

HAYDEN J. SMITH

REALISM AND IDEALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING



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To Madeline

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Acknowledgments

This project began as my dissertation at Washington State University, where I became intrigued by both system-level IR theory and individual leadership profiling. Within these fields of both IR and political psychology I was most drawn to decision-making analysis and the unfortunate disconnect between the two bodies of literature. This book is an attempt to tie together existing scholarship with the hope of laying a foundation that connects the black box of state-level analysis and nuanced individual level of analysis. Various portions of this project have been presented at the International Studies Association and the International Society of Political Psychology. At each point of the project I am indebted to others, not only for their support but also for their criticisms that inspired me to push further.

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As one of the individuals named above put it, my efforts here to join systemic theory and foreign policy decision-making are perhaps reminiscent of Don Quixote and any mistakes are my own. This work is not meant to be a definitive theory of international politics. Rather, my hope is that this project will crack open the black box of systemic theory so that future work can build on this foundation to show how individuals influence the system and how the system influences the decision-making of world leaders.

Introduction

The goal of this book is to bridge the theoretical gap between systemic International Relations (IR) theory and the individual level of analysis. Thus, the analysis in this book has theoretical and empirical implications for the study of international politics and foreign policy decision-making. The foundational goal of this project has been to reconcile the wide chasm that often separates IR paradigms, realism and liberalism, from the study of individual-level actors and the psychology behind their decision-making processes, seeking to understand conflict and cooperation in world affairs. Waltz (1954, 1959) posited that conflict can be attributed to the man, the state, or the system. Although these levels of analysis are interconnected, Waltz (1996) vehemently argued that a theory of foreign policy is not a theory of IR. This theoretical divide has separated scholars of systems theory (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) and scholars of foreign policy decision-making (George, 1960; Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1990; Cottam, 1992; Preston, 2001). Smith (2019) differentiates between philosophical and explanatory realists. This analysis in this book builds on and helps define IR theories philosophically, rather than a grand theory system-level explanation.

Waltz (1979) asserts, “Theories of international politics that concentrate causes at the individual or national level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic” (18). He further argues that we cannot learn anything new from a “reductionist” theory, because the whole must be known and then it is explained by breaking it down into smaller parts. In specific, regarding the use of psychological analysis, Waltz (1979) argues that they are “nonpolitical theories” and are not “strong enough to provide reliable explanations or predictions” (19). He posits that analytical analysis

will be sufficient only where systems-level effects are absent or are weak enough to be ignored. It will be insufficient, and a systems approach will be needed, if outcomes are affected not only by the properties and interconnections of variables but also by the way in which they are organized. (Waltz, 1979, 39)

Thus, Waltz (1979) lays the groundwork for “systems theory,” clearly separate from the study of foreign policy, defined as individual issue decisions (Waltz, 1967, 1996). For scholars in this camp, the individual level of analysis is a “black box.”

Foreign policy decision-making research, particularly that which is focused on personality and cognition, has rejected system-level theory in favor of individual-level explanatory variables (Cottam, 1994; Preston, 2001; Walker, 1983). Several scholars have stretched the boundaries, making abstract correlations and utilizing concepts from systems theory combined with foreign policy decision-making (Holsti, 1977; Barkin, 2010; Zakaria, 1999; Smith, 2019). There are, however, no prior attempts to carefully integrate the two research agendas, with a complete typology; that is the goal of this project.

I do not reject Waltz’s claim that systemic variables generate constraints and opportunities that drive state behavior. I do, however, seek to rectify a critical error in Waltz’s theory. Waltz’s fatal flaw is his disregard for the potential for individual decision-makers to misperceive the system-level variables. Again, Waltz is not incorrect, but failed to incorporate the caveat that perception and misperception (Jervis, 1976) dictate behavior. Rather than rejecting system-level theory in favor of psychological decision-making analysis, I have attempted to bridge the gap between these two scholarly endeavors by incorporating realist thought into personality profiling, which provides insight as to how actors view themselves and other actors. This work is a first step and as stated by Waltz (1979), “A theory is never completed” (preface). It is my hope that this will serve as a catalyst to further advance IR theory and bridge the gap between systems theory and theories of foreign policy.

Empirically, this book contributes to our knowledge and understanding of the foreign policy goals and intentions with five case studies of U.S. presidents: Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. Understanding the foreign policy objectives gives us a wholistic (Hollis and Smith, 1990) picture of how each leader differed in their cognitive perceptions of the international environment, particularly in regards to the perceived source of threat and conflict in the system, as well as the perceived balance of power. These chapters will be of interest to general readers of history, as well as scholars. Each case study contributes to our greater understanding of personality, perception, and decision-making during each administration.

Each case study focuses on the realist, and/or liberal, goals and intentions of the respective president's foreign policy agenda. They are, however, unequal in the amount of information analyzed, particularly in regards to the amount of detail available in the behind-the-scenes policy making with key advisers. Presidential records are held for up to twelve years and information pertaining to national security are often held much longer. For this reason, the cases of Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter are much more detailed, with memos between the president and key advisers. While this level of detail is not available for George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, these cases serve an equal importance to the theory building and analysis of this book.

Each presidential case was selected for an empirical and theoretical purpose, covering different periods of structure in the international system as well as differences in perceptions, personality, and political experience. In addition, cases were selected on the basis of policy actions that are comparable to another president.

Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter were selected as Cold War presidents who were both involved in Strategic Arms Limitations Talks negotiations with the Soviet Union and active in addressing conflict between Israel and Palestine. Nixon, a seasoned politician, is easily associated with the "realist" foreign policy of Henry Kissinger. Alternatively, Carter was, relatively, a political novice who is perceived as soft and less prone to engage in militarized conflict.

George W. Bush and Barack Obama were selected, because they both served and focused on the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Analyzing post-Cold War presidents is important to the theoretical development in this book, as it sheds light on the shift in the source of conflict and threats within the international system. The rise in power of non-state actors alters what security and defense means, and enjoying a unipolar system, U.S. presidents did not experience the same constraints that were imposed by the bipolar system of the Cold War. Stephen Walt (2019) says, "A quarter century ago, after the Cold War ended, foreign policy elites abandoned realism in favor of an unrealistic grand strategy—liberal hegemony—that has weakened the country and caused considerable harm at home and abroad" (26). From the analysis in the following case studies, this is not correct; realist and idealist policy goals and actions are not confined to time frames but are influenced by systemic constraints. During the Cold War, the liberal agenda was in check by the USSR, but with the changes in polarity, after the collapse of the USSR, there was no more check on the U.S. system, giving the decision-makers more latitude (Schweller, 2010).

As a final case study, Donald Trump was selected, because he is different from all of his predecessors, in that he has a very low level of political

knowledge and lacks prior experience in political office. This makes him unique, in that he is not cognitively constrained by the mainstream thinking of U.S. foreign policy and pursues his own true objectives. In specific, Donald Trump has made an attempt to return to an isolationist foreign policy, abandoning the pursuit of global proliferation of democracy and Western liberal ideology. These goals, and as I will argue failures, contribute to our understanding of the systemic structure, balance of power, and constraints placed on great powers.

Collectively, these case studies provide a comparison of the Cold War versus post-Cold War eras. During the Cold War, there was a clear balance of power between the United States and USSR, with known objectives and threats at the state level, whereas the post-Cold War era was, at least initially, characterized by unipolarity under U.S. hegemon, with less direct threats from state actors and more threats from non-state actors. Although there is no direct connection between political parties and realist and liberal foreign policy agendas, I have selected two Democrats and three Republicans, so that this variable is accounted for and compared appropriately. The final characteristic used to select these cases is experience in a political environment, particularly with respect to foreign policy. Of the five cases, Richard Nixon entered the White House with the most experience in federal government and foreign policy, while Donald Trump is representative of a political novice. Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush both served as state governors and Barack Obama was a junior senator before winning the election for the Oval Office. These three latter presidents had relatively little experience in international affairs and we see evidence of learning and change in policy strategy; Nixon and Trump demonstrate less learning, whereas Carter and Obama actively sought high amounts of information and varying opinions from advisers.

Of equal importance is the evidence of continuity that is observed between administrations, despite differences in perception of U.S. power, external threats, and the malleability of the system. The continuity in policy choices and outcomes, rather than intentions, allows us to identify the systemic variables that constrain policy actions. This is particularly evident when leaders attempt to pursue personal agendas. It is important to note that, in this analysis, there is no normative judgment on the policy agendas themselves. Rather, the objective is to identify the perceptions and cognitive processes that influence and drive these policy objectives. In the concluding chapter, the empirical analysis contributes to the explanatory characteristics of realism and liberalism, by drawing on the philosophical characteristics that have been put into action (Smith, 2019). The goal is not to create a definitive new theory of IR but an effort to begin bridging the gap between individual and systemic-level variables.

The theoretical exploration of realist and idealist thought and development of a foreign policy typology, founded on cognitive perceptions, realist and idealist goals and perceptions of the international system begins in chapter 2. This chapter is fundamental for understanding the implications drawn from each case study the model is applied to. In IR, systemic theory and foreign policy are often treated as separate areas of study. This chapter challenges this idea and draws connections between systems-level constraints, system-level variables related to the balance of power, and cognitive elements of individual leader's personality characteristics.

Chapters 3–7 employ the realist/idealist framework to understand the foreign policy goals and intentions of the five presidential administrations mentioned earlier. Each case study should be understood within the context of the time period in which the president served; changing variables in the international system, as well as domestically, have significant implications for each president's decision-making, as well as what should be understood as realist or idealist. However, larger implications can be drawn by considering the findings of the case studies collectively.

Chapter 8 concludes with an analysis of these large theoretical implications. In specific, the case studies provide insight as to how when systemic variables change and create constraints and opportunities on individual action. Finally, I discuss an agenda for future research, which should focus on the analysis of leaders outside of the United States, or other great powers. What it means to pursue realist or idealist objectives largely depends upon where one sits within the balance of power.

Chapter 1

Realism, Idealism, and Belief Systems in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Returning to the roots of realism and idealism, the goal of this chapter is to construct a typology of worldviews based on realist and idealist ideologies, by utilizing Operational Code (OpCode) and image theory. A typology of this nature was established by Ole Holsti (1977) and later condensed by Walker (1983) for theoretical simplification. When Walker (1983) consolidated the typology, all realists were grouped into one category, and critical nuance was lost because not all realists are equal. The typology generated in this chapter is intended to provide a complete range of realist and idealist thought.

Stepping outside of the confines of state-centered realism (Waltz, 1979), this analysis fits into the scholarship of neoclassical realism (Zakaria, 1998; Schweller, 1998; Toje and Kunz, 2012; Christensen, 1996; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2006) and proceeds in four sections. First, I provide an overview of neorealist and neoclassical realist scholarship. Second, I turn to classical realism and idealism to describe each respective set of thoughts and beliefs as ideologies. In the third section of the chapter, I develop a framework for categorizing worldviews as *realists* or *idealists* using OpCode and image theory. Note that the italicized *realism* and *idealism* refer to ideologies and belief systems and “realism” and “liberalism” will refer to the theories. Finally, I outline a coding methodology for analyzing realist and idealist ideology.

NEOREALISM

Waltz (1959) clearly defined three “images” of IR. The first image is that of man. Waltz (1959) takes a Hobbsian view of human nature and describes how it is human decisions that ultimately lead us to war. The second image depicts

the domestic and bureaucratic politics of the state. While Waltz (1959) claims the second image is useful for understanding foreign policy, his third image is a view of the international system. In “Theory of International Politics,” Waltz (1979) builds on the third image and describes world politics within a structural system, creating the foundation of neorealism. Waltz (1979) describes the international system based on “deep structure,” which is comprised of the defining elements that drive world politics, namely anarchy and the balance of power. Although realism is applied by scholars in a variety of contexts, it remains a cohesive theory with a consistent body of research and scholars that have progressed over time, connected by a distinct set of assumptions and views regarding the international system (Gilpin, 1986; Feng and Ruizhuang, 2006).

According to Waltz (1979), conflict occurs when there is a shift in the polarity of the system, causing states to compete for a position of influence within the system. However, he believes that, in most cases, states attempt to maintain the status quo rather than seek more power; this is known as defensive realism (Waltz, 1979). Using Waltz (1979) as a foundation, Mearsheimer (2001), alternatively, posits a theory of offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer, states constantly seek to expand their power, resulting in more conflict. The goal of this book is not to engage with the scholarly debate over which grand strategy is most prudent for great powers (Taliaferro, 2001) but rather to show that different leaders have inherent preferences for their foreign policy strategy.

Beyond the expectations of the desires of states, Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer’s (2001) theories are based on two fundamentally different principles, which has led to the debate of international politics versus foreign policy in the field of IR. First, Waltz’s (1979) theory does not directly rely upon the rational actor model of states, because he posits that intentions are often misperceived, thus perfect rationality does not exist. Alternatively, Mearsheimer’s (2001) theory relies heavily on the rational actor model. Second, Waltz (1979; 1996) asserts that a theory of foreign policy is not a theory of IR. He posits that a theory of international politics must stay at the systemic level of analysis (Waltz, 1979), whereas a theory of foreign policy examines domestic influences and explains specific foreign policy decisions (Waltz, 1967). Mearsheimer (2001), on the other hand, sees no difference between theories of foreign policy and international politics, which is more consistent with scholars of classical realism (Herz, 1951).

Neorealism has made many long-lasting contributions to the field of IR. The utility of neorealism, however, is limited. Waltz’s (1979) neorealism is parsimonious and does not seek to explain state behavior but rather attempts to describe international systemic outcomes. Mearshimer’s (2001) theory is

better equipped to explain some state behavior, but both theoretical frameworks are stuck at the systemic level of analysis. This limits the utility of the theories explanatory power. This should not be interpreted as a criticism of the theories themselves, because they were not intended to explain more than they do. A different analysis, however, is needed for expanding our understanding of how the lower levels of analysis affect the systemic level and how the system affects the individual decision-makers and the state. More recent scholarship, neoclassical realism, utilizes what we have learned about systemic constraints from neorealism to develop a new realist theory that has greater explanatory power for state behavior.

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

Realism has remained predominately at the systemic level of analysis, because Waltz (1979, 1996) asserts that only systemic factors are applicable to the IR system and domestic politics should remain only with the study of foreign policy (Waltz, 1967) and this line of research has largely dominated the literature; but, it is not without critique. Neorealism is helpful in bridging the levels of analysis debate that has plagued and divided scholars of structural realism (Waltz, 1979; Mearshimer, 2001) from those that examine the internal characteristics of states (Zakaria, 1992) and the individual level of analysis (Cottam, 1977; Holsti, 1977; Cottam, 1994; Schafer and Walker, 2006).

Realist scholarship, however, does not have to be constrained to the systemic level. *Realist* behavior can be measured in the context of realist expectations, resulting in midrange theories, which has been the goal of neo-classical realism (Feaver et al., 2000), incorporating ideational variables in a positivist approach (Meibauer, 2020). Neoclassical realists, such as Fareed Zakaria (1998); Randy Schweller (1998); Toje and Kunz (2012); Christensen (1996); and Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (2006, 2009), all begin with the basic assumptions of realism, that states seek security and power, but in a more nuanced way that allows them to examine the internal forces within states that drive their behavior within the international system, compared to the systemic theories, such as Waltz (1979) and Mearshimer (2001). Neoclassical realism is not simply an ad hoc addition to realist scholarship but rather a “necessary” step at bolstering and building the theory (Rathbun, 2008). Christensen (1996) posits that the public makes foreign policy decisions as an interaction between the goals of the policy makers and the level of acceptance of those policies in the general public. In specific, “If the political hurdles to mobilization are relatively low, then we should expect policies that are consistent with the expectations of black-box realists. If the

hurdles are high or prohibitively high, we should expect policies that would be considered by *realists* to be either overreactions or underreactions to the international environment facing the nation” (Christensen, 1996, 13). In other words, foreign policy goals may face constraints from the system.

The challenge, then, is for policy makers to sell their policy to the general public and reach a compromise, so that the long-term goals and interests of the policy makers are equal to the long-term interests and goals of the public (Christensen, 1996). His theory makes a strong case for the merging of area studies and general theory, to better understand specific cases. This is beneficial for theory, because different populations interact with their government in different ways, and thus the nuances are important in understanding the grand strategy of a state (Taliaferro, 2001).

Zakaria (1998) begins by not treating offensive realism and defensive realism as either-or options but rather asking when states choose to pursue expansion and when they exercise restraint. He posits that the goal of states is to have influence within the international system. Thus, they expand when the opportunity to increase influence arises (Zakaria, 1998). This is dependent not only on state capabilities but also on the ability of the state to employ those capabilities in the appropriate manner, which is dependent upon the domestic political environment and their fungibility of the resources. Along the same lines, Schweller (2004) investigates the neorealist claim that states “balance” against one another in the system. He finds that states often do not respond in ways that neorealists would predict or prescribe, mostly by underbalancing. But, he fails to explain when and why states are most likely to underbalance (Schweller, 2004).

While the current neoclassical realist literature has provided a foundation for a multilevel analysis of international politics, there are many gaps left to fill. Rose (1998) asserts that neoclassical scholars have focused on area studies and specific cases but have made no significant contributions to systemic theory.

REALISM AND IDEALISM AS IDEOLOGY

If we step outside of neorealism’s black box and view *realism* and *idealism* as philosophical ways of perceiving the world around us (Herz, 1951; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012; Smith and Michelsen, 2017) and ways of managing foreign policy (Barkin, 2010), then we can understand how the two philosophies affect foreign policy decision-making. In brief, *realism* is a set of assumptions held by those that view the international system as being characterized by conflict, which cannot be altered through cooperation, but the absence of conflict can be maintained with the use or threat of force. Alternatively,

idealists believe that a more permanent peace is possible within the system; this does not mean they believe the system is currently peaceful, but that it may be achieved by various means including international organizations and cooperation of individuals. It is important to understand that modern realism came about as push against *idealism* and the development of both has relied on their opposition to the other (Herz, 1951; Waltz, 1979)

Gideon Rose (1998) asserts that neorealists have created two theories of foreign policy, offensive realism and defensive realism, by applying realist principles to individual states' foreign policies. The same could be said of liberalism, which grew from "idealism." One example of realism being applied to policy decisions is John Mearsheimer's (2014) argument that Vladimir Putin's *realist* foreign policy moves in Crimea and the liberal foreign policy of the United States and its NATO allies. This treatment of realism and idealism is based upon the foundations of classical realist thought. John Herz (1951) begins his analysis of *realist* and *idealist* thought by positing that both philosophies are founded in individual psychology and are how one perceives the world. Several authors exemplify this characterization of *realism* and *idealism*. Feng (2005) discusses Mao Zedong's policies in terms of defensive and offensive realism. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) discuss the OpCode of Jimmy Carter and his shift toward realism. In addition, Kertzer and McGraw (2012) conducted a study of college students to determine that college students hold *realist* and *idealist* ideologies, and Smith and Michelsen (2017) found that these ideologies impact foreign policy decision-making and policy goal preferences.

Further emphasizing that there are differences in how individuals perceive foreign policy, I turn to studies of American politics, discussing the divide that exists among liberals and conservatives. Some studies show that there is virtually no difference in the foreign policy preferences between conservatives and liberals, but this is incorrect (Gries, 2014). This misperception comes from Morris Fiorina's (2011) argument that American voters are not deeply divided by political party lines. "On domestic politics, he asserts that 'there is little evidence that the country is polarized even on "hot button" issues like abortion.'" On foreign policy, Fiorina claims that "red and blue state voters have similar views on diplomacy vs. force in international affairs" (cited in Gries, 2014, 41). Peter Gries (2014) asserts that Fiorina's findings are based on poor methodology and demonstrates how there are not only divides between conservatives and liberals over foreign policy issues but how there are divides within the parties among different types of conservatives and liberals respectively. This shows that foreign policy preferences are, in fact, divided by political ideology. He views composite ideologies with the aid of subideologies of culture, social, economics, and politics, with the most important being economic and social. His findings suggest that, in general,

conservatives feel more loyal to their government and state, whereas liberals tend to feel more like citizens of the world. This results in conservatives supporting a more isolationist foreign policy, whereas liberals favor a foreign policy that provides humanitarian aid and betters humankind around the world. However, when conservatives are not in the mindset of isolationism, they prefer a stronger foreign policy than liberals, because they place value on having authority and dominance over other groups. This demonstrates that ideology plays a key role in foreign policy perceptions (Gries, 2014).

Juxtaposed to realism is idealism, which is the philosophical set of ideals that was the catalyst for forming the theory of realism. Political idealism is not so much a theory of “what is” in the international system, but rather a set of philosophical propositions of “what ought to be” (Herz, 1951). The idea was put forward by theorists of International Law, primarily in conjunction with the League of Nations (Herz, 1951). Even the authors of these theories, however, find that there are many exceptions to states’ actual behavior versus what they “should do” according to international law. International law is based on “norms” (Herz, 1951). Essentially, political idealism is philosophically based on the new international system of nation-states. Political philosophers such as Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini discuss nationalism as a right and a way to bring peace to the international system (Herz, 1951). Political idealism was indoctrinated into the works of theories of international law, through scholars, such as Hans Kelsen (Herz, 1951). Realist thought was promoted to counter idealism and personified into a theory is intended to show a more accurate presentation of the world, rather than an idealistic one. Osiander (1998) posits that the early twentieth-century idealists have been, in part, misrepresented by realists, namely E. H. Carr (1939). He argues that the idealists, like realists, conduct a historical analysis to reach their conclusions and simply interpret history differently than the realists. Further, he posits that they are not as “utopian” as claimed by Carr (1939). While there may be some truth to this, Osiander (1998) does not consider the fundamental differences in the assumptions held by realists and idealists. The idealists, as depicted by Osiander (1998), do not change the current frame they are placed in by realists. He is correct that not all idealists believe in a “utopian” world community of individuals, but they do have a belief that cooperation is achievable and have a more optimistic view of the intentions of other actors. It is the general optimism and trust of others that sets them apart from realists.

More modern idealist scholarship is referred to as liberalism and has specifically influenced liberal institutionalism (Rosato and Schuessler, 2011). This idea of “liberalism” has grown out of the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, and there are now different varieties of “Wilsonians.” This philosophy is based in the American idea of liberalism (for a review of American liberalism, see Hartz 1955 and Kloppenberg 2001). Scholars of democratic peace theory

posit that the global system will be more peaceful with the spread of democracy. They believe that if individuals have control over their own system of government, they will be less willing to go to war against other nations that have similar democratic beliefs (Babst, 1964; Maoz and Russett, 1993). For these scholars it is the internal characteristics of the state that lead to peace or conflict. Other liberal institutionalists promote the strengthening of international institutions so as to provide a peaceful venue for resolving conflict (Deutsch et al., 1957). The overarching viewpoint of these scholars is that the international system can be shaped into a world of peace due to the creation of shared ideologies and understanding among one another. Stated succinctly, “The . . . liberal version of foreign policy . . . emphasizes democracy, institutions, and interdependence rather than the balance of power, and that holds out the prospect of peace rather than stability” (Rosato and Schuessler, 2011, 808). The end goals and general perception of the international political environment are what separates realists and idealists. This means that two individuals could pursue the same policy objectives but be categorized as an idealist or realist based on their perceptions and intentions; the development of a realist/idealist typology based upon these characteristics is the end goal of this chapter.

This liberal policy has personified itself in the murky and loosely used term “neoconservatives.” True neoconservatives support the welfare state and liberal domestic policies, but take a hard-line approach to foreign policy. The term, however, has been misused by the American political left to unfavorably label all foreign policy hawks on the right (Lipset, 1988). Max Boot (2004) posits that neoconservatives are Wilsonian idealists, but is careful to note that not all who subscribe to the Wilsonian idea of spreading democracy are the same. He states as follows:

Liberal “soft Wilsonians,” such as former U.S. president Jimmy Carter and, previously, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson himself, share a faith that multilateral organizations such as the League of Nations or the United Nations should be the main venues through which the United States promotes its ideals, and that international law should be in the United States’ main policy tool. They are willing to use force, but preferably only when (as in Haiti or Kosovo) the intervention is untainted by any hint of national interest. The neocons have scant regard for Wilson himself, whom they regard as hopelessly naïve. Instead, they are “hard Wilsonians,” who place their faith not in pieces of paper but in power, specifically U.S. power. Their heroes are Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan—all U.S. presidents who successfully wielded power in the service of a higher purpose. Neocons believe the United States should use force when necessary to champion its ideals as well as its interests, not only out of sheer humanitarianism but also because the spread

of liberal democracy improves U.S. security, while crimes against humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place. (Boot, 2004, 24)

In short, “soft Wilsonians” are more isolationist than “hard Wilsonians” (Boot, 2004).¹

To further understand how these beliefs influence policy preferences, I return to a comparison of U.S. liberals and conservatives. Gries (2014) discusses the difference in support for different versions of idealism within the American electorate. In this section liberal and conservative refer to the domestic political ideologies in the United States, not IR theory. The differences in policy preferences not only help to validate that different worldviews lead to different foreign policy preferences, but this discussion will aid in describing modern idealism and who is likely to subscribe to it. Liberals tend to support foreign aid and humanitarian intervention more than conservatives, who subscribe to the idea of “self-help,” meaning that individuals should have the freedom to help themselves, but the end result is dependent upon their own actions (Greis, 2014, 95, 109–110). Conservatives favor a stronger military than liberals due to a belief in power through dominance (Greis, 2014, 109). This emphasis is what divides the idealists. Liberal idealists fit Boot’s (2004) definition of “soft Wilsonians,” whereas as conservative *idealists* fit the definition of “hard Wilsonians.”

One of the defining characteristics of idealists and realists is how they treat policy ends and means. “Unilateralism versus multilateralism and diplomacy versus military force address the questions of *means*: How should the United States conduct its foreign policy? Realism versus idealism, by contrast, addresses the issue of *ends*: What foreign policy *goals* should the United States pursue?” (Gries, 2014, 109 emphasis in original).

Interestingly, beliefs about domestic issues directly correspond to foreign policy preferences regarding the humanitarian intervention. The difference in beliefs regarding sexual education, family planning, and contraceptive use accounted for 90 percent of the relationship between liberals and conservatives views on humanitarian intervention (Gries, 2014, 112). Political idealism has been used in American foreign policy to justify intervention to spread “freedom and democracy,” such as George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq and Barack Obama’s actions in Libya (Gries, 2014, 112). As another example, justifying entrance into World War I, Woodrow Wilson said, “The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty” (quoted in Gries, 2014, 113). In short, ideological liberals tend to favor the humanitarian idealism more than conservatives. Religion is also a key variable in support for idealist foreign policy. Cultural conservatives support political idealism, due to religious belief, but it seems that libertarianism rejects political idealism (Gries, 2014). Both

liberals and conservatives care about promoting religious freedom, but conservatives are specifically motivated by the persecution of Christians (Greis, 2014, 114–115). Progressive thought, however, is not confined to idealists as one may assume.

It is important to understand that realists do not entirely reject “what ought to be” in international politics. John Herz (1951) posits that in order to achieve “what ought to be,” we must operate within the constraints of “what is.” Essentially, the push against idealism came about to push against the idea that peace will be achieved by cooperation (see Carr, 1939). The roots of realism lie in the philosophical works of Thomas Hobbs and Nicolai Machiavelli. Both scholars posited that human nature is self-serving and power is what holds order within society.

Carr (1939) sought to describe IR in terms of the real world based on the conflictual nature and self-interest behavior of humans. The goal was to push against the *idealists* of the day, including Woodrow Wilson, who were seeking world peace through the formation of organizations, such as the League of Nations. Carr saw this endeavor as fruitless. The theories or ideologies, however, are not at war with one another, as many scholars today make them out to be. Rather, when treated as ideologies and foreign policy prescriptions they are well suited to work together. This is depicted by two quotes, one from a scholar and one from a policy maker. Inis Claude Jr. (1981) commented to John Herz, “Realism avoids expecting too much; idealism avoids attempting too little” (200). How the two ideologies work together in policy is further depicted by Hillary Clinton’s statement:

I’ve never understood the division between so-called realists and so-called idealists. I don’t know how you get up in the world every day, doing what I do, if you don’t have some sense of idealism, because you have to believe that as hard as it is, you’re going to help to stop the war, you’re going to figure out a way to get clean water to thirsty people and cure kids of disease. And at the same time, I don’t know how you go through the day and expect to be successful without being very hardheaded and realistic. So for me, it’s not an either/or. (Hillary Clinton, quoted in Gries, 2014, 121)

The point here is that the ideologies interact with one another to form policy preferences and outcomes, and scholars of classical realism and classical idealism were aware of this. Moreover, it is significant that we see intellectual engagement with these philosophical principles both in academic debate and by practitioners.

One of the most significant differences between realists and idealists is their treatment of morality in foreign policy. Smith (1986) argues that Carr (1939) posited that foreign policy and morality are on separate planes

that never intersect while idealists insist that morality and policy must go together. This dichotomy, however, depicts a narrow view of the two ideologies that must be further investigated. Morality will always be ingrained in foreign policy decision-making for an idealist, but realists must not always be divorced from morality. In the majority of cases foreign policy and morality, for a realist, must remain separate, but occasionally they can, and do, intersect. They intersect when the impact on security and potential gains or losses are murky and debatable.

As a short intellectual exercise, we can use the 1992 Rwandan genocide and the call for international intervention as an example. The United States refused to provide direct support to the intervention efforts, and this can be viewed in multiple ways: (1) realists may posit that there was no benefit to the United States and any use of resources, although physically negligible, would not be prudent (*defensive realism*); (2) a realist could posit that it was prudent to intervene and stabilize the country to prevent it from creating a new ally in the area that presents an opportunity for trade, resource acquisition, and so on (*offensive realism*); or (3) a realist could agree with the idealists and support intervention based strictly on morality, because there was no impact on U.S. security or power, thus making it a nonissue. The third viewpoint requires further explanation. Waltz (1967), Krasner (1976), and Zakaria (1998) posit that sometimes states pursue objectives other than security when they are secure enough and have enough power. So, morality and foreign policy can intersect when the decision-makers feel that their state is secure enough and the action will not affect their relative power.

The point of the discussion above is that to understand if a foreign policy preference is realist or idealist is dependent upon how the issue is perceived and framed by the individual decision-maker. *Realists* do not always have to agree on a foreign policy decision, and at times may seem at odds, for two reasons. First, there is a difference between the foreign policy prescriptions of offensive and defensive realists. An offensive realist is more likely to be a hawk and advocate eliminating potential or rising threats, while a defensive realist is likely to be more reserved in their direct use of military force and favor the buildup of arms, making war a less appealing option for other actors. The second difference can simply come from a difference in perception; the perception of threat can vary between individuals. This means that what makes someone realist is larger and more philosophical than individual foreign policy goals and decisions. Rather, it is a part of their ideology and frames the decision-makers' perceptions.

Realists, however, are connected. The first connection among realists is that they all accept that the international system is anarchic and that results in a perpetually conflictual system, if not managed. For realists, managing the constant threat of other actors within the system sometimes requires

aggressive foreign policy and at other times called for peaceful diplomacy. Which option is most pragmatic depends upon the power relationship between the two actors and the context of the specific issue. Either way, to be realist, the policy maker must advocate their policy in terms of national interest, rather than morality as the end goal, in most cases; exceptions to this are discussed below.

To conclude this part of the discussion, the difference between realists and idealists is not that realists advocate the unrestrained use of military force and seek to perpetuate conflict, while idealists simply promote peace. Realists as well as idealists seek peace not war, although realists, and some idealists, may advocate the use of force to achieve peace. Waltz (1981) advocated nuclear proliferation to increase stability and prevent future conflict. This directly and obviously increases the military and destructive capabilities that we acknowledge can pose a threat. But, that is simply the tactic, not the goal. The goal is peace. Thus, it is possible, and probable, for an individual to be philosophically idealistic in their goals, while being a pragmatic realist willing to use immoral and brutal foreign policy to achieve it. Henry Kissinger is a prime example, arguing that foreign policy decisions are most often a choice between two evils (Kissinger, 1956).

To further explore how and when realists are, or appear to be, optimists we must reassess the claims of some structural realists, particularly the “offensive realism” of John Mearsheimer (2001). Realists, all too often, claim that states engage in competition rather than cooperation because cooperation comes with too much risk. With realist research focusing on conflict, realist scholarship has not contributed much to our understanding of cooperation. Charles Glasser (1994/95) reclaims this ground for realists by explaining when states benefit the most from conflict and when they benefit more from cooperation all in terms of security and power, thus making the theory definitively realist. His theory is called “contingent realism.” Glasser (1994/95) reduces the concept of “power” to “military capability” and uses the security dilemma as the contextual frame. He posits that a country is concerned about relative gains in security if cooperation would increase its adversary’s security more than its own, and if this relative loss in security would in turn reduce its own security . . . following security-dilemma logic, all else being equal, increases in the adversary’s security often increase one’s own security because a more secure adversary has smaller incentives for pursuing an expansionist foreign policy, and therefore will pose a smaller threat.

Contingent realism, then, argues that whether engaging in cooperation or conflict is the most prudent is dependent upon the balance of relative power between the actors in question. If an adversary is stronger, then it may be most prudent for the state to cooperate, or conflict may be the most prudent if there is much to gain and the adversary is weaker. The same logic applies to

arms races. An increase in defensive buildup can decrease one's own security by signaling an increased security threat to adversaries that may have more power and find it most prudent to attack preemptively. Mearshimer (2001) argues that Glasser's theory is flawed because it is simply prescriptive, telling states how they should act, rather than explaining how they do act.² This is problematic because "great powers often behave in ways that the defensive realists consider reckless rather than rational" (Mearshimer, 2011, 425). He also posits that Waltz's theory of defensive realism is also a prescriptive theory that state's behavior often does not fit. Mearshimer (2011) goes on to say that Glasser needs a two-part theory explaining when states are more likely to select cooperation over conflict. The methodology outlined below will be able to depict this by demonstrating the role of ideology. The pursuit of a policy of conflict or cooperation is dependent not only upon the security and position of the state but also the will and desires of the policy makers.

The discussion above shows that the most common argument against realism is that states do not behave as expected by the theory, which results in a debate over what realist behavior really is. Rosato and Schusseler (2011) correctly posit that, when considered historically, realist policy prescription was not followed in World War I, World War II, Vietnam, or the 2003 invasion of Iraq and that policy that is explained by liberal theory policy prescription is partially at fault for, at a minimum, the magnitude of the conflicts. In short, they are correct that policies of balancing and containment, as thought of by realism, were not followed. But, because the authors so clearly show the points of departure from realism and the real-world policy, it is far too easy to glance over the flaws in their argument. Alternatively, Adam Quinn (2014) posits that states do not behave as realists expect due to their goals and perceptions of other actors; this does not necessarily mean they did not behave as *realists*, but that the theory of realism, as is, is inadequate at predicting or explaining their decisions. What Rosato and Schusseler (2011) failed to take into consideration was the perception of the decision-makers and as Jervis (1976) points out, perception and misperception are key to the success or failure of policy. Rosato and Schusseler (2011) are correct that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was initiated and a blunder, due to the liberal policy prescriptions followed by the George W. Bush administration, and they make a strong argument for liberal policy constraints greatly contributing to Britain's failure to balance against Germany in World War I. Their arguments, however, for World War II and Vietnam being, caused and driven by liberal policy respectively, is much less convincing. In the lead up to World War II they criticize the policy of appeasement as liberal and not in line with realist policy prescription. This is problematic and potentially incorrect because it could also be argued that a policy of appeasement was intended to be a policy of containment. The leaders of the time incorrectly perceived

that Hitler's goals were limited and had this been true engaging in a military conflict would have not aligned with realist policy prescription. In regards to Vietnam, Rosato and Schusseler (2011) posit that the war was liberal because it was fighting against Communist ideology, rather than balancing against a true military threat. As with World War II, this is true in hindsight and we know that "domino theory" was deeply flawed. Nonetheless, the perception at the time was that Communist ideology would spread and materialize into a true physical threat to the United States and its allies. It may also be true that Henry Kissinger and others believed in the right of the people of Vietnam to control themselves, but this was secondary to the realist policy of containment against Communist ideology, which was believed to be the threat.

The discussion above shows that realist and idealist thinking is not only held in the context of how an individual views the world, but how they frame foreign policy, and at what point they give consideration to morality. Realists will always view the world as more inherently conflictual and be less trusting of other actors than idealists. Idealists will always treat morality as an end unto itself and give morality consideration in the means, whereas a realist, if they consider morality at all, will only do so as a secondary end after security, or when security is of no concern to the states' relative power.

To utilize the typologies of realism and idealism I utilize OpCode (Holsti, 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998) because it depicts the general worldview of a leader and knowing how an individual perceives the system is the first step in labeling them as a realist or idealist. However, from the discussion above we know that it is not simply how an individual views the system that makes them idealist or realist. We must also examine how they perceive the individual actors they are interacting with. For this, I employ image theory (Cottam, 1977, 1994) which provides a more nuanced view of individual actors than OpCode. Together, these two methodologies will allow us to correctly categorize individuals and their foreign policy preferences and decision-making as realist or idealist. It should be understood that "decision-making" is a term that groups several cognitive processes, which are not independently analyzed, into a parsimonious concept (Holsti, 1977).

CREATING THE TYPOLOGY

OpCode

Assessing the role of cognition by various means has proven fruitful for IR (see Young and Schafer, 1998). One approach, OpCode, provides a general worldview of an individual's cognitive belief system and is used to analyze and predict an individual's behavior and policy preferences

(Holsti, 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). A belief system is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964 p. 207). The interconnectedness of individual beliefs is significant, because it allows us to form a typology of expected behavior based upon clusters of beliefs, which then comprise a system. Hostli (1977) states, “The concept of a belief *system* implies that one’s beliefs about history and politics are more than an unconnected set of ideas in which the relationship between components is a random one. Rather, they are assumed to form more or less patterned ways of thinking about history and politics” (151, emphasis in original). The set of beliefs are joined by “core beliefs,” which “are those which affect or constrain the range of responses to other questions that compose the operational code”; these are the most stable beliefs (O. Holsti, 1977, 151). Individual cognitive processes in policy, however, are minimized because of bureaucratic processes and domestic political factors (O. Holsti, 1977). With this in consideration, Ole Holsti (1977) states, “Attention should therefore be directed to the linkages between beliefs and certain decision-making tasks that precede a decision, including the definition of the situation, analysis, prescription, and the like” (25). The study of leaders’ perceptions and traits gives insight on how they narrow their policy options (Holsti, 1977; Preston, 2001; Winter, 2005).

OpCode has been used extensively to understand political leaders (Leites, 1951, 1953; O. Holsti, 1970; O. Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1977; Starr, 1980; Walker and Murphy, 1981; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2000; Marfleet, 2000; Schafer and Walker, 2006; Walker and Schafer, 2007; Renshon, 2009; O’Reilly, 2015). The method was created to understand how belief systems influence the decisions of policy elites (Leites, 1951, 1953; O. Holsti, 1977). Alexander George (1969) operationalized the concepts of Leites’s studies to construct the OpCode framework used today. This framework focuses on the philosophical beliefs of leaders, which guide the thought processes in context, as well as instrumental beliefs, which focus on the strategies and tactics used by the leader (George, 1969; Holsti, 1977). Because Leites’s study was very complex and did not have a patterned methodology, which other scholars could build on, George (1969) generated five base-level philosophical questions and five instrumental questions that would give insight into leaders’ worldview:

- (P-1) What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

- (P-2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
- (P-3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
- (P-4) How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?
- (P-5) What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?
- (I-1) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
- (I-2) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
- (I-3) How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
- (I-4) What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?
- (I-5) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?

The original OpCode analysis relied on the questions presented here, which were then placed into greater context with many sub-questions (see Holsti, 1977, 47–49); the importance of this will become more apparent in the discussion below as I critique code analysis, but for now it is sufficient to say that the breadth of the analysis was simply descriptive and was in need of theoretical parsimony.

A central question for testing the validity of the methodology is, "Is the OpCode a true belief system or is it simply a reflection of one's environment?" While learning can alter one's OpCode, certain beliefs should remain relatively stable over time and there should be a clear connection between the beliefs, if they are autonomous from the external environment. While developing the standardized OpCode questions, George (1969) validated the beliefs by showing how the beliefs identified by Leites (1951, 1953) of the Bolsheviks are interconnected, creating the belief system. We should also find some connection between beliefs and behavior, which is useful for forecasting the behavior of leaders (Walker and Murphy, 1981, 24–60). Because of the complication of many intervening and moderating variables in foreign policy behavior examining the link between beliefs and behavior requires careful examination. As stated by Holsti (1976),

It is not very fruitful to assume direct linkages between beliefs and foreign policy action . . . [and] . . . it is important to recognize the distinction between decisions and foreign policy actions. The bureaucratic politics literature has illustrated the many potential sources of slippage between executive decisions

and implementation of policy in the form of foreign policy actions. (pp. 18–19, qtd. in Walker and Murphy, 1982, 28)

But, Holsti (1970) understands the importance of beliefs and perceptions in policy action, stating,

It is generally recognized that our behavior is in large part shaped by the manner in which we perceive and interpret our physical and social environment. Our perceptions, in turn, are moulded by clusters of beliefs about what has been, what is, what will be, and what ought to be. Thus our beliefs provide us with a more or sell coherent code by which we can organize and make sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by our senses. (123)

The point he makes is that, although complicated, we cannot fully understand behavior without understanding beliefs, perceptions, and misperceptions. “The operational code can be viewed as one of several clusters of independent variables that explain policy making behavior” (Holsti, 1970, 153). Walker and Murphy (1981) argue that if the decision-maker also executes the policy or if the belief system of those executing the policy is similar to the decision-maker a link can be examined. Context also matters in analyzing or predicting behavior. Walker and Murphy (1981) state, “If we know the decision maker’s situation and OpCode, then we can forecast the decision maker’s diagnosis and response to the situation.” The authors used existing OpCode studies and found support for a link between beliefs and behavior (Walker and Murphy, 1981). Although not perfectly aligned, Walker (1977) finds evidence that Henry Kissinger’s OpCode significantly influenced the foreign policy behavior in Vietnam. Another study finds that presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush respond to similar situations from external actors differently and convincingly posit that this is explained by differences in their OpCode (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999).

Cognitive consistency (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991 p. 10–11) is a foundational assumption of OpCode for both George (1969) and Holsti (1977). Furthermore, cognitive consistency is the reason that OpCode is generally stable over time. That is, individuals will be consistent in how they view and process similar information. Due to this, consistency-specific questions can be analyzed to understand the “master belief” of the individual’s worldview (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 2005).

An individuals’ philosophical belief regarding the nature of the political universe (P-1) is the master belief that influences the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Holsti, 1977). Holsti (1977) sought to create a typology of OpCode to identify the core beliefs from the peripheral beliefs

Table 1.1

<i>What Are the Fundamental Sources of Conflict?</i>	<i>Harmonious (Conflict Is Temporary)</i>	<i>Conflictual (Conflict Is Permanent)</i>
Human Nature	A	D
Attributes of Nations	B	E
International System	C	F

and to generate parsimony. He posited that verifying that there is a connection between the beliefs, which create a belief system, will bolster the validity of the ideology by demonstrating that there are combinations of beliefs rather than simply being independent and random. To achieve this Holsti (1977) considers P-1, “What is the nature of political life?,” and sub-question P-1b, “What is the source of conflict?.” P-1b is categorized as human nature, domestic characteristics of states, or the international system, which are the three “images” of international politics as defined by Waltz (1954). The reason is that P-1b is founded in attribution theory, which posits that the source of conflict will lead to different policy preferences (Holsti, 1977 p. 161). This led to the development of six ideal typologies (see table 1.1). Type A believes that conflict is temporary and is resolved by addressing domestic social issues, better communication, institutional reform, and other individual based issues.

Type B believes that conflict is temporary and that conflict is derived from the characteristics of states. They believe that conflict is reduced by altering the characteristics of the state. Holsti’s (1977) examples of this are Marx’s goal of eliminating capitalist states and Wilson’s goal of spreading democracy. Type C believes that conflict is temporary and that the conflict is derived from the anarchic characteristic of the international system. Thus, conflict, for a Type C, is only ended by the elimination of anarchy through some form of world government. Type D believes that conflict is permanent and that it is derived from human nature. They prefer a balance of power strategy and believe that engaging in conflict to create peace will result in more conflict. Type E believes that conflict is permanent and that it is derived from the characteristics of states. Like Type D, they believe that engaging in conflict to alter the characteristics of other actors will result in greater conflict; thus, they prefer to balance. Type F believes conflict is permanent and that it is derived from the anarchic characteristics of the international system. Unlike any of the other typologies they believe that engaging in behavior that will inevitably result in conflict with others is necessary for survival. This typology is based upon IR theory and each type has distinct characteristics that should be appreciated. Walker (1990) states,

Holsti’s formulation of an operational code typology has the following characteristics as a social-psychological theory of cognitive consistency. The basic

unit of analysis is individual behavior constrained by the decision maker's belief system. The key concepts are philosophical and instrumental beliefs, belief system, and foreign policy strategies and tactics. The dominant inference pattern is the principle of cognitive consistency, from which are derived two general propositions: (a) beliefs tend to reinforce one another for form a coherent belief system; (b) under specified conditions beliefs constrain the range of alternative choices and thereby influence the final decision. (pp. 409)

The Holsti typology is theoretically sound and has utility as a cognitive theory as well as applications for IR.

Walker (1983) consolidated types D, E, and F into one ideal typology as they only vary in minor ways, agreeing on eleven of thirteen shared beliefs (Walker, 1983). See table 1.2 for a representation of these typologies. The three types that believe in the possibility of peace (types A, B, and C) remain and the types that believe conflict is permanent (types D, E, and F) were condensed into one Type DEF, because Walker (1983) found that the types agreed on almost all categories. Stated more clearly, "While [types D, E, F] differ regarding what are the sources of conflict . . . they share common beliefs about its permanence and corresponding implications for the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs" (Walker, 1983, 81). Types A, B, and C also disagree over the source of conflict, but are treated equally in the typology (Walker, 1983; 2004), thus implicitly assuming that the sources of conflict matter for the policy preferences of idealists, but not realist. While Walker (1983) is correct that the types are very similar, each characteristic may not warrant equal weight. Types D and E prefer a defensive realist policy of balancing, whereas Type E prefers an offensive realist policy. This nuance is crucial for understanding the perceptions and policy preferences of a leader. It is still possible to condense the six-category typology by policy preference. Type C's policy preferences are more in line with the defensive realists (Types D and E) than the other idealists (Types A and B).

The philosophical beliefs are plotted as P-1 on the vertical axis and P-4b (other) on the horizontal axis. The instrumental beliefs are plotted as I-1 on the vertical axis and P-4a (self) on the horizontal axis. Walker and Falkowski (1984 a, b) found that leaders do not fit into the six-category typology (Holsti, 1977) or the condensed four-category typology (Walker, 1983), but rather form some combination of the typologies differing in philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The problem is that this typology relies on both the philosophical and instrumental beliefs, whereas the Holsti (1977) typology was based only on the philosophical master belief. This is significant, because instrumental beliefs should not be used to categorize an individual's beliefs about the international system. In other words, realists and idealists may share

Table 1.2

<p>Type A Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A "conflict spiral" based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by nonrational conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. <i>Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.</i> Preference Order: Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit Nuclear Self</p>	<p>Type C Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. <i>Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful.</i> Preference Order: Settle> Dominate> Deadlock> Submit High nAch (Ideals)</p>
<p>Type DEF Preference Order: Dominate> Settle> Deadlock> Submit Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. <i>Seek limited goals flexibility with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.</i></p> <p>Ambition High nPow</p>	<p>Type B Preference Order: Dominate> Deadlock> Settle> Submit Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. <i>One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.</i></p>

Source: Borrowed from Schafer and Walker (2006); originally adapted from Holsti (1977).

the same policy preferences, but the way they go about forming those preferences is a significant difference.

As stated above, OpCode analysis is based on the concept of cognitive consistency. The worldview of leaders does, however, occasionally shift. When an event, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, shocks the belief system of the leader the philosophical beliefs are subject to change (Renshon, 2008:827). When beliefs do change, individuals first alter the means to reach the end and only alter their goals after the altered methods fail (McGuire, 1985; Tetlock, 1998).³ In other words, fundamental attitudes and perceptions only change after they are challenged repeatedly (Tetlock, 1991). Thus, it is more common that the philosophical beliefs remain stable and tactical beliefs are altered to accomplish the desired goals; the philosophical beliefs are then subject to change if the change in tactics failed to achieve the desired goals (Tetlock, 1991). In addition, the role of the individual will often change their worldview, because they have an increase or decrease in influence over a specific policy area depending upon their position in government (Holsti, 1970). This means that a leader, regardless of their ideology, may change their tactics depending on the situation. In the context of realist decision-making this is supported by Glasser's (1994/95) contingent realism. The position of power also matters, as is demonstrated by George W. Bush, whose beliefs were bolstered upon entering the presidency (Renshon, 2008). Differing from the findings of analysis of Jimmy Carter, whose philosophical worldview shifted to more conflictual after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998), the OpCode of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have been found to be relatively stable (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999).

Jimmy Carter's tactical beliefs and overall beliefs regarding human rights did not shift (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). OpCode methodology has become more consistent and reduced coder bias by employing the Verbs in Context System (VICS) through the computer software system Profiler Plus (Young, 2001; Young and Schafer, 1998). The OpCode is comprised of (1) diagnostic propensities, (2) choice propensities, and (3) shift propensities, which are exhibited through positive and negative attributes of self and other (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). The material used for coding are public and private statements by the individual (Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Dille, 2000).

To determine the scores for each OpCode question, VICS first determines values for each of the following: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and the context of each unit. The score is then determined by multiplying the verb categories by their frequency and intensity of positive and negative context. Also factored into the scores is whether the individual refers to herself or himself or another individual as having influence (Walker et al., 2005).⁴ For a more detailed description of VICS coding, see table 1.3, and for more detail on interpreting the range of scores, see table 1.4. While VICS does analyze the context, the context is not evident to the researcher simply from analyzing the output.

Table 1.3

Steps in the Verbs In Context System

1. Identify The Subject As		
Self	Or	Other
2. Identify The Tense of the Transitive Verb As		
Past	Present	Future
And Identify The Category of the Verb As		
Positive (+)	Or	Negative (-)
Words	Appeal (+1)	Oppose, Resist (-1)
	OR	OR
	Promise Benefits (+2)	Threaten Costs (-2)
Deeds	Rewards (+3)	Punishments (-3)
3. Identify The Domain As		
Domestic	Or	Foreign
4. Identify Target And Place In Context		
An Example		
A quote taken from Jimmy Carter’s January 4, 1980, address to the nation: “Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan . . .”		
1. Subject. The subject is “Massive Soviet military forces” which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.		
2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase “have invaded” is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.		
3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker’s state (The United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.		
4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.		
The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past Afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979–88		

Source: Walker et al. 1998

OpCode is criticized for not being founded solidly in psychology or theory, and the questions that comprise the code seem to be random; the foundational assumptions of cognitive consistency and cognitive dissonance are debated within the discipline of psychology (Cottam, 1986). Additionally, OpCode, on its own, does not consider the context in which policy makers are operating (Cottam, 1986). Cottam (1986) states, “In the long run the Operational Code is most useful as a guideline for describing some of the political beliefs of policy makers. Using the code to generate testable hypotheses concerning political decision-making remains problematic. It does not employ cognitive psychology beyond its founding assumptions and it asks about a very small part of the policy makers’ overall political worldview (17).” These criticisms are fair when considering how OpCode evolved. Holsti (1977), however, employed psychology and IR theory to develop his typology, but the nuance

Table 1.4

<i>VICS Coding</i>									
<i>P-1: Nature of the Political Universe</i>									
Hostile Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Friendly Extremely	
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0	
<i>P-2: Realization of Political Values</i>									
Pessimistic Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Optimistic Extremely	
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0	
<i>P-3: Predictability of Political Future</i>									
Very Low	Low	Medium	High					Very High	
0.0	.25	.50	.75					1.0	
<i>P-4: Control Over Historical Development</i>									
Very Low	Low	Medium	High					Very High	
0.0	.25	.50	.75					1.0	
<i>P-5: Role of Chance</i>									
Very Low	Low	Medium	High					Very High	
0.0	.25	.50	.75					1.0	

I-1: Direction of Strategy

Conflict Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Cooperation Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I-2: Intensity of Tactics

Conflict Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Cooperation Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

I-3: Risk Orientation

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I-4a: Flexibility of Tactics (between Cooperation and Conflict)

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I-4b: Flexibility of Tactics (between Words and Deeds)

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

I-5: Utility of Means (Appeal/Support, Promise, Reward, Oppose/Resist, Threaten, Punish)

Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

Source: The verbal descriptor categories are borrowed from Walker et al., 2003. Figure 2 borrowed from Renshon (2008)

and theory lost out in the pursuit of more rigorous methodology and parsimony. Consistent with this thought, George (1969) asserted that OpCode was intended to be supported by and contribute to theories employing cognitive psychology; it is not a stand-alone cognitive theory. Thus, it is intended for multimethod analysis.

Realist/Idealist Typology

Several scholars have generated typologies of realists and idealists. Walker and Schafer (2007) created a realist/idealist typology relying only on the modified Holsti (1977) typology. They labeled types A and C, which view conflict as temporary and lean toward cooperative strategies, as idealists and types DEF and B, which view the world as more hostile and lean toward conflictual strategies, as realists. These broad categorizations are then analyzed into more nuanced descriptions of what makes each type realist or idealist. “The Type B leader . . . is associated with the Revolutionary who blends a mix of utopian goals with Realist conceptions of strategies and tactics and a definition of the political universe as a dangerous place” (Walker and Schafer, 2000, 753). The opposite of the Type B leader is the Type C leader who is a “utopian Reformer” who believes change is possible with control over historical context, but will not use violent tactics to achieve the goals. With feelings of lower control over historical context Walker and Schafer (2007) label Type DEF the moderate realist and Type A the moderate idealist. This is a useful starting point, but provides an overly simplified definition of realists and idealists due to incomplete information used to define the ideologies. Walker and Schafer (2007) do not clearly differentiate between offensive and defensive realism and idealism. In addition, their inclusion of tactical preferences in their realist/idealist typology is problematic; in the discussion above I argue that it is the frame associated with a decision that makes it realist or idealist, not the tactic employed.

Crichlow (1998) also attempted to construct a typology of realism and idealism based on OpCode, analyzing Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, particularly in the context of Arab-Israeli peace agreements. He creates the following typology of idealists and realists: idealists, pragmatic idealists, pragmatists, pragmatic realist, and realists (Crichlow, 1998, 701). This typology is based on the general worldview of the individuals, but primarily focuses on their tactical beliefs. He categorized Rabin as an idealist, because he always preferred compromise and peaceful tactics, whereas Peres is labeled a pragmatic idealist, for adapting to the changing nature of the political environment. Crichlow’s (1998) typology is not based on any literature and his choice to focus on tactics rather than philosophical beliefs is the incorrect way to build a realist/idealist typology.

Analyzing the American political electorate Gries (2014) develops three categories of foreign policy preferences: idealistic doves, idealistic hawks, and unilateralist hawks. Idealistic doves, representing about 41 percent of the population, have low support for military force and have low levels of nationalism. Idealistic hawks, representing about 34 percent of the population, have the strongest support for all three idealisms, are the most nationalistic, the most willing to use military force, and the least isolationist. The unilateralist hawks, representing about 25 percent of the population, are the least idealist, most realist, and most isolationist. This analysis suggests that the majority of Americans are idealists, which is contrary to the findings of Drezner (2008), who posits that majority of Americans are accepting of realist policy while the policy elites promote a policy of liberal internationalism. The problem with both studies is that neither Gries (2014) nor Drezner (2008) clearly differentiate offensive and defensive realists and isolationist and imperialist idealists. This is problematic; it is categorizing individuals into an aggregate that may hold very different ideologies and policy preferences. Where policy preferences are similar there could be vast differences in the reasons the individuals support those policies. The mass grouping of realists and idealists is similar to categorizing all liberals (democratic candidate supporters) and conservatives (Republican candidate supporters) as distinct groups in the 2016 American presidential primary elections. The Democrats were divided by Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton supporters. Considering them as one group would be incorrect, because there are many Sanders supporters who spoke out against Hillary Clinton and pledged not to support her (Roth, 2016). In addition, there are Sanders supporters that also like Donald Trump as a candidate (Spodak, 2016). Thus, assuming cohesion among a group, without understanding nuanced individual ideological preferences, is problematic.

Image Theory

To incorporate more nuanced perceptions into the context of OpCode image theory is employed to complete the analysis in this book. Image theory is a qualitative methodology that provides a more nuanced measure of how specific actors are perceived. Thus, using image theory along with OpCode will bolster the internal and external validity of the findings from the OpCode analysis by allowing us to move from a general analysis to a more specified analysis. In other words, where OpCode provides us with a general worldview of the leader, image theory allows us to apply that analysis to more specific actors or policy contexts. Additionally, understanding the perception of other actors is crucial to interpreting OpCode in context. As stated by George (1969), "In the classical Bolshevik belief system the 'image of the opponent'

was perhaps the cornerstone on which much of the rest of their approach was based” (202). It is important to consider, however, that the “image of the opponent” may be less important for those that do not see the world as conflictual (George, 1969, 221). The nuance lost from the Holsti (1977) methodology can be regained by incorporating image theory and identifying the source of conflict.

Psychological research on cognitive stimuli shows that perceptions are categorical and formed, in part, by psychological scripts, or memory of past experiences (Cottam, 1986). Thus, images are stereotype like perceptions that are created by an interaction of emotions as well as facts about another actor (Cottam, 1994) and are associated with expected behavior (Cottam, 1986). The perceptual categories are persistent over time and resistant to change because they are used as cognitive frames (Cottam, 1986). It is important to note, however, that the images employed by policy makers are not overtly cognitive and the individuals are generally unaware of them (Cottam, 1986).

Many IR scholars have discussed images as influential in foreign policy decision-making (Cottam, 1977, 1994; Elwarfally, 1988; Jervis, 1989; Shimko, 1991; Cottam and Huseby, 2016). Images are significantly influential to the study of foreign policy, because perceptions can be more relevant than reality (Jervis, 1976). Simply stated scholarship should recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the “objective” facts of the situation, whatever they may mean, but to their “image” of the situation. It is a leader’s perception of the world, not reality, which determines behavior (Boulding, 1969: 423). Thus, it is the stereotypical beliefs that matter (Cottam, 1977), because they are appropriate for analysis since individuals categorize beliefs through schemata (Jervis, 1976).⁵

The most significant challenge to image theory is that the analysis, if done incorrectly, can become tautological, as it is difficult to determine if the image leads to the policy or if the policy leads to the image. In a large overview of the development of image theory, Richard Herrmann (2003) posits that this was the case for early studies. This dilemma can be overcome, however, by determining the image prior to the time frame of the policy being analyzed (Cottam, 1994). Of course, when analyzing a decision process over a long period of time decisions and interactions may impact the image; this is manageable by the coder taking care to notice any shifts in the image.

Another challenge for image theory is to understand which images matter. Boulding (1959) specified a model of hypothesized relationships based on the interaction self and other perceptions of hostility or friendliness with self and other perceptions of strength and weakness. As these concepts have been

operationalized more concretely, the underlying assumptions of other theories within the discipline have not been ignored. For example, K. J. Holsti (1970) related perceptions of the self and other regarding states within the system, in individual policy makers, to “role conceptions” of the state within the system; the perceptions and decision outcomes are interrelated to the role of the state within the system. Perceptions are also important for power-based theories. Relative power is a central concept of realism (Morgenthau, 1973) and perceived threat is key to neorealism (Waltz, 1979). Thus, which images matter is dependent upon the question, or foreign policy objective, at hand.

Operative images of individuals are best determined by examining their oral statements as well as their actions. As Cottam (1994, 188) states,

Images are composed of (1) perceptions of a country’s capability, culture, and intention (2) event scripts, reflecting lessons from history that policy makers use to understand the behavior of a country or to predict its behavior; and (3) response alternatives that were consistently considered appropriate for use vis-à-vis a country. The attributes of capability, culture, and intention could not be operationalized at those levels of abstraction and were therefore broken down into smaller components.

The measure of capability disaggregates into “military strength and capability,” “domestic policy,” and “economic characteristics.” Culture disaggregates into “comparison of culture to U.S. culture” and “cultural sophistication.” Intention is disaggregated into “goals and motives” and “flexibility.” Event scripts are derived from statements about historical experience. Response alternatives are derived from statements about instruments used for conflict and bargaining with a country (Cottam, 1994). Each of these elements is then disaggregated into more precise coding guidelines.⁶

The ideal images are depicted in table 1.5. These images are used as a guideline, but the image of an actor can fall between the ideal images. In addition, for some actors one category used to form an image may carry more weight than others and thus the assessment of an image must be adjusted accordingly.

Each image is comprised of specific combinations of each category. The ideal enemy image is held by both the United States and the Soviet Union of one another during the Cold War. Both states saw one another as having equal capabilities, an equally sophisticated culture, harmful intentions, led by a small group of decision-makers, and as posing a threat. For another example, U.S. policy makers held the dependent image of Latin American states during the Cold War, meaning that policy makers in the United States viewed their

Table 1.5

<i>Image</i>	<i>Capability</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Intentions</i>	<i>Decision-Makers</i>	<i>Threat or Opportunity</i>
Enemy	Equal	Equal	Harmful	Small Elite	Threat
Barbarian	Superior	Inferior	Harmful	Small Elite	Threat
Imperialist	Superior	Superior	Exploitative	A few groups	Threat
Dependent	Inferior	Inferior	Benign	Small elite	Opportunity
Degenerate	Superior or Equal	Weak-willed	Harmful	Confused, differentiated	Opportunity
Rogue	Inferior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
Ally	Equal	Equal	Good	Many groups	Threat

capabilities and culture as inferior, their intentions as benign (Cottam, 1994). The barbarian image is characterized by a perception of superior capability, but with an inferior culture, harmful intentions, a small decision-making elite, that poses a threat. An example of this may be South Korea's perception of North Korea. The imperialist image is similar to that of the barbarian, but the perception of their intentions is exploitative rather than harmful and the decisions are made by a few small groups rather than a small elite. An example of this image may be Iran's perception of the United States prior to Khomeini's revolution. The dependent image is characterized by a perception of inferior capabilities, inferior culture, having benign intentions, a small decision-making elite, and presents an opportunity. This image is depicted by Iran's perception of Palestine. The degenerate image is characterized by a perception of superior or equal capabilities, a weak-willed culture, harmful intentions, and a confused or differentiated decision-making group that presents an opportunity (Smith, 2018). This perception is also depicted by Iran's current perception of the United States after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan (Smith, 2018). The rogue image is similar to that of the barbarian, with the only difference being in the perception of capabilities. Where the barbarian has superior capabilities, the rogue has inferior capabilities but still has an inferior culture, harmful intentions, a small decision-making elite, and poses a threat. This may be depicted by the U.S. perception of North Korea. The ally image is characterized by a perception of equal capabilities and culture, good intentions, many groups involved in decision-making, but poses a potential threat. The U.S. image of the UK may depict this image. It should be noted that because image theory is a method of qualitative analysis, the researcher might find nuances that affect the overall image. This could mean that specific categories, such as whether or not an actor poses a threat or an opportunity, could be more important than other categories that affect the image. Additionally, all actors may not fit neatly into the defined categories and more appropriately fit between them, such as a degenerate imperialist.

Image theory can be used to define whether foreign policy behavior and perceptions are realist or idealist, because it can depict the perceived balance of relative power between actors. This is key because conflict or cooperation can be realist or idealist, based on this perception (Glasser, 1994/95). Of particular interest to this study is the perception of enemies. Cottam (1994) states, "The enemy, at its prototypical extreme, is a country approximately as powerful as our own country, different in domestic polity and culture, evil in motivation, inflexible, and completely incompatible with the goals of our own country" (20). I posit that realists are more likely to hold an ideal type enemy image of an actor within the system than idealists, because they associate the international environment as more conflictual.

LINKING IMAGE THEORY TO THE OPCODE TYPOLOGY

OpCode reveals the broad worldview of an individual, which allows us to categorize them as realist or idealist in general terms, but as discussed above, determining if specific policy positions are realist or idealist is dependent upon how they perceive actors within individual cases. I turn to Cottam (1986) to bolster the coding of perceptions about intentions, since this is key to policy makers' perceptions being coded as realist or idealist. Cottam (1986) codes for an actor's goals as aggressive or passive and compatible or incompatible with one's own state. This will be built into the analysis as the goals of self and other. Below are a set of categorical hypotheses connected to both the OpCode results and image theory. By way of image theory analysis, it is easy to derive where the source of conflict is perceived (i.e., the system, the domestic structure of the state, or individuals). This allows us to understand the complete structure of the image and interpret it in analysis properly.

Taking a more complete and nuanced approach to realist and idealist ideology I have developed four ideal typologies, which are depicted in table 1.6. Realist typologies include offensive realist and defensive realists. The offensive realist believes that nature of the political universe is very hostile and that conflict is permanent. This leader feels that they have a high level of control over historical events and they seek the acquisition of more absolute power regardless of the current distribution of relative power. The defensive realist views the nature of the political universe as hostile, but less so than the offensive realist, and believes that conflict is temporary. This leader feels that they have a less control over historical events than the offensive realist and are more concerned with maintaining the status quo balance of power. Defensive realists, however, may behave offensively to maintain the status

Table 1.6

<p><i>Offensive Realist</i></p> <p>P-1 Nature of the political universe is hostile and conflict is permanent. Peace is only achievable through the use of force and domination.</p>	<p><i>Expansionist Idealist</i></p> <p>P-1 Nature of the political universe is somewhat hostile to hostile. Peace is achievable through the use of force, to change the characteristics of states.</p>
<p><i>Defensive Realist</i></p> <p>P-1 Nature of political universe somewhat hostile and conflict is permanent. They perceive the intentions of others to be less hostile than offensive realists. Peace is achievable by maintaining the status quo of states within the system.</p>	<p><i>Non-Expansionist Idealist</i></p> <p>P-1 Nature of political universe is optimistic to somewhat hostile. Peace is achievable by cooperating and negotiating. The use of force is not an optimal way to bring about peace.</p>

quo; the difference in the defensive and offensive realists is that the offensive realist wants to shift the balance of power in their favor or acquire more absolute power if they are already at the top. Idealist ideology also has two forms: the expansionist and the isolationist. Both are more optimistic about the nature of the political universe than the realists and believe that conflict is temporary, but the expansionist idealist is the more pessimistic of the two. The expansionist idealist has the goal of reforming the international system, through ideas such as the spread of democracy, with the goal of creating a more utopian system. In this way, their policy preferences may resemble the offensive realist. The non-expansionist idealist views the nature of the political universe as the least hostile of any of the typologies. The isolationist idealist does not necessarily stay out of all conflict, but their role is more restrained and limited than other leaders. In other words, isolationist idealists prefer to refrain from involvement in conflict with other nations whenever possible.

Both Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush depict the imperialist idealist typology. Wilson's war in Mexico and Bush's war in Iraq were, at least in part, for the purpose of spreading democracy with the hopes of bringing about more peace to the world system (Quinn, 2014). Jimmy Carter depicts the defensive realist. Although Carter pursued humanitarian objectives, he did not do so at the expense of American power and did not shy away from the use of force to defend U.S. power. Richard Nixon depicts the expansionist idealist. His aggressive foreign policy was intended to reshape the international system into a liberal world order, focused on democratic states and Western liberal ideology. Although the use of force and balancing against the USSR appears to be realist at face value, the end goal of reshaping the system is what makes Nixon the idealist. Barack Obama depicts defensive realism, but within a different international security context than the great power balancing of the Cold War, whereas George W. Bush and Donald Trump represent new types of post-Cold War idealism.

Characterizing realist and idealist worldviews and behavior in the post-Cold War system is more complicated, due to the unipolarity of the system. In the post-Cold War unipolar system there are no constraints on behavior of the United States, the hegemonic great power. Thus, behavior of the United States appears more chaotic and random, as opposed to a structured relationship of balanced competing powers (Schweller, 2010). Due to this, we must look beyond the structural variables. Kirshner (2010) states,

Structure . . . informs importantly the environment in which all states act, but, in that context, all states, and especially great powers, enjoy considerable discretion with regard to how they will pursue their goals and what sacrifices they will make in the face of constraints. It is thus impossible to understand and anticipate the behavior of states by looking solely at structural variables

and constraints. To explain world politics, it is necessary to appeal to a host of other factors, including domestic politics, history, ideology, and perceptions of legitimacy. . . . Due to the predominance of neo-realism, there is a commonly held assumption that “realists cannot do that” (57).

The liberal idealist agenda of the United States for expansion began long before Woodrow Wilson, but, with Wilson, it became secular.

To be sure, a secular notion of American exceptionalism divorced from explicit racial or religious expression but based instead on this country’s governmental institutions and civic virtue—America as ‘the last, best hope of earth (Lincoln), America as ‘the ark of liberties of the world’ (Melville)—goes back to the American Revolution. (T. Smith, 2019: 231).

However, the expansion of the United States was often justified and supported with religion and racial superiority (T. Smith, 2019). When Woodrow Wilson took office, however,

the United States for the first time could present in secular terms concepts argued from a cultural and historical perspective that made the expansion of American influence around the globe legitimate not only in terms of national security but more especially in ways that would eventually redound to the benefit of all mankind. (T. Smith, 2019: 231)

Thus, the idea of American exceptionalism and projecting a liberal agenda has been institutionalized within U.S. policy. This is significant, because to unpack what it means to be analyze realist versus idealist policy in the United States requires a recognition of context, in both the systemic variables and institutionalized policy culture.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The above discussion shows the theoretical flaw of other realist/idealist typologies, primarily their lack of differentiation between offensive and defensive realists and idealists. Associating all aggressive behavior with realism and all passive behavior with idealism is not consistent with the rage of these philosophical worldviews. The typology presented attempts to fill this gap. The remaining dilemma for this typology is incorporating the position of the state, for the leader in question, within the system. Below I offer an ideal type definition of each realist/idealist category

Offensive Realist

The offensive realist views the system as the most conflictual and is the most wary of other actors. This individual is more likely to hold an “enemy” or “barbarian” image than the other typologies, which leads them to more aggressive balancing behavior. They can hold an ally image, but it will be weaker than the ally image held by a defensive realist.

Defensive Realist

This typology is more likely to hold “ally” images than the offensive realist, because they can trust other actors, under specific conditions; the ally image will also be stronger than if an ally image is held by an offensive realist. They will also hold the same images as the offensive realist, but they are more likely to balance domestically with defensive systems and strengthen alliances than to be overtly aggressive.

Imperialist Idealist

This typology is the most likely to hold “dependent” images of other actors, which leads them to intervene in the affairs of other actors more frequently. The policies of the imperial idealist may resemble that of the offensive realist. The difference lies in their intentions. The imperialist idealist will pursue humanitarian-oriented goals, while the offensive realist will pursue goals with goals oriented at balancing against a threat or otherwise gaining power.

Non-expansionist Idealist

Like the imperialist idealist this typology will view many actors as “dependent,” but their responses will be less overtly aggressive than the imperialist. Their policies may resemble that of the defensive realists, but they will likely hold images of actors as less threatening and take less aggressive defensive measures than the defensive realist.

Together, OpCode and image theory create the typological theoretical framework above.

A typological theory is, a theory that specifies independent variables [delineated] into the categories for which the researcher [measures] the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified independent variables. (George and Bennett, 2005, 235)

This typology is employed in the following chapters to analyze U.S. presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.

NOTES

1. Although Carter is used as an example by Boot (2004), the analysis in this book contradicts his example of Cather. However, his categorization of hard and soft Wilsonians remains theoretically useful for building the typology.

2. Mearsheimer does not reject the utility of prescriptive theory. See Mearsheimer, John. 2009. Reckless States and Realism. *International Relations* 23(2): 241–256.

3. This differs from assertions by Walker, Shafer, and Young (2005), which posit that instrumental beliefs are more stable than philosophical beliefs. Their assertion, however, is not supported by systematic research. Thus, I expect philosophical beliefs to remain more stable than tactical beliefs based on psychological research.

4. The scores produced by VICS are standardized in comparison to thirty world leaders (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).

5. A full description of schema is outside the scope of this study. For a concise review, see Herrmann (2003, 290–292).

6. Refer to the appendix for full coding guidelines from Cottam (1994).

Chapter 2

Richard Nixon

Richard Milhous Nixon was born on January 9, 1913, in Yorba Linda, California, where he grew up on a small subsistence farm and dreamed of being a railroad engineer (Nixon, 1978 p. 3–4). Seeking more opportunity, his family moved to Whittier, California, where his father worked in the oil fields and then eventually opened a gas station and convenience store. He describes his mother, a Quaker, and father as “deeply religious” (Nixon, 1978, 5). Nixon did his best to avoid personal confrontation, which he believed is a trait he developed in response to his father’s temper (Nixon, 1978, 6). Although strict, Nixon had a good relationship with his father, who was very interested in politics, sparking his own interest (Nixon, 1978).

After high school Nixon attended Whittier College and then went on to Duke Law School. After graduation, he worked for a law firm back in Whittier until he was offered a position in Washington, DC, with the Office of Price Administration, where he served as an “assistant attorney for the rationing coordination section, which dealt primarily with rationing rubber and automobile tires” (Nixon, 1978, 26).

Then, in August 1942, he signed up to be a commissioned officer in the Navy (Nixon, 1978, 27). Eventually, he was deployed overseas and World War II had a significant impact on his view of the world and warfare. Never as religious as his parents, he became more conflicted about the pacifism of Quakers. He stated, “The problem with Quaker pacifism, it seemed to me, was that it could only work if one were fighting a civilized, compassionate enemy” (Nixon, 1978, 27). This characterization of enemies and the aggressive stance he took would be influential throughout his time in politics.

In 1946 Richard Nixon took his first real shot at national politics and ran for Congress. He ran on a platform of “practical liberalism” and campaigned against his opponent Jerry Voorhis’s “New Deal Idealism” (Nixon, 1978,

35). From the beginning of his involvement in politics he was very much concerned with foreign policy. The Hitler-Stalin pact was influential in the perceptions he formed of the Soviets; Nixon hated Hitler, so therefore he now had disdain for Stalin. He, however, did not reject diplomacy and saw promise in the United Nations (Nixon, 1978, 45). Key to forming Nixon's image of the Soviet's was Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech. At this point he developed a hatred of both communism and the Soviets (Nixon, 1978). Although not as extreme as Joe McCarthy, his disdain for communism was obvious while he served in Congress where he sat on the Committee on Un-American Activities and the first bill he sponsored was the Mundt-Nixon bill, which would have required the registration of all Communist Party members along with a full disclosure of funding for broadcast activities, but failed to pass in the Senate.

Building on his foreign policy expertise, Nixon was also on the special committee for foreign aid plan in Europe. He developed the opinion that anyone who identified as a Communist would be loyal to Russia. He states, "Communists throughout the world owe their loyalty not to the countries in which they live, but to Russia" (Nixon, 1978, 50). Nixon's national notoriety came from his involvement with the trial of Alger Hiss, who was a spy for the Soviet Union. This perception of threat from the ideology, communism, is key to understanding the type of threat he perceived later when he was in the Oval Office.

In the 1952 election, Dwight D. Eisenhower chose Richard Nixon as his running mate. This was a defining moment for his political career, as he would develop a very close personal and professional relationship with the much-loved former general and president of the United States (Nixon, 1978). Despite Eisenhower's great popularity with the nation he was not much of a politician. For this reason, Nixon did much of the campaign work. In the 1954 midterm election Eisenhower sent Nixon across the nation to endorse candidates and give speeches. In short, Richard Nixon was the political frontman of the Republican Party. In addition, with Eisenhower being less conservative, Nixon served as the unifier of the party throughout the administration (Nixon, 1978).

They won the election and over the course of the next eight years, Nixon gained substantial experience in foreign policy. In late 1953, he was assigned by Eisenhower to go on a diplomacy trip across Asia and the Far East, which was his first experience with Communist China and Vietnam. During this trip, he met with individuals from all walks of life, including farmers and businessmen, as well as politicians (Nixon, 1978). This trip served to enhance Nixon's interest in international affairs, and he formed opinions about the conflict in Vietnam. After the Dien Bien Phu attack on the French forces in Vietnam, there was much discussion of direct U.S. involvement. Eisenhower

did not want to take unilateral action, but was willing to participate with allies. Nixon also had reservations about sending troops to Vietnam, but was willing to do so to stop the spread of communism (Nixon, 1978, 151).

Eisenhower and Nixon won a second term in 1956, during which Nixon's foreign policy experience expanded and bolstered his fervent hatred of communism. After the Soviets crushed a political uprising in Hungary, thousands of refugees fled to Austria. To provide assistance Eisenhower wanted to increase the number of refugees brought to the United States. This was called "Operation Mercy" and Nixon was charged with working the domestic politics side through Congress (Nixon, 1978). This supported Nixon's belief that individuals needed to be saved from communism.

In addition, Nixon was sent on a diplomacy tour through Latin America. He expected some pro-Communist demonstrations, but the events that unfolded eliminated any remaining tolerance of Communists he may have had. While in Peru, Communist activists threw rocks at him and before arriving in Venezuela the CIA informed him that there was an assassination planned for him; when he arrived, he was greeted with flying rocks and one protestor spit in his face. Then, he narrowly avoided a mob, armed with Molotov cocktails, who were waiting for him at a wreath-laying ceremony he was supposed to attend (Nixon, 1978).

He was then sent as the U.S. representative to Moscow to meet with Khrushchev, who was very angry over the passage of the Captive Nations Resolution. This resolution came very close to important scheduled negotiations and became the focus of the meetings, and the interactions showed the deft of Nixon's diplomacy. He very much knew whom he was dealing with and used knowledge of Khrushchev's personal life to his advantage. According to Nixon (1978) Khrushchev said,

I . . . cannot understand why your Congress would adopt such a resolution on the eve of such an important state visit . . . people should not go to the toilet where they eat. . . . This resolution stinks. It stinks like fresh horse shit, and nothing smells worse than that! (207)

From his briefing materials Nixon recalled that Khrushchev had worked as a pig herder and a neighbor once used pig manure instead of horse manure for fertilizer, and Khrushchev had said the smell was overpowering. With this knowledge, Nixon responded, "I am afraid the Chairman is mistaken. There is something that smells worse than horse shit—and that is pig shit" (Nixon, 1978, 207). This subtle comment was enough to break the tension and allowed the meeting to continue with less aggression. This type of personal relationship building with the Soviets would prove to be key in his future presidency.

After losing a presidential bid against John F. Kennedy and a race for governor of California, Nixon made another presidential bid in 1968. During this campaign is when Nixon was first introduced to Henry Kissinger, a Harvard political science professor who was the foreign policy adviser for his opponent in the primary, Nelson Rockefeller. Vietnam was a central issue during the campaign, and the most pressing concern was that President Johnson might halt the bombing campaign in North Vietnam. With Kissinger's connections in the Johnson administration he was able to pass secret information to the Nixon campaign (Nixon, 1978). It is important to note that in his memoir, Nixon indicates that Kissinger's information was more of hints than direct, explicit, information. Nixon believed this to be intentional on the part of Kissinger to protect his identity and reputation. Nixon liked this trait of Kissinger and the secrecy of policy actions would carry through his administration (Nixon, 1978).

Nixon successfully won the election and took control of the White House. The structure of his administration was intentionally very different from Eisenhower, who scheduled many meetings and interacted with his full cabinet for decisions. Nixon, alternatively, instructed his chief of staff Bob Haldeman to act as a "funnel" for information. Rather than having conversations Nixon preferred to read a variety of information. In addition, he wanted to give his cabinet power to make decisions and reserve his time for the most important issues (Nixon, 1978). Nixon, after making a decision, however, does not like disagreement. This is demonstrated by his withholding the appointment of the vice president of Cornell University, Dr. Franklin Long, as head of the National Science Foundation, because of his opposition to Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system (ABM) (Nixon, 1969i).

Nixon's focus was primarily on foreign policy. Where foreign policy is traditionally run from the State Department, he decided to run it out of the White House. To do this, he placed emphasis on the national security adviser (Nixon, 1978). This position would be filled by arguably the most influential person in his administration, Henry Kissinger. The secretiveness of Nixon's foreign policy actions is depicted by his relations with the press and with the public. Nixon was reserved and avoided direct contact with the public. At a news conference he said, "I consider a press conference as going to the country. I find that these conferences are rather well covered by the country, both by television, as they are today, and also by members of the press" (Nixon, 1969i). Emphasizing the secretiveness of the negotiations he states,

We think we are on the right track but we are not going to raise false hopes. We are not going to tell you what is going on in private talks. What we are going to do is to do our job and then a few months from now, I think you will look back and say we did what was right. If we did what was wrong then it doesn't make

any difference, the headline that we have made today. So, this will be our policy in that respect. Again, I think that you as negotiators will recognize the validity of that position. Much as we want an open administration, there are times when it is necessary to have those quiet conversations without publicity in which each side can explore the areas of difference and eventually reach an agreement which then, of course, publicly will be announced. (Nixon, 1969h)

IMAGES IN NUCLEAR TALKS PUBLIC STATEMENTS—NIXON

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) were the key interactions between Nixon and the Soviet Union, in which both sides made compromises to their nuclear arsenal. Nixon asserted repeatedly that the United States has superior capabilities, when compared to the Soviets and all other actors, and held the strong belief that this superiority must be maintained (Nixon, 1969a,i, 1972d,f,g,j). Indicative statements include the following: (1) “The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today” (197); and (2):

Today, no nation on earth is more powerful than the United States. Not only are our nuclear deterrent forces fully sufficient for their role in keeping the peace, our conventional forces also are modern, strong, prepared, and credible to any adversary. (Nixon, 1972h,j)

Nixon believed in maximum deterrence (Aaron, 2017), meaning sufficiency in military capabilities meant maintaining the lead in weapons technology, although he recognized the destructive capability of the Soviets’ weapons systems. The defense budget was reduced by Congress during the Nixon administration, but he cautioned strongly against weakening U.S. capabilities. Cautioning about weakening defenses in the 1972 election he states,

But now in this campaign our opponents have proposed massive new cuts in military spending—cuts which would drastically slash away not just the fat but the very muscle of our defense. (Nixon, 1972h,j)

Supporting this goal, he refused to make any concessions in the SALT agreement unilaterally, stating,

Let me emphasize that in SALT, both sides are asked to make an agreement which limits [vital interests]. This is not unilateral. We, on our part, will be

having very severe limitations with regard to our defensive capability, with ABM. They, on their part, will have limitations on their offensive capability, their buildup of offensive missiles. (Nixon, 1971d)

This clearly depicts a policy of balancing, but, he continued to push for new defensive programs, namely ABM, to increase the capabilities of the United States. Nixon said,

In the event that the United States does not have ongoing programs, however, there will be no chance that the Soviet Union will negotiate phase two of an arms limitation agreement. I can say to the members of the press here that had we not had an ABM program in the beginning there would be no SALT agreement today, because there would have been no incentive for the Soviet Union to stop us from doing something that we were doing and, thereby, agree to stop something they were doing. (Nixon, 1969m)

Nixon believed that maintaining technological superiority over the Soviets was the only way they would negotiate.

The difference in defense budget between the Nixon and Carter administrations are likely more due to a difference in situational context rather than military goals. General Randy Jayne, who served on the NSC staff during the Nixon administration and was associate director for National Security in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the Carter administration, was able to provide insight. He said that under Nixon budgetary constraints were placed on defense spending due to public disapproval of the Vietnam War. Consequently, the Vietnam War took a toll on U.S. military equipment, requiring repair and replacement by the Carter administration (Jayne, 2016).

Although, at least publicly, Nixon maintained the image of the Soviets as having weaker capabilities, he spoke often of balancing with Soviet capabilities and Soviet increased capability (Nixon, 1969b,e, 1972c,j). In this light, Nixon was concerned about Soviet capabilities catching up to U.S. capabilities and thus supported a strong defense budget along with continued development in order to maintain superior capabilities. In addition to military capability, Nixon believes economic power is also of significance, stating,

In this period we must keep our economy vigorous and competitive if the opening for greater East-West trade is to mean anything at all, and if we do not wish to be shouldered aside in world markets by the growing potential of the economies of Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China. For America to continue its role of helping to build a more peaceful world, we must keep America number one economically in the world. (Nixon, 1969i)

Of utmost importance in this statement is, “helping to build a more peaceful world.” Nixon’s belief was that U.S. capabilities could be used to reshape other countries and the international system.

At times Nixon professes fear of the Soviet Union and their nuclear capabilities and at other times he seems certain that they will do whatever necessary to avoid direct conflict with the United States. This dichotomy is likely derived from the true nuclear capability, which did present a potential threat and that he was convinced the leaders on both sides understood that any nuclear exchange would be mutually catastrophic. Although he maintained strong relationships with the Soviet leaders, he maintained uncertainty of their intentions.

As the SALT negotiations progressed Nixon became more optimistic about working with the Soviets. At the start of the talks the Soviets Nixon only saw the impending threat, but as the negotiations continued, he saw that there was also an opportunity. In his letter to chief negotiator, Gerard Smith, sending him to the second round of SALT talks he said,

In my letter to you three years ago I observed that no one could foresee the outcome of the negotiations, but I also expressed my conviction that arms control was in the mutual interest of our country and of the Soviet Union. We have learned in the last three years that such mutual interests do, in fact, exist.¹ The achievement of the SALT agreements, as well as the Basic Principles governing our relations with the USSR, lead me to believe that your current efforts will meet with new success. (Nixon, 1972l)

With this perspective, the threat of the Soviets’ capabilities had not gone away, but were at least moderately decreased, because mutual interest was identified.

Also of note, is Nixon’s respect for the beauty and magnificence of Soviet architecture and culture, such as the ballet. Making sightseeing suggestions to the press for their trip to Moscow he states,

Well naturally, you want to see the Kremlin. You ought to see the university; you ought to see certainly one of the greatest industrial plants in Moscow, the magnificence of the gardens and the former Czar’s Palace in Leningrad, and so forth. (Nixon, 1972b)

The palaces of the Czar’s were much larger and more extravagant than American presidents’ homes. Speaking of the time that Brezhnev stayed at the Nixon’s California home he said,

Although our house in San Clemente is very beautiful, it is very small by the standards of the Soviet leaders, who are used to dachas and villas of Czarist

nobles, and it is not at all equipped to accommodate state visitors. (Nixon, 1978, 881)

This perception of culture is important, because it suggests Nixon viewed the Soviets as equals that deserve respect, unlike third world countries.

SOURCE OF CONFLICT

Understanding the source of conflict, individuals, state characteristics, or the international system is key to understanding the goals of foreign policy and which actors are the target. For Nixon, the source of conflict is, at least in part, the individual. He stated,

We find within the last third of a century that sometimes decisions by great powers, as well as small, are not made by rational men. Hitler was not a particularly rational man in some of his military decisions. So it is the responsibility of the President of the United States not only to plan against the expected, and against what normal and rational men will do, but within a certain area of contingency to plan against the possibility of an irrational attack. (Nixon, 1969h)

In other words, Nixon believed that he had to be prepared to defend against irrational behavior. He also understands that conflict arises out of state interests, stating,

I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day. (Nixon, 1969v)

Nixon saw Communist and anti-Communist ideologies were important in defining the international system, stating, “There has never been a greater need for a sense of common purpose among the non-Communist nations” (Nixon, 1972a). This shows that the state characteristics, specifically communism, had a significant influence over the individual actors, in Nixon’s mind. In other words, he believed that communism dictated policy goals that were counter to the goals of Western democracy.

Thus, for Nixon, there are multiple sources of conflict. The belief in the power and influence of individual actors is demonstrated by his desire to maintain close relationships and be in constant communication with his Soviet counterparts. Excited by progress in the SALT agreements he states, “We agreed on a more reliable ‘hot line’ between Washington and Moscow,

and found new ways to consult each other in emergencies which will reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war” (Nixon, 1972a). Thus, conflict is exemplified and dealt with in the international system by “balancing,” but the system is created by the motivations and actions of individual leaders.

OTHER IMAGES

Another important image, significant for understanding SALT negotiations, as well as the conflict in the Middle East (discussed in the next section), is that of Eastern Europe. Because Western Europe was strategically located to defend against the Soviets from the east, the capabilities of European allies were calculated into the balance of power analysis. While Europe was still recovering from World War II and rebuilding their military capabilities Nixon viewed them as substantially weaker than the United States and thus requiring our support to maintain the balance. Thus, he held a “dependent” image of the Western European powers, along with many elements of the ally image (Nixon, 1969e, 1972a). As an example of this, Nixon states, “The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well” (Nixon, 1969f).

Later, as the capabilities of Western Europe increased, the image began to transition from dependent ally to a more robust ally image (Nixon, 1969b). Referring to both Europe’s strengthening military capability and growing economy, Nixon states, “Our former dependents have become our competitors” (Nixon, 1972a). This clearly shows that there was a shift in the perception of power, both military and economic, held by the European allies. The increase of capability and transition to potentially posing a threat makes the categorization fit the ally image.

After the strength of Western Europe grew, the stronger dependent image was projected onto the citizens of countries Nixon felt were oppressive. This image grew out of his perception of how those citizens viewed the United States. He states, “Everywhere we went—to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Poland—we could feel the quickening pace of change in old international relationships and the peoples’ genuine desire for friendship for the American people” (Nixon, 1972c). His determination to proactively shape the world in his vision of “freedom” is specifically exemplified by his statement of Polish people. He said,

No country in the world has suffered; more from war than Poland—and no country has more to gain from peace. The faces of the people who gave us such a heartwarming welcome in Warsaw yesterday, and then again this morning and

this afternoon, told an eloquent story of suffering from war in the past and of trope for peace in the future. One could see it in their faces. It made me more determined than ever that America must do all in its power to help that hope for peace come true for all people in the world. (Nixon, 1972c)

In Nixon's mind, these people were dependent upon the American government to break away from the oppressive regimes, which governed them.

OPERATIONAL CODE

The OpCode of Richard Nixon in the context of nuclear agreements involving the Soviet Union using press conferences and public statements is presented in table 2.1. The scores suggest that Nixon views the world as somewhat to definitely friendly (P-1) and believes the Soviet leaders he is negotiating with are definitely cooperative (I-1). What this means is that Nixon, at least publicly, expressed his belief that cooperation and a reduction in conflict were possible by way of negotiations.

He is somewhat optimistic in realizing his political goals (P-2), does not believe the future is predictable (P-3) or that he has much control over historical development, and believes that the outcome of decisions involved a very high degree of chance (P-5). This explains his plea to the American public to not decrease defense spending, because he is uncertain of future threats. If

Table 2.1

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.47 (Somewhat/Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.24 (Somewhat Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.11 (Very Low)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.29 (Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.96 (Very High)
	Choice and Shift Propensities	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.59 (Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.26 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.21 (Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.41 (Medium)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.59 (Medium)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.11 (Low)
	(b) Promise	0.07 (Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.54 (Very High)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.06 (Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.04 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.11 (Low)

he had felt that he could successfully decrease threats, his outlook may have been very different. With statements such as “Nothing would have happened unless we made it happen,” one may presume that these results are skewed and that Nixon believed that American influence did lead to specific outcomes (Nixon, 1972a). But, the scores make more sense when we understand where Nixon believed conflict was derived from. As indicated in the above discussion, he placed substantial emphasis on the individual in conflict and cooperation. This suggests that although Nixon may believe that he, or the United States generally, has influence in negotiations, the final outcome is dependent upon many factors that create the international system. So, the previous statement should be interpreted as Nixon believed that the influence of the United States had a significant impact, but the impact of the other actors should not be minimized. It is also important to remember that these statements were public during the SALT negotiations, but the majority of work was done in secret (Nixon, 1978). This contrasts with his approach to domestic policy, where he has more unilateral power. In response to being asked what the federal government would do in the case of a postal worker strike he stated,

I will answer that question only by saying that we have the means to deliver the mail. We will use those means. But I do not want to indicate what they would be because I think that might put a disturbing element into the very delicate situation of negotiation going on in local unions throughout the country. I am not threatening. I am simply stating as a matter of fact that the President of the United States, among his [*sic*] many responsibilities, has a responsibility to see that the mail is delivered, And I shall meet that responsibility and meet it effectively beginning Monday in the event that the postal workers in any area decide that they are not going to meet their constitutional responsibilities to deliver mail. (Nixon, 1970d)

This suggests that when Nixon has superior power and is not reliant on other actors, he is far more controlling.

The scores also suggest that Nixon was cooperative in his pursuit of goals (I-2), had a low acceptance of risk (I-3), and was moderately flexible in tactics (I-4). These scores are expected, as they moderate the high level of uncertainty in the philosophical beliefs. Because Nixon is uncertain about achieving his goals unilaterally and is dependent upon other actors, he must be cooperative and flexible. The evidence of behavior supports these scores, but does not tell the full story. Nixon is cooperative and willing to compromise, as evidenced by making limitations on ABM, to reach a nuclear agreement. Remember, however, that Nixon always intended for ABM to be a bargaining chip. So, Nixon is cooperative and makes compromises, but most often the cooperation is planned and initiated by him.

The utility of means (I-5) demonstrate Nixon's belief in the success of specific tactics. With an extremely high score of 0.54 for statements of appeal and support, this is his preferred tactic. This means that Nixon believes that making appeals for reaching a SALT agreement and making statements supporting the progress on the part of the Soviet Union, the goal is more likely to be achieved. Promises, opposition, and threats, for Nixon, are unlikely to be effective as indicated by their low scores. Although unlikely to be effective he still believes promises are almost twice as effective as threats, which is in line with the other scores indicating his high level of cooperation. He believes offering rewards or threatening punishment have nearly twice the utility as statements of opposition. This is also indicative of cooperation and flexibility of tactics, because the threat of punishment or offer of reward may be effective at different points in negotiation.

MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The perceptions of the conflict in the Middle East, for the Nixon administration, were defined by the United States' strong relationship with Israel and the Soviet Union's involvement with the Arabs, particularly Egypt. The perceptions that direct interests of the United States were at risk was a proxy of perceptions from the Israeli leadership, who Nixon believed the United States has a "special relationship" with. Although Nixon recognized the different approaches by Israel and the United States to resolving conflict in the region he emphasized the common bond between the two nations. He stated,

I have spoken with many leaders of other governments now, and many times we have spoken together in English. But today, I believe, is the first time the leader of another nation and I have spoken together in purely American English. I say this not because it matters one bit whether people speak in one accent or another but because this experience brought home to me one point: Our guest tonight has spoken of the profound common values the people of the United States and Israel share, and it is her very experience which explains why the United States and Israel share, and it is her very experience which explains why the United States and Israel are close. It has little to do with just religion or politics or things of that nature. It has much to do with the simple fact that many of us share—in broad terms—some kind of common experience. (Nixon, 1969t)

This suggests that Nixon feels there is a connection to Israel beyond what is obvious. For Nixon, Israel is representative of America in the Middle East. Further emphasizing this, he said,

Even the more modest Israeli goals add up to a “special relationship” with the US that Israeli officials have occasionally called a “tacit alliance.” In addition to Israel’s specific need for support in security and foreign policy matters, many Israelis, especially some of the more militant right-wingers, see Israel as the guardian of US interests in the Middle East. Israel aspires to be a kind of special representative of Western democracy in an area where authoritarianism is the most common form of government, and a bridge between the developed and developing worlds that can communicate with both. (Nixon, 1969x, 4–5)

Israelis also emphasize that there is a “special relationship” with the United States because the United States is home to the largest Israeli population outside of Israel (Nixon, 1969x). The above shows that the perception was that Israel represented American values and American interests in the Middle East.

Nixon’s support of Israel, however, did not come without something in return. He expected acknowledgment and appreciation from the Jewish community for his support of Israel. A memo from the president to Henry Kissinger states, “What, if anything, did Garment report to you on the absolute failure of the American Jewish community to express any appreciation by letter, calls or otherwise for RN’s over-ruling both State and Defense in sending phantom jets to Israel?” (Nixon, 1969q).² This suggests that he is not only concerned about the physical security of Israel, but he is concerned about his perception as the protector of Israel. This represents a dependent image of Israel and suggests the need for Israel to validate this role.

The strong perception of shared culture and Israel’s need of protection, from the Soviet-backed Arabs, is key to understanding the perception of threat in the region. The images, overall, held by Nixon in the context of the Israeli’s conflict with the Arabs are similar to those analyzed in the nuclear negotiations. This is to be expected, because Nixon did not compartmentalize or fully differentiate between small-scale conflicts involving both the United States and the Soviet Union around the world. Rather, the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union was at the center of a foreign policy web of proxy conflicts in which the great powers balanced against one another.

The escalation of tensions in the Middle East and focus on balancing between the two superpowers, however, was blamed on the Soviets. In a memo to the president, Kissinger states, “Before Kosygin’s message to you, the conflict was viewed as primarily an Arab-Israeli conflict slipping toward a subordinate role of a tool in that larger context” (Nixon, 1972h; nd.a). One of Kissinger’s concerns was that the Soviets would take direct responsibility for Egyptian air defenses. If this occurred, he believed not responding would signal “superior Soviet power,” yet responding would “confirm the elevation of the conflict to the US-Soviet level” (Nixon, nd. A).³ This suggests that Kissinger and Nixon

believed the balance of power was shifted in favor of the Arabs, due to Soviet influence. The influence of the Soviets is key to understanding the subsequent policy in the region, because it is not obvious that the same policies would have been followed if the Arabs gained power without the aid of the Soviets.

In addition to Soviet actions being a catalyst for elevated tensions, the Israelis also stoked the fire under the two superpowers. Ambassador Rabin communicated that Soviet pilots were operating in the region since April 18 (Nixon, 1970f). The administration was concerned about Israel provoking the Soviets with false accusations. Referring to one such document distributed by Israel, it is noted that

the document contains two admissions: (a) It dates the Soviet decision to introduce SA-3s into the U.A.R. in January 1970, instead of November 1969, as earlier claimed by the Israelis—i.e., after the Israelis had undertaken their deep penetration raids, and (b) It acknowledges that Israel's dismemberment and destruction have not been a Soviet goal. (Nixon, 1970g)

The claims were untrue, as the closest Soviet aircraft came to Israeli attack aircraft is 10 miles. They were not directly interfering in Israeli missions, but were “scrambling” (Nixon, nd b). The balance between the real actions of the Soviets and the perceptions of the Israelis without losing the trust of the Israelis was a constant battle for the Nixon administration.

Although the balance of power had shifted, Nixon believed that the United States maintained superior capability and could successfully support Israel's defense against the Arabs (Nixon, 1969a;b). Maintaining this superiority was very important to Nixon. He states, “Frankly, I do not believe the United States should go into any talks where the deck might be stacked against us” (Nixon, 1969c). The need to maintain dominance was, in part, due to the perception that Israeli defenses are dependent upon the strength of the United States along with its direct support of Israel (Nixon, 1969a). These images and Nixon's ideas for the role of the United States in the peace talks is depicted in his statement:

I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid. (Nixon, 1969a)

This statement contains two images. The first is that Israel is dependent upon the United States to maintain security against the Arabs (Nixon, 1969a). The

second image is the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In Nixon's view the conflict in the Middle East had a significant and direct impact on the tensions with the Soviets (Nixon, 1969a,u).

Out of the belief that the conflict was directly connected to Soviet relations Nixon wanted to include the Soviets in the peace negotiations and also expressed some support for the Arabs. He stated, "We believe that the initiative here is one that cannot be simply unilateral. It must be multilateral. And it must not be in one direction. We are going to pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast we can" (Nixon, 1969b). These statements suggest a stronger interest in the Soviet Union than in Israel and humanitarian concerns appear to be at the bottom of the list of concerns. As stated by Nixon,

I have noted several recent stories indicating that the United States one day is pro-Arab and the next day is pro-Israel. We are neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel. We are pro-peace. We are for security for all the nations in that area. As we look at this situation, we will consider the Israeli arms request based on the threats to them from states in the area and we will honor those requests to the extent that we see—we determine that they need additional arms in order to meet that threat. (Nixon, 1970a)

This suggests that Nixon's actions in the Middle East were solely in the interest of the United States and not that of Israel or the Arabs. Rather, his goal was to shape the Middle East by inserting American values and ideas; Israel is the pawn.

More indicative of this sentiment is his reluctance to send arms at Israel's request, but rather made decisions based on the assessment of their needs (Nixon, 1970d). Nixon's goal, then, was to balance against the capabilities of the Soviet Union (Nixon, 1970e,k). A part of the tensions were due to the direct involvement of the Soviets on the side of the Arabs. Nixon was concerned about increased Arab power through a treaty between Egypt and the Soviets (Nixon, 1971c). Even when the Soviets left Egypt Nixon seems unsure of the threat level (Nixon, 1972i). Nixon believed that the power balance was still in favor of the United States because the countries of the Middle East were economically dependent upon the United States through oil sales, but that the United States had leverage because they were not dependent upon the Middle East for oil (Nixon, 1973a). He was, however, concerned for the European allies that were dependent upon the region's oil (Nixon, 1973b). These public statements prevailed and were due to Nixon's strong personal feelings about Israel. It is important, however, to understand the various opinions throughout the administration that influenced the final images.

Some in the administration took a strong stance in support of Israel and their hawkish policies toward the Arab states. Growing military capability

of Arabs, through the Soviets, is a concern of Israel. Advocating such a response, CIA director Richard Helms posits,

There is no limit to military action the Israelis can take against Egypt. The only restraints are of a political nature. It is difficult to justify these restraints; if the Egyptian leadership cannot defend its own people, it cannot expect to survive. The Israeli course of action should be encouraged, since it benefits the West as well as Israel. (Nixon, 1969r)

Others balanced the concern of Israeli security with their own concerns of increased tensions with the Soviets. Nobody in the administration was willing to allow Israeli power to weaken, but several key advisers, including Kissinger, held the opinion that Israeli perception of insecurity was exaggerated. In specific, Kissinger believed that Israel was aggressive beyond what was required to protect their security, which jeopardized an increase in USSR and U.S. involvement (Nixon, nd c, 2). The Israelis, however, believed any unilateral ceasefire on their part would be a sign of weakness (Nixon, nd c, 3). The context of this was over a request from Israel for replacing aircraft that had been lost in recent combat. Balancing the risk of provoking the Soviets, Nixon decided to not immediately increase aircraft sales to Israel, as he believed the perception of increased direct support would be destabilizing. Kissinger cautioned that the decision could have the additional side effect of this decision was appearing to be “bowing to Soviet pressure.” Then, to have the cake and eat it too, Kissinger proposed amending previous aircraft sale contracts to include the replacement of actual attrition rates. The intention was then to not escalate involvement while simultaneously maintaining Israel’s current level of aircraft capabilities (Nixon, nd d). What this shows is an unwillingness to let Israel’s status quo power diminish, but also refrain from escalating tensions by trying to strengthen the power of Israel over the status quo.

Because the Nixon administration did not simply acquiesce to every request for aid, Israel often appears unconfident in the commitment of support from the United States. Exemplifying this is a summary of statements made by Israeli prime minister Rabin:

[Prime Minister Rabin] believes that the US has “made a great mistake” and has “undermined” Israel’s position in future negotiations with her neighbors whenever they come about. . . . Ambassador Rabin stressed that the US approach to the Soviets was “basically wrong.” If the real purpose was to find out if the Soviets want compromise we should not “give in” without concessions from them. “You should know better than we” that the US can “only move as they move toward you.” (Nixon, 1969w)

The Nixon administration did want Israel as an ally in the region and was willing to provide all assistance necessary to prevent the Soviets, thus the Arabs, from gaining power in the region, as would later be demonstrated by the support after the Yom Kippur attack.

The support, however, was primarily to prevent the increased power and influence of the Soviets more so than absolute support for Israel. As stated by ElWarfally (1988), "Libya's antagonism toward communism in general and the USSR in particular was used by some U.S. officials to convince President Nixon and his top officials to recognize the [new revolutionary led regime]" (pp. 76). This perception held firm, even though an arms deal with the Soviet Union conducted via Egypt. The support Libya could provide to other Arab states in the fight against Israel and their roll in revolutions in other Arab states was minimized (ElWarfally, 1988, p. 75–84). This demonstrates that anti-Communist ideology and anti-Soviet policy is more important for the Nixon administration than the interests of Israel.

It is important to note that Israel never expressed empathy for the position of American interests and the Nixon administration recognized the legitimate grievances by the Arabs. Melvin Laird, secretary of defense, posited that a substantial source of conflict is the issue of Palestinian refugees. He believes that the United States has a vested interest in the protection of human rights (Nixon, 1969p). Nonetheless, Laird emphasizes that the threat to U.S. interests is real. He stated,

There are those who insist that the present situation between the Arabs and the Israelis is not to be solved by us, because the issues go beyond the scope of American power. It is easy to succumb to this pessimism. Yet "American power" has many dimensions: some cultural, some economic, some political, some military. It is the multi-faceted nature of American society which makes for American power. Where one area might be closed, another area of endeavor, such as economic cooperation might be opened. In any event, loss of the Middle East to some new form of Leninism or Maoism in the Arab world is a possibility which could very well develop after years of humiliation and defeat. Present Arab leadership does not represent this extreme form of politics, but Soviet and Chinese plans for the area are clearly envisage something along these lines. Before this disaster occurs, it is worth considering alternatives in American policy toward the Middle East which can guide political change and prevent these extreme developments. (Nixon, 1969p)

This demonstrates that Nixon perceives of threat from another culture. Strength was also strongly emphasized in the talks. Harold Saunders stated,

The tone of your response, I suggest, should convey the notion that we are no babes in the woods vis-à-vis the Soviets and have no intention of jeopardizing

Israel's security or our interests. As the President told Eban, he has been accused of a lot of things—but not of being naïve about the Russians, stating “One of our purposes in talking with the Russians is to probe what price they are willing to pay for peace. They and their clients got themselves into their current mess, and we intend that they—not we—should pay the price for getting out. But the only way to find out what price Moscow and Cairo will pay is to put a specific proposition on the table—less than they want—and see what they'll pay to improve it” (Nixon, 1969j).

In many cases the Americans tried very hard to convince the Israelis that they were not in a weaker position and would not be allowed to fall to a weaker position, but the Israelis were resistant to this belief.

Recognizing that the United States would have to be the ones to pressure Israel, David Packard, secretary of defense, argued aircraft sales to Israel should be stopped until Israel made concessions in the peace negotiations. Harold Saunders, speaking of this memo, said, “The tone of this memo is unfortunate—openly anti-Israel” (Nixon, 1970c). David Packard, however, also believed that a stop in aircraft sales to Israel would improve the U.S. position with North African countries, namely Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria (Nixon, 1970b). The position of withholding aircraft until Israel made concessions was also supported by Ambassador Yost (Nixon, 1970h). This shows two things about the perceptions of Israel. First, the less emotional perception is that Israel's actions could jeopardize the security of the U.S. and Soviet relationship, and thus Israeli interests should be put second and they should be pressured to make concessions. This, however, was seen as “anti-Israel” and the emotional support of Israel ultimately prevailed.

The primary objective throughout the Nixon administration was to preserve the stable relationship with the USSR, in order to progress the SALT agreements. The Middle East conflict and possibility of Israel going nuclear was viewed as a direct threat to SALT agreements and stability (Nixon, 1970m, nd e). Israel publicly stated that it had no intentions to be the first nuclear state in the Middle East, but intelligence observed that they were rapidly developing the capability to produce and deploy a nuclear weapon within a short time frame (Nixon, nd f, 1969g). Several officials within the administration were concerned that Israel had not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that a nuclear-armed Israel would inspire others in the region to pursue the technology. The real fear was that a nuclear Israel would then increase the risk of confrontation between the United States and USSR, and hold up peace talks.

The primary negotiations for a Middle East peace agreement did not come from meetings between the Israelis and the Arabs, but rather the Four Power Talks, which consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and

USSR. The goal was to create an agreement to settle the territorial dispute following the 1967 war. All of the four powers, with small variances, believed Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders (Nixon, nd g). Publicly emphasizing the significance and power of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this conflict, Nixon stated,

The four-power conference can become an absolute essential to any kind of peaceful settlement in the Mideast, and that is a major-power guarantee of the settlement, because we cannot expect the Nation of Israel or the other nations in the area who think their major interests might be involved—we cannot expect them to agree to a settlement unless they think there is a better chance that it will be guaranteed in the future than has been the case in the past. (Nixon, 1969c)

The significance placed on the Four Power Talks further suggests that the real interests for the international system are between parties outside of the region and the region is a proxy for balancing power between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the conflict were truly attributed to the Israelis and Arabs with only regional consequences we would expect to see emphasis placed on direct negotiations.

The conflict escalated when the power balance in the region was altered by the Soviets. One memo states,

Since President Nasser opened his country's gates to Soviet penetration, the Soviets have entered the region as a force active in all developments of the area. . . . The Soviet Union fostered and exploited the sense of Arab frustration towards Israel, and Egypt's ambition to establish its hegemony within the Arab world through the elimination of Israel, Israel serving as a geographical barrier between it and the major centers of the Arab world. (Nixon, 1969r, 1)

The USSR provided multiple levels of support for the Arabs, both politically in the international community and on the battlefield with military aid (Nixon, 1969r, 2). It was posited that the USSR and Egypt were waging a "war of attrition" by prolonging any agreed-upon settlement (Nixon, 1969r, 9). Although there were attempts to build relations with the Arabs, Arab power was derived through Soviets, so the United States has no influence on Arab position directly (Nixon, 1970i). The closest Arab ally directly involved in the conflict would have been Jordan. However, the CIA reported that King Hussein was weak and could not hold up to terrorists, Egypt, or the Russians, thus their weak capabilities did not make them strategically advantageous (Nixon, 1969s).

Thus, Nixon views Israel as dependent upon the United States, the Arabs dependent upon the Soviets, and the United States and the Soviet Union dependent upon one another to avoid direct confrontation. Stated by Nixon,

In the Mideast, without what the Soviet Union has done in rearming Israel's neighbors, there would be no crisis there that would require our concern. On the other hand, at the same time that the Soviet Union had gone forward in providing arms for potential belligerents—potential belligerents in the one area and actual belligerents in another—the Soviet Union recognizes that if these peripheral areas get out of control, the result could be a confrontation with the United States. And the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States, any more than we want one with them, because each of us knows what a confrontation would mean. (Nixon, 1969c)

In other words, the Soviets are the source of conflict and the key to peace and he compared the conflict to that of Vietnam (Nixon, 1969c, 1970j, 1972j, 1973b). What he really means is that peace between the United States and Soviet Union is dependent upon peace in the smaller areas of conflict.

Although tensions were high, Nixon, as we saw in the analysis of nuclear agreements, believed the Soviets would not escalate (Nixon, 1969c, 1969I). Nixon essentially believed the Soviets held the same position he did, that he did not want to escalate the situation by becoming further involved. He believes in the necessary influence of the United States, but was reluctant to actively encourage either side to make concessions (Nixon, 1970I, 1971a,b). He stated, "But for the United States publicly to move in and indicate what we think ought to be done while these delicate negotiations go on would not help" (Nixon, 1971a). The level of involvement changed when the Soviets expressed interest in actively assisting in a peace agreement between Israel and the Arabs and requested that Henry Kissinger come to Moscow to begin negotiations (Nixon, 1973b).⁴ A joint communication following discussions with the Soviets states,

Both sides believe that the removal of the danger of war and tension in the Middle East is a task of paramount importance and urgency, and therefore, the only alternative is the achievement, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 338, of a just and lasting peace settlement in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area. (Nixon, 1974c)

This depicts the mutual feelings of required cooperation and potential for conflict escalation on the Middle East issue.

Of note, is that Nixon had little to no concern for the Palestinians or human rights. In fact, he supported Israel in putting down a Palestinian uprising (Aaron, 2017). This is a stark contrast to Jimmy Carter, in the next chapter.

OPCODE—MIDDLE EAST

The OpCode results are depicted in table 2.1. As with the images, the OpCode analysis for Richard Nixon using data related to the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is very similar to that of the analysis of the SALT negotiations. This further supports the idea that Nixon did not separate the conflict issues. There are some minor shifts in Nixon's code shown in table 2.2 below. These shifts likely reflect a small shift in Nixon's goals. The overall goal of improving relations with the Soviets and increasing the security of the United States did not change and Nixon had less interest in the consequences of the final outcome of the Israeli conflict, as long as it did not increase Soviet capabilities. Thus, he was likely willing to make more compromises in the Middle East than with direct negotiations with the Soviets in SALT.

What is immediately noticeable about this analysis is that the philosophical beliefs, although there were some slight shifts in value, retained the same descriptors. This indicates that he held the same image of the international system in the context of both the SALT negotiations and the conflict in the Middle East. Some of the instrumental beliefs, however, did shift noticeably (table 2.2).

The first noticeable shift is in the instrumental master belief (I-1), which shifts from definitely cooperative to very cooperative. This is most likely reflective of his desire to stay out of direct conflict in the region. He was

Table 2.2

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.47 (Somewhat/Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.26 (Somewhat Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.11 (Very Low)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.33 (Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.96 (Very High)
	Choice and Shift Propensities	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.75 (Very Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.38 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.29 (Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.25 (Low)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.56 (Medium)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.23 (Low)
	(b) Promise	0.06 (Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.59 (Very High)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.07 (Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.01 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.05 (Very Low)

willing to compromise more on Israel than on issues involving direct U.S. capabilities in the SALT negotiations. Depicting the nature of compromise in the administration, in a memo to the president, referring to a settlement proposal by the Soviets, the secretary of state said,

We have prepared a counterproposal which includes sufficient hints of movement and changes on our part to assure the continuation of the bilateral dialogue, while remaining firm on the fundamentals which we believe are essential if we are to have any chance of brining the Israelis along at some stage. (Nixon, 1969n, 2)

This shows the willingness to compromise, to the extent possible. The lack of movement is due, in part, to the unbending perceptions of Israel. The secretary states, "Israel has already characterized the Soviet reply as retrograde and a confirmation that Nasser has no intention to make peace at this time" (Nixon, 1969n, 1). This is a sentiment expressed over time, across the administration, and is reflected in the president's OpCode.

It is also important to understand the nature of the negotiations and the position from which they were starting. Henry Kissinger expressed that in the negotiations with the Soviets regarding peace in the Middle East, that Israel had the advantage, because they had a superior military to the Arabs and had won the previous conflict. He, however, provided the caveat that the United States would avoid confrontation with the USSR at all costs and that it is possible the USSR would not allow Israel to retain all of the Arab territory acquired in 1967. Dr. Kissinger said there are two types of situations resulting from peace negotiations: "(1) a situation which would reduce the will of the parties to fight each other; (2) a situation which would reduce the ability of the parties to 'get at each other'" (Nixon, 1969k). Showing the inflexibility of the Israeli position,

Mr. Argov noted on this second point that the Israeli concept was exactly the opposite—that peace should not keep Arabs and Israelis from "getting at each other," but should, to the contrary, enable them to get at each other on a massive scale. Israel believes that there should be open borders and the free flow of people and commerce, although Argov acknowledged that perhaps that is unattainable now, "in which case Israeli withdrawal is unattainable now." (Nixon, 1969k)

The same basic arguments are made by both sides in the State Department with Rogers representing the United States and Abba Eban representing Israel (Nixon, 1969d). The Israelis were persuading the Nixon administration to not include the Soviets in negotiations and allow the negotiations to be only

between the Israelis and the Arabs. The Israelis viewed this as antagonist to their goals, reflected by the willingness of the Nixon administration to include Israeli concessions in the negotiations. Thus, they compromised with the Soviets, not the Israelis.

The hold up in negotiations was that the Soviets were not as concerned about the situation as Israel and consequently the United States. In a memo speaking of the Soviets position on the Middle East talks, Joe Sisco states, "They gave no serious signs of concern over the present status quo in the area and seemed prepared to live with it as manageable" (Nixon, 1969o, 1). Speaking of their tactics, he argues that they will not put significant pressure on Egypt to reach an agreement and will use the public negotiations of the four powers and through the UN to "chip away at the US position" (Nixon, 1969o, 2). This is important because what may be viewed as a lack of willingness to compromise on part of the United States is a lack of compromise on the part of the Soviets.

Further supporting this, instrumental belief 4a shifts from medium to low. This suggests that he is less flexible in his propensity to shift between cooperation and conflict in the Middle East conflict. In the context of the documents analyzed and the images, this is most likely a reflection of his decreased willingness to use direct force. Moreover, there were small shifts in the utility of means for punishment and reward. His belief in the utility of punishments shifted from low to very low and his belief in the utility of rewards slightly increased. This is further support that Nixon was more willing to make compromises and less willing to engage in confrontation with the Arabs and Soviets. Depicting this he stated, "What I am simply saying is this: that insofar as the military portion of the decision is concerned, that portion is based on the fact [that the] [*sic*] situation as we see it at this time, and that will be constantly reappraised as the fact situation changes" (Nixon, 1970e). This suggests that he was not going to provide arms to Israel blindly, because he did not want to risk increasing tensions with the Soviets. This could also be correctly interpreted as a lack of support for Israel, because the primary interest in the conflict was American interests.

Nixon was unconfident in his ability to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East (Nixon, 1973b, 1974a). Depicting the source of conflict and his reliance on compromise to reach a peace agreement, he states, at a signing of a cooperation agreement between the United States and Egypt,

there is one important rule which governs statements or agreements or treaties or whatever documents are signed by heads of government, and that is this: that the statement, the treaty, the agreement, is only as good as the will and the determination of the parties concerned to keep that agreement. (Nixon, 1974b)

This shows that he believes individual states and their leaders are responsible for conflict and peace.

NIXON THE DEFENSIVE REALIST AND OFFENSIVE IDEALIST

For this analysis, it is important to separate foreign policy motivations and intentions from realized actions, allowing us to understand the decision process and the most important variables in the final decision process, be they individual-level motivations or systemic-level influences. Nixon's general foreign policy was one of intervention, with the goal of reshaping countries in his image, but with a caveat; balancing against the USSR as a core goal of security is consistent with defensive realism. When allowable, however, Nixon attempted to expand the liberal world order through intervention. In addition to actions in the Middle East, the cases of Vietnam, as well as covert actions in Latin America, demonstrate Nixon's ultimate foreign policy desires.

Although the USSR served as a check on U.S. power, that Nixon respected, he also utilized the enemy image of the Soviets to justify his expansionistic goals. In addition to being a threat, in the mind of Nixon, the Soviets also served as an opportunity to justify American involvement around the globe (Gates, 2017). He was only confident that deterrence would hold, thus he was able to do as he pleased in "flashing them around" (Aaron, 2017).

Nixon believed that the source of conflict was in individuals and their use of their state's capabilities defined and shaped the international system. In other words, he believed Communist ideology, held by individuals, had systemic effects. He stated,

That term, "a structure of peace," speaks an important truth about the nature of peace in today's world. Peace cannot be wished into being. It has to be carefully and painstakingly built in many ways and on many fronts, through networks of alliances, through respect for commitments, through patient negotiations, through balancing military forces and expanding economic interdependence, through reaching one agreement that opens the way to others, through developing patterns of international behavior that will be accepted by other powers. Most important of all, the structure of peace has to be built in such a way that all those who might be tempted to destroy it will instead have a stake in preserving it. (Nixon, 1972k)

This depicts Nixon's belief that a forceful foreign policy is, at least sometimes, required to lead to achieving goals, including peace.

It is easy to quickly label Richard Nixon a realist. He stated,

Those who scoff at *balance of power diplomacy* should recognize that the only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance. It is precisely the fact that the elements of balance now exist that gives us a rare opportunity to *create a system of stability* that can maintain the peace. (Nixon, 1972k, emphasis mine)

He pursued a goal of balancing against the Soviets, thus at times behaving more aggressively. In addition, the statement “create a system of stability” tells us that Nixon believed that stability was possible to “maintain peace.” Maintaining peace can indicate defensive realist behavior, because he does not suggest the threats have been eliminated but rather stabilized. He, however, seeks to “create” a system of peace and stability. While he sought to maintain balance and peace with the USSR, his true goal was to alter the international system by intervening in and shaping weaker powers in his image. If he were an offensive realist, his goal would have been the pursuit of American power. While this was certainly a goal in the nuclear balance, his goal was an ideological change in the international system, rather than maintaining dominance over all states.

Thus, while Nixon’s goals are to create a peaceful system by exporting American values through force, they are unachievable due to external forces. In other words, the power of the Soviet Union and the bipolar structure of the system dictated that Nixon must be cautious where he intervenes. The system also dictated that he give attention to the Soviet Union and react to their behavior. In this light, the system level of realism analysis has greater explanatory power for the foreign policy behavior of the Nixon administration. This, however, does not diminish the need to understand his personal goals as an expansionist idealist.

Nixon’s expansionistic goals were never realized, but were a driving force behind his foreign policy agenda. Early in his administration, he attempted to secretly escalate the war in Vietnam, showing his goals, staunchly anti-Communist, but certainly not humanitarian. When politics got in the way, the media reporting about the secret bombings in Laos and Cambodia and the escalation of the anti-war movement, his administration was forced to withdraw. The issue of Vietnam provides insight into Nixon’s foreign policy goals, and it would be remiss to only discuss Nixon’s role in Vietnam in his presidency and ignoring his role during the Eisenhower administration, because the context of the conflict would change drastically. The Eisenhower administration initiated American involvement by sending military advisers and then quickly escalating. The use of force was intended to prevent the

Communist regime in Hanoi from controlling the democratic, although corrupt, South Vietnam. In other words, both Eisenhower and Nixon supporting intervention in the conflict in Vietnam, with the single goal of resisting a political ideology, which he thought threatened the liberal order. Similarly, his efforts at regime change in Cuba and Chile were also thwarted.

NOTES

1. Richard Nixon: "The President's News Conference," April 18, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2004>.
2. Leonard Garment held a variety of positions throughout Nixon's tenure in the White House, including "counselor to the president."
3. The letter from Kosygin has been unable to be located at the time of this writing. The context, however, is provided from other documents. It is at the time of this letter that the Nixon administration learns of the strong military support to the Arabs and direct involvement in the peace process on the part of the Soviet Union.
4. This included a possibility of sending observers to monitor the cease-fire at the request of the United Nations secretary general.

Chapter 3

Jimmy Carter

James Earl Carter—“Jimmy”—was born on October 1, 1924, in Plains, Georgia (Bourne, 1997, 20). His mother was a nurse, who worked at the local hospital and paid “an undue concern for the health needs of the black population” in the area (Bourne, 1997, 21). His father was a landowner, who employed many black workers to farm the land and Jimmy was friends with their children. This relationship with the black community was unusual for rural Georgia, at the time, and was formidable for Carter’s future political career.

Carter also learned to be very frugal with money from his father (Bourne, 1997). Where his mother, Lillian, was socially progressive, particularly with race, “[Earl] shared the racist views of others in the community, but was tolerant if not supportive of Lillian’s views” (Bourne, 1997, 26). Earl was a very strict disciplinarian and Jimmy grew to resent his father as much as he loved him. His mother’s compassion for all had a long-lasting and more profound impact on his life. She, along with the local doctor Sam Wise, would offer medical services for free to anyone that could not pay, mostly blacks. Earl discretely covered the cost of any medicine or other direct costs (Bourne, 1997, 28). As a child, Jimmy sold boiled peanuts he cultivated, harvested, cleaned, and prepared himself and, although not particularly religious as a child, took his role in the church seriously (Bourne, 1997). These childhood events set the stage for Jimmy’s future.

Jimmy was a good student and became an avid reader like his mother. For college, he was set on attending the U.S. Naval Academy (Bourne, 1997). His desire to join the Navy came from his uncle who served during World War II and sent Jimmy postcards and gifts from around the world (Bourne, 1997, 44). He first attended Georgia Tech where he was in the Naval ROTC and then the Academy (Bourne, 1997).

He went through elite training to be a submarine officer and graduated third in his class of fifty-two (Bourne, 1997, 65). Always a hard worker, Jimmy quickly rose through the ranks. For Carter, "Pleasure was derived not from relaxation and well-earned lethargy but from a sense of constant accomplishment, whether it involved self-improvement or contribution to the welfare of others" (Bourne, 1997, 65). After his father passed away, he resigned from the Navy and returned to Plains, to run the farm, which had shifted from cotton to primarily peanuts (Bourne, 1997).

Unlike Richard Nixon, whose political roots were in Washington, Carter began at the state level and considered himself a Washington outsider (Carter, 1982; Bourne, 1997). Getting his feet wet in politics, Jimmy was a member of the Lions Club and helped take up efforts for the Georgia Better Hometowns Project, which was a program designed to beautify small towns. He applied to have the roads paved and was able to get enough volunteers to construct a town swimming pool at nearly no cost; he was also able to get a physician back in Plains (Bourne, 1997, 89).

Fully stepping into politics, Carter became a member of the school board in 1956 (Bourne, 1997, 115). He then decided to run for the state Senate, which he lost on the issue of racial integration, along with election corruption. As a man of principle, he challenged the results and successfully claimed the Senate seat (Bourne, 1997). Becoming very well respected, he was voted one of the five most effective senators in Georgia and one of the top thirty-five legislators nationwide (Bourne, 1997, 148). Then, in 1966, he decided to run for Congress (Bourne, 1997). Early in the Congressional election cycle his strong Republican opponent, Bo Callaway, dropped out and opted to run for governor. Jimmy could have run virtually unopposed and easily won the Senate seat but decided instead to run against Callaway for governor. There was a full field of candidates in the Democratic primary and Carter came in third, which resulted in a runoff election and Lester Maddox, a strong segregationist, won the nomination (Bourne, 1997). By running against Callaway for governor instead of claiming the Senate seat is telling of Carter's personality. He ran for office based on principles and refused to take the easy road. Hard work and an unwavering devotion to his values were how he lived his life in business, his personal life, and politics.

After losing the election, Carter embraced his faith and became much more religious through the encouragement of his sister Ruth (Bourne, 1997). Although he felt defeated, he became determined and began working hard to prepare for the 1970 election.

In 1970 Carter again ran for governor of Georgia with a campaign largely emphasizing racial equality and integration. This was not a popular position for a Southern Democrat to hold, but he walked a fine line with supporters on many issues and won the election. Carter's promises to combat racial

inequality were not empty. As stated by Bourne (1997), "At the start of his administration there were only three blacks serving on major state boards and commissions. When he left, there were fifty-three. At this instigation the number of black state employees increased from 4,850 to 6,684" (p. 212). The fight for racial equality is a fight for equal human rights, an issue that would be central to his future tenure in the White House.

In 1972 Carter toyed with national politics in an unsuccessful attempt at joining the Democratic presidential ticket with George McGovern. He was, however, encouraged to start considering his own run for the presidency in 1976 (Bourne, 1997). Specifically, he was approached by Dean Rusk, former secretary of state (Bourne, 1997, 237). This is significant for Carter, because as a state-level politician his weakness was in the area of foreign policy. To start building his credentials he led two trade commissions from Georgia to foreign states. The first delegation, in April 1972, traveled to Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina. Then, in May 1973, he led a trade mission to London, Brussels, West Germany, and Israel (Bourne, 1997, 239). Perhaps the most significant foreign policy experience for Carter was being appointed to the Trilateral Commission, which was created to bring political, business, and academic leaders from Western Europe, Japan, and North America together (Bourne, 1997, 240).

After building a network of contacts and gaining national notoriety, he secured the nomination for president of the United States in 1976. His primary and national campaigns were much more grassroots efforts than Nixon's. His supporters went door to door and were called the Peanut Brigade (Bourne, 1997). Carter worked very hard to make everyone feel like they had a personal connection to him and wanted to be a president that common people could identify with. His accent and mannerisms led the press to characterize him as a hillbilly, but Carter was less concerned about that and more concerned about losing touch with the common people (Bourne, 1997). As stated by Bourne (1997), "Carter campaigned more on his personality and his character than on the issues, relying on his warm smile, his charm and, as he had done in his two gubernatorial races, on the sense of sincerity and integrity that he emanated" (264). Most telling about Carter's character and strong beliefs can be found in his compassion for those that are not treated as equals in society. He worked hard on racial integration, but also focused on the racial bias of the judicial system. While governor, the nanny for Carter's children was a convicted murderer who he believed was falsely convicted because she was black; he commuted her sentence to work at the governor's mansion and then made special arrangements to bring her with him to the White House (Carter, 1982, 32).

Carter truly sought to surround himself with the best advisers, based on their qualification, rather than any political debt he owed them (Carter, 1982;

Bourne, 1997). One of his most important connections was to Andrew Young. Young was a close aid to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., thus providing a strong connection to the black community, giving Carter legitimacy. In the area of foreign policy his connection to Zbigniew Brzezinski was key (Bourne, 1997). Brzezinski was a close and trusted adviser, but a controversial choice. He was described as “aggressive and ambitious, and that on controversial subjects he might be inclined to speak too forcefully” and it was thought that he “might not be adequately deferential to a Secretary of State” (Carter, 1982, 42). On this subject Carter (1982) states, “Knowing Zbig, I realized that some of these assessments were accurate, but they were in accord with what I wanted: the final decision on basic foreign policy would be made by me in the Oval Office, not the State Department” (52). Carter found Brzezinski particularly useful, because he often offered a different perspective. Often Carter and Brzezinski would argue, “disagreeing strongly and fundamentally” (Carter, 1982, 54).

His selection for vice president was also done with thoughtful criteria. He wanted someone that was in the Senate, because they could offer the knowledge of Washington that he lacked; for political reasons, he did not want another southerner. Moreover, Carter wanted someone that would be qualified to fill his place as president, if ever needed. Many southerners still carried resentment of the North from the Civil War. Carter was seen as the Southern president to rejoin the south with the north (Carter, 1982, 22). Walter “Fritz” Mondale was selected to join the ticket (Bourne, 1997). His personal and professional relationship with Mondale was very important while he was in the White House. Unlike most of the presidents before him, Carter treated his vice president as “second in command” and included Mondale in all security briefings and nuclear launch procedures. In addition, he set up Mondale’s office in the West Wing and integrated the staffs (Carter, 1982).

The way Carter utilized his staff was also very different from Nixon. He wanted to have open communication with all of his senior advisers and initially had very little management structure for his administration. Where Nixon wanted his chief of staff to be the gatekeeper of information that flowed to the Oval Office, Carter wanted Hamilton Jordan to coordinate the staff. Carter self-describes his leadership style with his advisers as “collegial” and wanted them to be able to speak as equals (Carter, 1982, 54). In fact, Jordan’s title was “chief staff aid” for the first two and a half years. Carter’s staff and advisers asked for more structure, and he was eventually given the title of “Chief of Staff” (Carter, 1982, 42–44).

Carter was very interested in the details of policy (Jayne, 2016; Aaron, 2017; Gates, 2017; Schechter, 2017). The amount of information Carter wanted, especially at the start of his presidency, was a “nightmare,” according to adviser David Aaron. He went on to say, “You had to be very careful

what you did give him because he would read every word” (Aaron, 2017). According to OMB direction, General Randy Jayne, “He made more decisions in the national security and intelligence space at lower levels than anybody before or since,” with the exception of Johnson, Nixon, and Rusk picking targets in Vietnam. “He wanted to get into the details.” To a level of detail that was below all of his senior advisers and information they believed he didn’t need. It took him much longer to make decisions. Jayne said that the information he was requesting was “how you proved to him that your judgment was based on sound evidence.” As time went on Carter did not request as much detail from certain staff members while being very hard on others (Jayne, 2016; Aaron, 2017).

On foreign policy Carter was committed to the advancement of and protection of human rights. Although a hard-lined academic realist, Brzezinski was supportive of Carter’s agenda to support human rights (Aaron, 2017). Concisely outlining his position on foreign affairs, Carter (1982) states,

I was familiar with the widely accepted arguments that we had to choose between idealism and realism, or between morality and the exertion of power; but I rejected those claims. To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best foundation for the exertion of American Power and influence. (Carter, 1982, 143)

Stated a bit differently, Carter (1982) says, “I was determined to combine support for our more authoritarian allies and friends with the effective promotion of human rights within their countries” (p. 143). This basic set of goals describes Carter’s approach to foreign policy. He was much more optimistic about reaching compromises and did not view other actors as enemies. The hiccup in the human rights part of his policy agenda, however, was that the only actors that cared and could be affected by the administration were friends of the United States, such as South Korea (Gates, 2017).

NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS—SALT II

President Ford unsuccessfully negotiated the SALT II treaty before leaving office and instead of picking up where Ford left off, Carter changed the tune of the negotiations. He switched the goals from “limitation” to “reduction” (Carter, 1982, 216). Carter’s goal was to use SALT II to set the stage for SALT III, which would include more reductions in long-range missiles and unlike SALT I and II would include short-range missiles (Carter, 1982, 216–217). Further complicating the negotiations was the fact that the Soviets

had developed a professional and personal relationship with the Nixon administration negotiators and were now faced with a new administration. Developing trust would prove difficult, and Carter never built the personal relationship with the Soviets that Nixon did (Carter, 1982). The Soviets also had a new leader, Brezhnev, who was very ill; thus he did not develop a personal relationship with Carter and his senior staff did much of the negotiating (Aaron, 2017).

Clearly depicting Carter's sentiments about the importance of the SALT agreements is an excerpt from a speech given to the American Newspaper Publishers on April 25, 1979. He states,

The possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational choice for both sides. . . . We have a common interest in survival, and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other. . . . This effort by two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history; none has ever done this before. . . . SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union. It's an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interests of the United States of America. . . . The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless nuclear weapons competition. That is the choice we face—between an imperfect world with a SALT agreement, or an imperfect and more dangerous world without a SALT agreement. (Carter, 1982, 239)

This speech was also an appeal for support from the American public, who were afraid the SALT agreement would reduce the capabilities and security of the United States.

Despite the complications of verifying compliance on nuclear issues, on June 18, 1979, President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement, which closed loopholes regarding verification of compliance in SALT I and prohibited the deployment of mobile ICBMs or SLCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), flight testing of mobile ICBMs, and established limits on the number of warheads, launches, and new deployment systems (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993, 1485). Specifically, the agreement required the Soviet Union to reduce their launchers by 10 percent, prohibit the encoding of missile test data, and establish that a "five percent modification of major characteristics would constitute a 'new' type of weapon" (Carter, 1982, 238).

The progress made in SALT II was a noble achievement, but SALT III fell apart with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On this David Aaron said, "We were on our way to getting the SALT agreement ratified and the Russians threw it out the window by doing this. I mean it was literally going up to the Senate for a vote when the Russians invaded." This led to Carter getting a "better feeling" of what the Soviets objectives were. The president

then authorized a very aggressive plan to go after the Soviets in Afghanistan, supporting the rebels and using the CIA (Aaron, 2017).

Upon taking office Carter acted “ambivalent” about the Soviet Union, other than wanting to pursue nuclear reductions (Gates, 2017). The invasion of Afghanistan, however, fundamentally shifted Carter’s perception of the Soviets, significantly heightening his perception of threat and viewing them a true potential enemy (Jayne, 2016; Aaron, 2017; Schecter, 2017). Within the administration, Carter’s top security advisers, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cy Vance, had very different policy paths toward the USSR and Carter entertained both sides until the Afghanistan invasion. On this Robert Gates (2017) said,

Brzezinski was tough minded and wanted to push back against Soviet Union all the time. Cy Vance was more into détente and more benign view of the role around the world. Carter waffled between them and never came down hard on one side or the other, until the invasion of Afghanistan, and then he basically came down firmly on Brzezinski’s side. Carter said he learned more about the Soviets in 24 hours than he had in the rest of his presidency, which dismayed Brzezinski.

This depicts a fundamental shift in Carter’s perception of the Soviets and conflict in the system. This, however, was not his only crisis. While various agencies were working to prop up the shah of Iran, the White House was missing a key fact about the shah. On this David Aaron said,

While we were pushing the Shah to squash the rebellion and the White House had no idea that he was dying. The State Department knew, didn’t tell the White House; CIA knew, didn’t tell the White House. Finally, the former head of CIA comes in and tell us. . . . That was certainly one of the biggest intelligence failures we had.

Carter then allowed the shah to come to the United States for medical treatment, when the revolution, led by Ruhollah Khomeini, succeeded in deposing him. Allowing him to come to the United States caused policy problems and cost Carter political capital (Aaron, 2017). This led to the Iran hostage crisis, which began on November 4, 1979, and paralyzed his foreign policy (Gates, 2017). Showing his resolve to use force when necessary, the Iran hostage crisis was the one time in his presidency that military force was a legitimate option, he gave authorization (Aaron, 2017; Gates, 2017). Prior to the military rescue attempt Carter had threatened significant military retaliation on when the revolutionaries were setting up bleachers outside of the embassy, obviously to have a public trial, which the Carter

administration knew would be a sham; the bleachers were taken down (Aaron, 2017).

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan the following month on December 25. Going straight into an election year. The military attempt to rescue the hostages failed, which Carter knew would cost him the presidency (Aaron, 2017). Although he supported efforts to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan, Carter did not have many cards left to play in 1980.

IMAGES IN NUCLEAR TALKS

Carter wanted to move “rapidly—aggressively—on arms control issues with the Soviet Union” (Carter, 1977a, 1). Like Nixon, Carter believed that the United States was in many respects superior in total capability in comparison to the Soviets, but for all intents and purposes the Soviets were perceived as equal due to their nuclear second-strike systems capability (Carter, 1979a, 1978d). Carter stated,

At the present time, my judgment is that we have superior nuclear capability. . . . I think that we are roughly equivalent, even though I think we are superior, in that either the Soviet Union or we could destroy a major part of the other nation if a major attack was made with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 million people if a large exchange was initiated. (Carter, 1979a)

In other words, the absolute power capabilities had reached a point of diminishing returns, because both states had the capability to launch attacks that would inevitably result in greater losses than any leader would deem an acceptable risk. Perhaps due to this level of extreme destructive capability, he did not believe the Soviets were developing any new technology that would increase the level of threat (Carter, E). Carter also believed that the economic power of the United States was a sign of greater strength than the Soviet Union (Carter, 1979d, 1980b).

The acknowledgment of relatively equal capability was significant for the progress of the SALT II agreements. Carter’s goal was to have a reduction in arms, but not at the expense of U.S. military power. Carter’s objective was equality of power to maintain balance, rather than seeking superiority (Carter, 1980c). For Brezhnev, this meant equality in security and the problem became balancing the differences in capabilities to reach parity (Carter, nd b).

Clearly depicting the difference in capability of the two states, Carter said, “We are ahead in warheads, accuracy, ASW and aerial surveillance; and [the Soviets] are ahead in throw weight” (Carter, 1977k). “The President asked whether the Soviets would consider reducing their throw-weight advantage if

we would forego escalating our quality advantage. Dobrynin responded that this might be considered after SALT II. To include this equation in SALT II would make it more complicated, he said” (Carter, 1977b, 3). One of the biggest problems with negotiating to maintain parity was that United States had difficulty telling the difference between the Soviet medium-range mobile missiles, which were intended for defense against China, and the ICBM launches, which were capable of hitting the United States (Carter, 1977b).

Carter was willing to negotiate and compromise, stating, “We are not going to negotiate in such a way that we leave ourselves vulnerable. But if the Soviet Union is willing to meet us halfway in searching for peace and disarmament, we will meet them halfway” (Carter, 1977m); this parity of capability, he believed, was essential for maintaining peace and falling to an inferior status to the Soviets would have been dangerous and destabilizing (Carter, 1979f, 1980d). Thus, Carter was committed to not unilaterally reducing nuclear weapons, but wanted the weapons stocks of both nations to remain balanced while reductions were made (Carter, 1977e,n). In fact, Carter asserted that he “set as our committed long-range goal complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the earth” (Carter, 1977e). In addition to reducing the level of threat between the United States and USSR, Carter believed SALT would lead other states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities (Carter, 1977e). It was important though for the two superpowers to take the first step. Carter said, “We can’t ask the Chinese to do much until we [the Soviet Union and the United States] do” (Carter, 1977a).

Carter’s initial goals were far-reaching and would have had immediate and profound effects. He did not want small reductions; rather, he wanted “drastic reductions” and “strict limitations” (Carter, 1977n). The end goal of eliminating nuclear weapons would represent a substantial reduction in absolute power, a policy, which a realist would not encourage. Speaking of the SALT treaty proposals, Brzezinski said, “If accepted, this proposal would halt the strategic arms race, eliminate insecurity, and make it impossible for either side to seek strategic superiority over the other. It would thus be a driving wedge for a potentially much more cooperative American-Soviet relationship” (Carter, 1977o). The takeaway here is that where Nixon was seeking an agreement to maintain equal capabilities without ending the arms race, Carter wanted to reach parity through reversing the arms race.

The allies in Europe were also important for Carter’s perception of balance of power. He stated, “My guess is and my belief is that without the use of atomic weapons, we have adequate force strength in NATO to stop an invasion from the Warsaw Pact forces” (Carter, 1977w). This suggests that Carter believed the conventional military power of the Western forces were superior to that of the eastern bloc. Nonetheless, the overall destructive power of the two nations and their allies were perceived as relatively

equal, in that both exceeded the capabilities to deliver more damage than would ever be an acceptable risk (Carter, 1978m). Maintaining parity during SALT negotiations was important for European allies and NATO (Carter, 1978p).

Another area where it is apparent Carter is an idealist is his commitment to human rights around the world. At many points this was a hindrance on negotiations with the Soviets. In fact, it was estimated that “by late February [1977], Soviet hopes for quickly restoring the bloom to US-Soviet relations and obtaining a quick SALT agreement probably had begun to fade in the face of the new Administration’s human rights policy and indications of seriously divergent approaches to strategic arms limitations” (Carter, 1977ff).

Despite Brezhnev’s pressures to drop the human rights issue, Carter never backed down and maintained the position that human rights and SALT agreements were not directly linked. Rather he saw human rights as the foundation of his foreign policy, stating,

This administration and I personally, have a commitment to express the basic values of our society as an integral part of our foreign policy. In doing so, we have no intention of singling out any one country, nor do we exempt ourselves from the questions that can and must be raised concerning the fulfillment of basic human rights and the respect for human dignity. Nothing of what we have said or what we will say in the future is intended to detract in the slightest from the seriousness of our commitment to reduce international tensions in general, and in particular to improve prospects for substantial progress toward greater cooperation between our two countries in strengthening the peace and improving the conditions of life for the people of your country and of ours, and of all the world. (Carter, 1977i)¹

According to Robert Gates, Human rights mattered very little in SALT. Carter kept human rights isolated from SALT and was more willing to do that than others in the administration. His big goal was to be much bolder on SALT initially, seeking much deeper cuts, which infuriated the Soviets and ended up building back what was in place with Ford. The human rights agenda influenced the Soviets’ perception of Carter and their refusal to make deeper cuts. In other words, the USSR connected human rights more than Carter to SALT (Gates, 2017).

Carter truly believed this to be a strategic position. He stated, “I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries. . . . I don’t want the two to be tied together” (Carter, 1977e).

The President told Dobrynin that it is not his intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union by making human rights statements. He said he did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union, but that he felt it was necessary for him to express human rights concerns from time to time.

And he further mentioned that it would be helpful with Congress in progressing trade relations if the Soviets would “respond on human rights issues” (Carter, 1977b). In other words, Carter wanted to remain strong on human rights, but it was not intended to be “a precondition to the significant effort we want to undertake to reduce the danger of confrontation and nuclear war” (Carter, 1977l, 5).

The Soviets felt that the human rights issue would make relations worse. As stated later in the memo of conversation,

Dobrynin said that he was concerned that the public debate on this issue would be disadvantageous to both sides. He said he believed that Brezhnev does not want to see the human rights issue become a test of wills between the two countries because then Brezhnev would be “forced to answer.” The President said we will try to be reticent and Dobrynin asked for “quiet diplomacy.” (Carter, 1977b, 8)

With Brezhnev’s continued pressure to drop the human rights issue, it appears that the Soviets followed a policy of “linkage,” similar to what we saw during the Nixon administration. Carter remarked, “I can’t certify to you that there is no linkage in the Soviets’ minds between the human rights effort and the SALT limitations. We have no evidence that this was the case” (Carter, 1977n). However, in a letter to Cy Vance in preparations for a meeting with Brezhnev Carter said, “I want you to preempt [attacks from Brezhnev] by setting SALT in the broad context of our approach to world affairs” (Carter, 1977gg). This seems contradictory to a policy of no “linkage.” This could be an indication that Carter did play to the policy of linkage, at least to some degree; this warrants further future exploration.

Carter may have wanted to keep SALT and human rights separate, but the Soviets did not see it that way and he was unwilling to back down. Thus, the issues seem to have been more intertwined than Carter wanted or was willing to admit. He was almost disturbed by the Soviets linking human rights to other negotiations. Carter stated,

I think that the Soviets’ reaction against me personally on the human rights issue is a misplaced aim. I have no hatred for the Soviet people, and I believe that the pressure of world opinion might be making itself felt on them and perhaps I am kind of a scapegoat for that adverse reaction on their part. But I feel very deeply

that we ought to pursue aggressively this commitment, and I have no second thoughts or hesitation about it. (Carter, 1977v)

Best illustrating the fervor with which he supported human rights is a brief exchange with a reporter:

Q: Mr. Carter, if necessary to achieve any progress, are you willing to modify your human rights statements—

President: No

Q:—or will you continue to speak out?

President: No. I will not modify my human rights statements. My human rights statements are compatible with the consciousness of this country. I think that there has been repeated recognition in international law that verbal statements or any sort of public expression of a nation's beliefs is not an intrusion in another nation's affairs (Carter, 1977n).

The above discussion demonstrates how strongly Carter felt about human rights, which are not directly a security issue. In addition, Carter believed that his position on human rights was consistent with the values of the American people stating,

My stand on human rights is compatible with the strong and proven position taken by almost all Americans. We feel that the right of a human being to be treated fairly in the courts to be removed from the threat of prison, imprisonment without a trial, to have a life to live that's free is very precious. In the past, this deep commitment of the free democracies has quite often not been widely known or accepted or demonstrated. (Carter, 1977q)

In addition, Carter obviously did not consider tensions with the Soviets to be so high that negotiations could potentially provoke conflict, a concern that he did have for Israel and Egypt at Camp David. Carter stated, "The worst that can happen, in my opinion, is a standoff at the present pace of development, which would be very unfortunate. I don't believe that either the Soviet Union or we want to continue this armaments race which is very costly and also increasingly dangerous" (Carter, 1977q). This shows that Carter's perception of the Soviets was that they were not an immediate threat and there was no need for too much concern even if the talks became deadlocked. Further depicting the perception of lack of threat, Carter posited that the Russian troops in Cuba in 1979 did not represent the same threat as 1962 but did shift the status quo power balance of the hemisphere and was thus threatening, to some degree and increased security measures in the region (Carter, 1979e). This small balance instead of responding with a nuclear threat shows

the lower intensity of the situation, even so close to the U.S. borders. As opposed to the expansionist goals of Nixon, Carter said, "I think our absence of desire to control other people around the world gives us a competitive advantage once a new government is established or as they search about for friends. We are better trusted than the Soviet Union" (Carter, 1978d).

Another area that makes it clear Carter felt less of a threat from the Soviets is that the Soviets took a direct role in conflict in Africa while the United States participated in a more hands-off fashion (Carter, 1978a). Instead of responding with increased arms sales to the hurried acquisition of new allies in the area to perfectly balance the Soviets, Carter, the idealist, showed restraint. This is potentially explained by the strong sense of empathy for the Soviet position. He said, "I have spent some time looking at the globe from the Soviet view, and they would appear to be surrounded by enemies—China and Europe. We have no equivalent threat from Canada or Mexico. We have to picture our own proposals in that framework" (Carter, 1977k, 2). By empathizing with the Soviets Carter was able to have understanding, thus reducing fear of the unknown. Essentially summarizing the most important perceptions, Carter states,

We try to pursue peace as the overwhelming sense of our goals with the Soviet Union, and I think that's shared in good faith by President Brezhnev. . . . We want to be friends with the Soviets. We want to improve our relationship with the Soviets. We want to make progress, and I might say we are making progress on a SALT agreement, on a comprehensive test ban agreement, the prohibition against attacks on one another's satellites, the reduction in the level of forces in Eastern and Western Europe, which I've already discussed, and so forth. These discussions, these negotiations, are going along very well. . . . I believe that President Brezhnev wants the same thing I do. He wants peace between our country and theirs. We do, however, stay in a state of competition. This is inevitable. I think it's going to be that way 15, 20 years in the future. We want to have accommodation when we can mutually benefit from that accommodation. We are willing to meet the Soviets in competition of a peaceful nature. . . . There is no present threat to peace. (Carter, 1978q)

In fact, Carter believed that SALT would help build trust between the United States and USSR and if SALT failed he believed the Soviet capabilities and subsequent threat would increase (Carter, 1978v, 1979h).

The takeaway from the discussion above is that Carter certainly held an enemy image of the Soviet Union, viewing them as a potential threat with equal capabilities. This enemy image, however, was much weaker than that held by Nixon. Carter did not believe that the Soviets had harmful intentions and he used empathy to better understand their positions. Where Nixon

viewed every action by the Soviets as requiring a response, Carter was able to operate in the system with the Soviets without always directly interacting with them.

CARTER IN THE MIDDLE EAST—CAMP DAVID

Carter's first trip to Israel was in 1973, while governor of Georgia, by the invitation of then prime minister Golda Meir. During this trip, Carter embraced the opportunity to explore the religious sites, but also to learn about the conflict that plagued the region. He studied the Middle East from a perspective of history and politics, as well as from a biblical perspective (Carter, 1982, 273–274). He believed in the United States' commitment to supporting Israel and stemming, in part, from his belief that the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust had the right to a sovereign nation, in which they could live in peace. He states, "I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teachings of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable" (Carter, 1982, 274). His commitment to equal rights, however, shined through, and he equally believed in the right of non-Christians to have access to the religious sites (Carter, 1982). In addition to supporting Israel on religious grounds, Carter supported the Israeli government as the only democracy in the region and he did not want increased Communist influence from the Soviets. It is important to note that Carter, at this time, had not visited any of the Arab states and had very little knowledge of them (Carter, 1982).

Carter was advised to stay out of the Middle East, but he was committed to exploring new solutions to peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors (Carter, 1982). It is important to understand that the context of the situation was different from that of Nixon, because "Anwar Sadat determined that cooperation with the United States offered greater rewards than collusion with the Soviet Union, and on 15 March 1976, he unilaterally terminated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Egypt" (Nogee and Donaldson, 1982, 315 qtd. from Carter, 1982). Although Carter viewed the Soviets as less of a threat than Nixon, in general, the absence of their involvement is significant. Also of importance is the Israeli's viewed the Soviets as a threat (Aaron, 2017).

Carter (1982) describes his first meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, however, as "a particularly unpleasant surprise" (p. 280).² Carter assumed that the Israelis would be most interested in finding solutions to the conflict and was shocked at how inflexible they were. Balancing the relationship with Israel by ensuring support for their security, while making a commitment to help the Palestinians, and demonstrated by negotiating with the Palestinian

Liberation Organization (PLO), was a precarious situation (Carter, 1982). Carter remained very interested in peacemaking in the Middle East and became frustrated with the Israeli's over settlements (Gates, 2017).

Where his experience with the Israeli leaders was a disappointment, his first meeting with an Arab leader was a rejuvenating experience that gave him hope for finding a solution. Carter (1982) stated, "Then, on April 4, 1977, a shining light burst on the Middle East scene for me. I had my first meetings with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, a man who would change history and whom I would come to admire more than any other leader" (282). As Nixon formed a close personal bond with Soviet leader Brezhnev, Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, became one of Jimmy Carter's best friends. Like Carter, Sadat was eager to find a solution to peace in the region, which would make him unpopular with other Arabs (Carter, 1982).

Carter had a meeting with all of the Arab leaders, in order to understand all sides of the disagreements. The main negotiations, however, were between Israel and Egypt. Sadat began directly negotiating with Prime Minister Begin, but any hope for progress was put to an end. When Sadat accepted compromises proposed by Israel Begin backtracked and became more hard-lined (Carter, 1982). With the negotiations deadlocked Carter proposed to act as the arbitrator and host the meeting at Camp David (Carter, 1982).

The Camp David Talks and Accords took place from September 7 to 17, 1978 (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1993). These thirteen days finally produced a document with promises of compromise from Israel on the status of non-Jewish citizens and its territory. This was the most progress made on the Middle East, although Israel did not uphold their end of the agreement.

The Soviets were essentially insignificant to the negotiations, as they were no longer in Egypt. Their reason for their departure is not well known or documented. Randy Jayne believes the Soviets were "mortally embarrassed" by the 1968 and 1973 wars. The "top of the line" Soviet equipment was defeated by the Israelis, so with failing at their objectives they left (Jayne, 2016). David Aaron said that "it was all Sadat, not Kissinger or anyone else," and hypothesizes that it was that the Soviets had nothing to offer. They had failed at helping them reclaim the Sinai and they didn't offer economic progress (Aaron, 2017).

CAMP DAVID

The Carter administration did not hold many firm positions on the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The issue of Palestinians was a secondary issue, and Carter was more interested in peace between Israelis and Egyptians (Gates, 2017). Carter did, however, care about the Palestinians as far as

human rights was concerned, and they were not simply a pawn on the chessboard (Aaron, 2017). On this, David Aaron (2017) said,

I would say his concern about the Palestinians was a human rights concern and I think he believed he thought it was not possible to have an enduring agreement without recognition and something for the Palestinians. Carter believes they are an occupied people [and the Egyptians felt the same way].

Believing that the issue needed to be settled between the two parties involved and not external forces, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, Carter was flexible in many aspects of the peace agreement (Carter, 1977p,cc, 1978e). He did not pressure Begin and let Sadat make the moves (Aaron, 2017). Carter, however, was deeply committed to bringing a peace agreement to fruition. He stated,

Let me say that our determination to bring about progress in the Middle East is as fervent as it has ever been. We're not going to slacken our effort. I'm convinced that the Congress and the American people can have their commitment to a peaceful settlement aroused even more than has been the case in the past. (Carter, 1977aa)

In this commitment to finding peace Carter was supportive of not only the Israelis but also the Palestinians. He wanted to see recognition of the Palestinian homeland but did not advocate for an independent Palestinian state (Carter, 1977r). Further supporting this position, Carter asserted that Israeli settlements were illegal (Carter, 1977g, 1978c,e). He stated,

We don't back any Israeli military settlements in the Gaza strip or on the West Bank. We favor, as you know a Palestinian homeland or entity there. Our preference is that this entity be tied in to Jordan and not be a separate and independent nation. That is merely an expression of preference which we have relayed on numerous occasions to the Arab leaders. (Carter, 1977ff)

Because Carter felt that any long-lasting settlement would have to be created and agreed upon by the Israelis and Arabs, he saw the role of the United States as simply a mediator and there was a lack of direct U.S. influence (Carter, 1977t, 1978b,c,h,u, nd a, 1979f, 1980a). Carter stated, "We have no control over anyone in the Middle East and do not want any control over anyone in the Middle East" (Carter, 1977u). This lack of influence, however, was not due to a lack of possibility to influence the actors. Carter stated, "Obviously we could exert pressure on Israel in other ways, but I have no intention to do so" (Carter, 1977z). Further, "We have no control over any nation in the Middle East. . . . I

think it's much more important to have direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel than to have us acting as a constant, dominant intermediary" (Carter, 1977dd). Thus, Carter's goal was to balance support for both the Israeli and Arab positions (Carter, 1977x). It is also important to note that he perceives the negotiations and the involved actors as an opportunity more than a threat.

Carter was adamant that there was no "linkage" between the conflict in the Middle East and negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but he did recognize that the involvement of the Soviets created a national security interest for the United States in the region (Carter, 1977bb, 1978n). Perhaps Carter was able to more or less dismiss the role of the Soviets in the context of the Middle East peace agreements, because this feeling was supported by Egypt and Israel. In a memo to the president, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance says, "Both Egypt and Israel believe that Syria and the Soviet Union can be ignored at present" (Carter, nd c). Being that Carter felt the negotiations needed to be worked out between Israel and the Arabs, he went along with their position that the Soviets did not need to be involved. On the relationship to security, David Aaron said,

On Israel, "I wouldn't put it as balance of power and security, but I would put it as security. I think felt if he could resolve the problem we would have a more stable Middle East, more secure economic environment for oil coming out of the Middle East, we would keep the Russians out . . . all in all a blow for peace." (Aaron, 2017)

The Soviets, however, certainly did not like being left out. Carter and Brezhnev exchanged a series of letters concerning the Israeli–Egyptian peace negotiations (Carter, nd e). Brezhnev expresses will and need to work with United States on the Middle East and other international issues, including European Security (Carter, 1977d). Brezhnev states, "You undoubtedly have great capabilities in restraining Israel from any sort of action which may lead only to an even greater exacerbation of the situation in Lebanon" (Carter, 1978t). Cooperation between the United States and USSR in the Middle East will reduce tensions there (Carter, 1977h).

He, however, did not believe the Soviet influence was all bad and did not necessarily view them as a direct threat. He stated, "Well, I think that we or the Soviets ought to play a constructive role. And I think that both of us will. . . . I don't think they are trying to be an obstacle to peace. Their perspective is just different from ours" (Carter, 1977dd). There was even consideration of a U.S.-Soviet settlement for the Palestinians where the Soviets control the Syrians (Carter, 1978f).

This clearly shows that Carter's perception of threat from the Soviets was far weaker than Nixon's perspective. But, Carter also obviously believes it

is important to have equal relations with nations in the region and not let the Soviets have a monopoly of allies. He stated,

I think it is very good for nations to turn to use for their security needs, instead of having to turn to the Soviet Union as they have in the past. I'm talking specifically about Egypt. And you have to remember that Saudi Arabia has never had any aggression against Israel. Saudi Arabia is our ally and friend. Egypt is our ally and friend. Israel is our ally and friend. To maintain security in the region is important. Egypt has other threats against its security. The Soviets are shipping massive quantities of weapons into the Middle Eastern area now, into the Red Sea area—Ethiopia, into Syria, Iraq, Libya—and we cannot abandon our own friends. So, I don't think that it's wrong at all to ensure stability or the right to defend themselves [the Arabs], in the region with arms sales. (Carter, 1978g)

This also shows that Carter feels the Arab states present an opportunity for the United States, rather than a threat.

Arms sales to the Arab nations, particularly Egypt, did not sit well with the Israelis. In an interview President Carter was asked, "A number of Israeli leader's in private say that you have made drastic changes in America's attitude toward Israel and that they regard you with considerable trepidation. Are you aware of that feeling, and do you think there is justification for it." He responded,

Yes, I'm aware of that feeling and also many other feelings. There's no single attitude among all Jews in the world or all Israeli citizens. To the extent that Israeli leaders genuinely want a peace settlement, I think that they have to agree that there will be an acceptance of genuine peace on the part of the Arabs, an adjustment of boundaries in the Middle East which are secure for the Israelis and also satisfy the minimum requirements of the Arab neighbors and United Nations resolutions, and some solution to the question of the enormous numbers of Palestinian refugees who have been forced out of their homes and who want to have some fair treatment. (Carter, 1977y)

One of Carter's reasons for supporting the Arabs militarily is because he recognized the superior power of the Israelis (Carter, 1978j, 1978l). He also, however, viewed the Israeli's as "fundamentally intransigent and not appreciating their own self-interest" (Aaron, 2017). Carter stated,

[The proposed arms deal] is a very well-balanced package. It emphasizes our interest in military security of the Middle East. It does not change at all the fact that Israel still retains a predominant air capability and military capability. There is no threat to their security. But it also lets the nations involved and the world

know that our friendship, our partnership, our sharing of military equipment with the moderate Arab nations is an important permanent factor of our foreign policy. (Carter, 1878j,l)

In specific, he believed that Anwar Sadat had the intention of negotiating to reach peace (Carter, 1977dd). This strong support for the Arabs in opposition to Israel's will was unprecedented and shows Carter's commitment to advancing human rights, here specifically the Palestinians. He did not view them as a threat and did not allow the Israeli government to convince him otherwise. It should be understood, however, that Carter developed a close personal relationship with Anwar Sadat, which would influence his perception of the conflict. Depicting this friendship, Sadat addressed letters in the form: "Dear friend Jimmy" (Carter, nd f).

In addition, the Carter administration believed that Sadat wanted a peace settlement, but were uncertain if Begin did. They were committed to working with Sadat, because the United States needed a settlement in the region (Carter, nd). This appears to have been a correct perception. The brief dialogue below between Israeli defense minister Dayan and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat depicts the Israeli position and negotiating method (Carter, 1978f).

Dayan: Settlements of no significance

Sadat: Can't afford to have any Settlements on my land

Dayan: I understand

This shows that the Israelis were not at all sympathetic to the Egyptian position or their concerns. Brzezinski believed that Begin could have desired for Carter and Sadat to fail in the Camp David negotiations, to weak the leaders and leave him in the "tolerable status quo" (Carter, 1978o).

After Camp David, Sadat sent Begin a letter over nine-pages long, reaffirming his commitment to peace and asking to bring the negotiated terms to fruition with a set timeline. Begin responded in just over one page of writing, did not answer Sadat's questions, and requested that the terms be worked out at a lower level (Carter, nd a). Sadat fervently tried to reach a successful peace agreement and showed respect to the Israeli leadership. Unfortunately, this sentiment was not reciprocated. This did not sit well with Carter and he was not necessarily quiet about it. In a meeting with Sadat Carter communicated that Begin had been "unpleasant, interrupting," in an earlier meeting, but that moderates convinced him to "be more accommodating" (Carter, 1979b).

As an optimist, Carter looked for positive actions and felt that Begin had shown willingness to work with the Egyptians when he visited Cairo and left his car to walk into the crowd of people (Carter, 1979c).

Carter did not see support for Israel and working with the Arabs, with the intention of seeking compromise, to be incompatible. He stated, “And I believe the American people are deeply committed to two things: One is the security of Israel under any circumstance, and secondly, the achievement of comprehensive peace” (Carter, 1978). He recognized, however, that initiating dialogue between the Israelis and the Egyptians could be the catalyst for renewed conflict if the negotiations failed. He stated, “I pray and hope the whole nation, the whole world will pray that we do not fail, because failure could result in a new conflict in the Middle East which could severely damage the security of our own country” (Carter, 1978n). This demonstrates the risk he felt he was taking by starting the negotiations.

Although Carter believed the Israeli settlements were illegal and supported the rights of the Palestinians, he respected the historical relationship between Israel and the United States. He stated, “The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it’s derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace” (Carter, 1977s). In addition, Carter believed that the relationship between the United States and Israel was “founded on public opinion in the broadest sense” (Carter, 1980e). Further, Carter recognized weight of Zionist lobby (Carter, 1978f). Thus, for personal and political reasons, Carter did maintain support for Israel, and it was just not the unconditional support Israel was used to. In general, the Israeli community did not trust Carter (Aaron, 2017). The Israel Lobby made many personal attacks on Deputy National Security Adviser David Aaron, which Begin publicly denounced, but in general they were “sidelined” during the Camp David negotiations (Aaron, 2017).

Both the Arab states and Israel, for Carter, represent opportunity for a better world community and the opportunity for peace, but also represent a threat that if conflict breaks out again there will be more insecurity in the world. In addition, Carter has much respect for both nations and the best image theory descriptor for both is dependent/ally and is consistent with his role as a strong mediator in the Camp David Accords.

SOURCE OF CONFLICT

Like Nixon, Carter viewed the source of conflict and the path to peace as dependent upon individual decision-makers. Randy Jayne said, “Carter believed the conflict [with the Soviets] was defined by a difference in ideology” (Jayne, 2016).

Carter wrote to Brezhnev,

I am very pleased that our initial exchange of letters has led us immediately into an examination of the central issues of world peace. Our two great countries share a special responsibility to do what we can, not just to reduce tensions but to create a series of understandings that can lead to a more secure and less dangerous world political climate. (Carter, 1977f)³

This shows the emphasis placed on the actions of individual countries, which he attributes to the leaders. Brezhnev felt the same way. In a memorandum of conversation, Carter said,

In this private meeting Brezhnev wanted to present some additional thoughts. It was his view that the most important element that should determine the relations between the two countries, the ultimate objective here, as it were, was to establish the kind of level of mutual understanding and confidence that would completely rule out the possibility of war breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States; and, even more, to create the kind of relationship that would bring about an understanding that in the event of attack on either of the two countries by a third nuclear power, or in the event of the threat of such an attack, the Soviet Union and the United States would join forces in repelling the aggressor. (Carter, 1979g)

This is important, because it could signal that the perception of peace and path to conflict for Nixon and Carter could have been, at least to some degree, a response or building on the perceptions of the Soviets.

This perception is not limited to relations with the Soviets. Carter attributes improving understanding and relations to Sadat and Begin (Carter, 1078r). Thus, the source of conflict in the Arab-Israeli conflict was also the individuals in power.

Carter was certainly aware of constraints on all nations from their domestic political systems, namely the legislatures. He was also very much aware of the role of the United States and others in the context of the international system. It was, however, for Carter and Nixon, individuals that determined the effects of these other influences.

INTERPRETING OPCODE

The scores calculated by VICS in table 3.1 represent the OpCode of Jimmy Carter in the context of the SALT agreements with the Soviet Union. Like Nixon, Carter views the nature of the political universe to be friendly (P-1) and that cooperation is possible and the best approach to negotiating with

Table 3.1

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.42 (Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.22 (Somewhat Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.11 (Very Low)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.28 (Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.97 (Very High)
	Choice and Shift Propensities	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.47 (Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.20 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.20 (Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.53 (Medium)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.49 (Medium)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.15 (Medium)
	(b) Promise	0.06 (Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.53 (Very High)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.14 (Medium)
	(e) Threaten	0.03 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.10 (Low)

the Soviets (I-1). Carter believed that by the two superpowers working together, there would be the best chance at maintaining peace throughout the world.

OpCode SALT

In addition, with scores nearly identical to Nixon's, Carter is somewhat optimistic in realizing his political goals (P-2), does not believe the future is predictable (P-3) or that he has much control over historical development, and believes that the outcome of decisions involved a very high degree of chance (P-5). Carter felt that both the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiating from positions of relatively equal power, at least in respect to nuclear destructive capability, and thus had to rely on one another to make progress in the SALT negotiations. This is depicted by Carter discussing the deadlock in negotiations when neither side agrees with the others' position or proposal (Carter, 1977n).

Also, like Nixon, Carter was cooperative in his pursuit of goals (I-2), had a low acceptance of risk (I-3), and was moderately flexible in tactics (I-4). The difference, however, is the intentions of flexibility and compromise. Where Nixon wanted to show compromise and flexibility by first creating things, such as ABM, to negotiate with, Carter saw compromise and flexibility as the path to a successful negotiation. He was happy to negotiate as equals and did

not try to undermine the Soviets, but he expected them to meet him equally as well. It is apparent from the discussion in the previous section that Carter felt no immediate threat from the Soviets and believed that they shared the same goal as his administration, but simply had a different perspective.

The utility of means (I-5) demonstrates Carter's belief in the success of specific tactics. Nearly identical to Nixon, with an extremely high score of 0.53 for statements of appeal and support, this is his preferred tactic. This means that Carter believes that making appeals for reaching a SALT agreement and making statements supporting the progress on the part of the Soviet Union, the goal is more likely to be achieved.

OpCode Middle East

The OpCode for Jimmy Carter in the context of Middle East peace agreements are depicted in table 3.2. As expected, the OpCode values essentially match the scores of the SALT OpCode, meaning that Carter's perception of the decision-making framework in the context of SALT and Camp David are similar. Although the Soviets did not actively participate in the Camp David Accords, their influence was recognized within the larger context of the Middle Eastern conflict.

The first significant change in score is "predictability of political future" (P-3), which shifts from very low to low. This is consistent with Carter's

Table 3.2

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.57 (Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.25 (Somewhat Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.22 (Low)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.29 (Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.94 (Very High)
	Choice and Shift Propensities	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.66 (Very Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.26 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.32 (Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.34 (Medium/Low)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.31 (Medium/Low)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.09 (Low)
	(b) Promise	0.10 (Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.64 (Very High)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.08 (Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.03 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.07 (Low)

strategy of only playing the role of mediator in the negotiations between Begin and Sadat. Because of this, the outcome was entirely dependent upon two external parties. In the SALT negotiations, he at least was a major actor, thus providing slightly more influence in the outcome.

The next significant shift is “strategic approach to goals” (I-1) shifts from definitely to very cooperative. This is consistent with the flexibility and cooperation that he actively encouraged. He stated, “Compromises will be mandatory . . . flexibility will be the essence of our hopes” (Carter, 1978s). He was willing to compromise on the specifics of the negotiations (Carter, 1977j). He believed that the solution had to come from the Egyptians and Israelis and not an external force; therefore, he was even more open than in SALT.

The next significant shift is a change in the utility of “reward,” which shifts from medium (0.15) to low (0.09). This could be interpreted from multiple perspectives. First, Carter uses a hands-off policy in the peace negotiations, and thus he has no rewards to offer. Another possible way to interpret this is that Carter does not want to reward the behavior of Israel. He was a strong voice calling the Israeli settlements illegal and advocating they retreat to at least the 1967 borders.

The next significant shift is the utility of “oppose/resist,” which shifts from medium to low. This also coincides with Carter’s hands-off policy in Camp David and the subsequent effect of being extremely flexible. His goal was for the Israelis and Egyptians to make the peace treaty on their own. He believed this would have the best chance at a long-term effect. For this reason, he was open to any and all suggestions by either party.

CARTER THE DEFENSIVE REALIST

Carter’s actions on human rights, namely keeping the issue as a priority despite the increased tensions with the Soviets and possibility of harming SALT negotiations, are consistent with Zakaria (1998) who posits that more powerful states can sometimes pursue objectives other than security interests. The pursuit of humanitarian rights, however, is not enough to label Carter an idealist. Although a central foreign policy goal, they did not interfere with negotiations with the Soviets and Carter had no intention of altering the international system.

In addition, Carter’s hands-off mediating style and reliance on the Israelis and Egyptians to follow through on the peace agreement may have been the reason they were not realized (Carter, 1978w). This may have been naive trust, but is not political idealism.

Further depicting the difference between Carter and Nixon is their role in developing world conflicts. Carter stated,

I intend to proceed vigorously in an attempt to reduce the sale or transfer of conventional arms to the third world and home that you will join in this effort. It seems to me that this is a senseless competition and we, as major suppliers, have a particular responsibility to put limits on such transfers. Obviously other suppliers should be involved in such an effort and we will broaden the discussion to include them. (Carter, 1977f)

Thus, Carter was more concerned with reducing conflict than building additional allies in the global south. Carter was not interested in expansion and was only interested in reducing the level of arms in parity with the Soviets. In other words, he saw aggression as a possibility, but the level of destructive power was unnecessary to maintain the status quo.

Carter believed in minimal deterrence and feared the mere existence of nuclear weapons, believing a catastrophic accident could happen (Jayne, 2016; Aaron, 2017). Prior to the inauguration, in a meeting on national security, president-elect Carter said, "Why don't we have like 200 missiles on submarines. Isn't that enough," and that was the beginning of the perception that he was weak on security (Aaron, 2017). A policy depicting this was the cancelation of the B-1 bomber program, believing that nuclear deterrence will be more effective if we have a stronger ICBM and Navy SLBM programs. Carter's view of deterrence went beyond simple balance of power, but extended to credibility and diplomacy (Jayne, 2016). Carter, however, should not be thought of as a complete pacifist and gun-shy. On the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, Carter said to David Aaron, the assistant national security adviser, "You know, I would use nuclear weapons to defend Germany, but Schmidt would never let me" (Aaron, 2016). David Aaron (2017) said, Carter held the "speak softly and carry a big stick mentality."

In the SALT negotiations, "The President asked for an analysis of an ultimate relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which would include profound mutual reductions in overall strategic nuclear capability, carefully monitored, which would not be unfavorable to either side. He indicated his desire to go as low as possible while still retaining an adequate deterrent capability. He suggested the possibility of including, at a later date, France and the PRC in mutual program reeducations" (Carter, 1977c). The goal of reduction of nuclear weapons, in parity, is consistent with defensive realism.

Sounding more like a realist, Carter posited, if the Soviets do not "negotiate in good faith" he would "reassess the strategic arms race, which means

continuing it with no end in sight” (Carter, 1977c). The power of the negotiations was certainly placed in the individual and indicates that Carter was willing to pursue more realist policy, if necessary. Further examination of Carter’s policy in other areas of interest, such as Afghanistan and Iran, may shed light on what is necessary and sufficient for idealist behavior and when realist behavior is more readily used, which would build on Zakaria (1998).

To simply summarize Jimmy Carter, in comparison to Richard Nixon, David Aaron said, “I think there’s a personality difference here. Carter really saw himself as a man of peace and I think Nixon saw himself as a world leader of power. He was very obsessed with demonstrating American power and his power” (Aaron, 2017). President Carter was not interested in blustering and aggressive foreign policy that could increase tensions and lead to conflict. Rather, he protected American security by promoting strong deterrent capabilities, both militarily and diplomatically. The avoidance of conflict and search for peace, through the use of strong deterrence, makes Jimmy Carter a defensive realist, although he certainly retains a streak of idealism with human rights.

NOTES

1. It is unclear if this letter was sent or was a draft. Nonetheless it provides an insight into Carter’s true perspective.
2. Rabin was replaced by Begin after Rabin was forced to resign from office for holding a U.S. bank account.
3. It is unclear whether or not his text was included in the final letter sent to Brezhnev, but these notes from Carter, nonetheless, help to show the emphasis he placed on the individual.

Chapter 4

George W. Bush

George W. Bush explicitly believes in a black-and-white moral code. He states,

Some people think it's inappropriate to make moral judgements anymore. Not me. Because for our children to have the kind of life we want for them, they must learn to say yes to responsibility, yes to family, yes to honesty and workand no to drugs, no to violence, no to promiscuity or having babies out of wedlock. (Bush, 1999, 11)

Much of his morality is derived from religion and the teachings of prominent religious faith leaders.

Bush's morality intersects with a strong belief in and respect for the system and order of the legal system. This is depicted in his handling of two specific death penalty cases while governor, Karla Faye Tucker and Henry Lee Lucas. Tucker admitted to committing a brutal murder, but while in prison had found religion and morality. She worked to reform the lives of other prisoners and expressed remorse for her crime. Bush believed she was legitimately a changed individual. On the other side of the spectrum, Lucas was a remorseless with an extensive criminal record. There were also doubts as to the legitimacy of his confession to the crime for which he received the death penalty. Morally, Bush believed Karla Faye Tucker was a good person and believed that Henry Less Lucas was a bad person. However, with not only moral and emotional reasons to spare the life of Tucker and no legal precedent, Bush allowed her execution to be carried out. With levels of doubt in the case of Lucas, Bush commuted his sentence. Bush struggled with the conflict of religious morality and the morality of carrying out his legal duties as governor of Texas.

Although he attended a well renowned preparatory school, Andover, formal educational learning did not come easily for Bush. He admits that he struggled in school, particularly with English (Bush, 1999, 20). This experience, along with his wife being a librarian, would significantly influence his goals in education reform.

Despite his academic lacking, he attended Yale, Bush was a member of the DKE fraternity and the secret Skull and Bones society. In addition, he played baseball and rugby (Bush, 1999, 47). During this time, he also joined the Air National Guard and was a fighter pilot.

After Yale, Bush attended Harvard Business School before entering the oil industry, founding companies Arbusto Energy and then Bush Exploration. He is deeply committed to free-market capitalism on the global stage, believing that tariffs are detrimental, even when prices fall due to foreign markets (Bush, 1999). It was in the oil industry that Bush developed his management style. He said,

I had decided I wanted a flat organizational chart rather than the traditional chief-of-staff approach; I wanted the senior managers of different divisions in my office to report directly to me, instead of working through a chief of staff. I like to get information from a lot of different people, plus I knew that high-powered people would be frustrated unless they had direct access to the boss. I had seen that problem in my dad's administration. Key members of his staff had felt stifled because they had to go through a filter to get information to the President. I did not want to replicate that environment. (Bush, 1999, 97)

In addition, he liked to have analysis from his advisers presented through their own words, rather than what was simply in reports. He said,

When state agency directors come in to brief me on a subject, they sometimes bring prepared notebooks and try to flip through them, reading out loud, page by page. I've usually already read the briefing books. I've been known to ask the directors to close the book and tell me in their own words what is really important, what they recommend and why. (Bush, 1999, 103)

It is a common perception that George W. Bush's political career began with his father's campaign and administration, but he actually played a very small roll. According to Bush, his role in the campaign was protecting his father personally, and he became involved in managing the media, which led him to become untrusting of the media (Bush, 1999).

Bush's book *A Charge to Keep* is viewed as the book that told the American people who Bush was as a person and his political agenda. Most obvious is that Bush's interest, knowledge, and strengths were in domestic

policy. He intended to be a domestic policy president. The events of 9/11 would change that.

9/11 AND AFGHANISTAN

George W. Bush's political agenda was instantly changed with the events on September 11, 2001. The former governor, focused on education reform, was now destined to be a foreign policy president. After receiving news of the attack while reading to a classroom of children in Sarasota, Florida, the president's first words to the nation were at 9:30 a.m. He said,

I have spoken to the Vice President, to the Governor of New York, to the Director of the FBI and have ordered that the full resources of the Federal Government go to help the victims and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our Nation will not stand. (Bush, 2001b)

This statement is one of strength and confidence that America will prevail and not be defeated. It is also the first acknowledgment of non-state actors being a significant threat to the world's hegemonic power, the United States.

Five hours later, speaking from an Air Force Base, Bush's perception of the attack is not just an attack on the United States, but an attack on American ideals, namely freedom and democracy. He states, "Freedom, itself, was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be defended. . . . The resolve of our great Nation is being tested. But make no mistake: We will show the world that we will pass this test" (Bush, 2001c). He reemphasizes this in his address to the nation at 8:30:

Good evening. Today our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. . . . America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. (Bush, 2001c)

These statements depict the full perception of threat, sharing both similarities and differences with the Cold War enemy. The threat posed by the terrorists of 9/11 is similar to the perceived threat of communism during the Cold War, in that it is a threat on ideals. Just as communism posed a threat to the spread of democracy and the new liberal world order, the ideology of radical Islamic terrorists threatened the core values of the United States. As stated by General Randy Jayne, "The perception of threat in the global war

on terror is a much murkier, less focused, harder to get your arms around . . . and that we've seen many examples of significant government overreaction to the emotional side of that," rather than a straight forward and obvious threat like the USSR (Jayne, 2016). The image differs from the Cold War enemy due to the weak capabilities of al-Qaeda, compared to the strength of the U.S. military. Moreover, Bush viewed the terrorists as cowardly and weak-willed. In addition, he believes that the conflict is between right and wrong, good and evil. The United States, freedom, and democracy are good. The terrorists are evil. This image of that of the barbarian. Depicting the full image, Bush said,

The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won't be able to run for cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide, but it won't be able to hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe, but they won't be safe forever. This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient; we will be focused; and we will be steadfast in our determination. . . . America is united. The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail. (Bush, 2001d)

These statements clearly depict the perceptions of source of threat and direction of the threat. The source is non-state actors, who he says hate the values and ideals of the United States, democracy and freedom. The attack on democracy and freedom is the direction and intent of the attackers. He stands firm that the United States is physically going to remain strong and views the terrorists with a degenerate image. He perceives them as a threat to the United States, but their capabilities and willpower are weak. The perception of weak willpower is evident by his statements that the attackers are "cowards" and "hiding." He also acknowledges that the attack was a major blow to the country, both in the emotion of fear, physical destruction of a city, and significant economic impact.

At this time, Bush also lays out what would become known as the Bush doctrine; any state that supports or harbors terrorists would be considered complicit in the acts of the terrorists. He said,

[Other nations] understand, fully understand that an act of war was declared on the United States of America. They understand, as well, that that act could have as easily been declared on them, that these people can't stand freedom; they hate our values; they hate what America stands for. Many of the leaders understand it could have easily have happened to them. Secondly, they understand that, unlike previous war, this enemy likes to hide. They heard my call loud and clear, to those who feel like they can provide safe harbor for the terrorists, that we will hold them responsible as well. And they join me in understanding not only the concept of the enemy but that the enemy is a different type of enemy. They join me also in solidarity about holding those who fund them, who harbor them, who encourage them responsible for their activities. (Bush, 2001e)

This statement shows that in Bush's mind the attack on 9/11 was not only an attack on the United States but an attack on the new liberal world order. He viewed this as an international crisis that all nations should join to combat and if they did not they would be viewed as supportive of those acts.

George W. Bush also emphasizes the changing nature of the enemy and battlefield. He said,

Good morning. This weekend I am engaged in extensive sessions with members of my National Security Council, as we plan a comprehensive assault on terrorism. This will be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy.

This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they are invisible. Yet, they are mistaken. They will be exposed, and they will discover what others in the past have learned: Those who make war against the United States have chosen their own destruction.

Victory against terrorism will not take place in a single battle but in a series of decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them. We are planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism. And we are determined to see this conflict through. Americans of every faith and background are committed to this goal. (Bush, 2001f)

This shows the changing source of threat in the post-Cold War era. The enemy is not state actors that would fight in uniforms on defined battle lines over power and resource acquisition. This enemy was defined by Bush as freedom and democracy hating individuals. The purpose of their attacks was to prevent the spread of democracy. This is similar to the ideologically driven Cold War with the Soviet Union, but this enemy did not follow the traditional rules of international politics. They were not deterred by the nuclear power of

the United States, because they had no base for us to blow off the face of the earth, without attacking civilians and state actors that are unaffiliated with the organization. The rules of foreign policy and defense had changed. The actors who posed a threat to the United States had changed and the tactics used to combat them would be required to change. Bush acknowledged this war was not traditional and could take an extended period of time. He said,

I think that this is a longterm battle—war. There will be battles. But this is long-term. After all, our mission is not just Usama bin Laden, the Al Qaida organization. Our mission is to battle terrorism and to join with freedom-loving people. We are putting together a coalition that is a coalition dedicated to declaring to the world, we will do what it takes to find the terrorists, to rout them out, and to hold them accountable. And the United States is proud to lead the coalition. (Bush, 2001g)

Bush's objective in Afghanistan went beyond defeating al-Qaeda militarily. It was also a mission of demonstrating the kindness of the United States and highlighting what democracy and freedom offer. He said, "The oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan" (Bush, 2001h). Bush views the United States as the leader of the free world and feels a responsibility for the country to uphold, as well as spread, these values. He says, "We did not ask for this mission, but we will fulfill it. The name of today's military operation is Enduring Freedom. We defend not only our precious freedoms but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear" (Bush, 2001h).

Bush was determined to destroy terrorism and believed it was vital to securing the future of freedom and democracy at home and abroad. He said,

People often ask me, how long will this last? This particular battlefield will last as long as it takes to bring Al Qaida to justice. It may happen tomorrow; it may happen a month from now; it may take a year or 2. But we will prevail. And what the American people need to know is what our allies know: I am determined to stay the course. And we must do so. We must do so. We must rid the world of terrorists so our children and grandchildren can grow up in freedom. It is essential. It is now our time to act, and I'm proud to lead a country that understands that. (Bush, 2001i)

What this also reveals is that Bush did not have a clear operational goal, objective, or time line. The goal was very broad, to eradicate terrorism. In

this case, his belief in protecting democracy and his perception of democratic values took precedence over methodical foreign policy. At this time, he is also making connections to Iraq stating,

You mentioned Iraq. There's no question that the leader of Iraq is an evil man. After all, he gassed his own people. We know he's been developing weapons of mass destruction. And I think it's in his advantage to allow inspectors back in his country to make sure that he's conforming to the agreement he made, after he was soundly trounced in the Gulf war. And so we're watching him very carefully. We're watching him carefully. (Bush, 2001j)

This is important, because Iraq will soon be labeled part of the “axis of evil,” viewed as antagonistic to the liberal world order and a threat to democratic expansion, which Bush associated directly with supporting and harboring terrorists. When this image of Iraq comes to full fruition, Bush makes no distinction between Iraq and al-Qaeda in image.

With the mission in Afghanistan, Bush was not just concerned about the military objective. When asked about nation-building and the possibility of American troops being in Afghanistan for an extended period of time he said,

I think we did learn a lesson, however, from—and should learn a lesson from the previous engagement in the Afghan area, that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved. That's why—and I sent that signal by announcing that we're going to spend \$320 million of aid to the Afghan people. That's up from roughly \$170 million this year. (Bush, 2001j)

On the issue of the capture of Osama bin Laden and the destruction of the al-Qaeda organization Bush had no mindset of negotiation or compromise with the Taliban, highlighting how he did not respect the sovereignty of Afghanistan or the legitimacy of the Taliban regime. This is best depicted in an exchange with a reporter:

Q. Mr. President, there's a new offer from the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. What's your response to that, sir?

The President. Turn him over. Turn him over; turn his cohorts over; turn any hostages they hold over; destroy all the terrorist camps. There's no need to negotiate. There's no discussions. I told them exactly what they need to do. And there's no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he's guilty. Turn him over. If they want us to stop our military operations, they've just got to meet my conditions. Now, when I said no negotiation, I meant no negotiation.

Q. You reject his offer?

The President. I don't know what the offer is. All they've got to do is turn him over, and his colleagues and the stocks he hides, as well as destroy his camps, and the innocent people being held hostage in Afghanistan.

Q. They want you to stop the bombing and see evidence.

The President. There's no negotiation—they must have not heard—there's no negotiation. This is nonnegotiable. These people, if they're interested in us stopping our military operations—we will do so if they meet the conditions that I outlined in my speech to the United States Congress. It's as simple as that. There's nothing to negotiate about. They're harboring a terrorist, and they need to turn him over—and not only turn him over, turn the Al Qaida organization over, destroy all the terrorist camps—actually, we're doing a pretty good job of that right now—and release the hostages they hold. That's all they've got to do, but there is no negotiation, period. (Bush, 2001k)

The issue of immigration is another area of policy that depicts the new post-Cold War source of threat. When asked about changes in immigration policy and the connection of immigrants to the 9/11 attacks Bush said,

Well, first, I—you know, our country has been an incredibly generous country, the most generous country in the world. We're generous with our universities; we're generous with our job opportunities; we're generous with the—what a beautiful system it is, that if you come here and you work hard, you can achieve a dream.

Never did we realize then that people would take advantage of our generosity to the extent they have. September the 11th taught us an interesting lesson, that while by far the vast majority of people who have come to America are really good, decent people, people that we're proud to have here, there are some who are evil. And our job now is to find the evil ones and to bring them to justice, to disrupt anybody who might have designs on hurting—further hurting Americans. (Bush, 2001l)

This reaffirms that Bush perceives a new, non-state actor, enemy, individuals that hate America, freedom, and democratic values. This threat was not confined to an overseas regime inside a defined territory. Rather, this treat was based on a pervasive ideology that could infect individuals in any location around the globe. This new threat would require law enforcement and

agencies to gather new information about individuals to protect the country from internal threats (Bush, 2001m).

Bush's next statement about Afghanistan becoming democratic expresses his belief in altering the regime type and structure of other states, for the purpose of making a more friendly and more peaceful world. He says,

We've also got a great tradition not only of recognizing freedom of religion and respecting religion; we've got a great tradition of liberating people, not conquering them.

These are army of compassionate souls who are on the frontlines of making sure that the Afghan people understand our commitment is real, that when we talk about freedom, we understand that freedom is more than just a word. Freedom is a chance for people to get a good education. Freedom is a chance for people to get good health care. Freedom is a chance for people to realize their dreams.

We've seen in Afghanistan that the road to freedom can be hard; it's a hard struggle. We've also seen in Afghanistan that the road to freedom is the only one worth traveling. Any nation that sacrifices to build a future of liberty will have the respect, the support, and the friendship of the United States of America. (Bush, 2002d)

Reaffirming this, he said, "Democracies yield peace, and that's what we want. What's going to happen in Afghanistan is, a neighborhood that has been desperate for light instead of darkness is going to see what's possible when freedom arrives" (Carter, 2006).

IRAQ

After the invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush views all conflict related to the "war on terror" collectively. He viewed Saddam Hussein's regime the same as al-Qaeda. In both cases, he viewed the citizens of the country as oppressed and longing for the relief and change that America would deliver by force. He said,

The terrorists became convinced that free nations were decadent and weak. And they grew bolder, believing that history was on their side. Since America put out the fires of September the 11th and mourned our dead and went to war, history has taken a different turn. We have carried the fight to the enemy. We are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes of its influence but at the heart of its power. This work continues. In Iraq, we are helping the

long-suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly, yet worthy of our country and critical to our security. (Bush, 2003k)

As early as May 2001, Bush expressed concern over Saddam Hussein, strongly believing that he had weapons of mass destruction. Of specific concern in Iraq was biological weapons (Bush, 2001n). When Bush began to publicly discuss concerns of threat posed by Iraq, it became apparent that the war on terror was not confined to Afghanistan or solely focused on non-state actors. Rather, Bush expressed a goal of addressing any threats to the expansion of the liberal world order.

We're reviewing all policy in all regions of the world, and one of the areas we've been spending a lot of time on is the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The Secretary of State is going to go listen to our allies as to how best to effect a policy, the primary goal of which will be to say to Saddam Hussein, we won't tolerate you developing weapons of mass destruction, and we expect you to leave your neighbors alone. . . . The primary goal is to make it clear to Saddam that we expect him to be a peaceful neighbor in the region, and we expect him not to develop weapons of mass destruction. And if we find him doing so, there will be a consequence. (Bush, 2001a)

In addition to non-state actors, Bush viewed Iraq, and other small belligerents, as part of the new post-Cold War threat. The image of these states is the rogue. They are hostile to the international system, meaning the liberal world order, but they are significantly different from the Cold War image of the USSR, due to having significantly weaker capabilities. In this sense, they are viewed more as a threat to liberalism than an imminent security threat. Describing the Cold War threat and how it has shifted, he says,

The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops deep in the heart of Europe, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. We used our nuclear weapons not just to prevent the Soviet Union from using their nuclear weapons but also to contain their conventional military forces, to prevent them from extending the Iron Curtain into parts of Europe and Asia that were still free.

In that world, few other nations had nuclear weapons, and most of those who did were responsible allies, such as Britain and France. We worried about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it was mostly a distant threat, not yet a reality.

Today, the Sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is gone, and so is the Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. Its Government is no longer Communist. Its President is elected. Today's Russia is not our enemy but a country in transition with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace with itself and its neighbors. The Iron Curtain no longer exists. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are free nations, and they are now our Allies in NATO, together with a reunited Germany.

Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons, and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.

Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least responsible states. Unlike the cold war, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world. (Bush, 2001a)

This statement depicts how the perceptions of the nature of threat had shifted in the post-Cold War era. George W. Bush was not concerned about balancing with another great power; The United States was the hegemonic power. With the absence of another great power, Bush saw an opportunity to shape the world system into his image and the new threat was from weaker actors, relative to the United States, that did not wish to conform to the new liberal world order. It is worth noting, however, that in the mind of George W. Bush, whether or not he was aware of it, his source of threat is very similar to that of Nixon during the Cold War. Bush's perception of threat is those that do not conform to American liberal ideals, they were just no longer Communist.

On September 28, 2002, Bush first alludes to the use of force in Iraq, under the presumption of Saddam holding weapons of mass destruction. He said,

We're moving toward a strong resolution authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to defend our national security interests against the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. And by passing this resolution, we will send a clear message to the world community and to the Iraqi regime: The demands of the United

Nations Security Council must be followed; the Iraqi dictator must be disarmed. These requirements will be met, or they will be enforced. (Bush, 2002a)

Not only does this statement emphasize Bush's perception of threat from Iraq, but also this statement provides insight into what type of liberal he is. George W. Bush is definitively an idealist, believing in the expansion of democracy and the possibility of creating an international system that is peaceful and cooperative. He, however, is not a liberal institutionalist. He has little confidence in the UN and more importantly disregards any compromise or opinions of other states. Rather, he firmly believes that the role of the United States is to expand the liberal world order. He believes that his foreign policy agenda is morally correct, supported by God, and any opposition to it is morally incorrect, even evil. Bush is an uncompromising expansionist idealist. In his announcement of Congressional approval for the use of military force in Iraq, he emphasized weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and chemical, as a direct threat to the United States. He also commented on the spread of democracy stating, "And as we saw in the fall of the Taliban, men and women celebrate freedom's arrival. . . . And should force be required, the United States will help rebuild a liberated Iraq" (Bush, 2001b). Bush was not shy about expressing his willingness to take unilateral action, should the United Nations fail to act. Bush viewed action in Iraq as directly protecting the security interests of the United States. He said,

If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and unacceptable risks. The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise. I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons. (Bush, 2003c)

This is further evidence that he is not a liberal institutionalist and sheds light on his entire worldview and placing him correctly in the realist/idealist framework. Questioning the Security Council, he said,

This is not only an important moment for the security of our Nation; I believe it's an important moment for the Security Council, itself. And the reason I say that is because this issue has been before the Security Council—the issue of disarmament of Iraq—for 12 long years. And the fundamental question facing the Security Council is, will its words mean anything? When the Security Council speaks, will the words have merit and weight. (Bush, 2003c)

Bush's belief in the liberal world order is not just a personal belief in American ideals but a deeply held religious belief. He said, "Liberty is not America's gift to the world; it is God's gift to each and every person. And that's what I believe. I believe that when we see totalitarianism, that we must deal with it" (Bush, 2003c).

The emphasis on freedom for Iraq and the belief that the people of Iraq wish for the United States to bring it to them depicts the expansionist idealist mindset of Bush. He also makes a direct connection to Saddam Hussein and the broader war on terrorism. Bush said,

Countering Iraq's threat is also a central commitment on the war on terror. We know Saddam Hussein has longstanding and ongoing ties to international terrorists. With the support and shelter of a regime, terror groups become far more lethal. Aided by a terrorist network, an outlaw regime can launch attacks while concealing its involvement. Even a dictator is not suicidal, but he can make use of men who are. We must confront both terror cells and terror states, because they are different faces of the same evil. (Bush, 2001b)

The connection to the broader war on terror depicts the low cognitive complexity of Bush (Preston, 2001) and is clearly evident as Iraq and Afghanistan are discussed as a unified warfront. A question worth asking is, why Iraq? There are plenty of anti-democratic regimes that Bush could have targeted instead of Iraq. Iraq drew attention because of known terrorist leaders, such as Abu Nidal and Abu Mussab al Zarquawi operating within Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq is in close proximity to key U.S. allies, had previously been belligerent in the region, and had a history with, and Bush believed still had access to, WMD. He said,

First, some ask why Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons. While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States.

Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles—far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and other nations—in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work. We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet

of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States. And of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it.

. . . We know that Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America.

. . . Some have argued that confronting the threat from Iraq could detract from the war against terror. To the contrary, confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror. When I spoke to Congress more than a year ago, I said that those who harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves. Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction. And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them or provide them to a terror network. (Bush, 2002c)

Moreover, Bush believed that Iraq was supportive and complicit in the actions of al-Qaeda. Referring to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, Bush said,

Iraq has also provided Al Qaida with chemical and biological weapons training. We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior Al Qaida terrorist planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad. (Bush, 2003a)

Explicitly making his case for Iraq as a threat, Bush called on United Nations observers to observe the destruction of WMD, stating, "The time for denying, deceiving, and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him" (Bush, BB). Bush believed that action was necessary to maintain credibility and secure the future progress of America. In Bush's words,

Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding and prove irrelevant to the problems of our time. And through its inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of fear. . . . Now as before, we will secure our Nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own. (Bush, 2002c)

Emphasizing the threat to the liberal world order and his goal of liberating individuals from tyranny, he said,

America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer freedom to slavery, prosperity to squalor, self-government to the rule of terror and torture. America is a friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women, and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi'a, Sunnis, and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin. (Bush, 2002c)

From the beginning of confrontation with Iraq, Bush was not simply interested in removing Saddam Hussein. His goal went much further. Bush sought to actively reshape Iraq, stating, "When Iraq has a government committed to the freedom and well-being of its people, America, along with many other nations, will share a responsibility to help Iraq reform and prosper. And we will meet our responsibilities. That's our pledge to the Iraqi people" (Bush, 2002e). Again on regime change, Bush said,

Well, I hope we don't have to go to war, but if we go to war, we will disarm Iraq. And if we go to war, there will be a regime change. And replacing this cancer inside of Iraq will be a Government that represents the rights of all the people, a Government which represents the voices of the Shi'a and Sunni and the Kurds. (Bush, 2003c)

Bush also adopts a with-us or against-us mentality in regards to removing Saddam Hussein. On the UN Security Council's upcoming vote he said,

No matter what the whip count is, we're calling for the vote. We want to see people stand up and say what their opinion is about Saddam Hussein and the utility of the United Nations Security Council. And so, you bet. It's time for people to show their cards, to let the world know where they stand when it comes to Saddam. (Bush, 2003c)

By this time Bush had developed his image of Iraq as an enemy, but in the sense of the Cold War enemy image of the USSR. He believed firmly that any state that opposed the United States removing Saddam Hussein from power was complicit in the actions of Saddam Hussein and was part of the threat to the United States. Furthermore, Bush perceived continued threat directed at the United States that could materialize into further militant attacks. He said,

It's hard to envision more terror on America than September the 11th, 2001. We did nothing to provoke that terrorist attack. It came upon us because there's an enemy which hates America. They hate what we stand for. We love freedom,

and we're not changing. And therefore, so long as there's a terrorist network like Al Qaida and others willing to fund them, finance them, equip them, we're at war. (Bush, 2003c)

Bush's objective in Iraq was clear, and he thought that it would be relatively simple. He believed that without Saddam Hussein, the people of Iraq would welcome a transition to democracy stating,

Our mission is clear in Iraq. Should we have to go in, our mission is very clear: disarmament. In order to disarm, it will mean regime change. I'm confident we'll be able to achieve that objective in a way that minimizes the loss of life. No doubt there's risks in any military operation; I know that. But it's very clear what we intend to do. And our mission won't change. Our mission is precisely what I just stated. We have got a plan that will achieve that mission, should we need to send forces in. (Bush, 2003c)

Bush has a strong vision for a new Iraq, centered on the freedom and prosperity of the Iraqi people (Bush, 2003d). On March 17, 2003, he directly addressed the citizens of the United States, as well as Iraq, giving a final warning to the regime to disarm and for Saddam Hussein to step down from power. He said,

Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them: If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.

Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.

The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace. (Bush, 2003e)

Bush's statement to the citizens of Iraq is revealing about the source of conflict. The conflict, in Bush's mind, is centered on the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein, clearly separating the regime from the people. He believed that the people would welcome America, welcome democracy, and welcome liberalism. On March 19, Bush announces that coalition forces had entered Iraq. "My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger" (Bush, 2003e). Bush's level of optimism in successful regime change and being welcomed by the Iraqi citizens is key to understanding his complete perception of individuals and conflict in the world system.

Bush emphasizes the compassion and quality of the American people and their ideals, by commenting on the actions of the soldiers, telling one story of a U.S. soldier carrying a wounded Iraqi soldier to safety (Bush, 2003f). In this way, he viewed the U.S. military, not only as an instrument of force but also as an instrument of policy. The actions and good will of American soldiers were to be representative of the positive change they were tasked with bringing to the people of Iraq (Carter, 2003g). Bush directly addressed the Iraqi people in a video:

This is George W. Bush, the President of the United States. At this moment, the regime of Saddam Hussein is being removed from power, and a long era of fear and cruelty is ending. American and coalition forces are now operating inside Baghdad, and we will not stop until Saddam's corrupt gang is gone. The Government of Iraq and the future of your country will soon belong to you. . . . In the new era that is coming to Iraq, your country will no longer be held captive to the will of a cruel dictator. You will be free—free to build a better life instead of building more palaces for Saddam and his sons, free to pursue economic prosperity without the hardship of economic sanctions, free to travel and free to speak your mind, free to join in the political affairs of Iraq. And all the people who make up your country—Kurds, Shi'a, Turkomans, Sunnis, and others—will be free of the terrible persecution that so many have endured. The nightmare that Saddam Hussein has brought to your nation will soon be over. (Bush, 2003h)

Bush's belief in peoples' desire and acceptance for American freedoms and democratic government was unwavering, even in the face of peaceful opposition. In an exchange with a reporter,

Q. Mr. President, there have been some anti-U.S. demonstrations stirred up by religious leaders in Iraq. Are you worried that's going to hurt the rebuilding effort?

The President. I'm not worried. Freedom is beautiful, and when people are free, they express their opinions. You know, they couldn't express their opinions before we came; now they can. I've always said democracy is going to be hard. It's not easy to go from being enslaved to being free. But it's going to happen, because the basic instincts of mankind is to be free. They want to be free. And so, sure, there's going to be people expressing their opinions, and we welcome that, just like here in America people can express their opinion. (Bush, 2003i)

This depicts the totality of Bush's plan for Iraq. It is often claimed that the administration had an invasion plan, but lacked a plan for reconstruction, but this does not tell the whole story. Bush did have a reconstruction plan; he expected it to be an easier transition with more immediate acceptance from the citizens. He said,

Yes, there were some in our country who doubted the Iraqi people wanted freedom, or they just couldn't imagine they would be welcome—welcoming to a liberating force. They were mistaken, and we know why. The desire for freedom is not the property of one culture; it is the universal hope of human beings in every culture.

Whether you're Sunni or Shi'a or Kurd or Chaldean or Assyrian or Turkoman or Christian or Jew or Muslim—no matter what your faith, freedom is God's gift to every person in every nation. As freedom takes hold in Iraq, the Iraqi people will choose their own leaders and their own Government. America has no intention of imposing our form of government or our culture. Yet, we will ensure that all Iraqis have a voice in the new Government and all citizens have their rights protected. (Bush, 2003j)

Bush emphasizes that Iraq is not simply gaining a new form of government, but the modernization that comes with it such as electricity, clean water, immunizations, emergency medical care, and higher standards for education. In his mind, there was no possibility of "good" people rejecting what the United States had to offer.

Bush's speech aboard the *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln* on May 1, 2003, announced "major combat operations in Iraq have ended" (Bush, LL). He reaffirms his belief that removing Saddam Hussein from power was the most important objective and greatest obstacle to a liberal, democratic Iraq stating,

In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women

in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices, and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear. (Bush, 2003b)

Bush, however, was not declaring victory over the war on terror. Reaffirming that the invasion of Iraq and ongoing battles in Iraq are directly connected to 9/11 he said, “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001, and still goes on” (Bush, 2003b). At this point, Bush also acknowledges that the war on terror is global in nature, discussing success in destroying al-Qaeda cells in other parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the Horn of Africa. Bush was now on a mission to alter the landscape of the international system by brining liberal democracy not only to the Middle East but around the world. He said,

The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty. (Bush, 2003b)

As conflict persisted in Iraq, Bush’s image of the enemy quickly broadened. He said,

The capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of violence in Iraq. We still face terrorists who would rather go on killing the innocent than accept the rise of liberty in the heart of the Middle East. This demonstrates the shifting view of the enemy and justification to continue to use military force to bring about liberal change. (Bush, 2003b)

“Success” in Iraq, however, did not alter Bush’s image of the strength of the new enemy and the ability of the Iraqi people to govern themselves change quickly. The source of conflict and the image of the enemy do not change after the transitional government handed over power to the Iraqi government in 2004. Bush said,

I believe there will be more violence, because there are still violent people who want to stop progress. Listen, their strategy is—hasn’t changed. They want to kill innocent lives to shake our will and to discourage the people inside Iraq. That’s what they want to do, and they’re not going to shake our will. In other words, the threat of the enemy had not changed, but the mission had shifted from liberating Iraq to defending a democratic Iraq. (Bush, 2004a)

The new enemy in Iraq was al-Qaeda in Iraq, later to become ISIS. Known al-Qaeda leaders, namely Abu Mussab al Zarqawi, were hiding in Iraq and part of the justification for the initial invasion. Despite the claim that major operations in Iraq had ended, hunting down the al-Qaeda operatives proved more difficult, time-consuming, and required more military personnel than Bush originally expected. Bush also viewed the terrorists and their tactics as low level and unsophisticated thugs, but he also feared their tactics and recognized their success. He said,

We're looking for [Zarqawi]. He hides. He is—he's got a effective weapon, and that is terror. I said yesterday that our military cannot be defeated by these thugs, that—but what they do is behead Americans so they can get on the TV screens. And they're trying to shake our will and trying to shake the Iraqis' will. That's what they're trying to do.

And like all Americans, I'm disgusted by that kind of behavior, but I'm not going to yield. We're not going to abandon the Iraqi people. It's in our interests that we win this battle in the war on terror. See, I think that the Iraq theater is a part of the war on terror . . .

And I believe that if we wilt or leave, America's security will be much worse off. I believe that if Iraq—if we fail in Iraq, it's the beginning of a long struggle. We will not have done our duty to our children and our grandchildren. And so that's why I'm consistently telling the Iraqi citizens that we will not be intimidated. That's why my message to Mr. Zarqawi is: You cannot drive us out of Iraq by your brutality. (Bush, 2004b)

As the war broadened and the focus in Iraq was on al-Qaeda, some charged that the removal of Saddam Hussein had destabilized the region, giving the terrorist networks a greater ability to operate. Bush, however, remained steadfast in his belief that Saddam was a strong and imminent threat that needed to be removed stating,

Anybody who says that we are safer with Saddam Hussein in power is wrong. We went into Iraq because Saddam Hussein defied the demands of the free world. We went into Iraq after diplomacy had failed. And we went into Iraq because I understand after September the 11th we must take threats seriously, before they come to hurt us. (Bush, 2004b)

This belief in the threat from Saddam was connected to the belief that he possessed WMD. Even after the release of the full investigation into Iraqi WMD programs that found no evidence of the weapons, Bush maintains his image of Saddam Hussein and justifies the invasion of Iraq. He said,

Chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there.

The Duelfer report also raises important new information about Saddam Hussein's defiance of the world and his intent and capability to develop weapons. The Duelfer report showed that Saddam was systematically gaming the system, using the U.N. Oil for Food Programme to try to influence countries and companies in an effort to undermine sanctions. He was doing so with the intent of restarting his weapons program, once the world looked away.

Based on all the information we have today, I believe we were right to take action, and America is safer today with Saddam Hussein in prison. He retained the knowledge, the materials, the means, and the intent to produce weapons of mass destruction, and he could have passed that knowledge on to our terrorist enemies. Saddam Hussein was a unique threat, a sworn enemy of our country, a state sponsor of terror, operating in the world's most volatile region. In a world after September the 11th, he was a threat we had to confront, and America and the world are safer for our actions.

The Duelfer report makes clear that much of the accumulated body of 12 years of our intelligence and that of our allies was wrong, and we must find out why and correct the flaws. The Silberman-Robb Commission is now at work to do just that, and its work is important and essential. At a time of many threats in the world, the intelligence on which the President and Members of Congress base their decisions must be better, and it will be. I look forward to the intelligence reform commission's recommendations, and we will act on them to improve our intelligence, especially our intelligence about weapons of mass destruction. (Bush, 2004c)

These perceptions had been formed and solidified, at least by 2002, and shaped the seemingly endless campaign that consumed the remainder of George W. Bush's presidency, over which time there was no change in worldview. Bush refused to accept that WMD were not possessed by the Iraqi regime by the time of the invasion, despite the official investigations. This depicts how Bush processes information. He is only receptive to information that confirms his preconceived beliefs and images. Contrary information is readily dismissed.

Confirming Bush's view of the spread of desire for democracy and freedom around the world being inspired by the actions of the United States stating,

Today, people in a long-troubled part of the world are standing up for their freedom. In the last few months, we've witnessed successful elections in

Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian Territories; peaceful demonstrations on the streets of Beirut; and steps toward democratic reform in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The trend is clear: Freedom is on the march. Freedom is the birthright and deep desire of every human soul, and spreading freedom's blessings is the calling of our time. And when freedom and democracy take root in the Middle East, America and the world will be safer and more peaceful. (Bush, 2005)

The stability of Iraq was key for Bush's war on terror and he understood that it was not the center of the Islamic terrorist movement. Commenting on the possibility of the United States withdrawing from Iraq, Bush said,

And the reason why I say "disastrous consequences," the Iraqi Government could collapse; chaos would spread; there would be a vacuum; into the vacuum would flow more extremists, more radicals, people who have stated intent to hurt our people. I believe that success in Baghdad will have success in helping us secure the homeland.

What's different about this conflict than some others is that if we fail there, the enemy will follow us here. I firmly believe that. And that's one of the main reasons why I made the decision I made. And so we will help this Iraqi Government succeed. (Bush, 2005)

OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

Bush's OpCode reveals some interesting insight to his worldview, particularly how his worldview is different in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq, compared to his OpCode prior to 9/11. He views the nature of the political universe (P-1) is in the somewhat friendly category, according to the standard VICS scale. This is misleading, since George W. Bush believes there are significant threats to the United States and the liberal world order. This discrepancy is explained by the rose-colored lenses of Bush. His simultaneous belief that threats are imminent is combined with his strong belief that American liberation would be welcomed by individuals. At no point did he believe that the United States would fail to thwart the terrorists efforts or that individuals would turn against the United States. Further, comparing his P-1 score before 9/11 was 0.58 and dropped to 0.29 for Afghanistan and 0.27 for Iraq. This is a significant shift indicating that his perception of the world was significantly altered by 9/11.

In addition to having a less friendly worldview, Bush was less confident in realizing his political goals (P-2), less confident in predicting the political future (P-3), felt that he had less control (P-4), and the outcomes were much

Table 4.1

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Base</i>	<i>Afghanistan</i>	<i>Iraq</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.58	0.29	0.27
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.35	0.12	0.10
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.62	0.34	0.31
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.50	0.35	0.29
P-5	Role of Chance	0.69	0.88	0.91
	Choice and Shift Propensities			
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.54	0.67	0.54
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.30	0.31	0.21
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.34	0.54	0.46
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics			
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.46	0.33	0.46
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.68	0.33	0.53
I-5	Utility of Means			
	(a) Reward	0.24	0.14	0.14
	(b) Promise	0.09	0.07	0.08
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.45	0.62	0.55
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.09	0.10	0.08
	(e) Threaten	0.03	0.05	0.03
	(f) Punish	0.11	0.02	0.12

more dependent upon a roll of chance (P-5). All of these indices are consistent with Bush's images of Afghanistan and Iraq. He believed they were weak, needing and yearning for both American military support, as well as American culture.

Strategically (I-1 through 5), Bush's OpCode is relatively consistent between his base profile and Afghanistan and Iraq. In general, Bush's preferred strategy is to be cooperative and he is more likely to offer rewards than make threats. This is consistent with Bush's paternalistic perception of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. He feels that he is offering them a significant improvement to their quality of life.

Bush's risk orientation (I-3) is moderate, but noticeably higher than his base score, for both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is consistent with his extreme confidence in the U.S. military's ability to succeed in defeating the enemy, as well as his belief that the United States would be accepted (table 4.1).

THE EXPANSIONIST IDEALIST

George W. Bush is an expansionist idealist. His foreign policy objective is to proliferate American values and Jeffersonian style democracy. Bush,

like Nixon, enjoyed showing off the military might of the United States of America. Although occasionally projecting a call for diplomacy, instead of an invasion of Iraq, was presented, but no one could have seriously believed that Saddam Hussein would abdicate by way of the Americans.

The military plan to remove Saddam Hussein was well-planned and well-executed. The part of the conflict that did not fall into place for George W. Bush was the unacceptance and persistent conflict between the domestic population; they did not welcome the United States with open arms. Bush, however, never adapted his policy to reconsider his perceptions of the individuals in conflict. Instead, he held strong to his belief that American values and American democracy were in the best interest of the Iraqi people, the citizens of Afghanistan, and all people around the world.

Moreover, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Bush believed that the enemy, terrorists, could be entirely defeated with the U.S. military. The political response to 9/11, with heightening airport security and unknown NSA surveillance on American citizens, was overblown, considering the low rate of effectiveness and actual strength of the organizations when compared to the United States. The terrorists were, however, an eminent threat in the mind of the president.

Afghanistan differed from Iraq, for Bush, in that it was the specific catalyst to making his administration have a foreign policy focus, rather than the domestic agenda he entered the White House with. He witnessed the 9/11 attacks in the first year of his presidency and experienced a significant shift in worldview, one that is less friendly. This helped to solidify his low cognitive complexity (Preston, 2001), black and white, views on the situation in both states.

In sum, George W. Bush relentlessly pursued the expansion of democracy and American values to Iraq and Afghanistan, even in the face of failure. He began war, not because he is a bloodthirsty warmonger, but because he believed the proliferation of the social and political characteristics of the United States would create a peaceful and cooperative international system.

Chapter 5

Barack Obama

Barack Obama certainly had less of a political heritage, as well as less political experience, than George W. Bush. A junior senator from Illinois charismatically empowered young voters through grassroots campaigning and made his way to the White House. What he lacked in experience was made up for by his strong reliance on a wide range of advisers. Obama, however, was always directly involved with the policy-making process, and although receptive to input from advisers, he was also accused by some as being over arrogant and always believing he was the smartest person in the room (Ferguson, 2016).

The expectations of Barack Obama's presidency was a duality between foreign and domestic agendas. On the one hand, he inherited the war on terror, with American troops deployed on two major battlefronts, Iraq and Afghanistan. But on the domestic front, Obama was viewed as a champion of the African American community, pushing against racism and white supremacy movements (Coates, 2014). Furthermore, he entered office with the worst economy since the Great Depression, and this issue would draw the majority of his focus.

In foreign policy, he had a disdain for the status quo establishment and rejected the "special relationships" with allies, such as the UK, Saudi Arabia, and Israel (Ferguson, 2016). Obama does, however, have an affinity for George H. W. Bush's national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. On his beliefs in foreign policy, he said,

"I am . . . an idealist insofar as I believe that we should be promoting values, like democracy and human rights" not only out of self-interest, but also because "it makes the world a better place." But "you could call me a realist in believing we can't, at any given moment, relieve all the world's misery. . . . We've got to be hardheaded . . . and pick and choose our spots. . . . There are going to be times

when our security interests conflict with our concerns about human rights.” (qtd in Ferguson, 2016)

This self-acknowledged duality between idealism and realism is key to understanding the foreign policy goals and motivations of his presidency. On the one hand, Obama seeks to support the growth of the liberal world order through the support of democracy and even more importantly economic development and trade.

These beliefs created a push-and-pull strategy that led to a lack of coherence throughout the Obama administration. He used force in Libya in 2011, along with international partners, but eliminating Gadhafi did not resolve the issues. The complex nature of Libya and the political capital he expended on the issue influenced his decision to not take action in Syria, which allowed Russia to gain more influence in the region (Ferguson, 2016). Although remaining supportive of democracy, his attempt at expansionistic liberalism in Libya was a learning experience and influenced his future foreign policy decisions.

Although there may seem to be inconsistency in Obama’s foreign policy, perhaps there is more evidence of intellectual development of Obama in foreign policy. Despite Russia having influence in Syria and constraining U.S. action by their support of the Assad regime, the Obama administration successfully persuaded the Russians to remove the majority of Assad’s chemical weapons. Further, while the support of human rights was a goal, the Syrian regime never posed a significant security threat to the United States, thus not warranting escalating a conflict that could involve other large powers such as Russia (Ferguson, 2016).

From the beginning, Obama significantly differed from Bush in that his perception of threat from terrorists was far lower, believing that “ISIS is not an existential threat to the United States”; he “frequently reminds his staff that terrorism takes far fewer lives in America than handguns, car accidents, and falls in bathtubs do” (Ferguson, 2016).

This chapter will focus on Obama’s perceptions on and approach to resolving conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, while also dealing with an economic crisis. When assessing the intentions and goals of his policy the fluctuations create some contrasting analysis. Is this because of a lack of continuity in Obama’s policy or a result in a more major shift in broad U.S. foreign policy strategy? As Niall Ferguson (2016) says, “There is no ‘Obama doctrine’; rather we see here a full-blown revolution in American foreign policy. And this revolution can be summed up as follows: The foes shall become friends, and the friends foes.” Who and what Obama considers to be a threat or opportunity for U.S. power is key to the realist/idealist analysis. Perhaps a better question to ask of Obama’s policy is, “Did

he reject the foreign policy establishment by asking if ‘foes’ are truly the enemy and have our ‘friends’ truly been friendly and helped to advance U.S. foreign policy interests?”

The situational context for the Obama presidency differs from the presidents in the previous chapters in a significant way. The economic and military power of the United States was in decline. The housing market crisis impacted the global economy, and Obama sought to bolster American power by building new partnerships and expanding global trade. Militarily the United States was overextended, fighting on two battlefronts without clear objectives for success and withdrawal. Obama questioned if traditional U.S. alliances were a drain on U.S. power that could not be sustained. He also questioned if old enemies could become beneficial economic partners. These changes in policy are more in line with realism, a concern for U.S. power, than liberalism, which defined the presidency of George W. Bush, and some would argue is the status quo of U.S. foreign policy. As put by then secretary of defense Robert Gates (2017), “Bush wanted to be successful and Obama wanted out. He didn’t appreciate how fragile things were in Iraq and that pulling all those U.S. troops out could lead to a reversal of a lot of the gains that were made in 2007 and 2008.”

This chapter will first proceed by examining Afghanistan, which took the majority of Obama’s focus, at least at the beginning of his presidency. Then, Iraq will be discussed in two parts, as the context changes. When Obama took office, his goal was to end the war in Iraq and fully transition power to a sovereign Iraqi government. The growth of ISIS and the crisis in Syria grew throughout his presidency, thus altering his perceptions and approach to conflict there.

AFGHANISTAN

President Obama was much more interested in Afghanistan than Iraq, because he saw it as a justified conflict with the objective of weakening al-Qaeda and supporting the sovereign government of Afghanistan. He said,

It’s important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11th, 2001, 19 men hijacked 4 airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of these flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington and killed many more. (Obama, 2009e)

He even placed blame on the Iraq War for lack of progress in Afghanistan stating,

Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well known and need not be repeated here. It's enough to say that for the next 6 years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention, and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world. (Obama, 2009e)

And emphasizing the degraded conditions of Afghanistan said,

But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, Al Qaida's leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate Government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an underdeveloped economy, and insufficient security forces. (Obama, 2009e)

Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with Al Qaida, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan Government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. (Obama, 2009e)

Specifically on the mission in Afghanistan Obama said,

And as Commander in Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

So no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by Al Qaida. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger, no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here

from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and Al Qaida can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on Al Qaida, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny Al Qaida a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and Government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. (Obama, 2009e)

This shows that Obama perceives the threat of al-Qaeda as both threats to security domestically and internationally and like his predecessor, the primary threat is a non-state actor. The increased cost to the United States had a direct benefit by increasing the security of the state. He, however, also expected the international community to contribute to the military efforts in Afghanistan, because the threat was not just on the United States stating,

Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now we must come together to end this war successfully, for what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility, what's at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world. (Obama, 2009e)

By committing more U.S. troops and resources, as well as calling for more international support, it is apparent that Obama believed the power of al-Qaeda and the Taliban was significant. He had no doubt they could be defeated by American power, but they were certainly not dismissed as irrelevant. This is directly connected to his image of Afghanistan. While he views the government as an ally to the United States and the opportunity for economic and security cooperation in the future as an opportunity for the United States, their current status was weak and in need of support for stability and success. In other words, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were a direct threat to the power of Afghanistan and were a general security threat to the United States.

Although Obama was determined to seek out and destroy al-Qaeda leaders within Afghanistan, and into Pakistan, he was not paternalistic to the Afghan government. He said,

We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan Government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence

and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan, grounded in mutual respect, to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner and never your patron.

Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. And that's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border. (Obama, 2009e)

The length of the conflict led to comparisons with the Vietnam War. Addressing this reveals Obama's full image of the conflict. He said,

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now and to rely only on efforts against Al Qaida from a distance would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on Al Qaida and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies. (Obama, 2009e)

In this statement we see perceptions of level of threat, source of threat, justification for action, and a belief in collective security. He argues that 9/11 justifies the threat is real, not just perceived. In his mind, leaving Afghanistan would make the United States more vulnerable, because they are a weak actor that cannot contain al-Qaeda on its own. The threats are clearly non-state actors, rather than a sovereign government. Further, we see that Obama is concerned with collective security and support from the world community, making an interesting dichotomy of realist U.S.-centered interests and liberal global security interests.

The realism of Obama's policy is founded in pragmatism and a cost benefit analysis for the state. He said,

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our Nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I'm mindful of the

words of President Eisenhower, who, in discussing our national security, said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars. (Obama, 2009e)

This emphasizes that Obama believes the United States had overextended itself during the previous administration, resulting in a weakening economy, thus weakening the power of the state. He wanted to correct this policy error and return to a focus on building American power, rather than focusing on the liberal change in the international system. Within this is also a note for realism: the economy is not strictly a variable to be considered by liberalism. With globalization and intertwined economies, economic power was perceived as equally or more important than military force.

This, however, does not mean that Obama lacked all affinity for liberalism. He goes on to say,

And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values, for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That's why we must promote our values by living them at home, which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman, and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America's authority.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades, a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down and markets open and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty. (Obama, 2009e)

Here we clearly see two aspects of liberalism in Obama. First, he cares deeply about American values and believes they are qualities that make better

government and more prosperous societies. Second, he believes that democratic expansion and American involvement in globalization has boosted global economy and progress. These are certainly qualities of liberalism, but did not define his foreign policy. It is important to note that he did not take the policies of liberalism off the stove, but he just moved them to the back burner. This is reminiscent of Jimmy Carter, who greatly supported human rights but did not promote liberalism with force. Another aspect of his policy that could be placed into the liberalism box is his view of the treatment of captured terrorists. He said,

To overcome extremism, we must also be vigilant in upholding the values our troops defend, because there is no force in the world more powerful than the example of America. And that is why I have ordered the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and will seek swift and certain justice for captured terrorists. Because living our values doesn't make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger. And that is why I can stand here tonight and say without exception or equivocation that the United States of America does not torture. We can make that commitment here tonight. (Obama, 2009b)

Obama did not want to combat terrorism just on the battlefield. Rather, he wanted to fight it ideologically by embracing American values. In his mind he was combating evil by supporting good. This emphasis on ideology and values would traditionally lean toward liberalism, but maybe this is a misreading of the situation. The nature of the enemy is different from the threat of states. The threat of terrorism is far more psychological and ideological than physical. If fire is fought with fire, then perhaps ideology is not best fought with guns. In this light, Obama could still be considered a pragmatic realist.

Again, though, with a more liberal slant Obama is concerned with collective security. Emphasizing the international nature of the threat, Obama said,

But this is not simply an American problem—far from it—it is, instead, an international security challenge of the highest order. Terrorist attacks in London and Bali were tied to Al Qaida and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it too is likely to have ties to Al Qaida's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at stake.

My administration is committed to strengthening international organizations and collective action, and that will be my message next week in Europe. As America does more, we will ask others to join us in doing their part. From our partners and NATO allies, we will seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training Afghan security

forces, a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to coordinate international action and assistance and to strengthen Afghan institutions. (Obama, 2009d)

Clearly setting himself apart from George W. Bush and other expansionist liberals, however, Obama said,

We are not going to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy.

What we can do is make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for Al Qaida. What we can do is make sure that it is not destabilizing neighboring Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons. And that's going to require not only military efforts, but also diplomatic efforts. It's also going to require development efforts in a coordinated fashion. And that's why I've asked the Joint Chiefs that have produced a review. David Petraeus is reviewing the situation there. We assigned Richard Holbrooke as a special envoy to the region. They are all working together. They will be presenting to me a plan. (Obama, 2009a)

Obama is not an expansionist liberal, because he does not believe all states can be shaped into a Jeffersonian democracy. He does believe that the international system can be cooperative and mutually beneficial, but driven by economics, not government type. This belief is directly tied to his goal of Afghanistan having a stable and sovereign government, created by themselves. Defending his decision to place a time line on exiting Afghanistan Obama said,

In the absence of a deadline, the message we are sending to the Afghans is, it's business as usual, this is an open-ended commitment. And very frankly, there are, I think, elements in Afghanistan, who would be perfectly satisfied to make Afghanistan a permanent protectorate of the United States, in which they carry no burden, in which we're paying for a military in Afghanistan that preserves their security and their prerogatives.

That's not what the American people signed on for when they went into Afghanistan in 2001. They signed up to go after al Qaeda. (Obama, 2009f)

What is interesting here is that Obama is not only avoiding being paternalistic to Afghanistan to not fuel the ideology that American is violating sovereignty and pressuring governments to act to their will, but he is also avoiding being sucked into providing for another country that would rather take the easy path and use American resources. The transition from American-led combat

missions to Afghan troops was not a policy of abandonment, but a set date to put pressure on the Afghan military to step up and assume responsibility for their own security concerns. He said,

Let's be clear about what July 2011 represents. What I have said is, is that having put in more troops over the last several months in order to break the momentum of the Taliban, that beginning in 2011, July, we will start bringing those troops down and turning over more and more responsibility to Afghan security forces that we are building up. But we are not suddenly, as of July 2011, finished with Afghanistan. In fact, to the contrary, part of what I've tried to emphasize to President Karzai and the Afghan people, but also to the American people, is this is a long-term partnership that is not simply defined by our military presence. I am confident that we're going to be able to reduce our troop strength in Afghanistan starting in July 2011. (Obama, 2001b)

Further demonstrating that in his mind the context of security had changed since the end of the Cold War, Obama said,

To move beyond outdated cold war thinking and to focus on the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, our new Nuclear Posture Review reduces the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is at the top of America's nuclear agenda, which reaffirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Obama, 2010a)

The capture of Osama bin Laden was the pinnacle of success in Afghanistan for Obama. It was his primary objective and he believed it was retribution for the attack on 9/11. He said,

Good evening. Tonight I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Usama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaida and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history. The images of 9/11 are seared into our national memory: hijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction . . .

We were also united in our resolve to protect our Nation and to bring those who committed this vicious attack to justice. We quickly learned that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Al Qaida, an organization headed by Usama bin

Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and was committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe. And so we went to war against Al Qaida to protect our citizens, our friends, and our allies.

Over the last 10 years, thanks to the tireless and heroic work of our military and our counterterrorism professionals, we've made great strides in that effort. We've disrupted terrorist attacks and strengthened our homeland defense. In Afghanistan, we removed the Taliban Government, which had given bin Laden and Al Qaida safe haven and support. And around the globe, we worked with our friends and allies to capture or kill scores of Al Qaida terrorists, including several who were a part of the 9/11 plot.

Yet Usama bin Laden avoided capture and escaped across the Afghan border into Pakistan. Meanwhile, Al Qaida continued to operate from along that border and operate through its affiliates across the world.

And so shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta, the Director of the CIA, to make the killing or capture of bin Laden the top priority of our war against Al Qaida, even as we continued our broader efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat his network . . .

Today, at my direction, the United States launched a targeted operation against that compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. A small team of Americans carried out the operation with extraordinary courage and capability. No Americans were harmed. They took care to avoid civilian casualties. After a firefight, they killed Usama bin Laden and took custody of his body.

For over two decades, bin Laden has been Al Qaida's leader and symbol and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat Al Qaida.

Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There's no doubt that Al Qaida will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must—and we will—remain vigilant at home and abroad . . .

The cause of securing our country is not complete. But tonight we are once again reminded that America can do whatever we set our mind to. That is the story of our history, whether it's the pursuit of prosperity for our people or the struggle for equality for all our citizens, our commitment to stand up for our values abroad, and our sacrifices to make the world a safer place. (Obama, 2011a)

Several images from this statement are important. First, Obama emphasizes that the United States is not the belligerent actor in the conflict, but rather is the victim of al-Qaeda. The conflict is justified to protect national security and for retribution of damages done to the United States. Killing Osama bin Laden, the symbol of al-Qaeda and the face of 9/11, was the ultimate retribution. Obama's mission in Afghanistan can be broken down into two goals, weaken al-Qaeda and stabilize a sovereign government; killing bin Laden all but achieved goal number one. But, we also see that Obama has a much more complex view of al-Qaeda than one individual. He believes he has been very successful in his mission, but is not illusioned that al-Qaeda is defeated into nonexistence.

After the death of bin Laden, Obama felt particularly confident in his mission in Afghanistan. He said,

The information that we recovered from bin Laden's compound shows Al Qaida under enormous strain. Bin Laden expressed concern that Al Qaida had been unable to effectively replace senior terrorists that had been killed and that Al Qaida has failed in its effort to portray America as a nation at war with Islam, thereby draining more widespread support. Al Qaida remains dangerous, and we must be vigilant against attacks. But we have put Al Qaida on a path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done. (Obama, 2011a)

Obama seeks to use American power as influence without risking the loss of power; he views the United States as the leader of the world system and the director of international security efforts. He said,

We must chart a more centered course. Like generations before, we must embrace America's singular role in the course of human events. But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate, as strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we must respond with force. But when that force can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies overseas. When innocents are being slaughtered and global security endangered, we don't have to choose between standing idly by or acting on our own. Instead, we must rally international action, which we're doing in Libya, where we do not have a single soldier on the ground, but are supporting allies in protecting the Libyan people and giving them the chance to determine their own destiny. (Obama, 2011a)

Similar to Jimmy Carter, Obama is supportive of democracy, but does not force democracy. On the Arab Spring, he said,

In all that we do, we must remember that what sets America apart is not solely our power, it is the principles upon which our Union was founded. We're a

nation that brings our enemies to justice while adhering to the rule of law and respecting the rights of all our citizens. We protect our own freedom and prosperity by extending it to others. We stand not for empire, but for self-determination. That is why we have a stake in the democratic aspirations that are now washing across the Arab world. We will support those revolutions with fidelity to our ideals, with the power of our example, and with an unwavering belief that all human beings deserve to live with freedom and dignity. (Obama, 2011a)

It is clear that Obama fully embraces American values and seeks to project them to the world. His intentions for doing so, however, are different from George W. Bush. Bush sought to actively reshape the system. Obama's objective was to preserve and grow America's power, economically, and allow the world system to organically form to the liberal world order through economic globalization. Rather than forcing American ideals and Jeffersonian democracy, Obama only interjected these ideals when the opportunity was presented with little to no cost.

The nature of the enemy, in the mind of Obama, is one that cannot be defeated in its entirety. An exchange with a reporter depicts how the president viewed the mission in Afghanistan and the war on terror as a whole.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Last week when you gave your Afghanistan draw-down speech, the word "victory," in terms of the overall war in Afghanistan, was not in your speech. So I'm wondering, sir, if you can define for the 100,000 troops you have in harm's way in Afghanistan "victory" in the war and for their families as well, sir.

The President. Well, I didn't use "victory" in my West Point speech either. What I said was we can be successful in our mission, which is narrowly drawn, and that is to make sure that Al Qaida cannot attack the United States of America or our allies or our interests overseas and to make sure that we have an Afghan Government that—and an Afghan people that can provide for their own security. (Obama, 2011c)

This is a stark contrast to George W. Bush, who adamantly believed that terrorism could be defeated. His approach was a conventional use of the military. Obama, on the other hand, did not believe terrorism could be entirely eliminated and fought less conventionally, focusing on winning hearts and minds.

When asked about the possibility of al-Qaeda launching an attack on the United States, despite eliminating much of its top leadership, Obama said,

I think that given the nature of our open society, we're always going to be vulnerable to the possible terrorist attack. But for them to be able to mount

something that is a big project with a lot of financing, that is very difficult for them to do now.

They're still dangerous. They're still our number-one enemy. We've got to make sure that we don't let up. But I think that we are in a position where over the next couple of years if we stay on it, that it's going to be very difficult for them to mount the kinds of spectacular attacks that we saw on 9/11. (Obama, 2011c)

This shows that Obama understands the vulnerabilities of an open and free society. This is why terrorism cannot be entirely eliminated and will always be a potential threat. This differs from Bush, who did not want to accept this and increased surveillance on the public.

Obama was not only concerned with non-state actors and with the draw-down of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama made a pivot to focusing on a military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This signals that he is more concerned with power growth from China. His goal was to balance against the rising power of China, a distinctly realist move.

On the limits of potential success in Afghanistan, Obama said,

When it comes to stabilizing Afghanistan, that was always going to be a more difficult and messy task, because it's not just military—it's economic, it's political, it's dealing with the capacity of an Afghan government that doesn't have a history of projecting itself into all parts of the country, tribal and ethnic conflicts that date back centuries. So we always recognized that was going to be more difficult.

I never believed that America could essentially deliver peace and prosperity to all of Afghanistan in a three-, four-, five-year time frame. And I think anybody who believed that didn't know the history and the challenges facing Afghanistan. I mean, this is the third poorest country in the world, with one of the lowest literacy rates and no significant history of a strong civil service or an economy that was deeply integrated with the world economy. It's going to take decades for Afghanistan to fully achieve its potential.

What we can do, and what we are doing, is providing the Afghan government the time and space it needs to become more effective, to serve its people better, to provide better security, to avoid a repetition of all-out civil war that we saw back in the '90s. And what we've also been able to do, I think, is to maintain a international coalition to invest in Afghanistan long beyond the point when it was politically popular to do so. (Obama, 2012b)

This depicts that terrorists, as they enemy, are a different type of threat that is not dealt with the same way as state actors. Obama's ability to understand

different types of enemies and various tactics to employ demonstrates his high cognitive complexity.

When asked about why the United States was hesitant for military intervention in Syria, as they did with Libya, Obama said,

I said at the time with respect to Libya that we would be making these decisions uh on a case-by-case basis based on how unified the international community was, what our capacities were. Uh, but we have been relentless in sending a message that is time for Assad to go, that the kind of violence that we've seen exercised against his own people over this weekend and over the past several months, is inexcusable. But uh not every situation is going to allow for the kind of military solution that we saw. . . . It is important for us to try to resolve this without recourse to outside military intervention and I think that's possible. My sense is you are seeing more and more people inside of Syria recognizing that they need to turn a chapter and the Assad regime is feeling the noose tightening around them. We're gonna just continue to put more and more pressure until hopefully we see a transition. This is not going to be a matter of if; it's going to be a matter of when. (Obama, 2012b)

Along with the military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya had made Obama far more cautious and was, "much less willing to large scale force involving conventional US forces on the ground. The lesson he took away from Iraq and Afghanistan was that didn't work" (Gates, 2017). What we see in Obama's statement above is a reinforced commitment to not act unilaterally. Ultimately the United States did provide support to some anti-Assad militia groups, but in the greater context of fighting ISIS. Obama obviously wanted to see regime change, but would not intervene without international support. The other major variable at this time is Russia. We see far more restraint from Obama when another great power is involved and the cost of action is increased. In other words, the opportunity to spread liberalism in Syria was blocked by Russia, whom Bush and Obama attempted to strengthen relations with but failed due to Russian aggression in Georgia, the Ukraine, and elsewhere (Gates, 2017). There was a high cost for the United States and there was not direct threat posed to the United States. This is more of a realist side of Obama.

Obama believes the mission in Afghanistan was a success stating,

Because of the progress we've made, I was able to sign an historic agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that defines a new kind of relationship between our countries: a future in which Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation and we build an equal partnership between two sovereign states, a future in which the war ends and a new chapter begins. (Obama, 2012c)

This depicts the president's confidence in mission success in Afghanistan growing as he believes he has made great headway in completing his second goal, a sovereign and stable government. With this success, Obama shows more concern for the domestic economy and pivots back stating,

As a new greatest generation returns from overseas, we must ask ourselves: What kind of country will they come back to? Will it be a country where a shrinking number of Americans do really well while a growing number barely get by? Or will it be a country where everyone gets a fair shot, everyone does their fair share, and everyone plays by the same set of rules, a country with opportunity worthy of the troops who protect us?

America has answered this question before. My grandfather, a veteran of Patton's army, got the chance to go to college on the GI bill. My grandmother, who worked on a bomber assembly line, was part of a workforce that turned out the best products on Earth. They contributed to a story of success that every American had the chance to share in: the basic American promise that if you worked hard, you could do well enough to raise a family, own a home, send your kids to college, and put a little away for retirement.

Keeping that promise alive is the defining issue of our time. But it means making responsible choices.

Because we've got more jobs to create, more students to educate, more clean energy to generate, more entrepreneurs with the next great idea, just looking for their shot at success. We've got to invest in things like education and medical research. We've got to build newer and faster transportations and communications networks. And we've got to secure the care and benefits our veterans have earned, so that we serve them as well as they've served us. (Obama, 2012c)

This is important, not only for understanding Obama's policy agenda abroad and domestically, but also provides insight into how he views threats. He maintains the belief that terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda, do pose a threat to the United States; he does not believe that threat is significant enough to abandon a domestic agenda of economic growth. Rather, Obama sought to move away from American front stage dominance in international affairs, which did not pose a debilitating threat, and focus on rebuilding the American economy; the weakened economy was viewed as the greatest threat to American power. To grow American power Obama wanted to stop expending power overseas and grow economic power domestically.

Obama did not rule out having U.S. troops in Afghanistan past 2014, but the conditions of this were limited. He said,

Just to repeat, our main reason, should we have troops in Afghanistan post-2014 at the invitation of the Afghan Government, will be to make sure that we are training, assisting, and advising Afghan security forces who have now taken the lead for and are responsible for security throughout Afghanistan, and an interest that the United States has—the very reason that we went to Afghanistan in the first place—and that is to make sure that Al Qaida and its affiliates cannot launch an attack against the United States or other countries from Afghan soil.

We believe that we can achieve that mission in a way that's very different from the very active presence that we've had in Afghanistan over the last 11 years. President Karzai has emphasized the strains that U.S. troop presences in Afghan villages, for example, have created. Well, that's not going to be a strain that exists if there is a follow-up operation because that will not be our responsibility, that will be the responsibility of the Afghan National Security Forces, to maintain peace and order and stability in Afghan villages, in Afghan territory.

And everything that we've done over the last 10 years, from the perspective of the U.S. national security interest, have been focused on that aim. And I have—at the end of this conflict, we are going to be able to say that the sacrifices that were made by those men and women in uniform has brought about the goal that we sought. (Obama, 2014a)

For Obama, Afghanistan was a success. He had significantly weakened al-Qaeda and eliminated much of their leadership. He also believed he had stabilized a sovereign government. While he certainly did not abandon Afghanistan, it was scaled down dramatically and simply treated as a normal security interest of the United States. Iraq, alternatively, was the reverse, with Obama focusing on Afghanistan and treating Iraq as essentially over, ISIS grew and recaptured his attention while Afghanistan was winding down.

IRAQ

Where George W. Bush viewed Afghanistan and Iraq as interconnected with the unified goal of defeating Islamic terrorism, Obama saw them as entirely separate. Part of Obama's perception rests in the situational context he was operating in. When Bush took office, he benefited from the booming economy of the 1990s and was suddenly thrust into becoming a foreign policy president, managing national and world security. Obama not only inherited two wars, but the worst economic depression since the Great Depression; the expensive wars exacerbated the problem. Obama, then, was much more focused on fixing the economy and he placed American foreign policy

into that agenda, namely by ending combat operations, first in Iraq then in Afghanistan. In other words, Obama was more concerned with butter than guns. This, however, does not mean that he is an isolationist. He simply did not want, nor did he believe the United States could afford, to bear the burden of all international security.

From the beginning of his administration Obama was not interested in “fixing” Iraq; his focus was on removing American troops and supporting the new Iraqi government with diplomacy. This, however, did not mean that Obama did not care about Iraq’s future, nor was he disillusioned with the difficulties Iraq faced. He said,

But let there be no doubt: Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq. Too many fundamental political questions about Iraq’s future remain unresolved. Too many Iraqis are still displaced or destitute. Declining oil revenues will put an added strain on a government that has difficulty delivering basic service. Not all of Iraq’s neighbors are contributing to its security. Some are working at times to undermine it. And even as Iraq’s Government is on a surer footing, it is not yet a full partner, politically and economically, in the region or with the international community. (Obama, 2009c)

Nonetheless, Obama did believe in the potential success of Iraq. The difference between Obama and Bush’s approach was that while Bush wanted to rebuild Iraq in the image of the United States, Obama wanted Iraq to rebuild in the image of Iraqis, by Iraqis, for Iraqis. Believing in their leadership and announcing the end date of combat operations, August 31, 2010, he said,

In short, today there is a renewed cause for hope in Iraq, but that hope is resting on an emerging foundation. On my first full day in office, I directed my national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of our strategy in Iraq to determine the best way to strengthen that foundation, while strengthening American national security. . . . We have acted with careful consideration of events on the ground, with respect for the security agreements between the United States and Iraq, and with a critical recognition that the long-term solution in Iraq must be political, not military, because the most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq’s future must now be made by Iraqis.

Today I can announce that our review is complete, and that the United States will pursue a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility. This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi people and the American people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi Government

that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists. We will help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world. And we will forge a partnership with the people and Government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region. (Obama, 2009c)

There are two big insights to Obama's view of foreign affairs in this statement. First, he does not believe that a continued large American presence will resolve the conflict. This sets him apart from his predecessor, but does not mean he does not believe in American supremacy in the international system. The second perspective revealed is consistent with Bush. Obama clearly believes that the stability of Iraq and suppressing the threat from terrorism from the region is a significant threat to the world system, not just the United States. Further emphasizing that the end to combat operations was a change in strategy and not an abandonment of American support for Iraq, Obama goes on to say,

After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from combat to supporting the Iraqi Government and its security forces as they take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces as long as they remain nonsectarian; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops.

As we remove our combat brigades, we will pursue the second part of our strategy: sustained diplomacy on behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq. The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq's future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend on decisions made by Iraq's leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people. Iraq is a sovereign country with legitimate institutions; America cannot and should not take their place. However, a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort on our part can advance progress and help lay a foundation for lasting peace and security. (Obama, 2009c)

Obama does not view leaving Iraq as failure or military defeat. He simply views the military option as less effective than diplomacy. This is similar to Afghanistan, believing that a paternalistic foreign policy is counterproductive. He does, however, believe in American leadership on the world stage stating,

But this milestone should serve as a reminder to all Americans that the future is ours to shape if we move forward with confidence and commitment. It should

also serve as a message to the world that the United States of America intends to sustain and strengthen our leadership in this young century. (Obama, 2010c)

He emphasizes the differences in situational context from when Bush started the war in Iraq to what the conflict evolved into. He said,

From this desk, seven and a half years ago, President Bush announced the beginning of military operations in Iraq. Much has changed since that night. A war to disarm a state became a fight against an insurgency. Terrorism and sectarian warfare threatened to tear Iraq apart. (Obama, 2010c)

The nature of the enemy in Iraq began as a threat from a state regime and evolved into an endless battle against non-state actors, connected to an ideology more than a territory. Bush did not fully adapt to this change, but it is what Obama started with. Discussing the new role of America's military in Iraq, he said,

Going forward, a transitional force of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq with a different mission: advising and assisting Iraq's Security Forces; supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our civilians. Consistent with our agreement with the Iraqi government, all U.S. troops will leave by the end of next year. As our military draws down, our dedicated civilians—diplomats, aid workers, and advisors—are moving into the lead to support Iraq as it strengthens its government, resolves political disputes, resettles those displaced by war, and builds ties with the region and the world. And that is a message that Vice President Biden is delivering to the Iraqi people through his visit there today.

Today, old adversaries are at peace, and emerging democracies are potential partners. New markets for our goods stretch from Asia to the Americas. A new push for peace in the Middle East will begin here tomorrow. Billions of young people want to move beyond the shackles of poverty and conflict. As the leader of the free world, America will do more than just defeat on the battlefield those who offer hatred and destruction—we will also lead among those who are willing to work together to expand freedom and opportunity for all people. (Obama, 2010c)

For Obama, again, the path forward is economic. He wants to build economic ties, strengthen developing economies, and has faith in developing democracies to support the economic growth. In this sense, Obama reveals his affinity for liberalism, albeit different from the liberalism of George W. Bush. Emphasizing this belief in economic liberalism, he said,

This weekend, I'm concluding a trip to Asia whose purpose was to open new markets for American products in this fast-growing part of the world. The economic battle for these markets is fierce, and we're up against strong competitors. But as I've said many times, America doesn't play for second place. The future we're fighting for isn't as the world's largest importer, consuming products made elsewhere, but as the world's largest manufacturer of ideas and goods sold around the world.

Opening new markets will not only help America's businesses create new jobs for American workers, it will also help us reduce our deficits, because the single greatest tool for getting our fiscal house in order is robust economic growth. (Obama, 2010d).

In contrast to Bush, Obama did not seek to use unilateral military force to create new democracies and reshape the world system. His goal was to create a system of interconnected and interdependent economies that would yield a peaceful and prosperous world system. In creating the new government of Iraq, George W. Bush's perceptions and policies could be viewed as paternalistic, whereas Obama treated the new government much more as a sovereign government, a key ally in the region. He said,

Today I'm proud to welcome Prime Minister Maliki, the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant, and democratic Iraq. We're here to mark the end of this war, to honor the sacrifices of all those who made this day possible, and to turn the page, begin a new chapter in the history between our countries, a normal relationship between sovereign nations, an equal partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect.

We're partnering to expand the ties between our citizens, especially our young people. Through efforts like the Fulbright Program, we're welcoming more Iraqi students and future leaders to America to study and form friendships that will bind our nations together for generations to come. And we'll forge more collaborations in areas like science and technology.

And finally, we're partnering for regional security. For just as Iraq has pledged not to interfere in other nations, other nations must not interfere in Iraq. Iraq's sovereignty must be respected. And meanwhile, there should be no doubt, the drawdown in Iraq has allowed us to refocus our resources, achieve progress in Afghanistan, put Al Qaida on the path to defeat, and to better prepare for the full range of challenges that lie ahead.

Our view is a sovereign Iraq that can protect its borders, protect its airspace, protect its people. And our security cooperation with other countries I think is a model for our security cooperation with Iraq. We don't want to create big

footprints inside of Iraq—and that’s, I think, demonstrated by what will happen at the end of this month, which is we’re getting our troops out. But we will have a very active relationship, military-to-military, that will, hopefully, enhance Iraqi capabilities and will assure that we’ve got a strong partner in the region that is going to be effective. (Obama, 2011d)

As Obama “ends” the war in Iraq the crisis in Syria emerges, causing disruption throughout the region and specifically bolstered the insurgency in Iraq. Being questioned about the connection between Syria and Iraq, as well as his policy on Assad, Obama said,

I have expressed my outrage in how the Syrian regime has been operating. I do believe that President Assad missed an opportunity to reform his Government, chose the path of repression, and has continued to engage in repressive tactics so that his credibility, his capacity to regain legitimacy inside Syria, I think, is deeply eroded . . .

But we believe that international pressure, the approach we’ve taken along with partners around the world to impose tough sanctions and to call on Asad to step down, a position that is increasingly mirrored by the Arab League states, is the right position to take. (Obama, 2010c)

With the increase in insurgency in Iraq, coming from the crisis in Syria, Obama made the decision to redeploy an increased number of U.S. military back to Iraq. He blames the destabilization of Iraq on domestic political factions not working cohesively, thus requiring American intervention for reasons of security, stating,

I think we did exactly what we should have done, which is to turn over to Iraq a country that had the capacity, the ability to govern itself if all the parties involved—Shia, Sunni and Kurd—were prepared to make compromises with each other.

And I think the American people understood that whatever the debate about originally going in, our troops made enormous sacrifices to give the Iraqi people that chance. Unfortunately, that trust between those parties has never fully cohered. And now we’re seeing some of the consequences of that. (Obama, 2014d)

In other words, the president decided that the context of the situation had yet again changed. Upon entering of White House, he did not view a significant threat within Iraq. With the rise of ISIS, that perception was altered. On the significance of this threat he said,

I think it's fair to say that their extreme ideology poses a medium- and long-term threat. Right now the problem with ISIS is the fact that they are destabilizing a country that could spill over into some of our, you know, allies, like Jordan, and that they are engaged in wars in Syria where, in that vacuum that's been created, they could amass more arms, more resources. (Obama, 2014b)

Fully characterizing his perception of ISIS, Obama states,

First of all, let's be clear. ISIL is a threat not only to Iraq but also the region and, ultimately, over the long term could be a threat to the United States. This is an extreme group of the sort we haven't seen before, but it also combines terrorist tactics with on-the-ground capabilities, in part, because they incorporated a lot of Saddam Hussein's old military commanders. And, you know, this is a threat that we are committed not only to degrade but, ultimately, destroy. It's going to take some time. What we knew was that phase one was getting an Iraqi government. That was inclusive and credible. And we now have done that. And so now what we've done is rather than just try to halt ISIL's momentum. We're now in a position to start going on some offense. The airstrikes have been very effective in degrading ISIL's capabilities and slowing the advance that they were making. Now what we need is ground troops, Iraqi ground troops that can start pushing them back. (Obama, 2014g)

Emphasizing American leadership worldwide, Obama says,

Abroad, American leadership is the one constant in an uncertain world. It is America that has the capacity and the will to mobilize the world against terrorists. It is America that has rallied the world against Russian aggression and in support of the Ukrainian peoples' right to determine their own destiny. It is America—our scientists, our doctors, our know-how—that can help contain and cure the outbreak of Ebola. It is America that helped remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons so that they can't pose a threat to the Syrian people or the world again. And it is America that is helping Muslim communities around the world not just in the fight against terrorism, but in the fight for opportunity and tolerance and a more hopeful future. (Obama, 2014e)

Throughout the remainder of his presidency Obama maintained that the United States' increase in air support and troops on the group working with Iraqi military was all in support of Iraq, not a show of American power dominance. He said,

This advances the limited military objectives we've outlined in Iraq: protecting American citizens, providing advice and assistance to Iraqi forces as they battle

these terrorists, and joining with international partners to provide humanitarian aid. But as I said when I authorized these operations, there is no American military solution to the larger crisis in Iraq. The only lasting solution is for Iraqis to come together and form an inclusive Government, one that represents the legitimate interests of all Iraqis and one that can unify the country's fight against ISIL. (Obama, 2014d)

This hands-off strategy of support was not always the policy that was followed. Obama authorized the use of force to protect civilians, preventing humanitarian atrocities. Speaking of one mission, he said,

Now, I've said before, the United States cannot and should not intervene every time there's a crisis in the world. So let me be clear about why we must act and act now. When we face a situation like we do on that mountain, with innocent people facing the prospect of violence on a horrific scale; when we have a mandate to help, in this case, a request from the Iraqi Government; and when we have the unique capabilities to help avert a massacre, then I believe the United States of America cannot turn a blind eye. We can act carefully and responsibly to prevent a potential act of genocide. That's what we're doing on that mountain. I've therefore authorized targeted airstrikes, if necessary, to help forces in Iraq as they fight to break the siege of Mount Sinjar and protect the civilians trapped there. (Obama, 2014c)

This reveals something about Obama's foreign policy strategy. First, he makes it clear that the United States should not intervene and act unchecked around the globe. That is not in American interests. However, action may be taken when it is of low cost and in the support of American values, in this case protecting innocent people. This singular incident is an act consistent with the goals of liberalism, but it is not the standard or core of Obama's foreign policy. Perhaps then, the real Obama doctrine is one of pragmatic defensive realism, but liberal actions are permitted when the cost is low and the moral consequence is high.

Because of the low cost of missions such as the mountain rescue, I argue that these actions should not be used to define a states foreign policy. This is of particular importance for great powers, because they can afford to take some actions that are not in their direct benefit, without threatening any loss to their relative power.

Further emphasizing the connection of operations in Syria and Iraq, Obama says,

But that's not the sole measure of whether we are "winning" or not. Remember, our first focus, Ed, here is to drive ISIL out of Iraq. And what we're doing in

Syria is, first and foremost, in service of reducing ISIL's capacity to resupply and send troops and then run back in over the Syrian border; to eventually reestablish a border between Iraq and Syria so that slowly, Iraq regains control of its security and its territory. That is our number-one mission. That is our number-one focus. (Obama, 2014f)

Stating the goals against ISIS, Obama says,

Today, the United States and our Armed Forces continue to lead the global coalition in our mission to destroy the terrorist group ISIL. As I outlined in my speech to the Nation last weekend, our strategy is moving forward with a great sense of urgency on four fronts: hunting down and taking out these terrorists; training and equipping Iraqi and Syrian forces to fight ISIL on the ground; stopping ISIL's operations by disrupting their recruiting, financing, and propaganda; and finally, persistent diplomacy to end the Syrian civil war so that everyone can focus on destroying ISIL. (Obama, 2015a)

And success was measured by the elimination of terrorist leaders. He said,

We're also taking out ISIL leaders, commanders, and killers one by one. Since this spring, we've removed Abu Sayyaf, one of their top leaders; Haji Mutazz, ISIL's second in command; Junaid Hussain, a top online recruiter; Mohammed Emwazi, who brutally murdered Americans and others; and in recent weeks, finance chief Abu Saleh, senior extortionist Abu Maryam, and weapons trafficker Abu Rahman al-Tunisi. The list goes on. (Obama, 2015a)

Part of Obama's success in combating ISIS was correcting misperceptions and mending poor relationships. ISIS and al-Qaeda are Sunni organizations, but Obama was successful by mobilizing the Sunni population to fight the insurgency. He said,

So part of my discussion with Prime Minister Abadi was, how do we make sure that we get more recruits in? A big part of the answer there is our outreach to Sunni tribes.

We've seen Sunni tribes who are not only willing and prepared to fight ISIL, but have been successful at rebuffing ISIL. But it has not been happening as fast as it needs to. And so one of the efforts that I'm hoping to see out of Prime Minister Abadi and the Iraqi legislature when they're in session is to move forward on a National Guard law that would help to devolve some of the security efforts in places like Anbar to local folks and to get those Sunni tribes involved more rapidly. (Obama, 2015b)

The threat was not from Iraqi citizens, but from fighters coming into Iraq for the purpose of supporting ISIS. Obama said, “we are still seeing thousands of foreign fighters flowing into, first, Syria, and then, oftentimes, ultimately into Iraq” (Obama, Z). This shows that the source of threat is not Iraq itself, but it is the extremist ideology throughout the region and world.

Obama downplayed the threat from Russia, believing that the United States had far more support worldwide. He said,

Iran and Asad make up Mr. Putin’s coalition at the moment. The rest of the world makes up ours. So I don’t think people are fooled by the current strategy. It does not mean that we could not see Mr. Putin begin to recognize that it is in their interests to broker a political settlement. And as I said in New York, we’re prepared to work with the Russians and the Iranians, as well as our partners who are part of the anti-ISIL coalition, to come up with that political transition. And nobody pretends that it’s going to be easy, but I think it is still possible. And so we will maintain lines of communication. (Obama, 2015d)

Furthering the precepting that ISIS is a worldwide threat, he said,

Now, tragically, Paris is not alone. We’ve seen outrageous attacks by ISIL in Beirut, last month in Ankara, routinely in Iraq. Here at the G-20, our nations have sent an unmistakable message that we are united against this threat. ISIL is the face of evil. Our goal, as I’ve said many times, is to degrade and ultimately destroy this barbaric terrorist organization. (Obama, 2015d)

Obama, however, did not believe this called for an increase in U.S. military force worldwide. He did not view the utility in that, nor would there have been a clear strategy for where to attack ISIS. In other words, a war on ISIS would have no clear battlefield or objective outside of Iraq and Syria. On this, he said,

And let’s assume that we were to send 50,000 troops into Syria. What happens when there’s a terrorist attack generated from Yemen? Do we then send more troops into there? Or Libya, perhaps? Or if there’s a terrorist network that’s operating anywhere else in North Africa or in Southeast Asia? (Obama 2015d)

Obama did not view terrorism as a traditional enemy. He understood the differences in tactical approach and remained focused on combating the ideology more than the group itself, stating,

The—this is not, as I said, a traditional military opponent. We can retake territory. And as long as we leave our troops there, we can hold it, but that does not

solve the underlying problem of eliminating the dynamics that are producing these kinds of violent extremist groups. (Obama, 2015d)

The fight against ISIS shows two parts of Obama's strategy. First, like in Afghanistan, he was reliant on the international community for support. He said,

Nearly two dozen nations—among them Turkey and our Arab partners—contribute in some way to the military campaign, which has taken more than 8,000 strikes against ISIL so far. And as I've said, we're ready to welcome or cooperate with other countries that are determined to truly fight ISIL as well. Fifteen countries have deployed personnel to train and support local forces in Iraq. The United Arab Emirates and Germany are organizing 25 coalition partners in helping to stabilize areas in Iraq liberated from ISIL. Italy is coordinating the multinational effort to train Iraqi police. (Obama, 2015e)

Second, Obama believed American values would combat ISIS ideology. He said,

We're strengthened by people from every religion, including Muslim Americans. So I want to be as clear as I can on this: Prejudice and discrimination helps ISIL and undermines our national security. And so, even as we destroy ISIL on the battlefield—and we will destroy them—we will take back land that they are currently in. We will cut off their financing. We will hunt down their leadership. We will dismantle their networks and their supply lines, and we will ultimately destroy them. Even as we are in the process of doing that, we want to make sure that we don't lose our own values and our own principles. And we can all do our part by upholding the values of tolerance and diversity and equality that help keep America strong. (Obama, 2015e)

OPERATIONAL CODE

President Obama's OpCode is depicted in tables 5.1 and 5.2. His perception of the nature of the political universe (P-1) is very different in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq. His view of Afghanistan became increasingly positive over the course of his presidency, rising from 0.19 to 0.35. This is due to the increased stability of the government, with successful elections and transitions of power, as well as the success in killing Osama bin Laden. His perception in Iraq, however, became increasingly hostile beginning at 0.34 to 0.10. At the start of his presidency, Obama's goal was to leave Iraq and that he did put as much effort in ensuring the stability of the withdrawal. As the situation

Table 5.1

Belief	Diagnostic Propensities	Base	Afghanistan 9–10	Afghanistan 11–13	Iraq 9–11	Iraq 14–16
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.23	0.19	0.35	0.34	0.10
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.13	0.04	0.17	0.25	-0.05
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.22	0.29	0.51	0.58	0.28
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.27	0.36
P-5	Role of Chance	0.91	0.88	0.78	0.84	0.90
	Choice and Shift Propensities					
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.33	0.21
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.14	0.02
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.57	0.23	0.23	0.57	0.29
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics					
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.80	0.78	0.75	0.67	0.79
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.13	0.66	0.96	0.48	0.68
I-5	Utility of Means					
	(a) Reward	0.15	0.18	0.19	0.15	0.15
	(b) Promise	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.05
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.39	0.36	0.36	0.39	0.41
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.17	0.18	0.06	0.11	0.11
	(e) Threaten	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.14	0.10
	(f) Punish	0.17	0.15	0.29	0.09	0.19

Table 5.2

<i>Image of terrorists</i>	<i>Capability</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Intentions</i>	<i>Decision-Makers</i>	<i>Threat or Opportunity</i>
Rogue	Inferior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat

deteriorated and the strength of ISIS grew, along with the combination of the hostile situation in Syria, Obama became increasingly negative in his view.

Obama's belief in the realization of his political values (P-2) and predictability of the political future (P-3) follow the same trend, becoming more optimistic about the future of Afghanistan and more pessimistic about Iraq.

Control over historical development (P-4), however, shows a different trend. This index remained fairly stable over the course of Afghanistan, but increased in Iraq. Reconciled with his uncertainty of success perhaps this means that Obama believes the United States will have an influence, but is not sure what that influence will be. Alternatively, the measure could be picking up beliefs in success against ISIS late in his presidency.

Strategically Obama is cooperative (I-1) and remains consistent in cooperation in Afghanistan, but becomes slightly less cooperative in Iraq. And consistent with his behavior of strategizing the conflicts, he is very flexible in his approach to problem-solving.

Obama's risk orientation (I-3) varies the most of any of the instrumental variables and appears consistent with the changes in the philosophical indices. Varying from 0 to 1, with higher scores being more risk acceptant. His base score is 0.57, the same as the early Iraq score. The score for later in Iraq dropped to 0.29, similar to his beliefs on Afghanistan throughout his administration. The higher level of risk acceptance toward Iraq early in his administration is likely due to his perception that Iraq was more stable than it proved to be. Alternatively, he was well aware of the fragility of Afghanistan.

Finally, in the pursuit of his objectives (I-5), Obama most frequently makes appeals for support, which is consistent with his belief in collective action for collective security and not pursuing unilateral action.

Obama's image of the threats in the Middle East is similar to George W. Bush's, the only difference being the level of threat perceived. His perception of both terrorist organizations and anti-U.S. regimes in the region, namely Gadaffi and Assad, is the rogue image. Overall, Obama has a significantly lower perception of threat than Bush of both the non-state and state actors; he is more confident in the security of the United States. He believes the capabilities are inferior and the culture is inferior. The inferiority of culture is evident through many statements that terrorist organizations do not represent the culture or ideology of the region, particularly the Muslim faith.

The intentions of the terrorists are obviously harmful and pose a threat to the security of the country and the international community. Completing the image, Obama perceives the structure of the organization as led by a small elite and believed he was successful in his mission when he eliminated top leadership.

DEFENSIVE REALIST OR A NEW TYPE OF IDEALIST?

President Obama's foreign policy shows elements of both realism and idealism, similar to Jimmy Carter, but he was not operating in an environment of international constraints. Rather, his constraint was a declining domestic economy. At its core the intention of his policy is to strengthen the power of the United States economically and stop expending U.S. power fighting non-state actors that cannot be militarily defeated in their entirety. Along with his lower perceptions of threat and reserved approach to international action Obama fits into the defensive realist box.

He does, however, make strong appeals to human rights and democracy. He also openly took actions in support of an idealist agenda, although noted these actions were not of a high cost. Further, he is highly supportive of international institutions and collective security action. On the UN he said,

I would like to talk to you about a subject that is at the heart of the United Nations: the pursuit of peace in an imperfect world.

War and conflict have been with us since the beginning of civilizations. But in the first part of the 20th century, the advance of modern weaponry led to death on a staggering scale. It was this killing that compelled the founders of this body to build an institution that was focused not just on ending one war, but on averting others; a union of sovereign states that would seek to prevent conflict, while also addressing its causes.

No American did more to pursue this objective than President Franklin Roosevelt. He knew that a victory in war was not enough. As he said at one of the very first meetings on the founding of the United Nations, "We have got to make not merely peace, but a peace that will last." (Obama, 2011b)

This perception of the potential for the international system to be defined by permanent peace puts Obama into the idealist camp. He is not simply arguing that peace can be maintained, but rather arguing that peace can be manufactured, through noble policy and cooperation, a characteristic of the system. This, however, is a long-term goal and Obama recognized the insecurity of the existing system, going on to say,

But let us remember: Peace is hard. Peace is hard. Progress can be reversed. Prosperity comes slowly. Societies can split apart. The measure of our success must be whether people can live in sustained freedom, dignity, and security. And the United Nations and its member states must do their part to support those basic aspirations. And we have more work to do.

...

We believe that each nation must chart its own course to fulfill the aspirations of its people, and America does not expect to agree with every party or person who expresses themselves politically. But we will always stand up for the universal rights that were embraced by this Assembly. Those rights depend on elections that are free and fair, on governance that is transparent and accountable, respect for the rights of women and minorities, justice that is equal and fair. That is what our people deserve. Those are the elements of peace that can last.

Moreover, the United States will continue to support those nations that transition to democracy with greater trade and investment so that freedom is followed by opportunity. We will pursue a deeper engagement with governments, but also with civil society: students and entrepreneurs, political parties and the press. We have banned those who abuse human rights from traveling to our country, and we've sanctioned those who trample on human rights abroad. And we will always serve as a voice for those who've been silenced.

...

Ultimately, peace depends upon compromise among people who must live together long after our speeches are over, long after our votes have been tallied. That's the lesson of Northern Ireland, where ancient antagonists bridged their differences. That's the lesson of Sudan, where a negotiated settlement led to an independent state. And that is and will be the path to a Palestinian state: negotiations between the parties. (Obama, 2011b)

In this part of his speech, we again see an idealist perception, based on the support of liberal democracy, as a long-term goal, but also the short-term policy of compromise and acceptance of imperfection. In this way, Obama is similar to his predecessor, Jimmy Carter. Both presidents had visions of a peaceful world, but were under no illusion that they could force that change within the scope of their time as president. Rather, their foreign policy was reserved and focused on maintaining American power, while supporting long-term goals of collective through organizations, namely the UN; neither Obama nor Carter believed the world could be made peaceful with efforts of the United States alone. Noting the steps that have been taken and visible progress, Obama continues on stating,

To bring prosperity to our people, we must promote the growth that creates opportunity. In this effort, let us not forget that we've made enormous progress over the last several decades. Closed societies gave way to open markets. Innovation and entrepreneurship has transformed the way we live and the things that we do. Emerging economies from Asia to the Americas have lifted hundreds of millions of people from poverty. It's an extraordinary achievement. And yet 3 years ago, we were confronted with the worst financial crisis in eight decades. And that crisis proved a fact that has become clearer with each passing year: Our fates are interconnected. In a global economy, nations will rise or fall together.

...

And to make sure our societies reach their potential, we must allow our citizens to reach theirs. No country can afford the corruption that plagues the world like a cancer. Together, we must harness the power of open societies and open economies. That's why we've partnered with countries from across the globe to launch a new partnership on open government that helps ensure accountability and helps to empower citizens. No country should deny people their rights to freedom of speech and freedom of religion, but also no country should deny people their rights because of who they love, which is why we must stand up for the rights of gays and lesbians everywhere.

And no country can realize its potential if half its population cannot reach theirs. This week, the United States signed a new Declaration on Women's Participation. Next year, we should each announce the steps we are taking to break down the economic and political barriers that stand in the way of women and girls. This is what our commitment to human progress demands . . .

It is the nature of our imperfect world that we are first—forced to learn these lessons over and over again. Conflict and repression will endure so long as some people refuse to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Yet that is precisely why we have built institutions like this: to bind our fates together, to help us recognize ourselves in each other. Because those who came before us believed that peace is preferable to war and freedom is preferable to suppression and prosperity is preferable to poverty. That's the message that comes not from capitals, but from citizens, from our people. . . . Peace is hard, but we know that it is possible. So, together, let us be resolved to see that it is defined by our hopes and not by our fears. Together, let us make peace, but a peace, most importantly, that will last. (Obama, 2011b)

This speech at the United Nations reveals some very important beliefs of President Obama. First, he believes that a permanent peace is possible, which is a strictly liberal belief. Second, he believes that international institutions

are key to achieving a peace that will last. This is, again, very different from the form of liberalism of George W. Bush. Bush believed so strongly in American values and held a black-and-white image of the world that he was unaccepting of alternatives. Obama was much more open to alternatives in government style and cultural values, to an extent. In this light, Obama is very much an institutional liberal. Recall from the previous chapter that Bush was very frustrated and saw institutions as a roadblock to his liberal objectives.

In sum, Obama exhibits traits of both a defensive realist and an institutional idealist. He does not perceive the threat of terrorists as extreme as George W. Bush and did not have the same systemic constraints from other state actors as Jimmy Carter, but “in other ways he was much more aggressive than Bush, but more narrow and specific targets. He deployed special forces and extensively used drones” (Gates, 2017). Obama was careful to not expend U.S. power without a clear benefit, but made strides toward expanding the liberal world order when the opportunity was presented. In this light, he is a defensive realist at the core, but also an opportunistic idealist.

Chapter 6

Donald Trump

Donald John Trump was born on June 14, 1946, in the Queens borough of New York City, where his father had cemented the family fortune and name in the real estate industry. Trump would become the fourth of five children to second- and first-generation immigrants—his father of German descent and his mother having emigrated from Scotland just sixteen years before as an eighteen-year-old young woman. Trump spent his entire childhood and adolescence in New York City, and would spend the vast majority of his adult life there, learning the family business from his father—as he had from his father—before setting out on his own to build his personal brand and approach to real estate in Manhattan.

Trump has forged himself, and his name, as a brand meticulously honed over decades. He projects a very particular self-image that was in no small part aided by media and tabloids captivated by the lavishness and dramatization of a New York City playboy. Aside from exposure to his father's work ethic and built reputation, Trump's awareness and drive for recognition possibly was provoked originally in a formative event in November 1964 on a trip home from college:

[Trump joined his father] for the opening ceremony for the elegant, daring Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. . . . Amid the pageantry, [Trump] noticed the city officials barely acknowledged the bridge's eighty-five-year old designer, Othmar Ammann. Although the day had been sunny and cloudless, Trump would remember pouring rain years later when he recalled Ammann's standing off to the side, alone. "Nobody even mentioned his name," Trump said. "I realized then and there that if you let people treat you how they want, you'll be a fool. I realized then and there something I would never forget: I don't want to be made anybody's sucker." (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 45)

His father, Fred, told a young Trump that he was a “‘king’ and needed to become a ‘killer’ in anything he did” (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 37). Yet, for all the wealth that Fred had accumulated he was averse to spoiling his children, instead making them work to earn money. Later becoming involved in the family business, Trump was socialized by the economical and shrewd approach his father took to development. From his father’s lessons and from his own realizations about self-promotion, Trump developed a potent self-confidence. His self-confidence could be described as reckless, if not at least fantastically arrogant. Trump displayed this sometimes detached self-confidence through the years in behavior such as promoting in 2006 his ambitious \$3-billion housing investment vehicle and hyping the health of the economy while publicly disagreeing with expert skepticism about downward trending indicators; and in 1984 criticizing President Ronald Reagan’s efforts at nuclear arms reductions, saying he was more than capable of doing better and would only need “an hour and a half to learn everything there is to learn about missiles . . . [and already knows] most of it anyways” (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 276).

Trump joined his father full-time in the family business after graduating from college in 1968.¹ Likely one of the most influential generational effects on Fred Trump was enduring the Great Depression through his mid-twenties, which most likely contributed to his tireless work ethic and risk-averse financial outlook. And borne from these he found safety in a simple business model that proved to be economically resilient and quite profitable: building middle-class housing in Queens, Staten Island, and Brooklyn (Kranish and Fisher, 2016). For Trump, though, with a business model founded on the middle-class came problems also of the middle-class: the people living in the buildings they built and managed. The profit margins were not enough to outweigh the issues and regulations the Trumps had to contend with (e.g., equal opportunity housing, rent control, and protections for minorities). By the early 1970s Trump and the self-image he was cultivating were becoming wary of his father’s business model as well as living in his father’s shadow of achievement. For all of Fred’s constant and disciplined tutoring to mold Trump into his successor, it did more to instill within Trump profound entitlement and a cannibalistic individualism. Both of these played into Trump’s self-image as an infallible prodigy and deserved heir to New York’s upper class, which he would protect at all costs. In 1973, amid a brutally damaging federal lawsuit brought against the Trumps for racial discrimination, the younger Trump would not capitulate and settle as they were initially and widely advised, but instead found his chief strategist of self-image: Roy Cohn.

Cohn, whom Trump became acquainted with through their mutual, exclusive social circles, provided for Trump a strategy continuum that he would go on to internalize and employ for the next four decades. Cohn was a lawyer turned informal adviser, publicist, and conduit to New York's elite for Trump, and insisted that Trump admit nothing and fight the case in the name of government overreach (Kranish and Fisher, 2016). Cohn's strategy was a succession of attack, parry and riposte, relaunching at the same problem from disparate angles whenever the previous tactic failed. It was more for intimidation and sowing doubt than it was about logical or principled purity. There was hardly any downside, since the misinformation or misdirection at least could change the post-narrative. Even if it ended in acquiescence and negotiations, the defending side could demand a private settlement so the fault and damages would never be known publicly and the post-narrative could cloud any actual deviance. The strategy is exemplified in the Trumps' defense of the 1973 federal lawsuit charging them and their business with racial bias. Cohn and the Trumps began by immediately fighting the charges and progressing along the continuum through countersuit intimidation and then to gaslighting. When the threat continued, a gentler tone was struck with negotiations, and then spinning the loss and capitulation ultimately into a lie. By 1975 the Trumps settled, though Trump insisted publicly that the case was never actually against him or his father (it was the individual landlords acting collectively alone, he argued), and that settling was not an admission of guilt but the best possible of outcomes (Kranish and Fisher, 2016).

Though the Trumps were developers by profession, they were not outside of the politics. Trump was involved in politics early on and learned from his father's transactional attitude toward equal-opportunity donations that money generally solved problems and bought influence. Since at least the early 1980s, Trump publicly maintained that he had no partisan leanings and freely supported candidates of opposing parties—sometimes simultaneously. During the 1980 presidential election cycle, Trump donated to Carter's campaign while helping Ronald Reagan, Carter's challenger, raise money. His lay, though celebrity-level, public statements on foreign policy issues, such as ending violence in Central America and speeding up nuclear disarmament, resonated with the Democratic Party. Equally, the Republican Party courted him on economic policy. Trump, his parents, and two siblings, each donated the maximum federal limit to Carter's re-election campaign, and not until four years after Reagan took office did Trump donate to Reagan (Grimaldi, 2015). Yet, Trump and his father reportedly served on Reagan's finance committee from 1979 to 1980 and attended his campaign launch announcement (Grimaldi, 2015).

By 1987 Trump was courted heavily by both parties because of his name recognition, the money he could inject into individual campaign and party coffers, and from voicing opinions on policies that resonated with both parties. Citing Trump's more progressive opinions on foreign policy, the Speaker of the House John Kerry and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee chairman Jim Wright pitched Trump to headline the biggest Democratic congressional fundraiser in 1987 (Hohman, 2016). When Republican officials, in both the White House and in the Senate, found out about the pitch, they reached out to Trump to implore him to reconsider out of fear he would nationally become personally associated with one party. By stroking his ego through recognizing him and his potential for influence, the Republicans were able to get Trump to reconsider the event (Hohman, 2016). The Republican Party, for its part, felt Trump represented well some of their fundamental positions on the economy. Republicans believed his views on America's perceived slide global standing wrapped up neatly within Reagan's campaign slogan "Let's Make America Great Again." Trump had expressed continuously his discontent with America's standing in the world—or at least his perception of the country's standing vis-à-vis other countries hustling the largesse of America's presidents who held weak or foolish foreign policies. The Republican Party attempted to recruit him to run in the next year's election, adding on to Reagan's legacy following his two terms in office. Trump ultimately decided not to throw his hat in the ring for Republican nominee, but the national attention, media coverage and intrigue piqued his interest for office.

Into the late 1990s, Trump became and was a vocal supporter of William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton, the two-term Democratic president who knocked off Reagan's Republican successor, George H.W. Bush, in the 1992 election (Kranish and Fisher, 2016). Trump had offered personal public praise of Clinton and disparaged in public at least one sexual harassment accuser of Clinton's—even going so far as to become competitive with the hypothetical controversy he himself would likely face in office compared to Clinton's; Trump predicted in 1998, and correctly, that if elected to office he probably would face more controversy because of his historical interactions with women (Kranish and Fisher, 2016). Following the fallout of Clinton's impeachment, who was then at the end of his second, and final term, Trump again considered a run for candidacy in the 2000 election cycle, this time possibly succeeding the Democratic incumbent.

Trump's political leanings became widely known to vacillate at will. In 1999, seeing his challengers as both established party members (i.e., Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Albert Arnold "Al" Gore Jr.), and upon the advice of a long-time adviser and associate, Roger Stone,

Trump formed an exploratory committee to consider the feasibility of a third-party campaign. In October 1999, Trump announced on *Larry King Live* that he was leaving the Republican Party for the Reform Party. By February 2000, he had already ended his pursuit for presidential candidacy and threw his support behind Hillary Rodham Clinton of the Democratic Party in her bid for Senator in his home state of New York (Kranish and Fisher, 2016). In 2001, Hillary Clinton had won her campaign and Trump, who had recently become independent, switched to the Democratic Party. In 2008, Trump publicly criticized then Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain and praised the eventual Democratic candidate Senator Barack Obama. By 2011, Trump “[was bashing] Obama with an intensity that he had never displayed for Obama’s predecessors” (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 291). The following year, he returned to the Republican Party. In all, between 1999 and 2012, Trump switched parties seven times (Kranish and Fisher, 2016).

For all of his waffling and self-serving allegiances, Trump had long voiced political and social attitudes that suggested an abstract but coherent idealism. His idealism spoke, at least in part, to a sizeable portion of America’s public who felt willfully disenfranchised and left behind by the coastal elites and especially by those in charge in Washington, DC. Even if he was a billionaire, he had a knack for populist appeal, vocally painting an image of himself attempting to reestablish some former golden era of prosperity and dominance that could only be realized by wresting back control of society from some alternating group of elites and conspirators who are and have been holding him (and the country) down and preventing him (and the country) from flourishing. In 2016, a description spread internationally across the Associated Press newswire depicting Trump as the “blue-collar billionaire” who connected with the middle-class, to which Trump claimed was accurate and owed to his socialization working with the laborers on the construction sites of his father’s development projects while he was growing up. In addition to his aversion to political correctness, what also resonated well with the “forgotten” voters was that Trump was wealthy enough to speak truth to power without fear of reputational damage or being muzzled. Ironically, his wealth was the key to the middle and lower classes identifying with and respecting him. Trump’s now-famous campaign slogan, “Make American Great Again,”² is a suggestive and empty canvas for voters to build in their own minds what it specifically means, but at bottom all agreeing that the country has deviated and needs to be restored to some ideal of national pride, strength and universal prosperity. Todd Harris, the 2016 campaign strategist to Republican presidential hopeful Senator Marco Rubio, described Trump’s appeal as,

You had an environment where you had literally hundreds of thousands of people who lost their homes or were upside down, lost their jobs or retirement savings, and saw in their political system that not a damn thing was being done about it. . . . At the same time, you had Republicans sweep into power saying they were going to clean up Washington, and nothing changed. . . . The anger was just underneath the surface, and all [Trump] needed to do was churn the waters a little bit. (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 318)

After being laughed off the stage and dismissed as a sideshow during the 2012 contest for Republican presidential nominee, Trump only promoted his message of “America first” harder and attacked Obama more viciously for issues generally unrelated to his presidency—most notably continuing to push the fabricated claim that Obama was not an American citizen. Trump was not only able to pinpoint and vocalize precisely what was angering so many voters who felt left behind, but he did so having the benefit of a long-honed and carefully crafted public image that had been within the tabloids, media, cinema and social ether for over four decades. In 1976, the *New York Times* ran a profile on the up-and-coming developer, breathing life into the self-image Trump had been trying to project throughout Manhattan and giving the American public an image, a platonic ideal, of the American spirit: beauty, strength, and economic and physical virility:

He is tall, lean and blond, with dazzling white teeth, and he looks ever so much like Robert Redford. He rides around town in a chauffeured silver Cadillac with his initials, DJT, on the plates. He dates slinky fashion models, belongs to the most elegant clubs and, at only 30 years of age, he estimates his worth “more than \$200 million.” (Klemesrud, 1976)³

He, in the public’s mind, was not only representative of what America used to be and how strong and enriching it could be, but he was substantively real and actually paying attention to them. As much as Trump blamed his problems on others, scapegoating his own behavior onto others who were either defenseless or got in his way, a good portion of the country was just as ready to unburden themselves of the residual ruin the financial crisis had wrought and re-“Americanize” eight years of a progressive agenda that had carved out too much for too many people who were either not deserving or did not belong. The American public responded to its own projection of its more isolationist and perverted idealism, while Trump just appealed to “the darker side of the American personality” (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 335). In studies using 2018 data, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported that the number of hate groups in the United States had reached a record high, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation reported hate-related violence against individuals had reached a sixteen-year high (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019; Triesman, 2019). Though these are trends that have become headlines during Trump's presidency, they have been within modern American society since the pivotal epoch of the 1960s;⁴ racial animosity and a more polarized partisan electorate has been taking shape since Lyndon B. Johnson firmly affiliated the Democratic Party with the Civil Rights Movement. It was hoped that Obama's presidency would deliver American society into a post-racial political era, but instead racial resentment and ethno-nationalism have risen and have predicted voting choice among whites since 2012 (Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019).

If Trump's rhetoric caught a wave that has been in motion since at least the 1960s, it was also due in no small part to the substance of his message. Where Republicans Senator John McCain and Governor Mitt Romney failed to inspire the same "missing white vote" in 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, respectively, Trump's message of flagging national standing, "America first," and an "othering" of foreigners, unquestionably energized and inspired the same slice of the electorate. This "missing white vote," and a cross-section of the greater population who themselves felt a degradation of social standing, were eager to hear that their position was being championed and that their social and political grievances *were* someone else's fault as opposed to the arbitrariness and banal unfairness of inanimate market forces. This was stacked as well with a rejection of the frightening realization of the creeping obsolescence of rural and manual ways of life and the inherent identities therein. Since at least the 1980s, Trump was vocal about America's diminishing standing in the world and how other countries were taking advantage of the United States. What made his message of America's burden unique was his inclusion of optimism and hope—that the unfair position the country found itself in was not some inevitable, progressive new reality but one that could be reversed by a rearrangement of priorities and some hard lines with historical "dependents" (i.e., allies). Trump had learned from his father how to find opportunity in gloom, and his familial and professional socialization had been remarkably tailored to deliver such a message of optimism at such a significant moment in America's social and political history. Just as Trump had promised in the early 1970s to grow and refine New York's Manhattan borough when the city was facing an acute budgetary shortfall and had seen 250,000 jobs disappear, his message in 2016 promised that pride, economic prosperity and an elevated quality of life would return to America (Kranish and Fisher, 2016).

There was a sense that things had gotten out of control in the country and that "people" (e.g., political parties, politicians, immigrants, domestic

undesirables, other countries) were getting away with it. Trump expressed an imperative idealism founded in warnings of lurking danger and American priority above all else. Throughout his speeches and in his rallies during the Republican nomination and the general election processes, Trump peppered in images of a country under siege, of marauding Muslims and Mexicans killing and raping, seizing on real or imagined media headlines and emphasizing just how scary and dark the world had become: the world is a lost cause, our dependents are bleeding us dry, and we have for too long neglected our own people and problems right here at home:

When I look at the world and you look at how various places are taking advantage of our country, and I say it, and I say it very proudly, it's going to be America First. It's not going to be what we're doing—we, we've lost—we're losing this country. We're losing this country. (Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 365)

In 2015, while fighting for the Republican nomination, Trump's campaign responded to coincidentally closely timed but unrelated terrorists attacks in Paris and a few weeks later in California by announcing a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" (Johnson, 2015). At once this gave urgency to Trump's America first isolationism, and gave real-world identity to an "other" that could be scapegoated for some of the country's problems. The threat the nation faced was within the country's borders. Trump felt that the country had been too soft on criminals and too generous to those leaching off the welfare system (Paquette and Stein, 2018; Amaral, 2020)—images of dependents and rogues are rife within Trump's perception of the world and domestic environment.

Trump's brand of national pride and convincing overtures for isolationism (through fear and frustration) landed him the Republican nomination for presidential candidate and carried him through the general election all the way to the White House, defeating former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton in November 2016. Trump had argued that dependent allies like Saudi Arabia and Japan were behaving more like enemies and should be at least footing more of the bill for American protection, implying that wasteful previous foreign policies had prioritized everyone else before the downtrodden American citizen. This was a common theme that echoed well within the electorate, creating for Trump a raucous base whose allegiance would go on to change the trajectory of the Republican Party and political calculus of more moderate party members who disagreed with Trump's idealism, isolationism, or his everyday demeanor and tactics. Though Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes, his campaign's targeted analytic approach within key electoral college states by identifying voters and convincing them of their own victimhood undoubtedly won him the White House.⁵

Motivating Trump in part was his image of a humiliated nation that the world was truly laughing at the United States, and frustration likely because he sincerely believes that there was a better time, real or imagined, that the country has been led away from and must return to. That what others think of the United States, or how they act toward the United States (e.g., as ungrateful dependents), disturbs him so deeply seems to suggest a conflation of identity where Trump perceives himself to be inextricably linked to the identity of the nation. And that others within his base and across the population are identifying themselves with the nation as well has given rise to a tide of nationalism that is simultaneously a consequence of Trump's projection of his own national image and self.

IMAGES IN TRUMP'S IDEALISM

National Identity (Enemy)

The idea of national identity, or of being thought of as not or un-American, is one of the most threatening notions to Trump's idealism, which is fundamentally built on his interpretation of Americanism. The enemy image of competing national identities is one of equality in capability and culture, yet acutely threatening to the core of Trump's identity. The intensity of Trump's national identity and seeming disdain for foreigners and immigrants is somewhat paradoxical given that his mother was an immigrant, his father was the son of immigrants, his current wife is an immigrant (his current and one of two of his former wives are immigrants who gained citizenship through marriage to Trump), and his current wife's parents are immigrants who entered the United States under the auspices of chain migration. It may be more insightful, though, to explain his public behavior toward immigration as part of a sincere projection of his constructed self-image, steeped in a socialized and defensive hostility to the question of his right to belong in America as part of his family's struggle with identity and anti-German sentiment in the early 1900s.

Trump's grandfather, Friedrich, had emigrated from Germany in 1885 and gained citizenship in the United States in 1892. After World War I broke out, President Woodrow Wilson in a 1917 speech known as the Flag Day Speech stoked fear of German immigrants throughout the country by alleging, and in part accurately, that Germany had planted spies to divide and corrupt the American people (Kranish and Fisher, 2016; Yockelsen, 2017). The public animosity for German immigrants clearly stayed with Trump's father, who, in later years following World War II when anti-German sentiment rose again, became defensive about his roots, and at times claimed alternative national heritage, which Trump also emulated, claiming Swedish heritage in his book *The Art of the Deal* (1987).

Iran (Rouge)

Since at least the Obama administration, Iran has been an archetypical example of Trump's decades-old claims that the "world is laughing at America." Trump claims that the Obama administration's policies and deals with Iran not only enabled Iran to take advantage of the United States but directly funded and encouraged their hostilities. Trump claimed in a speech in January 2020⁶ that the deal finalized between the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany (i.e., P-5+1), the European Union and Iran in 2015 to reduce and prevent Iran's nuclear arms ambitions was incentivized with \$150 billion, and \$1.7 billion being a direct cash payment (Kessler and Rizzo, 2020). The money returned to Iran was part of assets frozen through international sanctions, and was returned, or unfrozen, in good faith as part of the nuclear agreement (Kessler and Rizzo, 2020). The \$1.7 billion in cash was part of separate 2016 hostage negotiations and an unfulfilled military aid contract from 1979 (Kessler and Rizzo, 2020).

Trump has tweeted at least 437 times about Iran since 2011 and named Iran specifically in many public speeches and interviews in the same time frame.

What a rotten deal we made with Iran. We get nothing (except laughter at our stupidity). They get everything, including delay and big cash! (Trump, November 24, 2013)

Never gotten over the fact that Obama was able to send \$1.7 Billion Dollars in CASH to Iran and nobody in Congress, the FBI or Justice called for investigations! (Trump, February 18, 2018)

President Obama made a desperate and terrible deal with Iran—Gave them 150 Billion Dollars plus 1.8 Billion Dollars in CASH! Iran was in big trouble and he bailed them out. Gave them a free path to Nuclear Weapons, and SOON. Instead of saying thank you, Iran yelled . . . (Trump, June 21, 2019)

Trump's image of Iran is that of a rogue state actor with inferior culture and capability, controlled by a small elite, and who poses a threat to the nation. Because of Iran's open ideological hostility to the United States and bucking of international norms in pursuit of its own regional influence, such as Iran's president in 2005 claiming that Israel must be "wiped from the map," it fills the precise image of rogue actor who is acting to undermine and threaten Trump's projected idealism. The difference between two successive administrations' (i.e., Trump and Obama) characterization of the same actor is likely due to the difference in the perceptions of threat and cultural validity. The Trump administration, and Trump himself, has not been shy about the derogatory schema used to understand, explain and interact with

the larger Muslim diaspora and some Islamic nations, specifically. Where Trump has seen inferiority and threat, the Obama administration perceived opportunity and confusion within a fraction of the overall ruling strata. The Obama administration likely held a degenerate image of Iran, wherein the actor, namely the fundamentalist Islamist ruling faction (to be contrasted with the more secular reformist ruling faction and the more secular and modernist population in general), was at least equal in capability relative to its neighborhood, but was culturally weak and confused or misguided in their approach to others. Though still threatening, Obama saw opportunity, expressed most fundamentally in the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Allies (Dependent and Enemy)

Trump has been at times more critical of America's current and long-standing allies than he has of the country's historical enemies and their ruling dictators, like Russia's President Vladimir Putin and China's President Xi Jinping. Trump has been critical of U.S. allies since at least 1990 when he sat down with *Playboy Magazine* for an interview in which he asserted that America is "being ripped off . . . by our so-called allies" (Plaskin, 1990).

I think our country needs *more* ego, because it is being ripped off so badly by our so-called allies; i.e., Japan, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, etc. They have literally outegotized this country, because they rule the greatest money machine ever assembled and it's sitting on our backs. . . . We Americans are laughed at around the world for losing a hundred and fifty billion dollars year after year, for defending wealthy nations for nothing, nations that would be wiped off the face of the earth in about fifteen minutes if it weren't for us. Our "allies" are making billions screwing us (emphasis in original). (Plaskin, 1990)

Trump probably believes his "tough love" for America's allies and allied organizations, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is exposing a culture of dependency and unequal effort on the part of the allies. Trump's approach is simultaneously playing into the isolationist narrative of America First and that the world, allies and enemies alike, is laughing at the United States.

Trump's perception of unequal partnerships has resulted in taking aim at spending on allied defense agreements as well as trade. In 2018, Trump targeted countries around the world with stiff tariffs on steel and aluminum exports to the United States, which prompted swift responses from U.S. allies, including retaliatory tariffs on American exports. Later that year in an

interview on *60 Minutes*, Trump asked rhetorically “What’s an ally?” (Stahl, 2018).

Lesley Stahl: You have also slapped some tariffs on our allies.

Trump: I mean, what’s an ally? We have wonderful relationships with a lot of people. But nobody treats us much worse than the European Union. The European Union was formed in order to take advantage of us on trade, and that’s what they’ve done.

Lesley Stahl: But this is hostile

Trump: And yet, they—it’s not hostile.

Lesley Stahl: It sounds hostile.

Trump: You know what’s hostile? The way they treat us. We’re not hostile. (Stahl, 2018)

Trump is at once utilizing the dependent and enemy images for U.S. allies, claiming they take advantage of the United States and need to do more to equalize their share of the partnerships, but he is also augmenting the image so that U.S. allies are perceived, or at least characterized, as more dangerous than America’s traditional enemies because they drain U.S. resources and capability (Friedman, 2018a). Trump’s projected idealism inherently holds America’s, and his, exceptionalism, and compared to the United States the country’s allies simply rely on the charity of the country, dependent on America’s economic and military magnanimity. As dependents, Trump views America’s allies as inferior in capability and culture with benign intentions yet still useful as means toward American ends.

An example of a dependent ally is America’s military relationship with the Kurds and their allied military forces in northern Syria. The United States has been allied and on the ground in Syria with the Syrian Democratic Forces led by the Kurdish YPG militia since 2014, who were America’s main partners in Syria and have lost around 11,000 soldiers in that time battling against the Islamic State (Mason and Zargham, 2019; Lamothe, 2019). In October 2019, Trump, in a surprise move that caught the military, senior officials and allies off guard, ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, saying in a White House Cabinet meeting, “We have a good relationship with the Kurds, but we never agreed to protect the Kurds. . . . We never agreed to protect the Kurds for the rest of their lives.” The United States enjoyed the placement and elite fighting the YPG militia added to U.S. efforts against the Islamic State in Syria, especially as the United States was countering Russian incursion and influence in the region. Many senior officials, civilian and military, argued that Trump’s framing of the Kurds as dependents inordinately requiring U.S. assistance

forever as a mischaracterization of the relationship. For the efforts of the YPG, their expected continued protection seemed mutually beneficial, especially since they are considered a terrorist organization by Turkey who bristled at the continued protection by proxy the United States was providing the YPG. Almost as soon as the United States withdrew, Turkey launched a cross-border military campaign to push the YPG from near its territory—an offensive that arguably bordered on ethnic cleansing. Trump, though, claimed that what the United States was providing for the Kurds was not worth what the Kurds would have needed—been dependent on—in exchange.

Conversely, the enemy image of an ally is exemplified in Trump's perception of NATO and its draining of American resources. Trump likely perceives NATO as having equal capabilities and an equally sophisticated culture led by a small group of decision-makers but who ultimately have harmful intentions that pose a threat to American capacity because of its bleeding of American assets. Trump has tweeted more than 100 times about NATO, and on this issue specifically, since at least 2016, and has held meetings and delivered numerous public statements on the partnership. Initially in 2016, and then in an escalation in 2018, Trump threatened to leave NATO if each member country did not immediately reach its 2 percent commitment of GDP spending toward the organization. Though Trump is not the first president to take issue with freeriding allies, he is probably the first one to frame allied partnerships in such a way as to perceive a direct threat to America and American interests that also infringe on American sovereignty (Friedman, 2018b). To this end, during a rally in Ohio in 2018 Trump emphasized that America's allies are more harmful than the country's enemies:

We are not letting other countries take advantage of us. Even our friends took advantage. Our friends are friends. They're wonderful people, but we said, "You can't do that anymore. Those days are over." Frankly, our friends did more damage to us than our enemies. Because we didn't deal with our enemies, we dealt with our friends and we dealt incompetently. Because we're now finally putting America first. America first. Right? (White House archives, 2018; Mason and Zargham, 2019)

SOURCE OF CONFLICT

In the mind of Donald Trump, conflict, directed specifically at him, is all around. We posit that in Trump's mind, the media is the single greatest source of conflict. Trump is paranoid of the media, in a manner reminiscent

of Richard Nixon. Nixon, however, had the USSR to direct this energy into, with a clear enemy image. George W. Bush and Barack Obama had a clear “enemy” in large terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and ISIS. As these organizations have diminished in strength and no true enemy, and no current great power equivalent to the USSR, Trump views every individual and situation that prevents him from achieving his desired outcome as conflictual, including criticism that may disparage his self-image. Criticism most frequently comes from the media, thus making it the single greatest source of conflict, in Trump’s mind. He tweeted,

There is great anger in our Country caused in part by inaccurate, and even fraudulent, reporting of the news. The Fake News Media, the true Enemy of the People, must stop the open & obvious hostility & report the news accurately & fairly. That will do much to put out the flame . . . (Lamothe, 2019)

. . . of Anger and Outrage and we will then be able to bring all sides together in Peace and Harmony. Fake News Must End! (Friedman, 2018c)

Any statement that contradicts Trump’s opinions, events that cause undesirable outcomes, such as stock market drops, or personal stories that could deteriorate his public image, is declared “fake news.” A few examples of his “fake news” declarations include publicly doubting the World Health Organization’s assessment of the global death rate of 3.4 percent from coronavirus, or COVID-19 (Walters, Aratani, and Beaumont, 2020), stating on March 4 on a Fox News program,

I think the 3.4% is a really false number. . . . Now this is just my hunch based on a lot of conversations with a lot of people that do this, because a lot of people will have this, and it’s very mild—they’ll get better very rapidly, they don’t even see a doctor, they don’t even call a doctor. (Trump, 10/29/18a)

Trump has tweeted about “fake news” and “fake media” more than 700 times since 2016 and has alleged it is the “enemy of the people” dozens of times during the same time span.

People are disgusted and embarrassed by the Fake News Media, as head by the @nytimes, @washingtonpost, @comcast & MSDNC [*sic*], @ABC, @CBSNews and more. They no longer believe what they see and read, and for good reason. Fake News is, indeed, THE ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE! (emphasis in original). (Trump, 10/29/18b)

The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People! (emphasis in original). (Trump, 10/29/18c)

The enemy image of the media is clear for Trump. They have power and influence over public opinion, even if he declared unfavorable poll numbers as fake news, such as in June 2019 when Trump claimed to be polling stronger than he had ever been when internal polling the contrary data and he instructed his aides to publicly disagree with the poor polling numbers (McGraw, 2019). This example depicts the strength of Donald Trump's cognitive dissonance, regarding his self-image and likability, because he is contradicting the data from his own people.

STABILITY OF TRUMP'S BELIEFS AND WORLDVIEWS

Individuals' perceptions and worldview are generally stable over time, but are influenced by, and may shift, when their role changes. Jonathan Renshon (2008) found that President George W. Bush's worldview did not shift upon entering the White House, but he had a firmly established life at the level of a political elite and the analysis of Bush in this book supports this finding. What we investigate here is the possible learning and changes in the beliefs and worldview of Donald Trump in his transition from private citizen to presidential candidate, to president of the United States. Using OpCode analysis we find that Donald Trump's beliefs and worldview do not shift, but is emboldened through his own brand messaging and deep belief in his own projected self-image. Key personality traits, whether labeled as narcissism (Gartner, 2017) or the asshole trait (James, 2016), and his self-proclaimed lack of desire to acquire new knowledge, prevents Donald Trump from learning in a complex way. Donald Trump is a good case study to examine belief change and learning, because he had not before held political office. Being a political novice, at least at the decision-making level, required a role change and, at a minimum, has provided the unquestionable opportunity for learning.

Belief Change

The study of belief change is a growing area of research (Robinson, 2006, 2011; Renshon, 2009; Levy, 1994). Robinson (2006) compares George W. Bush and his advisers' beliefs before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks, finding that Bush's beliefs shifted toward the foreign policy hawks

in his administration, Rumsfeld and Cheney. Examining the differing effects of domestic and international politics on belief change, Robinson (2011) finds, “Overall, domestic factors seem to have a slightly stronger influence regarding the (P-1) image belief, and international factors seem to play a slightly stronger role regarding (I-1) strategic orientation” (p. 202).⁷ The study of crisis situations is robust (Allison and Zelikow, 1971; Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Kouzmin, 1991). Marfleet and Simpson (2010) find, “belief change should occur when crisis characteristics increase salience and when there is low congruence between pre-crisis expectation rooted in beliefs and actual outcomes” (p. 215). An example crisis and belief change is Jimmy Carter’s viewed the international system as more conflictual after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).

Particularly relevant to this study, Robinson (2011) finds a strong relationship between domestic level variables and presidential rhetoric and beliefs. He states,

When times are less challenging, then the president may perceive more room for autonomy with a reduced chance of negative consequences following a change in the beliefs expressed in presidential rhetoric. In these times, he may allow himself more freedom to shift beliefs, and he may experiment with the use of different signals as a means to maximize U.S. bargaining leverage vis-à-vis others or to better promote a given policy agenda. During periods of hardship such changes may be viewed as too risky, and thus they may be supplanted by rhetorical and belief stability as a means to better ensure security and political well-being. The exception to this generalization is in regard to domestic public opinion. When public support is low, presidential beliefs regarding his representation of the nature of both “others” and of the “self” in the foreign political sphere tend to shift. When public support levels are higher, the president maintains his beliefs, possibly out of fear that the public will yield less support for him and his policies if he shifts his representation of the external political environment and the U.S. role in it. (p. 202)

There is much evidence that Trump believes that he is loved and does not believe the reported polling numbers. In reference to the Gallup poll referenced above, Trump tweeted,

Just heard Fakes News CNN is doing polls again despite the fact that their election polls were WAY OFF disaster. Much higher ratings at Fox. (Trump, March 20, 2017)

Further demonstrating this strong belief, at a campaign rally he said,

I could stand in the middle of fifth avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn't lose any voters. (Trump, January 23, 2016)

H2: Donald Trump's beliefs remain stable.

Where you stand depends on where you sit. That is, the beliefs or world-view of an individual is altered by their role in the decision-making process, and subsequent increase or decrease in influence over a specific policy area (Holsti, 1970). As examples, George W. Bush's beliefs were bolstered when he moved from the governor's mansion to the Oval Office (Renshon, 2008). After Donald Trump was elected, there were optimistic dissenters believed that his rhetoric and behavior would change after assuming office. On this Barack Obama stated,

This office has a way of waking you up. Those aspects of his positions or predispositions that don't match up with reality, he will find shaken up pretty quick because reality has a way of asserting itself. There are going to be certain elements of his temperament that will not serve him well, unless he recognizes them and corrects them. (qtd. in *Politico*, Dove, 2016)

H3: Trump's electoral beliefs will differ from his beliefs after assuming office.

Another dilemma for the study of belief change is that we traditionally assume that learning will produce a visible change and role change always requires some experiential learning. A visible change, particularly a policy change, however, is not a guaranteed byproduct of learning. Jack Levy (1994) states,

I define experiential learning as a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience. This definition differs from a number of alternative conceptions that one can find in the literature in that it does not require that learning involve policy change, an improved understanding of the world, or an increasingly complex cognitive structure. (Levy p. 283)

This definition is helpful, because learning may result in a change of belief, or a bolstering of already held beliefs. Further, learning is not a binary process, but rather a linear process with no defined ending. As Levy (1994) states,

“In addition to learning about causal laws and initial conditions, individuals also learn how to learn. They learn new decision rules, judgmental heuristics, procedures, and skills that facilitate their ability to learn from subsequent experiences” (286).

Even when learning does take place, not all individuals respond in the same way. In a study of belief change and response to the Euro crisis, van Esch (2015) states, “Even if the beliefs of leaders are open to change, they may each learn different lessons from a crisis.” In other words, different leaders take away different lessons from experiences. Learning may also be complex or simple.

Political psychologists distinguish between simple and complex learning. Learning is simple when means are better adjusted to ends. Complex learning occurs when a person develops a more differentiated schema and when this schema is integrated into a higher-order structure that highlights difficult trade-offs. Complex learning, at its highest level, may lead to a reordering or a redefinition of goals. From this perspective, learning must include the development of more complex structures as well as changes in context. (Stein, 1994, 171)

The theoretical problem we face again is the personality traits of Donald Trump that indicate he may not hold firm beliefs about issues that do not directly benefit his life. Philosopher Aaron James has provided a character trait typology of assholes. “The *asshole* is the guy . . . who systematically allows himself advantages in social relationships out of an entrenched (and mistaken) sense of entitlement that immunizes him against the complaints of other people” (James, 2016, 4, emphasis in original). It is not that assholes cannot or do not care about other people, but they always consider themselves first. James (2016) provides subtypes of assholes that are useful. “The *ass-clown* is someone who seeks an audience’s attention and enjoyment while being slow to understand how it views him” (James, 2016, 8, emphasis not in original). With the grandiose style of Trump and his constant desire for attention in the media, this may be the most explanatory, yet simplistic, definition of his personality.

Being labeled an asshole is generally thought of as a negative or undesirable character trait, but that is not always the case. James (2016) posits that many politicians fit the definition of “asshole” and that there is a large segment of the American population that is dissatisfied with the political status quo. The significance, James (2016) states,

And therein, at this moment of powerlessness, lies the appeal of Trump. For those with contempt for the existing system, he offers disruption and the hope

of his creating the strongman's order. Progress, in our degraded system, can at times seem to be a matter of winning an Asshole v. Asshole contest. So one genuinely can wonder: Might a top-dog, alpha-asshole *superasshole* do the public a great favor, restoring some sort of cooperation? (13–14)

In other words, perhaps the electorate wants a new asshole to fight the current assholes that created an undesirable system. This also relies on Trump being viewed as a political outsider. This, however, does not mean he does not behave like a politician. James (2016) says,

Like any politician, Donald Trump's quarry is the electorate [and he wants] to affirm his worth by being seen as powerful, the center of attention, as the man whose favor must be carried, as at to uphold his vision of himself as "great," a "winner," a "huge success." He's lucky not to have the smooth tactics of the pickup artist, since in an electorate used to The Rubio (slick, bogus, likeable, but without substance), voters will take to a scrappy effort and forgive the rest, if they can find sufficient reason to keep up their interest. And Trump does effortlessly keep up people's interest, by keeping 'em guessing, shocked, self-doubting, and amused. (19)

The point is that Donald Trump is operating within the existing political system, while presenting himself as something disconnected from the system. He does not want to be seen as a politician in the same way as a "lyin' Ted Cruz" or "crooked Hillary." In the sense of voters who like the "asshole" trait of Trump, there are parallels to Hillary Clinton supporters. Hillary was characterized in many derogatory terms, including "bitch." At least a segment of her supporters saw this as a positive. As stated by Tina Fey, "Bitches get stuff done" (SNL July 10, 2016). Being an established political candidate, we do not expect Clinton to become more of an "asshole." We do, however, posit that Trump's base's desire for an asshole may influence his beliefs.

ASSESSING PERCEPTION AND WORLDVIEW THROUGH RHETORIC

For a review of belief change in leaders, please see Chapter 1.

The measurements and changes in Donald Trump's OpCode provide a unique opportunity and may fluctuate more so than other world leaders, because he is entering a new context as decision-maker; never before has he made policy decisions. This means that his OpCode as policy decision-maker is just forming and we should expect more changes as learning takes

place. Furthermore, the worldview of leaders can be considered the OpCode of the administration, since there is often much input from advisers before public statements are made and those public statements reflect the input of the various individuals involved. If this is the case, we may also see a shift in Trump's OpCode after the transition of key campaign staffers.

In addition to using public speeches and statements, we utilize Trump's unprecedented unfiltered and personal account of his stream of consciousness via the social media platform Twitter. Some may be concerned that using public speeches fail to reveal the true beliefs of leaders, so we will briefly address this issue. First, the use of speeches by researchers using at-a-distance profiling methodology is greatly beneficial because we often lack direct and personal access to the leaders we are analyzing. Aside from the availability of data, speeches may be theoretically prudent, because "a leader's public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will consistently match his public beliefs" (Walker et al., 2003, 223).

In his speeches leading up to the 2016 general election, Donald Trump did not use a teleprompter in the debates (i.e., largely extemporaneous), and only began using a teleprompter, suggesting a speech prepared by someone else, deep into the general election campaign. More significantly, this signals a rather notable strategy shift and, we hope to so show, resulted in a change in tone and rhetoric. On August 18, 2016, Donald Trump delivered (with teleprompter) his first campaign speech following the onboarding of both Steve Bannon (former executive chair of Breitbart News) as chief executive officer, and Kellyanne Conway (former political action committee chair of Republican Party presidential-candidate hopeful Ted Cruz) as senior adviser (then to campaign manager). This dramatic shift in staffing and strategy came on the heels of the turbulent June 2016 termination of Trump's then-campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, and preceded by two days the August 2016 resignation of the successor campaign manager, Paul Manafort.

To measure this hypothesized change in rhetoric, we have undertaken two content analysis studies, first in 2017 that analyzed the complete transcripts for all three presidential debates (Table 6.1) between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, and complete transcripts of eighteen presidential campaign speeches; and the second analysis compiled in 2020 using the universe of Trump's Twitter content, divided into three time periods: (1) from announcement of candidacy to general election win, (2) first calendar year in office, (3) years two and three in office, and including a separate content analysis of the conflict with Iran and the escalation from late 2019 to January 2020.

TRUMP'S OPCODE: 2017 ANALYSIS

In the 2017 study's speech content (Table 6.2), we found that Trump is not cooperative and seeks to achieve his objectives through conflict. The analysis, however, shows that Trump became more stable over the time of the debates than expected, especially given the extreme shifts in campaign staff and strategy. There was very little change in the OpCode indices across debates and no major shift in Trump's OpCode when analyzing speeches controlling for Trump's shift in campaign adviser. Some changes, however, are worth further investigation and are detailed below.

The 2017 analysis showed there was very little, if any, significant shift in the rhetoric of Donald Trump across the debates. Only three of the ten OpCode indices make noticeable shifts. P-1, nature of the political universe, at debate 1 is "mixed" on the nature of the political universe, increases slightly in the second debate, and reaches "somewhat friendly" in debate 3. This could easily be attributed to Trump becoming more familiar and comfortable operating within the political environment. Next, I-1, direction of strategy, decreases over time, indicating that Trump becomes more rigid in his plans and is less willing to compromise. In accordance with this, I-4a, tactical orientation, moves from cooperation to more conflict oriented. These changes are marginal and do not indicate any significant shift in personality. It is possible that becoming more conflictual and rigid are also indicators of becoming more familiar with the political environment and the process of forming solid opinions and policy goals. In addition, there was no significant change in the rhetoric of speeches from time 1 and time 2. This indicates that Trump's staffers have little control of him and we should not expect any changes from Trump due to external influence.

Interestingly, during the second debate, Trump became more cooperative and Clinton became more conflictual. The fact that the second debate stands out raises more questions than it answers. At first glance, we might presume that our initial hypothesis was correct and that the shift in campaign staff resulted in a change in rhetoric from both of the candidates. This, however, is not a convincing argument, because the rhetoric of debate 3 closely matches that of debate 1. If the campaign staff was responsible for the shift we would expect debates 2 and 3 to match more closely. What is definitively different about debate 2 is the format. Debate 2 was a town hall with questions taken from citizens in the audience. Trump also intentionally attempted to antagonize Clinton by inviting Bill Clinton's sexual harassment accusers as his personal guests.

TRUMP—PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

Table 6.1

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Debate 1</i>	<i>Debate 2</i>	<i>Debate 3</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.11 (Mixed/Somewhat Friendly)	0.19 (Somewhat Friendly)	0.27 (Somewhat Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	-0.07 (Mixed/Low Pessimistic)	0.01 (Mixed Pessimistic)	0.10 (Mixed/Low Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.29 (Low Predictability)	0.23 (Low Predictability)	0.31 (Low Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.56 (Medium Control)	0.41 (Medium Control)	0.37 (Low/Medium Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.84 (High)	0.91 (Very High)	0.89 (High/Very High)
<i>Choice and Shift Propensities</i>				
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.52 (Definitely Cooperative)	0.35 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0.37 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.18 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0.15 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0.23 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	-0.6 (Extremely Low)	-0.48 (Extremely Low)	-0.44 (Extremely Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics			
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.48 (Medium)	0.65 (Medium High)	0.63 (Medium High)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.53 (Medium)	0.53 (Medium)	0.69 (Medium High)
I-5	Utility of Means			
	(a) Reward	0.13 (Low/Very Low)	0.15 (Low/Very Low)	0.24 (Low)
	(b) Promise	0.06 (Very Low)	0.09 (Very Low)	0.10 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.57 (Medium)	0.44 (Medium)	0.34 (Medium Low)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.08 (Very Low)	0.15 (Low/Very Low)	0.16 (Low/Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.02 (Very Low)	0.06 (Very Low)	0.04 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.14 (Low/Very Low)	0.12 (Low/Very Low)	0.10 (Low/Very Low)

TRUMP—SPEECHES

Table 6.2

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Speech time 1</i>	<i>Speech time 2</i>	<i>Post-Election</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.14 (Mixed/Somewhat Friendly)	0.22 (Somewhat Friendly)	0.46 (Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	-0.01 (Mixed)	0.05 (Mixed/Low Optimistic)	0.18 (Somewhat Optimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.22 (Low Predictability)	0.24 (Low Predictability)	0.39 (Low/Medium Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.35 (Medium Low Control)	0.33 (Medium Low Control)	0.48 (Medium Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.92 (Very High)	0.92 (Very High)	0.81 (High)
<i>Choice and Shift Propensities</i>				
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.24 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0.15 (Somewhat Cooperative)	0.39 (Somewhat/Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.09 (Mixed Cooperative)	-0.01 (Mixed)	0.13 (Mixed/Somewhat Cooperative)
I-3	Risk Orientation	-0.48 (Extremely Low)	-0.46 (Extremely Low)	-0.53 (Extremely Low)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics			
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.76 (High)	0.85 (High/Very High)	0.61 (Medium High)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.29 (Low)	0.32 (Low)	0.45 (Medium)
I-5	Utility of Means			
	(a) Reward	0.07 (Very Low)	0.06 (Very Low)	0.12 (Very Low/Low)
	(b) Promise	0.15 (Low)	0.13 (Low/Very Low)	0.08 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.40 (Medium)	0.38 (Medium Low)	0.50 (Medium)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.19 (Low)	0.11 (Low/Very Low)	0.09 (Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.12 (Very Low/Low)	0.22 (Low)	0.11 (Very Low/Low)
	(f) Punish	0.07 (Very Low)	0.10 (Low/Very Low)	0.10 (Low/Very Low)

Results: 2017 Analysis

Trump's general worldview moves from "mixed" to almost "definitely cooperative" and his strategic direction begins as "somewhat cooperative" and increases marginally. Further, his belief in the realization of political values moves from negative to positive. These indices makes sense, because despite difficulties in implementing his policies, his electoral victory was thought to be near impossible based on the polling data. Also consistent with this, Trump's belief in the predictability of the political future and control over historical development slightly increased, while his belief in the role of chance marginally decreased. This all points to Trump feeling a greater sense of control over his environment.

Feeling a greater sense of confidence Trump is approaching negotiation with more willingness to compromise and is far more flexible in his tactics. Trump's risk orientation in this analysis is relatively stable around "medium." These results suggest that if Trump has learned anything since the start of his political campaign is that he is a winner and his beliefs have been bolstered. The analysis also suggests that he is more cooperative, but this may need more interpretation. The change in appearing more cooperative could be related to learning and being exposed to new policy issues and solutions. He feels that he was given power by his supporters, and he will provide them with what they want. This fits firmly into the "asshole" mold posited by James (2016).

Some experts and political analysts expected Trump to learn and conform to the political system in which he is now operating. However, instead of conforming, he has interpreted continued resistance to his tactics and agenda as attacks on himself personally; he views all criticism as something he should fight against, rather than any area in which he can improve upon. Speaking at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy graduation, he stated, "No politician in history, and I say this with great surety, has been treated worse or more unfairly" (qtd. in *The Washington Post*, Wagner, 2017). His response is to bolster his beliefs and stand against his disinters, who he believes are unfair to him.

Trump's OpCode: 2020 Analysis

Donald Trump's OpCode profile remains interesting and unique, as there is a lack of consistency and seemingly incompatible belief sets. We continue to argue that this is due, in part, to Trump's lack of knowledge and

interest in policy and the policy-making process. In Michael Wolff's book *Fire and Fury* (2018), he says, "He didn't read. He didn't really even skim. Some believed that for all practical purposes he was no more than semi-literate" (qtd. In Graham, 2018). Wolff also quotes an email from Gary Cohn about Trump's lack of interest in information and policy stating, "It's worse can you can imagine . . . Trump won't read anything—not one-page memos, not the brief policy papers, nothing. He gets up halfway through meetings with world leaders because he is bored" (qtd. In Graham, 2018). The lack of knowledge and interest means that the president's worldview is not set; rather, it is in flux, due to new information and experiences. In the 2020 analysis, Trump's OpCode is measured across three time periods noted above (Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5) and an analysis of Trump during the late 2019 competition with Iran (Table 6.6).

TIME PERIOD 1: CANDIDACY TO VICTORY (JUNE 16, 2015, TO NOVEMBER 11, 2016)

Table 6.3

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.38 (Somewhat/Definitely Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.08 (Mixed Optimistic/Pessimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.24 (Low Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.15 (Very Low/Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance Choice and Shift Propensities	0.96 (Very High)
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.44 (Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.14 (Mixed/Somewhat Intensity)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.26 (Low Risk)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.56 (Medium Flexibility)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.31 (Low Flexibility)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.08 (Very Low)
	(b) Promise	0.05 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.59 (Medium)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.11 (Low/Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.09 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.07 (Very Low)

**TIME PERIOD 2: FIRST YEAR (JANUARY
1, 2017, TO DECEMBER 31, 2017)**

Table 6.4

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.29 (Somewhat Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.09 (Mixed Optimistic/Pessimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.12 (Very Low/Low Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.16 (Very Low/Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance Choice and Shift Propensities	0.98 (Very High)
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.53 (Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.22 (Somewhat Intensity)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.22 (Low Risk)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.47 (Medium Flexibility)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.43 (Medium Flexibility)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.13 (Very Low/Low)
	(b) Promise	0.08 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.56 (Medium)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.11 (Low/Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.04 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.09 (Very Low)

**TIME PERIOD 3: SECOND AND THIRD YEARS
(JANUARY 1, 2018, TO OCTOBER 14, 2019)**

The perceived nature of the political universe (P-1), for Trump, is categorized as somewhat cooperative, but it should be noted that there is a noticeable steady decline in this measure over time, indicating that Trump's perceives an increasingly hostile environment. This measure it at its lowest during the confrontation with Iran, which makes sense given the direct hostility between the two actors. One possible explanation for Trump's decline in this score is due to his role changing from CEO to president. As CEO, he had much more personal control, whereas his power as president is shared among other branches of government and key decisions as left to advisers. In other words, in his new role, Trump became more dependent upon the cooperation of others to achieve his goals and he met more resistance than he had encountered in any other time period of his professional life.

Along with the increased perception of a hostile environment, Trump has a very low belief that his political goals (P-2) will come to fruition. Further, his belief in the predictably of the political future (P-3) and control over

Table 6.5

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	0.21 (Somewhat Friendly)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	0.03 (Mixed Optimistic/Pessimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.11 (Very Low/Low Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.17 (Very Low/Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.98 (Very High)
	Choice and Shift Propensities	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.46 (Definitely Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.16 (Mixed/Somewhat Intensity)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.21 (Low Risk)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.54 (Medium Flexibility)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.56 (Low Flexibility)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.15 (Very Low/Low)
	(b) Promise	0.04 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.54 (Medium)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.09 (Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.05 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.13 (Very Low/Low)

historical events (P-4) are very low, while his belief in the role of chance (P-5) is extremely high. Thus, Trump does not perceive himself as having significant influence over the outcome of political events. Rather, he views other actors as responsible for all events.

This could be analyzed and understood from multiple perspectives. On face value, these score dynamics, although extreme, are not unique to world leaders. Political leaders often have a considerable amount of experience and recognize the complexity of international politics. For this reason, they hold the worldview that they cannot dictate the outcome of international political events alone, thus relying on other actors and the role of chance in achieving their desired objective. However, we posit that this does not explain the worldview of Trump, because he retains the belief that he has a considerable amount of personal influence over other's behavior.

The explanation for Trump's scores, then, is that he is static in his position, believing that the United States is not responsible for any escalation of tension or conflict. In other words, all negative actions and outcomes, in Trump's mind, are the result of actions by other actors and no amount of responsibility rests on Trump or the United States. In other words, he believes the outcome of conflict is due to the actions of the other, never himself. In the context of Iran, his belief in the role of chance was nearly absolute (0.99). He did not believe he had any influence over the actions of Iran and the rest of the situation would be dictated by their next move. Trump, however, backed down after the Iranians escalated.

Turning our attention to the instrumental variables, Trump expresses a trait of “definitely cooperative” (I-1) across all three generalized time periods and scores higher in the Iran crisis. However, confusingly, he also expressed a low score for cooperation in (I-2), which is best interpreted in the context of P-2. Because Trump does not believe in a high probability of achieving his political goals, he does not believe cooperation is the best tactic. This adds to the explanation above, that while Trump accepts that he cannot control outcomes, he refuses to cooperate if he is not getting what he desires. This is his tactic of negotiation. Trump has a low propensity toward risk (I-3), which one may assume explains his behavior with Iran in late 2019, but his risk orientation is slightly higher during that time, which is most likely due to posturing rhetoric. In general, Trump does not express a propensity toward risk to achieve his goals. His flexibility of tactics (I-4) is low but leans toward cooperation. Again, this is best interpreted with the caveat that Trump seeks cooperation, which, in his mind, means that the other actor he is dependent upon must first “cooperate” by making any concessions demanded by Trump.

The index of preferred tactics (I-5) further supports this analysis. Trump scores consistently very low across all categories, except appeal, which gets a measure of medium. These measures are consistent with the time during the Iran event as well. What this tells us is that Donald Trump’s preference for resolving conflict is to make appeals to the other actors. There is no internal flexibility,

Table 6.6

<i>Belief</i>	<i>Diagnostic Propensities</i>	<i>Result</i>
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	-0.08 (Somewhat Hostile)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	-0.14 (Somewhat Pessimistic)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	0.08 (Very Low Predictability)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	0.01 (Very Low Control)
P-5	Role of Chance	0.99 (Very High)
	<i>Choice and Shift Propensities</i>	
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	0.31 (Somewhat Cooperative)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	0.01 (Mixed Intensity)
I-3	Risk Orientation	0.28 (Low Risk)
I-4	Flexibility of Tactics	
	(a) Cooperation/Conflict	0.69 (High Flexibility)
	(b) Words/Deeds	0.46 (Medium Flexibility)
I-5	Utility of Means	
	(a) Reward	0.04 (Very Low)
	(b) Promise	0.04 (Very Low)
	(c) Appeal/Support	0.58 (Medium)
	(d) Oppose/Resist	0.15 (Low/Very Low)
	(e) Threaten	0.00 (Very Low)
	(f) Punish	0.19 (Low)

because there is no sense of responsibility for any negative or conflictual situation. Thus, he makes appeals to the other actor to remedy the situation.

TRUMP'S OPCODE: ESCALATION WITH IRAN

Time Period: 27 December 2019 to 10 January 2020⁸

Trump's interactions with Iran, and most notably in the escalation between the United States and Iran during December 27, 2019, to January 8, 2020, clearly depict his worldview and decision-making characteristics. The escalation between the two countries had been at a low boil since at least 2018, leading up to Trump's decision on January 3, 2020, to order a fatal airstrike on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander General Qasem Soleimani.

In May 2018, Trump followed through on a campaign promise and withdrew the United States from the JCPOA. Trump added further that if Iran did not meet added provisions that were outside of the original deal, such as dropping entirely its nuclear program and withdrawing from Syria, the United States would ratchet up the sanctions that had already been crippling Iran's economy. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior Iranian officials, though incensed over Trump's decision, decided to maintain the agreement with the other signatories in the hopes of continued economic benefit via the agreement. In August 2018, Trump issued the first round of sanctions and again a second round in November. Further ratcheting up the rhetoric and "full-pressure campaign," the Trump administration formally designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization in April 2019. This was the first time in history the United States labeled another country's military as a terrorist organization, with the designation triggering international economic and travel sanctions. Iran responded in kind and declared the United States a state sponsor of terror and U.S. Central Command as a terrorist organization.

Through May and into June 2019, tension and conflict escalated, as Iran at least directed, if not carried out themselves, attacks on international oil tankers and pipelines, and shot down a U.S. military drone. Trump and Iranian officials simultaneously traded pithy barbs on Twitter, threatening ever-increasing conflict, and Trump claimed to have called off at the last minute an attack targeting Iranian military personnel in response to the downing of the drone—Trump later reasoned that an attack killing Iranian soldiers would have been out of proportion to the offense (Milbank, 2019). During the summer of 2019 and into the fall, the rhetorical clamoring maintained while small-scale incidences, such as targeting sanctions, more oil tanker harassment, and deploying of military assets, increased. Iran began exceeding the limit of enriched uranium allowed in the JCPOA nuclear deal and executed a

defense ministry contractor accused of spying for the United States (Milbank, 2019). In September, Yemen's Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for a sophisticated drone attack on two major Saudi Aramco oil facilities, and U.S. officials immediately blamed Iran for at least orchestrating if not executing the attack. The sanctions against Iran caused Iranian officials to raise prices on oil which in turn catalyzed civil unrest. In the middle of the rising tension, the United States and Iran exchanged prisoners in early December 2019, suggesting a possible calming of temperament.

Then, on December 27, 2019, a U.S. contractor was killed in a rocket attack on a Iraqi military base, carried out by an Iran-backed militia. Two days later, the United States retaliated by conducting airstrikes on multiple Iran-backed militia bases in Iraq and Syria, killing at least twenty-five militia members and wounding at least fifty-five more (Al Jazeera, 2019a). On December 31, protestors returning from the funerals of the militia members stormed the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, smashing the perimeter fencing and lighting a guard tower on fire, surrounding the embassy for two days before peacefully dispersing on January 1, 2020. Prior to their departure the day before, Trump wrote on Twitter,

Iran killed an American contractor, wounding many. We strongly responded, and always will. Now Iran is orchestrating an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. They will be held fully responsible. (Trump, December 31, 2019)

On January 3, 2020, the United States conducted an airstrike on General Soleimani just outside Iraq's Baghdad airport, killing him, the deputy commander of the Iran-backed militias in Iraq, and at least five others (Coles, Adnan, and Gordon, 2020). The world was in shock following an unexpected and unorthodox targeting of a senior government official, and anxiously awaited Iran's response, questioning if the Middle East and greater regional proxies were on the brink of a major conflict.

Trump doubled-down on this decision and continued the rhetoric of the full-pressure campaign against Iran, tweeting on January 4,

. . . targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats! (emphasis in original). (Trump, January 4, 2020)

Incensed by the unsanctioned attack within its borders, Iraq's parliament the next day called for the expulsion of U.S. forces in Iraq. On the same day, January 5, tens of thousands of mourners took to the streets in Iran, and

Iranian officials stated Iran will no longer limit their nuclear ambitions and already have enough material to build an atomic weapon (BBC, 2020). Trump and Iranian officials continued to exchange escalatory warnings on social media and in the press while the world waited to see how, to what degree, and when Iran would respond. On January 7, Iran responded, launching more than a dozen ballistic missiles into Iraq and hitting with precision two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops, though stating after the attack the intention was not to kill U.S. personnel (Fahim and Dadouch, 2020). In the immediate aftermath of the attack, and in anticipation of simultaneous U.S. retaliation and possible drone strikes, a commercial airliner taking off from Tehran's international airport was unintentionally shot down by Iranian air defense system controllers who mistook the airliner's radar signature for a cruise missile (Fassihi et al., 2020; Eqbali, Jones, and Kantchev, 2020). Iran first attempted to deny the accident, but eventually admitted to its mistake while also the United States was assessing the damage inflicted by Iran's barrage of missile strikes. There were no more strikes from either side following this crescendo. In a speech on January 8, Trump acknowledged that the Iranians appeared to have stood down after the attack and appeared to have de-escalated, suggesting the crisis had come to an end.

This escalation of tensions with Iran, due to rhetorical bullying and steadily increasing belligerence by both sides, exacerbated by Trump dictating his demands to the Iranian government, was predicted by Smith (2018) in an analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei's worldview. Khamenei's view of the United States is that of a degenerate imperialist, meaning he views the United States as a threat with harmful intentions, but also a weak actor who does not follow through. While Khamenei is willing to compromise and negotiate, he will shut down and bolster his own position of strength, particularly in the face of threats. Although his OpCode during this time period indicates he is not making threats, Trump's leadership and negotiation style—the demanding CEO—is exactly what Khamenei will respond to. Further, even though it does not show up in his OpCode for this time period, the threats have already been made. Withdrawing from the JCPOA was viewed as a threat by Khamenei and a catalyst for intensified Iranian action in the region, which Trump viewed as threatening. In other words, this is a clash of worldviews and leadership styles with near perfect mirror imaging.

CONCLUSION

Overall what we have found in this analysis of the forty-fifth president of the United States is that his worldview is unexpectedly stable across time periods. While this supports existing research on the stability of belief systems,

it is also interesting, perhaps shocking or concerning, that there is little to no change from the time Trump became a political candidate through the end of his third year in the Oval Office. This lack of change is surprising, because he has shifted his role significantly. Our explanation for this is that Trump still does not understand his role in policy making or what powers the president does and does not possess. It is likely that his OpCode traits have been bolstered because he believes that being president affords him more power than his role as a private citizen and CEO. While this is true in many ways, the presidency is far more dependent on the cooperation of other actors, including other branches of government, bureaucratic institutions, and other world leaders. As CEO, he is not used to being told “no,” and that has happened repeatedly, such as the Supreme Court limiting his immigration policies, federal judges blocking Executive Orders, and Congress, in general, being nothing like an obedient board or dependent employees. In this light, the presidency does not have the same powers as a CEO, and it appears that Donald Trump has not yet learned that lesson.

As president, Trump has continued to project his self-image, which is one of grandeur and supremacy. He believes that he alone possesses the intelligence and abilities necessary to “Make America Great Again.” This perception is sustained, in part, due to the lack of substance in his policies. With nothing clearly defined, nothing can ever be a failure. Alternatively, with no clear definition of success, Trump is able to project everything he touches as a success. What is clear from this analysis is that Trump’s self-image and belief in enemies all around him have created an immovable worldview, despite significant changes in position, power, and domain; his “infallible” worldview is supported further by his lack of desire to learn from actual and understandable mistakes he has made.

In Trump’s mind, everyone is an enemy, rogue, or dependent, and his foreign policy agenda is that of an isolationist idealist, at least in his first term. He is an isolationist because he is retrenching by ending wars and withdrawing from relationships with allies. This policy has been praised by realists, such as Randal Schweller (2018), but the intention of his policy is not realist. He is not retrenching to bolster defenses, but is retrenching away from projecting American influence, which may evolve into an expansionist and adventurous second term if re-elected. This is a strange policy agenda, given his view of enemies all around, but because he is not actively trying to balance or project power, Trump has not demonstrated being an expansionist in any way. He is also not building up defenses to protect the United States. Instead, he is attempting to insulate the United States from world affairs, perhaps in the same way that Woodrow Wilson attempted to stay out of World War I and European affairs. Trump is attempting to return to a policy of isolationism. Walt (2019) asserts that a policy of pulling back does not

mean isolationism, but rather can be “offshore balancing,” where the United States would compete diplomatically, economically, and selectively militarily. If that were Trump’s agenda, he would be labeled as a defensive realist. However, this is not descriptive of his policies. Although it may fit, in some ways, with his economic policies concerning securing better trade agreements with China, Trump is lashing out at key allies and diminishing the ability of the United States to exert influence; he believes the United States can be isolated and self-sufficient.

Characterizing Donald Trump as a realist or idealist is difficult, due to his lack of ideological loyalty and low interest in the policy-making process, he is easily influenced by those around him and does not represent a consistent strategy. His foreign policy has, however, been related to Jacksonianism. Although there is no clear definition, “In foreign policymaking Jacksonianism implies an aggressive disposition based on the veneration of military power and the protection of the cultural, ethnic and racial ties of the folk community” (Biegon, 2019, 519). This fits the general trend of Trump’s foreign policy agenda of “America First.” Biegon (2019) posits that Trump’s foreign policy is grounded in being anti-globalist, along with a message of declining American power, due to “losing” in international agreements. This is a fear-based appeal to the emotion of fear, a key characteristic of fascist leadership (Albright, 2017).

Cha (2020) asserts that Trump has a consistently anti-globalist foreign policy agenda, based on the restructuring of relationships, alliances, and agreements. Under this policy the United States has abdicated its position and authority as the leader of the liberal world order. If we accept that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992) then all other actors can be ignored. However, if other actors view this as weakness the balance of power will shift, regardless of how one feels about anarchy (Smith and Michelsen, 2017; Fiammenghi, 2019). This behavior is further confusing, as it does not support the idealist agenda, but also accepts a loss of power of influence on the international stage. From the perspective of defensive realism, perhaps this is smart policy, on face value (Schweller, 2016), but from the perspective of outside analysis there is doubt as to the intentions behind such policy. Thus, we conclude that while Trump best fits the characteristics of the isolationist idealist, he is erratic and lacks consistency in policy, making it difficult to predict future behavior.

NOTES

1. Trump graduated from University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School in 1968, though he had spent years before at Fordham University, opting for college in 1964 instead of the draft (Kranish & Fisher, 2016).

2. “Twelve days after the 2012 election, Trump filed an application with the US Patent and Trademark Office for a phrase he wanted to be his own: Make America Great Again” (Kranish & Fisher, 2016, pg. 292).

3. According to the *Washington Post*'s investigative reporter Michael Kranish and senior editor Marc Fisher,

How Trump estimated his worth at \$200 million was unclear. He was involved in real estate deals that might pay off handsomely, and this may have been the first time he projected the intangible value of his name. The company his father founded might have been worth \$200 million, or [Trump] may have valued his ownership in various properties that highly. But he reported income in 1976 of a relatively modest \$24,594, in addition to some payments from family trusts and other assets. All told, he owed \$10,832 in taxes, according to a report later issued by the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement. (Kranish & Fisher, 2016, pg. 69)

Questions [over Trump's actual net worth] increased when it turned out that Trump had paid no income tax in 1978 or 1979. Using tax deductions including real estate depreciation, he claimed a negative income of \$3.8 million during those two years. The same report showed that he had borrowed \$7.5 million from his father, had used his take from the already-indebted Grand Hyatt to back his Atlantic City debt, and had relied on a \$35 million line of credit from Chase Manhattan. . . . In 1984, [*Forbes* magazine] estimated [Trump] was worth \$400 million. Then it was \$1 billion in 1988. . . . In 1989 . . . Trump faced a \$2 billion debt and needed a \$60 million loan to keep his business going. . . . Around the same time, [Trump] submitted documents to the Casino Control Commission showing assets of about \$3.6 billion . . . Commission officials who factored in Trump's debts calculated his net worth at \$206 million. The editors at *Forbes* seized on the commission's report and published a May 1990 story detailing Trump's severe cash-flow problems, “unrealistically optimistic” real estate assessments, and billions in debts. (Kranish & Fisher, 2016, pgs. 294–297) In 2005, Trump's worth, by his own admission or in personally published collateral, was estimated at between \$1.7 billion and \$9.5 billion, though he conceded the discrepancy depended on his own “feelings” and how those affect his value of himself (Kranish & Fisher, 2016). In 2011, in a ruling on a failed appeal to a suit Trump brought against *New York Times* reporter Timothy O'Brien who had described Trump's less-than-advertised net worth, the judge's opinion noted that the majority of Trump's net worth came from inheritance, and factoring in the debt he owed, his actual net worth was more likely to be about \$200 million to \$300 million (Kranish & Fisher, 2016).

4. Though outside of the historical scope of this chapter, it is undeniable that race-based exploitation, politics and group behavior existed since at least the first slaves landed in the colonies in 1619, and existed before that in European immigrant attitudes and violent behavior toward the native populations.

5. As Kranish and Fisher (2016) point out in their reporting,

The election was about winning the Electoral College, winning in states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio, stripping away what Democrats had thought of as their structural advantage in traditionally blue states. In the end, a flip of only 107,000 votes in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania would have turned the election to Clinton. Clinton never set foot in Wisconsin during the fall campaign. The Clinton campaign was so confident that it had pumped resources into states it didn't need to win, such as Arizona and Nebraska, and neglected traditional Democratic strongholds such as Michigan

and Wisconsin. Although Clinton's campaign ran three times as many TV ads as Trump during the general election, she aired almost no ads in Wisconsin and Michigan in the second half of October. Trump flooded the zone and won both states. (Kranish & Fisher, 2016, 358–359)

6. Trump has held this belief since at least 2013.
7. P-1 and I-1 refer to measures in the OpCode. See methods section below.
8. The dates referenced are based on the time parameters for the content gathered on the events and not the specific dates of the events themselves.

Conclusion

CONSIDERING REALISM AND IDEALISM AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Realism and liberalism, referred to idealism in this analysis, are traditionally systemic theories in IR, but recent research has applied the theoretical assumptions to foreign policy behavior. To further expand the utility of realism and idealism, I have utilized the philosophical foundations to generate a foreign policy typology, based upon individual leaders' worldview, actor-specific perceptions, and policy intentions, on a spectrum of expansionistic to isolationist.

The intention of foreign policy is crucial for placing a leader into the realist/idealist typology, because, while the core goals of realism and idealism differ, the policy action may be quite similar. How a policy decision-maker perceives their environment, specifically threats, as well as their confidence, or lack thereof, in their ability to create change, specifically peace, in the world system. This chapter will review each of the typologies, both theoretically and including what was learned in the case studies.

THE OFFENSIVE IDEALIST

Typically, aggressive foreign policy is associated with realism, but this is a misunderstanding of idealism. A core difference between realism and idealism is the belief in the stability of peace in the international system. Due to a lack of trust in other actors and belief that other actors will seek to gain power at the expense of others, realists do not believe peace can be a permanent characteristic. Idealists, however, believe that peace can become a permanent

characteristic of the system and long-term cooperation, for the collective good, between actors is possible.

The offensive idealist believes that this permanent peace is dependent upon regime type and societal-level characteristics. When a leader believes they can shape the world system in their image, what they believe the ideal system looks like and the characteristics of the actors is what matters. Being a “great power,” the United States has had the capacity and capability to exert influence worldwide, when and where its leaders choose.

The United States has a long policy of expansionist liberalism that persists today. Even those deemed realist in this analysis cannot fully escape the institutionalized culture of promoting idealism. As stated by Smith (2019),

Democracy promotion (associated with open markets economically and multilateralism) reflected America’s cultural superiority (inherited from racial thinking), as well as its mission to help others (descended from its religious background). An internationalist complexion could be given to America’s nationalist identity. In Wilson’s hands, an enduring framework for American foreign policy was born, one that remains with us to this day. (231-32)

In this analysis, both Richard Nixon and George W. Bush fit the typology of the expansionist idealist, but the influence of this view can be seen in the other three cases.

Nixon and Bush firmly believed in the righteous virtues of the U.S. culture and political system and sought to spread this throughout the world. One core goal of Nixon’s agenda was to prevent the spread of communism and his path for achieving this was to spread and protect democracy. In relation with Israel, Nixon believed there was a special relationship due to their democratic political system and Western societal behavior and values. Without question he expended American resources to support Israel. Further, he escalated and expended substantial resources in an attempt to save the democratic government of South Vietnam. Nixon’s paternalistic view of the United States’ role in supporting these regimes is similar to what we saw in the analysis of George W. Bush. While Bush first claimed that the war in Iraq was for protection against a rogue actor, there was much rhetoric and background discussion of regime change and democracy promotion, without consideration for balancing or security concerns.

Nixon’s policy goals, however, were constrained by the power of the Soviet Union. His goal may have been to expand democracy, believing it would create peaceful actors, but he was forced into balancing against the Soviets. In the SALT negotiations Nixon was very skeptical and fearful of the USSR’s intentions. Although he was close friends with their leadership,

he viewed them as a threat politically. In the nuclear talks, Nixon's goal was to maintain parity and did believe deterrence was possible.

George W. Bush, on the other hand, did not face the constraints of balancing against another great power. He firmly believed in the righteousness of the U.S. values and political system. His ultimate goal was to export Jeffersonian style democracy and American values for the purpose of creating a harmonious international system. He was extremely confident in his ability to create this peaceful system, never believing that the United States could fail. Moreover, he held a firm belief that the majority of people around the world would welcome the United States and political change. Capitalizing on the booming economic growth of the 1990s and the downfall of the only other superpower, Bush was able to pursue his objectives without impediment, in large part because the characteristics and constraints of the system had shifted (Schweller, 2010; Smith, 2019). As stated by Smith (2019),

By the late 1990s . . . 'rogue states' could legitimately be attacked for the sake of the people they oppressed; these people themselves would rally to their liberation and rater easily democratize once the tyrants were safely removed; and the result would be increased security for the democratic states that had launched the assault as the "zone of democratic peace" with its "pacific union" would be expanded. (246)

While outside the scope of analysis in this book, Bill Clinton exercised newly unconstrained power, such as with the intervention in Somalia. His constraints, however, were domestic, a lack of acceptance for casualties without a clear benefit, and he refrained from involvement in events like the genocide in Rwanda. George W. Bush capitalized on the events of 9/11 to alter public perception and promote his unconstrained liberal agenda. In Afghanistan, Bush's goal was to eliminate terrorist organizations and create a democratic Afghanistan. His style of leadership toward Afghanistan was paternalistic and he was unwilling to compromise on what the new Afghanistan would look like. In addition, Bush lost focus on Afghanistan with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Where Afghanistan was centered on non-state actors, Iraq was about eliminating Saddam Hussein's regime and replacing it with a U.S. friendly, democratic government. Bush's extreme optimism about being welcomed by the Iraqi people led to a lack of plan when that did not occur. The result was that Iraq was destabilized and foreign fighters from all over the region came to Iraq to fight the United States. Bush, however, remained optimistic and believed that those opposed to U.S. democracy and values were bad and small in number. He believed that when they were eliminated everything would fall

into place. Although arguably unsuccessful, Bush clearly sought to expand the liberal world order in his own image, with the use of force.

In sum, the expansionist idealist is one who seeks to forcefully expand their own culture, values, and political system, for the purpose of creating a peaceful international system. Currently, democracy is the political system tied to this typology, but there is no reason that they cannot change in the future, or in analyzing a different set of leaders. What makes it idealist is the belief in long-term peace through the expansion of regime type. There is a belief in policy and some areas of research that democracy leads to peace, but a new political system that individuals believe will create peace is also possible.

THE ISOLATIONIST IDEALIST

The isolationist idealist is a typology that is attempted by Donald Trump, but difficult to achieve in modern U.S. foreign policy. An isolationist is not simply a state that does not interact with others, but, at least for the intentions of this analysis, must be a state that chooses isolationism. If the policy being followed is not chosen, then it cannot be clearly identified as the preferred policy.

George Washington warned of foreign alliances and being dragged into international conflict and a few other early presidents attempted to avoid involvement in international affairs, but this has been the exception. From its inception the United States was expansionistic, gaining more territory and resources. International trade was in place prior to 1776 and expanded with the new sovereign government. The fur trade, tobacco, and other commodities were in demand in Europe and elsewhere. As technology has progressed, so has globalization and through a series of events in history the United States became a superpower. A superpower has the capacity to choose isolationism or to take action, but a superpower cannot not remain a superpower without being engaged in globalization. In other words a superpower may abdicate their position of influence by not exerting influence. To maintain the status quo a superpower must capitalize on a global economy and be dominant in foreign affairs, otherwise they will be replaced by another actor who desire to exert influence. The structure of the post-Cold War system has opened up this possibility.

Because relinquishing power is an undesirable outcome, policies of isolationism have been short-lived and redirected. Woodrow Wilson, after World War I, advocated for an isolationist foreign policy, while supporting the newly founded League of Nations. As one of the winners of World War I, however, the United States had placed itself at the front of the international stage and drew attention from other actors. Further, in the pursuit of economic growth,

tension was created with adversaries, such as in Asia. Being targeted by both Germany and Japan, the United States was drawn into World War II.

In a modern context, Donald Trump's foreign policy of "America First" has been an attempt at isolationism. Trump has withdrawn from the international stage, scaling down leadership and partnership in NATO as well as the United Nations. He has fought against the global economy with tariffs, in favor of domestic production. Although all of the data is not available yet, this policy agenda appears to have been unsuccessful in that it has weakened the U.S. economy, harming producers who depend upon exports and raising the cost for consumers.

THE DEFENSIVE REALIST

The defensive realist feels secure in their position, not perceiving a high level of threat in the system. They are not prone to conflict, thus being more likely to seek a peaceful resolution to conflict. The defensive realist is not interested in expanding power, but rather preserving power. In this analysis we saw evidence of this typology in Jimmy Carter, as well as Barack Obama.

Carter and Obama had a similar approach in their treatment of allies and humanitarian concerns around the world. Both leaders gave strong verbal support to allies but were much more cautious than Nixon or Bush when expending U.S. power at the request of those allies. With regard to Israel, Carter was much more reserved in his action than Nixon. Carter was more interested in brokering peace negotiations and advocated for a two-state solution. Further, he did not always side with Israel and was resistant to their pressure for U.S. escalation of conflict in the region. Although outside the scope of analysis, Obama was also more reserved in his support of Israel.

With respect to the Obama administration, we saw that he was more interested in removing U.S. power from Iraq and Afghanistan and allowing the new sovereign governments to have control of their security affairs. This differed strongly from the paternalistic approach of George W. Bush. Moreover, although he sought to maintain a strong U.S. presence in international affairs, he did not do so unilaterally. Rather, he was adamant that international support was required. The strong belief in the role of institutions and collective security is more idealist than realist, but Obama more closely fits into the defensive realist category, because the intention behind this policy was to preserve U.S. power.

Carter's view of nuclear deterrence and goals in the SALT negotiations is also evidence of defensive realism. He held a very strong belief in the power of nuclear deterrence and did not believe that it required a large number of weapons to hold. In the analysis, I found that Carter was likely more

constrained by the political nature of nuclear weapons than his beliefs about the need to have a large stockpile. This differed from Nixon who sought to always maintain parity or superiority to the Soviet's nuclear arsenal.

THE OFFENSIVE REALIST

The offensive realist is an aggressive actor that is seeking to expand their power by force, acquiring resources from other actors. We do not have an example of this type of leader in modern U.S. history for a number of reasons, but it may exist in the early years of the country. Soon after the United States was founded as a sovereign state, it began to expand its power by moving westward, purchasing land, as well as acquiring it by force. Wars were fought with Mexico and Canada during this time. As the modern borders have settled, however, expansionistic moves against Mexico and Canada are not likely to be in the interest of the United States, as they are two of the United States' top trading partners. Overseas, colonies, in addition to the territories already maintained, would be a huge cost for the United States and go against the international norm of respecting sovereignty.

Historically, examples of expansionist realists from the United States include Andrew Jackson and Thomas Jefferson. The expansionistic history of the United States, however, also includes expansionist idealists like Zachary Taylor, who sought to proliferate the values and ideals of the United States; thus any future analysis of this time period should be careful to understand the belief system and intentions of each leader.

Outside the United States there are several examples of expansionistic realist behavior that deserve their own analysis in future research. Germany during World War I and World War II was clearly seeking to expand their own power and bolster against the power of other European actors, namely France and the UK, as well as Imperial Japan, balancing against U.S. influence in the region and China.

THE COLD WAR, POST-COLD WAR, AND CONSTRAINTS

The analysis presented in this research has not only provided insight into foreign policy behavior but also shed light on the effects of different structure of the international system. Both Nixon and Carter were operating in a bipolar system, which required balancing against the USSR. In the post-Cold War environment, George W. Bush and Barack Obama had the opportunity to act with less restraint. The significant difference in terms of analysis is

that we must ask what realism and idealism means within the context on a constrained and non-constrained environment. While this research is a step toward that goal, there is much work remaining to be done, both in terms of theory building and case study analysis.

As we saw with Obama, he took action that could be considered idealist. But, although some actions had no benefit to the United States, they also were not of a significant cost to the United States. Thus, he had the ability to behave as an idealist, but retain his defensive realist core. Jimmy Carter may have behaved the same way, but the constraints of the USSR did not allow for inconsequential intervention. Carter, alternatively, supported the liberal world order in a more passive manner. In other words, both Obama and Carter pursued a liberal agenda when possible, but retained a defensive realist policy when the security of the country was in question.

The primary difference in the situational context is the source of and level of threat. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and the United States both posed a significant military threat to one another and the two regimes also competed ideologically. In the post-Cold War environment the primary threat was from non-state actors, competing with globalization and Western values causing a high level of psychological fear, but not posing a significant military threat as did a nuclear USSR.

The lesson learned for the development of IR theory is that our conceptualization of threats that require defense and balancing is not static, but ever evolving with the changing nature and strength of various actors within the international system. Moreover, for the analysis of belief systems and foreign policy intentions does not depend upon what threats legitimately exist, but rather the individual decision-makers' perceptions of threat.

USING IMAGE THEORY WITH OPERATIONAL CODE

Methodologically, this research has expanded the scope of decision-making analysis by combining image theory with OpCode analysis. OpCode is designed to provide an insight into the worldview and generalized belief system of an individual. The downfall of this methodology is that situational and actor-specific context is not included. Image theory suffers from the reverse flaw. While it provides an insight into actor-specific and context-specific perceptions, it does not provide individual-level nuanced variables that are provided by OpCode. In other words, OpCode can be criticized for being overly generalized and image theory can be criticized for being overly specific. Together, the methodologies complement one another and the use of image theory allows the leaders' OpCode to be analyzed in context.

Specifically, image theory helps the researcher to determine the source of threat and the level of perceived threat, both of which are qualities to the original OpCode methodology, but have been removed by the automated system, VICS. Returning to the foundational elements of OpCode methodology also bolsters the connection to realism and idealism, as this was Ole Holsti's (1977) original intent, based on Ken Waltz's (1954) "Man, The State, and War." Bridging the gap between the individual and systemic levels of analysis is a theoretical and methodological battle in the field of political science. This divide inhibits progress and collaboration. I hope that this analysis has shown that there is a direct link between the theoretical assumptions and tools used by researchers focusing on individual and system-level analysis. A wholistic research approach (Hollis and Smith, 1990) will allow us to generate macro-level theories that are applicable at multiple levels of analysis, thus explaining individual foreign policy actions and systemic behavior. Rather than limiting or weakening either approach, both are strengthened. I hope that political psychology will continue to integrate with systemic literature and expand the scope of neoclassical realism.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The greatest limitation of this research is that I have only analyzed U.S. leaders, within the context of the United States as a great power. What we have learned through this analysis is that the situational context of a state influences the perception of threat and ability to deal with the threat, thus having a significant impact on the intention of policy goals and realized actions. Understanding the perceptions of threat and intentions of policy is crucial for placing an actor into the realist/idealist typology. While the typology generated with realist and idealist philosophical text, as well as OpCode and image theory methodologies, should be applicable to any case, until it is tested in a new context it may be subject to modification. The intention of the typology structure is intended to be malleable to new environments, actors, and contexts.

The second limitation of this analysis is that it focused on a limited scope of foreign policy cases. Over the five and a half years Nixon was in office, the four years Carter was in office, the eight-year terms of both George W. Bush and Obama, and into the early months of Trump's fourth year respectively, there were countless foreign policy decisions. My goal was to select cases that were comparable in context to at least one other administration. I could have examined Vietnam in greater detail as well as intervention in Latin America with Richard Nixon, but these issues would collectively take several volumes to address. Moreover, there is no situational context to compare

with the Carter administration, particularly with regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This event would have been a crucial turning point for his foreign policy, as would have been the Iran hostage crisis, greatly influencing his second term, possibly causing a worldview shift. These issues, however, occurred so late in his presidency that there was not enough time to develop a complete image change and certainly no time to change policy based on an altered perception.

There are three big questions left for this research agenda, defining and identifying realist and idealist policy goals in non-great powers. First, what does realism and idealism mean for weak states? The modern systemic theories of realism and liberalism grew out of analysis of competition among strong states, but to fully understand state behavior we must also understand the behavior of lesser powers. A weak state, relative to great powers, is not likely to be any type of expansionist on the world stage, but they may be a belligerent and regionally expansionist. A weak state may attempt to shift the balance of power if they believe they have nothing to lose, or alternatively, they may be much more prone to defensive posture since any loss is more significant. A weakness in the theory and literature development of individual-level analysis based on speech, such as OpCode used in this work, is that it has only been able to code English text. With recent advancements in the software coding, there is now an opportunity to expand this analysis to non-English-speaking leaders (Brummer et al., 2020).

The second question is, what does realism and idealism mean for middle power states? Where a weak power may feel backed into a corner with no option but to die or fight, or they may be over-cautious, the calculus for a middle power is likely to be more complex. A loss is much more significant for a middle power than a weak power, because it could change their level of influence in the system. They also, however, have more to gain if they view themselves as a rising power, which could be strengthened, and trigger action if they believe one or more of the great powers they compete with is in decline. This question opens the door to an entire research agenda of exploring power shifts in the system.

The third question is, what do realism and idealism mean in an increasingly globalized economy and society? Realism and idealism are both predicated on traditional security concepts, state-to-state conflict. The nature of the system, however, has shifted to include many non-state actors and the globalized economy has increasingly significant importance. Not only is the security of the state dependent upon wealth, but the day-to-day functioning of a state is dependent upon a well-oiled global economic system. Sanctions and trade wars can have catastrophic consequences for domestic production and one economic sector will have ripple effects into the others. In this light, what is considered “state interest” may now often be the collective interest.

Economic policy may be the focus on balancing against rising powers, thus altering the traditional conceptualization of what realist and idealist policy means.

It is my hope that the analysis in this text has laid a small foundation on which we will continue to explore and build theoretical tools for the analysis of IR and foreign policy decision-making. What defines a security concern and competition today is not the same as it was during the Cold War, or earlier in history, and it will inevitably continue to evolve. Of course, the fundamental security of a state remains the core, but globalization has made the world more interconnected and sovereignty more fluid. Some individuals today hold more wealth than some states. Global corporations drive markets. As such, our understanding of world politics must also be fluid and evolve with the changing system.

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