A World of Turmoil

THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND TAIWAN IN THE LONG COLD WAR

Stephen J. Hartnett

US–CHINA RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

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ON THE INTERSECTION OF EDGE BALL AND COURTESY:
NOTES ON SCHOLARSHIP IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Like America or France or Brazil, China is a nation-state riven with fault-lines along region and race, ethnicity and education, linguistics and libido, gender and more general divisions. Media in the United States tend to portray Chinese society as monolithic—billions of citizens censored into silence, its activists and dissidents fearful of retribution. The "reeducation" camps in Xinjiang, the "black prisons" that dot the landscape, and the Great Firewall prove this belief partially true. At the same time, there are more dissidents on the Chinese web than there are living Americans, and rallies, marches, strikes, and protests unfold in China each week. The nation is seething with action, much of it politically radical. What makes this political action so complicated and so difficult to comprehend is that no one knows how the state will respond on any given day. In his magnificent *Age of Ambition*, Evan Osnos notes that "Divining how far any individual [can] go in Chinese creative life [is] akin to carving a line in the sand at low tide in the dark." His tide metaphor is telling, for throughout Chinese history waves of what Deng Xiaoping called "opening and reform" have given way to repression, which can then swing back to what Chairman Mao once called "letting a hundred flowers bloom"—China thus offers a perpetually changing landscape, in which nothing is certain. For this reason, our Chinese colleagues and collaborators are taking great risks by participating in this book series. Authors in the "west" fear their books and articles will fail to find an audience; authors in China live in fear of a midnight knock at the door.

This series therefore strives to practice what Qingwen Dong calls "edge ball": Getting as close as possible to the boundary of what is sayable without crossing the line into being offensive. The image is borrowed from table tennis and depicts a shot that barely touches the line before ricocheting off the table; it counts as a point and is within the rules, yet the trajectory of the ball makes it almost impossible to hit a return shot. In the realm of scholarship and politics, playing "edge ball" means speaking truth to power while not provoking arrest—this is a murky game full of gray zones, allusions, puns, and sly references. What this means for our series is clear: Our authors do not censor themselves, but they do speak respectfully and cordially, showcasing research-based perspectives from their standpoints and their worldviews, thereby putting multiple vantage points into conversation. As our authors practice "edge ball," we hope our readers will savor these books with a similar sense of sophisticated and international generosity.

—Stephen J. Hartnett

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Acknowledgments and Notes on Doing International Scholarship

I wrote *A World of Turmoil* across many years, so the book encompasses both vast distances of travel and deep networks of collaborators. These acknowledgments therefore reflect my debts to friends, adventurers, colleagues, research librarians, students, and interviewees across America, China, Hong Kong, India, Macau, Nepal, Taiwan, and Tibet.

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At the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California, thanks to Ryan Pettigrew for help locating visual materials from the U.S.-China breakthrough in 1972.

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Clinton's 1998 trip to China are classified. Nonetheless, for their help accessing electronic resources, thanks to Jason Kaplan, Brittany Gerke, Herbert Ragan, and Dana Simmons; for their help with paper resources, thanks to Mary Dunn, Letish Stacey, and Dan Brogden.

At the Auraria Campus Library on the hip and urban campus of the University of Colorado Denver, thanks to Ellen Metter and her team, who have been so generous in supporting interlibrary loan requests, extending my time with overdue books, and guiding me through the world of online databases.

At the United States Library of Congress, especially at the Jefferson Building—one of the wonders of the world—thanks to the team for help locating obscure items.

At the New York Public Library's Rose Main Reading Room, I found rare documents that helped flesh out my understanding of Chiang Kai-shek's political rhetoric, and thank the NYPL team for their support.

Two online sources of information were invaluable. The United States' Department of State's enormous project *The Foreign Relations of the United States* includes insider documents illuminating the complex functioning (and dysfunction) of our democracy. As is true of any such historical archive, debates flourish as to what is or is not included in the accessible materials; while I acknowledge those debates, I nonetheless draw heavily upon this source and am grateful for all the colleagues who manage it. The colleagues who run The American Presidency Project have made it possible to access all modern presidential news conferences, speeches, radio addresses, and notices to Congress, meaning the history of the American presidency is accessible to all who care to learn.

Thanks to Coen Blaauw and my friends at the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, in Washington, DC, for providing background conversations and essential materials.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my colleagues and friends in Taiwan, who have so generously shared their time and perspectives. At the Taipei 228 Memorial Museum, thanks to Hsiao Ming-Chih and the team. At the Jingmei Human Rights Museum in Taipei, thanks to Fred Chin and Yu Ting-wen. At the Green Island White Terror Memorial Park, on Green Island, thanks to Ho Hsin-ying. Special thanks to the staffs at both the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, both in Taipei, where I encountered helpful historical documents. At Academia Sinica, thanks to Huang Cheng-yi. At the heartbreaking Nylon Cheng Museum for Freedom, thanks to Chiu Ting-yun, Tsinghua Cheng, and Tu

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Chih-yao. From Taiwan's Transitional Justice Commission, thanks to Commissioner Yeh Hung-ling and her staff. At the Mainland Affairs Council, thanks to Deputy Minister Chiu Chui-cheng, Assistant Director-General Linda Chang, and Section Chief Lin Ching-wen. At the Office of the President, great thanks to Premier Su Tseng-chang, Minister Lo Ping-cheng, Secretary-General Chu Chen, and National Policy Advisor Jason Chin-hsin Liu. Many of the background conversations with these Taiwanese leaders were smoothed over by Pearl Lin, translator extraordinaire. For her commitment to intercultural understanding, and for arranging many of these conversations, special thanks to May Lin, the executive officer of the U.S. Academic Cooperation Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I will say more below about my long-term collaborator, Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge, who participated in these conversations and opened my eyes to Taiwan. Deep thanks to Chiaoning Su, who has been such a terrific cultural ambassador, scholarly interlocutor, and fellow traveler.

I am likewise indebted to a wide array of colleagues and friends in China who, over the past dozen years, have opened their homes, offices, museums, and archives to me, all in the spirit of international solidarity and a shared commitment to piecing together a narrative that draws close to our shared sense of the truth. Whether in Beijing or Chengdu, Shanghai or Suzhou, Xiamen or Qingdao, these colleagues have shown me tremendous generosity. However, I hesitate to name them, as the conditions for free inquiry continue to close down under Xi Jinping's regime, meaning being named herein could only lead to troubles—but you know who you are, and I thank you for our conversations, the long walks, the glorious dinners, and for sharing your hopes and dreams.

I knew *A World of Turmoil* would also need to draw upon sources not yet published, so I sought out the reflections of parties with alternative versions of the historical record. I gathered such information via interviews with frontline activists, political participants, and leading scholars, hoping to glean from these conversations a more nuanced understanding of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication. While many of these interviewees have asked to be named—*they want their opinions recorded and they want their groups acknowledged*—the terms of permission granted to me via the Colorado Multiple Institution Review Board (IRB protocol #15-0407) dictated that all interviewees quoted in this study are cited anonymously. The idea driving this IRB protocol is that we do not want any of the interviewees to suffer possible political retribution. We can debate the anonymity rule, but it is enforced in the interests of erring on the side of caution and prudence, norms that seem

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more important in America with each passing day. And so, while respecting this caution-based umbrella of anonymity, I want to thank all the scholars, activists, and community leaders who spoke to me in Hong Kong and Macau, China; New Delhi and Dharamsala, India; Kathmandu, Nepal; in Lhasa, Tibet; and in Taipei and on Green Island, Taiwan. Because this IRB protocol forbade conducting formal interviews in mainland China, I was forced to speak with some Chinese sources while they worked or traveled in America, and did so in interviews in Washington, DC, New York City, Denver, and via Facetime and Zoom.

Every idea expressed in this book was first tested in a conversation with a friend over hot-pot in Chengdu, or over beers in a grotto in Xining, or on one of the lovely trains that speed across Taiwan, or in bars, cafés, and workshops around America. When those ideas made it into draft form, they were shared with a wide network of colleagues whose collective wisdom, I hope, infuses this book. And so, for their camaraderie during travels in Asia and/or for their comments on various parts of this book, great thanks to Zhuo Ban, Soumia Bardhan, Sophie Beach, Hamilton Bean, Marcus Breen, Betsy Brunner, Hsin-I Cheng, Donovan Conley, Anthony De Ritis, Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge, Qingwen Dong, Mohan Dutta, Sonja Foss, Larry Frey, Trevor Parry-Giles, Andy Gilmore, David Gruber, Clay Harmon, David Ignatius, Hongfei Zhang, Nathan Kaiser, Dongjing Kang, Lisa Keranen, Li Hongtao, Emily Lin, Jingfang Liu, Lu Wu, Martin J. Medhurst, Jennifer Mercieca, Jeremy Morris, Evan Osnos, Zhongdang Pan, Phaedra Pezzullo, Bryan Reckard, Todd Sandel, Shaunak Sastry, Leah Sprain, Ted Striphas, Chiaoning Su, John Sunnygard, Paaige Turner, Wang "Will" Da, Wenjie Yan, Jared Woolly, Xiao Qiang, Xing "Lucy" Lu, Xiuyan Lu, Guobin Yang, Michelle Murray Yang, ej Yoder, Hsin-I Sydney Yueh, Esther Yook, Rudong "Ian" Zhang, Yufang "Sarah" Zhang, Zhi Li, and Nic Zoffel.

Special thanks are due to Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge. In his role as one of the anchors of the Department of Communication at the International College Beijing (a CU Denver entity), he has become one of the key bridge-builders bringing American, Chinese, Taiwanese, and international students of communication together. As my travel companion, interviewing partner, running mate, and dear friend for more than a decade, he has shared many of the adventures that lie behind this book. In fact, most of what happens herein has been bounced off of him on boat rides across Hong Kong's Victoria Harbor, or during long runs in the crushing Taipei heat, or while sitting in another Beijing taxi, while jostling with the crowds in Shanghai subways, or while hiking through the Himalayas. This book would not have happened without his support, encouragement, and counsel.

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The research and travels that lie behind this book overlap with the founding of the National Communication Association's (NCA) Task Force on Fostering International Collaborations in the Age of Globalization. Working with our colleagues at the Communication University of China (CUC), we launched the Biennial Conference on Communication, Media, and Governance in the Age of Globalization, and held our conferences on the lovely campus of CUC, in Beijing, in June 2016 and 2018. Many of the ideas that appear herein were first aired at these conferences or in conversations with my Task Force colleagues. And so, from the NCA Task Force, thanks to Soumia Bardhan, Tiffany Bell, Carolyn Calloway-Thomas, Janet Colvin, Stephen Croucher, Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge, Qingwen Dong, Tracey Q. Holden, Eddah Mutua, Moira O'Keefe, Jasmine Phillips, Kimberly Singletary, Paaige Turner, and Esther Yook. From the NCA National Office, which supported this international work, special thanks to LaKesha Anderson, Justin Danowski, Jenna Sauber, Wendy Fernando, and Trevor Parry-Giles. From the CUC team, special thanks to the former CUC President Hu Zhengrong, the visionary Dean Gao Xiaohong, and the indefatigable Professor Zhi Li. From this emerging NCA-CUC network, special thanks are due to Qingwen Dong, who has been an amazing intercultural liaison, sounding board, international ally, and friend; his life and work embody the spirit of global collaboration that, I hope, will help bring China, America, and Taiwan together as friends.

The logistics that lay behind the international research trips that drive this book were handled for the most part by the CU Denver Department of Communication's award-winning program assistant, Michelle Medal. She has become a dear friend and sounding board, known not only for her administrative acumen but her keen insights on politics and culture.

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Most of the documents used herein from China and Taiwan were either translated into English at the time by the respective governments or later translated by them for the purposes of historical documentation and political advocacy. In the case of Chinese or Taiwanese documents not available in English, thanks to Wang "Will" Da for translating such materials. Will did most of the translation work used herein while he was completing his MA in Taipei, at the National Taiwan University Graduate Institute of Journalism; he has since matriculated into the PhD program at Tsinghua University in Beijing—he in no way bears any responsibility for the critical commentary in this book. This question of translations is important, for I must acknowledge that my inability to read Chinese or Hakka means I have no doubt missed important evidence in Chinese and Taiwanese archives.

Thanks to editor George Edwards and the blind reviewers at *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, where, in the December issue of 2018, I published an early version of chapter 1 as "Avoiding 'a Chain Reaction of Disaster': A Reassessment of the Eisenhower White House's Handling of the 1954–1955 Quemoy Crisis."

Thanks to editor Todd Sandel and the blind reviewers at the NCA's *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, where, along with Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge and Lisa B. Keranen, I published "Postcolonial Remembering in Taiwan: 228 and Transitional Justice as the 'End of Fear.'" Some of the materials used therein, regarding Taiwan and postcolonial remembering, appear here in modified form.

At *SupChina*, thanks to editor Anthony Tao for allowing me to use herein materials that first appeared as "Transitional Justice and the 'Voyage' of Democracy in Taiwan."

At *Public Seminar*, thanks to editor Leah Prinzivalli for allowing me to use herein materials that first appeared, coauthored with Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge, as "On Postcolonial Remembering and Democratic Openings in Taiwan: An Interview with Former Political Prisoner Fred Chin."

I presented early versions of this work at the following venues, with great thanks to the local organizers for their efforts, and to the audiences for their feedback:

- On panels or in workshops in 2015 (Las Vegas), 2016 (Philadelphia), 2017 (Dallas), and 2018 (Salt Lake City) as part of the annual convention of the National Communication Association.
- As a keynote lecture in 2016 and as a panel presentation in 2018 before the NCA-CUC-hosted Biennial Conference on Communication, Media, and Governance in the Age of Globalization, Beijing.

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- As invited workshops before the International Department of the Communist Party of China, whom we hosted at NCA headquarters in Washington, DC, in January 2017, and with whom we led workshops in Beijing in June 2017.
- As invited lectures before the College of Media and Communication, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China, in the summers of 2016 and 2017.
- As two three-hour-long seminars before the Advanced Summer Institute, hosted at Soochow University, Suzhou, China, in June 2018.
- As the 32nd Annual J. Jeffery Auer Lecture in Political Communication, hosted by the Department of Communication and Culture at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, in March 2015.
- As the Kirt Ritter Lecture in Political Rhetoric, hosted by the Department of Communication at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, in February 2018.
- As a brown-bag presentation before the CU Denver Security Studies Research Group, a team we lovingly call "Spy Club," in October 2018.
- As an invited lecture before the Department of Communication at the University of Macau, China, in June 2019.
- As a plenary address at "The Shenzhen Forum," co-hosted by NCA and Shenzhen University, in June 2019.
- And as an invited plenary address at the "Chinese Media-Technology Nexus" Conference, at Boston College, December 2019.

I have sought throughout the book to offer readers visual evidence of the tenor of the times; special thanks to Robert Damrauer, Naomi Nishi, and my colleagues at the CU Denver Office of Research Services for the generous financial assistance required to reproduce these images.

At Michigan State University Press, thanks to editor-in-chief Catherine Cocks for her support of this book series and for embodying prudence and excellence. In an exceptional gesture of kindness, she edited the entire book. I should note that as the founder of the US–China Relations in the Age of Globalization series, Catherine and I wanted to avoid any possible perception of a conflict of interest in the Press publishing this book, and so I recused myself from all editorial handling of this project. In my place, we asked Robert Hariman to serve as editor; he secured three blind peer reviews and provided his own detailed and remarkably helpful commentary on the revising process. While I alone am responsible for any errors or

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foolishness herein, Catherine, Bob, and the blind peer reviewers deserve much of the credit for knocking this book into shape. Thanks as well to MSU's crack copyeditor Bonnie Cobb for her good work. Anastasia Wraight, Terika Hernandez, Kristine Blakeslee, Elise Jajuga, and Nicole Utter all did excellent work as well, completing the team of MSU Press colleagues. Thanks to Dawn Martin for creating the index.

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Abbreviations

AIT	The American Institute in Taiwan
AJCS	*American Journal of Chinese Studies*
APP	The American Presidency Project (the online version of what was formerly called *The Public Papers of the Presidents*)
ARATS	The PRC's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWF	The Ann Whitman Files, DDEPL
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BR	*Beijing Review* (formerly the *Peking Review*)
CD	*China Daily* (English-language version)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CDL	Clinton Digital Library (also see WJCPL)
CDT	*China Digital Times* (online clearing-house from California)
CNA	Chinese News Agency, Taiwan's version of Xinhua

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CP	*China Post* (from Taipei, in English)
CPC	Communist Party of China, also written as the Party
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
DDEPL	Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
FAPA	Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Washington, DC
FBIS	The CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FR	President Eisenhower's Formosa Resolution (1955)
FRUS	The U.S. Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series
GPO	The U.S. Government Printing Office (publisher of the *FRUS*)
GT	*Global Times* (English-language version)
HRIC	Human Rights in China, New York City
HSTPL	The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri
ICHRT	The International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, Washington, DC
JCC	*Journal of Contemporary China*
JCS	The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
KMT	Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (also written as Kuomintang)
MAAG	The U.S.-run Military Assistance and Advisory Group
MAC	The ROC's Mainland Affairs Council
MDT	The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)
MFA	The CPC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NEW	Taipei's *New Era Weekly*
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate (or SNIE, for Special National Intelligence Estimate)
NSC	The U.S. National Security Council
NYRB	*New York Review of Books*
NYT	*New York Times*

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PD	*People's Daily* (English-language version)
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSQ	*Presidential Studies Quarterly*
RNPLM	Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
RPA	*Rhetoric & Public Affairs*
QJS	*Quarterly Journal of Speech*
SCMP	*South China Morning Post*, from Hong Kong
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEF	The ROC's Straits Exchange Foundation
TAO	The PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office
TIM	Taiwan Independence Movement
TN	*Taiwan News*
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
TSM	The Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989)
TT	*Taipei Times*
TTA	The U.S. Taiwan Travel Act (2018)
UN	United Nations
UNRRA	The United Nations' Relief and Reconstruction Agency
VFW	The U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars
WHCF	White House Central Files, part of the Eisenhower Records as President, DDEPL
WJCPL	William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, Arkansas
WSJ	*Wall Street Journal*
WP	*Washington Post*

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Persons and Places with Naming Changes or Complications

Over the past seventy years, as different regimes have come and gone, leaders have made political statements by changing the names of places in China and Taiwan. During this time, as part of the process of building intercultural understanding, linguists have constructed different systems for rendering Chinese characters into English-friendly phrases. I am not qualified to speak to the complexities of these translational practices or to the nuanced cultural work embedded in these changes of personal and place names. To make things easy in this book, I use the simple system of working in each chapter with the place or personal name that was in currency at that time in English. For example, during the crisis of 1954–1955, the American press referred to the island of Quemoy, and so I use that name in chapter 2; today, most observers use the name Kinmen, so that name is used in later chapters. Likewise, the capital of China was historically rendered in English as Peking, with Beijing becoming more common only around 1978. Hence, Peking is used chapters 1, 2, and 3, while Beijing is used thereafter. To avoid confusion, the table below offers readers both contemporary English place names and any prominent alternative or prior usages.

Personal names can be even more confusing. For example, consider the case of Zhou Enlai, whose name was rendered in English as Chou Enlai up through

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the 1970s, only switching in popular usage to Zhou Enlai later. Zhou has been so significant a figure in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations that I find myself using Chou in the early chapters of the book and then Zhou in the later chapters, for his life spanned this period of linguistic change. Some characters, like Sun Yat-sen, worked with names rendered in Mandarin, Japanese, the romanization system known as "pinyin," a different system known as "Wade-Giles," the Cantonese dialect popular in Hong Kong and surroundings, the Hakka language dominant on Taiwan, and others, meaning he had different names depending on whom he was speaking to. For any reader confused by this process, please consult the chart below, which lists contemporary names as rendered in English and their prior or alternative iterations. Let me be clear that I have no intention of making any critical commentary on the political or cultural implications of these naming systems—I use in each instance the name that was, at that time, most prevalent in the major English-speaking outlets.

Another complication regarding naming reflects the different understandings in America, China, and Taiwan about the order and significance of names. In America, we list a personal name first and a family name second, so Harry S. Truman is cited in subsequent references as Truman. The reverse is true in China and Taiwan. This means Mao (family name) Zedong (given name) is referred to as Mao; likewise, in Taiwan, this means that Tsai (family name) Ing-wen (given name) is listed as Tsai. Problems arise, however, when international figures publish in Western contexts, where sometimes they switch their names to accord with English conventions. For example, Zheng Wang, who works in America and often publishes in English, lists his family name second, so his name is rendered in English as Wang; likewise, Xing Lu, who was born in China but now resides in America, is rendered as Lu. But, other authors publish regularly in English contexts while keeping their original Chinese naming; for example, Wang Jisi is referred to as Wang. Other authors use modified intercultural combinations, so Hsin-I Sydney Yueh, for example, is rendered in English as Yueh. The complications can even spread within a family, as in the case of Su Tseng-chang, the prominent Taiwanese politician (family name Su); his daughter, a professor living and working in America, publishes in English as Chiaoning Su. These naming practices can lead to confusion, for not all readers will know which authors or figures are using which naming system. To clear up this confusion, in the chart below I have rendered each figure's last/family name in bold and listed any prior or alternative names.

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CONTEMPORARY VERSION IN ENGLISH, LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY PLACE NAME OR FAMILY NAME	PRIOR OR ALTERNATIVE ITERATIONS
Beijing	Peking, Peiping
C. Y. **Chang**	
Chang Ching-yun	
Jung **Chang**	
Chang Kuo-tsai	
Chien-min **Chao**	
Vincent Y. **Chao**	
Chien-kai **Chen**	
Chen Ching-chang	
Chen Guo-ming	
Chen Kuan-hsing	
Chen Mao-hsiung	
Chen Ming-tung	
Chen Shui-bian	Also called A-Bian, Chen Shui-pien,
Chen Wei-han	
Chen Weihua	
Chen Wei-ting	
Chen Xiaolu	
Hsin-I **Cheng**	
Cheng Si	
Chiang Ching-kuo	Jiang Jingguo
Chiang Kai-shek/the “Generalissimo”/Gimo	Called “peanut” by Stilwell; Chiang Chung-cheng, Chiang Chieh-shih, and Jiang Jieshi
Yuan-ming **Chiao**	
Chou Shu-Kai	
Yun-han **Chu**	
Rueyling **Chuang**	
Chung Li-hua	
Deng Xiaoping	Teng Hsiao-p’ing
Patrick Shaou-Whea **Dodge**	
Qian **Gong**	
Guangdong	Canton
Zhidong **Hao**	
Hsia Tao-Sheng	
Ying-chung **Hsieh**	
Hsu Chia-ching	Xu Jiaqing
Emmanuel Chung-yueh **Hsu**	Also called Emmanuel C. Y. Hsu
Hu Jintao	Hu Chin-t’ao
Huang Tien-lin	
Stacy **Hsu**	

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CONTEMPORARY VERSION IN ENGLISH, LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY PLACE NAME OR FAMILY NAME	PRIOR OR ALTERNATIVE ITERATIONS
Hu Weizhen	
Victoria Tin-bor **Hui**	
Jia Qingguo	Qingguo Jia
Jiang Zemin	Chiang Tze-min
Kinmen	Quemoy, Jinmen
Wellington **Koo**	Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Ku Wei-chun
Kuomintang, the ROC's Nationalist Party	Guomindang
Lai Tse-han	
William **Lai** Ching-te	Lai Qingde, Lai Ch'ing-te
Willy Wo-lap **Lam**	
Lee Hsin-fang	
Lee Min-yung	
Shyu-tu **Lee**	
Lee Teng-hui	Li Denghui, Li Teng-hui
Li Ruihuan	Li Jui-huan
Victor Hao **Li**	
Li Zhisui	
Ping-hui **Liao**	
Liao Yiwu	Liao Wei
Chen-wei **Lin**	
Lin Fei-fan	
Hsiao-ting **Lin**	
Lin Kien-tsu	
Ping-pei **Lin**	
Lin Thung-hong	
Liang-ya **Liou**	
Liu Hsin-de	
I-chou **Liu**	Liu Yizhou
Joyce C. H. **Liu**	
Xing **Lu**	
Ringo **Ma**	
Sheng-mei **Ma**	
Ma Ying-jeou	
Mao Zedong/Chairman Mao	Mao Tse-tung
Nanjing	Nanking
Nylon (*nickname*) **Cheng**	Nylon Deng, Cheng Nan-jing
Peng Ming-min	Peng Mingmin
Qian Qichen	Ch'ien Ch'i-ch'en
Qiao Guanhua	Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Qiao Shi	Ch'iao Shih

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CONTEMPORARY VERSION IN ENGLISH, LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY PLACE NAME OR FAMILY NAME	PRIOR OR ALTERNATIVE ITERATIONS
Qimao Chen	Chen Qimao
James C. H. **Shen**	Shen Jianhong, Shen Chien-hung
Shu-mei **Shih**	
Soong May-ling/"Madame Chiang"	Soong Mei-ling, Song Meiling
Chiaoning **Su**	
Chi **Su**	Su Chi, Su Qi
Su Tseng-chang	"The Lightbulb"
Sun Yat-sen	Sun Zhongshan, Sun Yixian, Sun I-hsien
Suzhou	Soochow
See Seng **Tan**	Tan See Seng
Tang Shubei	
Emma Jinhua **Teng**	
Pei-ju **Teng**	
Hung-mao **Tien**	
Taiwan (Republic of China)	Formosa
Tsai Ing-wen	Cai Yingwen, Tsay Ing'wen, Ts'ai Ying-wen
Shih-shan Henry **Tsai**	
Tehpen **Tsai**	
Tsai Wei-ping	Cai Weiping
Tsay Ting-Kuei	Ts'ai Ting-kwei, Cai Dinggui
Chen-yuan **Tung**	
Wang Hui	
Wang Jianmin	
Wang Jisi	
Wang Liming/"Rebel Pepper"	
Vincent Wei-cheng **Wang**	
Wang Qingyun	
Wang Xingqiao	
Wei Wou	Wou Wei
Yiu-chung **Wong**	
Wu Den-yih	
Wu Hsiu-chuan	Wu Xiuquan, Wu Hsiu-ch'uan
Rwei-ren **Wu**	Wu Ruiren
Xi Jinping	Hsi Chin-p'ing
Yafeng **Xia**	
Xiamen	Amoy
Xinjiang	Sinkiang
Wang Lixiong	Bao Mi (*pseudonym*)
Zheng **Wang**	
Zhuoliu **Wu**	Wu Zhuoliu, Wu Chuo-liu, Wu Jiantian

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CONTEMPORARY VERSION IN ENGLISH, LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY PLACE NAME OR FAMILY NAME	PRIOR OR ALTERNATIVE ITERATIONS
Guobin **Yang**	
Yang Jiliang	
Yang Yizhou	
George **Yeh**	Yeh Kung-ch’ao
You Ji	
Hsin-I Sydney **Yueh**	
Zhang Baijia	
Zhang Baohui	Baohui Zhang
Jialin **Zhang**	
Zhang Xianling	
Zhang Yiqian	
Suisheng **Zhao**	
Mei **Zhong**	
Zhou Enlai/Premier Zhou	Chou Enlai, Chou En-lai, Zhou Xiangyu
Zhu De/Marshal Zhu	Chu De, Chu Teh
Zhu Songling	

For readers who seek more information on these key scholars, activists, politicians, and other thought leaders, nice data sources are ChinaVitae.com, hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; BeijingReview.com, under the “CPC leadership” tab; Wikipedia; ChinaDaily.com, which has a limited search engine; Harvard University’s China Biographical Database Project; and the University of Washington’s Taiwan Studies Database.

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Mapping the Rhetorical Histories of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

Taiwan has served for more than seventy years as "an enduring symbol of China's weakness and humiliation" and as the center of disputes between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] As Robert P. Newman observed in 1975, the "wildly fluctuating" American views of these interactions indicate "amazing, historic volatility," "perceptual ambiguity," and "secular ambivalence," and have produced "totally incompatible perceptions" amounting to a pattern of "lethal rhetoric."[2] As an heir of these misunderstandings, a participant-observer in the reemergence of China as a global power, and a supporter of the ongoing successes of Taiwan (also called the Republic of China, or ROC), I argue that making sense of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication is a crucial first step in reversing this pattern. This is no small endeavor, however, for lethal rhetoric has polluted U.S.-China-Taiwan relations for more than seventy years. In fact, the U.S.-China-Taiwan conundrum lay at the heart of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's epic 1953 lament—in the phrase I have borrowed for my title—that the United States was confronting a "world of turmoil."[3]

Addressing the communication patterns that structure this turmoil is deeply significant, for as Kenneth Lieberthal has noted, "One of the greatest dangers to international security today is the possibility of a military confrontation between

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China and Taiwan that leads to a war between China and the United States."[4] The threat of war is so tangible that the *Taipei Times*, the leading English-language paper in Taiwan, routinely refers to China's "invasion preparations."[5] If we hope to avoid that catastrophe, then coming to a better understanding of the nuances of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication stands among the most pressing communication issues in the age of globalization and as one of the keys to building peace in the Asia Pacific.[6] Indeed, if the United States, China, and Taiwan hope to nurture relationships rooted in mutual respect and trust, then reimagining our shared fates is one of the most crucial foreign-policy, and hence communication, issues of our age. In short, it is time to end this long-standing international conflict.

Consider that upon the inauguration of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen as president of Taiwan in 2016, the Communist Party of China (CPC or Party) announced a halt in cross-Strait dialogue and initiated a campaign of threats. The CPC-controlled *China Daily* advised President Tsai to "refrain from any disguised moves for 'Taiwan Independence'" and warned, "The mainland is unswerving in its demonstration to fight 'Taiwan Independence'. . . . Any reckless 'Taiwan Independence' move *will inevitably invite a strike* from the other side of the Straits."[7] The CPC's campaign was so ferocious that John F. Copper called it "a coordinated effort by Beijing to punish President Tsai and the DPP."[8] The Taiwanese leader spent the early part of her tenure trying to tamp down such bluster, repeating—sometimes to the consternation of the more progressive wing of the DPP—that she was committed to maintaining a stable Taiwan-PRC rapport.[9] Even prior to assuming the presidency, she emphasized, "I am committed to a consistent, predictable, and sustainable relationship" and "the maintenance of the status quo."[10] To grasp the vast difference in understanding between the CPC and Taiwan, consider figure 1, a political cartoon from the *Taipei Times*.[11]

If the CPC threatened Taiwan, and if President Tsai sought to parry such aggression, America's President Trump sought to prove his foreign-policy toughness by supporting Taiwan, much to the displeasure of the Chinese. Just following his election, in December 2016, President-elect Trump took a controversial call from Tsai, setting off a frantic round of international intrigue and recrimination.[12] By the summer of 2017, the United States announced that it would sell Taiwan an arms package valued at $1.42 billion, thus sending China what the *New York Times* called "another sign that the Trump administration is embracing a far more confrontational approach with China."[13] The same day the weapons deal was disclosed, the United States and Australia began what *The Guardian* called "their biggest ever

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

FIGURE 1. President Tsai confronts China's "annexation ambitions," political cartoon from the *Taipei Times*, August 15, 2017, by TACO; © held by and image printed with the permission of the artist and the paper.

joint military exercises . . . a show of force purposefully directed at China."[14] And so the Long Cold War lumbered along in a familiar pattern: Taiwan trying to maintain its national independence while not provoking China, the CPC threatening war in the name of righting past assaults upon its sovereignty, the United States hoping calmer heads prevail while nonetheless engaging in actions that could reasonably be deemed escalatory. The stakes could not be higher, for as Chen Mao-hsiung argued in the *Taipei Times*, China and Taiwan are "basically at war."[15]

As these opening comments indicate, I hope to outline the rhetorical dispositions that have structured U.S.-China-Taiwan communication from 1945 up to 2020. My central claim is that the intersection of China's *rhetoric of traumatized nationalism*, the United States' *rhetoric of geostrategic deception*, and the United States' treatment of Taiwan via the *rhetoric of marginal significance* has produced a dysfunctional communication dynamic that has left all parties feeling bruised, disrespected, and uneasy, and hence incapable of working toward a peaceful

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resolution. The Taiwanese have responded by producing their own patterns of communication, what the later chapters call the *rhetoric of democracy as conversion*, and eventually the *rhetoric of democratic disdain*. The chapters that follow deploy these terms systematically, as frames of analysis robust enough to diagnose long-standing historical patterns, yet flexible enough to accommodate innovations in how the United States, China, and Taiwan communicate about and with each other. Across this matrix of persistence and invention,[16] my goal is to track the communication patterns structuring what Thomas Farrell once called "the continual reinvention of human agency."[17] Unfortunately, the rhetorical-historical evidence suggests that each nation's communicative habits trigger the other nation's worst insecurities, making this triangular relationship a machine of grievance and hostility.[18]

To make sense of the impulses driving this conflict, we need to situate the CPC's "humiliation" within a wider context. The narrative begins with the British-led Opium Wars, first launched in 1839, and spirals up through the nineteenth century's parade of imperial intruders, featuring especially Japan's seizing of contested lands at the close of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.[19] Next come Japan's brutal conquests on mainland China during World War II, and the United States' support for the loathed Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War and after. Schooled in this narrative, many Chinese believe that external forces are committed to carving up their civilization.[20] This sense of suffering indignities at the hands of foreigners—the central emotion associated with what has become known as "the century of humiliation"—is so foundational to Chinese consciousness that when Chairman Mao and the CPC won the Civil War in 1949, the Great Helmsman announced the triumph by gloating over the defeat of "Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the running dogs of imperialism." Mao promised, "Ours will no longer be *a nation subject to insult and humiliation*. We have stood up."[21] This same theme was reprised in 1954 by the PRC's Political Consultative Conference during another period of U.S.-China-Taiwan tension: "The time when China could be dismembered at the will of the imperialists is gone."[22] Even as late as 1971, when Premier Chou Enlai began secret negotiations with Henry Kissinger to normalize relations between China and the United States, Mao's lieutenant referred to the loss of Taiwan as "a great wound for us."[23] When Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited New York City in 1997, he too referred to China's "century-old humiliation caused by its occupation"; the final three paragraphs of his speech focused on how to "handle the Taiwan question properly."[24]

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This sense of suffering endless insult and humiliation at the hands of "imperialists" and "occupations" has ripened over the years into one of the propulsive forces motivating China's new "hawkish patriotism."[25] PRC President Xi Jinping (2013 through the time of this writing) has pushed this perspective in speech after speech:

> Chinese history is a history of imperialist oppression, humiliation, and suffering. Almost all the imperialist countries in the world have invaded and bullied China. . . . They slaughtered Chinese people, forced China to sign a series of unequal treaties, sabotaged China's sovereignty, [and] set up their territories. . . . They extorted us to pay unfair reparation, pillaged our wealth, stole our treasures, [and] controlled China's economy. All these have brought unfathomable miseries to Chinese people.

As Xing Lu has shown, Xi uses such language to justify a wide range of "hawkish patriotism" agendas.[26] Ian Johnson has likewise noted how China's imagined futures are based in large part on re-creating fictional pasts: that is, righting the wrongs of history through aggressive nationalism in the present hinges on a series of fantasies about some lost-yet-once-shining imperial moment. But as Johnson reminds us, "This past never existed. It is a dream—the China dream, perhaps, which Mr. Xi has made his signature idea. But if pushed too far it can become something else: a delusion."[27]

From this perspective, the "China Dream" is less historical than eagerly aspirational, less of a realist pursuit of new alliances on the road to national greatness than imperial wish fulfillment, all driven by outrage at China's "unfathomable miseries."[28] The China Dream can therefore be understood as what James Wang calls "a recurring nightmare," for at least in President Xi's vision, it hinges on an explicitly anti-democratic worldview, thus rendering Taiwan's thriving civil society a direct threat to ongoing Party control.[29] Ian Buruma notes that "contemporary Chinese nationalism" is now driven by "that most explosive of goals: wiping out the national humiliations of the past" by "avenging the suffering inflicted in the past century and a half."[30] This impulse is so strong, Zheng Wang argues in *Never Forget National Humiliation*, that righting the perceived wrongs of the "century of humiliation" has become "the Chinese master narrative."[31]

Building upon the notion of nationalism as a process of imagining, I have argued that traumatized nationalism stands among the core rhetorical habits of the contemporary CPC.[32] In this formation, "the wounds of [China's] history

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as a colonial victim" drive its impulse for "a new chest-thumping bravado."[33] This compulsion is so strong that it propels the CPC toward an "exaggerated notion of sovereignty."[34] Actions that might have once been called imperialist or warmongering—invading Tibet in 1951, reclaiming Hong Kong in 1997, violating international law while expanding into the South China Sea in 2016 and after, perpetually threatening Taiwan, crushing regional senses of place and religion in Xinjiang, and so on[35]—are now justified as making the injured nation whole again, thus amounting to "postcolonial colonialism."[36] This quest for greatness is so intense that Evan Osnos has characterized the nation as riding a wave of expectation, amounting to an Age of Ambition.[37]

Within that dynamic, Taiwan festers as the most painful and long-standing national wound, a rebuke to those who seek to "unify" the nation. For example, a 2013 Party white paper noted that "the trauma" caused by China's historical "humiliation by foreign powers" "will not be healed" until Taiwan is "reunited"—by force if necessary—with the mainland.[38] As *China Daily* announced in 2016, "Taiwan stands on top of China's menu of core national interests, and is not negotiable."[39] This notion of Taiwan as not negotiable is crucial for understanding the CPC's sense of humiliation. As Marshal Zhu De, then the commander in chief of the PLA, argued in 1954:

> The liberation of Taiwan and the liquidation of the Chiang Kai-shek gang are China's own internal affair. We will absolutely not allow other countries to interfere. The people of our country must, with unity and singleness of purpose, resolutely fight for the liberation of Taiwan so that the people on Taiwan can return to the embrace of their motherland.[40]

That passage is full of extreme rhetoric—including the call to *liquidate* the enemy, to *liberate* a people not seeking liberation, claims of actions that will not be allowed, assertions of what must be done, and so on—amounting to a précis on both the CPC's revolutionary clichés and the unilateral "command communication" style used to express them.[41] Yet the string of promises and commands leveled here have neither been fulfilled nor obeyed, indicating a failure on the part of the CPC in general and the PLA in particular.

Consider the roaring editorial published in *People's Daily* and the *Peking Review*, from the summer of 1972:

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> Taiwan is a province of China and the 14 million people living on Taiwan are flesh-and-blood compatriots of the Chinese people. The liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere. All U.S. armed forces and military installations should be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," an "independent Taiwan," or advocating that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan.[42]

Like Zhu's rhetoric, this passage is declaratory, unilateral, unbending; it prohibits a range of perspectives while prescribing only one possible outcome; it makes claims both political and historical, suturing Taiwan into China's political orbit and its citizens into China's deep civilizational sweep. Generations of Chinese were raised on such promises, yet Taiwan still stands as a free, thriving, democratic, and independent nation, making such CPC rhetoric seem foolish. It is this sense of an ongoing failure that makes the situation today even more dangerous than it was when Chairman Mao made his promises in 1949, or when Marshal Zhu gave his pledge in 1954, or when the *Peking Review* roared its claims in 1972.

Addressing the Long Cold War as a Matrix of Communicative Persistence and Innovation

I want to flag the use of "long" as a periodizing concept to explain my reference to the "Long Cold War." In recent scholarship, the term has been applied to indicate that periods are not neat and linear episodes in human development but messy and circuitous mishmashes of competing forces, often with inchoate beginnings and fuzzy endings. Instead of dating the Cold War from date X to date Y, as is often done—say with a beginning in March 1946, when Winston Churchill declared the descent of an "iron curtain" across much of Europe, and an ending in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall—some historians refer instead to the "long" Cold War, indicating both the historical trends and precedents that led up to its inception and the lingering effects and unresolved crises that have festered since its alleged close. Referring to the Long Cold War thus extends the period of inquiry, enabling scholars to approach a specific period of history within a more robust set of causal

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factors, rhetorical artifacts, and political consequences.[43] For example, in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, Wang Hui notes that "People regard the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc as the end of the 'Cold War,' but in Asia the structure of the 'Cold War' has to a large extent been preserved and has even developed new derivative forms."[44] Following Wang's lead, I situate U.S.-China-Taiwan relations within this temporally expanded notion of the Long Cold War.[45] As a corollary, historians have also broadened the term's geographic scope of consideration, approaching it not so much as a European-based conflict as a global network of relations,[46] with diffuse causes and devastating impacts in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and more.[47] This lengthened and broadened notion of a Long Cold War is applicable to Taiwan as the island's status lingers as an unresolved holdover from earlier times.

To map the rhetorical dispositions that have structured U.S.-China-Taiwan relations throughout the Long Cold War, I offer a series of detailed case studies. To familiarize readers with the terminology and methods I deploy, I offer here opening comments on the central arguments and how they fit together to create a communication-based framework of analysis. My guiding belief is that the specific claims, larger historical narratives, and overarching national imaginaries at play constitute the range of available options, lingering grievances, and interpretive frames for the key parties, thus shaping their discourse. Indeed, this book unfolds with the assumption that the tension between our nations is *perceptual* and hence embodied, experienced, and extended via long-standing communication dispositions.[48] Assuming that communication does not merely reflect our thinking but structures it means that if we hope for peace in the Asia Pacific, then we need better analyses of how China, Taiwan, and the United States envision each other, and how their interlinked national imaginaries create both opportunities and obstacles for greater understanding. From this perspective, communication is productive, constituting possibilities and blockages, both avenues for innovation and dead-ends of accrued habits.[49] I will say more about this theory of communication later and will turn now to the key dispositions that structure my case studies.

First, the United States has historically dealt with Taiwan as an expendable bargaining chip within the larger geostrategic game of international power—and this has engendered no end of hard feelings on the part of Taiwan's leaders and citizens. I characterize this pattern as "the rhetoric of marginal significance," wherein Taiwan is an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy.[50] The history of this relationship is marked by the sense that what Taiwan wants is irrelevant in the

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face of what America wants. This disregard was flagged in George H. Kerr's epic *Formosa Betrayed*, a book of observations Kerr made while serving the United Nations in Taiwan following World War II. Regarding the retrocession of Formosa from the just-defeated Imperial Japan to Chiang's KMT in 1945, Kerr observed that by simply handing the island to the Nationalists, without making any effort to consult the locals, the United States was "treating five million Formosans as chattel property, to be transferred from one sovereignty to another, without reference to their wishes."[51]

While such references to slavery have faded from contemporary debates, public discourse about Taiwan still tends to represent the island as someone else's property, as a resource to be bartered over. For example, in the summer of 2017, the *South China Morning Post* reported, "Washington has ratcheted up the pressure on Beijing . . . [by] upping the ante on Taiwan."[52] Along these same lines, commentators often refer to "playing the Taiwan card." In 2016, John Bolton urged the United States to "Play a Taiwan Card" in a *Wall Street Journal* editorial; the *American Conservative* countered, "No, the U.S. Shouldn't Play the 'Taiwan Card.'"[53] By the summer of 2017, *China Daily* was admonishing, "US Must Stop Playing 'Taiwan Card,'" while the *Taipei Times* was criticizing the CPC for its "Taiwan Card" rhetoric.[54] In this formation, superpowers gamble with Taiwan's fate as they maneuver for geostrategic advantage. It takes no great leap of imagination to understand how this rhetorical pattern infuriates many Taiwanese. As one activist said in 2017, "we're just tired of our two Big Brothers [the United States and China] treating us like a pawn."[55]

The CPC has likewise portrayed Taiwan not only as a poker chip, a playing card, or a pawn, but as a renegade province, a wayward child in need of stiff CPC discipline. In this way, the Party clings to a fantastical version of history wherein it possesses an inalienable right to control Taiwan, as if it is not a free and independent nation-state but a "purely internal affair" within China's nonnegotiable sense of "one China."[56] The Party's relationship to Taiwan is both condescending and imperial, both threatening and annoyed. For example, in 2017, as the Party firmed up its hold over the once-free press of Hong Kong, readers were treated to claims like this one: "There is nothing more important in the long run to world peace, stability, and prosperity than the Sino-US relationship. Bilateral relations are too important to be derailed by the Taiwan issue."[57] In this construction, Taiwan is but a nuisance gumming up the work of empire building, neither the subject of its own history nor the author of its own fate. As Steven I. Levine argues, this communication pattern has left all sides mired in "mutual disenchantment."[58]

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Indeed, the Americans' repeated use of the rhetoric of marginal significance has taught the Taiwanese to resent the United States and to feel stuck in what Ambassador Karl L. Rankin once called "a pawn complex."[59] This sense of Taiwan's marginal significance was so acute that Thomas E. Dewey, the perennial Republican candidate for president, reported an outburst of "searing emotional bitterness" on Chiang's part during a 1951 dinner party in Taipei: "Must we become the victims of total abandonment?"[60] The lines of allegiance, fear, and desire were so tangled that Kerr characterized U.S.-Taiwan relations as suffering from "institutional schizophrenia."[61]

Consider the State Department's 1949 *White Paper*, a 1,000+ page-long compendium of documents on U.S.-China relations, wherein the Chiang regime was portrayed as inept, corrupt, and irredeemable. Published to defend the Truman administration against the charge that it had "lost China," the *White Paper* began with Secretary of State Dean Acheson claiming, "The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits and capabilities could have changed that result."[62] Despite the avalanche of evidence supporting Acheson's point, the *White Paper* felt to both the KMT and their American supporters like a decorum-shattering rebuke. The old "China Hands" were stunned that the United States had published "a portrayal of another country and its government so adversely critical," as John Leighton Stuart, the U.S. ambassador to wartime China, put it.[63] Geraldine Fitch slammed "this hypocritical washing of hands in the defeat of a friendly nation and faithful ally."[64] Dewey went further, lamenting how the *White Paper* "hit Formosa like an atom bomb."[65] Domestically, rather than persuading Americans of the wisdom of Truman's policies, Newman has concluded that the *White Paper* "was a blazing success in activating the wrath of Chiang lovers," who responded by redoubling their attacks on the White House.[66] Writing from Peking, Mao relished the document as evidence of "the victory of the Chinese people and the defeat of imperialism," adding "Acheson's *White Paper* admits that the U.S. imperialists are at a complete loss as to what to do."[67]

And so generations of Taiwanese have come to expect the United States to treat them as afterthoughts. The *Taiwan Communiqué*, published by the International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan (ICHRT), captured the grievances underlying the rhetoric of marginal significance when it wrote that "At Shimonoseki (1895), Cairo (1943), San Francisco (1952), and Shanghai (1972), other powers made

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pronouncements and decisions about the status of Taiwan without consulting the people of Taiwan."[68] The evolution of this rhetoric of marginal significance has hampered the ability of the United States and Taiwan to collaborate, in part because it has instilled in the Taiwanese "a rather unpleasant suspicion of the West," while it has blocked generations of Americans from understanding Taiwanese hopes.[69]

The rhetoric of marginal significance impacts a sense of self and culture as well. In the 1980s, "Dancing Girl" was a popular song before the KMT banned it, fearing the song's portrayal of Taipei's red-light district. The lyrics lament a prostitute "swinging with the clients" yet living a life of "sadness . . . secretly shedding tears, while smiling outside."[70] The song's popularity overlapped with the heady days of *New Era Weekly* (*NEW*), the underground magazine edited by Nylon Cheng.[71] Prohibited by the KMT yet wildly popular, *NEW* became the voice of a generation longing for democracy and an end to KMT repression. In the issue of August 4, 1986, the banned magazine included a visual portrayal of the banned song's Dancing Girl (see figure 2), depicting her as a street-wise beauty dressed up for a night out, smoking a cigarette with an elegant holder, her face a mixture of sadness and whimsy. While her dress sparkles and she wears a faux tiara and fancy earrings, Dancing Girl straddles a pig, the universal symbol of excess and greed. If you look closely at the pig's face, its eyes are dazed and confused and its cheeks are red, as if falling down with drink, or power, or money, or all of them. Dancing Girl thus sashays over the pig of empire, the pig of KMT repression, the pig of men paying for sex. If Dancing Girl represents Taiwan, then we are seeing a weary fighter, someone who knows they are being used by stronger forces while trying to make the best of a bad situation.

Despite the image's sadness, the upper left corner of the page features a line drawing, common in *NEW*, depicting the torch of liberty, amounting to a call for democracy. The text to the right of Dancing Girl offers a few snippets from the song's lyrics, and claims, "You must know at least how to hum a part of the song, which was once highly popular and sung in every corner of Taiwan." Cheng then makes this radical leap: "In the past four hundred years in Taiwan, she first accompanied the Dutch, then Zheng Chenggong, then the Emperor of the Qing, then the KMT. . . . As she looks around in the dark, when can we triumph and truly be our own master? Love Taiwan, Support Tangwai!"[72] Dancing Girl therefore stands as a rallying cry for a democratic Taiwan, as the "Tangwai" movement, which at the time meant "outside the party," involved independent groups opposing the KMT. And so Dancing Girl becomes a revolutionary. Taken together, the song, the image, the

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icon, and the call to action depict the complications of living under the rhetoric of marginal significance, of being used for others' pleasure while holding your head up high, of experiencing a grinding sense of colonial damage while fighting for dignity and democracy.

The rhetoric of marginal significance is not just a reflection of Taiwan's size. Yes, the island is relatively small compared to China's immensity, yet it is roughly equivalent to the size of Switzerland and larger than many other UN member states. Yes, the island's population would fit within one of China's megacities, yet it is roughly three times as populous as Israel and larger than one hundred smaller UN member states.[73] Moreover, as a thriving market for ideas and goods, as a hub in the global flow of capital and technology, Taiwan stands as an international leader; as of 2019, it was the United States' "11th-largest trading partner" and "the world's 22nd-largest economy," hardly the kind of figures that merit second-class treatment.[74] The rhetoric of marginal significance, then, is not simply a reflection of Taiwan's size, or its population, or its economic clout, but of a unique Long Cold War history.

Second, deploying sabotage, surveillance, coastal raids, and port blockades throughout the region, and then via war in Korea and Vietnam, the United States has used Taiwan as a base for staging the fight against Communism. This military role has produced in both the Chinese and Taiwanese leadership a sense that generations of American leaders could not be trusted, for they would do what they pleased to advance their own cause, while issuing public announcements that were less than sincere and frequently ambiguous, if not deceptive. Within this rhetoric of geostrategic deception, Taiwan's relationship to the United States and China has been framed within a web of innuendo, lies, and flip-flops. This pattern was entrenched in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, which launched the notion of "one China" on its torturous journey and has underwritten U.S.-China-Taiwan communication ever since. Perhaps the most damaging consequence has been the sense that the proliferation of circuitous and conflicted rhetoric has left U.S. foreign policy tied up in knots, leading to both domestic and international complications. The lingering sense of deception embedded in this rhetorical pattern has crippled American credibility in Asia. However, while generations of leaders in China and Taiwan have tended to view this rhetorical pattern as driven by intentional deception, my analysis points more directly to confusion. As we will see, America's leadership has been less focused on offensive manipulation than on the defensive task of not screwing up; what has appeared to international

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FIGURE 2. "Dancing Girl" as the embodiment of Taiwan's predicament, from *New Era Weekly*, August 4, 1986; © held by and image used with the permission of the Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation and Memorial Museum, Taipei.

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audiences as deception has tended to be the result of muddled communication rooted in fear and misunderstanding.

America's attempts to use Taiwan to thwart Communism in Asia have led U.S. leaders to speak of advancing democracy while backing a regime often described as fascist. For example, addressing Chiang's strong-arm tactics against dissidents during World War II, Gary May refers to the KMT's internal security forces as Chiang's "gestapo."[75] Writing about Chiang's military and security policies, Brian Crozier claimed they were imbued with an "admiration for fascism and Nazism."[76] Mao's propagandists regularly referred to Chiang as a "Fascist chieftain," while Chou Enlai ripped "the fascist essence of the KMT."[77] In July 1950, Robert C. Strong warned the White House that Formosa was a police state lacking the most rudimentary aspects of competent governance and the spirit of democracy.[78] Despite these warnings, the White House continued to back Chiang, demonstrating that the rhetoric of geostrategic deception had damaging domestic implications.[79] In short, the drive to oppose Communism was so overriding that it led Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower to support the fascist KMT even while speaking of democracy, thus shackling the United States with the crippling habit of self-deception.[80]

While generations of American leaders slid into this trap, the Nationalists on Taiwan also greased the wheels of doubt and acrimony by deploying deception. In fact, in his sleuthing into the evidentiary trail regarding (eventually vacated) charges of treason against Owen Lattimore, Newman discovered that the records of the FBI, Senator McCarthy's hearings, and Senator Pat McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee included elaborate fakes produced by the KMT in 1950 and 1951. One memo entitled "International Red Conspiracy" contained trumped-up charges against Lattimore and others, raising the question of how many other poison pills were produced. Newman concludes that "the willingness of the witch hunters of the 1950s to accept the disreputable allegations coming from Taipei is compelling testimony to the sickness of the times."[81] We could expand that claim to suggest that the false charges made by the KMT and the amplification of those claims by McCarthy and others indicate how the history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication is based not only on the United States deploying the rhetoric of geostrategic deception against China and Taiwan, but on the Taiwanese in turn seeking to shape U.S. political discourse through any means available. In the closing chapters, we will likewise encounter the CPC's massive propaganda efforts against Taiwan, demonstrating how Beijing too has relied upon communication

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that bends the facts. The rhetoric of geostrategic deception, then, is an especially dangerous form of communication, for it corrupts both international relations and domestic practices.

Third, regardless of the number of assurances, pledges, communiqués, or promises made by various U.S. presidents, China's overriding response to Taiwan's de facto independence would be, and still is, humiliation and anger. As I indicated earlier, this pattern illustrates the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, wherein Taiwan stands as the ultimate wound in a long national history of victimization. As Chou Enlai said in 1954: "Taiwan is China's territory. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. Only by liberating Taiwan from the tyranny of the Chiang Kai-shek gang of traitors can the Chinese people achieve the complete unity of their motherland."[82] These same claims were reprised almost fifty years later in the CPC's 2001 white paper, "The Taiwan Question and [the] Reunification of China," where the Party describes how the unresolved "Taiwan Question" lingers as a reminder of China's "record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment, and humiliation by foreign powers." The white paper argues that only Taiwan's "reunification" with the mainland can heal "the trauma of the Chinese nation."[83] This rhetorical pattern of aggrieved nationalism may seem odd to Americans, who have inherited a sense of unquestioned national greatness and manifest destiny, yet John K. Fairbank reminds us that for the Chinese, "to speak of imperialism as a world menace has seemed simply the beginning of wisdom."[84]

The wisdom of fearing imperialism has evolved, however, not so much into a necessary self-defense mechanism as into a self-shackling paranoia. Because this dual sense of humiliation and trauma is still so alive for the Chinese, communication about Taiwan has been especially difficult, making it appear as if any negotiated settlement is impossible. This pattern of traumatized nationalism is particularly damaging to international dialogue and deliberation, for any Chinese gestures that appear flexible toward the United States, Taiwan, or other global actors are likely to be read by domestic hard-line audiences as weakness, not so much as calm and confident as cowardly and complicit.[85] While this disposition is grounded in hard-earned experience, contemporary manifestations of the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism make it less, not more, likely that the United States, China, and Taiwan can reach some reasonable understanding. As the book progresses, we will likewise encounter President Xi's "China Dream" rhetoric, which, even while trumpeting a new national narrative of would-be superpower status, dredges up traumatized nationalism.

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It is important to add into this lexicon two more key concepts, for as the book progresses, the authoritarian KMT gives way to a new culture of democracy in Taiwan, hence driving new communication patterns and possibilities. For example, beginning from his first inaugural address in 1990, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui embraced the language of democracy and globalization while portraying his mainland Chinese brothers and sisters as trapped in the old world of Party control. By deploying the rhetoric of democracy as conversion, Lee and his supporters imagined Taiwan as a beacon of democracy, diversity, and international engagement, and hence as a nation poised to lead China into a bright new future. If the Chiangs and the KMT dreamed of reconquering the mainland via war, President Lee's rhetoric imagined China willingly uniting with Taiwan, with the latter leading the way as an enlightened and modern democracy. This political evolution made Taiwan even more appealing for Americans looking for an example of how democracy can flourish in Asia. As a leading voice for Taiwan's independence said in an interview, "Taiwanese independence jells perfectly with American values. What American doesn't love freedom and independence?"[86]

At the same time, Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion stoked the CPC's fire of traumatized nationalism. In fact, by the time Tsai won the presidency in 2016, any hope that Taiwanese communication might influence thinking in China was long dead, and so the rhetoric of democracy as conversion morphed into a more cynical and dismissive form, the rhetoric of democratic disdain. Whereas the former envisioned a possible reunion on terms favorable to Taiwan, the latter gives up any hope for cross-Strait comity, and instead celebrates a postmodern and cosmopolitan Taiwan while mocking China as an authoritarian dinosaur. This disposition makes for biting and sometimes comic commentary supporting an emerging sense of Taiwanese nationalism, yet it also infuriates Chinese citizens. As this précis indicates, the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship is broken in part because our ability to make sense of each other has been driven by long-standing communication dispositions that have trapped us in misunderstandings.

The Political Unconscious of U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

When I point to these communicative dispositions, I outline overarching frames of reasoning and feeling, not so much context-specific arguments as more general ways of seeing and interpreting the world. I have named each disposition as "the

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rhetoric of ______," indicating a series of symbolic patterns; yet, when understood as an interlocking series of assumptions, narratives, and justifications, these dispositions point to something deeper, what Fredric Jameson once called "the political unconscious." For Jameson, "history is *not* a text, not a narrative . . . but as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form." Once we collect and then appraise these textual forms—the myriad pieces of evidence considered herein, for example—we realize that our experiences and interpretations of history pass through a "prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious." Not so much an allusion to Freudian notions of unconscious drives as an argument about the fragmentary nature of our understanding, this political unconscious is the overstuffed garage of our stories, images, songs, and explanatory schema—the frames of reference we assemble as best we can to make sense of the world.[87] More than just patterns of symbols, however, the political unconscious assumes a physical, embodied power that drives everyday decision-making; as Donovan Conley has argued, such dispositions amount to "the *embodiment* of a particular clustering of proclivities."[88]

Over time these modes of understanding become baked into our habits, forming modes of thinking and feeling that are both empowering and crippling. They become what Herbert Marcuse called a "second nature," meaning they feel "organic," almost "biological," offering ready-made responses embedded in both everyday life and the institutions that govern our world.[89] Kenneth Burke likewise argued that our symbolic constructions and physical habits interweave, forming what he called "metabiology."[90] As explained by Bryan Crable, this notion of metabiology suggests that "as we act in our situation, patterns of embodiment become externalized—and these patterns are the basis for the symbolic patterns that we enact and reenact."[91] For these thinkers, the symbolic is more than just representative; it both reflects and in turn constitutes our deepest beliefs. The concept of dispositions thus points to the complex layering of "symbolic patterns" and embodied proclivities, amounting to a political unconscious that hums in the background of our daily lives.

However, because no single text, or collection of texts, can illustrate this political unconscious at work, so critics position their data in what Walter Benjamin called "constellations."[92] These are elaborate constructions wherein we try to disentangle the infinite flow of historical data by positing patterns, contradictions, confusions, and layers of similarity and difference—in this case by arranging the data according to my five overarching rhetorical dispositions. I have accordingly sought to assemble my constellations by gathering as much data as possible and then putting it into

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play, watching as U.S., Chinese, and Taiwanese perspectives align or clash or melt into each other, in turn establishing both persistent communication patterns and innovations. These maneuvers require the critic to make choices about what stories to include and which to exclude, what figures to feature and which to sideline, meaning these constellations are not organic representations of the human condition but authored inventions meant to create insight.[93]

What methods or principles underwrite the making of these historical contraptions? To answer that question, let me borrow terminology from Hayden White's "The Poetics of History." Thinking *metonymically*, I have tried to locate texts so representative that they illustrate some larger whole; working on this part-whole dynamic has the benefit of portraying overarching cultural dynamics, yet risks the trap of reductionism. This notion of metonymy drives my analysis, for example, of the Dancing Girl image/text, where I argued that that cultural part was so rich with meaning, so symbolically dense and politically charged, that it pointed toward the larger narrative whole of Taiwan's sense of colonial oppression. Thinking *metaphorically*, I have tried to respect the unique particularity of data points while layering them in illustrative chains of comparison; working on this part-part dynamic has the benefit of rendering illuminating juxtapositions and comparisons, yet risks the trap of missing what White called the "manifest differences" between the compared items.[94] The very structure of this book, for example, working sequentially through periods in U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, offers such a chain of part-part comparisons, which are meant, via their juxtapositions, to offer readers illuminating insights into the similarities and differences that enrich our entwined histories.

Thinking *synecdochically*, I have tried to imagine integrative part-part relationships that represent the larger whole of historical trends while nonetheless recognizing that the portrayed whole is "qualitatively different from the sum of the parts."[95] This too underwrites the very structure of the book, where the part-part alignment of case studies comparing U.S., Chinese, and Taiwanese communication creates the illusion of an integrative whole, some grand narrative, even while recognizing that such a narrative is fundamentally fragmentary. Thinking *ironically*, the entire project is shot through with a sense of our human fallibility, our immersion in "aporia," states of "absurdity," and the "essential folly" of such critical work, which can but scratch the surface of our human condition.[96] As Ambassador Rankin confessed in a memo from Taipei in 1954, "We are faced by alternatives all of which are less than perfect. To put it in the worst terms, it is a question of finding the least

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bad solution."[97] Finding the least bad solution amounts to a recipe for humility, for it foregrounds our tenuous hold on reality, suggesting the rhetorical historian proceed under the sign of prudence.

As White summarizes our methodological choices, these four strategies are (1) metonymic/reductionist, with part and whole speaking to the same overarching narrative; (2) metaphoric/representational, with part-to-part comparisons leading to fresh perspectives; (3) synecdochical/integrative, with part-part chains suggesting a provisional or fragmentary sense of a whole; and (4) ironic/negational, with the very notion of a "whole" out the window—with the key caveat that "there are no apodictic epistemological grounds for the preference of one mode of explanation over another."[98] Given that these methods are but interpretive tools, and considering that no single method is more or less right than the other, *A World of Turmoil* has sought to marshal all four of White's categories, thus risking the charge of inconsistency or internal contradiction, while hoping that this promiscuous mishmash of methods embodies the sheer complexity of the issues addressed herein—making for a historical-rhetorical method that approximates the dense complexity of the political unconscious.

Within this framework, it is important to acknowledge that the rhetorical dispositions structuring the political unconscious of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication are inherently contradictory and often unproductive, at least in terms of enabling their users to craft mutually satisfying solutions to political crises. While these schema may be unproductive in terms of their functioning vis-à-vis others—China's traumatized nationalism, for example, is remarkably unpersuasive to American and Taiwanese respondents—they have been long-standing, meaning they serve the emotional needs of their users. Even when inaccurate or debilitating in international relations, they provide explanatory frameworks that make sense of geostrategic dilemmas. These cognitive structures therefore provide their users with what Jameson called "compensatory exchange," meaning that even when a specific narrative frame or justificatory trope is demonstrably not helpful—as we will see later again and again—it nonetheless provides a sense of "gratification."[99] In this way, the rhetorical dispositions that have structured U.S.-China-Taiwan communication serve as the deep narratives that propel political truth statements that often rely on historical claims that are fantastical; they underwrite specific charges that can feel argumentative yet are not necessarily logical or fact-based, and they support proclamations about national dignity and honor that frequently disrespect the needs and wishes of others.

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Given this understanding of rhetorical history as the attempt to assemble constellations that embody persistence and innovation in our political communication, my choice of case studies is pragmatic. For example, I do not tackle Presidents Barack Obama and Chen Shui-bian because I have not found in their periods of leadership, nor in their political rhetoric, source materials that shed new light on the political unconscious. Their years of calm and steady leadership, while admirable, illustrate periods of adjustment, gradual accommodation, and incremental change. The case studies I have chosen, in comparison, offer moments of rupture wherein the communicative pattern was rocked by some crisis leading to innovation. The structural irony, of course, is that I place these moments of rupture and innovation into a historical continuum marked by persistence.

Mapping the Dispositions via Case Studies

To demonstrate how this methodology works, the book unfolds chronologically across seventy-plus years of history, enabling readers to watch as the matrix of persistence and innovation in communication dispositions emerges and then evolves through specific case studies. Chapter 1 accordingly opens at the end of World War II, when the disintegration of the Japanese empire and the turmoil of the Chinese Civil War, and then the start of the Korean War and the United States' emerging concerns about the global spread of Communism turned Formosa/Taiwan into one of the hottest sites of conflict in the Long Cold War. The broad contours of this moment have been addressed by a wide range of talented historians, so my goal is to focus on the communicative dynamics at play, concentrating in particular on the dilemmas faced by President Harry S. Truman. Every time Truman thought he was being prudent, his Republican critics ripped him as an appeaser of Communism; every time the president thought he was being strong internationally, the Communists ripped him as an imperialist dog; and no matter what he did, Chiang was left sulking. Many of Truman's communicative acts at the time were therefore failures, often creating unintended consequences that only complicated matters. This observation is not meant as a criticism of Truman, but as recognition of the immense difficulty of the moment, wherein the president faced irreconcilable constituencies at home and abroad. This opening chapter therefore foregrounds the complexity of political communication and the dilemmas of leadership in the Long Cold War, establishing a theme of contingency and chance. As Robert Hariman

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argues in *Political Style*, the exercise of political power often "leads not to certainty but rather to indeterminacy, perplexity, and anxiety."[100] Indeed, under Truman's handling, American foreign policy looks less like a grand scheme of imperial domination than a trail of ambiguity and confusion. Despite his good intentions, Truman triggered both the CPC's traumatized nationalism and the KMT's dismay at suffering the rhetoric of marginal significance, meaning that by the time the Korean War began in 1950, U.S.-China-Taiwan communication was launched upon a pattern of acrimony and bewilderment.

In chapter 2, I move into the Eisenhower administration and focus on the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955, when the United States and China nearly went to nuclear war over Chiang's clinging to the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. A string of outcroppings claimed by both the KMT and CPC, the islands seemed to the United States to be a shield protecting Taiwan from China, while the Chinese saw them as springboards from which Taiwan and the United States could attack the mainland. Eisenhower did not want to fight World War III over these islands, but he did not want to lose them in yet another Communist advance, and so the general and his team practiced a rhetorical strategy of "fuzzing," wherein they waffled and shuffled about U.S. plans, never to reveal them to the public nor their allies nor their enemies. Historians have tended to praise Eisenhower for his strategic handling of the situation, but my research shows the president not so much mastering the moment as hanging on for dear life, acting less strategically than in a state of confounded dread. The initial confusions of the Truman era ripened under Eisenhower into a pattern of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Nonetheless, I conclude that Eisenhower's prudence enabled him to resist both Chiang's urgings to war and the CPC's threats, meaning an uneasy condition of nonwar settled over U.S.-China-Taiwan communication at this time.

In chapter 3 I turn to the next major milestone in U.S.-China-Taiwan communication: the 1972 "Shanghai Communiqué." The general story of this historic moment has been told already, with dueling interpretations coming from either the fans or critics of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. I add fresh insights by comparing the Shanghai Communiqué's cautious pledges with Nixon's public statements and, most importantly, the previously secret transcripts of the conversations held between the PRC's Chou Enlai and the United States' Kissinger, wherein they reached a series of secret agreements that exceeded what was said publicly. Even today, the notion of "one China" hovers over U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, so it is crucially important to try to understand why Nixon went to

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China, what he hoped to accomplish, and how he and Kissinger pursued their goals in large part by shuffling on the notion of "one China." Indeed, whereas Truman worked heroically to avoid catastrophe and Eisenhower deployed a complicated combination of "fuzzing" and prudence, Nixon and especially Kissinger relied upon cold-eyed variations of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception. In so doing, they embedded a sense of betrayal at the heart of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, for the Taiwanese felt abandoned by the United States' actions and words in 1972—hence igniting their sense of marginal significance—while the Chinese came to realize that what they called "one China" was in fact, in the eyes of the Americans, an imminent "two China" solution—hence escalating their sense of traumatized nationalism.

Nixon's and Kissinger's secret promises, public pledges, and political machinations were derailed by Watergate and the president's resignation in 1974, meaning it would take another five years for the "normalization" of relations between the United States and China to come to fruition during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. But while Carter and the Chinese negotiated one deal, the White House worked with congressional leaders to pass the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which tempered the U.S.-China "normalization" by locking-in U.S. support for Taiwan, albeit in a nuanced manner. Of all the episodes in the long history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, the drama surrounding the TRA has received by far the most scholarly attention and, in my opinion, offers few opportunities for fresh insight.[101] I accordingly address this moment briefly, using it as a preface to my work in chapter 4, where I turn to the Clinton administration.

In this chapter I tackle the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, which was launched in part by the remarkable innovations of President Lee Teng-hui, who, despite having risen through the ranks of the KMT, turned out to be a brave, playful, and relentless advocate for Taiwan's independence from mainland China. Studying the response to Lee, in particular China's President Jiang Zemin's threats and U.S. President Clinton's corresponding gunboat diplomacy, enables us to watch the first key chapter of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication in what scholars might call a post–Cold War environment, but which I argue is an extension of the Long Cold War. This analysis points to the rhetoric of democracy as conversion, wherein Lee argues that Taiwan's commitment to democracy, cultural diversity, and international law positions it as leading all of China into the future. Within this conversion narrative, it is not Communist China that will force Taiwan to "reunify" with the motherland, but democratic Taiwan that will lure China to join the international

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family of democratic nation-states. In this messianic formation, Taiwan's democracy will convert China away from Communism, literally saving the Middle Kingdom. While Clinton was furious with Lee for pushing the boundaries of the status quo, when China responded to Lee by launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait, Clinton countered by sending an armada to the region. Mirroring the 1954–1955 Quemoy crisis, the United States and China again verged on war over Taiwan. Nonetheless, Clinton was wary of escalating tensions with China, and so the crisis ended with him issuing his famous "three noes" from Shanghai in the summer of 1998. The "three noes" mark a crucial turning point in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, for they removed the ambiguity embedded in "one China" thinking by rendering that phrase not in Kissinger's slippery way but in the we-own-Taiwan way preferred by the Party. In short, when China's anger was triggered by Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion, Clinton sought to tamp down the rage of traumatized nationalism, only to enflame Taiwan's leaders, who took the episode as yet another chapter in the rhetoric of marginal significance.[102]

I then move in chapter 5 to 2016, when President Tsai Ing-wen's ascent to power, coupled with tensions in the South China Sea, left many observers worrying again about the specter of war. Whereas Lee deployed the rhetoric of democracy as conversion to imagine Taiwan unifying China under the banner of multicultural democracy, Tsai took a more domestic approach, unearthing Taiwan's internal political history—and in particular the long train of KMT abuses—as a first step toward establishing *the rhetoric of postcolonial remembering*.[103] In this formula, the Taiwanese are asked not so much to imagine a new relationship with China as to reclaim their own national lineages and cultural heritages, in part by speaking of events long forbidden by KMT repression. Within this formula, what the PRC had long called "reunification" is depicted as "annexation."[104] Tsai and the DPP clearly believe that building this postcolonial sense of Taiwanese nationalism will help defend the island's sovereignty; yet, having seen how the United States and China responded to her predecessors, and facing the constraints of leadership in a democratic society, Tsai made the prudent decision to pursue an indirect, long-term strategy focusing on domestic issues. The catch, however, is that while Tsai and her allies began to celebrate a postcolonial sense of Taiwanese nationalism, many netizens in Taiwan began to mock the CPC's regime of forced forgetting.[105] This combination of surging Taiwanese pride and criticism of China is expressed via the rhetoric of democratic disdain, wherein Taiwanese citizens portray China not so much as a feared enemy as a relic of old-world authoritarianism. This of course

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triggers a sense of traumatized nationalism within China, yet by 2016 that disposition was evolving, under Xi Jinping's leadership, into a more robust and unilateral understanding of the China Dream. At the same time, this chapter watches as Tsai's and Xi's efforts were confused and complicated by the outrageous performances of President Donald Trump, who brought his "alternative facts"–style communication habits to the table, leaving all parties baffled. Was he authoring a new version of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception, or was he just clueless? With no clear answers in sight, the chapter closes with the United States, China, and Taiwan locked in a spiral of miscomprehension and recrimination.

Across these case studies we see the following: (1) Anger at being treated with the rhetoric of marginal significance has underwritten Taiwanese responses, leaving them wary of America's advances and leery of Chinese overreactions. (2) While initially a logical response to nineteenth-century imperialism, contemporary versions of the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism tend to lead the Party into a boiling rage—which, I argue, leaves them looking foolish on the international stage and deprived of political wiggle room domestically. (3) Even while China and Taiwan perceive the rhetoric of geostrategic deception as evidence of the United States' habitual recourse to duplicitous and untrustworthy communication, my case studies show a more nuanced reality: Truman and Eisenhower were treading fine lines, not so much deceptive as unsure of what to do and hoping, above all else, to avoid World War III. Carter and Clinton likewise felt trapped by international circumstances and dogged by domestic right-wing backlashes, leading to communicative habits that felt mixed, even contradictory. Nixon and Kissinger are the outliers here, as they were stone-cold dealers in deception; and then Trump landed on the scene without a coherent Asia policy, not so much strategically purposeful as embodying chaos. And (4) throughout it all, faced with threats from China and either confusion or contradiction or chaos from America, the Taiwanese have evolved new forms of national self-reflection expressed through the rhetoric of democracy as conversion and ultimately the rhetoric of democratic disdain. When interwoven as rhetorical dispositions, these formations help us to diagnose the dysfunctional communicative dynamic between the United States, China, and Taiwan across the Long Cold War. In this sense, my goal is to offer readers a rhetorical history that captures what Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby referred to in 1946, in *Thunder out of China*, as the "majestic rhythms in history."[106]

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A Closing Note on Readers, Archives, and Communities

I hope this book speaks to multiple audiences, including scholars and students of communication, history, international studies, political science, globalization, and more; across those disciplines, I hope to add to our collective understanding of the Long Cold War, particularly as it has evolved in the Asia Pacific. While I hope readers will find the sweeping narrative offered herein exciting and edifying, I would also like to imagine legislators in the United States, China, and Taiwan learning from these pages, and perhaps shaping policy accordingly. My reading habits are therefore promiscuous, reflecting the wide range of places I look for evidence and the equally wide range of places where I hope to have some impact. The Acknowledgements section of this book offers extensive details on my research adventures and interviewing practices across America, China, and Taiwan, so I will not repeat that information here—but I hope readers will consult those comments to see how I have engaged in international scholarship in partnership with a range of different colleagues, archives, and communities. Suffice to say that I hope to find an interdisciplinary readership committed to the belief that fair and objective scholarship can function as a public good, contributing to the hard work of building bridges of understanding across disciplinary boundaries and national borders.

Still, communication is my home discipline, and so I want briefly to situate my analysis within two subgenres in that field. First, the discipline is experiencing a surge in studies looking at the rhetorical histories of U.S.-China contact,[107] at U.S.-Chinese communication surrounding the 2008 Olympics,[108] at aspects of this relationship within the framework of human rights debates,[109] at questions of different communicative practices surrounding public memory,[110] at China's evolving roles in an age of globalization,[111] at the playful mingling of pop-culture imagery between China and the United States,[112] at U.S.-Chinese responses to environmental challenges,[113] at debates about the future of Hong Kong,[114] at our complicated interactions in cyberspace,[115] and more.[116] We have seen two books addressing popular culture and daily life in Taiwan: Todd Sandel's *Brides on Sale*, and Hsin-I Sydney Yueh's *Identity Politics and Popular Culture in Taiwan*.[117] This amounts to an exciting trend within the field, yet a review of this literature suggests that at least for scholars writing in the leading U.S.-based communication journals and book series, Taiwan's roles within international geopolitics have been invisible.[118] This observation is not offered as a critique but as a comment on a structural deficit within our collective intellectual production that reflects the same patterns

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of disinterest and disregard that underlie the rhetoric of marginal significance. Acknowledging this gap is by no means a strong justification for this book—for there are many such topics that deserve scholarly attention—but it does point to one of my driving impulses: to do my humble part in opening up fresh discussions about the U.S.-China-Taiwan tangle.

Second, my analysis of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication falls squarely within a long tradition of analysis that was once called Cold War, and sometimes "post" Cold War, criticism.[119] Within this immense field, communication scholars have written about U.S.-USSR relations,[120] U.S.-China relations,[121] U.S.-India relations,[122] U.S.-Korea relations,[123] the rhetorical contributions of any number of U.S. presidents and other key figures,[124] the communicative structures of the Cold War itself,[125] the various roles of propaganda within the Cold War,[126] the complicated cartographies of power and health in the global Cold War,[127] and the long, slow slide into catastrophe in Vietnam.[128] Yet here as well, Taiwan has been invisible. Particularly as contemporary tensions rise in Asia, I like to hope that this book might help persuade my fellow scholars of the Long Cold War to turn their attention toward the crucial U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship.

Political scientists, historians, and cultural-studies scholars have written excellent studies about the tangled history of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations; I cite hundreds of these works. Yet I am not aware of any study in any discipline that strives to convey the historical sweep offered herein while focusing on the communicative dynamics driving the Long Cold War in Asia. My overarching ambition, then, is to put U.S.-China-Taiwan communication patterns on the radar of my colleagues, students, and the larger public. At the same time, I hope this analysis points toward the central role communication plays in shaping emerging foreign-policy opportunities and challenges in our age of globalization. I am therefore proposing a long form of rhetorical history across more than seventy years of international communication, and I am doing so while combining published materials, archival sources, and extensive interviews to which I apply analytic practices derived from a wide array of disciplines.

Moreover, while this tropological method looks backward in an attempt to map the communication dispositions that have led us up to the present, I also hope to look forward to a future where U.S.-China-Taiwan communication models mutual respect, transparent trust-building, and unshakable integrity.[129] Diagnosing what has gone so wrong can serve as a first step toward building better, healthier patterns of advocacy and engagement. In one of his essays on Cold War rhetoric,

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Robert L. Ivie observed how long-standing rhetorical constructions about friends and enemies, both real and imagined, have hardened into "powerful conventions of public discourse that diminish the political imagination."[130] My hope herein is to reconsider the rhetorical-historical conditions of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, thus establishing how such powerful conventions were produced, and then to offer some fresh perspectives for transcending them, hence enlivening our "political imagination" about how we might move toward a peaceful resolution of one of the most complicated, relentlessly bitter, and heavily armed conflicts of the Long Cold War.

In closing, studying the communicative dispositions that have structured U.S.-China-Taiwan relations is crucially important, for our shared conflicts and confusions amount to one of the likely flash points for international catastrophe, yet our ability to understand each other, let alone ourselves, is trapped in stifling conventions. As a first step toward understanding, all parties need to listen more closely, to speak more clearly, and to think more creatively; yet venturing into a different future depends on understanding and then transcending the past. Tackling the communicative patterns that structure U.S.-China-Taiwan relations therefore points toward nothing less than the prospects of war and peace in the age of globalization. The stakes could not be higher.

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CHAPTER ONE

Wandering in a Labyrinth of Ignorance, Error, and Conjecture, 1945–1952

Imagine President Harry S. Truman sitting in the White House in the summer of 1945, surveying a world reduced to ashes. He had become the president on April 12, following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the next day had confessed that he felt like "the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen on me."[1] Nonetheless, Truman responded admirably to the challenge of leading America through the final stretch of World War II; yet by August it seemed the end of war would not bring the dawn of peace. While dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki persuaded Imperial Japan to surrender, doing so also opened a new age of nuclear anxiety and gut-wrenching debates about the ethics of using such weapons.[2] Peace brought no clarity, just more complications.

The defeat of Japan opened a new round of problems in Asia. While negotiating the terms of Japan's surrender, the Russian, British, and Chinese governments argued fiercely over the fate of former colonies, lost territories, or desired expansions. Chiang Kai-shek assumed *all* of Japan's conquered lands would revert to the ROC, as may or may not have been promised in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943.[3] The British were insisting that they must "reestablish the status quo in Hong Kong."[4] The conflict illustrated one of the great dilemmas of the age: Despite performing dismally during the war and facing civil war with the Communists,

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Chiang dreamed of a unified China rising to global power, while the British, despite getting battered in the war, hoped to rebuild their prewar empire. As Congressman Michael J. Mansfield (D-MT) had warned Roosevelt earlier that year, "all the British are interested in is Singapore, Hong Kong, a restoration of [their] prestige, and a weak China."[5] Indicating a communicative pattern that would structure the Long Cold War, Chiang responded to the British pressure by complaining to U.S. officials not only that he disagreed with the British, but that he took umbrage at being treated in an "imperialistic, domineering, and unbecoming" manner.[6] Already, by August 1945, Chiang resented the rhetoric of marginal significance while Truman chafed at having to mediate between the squabbling allies.

Worse yet, Stalin was encroaching upon China from multiple directions, sending troops into Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the far western region now known as Xinjiang, all while making noises about wanting to share governance duties in postwar Japan and stripping China's formerly occupied territories of every movable good.[7] While Stalin blustered and threatened, Chiang pouted, as inept and ineffective as ever, sowing doubt in virtually all observers about his ability to rebuild China, let alone defeat the Communist insurgents who now controlled much of the countryside.[8] Postwar Asia was therefore a quagmire of almost unimaginable proportions, while in China specifically, as Mansfield put it coolly, "conditions are really bad."[9]

In the midst of these crises, who cared about the island of Formosa? It had been a Japanese colony since 1895, and it too had been bombed into smithereens—in an effort to halt Japanese aircraft using the island—and so Truman's advisors were adamant: Honor the terms of Cairo and Yalta and hand it over to Chiang.[10] Thus, late in the summer of 1945, even while the United States focused on occupying and then rebuilding Japan, American naval vessels began ferrying Chiang's Nationalists to Formosa, where they assumed control of the island. The Nationalist forces, however, were ill-equipped to manage this hand-over of sovereignty. Having been hammered in battle after battle by Japan's and then Mao's forces, the KMT soldiers were often starving and badly trained. Taiwanese independence leader Peng Ming-min remembers them as "a crowd of dirty men in ragged uniforms" who were little more than "petty thieves" and "a rabble of scavengers." Often barefoot, the KMT soldiers were quick to steal shoes; with no functional supply system for their makeshift bases, the soldiers took what food they wanted from the locals. Assuming the Formosans had been loyal Japanese colonial subjects, the Nationalists treated the Formosans as "a conquered people."[11] Because Chiang

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was focused on defeating Mao's rebels, his army was soon stripping everything of value from Formosa, including "87,962 tons of sugar, 45,325 tons of coal, 217,138 tons of salt, and 97,269 tons of cement."[12] As eyewitness George Kerr reported, "anything moveable . . . was fair prey for the ragged and undisciplined soldiers."[13] In a heartbreaking letter from Taipei, Pillar Huang recounts how "We thought despotism and imperialism would be replaced by democracy, and militarism and anarchy by legalism. But we only earned more oppression and injustice."[14] The Formosans felt so betrayed that in Tehpen Tsai's *Elegy of Sweet Potatoes*, one of the characters makes this startling comparison: "The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. But on Taiwan, it dropped the Chiang regime, an even more destructive, unlimited bomb."[15] By the spring of 1947, the Formosans were in open rebellion; the KMT responded with gruesome ferocity.[16]

Still, President Truman had bigger fish to fry. The clarity of a unified nation dedicated to winning World War II was sliding into the confusion of fractured parties quarreling over how not to lose the Cold War. Meanwhile, Stalin was stealing eastern Europe, Mao was gaining strength in the Chinese countryside, and Britain's former colonies were struggling for independence. Particularly in Asia, defeating the Japanese Empire left tens of millions of formerly colonized subjects searching for new political arrangements, albeit in societies thrust into poverty, destroyed by war, and bereft of indigenous leadership (as the Japanese Empire had meticulously repressed anyone who showed potential as a leader in anti-colonial and national independence movements). As the *New York Times* summarized the postwar problem, "Elimination of Japan Leaves a Vacuum in Asia."[17]

On the home front, the Republicans were flaying Truman on the question of why he was letting this all happen, as if he could wave a magic wand and turn back the tides of history. And so it would go for the next five years: Truman managing a mountain of crises as best he could, his domestic enemies crucifying him as an appeaser, the world turning as it will regardless of Washington's best-laid plans. This is the crucible of both international and domestic crisis that forged the foundation of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. To begin the hard work of mapping the rhetorical histories of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, we must therefore return to the aftermath of World War II, to the midst of the Chinese Civil War, and hence to the early stages of the Long Cold War.

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Truman, the Old Warlord, and the Genesis of the Formosa Problem

On January 5, 1950, Truman spoke to reporters at the White House. Entitled "Statement on Formosa," the president's remarks sought to clarify U.S. policy toward Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces, which had retreated in the summer of 1949 to Formosa.[18] The United States had poured roughly "six billion dollars in credits, goods, and equipment" into Chiang's army during World War II, hoping it would defeat both the imperial Japanese and rival Communists while establishing a stable, democratic, and Christian regime.[19] By 1950, however, virtually everyone in Washington believed the writing was on the wall: Mao would soon be triumphant, Chiang would finally be finished, and the Communists would take Formosa, ending China's agonizing, twenty-two-year-long civil war.[20] The situation was so dire for the Nationalist forces on Formosa and Hainan that on January 6, 1950, the *New York Times* declared, "Invasion Awaited Hourly on Hainan."[21] Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's son and heir apparent, was so convinced the PLA was coming across the Taiwan Strait that he "made contingency asylum arrangements in the Philippines for his father."[22] By March, the CIA was telling the president that the Communists would likely "carry out their frequently expressed intention of seizing Taiwan during 1950, and will probably do so during the period of June–December."[23]

Nonetheless, Republicans worked feverishly to support Chiang, as depicted in Herb Block's political cartoon in the *Washington Post* from January 4 (see figure 3). Published the day prior to Truman's severing United States support for the KMT, the image depicts a boat named "Chiang Govt." sinking; yet the die-hard anti-Communist Republicans, Senator Robert A. Taft and former President Herbert Hoover, are advising Uncle Sam to save it. Hoover's face merits special attention, for while the boat is sinking, Hoover points toward it, his face clenched in a righteous scowl: Few men have been so wrong about, yet so certain in, their appraisal of U.S. foreign policy. Block thus depicts with painful accuracy how the Republicans would bluster and bicker, fierce piety triumphing over complicating facts, anger displacing analysis.

The boat was clearly sinking, despite Hoover's and Taft's denials, and so Truman's statement was also intended to douse a domestic firestorm. Beginning in the closing days of World War II, and reaching a crescendo in the fall of 1949, when Mao declared the founding of the PRC, Republicans alleged that Truman had "lost China" because he was "soft" on Communism.[24] In fact, McCarthyism arrived on February 9, 1950, when the junior senator from Wisconsin first charged the State

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

FIGURE 3. The Chiang government sinking; a 1950 Herblock Cartoon, © held by and image used with permission of the Herb Block Foundation.

Department's China experts with treason.[25] McCarthy's witch-hunt was an exercise in fact-free malice; as Lyman P. Van Slyke later observed of his State Department victims, "for telling unpleasant truths about the Nationalists, they were called Communists."[26] McCarthy's accusations were just one manifestation of fierce policy debates, as the JCS, the NSC, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, innumerable State Department factions, various White House teams, rival wings of the Defense community, and more, were all enmeshed in "bitter and partisan" arguments about the fate of China in general and Formosa in particular.[27]

The Republican charge was led by General Douglas MacArthur and Senators Alexander Smith of New Jersey, William F. Knowland from California, and Robert A. Taft of Ohio, who circulated formal memos, personal letters, secret notes, and bitter rumors undercutting Truman. The gist of this attack—again hinging on

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interpretations of the slippery wartime agreements Roosevelt had negotiated with different parties—was that Formosa fell legally into the hands of the United States, which, after conquering Japan, was entitled to administer Japan's former territories. This meant the United States should be treating Taiwan as a protectorate, hence saving it from the impending Communist invasion.[28] Echoing one of the Devil terms associated with the start of World War II in Europe, Republicans argued that not acting more forcefully against the Communists in Asia was appeasement.[29] Consider Karl Lott Rankin's memoir of his years as one of America's top diplomats in Asia, *China Assignment*. Throughout, Rankin refers to policies not actively pursuing the rollback of Chinese Communism as "appeasement" or "acquiescence" or "abandonment"; prudence is generally hailed as "sacrificing Free China on the altar of appeasement"; any policy hinting at neutralizing Chiang's forces is called "appeasement and surrender."[30] Such terms were ubiquitous insults deployed by Truman's enemies, who believed that traitorous Communist sympathizers in the United States, coupled with the rise of Communism in China, posed a double-barreled threat to America.[31]

One of the key turning points came on December 2, 1949—roughly one month before Truman's speech—when the *New York Times* ran a story titled "Senator Urges U.S. to Take Formosa."[32] Following a fact-finding mission to Asia, Senator Smith submitted a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 1.[33] The *Times* story both summarized Smith's report and marshaled new quotations from him. The blockbuster first sentence announced Smith's "recommendation that the United States send troops into Formosa to occupy it indefinitely." Claiming backing from General MacArthur and "other military and naval authorities in the Orient," Smith proposed to support the seizure of Formosa with a naval blockade of Communist China.[34] Pursuing such maneuvers would have embroiled the United States in war with Mao's China and possibly Stalin's USSR, yet the war hawks fired away, hammering the Truman administration as being hopelessly—and perhaps even traitorously—soft on Communism.[35]

What Senator Smith did not say was that most U.S. observers had long been disgusted with Chiang's leadership. Writing from China in 1944, John S. Service described the KMT officers surrounding Chiang as "selfish and corrupt, incapable and obstructive." As for the Generalissimo, he carried "an opportunist's combination of extravagant demands and unfulfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff and blackmail."[36] The view was no less dismal from Nanking, from where the U.S. ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, observed that America was losing

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prestige by wedding its interests with the "inevitable collapse [of the] Nationalist government."[37] Stuart warned that the ranks of the Communists were swelling not because of "attraction to Marxist ideology" but because of "disgust with the KMT."[38] Similarly, Allan Shackleton, a New Zealand–born industrial rehabilitation officer posted to Formosa by the UNRRA, warned, "Chiang Kai-shek's China is collapsing through her own rottenness." These damning conclusions reappeared in the State Department's 1949 *White Paper*, which argued "the reasons for the Communist victory must be sought in an appraisal of Nationalist failings rather than in positive Communist accomplishments."[39]

America's military elite shared that conclusion. Major General David Barr seethed in 1949 that the "military debacle" of Mao's PLA routing Chiang's KMT "can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership."[40] Two of America's most-decorated war heroes, General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell and General George Marshall, were dismayed at how Chiang tolerated too much corruption among his lieutenants, instilled too little discipline in his troops, and time and time again botched even basic military strategy.[41] Chiang's troops were so routinely routed that Communist soldiers mocked them as "ammunition carriers," meaning the KMT hauled U.S.-supplied material into the field, only to abandon it during hasty retreats, hence transferring what was meant to be anti-Communist firepower into the hands of the Communists.[42] Secretary of State Dean Acheson summarized such arguments in January 1950, arguing that Chiang and his senior leadership team had demonstrated "the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command."[43]

The world's worst leadership, *ammunition carriers*, *the grossest incompetence ever*—trust in Chiang was so low that a wide array of U.S. officials floated proposals to instigate uprisings on Formosa to overthrow the Nationalists and pave the way for a UN-led protectorate, outright U.S. stewardship, or perhaps Formosan independence. George F. Kennan advocated ditching the KMT in favor of "a provisional international or U.S. regime," while noting that "Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism."[44] State Department heavies Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze, and John Foster Dulles entertained plans for forced resignations, military coups by rival KMT officers, and U.S.-led efforts to place Taiwan under UN supervision.[45] These scenarios were never instituted because, as Kennan noted, they "would involve a considerable amount of pushing people around," which would "provide the Kremlin and Chinese Stalinists with a welcome propaganda foil."[46] Nonetheless, the fact that such discussions were taking place at the highest levels of government indicates

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that aside from Senators Smith, Knowland, Taft, and their hard-right Republican allies on MacArthur's staff, virtually no one trusted Chiang or envisioned his regime-in-retreat surviving.

It was widely known that alternative leaders were being considered, perhaps even courted. By 1948, Hsiao-ting Lin reports that "American consular personnel and secret agents . . . were busy building close contacts with political and military figures . . . who were perceived to be potential leaders of future anti-Communist campaigns and, therefore, of the new political units."[47] In January 1949, acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett wrote to President Truman that he worried the United States would need "to intervene," and "with force if necessary." Yet he urged the president to frame any actions he might order not as pursuing "obvious American strategic interests" but as the noble extension of the "principle of self-determination of the Formosan people"; he supported "fostering a Formosan autonomy movement."[48] By February 1949, NSC 37/2 circulated among the key players in Washington, with the first point of the policy memo suggesting "the U.S. should seek discreetly to maintain contact with potential native Formosan leaders with a view at some future date to mak[ing] use of a Formosan autonomous movement."[49] Diplomatic correspondence from Formosa reinforced the negative view of Chiang and the Nationalists.[50] In August 1949, the anti-Communist political leader Hsia Tao-sheng met with U.S. consul Donald Edgar "to ask if the United States had already selected the democratic force that it was willing to support in substitution for the Gimo [then a popular abbreviation for the Generalissimo] and KMT."[51] Many Formosans were likewise horrified at the prospect of life under the KMT; one letter to George H. Kerr—who redacted the authors' names so as not to "seriously endanger the lives of the signers"—argued that returning Formosa to Chiang's rule was tantamount to "put[ting] all Formosans into slavery."[52]

Senator Smith's bravura call for the United States to launch actions that would likely start World War III was therefore an act of supreme folly. Nonetheless, Smith's report to the Senate, his comments on the trip, and his statements to the *Times* took these incendiary ideas public and, worse yet, framed them as speaking for a fractured U.S. military leadership, stoking angry debates at home and abroad about who exactly was directing U.S. foreign policy, and toward what ends?

While President Truman faced this storm of confusion and criticism, his NSC held internal debates about what to do. Secretary of State Acheson made a long statement on "the Formosan Problem" before the NSC in March 1949, arguing that the United States should not "overtly show pronounced interest in Formosa."

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Instead, he counseled, "we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland control." Acheson was, therefore, proposing a "two China" solution, albeit one pursued in a stealthy manner giving the United States plausible deniability. But he then confessed that the only route to preventing Mao from taking the island would be a "complete blockade [of the mainland] and occupation [of] Formosa"—hardly actions that could be taken in secret. Having proposed not one but two acts of military intervention, the secretary of state again stressed the importance of "restraining evidence of zeal with regard to Formosa."[53] You can imagine President Truman's head spinning at this point. But then, by April, Acheson was writing to Taipei to inform his colleagues that the White House had decided "Formosa [is] not of sufficient strategic importance in the mid-20th century."[54] Allen Griffin, writing from Shanghai, offered a stronger version of this argument: "we should stay out of Formosa." And why? Because "Formosa has become the redoubt of the Gimo's favored elements, the very people whose selfishness, corruption, and shortsightedness have destroyed their regime on the mainland."[55] Griffin repeated the State Department's *White Paper* thesis: Chiang was an incompetent leader, his KMT was laced with crooks, and they could no more turn Formosa into a functioning democracy than they could defeat Mao in the Chinese Civil War. Tensions ran so high on the island, in fact, that Consul General John J. MacDonald wrote in September 1949 that "nothing short of a miracle would make them [the Formosans] forgive the KMT for [their] past record."[56]

The death knell for U.S. support for the KMT came at the end of December 1949, when Acheson lamented to a meeting of the JCS that the United States' partnership with Chiang had "once more involved U.S. prestige in another failure." Instead of aligning with the "discredited, decayed KMT," Acheson argued, "we must get ourselves on the side of nationalist movements, a task which is easier now that the dead hand of European colonialism has been removed."[57] To his credit, Acheson seems to have realized that U.S. foreign policy needed to be rethought: Opposing Communism was not enough; the Americans needed to stand for something worth fighting for, something like democracy—and that was not possible while playing handmaiden to Chiang's authoritarian KMT.

Forced to counter the assaults launched by his enemies, tired of dealing with an ally he would later characterize as "an old-fashioned warlord," acknowledging the battle fatigue of Americans, confused by his own counselors' vacillating advice, and sick and tired of having to clean up the messes created by the rhetorical firebombs lobbed by MacArthur and other war hawks, Truman sought to set the record straight

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regarding U.S. intentions.[58] Thus, in his January 5, 1950, statement, he announced that "the United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States government will not provide aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."[59] And that was that: After supporting Chiang and his Nationalists throughout World War II and much of the Chinese Civil War, the United States was done.

Or not. Witnesses were confused by Truman's inclusion of the phrase "at this time," which suggested the White House was creating wiggle room. In fact, that afternoon, Acheson told reporters the phrase "is a recognition of the fact that in the unlikely and unhappy event that our forces might be attacked in the Far East, the United States must be completely free to take whatever action in whatever area is necessary for its own security."[60] The Truman administration was thus making a bold foreign-policy declaration hedged by the infinitely malleable caveat that its decision could be reversed at any time. Scholars have long pointed to this moment as one example of how strategic ambiguity was embedded at the core of the United States' Long Cold War communication, yet as I have indicated here, the ambiguity of the moment was less strategic than desperate.[61] Truman was not so much trying to be strategically deceptive as trying to manage a crisis so that it didn't blow up in his face. The president was responding to a bad hand, not envisioning some grand strategy.

Moreover, June Grasso has noted that while Truman broke with the Generalissimo, the United States was still wrapped up in the messy logistics of a preexisting $125 million arms package. Truman's public cutting-off of U.S. aid to Chiang therefore did not match the facts on the ground, where the U.S.-ROC relationship continued to shuffle along.[62] In fact, the Truman Presidential Library contains folders full of notes on the complicated bookkeeping by various branches of the U.S. government trying to account for the mountains of military aid both shipped to Formosa already and left unfulfilled as of January 1950.[63] Despite these logistical complications, Truman's speech was clear: The United States was not ready, "at this time," to wage war against China on behalf of the Nationalists.

Korea Foretells a Disastrous Chain of Events, Yet Saves Chiang

Everything changed for U.S.-Formosa relations on the morning of June 25, 1950 (it was still the 24th in the United States), when North Korea, in violation of the

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terms of separation agreed to at the Yalta Conference, invaded South Korea. A flurry of international drama ensued, with the UN Security Council approving a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities (because the USSR was at that time boycotting the UN, the United States acted with a relatively free hand). Truman's advisors believed the invasion was an act of war against a sworn ally and, more ominously, a test of America's post–World War II resolve. Dulles argued that "to sit by while Korea is overrun . . . would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war." Truman concurred, worrying that "there's no telling what they'll do if we don't put up a fight now."[64] One of Washington's war hawks, Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, asked in the Senate on June 26, "Will we continue appeasement?"[65] Truman lamented in his personal notes, "It looks like World War III is here."[66] The White House assumed that Mao and Stalin had jointly planned the invasion, meaning the Cold War had just become a hot and possibly global war.[67]

And so, on June 27, 1950, President Truman announced that the United States was once again at war (although he did not use that word). Within that declaration of (non)war, the president also asserted that as "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific," he had "ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa." However, "as a corollary of this action," Truman announced, "I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland."[68] Stopping the Communist invasion of South Korea, then, was linked to intervening in the final, crucial stage of the Chinese Civil War. Thus reversing his hands-off position from January, and invoking the wiggle room created by his "at this time" phrasing, the president inserted the U.S. Navy into the Taiwan Strait and demanded a cease-fire between the Communists and the Nationalists.[69] Wang Jisi has shown how in the draft of that statement, the president was prepared to pledge that his actions did not indicate any "predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory." The president was ready to promise that "the United States has no desire . . . to detach Formosa from China." That latter phrase suggests that Formosa was a part of "one China," whose eventual governance was still an open question. Wang notes, however, that that phrase was deleted at the last minute, indicating the White House was envisioning the separation of Taiwan from China, amounting to a "two Chinas" scenario.[70] Despite the alarm bells he triggered in Peking, Truman envisioned his actions as embodying prudence in the face of crisis, and so he called this his "neutralizing policy."[71]

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While the American press cheered the president's actions, the CPC responded with fury. Premier Chou Enlai announced that Truman's speech revealed "the conspiratorial schemes of American imperialism to commit aggression against China."[72] Speaking at the UN, the CPC's Wu Hsiu-Chuan seethed at how "the Truman of January 5, 1950, contradicts the Truman of June 27, 1950," thus offering a "preposterous farce" in which "Truman makes a mockery of himself."[73] As Chen Xiaolu argues, based on analysis of Chinese documents, the CPC interpreted Truman's "neutralizing policy" as "naked aggression" foreshadowing an imminent U.S. invasion of mainland China and as proof of America's pursuit of two Chinas.[74] While that invasion never came, the PRC has nonetheless held the United States responsible for saving Chiang and the KMT from defeat, hence fracturing "one China" and producing one of the most painful examples of how foreigners have created the legacy of traumatized nationalism.[75]

Truman's speech of June 27, 1950, turned Formosa from a post–World War II space of confusion and consternation into a much-needed Cold War base and the single most onerous thorn in the side of U.S.-China relations.[76] Moreover, while making this startling policy reversal, President Truman made another history-changing gesture, declaring, "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."[77] Just six months earlier, the president washed his hands of Chiang and his battered army; now he was sending U.S. forces to protect Chiang's fortunes and declaring that the fate of the island was up for grabs. Also, Japan was now reinserted back into the picture as a regional power (at the time, the United States had not yet concluded a peace treaty with Japan, meaning its World War II holdings were up for debate). This was a crucial moment in the history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, for as Accinelli has pointed out, "the contention that Taiwan's status was in legal limbo was henceforth embedded in American policy."[78] This change of strategy from January to June of 1950 was so complete that George F. Kennan declared, "never before has there been such utter confusion in the public mind with respect to US foreign policy. The President doesn't understand it; Congress doesn't understand it; nor does the public; nor does the press. They all wander around in a labyrinth of ignorance and error and conjecture, in which truth is intermingled with fiction at a hundred points."[79]

Kennan's critique makes for fun reading, but it is important to hear President Truman's thinking on these matters, for the embattled president's reasoning seems sound:

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> This was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. . . . No small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war.[80]

Truman feared that taking no action in Korea would amount—as the Republicans were screaming—to another instance of appeasement.

Pulled back from the brink of defeat, Chiang and the Nationalists could survey the region with some sense of certainty. The United States was now a full-on combatant against Communism in China, backed by both the will of the UN and the nation's still formidable war-making forces stationed in occupied Japan and elsewhere around the Asia Pacific. In fact, in July 1950, in another of his ill-advised and unauthorized foreign-policy gambits, General Douglas MacArthur flew from his headquarters in U.S.-occupied Japan to Taipei, where he was "greeted as nothing less than a head of state."[81] Truman wanted to focus on the fight in Korea while maintaining a standoffish policy toward Chiang, yet the insubordinate MacArthur appeared to be offering the United States' unqualified support for the KMT regime, and presumably the goal of reconquering the mainland. MacArthur's colleague General Omar N. Bradley wrote that MacArthur's visit to Taipei gave "the impression that the United States was, or was going to be, more closely allied with Chiang in the military struggle against Communism in the Far East; that we might even arm him for a 'return to the mainland.'"[82] MacArthur knew this impression was contrary to his commander's wishes, which explains why throughout his Formosa trip he "ignor[ed] U.S. diplomats in Taipei" and instead stacked his meetings with Chiang with the General's sycophantic staff.[83] MacArthur's treating the Generalissimo as a trusted friend and ally undercut Truman's and the State Department's messaging, leaving Chiang feeling supported and even "jubilant" (see figure 4).[84]

The summer before MacArthur's destabilizing trip of 1950, the consul general at Tientsin (in Taiwan), Robert L. Smyth, alerted Acheson that "Many [Formosans] believe it [to be] virtually U.S. territory administered indirectly by MacArthur."[85] If the Formosans saw MacArthur as an absentee military governor, David Halberstam

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FIGURE 4. MacArthur visits Chiang on his insubordinate junket of July 1950; photographer unknown; © held by and image used with the permission of Keystone-France and Getty Images.

has argued that "MacArthur had begun to see his mission in Asia in a quasi-religious light, as the leader of *a holy crusade* against a godless enemy."[86] MacArthur was insubordinate toward the White House, belligerent toward his staff, and escalatory regarding conflict with China; yet one of his chief enthusiasts, Karl Rankin, gushed that the general was "almost a prophet."[87] Charisma is no substitute for policy, however, meaning MacArthur's showboating was deeply damaging to Truman's diplomatic efforts.

In fact, following MacArthur's unauthorized junket to Taipei, he then sought to needle Truman into taking a more robust posture against North Korea, China, and the USSR by releasing a blistering critique of Truman's policies. Originally written as a top-secret memorandum shared with military leaders in June, and then submitted as a confidential memo for the NSC in July, MacArthur repurposed the classified document as an editorial for the VFW newsletter.[88] The broadside included MacArthur's now infamous argument that Formosa was "an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy," thus indicating that anything less than total support for Chiang and the "holy war" of obliterating

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Mao's forces amounted to another instance of "appeasement."[89] Encapsulating the frustration of a generation of Americans who watched the triumph of World War II sink into the murky Long Cold War, MacArthur roared, "A line must be drawn beyond which Communist expansion will be stopped."[90]

MacArthur claimed that his message was "a matter of routine" and contained only "my personal opinion," yet the memo was deeply damaging to Truman's "neutralizing policy" on three counts.[91] First, the CPC did not know that MacArthur was acting without approval, and thus assumed that President Truman sent General MacArthur to Taipei as an embodied signal that Truman was enlisting the island into an emerging anti-Communist network.[92] Second, the CPC assumed that the general's VFW letter was not so much insubordinate and McCarthyite dream-work as White House truth-telling, concluding that the "voluntary confessions of MacArthur" peeled away the "deceptions and lies" offered by Truman.[93] Third, the general's bravura claim that "a line must be drawn" sent the message that Truman's nuanced policies in Asia were not the product of prudent deliberations but cowardice. Acheson thus worried that MacArthur had handed the Communists "a convenient and persuasive basis for raising the cry of U.S. imperialism in Asia and the Pacific." Worse still, the letter created a dangerous scenario: "A serious problem in the conduct of our foreign relations will arise if our friends abroad are left with the impression that we have an uncontrollable military commander in such a key position."[94]

MacArthur's "Memorandum on Formosa" was one of the many unauthorized statements and military decisions that led to the general getting sacked for insubordination in the spring of 1951.[95] The controversy is significant for the purposes of this study because it shows how America's prosecution of the Long Cold War was driven in large part by debates about and tensions within U.S.-China-Taiwan communication. The importance of this dynamic was depicted with brutal clarity in a Herb Block political cartoon from April 8, 1951 (see figure 5). In the image, President Truman shuffles along on his "U.S. Policy in Asia" treadmill, while MacArthur and Chiang charge confidently in the opposite direction. Depicted as the force driving American policy, MacArthur holds a rope pulling the treadmill along behind him while the clueless president scans the far horizon, desperate for a sign of clarity.

Despite its founding in insubordination, MacArthur's stark moral imperative—to use Taiwan as a base for deploying whatever means necessary to defend democracy anywhere it was threatened by Communism—soon became ubiquitous.

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FIGURE 5. MacArthur and Chiang plotting behind Truman's back; a 1951 Herblock Cartoon, © held by and image used with permission of the Herb Block Foundation.

As an NBC News segment declared on New Year's Day 1950, "Formosa stands against Communism in Asia."[96] As Rankin wrote from Taipei, Taiwan is "a bastion and rallying point where hope is kept alive."[97] "Thus the 'ROC on Taiwan' became 'Free China,'" Shelly Rigger concludes, "turning it into a handy ideological and rhetorical foil to the 'Red Chinese' governing the mainland."[98] Henceforward, and regardless of facts on the ground, the embattled island would be synonymous with advancing democracy, defending America's interests, and waging war against Communist expansion, standing as "an offshore fortress beaming the beacon of liberty into the totalitarian void."[99] And so, come Dwight D. Eisenhower's ascendancy to the White House in 1952, with the Republicans now wedded to hating global Communism, and with Taiwan celebrated by the war hawks as the linchpin of the United States' hopes to throttle Mao and roll back Communism, Senators Knowland and McCarthy and

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their friends celebrated in Washington with Taiwan's ambassador, Wellington Koo. Their dinner party ended with the anti-Communist war hawks chanting Chiang's dream: "Back to the Mainland!"[100]

Before dismissing that phrase as Republican dream-work, it is important to try to understand what its singers meant in the Long Cold War context. First, for the Republicans, the world map at the close of 1952 featured tens if not hundreds of millions of refugees chased from their homes by war or "enslaved" by the expansionist Communism that had seized land all across Europe and Asia.[101] The Republicans therefore believed the mere containment of Communism was nothing less than a sin, meaning "Back to the Mainland!" indicated not only a commitment to Chiang's ambitions regarding China but a pledge to fight for the rollback of Communism everywhere—it was less a specific plan than a quasi-religious goal. As Rankin put it, "'Return to the Mainland' is the free world's answer to 'Workers of the World Unite!' The importance of such slogans in the struggle between freedom and tyranny cannot be overestimated."[102] "Back to the Mainland!" was an aspirational slogan useful for "sustaining the morale so essential," Rankin sermonized, "to surmounting the moral crisis facing the whole world today."[103] Understood in this symbolic way, U.S. support for Formosa was not so much an endorsement of Chiang, or evidence of a commitment to local autonomy in Asia, or suggestive of aggressive intentions regarding mainland China, but a garbled act of communication, a message of deterrence intended for Mao and Stalin, and a message of hope for America's allies in the region. One of the tragedies of America's roles in the Long Cold War is that this messaging was not successful, in large part because by treating Formosa/Taiwan as an expendable leverage point—by treating it via the rhetoric of marginal significance—the United States signaled to the world that its alliances were transactional and utilitarian, not principled and ethical.

The Denial of Formosa to Communism; or, Setting the Stage for the Long Cold War

The JCS produced a memo in 1952 that encapsulated U.S. interests and confusions. Mirroring the dilemmas of the age, the text works under the sign of realism while authoring a set of messages that could not help but be escalatory. The first key line calls for "the denial of Formosa to communism," indicating the negative nature

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of the U.S.-KMT relationship: American decision-makers distrusted Chiang and thought his administration inept, yet he was their best bet for denying Mao his final triumph in the Chinese Civil War.[104] And so the United States would continue its unhappy relationship with a tyrant, not so much addressing the crises in Taiwan and emerging between the United States, China, and Taiwan as kicking them down the road. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship was based, then, not on a positive sense of what the two nations could accomplish together, but on a negative sense of how the United States could use Taiwan to deny China a cherished goal. While this policy of denial made short-term sense to Truman and his team, it also produced two deeply felt responses. For Mao and his lieutenants, it laid the groundwork for a generation's worth of distrust, both triggering their traumatized nationalism and fueling their hatred of the United States. For Chiang and the KMT it likewise left the smell of disregard, for the Americans were treating Taiwan as a point of leverage, hence beginning the long train of evidence that would become the rhetoric of marginal significance. What seemed like caution in Washington was perceived in Taipei and Peking as Yankee arrogance.

The second key phrase from the JCS memo states that American policy will be driven by the need to maintain "the continued availability of Formosa as a base for possible United States military operations" in the region.[105] This line indicates the utilitarian nature of the relationship, wherein the U.S. brass, as MacArthur had written, envisioned Formosa as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." The fact that this relationship was utilitarian rather than based on a shared vision of good governance and liberal civic values is drilled home by the fact that the word democracy does not appear in this document. The memo ends by stating "the need for the United States to support the Chinese Nationalist Government of Formosa" in general and, in particular, "to support [the] Generalissimo's" plan to "return . . . to China," yet that latter phrase is significant not for what it says but for what it omits. Indeed, in this order, the JCS sought (1) to hold Formosa free from Communist expansion, even if the people of Formosa were not themselves free; (2) to garrison the island as a base for future U.S.-led anti-Communist military activity; and (3) to hold on to, even to support, but *not* to plan for or participate in Chiang's return to the mainland, where he claimed he would wage war on Mao, destroy Chinese Communism, and, by proxy, check any further Russian influence in Asia. The memo therefore held Chiang at arm's length, took no notice of the political situation in Taiwan, indicated China was and would remain an enemy, and foregrounded the fact that Formosa was prized only as a military base.

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This policy set the stage for endless recrimination by enflaming China's traumatized nationalism and Chiang's anger at being treated via the rhetoric of marginal significance. In this way, the JCS memo shows how a temporary solution could lay the groundwork for long-term communicative dilemmas. In contemporary China, these events from 1950 still trigger a burning sense of indignation. The CPC's 2001 white paper on "The Taiwan Question and [the] Reunification of China" described how Truman ordered "the Seventh Fleet [to] invade the Taiwan Straits," supporting "the Kuomintang clique's reign of terror," adding yet another chapter to China's "record of subjection to aggression, dismemberment, and humiliation by foreign powers."[106] Despite these accusations, the fact remains that the CPC did not invade Formosa in the summer of 1950 because it lacked legitimate amphibious assault forces, naval support vessels, or credible air cover.[107] President Truman had washed his hands of Chiang and the KMT, yet Mao squandered his opportunity by diving headlong into the madness in Korea, which sucked the Americans back into the region. Formosa remained separated from the mainland, then, because of miscalculations and mismanagement in Peking.

As we have seen herein, Truman did not "invade" the Taiwan Strait, yet actors may derive a sense of gratification from deploying narratives that are demonstrably false.[108] What matters in such cases is not the accuracy of the rhetoric but its emotional resonance, its ability to offer a compelling and even compensatory justification for the way things are. For Mao and the CPC, blaming Truman and the Americans was easier than engaging in self-reflection; moreover, stoking traumatized nationalism both tarred the Americans and rallied the Chinese against their alleged imperial enemies. For Chiang and the KMT, puffing up their sense of indignity at being handled arrogantly by the Americans, all while chanting "Back to the Mainland," helped (or so they thought) hold the island together in its time of desperation. For Truman, besieged at home and abroad, no options seemed good, all avenues were fraught with danger, and so policy flip-flops on Formosa were not strategic deceptions but desperate acts of crisis management. It may have looked to others like strategic ambiguity, but from the Oval Office it was just damage control.

This first chapter closes having established the communicative matrix that would drive the future of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations: The CPC would hammer away at the trope of traumatized nationalism, ignoring its own escalatory rhetoric while imagining U.S. "invasions" and depicting America's policy confusions as strategic deceptions. The White House would deploy short-term responses intended as stopgaps against World War III, unaware of how these flip-flops were being

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interpreted in Peking as evidence of deception and in Taipei as evidence of the rhetoric of marginal significance. And Chiang, angered at being sidelined in the era's great decisions, would burn with a sense of marginalization and disregard, fueling his and his nation's anger at the rhetoric of marginal significance. In this way, each party nursed misunderstandings and grievances, allowing specific instances of botched communication and "lethal rhetoric" to harden into explanatory schema, the overriding dispositions that would not just reflect their rhetorical habits but drive their thinking. The implications for the Long Cold War would be devastating, as all parties, reacting to the others through their own dispositions, were primed for mutual miscomprehension. As we will see in chapter 2, this process led in 1954 and 1955 to the precipice of nuclear war.

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CHAPTER TWO

Avoiding a Chain Reaction of Disaster, 1952–1955

The United States and China nearly stumbled into nuclear war in 1955, when tension over the offshore islands Quemoy, Matsu, and others, then occupied by Chiang's Nationalists yet claimed by Mao's Communists, left the United States caught in a conundrum. Known in Taiwan as the "September 3rd Artillery War," the drama began in 1954 and bled into 1955, producing a Long Cold War dilemma with the United States and China dancing along the "knife edge of global confrontation."[1] The Eisenhower administration was loath to let Mao's PRC muscle Chiang's ROC off the islands, fearing another debacle like the one suffered in Korea, or the one then brewing in Indochina.[2] On the other hand, Eisenhower and his team were not enthusiastic about defending the islands if doing so meant triggering war with China.[3] Like Truman and Acheson before them, Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, entered the crisis deeply distrustful of Chiang, who, Dulles worried, "has a vested interest in World War III, which alone, he feels, might restore his mainland rule."[4] The White House felt trapped between bad choices on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, Eisenhower was torn between fulfilling the fiery "liberation" pledges launched during his 1952 campaign and facing the stark realities of power politics in Asia.[5] As David Halberstam has observed, "a certain schizophrenia was at work here: We wanted

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to be the policeman of the world . . . but did not want to get involved in a messy, costly foreign war."[6] In this sense, the Quemoy crisis stands as a representative case study of the complexities and ambiguities of the Long Cold War.

The fighting began on September 3, 1954, when Mao's forces began lobbing artillery shells onto Quemoy.[7] For many Americans, the attack confirmed an ominous pattern of Communist aggression; as Eisenhower had warned earlier that spring, similar acts in Indochina could trigger "the falling domino principle," thereby "beginning a disintegration that would have the most profound influence."[8] The *New York Times* characterized this imagery as portraying "a chain reaction of disaster for the free world."[9] Eisenhower was not alone in imagining the dominoes falling, for as the Generalissimo warned in a letter, defending Quemoy was just the first step in stopping "the Communist program of world conquest."[10] Dulles pushed his own version of the globalizing Communist threat, writing in *Foreign Affairs* that China was merely a puppet of the Soviets, with the twinned "menace" pursuing "a new form of imperialist colonialism."[11]

A chain reaction of disaster, *world conquest*, *imperialist colonialism*—such language might sound hyperbolic, yet the post–World War II period was driven by fears of anticipated cataclysm. As Norman A. Graebner once observed, the Cold War "emerged and thrived on images of impending global disaster."[12] For example, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 58, released from Washington in September 1952, declared, "Peiping and Moscow both aim at expelling all Western influence from Asia and at extending Communist control over the entire region. Both desire to spread the Communist world revolution."[13] Within this global war over the fate of freedom, and with shells raining down on the island, September 1954 found many in the U.S. government believing that defending Quemoy was enmeshed within a life-and-death contest over all they held dear. As the authors of NSC-68 had argued in the autumn of 1950, nothing less was involved than "the fulfillment or destruction of this Republic" and even "civilization itself."[14]

Like Graebner, Robert P. Newman has suggested that some of the key decision-makers in the Truman and then Eisenhower administrations were "delusional and panicky" regarding the trajectory of the Long Cold War.[15] Ample evidence confirms this thesis, yet neither Graebner nor Newman wrote about the offshore islands or the fact that in 1954 the PRC was both landscaping Quemoy with tons of explosives and filling their newspapers with declarations about the revolutionary goal of "liberating" Taiwan and annihilating Chiang and his imperialist friends.[16] Not so much delusional and panicky as confused and wary of escalation, Eisenhower

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and his team responded to this dual military/propaganda assault by trying to walk the rhetorical tightrope of seeming to be strong but not provocative. Considering the potentially catastrophic consequences of a misstep, Eisenhower's rhetoric was therefore prudent, ambiguous, and vague—not because he was trying to be strategically deceptive, but rather, because he and his team were confused.

Indeed, based upon both published and archival evidence, including commentary from Chinese scholars accessing recently declassified materials, I demonstrate how the White House's strategy of "fuzzing"—the forerunner of America's long habit of engaging in strategic ambiguity—gave way to threats of nuclear war, all while misunderstanding Chairman Mao's motivations and goals in the Taiwan Strait.[17] While traditional Eisenhower scholarship sees this "fuzzing" as a brilliant form of strategic ambiguity, I argue it was the product of confusion and, most importantly, a reflection of the president's commitment to what he called "strong patience." Mao, on the other hand, responded first by marshaling the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, but then by switching gears and deploying a flip, almost cheerful frame depicting America as insane and its actions as foolish. Despite Eisenhower's best intentions and Mao's provocations, Washington's handling of Taipei during this crisis entrenched the rhetoric of marginal significance at the heart of the Long Cold War, for any action short of invading mainland China struck Chiang as soft, if not traitorous. In short, each of the key players deployed rhetoric that aggravated regional conflicts, producing a sense of *in*security. Seen in this light, the United States' fuzzing should be understood not as a Long Cold War strategy of crafty misdirection and calculated deception but as a form of rhetorical deferral.

The typical read on these events is as follows, in this case as argued by Evan Thomas: "Eisenhower was able to bluff without showing his hand. Of course, he had been lucky; the obdurate Chiang might have dragged out the crisis had the Red Chinese not backed down. But they did."[18] These conclusions merit reconsideration on three counts: First, Ike and his team eventually lost patience with "fuzzing" and showed their hand via nuclear threats; second, Chiang did everything in his power to drag out and escalate the hostilities; and third, Mao did not back down, for the operation was never meant to be a precursor to an invasion of Formosa. Rather, the Quemoy crisis was meant to goad the Soviets into providing the CPC with nuclear weapons and to bar Chiang from going down the road toward "two Chinas." Or consider H. W. Brands's conclusion, representative of much Eisenhower scholarship, that "no doubt the threat of atomic attack influenced Chinese leaders'

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decisions" to not attack Quemoy.[19] That conclusion also merits reappraisal, for Mao relished such escalatory language as evidence of "INSANITY IN WASHINGTON."[20] Thus proposing fresh interpretations of Mao's intentions, Chiang's hopes, and Eisenhower's ambiguous and then alarming rhetoric, I offer readers a reappraisal of the 1954–1955 Quemoy crisis, one of the key moments of the Long Cold War, and new insights into the rhetorical history of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

Eisenhower's Unleashing and the Beginning of a Chain of Events

To make sense of this crisis of contested sovereignty, it is important to backtrack into U.S. domestic politics, for by the time the Republicans ran General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, the Democrats had held the White House for twenty years, leaving the Republicans to stew in a generation-long, bitter malaise.[21] Fierce enemies of the New Deal, ardent champions of free-market capitalism, fanatical in their hatred of Communism, and convinced the Cold War was already being lost, the Republicans rode a McCarthy-fueled "fever of conspiracy" back to the White House, producing what Newman has called "an orgy of scapegoating and recrimination."[22] One of the lead authors of the Republicans' national party platform and soon to be secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, declared during the campaign that Truman's foreign policy was a "treadmill" blocking the more robust task of "liberation."[23] For the Republicans, Truman's defensive policy of containment was akin to surrender; only the more aggressive policy of liberation would honor the glory and obligation of America's global mission.[24]

The Republicans looked to General Ike to reassert a version of America as a robust, heavily armed, and righteous agent of Christian decency. And so, on February 2, 1953, when President Eisenhower delivered his first State of the Union Address, Republicans entered the Capitol ready for deliverance. "Our country has come through a painful period of trial and disillusionment since the victory of 1945," the president said. "We anticipated a world of peace and cooperation," but "the calculated pressures of aggressive communism have forced us, instead, to live in *a world of turmoil*."[25] That phrase encapsulated all the resentment, alienation, and fear the Republicans had felt ever since the closing days of World War II.[26]

To appreciate the barbs within Eisenhower's Inaugural Address, it is important to remember that in response to the start of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, President Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.[27] While

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Truman's "neutralizing policy" made sense in 1950,[28] by 1953 the Seventh Fleet's service as a buffer between the mainland and Formosa was now inimical to U.S. interests. "Consequently, there is no longer any logic or sense in the condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists," the president announced to thunderous applause. "I am therefore issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China."[29] Eisenhower's renunciation of Truman's neutralizing policy was celebrated as "unleashing" Chiang and the KMT to wage war against Mao and the CPC, and as a clear indication that the Democrats' soft road of containment was giving way to the Republicans' hard road of "liberation." As the *New York Times* observed, "In many quarters the impression was created that Chiang Kai-shek, with full American air and logistic support, would soon be marching on Peiping."[30]

To understand the implications of this "unleashing," consider a memo written by Major General William C. Chase, the chief of the U.S. MAAG in Taiwan. Chase responded to Eisenhower's speech in red-blooded fashion, announcing to his opposite number in the ROC's army, "I recommend that plans be made at once to increase the frequency of raids, not only from the 'off-shore' islands, but also from Formosa and the Pescadores, and that both little and big raids be planned and executed on a wide front."[31] Chiang and the KMT could now return to the aggressive tactics they had used before 1950 to hasten the fall of Mao's regime. One of the keys to this guerrilla campaign was controlling the offshore islands—Quemoy, the Tachens, Matsu, and dozens more—from which the KMT staged their operations. For hardline Republicans and KMT stalwarts, these island-based guerrilla hits were just the tip of the anti-Communist spear.

As seen in the report filed that spring by Karl Rankin, the U.S. chargé (and soon to be ambassador) in Taipei, the unleashed KMT had big plans:

- Large raids on the mainland;
- Blockade of the mainland coast;
- Invasion of the mainland;
- Assignment of an army of 25,000 to the Korean front; and
- Operations in Southeast Asia in the "far distant future."[32]

In short, controlling the islands was just the first step in what the KMT envisioned as its rightful Long Cold War trajectory: to destroy Mao, retake the mainland, then

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clean up the mess in Korea, and then begin its ascent to global power status. Within this U.S.-funded KMT dream-work, Quemoy was the frontline for stopping the wave of Russian- and Chinese-sponsored Communism.

If the United States and Taiwan were jockeying in escalatory fashion, so was Mao's PRC; indeed, this period of the Long Cold War found Mao in transition. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, formally ending one aspect of the post–World War II phase of uncertainty in Asia by returning sovereignty to Japan and dispersing its wartime holdings, was signed on September 8, 1951.[33] In the first week of April 1953, Joseph Stalin died, opening up the possibility of post-dictator coups, policy reversals, personal betrayals, and military confusions within the Kremlin.[34] As Martin J. Medhurst has shown, U.S. leadership had been contemplating launching a "peace offensive," first signaled in President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech of December 8, 1953; with the death of Stalin, that offensive was accelerated, as the United States sought to "set in motion a systematic plan to exploit the weakness perceived to accompany a Soviet transfer of power."[35] Moreover, the Korean War was formalized as a draw on July 27, 1953. If these events enabled the United States to withdraw significant amounts of troops from the region, hence diminishing the importance of Taiwan as a base, then U.S. support for Chiang might likewise diminish, and this, in turn, could open the door for a return to something like foreign-policy normalcy between the United States and China—something Mao absolutely did not want. His intention was not to seek regional peace but regional turmoil. As CPC propaganda at the time roared: "We must hate America because she is the Chinese people's implacable enemy. . . . America is a corrupt and imperialist nation."[36] Working from such assumptions, Mao sought neither World War III nor détente but localized, nationalist-fueled crises that would justify the PRC's rapid militarization (with massive Soviet assistance) while confirming China's anti-imperialist arguments against the United States and its allies.[37] Traumatized nationalism serves as one of China's post–World War II master narratives, but here Mao is not so much stoking a sense of national trauma as playing a coy game of asymmetrical jockeying—he is probing, taunting, feinting, seeing how much trouble he can create.

Nonetheless, Mao's and the Party's rhetoric regarding Taiwan remained consistent. As Premier Chou Enlai reported in 1954, "only by liberating Taiwan from the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek gang of traitors, only by fulfilling this glorious task, will we achieve complete unification of our great motherland."[38] The problem for observers lies in deciphering what amounts to a calculated statement of intention

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vs. bombastic nationalist bluster. Was the "glorious task" of "liberating Taiwan" a short-term goal scheduled for specific military action or a long-term aspirational dream deployed to unite the people? With no usable intelligence access in Peking, with the KMT whispering nightmares, with the State Department's old "China Hands" sidelined by McCarthy's accusations, and with the CPC both roaring propaganda and bombing Quemoy, it takes no great leap of imagination to picture the White House taking such threats at face value.[39]

The play of misreadings and confusions is important to note. The White House took Mao's threats not as bombast but as actual predictions, hence overreacting. Then, in trying to calm the tensions, Eisenhower's team took steps that felt half-hearted and condescending to Chiang, hence stoking his anger about the rhetoric of marginal significance. Chiang's response triggered China's sense of traumatized nationalism and outraged the Americans. Each party misread the other and acted in ways that made the situation worse. This chain of misunderstanding had deadly consequences. Consider this train of events: From the KMT perspective, the Soviet Union was supporting the PRC in advancing a global revolution. It made sense, then, for the KMT to interdict the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* on June 23, for that vessel was both aiding the enemy and fueling expansionist Communism. Regarding the seizure as an act of war, the PRC responded by shooting down a British airliner (apparently mistaken for a bomber) on July 23. The United States then retaliated by shooting down two PRC fighter jets on July 26. The shelling of Quemoy began on September 3, suggesting that this string of events was intimately linked, with the September 3rd Artillery War standing as the end result of a chain of misunderstandings.[40] In a memo dated August 20, 1954, Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff argued that the CPC "consider that the Chinese Nationalists are complete American stooges" and must therefore "have assumed that the Soviet tanker was seized upon American orders. They must further have assumed that this was the first implementation of a U.S. policy to seize all Communist shipping in the area. They decided they could not put up with this without a fight and were determined to give naval and air protection to their shipping."[41] Schwartz was suggesting that the Generalissimo's rash actions vis-à-vis a non-military Russian ship initiated a deadly chain of events, none of which served U.S. interests. In short, the KMT's defensive action felt to the Chinese like aggression; the PRC's reply to the KMT then triggered a strong American response; the United States' actions then confirmed China's worst fears about a forthcoming imperial invasion—the parties were locked in a spiral of escalation.

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The CPC made matters worse by falling back upon traumatized nationalism as an explanatory framework. In August, Chou Enlai described the KMT's coastal raids and shipping harassment as indicating Chiang's "true pirate fashion"; the next month, he lamented "the truculent policy of sabotage"; by December, he was pointing to the KMT's U.S.-approved "grave warlike provocations."[42] Across these statements, Chou portrayed China as an innocent victim of imperial aggression, not as an equal participant in the drama. While overwrought, Chou's assessment was fueled by the KMT, whose escalatory rhetoric and paramilitary actions—in true pirate fashion—guaranteed that the CPC would see any diplomatic efforts from America as deceptive, for the KMT's strikes up and down the coast of China left little doubt that war was coming to the region.

Sick and tired of feeling stuck in this position, on September 4, 1954, the day after the shelling began on Quemoy, Secretary Dulles awoke in Manila in a foul mood. Dulles had traveled to the capital of the Philippines to lead the conference that would found SEATO, and while he was no fan of the Generalissimo, he feared the ambitions of the Communists.[43] And so Dulles confessed in a letter to the acting secretary of state, General Bedell Smith, "I believe the loss of Quemoy would have grave psychological repercussions and lead to mounting Communist action . . . this would be the beginning of a chain of events."[44] In addition to confirming the pattern of rhetorical escalation criticized by Schwartz, Dulles's lament illustrates how the United States' range of actions appeared to be severely limited. For Dulles, this agony of sovereignty was caused by a constellation of forces, including ongoing PRC aggression, lurking Soviet influence, festering KMT ineptitude, and the maddening timidity of regional allies.[45] Add to this string of complications the fact that Dulles believed the Democrats were perpetually weak, Congress was meddling, and the press was not to be trusted, and you get the picture of a man desperately trying to hold U.S. policy together in the face of daunting odds—hardly the architect of the superpower arrogance the CPC loved to lambaste as "hegemony."[46]

Chiang, on the other hand, said in April 1954 that he relished the challenge of "realizing God's righteousness" and "the salvation of mankind" via an assault against China—claims that one reporter called Chiang's "holy war."[47] In fact, within a week of the initial volleys, the KMT's air force, flying U.S.-supplied F-84 jet fighters, was launching more than one hundred sorties a day, pummeling Chinese positions up and down the seaboard. At the same time, Chiang's U.S.-supplied and trained navy opened its guns on ships in the region and PLA bases up and down the coast (see figure 6). Fully aware of the internal complications threatening

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FIGURE 6. Map of the Quemoy theater during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, from the *New York Times*, August 19, 1954; © held by and image used with permission of the paper and PARS International.

Mao's rule, expecting the United States to come to his aid if the fighting escalated, and continuing in his messianic conviction that retaking the mainland was part of his "sacred anti-Communist mission," Chiang hoped for a regional war.[48] In his annual Ten-Ten Day speech, the Generalissimo was exuberant. "The Communists," he prophesied, will be "made to pay the debts of blood. . . . We must demand our motherland from the Russian bandits and reclaim our freedom from the Communist traitors."[49] Chiang saw the season in apocalyptic terms, announcing that the actions around Quemoy indicated the Communists' intention of "occupying Asia and conquering the whole world." The Generalissimo was so ready to fight this war that he boasted, "[We are] not afraid of what our enemy might do. On the contrary, we are looking forward to such an eventuality so that we might deal our enemy a mortal blow. What we are afraid of today is that our enemy might decide *not* to take the risk of launching an invasion from across the sea."[50]

Amid the PRC's shelling, the KMT's bombings, and Mao's bombastic declarations, the Americans remained confused and wary. In fact, the Department of Defense still thought an invasion of Taiwan highly unlikely.[51] In "The Chinese Offshore Islands," a report dated September 8, 1954, and marked "President's Copy, TOP SECRET," the CIA revealed that "Chinese Communist naval strength in the Amoy area is negligible" and that "There have been no confirmed reports of Communist air activity in the area, and Communist naval and ground force activity in the area is not unusual." While the bombardment of Quemoy was getting hyped in the press as a prelude to war, the CIA noted that "the Communists have chosen to proceed cautiously. They have taken no action against US forces and have not indicated that

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they are readying their forces for an attempted invasion of the Quemoys at this time."[52] Thus, Secretary Dulles acknowledged publicly on September 12 the "limited war" engulfing the region while confessing that U.S. military intelligence was relatively sure that Mao's forces "do not have any military intentions on invasion."[53] Behind closed doors, Eisenhower's team received intelligence report after report suggesting that the CPC was *not* preparing for an attack but probing U.S. intentions and, ideally, sowing the seeds of acrimony between the United States and its allies.[54] Yafeng Xia's study of recently declassified Chinese sources confirms that "the PRC had limited aims, with no plan to take over Jinmen [Quemoy], much less Taiwan."[55] But the Eisenhower team was not so sure at the time.

With no consensus emerging within elite policy circles, Eisenhower's lieutenants devised a rhetorical strategy they called "fuzzing." In this formulation, the White House would say one thing to Chiang in private, then signal another thing to Mao via the press and other international intermediaries, then say as little as possible to the American public, all while conveying different meanings via calibrated military gestures, thus creating a rhetorical environment of ambivalence and subterfuge. Ambassador Rankin argued, "it would be best simply to keep the Communists guessing" regarding U.S. intentions.[56] When the NSC met in Denver (where Eisenhower was "vacationing"), Vice President Richard M. Nixon offered his own spin on the fuzzing strategy, counseling that "we should play poker in order to keep the Communists guessing."[57] By October, the State Department had prepared a policy statement concluding, "We have been careful to keep the Communists in uncertainty as to our probable course of action."[58] Walter P. McConaughy, the U.S. director of Chinese Affairs in Taiwan, noted that "The problem is how to keep the Communists in the dark as to our intentions regarding the offshore islands."[59] Dulles explained this strategy to the president at a NSC meeting that November:

> It might be desirable, in the text of the proposed mutual defense treaty with Formosa, to "fuzz up" to some extent the U.S. reaction with regard to a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa. . . . He read a paragraph to illustrate how this fuzzing up might be accomplished. . . . The advantage of this fuzzing up would be to maintain doubt in the minds of the Communists as to how the U.S. would react to an attack on the offshore islands.[60]

As these passages indicate, U.S. leadership believed that "fuzzing up" their public discourse—what scholars have come to call "strategic ambiguity"[61]—would keep

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Mao and the CPC guessing, perhaps deterring them from taking actions for which there could be unintended consequences. Within this line of reasoning, fuzzing was a tool within the rhetoric of geostrategic deception.[62]

Contrary to this position, the evidence suggests that even while some members of the Eisenhower administration portrayed their fuzzing as an intentional and strategic means of Long Cold War deception, it should more accurately be understood as a product of intense confusion within the White House. For example, SNIE 100-4-54, filed on September 4, 1954, the day after the shelling began, reported that "there has been no great increase in troop strength" in the Amoy area, and that "the Communists do not have experience with or adequate equipment for major amphibious operations."[63] The week after the shelling began, while Dulles and others were imagining World War III, General Matthew Ridgway, the chief of staff of the United States Army, calmly reminded the president that Quemoy held "miniscule importance" and that "the defense of the Quemoy islands is *not* substantially related to the defense of Formosa."[64] Buffeted by internal disagreements about the importance of Quemoy, the Eisenhower White House was awash in confusion.[65] Indeed, given the consistency of intelligence reports showing that Mao had no intention of attacking Formosa, and the anxiety America's fuzzing caused its allies, many administration members worried that it was a counterproductive strategy. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson argued that it was "nothing but a lot of doubletalk" that was leaving everyone confused, and to what end? Allen Dulles, John's brother and head of the CIA, likewise worried that "our bluff might be called at any time."[66] In retrospect, it seems clear that Eisenhower and Dulles were not so much bluffing Mao as simply stalling for time, hoping the crisis would peter out before they needed to make any hard calls with potentially catastrophic consequences. I offer this reading not as a critique of Eisenhower, who did a heroic job of balancing the conflicting views of his many advisors, but as a humble historical corrective: the Quemoy crisis found U.S. leadership not so much pursuing a grand strategy cloaked in ambiguous rhetoric as hoping against all hope that tensions would die down before anyone did anything rash.

As seen in Fred Greenstein's *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* and other works, scholars have long celebrated this alleged "strategic ambiguity" as a brilliant maneuver.[67] An alternative reading is that such fuzzing up left the Americans looking, if not delusional and panicky, at least confused and clueless, and likely lacking clarity and resolve. Nixon's poker metaphor is particularly telling, as it indicates how the U.S. strategy of fuzzing up may in fact have been little more than desperate

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hot air—for despite the Republicans' hard talk, none of President Eisenhower's inner circle wanted to launch World War III over what Gordon H. Chang has called "insignificant specks of land."[68] Fuzzing also seemed to confirm a popular belief that Eisenhower, despite his immense charisma and likability, was something of a dummy. As the CBS newsman Eric Sevareid scoffed, Eisenhower was generally seen as "empty of ideas or certitude."[69] Within this context, fuzzing locked-in the sense that Ike was confused and noncommittal, less interested in the "liberation" of Taiwan and the "rollback" of Communism than in pursuing what Robert Accinelli calls "the diplomacy of postponement."[70]

My reading sides with Accinelli, albeit with the important caveat that Eisenhower's policy of postponement demonstrated its own kind of bravery. As the president said in the spring of 1955, "If you are going to live in the confidence that you are right . . . but you are not going to resort to aggressive force yourself, then you have got to be patient and strong in your patience, not to let anybody run over you, but not to say 'they are going to attack me today; therefore, I attacked them yesterday.'"[71] Despite the sense of crisis swirling all around him, Eisenhower calculated that it was better to show strength in patience than to rush into a foolish war. As he said that May, "we are sort of in a wait-and-see attitude."[72] Fuzzing, then, was not a grand demonstration of strategic ambiguity, it was not a brilliant maneuver within the rhetoric of geostrategic deception; rather, it was the product of the president sitting on history—practicing his own version of "strong patience"—by refusing to be prodded into a war no one wanted to fight. Moreover, considering the fire he was taking from both the hard-right Republicans and the messianic and warmongering Chiang, Eisenhower's "wait-and-see" rhetoric showed admirable restraint. As he lamented in a phone call with Dulles, "the easy road would be to go along with being belligerent," but this knee-jerk jumping into war would be "the cowardly way." Instead, Eisenhower said, "We are taking the way of patience and persuasion. . . . We can't just give way to anger and say 'to hell with you, here we go'!"[73]

The Incommensurable Long Cold War and the Agony of Sovereignty

By the time the Eisenhower White House confronted the Quemoy crisis in the fall of 1954, the Long Cold War was fracturing into worldviews that were diametrically opposed to each other yet also laced with internal contradictions. Within this incommensurable and now global conflict, the Soviets, the Chinese, the Americans,

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the Taiwanese, and their various proxies and allies seemed to live in parallel universes that made no sense to the others. As President Harry S. Truman said to the U.S. Congress in his "Truman Doctrine" speech of March 12, 1947, the postwar situation had evolved into two diametrically opposed, "alternative ways of life." On one side stood the "free people" of the world, committed to transparency and participation in governance, the celebration of individual talents, and freedom of speech and religion; on the other side, Truman alleged, stood "totalitarian regimes" relying upon "terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedom."[74] As the CPC propaganda clichés cited herein indicate, the Chinese were expected to engage in a similar process of bifurcation, as were those Taiwanese who followed the Generalissimo's strict hatred of Mao and his "Reds." The world was being divvied up into incommensurable factions, illustrating Phil Wander's notion of "prophetic dualism," which

> divides the world into two camps. Between them there is conflict. One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other. . . . There is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a delusion, compromise [as] appeasement, and negotiation [as] a call for surrender.[75]

Much of the difficulty stemmed from an explosion of post–World War II confusions regarding sovereignty, which left the world's powers scrambling. The British and French were wrecked empires, leaving their former colonial holdings in disarray.[76] Imperial Japan lay smoldering and radiated, its future uncertain.[77] The USSR was colonizing Eastern Europe, yet it was a "shattered state" with a starving population and little rhetorical traction in Stalin's version of militarized Communism.[78] China was also surging, albeit under Mao's dictatorial leadership and with the peasants starving due to failed five-year plans and botched collectivization schemes.[79] India was now free, albeit surrounded by enemies and beset with poverty.[80] All this left much of Asia up for grabs, with anti-colonial nationalists of all varieties fighting for control of what amounted to roughly one-third of the Earth's population. National borders were being redrawn; national identities were being contested; regional and global affinities were being scrambled. The moment was ripe with opportunity for a postcolonial flourishing of locally driven democracies, yet as Garry Wills observed, the collapse of prior colonial orders left the region full

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of divided states wracked with poverty, bereft of efficient governments, and lacking civic infrastructure—thus producing "half-countries at war with themselves."[81]

One of the oddities of the Long Cold War is that Americans surveyed this situation and, instead of feeling proud of their affluence and security, believed that "the peace was more precarious and the United States more vulnerable than ever before."[82] Eisenhower captured the nation's dire mood in his radio address of May 19, 1952, wherein he warned that "Communist aggression" around the world sought "the destruction of freedom everywhere" and produced not a moment but "an age of peril."[83] And so, my analysis of Quemoy in 1954 proceeds here by moving from U.S. domestic politics to the Long Cold War's incommensurable claims and this postwar agony of sovereign confusion, where questions of material ownership, historical legacy, military power, political legitimacy, and future trajectories were all up for grabs. If nations are *imagined communities*, rhetorically constructed entities to which we grant our assent and allegiance, then the Quemoy crisis was a useful postcolonial stage for producing different senses of nationalism.[84]

For example, consider the cover of this book, which features a CPC propaganda poster depicting child soldiers representing the army, navy, and air force storming Taiwan. Standing in solidarity, a munitions-factory worker holds up a bomb, while a farmer, harvesting the bounty of the motherland, feeds the revolution. Consistent with much imagery from this period, the nation is shown as striving heroically to advance, all unity and purpose and determination, with China's revolutionary youth leading the charge.[85] As Rya Butterfield has observed of contemporary Chinese propaganda imagery, so this poster illustrates "everyday practices of virtuous labor in the service of the nation."[86] It also depicts the Evil Other: Chiang and General MacArthur. This part of the image offers a visual corollary to a speech Wu Hsiu-Chuan delivered before the UN's Security Council on November 28, 1950, when Wu reiterated the CPC position that "the Chiang Kai-shek KMT reactionary regime was nothing more than a puppet through which American imperialism controlled China." Wu painted a grisly picture: "The hands of the American imperialists are stained with blood."[87] Chiang appears in the image as the walking dead, pale and scrawny, his KMT uniform ripped and stamped with "US," thus demonstrating the obvious truth: He fights not for his people but for his imperial overlord. Chiang sits on the shoulders of MacArthur, the most fanatical of America's anti-Communists and one of the chief architects of America's flawed Long Cold War policies in Asia. MacArthur was a favorite target of the Communists; as Zhu De argued in a revolutionary pamphlet, the general was "the notorious American arch-criminal of

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aggression in the East."[88] Bright, cheerful, and full of energy, the image celebrates China's revolutionary youth and the fact that the "arch-criminals" of imperialism are sinking into oblivion.

Nonetheless, as was so often the case in revolutionary China, the propaganda poster's bold vision, the claims driving Wu's speech before the UN, and Mao's actual planning diverged dramatically. For Mao had no intention of storming Quemoy in 1954; he intended to create chaos, fear, and the threat of war, but a large-scale assault was not planned. Launching round after round of artillery shells onto the island was one thing, but sending amphibious invasion forces was another—particularly considering that the United States' superior naval and air power, if deployed, would have cut the Communists to pieces. Indeed, Chang and Halliday have argued that "the point of this hullabaloo about attacking Taiwan was really to push the situation to the brink of nuclear confrontation with America" in the hopes that doing so would goad Moscow into giving in to one of Peking's long-standing requests: to provide the CPC with nuclear weapons.[89]

It is important to underline this conclusion, for while earlier analyses concluded that U.S. leadership prevented catastrophe via the artful deployment of strategic ambiguity, the arguments offered above confirm that Mao had no intention of invading Quemoy. For Mao and the CPC, Quemoy was not so much a military target as a propaganda opportunity at home and yet another occasion to harass the United States while not confronting it directly, all while creating discomfort for the Soviets, their ambivalent allies. Jay Taylor has argued that for Mao, "creating a crisis" on Quemoy "was meant primarily to raise the political consciousness of the Chinese people and stir up revolutionary enthusiasm."[90] Eisenhower seems to have sensed this ploy, as he wrote on September 8, following the start of the shelling on the 3rd, that "all along the Eastern edge of Asia, from the Bering Sea to Indonesia, there is a constantly boiling kettle of possible trouble."[91] That was Mao's play: to use Quemoy to keep the kettle boiling. In fact, Li Zhisui reports that Mao later celebrated how the crisis was useful for "keep[ing] Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that."[92] In this sense, the propaganda poster's portrayal of noble youth charging onto Taiwan was less a threat against the Americans and Taiwanese than a recruiting pitch for the locals—it was a piece of nationalist dream-work, an imagined community stitched together by hatred of the Other and the élan of Revolutionary nationalism.

To demonstrate how far apart the United States, China, and Taiwan were from understanding each other at this time, consider an image from the cover of *Time*

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magazine in the spring of 1955. The homage depicts Chiang wearing his military gear, his stiff collar buttoned up in a show of Confucian discipline (see figure 7). Eyes on the horizon, the Generalissimo stares into the future, envisioning "Free China" returning to the mainland. But before his triumphant return, the KMT must defend Quemoy, depicted here as a Normandy-style beach/war zone. While a soldier stands watch, the Red Sun of China dawns across the bay, a shapeless yet enormous threat. In this depiction, the Quemoy crisis of 1954–1955 amounts to a showdown between expansionist Communism and America's dream of Chiang serving as a bulwark of democracy in Asia. The image is a perfect example of what Christina Klein has called "Cold War orientalism," as Chiang is portrayed as both exotically Other yet also heroically familiar, as both foreign and also as a long-time U.S. ally meriting respect and perhaps even the loss of American lives in the shared project of defending the island.[93]

It is important to note that in July 1952, two of the top American military men in Asia, Admiral William M. Fechteler and General Chase, dined in Taipei with the Generalissimo and the United States' chargé, Howard Jones. At that dinner, the Generalissimo again pressed his case for the United States to provide the support needed "to invade the Chinese mainland." In Jones's memo to the State Department, he observed that General Chase considered the plans "totally impracticable."[94] Confirming doubts that had circulated from as early as 1949, by the summer of 1952 many of the key U.S. military brass believed the KMT's dream of retaking the mainland was bunk and would likely result in the United States getting sucked back into the Chinese Civil War and possibly World War III.[95] Still, the very next day, Admiral Felix B. Stump, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, wrote a memo to Admiral Fechteler arguing that holding Quemoy was "essential for NGRC [National Government Republic of China] morale, psychological warfare purposes, NGRC pre-invasion mainland operations, commando raiding, [and] intelligence gathering." Following the escalatory logic that thrilled the KMT but terrified Washington, Stump wrote that he "consider[ed] it essential that I be authorized to permit ChiNats [the KMT] to attack ChiCom [CPC] concentrations on the mainland."[96] In Stump's view, defending Quemoy would slide almost seamlessly into the United States bombing Amoy (Xiamen)—World War III was just a heartbeat away. And so, while the *Time* magazine cover was all glossy heroism and honor in the grand fight of Democracy against Communism, the documents quoted herein indicate that the U.S. military and political elite were riven—was Quemoy a key resource or a distraction? Was the threat of World War III worth holding on to the

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FIGURE 7. Chiang looking heroic on the cover of *Time* magazine, April 18, 1955; © held by and image used with the permission of the magazine and PARS International. TIME and TIME USA LLC are not affiliated with, and do not endorse the products or services of, Stephen Hartnett.

tiny island? And did anybody actually think Chiang could pull off anything other than another epic loss to Mao?

While these two images portray some of the incommensurable values driving the Long Cold War in Asia, it is important to observe how their worldviews were shaped by the agony of sovereignty, for in 1954 and 1955 all of the key parties were enmeshed in relationships that blurred traditional senses of national sovereignty. As a wave of recent critical literature suggests, sovereignty involves both the material control of borders and all that that implies (armed guards, passports, visas, checkpoints, reams of data, currency systems, etc.) and also a strong sense of rhetorical agency, of being the author of an ostensibly stable version of a nation-state that is politically legitimate, historically deep, and capable of endowing individuals with rights, obligations, and protections.[97] Yet the Long Cold War's labyrinthine alliances, rivalries, and proxy relationships left the major players feeling not so much empowered as sovereign entities as hemmed in by suffocating and maddening

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relationships. In this paradoxical formation, the more power and responsibility a nation accrued, the more it suffered the agony of sovereignty.

This moment of clarity from U.S. General Vandenberg, shared at a meeting between the JCS and the State Department on March 27, 1953, illustrates the point:

> As I understand it, we are getting ready . . . to protect Formosa. If the Chinese Communists should mount an air attack on Formosa, we would counter it. This would undoubtedly involve attacks on the mainland. Given the Sino-Russian agreement, there would be every possibility that Russia would assist the Chinese. In that case, we would really be getting into a war with the U.S.S.R. and China. . . . I think everybody should be clear as to what the possible implications are. . . . We have to realize that Chiang Kai-shek is a strong-headed sort of person. . . . I think we should fully understand the kind of flypaper that we are stuck on.[98]

In this remarkable passage, Vandenberg fears the United States getting dragged into war by the "strong-headed" Chiang, an ally no one trusts, who wants to pursue his dream of reconquering the Chinese mainland by launching a war no one wants to fight.[99] At the same time, Vandenberg shares the then-prevalent belief that the USSR was backing China, and was doing so at the risk of fighting a major war against the United States—yet we now know that the Russians had no such desire and, in fact, felt that Mao was every bit as strong-headed and dangerous to their interests as Chiang was to the Americans' plans.[100] This agonizing "flypaper" amounts, then, to a trap made of misunderstanding and apprehension. All four parties—the United States, Taiwan, the Chinese, and the Soviets—were left circling around questions of sovereignty: Who owns Quemoy? To what nation-state is it beholden? To what superpower is the local nation-state allied? How far would anyone go in seeking to enforce their or their proxies' contested claim of sovereignty? And how would these local questions of sovereignty impact regional and even global trajectories of power?

The agony of sovereignty meant that at this stage of the Long Cold War, even the major powers felt hemmed in by bad choices and dubious allies—they were stuck in Vandenberg's geopolitical "flypaper." As Ambassador Rankin confessed, "We are faced by alternatives all of which are less than perfect. To put it in the worst terms, it is a question of finding the least bad solution."[101] The agony of sovereignty within the incommensurable Long Cold War meant, as Brands has argued, that "national security no longer existed"; instead, the best Eisenhower and his team could hope for was "minimizing national insecurity."[102]

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The Formosa Resolution and Eisenhower's Nuclear Bullets

As a means of diminishing the United States' "national insecurity," Secretary of State Dulles sought to encircle Mao. And so his "Pacific Charter," formalized with the founding of SEATO in September 1954, committed the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines to the shared cause of anti-Communism in Asia.[103] With bilateral treaties already in place with South Korea and Japan, Dulles was surrounding the PRC with hostile forces. The Generalissimo knew he needed to find a way to nestle Taiwan within such protective alliances, and so his envoys in Washington pressed for a mutual defense treaty. Throughout 1954, the *FRUS* records meeting after meeting between Chiang's and Eisenhower's representatives. Space prohibits a detailed analysis of these negotiations, yet a key sticking point hinged on differences between the American and Taiwanese negotiators about "fuzzing" and what it meant for U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan was first signed by the key players in Washington on December 2, 1954.[104] Hoping to avoid the fate of Truman, whose actions in Korea were never sanctioned by a congressional vote, Eisenhower then sent his "Formosa Resolution" to the U.S. Congress in January 1955. While the treaty spoke to the obligations of the United States and ROC in facing their shared enemy, the resolution authorized the American president to use force to honor the provisions of the treaty.[105] In this way, as Dulles put it, the treaty and the resolution were "two complementary acts."[106] Approved with overwhelming majorities in the House (410 to 3) and Senate (83 to 3), the resolution is a prime example of fuzzing in action. It authorizes the president "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protecting of such related positions and territories of that area . . . as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."[107] This is a carte blanche for Eisenhower to declare war where and when he chooses; virtually any CPC incursion anywhere in the region could be used to justify a preapproved war. As Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) worried, the resolution read like "an advance declaration of war."[108]

No wonder, then, that Chou Enlai decried the document as "illegal and void," for it declared an end to the Chinese Civil War, with Taiwan now an independent nation allied with the United States. As Chou thundered, this was yet another act of "naked

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aggression."[109] In that same vein, a CPC "Joint Declaration" described the treaty as a prelude to the United States "launching an offensive against our mainland" and "provoking world war."[110] Reenergizing China's traumatized nationalism, Eisenhower's actions announced his turning toward a "two China" solution, and hence toward Mao's worst nightmare. The president's fuzzing, undertaken in the name of deterrence, had yet again felt to others—both Chinese and American—more like aggression. In this peculiar Long Cold War pattern, the search for more security via enhanced military alliances produced more insecurity in others, hence fueling the period's escalatory dynamic.

At the same time, if the fuzzing within the resolution meant Eisenhower now had a blank check for launching war against Mao, it also gave the White House great latitude in where, when, and how to respond to the Communists—including the possibility that it might *not* respond. Indeed, given that Quemoy and Matsu and the Tachens were in the news, then why, the Generalissimo's men wanted to know, were those islands not listed explicitly within the resolution's envisioned ring of protection? And what about the dozens of other offshore islands in dispute? And what if the CPC invading one island was thought not to be a precursor to invading Taiwan—did that count in terms of triggering a U.S. response as indicated in the treaty?[111] The fact that Chiang's team kept asking questions about the specifics left unanswered within the fuzzy rhetoric indicates their lack of trust in the Eisenhower White House; even while receiving the blessing of the MDT and resolution, the KMT worried about a future betrayal, for fear of the rhetoric of marginal significance drove their thinking.

On the one hand, Chiang was elated, for he finally had his Mutual Defense Treaty; by signing such a document with the world's most powerful nation, he appeared to be receiving recognition as the leader of a free and independent nation. Surely the treaty and the resolution marked the death of any lingering "one China" pretensions on the part of Mao and hailed the dawn of a new age of Taiwan's place at the table of nations—marginal significance was over! On the other hand, the fuzzy details of the resolution seemed to raise as many questions as they answered, especially when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a statement announcing that "nothing in the treaty shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or sovereignty of the territories to which it applies."[112] If the United States was not yet conferring sovereignty upon Taipei, the CPC assumed that it was; Thomas E. Stolper has shown that Mao received the news of the treaty and the resolution as nothing less than warnings of an imminent attack on the

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mainland.[113] Zhang Baijia has used newly available Chinese sources to argue that Mao's shelling Quemoy was in part a response to intelligence reports about the U.S.-Taiwan negotiations over the MDT—meaning the treaty was not a response to Chinese threats but one of the causes of them.[114]

Some Americans were concerned about the imprecise language in the treaty, the resolution, and the public deliberation about them. In a memo from that December, Henry Owen from the Office of Intelligence Research warned his superiors that the treaty's ambiguous language amounted to a "deliberately mystifying policy" that would neither deter Mao nor defend the United States' reputation if events turned south.[115] Indeed, the resolution's ambiguities confirmed James Reston's critique from the previous April, when he charged that President Eisenhower's "maybe-he-will-and-maybe-he-won't" policy of "calculated imprecision" amounted to little more than "waiting and doing nothing."[116]

Reston's charge was based on the White House's public statements, yet what the reporter could not have known was that even as Dulles and Eisenhower "fuzzed up" their public pronouncements, they sought to turn down the heat in the region by forcing Chiang, as a condition to continued U.S. support, to cease his attacks on the mainland.[117] It stands as one of the period's delicious comeuppances to note that whereas President Eisenhower stormed into Washington in 1953 blustering about "unleashing" Chiang and rolling back Communism, by 1955 he was desperately searching—as had Truman before him—for ways to put the KMT back on the leash. The sticking point for the Taiwanese side was that forgoing attacks on the mainland "would imply an acceptance of the right of the Peiping regime to remain in possession of Mainland China."[118] Eisenhower's and Dulles's secret prerequisite amounted to the United States recognizing not one indivisible China but two divided Chinas, with Mao holding the mainland and Chiang holding Formosa, inching their way toward a divided China, not unlike the then-divided East and West Germany, or North and South Korea.[119] Eisenhower and Dulles were so committed to this strategy of de-escalation that they deployed U.S. ships to help evacuate KMT personnel from Yikiang Shan and other peripheral islands in the Tachens chain (far to the north of Quemoy) where, in late January and early February 1955, the CPC quietly assumed control.[120]

While Dulles and Eisenhower thought the combination of founding SEATO, launching the MDT, and ratifying the resolution would create an unambiguous ring of anti-Communist deterrence around China, thus protecting Taiwan and leading to regional peace, Chiang was livid. Viewed from Taipei, the ambiguous language of

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the MDT and then the secret strong-arming denying him offensive action against the mainland amounted to undeniable evidence of Washington treating the ROC like a supplicant, not an equal. On October 13, 1954, the Generalissimo and his team met in Taipei with Ambassador Rankin and his team. In that tense meeting, the Generalissimo spun out a nightmare scenario in which agreeing to not attack the mainland would lead to the eventual "liquidation" of his government and the "Communist takeover of Formosa."[121] Despite these misgivings, Chiang relented to a modified version of the White House's request that he cease attacking the mainland (although he did not honor that commitment),[122] meaning that even as the Eisenhower administration tried to use the Formosa Resolution to wrench the Quemoy crisis closer to settlement, it simultaneously left Taipei smarting from what was perceived as Washington's deployment of the rhetoric of marginal significance. Indeed, Accinelli has concluded that during this crucial phase of U.S.-Taiwan relations, the KMT leadership began to harbor "an undercurrent of mistrust, even outright anti-Americanism."[123]

Throughout it all, the CPC remained stunned that the Americans could not grasp the simple fact that the KMT holding islands within shouting distance of Amoy made no sense. Hence the classic line from *People's Daily*, in the spring of 1955: "If some power occupied America's Long Island and supported a hostile group there for war activities against the United States, the United States would never tolerate it."[124] The fact that the Americans were forcing the Chinese to accept a situation that no one in Washington would ever tolerate if the tables were reversed served as further evidence that the United States was pursuing imperialistic and hypocritical goals, thus triggering the CPC's sense of traumatized nationalism.

While the CPC in Peking and the KMT in Taiwan were both frustrated, this process also left the White House feeling bedraggled. Getting hammered in the press, with Chiang pouting and recalcitrant, with Chinese shells still falling on Quemoy, with MacArthur-like elements of the JCS calling for all-out war, and with frustration rising all around, the president—and especially Secretary Dulles—grew tired of the non-war surrounding Quemoy.[125] And so, in a meeting with congressional leaders toward the end of January 1955, Dulles confessed, with Admiral William Radford at his side, that "Up to the present time, we have been covering the situation by hoping the communists would be deterred by uncertainty," but this was not working, and "our position has deteriorated," so "this step must be taken."[126] "This step," it turns out, was the decision to begin threatening atomic war.

The rhetorical change of course began in public on March 4, when Dulles,

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speaking from the ritualistic re-signing of the MDT in Taipei, announced what the *New York Times* called "an all-out defense of these islands." The secretary warned, "It cannot be assumed that the defense would be static and confined to Taiwan itself or that the aggressor would enjoy immunity with respect to the areas from which he stages his offensive."[127] In short, U.S. forces would employ all means at their disposal to defend Taiwan, including taking the fight to the Chinese mainland. When Dulles returned to Washington, he pressed this line of argument at a meeting of the NSC on March 10, calling "for urgent steps to create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons." Fearing that Eisenhower's "New Look" military posture would be discredited if the United States appeared hesitant to use its major weapons, the secretary urged his colleagues "to face up to the question whether its military program was or was not in fact designed to permit the use of atomic weapons." Dulles concluded that "it was of vital importance" that Eisenhower's team "urgently educate our own and world opinion as to the necessity for the tactical use of atomic weapons." Ever the war hawk, Admiral Radford responded, "our whole military structure had been built around this assumption."[128]

President Eisenhower's response during this meeting is not recorded, either in the *FRUS* or the documents I have studied at the Eisenhower Presidential Library, yet Dulles and Radford apparently carried the day, for later that week the secretary declared that the United States possessed "new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers."[129] The campaign to "educate our own and world opinion" had begun. Later that week, Dulles described these new "precision" weapons as part of a "less-than massive retaliation" strategy based on the United States' readiness to deploy "small nuclear weapons."[130] The clincher came the next day, March 16, when Eisenhower was asked at a press conference about Dulles's statements. Pivoting away from the sense of atomic bombs as last-ditch weapons of mass destruction, the president mused, "I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else" (see figure 8).[131] Locking-in the season's rhetorical logic, Vice President Nixon chimed in the next day, arguing that it would be "insanity and madness" for the CPC to continue acting in a manner that might provoke the United States to unleash "the consequences we have made clear will follow." Under this new version of limited nuclear war, Nixon alleged, "tactical atomic weapons are now conventional."[132]

In this education campaign, a Communist attack on Quemoy or Formosa would not lead to the United States retaliating by launching World War III, but to precision

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President Says Atom Bomb Would Be Used Like 'Bullet'

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 16—President Eisenhower disclosed today that atomic weapons would be used with "bullet" precision against military targets in the event of war. In any combat, "where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else," he asserted.

FIGURE 8. Eisenhower's atomic threat from the *New York Times*, March 16, 1955; © held by and image used with the permission of the paper and PARS International.

strikes with small, now "conventional" atomic warheads, with the genocidal big ones waiting in the wings for worst-case scenarios. Bryan C. Taylor has noted how through the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Americans learned to live with "the excruciating tension fostered by presidential rhetoric depicting nuclear weapons as *both* an apocalyptic threat *and* a political necessity."[133] That characterization is apt, particularly regarding the Americans' perspectives vis-à-vis possible war with the Soviets, yet here we see Dulles, Eisenhower, and Nixon moving the discourse away from atomic-weapons-as-apocalypse by normalizing WMD as "conventional" tools, not means to mutually assured destruction.[134] It apparently did not occur to the White House that threatening to deploy such weapons, even as an allegedly "conventional" form of limited war-making, amounted to an extreme act of rhetorical escalation. As Halberstam notes, "our allies were terrified"; Ira Chernus observes that such threats-as-deterrence only created more threats, making the president's posture "a very unstable recipe for enhancing stability."[135] If fuzzing left allies and enemies stewing in confusion, the White House's atomic saber-rattling sowed panic—Eisenhower's team had lurched from saying too little to saying too much.

The State Department was so alarmed by this turn that it ran a study showing how the so-called "precision" bombs—they were in fact 15 kiloton monsters—would, if launched as artillery shells from Quemoy into the Chinese mainland, produce a civilian death toll that "would exceed ten million."[136] Years later, writing his memoirs, Eisenhower noted that using such bombs would have produced "a worldwide feeling of revulsion against the United States," a consequence he thought

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"might be lessened" by using the bombs "solely against military installations, minimizing fallout and civilian casualties."[137] That unfortunate phrasing appears to suggest that Eisenhower's concern was not ethical or humanitarian but political, as if he feared not mass destruction but loss of international prestige.

Despite that troubling passage, his threat of March 16, and his comments in various NSC meetings, many scholars have found it comforting to imagine President Eisenhower making his atomic-bullets threat as simply one more act of strategic ambiguity, yet another sly-as-a-fox act of rhetorical misdirection by a common-sense soldier who would have never dared do something as insane as rain nukes down on China. Ambrose argues that Eisenhower "had managed to so confuse the ChiComs as to whether or not the United States would use atomic bombs against them . . . that they decided not to attack."[138] Thomas has characterized Eisenhower's nuclear rhetoric as a "sleight of hand" and as further evidence of his "deft maneuvering."[139] We may never know the truth of what Eisenhower would have done if push came to shove, yet H. W. Brands has uncovered archival documents showing that on February 1, 1955, the JCS ordered the Strategic Air Command "to begin, on an 'urgent basis,' target selection for an 'enlarged atomic offensive' against the PRC."[140] Based on his research into nuclear-war planning, Gordon H. Chang has concluded that "Eisenhower was fully prepared to use nuclear weapons." In fact, beginning in March, nuclear-capable B-36 bombers based in Guam were given strike coordinates within China; in April, eighteen such aircraft conducted flyovers of mainland China, amounting to test runs for Armageddon.[141] His prior comments to Winston Churchill may have been bluster, but it bears noting that Eisenhower had promised in 1953 "to use every weapon in the bag" if the Chinese violated the tenuous peace in Korea. Churchill was stunned, but the president continued, "We have come to the conclusion that the atom bomb has to be treated just as another weapon in the arsenal."[142]

While Eisenhower spoke both in private and public about using atomic weapons, America erupted in a wave of antiwar protest. An elegant counterargument was penned by Arthur Dean in *Foreign Affairs*:

> Our own Christian ideals as well as the opinion of our friends, which in many respects constitutes our strongest continuing weapon in the Cold War, rebel at the thought that we might precipitate an atomic battle and the indiscriminate slaughter of human beings. We are not in a position to exercise our atomic strength without risking destroying civilization as we now know it.[143]

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Dean was not alone in leaning on moral principles and political realism to argue against using atomic weapons. In fact, the cumulative effect of Dulles's, Nixon's, and Eisenhower's atomic discourse triggered an avalanche of public concern that left the White House inundated with letters, postcards, and telegrams. Flora Lawrence wrote from Buffalo, "This is the atomic age and any war will doubtless cost us our survival." The Save our Sons Committee sent a memo from Argo, Illinois, warning that "Mankind stands in great peril of destruction through atomic war."[144] Clara Lee wrote from Arvada, Colorado, urging the president to continue showing "patience and restraint." Like almost every one of the hundreds of messages sent to the president, this one was both antiwar and pro-Eisenhower, as Lee concluded with a note of support and affection: "You *will* find a peaceful way out." The Social Action Mending Group from Lyme, New Hampshire, and Thetford, Vermont—nineteen women who gathered to talk politics while "we darn socks and patch blue jeans"—wrote to remind the president that his recent "pinpoint atomic weapons" talk "seems to give an enemy at least partial justification for beginning total atomic warfare."[145] Dr. and Mrs. Jack Everett, of Chicago, sent a telegram announcing that "Anything precipitating all-out war in [the] atomic age [is] unthinkable." Helen Beardsley wired from Los Angeles, "To risk war seems madness." Dr. and Mrs. Alfred Stein, from Chicago, wrote to "respectfully urge you to exert your influence so that our great country will not be plunged into a war of annihilation."[146]

Reflecting the public outcry, at the first press conference following the "atomic bullets" statement of March 16, Joseph Harsch from the *Christian Science Monitor* asked the president to clarify his thinking on the use of atomic weapons. After spinning his wheels for eight sentences, the president relocated his moral center: "Suppose you won a war by the indiscriminate use of atomic weapons, what would you have left? . . . I repeat, the concept of atomic war is too horrible for man to endure and to practice, and he must find some way out of it."[147] It would be a great tribute to democracy to conclude that the president, talked into his atomic-bullets comment by Dulles, Radford, Nixon, and other war hawks, reversed course because the American people reminded him that atomic war was unthinkable.[148]

While the good people of America were aghast at the prospect of Eisenhower launching atomic bombs, Mao assumed they were coming. From his perspective, the combination of U.S. treaties with South Korea and Japan, the founding of SEATO, the signing of the MDT, the passage of the resolution, and the dual punch of multiple threats backed up by atomic-capable bombers roaming over his country sent an unmistakable signal: The United States was coming, Chiang was coming,

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nuclear war was coming. To which, as was his habit, Mao scoffed: "the Chinese people are not to be cowed by U.S. atomic blackmail." The Americans could "make a hole right through the earth," he sneered, yet their bombs would not defeat a nation as immense and populous as China.[149] The dean of American Sinologists, Harvard's John King Fairbank, later commented upon Mao's "professedly casual, couldn't-care-less attitude toward nuclear warfare," but Mao clearly enjoyed standing tall against American threats.[150] Happy to reap the propaganda bonanza offered by White House bluster, *People's Daily* roared, "Eisenhower Advocates the Use of Atomic Weapons."[151] Here is another instance where Mao and his media spokespeople dropped the traumatized nationalism for a sly, mocking rhetoric of disdain, not so much portraying China as a victim of imperialism as portraying America as insane with power.

China's leader also used Eisenhower's infelicitous rhetoric to prod the Soviets, who, exactly as Mao had hoped, responded to the crisis by supplying China with a cyclotron and a nuclear reactor, "the two key items needed to make a Bomb."[152] Dulles and Eisenhower thought their barrage of threats about using atomic bombs would deter Mao from attacking Quemoy, yet it only succeeded in accelerating China's acquisition of Soviet-supplied weapons of mass destruction. The Americans' attempts at atomic deterrence fueled Mao's manipulation of the Soviets into escalating the race toward a nuclear holocaust, all over a chain of minor islands Mao never meant to attack in the first place.

Hence, by the spring of 1955, Mao calculated that he had pushed the crisis far enough. Having secured new promises from the Soviets, and having sutured Chiang and the KMT to Quemoy, thus preserving the delusion of "one China" a little longer (more on this later), all while prodding the Eisenhower White House to make alarming statements that alienated allies and enemies alike, Mao had Premier Chou Enlai offer a public olive branch. Attending the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, Chou announced on April 23 that "The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government to discuss the question of relaxing tensions in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."[153] The next day, Chou repeated his message in an address that "caused a sensation" among the conferees.[154] In response, the Americans and Chinese began meetings in Geneva that August, starting down the road toward recognizing Mao and the CPC as the legitimate authority on the mainland.[155]

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Conclusion: The Inverted Speech Situation and Hoping for the Least Bad Solution

From the vantage point of 2020, the Quemoy crisis appears inscrutable, an almost-war fought over a tiny island that held little military significance and no natural resources. Still, as we have seen herein, the CPC, KMT, and U.S. brass all viewed the island as a significant symbol, either as an indicator of American resolve, or as evidence of Communist aggression, or as another call for KMT heroism, or as a sign of the death throes of imperialism, and so on. But the material stakes involved did not seem to merit the risks involved, including perhaps triggering World War III and even a nuclear holocaust. So why were tensions so high over this symbolic rock?

To try to answer that question, I want to flash forward to the footnote of a memo Henry Kissinger sent to President Richard Nixon in 1971:

> In a January 21 memorandum to Johnson [U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs], Green [Marshall Green, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs] noted that the paper "deliberately excluded any mention of Quemoy and Matsu, the offshore island complexes in the Taiwan Strait held by the ROC. We decided not to address the issue of the Offshore Islands because we feel that the status quo there is both tolerable and likely to continue." He concluded, "there is a strong chance that some successor government in Taipei may choose to use the Offshores as bargaining counters in talks with Peking—or even unilaterally withdraw from the islands. A more representative government on Taiwan would not need symbols of any continued pretension to be the rightful ruler of all of China; seeing the islands as an expensive and dangerous military and political luxury, it could easily decide to disengage. This day has not yet, however, arrived. Therefore, we feel the best policy for the US is not to open this issue of the Offshores in any way, and are operating on this basis."[156]

From Green's perspective, Chiang wanted to hold on to Quemoy because it indicated his pretension of returning to the mainland. But if Chiang would give up that fantasy, Green observes, then he would not need to maintain a costly garrison on an island in plain sight of Amoy/Xiamen, and instead could use the island as a bargaining counter, perhaps as an offering of goodwill toward the CPC in exchange for China making a larger deal about Taiwan's independence.[157] From this perspective, Quemoy was more than just a symbol: It was an embodied form of currency, the potential down payment on some future peace treaty. As is typical of almost all

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U.S. discourse around this topic, the sticking point was Chiang's "pretension," his return-to-the-mainland delusion. Yet it must be acknowledged that successive U.S. administrations indulged this pretension because Chiang's vision of the islands as an *offensive springboard* for assaulting the mainland dovetailed with the Americans' vision of the islands as a *defensive shield* against Communist encroachment.[158] Chiang's offensive delusions fed nicely into Washington's defensive nightmares, creating a perfect storm of bad policy and escalatory rhetoric.

For Mao and the CPC, the Quemoy crisis served a different purpose. The PRC had no intention of starting World War III; as Accinelli has concluded, "evidence was lacking at this time that the Chinese were even massing their forces for an assault on Quemoy or Matsu, let alone preparing to invade Taiwan."[159] Thinking counterintuitively, then, Mao used the shelling of Quemoy not to expel Chiang from the offshore island but to compel him to stay on it.[160] If Chiang and the KMT were to accept the kind of logic Green and other U.S. diplomats outlined later, and that the Formosa Resolution implied at the time, then leaving Quemoy would have been the first step in abandoning the myth of returning to the mainland.[161] But Mao wanted a "one China" solution, with Taiwan "liberated" back into the loving arms of the mainland, meaning he needed to maintain the impression of impending war with Chiang to continue fueling CPC propaganda. Mao could not let Chiang leave the island, nor could he allow the Generalissimo to claim sovereignty over it, so the Great Helmsman engaged in shelling to ratchet up the international pressure, risk no troops, steer clear of war with the United States, and guarantee Chiang's refusal to leave. This explains why, in November 1954, the CPC's New China News Agency alleged that the United States was trying to "hoodwink world opinion by arranging for the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group to 'quit' the coastal islands," a course of action Mao clearly opposed.[162] Mao reiterated this strategy when he confessed to Khrushchev, "We don't want Chiang to be too far away from us. We want to keep him within our reach."[163] The shelling of Quemoy was therefore a symbolic suturing of Chiang and his delusion of returning to the mainland to Mao and his delusion of "liberating" Taiwan. The theatrical nature of the crisis finally dawned on Eisenhower in 1958 when the president sardonically noted that Mao's maneuvers toward Quemoy were so operatic and obviously not military that "I wondered if we were in a Gilbert and Sullivan war."[164]

The 1954–1955 Quemoy crisis therefore stands as an example of what Marc Howard Rich and Robert T. Craig have called "the inverted speech situation." Feeding off Jürgen Habermas's writings, they propose that the Cold War produced "paradoxical communication" scenarios wherein rational discourse between consenting

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actors seeking “mutual understanding” (Habermas’s ideal) was impossible, with nuclear-armed enemies instead engaging in “strategic, indirect, and contradictory exchanges” that amounted not so much to clear and edifying communication as to cryptically overlapping threats.[165] In this case, the 1954–1955 crisis left the Americans initially fuzzing and then directly threatening, for their chief concern was showing Mao and the world that the line was drawn at Quemoy. At the same time, Eisenhower hoped to draw that line without engaging in war, hence his retrospective evaluation that “the hard way is to have the courage to be patient.”[166] For Chiang, the chief concern was entangling the United States in his never-ending civil war with Mao, thus prolonging the fantasy of the KMT returning to the motherland. For Mao, the non-war compelled Chiang and the United States to forego the obvious move of turning the islands over to Mao in exchange for a negotiated settlement of the one/two China dilemma, all while enticing the Soviets into jump-starting China’s nuclear-weapons program. Thus, in this paradoxical way, in this painfully inverted speech situation, all parties could look back upon the Quemoy crisis with satisfaction. As Eisenhower later wrote, he had “threaded” U.S. policy “through narrow and dangerous waters between appeasement and global war.”[167]

The fact that anything approaching regional peace, mutual understanding, nuclear disarmament, or the cessation of hostilities between China and Taiwan *were never even discussed* indicates how the Long Cold War left all parties stymied by fear and grateful for simply living to fight another day. Within this peculiar rhetorical (il)logic, peace comes to look like endless war. As Chernus argues in *Apocalypse Management*, “World War III would continue indefinitely precisely so that, and because, one would never have to fight it. The nation would continue to be at peace precisely because—and only so long as—it was still successfully at war.”[168] And so, within the incommensurable Long Cold War in Asia, where each nation was beset with what I have called the agony of sovereign confusion, the “fuzzed-up” strategies of delay, hanging on, stalling for time, and waiting for better circumstances were considered best options, meaning neither Mao nor Chiang nor Khrushchev nor Eisenhower were willing to engage in anything like genuine dialogue about resolving the underlying issues driving the crisis of 1954–1955. In this inverted communicative morass, the best anyone could hope for was “the least bad solution.” Still, achieving the least bad solution was no small feat, for as Eisenhower confided in a letter from 1955, “Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.”[169]

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CHAPTER THREE

I Will Never Sell You Down the River, 1971–1972

We saw in chapter 2 how the 1954–1955 crisis over the islands contested by China, the United States, and Taiwan ended with Premier Chou Enlai announcing that "the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America."[1] Not wanting to have a war is not the same thing as desiring peace, however, and so the U.S.-China-Taiwan conundrum limped along through the remainder of the Eisenhower administration and on through the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. While those Democrats—haunted by the attacks launched against Truman—lived in fear of being charged as soft on Communism, Richard Nixon had long envisioned a rapprochement with China, ideally as part of a larger strategic gambit to hem in the Russians by peeling away their Chinese allies. Indeed, even while he built his political brand on virulent anti-Communism, Nixon had long pondered the possibility of modifying his hatred of the "Reds" in order to pursue what, in 1971, he would call "a journey for peace."[2]

Nonetheless, ever since 1945, any talk of peace between the United States and China had foundered on the question of Taiwan's status: Was it a U.S. protectorate? An independent nation-state? An "unsinkable aircraft carrier" harboring democratic forces preparing to re-invade Communist China? An inherent province of China?

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In the early 1970s, U.S. conservatives knew any whiff of peace with China would involve giving up U.S. support for Taiwan, which explains why President Nixon, as early as March 1971, campaigned to soften up Republican opposition to his openings toward Mao. "Under no circumstances will we proceed with a policy of normalizing relations with Communist China," the president pledged, "if the cost of that policy is to expel Taiwan from the family of nations."[3] But expelled it would soon be, in a heartbreaking manner that still shadows U.S. foreign policy in Asia. And so, looking back to 1972 from the vantage point of 2020, I dig into both the public and previously secret records to map the rhetorical dynamics of Nixon's famous trip to China, the resulting Shanghai Communiqué, and the tensions between the United States, China, and Taiwan. As we shall see, if Eisenhower's rhetoric vacillated from confused and cautious to temporarily reckless and then back toward prudence, all while wrapped in Ike's sense of strong patience, Nixon sought to play a bolder game, albeit one based on the rhetoric of geostrategic deception.

Nixon's strategy rotated from his serving as the keeper of deep secrets to his acting as the revealer of secrets via televisual spectacles. This rhetorical configuration depletes our democratic resources, so let me detour here through a prefatory moment of theory, to which I will turn in more detail in the closing pages of this chapter. In his classic essay "Secrecy and Disclosure as Rhetorical Forms," Edwin Black notes that Western rhetoric has long harbored an "oppositional tension" between those who translate secrets for the public good and those who disclose them for political advantage. In Black's telling, historical "translators"—including doctors, scientists, and some religious leaders—derive much of their authority from serving as explanatory go-betweens whose training provides "privileged access to arcane truths," which they translate for the benefit of their audiences. "Secret exposers," on the other hand—Black cites Senator Joe McCarthy as a textbook example—derive their authority from revealing scandals for paranoid consumers, confirming their worst hunches about "the debauchery of the respectable" and the "perfidy of the reliable." Translators strive to boost public confidence by spreading interpretations of empowering texts, while exposers seek to undermine public confidence by spreading rumors and conspiracies.[4] Black envisions these character types in opposition, yet Nixon's handling of China offers a third type: the politician who handles his business in secret, hence circumventing democratic checks and balances, who then announces his deal-making prowess in televisual spectacles that "shock and awe" the public. By conveying what was once secret into public life, albeit now as a fait accompli, such figures reveal agreements that transcend

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the usual debate and compromise of democratic politics. In this way, Nixon sought to manage U.S.-China-Taiwan relations without dithering with Congress, the public, or the United States' foreign-policy establishment. By authoring this secrecy/spectacle dialectic, he made tremendous short-term progress in U.S.-China relations, albeit by engaging in a pattern of deception that left a trail of long-term damage. Truman changed his mind as circumstances evolved; Eisenhower waffled according to his advisors' competing advice; but Nixon engaged in deception, and he did so strategically.

In pursuing this thesis, I enter into a rich subgenre of rhetorical criticism addressing Nixon's communication patterns and political legacies. The 1960 campaign pitting John F. Kennedy against Nixon has produced a slew of books and articles.[5] Robert P. Newman has addressed Nixon's rhetoric about ending the Vietnam War, whereas Roderick P. Hart has tracked the oscillations in Nixon's political rhetoric between its situational adaptability and its latent absolutism.[6] Forbes Hill and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell used Nixon's public speech as grounds for a debate about the roles of ethics and political judgment.[7] Edwin Black and Michael J. Steudeman have written about Nixon's sense of "political time," with Black seeing it as an exercise in "amnesia" and Steudeman as a form of irony.[8] Of the communication work that is germane to the questions raised in this chapter, Denise M. Bostdorff has written about the evolution of Nixon's rhetoric about China prior to his trip to Peking in 1972, Michelle Murray Yang has analyzed Nixon's toasts from his "journey for peace," and Zoë Hess Carney and Allison M. Prasch have addressed Nixon's spatial metaphors.[9] These communication-specific contributions sit alongside a vast secondary literature on Nixon.[10] I supplement these studies by drawing upon the *FRUS*, wherein the U.S. State Department is publishing thousands of pages of previously secret materials revealing the inner workings of multiple U.S. administrations—the crucial Nixon-era documents were only released in 2006. Diving into this resource enables me to juxtapose the Nixon White House's public pronouncements and its secret pledges and to pinpoint the crucial deceptions, outright lies, and interpersonal betrayals that poisoned U.S.-China-Taiwan relations by authoring a toxic version of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception.

It is impossible to make sense of Nixon's rhetorical work without addressing his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, who was so highly respected during the early 1970s that he was featured on the cover of *Time* as a foreign-policy magician and on the cover of *Newsweek* as Superman.[11] Kissinger appears from

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some historical distance, however, less as a vaudeville showman or superhero than as a Shakespearian tragic hero cursed with strategic brilliance, crippling hubris, and a theatrical sense of decorum. More troubling, he fell into the habit of gutting the president behind his back while, according to Greg Grandin, "shoring up Washington's position with sundry dictators and giving the green light to invasions, coups, and assassinations."[12] Such contradictions feature prominently in dozens of biographies, celebrations, and takedowns.[13] In communication, we find a surprisingly slim list of contributions and only one stand-out article: Robert Hariman's 1996 chapter situating Kissinger within the history of "realism."[14] Perhaps because of his outsized personality, or his half-century-long hold on U.S. foreign policy, or because of his own authorial efforts to try to determine how observers appraise his tenure in power, the critical literature is surprisingly short on detailed analysis of the intense negotiations Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou Enlai held in 1971, in the meetings that laid the groundwork for both Nixon's 1972 "journey for peace" and the resulting Shanghai Communiqué.

Addressing those negotiations enables me to show how Kissinger's sweeping sense of history and his stunning rhetorical flexibility enabled him to slide a knife into Chou's back and, hence, into the foundation of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication. Indeed, throughout this crucial period in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, the Nixon/Kissinger strategy of rotating from secrecy to spectacle, of filling their political negotiations with deception, and of routinely misleading the public—what Richard Madsen has called a combination of "Disneyland with realpolitik"[15]—produced a toxic version of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception, hence souring U.S.-China-Taiwan communication.

The Anti-Communist Hatchet Man Approaches China

Richard Nixon campaigned in 1968 as a law-and-order strongman and a lifelong anti-Communist "cold warrior."[16] As Norman Mailer seethed, "there had never been anyone in American life so resolutely phony" as Nixon, "nor anyone so transcendentally successful by such means." Nixon's phoniness—recall his moniker, "Tricky Dick"—was rooted in part on his trying to channel what Mailer called "the militaristic muscle-bending witch-hunting foam-rubber virilities" of America's radical right into the more presidential language of sophistication and nuance, a rhetorical alchemy that often left candidate and then President Nixon tied up

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in knots.[17] Ever since his first term in Congress in 1947 and up through his eight years as Eisenhower's vice president, Nixon had served in the role described by Denise M. Bostdorff as "the Republican hatchet man on China."[18] This status included a career-long defense of Taiwan; as Nixon declared in 1950, "if Formosa falls, the next frontier is the coast of California."[19] In the years preceding Donald Trump, however, it was assumed that the occupant of the White House possessed more than just "hatchet man" credentials—acting presidential mattered. And so, following his election in 1968, President Nixon walked a rhetorical tightrope, balancing his critique of Communism against his reappraising the conditions of the Long Cold War.

Nixon's shifting thinking reflected the age; as Stephen E. Ambrose argues, "the structure of world politics in 1971 led toward détente."[20] In the late 1960s, with the United States, China, and the USSR either covertly driving or openly engaging in proxy wars all around the globe,[21] voices committed to peaceful coexistence began calling for a rapprochement between the world's dominant democracy and its countervailing Communist and postcolonial forces. As Harrison E. Salisbury wrote during the campaign, "The China problem cannot be indefinitely swept under the table. This country [the United States] must prepare to cope with it."[22] Key figures hoped at the time that "coping" with China might provide the United States some leverage in other foreign-policy dilemmas, either vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, or the India/Pakistan troubles, or tensions in the Middle East and Africa.[23] Within this context, Jeremi Suri notes that Kissinger advocated a U.S. foreign policy of both flexibility and domination in which "the United States would stand above its new partners as *the* central diplomatic player, *the* worldwide mediator." Of course, the architects of this global oversight would, in turn, become "the transcendent statesmen for the indispensable nation."[24] Nixon and Kissinger responded to the exigence of their time with a shared sense of ambition: Working together to overcome a generation of hostility with China, they would become the transcendent statesmen of the age by reshaping the Long Cold War.

Clear signaling of this change in U.S. foreign policy was offered in Nixon's 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, "Asia after Viet Nam." While Mailer's comments paint Nixon as a monster of the hard right, this article indicates a subtle strategist. The essay opens with the claim that recent "developments present an extraordinary set of opportunities for U.S. policy."[25] These developments include the overlapping trends of "decolonization," which is driving a rapidly evolving "new world order" based less on fanatical ideologies than pragmatic economic development, and the

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dawning realization that "externally supported guerrilla action" around the globe was not leading to peace but to endless proxy wars.[26] In light of these factors, Nixon pointed to "transitional anomalies" in Burma, the Philippines, India, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, where "ancient civilizations" with no experience with democracy were diving into "modernization," producing social transformations and political tensions.[27] And looming over the entire region, Nixon points to "Red China" as a "clear, present, and repeatedly and insistently expressed" threat. Still, invoking the tone of a pragmatist, Nixon argues the United States "must come urgently to grips with the reality of China." "Taking the long view," he writes, foreshadowing his inaugural address in 1969, "we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors."[28] And so the Republican "hatchet man" proposes the "dynamic detoxification" of Mao's China, which needs to be "pulled back into the world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution."[29] It has become easy in the years after Watergate to mock Nixon as a fool, or a criminal, or a sociopath, but "Asia after Viet Nam" shows a diplomat of intellectual depth and historical vision. Moreover, Gong Li and Zhang Baijia have used Chinese source materials to confirm that Mao and Chou studied Nixon's essay, which they filed away as food for thought in the event that he was elected president.[30]

While Nixon's 1967 *Foreign Affairs* essay may have struck many Americans either as heresy or as groundbreaking wisdom, and while CPC leaders saw it as a sign of things to come, the positions expressed therein had been debated within the White House since 1953. When the NSC met that November, President Eisenhower offered this comment:

> There was no profit in blindly adhering to a rigid set of rules and methods dealing with trade with Communist China. We should instead have freedom to act in such a manner as would contribute most to our own advantage. . . . He said facetiously, and in order to make his point, he would be willing to send jet aircraft to the Chinese Communists if it could be shown to our net advantage.[31]

Nixon missed this meeting while on a fact-finding venture to Asia, including five days in Taipei, but he would have read the notes from it.[32] By the summer of 1954, the vice president would air similar thoughts before the NSC: "There was an area of action between war and appeasement which we should explore. . . . [A] tough

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coexistence policy may be in the long run the best method."[33] These statements suggest that Eisenhower and Nixon were imagining how the Long Cold War might not lead to Armageddon in the mid-1950s. For Nixon, this meant abandoning Taiwan. Spinning out possibilities at an NSC meeting in December 1953, the vice president showed his hand: "What's going to be the result? *Formosa must go back to China; it belongs to China*."[34] In this instance, Nixon was summarizing a conversation he had with Sir Alexander Grantham, the British governor of Hong Kong; the moment is uncertain, but I would venture that Nixon is trying out an argument most likely advanced by Grantham, not so much endorsing it as testing it before his peers. Still, more than a decade before publishing his *Foreign Affairs* essay, Nixon was imagining a post–Cold War order wherein the United States and China could explore a "tough coexistence" founded upon the return of Formosa to the mainland.

As Bostdorff has argued and my research makes clear, Nixon had long been signaling his willingness to rethink America's position vis-à-vis China. Still, at the time of his inauguration most observers assumed that President Nixon would be a champion of Taiwan and a foe of Mao's China, which was then suffering through the agony of the Cultural Revolution.[35] Moreover, even if Chiang Kai-shek had done little since the end of World War II to change the minds of those Americans who saw the Generalissimo as an incompetent and corrupt warlord, the madness of the Cultural Revolution made the KMT's inept authoritarianism look good by comparison.[36] Nancy B. Tucker has observed that "CPC irrationality"—the Cultural Revolution writ large, coupled with Mao's destabilizing foreign policy—"seemed to confirm ROC judgements of the mainland system."[37] This explains why, when the Generalissimo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo (by then Taiwan's vice-premier and his father's designated heir),[38] visited Washington, DC, in the spring of 1970, he was relieved to hear Nixon promising, "I will never sell you down the river."[39] To understand the Nixonian version of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception, we must flag this startling discrepancy: Behind the closed doors of NSC meetings, Nixon was imagining the surrender of Taiwan to China, yet shaking Chiang Ching-kuo's hands before the White House cameras, he would say the exact opposite.

Nixon's public pledge reinforced the perception that the hatchet man would stand firm regarding U.S. support for Taiwan—lying to Chiang shielded Nixon from what he later characterized as the "murderous cross fire" any Republican would absorb if they were perceived as soft on Communism.[40] Given such public gestures, few observers could have imagined that it would be just one year until Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, began secret negotiations with Chou

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Enlai. When the CPC invited Kissinger to Peking, Chou warned, "It goes without saying that *the first question to be settled* is the crucial issue . . . of the withdrawal of all the U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area."[41] Then, in their preliminary conversations in July 1971, Chou again told Kissinger that for the normalization of relations between the two nations to proceed, "the US must recognize that the PRC is the sole legitimate government in China and that Taiwan Province is an inalienable part of Chinese territory which must be restored to the motherland."[42] Chou indicated that normalization was only possible if the United States reversed policies regarding Taiwan that had lasted through the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. His eyes on pinching the USSR by courting China, Kissinger responded, "We will not stand in the way of basic evolution."[43] The selling down the river had begun.

When Chou and Kissinger began their secret negotiations in Peking in October 1971, Chou reiterated the claims noted above, adding that he and Mao were concerned by the rise of the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) in the United States. The TIM was driven by intellectuals, students, and activists who had fled Chiang's brutal repressions on Taiwan to the United States, where they took advantage of America's liberties to protest the KMT's atrocities.[44] A TIM protest outside the United Nations had caught Chou's attention; he assumed it was sanctioned by the U.S. government and even organized by the CIA. In response, Kissinger said, "To the best of my knowledge, it had no encouragement from the US government." Kissinger could have ended there, or he might have explained the First Amendment and how U.S.-style free speech makes such protests hallowed events. But no. Instead, Kissinger made this gesture: "If you will send me the material [the CPC's dossier alleging CIA involvement], I will start an investigation when I get back from here and send you the results." Kissinger was so keen on normalizing relations with China, and so ready to deal away Taiwan, that he pledged to Chou that he would investigate the lawful use of free speech in America. To make sure Chou understood his position, Kissinger reiterated how "We recognize that the People's Republic considers the subject of Taiwan an internal issue, and we will not challenge that." When Chou pressed Kissinger on the details—for "recognize" is a slippery verb—the national security advisor said, "let me separate what we can say and what our policy is," hinting that Kissinger and Nixon were willing to deal privately in a different manner from what they would say publicly. Admitting that he too was willing to be "prudent" regarding "actual policy," the premier made it clear that he was a realist, not a devotee of Mao's

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rhetorical bombast, which was just "firing empty guns. . . . it's empty cannon."[45] And so the tone was set: Kissinger was so ready to deal on Taiwan that he would investigate lawful actions conducted on U.S. soil by members of the TIM; Chou was so ready to deal on Taiwan that he would make fun of Mao's over-the-top rhetoric. The two leaders were ready to make history—they would pursue a U.S.-China détente by exchanging Taiwan.

If Chou, Kissinger, and Nixon were ready to etch their names into history—in part by dealing away Taiwan's independence—their domestic constituencies were assumed to be less enthusiastic, which explains why Nixon worked first under the cover of secrecy and then in the glare of a TV announcement meant to create an irreversible sense of a fait accompli. Indeed, Nixon made Kissinger's secret trip public via a speech delivered on national television on July 15, 1971.[46] As Walter Isaacson has observed, the moment was electric: "Nixon and Kissinger were able to capture . . . the imagination of the American people. The dramatic opening to a faraway land was enchanting, exciting, and invigorating."[47] Because Kissinger's trip was shrouded in secrecy, the president's revealing the big secret landed like a thunderbolt, amounting to what Hanhimäki has called "a shock announcement" intended to throw domestic and international critics off guard.[48] The *Washington Post* literally trembled, calling the news "mind-blowing."[49] Michael Oksenberg captured the thrill of the moment, writing, "After 22 years of unyielding enmity, the improvements in Sino-American relations have produced a sense of relief and optimism about the future. After all . . . Americans were more familiar with the moon than the People's Republic." Hence, Oksenberg concluded, "the euphoria of the moment is to be welcomed."[50] As these comments indicate, the televised announcement fulfilled the effect desired of such spectacles: Shortcutting around congressional deliberation, DoD oversight, NSC debate, or public questioning, at no point did any semblance of democratic deliberation take place.

The excitement created by the spectacular announcement was tempered by the fears of Taiwan supporters and anti-Communist hardliners, who worried about what this turn of events meant for Taiwan in particular and for U.S. policy in Asia broadly. This question was so ubiquitous that the morning after Nixon's announcement, the *New York Times* observed, "the tough problem is the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan"; the paper of record called this conflict "seemingly insoluble."[51] But Nixon was confident he could finagle the "insoluble" problem, and so, when he and Kissinger boarded Air Force One on July 18 to return to Washington, DC, reporters found the president "in a mood approaching euphoria."[52] Still, Nixon had a rough

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road before him, as hardline cold warriors were outraged, with Congressman John Schmitz (R-CA) fuming about "surrendering to international communism."[53]

The president responded by telling some Americans one thing, other Americans another thing, and then telling the Chinese and Taiwanese entirely different things, hence using deception to smooth over the complications and contradictions within his larger plan. For example, when he met with foreign-policy leaders in Washington, DC, on February 16, 1972, the day before his departure for Peking, the president assured his Republican colleagues that "normalization" would not occur "because of American support for Taiwan," which the president pledged was nonnegotiable.[54] Kissinger had been greasing the wheels with the Communists in Peking by telling them, *Yes, normalization is imminent because Taiwan is expendable*, but now Nixon was covering his flanks in Washington by pledging, *No, normalization is impossible because our support for Taiwan is nonnegotiable*. Scholars have made their careers catching the Nixon White House in lies, yet still, the contradiction noted here is stinging.[55] It would be churlish to deny any president the latitude of negotiation and persuasion required to author game-changing foreign policy, yet the deceptions flagged here point to the heart of Nixon's and Kissinger's rhetorical strategies: They would say one thing in public, but then say entirely different things in private. As we see here, the rhetoric of geostrategic deception targets both international and domestic audiences.

The depth of these deceptions was not widely known at the time, however, and so the American public—reeling from the debacle in Vietnam and stunned into compliance by the spectacular announcement on July 15—enjoyed a moment of foreign-policy success. Consider the cheerful cover of *Time* magazine from July 26, 1971 (see figure 9). In the image, Kissinger drives the boat of foreign policy while Nixon, in an echo of the famous image of George Washington crossing the Delaware River, stands in the boat's prow. With the cover announcing "To Peking for Peace," the smiling Nixon is portrayed as a visionary commander sailing into the future.[56] It bears mentioning that the boat's oars are shown slipping into the surf, meaning the older, slower means of steering the ship of state are sinking while Kissinger guns the engine of change.

The Nixon White House's obsession with secrecy, and with telling different stories to different audiences, was so great that when Walter McConaughty, the U.S. ambassador to China, met with Nixon in the summer of 1971 to discuss the future of U.S.-China relations, the president engaged in what Jay Taylor has called "rank dissembling."[57] Nixon was so averse to making policy in an inclusive, collaborative,

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

FIGURE 9. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on their "journey for peace" to China, on the cover of *Time* magazine, July 26, 1971; © held by and image used with the permission of the magazine and PARS International. TIME and TIME USA LLC are not affiliated with, and do not endorse the products or services of, Stephen Hartnett.

and transparent manner that Kissinger later described how the president viewed the NSC not as a sounding board for idea testing with colleagues but as "an opportunity . . . to camouflage his own aims."[58] The search for a Long Cold War–altering foreign policy devised in secret clearly amounts to a recipe for trouble. To see what the public rhetoric and contradictory private promises of Kissinger and Nixon produced, both for U.S.-China relations in general and for the future of Taiwan in particular, I will turn to the key public document released on the final day of Nixon's historic trip to China, the "Joint U.S.-China Communiqué" (now known as the Shanghai Communiqué). Before analyzing the Communiqué, however, I work through some of the intrigues that unfolded between Nixon announcing Kissinger's first secret trip in July 1971 and the release of the Communiqué in the winter of 1972, for this crucial period saw Taiwan dumped from the United Nations and America ratcheting up the rhetoric of marginal significance.

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The Rhetoric of Marginal Significance

As the White House revealed its intentions regarding China, the news fueled long-standing debates about whether Chiang's ROC or Mao's PRC was the rightful holder of the "China" seat at the United Nations, an institution Kissinger mocked as "that madhouse."[59] Perhaps because of the KMT's rhetorical ineptitude, or the signals Kissinger and Nixon were sending, the growing support for Communist China from Third World nations, or Soviet animosity toward the United States' ally, the UN decided in October 1971 that China's seat at the UN would be occupied by Mao's PRC, not Chiang's ROC.[60] To avoid the embarrassment of being tossed out, the KMT withdrew on October 25, thus beginning a long wandering in the wilderness. Taiwan was neither willing to be seen as a province of China nor to relinquish the dream that it would someday reconquer mainland China; it was a de facto ally of the United States, complete with Eisenhower's MDT, yet Nixon did not even trust his own ambassador to Taipei, let alone the KMT government; it sought recognition internationally, yet had no seat at the UN; it was hailed by its defenders as making "the last stand" against Communism in Asia, yet had no democracy in practice.[61] And so, despite his pledge that this outcome would not arrive on his watch, the Nixon administration ushered in what Taylor has called "Taiwan's fall into international limbo."[62]

But the KMT would not go down without taking some swings at its former ally, and so Tsai Wei-ping, the vice minister of foreign affairs, declared that the UN debacle meant "America's image and reputation [have been] ruined."[63] Hoping to limit such criticisms, Nixon called upon the Hollywood charm and anti-Communist credentials of the governor of California, Ronald Reagan. And so the Great Communicator was dispatched abroad to shake hands and to share a stage with Chiang Kai-shek at the Presidential Palace in Taipei, where the two leaders spoke to a crowd estimated at 250,000.[64] Reagan's visit was a goodwill gesture intended to soften the blows caused by the debacle at the UN and the United States' turning toward Mao. Reagan's appearance was a theatrical moment of crisis management—yet another instance where spectacle was deployed instead of doing the slow, methodical work of diplomacy. Richard Allen, who became President Reagan's national security advisor, reported to James Mann that Reagan "had some lingering regrets about having been used in that way."[65] Nonetheless, in Taipei today, photographs of Reagan shaking hands with Chiang are displayed as evidence of the strength and sincerity of the two nations' long bond. At the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in

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Taipei, the image hangs in a room of oversized photographs honoring American and other foreign dignitaries who have supported Taiwan. The Taiwanese have thus turned the evidence of past ignominies into what now looks to be evidence of an enduring friendship. This odd, asymmetrical relationship is driven by the rhetoric of marginal significance, in which the United States treats Taiwan as a sort-of ally, a not-quite friend, an almost-power, a quasi-colonial nonstate worthy of limited attention but not equal treatment.

To make sense of the rhetoric of marginal significance, let us unpack some of the complications and silences surrounding the Reagan trip. By way of comparison, consider that when Nixon announced Kissinger's secret diplomacy to China, he did so in a nationally televised speech. Then, both when Nixon's entourage departed Washington and again when it landed in Peking in 1972, the events were broadcast worldwide. When Nixon and Kissinger acted on China, it was big news conveyed via breathless coverage—"Disneyland and realpolitik" indeed. Yet throughout this period, America's dealings with Taiwan were barely mentioned. By the fall of 1971, Governor Reagan was a rising star in the Republican Party; he was a longtime figure on the party's far right; he was tall, handsome, well-spoken, both earthy and sometimes funny—and hence a man with a bright political future. Sending him abroad in a crisis could be perceived as a credentials-building foreign-policy engagement for a future presidential candidate. Reagan's visit to Taipei, then, would have made excellent footage of a prominent Republican proving his anti-Communist chops while being photographed alongside men in uniform—it would have been PR heaven for the image-conscious governor and could have tamped down Nixon's right-wing critics. Instead, on October 10, 1971, the day Reagan arrived in Taipei, the *New York Times* carried a two-sentence notice at the bottom left corner of a page dominated by a furniture advertisement.[66]

The *Times* continued in this vein the following day, when a front-page story about the ceremonies in Taipei made no mention of the governor on page one. The event marked the 60th anniversary of independence from the Qing Empire, yet Reagan is only mentioned on page five, in a juxtaposition that says it all: "Among the foreign dignitaries attending the festivities were Gov. Ronald Reagan of California, representing President Nixon, and the Vice President of the Dominican Republic."[67] The former television star and perhaps future of the Republican Party, Nixon's emissary sits next to the number two man from an impoverished Caribbean island. The White House was equally uninterested, as the *FRUS* indicates that Reagan's dealings in Taipei were reported back to the Oval Office in a dull half-page

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memorandum.[68] As the text indicates, no one in the White House was interested in what Reagan and Chiang may have discussed.[69] If the function of political spectacles is to overwhelm viewers with the sense of grandeur, rendering politics not so much the art of slow deliberation as the thunderclap of fantastical decisions made from afar, then complications cannot be allowed to sully the gloss—Taiwan, and Reagan's visit thereto, would have to remain tangential. Reagan was deployed, then, to placate Chiang and the KMT but not to be seen on American televisions, for Taiwan's fate was only marginally significant.

Or consider the exchange between Kissinger and ROC Ambassador James Shen, which took place in the White House the following month, on November 15, 1971. Ambassador Shen was worried—all signals were pointing toward the United States and China normalizing relations at the cost of U.S. support for Taiwan. Shen was therefore hoping that Kissinger would use a White House press briefing for him, Nixon, or White House press secretary Ron Ziegler to state that the United States was still committed to defending Taiwan. Kissinger had promised in a prior meeting to do exactly this, to plant the triggering question with a friendly reporter, but the moment had not come to pass, and so Kissinger began the meeting by apologizing to Shen, saying he "owed you something" and "had been telling Mr. Ziegler for two weeks to get that thing done." Kissinger then discussed the political niceties of staging such plants, but concluded that "the subject had not come up, and there was no good way to make the point."[70] The White House was secretly wrenching the Long Cold War in a new direction by dealing with a former enemy, with implications for the political fates of China, India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others, yet Kissinger told Shen that he could not manage to plant one question with a local reporter. Taiwan's role in the unfolding drama was so insignificant, in fact, that it "has not come up" in any White House press briefings. This is what I mean by the rhetoric of marginal significance: The White House hosts Shen, the representative of a longtime ally, thus granting him a sense of diplomatic respect, yet then highlights the friend's status as an afterthought.[71]

In his analysis of the rhetorical traditions of foreign-policy realism, of which Kissinger was a champion, Robert Hariman has argued that the realist's pursuit of world order often entails "the sacrifice of small states to grand designs."[72] Kissinger might have been moving cautiously because the release of the Pentagon Papers in the summer of 1971 had shaken the Nixon White House's confidence in handling the press; in fact, Kissinger was being criticized for his cavalier handling of sources, planted "leaks," and other forms of manipulation.[73] While these local conditions

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may have hampered his ability to plant a question about Taiwan, I think Hariman's point is explanatory: Within the grand design of Nixon and Kissinger's emerging new world order, the threat of losing Taiwan was considered a fair price to pay for building peace with China. As Patrick Tyler has observed, in Kissinger's vision of realpolitik, "only the dominant players counted, and it was absurd to consider Taipei a major player."[74] Pursuing normalization with the PRC virtually mandated that Nixon and Kissinger treat the ROC with the rhetoric of marginal significance.

The Shanghai Communiqué and the Rhetoric of Abeyance

In light of these events, the U.S.-PRC Shanghai Communiqué must have felt like the nail in the coffin for Taiwan's leaders. Released on February 27, 1972, on the last day of Nixon's historic trip, the Communiqué announced that the United States and China had resumed a relationship that, if not yet normalized, was inching away from perpetual conflict. To facilitate their work on the document, Kissinger and Chou agreed that it would not resolve U.S.-China tensions; instead, it would place them within a wider context of shared interests. Still trying in 1973 to explain the previous year's rapprochement with China, Kissinger told reporters that he and Chou believed it was "essential for the peace of the world" that the United States and PRC show good stewardship of the interests of "an international community," thus envisioning the former rivals not so much as allies as grudging partners in avoiding catastrophe.[75] Kissinger later observed that Mao and Chou "had never conceived their security to reside in the legal arrangements of a community of sovereign states"; rather, they opened up to the United States as one way of entering a more manageable "kind of combative coexistence."[76] Nixon and Kissinger approached China, then, in neither regime change nor nation-building mode, but rather, seeking "regime collaboration"—what Nixon called in 1954 "tough coexistence."[77]

To watch how these notions were operationalized, let us turn to the Shanghai Communiqué, wherein both sides outlined their national interests. Traditionally, such documents strive for a sense of comity and agreement, yet Kissinger and Chou knew the situation regarding Taiwan required what the American would call "an unusual communique."[78] As Nixon put it in one of the early conversations in Peking, neither side had any interest in releasing a "conventional" or "weasel-worded communique."[79] And so the first paragraph relaying the American position linked the opening of relations with China to the hope of resolving a series of other

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conflicts, including those still roaring in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, festering in the split Koreas, and simmering between India and Pakistan. The U.S. interest in talking to China, then, was coupled with a global view of geopolitics—*the peace of the world*—wherein the United States hoped China might begin to play a moderating rather than an escalating role, hence fulfilling Nixon's 1967 notion of pursuing the "dynamic detoxification" of Mao's regime. The opening Chinese paragraph summarized Communist ideology, including the promise that "China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and politics of any kind."[80] The Chinese position, then, was layered in opposition to the assumptions driving the American position.

Despite these divergent worldviews, the two sides then agreed to a set of shared principles: "That countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."[81] Reasonable minds might be baffled by this list of boilerplate statements, for they contradicted ongoing PRC and U.S. foreign-policy actions at the time. In fact, in 1972 the Americans and Chinese were both openly intervening in multiple Asian nations, most prominently in Vietnam; both nations were also waging covert operations in Laos, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Tibet, Indonesia, and Taiwan. Both nations were, in short, violating each of the aspirations listed above.[82] Nonetheless, Kissinger later argued that the text was a declaration of "joint opposition to any further expansion of the Soviet sphere," and hence "a veritable diplomatic revolution," as the text announced the decoupling of the two Communist giants.[83] But no such meaning could be inferred by anyone who was not privy to the secret information driving the statement. The Chinese and Russians had been engaging in dangerous border skirmishes for years, and U.S. intelligence was gauging the seriousness of intercepts pointing to "Soviet plans for a nuclear strike inside China," yet this information was not publicly available at the time.[84] Rather, many observers assumed a deal was looming regarding the Vietnam War, wherein both China and the United States viewed North Vietnam as a threat.[85]

The Communiqué's language was so vague that when Kissinger first presented a draft to Nixon prior to the president's historic trip, the president asked, "That's directed against Russia, isn't it? Or is it Japan?"[86] Then, when the passages arose in conversation in Peking, Chou first mentioned Japan as the target of veiled hostility, to which Nixon said, "And the Soviet Union . . . [and] India."[87] This first part of the

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Joint Communiqué's string of vague platitudes was rooted in serious agreements reached in private. The obvious drawback of this secret diplomacy is that it leaves the public (including future generations of political leaders) shackled with documents that do not make sense without access to the privileged information. In this case, the Joint Communiqué pursued elite, secret geostrategic ends allegedly directed against the USSR while producing public rhetoric that was so vague that it would hamstring future deliberations and international expectations.

This rhetorical pattern is even more damaging as regards the Communiqué's passages about Taiwan. The part representing China's interests states, "Taiwan is a province of China" and that "the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere." Pointedly rejecting options previously explored by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the document announces, "The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'one China, two governments,' 'two Chinas,' 'an independent Taiwan,' or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.'"[88] These lines indict U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan between 1949 and 1972. China's position in the text was echoed outside on a billboard announcing "We Will Certainly Liberate Taiwan."[89]

If the Chinese side is clear, rhetorical trouble emerges in the U.S. response:

> The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. . . . It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. . . . It affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.[90]

While the text "acknowledges" a preferred "one China" solution, commentators asked whether this word is rendered in Chinese as *ren-shi*, indicating "cognizance but not necessarily agreement," or *cheng-ren*, which bears a stronger sense of "acceptance or agreement."[91] As we shall see, Kissinger was shooting for the weaker version of the word, for it left the United States uncommitted on the question of how to achieve "one China" while not declaring whether some eventually unified nation would be run by the Communists or the Nationalists. That question of ultimate governance was left to "the Chinese themselves," another nod toward a peaceful settlement of the problem, yet the fact that neither state was a democracy

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meant neither side could undertake a fair election, meaning any decision by the Chinese people would be postponed for generations. In essence, then, the passage created for Taiwan indefinite breathing room during which the "ultimate objective" of demilitarizing Taiwan would be linked to "diminish[ing] . . . tensions." These beguilingly vague phrases suggest that the United States would continue to militarize Taiwan as long as it felt the CPC was threatening any non-peaceful resolution of the PRC-ROC issue or continuing to engage in hostilities in Vietnam and elsewhere. Peace was cited as an eventual goal, but the actions of war would continue unchanged.[92] And so, whereas the Chinese demands are clear and precise, the American responses defer any decision. The result, as Kissinger later observed, created a framework for ongoing U.S.-PRC dialogue while "put[ting] the Taiwan issue in abeyance."[93]

Kissinger's rhetoric here may sound similar to Eisenhower's "fuzzing." The crucial difference is that whereas fuzzing was driven by genuine confusion and was meant to serve the president's unwavering ethics and prudence, Kissinger's "abeyance" was a recipe for deception based in large part on his belief that he could play competing forces off each other. Whereas Eisenhower's fuzzing was a strategy of delay and compromise, Kissinger's abeyance was a strategy of manipulation. To prove this claim, and hence to understand how Kissinger's strategy created a new wrinkle within the rhetoric of geostrategic deception, we must understand what he meant by abeyance.

Before doing so, it is important to note that some scholars have argued that the Chinese were not nearly as concerned about Taiwan as they were about the Soviets and Vietnamese. As Isaacson has noted, "The great breakthrough on Taiwan was that there did not need to be a breakthrough on Taiwan."[94] This realization was premised, however, on the subtle dance of expectations and deceptions wrapped up in Kissinger's notion of abeyance. In his long memo to Nixon summarizing his first, secret trip to China, Kissinger makes clear that whatever difficulties he and Chou experienced while drafting the passages regarding Taiwan were driven by "the tension between the Chinese thrust for clarity and ours for ambiguity."[95] When the later round of negotiations started to bog down over this discrepancy, Nixon asked for leniency from Chou, claiming that he needed "running room" domestically—that is, Nixon feared getting pounded from the Republican Right for selling out Taiwan, and so he asked Chou to accept this textual ambiguity as the price of forging the preliminary U.S.-PRC friendship.[96] Decades later, Kissinger would celebrate this strategic "running room," saying, "ambiguity is sometimes the

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lifeblood of diplomacy."[97] Garver offers a glowing assessment, pointing to this part of the Communiqué as "a diplomatic masterpiece."[98]

There are two crucial flaws in such evaluations, however, and they both merit careful consideration, for they touch upon the delicate balance of what was said in print in the Communiqué and what was said in private in Peking and Washington. In both cases, the confusion stems from a subtle difference in the notion of abeyance. For Nixon, abeyance meant saying one thing in the present while promising to do another thing in the near future, essentially playing a strategic game based on domestic political considerations. For Kissinger, the word opened up an even more nuanced gamble based on his assumptions about where the arc of history would take geopolitics. To make sense of these subtle differences, which held tremendous importance for the future of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, I turn first to Nixon's statements and then to Kissinger's.

Nixon's Secret Pledges vs. What We Are Going to Say

First, despite his April 1970 promise to Chiang Ching-kuo that he would not betray Taiwan, it is clear that Nixon as far back as 1954 had every intention of doing just that. In a White House conversation from October 1971, the president said to Kissinger: "the Taiwan thing, *we know what has to happen*."[99] When the U.S. president sat down for his first conversation with the Chinese prime minister, he dutifully repeated back what he knew were the CPC's requirements for proceeding toward diplomatic normalization:

> Principle one: There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China.
>
> Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwanese independence movement.
>
> Third. . . . We do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan.
>
> The Fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. . . . And we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.
>
> Finally, we seek the normalization of relations with the People's Republic.[100]

A comparison of Nixon's first four points with Chou's previously quoted preconditions indicates why the Chinese were thrilled from the start of Nixon's "journey

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for peace": without any rancor, the United States opened the week-long visit by signaling it was ready to consider Taiwan's return to the mainland. In his notes from this week, Nixon jotted down "Taiwan—Vietnam = tradeoff," a geopolitical bargain he called inevitable.[101]

Nixon was painfully aware, however, that this news would not play well in America, where it would be interpreted as having "sold Taiwan down the river," thus appeasing China and enraging the Republican base. And so Nixon continued: "The problem here, Mr. Prime Minister, is not in *what we are going to do*, the problem is in *what we are going to say* about it. As I said yesterday [in his talks with Mao], my record shows I always do more than I can say, once I have made the decision as to the direction of our policy."[102] Nixon here made it clear to Chou "what we are going to do": Taiwan was finished. The only issue was that "what we are going to do" depended upon his reelection, meaning the U.S. Left and Right (Nixon disparaged both) could not be allowed to destroy his initiative with China. What could be said publicly, then, had to be ambiguous, ensuring that domestic grievances would not short-circuit the long-term geostrategic plan. "Our problem," Nixon said, "is to be clever enough to find language that will meet your needs yet does not stir up the animals so much that they get to gang up on Taiwan and thereby torpedo our initiative."[103] Nixon was promising one thing to Chou but planning on saying very different things in public—this is the essence of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception.

Nixon's statements in this and other conversations that week were so unequivocal about surrendering Taiwan that by the night of February 24, 1972, a satisfied Chou suggested, "It would be good if the liberation of Taiwan could be realized in your next term in office."[104] Nixon replied: "I have stated my goal is normalization," which he knew was dependent upon satisfying the requirement about Taiwan; hence, "If I should win reelection, I have five years to achieve it."[105] Then, in a remarkable passage, the president said to Chou, "Now, if someone asks me when I return, do you have a deal with the Prime Minister . . . I will say 'no.' But I am telling the Prime Minister that is my plan."[106] Nixon thus made a secret plan with Chou even while warning him that he would disavow the deal in public. Roderick P. Hart once observed how, in a strange twist, Nixon was eventually undone not by his public pronouncements and official policies—the usual fate of a professional public speaker—but, instead, "by his private discourse."[107] It was Nixon's secrets that got him in trouble. And so, in a moment that confirms Hart's argument and foreshadows Nixon's eventual downfall, the president assumed that lying to the

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American public was justified by reaching a grand bargain that only he, Kissinger, and Chou could envision, and which they therefore had to make in secret.

These private promises were so clear that Chang and Halliday, reviewing the archival records in Chinese, argue that "by the end of the trip, Chou was talking as if Peking pocketing Taiwan was a matter of course."[108] In subsequent negotiations, Kissinger even hinted that the United States would not object to the CPC using force to take Taiwan, giving the Chinese what Taylor describes as "a virtual carte blanche" to unify the motherland on their own timetable and via their own preferred means.[109] My reading of the transcripts published by the *FRUS* in 2006 makes it clear that the public record at that time did not reflect the full substance of what Nixon promised to Mao and Chou in private. Moreover, Chou's willingness to accept the ambiguity of the Shanghai Communiqué, thus granting Nixon his request for "running room," was based on the president's repeated assurances that such rhetorical subterfuges were short-term political necessities pointing toward a long-term resolution that would meet China's demands regarding Taiwan. It is important to emphasize that Nixon appears genuine in this design: He deceived not Chou but the American public, which he was determined to mislead until after his reelection. Still, there is every reason to believe that if it were not for Watergate, Nixon's pledges to Chou would have been fulfilled—Taiwan was finished.

Kissinger's Abeyance and the Arc of History

The same conclusion cannot be reached regarding Kissinger's role in this drama. For if Nixon was willing to dissemble in the short run with his eyes on a grand alliance to come, Kissinger's version of "abeyance" hinted at a more subtle game based on a gamble about the arc of history. It is interesting to speculate if Kissinger, a serious student of diplomatic history, was basing his thinking upon positions elucidated by his forerunners. On July 14, 1949, J. Leighton Stuart, the U.S. ambassador to China, sent a memo from bombed-out Nanking to the White House. Surveying the collapse of Chiang's regime before Mao's Communists, Stuart recognized no clear postwar path and worried that governance in China was a toss-up. He concluded, "The chief virtues for us to exercise at present are perhaps patience, self-restraint, and reserve."[110] Five years later, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles offered similar advice in *Foreign Affairs*: "Time and fundamentals will work for us, if only we let them." Dulles was assuming that just holding on for now would lead to victory

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in the long run, for "the dictators face an impossible task"—democracy would inevitably triumph.[111] Kissinger's notion of abeyance was based on a similar sense of the assumed trajectory of history, the gamble that Communism would crumble under the weight of its own contradictions, making temporary strategies of delay and deferral wise policy.

In his November 1971 memo to the president summarizing his first round of talks with Chou, Kissinger described how putting Taiwan into "abeyance" would create evolutionary space, an open-ended course of inaction that would eventually bend toward America's interests. "The Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on *the thrust of history*," Kissinger wrote. "They will continue to be tough, but they essentially accept our arguments that we can often do more than we can say, that the process must be gradual, and that some issues must be *left up to evolutionary pressures*. This involves great risks for them . . . they are clearly gambling on your reelection."[112] Kissinger sensed that Chou could be patient about reunification with Taiwan because the prime minister believed both that Nixon would be reelected and hence make good on his promise, and that "evolutionary pressures," the inescapable "thrust of history," made it inevitable that Chiang's dictatorship would succumb before the majesty of the PRC. Chou believed history was on his side. It is striking to realize that both parties made this assumption: Kissinger believed his capitalist democracy would triumph in the long run, while Chou assumed his Communist dictatorship would win the global battle for hearts and minds—both leaders thought they could be patient, for the arc of history was bending their way.

It is particularly important here to watch how Kissinger reinforced Chou's assumptions. In a key meeting in the final hours that produced the Communiqué, China's vice minister of foreign affairs, Qiao Guanhua, questioned the ambiguity of the Communiqué's passages regarding Taiwan. Qiao sought to separate the literal messages of the document from what he had been told was the direction of U.S.-China relations, as promised by Nixon and implied by Kissinger. Qiao found the discrepancies puzzling, so Kissinger eased his mind by saying, "I agree with the direction and we will carry it out scrupulously. . . . We will do our part and in the spirit of the Communiqué unilaterally carry it out." When Qiao pressed him for details, Kissinger again used the cover of avoiding a domestic backlash to argue for the need for ambiguity. Then, in a crucial moment, Kissinger said to his Chinese interlocutors, "We can't lay down exact rules here. We have to do it *on the basis of mutual trust*."[113] Kissinger thus pledged that his government would uphold the

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implied direction of what had been promised in private, which, as Nixon made so clear, was more encompassing than what the Communiqué would say in public. The ultimate achievement of China's goal was a matter of mutual trust between these leaders, who understood that a little secrecy in the short run would grease the wheels for changing history in the long run.

Qiao and Chou appeared satisfied with this formula, in large part because they trusted that Nixon and Kissinger were men of their word. Nixon's formal toasts while in China may have played a key role here, for as Michelle Murray Yang has shown, the president rose at each evening's banquet to deliver homages to the majesty of Chinese civilization. Speaking both to his Chinese hosts and to millions of viewers watching the ceremonies on TV, Nixon's toasts praised Mao, celebrated U.S.-China relations, and gave every indication that the hatchet man had come to respect and even admire the Chinese.[114] When considered alongside the secret promises noted above, these public speeches and toasts must have felt to the Chinese like confirmation that their wishes had been met: Nixon was ready to surrender Taiwan.

When the three leaders reconvened in Peking in June 1972—with Nixon's reelection looking likely, and thus with reunification looking imminent—the repartee felt almost jovial, with the old friends surveying the globe and bantering about the fate of the world. In a self-congratulating moment, Kissinger said to Chou, "The secret to our relationship is we were prepared to start an evolution in which the Prime Minister has expressed great confidence."[115] Whether described as *the direction*, *the thrust of history*, *evolutionary pressures*, or *an evolution*, Kissinger lavished praise on Chou—he celebrated their *mutual trust* and Chou's *great confidence*—with the sense that the premier's singular wish, to unify Taiwan with the mainland, was about to be met.

The record on Kissinger becomes even more complicated when we encounter his comments from a November 15, 1971, meeting with James Shen, then the ROC's ambassador. It takes no great imagination to envision Ambassador Shen as a terrified man: Having fought against the Communists for decades and representing a government that had heroically (if brutally) built a new regime on Taiwan, he came to Kissinger wondering if his world was about to be torn to pieces. The Shanghai Communiqué would not be made public until the end of Nixon's trip to China, in February 1972, but the Taiwanese were fully apprised of the dealings in Peking. But to the ambassador's great surprise, Kissinger reassured Shen that what had been happening in Peking "was less than meets the eye" and that the United States would continue to stand firm in its "defensive commitments to Taiwan." Based on

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his intelligence reports regarding what the Communiqué might say, Shen asked the obvious question: Doesn't promising a coming unification when in Peking while talking about defending Taiwan when in Washington amount to "an inconsistency"? Kissinger replied that the Communiqué would be ambiguous by design, that Chou "knew this," and that where history took the facts on the ground was "Chou's problem." Shen was stunned, finding that the man he thought was the architect of his nation's downfall might in fact be a sneaky friend. Shen pressed Kissinger on the details: "Was the status of Taiwan going to change?" Here Kissinger's notion of "abeyance" comes into focus:

> According to Mr. Kissinger, one of two possible situations could occur: the first was that there could be negotiations between Peking and Taiwan, and the other was that Taiwan would develop more and more in the direction of a separate state . . . Kissinger spoke of a third possible situation: that of civil war breaking out on the mainland, with Taiwan aligning with one of the factions later on. . . . Whatever happened would happen slowly. They [the ROC] would be very foolish to commit suicide in order to avoid death. . . . Kissinger's judgement was that if the ROC could maintain itself, the situation could change in a dramatic way.[116]

Hence, while Chou, Nixon, and Kissinger spoke openly about seeking "normalization" between the United States and China by 1976—which, as Chou had made perfectly clear, was dependent upon the PRC's unification with Taiwan—Kissinger here made it clear that he envisioned the abeyance opening onto a number of long-term options, *none of which entailed unification*. Indeed, Kissinger knew the Taiwanese would not negotiate their own annexation by the PRC, meaning the first option listed above was a nonstarter. The second option implied Taiwanese independence. And the third option indicated that Kissinger assumed the imminent passing of Chou and Mao would plunge China into chaos, at which time all bets would be off. In Peking, Kissinger implied that his notion of abeyance would work in China's favor given the arc of history; back in Washington, he made it clear that abeyance was in fact a slow-motion knife in Chou's back.

A similar exchange took place in Key Biscayne, Florida, on December 30, 1971, when Kissinger hosted the ROC's foreign minister, Chou Shu-kai, and again Ambassador Shen. At this meeting, the Taiwanese diplomats were still concerned about what the Shanghai Communiqué might say to the world. Kissinger again defended his formulation, the idea of a temporary abeyance regarding U.S.-China-Taiwan

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commitments, saying, "As long as no pressure is put on you for a political settlement, why isn't the formula the best possible policy?" The United States, Kissinger pledged, would push no settlement on Taiwan and would not tolerate China using force in the matter, meaning he had created a stalemate, a temporary abeyance that would evolve into a permanent state of affairs. Kissinger concluded this defense of his grand design with a satisfied, almost smug "What can go wrong?"[117]

This exact rhetoric was marshaled again in the White House on March 6, 1972, when Kissinger and Nixon hosted Shen in the Oval Office. By now, the Shanghai Communiqué had been public for more than a week, and while Nixon and Kissinger were basking in the glow of their triumph with China, the Taiwanese remained alarmed. And so Kissinger again made the case for abeyance, emphasizing that the temporary nondecision regarding unification with Taiwan would become, on his reading of the arc of history, a permanent fact on the ground. Look, an annoyed Kissinger said, "You are under no pressure to settle. Mao could disappear. Chou could disappear. . . . It would be a mistake for you to panic or do anything rash." The president, finally beginning to understand the ramifications of Kissinger's rhetoric, jumped in: "This isn't like the Arab-Israeli thing, where we are attempting to try to broker it. . . . I wouldn't be in too much of a hurry to produce an agreement."[118]

From the distance of almost fifty years, it seems that Chou was conned. While Nixon asked for ambiguity and "running room" in order to secure his reelection, and while he had no scruples in lying to the American public, he was genuine in seeking a rapprochement with China, for which he was willing to jettison Taiwan. Neither Chou nor Nixon could foresee Watergate, meaning the crumbling of their plans was the product of history, not connivance. Kissinger, on the other hand, used words like "mutual trust" while insinuating that he concurred with Chou's vision of the arc of history, only to completely reverse himself when speaking privately to Nixon, Shen, or the reporters whom he so routinely tried to sway. It is clear that Kissinger never had any intention of nudging "the thrust of history" in China's direction as regards Taiwan. In this sense, Kissinger was a duplicitous broker, who, when speaking to Chou, treated him like a trusted friend and fellow man of honor, all the while planning to renege on the single most important part of the emerging U.S.-China relationship: the unification of Taiwan with the mainland.

In summary, the public statements—vague and deferring, the tentative language of abeyance—contradicted the Nixon administration's repeated private promises—certain and appeasing, clear statements of "mutual trust"—thus creating a template

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for confusion and even a sense of betrayal on the part of the Chinese. The systematic and intentional contradictions between public statements and secret promises offer a precise illustration of what Robert Hariman has called the "moral anomaly" at the heart of Kissingerian rhetoric.[119] In this reading, the pursuit of "world order" trumps the need for such niceties as transparency, oversight, consultation, policy consistency, or most of the other hallmarks of civic republicanism. Even when temporarily successful, such rhetoric fails in the long term, for presidents come and go—sooner rather than later in the case of Nixon—taking their secret pledges along with them, leaving only the inaccurate public record to guide future deliberations. In this case, Tucker concludes that the morally anomalous rhetorical dynamic meant Nixon and Kissinger "misled China's rulers," left Chiang and the Taiwanese feeling "betrayed," and "bred mistrust everywhere."[120] Thinking rhetorically, we may conclude that Nixon and Kissinger's deployment of *the rhetoric of abeyance* placed deception at the heart of U.S. foreign-policy communication vis-à-vis China and Taiwan, thus undermining future prospects for trust and goodwill.

Responses to the Shanghai Communiqué and the Costs of Secrecy

The question of how the rhetoric of abeyance impacted the reception of the Communiqué illustrates how public interpretations, when framed within a vacuum of information, tended toward the assumption that a secret deal had been cut. The Nixon White House was keenly aware of this rhetorical logic. For example, when the president landed in America on the night of February 28, 1972, he received a "conquering hero" welcome at Andrews Air Force Base. Within his brief, valedictory speech, the president included a preemptive denial: "There were no secret deals of any kind." Making full use of the "running room" Chou had provided, the president contradicted the spirit of his conversations in China about Taiwan by claiming, "we will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs, and we did not do so at Peking."[121] Isaacson has observed how Nixon's penchant for such deceptions "instilled distrust among those around him," yet we should also note how the president sought to shape public perception—and to diminish doubt—by rendering such statements in spectacular media events.[122] Counting the initial televised announcement about Kissinger's travels to China, the coverage of Nixon's departure from Washington and then his arrival in Peking, and then the nightly doses of coverage of the splendid banquets in China, the Andrews Air Force Base

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FIGURE 10. Shock and Awe in Action; Karl Schumacher's photograph of President Nixon's entourage at Andrews Air Force Base, February 28, 1972; © held by and image used with the permission of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, White House Photo Office 8638-31.

event marked yet another instance of the Nixon White House seeking to "shock and awe" viewers by marshaling televised spectacles.

For the most part, this strategy worked. Consider figure 10, which shows Nixon waving to the crowd at Andrews Air Force Base upon his return from China. In the contact sheets held at the RNPLM, Karl Schumacher's photographs depict a scene of almost rock-concert-like intensity. Many of these images show that Air Force One had been wheeled partly into the hangar, so the plane's immense nose loomed over the gathering, suggesting the global reach of America's power. In a tighter frame, figure 10 shows how Marine One, the president's helicopter, parked next to the jumbo jet, glistens with impeccable, crisp authority. A throng of reporters, supporters, and well-wishers gathers around the makeshift podium where the president stands beaming. The moment is electric; Nixon is triumphant.

Such made-for-TV moments left some observers troubled by the pattern of orchestrating U.S. foreign policy via televised spectacles rather than through congressional deliberation or public vetting. Given the widespread distrust of

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Nixon's White House, the press took up the challenge of trying to read between the lines of what was being said in public and what might have happened behind closed doors. The *New York Times* editorialized on March 6 that the Communiqué "has finally shattered the sustaining illusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan—the claim that it is the only legitimate government of China and the hope for a triumphal return to the mainland." While the *Times* may have welcomed an end to U.S. support for what it called "Chiang's pretensions," the paper also directly called out Nixon's claim to have not dealt "behind the back" of other nations, as it noted that the Communiqué "wholly ignores the wishes of twelve million native Taiwanese."[123]

Even in the face of such fears, the press seemed to back the Big Picture as envisioned by the Nixon White House. Writing in the *New York Times* roughly one month after the release of the Shanghai Communiqué, Edwin Reischauer captured one side of the argument about what Nixon's trip meant for Taiwan: "The United States has no vital national interest in the existence of a separate Taiwan."[124] At the same time, the same paper reported "bitter dissatisfaction here [in Taipei] with the outcome of Mr. Nixon's China visit."[125] In both cases, the interpretations provided—*Taiwan is sold down the river, so what?* Or *Taiwan is sold down the river, what an outrage!*—indicate the sense that the Communiqué's vague language belied a fundamental, albeit not stated, abandonment of Taiwan. Back in China, the CPC circulated a memo (unknown in the United States) celebrating how the deal with Nixon "benefits our liberation of Taiwan."[126] It may reasonably be suggested that its conclusions reflected mandatory affirmations of the CPC's preferred spin; but still, given the Communiqué's vague language, and the widely different interpretations of it coming out of Peking, Taipei, and various factions in Washington, it makes sense that some observers wondered whether a secret understanding underlay and perhaps contradicted the public text. Reflecting this suspicion, one reporter asked Kissinger, "Were there any secret agreements made?" Kissinger: "No. . . . There were no secret agreements."[127] The rhetoric of geostrategic deception leads to such doubts and denials, creating a communicative environment ripe for speculation about conspiracies and cover-ups.

Reporters were not the only ones asking questions, for Morton Halperin has noted how leaders in South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and Australia "were not informed in advance nor told afterward what had been discussed" in the Peking meetings, leaving them "fear[ing] that some secret understanding had been reached."[128] Nixon later celebrated what he called "the miraculous secrecy we

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had been able to maintain,"[129] but it left America's allies fearful and even resentful that they were never consulted, let alone informed about negotiations that so dramatically impacted their own national security. James Reston reported that Premier Eisaku Sato of Japan "was embarrassed by not being consulted" about the talks, while Isaacson observed that Kissinger's and Nixon's handling of America's allies during these crucial months was "shabby."[130]

Of these bruised allies, the most worried was Taiwan, which, reading between the lines, denounced "any agreement which has been *and which may not have been published*."[131] Despite Kissinger's and Nixon's public denials, the KMT feared a secret deal had been struck. The KMT's response to this diplomatic crisis adds another layer of complexity to my analysis of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication. Back in July 1971, when the KMT first learned of Kissinger's secret trip to Peking, the Taiwanese leadership responded with dismay, asking, "How can the United States now go even further in paving the way for additional aggression by Peking and thereby make possible an even more disastrous catastrophe?"[132] The KMT's response to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué was even more ferocious, illustrating why so many generations of American leaders found Chiang a difficult, even maddening, ally. By 1972, no one believed the KMT was going to retake mainland China, yet the *New York Times* quoted Chiang's Ministry of Foreign Affairs peddling the cliché that the heroic KMT will provide "the salvation of China" by fulfilling "the sacred responsibility" of achieving "the destruction of the tyranny of the Chinese Communist regime."[133] As of 1972, the Chinese Civil War had been over for twenty-four years (assuming 1949 marks its effective termination), democracy had not yet taken hold on Taiwan, Mao had assembled an enormous army and unified the mainland, and official U.S. policy forbade Taiwan attacking China, yet Chiang was still speaking of the "salvation" awaiting the fulfillment of the "sacred responsibility" of reconquering the mainland. You can imagine eyes rolling all across Washington. Worse yet, the KMT closed their response by claiming, speaking now for both Taiwan and all the other "countries in the Asia and Pacific," that "They should not entertain the slightest illusion of coexisting peacefully with the Chinese Communists," thus portraying the turn in U.S. foreign policy as naive, doomed to fail, and inhospitable to regional allies.[134]

A bitter version of Chiang's response to Nixon's China dealings was offered in the Generalissimo's "Message to the 18th Conference of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League." Delivered in Seoul, South Korea, on August 21, 1972, Chiang's speech attacked what he called "the rising tide of international appeasement, aided by [an]

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onslaught of smiling diplomatic offensives." South Korea was led at the time by the authoritarian Park Chung-hee, another president-for-life driven in large part by a near-religious hatred of Communism. The Asian People's Anti-Communist League (APACL) lay at the heart of this ROC–South Korean shared interest, and so Chiang, speaking before friends and allies, lambasted Nixon's "appeasement," pledging that he and Park would instead fight to the end. Nixon and Kissinger were drifting into "wishful thinking," Chiang alleged, and that road leads to "compromise with evil."[135] From Seoul, Chiang flew to Mexico City, where he delivered another fiery speech, this time addressing the far-right World Anti-Communist League (WACL). This speech pointed a scolding finger at "the international air of appeasement," which was coddling the "dark-scheming Communists" by engaging in "a smiling-face offensive."[136]

If the CPC's rhetoric was demanding but honest, and if Kissinger's and Nixon's rhetoric was duplicitous and deceptive, then Chiang's and the KMT's rhetoric was *fanatical* in its hatred of the Communists, *delusional* as regards future military actions against China, and *condescending* toward the United States, the nation without which "Free China" would not exist. The rhetorical schema I am arguing for here would suggest that the outbursts quoted above were likely driven, at least in part, by Chiang's rage at not having been consulted in the U.S.-China deliberations of 1971 and 1972. The secrecy Kissinger and Nixon so prized left their allies punching in the dark, in this case in the form of overheated rhetoric that only further strained the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It would be reasonable to speculate that Chiang's and the KMT's rhetorical extremism was a byproduct of Nixon and Kissinger's obsessive secrecy, suggesting that the United States' rhetoric of marginal significance and abeyance was consistently, albeit unintentionally, escalatory. On the other hand, it is also safe to conclude that by 1972 neither Nixon nor Kissinger held out any hope for Chiang magically becoming a moderate advocate of democracy and regional peace; they must have known he would blast any rapprochement with China, meaning his habitual intransigence made it less likely the Americans would even consider his opinion. The condescension and anger flowed in both directions. In fact, Taylor reports that by this time Chiang "hated him [Nixon] even more than Stilwell,"[137] hence the bitter irony of the Generalissimo hurling at Nixon the very curses Republicans once used to tar the allegedly weak Truman—*appeasement*, *wishful thinking*, *compromise with evil*.

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Conclusion: On Secrecy, Spectacle, and Betrayal

In *Kissinger's Shadow*, Grandin argues that the Nixon/Kissinger White House produced "a dynamic coupling of secrecy and spectacle."[138] As I have shown here, the two American leaders sought secret agreements with the Chinese that could then be spun to fill their domestic needs via spectacular televised events, what we saw Hanhimäki call "shock announcements."[139] In fact, Tyler reports that even before the substance of the Shanghai Communiqué was drafted, President Nixon "was already thinking television, pageantry, and extravaganza"; Tyler also avers that for Nixon "the public-relations side of the trip dominated everything."[140] Nixon was so enamored of this version of secret-diplomacy-as-eventual-public-spectacle that when Air Force One (renamed "The Spirit of '76" for the occasion) left Andrews Air Force Base to begin the historic "journey for peace" in 1971, the Nixon team gathered around a television set, watching from inside the plane the live national news coverage being shot of them from outside the plane.[141] The *New York Times* warned of the inherent tension between "spectacle and substance," noting that "one of the great TV spectaculars of this or any other year" was clearly rife with "genuine danger."[142] As I have demonstrated, the Nixon White House sought to overwhelm the critical-thinking capacity of the public and bypass anything like congressional oversight via the production of such illusions. Even as President Nixon embarked on his televised spectacle, he ordered the "largest one-day tonnage" of bombing Vietnam had suffered in the past four years, hence sending the signal that he could not be pushed around.[143] Nixon would pursue peace with China by dealing on Taiwan and escalating the war in Vietnam all while smiling for the cameras at home.

Examining Nixon's handling of the media thus confirms the insights of Guy DeBord, who argued in *The Society of the Spectacle* that postmodern life was becoming a blizzard of white noise meant to facilitate consumption, alienation, and non-democratic politics. "The spectacle," DeBord wrote, "manifests itself as an enormous positivity out of reach and beyond dispute," making it "inaccessible to any projected review or correction. *It is the opposite of dialogue*."[144] Nixon's and Kissinger's handling of this pattern, wherein communication rotates from secret dealings conducted behind closed doors to public spectacles delivered before stunned audiences, offers a perfect example of DeBord's anti-deliberative society of spectacles.[145]

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As we now know, this oscillation from secrecy to spectacle is exceptionally dangerous. Robert Hariman and Francis A. Beer have argued that "prudential reasoning depends on full deliberation," meaning "it behooves those who wish to be prudent to insure that their decision making culture contains real differences of opinion and perspectives," thus creating a robust communicative environment for "democratic accountability."[146] Neither Nixon nor Kissinger imagined themselves as prudent, of course, yet DeBord's and Hariman and Beer's comments help to position the president and his national security advisor not so much as audacious and game-changing as reckless and dishonest. Nonetheless, once their surprises grew cold it was clear that we—Americans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Taiwanese alike—had been left, as Ambrose describes it, with "a maze of lies, half-truths, innuendos, [and] cover ups."[147] In his essay on secrecy and disclosure, Black reminds us that "the prizing of sincerity is a demand that things be what they seem";[148] but the dialectic of secrecy/spectacle authored by Nixon and Kissinger makes sincerity virtually impossible. This is why Berman argues that "Nixon and Kissinger's obsession with secrecy would have disastrous consequences" for both American democracy and the people of Asia.[149] Whether it was the war in Vietnam or their subterfuge regarding China and Taiwan, Nixon and Kissinger sacrificed any notion of transparent, honest communication on the short-term altar of geopolitical advantage, suggesting to the Chinese that the United States was not a truthful broker.

Over the coming years, as the full extent of Nixon and Kissinger's dishonesty was realized in Peking, and as the United States continued to arm Taiwan, successive generations of Chinese leaders were left baffled at how "the earnest Americans [were] blatantly rescinding the most important commitment they had made."[150] It eventually dawned on the Chinese: Nixon and Kissinger had used them. As a result, the CPC would henceforward jettison any acknowledgment of the rhetorical subtleties discussed herein and, making use of their own "running room," would instead claim that their demands regarding Taiwan had been met. If Nixon and Kissinger could say one thing in private, only to say other, different things in public, so would the CPC. Thus, when the "normalization" of relations between the United States and China was finally announced by President Jimmy Carter on December 15, 1978 (effective January 1, 1979), the CPC released a statement which read, in part: "The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. *It has now been resolved.*"[151] Kissinger and Nixon's deceptions

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thus led the Chinese to engage in their own rhetorical unilateralism. The warm "embrace of the motherland," extended in an effort to "reunify the country," would henceforward proceed with the understanding that Taiwan's fate was "entirely China's internal affair."[152] Its worst fears confirmed, Taiwan would limp into the future, shackled with the sense of dismay and disregard created by the rhetoric of marginal significance.

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CHAPTER FOUR

We Prefer to Stay Single, 1990–1998

The Watergate scandal and the president's forced resignation in 1974 derailed President Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's secret promises, media spectacles, and political machinations regarding China and Taiwan. Then Chiang Kai-shek died in the spring of 1975, and Chou and Mao followed in 1976, meaning all of the key players—save Kissinger—passed from the stage before U.S.-China-Taiwan relations reached any resolution. Nonetheless, the momentum these Long Cold War figures had built toward "normalizing" relations hung over the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, who both felt obligated to complete the process.[1] Much like Nixon, Carter appraised the potential of China and concluded that "the United States could not forever ignore reality."[2] Following multiple rounds of secret talks with the Chinese, surviving "all-out civil war" within his administration,[3] and hailing the goal of "advanc[ing] peace," Carter announced the "normalization" on December 15, 1978, with the agreement becoming effective on New Year's Day, 1979.[4] Carter worked closely on the deal with Deng Xiaoping, who linked normalization with the United States to his "opening and reform" program in post-Mao China. Thus imagining a change of politics in both China and in U.S.-China relations, Carter felt a sense of accomplishment: "These decisions within China, as well as those affecting the relationship between our two nations,

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have resulted in perhaps the most important changes in the worldwide economic and political landscape during the past thirty years."[5]

While Carter believed this breakthrough pointed toward global peace, the Generalissimo's son and heir, Chiang Ching-kuo, was devastated. His worst nightmare come true, Chiang roared from Taipei, "Our country and people have reached the critical moment of life or death."[6] Protesters marched on the U.S. Embassy in Taipei carrying signs calling the deal "a cowardly concession" and an "infamous betrayal."[7] In her novel about these events, Shawna Yang Ryan depicts protesters hanging banners with Lady Justice weeping, her scales once again tilted in the wrong direction.[8] Having suffered slights and snubs for generations, here was the final, bitter fruit of the rhetoric of marginal significance.

On the other side of the Strait, the CPC released a statement: "The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. *It has now been resolved*."[9] When Deng met with U.S. legislators in Washington in early January, he assured them that in exchange for "the Nationalists giving up their sovereignty," Taiwan could "retain its government" and "remain fully autonomous," hence succumbing to what has come to be known as the "one country, two systems" arrangement.[10] The PRC believed that "unification" was now just a question of details and timing. To celebrate this fact, on New Year's Day 1979, the CPC released a triumphant "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan."[11] Including the old canard that "Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times," and claiming that "people in all walks of life in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland," the "Message" framed normalization as achieving the "reunification of the motherland," thus fulfilling "the sacred mission history has handed to our generation."[12] But these big claims were yet another moment of CPC overreach. President Carter indicated in his December 15 announcement and in a follow-up news conference of January 17, 1979, that he had reminded the Chinese how, according to the protocols established in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, unification needed to happen in a consensual manner without the use of force—hence reaffirming Taiwan's de facto veto over any CPC plans for unification.[13]

Given the ambiguities and confusions surrounding the "normalization," the deal met with a variety of responses. When Deng visited New York City to celebrate normalization, throngs of pro-Taiwan activists marched in protest, carrying signs reading "Keep China Free."[14] What the New York protesters did not know was

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that the Carter White House, in consultation with Presidents Ford and Nixon, had committed to protecting Taiwan from any aggressive action by China. First, throughout the normalization negotiations, Carter's team had hinted to the Chinese that America would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan, per the language of the Shanghai Communiqué. When Deng figured out what the Americans were suggesting, he thundered that this arrangement was "completely unacceptable"; yet the agreement went forward via slippery language that Tyler called "mumbo jumbo" and that Senator Jacob K. Javitz described as "sketchy and incomplete."[15] Second, even while negotiating normalization, the Carter White House was collaborating with congressional allies on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).[16]

First introduced as the Taiwan Enabling Act, and passed that spring after intense congressional debate, the TRA mandates that the United States "preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan." The TRA locks in the U.S. "expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means." To enable the Taiwanese to protect themselves in the event of an invasion from China, the TRA pledges, "the United States shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." While the normalization deal with China meant the U.S. Embassy in Taiwan and the ROC Embassy in Washington had to close, the TRA empowered a new entity, the nongovernmental, embassy-but-not-an embassy "American Institute in Taiwan" (AIT), to oversee the provisions of the bill.[17] The stunned Deng complained that the TRA "disregards the norms governing international relations" and "violates the principles embodied in the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations."[18] As one scholar has noted, this combination of events in 1978 and 1979 left many observers convinced that U.S. foreign policy regarding China and Taiwan was "ambiguous and contradictory."[19] To the Chinese, the lesson was as bitter in 1979 as it had been in 1972: dishonest American politicians had spoken of normalization with the PRC while maintaining military relations with Taiwan, hence amounting to a fundamental "betrayal" of China's interests.[20]

The episode left all parties feeling bruised. In the eyes of the Chinese, the United States had again deployed the rhetoric of geostrategic deception. Moreover, by the TRA cementing into law the United States' policy of arming Taiwan—again demonstrating America's unlimited ability to intercede at the time, location, and means of its choosing—the bill left the Chinese smarting from the sting of the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism. At the same time, even the passage of the TRA could not massage the bitter wound of getting dropped as a formal ally, meaning the

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Taiwanese yet again felt their American allies had disrespected them by deploying the rhetoric of marginal significance.

And so U.S.-China-Taiwan relations slouched along, now governed by the dueling imperatives of Carter's normalization deal and the countervailing TRA, all while veiled in the nuanced language of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. Outraged by this delicate dance, President Ronald Reagan, a longtime Taiwan supporter and arch-anti-Communist, tried to clarify the situation by offering the Taiwanese his "Six Assurances" in July 1982. The "assurances" restated that no force should be used by China, and confirmed that America "will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing" (assurance number 3) and "will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC" (assurance number 6).[21] Along with the 1979 TRA, Reagan's 1982 Six Assurances offered Taiwan a sense of U.S.-enforced breathing room, more latitude for Kissinger's "abeyance" to follow its long-term historical trajectory. Not yet grasping the nuances of the democratic process in America, and therefore not understanding the processes underwriting the jarring flip-flops from Nixon to Carter to Reagan, the CPC was left with only one conclusion: America was again deploying geostrategic deception.

With this context in place, I want now to leap ahead to the mid-1990s. For even while the tangled U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship shuffled along, both confusing and at times maddening Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush, a political revolution was brewing in Taiwan. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of Taiwan's transition from the KMT's brutal domination into the rollicking, multiparty, free-speech-loving nation that Taiwan is today, but it is important to note that as Taiwan democratized, so the delicate U.S.-China-Taiwan dance evolved in exciting and sometimes dangerous ways.[22] Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui managed that political revolution with a deft touch and an at times provocative glee. China's President Jiang Zemin opposed this democratic revolution in Taiwan at every turn, while U.S. President Bill Clinton responded with foreign policy that alternated between bold and charming, confused and erratic, ultimately resulting in the devastating "three noes."

Mr. Democracy and the Roller Coaster Ride in U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

For both internal governance reasons and external image reasons, Chiang Ching-kuo realized that Taiwan needed to transition toward a more pluralistic society, and so he

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initiated baby steps in this direction, including trying to staff KMT leadership posts with more Taiwanese. The Generalissimo's son therefore appointed Lee Teng-hui as his vice president in 1984. Lee had risen through the KMT as a capable administrator, first working on the party's Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction, then as mayor of Taipei, and then as governor of Taiwan Province. The younger Chiang then lifted Taiwan's long-standing state of martial law on July 14, 1987, further stoking the hopes of those Taiwanese who longed for democracy.[23] When Chiang died in January 1988, Lee became interim president; then, in 1990, he was selected by the KMT to fulfill a full six-year term. It was only then that Lee began to reveal that he was not an old-school KMT apparatchik. Instead, President Lee was a stalwart supporter of democracy, a nationalist who envisioned a new sense of Taiwanese identity, and an outward-looking cosmopolitan who cherished strong ties to the United States. He took every opportunity to hammer the authoritarians on the other side of the Strait. As one consequence of these roles—none of them wedded to a CPC-style understanding of "one China"—Lee launched U.S.-China-Taiwan relations on what Chien-min Chao has called a "roller coaster ride."[24]

The nation's first native-born Taiwanese leader, Lee had studied in World War II–era Imperial Japan and served as an anti-aircraft gunner in the Imperial Army; postwar, he worked toward (but did not complete) an MA from Iowa State and then earned a PhD from Cornell University in 1968.[25] He was a devotee of both Zen Buddhism and Presbyterianism, and was never comfortable in Mandarin, preferring to speak and write in Japanese, Taiwanese Hokkien, and, occasionally, English. As one of his biographers wrote, "Lee's assimilation in Japanese culture and language marked him," for both the KMT and CPC elite, "as a colonized subject at best and a traitor at worst."[26] He "incarnated everything," Henry Kissinger wrote, that "Beijing detested in a Taiwanese official."[27] Lee demonstrated his new mode of governing on February 22, 1988, early in his dangerous days as Chiang's successor, by holding a two-hour press conference during which he fielded questions from reporters from around the world. With just this one gesture, Lee signaled a new era of political openness and responsiveness.[28] Then, on the heels of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the parallel protests that shook Taiwan, Lee recognized that Taiwan needed to chart a different course, one that outraged both the old-school KMT and the mainland's Communists.[29]

While Lee believed history was hurtling past "the tired old guard in Peking," his local concerns focused on the KMT's hard-right wing, which still controlled the military.[30] As Chen-Wei Lin has argued, "Lee's only option for political survival

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was to create a moderate reformist block within the KMT."[31] Jockeying amidst these dangerous camps and competing pressures, Lee announced his democracy agenda in his inaugural address of May 20, 1990. Just six sentences into his speech, following the usual opening niceties, Lee offered this salvo: "The pursuit of political democracy, economic liberalization, and world peace by all of humanity is now a raging, irresistible tide that will inevitably destroy the shackles of systems that refuse to change with the times and the stockades of closed, totalitarian ideologies." Explicitly ripping the CPC and implicitly chiding the anti-democratic elements within the KMT, Lee announced that the dream of "our national reunification" would only come true if led by a democratic Taiwan. Having made his mandatory nod toward unification, Lee then uncorked his key line: "I wish to reiterate that the Republic of China is an independent and sovereign nation."[32] Lee projected Taiwan's evolving democracy as a critique of the CPC's tired Communism and as a cosmopolitan movement in touch with global trends, all while declaring the nation's independence. It would not be long before Lee was widely celebrated as "Mr. Democracy."[33] Yet the new president also tried to soften the impact of his bold rhetoric by revoking the old KMT language describing the mainland government as part of a "Communist rebellion."[34] As far as Lee was concerned, bluster about the Chinese Civil War was foolish—the war was long over. And so Lee asserted Taiwan's sovereignty while, in a historic change of tone, acknowledging the legitimacy of the CPC's reign in Beijing.

While Lee asserted a new sense of Taiwanese strength, at the same time offering Beijing an olive branch, the KMT's PR machinery kicked into high gear. Readers of the *New York Times* encountered a propaganda blitz on Sunday, May 20, 1990, when the paper ran a series of advertisements celebrating Lee's inauguration and Taiwan's turn to democracy. Weapons contractor Grumman, a chief beneficiary of the United States' military support of the ROC, offered Lee a secular benediction: "May he lead his people in peace, progress, and prosperity."[35] An advertisement made to look like a news story, and headlined "The ROC Turns to the Development of Chinese Culture," claimed "the cultural renaissance now taking place in Taiwan is nothing short of breathtaking."[36] A few pages later, readers encountered a tribute to responsible energy production from the Taiwan Power Company flanked by another story/advertisement titled "Pragmatic Diplomacy Flexibly Applied." While the Communists spent the summer of 1989 mowing down peaceful protesters around Tiananmen Square, and then arresting the survivors by the tens of thousands, these ads celebrated Taiwan as a democratic beacon of civilization, making it both "an

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attractive international business partner" and an appealing ally.[37] To lock in the perception of Lee's democratic Taiwan as the antithesis of Deng's Communist China, another story/advertisement, "The Question of China's Reunification," noted that in May 1989 Taiwan was blanketed with "rallies in support of the mainland democracy movement," and that in June 1989 Lee "issued a statement condemning the Tiananmen Square massacre."[38] Americans enticed by such messaging and thinking of visiting were reassured by another ad announcing that "the new Grand Hyatt Taipei has made its grand entrance."[39] And never fear, getting to Taiwan is easy, as a stylized map printed by China Airlines situated Taipei at the center of the democratic world, with flights linking Taipei to New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Amsterdam, and more.[40] Produced by the Kwang Hwa Mass Communications firm, the ads portray Taiwan as an emerging gem, complete with easy travel access, fancy hotels, fine culture, and a U.S.-friendly government committed to democracy.

The one-two punch of positive coverage of Lee's inaugural and the advertising blitz surely helped Taiwan's standing with American audiences, yet Lee faced daunting tasks at home. And so, Lee convened a landmark gathering of the nation's political leaders—including many whom the anti-democratic hard-liners would have likely imprisoned—for a week-long National Affairs Conference (NAC) meant to accelerate the nation's democratic reforms. As Richard Kagan has observed, the June 1990 NAC "sparked a nationwide catharsis."[41] More than just public goodwill, however, Lee was after another goal: As described by Katutugu Yoshida, the wily politician sought to enable "the KMT reformists" with whom he was allied to "utilize pressure by the DPP [the opposition Democratic Progressive Party] . . . to help them win the intra-party struggle with the KMT right-wingers," thus pushing the anti-democratic hard-liners to the fringes of power.[42] Lee thus supported his bold democracy rhetoric by building a more inclusive and transparent political process, all while easing out forces aligned with the Chiang dynasty. Particularly in the shadow of the TSM, this turn in Taiwanese politics thrilled many American supporters, who could now envision U.S. interests in the region evolving not with the KMT's "vile dictatorship" but alongside the enlightened Lee and his reformist allies.[43]

As Lee made these moves toward democracy, he waged bureaucratic war within the KMT and tried to coopt the radical demands of grassroots activists; yet he also presided over what was still a powerful political machine. Ping-hui Liao has noted that when Lee assumed control, the KMT held "some 40 percent of the stocks of the three major official TV channels," earned "15 percent of gross national product," held "40 percent of national capital," and carried "17 percent of the population" on

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its payrolls.[44] The KMT enjoyed remarkable control over Taiwan's media, economic functions, finances and wealth, and hiring practices, meaning "Mr. Democracy" ran point on an immense political machine that was still far from democratic.

Throughout these early years of his presidency, Lee offered fascinating twists on the notion of "unification" between Taiwan and China. Speaking before the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei in July 1991, he merged his pro-democracy, anti-CPC, and pro-Taiwan positions when he observed that "Chinese Communist authorities have succeeded temporarily in suppressing the people's clamor for freedom and democracy with machine guns and tanks." In contrast, Lee envisioned Taiwan's democracy becoming a model for other Asian nations. Then, in his key line, he proffered how "the Taiwan experience will be the beacon that guides China's future."[45] That beacon featured values intended to guarantee continued U.S. support for Taiwan. In fact, in an interview with a French journalist, Lee invoked Abraham Lincoln's immortal words to promise that Taiwan's new democracy would be "of the people, by the people, and for the people."[46]

In the speech and interview quoted above, Lee described the march of this new democratic spirit as "irresistible." "Mr. Democracy" was so confident of the conversionary pull of such ideals that in his first press conference following his inauguration in 1990, he speculated that "in the coming six years, we are sure to have a chance *to return to the mainland* and transplant our experience to help all Chinese people be free from living in hardship and bondage." Lee used this same interview to again declare that "the Republic of Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country."[47] While his projected six-year window of opportunity never arrived, yet again in 1999 he wrote that he anticipated "China as a whole will move toward the Taiwan model."[48] And so Lee—echoing the foundational myth of Chiang Kai-shek's KMT—spoke of a triumphant Taiwanese return to the mainland. But, instead of echoing the old KMT canard about reconquering the mainland with military force, Lee instead envisioned an "independent and sovereign" Taiwan pulling China into a political future driven by a democracy so irresistible that it would convert the Communists into the God-fearing stepchildren of Lincoln.[49]

Thus, across his early speeches, interviews, articles, and editorials published in papers around the world, Lee authored a new strand within the rhetorical history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication: *the rhetoric of democracy as conversion*. The phrase points to Lee's advocacy for democracy, the Christian overtones of his language—which mirrored what Kagan has called Lee's "spiritual mission"—and the deft ways his rhetoric echoed a long-lasting American sense of democracy as

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offering not only good governance but the pull of salvation.[50] Even as Lee spoke in favor of peace—he was no imperialist—his faith in the conversionary power of democracy echoed a missionary version of manifest destiny, wherein Christian Democrats ride to the rescue of those toiling in darkness.

Within U.S. rhetorical history, these terms became important in the mid-nineteenth century, when the nation first began to consider the consequences of its continental ambitions. For example, in 1844, as the nation stretched westward, Senator James Buchanan announced that "Providence has given to the American people a great and glorious mission to perform, of extending the blessings of Christianity and of civil and religious liberty." Buchanan called for aggressive action "to fulfill our destiny."[51] John L. O'Sullivan then popularized "Manifest Destiny" in the pages of the *Democratic Review*, where he linked U.S. ambitions with "the manifest design of Providence."[52] Such talk went global following the U.S. Civil War, first via the Spanish-American War of 1898 and then via the international roles foisted upon the United States by World War I. By the post–World War II era, Secretary of State Dean Acheson could write with cheerful clarity about the need to "save the souls of the heathen Chinese."[53] The trope of democracy-as-conversion, and perhaps even as salvation, was so embedded in U.S rhetorical history that in the early days following 9/11, President George W. Bush referred to the perpetrators of the attacks upon America as "a new kind of evil" that warranted the United States launching "*this crusade*, this war on terrorism."[54] From Senator Buchanan in 1844 to President Bush in 2001, leaders portrayed American democracy as sanctioned by God, as nothing less than a crusade pursuing the salvation of the world. James Peck argues that this manifest-destiny-style rhetoric is crucial to understanding the long history of U.S.-China relations. While "the worldwide battlefield of anticommunism" offered "a superb rationale for the central role of state power," amounting to an Evil Other to fight against, Peck argues that post–World War II American leaders evolved a frame of "visionary globalism," wherein U.S.-style notions of the good and the right would transform the fallen, ideally in China.[55] Lee's notion of Taiwan's democracy offering the only way for China to move forward—and hence his appropriation of American-style manifest destiny and visionary globalism—illustrate how he marshaled the rhetoric of democracy as conversion.

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Imagining Conversion: God Bless the Republic of China

To try to create a wider, more international venue for Taiwan, Lee maneuvered around the wishes of President Bill Clinton and the U.S. State Department to deliver the annual Spencer T. and Ann W. Olin Lecture at Cornell University on June 9, 1995.[56] Lee had staged visits in the preceding years to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and more, in some cases circumventing a CPC backlash by engaging in "vacation diplomacy," whereby he avoided governing chambers and embassies while meeting with foreign leaders on golf courses and in other informal venues.[57] These trips were largely successful, and so he turned his sights on a similar trip to the United States, initially working an awkward stopover at the airport in Honolulu; then he sought to visit the U.S. mainland.[58] To facilitate the process, Lee and his team hired Cassidy and Associates, a prominent PR firm with ties to the Democrats, and launched what Richard C. Bush has called "a broad and sophisticated campaign to pressure the Clinton administration."[59]

The Clinton White House initially resisted, fearing that a Lee visit to the United States would violate the spirit of the 1979 deal with China and the nebulous "one China" policy. But Taiwan supporters, led by Newt Gingrich (R-GA), the House Speaker and leader of an intense anti-Clinton backlash, kicked into high gear and the White House was soon flooded with arguments in favor of a Lee visit.[60] Clinton's opponents even sought to persuade the president by criticizing the rhetoric of marginal significance, noting that by denying Lee a visa, the United States was "treating Taiwan like an international pariah."[61] But Secretary of State Warren Christopher confirmed with Chinese diplomats in April 1995 that the United States would not allow Lee to set foot on the American mainland. By holding firm, Clinton committed the sin, so one Taiwan supporter argued, of "going to ludicrous lengths to placate Beijing."[62] In response, Gingrich and his allies brought concurrent resolutions before the U.S. Congress supporting Lee's proposed visit; in May, they won a 396–0 victory in the House and a 97–1 victory in the Senate.[63] Foreshadowing an argument President Lee would soon embrace, the resolution declared that Taiwan was "a model emerging democracy, with a free press, free elections, stable democratic institutions, and human rights protections," hence meriting America's respect and support.[64]

Faced with mounting public pressure and this bipartisan congressional statement, the White House relented on May 21, 1995, when it announced Clinton would allow Lee to enter the United States.[65] Clinton put a positive spin on the process:

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> In the American culture there is a constitutional right to travel and a constitutional right to speak. And as a man who has almost never missed any of his high school or college reunions, I just felt I ought to give him the same opportunity. It was not an abrogation of our one-China policy in any way. It was a recognition of something that's special in our culture about the rights we accord individuals who obey our laws and comport themselves appropriately.[66]

Clinton thus transformed Congress's forcing the Lee visit upon him into an indicator of "something that's special" about America's commitment to free speech. Privately, however, the Clinton White House was fuming, assuming that the CPC would perceive Lee's visit as an abrogation of the tenuous "one China" policy. The records are still classified, but in the archives of the WJCPL, one of the thousands of withdrawal sheets marking where the National Archives has withheld sensitive materials indicates that a "Taiwan Démarche"—historically understood as a diplomatic reprimand wherein one power expresses its displeasure with another—is missing from the files.[67] We can only speculate as to what this classified document said, and to whom it was sent.[68] Scholars can access a set of AIT talking points from May 1995, however, wherein American diplomats in Taipei were tasked with telling Lee "not to embarrass the United States."[69]

Clinton's worst concerns came true, for while Lee's PhD alma mater, Cornell, provided the cover for him to claim to be doing personal alumnus work—"a private visit" is how the U.S. Congress described it in the resolution—Lee's speech was a full-throated call for Taiwanese independence and a ringing endorsement of democracy-as-conversion. Precisely as Clinton feared, the speech left the CPC feeling "outraged, embarrassed, and betrayed" by the White House.[70] With a large crowd of expatriate TIM activists gathered outside the hall waving flags and placards while chanting for Taiwanese independence, President Lee was welcomed to the stage by thunderous applause and a glowing introduction by Frank Rhodes, the president of Cornell. Wearing a swanky gray suit and a silver tie, his hair slicked back in his trademark style, a beaming Lee—the picture of cosmopolitan sophistication—opened his speech with a blast at the CPC, announcing, "Communism is dead or dying." In contrast to authoritarian repression, and virtually quoting the congressional resolution that forced Clinton's hand, Lee proclaimed Taiwan a beacon of democracy, where free speech reigns and "human rights are respected and protected." Lee then segued into his rhetoric of democracy as conversion, announcing that the "peaceful reunification of China" will only happen "under

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FIGURE 11. Embodying the CPC's worst nightmare, President Lee Teng-hui appeared on the cover of the international edition of *Time* magazine, on June 19, 1995. Photograph from the cover originally taken by Najlah Feanny Hicks. © held by and image used with permission of the artist.

a system of democracy, freedom, and equitable distribution of wealth." That is, reunification will only occur on Taiwan's terms.[71] These lines received a standing ovation, giving the supposedly private and nonpolitical alumni event the feel of a political rally.[72]

Lee then began a section of the speech characterizing "my country" as "a friendly and capable partner for progress" with the other nations of the world. As for the United States, "we stand ready to enhance the mutually beneficial relations between our two nations . . . our two countries." That makes for four uses of the terms of sovereignty—*country* (twice), *nation*, and international *partner*—before Lee placed Taiwan "among the family of nations." In a closing flourish that must have sounded Reaganesque in its godly conviction, Lee borrowed a line that is achingly familiar to all Americans: "I say God bless you, God bless Cornell University, God bless the United States of America, and God bless the Republic of China."[73] Here was the CPC's worst nightmare: a Taiwanese politician speaking in English before an adoring audience, complete with a raucous crowd rallying in the streets, with his words draped in one of the oldest and most cherished narratives in U.S. rhetorical

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history. Lee's speech offered tribute to the genius of U.S.-style free speech, celebrated a coming age of globalizing democracy, and blessed the joyous affinity of American and Taiwanese interests, all while appropriating the righteous missionary zeal of Christianity.[74] As if to confirm China's worst fears and Taiwan's best hopes, the international edition of *Time* magazine splashed Lee across its cover (see figure 11), announcing "Taiwan's rising global importance."

Beijing's response to Lee's visit and his rhetoric of democracy as conversion reminded many observers of the early days of the Long Cold War. *People's Daily* invoked the ghost of MacArthur while fuming, "Although the United States claims to recognize only one China, deep down it does not want China to be unified, and is always looking for an excuse to engineer 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' in an attempt to keep Taiwan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for the United States."[75] Repeating one of the central themes of this book, China's President Jiang Zemin framed Lee's visit as further evidence of the PRC getting "bullied and humiliated by various powers."[76] Not yet conversant in the labyrinthine modes of U.S. democracy, and thus seeing the Lee visit as an intentional snub of China rather than a Republican-orchestrated slap at an unpopular Democratic president, "Beijing viewed the event as further proof of a Western conspiracy against China."[77] The CPC's propaganda machinery thus churned in high gear, producing what John Copper has called a "salvo of hate speech against Lee Teng-hui" and what Bruce Gilley has characterized as "a guns-blazing propaganda assault."[78]

The Party matched its hard words with strong actions. First, on June 17, the CPC recalled its ambassador from Washington.[79] Then, seeking to indicate that any forthcoming political conversions would be authored by the CPC and Communism heading east across the Strait, not by Taiwan and Christian democracy heading west toward the mainland, the PLA began threatening military maneuvers in July. To add a little more Cold War–era thump to the threats, the PLA detonated a 20–80 kiloton nuclear blast at their test facility in Lop Nor, high in the desert of Xinjiang.[80] These maneuvers continued through the summer of 1995, with some observers wondering if Jiang Zemin was using the political theater to placate "strong nationalistic currents" within the PLA, who, still smarting from the debates that followed the 1989 TSM, hoped to reassert their dominance over China's political processes.[81] Throughout this season of discontent, the Party reprised the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, barking that "China today is no longer the old China that was weak, could be bullied, and allowed itself to be trampled upon, but is a dragon that stands firm in the East."[82]

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U.S.-China relations were so fraught in the summer of 1995 that the Clinton White House, searching for bipartisan answers, met with veteran Republican foreign-policy experts. On July 13, President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, chief of staff Leon Panetta, national security advisor Anthony Lake, his deputy Samuel R. Berger, and NSC member Robert Suettinger met with the dean of U.S. foreign policy, Henry Kissinger; President Reagan's former secretary of state, Alexander Haig; international capitalist tycoon Maurice R. Greenberg; and John Whitehead, the World War II hero, Republican heavy hitter, and former deputy secretary of state under President Reagan. Just returned from a visit to China under the aegis of the U.S.-China Society, the four came to the White House to deliver the unhappy news, as summarized by Greenberg, that they had "never seen relations as bad as they are now." Having absorbed round after round of rage from their Chinese hosts, the Republicans warned Clinton and his team that "we can't tamper with the 'one China' policy." Worried that Clinton's actions with Lee foreshadowed additional changes in U.S. foreign policy regarding Asia, and marshaling his knack for the grand historical gesture, Kissinger announced, "Everything depends on the state of U.S.-China relations." He knew the storm was not entirely of Clinton's making, however, and so he confided in his White House hosts that he believed "the Republicans in Congress . . . are behaving very irresponsibly on this issue." Torn between competing factions among the Democrats, and frustrated by what he perceived as the extremism of his Gingrich-led enemies, Clinton agreed with Kissinger's assessment of the toxic environment in Washington, saying, "it's like a funhouse." Channeling the experience of his marathon 1971 and 1972 meetings with Chou Enlai, Kissinger advised the president that the Chinese "love to talk about the big picture, engage in strategic dialogue . . . [redacted] . . . I really believe that if you consult with them—not just lecture them—they will respond."[83] Clinton took this advice to heart and began to mend relations by *engaging* Jiang Zemin, not *lecturing* him. Tensions seemed to calm down that autumn, when the two presidents met in New York City, on the sidelines of the events marking the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the UN.[84]

Despite that thaw, the PLA's hardline top brass kept pushing Jiang to take "a more hawkish policy"; Lee kept talking, and the first-ever presidential elections in Taiwan in 1996 unsettled the Party, which dreaded the flourishing of democracy.[85] Hence, by the spring of 1996—timed to serve as a chilling effect on Taiwan's presidential election that March, wherein Lee stood for election—the PLA was staging massive practice amphibious assaults along the coast and launching M9 and M11

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missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan's key ports.[86] As Nat Bellochi, a longtime U.S. diplomat, remarked, "missile firing was a rather crude way of reminding the Taiwanese to behave."[87] Those gestures were backed up with harsh words, as Tang Shubei, the deputy director of the CPC's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), announced that "We would not hesitate to use all means necessary, including military means, to achieve reunification of the motherland."[88] The CPC's propaganda machinery referred throughout this period to the areas around Xiamen, Fujian, and the Taiwan Strait as the "Nanjing war zone."[89] Hardline CPC elements were allegedly threatening nuclear war, as one PLA leader speculated with Charles W. Freeman, then a high-ranking U.S. official, that "you will not sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan."[90] These nuclear threats were quickly quashed, but the point is clear: Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion had flustered the CPC and rattled the PLA.[91] The fear that Clinton and Lee were reneging on the Shanghai Communiqué pushed the CPC toward an overreaction that amounted, as the *New York Times* characterized it, to "the bludgeoning of Taiwan."[92]

In response to what the *Los Angeles Times* called "China's saber rattling," and what Lee called China's "state terrorism," Clinton engaged in his own election-season bravado.[93] In an echo of President Truman's actions in the summer of 1950, Clinton ordered the USS *Nimitz* to join the USS *Independence* (along with their imposing support groups) in patrolling the region.[94] Repeating one of the oldest narrative threads in American post–World War II politics, observers celebrated Clinton for standing strong against the perceived Communist Other by engaging in armed "coercive diplomacy."[95] Other observers, however, warned that Clinton was deploying the world's most formidable aircraft carriers in a dangerous game of "nuclear gunboat diplomacy."[96] Some reports assumed the U.S. forces had entered the contested waters between Taiwan and China, yet the *Independence* battle group was actually stationed several hundred miles east of Taiwan, putting the armada not so much on China's doorstep as out in the Pacific Ocean.[97] While hardline U.S. figures spoke about defending Taiwan against Communist encroachment, America's defense elite were more prudent. According to *Preventive Defense*, the memoir by then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter (President Obama's eventual secretary of defense), "We concluded that we should send two carrier battle groups to patrol off Taiwan, but that they should not go into the exercise area. . . . We believed that this would send a message of capability and firmness, without undue provocation."[98] One Clinton administration official confided to the *Chicago Tribune* that "it was a drama, a play . . . not a precursor to military action."[99]

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Department of Defense news briefings made it clear that the United States and China were in close dialogue, leading Perry to conclude that "the Chinese do not intend to take any military action against Taiwan." Moreover, he noted that even if China wanted to attack, it "doesn't have the ability to launch an amphibious attack against Taiwan."[100] Speaking before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on March 14, 1996, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, said, "The PRC does not, in our judgment, intend to take direct military action against Taiwan." Rather, "this is psychological warfare."[101] Lord was no doubt referencing the same intelligence that lay behind Patrick Tyler's reporting, which included his noting that "the U.S. Embassy in Beijing has conveyed to Washington private assurances from senior Chinese officials that Beijing will not invade Taiwan."[102] And thus, as Kissinger later observed, the missile firings and subsequent U.S. responses were "equal parts military deterrent and political theater" prompted by Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion.[103] Yet, as was the case with the Quemoy incidents in 1954–1955, and the Nixon-Kissinger-Mao-Chou talks of 1971–1972, neither side wanted to go to war over Taiwan.

Thus, by the summer of 1996, the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship was grinding along in a familiar communicative pattern, where calibrated escalations sent signals about the consequences of radical moves, all while preventing any substantial progress in the nearly fifty-year-old impasse. But if the geopolitical chessboard and international communication dynamics seemed stuck, internal political developments in Taiwan were hurtling along, prodded largely by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which, from as early as the late 1980s, had "openly called for Taiwan independence."[104] With the DPP aggressively challenging the KMT for the hearts and minds of Taiwanese—prodding Lee to take stronger stands in public—the weak old line that the United States supported Taiwan because its authoritarian government was opposed to the CPC's derelict Communism shifted toward the stronger argument that America carried a moral burden to support a healthy and thriving democracy. As Phyllis Hwang argued in a *New York Times* editorial, "After surviving nearly five decades of Japanese colonial rule, a 1947 island-wide massacre of at least 20,000 native Taiwanese ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, and four decades of military rule under the Kuomintang, the people of Taiwan deserve more than double standards and backdoor diplomacy."[105] While this argument appealed to the supporters of human rights, democracy, and a sense of foreign-policy decency, other parties were quick to note that U.S. trade with Taiwan had surpassed $16 billion per year, more than the comparable rate with China, meaning American business

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interests supported protecting Taiwan and its lucrative markets.[106] Moreover, as they cherished their newly won political freedoms, so "Chinese threats made the people of Taiwan less likely than ever to consider unification."[107] The flowering of democracy in Taiwan, coupled with its emerging leadership in global markets and Lee's creative rhetoric, seemed to provide the Taiwanese with a newfound sense of national confidence and identity, many U.S. leaders with an expanding sense of obligation, and the CPC with a towering feeling of dread.

Jiang's Traumatized Nationalism and the Party's Postcolonial Colonialism

Within this context, President Jiang Zemin's "Eight-Point Policy" speech of January 30, 1995, stands as a poignant example of how the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism forecloses more creative foreign-policy alternatives.[108] Remember that the Japanese had assumed control of Formosa by treaty in 1895, and that Chiang's Nationalists first took the island in the summer of 1945, meaning by 1995 the island had been divorced from any Chinese leadership for one hundred years. Even prior to the Japanese takeover of 1895, the island had been wracked for centuries by the comings and goings of foreign empires, merchant multinationals, and rogue warlords, making Formosa's historical sense of sovereignty a deep mystery.[109] Nonetheless, Jiang's first sentence repeated the old line: "Taiwan is an integral part of China." Traumatized nationalism emerges in the next sentence: "The Chinese people will never forget the humiliating chapter of our history" when "Japanese imperialists" forced "betrayal and humiliation" upon China by instigating colonial rule in 1895.[110] For Jiang and the CPC, this bitter narrative stretched from political tensions in 1995 back to Japan's seizing Formosa in 1895 and on back to the Opium Wars, which Britain first launched in 1839—China was again struggling against colonial interference while pursuing its historically anointed greatness.[111]

Jiang's comments point to one of the major oddities in modern Chinese history: That the once revolutionary CPC, celebrated for generations as the engine driving China's anti-imperial and postcolonial politics, has relentlessly sought to reclaim pre-Communist imperial holdings. But as Emma Jinhua Teng notes, "the Qing incorporation of the island" was "only one incident in the much larger phenomenon of Qing expansionism, a phenomenon that scholars have recently begun to treat as an example of imperialism, comparable to European imperialisms."[112] This Qing

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imperialism was launched by "the invading Manchu dynasty" (the Mongolians who overthrew the Ming), meaning that Jiang's breezy enfolding of modern Taiwan into an imagined Chinese motherland erases multiple waves of invasion and colonization, thus creating a seamless—and fantastical—narrative of unbroken Chinese sovereignty.[113] As Benedict Anderson has argued, nation-states are imagined into being, thus embodying the power of constitutive rhetoric.[114] What makes Jiang's claims here so extraordinary is not their fictional, constitutive, and revisionist force, but the fact that they so clearly embody the emotional force of traumatized nationalism and the specific subset of claims that I have called China's emerging "postcolonial colonialism."[115] In this formation, the previously humiliated and anti-colonial revolutionaries strive for national greatness by trying to absorb their less powerful neighbors, returning to imperial glory while righting past wrongs. Hence the PRC becomes both a postcolonial and a colonizing power.

Jiang then leveled his key threat: Because the goal of reunifying the motherland is nonnegotiable, and because the question of Taiwan "is China's internal affair and brooks no foreign interference," so *war is a possibility*, meaning "we will not undertake not to use force."[116] As Christopher R. Hughes has noted, this attempt to envision a settlement, while at the same time threatening war if China does not get its way, amounts to "the fundamental contradiction in Beijing's policy."[117] The CPC could not see that contradiction, however, and so Jiang then switched to an imagined future. After the war of reunification has been won, he promised, "China will pursue the policy of 'one country, two systems,'" in which Taiwan will become—like Hong Kong and Macau—"a special administrative region."[118] If Taiwan as a wayward province were forcibly reincorporated, Jiang declared that henceforward it would be called "Chinese Taipei," a term that most Taiwanese have come to hate.[119] Thus, even as democracy was beginning to flourish in Taiwan, and even as U.S. President Clinton was on the verge of engaging in nuclear-armed gunboat diplomacy, so the CPC rolled out its old rhetorical warhorses. Sounding remarkably similar to Mao in 1949, Jiang called for *reunification* and *national sovereignty*, he portrayed Taiwan as *an inherent part of China*, and he warned against the catastrophes awaiting *foreign meddlers*. For these reasons, Jiang's speech was widely seen as a failure, both at home and abroad. For example, Robert Lawrence Kuhn notes in his otherwise effusive *The Man Who Changed China* that "foreign critics dismissed it for not offering anything new, while hardliners in China bashed it for being soft and weak."[120]

Jiang was then dealing with complicated domestic issues. First, long the glue holding together the CPC, and Jiang's chief backer, the retired Deng Xiaoping was

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ailing, raising questions about the future of Party leadership. Second, Jiang had no power base within the PLA, making his command of China's military forces tenuous. Third, Jiang's rivals, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, were jostling for prominence by marshaling "jingoistic nationalism," particularly regarding Taiwan.[121] Opposed to the fanaticism that led China down the path of the Cultural Revolution, yet needing to placate the military and neutralize his rivals, Jiang sought to thread the rhetorical needle by sounding both moderate and hardline, both willing to negotiate with Taipei yet setting nonnegotiable baselines. The difficult context Jiang was then facing was revealed by Robert Suettinger in an NSC memo written a year later. He noted that the "political situation in China is somewhat volatile," leading Jiang and other Party leaders to "stoke anti-foreign nationalism and [a] preoccupation with sovereignty."[122] Calling upon the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism offered Jiang a proven means of appealing to his compatriots' grievances, hence massaging the challenges of the moment.

Jiang's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism sought to turn embarrassments from the past into warrants for bold action in the present, predicting China's glorious future, even if that implied attacking Taiwan and perhaps the U.S. forces protecting the island. When this rhetorical format is marshaled against China's weaker neighbors, it amounts to a version of "postcolonial colonialism."[123] Wu Rwei-ren has used "anti-colonial colonialism" to describe China's vision of Taiwan, arguing that it has been driven by "an anti-colonial nationalism that sought to resist Western domination and defend its cultural identity by dominating its peripheral subjects."[124] The pull of this postcolonial colonialism is so strong that many Chinese scholars seem incapable of noticing it; for example, Qimao Chen refers to Jiang's "Eight-Point" speech not as another illustration of CPC bullying but as "a new opportunity in cross-straits relations" and as "a great contribution to the concept of peaceful reunification."[125] You Ji argues, on the other hand, that such gestures have little to do with actual war plans regarding Taiwan and more to do with rallying competing domestic factions around the push for greater military prowess. "The Taiwan issue can be used," You notes, "as a centripetal force that binds the leadership together and mobilizes popular support," albeit "under the one precondition that there is no real war."[126]

From this perspective, war talk about Taiwan serves the same function in China as did post-9/11 bravado in the United States, where a specific tragedy was marshaled into an infinitely flexible justification for the enrichment of the military-industrial complex.[127] For those who support a stronger, more modern,

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unbridled PLA, Taiwan is the gift that keeps giving—like the fear of separatism in Tibet, combating Taiwanese independence drives postcolonial colonialism, unites domestic rivals, and serves as the never-ending threat that calls for enormous military expenditures.[128]

Lee's Cheerful Rebuke: We Prefer to Stay Single

Despite Jiang's and the CPC's warnings, Taiwan's newly empowered voters turned out in dramatic numbers, leading Lee to a landslide victory in the spring of 1996.[129] Copper quotes an anonymous campaign official smirking, "We should give Jiang Zemin a medal. He was a super campaign aide."[130] America's newspaper of record praised Lee and Taiwan, celebrating the nation's "extraordinary march to democracy," characterizing the election as a brave "affront to the Communist Party leadership in Beijing," and speculating that the free and fair election "buries the legacy of a Nationalist dictatorship for good."[131] Peng Ming-min, the DPP candidate who lost the election (but who played such a heroic role advocating for democracy), capped election-night celebrations with an ultimatum: "We cannot reunify with a regime that launches missiles at us. . . . Taiwan must be an independent state from China."[132] Regardless of party affiliation, Shih-shan Henry Tsai reports, "there was a national backlash against China's military threats," with the Taiwanese reveling in a new sense of national identity.[133] Worse yet for the CPC, Chi Su summarizes the international response to the affair: "Beijing's saber-rattling provoked worldwide sympathy for Taiwan."[134] As both a regional power play and a global message, then, China's actions against Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 were failures; on the other hand, Lee's performance helped to produce what Copper has called "a public relations coup for the ROC."[135]

Perhaps the historic election gave Lee a sense of rhetorical leeway, or perhaps those U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast lent a sense of security, or perhaps he suspected that Jiang's blustery comments were intended mostly to bolster the Chinese premier's standing with domestic hardline audiences.[136] Or perhaps it was his intention to appropriate the rhetorical cutting edge from the DPP, or his abiding and Lincoln-like faith in the rhetoric of democracy as conversion, or perhaps his knowledge of the swelling worldwide sympathy for Taiwan. It may have been one, or none, or all of these factors combined—but President Lee responded to Jiang's hard words and the PLA's missiles with a barrage of bold claims, irreverent

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provocations, and glowing tributes to democracy. Channeling the spirit of the age, he announced on election night, "the door to democracy is now completely open."[137] A joyful celebration of Taiwan, such lines were also, as Tyler observed, "a forceful rebuke to mainland China."[138]

Following the election, Lee sharpened his arguments. Speaking with *Washington Post* reporters in 1997, he asserted—in a line that would have made Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon proud—"Taiwan is a symbol of American idealism: Freedom, democracy, and human rights." On the question of declaring independence, Lee scoffed: "We are an independent, sovereign country. . . . *Taiwan is already independent. There is no need to say so*." In a jab at the CPC, and in a clear echo of his 1990 and 1991 statements, when asked about the possible conditions of unification, he said, "When China becomes free, democratic, and has social justice—in that case, we will have unification."[139] The former Chiang appointee and KMT bureaucrat was evolving an uncompromising and Taiwan-centric voice.

Alongside these bold positions, Lee rejected the PRC's version of "one China." Speaking with the *New York Times* in 1998, he rebutted the claim that Taiwan is an inherent part of China, arguing instead that "I'm a Taiwan person first and a Chinese person second." Lee scoffed, "We prefer to stay single. Why get engaged if engagement is equivalent to becoming a local government and making ourselves slaves?"[140] Thus, in the face of the CPC threatening war, Lee portrayed Taiwan as a nation culturally separate from China, as a state politically independent from China, and as a proud democracy in opposition to the CPC's institutionalized "slavery." Lee's rhetorical campaign was clearly working in American circles, as Jonathan Mirsky summarized a typical U.S. response: "The plain fact is that Taiwan is independent. . . . It has a flag, a national anthem, an army, and a government, which now includes a democratically elected president." Trying to revise such "plain facts" behind the CPC's "one China" line, Mirsky argued, amounted to "the Big Lie."[141]

Lee's 1999 *The Road to Democracy* summarized many of his key claims before offering the assertion that Taiwan's evolving democracy "expresses our national identity and asserts our sovereignty and independence as a state."[142] Having launched his first full term as president with the same language in 1990, Lee here repeated the key phrase: *sovereignty and independence*. He reiterated it on July 9, 1999, in an interview with a radio reporter from *Deutsche Welle*, wherein Lee lamented how "Beijing authorities ignore the very fact that the two sides are two different jurisdictions." Rather than a Chinese motherland seeking to harbor what the CPC likes to call "a renegade group," Lee argued, cross-Strait relations

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should be conducted "as a state-to-state relationship." Then, in a key moment, Lee proclaimed, "there is no need to declare independence," for that status has long been established by facts on the ground. Having said that he need not utter the word "independence," Lee then did so, reminding listeners that in comparison to former colonies like Hong Kong and Macau, "the ROC is a sovereign, independent state." In a final flourish, Mr. Democracy returned to his signature line, his trope of democracy-as-conversion: "The Taiwan experience can serve as a catalyst for the modernization and democratization of the Chinese mainland."[143] While most U.S. media outlets commented upon these lines, *Newsday* took the escalatory step of headlining its article "Taiwan Declares Independence."[144] Lee followed up his controversial *Deutsche Welle* interview with an even more high-profile commentary in the November 1999 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, where he repeated the claim that "There is no need to warn against Taiwan's declaring independence, because the ROC has been sovereign and independent since its founding in 1912."[145]

While the trajectory of Lee's rhetoric had been clear for many years, the *New York Times* nonetheless referred to this string of comments as "dropping the bombshell."[146] And so, as Lee hoped would happen, the CPC responded with a flurry of angry rhetoric. Tang Shubei, vice-chairman of the CPC's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), responded by calling President Lee—in an epithet usually reserved for the Dalai Lama—"an incorrigible splittist."[147] Tang then warned that Lee's "crude sabotage of cross-straits relations" could "only cause disaster."[148] Xinhua roared that Lee was a "stark-naked splittist."[149] Suisheng Zhao has tracked down "more than 400 articles of such nature" from this period, amounting to a massive propaganda assault against Lee in particular and Taiwan in general.[150] In this way, Lee managed both to make his case for Taiwanese independence to the world, and to create an occasion for the Party to demonstrate once again that it was politically inflexible, rhetorically inept, and only too willing to threaten war. When the rhetoric of democracy as conversion was coupled with Lee's bold statements about Taiwanese independence, it triggered another round of China's traumatized nationalism, which, expressed via the Party's typical stridency and absolutism, highlighted the urgency of Lee's push for democracy.

Within this rhetorical logic, the news was not Lee reasserting Taiwanese independence, but the Party's yet again threatening war. In the *Washington Post*, an editorial began by quoting the Party's war-hawk rhetoric before concluding, "As a matter of fact, there can be no disputing Mr. Lee's observation," for China and Taiwan "have separate governments, currencies, armed forces, foreign policies, laws,

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television networks, customs, [and] airlines—they are, in other words, separate countries."[151] In the *Wall Street Journal*, longtime Taiwan friends James Lilley and Arthur Waldron asked, "Who can deny that, in reality, China and Taiwan are today distinct, independent, and sovereign states?"[152] In this formulation, the CPC's "one China" line is not a part of "reality"; rather, the Party's claims on Taiwan are just another example of post-Tiananmen Communist propaganda and delusion. The *Boston Globe* noted that the Party's responses to Lee demonstrated its "usual thuggish style" and argued that Taiwan "deserves our friendship, protection, and admiration," whereas China is but "a Communist dungeon ruled by a junta that enslaves prisoners, persecutes Christians, arms vicious terror-states, forcibly sterilizes women, and sends people to prison for talking about freedom."[153] For Lee, this dual outpouring of support for Taiwan and criticism of China amounted to a public relations coup.

Thinking stylistically, Lee's comments from this period indicate a dramatic break with typical Maoist and KMT bluster. Even while Jiang pounded away with revolutionary clichés, Lee responded with cheeky lines pulled from dating lingo. He casually dropped references to Communism-as-slavery and repeatedly announced that Taiwan's independence is so obvious that it need not be declared—only then to declare it. The PLA thought it could silence Lee by launching missiles into the Taiwan Strait, only to have him tell American reporters that "Taiwan is already independent." And so, if China's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism marshaled Mao-style bombast to cover old wounds and deep insecurities, Lee's cheerful provocations offered the complete opposite: a rhetor so confident in the righteousness of his nation's cause that he could laugh at his opponent's foolishness while making his case with aplomb. Lee's provocations nearly led two superpowers to blows, yet it is hard not to admire his gusto—*Taiwan is already independent*, and therefore, *we prefer to stay single*.

Considering how the United States has habitually interacted with Taiwan via the rhetoric of marginal significance and the rhetoric of geostrategic deception, then Lee's cheerful provocations were meant not only to embarrass China but to rebuke the United States as well. Lee did not say this in so many words, but his rhetoric conveyed a message to Taiwan's longtime patron: We will no longer be supplicants begging for your support or seeking your approval. There can be no surprise, then, to find Copper relaying how "the reaction to Lee's statements from the White House and the State Department was one of unmistakable and unabashed hostility."[154] Lee was rocking the status quo, in Washington as much as in Taipei and Beijing.

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Moreover, Lee's cheeky "we prefer to stay single" line marked a significant break with generations of KMT dogma. In 1973, when Deng Xiaoping reached out to Taiwan with an invitation to hold talks about unification, Chiang Ching-kuo told the *New York Times* "his government would never negotiate with the Chinese Communists" and that this refusal was "a matter of life or death."[155] From this all-or-nothing perspective, even diplomatic approaches hint of national collapse. Following another round of the evolving U.S.-PRC détente, Chiang Ching-kuo wrote to the U.S. State Department in 1978, again asserting that "The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state." He then assaulted the Carter administration for forgetting that "the threat of invasion and subversion by Communist forces . . . is even more serious than before."[156] If Chiang's rhetoric was steeped in fear of Communist subterfuge, ongoing CPC imperialism, and the pressing threat of national "suicide," he also blistered the CPC for its rank incompetence and "tyrannical rule," arguing in 1981 that "the happy and peaceful lives of our compatriots" in Taiwan offer a "striking comparison to the unparalleled misery of our compatriots on the Mainland." Like his father, Chiang imagined KMT forces "delivering" peace to the mainland by "remov[ing] the yoke of Communism."[157] For the younger Chiang, arguing for Taiwanese independence was linked to arguing against Communist imperialism abroad and terror on the mainland—his words ring with a wartime urgency, where deliverance from CPC evil obliges the KMT to reach for heroism, even if that means continuing a war most observers believed had been over for more than thirty years.

For an even more strident example of KMT rhetoric, consider *China's Destiny*, Chiang Kai-shek's 1943 manifesto, which opens with two lengthy chapters explaining the colonial roots of "China's national humiliation." Traumatized nationalism runs so deep in this manifesto that Chiang imagines the KMT will "avenge" China's wounds only through a cleansing war.[158] Indeed, for the elder Chiang, KMT nationalism was explicitly an act of retribution: "Prepare yourselves for vengeance," the Generalissimo ordered, for the KMT must carry out "a thorough purge."[159] A decade later, in his National Day speech of 1954, the Generalissimo was still framing the KMT as a "retaliation movement" against the Communists.[160] If the younger Chiang avoided such talk of revenge, purges, and retaliation (even while his secret service conducted internal sweeps of dissidents), his rhetoric was still driven by the dream of conquering the loathed Other. Both leaders of the KMT marshaled rhetoric that was unilateral, commanding, laced with struggle and drama, and steeped in war.

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Seen within this comparative framework, Lee's comments from the mid-1990s indicate a remarkable break within Taiwanese political rhetoric. Indeed, by Lee's reign, Taiwan had become so successful economically, so confident in its emerging democracy, so strong militarily, so proud of its newfound nationalism, and so dismissive of the post-Tiananmen regime in Beijing that the old Communist enemy was portrayed as little more than a jilted suitor. As Yun-han Chu argues, President Lee "had essentially performed the function of a political bulldozer clearing away all major political, institutional, and ideological obstacles," yet he did so while authoring political rhetoric that was pointed and funny, aggressive yet playful.[161] In this way, "Mr. Democracy" advanced the cause of Taiwan's independence, authored a new framework for Taiwanese nationalism, and nudged the historical needle a little closer to a "two Chinas" scenario—all while burying any lingering concerns about the rhetoric of marginal significance. As we will see below, that confidence was misplaced, for President Clinton had a surprise up his sleeve.

Clinton's "Three Noes" and the Slow-Motion Betrayal of Taiwan

The history of the "three noes" begins with a secret letter Clinton sent to Jiang in 1995 in the hope of firming up U.S.-China relations by undermining Lee in particular and Taiwan's hopes more broadly. I must admit that I have not seen this letter, for it is not included in any of the accessible materials held in the Clinton Presidential Library, nor has it ever been reproduced in any public documents. Nonetheless, the letter has been confirmed by multiple sources I trust, and its contents were soon reflected in other public statements made by the president and members of his administration, culminating in Clinton's first public utterance of the "three noes" in June 1998.[162] Addressing the "three noes" is important for understanding the communication patterns between the United States, China, and Taiwan, for it appears that Clinton—reprising the tactics used by Nixon before him—sought to massage U.S.-China relations by, according to June Teufel Dreyer, "making secret promises to Beijing."[163] As was true of Nixon's secret pledges, so Clinton's came back to haunt him, thus complicating U.S. foreign policy in Asia and opening the president up to bitter recriminations at home.

It was known at the time that Secretary of State Warren Christopher was meeting with Chinese diplomats in Brunei, in August 1995, as part of the annual ASEAN Regional Forum. As part of this diplomatic work, Christopher brought a letter from

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Clinton inviting Jiang to America.[164] But the letter was more than just an invitation, as detailed in *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy*, where China's minister of foreign affairs, Qian Qichen, confirms both that Secretary Christopher handed him the letter and that it contained the "three noes."[165] In the letter, Clinton promised—counter to the vague language that had marked U.S. policy regarding Taiwan ever since the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué—that the United States "would oppose Taiwanese independence," "would not support 'two Chinas' or one China and one Taiwan," and "would not support Taiwan's admission into the U.N."[166] These promises have come to be known as the "three noes." They are significant because with them, the subtle wait-and-see strategy of the United States—what I described in chapter 3 as Kissinger's rhetoric of abeyance—was reshaped into agreement with the PRC's more robust understanding of "one China," wherein Taiwan is a renegade province awaiting "reunification" with the motherland.

The "three noes" were then orally relayed to Jiang when he visited the United States in October 1997 and were confirmed by State Department spokesperson James Rubin, who asserted the "three noes" were essential elements of America's understanding of the "one China policy."[167] The "three noes" were again repeated by the White House press secretary in June 1998.[168] Still, up to this point, the U.S. president had not conveyed these promises in public, so the "three noes" were not quite secret, yet not formally declared as U.S. policy. The cumulative effect of these repeated iterations amounted, as described by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, to "a secret guarantee from Clinton" that he would lean hard toward China and away from Lee.[169] Tucker reports that sensing a major political breakthrough and wanting Clinton to own it in public, the Chinese "pressed for a public written statement."[170] As noted by Robert S. Ross, "the Chinese leadership was determined to compel the Clinton administration to formally commit the United States" to the revised version of the "one China policy" indicated in the "three noes."[171]

Facing this intense pressure, Clinton first publicly uttered the "three noes" in June 1998, while answering a question during an event in Shanghai.[172] Thus stating publicly what had been promised secretly in 1995, the president's "three noes" were denounced in the *Wall Street Journal* as "Bill's Kowtow."[173] The *Washington Post* described the "three noes" as crushing evidence of how "Mr. Clinton has sided with the dictators against the democrats."[174] Capturing the anguish caused by the president's comments, the International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan (ICHRT) asked in bold letters across the cover of its *Taiwan Communiqué* if America was "Betraying Taiwan Again?"[175] As Ross has concluded, the historical consensus

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is clear: The "three noes" "effectively align[ed] the United States with China in opposition to Taiwan's policy."[176]

Lee apparently knew the statement was coming, as he embarked that same July on a campaign of anti-three-noes persuasion. Taiwan's CNA reported on July 6 that Lee was reminding the world that "the ROC has been a sovereign state since 1912." This same press release—embodying the anger that results from the United States treating Taiwan via the rhetoric of marginal significance—indicated that Lee, meeting with AIT chairman Richard Bush, relayed "his hope that in the future, Washington should negotiate directly with Taipei in matters regarding Taiwan."[177] The ICHRT apparently knew the "three noes" were coming as well, as their June 1998 issue of the *Taiwan Communiqué* warned the Clinton administration against saying in public what had allegedly been promised in private. Doing so would "amount to a betrayal of Taiwan and its future as a free, democratic, and independent nation."[178] Taiwan's leaders and friends believed the "three noes" offered a significant and even dangerous evolution in U.S. thinking about China-Taiwan relations, all while reprising the worst aspects of both the rhetoric of geostrategic deception and the rhetoric of marginal significance.

Before addressing the "three noes," I want to situate them within President Clinton's foreign policy, which was evaluated at the time as erratic. Steven Erlanger and David E. Sanger described its early years as "floundering" and as pocked by "reversals and [a] confused agenda," amounting to "woeful chaos." The president was portrayed as "not ready or able to articulate the structure of American foreign policy" and as "bouncing around aimlessly."[179] Hence, by the time of the Taiwan crisis of 1995–1996, Clinton needed a win, and he needed a win that showed his toughness. Sending U.S. naval vessels toward the Taiwan Strait in the summer of 1996 accomplished this mission, yet the White House then switched course by offering China the "three noes." For Clinton critics, this reversal was emblematic of the administration's bad judgment. Even the politically neutral Congressional Research Service noted that "the administration appears to be buckling in the face of PRC pressure, sacrificing Taiwan interests . . . for the sake of assuring a smoother U.S. relationship with Beijing."[180]

For conservatives, the change in course was more than a buckling. Reprising the alleged crimes of the Truman administration, Republicans spoke of *appeasement* and *losing China*. The Heritage Foundation fumed that the Clinton administration was ethically challenged: "In a conflict between freedom and democracy versus authoritarian military force, only the side of freedom and democracy can be

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considered the right side of history."[181] The knife-edged voice of high conservatism, William Safire, punned on the "three noes" to rip President Clinton for the crime of granting Jiang "Eight Yeses." Safire's list of grievances was topped by the president's choosing to forgive and forget the TSM of 1989.[182] Another figurehead of Republican venom toward Clinton and China, Charles Krauthammer, slammed "Clinton's China Grovel."[183] Frank Keating, the Republican governor of Oklahoma, published an editorial that dredged up McCarthy-like vitriol, asking, "Who Lost China Again?"[184] And so the debate in 1998 and 1999 sounded strikingly familiar to the debate in 1949, when Republicans charged the Democrats with losing China to Communism.

And through it all, the Taiwanese found themselves on the sidelines, their voices drowned out by superpower posturing. The champion of indigenous independence and self-determination, the ICHRT reminded the world that China and America could bluster all they want, but their clashing statements "are made without any involvement or representation of the people of Taiwan, and thus have no validity whatsoever in determining the future of the island."[185]

Nonetheless, the "three noes" fit within Clinton's thinking about global realities. For while the 1989 TSM left China ostracized on the world stage and Americans seething at the use of state violence against peaceful protesters, Clinton believed—as had Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush before him—that the United States needed to find constructive ways to engage China. Clinton tried to balance delicate imperatives: "We have adopted a one-China policy. We have strictly adhered to it," he said. "But a part of the one-China policy was the clear, indeed, explicit understanding that Taiwan and China would work out their differences peacefully over time."[186] This is Kissinger's "abeyance" argument, in which the United States claims to have no position on the course of unification as long as it is achieved consensually. But just as the historical thrust of détente pointed toward Nixon's historic visit to Beijing, so Clinton felt the pull of globalization, which demanded China's entry onto the world stage as a respected nation-state.[187] In his "Remarks at the Congressional Asian Pacific Caucus Dinner" from April 1996—wherein he offered a dynamic and moving encomium to diversity and inclusion—Clinton said, "I want better relations with China." He then restated the nuanced version of the one-China policy noted above before adding, "China is not just another developing economy. It is a very great nation, with over one billion people."[188] The sheer geopolitical immensity of China, Clinton was arguing, made it an indispensable player, and perhaps future partner, in the age of globalization. It seems clear that Clinton was building upon

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the advice Henry Kissinger had offered in 1995: "Everything depends on the state of U.S.-China relations."[189]

Clinton was no China patsy, however, despite what Republicans alleged then, and have alleged ever since. When Jiang visited the United States in October 1997, he and Clinton held a joint press conference that can only be described as historic. For the first time in the long history of U.S.-China relations, two heads of state shared a stage while answering frank questions. For his part, Clinton reiterated the standard one-China policy, talked about emerging trade deals, and emphasized America's commitment to human rights and free speech, all while repeating the mantra that the United States and China share "the opportunity and the responsibility to build a future that is more secure, more peaceful, and more prosperous for both our people." When a reporter pushed him on human rights in China, Clinton said, "On this issue we believe the policy of the [Chinese] government is on the wrong side of history." That is a powerful indictment, uttered while standing next to China's president. Jiang hit back, noting that his country "has not committed to renounce the use of force" regarding Taiwan.[190] And on it went, both leaders exchanging ideas, and frequent laughter, in an ideal public forum, a collegial showing like none before it and very few since then. It is hard to read the transcript, to watch the video, or to see the photographs of the event without feeling the respect and warmth between Clinton and Jiang.[191] As the *New York Times* summarized the day, both sides had chosen "to emphasize engagement rather than estrangement."[192]

While Clinton and Jiang smiled for the cameras, a sea of protesters surrounded the White House. Organized by the Coalition for Taiwan Independence, and featuring contingents representing Free Tibet groups, Amnesty International, and others, marchers gathered at the Washington Monument before heading to the White House, where they chanted, "China, Hands Off Taiwan," "China, Out of Tibet," and so on. From the White House, the march wound its way toward the U.S. Capitol, where senators and congress-people, both Democrats and Republicans, spoke on behalf of Taiwanese independence.[193] One can only speculate on what Jiang must have made of the events, as Washington, DC, was both the center of swelling support for China and a hotbed of activism supporting Taiwan.

Despite the protesters, Clinton and Jiang believed the U.S.-China relationship was moving in positive directions under their shared leadership, and so they repeated the joint-press-conference format in Beijing in June 1998. Before that event, however, the Party released a statement declaring, "China and the U.S. should make particular efforts to purposely address the Taiwan question," which remained "the

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most important and most sensitive issue."[194] With "the Taiwan question" hovering over the proceedings, and after making boilerplate statements, both presidents fielded questions from the assembled reporters, often responding to the other's comments, amounting to a historic demonstration of political deliberation in an American-style format *on Chinese soil*. Clinton accentuated the positive and, in a reprise of the framing strategy Kissinger used in 1971 and 1972, noted that "We now have an atmosphere in which it is possible for us to be open and honest . . . there are legitimate and honest differences in the way we look at this. But I believe we are making progress, and I believe we will make more." It feels as if Clinton was trying to show the Chinese that free speech can be ennobling and inclusive while creating the conditions for good decision-making. He even ended his comments by making a pitch for renewed talks between China and the Dalai Lama.[195] Reportedly watched by as many as 600 million Chinese, the Jiang-Clinton debate was a historic first: Here were an American and a Chinese president jointly modeling free speech, fair and impromptu debate, and a sense of shared global leadership on live TV for an immense Chinese audience.[196]

That night, at the state dinner Jiang hosted in Clinton's honor, the two presidents engaged in more friendly banter, cementing the sense that the leaders were making progress. Both presidents were musically inclined, so at one point during the event Jiang rose to conduct the military band; he then invited Clinton to take a turn, who led the band through a John Philip Sousa march. As seen in figure 12, Clinton was having a great time and the assembled guests were smiling and clapping.[197]

This groundbreaking attitude was on display two days later, on June 29, when the president spoke with students at Beijing University (also known as "Beida"). Clinton said, "As you build a new China, America wants to build a new relationship with you. We want China to be successful, secure, and open, working with us for a more peaceful and prosperous world." In a line that encapsulates Clinton's thinking from this period, he told the audience, "we can clearly accomplish so much more by walking together rather than standing apart."[198] He pledged that America and China were "working toward a common destiny."[199] That same day, while visiting the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the president thanked his assembled team, and especially U.S. Ambassador James Sasser, for doing the on-the-ground labor of proving that "engagement is working." An upbeat Clinton focused on the need to convey "the message of cooperation and optimism."[200]

We want China to be successful; *we can clearly accomplish so much more by walking together rather than standing apart*; we share *a common destiny*; our

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FIGURE 12. Barbara Kinney's photograph of President Clinton conducting a Chinese military band, at the state dinner held in his honor, June 27, 1998; © held by and image used with permission of the Clinton Presidential Library, image P064609.

relations are fueled by *cooperation and optimism.* If the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism drives modern CPC thinking, polluting U.S.-China relations with a bitter legacy of mistrust, and if the United States' rhetoric of geostrategic deception routinely nourishes that disposition, then Clinton's charm offensive amounted to a long overdue attempt to reframe the relationship along lines of mutual respect and collaboration. As noted above, U.S. Republicans were frothing at the time, yet Clinton's work on this trip was not only necessary, but visionary, for he was demonstrating what a mature, confident, and reasonable U.S.-China relationship would look like.

Considering how clearly Clinton's actions reflected lessons learned from Kissinger, it comes as no surprise to learn that the dean of American foreign policy supported Clinton's work via a series of Op-Eds. Writing in the *Houston Chronicle*, Kissinger argued, "The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes. The test of the meeting [between Clinton and Jiang] is the key principle of reciprocity." In a clear rebuke to Republican scaremongering, and ever the master of the grand gesture,

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Kissinger asked of those who were then so bitterly criticizing Clinton, "Do we really want to turn the world's most populous nation and second largest economy into an enemy?"[201] And so the moderate Republican rebuked Gingrich-era war hawks by supporting the centrist Democrat in the cause of massaging relations with China.

The president ventured on June 30, 1998, to Shanghai, where he and Jiang appeared on the "Citizens and Society" radio program. This popular call-in show with a daily audience (in 1998) of 10 million listeners gave Clinton a chance to demonstrate to Jiang and the Party that providing citizens direct access to their leaders is a sound form of politics.[202] The good citizens of Shanghai apparently thought so, as "listeners started to jam the telephone lines."[203] Rueyling Chuang and Ringo Ma have noted that call-in radio shows were just becoming popular in Taiwan and China at the time, and that the idea of unscreened citizens airing their voices on live radio was then "a symbol of progress," a sign of opening and reform in the political culture.[204] For Clinton to engage this communication platform showed his finger on the pulse of change and progress in China.

Earlier that same day, the president and first lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton—who made an international splash with her 1995 women's rights speech in Beijing—hosted a public forum with a number of leading Chinese intellectuals.[205] According to most accounts, this was another breakthrough moment wherein a U.S. president engaged directly with Chinese community leaders by hosting an American-style town hall—a veritable showcase of democracy in action. And it was here that President Clinton first uttered the "three noes" in public. They came out this way: "We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan–one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any international organization for which statehood is a requirement."[206] The meeting ended cordially, yet as news of the president's statement about Taiwan circulated on global media, confirmation that the president had uttered his three noes "sent shock waves through every corner of the island" of Taiwan and through many of the offices of the U.S. Congress.[207]

To make sense of this important moment, let us turn to the three noes in order:

- No #1: "We don't support independence for Taiwan." As we have seen above, by 1998 Lee had already stated on numerous occasions that Taiwan was an independent nation-state. The opposition DPP's political platform was built on this premise. We have also seen how many U.S. media outlets referred to anything less than Taiwan's independence as part of the CPC's "Big Lie." For

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Clinton to make his no-independence statement thus felt like a reversal of facts on the ground and a political betrayal of the hopes of many Taiwanese. Truman and Eisenhower each offered versions of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication based on the assumption that Taiwan would, eventually, either reconquer mainland China or achieve its independence. Nixon and Kissinger's "abeyance" version of this thinking—which was then built into the 1979 TRA—posited that unification was only possible if achieved consensually and without force, providing Taiwan an unlimited time frame for making its own decisions about China, all while developing the markers of independence. Clinton's comment therefore contradicted the implied trajectory of long-standing U.S. policy regarding Taiwan's eventual fate.

- No #2: We don't support "two Chinas, or one Taiwan–one China." In this phrasing, it would appear that President Clinton was trying to restate long-standing U.S. policy regarding the trope of "one China." From the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué onwards, U.S. policy tried to thread the needle by acknowledging the dream of "one China" without deciding whose version of China would triumph. From Kissinger and Nixon forwards, however, every U.S. administration held firm to the idea that any eventual unification would need to be achieved peacefully, with the full participation of both sides. The status quo, then, was based on a delicate sleight of hand—Kissinger's rhetoric of abeyance—in which the United States protected Taiwan from invasion, yet left open the possibility that unification might come later and on mutually satisfactory terms. But as Vincent Wei-cheng Wang has noted, by 1998 "the fact is that the status quo is two separate governments in a divided China."[208] By denying that obvious fact, by speaking as if the PRC's version of "one China" was a foregone conclusion, Clinton handed the Communists exactly what every U.S. leader since Truman had refused to grant: unconditional support for "unification" on the CPC's terms.
- No #3, 1995 version: America "would not support Taiwan's admission into the U.N."; 1998 version: "We don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any international organization for which statehood is a requirement." Here we see how the specific 1995 claim about not supporting UN admission has expanded to the 1998 claim, wherein "any" (and presumably therefore *all*) international organizations are off-limits. With talk about the World Trade Organization, the UN, ASEAN, WHO, the Olympics, and other such bodies and/or events swirling, this embargo on Taiwanese participation in international life felt like a death knell, leaving Taiwan forever in the wilderness as a (non)nation

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> with few allies and no ties to the international community. For fifty years, the assumption in U.S. policy circles was that history was on Taiwan's side: China would eventually evolve into a responsible world power that would respect Taiwan's rights, meaning peace would evolve on Taipei's terms. This thinking follows from Kissinger's assumptions about how the "arc of history" would inevitably bend in Taiwan's direction. But here, in a stunning reversal, Clinton indicates that history is on China's side. Because Taiwan is not independent, nor ever will be, and because it has no openings in the international arena, and because "one China" is a forgone conclusion, then Taiwan will eventually unify with the mainland on Beijing's terms. It can come as no surprise to find the ICHRT lamenting this part of the three noes as "a ruinous capitulation to Beijing."[209]

Moreover, it had been U.S. policy for decades, via the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and President Reagan's 1982 "Six Assurances," and in law via the 1979 TRA, that all discussions of China-Taiwan relations had to proceed with the baseline understanding that force would not be used, by either party, to alter the status quo. Because Clinton's "three noes" did not reiterate that criterion, his critics worried he was sending China a signal. Senate majority leader Trent Lott (R-MS) thus responded to Clinton's Shanghai statement by arguing that "instead of pressing Beijing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, President Clinton accepted Beijing's position."[210] Republicans were incensed, Barton Gellman reports, charging the president with the crimes of "appeasement and strategic madness."[211] Senator Lott backed up this critique of the president by orchestrating the nonbinding Senate Congressional Resolution 107, "A Concurrent Resolution Affirming U.S. Commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act," which called for Clinton to correct his oversight by pressuring China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Passed in the Senate by a vote of 92 in favor against 0 opposed, Lott's resolution amounted to a public rebuke of the "three noes." In the House, Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX) led the snubbing of the president; his version of the resolution passed by a vote of 390–1.[212]

With Clinton thus ending a productive visit to China with a potentially crippling concession to CPC wishes, and returning home not so much to celebration as congressional censure, his performance in 1998 embodied his status as a baffling leader. As Trevor Parry-Giles has written, Clinton remains a puzzling "site of considerable symbolic power, [in] a position of polysemous potential."[213] That polysemy

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flows from the president's confusing actions: Were his "three noes" a capitulation based on secret promises, and hence a betrayal of both Taiwan in particular and long-standing U.S. interests in general? Or were they rhetorical throwaways on an otherwise game-changing visit to China? Was Clinton demonstrating catastrophic foreign-policy ineptitude or modeling visionary global leadership?[214] Was he walking a delicate rhetorical tightrope, or was his language indicative of his (and his inner circle's) not grasping the nuances of the "one China" policy? And, most worrisome, was the apparent warmth and friendship of the 1998 trip to China prefaced, perhaps even purchased, with the down payment of the 1995 letter conveying the "three noes"? The whiff of quid pro quo was strong, hence raising questions about both the morality and foreign-policy judgment of the president. As Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles have noted, the Clinton presidency seemed poised between "the aura of hope" and "a sentiment of despair."[215] The drama surrounding the "three noes" illustrates that tension in striking clarity.

The president and his team knew they were playing a dangerous game that summer. Richard C. Bush reports that when he was serving as the Clinton-era chairman of the AIT, the White House sent him to Taipei in July 1998, just after Clinton's trip to China, "to make the case that U.S. policy had not changed." Bush deprecatingly calls himself at this time "the leading 'reassurer' of Taiwan."[216] The CNA reported on July 7 that Bush was telling Lee and his inner circle that "there will be no change in the US's basic stance with regard to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait."[217] As was the case during the Nixon administration, then, the Clinton administration was saying one thing to the Chinese in secret, another thing to the world in public, and yet another thing to the Taiwanese, amounting to a textbook example of the rhetoric of geostrategic deception. There can be no surprise, then, to find the ICHRT concluding, in a play on the title of the classic *Thunder out of China*, that President Clinton had instead committed a "Blunder out of China," for the "three noes" amounted to "selling out Taiwan's future."[218]

While there is no evidence suggesting this was Clinton's intention—he repeatedly denied having made any changes to U.S.-China-Taiwan policy—consider his memoir, *My Life*, where the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis merits but two paragraphs. Whereas Clinton mentions no Taiwanese leaders by name, he reflects sweetly on Jiang, whom he admires; the 1998 Shanghai meeting where he first uttered the "three noes" in public is portrayed as a nice example of U.S.-style civic engagement bringing hope to China.[219] At no point in his memoir does Clinton indicate an appreciation for Taiwan's precarious situation vis-à-vis China, or

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celebrate its remarkable transition toward democracy, or reflect upon the impact of his "three noes." In fact, the only time he discusses Taiwan or the Taiwanese comes from a happy recollection of his 1986 gubernatorial victory, when the governor-elect observed that "the Taiwanese were good customers for Arkansas soybeans and a wide variety of our manufactured products."[220] In short, the published record suggests he saw the island as little more than a useful market for Arkansas goods. American leaders have often treated Taiwan via the rhetoric of marginal significance, a disposition that indicates not so much malevolence as the hubris of an imperial giant that can treat smaller nations like playing cards. In his handling of Taiwan during the 1995–1998 period, Clinton offers comments on Taiwan that are brutally honest about the power politics of empire, yet he appears neither to grasp the significance of his words nor to lament how profoundly they tilted the balance of power in Asia toward China, in part by betraying Taiwan.

Subsequent U.S. leaders have accordingly sought to backtrack from Clinton's "three noes," yet China has clung to them as if scripture. And so, in a historical drama with far-reaching consequences, Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion prodded the CPC into yet another round of traumatized nationalism, which in turn led Clinton to make a grand gesture of defending Taiwan. The consequences of that U.S.-China-Taiwan tension nudged Clinton into a round of visionary diplomacy with China that nonetheless ended in a set of promises that undercut Taiwan's hopes, compromised its future freedoms, and authored yet another round of the rhetoric of marginal significance. Still, never one to be outdone, Lee responded to the "three noes" with one of his most categorical statements, writing in the *Wall Street Journal* in August 1998, "There is no 'one China' now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does not exist. Today, there is only 'one divided China.'"[221]

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CHAPTER FIVE

A Free and Democratic People, 2016–2020

Considering how the CPC greeted the rhetorical flourishes of President Lee Teng-hui, it comes as no surprise to learn that the CPC views the contemporary leadership of Taiwan's DPP as nothing less than a Chinese-sovereignty-threatening engine of crisis. From as early as 1996, the DPP's platform skewered both CPC and KMT pieties by declaring, "Taiwan must abandon the 'one-China' policy and announce to the world that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state."[1] By 1999, the DPP's "Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future" went even further, offering a list of claims and directives:

1. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country.
2. Taiwan is not a part of the People's Republic of China.
3. Taiwan should expand its role in the international community . . . and pursue entry into the United Nations and other international organizations.
4. Taiwan should renounce the "one-China" position to avoid international confusion and prevent China's use of this position as a pretext for forceful annexation.[2]

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FIGURE 13. The CPC as the walking dead, political cartoon from the *Taipei Times*, July 17, 2017, by TACO; © held by and image printed with the permission of the artist and the paper.

Based on its long-standing anger at such language, and even before DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen was sworn in as Taiwan's first woman president on May 20, 2016, the CPC was exacerbating tensions.[3] Its anti-Tsai campaign included a textbook example of meiosis, the rhetorical strategy of belittling an opponent by using demeaning words or humbling phrases to question her or his authority. *China Daily* sneered at "Tsai, who likes to call herself 'president of Taiwan,'" thus seeking to humiliate Tsai by questioning the legitimacy of both the office she holds and the nation she governs.[4] The Party also threatened Taiwanese voters, warning that if Tsai won the presidency, then her supporters "should be made to pay the price for their choice."[5] The Party seethed that Tsai and the DPP were "independence leaning" radicals committed to "separatism" and "splittism."[6] As these examples indicate, the Party's rhetoric against Tsai has been demeaning, misogynist, and threatening, amounting to what the *New York Times* characterized as "hateful commentary."[7]

In response, DPP supporters and advocates for Taiwan's independence have crafted *the rhetoric of democratic disdain*, in which they mock China as a totalitarian

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dinosaur. Paul Lin summarized what many Taiwanese see as the patriarchal and colonial underpinnings of the PRC's "unification" plans when he caricatured China's President Xi Jinping as "Great Father Xi," a would-be Mao-like colossus who appeals to China's "ignorant public" by peddling "feudal thinking."[8] The practitioners of the rhetoric of democratic disdain portray China's leaders and people as lagging hopelessly behind Taiwan, while they celebrate their island nation as a democratic bright spot on the cutting edge of progressive governance and cultural sophistication. For instance, consider figure 13, wherein Tsai and a character labeled "Taiwan" hold their noses, aghast at the "stench" emanating from an enormous faux-Confucian zombie.[9] Within the rhetoric of democratic disdain, Taiwan's defenders portray the CPC's "reunification" claims as historical anachronisms, bad Long Cold War memories threatening Taiwan's hard-won freedom. Such claims also rip China, as seen in one *Taipei Times* editorial: "As Taiwan's democracy evolves and strengthens, China under Xi is regressing into rigid totalitarianism and a Mao Zedong–style leadership cult."[10]

While the rhetoric of democratic disdain fuels a communicative dynamic steeped in conflict, Tsai has pursued a different path. Understanding that Taiwan has little ability to sway either the CPC or the White House, Tsai has focused on domestic matters, advocating for "transitional justice." The phrase indicates a national reckoning wherein layers of imperial colonization and generations of KMT repression receive frank airings via public deliberations including all segments of society. Practicing "postcolonial remembering," the president hopes to move the nation past recrimination, enforced silence, and long-standing ethnic, political, and cultural divisions toward a sense of Taiwan as an inclusive, multiethnic, and progressive state committed to "social fairness and justice."[11] Tsai has even used the notion of reconciliation to suggest that her administration will promote national healing, in part by creating avenues for reconsidering Taiwan's tortured history.[12] As we will see, part of what makes contemporary Taiwan so confusing is that the mocking and critical rhetoric of democratic disdain is entwined with the uplifting and hopeful rhetoric of reconciliation, meaning each communicative form is both strengthened and compromised by the other.

Before addressing the flow of rhetoric between China, Taiwan, and the United States from 2016 to 2020, and before diving into the overlapping rhetorics of democratic disdain, postcolonial remembering, and reconciliation, I should note that Tsai has been on the CPC's radar from as early as the mid-1990s, when President Lee appointed her to a task force studying Taiwan's political dilemma vis-à-vis China. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker reports that in this capacity, Tsai "wanted

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FIGURE 14. Two "splittists" campaign together; Liu Hsin-de's photograph of candidate Tsai Ing-wen after a meeting with former President Lee Teng-hui, March 17, 2011; © held by and image printed with the permission of the artist and the *Taipei Times*.

to advance a separatist agenda" and became "the principal agent behind President Lee's two-states theory."[13] When the DPP's Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election, becoming Taiwan's first non-KMT executive, he appointed Tsai to chair the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), which leaned toward independence.[14] Having studied law at Cornell and earning her PhD from the London School of Economics, long embedded in the DPP leadership, fluent in English, and comfortable in Western circles, Tsai embodies cosmopolitan, socially progressive, networked, and Taiwan-centric values—this explains why the CPC believes she poses an existential threat to China's "reunification" plans.[15] As if to confirm these worries, Tsai has embraced former President Lee (see figure 14), cementing the sense that a Tsai presidency would embody Lee's bold claims.[16] In fact, Chi Su, the former chairman of the MAC, has concluded that "the DPP basically inherited the core thinking behind Lee's 'special state-to-state relationship' study."[17] It is easy to imagine the CPC seeing Tsai as an unholy amalgamation of Lee's "we prefer to stay single" rhetoric and the radical demands of the independence-seeking DPP.

Recognizing how such optics might complicate relations across the Taiwan Strait, candidate Tsai sought to not enrage China; during her campaign she sounded

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a cautious tone, saying "we must ensure that no provocations or accidents take place."[18] If Lee was a cheerful provocateur, then Tsai was signaling that she would be a prudent manager of the status quo.[19] As *Foreign Policy* characterized her, "Tsai is, at heart, a technocrat. She is cautious, and she operates through policy, not impulse."[20] Nonetheless, Tsai's positioning within the hated DPP left the Party reeling; *Foreign Policy* might have seen her as a technocrat, but the CPC viewed her as a secessionist threatening China's sovereignty in general and its unification plans in particular.

Tsai's rise to power was considered so alarming by the CPC that in January 2016 it orchestrated what China's *Global Times* celebrated as an "Internet war" against her. Hosted by the Di Ba discussion group on China's popular Baidu platform—which boasts more than 20 million readers—organizers tasked users with bombarding Tsai's Facebook account in "an online rally" supporting hardline Chinese nationalism.[21] Many posts used prepackaged sets of emojis, emoticons, and other visual "stickers," so the trolling campaign became known as a "sticker war." Within twenty-four hours of the announcement of Tsai's electoral victory, more than 70,000 messages flooded her Facebook page.[22] The original Baidu and Facebook posts then ricocheted across WeChat, Weibo, and other Chinese social apps, turning into an online phenomenon Nikhil Sonnad has characterized as "troll madness."[23] Gabriele De Seta concludes that these posts contain a strong strain of hatred toward Tsai, anger toward anyone who supports Taiwanese independence, and threats of sexual violence. De Seta quotes posts saying, "Every one of you is an Idiot!" "You are all *Shabi* [stupid cunts]!" "What the fuck, you dare support Taiwan independence?"[24] The vulgar and threatening tone of the sticker war was captured in a political cartoon from the Japanese *Newsweek* (see figure 15) that merged the righteous fury of Chinese nationalism with the male prerogative to inflict sexual violence.[25]

Virtually all of the commentaries referenced herein note that the sticker war was driven by Chinese users leaping the CPC's Great Firewall of censorship by using VPNs and other workarounds, which are banned in China, to access Facebook.[26] As Sonnad noted, the sticker war revealed a delicious irony: "To voice their real anti-independence feelings, China's Netizens had to flee to Taiwan's internet."[27] Part of what makes Rebel Pepper's political cartoon so insightful is the way he depicts the angry Chinese nationalists scaling a giant wall, presumably the Great Firewall. Moreover, even while the CPC was orchestrating its trolling of Tsai via the use of VPNs, the Party warned its state-run media outlets to "look out for and prevent the spread of 'scaling the wall' and other harmful technical information."[28] Attacking a

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

FIGURE 15. Angry nationalism jumping the Great Fire Wall; Rebel Pepper's political cartoon in the Japanese *Newsweek*, January 22, 2016; © held by and image printed with the permission of the artist.

foreign leader with vulgar and threatening words and images was fine, and leaping over the Great Firewall to do so was fine, yet the Party warned that "scaling the wall" should not be encouraged in a more general sense! Trying to turn the sticker war to its advantage, and deploying a deadpan version of the rhetoric of democratic disdain, the DPP replied, "Welcome to the free and Democratic Taiwan."[29]

The sticker war serves as another example of online platforms producing extremist rhetoric committed more to outrage and hatred than compromise and mutual understanding.[30] It was also clear foreshadowing of what experts believe has evolved into China "launch[ing] cyberattacks on pro-democracy and pro-independence activists" across Taiwan.[31] Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute, pointed to the sticker war as part of the CPC's "political warfare campaign" against Tsai in particular and Taiwan more broadly.[32] China's cyber-campaign is so immense, the *Washington Post* has called it "a full-scale disinformation campaign to undermine the government of President Tsai Ing-wen."[33] The *Taipei Times* warned that the CPC was trying to "inject the most poisonous parts of its culture into Taiwan."[34] The CPC's aggressive actions reflected

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the fact that Tsai's version of postcolonial Taiwan highlights the nation's historical, cultural, and political differences from China—thus positing a space of national independence, cultural autonomy, and nonnegotiable freedom.

President Tsai's Rhetoric of Postcolonial Nationalism

In her inaugural address of May 20, 2016, President Tsai emphasized a postcolonial sense of Taiwanese nationalism. Her comments about possible "unification" with China were nuanced and guarded and, to the dismay of the CPC, eschewed the phrase "one China." Tsai began with a ringing encomium to Taiwan's democracy, saying, "The people of Taiwan have shown the world . . . that we, as a free and democratic people, are committed to the defense of our freedom and democracy as a way of life."[35] That "way of life" precludes any forced "reunification" with or "annexation" by a CPC that still demonizes democracy.[36] To help Taiwan's bustling economy build more partnerships with entities that do not threaten this way of life, Tsai then introduced her "new Southbound Policy." The strategy looks toward Australia, Vietnam, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, India, and other South Asian states that harbor no intentions upon Taiwan's territory.[37] From this perspective, a deeper immersion in globalizing trade relations will provide both a buffer against Chinese economic encroachments and openings for Taiwan to build additional international partnerships.[38]

Tsai then made a series of gestures regarding public memory, the nation's sense of self, and Taiwan's enlightened culture. Her administration, she promised, will cherish "the values of diversity, equality, openness, transparency, and human rights." She announced that to enable these progressive values to flourish free of the shadow of Taiwan's colonial history, "we must find a way to face the past together," hence justifying her "establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission" to lead the process of "transitional justice." "We will discover the truth," she promised, "heal wounds, and clarify responsibilities."[39] Taiwan sports a thriving network of museums and other memory sites commemorating the tragedies of 1947 and the KMT-led "White Terror," so these lines reinforced the sense that Tsai would support the nation's reckoning with its long-repressed post–World War II dynamics.[40] While it is too early to know where this national reckoning will lead, Tsai's speech was remarkable for its sense of beginning anew. In fact, in her National Day Address of 2016, Tsai said her administration amounted to "a new beginning for Taiwan's

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Democratic politics," and that her notion of transitional justice would "enable our democracy to begin anew."[41] As Eric Doxtader has written, such truth and reconciliation processes are based on "constitutive faith in the work of those words that strive to open, make, and sustain a beginning." Moreover, because this faith in words is often deployed in post-catastrophe contexts, it tends to "structure moments of transition," where repression, silence, and forgetting move toward political openings, fresh speech, and collective remembering.[42] As Robert L. Ivie has noted, such leaps out of the cycle of anger and vengeance indicate "the tactics of escape into democratic space."[43] Hence deploying a number of key postcolonial tropes—recovering long-repressed atrocities, celebrating indigenous cultural heritages, invoking difference from assumed universals, and privileging local democratic formations over global affiliations—Tsai portrayed a sovereign and independent Taiwan free from the shackles of both Chinese and U.S. assumptions. In this confident part of her speech, the new president buried any concerns about old wounds or lingering insecurities caused by the rhetoric of marginal significance.

Tsai's call for this constitutive remembering echoes similar truth and reconciliation processes around the world and aligns with the revisionist strategies of many postcolonial states. As the Holocaust and postcolonial scholar Michael Rothberg has noted, "the struggle against colonialism involves, in part, a struggle over collective memory."[44] In Taiwan's case, the attempt to build a national sense of collective memory means confronting the seventy-plus-years-long history of threatened "unification" with China, the KMT's long-repressed history of brutality and corruption, and the island's complicated histories with the United States. Framing Taiwan as postcolonial also entails making sense of its overlapping waves of colonization in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.[45] As Sheng-Mei Ma writes, "A Taiwanese identity must be forged out of a history of colonial servitude, an ethos of the disenfranchised characterized by sadness and abjection." Thus, even while "rushing headlong into the future," Taiwan "looks back in tears."[46] Embodying these ideas, and working as both a historical revisionist and the author of a new and proud sense of national empowerment, Tsai's inaugural address amounted to a powerful celebration of a Taiwan-centric version of postcolonial nationalism.[47]

Trying to constitute this new national identity means rejecting any version of "one China" wrapped in the fantasy of a timeless and homogeneous Chinese civilization. Instead of worrying about the mainland, Tsai pointed to doing right by "Taiwan's indigenous people" as a key ingredient in "rebuilding an indigenous historical perspective."[48] Her pledge was sweetened by beautiful political theater,

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as the speech was preceded by a choir of indigenous children, whose voices swelled into "a traditional song of blessing."[49] Thus, across the first four segments of her inaugural address, Tsai did not say the word "independence," yet her speech amounted to a ringing declaration of postcolonial independence from both China and the old KMT past. By celebrating an indigenous national identity, pointing economic activity away from the mainland, building a postcolonial sense of national history opposed to both *prior* colonizations by Japan and the KMT and *threatened* colonizations by the CPC, and rooting the nation in a democratic way of life, she offered a new national imaginary. Tsai sought, then, to combine a sense of a new Taiwanese identity that is local, specific, and indigenous, with a sense of Taiwan as a leading force within globalizing flows of ideas, goods, and rights, thus envisioning a Taiwanese version of postcolonial cosmopolitanism.[50]

Tsai then turned to Taiwan-China relations, where she finessed the question of "one China." Endorsing the status quo, she declared, "We are willing to engage in candid exchanges and pursue possibilities for cooperation and collaboration with the other side of the Strait." This iteration places Taiwan as a sovereign entity willing to consider dialogue but under no compulsion to do so, foregrounding the need for a fair and ethical communication process between China and Taiwan while making no guarantees about the outcomes of that communication. She acknowledged how "in 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait . . . arrived at various joint acknowledgements. . . . It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground." This portrayal of the "'92 Consensus"—now called the '92C for short—acknowledges it as historical fact but grants it no normative authority over Taiwan's thinking.[51] These rhetorical gymnastics were noted in America, with the *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times*, and Brookings Institution all commenting on how Tsai had skirted the phrase "one China."[52] The *New York Times* portrayed Tsai as walking "a cautious line" by refusing to endorse the CPC's version of "one-China" yet not declaring independence.[53]

The CPC heard Tsai's "equivocations" as not-so-subtle indications that she posed an existential threat.[54] The Party's propaganda machinery was so hard on Tsai that *Foreign Policy* observed that "the mainland state-controlled press has vilified" her.[55] Moreover, *China Daily* offered a set of directives, including the demand that Tsai "properly endorse the one-China principle."[56] The article did not say "or else," but that has always been either implied or, occasionally, stated clearly.[57] But Tsai and the DPP leadership did not respond as desired to this implied threat, and so, two weeks

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later, *China Daily* tried the more direct route of advising Tsai to "refrain from any disguised moves for 'Taiwan Independence.'" Here the "or else" was stated clearly: "The mainland is unswerving in its determination to fight 'Taiwan Independence,'" meaning "any reckless 'Taiwan Independence' move *will inevitably invite a strike* from the other side of the Straits."[58]

As it was, so shall it be: Undeclared but de facto independence will be tolerated in the short run, albeit countered with stern talk of some forthcoming "unification," but declarations of independence will be met with war. The CPC's 2016 rhetoric thus confirms Jonathan Manthorpe's assessment that China's perspective on Taiwan "is steeped in old propaganda and imperial hubris."[59] As J. Michael Cole wrote, "The rigidity that undergirds" such rhetoric "highlights both a policy failure on Beijing's part" and "suggests a future of greater instability resulting from an inability to adapt to and accept reality."[60] While the CPC struggled to adapt to and accept the reality of Tsai Ing-wen's postcolonial nationalism, many observers on Taiwan responded to the CPC's threats with a wave of withering sarcasm.

The Rhetoric of Democratic Disdain and the Phantom '92C

As Beijing fumed, many on the island responded with the rhetoric of democratic disdain, mocking the authoritarian CPC for peddling idle threats and boring clichés. This rhetorical formation draws a stark contrast between the two nations by celebrating Taiwan's democratic achievements and criticizing the CPC's commitment to one-party rule. For example, the *Taipei Times* used the anniversary of the June 4, 1989, TSM to excoriate the Party for its decades-long amnesia. While the Party censors all coverage of the annual march commemorating the TSM in Hong Kong's Victoria Park, the *Taipei Times* offered plentiful coverage, positioning a free-speech-loving and information-sharing Taiwanese democracy as the antidote to the CPC's enforced forgetting. One editorial aligned the healthy democracy in Taiwan with the dashed hopes of those who died in Tiananmen and the bravery of those marching in Hong Kong: "What is certain, people are farther away from the 'Chinese dream.' China's refusal to commemorate the Tiananmen Square Massacre affects not only the possibility of a democratic China, but also the future of its relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong."[61] While *China Daily* spoke of using war to "reunify" the motherland, the *Taipei Times* scoffed at the absurdity of a thriving democracy returning to the warm embrace of a totalitarian regime. From this perspective, the

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Taiwanese were reveling in the messy joys of democracy while the CPC reverted to what Chang Ching-yun lamented as Cold War–style "bully tactics."[62]

Within this formation, China's actions in Hong Kong serve as damning evidence of what happens to a thriving democracy when it falls under the CPC's control.[63] First proposed by Premier Deng Xiaoping in 1984, "One Country, Two Systems" was envisioned as a peaceful means for Hong Kong and Taiwan to "reunify" with China while enjoying a period of transition, easing the democratic entities back into life under the CPC's control.[64] While Deng and the CPC believed this offer softened their position, commentators then and now have portrayed the idea, according to C. Y. Chang, as "nothing more than a decoy" intended to seduce Hong Kong and Taiwan to surrender their sovereignty.[65] As President Lee stated in 1991, "as long as they [the CPC] insist on 'one country, two systems' . . . the ROC has no room for maneuver."[66] Taiwan's MAC roared in 2007, "A Totalitarian Dictatorship is the Natural Enemy of a Free Society."[67] Working from this understanding, the rhetoric of democratic disdain hammers the Party at every chance, for as the *Taiwan News* wrote, "The CPC's betrayal of the so-called 'one-China, two systems" approach in Hong Kong is a reminder why *they must never be trusted*."[68] As these examples and figure 13 indicate, the rhetoric of democratic disdain portrays the CPC as a regime pushing lies but also dying a slow death.

John Lamorie encapsulated the rhetoric of democratic disdain when he scoffed:

> Hey Mr. Premier of China, hop on a plane . . . and come see for yourself. Here in my country, you won't find any China flags flying, no PLA troops marching around, and no big pics of Mao or Xi hanging around. We don't need to separate from China, we have been separate from China for a very long time. And we are happy to remain so.[69]

Lamorie portrays the PRC as a totalitarian regime held together by forced homages to great leaders, where the streets are full of soldiers and flags enforcing mandatory nationalism, whereas the Taiwanese get on with the work of building a thriving and independent democracy. For such observers, Chinese nationalism is not an expression of political legitimacy but an authoritarian imposition. While avoiding this confrontational style, Tsai echoed these themes in an October 2016 interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, wherein she characterized Beijing as "revert[ing] back to the old ways" and "old paths, which are suppression and division." In contrast, Tsai portrays Taiwan's "democracy, freedom, and human rights" as indicators of how

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"Taiwan represents a new model" for Asia. She then echoed former President Lee while crossing what the Party has long threatened as a war-triggering rhetorical red line: "We are, after all, a sovereign and independent country."[70]

Within these debates, no concept is more charged than the 1992 Consensus. The phrase refers to negotiations between Taiwan and China, held in Hong Kong in October 1992; the talks broke down in acrimony, yet the Party has turned them into a touchstone of alleged mutual agreement. The *Beijing Review* claimed in 2016 that Taiwan's embrace of the "strict one-China sense" embodied in the 1992 Consensus indicated that it was a happy member of China, "with a status, one might say, akin to Hawaii."[71] *People's Daily* took these claims a step further in 2017, arguing that "the right track set in the 1992 Consensus" was not only the "fundamental" bedrock of Taiwan's provincial existence within China, but also "the general consensus of the international community"—hence invoking global backing for the controversial principle.[72] By that autumn, *People's Daily* was again promising that "all secessionist attempts to seek 'Taiwan independence' are doomed to failure."[73]

Questions about the 1992 Consensus trigger China's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism. And so debates about contested history are melded into one continuous sense of China's civilizational grandeur. Anachronistic and contested claims from the Long Cold War are invoked not only as settled, but as indicative of a global consensus. Because resistance is futile, Taiwan finds itself the subject of dire warnings, with appeals for discussion turned into secessionist plots. In this framework, the trajectory tends toward war, the emotional key is grievance, the prose is unilateral, and the grasp of history is both fantastical and aspirational. President Xi capped this rhetorical logic when he pledged, "We will resolutely contain Taiwan independence secessionist activities in any form, safeguard our country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and never allow the historical tragedy of national secession to happen again."[74] Students of the Long Cold War will notice the peculiarity of the once postcolonial China invoking the trope of "containment" to justify its actions.

Contrary to that CPC revisionism, Myers and Zhang note that when the CPC's ARATS met with Taiwan's SEF in 1992, they reached no grand bargain, instead "agreeing to disagree . . . on the definition of 'one-China.'"[75] The Taiwanese report notes that while "both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one-China, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of 'one-China.'"[76] Recall that when the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué got bogged down in unresolvable issues, Henry Kissinger and Chou Enlai decided that each side would simply state

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its position. This strategy seemed better than releasing no statement at all, as it created the sense of the parties working together. Apparently this is what the KMT and CPC negotiators did in 1992 as well; as Muthiah Alagappa has noted, the parties agreed that "each side [would] express its own interpretation" of what was meant by "one-China."[77] In fact, when Chi Su, Taiwan's minister of the MAC, coined the phrase "1992 Consensus," he meant this agreement to disagree.[78]

However, just as the CPC has sought ever since 1972 to force the United States into accepting its version of "one-China" rather than the nuanced, open-ended, noncommittal version indicated in the Shanghai Communiqué, so the Party has claimed ever since 1992 that Taiwan agreed to China's version of "one-China"—but this simply is not true.[79] Indeed, one of the leading voices for Taiwan's independence joked that the '92C could more accurately be called "the '92 non-sense-us."[80] This understanding has been mirrored in some CPC documents as well. The Party indicated in 1999 that the PRC's ARATS "never and will not recognize the so-called one-China with different interpretations, which is fabricated by the Taiwan authorities." This 1999 denial indicates that the only consensus reached in 1992 was to disagree.[81] The CPC's revisionism regarding the '92C and the one-China policy goes so far as taking formal diplomatic communiqués signed by Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, the United States, and others, and translating them into language more favorable to China's preferred reading of the terms. In these instances, the soft and slippery notion of "acknowledge," meaning a fair but noncommittal hearing of China's position, is replaced with Chinese characters that translate into the binding terms "recognizes and accepts."[82] These creative translations make it appear to Chinese readers as if the nations listed above agree with China's version of its "one-China" policy rather than holding their own, much more ambiguous understandings.

Tsai was deeply involved in policymaking during the 1990s and grasps the Party's revisionism. This explains why the president avoided the term in her inaugural address. The *Taipei Times* considered it front-page news that Tsai chose not "to officially recognize the so-called '1992 consensus,'" which it described as "an alleged understanding between the ROC and the PRC that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is 'one-China,' with each side having its own interpretation of what 'China' means." A string of pro-DPP and anti-KMT comments followed the story. One poster, in another example of the rhetoric of democratic disdain, scoffed how "It is rather amazing that the KMT, a major party (soon to be a ghost) sides with the nation's enemy, the PRC, in agreeing with the blackmail the CPC keeps using

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to try to force Taiwan to accept the phantom '92C."[83] On this reading, the KMT is a virtual extension of the CPC.

CPC leaders were outraged by Tsai's refusal and the DPP mockery. The *China Post* reported that Beijing's TAO had warned that "denying the 1992 Consensus . . . [is] a dead-end, evil path."[84] The *China Daily* repeated the "evil path" charge and then lofted this Mao-style bombast: "No force can stop the historical step for China's unification and rejuvenation. Those who respect history will prosper, *those who deny it will perish*."[85] Much as the Taiwanese mocked the Party for its forced forgetting of the TSM, so the Party ripped Tsai and her allies for "denying" the '92C. The key difference is that the Party's claims over history included the old revolutionary cliché that those who disagree will "perish," thus offering another in the long line of threats directed at Taiwan.

In contrast, the *Taipei Times* offered its readers a crash course in historical debunking. Looking back to the 1992 talks between China's ARATS and Taiwan's SEF, the paper noted that ARATS "withdrew from the negotiation table unilaterally," meaning "no consensus was ever reached." The CPC's turning these failed 1992 talks into a political line in the sand amounts, then, to a case study in how "a lie told a thousand times can almost become a 'truth.'"[86] Arguing that that "lie" is deployed in order "to annex Taiwan," the *Taipei Times* cautioned against swallowing the "One-China poison pill."[87] To support these arguments, pro-independence groups were quoted referring to the '92C as "a fabrication" that "does not exist" and as "fictitious." The paper also called upon former presidents Ma Ying-jeou and Lee Teng-hui, who confirmed that back in 1992, "no consensus was reached" and "there was no agreement."[88] The *Taipei Times* portrayed popular understandings of the issue in a political cartoon (see figure 16) wherein Tsai is being lectured by Wu Den-yih, the KMT party stalwart and former vice president under Ma Ying-jeou, who was long charged with pursuing pro-China policies.[89] For Taiwanese readers, then, debates about the '92C were portrayed as yet another example of the Party's historical revisionism and as nothing less than the cause of an imminent Chinese attack.[90] The image captures one of the startling facts of life in contemporary Taiwan: how China's threat of military action hangs over the nation. One of the leading voices for Taiwan's independence observed how Tsai and the DPP are in "an unbelievably difficult situation," for "the lives of 23 million people hang on her every word," leaving Taiwan "caught between a rock and a hard place, or, if you will, between *rockets* and a hard place."[91]

In keeping with her unflappable character, Tsai responded to the Party's

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FIGURE 16. The '92C as an imminent attack from China, political cartoon from the *Taipei Times*, July 27, 2017, by TACO; © held by and image printed with the permission of the artist and the paper.

threats with a series of speeches reconfirming her vision of Taiwan as a free and independent nation-state. Speaking of The Hague's ruling regarding the disputed South China Sea—wherein the international lawyers danced around the status of Taiwan—Tsai reiterated that "We have a complete government and democratic mechanism. We have our own army and it is a country that can make decisions for itself . . . the majority of Taiwanese people regard us as a country."[92] The PRC accordingly unleashed a string of attacks on "her increasingly hardline comments," again threatening that "all secessionist attempts to seek 'Taiwan Independence' are doomed to failure."[93] Lee Min-yung offered a linguistic sleight of hand as one way around this impasse: "If Taiwan were to remove the word 'China' from its official name, would not Beijing's demand for only 'one-China' be realized?" Commenter Long Hwa drew the obvious conclusion: "Of course there is one-China, it is over there. Taiwan is not a part of it."[94] In short, the rhetoric of democratic disdain demolishes the historical fantasies of those who claim Taiwan is an organic

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part of "one-China"; it deconstructs China's imaginary version of the '92C; and it cherishes Taiwan's raucous democracy by mocking the CPC as the walking dead of authoritarianism.

Moving Past "One-China" toward Reconciliation

It is important to notice a flaw within one strand of Taiwan's contemporary political rhetoric. For even while advocating for Taiwan's independence and cultural autonomy, DPP leadership often falls into the Party's and the old KMT's "one-China" thinking. For example, even as Tsai maintained the nation's independence from China, her 2016 "Double Ten" Day speech marking Taiwan's independence echoed the fantasy that Taiwan is the real China. The key issue involves the question of Taiwan's national origins. In this case, Tsai celebrated the belief that "Today is the 105th National Day of the Republic of China."[95] The next day, the *Taipei Times* repeated the claim.[96] Both dated the ROC's birth not to 1945, when Chiang and the KMT first landed on the island, or to 1949, when Chiang's forces abandoned the mainland, but to the October 1911 Wuchang Rebellion that toppled the Qing dynasty, enabling Sun Yat-sen to declare the founding of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912. This is a remarkably odd gesture, for Sun did so on the *mainland*, while Japan held Formosa as a colony. Moreover, Sun's "Republic" soon collapsed into anarchy, and there has not been any continuous sense of governance, let alone nationhood, associated with the many regimes that followed, making Taiwan's 10.10 dating just as fictional as the CPC's claim that Taiwan is an inherent part of the "motherland."[97]

The gesture is even more confusing when considering that the now-loathed Chiang Kai-shek built his political legacy around this same fiction. In his 10.10 address in 1954, the Generalissimo began by claiming "it is 43 years since the revolution of 1911."[98] Harking back to 1911 therefore enmeshes Tsai within the same imaginative dating that anchored the KMT dictatorship for generations and that is now woven into the fabric of Taiwanese political life. In 1996, the MAC study "Promoting Cross-Strait Relations" intoned, "Founded in 1912, the Republic of China has been in continuous existence for eighty-five years." The MAC qualified that claim with a revealing caveat: "although the areas under its effective rule have changed from time to time."[99] From Chiang to Lee to Tsai, Taiwan's national narrative clings to the 1911 Revolution on the mainland as its founding moment. As Richard Bush notes, the mythology of 1911 represents modern Taiwan as the successor state to the

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toppled Qing dynasty, erasing the intervening one-hundred-plus years of Chinese history.[100] Surely independence-supporting Taiwanese would want to emphasize the island's post–World War II separation from China—and its geographically, culturally, and politically unique character—not its pre-Communist entanglements with the mainland. As if to add comedy to the confusion, Tsai's 10.10 speech from 2016 concluded with a request for both sides "to set aside the baggage of history," yet the Taiwanese leadership is just as guilty as the CPC of playing fast and loose with that baggage.[101]

By 2017, some of these 10.10 fault lines were on full display. In keeping with tradition, Tsai delivered a speech from the Presidential Palace, wherein she again assumed Taiwan's sovereignty without insulting China.[102] Yet the week before, speaking in the Executive Yuan (one branch of Taiwan's multilayered version of Congress), Tsai's number two, Premier William Lai, asserted that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation," making the president's implied message both crystal clear and confrontational.[103] As Lee Min-yung observed, both presentations were made within a building originally built as part of the Japanese occupation, meaning the ghosts of colonialism hung over the proceedings. This interlacing of Japanese colonialism, Chinese threats, and competing visions of Taiwan's political fate renders such 10.10 moments "a confused scene that mixes history and reality."[104] Local activists made sure the 2017 version of 10.10 also included incendiary street theater and raucous chanting. Asserting that a sense of the nation rooted in the KMT's notion of the Republic of China links the present to an "illegal occupying force that took over the island," pro-independence groups burned in effigy a figure representing the ROC. They sought to cleanse Taiwan from the "evil, ghoulish spirit" of World War II–era KMT pretensions, which, the activists alleged, the DPP is complicit in maintaining.[105] The cumulative logic of these competing visions is dizzying; as one comment posted to the *Taipei Times* website suggested, "ROC = Republic of Confusion."[106] Yet 2017's 10.10 events also indicated a healthy, thriving, playful democracy where different parties jockey for position. The year's 10.10 celebrations may have been confusing, and they may have left some observers wondering where exactly the nation's political elite are leaning, yet they also embodied an effervescent love of free speech and the emerging sense of postcolonial Taiwanese identities.

Within these debates, the key question revolves around how Taiwan and China configure the historical narratives that prefigure their current imaginings of their respective nation-states.[107] Some DPP leaders are just as complicit as their KMT and CPC counterparts in offering totalizing accounts of how they are the rightful

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inheritors of some mythically unified and seamless nation-state called China. In this sense, the DPP, KMT, and CPC all make the mistake of perpetuating what Emma Jinhua Teng calls "the denial of Qing imperialism."[108] In this historical erasure, the CPC speaks of "reunification" as if Taiwan has always been enfolded within the timeless Chinese nation-state. Yet some Taiwanese rhetors make this same mistake, for by failing to situate their nation as the product of centuries of imperial adventuring—by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Japanese, the Chinese, and America in its own, odd way—they "preclude the possibility of Taiwan's postcoloniality."[109] As Shu-mei Shih explains, "the efforts to delineate Taiwan culture against Chinese culture are contradicted by Taiwan's desire to be the representative of authentic Chinese culture to the international community."[110] In short, lingering fantasies about Taiwan as the heir of "one-China" legitimacy short-circuit the nation's possible futures. As Tucker has noted, "when Taipei claimed to be the capital of all of China, it undermined confidence in the government's grasp of reality."[111] The very name of the country, the Republic of China, embodies this long-standing fiction.

A more empowering rhetoric might instead foreground those centuries of imperialism, portraying modern Taiwan not as a successor state to the Qing, but as *a survivor state*, as an independent, postcolonial, and anti-imperialist entity. Claiming this postcolonial status would entail breaking with any notion of Taiwan standing as the carrier of some entity called "China," in turn enabling a liberated, multicultural, and democratic nation to embrace what Chen Ching-chang has envisioned as "Taiwan's emergence as a subject in history."[112] Jettisoning the historical baggage of 10.10 might be a step toward making this break. Some activists have called for celebrating the anniversary of Chiang Ching-kuo ending martial law (from July 14, 1987), a date many Taiwanese see as the breaking point between the new and democratic Taiwan and the KMT's old repressive ROC.[113] When I met with the spokesperson of one of the leading organizations backing Taiwan's independence, he seethed, "All that 10.10 mythology is bullshit. It has nothing to do with Taiwan."[114] Peng Ming-min explored this line of reasoning in the long-repressed Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, the 1964 document that landed him and his collaborators in prison. He argued that the key question was not reclaiming some lost Chinese lineage but "establishing a new country," one that would seek admittance to the UN "as a new member."[115] Supporting this strategy, the *Taipei Time*s ran a series of editorials in 2018 arguing that "it is about time for Taiwan to deROCize," "it is time to rid Taiwan of the ROC," and "the world knows of Taiwan, not the ROC."[116]

The problem, of course, is that opening the nation to these questions would be

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deeply confusing and hotly disputed, especially considering how hard it has been for the nation to gain symbolic traction in international circles.[117] When I raised this possibility with Taiwanese officials in the summer of 2019, they all shuddered. While they supported the principle of Taiwan as a postcolonial nation, they could not endorse any gestures meant to redefine the nation's relationship to 10.10. "Oh no, no," one said, "that would be way too radical." Another retorted, "Would you give up July 4th in America?" For these leaders, the complications of creating a new myth of national foundations were more daunting than sticking with the old 10.10 dating system.[118]

While asking their neighbors to reconceive the nation's foundations is "too radical," Tsai and the DPP have encouraged Taiwan's postcolonial remembering via comparisons to China's forced forgetting. The horrors of June 4, 1989, and China's repression of any memory of them, have become especially useful for illustrating the differences between the mainland's frozen politics and how Taiwan has evolved into an independent, sovereign, and democratic nation. For example, on the mainland the twenty-eighth anniversary of the TSM passed in mandatory silence; the CPC's state-run media outlets dared not utter one word about the forbidden event.[119] But Tsai refused to be complicit with what Louisa Lim has called "The People's Republic of Amnesia."[120] The president took to Facebook to lecture the Party, announcing that "Taiwan is willing to share its experience of transitioning to a democracy so that pain in China can be kept to a minimum." She noted that "Mainland China would impress the world if it re-examined the June 4th incident."[121] This post—symbolically issued via a communication platform censored in China—was front-page news the next day, when the *Taipei Times* celebrated Tsai's vision of Taiwan as a healthy and thriving democracy unafraid of confronting the past and, hence, as a living critique of China's amnesiac police state.[122]

Despite the leadership's glossing over of the contradictions of the 10.10 narrative, Tsai's post positions Taiwan at the forefront of *postcolonial remembering*, an anti-authoritarian reclamation project wherein unearthing past atrocities fuels an emerging discourse of democracy and cultural autonomy. In Taiwan's case, this means heeding the call of activists to open up long-classified archives about the KMT's World War II–era brutalities, beginning with the notorious 228 incident (of February 28, 1947) and the ensuing "White Terror."[123] As we saw earlier in my reading of her inaugural address, Tsai has supported these historical reclamation efforts, referring to them as part of the nation's "transitional justice."[124] She told the nation, "We will discover the truth, heal wounds, and clarify responsibilities. From

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here on out, history will no longer divide Taiwan."[125] Tsai echoed this pledge in her TSM commemoration note of 2018:

> For decades, mainland China has never gone out of the gloom of this historical tragedy. In contrast, Taiwan has also been through the incident. . . . But because of these events, the accumulated and mobilized social energy has driven the reform of Taiwan's democratic politics and full democratization.
>
> Over the years, we have assumed the responsibility of history and are committed to the truth and to the rehabilitation and compensation of the victims and their families. Taiwan has recently set up the "Committee for the Promotion of Transitional Justice," which will investigate and review the mistakes of the authoritarian state in human rights, and which is designed to further pursue the truth of historical events, to heal social wounds, to defuse the confrontation, and to consolidate Taiwan's democratic system.[126]

Paraphrasing these comments the next day, the *Taipei Times* described how the nation is striving "to heal society's scars, resolve antagonisms, and strengthen Taiwan's democracy."[127] *Heal*, *resolve*, *strengthen*—these are the touchstones of postcolonial remembering.

For a statement of how this postcolonial remembering is meant to drive Taiwan's transitional justice, perhaps even leading toward reconciliation, consider this passage from a 2017 MAC press release, timed to coincide with the nation's commemorating 228:

> In its treatment of the historical truth of the 228 Incident, the government of the ROC chose to courageously face the truth, deeply reflect, and take responsibility. Through apologies to the families of the victims, legislation for compensation, and the holding of various forms of commemoration, the government has restored the truth, learned its lessons, healed wounds, and established transitional justice on the basis of facts. It has converted the power of reconciliation into a power for national development and social progress.[128]

In this multilayered format, fact-based historical reckoning leads to commemorating past injuries, in turn building a more open and transparent society, hence creating an appreciative and forgiving communicative dynamic that drives the search for common ground, even reconciliation. This discourse of uplift and recovery works

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alongside constant criticism of the Party's management of contemporary political life in China, meaning the appreciative rhetoric of reconciliation can shade quickly into the sarcastic rhetoric of democratic disdain.

This mingling of discourse styles explains why, as the *Japan Times* reported in 2018, even Tsai's most prudent comments about reconciliation are "likely to incense Beijing."[129] Tsai's attempts to author a new Taiwan-centric version of postcolonial remembering clash with the mocking tones of the rhetoric of democratic disdain; no matter how much the former points to reconciliation, prudence, and understanding, the latter triggers the CPC's traumatized nationalism. I hoped to provide readers with visual evidence of what this dynamic looks like, but *China Daily* has not responded to repeated requests for permission to reproduce any of its political cartoons. And so I will direct readers to the October 12, 2018, story "Tsai Banging Her Head against a Brick Wall," which is accompanied by a representative image.[130] The cartoon portrays Tsai delivering her annual 10.10 speech while sporting a Pinocchio nose, for in the CPC's eyes she is not a legitimate leader but a professional liar. The left half of the image consists of a giant hand bearing the Stars and Stripes, showing Uncle Sam's palm flat against Tsai's back, suggesting Tsai is a stooge of the United States.

If the rhetorical confusions emanating from Taiwan make such images possible, the double-edged strategy of calling for reconciliation at home (via the rhetoric of postcolonial remembering) while poking at China (via the rhetoric of democratic disdain) is embedded in popular sentiment. The day before Tsai's 2017 Facebook post, the *Taipei Times* ran a glowing story about the DPP's pre–June 4th statement, which both celebrated Taiwan's new national imaginings and "urged China to transition to democracy." This statement argued that "Beijing's authoritarian government is still challenging those values on which modern civilization depends," including "democracy, freedom, and human rights," which are "universal values." In contrast to the CPC's totalitarian version of "harmony," the DPP preached, "A harmonious society has to be based on pluralism, openness, and justice."[131] The rhetoric of democratic disdain thus feeds off the sense that the CPC is committed to enforced forgetting, whereas Taiwan's remembering of its past drives the nation's healthy democracy.

Fully aware of the implications of this maneuver, the CPC charged Tsai with fostering "cultural separatism" and fueling "sinister anti-mainland intention[s]."[132] For the CPC, then, each critical statement about life in mainland China cancels out any hope for positive Taiwan-China communication. On the other hand, and

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following this same rhetorical dynamic, each time the Party rips into Tsai and the DPP it only confirms the disdain many Taiwanese feel for the CPC. And so the *Taipei Times* concluded that China's "malicious ambition to annex Taiwan," along with the Party's relentless attacks on Tsai, only deepened the sense that "most Taiwanese are appalled by its insincerity and incessant hostility." Highlighting the emotional response that drives the rhetoric of democratic disdain, the article concludes that most Taiwanese view the Party "with a growing feeling of disgust."[133] That "disgust" targets the World War II–era actions of the KMT as well, as indicated in an editorial arguing that "Following World War II, the KMT took over Taiwan" and "tried to erase Taiwanese culture," proving that "for Chinese politicians, Taiwan was a colony rather than a part of the country."[134] Postcolonial remembering thus entails a dual rejection of the CPC's unification fantasies and any lingering sense of the KMT as a legitimate source of political authority—hence positioning Tsai's DPP as the only force capable of leading Taiwan into a new era of postcolonial independence, democratic thriving, and perhaps reconciliation. The fact that this argument hinges on the selective forgetting of the baggage of 10.10 does not so much short-circuit the narrative as confirm how national histories are always a mishmash of longing, forgetting, and selective remembering.

As if to sidestep these historical complications, Tsai has stressed looking forward toward reconciliation. The push for transitional justice is rooted in open and invitational communication, confirming Doxtader's claim that "reconciliation begins with a call to talk about talk." From this communicative perspective, changing the norms of public deliberation will enable Tsai and her interlocutors to "turn historical fate towards the creative potential for history-making."[135] Indeed, it is striking to notice how often Tsai speaks of Taiwanese political life while referring not to desired outcomes but to the communicative processes required to begin the dialogues that might lead to change. In her 2016 inaugural address, she portrayed Taiwan as "a proactive communicator for peace." In contrast to the CPC and the KMT's long history of repression or the Americans' rhetoric of geostrategic deception, Tsai pledges that Taiwan stands in a posture of invitation, open and ready to engage in the fair exchange of views.[136] Likewise, when asked in 2017 about how to move Taiwan-China relations forward, Tsai said, "There has to be a process of engagement . . . there must be an accumulation of goodwill."[137] As Jill Scott writes in *A Poetics of Forgiveness*, "forgiveness is not a one-time response to specific acts of wrongdoing, but rather a constant attention to ethical relations with others and a mode of being in the world." For Scott, this "being" entails "an ongoing ethical engagement with

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loss."[138] Working from that sense of ethics and engaging with loss, Tsai's notion of reconciliation hinges on both looking back to reconsider long-repressed pasts and also looking forward to new possibilities defined not by outcomes but by open and fair deliberation based on goodwill. In this sense, postcolonial remembering amounts to a sense of politics rooted in ethical communication. As we will see, however, such communicative possibilities require reciprocity with engaged interlocutors, yet with Xi in China and Trump in America, we have entered a new phase of international relations rooted in unilateral declarations, "alternative facts," and swaggering bravado.

Complicating Factor #1: Alternative Facts and the Storm of Trump

Tsai's first year in office overlapped with a fierce U.S. presidential campaign, wherein it seemed neither candidate felt warmly toward China or noticed Taiwan. Trump's campaign in particular featured extreme spikes in China-bashing. While his anti-China fusillades could have been interpreted as foreshadowing more support for Taiwan, his hard-right messaging about an isolationist version of nationalism and his retrograde positions on gender, race, class, and science clashed with the core principles of the DPP, leaving observers confused about what his victory would mean for U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.[139] Even while Trump took hardline stands against China and the Republicans had traditionally supported Taiwan, it was hard to imagine the DPP's Tsai—an LGBTQ ally, a lawyer, a prudent speaker, a social progressive, and a committed internationalist—working with a figure widely hailed as vitriolic, misogynistic, anti-intellectual, racist, and nationalist.[140] And so, just as Tsai was poised to lead Taiwan in an exciting new direction, the island was hit with what the *China Times* called "the storm of Trump."[141]

Following his surprise victory, it did not take long for the storm to make landfall. During the first month following his triumph, President-elect Trump embarked on a crash course in the complexities of international affairs. But, whereas heads of state often place congratulatory calls to election winners, just to make preliminary contact and to ensure a smooth transition of power, Trump used these moments to foreshadow how his presidency would include bold, game-changing gambits. One of the more controversial was his protocol-shattering talk of Friday, December 2, 2016, with Tsai. Breaking an almost forty-year-long silence between the leaders of the two nation-states, Trump angered China and "rattl[ed] the entire region."[142] The

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call with Tsai sent a clear message: The Trump White House was going to break free from eight years of Obama-style prudence to challenge China in assertive ways.[143]

Had it been an isolated incident behind closed doors, the call might have fulfilled diplomatic purposes yet not become controversial, but Trump followed it up with a series of tweets, including attacks on China's monetary policies, trade practices, and naval actions in the South China Sea. If the call was a provocative act of transitional diplomacy, the tweets felt like the announcement of a new China policy. Thus, by Monday, December 5, Trump had unsettled U.S.-China-Taiwan communication. Commentators on both sides of the Pacific erupted at what long-time China expert Orville Schell called "a new kind of Trumpian brinkmanship."[144] Senator Christopher Murphy (D-CT) captured the concern of those committed to nuanced international communication practices: "These are major pivots in foreign policy without any plan. That's how wars start."[145] *United Daily News*, one of the leading Chinese-language newspapers in Taiwan, warned readers that "when big powers wrestle, we should have a coping strategy."[146] The moment was ripe with uncertainty, for the veneer of foreign-policy niceties regarding U.S.-China relations had been yanked away in favor of a more direct, confrontational style that hinted at a shift in America's support for Taiwan.

Trump relishes his knack for disruption, and so he raised the stakes with an appearance on *Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace* on December 11. In the interview, Trump reiterated his attacks on China in general and the "one-China" policy in particular:

> I fully understand the one-China policy. But I don't know why we have to be bound by a one-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.
>
> I mean, look, we're being hurt very badly by China with devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don't tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn't be doing.
>
> And, frankly, they're not helping us at all with North Korea. You have North Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that problem. And they're not helping us at all.[147]

And so the president-elect announced that the Trump White House would not hold "one-China" policy sacrosanct, instead approaching foreign policy in a transactional, utilitarian frame.

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The Trump team entered the White House in January 2017 and soon began asserting what Kellyanne Conway called "alternative facts."[148] The phrase declares a parallel counter-reality, hence laying the foundation for what *Foreign Policy* began calling Trump's "War on Truth."[149] These combined events—the call with Tsai on December 2, the tweets on the 3rd and 4th, the TV comments on the 11th, and then the announcement of "alternative facts" on January 22, 2017—were part of a struggle within the White House. On the one hand, traditional Republican leaders sought to constrain the president within long-standing governing patterns, communication norms, and policy protocols; on the other hand, Trump, egged on by Steve Bannon in particular, fashioned himself as what James Mann has characterized as "a-one-man-wrecking-ball."[150] Trump's foreign-policy communication style, like the "alternative facts" approach in general, rests upon a disregard for evidence and a populist strategy of rebuking all experts, expertise, and expectations, thus sanctioning what the *Washington Post* called a torrent of "enormous, preposterously audacious falsehoods."[151] As a *New York Times* editorial observed, Trump appeared determined to "casually weaponize" his campaign promises in the form of executive orders and late-night tweets, many of them including demonstrable falsehoods.[152] In the case of China and Taiwan, these bursts felt like reversals in long-standing U.S. foreign policy. For many Americans, these performances confirmed Trump's reckless incompetence, his willingness to tear the old order down without thinking through the consequences, but for readers in Asia these gyrations pointed yet again to the U.S. habit of geostrategic deception.

From this perspective, President Trump's alternative-facts-style foreign-policy rhetoric stands as an intentional act of anti-diplomatic sabotage, an anarchist setting into play words and forces meant not to sustain the status quo or build trust, but to release the unpredictable energies of creative destruction. As Thomas B. Farrell observed of this rhetorical strategy, in this case regarding Joseph McCarthy, it amounts to a "counter-deliberative stance" that eschews faith or reason in favor of a "radical suspicion" that merges "recklessness" and "cruelty" into a toxic cocktail.[153] Given China's preference for predictable relations and stable policies, and considering how vulnerable Taiwan feels, the president's rhetoric can only sow confusion and unease—and this, of course, leaves America's allies worried. As the *New York Times* observed, "From defense treaties to trade pacts, foreign leaders are struggling to gauge whether they can depend on the United States to honor its commitments."[154] Trump believed he could ride that wave of destabilizing rhetoric to his own advantage, yet the risks involved in such communicative brinkmanship are

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harrowing, even leading some observers to recall President Nixon's failed "madman theory" of threat construction.[155] Thus Trump laced the rhetoric of geostrategic deception with a toxic dose of chaos, all while leaving U.S.-China-Taiwan relations in tatters.

This communicative pattern was so unsettling that by the summer of 2018 the Party was referring to the United States as "a rogue nation."[156] Trump's tweet-storms about China were so provocative, his communication habits so "rogue," that the Party lamented how decoding his rhetoric was like translating "messages from some alternative universe."[157] This explains why Robert L. Ivie observed that "Trump personifies chaos."[158] As a disposition, an overarching approach to communication that helps to shape specific responses to discrete moments, Trump's "alternative facts" foreign-policy communication therefore stands in contradiction to Tsai's postcolonial remembering. Whereas the latter seeks open and fair deliberation, privileging a sense of ethical communication rooted in collaborative processes, the latter offers a recipe for unilateral lying, foregrounding a sense of bullying rooted in narcissism. Trump, then, even while provoking China and apparently supporting Taiwan, was deploying communication methods that marked him as the anti-Tsai and as a leader who could abandon Taiwan at a moment's notice. This presidential communication-as-chaos left both the Chinese and Taiwanese reeling.

Sure enough, as if to confirm these fears, Trump then dramatically changed course.[159] The flip-flop came on February 9, 2017, when Trump called President Xi. In what the *New York Times* called a "significant reversal," Trump told Xi that "the United States would honor the one-China policy."[160] The *Washington Post* speculated that "the whole episode is likely to have cost Trump credibility with China," with James Zimmerman warning that "Trump just confirmed to the world that he is a *zhilaohu*, a paper tiger."[161] The Chinese media responded not by mocking the paper tiger's capitulation, but by cooing how the exchange showed that "as long as he is willing to learn . . . he can avoid unnecessary collisions with China."[162] In the world of alternative-facts-style foreign policy, alliances come and go, policies and treaties are irrelevant; was this geostrategic deception being deployed for manipulative purposes, or was the U.S. president just unhinged?

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Complicating Factor #2: Xi Jinping's China Dream Weaponizes Traumatized Nationalism

While the Trumpian reign of chaos threw U.S.-China-Taiwan relations into a tailspin, a second complicating factor arose: President Xi's aggressive pursuit of what he calls the "China Dream." By repurposing old Mao-style claims about the nation-state, and weaponizing traumatized nationalism as a motivating wound demanding a confident vision of China as a rising power, Xi's rhetoric has become increasingly strident, unilateral, and confrontational.[163] When Xi lectured the cadres at the Central Party School in 2019, he stressed "strict ideological refinement" and fighting for "the realization of the Chinese people's great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream."[164] "Ideological refinement" at home has meant a new era of thought control; when this China Dream rhetoric has been put into action internationally, it has led time and again to conflict. From ordering aggressive military actions in the South China Sea,[165] to leveling increasingly brash threats against Taiwan,[166] to overseeing increased cyber-intrusions abroad and censorship at home,[167] to abolishing presidential term limits,[168] to launching a brutal system of detention camps in Xinjiang,[169] Xi has pushed China away from "reform and opening" and closer to authoritarian domination.[170]

Part of what makes Xi's China Dream so frightening is its increasing reliance on military firepower as a form of embodied communication. In January 2017, as the "storm of Trump" was first breaking, and in another attempt to intimidate Tsai, the PLA launched intrusive military air patrols around Taiwan. The flights were so threatening that Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan scrambled fighter jets in response. In an echo of prior Taiwan Strait crises, the PLA sent the *Liaoning*, the navy's only aircraft carrier, on a show-of-force sail through the Taiwan Strait. The *New York Times* described this ratcheting-up of military action as "menacing," while the *Wall Street Journal* warned that "New U.S.-China Rivalry Risks Lethal Confrontation."[171] The Party-run press relished the moment, as the ultranationalist *Global Times* promised "further military pressure" and warned, "If Trump reneges on the one-China policy . . . the Chinese people will demand the government *to take revenge*."[172] That "revenge" will target Taiwan. Another editorial claimed "the reunification of China is an inalienable part of world peace," and warned if that preordained promise is not fulfilled, then the PRC "will make them [the Taiwanese] pay the price," will make them "feel multiple fear," and will "strangle them."[173]

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This is violent language. Revealing the fury embedded within the CPC's traumatized nationalism, the claim was for defending peace and stability, yet the threats pointed not only to war but to the more intimate death-by-strangling. The CPC's responses illustrate the paradox of sovereignty, as outlined by Jean Bethke Elshtain: "Sovereignty is a heroic narrative, a story of the bringing of order and civic peace and unity, on the one hand, and of the necessity of war and state violence, on the other."[174] Peace secured through war, order earned through violence, honor burnished through destruction—such are the rhetorical backflips that underwrite sovereignty. One outraged *Global Times* editorial yearned for the coming war between China and the United States, declaring, "Unless Washington plans to wage a large-scale war in the South China Sea, any other approaches to prevent Chinese access to the islands will be foolish." Then, in a stunning moment of brinkmanship, in this case directed at escalatory comments made by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the paper suggested, "Tillerson had better bone up on nuclear power strategies if he wants to force a big nuclear power to withdraw from its own territories." In short, "the two sides had better prepare for a military clash."[175]

The rhetoric here is not so much defensive as giddy: War is not a last-ditch disaster that comes after failed diplomacy but a heroic calling anointing the speaker in grandeur. *China Daily* thus warned the United States that it was toying with "a Pandora's box of lethal potential"; the paper worried that if the incoming president continued to shatter the status quo, "Beijing will have no choice but to take off the gloves."[176] The next day, the *Taipei Times* reported that Yang Yizhou, a CPC official, had argued that "if you do not beat them until they are bloody and bruised, then they will not retreat." Of Tsai and her allies, Yang blustered, "we must use bloodstained facts to show them that the road is blocked."[177] *Large-scale war*, *nuclear power strategies*, *prepare for a military clash*, *lethal potential*, *strangle them*, *take off the gloves*, *bloodstained facts*, *Pandora's box*—these phrases have not been uttered in public between China and the United States since the 1954–1955 and then 1958 crises over Quemoy. As this reconstruction of the moment indicates, the CPC's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism is escalatory, unilateral, and accusatory, making it an unproductive response to Trump's alternative-facts-style rhetoric.

As these examples make clear, Xi has weaponized traumatized nationalism as the emotional backstop to his China Dream, wherein he offers rousing narratives celebrating China's "rejuvenation"—which hinges, in part, on "reunification" with Taiwan. Jettisoning the long-standing role of humiliated victim, Xi's China Dream foregrounds China's new strength, shifting the tone from aggrieved colonial to proud

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colonialist, from cooperative multilateralist to unilateral and uncompromising power.[178] As regards Taiwan, however, Xi's rhetoric is virtually unchanged from previous Chinese leaders' arguments. For example, upon the "normalization" of relations with the United States on January 1, 1979, the CPC released its "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan."[179] In the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, President Jiang echoed and then expanded upon that message in his "Eight-Point Speech" of January 30, 1995.[180] Ever aware of the power of anniversaries in Chinese culture, Xi used the 40th anniversary of the 1979 message to reprise the main claims of Jiang's 1995 speech while wrapping both texts in the glowing sense of accomplishment and heroism that marks the China Dream.

Xi's "Speech at Taiwan Message Anniversary" of January 2, 2019, offered no new fresh ideas. The president began by celebrating how "the mainland and Taiwan reached the 1992 Consensus," a claim we saw earlier is not true.[181] But Xi assures his audience in the Great Hall of the People that not only is the '92C in place, but "reunification" is imminent and "can never be altered by anyone or any force." Part of the "irresistible trend" of China's "national rejuvenation," this fact is part of "the tide of time" foretelling China's rise, which "can never be stopped by anyone."[182] These claims of preordained national triumph still hinge on traumatized nationalism, however, as Xi reminds his listeners that "the Taiwan question originated from national weakness and disorder."[183] Then, wheeling out one of the Party's old warhorses, Xi suggests Taiwan will enjoy the protections of "one country, two systems," which will both "reunify" the motherland and defeat Taiwan independence activists.[184] Repeating one of Jiang's lines, Xi then warns that "We make no promises to renounce the use of force," not only because of the need to defend against Taiwanese splittists but because China must defeat "the interference of external forces."[185] In reprising these claims, Xi's 2019 speech offers a virtual repeat of Jiang's 1995 speech and the Party's 1979 "Message." A tribute to the Party's consistency, Xi's speech proved a disheartening example of a leader lacking ideas—there is nothing new here, just the same old threats.[186] As Taiwan's MAC snorted in response to Xi's offer of "one country, two systems"—in a quip encapsulating the playful and mocking tone of democratic disdain—"No thanks! We have democracy and freedom and are just fine."[187]

The MAC's rejection of Xi's offer belied the fact that Taiwan was on edge. With Trump and Xi blustering, there was no telling what might happen. Some advocates called for a return to foreign-policy sanity, while others hoped the moment might lead to a fundamental realignment. Parris Chang argued it was "time for Washington

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to abandon its policy of 'benign neglect' toward Taiwan," especially in the face of the CPC's rising "hegemonic ambitions."[188] Some Taiwanese observers were just as frustrated with the United States as with China, however, as seen in an editorial published in the *Washington Post*. Authored by Lin Fei-fan, Chen Wei-ting, and June Lin, the piece rips America and China for treating Taiwan "as a pawn of superpower politics." Noting that the legacy of the Cold War should no longer dictate policies, the authors point to America's love of human rights, freedom, and democracy as reasons why the United States should stop coddling China and embrace Taiwan, a "flourishing multicultural society," as a free and independent nation worthy of formal "recognition and dignity."[189] As Xi's China Dream rhetoric makes clear, however, following such advice could lead to war.

Conclusion: Tsai's "Four Musts" and the Critique of the Rhetoric of Marginal Significance

For many in Taiwan, the combination of Trumpian chaos and Xi's threats felt like another instance of the United States and China jockeying for power by toying with the island. The day after Trump's February 9, 2017, call to Xi was revealed, *United Daily News* noted, "Taiwan is worried."[190] The *Taipei Times* observed that while Trump's capitulation to the "one-China" policy may have been "a return to a longstanding stance," "many Taiwanese were harboring hopes for a new era in US-Taiwan relations."[191] *Apple Daily* reminded readers not to fall for false hopes, however, because "U.S. presidents' pretentious friendliness to Taiwan often goes sour."[192] Across the political spectrum, from the English-language and DPP-leaning *Taipei Times* to the video-game-style *Apple Daily*, to the Chinese-language and KMT-leaning *United Daily News*, readers encountered stories depicting Trump's capitulation to Xi as a dire warning of the imminent betrayal of Taiwan. Yet again, the rhetoric of marginal significance was in full bloom.

As one activist said, "We're just tired of Big Brother [the United States] treating us like a pawn."[193] To visualize this resentment, consider figure 17, a full-page advertisement placed in the *Washington Times* by FAPA on December

FIGURE 17 (*opposite*). FAPA responds to the CPC's "one China" campaign by asserting, "Taiwan is not a part of China"; advertisement from the *Washington Times*, December 16, 2016; © held by and image used with permission of FAPA and the *Washington Times.*

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TAIWAN IS NOT PART OF CHINA
TAIWAN IS NOT A BARGAINING CHIP

THE CALL HEARD AROUND THE WORLD...

Taiwanese Americans express their appreciation to President-elect Donald Trump for his ground-breaking telephone call with the democratically elected president of Taiwan, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, who congratulated Mr. Trump with his election victory.

Taiwanese Americans believe that the coming years will be pivotal for Taiwan's democracy, and American support will be a necessary part of this process.

DO YOU KNOW THAT...

- For more than 50 years, Taiwan has been one of the United States staunchest allies.
- Taiwan is the United States' 9th largest trading partner.
- Taiwan is the world's 22nd largest economy.
- Taiwan is eager to contribute to international organizations such as the UN, the WHO etc..
- Taiwan is a critical strategic asset (an "Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier") to the United States.
- Taiwan democratically elects its own President and Legislature every four years.

CONTACT: FORMOSAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (FAPA)
WWW.FAPA.ORG • TEL: (202) 547-3686
PHOTO COURTESY: JESSIE CHEN
AD DESIGN: HSI CHEN

NEVERTHELESS...

- High-level officials from Taiwan –including the president– are not allowed to come to Washington DC.
- Taiwan is not a member of any international organization that requires statehood.
- Taiwanese citizens are banned from entering UN headquarters in New York.
- The U.S. has diplomatic relations with all the countries in the world except for North Korea, Iran, Bhutan, and Taiwan. Taiwan clearly does not belong in that small group of insular and isolated nations.
- Although the U.S. regards Taiwan's international status as undetermined, its "One China Policy" is all too often misinterpreted to imply that Taiwan is part of China. This constrains Taiwan's ability to fully participate in world affairs.

CLEARLY, AMERICA'S TAIWAN POLICY IS UNSUSTAINABLE.

We therefore applaud Vice President-elect Mike Pence's statement: *"I think you are going to see in a President Donald Trump a willingness to engage the world but engage the world on America's terms."*

We urge President-elect Trump to continue to develop a U.S. policy that provides more dignity and respect for the leaders and people of Taiwan and further strengthen the ties between the two democratic nations.

SELF-DETERMINATION IS NOT NEGOTIABLE
THE ONE CHINA POLICY IS OBSOLETE

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16, 2016. With Tsai speaking to a packed hall, the image announces, "Taiwan Is Not a Bargaining Chip." The poster expresses appreciation for Trump's initial efforts, notes that much more is yet to be done to secure Taiwan's freedom, and invokes MacArthur's Long Cold War line about "an unsinkable aircraft carrier." The advertisement closes with a key line from Taiwan's independence activists: "The One-China Policy Is Obsolete." The broadside offers a rousing critique of the rhetoric of marginal significance.

While FAPA sought to rally supporters in America, longtime democracy activist Peng Ming-min sought to rouse Taiwanese readers: "The only thing that matters is Taiwan is not ruled by China. The idea that Taiwan is a part of China must be completely eradicated."[194] As the evidence offered herein indicates, the combination of the "storm of Trump" and Xi's China Dream left the island nation once again disillusioned by the consequences of the rhetoric of marginal significance, yet bravely clinging to a sense of freedom. As a Taiwanese public memory worker said, "We're just so tired of everyone treating us this way. Come on, we've been independent for what, sixty years? What's it going to take for you two [China and America] to face reality? We are not a province of China, and we are not a colony of America. You keep asking about 'one-China,' but we should be talking about the future of Taiwan."[195]

That future took on a new shape on New Year's Day 2019, when Tsai delivered her "Four Musts" speech. In contrast to Xi's "one country, two systems" model—what one commentator called a recipe for Taiwan's "political suicide"[196]—Tsai stressed that China and Taiwan needed to engage in frank and open dialogue about cross-Strait issues. But, Tsai boldly asserted that no dialogue could take place without China agreeing to her "four musts":

- China must face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan);
- it must respect the commitment of the 23 million people of Taiwan for freedom and democracy;
- it must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on a basis of equality;
- and it must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in negotiations.[197]

President Tsai's naming strategy in the first "must," listing the now popular "Taiwan" in parentheses after the old name, Republic of China, suggest she may be moving

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toward the kind of revisionary rhetoric discussed above. If nothing else, using both names in the same phrase indicates a savvy politician navigating tricky political waters. Her third "must," correcting the oversight in Clinton's "three noes," reasserts the language from the Shanghai Communiqué mandating that cross-Strait developments must be "peaceful." Her fourth "must" includes a pointed reference to the fact that various KMT officials making pronouncements about future Taiwan-China arrangements are not acting on behalf of Taiwan's democratically elected government—meaning their freelancing on cross-Strait relations amount to undermining the national interest, and hence to treason. Tsai's speech therefore rejected China's unification fantasies, confirmed Taiwan's nonnegotiable independence and freedom, and signaled that she would no longer tolerate KMT subterfuge regarding the mainland. When juxtaposed against Xi's "Speech at Taiwan Message Anniversary," the KMT's bumbling, and Trump's unnerving chaos, Tsai's speech modeled professionalism and offered a clarion call for postcolonial nationalism. Based on responses in America and Taiwan, Tsai's New Year's Day speech turned her from an embattled president worrying about local economic troubles into a national hero.[198]

While Tsai's popularity in Taiwan rose, so the Trump White House moved steadily closer to Taiwan. In the summer of 2018, the United States unveiled its new American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). A massive $250 million compound that serves as the unofficial embassy in Taipei, it stands as clear evidence of America's deep, bipartisan, and ongoing commitment to Taiwan.[199] Then the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), signed into law in March 2018, opened the door to enhanced visits to America by Taiwanese leaders, and by American leaders to Taiwan, thus facilitating cultural, political, and economic exchanges. In a shot at the CPC that echoes one of the key tropes from the Long Cold War, the preamble to the bill describes Taiwan as "a beacon of Democracy in Asia."[200] Passed unanimously in Congress, the bill delivered another blow to the Party's "one-China" hopes. While the American media ignored the bill, the Taiwanese press was jubilant.[201] Then, in August 2019, in tandem with an escalating trade war against China, the Trump administration announced an $8 billion arms deal with Taiwan, including sixty-six high-tech F16s, a major upgrade in Taiwan's air defense capabilities.[202] In each of these instances, the machinery of government chugged along regardless of Trump's latest rhetorical absurdity—suggesting a disconnect between the president's ephemeral public communication and the deep ties between Taiwan and its supporters in the State Department, the Department of Defense, and Congress.

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Hardline elements in China greeted the TTA with a hailstorm of criticism, including the charge that the "vile" bill "violates gravely the one-China policy" and offers yet another example of "US double-dealing."[203] The F-16 package met with similar denunciations.[204] These critics reprised the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism to enflame a sense of grievance while assuming the U.S. actions exemplified the rhetoric of geostrategic deception. Even more alarming, at a high-profile panel held in Beijing in December 2018, a number of elite policy figures said things like "The PLA is capable of taking Taiwan within 100 hours with only a few dozen casualties"; "it is time for the PLA to deploy troops"; and "it is time to achieve unity."[205] As these comments indicate, proponents of Xi's China Dream see a coming war over Taiwan not only as inevitable but as desirable. For these figures, the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, especially when marshaled in the service of fulfilling the China Dream, offers both justification for, and a communicative roadmap to, war.

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Conclusion

I began this book by pledging to offer readers a rhetorical history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, and to do so while reaching for what Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby referred to in 1946, in their magnificent *Thunder out of China*, as the "majestic rhythms in history."[1] To fulfill that promise, I have addressed five key moments in U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, beginning with the Truman administration's grappling with the end of World War II in 1945 and ending with the Trump administration's behavior through 2020. In addition to my interpretations of the efforts of Presidents Truman and Trump, that seventy-five-year period of examination includes chapters addressing the Eisenhower administration's handling of the 1954–1955 Quemoy Crisis, the Nixon administration's opening to China across 1971 and 1972, and the Clinton White House's roles in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which led to the "three noes" of 1998. I have also touched upon the Carter administration's handling of the "normalization" that took effect between the United States and China on New Year's Day, 1979. Thus traversing seventy-five years while focusing on five presidential administrations (and touching upon another), *A World of Turmoil* offers both a history of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication and an analysis of the triumphs and tragedies of post–World War II U.S. foreign policy in Asia. I have sought throughout

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these chapters to convey a sense of the urgency of the matter, for following a tradition of scholarship embodied in Robert P. Newman's classic essay on "Lethal Rhetoric," I have argued that entrenched misunderstandings between the United States, China, and Taiwan leave our nations hovering on the precipice of disaster.[2]

In parallel fashion, this rhetorical history has enabled me to track the evolution in China's arguments about Taiwan, beginning with Chairman Mao's pronouncements in 1949 and ending with President Xi Jinping's "great rejuvenation" comments from 2019. Along the way, I have addressed Premier Chou Enlai's efforts in the 1950s and 1970s, Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao transitional rhetoric from the late-1970s and 1980s, and Jiang Zemin's claims about Taiwan from the 1990s. To supplement the arguments made by China's leaders, I have also considered material from such leading Chinese sources as the *Beijing Review*, *People's Daily*, *China Daily*, the *Global Times*, various white papers and military reports, and press releases from the Xinhua news agency. My analysis has benefited as well from a wave of scholarship by Chinese colleagues, many of whom have accessed archival documents offering fresh insights into China's perspectives and policies during the Long Cold War. Based upon this rhetorical evidence, I offered readers analyses of the different histories of "one China" thinking, thus providing an overview of how the CPC's arguments about Taiwan have shaped tropes about sovereignty, nationalism, postcolonialism, and the Long Cold War.

Simultaneously, by working from 1945 up to 2020, I have engaged with some of Taiwan's key leaders, moving from Chiang Kai-shek to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, then on to Taiwan's first publicly elected president, Lee Teng-hui, and closing with what I have called the "postcolonial remembering" of Taiwan's first woman president, Tsai Ing-wen. I have supported my readings by drawing upon materials from the government's Mainland Affairs Council, various think tanks, a wide array of voices from Taiwan's booming public spheres, and stories from the leading English-language newspapers, the *Taipei Times*, *Taiwan News*, and *China Post*—and, in the latter chapters, from its most popular Chinese-language newspapers, *China Times*, *United Daily News*, and *Apple Daily*. Across these sources, we have watched as Chiang Kai-shek's post–World War II dream of reconquering the mainland has evolved into President Tsai's commitment to postcolonial remembering and transitional justice, thus watching the miracle of the KMT's dictatorship being swept away by a raucous and rollicking democracy.

To grasp the full complexity of political rhetoric in and between the United States, China, and Taiwan, I have supplemented these printed materials with

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insights gleaned from roughly one hundred formal interviews with activists, politicians, scholars, memory workers, and other leading figures. I conducted these interviews all around Taiwan; across the United States; in Hong Kong, Macau, Nepal, and New Delhi; and, because I was not allowed to conduct interviews in mainland China, via various electronic media. While comments from these formal interviews are quoted following (and were conducted according to) the human subjects protocols discussed in my Acknowledgments,[3] my arguments herein have been deeply influenced by my informal interactions with colleagues, friends, students, and everyday citizens across more than a decade of work, travel, and play in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Nepal, India, and Tibet. These interactions have shaped my thinking, for regardless of national affiliation or political proclivity, virtually everyone I have spoken with has hoped for peace in the region—hence infusing my analysis, I hope, with a sense of solidarity and a commitment to social justice.

By playing this range of figures and sources off one another, by creating a constellation of international voices in debate, I have sought to enable readers to hear the tenor of the times, thus appreciating what America's World War II–era ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, once described as "the haunting perplexity in determining on a wise and effective policy" vis-à-vis U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.[4] That notion of "perplexity" has been a central theme, for we have seen throughout the study how leaders in the United States, China, and Taiwan have found themselves confronted by circumstances that left them baffled. Acknowledging this sense of complexity and confusion follows from encountering rhetors not so much crafting masterful Truth-statements to shape the world as desperately scrambling to avert catastrophe. As my case studies have shown, approaching rhetorical history in this way means diving into the world of the contingent, the malleable, the infinite give-and-take of ideas working (or not) in action. As David Zarefsky has written, "This approach views history as a series of rhetorical problems—situations that call for public persuasion to advance a cause or to overcome an impasse."[5] My qualifying twist on that version of rhetorical history is that we have encountered leaders not so much "overcoming" crises as enduring them.

This caveat does not diminish the immense power of words in shaping our world; rather, it offers a humble reminder that our best intentions often end up in a ditch. I have thus taken U.S. ambassador to Taiwan Karl L. Rankin's lament as an axiomatic reminder of the sheer perplexity of global politics and our roles therein. Writing from Taipei in a moment of crisis, Rankin observed, "We are faced

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by alternatives all of which are less than perfect. To put it in the worst terms, it is a question of finding the least bad solution."[6] This ironic mode is not meant as a form of defeatism, but rather, following Kenneth Burke, to position the critic with a "charitable attitude" that recognizes our foibles and shortcomings as inescapable facts of life, which the critic appraises from a place of "humbleness."[7] This does not preclude us, however, from discerning the long sweep of ideas across time, hence mapping rhetorical dispositions and their impact on our daily lives. In this way, addressing the American, Chinese, and Taiwanese efforts to find "the least bad solution" can point toward a provisional narrative, perhaps even suggesting the "majestic rhythms in history."

By offering these interlinked case studies of political rhetoric both in and about the Taiwan Strait from the middle of the twentieth century through the first decades of the twenty-first century, I have sought to embed U.S.-China-Taiwan communication in what I have called the Long Cold War. Both geographically decentering Cold War studies from their traditional emphasis on Europe and expanding Cold War studies beyond their traditional historical framing, I have argued that the Long Cold War was, and remains, a global endeavor. Within this global Long Cold War, the United States' handling of its relations with Taiwan and China has been seen, and continues to be seen, as a crucially important and deeply symbolic test case for how America conceives of its roles in the world. Moreover, this notion of the Long Cold War shifts our attention away from a dyadic sense of the United States battling the USSR, instead embedding our understanding of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations within global political dynamics driven largely by the hopes of postcolonial entities. Approaching the Long Cold War in this way, as a labyrinth of political opportunities and dilemmas driven in large part by emerging postcolonial nationalisms, helps to explain why Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP allies have sought to bend the promises of postcolonial thinking to their needs, using it to chart a sense of a nonaligned, culturally autonomous, politically independent nation-state.

Across these case studies, we have seen how China's rhetoric about Taiwan has remained virtually unchanged throughout the Long Cold War. I have cited this never-changing rhetoric as evidence of the CPC's failed foreign policy and, more specifically, as indicating the Party's unwillingness to acknowledge the fact that Taiwan is a free and independent nation-state. This analysis points to a heartbreaking contradiction, for Mao and his comrades founded the People's Republic of China in 1949 as a proudly postcolonial entity throwing off the shackles of foreign oppression. For Mao and his followers, throwing off the yoke of imperialist oppression and

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"standing up" as a postcolonial entity was a historical obligation, a moral imperative, and a national calling.[8] Yet neither Mao nor the leaders who followed him have acknowledged that same right in the Taiwanese, whom they continue to threaten with the notion of "reunification," hence practicing postcolonial colonialism.[9] As was true of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century versions of colonialism as well, this twenty-first-century postcolonial colonialism amounts to a political delusion. In this sense, I agree with Arthur Waldron, who concludes the PRC remains "completely unwilling to acknowledge the real *status quo*" in the Taiwan Strait.[10] As we have seen time and time again when hearing the voices of Taiwanese leaders, this Chinese failure to evolve throughout the Long Cold War has become a garland of infamy, harrowing evidence that the "republic of amnesia" refuses to engage in supple, postcolonial remembering and mature foreign policy, instead clinging to "the Big Lie" about "one China."[11] When layered against the rhetorical norms and habits of the United States and Taiwan, the PRC's position indicates the complete miscomprehension between the parties.

Structured Disagreements: Five Arguments about U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

Within this multilayered rhetorical history of U.S.-China-Taiwan (mis)communication in the Long Cold War, the evidence points toward five dominant arguments. One is captured in Jonathan Manthorpe's conclusion that "Washington's strategic ambiguity in courting Beijing while remaining Taiwan's principal ally has been reasonably utilitarian. It is now becoming a farce."[12] From this perspective, Taiwan is an independent nation-state, the United States is its chief ally, China's "one China" mantra is a long-dead dream, and saying anything else is an act of political folly—what Waldron mocks as a policy of "make believe."[13] From this vantage point, the long history of U.S-China-Taiwan communication has devolved into ritualized lying, wherein everyone plays a farcical game of innuendo and wink-wink. The implication is that healthy, honest communication requires a grand gesture, a statement of unequivocal clarity: *Taiwan is independent, now let's get on with our lives.* As we have seen herein, this position was hinted at by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, disavowed but simultaneously practiced by Nixon and Kissinger, and first implied but then denounced by Clinton. Such vacillations have convinced many in Taiwan that the United States is confused, if not complicit

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in their eventual betrayal, while they have convinced the Chinese that the United States is simply, and perpetually, dishonest.[14] As we saw in chapter 5, the mercurial President Trump has only deepened these confusions, leaving interlocutors in Taiwan and Beijing baffled.

A very different conclusion is drawn by Alan Romberg, who reprises the standard line: "The United States will not support independence, but neither will it support unification. It will support whatever outcome the two sides come to peacefully, non-coercively and willingly."[15] As Shirley A. Kan has summarized this position, because "U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled," America's role in U.S.-China-Taiwan debates has "focused on the *process* of resolution . . . not any set outcome."[16] From this perspective, the United States is an honest broker guaranteeing that Taiwan and China have the time and space to invent their own, indigenous solutions.[17] From this vantage point, U.S.-China-Taiwan communication is a delicately calibrated machine meant primarily to avoid war, with the United States playing the role of peacekeeper. As Thomas Friedman wrote at the height of the 1996 crisis, "America cannot negotiate an end to this crisis. This is a civil war and only the people of China and Taiwan can sort out the solution. But what the U.S. can do, and must do, is *be the reality principle*, setting the boundaries of what is permissible."[18] The implication is that continuing to produce nuanced "status quo" rhetoric is a better option than war—the "reality principle" prefers an ambiguous peace over live ammunition. As Bonny Glaser puts it, "The U.S. should follow the international relations equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath: Do no harm."[19]

From the CPC's perspective, this position rings hollow in the face of America's long-standing and massive economic and military support for Taiwan. Friedman's assumption that America can impose its version of some "reality principle" upon Asia, for example, surely strikes international observers as confirmation of unquestioned U.S. dominance over the region. Or consider the words of James Moriarty, the AIT chairman. Speaking before the Global Taiwan Institute in 2018, Moriarty offered a shimmering tribute:

> Taiwan's transformation from an island ruled by martial law to a beacon of democracy is one of the major developments of the late 20th and early 21st centuries—a great accomplishment for the people on Taiwan that inspires not just Americans but many around the world. All of us here treasure the powerful example that Taiwan, through its political and economic achievements, offers to the Indo-Pacific region and the world.[20]

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Moriarty is an eloquent supporter of Taiwan; his praise strikes me as accurate and commendable. But these are hardly the sentiments of an impartial referee—and so the CPC has seized upon such language for decades to argue that the United States' "we're just the honest broker" position is a lie. We should note as well that Moriarty's arguments here and elsewhere offer a pointed alternative to what I have called the rhetoric of marginal significance, and thus stand as yet another data point in our consideration of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication.

A third and very different argument is forwarded by Jia Qingguo, who scoffs at the first two positions when observing that "the real thrust of the U.S. policy . . . is to strengthen the hand of Taiwan to a degree that makes a negotiated unification very difficult if not completely impossible."[21] From this perspective—wherein the scholar Jia channels arguments made by China's leaders from Mao to Chou to Deng to Jiang to Xi—U.S. communication about and between China and Taiwan is now, and has historically been, fundamentally dishonest, with the United States claiming to play the role of neutral peacekeeper while in fact pursuing the role of imperial intruder. This means the United States' involvements with the island amount to imperial meddling and assaults upon Chinese sovereignty.[22] Within this narrative, U.S. policies toward Taiwan serve as one of the foundations of China's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, wherein the nation-state has been constantly attacked by outside forces, hence justifying a turn to aggressive nationalism.[23] As Ma Xiaoguang, the spokesman for the PRC's TAO, said in 2019, "U.S. arms sales to Taiwan only fuel the arrogance of the 'Taiwan Independence' separatist forces." American claims to be otherwise, Ma thunders, are "totally wrong and invalid."[24] The argument here is that the United States is now and has been lying, that China has been wronged, and that Taiwan should return to the warm embrace of the motherland. While this position merits due credit for its consistency—it has not changed ever since 1949—it also indicates China's unwillingness to consider the push and pull of the intervening seventy-plus years of history, hence portraying the Party as frozen in time, still thundering on about contested World War II–era sovereignty claims in the midst of the age of postmodern globalization.

A fourth, hybrid argument is offered by Julian J. Kuo, who merges the first and second schools of thought noted above when observing that Taiwan's rhetorical strategy is "to buy time and security on the assumption that mutual goals [between the PRC and ROC] are basically incompatible, but that talk and some contact is better than conflict. . . . The policy focus is on the *process* of diplomacy rather than its *substance*."[25] The implication here is that declaring independence would be too

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provocative, so Taiwan should instead work on building better communication "processes" with the CPC, creating conversational spaces and evolutionary time for the CPC to come to see the folly of its "one China" dream. As noted by Howard Lange, this position amounts to "the status quo *plus*," with that *plus* suggesting the implied, longed-for, eventual move toward the formalization of Taiwan's de jure independence.[26] The problem with this position is that the CPC shows little evidence of undergoing any kind of evolution in its thinking about Taiwan. If anything, Xi Jinping's "China Dream" is fueling an aggressive nationalism—some observers are calling this "Chinese exceptionalism"—that assumes Taiwan is an inherent part of the motherland that should be recovered, by force if necessary.[27]

The fifth major argument we have encountered herein reflects Taiwanese thinking from Lee Teng-hui up to Tsai Ing-wen and may be characterized as the "we're already independent" position. This is a crafty line of argument, for we have seen how the CPC has warned that any Taiwanese declaration of independence will trigger an invasion. We saw in chapter 4 how, to circumvent this red line, President Lee Teng-hui scoffed in 1997, "*Taiwan is already independent*. There is no need to say so."[28] From this perspective, CPC threats about forced annexations are just bluster, for the war-triggering worst-case scenario of Taiwan declaring independence will never happen—for the simple reason that *independence was achieved long ago*. Speaking nineteen years later, and clearly echoing her mentor, we saw in chapter 5 how President Tsai Ing-wen has repeated this same formula, saying, "We are, after all, a sovereign and independent country."[29] In this instance, any war-causing declaration of independence would be beside the point, restating the obvious; like Lee, Tsai was preempting the Chinese threat by sidestepping the need for any declaration at all. As the president said in an interview with the BBC in 2020, "We don't need to declare ourselves an independent state" because "We are an independent country already."[30]

While the rhetorical logic here is admirable, we have also seen how Taiwan's leaders from Chiang Kai-shek to Tsai Ing-wen have sought to backdate this independence all the way down to the Qing-toppling revolution on the mainland in 1911. Enshrined in the national holiday of October 10—celebrated as "10.10" or "double ten"—this dating enmeshes Taiwan in a range of historical controversies and political confusions that hamper the island's ability to appear independent from mainland China. Indeed, we saw in chapter 5 how one prominent Taiwan supporter mocked this nationwide act of historical fantasy, saying, "All that 10.10 mythology is bullshit. It has nothing to do with Taiwan."[31] Lee and Tsai and their supporters may

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thus boast that Taiwan is "independent already," but linking that claim to a highly contested rebellion launched on the mainland is problematic, meaning it has been exceptionally difficult for postcolonial and multicultural Taiwan to author anything like a coherent national narrative regarding its historical foundations.

While I have not focused in this study on either economics or the arts, the five arguments I have outlined above all work in parallel fashion with the sheer materiality of markets and cultural appropriation in action. For despite the increasingly harsh rhetoric on both sides of the Strait, PRC-ROC relations have been deepening for decades on the economic front. While trade between Taiwan and the mainland accounted for $1.7 billion (in United States dollars) in 1987, it has ballooned to over $152 billion per year, with Taiwanese exports to China accounting for "about 29% of Taiwan's total trade."[32] Removed from the thorny issues of nationalism and sovereignty, despite the trade shift implied by President Tsai's "Southbound Policy," and regardless of the fate of the U.S.-China "trade war," the economic fortunes of China and Taiwan rest squarely on maintaining the status quo, or at least on avoiding war.[33] These economic entanglements have facilitated robust cross-Strait migrations of workers, managers, tourists, investors, students, artists, and scholars—leading to a kaleidoscope of collaborations across national borders. For these reasons, it is impossible to walk the streets of China or Taiwan without encountering their mutual enmeshment in shared cuisine, songs, films, TV shows, business ventures, and fashion, suggesting deep familiarity, respect, and even love between the people—we can only hope that the daily lived experiences of these shared economic and cultural factors mitigate geostrategic hostilities.

Rhetorical Dispositions and the Political Unconscious of U.S.-China-Taiwan Communication

While the five arguments reviewed above have ebbed and flowed over the decades, transforming depending on circumstances and personnel and dumb chance, I have suggested that these specific arguments have been structured by five overarching rhetorical dispositions. As detailed in the Introduction, and as witnessed in my case studies, these dispositions are cumulative frames of reasoning and feeling, not so much context-specific arguments as ways of seeing and interpreting the world. Understood as an interlocking series of assumptions, narratives, and justifications, these dispositions approximate what Fredric Jameson once called "the political

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unconscious."[34] While mapping these dispositions, I have sought to explain how they can be both empowering and crippling, both ennobling and demeaning. By way of conclusion, let us review these five rhetorical dispositions:

China's Traumatized Nationalism and Xi's China Dream

I have argued that the CPC's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism provides a uniquely inelegant response to contemporary affairs. Each time the Party ratchets up its sense of grievance, it authors its own worst critique, one that substantiates what many Taiwanese have been saying since the end of World War II: that the Communists refuse to negotiate, they are clueless about the woof-and-warp of international relations, and they remain blind to the fact of Taiwan's sovereignty. History changes, facts on the ground mature, yet the Party stays frozen in the Long Cold War, barking colonialist orders and clunky threats. This rhetorical ineptitude has accelerated under the Party's recent turn to brash nationalism, what Xing Lu has diagnosed as President Xi Jinping's strategic appeal to neo-Maoist rhetoric.[35] Following that analysis, I have argued that Xi's China Dream offers few avenues for compromise and conciliation, agreeing with Suisheng Zhao that "Xi's gambit looks less like a show of strength than an embarrassing confession of regime fragility."[36] The examples cited herein from Taiwan.CN, *Global Times*, *China Daily*, Xinhua, *People's Daily*, various CPC white papers, and President Xi reveal a Party not so much calm and confident as anxious and insecure.[37]

Nonetheless, the CPC's "one China" narrative amounts to a nightmare for the people of Taiwan and a perpetual headache for the United States. Aside from the ethical question of pursuing this China Dream in violation of the stated wishes of the Taiwanese—hence rendering the CPC's actions vis-à-vis Taiwan as nothing less than postcolonial colonialism—basing one's political rhetoric on the need for healing ancient wounds amounts to a recipe for infinite grievance. Political relations between powers move toward compromises that avoid catastrophes; international relations are not about finding national redemption but about managing the possible. By seeing the world via the prism of traumatized nationalism, wherein China's national consciousness is prefigured via narratives of victimization and confrontation, the CPC has left itself no room for maneuvering. In this combative framework, compromise becomes weakness and prudence becomes cowardice—meaning most of what we might consider sensible deliberation is predetermined

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as off-limits. Driven by this fear of injury, and hence perpetually afraid of both the imperial ambitions of Others and the "splittist" tendencies of Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, internal dissidents, pro-democracy Hong Kongers, and so on, the CPC has become deaf to the friendly intentions of potential collaborators. This process leaves China isolated on the world stage and incapable of generating the positive, endearing, empowering communication required to become a great power. In this sense, traumatized nationalism has served as a crippling obsession, warping modern Chinese history.

President Xi Jinping has sought to move the nation out of this communicative morass by offering his China Dream, which strives to evoke the grandeur of Mao's revolutionary nationalism.[38] Especially as regards Taiwan, this strength-without-compromise strategy amounts to a new Chinese unilateralism, a posture based on inflexible demands that stand no chance of achieving their stated goals. And so the more Xi pushes on Taiwan, the more they recoil, and this then makes Xi look both ineffective abroad and weak at home, creating a spiral of acrimony in both international and domestic circles.[39] Seen as a rhetorical pattern, then, as a form of the "political unconscious," Xi's China Dream feels like weaponized traumatized nationalism, with the old humiliations and traumas now driving a fierce urge toward military domination abroad and Party control at home.[40] The China Dream therefore serves as a rallying cry for the nation, yet it foreshadows catastrophe in the Taiwan Strait.

America's Geostrategic Deceptions and the Flip-Flops of Democracy

The five case studies included herein have shown how, across seventy years of history, leaders from China and Taiwan have lambasted each new occupant of the White House for duplicity, cowardice, and stupidity. We saw in chapters 1 and 2 how Mao on the mainland and Chiang in Taipei both came to nurse a condescending disregard for Harry S. Truman and then a desperate hatred toward Dwight D. Eisenhower. We saw in chapter 3 how Henry Kissinger's towering intellect seduced Chou Enlai, whom Kissinger deceived again and again, while Mao came to believe that Richard Nixon's promises about returning Taiwan to the motherland were empty and manipulative. President Bill Clinton wowed the Chinese, and especially Jiang Zemin, yet he did so at the cost of betraying Taiwan, turning his "three noes" of 1998 into one of the most painful examples of

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the rhetoric of marginal significance in action. And Trump has left us all baffled and exhausted. I have tried herein to situate these leaders' words and actions in detailed contexts that, for the most part, prove they were acting—not counting Nixon and Trump—in good faith, often under duress. Yet for both Chinese and Taiwanese audiences, the overarching narrative that emerges looks like patterned, intentional, virtually perpetual deception.[41] Whether it was Mao, or Deng, or now Xi in Beijing, or Chiang Kai-shek and then Chiang Ching-kuo in Taipei, we have seen how both sides have often felt disrespected, sometimes abandoned, frequently lied to, and generally treated shabbily by the Americans. Concern about America's geostrategic deception, then, amounts to a deep narrative structure drawn upon by Chinese and Taiwanese leaders, in both cases deriving from decades-long patterns of hard-earned mistrust.

This explains why the CPC has spent the past seventy years roaring about American hypocrisy and hegemony, for each new instance in U.S.-China tension is reduced in Beijing's eyes, working metonymically, as representing the whole of America's unchanging imperial arrogance. In this reductionist framework, the specificity of each moment's details are overridden by the grand narrative they allegedly evoke. This interpretation has the benefit of providing a ready-made explanatory frame, yet the tragedy of this strategy is that it hinges on not understanding the complexities and nuances of U.S. politics. For example, whether it was Truman in 1950 and then Eisenhower in 1955, or Nixon in 1971 and then Clinton in 1998, we have seen how America's presidents have worked in constrained spaces. Even while trying to avoid Long Cold War catastrophes, their every move was scrutinized by the press, checked by Congress, debated by the military establishment, commented on and criticized in letters and telegrams from citizens around the nation, and ripped by their enemies—illustrating how the White House is less the epicenter of grand imperial planning than desperate crisis management. Mao sees geostrategic deception, but Truman is worried about voters in Ohio, has lost the Congress, and is desperate to manage the bitter attacks being launched against him by Republican war hawks. When Lee visited Cornell in 1995, the Party believed Bill Clinton had lied to them, and so they saw the incident as another instance of geostrategic deception; but Clinton's hands were tied by an angry Congress where he, like Truman, was being crucified by Republican war hawks. From Beijing or Taipei, specific American actions look like repeats of prior deceptions, yet we have seen how in each case the president was hemmed in, a virtual prisoner of circumstances, balancing conflicting advice and clashing constituencies. By turning reflexively to a totalizing notion

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of American geostrategic deception to explain too much, leaders in Beijing and Taipei have failed to grasp the complexities of the U.S. democratic process, thus misunderstanding the structural constraints on how different administrations have pursued their respective foreign policies.

And then there are the consequences of elections, meaning each new American president is beholden to a different block of supporters and special interests, virtually guaranteeing that U.S. foreign policy is a feckless circus wheel, forever spinning, rendering our international relations absurd.[42] From the American side, our "political unconscious" is geared to celebrate these facts as part and parcel of the democratic process, wherein foreign-policy flip-flops are the norm, the very essence of a constitutionally mandated system of checks and balances; yet from Beijing and Taipei this same process can look like institutionalized inefficiency and a recipe for deception.

An added tragedy is that America's leaders have engaged in enough duplicity to suggest that interpretations of our actions based on the assumption of geostrategic deception are not entirely wrong. Trump calls Tsai, apparently favoring Taiwan, but then he backtracks to agree with Xi on "one China," apparently getting ready to abandon Taiwan. Trump then rips Xi and announces a new trade war against China, again apparently leaning toward Taiwan. Trump then supports Taiwan with weapons sales, but then he talks again with Xi and praises his leadership . . . on and on it goes in a cycle I characterized in chapter 5 as an "alternative facts"–style worldview. Is Trump confused or manipulative? Is there some grand strategy here, a long-term process of foreign-policy maneuvering, or are these flip-flops the erratic jerks and twists of a man overmatched by circumstance? Regardless of how one answers those questions , it is not difficult to see how these vacillations leave both the PRC and the ROC feeling abused. Thus, for Beijing and Taipei, an overarching and prefigured narrative disposes them to interpret discreet events as just more instances of geostrategic deception. In this way, both China and Taiwan engage in the metonymic reduction of all U.S. actions to fit a communication-blocking narrative. The underlying tragedy of this interpretive process is that just enough bad behavior on the part of different Americans has provided just enough evidence to Beijing and Taipei that the great hegemon can never be trusted, hence adding legitimacy to readings based upon this notion of geostrategic deception.

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The Rhetoric of Marginal Significance

Across the five case studies, we have watched various evolutions in the rhetoric of marginal significance, a term indicating first how the United States has dealt with its interlocutors in a dismissive, off-hand, often glib manner, and secondly how both China and Taiwan have internalized this discourse, creating a sense of self-doubt and worry. If China's rhetoric of traumatized nationalism is the response to the horrors endured during the "century of humiliation," then the rhetoric of marginal significance points to the more personal, more intimate, more emotional sense of being disrespected. The term indicates the accumulation of sleights, the damage caused by decades of miscommunication, the emotional weight of feeling you have not been heard.

This rhetorical disposition is particularly apt regarding the United States' handling of Taiwan, whether as illustrated in the damning *White Paper* released just after World War II, or the Nixon White House's cavalier handling of ROC Ambassador Shen, or the Clinton White House's offering China the 1998 "three noes" while trying to tell the infuriated Taiwanese that nothing had changed—when, of course, everything had changed. Across these chapters, we have seen how this rhetorical schema is enacted in a few key metaphors, including portraying Taiwan as an ante in a poker match, or as a card to be played at the right time, or as a pawn on the geostrategic chessboard of Long Cold War superpower jostling. Across these examples, it has been hard to watch as a parade of different U.S. administrations have engaged in and extended this rhetorical pattern, suggesting that the United States' communicative stance toward Taiwan has been, on the whole, belittling, perhaps even colonialist.

Taiwan's Postcolonial Remembering and the Rhetorics of Democratic Disdain and Conversion

The trope of postcolonial remembering positions Taiwan as a healthy democracy engaging in historically based soul-searching, trying to uncover and process the damage caused by both centuries of colonization and the KMT's post–World War II atrocities. This looking backwards into the nation's repressed past is meant to drive robust deliberation about how Taiwan can transition into the future.[43] As we saw in chapter 5, the *Taipei Times* describes how the nation is striving "to heal

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society's scars, resolve antagonisms, and strengthen Taiwan's democracy."[44] *Heal, resolve, strengthen*—these are the touchstones of postcolonial remembering. More than an argument about the importance of historical thinking, and more than an argument about Taiwan's imagined political futures, this postcolonial remembering amounts to a fundamentally ethical framework meant to encourage open and fair communication.[45] This schema functions, then, as a call to deliberation, meaning it is not so much about intended outcomes as desired communicative processes.[46] If Xi's China Dream serves as a unilateral threat, Tsai's postcolonial remembering calls for mutually reciprocal listening; the former demands obedience while the latter invites conversation.

At the same time, as China has ratcheted up its threats against Taiwan, so many on the island have responded with a mocking shrug, or a knowing quip, or an eviscerating image portraying Xi Jinping's China as an authoritarian zombie stumbling through history. I have characterized this response as "the rhetoric of democratic disdain." As Palden Sonam put it, while Taiwan has evolved and prospered, "China has remained stagnant under an authoritarian system."[47] This sense of disdain for China serves two mutually unhelpful impulses, both clouding the analysis of China's remarkable dynamism and exacerbating the communication wedge between the two nations. For even while it may feel good to mock the CPC, the rhetoric of democratic disdain strains against the sense of ethical soul-searching that drives postcolonial remembering. We saw in chapter 4 how President Lee argued that China could heal itself of the scourge of authoritarianism by taking the radical step of mimicking Taiwan's journey toward democracy. Lee was a deeply religious man, and his offer was bathed in messianic overtones, making his rhetoric feel salvationist. By pursuing this Taiwan-can-convert-China strategy, Lee's rhetoric of democracy as conversion echoed parts of America's manifest destiny, assuming not only the right, but an obligation to save others. If the rhetoric of postcolonial remembering points toward an open communicative process, towards a domestic scene in need of care, then the rhetoric of democracy as conversion points toward a desired outcome, toward an international scene in need of change. Postcolonial remembering entails humility and a willingness to change oneself, whereas democratic disdain and the trope of democracy as conversion embody arrogance and an impulse to change the Other. As has been true again and again throughout the history of postcolonial nationalism, then, Taiwan's people face a choice between expressing their sense of nationalism via the gentle, dignified, and respectful rhetoric of postcolonial remembering, or the aggressive, mocking, and demeaning

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rhetorics of democratic disdain and democracy as conversion. As anyone who has spent time in Taiwan will tell you, these impulses stand side by side in a perpetual mishmash—they are not so much neat categories as entwined energies, dueling patterns within the nation's political unconscious.

Trump's and the CPC's World of Alternative Facts

One of the complications clouding this study is the question of the CPC's commitment to propaganda. When encountering choice CPC bombast, it is difficult to know whether its authors mean what they say, are dutifully repeating long-dead pieties, are shouting with vigor to appease hardline domestic audiences, or—Trump-like—are trying to rattle their opponents with smoke and mirrors. Asking this question is not an indication of what the Party dismisses as imperial arrogance or American smugness. Rather, asking about the role of propaganda is the first step in any serious inquiry into the communicative disposition of the Party, for as we have seen herein time and time again, the Party has often landed more on the side of wishful thinking than of accuracy, habitually engaging in lies so obvious that they discredit the Party.[48] As a rhetorical disposition, this penchant for propaganda raises questions about the Party's understanding of reality. Even as far back as 1946, White and Jacoby—critics of U.S. policy and friends of the Chinese—remarked in awe upon the "emotional autointoxication that is characteristic of the Communists and their propaganda."[49] As is true of U.S. President Trump's "alternative facts" style, this "autointoxication" points beyond the accumulation of specific lies and patterned deceptions to a deeper, fundamental inability to appraise counterarguments, unappealing facts, dissident appeals, or the other data points that lead to mature and sophisticated political decision-making. While specific acts of propaganda function as deceptive persuasion, both Trump and the CPC have elevated propaganda to a higher narrative form of (non)sense-making, amounting to a form of the "political unconscious" detached from any notion of "truth."[50]

For example, consider Deng Xiaoping's claim from 1979 that "the thoughts of our compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau . . . turn with longing to the motherland, their sense of patriotism growing constantly stronger."[51] Did Deng know his claims were aspirational rather than accurate? Was he simply repeating clichés fed to him by subordinates, who in turn lived in fear of failing to uphold long-standing CPC catechisms? Was he serving bold-faced lies about international

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relations to less-well-traveled domestic audiences, whose sense of nationalism needed stoking? Like would-be imperialists everywhere, was he simply clueless about the intentions of those whose fate he assumed he could speak for?[52] Or consider "Complete National Reunification a Historical Reality," a *China Daily* editorial from 2019 wherein Tang Yonghong begins by foregrounding the rhetoric of traumatized nationalism, referencing "the historical wounds of the Chinese nation," before leaping to the fantastical conclusion that those old wounds have been healed because Taiwan has finally been "reunified" with the mainland. Despite all the evidence reviewed herein, this author announces that "reunification" is "a fact that cannot be changed by any force."[53] But reunification has not occurred, it is not a fact, and claiming it is just makes the author look delusional. Published one week before the PRC's 70th anniversary on October 1, 2019, the editorial reads less like news and more like Party wish fulfillment, a happy announcement meant to sweeten the Party's birthday celebrations.

For another example, recall that in a press conference at the White House on September 25, 2015, President Xi Jinping promised President Barack Obama that China had "no intention to militarize" the South China Sea.[54] Despite this public promise, a few years later, the United States produced photographic evidence of China landing nuclear-capable H-6K bombers on an illegally built-up island in the South China Sea and stationing surface-to-air missiles on the contested Woody Island—confirming a sustained and escalatory course of militarization.[55] American leaders protested the deployment of such weaponry as violating Xi's promise to Obama, yet the Party-controlled press erupted in the usual round of denials and counter-accusations—acting as if more propaganda could erase past promises or disappear the damning photographic evidence.[56] U.S. President Donald Trump has complicated U.S.-China-Taiwan communication by proliferating "alternative facts," yet we see here that the Party also engages in such up-is-down rhetoric, wherein mighty weapons are not evidence of militarization, suggesting that the age of "alternative facts" is alive and well in China.[57]

In both the United States and China, the massive machinery of alternative-facts-style propaganda renders foreign policy more dangerous. We saw in chapter 2, for example, how the Eisenhower White House was never sure about how to handle Mao's and Chou's pronouncements about the Quemoy Islands. The Party's propaganda left the Americans perpetually puzzled, and so Eisenhower responded with his own rhetorical strategy of "fuzzing"—but producing confusion did not help to resolve tensions, instead shrouding the crisis in a sense of impending doom.

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Likewise, at the onset of the Korean War, U.S. leadership did not know how to read the clues coming from Beijing and so miscalculated China's intentions. Premier Chou offered sober public commentary on the matter, but the Party's propaganda machinery was humming in high gear, and so U.S. General Omar Bradley recalls, "it was especially difficult to sort out real intentions from propagandistic threats."[58] As Bradley's comment makes clear, and as Eisenhower's actions confirm, the United States' leaders could not read Chinese political rhetoric, for a generation's worth of Beijing's thumping propaganda had left the Americans dazed and confused.

During the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, this commitment to propaganda reached comic proportions. On March 7, 1996, while China was launching missiles into the waters around Taiwan, the world watched with trepidation, fearing a possible war. Nonetheless, at an MFA press briefing in Beijing, spokesperson Shen Guofang claimed that "these exercises are not meant to frighten the people of Taiwan." Observers worried that a targeting mistake might trigger a war, and assumed that China's missile barrage hoped to terrify the Taiwanese, amounting to what the *New York Times* called "the bludgeoning of Taiwan."[59] Seeking to counter that narrative, Shen announced that "the people of Taiwan should be heartened, knowing that China will not allow anyone to 'split the motherland.'" Reporters from America, Taiwan, south Asia, and Europe pounced upon these lines, asking hard follow-up questions, to which Shen responded by canceling all translations and instead speaking in Chinese only to Party-approved reporters. When this exclusionary gesture prompted derisive laughter from the reporters, the "visibly agitated" Shen canceled the press conference and stormed off the stage.[60] In this case, the Party's inability to handle questions from reporters, and its reflexive turn toward doling out canned answers and then simply shutting down any political debate left it looking foolish and unprofessional, adding another layer of confusion to an already "delicate and hazardous moment."[61] Whether coming from Beijing or Washington, this kind of alternative-facts-style communication injects uncertainty into international deliberations, leaving us awash in lies that cloud our ability to seek peace and understanding.

Reconceptualizing U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations

As the preceding pages demonstrate, the five rhetorical dispositions are interwoven, shot through with contradictions, and often simultaneously empowering and

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crippling, both enabling and self-defeating—they are, in short, as complicated as the political unconscious they structure. At the same time, my comments about these overarching frameworks of (mis)understanding point toward some obvious communicative fixes, common-sense responses that would facilitate better dialogue between the key parties. First, responding to the disposition of traumatized nationalism, the CPC would benefit from transcending its habitual sense of victimhood in order to begin demonstrating the mature, sophisticated, nuanced leadership expected of a would-be global power. Doing so by ramping up President Xi's China Dream will not work, however, for that vision is too unilateral, too aggrandizing, too imperial. As Björn Jerdén has observed, "coercion and transnationalism are not sufficient tools for a great power that wishes to transform itself into a global leader." Jerdén argues it is time for the CPC to move past its chronic insecurity so that it can "exercise self-confident and responsible global leadership."[62] Making such a move would have domestic benefits as well, for Xing Lu has observed how the CPC's leaders "face the challenge of establishing a national imagination compelling enough to enthuse Party members while responding to the increasing demands from Chinese people for a truly civil, equal, and democratic China."[63] As a first step in this repackaging of China's rise as a benefit to its people and the world, rather than as a threat, the CPC will need to revise its position on Taiwan—for no democracy anywhere will support a China that pursues the colonization of the free and independent nation-state of Taiwan.

Second, responding to the disposition of geostrategic deception, if America hopes to have its actions perceived more favorably by international interlocutors, then we will need to have a frank national reassessment of priorities and practices regarding the Long Cold War in general and the Indo-Pacific in particular. Such self-assessment suggests that America needs to return to the pursuit of international liberalism as a broad framing strategy, and to the multifaceted creation of organic and sincere relationships with all levels of Chinese and Taiwanese society. Americans will not understand China or Taiwan until we spend more time in their countries, learning their hopes and dreams, while establishing deep connections in academic, cultural, military, economic, and scientific realms. Demonstrating genuine leadership will in turn require playing a consistent and humble role in such international bodies as the UN, ASEAN, the WHO, and others—America needs to leap out of its Trumpian isolation and back onto the world chessboard. President Clinton's notion of "a common destiny" should underwrite these efforts,[64] for there will be no healthy U.S.-China-Taiwan communication until the Chinese

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and Taiwanese believe Americans are approaching them as equals working on our shared fates.[65]

This approach, based upon building trust and reciprocity, in turn suggests an American rhetorical strategy cleansed of any lingering notions of imperial hubris—no small task considering how the now almost two-hundred-years-long notion of U.S. exceptionalism has become one of the foundations of our national political unconscious.[66] Moreover, we have seen herein how making any such move will trigger the worst, most reactionary impulses of American war hawks. Beginning with MacArthur in the 1950s and running through Trump's China-bashing Cabinet, these figures have assumed that the Pacific was an American territory, ours to control as we wish. This means revising U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific will require towering leadership rooted in a sense of reciprocity and ethical communication. In short, pursuing this version of U.S. foreign policy cleansed of exceptionalism will require the United States to turn away from President Trump's "America First" ethno-nationalism and to return to the collective, TPP-building sense of teamwork that marked President Obama's leadership. An America embedded in deep Indo-Pacific partnerships, working shoulder to shoulder with a wide range of allies, demonstrating caution and care rather than hubris and aggression, would look less imperialistic and more diplomatic, standing less as a unilateral hegemon than as a facilitator of multilateral conversations. Above all else, America would need to re-earn the trust of its international collaborators by showing respect for the rule of law, celebrating the importance of immigration, protecting both free and fair markets, and committing to supporting democracies around the world. An America that attracts rather than repels, that listens rather than threatens, that encourages rather than chastises, is more likely to earn the respect of our world neighbors. Exceptionalism and "alternative facts" will not work; America needs to evolve a communication disposition rooted in accuracy, honesty, and transparency.

Third, responding to the rhetoric of marginal significance, it is time for both the United States and China to jettison their high-handed communicative habits regarding Taiwan in favor of pursuing collaborative and mutually reciprocal negotiations. This would mean that the United States, China, and Taiwan pledge to address each other as equals, with the understanding that our triangular relationship holds the key to the future of the Indo-Pacific. In this way, any lingering sense of the Taiwan Strait as a marginal space of second-class treatment would be replaced with a new realization that peace in the Indo-Pacific begins and ends with the fate of Taiwan.

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If China continues to bully Taiwan, openly talking of forthcoming invasions, then no small, new, or emerging democracies in the region will be safe. As President Tsai said in 2019, "China's ambitions and intentions do not just involve Taiwan. It seeks opportunities to control or influence all countries in the region, and even beyond. China's pressure on Taiwan is an issue not only for Taiwan, but for all regional countries and beyond. It is a problem that all of us must face together."[67] Facing that challenge means the United States needs to find constructive ways to accommodate China's ambitions as a regional power. Any notion of "containment" will need to be replaced by a sense of partnership, wherein China can begin to shoulder the kinds of burdens carried by superpowers—like policing global shipping lanes against pirates, increasing commitments to disaster relief regionally, working on next-generation environmental sustainability projects, building debt-free infrastructure both in and with developing countries, and more. There are innumerable ways the United States could facilitate this scenario, in which Taiwan remains free and independent while China continues to rise, but none of them will work until the communication dynamic between the parties becomes more respectful, more careful, more infused with a genuine sense of trust and hope. As Barbara Tuchman once wrote, "What one would like to hope for from our side is good will and cool realism."[68]

Fourth, I have praised the empowering and ennobling promise of postcolonial remembering in Taiwan. While that project has fueled a national reawakening on the island, based in large part on unearthing the monstrosity of the post–World War II KMT regime, we have also seen how that same impulse can morph at times into a smug sense of superiority, either as the rhetoric of democratic disdain or as the rhetoric of democracy as conversion. To maximize the benefits of this historical remembering while minimizing the consequences of disdain, the Taiwanese could help the cause of regional peace by finally putting to bed the name "Republic of China," the nation's old Nationalist flag, and the 10.10 myth of Taiwan as the inheritor state of the toppled Qing dynasty. As a forward-looking report puts it, "In the past, under the leadership of political strongmen, *Taiwan's national identity was fraught with illusions*. . . . [But] the rise of a Taiwanese consciousness, and a new national identity, distinct from the past, has emerged."[69] Taiwan's political elite could accelerate that emergence by designing a new flag, reforming the constitution, and calling the nation simply *Taiwan*. This would involve a nationwide conversation about historical foundations, which could be agonizing, but it could also open the door to fresh imaginings of a nation-state finally freed from the baggage of its prior entanglements with the mainland.

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Responding to the fifth disposition within the political unconscious of U.S.-China-Taiwan communication, it should be obvious that the world of the CPC's propaganda and Trump's "alternative facts" is untenable. Searing putdowns, conspiracy theories, and snarky insults make for great campaign fodder, but they ruin nations. While the media ecosystem of the post–World War II era facilitated top-down message control and spin, the age of hypermediated globalization has exploded that sense of unilateral messaging—meaning every Party lie or Trump tweet is fact-checked, contextualized, and criticized almost immediately, leaving the original message in tatters. Given the complexity and sophistication of our contemporary media ecosystem, old-fashioned Party propaganda just looks dumb. Trump was still beloved by his base up until the bitter end in November 2020, but domestic and international polls proved that his "alternative facts" messaging had turned him into a global joke.[70] Both Trump in America and Xi in China therefore preside over communication networks that are unethical, unbelievable, and unsustainable. In this regard, I return again to President Tsai as a leader committed to respectful conversation, evidence-based reasoning, and a deep commitment to democratic practices.[71] Both the United States and China would do well to threaten less, to listen more, to cut the propaganda, and to model their communication practices on Tsai's generosity and ethics.

Closing Thoughts on Democracy and Justice

The CPC has historically threatened war over the question of Taiwan's already-existing or yet-to-be-declared independence, but they would do well to remember the words of Chairman Mao. Speaking with Edgar Snow in July 1936, Mao was looking ahead to the political goals a liberated China might pursue following the defeat of imperial Japan in World War II. Thinking about then-occupied Korea, Mao said the role of the Communists was to "extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." And then, in a statement of world-historical importance, Mao added, "*the same thing applies for Taiwan*."[72] Perhaps the contemporary CPC's traumatized nationalism would flare with a little less intensity if the Party's elite remembered an independent Taiwan was precisely what Mao envisioned during the darkest days of World War II. Or consider China's ethical principles, as expressed back in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. The Party's claims in that text, embodying the revolutionary fervor of the times, were ethically clear and politically pointed.

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"All nations, big or small," the Communiqué pledges, "should be equal. Big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak."[73]

For added historical poignancy, consider a conversation Chou Enlai had with Nixon and Kissinger in Beijing, on February 25, 1972. In their wide-ranging talks, Chou pressed the Americans on their foreign policy broadly, which he saw as forming "reactionary" alliances with dictators, or as supporting European powers that clung to old colonial holdings, in both cases landing on the wrong side of history in general and emerging postcolonial nationalism in particular. Chou advocated the righteousness of China's support for the self-determination of emerging and developing nations, and tried to prod the Americans to pursue a more ethical foreign policy based on recognizing the self-determination of local populations.[74] Later that summer, Chou reprised this same argument, this time in reference to France, which had learned the hard way that suppressing Algerian freedom was impossible. Using the France-Algeria situation to offer some lessons about Vietnam, Chou wondered, "Why do you obstinately remain in this place" of waging imperial war? Instead, "you should assist to fulfill their desire to be independent." This, Chou said, would be "honorable."[75] It bears repeating: For the heroic generation of leaders who won China's independence in 1949, and who then spent the Long Cold War supporting anti-colonial independence movements around the globe, fighting for the rights of formerly colonized states was an "honorable" strategy, whereas bullying smaller states was "reactionary." Here too, a revised position vis-à-vis Taiwan could be seen not as an act of treason but as fulfilling Chou's revolutionary vision.

Americans also have their nuggets of wisdom to look back upon, so let me close by returning to John Leighton Stuart, America's World War II–era ambassador to China. At the close of his memoir, Stuart called for the United States to practice international relations based on moral suasion deployed in the cause of justice:

> If our finest ideals and beliefs are true, we must make it our business to see that they prevail—both in theory and in practice. We should not merely be anti-Communist. We must have a positive and dynamic program of democracy, social and economic justice, and faith in moral and spiritual values that will give new hope and power to the free world.[76]

If the United States were to take this advice, pursuing a communication paradigm based in such values would go a long way toward building a lasting peace in Asia. A humble sense of working for justice while partnering with allies would enable a

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resurgent and proud China to stand unthreatened alongside a free and independent Taiwan, the two nations allied with the United States in the work of building "social and economic justice" for their people. But even this vision only merits consideration if coupled with the full participation of the Taiwanese, for as independence hero Peng Ming-min reminds us: "It would seem to be fair and sound to accept the basic proposition that no one can speak for Formosans but Formosans themselves. [And that] no one can dictate to them where and to whom they should belong, and no one has the right to ask them to accept liberation by some outside power, as true liberation can only come from the people directly concerned."[77]

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A Timetable of U.S.-China-Taiwan Communication, 1990–1998

Each of these key moments noted below is discussed in chapter 4 in more detail, so notes are not provided here. Seeing the communicative pattern in this way points to how every attempt by the PRC or the U.S. to rein in Taiwan failed, that China's use of force to intimidate Taiwan failed, and that Clinton sought to salvage the U.S.-China relationship by offering his "three noes," only to have President Lee reply with one of his most categorical denunciations of the "one China" fantasy.

DATE	COMMUNICATIVE ACT	SIGNIFICANCE
May 20, 1990	Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui delivers inaugural address after being appointed to office.	Lee announces "the Republic of China is an independent and sovereign nation."
May 20–21, 1990	Taiwan launches PR campaign in USA.	Flood of advertising in U.S. positions Taiwan as political ally, investment opportunity, and tourist destination.
Summer 1990	CPC publishes over 400 articles attacking Lee as a "splittist."	The Party responds to Lee with fury, setting up a pattern of ROC-PRC conflict.

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DATE	COMMUNICATIVE ACT	SIGNIFICANCE
July 6, 1991	Lee speaks before the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei.	Lee positions Taiwan as a “beacon” pulling China into the democratic future.
November 3, 1992	Taiwan’s SEF announces “One China, Different Interpretations.”	ROC’s “one China” and PRC’s “one China” diverge in dramatic ways.
May 1993	Taiwan’s MAC reviews the April Koo-Wang talks in Singapore.	MAC declares Taiwan “an equal political entity” with the PRC.
August 1993	PRC publishes white paper on Taiwan.	China restates that it will use “any means necessary, including military ones,” to achieve “reunification.”
July 1994	MAC publishes its “Explanation of Relations.”	Taiwan again declares itself “an independent sovereign state” and an “equal political entity” to the PRC.
January 30, 1995	PRC President Jiang Zemin’s “Eight-Points” speech.	PRC effort at negotiation, albeit another example of postcolonial colonialism.
April 8, 1995	ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s “Address to National Unification Council” (his “six point response” to Jiang).	Lee calls upon Jiang to “publicly renounce the use of force”—considered a rebuke to Jiang’s “Eight-Point” speech.
April 1995	U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assures China Lee will not be granted a visa.	Apparent confirmation of U.S. support for China’s version of “one China.”
May 22, 1995	U.S. Congress forces President Clinton to grant Lee a visa.	The reversal outrages China, thrills Taiwan.
June 9, 1995	Lee delivers the Spencer T. and Ann W. Olin Lecture at Cornell University.	First-ever speech in the U.S. by a Taiwanese president; Lee delivers a bravura tribute to Taiwan’s democracy.
June 17, 1995	China withdraws ambassador from the U.S.	First step in major PRC response to Lee’s visit; PRC seeks to punish U.S.
June 19, 1995	Lee appears on the cover of international version of *Time* magazine.	Lee is a sensation, a global advocate for democracy.
June–July 1995	PRC propaganda machine floods Chinese press with articles.	Major rhetorical offensive against Lee with PRC also slamming Clinton and the U.S.
July 21–25, 1995	PLA launches missile tests near to Taiwan.	Significant shows of military strength targeting Taiwan; PRC believes it can coerce U.S. and Taiwan into compliance.
August 12–25, 1995	PLA launches missile tests near to Taiwan.	
August 1995	Christopher delivers to Qian Clinton’s secret letter to Jiang declaring the “three noes.”	Clinton reverses his apparent support for Taiwan by offering China confirmation that the U.S. will not support Taiwan’s independence.

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DATE	COMMUNICATIVE ACT	SIGNIFICANCE
October 1995	Clinton and Jiang meet in NYC.	Driven by the letter, an apparent thawing of hostilities; Clinton and Jiang begin building a genuine friendship.
Spring 1996	First-ever Taiwanese campaign season.	Lee (KMT), Peng (DPP), and others blanket Taiwan with political rhetoric, virtually none of it acceptable to the PRC.
March 8–25, 1996	PLA launches missiles near Taiwan and stages amphibious landing exercises.	*Is an invasion imminent?* PRC believes its show of force intimidates Taiwanese and U.S.
Mid-March 1996	U.S. sends two carrier battle groups to Taiwan area.	Strong U.S. response to PRC's threats thrills Taiwan and stuns China.
March 22, 1996	Lee elected president of Taiwan.	First-ever democratic election for president in Taiwan; Lee's victory hailed as a major snub to China's intimidation tactics.
March 23, 1996	Lee celebration speech.	In snub to PRC, Lee announces, "the door to democracy is now completely open."
October 1997	Clinton/Jiang "Summit" in DC.	Personal warmth between US and PRC presidents, apparent partnership emerging; U.S. pressuring Lee to soften his rhetoric.
October 31, 1997	James Rubin publicly states the "three noes" following the Clinton/Jiang "summit."	First public confirmation of the rumored "three noes," major blow to Taiwan and huge relief to PRC.
November 7, 1997	Lee interview with *WSJ.*	Refusing U.S. and PRC pressure, Lee declares, "We are an independent, sovereign country. . . . *Taiwan is already independent. There is no need to say so.*"
June 1998	Clinton visits China and leads U.S.-style town halls and participates in call-in radio show.	First time a U.S. president speaks directly to Chinese audiences; Clinton does so while endorsing American values.
June 30, 1998	Clinton ends trip with town hall in Shanghai.	First public statement by the U.S. president of the "three noes."
August 3, 1998	Lee op-ed in *Wall Street Journal.*	Contra the emerging U.S.-PRC view of "one China," Lee announces "there is only one divided China."

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Notes

INTRODUCTION: MAPPING THE RHETORICAL HISTORIES OF U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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127. See Timothy Barney, "Diagnosing the Third World: The 'Map Doctor' and the Spatialized Discourses of Disease and Development in the Cold War," *QJS* 100 (2014): 1–30.
128. For a review of this literature, see Gregory O. Olson, George N. Dionisopoulos, and Steven R. Goldzwig, "The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 1945–1965," in Medhurst, *World War II and the Cold War*, 303–64.
129. On "rhetorical integrity," see Stephen J. Hartnett and Laura A. Stengrim, *Globalization and Empire* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 267–92.
130. Robert L. Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework of Criticism," in Medhurst et al., *Cold War Rhetoric*, 71–79, 71.

CHAPTER ONE. WANDERING IN A LABYRINTH OF IGNORANCE, ERROR, AND CONJECTURE, 1945–1952

1. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 19; and see David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
2. Debates about the bomb emerged simultaneously with its use. While denying that any position had been taken, the Vatican indicated "a deep personal revulsion against the use of so awesome a weapon" ("No Vatican Stand Is Taken on Bomb," *NYT*, August 8, 1945).
3. The Cairo Communiqué made no mention of Hong Kong; see "The Communiqué and Its Release," in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, ed. William M. Franklin and William Gerber (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 448–49, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/pg_448.
4. British memo to Chiang, late August 1945, repr. in Truman, *Memoirs*, 1:449.
5. "Representative Michael J. Mansfield, of Montana, to President Roosevelt," January 3, 1945, document 2 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China*, vol. 7, ed. Ralph R. Goodwin et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d2.
6. Truman, *Memoirs*, 1:450; and see A. J. Baime, *The Accidental President: Harry S. Truman and the Four Months That Changed the World* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2017).
7. See David L. Roll, *George Marshall: Defender of the Republic* (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2019); for an indictment of Stalin's postwar leadership, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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8. Chiang's efforts are praised in Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and eviscerated in Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), and Brian Crozier, *The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek* (New York: Scribner's, 1976).
9. Mansfield to Roosevelt, 4; and see Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, *The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945–1947* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).
10. On the significance of the Yalta conference of February 1945 to U.S.-China relations, see Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 300–335; Tuchman, *Stilwell*, 510–17; and Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 240–54.
11. Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Independence Leader* (Manchester, UK: Camphor Press, 2017), 40, 43, 44.
12. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 73.
13. George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1996), 97.
14. Pillar Huang, "Letter to Kerr" (September 6, 1947), document 161 in *Correspondence by and about George H. Kerr*, vol. 1, ed. S. Yaochong (Taipei: 228 Peace Memorial Museum), 378–81, 379. Huang was among the founders of the Formosa League for Re-Emancipation (FLR) and tried to curry U.S. support for anti-Chiang rebellions (see Hsiao-ting Lin, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016]).
15. Tehpen Tsai, *Elegy of Sweet Potatoes: Stories of Taiwan's White Terror*, trans. Grace Hatch (Upland, CA: Taiwan Publishing, 2002), 141.
16. On the February 28, 1947, uprisings and their aftermath, see Stephen J. Hartnett, Patrick Shaou-Whea Dodge, and Lisa B. Keranen, "Postcolonial Remembering in Taiwan: 228 and Transitional Justice as the 'End of Fear,'" *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication* 13 (2020): 238–56, from which parts of this paragraph are adapted. For primary documents, see Allan J. Shackleton, *Formosa Calling: An Eyewitness Account of the February 28, 1947 Incident* (Manchester, UK: Camphor Press, 1998); and S. Yaochong, ed., *Collected Documents of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Taiwan* (Taipei: 228 Memorial Museum, 2006).
17. Frank Kluckhorn, "Elimination of Japan Leaves a Vacuum in Asia," *NYT*, August 26, 1945, which includes some typically racist visual imagery.
18. On the retreat, see Jonathan Manthorpe, *Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 194ff.

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19. Such figures vary according to the source; this reckoning is from John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 345. See also James Bradley, *The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia* (New York: Little, Brown, 2015).
20. I am counting backward from Mao's speech declaring the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949, to the first violent split between the KMT and CPC, which occurred in April 1927 when Chiang purged Communists from the government and military. See Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 44–316; and Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 49–408. For details of the 1927 purge, what he calls "the Nanking *coup d'état*" (99), in which KMT forces executed as many as 5,000 Communists (76–77), see Edward Snow, *Red Star over China*, rev. ed. (1938; New York: Grove Press, 1968).
21. "Invasion Awaited Hourly on Hainan," *NYT*, January 6, 1950; Hainan was captured by the Communists on April 16. Lin notes in *Accidental State* that Hainan was lost in part due to the machinations of inner-KMT rivalry, with generals jockeying for power both *with* and *against* Chiang (123–27).
22. Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 196. The Philippines denied the overture, as reported in David M. Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949–1950: From Abandonment to Salvation* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 328, n. 123.
23. CIA, "Probable Developments in Taiwan," CIA ORE 7–50, March 20, 1950, 1, in the folder marked "Papers of HST, Intelligence File, Central Intelligence Reports, ORE 1950, 1–17," in Box 218, President's Secretary's Files, HSTPL.
24. See Gary May, *China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, DC: New Republic, 1979); and Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
25. For an example of McCarthy's methods, see his performance on *Meet the Press*, July 2, 1950; and see Joyce Mao, *Asia First: China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
26. Lyman P. Van Slyke, 1967 "Introduction" to the U.S. Department of State, *The China White Paper* (repr., Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), originally published in 1949 as *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949*, ix.
27. Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, 164; and see Robert P. Newman, "NSC (National Insecurity) 68: Nitze's Second Hallucination," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (College

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Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 55–94.

28. See the discussions in Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (1969; repr., New York: Norton, 1987), 330ff.; and Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, 163–262.
29. Originally explored by Kenneth Burke, the notion of a "Devil term" indicates a phrase or word conveying disgust so strong that it stops deliberation. Whether "appeasement" in the World War II context or "terrorist" since 9/11, such words short-circuit debate by naming someone or some action in a way that precludes their defense.
30. Karl Lott Rankin, *China Assignment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 172, 175, 181, 184, 235. Serving on the mainland, then in Hong Kong, and eventually in Taipei, Rankin was among the key American figures in Asia between 1949 and 1958; he was the U.S. ambassador to the ROC from 1953 to 1957. While the terms quoted here are McCarthy-like, Rankin's observations were usually precise and sometimes prescient.
31. See Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).
32. William S. White, "Senator Urges U.S. to Take Formosa," *NYT*, December 2, 1949.
33. See Rankin, *China Assignment*; and Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, 218.
34. White, "Senator Urges U.S. to Take Formosa."
35. See Bert Anderson, "Formosa: What Happened," *New York Herald Tribune*, February 9, 1950; we know Anderson's article was read in the White House, for I found a copy in "Foreign Relations—China (Policy on Formosa)," in Box 59 of the George M. Elsey Papers, HSTPL.
36. Service's memo is quoted at length in E. J. Kahn Jr., *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* (New York: Viking, 1975), 130; and see *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service*, ed. Joseph W. Esherick (New York: Vintage, 1974); for his observations, Service was recalled to Washington and sacked.
37. John Leighton Stuart, "Stuart to the Secretary of State," July 12, 1948, from Nanking, as printed in *The Forgotten Ambassador: The Reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946–1949*, ed. Kenneth W. Rea and John C. Brewer (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 254–55, 255.
38. "Stuart to the Secretary of State," October 26, 1948, in Rea and Brewer, *Forgotten Ambassador*, 274–76, 275.
39. Department of State, *China White Paper*, 315.
40. Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949–1955," in *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 184–97, 184.
41. See Tuchman, *Stilwell*; Marshall's evaluation was more measured but no less damning, as seen in Kurtz-Phelan, *China Mission*.

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42. Snow, *Red Star over China*, 261; in "Cast Away Illusions," August 14, 1949, Mao gloated that "Most of the powerful equipment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army comes from U.S. imperialism" (repr. in Mao, *On the U.S. White Paper* [Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1961], 1–9, 1).
43. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "Speech on the Far East," delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, p. 1 of the version accessed at http://teachingamericanhistory.org; for analysis of Acheson's thinking, see Denise M. Bostdorff, "Dean Acheson's May 1947 Delta Council Speech: Rhetorical Evolution from the Truman Doctrine to the Marshall Plan," in *World War II and the Cold War*, 167–214.
44. George F. Kennan, "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff" (what has come to be known as PPS 53), Washington, July 6, 1949, document 402 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China*, vol. 9, ed. Francis Prescott, Herbert Fine, and Velma Hastings Cassidy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d402; and see Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, 134 on covert operations, 178 on Kennan's proposal.
45. See Taylor, *Generalissimo's Son*, 197–99; and Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2004), 9–84.
46. Kennan, "PPS 53," 1.
47. Lin, *Accidental State*, 70.
48. "Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman," Washington, January 14, 1949, document 293 of *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d293.
49. "Report by the NSC on the Current Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa," the "Annex" attached to "Note by the Executive Secretary of the NSC (Souers) to the Council," February 3, 1949, document 310, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d310.
50. See "Memorandum by Mr. Livingston T. Merchant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs," Washington, DC, May 24, 1949, document 384, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d384; and "The Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State," Taipei, May 4, 1949, document 365 of *FRUS, 1949, China* vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d365.
51. "The Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State," Taipei, August 24, 1949, document 579 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China*, vol. 8, ed. Francis Prescott, Ralph Goodwin, Herbert Fine, and Velma Hastings Cassidy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v08/d579.

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52. See document 140, titled “A Plea to General Marshall” (apparently sent to Kerr for delivery to Marshall), authorship redacted, January 15, 1947, repr. in *Correspondence by and about Kerr*, 305–7, Kerr’s redaction quoted at 305, letter quoted at 307.
53. “Statement by the Secretary of State at the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the NSC on the Formosan Problem,” the “Annex” to “Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the NSC to the Council,” March 3, 1949, document 322, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, pp. 1–2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d322.
54. “The Secretary of State to the Consul at Taipei,” Washington, April 15, 1949, document 352, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d352.
55. “The Acting Chief of the ECA China Mission to the Director of the China Program,” Shanghai, April 14, 1949, but not forwarded to Washington until April 29th, as the “enclosure” to document 359, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d359.
56. “The Consul General at Taipei to the Secretary of State,” September 6, 1949, document 422, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d422.
57. “Memorandum of Conversation,” December 29, 1949, document 490, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d490.
58. *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1936), 90.
59. Harry S. Truman, in what has come to be called his “Statement on Formosa,” January 5, 1950, listed as “The President’s News Conference” at APP.
60. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking at a White House Press Briefing, January 5, 1950, as quoted in Walter Waggoner, “Pacts Recalled,” *NYT*, January 6, 1950.
61. “Strategic ambiguity” is addressed in chapter 2; for overviews, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis*, ed. Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 186–211; and Michelle Murray Yang, “Tracing Rhetorical Shifts in Strategic Ambiguity,” in *The George W. Bush Presidency*, vol. 3, ed. Meena Bose and Paul Fritz (New York: Nova, 2016), 145–60.
62. June M. Grasso, *Truman’s Two-China Policy, 1948–1950* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1987), see tables 2 and 3, pp. 132, 133.
63. See “Foreign Relations—Drafts of the President’s China Statement,” Box 59, George M. Elsey Papers, HSTPL.
64. Dulles and Truman quoted in David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 89, 93.

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65. Bridges quoted in Halberstam, *Coldest Winter*, 97.
66. Quoted in David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Random House, 1993), 69.
67. Mao was urged into the war by Stalin, with the understanding that if he committed ground forces in North Korea, then Stalin would supply the CPC with the advanced weaponry it desired; see John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 21–25; Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, 350–72; and Zhang Baijia, "'Resist America': China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 179–214.
68. President Harry S. Truman, "Statement on Korea," *NYT*, June 27, 1950.
69. While Truman envisioned a cessation of hostilities between Mao and Chiang, the Generalissimo volunteered to send 30,000 soldiers into South Korea. Suspecting that doing so would provoke the Chinese, the United Stated declined the offer (see Dean Acheson, *The Korean War* [New York: Norton, 1971], 28–29).
70. Wang Jisi, "The Origins of America's 'Two China' Policy," in Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations*, 198–212, quotation from Truman's draft and his analysis at 200. Truman was so frustrated that he wondered about "taking Formosa back as part of Japan and putting it under MacArthur's command" (as quoted in H. W. Brands, *The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War* [New York: Anchor Books, 2016], 84).
71. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:354, 357.
72. Chou Enlai, "Statement Refuting Truman's Statement," June 28, 1950, repr. in *Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), 13–15, 13.
73. Wu Hsiu-Chuan, "Speech at the United Nations' Security Council," November 28, 1950, repr. in *Important Documents*, 26–70, 39.
74. Chen, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949–1955," 188.
75. See Ramon Myers and Jialin Zhang, *The Struggle across the Strait: The Divided China Problem* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2006).
76. The U.S. would henceforward use Taiwan as a staging ground for the Korean War, then the Vietnam War, and as a base for launching covert operations against Communism throughout Asia. Under Chiang's leadership, Taiwan established the Special Warfare Center, the Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps, and the World Anti-Communist League, turning Taiwan into ground zero for U.S.-led covert paramilitary actions throughout Asia (see Taylor, *Generalissimo's Son*, 206–22; and Kyle Burke, *Revolutionaries*

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for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018]).

77. Truman, "Statement on Korea."
78. Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 33; and see Wang Jisi, "The Origins of America's 'Two China' Policy," 203.
79. August 14, 1950, *The Kennan Diaries*, ed. Frank Costigliola (New York: Norton, 2014), 269–70; Kennan's flabbergasted tone was reprised in "Diplomacy in Cuckoo Land," *WP*, September 4, 1951.
80. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, 332–33.
81. Halberstam, *Coldest Winter*, 216; MacArthur claimed he did not consult with either the White House or State Department because the trip was about "solely military matters" and "had no connection with political affairs" (*Reminiscences*, 340).
82. Omar N. Bradley, with Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 549.
83. Lin, *Accidental State*, 163.
84. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 439.
85. "The Consul General at Tientsin to the Secretary of State," Tientsin, June 21, 1949, document 395, *FRUS, 1949, China*, vol. 9, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d395.
86. Halberstam, *Fifties*, 79, emphasis added; and see Geraldine Fitch, *Formosa Beachhead* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), 211.
87. Rankin, *China Assignment*, 100.
88. "Top secret" and the news that MacArthur first shared the document with General Bradley and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in Tokyo in June 1950, from Bradley and Blair, *General's Life*, 530. "A Report to the NSC, by the Departments of State and Defense," August 3, 1950, contains an appendix, "General Policy of the US Concerning Formosa," July 27, 1950, containing a version of MacArthur's "Memorandum on Formosa"; see the materials in "Papers of HST, NSC Meetings, 62: July 27, 1950," Box 181 of President's Secretary's Files, HSTPL.
89. MacArthur's editorial was destined for the VFW newsletter, but was pulled at the White House's order, only then to be published in the September 1, 1950, issue of *U.S. News and World Report*; see Acheson, *Korean War*, 42–46, 44; Garver, *Sino-American Alliance*, 40–42; Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 46–48; and Brands, *General vs. President*, 132–40.
90. General Douglas MacArthur, "Memorandum on Formosa," June 14, 1950, repr. in

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Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, 345–49, 348.

91. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 341.
92. Wu, "Speech at the United Nations' Security Council," 36.
93. Wu, "Speech at the United Nations' Security Council," 46.
94. See "Document 152: Papers of Dean Acheson, Foreign Policy Aspects of the MacArthur Statement," August 26, 1950, in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 18, *The Korean War*, ed. Dennis Merrill (n.p.: University Publications of America, 1997), 413–17, 413, 414, 415; and see Dennis Merrill, ed. *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, vol. 20, *The Korean War: President Truman's Dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur* (n.p.: University Publications of America, 1997).
95. President Truman wrestled with the decision, but concluded that MacArthur was engaging in a pattern of insubordination that threatened the Constitution; see Truman, *Memoirs*, 2:442ff.; Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 521–28; Brands, *General vs. President*; and Bradley and Blair, *General's Life*, 624–42.
96. "Formosa: The Last Stand for the Chinese National Republic," *NBC News*, January 1, 1950.
97. Rankin, *China Assignment*, 160.
98. Shelly Rigger*, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 5.
99. Steven I. Levine, "On the Brink of Disaster: China and the United States in 1945," in Harding and Yuan Ming, *Sino-American Relations*, 3–13, 4.
100. See Halberstam, *Coldest Winter*, 250; and Kahn, *China Hands*, 247 n. 3.
101. The Republicans appropriated "slavery" for Cold War purposes, as seen in Rankin, *China Assignment*, 159, and Alfred Kohlberg, "The Great Debate," *The Freeman*, January 8, 1951. On how Eisenhower deployed the tropes of "slavery" and "enslavement" in his campaign speeches from 1952, see Martin J. Medhurst, "Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign," *PSQ* 30 (2000): 464–84.
102. Rankin, *China Assignment*, 63.
103. Rankin, *China Assignment*, 257–58.
104. "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Washington, March 4, 1952, document 9 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54, China and Japan*, vol. 14, ed. David W. Mabon and Harriet D. Schwar (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d9. The language from this 1952 memo recycles claims first aired in the August 3, 1950, NSC 37/10, "Immediate United States Course of Action with Respect to Formosa," *FRUS, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific*, vol. 6, p. 413, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/pg_413.
105. "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," March 4, 1952, 1.

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106. CPC, "The Taiwan Question and [the] Reunification of China."
107. See the dissenting opinions in CIA, "Probable Developments in Taiwan," which argue the CPC did not have the capability to invade Formosa.
108. Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 287.

CHAPTER TWO. AVOIDING A CHAIN REACTION OF DISASTER, 1952–1955

1. Brantly Womack, "Borders, Boundaries, Horizons, and Quemoy in an Asymmetric World," *Asian Anthropology* 15 (2016): 104–15, 110.
2. See Gregory A. Olson, "Eisenhower and the Indochina Problem," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 97–135.
3. Tang Tsou addresses the 1958 version of the crisis in "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-Shek and the United States," *Western Political Quarterly* 12 (1959): 1075–91.
4. Quoted in Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 83.
5. See Martin J. Medhurst, "Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower's 'I Shall Go to Korea' Speech," *PSQ* 30 (2000): 464–84.
6. David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Random House, 1993), 67.
7. Paul P. Kennedy, "U.S. Naval Units Put to Sea over Red Blows at Quemoys," *NYT*, September 5, 1954. Two Quemoy Islands lie next to each other, so some reports refer to the Quemoys; I work in this chapter with Quemoy, in the singular.
8. "The President's News Conference," April 7, 1954, 2, APP.
9. Anthony Leviero, "President Warns of Chain Disaster if Indo-China Goes," *NYT*, April 8, 1954; the president repeated the phrase in his *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 294.
10. "The President of the Republic of China to President Eisenhower," Taipei, April 15, 1953, document 97 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54, China and Japan*, vol. 14, ed. David W. Mabon and Harriet D. Schwar (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d97.
11. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 32 (1954): 353–64, 354.
12. Norman A. Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2000), 20–37, 20.
13. "National Intelligence Estimate," Washington, September 10, 1952, document 50 of *FRUS,*

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1952–54, vol. 14, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d50.

14. "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," what has come to be called NSC-68, was submitted to the NSC on April 7, 1950, and debated for months; Truman approved it via his "Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary," Washington, September 30, 1950, document 129 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. 1, ed. Neal H. Peterson et al. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d129); the full text of NSC-68 is included in this same volume, beginning on 234, and the quotation is from 238.
15. Robert P. Newman, "NSC (National Insecurity) 68: Nitze's Second Hallucination," in Medhurst, *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, 55–94, 90; also see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
16. The CPC propaganda barrage began in July 1954, when *People's Daily* ran the editorial "We Must Liberate Taiwan"; see Niu Jun, "Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions across the Taiwan Strait," in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 293–326.
17. See Ronald W. Pruessen, "Over the Volcano: The United States and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954–1955," in *Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 77–105.
18. Evan Thomas, *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (New York: Little, Brown, 2012), 164.
19. H. W. Brands Jr., *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 20; see also Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 52.
20. "INSANITY IN WASHINGTON," September 30, 1958, cover of the *Peking Review*.
21. See David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007); in *Asia First: China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), Joyce Mao argues that modern Republicanism was born in this moment of anti-Communist fervor.
22. Robert P. Newman, "Lethal Rhetoric: The Selling of the China Myths," *QJS* 61 (1975): 113–28, 118, 120.
23. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, May 19, 1952, 146–57, 146, 154; for context,

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see Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), and Brands, *Cold Warriors*, 3–26.

24. See David L. Anderson, "China Policy and Presidential Politics, 1952," *PSQ* 19 (1980): 79–90; and Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'I Shall Go to Korea' Speech."
25. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "State of the Union Address," February 2, 1953, 1, APP, emphasis added.
26. See U.S. Department of State, *The China White Paper*, repr. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), ix, originally published in 1949 as *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949*; and see Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
27. President Harry S. Truman, "Statement on Korea," *NYT*, June 27, 1950; see chapter 1 for context and analysis.
28. *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1936), 354, 357.
29. Eisenhower, 1953 State of the Union Address, 3–4; for coverage, see Anthony Leviero, "State of the Union," *NYT*, February 3, 1953.
30. "What Next?" *NYT*, February 15, 1953.
31. "The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, to the Chief of General Staff, Republic of China," Taipei, February 1953, document 147 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d78.
32. "The Chargé in the Republic of China to the Department of State," Taipei, March 23, 1953, document 84 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d84.
33. See Michael M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Seigen Miyasato, "John Foster Dulles and the Peace Settlement with Japan," in Immerman, *Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 189–212.
34. On the openings created by Stalin's death, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953–1956* (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 143–49.
35. Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 29–50, 31; and see Richard Immerman and Robert B. Bowie, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
36. These were quoted by Secretary Dulles as evidence of CPC hostility; see "Text of Address by Secretary of State Dulles on United States Policy in the Far East," *NYT*, March 30, 1954,

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4; and see Jia Qingguo, "Searching for Peaceful Coexistence and Territorial Integrity," in *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955*, 267–86.

37. For context, see Zhang Baijia, "The Changing International Scene and Chinese Foreign Policy toward the United States, 1954–1970," in Ross and Jiang Changbin, *Re-Examining the Cold War*, 46–76.
38. Chou Enlai, "Report on Foreign Affairs to the Central People's Government Council," August 11, 1954, repr. in *Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 109–26, 126.
39. Even as late as 1970, the CIA confessed "we have remarkably little information on the decision-making process in Beijing" (see National Intelligence Estimate 13-7-70, submitted on November 12, 1970, 1).
40. See "Incidents Mount in the 'Cold War,'" *NYT*, September 6, 1954; and see Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 150–51.
41. "Memorandum by Harry H. Schwartz of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff," Washington, August 20, 1954, document 259 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d259.
42. Chou, "Report on Foreign Affairs," 122; Chou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government," September 23, 1954, repr. in *Important Documents*, 134–49, 141; Chou Enlai, "Statement on U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek Mutual Defense Treaty," December 8, 1954, repr. in *Important Documents*, 161–71, 161.
43. For context, see the United States Army television series *The Big Picture*, 1954 installment on "Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Nations," from the National Archives and Records Service, digitized by the Films Media Group (New York, 2011); also see Hanson Baldwin, "SEATO's Impact Now Mainly Psychological," *NYT*, September 12, 1954.
44. "The Secretary of State to the Department of State," Manila, September 4, 1954, document 273 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d273.
45. On the behind-the-scenes drama surrounding the SEATO negotiations, see Roger Dingman, "John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954," *International History Review* 11 (1989): 457–77.
46. In *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), John Lewis Gaddis refers to "tails" (developing-nation allies) "wagging dogs" (the USSR and United States, 132); also see Ronald W. Pruessen, "John Foster Dulles and the Predicament of Power," in Immerman, *Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 21–45.
47. "Chiang Urges a Holy War," *NYT*, April 18, 1954.

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48. “Chiang Sets ‘Hope’ in Regained China,” *NYT*, May 20, 1954.
49. “Chiang Predicts Mainland Attack,” *NYT*, October 11, 1954.
50. “President Chiang Kai-shek’s Message to the Nation on National Day, October 10, 1954,” in *President Chiang Kai-shek’s Messages, October 10, 1954–February 14, 1955* (Taipei: Central Committee of the Kuomintang, n.d.), 1–8, 4, 6, emphasis added.
51. See “Pentagon Doubts Formosa Invasion,” *NYT*, August 19, 1954.
52. CIA, “The Chinese Offshore Islands,” September 8, 1954, 13, 19, and 5; held in the folder marked “Formosa (1)” in Box 9 of the International Series of the AWF, DDEPL.
53. “Excerpts from Dulles News Conference,” *NYT*, September 12, 1954; and see “Text of Address in Chicago by Dulles,” *NYT*, November 30, 1954.
54. See the “Special National Intelligence Estimate 100-4-54” (hereafter SNIE), dated September 4, 1954, which appears as document 276 in *FRUS, 1952–54, China and Japan*, vol. 14, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d276.
55. Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 82.
56. “The Ambassador in the Republic of China to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs,” Taipei, September 13, 1954, document 294 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d294.
57. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Denver, September 12, 1954, document 293 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d293.
58. “Memorandum Prepared in the State Department,” Washington, October 9, 1954, document 334 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d334.
59. “Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs,” Taipei, October 13, 1954, document 337 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 9, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d337.
60. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 221st Meeting of the National Security Council,” Washington, November 2, 1954, document 375 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d375; note the odd prose here, which reports on the meeting in the second voice.
61. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?” in Tucker, *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 186–211; and Roy Pinsker, “Drawing a Line in the Taiwan Strait: ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ and Its Discontents,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (2003): 353–68.

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62. See, for example, Mark J. Schaefermeyer, “Dulles and Eisenhower on ‘Massive Retaliation,’” in Medhurst, *Eisenhower’s War of Words*, 27–45.
63. SNIE 100-4-54, 2, 3.
64. See “Enclosure B” to “Memorandum by the Chairman of the JCS (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson),” September 11, 1954, document 291 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, pp. 5–8, 6, 7, emphasis in original, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14/d291.
65. See the documents marked “Meeting in the President’s Office, TOP SECRET, March 11, 1955”; “Memorandum for the Record, March 11, 1955, EYES ONLY”; and “Memorandum for the President, March 15, 1955,” held in the International Series, Box 9, folder marked “Formosa, Visit to CINCPAC (1),” AWF, DDEPL.
66. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Washington, October 6, 1954, document 322 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d322.
67. Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 233.
68. Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” *International Security* 12 (1988): 96–122, 99.
69. Sevareid quoted in Halberstam, *Fifties*, 235.
70. Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 132.
71. “The President’s News Conference,” March 30, 1955, APP, 4.
72. “The President’s News Conference,” May 4, 1955, APP, 5.
73. December 1, 1954, as recorded in the folder marked “Phone Calls—June–Dec. 1954 (1),” Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 7, AWF, DDEPL.
74. President Harry S. Truman, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress,” the so-called “Truman Doctrine” speech, March 12, 1947, APP, 2. For analysis, see Dennis Merrill, “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity,” *PSQ* 36 (2006): 27–37; and Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008).
75. Philip Wander, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” in Medhurst et al., *Cold War Rhetoric*, 153–83, 157.
76. See Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 81–115.
77. See Gary D. Allison, *Japan’s Postwar History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar*

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Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

78. Gaddis reminds readers that Russia lost 27+ million citizens in the war, with its industry destroyed, its farmland ravaged, its banks emptied, its infrastructure ruined; "shattered" from *Cold War*, 9.
79. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday estimate as many as 38 million Chinese perished from such disastrous plans (see *Mao: The Unknown Story* [New York: Anchor Books, 2005], 430).
80. See Rohini S. Singh, "It's About *Time*: Reading U.S.-India Cold War Perceptions through News Coverage of India," *Western Journal of Communication* 78 (July–September 2014): 522–44.
81. Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man* (New York: Signet, 1969), 398; Odd Arne Westad notes that these failing states were another of the legacies of colonialism (see *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 94–109).
82. Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 2; on how this culture of fear was produced, see Stephen J. Hartnett, "Four Meditations on the Search for Grace amidst Terror," *Text and Performance Quarterly* 19 (1999): 196–216; and David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).
83. President Dwight Eisenhower, "Radio Address to the American People on National Security," May 19, 1953, APP, 1, 2, and 5.
84. I borrow the notion from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006); and see Stephen J. Hartnett, Lisa B. Keranen, and Donovan S. Conley, eds., *Imagining China: Rhetorics of Nationalism in an Age of Globalization* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2017).
85. More images are available at http://chineseposters.net/gallery/; for context, see Stefan R. Landsberger, "Dreaming the Chinese Dream," *International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity* 2 (2014): 245–74.
86. Rya Butterfield, "Rhetorical Forms of Symbolic Labor: The Evolution of Iconic Representations in China's Model Worker Awards," *RPA* 15 (2012): 95–126, 98.
87. Wu Hsiu-Chuan, "Speech at the United Nations' Security Council," November 28, 1950, repr. in *Important Documents*, 26–70, 54.
88. Zhu De, "How the Chinese People Defeated the Chiang Kai-shek Reactionary Clique Armed by American Imperialism," in *China's Revolutionary Wars: In Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), 1–12, 12.
89. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, 389.

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90. Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 472.
91. "The President to the Acting Secretary of State," Denver, September 8, 1954, document 284 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d284.
92. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (New York: Random House, 1991), 271.
93. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
94. "The Chargé in the Republic of China to the Department of State," Taipei, July 22, 1952, document 37 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d37.
95. In *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), Warren I. Cohen summarizes the general U.S. belief that Chiang's return-to-the-mainland position was "ludicrous" (181).
96. "The Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Chief of Naval Operations," Honolulu, July 23, 1952, document 129 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d129.
97. See Stephen J. Hartnett and Bryan R. Reckard, "Sovereign Tropes: A Rhetorical Critique of Contested Claims in the South China Sea," *RPA* 20 (2017): 291–338; Anne Demo, "Sovereignty Discourse and Contemporary Immigration Politics," *QJS* 91 (2005): 291–311; and Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (New York: Zone Books, 2010).
98. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held at the Pentagon," Washington, March 27, 1953, document 86 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d86.
99. As deputy secretary of state, Matthews observed in a memo, "Chiang Kai-shek will be very unhappy if an armistice is achieved in Korea, *he wants to broaden the conflict, not end it*" ("Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State," Washington, March 31, 1953, document 88 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d88).
100. On the uneasy relationship between Mao and Stalin, see J. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*; and G. Chang, *Friends and Enemies*.
101. "Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs," Taipei, October 13, 1954, document 337 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 5, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d337.
102. H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review* 94 (1989): 963–89, 964.

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103. See Baldwin, "SEATO's Impact Now Mainly Psychological," and "Formosa a Key Issue," *NYT*, September 16, 1955; for context, see "Text of Dulles' Speech on the Asian Defense Pact," *NYT*, September 16, 1954.
104. See the MDT at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chin001.asp#art1, and as reprinted in *America and Island China: A Documentary History*, ed. Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter (New York: University Press of America, 1989), 124–28.
105. Also see President Eisenhower's "Special Message to Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa," January 24, 1955, APP; and see Robert Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954–1955 Offshore Island Crisis," *PSQ* 20 (1999): 329–48.
106. Dulles quoted in Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 195.
107. The "Formosa Resolution," H. J. Res. 159, approved on January 29, 1955, www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/84/hjres159.
108. Quoted in Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, *The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 233.
109. Quoted in J. H. Kalicki, *The Pattern of Sino-American Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 129, 140. In *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai argue that Mao's learning about the negotiations over the MTD was what compelled him to shell Quemoy.
110. "Joint Declaration of All Democratic Parties and People's Organizations," August 22, 1954, repr. in *Important Documents*, 127–33, 128.
111. These questions peppered the negotiations throughout 1954, as recorded in *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14.
112. Quoted in Wang Jisi, "The Origins of America's 'Two China' Policy," in *Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*, ed. Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 198–212, 207.
113. See Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 49–65 on Mao's response to the treaty.
114. Zhang Baijia, "The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 1954–1970," in Ross and Jiang Changbin, *Re-Examining the Cold War*, 46–76.
115. "Memorandum by Henry Owen of the Office of Intelligence Research to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff," Washington, December 7, 1954, document 431 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d431.
116. James Reston, "Quemoy-Matsu Trends," *NYT*, April 4, 1954.
117. This quid pro quo was first reported in Dana Adams Schmidt, "U.S. and Formosa Agree to Set Up Mutual Defense," *NYT*, December 2, 1954.
118. "Memorandum of Conversation/Negotiation of Mutual Defense Pact, Fifth Meeting,"

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Washington, November 12, 1954, document 392 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d392.

119. This implication is drawn out in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy," in Immerman, *Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 235–62.
120. See Kalicki, *Pattern of Sino-American Crises*, 143–44; and Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 185–90. For a remarkable example of Chiang-style doublespeak, see "President Chiang Kai-shek's Statement on the Evacuation of the Tachens, February 7, 1955," in *President Chiang Kai-shek's Messages*, 34–37.
121. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs," Taipei, October 13, 1954, document 337 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d337.
122. While the Americans believed Chiang had agreed to cease offensive operations against the mainland, the ROC maintained a robust schedule of flights over, shellings of, and naval interdictions against CPC locations, as revealed in "Instruction from the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, in Geneva," *Washington, August 25, 1955*, document 43 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China*, vol. 3, ed. Harriet D. Schwar and Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d43.
123. Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 91.
124. Quoted in Jia, "Searching for Peaceful Coexistence," 274.
125. See Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 483; Admiral Radford was pushing so hard for nuking China that Pruessen has described his performance on the JCS as "near insubordination" ("Over the Volcano," 95).
126. "Meeting of Secretary with Congressional Leaders, January 20, 1955," 5, in the folder marked "White House Memoranda 1955—Formosa Straits (3)," in Box 2 of the White House Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEPL.
127. "All-out" from Greg MacGregor, "Dulles Says U.S. Would Go All-Out to Save Formosa," *NYT*, March 4, 1955; Dulles's threat from "Text of Dulles Statement on Formosa Pact," *NYT*, March 4, 1955; for earlier indications of Dulles's thinking about atomic war, see his "Policy for Security and Peace," 357–59.
128. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the NSC, Washington, March 10, 1955," document 146 in *FRUS, 1955–57, China*, vol. 2, pp. 2–3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v02/d146. As Radford said in a memo from 1954, "the question of the use of atomic weapons would be presented if and when the need arises, *but with the understanding now that if essential to victory, their use would be accorded*"

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("Memorandum by the Chairman of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense," September 11, 1954, document 291 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 5, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14/d291).

129. Quoted in Elie Abel, "U.S. Might Cited," *NYT*, March 9, 1955; for context, see Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (1981): 465–80.
130. Quoted in Elie Abel, "Dulles Says U.S. Pins Retaliation on Small A-Bomb," *NYT*, March 16, 1955.
131. "Transcript of Presidential Press Conference," *NYT*, March 17, 1955.
132. Richard J. H. Johnston, "Nixon Gives Reds Warning on Atom," *NYT*, March 18, 1955.
133. Bryan C. Taylor, "'The Means to Match Their Hatred': Nuclear Weapons, Rhetorical Democracy, and Presidential Discourse," *PSQ* 37 (2007): 667–92, 681; more broadly, see Robert J. Lifton and Richard Falk, *Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case against Nuclearism* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
134. The secondary literature tends to give Ike "the benefit of the doubt," portraying him as "a reluctant nuclear warrior" who was "bluffing his opponents"; Eisenhower scholarship thus tends to serve an "exculpatory" function, as argued in Michael Gordon Jackson, "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953–1968," *PSQ* 35 (2005): 52–75, 53, 54, 55.
135. Halberstam, *Fifties*, 397; Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 69.
136. State Department report quoted in Thomas, *Ike's Bluff*, 159; the cannons that could have launched nuclear shells into China are still on display on Quemoy—now called Kinmen—Island, where tourists swarm the bunkers.
137. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 295.
138. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, 245; this version of events is more or less echoed in Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Greenstein, *Hidden-Hand Presidency*; Brands, *Cold Warriors*; and dozens of other tributes to the general.
139. Thomas, *Ike's Bluff*, 106, 164; and see Brian Madison Jones, *Abolishing the Taboo: Dwight D. Eisenhower and American Nuclear Doctrine, 1945–1961* (Solihul, UK: Helion, 2011); for a review of recent Eisenhower literature, see James I. Matray, "Still Liking Ike," *PSQ* 45 (2015): 199–205.
140. H. W. Brands, "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security* 12 (1988): 124–51, 141.
141. G. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink," Eisenhower line at 98, B36s at 112; and see Jackson,

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"Beyond Brinkmanship."

142. See "Bermuda (Dictated 12/6/53)" and "Bermuda, December 4, 1953," which appear in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 9, folder marked "Diary—Copies of DDE Personal 1953–54 (1)," in the AWF, DDEPL.
143. Arthur Dean, "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa," *Foreign Affairs* 33 (April 1955): 360–75, 366.
144. Lawrence and Save Our Sons in the folder marked "China—Formosa (1)," in Box 802, General Files, of the DDE Records as President (White House Central Files [hereafter WHCF]), DDEPL.
145. Lee and Mending Group in the folder marked "China—Formosa Resolution," in Box 802, General Files, WHCF, DDEPL.
146. These telegrams are in the folders marked "CON" in Box 803-PRO (the box contains both "pro" and "con" folders), General Files, WHCF, DDEPL; at this same location, also see Box 804-CON.
147. "The President's News Conference," March 23, 1955, APP, 4.
148. As his presidency wore on, Bowie and Immerman argue the president came to believe that "nuclear weapons were a curse" (*Waging Peace*, 222).
149. Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese People Cannot be Cowed by the Atom Bomb," January 28, 1955, *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978). Mao is quoted in a slightly different translation in Gong Li, "Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics," in Ross and Jiang Changbin, *Re-Examining the Cold War*, 141–72, 150.
150. John King Fairbank, "Communist China and Taiwan in United States Foreign Policy," pamphlet version of the annual Brien McMahon Lecture at the University of Connecticut, November 21, 1960, 21.
151. "Eisenhower Advocates the Use of Atomic Weapons," *People's Daily*, March 18, 1955.
152. J. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, 390; Wilson and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 41–43.
153. "Premier Chou Enlai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Area," April 23, 1955, repr. in *Important Documents*, 182; for context, see Robert L. Suettinger, "U.S. 'Management' of Three Taiwan Strait 'Crises,'" in Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, *Managing Sino-American Crises*, 251–92; and Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 44–47.
154. Tillman Durdin, "Chou Asks for U.S. Talks on Easing Formosa Crisis," *NYT*, April 24, 1955; Chou's statement was printed as "Texts of Address and Statement by Chou at the Bandung Conference," *NYT*, April 25, 1955; for context, see Westad, *Global Cold War*,

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97–109.

155. See Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 184–86.
156. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," Washington, March 8, 1972, document 208 from the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, vol. 17, *China, 1969–1972*, ed. Steven E. Phillips (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), footnote 4 of p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d208.
157. Rumors of this islands-for-independence notion were floated in two *NYT* stories: "Chou's Move" (April 24, 1955), and "Chou Renews Insistence on Formosa 'Liberation'" (April 25, 1955), and are confirmed in the archival materials accessible at DDEPL.
158. See Kalicki, *Pattern of Sino-American Crises*, 151ff.
159. Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 190, and see 213 and 230.
160. See Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Books, 1973), 267; and Li, "Tension across the Taiwan Strait," 164.
161. The "one China/two China" debate surfaced again in 1958, as discussed in James Peck, *Washington's China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), 186–91.
162. Tucker, "Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two Chinas' Policy," 259.
163. Quoted in Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 157.
164. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 304.
165. Marc Howard Rich and Robert T. Craig, "Habermas and Bateson in a World Gone M.A.D.: Metacommunication, Paradox, and the Inverted Speech Situation," *Communication Theory* 22 (2012): 383–402, 383.
166. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 465.
167. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 483.
168. Chernus, *Apocalypse Management*, 224.
169. Eisenhower to General Alfred M. Gruenther, February 1, 1955, in the folder marked "DDE Diary—February, 1955 (2)," in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, Box 9, AWF, DDEPL.

CHAPTER THREE. I WILL NEVER SELL YOU DOWN THE RIVER, 1971–1972

1. "Premier Chou Enlai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Area," April 23, 1955, in *Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 182; see "Peiping Disavows Any Idea of War against the U.S.," *NYT*, April 23, 1955.

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2. “Transcript of Nixon TV Address to Nation,” *NYT*, July 16, 1971; for context, see Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York; Touchstone, 1978), 544–80.
3. “Transcript of President Nixon’s News Conference on Foreign Policy Matters,” *NYT*, March 5, 1971.
4. Edwin Black, “Secrecy and Disclosure as Rhetorical Forms,” *QJS* 74 (1988): 133–50, 133, 134, 138.
5. See the review of this literature in John M. Murphy, “The Making of the President. Again,” *RPA* 15 (2012): 525–38.
6. Robert P. Newman, “Under the Veneer: Nixon’s Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969,” *QJS* 56 (1970): 168–78; Roderick P. Hart, “Absolutism and Situation: *Prolegomena* to a Rhetorical Biography of Richard M. Nixon,” *Communication Monographs* 42 (1976): 204–28.
7. Forbes Hill, “Conventional Wisdom—Traditional Form—The President’s Message of November 3, 1969,” *QJS* 58 (1972): 373–86; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Conventional Wisdom—Traditional Form: A Rejoinder,” *QJS* 58 (1972): 451–54.
8. Edwin Black, “Electing Time,” *QJS* 59 (1973): 125–29, “amnesia” from 129; Michael J. Steudeman, “Entelechy and Irony in Political Time: The Preemptive Rhetoric of Nixon and Obama,” *RPA* 16 (2013): 59–96.
9. Denise M. Bostdorff, “The Evolution of a Diplomatic Surprise: Richard M. Nixon’s Rhetoric on China, 1952–July 15, 1971,” *RPA* 5 (2002): 31–56; Michelle Murray Yang, “President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts during His 1972 Trip to China: A Study in Diplomatic Rhetoric,” *RPA* 14 (2011): 1–44; Zoë Hess Carney and Allison M. Prasch, “‘A Journey for Peace’: Spatial Metaphors in Nixon’s 1972 Opening to China,” *PSQ* 47 (2017): 646–64.
10. See Garry Wills, *Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man* (New York: Signet, 1969); Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 2001); William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). On Watergate, see Rick Perlstein, *The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014); and Robert Dalleck, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
11. See the covers of *Time*, April 1, 1974, and *Newsweek*, June 10, 1974.
12. Greg Grandin, *Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman* (New York: Metropolitan, 2015), 115; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 139–51.
13. See Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (New York: Twelve, 2002);

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Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit, 1983); Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

14. Robert Hariman, "Henry Kissinger: Realism's Rational Actor," in *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, ed. Francis A. Beer and Hariman (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), 35–53.
15. Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 61.
16. See Rick Perlstein, *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America* (New York: Scribner, 2008), 295–354; and Wills, *Nixon Agonistes*, 181–381.
17. Norman Mailer, *Miami and the Siege of Chicago* (1968; repr., New York: New York Review of Books, 2008), 46, 47.
18. Bostdorff, "The Evolution of a Diplomatic Surprise," 33; and see David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Random House, 1993), 328, where he uses the same phrase.
19. Quoted in Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 217.
20. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon*, vol. 2, *The Triumph of a Politician* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 440.
21. See Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions since World War II* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1995).
22. Harrison E. Salisbury, "Nixon: Then and Now," *NYT*, September 16, 1968.
23. See Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 229–43.
24. Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 184.
25. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (1967): 111–25, 111; for context, see Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 101–23.
26. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," 112, 113, 115.
27. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," 118–19.
28. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," 113, 121. Nixon repeated this idea in his January 20, 1969, Inaugural Address, pointing to "a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation"; APP.
29. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," 123.

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30. See Gong Li, "Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of U.S.-China Relations," in *Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 321–60; and Zhang Baijia, "The Changing International Scene and Chinese Policy toward the United States, 1954–1970," in ibid., 46–76.
31. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 169th Meeting of the National Security Council," Washington, DC, November 5, 1953, document 147 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54, China and Japan*, vol. 14, ed. David W. Mabon and Harriet D. Schwar (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d147.
32. On Nixon's trip, see "The Ambassador in the Republic of China to the Department of State," Taipei, November 30, 1953, document 155 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d155; for praise for Nixon's work during this trip, see Karl Lott Rankin, *China Assignment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 186–88; for a rare photograph, see *Chiang Kai-shek: A Pictorial Biography of the President of the Republic of China* (Taipei: China Publishing Co, 1957), 105; notices of the trip appeared as "Nixon Lands in Formosa," *NYT*, November 9, 1953, and "Chinese Acclaim Nixon," *NYT*, November 10, 1953.
33. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 211th Meeting of the National Security Council," Washington, DC, August 18, 1954, document 256 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d256; and see Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 106–12.
34. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council," Washington, DC, December 23, 1953, document 163 of *FRUS, 1952–54*, vol. 14, p. 2, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d163.
35. See Liao Yiwu, *The Corpse Walker: Real-Life Stories from the Bottom Up*, trans. Wen Huang (New York: Anchor Books, 2008); Zhang Xianliang, *Grass Soup*, trans. Martha Avery (Boston, MA: Godine, 1995); and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 493–516.
36. "Warlord" from Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1936), 90.
37. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis within China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 25.
38. See Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); for a profile of the younger

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Chiang, see "Tough, Affable Chinese Nationalist," *NYT*, April 20, 1970.

39. President Nixon's infamous line is discussed in Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 551–52; in John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 268–69; and in Tucker, *Strait Talk*, 38–39.
40. Nixon, *RN*, 563.
41. Chou's letter is printed in Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 726–27, emphasis added; and see Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai* (New York: St. Martin's, 1989).
42. Chou quoted in Tucker, *Strait Talk*, 44; and see Gong Li, "Chinese Decision Making."
43. Kissinger quoted in Tucker, *Strait Talk*, 44.
44. See Shawna Yang Ryan, *Green Island* (New York: Knopf, 2016); for accounts from TIM activists, see Strong C. Chuang, "The Struggle against KMT Rule: A Personal Memoir," in *Taiwan's Struggle: Voices of the Taiwanese*, ed. Shyu-Tu Lee and Jack F. Williams (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 61–72; and Tsay Ting-kuei, "Nonviolent Struggle in Taiwan: A Personal Memoir," in ibid., 73–86.
45. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, October 21, 1971, document 162 of the *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, vol. 17, *China, 1969–1972*, ed. Steven E. Phillips (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d162.
46. See Kissinger's version of events in *White House Years*, 755–63; Nixon's memoir does not mention this speech; see Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 251–52.
47. Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 353; and see Bostdorff, "Evolution of a Diplomatic Surprise," 32.
48. Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 117.
49. "Onward to Peking," *WP*, July 17, 1971.
50. Michael Oksenberg, "The Strategies of Peking," *Foreign Affairs* 50 (1971): 15–29, 18.
51. Seymour Topping, "Journey for Peace," *NYT*, July 16, 1971; and see "Nixon Will Visit China before May to Seek a Normalization of Relations," *NYT*, July 16, 1971.
52. John Herbers, "Elated Nixon Ends Western Vacation," *NYT*, July 19, 1971.
53. Quoted in Ambrose, *Nixon*, 2:454.
54. President Nixon, speaking at a "Bipartisan Leaders Meeting," February 16, 1972, as quoted in Yang, "President Nixon's Speeches and Toasts," 23.
55. Grandin, *Kissinger's Shadow*, 113; or recall Adlai Stevenson's characterization of "Nixonland" as ruled by "slander and scare, sly innuendo, a poison pen, the anonymous phone call, and hustling, pushing, shoving" (quoted in Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 7, and

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used as the central metaphor in Perlstein, *Nixonland*).

56. The 1853 Washington painting by Emanuel Leutze hangs in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, where it honors the Great Cincinnatus; for context, see Robert James Branham and Stephen John Hartnett, *Sweet Freedom's Song: "My Country 'Tis of Thee" and Democracy in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 39–44.
57. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 562. Nixon's and Kissinger's poor treatment of the State Department and ambassadors is reported broadly in the secondary literature; see Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: Viking, 1978), 9, 19, 416. In *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York: Century Foundation, 1999), Patrick Tyler argues that "the humiliation of Rogers" (Nixon's secretary of state) was "emblem[atic] of Nixon's lack of regard for the overall institution of the State Department" (134).
58. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 164.
59. "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, October 29, 1971, document 169 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d169.
60. See Jonathan Manthorpe, *Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 211–14; Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 130–37; Garver, *Sino-American Alliance*, 248–63; and Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), 120–43.
61. "Formosa: The Last Stand for the Chinese National Republic," *NBC News*, January 1, 1950.
62. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 574.
63. Tillman Durdin, "Nationalists Determined to Make Best of a 'Tough but Not Irreparable' Situation," *NYT*, October 28, 1971.
64. Crowd size from Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 571; the key Reagan biographers do not mention the trip, as (not) seen in Lou Cannon, *Reagan* (New York: Putnam's, 1982), and H. W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015).
65. James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 38.
66. See "Reagan Arrives in Taipei," *NYT*, October 10, 1971.
67. "Difficulties Dim Taipei Anniversary," *NYT*, October 11, 1971; this story reports the crowd at "250,000." The Reagans received better coverage in "Gov. Reagan in Taipei," an Associated Press story picked up by the *Stars and Stripes*, October 11, 1971.
68. "Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs," Washington, November 5, 1971, document 170 of *FRUS 1969–76*, vol. 17, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/

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frus1969-76v17/d170.

69. While Nixon was leery of a possible rival, Kissinger was a harsh critic of Reagan, whom he described as "incompetent" in a May 12, 1975, White House conversation with President Gerald Ford, as quoted in David Allen, "Realism and Malarkey: Henry Kissinger's State Department, Détente, and Domestic Consensus," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17 (2015): 184–219, 192.
70. "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, November 15, 1971, document 172 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d172.
71. See James C. H. Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally* (Washington, DC: Acropolis, 1983).
72. Hariman, "Henry Kissinger: Realism's Rational Actor," 42.
73. See Tom Wicker, "Background Blues," *NYT*, December 16, 1971.
74. Tyler, *Great Wall*, 115.
75. "Transcript of Kissinger's News Conference," *NYT*, February 23, 1973.
76. Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 235.
77. Suri, *Kissinger and the American Century*, 235.
78. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," Washington, undated (presumably November 1971), document 165 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d165.
79. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 21, 1972, document 195 from *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d195.
80. "The Joint U.S.-China Communiqué, Shanghai, February 27, 1972," in Ramon Myers and Jialin Zhang, *The Struggle across the Strait: The Divided China Problem* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2006), 123–27, 125; also published as "Text of U.S.-Chinese Communiqué," *NYT*, February 28, 1972.
81. "Joint U.S.-China Communiqué," 125.
82. See Westad, *Global Cold War*; and Blum, *Killing Hope.*
83. Kissinger, *On China*, 270.
84. Hersh, *Price of Power*, 359; and see Tyler, *Great Wall*, 47–103.
85. See Hersh, *Price of Power*, 366–68 and 490–92.
86. "Conversation between President Nixon and His Assistant for National Security Affairs," Washington, February 14, 1972, document 192 from *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 6, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d192.
87. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 24, 1972, document 199 from *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d199.

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88. "Joint U.S.-China Communiqué," 126.
89. Billboard noted in Margaret MacMillan, *Nixon in China: The Week That Changed the World* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2006), 304.
90. "Joint U.S.-China Communiqué," 126–27.
91. Victor Hao Li, "The 'Taiwan Question' in U.S.-China Relations," in *Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy*, ed. Hung-mao Tien (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983), 197–205, 198, 199.
92. See Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
93. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1080.
94. Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 402.
95. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon," Washington, November 1971, document 164 from *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 5, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d164.
96. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 24, 1972, document 199 from *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d199.
97. Kissinger, *On China*, 356.
98. Garver, *Sino-American Alliance*, 271; and see Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2004), 127–36.
99. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," Washington, undated (presumably November 1971), document 165 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, the October quotation in footnote 2, p. 5, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d165.
100. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 22, 1972, document 196 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d196.
101. Nixon's notes from MacMillan, *Nixon in China*, 239. As Goh argues in *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China*, "there would seem to be very little reason to believe that the Chinese could or would help the United States in Vietnam" (181). Also see Yafeng Xia, "Vietnam for Taiwan? A Reappraisal of Nixon–Chou Enlai Negotiation on Shanghai Communiqué," *American Review of China Studies* 3 (2002): 35–55.
102. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 22, 1972, document 196 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d196, 3, emphasis added.
103. Ibid., 3.
104. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, February 24, 1972, document 199 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d196.

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105. Ibid., 4.
106. Ibid., 4.
107. Hart, "Absolutism and Situation," 205; and see Anthony Summers, *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon* (New York: Viking, 2000).
108. Chang and Halliday, *Mao*, 569.
109. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 573; see also William Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1999).
110. "Memorandum by the Ambassador in China (Stuart)," Nanking, July 14, 1949, document 499 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China*, vol. 18, ed. Francis Prescott, Ralph Goodwin, Herbert Fine, and Velma Hastings Cassidy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v08/d499.
111. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 32 (1954): 353–64, 364.
112. "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs," document 165 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 3, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d165.
113. "Memorandum of Conversation," Shanghai, February 27–28, 1972, document 202 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, pp. 4–5, emphasis added, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d202.
114. See Yang, "President Nixon's Speeches and Toasts."
115. "Memorandum of Conversation," Beijing, June 20, 1972, document 231 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 12, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d231.
116. "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, November 15, 1971, document 172 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, quotations from 1, 2, and 3, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d172.
117. "Memorandum of Conversation," Key Biscayne, Florida, December 30, 1971, document 180 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d180.
118. "Conversation among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the Ambassador of the Republic of China," Washington, March 6, 1972, document 207 of *FRUS, 1969–76*, vol. 17, p. 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d207.
119. Hariman, "Henry Kissinger: Realism's Rational Actor," 41, 43; and see Suri, *Kissinger and the American Century*, 13–15, and Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 653–72.
120. Tucker, *Strait Talk*, 68. Nixon's speechwriter, Pat Buchanan, "was so incensed by what he considered Nixon's abandonment of Taiwan," writes Yang, "that he later threatened to resign" ("President Nixon's Speeches," 29).

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121. President Richard Nixon, "Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base," February 28, 1972, APP, 2; "conquering hero" from Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, 282.
122. Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 145.
123. "The Forgotten Taiwanese," *NYT*, March 6, 1972.
124. Edwin Reischauer, "What the Taiwanese Really Feel," *NYT*, March 20, 1972; and see Earl C. Ravenal, "Approaching China, Defending Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs* 50 (1971): 44–58.
125. "Taiwan Seeks Defense Pledge," *NYT*, March 1, 1972.
126. See the text as printed in Garver, *Sino-American Alliance*, 274.
127. "Transcript of Kissinger's News Conference," 14; and see "Nixon: There Were No Secret Deals," *WP*, February 29, 1972.
128. Morton H. Halperin, "America and Asia: The Impact of Nixon's China Policy," in *Sino-American Relations, 1949–1971*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Praeger, 1972), 3–20, 13; this claim is repeated in *The U.S. and Free China*, where Ambassador Shen reports that "Japan felt it could no longer trust Kissinger or any other American official" (120).
129. Nixon, *RN*, 545.
130. James Reston, "In a Flurry of Diplomacy, Nations Head for a New World Order," *NYT*, September 9, 1971; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 348; Secretary of State Rogers reported Japan's Sato was "crushed by the announcement of Kissinger's secret visit" (Tudda, *Cold War Turning Point*, 104).
131. "Taipei's Statement on the Communiqué," *NYT*, February 29, 1972.
132. "Nationalist Chinese React with Dismay to Nixon Decision," *NYT*, July 17, 1971.
133. "Taipei's Statement."
134. "Taipei's Statement."
135. "Message to the 18th Conference of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League," Seoul, South Korea, August 21, 1972, in *Addresses and Messages of President Chiang Kai-shek, Republic of China, to Asian People's Anti-Communist League, World Anti-Communist League, and Asian Parliamentarians' Union* (n.p.: China Chapter, World Anti-Communist League, 1975), 11–12, 11, 12.
136. "Message to the 6th Conference of the World Anti-Communist League," August 24, 1972, Mexico City, in *Addresses and Messages of President Chiang Kai-shek*, 33–34, 33; for context, see Kyle Burke, *Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018).
137. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 561.
138. Grandin, *Kissinger's Shadow*, 154.

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139. Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 117.
140. Tyler, *Great Wall*, 112.
141. "'76" from Perlstein, *Invisible Bridge*, 254; TV story in Tyler, *Great Wall*, 127.
142. "Spectacle and Substance," *NYT*, February 19, 1971.
143. Perlstein, *Nixonland*, 624.
144. Guy DeBord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (1967; repr., New York: Zone, 2004), 15, 17, emphasis added.
145. See Stephen J. Hartnett and Jennifer R. Mercieca, "A Discovered Dissembler Can Achieve Nothing Great": Four Theses on the Death of Presidential Discourse in an Age of Empire," *PSQ* 37 (2007): 599–621.
146. Robert Hariman and Francis A. Beer, "What Would Be Prudent? Forms of Reasoning in World Politics," *RPA* 1 (1998): 299–330, 322.
147. Ambrose, *Nixon*, 2:560; and see James P. Pfiffner, "The Contemporary Presidency: Presidential Lies," *PSQ* 29 (1999): 903–17.
148. Black, "Secrecy and Disclosure," 146.
149. Berman, *No Peace, No Honor*, 43.
150. Taylor, *Generalissimo*, 583; on China's frustrations, see Goh, *Constructing the Rapprochement with China*, 243–55.
151. "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1978, repr. in *America and Island China: A Documentary History*, ed. Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter (New York: University Press of America, 1989), 206, emphasis added.
152. "Statement by the Government of the PRC," 206.

CHAPTER FOUR. WE PREFER TO STAY SINGLE, 1990–1998

1. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 69–126; and Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York: Century Foundation, 1999), 181–286.
2. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 191.
3. Patrick Tyler, "The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (September 1999): 93–122, 94; Tyler depicts a "civil war" between national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.
4. Jimmy Carter, "Address to the Nation on Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China," December 15, 1978, APP; and see Fox Butterfield,

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"U.S. and China Mark Resumption of Ties," *NYT*, January 2, 1979.

5. Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 265.
6. Quoted in Henry Scott-Stokes, "Taipei Is Quiet as Ties with U.S. Are Broken," *NYT*, January 2, 1979; and see James C. H. Shen, *The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally* (Washington, DC: Acropolis, 1983), 247–88.
7. Yeong-kuang Ger, "Cross-Strait Relations and the Taiwan Relations Act," *AJCS* 22 (2015): 235–52, 235.
8. Shawna Yang Ryan, *Green Island* (New York: Knopf, 2016), 188.
9. "Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1978, in *America and Island China: A Documentary History*, ed. Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter (New York: University Press of America, 1989), 206, emphasis added.
10. Fox Butterfield, "Peking Says Taiwan Can Keep Autonomy under Unification," *NYT*, January 10, 1979. Deng was envisioning a formula he hatched in 1984 to drive the "reunification" with Hong Kong—see his June 23, 1984 speech, "One Country, Two Systems," in Deng Xiaoping, *Speeches and Writings*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pergamon, 1987), 91–94.
11. National People's Congress Standing Committee, "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," repr., *Beijing Review* 1 (January 5, 1979), 16–17.
12. "Message to Compatriots," 16–17, 17.
13. Jimmy Carter, "The President's News Conference," January 17, 1979, APP; Carter writes in *Keeping Faith* and *White House Diary* that he did not demand China accede to a no-use-of-force-against-Taiwan clause in the public statements, but that this condition was emphasized leading up to normalization.
14. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Officials See a Bright Future in New Relationship with Peking," *NYT*, January 2, 1979.
15. Tyler, "(Ab)normalization," 101, 108; Jacob K. Javitz, "Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (1981): 54–62, 56.
16. For context, see Tyler, *Great Wall*, 227–86; Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2004), chaps. 5–6; Michael S. Chase, "U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship," in *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis*, ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 162–85; R. Gordon Hoxie, "Presidential Leadership and American Foreign Policy: Some Reflections on the Taiwan Issue," *PSQ* 9 (1979): 131–43; and Mark S. Adelman, "Research Note on the Taiwan Relations Act," *JCC* 6 (1997): 125–38.
17. Quotations from pp. 1 and 2 of the TRA, listed as H.R. 2479, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479. The TRA was introduced on February 28, marking

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the 42nd anniversary of the 228 tragedy; for details, see Martin B. Gold, *A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act* (Boulder, CO: Lexington, 2017).

18. "Interview of Deng Xiaoping by Robert Maxwell," in Deng, *Speeches and Writings*, 105–12, 105, 106; Maxwell's portrayal of Deng contradicts the cheerful version offered in Carter's *Keeping Faith* (207–16).
19. Dennis van Vranken Hickey, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996," *JCC* 7 (1998): 405–19, 406.
20. Tyler, "(Ab)normalization," 122.
21. "Six Assurances," repr. in Shirley A. Kan, *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 43–44.
22. See Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1994); John F. Copper, *The Taiwan Political Miracle* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996); Gary Rawnsley and Qian Gong, "Political Communications in Democratic Taiwan," *Political Communication* 28 (2011): 323–40; Hung-mao Tien, *The Great Transformation: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute, 1989); and Zhidong Hao, *Whither Taiwan and Mainland China: National Identity, the State, and Intellectuals* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 27–74.
23. See "The Lifting of the Chieh-Yen (Emergency) Decree in the Taiwan Area," July 14, 1987, in Gibert and Carpenter, *America and Island China*, 395–97; Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and I-chou Liu, "The Development of the Opposition," in *Democratization in Taiwan*, ed. Steve Tang and Hung-mao Tien (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), 67–84.
24. Chien-min Chao, "The Republic of China's Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui," in *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations*, ed. Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 177–203, 178; and see James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 315–17.
25. On Lee's pre-presidential life, see Shih-shan Henry Tsai, *Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's Quest for Identity* (New York: Macmillan, 2005), chaps. 1–4.
26. Richard C. Kagan, *Taiwan's Statesman: Lee Teng-hui and Democracy in Asia* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2007), 41.
27. Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 472.
28. See Tsai, *Taiwan's Quest for Identity*, 165–66.
29. The Farmer's Movement in 1988, the White Lily Student Movement in 1990, and the Taiwan Independent Association incidents in 1991 all helped push Taiwan's

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democratization process; see Jian Huiwen, Ren Yude, and Yong Zhongji, eds., *Daylight Breaking: A Retrospective of Taiwan's Democratic Developments, 1987–1996*, trans. Mathew James Hinson (Taipei: National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, 2017); and Tsai, *Taiwan's Quest for Identity*.

30. Lee Teng-hui interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Taiwan Predicts Peking Will Come Around," *Washington Times*, July 10, 1991, repr. in Lee Teng-hui, *Creating the Future: Towards a New Era for the Chinese People* (Taipei: Jason C. Hu, 1992), 95–103.
31. Chen-Wei Lin, "Taiwan's Democratic National Identity, Lee Teng-hui, and Japan," *JCC* 10 (2001): 173–77, 174.
32. Lee Teng-hui, "Opening a New Era for the Chinese People," inaugural address of May 20, 1990, repr. in Lee, *Creating the Future*, 3–10, 3 and 9; and see the essays in *Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross Strait Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).
33. See Kagan, *Taiwan's Statesman*.
34. David E. Sanger, "Taiwan's New President Signals Major Softening in Relations with China," *NYT*, May 21, 1999.
35. "Display Ad 577," *NYT*, May 20, 1990.
36. This is also included in "Display Ad 577," *NYT*, May 20, 1990.
37. "Display Ad 588," *NYT*, May 20, 1990.
38. "Display Ad 591," *NYT*, May 20, 1990.
39. "Display Ad 585," *NYT*, May 20, 1990.
40. "Display Ad 570," *NYT*, May 20, 1990; I wanted to reproduce some of these advertisements here, but was not able to secure permissions.
41. Kagan, *Taiwan's Statesman*, 112.
42. Katutugu Yoshida, *Taiwan's Long Road to Democracy: Bitter Taste of Freedom*, ed. and trans. Toshie Habu and Peter Hayes (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2005), 98; on the jockeying around the NAC, see Chao and Myers, *First Chinese Democracy*, 196–215; and Joseph Wong, "Dynamic Democratization in Taiwan," *JCC* 10 (2001): 339–62, 352.
43. Yoshida, *Taiwan's Long Road to Democracy*, 146.
44. Ping-hui Liao, "Rewriting Taiwanese National History: The February 28 Incident as Spectacle," *Public Culture* 5 (1993): 281–96, 284.
45. Lee Teng-hui, "The Taiwan Experience and China's Future," July 6, 1991, repr. in Lee, *Creating the Future*, 85–91, 85, 90, 91.
46. Lee Teng-hui, "Constitutional Reform, National Unification, and the Future," July 1, 1991, repr. in Lee, *Creating the Future*, 73–81, 74; on the uses of Lincoln as Long Cold War material, see Shawn J. Parry-Giles and David S. Kaufer, "Memories of Lincoln as Cold War

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Propaganda: Competing Scripts of American Greatness," in *A Rhetorical History of the United States*, vol. 8, *World War II and the Cold War: The Rhetoric of Hearts and Minds*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 123–66.

47. Lee Teng-hui, "International Press Conference" (May 22, 1990), repr. in Lee, *Creating the Future*, 13–34, 30, 18.
48. Lee Teng-hui, *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity* (Tokyo: PHP, 1999, originally in Japanese), 188.
49. See "Guidelines for National Unification," approved by the Executive Yuan on March 14, 1991, and appended to the MAC's 1994 "Relations across the Taiwan Straits," held in their "General Policy Archives (1994–2008)."
50. Kagan, *Taiwan's Statesman*, 121, and see 156–59.
51. James Buchanan, Senate speech of March 12, 1844, in *The Appendix to the Congressional Globe, for the First Session, Twenty-Eighth Congress* (Washington, DC: Blair and Rives, 1844), 350. On the early phases of Manifest Destiny see Stephen John Hartnett, *Democratic Dissent and the Cultural Fictions of Antebellum America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 93–131; and Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
52. John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation," *United States Magazine and Democratic Review* 17, no. 85 (July–August 1845), 7. More broadly, see Godfrey Hodgson, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); and Donald E. Pease, *The New American Exceptionalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
53. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 8; the material used in the latter half of this paragraph originally appeared in Stephen J. Hartnett, "The Folly of Fighting for Providence, or, the End of Empire and Exceptionalism," *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies* 13 (2013): 201–14.
54. President George W. Bush, "Remarks on Arrival at the White House," September 16, 2001, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 2 and 3, emphasis added; for analysis, see Stephen John Hartnett and Laura Ann Stengrim, *Globalization and Empire: The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Free Markets, and The Twilight of Democracy* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 101–4; more broadly, see Denise Bostdorff, "George W. Bush's Post–September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation," *QJS* 89 (2003): 293–319; and John M. Murphy, "'Our Mission and Our Moment': George W. Bush and September 11th," *RPA* 6 (2003): 607–32.
55. James Peck, *Washington's China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), 22 and passim.
56. See Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003),

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195–202; Mann, *About Face*, 320–30; and Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 225–30.

57. See Tsai, *Taiwan's Quest for Identity*, 170–74; and Murray A. Rubinstein, "Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Rubinstein (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 436–80.
58. See Mann, *About Face*, 315–19, "vacation diplomacy" from 316; Mann notes that Lee greased the wheels at Cornell by "contributing $2.5 million to the university to endow a Lee-Teng-hui Professorship of World Affairs" (321).
59. Richard C. Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), 247; in *Strait Talk*, Tucker reports the contract at $4.5 million (206); Suisheng Zhao argues the influence campaign deployed hundreds of millions of dollars to persuade American legislators ("Changing Leadership Perceptions," in *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis*, ed. Suisheng Zhao [New York: Routledge, 1999], 99–125, esp. 117).
60. Throughout 1995, the White House's director of correspondence, Jim Dorskind, sent memos to the president to which he appended notes indicating how many similar letters had been received; see "Sample of 100 Petitions Received on US-Taiwan Policy," December 7, 1995, in the file marked "Kristoff, Sandra, Asian Affairs, Taiwan [4] [OA/ID 1041]," Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Asian Affairs, 2012-0975-F, Box 1, WJCPL. These records indicate the Clinton White House received boxes of mail supporting both Taiwan in general and Lee in particular.
61. Signed by Senators Frank Murkowski (R-AK), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), and seven others, January 30, 1995, from the file marked "Kristoff, Sandra, Asian Affairs, Taiwan [1] [OA/ID 1041]," Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Asian Affairs, 2012-0975-F, Box 1, WJCPL.
62. Phyllis Hwang, "Taiwan for the Taiwanese," *NYT*, April 10, 1995.
63. See H. Con. Res. 53, "Expressing the Sense of the Congress Regarding a Private Visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States," https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/53. While Taiwan is not discussed, Joe Klein's *The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton* (New York: Doubleday, 2002) portrays Clinton's dealings with the Republican-controlled House.
64. H. Con. Res. 53, fifth clause.
65. On Clinton's initial "no," see Steven Greenhouse, "Clinton Rebuffs Senate on Letting Taiwan President Visit U.S.," *NYT*, May 11, 1995; on his "yes," see Steven Greenhouse, "Aides to Clinton Say He Will Defy Beijing and Issue Visa to Taiwan's President," *NYT*, May 22, 1995.

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66. William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference," August 10, 1995, APP, 8.
67. This and fifteen other such withdrawal sheets can be found in the file marked "Kristoff, Sandra, Asian Affairs, Taiwan [2] [OA/ID 1041]," Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Asian Affairs, 2012-0975-F, Box 1, WJCPL. The classified démarche is indicated on a second withdrawal sheet in the folder marked "[Tung-hui or Denghui] [05/24/1995-08/01/1996] [OA/ID 510000]," Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Cables, Jan 1995-Dec 1996, 2012-0973-F, Box 1, WJCPL.
68. On February 26, 2019, I wrote to the National Archives requesting a copy of the classified démarche; on October 30, 2019, I received a reply from the WJCPL's supervisory archivist saying, "We can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of any records that may be responsive to such a request."
69. These untitled AIT talking points are dated May 19, 1995, in the file marked "Suettinger, Robert, Asian Affairs, Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit [OA/ID 1044]," Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Asian Affairs, 2012-0975-F, Box 1, WJCPL.
70. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity?" in *Dangerous Strait*, 186–211; the CPC's response is characterized at 195. For an overview of Lee's program at this time, see Richard Bush, "Lee Teng-hui and 'Separatism,'" in *Dangerous Strait*, 70–92.
71. Lee Teng-hui, "Always in My Heart," June 9, 1995, Spencer T. and Ann W. Olin Lecture at Cornell University, quotations from 1 and 3 of the transcript available at https://www.eapasi.com/uploads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_--_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf; segments of the speech can be seen via YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ulCSS8OZFc.
72. It is therefore odd to read David Chen's headline, "Taiwan's President Tiptoes around Politics at Cornell," *NYT*, June 10, 1995.
73. Lee, "Always in My Heart," 3 and 4.
74. The full speech is archived by CSPAN at https://www.c-span.org/video/?65610-1/cornell-university-alumni-reunion, where the footage of Lee begins at 1:10.
75. "Serious and Dangerous Retrogression," *PD*, May 23, 1995, as quoted in Martin L. Lasater, *The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 209.
76. Lasater, *Taiwan Conundrum*, 227.
77. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus," in Suisheng Zhao, *Across the Taiwan Strait*, 77–98, 82.
78. John F. Copper, *Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 65; Bruce Gilley, *Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 252.
79. Elaine Sciolino, "Angered over Taiwan, China Recalls Ambassador," *NYT*, June 17, 1995.

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80. Lasater, *Taiwan Conundrum*, 223.
81. "Nationalist currents" from Patrick E. Tyler, "Sound and Fury in East Asia," *NYT*, August 23, 1995; also see his "China War Games Viewed as Tactic to Pressure Taiwan," *NYT*, August 19, 1995. For context on post-TSM power struggles within China, see Yiu-chung Wong, *From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political Reform in the People's Republic of China* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005).
82. "Do Not Underestimate China's Will to Safeguard Its Sovereignty," *Kung Pao*, June 3, 1995, cited in Suisheng Zhao, "Changing Leadership Perceptions," 102.
83. Originally stamped CONFIDENTIAL, but declassified on August 24, 2015; see "Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Three Others re China," Washington, DC, July 13, 1995, accessed via the CDL as NSC and Records Management Office, "Declassified Documents on Henry Kissinger," https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47988.
84. Alison Mitchell, "China's President and Clinton Meet to Repair Fences," *NYT*, October 25, 1995.
85. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, *China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1995), 398.
86. See James Risen, "U.S. Warns China on Taiwan," *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 1996; and see Suisheng Zhao, "Reunification Strategy: Beijing versus Lee Teng-hui," in Dickson and Chien-min Chao, *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy*, 218–40.
87. Bellochi quoted in Nancy B. Tucker, ed., *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 486.
88. Tang quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "Beijing Steps Up Pressure on Taiwan Leader," *NYT*, March 7, 1996.
89. Tyler, *Great Wall*, 25.
90. Mann, *About Face*, 334; and see Chi Wang, *The United States and China since World War II* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2013), 157; Mann reports other U.S. officials heard similar threats, amounting to a secret nuclear campaign against U.S. support for Taiwan; see Patrick E. Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," *NYT*, January 24, 1996.
91. In an email sent to key Clinton White House personnel, Sandra J. Kristoff, the director of Asian Affairs at the NSC, confirmed that "There has been no threat from China that it would use nuclear weapons against the United States. . . . The Chinese have told us officially that this does not represent their policy. . . . [The threat was] disinformation by low-level Chinese authorities" (email dated March 18, 1996, in the folder marked "MSMail-Record (Sept 94–Sept 97), [China or Taiwan Missile Test] [OA/ID 590000],"

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held in the Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails, MSMail Record (Sept 94–Sept 97), 2012-0975-F, Box 3, WJCPL).

92. "The Bludgeoning of Taiwan," *NYT*, March 8, 1996.
93. Risen, "U.S. Warns China on Taiwan"; Lee quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns U.S. to Keep Away from Taiwan Strait," *NYT*, March 18, 1996.
94. See John O'Neil, "U.S. Sending More Ships to Taiwan Area in Warning to China," *NYT*, March 10, 1996; the carriers led an armada including two destroyers, one missile frigate, one cruiser, at least one submarine, and many others—amounting to the "largest armada in Southeast Asia since the end of the Vietnam War" (Mann, *About Face*, 337).
95. "Coercive diplomacy" from Thomas J. Christensen, *The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power* (New York: Norton, 2015), 190; throughout the spring of 1996, Dorskind sent memos to the Oval Office confirming receipt of thousands of letters supporting Clinton's actions (see the folders marked "[China or Taiwan Missile Test] 9603204 [OA/ID 1101]" and "[China or Taiwan Missile Test] 9603210 [OA/ID 1101]," Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails, MSMail Record (Sept 94-Sept 97), 2012-0975-F, Box 3), WJCPL.
96. James Shin, "Clinton's Gunboat Diplomacy," *NYT*, March 15, 1996.
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CHAPTER FIVE. A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE, 2016–2020

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