BONAVENTURE'S AESTHETICS

THE DELIGHT OF THE SOUL IN ITS ASCENT INTO GOD

THOMAS J. MCKENNA

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A Note on the Cover Illustration

The cover illustration is a depiction of Bonaventure from an anonymous engraving after a fresco by John of Florence, Fra Angelico, in the Vatican. It first appeared in a history of the Middle Ages in 1878 and is now in the public domain.

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Abbreviations

AF	Analecta Franciscana
BA	Bibliothèque Augustinienne
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CSEL	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
PL	Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina
SVF	Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

Introduction

Disputed Questions on Bonaventure's Aesthetics

The authors of the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics—Künzle, Lutz, Boving, *et alii*—had argued that it was one of the more extensive and innovative of the later Middle Ages.[1] They supported their thesis in their careful consideration of its salient features: Bonaventure's rich definition of beauty (*pulcritudo*) and its properties, harmony, proportion, and order, its metaphysical form, and its transcendental status; his account of the sensory experience of beauty (*speciositas*) in anticipation of the concept of the aesthetic attitude that emerged in the Enlightenment; the role of this experience in the ascent of the rational soul or mind (*mens*) into union with God (*in Deum*); the aesthetic significance of his doctrine of exemplarity; the revelation of divine beauty in God the Father's disclosure of Himself in His eternal emanation of the Son; the aesthetic properties of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, *Deus et homo*; and, finally, his philosophy of the fine or beaux arts.

Balthasar, the last of the authors of the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics, developed the thesis further. He provided an extraordinarily detailed consideration of a long list of philosophers, theologians, and mystics and argued that Bonaventure's aesthetics was the *most* extensive and innovative of the later Middle Ages. "Of all the great scholastics," he contended, "Bonaventure is the one who offers the widest scope to the beautiful in his theology: not merely because he speaks of it most frequently, but because he thereby gives expression to his own innermost experience and does this in new concepts that are his own."[2] Balthasar's contention remains a cause célèbre in the relevant literature, particularly among Thomists.[3]

But they also introduced a series of disputed questions that remain unresolved and often overlooked in the more recent literature.[4] The first is the question of approach. They endorsed a standard approach to medieval

aesthetics that emerged in Hegel's conception of aesthetics as the *philosophy* of beauty, distinct from its context in the particular *theological* traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and its principal manifestation in the fine or beaux arts.[5] This approach provided some insight into the continuity between Bonaventure's aesthetics and later developments in the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Romantic era, but it was an anachronism that tended to distort rather than clarify Bonaventure's reflections on beauty. Is there a more viable approach that enables us to recover Bonaventure's aesthetics with a greater degree of clarity, and still renders it relevant to contemporary discourse?

Their approach also birthed a long list of more pointed questions on each of the features they enlisted in support of their thesis. Is Bonaventure's definition of beauty in terms of harmony, proportion, and order compatible with the simplicity of its metaphysical form? Did he advocate for the transcendental status of beauty, a unity of truth, goodness, and beauty extensive with Being Itself (*Ispum Esse*)? Did he distinguish the sensory apprehension of beauty from the rational analysis of it in anticipation of developments in the Enlightenment? What role does the sensory experience of beauty play in his account of the soul's ascent into union with God? Is his doctrine of exemplarity aesthetically significant? Is his analysis of the aesthetic dimensions of the Three Person'd God successful?[6] Is the terrible beauty of Christ's arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and death a proper aesthetic category?[7] And, finally, does he provide insight into the fine arts as we understand them today?

The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of Bonaventure's aesthetics, that is, his philosophy, theology, and mystical theology of beauty, the first to appear since Balthasar's *Herrlichkeit*, and, in so doing, to argue for resolutions to these disputed questions—and, perhaps, the restoration of Bonaventure's status as the author of the most extensive and innovative aesthetics of the Middle Ages.

THE QUESTION OF APPROACH

The question of the proper approach to medieval aesthetics is particularly problematic. Zimmermann, the initial architect of the standard approach to the history of aesthetics, defined aesthetics as the philosophy of beauty and its principal manifestation in the fine or beaux arts.[8] He rejected its applicability to the Age of Faith and moved from his analysis of classical aesthetics to the Enlightenment in a handful of pages. Schasler, the second principal architect of the standard approach to the history of aesthetics, concurred, although he discussed the remnants of the classical ideal of beauty in the Middle Ages in more detail.[9] Bosanquet, the third principal architect of the standard approach,

was the first to defend the viability of a medieval aesthetics; he did so on the basis of the emerging concept of the Middle Ages as a series of renaissances of classical civilization.[10] A number of other scholars, notably, Maritain, De Bruyne, Eco, Assunto, and Perpeet, developed the standard approach to medieval aesthetics in more detail.[11] But revisionists in the next generation—Kristeller, Speer, and Aertsen—revived Zimmermann's objection and rejected the applicability of the standard approach to the Middle Ages.[12] Still others, notably Marenbon, rejected both the standard approach and its revision.[13] Balthasar had argued for a radical alternative to the standard approach, an explicitly theological approach that has further confounded the question. A brief review of these efforts—standard, revisionists, and revelatory—will enable us to clear the way for a more viable approach.

The Standard Approach to Medieval Aesthetics and Its Alternatives

The standard definition of aesthetics, the philosophy of beauty and its principal manifestation in the fine or beaux arts, possesses an impressive pedigree. Plato initiated the philosophical reflection on the concept of beauty (καλός) and established the fundamental elements of aesthetic discourse that continue to shape the field, namely, the aesthetic attitude, affect, imagination, perception, judgment, the attempt to define beauty as order, proportion, or metaphysical form (ἰδέα or, at times, εἶδος), and its relation the good (ἀγαθός).[14] But he and other philosophers in Antiquity applied a wide range of connotation to the concept, the beauty of the body in its youth, precious objects, wealth, nobility, and wisdom, in sum, everything that displays a degree of excellence (ἀρετή).[15] He also argued that the desire for beautiful things—for beautiful bodies and other physical, earthy things; for the beauty of nobility; and even for the rarified beauty of the principles, concepts, and other objects of the rational soul—led the soul along the steps of a ladder of love until it came face to face with a divine Beauty: "separate, simple, and everlasting; which lending of its virtue to all beautiful things that we see born to decay, itself suffers neither increase nor diminution, nor any other change."[16]

Plato's influence in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages was not direct. It moved through a series of intermediaries. Antiochus and the Middle Platonists revived the Platonic doctrine and absorbed other traditions into their own, Peripatetic, Stoic, and, with Philo, an early Jewish synthesis. Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists, notably Porphyry, Iamblychus, and Proclus, codified the stages of the ladder of the love of beauty and handed the paradigm down to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic philosophers, theologians, and mystics. Augustine proved the most important conduit for the Christian West, but so, too, a wide range of other sources: Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, whose

authority rivaled that of the authors of the scriptures; the members of the School of St. Victor—Hugh, Richard, and Thomas Gallus—who transmitted the Dionysian corpus to their heirs in the later Middle Ages; Bernard of Clairvaux and other commentators on the Song of Solomon who preserved the striking erotic metaphor of the paradigm; Ibn Sina, the most influential of the Islamic Neo-Platonists; Thomas of Aquinas, whose sparse reflection on beauty's criteria remains influential; and, above all, Bonaventure, "who offers the widest scope to the beautiful in his theology."

The philosophers who first demarcated the concept of "aesthetics" as a distinct field of philosophical inquiry—Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Du Bos, Addison, Baumgarten, and Kant—developed a rival paradigm that emphasized their subjective encounter with beauty rather than its proper *telos* in union with the Divinity. Guyer argues for a complex set of theses that define their innovation: the development of aesthetic immediacy, affect, disinterest, and the self-determination of "the idea of the freedom of the imagination."[17] Hutcheson, who intended to explicate "the Principles of the late Earl of Shaftsbury [*sic*]," provided a telling explanation: "The Ideas of Beauty and harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or deformity of an object."[18] Du Bos, Addison, and Baumgarten applied the new paradigm in their analyses of the "pleasures of the imagination" peculiar to the immediate perception of beauty. Baumgarten developed the phrase *epistêmê aisthetikê* to distinguish the "perfection" of the "lower faculty" of "perceptual cognition" from the "perfection" of the "higher faculty" of the intellect.[19] He made the relationship between aesthetics and its proper object, beauty, explicit in a later work: "Aesthetics . . . is the science of sensible cognition" and its aim "is the perfection of sensible cognition . . . that is, beauty (*pulcritudo*)."[20] He also insisted on the inherent value of aesthetic perception independent of rational analysis: "The perfection of every kind of cognition grows from the richness, the magnitude, the truth, the clarity and certainty, and the liveliness of cognition, insofar as these harmonize within a single representation and with each other . . . when all of these perfections of cognition appear together in sensory appearance, they yield universal beauty."[21]

Guyer argues that Kant brought these streams of thought together into a comprehensive, well-wrought whole, but he emphasizes aspects of Kant's synthesis that others often miss. He first repudiates "the common caricature of Kant's purported reduction of aesthetic response . . . to perceptual form apart from all content and significance."[22] He admits that Kant restricted the "pure judgment of taste" to the contemplation of the "pure beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*)" of an object's perceptual form as an end in itself. But, he notes, Kant also extended the free play of the imagination to the contemplation of

the adherent beauty (*pulchritudo adhaerens*) of the conceptual content of natural and artistic objects although not, and this is the crucial point, to any determinate concept, "that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible."[23]

The concept of the fine or beaux arts, the second component in Zimmermann's definition of aesthetics, is of more recent lineage. Kristeller argues that ancient and medieval philosophers had produced significant discussions of the arts, artistic practice, and production—Bonaventure's *De reductione artium ad theologiam* is a prominent example—but their discussions served as precursors for the emergence of the concept of the "fine arts" in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, not the philosophy of the fine arts per se. "The Greek term for Art (τέχνη)," Kristeller explained, "and its Latin equivalent (*ars*) do not specifically denote the 'fine arts' in the modern sense, but were applied to all kinds of human activities which we would call crafts or sciences."[24] The fine arts lay scattered throughout various classifications of these crafts and sciences: poetry imbedded in the *trivium* with grammar, rhetoric, and logic; music in the *quadrivium* alongside arithmetic, geometry, and the harmony of the astronomical spheres; and architecture, sculpture, and painting, along with other crafts, in the mechanical arts—Bonaventure, an exception to some of these tendencies, located poetry and other dramatic arts in the *mechanicae artes*.

Kristeller argues that the Abbé Batteux took "the decisive step toward a system of the fine arts" in his *Les beaux arts réduits à un même principe* of 1746.[25] The Abbé distinguished the fine arts, that is, beaux arts—music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and the dance—from the mechanical arts on the basis of the pleasure they provided in the degree to which they imitated nature. He added a third category that included those arts, rhetoric and architecture, that combined pleasure and utility and a fourth, the theatre, that combined all of the arts into a *Gesamtkunstwerk*—although that particular term appeared only in 1827.[26] Later critics ridiculed Batteux's emphasis on the imitation of nature, but he established the paradigm that, with some variation, continues to inform our current conception of the fine arts.

This development, the union of beauty and the arts, reached its climax in the romantic aesthetics of Schiller, Schelling, and, above all, Hegel, who folded the Platonic and Kantian traditions into his philosophy of the *Schöne Kunsten*. He collapsed the distinction between the Creator and Its creation to render those traditions compatible; his divine Spirit (*Geist*) was continuous with Its self-expression in the cosmos. Beauty is the manifestation of this Spirit in sensuous form and the *Schöne Kunsten* the explicit manifestation of this Spirit: It is "the beauty that is born . . . of the mind."[27] Hegel went on

to analyze Its development in three stages (*Kunstformen*): the Spirit began to manifest Itself in the primitive art (*Vorkunst*) of Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, Persia, and India, the borders of Alexander's empire and the greatest extent of European influence in Antiquity; It reached the perfection of Its manifestation in the classical art of ancient Greece; and It exceeded Its media of expression in the romantic art of European civilization in five fundamental forms, such as architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, "the most perfect art" insofar as it provided the Spirit with the means for the rational expression of Itself in the concrete medium of sound and thus pacified the philosopher's ancient quarrel with poetry.[28]

The architects of the standard approach to the history of aesthetics—Zimmermann, Schasler, and Bosanquet—developed their approach in the midst of the debates between Herbart—Kant's successor at Königsberg, who endorsed a philosophy of Critical Realism—and the Absolute Idealists, such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Zimmermann sided with Herbart and the Critical Realists. He defended a formal definition of beauty: the perfection of perceptual form (*Vorstellung*) in the harmony (*Zusammen*) of its parts independent of its context, signification, or symbolism—thus his rejection of the possibility of the philosophy of beauty and the fine arts in the Age of Faith.[29] Schasler appropriated the concept of Hegelian dialectic to propose a compromise position, an "objective," "concrete," or "realistic idealism" that synthesized the "Idea" in the form of its sensory representations.[30] Bosanquet rejected both for their overemphasis on the formal properties of beauty. He defended a thoroughly Hegelian aesthetic that defined beauty as the sensuous symbol of the *Idee*.[31] He recorded the development of "beauty as a symbol for spiritual things" throughout his *History*. Plato, Bosanquet argued, had been the first to articulate a precise philosophy of beauty. Plotinus and his heirs throughout the Middle Ages handed it down to subsequent generations until it reached its fullest development in Hegel's mystical metaphysics, "the greatest single step that has ever been made in aesthetic."[32] Hegel's achievement, Bosanquet argued, was the realization of the proper balance between the formal properties of aesthetic objects and their symbolic potential. "There is thus nothing 'abstract' in Hegel's 'idea' which is the very concrete itself, nor any unreality in his 'ideal' which is . . . the idea as manifested in the chief historical types or phases of art": the primitive, the classical, and the romantic.[33]

Bosanquet's *apologia* for the possibility of medieval aesthetics depended on his conception of the Middle Ages as a series of renaissances of these Platonic intuitions that would find their full expression in the sensuous expression of the Hegelian *Idee*. He located the first of these renaissances rather early. "The re-birth of humanity began with the Christian era," he argued, "and the apparent aberrations of the later middle age were but necessary grades in the process which vindicated the full breadth and intensity of

the human ideal."[34] He provided a brief overview of these grades of development with particular attention to Augustine, Erigena, Francis of Assisi, and Thomas Aquinas, who, so Bosanquet argued, applied the elements of Neo-Platonic aesthetics to the content of their faith and, in agreement with the Platonists, concluded that "beauty is the revelation of reason in sensuous shape, that its fascination consists in its affinity with mind, and that consequently the entire sensible universe, as a symbol of divine reason, must be beautiful to the eye that can see it in relation to its Creator."[35]

The historians, philosophers, and theologians who furthered Bosanquet's formulation of the standard approach to medieval aesthetics—Maritain, de Bruyne, Eco, Assunto, Perpeet, and, to a lesser extent, de Wulf—defined the nature and scope of medieval aesthetics in terms of five prominent features. They argued, in agreement with Bosanquet, that medieval philosophers depended on classical sources to derive the decidedly objective properties of beauty, integrity, order, measure, proportion, number, weight, and the splendor of metaphysical *formae*; the corollary that these properties functioned as a sign (*signum*) of creation's testimony to its Creator; the transcendental status of beauty on par with the fundamental metaphysical properties of the one, the true, and the good; an incipient form of the aesthetic attitude in which the rational soul delights in its sensory apprehension of beauty prior to its rational analysis of it; and, finally, a philosophy of the fine arts. They admitted the medieval divisions of the arts (*ars*) into the liberal arts, the mechanical arts, and other categories did not align with the fine arts that first emerged in the Renaissance. But they also argued that they could derive a viable philosophy of the fine arts on the basis of the similarity between the medieval categorization of particular arts and the modern.

The revisionists—Kristeller, Speer, and Aertsen—argued that this standard approach was an anachronism. They adopted a similar definition of aesthetics, the philosophy of beauty and its manifestation in the fine arts, but they reiterated Zimmermann's argument. The philosophers of the Middle Ages pressed philosophy into the service of theology. Thus, their philosophy of beauty was intractably intertwined with their explicitly theological convictions, the ontology of the Christian concept of the Divinity, and the doctrine of creation, salvation, and the four last things: death, judgment, heaven, and hell. They also rejected the status of beauty as a transcendental of being; the legitimacy of attempts to derive a medieval conceptualization of the fine arts from medieval discussions of the liberal, mechanical, and other categories of the arts; and the medieval anticipation of the aesthetic attitude—a concept that had, since the initial development of the standard approach to medieval aesthetics, fallen into disfavor.[36]

Marenbon developed a third approach, an analytic approach on the basis of Wittgenstein's concept of resemblance rather than beauty or any other single

feature that limits the conceptualization of the fine arts.[37] The contemporary approach to the philosophy of art, he argued, is a loose field of inquiry that studies a vague category of objects, "poems, or pieces of music, or paintings, or sculptures . . . without attaching any theoretical weight to this concept." He proposed "a body of research projects on bodies of medieval material, linked by subject or theme, where the questions raised can be related interestingly, and perhaps provocatively, to those discussed by contemporary analytic philosophers." He included beauty in his list of possible subjects, but it, he remarked, has become passé.[38] Instead, he identified five topics that, in his estimate, demonstrate greater promise: the medieval theories of hermeneutics; the medieval conception of music and its independence, even superiority, to other arts; the logical foundations of metaphor and analogy; poetics, particularly in the Arabic tradition; and the problem of representation in the visual arts.

Balthasar had further confounded the effort to identify a viable approach to medieval aesthetics.[39] He endorsed a number of the features of the standard approach, the definition of beauty in terms of its objective properties, integrity, measure, number, proportion, order, weight, and its metaphysical *formae*; its transcendental status; and its principal function as a sign (*signum*) of creation's dependence on its Creator. But he also argued for a theological *a priori* in the study of aesthetics that breached the traditional division between philosophy and theology (and, to some extent, mysticism): the "splendor" of Otto's *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* in the "species" or perceptual "form" of creation's testimony to its Creator.[40] He located its origins in the mythological poetry of Antiquity, for example, in Homer's *Iliad*, Hesiod's *Theogony*, and Pindar's *Odes*, and tracked its development through Socrates, Plato, and the Neo-Platonists, and their heirs in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Enlightenment until it ended in the Romantic era, when, so he argued, philosophers, poets, and other artists lost sight of the revelatory aspect of beauty in their fascination with its sensuous form as an end in itself; thus, aesthetics became self-reflexive and "all glory of Being now becomes the self-glorification of the Spirit."[41] His effort remains promising,[42] but it has proved something sui generis: philosophers tend to ignore his effort in favor of an approach akin to Marenbon's,[43] while theologians tend to focus their attention on the revelatory significance of the fine and, increasingly, more egalitarian arts.[44]

The Hermeneutic Crisis

This lack of consensus in the recent effort to develop a consistent approach to medieval aesthetics is an instance of the broader hermeneutic crisis in the field of historical scholarship. Grondin explains: "The basic doctrine . . . is

that every particular phenomenon must be conceptualized within the context of its age" to avoid anachronism.[45] But if so, this "raises a striking epistemological problem. . . . Our view of earlier ages must itself be produced by reference to our present, and is thereby relativized."[46] Thus, Grondin asks, "How, if at all, is it possible to escape from the hermeneutic circle of our historicity?" Or, more particularly, is it possible to accurately recover the conceptualization of beauty and, perhaps, the arts of any age—ancient, medieval, or modern—with a reasonable degree of accuracy? If so, does it remain relevant to current aesthetic theory and practice? Or must we choose between a historically accurate conceptualization of the aesthetic sympathies of the past and a relevant conceptualization of them?

Grondin enlists Gadamer's effort to go between the horns of the dilemma.[47] Gadamer argued, against Dilthey and other hermeneutic positivists, that we possess pre-conceptual prejudices that prevent a fully determinate interpretation of the meaning of ancient and medieval texts.[48] But he also argued, against Derrida and other post-structural skeptics, that we also possess preconceptions that render those texts intelligible.[49] He provided a "rough abbreviation" of this via media in his commentary on Heidegger's conception of our cognitive "fore" projection:

> A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.[50]

The challenge, Gadamer argued, was to distinguish the preconceptions that render ancient and medieval texts intelligible from those preconceptions that distort them, so that we can revise them and, in a continual process of revision, come to an ever more accurate reading of them. He proposed a method of "authentic" dialogue in the Socratic tradition to meet that challenge, a method that possessed a "logical structure of openness" to the revision of our preconceptions in our reading of the text at hand. It is a dialogue that is never entirely "settled" but remains "awaiting a decisive answer," and it does so through "an equilibrium between pro and contra" reminiscent of medieval dialectic.[51]

A Resolution to the Question of Approach

I have adopted an approach that depends on the relatively recent application of the method of analytic philosophy to theology to render an account

of Bonaventure's aesthetics that both is accurate and serves as the proper basis to evaluate its current relevance.[52] It applies the fundamental tactics of the analytic method, such as the analysis of terms, propositions, and arguments, to Bonaventure's treatises in philosophical theology to render the aesthetic content of those treatises intelligible and evaluate their epistemic merit. It applies a similar approach to his devotional treatises in which he presented the greater portion of his aesthetics. Bonaventure was a master of the devotional genres of the later Middle Ages, and he did much to further their development, but he impressed his philosophical theology on every page of those treatises in his effort to further his readers' knowledge and love of God.

It also depends on the recent rapprochement between the analytic method and the historical that provides the basis for an authentic dialogue: the careful sifting of the historical sources of Bonaventure's thought, the use he made of them, and the relevant secondary literature that strives to make sense of them to properly define the terms, propositions, phrases, metaphors, allegories, and other literary devices that he employed to articulate his aesthetics.[53] The result is a thick description of the intellectual *milieux* in which Bonaventure developed his aesthetics in his philosophical, theological, and devotional treatises—similar to Geertz's thick description of cultural anthropology.[54] Bonaventure distinguished, but did not sever, philosophy and philosophical theology from other forms of discourse.[55] The old categorization of Thomas and the Peripatetics, who emancipated reason from fideism, and Bonaventure and other Augustinians, who pressed philosophy into service in the explication of their faith, is no longer tenable.[56] Both mixed the water of philosophy with the wine of the data of revelation and they did so carefully, so not to dilute the content of revelation.[57] Thus, while it is possible to extract a philosophy of beauty from the thought of Bonaventure and other medieval thinkers, the extraction results in a diminished expression of the full extent of their thought, philosophical, theological, and even mystical.

OTHER QUESTIONS

I will resolve the other, more pointed questions in the remainder of this study. It consists of four movements: the analysis of Bonaventure's debt to the tradition of *l'esthétique musicale* and its counterpoint, his debt to *l'esthétique de la lumière*, his account of the aesthetic experience, and the role of that experience in his description of the rational soul's ascent into union with God in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* and other relevant texts.

Bonaventure's Debt to *l'Esthétique Musicale* and *l'Esthétique de la Lumière*

Bonaventure and other philosopher-theologians in the later Middle Ages depended on a wide range of sources to develop their definitions of beauty—Pythagorean, Platonic, Stoic, and Neo-Platonic—through the lenses of the Jewish and Christian philosophers and theologians of late Antiquity. De Bruyne established the conceptual categories to make sense of them: *l'esthétique musicale*, *l'esthétique de la lumière*, and a number of other, less extensive classifications.[58] The first of these, *l'esthétique musicale*, defined beauty in terms of different types of proportion or *rapport*, the proportion between musical intervals, for example, the perfect fourth, fifth, or octave. The second, *l'esthétique de la lumière*, defined beauty as a property of the Platonic ideas or forms (*formae*). These metaphysical *formae*, like the light of the sun and other celestial bodies, were beautiful in themselves, and their presence within beautiful things rendered them beautiful, not the proportion of their parts. De Bruyne went on to argue that medieval philosophers and theologians faced a categorical imperative; they had to choose one or the other or run the risk of a fundamental contradiction that would undermine the validity of their arguments. He placed Bonaventure's definitions of beauty in the category of *l'esthétique musicale*.

Eco initiated the counterclaim.[59] He argued that Bonaventure endorsed a metaphysics of light, the proposal that a primordial *formae*, the light (*lux*) of the first day of creation, was beautiful in itself and that it informed all created things. Thus, Bonaventure's metaphysics determined his commitment to *l'esthétique de la lumière*.

I will argue that de Bruyne was correct. Bonaventure defined beauty in terms of the proper *rapport* between one thing and another: the *rapport* between one thing and another in the cosmic hierarchy; the *rapport* between the rational soul and the objects of its contemplation; and the perfect *rapport* between God the Son—the divine Image of God the Father—and the Father. But I will also argue that de Bruyne overstated the contrast between the two categories. Bonaventure defined beauty in terms of different types of *rapport*, but he also insisted that the *rapport* of the created order depended on the metaphysical *formae* that determined the nature and extent of that order.

The controversial thesis that Bonaventure listed beauty as a transcendental property of being is closely related to these definitions. Henquinet first advanced the thesis on the basis of an anonymous manuscript in the *Biblioteca Comunale* in Assisi, whose author clearly listed four transcendentals of being: unity, truth, goodness, and beauty.[60] He attributed the manuscript to Bonaventure, and the authors of the formative studies of

Bonaventure's aesthetics accepted his attribution with enthusiasm. It remains a common claim in the secondary literature.

A minority of scholars have cast doubt on Henquinet's attribution. They argued that Bonaventure explicitly listed three and only three transcendentals of being—the one, the true, and the good—in each and every one of his authentic texts. He consistently located beauty in a secondary position, as a further aspect of truth. Thus, if Bonaventure had been the author of the manuscript, he abandoned his support for its claim early in his career and never revisited it. I will argue in support of the minority position. Bonaventure insisted that beauty is coextensive with the full extension of being—physical being, intelligible, and divine—but its pervasiveness is a corollary to the transcendence of truth.

Bonaventure's Account of the Aesthetic Experience

Bonaventure relied on a syncretic tradition of Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and Peripatetic theories of sense perception to derive his account of the aesthetic experience. It consists of two initial components: the rational soul's perception or, more properly, its sensory apprehension (*apprehensio*) of physical objects, the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of them, and its natural delight (*oblectatio*) in their beauty (*speciositas*), agreeableness, and goodness.[61] He fastened these to a third component, judgment (*diiudicatio*), a synthesis of an abstraction theory of concept formation in tandem with an Augustinian theory of divine illumination in which the rational soul inquired into the reasons (*rationes*) for its delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of creation.

Künzle initiated the tendency to argue that Bonaventure's account of the aesthetic experience, the rational soul's sensory apprehension of beauty (*speciositas*) and its subsequent delight, *prior* to its rational judgment, anticipated the more explicit emphasis on the aesthetic experience as an end in itself in the Enlightenment. I will argue that Bonaventure did anticipate the emphasis in his detailed distinction between the soul's aesthetic experience and its rational reflection on the reason for its experience. But I will also argue that Bonaventure did not approve of bringing the process to a premature halt. The soul's apprehension and delight in the physical realm of being is the preliminary stage of its cognitive *reductio* of creation to its fundamental cause in its Creator, the Three Person'd God. The person who brings the *reductio* to a halt and refuses "to recognize the First Principle (*Primum Principium*) through such clear signs," Bonaventure rebuked, "is a fool (*stultus*)."[62]

The Role of the Aesthetic Experience in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*

Bonaventure's account of the rational soul's *reductio* in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* and other closely related texts depended on his doctrine of exemplarity, creation's testimony to the existence and nature of God, the divine Exemplar, through a series of carefully graded exempla. These include the vestige (*vestigium*) of the physical realm of being, the image (*imago*) of the rational soul, and the likeness (*similitudo*) of the soul reformed through grace into an even more perfect image, each of which testified to the existence and nature of the Three Person'd God. De Bruyne was the first to provide an account of the aesthetic significance of Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarity.[63] Others soon followed and Bonaventure's enthusiasm for creation's testimony to its Creator became a standard feature in the secondary literature. But they also tended to pose more questions than they answered.

The first is the precise relationship between Bonaventure's description of the initial aesthetic experience, the soul's apprehension and delight in the beauty of the physical realm of being, and the aesthetic significance of exemplarity. I will argue that the soul's *reductio* of creation's testimony to its Creator is the first in a series of further "aesthetic" experiences similar to the initial and more proper aesthetic experience in their dependence on the *rapport* between the soul, the objects of its contemplation, and their divine Exemplar. They differ, however, from the initial experience insofar as the soul no longer relies on its physical senses to mediate between itself and the objects of its contemplation. The soul's rational contemplation of creation's testimony to its Creator is the occasion for a *cognitive* delight that stimulates its affective desire for the further pleasures of the intellect until it comes to an apophatic union in God—the Father, Son, and Spirit.

Bonaventure's description of the highest grade of these exempla, the rational soul's own testimony to the existence and nature of God, reformed through grace into an even more perfect likeness (*similitudo*) of God, leads to three further questions that remain without adequate resolution: the precise function of the reformed soul's spiritual senses, the aesthetic status of the proper object of those senses, and the possibility of an aesthetic experience at the summit of the soul's ascent in an apophatic union in God that exceeds the capabilities of the intellect.

Bonaventure claimed that the *similitudo* of the soul, reformed through grace, recovered its spiritual senses, its ability to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the Divinity in the form of the mystical Christ, the *Deus homo*, and through the mediation of Christ, the One God—the Father, Son, and Spirit. The soul *sees* the real presence of the Divinity immediately present to itself or perhaps in itself and so, too, the other senses, hear, smell, taste, and even

touch the Divinity "in ecstatic love," similar to the Bride in the Song of Solomon, who in "the fullness of delights . . . rests entirely upon her Beloved" (Song of Sol. 8:5).[64] But the precise details of Bonaventure's doctrine have proved elusive.[65] Bonnefoy had argued that it remains hopelessly vague. Rahner had argued that the spiritual senses are metaphors for the operations of the soul's higher faculties—its memory, intellect, and will—in its ascent into union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit. Balthasar had argued, *contra* Rahner, that Bonaventure's conceptualization of the spiritual senses is analogous to the physical senses. The soul possesses its own capacity to "sense" the Divinity, parallel to its capacity to sense physical objects and delight in them, distinct from its higher faculties of memory, intellect, and will. He also argued that the proper object of the soul's spiritual senses is Christ—*increatum*, *incarnatum*, *et inspiratum*—prior to its apophatic union with God.

Recent scholarship tends to confirm Balthasar's interpretation. I, too, will argue that Balthasar is correct. If so, then Bonaventure's doctrine of the spiritual senses provides a distinct aesthetic experience in which the soul apprehends and delights in the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the mystical Christ, similar to the Bride's delight in the sensual pleasures of her Bridegroom.

Bonaventure's description of the soul's delight in the spiritual sensation of the immediate presence of Christ hints at a problematic detail he had explored in greater depth in his devotional treatises: the contemplation of Christ's passion, His arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and death. Bonaventure had focused on the contemplation of the mystical presence of the risen Christ in his account of the spiritual senses in the *Itinerarium*, but he had addressed the soul's contemplation of the *Christus Patiens* in the *Lignum vitae* and other devotional treatises, in which he asked his readers to engage the senses of their imagination so they could perceive Christ as if they had been present at pivotal points in his life on earth, His birth, public ministry, and the Last Supper, His arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and death, His resurrection from the dead, post-resurrection appearances, and ascension into heaven.

The authors of the formative studies on Bonaventure's aesthetics tended to neglect his explication of the aesthetic dimensions of the *Christus Patiens* in his devotional works. Balthasar's personal presupposition in regard to the theological import of Christ's sacrifice on the cross inclined him to provide a starting point for a more comprehensive analysis.[66] He argued persuasively that Bonaventure presented two foci in his aesthetics: the soul's *reductio* of creation to its origin in the Three Person'd God and the soul's contemplation of the full extent of the person of Christ, *Deus et homo*, the Father's perfect *similitudo* of His Divinity in hypostatic union with the person of Christ, body and soul. But he also argued for Bonaventure's endorsement of Francis of

Assisi's Christ—poor, humble, and broken on the wood of the cross—who, in the tradition of the suffering servant of Isaiah, possessed "neither beauty (*species*) nor comeliness" (Isa. 53:2).

Balthasar argued for the rather innovative thesis that the "nuptial poverty" of the crucified Christ was the *fullest* expression of the divine *similitudo*. It was the "crowning conclusion" and not, Balthasar insisted, the "breaking-off" of Bonaventure's aesthetics. The crucified Christ was the "expression" of the "self-sacrificing love of God." It "penetrates through to the ultimate source from which all beauty in its appearing flows" and enkindles the soul's "ecstatic love" of Christ that leads to union with Him—and then into union with the fullness of the Divinity, God the Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus, Bonaventure's aesthetic contemplation of Christ entails the impossible juxtaposition of divine Beauty, the aesthetic object par excellence, "fairer (*formosus*) than the sons of men" (Ps. 45:2), and Christ crucified, who possessed "neither beauty nor comeliness" (Isa. 53:2).[67]

This tension within Bonaventure's depiction of Christ, the paradigm of beauty and its paradox, lies at the heart of Bonaventure's contemplative aesthetics. Nevertheless, the question remains, is Balthasar's solution defensible? I will argue that it is defensible but not entirely adequate. Balthasar failed to fully account for the degree to which Bonaventure emphasized the graphic horror of Christ's passion, an emphasis that stubbornly refuses to be folded into the broader theme of divine *condescensio*.

Bonaventure brought his account of the soul's ascent to its proper end in an apophatic union in God—Father, Son, and Spirit—but the precise status of its intellect in its union had been the subject of a long and frustrating debate. McGinn provides a helpful summary of the possibilities that range between some degree of the intellect's participation to its full disengagement.[68] He argues for a type of experiential knowledge in which the soul's cognitive capabilities remain intact, but the object of the soul's contemplation, the immediate presence of the Three Person'd God, overwhelms its cognitive capabilities and it rests in a thoroughly affective union. If McGinn is correct, and I will argue that he is correct, then Bonaventure's description of ascent ends in a profound aesthetic experience consistently overlooked in the secondary literature, the soul's supra-cognitive delight in the overwhelming beauty of its *rapport* with the full disclosure of the Divinity.

A Brief Interlude on Bonaventure's Philosophical Theology of the Fine Arts

Did Bonaventure develop a philosophy or theology of the fine arts as we understand them today? The answer, in brief, is no, he did not. He authored one of the more extensive medieval treatises on the arts, *De reductione artium*

ad theologiam. But, as Kristeller, Speer, and Aertsen have successfully argued, neither Bonaventure nor any other ancient or medieval figure developed a concept of the fine arts remotely similar to the concept that emerged in the early stages of the Enlightenment. Bonaventure defined "art" as a rational skill (*habitus cum ratione factivus*)[69] and divided those skills into a number of categories: the mechanical, sensory, philosophical, and theological arts—not, significantly, the category of the liberal arts.

It is possible to locate the arts as we understand them today in Bonaventure's category of the mechanical arts: vocal music, instrumental music, spoken poetry, and other dramatic arts; the production of textiles, sculpture, and any type of metal, wood, or stone work; and perhaps even the gestures (*gesticulationes*) of the participants in the liturgy, liturgical drama, and other performances that may well extend to the dance.[70] He also provided a curious reference to Horace's distinction between those arts that provide delight and those that provide benefits that may go some way toward the emergence of the concept of the aesthetic attitude in the Enlightenment, although he preferred the combination of both.[71] But he relegated these to a "servile" status, explicitly "lower" than perception, reason, and the rational explication of the scriptures in the theological arts.

Nevertheless, Spargo, among others, has attempted to reconstruct Bonaventure's concept of the fine arts.[72] She pointed out that Bonaventure defined "art" as a rational skill and collected a number of passages to further explicate the nature and function of those skills. The most important of them is Bonaventure's insistence that God the Father's production of the Son, the *Ars Aeterna*, is the model for the human production of artifacts. God the Father, the *Primum Principium*, expressed Himself in His production of the Son, so, too, the human artist expresses himself or herself in the production of things that are both good, that is useful, and beautiful, a delight to the soul's faculties of perception. Thus, Bonaventure's description of the practice of the arts was a type of *imitatio Dei*. It found its fullest expression "in contact with the divine."[73] Its purpose was akin to the contemplation of beauty, to display the glory of God. Spargo derived an imaginative, perhaps even inspired, approach to the fine arts from her careful study of Bonaventure's aesthetics. But it remains an anachronism. Neither Bonaventure nor his peers provided a philosophy, theology, or even a participatory mysticism of those arts as we understand them today.

NOTES

1. M. Künzle, "*St. Bonaventure und die modern Ästhetik*," *Schweizer Rundschau* 3 (1906): 197–211; E. Lutz, "*Die Ästhetik Bonaventuras nach den Quellen dargestellt*,"

Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Supplementband 1 (1913): 195–215; R. Boving, "Die Äesthetik Bonaventuras und das Problem der aesthetischen Einfühlung," *Franziskanische Studien* 8 (1921): 201–206; H. Pouillon, "*La beauté, propriété transcendentale chez les scholastiques*," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 21 (1946): 262–329; E. de Bruyne, *Études d'esthétique médiévale* (Brugge: De Tempel, 1946), 3:189–226; E. J. M. Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1953); D. Halcour, *Die Lehre vom Schönen im Rahmen Transzendentalienlehre der Metaphysik der frühen Franziskanerschule von Paris* (PhD diss., Freiburg, 1957), 163–223; U. Eco, *Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale* (Milan: C. Marzorati, 1959); K. Peter, *Die Lehre von der Schönheit nach Bonaventura* (Werl: Dietrich Coelde, 1964); and H. Urs von Balthasar, *Herrlichket: Eine Theologische Ästhetik* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1961–1969).

2. H. Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*: *A Theological Aesthetics* [*Herrlichket*], ed. J. Fessio, J. Riches, and B. McNeil and trans. E. Leiva-Merikakis, A. Louth, F. McDonagh, et al. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1984-1989), 2:260.

3. Balthasar's estimate of Bonaventure's aesthetics is the antithesis of his estimate of Thomas': "Beauty is seldom a central concern for St. Thomas Aquinas, and for the most part his discussion is dependent on material presented to him by tradition." *The Glory of the Lord*, 4:393. See also A. Nichols *Redeeming Beauty: Soundings in Sacral Aesthetics* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). Nichols provides a spirited defense of Thomas' aesthetics in an explicit response to Balthasar.

4. O. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation: Reading Ancient and Medieval Texts after Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 268–321; R. Davies, *Bonaventure, the Body, and the Aesthetics of Salvation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); M. B. Ingham, *Rejoicing in the Works of the Lord: Beauty in the Franciscan Tradition* (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2009); P. A. Kwasniewski, "The World as a Symbol of Divine Beauty in the Thought of St. Bonaventure," *Faith & Reason* 24 (2000): 31–54; M. Ofilada, "St. Bonaventure: Aesthetics and Contemplation in the Journey towards God," *Studies in Spirituality* 16 (2006): 151–164; D. Ost, "Bonaventure: The Aesthetic Synthesis," *Franciscan Studies* 14 (1976): 233–247; L. Smit, "He Is All Delight: A Pedagogy of Beauty in Bonaventure's *Triplica Via*," *Cithara* 57 (2017): 24–37; and M. J. R. Villalón, "Propuesta para una definición de belleza," *Dialogos: Revista del Departmento de Filosofia Universidad de Puerto Rico* 45 (2014): 151–177.

5. R. von Zimmermann, *Geschichte der Ästhetik als Philosophischer Wissenschaft* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1858); M. Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Ästhetik von Plato bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1872); and B. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1904).

6. The phrase "Three Person'd God" is from J. Donne, "Batter My Heart," in *The Complete English Poems*, ed. A. J. Smith (London: Penguin, 1996), 314.

7. The phrase "terrible beauty" is from W. B. Yeats, "Easter 1916," in *The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats*, ed. R. J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996), 180–182.

8. Zimmermann, *Geschichte der Äesthetik*, 152–154.

9. Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Äesthetik*, 2:253–273.

10. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*, 120–150. See also J. J. Ampère *De l'histoire de la poésie* (Marseille: Barlatier-Feissat et Domonchy, 1830). Ampère had introduced the concept of a medieval renaissance.

11. J. Maritain, *Art et scolastique* (Paris: La Librairie de L'Art Catholique, 1920); R. Assunto, *Die Theorie des Schönen im Mittelalter* (Cologne: Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg, 1963); and W. Perpeet, *Ästhetik im Mittelalter* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1977). De Bruyne's *Études* and Eco's *Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale* included substantial reflection on Bonaventure in their contributions to the standard approach, hence their inclusion in the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics. See also M. de Wulf, *L' Œvre d'Art et la Beauté: Conférences faites à la Faculté des Lettres de Poitiers* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1920), 194–221.

12. O. P. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 12 (1951): 496–527 and 13 (1952): 17–46; A. Speer, "*Kunst und Schönheit: Kritische Überlegungen zur mittelalterlichen Ästhetik*," in "*Scientia*" *und* "*ars*" *in Hoch und Spätmittelalter*, ed. I. Craemer-Ruegenberg and A. Speer (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1994), 946–966; and J. Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcendental?" *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 1 (1991): 68–97. See also L. Shiner, *The Invention of Art: A Cultural History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

13. J. Marenbon, "Medieval and Renaissance Aesthetics," in *A Companion to Aesthetics* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 22–32.

14. C. Janaway, "Plato," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (London: Routledge, 2013), 3–12. See also R. E. Allen, *Plato's Symposium* (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 83–97.

15. For a brief history of the concept of beauty with particular emphasis on the classical concept, see S. D. Ross, "Beauty: Conceptual and Historical Overview," in *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics*, ed. M. Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1:237–244. See also D. Konstan *Beauty: The Fortunes of an Ancient Greek Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

16. Plato, *Symposium*, 211c. I have used Robert Bridges' translation for this passage for the high quality of its poetic expression. See R. Bridges, *The Spirit of Man: An Anthology* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1916), §37.

17. P. Guyer, "The Origins of Modern Aesthetics: 1711-35," in *Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2005), 3-36.

18. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1738), §1.1.13, quoted in Guyer, "Origins," 9.

19. A. G. Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, trans. K. Aschenbrenner and W. B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), §116. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, 4.8.7.

20. A. G. Baumgarten, *Aesthetica* (1750), ed. D. Mirbach (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007), §1 and 14.

21. Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, §20.

22. P. Guyer, "Origins," 34. See also his more detailed discussion in *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). He provides a brief review of the works of those other scholars with whom he engages in debate in *Kant*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014), 383–385.

23. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), §49, quoted in Guyer, "Origins," 34.

24. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts" (1951), 497. See also J. I. Porter, "Is Art Modern? Kristeller's Modern System of the Arts Reconsidered," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 49 (2009): 1–24. Porter provides the most informative criticism of Kristeller's thesis. He admits that the concept of the fine arts emerged in the long Renaissance that extended into the Enlightenment, but he insists that the development of the concept is neither as neat nor as tidy as Kristeller intimates.

25. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts" (1952), 19.

26. K. F. E. Trahndorff, *Ästhetik oder Lehre von Weltanschauung und Kunst* (Berlin: Raurersche Buchhandlung, 1827).

27. G. W. F. Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics* §2, trans. B. Bosanquet (London: Penguin, 1993), 4. There is some question on the reliability of the sources for Hegel's aesthetics. See A. Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte*: *Untersuchungen zu Hegels Ästhetik* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1984) and S. Houlgate, "Review of A. Gethmann-Siefert, *Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte*," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 13 (1986): 33–42.

28. Plato introduced the quarrel in *Respublica* 607b-608b. For Hegel's response, see R. Barfield, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 168–188.

29. Zimmerman, *Geschichte der Äesthetik*, 754–804.

30. Schasler, *Kritische Geschichte der Äesthetik*, 2:1126–1140.

31. There is some disagreement in regard to the status of Hegel's metaphysics. His immediate heirs argued for a mystical interpretation that focused on the realization of the divine Spirit. Others argued for his endorsement of Kant's skepticism and still others for his anticipation of an analytical approach. See G. A. Magee, "Hegel and Mysticism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy*, ed. F. C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 253–280.

32. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*, 334–362. See also B. Lang, "Bosanquet's Aesthetics: A History and Philosophy of the Symbol," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 26 (1968): 377–387.

33. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*, 337.

34. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*, 130–131.

35. Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*, 146.

36. G. Dickie led the effort. See his "The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1 (1964): 56–65.

37. J. Marenbon, "Medieval and Renaissance Aesthetics," 22–32.

38. See A. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty*: *Aesthetics and the Concept of Art* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2003).

39. Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, 1:17–127.

40. R. Otto, *Das Heilige* (Breslau: Trewendt & Granier, 1917).

41. Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, 5:513.

42. O. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, 323–334.

43. J. Margolis, "Medieval Aesthetics," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001), 27–36; J. Haldane, "Medieval Aesthetics," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes, (London: Routledge, 2013), 25–35; and A. Speer, "Aesthetics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. M. Kelly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 661–684.

44. K. B. Alexander, *Saving Beauty: A Theological Aesthetics of Nature* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2014). Alexander is the notable exception to this trend. See also F. F. Brown, *Religious Aesthetics: A Theological Study of Making and Meaning* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); J. Dillenberger, *A Theology of Artistic Sensibilities: The Visual Arts and the Church* (London: SCM Press, 1987); R. Harries, *Art and the Beauty of God: A Christian Understanding* (London: Mowbray, 1993); P. Sherry, *Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); R. Viladesau, *Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

45. J. Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 76.

46. Grondin, *Introduction*, 77.

47. Grondin, *Introduction*, 106–123.

48. H. G. Gadamer, Truth *and Method*, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), 237–238.

49. J. Derrida, J. "*Comment ne pas parler: Dénégations*," in *Psyché*: *Inventions de l'autre* (Paris: Vrin, 1987), 584–595. See also D. P. Michelfelder, *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Buffalo: The State University of New York Press, 1989).

50. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 267.

51. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 362–363.

52. See M. Beaney, "What Is Analytic Philosophy?" in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, ed. M. Beaney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3–29. Beaney provides an overview of the essential features of analytic philosophy. See also N. Wolterstorff, "How Philosophical Theology Became Possible within the Analytic Tradition of Philosophy," in *Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology*, ed. M. C. Rea and O. D. Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 155–168.

53. E. H. Reck, "Introduction: Analytic Philosophy and Philosophical History," in *The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy*, ed. E. H. Reck (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1–37.

54. C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

55. C. Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23–35. See also A. Speer, "Bonaventure and the Question of a Medieval Philosophy," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 25–46.

56. J. Inglis, *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill 1998), 263–281. He derived his approach from P. Vignaux,

Philosophy in the Middle Ages: An Introduction, trans. E. Hall (London: Burns & Oates, 1959), 9–16.

57. Inglis developed this comparison in reference to Thomas' gloss of Isaiah 1:22 in *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate* q. 2.

58. De Bruyne, *Études*, 1:306-338 and 3:3-29. He provided a summary of these categories in *L'Esthétique du moyen age* (Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1947), 61–99.

59. Eco, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages* [*Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale*], trans. H. Bredin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 43–51.

60. F. M. Henquinet, "*Un brouillon autographe de S. Bonaventure sur le Commentaire des Sentences*," *Les Études Franciscaines* 44 (1932): 633–655 and 45 (1933): 59–82.

61. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* 2.2–6 (5:300–301). All references to Bonaventure's works are to the volume and page number of the critical edition: *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882–1922).

62. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.5 (5:299).

63. De Bruyne, *Études*, 3:219–226.

64. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 4.3 (5:307).

65. See G. F. LaNave, "*Bonaventure*," in *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, ed. P. L. Gravrilyuk and S. Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2012), 159–173.

66. H. Urs von Balthasar, *Theologie der drei Tage* (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1970). See also *The Glory of the Lord*, 2:352–362.

67. Bonaventure, *Lignum vitae* 29 (8:79), trans. E. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God, the Tree of Life, the Life of St. Francis* (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 154.

68. B. McGinn, *The Flowering of Mysticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1998), 87–112.

69. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 6.4. See Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* 5.12.13 (5:356). See also his *Commentaria in sententiarum* 1 *Sent*. d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (1:31), 1 *Sent*. d. 2, q. 4, ad 4 (1:58), and 2 *Sent*. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4 (2:17).

70. Bonaventure, *De reductione artium ad theologiam* 2 (5:317). He took his list of the mechanical arts from Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon* 2.20–27.

71. Horace, *Ars poetica*, 333.

72. E. J. M. Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic*, 108–129. See also de Bruyne, *Études*, 3:207–216.

73. Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic*, 129.

Chapter 1

Bonaventure's Debt to
l'Esthétique Musicale

A number of sources inform Bonaventure's definitions of beauty: Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic. De Bruyne and other authors of the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics had engaged in a lively debate on Bonaventure's use of those sources to formulate his definitions. Subsequent studies tend to pass over this debate without adequate discussion and, thus, perpetuate a degree of ambiguity that prevents an accurate analysis of Bonaventure's account of beauty. The purpose of the first chapter of the present study is to resolve this dispute in preparation for a more accurate analysis of Bonaventure's innovative account of the role of beauty in the ascent of the rational soul into God.

De Bruyne set the stage for the debate in his distinction between *l'esthétique musicale* and *l'esthétique de la lumière*.[1] The first of these categories defined beauty in terms of different types of proportion, the proportion of musical intervals, for example, architectural elements, or the parts of the human body. The phrase itself, *l'esthétique musicale*, referred to a Pythagorean legend, one of many Pythagorean legends popular throughout late Antiquity and the Middle Ages.[2] Its source is Iamblychus' *De vita Pythagorica*:

> He was walking near a blacksmith when he heard, through divine Fortune, the sound of hammers beating out a piece of iron on an anvil. The hammers produced sounds that accorded with one another with only one exception. But he recognized in those sounds the harmonic intervals of the diapason, the diapente, and the diatessaron. However, he realized that the interval between the diatessaron and the diapente was dissonant in itself, nevertheless it rendered the diatesseron complete in relation to the diapente.[3]

Iamblychus continued to relate Pythagoras' investigation into the relative weights of the hammers—the twelve-weight hammer, the nine, the eight, and

the six—and the intervals they produced in some detail. The combination of the twelve-weight and the six produced the diapason, the octave. The twelve and the eight produced the diapente, the perfect fifth, and the twelve and the nine, the diatesseron or perfect fourth. The eight and the nine produced the whole tone. This was the sole exception to the harmony of the hammers. But, as Pythagoras was pleased to discover, the perfect fourth is precisely one whole tone from the perfect fifth and thus "rendered the diatesseron complete in relation to the diapente."

The legend requires some clarification. The ancient concept of musical accord or *harmonia* (ἁρμονία) probably referred to the proper agreement or concord between one musical pitch and another in melodic intervals, not harmony as we understand it today.[4] The initial formulation of the concept, the ethnic *harmonia* of the Dorians, Lydians, and Phrygians, is lost. Aristoxenos, a student of Aristotle, recorded the first extant reference to a more precise formulation in his *Elements of Harmony*. He based his theory on the principle of the interval, the acoustic distance between one pitch and another, and their arrangement into systems or sequences of measured, intervallic pitches or modes, distinct from the concept of Pythagorean proportion. His system remained dominant throughout Antiquity and served as the basis for further development in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Capella, for example, depended on Aristoxenos' theory, not the Pythagorean, in his inquiries into acoustics and music theory. The Pythagoreans propagated the legend in their discussions of mathematics and a mathematically informed metaphysics, not music theory. Further, the legend is a fiction. The pitch of a hammer striking an anvil depends on the physical properties of the anvil, not the hammer.[5] The purpose of the legend, again, had been to introduce the Pythagorean principle of metaphysical *harmonia*, the bringing together of these diverse proportions into the well-ordered whole of the cosmos.

The second category, *l'esthétique de la lumière*, defined beauty as a property of the Platonic idea (εἶδος) or form (*forma*). "Radiance, resplendence, and brilliance," de Bruyne explained, "characterize Plato's 'Forms,' the highest example of which, the Idea of the Good, is comparable to the sun."[6] The metaphysical *formae*, de Bruyne explained, were beautiful in themselves. Their presence rendered things beautiful, not the proportion of either one part of something to another or part to the whole.

De Byune placed Bonaventure's aesthetics within the category of *l'esthétique musicale*. Bonaventure's conception of beauty, he argued, depended on the proper *rapport* or harmonious relationship between one thing and another, the *rapport* in the physical, intelligible, and divine objects of aesthetic contemplation, the rational subject who contemplates them, and the relationship between the two that constitutes the aesthetic experience:

> In our opinion, all of the Bonaventurian aesthetic gravitates around the principle taken from the sixth book of [Augustine's] *De musica*: beauty is an *aequalitas numerosa*, that is to say, it is a certain type of *rapport . . .* an *aequalitas numerosa* in the object, in the subject, and in the harmony that unites these two in the bloom of pleasure.[7]

He also cited the debate between the Stoics, who championed *l'esthétique musicale*, and Plotinus, who championed *l'esthétique de la lumière*, to argue the two definitions opposed one another—even though Plotinus would come to mitigate his exclusion of the *rapport* between one thing and another in his analyses of beauty.[8] Thus, de Bruyne insisted, the philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages faced an aesthetic imperative, either the *rapport* between one part of an object and another rendered it beautiful or something metaphysically simple within them rendered them beautiful, something that could account for the simple allure of their *forma*.

Eco disagreed with de Bruyne's categorization of Bonaventure's definitions of beauty. He employed similar categories to sort the diverse literature of medieval aesthetics in his short handbook, *Sviluppo dell'estetica medievale*, but he made almost no mention of Bonaventure's debt to *l'esthétique musicale*. Rather, he placed Bonaventure within *l'esthétique de la lumière*.[9] Bonaventure, Eco argued, had endorsed a Platonic reading of Genesis in which God had created the metaphysical *forma* of light (*lux*) on the first day of creation and the simple presence of this *forma* rendered creation beautiful. He supported his thesis with reference to Bonaventure's enthusiastic descriptions of distinct types of light: the physical light of celestial objects, the sun, the moon, and the stars; the rational light of the mind; and the soteriological light of Christ, the savior of the world. He also supported his thesis in a rather imaginative reading of Bonaventure's description of the proportions of the human body. Those proportions, he argued, dissolved in the brightness of the risen body.

> In the resurrected bodies of mankind, light will shine out with its four fundamental characteristics: clarity which illuminates, impassibility so that it cannot corrupt, agility so that it can travel instantaneously, and penetrability so that it can pass through transparent bodies. Transfigured in heaven, the original proportions dissolved into a pure effulgence, the ideal of the *homo quadratus* returns as an aesthetic ideal in the mysticism of light.[10]

But he agreed with de Bruyne's insistence that the two traditions necessarily opposed one another and did so without the possibility of compromise or reconciliation. If so, then either de Bruyne is correct or Eco, not both.

I will argue that de Bruyne's analysis of Bonaventure's conception of beauty is correct. Bonaventure developed a series of definitions that fall

clearly within the category of *l'esthétique musicale*—the *ordo*, *ordinatio*, *proportio*, *harmonia*, *congruentia*, *coniunctio*, *convenientia*, and *aequalitas*—between one thing and another in the physical, intelligible, and divine realms of being. But I will also argue that both De Bruyne and Eco overstated the contrast, conflict, and incompatibility between *l'esthétique musicale* and *l'esthétique de la lumière*. Bonaventure's definitions of beauty depend on the *rapport* between one thing and another, but all of them depend on the *rapport* between an object and the metaphysical *formae* that structure the physical, intelligible, and divine realms of being.

BONAVENTURE'S SOURCES: GENESIS, TIMAEUS, AND THE STOIC INHERITANCE

Bonaventure derived his definitions of beauty from three collections of sources. The first consists of the initial creation narrative in Genesis and the counterpoint between that narrative and Plato's *Timaeus*.[11] The second consists of the Stoic tradition's definitions of physical beauty preserved in the texts of Cicero, Seneca, and, above all, Augustine. The third consists of the Stoic arguments from design. A careful reading of these collections in comparison with Bonaventure's use of them will enable us to come to a more well-informed judgment of his place within *l'esthétique musicale*.

The Counterpoint between Genesis and the *Timaeus*

The author or authors of the initial creation narrative in Genesis shared a theme with other ancient narratives: the divine imposition of order on chaos.[12] But the author of Genesis dispensed with the difficult struggle to impose order on chaos common to those other narratives. The enigmatic divinity, the *'elohim* (אֱלֹהִים), brooded over the surface of the waters without significant opposition: "When God (אֱלֹהִים) began to create heaven and earth—the earth being unformed and void, with darkness over the surface of the deep and a wind from God sweeping over the water."[13] Sarna notes that the scriptures retained some indication of the cosmic battles with the primordial sea and its monstrosities common throughout archaic civilizations: the "Coiled One," the "Arrogant One," and the primordial "Dragon." But he also notes that the author of Genesis dismissed them. The text records only God, the *'elohim*, the problematically plural but sole actor in the drama, who created the world without opposition.

The author of the narrative continued with a description of God's imposition of order on the cosmos through a process of division and separation, the division of the light from darkness on the first day of creation, the division of

the waters above the expanse from those below on the second, and the division of the earth from the waters below on the third. The narrative continues with God's creation of the appropriate inhabitants for each of the three realms on the fourth, fifth, and sixth days, a process that reached its climax in the formation of the human person "in our image" (בְּצַלְמֵנוּ). The passage also established the basis for the aesthetic significance of the cosmos. God "saw" that "this was good" (טוֹב) at the end of each day except one, the second day, and at the end of the seven days, saw that creation in its entirety was "very [מְאֹד] good [טוֹב]"—thus the author nulled the significance of the omission of the phrase at the end of the second day. But the phrase *me'od tov* that appears throughout the many translations of the scriptures as "very good" wedded the concepts of the good and the beautiful, similar to the Greek concept of καλός; the standard Latin translation, *bonum*, carried a similar range of meaning.[14] The Greek translation of the passage in the Septuagint made this explicit: "καὶ εἶδεν ὁ Θεὸς τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησεν καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν."[15]

Two disputes dominate commentaries on this narrative that have direct implications for Bonaventure's aesthetics: its support for the concept of creation *ex nihilo* and the more difficult attendant concept of the eternity of the world. Sarna endorses the current consensus that the authors of the Torah did not advocate creation *ex nihilo*, nor did they explicitly argue against it. The question of creation *ex nihilo* was foreign to their cultural context. Sarna locates the first efforts to distinguish the formation of the cosmos from the creation of the cosmos *ex nihilo* in the efforts of the rabbis in the Second Temple Period to defend Jewish orthodoxy from the threat of Hellenism.[16] May argues, *contra* the consensus, that early Christian apologists first developed the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* to refute those Gnostics who argued for the existence of an eternal heaven and earth in opposition to God's will, reminiscent of the ancient cosmic battles between the Divinity and the forces of chaos, the unruly sea and its dragon.[17] But despite its origin, Bonaventure and his peers strongly defended the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* in order to preserve the dignity and authority of God and to remove creation as an object of value in itself.[18]

Plato's *Timaeus* was the only significant rival to the creation narrative in Genesis until the advancements in physics and astronomy in the Renaissance. It was also the only Platonic Dialogue to survive, albeit in a partial translation, throughout the Middle Ages.[19] Plato, in agreement with the author of the Genesis narrative, argued that a rational agent, the divine Architect or Craftsperson (δημιουργός), imposed order on chaos through the imposition of a degree of proportion or measure onto the preexistent and therefore stubborn chaos. But he also added a number of other critical themes in the order of philosophical explanation: the *dêmiourgos* was the mediator between the *formae* of being and the chaos of being; it imposed those *formae* on the

primordial chaos to render it into a determinate being; and its imposition of those *formae* rendered the cosmos into a well-ordered whole that established both its goodness and its beauty. O'Meara notes that it is "perhaps . . . the first systematic description of the beauty of the world" and certainly "one of the most influential." Stoics, Gnostics, Middle and Neo-Platonists, Jews, Christians, and Islamic commentators enlisted the authority of the *Timaeus* to support the relationship between goodness and beauty and the aesthetic implications of their reading of their creation narratives.[20] O'Meara identifies the key passage in the Dialogue: "All that is good is beautiful," Plato insisted, "and what is beautiful is not without measure."[21]

Jewish, Christian, and, later, Islamic philosophers and theologians, familiar with the rival schools of ancient philosophy, developed two strategies in reaction to Plato's *Timaeus* and other philosophical texts. The proponents of the first, the traditionalists, argued for the rejection of pagan philosophy in its entirety. Tertullian, one of the most ardent of the traditionalists, advanced his position in a particularly influential question: "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"[22] He explicitly rejected the answer of those who threatened to render the purity of divine revelation into "a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition." The proponents of the second, Philo of Alexandria and other Hellenists, argued for a careful engagement with pagan philosophies.[23] The proponents of Hellenism won the day in late Antiquity, although both strategies continue to inform the tensions between traditionalists and the more liberal Hellenists throughout Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to this day. They brought their reading of Genesis into agreement with Plato's narrative in their development of a syncretic Neo-Platonism, a "mottled" mix of the faith of the children of Abraham with "Platonic, Stoic, and dialectic composition." Marenbon explains: "It was a harmony, primarily, of Plato and Aristotle," but also other schools, "especially the Stoics, whose thinking the Neo-Platonists disparaged and yet . . . absorbed."[24] He adds that although "the Neoplatonists were pagans. . . . They had an incalculable influence on thought within the three great religious traditions—Christianity, Islam and Judaism." Thus, Jewish, Christian, and Islamic philosophers and theologians had little trouble reading Plato's *dêmiourgos* as a metaphor for the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.[25]

This rapprochement between Genesis and the mottled mix of the schools of ancient philosophy reinvigorated the dispute on the question of the eternity of the world. Dales locates the origin of this dispute in late Antiquity with particular attention to Augustine's insight that the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* is incompatible with the eternity of the world. But, he notes, the question remained without adequate resolution until Bonaventure, Thomas, and their less philosophically gifted but politically more successful contemporary Peter of Tarentaise established the basis for a more thorough defense of the

doctrine.[26] Bonaventure's proved the most influential and, in Dales' estimate, the most impressive.[27] He was the first of the philosopher-theologians of the later Middle Ages to possess a firm grasp of the arguments of his predecessors, particularly the Peripatetic reflection on the paradox of infinity, the impossibility of the addition, order, traversal, comprehension, and simultaneous existence of an infinite number of physical entities—even though Dales points out, he did not think we could provide a rigorous philosophical demonstration against the eternity of the world.

Stoic Definitions of Beauty

The second source for Bonaventure's debt to *l'esthétique musicale*, the Stoic conception of the beauty of a well-ordered cosmos, has been neglected, which is the result, perhaps, of the tendency to locate late antique and medieval philosophers into distinct categories, either Platonists or Peripatetics, rather than their relative positions across a wide spectrum of a common, syncretic tradition. Verbeke led the relatively recent effort to recapture the subtle "presence" of Stoicism in medieval thought, particularly in the development of medieval ethics;[28] its presence is now well-acknowledged throughout the full extent of current scholarship on medieval philosophical-theology—with the notable exception of the field of aesthetics.[29]

The Stoics expressed their definitions in a series of parallels between the body's beauty and the soul's beauty, the body's beauty and its health, and the body's health and the soul's health. Cicero recorded the first of these parallels in an influential passage in the *Tusculanarum disputationum*:

> As in the body a certain symmetrical shape of the limbs combined with a certain charm of colouring is described as beauty (*quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate eaque dicitur pulchritudo*); so in the soul the name of beauty is given to an equipoise and consistency of beliefs and judgments, combined with certain steadiness and stability, following upon virtue or comprising the true essence of virtue.[30]

Galen recorded the second in his commentary on Stoic medicine, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*:

> In the same way that proportion or the lack of proportion in warmth and coldness, in dampness and dryness, affect health and illness, and in the same way that proportion and the lack of proportion result in strength or weakness, so proportion or the lack of proportion in the limbs results in beauty or ugliness.[31]

Cicero recorded the third in another passage from the *Tusculanarum disputationum*:

Just as when the blood is in a bad state or there is an overflow of phlegm or bile, bodily disease and sickness begin, so the disturbing effect of corrupt beliefs warring against one another robs the soul of health and introduces the disorder of disease.[32]

The Stoics had specific ratios in mind in these definitions.[33] Galen, for example, cited an influential passage in Polykleitos' *Canon* to support his parallel, a passage that purportedly listed the proportions of "one finger to another, and all the fingers to the hand and wrist, and these to the forearm, and the forearm to the arm, in fact, every part to every other part."[34] He continued with an intriguing declaration: "Polykleitos supported his treatise with an artwork, he made a statue of a person according to the tenets of his treatise and called the statue, like the treatise, the *Canon.*"

Polykleitos' literary *Canon*, composed sometime in the fifth century before the Common Era, remains among the most renowned artistic handbooks in the ancient world.[35] But the literary *Canon*, unfortunately, is no longer extant. Galen provided the fullest account of its contents. He tells us that Polykleitos derived a set of measurements for every part of the body, but he does not tell us what those measurements were. Nor does he identify the sculpture that Polykleitos also called his *Canon*. His *Doryphoros*, the Spear-Bearer, is the most likely candidate, but attempts to reconstruct the list of proportions from the copies that remain have proved inconclusive.[36] They confirm the approximate proportions of Polykleitos' *Canon*, not the precise proportions.

The only surviving list of the precise proportions that regulate the order of the human figure in antique literature, isolated from the Stoic parallels, is found in Vitruvius' *De architectura*: "The face from the chin to the top of the forehead and the roots of the hair is a tenth part; also the palm of the hand from the wrist to the top of the middle finger is as much; the head from the chin to the crown, an eighth part," and so on, for the neck, chin, nostrils, crown, brows, and hair, the face as a whole, the head, the feet, the breast, and arms.[37] All of the body's parts, he informed his readers, "have their own proportionate measurements." Vitruvius added that "many ancient painters and famous sculptors have attained great and unbounded distinction" through the use of these proportions, but he did not tell us whether Polykleitos was one of them. Attempts to apply these measurements to the *Doryphoros*, or any other sculpture, have also proved unsuccessful.

These proportions formed the basis for the geometric patterns within the body. Vitruvius continued: "If a person lies on his back with hands and feet spread out, and if the center of a circle is placed within the navel, then his fingers and toes will touch the circumference of the circle and you can inscribe a square in the same way."[38] Vitruvius' text may well have included a sketch of this squared person (*homo quadratus*) to illustrate his description. But if

so, it did not survive the passing of the ancient world. Subsequent attempts to reproduce the figure present a stubborn challenge. Leonardo Da Vinci's rendition of the *homo quadratus* places the center of the circle in the navel, but *not* that of the square. Cesare Cesariano's commentary on the book *De architectura*, published thirty years after Da Vinci's rendition, includes a representation of the *homo quadratus* in which the circle *and* the square are centered on the navel, but in order to do so, he grossly exaggerated the length of the feet and hands.[39] Da Vinci's sketch is certainly more successful in its attempt to depict the geometrical relationships that regulate the human form, but it is a matter of conjecture as to whether Da Vinci interpreted the passage correctly or Vitruvius, the author of the assertion, misunderstood the actual proportions of the human figure. Howe defends Vitruvius.[40] He argues that Vitruvius spoke about the approximate ideal of geometric patterns within the human body. Those patterns, Vitruvius explained in this same passage, are present in the human figure only "to a certain extent (*quemadmodum*)."

Galen had also referred to specific proportions in his reference to the body's health in the second parallel, the proportions between the body's humors or fluids that regulate its health and temperament.[41] He provided a list of the basic ingredients of those humors: warmth and dampness form blood, coldness and dampness form water, warmth and dryness form yellow bile, and coldness and dryness form black bile. An excess or scarcity of one or more of these fluids marked specific disorders, diarrhea, for example, or a cold. Treatments to regulate the proper proportions of these fluids included diet, exercise, prescriptions, bloodletting, and a number of other medical procedures. He also thought that an excess of one or more of these fluids regulated a person's temperament, sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, or melancholic. But the precise measurements of these humors eluded the ancient mind.

The reference to color remains obscure. De Bruyne had pointed out that ancient and medieval authors often associated the color of the body with its physical and emotional health, but his explanation remains little more than conjecture.[42] The color of the human body, he argued, was an indication of the measure of the four fluids. A pale complexion, for example, might have indicated a lack of blood, a flushed complexion an excess. The imbalance might have been the result of injury or disease, like blood loss, or emotional distress. It also might have indicated diarrhea, a cold, a fever, or even fear, a flushed complexion, anger. The proper and most beautiful color was a mean between these extremes, neither too pale nor too flushed. It indicated a healthy body and soul with the proper proportion of fluids in the body and the proper emotional balance within the soul.

Cicero's description of the parallel between the proportions of the body and the soul in the third example is also obscure. He argued that the improper proportions among the body's humors are the cause of illness in the same way

that corrupt, conflicting beliefs rob the soul of its health. But did he mean to argue that the soul is sick because of a lack or excess of particular beliefs, like the lack or excess of particular fluids? If so, what constitutes the measure of a belief, concept, or other mental intention? Or is the soul sick because of a degree of discord among its beliefs? Cicero went on to explain that, like the body, "so health of the soul means a condition when its judgments and beliefs are in harmony."[43] So, if the soul's health is the result of the concord or agreement between its beliefs, then its illness is probably the result of a discord in its beliefs, not a lack or an excess of particular beliefs. In either case, the proportions within the soul are not something that can be measured. Only bodies can be measured. The proportions within the soul lack extension in space and time and are not subject to quantification.

Augustine repeated these definitions throughout his works, but he did so with an important difference: he omitted reference to the parallel between the body and the soul: "All bodily beauty consists in the proportion of the parts, together with a certain agreeableness of colour (*omnis enim corporis pulchritudo est partium congruentia cum coloris quadam suavitate*)."[44]

Augustine cited this parallel in his discussion of the risen body. He had particular proportions in mind, although he did not articulate the precise measure of those proportions. He argued that human hair, for example, and other parts of the body will be preserved in their proper proportion: "no one will lose these parts at the resurrection, for they shall be changed into the same flesh, their substance being so altered as to preserve the proportion of the various parts of the body." He also assured his readers that their girth will be restored to its proper proportions. "Overgrown and emaciated persons need not fear that they shall be in heaven of such a figure as they would not be even in this world if they could help it. For all bodily beauty consists in the proportion of the parts, together with a certain agreeableness of colour." He also redefined the reference to color: "And as for the pleasant colour, how conspicuous shall it be where the just shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father!"

The precise nature of the risen body eluded Augustine. He was not alone. Paul had insisted that the risen body was a "spiritual" body, σῶμα πνευματικόν (1 Cor. 15:44). The Stoics and their heirs in the Christian tradition—Tertullian, Tatian, Lactantius of Nicodemia, and Marcarius of Egypt—would have understood his description to refer to a less substantial body, something resembling the air or the breath of the body.[45] But Neo-Platonic Christians, like Augustine, drew a sharp distinction between the spirit and the body; thus, Paul presented them with something of a paradox. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the discussion indicates that Augustine had certain quantifiable proportions of the risen body in mind, that is to say, the *proper* length of the body's hair, the *proper* girth, and, I would argue, the proper proportion

of the entire body, since "there shall be no deformity resulting from want of proportion in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected, and all that is defective supplied . . . and all that is excessive removed." But at no point does he provide a set of ratios for the proportions of the human body either on earth or in heaven.[46]

Augustine also neglected to refer to specific colors. The phrase *cum coloris quadam suavitate* referred only to the brightness of bodies of the just who "shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." Color ceased to be a criterion for beauty in Augustine's thought, but precisely what has replaced it is a matter of some confusion. He may have referred to the "brightness" of the risen body, an ambiguous description of either the brightness of its complexion regardless of its color or, more probably, an ethical metaphor. It appears that Augustine applied the phrase to the brightness of a person's virtue, a defining characteristic of the just who "shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father."

Why does Augustine drop the parallel between the beauty of the body and that of the soul? Bychkov argues that the parallel "constitutes the core of Stoic materialism" and thus proved "unacceptable to Christianity."[47] The Stoics, and again, their heirs in the Christian tradition, taught that the soul was a physical entity, a less substantial *pneuma* or breath than the body, but it still possessed the physical characteristics of extension and mass. Ambrose, Augustine, and other Christian Neo-Platonists distinguished the soul, a spiritual substance, from its body. The Stoic parallel undermined their distinction. It became entrenched within Jewish, Christian, and later Islamic thought, particularly after the first millennium of the Common Era. Even those philosophers and theologians who distanced themselves from other traditional Platonic doctrines, like Thomas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham, would retain the distinction between the soul and the body and thus eschew the Stoic parallel.

I agree. The Stoic parallel would have proved unacceptable to Neo-Platonists and their heirs in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. But I would point out that the parallel would not have proved unacceptable to the Christian tradition in its entirety. There had been, as Verbeke had argued, Christian Stoics in Antiquity and well into the medieval era who would have found the parallel perfectly acceptable. I would also add that the context in which the Stoics advanced their definition differed from the context in which Augustine advanced his. The Stoics' main concern had been with the *soul*'s beauty or its health. They turned to the definition of the body's health only to illustrate the principles of the soul's health. Likewise, when the Stoics argued for the beauty of the spirit, they included a reference to the body's beauty only to further their discussion of spiritual beauty. But Augustine had used the first part of the formula to discuss the beauty of the risen body, not

the soul and, so, it was the *body*'s beauty, not the soul's beauty or its health, that interested him. It is not surprising, therefore, that he omitted the parallel between the body and the soul.

Stoic Arguments from Design

Cicero summarized the Stoic arguments for the existence of God in *De natura Deorum*. He divided them into four groups: the *ad populum* argument of widespread reliance in augurs, soothsayers, oracles, and prophecies; the blessings of a temperate climate; the terror of lightning, thunderstorms, rain, snow, hail, floods, plagues, earthquakes, and a host of other natural disasters; and, most significantly, arguments from design: "The uniform movement and undeviating rotation of the heavens, the individuality, usefulness, beauty, and order of the sun and moon and stars, the very sight of which is sufficient proof that they are not the outcome of chance."[48] The Stoics listed beauty as one of a number of the features of the cosmos, including regularity, individuality, utility, and order, to convince their readers that the world is well-designed and, thus, that it owes its design to the intent of the gods.

Cicero referred to the beauty of the cosmos throughout the *De natura Deorum* in his effort to propagate the Stoic arguments. One of these proved particularly popular throughout the later Middle Ages: "All the parts of the cosmos have been so appointed that they could neither be better adapted for use nor be made more beautiful in appearance."[49] This argument is significant for three reasons. First, it is exhaustive. The Stoics argued that "all the parts of the cosmos have been so appointed," ostensibly including even the *apparently* less well-functioning, damaged, or even ugly parts. Second, the Stoics argued that the gods could not have appointed any of these parts for better use or beauty. The current configuration of the cosmos is its optimal configuration. Third, they paired utility and beauty, thus incorporating beauty into their argument from design.

Bychkov provides an informative analysis of the influence of these and other Stoic arguments in several texts of the thirteenth century.[50] He neglected Bonaventure's rather extensive reformulation of these arguments; nevertheless, his insightful comment, that the Stoics had formulated an aesthetic argument for the existence of God, also applies to Bonaventure's appropriation of them. "The Stoics," he explained, "turned to the most attractive phenomenon in the world, beauty, thus aestheticizing their cosmological doctrines and using worldly beauty as a proof of the existence of the Divine power." The aesthetic dimension of the design of the cosmos—the course of the sun, the moon, the stars, and other beautiful things—is a significant innovation in their argument from design that rendered their argument more attractive. Their critics might have been able to reject their arguments at the level of reason,

but who, the Stoics might well have thought, would look at the starry skies and deny the existence of the gods?

BONAVENTURE'S DEFINITIONS
OF PHYSICAL BEAUTY

Bonaventure presented his reformulation of the Stoic parallels in a series of definitions of the body's beauty as well as its dignity and nobility:

1. "The more the parts of the face are proportioned and adequated (*proportionantur et adaequantur*), so much the more beautiful (*tanto venustior*) it will be."[51]
2. "The great dignity of the human body depends on the harmony and proportioned conjunction of its part (*harmoniam et proportionalem coniunctionem suarum partium*)."[52]
3. "The great nobility of the body depends on the organization and arrangement of its parts (*complexione et organizatione*)."[53]

Ancient and medieval authors had tended to apply *venustas* to the appearance of the human body, its elegant conduct, or its charm.[54] Bonaventure defined *venustas* in the first of this series as the proportion, adequation, or symmetry of parts, eyes of the same size, for example, ears of the same size and shape, and so on. The dignity and nobility of the body in the second and third definitions referred to its position in the cosmic hierarchy. He had divided the cosmos into three broad realms of being—the physical, the spiritual, and the divine—on the basis of Augustine's reading of the books of the Platonists.[55] He placed the human person, body and soul, in the most noble position in the created order, distinct from other creatures in its location in two of the three realms of being. Its dignity and nobility depended on its possession of a soul rendered into the image of its Creator. But in these definitions, he affirmed the dignity and nobility of the human person's body, a dignity dependent on the same criteria that rendered it beautiful, the proper proportion and arrangement of its constituent parts. Like Ambrose, Augustine, and other early Christian Neo-Platonists, he did not provide a list of the specific ratios that defined the proper proportions of the human body, nor did he provide a thorough description of the proper arrangement of those parts.

He applied similar formulas in his descriptions of the beauty of the risen body:

1. "Beauty is a certain proportion of parts with a pleasant color (*pulcritudo est quaedam partium congruentia cum quadam coloris suavitate*)."[56]

2. "Every beautiful thing is an arrangement of parts with a certain pleasant color (*omnis pulcritudo est partium convenientia cum quadam coloris suavitate*)."[57]

He struggled to articulate a precise definition of the risen body—as did his peers. His conception of the risen body is a spiritual body, distinct from the immaterial soul, perhaps something rarified, similar to the Stoic conception of spiritual entities. His conception of the risen body, similar to Augustine's, included an extension in space and time or more accurately eternity, so the descriptions of the proper proportion and arrangement of parts applied to the risen body in the same manner as they applied to the more substantial, physical body. Although again, he did not provide the ratios that defined the proper proportions or arrangement of the risen body's parts.

His description of the perfections of the risen body blurred the distinction between the body as something quantifiable in terms of its proper proportion or the body as an arrangement of its parts and the nonquantifiable soul, and further obscured the nature of the risen body.[58] He listed four perfections: clarity (*claritas*), impassibility (*impassibilitas*), immortality (*immortalitas*), and agility (*agilitas*). The *claritas* of the risen body referred to its brightness and the perspicuity of the intentions of the risen person's memory, intellect, and will: "There, the body does not hide the mind from the eyes of others."[59] But it might also have referred to its bright complexion that indicated its health, vitality, and vigor in addition to the perspicuity of the contents of its mind or, perhaps, to the brightness of the moral rectitude of the risen person visible, so to speak, in the demeanor of its body. The other perfections described superhuman properties: the risen body will suffer neither defect nor possibility of change (*impassibilitas*); it will live forever without the possibility of defect or decline (*immortalitas*); and it will be able to overcome the limitations of space, possessing the ability of instantaneous locomotion (*agilitas*).

Nevertheless, Bonaventure's concept of universal hylomorphism enabled him to preserve the distinction between the soul and its risen body. He was a proponent of the so-called *binarium famosissimum*: the purported logical entailment of the thesis of (near) universal hylomorphism and the plurality of *formae*.[60] He argued that all created entities possess the metaphysical attributes of matter and *forma*—his advocacy of the doctrine of divine simplicity precluded his application of the thesis to the Divinity. He also argued that a series of *formae* determined the precise nature of each entity.[61] The metaphysical light (*lux*) of the first day of creation was common to all physical entities, but other *formae* rendered things into particular types of things according to the Peripatetic hierarchy of the *formae*, vegetation, nutrition, animation, and intelligence. Bonaventure's definition of the risen body, as Paul had argued, was a spiritual body; thus, it possessed the metaphysical elements of both *forma* and an imprecise type of spiritual matter. Bonaventure might have

thought that the risen body possessed measure and proportion and that the same measure that determined the beauty of the mortal body determined the beauty of the immortal body, the proper proportion, adequation, harmony, organization, and arrangement of its parts. But, if so, it is also clear that he thought the risen body was more beautiful than the mortal body in its "spiritual" proportions. It suffers neither defect nor decay. It is the idealized body made real, perfect in whole and in part.

His reference to *cum quadam coloris suavitate* also remains obscure. Spargo argued the brightness of the risen body with a certain pleasant color referred to the luminosity of the risen body, similar to the brightness of the color of the physical body, not the perspicuity of the intentions of its intellect and will. Bonaventure, she pointed out, had compared the brightness of the risen body to the brightness of other, physical objects, the brightness of a polished sword, for example, or the glow of hot coals.[62] If so, then Bonaventure had argued that the risen body is bright as well as beautiful or, perhaps, its brightness as well as its perfect proportions constitute its beauty.

McAdams, *contra* Spargo, argued for a Thomistic solution to the *claritas* of the risen body and its agreeableness (*suavitas*). He argued that Bonaventure's description of the color of the risen body was a metaphor for its metaphysical *claritas*, the self-manifestation of the risen body's *forma*.[63] But this is unlikely. Thomas might have employed the concept of *claritas* to refer to the perspicuity of the *forma* that informs the risen body, distinct from the brightness of the risen body or the intentions of the intellect and will—his position on this point is not clear.[64] But Bonaventure provided no indication that he applied the term to the perspicuity of the *forma* that informs the risen body. McAdams also argued that Bonaventure added the agreeableness (*suavitas*) of the risen body to his list of criteria for its beauty.[65] But Bonaventure made an explicit distinction between the delight of the mind (*mens*) in its sensory apprehension of an object's beauty and its delight in its agreeableness in an important passage in the *Itinerarium*—a passage I will discuss at some length later in this study.[66] So, while the risen body may well be both beautiful and agreeable, its agreeableness is distinct from its beauty. Spargo's solution is the better explanation, but so, too, Bonaventure's appropriation of the phrase as a metaphor for the perspicuity of the content of the risen person's mind, its memory, intellect, and will insofar as "the body does not hide the mind from the eyes of others."

BONAVENTURE'S REFORMULATION OF
THE ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN

Bonaventure presented his most extensive discussion of the Stoic argument from design in two dense passages from his *Commentary* on Peter Lombard's

Sententiae. He distinguished between the "order (*ordo*) of parts to the whole" and "the order of parts to their end" in the first passage.[67] The "order of parts to the whole" refers to the "substantial" order of the world, the state of creation on the sixth day in the Genesis narrative, prior to the fall. This order, he insisted, is the basis for "the immutable beauty of the universe (*pulcritudo universi immutabilis*)." The "order of parts to their end" refers to the order of "the corruptible and separable parts" after the fall. These, he admitted, could have been "ordered better" in comparison to the substantial order of the world, but "are ordered best in relation to their end." These parts, he added, are like "a most beautiful song (*pulcherrimum carmen*) that unfolds in perfect harmony, one part after another, until it comes to its perfectly ordered end."[68]

He presented the second passage, parallel to the first, in his explication of the perfection of the cosmos in which he distinguished between "the perfection of its permanent being" (*esse permanens*) and "the perfection of its successive being" (*esse decurrens*).[69] The first perfection consists in "the completion of principles and the number of species" in the six days of creation. The second in "the production of these in temporal succession" and it is "the order within this succession," he explained, that "renders the universe beautiful and perfect in its totality (*resultat quaedam unitatis pulcritudo et perfectio*)."

The Stoics had presented a problem for Bonaventure and other philosophers and theologians in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. They had claimed that God had appointed *all* the parts of the universe for both use and beauty and that He could not have appointed them for better use or beauty, even the apparently less well-functioning parts. Bonaventure relied on Plato's distinction between being in itself and being that comes to be in the *Timaeus* to solve this problem. He accepted the Stoic argument for the ideal configuration of the cosmos: the first, permanent, and perfect configuration of the cosmos. God had actualized this ideal order in the first six days of creation. It was a time apart, so to speak, in which sin and its wage, death, had not marred its beauty. But the properties of the actual configuration of the cosmos are ordered best and beautiful only conditionally in relation to its end, like "a most beautiful song that unfolds in perfect harmony, one part after another, until it comes to its perfectly ordered end."

This "perfectly ordered end" consists of four principal parts: judgment, the resurrection of the body, the final conflagration, and the soul's eternal union with God.[70] The first of these, the judgment, is of immediate interest. Bonaventure, indebted to Paul and the dominant reading of the Pauline corpus throughout late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, argued that human beings had brought down the order of creation through their sin.[71] God had created them "a little lower than the angels." But they counted themselves "as gods" and rejected their proper place in the cosmic *ordo* and could no longer reach

their proper end in union with the One God—Father, Son, and Spirit. They longed only for themselves as their own end. Bonaventure, again in fidelity to the dominant orthodoxy, argued that God would restore them to their proper place in two ways. First, God the Father, in His perfect perichoresis with the Son and Spirit, would subject those who refused to recognize or, perhaps, to accept their proper place in the created order into the eternal conflagration of hell and, thus, force them into their proper position. Second, He would restore those who accepted their position in relation to their proper end in eternal union with Him. The solution does not appear to be entirely satisfactory. The damnation of the prideful to hell would put them in their proper place. But it would not lead them to their proper end in union with God.

Bonaventure, in debt to Augustine's reading of Paul, preserved the aesthetic implications of Stoic teleology in his defense of the terrible beauty of this two-pronged solution.[72] "Wisdom," Bonaventure explained, "demands that sin be punished for the sake of beauty." Why? "It cannot suffer anything ugly or disordered to be found in the universe." His solution appears harsh: "So, since all sin . . . is a privation of mode, species, and order, God necessarily corrects the disorder of nature by the order of punishment. Thus, the beauty of the universe continues, undisturbed in any part."

Philosophers, theologians, and, more recently, art critics have often argued that without the bad, we would not know the good, and without the ugly, we would not know beauty.[73] But neither Augustine nor Bonaventure shared that opinion. The highest degree of beauty is a pure beauty without any blot or blemish, like the sun, the virgin, or Christ—a prefiguration, perhaps, of Kant's conception of the *pulchritudo vaga*.[74] Bonaventure admitted that the presence of sin *highlighted* the presence of the good and beautiful; but, significantly, its presence did not render it possible.[75] Similarly, the use of antitheses might well add beauty to a poem, but a poem may also be beautiful without it. Shadows might well add to the beauty of a painting, but again, it may be beautiful without them.

BONAVENTURE'S COSMOLOGY AND HIS REFORMULATION OF THE GENESIS NARRATIVE

Bonaventure provided further insight into the permanent order of the cosmos and its beauty in a brief presentation of his cosmology in the *Breviloquium.*[76] He divided the universe into three realms of being (*naturae*)—the luminous, the translucent, and the opaque—in a slight revision of the Genesis narrative.[77] God the Father, again in close cooperation with the Son and the Spirit, created the first realm, the luminous, on the first day of creation. It contains the purest form of metaphysical light (*lux*) and corresponds to the heavens,

bright with the light of the purest *forma* and a modest amount of prime matter. He created the second realm, the translucent, on the second day of creation. It corresponds to the waters and contains a less pure presence of the primordial light in its mixture with prime matter. God created the third realm, the opaque, on the third day of creation. It corresponds to the earth and contains the least pure presence of light in its mixture. Bonaventure went on to detail the provision of each realm in the course of the next three days of creation. God's creation of heaven and earth in these six days, Bonaventure argued, is the order of wisdom (*ordo sapientia*):

> Thus, in the beginning (*in principio*), before the beginning of time, God created a triple nature (*natura*) in an instant, and so, in the succession of time, he applied a triple measure of time, that is, three days, to establish a threefold distinction among this triple nature and appointed three more days to provision this threefold distinction with a threefold embellishment (*ornatum*).[78]

Bonaventure relied on Peripatetic cosmology to further divide the cosmos into the empyrean heaven, that is, the crystalline heaven, and the firmament; the planetary spheres, namely, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon; the elemental natures of fire, air, water, and the earth; and, finally, the four qualities, the hot, cold, wet, and dry, the most basic elements of the physics of the later Middle Ages.[79] The heavenly spheres, he explained, correspond to the luminous realm. The elemental natures of air, water, and earth correspond to the translucent and opaque. Fire is a special case. Although elemental, it shares much in common with the luminous and thus consumes the air around it in its effort to rise to the heavens.

He also argued that the beauty (*pulcritudo*) of the permanent order of the world depends on this arrangement. There are, in sum, three heavens and seven planets, for a total of ten heavenly spheres and a further four elemental spheres. The arrangements of these spheres are the "numerical proportions" that render the universe "so beautiful (*tam pulcrem*) in its proportions, so complete and orderly, that in its own way it offers an image of its Principle."[80] Thus, Bonaventure presented a significant development within the tradition of *l'esthétique musicale*. The "numerical proportions" in his description of the beauty of the permanent order of the world refer to the proper *arrangement* of the elements in the physical cosmos, not the precise numerical *ratios* that the Stoics had used to define the proper relationship between one part of a body and another. The arrangement of these parts rendered the cosmos beautiful, not the ratios that defined the relationship of one part of a body to another.

Bonaventure provided a more detailed description of the *successive* order of the cosmos in passages from the *Breviloquium* and the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*. He explained in the first, the prologue to the *Breviloquium*,

that "scripture describes all times and periods from the beginning of the world until the day of judgment."[81] He divided these periods on the basis of two ancient biblical models: the three periods of the law (*lex*)—the natural, the written, and the spiritual law—and the seven stages of history. The first period of the law, the natural law, refers to the first stage of history, which began with the formation of Adam and Eve on the sixth day of creation. The second period of the law, the written law, refers to the second through the fifth stages of biblical history: the second begins with Noah, the third with Abraham, the fourth with David, and the fifth with the Babylonian exile. The third and final period of the law, the spiritual law, refers to the sixth stage of history, which begins with the coming of Christ. Bonaventure contends that the seventh stage begins with the repose of the souls of the dead and runs concurrently with the sixth.

The Apostle Paul provided the basis for further detail in his distinction between the natural law accessible to everyone through reflection on the natural inclination of their will and the further distinction between the revealed law of the old covenant and the new (Rom. 2:14). Bonaventure relied heavily on Augustine's reading of Paul and later authors, particularly Hugh of St. Victor, to develop these distinctions into a detailed sacred historiography.[82] He argued that God the Father, again in close cooperation with the Son and Spirit, "impresses" the natural law on the human "heart," that is, its memory, intellect, and will.[83] These "first principles" of the law—universal, objective, and rational—determine the minimum standard of human conduct in the love of God and neighbor. The revealed law rendered the natural law explicit, and the spiritual law, through the indwelling of Christ, restored the impression of the natural law on the fallen human heart.[84] He also argued that the revealed law contains precepts to guide human behavior, promises of punishment and reward to motivate behavior, and sacraments to help the wayfarer to "come through precepts to promises." He tended to associate the promise of punishment with the old law, but not exclusively; he insisted that both the old law and the new, in harmony with one another, would bring human beings to the promise of eternal life.

Bonaventure reinforced his division of the stages of the world's history with two further parallels: the seven days of creation and the seven stages of the human life span.[85] The first day, God's separation of the light from the darkness, is analogous to the first age: the fall of the demons and the confirmation of the allegiance of the angels. The second, God's separation of the waters, is analogous to the flood, the salvation of the righteous, and the condemnation of the unrighteous. The third day, God's command to the earth to bear fruit, is analogous to the call of Abraham, the first fruits, so to speak, of God's chosen people. The fourth day, the formation of the stars and other heavenly bodies, is analogous to the liturgy of the synagogue. The fifth day,

the command to the waters to bring forth fish and fowl, is analogous to the Babylonian exile. The sixth age, the formation of human beings, is analogous to the birth of Christ, the New Adam, in whom human beings are reformed into the image of God. The seventh age, the repose of the Divinity, is analogous to the repose of the dead, who rest until the Day of Judgment.

He also developed a parallel with the traditional stages of the human life span: infancy, childhood, youth, adulthood, decline, and old age. The first stage of history, in which God deleted the memory of the earliest civilizations through the flood, corresponds to infancy. The second, in which God confused the tongues in Babylon, corresponds to childhood. The third, in which God showed favor to Abraham so that he bore a son, corresponds to adolescence; the fourth, in which God caused the Synagogue to flourish, corresponds to the strength of adulthood. The fifth, in which God allowed the priesthood to decline in captivity, corresponds to the decline of middle age. The sixth, in which God brings the world to its end, corresponds to old age. He omitted the seventh age, death, from the list. It would correspond to the repose of those who have passed away and would run concurrently with the sixth, with the lives of those who remain until the final judgment.

Bonaventure deftly weaved the themes of providence, physics, metaphysics, history, ethics, and aesthetics into a well-wrought whole in these passages. He argued that God the Father's divine decree established the course of the cosmos in both its spatial and temporal order. He also argued that the same decree established the ethical principles of the law that regulated the freedom of the human person within the bounds of its physical and metaphysical limits. The order of the cosmos rendered it beautiful and the human person's degree of obedience to God's law would either enhance its beauty or mar its perfection until the Day of Judgment, when God the Father would restore the order and beauty of the cosmos through the punishment of the damned in eternal exile and the reward of the faithful in eternal union with Him.

He concluded with an extensive development of an Augustinian analogy.[86] "The entire course of this world runs in a most orderly fashion from its beginning to its end, like a beautifully ordered poem (*pulcherrimi carminis ordinati*)." Its course testifies to "the diversity, multiplicity, symmetry, order, rectitude, and beauty (*pulcritudinem*) of the many judgments that proceed from the divine Wisdom that governs the world." Its beauty might not be readily apparent, but "no one can appreciate the beauty of a poem unless they hear all of it" and so, too, "no one can see the beauty (*pulcritudinem*) of the order . . . of the world without seeing the entirety of its course," a revelation reserved for the faithful at the end of days.

Bonaventure's development of this analogy into a litany—the diversity, multiplicity, justice, order, rectitude, and beauty of the course of history—is a complex teleological argument that testifies to "the many judgments that proceed from the divine Wisdom that governs the world." But, Bonaventure explained, it is successful only in view of the proper end of the cosmos that God the Father would restore through punishment and reward. No one, Bonaventure explained, lives long enough to see the entire course of the universe, nor can anyone foresee the details of its end. So, he argued, God provided a record of the entire course of the universe—the past, the present, and the future—in the pages of the scriptures that revealed its proper end. Thus, the successive beauty of the universe is apparent to those alive today only through a careful reading of the scriptures.

Bonaventure developed this theme in even greater detail in the second passage on the successive order of the cosmos in the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*.[87] He repeated the division of time into three periods of the law. But he also introduced three new divisions: a five-part division, a twelve-part division, and the new seven-part divisions. He based the five-part division on the traditional hours of the day: dawn, the third, sixth, ninth, and eleventh hours. The last hour referred, predictably, to the coming of Christ and the imminent end of the world. He numbered the prophecies of Christ and their fulfillment in the New Testament in his twelve-part division and articulated a parallel history of the prophecies concerning the Anti-Christ and their fulfillment in the last days.

The new seven-part divisions, parallel to the seven days of creation, occupied most of his attention. He began with the time of origin, the seven days of creation that established the foundation for the history of the world. The time of symbolism identified the division of the Jewish scriptures into periods that prefigure coordinate periods in the Christian scriptures of the New Testament: the natural formation of human beings in Adam; the cleansing of sin in the flood; the choosing of a people in the call of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the establishment of the law with Moses; the glory of the kings; the voice of the prophets; and the intermediate repose—the silence in the scriptures between the last of the prophets and the Gospels. These prefigured the seven periods in the time of grace: the formation of Christ, the baptism in the blood of the martyrs, the establishment of the universal church, the judicial law, the lofty thrones of the Christian kings, the clarity of doctrine, and the final repose or death until Christ comes again in glory. He then divided each of these seven periods into three subdivisions and compared them with one another for a total of forty-two comparisons, the same number, he fortuitously discovered, that distinguished Israel's slow progress to the Promised Land. "Thus, it is clear," he concluded, "how

scripture describes the succession of times; and they are not haphazard nor left to chance, but they contain a marvelous light and many spiritual meanings."[88]

He had also added an eighth age of resurrection after the day of rest. This age would come at the end of the world. But it is a new beginning, the earthly paradise restored in the Kingdom of Heaven. He counted it not as another stage of development but as the establishment of a new Eden that would know no end.

CONCLUSION

Bonaventure's debt to *l'esthétique musicale* consists in two complementary conceptions of proportion. He defined the beauty of the human body and, perhaps, other physical objects, primarily in terms of the proportion of one part of those objects in relation to another. But he did not list the precise proportions of the body anywhere in his extant works. Nor did his peers. The lists of the particular proportions of the body that survived in scattered copies of the ancient artistic handbooks failed to appear in the philosophical or theological literature of the Middle Ages. He also reformulated the problematic phrase *cum quadam coloris suavitate*. He applied it to his description of the *claritas*, or brightness of the risen body and, as a metaphor, the *claritas* of the mind's intentional states, but he did not insist on it as a critical component in his definition of beauty.

He applied the second conception of proportion to the permanent and successive orders of the cosmos: the three *naturae* that structure the full extent of the cosmos; the three heavens; the seven planets; the four elements; and the four qualities, the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry; and its successive order in a complex series of three-, five-, seven-, and twelve-fold meters. But these proportions referred to the numerically ordered *arrangements* of the spatial and temporal dimensions of the cosmos, not to the ratios that defined the relative size, shape, or duration of one part of a thing to another. Thus, the proper *arrangement* of the cosmic hierarchy and the creatures that inhabit each of those divisions—the sun, moon, and stars; the earth, air, fire, and water; and the human person, the crown of creation—rendered its ideal *ordo* beautiful. And the proper *order* of the events in its history—their beginning, their proper development, and their final end—defined the successive order of the cosmos and rendered it, too, beautiful, "like a beautifully ordered poem (*pulcherrimi carminis ordinati*)" that testifies to "the diversity, multiplicity, symmetry, order, rectitude, and beauty of the many judgments that proceed from the divine Wisdom that governs the world."

NOTES

1. Bruyne, *Études*, 1:306–338 and 3:3–29. See also *L'Esthétique du moyen* age, 61–99.

2. De Bruyne, *L'Esthétique du moyen age*, 61–62. See also Boethius, *De Musica* 1.10.

3. Iamblychus, *De vita Pythagorica*, 26. All translations are my own except as noted.

4. See M. L. West, *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

5. W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 375.

6. De Bruyne, *L'Esthétique du moyen age*, 25. Plato makes the comparison in the *Respublica* 508d.

7. De Bruyne, *Études*, 2:199.

8. De Bruyne, *L'Esthétique du moyen age*, 70–79. See Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.6 and 5.8.

9. Eco, *Art and Beauty*, 49–51. Eco reprised his thesis in *Arte e bellezza nell'estetica medievale* (Milan: Bompiani, 1987).

10. Eco, *Art and Beauty*, 51. The phrase *homo quadratus* refers to Vitruvius' description of the geometric proportions of the human figure.

11. See J. Pelikan, *What Has Athens to Do with Jerusalem: Timaeus and Genesis in Counterpoint* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

12. See Hesiod, *Theogonia* l.116. Hesiod began his account of creation with Gaia, the divine Feminine, and her struggle to tame Chaos.

13. Gen. 1:1-2 (JPS 1992).

14. D. Ross, "Beauty: Conceptual and Historical Overview," 238.

15. Gen. 1:31 (LXX 2006).

16. N. M. Sarna, *The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2001), 5.

17. G. May, *Creation Ex-Nihilo: The Doctrine of "Creation Out of Nothing" in Early Christian Thought* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2004).

18. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 42–43, and 197, n. 17.

19. D. Zeyl, "Plato's Timaeus," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford University, 2019). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/plato-timaeus/.

20. D. O'Meara, "The Beauty of the World in Plato's *Timaeus*," *Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition* 8 (2014): 24–33.

21. O'Meara, "The Beauty of the World," 28. The passage is from the *Timaeus* 87 c4–d3.

22. Tertullian, *On Prescription against Heretics* 2.7, trans. P. Holmes (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1870), 7–13.

23. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*: *Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 1:3–27.

24. J. Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2007), 1–5.

25. See D. T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the "Timaeus" of Plato* (Leiden: E, J. Brill, 1986).

26. R. C. Dales, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World* (Leiden: Brill, 1990). See also S. Baldner, "St. Bonaventure and the Temporal Beginning of the World," *New Scholasticism* 63 (1989): 206–228; B. Bonansea, "The Question of the Eternal World in the Teaching of St. Bonaventure," *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974): 7–33; and M. D. Walz, "Theological and Philosophical Dependencies in St. Bonaventure's Argument against an Eternal World and a Brief Thomistic Reply," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 72 (1998): 75–98.

27. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q .2 (2:19–25). See also Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 23–35.

28. G. Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982).

29. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, 176–211.

30. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.12 (31), trans. J. E. King (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945), 359–360. See also Stobaeus SVF 3.278 and Philo of Alexandria SVF 3.392.

31. Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 5.2. See also SVF 3.471.

32. Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.10 (23), trans. King, 351.

33. A. Celkyte, "The Stoic Definition of Beauty as Summetria," *Classical Quarterly* 67 (2017): 88–105.

34. Galen, *De placitis*, 5.3.

35. J. J. Pollit, *The Ancient Greek View of Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 14–22. See also Pollitt, "The *Canon* of Polykleitos and Other Canons," in *Polykleitos, the Doryphoros, and Tradition*, ed. W. G. Moon (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 19–24.

36. G. Hafner, *Polyklet Doryphoros: Revision eines Kunsturteils* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2016).

37. Vitruvius, *De architectura* 3.1.2. Translated by F. Granger as *On Architecture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1931 and 1934), 1:159. The text is corrupt. The measurements, for example, from the top of the breast to the roots of the hair and from the middle of the breast to the crown are incompatible. See Panofsky, *History of the Theory of Proportions*, in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (New York: Overlook, 1974), 55–107. Vitruvius' books *On Architecture* survive in approximately eighty medieval manuscripts, many with illustrations. Bonaventure does not seem to have been aware of them. See L. D. Reynolds, *Texts and Transmission: A Study of the Latin Classics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 440–444.

38. Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 3.1.3, trans. Granger, 1:161.

39. C. Cesariano, *De architectura* (Como: Gotardus de Ponte, 1521).

40. T. N. Howe, *Vitruvius: Ten Books on Architecture*, ed. I. D. Rowland (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 189.

41. Galen, *De naturalibus facultatibus*, 2.9.

42. De Bruyne, *L'Esthétique du moyen age*, 20–21.

43. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.13 (30), trans. King, 359.

44. Augustine, *City of God* 22.19, trans. Marcus Dodds (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913), 842–843. See also his *Ep.* 3.4 in which he defines beauty as a *congruentia partium cum quadam coloris suavitate*.

45. Verbeke, *The Presence of Stoicism*, 21–44.

46. Augustine does provide a complex set of ratios for the proportions of poetic meter. He had been, after all, a professor of rhetoric prior to his conversion. See *De musica* 1–5 esp. 2.8. But he does not apply these to the proportions of the human person.

47. O. Bychkov, "The Reflection of Some Traditional Stoic Ideas in the Thirteenth-Century Scholastic Theories of Beauty," *Vivarium* 34 (1996): 147–151. This is not to say that the parallel would have proved unacceptable to the Christian tradition in its entirety. There had been, as Verbeke had argued, Christian Stoics in Antiquity and well into the medieval era who would have found the parallel perfectly acceptable.

48. Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods* 2.15, trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 52.

49. Cicero, *The Nature of the Gods* 2.87, trans. Walsh, 78. Altered.

50. Bychkov, "Stoic Ideas," 151–152.

51. Bonaventure, *Sermo in Festo Omnium Sanctorum* 2 (9:601).

52. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 17, a. 2, q. 2 (2:423).

53. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 1, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2 (2:50).

54. Pollit, *The Ancient Greek View of Art*, 447–449.

55. Augustine, *Confessiones* 7.9.13–7.12.18.

56. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 49, p. 2, s. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (4:1015).

57. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 49, p. 2, s. 2, a. 2, q. 1 (4:1025).

58. Bonaventure, *Soliloquium de quatuor mentalibus exercitiis* 4.20 (8:63). See also 4 *Sent*. d. 49, p. 2, s. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (4:1015). Bonaventure replaces *immortalitas* with *subtilitas* in the latter passage.

59. Bonaventure, *Solil.* 4.20 (8:63). He paraphrases Gregory, *Moralia in Job* 18.48.78.

60. P. V. Spade, "Binarium Famosissimum," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford University, 2018). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/binarium/.

61. Bonaventure's advocacy of the doctrine of the plurality of the *formae* is a recent consensus. See Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 48–50 and 198, n. 41.

62. E. J. M. Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic*, 62. She refers to 4 *Sent.* d. 49, p. 2, s. 2, a. 2, q. 1 (4:1025).

63. S. McAdams, "The Aesthetics of Light: A Critical Examination of St. Bonaventure's Doctrine of Light in View of His Aesthetics" (PhD diss., Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1991), 135.

64. Eco, *The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1988), 102–121.

65. McAdams, "The Aesthetics of light," 135.

66. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.5 (5:300–301).

67. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 44, a. 1, q. 3 (1:786). See J. A. W. Hellmann, *Ordo: Untersuchung eines Grundgedankens in der Theologie Bonaventuras* (Munchen:

Ferdinand Schoningh, 1974). Hellmann was the first to explore the fundamental role of the concept of order in Bonaventure's thought, but he did not explore its role in Bonaventure's aesthetics in detail.

68. See also Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 15, a .2, p. 1 (2:383) and *Breviloquium*, prol. 2 (5:203–204).

69. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 15, a. 2, q. 3 (2:387).

70. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 177–186.

71. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. prol. (2:3–6) and *Brevil*. 3 (5:231–241).

72. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 32, a. 3, p. 1 (2:770). See also *Hexaëm.* 1.34 (5:535).

73. See S. Bayley, *Ugly*: *The Aesthetics of Everything* (New York: Overlook, 2011).

74. Bonaventure, *Sermones de nativitate B. Virginis Mariae* 2 (9:708–709).

75. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 44, p. 2, a.1, q.1 (4:921). See also Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 11.18.

76. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.1–12 (5:219–230). See Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 128–133.

77. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.3 (5:220).

78. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.5 (5:223).

79. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.3–4 (5:220–222).

80. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.3 (5:221).

81. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. prol. 2 (5:203).

82. P. Rorem, *Hugh of St. Victor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57–119.

83. Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica* 4.1 (5:181). See J. F. Quinn, *Bonaventure's Fundamental Conception of Natural Law* (Rome: Collegium S. Bonaventura, 1974).

84. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent*. d. 40, a. un., q. 1–2 (3:884–890).

85. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. prol., 2 (5:204). His source is Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus*, 44. See also *De civ. Dei* 10.14. P. Archambault has traced the development of these themes in "The Ages of Man and the Ages of the World: A Study in Two Traditions," *Revue des études augustiniennes* 12 (1966), 193–228. See also E. Sears, *The Ages of Man*: *Medieval Interpretations of the Life Cycle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 54–79

86. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. prol. 2 (5:204). See Augustine, *Ep.* 138, 1.5.

87. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 15.1–16.31 (5:398–408).

88. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 16.31 (5:408).

Bonaventure's Debt to
l'Esthétique de la Lumière

Eco and other proponents of *l'esthétique de la lumière* identified a number of sources for the tradition: Plato, who argued that beauty (καλός) is an idea (ἰδέα) or metaphysical form (*forma*) and developed the analogy between the "radiance, splendor, and brilliance" of the *formae* and the light of the sun; Plotinus and his heirs, who extended the Platonic Thesis and identified beauty with the entire realm of the *formae*; and, finally, Basil, Ambrose, and Augustine, who transmitted the Thesis to the Christian West. Again, a careful and more detailed reading of these sources will provide a more well-informed judgment of Bonaventure's use of them and his debt to *l'esthétique de la lumière*.

THE PLATONIC THESIS

Plato presented his Thesis in an influential passage in the *Phaedo*, in which he explicitly rejects the argument that shape and color render something beautiful: "I find them all confusing," he claimed.[1] He presented his Thesis in response: "I cling simply and straightforwardly and no doubt foolishly to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it or association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty." Plato appears to have argued that an object is beautiful because it participates in the *forma* (εἶδος) of an absolute beauty, that is, beauty itself, in the same way that large things participate in largeness, or good things in goodness. The *forma* of beauty, like the other *formae*, is not beautiful because it possesses certain properties, like shape or color. It is beautiful in itself, and every beautiful thing is beautiful because the *forma* of beauty is within it or

participates in it in some way. Plato appears to consider the *formae* a hypothesis throughout this particular Dialogue, but his point is clear: Beauty itself is a *forma* and the reason for the beauty of every other thing.

Two points of debate complicate the Thesis: the relationship between the metaphysical *formae* and proportion and the problem of the predication of the *formae*. Plato introduced the first point, the relationship between *forma* and measure (μετρέω) or proportion (συμμετρέω), in the *Philebus*: "Any compound, whatever it be, that does not by some means or other exhibit measure and proportion, is the ruin both of its ingredients and, first and foremost, of itself; what you are bound to get in such cases is no real mixture, but literally a miserable mass of unmixed messiness."[2] On this basis, he concluded: "The good (ἀγαθός) has taken refuge in the character of the beautiful, for the qualities of measure and proportion invariably, I imagine, constitute beauty and excellence."[3]

He provided further insight in his discussion of the metaphysical status of the *forma* of the cosmos in the *Timaeus*.[4] The divine Architect (δημιουργός), he argued, is "the best of causes," and the cosmos "beautiful (καλός)," and so this Architect must have looked to the best and most beautiful *formae*, the eternal *formae* that, as he had argued in the *Symposium*, "suffers neither increase nor diminution, nor any other change."[5] He brought the concept of proper measure into the discussion later in the *Timaeus*: "Everything that is good is beautiful," he explained, "and the beautiful is not without proportion." He then introduced the parallels between the proportions of the human person's body, soul, and the cosmos that influenced the Stoic parallels of *l'esthétique musicale* in support of his Thesis: "there is no proportion or disproportion more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice, than that between soul and body themselves."[6]

Plato had presented the proponents of *l'esthétique de la lumière* with a dilemma they tended to ignore. He argued that beauty is a metaphysical *forma*, like largeness, goodness, "and all the rest of them," and the *forma* of beauty is the reason for the beauty in every other beautiful thing. But he also sometimes argued that some type of measure or proportion is the essential ingredient in the beauty of things. Does Plato intend to have his readers choose between one horn of the dilemma and the other, as de Bruyne had done? Does the presence of the metaphysically simple *forma* of beauty in things render those things beautiful? Or their measure or proportion? Or does he intend to go between the horns of the dilemma? Does the *forma* of beauty bring order to the chaos of the world?

The solution to the dilemma lies in the second point of debate: the problem of predication. Plato recorded his own difficulties with this problem in the *Parmenides*: the extent of the predication of the *formae*, the conceptual status of them, and, above all, the apparent inability of the human mind to grasp

them.[7] Neither he nor his successors provided a determinate solution. Walton has proposed a viable explanation: The literary form of Plato's discussion, the philosophical dialogue, precluded his ability to deliver a definitive presentation of the theory of the *formae* and, I might add, any philosophical thesis, to such an extent that "it seems increasingly uncertain if we should even speak of a theory of Forms at all."[8] Thus, a definitive solution to his definition of beauty remains elusive—perhaps intentionally elusive. If Plato was a "Platonic" realist and located the *formae ante rem* and *in re*, then the first horn of the dilemma is a viable solution, the *forma* of beauty is beautiful in itself and its presence within beautiful things renders them beautiful. If he located the *forma ante rem* but not *in re*, then between the horns is a viable solution, the *forma* of beauty brings order to the chaos of the world. Finally, if he argued against the existence of the *forma ante rem*, but for some type of existence *in re*, *post rem*, or perhaps even as *flatus vocis*, then, the second horn is viable, some type of measure or proportion is the essential ingredient in the beauty of things.

PLOTINUS' REFORMULATION OF
THE PLATONIC THESIS

Plotinus provided the second source for the proponents of *l'esthétique de la lumière* in his most influential treatise, *On Beauty*.[9] He proposed two innovations in his reformulation of the Platonic Thesis. First, he, not Plato, was the author of the explicit rejection of the theories of proportion that led de Bruyne, Eco, and other authors of the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics to argue for a categorical distinction between *l'esthétique musicale* and *l'esthétique de la lumière*.[10] Second, he argued that the *formae* in the intelligible realm of being render things in the physical realm of being beautiful, not the *forma* of beauty in itself but each of the *formae*. He went between the horns of Plato's dilemma:

> The form, then, approaches and composes that which is to come into being from many parts into a single ordered whole; it brings it into a completed unity and makes it one by agreement of its parts; for since it is one itself, that which is shaped by it must also be one as far as a thing can be which is composed of many parts.[11]

Nevertheless, much of Plotinus' reformulation of the Platonic Thesis remains problematic. Beardsley argued that unity is its definitive concept: "It is unity, then, that is essential" and beauty "is the outcome of unification."[12] Rist argued that "the individual Forms are beautiful and the Intelligible

World has κάλλος."[13] Gerson argued, "Beauty is a property of Forms as contemplated."[14] O'Meara argued, "The beauty of Form is not some property of Form," *contra* Gerson, "but is Form itself" and this is identical with "true being." He cited Plotinus in support of his interpretation: "But the power that is there [in the intelligible] has only its being and only its being beautiful. For where would beauty be if deprived of being? Where would being be if deprived of being beautiful?"[15] The riddle, then, is the relationship between the beauty of the *formae* and the unity inherent in beautiful things. O'Meara provided the best explanation in consideration of Plotinus' treatises on beauty in their entirety: "Form is responsible for good proportion."[16] He quoted Plotinus: "As it approaches, then, Form organizes what is to be one whole out of many parts, bringing it to a single completion and making it one through agreement [of the parts]."[17]

Plotinus also faced a challenge Plato had not. He developed a more robust theology of the divine *Primum Principium* but found it difficult to articulate its aesthetic status. The One (τὸ Ἕν), Rist explains, is the cause or source of everything else but not a rational agent in the sense of the divine Architect of the *Timaeus* who carefully crafted every beautiful thing.[18] The One is the absolutely simple first principle of all other things, the cause of being for everything else. It does not act to produce a cosmos or a spiritual order but simply generates from itself, effortlessly, a Power that is at once the Intellect and the object of contemplation of this Intellect—and this includes beautiful things. Thus, he concludes, the One is the cause of the "beauty" that renders all other things "beautiful," but the One is not beautiful in Itself.

Rist also points out that the argument stems from a mystical tendency in Plotinus' thought that prohibits the rational contemplation of the One and initiates the apophatic tradition in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic mystical theology. The simplicity of the One defies rational contemplation; it remains rationally inaccessible, ineffable, and "alone with itself."[19] Rist explains: "The truth is that Plotinus does not look on the One as a beautiful *object* at all. The Forms are looked on as beautiful *objects*; the One is to be seen as the source of their existence and therefore of their Beauty."[20] O'Meara adds an important correction: This distinction should not "be pressed to the point of losing sight of the status of the divine Intellect as expression of the Power of the One." The One and its Beauty is rationally inaccessible. It is "beauty above beauty," the "super-essential beauty," themes which Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite will develop more fully,[21] but it reveals itself in its emanation of the Intellect and is thus accessible in the contemplation of the *formae* that comprise the Intellect. The One is the "light" that both produces the Intellect and shines upon it to render its *formae* visible to the rational contemplation of the mind.

THE TRANSMISSION OF THE PLATONIC THESIS

Basil, Ambrose, and, above all, Augustine transmitted the Platonic Thesis to the Christian West.[22] But they did so with a significant innovation: they resolved the tension between the Platonic Thesis and Stoic theories of symmetry, proportion, and order in the context of a syncretic philosophical tradition, Pythagorean, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic, and they did so in fidelity to their own theological convictions.[23]

Augustine, the most influential advocate of the Platonic Thesis, presented his revision of the Thesis in his account of divine Beauty in *De Trinitate*.[24] God the Father, he explained, is the primal source of the Son and Spirit. It is the second of these divine *Personae*, the Son—the divine Form (*Species*), Image (*Imago*), and Art (*Ars*)—who is beautiful and the reason for the beauty of every beautiful thing—the term *species*, in particular, carried the connotation of splendor and beauty.[25] He credited Hilary of Poitier with the appellation: "He gave the name Form to the Image, I believe, on account of the beauty (*pulchritudinem*) which arises from this perfect harmony (*tanta congruentia*), this primal equality (*prima aequalitas*), this primal similarity (*prima similitudo*)" between the Father and His Image, a relationship without "difference," without "disproportion," and without "dissimilarity" of any kind or degree, in which the Son "corresponds in everything to that of which it is the image."[26] The beauty of the Son, difficult to measure in terms of numerical proportions, is the result of the degree of its harmony, equality, and similarity to God the Father. Augustine's One God in Three *Personae*—the Father, Son, and Spirit—is not beautiful in Its divine *Essentia*. It is beautiful in the degree of the resemblance of one divine Hypostasis, the Son, to another, the Father.

He furthered his revision of the Thesis in his explication of the account of creation.[27] God the Father, in His eternal perichoresis with the Son and Spirit, created all other things in conformity to the divine *rationes* or *formae* within the Son, the *Ars Aeterna*—the rough equivalent of the Neo-Platonic νοῦς.[28] He derived the principal *formae* from a brief passage in the Wisdom of Solomon that would prove pervasive throughout the Middle Ages: "You, O Lord, have ordered all things in measure, number, and weight" (11:21).[29] Measure (*mensura*) referred to the inherent ontological limit of created beings as contingent, number (*numerus*) to their possession of the *formae* that rendered them into specific types of things, and weight (*pondus*) to their inclination to their proper end. The Pythagoreans had identified number as the principal metaphysical element in the cosmos. Platonists transformed number into the principal *forma* and a cipher for the *formae* as a whole. The numerical *forma* rendered the cosmos into a well-ordered whole. Weight inclined rational creatures to their proper end in union with the Creator from which they came. It inclined irrational creatures indirectly, through their testimony

to their dependence on their Creator that furthered rational creatures' pursuit of union.

Augustine insisted that God the Father had created all things in an instant. Each of the six days of Genesis was a repetition of the first, a didactic device to render the complex instant into a comprehensible process.[30] The Father brought all things into being *ex nihilio*, without effort or opposition. He created a primordial state of formless matter (*materia informis*) prior to the first day in order of explanation and formed it into a carefully crafted cosmos in the course of the six days.[31] The number six, Augustine explained, a perfect number, the first number that is the sum of its aliquot parts, testified to the perfection of the ideal order of creation.[32] The Father, the divine Architect, formed the cosmos in conformity to the divine *Formae* in the *Ars Aeterna*, similar to the manner in which a human artist forms things in conformity to the *formae* in his or her mind.[33] The Father's careful formation of creation in conformity to the divine *Formae* rendered it good and beautiful in both its static beauty, that is, the proper arrangement of each of its constituent parts in relation to the whole, and its dynamic beauty, that is, the order of each creature to its proper end in the fullness of time. The Father, Augustine explained, "orders all things in His providence until the beauty of their course in time comes to its proper end . . . like the masterwork of a poet of ineffable skill."[34]

The degree of Augustine's debt to the Neo-Platonic tradition in his revision of the Platonic Thesis is a matter of some debate. Du Roy argued that Augustine depended heavily on Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic tradition to articulate the relationship between the One and the Many in the Divinity, in particular, the relationship between the Father and the Son.[35] Ciprani and more recent scholars argue, *contra* du Roy, that Augustine's commitment to Nicene orthodoxy guided his careful reading of the "texts of the Platonists."[36] They admitted that he relied heavily on the Neo-Platonists to articulate some of the relationships between the One and the Many, especially his formulation of the doctrine of divine simplicity, but he refused to rely entirely on them. Byers, too, argues that Augustine relied on a wide range of philosophers and their doctrines—Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic—in the development of a syncretic, innovative, but thoroughly orthodox philosophical theology.[37] Thus, Augustine bequeathed to Bonaventure a particularly rich but thoroughly orthodox reading of the Neo-Platonic texts—even if it tested the boundaries of orthodoxy and the plain sense of the scriptures.

Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite provided the second most influential reformulation of the Platonic Thesis.[38] He was a careful student of Proclus, the last of the great pagan Neo-Platonists, and his texts reflect a direct awareness of the Neo-Platonic tradition.[39] He rendered Beauty (καλός) into a divine Name of God as a whole, not an individual hypostasis.[40] This One, Beautiful God is the source of all beautiful things, "the Cause of the multitudes of the

good and the beautiful." He "bestirs the world" and instills in all things the "longing" for beauty that finds its proper end in an apophatic union with Him—the divine Beauty, the "Goal," the "Beloved," the "Cause toward which all things move." But, as Sammon points out, this One God is also the subject of his negative theology, the predication of Beauty, Goodness, and other names to the divine Being, and his simultaneous denial of the applicability of these names to the Being who transcends all names.[41] Thus, "Beauty" denotes the "One" as "the cause of beauty in things," not as beautiful in itself.

Dionysius exerted a significant influence on Bonaventure's philosophical theology, particularly his mystical theology, both directly and mediated through Hugh, Richard, and Thomas Gallus of St. Victor. Bonaventure explicitly listed Dionysius among his most important influences as well as Richard and Hugh.[42] But Bonaventure chose to follow the more dominant Augustinian stream of influence in the development of his aesthetics, not Dionysius'.

BONAVENTURE'S REFORMULATION
OF THE PLATONIC THESIS

Bonaventure developed Augustine's reformulation of the Platonic Thesis in another dense passage in his *Commentary* on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, in which he discussed Hilary's appellation of *species*, *imago*, and *art* to the Son.[43] The Son, he explained, is beautiful in relation to the Father insofar as He is the perfect and explicit likeness (*similitudo*) of the Father and in perfect conformity (*aequalitas*) to the Father. Balthasar had noted Bonaventure's claim that the Son is the perfect "expression" of the entirety of the Father, "the unsurpassable 'resemblance,' 'assimilation,' 'correspondence,' and so 'truth.'"[44] He also noted that the modifier *expressa* conveys the sense of the explicit degree of the Son's *similitudo* to the Father in its conformity to the Father. The Son, Bonaventure continued, is the Image of the Father through "a natural mode of origin" in which one thing brings forth something else that is like and equal to it (*simile et aequale*). It also conveys its function as an expression of the Father in virtue of the degree of its explicitness. The intension of the term *similitudo* points to the Father, but it also reveals the Father in the extraordinary degree of its intension. The translation into "explicit" emphasizes one sense of the term, "expressive" emphasizes the other, but the Latin conveys both.

Bonaventure developed the basis for Son's beauty in his explication of a series of *rationes* or *formae*: the *ratio* of likeness, the *ratio* of knowledge, and the *ratio* of beauty. The *ratio* of likeness is closely related to that of knowledge. God the Son knows an infinite number of things through the likenesses (*similitudines*) in the divine Mind, so to speak, His possession of

the divine *Formae* with which the Father created the heaven and the earth.[45] The conceptual *similitudines* in the human mind refer to the abstract concepts that make knowledge possible. Bonaventure was the architect of a synthesis between an abstraction theory of knowledge and the doctrine of divine illumination, which I will consider in more detail later in this study.[46] He argued that the human mind was able to comprehend creation and its testimony to its Creator through the proper function of its higher faculties—its memory, intellect, and will—in close cooperation with the sense organs of its body. God the Father, in its perichoresis with the Son and Spirit, had endowed the mind with the capability to abstract the conceptual *similitudines* from its possession of the sensible *species* in its faculties of perception, but the mind abstracts these conceptual *similitudines* in the "light" of the divine *Formae* in the Son that enables the mind to abstract the intelligible species with a degree of certainty and thus come to the truth of things.

Bonaventure also argued that each and every creature is beautiful in comparison with the Son, since the Son holds within himself the *similitudines* of all things. God the Father had created the heaven and the earth through the same divine *Formae* in the Son that enabled the human mind to come to certain truth.[47] God the Father embedded the most fundamental of these *Formae*—measure, number, and weight—into the formless void prior to the first day of creation and a host of subsequent *formae* in the course of six days—Bonaventure had rejected Augustine's insistence that God had created the world in an instant. Thus, God the Father conformed creation to the divine *Formae* in the Son and rendered the Son into the *ratio* of "the most perfect beauty." God the Son is the aesthetic center in the grand scheme of the universe, the mediator (*medium*) between the Creator and Its creation who orders all things into a beautiful whole and guides it to its proper end.[48] The Son is the preeminent object of beauty in His dual relationship with the Father and with the created order.[49] He is the incomparable Image of the Father and the *Ars Aeterna* who possesses the *rationes* "of all things." He bestows beauty to the created order through the imposition of those *rationes* into the full extent of that order. Every single created thing that exists does so through some degree of participation in the *formae* that have rendered each of them into something good and beautiful.

Bonaventure' description of the analogy of the divine Architect reinforces his revision of the Platonic Thesis.[50] The "artist," he explained, produces an "artifact" in conformity to "a likeness (*similitudo*) that exists in the artist's mind," a likeness that bears "the closest possible similarity to the interior exemplar." Similarly, the "Most High Maker" created all things through His conception of them in "the Eternal Word (*Verbum*)." The aesthetic dimension of this passage comes to the fore in Bonaventure's analysis of the intent of this divine Artist. "Every artist," he explained,

"intends to produce an artifact that is beautiful (*pulcrum*), useful (*utile*), and lasting (*stabile*)."[51] He continued, "knowledge renders the artifact beautiful, the will renders it useful, and perseverance renders it lasting." Knowledge is the critical element in this discussion. It refers to the knowledge of the *similitudines* in the mind, the patterns according to which the artist produces particular artifacts.

Thus, Bonaventure did claim that beauty depends on *forma*, but it depends on the relationship or, as de Bruyne had so aptly phrased it, the *rapport* between the *similitudo* in the mind of the divine Artist and the expression of that *similitudo* in the object of its art, similar to the human artist's production of artifacts in a wide variety of forms that include the fine arts. Its beauty does not depend, as proponents of *l'esthétique de la lumière* argued, in its possession of or participation in the *formae* in themselves.

Bonaventure provided an intriguing example that confirms this reading of his debt to *l'esthétique de la lumière* in his brief gloss on the Bride in the Song of Solomon 1:5, who declared, "I am dark (*nigra*), but lovely (*sed formosa*)."[52] The text of the Song implied that the Bride's dark complexion was the result of exposure to the sun, a reference to her relatively low social status as an agricultural laborer in comparison with her Bridegroom; nevertheless, it remains a difficult passage.[53] Bonaventure inherited a hermeneutic tradition, whose participants identified a dark complexion with the "stigma" of sin, the target of "slander" and physical abuse,[54] the dark woman an object of inordinate sexual desire.[55] But it was a complex tradition. Its participants had affirmed and simultaneously subverted the stigma of the Bride's complexion in their insistence on the reformation of her spirit in her devotion to Christ, her Bridegroom. She had become both a dark sinner and a lovely soul, *simul iustus et peccator*. The mirror of her spirit reflected the bright light of her reformation into the image of Christ, the light of the world.

Bonaventure transcended this hermeneutic stigma.[56] The Bride might have thought that she was lovely in spite of her dark complexion. But, Bonaventure argued, she had erred in her estimate of her beauty. "She is lovely *because* she is dark," Bonaventure insisted, not in spite of her darkness. He reminded his readers that God had created everything "according to its own kind," a reference to the formation of creation according to the divine *Formae* in the *Ars Aeterna*. God, he continued, had looked on everything he had made and it was "very good" and beautiful (Gen. 1:31). Thus, Bonaventure explained, "even in the case of a superficial ruggedness (*scabrositas*) that gives something the appearance of being poorly formed (*deformem*), this ruggedness is the very thing that makes it most beautiful (*et tamen ex hoc est pulcherrima*)." He meant to argue, I suppose, that the prejudicial limits of the human mind might hinder its recognition of someone's or something's beauty, status, or value, but that does not mean that he or she is not beautiful. The Bride is

beautiful because God made her dark according to the darkly beautiful *forma* that established her beauty.

　　Bychkov has pointed out a potential complication in Bonaventure's formulation of the Thesis. He identifies two loci for the beauty of the Christian God in the broad tradition of medieval aesthetics that extends from Augustine through Scotus. The "the most logical locus" is "the common relations of equality" among God the Father, Son, and Spirit.[57] The second, in contrast to the first, is in the personal properties of Christ or, more properly, God the Son—Bychkov pays little attention to the *Deus homo* as the loci of beauty.[58] He points out that Bonaventure followed Augustine in the identification of "the perfect beauty (*perfecta pucritudo*)" of God in "the most perfect equality and likeness" among the divine *Personae*—although the text actually reads "the most perfect unity and equality (*in summa unitate et aequalitate*)."[59] But that Bonaventure had located "the most perfect likeness and equality (*similitudo et aequalitas*)" among the divine *Personae* in the absolute identity of the *Essentia* common to them.[60] This, Bychkov argues, leads to a dilemma. The Son is absolutely identical to the Father in His *Essentia* that He has in common with the Father, but the Son, precisely as the Son, is distinct from the Father. So, if the perfect beauty of the Son depends on the perfect *similitudo et aequalitas* in His *Essentia* that He has in common with the Father, then the Son precisely as the Son is not perfectly beautiful in His *similitudo et aequalitas* with the Father as the Father. But if the Son precisely as the Son is beautiful in His *similitudo et aequalitas* with the Father as the Father, then He falls short of the "perfect" *similitudo et aequalitas* required for the perfection of His beauty.

　　Bychkov has provided an insightful criticism of a neglected aspect of the tradition's approach to the first locus of the aesthetic dimensions of the Divinity. But he has also raised the problem of absolute identity in the logical analysis of the Three Person'd God. The philosophers and theologians who devised the delicate balance between the One and the Three in the emergence of a Christian orthodoxy in late Antiquity had been well aware of the absolute identity of one and the same divine *Essentia* among Its three *Personae*; they had insisted on it in their effort to refute the heresy of subordinationism.[61] Bonaventure confirmed his allegiance to the orthodox tradition in his claim that the perfect *similitudo et aequalitas* obtained in the relationship between the divine *Essentia* of the Son as Son and one and the same *Essentia* in the Father. But the development of a more rigorous formal logic in the late nineteenth century led Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Geach, and more recent philosophers to question the logical necessity of absolute identity.[62] The claim that the perfect *similitudo et aequalitas* obtained in the divine *Essentia* of the Son as Son and one and the same *Essentia* in the Father is nothing more than the rather vacuous claim, as Geach would express it, that the divine *Essentia* is Itself.

Nevertheless, Bonaventure did not pursue the first locus in significant detail. His almost exclusive focus is the second locus, the beauty of the Son precisely as the Son, distinct from the Father, and, particularly in his devotional treatises, the beauty of the full extension of Christ, *Deus et homo*. The Son possesses the perfect *aequalitas* and *similitudo* in His *rapport* with the Father—the unsurpassable "resemblance," "assimilation," "correspondence," and so "truth" of God the Father. He is the reason (*ratio*) for the beauty of everything else in heaven and earth, the *Ars Aeterna* who rendered every created thing into something good and beautiful. And, finally, He is the "most beautiful root of the flower of Jesse" in His hypostatic union with Christ's humanity, body and soul.[63] The flower withered in His passion, but blossomed again in His resurrection, and is now and forever "the most extraordinary beauty . . . more beautiful than all other things . . . more beautiful than the sun . . . more beautiful than the sun and every configuration of the stars."

THE ARGUMENTS FOR *L'ESTHÉTIQUE DE LA LUMIÈRE*

The principal proponents of Bonaventure's fidelity to *l'esthétique de la lumière*—Eco, Assunto, and McAdams—depended on three preliminary claims in making their case: Bonaventure's endorsement of a primordial *forma* of light (*lux*); his declaration that beauty is coextensive with *forma*; and his enthusiasm for the beauty of the light of the stars, the planets, and other bright objects.

Their first claim is that Bonaventure endorsed a metaphysics of primordial light (*lux*). Robert Grosseteste and other early Franciscan Masters developed the doctrine of the metaphysics of light, which Bonaventure would develop further. God, he explained, created *lux*, the principal *forma* of physical entities, prior to the first day.[64] It determines the degree of those bodies' dignity within the cosmic hierarchy.[65] It is the principal ingredient in the composition of the heavenly objects, the purest and most beautiful bodies that regulate the course of the lower spheres of creation, and it adjusts the opposition between the fundamental elements of Peripatetic physics—the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry—to form the earth, air, fire, and water, which are the four elements that determine the lower orders of creation.

Their second claim is that metaphysical *forma* is coextensive with beauty. Bonaventure was explicit: "Everything that has being has *forma* and everything that has *forma*, has beauty (*pulcritudinem*)."[66] Bonaventure clearly supported the principle that metaphysical *forma* is coextensive with beauty. He argued that every created thing necessarily possesses metaphysical *forma* in order to exist. He also insisted, as I have argued, that everything that possesses *forma* possesses beauty.

Their third claim is that Plato and his heirs in Antiquity and the Middle Ages routinely praised the beauty of light and color. Bonaventure, to cite their most pertinent example, explicitly identified the stars and the seven planets of the dominant medieval cosmology—Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon—as the preeminent examples of beautiful things.[67] Their light "is the most beautiful (*pulcherrimum*), the most delightful, and the best of all physical things."[68] Light, Bonaventure continued, is "the queen of colors." He cited Augustine: "It bathes all that we see in its brightness. It falls upon me with gentle grace through many media. . . . And if it is absent for a long time, its lack depresses my mind."[69]

The Arguments

Eco, Assunto, and McAdams weaved these claims into a common set of premises in their arguments for Bonaventure's fidelity to *l'esthétique de la lumière*. Eco's argument is the most concise.

1. Light is the substantial form of bodies.
2. It is beautiful and delightful.
3. Therefore, all bodies, in heaven and on earth, are beautiful and delightful.[70]

Eco recognized that Bonaventure's description of the ideal proportions of the human body, the *homo quadratus*, implies some degree of sympathy for *l'esthétique musicale*. But he also argued that the superficial beauty of the human person's physical body is fleeting. It would begin to fade in death. The more fundamental reason for the human person's beauty is its possession of its metaphysical *forma*, created in the image of God. The simple beauty of its *forma* would "shine" through the *claritas* of its risen body in its eternal beatitude. "Transfigured in heaven," Eco explained, "the original proportions dissolved into a pure effulgence, the ideal of the *homo quadratus* returns as an aesthetic ideal in the mysticism of light."[71]

Assunto's argument is similar to Eco's. He also argued that light is the substantial form of the body and it is beautiful and delightful in itself. But he added a further component. He argued that *claritas*, one of the four aspects of Bonaventure's description of the risen body, refers to the degree of purity of the metaphysical light in bodies. The degree of the purity of this light in bodies determined their degree of beauty and their status in the cosmic hierarchy. "For Bonaventure, *claritas* is not a clarity that makes an observed object thoroughly recognizable, but that object's intensive participation in light, a radiance which, in bodies, cannot be separated from color and which depends on the four natural elements."[72] The objects that occupy the highest, luminous

realm of the physical cosmos, the stars and the seven planets, possess the purest mixture of metaphysical light and primordial matter.[73] They are the most beautiful. The objects that inhabit the translucent realm possess a less pure mixture of metaphysical light and primordial matter and are less beautiful. The objects that inhabit the opaque realm possess the least pure mixture and are the least beautiful.

Assunto's argument fits well with Eco's. The human person stands in a dynamic position within this hierarchy. The human body occupies the opaque realm, the least of the realms of physical cosmos and thus counted among the least beautiful of physical things. But, in agreement with Eco, the opaque body will fade in death and reveal its substantial *forma* in its resurrection. The risen body will outshine the stars with an unsurpassed *claritas* of the metaphysical light within itself.

McAdams weaved the same preliminary claims into his argument for Bonaventure's fidelity to *l'esthétique de la lumière*.[74] But he tracked the various theories of light metaphysics throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages and located Bonaventure's metaphysics within that long tradition—and thus added considerable weight to his argument. In the course of his description, he candidly admitted that physical, intelligible, and divine types of light are only analogically related (*analogia lucis*) to one another. Nevertheless, he drew the rather extreme conclusion that light in each of its analogical manifestations, such as physical, intelligible, and divine, "is the cornerstone-foundation of Bonaventure's theory of the beautiful."[75] Thus, Bonaventure's aesthetics "is essentially an aesthetics of light."

Counterarguments

Eco, Assunto, and McAdams devised a series of carefully crafted and well-documented arguments in support of their claim that Bonaventure was an advocate of *l'esthétique de la lumière*. Their arguments are valid. But they committed three errors in the formulation of their arguments that render them unsound.

First, they conflated the *forma* of primordial light (*lux*) with the *formae* that served as the basis for the divine Architect's formation of the cosmos. Bonaventure did argue for the close-knit series of propositions that appear to provide evidence for *l'esthétique de la lumière*: the *forma* of primordial light (*lux*) is the fundamental *forma* of the cosmos, every created thing possesses this *forma*, and everything that has *forma* has beauty. But a closer reading reveals that the created order is metaphysically beautiful due to the degree it resembles its *forma* in the mind of the divine Architect, not the degree of substantial light in its metaphysical constitution. Bonaventure did grant special status to the *forma* of light (*lux*) in his metaphysics—it is the substantial

forma that informs every physical thing—but he did not privilege the *forma* of light in his theory of beauty.

Second, they conflated the *forma* of primordial light (*lux*) with brightness, color, and clarity (*claritas*). Bonaventure was enthusiastic in his praise for the brightness, color, and *claritas* of physical bodies: the beauty of the light of the stars and other celestial bodies;[76] the beauty of the human body, both earthly and risen;[77] and the *claritas* of the human "heart" within the risen body, "brightly luminous and purely transparent (*claritate lucent et puritate translucent*)."[78] But he did not claim that the metaphysical *forma* of light is the formal equivalent of brightness, color, or the more dynamic concept of *claritas*. The most we can conclude from his enthusiastic description is that brightness, color, or even the *claritas* of the body serve as additional criteria for beauty, the criteria he inherited from the Stoics but, as I have argued, he tended to neglect in his formal definitions of beauty.

Finally, they confused Bonaventure's claim that physical, spiritual, and divine light is beautiful with the reason for its beauty. Bonaventure argued that the proper arrangement of the starry heaven rendered it beautiful, not its participation in the *forma* of light: "The universe itself is organized in numerical proportions (*numerales proportiones*) . . . the ten heavenly and four elemental spheres make the universe so beautiful in its proportions, so complete and orderly, that in its own way, it offers an image of its Principle."[79] Their brightness, as I have mentioned, may well have served as an additional criteria for their beauty, but even if so, it was their physical brightness that did so, not the *claritas* of their metaphysical *forma*. Consider, too, Bonaventure's claim that the sun is beautiful (*speciocitas*) due to the arrangement of its parts with an agreeable color (*quidam partium situs cum quadam coloris suavitate*).[80] It is a perfect beauty (*speciocitas perfecta*). It possesses a perfect coordination of parts. It delights the senses that perceive it. It decorates the entire universe and its presence renders all things into something beautiful. It is a sweet brightness and a delight for the eyes. Thus, the sun, the brightest of the celestial bodies, is beautiful because of the arrangement, proportion, and coordination of its parts; its place in the order of the celestial hierarchy; even its agreeable color (*coloris suavitate*), but not its possession of the metaphysical *forma* of light.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL STATUS OF BEAUTY

The controversial thesis that Bonaventure listed beauty as a transcendental property of being provided a further dimension to the concept of beauty that, if correct, would reinforce its ubiquity in the created order and its relationship with the divine Being. Henquinet established the basis for the hypothesis in

his discovery of a manuscript in the *Biblioteca Comunale* in Assisi, whose author had explicitly listed beauty as a transcendental property of being. He identified its author with Bonaventure on the basis of the similarity in the rest of the manuscript's content to Bonaventure's more authentic works.[81] It reads in part:

> The one (*unum*), the true (*verum*), the good (*bonum*), and the beautiful (*pulcrum*) presuppose the intelligibility of being in which they share and, in so doing, they presuppose one another. The beautiful presupposes the good, the good the true, and the good the one. The one, however, is being itself. . . . The one refers to the efficient cause, the true to the formal cause, and the good to the final cause, but the beautiful embraces all these causes.[82]

The concept of the transcendentals (*transcendentia*) is a distinctive innovation in the effort of medieval philosophers and theologians to reengage the sources of the syncretic philosophical systems of late Antiquity: Porphyry's *Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, Boethius' *De hebdomadibus*, and Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus*.[83] Ibn Sina led the effort in his distinction between the "first principles" of conception that establish the foundation for human knowledge. Others built on his effort. Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham developed the concept into an innovative and rigorous approach to metaphysics that served as the basis for Kant and other philosophers of the Enlightenment who would radically transform the discipline. Their definitions, enumeration, and approach to the *transcendentia* varied, but in general the concept referred to the most common notions (*communissima*) of being (*ens*) that transcended the traditional Peripatetic division of things, or perhaps the names of things, into the categories of substance and its accidents: quantity, quality, relation, and so on. Substances referred to things in themselves. "To give a rough idea," Aristotle explained, "examples of substance are human being, horse."[84] Accidents inhered in them in some way. Aristotle continued, "of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualifications: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position; is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected; being-cut, being-burned."

Medieval philosophers enumerated three, four, five, or more of the properties that transcended the divisions of the categories. Philip the Chancellor, the first to provide a thorough analysis of the *transcendentia*, listed three of them in his *Summa de bono*: the one, the true, and the good.[85] Thomas listed six in *De veritate*: being, being a thing, being one, being something, being true,

and being good.[86] Scotus listed nineteen of them.[87] He argued that "being" itself is the principal transcendental and that unity, truth, and goodness are coextensive with being. He listed fifteen "disjunctive" attributes of being: prior and posterior, independent and dependent, necessary and contingent, absolute and relative, infinite and finite, finished and unfinished, actual and potential, simple and composed, one and many, cause and caused, effecting and effect, exceeding and exceeded, substance and accident, same and diverse, and equal and unequal. The disjunctive attributes apply to being only as a whole. The first attribute in each pair applies to the divine Being and the second to created beings. Scotus had also listed a number of pure perfections, omnipotence and omniscience, for example. These applied only to a particular being, God, and so are not transcendentals in the strict sense of the term. But the author of the Assisi Manuscript was the first and only medieval author to place beauty on the same level as the other transcendental attributes of being.

Is Bonaventure the author of the manuscript? Pouillon, de Bruyne, Eco, Spargo, Peter, Balthasar,[88] and a number of more recent scholars, Ost, Murphy, Viladesau, Astell, and McInroy, either accepted Henquinet's argument that Bonaventure was the author of the manuscript or argued that, if he was not, then he implicitly listed beauty as a transcendental of being on par with unity, truth, and goodness.[89] Brady cast doubt on the authenticity of the manuscript in his review of potential additions to Bonaventure's *Opera Omnia*.[90] He argued that the manuscript is a summary of select passages from the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* to which its author, a student in the Franciscan School at Paris, attached his own conclusions, but, and this is the crux of Brady's argument, those conclusions diverge from the content of Bonaventure's more authentic works. Aertsen, the leading scholar on the medieval concept of the transcendentals, concurs.[91] He speculates that the author of the manuscript relied on two sources for his rather innovative conclusion regarding the transcendental status of beauty. The first is Alexander's identification of the one, true, and good with different types of causality, efficient, formal, and final, and the second is Dionysius' identification of beauty with the Divinity as the principal source of the causal processes at work in the cosmos. He concludes, "If Bonaventure is the author of the anonymous treatise, then it is striking that in his other works he nowhere makes mention of the beautiful as a distinct transcendental and constantly restricts himself to the triad of the one, the true, and the good."

A closer reading of Bonaventure's doctrine of the transcendentals in his more certain texts confirms Aertsen's claim: the Commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, the *Breviloquium*, the *De triplici via*, the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, and the *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*.

The Transcendentals in the Commentary

Bonaventure introduced his discussion of the transcendentals in the first book of his Commentary in response to the question, can the human person know God, specifically, God in Three *Personae*, in and through creation's testimony to its Creator?[92] He argued, in response, that the human person can know God, even God in Three *Personae*, through creation's participation in the general conditions of being: the one, the true, and the good. Its oneness referred to its existence as a distinct thing, its truth to its existence as a particular type of thing, and its goodness to its existence for a particular purpose. These three conditions indicated its dependence on its Creator as its efficient, formal, and final cause, respectively. Furthermore, Bonaventure argued, these three types of causality pointed to the existence of God in Three *Personae*. The condition of oneness indicated the Father as the efficient cause, the Son as the formal cause, and the Spirit as the final cause *appropriate loquendo*. The human person, Bonaventure continued, is not able to come to the knowledge of the Three Person'd God without the aid of revelation, but with faith in the data of revelation, the human person is able to align each particular cause with its most appropriate source among the divine *Personae*.

Bonaventure's brief references to these general conditions of being served as the foundation for his further elaboration of the concept in later works. Significantly, he did not list beauty on par with the one, the true, or the good.

The Transcendentals in the *Breviloquium*

Bonaventure's discussion of the transcendentals in the *Breviloquium* confirms that he agreed with the author of the Assisi Manuscript to some extent. He argued that God, the First Principle (*Primum Principium*), is "the most high and perfect" and thus "possesses the highest and most general properties of being."[93] He identified these properties—the one, the true, and the good—and then provided a brief definition: "The one denotes being as numerable in so far as it is not susceptible of division in itself; the true as intelligible in so far as it inseparable from its proper *species*; and the good as communicable in so far as it is inseparable from its proper operation . . . the true presupposes the one and the good presupposes the one and the true."

He made three points in this passage in agreement with the author of the Assisi Manuscript. First, transcendental concepts, in this case, the one, the true, and the good, refer to the same thing, not to distinct things. Second, these concepts refer to distinct properties of things: its oneness indicates it is whole, its truth it is intelligible, and its goodness it is communicable. Third, they depend on one another; the intelligibility of being depends on its wholeness and its communicability on its intelligibility and its wholeness. It would

take a rather short step to add beauty to the list and claim, as does the author of the Assisi Manuscript, that the one, the true, the good, *and the beautiful* refer to the same thing, not distinct things; that they refer to distinct properties within things; and that they depend on one another: the intelligibility of being depends on its wholeness, the communicability of being on its intelligibility, and the beauty of being on its communicability.

Bonaventure also aligned these highest and most universal properties of being with the personal properties of God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit and attached a series of other properties to them. He attached beauty to truth: "The supremely one is supremely first in so far as it is entirely without beginning; the supremely true is supremely conforming and beautiful (*aequale et pulcrum*); and the supremely good is supremely useful and profitable."[94] He included only oneness, truth, and goodness in the list of "the highest and most universal properties of being." He included beauty (*pulcritudo*) in his analysis of the concept of truth in the second order of appropriations and not, as most of his peers had done, in his analysis of the good. Thus, he placed beauty within a relatively minor position vis-a-vis the one, the true, and the good. His concept of beauty simply does not stand on the same level of conceptual analysis as the other three.

The relationship between truth and beauty becomes clear in a brief analysis of Bonaventure's conception of truth. He defined truth as a comparison (*comparatio*) or adequation (*adequatio*) between one thing and another.[95] These include ontological truth, cosmological truth, and epistemological truth, as well as others. The most pertinent of these is cosmological truth. It depends on the degree of conformity between an object and its exemplar in the divine *Formae*. The greater the degree of its conformity to its formal exemplar, the greater the degree of its truth and the greater degree of its beauty. Thus, truth, in this sense of the term, depends on a type of formal *rapport* between one thing and another and so, too, its beauty.

It is difficult to see where Bonaventure would have placed beauty on par with the one, the true, and the good on this list. His commitment to the overwhelming consensus of Christian orthodoxy required three and only three divine *Personae*, so he would not have allowed the addition of a fourth *Persona* to account for the property of divine beauty at the same level of predication as the one, the true, and the good. His manner of explication of the transcendentals also prohibited him from aligning beauty with "all these causes" *as a whole* as the author of the Assisi Manuscript had done. He applied these properties to particular divine *Personae*, not the divine *Essentia* they held in common, and they functioned as explanatory principles of those *Personae*, not as principles of the divine Being in Itself. He explicitly associated beauty with the formal or exemplary cause of being, a property of God the Son, the second divine Hypostasis; not with all the causes, as did

the author of the Assisi Manuscript. He placed beauty on a vertical plane of explication in his analysis of being, under truth and formal causality, not on a horizontal plane of explication on par with the one, the true, and the good.

The Transcendentals in *De triplici via*

A similar pattern emerges in his discussion of the transcendentals in other texts. Bonaventure listed the same three properties, that is, the one, the true, and the good, in his discussion in *De triplici via*.[96] Again, he appended beauty to his discussion of truth. "Beauty (*pulcritudo*) is attributed to the Son due to His association with wisdom and truth. Divine Wisdom possesses an abundance of ideas and Its truth presupposes equality, since beauty is nothing other than numbered equality (*aequalitas numerosa*)." The Son is true and beautiful insofar as He is the divine "Image" and conforms to the source of His status as the divine Image, His *aequalitas* with God the Father. The Son is also beautiful insofar as He contains within Himself the "abundance of ideas" that establish the standards for both the truth and the beauty of the created order. The greater the degree a created being conforms to its "idea" in the divine Mind, which Bonaventure located in the second *Persona* of the Trinity, the *Ars Aeterna*, the greater its truth and its beauty.

The Transcendentals in the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*

He repeated his alignment of beauty with the truth and wisdom of God the Son in the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*.[97] He relied on an analogy with the process of sensory apprehension that he had explored in more detail in other texts: the mind apprehends and then delights in the beauty of the objects of its apprehension.[98] Its delight in perceptual beauty (*speciositas*) depends on the degree of conformity between the perceptual representation of an object, the perceived *species*, and its object. He applied the analogy of perceptual beauty in these passages to argue that the Son is beautiful (*speciositas*) because He is the perfect *species* of God the Father and perfectly conforms to the Father.

The Transcendentals in the *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*

Bonaventure expanded his list of transcendentals in his explication of the cosmological arguments for the existence of God in his *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*.[99] He distinguished between the participatory properties of the created being and the essential properties of the Divinity to derive a list of "disjunctive" transcendentals: posterior and prior, from another and not from another, possible and necessary, relative and absolute, qualified

and absolute, from another and from itself, by participation and essentially, potential and actual, composite and simple, and changeable and unchangeable. The first term in each pair of these disjunctions refers to the properties of the created order of being that indicates the variety of its dependence on the divine Being, and the second term to the "fullness" of those properties in the divine Being. Significantly, he omitted beauty from this list. It remained entirely within his explication of truth, never on par with the one, the true, or the good.

The Refutation of Henquinet's Thesis

The author of the Assisi Manuscript had argued for four transcendentals of being: unity, truth, goodness, and beauty. He had argued that each transcendental tells us something about being in itself and something about everything that participates in being; everything possesses some degree of unity, truth, goodness, and beauty. He had also argued that each transcendental depends on the one that came before it: truth depends on unity, goodness on truth, and beauty on goodness. The series is transitive. Beauty depends directly on goodness, but it also depends indirectly on all the other transcendental properties of being. It sums them up, so to speak. It contains them within itself in a description of the universe full of the promise of delight and desire.

But Bonaventure consistently applied the concept of "the highest and most universal properties of being" to the explication of the properties proper to each of the divine *Personae*. He consistently aligned the concept of the one with God the Father as the efficient cause, the true with the Son as the formal cause, and the good with the Spirit as the final cause, but he consistently aligned beauty with truth and formal causality, never with "all these causes." If Bonaventure did compose the Assisi Manuscript, he abandoned the thesis that beauty is a transcendental property of being on par with the one, the true, and the good early in his career while still a student, prior to the publication of his earliest authentic texts. But a better explanation is that Bonaventure did not compose the manuscript. He neither developed nor endorsed the doctrine of the transcendental status of beauty on par with the one, the true, and the good.

CONCLUSION

De Bruyne's insight has proved correct. Bonaventure's conception of beauty requires a *rapport* between one thing and another: the *rapport* between one part of the body and another; the *rapport* between one object and another in the universal hierarchy; the *rapport* between the soul, created in the image of

God, and its divine Model; or the perfect *rapport* in the absolute *aequalitas* of God the Son, the divine Image of the Father.

But, *contra* de Bruyne, the two traditions of *l'esthétique musicale* and *l'esthétique de la lumière* exist in an easy tension with one another. The quantitative beauty of the well-ordered cosmos is distinct from the qualitative *aequalitas* of its *rapport* with the divine *Formae*, but it also depends on those *Formae*. The proportions of the human form, the spatial order of the world in three realms of being and its subdivisions, and the temporal order of the world in the distinct stages of its development, all depend on the eternal conception of them in the *Ars Aeterna*.

NOTES

1. Plato, *Phaedo* l00c–d, trans. H. Tredennick, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 81–82. The current standard translation of the Dialogues in English is *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. J. M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). Hamilton's older collection tends to emphasize a more dynamic translation, Cooper's a more formal.

2. Plato, *Philebus* 64d, trans. R. Hackforth, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, 1147. Plato is the first to draw the parallel between the beauty of the body and that of the soul. See also *Timaeus* 87d.

3. Plato, *Philebus*, 64e, trans. R. Hackforth, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, 1147.

4. Plato, *Timaeus*, 27d–29d, trans. B. Jowett, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, 1161–1162.

5. Plato, *Symposium* 211c, trans. R. Bridges, in *The Spirit of Man: An Anthology* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1916) §37.

6. Plato, *Timaeus*, 87c–d.

7. S. Peterson, "The Parmenides," in *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, ed. G. Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 383–410.

8. W. A. Walton, ed., *Plato's Forms: Varieties of Interpretation* (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 3.

9. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.6. See also 5.8. Plotinus employed the same aesthetic vocabulary as Plato and the Stoics: beauty (καλός), measure (μετρέω), and proportion (συμμετρέω).

10. J. P. Anton, "Plotinus' Refutation of Beauty as Symmetry," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 23 (1964–1965): 233–237.

11. Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.6.2, trans. A. H. Armstrong, in *Plotinus* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1:239. See Also A. H. Armstrong, "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus," in *Kephalion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel*, ed. J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975), 155–163.

12. M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present*: *A Short History* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), 82.

13. J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 59.

14. L. P. Gerson, *Plotinus* (London: Routledge, 1998), 212.

15. D. O'Meara, *Plotinus*: *An Introduction to the Enneads* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 96. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, 5.8.9.

16. O'Meara, *Plotinus*: *An Introduction*, 92.

17. Plotinus, *Enneads*, 1.6.2.

18. Rist, *Plotinus*, 53–65. He relies heavily on W. R. Inge *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1929). See also the *Enneads*, 1.6.6, 1.6.7, 5.5.12, 6.7.32, and 6.7.33.

19. Plotinus, *Enneads*, 6.9.6 and 5.2.1.

20. Rist, *Plotinus*, 60.

21. Dionysius, *Divine Names* 4.7 (704a), trans. P. Rorem, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works* (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 77.

22. The classic study of Augustine's aesthetics is K. Svoboda, K. *L'esthétique de Saint Augustin et ses sources* (Brno: Vydava Filosoficka Fakulta, 1933). See also C. Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine* (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1992) and J. M. Fontanier, *La beauté selon saint Augustin* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1998).

23. Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy*, 6–33.

24. Augustine, *De Trinitate* 6.10 (11).

25. I have used the term "*Personae*" rather than "Persons" to indicate the distinction between the divine *Personae* that participate in an absolute identity of essence and the more colloquial sense of persons that possess distinct essences.

26. Augustine, *On the Trinity* 6.10.11, trans. S. McKenna (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 212–213. See Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, 2.1.

27. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 1–4. See C. P. Mayer, "Creatio, creator, creatura," in *Augustinus Lexicon*, ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2002), 2:56–116 and S. Knuuttila, "Time and Creation in Augustine," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. E. Stump and N. Kretzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 103–115.

28. Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.9.2.

29. Augustine, *De vera religione* 13, *De natura boni* 3, and *De civ. Dei* 12.5. See C. Schafer, "Augustine on Mode, Form, and Natural Order," *Augustinian Studies* 31 (2001): 59–77.

30. See also Augustine, *Conf.* 12.40.

31. See also Augustine, *Conf.* 12.9–16.

32. Augustine, *De Trin*. 4.4.7 and *De civ*. 11.30. Philo had made the same point in *De opificio mundi* 3.

33. Augustine, *De Trin.* 6.10.12, *De civ.*, 11.21, and *In Iohannis evangelium tractatus* 1.9.1. He extended the analogy to that of a carpenter in 1.17 and 2.10. See also Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.8.1 and Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* 65.3-4.

34. Augustine, *Ep.* 138.5.

35. O. du Roy, *L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Siant Augustin* (Paris: *Études Augustiniennes*, 1966).

36. N. Ciprani, "*Le fonti Cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei primi Dialoghi di S. Agostino,*" *Augustinianum* 35 (1994): 253–312. See also L. Ayers, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13–41.

37. S. Byers, "Augustine and the Philosophers," in *A Companion to Augustine*, ed. M. Vessey (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 175–87.

38. A. Louth, *Denys the Areopagite* (London: Continuum, 1989).

39. H. D. Saffrey, "New Objective Links between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus," in *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, ed. D. O'Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 2:64–74.

40. Dionysius, *Divine Names* 4.7 (704a), trans. P. Rorem, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, 77. Altered.

41. B. T. Sammon, *The God Who Is Beauty: Beauty as a Divine Name in Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius the Areopagite* (Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2013).

42. Bonaventure, *Red. art.* 5 (5:321).

43. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3 (1:544). See also 1 *Sent*. d. 27, p. 2, a. un. q. 3 resp. (1:487-488); 1 *Sent*. d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3 (1:544) and *Hexaëm*. 1.13 (5:331).

44. Balthasar, *Glory of the Lord*, 2:289.

45. Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi* q. 2 (5:6–10). See also 1 *Sent*. d. 35 a. un. q. 1 ad 3 (1:602).

46. Cullin, *Bonaventure*, 77–87.

47. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.1-12 (5:219–230).

48. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm*. 1.10-39 (5:330–335).

49. Balthasar, *Glory of the Lord*, 2:291–299.

50. Bonaventure, *Red. art.* 12 (5:322–323). See also Plotinus, *Enneads*, 5.8.1 and Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 65.3–4.

51. Bonaventure, *Red. art.* 13 (5:323).

52. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm*. 14.4 (5:393). See also the shorter and perhaps more accurate redaction, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, ed. F. Delorme 4.1.19 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1934), 229.

53. M. Fishbane, *The Song of Songs* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2015), 22–53.

54. Bernard of Clairvaux, "*Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*" 25, in *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957–1977), 1:25. See also G. Heng, *The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 181–242.

55. P. Biller, "Black Women in Medieval Scientific Thought," *Micrologus* 13 (2005): 477–492.

56. This is the only instance in which Bonaventure transcended the stigma. The passage is the first in a short series in which the Bride declares she is dark but lovely, *nigra sum sed formosa* (1:5), she accounts for her dark complexion, *sim quia decoloravit me sol* (1:6), and the Bridegroom affirms that she is the fairest among women, *o pulchra inter mulieres* (1:8). Bonaventure commented on the initial passage in only

one other text, his *Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae* 11.88 (7:306), in which he compared the Bride, whose inner beauty contrasts with her apparent darkness, with the Pharisees, whose inner corruption contrasts with their apparent brightness; they stink like the tomb but appear white (*albi*). He repeated the same theme in his citation of 1:6 and 1:8: the Bride appears dark, but her soul shines with the brightness of her devotion to Christ, and this renders her *pulchra inter mulieres*. See *Hexaëm*. 20.19 (5:428), *Solil*. 1.7 (8:32), and *Sermones Dominica post Pascha* 4 (9:303); and, in one instance, he applied the phrase *o pulchra inter mulieres* to the Blessed Virgin (9:712).

57. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, 289–298.

58. Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, 298–321.

59. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 9, a. un., q. 8, resp. ad 4 (2:256). See Bychkov, *Aesthetic Revelation*, 292. Bonaventure may have taken the phrase from Augustine, *De ver. rel.* 30.55: "Symmetry (*convenientia*) gives pleasure in all the arts. It preserves unity (*una*) and renders the whole into something beautiful (*pulcra*). It demands unity and equality (*aequilitatem unitatemque appetat*), the similarity (*similitudine*) among like parts (*parium partium*) or the graded arrangement of dissimilar parts."

60. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 31, p. 1, a. un., q. 2 (1:534). I have used the term "*Essentia*" to distinguish between the absolute identity of the divine *Essentia* common to the divine *Personae* and the more colloquial sense of the relative identity of essence.

61. J. W. Smith, "The Trinity in the Fourth Century Fathers," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, ed. G. Emery and M. Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109–122.

62. J. Hawthorne, "Identity," in *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*, ed. M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 99–130.

63. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 35 (8:81), trans. E. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God, the Tree of Life, the Life of St. Francis*, 160.

64. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 13, a. 2, q. 2 (2:320–322). See M. T. Etcheverria, *De Doctrina Lucis apud St. Bonaventuram* (Victoria: Graficas Eset, 1961).

65. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.2–5 (5:219–224).

66. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 34, a. 2, q. 3 (2:814).

67. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.14, (5:299).

68. Bonaventure, *Commentarius in Librum Sapientiae*, 7.10 (6:153). There is some doubt as to the authenticity of this text. See D. Monti, "A Reconsideration of the Authorship of the *Commentary on the Book of Wisdom* Attributed to Saint Bonaventure," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 69 (1986): 359–391.

69. Augustine, *Conf.* 10.34 (51), trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 209.

70. Eco, *Art and Beauty*, 50.

71. Eco, *Art and Beauty*, 51.

72. Assunto, *Die Theorie des Schönen*, 106.

73. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.3 (5:220).

74. McAdams, "The Aesthetics of light," 154.

75. McAdams, "The Aesthetics of light," 205.

76. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.14 (5:299).

77. Bonaventure, *Legenda maior sancti Francisci* 15.2 (AF 10, 624).

78. Bonaventure, *Solil*. 4.20 (8:63). See Gregory, *Mor. in Job*, 18.48.78.

79. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.3 (5:221).

80. Bonaventure, *Serm. B. Virg. Mariae* 2 (9:708–709).

81. P. Henquinet, "*Un brouillon autographe de S. Bonaventure sur le Commentaire des Sentences*," *Les Études Franciscaines* 44 (1932): 633–655 and 45 (1933): 59–82.

82. De Bruyne, *Études*, 3:190–191.

83. See J. Garcia, "The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Introduction," *Topoi* 11 (1992): 113–120; and J. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor to Francisco Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 13–34.

84. Aristotle, *Categoriae* 4, trans. J. Barnes, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1:4.

85. Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 86–87.

86. Aertsen, "Beauty in the Middle Ages," 73–78.

87. A. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946).

88. H. Pouillon, *La Beauté*, 21; De Bruyne, *Études*, 3:190–191; Eco, *Art and Beauty*, 24; Spargo, *The Category of the Aesthetic*, 34–37; Peter, *Die Lehre von der schonheit*, 130; Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, 2:260.

89. D. Ost, "Bonaventure: The Aesthetic Synthesis," *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976): 233–247; F. A. Murphy, *Christ the Form of Beauty: A Study on Theology and Literature* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 213–215; R. Viladesau, *Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 114; A. W. Astell, *Eating Beauty: The Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middle Ages* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 104; and M. McInroy, *Balthasar on the Spiritual Senses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 77. The list is not exhaustive. The thesis, that Bonaventure listed beauty as a transcendental of being on par with the one, the true, and the good, is pervasive.

90. I. Brady, "The Opera Omnia of St. Bonaventure Revisited," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 48 (1974): 295–304.

91. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 168–176.

92. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 3, p. 1, a, un. q. 1–4 (1:67–80).

93. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 1.6 (5:214–215).

94. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 1.6 (5:215).

95. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (1:151). See also *Sc. Chr.* q. 2 ad 9 (5:10). Bonaventure extends his definition to other types of truth, specifically the truth of speech and morals, in *Hexaëm*. 3.8 (5:344).

96. Bonaventure, *De triplica via* 3.7.12 (8:17).

97. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm*. 21 (5:431–437).

98. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.5 (5:300–301) and *Red. art*. 8 (5:322).

99. Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis* 1.1 (5:46–47).

Chapter 3

Bonaventure's Account of
the Aesthetic Experience

Bonaventure's philosophical anthropology provided the fertile ground that enabled him to develop the components of an epistemological process that anticipated the emergence of the aesthetic experience in the Enlightenment. He endorsed the standard scholastic definition of the human person, a composite of a rational soul and body. But he would argue for a degree of intimacy in the soul's union with its body that enabled him to emphasize the human person's engagement with the physical realm of being in order to achieve its proper end, the knowledge and love of God—Father, Son, and Spirit—and, ultimately, union with God. The soul's initial engagement with the physical realm of being is a three-part process. The soul, in close cooperation with its body, begins its ascent into union with God in its perception or, more accurately, its sensory apprehension (*apprehensio*) of physical objects—the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of them. It continues in the delight (*oblectatio*) of its apprehension of the beauty (*speciositas*), agreeableness, and goodness of the physical realm of being. Its delight compels it to bring the process to its immediate end in judgment (*diiudicatio*), its rational discernment of the reasons (*rationes*) for its delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the physical realm of being.

The authors of the formative studies of Bonaventure's aesthetics, particularly Künzle, de Bruyne, and Spargo, emphasized the initial stages of the process: the soul's apprehension and delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the physical realm of being prior to its rational discernment of the reasons for its delight. They concluded, on that basis, that Bonaventure anticipated later developments in the Enlightenment: Shaftesbury's, Hutcheson's, Hume's, and Burke's descriptions of aesthetic taste; Baumgarten's distinction between aesthetic perception and rational analysis; and Kant's seminal discussion of aesthetic judgment. But they failed to recognize the integral

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relationship between the precognitive stages of the process, the soul's apprehension of the physical realm of being and its delight in its apprehension, and the soul's rational discernment of the reasons for its delight; and thus they overestimated the degree of similarity between Bonaventure's account of the aesthetic experience and the formulation of the aesthetic experience, properly speaking, in the Enlightenment.

I will argue that Bonaventure did anticipate to some degree the development of aesthetics in the Enlightenment. But I will also argue that he distinguished himself from these later developments in two significant ways. First, he insisted that the initial stages of the soul's ascent into God—its apprehension and delight in the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good—compelled its rational judgment of the reasons for its delight in the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good. Thus, Bonaventure's account of the aesthetic experience is not, as Künzle, De Bruyne, and Spargo implied, an anticipation of the experience as an end in itself. Second, Bonaventure also insisted that the soul's rational discernment of the reasons for its delight initiates its cognitive *reductio* of the created order to its fundamental causes: its efficient, formal, and final cause in its Creator that prepares it for mystical union with its Creator.[1] Thus, Bonaventure's account of the soul's apprehension and delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the cosmos is an *aesthetic* stimulus to its rational analysis of creation's testimony to its Creator, an analysis that both prepares it for its proper end in union with God and enables it to achieve that end.

BONAVENTURE'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Bonaventure adopted a definition of the human person common among Jewish, Christian, and Islamic philosophers and theologians throughout the Middle Ages: the human person is a composite of a soul (*anima*) and body, "formed from the mire of the earth (*de limo terrae*)."[2] The human soul is the metaphysical *forma* of its body. It perfects its body insofar as its union with its body brings the act of creation to its proper end in the formation of the human person, the sum of all creation, in the image of God. It then directs its body in the completion of its principal task, to enable the human person to recognize creation's testimony to its Creator so that it might come to its proper end in union with its Creator.

He distinguished his definition of the human composite from his peers in his juxtaposition of two convictions that initially seem to oppose one another: the ontological independence of the soul as a substantial, self-subsisting entity and the degree to which he emphasized the soul's disposition to unite with its body. Plato and his heirs, who had insisted on the soul's substantial

independence, tended to denigrate its relationship with the body. Plotinus' complaint is indicative if hyperbolic: Porphry, his biographer, told us that he "seemed ashamed of being in the body."[3] Bonaventure rejected this tendency.[4] He agreed that the soul is an independent substance on the basis of his conviction that it possesses its own passive potential. It is able to live, perceive, reason, and will independently of its body in this life and in the next and, after its reunion with a new, "spiritual" body, in its eternal contemplation of God. The soul, Bonaventure insisted, is something in itself (*hoc aliquid et nata est per se et in se subsistere*).[5] The human spirit is a fully functioning organism with or without its corporeal body.

But he also argued that the soul is the active principle that brings existence to the human composite in its union with its body and enables it to function properly in the physical realm of being.[6] Thus, the soul possesses an innate tendency to unite with its body (*unibilitas*).[7] The soul is ordered to its body, not imprisoned within it. It realizes its perfection in union with its body, not in spite of it, and with its body, it engages in the cognitive *reductio* that leads to its proper end in the knowledge of God and ecstatic union with God. Its relationship with its body is so intimate that it no longer functions properly at the moment of its body's death. It yearns for its reunion with its risen body in the world to come—a clear, impassible, subtle, and agile body that furthers its access to the beatific vision.[8]

BONAVENTURE'S PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROCESS

Bonaventure's philosophical psychology, like so much of his thought, is a complex synthesis of diverse traditions.[9] He agreed with the Peripatetics that the soul is the first principle of the human person: it confers the powers (*potentiae*) of being, life, intelligence, and freedom of choice to the human person.[10] His account of these powers was not entirely systematic, but it was consistent in its basic formulation. The first *potentia*, being, renders the human person into an existing thing; the second, life, into a living thing that regulates the nourishment, growth, and procreation of its body and the proper function of its senses; the third, its intellect, directs its cognitive powers in the discernment of truth in close cooperation with its will in its desire for the good and its freedom to choose the good—or not to do so.

The Rational Soul's Power of Sensory Apprehension

Bonaventure identified the proper operation of these *potentiae* in his description of the initial stages of the epistemological process in a celebrated passage

in the *Itinerarium*: "This world, the macrocosm (*macrocosmus*)*,* enters into our soul, the microcosm (*minor mundus*)*,* through the doors of the five senses for the soul's apprehension (*apprehensionem*), delight (*oblectationem*), and judgment (*diiudicationem*)."[11]

McEvoy locates the origin of this theme, the soul as the *microcosmos*, in pre-Socratic cosmology. Jewish and then Christian exegetes quickly adopted it in their commentaries on the creation narratives in Genesis and other scriptural passages that define the relationship between human beings and other creatures, such as the fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and "every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."[12] He argues that Bonaventure developed this tradition in his explication of the full extent of the human composite, body and soul. Bonaventure conceived the human *microcosmos*, created on the sixth and final day of creation, as the culmination and summation of the created order, the union of a fully functioning spiritual being and a perfectly proportioned corporeal being. Its soul (*anima*) possesses the sum total of the soul's capacities, vegetation, sensation, and reason. Its body consists of the perfect proportion of the primal elements that comprise the physical universe, the primordial light (*lux*), common to all bodies—earth, air, fire, and water—and the subelemental particles of Aristotelian physics—the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry. The human intellect is also capable of becoming all things insofar as it is capable of knowing all things both in its apprehension of them and in its intellectual knowledge of them. "The intelligent and rational creature," Bonaventure explained, "is in a certain way all things; all things are naturally written there; all things impress a *similitudo* of themselves there."[13]

The rational soul begins its engagement with the physical realm of being in its sensory apprehension (*apprehensio*) of that realm: the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of it. He was explicit in his claim that knowledge begins with the senses, but he was not an empiricist.[14] He admitted the possibility of the mind's direct knowledge of itself and other intelligible beings, namely angels, fallen angels, and the divine Being. The epistemological process of apprehension, delight, and judgment of the physical realm of being constitutes the preliminary stage of the soul's normative ascent into God, an ascent that includes the soul's philosophical reflection on itself, on the presence of the divine Being within it, and on the existence and nature of God. It ends, significantly, in an apophatic union with God.

He continued with a summary of apprehension: "Therefore, the human person, the microcosm, has five senses, which serve as five doors through which the knowledge of all things in the sensible world enters its soul."[15] He continued with the identification of particular senses with particular elements or combinations of elements culled from varied accounts of medieval physics. "Sublime and luminous things, and all other colored things, enter through sight. Solid and earthy things enter through touch. Intermediate things enter

through the three intermediate senses: watery things through taste, airy things through hearing, and vaporous things (*vaporabilia*) through smell." These vaporous things consist of a combination of elements, "something of the watery, the airy, and the fiery or hot, as in the aroma of spices."

Bonaventure developed his account of sensory apprehension in response to a philosophical dispute on the objects proper to each of the senses. Smith has identified the principal rivals in the dispute: a largely, although not entirely, Platonic Greco-Latin school and a more thoroughly Aristotelian Greco-Arabic school.[16] Advocates of the Greco-Latin school aligned particular senses with particular elements of the physical world: sight with light, for example, the other senses with the four elements, that is, earth, air, fire, and water. But the advocates of the Greco-Arabic school identified a more robust series of parallels, including the objects proper to each of the senses, like light, and objects common to the senses: size, shape, and location. Advocates of the Greco-Latin school also endorsed a largely active, extromission theory of sense perception, in which the mind initiates perception in its emission of a rarified form of physical light through the eyes of its body and other sense organs to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the objects proper to each sense, like the light of a lamp that illumines a dark room. Advocates of the Greco-Arabic school endorsed a largely passive, intromission theory of sense perception, in which the senses receive sensory data, that is, information about the way the world looks, sounds, smells, tastes, and feels to the touch. The most notable difference between the schools is their distinct assessment of the value of sense perception. Advocates of the Greco-Latin school tended to cast dispersions on the process. The mind is capable of direct access to the *formae* that inform the created order, whereas the senses provide only a deceptive image of that metaphysical reality. Advocates of the Greco-Arabic school argued that the mind depends on the senses for its access to the *formae*. Indeed, they argued that "without the data of sense perception, reason has little or nothing to reason about and, therefore, no meaningful path to understanding."[17]

Bonaventure drew on both schools of thought. He explicitly derived his list of the objects of sense perception from Augustine, the principal architect of the Greco-Latin school. Sight, Augustine argued, apprehends the primordial light (*lux*) that God brought into being on the first day of creation and is the essential ingredient in all physical things: hearing, the air within things; smell, the fire; taste, the liquid; and touch, the earth.[18] The objects of smell include a subtle combination of airy, fiery, and watery elements. The primordial light (*lux*) of the first day of creation plays a particularly important role in Augustine's description of this process. This light or, in some cases, a primordial fire, is "the finest element in bodies," so fine that it resembles the soul to a greater degree than any other physical thing. It is the fundamental ingredient in the composition of physical things, and it alone "penetrates all

bodies and gives motion to them." It is most pure in the composition of the sun, moon, and celestial bodies and it is the binding agent, so to speak, in the composition of all other things that consist of light and the four elements.

Bonaventure allotted a similar degree of importance to light (*lux*) in his account of the formation of the corporeal universe, a theme Eco and other advocates of Bonaventure's fidelity to *l'esthétique de la lumière* had emphasized. God brought it into being on the first day of creation.[19] It was and, so Bonaventure argued, remains, the first, substantial *forma* of bodies and the mechanism that God employed to form the formless void into a substantial body and prepared it for further development in the course of the subsequent days of creation. Bonaventure divided the physical cosmos into three realms of being (*naturae*) according to the degree to which they participate in this light in his description of the ideal order of creation.[20] The highest realm of physical being, the luminous *natura*, is composed of the purest mixture of this type of light. It contains the brightest objects, namely the sun, the moon, and the stars; and God, together with the "spirits of ministry" (*administratorii spiritus*), continues to direct (*administro*) the universe through the course of the celestial lights, such as the stars, the sun, the moon, and the other planets.[21] The translucent *natura* is less pure and less bright. It contains a significant admixture of air and water. Birds and fish populate this *natura.* They exist in the wide area between the heavens and the earth. The opaque *natura* is the densest and most well developed. It contains a significant admixture of earth. Plants and animals exist on this layer of creation. Elemental fire and fiery things, like the flame of a candle, are more difficult to locate in this schema. They are apparently related in some way to light, perhaps a purer admixture than earth, air, or water; the light within fire and other fiery things compels them to reach toward that bright place from which they came. Augustine had equivocated on the relationship between fire and light, but Bonaventure distinguished more clearly between the two and relegated fire to a relatively minor role in his account of the cosmic hierarchy.

Bonaventure's description of the role of light in the composition of the human person's sense organs parallels his description of its role in the macrocosm. "If the light (*lux*) or brightness (*lumen*) responsible for the distinction of corporal things exists in its own perfection and in purity, it pertains to the sense of sight; if mixed with the air, to hearing; if with vapor, to smell; if with fluid, to taste; if with the solidity of earth, to touch."[22] Thus, the human person's body contains the same fundamental elements that form the macrocosm: light (*lux*); the four elements, that is, earth, air, fire, and water; and the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry. The sense organs consist of these same elements. The eyes, the organs of sight, consist of the purest mixture of light and the other sense organs an admixture of the other four elements. The similarity between the sense organs and the proper objects of the sense

faculties is the basis for their propensity to receive the sensible *species* of those objects; "like," Bonaventure insists, in fidelity to the doxographical lexicon of Antiquity, "knows like."

His concept of the human microcosm is an essential element in his account of the process of apprehension and the aesthetic experience: "And so, since there are five simple physical substances in the world, namely, the four elements and the fifth essence, the human person has five senses that correspond to these substances so that the person might be able to perceive all physical things."[23] The aesthetic significance of this correspondence is explicit: "Each sense possesses a particular correspondence (*correspondentes*), so apprehension takes place only when there is a certain similarity (*similitudinem*) and proportion (*convenientiam*) between the sense organ and its proper object."

The affinity between the microcosm of the human person's body and its senses and the macrocosm of creation at large establishes the *rapport* that enables the human person's rational soul to apprehend the microcosm through the conduits of its five senses, delight in it, and then come to know it and its testimony to its Creator. The sense of sight contains the purest mixture of light, the fifth essence (*quinta essentia*), and is able to adapt itself to that light when it senses it in the objects of the macrocosm; and so, too, for all the senses and their proper objects. The greater the degree of affinity between the body's senses and the objects that they see, hear, smell, taste, and touch, the more accurate the apprehension of them.

Bonaventure also relied heavily on the Peripatetic account of sense perception in his synthesis of the two traditions.[24] Aristotle provided a more complex account of the proper objects of each sense in his theory of the fundamental particles: the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry. Sight and the higher senses attend to especially refined composites of these fundamental particles and so they remain difficult to see or hear. The lower senses attend to less refined composites and so the human person is able to smell, taste, and touch them. Thus, although Aristotle provided a distinct and more complex description of the objects of perception, he, too, indicated that the human person, through its exercise of the full extent of its sensorium, is able to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch almost everything in the universe. The only things that eluded its sensorium were those outside the range of its perception, things that are either too far or too small to see, for example, or too far to hear, smell, taste, or touch.

Aristotle also endorsed a largely passive, intromission process of sense perception, *contra* Plato, in which the senses receive sense data, but his description of the process is both sparse and problematic.

> Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the

way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not *qua* bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort according to its form.[25]

Aristotle appears to have argued that some type of an impression or sensible form of the object of perception forms within the sense faculty, like the impression of a ring, for example, similar to but distinct from the object in itself. But the precise nature of these forms is obscure.

Sorabji provides insight into particular aspects of Aristotle's theory of sense perception that inform Bonaventure's.[26] He argues that, for Aristotle, the sense organs undergo a physiological change. The eye-jelly within the pupil, for example, literally becomes red when the eyes see red things. Shapes appear there too, so that when the eyes see a red flag, a tiny speck of red in the shape of a flag appears within the eye-jelly. This interpretation, Sorabji points out, conforms to Aristotle's physiological interpretation of his analogy in *De memoria*, where he compares the failure of memory to a wax tablet that is too hard, or too soft, to retain an impression.[27] Sorabji also thinks that this is the common-sense interpretation of the metaphor. After all, wax does, in fact, undergo a physiological change in response to the impression of a signet ring.

But Sorabji also points out that Aristotle's commentators interpreted his description of sensation in a less literal manner.[28] He traces this development in the thought of a number of ancient and medieval philosophers—Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themestius, Philoponus, Ibn Rushd, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas—who argued that the senses receive some type of sensory representation, so to speak, of the way things look, sound, smell, taste, and feel, distinct from the physiological change within the sense organs. Sight is the purest of the senses and thus receives these representations with the least degree of physiological change. The other senses receive them with a greater degree of physiological change. Touch, the basest of the senses, undergoes the greatest degree of change, like the hand that becomes hot when it touches something hot.

He adds, for the purpose of clarification, that Aristotle's commentators described these sensory representations as intentions (*intentiones*) in the sense of signs (*signa*) or notions (*notitiae*) within the sense faculties. The precise definition of these intentions eluded them. But their concept of them is decidedly not the same as Brentano's concept of them—in spite of Brentano's debt to the medieval conception. Aristotle's commentators argued for the presence of some type of foreign, information-bearing object within the sense faculties, a rarified, physical image within the eye, for example. But Brentano

argued that the intentions are merely a state or disposition of the mind, the mind's awareness of the object through the sense organs.[29]

Burnyeat provides the leading argument against Sorabji's reading of Aristotle's theory and its influence.[30] He argues that Aristotle described only an awareness of the objects of sense perception, of their size and shape, their color, temperature, and so on, but not a physical change in the sense organ—akin to Brentano's concept of intention. The internal medium within the sense organ, the eye-jelly in the eye, for example, is comparable to the external media, in this case, the air, water, or other permeable material that remains transparent to its particular sense object.[31] Colors simply appear through the transparent medium of the air between the eye and the colored things in the line of its sight and so, too, through the transparent medium of the eye-jelly.

But he admits that Sorabji's reading of Aristotle's commentators is correct. The rational soul's power of sensory apprehension receives some type of representation of the way things look, sound, smell, taste, and feel, distinct from the physiological change within its sense organs. The soul's reception of these representations is the result of a process that begins with the perceived object's propagation of a representation of itself in the media that surrounds it; the air, for example, in the case of an object of sight, continues with its propagation of another form of its representation in particular sense organs, the eyes, for example, and ends in its reception of an even more rarified form of the representation in its *sensus communis*, the interior sense that combines the representations proper to each sense into a composite representation of the object that includes its appearance, its sound, and so forth.[32] Thus, the representations bear a likeness or *similitudo* to their objects, a likeness that provides the soul with a picture, so to speak, of the way they appear, sound, smell, taste, and feel.

Bonaventure's debt to the Greco-Arabic school of thought is twofold: his debt to their more robust description of the objects proper to each sense and his endorsement of the intromission theory of sense perception. He supplemented his initial, Augustinian description of the objects of sense perception with parallel lists that include Aristotle's four subelementary particles—the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry—"that touch apprehends." But these qualities inform the basic structure of all things in the Peripatetic physics that dominated the later medieval schools, not only solid, earthy things, and thus remain perceptible, at least *in potentia*, to all the senses. Perhaps Bonaventure meant to say that these qualities are simply more apparent to touch than to sight, hearing, smell, or taste. It is certainly more difficult to see whether something is hot or cold, wet or dry, than to touch it and feel whether it is hot or cold, wet or dry. Smell and taste, closer to touch in the hierarchy of the sense faculties, are able to perceive these properties more easily than sight and hearing. Their proper objects, Bonaventure argued, are

made up of a preponderance of one or more of these qualities. In taste, the wet predominates and in smell, the dry and the hot. Still, one might argue on Bonaventure's behalf that it is easier, or at least more common, to distinguish between the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry, in the sense of touch.

Bonaventure insisted that, for most things, the human person invokes each of the senses in tandem with the others. Each sense opens onto particular properties inherent within physical things, not particular things, and when the mind applies them in conjunction with one another, they provide a comprehensive grasp of the universe in its totality. Some things, like the morning star, remain so bright, so pure, that it is accessible only to sight. But most things contain a more thorough mixture of the primordial light of creation and the more substantial elements of earth, air, fire, and water, of the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry and so the mind, through its faculty of sensory apprehension, is able to hear, smell, taste, and touch them as well. It brings all the senses to bear in its apprehension of most things. The mind's apprehension of the world, either in whole or in part, generally demands the use of all the senses.

He also endorsed an intromission theory of sense perception and derived the bulk of his description of the process from the long commentary tradition on Aristotle's *De anima*.[33] Thus, his theory of perception, like those of other philosopher-theologians in the Greco-Arabic stream of thought, is cast in the Aristotelian language of sensibles, sensation, abstraction, form, species, intention, and the powers of the intellect. "The entire sensible world," Bonaventure explained, "enters the human soul through apprehension. . . . But these sensible things enter through their *similitudines* generated in the medium, not their substances, and from the medium to the external sense organ, and from the external sense organ to the internal sense organ, and from the internal sense organ to the apprehensive faculty."[34]

These *similitudines* and the closely related concept of *species* possessed a wide range of intension in Bonaventure's thought. He listed the four most prominent of them: a *similitudo* of complete agreement, of common nature, of relation, and order in "the way an *exemplum* is similar to an *exemplar*."[35] The *similitudines* of the sensible *species* or impressions fall within this fourth category. Each object of perception, like the signet ring, is an exemplar that impresses a *similitudo* of itself in the *media* that surrounds it—the air, water, earth, and, at least theoretically, fire—similar to the way in which a signet ring impresses a copy of itself in wax. This impression in the *media* then impresses a copy of itself onto the external sense organ, like the eye, and so on, until the process comes to an end in apprehension, in which the intellect turns its attention to the impressions within the internal sense organ (*organum*) for further cognitive analysis.[36]

Bonaventure discussed these sensible impressions in more detail in a relevant passage in his *Commentary* on the *Sententiae*.[37] He explained that the ability to sense something can be understood in three ways: to know that something is simply present to you, to know it in its present condition (*hic et nunc*), or to receive a *species* that exists in matter without its material component (*in materia praeter materiam*). He pointed out that the third alternative "is the way the Philosopher [Aristotle] uses the word in the second book of the *De anima*." But all three appear to be required for a complete understanding of Bonaventure's account of the apprehension of the sensible species. He explained, in another passage in the *Commentary,* that the sense organs receive *species* that contain information regarding the current corporeal status of the sense object, but not the corporeity of the object (*sine materia*).[38] The intellect recognizes a particular object's presence and its present condition in the apprehension of the object's impression of itself upon its sense organs— its color, size, shape, and so on—distinct from the *species*' exemplar in the realm of corporeal being, the object that possesses the attributes of a particular color, size, and shape.

Bonaventure's account of these sensory *species* or *similitudines* aligns with Sorabji's account of Aristotle's commentators. His account of these *species* is an "intention" in the sense of a sign, a rarified, information-bearing object within the sense organs, not merely the awareness of the object of perception. They contain information about the way things look, sound, smell, taste, and feel, and information about their size, shape, whether they are in rest or in motion, *hic et nunc*. They exist within the senses, an image within the eye, for example, an image of a particular object in a particular place at a particular time, subject to all the vagaries of spatial-temporal existence. They are a picture in the mind's apprehension of particular things, in particular places, and at particular points in time, the imprint in the senses of the concrete reality of physical being.

Bonaventure continued to explain that these sensible *species* or *similitudines* are neither an intelligible *species*, an intellectual concept, nor entirely physical but a rarified type of hylomorphic *species* that possess both form and matter in order to convey the sense of the presence of an object and its present condition in the apprehension of the object's impression of itself upon the sense organs—again distinct from the object in itself. Gilson provided a helpful description of the rarified state of their existence. He compared them to the radiation of a light that enables us to see and then come to know things, but he cautioned:

> This radiation is not a form, for it emanates from the object in its entirety and expresses it in its entirety, form and matter together; and it cannot be material, for in that case the formal element from which it has proceeded would

not be represented; it is precisely one of those beings which can be explained only *per reductionem*, and that is why St. Bonaventure calls it a resemblance (*similitudo*).[39]

Bonaventure's theory of apprehension bears a number of profound implications for his account of the aesthetic experience. These *species* project an image of themselves onto the *media* that surround them whether a person is present to receive the *species*' projections or not, like the radiation of the light of a lamp into an empty room. "And even though the object is not always present to the senses," Bonaventure explained, "it naturally begets a *similitudo* of itself."[40] The macrocosm is bright with the data of its self-disclosure: loud, pungent, flavorful, and palpable. Its objects impress innumerable impressions of themselves on the media that surround them and come together into a vast *Gesamtkunstwerk* of self-disclosure, a total-art-work that stimulates all the senses. The soul, Bonaventure insisted, will inevitably focus its attention on particular sensual stimuli to account for the reasons for its delight in them, but the initial response of the rational soul and its body is spontaneous, without thought. It cannot silence the clamor of the macrocosm's insistent self-disclosure.

Delight

Bonaventure subdivided the second stage of his account of the epistemological process, the rational soul's delight (*oblectatio*) in its apprehension of the sensible *species*, into three distinct classifications: the soul's delight in its apprehension of the beautiful (*speciositas*), the agreeable (*suavitas*), and the good (*salubritas*). "Delight follows this apprehension if it is of a suitable object. The senses delight in the perception of the abstracted *similitudo* of the object by reason of its beauty as in sight, or of its agreeableness in hearing or smell, or of its goodness in taste and touch, to speak in the manner of appropriation (*appropriate loquendo*)."[41]

His source for the soul's delight in its apprehension of the sensible *species* is not clear. Lang speculates that he derived the notion from the first lines of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All people by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight (ἀγάπησις) we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves."[42] She points out that the Latin translations of the *Metaphysics* consistently rendered ἀγάπησις into *delectio*.[43] But, she also points out that Aristotle had not explained his concept of delight in any degree of detail, and so she tentatively concludes, "it stands available for philosophical development."[44]

Bonaventure specified three conditions that render an object suitable for delight: perceptual beauty (*speciositas*), agreeableness (*suavitas*), and

goodness (*salubritas*). Similar divisions were common in ancient and medieval philosophical literature, but none provides precisely the same formulation that appears in Bonaventure's texts. Pythagoras appears to have introduced it:

> Sosicrates, in his *Successions of Philosophers* says that, when Leon the tyrant of Phlius asked him who he was, he said, "A philosopher," and that he compared life to the Great Games, where some went to compete for the prize and others went with wares to sell, but the best as spectators; for similarly, in life, some grow up with servile natures, greedy for fame and gain, but the philosopher seeks for truth.[45]

Pythagoras' preference is clear. The desire for fame and fortune belongs to the lower classes, "with servile natures," but the philosopher "seeks for truth," something more important than his or her own self-interest. Plato repeated the same classification in his division of citizens in the *Republic* into those who love gain, those who love victory, and those who love wisdom.[46] Aristotle replaced gain with sensual pleasure in his list of pleasure, honor, and the contemplation of truth in the *Ethica Nicomachea*.[47] He reformulated the list in a later passage into pleasure, the advantageous, and the noble and their opposites: the painful, the injurious, and the base.[48] But Bonaventure was the first to associate contemplation specifically with the contemplation of beautiful things, instead of truth or nobility. He appears to have derived his classification from Aristotle's second list, replacing the contemplation of nobility with the contemplation of beauty—an indication of the concept's wide range of connotation throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

Bonaventure clearly distinguished each type of delight from the others on the basis of the relationship between the sensible *species* and different types of proportion (*proportio*).[49] The first is the proportion between the sensible *species* and "the principle from which it emanates." This is the basis for the rational soul's delight in the beauty of the sensible *species*: "Proportion is discerned in the *similitudido* in so far as it possesses the principle of *species* or form (*formae*)." He established the beauty of these sensible *species* through Stoic definitions of beauty. "[This proportion] is called beauty (*speciositas*) because beauty is nothing other than a numbered equality (*aequalitas numerosa*) or a certain disposition of parts with a pleasant color (*quidam partium situs cum coloris suavitate*)."

The second is the proportion between the sensible *species* and "the medium through which it passes." This is the basis for the soul's delight in the agreeableness of the sensible *species*: "Proportion is discerned [in the *species*] in so far as it possesses the principle of power or strength; [this proportion] is called agreeableness because the power [of the *species*] that acts on [the

medium] does not disproportionally exceed the [medium of the] recipient sense." He also added an important justification: "For the senses are pained through extremes and delighted through moderation."

The third is the proportion between the sensible *species* and "the subject on which it acts." This is the basis for the soul's delight in the goodness of the sensible *species*: "Proportion is discerned [in the *species*] . . . when the object of sensation fulfills the need of the recipient through its impression on the senses. The object [of sensation] does this through the preservation and nourishment [of the recipient] and this," Bonaventure added, "is most apparent in taste and touch."

These concepts—*similitudo*, *species*, and *speciositas*—bear a close relationship to one another in this passage. These *similitudines* are the equivalent of the sensible *similitudines* or *species*, not the intelligible species, the abstractions of the cognitive faculty—at this point in his description of the epistemological process, Bonaventure focused on the pleasure in the perception of the sensible *species*, not in the abstraction of the intelligible species or *forma* from the sensible *species*. *Specto* means to look or to see, and *speciositas*, in this particular context, refers specifically to the sight of beautiful things, the beauty in the appearance of the sensed *similitudo* or *species*.

Bonaventure provided two definitions of perceptual beauty. He took the first, *aequalitas numerosa*, from Augustine, who developed the phrase to describe the proper measure of poetic meter, but de Bruyne was quite right to argue, on the basis of its context within this passage, that it refers to the similar proportion between the *similitudo* and "the principle from which it emanates," that is, the object that it represents.[50] The soul's delight in its apprehension of beauty depends on the degree to which its apprehension conforms to the object of its apprehension. Bonaventure provides further support for de Bruyne's reading of this passage in his argument that the sun is not as beautiful on a cloudy day as it is on a clear day, precisely because the rational soul cannot see it clearly.[51] Its beauty on a cloudy day, like its truth, is elusive.

Bonaventure's second definition of perceptual beauty in this passage, "*quidam partium situs cum coloris suavitate*," is less successful. The proper "arrangement" or *situs* of the parts of a whole is an awkward phrase to describe the *aequalitas* between a *similitudo* and its model. The other half of the phrase, *cum coloris suavitate*, is even more problematic. It restricts delight to colored objects and leaves no room for the beauty of the objects of hearing, such as music, or the beauty of the objects of other senses. It also confuses the distinction between *speciositas* and *suavitas*, a distinction Bonaventure made clear in this very passage—and one that has caused some confusion in the secondary literature. I suspect that Bonaventure employed this definition, a particularly popular definition, as a proof text for the relationship between beauty and proportion. If so, then he included the reference

to color only as part and parcel of the Stoic formula, not to restrict perceptual beauty to colored objects.

The soul's delight in the agreeable or the sweet (*suavitas*) refers to the proportion between the strength of an impressed *similitudo* and "the medium through which it passes," that is, any of the varied media that lie between the soul and the object of its apprehension. This includes the exterior sense organ, "for the senses are pained through extremes and delighted through moderation." Bonaventure took his notion of *suavitas* from Aristotle, who had argued that "excess in an object's sense destroys the sense organ; if the movement which the object sets in motion is too strong for the organ, then the form which is its sensory power is disturbed, in the same way in which striking the strings of a lyre too harshly destroys concord and tone."[52] Other examples are not difficult to imagine. A blinding light, for example, a pungent odor, a foul taste, or the touch of a painfully hot object are all instances in which the force of a stronger impression, projected through various media, overwhelms the relatively weaker capacity of the sensory organ.

Bonaventure defined goodness or wholesomeness (*salubritas*) as the proportion between the subject and the possession of an object that "fills the need of the recipient." These things, good things, strengthen the soul and nourish the body. A tall glass of water on a hot day, I suppose, counts as a good, wholesome pleasure.

The degree of similarity between Bonaventure's distinctions among the soul's delight in *speciositas*, *suavitas*, and *salubritas* and Kant's seminal distinctions among the beautiful (*das Schöne*), the agreeable (*das Angenehme*), and the good (*das Gute*) in his *Analytic of the Beautiful* is striking:

> The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus denote three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, as a feeling in respect of which we distinguish different objects or modes of representation. Also, the corresponding expressions which indicate our satisfaction in them are different. The *agreeable* is what GRATIFIES a man; the *beautiful* what simply PLEASES him; the *good* what is ESTEEMED (*approved*), i.e., that on which he sets an objective worth.[53]

However, the two lists are not coordinate. Bonaventure's concept of *suavitas* is comparable to Kant's concept of *das Angenehme*, but neither his conceptualization of *speciositas* to Kant's *das Schöne* nor his conceptualization of *salubritas* to Kant's *das Gute*. Bonaventure's conceptualization of the soul's pleasure in the apprehension of beauty, *speciositas*, depends on the degree of correspondence between the soul's apprehension of the sensible species and its proper object, not on the free play of the mind's higher cognitive faculties, the intellect and the imagination; and his conceptualization of the pleasure in

salubritas depends on the wholesomeness of the object, not on the degree of esteem or approval we place upon it.

Nor is there evidence of Bonaventure's direct influence on Kant. Fistioc has demonstrated Kant's access to the texts of Pythagoras, Plato, and other philosophers of Antiquity in Latin translations in the university library at Konigsberg, in German translations that began to appear after 1780, and in Kant's explicit dependence on Jakob Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae*.[54] Bonaventure's text is not among them. Thus, the best explanation for the similarity is that Kant relied on the common themes of Antiquity, namely, the beauty of proper proportions and the pleasure in the contemplation of them, and perhaps common texts, but not Bonaventure's direct influence on Kant.

Significantly, Bonaventure refused to restrict his description of the aesthetic experience, the soul's delight in beauty, to the higher senses of sight and hearing. He does associate particular senses with their delight in beautiful, agreeable, and good things, but he does so only *appropriate loquendo*, that is, to speak about what is proper to each sense, not what is exclusive to each of them. The soul's delight in the beauty of an object is most proper to sight, not restricted to it. The soul can also delight in the beauty of the sound of well-proportioned verse, the smell of a well-proportioned perfume, the taste of well-proportioned ingredients, or even the touch of a well-proportioned body. The soul is able to access beauty through all its senses, and the loss of one or more of them does not deny it the opportunity to delight in the beauty of the world.

Notice, too, that Bonaventure did not distinguish among beautiful, agreeable, or good things, only beautiful, agreeable, and good properties within things. The same objects are, at once, beautiful, agreeable, and good, and so the distinction is one of reference to certain features of an object, not distinct objects. The clearest example of this is his argument for the soul's delight in its apprehension of the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of God the Son, the First Species (*Prima Specie*), in whom there is the *prima speciositas*, *suavitas*, and *salubritas*.[55] The argument is straightforward. The first premise enlists the common criterion for delight: "If delight is the union of the harmonious with the harmonious (*coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti*)." The second his conception of the Son as the perfect Image of the Father: "If the divine *Similitudo* alone possesses the principle of the highest beauty (*summe speciosi*), the highest agreeableness, and the highest goodness." The third is the reality of the soul's relationship with the divine *Similitudo*: "If it is united in truth, in intimacy, and in an excess that satisfies every need."

He affirmed these antecedents in a complex explication of the aesthetic status of the divine *Similitudo*, the archetype of beauty. He is the perfect image of the Father and is in perfect harmony (*convenientia*) with the Father.

He carries within himself the *similitudines* or *formae* of all things, including the *similitudines* of beauty, agreeableness, and goodness. The soul is united with Him in a harmony of truth, intimacy, and in an excess that satisfies every need in its dependence on the illumination of the divine *Formae* for the success of its judgment, the next stage in the epistemological process. It is an instance of an epistemological mysticism in which the soul, in its union with the light of the divine *Formae*, delights in the immediate presence of a divine Beauty, Agreeableness, and Goodness. Bonaventure had commented that the soul naturally delights in the beauty of creation, but it is not fully satisfied; and its lack of satisfaction furthers its desire.[56] But the soul's delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the divine *Species* "preserves, satisfies, and completely fulfills the needs of the beholder."[57] Thus, Bonaventure concludes: "It is clearly evident that the fountain of true delight is in God alone and all other delights lead us to seek Him."

This reading of Bonaventure's delight in sensation is distinct from two extremes: Schumacher's cognitive reading of delight and Künzle's a-cognitive reading. Schumacher argues that Bonaventure's account of delight is a type of apprehension.[58] She identifies three layers of Bonaventure's sensorium: the external senses provide the mind with information of the objects proper to each sense: the internal senses gather the information of the external senses together and compiles a complete picture, so to speak, of the way particular things look, sound, smell, taste, and feel; and the "sense" of delight that provides the mind with *information* regarding the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of particular objects as well as the *reasons* for their beauty, agreeableness, and goodness. I would argue, *contra* Schumacher, that a careful reading of the relevant texts indicates that Bonaventure clearly delineated three distinct stages in the process of the soul's encounter with the physical realm of being, its sensory apprehension of the physical realm, its delight in it, and its rational judgment of the reasons for its delight. Its sensory apprehension of the physical realm precedes its delight in it and remains distinct from it. Its sensory apprehension and delight also constitute a precognitive aesthetic experience distinct from its rational judgment of the reasons for its delight, although the experience comes to its proper end in its discernment of the reasons for its delight.

Künzle, among others, was right to point out Bonaventure's anticipation of the distinction between the soul's aesthetic experience and its rational analysis of the objects of that experience that emerged more clearly in the Enlightenment. But, *contra* Künzle, Bonaventure did not argue for the soul's aesthetic experience as an end in itself. He argued for a seamless process: the soul's apprehension and delight in the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good that stimulates its rational discernment of the reasons for its delight in them. Bonaventure admitted the soul may well stop at this stage of the process: its

delight in the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the world. He chastised his readers for their tendency to give in to this very temptation.[59] But he insisted that the proper end of the process is the soul's judgment (*diiudicatio*), that is, its determination of the reasons for its delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the physical realm of being.

Judgment

The aesthetic experience comes to its proper end in judgment (*diiudicatio*), "in which the rational soul determines the reason for its delight. . . . It is an action that purifies and abstracts the sensory *species*, received though the senses, and brings them into its intellect (*potentiam intellectivam*)."[60]

Bonaventure developed a dual process to account for the mind's purification and abstraction of the sensible *species*: an abstraction theory of concept formation that purified the sensible *species* into an intellectual *species* and a doctrine of divine illumination that rendered its judgments on the basis of those *species* certain and thus true. He derived his abstraction theory from Aristotle's *De anima* and, more immediately, Ibn Sina, who argued, in his influential commentary on the *De anima*, that the agent intellect purifies or abstracts the intelligible *species*, the mental representation (*repraesentatio*), from the sensible *species* and then stores it for further analysis and contemplation. Bonaventure's abstraction theory is relatively noncontroversial. There is widespread agreement on his position in the appropriation of the agent intellect and its role in his epistemology.[61] He derived his illumination theory from Augustine's scattered references to the concept and its more concise reformulation into a coherent doctrine in the thought of William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste, and other early scholastic masters, who argued that the mind requires some degree of divine assistance in order to come to the *infallible* knowledge of *immutable* objects. The nature and scope of Bonaventure's illumination theory is the most controversial aspect of his epistemology, perhaps the most controversial aspect of his thought in its entirety.

The Agent Intellect, the Possible Intellect, and the Abstraction of the Intelligible Species

The locus classicus of the agent intellect's abstraction of the intelligible *species* is a particularly enigmatic passage in Aristotle's *De anima*:[62]

> There is an intellect (νοῦς) that becomes all things and there is an intellect that produces all things, a kind of disposition like light that brings potential colors into actuality. This intellect is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed. It is essentially

an activity . . . it is always thinking. Separated from the body it remains what it is, and it alone is immortal and eternal.[63]

Aristotle's basic motivation in distinguishing the one intellect from the other is clear: the intellect possesses the potential to acquire something it lacks, knowledge. Thus, it possesses both the capacity to acquire knowledge, its passive aspect, and the means with which it acquires knowledge, its active or agent aspect. But the precise nature of that distinction remains obscure. Aristotle did not provide an adequate account of these intellects, their operations, or their relationships with one another and with the human composite, soul and body; and, thus, inspired a wide range of discussion—particularly in response to his claim that the agent intellect "is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed . . . and it alone is immortal and eternal." At one extreme, Alexander of Aphrodisias and his followers concluded that the agent intellect is a distinct entity, either the divine Mind or one of the semi-divine intelligences of a synthetic Neo-Platonic cosmology. At the other, Thomas Aquinas, among others, identified the active intellect with a natural capability, a *potentia*, within the human mind. Both solutions proved problematic.

Marrone points out that Rosenmöller and other early scholars of Bonaventure's epistemology argued that Bonaventure endorsed the Alexandrian interpretation of Aristotle's agent intellect and identified it with either the divine Mind or Its operations in the human intellect.[64] But, Marrone adds, the current consensus is that Bonaventure's solution is a compromise position between the two extremes. He endorsed both the role of the agent intellect's abstraction of the intelligible species and the intellect's access to the "light" of the divine Ideas. The success of his compromise is a matter of dispute. Kuksewicz provides one of the most negative assessments.[65] He argues that Bonaventure's opposition to Aristotle and his commentators led him to assign a minor role to the agent intellect and misconstrue Aristotle at every point: the relationship between the agent intellect and the mind, the relationship between the agent intellect and the passive, the distinct roles of the agent intellect and the passive, and the role of abstraction in the formation of concepts. His Bonaventure is a thorough Augustinian, whose concept of the intellect and its illumination negates the need for the agent intellect's abstraction of the intelligible species and renders his attempt to synthesize the two traditions a failure.

Proponents of the current consensus—Gilson, Dady, Quinn, Gendreau, and Cullen—argue for Bonaventure's successful integration of both extremes.[66] A close reading of the relevant texts confirms their conclusion. In sum, Bonaventure argued that the agent intellect is not distinct in either substance (*substantia*) or power (*potentia*) from the possible intellect; thus, inseparable from it—an explicit clarification of Aristotle's claim that the agent intellect

"is distinct, unaffected, and unmixed . . . and it alone is immortal and eternal."[67] Bonaventure insisted that the phrase "agent intellect" describes a distinction (*differentia*) in the action of one and the same intellectual faculty. It is a "light" that "shines" on the intelligible properties of the sensible species and reveals them. It makes them "known" and then "impresses" them upon the possible intellect—hence Rosenmöller's misunderstanding of the precise relationship between Bonaventure's conception of the agent intellect and divine Illumination. Gendreau provides a particularly helpful explanation: The intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the sensible through "the power of a natural judicatory light '*lumen naturale judicatorum*,'" a thoroughly natural power (*potentia*) that is able to perform the "act of discernment or of separation, '*dijudicatio*'" and it is able to do so without divine assistance.[68] But, and this is the critical component of his epistemology, the intellect relies on the assistance of the illumination of a divine Light to do so without error.

The Doctrine of Divine Illumination

Bonaventure insisted that the human mind possesses the innate ability to abstract intelligible *species* from the impressions of its sensory apprehension and thus come to know the created order without the assistance of the divine Mind or other, semi-divine intelligences. Thus, it is fully capable both of delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the created order and of knowing why it delights in the created order. But he also insisted that the soul requires the assistance of the illumination of the divine *Formae* to do so with certitude. His argument for the soul's dependence on the divine *Formae* in the present context is precise.[69] His first premise depends on his account of the agent intellect: "For judgment (*diiudicatio*) is made through a reason (*per rationem*) that abstracts from place, time, and change and thus it abstracts [the intelligible *species*] from dimension, succession, and transmutation through a reason that is immutable, in-circumscribable, and interminable." His second depends on the distinction between the divine Being and created being: "But nothing is absolutely immutable, in-circumscribable, and interminable unless it is eternal and everything that is eternal is either God or in God." His third premise is a hypothetical proposition that will require some explanation: "If, therefore, everything the soul judges in a more certain manner, it judges through such a reason." It is the key premise in his attempt to establish his conclusion: "Then it is clear that God is the reason for all things, the infallible rule, and the light of truth."[70]

    The doctrine of divine illumination, the claim that the human mind requires some degree of divine assistance in its effort to justify its beliefs and reveal the truth of things, possesses an impeccable pedigree. Pasnau provides a brief

account.[71] Its advocates traced their lineage to Socrates, Plato, and Augustine, but there is good reason to suspect that Aristotle endorsed something similar. Thomists routinely credit their patron with the first steps toward a more rational epistemology, but the Angelic Doctor continued to insist on the soul's possession of the light of the eternal reasons within itself to render its judgments true. Scotus provided the first thorough refutation of the doctrine in his defense of the adequacy of the agent intellect's abstraction of the intelligible *species* independent of divine assistance and, so the standard account of the story goes, it gives way to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. But, Pasnau argues, it survived in the epistemic principle of the Islamic illuminationists, the innate ideas of Cartesian rationalists, the epistemological mysticism of the Ontologists, and, I would add, the less philosophical but more expressive themes of the inchoate presence of the Divinity in the poetry of the Romantics and their heirs.

Augustine's formulation of the doctrine is the principal source for Bonaventure's, but it is the subject of a wide range of debate. Nash has identified a number of prominent schools of thought on the issue: the Thomist, Franciscan, Formalist, Ontologist, and his own Modified Ontologism.[72] They continue to inform the current assessment of Augustine's formulation of the doctrine as well as Bonaventure's.

The Thomists had identified illumination with the activity of the agent intellect. God imprinted the light of the first principles on the agent intellect in the initial formation of the human mind and, thus, enabled it to successfully abstract the intelligible *species* from the sensible *species* without further assistance. Advocates of the Franciscan Position argued that illumination is ideogenic—they also argued that Bonaventure's formulation of the doctrine was ideogenic, hence their denomination. The divine mind impresses the divine *Formae* directly on the human mind and thus abrogated the function of the agent intellect. The Formalists argued that the mind depends on the light of the divine *Formae* to judge the accuracy, objectivity, and certainty of its conceptual knowledge, but denied its role in the formation of concepts. Nash rejected all of these. They failed to account for Augustine's preference for some form of Platonic *anamnesis*.

Nash argued that the Ontologists presented a rather vague notion of the doctrine, perhaps intentionally so: the mind "in some way" possesses knowledge of the divine Ideas; it "sees" them as they subsist in the mind of God.[73] He identified two extremes that tend to obfuscate their position. The first is an extreme degree of epistemological optimism. They seem to imply that human beings can "see" God "face to face" in this life. The second is the extreme compass of some forms of Ontologism. Malebranche, the most influential of them, argued that the mind is the essence of the human person and thoroughly independent of its body. It bears no causal relationship with it. Thus,

it depends on its direct access to the divine Ideas for all its knowledge, both its knowledge of sensible objects and rational concepts.

Nash endorsed a Modified Ontologism reminiscent of the Platonists' *anamnesis* in order to guard against these excesses. He argued that God projects the "light" of the divine Ideas on the depths of the human mind in its memory (*memoria*), and it does so continuously, like the light of the sun that shines on the objects of sight. If it ceases to shine, the mind can no longer see them. Thus, the mind "sees" these ideas "dimly" in its *memoria*, not as these ideas subsist in the divine Mind. It does not "see" God "face to face" in this life, only in the life to come.

He cites the tradition of Franciscan Innatism and Kant's Transcendental Idealism in order to further clarify his position. Advocates of Franciscan Innatism argued that the divine Mind produces, infuses, and then impresses the divine *Formae* on the human mind, but they also argued that these *Formae* are innate. They exist within the human mind ab initio. He also draws a parallel with Kant's "forms of consciousness" in order to explicate three criteria that define these illuminations: they are *a priori* and independent of sense experience, they are present regardless of the mind's actual awareness of them, and they are the basis for conceptual knowledge (*scientia*). The illuminations impressed on the mind, like Kant's "forms" of space and time, regulate and structure our perception of reality, but unlike Kant's forms, they also provide the conceptual content that enables the human mind to come to know reality.

Nash's analysis of Augustine's epistemology has failed to produce a consensus. Schumacher, for example, endorses the Thomist Position in a peculiar argument that aligns Augustine with Thomas instead of Bonaventure and other "so-called" Augustinians.[74] Matthews argues that Augustine approaches but refuses to actually commit to a Modified Ontologism.[75] Noone, perhaps most insightfully, argues that Augustine's doctrine consists of a series of loosely related arguments for the presence of *a priori* concepts in the human mind, a series of arguments rich in ideas, but not well developed in its details.[76] He also suggests that its indeterminacy might well have been the secret of its success "inasmuch as practically all later thinkers, illuminationists and non-illuminationists alike, seem to find something in Augustine's views worthy of preservation and adaptation."[77]

The wide variety of approaches to Bonaventure's account of illumination fall into the same range of options: Ontologists dominated the early stages of debate,[78] but proponents of the Thomist,[79] Ideogenic,[80] and Formalist[81] positions quickly asserted themselves. Cullen presents a cogent defense of the Formalist position: Bonaventure's illumination is a metaphysical analysis of the criteria for certitude.[82] His argument is two pronged: a Franciscan, textual prong that he aims at the Ontologist position and his own conceptual prong

that he aims at the Ontologist, Ideogenic, and a synthesis of the Ideogenic and Formalist positions. (He omits the Thomist, a decidedly minority position in the current debate.)

Cullen notes that the Ontologists enlisted Bonaventure in their efforts to legitimize their position. They argued that they belonged to an ancient tradition that began with Plato and included Augustine and Bonaventure, both Doctors of the Church, and thus insulated themselves from charges of novelty and heterodoxy. Gioberti, for example, cited Bonaventure's texts on illumination in his *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia*,[83] and Ubaghs, one of the most infamous of the Ontologists, went so far as to argue that Bonaventure was the principal exponent of Ontologism.[84]

I would add that the Ontologists posed two especially threatening challenges to Bonaventure's orthodoxy. The first is the claim that human persons are capable of "seeing" God "face to face" in this life. The second is their argument that "being" is the first and most fundamental concept of the mind. They identified this concept of being, being in itself, with the divine Being, and thus raised the specter of pantheism.[85] The other positions—Ideogenic, Formalist, and a synthesis of the Ideogenic and Formalist—posed less of a challenge to Bonaventure's orthodoxy; none claimed that the human mind possesses immediate access to the divine Ideas, and thus none threatened pantheism.

Cullen also notes that the Franciscan scholars of the late nineteenth century, notably Jeiler, an editor of the critical edition of Bonaventure's *Opera Omnia*, delivered the coup de grace to the Ontologists. They based their refutation of Ontologism on a reading of illumination in the broader context of Bonaventure's works, particularly the *Commentary* on the *Sententiae*, the *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi*, the *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*, the *Itinerarium*, and the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*. Jeiler summarized their argument in the *scholion* to the relevant passages in the *Itinerarium* in the *Opera Omnia*.[86] He first pointed out Bonaventure's explicit rejection of the possibility of the human mind's immediate access to the divine Mind and then Bonaventure's consistent distinction between divine Being—the absolute first principle of all other things, resolutely independent of them—and created being, created *ex nihilo* and entirely dependent on divine Being. Thus, *contra* the Ontologists, Bonaventure's illumination implied neither the human mind's immediate access to God nor the possibility of pantheism.

Cullen bases the conceptual prong of his argument on two of Bonaventure's key doctrines: his emphasis on exemplarism, that is, his doctrine of creation's ubiquitous testimony to its divine Exemplar, and his endorsement of a compromise position between an abstraction theory of concept formation and illumination.[87] He argues, in fidelity to the current consensus, that Bonaventure's

conception of the agent intellect's abstraction of the intelligible *species* from
the sensible *species* enables it to engage in a cognitive *reductio* of creation's
testimony to its Creator. But illumination provides the "motive" cause
that "regulates" the mind's assessment of concepts and thus "fills the gap"
between Bonaventure's account of abstraction and his distinct account of
epistemological certainty.

He argues that the other positions would render Bonaventure's account
of these key doctrines into nonsense. If the mind possesses immediate
access to the divine Ideas subsisting in the divine Mind, as the Ontologists
argued, or the ideas themselves, as the proponents of the Ideogenic position
had argued, then it would not need the agent intellect in order to abstract
the intelligible species from the sensible in order to recognize creation's
testimony to its Creator.[88] Ontologism would render all human beings into
mystics, able to "see" God "face to face" in this life, with little need for
the intimate engagement with creation and its testimony to its Creator so
characteristic of Bonaventure's thought. It would also, I would add, ren-
der Bonaventure's recommendation to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch
the created order and delight in its beauty, agreeableness, and goodness
less compelling.

Why include a detailed consideration of Bonaventure's account of the third
portion of this process in a study of his aesthetics?

The first reason is Bonaventure's claim that the soul's apprehension and
delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the created order finds
its proper end in its cognitive discernment of the reasons for its delight. The
human person, Bonaventure insisted, is a rational soul in a felicitous union
with its body. It naturally desires to know the reason for its sensual delight
in its apprehension of the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the physical
realm of being. It remains unsatisfied until it does.

The second is that the rational soul that engages its intellect in this process
also engages in the cognitive delight of an epistemological mysticism. Its
abstraction of the intelligible *species* from the sensible *species* in the light
of the divine *Formae* results in a cognitive *rapport* between its contempla-
tion of the intelligible *species* and the light of those *Formae*. Bonaventure
had argued that the human mind is an image of the Divinity in the form and
function of its higher faculties of its memory, intellect, and will—an anal-
ogy I will discuss at length in the next chapter.[89] But the content of the mind
is also a *similitudo* of the divine Mind in its *rapport* with the divine Ideas.
The soul's abstraction of the intelligible *species* renders the content of its
mind into something beautiful. The presence of the divine Light lifts up the
mind, so to speak, in its act of cognition and carries it into the delight of an
epistemological union with the Divinity, albeit indirectly. The divine Ideas
are one in substance with the Divinity. But Bonaventure does not think we

have direct access to the Ideas that are one with the Divinity, only the "light" of their influence.[90] The soul's delight in the constant presence of the divine Light *pulls* it along its ascent into God until it rests in union with God, like the Bride in the Song of Solomon, who runs after her Spouse with panting heart until she "leans wholly upon her Beloved."[91]

CONCLUSION

Careful attention to Bonaventure's philosophical anthropology reveals the pivotal role the aesthetic experience plays in the human person's effort to achieve its proper end in union with God. He located the experience in the human person's delight in its apprehension of the full range of its sensorium: the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of beautiful, agreeable, and good things. Its delight further stimulates its desire for them and inclines it to determine the reasons for its delight, the proper proportions that render the cosmos an abundant source of beauty, agreeableness, and goodness. It does so through its abstraction of the intelligible *species* from the sensible *species* in the light of the divine *Formae* that brings it to the knowledge of the infallible truth of the cosmos.

The aesthetic experience is the fulcrum of this process. The mind's delight in the beauty of its apprehension is a precognitive experience, a delight in the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the vast fabric of creation—in anticipation of the emergence of an explicit aesthetics in the Enlightenment. But it is not an a-rational experience—in defiance of the Enlightenment's emphasis on the distinction between aesthetic experience and rational reflection. Bonaventure's aesthetic experience is a stimulus for the mind's desire to know. Its delight tempts it to discern the reason for its delight and initiates its cognitive *reductio* of creation's testimony to its Creator, in close cooperation with the affections of its will, until it comes to its proper end in union with its Creator.

NOTES

1. A. Pegis, "The Bonaventurean Way to God," *Medieval Studies* 29 (1967): 206–242. Bonaventure provides evidence for this thesis in *Itin*. 1.2 (5:297).

2. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.10 (5:228). See also 2 *Sent*. d. 16–18 (2:391–455).

3. Porphyry, *On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books*, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 3.

4. J. Haldane, "Soul and Body," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1:293–304.

5. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 17, a. 1, q. 2 (2:414).

6. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 43, a.1, q.1 fund. 5 (4:883). See also *Brevil*. 7.5 (5:286).

7. T. M. Osborne, "*Unibilitas*: *The Key to Bonaventure's Understanding of Human* Nature," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 37 (1999): 227–250.

8. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 49, p. 2, s. 1, a. 2, q. 1 (4:1015).

9. See E. Lutz, *Die psychologie Bonaventuras* (Münster: Aschendorf, 1909). It is the classic but still informative exposition of Bonaventure's philosophical psychology. See also A. Schaeffer, "The Position and Function of Man in the Created World According to Bonaventure," *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960): 261–316 and 21 (1961): 233–382 and "Corrigenda: The Position and Function of Man in the Created World According to Bonaventure," *Franciscan Studies* 22 (1962): 1.

10. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.9 (5:226).

11. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.2 (5:300).

12. J. McEvoy, "Microcosm and Macrocosm in the Writing of St. Bonaventure," in *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974* (Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventura, 1973), 2:309–343.

13. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (2:393–396).

14. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 54–59.

15. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.3 (5:300).

16. A. M. Smith, "Perception," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1: 334–345.

17. Smith, "Perception," 338.

18. Augustine, *De gen. ad lit.* 12.16 (32).

19. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 13, a. 2, q. 2 (2:319–323).

20. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. 2.2 (5:220).

21. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.2 (5:300).

22. Bonaventure, *Red. art.* 3 (5:320).

23. Bonaventure, *Red. art. 3* (5:320). The fifth essence (*quinta essentia*) is light.

24. Aristotle, *De anima* 2–3.

25. Aristotle, *De an.* 2.12, trans. J. Barnes, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1:674.

26. R. Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception," in *Essays on Aristotle's De anima,* ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 195–225.

27. Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, 1, 450a–450b.

28. R. Sorabji, "From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality," in *Aristotle and the Later Tradition,* ed. H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 227–259.

29. F. Brentano, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* (Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1867), 79–81 and 120, n. 23.

30. M. Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?" in *Essays on Aristotle's De anima,* ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 15–26. For the current status of the debate, see A. Marmodoro *Aristotle on Perceiving Objects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

31. M. Burnyeat, "How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C? Remarks on *De anima* 2.7-8," in *Essays on Aristotle's De anima*, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 421–434.

32. See D. N. Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:305–319.

33. Aristotle, *De an.* 3.1.424b.

34. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.4 (5:300). See also *Red. art*. 8 (5:322).

35. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (2:393–396).

36. See also Bonaventure, *Red. art*. 3 (5:320).

37. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 8, p. 1., a. 3, q. 2 ad 4 (2:222). See Aristotle, *De an.* 2.12.

38. Bonaventure, 4 *Sent*. d. 12, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (4:280).

39. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure,* trans. I. Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1940), 319.

40. Bonaventure, *Red. art*. 8 (5:322).

41. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.5 (5:300).

42. H. Lang, "Bonaventure's Delight in Sensation," *New Scholasticism* 60 (1986), 72-90. See *Metaphyscia*, 1.1.

43. Bonaventure uses *oblectatio* and *delectatio* interchangeably throughout this passage.

44. Lang, "Bonaventure's Delight in Sensation," 84.

45. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, 8.1 (8), trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 2:327–329.

46. Plato, *Respublica* 9, 581c.

47. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 1.5.

48. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.3.

49. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.5 (5:300–301).

50. De Bruyne, *Études*, 3:193. See Augustine, *De mus.* 13 (38).

51. Bonaventure, *Serm. B. Virg. Maria* 2 (9:708–709).

52. Aristotle, *De an.*, 2.12, trans. J. Barnes, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, 1:675.

53. Kant, *Critique of Judgment* 5, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), 49.

54. M. Fistioc, *The Beautiful Shape of the Good: Platonic and Pythagorean Themes in Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment* (London: Routledge, 2002).

55. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.8 (5:301).

56. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1 (1:81).

57. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.8 (5:301).

58. L. Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

59. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.15, 2.11–12 (5:299, 302–303).

60. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.6 (5:301).

61. L. Bowman, "The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century," *The Modern Schoolman* 50 (1973): 251–279.

62. D. Black, "The Nature of the Intellect," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:320–333.

63. Aristotle, *De an.* 3.5. This translation is my own.

64. S. P. Marrone, *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1:178–179, n. 98

65. Z. Kuksewicz, "The Potential and Agent Intellect," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 595–601.

66. É. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1924), 274–324; M. R. Dady, *The Theory of Knowledge of Saint Bonaventure* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1939), 18–30; J. F. Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1973), 436–664; B. Gendreau, "The Quest for Certainty in Bonaventure," *Franciscan Studies* 21 (1961): 104–227; and Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 54–59.

67. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent*. d. 24, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4 (2:569). See also 2 Sent. d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 ad 6 (2:412–413).

68. B. Gendreau, "The Quest for Certainty in Bonaventure," 167.

69. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.9 (5:301). Bonaventure discussed the doctrine in more detail in *Sc. Chr*. q. 4 (5:17–27) and *Sermo Christus unus magister* (5:567–574). See also *Hexaëm*. 4.1 (5:349).

70. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.9 (5:301).

71. R. Pasnau, "Divine Illumination," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford University, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/illumination/.

72. R. H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969).

73. Nash, *The Light of the Mind*, 102.

74. Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, 1–24. See also A. S. McGrade, "Reexamining the Doctrine of Divine Illumination in Latin Philosophy of the High Middle Ages," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, ed. K. Emery, Jr. and A. Speer (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 275–302.

75. G. B. Matthews, "Knowledge and Illumination," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 171–185.

76. T. Noone, "Divine Illumination," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:369–383.

77. Noone, "Divine Illumination," 371.

78. V. Gioberti introduced the thesis in *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia* (Venice: Carlo Fontana, 1851). I. Brady provides a brief survey of the thesis and its refutation in "St. Bonaventure's Doctrine of Illumination: Reactions Medieval and Modern," in *Bonaventure and Aquinas: Enduring Philosophers* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 57–67.

79. T. Crowley, "Illumination and Certitude," in *S. Bonaventura 1274-1279* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1973), 3:431–448.

80. B. A. Luyckx, "Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras," *Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 23 (1923): 39–46.

81. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Bonaventure*, trans. I. Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1940), 309–364.

82. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 77–87. See also A. Speer, "Illumination and Certitude: The Foundation of Knowledge in Bonaventure," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 85 (2011): 127–141.

83. Gioberti, *Introduzione*, 256ff.

84. G. C. Ubaghs, *De mente S. Bonaventurae circa modum quo Deus ab homine cognoscitur* (Louvain: de Vanlinthout, 1859).

85. J. Pohle provided an influential response to their threat in his *Dogmatic Theology* (Baden: Herder, 1911), 1:113–132.

86. Bonaventure, *Itin. scholion* (5:315–316).

87. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 77–87.

88. Marrone "Reexamining the Doctrine of Divine Illumination in Latin Philosophy of the High Middle Ages," in *Philosophy and Theology*, 275–302.

89. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.2-5 (5:304–305).

90. Bonaventure, *Sc. Chr*. q. 2 resp. (5:8–9).

91. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 4.3 (5:307).

The Aesthetic Dimensions of the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*

Bonaventure positioned the aesthetic experience at the foot of the soul's ascent into God. The soul begins in its apprehension of the physical realm of being: the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the full extent of the created order. It continues in its delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the objects of its sensation. But the process does not come to a halt in its precognitive delight in beauty and other modes of sensual pleasure. Its desire for ever greater delight compels its cognitive *reductio*, in close cooperation with the affections of its will, to the fundamental reasons (*rationes*) for all things in God the Father, the *Primum Principium*, in Its perfect perichoresis with the Son and Spirit—the fountain of all delight.

The key to this *reductio* and its aesthetic significance is Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarity: "the intelligible radiation (*radius*) that enlightens [the soul] and enables its *reductio* to the *Summum Bonum*."[1] God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—had created all other things *ex nihilo* through the imposition of the divine *Formae* onto the chaos of the formless void (Gen. 1:2). The imposition of these *Formae* rendered the created order into a mirror that reflects the "light" of its divine Exemplar. It also established the basis for a series of further "aesthetic" experiences that simulate the initial experience. The soul delights in its *cognitive* apprehension of the *rapport* between creation's reflection of the divine Light and the divine Light in Itself, but in these further experiences, the soul no longer relies on its physical senses to mediate between itself and the objects of its contemplation.

Reynolds has identified two types of analogy in Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarity that establish the proper *rapport* between creation and its Creator that promote these further aesthetic experiences—although he did not explicitly discuss their aesthetic implications.[2] He first considered the analogy of names that depends on the semantic relationship between the primary sense

of a term and its secondary sense, but this type of analogy does not establish a real resemblance between the terms it modifies and so it does not play a significant role in Bonaventure's exemplarity. He then considered two types of analogies of resemblance: the univocal resemblance of things that participate in the same nature and the equivocal resemblance between things that do not participate in the same nature. The first refers to individuals who share a *tertium quid*. But, so Bonaventure argued, creation does not resemble God in this way; created *ex nihilo*, it does not share a *tertium quid* with its Creator. This leaves two modes of equivocal resemblance applicable to the created order: the traditional analogy of proportion between two ordered pairs—(A is to B) is similar to (C is to D)—and the simple analogy of imitation in which "one thing" is "an imitation and likeness of another."

THE *REDUCTIO* OF THE *ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM*

Bonaventure presented his most impressive account of this *reductio* in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*.[3] Cousins noted that the *Itinerarium* is "Bonaventure's masterpiece."[4] The manuscript tradition indicates its popularity throughout the Middle Ages and it remains so. But it is also a difficult text to read. It is "an extraordinarily dense summa of medieval Christian spirituality." Bonaventure addressed the *Itinerarium* to readers familiar with the philosophical, theological, and spiritual traditions of the medieval schools. Some degree of explanation of the overall structure of the text is in order.

The Title

The title of the text is rich in metaphor and meaning. The term "*itinerarium*," Boehner explained, refers to a plan, a description, or even a prayer for a safe journey and, in the relevant ecclesiastical literature, for a pilgrimage, particularly a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.[5] Bonaventure incorporated each of these nuances of meaning into his formulation of a mystical pilgrimage into union with God. The *Itinerarium* is a travel guide. Bonaventure informed his readers where they should go, what they should see, and what they should do in their pilgrimage into God.

The term "*mens*" refers to the higher portion of the human soul or spirit (*anima*), its faculties of the memory, intellect, and will that render it into an image of God, able to know and love God and thus equip the pilgrim for his or her pilgrimage. It is difficult to translate. Boehner preferred "mind" to preserve the rational connotations of the term.[6] Brown prefers "soul" in his introduction to Boehner's translation but does not significantly alter

Boehner's translation.[7] Cousins prefers "soul" in his more dynamic translation in deference to current practice in the translation of spiritual and devotional texts, although he sometimes uses "mind" when the context demands a more rational shade of meaning.[8] Hayes also prefers "soul" in his revision of Boehner's translation.[9] I have chosen a variety of terms—"rational soul," "soul," or, more rarely, "mind"—to better convey the subtle shades of its contextual meaning. But it is critical to remember that Bonaventure argued for a perichoresis of the soul's principal faculties in its ascent, its memory, intellect, and the affections of its will. The three worked in tandem with one another to bring the soul to its proper end *in Deum*.

The phrase "*in Deum*" is unusual. The preposition "*ad*" is more common. It refers to the movement to something. But "*in*" refers to movement into something and underscores the degree of intimacy between the *mens* and its union with God. "The purpose of the *Itinerarium*," Boehner explained, "is not merely to lead us up to God, nor only to touch or reach Him with the intellect, but actually to enter into Him in the highest affection of love in mystical union."[10]

Prologue and Preparation

Gilson pointed out that Bonaventure had organized the text of the *Itinerarium* in accord with the rhetorical models of classical and medieval homiletics.[11] Its prologue begins with a series of passages from the scriptures that introduce the themes of the text and exhorts its readers to prayer.[12] The initial passage is a pastiche of Gen. 1:1, John 1:1, and James 1:17 that summarizes Bonaventure's doctrine of the origin, development, and end of all things. God the Father is the First Principle (*Primum Principium*), the Creator of heaven and earth, the Father of Lights, and the Giver of every good and perfect gift. These lights signify the divine *Formae* that illuminate the soul's intellect and enable it to recognize creation's testimony to its Creator, the testimony of every good and perfect gift. The soul, in its contemplation of those gifts, scales the ladder (*scala*) of the hierarchy of the created order to its proper end in its union with its Creator.

It continues with a short litany of petitions to God the Father; God the Son; Mary, the Mother of God; and Francis of Assisi, the spiritual father of the Franciscan Order and Bonaventure's primary readership. Bonaventure reminded his readers that their effort will amount to little unless they receive divine assistance. Reading, he insisted, requires unction; speculation, devotion; investigation, wonder; observation, joy; work, piety; knowledge, love; understanding, humility; endeavor grace; the recognition of creation as a mirror that reflects its Creator, the assistance of divine Wisdom. The soul's cognitive contemplation of the testimony of the created order requires the

close cooperation of the affections of its will and the grace of Christ "through whose blood we are cleansed from the filth of vice."[13]

The most striking feature of the prologue is its principal *figura*: Francis' vision of the Seraph.[14] The vision is multivalent. The author of the Book of Isaiah had introduced the Seraphim as angelic courtiers who tend the royal throne of God (Isa. 6:1–13). Their principal task appears to be the care of the fire in the heavenly court and thus their exemplification of the intense ardor of their affections that burns for union with the Divinity. Early Christian exegetes had identified them as the highest of the heavenly choirs. Hence their eternal hymn: "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord, God almighty! All the earth is filled with His glory!" They had also anointed prophets through the purgation of fire. Isaiah had protested the Seraph's command to declare the glory of God on earth. In response, it descended from heaven to place a burning coal on his lips to render them clean and thus worthy to proclaim the kingdom.

But this Seraph appeared to Francis "in the form of the crucified" and rendered him into the perfect *similitudo* of Christ, so perfect, Bonaventure argued, that Francis bore the literal wounds (*stigmata*) of Christ's passion imprinted in his own body as "a seal of the living God."[15] Bonaventure is explicit. The six wings stand for the six steps or rungs of the ladder of the soul's ascent that raise it aloft. The figure of the crucified stands for Christ, who provides the grace for the soul to succeed in its ascent, and a metaphor for the death of the soul's cognitive capabilities in its ineffable union with God at the summit of its ascent.

The body of the text consists of a series of *exempla* that Bonaventure employs to develop the themes of the text: illumination, ascent, and union. It concludes with a *peroratio* on the soul's union with God in the peace that surpasses all understanding (Phil. 4:7) and a benediction *of sorts*: Bonaventure called on his readers to "die" and enter the "darkness" of the peace of apophatic union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit.

The Structure of the *Itinerarium*

Plotinus and his heirs developed the influential codification of the Platonic ladder of love that led Bonaventure to delineate three stages of the soul's ascent, the contemplation of the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the divine.[16] Bonaventure derived the first stage, the soul's contemplation of the physical realm of being, from Dionysius' contrast between the cataphatic contemplation of the *formae* in the created realm of being that testify to the Creator and apophatic contemplation of the Creator in itself.[17] His reformulation of the second stage into the soul's contemplation of itself stems from Augustine's appropriation of the Delphic Oracle's dictum, know thyself (γνῶθι σεαυτόν).[18] It imparts a distinctive trajectory to the *Itinerarium*. The

rational soul ascends through three objective degrees of being in terms of their ontological permanence and dignity, the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the divine. But its position relative to each of them determines the peculiar trajectory of its ascent: its contemplation of the vestiges (*vestigia*) outside of itself in the physical realm of being; the contemplation of the image (*imago*) within itself in the intelligible realm of being; and the contemplation of the *Primum Principium* above itself in the divine realm of being, the intellect's full resolution (*plene resolvens*) to the fundamental cause of the cosmos.[19] Thus, the rational soul occupies a pivotal role in its *Itinerarium*. It or, more precisely, its higher faculties of its memory, intellect, and will, is both the means of contemplation and an object of contemplation in which the soul, in its self-examination, recognizes its status as an image of God and the mystical presence of God within it.

Bonaventure's account of the soul's contemplation of the Creator in Itself in the third stage of its ascent is distinctive for two reasons: his development of the ontological argument to derive the necessary existence of the One God in Three *Personae* and his development of an innovative doctrine of the Cosmic Christ that sums up the entire course of the soul's *reductio*, its contemplation of the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the divine in the *Deus homo*. This, Bonaventure insisted, is the "perfect illumination of the soul" (*perfectio illuminationis mentis*).[20] But it also tests the limits of the soul's cognitive capabilities in preparation for its apophatic union with God. "Nothing more remains to be done," Bonaventure explained, "except for the day of rest when the soul, in ecstatic insight . . . , rests from all the work that it has done."

Bonaventure further divided each of these stages of ascent into two for a total of six steps.[21] The basis for his subdivision is not entirely clear.[22] Briefly, the first step of each stage, the Alpha step, refers to the soul's contemplation of each realm of being's testimony to its Creator in itself. The second, the Omega step, refers to the soul's contemplation of the proper end of each realm of being and leads it to the contemplation of the next realm of being. The proper end of each realm is a type of mystical union *in Deum*. This division breaks down on the third stage of the soul's contemplation of the divine Being in Itself. Nevertheless, some continuity remains. The soul contemplates the One God on the fifth step and the proper end of its contemplation of the One God in the fullness of Its existence in Three *Personae* on the sixth. The soul's contemplation of the sixth step also leads it to the seventh and final step or summit of its ascent in mystical union with the One God in Three *Personae*.

Bonaventure located the proper end of the soul's *reductio* in a seventh day of rest, so to speak, from its intellectual labors in an apophatic union with God, in which the intellect ceases its normal functions and the sum total of its

affections is now "directed to God and transformed into God."[23] Bonaventure enlisted Francis' vision of the Seraph in the form of the Crucified to provide the model for this experience. Francis' vision was the occasion for his reception of the stigmata, the "marks" (*stigmae*) of Christ's crucifixion in his hands, feet, and side. Bonaventure transformed it into the sign (*signum*) of the soul's perfect contemplation of God in which it "passed over into God" in the ineffable union of the "peace that surpasses all understanding."[24] He enlisted a wealth of metaphors to delineate the cognitive status of this ineffable union: secrets, silence, darkness, fire, and, above all, death through hanging, conflagration, and crucifixion. But the effort was, rationally speaking, in vain. He abandoned the precise tools of philosophical logic—the proper definition of terms, the construction of propositions, and the analysis of arguments—in favor of the affective excess of poetic expression.

Significantly, he applied particular types of aesthetic analogy to particular steps of the *Itinerarium*. He applied the first type of analogy, the analogy of proportion, to creation's testimony to the nature and existence of the *Primum Principium*, the One God in Three *Personae*. The soul's intellect takes precedence over the affections of its will in its contemplation of these analogies, although both faculties remain in close cooperation with one another throughout the full extent of the soul's ascent. He located them on the first and third steps of ascent. He applied the second, the simple resemblance, to creation's dynamic orientation to its proper end in varied modes of mystical union with Christ, *Deus et homo*, and, through the mediation of the *Deus homo*, the Three Person'd God. The soul's affections outpace its reason in its contemplation of this type of analogy on the second, fourth, and seventh steps of ascent.

Table 4.1   The Structure of the *Itinerarium*

Stages of Ascent	Step A	Step Ω
First stage: the physical realm	In itself	Its end and to another
	Its testimony to its Creator	Mystical union
	Analogy of proportion	Analogy of imitation
Second stage: the intelligible	In itself	Its end and to another
	Its testimony to its Creator	Mystical union
	Analogy of proportion	Analogy of imitation
Third stage: the divine	In itself	Its end and to another
	Contemplation of God	Of the Three Person'd God
	Analogy of proportion variant	Analogy of proportion variant
The summit		Its final end
		Mystical union
		Analogy of imitation

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But what of the fifth and sixth steps? Creation's testimony to its Creator has come to a halt in the soul's contemplation of the Creator in Itself on the fifth step, so Bonaventure did not engage the analogy of proportion on this step. Instead, he applied a subtle rhetorical variation of the analogy of proportion, the coincidence of opposites, in which the intellect contemplates the seemingly impossible proportions of the essential properties of the One God on the fifth step. He extended the rhetoric of the coincidence of opposites to the sixth step in the intellect's contemplation of the even more seemingly impossible proportions of the personal properties of God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. This extension pushes the analogy of simple resemblance to the seventh and final step of the soul's ascent, in which its affections now thoroughly outpace its reason and comes to rest in apophatic union with the One God in Three *Personae* (see table 4.1).

The First Step: The Contemplation of God *per* the Physical Realm of Being

The analog of the first step of ascent is the threefold testimony of the existence, course, and potential excellence of the physical realm of being.[25] Bonaventure derived the first analog, the testimony of the actual existence of physical things, from the Peripatetic method of causal *reductio*, the identification of the efficient, exemplary, and final cause or reason (*ratio*) for the physical realm of being in the One God, the Creator of heaven and earth.[26] But this *reductio* also reveals some degree of distinction in the One God *per analogiam*, specifically, the power of the Father, the wisdom of the Son, and the goodness of the Sprit. The One God in Three *Personae* in perfect perichoresis with one another is the threefold cause of the physical realm of being, but the hermeneutic tradition had associated the efficient cause with the Father, the formal with the Son, and the final with the Spirit and their respective appellations of power, wisdom, and goodness—*appropriate loquendo*.

He complicated this causal *reductio* with the further analysis of each thing in relation to itself (*in se*), in relation to other things (*ad alias*), and in relation to its end (*ad causam Primam*) that draws heavily on the lexicon of medieval metaphysics: the measure of things that identifies their existence as individual substances *in se*, their substance that does so *ad alias*, and their mode that does so *ad causam*; the number of things that identifies their existence as individual substances of particular kinds *in se*, their power that does so *ad alias*, and their *species* that does so *ad causam*; and, finally, their weight that identifies their proper end or purpose in the cosmic hierarchy *in se*, their operation that does so *ad alias*, and their order that does so *ad causam*.[27] The first set of properties—measure, substance, and mode—testifies to the power of the Father as the efficient cause; the second—number,

Table 4.2   *Reductio in se, ad alias, et ad causam*

In se	*Ad alias*	*Ad causam*		
Measure	Substance	Mode	Efficient cause	Power
Number	Power	Species	Exemplary cause	Wisdom
Weight	Operation	Order	Final cause	Goodness

Author created.

power, and species—to the wisdom of the Son as the exemplary cause; and the third—weight, operation, and order—to the goodness of the Spirit as the final cause (see table 4.2).

Bonaventure derived the second analog, the testimony of the habitual course of things, from his theology of history, the origin, development, and end of the created *ordo* in the final judgment—thus, his insistence on the necessity of faith in the revelation of the scriptures.[28] In this passage, he identified the period of origin with the natural law that testifies, analogically, to the power of God, the period of development with the written law that testifies to the wisdom of God, and the end with the spiritual law that testifies to the goodness of God. The passage is a brief summary of his far more extensive description of the three-part, five-part, seven-part, twelve-part, and forty-two-part divisions of the successive order of the cosmos that runs "in a most orderly fashion (*ordinatissimo*) from beginning to end, like a beautifully ordered poem (*pulcherrimi carminis ordinati*)."[29]

He derived the third, the potential excellence of things, from his cosmological arguments that he had developed in more detail in earlier works.[30] The key to this category is the concept of metaphysical participation: "If there is being that exists through its participation in another being, there must exist being that exists entirely in its own essence and not from another."[31] He repeated this type of implication for a series of ten coordinate pairs of properties derived from a wide range of sources, namely Stoic, Platonic, and Peripatetic: if posterior being then prior being, if being that exists from another then being that does not exist from another, if possible being then necessary being, if relative being then absolute being, if diminished being then qualified being, if being that exists because of another then being that does not, if being by participation then being by essence, if being in potency then being in act, if composite being then simple being, if changeable being then unchangeable being.[32] If the reference of the antecedent in each implication exists, Bonaventure argued, then the reference of its consequent necessarily exists. The reference to the antecedent, the created realm of being, exists; therefore, the reference to the consequent, the divine Being.

The argument in the *Itinerarium* follows a similar pattern, but he developed a more robust degree of participation on the basis of the Peripatetic tradition: some things exist, some exist and live, and some exist, live, and

reason; some are wholly corporal, some partly corporal, and some noncorporal; and some are mutable and corruptible, some mutable and incorruptible, and some immutable and incorruptible. The partial realization of each of these series of properties depends on the existence of the perfect realization in each series. Thus, there exists a perfect, divine Being. It exists, lives, and discerns; it is noncorporal; and it is both immutable and incorruptible. He concluded: "Therefore, the soul rises from visible things to the consideration of the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, who is existing, living, intelligent, purely spiritual, incorruptible, and in-transmutable."[33]

Bonaventure augmented his principal analysis of this threefold testimony with a brief consideration of Hugh of St. Victor's list of the fundamental properties of creation: the origin, extent, multiplicity, beauty, fecundity, activity, and order of the cosmos.[34] The first, the origin of the cosmos, refers to the ideal *ordo* of the cosmos that, Bonaventure argued, extended for the first six days of creation and its testimony to the power of God "that produced all things out of nothing," the wisdom of God that "clearly differentiated all things," and the goodness of God "that lavishly adorned all things." Its other properties, such as its extent, multiplicity, beauty, fecundity, activity, and order, emphasize features of the development of the actual order of the cosmos. Bonaventure's description of this sevenfold testimony threatens to exceed the cognitive capacities of his readers. It consists of three realms: the physical, intelligible, and divine; the physical realm consists of ten celestial spheres, the firmament that separates the celestial spheres from the earth, the four elements, and so on. The detailed analysis of the actual extent of those realms of being, "their vast extension, latitude, and profundity," defies the soul's cognitive capacity. Bonaventure's lavish description encourages his readers to respond with astonishment (*admiratio*) and awe (*stupor*) in response to the overwhelming extent, multiplicity, beauty, fecundity, activity, and order of the cosmos.

The aesthetic dimensions of the soul's contemplation of this threefold testimony is rich and complex. The physical realm of being is beautiful in itself—in its proportion, arrangement, and disposition toward its proper end. It is also metaphysically beautiful in its conformity to the divine *Formae* that render it into a well-ordered whole. But Bonaventure's focus in this passage is its analogical beauty. The soul's contemplation of the physical realm of being reveals a complex list of properties—its measure, number, weight, and so on—that testify to the existence of the *Primum Principium*, God the Father in Its perfect perichoresis with the Son and the Spirit. These properties serve as an analog that reveals something about the nature of their target, the power of the *Primum Principium* that brought them into existence, the wisdom that ordered them into a coherent whole, and the goodness that leads them to their proper end. Their analogical beauty depends on the *rapport* between them

and their target, the degree to which they testify to the power, wisdom, and goodness of God.

Bonaventure concluded this first step of contemplation with a pointed rebuke.[35] The soul that refuses to see the beauty of creation and its testimony to its Creator is "blind"; that refuses to hear, "deaf"; and that refuses to praise God for all He has done, "dumb." The soul that refuses to recognize the "signs" that testify to the "*Primum Principium*" is a "fool." He pleaded with his readers to open their eyes, ears, and lips, to "see, hear, praise, love, and adore, magnify, and honor God in every creature." He threatened those who refused to see, "the entire world [will] rise up against you . . ." Wisd. 5:21. Bonaventure's rhetoric evokes Hobbes' description of the state of nature, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[36] But he promised "glory for the wise" who "rejoice" in the work of the Lord's hands, a promise that evokes Isaiah's description of the Peaceful Kingdom, in which the wolf lies with the lamb, the leopard with the kid, the lion with the calf, and so on, in an earthly paradise without violence in which "the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea."[37]

The Second Step: The Contemplation of God *in* the Physical Realm of Being

Bonaventure developed an intriguing and wholly original analogy between the process of the soul's apprehension, delight, and judgment of the physical realm of being and the soul's apprehension, delight, and judgment of the presence of the Divinity in the second step of the *Itinerarium*.[38] The soul apprehends the physical realm through the mediation of sensible *species* or likenesses (*similitudines*). These *species* testify to the nature and existence of their origin in the real world, the world as it really exists, independent of our mind. The soul then delights in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of these *species*, a delight that depends on the degree of proportion between the soul that apprehends them and their intrinsic properties. The process comes to its end in the soul's judgment of them; that is, its agent intellect abstracts an intelligible *species* from the sensible, and it does so in the light of the divine *Formae* in order to provide the soul with the *certain* reasons (*rationes*) for its delight.

This threefold process, Bonaventure insisted, is a vestige of the immediacy of the soul's apprehension, delight, and judgment of the divine *Species*. The soul's apprehension of the divine *Species*, the perfect *similitudo* of the *Primum Principium*, is analogous to its apprehension of the sensory *species*. It delights in the first (*primum*) beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the first *Species* that possesses the "highest proportionality" between itself and the intrinsic properties of the divine Impression that "preserves, satisfies, and

dispels the soul's every need." The process comes to its end in the soul's judgment of the reasons for its delight in the immediate presence of the divine Light: "God . . . is the light of truth. The entire created order shines forth in this infallible, indelible, indubitable, irrefutable, incontestable, immutable, in-circumscribable, interminable, indivisible, and thoroughly intelligible light."[39]

The analogy is subtle. The soul's abstraction of the intelligible *species* or *similitudo* is analogous to the Father's formation of a divine *Species*, the "perfect" *Similitudo*. This relationship between the Father and the Son is the basis for Bonaventure's analysis of divine Beauty. The Father remains ineffable, similar to Plotinus' conception of The One (τὸ Ἕv). But He reveals Himself in the formation of His Son, the perfect Image of the Invisible God (Col. 1:15) and the paradigm of Beauty. However, Bonaventure's emphasis in this passage is the further analogy between the intimacy of the soul's apprehension, delight, and judgment of sensible *species* and the intimacy of its apprehension, delight, and judgment of the divine *Species* present to it in the epistemological process. Bonaventure's epistemology is inherently mystical. The soul is capable of perception, delight, and judgment, that is, the abstraction of intelligible *species* without divine assistance, but it necessarily relies on the illumination of the divine *Species* to render its belief into knowledge through the proper justification of those *species* in the light of its eternal Truth. Bonaventure insisted on the real and local presence of the divine *Species*, similar to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist in his sacramental theology, to bring the epistemological process to its full resolution: the soul's apprehension of the divine *Species*, its delight in It, and its discernment in its epistemological union with the divine Illumination of Truth.

Bonaventure augmented his analogy of the soul's apprehension, delight, and judgment of the sensible *species* with a brief review of Augustinian number theory. Numbers exist in physical objects (*sonantes*), in our perception of them (*occursores*), in our production of well-proportioned things (*progressores*), in the pleasure we take in the perception of them (*sensuales*), in our memory of them (*memoriales*), and the numerical *formae* that regulate all the other types of number (*iudiciales*). He added a seventh to Augustine's list, the artistic numbers (*artficiales*) in the mind of the artist that he or she uses to produce beautiful, well-proportioned artifacts. But he also argued for an analogy between the number in the mind of the human artist and the divine Artist: number is "the principal exemplar in the mind of the Creator . . . the *Ars Aeterna*." Thus, number is "the principal vestige that leads to Wisdom." Number is the principal *forma* in the mind of the divine Architect. It is the basis for the truth of the created order in the soul's abstraction of intelligible *species* in the light of the divine *Formae*. It is also the basis for the beauty of the created order. It renders the world into a well-proportioned, coherent

whole and structures its development in a well-ordered process that reaches its proper end on the last day.

Bonaventure concluded this stage of the ascent with a summary of its contents: the shadows, echoes, pictures, vestiges, images, spectacles, exempla, illustrations, and signs that "transport" the soul to "the invisible things of God."[40] The summary is rhetorical. He did not draw any particular distinction among these various terms in this passage. He intended, I suspect, to overwhelm the cognitive capacity of his readers and to stir the affections of their hearts for the beauty of the earth, "to see, hear, praise, love, and adore, magnify, and honor God in every creature, lest perchance, the entire universe rise against you."

The Third Step: The Contemplation of God
per the Intelligible Realm of Being

Bonaventure introduced the third step of the *Itinerarium* with a powerful supporting analogy that marks the soul's progress: the Desert Tabernacle of Exodus 25–31 and 35–40. The soul has moved through the "outer court" of the Tabernacle that houses the *vestiges* of the Divinity and now stands "before" the Holy of Holies.[41] The light of the candelabra of truth shines on the "face of the mind" and reveals that it possesses the "splendor" of the image of the Blessed Trinity. This stage of contemplation, the contemplation of the image, refers to the rational soul's contemplation of its own testimony to the Divinity—its faculties of memory, intellect, and will that render it into the image of the Three-Person'd God. Bonaventure explained: "Consider, therefore, the activities of these three faculties and their relationships, and you will be able to see God through (*per*) yourself as you see through an image."

He depended heavily on Augustine's formulation of the analogy to derive the testimony of the proper function of each faculty to the properties proper to each of the divine *Personae* and the testimony of their unity of operation with one another to the unity of the divine *Essentia*.[42] He began with the faculty of the memory that includes the retention of things—past, present, and, through foresight, the future—as well as the possession of the principles and axioms of the sciences: the concept of the point, for example, or the Peripatetic principles that form the basis of classical logic, the principles of non-contradiction, the excluded middle, and identity. These principles, Bonaventure explained, "cannot enter through the doors of the senses" but are "present" to the soul in its faculty of memory through its participation in "a changeless light that recalls changeless truth." The memory, often neglected in the secondary literature, is critical to the proper functioning of the mind. It is the point of contact between the soul and the illumination of its intellect. It receives the light of the divine *Species* that regulates the intellect's

abstraction of the intelligible *species* to render its knowledge certain. It is an image of the Divinity "so present to itself . . . that it grasps God; it possesses God, and it participates in God."[43]

Bonaventure summarized the function of the intellect in his analysis of the terms, propositions, and inferences of Peripatetic logic.[44] He invoked the classical method of regressive analysis to first principles to demonstrate the intellect's reliance on the Divinity. The most fundamental first principle is being (*ens*), so much so that without the knowledge of being in itself, no-thing or being is known. But this being, he argued, is the divine Being, the "most pure, most actual, most complete and absolute being"—an identification that will prove critical on the fifth step of the soul's ascent. It is "unqualified," but it is also the *Ars Aeterna* that possesses "the essences of all things in their purity." It is this light that "enlightens every person who comes into the world," and the intellect's access to the light of these "essences" enables it to know things with certainty.

The will depends on the highest good (*summum bonum*) in its effort to counsel, judge, and desire good things.[45] Bonaventure argued that it is only in light of the higher good that the soul is able to inquire, judge, and then desire what is better and only in the light of the highest good that it is able to distinguish among the good, the better, and the best. "The highest Good is so desirable, that creatures are unable to love any other thing except through their desire for that Good."

Bonaventure then invoked the analogy of proportion to explicate the testimony of the image of the rational soul and its faculties to the Three Person'd God. Memory "emerges at the crest of our understanding" in the form of a mental "word." It gives rise to the intellect "as its offspring" in its contemplation of that word and, in cooperation with its intellect, "breathed forth love"—the paradigmatic expression of the will. He then argued that the "order, origin, and relationship" of these three faculties is an analogy of proportion to the divine Mind and its consubstantial faculties of memory, intellect, and will that correspond to God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, respectively. "The soul then, when it considers itself through the mirror (*speculum*) that is itself, rises to the speculation (*speculandam*) of the Blessed Trinity, the Father, the Word, and Love, Three *Personae*, co-eternal, co-equal, and consubstantial to such a degree that whatever is in any one of them is also in the others, but not one of them is another."

He reinforced this analogy with a brief consideration of the Stoic division of philosophical inquiry into natural, rational, and moral philosophy.[46] The first, natural philosophy, is the study of "the cause of being" and signifies "the power of the Father." The second, rational philosophy, is the study of "the basis of understanding" and signifies "the wisdom of the Word." The third, moral philosophy, is the study of "the order of living" and signifies

"the goodness of the Holy Spirit."[47] He further subdivided natural philosophy into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; rational philosophy into grammar, logic, and rhetoric; and moral philosophy into individual, familial, and political ethics. The first term in each series, he argued, is analogous to the Father, the second to the Son, and the third to the Spirit. Their order indicates the order of relationship among the divine *Personae*; and their cohesion, the essential cohesion among the divine *Personae*.

The aesthetic dimensions of this stage of the *Itinerarium* are distinctly different from those of the first. The soul now contemplates the beauty of itself, in itself, and its own testimony to its Creator, rather than the beauty of something else, outside itself. Its metaphysical beauty depends on the degree of its conformity, its *rapport*, to its *forma* in the *Ars Aeterna*. Its analogical beauty depends on the degree of its conformity to its testimony to the Three Person'd God. Its faculty of memory is an analog for the Father, its intellect for the Son, and its will for the Spirit. The cohesion among its faculties is an analog for the cohesion of the coeternal, coequal, and consubstantial divine Faculties in a thorough perichoresis through one another, in one another, and with one another.

Bonaventure ends this step with a now familiar rhetorical trope. He contrasts the "wise" who see the extraordinary "brightness" of their own testimony to the "Eternal Light" with the "foolish" who remain "blind."[48] The wise reap the rewards of their faith and rise up to the analogical revelation of their divine Exemplar in a state of wonder (*miratio*) and *admiratio*, a more intense state of wonder, a cognitive delight in the contemplation of the beauty of their divine Exemplar. He cited the Psalmist to confirm his judgment: "Thou enlighten wonderfully from the everlasting hills," but the foolish, who refuse to recognize the beauty of their Exemplar, reap the punishment of their disbelief and remain "troubled" in mind and body (Ps. 75:5).

The Fourth Step: The Contemplation of God *in* the Intelligible Realm of Being

The focus of the fourth step of the soul's ascent is its reformation into a likeness (*similitudo*) of God, a more perfect image (*imago recreationis*) of God—the Father, Son, and Spirit. The soul's reformation of itself into a more perfect image begins with the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love that clothe the image of the soul so that it can reform itself along the threefold hierarchy of the *triplica via*: the process of purgation, illumination, and perfection that renders it worthy of union with Christ, its mystical Spouse.[49]

Bonaventure endorsed an Aristotelian definition of the virtues: "a disposition (*habitus*) that perfects" the soul, a "voluntary" disposition, "rightly

reasoned" in accord with the concept of the "mean" between the extremes of vice.[50] But he did so in light of his theological convictions; the purpose of these dispositions is to assist the soul in fulfilling the commandment of the law to love God and neighbor.[51] He brought together a number of lists of the virtues: the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love; the cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, fortitude, and prudence; and the intellectual virtues of science, art, prudence, understanding, and wisdom—thus repeating himself.[52] But the theological virtues proved the most critical. They, more so than the others, prepared the soul for union with God, and love, the principal virtue, is the metaphysical *forma* common to all of them. It renders them effective; without love, all the other virtues will fail to properly dispose the soul to the love of God and neighbor.

The *triplica via* is the moral counterpart to the soul's cognitive *reductio*. Its origins lie in the same Platonic classification of philosophy into the consideration of the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the divine that shaped the stages of the cognitive *reductio*. Bonaventure had inherited the basic formulation from Dionysius, read through the lenses of Dionysius' translators and commentators, Hugh, Richard, and Thomas Gallus.[53] Bonnefoy identified two innovations in Bonaventure's development of the triad.[54] The most significant is his attention to the role of the person of Christ in the process. The soul's purgation consists in its cooperative effort to cleanse itself of sin, its inordinate desire for the physical realm of being, through the grace of Christ's sacrifice on the cross. Its illumination consists in its imitation of Christ's life and, sometimes, death; and its dual effort on the paths of purgation and illumination furthers its reformation into a more perfect and, I would add, a more beautiful image of God. The second is Bonaventure's insistence that the soul progressed through the three *viae* simultaneously, insofar as its purgation depended fully on its illumination, and together, these transformed the soul into an ever more perfect image of God through its cooperative effort with the grace of Christ crucified. The goal, as Dionysius had insisted, had been to enable the human person to be like God and thus fit for union with Him,[55] but in this case, fit for union with Christ, the focus of Bonaventure's reformulation of the triad.

Bonaventure then introduced one of the most intriguing aspects of his aesthetics: the soul's progress in the *triplica via* restores its spiritual senses that enable it to "apprehend" the real and immediate presence of the mystical Christ: *increatum*, *incarnatum*, *et inspiratum*.[56] The reformed soul sees, through its faculty of spiritual sight, the "highest beauty" in the light of His countenance; it hears the "highest harmony" in His voice; it smells, tastes, and touches Him in the most intense sensations and "passes over into Him in the ecstasy of love." The soul, like the Bride in the *Song of Solomon*, sees, hears, smells, tastes, and touches her Bridegroom; "delights" in Him; and "sings" in

devotion (*devotionem*), astonishment (*admirationem*), and exultation (*exultationem*) in her union with Him. She comes to the "fullness of delight" in her intimate embrace with Him and "rests wholly on her Beloved"—a thinly veiled reference to the intimacy of sexual union.

The analogy of the spiritual senses has a long history. It is deeply rooted in the scriptures that call on its readers to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the Divinity and has captured the attention of a long list of influential philosopher-theologians in the Christian tradition: Origen of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Thomas Aquinas, Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley, Karl Rahner, and, most recently, Hans Urs von Balthasar.[57] Current scholarship ranks Bonaventure's formulation of the doctrine among the more influential in its history, but the precise nature of Bonaventure's doctrine is the subject of significant debate.

Bonnefoy had distinguished between Bonaventure's broad application of the analogy to his doctrine of grace and his narrow application to the effect of grace in the soul's relationship with God, but even the narrow application, Bonnefoy concluded, remains hopelessly vague.[58] Rahner refuted Bonnefoy's claim.[59] He argued that it is possible to separate a coherent doctrine of the spiritual senses from Bonaventure's more extensive use of the analogy.[60] He identified a number of critical points in Bonaventure's expression of the analogy, but two are of particular relevance to Bonaventure's aesthetics. The first is that the proper object of Bonaventure's formulation of the doctrine in his earlier, more philosophically rigorous texts, is God—the Father, Son, and Spirit. The second, Bonaventure enlisted the analogy to refer to distinct experiences. Sight and the higher senses referred to the soul's contemplation of God in its union with God; its lower senses, particularly touch, referred to its affective union with God in apophatic ecstasy. Thus, Rahner conflated the soul's nuptial union with the mystical Christ at this stage of its ascent with its ecstatic union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—at the summit of its ascent. Balthasar disagreed.[61] He argued, *contra* Rahner, that the proper object of Bonaventure's analogy of the spiritual senses in his later, more developed texts, is the fullness of Christ, the *Verbum increatum, incarnatum, et inspiratum*, and located their proper operation in the soul's mystical union with Christ prior to its apophatic union with the Three Person'd God.

The current consensus favors Rahner's claim that it is possible to extract a coherent doctrine of the spiritual senses from Bonaventure's strict application of the analogy but that Balthasar's reading of the doctrine is largely correct.[62] Nevertheless, Bonaventure's doctrine remains obscure on a number of admittedly smaller points: his distinction between the senses as a metaphor for the soul's cognitive apprehension of God and the more precise doctrine of the spiritual senses in the soul's mystical union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—and particularly in his later works, the person of Christ, is

not always clear; his identification of the objects of particular senses is not entirely consistent; and, finally, he continued to confuse the nuptial ecstasy of the soul's union with Christ and the apophatic ecstasy of its union with God, as well as the more rare experience of rapture, even in his later, more well-developed texts.[63]

Perhaps the fault is in Bonaventure's failure to develop a precise doctrine over the course of his lifetime. But a better explanation is that Bonaventure possessed no small skill as an author as well as a philosopher-theologian. He relied heavily on various means of poetic expression in his later works, in this case, the analogy of the senses and the erotic metaphors of the Song to further his readers' devotion and, as LaNave has pointed out in his estimate of the current consensus, their affective knowledge of Christ, that is, the knowledge of Christ, who is simultaneously an object of the affection of their wills.[64] The problem, then, is the application of the criteria for one mode of expression to another, not Bonaventure's inability to achieve a degree of logical precision in his effort to touch the hearts of his readers and stir the affections of their will.

Bonaventure's doctrine of the spiritual senses is a significant development in the analogical dimensions of his aesthetics even in its poetic excess—perhaps even more so because of it. The soul—reformed into the more perfect image (*imago recreationis*) of God through its progress in the purgation, illumination, and perfection of the *triplica via*—is more beautiful in relation to its *forma* in the *Ars Aeterna* than it had been in its decided deformity in its sin. This reformation into a more perfect image of the Divinity also restores its spiritual senses, analogous to its physical senses, that enable it to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the real presence of the mystical Christ within it, delight in Him, and determine the reasons for its delight, the *rapport* between itself, reformed into a more perfect image of the Divinity, and the incomparable beauty of Christ the *Verbum increatum, incarnatum, et inspiratum.* Bonaventure concluded this step with a summary of the soul's recovered status in union with its Spouse that reinforces its beauty and newly recovered dignity: It "is inhabited by Divine Wisdom," reformed into a "daughter," a "spouse," a "friend of God"; reinstated as a "member," a "sister," an "heir of Christ"; and transformed into the "temple of the Holy Spirit," with "faith" its foundation, "hope" its walls, and "sanctity" its dedication to "God."[65]

The Terrible Beauty of Christ Crucified

Bonaventure's focus at this stage of the soul's ascent is the mystical Christ, its Bridegroom, who died, was buried, *and rose again*.[66] But this focus obscures the soul's contemplation of the passion of Christ, the most troublesome aspect of the *Verbum incarnatum* as an aesthetic object.

Bonaventure had invoked Francis' vision of Christ crucified in the form of the six-winged seraph at the start of the *Itinerarium*, but he did so to identify the means of the soul's ascent, the grace of Christ crucified, and to provide an analogy for the six steps of that ascent.[67] He repeated the reference in his description of the summit of the soul's ascent as a metaphor for its apophatic union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit.[68] But he did not emphasize the imitation of Christ's life in the *Itinerarium* or the sustained contemplation of Christ crucified, a form of devotion that lies at the heart of the Franciscan *forma vitae*.

Nevertheless, he had explored the passion in greater detail in other texts, notably the *Lignum vitae*, a series of meditations on the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, which also enjoyed considerable popularity throughout the later Middle Ages.[69] He depended on a wide range of sources for his meditations,[70] but the current scholarly consensus has identified a number of innovations that render them something entirely new. First, he overcame the most common shortcomings of the tradition that tended to emphasize a superficial sentimentality or a staid intellectual reflection on the ethical implications of Christ's life. His meditations lead the reader into "deeper mystical states of consciousness" similar to those of the *Itinerarium*, a distinctly Franciscan mysticism of the soul's union with Christ, so that the "disciple of Christ . . . can truly say with the bride: A bundle of myrrh is my beloved to me: he will linger between my breasts" (Song of Sol. 1:13).[71] Second, he weaved his sources into an original synthesis in which he asked his readers to identify with Christ to a greater extent than his predecessors, to become one with Christ in so intense a relationship of body and soul that they can say with Paul: "I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me" (Gal. 2:19).[72] Finally, his description of Christ's passion is significantly more realistic and more horrific than those of his predecessors, a development that directly influenced the even more extreme depictions in both literature and the visual arts, the Pseudo-Bonaventure's *Meditationes vitae Christi*, Ubertino of Casale's *Arbor vitae crucifixae Jesu*, Ludolph of Saxony's *Vita Christi*, and, above all, Grünewald's gruesome representation of Christ crucified on the Isenheim Altarpiece.[73]

Thus, Bonaventure's meditations transcend the facile division between the intellectual contemplation of the academic philosopher-theologian and the affective contemplation of the mystic. He invoked the full extent of the epistemological process in his invitation to meditate on Christ in the *Lignum vitae*—the soul's perception, delight, and judgment—that leads to its discernment of the reasons for its delight in the incomparable beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of the *Deus homo*. He invited his readers to engage the full extent of their sense capacities, both their exterior senses that see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the sensible species of their proper objects and their interior

senses that form these proper *species* into coherent wholes, complete pictures, so to speak, of the full extent of Christ's divinely human form. He encouraged them to delight in the beauty, agreeableness, and goodness of Christ and then to engage their higher faculties—their memory, intellect, and will—to know Him, love Him, and enter into a more intimate union with Him.

The soul's interior sense of the imagination is critical in this process.[74] The physical senses provide access to the immediate presence of the physical realm of being, *hic et nunc*, but the senses of the imagination provide access to the *distant* presence of the Christ of the Gospels: the Christ who lived, moved, and had His being in ancient Palestine.[75] The soul's imagination compounds and divides the impressions of the five senses stored in its memory into the fictions (*ficta*) that enable it to imagine its presence in Christ's life in the distant past; to enter into the biblical story, to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch the full extent of Christ's being as if it were present *hic et nunc*; to delight in His beauty, agreeableness, and goodness; and then, through judgment, to know and love Him.

Bonaventure identified Christ as the aesthetic object par excellence in his description of the central metaphor of the text, the Tree of Life: its flowers "beautiful (*formositate*) with the radiance of every color . . . perfumed with the sweetness (*suavitate*) of every fragrance," its fruits full of "every delight."[76] He continued the identification throughout his meditations in his invitation to his readers to imagine their participation in the events of Christ's life, to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch Christ and delight in Him, analogous to the Bride in the Song of Solomon, who delights in the beauty of her Bridegroom. He asked them to delight in the splendor of the brightness of His Divinity,[77] to hear the choirs of angels at his birth,[78] to smell the fragrance of His body as He lies between their breasts,[79] to taste His body in the bread of the Eucharist, and, in an exchange of mutual intimacy that evokes the nuptial themes of the Song of Solomon, to offer their bodies to Him "as a pleasant and sacred place of rest."[80]

He also developed a profound hermeneutic tradition that poised Christ's beauty with the denial of that beauty in the events of Christ's passion: His arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and death. Bonaventure cited a standard verse to affirm Christ's incomparable beauty: He is "fairer in beauty (*formosus*) than the sons of men" (Ps. 45:2).[81] But he also supported the traditional identification of the suffering servant of Isaiah with Christ, in whom "there was neither beauty (*species*) nor comeliness" (Isa. 53:2). Thus, Bonaventure explicitly negated the proposition of the Psalmist: Christ, he insisted, "appeared ugly for the sons of men (*pro filiis hominum deformis apparuit*)" in the agony of His passion. The "most beautiful flower of the root of Jesse (*flos ille pulcherrimus de radice Jesse*)," which had been the source of the soul's extraordinary delight, "withered in His passion" (Isa. 11:1).[82] Bonaventure confirmed

this denial in other texts: His immense power destroyed, His beauty robbed of its color, His joy tortured, His eternity ended.[83]

Bonaventure's denial of Christ's beauty in His passion comes to the fore in two scenes: his depiction of Christ's abandonment on the cross and his depiction of the blood of the cross. The authors of the Gospels record Christ's evocation of the Psalmist: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" (Mark 15:34). Early commentators on the passage had identified it as a prophecy: the agony of the Psalmist testifies to the agony of Christ: "Dogs have surrounded me. The company of the wicked surround me. They have pierced my hands and my feet. They have numbered all my bones" (Ps. 22:16–17). Bestul notes that the Psalmist's memorable phrase, "they have numbered all my bones," inspired frequent descriptions of Christ stretched so tightly in pain on the cross that his bones were visible through his flesh. Bonaventure intensified his description of the agony of Christ's crucifixion in his metaphor of the hide of an animal stretched on the wood of a rack to bleed dry: "Thrown roughly on the wood of the cross, spread out, pulled forward, and stretched back and forth like a hide, he was pierced by pointed nails, fixed on a cross by his sacred hands and feet and most roughly torn with wounds."[84]

He devoted an entire meditation to the image of Christ "dripping with blood."[85] He informed his readers that "Christ was stained with His own blood," so much so that His "apparel was truly red and his garments like those of a wine presser" (Isa. 63.2). He assured them that Christ's blood "flowed profusely" and asked them to *slowly* consider the blood that flowed profusely from each wound, "first from the bloody sweat" in the Garden of Gethsemane, "then from the lashes and the thorns" that the soldiers inflicted upon Him prior to his crucifixion, "then from the nails" that fastened Him on the wooden rack of the cross, "and finally from the lance" from which blood and water flowed "like a fountain."

The Sublime and Other Lenses of Interpretation

The category of sublime would have served Bonaventure well had it been available to him, the experience of something overwhelming in its grandeur, its nobility, or its terror, particularly Burke's bifurcation of the beautiful and the sublime on basis of the latter's overwhelming terror.[86] But the sublime has not fared well. It is now something passé.[87] Christian philosophers and theologians tend to prefer to fold the sublime into the beautiful, rather than distinguish between the two. Barth led the effort in this regard, and Balthasar developed Barth's insight.[88] It now serves as the standard solution to the problem. The most authentic aesthetic experience in the Christian tradition, Balthasar had argued, is an aspect of delight in "seeing" God the Father's disclosure of Himself in His Son, in Christ's life *and death*. The cross, Balthasar

argued, is the fullness of God's revelation of Himself, the Paradigm of Love (1 John 4:8), who laid down his life for those he loved, and emptied himself on the cross (Phil. 2:8).

Balthasar argued for Bonaventure's inclusion in this wider vision on the basis of his conception of Divine condescension (*condescensio*).[89] God the Father's perfect expression of Himself in the eternal production of His Son establishes a motif that repeats itself in the cosmic hymn: God the Father's creation of the cosmos *ex nihilo*, in perfect concord with the Son and the Spirit, who "broods" over the surface the deep (Gen. 1:2); His revelation to the cosmos again in perfect concord with the Son and the Spirit; His salvation of the cosmos; His sanctification of the cosmos; and His glorification of the cosmos . . . for no other reason than love. The cross is the greatest expression of this motif. Its "nuptial poverty" is the full revelation of the "beauty" of the "heart of God," the beauty of the sublime sacrifice of the Lover for His Beloved. Bonaventure provided explicit confirmation for Balthasar's thesis: the "height" of the divine *Imitatio* lies in the *condescensio* of God on the cross.[90]

But Balthasar has failed to adequately account for Bonaventure's explicit denial of Christ's beauty. Has he read something into these passages? Or has Bonaventure contradicted himself? Or simply sacrificed the logical rigor of his Christology to poetic expression? Bonaventure had suggested a subtle resolution of the dilemma in his distinction between two criteria for beauty in his defense of icons and other artistic representations.[91] The first criterion, "when the representation is drawn well," enlists the standards of proportion, order, and perhaps the colors of *l'esthétique musicale*. He denied the beauty of Christ's passion in this sense of the term. Christ's body was deformed in His passion, "spread out, pulled forward, and stretched back and forth . . . most roughly torn with wounds." The second, "when it well represents the object of which it is an image," enlists the standard of the metaphysical *similitudines* of *l'esthétique de la lumière*. He affirmed the beauty of Christ's passion in this sense, in the *rapport* of the sublime sacrifice of the Paradigm of Love for His Beloved in conformity to the will of the Father.

Nevertheless, the problem may well be exaggerated. Bonaventure's account of the soul's contemplation of the mystical Christ in the *Itinerarium* corresponds with his account of the risen Christ of the *Lignum vitae*. The flower that withered in his passion has become "the most beautiful of all things" (*ut omnium esset decor*) in his resurrection.[92] The pilgrim soul's union with the mystical Christ is a foretaste of its "marriage to the Lamb" in the world to come, where it will enter into "the secret bridal chamber . . . into the nuptials with its Spouse and with the door closed, will abide in the beauty of peace in the tabernacle of confidence and opulent repose."[93] Bonaventure emphasized the impossible degree of the soul's delight in its Spouse through

an excessive display of superlatives. Christ the Bridegroom is "the inaccessible beauty of the Most High God."[94] He is "the pure brightness of the eternal light" and shines with the brightness of "a thousand times a thousand lights." He is the "fountain" of unfathomable height, unfathomable depth, unfathomable breadth, unfathomable purity. He is the stream of "the oil of gladness" and "the torrent of the fire . . . of its pleasure in God."

One final point in regard to Bonaventure's denial of the appellation of beauty to Christ's passion is essential: Christ's spiritual beauty remained intact throughout His ordeal and shone through His broken body, so to speak. Bonaventure had argued that the human person's spiritual beauty, the beauty of its will and its affective dimensions, depends on the rectitude of its will in conformity with the Divine will.[95] The sinful human person is incapable of doing so without the grace of the Holy Spirit, who infuses the disposition to practice the virtues into its soul.[96] Thus, the human person, through the cooperative process of the *triplica via* and the grace of these infused virtues, reclaims its inheritance as the image (*imago*) and likeness (*similitudo*) of God and conforms itself to God (*Deiformis*); it becomes "the image of the new creation (*imago recreationis*)."[97]

But this, Bonaventure argued, is rather unnecessary in the case of Christ, who knew no sin.[98] He possessed the fullness of grace. He retained His image and likeness to God in His humanity. He is the perfect exemplar of the rectitude of the will and the virtues, the "center" (*medium*) who both exemplifies the practice of the virtues and whose conduct inspires our own.[99] Thus, He is the exemplar of the cardinal virtue of fortitude in the face of trial.[100] His prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane confirms His steadfastness: "Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me; yet, not my will but yours be done" (Luke 22:42). He took that cup and the terrible beauty of His bruised, broken, and bleeding body testified to the radiant beauty of his steadfast will.

The soul's proper response to these events is a critical component in its progress on the *triplica via*.[101] The soul's initial response—terror at the sight of Christ's arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and death—was the most natural. But terror led to a compunction that motivated the soul's purgation of its sin in its effort to render itself fit for union with the risen Christ in this life and the next. It also motivated the soul's compassion for Christ and all those who suffer. The list of moral exemplars includes Mary, his mother, and John, whom he loved, who remained at his side throughout his ordeal. It includes Joseph of Arimathea, who removed his body from the cross, anointed it, wrapped it, and laid it gently in the tomb. And it includes Mary Magdalene, who, with other unnamed women, went to his tomb to anoint his body, but found it sealed. She "bathed the tomb with her tears."[102]

Francis' encounter with the leper provides an even more striking moral exemplar. Bonaventure records a scene, widely attested in the early

hagiographical literature, in which Francis confronts his initial reaction to those who suffered from leprosy.[103] He had been repulsed at the sight of their deformed bodies. But in imitation of Christ, who had been despised "as a leper" (Isa. 53:3), he dedicated himself to their care. He served them, provided for them, visited them, and even "kissed their hands and their mouths." It was a remarkable act of compassion insofar as their hands and mouths bore the wounds of their disease. Francis is an exemplar of what Davies has called an opportunity to transform the diminishment of the body into an act of redemption for those who suffer diminishment and those who care for them.[104] Francis' compassion reaffirmed the moral value of those who suffer in spite of their deformity. It also rendered him into a more perfect image of Christ, who laid down His life so that others might live.

The Fifth Step: The Contemplation of Being Itself

Bonaventure introduced the fifth step of the *Itinerarium* with a further explication of the analogy of the Tabernacle. The soul is now in the third stage of its ascent. It has entered into the "Holy of Holies" of the Tabernacle, "where the Cherubim of Glory stand over the ark and overshadow the Mercy Seat."[105] The Holy of Holies had been reserved for the high priest who entered it on the Day of Atonement, the most sacred day in the Jewish calendar, to sprinkle the blood of the sacrificial bull on the Mercy Seat. Samuel had indicated that God, the Lord of Hosts, was enthroned between the Cherubim on or perhaps over the Mercy Seat (1 Sam. 4:4). Thus, the high priest came face to face with the presence of God on the Day of Atonement and offered the blood of the sacrifice to the Lord of Hosts.

This step, the first step of the third stage of the *Itinerarium*, is distinct from the steps of the two previous stages for a number of reasons. The soul, reformed into the more perfect image of God, has entered into the height of its contemplation and, with the Cherubim, gazes directly on God, the Lord of Hosts, enthroned between them. It is a rare state of contemplation and difficult to comprehend—although not impossible. It is also the cessation of the aesthetic mechanism that had driven the soul to this point in its ascent; the rich analogies between creation and its Creator have accomplished their purpose. Nevertheless, Bonaventure invoked an intriguing rhetorical device at this stage of ascent, the coincidence of opposites, that mimics and subverts the aesthetic mechanism of analogical *similitudo* and further prepares the soul for the end of its ascent in an apophatic union with God.

The coincidence of opposites brings together pairs of opposing properties in God or the metaphysical principles that structure the universe in order to describe the comprehensiveness of those properties. Cousins, who first identified Bonaventure's use of the device, argued that it has a long history.[106]

It emerged in the mythologies of the Sky God and Earth Mother common among Indo-European civilizations; the dual manifestations of Shiva, the Creator and Destroyer; and the Taoist principles of the Yin and Yang. It became explicit in the late medieval philosophical-theology of Nicholas of Cusa, it served as the basis of Hegel's dialectic, and it exerted a profound influence on the study of world religions. Mircea Eliade adopted it as the central theme of his seminal text, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*: "It is implied in every hierophany whatever, for every hierophany shows, makes manifest, the coexistence of contradictory essences: sacred and profane, spirit and matter, eternal and non-eternal, and so on."[107]

Cousins argued that the device is the "indigenous logic" of Bonaventure's thought. It permeates each stream of his thought, his philosophy, theology, and mysticism; brings them together into a coherent whole; and serves as the key to unlock its secrets.[108] His thesis is controversial.[109] Some endorsed it,[110] some rejected it,[111] and, more recently, Delio has proposed a compromise.[112]

Cousins identified three types of coincidences in the world's philosophical, theological, and mystical literature.[113] The first is a coincidence in unity, in which opposites coincide to such an extent that they become one and cease to exist as opposites. The second is a coincidence in difference, in which opposites persist to such an extent that they achieve no real union. The third is a coincidence of unity in difference, in which opposites coincide while continuing to exist as opposites. He placed Bonaventure's formulation of the device in the third category.[114] Its root is Bonaventure's conception of the absolute primacy of God the Father and the two fundamental properties that emerged upon reflection on His primacy: inascibility and fecundity.[115] The Father's inascibility is the root of His inexhaustible fecundity that gives rise to a series of coincidences: the coincidence of the One and the Many in the Three Person'd God, the coincidence of the Creator and creation, the coincidence of Christ, *Deus et homo*, and Christ's coincidence with fallen humanity on the cross.[116] Cousins also argued for the privileged position of Christ within these coincidences: He is the divine *Mediator* between heaven and earth, its beginning and end, the center (*medium*) who holds all things together (Col. 1:17).[117]

Those opposed to the thesis proposed a number of objections: Cousin's lack of logical rigor; his inability to clearly distinguish the coincidences from the more common practice of the *via negativa*; his lack of attention to the details of Bonaventure's thought on metaphysical primacy, inascibility, and fecundity; and his tendency to conflate God the Son with Christ, the *Deus homo*. He answered some of these objections directly,[118] but others remain. A more careful analysis will help resolve them.

Bonaventure structured his presentation of the coincidence of opposites on this stage of the *Itinerarium* according to a definite schema: he invoked

the Cherubim as the metaphor for the contemplation of the divine Being; he presented a traditional definition of God; he developed a reformulation of the ontological argument for the existence of God on the basis of that definition; he derived a set of primary properties from that definition; and then paired each primary property with its impossible complement in order to "lift up" the minds of his readers to a sense of wonder (*mirabilis*), astonishment (*admiratio*), and awe (*stupor*) in the contemplation of these impossible pairs—all in preparation for the soul's apophatic union with God.

The first of the two Cherubim, he explained, contemplates "Being Itself," that is, "the One Who Is," the scriptures' testimony to "I am."[119] He argued Being Itself (*ipsum esse*) is "so absolutely certain that it cannot be thought not to be."[120] The existence of particular beings is debatable, but the concept of being in itself is indubitable. He derived a standard series of properties of Being Itself on the basis of this definition, primacy, eternity, simplicity, actuality, perfection, and unity, and then paired each of these properties with a complement in order to lift up the soul in a sense of astonishment (*admiratio*). "For being itself is first and last, eternal and most present, most simple and most extended, most actual and most immutable, most perfect and most immense, unsurpassed in unity and holds together all things."[121]

A closer look at each of these properties and their complementary opposites confirms Cousins' reading: Bonaventure paired each primary property with a complementary property (p & q), not the affirmation of both the property and its denial (p & ~p) that characterized the *via negativa* (see table 4.3).

Bonaventure's formulation of the coincidence of these complementary opposites mimics his formulation of the analogs of the vestiges, images, and likenesses he had invoked on earlier stages of the ascent. The soul's contemplation of the primary property within each coincidence reveals its complement, similar to the way the soul's contemplation of the properties of each analog revealed something about its target. But the contemplation of the primary property reveals a distinct, complementary property, rather than something that bears a degree of analogical similarity to them and, thus, subverts the principle of analogy in the degree of its difference: the contemplation of the first demands the last; the eternal, the most present; the simple,

Table 4.3   The Coincidence of Opposites in the *Itinerarium* 5.7

First	Last
Eternal	Most present
Most simple	Most extended
Most actual	Most immutable
Most perfect	Most immense
Unsurpassed in unity	Holds all things

Author created.

the greatest; and so on. The soul's attempt to make sense of them leads it to a state of suspended wonder (*miratio*) and a more intense state of wonder or astonishment (*admiratio*). Its attempt threatens to overwhelm its capabilities. It evokes something of the grandeur of the sublime, the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* of the fundamental, metaphysical properties of the divine Being.

The Sixth Step: The Contemplation of Being as the Self-Diffusive Good

Bonaventure introduced the sixth step with the reiteration of the second Cherub, who contemplates Being as the Self-Diffusive Good of the Neo-Platonists.[122] He provided a short summary of another reformulation of the ontological argument, parallel to the ontological argument for the existence of Being Itself, in order to establish the necessary existence of "the highest good . . . that than which nothing better can be thought."[123] He argued that goodness is self-diffusive *per definitionem*, so the highest good necessarily diffuses itself in the production of a plurality of divine Hypostases—God the Father, Son, and Spirit. He derived a standard list of primary properties common to the divine *Personae* from this definition—communicability, consubstantiality, conformability, coequality, coeternity, and intimacy—and then paired each of these properties with its complement to lift up the soul to a higher state of "awe inspiring astonishment (*stuporem admirationis*)." The divine *Personae*—the Father, Son, and Spirit—communicate themselves supremely. They communicate the totality of their substance to one another but retain the property of individuality; supremely consubstantial, but preserve their plurality of hypostases; supremely conformed to one another, but possess distinct personalities; coequal, but possess a distinction of degree in order of logical origin; coeternal, but the Father eternally emanates the Son and, with the Son, the Spirit; supremely intimate, but distinct in their missions in the order of creation (see table 4.4).

Bonaventure further extended the pattern in an even more startling manner. He paired the properties of the One God, Being Itself, with their complements in God's hypostatic union with the person of Christ: God, the first, eternal,

Table 4.4   The Coincidence of Opposites in the *Itinerarium* 6.3

Supreme communicability	Individuality
Supreme consubstantiality	Plurality
Supreme conformability	Distinction
Supreme coequality	Degree
Supreme coeternity	Emanation
Supreme intimacy	Mission

Author created.

Table 4.5   The Coincidence of Opposites in the *Itinerarium* 6.5

First	Last in the order of creation
Eternal	Temporal
Most simple	Composite
Most actual	Passible
Most perfect	Lowly
Unsurpassed in unity	Unique

Author created.

simple, actual, perfect, and unsurpassed in unity, united in Christ, the *Deus homo*, with humanity, last in the order of creation, temporal, composite, passible to the point of death, lowly, and unique, an individual composite of the Divine and human distinct from all others (see table 4.5).

He then paired the properties of the Three Person'd God, the Self-Diffusive Good, with their complements in Christ: the One God in the unity of Three *Personae*, in complete accord with one another, mutually predicable, coadored, coexalted, and who exercise codominion over the created order, incarnate in Christ, who possesses two natures, divine and human, with a concomitant plurality of wills, properties, excellences, dignities, and powers (see table 4.6). The soul's contemplation of these, the most impossible of coincidences, propels it into the highest level of cataphatic contemplation, "the supreme height of astonishment (*admirationem altissimam*)."[124]

Bonaventure's account of the soul's contemplation of the One God in Three *Personae* in union with Christ in this passage testifies to his commitment to a Cosmic Christology, which has its roots in Irenaeus' concept of the recapitulation of the cosmos in the person of Christ, the *Deus homo*.[125] Christ, Bonaventure argued, is the sum total of all things: the fundamental principles (*rationes*) of the divine realm of being, the intelligible, and the physical in the final realization of the ideal order of the cosmos.[126] Bonaventure's Cosmic Christology is also the basis for his theory of atonement, in which Christ's sacrifice on the cross rendered the proper satisfaction for sin to God and defeated the "serpent."[127] His sacrifice thus restored the fallen to their proper end in union with God. Christ—the paradigm of beauty in the divine,

Table 4.6   The Coincidence of Opposites in the *Itinerarium* 6.6

A unity of three persons	A duality of natures
Complete accord	A plurality of wills
Mutual predication	A plurality of properties
Co-adoration	A plurality of excellence
Co-exaltation	A plurality of dignity
Codominion	A plurality of powers

Author created.

intelligible, and physical realms of being—restored the beauty of the cosmos precisely through the sacrifice of His physical beauty, a sacrifice that rendered His divine and intelligible Beauty all the more brilliant.

Bonaventure informed his readers that they have now reached "the perfect illumination of the soul."[128] But he did not think that human reason can fully penetrate the "veil" of the Desert Tabernacle, which obscures its vision of God's presence in the Mercy Seat. The cataphatic contemplation of God and Christ, the *Deus homo*, leaves the soul in a state of suspended *admiratio*, unable to fully fathom the conceptual tensions within the divine Being and its incarnation in human form. Nor does the soul's ascent end here, in its cataphatic contemplation of God. Instead, the soul's attempt to penetrate the veil leads to a state of *admirationem altissimam* in preparation for the summit of its ascent in which the soul reaches "the Sabbath of rest,"[129] "passes over,"[130] and "dies"[131] in an apophatic union *in Deum* that stills both the intellect and the will.[132]

Cousins correctly located the initial appearance of the coincidence of complementary opposites in Bonaventure's detailed discussion of God the Father's most fundamental property: inascibility (*innascibilitas*).[133] The Father's inascibility secured His status in a "perfect" and "noble" position insofar as He is the first in both the divine and created orders. It also established Him as "the fountain fullness (*fontalis plenitudo*)," the fecund source of all other things, *ad intra* in the production of the Son and Spirit and *ad extra* in the production of the created order. The Father's absolute priority was directly proportional to His absolute potency. Thus, the Father, the absolute first in both the divine and created orders, was the "most omnipotent" fecund source in both orders.

This is a significant beginning for Bonaventure's formulation of the coincidence of complementary opposites and a significant component in his aesthetics. The Father's inascibility established His absolute priority and the dynamic tension within the coincidence of the Father's fundamental inascibility and inexhaustible fecundity set in motion the metaphysical process of emanation, exemplarity, and consummation that informed the entirety of his philosophical, theological, and mystical thought. It also established the foundation for the aesthetic properties of the Divinity and the cosmos. The *rapport* between the Father and the Son and the Son's establishment of the *rapport* between the analog of the vestiges, images, and likenesses and their target—the power, wisdom, and goodness of the divine Being—is an inherent principle within the deepest foundation of the cosmos.

Cousins also correctly located the emergence of several series of coincidences in the *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*, the *Breviloquium*, and, above all, in these passages from the *Itinerarium*.[134] They serve a dual

purpose in each of these treatises. They provide an analysis of the deepest mysteries of the divine Being and Its relationship with the created order, and Bonaventure invoked them for a purpose specific to his mysticism: to "lift up" the soul to a sense of wonder (*mirabilis*), astonishment (*admiratio*), and awe (*stupor*) and stretch the *rapport* between the soul and the object of its contemplation to its limit in preparation for the summit of its ascent in apophatic union.

But Cousins' inclusion of Bonaventure's discussion of Christ the center (*medium*) in the *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*[135] disrupts this pattern. Delio repositions his thesis in response. She argues that Bonaventure located Christ the *medium* within his reformulation of the Neo-Platonic process of emanation, exemplarity, and consummation that ends in the resolution of the intellect and will in union with God the Father.[136] This dynamic, three-part process serves as the indigenous logic of his thought; not the static, bipolar pattern of the coincidence of opposites. But the inclusion of Christ *in media res* resolves the tension between the two. God the Father is the *Primum Principium* of the process of emanation; the Son, the metaphysical *medium* of cosmic exemplarity; and the Spirit, the final cause that resolves all things into their proper end in union with the Father.

But the bipolar series of coincidences Bonaventure had developed in the Commentary, the *Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis*, the *Breviloquium*, and, most extensively, the *Itinerarium* stubbornly resist resolution into a greater unity through the *tertium quid* of Christ the center. Bonaventure often neglected to include Christ in their midst, and when he did, he preferred to include Christ on one pole of their coincidence. I would argue that these polar coincidences emerge from the tripartite logic of his metaphysics—the Neo-Platonic process of emanation, exemplarity, and consummation—but do not reduce to it. The Father's emanation of Himself gives rise to them in the second stage of the metaphysical process: exemplarity. They also serve that process. The soul's contemplation of them leaves its intellect in a state of cataphatic suspension, in wonder (*mirabilis*), astonishment (*admiratio*), and awe (*stupor*) in preparation for its consummation in an apophatic union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit.

The Summit of the Ascent of the Soul in Apophatic Union with God

Bonaventure began his description of the summit of the soul's ascent with a brief recapitulation: it has beheld the testimony outside itself through the vestige of the physical realm of being and in it; within itself through the image of the intelligible and in it; and above itself "in the divine Light itself . . . in the First and Highest Principle and in Jesus Christ, the Mediator between

God and human beings, the like of which (*similia*) cannot possibly be found among creatures and exceeds the most penetrating insight of the human intellect."[137] But, he insisted, it "must still, in beholding these things, transcend and pass over, not only this visible world, but even itself."

His account of this ecstatic experience at the summit of the soul's ascent in the *Itinerarium* and other texts is not entirely consistent.[138] It is also sometimes difficult to distinguish his account of this transcendent ecstasy from other states of mysticism, namely, the activation of the soul's spiritual senses in its nuptial union with Christ and rapture, a foretaste of heavenly beatitude. Nevertheless, a careful reading of his account of the experience in the *Itinerarium* in comparison with other relevant texts provides some degree of clarity in regard to its essential features: the soul's preparation for the experience, the proper object of the experience, the precise role of its intellect in the experience, its aesthetic significance, and, finally, its distinction from rapture.

Bonaventure insisted that the soul should prepare itself for the experience through the complementary processes of the *triplica via* and the cognitive *reductio*, through which it comes to recognize creation's dependence on its Creator and, through a series of carefully graded steps, to a greater understanding of the nature of the Divinity. But it requires divine assistance to do so. It cannot reform itself along the paths of the *triplica via* without divine grace and it cannot merit ecstatic union with God. Ecstatic union is a gratuitous gift.

The proper object of the experience is the Three Person'd God—the Father, Son, and Spirit. Bonaventure had cited Francis' contemplation of the vision of Christ crucified in the form of a Seraph as the paradigm of ecstatic contemplation in the prologue to the *Itinerarium*, but he also clearly indicated that the contemplation of Christ crucified is the "way," the "door," the "ladder," and the "vehicle" to its affective union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—and thus distinct from it.[139] Christ crucified is the "Mercy Seat" of the Ark of the Covenant, and all those who contemplate the Mercy Seat pass through "the Red Sea" into "the desert" to taste the "hidden manna" of union with God.[140] The contemplation of Christ crucified, as I have mentioned, is the heart and center of Francis' way of life, but it is not its proper end. It is the moment and mechanism of the soul's "Passover" (*transitus*) into ecstatic union with God. Bonaventure had identified the risen Christ as the object of a nuptial mysticism at a distinctive stage in the soul's ascent, prior to its ecstatic experience at the summit of its ascent.[141] This nuptial experience prepares the soul for a rational consideration of the One God in Three *Personae*, in hypostatic union with humanity in the person of Christ, even if its consideration stretched its ability to comprehend the full extent of the One and the Many united in the *Deus homo*. Bonaventure's account of the soul's

apophatic union at the summit of its ascent, in contrast, exceeds the soul's cognitive faculties.

He had explicitly identified God *the Father* as the object of union in the final passage of the text: "With Christ crucified let us pass out of this world to the Father."[142] But the best explanation for this is rhetorical. Bonaventure began his account of the soul's ascent with a reference to the *Primum Principium*, the Father of Lights, from whom all good things come; thus, he brought his account of the soul's ascent to the place of its beginning (*in principio*). He insisted that the soul's union is with the One God in Three *Personae*—the Father, Son, and Spirit—throughout his account of the experience, not particular manifestations of the One God to the exclusion of the others who, through their eternal *perichoresis*, necessarily manifest one another in the manifestation of themselves. The soul's proper contemplation of God the Father necessarily reveals His manifestation of Himself in His Son and Spirit. Its proper contemplation of Christ, *Deus homo*, opens the path to its union with the fullness of the Divinity, God the Father, Son, and Spirit.

The precise role of the rational soul's intellect in this transcendent experience had been the subject of a wide-ranging debate. Rorem notes that Dionysius and his heirs in the School of St. Victor, Hugh, Richard, and Thomas Gallus provided Bonaventure with two distinct options.[143] The first and more faithful option emphasized the cognitive dimensions of the experience. Dionysius had argued that the mind engages in a cognitive dialectic of conceptual refinement in order to ascend into union with God. It first postulates the theses that the Divinity is one, good, beautiful, and so on; the antitheses that He is above oneness, goodness, and beauty as we know them; and the final synthesis of an apophatic cognition, the intellect's "vision" of a "light" so blinding bright that it seems to "see" nothing.

> Indeed, the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational process. Nor can any words come up to the inexpressible Good, this One, this Source of all unity, this supra-existent Being. Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name. It is and it is as no other being is. Cause of all existence, and therefore itself transcending existence, it alone could give an authoritative account of what it really is.[144]

The second emphasized the affective dimensions of the experience. Thomas Gallus, the principal exponent of this emphasis, argued that Dionysius had distinguished two approaches to God: the one cognitive and the other affective.[145] The mind knows God indirectly through its cognitive analysis of sensible and intelligible realities, but it also knows God directly through a type of experiential knowledge or love (*affectus*). Thus, Rorem notes that "many readers quite naturally concluded that the purpose of the

Areopagite's forceful negations was to clear the way for the higher, nonintellectual union of love beyond the mind."

The authors of the most influential studies of Bonaventure's mystical theology have long agreed that Bonaventure incorporated both tendencies into his description of ascent but disagree on the relative emphasis he placed on the two. McGinn provides a summary of the debate: Longpré, Szabó, and Beumer, the authors of the earliest reading of Bonaventure's apophatic mysticism, had argued that Bonaventure insisted on some degree of an intellectual element throughout the full extent of his description of the affective dimensions of apophatic union; Gilson, Rahner, and Tavard had argued for a subtle degree of continuity between the soul's cognitive ascent and a thoroughly affective union; and Ratzinger disengaged the cognitive aspect of the mind's ascent from its end in an affective union.[146]

McGinn argues for a resolution to the question that emphasizes Bonaventure's debt to Gallus. The soul's cognitive faculties remain intact, but the object of their contemplation exceeds their capabilities. The soul knows, but it is an experiential knowledge, not propositional.[147] It may even strive to know in the so-called proper, propositional intension of the concept—after all, it possesses an inclination to do so. But it fails. It knows God—the Father, Son and Spirit—in the sense that it experiences God. But it cannot apprehend God; it cannot abstract an intelligible *species* of God; it cannot imagine, compound, divide, estimate, or remember God. Nevertheless, it experiences the immediate presence of God that remains forever inexplicable, an experience that ignites its affections to an unfathomable degree of intensity. "The apophatic exigence present in Dionysian mysticism," McGinn explains, "becomes transmuted in Bonaventure primarily into the language of love."[148]

A close reading of Bonaventure's decidedly poetic account of the experience confirms McGinn's conclusion. Bonaventure is explicit: The soul must relinquish "all intellectual activities" in order to achieve the perfect "pass-over" of "the most profound affection" that results in its "transport" to the immediate presence of the Divinity and its "transformation" into a perfect *similitudo* of the Divine.[149] He enlisted two rhetorical devices from Dionysius' *De mystica theologia* in his attempt to express this inexpressible experience. The first device is a series of denials of the soul's intellectual capabilities that he drew from Dionysius' practice of negative theology: the soul sees, but it does so in a dark light; it hears, but in the silence of secrets whispered in the dark; it learns, but it learns in ignorance. The second is a series of metaphors: the fire of the affections of the will; the blindness of the intellect and its slumber; the hanging, crucifixion, and death of the soul's cognitive faculties in its inability to comprehend the real and immediate presence of the Three Person'd God in the full disclosure of Its infinite majesty "above all essence and all knowledge."[150] Bonaventure has taken up the more

traditional approach of Dionysius' *via negativa*, wedded it to Gallus' emphasis on the burning desires of the affections of the will, and added a striking and innovative metaphor to convey the intellect's inability to speak: "The broken, crucified Christ," Turner noted, vividly expresses "the brokenness and failure of all our language and knowledge of God."[151]

Bonaventure provided a succinct précis of the experience in the final passage of the *Itinerarium*, one of the most eloquent in the mystical literature of the entire Middle Ages—or, as Underhill had argued, any other.[152]

> Let us, then, die and enter into darkness. Let us impose silence upon all our cares, our desires, and our dreams. Let us pass out of this world with Christ crucified to the Father so that, when the Father is revealed to us, we may say with Philip, it is enough for us, we may hear with Paul, my grace is sufficient for you, and rejoice with David, and say, my flesh and my heart have fainted away, you are the God of my heart and the God that is my portion forever. Blessed be the Lord forever, and let all the people say, let it be so, let it be so. Amen.[153]

The rational soul's ecstatic union with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—is the locus of a profound aesthetic experience. The soul, Bonaventure insisted, longs to transform itself into the likeness of its affections.[154] The dark beauty of its ecstatic union rests in the degree of its similarity between itself, created in the image of God, and the immediate presence of its divine Exemplar. The soul is the image of God in its faculties of memory, intellect, and will. Each faculty testifies to the nature of particular divine *Personae*—the memory to the Father, the intellect to the Son, and the will to the Spirit—and the interdependence among its faculties testifies to the *circumincessio* of the Divinity: God the Father's presence in the Son and together, the Father and the Son in the Spirit. Grace further transforms the soul into "the image of the new creation" and thus intensifies its degree of similarity to the point that it is God-conformed (*Deiformis*). Significantly, the soul does not realize its degree of similarity to its divine Exemplar in its ecstatic union with its Exemplar. Its cognitive faculties have been stilled. It has been carried out of itself. It has passed over *in Deum*. Nevertheless, its degree of similarity with the object of its ecstatic union is the source of its superlative degree of delight that further enkindles the affections of its will until it comes to rest in the repose of a peace that surpasses all understanding. The restless heart has come home.[155]

Bonaventure had also made a distinction between ecstatic union and rapture that confounds the nature of the experience.[156] Ecstatic union, the subject of the *Itinerarium*, is the more common experience—although still an inexplicable gift. Bonaventure relied heavily on the generosity of God the Father, the giver of all good gifts, to invite the pilgrim soul to taste and see the

real presence of the Divinity *hic et nunc*. Rapture is rare. Only a handful of the elect—Moses, Job, Paul, Dionysius, and, above all, Francis—have been "caught up" (2 Cor. 12:2).[157] It stands at the border between the historical present and an anticipated future. The experience of rapture, Bonaventure argued, is a foretaste of the beatitude reserved for the faithful in the world to come. It transforms the soul into a degree of similarity with the divine Being so extraordinary, that the soul, in the unfathomable depths of humility in its encounter, experiences an absolute identity with God.[158] But it is far too rare a gift to hope for.

CONCLUSION

Bonaventure's account of the rational soul's ascent into union with God in the *Itinerarium* and other related texts is an account of a profound aesthetic experience. The soul begins its ascent in its sensory apprehension of the physical realm of being—the sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch of the created order—and its attendant delight in its beauty, agreeableness, and goodness. But Bonaventure distinguished his account of this aesthetic experience from the philosophers of the Enlightenment in his insistence that the process came to its proper end in the soul's discernment of the reasons for its delight, reasons that initiated the soul's cognitive *reductio* of creation to its fundamental cause in its Creator.

This *reductio* consists of a series of further "aesthetic" experiences of the intellect in close cooperation with the affections of its will similar to its initial experience: the soul's cognitive delight in the *rapport* of the analogical testimony of creation to its Creator, its delight in its epistemological *rapport* with the Illumination of the divine *Formae*, its delight in its *rapport* with God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—its delight in its *rapport* with the mystical presence of Christ—*increatum*, *incarnatum*, *et inspiratum*—its delight in its contemplation of the *rapport* of the incomprehensible coincidence of disproportional properties within the One God in Three *Personae* united in hypostatic union with Christ, and, finally, its ecstatic delight in its *rapport* with the immediate presence of God—the Father, Son, and Spirit—a mode of "aesthetic" experience that steadfastly defies comprehension insofar as the soul "sees" that which will forever exceed its cognitive capacities but fully sates the desire of its will.

NOTES

1. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 1.17 (5:332). The literature on Bonaventure's exemplarity is extensive. See É. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J.

Vrin, 1924), 165–191; J. M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure* (Paris: Vrin, 1929); T. Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in Creaturis Refulgente* (Rome: Herder, 1955); L. Bowman, "Cosmic Exemplarism of Bonaventure," *Journal of Religion* 55 (1975): 181–198; H. Heinz, *Trinitarische Begegnungen bei Bonaventura: fruchtbarkeit einer appropriation Trinitätstheologie* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1985). Cullen provides a useful summary. See *Bonaventure*, 71–77

2. P. L. Reynolds, "Bonaventure's Theory of Resemblance," *Traditio* 49 (2003): 219–255.

3. Bonaventure presented other versions of this *reductio* in the *Breviloquium* (5:199-291), the *De Reductione Atrium ad Theologium* (5:317–325), and the more ambitious but incomplete *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* (5:327–454).

4. E. Cousins, introduction to *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God, the Tree of Life, the Life of St. Francis*, 12.

5. P. Boehner, notes to *Itinerarium*, trans. Z. Hayes (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 143–144. See also F. S. Bechtel, "*Itineraria*," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. C. G. Herbermann (New York: The Robert Appleton Company, 1907–1914) 8:254–255.

6. P. Boehner, notes to *Itinerarium*, trans. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), 105.

7. S. Brown, introduction to *The Journey of the Mind to God*, ed. S. Brown and trans. P. Boehner (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), ix–xviii.

8. Cousins, introduction to *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 20–21.

9. Z. Hayes, preface to *Itinerarium*, trans. Z. Hayes (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 8. Hayes did not comment directly on the translation of specific terms, only that a new translation was in order in response to changes in English usage.

10. Boehner, notes to *Itinerarium*, 144.

11. Gilson, *Les idées et les lettres* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932). Curiously, Bonaventure began the first chapter of the *Itinerarium* with a second prologue. The reason remains obscure. Nevertheless, the second prologue complements the first in its themes, its division of the text, and its petitions. See *Itin.* 1.1–6 (5:296–297).

12. Bonaventure, *Itin.* prol. 1 (5:295).

13. Bonaventure, *Itin.* prol. 4 (5:296).

14. Bonaventure, *Itin.* prol., 3 (5:295–296).

15. D. Keck, "Bonaventure's Angelology," in *A Companion to St. Bonaventure*, ed. J. Hammond, W. Hellmann, and J. Goff (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 289–332.

16. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 1.2 (5:297). Bonaventure's immediate source is Richard of St. Victor, *Benjamin major* 1.6. He discussed Richard's schema in his *Comm. Lc.* 9.47 with explicit reference to the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the divine (7:231). See S. Brown, "Reflections on the Structural Sources of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*," in *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times*, ed. G. Homström-Hintikka (Netherlands: Kluwer, 2000), 1–16.

17. D. Turner, *The Darkness of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 102–135.

18. B. McGinn, "Ascension and Introversion in the *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*," in *S. Bonaventura 1274–1974* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae), 3:535–552.

19. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.2 (5:297). Bonaventure's initial analysis of creation's testimony to its Creator included the shadow (*umbra*), vestige (*vestigium*), and image (*imago*). The first, the *umbra*, is the most "distant" and "confused." It expresses an "indeterminate" degree of causal dependence—Bonaventure would abandon this degree of analogy in his later treatments of exemplarity. The *vestigium* is "distant" but "distinct" insofar as it expresses the triple causality of the divine Being, the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of the created *ordo*. The *imago* is "near" and "distinct" and denotes the higher cognitive functions of rational creatures, the memory, intellect, and will, that testify analogously to the nature and relationship of the divine *Personae*. He added a fourth degree in his later treatises, the *similitudo*. It is the most explicit degree of likeness and expresses the degree to which the soul (*mens*) conforms itself to the will of God through a process of cooperative sanctification and is able to achieve its proper end in union with God. See 1 *Sent*. d. 3 (1:66–94); 2 *Sent*. d. 16 (2:393–408); *Brev*. 2.12.1 (5:230) and *Hex*. 2.20 (5:339).

20. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 6.7 (5:312).

21. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.5 (5:297). Bonaventure supported this subdivision with reference to the six powers of the soul from Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 10–14 and 38: *sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia, et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla*. But he is rather free with his interpretation of these powers.

22. See Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 3, a. un., q. 3 (1:74) and a brief recapitulation in *Itin*. 7.1 (5:312). See also G. LaNave, "Knowing God through and in All Things: A Proposal for Reading Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009): 267–300; and J. Hammond, "Bonaventure's *Itinerarium*: A *Respondeo*," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009): 301–322.

23. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.5 (5:312–313).

24. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.3 (5:312). See also *Leg. maior* 13.1–10 (AF 10, 615–620).

25. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.10 (5:298).

26. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.11 (5:298). See Aristotle, *Analytica priora et posteriora*, 71b.

27. Bonaventure developed this schema in more detail in 1 *Sent*. d. 3, dub. 3 (1:78–79).

28. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.12 (5:298). See also *Brevil*. 2.4 (5:204).

29. Bonaventure, *Brevil*. prol., 2.4 (5:204). See Augustine, *Ep*. 138, 1.5.

30. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.13 (5:298–299). See also I *Sent*. d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (1:153–155) and *M. Trin*. 1.1. arg. 11–20 (5:46–47). On Bonaventure's cosmological argument, see R. E. Houser, "Bonaventure's Three-Fold Way to God," in *Medieval Masters: Essays in Honor of E. A. Synan* (Houston: University of St. Thomas Press, 1999), 91–145.

31. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 8, p.1, a. 1, q. 2 (1:155).

32. Bonaventure, *M. Trin* 1.1 (5:296–297).

33. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.13 (5:298–299).

34. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.14 (5:299). See Hugh of St. Victor, *Didascalicon*, 7.1-12.

35. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 1.15 (5:299).

36. T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 13.9.

37. Isa. 11:6-9 (NRSV 1989).

38. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 2.7-9 (5:301–302).

39. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 2.9 (5:301–302).

40. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 2.11-12 (5:302–303).

41. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.1 (5:303). See L. Turney, "*The Symbolism of the Temple in Bonaventure's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*" (PhD diss., Fordham University, 1968).

42. See Z. Hayes, "Bonaventure's Trinitarian Theology," in *A Companion to Bonaventure* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 189–245. See also K. B. Osborne, "*The Trinity in Bonaventure*," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity*, ed. P. C. Phan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 108–127.

43. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.2 (5:304). See Augustine, *De Trin.* 14.8.11.

44. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.3 (5:304).

45. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.4 (5:304–305).

46. Bonaventure's source for this division is Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 8.4. See also K. Ierodiakonou, "The Stoic Division of Philosophy," *Phronesis* 38 (1993): 57–74.

47. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.6 (5:305).

48. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 3.7 (5:305–306).

49. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 4.3 (5:306–307). See also *Brevil.* 5.6 (5:259–260); and *Triplic. via* (8:3–27).

50. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.1–6. Bonaventure cited Aristotle in 2 *Sent*. d. 27, dub. 3, resp. (2:671). See also K. Emery, "Reading the World Rightly and Squarely: Bonaventure's Doctrine of the Cardinal Virtues," *Traditio* 39 (1983): 183–218.

51. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent*. d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (3:712).

52. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent*. d. 33 (3:710-731); *Brevil.* 5.4 (5:256–257); *Hexaëm.* 5:2-13 and 6.7–32 (5:354–356 and 361–364); and *Hexaëm.* (D) 1.3.2.11–25 (Delorme, 93–96).

53. [Pseudo] Dionysius, *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, 3. See R. Roques, *L'univers dionysien*: *Structure hiérarchique du monde selon pseudo-Denys* (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 1954). See also P. Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius*: *A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence* (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1993), 49–59 and 219–222.

54. J. F. Bonnefoy, *Une somme Bonaventurienne de Theologie Mystique: le De Triplici Via* (Paris: Librarie Saint-François, 1934).

55. [Pseudo] Dionysius, *De Coelesti Hierarchia*, 3.2.

56. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 4.3 (5:306–307).

57. P. L. Gravrilyuk and S. Coakley, *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–19.

58. J. F. Bonnefoy, "*Le Saint Espirit et ses dons selo1n saint Bonaventure*," *Études de philosphie médievale* 10 (1929): 214.

59. K. Rahner, "*La doctrine des 'sens spirituels' au Moyen-Âge, en particulier chez saint Bonaventure*," *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* 14 (1933): 263–299. An abridged version of this article appeared in his *Theological Investigations* (New York: Crossroad, 1979), 16:104–134.

60. Tedoldi has identified the most relevant passages in the debate: 3 *Sent.* d. 13, dub. 1 (3:291–292); 3 *Sent.* d. 34, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (3:735–739); *Brevil.* 5.6 (5:258–260); *Itin.* 4.3-7 (5:306–308); *Red. art.* 8–10 (5:322); *Hexaëm.* 3:22 (5:347); *De plantatione paradisi* 9 and 16 (5:577 and 578–579); *Solil.* 1:12-17 (8:33–35); *De quinque festivitatibus pueri Iesu* 4.1 (8:93); *Sermo in Epiph.* 9 (9:166–167); and *Sermo in Epiph.* 14 (9:168–169). See F. M. Tedoldi, *La dottrina dei cinque sensi spirituali in San Bonaventura* (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1999), 137–182.

61. H. Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the* Lord, 2:315–326.

62. G. F. LaNave, "*Bonaventure*," 171–173. See also M. McInroy, *Balthasar on the Spiritual Senses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 56–84.

63. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 22:39 (5:443) and *Hexaëm.* (D) 4.4.3.34–39 (Delorme, 260–262).

64. LaNave, "Bonaventure," 172–173.

65. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 4.8 (5:308).

66. Cousins, *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 13.

67. Bonaventure, *Itin.* prol. 3 (5:295).

68. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 7.2 (5:312). See J. A. W. Hellmann, "The Seraph in the Legends of Thomas of Celano and St. Bonaventure," in *Bonaventuriana: Miscellanea in onore di Jacques Guy Bougerol* (Rome: Antonianum, 1988), 347–356.

69. See also Bonaventure, *De Perfectione Vitae ad Sorores* 11:1–6 (8:120–124) and the *Vita Mystica sive Tractatus de Passione Domini* (8:159–229). The authenticity of the *Vita Mystica* is in doubt. See I. Brady, "The Edition of the 'Opera Omnia' of St. Bonaventure," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 70 (1977): 352–376 and P. Maranesi, "The Opera Omnia of Saint Bonaventure: History and Present Situation," in *A Companion to Bonaventure*, ed. J. M. Hammond, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 79.

70. These include Anselm of Canterbury, *Orationes*; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*; Aelred of Rievaulx, *De institutis inclusarum*; and the most influential source, Eckbert of Schönau, *Stimulis amoris*.

71. Cousins, introduction to *Bonaventure*, 34–37.

72. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* prol. 1 (8:68), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 119. See P. F. O'Connell, *The Lignum vitae of Saint Bonaventure and the Medieval Devotional Tradition* (PhD diss., Fordham University, 1985). See also his "Aelred of Rievaulx and the "Lignum Vitae" of Bonaventure: A Reappraisal," *Franciscan Studies* 48 (1988): 53–80.

73. Bestul, *Texts of the Passion: Latin Devotional Literature and Medieval Society* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 26–68.

74. D. N. Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1:305–319.

75. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* prol. 2 (8:68).

76. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* prol. 3 (8:68–69), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 120–121.

77. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 4 (8:72), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 128.

78. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 4 (8:71–72), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 129.

79. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* prol. 1 (8:68), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 119.

80. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 16 (8:75), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 139.

81. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 29 (8:79), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 154.

82. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 35 (8:81), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 160.

83. Bonaventure, *Triplic. via* 3.3 (8:13).

84. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 26 (8:77–78), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 148.

85. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 31 (8:80), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 156–157.

86. See R. Doran, *The Theory of the Sublime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

87. T. M. Costelloe, "The Sublime: A Short Introduction to a Long History," in *The Sublime*, ed. T. M. Costelloe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–10.

88. Balthasar, *The Glory of the* Lord, 1:117-127. See also R. Viladesau, *The Beauty of the Cross: The Passion of the Christ in Theology and the Arts from the Catacombs to the Eve of the Renaissance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 9–12.

89. Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, 2:352–362. See also Viladesau, *The Beauty of the Cross*, 105–110.

90. Bonaventure, *Perf. ev.* 1 (5:117–124).

91. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent.* d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3 (1:544).

92. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 35 (8:81).

93. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 44 (8:84), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 168.

94. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 47 (8:85), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 171–172.

95. Bonaventure, *Red. art.* 23–25 (5:325).

96. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent.* d. 27 a. 1 q. 1–2 (2:653–658) and *Brevil.* 5.4 (5:256–257).

97. Bonaventure, *Brevil.* 5.1.3 (5:253); see also 2 *Sent.* d. 38 a.1 q.1 resp. (2:882).

98. Bonaventure, *Brevil.* 4.5 (5:245–246) and 3 *Sent.* 13 (3:276–293).

99. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 1:10-39 (5:330-335) and *Hexaëm.* (D) 1.10–39 (Delorme, 4–19).

100. Bonaventure discussed the cardinal virtues in detail in 3 *Sent.* d. 33 a. un. q.1–6 (3:710–731) and *Hexaëm.* 6.11–32 (5:362–364). See also *Hexaëm.* (D) 1.3.11–32 (Delorme, 93–98).

101. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit.* 29 (8:79).

102. Bonaventure, *Lign. vit*. 32 (8:80), trans. Cousins, in *Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey*, 157.

103. Bonaventure, *Leg. maior* 1.6 (AF 10, 562).

104. Davies, *Bonaventure*, 1–3, 135–167.

105. Bonaventure, *Itin.* 5.1 (5:308).

106. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), 17.

107. See also M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958), 29.

108. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 9.

109. C. Berube, "Grandeur et misere de notre connaissance de Dieu chez saint Bonaventure," *Doctor seraphicus* 27 (1980): 51–81; J. Bougerol, introduction to *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites,* E. Cousins, ed. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), xiii–xx; L. S. Ford, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Process Studies* 8 (1978): 201–202; Z. Hayes, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Journal of Religion* 60 (1980): 349–351; F. Podgorski, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 16 (1979): 526–527; F. Ruello, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Recherches de science religieuse* 70 (1982): 290–293; M. Schlosser, "*Lux Inaccesssiblis: Zur Negativen Theologie bei Bonaventura*," *Franziskanische Studien*, 68 (1986): 1–140; G. Tavard, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Theological Studies* 41, no. 3 (1980): 576–584; T. Tomasic, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Speculum* 56 (1981): 111–114; and D. A. Trapp, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites," *Eglise et theologie* 11 (1980): 446–447.

110. Bougerol and Hayes provided the most enthusiastic endorsements of the thesis.

111. Berube, Schlosser, Tavard, and Tomasic provided the most critical rejections of the thesis.

112. I. Delio, *Simply Bonaventure* (Hyde Park: New City Press, 2001).

113. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 18–22.

114. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 21.

115. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 101–105. See Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 27, p. 1, a. un., q. 2 (1:468–474).

116. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 200–206.

117. Cousins, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites*, 206–208.

118. E. Cousins, "Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites: A Response to Critics," *Theological Studies* 42 (1981): 277–290.

119. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 5.2 (5:308). The reference is to Exod. 3:14.

120. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 5.3 (5:308–309). See R. E. Houser, "Bonaventure's Three-Fold Way to God," in *Medieval Masters: Essays in Honor of E. A. Synan* (Houston: University of St. Thomas Press, 1999), 91–145; and J. Seifert, "*Si Deus est Deus, Deus est*: Reflections on St. Bonaventure's Interpretation of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument," *Franciscan Studies* 52 (1992): 215–231.

121. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 5.7 (5:309–310).

122. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 6 (5:310–312).

123. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 6.2 (5:310–311).

124. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 6.3 (5:311).

125. Z. Hayes, *The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1981), 152–191.

126. Bonaventure, *Red. art*. 20 (5:324).

127. Cullen, *Bonaventure*, 146–148. Cullen notes that Bonaventure effortlessly weaved the satisfaction theory of the atonement with the rhetoric of ransom. See the *Lign vit*. 33 (8:80-81).

128. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 6.7 (5:312).

129. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.1 (5:312).

130. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.1 (5:312).

131. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.6 (5:313).

132. Bonaventure makes the affective nature of the union explicit throughout this last chapter. See the *Itin*. 7.4 (5:312) and his extensive references to Dionysius' *Mystical Theology* in *Itin*. 7.5 (5:312-313). See also B. McGinn, *The Flowering of Mysticism*, 70–112.

133. Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 27, p. 1, a. un., q. 2 ad 1–3 (1:469–472). See also 1 *Sent*. d. 28 (1:492–494).

134. See Bonaventure, 1 *Sent*. d. 2 (1:46–62); *M. Trin*. (5:45-115); and *Brevil*. 1.2–9 (5:210–218).

135. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm*. 1.10–39 (5:330–335).

136. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm*. 1.17 (5:332).

137. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.1 (5:312).

138. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent*. d. 35 a. un. q.1 resp. (3:774); *Brevil*. 5.8 (5:261–262); *Triplic. via* 1.15–17 (8:7) and 3.6–7 (8:14–15); *Hexaëm*. 2:28–34 (5:340–342), 20.11 (5:427), and 22.39 (5:443).

139. Bonaventure, *Itin*. prol. 2 (5:295) and 7.2 (5:312). See also R. G. Davis, *The Weight of Love: Affect, Ecstasy, and Union in the Thought of Bonaventure* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 107–126.

140. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.2 (5:312).

141. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 4.3 (5:306–307). See also *Brevil*. 5.6 (5:258–260).

142. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.6 (5:313). See also *Brevil.* 5.6 (5:259).

143. Rorem, *Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts*, 214–225.

144. *De Divinis Nominibus*, 1.1, trans. C. Luibheid, in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, 49–50.

145. B. McGinn, "The Role of Thomas Gallus in the History of Dionysian Mysticism," *Studies in Spirituality* 8 (1998): 81–96.

146. McGinn, *Flowering of Mysticism*, 87–112. See also M. Schlosser, *Cognitio et Amor. Zum kognitiven un voluntativen Grund der Gotteserfahrung nach Bonaventura* (Paderborn: Grabmann-Instituts, 1990), 189–205.

147. Bonaventure, III *Sent*. d. 35, a. un., 1, resp. (III, 774); *Perf. ev*. 1 (5:120). These passages have served as proof texts throughout the debate.

148. McGinn, *Flowering of Mysticism*, 111.

149. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.4 (5:312–313).

150. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.5 (5:313).

151. D. Turner, *The Darkness of God*, 132.

152. E. Underhill, *Mysticism: A Study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961), 124.

153. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.6 (5:313).

154. Bonaventure, *Solil*. 2.12 (8:49). See Pseudo Bernard, *Tractatus de charitate* 18.61.

155. Augustine, *Conf*. 1.1.

156. Bonaventure, 3 *Sent*. d. 35 a. un. q. 1 resp. (3:774); 2 *Sent*. d. 23 a. 2 q. 2 resp. (2:543-545); and *Hexaëm.* 3.30 (5:347–348).

157. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 3.24 and 30 (5:347 and 347–348); *Hexaëm.* 22.22 (5:441); *Itin.* prol. 2 (5:295); *Leg. maior* 3.6 (AF 10, 568–569), 9.2 (AF 10, 598), and 10.2 (AF 10, 602).

158. Bonaventure, *Hexaëm.* 3.30 (5:348).

Conclusion

Bonaventure's rich conception of beauty, the *rapport* between one person or thing and another, his detailed account of the aesthetic experience, and the pervasive role that initial experience and other modes of the aesthetic experience play in his account of the soul's ascent into God confirm the thesis that his aesthetics is among the most, if not the most, innovative and extensive of the Middle Ages.

Bonaventure's aesthetics is a significant development in the prehistory of a field that became explicit in the Enlightenment and continues in the varied forms of philosophical, theological, and mystical aesthetics current to this day. The Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic traditions provided Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Du Bos, Addison, Baumgarten, Kant, and other philosophers of the Enlightenment with the raw material they fashioned into aesthetics as a distinct field of philosophical discourse. Bonaventure did not directly influence these developments. Nevertheless, he provided a second witness to the pervasive influence of these ancient schools of thought throughout the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Enlightenment and, thus, a better understanding of the broad contours of the ancient and medieval roots of current aesthetic discourse, discussion, and debate.

Bonaventure anticipated the description of the aesthetic experience that emerged in the Enlightenment, the soul's delight in the sensory apprehension of beauty, but he also aligned the aesthetic experience with its cognitive functions, the apprehension, delight, and judgment of the beautiful, the agreeable, and the good. His formulation of this tripartite process evades two extremes: those who would stop at the second stage of the process in their pursuit of the purity of the aesthetic experience independent of its cognitive component and those who would move too quickly past it in their emphasis on the sober pleasures of the intellect. Bonaventure advocated for an enthusiastic embrace

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of each stage of the process. He encouraged his readers to pursue the delight of their eyes, ears, and other senses, with all the abandonment of the Bride of the Song of Solomon on her wedding night. But he also insisted on the rational reflection of those delights.

Bonaventure's careful attention to a wide range of categories of beauty remains especially relevant for philosophers and theologians in the Christian tradition and as an insightful interlocutor in dialogue with others: the perceptual beauty of the eyes, ears, and other senses; the physical beauty of the well-ordered cosmos; the metaphysical beauty of the soul reformed into its proper status as an image of the Divinity; and the analogical beauty of creation's testimony to its Creator. He weaved these categories together into an innovative reformulation of the Platonic ladder of love that ends in an ineffable union with the *Primum Principium*. The common thread throughout his aesthetics is the concept of *rapport*, as de Bruyne so aptly put it. The *rapport* between the subject and the object of its contemplation in the physical realm of being, the intelligible, and the Divine. Bonaventure's world, like Hopkins', is "charged with the grandeur of God."[1] And, again like Hopkins', "It will flame out like shinning from shook foil." The grandeur is omnipresent insofar as the beauty of each and every creature testifies to the existence of God. It is also difficult to miss. It shines so brightly, Bonaventure insisted, that the person who refuses to see it is a fool.

Bonaventure's account of these categories also provides for the correction of certain tendencies within the Christian tradition: its tendency to disparage the beauty of the body and its tendency to deny the dignity of creation.[2] Bonaventure was a participant in his own tradition's effort to crucify the inordinate desires of the flesh (Gal. 5:24). His devotion to Francis and Francis' imitation of Christ crucified testifies to his participation in that tradition. But Bonaventure was also an advocate of an Aristotelian doctrine of the mean of virtue between the extremes of vice. He encouraged his readers to mortify their flesh in their effort to rid themselves of sin, but he also encouraged them to recognize the beauty of their bodies, a beauty that persists through sin, suffering, and death. He chastised them for their inordinate love for creation as an end in itself, but, again, he also encouraged their delight in creation insofar as it possessed in itself the metaphysical properties that rendered it into a sign, *per analogiam*, that signified the existence and nature of the Three Person'd God.

Nevertheless, the details of Bonaventure's aesthetics pose some difficulty for theists in other traditions. His commitment to the orthodox formulae of Nicaea and later Ecumenical Councils compelled him to adopt a definition of divine Beauty that depends on the *rapport* between God the Father, the *Primum Principium*, and His perfect expression of Himself in His Son. But that definition is difficult to reconcile with theists who defend a more rigid

and, perhaps, a more logically compelling monotheism that denies the possibility of ontologically distinct hypostases on par with the *Primum Principium*.

His portrait of Christ's passion is also difficult. He endorsed a degree of devotion to a more realistic *Christus Patiens*, profuse with blood, that remains current only among minorities scattered across the Christian spectrum, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant. Thus, the most distinctive feature of Bonaventure's aesthetics, the terrible beauty of Christ crucified, remains an intellectual curiosity for most of the Christian tradition—as well as other faith traditions. Nevertheless, Bonaventure's insistence on the terrible beauty of Christ raises an important question: Is there a place for something less than beautiful, perhaps decidedly ugly, in aesthetic discourse, and, if so, what? Bonaventure's response poses a challenge. He argued, in deference to his theological convictions, that the ugliness in the world is the result of the damage human beings have done to themselves and to others as well as to creation as a whole. But he urged his readers to recognize the beauty that persists in spite of the damage. He also urged them to respond with compassion to the brokenness of themselves and others and creation as a whole, to help restore their proper relationship with their Creator and thus regain the full measure of their beauty.

The most striking feature of Bonaventure's aesthetics is its immediacy. He presented an aesthetic *itinerarium* to his readers, a travel guide to assist them in their ascent, not an academic treatise. He implored them to open their eyes to the beauty of the created order, delight in its beauty, and come to realize the reasons for its beauty, reminiscent of Francis' cosmic hymn of praise in his *Canticle*. He implored them to recognize their own beauty, the beauty inherent in the faculties of their minds and its felicitous union with their bodies in its testimony to the Three Person'd God—Father, Son, and Spirit—and come to realize their capacity for intimate union with God. He implored them to marvel at the One God who is also Many in Its intimate union with Christ, the *Deus homo*. And finally, he implored them to abandon themselves in ineffable union with the One God—Father, Son, and Spirit—and rest in the ecstatic knowledge and love of Them. "Let it be so, let it be so," he concluded, "Amen."[3]

NOTES

1. G. M. Hopkins, "God's Grandeur," *Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Major Works*, ed. C. Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 128. See also L. Bowman, "Bonaventure and the Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins," in *S. Bonaventura 1274-1974* (Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1973), 3:553–570. Bowman argues convincingly for the "similarity in spirit" between Bonaventure and Hopkins.

2. Davies provides the strongest argument against the former tendency. See Davies, *Bonaventure*, 168–174. Mizzoni provides a precise argument against the latter. See J. Mizzoni, "Franciscan Biocentrism and the Franciscan Tradition," *Ethics and the Environment* 13 (2008): 121–134. See also I. Delio, *A Franciscan View of Creation: Learning to Live in a Sacramental World* (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2003).

3. Bonaventure, *Itin*. 7.6 (5:313).

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