time, he proposed a vision of the Polish past that was not homogenous in the sense either nationalists or communists were propagating. This vision was not Polish-Catholic, unambiguously positioned against its assorted "others," usually Jewish. Nor was it elegantly progressing toward the realization of a socialist utopia. It was rough, discordant, a mélange of seemingly disparate elements molded together by an extraordinary artistic vision; a vision of such power that it immediately intrigued "sophisticated" theater-goers around the world. But—most importantly—it

engaged his (young) Polish audiences by offering them a new way of thinking and visualizing their collective identity. Under state socialism, people did not have many occasions to experience artistic or intellectual events that would help them imagine transgressing the boundaries of either official or unofficial "Polishness." Kantor's work stimulated such transgressive imagining. In this respect, his work was inevitably political; contributing to the construction of collective identities cannot be apolitical.

By staging his memories and thus offering an artistic rendition of a small Polish-Jewish village before 1939, Kantor denied the nationalists a monopoly over national memory formation and spoke to hundreds of young Poles who were most often subjected to only two loud versions of their nation's past: a hateful, anti-Semitic vision of nationalists or a sanitized, a-Semitic (without Jews) vision offered by the communists. It is indeed quite remarkable that the cosmopolitan world of the early twentieth-century Poland, forgotten and almost inaccessible to my generation, was re-created within a cosmopolitan aesthetic framework of late twentieth century avant-garde aesthetics.

CONCLUSIONS

Even after 1956, Soviet avant-garde artists remained influential only in small and closely watched circles of other artists and intellectuals; their impact on the broader society or political dissidents remained very limited.[42] The Polish situation was quite different. Several avant-garde artists and groups reached a sizeable, though limited, audience (mostly members of the intelligentsia). In retrospect, it seems that their impact was critical for they offered artistic visions of the past and present, which in many ways challenged the ideological visions offered by the state. Due in part to their work, the field of Polish culture became more diversified and pluralized than in any other country of the Soviet Bloc.

In a catalogue accompanying a recent major exhibition, "Warsaw–Moscow: 1900–2000," which carefully traces complex links between the artists of both countries, Anda Rottenberg wrote, "The Warsaw exhibition demonstrates that the subsequent generations entering the world of art engaged—as we can see only now—in solving similar problems, emerging *in accordance with the global paradigms* (emphasis—JK)."[43] Remarkably, Polish and Russian/Soviet artists often wrestled with similar aesthetic dilemmas and their labors were not all that different from those of their counterparts in New York, Paris, or Berlin. The difference was that while the Soviet artists managed to retain at least some contact with the "global/cosmopolitan" community of discourse and, therefore, their artistic trajectory was not entirely divorced

from the trajectory of the artistic center (that moved from Paris to New York), they were not partners in any sustained conversation with political dissidents within the Soviet Union. Artistic "dissidents" may have been even more "revolutionary" than the political dissidents, due to their more radical rejection of the "communist" rules of the game, as Oushakine argues, but there were no significant and enduring links between the two groups.[44] In Poland, the situation was again different. In the major cultural centers of Warsaw and Kraków, the circles of artistic nonconformists, independent intellectuals (including some Catholic milieus), knowledge-hungry students, and political dissidents were heavily overlapping. I believe it is this rich plurality of views and styles, in whose creation Kantor played a major role, nourished by the relatively strong immersion in the global/cosmopolitan aesthetoscape, which contributed to the development of a cosmopolitan/liberal cultural-political syndrome that was a significant factor increasing the "mobilizability" of the Polish society and a crucial part of Solidarity's ideological armamentarium. Until recently, this cultural pluralization continued in the post-1989 Polish public sphere and its spirit seems to be driving at least part of the resistance to the latest nationalistic mobilization under the PiS government.

The Soviet artistic field was tightly controlled by the communist authorities until the perestroika years (1985–1991); rare moments of liberalization were never institutionalized to offer artists more predictable spaces of autonomy, as it happened in the post-1956 Poland. Hence, most of the population had little or no access to alternative sources of meaning-production. By contrast, in Poland, particularly after 1956, quite a few people had at their disposal *publicl*y accessible interpretive tools provided by several alternative institutions of meaning production. Kantor's theater was one of them.

Many Russian artists, beginning in the early twentieth century, emigrated to the West and became influential as members of the cosmopolitan avant-garde movements. Their domestic, political, and cultural influence was, however, minimal as they were cut off from their country's culture. They could not thus play the role of cultural brokers, middlemen between the cosmopolitan/globalizing ecumene of the "high" world culture (cosmopolitan aesthetoscape) and the Russian culture. By contrast, Polish (visual) artists rarely emigrated, and to the extent that they received recognition as significant contributors to the cosmopolitan aesthetoscape, they did it from Poland. Their work had a substantial impact on domestic politics and culture, most notably in the formation of unorthodox collective identities within Poland. For example, Kantor and other artists were free enough to show that "content [that is] distant and alien to a territorially defined locality can become an integral part of what is being experienced as local."[45] For Kempny, such an appropriation of the global (or cosmopolitan) cultural content by a local culture, that is thereby inescapably transformed, is a hallmark of globalization. If so, globalization

commenced in Poland, at least for a major segment of Polish intelligentsia, well before 1989. Again, as significant connections between the (cosmopolitan avant-garde) aesthetoscape and the (dissident) ideoscape were forged, a relatively liberal and cosmopolitan climate within one significant wing of the Solidarity (sub)culture emerged.

Hannertz and several other writers suggest that "cosmopolitanism becomes proteanism."[46] In this vision, cosmopolitans as uprooted, nomadic carriers of Karl Mannheim's *freischwebende Intelligenz*, produce de-centered and ever changing discourses that avoid any notion of essential attachment to a single identity. Kantor's work seems to suggest another possibility. His imagination was incessantly oscillating between the global/cosmopolitan and *his* local. Artists "in their subconscious mind [gaze] from a distance, from a perspective, at their place of birth. To leave this place, in order to return, is an innate human trait." But the aesthetic form or ideological frame of this return is not predetermined, Kantor teaches us. Nationalists do not have an ideological monopoly in this matter; theirs is not the only method of negotiating our engagement with the local. It is a message that—sadly—is urgently needed again, at a time when reenergized nationalisms have nothing but scorn and contempt for peregrinations in the search of new identities and meditative returns that can help us to see our nations as projects of reasoned love, not uncompromising obsession.

NOTES

1. This is a revised and updated version of the essay that was published in Polish in 2006 as "Teatr awangardowy a socjalizm państwowy—czyli co było globalne przed erą globalizacji (w teatrze Kantora) i co z tego (wynika)? in *Stawanie się Społeczeństwa*, ed. Andrzej Flis (Kraków: Universitas, 2006), 267–291. I wrote the Polish version to honor my teacher, Piotr Sztompka. Since this publication, I have been looking for an appropriate opportunity to prepare an English version. I cannot think of better venue than this volume, prepared to honor another teacher, collaborator, and friend, Mike Aronoff. I believe Mike will find in this essay a few themes that He and I had thought and wrote about together.

2. *Kongres Kultury Polskiej, 11–13 grudnia 1981* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 2000), 123.

3. In fall 1981, the situation in the country was very tense; the confrontation between the independent union and the governing communists reached new heights, particularly in rhetoric. Thus, the Gdansk meeting was convened with a sense of heightened urgency. Its goal was to propose major changes in the union's political strategy, as the state and Solidarity were clearly entering a more confrontational period of their tenuous coexistence.

4. *Kongres Kultury Polskiej*, op.cit., 123.

5. Ibid., 123–124.

6. Jonathan Friedman, "Globalization," in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*, eds. David Nugent and Joan Vincent (London: Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 191–192.

7. Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania," *Slavic Review* 52, 2 (1993): 179–203.

8. Jan Kubik, "Cultural Legacies of State Socialism: History-making and Cultural-political Entrepreneurship in Postcommunist Poland and Russia," in *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule*, eds. Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 317–351.

9. Ulf Hannertz, *Cultural Complexity. Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992), 254.

10. Dick Pels, "Privileged Nomads. On the Strangeness of Intellectuals and the Intellectuality of Strangers," *Theory, Culture & Society* 16, 1 (1999): 76.

11. Ibid., 77.

12. Ibid., 78. The quotes come from Rosi Braidotti, "Reizende theorieën in een multicultureel perspectief," in *Praten in het Danker. Multiculturalisme en anti-racisme in feministisch perspectiet*, eds. Gloria Wekker and Rosi Braidotti (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1996), 34.

13. Ibid., 76.

14. Friedman, "Globalization," op.cit., 193. Elsewhere he writes: "The cultural globalization literature . . . finds cosmopolitans in the most dubious of places, and it is wont to trash redneck indigenes as enemies of the world society to come" (Ibid., 182).

15. Hannertz, *Cultural Complexity*, op.cit., 261–267.

16. József Böröcz and Melinda Kovács, *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU-Enlargement* (Central Europe: Review e-Books, 2001).

17. Henry F. Carey and Rafal Raciborski, "Postcolonialism: A Valid Paradigm for the Former Sovietized States and Yugoslavia?" *East European Politics and Societies* 18, 2 (2004): 191–235.

18. Piotr Piotrowski, "Interview," in *Central and East European Art and Culture 1945—Present*, edited by Susan Snodgrass, 2001a, accessed December 8, 2019, https ://artmargins.com/central-and-east-european-art-and-culture-1945-present/.

19. Jerzy Tchórzewski, "Kantor i inni," in *Nowocześni a Socrealizm. Tom Pierwszy* (Kraków: Fundacja Nowosielskich i Galeria Starmach, 2000), 286.

20. Camilla Gray, *The Russian Experiment in Art: 1863–1922. Revised and Enlarged Edition* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 219–351.

21. Ibid., 219.

22. Kornetchuk, Elena, "From the 1917 Revolution to Krushchev's Thaw," in *From Gulag to Glasnost. Nonconformist Art from the Soviet Union*, eds. Alla Rosenfeld and Norton T. Dodge (Thames and Hudson in Association with the Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Museum, Rutgers University, 1995), 37.

23. Ibid., 37.

24. Ibid., 37–38. Much of this section is based on Kornetchuk's work. I am also heavily indebted to the work of and conversations with a remarkable undergraduate student of mine, Sivan Yosef. See her, "Indiana Jones Meets Sitnikov: Western Art

Collectors in the World of Underground Soviet Art," Henry Rutgers Thesis, Rutgers College, April 2003.

25. Michael Scammell, "Art as Politics and Politics in Art," in *From Gulag to Glasnost. Nonconformist Art from the Soviet Union*, eds. Alla Rosenfeld and Norton T. Dodge (Thames and Hudson in association with the Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Museum Rutgers University, 1995), 50.

26. Ibid., 51.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 55.

29. Mieczysław Porębski, *Dzieje sztuki w zarysie. Wiek XIX i XX* (Warszawa: Arkady, 1988), 356–361. Marek Bartelik, *Early Polish Modern Art. Unity in Multiplicity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). Irena Kossowska, *Między tradycją i awangardą. Polska sztuka lat 1920. i 1930*, 2004, accessed December 8, 2019, http://www.culture.pl/pl/culture/artykuly/es_miedzy_tradycja_i_awangarda.

30. Kossowska, *Między tradycją i awangardą*, op.cit.

31. Andrzej Paczkowski, *Strajki, bunty, manifestacje jako "polska droga" przez socjalizm* (Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 2003); Padraic Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland. Workers and Communists, 1945–1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 331.

32. *I Wystawa Sztuki Nowoczesnej. Piećdziesiąt lat później* (Kraków: Fundacja Nowosielskich and Gallery Starmach, 1998), 150.

33. Mieczysław Porębski, *Krytycy i sztuka* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2004), 145.

34. *Nowocześni a Socrealizm. Tom Pierwszy* (Kraków: Fundacja Nowosielskich and Gallery Starmach, 2000), 51.

35. Marta Fik, *Kultura Polska po Jałcie. Kronika lat 1944–1981* (London: Polonia, 1989), 195.

36. *Nowoczesni a Socrealizm*, op.cit., 53.

37. Piotr Piotrowski, *After Stalin's Death: Modernism in Central Europe in the late 1950s*, October 15, 2001b, accessed September 7, 2019, https://artmargins.com/after-stalins-death-modernism-in-central-europe-in-the-late-1950s/.

38. Joanna Inglot, *The Figurative Sculpture of Magdalena Abakanowicz: Bodies, Environments, and Myths* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).

39. Małgorzata Kitowska-Łysiak, "Tadeusz Kantor The text updated by Hilary Heuler in August 2010," *Culture.pl*, 2002, accessed December 8, 2019, https://culture.pl/en/artist/tadeusz-kantor.

40. Tadeusz Kantor, as quoted by Jan Klossowicz. See Kitowska-Łysiak, "Tadeusz Kantor," op.cit.

41. Jarosław Suchan, "Tadeusz Kantor. Niemozliwe/Tadeusz Kantor – Impossible," *Culture.pl*, accessed December 8, 2019, https://culture.pl/en/artist/tadeusz-kantor.

42. Anda Rottenberg, "Sztuka rosyjska – sztuka polska. Wiek XX. Z punktu widzenia polskiego kuratora," in *Warszawa—Moskwa/Moskva—Varshava: 1900–2000. Exhibition Catalogue* (Warsaw: Zachęta Narodowa Galeria Sztuki, 2004). Serguei Alex Oushakine, "The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat," *Public Culture* 13, 2 (2001): 191–214.

43. Rottenberg, "Sztuka rosyjska," op.cit., 25.
44. Oushakine, "The Terrifying Mimicry," op.cit.
45. Marian Kempny, "Wspólnota i polityka tożsamości jako sposoby organizacji kulturowej różnorodności—o potrzebie nowej topiki teorii społecznej w dobie globalizacji," in *Kultura w czasach globalizacji*, eds. Małgorzata Jacyno, Aldona Jawłowska, and Marian Kempny (Warsaw: IFiS PAN, 2004), 185.
46. Hannertz, *Cultural Complexity*, op.cit., 253.

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Epilogue

Myron J. Aronoff

I am profoundly grateful to the editors of and contributors to this volume for this exceptional honor. Since the editors succinctly summarize the main theses of the chapters in their introduction and the reader has now read the chapters, in my Epilogue, I will relate them to significant themes in my own body of work. Although self-referential discourse has not (yet) made an impact in political science, it has become an important aspect of contemporary anthropology. Since my professional career has been devoted to building conceptual and methodological bridges between these two disciplines, it fits my project. Hopefully, the reader will find this approach appropriate for a *festschrift*.

Yael Aronoff and I first collaborated on analysis of the domestic determinants of Israeli foreign policy, examining the peace process from the Declaration of Principles to the Oslo II Interim Agreement.[1] We traced the pivotal role of events, political parties, personalities, and cognitive and cultural change that made possible progress toward peace with the Palestinians and a peace treaty with Jordan. Later, in 2004 and 2007, we interviewed twenty-six Israeli and Palestinian leaders and negotiators who participated in the Camp David Summit in July 2000 and in the Taba Talks in Egypt in January 2001. In addition, we interviewed several American mediators as part of our respective projects.

Her book on the political psychology of six Israeli Prime Ministers perceptively analyzed why some changed their positions on the conflict with the Palestinians and others did not.[2] She examines the roles of commitment to ideology, present or future time orientation, cognitive flexibility and openness to advice, emotional intelligence, and risk propensity in a highly original conceptual framework. This book and related articles make a major contribution to understanding the vital role of leaders in matters of war and peace. My analysis of Camp David and Taba was published in several versions—the

most recent will be discussed in the context of the contribution by Yossi Beilin to this volume.[3]

Yael's contribution to this book addresses the conceptual and methodological basis for understanding the legitimacy of the two-state paradigm. She analyzes the arguments and evidence for challenges to it and how they are met, as well as investigates triggers that might strengthen challenges to the paradigm and measures to maintain and even reinvigorate it. Yael concludes that the two-state solution remains the main paradigm for resolving the conflict despite critiques of and challenges to it. She cogently examines its legitimacy in terms of changes in political culture and shifting political alignments. I find her comprehensive analysis and conclusions compelling. It builds upon my work on legitimacy—particularly the notion that the construction and destruction of legitimacy involve interaction between cultural and political processes. I have suggested that while acceptance of legitimating discourses is essential for legitimacy, they are rarely completely consensual. She relates my discussion of myths of legitimacy to paradigms of conflict resolution.

Saliba Sarsar, my outstanding student and research assistant at Rutgers University, has a long-standing interest in peacemaking and peacebuilding as related to Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states. As a Palestinian (of Greek and Russian roots) who lived in Al-Thawri neighborhood of Jerusalem occupied by Israel in 1967, he has a personal and professional investment in this topic.[4] In my graduate seminar, he role-played Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in simulated Camp David negotiations. Saliba's correspondence with Sadat led to his doctoral dissertation on the change in Egyptian foreign policy toward Israel, 1970–1977. Many of his publications focus on the possibilities for reconciliation, especially between Palestine and Israel.

In his chapter, he considers the roles of the Holocaust and Al-Nakba in Israeli and Palestinian collective memories. The sense of righteous victimhood leads each side to focus on their unique suffering, thereby reducing empathy for the other. The result is the purging of the other's identity, memory, and even humanity. Sarsar cogently argues that reconciliation can only occur when each party empathizes with past injustices that the other side has endured, eventually establishing goodwill and amity. His examples of personal and institutional efforts to accomplish this goal are a step in the direction of mutual empathy, generosity of spirit, dignity, and humanity. His analysis compliments both Yael Aronoff's examination of the legitimacy of the two-state solution and Yossi Beilin's analysis of how the misplaced trust among negotiators contributed to the failure of the implementation of the accords reached at Camp David.

Yossi Beilin was my doctoral student at Tel Aviv University. I continued to comment on drafts of his dissertation after I moved to Rutgers. Yossi spent over three decades in political life and two decades as a member of

the Knesset (representing Labor and later Meretz). Among other positions, he served as Minister of Justice. His role as "architect" of the Oslo peace process (while deputy foreign minister) gives Beilin a unique perspective, currently known as "paraethnography."[5] Beilin has written extensively of his quest for a permanent agreement with his Palestinian counterparts.[6] His contribution on the role of trust among negotiators resonates with my analysis of the lack of trust between the parties and mediators, but also *within* the respective delegations at Camp David.[7] Whereas Beilin cites a case where trust actually undermined the implementation of peace agreements, my analysis demonstrates how the lack of trust undermined negotiations and prevented agreement. In my evaluation of the different schools of interpretation of what transpired at Camp David, problematic leaders (Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak), the cultural dimension, mutual mistrust, and internal divisions within the delegations were major obstacles to reaching an agreement. These contrasting case studies call for comparative analysis in order to delineate the conditions in which mutual trust and distrust contribute to success and failure of such negotiations.

Nadav Shelef has written extensively on nationalism.[8] In his contribution to this volume, he turns his attention to processes of denationalization in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He analyzes the substitution of criteria for membership in the community, as in the "one state" solution, replacement of nationalism with either universal cosmopolitan or particularistic, for example, religious identities, and the downshifting of the goal from total to partial sovereignty, for example, federation. In the context of this case, he finds low support for denationalization among both Israelis and Palestinians. His conclusion that alternatives to the two-state solution are unlikely to succeed strongly supports the findings of the three preceding scholars.

Shelef's analysis also complements my own work on contested Israeli nationalisms. I conclude, "In Israel, the tension created by the dual attachment to ethnicity (including national identity) and state is manifest and seeks resolution through competing civic, ethnic, ethnic republican, and ethnonationalist forms of collective identity."[9] I analyze the relationship between these forms and types of temporal perceptions (linear/historical, mixed, and cyclical/mystical), competing perceptions of space (borders), to categories of religiosity (secular, traditional, and religious), and the sense of personal and collective security. I note, "The confrontation over defining the national "we" is at the heart of many of the current political struggles taking place in the world today."[10] As Joel Migdal perceptively observed, "Unstable boundaries create a pervasive sense of insecurity that may push societies into ethnic self-determinations and increased ethnic conflict."[11] Nuanced analysis of the reciprocal relationship between culture and politics is essential to explain and understand this complex phenomenon.

Naomi Chazan and I share several professional interests. Among others, we were both trained as specialists on Africa. She remained in this field longer than I. Whereas she authored, coauthored, and edited eight books on Africa, I have published nothing on this fascinating continent. The obligatory "service" course I was assigned in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University was "Israeli Government & Politics." I never took a single course on modern Israel either in undergraduate or graduate schools since none was offered at the time at the institutions I attended. Serendipitously, Israeli culture and politics became my specialty.

Chazan's academic understanding of Israeli democracy is informed by lifelong involvement in Israeli human rights, peace, and women's movements. She was a member of the Knesset (1992–2003) representing Meretz, and president of the liberal New Israel Fund (2008–2012). Therefore, she is uniquely positioned to evaluate the erosion of democracy in Israel.

In origin and culturally, I wrote, "Israel is a product of the wedding of the Kasbah and the shtetl," and neither of which "were noted for their democratic principles or practices. However, both of which were characteristically participatory and representative, albeit oligarchic in structure."[12] I compared the changing role of one-party dominance under Labor and the Likud as an important dimension of *Uncommon Democracies*.[13] The changing party system, as Chazan notes, is an important factor in democratic decline.

I concluded, "The unresolved debate over the Jewish character of the state remains an issue that divides Israeli Jews deeply, as well as dividing Arabs from Jews, and has significant implications for the democratic nature of Zionism and the State of Israel."[14]

> Few states have undergone more rapid and comprehensive change in the past fifty years than Israel, which evolved from a socialist-inspired mixed, centralized, highly planned, state centered, protectionist economy to a much more decentralized and internationally-oriented, neoliberal one. From a political culture dominated by a collectivist version of hegemonic Zionism legitimating a Mapai (Labor-led) dominant party system, Israel passed through a phase in which two mass parties vied for power. Once hegemonic, Zionism is now under challenge and in a crisis. A change in the electoral system resulted in the election of the past three prime ministers independent of the parliament (Knesset). This reform intensified the dramatic decline of both mass parties and the concurrent rise of several parties based on identity politics. The substantial increase in the representation of previously marginal groups made the system more inclusive. However, it seriously undermined governability and led to the premature end of the governments of the first two directly elected prime ministers, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak. Consequently, the Knesset recently restored the traditional parliamentary electoral system.[15]

Chazan traces the "unique" democratic evolution from the Zionist movement through the autonomous institutions during the British Mandate noting conflicting principles and goals. She explains how the formal democracy, initially devoid of strong liberal traditions, later adopted liberal features that culminated in two basic laws dealing with human rights in 1992. She then situates the erosion of democracy in Israel within the context of the global phenomenon in the twenty-first century. The growth of illiberalism, neo-authoritarianism, and populism accelerated after the 2015 election. The targets were Arab citizens, human and civil rights groups, women, and opponents of the right-wing Likud-led coalition government. This process culminated in the illiberal "Basic Law: Israel the Nation-State of the Jewish People" and the "Arrangements Law" in 2018.

As Israel faced the third Knesset election in a year while Prime Minister Netanyahu has been indicted on charges of corruption, it is not hyperbole to state that democracy is in crisis. As Susie Linfield concludes, "It is up to Israeli democracy (despite its many failures, I do not enclose that term in sarcastic quotes) to rescue itself, reassert itself, revise itself, improve itself, before it is too late."[16]

Ilan Peleg demonstrated an early interest in ethnic politics in my graduate seminar at Tel-Aviv University, a seminar that dealt with theoretical, empirical and normative aspects of Israeli politics. Many of his widely praised publications, particularly his theoretical book[17] and his follow-up application of his theory to Arab-Jewish relations in Israel,[18] have analyzed different aspects of the subject in Israel and comparatively. Here, he studies majority-minority relations in democratic but nevertheless deeply divided societies in a globalizing world, focusing on Israel as a case study. The major challenge in such cases is to balance the mutual, and often conflicting, demands and interests of the majority and minorities with requirements of democracy for equality. The major divide in Israel is between Arab and Jew, but others include religious and ethnic divisions among Jewish Israelis. The Israeli case is particularly important today, argues Peleg, given the populist wave in Israel and beyond.

In my analysis of democratizations in deeply divided societies, I compare the Netherlands, India, and Israel to one another. I ask, "*How do fissures affect and are, in turn, affected by processes of democratization?*"[19] I assess different cultural and political mechanisms of control and accommodation. The extreme form of control is coercion. Democracies may achieve majoritarian domination with cultural forms of hegemony. A classic form of accommodation is consociationalism, which can be achieved through elite consensus on an accepted legitimating discourse and rules of the game. Different combinations of mechanisms applied at various stages in all three cases. The role of cultural-political entrepreneurs was crucial.

Joel Migdal was my close colleague in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University. He is best known for his original state-in-society approach, which he has applied in analyses of Israel[20] and Palestine,[21] among others. His analysis of the forging of the American Public, on a much more ambitious scale, echoes the theme of my first book.[22] Whereas Migdal analyzes the role of cities in this process, I explore the same process in the microcosm of the creation of community in a new town in the Negev desert. He emphasizes the "creative struggle for the soul of the city." I stress the role of political strife in the creation of communal cohesion through the mobilization of large-scale involvement in public affairs. His conclusion that "a cross-cutting set of rules of everyday life spread and boundaries of public widened as they were contested" is remarkably similar to my local study in Israel. I note that the processes that transformed Frontiertown were very similar to those that historically transformed Israeli society.

Yael Zerubavel was my long-time colleague at Rutgers University. Together with other colleagues, we established, and she chaired and led, a strong center of Jewish studies in which Israel studies was a vital component. The center eventually became an academic department in the university. Zerubavel is a leading expert on Israeli collective memory.[23] She continues her project with an analysis of political satire and national memory in Meir Shalev's *The Bible Now*. She suggests it represents both "contemporization," the application of contemporary perspective and sensibilities to history and "archaization," drawing from history to satirize contemporary appreciation and interpretation of the Bible.

Zerubavel's analysis is reminiscent of my examination of the state funeral for the 2,000-year-old remains of "Bar Kochba's fighters and people."[24] Prime Minister Menachem Begin used the State-sponsored reburial of ancient bones to give legitimacy to his current policies. A group of twenty-four protestors wearing Roman-style togas chanted, "You are making a laughing stock of our history," in a parody ritual protest against the event designed to subvert Begin's policies and his blatant manipulation of history. Both cases involve the interpretation of political satire that uses multivocal symbols that can only be explained through nuanced cultural, context specific analysis.

Roland Vazquez was my best anthropology doctoral student at Rutgers. His book on the Basque nationalist party is an original and important work that combined participant observation and archival research in a linguistically difficult and politically challenging environment.[25] Although completely different and original, it reminds me of my study of the Israel Labor Party.[26] To the best of my knowledge, mine was the first anthropological study of a national political party. Roland's, may be the second. If not, it is certainly one of the few such studies.

The subject of his contribution in this book is sculptural commemoration of the victims of the Basque E.T.A. violent campaign for independence

from Spain, which officially ended in 2018. The symbolic memorial "map of memory" throughout the Basque autonomous region of Spain, is reminiscent of my suggestion that the memorialization of the dead has become so central to Israeli political culture that it has become "a national cult."[27] For example, there are a vast number of war memorials and shrines throughout the country. Vazquez analyzes the symbolism and political aesthetic of Christina Iglesias's monumental sculpture "The Midnight Compass" on the grounds of the Basque parliamentary building to elucidate multiple meanings for Basque political culture. It is a virtual tour de force.

Jan Kubik was professionally my closest colleague in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers. When his PhD dissertation in anthropology from Columbia University was published, it blew me away.[28] I was chair of the Department of Political Science at Rutgers when we hired him. Jan, eventually, was elected chair of the department.

The culmination of our collaboration aimed to clarify and summarize our career-long efforts to build conceptual and methodological bridges between anthropology and political science.[29] Whereas the case studies were written independently based on our own fieldwork, the conceptual and methodological chapters were coauthored. Jan's contribution was greater on ethnology and I contributed the section on case studies. However, the entire process was collaborative. We learned much from each other.

Kubik's contribution to this volume focuses on the avant-garde theater of Tadeusz Kantor to discuss the emergence of a liberal strand and openness and cosmopolitanism in Polish culture. Kantor universalized his Jewish Polish hometown. Jan artfully relates aesthetic creativity to regime type by comparing repression of the arts in the Soviet Union to the greater freedom in Poland in different periods. He convincingly analyzes the role of the avant-garde artists in offering alternative visions to state ideology that challenged State Socialism and continue to challenge current state sponsored nationalism. His case study dramatically demonstrates how artful analyses of the relationship between culture and politics shed light on important contemporary issues.[30]

> Political culture is far more tenuous than it is generally portrayed. It is like a fragile web of symbolic themes that is constantly being stretched in opposite directions by conflicting interpretations. The myths that crown power with legitimacy are constantly threatened by iconoclasts who call into question and undermine them. Old truths are constantly reinterpreted as political realities change, and new cultural traditions are invented by myth-makers who drape emergent groups with the mantle of authority. Political culture, like all culture, is an illusion that is essential for the survival of society and civilization. Like other modern nations, Israel claims "to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely" a human community "so 'natural' as to require no definition other than self-assertion."[31]

> Its political culture is particularly vulnerable because so many within and without its borders challenge this claim.[32]

I was actively engaged in academics for several decades. This volume represents for me the greatest honor I have received (among several of which I am proud). I retired from Rutgers in 2007 concluding thirty years on faculty as a member of the political science, Jewish Studies, and graduate anthropology departments. At the retirement party organized by the Department of Political Science, I was given an album of photos of colleagues, former and current graduate students who wrote messages to me—reminiscent of a high school yearbook. I was most touched that some younger colleagues and students saw me as a "role model" and called me a "*mensch*" (a person of integrity and honor, a decent human being). I could not ask for a more meaningful tribute!

As I noted, two of the editors and several of the contributors were my graduate students who became my professional colleagues. Whereas Yael Aronoff was never my formal student, I like to think I may have influenced her. When people say she is following in my footsteps, she proudly agrees, but also points out that I am a specialist in comparative politics, whereas her major field is international relations and security studies. Several contributors were my colleagues in departments with which I was affiliated in Israel and the United States. I very much appreciate the contributions of Nadav and Naomi, my noninstitutionally affiliated professional colleagues. Whereas I have dealt with words for my entire career, I find it difficult to express the depth of my gratitude for this honor.

In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my intellectual mentors at UCLA, David C. Rapoport and the late Michael G. Smith, and at Manchester, the late Max Gluckman.[33] As is written, learning is acquired by the scholar who

> concentrates on his study, is capable of intellectual give and take, is capable of adding to what he has learned, studies in order to teach, and studies in order to practice, makes his teachers wiser, is exact in what he has learned, and quotes his source. Thus thou dost learn that whoever quotes his source brings deliverance to the world.[34]

NOTES

1. Myron J. Aronoff and Yael S. Aronoff, "Explaining Domestic Influences on Current Israeli Foreign Policy; The Peace Negotiations," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* III, 2 (Summer/Fall 1996): 83–120; and Myron J. Aronoff and Yael

S. Aronoff, "Domestic Determinants of Israeli Foreign Policy: The Peace Process from the Declaration of Principles to the Oslo II Interim Agreement," in *The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords*, edited by Robert O. Freedman (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1998), 10–34.

2. Yael S. Aronoff, *The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

3. Myron J. Aronoff and Jan Kubik, *Anthropology & Political Science: A Convergent Approach* (New York, NY/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2013).

4. Saliba Sarsar, *Jerusalem: The Home in Our Hearts* (N. Bethesda, MD: Holy Land Books, 2018).

5. Aronoff and Kubik, *Anthropology & Political Science*, op.cit., 46–48.

6. Yossi Beilin, *The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996–2004* (New York, NY: RDV Books, 2004).

7. Ibid., 121–197.

8. Nadav Shelef, *Evolving Nationalisms: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925–2005* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010) and *Homelands: Shifting Borders and Territorial Disputes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).

9. Ibid., 125.

10. Ibid., 128.

11. Joel S. Migdal, *Through the Lens of Israel: Explorations in State and Society* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).

12. Myron J. Aronoff, "The Origins of Israeli Political Culture," in *Israeli Democracy Under Stress*, edited by Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 47–80.

13. Myron J. Aronoff, "Israel Under Labor and the Likud: The Role of Dominance Considered," in *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, edited by T. J. Pempel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 260–281.

14. Myron J. Aronoff, "Zionism" in *Encyclopedia of Democracy*, Editor-in-chief, Seymour Martin Lipset (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), 1411–1414.

15. Myron J. Aronoff, "Radical Change in Israel: A Review Essay." *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (Fall 2001): 447–453.

16. Susie Lindfield, *The Lion's Den: Zionism and the Left from Hannah Arendt to Noam Chomsky* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019).

17. Ilan Peleg, *Democratizing the Hegemonic State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

18. Ilan Peleg, *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

19. Aronoff and Kubik, *Anthropology & Political Science*, op.cit., 132–170.

20. Migdal, *Through the Lens of Israel*, op.cit.

21. Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

22. Myron J. Aronoff, *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel* (Manchester: Manchester University Press and Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1974).

23. Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

24. Aronoff and Kubik, *Anthropology & Political Science*, 56–57.

25. Roland Vazquez, *Politics, Culture, and Sociability in the Basque Nationalist Party* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 2010).

26. Myron J. Aronoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party: A Study in Political Anthropology* (Assen/Amsterdam, Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1977; Revised & Expanded Edition. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).

27. Myron J. Aronoff, "Myths, Symbols, and Rituals of the Emerging State," in *New Perspectives on Israeli History: The Early Years of the State*, edited by Laurence J. Silberstein (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991), 175–192, specifically pp. 182–183.

28. Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).

29. Aronoff and Kubik, *Anthropology & Political Science*, op.cit.

30. My most succinct statement on the subject is Myron J. Aronoff, "Political Culture," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001), 11640–11644.

31. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, Editors, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 142.

32. Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

33. Myron J. Aronoff, Editor, *Freedom and Constraint: A Memorial Tribute to Max Gluckman* (Assen, Netherlands: van Gorcum, 1976).

34. Judah Goldin, *The Living Talmud: The Wisdom of the Fathers and its Classical Commentaries, Selected and Translated with an Essay by Judah Goldin* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; volume cited: New York, NY: Mentor Book, 1964), 233–234.

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Note: *Italic* page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by "n" denote endnotes.

About the Contributors

Myron J. Aronoff is the distinguished professor emeritus of Political Science, Anthropology, and Jewish Studies at Rutgers University. His PhD in anthropology is from the University of Manchester, and his PhD in political science is from UCLA. He devoted his professional career to building conceptual and methodological bridges between political science and anthropology. Professor Aronoff is the author of *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel*, *Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party*, and *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict*. He coauthored *Anthropology & Political Science: A Convergent Approach* and edited *Freedom and Constraint: A Memorial Tribute to Max Gluckman* and the series of *Political Anthropology*. Professor Aronoff was awarded the first Lifetime Achievement Award in Israel Studies from the Association for Israel Studies and the Israel Institute "in recognition of your outstanding scholarship and contributions to the study of Israel" on June 24, 2013. In 2018, he was awarded the Albert Nelson Maruis Lifetime Achievement Award.

Yael S. Aronoff is the director of the Serling Institute for Jewish Studies and Modern Israel and is the Serling Chair in Israel Studies at Michigan State University. Dr. Aronoff teaches in James Madison College, where she is associate professor of Political Science. Her book, *The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard Liners Opt for Peace*, was published by Cambridge University Press (2014), and her current book project is titled, *The Dilemmas of Asymmetric Conflicts: Navigating Deterrence and Democratic Constraints*. Dr. Aronoff has published in *Foreign Policy, Israel Studies, Israel Studies Review,* and *Political Science Quarterly* and has given over 100 public lectures. She is the President of the Association of Israel Studies.

Yossi Beilin is the head of the steering committee of the Geneva Initiative and the chairman of "Hillel-Israel." In his private life he is a president of a business consultancy in Tel Aviv, "Beilink." In the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations, Beilin initiated the Oslo Process in 1992, the "Beilin-Abu Mazen agreement" in 1993–1995, and the Geneva Initiative in 2001–2003. In the context of the Jewish world, Beilin initiated the Taglit-Birthright project. Beilin was Israeli Justice Minister and served as deputy minister and as minister in four governments in Israel between 1988 and 2001. He was elected to the Knesset in 1988, and resigned twenty years later. For many years, he represented the Labour Party. In 2003, he moved to the Meretz Party, and was its leader between 2004 and 2008. Before joining politics, Beilin taught political science in Tel Aviv and was a journalist. During the Spring 2020 Semester, he lectured at New York University as a global distinguished professor.

Naomi Chazan is professor emerita of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and at the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. She is a former member of the Knesset (1992–2003), past president of the New Israel Fund (2008–2012), and has been active in a variety of human rights, peace, and women's organizations for over four decades. She has written and edited nine books and over seventy scholarly articles. Her latest publication, an edited volume with Michal Shamir and Hanna Herzog, has just been published in Hebrew: Michal Shamir, Hanna Herzog and Naomi Chazan eds. The Gender Gap in Israeli Politics. Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv: Van Leer and the Kibbutz Ha'Me'uhad, 2020.

Jan Kubik is professor in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University and professor of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London (UCL). He works on the rise of right-wing populism; culture and politics; civil society, protest politics and social movements; and communist and post-communist politics. Among his publications are *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power*; *Anthropology and Political Science*, with Myron Aronoff, and *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, with Michael Bernhard. He is the 2020 president of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and the recipient of the 2018 Distinguished Achievement Award from the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America (PIASA). He is currently co-directing (with Richard Mole) two large international projects, "Delayed Transformational Fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe: Responding to the Rise of Populism," and "Populist rebellion against modernity in twenty-first-century Eastern Europe" (https://populism-europe.com/

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Joel Migdal is the Robert F. Philip professor of International Studies in the University of Washington's Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. He was the founding chair of the University of Washington's International Studies Program. Migdal was formerly associate professor of Government at Harvard University and senior lecturer at Tel-Aviv University. Among his books are *Strong Societies and Weak States*; *The Palestinian People: A History* (with Baruch Kimmerling); and *Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East.* In 1993, he received the University of Washington's Distinguished Teaching Award, and, in 1994, the Governor's Writers Award. Joel S. Migdal is professor emeritus and formerly the Robert F. Philip professor of International Studies in the University of Washington's Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.

Ilan Peleg is the author or editor of eleven books and over ninety scholarly essays. A former president of the Association of Israel Studies, he is the founding editor-in-chief of *Israel Studies Forum*, the scholarly journal of the Association for Israel Studies. Among Peleg's books are *Democratizing the Hegemonic State* (2007) and *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within* (2011), both published by Cambridge University Press, as well as a political biography of Menachem Begin, a book on worldwide censorship, an early book on Israel as a binational society, a volume on human rights in the West Bank and Gaza, and a forthcoming edited book on The *Victimhood Discourse in Contemporary Israel*. A scholar at Washington's Middle East Institute and the Charles A. Dana Government and law professor at Lafayette College, Peleg held visiting positions at Harvard, Oxford, Princeton, and Penn; has appeared on CNN, Voice of America, and National Public Radio; and has delivered hundreds of lectures in academic, civic, and religious institutions.

Saliba Sarsar is professor of Political Science at Monmouth University. His teaching, research, and writing interests focus on the Middle East, Palestinian-Israeli affairs, Jerusalem, and peacebuilding. His most recent authored books are *Peacebuilding in Israeli-Palestinian Relations* (2020) and *Jerusalem: The Home in Our Hearts* (2018). His most recent edited book is *What Jerusalem Means to Us: Christian Perspectives and Reflections* (2018). He is the guest editor of a special issue of the *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, focusing on "Israel, Palestine, and the Prospects for Peace" (2020). Dr. Sarsar was featured in several publications, including *The New York Times*, and is the recipient of several honors, including the Award of Academic Excellence from the American Task Force on Palestine, the

Global Visionary Award and the Stafford Presidential Award of Excellence from Monmouth University, the Humanitarian Award from the National Conference for Community and Justice, and the Holy Land Christian Ecumenical Foundation Award.

Nadav G. Shelef is the Harvey M. Meyerhoff professor of Israel Studies and professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His research focuses on nationalism, territory, religion and politics, Israeli politics and society, and Middle East politics. His most recent books include *Homelands: Shifting Borders and Territorial Disputes* (Cornell University Press, 2020) and *Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity and Religion in Israel, 1925–2005* (Cornell University Press, 2010).

Roland Vazquez is professor of Anthropology and Social Science at Upper Iowa University. He received his doctorate in Anthropology at Rutgers University under the direction of Myron J. Aronoff. His research interests include Basque and Spanish politics, especially links between institutional realities and culture. His *Politics, Culture, and Sociability in the Basque Nationalist Party* (University of Nevada Press, 2010) is an ethnographic study of Basque partisan competition. He is currently working on an ethnography focusing on the political culture of post-terrorism in Basque society, with special attention to the victims of ETA.

Yael Zerubavel is professor Emerita of Jewish Studies and History at Rutgers University and the former founding director of the Bildner Center for the Study of Jewish Life. She has published extensively in the areas of collective memory and identity, political myths, Israeli culture, war and trauma, and symbolic landscapes. She is the author of the award-winning *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), and *Desert in the Promised Land* (Stanford University Press, 2019). She has coedited (with Amir Goldstein), *Tel Hai, 1920–2020: History and Memory* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi & Weizmann Institute for the Study of Zionism and Israel, Tel Aviv University Press, 2020) (in Hebrew). Professor Zerubavel is the recipient of the 2019 Lifetime Achievement Award in Israel Studies from the Association for Israel Studies and the Israel Institute.