John Locke and the Uncivilized Society

Individualism and Resistance in America Today

Scott Robinson

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Chapter One

The Uncivilized Society

John Locke's Ironic Place in America Today

When John Locke wrote of the "civil society," the irony was not intentional (89).[1] But if John Locke is acknowledged as fathering the character of contemporary American liberalism, it is hard to argue that this breed of liberalism is greatly civilized at present. Certainly, American history contains periods in which a much higher degree of national unity was obtained than today. No one would dare refer to the political atmosphere that has prevailed in America recently as an "Era of Good Feelings." The national euphoric *homonia* that characterized the 1950s has long since dissipated. It is as if nothing truly meaningful unites America today; nothing which provides a deep sense that Americans are *e pluribus unum*. Communitarian theorists have been wise to this for some time; scholars of American voting behavior have been able to detect this tendency since at least the early 2000s.[2]

Accordingly, scholars have speculated about the reasons for this sad change in American culture. The "usual suspects" have been summarized nicely:

> busy-ness and time pressure; economic hard times (or, according to alternative theories, material affluence); residential mobility; suburbanization; the movement of women into the paid labor force and the stresses of two-career families; disruption of marriage and family ties; changes in the structure of the American economy, such as the rise of chain stores, branch firms, and the service sector; the sixties (most of which actually happened in the seventies) including Vietnam, Watergate, disillusion with public life; and the cultural revolt against authority (sex, drugs, and so on); growth of the welfare state; the civil rights revolution; television, the electronic revolution, and other technological changes.[3]

Some argue that technology today allows for new forms of civic engagement and remediates the effects of all of these changes.[4] But online engagement as a replacement for real civic engagement also seems to be having a deleterious

effect on national unity. Not only do we bowl alone today, but we, through the isolating mediums of our phones and computer screens, engage in divisive political ideas alone as well. Even advocates of online civic engagement have conceded that trust has indeed waned in American society since about the 1950s.[5] This has created problems regarding, not civil engagement, but of uncivilized behavior when we do choose to engage in civil affairs.

Dictionaries tend to define civilized in two ways, first, relating to advanced societies, and second, relating to polite and courteous behavior. These two definitions imply a deeper connection between the two, that behavior in advanced societies turns on polite interactions. The standard measures of development in comparative politics bear this out; open and free press, for instance, wherein opposing ideas may be expressed, a system of government which protects basic political rights, and above all, effective elections whereby the consent of the governed is tangibly expressed, hallmark advanced and civilized nations. So, by civilized behavior, I mean behavior in which political ideas are expressed in a courteous manner, through mediums which effectively disseminate these ideas, and, most importantly, where this is so because the normative manner of expressing political discontent is through the ballot and through persuasive petitioning. All of this may occur in a society which contains at least some basic modicum of *homonoia*, a level of trust that enables society members to rule and to be ruled in turn.

Incidents of uncivilized political expression are too easily exemplified in recent years in America. Sometimes this behavior is merely vitriolic expression and perhaps some of this is to be expected in a pluralistic liberal society. A Houston, Texas, woman, for instance, recently gained local media notoriety for having adorned her pick-up truck's back window with a very large bumper sticker that read, "F—— TRUMP."[6] But sometimes these actions are more consequential. And we can see these actions developing into a trend in recent decades. In May 2009, Dr. George Tiller, a Kansas abortion practitioner, was murdered in the eleventh abortion-related homicide in the United States since 1993.[7] In February 2010, a man distraught over tax policies flew a small aircraft into an IRS building in Austin, Texas. And in January 2011, another man murdered six people in an assassination attempt of US congresswoman Gabriel Giffords in Tucson, Arizona.[8] President Obama remarked, after this attempted assassination, that Americans needed to behave more civilly toward each other.[9] But, as the bumper sticker mentioned above exemplifies, the uncivilized nature of politically motivated behavior in society has only expanded since he left office. By one count, 383 documented "incidents of hate" were perpetrated against supporters of President Trump between 2015 and summer 2019; others have identified that incidents of fraudulent accusations of hate crimes against Trump's supporters are also

widespread.[10] Scholars who count the size of protests in America have argued that the largest protests in our nation's history are presently occurring during the Trump administration, outpacing even Vietnam War Moratorium protests in 1969 and 1970 (the second largest in America's history).[11] Counts estimate that between six and nine million individuals participated in over 8,700 protests in America in 2017—the vast majority of them being protests against President Trump.[12] Many of these protests have caused injury, death, and resulted in the destruction of private property; these outcomes do not comport with persuasive petitioning. Although the basic comparative indicators of civility discussed above suggest the United States is a civilized society—the American press is free, political rights and liberties are more expansive today than ever before, and Trump's 2016 election, like all American elections, was free and administered without corruption—the vitriolic behavior exemplified above cannot be described as civilized. A little rebellion every now and again may indeed offer therapeutic relief from tyrannical government; but can persistent rebellion that is not caused by any corruption of our elections or diminishment of our political rights possibly be what Jefferson's words should mean to us today?

I do not believe that the sources identified above for such behavior are truly sources of civic decline in America. They appear to me rather as symptoms of the philosophical attitude or disposition of Americans that cultivates the symptomatic behaviors identified above. The actual culprit is the underlying worldview that inspires the economic and cultural priorities of our times. Beneath America's divide lays one commonality: democratic-socialists on today's left and conservatives on today's right are both inspired by America's revolutionary and liberal character. One thing that we share is the desire to fight vociferously for the rights that we perceive to be important to us, rights of some personal stake, whether it be the right for the provision of some welfare good, for identity recognition, or the right to retain one's property through low taxes. The ease with which America's young people today may become (and they have a word for it) "triggered" at the slightest perceived offense speaks symbolically to how readily Americans are primed for resistance (or for social action more generally) inspired by selfish proclivities.

One thing that showed up in American culture at about the time that the *homonia* of the 1950s was attenuating was John Locke's *Second Treatise*. Though Locke had not been a significant figure in American political culture since about 1776, his return to the epicenter of American political thought was well received. Our contemporary tendency to view Locke as the perennial theoretical voice of American ideals is mistaken. The historical record reveals a rather different story. Scholarly and popular interest in Locke's thought contained two significant peaks in American history.[13] First, Locke

was among the greatest influences during the revolutionary era.[14] While Locke was useful in developing America's resistance theory during the 1760s and 1770s, our founders then turned to other places—such as the texts of existing state constitutions, the language employed by colonial charters, and the writings of Montesquieu—to gain inspiration for a constitutional order.[15] Though Locke, through Jefferson's Declaration, was useful during the abolition movement, a sharp increase in Lockean scholarship does not sustain itself until about the close of World War II.[16] Only then did he become, for the first time in our nation's history, a staple in college curriculums and a force in shaping the American way of life during nonrevolutionary times. The twenty-year span from 1962–1982, for instance, produced 826 scholarly pieces of literature about John Locke, a number that far outpaces the interest displayed at any time prior (figure 1.1).[17]



Figure 1.1. Publications about John Locke 1689–1982
This chart was created by Scott Robinson

Not merely his resistance theory, but his entire body of work have become important pieces of academic literature today. This is a curious trend. Why, after all, should Locke's resistance theory have become important again at this time? If Montesquieu and the Federalist Papers better explain our constitutional order, and if Hobbes gives us everything about consent that Locke does, then why reincorporate Locke's ideas as we did into the basic body of our civil theology? America had at that time recently won a world war and was in the process of establishing itself as one of the world's preeminent super powers. Today America is even better situated as hegemon than it was in the late 1940s and 1950s. Why does America's love affair with his resistance ideas continue? No tyrant has reigned over America at any time from the 1940s until today, as had been the case in 1776.

One possible answer to the first of these questions is that American scholars simply developed an interest in all things concerning the American Revolution as we approached the bicentennial celebration of 1976.[18] This certainly was true, but the interest in Locke has not abated since that date. Another possible explanation is that American political theorists sought to emphasize the American ideals of capitalism, liberalism, and democracy against the Soviet ideal of communism.[19] There is also truth to this. It is entirely appropriate to argue, as Lincoln had, that the Constitution is framed by the (Lockean) ideals of the Declaration. Locke, moreover, does express perhaps more forcefully than any other celebrated thinker the theoretical suppositions of both capitalism and liberalism. Another answer, not exclusive to the last, is that America saw Locke's thought as a means of facilitating a world-wide liberal order of which the United States would become both benefactor and beneficiary.[20] Locke's thought was not, after all, necessarily specific to America, though it did effectively express the liberal values that America endorsed. America had once lifted it themselves from England because it so adeptly inspired resistance against tyranny. Could it not, likewise, help to facilitate liberal regimes elsewhere? Locke, for this reason, became one of the quintessential building blocks (Kant's *Perpetual Peace* is the other) for the liberal world order that has obtained since the second half of the 1940s.[21] Locke became the preeminent voice of liberalism precisely because his theories regarding consent, capitalism, and resistance are most adept at inspiring and spreading liberal values to places other than America.

These three concepts—consent, capitalism, and resistance—are integral to Locke's thought, but are diminished when cherry-picked and employed in isolation from one another. Locke's ideas regarding consent and capitalism are, of course, essential to his larger scheme: individuals labor for their property, and consent to relinquish some property (and thereby liberty) for the welfare of the community. Individuals, moreover, resist government when that government has made obvious and blatant infringements (or attempted infringements) into property that has not been condoned by a legislature that democratically represents the individuals composing society, or when the legislature has become corrupted to the point that they will pass laws which cannot be understood to be the product of a consensual process. In this way, the idea of resisting government is deeply tied, in Locke's own work, to the philosophical premises that, first, the most important liberties are the liberty to acquire property and the liberty to consent to governmental rule and that, second, individuals are capable of judging correctly whether their property is being improperly confiscated by a legislature. In other words, the idea of governmental wrong-doing to be gleaned from Locke is rather limited, and resistance is tied to the idea that the official policies enacted by government

blatantly exceed the limitations on property confiscation that the individuals composing society have endorsed.

This formula for redressing grievances made sense in Locke's day. Consent had not been fully developed within the English system. The checking of tyrannical action through republican legislative bodies was still inchoate. Charles II could still, at that time, prorogue parliament as a manner of evading consent. Parliament members, due to limited suffrage, were more prone to corruption by executive entanglements (bribery) than are legislators in today's western republican governments. Due to the dynamics of political power between parliament and the American colonies, this formula still made sense during the American Revolution. Suffrage for colonists simply did not exist. In both contexts, the redressing of political grievances could have only been achieved through violent resistance, given the failure of persuasive petitioning, because electioneering did not yet exist as a method of affecting politics.

Lockean individualism and resistance, however, can be overwrought in an established and highly functioning democratic republic such as twenty-first-century America. The would-be tyrant is also always a fellow citizen deeply enmeshed in our long-standing norms of consensual rule; American institutions provide for regular elections and, as a norm, the results are consistently honored. American laws are, as a product of this Lockean tradition, always already the product of consensual democracy and capitalistic norms. The circumstance little resembles that in which Locke or the American Founders lived. Consequently, the appeal to resistance today in America, especially when divorced from appeals to *both* property acquisition *and* consent, appears rather different than appeals to resistance in Locke's or Jefferson's day. Rather than asking Americans to rebel against a tyrant asserting *his own* will, Americans are asked to rebel against a regime that is, by virtue of our separation of powers and effective democratic elections, asserting *the will of the American people*. Americans need not employ a strategy of resistance at every turn today, for doing so builds a fortress instead of a fence against potential governmental abuse. The epitome of civilization is not characterized by resistance to the power that the refined citizens of that very civilization themselves have authored. It cannot consist in the resistance to laws authored by and consented to by the American people through the long-standing and effective electoral process whereby this consent is expressed.

But resistance against political actors whose actions have been consented to in the rote manner in which Americans regularly consent to our regime (through winning elections) does occur frequently today in America, and it might be best viewed as a symptom of civilizational decline. Although we have indeed built for ourselves from the basic liberal ideas expressed by Locke and others the necessary components of a civilized society, we do not

always behave in the most civilized of manners, and, ironically, this is especially true since the resurgence of Locke into our society (which is not to say that America was a paragon of civility before his return). In this way the resurgence of Locke in American culture represents something different than it did in America's founding era. Today, the elements of Locke's thought which we might most profit from emphasizing are his ideas regarding labor and his basic ideas regarding consent (both of which are integral to the development of the civilized society). However, in America today these components of Locke are too often minimized or ignored at the expense of his resistance theory and the idea of conscience that is used to justify it. The splintering of these components of Lockean thought appear today, with consequences, in American resistance movements.

Differences in today's resistance movements can be easily seen by comparing them against the American Revolution as understood in the Declaration of Independence. Conceding that this document is not merely inspired by Locke, I will point toward the superficial employment of Locke's idea of using empirical evidence to justify an appeal for revolutionary action as the cornerstone of the Declaration's philosophical position. Jefferson's Declaration, as is well known, contains a list of twenty-seven reasons why "a candid world" would believe it just for the Americans to resist the British. The items on this list, such as "quartering of soldiers," were blatantly stated policies which were acknowledged as real policies by all actors at the time. Jefferson's list thereby effectively connected grievance claims based on theoretical suppositions of individual property rights to clearly evident policies of England's King George III, within the greater context of a denial of the ability to provide consent to those policies. In so doing, the concept of conscience was clearly connected to the underlying empirical evidence, and resistance grounded on both theoretically tenable and empirically detectable grievances. In other words, the grievances against the Crown were connected to clear actions that the government not only undertook, but intended to undertake, did so as a matter of policy, and did so without providing the colonists with an opportunity to participate in the political process whereby consent to these policies was expressed. When Jefferson laments the existence of standing armies in the colonies without the consent of the colonists, no one disputed that that was the policy of the Crown, that there were indeed Redcoats in the colonies, or that the Americans were denied representation in the British Parliament. In this way, the theoretical claim (of consent) is connected to an empirically discernible policy (of standing armies), that is, by the way, also consistent with the theoretical priority of retaining private property.

Today, the American proclivity for resistance only sometimes resembles the philosophical standard articulated by Locke or Jefferson. The Jeffersonian/

Lockean standard can be candidly summarized: empirical evidence showing individual property harm as a result of a governmental policy that is not authorized by the democratic process occasions the possibility of resistance. In many cases today, this standard is lacking. The Woman's March in January 2017, one day after President Trump's inauguration, exemplifies a recent resistance movement that did not demonstrate the Lockean/Jeffersonian requirement that empirical evidence demonstrate property damage as a result of a governmental policy that was implemented against the will of the voters. The empirical evidence presented in the Woman's protest against newly elected President Trump relied on the media presentation of Trump as a womanizer in his personal life and not upon policies enacted by his administration. One day into his administration, no policies relating to women's issues had been implemented. Trump's only policy position during his proceeding presidential campaign relating specifically to women's issues was a promise to extend maternity leave for working mothers. Such a policy had been desired by women's rights advocates for some time. Instead of offering a list of actions taken by Trump that would justify why this protest was needed, many signs in the crowd simply read, "Resist." But there was no policy for them to resist; and even if there had been, it would have been the product of the established American system for providing consent to governmental action.

The Black Lives Matter movement, beginning in 2014, inspired a number of large, sometimes violent, protests against perceived police brutality and mistreatment against blacks. These protests, however, were also plagued by a lack of empirical evidence for their claims. For instance, each of the police officers charged in the Baltimore death of Freddie Gray were exonerated of any wrongdoing by the US Department of Justice (under the direction of Obama appointee Loretta Lynch).[22] A Grand Jury (of regular citizens that included three blacks) declined to prosecute the officer involved in the Ferguson, Missouri, shooting of Michael Brown.[23] Another Grand Jury also declined to charge the police officer involved in the also controversial death of Eric Garner in New York City in 2014.[24] Beyond this, when compared to any of Jefferson's allegations in the Declaration, the same important difference emerges as was evident in the Woman's March. Jefferson accused the crown of distinct tyrannical acts, such acts as "cutting off our trade with all parts of the world." This and the other twenty-six allegations in the Declaration were empirically verifiable, because they referenced publicly known policies executed by King George's government without pretense or duplicity. There is no policy in the Baltimore Police Department censuring the murder of individuals being transported to jail, nor has there ever been any evidence offered to suggest that the upper echelon of that force unofficially sanctioned such acts. Similar remarks could be made of the Ferguson and New York City police depart-

ments' policies. Though occurring shortly before this manuscript was sent to press, the events in Minneapolis resulting in the death of George Floyd, though intensifying the protest movement, do not, as of this date, appear to change the basic dynamics of it. The police officers involved in that murder were quickly arrested and are presently being prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The policies of the Minneapolis police department stand in full relief against the actions of the few individual actors charged in this case; though anger is warranted against the individual actors, to protest the government for prosecuting them to the fullest extent possible is an illogical expression of that anger.

In both the Woman's March and the Black Lives Matter movement, three trends stand out. First, there is not a governing authority that may be held culpable for the stated grievance. Trump had not executed nor promised to implement any policies nefarious to women, and no local, state, or federal government official under either Obama or Trump sanctioned racially based murder by our police forces. In both cases the evidence for the existence of a grievance against the government cannot be candidly detected by an objective observer (though grievances against individuals are easy to detect). Second, neither movement alleged that government actors were executing policies that were contrary to the will of the American people as expressed through the democratic process. And third, society was harmed in real ways by these instances of resistance. Female teachers taking part in a second Woman's Day, "A Day Without a Woman," shut down elementary and secondary schools in four states.[25] Police officers working to maintain peace during a Black Lives Matter protest march in Dallas were murdered by protesters.[26] Police shootings elsewhere have been tied to the Black Lives movement.[27] And, as this manuscript is going to press, protests inspired by this movement in Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, have devolved into violent anarchy.

The difference between resisting a tyrant asserting his own will and resisting a government properly authorized by the consent of the electorate is important. As the Women's and Black Lives Matter movements readily acknowledge, they seek social justice. Social justice is distinct from political justice. Social justice aspires to change hearts and minds, while political justice seeks, in the American context, laws that are the product of consent and are written in the basic spirit of enabling freedom and facilitating equality. But laws may only facilitate a social setting in which their intended spirit can be implemented by the human actors who compose society. When radical discordance over what the fundamental spirit of the American laws should mean outweighs the shared belief in the method through which such laws are produced, the outcome is predictably a hamstrung attention to the resistance components of liberalism, at the expense of the property acquisition and, especially, consent aspects of liberalism.

The proclivities for changing hearts and minds and resisting tyrants are indelible and salubrious components of America's political culture. But the divorcing of social justice from political justice is problematic. The arena of political justice provides some modicum of assurance that civilization will be peacefully managed by persuasion because the fighting occurs at the ballot box. When social justice becomes an undertaking divorced from political justice, when it begins coercing through violence (rioting, arson, murder, etc.), or through a refusal to teach children (an important social obligation that also harms society when it is not done), it is no longer producing a consent-based political environment. The spirit of the fundamental laws produced by a system of coercion do not represent the equality and freedom represented by a process of consent. Rather, we are describing a system characterized by strong men and bullies who produce the mere ostentation of consent through duress; an ironic civil society.

If we compare these two liberally inspired resistance movements against one inspired by today's conservative ideals, we might be troubled by a similar lack of connection to America's Lockean roots. Cattle ranching in the American West has a long-standing tradition, dating back into the 1800s, of using common grazing lands and traditional cattle trails on what are now public lands. Conflicts over the use of this land between the federal and state governments and local ranchers are longstanding. Beginning in 2014, however, the situation escalated as groups of ranchers began challenging regulatory policies adopted by the Bureau of Land Management under President Obama. BLM goals under Obama seemed to have been for the federal government to acquire as much land as possible, and to do so for the purpose of limiting private use of western lands, especially for oil and gas production. Early incidents between ranchers and Obama's BLM concerned grazing permits on public lands, leading to the armed standoff in Bunkerville, Nevada, in 2014. Two years later, in eastern Oregon, a group of protesters, led by the same individual who had led the 2014 Nevada standoff, occupied the Malheur Wildlife Refuge. This protest was a response for the imprisonments of two members of a local ranching family, who had been convicted of arson for setting controlled fires on private land that also engulfed the adjoining refuge.

On the surface, this movement appears to be Lockean. The motivation for this protest does concern the private property rights of local ranchers. At the time of the occupation, the predominant use of the refuge was to farm carp (a species of fish that is not often pursued as a food source) that the government would then sell to migrant workers—a practice which reduced the utility and productivity of the land, at the expense of the ranchers who had traditionally used it productively for grazing. Locke, of course, argues that the aim of property is to exponentially increase the productivity of land through private industry.[28] Thus,

there does initially seem to be a Lockean basis for this grievance based on the right to productively cultivate land upon which one has traditionally labored.

To end the protest, several protesters agreed to meet federal agents to discuss a resolution. In route to this meeting, these protesters were ambushed and pursued by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents into a roadblock set immediately behind a blind curve, where the group's leader was shot to death from behind by agents hiding in the woods as he attempted to escape a wrecked vehicle.[29] Thus, in addition to the individual property motivations for this resistance, we could add this duplicitous scheme which ended in murder. The government, in this case, does appear to be infringing upon the lives and property of American citizens. In contrast to the above cases, the confiscation of land and the prosecution of the protesters was conducted as a matter of publicly known and open policies adopted by the BLM and FBI; hence, it is possible to at least form part of the argument that this resistance movement is inspired by Locke or Jefferson in ways that the Women's marches and Black Lives Matter movement were not. The governmental policy was openly against the property interests of the ranchers.

But, importantly, the final component of the Lockean formula for resistance is missing from this resistance as well. Whereas the American colonists were denied representation in Parliament, and could not therefore consent to the onerous laws enacted throughout the 1760s and 1770s, the protesters in Nevada and Oregon were American citizens who were indeed represented in their states' legislatures and in the US legislature, and who helped to authorize the Obama administration policies in the 2008 and 2012 elections. They could claim, quite reasonably, that Obama's land policies represented an unfairly onerous taxation burden, but they could not claim that this burden was imposed upon them *without representation*.

The Trump administration has taken a decidedly different view of the Malheur incident than had the Obama administration. Trump pardoned the jailed farmers, reissued grazing permits to the families who had traditionally used the land in question and prosecuted several of the FBI agents who were involved in the ambush shooting.[30] Moreover, many of the Malheur protesters were exonerated during jury trials of any wrongdoing.[31]

This, of course, is precisely how the American system is designed to operate. The reason that resistance movements do not have the same proper place in our system today is revealed in this case: the purpose of regular elections is so that we may, as a nation, check potential violations of the trust granted to governmental officials on a regular basis. Trump was elected immediately following this incident, and, among other reasons, his election might be viewed as a manner of rectifying such overreaches (violations of trust, as Locke would have put it) by the American government. Trump's election was

a way of expressing, among other things, that Obama's land policies were unsavory. And, given that Obama facilitated a peaceful transition of power to Trump, it was an effective method of redressing that grievance.

The Woman's Day and Black Lives Matter movements could, almost, not be more different from the Malheur occupation. Their inspirations are fundamentally different (identity versus property); the public response to them is fundamentally different (American media approved the former, were critical of the latter); and the legal responses from administrations of different political parties were different.[32] The two things that they share in common is, first, the basic attribute of resistance, but, second, the fact that each of these resistances were aimed at governmental actors and actions that had been authorized by the consent of the electorate.

Resistance is indeed an essential ingredient in American political culture today. We are fortunate that, as exemplified by the Malheur occupation, there remains in American culture and in America's political institutions a deep appreciation for the property rights basis of traditional resistance arguments, as argued for by Jefferson and Locke. There is hope in this, and good reason to defend the basic plight of liberalism to defend the individual's ability to provide for his- or herself. But, where there is hope there is also concern; even in the Malheur occupation, which I have selected because it comes closer than any other recent resistance movement at fulfilling the Lockean vision of resistance, there is no tenable argument based on evidence available to date that Obama's land policies were the product of some abuse against our elections or legislative process. One cannot say, if consent to properly authorized government is the hallmark of civilization, that any of these resistances are civilized.

The splintering of Locke's thought today represents, as highlighted above, an area for concern. By the splintering of Locke, I mean the use of some of his ideas in isolation from others in order to justify some position or another. The practical consequence of the splintering of resistance views in America today is an attenuation of civil behavior in our society; if America is an example of Locke's society, it is something of an uncivilized society. What exactly is it about Locke's thought that inspires such splintering of the critical concepts within it, and that consequently spawns so much incivility? This is the question that this manuscript seeks to answer.

This manuscript does not address one important question. The relationship between Locke and contemporary Americans is certainly complex and subtle. One could address this relationship by asking, first, What about Locke's work lends itself to being interpreted in the loose manner exemplified above by America's resistance movements today? One could also ask: What about contemporary Americans inclines them to wish to interpret Locke's work as they do? There is some tautology here, as today's Lockeans wish to interpret his

work as they do because they are the product of his work. But humans are, additionally, more complexly motivated than by any one historical figure. With this acknowledged, the first question is the substance of this work, the second question is interesting, but requires a different sort of analysis than the textual analysis of Locke's works conducted below, if one wishes to explain anything about contemporary political culture beyond Locke's influence upon it. To this end, the argument in this manuscript is not, certainly, that Locke's contribution to America is the only or even the most important contributor to the selfish, uncivilized attributes of contemporary American culture. To answer this second question, I would refer to the "usual suspects" listed above in this chapter, to the invasion of continental philosophy in American college courses, and to a number of other technological and cultural fads. Much ink has been well used answering this question, and though Locke is often mentioned in this literature, he is one name among many.[33] Locke himself could only have done so much to help facilitate the American political culture of today, and it is the point of this work to show that he did indeed do his part.

Much post–World War II Lockean research, as I will review in chapter 2, argues that Locke's political thought encourages both rationality and civility. Thus, the general thrust in academia, until very recently, has been that Locke should not be connected to the political woes discussed above. Within the past several years, however, there has been a trend to view liberalism in a critical light. I have found, in support of this recent trend, that Locke's political arguments foment a selfish brand of limited rationality that is deeply tied to the resistance of government as the means of achieving one's selfish interests. Locke encourages individuals to view their own individual rights (sometimes now interpreted as the class rights based on gender or race discussed above) as the paramount political good and discourages individuals from contemplating the full gambit of ramifications that result from deeming one's own individual rights as the paramount political good. Lockean individuals will be rational in this regard, but incapable of selflessness. I have found that two causes lead to the condition of the Lockean individual.

First, I have discovered that the method of philosophical analysis affects the manner in which a political theory will be executed if it is implemented in a society. It is possible, as in the case of Locke's, for a political theory that advocates laudable and humane principles to have a negative impact on society. The reason for such incongruence between principles and outcomes lies in the fact that laudable principles must be realized through a robust style of philosophical reasoning by the individuals adopting said principles. If individuals blindly or dogmatically follow even laudable principles that which was worthwhile about said principles will become drained of value and applied improperly to contemporary events.

The individualism argued for by Locke is not couched in robust philosophy. The Lockean individual is encouraged to pursue his individual interests, but these interests are presented in isolation, and don't consider other aspects of reality which might encumber Locke's construction of reality. The individual that would be created by Locke's thought is not, moreover, adequately educated by Locke's guidance on education, religion, or reason as to how the pursuit of individual interests must be checked against the interests of other individuals and against the interest of the society at large. The Lockean individual turns out this way, first and foremost, because Locke discourages the type of robust reasoning which would encourage individuals to contemplate what the proper limits of rights claims might be. Locke encourages individualism, but not deep or robust thought by individuals; the result is individuals who pursue their individual interests, but do not think about other interests while they are in the pursuit of these disparate individual interests. I am describing a selfish individual who knows what he wants, but who might act improperly when setting out to acquire.

The second cause of the selfishness of the Lockean individual is the focus placed on resistance in Locke's theory. This aspect of Locke's theory encourages already selfish individuals to justify violent and extreme actions undertaken in the name of their personal interests. That Locke's theory develops a violent pursuit of selfish interests instead of a reasonable pursuit of a wide array of interests is related to the thin reasoning style advocated by Locke.

The first and second causes of the selfishness of the Lockean individual share the attribute that Locke made these elements of his theory because they were politically expedient.[34] Individual resistance against government for the sake of property was not simply a principled argument for Locke; it was seated within the Earl of Shaftsbury's political goals. This implies a distinction which I have carefully maintained throughout this analysis between political theory and political philosophy. I always define Locke's project as political theory; by which I mean a political argument designed to justify a particular end or goal. By contrast, I define political philosophy as the process of contemplating political issues with an open mind to all possible ends or goals, and of valuing each different relevant end or goal to the extent that open-minded contemplation suggests—that each end or goal should be valued. Political philosophy, in this way, is always engaged in contemplations concerning the best possible regime for humans from a perspective that has not preconceived the good to be pursued through political organization.

Thus, the uncivilized Lockean society emerges because it is a product of a political theory designed to encourage resistance and to discourage robust philosophical reasoning. The problems related to civility in liberal societies, and especially in America, can be traced to the theoretical way that Locke constructed his theory, and to the subsequent way that Lockeans defend

their individual rights. After reviewing the postwar Lockean scholarship in chapters 2 and 3, I turn to the theoretical manner in which Locke's theory is constructed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 is an analysis of Locke's theory of history, and chapter 5 provides a close analysis of Locke's consequential resistance theory. Then, in chapters 6 through 8, I review the ways that Locke discourages individuals from contemplating issues in a philosophical way. Chapter 6 analyzes Locke's conception of the reasoning process, chapter 7 analyzes Locke's view of how this reasoning process should be carried out in relation to religious matters, and chapter 8 discusses how Locke's philosophically closed-minded version of reason can be cultivated through education.

The concluding part of this work has two goals. First, in chapter 9, I provide a case-study of Locke's harmful effects on American political culture through an analysis of Locke and Americans on the concept of toleration. I pay special attention to the danger posed by ISIS in the mid-2010s, the splintered use of Locke's toleration arguments and the manner in which Americans' desire for toleration downplayed this danger. Second, in chapter 10, I provide commentary on how liberalism might be improved. Though Locke's presentation of liberalism is inadequate, this does not mean that liberalism as a philosophical idea is inadequate. The uncivilized Lockean society can be made more civilized by making it more philosophical. We should expose ourselves to philosophical arguments for liberalism, not just theoretical arguments. One good source for a philosophical version of liberalism is the writing of Locke's contemporary, Algernon Sidney. I analyze Sidney's resistance theory, and show how Sidney values the same principles as Locke, while arriving at these principles through philosophical contemplation instead of theoretical calculation. I will also make some recommendations on how liberalism's relationship with religion should be augmented to improve civility, and how an education system that cultivates philosophical reasoning can improve civility in liberal societies that have become uncivilized.

NOTES

1. References to John Locke's *Second Treatise* in this book are made parenthetically using this format: (section number). I have relied on: John Locke, *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).

2. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsden, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope, *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America* (Boston: Longman, 2011).

3. Robert Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civic Engangement in America," *The American Prospect*, Winter 1996, https://prospect.org/article/strange-disappearance-civic-america.

4. Dietland Stolle and Marc Hooghe, "Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies," *British Journal of Political Science*. 35 (2004): 149–167.

5. Ibid.

6. Emily Foxhall, Dana Burke, and Brooke A. Lewis, "'F—— TRUMP' Truck Driver Has Been Arrested," *The Houston Chronicle*, November 17, 2017, https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/fortbend/news/article/Sheriff-s-warning-to-F-TRUMP-truck-owner-12360280.php. I have also personally encountered a pickup in the Houston area that had painted across the entire width of its tailgate: "Trump is a F---ing Nazi." (Expletives removed for decency, but appeared in full in both instances.)

7. Joe Stumpe and Monica Davey, "Abortion Doctor Shot to Death in Kansas Church," *New York Times*, May 31, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/us/01tiller.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=4E7A2A851FF4C032DD13329B311F5236&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL.

8. Michael Brick, "Man Crashes Plane into Texas IRS Building," *New York Times*, February 18, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=A90504AA4C99603A97DF4E51E166FC9C&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL.

9. Helene Cooper and Jeff Zeleny, "Obama Calls for a New Era of Civility in U.S. Politics," *New York Times*, January 12, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/13obama.html.

10. The list of incidents of hate is available at: https://www.attacksontrumpsupporters.com/; for hoax hate crimes, see Wilfred Reilley, *Hate Crime Hoax: How the Left Is Selling a Fake Race War* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2018); Jason L. Riley, "Hate Crime Hoaxes Are More Common Than You Think," *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/hate-crime-hoaxes-are-more-common-than-you-think-11561503352; https://www.attacksontrumpsupporters.com/ also contains a list of documented hoax hate crimes (206 such incidents between 2015 and June 2019).

11. Erica Chenoweth and Jeremy Pressman, "What We Learned by Counting the Women's Marches," *Washington Post*, February 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/07/this-is-what-we-learned-by-counting-the-womens-marches/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0401f184bf0c.

12. "The Crowd Counting Consortium," accessed on June 23, 2019, https://sites.google.com/view/crowdcountingconsortium/home.

13. Jean S. Yolton and John W. Yolton, *John Locke: A Reference Guide* (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co, 1985).

14. For example, Donald S. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late-Eighteenth Century American Political Thought," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 189–197; Jerome Huyler, *Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995);

Michael P. Zuckert, *Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), each suggests that this influence may have been greater during the revolutionary years.

15. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late-Eighteenth Century American Political Thought," 189–197.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. Newer data does not exist. This is perhaps because scholarly work on Locke today is too prolific to accurately count.

18. See Peter S. Onuf, "Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 46:2 (April 1989): 341–375.

19. Chapter 2 reviews the prominent literature that develops this view.

20. See Yoram Hazony, *The Virtue of Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books: 2018).

21. Another philosophical trend in America which certainly effects the American character is the acceptance of continental existential philosophy in America since about 1960. We must remember that our students are reading the likes of Heidegger today as well as Locke, whose thought only exacerbates the individualism found in Locke. The continental thinkers are not, however, particularly inclined to advance clear resistance arguments as had Locke. We must look to Locke to explain why individualism is particularly tied to resistance in America.

22. Kevin Rector, "The Freddie Gray Case: DOJ Won't Charge Baltimore Police Officers," *Baltimore Sun*, September 13, 2017, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-doj-decline-charges-20170912-story.html.

23. Eyder Peralta and Bill Chappell, "Ferguson Jury: No Charges for the Officer in Michael Brown's Death," *NPR*, November 24, 2014, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/24/366370100/grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-michael-brown-case.

24. Andrew Siff, Jonathan Dienst, and Jennifer Millman, "Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Death," *NBCNews NewYork.com*, December 3, 2014, https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Grand-Jury-Decision-Eric-Garner-Staten-Island-Chokehold-Death-NYPD-284595921.html.

25. Anonymous, "'Day without a Woman' Strike Shuts Down Schools as Teachers Bolt," *FoxNews.com*, March 8, 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/us/day-without-a-woman-strike-shuts-down-schools-as-teachers-bolt.

26. Manny Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena, and Jonah Engel Bromwich. "Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says," *New York Times*, July 8, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html.

27. Anonymous, "Black Lives Matter Leaders Sued Over Baton Rouge Police Shooting," *Reuters.com*, July 7, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-louisiana-police-lawsuit/black-lives-matter-leaders-sued-over-baton-rouge-police-shooting-idUSKBN19S2TA.

28. See Devan Schwartz., "Turning Around Malheur Wildlife Refuge One Carp Carcass at a Time," *OPB.com*, June 9, 2014, https://www.opb.org/news/article/turning-around-malheur-refuge-one-carp-carcass-at-/.

29. Leah Sottile, 7/25/2018, "Malheur Wildlife Refuge Occupation Still Reverberating as FBI Agent Goes on Trial," *Washington Post*, July 25, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/malheur-wildlife-refuge-occupation-still-reverberating-as-fbi-agent-goes-on-trial/2018/07/25/3b6c2f18-8f5b-11e8-8322-b5482bf5e0f5_story.html?utm_term=.28b503acfa39.

30. Ibid. Bill Chappell, "Trump Pardons Ranchers Dwight and Steve Hammond over 2012 Arson Conviction," *NPR,* July 10, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/07/10/627653866/president-trump-pardons-ranchers-dwight-and-steven-hammond-over-arson.

31. Scott Martelle, "Was the Malheur Occupation Legal or Did the Feds Botch the Bundy Case?" *L.A. Times*, October 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/opinion/sunday/black-lives-matter-leadership.html.

32. At the time of the incident, most media outlets portrayed the participants of the Malheur incident as "occupiers," and "extremists"; depicted the incident as a "hijacking" of the government's land, and therefore supported and encouraged the government's aggressive prosecution of this case (Sottile, "Malheur Wildlife Refuge Occupation Still Reverberating"; Chappell, "Trump Pardons Ranchers"). Language defending the Malheur "occupation" as "resistance" inspired by "justice"—similar to the depictions of Black Lives Matter and Woman's Day protesters—is difficult to find (Martelle, "Was the Malheur Occupation Legal").

33. For instance: Robert Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart*; Allan Bloom, *Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Patrick Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); Yoram Hazony, *The Virtue of Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2018); Scott Robinson, "Defenders of Democracy," in *Eric Voegelin Today: Voegelin's Political Thought in the 21st Century*, edited by Scott Robinson, Lee Trepanier, and David N. Whitney (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019).

34. See Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). This book is about Locke's theory, not his politics; I delve briefly into his political affiliations in chapter 6, only far enough to demonstrate that his theory is inspired by politics.

Chapter Two

Conflicting Views of Locke in the Secondary Literature

John Locke was once understood in America and England as the benign progenitor of modern Western life; he was widely credited for deriving ideas regarding constitutionalism, limited government, free markets, and justified resistance against corrupt tyrants from the traditions of Greek, Roman, biblical, and scholastic philosophy. Attitudes regarding John Locke are now wide-ranging, often antagonistic and divisive. The contemporary cacophony about Locke is occurring because a few political philosophers, writing in the mid-twentieth century, penned critical interpretations of Locke's political thought. These thinkers cast him as a recondite modern and discreet protégé of Thomas Hobbes. As a result of these studies, provocative at least, American and English scholarship on Locke for the past fifty years has occupied itself with seemingly incessant and sometimes vehement rebuttals against the critical readings of the mid-twentieth century. It is only very recently that critical interpretations of Locke are beginning to reappear.

A traditional reading of Locke, offered by George H. Sabine in 1950, suggested the *Two Treatises* were written in 1690 to justify the Glorious Revolution, and saw deep ties between Locke and Thomist natural law teaching: "he reached back into the past . . . and joined hands with Hooker."[1] Sabine viewed these ties as essential to the Western liberal tradition, and, moreover, viewed Locke as an outright critic of Thomas Hobbes.[2] A second traditional reading, offered by J. W. Gough, was similar in tone. Gough argued, as well, that Locke was critical of Hobbes, and in tune with more traditional thought.[3] Locke's arguments regarding consent, for example, had been crafted and established by Middle Age philosophers, from whom Locke merely "took over" the idea.[4] Gough only mildly anticipates Laslett's discoveries regarding the date of the *Second Treatise*'s composition.[5] Gough, like Sabine, sees Locke as the benign father "of the modern

democratic state."[6] Five studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s, however, cast doubt on the traditional reading of Locke. These studies were widely read and highly influential in some circles. They consequently spawned a trove of responses, some agreeable, but many unwelcoming.

Leo Strauss was the first consequential political philosopher to identify Locke as a closet modern and Hobbesian, in his well-known analysis, *Natural Right and History* (1953).[7] Strauss detected that the individualism inherent to Locke's theory departed from the traditional conception of natural law, which had stipulated individuals defer their personal interests to society's common interests. Locke's law of nature, Strauss argued, amounted to an individual right to happiness, irrespective of the well-being of the individual's society. In Strauss's words: "Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center of the moral world, since man—as distinguished from man's end—had become that center or origin."[8] Through such thought, man loses a *summum bonum* outside or above himself. Fulfillment becomes associated with the avoidance of discomfort; man's *summum bonum* is replaced by a *summum malum*, the fear of pain. Strauss appropriately refers to life under Locke's philosophy as, pursuant to its tacit Hobbesianism, "the joyless quest for joy."[9]

Sheldon Wolin conducted a second critical appraisal of Locke's political theory in *Politics and Vision* (1960). Wolin's examination of the continuity of Western thought concludes that, partly due to Locke's political thought, the modern crisis originates from the impoverishment of the "civic conscience of society."[10] The "radical" individualism of Lockean liberalism resulted in "cramped quarters assigned philosophy," in relation to the more civic-minded perspectives of classical political philosophers.[11] Wolin, like Strauss, placed the modern crisis of liberalism in the emphasis on individualism in Lockean and subsequent liberal thought. The Straussian argument, reflected by Wolin, is that the modern crisis occurs because the society's larger interests are, if not ignored all together, made subservient to the individual's personal interests.

Eric Voegelin offered a third criticism of Locke in volumes 6 and 7 of his *History of Political Ideas*. Although portions of these analyses were completed during the 1940s, they were not published until the 1970s. Voegelin argues, similarly to Strauss, that Locke facilitated significant transformations to important philosophical concepts, such as reason and religion.[12] Voegelin's reading of Locke, as far as practical implications for a society which adopts Lockean thought is concerned, is fairly consistent with the criticisms leveled by Strauss and Wolin. I will, however, return to Voegelin in the next chapter to more closely analyze his theoretical differences with Strauss.

In a fourth and unique critique, C. B. Macpherson identified the root of the modern crisis in the socioeconomic situation of Western societies from

the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. In his study, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962), Macpherson argues that Locke's *Second Treatise* created two classes in society, arising from the inherent "possessive individualism" of society members, whose individualism and materialism produce a society that is "a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange."[13] Deriving his argument largely from Locke's chapter on property, Macpherson suggests that one class, politically active and wealthy, controlled the other class, the politically inactive working class, through a Lockean political system. This social order was viable through the nineteenth century. The emergence of a politically active working class in the mid-twentieth century upset this balance; afterward, individuals of lower social classes became emancipated from the obtaining political superstructures. After this, "liberal-democratic theory must continue to use the assumptions of possessive individualism, at a time when the structure of the market society no longer provides the necessary conditions for deducing a valid theory of political obligation from those assumptions."[14] Liberal-democratic states continue to exist, but their survival is based on either the dependence of an emerging global working class, or on the façade of domestic cohesion brought about by large scale international wars.

Michael Oakeshott iterated the idea that Locke deviated from traditional philosophical principles. Locke, he argues, develops an ideological scheme supplying the technical language of a rational politics which is to replace the traditional political symbols of order, such as, for example, folklore. Consequently, "the partnership between present and past is lost."[15] For Oakeshott, like Macpherson, Locke's political thought is associated with developing a political order suitable for newly emancipated political classes. Oakeshott writes:

> The new and politically inexperienced social classes which, during the last four centuries, have risen to the exercise of political initiative and authority, have been provided for in the same sort of way as Machiavelli provided for the new prince of the sixteenth century. None of these classes had time to acquire a political education before it came to power; each needed a crib, a political doctrine, to take the place of a habit of political behavior. Some of these writings are genuine works of political vulgarization; they do not altogether deny the existence or worth of a political tradition (they are written by men of real political education), but they are abridgements of a tradition, rationalizations purporting to elicit the "truth" of a tradition and to exhibit it in a set of abstract principles, but from which, nevertheless, the full significance of the tradition inevitably escapes. This is preeminently so of Locke's *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, which was as popular, as long-lived and as valuable a political crib as that greatest of all cribs to a religion.[16]

Oakeshott argues that Locke founds this new political doctrine from a "new intellectual character" of the seventeenth century, characterized by an emphasis on the techniques of rational inquiry. He criticizes this intellectual character because "morality [is] reduced to a technique, [it is] to be acquired by training in an ideology rather than an education in behavior."[17] In other words, Locke's thought is characteristic of a rationalism which ignores the commonsense principles learned by and disclosed to generations through the traditions inherent to a society's political culture. Consequential moral principles taught through tradition, but not discerned by rational techniques, are antiquated and lost.

Scholarly literature soon began to recoil from these critiques of Locke. A large percentage of the abundance of Lockean scholarship from 1960 to the present can be characterized as attempting, in various guises, to exonerate Locke from any responsibility for criticisms detected by these five studies.[18]

Willmore Kendall's *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* (1959) offered a much more traditional view of Lockean political theory. Kendall did not view Locke's philosophy as depriving individuals of some greater societal duty; Locke's average man is "rational and just" and succumbs to "objective moral standards."[19] Kendall's Locke, like Sabine's Locke, wrote the *Two Treatises* in 1690, mirrored classical political thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, and opposed Thomas Hobbes on the fundamental issue of natural law.[20] Kendall moreover argued that Locke's championing of the individual was qualified in important ways by his doctrine of majority rule: "so long as he continues to be regarded as the philosopher of individual rights *against* the majority, much remains to be done to put straight the record."[21] Kendall demurred from Locke's critics by returning to the traditional Locke.

Quentin Skinner, progenitor of the Cambridge school, bashed Locke's critics on methodological suppositions: "we can never hope to attain an understanding simply by reading the text itself 'over and over again.'"[22] Skinner adopted a historical methodology in which he placed a text in historical context, in, as one commentator refers to it, its "convention-governed linguistic context," in an attempt "to recover what the author was doing in writing it."[23] Skinner refers to this as a "focus on the writer's mental world."[24]

Using these methods, Skinner, resembling Sabine and Kendall, argues that Locke falls into a broader Thomist tradition and that Locke's fundamental suppositions "had already been largely articulated and refined over a century earlier."[25] He ultimately concludes: "Locke can scarcely have intended to contribute to a school of political philosophy which, [some] fashionable but muddled interpretations suggest, it was his great achievement to make possible."[26] In other words, Locke is not responsible for the modern liberal ideology because Locke was neither a modern nor a liberal. The Cambridge school

reading leads to the conclusion that "the liberal individualist celebration of Locke is just plain wrong."[27]

Peter Laslett offered a third revision to Locke's critical readers in the introduction to the Cambridge edition of *Two Treatises of Government* (1960).[28] Laslett utilized the historical method to suggest that Locke's work was an explicit political tract in response to the Exclusion Crisis of the late 1670s and early 1680s.[29] Laslett additionally argues forcefully against Strauss's position that Locke was responding to Hobbes, instead suggesting Locke's target was Robert Filmer. Filmer was "the man of the moment," making him the more appropriate target for Locke's pragmatic treatise than Hobbes the anachronism.[30] Laslett asserts that the text was "at once a response to a particular political situation and a statement of universal principle."[31] Laslett absolves Locke from the modern liberal crisis by making his text a matter of political expediency more than philosophical principles. Locke does not engage Hobbes, and therefore does not engage the radical individualism noticed by Strauss.

Laslett does acknowledge "in Locke, the recognized point of departure for liberalism."[32] This liberalism, however, differs from the radical individualism noticed by Strauss, in that Laslett detects a tone of civil obligation in Locke. Laslett identifies the locus of Locke's theory to be the concept of "trust." Locke's theory teaches not a radical individualism but that "we can and must trust each other if natural political virtue is a reality."[33] In other words, Laslett reads in Locke's philosophy a binding source of civic obligation through the concept of trust. Virtuous men, he believes, are made by the circumstance of existence in society. Hence, the radical individualism of Strauss's Locke ignores the fact that most men are reasonable or at least trustworthy enough to live within society. Laslett argues that Locke provides a robust philosophical underpinning for society, articulating concepts of both individualism and obligation for society members. If there is a modern liberal crisis, Laslett asserts that Locke cannot be implicated, for Locke provides a sense of societal obligation which Strauss had simply not noticed.

John Dunn's *The Political Thought of John Locke* (1962) was a fourth influential reevaluation of Locke's place in the history of liberal thought. Dunn attempted, like Skinner, to identify "the specific focus of Locke's mind at the times of the composition of the work."[34] Dunn employed a more biographical approach to ascertain that Locke's concerns were religious, instead of being explicitly political: "There is no doubt that if the text of the *Two Treatises* as we have it now is exclusively or even predominately an Exclusion tract, it is often a notably ham-fisted one."[35] Dunn argues that Locke did not engage the particular Whig concern of annual parliaments, and that consequently the *Two Treatises* cannot be a political tract.[36] Instead, Dunn reasons that

Locke's thought is a philosophical justification of Christian ideas. He argued that "Locke saw the rationality of human existence as dependent upon the truths of religion" and that, for Locke, "theology was the key to a coherent understanding of religion."[37] Dunn rejects the conventional view that Locke was an empiricist, arguing instead that Locke's theory "perceives in it what he already knows (from Christian revelation) to be there."[38] "The *Two Treatises*," Dunn asserts, "is saturated with Christian assumptions."[39] Hence, Locke's argument cannot be responsible for the malaise associated with liberalism because, quite simply, Locke's thought professed no simple, radical, or possessive sort of individualism: "the structure of Locke's thought may perhaps retain a certain potential embarrassment for the simpler devotee of liberalism."[40] Scholars continue to emphasize this view of Locke.[41]

J. G. A. Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment* (1975) vindicated Locke in a fresh and powerful manner. Pocock influentially argued that America's political traditions could be traced more to the republicanism of the Italian peninsula, than to Locke or liberalism.[42] Pocock saw the American founding as motivated by a fear of the "threat to virtue by corruption."[43] Florentine republicanism, as articulated, for example, by Machiavelli's *Discourses*, touted civic virtue. Man's essential experience as responsible and active citizen cannot manifest in dilapidated societies. Florentine political philosophy expressed an enthusiasm for civic consciousness which meant deference to strong princes and replacing weak ones whose poor governance failed to facilitate conditions for a virtuous political existence. Conditions change in different times, and wise men accommodate themselves to the prevailing conditions. Changing times are characterized by an ebb and flow of *virtú*: when the masses lose it they become prone to tyranny; when they have it—like in the Roman Republic—societies can flourish. Two opposite moralities are evident in different times: sometimes men are infatuated with self-aggrandizement, at other times with sloth and irresponsibility. There is a kind of balance of power when *virtú* (aggrandizement) is widespread, and a kind of degenerate tyranny when sloth obtains. Pocock argues that the American Revolution was carried out with precisely these sorts of considerations in mind. The American Revolution, and consequently American political thought, was an attempt to insulate the colonies from corruption from across the Atlantic.[44] It was a revolution carried out in the name of virtue and civic invigoration, for the cause of "empire" much more than for the cause of individual rights and liberties.[45] Pocock's theory has been widely influential as well.[46]

Richard Ashcraft, in two books, provided yet another rendering of Locke. *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (1986) was an extensive historical review of the circumstances surrounding Locke's work, while *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (1987) analyzed the

text itself. Ashcraft produced a Locke somewhere between Laslett's Locke and Dunn's Locke. He read Locke as being a political radical concerned with practical politics, engaged in an effort to justify a fundamental expansion of suffrage rights and thereby to achieve political victory for the Whig cause against Charles II. Ashcraft's Locke cannot, as seminal studies accused, be held responsible for liberalism because he was, first, not philosophically responsible for an ideology he did not endorse, and, second, as a political activist not attempting to bring such ideals about through his text. Ashcraft, employing both historical and philosophical methods, therefore provides the most thorough exoneration of Locke's liberalism to date.

Michael Zuckert, however, in *Launching Liberalism* (2002), reintroduces the charges originally brought against Locke by Leo Strauss. Zuckert concedes that Strauss's reading of Locke's natural right theory was largely correct. Zuckert, however, refuses to acknowledge Locke's responsibility for the following political conditions:

> A Lockean rights regime would endorse neither the agenda of the left "rights-talkers," with their wish list of rights, nor the right "rights-talkers," with their deployment of such a narrow notion of rights and legitimate governmental action as would hamstring governments from doing many things that the public good and a decent society genuinely require. The language of rights, in other words, has been extended too far on the one side to encompass demands for goods and services that cannot be justified as genuine rights and that certainly cannot be demanded independently of the economic and other conditions of the societies in which such claims are raised or to which they are applied. This language has at the same time been unduly restrictive on the other side.[47]

Zuckert's position is that partisan readings of Locke result in dogmatic misapplications of Lockean liberalism. This reading leads one to believe that contemporary liberalism is not perfect, but that Locke, despite having "launched liberalism," is not Thomas Hobbes, and is not responsible for liberalisms normatively unappealing attributes. I will agree fundamentally with Zuckert on the evolution of rights claims, but will attribute more responsibility for this evolution to Locke than Zuckert saw fit.

At the time of Zuckert's well-received work, at least one critic believed further research was necessary to settle Locke's responsibility for the crisis, suggesting Zuckert's analysis left this issue unresolved.[48] Yet, for over a decade, Zuckert's seemed to be the last significant word regarding Locke and liberalism. But the world has changed dramatically in the fifteen years since the publication of Zuckert's apologist reading of Locke. The forces of globalization intensified, jobs were exported from America while immigration intensified; Western societies faced the backlash of this trend during the

Great Recession, and today we see a rekindling of nationalistic sentiments throughout the liberal world that have not been a factor in Western politics since the institution of the Bretton Woods system.

Indeed, in the past few years of Locke scholarship, at least two critical views of Locke have been penned as components of criticisms of international liberal order. Yoram Hazony's *The Virtue of Nationalism* argues that Locke's reductionist theory "did not merely offer an impoverished and unsuccessful account of human motivation and action. His political theory summoned a dream-world, a utopian vision, in which the . . . national state, community, family, and religious tradition appear to have no reason to exist."[49] Hazony further argues, as I have also suggested in chapter 1, that this reductionist view has been employed since World Word II by America for the purpose of facilitating a nationalistically ambivalent world empire.[50] Patrick Deneen's *Why Liberalism Failed* also harpoons Locke's pedigree of liberalism along similar lines. Deneen essentially argues that the success of liberalism has resulted in a number of practical consequences that are inconsistent with the liberty that should be at the essence of liberalism, such as the rise of centralized state policing and surveillance powers in today's liberal democracies.[51] Deneen, too, argues that Locke's philosophically thin thought, emphasizing the contractual elements of liberal freedom, helps to facilitate such an evolution of liberalism.[52]

Hence, two distinct but similar criticisms of liberalism have been published within the few years prior to the publication of this work. This work shares the fundamental view of Locke's thought that is put forward in Hazony's and Deneen's analyses, namely that Locke's thought is not philosophically robust. This work further complements the criticisms offered by those works, but does not duplicate them. Hazony focuses on the nationalistic deficiencies of liberal thought, and Deneen focuses on the ironic restrictions of freedom that result from liberal thought. This work most fundamentally argues that the Lockean social contract was designed to achieve specific political gains in the context of 1680s England, and that the application of these specific goals as universal contractual obligations produces, quite ironically, selfishly motivated individuals that will fail to display the basic civility necessary for any political community or nation to effectively function.

One additional but significant characteristic distinguishes this work from Hazony's and Deneen's recent works. Both Hazony's and Deneen's focus is upon the plight of liberalism as an imperial movement; both point to Locke as an important articulator of this trend, but neither work spends very much time closely diagnosing Locke's works, or does so in a thorough or comprehensive fashion. This book does precisely this, and through this analysis, is able to

draw the same conclusions about Locke's work that Hazony and Deneen are merely capable of suggesting in theirs.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Studies on Locke can be divided, most essentially, between studies that employ a philosophical approach, and studies that employ a historical approach. The philosophical approach concerns the ideas directly articulated in Locke's texts. The historical approach looks to seat Locke's philosophy within the complex historical setting in which it was written. According to the historical approach, writings are not interpreted purely, but within the context of what certain words or sayings may have implied to Locke's contemporaries. The philosophical approach is typically associated with Straussian studies, while the historical approach is generally associated with the Cambridge school. Hybrid approaches, such as Ashcraft's, may be most appropriately situated within the Cambridge school tradition, as these approaches cannot help but to read philosophical notions as contextually determined by historical factors.

The outcomes of the various schools have always been somewhat mixed, but dominant tendencies can be detected. Those employing some variant of the historical approach generally exonerate Locke (Skinner, Dunn, Ashcraft, Franklin). The exception is Macpherson's early study, though it has been responded to with animosity by more recent historical scholars.[53] Thus, we may say that historical scholars generally agree that Locke was a traditional, religious thinker, who cannot be held responsible for any undesirable aspects of modernity.

At one time, it could be said that those employing a pure philosophical approach were generally critical of Locke's work (Strauss, Voegelin, Wolin). Again, exceptions can be named (Kendall). However, until very recently, critical readings of Locke had largely disappeared from the preeminent scholarly literature, including literature employing a pure philosophical approach. Some second-generation students of Strauss, for example, have demurred from Strauss's critical reading of Locke (Myers, Zuckert). Because other second-generation Straussians are more dedicated to Strauss's original position (Stoner, Bloom), I will refer to the second-generation Straussians who demur from Strauss's reading (Myers, Zuckert) as "New Straussians." Peter C. Myers has articulated the New Straussian position succinctly: "the original Straussian reading restores respect for Locke's enduring relevance and power at the cost of obscuring his moral design, especially by associating Locke's thought with the morally debilitating reductionism and conventionalism for

which Hobbes was 'justly decried.'"[54] The New Straussians read a venerable political rationality into Locke's philosophy.

The New Straussians, consequently, read more like the Cambridge school than they do Leo Strauss. Ashcraft, a pseudo-Cambridge writer, argues with striking similarity to the New Straussian Peter Myers: "Supporters of the Hobbes/Locke paradigm have been resistant to incorporating into their conception of political theory not only contextual evidence relating to Locke's intentions and political activity but also textual evidence that would extend the scope of Lockean political theory into the realms of theology and philosophy."[55] Ashcraft reveals the two fundamental Cambridge reservations of what he calls the Hobbes/Locke paradigm, or what may be called the original Straussian position. First, the Hobbes/Locke paradigm employs a pure philosophical approach, and fails to account for contextual evidence. Second, the Hobbes/Locke paradigm fails to account for certain aspects of Locke's texts which reveal a more rational Locke.

This work will demur from the dominant currents in contemporary Lockean literature and side with the very recent critical readings of Locke. Substantively, I identify areas in Locke's thought that may exacerbate individualistic beliefs and therefore may be problematic when applied to contemporary political dilemmas that are centered around radical rights claims. This is to say, I support the now unpopular Hobbes/Locke paradigm. Methodologically, I will employ a rather obscure methodological bend to the pure philosophical approach by using the concept of pneumopathology to explain Locke's thought. I fully explain this concept in chapter 3. Before moving on to this discussion, however, it is appropriate to account for my general decision to utilize a pure philosophical approach, and to defend it from the two particular criticisms offered by Ashcraft.

First, Cambridge scholars will assert that a pure philosophical approach fails to account for contextual evidence pertinent to Locke's writings. This criticism is based on an overemphasis of the vernacular of seventeenth century English society Locke could not have avoided, and a lack of proper emphasis on the symbols and language Locke actually chose to employ in his writings. Certainly, Locke's writing, word choice and meaning, was to some indeterminable extent affected by the temporal and societal norms in which Locke was immersed. The Cambridge school, then, asks the reader to interpret Locke based on seventeenth-century English norms we find in his writing pertaining to religion and Calvinism. But these were not the symbols that were important to Locke. These were the symbols important to the traditional political system that Locke made pains to modify. It would be difficult at best to modify a tradition without usurping its language and employing it in a new capacity. If Locke had attempted to operate outside

the framework of contemporary vernacular, his work would have been less influential, viewed as an outright renunciation of tradition, instead of as a modification or abridgement of tradition. The extent to which Hobbes was reviled in Locke's day for doing just this should remind us as it would have reminded Locke of the difficulty of such endeavors. As our inquiry concerns the way Locke modified or abridged the tradition in which he found himself, we must direct ourselves not toward the traditional symbols Locke employs in a vapid manner, but rather toward those symbols which appear in Locke's writing as a result of Locke's volition. Such symbols include: the state of nature, the state of war, the law of nature, and other such terms not derived from traditional religious language. Symbols pertinent to philosophical discourse and known only by men of learning, and not the well-known religious superstructures of everyday men, can more adequately guide an inquiry of Locke's theoretical intent. Indeed, such symbols reveal that Locke employs certain terms understood in popular discourse, such as the word rebellion, in ways completely disparate from tradition. He and others of his contemporaries also borrowed terms from sixteenth century maritime legal thought that were not part of the traditional set of political symbols in England. It is therefore the theoretical context of Locke's work, rather than the historical context, which is an appropriate gauge of his theoretical attitude. If no meaning could be attached to the recondite secondary set of symbols employed by Locke, some validity would be found in support of the Cambridge historicist reading. As I will demonstrate, however, the recondite philosophical symbolism Locke employs is central to his political thought. Being recondite, there would be no need to employ the philosophical symbols at all if Locke meant to emphasize the traditional and religious elements of his doctrine.

Another criticism of the symbols employed by Cambridge school proponents includes the vitiation and enervation of political philosophy itself through an over-inclusive use of concepts that are conceived as codifying philosophical behavior. Ashcraft includes within political theory all things inclusive to the "sociological dimensions of political consciousness."[56] He specifically mentions: "newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, broadsides, and various literary forms," when arguing for political theory as a "social language."[57] It is the product, he argues, "of thousands of individuals" in any social setting, and this "democratizes the notion of political theory."[58] Donald Lutz's body of work, drawn from such sources on the American Founding, suitably demonstrates that these sources often do comprise meaningful contributions to political theory. But to have a political idea does not make one a political theorist, and it certainly does not make one a political philosopher. To express an idea as a slogan does not mean one has contemplated anything at all, including the constitution of the best regime, how to improve one's

own regime in light of such contemplation, and other similarly philosophical queries that have marked the discipline since its conception by Plato and enunciation by Aristotle.

Such timeless and fundamental questions are swept aside by the Cambridge democratization of political philosophy. No objective foothold on human excellence can be ascertained through such historical analyses, especially when democratic ideals are taken as a highest good to be pursued, which is the case in Cambridge analyses. The Cambridge method may explain the subjective meaning of terms to those living at the time. But this subjectivity does not change the overarching objective world in which all things that we know exist. The basic forms of government noticed by Aristotle are not changed by explaining how democratic ideals are not vitiated by the democratic ideas of this or that thinker. This merely explains that a society is democratic. And too often this is where the Cambridge analysis ends. But is the democracy favoring the entire city or merely its democratic elements? Is it a good or a poor democracy? Will it endure in this condition or does this democratic articulation portend a future change in form resulting from a too-devout democratic attitude?

Second, both the Cambridge school and the New Straussians will assert that most applications of the philosophical approach fail to account for certain aspects of Locke's texts which reveal a more rational Locke. Ashcraft, for instance, argues that, first, neither Strauss nor Macpherson accounted for Locke's theory of resistance, and second, that both thinkers ignored some of Locke's texts, such as *The Essays on the Law of Nature*, which reveal the moral obligations inherent to Locke's thought.[59] I will respond forcefully to both of these particular charges as my argument develops, by carefully analyzing Locke's resistance theory, and by incorporating the breadth of Locke's texts into this analysis. And indeed, careful readings of Locke's texts that regard morality, such as *The Second Treatise of Government*, *The Essays on the Law of Nature*, *The Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, contain textual evidence, as I will demonstrate, of a morally dilapidated philosopher. This criticism of neglecting textual evidence should be cast back at those who have leveled it: the Cambridge and New Straussian reading of Locke can only be supported by a loose reading of Locke's texts. The words written on Locke's pages tell a far different story than proponents of a civically oriented and rational Locke would lead one to believe. A comprehensive reading of Locke's words reveals a clear dedication to self-interested individualism. While it is true that Locke's essential philosophical beliefs are diluted by frequent references to notions which would undermine my argument—religion, reason, the common good—these references occur because they are words

of philosophical discourse in Locke's day. As I will demonstrate, textual evidence for a traditional, religious, or rational Locke is misleading and misestimates the foundations of Locke's thought. Locke's philosophical interests rested in transforming, not supporting, obtaining philosophical tendencies. In short, those who fail to interpret Locke within the realms of philosophy or theology fail to do so because Locke's ideas, indeed reductionist, do not rise to the high calling of philosophy and theology.

NOTES

1. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*: *Revised Edition* (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1950), 523.
2. Ibid., 523–524.
3. J. W. Gough, introduction in John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), xix–xxii.
4. J. W. Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 48–49.
5. Ibid., 127.
6. Gough, introduction in John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration,* xxxi.
7. The critique against modernity is certainly older than Strauss. To say nothing of older critics, such as Rousseau, Eric Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* was published in 1952 and also identifies a crisis of modernity, but attacked liberalism through Hobbes, and does not mention Locke (Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952]). Another well-known critic is R. H. Tawney, who in 1922 argued that "nature," in the seventeenth century, began to "connote not divine ordinance, but human appetites, and natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age as a reason why self-interest should be given free-play" (R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study [Holland Memorial Lectures 1922]* [Harcourt, Brace, and Co. Inc., 1922], 180).
8. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 248.
9. Ibid., 251.
10. Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 606.
11. Ibid., 264, 266.
12. Cf. Eric Voegelin, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 24: History of Political Ideas (Volume VI); Revolution and the New Science* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998), 172–183; Eric Voegelin, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 25: History of Political Ideas (Volume VII); The New Order and Last Orientation* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 137–14.

13. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 3.
14. Ibid., 275.
15. Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1991), 28.
16. Ibid., 30.
17. Ibid., 40.
18. Bellah et al, *Habits of the Heart*, is an exception, indicative of the communitarian critique of liberalism.
19. Willmore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), 134.
20. Ibid., 11–14, 64.
21. Ibid., 67.
22. Quentin Skinner, "Analysis of Political Thought and Action," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, eds. James Tully and Quentin Skinner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1988), 105.
23. James Tully, "Overview," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, eds. James Tully and Quentin Skinner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.
24. Quentin Skinner, "Motives, Intentions, and Interpretation," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, eds. James Tully and Quentin Skinner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 78.
25. Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 158, 348.
26. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*, eds. James Tully and Quentin Skinner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 45.
27. Jacqueline Stevens, "The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority: Property Rights, Resistance, and Consent in 'The Second Treatise.'" *Political Theory* 24 (August 1996, 425.
28. Peter Laslett, foreword in *Locke: "Two Treatises of Government,"* ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
29. Ibid., 61.
30. Ibid., 67.
31. Ibid., 78.
32. Ibid., 90.
33. Ibid., 113.
34. John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 9.
35. Ibid., 53.
36. Ibid., 55.
37. Ibid., 263.
38. Ibid., 98.
39. Ibid., 99.

40. Ibid., 265; cf. John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by John Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 45–80.

41. Cf. Geraint Parry, *John Locke* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978); Eldon J. Eisenach, *Two Worlds of Liberalism: Religion and Politics in Hobbes, Locke, and Mill* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Kim Ian Parker, *The Biblical Politics of John Locke* (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2004).

42. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

43. Ibid., 509.

44. Ibid., 508–509.

45. Ibid., 510.

46. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967); Issac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Donald S. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late-Eighteenth Century American Political Thought," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 189–197; J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays in Political Thought and History* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 80–103, 104–147; Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969); Donald Winch, *Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographical Revision* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). For the contrarian position: cf. Joyce D. Appleby, "Ideology and Theory: Tension between Political and Economic Liberalism in Seventeenth Century England," *American Historical Review* 81 (June 1976): 499–515; Joyce D. Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), Joyce D. Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd ser., 43 (January 1986): 20–34; Edward J. Harpham, "Liberalism, Civic Humanism, and the Case of Adam Smith," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984): 764–774; Steven Michael Dworetz, *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Gordon S. Wood, "The Virtues and the Interests," *New Republic* 11 (February 1991): 32–35. For literature review: Edward J. Harpham, "Locke's *Two Treatises* in Perspective," in *John Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* edited by Edward J. Harpham (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992).

47. Michael P. Zuckert, *Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 363.

48. James R. Stoner, "Was Leo Strauss Wrong about John Locke?" *The Review of Politics*, 66 (Autumn 2004): 562.

49. Yoram Hazony, *The Virtue of Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2018), 33.

50. Ibid., 29–30.

51. Patrick Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), introduction.

52. Ibid., 47–50.

53. For example, Richard Ashcraft, "The Politics of Locke's *Two Treatises*," in *John Locke's "Two Treatises of Government": New Interpretations,* edited by Edward J. Harpham (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 1992), 14–48.

54. Peter C. Myers, *Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Political Rationality* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 24.

55. Ashcraft, "The Politics of Locke's *Two Treatises*," 18.

56. Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 6.

57. Ibid., 7.

58. Ibid.

59. Ashcraft, "The Politics of Locke's *Two Treatises*," 17, 22.

Chapter Three

Locke's Political Thought and the Art of Subtle Ideological Construction

Explanations were offered in the mid-twentieth century by C. B. Macpherson, Leo Straus, and Eric Voegelin, among others, to explain the subtle nature of Locke's transformative writings. Although these scholars shared a skeptical and critical view of Locke, generally agreeing that Locke's writings produced a philosophically and socially undesirable prioritization of materialistic individualism, they each offered a distinct explanation for why Locke might have prioritized individualism as he did. Macpherson maintains that Locke's style can be explained by a number of social assumptions inherent to Locke's society. Strauss argues that Locke's writing style was a product of caution inspired by a fear of persecution. Finally, Eric Voegelin suggests that Locke, while touting certain social assumptions that might have necessitated a cautious demeanor, was ultimately driven to his recondite writing style because he possessed "the bad conscience of 'modern' man."[1] Voegelin uses the term "pneumopathology" to describe the psychological disposition of individuals, such as Locke, who through duplicitous writing styles, hide the true moral implications of their thought from their readers.

In this chapter, first, I will review the positions of these three scholars, and make a case for the Voegelinian interpretation of Locke. Then, I will review the extant literature on pneumopathology, and explain my hypothesis: certain symptoms of pneumopathology appear in Locke's work, enough so that it may be said that Locke is engaged in the activity of subtly constructing ideological arguments which derive their validity from the object of ideological aspiration instead of from robust contemplation of philosophical matters. In short, this chapter explains the terminology and conceptual framework necessary to analyze the pneumopathological nature of Locke's political thought. An analysis of Locke as subtle ideological constructor provides the content of the remaining chapters.

MACPHERSON AND SOCIAL ASSUMPTION

Macpherson suggested that Locke was motivated by inspirations he himself did not fully recognize, and that this characteristic of his thought leads to the perplexing elements of Locke's writing.[2] Locke does not clearly articulate the theoretical assumptions in his writing, Macpherson argued, because his theoretical assumptions reflected the prevailing "social assumptions" of seventeenth-century England.[3] First, because his assumptions were shared by his audience, Locke could "take for granted" that his audience understood them.[4] Locke did not need to explain the nitty-gritty to an audience in whom it was deeply ingrained. Second, Locke, as a product of a participatory involvement in his society, did not fully realize that his assumptions were actually assumptions.[5] Thus, Locke was incapable of articulating some of his assumptions because he found some to be so self-evident that to write about them would have seemed a waste of ink, and because he did not know of some of his other assumptions. Macpherson argues that the recondite nature of social assumptions means that they "can easily be overlooked, or undervalued."[6] He admits "the probability" of "some measure of concealment of assumptions" in Locke's writing due to the level of personal danger involved in seventeenth-century English politics, but urges that difficulties encountered interpreting Locke's texts are to a larger extent attributable to a prevailing consensus regarding the "possessive quality" of individualism in seventeenth-century English life.[7]

STRAUSS AND CAUTION

Strauss offers a second explanation for Locke's peculiarly reticent writing style. He argues that Locke was a cautious political writer. The idea of caution is important to Strauss's method of interpreting certain philosophical and political texts. If a writer develops socially discordant ideas, he will learn to move with "circumspection" and to "write between the lines."[8] Strauss contends that "the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing."[9] This writing technique involves positing one's heterodox ideas in a manner that appears to be concordant with orthodox views. The author will appear to attack the "liberal" (heterodox) view, or the view which the author will tacitly support.[10] He will attack the liberal position in an "unspectacular and somewhat boring" capacity; he will "use many technical terms, give many quotations and attach undue importance to insignificant details."[11] The author will support the traditional position,

but he will do so in such a manner that only careful, young readers, who are thoughtful and open-minded, will recognize the importance of the text's thesis, which the author will carefully bury in an unsuspecting location of the text—the middle: "Only when he reached the core of the argument would he write three or four sentences in that terse and lively style which is apt to arrest the attention of young men who love to think."[12] This central passage will be an invigorating critique of the traditional position or an enlivening panegyric of the liberal position. It will placate to sentiments subtly encouraged during the "between the lines" portion of the analysis, allowing the "reasonable young reader" to "for the first time catch a glimpse of the forbidden fruit."[13] This method of writing is designed to convert thoughtful young men from the orthodox to the liberal position:

> The intelligent young man who, being young, had until then been somehow attracted by those immoderate utterances, would now be merely disgusted and, after having tasted the forbidden fruit, even bored by them. Reading the book for the second and third time, he would detect in the very arrangement of the quotations from the authoritative books significant additions to those few terse statements which occur in the center of the rather short first part.[14]

Strauss was able to detect such a style of writing in a number of political philosophy texts from various times and places: fourth-century BC, Athens; Muslim countries of the early middle ages; seventeenth-century Holland and England; and eighteenth-century France and Germany.[15] In the ancient cases, philosophers concealed a philosophic truth from a "vulgar" public which was believed to be incapable of bearing philosophic truths.[16] The modern philosophers were motivated, contrarily, by a desire to "enlighten an ever-increasing number of people who were not potential philosophers."[17] To Strauss, this means that the moderns were interested in modifying popular opinions for political gain. Indeed, inquiries concerning philosophic truths are not relevant, and are sometimes harmful to a political cause.[18] Consequently, ancient caution, aimed at carefully disclosing philosophic truth to potential philosophers, operates differently than modern caution, which aims at concealing philosophic truth. The modern sort of caution—of which Locke is characteristic—is inclined to conceal "their views only far enough to protect themselves as well as possible from persecution; had they been more subtle than that, they would have defeated their purpose."[19] Strauss explains what caution would have meant to Locke, acting as a political practitioner:

> Caution is a kind of noble fear. "Caution" means something different when applied to theory than when applied to practice or politics. A theoretician will not be called cautious if he does not make clear in each case the value of the

> various arguments which he employs or if he suppresses any relevant fact. A man of affairs who is cautious in this sense would be blamed as lacking in caution. There may be extremely relevant facts which, if stressed, would inflame popular passion and thus prevent the wise handling of those very facts. A cautious political writer would state the case for the good cause in a manner which could be expected to create general good will toward the good cause. He would avoid the mention of everything which would "displace the veil beneath which" the respectable part of society "dissembles its divisions." Whereas the cautious theoretician would scorn the appeal to prejudices, the cautious man of affairs would try to enlist all respectable prejudices in the service of the good cause.[20]

VOEGELIN AND PNEUMOPATHOLOGY

While Strauss's and Macpherson's arguments are both coherent and plausible, neither offers a deep or fully acceptable account of Locke's moral priorities. Caution driven concealment explains little more than that the political circumstances affecting Locke were dangerous. Social assumptions explain the social circumstances during Locke's lifetime. These explanations account for the issues with which Locke deals in his works—things like resistance, prerogative, and property rights—and why Locke chose to deal with these issues in a recondite manner, but they do not explain the character of a man that advocates Locke's positions. Both Macpherson and Strauss, to some extent, excuse Locke's writing style because of the circumstances entailing Locke's life. One critical response to Strauss and Macpherson is that Locke's manner of writing is more intimately connected with the moral disposition motivating his thought than either Macpherson or Strauss recognized.

Eric Voegelin accounts for this criticism, offering a third explanation for Locke's writing style in a letter to Strauss: "The Locke piece interested me greatly. With regard to the general thesis—that Locke does not return to Hooker, but develops Hobbes further—I can on the basis of my own analyses heartily agree. The famous conflicts in Locke in fact do not exist. The *Second Treatise* does not base the theory of the right constitutional order upon some natural law but on a psychology of desire."[21] Voegelin disagreed, however, with Strauss's proposition that Locke's philosophy was articulated in the manner it was as a consequence of caution:

> In the case of Locke, you wish to enrich your observations about the concealment of the actually intended theory on the part of the philosopher behind harmless-looking formulas. But is this case not after all different from that in your excellent studies, for example, on Arabic philosophers? In the one case, which I would call the legitimate one, a philosopher tries to hide his philosophizing against disturbance by the unqualified; in the other, in the

> case of Locke, a nonphilosopher, a political ideologue, tries to hide his dirty tricks against the attentiveness of the qualified. Isn't that, which might appear as camouflage of a philosopher, the bad conscience of "modern" man, who doesn't quite dare to say outright what he intends to do, and thus therefore hides his nihilism, not only from others but also from himself, through the rich use of a conventional vocabulary.[22]

Voegelin, in a letter never sent and published posthumously, suggests an alternative interpretive framework for dealing with Locke. Voegelin corroborates Macpherson's social assumption hypothesis, asserting that Locke's writing was designed to assist the designs of:

> the politics of the Stuarts (Stafford and Laud) to protect the farmers of N. England and the slaves in Bermuda against extreme exploitation by the landlords and merchants, the attempts that were the material motive for revolt of the upper classes against Charles I. It is a brutal ideological construction to support the position of the English upper class, to which Locke belonged through his social relations.[23]

Social interests direct Locke's philosophy to a radical and dangerous extent. As the sole inspiration of his ostensibly philosophical texts, partisan interest replaces philosophic inspiration.[24] Voegelin consequently reads an inimical and nonphilosophical manner of legitimating ideological motivations in the elusive manner with which Locke advocates his ideas. Locke attempts the "deliberate destruction of spiritual substance" through "verbal construction."[25] Locke's thought is not philosophical, in the sense that philosophical thought involves an open-minded spiritual questioning of the good; Locke's thought is ideological, in the sense that ideological thought involves a closed-minded lurching for a particular goal that has been deemed good. Such lurching involves political systems or "verbal constructions" which facilitate the realization of the deemed good. Such lurching requires one to contemplate a matter from loaded assumptions which prevent one's contemplation from being philosophic activity. This less-than-philosophic thought begins and ends from logical templates which encourage the outcome advocated by the thinker. Locke, being such a thinker, is not a philosopher from Voegelin's perspective but instead "an ideological constructor, who brutally destroys every philosophical problem in order to justify the political status quo."[26] Voegelin consequently suggests an alternative conceptual apparatus for dealing with the ideological, and consequently corrupt, nature of Locke's thought:

> it seems questionable to me, at least where it concerns Locke's political work, whether it still falls within the area of philosophizing; and following from that, it seems questionable whether the substance of Locke's political work becomes

> accessible by attending to the question of philosophical camouflage. Perhaps what is involved is a phenomenon of a completely different order; Locke was one of the first very great cases of spiritual pathology, whose adequate treatment would require a different conceptual apparatus.[27]

Elsewhere Voegelin writes:

> I say advisedly from a *spiritual* disturbance, not from a *mental*: Locke was not a clinical case, and his disease does not come under the categories of psychopathology. His is a case of spiritual disease in the sense of the Platonic *nosos*; it belongs in the pneumopathology of the seventeenth century of which Hobbes was the masterly diagnostician. In Locke the grim madness of Puritan acquisitiveness runs amuck. The fury of personal mysticism has simmered down. The elements of a moral public order that derive from biblical tradition have disappeared. A public morality based on belief in the substance of the nation is practically absent. What is left, as an unlovely residue, is the passion of property.[28]

A BRIEF NOTE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Richard Ashcraft's excellent analysis of Locke's writings develops the position that political theory "is a set of structured meanings that are understandable only in reference to a specified context, wherein the concepts, terminology, and even the internal structure of the theory itself are viewed in relation to a comprehensive ordering of the elements of social life."[29] This view, in his opinion, invalidates the traditional idea of political theory "as a body of scientific knowledge . . . regardless of when or where it was originally written."[30] Thus a proper study of political theory will contain references to "newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, broadsides, and various literary forms (plays, novels, poetry). Political theory as a social language flows through all of these media."[31] It would be wrong, he contends, to provide any special preeminence to writers such as Plato, or Mill, without accounting for the specific social context in which their writings appeared.[32] Ashcraft—a modern and a democrat—sees it as the crowning jewel of his work that "it democratizes the notion of political theory."[33]

Ashcraft's view on theory exemplifies what Voegelin understood to be the problem with Locke's work: by placating the desires of the times within a society, one engages in the plight to build and shape social forces therein. One is doing political propaganda and not engaging in the more timeless activity of political philosophy as Plato or Aristotle would have understood the task—the asking of questions such as: Where does this society fall in the manifold of regime types? Which factors therein make its citizens stronger or weaker? Which factors make them more virtuous or vicious?

As I stated in chapter 1, a distinction between what Ashcraft has defined as "political theory" and what I refer to as "political philosophy" is necessary and warranted in an analysis of propagandist material such as Locke's. If we understand theory as the plight to build ideological edifices which justify and sustain a political order, and if we also understand philosophy as the open-minded scientific analysis of all order, then this useful bifurcation will allow us to draw distinctions between those writings that are used to substantiate or create some social narrative, and those writings which scientifically seek to categorize societies based on their way of life. It is indeed for its ability to do not merely the first but also the second that Plato's *Apology* and *Republic* remain the introductory pieces to the disciple of political science—for both call to question timeless truths and do not merely articulate a formula for Athenian life which is now completely useless to a modern removed by two and a half millennia from the social forces of fourth-century BC Greece.

There is a place in our discipline for studies of both political philosophy and political theory. The latter is useful for pointing out the particular meanings of terms and arguments within a given society, as Aschraft's study of Locke is useful for demonstrating that his narrative is explicitly designed to build an alliance of landed gentry and working-class Englishmen against the crown. But I argue against Ashcraft's attack on philosophy. It has been a fundamental task since the beginning of political science to judge how well a given regime type may cultivate individuals to fulfill their potentials as human beings who are both maturely developed and happy. To develop the political theory of a society without also developing the political philosophy of a society is to leave the work of political science half done.

VOEGELIN AND PNEUMOPATHOLOGY REJOINED

Voegelin never carried out a full-bore analysis of Locke as an exemplar of "spiritual pathology" or "pneumopathology."[34] Although his view of Locke is lucid and unambiguous—"when it comes to Locke, my heart runs over. He is for me one of the most repugnant, dirty, morally corrupt appearances in the history of humanity"—he did not thoroughly analyze Locke's works. In fact, within the recent fascination with Locke in political theory circles, no thorough analysis of Locke's work has been conducted which seeks to discover whether and to what extent Locke intentionally feigned works of political theory as political philosophy to provide a deeper sense of philosophical veracity than was warranted by the actual substance of his ideas. Fortunately, the concept of pneumopathology was explored by Voegelin in some depth, and has since been taken up by other scholars.[35] This analysis will build upon existing but scant pneumopathology literature by undertaking a thorough

examination of Locke's writings and ideas in order to determine whether Locke may be appropriately characterized as an ideological constructor who also possesses the pneumopathological spiritual character.

I prefer the less technical term "subtle ideological constructor" to the more suggestive "pneumopathology." I will tend to use the former term throughout this analysis, for several reasons. First, the suffix "pathology" is loaded in contemporary language; although subtle ideological constructors are quite spiritually diseased, individuals are rarely persuaded of the erroneousness of their political beliefs, and it is rarer to still persuade an individual by telling him that he is diseased. Moreover, the suggestion that a disease is "spiritual" will gain little analytic traction in an academic climate that requires empirical evidence. The term subtle ideological constructor suggests the activity of philosophical denial, where the term pneumopathology suggests an actual psychological condition. The psychology of being spiritually closed-minded is not something that can be readily demonstrated by a historian of political thought whose primary sources of evidence are textual; especially when one is asserting that the true philosophical character of the textual evidence contradicts what the text itself argues. However, Voegelin and others have asserted that pneumopathology results in a particular style of ideological constructing, namely the subtle or even duplicitous presentation of ideas in a manner specifically designed by the constructor to support the ideology without appearing to be ideological; indeed, the construct will be designed so that it will appear to be philosophical and not ideological, while in earnest the thinker himself understands that the appearance of his argument is inconsistent with the essence of his argument. Though it is very difficult to affirm that a writer that has been dead for more than three hundred years, who cannot be interrogated on a psychologist's couch, is actually being intentionally duplicitous, it can be affirmed that such a writer has presented his ideas in a manner that could lead the audience away from its true intention easier than it can disclose that intention. What we may say, therefore, of subtle ideological constructors, is that the structures of their theories are consistent with what an individual suffering from pneumopathology would also construct.

Methodologically, therefore, I will attempt to discern known symptoms of pneumopathology in Locke's writings as evidence of subtle ideological construction. This undertaking first requires a clear explanation of pneumopathology and its known symptoms.

WHAT IS PNEUMOPATHOLOGY?

Pneumopathology is a condition of the soul (*psyche*) in which an individual intentionally conceals the existence of a philosophically realized truth to jus-

tify his pursuit of some other truth or good that he has been inspired to pursue by contemplating things from a nonphilosophical perspective. A political theoretician may be characterized as a subtle ideological constructor when he goes about theorizing in a manner that does not take into account insights gained through philosophical contemplation. Instead, subtle ideological constructors ignore the wisdom gained through philosophical contemplation and instead focus their theoretical efforts on the most efficient means of achieving the end desired by the ideology they are attempting to justify.

I define subtle ideological construction as political theorization with a technical structure that distorts reality by developing the language and symbols necessary to conceal certain aspects of reality and thereby to facilitate some particular conclusion. Again, subtle ideological construction is the detectable symptom of pneumopathology. Barry Cooper defines pneumopathology as "an intellectual act whereby a thinker arbitrarily denies the reality of one or another aspect of the world in order to fantasize about an imaginary world."[36] Eric Voegelin defines pneumopathology as occurring when "a thinker, who, in his revolt against the world as it has been created by God, arbitrarily omits an element of reality in order to create the fantasy of a new world."[37]

Theoretically modifying the structure of reality is an intellectual process. Particularly, this process entails making a decision that it is worth lying to oneself or others in order to achieve a particularly tempting objective. Such a decision falls under the purview of what we generally refer to as morality and ethics. Previous pneumopathology literature has frequently turned to the language and terminology of classical philosophy in order to explain the moral or ethical reasoning that induces subtle ideological construction.

According to classical philosophy, the soul (*nomos*[38] or *psyche*) is the organ responsible for organizing ethical and moral priorities. Accordingly, pneumopathology results from what Voegelin viewed as a diseased soul or spirit: "a disturbance in the equilibrium of the spirit";[39] "a defect of the spirit, a revolt against the spirit, which gives rise to saying and doing things against the spirit";[40] "a condition of higher stupidity";[41] and "spiritual sickness."[42] Thus pneumopathology, the moral disposition that gives rise to subtle ideological construction, is a condition in which the moral and ethical decision-making capacity of an individual is diminished.

To speak of healthy versus diseased souls is an admittedly antiquated undertaking, but it does produce insight into the methodological process involved in philosophical decision making. Moreover, employing parts of this language will allow for distinctions between ways of thinking that are not, sadly, readily available using contemporary vernacular. I will first outline how Voegelin summarized the classical position regarding a healthy soul, and then I will turn to the diseased soul that is indicative of pneumopathology and that will give rise to subtle ideological construction.

Voegelin explained that a healthy soul developed a capacity for the contemplation and reason, to organize the complex of "external goods, goods of the body . . . like health, beauty and so on."[43] "The most important," however, "are goods of the soul: . . . the constellation of virtues and the character." He considered this categorization of goods to be "objective criteria" by which "everyone act . . . even if he denies that there are objective criteria."[44] This criteria is detected objectively because it is a component of "a transcendent nature toward which one lives in tension."[45] The "organ" or "sensorium of transcendence" that perceives the objective truthfulness of reality has been labeled the "*psyche*."[46] A healthy individual would undertake in contemplation informed by all aspects of reality and existence, and especially in contemplation informed by the *psyche*. Voegelin argues that "the first rule therefore in the self-esteem, the self-treatment of man, is to have some respect for the organ in himself by which he is aware of and desires a life toward" the objectively true reality. This "self-love," to Voegelin, composed "the divineness, the divine part, in man."[47] In Voegelin's analysis, noetic contemplation, contemplation made through a healthily functioning soul, is a type of reasoning or thinking that occurs in "tension" with divine existence. The style of reasoning Voegelin expresses as *noetic* may be semantically confusing to cotemporary readers; this is because *noetic* reason is not the same type of reasoning style often implied by the modern, scientific definition of reason. The idea of a healthy soul as being a soul which respects the *noetic* self if elucidated through a brief comparison of *noetic* reason against the type of logical rationality, depicted by the ancient Greek word *logos*, that is almost always connoted by the word reason in contemporary usage.

First, *logos*, a Greek word, is the etymological origin of the English word "logic." *Logos* is the sort of reasoning that considers means in relations to ends; *logos* is the reasoning associated with the successful completion of practical tasks. If I want to build a sandwich, for example, I need to procure bread. I will also need to put sliced turkey between the bread, and, furthermore, I will need to put a small amount of mayonnaise on the turkey. In this case, I have been guided by reason, *logos*, to the necessary means to achieve my desired end. *Logos* explains the motivational chain that determines the practical process to be carried out during an action, but it does not explain the inspiration or motivation regarding the decision whether to act. *Logos* takes as given the prime motivation, for example, that I am hungry and must eat for nutritional reasons, and determines the chain of action necessary to carry out a given desire, impetus, or need. Stated another way, *logos* is reasoning, but it does not provide a prime cause regarding the inspiration of action. Voegelin stated the circumstance of *logos* clearly:

> In ordinary life, we leave it at [*logos*]; we expect that a man acts rationally in coordinating means to an end. But in a theoretical examination of the problem we cannot be satisfied with the simple coordination of means to an end because every end cannot be converted into a means by asking, for instance, "For what purpose have we built this building?" And when we have ascertained that purpose we may further ask, "And for what purpose do we do what we do in this building?" Thus, we are led into an infinite regression in which the supposed end from which we started always becomes a means in another means-end relationship, and that end a means for the next means-end relation. We have rational adequacy in the pragmatic sense within any one relation, but the whole chain hangs in the air and we do not know whether the whole chain is rational.[48]

Second, *nous* is translated as intellect, spirit, or reason. *Nous* is a manner of reasoning that grounds this chain that hangs in the air on some type of fundamental principle whose propriety is revealed through the process of wondering about the final cause of the given action. It is the intellectual process which defines one's morality, ethics, and character. *Nous* is not disclosed by analyzing rational means to ends, but by analyzing "the hierarchy of being in which man stands."[49] Such an analysis questions the essential purposes of an item or activity, and necessarily, the essential purposes of human existence; it is not an exercise in determining the most efficient means to carrying out an action; it is the analysis that determines if the action is a worthwhile undertaking in the first place. *Logos* is all that is necessary to determine what the various consequences of an action might be, but the determination of the value of the different consequences to human existence cannot be determined by the reasoning style denoted by the word *logos*. If I want to know what the best sandwich is, or more consequently, what the best political order is, I will need to ponder why we need sandwiches or politics in the first place. We go beyond contemplations of utility when doing so, and engage questions concerning the essence of goodness, beauty, and truth.

Accordingly, the tension experienced through an open *psyche* does not produce a dogmatic set of rules that prescribe the good life. The good life is achieved through the experiential participation in open-minded philosophic contemplation; it cannot be achieved through blindly doing this act or that one. Virtue is, in this way, a methodological and not an institutional achievement. One must think philosophically. How one arrives at one's conclusions are as important as the conclusions themselves.

Thus, a healthy soul is one which undertakes in open-minded contemplation concerning the true nature of a complex reality. Healthy spiritual activity, for Voegelin, is intimately connected with philosophy. We would wisely learn from his work that healthy spiritual activity *is* philosophy. Because the experience of spiritual or philosophical contemplation is essentially ineffable,

the philosopher will have more to say in renunciation of nonphilosophic experiences than he may accurately express of the philosophical experience. "Philosophy," as Voegelin sees it, "is not a doctrine of right order, but the light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; and help is not a piece of information about the truth, but the arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and identify their nature. For half the battle is won when the soul can recognize the shape of the enemy and, consequently, knows that the way it must follow leads in the opposite direction."[50] Philosophic activity, although it is something which every human being is capable of doing, may be a difficult undertaking, and is especially so for those who undertake in contemplation to alleviate a sense of "insecurity" or "uncertainty" regarding "the order of being and man's place in it."[51] Philosophy must entertain even the unpalatable questions regarding our existences. Philosophy is open to all questions regarding the sources of unavoidable human anxiety—evil, misery, suffering, and so forth. If one seeks mundane comfort through contemplation, rather than the truth regarding "the order of being," one cannot undertake in philosophy as defined by Voegelin, precisely because one cannot gain certainty of an uncertain order through philosophic activity.

One consequence of note follows from this conception of philosophy.[52] Abstract speculations are not philosophical thoughts. Philosophy must be based in experience, and indeed, "Voegelin's amplification of *experience* embraces the whole range of human awareness and is not reduced to mere sensory perception."[53] Philosophy is grounded in empirical evidence, and Voegelin's style of empiricism includes evidence obtained through the *psyche*. A philosophical thought must not only entertain the needs of subsistence or the bodily desires but must facilitate man's highest goods regarding virtue and character. In this manner, philosophy is qualified by a robust empiricism. It consequently resists, for example, the Heideggerian value of creativity; it is indeed unlikely a unique human creation regarding politics has adequately accounted for all of the many empirical considerations necessary to fully grasp the workings of a political order. A Voegelinian philosopher might inquire of a Heideggerian creator: "Have you considered everything under the sun?"[54] Philosophy does not create; contemplation of things that exist necessarily falls short of conjuring things which do not exist.

Pneumopathology, contrary to philosophy, is a spiritual affliction in which the *psyche* is closed as a sensorium of experience. Without an open-minded philosophic demeanor, the logical faculties of the mind are free to pursue an objective that has been deemed good (*logos*) without scrutinizing this objective by philosophical inquiry (*nous*). Pneumopaths envision a reality that has been idealized in some manner, and the process of legitimizing that ideal

betrays the pneumopathological, closed-minded, soulless character of the individual seeking an idealized life.[55]

Pneumopathological thought is characterized by a desire for an existence that is, in some manner or another, different from the human experience as constituted by an open-minded contemplation of the full gambit of the experienced phenomena. The process of legitimizing the pneumopathological ideal consists of creating symbols, which may be expressed as theoretical arguments (that appear to be philosophical arguments), which accentuate some aspect of existence as a deemed highest good. This aspect of pneumopathological thought has been referred to as the creation of a "second reality," a type of imaginary fantasy existence, within which the pneumopath's constructed ideal may appear as a logical and valid highest good.[56]

A second reality is not a hallucination, or a symptom of psychopathology or some other type of mental insanity. Pneumopathology does not fall under the purview of medical diagnosis. Nor is the pneumopath characterized by a philosophical construction which deals in fantastical ideas unknown or inconceivable to human imagination. This is not a study in science fiction. A second reality is, on the other hand, a completely sane way of constructing, articulating, and otherwise convincing one's audience of the veracity of a deemed good. Voegelin emphasizes that a second reality will be a cogent construction: "Such a man's image of reality, therefore, although defective, has not lost the form of reality; that is, he is still a man, with the full claim to make statements of order, even when the ordering force of orientation toward divine being has got lost—even then—except that he puts a pseudo-order in place of the real order."[57]

Barry Cooper has explained the concept of second reality with great lucidity; he well explains that the pneumopath, even while indulging in the fantasy world of his second reality, is aware that he is constructing a second reality and knowingly conceals unappealing aspects of existence in order to legitimize this fantasy world. The second or fantasy reality must be made to "eclipse" the first or objective reality:

> There is, to begin with, the reality projected by the imagination that engenders the deformation of human being. The now-deformed being is still human, however, and is just as real as anyone else; the only difference is that the deformed human being has projected a second reality that is intended to hide first reality, including his status as a human being. Moreover, he may well be successful in the sense that for a longer or shorter period of time and for a larger or smaller number of people, the second reality can, indeed, put first reality into a shadow. . . . Indeed, unless human beings could, as by magic, change reality rather than merely refuse to apperceive reality, it could hardly be otherwise.

> In this context one must pay attention to the vaguely Kantian term *apperception*. It is used by Voegelin instead of the word *perception* because the imaginator, assuming he has a moderate technical competence as a thinker, is never unaware of what he is doing. Indeed, most imaginators are perfectly well aware of what they refuse to admit and go to great pains to disguise what they really know. . . . Eclipsing reality is therefore a complex intellectual and practical operation. Any particular example will have to be analyzed with care in order to make the purpose intelligible, along with its structure, the frictions with first reality, the revisions of the second reality that follow from the conflict with first reality, and the reasons why the second reality eventually disintegrates.[58]

Pneumopathology, then, manifests as subtle ideological construction: the ordering of theoretical arguments in an orderly, ostensibly reasonable, and persuasive manner to the end sought by the ideologue.

Pneumopathology describes the condition of a subtle ideological constructor who has intentionally concealed philosophical questions regarding his propositions through creative abstractions. Such intentional concealment will necessarily be clever. The thinker is attempting to hide the philosophical consequences of his ideas from his audience and does so through complicated uses of semantics and technical jargon. Although philosophy is itself a commonsense activity which any sane individual may perform, some technical competence will be required to diagnose pneumopathology because an understanding of the technical jargon of political philosophy and political theory is necessary to accurately determine whether jargon is misused by a particular thinker.

The use of convoluted jargon to prohibit philosophically inspired questions regarding a thinker's second reality is a clear indication that the thinker in question is not a dilettante, nor insane, but a subtle ideological constructor. Most humans will critically examine assertions they read in a text to the extent that their common sense is capable. Because a second reality is not reality, because this "disturbance within reality" will be noticed by someone, questions will arise concerning its legitimacy. Whereas it is completely possible to advocate an ideology from sound evidence derived from empirical observation, or further possible to give up on an ideological construction in the face of insurmountable contradictory empirical evidence, the subtle ideological constructor will make an effort to hide those questions he will inevitably face about his political system within the technicalities of his political system itself. No formal training is required to perceive whether what one perceives through a medium is compatible with what one has perceived to be real in existence. Because assertions made by subtle ideological constructors, assertions of a particular good as the highest good, will invariably run up against assertions that other particular goods are the highest good, and assertions that none of the proposed goods are the highest good, such asser-

tions require that those questions which pertain to other ideas of the good not be asked.[59] Although a technical competence is requisite to properly detect a subtle ideological constructor, no great training is necessary for a common individual to sense or perceive—even if this perception cannot be adequately explained by the individual doing the perceiving—that a political proposition is in some manner or another inconsistent with reality as experienced by the individual. The act of prohibiting questions related to the good is an essential component of pneumopathological thought that can be detected by careful readings of texts, and therefore indicate that the thinker in question may be categorized as a subtle ideological constructor.

Voegelin reads more into the act of prohibiting questions than had Strauss. For Strauss, concealment simply reflected the urgency of political goals. For Voegelin, the concealment of questions meant that the subtle ideological constructor intended to conceal the nonphilosophical nature of his thought from his readers. The subtle ideological constructor operates in a philosophically deplorable manner, while convincing his readers of the philosophical validity of his positions. He is ostensibly unaware of the moral nature of his motivations because he professes them to be good; yet on a deeper level he understands that a prohibition of questions aimed to conceal first reality is necessary for his position to be valid, and therefore ultimately must, although unwilling to admit it, understand that his propositions are philosophically and logically intractable constructions.

For Voegelin, "the fear of critical concepts and of philosophy in general . . . [is] the most glaring symptom" of pneumopathology.[60] Barry Cooper follows Voegelin by arguing that the concealment of questions provides the methodological tool necessary to actually detect the manifestation of pneumopathological thought as subtle ideological constructions; he put the utility of this tool clearly:

> These, Voegelin says, are pneumopathologies, not psychopathologies. In one respect spiritual disorders are easier to detect than psychic ones because the pneumopathologically afflicted are usually clinically sane; they are capable of writing things down coherently, and often do. This means that one can usually find a text and subject it to analysis in order to show as clearly as possible that the author is out of tune with the structure of reality even while he/she is perfectly capable of operating sanely enough. This complex of issues, involving alienation from reality, the construction of an imaginary second reality, the awareness of friction between reality and the imaginary reality and so on is regrettably under-explored.[61]

Some may argue that it is not possible to prove that a thinker *intentionally* concealed an aspect of reality. Other alternatives, such as, that the thinker was

unaware of the concealed aspect of reality, must be considered. However, it is possible to demonstrate that a thinker performs actions that are consistent with what an individual who is attempting to conceal an aspect of reality would perform. By way of metaphor, a prosecutor might argue successfully that the act of loading a revolver before it is used to perpetrate a murder demonstrates the calculated intent to commit murder and charge the defendant with first instead of second or third degree murder.

To detect subtle ideological construction, it is therefore requisite to show two things. First, that a thinker in question is aware of the nonsystemic, open-minded, commonsense, and empirically grounded nature of philosophy. This may be demonstrated through either textual or historical analyses, preferably through a combination of the two methods. A thinker must betray to his audience at some point in his writings that he is aware of and venerates the type of reasoning (*nous*) that is consistent with philosophical inquiry. Once a thinker's awareness of philosophy can be shown, a textual analysis of his writings must demonstrate, second, that the thinker uses his constructed set of symbols in a deliberate manner to conceal the insights that result from philosophical inquiry. Two specific methods of concealment are generally used in tandem to achieve the subtlety inherent to the ideological construct. First, a political theory may be based on creative or abstract speculation. Second, a political theory may contain technical means whereby aspects of reality that would invalidate the theory are obfuscated such that the creative speculations of the theorist may appear to be empirically grounded instead of speculatively abstracted from that which is discernible within reality through scientific analysis.

If these two conditions can be demonstrated, it can be shown that a thinker is aware of the proper method of philosophical inquiry, and that the thinker is attempting to conceal or distort the proper method of philosophical inquiry for the sake of the outcomes deemed desirable by the thinker. These are the practical evidences for the theoretical condition of pneumopathology. The requirements for the presence of a pneumopathological mindset and consequently for the detection of subtle ideological construction may be therefore summarized as follows:

1. The thinker in question is aware of the nonsystemic, open-minded, commonsense, and empirically grounded nature of philosophy.
2. The thinker uses his awareness of philosophy to create an ideological argument for some specific, closed-minded good.

More specifically, subtle ideological constructions tend to obfuscate the distortions between their theory and first reality by employing certain theoretical methods:

2a. A political theory is based on creative or abstract ideas or speculations about reality.
2b. A political theory discourages those questions that would expose that the ideological edifice created by the thinker is not consistent with the complex nature of reality.

Abstraction is the presentation of ideas in isolation. This tactic allows a thinker to coin new definitions for existing concepts and to create new concepts all together, to thereby conceal or camouflage aspects of their construction which might not be effective if implemented, or to conceal aspects of reality which would frustrate the construction of their system. Speculation is the drawing of conclusions beyond what the evidence at hand facilitates. This tactic allows a thinker to recast reality in a way that is consistent with their plight. Abstraction and speculation are both effective means of describing reality in a manner that allows political theoreticians to accentuate the elements of reality that they care to develop. This, however, is also how the work of the philosophical dilletante would appear. We must also be able to demonstrate, therefore, that the thinker we are scrutinizing is discouraging the asking of relevant questions so as to preserve his scheme against critical inquiry. Both techniques have hallmarked previous attempts to identify pneumopathology, and both will be integral to this analysis of the subtle ideological construct that Locke's pneumopathology motivated him to develop.

The concept of pneumopathology has been used to explain the writing techniques of several political theoreticians. Professor Cooper is correct to label its application as "under-explored" because despite its utility as a philosophical diagnostic tool nearly all advancements in the field have been made by Eric Voegelin, Ellis Sandoz, and Barry Cooper. Because this concept is underused, it is appropriate to review the various ways in which the tactics described above manifested in existing studies of pneumopathological ideas. (Again, these tactics will also appear in the product created by a pneumopath, his subtle ideological construction.) Voegelin divides pneumopathology between theoretical pneumopathology and practical pneumopathology.[62] Theoretical pneumopathology is found in the works of many modern political theorists. Theoretical pneumopaths partake in the sort of philosophical language necessary to add to and remove from the natural order of being those elements deemed important by a thinker. Theoretical pneumopathology is a strictly theoretical act. It is the construction of the ideology which political movements may (or may not) later adopt and attempt to implement in the world.[63] Voegelin explained, for instance, how both Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche conceal questions regarding their philosophies. Both thinkers employ conceptions of reason and speculative propositions about

reality which facilitate the appeal of their second realities.[64] Auguste Comte relies on similar propositions and evades questions concerning their validity by the "dictatorial prohibition of metaphysical questions concerning the ground of being."[65] Voegelin has shown how other modern thinkers omit an element of reality from their contemplations, which allows them to construct political and philosophical systems that they believe would better govern man. Thomas More omits the concept of *superbia* from his *Utopia*;[66] Thomas Hobbes omits the *summum bonum* from his view of man;[67] Hegel omits "the mystery of a history that wends its way into the future without our knowing its end" from reality.[68] Each think both tinkers with what reality may entail, and each attempts to restrict questions that would challenge their constructions of reality through their detailed constructions themselves.

Practical pneumopathology, on the other hand, leads to subtle ideological constructions produced directly for propaganda for a political movement. It is the literature written by the Marxians or Hegelians who would implement the ideas espoused by a Marx or a Hegel. This sort of pneumopathology occurs "when these conflicts between second and first reality occur at a relatively low intellectual level."[69] Operating on this level, you have, for instance, not the theoretical speculations of a Heidegger, but the political propaganda of a Hitler and of German academic and spiritual leaders who, sharing in Hitler's Heideggerian aspiration, shaped Germany's propaganda during the 1930s in ways that are compatible with the theoretical works that inspired the movement.[70] Or, instead of Marx you get the Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century, such as Belinsky.[71] Instead of the philosophical writings of the *falasafia*, Ibn Taymiyya, or Arabia al-Wahhab (all theoretical pneumopaths), you get the politically charged thought of Sayyid Qutb.[72] Or, you get the ostensibly theoretical writings of Shoko Asahara, a man who was in actuality a practical pneumopath, as betrayed by the politically active (and ultimately suicidal) pneumopathological followers who joined his cult, Aum Sinrikyo.[73]

The idea of subtle ideological construction has the potential to be a useful diagnostic tool to political philosophers. The three thinkers who have utilized the concept of pneumopathology have successfully applied it to a wide range of philosophical-political movements; from Continental philosophy to Middle Eastern thought to writings from the Far East. The main thing that followers of Hitler, Lenin, Qutb, and Asahara share is a depravity resulting from ideological radicalism so extreme that each movement that grew from these thinkers was responsible for murdering thousands (or more) of innocent individuals who might have thwarted the ideology because they did not believe in it. The motive for these murders, were in each case, the desire to achieve the ideology posited by a pneumopathological thinker; to make it become reality by so violently altering reality. And in these historical examples of practical

pneumopathology the true problem with it becomes evident. Pneumopathology has consistently produced subtle ideological constructions that motivated societies to engage in profoundly extreme action in order to achieve the goals of the ideology. In short, subtly constructed ideologies are most likely those that are also dangerous ideologies.

Locke offers the quintessential case study of subtle ideological construction. As I have said, some accusations of pneumopathology are made based solely on a scholar's interpretation that a thinker is attempting to conceal an aspect of reality in his text (step 2). In many cases, step 2 probably is sufficient evidence. However, an analysis of Locke allows me to demonstrate both step 1 and step 2 because of the particular nature of Locke's situation. In his writings on reason, philosophy, religion, and understanding, he left behind ample evidence that he understood and assented to the nonsystemic, open-minded, commonsense, and empirically grounded nature of philosophy as listed above. This is especially true of texts written before his political association with Shaftsbury but can even be found in a few later texts. For example, in one later text he argues that philosophy be grounded in empirical evidence and open to any insights garnered from experience. He lists "several weaknesses and defects in the understanding" that hinder men's reasoning abilities (CU 12).[74] These weaknesses result from "the instilling a reverence and veneration for certain dogmas under the specious title of principles" (CU 12). Examples of these weaknesses include: observing too much without "digesting anything" (CU 13); being biased, or suffering from one's "own natural tempers and passions" (CU 14); being obstinate, or "hunting after arguments to make good one side of a question" (CU 15); listing pros and cons for both sides of an issue, as "copious talk" "only distract[s] the understanding" (CU 15); studying a subject with too much haste (CU 16, 25); gaining only desultory knowledge of issues, or "skipping from one sort of knowledge to another" (CU 17); only gaining a "superficial" knowledge of a matter (CU 18); applying ideas with too much universality (CU 19); reading too much (CU 20); relying on "intermediate principles" (CU 21): being partial (CU 22, 24); abusing words (CU 29); "wandering" through the "constant succession and flux of ideas in our minds" (CU 30); making improper divisions or distinctions between things (CU 31); using similes, as they "come short of that exactness which our conceptions should have of things" (CU 32); assenting to propositions with too much or too little evidence (CU 33); failing to be indifferent in some capacity or another (CU 35–45). Locke asserts that each of these weaknesses facilitates a dogmatic "sophistry" that is normatively undesirable:

> If it be asked me, how authors who have such a bias and lean to it may be discovered, I answer, by observing how, in their writings or arguings, they are often led by their inclinations to change the ideas of the question, either by

> changing the terms, or by adding and joining others to them, whereby the ideas under consideration are so varied as to be more serviceable to their purpose, and to be thereby brought to an easier and nearer agreement or more visible and remoter disagreement one with another. This is plain and direct sophistry. (CU 41)

Or elsewhere:

> *Try all things, hold fast that which is good*, is a divine rule coming from the Father of Light and Truth; and it is hard to know what other way men can come at truth, to lay hold of it, if they do not dig and search for it as for gold and hid treasure. Every man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices, overweening assumption, and narrowing our minds. (CU 3)

These utterances, and many other similar lines that can be found in Locke, indicate that Locke understood and ostensibly appreciated the type of open-mindedness necessary for philosophy. Locke, moreover, understood that closed-mindedness was equal to sophistry. Locke additionally understood that sophistry aimed at particular or partisan outcomes could be achieved through certain techniques in "writing or arguing" undesirable from a philosophical perspective. Finally, Locke was aware that indulging in such writing techniques was unacceptable from a philosophical perspective.

The following five chapters analyze distinct symbols created by Locke and make a case for each as a subtle ideological construct lending support to the Hobbes-Locke paradigm. The analysis will be conducted in two parts. In part 2, I review the symbols created by Locke that are pertinent to his political thought and that become the backbone of his subtle ideological construction. This structure of symbols was created in *The Second Treatise*. Part 2 consists of two chapters. In chapter 4, I will look at Locke's speculations on history. Chapter 5 will discuss Locke's definition of rebellion, which I will describe as "new" view on rebellion. These chapters contain the primary rhetorical devices through which Locke's political goals are expressed as philosophical ideas. In part 3, I review the evidence showing that Locke did understand that much of his language departed from traditional uses of the identical terms, and further review techniques used by Locke to conceal that aspects of his symbolic constructions were inconsistent with traditional philosophical uses. Part 3 consists of three chapters. Chapter 6 will review Locke's conception of reason, while chapter 7 looks at his definition of religion. Chapter 8 will consider the type of education scheme Locke discusses. In sum, a picture of Locke's thought as an elaborate system of symbols designed to foment attraction to his ideas while also concealing their new and revolutionary character

will emerge from this methodologically unique study of Locke's writings. Part 4 (chapters 9 and 10) provides a contemporary case study exemplifying the subtle but ideological nature of Locke's work, and concluding remarks regarding how to improve liberalism presently.

THE METHODOLOGICAL VALIDITY OF USING SUBTLE IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION AS A PHILOSOPHICAL DIAGNOSTIC TOOL

Analyses of subtle ideological construction are methodologically robust because the acts of subtly constructing second realities and subtly concealing first reality can be traced through evidence left within a writer's texts. This evidence occurs in the form of symbols created by or relied on by an author. The decision to use a symbol in writing is indicative that the notion expressed by the symbol is of value to the author, that the symbol is a valid expression of the thinker's intent in writing, so long as the symbol in question can be distinguished from the types of social assumptions that appear unintentionally in the vernacular of any age. Ellis Sandoz writes:

> A thinker himself best knows what he is doing: the self-interpretation of the human beings to whom experiences happen (and who therewith articulate these in the symbolisms of philosophy, prophecy, poetry, and the rest) is decisive for their comprehension. As Voegelin has more succinctly expressed the principle: "The reality of experience is self-interpretive. The men who have the experiences express themselves through symbols; and the symbols are the key to understanding the experience expressed. . . . What is experienced and symbolized as reality, in an advancing process of differentiation, is the substance of history."[75]

Sandoz and Voegelin cast a serious criticism against Cambridge's historicist interpretations of Locke. The Cambridge school relies too heavily on contextual settings surrounding Locke's work in order to explain the work itself. By gauging the character of Locke's work by the symbols and constructions conjured up by Locke, as opposed to the symbols of seventeenth-century English social discourse, which a seventeenth-century Englishman could not have avoided in his work, we may gain a more accurate insight into the character of the thinker whom we are diagnosing.

A quick example of the Cambridge historicist approach is appropriate. John Dunn interprets Locke's psychological motivations in the following manner:

> Lockean social and political theory is to be seen as the elaboration of Calvinist social values, in the absence of a terrestrial focus on theological authority and in response to a series of particular challenges. The explanation of why

> it was *Calvinist* social values upon which Locke continued to expound is that he was brought up in a Calvinist family. And the reason why he *continued* to expound them is that his own experience was too dominated by "uneasiness," too anxious, to make a self-confident naturalism a tolerable interpretation of the world. A "state of license" did not seem an enhancement of liberty but simply a destruction of security. His own psychology and his own biography conspired to retain him within the inherited theological framework and in consequence the honesty and force of his thought were devoted to making such sense as could be made of this framework instead of to replacing it. The reason why Locke failed to become Hobbes was that he was not only born a Calvinist and subject to acute status aspirations but also very neurotic.[76]

In response to the type of argument offered by Dunn, the symbols that were pertinent to Locke's own thought were not the Calvinist symbols of his upbringing and of his social discourse, although such symbols were indisputably central to his vocabulary. The symbols that must entertain the student of Locke's thought are the symbols of Locke's own doing. Such symbols include symbols created by Locke himself; for instance, his theory of history and his definition of rebellion. Such symbols also include symbols of philosophical discourse (not of social discourse) which Locke could have avoided in his writing but chose to employ for one reason or another; these symbols include, for example, the term "state of nature," employed by Grotius, Hobbes, and others before Locke. Although he did not invent this symbol, his volitional decision to employ it in philosophical writings is indicative of its significance to Locke. We may not draw the same conclusion from references to symbols pertinent to Calvinism, as these symbols were part of a social milieu which would have been inescapable for a man writing theoretical tracts (and especially tracts repudiating Filmer) for political purposes in Locke's day. By studying Locke's attributions to the social discourse in which he participated, we may distinguish him from the context in which he lived and wrote and gain a better foothold on his political theory. By doing so, one may see that Locke's mid-twentieth-century critics, frequently reviled in contemporary literature for suggesting Locke's affinity to Hobbes, may have been correct.

NOTES

1. Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper, *Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934–1964* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 93.

2. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 7. Cambridge School readings of Locke

also operate on the level of social assumption. The main difference between Macpherson's reading of Locke and the Cambridge reading of Locke is that Macpherson and the Cambridge School disagree about which social assumptions motivate Locke (cf. Ashcraft, *The Politics of Locke's* Second Treatise, 26–47). Macpherson asserts possessive assumptions motivate Locke, where the Cambridge school asserts that traditional and religious assumptions earnestly drive Locke's thought.

3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 5.
5. Ibid., 6.
6. Ibid., 4.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952), 24.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 25.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 33.
16. Ibid., 34–35.
17. Ibid., 34.
18. Ibid., 23.
19. Ibid., 34.
20. Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 206–207.
21. Emberley and Cooper, *Faith and Political Philosophy*, 92.
22. Ibid., 93.
23. Ibid., 95.
24. Richard Ashcraft has subsequently written an excellent analysis of the political motivations for Locke's writings; his analysis is necessary for understanding the prolific extent to which Whig political exigencies color his writings. [*Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986)].
25. Emberley and Cooper, *Faith and Political Philosophy*, 95.
26. Ibid., 96.
27. Ibid., 96–97.
28. Eric Voegelin, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 25: History of Political Ideas (Volume VII); The New Order and Last Orientation* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 151–152.
29. Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* 5.
30. Ibid., 4.
31. Ibid., 7.
32. Ibid., 4.
33. Ibid., 7.

34. Voegelin's writings on Locke are few, amounting to no more than a few pages in Emberley and Cooper, *Faith and Political Philosophy*; Eric Voegelin, *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 24: History of Political Ideas (Volume VI); Revolution and the New Science* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998) and Voegelin, *The Collected Works, Volume 25.*

35. For example, Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 76; Ellis Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 27; Barry Cooper, *New Political Religions, or An Analysis of Modern Terrorism* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004).

36. Cooper, *New Political Religions*, 42.

37. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, 76.

38. It is from "nomos" and "pathos" that Voegelin constructs the word pneumopathology; literally meaning a disease of the soul.

39. Eric Voegelin, *Hitler and the Germans* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 101.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Eric Voegelin, *The Collected Works, Volume 11: Published Essays 1953–1965* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 229.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 230.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 230.

48. Ibid., 226–227.

49. Ibid., 229.

50. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History, Volume 3: Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 43; cf. Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution*, 24.

51. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, 81.

52. Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution*, 23–27.

53. Ibid., 24.

54. Ibid., 25.

55. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, 16.

56. Cf. Cooper, *New Political Religions*, 40–59, 66–71; Voegelin, *Hitler and the Germans*, 102, 108–109, 184, 231, 239–254, 262–264.

57. Voegelin, *Hitler and the Germans*, 108.

58. Cooper, *New Political Religions*, 45–46.

59. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism,* 19

60. Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975), 258; cf. Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution*, 27.

61. Barry Cooper, "Minutes of the Eric Voegelin Society Meeting at the American Political Science Association Conference, 2002" (http://www.artsci.lsu.edu/voegelin/EVS/barrycooper.htm, Barry Cooper, comments APSA EV meeting 2002).

62. Voegelin, *Hitler and the Germans*, 108–109.
63. Cf. ibid., 108.
64. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, 18–34.
65. Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, 257–259; cf. Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution,* 28.
66. Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, 76.
67. Ibid., 77.
68. Ibid., 79.
69. Voegelin, *Hitler and the Germans*, 109.
70. Ibid.
71. Ellis Sandoz, *Political Apocalypse: A Study of Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 5–39, 175*n.*
72. Cooper, *New Political Religions*, 72–130.
73. Ibid., 58–71.
74. References to John Locke's *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* in this book are made parenthetically and use this format: (CU, section number). I have relied on: John Locke. *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).
75. Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution*, 22.
76. John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

PART II

SUBTLY CONSTRUCTING AN IDEOLOGY BY CREATING SYMBOLS THROUGH SPECULATION AND ABSTRACTION

Chapter Four

Locke's Speculative View of History

This part of the analysis demonstrates how Locke perpetrates subtle ideological construction indicator 2a, how he builds a political theory based on creative and abstract speculations. I have divided this part into two chapters. First, in this chapter, I will review Locke's theory of history, which I characterize as speculation. Locke's theory of history is a way of validating his political theory because, as history culminates in the peaceable fulfillment of the materialistic individualism argued for in the *Second Treatise*, the *telos* of history becomes characterized by the manifestation of Locke's political theory. Second, to supplement the analysis of Locke's theory of history, in the next chapter I will demonstrate how Locke's resistance theory facilitates his political theory through subtle transformations of traditional ideas regarding natural law and the origins and nature of power, giving rise to a radically materialistic and individualistic view of the nature of political obligation. Because Locke gives traditional words new meaning, his resistance theory may be characterized as abstraction. This part of the analysis argues that Locke's speculative theory of history and abstract definition of rebellion are components of a set of pneumopathological symbols created by Locke to facilitate the theoretical prioritization of materialistic individualism through subtle ideological construction. In part 3, I will consider the efforts Locke undertakes in his later writings to conceal philosophically inspired questions regarding this set of symbols. To begin, I turn to the historical speculations inherent to Locke's political theory.

INTERPRETATIONS OF LOCKE ON HISTORY

The idea of treating Locke's terms "state of nature," "state of war," and "civil society," as temporal stages pertinent to human evolution is unoriginal.[1] The

argument that Locke's historical arguments are, as matters of historical fact, skewed, has also been widely articulated and well accepted by scholars in the past fifty years or so.[2] I will ask the reader to endure a short summary of how these historical stages have been interpreted by two different scholars, as I offer some modifications to these interpretations. Most importantly, the level and nature of conflict existing within the state of nature has been misconstrued by these scholars. This common mistake leads scholars to incorrectly identify the nature of Locke's man to be rationally acquisitive. Locke's man is indeed rationally acquisitive, but only up to a certain point in his historical evolution. After the invention of money, man's moral compass fails to keep pace with his ability to accumulate, and he becomes, at least until restrained by the government, irrationally acquisitive.

C. B. Macpherson (1962) and Robert Goldwin (1987) both read Locke to view men's behavior as more-or-less rational within the state of nature, even after the invention of money. Macpherson (1962), for example, views Locke's history as developing in three stages (see table 4.1). An original stage is characterized by limits (spoilage, sufficiency, and supposed labor)

Table 4.1. Locke's Historical Stages per Macpherson (1962)

Historical Stage	*Level of Consent*	*Limits to Property*	*Type of Social Organization*	*Level of Conflict*
State of Nature 1	No consent (202)	Spoilage, sufficiency, and labor limitations exist (201–203)	Not organized (202)	Men behave rationally (233)
State of Nature 2	Consent between free, equal, rational men to put a value on money (210)	Transcend spoilage limitation, sufficiency limitation, and supposed labor limitation (203–220)	Commercial economy exists (209); wage relationships and contracts occur (214)	Men behave rationally (234)
Civil Society	Consent of each to hand over all his power to the majority (210)	Class differentials (222–238)	Civil society; majority determines contract laws (218)	Men behave rationally

Source: This table was created by Scott Robinson.

to property accumulation. These limits are overcome by the tacit consent to money during the second stage of the state of nature, in which all facets of commercial society are established, but without government. Finally, positive laws regulate commerce with the establishment of civil society. Man's ability to accumulate becomes increased in each stage, as the level of consent also changes. In each stage, man is viewed as behaving rationally, appropriating what he reasonably may, given the stage of development.[3] Macpherson reads the nature of Locke's man as having the "rational propensity to accumulate."[4]

Goldwin (1987), offering a Straussian interpretation, presents Locke's historical stages as proceeding through three stages in the state of nature (see table 4.2). Spoilage limits characterize an original condition of widespread penury, which is first alleviated with agriculture, and then overcome with money. Goldwin agrees with Macpherson that Locke sees the ability to accumulate as essential to man's nature: "the central theme of Locke's whole political teaching [is] *increase*."[5]

Table 4.2. Locke's Historical Stages per Goldwin (1987)

Historical Stage	*Level of Economic Development*	*Condition*	*Limits to Property*	*Level of Conflict*
State of Nature 1	Original Condition (489)	Equality of penury, limited by spoilage (489)	Spoilage, waste of abundance (491)	Unspecified
State of Nature 2	Agriculture (491)	Move toward alleviating penury, still limited by spoilage (491)	Spoilage (491)	Unspecified
State of Nature 3	Money (491)	Economic inequality, but worst off after money better than best off before money (493)	"The fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious" (495)	Conflict exists but extent is limited, majority behave rationally
Civil Society	Government (495)	Settled laws for protection of property (497)	Industry and rationality (495), compact prevents acquisition by trespass	Rare, occurs by calamity or folly (501)

Source: This table was created by Scott Robinson.

Macpherson's and Goldwin's readings are close, but ultimately inaccurate. Locke's political evolution is depicted in terms of material accumulation. However, individuals are not depicted as having either a constant need to accumulate or a consistent capacity for rationality across historical stages.

It is important that neither Macpherson nor Goldwin adequately explains the necessity of the final stage of temporal development, the move from the state of nature to civil society. If the rational ability to accumulate has been fulfilled with the discovery of money, which occurs during the state of nature, further increased accumulation would not be facilitated through the invention of positive laws to regulate commercial activity.

Goldwin notes that "men are 'quickly driven into society' for the protection of their property" (127), but says no more of this expeditious change other than that it is inspired by the "fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious" (34).[6] His analysis makes clear that government is intended to provide for the "honest industry of mankind," that individuals were "quickly driven" into government because "it was no longer possible for men to live together without greater protection for their possessions."[7] But Goldwin's account does not make clear the extent and nature of conflict, the extent to which individuals have become quarrelsome, and why, or which individuals are more inclined to covetousness. An important question is whether those responsible for administering governing affairs (e.g., the rich) are among the quarrelsome. After all, Locke is arguing that society's most important protection as a society is against government. I am to show that Locke's speculative history is built to imply an inherent covetousness or evilness to government, thereby making the individuals' protections against malicious government among the most important functions of society: Locke's theoretical historical speculations, not by happenstance, corroborate Locke's political exigencies.

Per Goldwin, a unanimous body will form a society, and thereafter a loosely-defined "majority" will seek the common good through a representative legislature and right to resistance, implying that most individuals remain honest and rational after the invention of money, but why (and if) those in government become corrupt, or whether individuals outside of government are likely to become corrupt, is left out of Goldwin's analysis.[8] Goldwin clearly assumes that corruption is possible within the nature of Locke's man, but does not ascribe it much importance in the development of man's nature, which is rather defined, as mentioned, in terms of his ability to acquire.

Macpherson's reading, although different than Goldwin's in certain respects, assigns no more importance than does Goldwin's to man's propensity for corruption. Macpherson argues that Locke did not mean to extend property rights beyond the landed class in England, a point which subsequent

research has dispelled.[9] The laboring class, he maintained, "would not live up to the moral standard required of rational men," and Locke only meant to establish property rights for the upper class of English society.[10] Thus, civil society exists to protect the rights of the landed against infringements by more powerful, also landed, individuals.

Landed elites agree to form society so that their property can be protected from those "who sought to acquire possessions not by appropriation but by trespass."[11] They do not agree to society so that accumulation may be limited.[12] Locke's society is, from Macpherson's perspective, a rational association of landed elites, formed from the rational desire to protect their possessions from trespasses. The nature of the relevant trespasses is not made evident. One is led to suspect that Macpherson had in mind the occasional and irrational trespasses that might have well occurred before money made class differentiation possible.

Whether a classless majority of individuals is capable of rational behavior, as Goldwin posits, or whether a majority of landed individuals is capable of rational behavior, as Macpherson posits, an underlying rationality of the majority of pertinent individuals is argued to prompt men to protect themselves by creating civil society. Goldwin plays up this act, based on a single line, as occurring "quickly" after the introduction of money.

I will argue, contrarily, that, according to Locke's argument, men behave quite irrationally during the state of nature after the invention of money (a temporal state I will call the historical state of war), which is characterized by a few men wielding absolute power, for the sake of personal pleasure, over a majority of slaves. Locke would characterize both absolute power and slavery as irrational behavior. Civil society manifests not so much as the champion of the majority's rationality, but as the majority forcefully seizing for themselves that level of pleasure fulfilled through material acquisition that they saw in the tyrant's lifestyle. This inspiration for valuing money, I will ultimately show, limits the ability for individuals to rationally manage money.

I read Locke's presentation of history in the following way. According to Locke, human history passes through a series of four economic stages that are situated within three broader conflict stages, eventually culminating in a state of peace and material convenience (see table 4.3). Man passes from the primordial nomadic stage into the farming stage, both stages being characterized by a general state of peace among men, but insecurity in man's relation to nature. I will refer to these stages collectively as the historical state of nature.[13] Man next enters an entrepreneurial stage antedating civil society, characterized by security against nature, but by conflict between humans. I will call this stage the historical state of war. Man finally enters a final stage of history in which civil societies form in response to the conflict experienced

Table 4.3. Locke's Historical Stages per Robinson (2019)

Historical Stages in Locke's Second Treatise						
Conflict Stage	*Stage of Economic Development*	*Amount and Spread of Property*	*Level of Security*	*Motivation Orientations*	*Factor Capable of Altering This State*	*Level of Conflict*
Historical State of Nature	*Nomadic Stage*	The spontaneous products of nature: apples, acorn, water, leaves, skins, moss, fish, venison, etc.	Little danger from fellow man, but insecure against nature due to a general state of penury	Mere subsistence: a simple poor way of life characterized by cooperation, friendship and trust	Agriculture	Few controversies, trespasses or offenses—general state of peace
Historical State of Nature	*Farming Stage*	Commodities: Increase in quality of property but still limited by spoilage	Little danger from fellow men; property limited by spoilage	Desire and hope to achieve a state of plenty through industry and barter	Money	General state of peace
Historical State of War	*Entrepreneurial Stage Antedating Civil Society*	Radical increase in material goods but concentration of same; introduction of scarcity, especially land	Property unlimited by spoilage but very unsafe and very insecure from other men	Greed, ambition, distrust, fear; desire for safety, ease and plenty	Civil Society	State of war; oppression by great robbers
Historical State of Peace	*Entrepreneurial Stage Postdating Civil Society*	Continued increase and concentration of goods with greater benefits shared by all	Safety, ease, and plenty (101)	Enjoyment of the conveniences of life and general desire and hope to increase those benefits	Dissolution of Civil Society	State of peace; security against great robbers

Source: This table was created by Scott Robinson and is based on a table created by Ross Lence.

in the historical state of war. This stage is characterized by both security against nature, and security against humans. I will call this final stage the historical state of peace.

THE HISTORICAL STATE OF NATURE

The first economic stage of history is a nomadic stage. In this economic stage, man's sustenance is provided by the raw, "spontaneous products of nature" (37), given to man by the "spontaneous hand of nature" (26).[14] Men were hunters and gatherers. The mere appropriation of spontaneous natural products was all the labor necessary to fulfill the economics of the nomadic stage. Locke asserts that in the beginning of human history, there was no private property, that "the earth and all that is therein" (26) was at man's disposal "in common" (25) for "the Support and Comfort of their being" (26). The natural bounty, however, is not useful unless appropriated by individuals (26). An apple, for example, provides no communal benefit to men; it is useless unless it is eaten by one man or shared between a few individuals.

Locke, therefore, undertakes to demonstrate how man may come by private property, essential to life, from goods naturally provided to men communally (25). He begins from the premise that God is proprietor of both man and the spontaneous products of nature. Locke argues that "the earth, and all that is therein, is given to Men for the Support and Comfort of their being" (26). God grants man the natural liberty to care for his own self (22), but not the liberty to injure or destroy himself (6, 23). It is in this limited capacity to freely pursue one's self-preservation, that Locke asserts man has a natural "property in his own person" (27). Individuals have propriety over their own actions, in so far as those actions facilitate self-preservation (23). This qualified ownership of self allows individuals to pursue their support and comfort through the individual appropriation of naturally communal goods.[15] The use of one's self, of one's own labor, to appropriate natural goods for one's own subsistence initially gave men a right to property beyond themselves: "if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That *labor* added something to them more than Nature, the common Mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right" (28).

Private property originally consisted of raw natural items that could be found and appropriated from nature through the labor of a single individual. The spontaneous products of nature include: "venison, acorns, apples, hare, leaves, skin, moss, plumbs," and other similar items (26, 28, 30, 42, 46). The domestication of animals was accomplished within this stage as well, as Locke asserts that beasts were tamed (37): "in that part of the World which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down

as Abraham's time, they wandered with their Flocks, and their Herds, which was their substance, freely up and down" (38). The primordial nomadic stage of man's history can be envisioned to consist of individuals, or small bands of individuals, roaming the wilderness, picking fruit and hunting deer, perhaps slaughtering a domesticated cow when nature's bounty became occasionally sparse, and gathering other spontaneous natural products conducive to their support and comfort. On rare occasions, when encountering others, one individual might have traded his apple for another individual's plumb.

The second economic stage of history is a farming stage. As men became adept at the hunting and gathering lifestyle, populations increased. Eventually the commonly used spontaneous natural resources became limited between nomadic tribes (38). As the few apple trees and scattered deer became insufficient to support the population of individuals living in an area, men learned how to grow more produce and support more domestic herds within confined areas. Farming provided the technological innovation necessary to accommodate groups of individuals living together in confined geographical areas. Consequently, they began to separate pastures and devise means of appropriating their sustenance in fixed areas (38).

Agriculture meant that men were no longer confined to the spontaneous products of nature. Men gained a level of material convenience through "commodities" that was unattainable in the nomadic stage (42). Commodities, as opposed to spontaneous products of nature, are "products which our industry and pains prepare for us" (42). These are goods which require additional labor, "industry," than simply harvesting from nature that which is edible. Commodities include goods such as: "wheat, barley, tobacco, bread, wine, cloth, silk, straw, bran," and "corn" (40, 42, 43). Where the nomadic stage forced each individual or tribe to appropriate their own sustenance from nature purely through their own labor, by hunting deer or plucking apples, the farming stage was characterized by the specialization of tasks which facilitated bartering. One farmer grew wheat, another tobacco, and yet another cotton. Through bartering, individuals could focus on producing one good from the spontaneous products of nature, which alone would be insufficient for survival, while enjoying other items essential for survival that have been produced from nature by other individuals. By trading commodities with one another, individuals gained the ability to begin using their labor to improve nature, instead of extinguishing their energy simply by appropriating spontaneous resources.

The farming stage meant not only the discovery of commodities but a reorientation of man's motivations. Nomadic men lived on the edge of death. When one's venison or apples rotted, one was required to appropriate more venison or apples before one starved (37). This situation repeated over and

again for each nomadic individual; as man possessed no or few means of preserving meat or fruit in the nomadic stage, the appropriation of each meal was a death-match with nature. The introduction of commodities in the farming stage meant that individuals could begin to concern themselves, not with acquiring their next meal, but with providing themselves with basic material comforts. Relish begins to transform the city of need to the city of sows. Although individuals have only limited commodities in the farming stage, they have by now discovered that labor "furnishes more useful Commodities" and "makes the far greatest part of the value of things" than does pure nature (42). Man is aware that he is capable of, by subduing nature through efficient labor systems, improving upon his natural material condition. He, moreover, has discovered a need or desire to step back from death's cliff by facilitating improvements to nature: "God and his Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something that was his own, his labor" (32). Locke sees the discovery of commodities during the farming stage of history as absolutely essential to the evolution or development of man, a creature coming to be defined in this historical stage by his ability to imagine, create, and carve out material convenience for himself through the process of conquering and subduing his spontaneous natural environment: "Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves" (43).

The main threat to existence in the first two economic stages, the nomadic and farming stages, came not from fellow men, but rather from nature itself: "there could be then little room for quarrels or Contentions about Property so establish'd" (31). During the nomadic stage, there was more quarry, more nuts and fruit in the world than the few men that inhabited it could appropriate (36); "the Plenty God had given him" meant that men had no need to quarrel or dispute with one another (28). The same was true during the farming stage. Cain, Abel, and Esau "separated and enlarged their pasture, where it best liked them" (38). Men had no need to dispute over property because property was unlimited in abundance, while greatly limited by the duration of its usefulness because most property was still perishable (e.g., bread and wine), and was useless if it spoiled. Men had no need to fight over abundant, perishable property: "it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of" (46).

The nomadic stage and the farming stage shared the characteristic that men remained relatively peaceful with one another. Although commodities, discovered during the farming stage, facilitate the desire for material convenience, the farming stage properly belongs to the conflict stage I refer to as the historical state of nature. The desire for material convenience is a desire that, as I will show, Locke believes later corrupted man's peaceful nature.

The products of man's labor during the farming stage, however, are still fairly raw. The things which one could steal included loaves of bread, clothes, bushels of wheat, and similar rudimentary items. Locke admits that the "insolent" would have been "injurious" in the state of nature (92), arguing for the "basesness of Human Nature" in "this, or any other Age" (92), but asserts that the great bounties that most often motivate malicious behavior are not to be found in the historical state of nature: "a King of a large and fruitful Territory [in America], feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a Labourer in *England*" (41). Although the sorts of things Locke believes men will steal exist in this state, for example, horses and coats (19), there is as yet no great purpose to stealing such items, as the invention which makes the idea of hoarding such items appealing, money, has not yet entered the historical scene.

THE HISTORICAL STATE OF WAR

The invention of money allowed men to adopt entrepreneurial, instead of farming, economic systems. The nomadic and farming economic systems were characterized by the bartering of perishable items in exchange for other perishable items. In these stages, if a man "bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a Week, for Nuts that would last good for his eating whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common Stock" (46). Although the duration of nuts represents an improvement in material convenience compared to the duration of plumbs, the accumulation of nuts is still limited by the amount that may be eaten in a "whole year." The commodities bartered in the farming stage—bread, wheat, corn, and so on—are similarly limited by their perishable nature. The level of material convenience provided by the historical state of nature, therefore, is limited in terms of duration: "*things really useful* to the Life of Man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first Commoners of the world look after *are* generally things of *short duration*" (46). The short duration of the farming stage's commodities meant that men in the historical state of nature, despite having harnessed the powers of agriculture, were in a state of material inconvenience. Locke describes American Indians, for example, as being "rich in Land, and poor in all the comforts of Life," and "enjoying one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy" (41).

Locke asserts that the discovery of money provided a means by which accumulation becomes unlimited by the decay of natural objects: "if he would give his Nuts for a piece of Metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or Diamond, and keep those by him all his Life, he invaded not the Rights of others, he might heap up as

much of these durable things as he pleased" (46). The discovery of the capacity for durable goods to represent perishable items in economic transactions facilitated radical changes to man's historical circumstance, regarding both his material situation and his motivations for action.

The ability to accumulate essential but perishable items beyond the time that they are naturally useful provided for a precipitous increase in material convenience. The increase in material convenience during the entrepreneurial stage antedating civil society is associated with innovations regarding the efficient use of land. Where the farming stage was characterized by the discovery that "*labour makes the far greatest part of the value* of things" (42), the entrepreneurial stage antedating civil society was characterized by the discovery that "*Labour puts the greatest part of Value upon Land*" (43). The entrepreneurial stage antedating civil society was still very much an agrarian historical stage, but one in which agriculture began to be used in an entrepreneurial manner. During the farming stage, agriculture provided subsistence; during the entrepreneurial stage antedating civil society, agriculture provided the means to material convenience. During the farming stage of economic development, farmers were limited in what they could reasonably produce by the amount of perishable goods needed for life during a fixed period of time. Even though one could produce more corn than one personally needed, the goods to be received by bartering away one's surplus corn were also generally of a perishable nature. During the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society, men began to be able to exchange perishable goods for money, which can be accumulated without reasonable limits. Hence, the same farming tactics as were employed during the farming stage of economic development could now be employed on larger scales to produce greater monetary rewards. Locke asks:

> What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or a Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent *Land*, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land Parts of *America*, where he had no hopes of commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw *Money* to him by the sale of the Product? It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would supply the Conveniences of Life to be had there for him and his Family. (48)

The situation is different for the farmer after the invention of money. The durable nature of money allows men to cultivate as many acres as he can feasibly work. Land became scarce because larger swaths were bought up by men with accumulated money and used to further enlarge their possessions (45). Cultivating large areas of land required employing many individuals, facilitating the historical manifestation of the employer-laborer dyad (42).

Increased productivity facilitated population growth, serving to further increase the amount and expanse of entrepreneurial farms. Technological developments that were required to farm large areas, produce large quantities of commodities and deliver commodities to markets facilitated a precipitous increase in material goods and material convenience:

> 'tis not barely the Plough-man's Pains, the Reaper's and Thresher's Toil, and the Baker's Sweat, is to be counted in the *Bread* we eat; the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, felled and framed the Timber imployed about the Plough, Mill, Oven, or any other Utensils, which are a vast Number, requisite to this Corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made Bread. . . . 'Twould be a strange *Catalogue of things, that Industry provided and made use of, about every Loaf of Bread,* before it came to our use, if we could trace them; Iron, Wood, Leather, Bark, Timber, Stone, Bricks, Coal, Lime, Cloth, Dying-Drugs, Pitch, Tar, Masts, Ropes, and all the Materials use of in the Ship, that brought any of the Commodities made use of by any of the Workmen, to any part of the Work, all which, 'twould be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up. (43)

Hence, radical technological innovation, population growth, and increases in material convenience distinguishes the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society from the farming stage of economic development, which had been marked by more moderate developments in technological innovation, population growth, and commodity use. The ability to accumulate items beyond the limits imposed by the decay of natural items, facilitated by the invention of money, is responsible for the advancements in economic organization during the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society.

With the ability to hoard and the proliferation of commodities, however, man's desire for material convenience was amplified. Locke argues that the motivations of men during the historical state of nature (the nomadic and farming stages) could be distinguished from the motivations of men during the historical state of war (the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society). During the historical state of nature, the bulk of property regarded "the Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on it," the spontaneous products of nature that occurred in abundance and the basic perishable commodities derived from those spontaneous natural products (32). During the historical state of war, however, the "*chief matter of Property*" became "not the Fruits of the Earth, but the *Earth* itself" (32). Disproportionate possessions of land, a trifling matter when in abundance during the nomadic and farming stages of economic development, became a matter of great importance during the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society when land became both scare and prof-

itable: "an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money" (50). As unequal possessions became "practicable," but as yet unrestricted by positive laws created by government, it became more difficult to discern the extent at which the accumulation of money constituted an encroachment on others' rights (50). Locke asserts that "*at the beginning* . . . what Portion a Man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much or take what he needed" (51). This was no longer true when the amount of property reasonably owned by one individual could no longer be determined by the decay of natural items. As Locke sees it, the increase in commodities and the ability to hoard them provided a key impetus in the evolution of man's nature: "The equality of a simple poor way of liveing confineing their desires within the narrow bounds of each mans small propertie made few controversies and there wanted not of Justice where there were but few Trespasses, and few Offenders" (107). The development of economic systems that allowed for hoarding created the individual disposed to and motivated by the ideal of mundane satiety. Money made man an utterly materialistic and mundane creature, whose moral standards for action became restricted to concerns for individual materialistic convenience.[16]

Locke's writings on education affirm that money provided a corrupting influence for men.[17] "*Dominion*," he writes, "is the first origin of most vicious [*sic*] that are ordinary and natural" (STCE 103).[18] Locke's idea of dominion is intimately connected with the superfluous use of property: "their love of dominion is their desire to have things to be theirs; they would have *property* and possession, pleasing themselves with the power which that seems to give and the right they thereby have to dispose of them as they please" (STCE 105). The unqualified desire to dispose of property as one pleases—or, as Locke puts it, "covetousness and the desire of having in our possession and under our dominion more than we have need of"—does not arise according to Locke's historical sketch until the invention of money (STCE 110.3). Locke refers to the desire for dominion, directly emanating from the invention of money, as "the root of all evil," and a quality to "be early and carefully weeded out" (STCE 110.3).

Locke's aversion to the influence of money, as suggested by his term dominion, results from the corrupting influence of overabundant property. From the unchecked propensity for material convenience grew the types of behavior Locke discusses to occur between individuals engaged in a state of war. A state of war presupposes "not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled Design, upon another Mans Life" (16). Although some few men will be "insolent and injurious" (92) in the historical state of nature, although

theft will sometimes occur in that state, retributive violence executed by individuals pursuant to the law of nature is a sufficient check against widespread depravity. Because the injurious behavior may only extend, Locke supposes, to spontaneous products of nature and perishable commodities, most individuals will reasonably refrain from such petty theft because of the retributive violence to possibly follow. It would be more logical to gather one's own apples, lying about in abundance, than to risk one's personal safety to appropriate a bounty that could have been more easily appropriated from nature, and without risk. Therefore, only the occasional fool will commit petty theft during the historical state of nature. Settled designs upon others can by definition not occur, as a thought-out design would lead to the conclusion that plans to enslave others under such circumstances are impracticable. Indeed, the tenor of Locke's discussion on the state of war is aimed more at the "great robbers" that manifested in history with the invention of money:

> The Injury and the Crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a Crown, or some petty Villain. The Title of the Offender, and the Number of his Followers make no difference in the Offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, Great Robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their Obedience, but the great ones are rewarded with Laurels and Triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of Justice in this World, and have the power in their own possession, which should punish the Offender. (176)

Between the invention of money and the establishment of civil societies, men were organized only by money. One cannot reasonably conclude that history's "great robbers" were only concerned with keeping "petty villains" "in their obedience." Rather, one must suspect that such great robbers were also inclined to keep innocent individuals under their dominion if it served their interest. Indeed, positive laws did not exist to protect individuals from being manipulated or abused by individuals that possessed more money than they did (50). Those who owned large farms could employ individuals and pay them only enough to allow for their subsistence, thereby restricting their potential for property ownership and ensuring a future labor force (42). The expectations of employers for employees could be extremely demanding, especially by today's standards, without a way to check the power of employers. Employees, for example, could be used as soldiers by their employers in disputes over land with other farms owners (108). Money became the only organizing source of power, and those without money became subject to the interests of those with money, rewarding the rich with "laurels and triumphs" for the poor treatment received at their hands.

The resulting radically disproportionate distribution of wealth was maintained by the "settled designs" of the large farm owners to control their labor

forces. The situation was what Locke described as "slavery": "*Slavery* is nothing else, but *the State of War continued, between a lawful Conqueror, and a Captive*. For, if once *Compact* enter between them, and make an agreement for limited Power on the one side, and Obedience on the other, the State of War and *Slavery* ceases, as long as the Compact endures" (24). Prior to the establishment of society, there were no compacts to restrict the accumulation of wealth, or the exercise of power by those with wealth. Designs to further one's own wealth by using laborers that are remunerated unfairly is essentially a restriction on natural human freedom: "He that in the State of Nature, *would take away the Freedom*, that belongs to any one in that State, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away everything else" (17). This is to introduce a state of war against one's labor force: "he who makes an *attempt to enslave* me, thereby puts himself into a State of War with me" (17).

Locke's fear of the overabundant use of property was indeed meant to inspire a revolution among those classes that did not have suffrage in 1680 England. This point has been so adequately developed by Ashcraft that I will not belabor it here.[19] Suffice it to say, the structure of Locke's historical arguments corroborates Ashcraft's historical research and his conclusion that Locke was indeed attempting to expand the idea of "industrious" or "rational" to those to whom Shaftsbury was attempting to extend suffrage.[20] This argument would have been appealing to both the working class of London and especially to the landed gentry in the country. The latter were the men who had the capacity and means to organize their own farms and provide a convenient living for themselves if not interfered with by the crown. Locke evokes fears of the upper class through the resemblance of his historical state of war—being characterized by a central ruler who centralizes and reaps the profits from farms that would otherwise be independently operated and profitable to many different hard working and intelligent individuals—to the plight of late seventeenth-century English Whigs.

To summarize, the historical state of war was characterized by groups or tribes of individuals organized around a single leader who had developed power over his tribe through his monetary overabundance. Such leaders often "retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity" (93). It was the power made available to men by money that allowed "vain Ambition, and *amor sceleratus habendi*, evil Concupiscence, [to] corrupt Mens minds into a Mistake of true Power and Honor" (111). The power provided by money unleashes an utterly evil aspect of man that had been buried underneath simplistic lifestyles and the fear of punishment during the historical state of nature: "robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure" (ECHU I ii 9). Between the historical state of nature, where man was

restricted by the penury of his condition and the fear of punishment from other individuals, and the historical state of peace in which man's power is restricted by positive laws, exists an anarchical historical state of war in which powerful men, emancipated from limits to action imposed by either nature or other individuals, behave with unabashed enthusiasm for mundane satiety. This is a historical state with which late seventeenth-century Whigs in England would have identified.

THE HISTORICAL STATE OF PEACE

The historical state of war was an unsavory experience for many of its participants. Powerful individuals enslaved powerless individuals for personal gain, in what amounted to a protracted state of war (123). The alleviation of this condition became an objective for ordinary men:

> when Ambition and Luxury, would retain and increase the Power, without doing the Business, for which it was given, and aided by Flattery, taught Princes to have distinct and separate Interests from their People, Men found it necessary to examine more carefully *the Original* and Rights of *Government*; and to find out ways to *restrain the Exorbitances*, and *prevent the Abuses* of that Power which they having entrusted in another's hands for their own good, they found was made use of to hurt them. (111)

The primary means discovered to restrain the powers of wealthy individuals was to establish societies based on laws established by consent: "To avoid this State of War is one great *reason of Mens putting themselves into Society*" (21); "were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would be no need that Men should separate from this natural and great Community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations" (128).

Through positive agreement, associations of men may draft standards for moral action which limits the sway of monetary power. The positive laws of all civil societies are designed to protect the property of individuals from usury by powerful men: "The great and *chief end* therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, *is the Preservation of their Property*" (124).

Again, Locke is not concerned with protecting men's property from common criminals, but rather concerned with protecting men's property from the "great robbers":

> As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still

> retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by *Pole-Cats*, or *Foxes*, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by *Lions*. (93)

Accordingly, Locke's discussion on the ends of civil society focuses on institutional designs that will prevent pernicious accumulations of power. Clearly, institutional design is not necessary to achieve what raw power may accomplish without assistance, deterring common thieves from stealing horses and coats on the street. Rather, institutional design is suggested to prevent great robbers from using governmental power in unrestrained, self-interested capacities (20). As I will discuss in chapter 5, a rudimentary system for separation of powers—the division between legislative, executive, and federative powers—is buttressed by a right to resistance which ultimately seats governmental power in the consent of individuals. Such a governmental system theoretically establishes a system for limiting the power of kingly authority: "where there is an Authority, a Power on Earth, from which relief can be had by *appeal*, there the continuance of the State of War is excluded, and the Controversie is decided by that Power" (21).

The economic arrangements of civil society do not differ in some regard from the economic arrangements of the historical state of war. Civil societies remain the entrepreneurial organizations that characterized the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society. Civil societies are still commodity driven organizations whose participants may hoard wealth and experience radical material convenience through the accumulation of money. In other words, the security provided to man against nature by the convenience of nonperishable items still exists. For this reason, the economic stage postdating the establishment of societies may be called the entrepreneurial stage of economic development postdating civil societies.

The entrepreneurial stage of economic development postdating civil societies can be distinguished from the entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil societies not by the motivations of its participants, but by the level of security provided to its industrious participants against kingly authority. The entrepreneurial stage of economic development antedating civil society was characterized by greed and fear, by great robbers who enslaved industrious individuals who would have, if not for the abuses of a "great robber," become wealthy and enjoyed material convenience given their own capacity for labor, industry, and productivity. In this regard, man's existence was fairly secured against nature, but radically insecure against potential abuse by their kings. The invention of positive agreements curbed kings' powers during the entrepreneurial stage of economic development postdating civil society. The entrepreneurial stage of economic development postdating

civil society therefore becomes a theoretical state of peace. Harnessed by the threat of punishment against other men through positive compact, and having harnessed nature through the invention of money, man enters a final historical stage characterized by widespread radical material convenience among all industrious and rational society members.

The historical state of peace, or the entrepreneurial stage of economic development postdating civil society, is the final stage in man's history. Although the historical state of peace may be disturbed for a particular society through tyranny or conquest, which revert a society to the historical state of war, the historical state of peace may be restored through resistance against tyrants and conquerors. Yet in the terms laid out as meaningful by Locke—economic development, material convenience, and peaceable living—human history cannot theoretically progress beyond the historical state of peace.

A reasonable question may be asked at this juncture: Does widespread access to money give rise to widespread depravity? My reading of Locke's account of history suggests that, according to Locke, money, as the prime source of corruption, will remain a source of controversy and inconvenience even after the historical state of war gives way to the historical state of peace. As Locke's historical state of peace will therefore not be all that peaceful, it is already evident at this early juncture of the analysis that, at least, Locke's political theory will require some sort of mechanism whereby corruptible individuals will behave reasonably after they have acquired wealth. The important question regarding Locke's political theory is not whether Locke's individuals are corruptible—although my next chapter is dedicated to further making this point—the question will become whether or not Locke builds the appropriate institutional mechanisms into his theory to curb the depraving influence of money. Locke's main attempt at this is through the reasoning process, through religion, and through education; part 3 of this analysis will demonstrate that Locke does not sufficiently deal with the moral problem associated with money through these mechanisms. For now, I will make a few concluding remarks regarding Locke's version of history, before turning to the second symbol used by Locke to affect the outcome of his political theory, his resistance arguments.

CONCLUSION

What does this interpretation of Locke's historical sketch imply of individuals living in a Lockean civil society? One implication is that we may expect to find a permanence of the conflict between the desire for money and the conscionable consent to laws. Social fighting will emphasize the desire to

acquire. This might be evident today in a number of socially salient political issues, such as claims for higher minimum wages, or, contrarily, defenses of wildly magnanimous executive pay. These are, of course, representative of natural cleavages within society. But the manner of this fighting, the exuberance for this issue, as manifest in, for instance, the Occupy Wall Street movement of the early 2010s, reflects a troubling tendency. Aristotle's analysis of regime change demonstrates that the rise of these fights in any society is troubling; it reflects a lack of middle class views, and a rise in the extreme views that will destabilize any society.[21] The Lockean presentation of money, as this chapter has reviewed, contains the theoretical kernel for this type of partisan fighting.

Cambridge school interpretations of Locke's theory of history downplay its speculative nature. John Dunn argues that Locke's use of the term "the state of nature" is used only as a heuristic device, and cannot be taken as a "sociological fantasy, a conjectural pre-history or a hypothesis about behavior."[22] Dunn argues that the state of nature is "any relationship between any men which is not modified by particular acts of direct aggression or by the particular explicit reciprocal normative understandings which institute a shared political society."[23] Although ubiquitous characterizations of how men will behave in such a situation could be, for Locke or any individual living the vast majority of his life within a shared political society, purely speculative, Dunn insists that the situation described between two hypothetical men by the term "the state of nature" is not based on "hypothetical duties but actual ones."[24]

Richard Ashcraft also downplays the charge that Locke's theory of history is speculative. He emphasizes the "empirical foundations" of Locke's historical account of property development, emphasized that Locke appeals to "'records' and 'matter of fact.'"[25] This is consistent with the Cambridge school emphasis on Locke's chapter 8, "Of the Beginning of Political Societies" (95–122), as an integral component of Locke's theory of history. However, Locke himself asserts within this chapter that "*History* gives us but a very little account of Men, *that lived together in the State of Nature*": Government is everywhere antecedent to Records, and Letters seldom come in among a People, till a long continuation of Civil Society has, by other more necessary Arts provided for their Safety, Ease, and Plenty" (101). This passage asserts two ideas in contradiction to Cambridge assertions. First, the term "the state of nature" is absolutely intended for historical conceptualization. It is true that Locke uses the term as a heuristic device intended to describe the condition of reasonable men after the dissolution of society, but this use of the term is in addition to the historical use of the term. As I will discuss further in the next chapter, Locke uses the term both as a heuristic device and as a term used

to describe an actual, real, historical state of existence that once occurred. Second, anything Locke wrote about history prior to the advent of civil societies may be described as speculative. Locke clearly did not have historical records at his disposal from which he may have garnered credible information pertaining to men living in a condition antedating civil society: "Government is everywhere antecedent to records." Archaeology and anthropology were not highly developed branches of historical study in the seventeenth century. Locke does base some of his arguments on historical evidence, but all of his historical evidence concerns events that occurred after the initial discovery of civil society, in what I have termed the historical state of peace. Thus, the historical state of nature and the historical state of war are aspects of Locke's theory of property which must be considered purely speculative.

Some of Locke's speculations are very good. Archaeologists and anthropologists now affirm many of Locke's arguments. Some of the primitive technological developments about which Locke speculates appear to be somewhat accurate, as, for example, tools for a nomadic or primitive farming lifestyle, fairly consistent with Locke's theory, although not an affirmation of an asocial historical state, have been unearthed since Locke wrote.

Others of Locke's speculations are more questionable. Locke argues that man was essentially peaceful until he was corrupted by the invention of money. Speculative political theorists do not agree on this point, and a comparison of Locke against Jean-Jacques Rousseau is instructive. Rousseau agrees with Locke that property likely arose fairly early in human history. However, he places much more emphasis on interpersonal human relationships in the state of nature than had Locke. Rousseau asserts that commodious property was, similarly to Locke's assertion, "the first source of evils."[26] However, he makes this argument for very different reasons than Locke. For Locke, money led directly into a historical state of war characterized by dominion and slavery. For Rousseau, commodities simply enervated "body and mind," as "these conveniences, by becoming habitual, had almost entirely ceased to be enjoyable, and at the same time had degenerated into true needs."[27] Consequently, "it became much more cruel to be deprived of them than to possess them was sweet, and men were unhappy to lose them without being happy to possess them."[28] Money, for Rousseau, did not lead to consequences characteristic of a state of war. Instead, Rousseau insists that "the weak found it simpler and safer to imitate [the strong] than to try to dislodge them."[29] The strong, meanwhile, had neither need nor desire for their neighbor's property.[30]

Rousseau refers to the slothful lifestyle of commodious living as "the first source of evils" because it gives rise to the more important and consequential corruption that results from jealous sentiments for other human beings. Hu-

mans develop psychological attachments to other human beings, partially as a result of commodious living: "They grow accustomed to attend to different objects and to make comparisons; imperceptibly they acquire ideas of merit and of beauty which produce sentiments of preference."[31] This leads to "sentiments of preference" to be felt, and eventually applied toward other individuals instead of toward commodities: "The more they see one another, the less they can do without seeing one another more. A tender and sweet sentiment steals into the soul, and at the least obstacle becomes an impetuous frenzy; jealousy awakens together with love."[32] Whereas for Locke it was a love of material property that led to a state of war, for Rousseau war results from love for other humans. "Discord triumphs," as a result of jealousy and passionate love, "and the gentlest of all passions receives sacrifices of human blood."[33]

Passionate love is to Rousseau what money is to Locke. We cannot deny Rousseau's claim that his own theory of history "seems plausible."[34] The main philosophical problem is that Locke's theory seems plausible as well. Both assertions, that men will fight for women and that men will fight for money, are self-evident. Locke and Rousseau both, therefore, posit ideas of man's original sin which ignore other plausible accounts. For example, the further plausible speculation of Thomas Hobbes provides yet another reasonable theory. Hobbes, of course, famously argues that deviant behavior is simply inherent to human nature. It is not unreasonable to surmise from the characterization of man's natural existence as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" that Hobbes believed men sometimes murdered or raped without economic or romantic motivation.[35] Hobbes more appropriately accounts for questions pertaining to crimes such as rape than does Rousseau or Locke, as the desire fulfilled by rape (brutish lust) is not the same desire that is fulfilled by the possession of commodities or by jealous sentiments. Nonetheless, and the more consequential point, attempting to discern which historical speculation is accurate is an exercise in futility because each theory ignores legitimate questions raised by other theories. Consequently, speculation on the origin of conflict in human history, however plausible, cannot be considered philosophical in nature as it tends to be closed-minded regarding some or another aspect of human behavior.

Locke's historical speculation is not political philosophy, that is, it is not an open-minded search for the most suitable political order. Instead, Locke's theory of history indicates Locke's intention to posit his predetermined view that a life of material convenience is the most suitable of potential human lifestyles. Although such a lifestyle is generally desirable, the veracity of Locke's position is ultimately questionable due to the fact that a speculative rendering of human history is used to substantiate it. The *telos* of Locke's theory of history is a society in which the acquisition and distribution of

property is managed so that productive and industrious individuals are duly rewarded for their efforts with monetary gain. Thus, a society characterized by safety, ease, and plenty theoretically exists for Locke as a second reality.

Locke's second reality is easily misdiagnosed. In most cases, a second reality is characterized by blatantly immoral objectives; a murderer, for instance, finds the logic necessary to justify murder. In Locke's case, the second reality is a much more normatively desirable construct in which individuals are duly rewarded for their productivity. The reason Locke's ostensibly reasonable construct is a second reality is because of the method in which Locke arrives at his theoretical conclusions. Because Locke bases his conclusions—conclusions clearly carrying partisan implications—on a speculative version of history instead of on robust empirical evidence, his paradigm is bound to run up against unforeseen questions. From a philosophical perspective, the ability or inability for a thinker to acceptably answer such questions is much more important than the normative bend of his ideas. Before turning to the manner in which Locke prohibits the asking of such questions, I will finish articulating the set of symbols Locke creates in the *Second Treatise*.

NOTES

1. Cf. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 211; Robert Goldwin, "John Locke," in *History and Political Philosophy*, 3rd edition, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 489–495.

2. Cf. Ellis Sandoz, *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding*, 58; Pocock, *Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study in English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century*, 237–238; Peter Laslett, introduction in *John Locke: "Two Treatises of Government,"* 13th reprint. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 75–78; Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), ch.1; Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 202–251; Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 300.

3. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 233–236.

4. Ibid., 236.

5. Goldwin, "John Locke," 493.

6. Ibid., 495. Parenthetical references in this section are Goldwin's, designing the section of the *Second Treatise* that he is quoting.

7. Ibid., 492.

8. Ibid., 500–501.

9. See Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government."*

10. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 223.

11. Ibid., 237.
12. Ibid., 236.
13. I identify Locke's historical conflict stages as "the historical state of nature," "the historical state of war," and "the historical state of peace." This terminology is meant to distinguish Locke's historical stages from "the state of nature" and "the state of war," which, as explained in chapter 4, are, in addition to their capacity as historical stages, used as heuristic devices describing whether a relationship between two or more individuals is confrontational or peaceful, despite the historical stage in which the two parties exist. The blurred boundaries between the heuristic and historical uses of the terms, as I explain in the next chapter, is an intentional linguistic trick symptomatic of pneumopathology.
14. As I noted in chapter 1, references to John Locke's *Second Treatise* in this book are made parenthetically using this format: (section number). I have relied on: John Locke, *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).
15. From the beginning of Locke's argument, the individual's relation to God is something that occurs on a materialistic level (i.e., God does not conduct this conduct through the soul).
16. Thus the highest good of government is to protect innocents' material interests from corrupt individuals. That this is the highest good of society is iterated by Locke's resistance theory, discussed in chapter 5 of this work. This reading is only reasonable given the nature of man offered in Locke's theory of history where the greatest fallacy is a propensity for corruption regarding material convenience.
17. I do not find the contrary reading, offered by Tully, that for Locke "morally, money changes nothing," to be intelligible (Huyler, Jerome. *Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 134).
18. References to John Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* in this book are made using this format: (STCE section number). I have relied on: John Locke, *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).
19. Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* ch 6.
20. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, 221–238; cf. Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* ch 6; Ashcraft, Richard, "The Politics of Locke's *Two Treatises*," in *John Locke's "Two Treatises of Government."* Edited by Edward J. Harpham (Lawerence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 26, for the contrarian position.
21. Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chigago Press: 1984), book V.
22. Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government,"* 111.
23. Ibid., 111.
24. Ibid., 112.
25. Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* 125.
26. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*. Edited by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2008), 164.
27. Ibid., 165.

28. Ibid., 165.
29. Ibid., 164.
30. Ibid., 164.
31. Ibid., 165.
32. Ibid., 165.
33. Ibid., 165.
34. Ibid., 164.
35. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. Edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996), 89.

Chapter Five

Locke's Abstract Definition of Rebellion

In chapter 4, I began discussing the set of symbols created by Locke in order to articulate his political theory. I focused on Locke's speculative theory of history, which substantiates the ideal that the productive and industrious members of society are due a certain level of material convenience. Through his theory of history, the *telos* of history is made to appear to be compatible with Locke's theoretical priorities. Because the actual *telos* of history is an unknowable mystery, Locke's theory of history is a pneumopathological construct designed to foment support for his political theory. In this chapter, I will focus on Locke's theory of resistance. Locke's idea of rebellion is another symbolic way of validating Locke's theoretical priorities. Locke takes the concept of rebellion, which has a rich history in political philosophy, and abstractly assigns it a new conceptual framework that is amenable to his political theory. Locke does not fully disclose, however, the transformative nature of his conception of rebellion. Instead, he attempts to make his idea of rebellion appear to be consistent with traditional ideas regarding rebellion. In other words, resistance theories are powerful tools in the grafting of priorities in any political theory. The use of technical jargon regarding resistance in a convoluted manner to make a new idea of society appear to be traditional is a means of concealing the creative and abstract nature of Locke's political theory from his readers. For this reason, a detailed analysis of Locke's resistance theory, which I will undertake in this chapter, is an important component of an analysis of Locke's subtle ideological construction.

Locke develops a comprehensive theory of resistance, which he legitimates, in part, by coining a new definition of the word "rebellion." He defines rebellion twice in *The Second Treatise*. First, in the context of an unjust conquest, Locke writes that "shaking off a Power, which Force, and not Right hath set over any one, though it hath the Name of Rebellion, yet it is no

Offence before God, but is that, which he allows and countenances" (196). Locke suggests that "though it hath the name," this is not actually the proper conception of the word. He later argues that it is those who abuse power who are "guilty of Rebellion" (227), writing that "those who set up force again in opposition to the Laws, do Rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of War, and are properly Rebels" (226). The second definition replaces the traditional conception of rebellion and asserts that rebellion is an unjustified abuse of power. Locke's new definition of rebellion, asserting that rebels are those who exercise political power for purposes not countenanced by society's precepts, admonishes rebellion while justifying resistance. This chapter will explore the hypothesis that Locke's recoining of the word "rebellion" is an indication of pneumopathology.

Locke's transformative definition is seated in the theoretical tenor of his work. Locke employs a set of terms (law of nature, state of nature, state of war, and civil society) to limit the exercise of various types of power (political, paternal, conjugal, and despotical) and to vilify unlimited (absolute) power.[1] Through these limitations, Locke founds society on the individualistic ability to resist government for the sakes of self-preservation and material convenience. Locke's resistance theory is a theoretical construct allowing for individualistic limitations to exercises of power. The right to resistance transforms the nature of social relationships from being oriented toward the common good of all parties involved, toward the individual interests of self-preservation and personal material accumulation.

To iterate: Locke's resistance justification, buttressed by his historical speculations discussed in the previous chapter, is the main vehicle through which this theoretical transformation takes place. Locke insists that rebellion is justified against rulers who attempt to alter the fundamental tenets of society. Although Locke denounces fundamental alterations to society, his society *is* fundamentally altered. Society was traditionally viewed as a group of individuals who share a way of life. *Polis* was grounded by *paidea*; the society existed because individuals were educated for a shared way of life that was conducive to their collective, not individual, preservation. It was in this way that the *polis* was believed to be a "man writ large." This remained true through Aquinas and Hooker, and even through English justifications for resistance up to, and including, the majority of Whig arguments in Locke's own day.[2] Because Locke justifies resistance from his new individualistic standpoint, justifiable resistance against tyranny is founded on individual rather than communal sources of moral orientation.

Through Locke's self-interested right to resistance, societies influenced by Locke on this point are reformed on the basis of his alterations. When these alterations conflict with traditional values, Locke's philosophy countenances

precisely those societal alterations impugned by Locke's conception of rebellion. Thus, it is precisely what I will call the modern form of political revolution, identified and denounced by Locke as a proper rebellion, which Locke's arguments for resistance unintentionally facilitate.

The modern form of political revolution occurs when social values and mores are fundamentally altered. The contemporary definition of "revolution" in political science literature is divided between three camps. The first camp defines revolution rather broadly; they assert that a revolution is characterized by a breakdown of sovereign authority and is typically violent. This school does not consider the nature and extent of social change as pertinent to revolution. Peter Amann, for example, asserts a revolution is simply "a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience."[3] James Rosenau identifies three types of revolution—personal conflicts, authority wars, and structural strife—which are different types of struggles for power.[4] These struggles may have constitutional ramifications, or may simply result in a change in leadership, but are not distinguished from each other based upon the extent of social change that occurs pursuant to a revolution.

For proponents of the second camp, although acknowledging that revolution today commonly connotes a "violent break from the past," theoretical and normative distinctions are drawn between the modern form of revolution and the political experience associated with the "recurrence to fundamental principles":

> "recurrence to fundamental principles" involves the action of going back mentally and in discourse to recapture the principles that inform and animate our constitutional system, to reconsider these principles in the light of altered circumstances and commitments, and either to reaffirm in contemporary language and symbols what still speaks the truth to us or to alter and then ratify formally modifications or additions to these principles.[5]

The third camp articulates the modern form of political revolution. These scholars argue that a revolution occurs when social values and mores are fundamentally altered. Dale Yoder argues a "real revolution is the change in the social attitudes and values basic to the traditional institutional order."[6] Godfrey Elton asserts a revolution occurs with "broad and sweeping changes in society."[7] This school articulates the modern conception of revolution as a fundamental alteration to society. This sort of revolution abandons the idea inherent to revolution, taken literally, as no regime's way of governance is reinstated after having been lost to a different regime's way of governance. A new state and new way of life are established by this type of revolution. Hannah Arendt defines the modern conception of revolution as happening

"where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom."[8] Such reformations are necessarily derived from experiential revulsion. Simple reactions to tyranny restore traditional forms of government; sweeping changes in society are associated with deep seeded alterations, such as those suggested by Locke.

Many scholars agree Locke's *Second Treatise* was meant to foment political resistance.[9] Yet, the philosophical consequences of his resistance theory have not been adequately diagnosed; this is at least in part the result of our contemporary semantic ambiguity regarding the term revolution. Many scholars read Locke's resistance theory as falling within either the first or second camps described above (that is, they interpret no consequential societal changes to follow from the revolution). Richard Ashcraft, for instance, argues that Locke's intention in arguing for a right of resistance, and in the language he uses to argue for it, is to argue for political but not for constitutional changes in England—for free elections and against executive proroguing of Parliament.[10] Julian Franklin's conception of Locke's resistance theory views it, similarly, as oriented by political contingencies, not private necessities.[11] Ashcraft sees Locke's resistance theory as radical because it justifies tyrannicide within the confines of explicitly politically motivated action.[12] Nathan Tarcov notes that Locke's theory articulates a preemptive justification for resistance against tyranny; that, for example, the people could act if they so much as feared a regime of tyranny.[13] This tone is iterated by A. John Simmons, who insists Locke's theory is restricted to the "moral limits on political relationship."[14] I will suggest a more expansive reading of Locke's theory of resistance than has been argued for by these erudite scholars; Locke subtly advocates that type of sociopolitical movement described by the third camp, the modern form of revolution. Locke does not merely provide a theory of resistance against government; he provides a theory of existential resistance that applies to a very wide array of circumstances, many of which are nonpolitical and derived from the constitution of the human experience, regardless of political circumstance. Because Locke fails to limit justified cases of resistance to explicitly political cases, because he does not restore a lost order but rather articulates the ideals for a new order, he prefigures the modern political revolution wrought through experiential, instead of political, renunciations. Locke's theory of resistance therefore vitiates the highest good arguments, sustaining politics instead on individual property rights and their relation to government action. It is precisely for this reason that the examples cited in chapter 1 to this work (which are ostensibly not inspired by Locke)—the experiential renunciations of police brutality and other vague

gender or racial class claims—are indeed inspired by a predictable misreading and misapplication of Locke by Americans who now rebel against their government, even when facts cannot be submitted to a candid world which would hold their government accountable for their grievances. What we have in such cases is the Marixian revolutionary drive for class equality filtered through the American language of Lockean resistance theory.

Locke is only capable of legitimizing his resistance theory by employing a rich and convoluted technical vocabulary that makes his theory appear to be traditional. This vocabulary is central to Locke's theoretical expression; it is the symbolic structure whereby we may determine what is important to Locke. Before explaining the two definitions of rebellion Locke uses to arrive at his new definition of rebellion, we must review the terse technical jargon Locke uses in order to make his new view of resistance, which is being employed to legitimate a new ideal of society, appear to be consistent with traditional philosophical views.

Locke's attempt to conceal his transformative definition through ostensibly traditional ideas is indicative of subtle ideological construction. He clearly understands the value of the traditional idea of rebellion, as well as the philosophic value of linguistic or semantic consistency. The calculated alteration to a traditional philosophical concept reveals Locke's desire to advocate a material, worldly, good over and against potential philosophical objections to the philosophic legitimacy of Locke's desired end.

THE LAW OF NATURE

Locke's new definition of rebellion is required by a new definition of man, a man explicitly oriented toward individual material interests. The law of nature requires that man orient himself toward two particular interests—self-preservation and material accumulation—which, according to Locke's account, are not readily available to man by the work of nature alone. Hence, to understand Locke's new definition of rebellion, Locke's new man must be explicated. The new man is defined by a transformed natural law, referred to by Locke as the law of nature.

The law of nature indicates what behavior is reasonable for an individual to undertake in relation to other individuals, as understood by man through his reasoning abilities (6). Reason is the fountainhead from which man understands two essential concepts.[15] First, reason implants in man "the desire, strong desire of Preserving his Life and Being" (I 86).[16] Such a desire is natural and universal in man (I 88). From this desire arises the subsidiary desire of propagation (I 88, II 11).

Second, reason urges man to seek the "Conveniences of Life" (37). The law of nature also asserts, therefore, that the material items a man may accumulate through his own labor is his property (25, 27, 28, 30). This is a part of the law of nature, not because it provides for preservation, but because it provides for convenience in life: "God, who hath given the world to Men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience" (26; cf. 36, 37). God's material creations are provided for man's enjoyment (31). Property improves nature (36, 37).[17] Reasonableness spurs industriousness (34). Improving man's natural condition is the goal of the law of nature; by following the law of nature inconvenience is replaced by convenience. The end of civil society is property, not for its own sake, but because property fundamentally represents the material convenience for which reason inspires man to act. It is for convenience that men transgress the law of nature and risk preservation, and it is for convenience that the law of nature condones retributive violence.

Preservation and convenience only occur if transgressions of the law of nature are minimal. Transgressions are minimized by the natural culpability of each individual to each individual: "every man, by the Right he hath to preserve Mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them" (8). Thus, the law of nature provides each man the power to punish transgressions of the law of nature undertaken against him. By nature, each man possesses the power to execute the law of nature; that is, each man possesses the power to defend his person and possessions with violence against other men who might seek to destroy him or take his possessions for the sake of their own aggrandizement (8, 19, 94, 130, 155, 181, 232). From these innate desires, Locke posits, in the *Second Treatise*, the law of nature to be: "when [a man's] own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods of another" (6).

THE STATE OF NATURE

Locke uses the term "the state of nature" in two distinct capacities, the historical capacity and the heuristic capacity. In chapter 4, I discussed the historical capacity in which Locke uses the term. The historical state of nature was characterized by a peaceful and atomistic existence; eventually men were corrupted by the invention of money, after which Locke speaks of a state of war arising within a state of nature. In this chapter, I discuss

the heuristic sense in which Locke uses the term. At some places in the text the term takes a heuristic role, and on these occasions, Locke can be seen trying to legitimize his ideal of society based on a heuristic state of nature which is quite inconsistent with his historical state of nature. In the heuristic sense, the state of nature is essentially warlike. There are heuristic occasions within the text of the *Second Treatise* where it is as if the generally peaceful state of nature predating the invention of money did not exist. In the heuristic state of nature, the importance of money disappears, and man's nature is depicted as being inherently malevolent.

The state of nature and the state of war are terms used by Locke to engender the idea that self-preservation and convenience, although not man's natural ends, are justified pursuits for man, and that conventions which can make these unnatural conditions be obtained are profitable improvements to man's natural condition.

By the state of nature, Locke signifies that reason is the theoretical ideal and foundation of civil society. Reason induces man to seek self-preservation and material convenience, although these often fail to occur in the state of nature due to the lack of restraint on the sometimes self-interested nature Locke posits for man. "Criminals" will risk their self-preservation for illicit gain (8). They will try to steal innocent men's coats and horses (19). Violence often accompanies thievery, and men, per the law of nature, desiring both their own preservation and the convenience associated with owning things like horses and coats, will defend themselves when attacked by a criminal. Locke views this defensive action as a power men have pursuant to the law of nature (8).

As discussed in chapter 4, Locke's theory of history downplays these types of petty offenses. Man was viewed as basically reasonable within the state of nature, and there was not logical reason to commit a crime against another individual until the invention of money offered bounties large enough for criminals to justify the risk of retributive violence. Given the historical state of nature, man was not really threatened by other individuals; in such a state Locke's law of nature would have been a trivial law. It would not have come up very often between individuals. To suggest that such a law was the fundamental law of nature is tantamount to suggesting that the traffic regulation for how to navigate the infrequently encountered roundabout is the fundamental law of American driving. Locke overplays the violence of the heuristic state of nature at certain junctures in his text in order to substantiate, even though his own theory of history does not corroborate, the theoretical priorities of his civil society.

Although Locke illustrates the historical state of nature as a generally reasonable state, reason must be depicted as an unattainable ideal within the heuristic state of nature. Thus, the heuristic natural condition of humanity, as

depicted by Locke, is described as "unsafe and uneasie" (131). It is wrought with "inconveniences" (13, 101). Existence is "very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others" (123).

THE STATE OF WAR

The heuristic natural state for man is depicted in Locke's term, "the State of War." This condition was described in detail in chapter 4 of this analysis. It is the condition that occurs between individuals when the law of nature is not followed by men living in any of Locke's historical stages. Locke does not assign a significant theoretical distinction between the historical and heuristic uses of this term.

A state of war is, like a state of nature, relative; it is a state that exists between two or more parties. The aggravating party is properly said to be "in a State of War" with those he assaults. The assailed party is granted "the Right of War"—a justification by reason for retributive uses of violence—against the aggravating party (19). The state of war is, therefore, the condition of existence in which reason condones the use of violence. The state of war is consistent with the heuristic state of nature and represents a perversion of the historical state of nature. In the historical state of nature, reasonable men were passive and peaceful. In a state of war, endowed by reason with the right of war, reasonable men assume the violent and aggressive nature that is typically found in only a few unreasonable men in the historical state of nature.

Because reason is posited as man's natural condition in the historical state of nature, the reasonable man retains the moral high ground when brought into conflict by the introduction of a state of war, he exercises a right of war in the heuristic state of nature. If Locke's historical state of nature was made consistent with Locke's heuristic state of nature, violent and dangerous, Locke would not be able to insist upon a right of war for only the reasonable men. If Locke had argued that the historical state of nature was a violent experience of slavery, *á la* Hobbes, there would be no basis for his defense of reason as natural, and consequently no ground for him to justify a reasonable use of violence in certain contexts. Indeed, Hobbes's political theory lacks the vindication for resistance found in Locke. A theory of justified resistance must assume that the aggrieved party is also the reasonable party, otherwise the aggrieved party would not be aggrieved but simply one party involved in a conflict.

Individual concerns, as predicated by one's material condition, define Locke's new man. Preservation and convenience, sought through reason, are the only proper ends sought by man. And these are radically individual ends. Hobbes, for all his unrestrained modernism and proto-positivistic meth-

odology, clung to tradition by the end he posited for man, as constituent to a greater communal good, through the representative of the sovereign will. Hobbesian men ultimately relinquish individual concerns to the commonwealth's needs. Locke makes the distinction between justified and unjustified violence inherent to nature by positing that his conception of reason is historically natural for men, when upon analysis, Locke's argument insists that man's natural experience is, as a matter of heuristics, infrequently determined by reason. Because reason is natural, Locke justifies the right of war. Otherwise, the right of war would be inherent to Locke's argument, but it would not be justified.[18] Locke justifies resistance because he labels Hobbesian passion as reason, and makes the ends determined by this conception of reason man's only viable objectives.[19]

The inconsistencies discussed here between the historical and heuristic state of nature reflect that Locke's theory requires him to both have and to eat his cake. Locke ignores money in the heuristic state of nature, and retributive violence is viewed as both natural and fundamental to existence. In the historical state of nature, contrarily, retributive violence is deemed to be conventional, and only essential to human life as a result of the conventional corruption that occurs after the introduction of money. Locke needs retributive violence to appear natural in order to justify the argument that it is naturally beneficial for a society to rebel against tyranny for the sake of material possessions. However, Locke also needs individuals who are not inherently disposed to act violently in order to justify the propriety of violence given the circumstance of retribution (that is, given that one is executing a right of war and not instigating a state of war).

CIVIL SOCIETY

Locke's political theory requires a society that exists for the sake of individual preservation and material accumulation. Resistance, justified by individual grievance, is Locke's institutional way of bringing about his new man and new society. Civil society is characterized by the existence of an impartial judge and is ultimately dependent on the impartiality of societal rulers (19). If the established common judge of a society perverts justice to "protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men or party of men, then it is hard to imagine anything but a state of war" (20, cf. 202). This argument extends the right of justified retributive violence to men who feel aggrieved by their society's rulers (93, 94, 204, 226, 227, 232, 240, 243). In this instance, Locke argues, retributive violence is justified against the society's rulers in an attempt to reinstate a reasonable and fair judge over society. Societal rulers that

abandon impartiality abandon the ideal of reason which is the fundamental law of any legitimate society (94, 232). Their unreasonable action in relation to the society over which they have power nullifies their societal relationships, and introduces them as aggressor in a state of war against this society. In essence, the society is reverted to the historical state of war or the heuristic state of nature. Any individual, by the law of nature, may undertake retributive violence against any aggressor with whom he shares a heuristic state of nature or state of war. Because the unreasonable ruler is in such a state in relation to his former society, the members of the society are justified by reason in executing a right of war against the aggressor and thereby reconstituting the fundamental law, the reasonable preservation of self and accumulation of material convenience, of their society. Hence, pursuant to Locke's reduction of man's nature to a productive corporeal being, civil society becomes man's individual safeguard of his individual goods.

Locke's account of the heuristic state of nature as fundamentally warlike, governed by a law of nature that requires retributive violence, as a rhetorical devise, ignores the historical stages pertinent to the term as a historical description. Locke's version of political revolution therefore does not restore a fundamental law of society which had ever been manifest according to Locke's version of history. As a historical matter, convenience and peace did not occur side-by-side. According to Locke's historical sketch, man was peaceful when life was inconvenient, and when money offered the possibility of convenience man chose corruption instead. Life was peaceful and inconvenient and then life was warlike with some possessing material convenience. Locke's idea of revolution, that for which a king may be ousted, is for the sake of a lifestyle which had not been historically manifest, and could not consequently have characterized a lost fundamental. Locke's idea of political revolution is therefore innovative, it seeks to make fundamental alterations to any society in history, although particularly to England, for the sake of the historically unprecedented goal of the attainment of both a peaceable and a convenient social lifestyle.

At this point, it should be clear that Locke justifies resistance in order to increase the attention given to individual interests in society, and that he does so through an ambivalent use of the term state of nature. I will further elucidate Locke's counterintuitive definition of rebellion through an analysis of his conception of power.

POWER

Locke argues that power exercised beyond the consensual limits of society facilitates a right to resistance. Locke decries absolute power by arguing that

wielding it violates the law of nature. His view of power allows him to make the argument that rulers who violate rights pertinent to individual preservation and convenience are actually rebels. Through Locke's conception of power, he appears to redefine rebellion, while he actually redefines man and society, without man and society appearing to rebel against the traditional order in the process. Locke quite successfully conceals fundamental changes by drawing limits to sovereign power for the sake of the individual from limits traditionally self-imposed by the ruler for the good of the community.

The powers discussed in this section—husband, father, and master of servants—are distinct from political power. The powers in these relationships do not have the power of life and death inherent to political power (86). Otherwise, however, these powers retain the character of political power: these powers are limited, oblige duties on the powerful, and permit rights to the powerless. However, the limits established on the powerful in these relations are set by the political power. Nonpolitical powers are powerless in relation to the political power.

This is to say, traditionally, limits to these powers were the result of positive laws established by a political power for its own sake. Political power had a sway over subsidiary powers because such a power structure was deemed good for the stability of the society. Social stability could not obtain unless the political power limited its own sway. In Locke, the political ruler is motivated by his personal interest of self-preservation, as it might manifest in response to self-interested society members who may resist undesirable commands. Wise rulers "have most need to avoid" transgressing a reasonable execution of their powers because this is "the most perilous" situation for a ruler (168). Hence, powers subsidiary to political power, whose moral limits were once themselves determined by the obtaining political power for the purpose of social order, but are now effectively determined by society members for individual purposes, are used to justify an individualistic basis for the limits placed on political power. Locke's tautology takes limits to subsidiary powers, established by political power for the community's sake, and views them as limits to the exercise of political power for the sake of individual, instead of communal, well-being. Rules established by the ruler over the ruled for social order, become rules set by the ruled over the ruler for the sake of individual interests.

Locke provides an analysis of power in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that will help elucidate the limits to power in the *Second Treatise*. Power is a concept that designates a relationship between two entities whose relation to one another is capable of being changed (ECHU II xxi 3–4).[20] The entities involved in this relationship possess either active power, or passive power, depending on their role within the relationship. The active

power is the party in the relationship capable of changing the substance of the other party (ECHU II xxi 4). The passive power is the party in the relationship who is capable of undergoing a change brought about by the active power (ECHU II xxi 4). Power manifests in human relationships as a result of the will, which is the power of the mind to consider ideas and to prefer one idea to another (ECHU II xxi 5). In my relationship with an orange, I possess an active power over the orange, in that I may will to eat the orange, thereby altering the orange's substance. The orange, in that instance, possesses a passive power in relation to me. On the other hand, the orange possesses an active power to the extent that it has the power to increase my vitamin C, thereby altering my own substance. Of course, the orange does not will the changes it makes to my body; my own passive power wills to be changed, in this instance. Hence, active power is the power to change something else, and passive power is the power to be changed by something else; both active power and passive power can be the result of volition, or will.

Supposing a theoretical relationship between two men, only one of whom possesses a weapon, it can be seen that the man possessing the weapon may wield an active power over the other man. The man with the weapon may injure the unarmed man, or command him to undertake an action, but the unarmed man cannot bring about the same changes to the armed man. The armed man, possessing active power, has significant liberties, liberty defined as "the power to do or forbear any particular action," while the unarmed man, possessing passive power, has very few liberties given the situation (ECHU II xxi 8). In this theoretical situation, which mimics a state of war, man's natural condition, active power is not limited by the will of the passive power. Locke understands that the natural relationship between active power and passive power is incompatible with the ideal of reason which is necessary for civil society. The typology of power developed in the *Second Treatise* is perfectly compatible with the typology of power just described in the *Essay*, save that Locke aims to modify the natural relationship between active and passive power in human relationships to prevent active power from being used in an unlimited capacity. Locke depicts a conception of power in which the passive will retains theoretical value, a conception in which the passive will is capable of actualizing its desires.

He modifies the natural relationship between active and passive power through a typology of power that compares the moral bases of political power to moral justifications for limitations on active power in nonpolitical arenas of life. He differentiates political power from paternal power, the conjugal relationship, the power of a master over a servant, despotical power, and absolute power. His argument proceeds in a purposeful manner toward a justification of resistance against one's government on individu-

alistic and materialistic grounds. In the first three cases, of paternal power, the conjugal relationship, and the power of a master over a servant, he shows how the active power in a relationship is limited by the interests of the passive power. This argument suggests limits to just exercises of power. In the fourth case, of despotic power, he shows that man is justified in resisting higher powers that exceed the limits to just exercises of power. In the final case, of absolute power, Locke demonstrates that men are justified in resisting not simply higher powers, but one's government, if government exceeds the just exercise of political power. It is this final conception of justified resistance in which Locke argues for the modern form of political revolution, for a remaking of society upon the unprecedented fundamental law of "safety, ease, and plenty" (101).

POLITICAL POWER

Locke views political power as the exercise of power by a ruler in a manner consistent with the individual interests of the ruled. Political power is defined as: "a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the defense of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good" (3). Although force remains an inherent component of the definition of political power, political power is further characterized by the qualified execution of active power. The active power inherent to political power is limited through a division into legislative, executive, and federative power, through the origin of this power in the consent of the people, and through the ultimate grounding of consensual government in a popular right to resist tyranny. Despite Locke's contention that political power is a "right," the rightful character of political power means that those wielding it are obliged to use active power in a certain manner. It is a "fiduciary" power and must appease citizen's preferences (149). Those wielding political power possess a duty in their active power. Those under the sway of that active power, that is, those possessing a passive power in the political relationship, have a right to that ruler's dutiful observance of the rightful limits to power. Locke justifies these limits to political power by comparing the moral bounds of political power to a number of nonpolitical relationships in which the active power is often already limited by civil laws and social constraints. Because these limits are the same (or similar to) limits that would have been set by a traditional ruler for societal preservation, the transformation in the origin of power from active to passive parties is recondite, although tractable and consequential.

PATERNAL POWER

Paternal power is the rightful execution of active power in regard to the raising of children: "The Power, then, that parents have over their Children, arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of Childhood" (58). Children do not participate in the state of nature; they instead participate in the state of Childhood (54, 55). Although capable of reasonable behavior, they do not generally display reasonable behavior of their own accord, and are dependent on their parents to direct them toward reason, so they may become reasonable themselves once they enter "a State of Maturity" with adulthood, then becoming subject themselves to the law of nature (57, 58). The parental charge of raising children is, therefore, a natural "duty" (58, 69): "God hath made it their business to imploy this Care on their Offspring" (63).

This duty is consistent with Locke's natural right teaching regarding political power.[21] According to this teaching, the execution of active power is restricted to the interests of persons possessing passive power. In the case of paternal power, the parent's duty gives the child rights pertinent to his welfare. Paternal power may only be used to provide for the welfare of the child, which is to incline it to a reasonable disposition, provide for its bodily nourishment until the child is capable of doing so for his or herself, and to treat the child tenderly while under the care of the parent (63, 64, 66, 67). Education is the only specific duty Locke names above these general parental duties (67, 69, 81). If the parents fail at this obligation, they fail to provide their progeny "the privilege of his Nature," and would amount to their child being "thrust out among Brutes" (63). The father has no natural right to "an Absolute Arbitrary Dominion" over his children, and may be replaced by the mother or a foster parent if he neglects his child's well-being (65, 69, 74). The parental duty toward their progeny, moreover, becomes manifest in a society's positive laws (59, 65). The critical point is that Locke asserts that this type of power structure occurs for the individual good of the children (67, 74), yet the proper education of children had been a critical concern of communally oriented thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle, neither of whom saw it necessary to distinguish between the interests of the father and son, for they understood that their interests were indeed one and the same.[22]

CONJUGAL SOCIETY

A father of a family wields paternal power, and included here, although not expressly articulated by Locke as a "power," is the conjugal relationship

between man and woman. Locke expressly refers to this relationship as the "conjugal society," suggesting it is a power limited by reason (78, 84).[23]

This power, like paternal power, is characterized by obligations for the man, the party viewed in Locke's day as typically possessing active power, and rights for the woman, or typically passive party. The relationship between man and woman, who join together for the conjugal purposes of procreation, "ought to last so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young Ones" (79). Because the interests of man and woman sometimes differ, it falls to the man to rectify these differences, and in this responsibility is the power inherent to a conjugal relationship (82). This power is obligatory, as the man is given discretion in the relationship only insofar as the best interest of the family is concerned. The woman may abandon him if he violates this obligation (82). Thus, like the relationship between father and child, woman subjects herself to man for her own good, but this subjection goes no further than the woman sees fit for her own good. The government oversees conjugal disputes, when necessary, to ensure the man does not violate the powers inherent to his station as husband (83). Hence this power is also limited by the interests of the party possessing passive power in the relationship. This power, as well, has been traditionally regulated by the governing powers for the best interest of the commonwealth. Plato, for instance, proposed a rather peculiar community of wives and children, and did so for the good of the republic, not because he believed such a community to be the most conducive route to the individual happiness of the women in the community.[24] For Aristotle, political power assumed control over household issues because the good of the city was "the most authoritative good of all."[25]

The power a master wields over a servant retains the same limited character as paternal power and as the conjugal society (86). The power of a master over a servant is limited by the terms of the contract between master and servant. Agreed upon by the servant, this contract will require nothing of the servant beyond what is reasonable from the perspective of the servant (85). Thus, a master cannot oblige a servant to perform duties, without consent, that jeopardize the servant's preservation; nor may a master bind a servant to his service for longer than the servant consents (23). Business interests, as well, were once regulated by governing powers for the best interest of the commonwealth. Plato's philosophers determined the nature of life for the artisans, and justice dictated that the artisans abide by philosophic rule for the sake of the community's collective interest.[26] For Aristotle, this was another aspect of household management subjected to political control for the communal good.[27]

DESPOTICAL POWER

Despotical power is another form of power limited by the interest of the passive power in the relationship. Locke uses despotical power to justify, not the moral limits of political power, as was the case with the powers discussed above, but the morality of actually resisting a power when it is determined to exceed these limits. Locke's first definition of rebellion occurs in the context of despotical power; it comprises the "shaking off a Power, which Force, and not Right hath set over anyone" (196).

The identification of despotical power with rebellion restricts the definition of rebellion, in this context, to the negative act of overthrowing an unjust foreign conqueror. Rebellion, in this context, is always a justifiable act against unjust foreign powers. Locke applies this conception of rebellion explicitly to unjust conquests, not to resistance against one's government. "Though it hath the name," this is not actually rebellion.

With this definition, seated in foreign affairs, Locke does two things. First, he removes the traditional view of rebellion from matters of domestic politics. Resisting conquerors was not actually the traditional view of rebellion, which had understood resistance against domestic tyrants as rebellion.[28] Locke's first definition of rebellion is a move used to ensure that his second definition does not simply contradict vernacular. It is a convenient redefinition, as no serious political philosopher has argued against the propriety of resisting invading foreigners. Second, because he grounds the use of retributive violence against higher powers in the universally accepted proposition that resistance against invading foreigners is valid, Locke not only modifies the traditional conception of rebellion in a useful manner, but he also founds the idea of justified resistance on premises his audience would have accepted without questioning. Although Locke will ultimately justify resistance against domestic tyrants by demurring from this first definition, it is the first definition, seated in the erroneous ground of international conflict, which justifies the idea of resistance on grounds few would dispute.

ABSOLUTE POWER

Locke's discussion on absolute power is aimed at justifying, not simply the morality of resisting higher powers, as he demonstrated through despotical power, but the morality of specifically resisting one's government. Absolute power is the power, gained through brute force and connivance, to have other individuals' persons and possessions under one's control. This is an illegitimate form of rule, which Locke fashions into his second definition of rebellion. Rebellion, in the second form, which Locke designates as the proper

definition of rebellion, is to wield absolute power over a society. Locke argues that man is God's property, and therefore man may never consent to enslave his whole person (although he may consent to a contractual servitude) (23). No one may give up his own natural power of self-preservation and right to material convenience, and the relinquishment thereof is required by those under the absolute power of another individual. To surrender one's natural freedom when demanded by force is to give up one's potential preservation, which is the very basis of the law of nature. One may not be "guarded from harm, or injury where the strongest hand is presently the Voice of Faction and Rebellion" (93).

In this case, "faction and rebellion" carry a malicious connotation. Locke's second definition of rebellion asserts that rebellion is: "an Opposition, not to Persons but Authority, which is founded only in the Constitutions and Laws of the Government" (226), therefore:

> those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justifie their voilation of [the Constitutions and the Laws fo the Government], are truly and properly *Rebels*. For when Men by Entering into Society and Civil Government, have excluded force, and introduced Laws for the preservation of Property, Peace, and Unity among themselves; those who set up force again in opposition to the Laws, do *Rebellare*, that is, bring back again the state of War, and are properly Rebels. (226)

According to the second definition, those who "set up force again" and "bring back again the State of War" are rebels. By "again," asserted twice, we see that this type of rebel may only occur once a civil society has been instituted, for this type of rebel must "bring back again the State of War" (226). A state of war, being more-or-less man's condition in the entrepreneurial stage of history antedating civil society, cannot be reintroduced unless it has first been extinguished, which typically occurs through the constitution of a society based on self-preservation and material convenience. This type of rebel renounces the constituted laws of his society in favor of the anarchy associated with the heuristic state of nature (historical state of war), and the possible absolute power he stands to achieve through the introduction of a state of war against a society. This type of rebel seeks absolute power, and consequently never has justice on his side.

Locke provides two situations where the second definition of rebellion may occur. The first situation in which Locke's second definition of rebellion may actually occur is when the legislative power in society has been altered (212). First, a person may set up arbitrary laws in place of those established by the legislative power of society (214). Second, a person may hinder the assembling of the legislative (215). Third, a person may change the way that the legislative is elected (216). Fourth, a person may subject

the society to a foreign power (217). Fifth, the executive may neglect his duty so that established laws cannot be executed (219). In each of these instances, an individual—almost always a Prince or the individual possessing executive power—executes a power which is properly reserved for the legislative power established by the society. The society being established for the explicit purposes of preservation of self and protection of property, altering the tenets of society is tantamount to acquiring the persons and property of a society for one's own use.

Successfully undertaking any of these five possibilities produces absolute power, and thereby dissolves society. These are not instances that validate resistance; they are instances where resistance is most readily called for, but also instances in which it may be too late to successfully resist. Because chained men make for poor insurgents, these are circumstances that may be metaphorically depicted as a society of captives, shackled and helpless in a dungeon, whose predicament prevents them from actually resisting. Society exists as the embodiment of reason, which cannot obtain under conditions of slavery that characterize life under an absolute power. In this regard, I demur from the otherwise astute analysis of Nathan Tarcov. Tarcov argues that individuals facing the dissolution of society by the above five causes "may constitute a new society."[29] Because they are enslaved under an absolute power, they are incredibly unlikely to do any such thing. Locke's theory of resistance is therefore a preemptive theory of resistance:

> In these and the like Cases . . . the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative. But the state of Mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this Remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell *People* they *may provide for themselves,* by erecting a new Legislative, when by Oppression, Artifice, or being delivered over to a Foreign Power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect Relief, when it is too late, and the evil is past Cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first to be Slaves, and then to take care of their Liberty; and when their Chains are on, tell them, they may act like Freemen. This, if barely so, is rather Mockery than Relief; and men can never be secure from Tyranny, if there be no means to escape it, they are perfectly under it: And therefore it is, that they have not only a Right to get out of it but to prevent it. (220)

Tarcov observes the preemptive nature of Locke's resistance theory, but he does not acknowledge the urgent nature of this preemptive resistance. Locke insists that men act "as soon as they can":

> But whatever Flatterers may talk to amuze Peoples Understandings, it hinders not men, from feeling: and when they perceive that any Man, in what Station so ever, is out of the Bounds of the Civil Society which they are of; and that

> they have no Appeal on Earth against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him, whom they find to be so; and to take care as soon as they can, to have that *Safety and Security in Civil Societies*, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. (94)

A society that fails to judge appropriately when resistance is needed, runs the risk of ending up under the absolute power of a tyrant. Locke communicates this idea through the metaphor of the man who would prudently attempt to escape from a ship that was carrying him toward a destination in which he will become enslaved. This man must attempt to escape *before* the ship arrives at Algiers, because if the ship arrives at port his fate is sealed:

> if a *long Train of Actions shew the Councils* all tending that way, how can a Man any more hinder himself from being perswaded in his own Mind, which way things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the Captain of the Ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the Company to *Algiers*, when he found him always steering that Course, though cross Winds, Leaks in his Ship, and want of Men and Provisions did often force him to turn his Course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as the Wind, Weather, and other Circumstances would let him? (210)

It is therefore prudent to act on the "feeling" that one "may receive harm."[30] Once society is dissolved, those that were members of it are not returned to a historical state of nature, where they are free to reconstitute a new society, but delivered instead to that historical state immediately predating civil society, a heuristic state of nature, which is a historical state of war, which is a state of slavery. This consequence is fundamentally similar to the dissolution of society by unjust conquest (212). It is in cases of unjust conquest where "Great Robbers have the power in their own possession, which should punish Offenders" (176). The only recourse in this situation, Locke asserts, is "patience" (176): "Justice is denied, I am crippled and cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it" (176). The sons of the conquered will likely have to "repeat" their father's attempts to get out from under the subjection of an absolute power (176). Locke thus intimates that it is not the actual dissolution of government which justifies resistance, but the determination in the consciences of the citizenry that the government may become dissolved in the near future. Resistance comes before the dissolution of government, because the dissolution of government by those with malicious intentions facilitates the dissolution of society (212).

The other situation where Locke's second definition of rebellion may occur, therefore, is when the government violates the "trust" of the society

members (221). This is the situation in which the populace fears the government may attempt to dissolve the government established by society. Hence, in addition to the five instances of actual tyranny listed above, Locke outlines three instances in which the trust between society members and rulers may be violated. These instances involve attempts to fundamentally violate the terms of society, those being, the preservation of property and persons. Because these are merely attempts at tyranny, absolute power has not actually been established and it is still practicable to put down such attempts. These instances therefore account for the justifiable exercises of preemptive resistance. There are two instances in which the legislative may violate its trust, and one instance in which the executive may violate his trust. First, the legislature may "endeavour to take away, and destroy, the Property of the people" (222). Second, the legislature may "endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of the People" (222). Finally, the executive may violate his trust "when he either employs the Force, Treasure, and Offices of the Society, to corrupt the Representatives, and gain them to his purposes: or openly pre-ingages the Electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has by Sollicitations, Threats, Promises, or otherwise won to his designs" (222). In these cases, if the people detect the actions of the malicious ruler, he may be ousted before establishing absolute power over his society.

Locke thus develops a new resistance argument, justifying preemptive resistance on the basis of perception and feeling, as most readily determined by the individual interests of preservation and convenience. Locke is reluctant to refer to the act of exercising the right of preemptive resistance as "rebellion." Rebels, according to Locke's second definition, "properly rebels," are individuals that renounce the ideal of society. The rebel, in this sketch, is the tyrant who has ruled in a manner different than the manner in which the society members perceive that he should rule; those who actually resist the tyrant are not rebelling but defending their society.

This is a definition coined by a careful writer.[31] By drawing the tyrant as the rebel and the resisters as lawful defenders of society Locke is able to justify the violent deposition of government in a manner that would not have been countenanced by classical political philosophers, while making the argument appear as if it would have been approved by classical political philosophers. If Locke had said what he meant—that the feeling of oppression occasions the dissolution of government and the institution of a new one—he would not have found support from classical sources. Socrates, most prominently, participated willingly in his own execution when it was ordered by a decision he believed to be unjustly rendered, though lawfully rendered, by the civil authorities. Plato insisted in *The Republic* that "faction is a wicked thing and

members of neither side are lovers of their city."[32] Aristotle's *Politics* insists that regime change occurs as a result of poorly constructed laws that favor one faction against another.[33] Thomas Aquinas, too, suggests that the long term communal stability of a society is better defended by tolerating small or occasional bouts of tyranny: "it is more expedient to tolerate milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself."[34]

But because Locke does not say what he means, because he instead suggests that the king is the rebel (which is, from a traditional linguistic standpoint, nonsense), Locke is able to emphasize the idea that the resisters (being resisters and not rebels) are lawful defenders of what is most naturally suitable for society. The idea that society has a natural fate and that society should do what is disposed by nature, is, of course, an argument which could have been made by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, or even Aquinas. However, this is an aspect of Locke's work that is emphasized as consequential to Locke's theoretical priorities by the reader who has not noticed the sleight-of-philosophical-hand performed by Locke. The natural law flashes in Locke's theory are the bait and not the hook: what the reader is actually intended to bite upon, and does bite upon if the bait is taken, is the individualistic justification for resistance against societal rulers that is utterly lacking in the traditional natural law philosophies. It is the traditional conception of what is natural that Locke's bait is meant to duplicity imitate.

In other words, Locke's new definition of rebellion was coined by a man who knew that neither his society nor the thrust of Western political philosophy was actually grounded simply on personal preservation or material convenience. It is a definition that therefore suggests returning to tradition, but one that changes the tradition in the same stroke. Locke's arguments did not restore the English precepts of ordered liberty under representative monarchy, they founded new individualistic precepts. Locke knew his arguments facilitated a subtle dissolution and new founding of English liberty.

Locke's re-founding is really a matter of emphasis. Individual well-being, of which material well-being is a necessary component, had always been emphasized by respected traditional political philosophers. But the good of the individual was often seen as balanced against or seated within the good of the community at large, as Plato suggested when he argued that the community was "man writ large."[35] But to emphasize the individual over and against the community also provides the theoretical underpinning to emphasize the group at the expense of the individual. In other words, by obliterating the tension between the individual and the group, Locke's thought provides the opportunity for interpreters of it to polarize both the individual and the group in forming Lockean political arguments.

The philosophically specious resistance argument constructed by Locke has had consequences for contemporary American political culture. We can, again, see how the traditional interpretation of Locke produced salubrious outcomes for America: Locke's resistance argument condones a radically individualistic worldview, this formula helped to produce the political philosophy of the American Revolutionary Era, and thereby the civil theology of America, which has advanced the plight of all individuals since its founding. However, the lack of philosophical roots to Locke's theory means that it can easily be morphed by contemporary actors into the broad-based group-rights claims that were exemplified by the Womans' marches and Black Lives Matter movements in chapter 1.

This morphing of Locke's resistance ideas from individually grounded appeals to conscience based on a specific and empirically evident grievance-claim into class-based grievance claims lacking specific empirical bases can be seen clearly in the evolution of feminist issues. A ready reliance on Lockean individualism is evident in early feminist work, a notable example being Elizabeth Stanton's Declaration of Rights and Sentiments.[36] Moving beyond the superficial plagiarism of Jefferson's Declaration, a comparison of Stanton's grievance list against Jefferson's is instructive. As I mentioned in chapter 1, Jefferson's appeals reference a specific fight between two parties (the English and the colonies), and cites specific and publicly endorsed positions taken by the specific actors involved in the fight. The "he" referenced in Jefferson's list is a specific actor, King George III. In this way, one's conscience may indeed judge, based on the theoretical reasons for which Jefferson alleges government to exist, who is actually violating those rights. Stanton's Declaration, while containing a list of grievances, does not contain a specific set of actors who are involved in a specific fight. The "he" referenced in her list is every man in human history. Because of this notable difference, the empirical grounding to judge any of her claims in a specific setting is not provided; the allegations are made against men in general. Rather, much like in the evolution of power in Locke's *Second Treatise* described in this chapter, the sensation of wrong-doing perceived by the powerless actor in the dyad suffices to demonstrate the conscionable violation of right. But the general nature of the appeal denies the judge from actually judging whether a claimed grievance might be true in a specific context. Moreover, the expansion of this feeling or sensation of grievance to others in the same class is substantiated through a preemptive resistance theory.

Contemporary American scholars of Locke have, in the tradition of Stanton, also used Locke's resistance theory (and its connection to the basis of civil society) to justify such group-based movements. One has recently argued that "the idea of collective rights [can be traced] through Locke's *Sec-*

ond Treatise."[37] Another has argued that conscionable decisions regarding resistance are collective and not individually rendered verdicts.[38] The analysis conducted in this chapter has demonstrated, however, that these interpretations of Locke's thought rest on thin ice. The power dynamics in Locke's argument have indeed been inverted, providing, for example, a greater claim for abused children to rightfully resist abusive parents. Locke's arguments do allow for such an extension of specific instances of abuse to generalized claims of collective abuse. To facilitate such an extension, the question of conscience and the determination that this harm will expand is critical, and I shall return to this in the next chapter. But without a single exception, each example of harm or grievance in Locke's *Second Treatise* is framed as an empirically detectable harm caused against an individual. Robbers steal an individuals' purse on the highway, for instance. It may be possible, of course, for many victims of theft to exist; but the harm they suffer and the motivation for redressing that harm is always essentially an experience one had and concerns passions felt by an individual. Even in instances where many individuals feel the same harm, they experience this harm individually and not collectively. Of special note here is Locke's ship bound for Algiers. The aggrieved individual on the ship does not cast about to save himself and his shipmates, but, rather, the entire experience of attempting to escape from this situation is framed by Locke as an individual one; he does not imply that this individual would attempt to also save the other individuals on the ship. Rather, he implies that this individual should act to save himself despite the non-action of others (210).

This splintering of interpretations of Locke's resistance justifications leads to conflicts regarding what precisely American individualism means. Traditional and individualistic property-based claims produce instances of resistance such as the Malheur Resistance, while the contemporary group-based claims produce opposing instances of resistance, such as the Woman's Marches and Black Lives Matter movement. Malheur sought limited action to rectify a specific grievance; the other two movements seek more proliferate social change. The deep manner in which these claims conflict with one another—individualistic versus group-based—makes it incredibly difficult for some prevailing conception of why resistance should occur to develop throughout American political culture. This conflict manifests in our political experiences as uncivilized behavior.

This view of Locke and of American politics, then, leads into another series of questions, which I will spend the second half of this book attempting to address. Did Locke construct a political theory whose essence is its unlimited ability to foment justifications for resistance, and not, as it appears, the individual's natural right to life, liberty and property? Is the appearance

of natural law grounding in Locke completely meaningless? Is Locke's use of conscience a specious manner of linking natural-rights to resistance? Is there evidence in the textual record that Locke's speciousness may have been intentional? In other words, may we fairly understand Locke's work as a pnuemopathologically motivated subtle ideological construction designed merely for partisan gain? And, if so, have we made more of Locke's thought in our culture today than we should have? To answer these questions, I must turn to the elements of Locke's thoughts that explain how the conscience develops and functions.

CONCLUSION

In chapter 4, I discussed the speculative nature of Locke's theory of history. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how Locke's theory of resistance is abstracted from the views of traditional political philosophy regarding an individual right to resistance. By creating a new conception of natural law, an ambiguous conception of the state of nature, a unique and inventive idea of power, and a new definition of rebellion, Locke appears to justify traditional and philosophically rendered ideas, while instead articulating a new conception of political order derived through nonphilosophic methods.

Locke's exacerbation of the material good of the individual through the structure of Locke's resistance argument is aided by the presentation of history in the text. These theoretical maneuvers are consistent with indicator 2a of subtle ideological construction discussed in chapter 3. At this juncture, my discussion on Locke's strategy for creating the symbols necessary to foment his new political theory is concluded. From this point, I will turn to an analysis of indicator 2b of subtle ideological construction, the attempt by the theoretician to conceal inquiries into aspects of reality that might disaffirm the propositions of the theory.

Before turning to that analysis, I can hint at its outcome. Locke has left behind evidence in his texts that he indeed understood the proper philosophical use of words requires both consistency and a respect for traditional uses of words. For example: "By the *philosophical* use of words, I mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge" (ECHU III ix 3). And: "The chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not well for that end, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker" (ECHU III ix 4). Within the text of the *Second Treatise* itself, Locke, as I

have demonstrated in this chapter and the previous chapter, ignores his own imperatives regarding the philosophical uses of words. The term "state of nature" is intentionally used in an inconsistent and imprecise manner, and the terms "law of nature" and "rebellion" indeed do "not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker." It is not presumptuous to assume that Locke understood that the political order articulated in the *Second Treatise* was not really political philosophy, but instead articulated a political theory aimed at justifying the ideological aspirations of Locke's boss, Shaftesbury, and other socially important members of the Country Party. The portrait of Locke as subtle ideological constructor can be further colored in through an analysis of the steps he took to ensure that individuals thought in a manner that would produce conclusions and sentiments in their minds that would prevent them from thinking about or asking certain questions inimical to Locke's design.

NOTES

1. Cf. Julian H. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, London, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 93: "the way for [Locke's resistance theory] is already prepared in Locke's account of the origin and nature of government."

2. Cf. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 104, regarding Whig justifications for resistance. Exceptions to the rule of clinging to traditional justifications for resistance crept up in England during the English Civil War; see, notably, George Lawsons's *Politica sacra et civilis* (Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 53–86).

3. Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly* 77 (1962): 36–53. cf. Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt. *The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 6.

4. James. N. Roseneau, "Internal War as an International Event," in *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, edited by James Roseneau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 63–64.

5. Donald S. Lutz, *Principles of Constitutional Design* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

6. Dale Yoder, "Current Definitions of Revolution," *The American Journal of Sociology* 32 (1926), 441.

7. Godfrey Elton, *The Revolutionary Idea in France, 1789–1871* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 4.

8. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), 28.

9. That is, Peter Laslett, introduction in *John Locke: "Two Treatises of Government,"* 13th reprint. Edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2003); Nathan Tarcov, "Locke's *Second Treatise* and 'The Best Fence against Rebellion,'" *Review of Politics*, 43 (April 1981): 198–217; Richard Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); David Wootton, introduction in *John Locke: Political Writings*, edited by David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993).

10. Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* 216, 220.

11. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution,* 93.

12. Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,*" 224.

13. Tarcov, "Locke's *Second Treatise* and 'The Best Fence against Rebellion,'" 210–211.

14. John A. Simmons, *On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 147.

15. Reason is also transformed from the traditional conception. I deal with this consequential transformation in chapter 6. For now it is sufficient to understand that reason leads man to prioritize preservation and material convenience above all else; how man makes this determination is dealt with in chapter 6.

16. References to John Locke's *First Treatise of Government* are made using this format: (I section number). I have relied on: John Locke. *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).

17. Cf. Goldwin, "John Locke"

18. Cf. Richard Aschraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* 199–200.

19. I agree with Zuckert in that Locke is largely Hobbesian, but in a way, "assimilates, rejects, and moves beyond Hobbes" (Zuckert, *Launching Liberalism,* 3). I disagree, however, about Locke's conception of the self. Zuckert argues Locke would bend to many communitarian ideals. I argue that Locke's man is, contrary to Zuckert's argument, indeed characterized by an "ahistorical, asocial, atomistic individualism" (ibid., 7).

20. References to John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* in this book use this format: (ECHU, book number, chapter number, section number). I have relied on: John Locke. *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).

21. Cf. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 216–220.

22. For example, Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Perseus Books Group, 1991) 502d–542c; Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1337a1l0–1342b1l35; Aristotle, for instance, argues that a lack of a proper education system "hurts," not individuals, but "the regimes" (1337a1l13). I have chosen to cite classical works using Stephanus pagination when available throughout this book.

23. All other powers identified by Locke are italicized and defined in the text: political power (3, 171), paternal power (52, 170), despotical power (172), and absolute power (17). Conjugal power, labeled as "conjugal society," breaks from this pattern (78).

24. Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 457d–471e.

25. Aristotle, *The Politics,* 1252a1l4–5.

26. For example, Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 412c-d, 413c.

27. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1253al–1255al.

28. For example, ibid., 1301al19–1316bl26.

29. Tarcov, "Locke's *Second Treatise* and 'The Best Fence against Rebellion,'" 208; cf. Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government,"* 217, and John Simmons, *On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 170, who, contra Tarcov, support my position on this point.

30. This is a radical break from traditional views on resistance, which had insisted occasional or slight bouts of tyranny should be tolerated by the people for the communal good (e.g., Aquinas argues in *On Kingship* that "it is more expedient to tolerate milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself" [Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2000), 24 §44]. Plato insisted that "faction is a wicked thing and members of neither side are lovers of their city" [Plato, *The Republic of Plato,* 470d]. cf. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 96.

31. Cf. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 113; Cranston, *John Locke: A Biography*; and Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 206.

32. Plato, *The Republic of Plato,* 470d.

33. Aristotle, *The Poltiics*, book 5.

34. Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, 24, §44; see also, Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 96.

35. Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 368d.

36. Elizabeth Stanton, "Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions," in *The Essential Feminist Reader,* ed. Estelle B. Freedman (New York: The Modern Library, 2007), 57–62.

37. Daniel Doernberg, "We the People: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action," *California Law Review* 73 no., 52 (1985): 57.

38. Jacqueline Stevens, "The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority: Property Rights, Consent, and Resistance in the Second Treatise," *Political Theory* 24 (August 1996): 423–463.

Part III

CONCEALING THE IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF A SUBTLY CONSTRUCTED POLITICAL THEORY BY PROHIBITING QUESTIONS INSPIRED BY NOETIC REASON

Chapter Six

Locke's Limited Idea of Reason

In order for a political theory to be a subtle ideological construction, it must not only be comprised of philosophically erroneous principles derived through speculation or abstraction, but some pains must be taken by the thinker to conceal the erroneous nature of his thought. The fact that the thinker makes an effort to prohibit questions about the erroneous aspect of his theory is a sufficient indication that the thinker is advocating a good that he is well aware is grounded in partisan, ideological, or otherwise self-interested motivations. Locke conceals the partisan nature of his political theory by attempting to prevent questions that would disaffirm his conclusions. Locke does this by restricting the idea of reason to exclude soulful, or *noetic,* modes of thinking, as these types of thinking would encourage individuals to ask questions whose answers cannot be satisfactorily found in Locke's writings. The theoretical restriction on reason is the substance of this chapter. The next two chapters will analyze practical measures taken by Locke to corroborate the restricted definition of reason he concocts. The measures include attempts to reconstruct religion and education in such ways as to encourage the restricted manner of reasoning that Locke attempts to cultivate in his society.

As far as Locke's conception of reason is concerned, I will demonstrate that Locke defined reason in a robust manner, inclusive of *noetic* reasoning, in his *Essays on the Law of Nature* (1664). In the text of the *Two Treatises*, the robust view of reason disappears, and the term becomes morally ambiguous, as no "right reason" is necessary to justify the decisions made by the consciences of the men who, by "appeal to heaven," justify their resistance against traditional society. Finally, in nearly all texts written by Locke after becoming employed by Shaftsbury, including: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Two Treatises of Government, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, The Reasonableness of Christianity,* the first and third *Letter*s

Concerning Toleration, and *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, Locke makes pains to whittle away the *noetic* form of reasoning he had understood to be part of the complex of reality a few decades previous. The concealing of *noetic* reality is an important aspect of Locke's pneumopathology, as *noetic* reasoning would call into question the materialistic and individualistic premises which Locke's political theory justifies. Because such questions would prove themselves to be philosophically legitimate, the only way that Locke's political theory can appear to be philosophical in nature—even though it is not philosophical—is for the type of intellectual activity that is truly philosophical in nature (*noetic* reason) to be eradicated from the human mind. Without true philosophical activity to detect the unphilosophical nature of Locke's thought, his unphilosophical thought could be more easily mistaken for actual philosophy. The texts written after the publication of the *Second Treatise* contain Locke's attempt to eradicate *noetic* reasoning and thereby legitimate his nonphilosophical political theory as political philosophy.

Locke reduces that which individuals may reason about to issues pertinent to the fundamental concern of his political theory: individualistic self-preservation and material convenience. A style of reasoning that lauds mundane satiety is an integral component of the man who will endorse Locke's political theory without questioning the veracity of it. Traditional natural law viewed men's individual preservation and convenient living as among a constellation of goods, not as the highest human good, and traditional natural law thinkers qualified the rational pursuits of such goods accordingly. Locke's law of nature views these particular goods as the human goods most worth pursuing, and thus his political theory is constructed with these particular ends, preservation and convenience, arranged as the highest goods. The manner of reasoning that countenances Locke's law of nature, reflecting the different ends pursued by Locke than by traditional natural law philosophers, is different than the manner of reasoning that countenances traditional natural law. Locke's reason does not facilitate the realization in men that the virtuous life correlates to the good life. Locke's reason prioritizes self-preservation and mundane convenience, making mundane satiety the standard against which moral decisions are rendered.

Locke's manner of presentation is at least as important to his theoretical objectives as what is being argued: the genius and legacy of his political theory is due to the fact that he was capable of making new and different ideas appear to be in line with traditional ideas. I have already demonstrated in the previous chapters how Locke subtly transforms the conception of the law of nature and the conception of rebellion. In this chapter I will demonstrate how Locke goes about transforming reason in a manner that is designed to appear to be consistent with traditional manners of reasoning, and is, moreover, designed to make the men who reason in Locke's style of reasoning

believe that they are reasoning in the style of classical philosophers, when in fact their type of reasoning process is a type of reasoning that is restrictive and philosophically inadequate. As Locke restricted access to that faculty of the reasoning process, which is responsible for orienting moral decisions, the subtle transformation Locke makes to the reasoning process has detrimental consequences on the moral bearings of citizens in a Lockean society.

The end result of the Straussian critique of Locke was that Locke's man was devoid of reason guided by virtue. Cambridge scholars, such as John Dunn and Richard Ashcraft, responded to this criticism by suggesting a Christian and faith-based orientation to Locke's thought, thereby grounding his philosophy on the virtues associated with Christianity. In the past decade or so, scholars of the Straussian persuasion, such as Michael Zuckert and Peter C. Myers, have attempted to revive Strauss, albeit by moderating his critiques to appease the Cambridge school. Myers argues that Locke's ends, amenable to ideals of faith, justify his thought: "he attempts to promote the life of reason or rational liberty, whether within or without the life of faith, as the condition and purpose of a healthy politics."[1] Myers's analysis views Locke as articulating a philosophy of "political rationalism," a system where reason leads to an ordered "rational liberty" and facilitates a "rational pursuit of happiness."[2] While Myer's condones Strauss's methodology, he insists Strauss's critique "restores respect for Locke's enduring relevance and power at the cost of obscuring his moral design, especially by associating Locke's thought with the morally debilitating reductionism and conventionalism for which Hobbes was 'justly decried.'"[3] Myers instead insists that Locke moderates Hobbes's modernism through an insistence on a politically oriented version of wisdom, a type of reason reliant on the will and the passions to incline men toward an ordered sort of liberty whereby they may achieve happiness. Myers views Locke's conception of reason, for its ability to produce happiness, as a theoretically sufficient alternative to the *summum bonum* of old. I will argue that Strauss's critique of Locke as philosophically restrictive holds up in the face of Myers's response, that Locke's conception of reason produces a desire for liberty that is not as orderly or rational as Myers suggests.[4] The inadequacy of Myers's position is revealed by the philosophical reduction that results from Locke's exclusion of *nous* from reality.

NOUS AND *LOGOS*: THE METHOD FOR ANALYZING LOCKE ON REASON

Scholars have occasionally asserted that Locke's arguments for a sensually grounded conception of reason were philosophically inadequate. G. W. F.

von Leibniz found "ambiguity in it."[5] Alexander Fraser's authoritative edition of the *Essay* criticized Locke's ability to deal, particularly, with metaphysical questions:

> The infinite cannot be logically concluded from the finite. We are practically obliged to *presuppose* immanent active Reason, in order to conceive the finite and changing, but we cannot, *by logical argument*, sustain the presupposition. Our "perception" of God is not the conclusion of a syllogism: it is the necessary assumption in all reasoning, whether about our sensuous or our spiritual existence, and the foundation of all certainty. Assume it—rest life upon it—and the universe and life become harmonious.[6]

Ellis Sandoz iterates the criticism over Locke's handling of metaphysical issues by noticing that Locke eliminates "the historically developed common sense or *koinai ennoiai* by rejecting the classical and Christian notions of man's knowledge of divine Being through participation in it as, alternatively, the bearer of divine Reason (*Nous*), in Aristotle's sense, or as the creature who bears the divine image of his Creator so that 'the spirit of the man is the cradle of the Lord.'"[7]

Sandoz's decision to utilize the Aristotelian word *nous*, which means reason as an experientially robust wondering at final causes, is a very useful way of explaining how Locke's view of reason is philosophically restrictive. Simply put: Locke's view of reason is philosophically inadequate because it eliminates that form of reasoning denoted by the word *nous*. Locke's view of reason is restricted to a form of reasoning the Greek's called *logos*, or calculation, and this form of reasoning was viewed by many classical thinkers as philosophically subsidiary to the form of reasoning denoted by *nous*.[8] I developed the concept of *nous* at length in chapter 3.[9]

In this chapter, I will focus on how Locke crafts a theoretical explanation for how reason can operate independent of *nous*. I will show that Locke actually did understand the philosophical value of *nous* in his early writing, *Essays on the Law of Nature*. However, I will further show that Locke's idea of reason is restricted to *logos* in his later writings, and that despite understanding the philosophical importance of *noetic* reasoning, he sets out to create citizens who are prompted by practicability, *logos*, but not morally conscious reflection (*nous*). Thus, this chapter will not only demonstrate that Locke's view of reason is philosophically restrictive, it will show that Locke knew that his view of reason was philosophically restrictive and that he followed through with his view of reason in spite of his own reservations about his idea. In the next two chapters I will dwell upon the second practical measure, Locke's painstaking attempt to actually establish a society that was only capable of *logos* through religious and education systems.

RIGHT REASON IN THE *ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE* (1664)

The seventeenth century has been rightfully called "the hey-day of natural-law theory."[10] Hugo Grotius, John Selden, and Thomas Hobbes, as well as a bevy of lesser known thinkers such as Nathaniel Culverwel, all impacted Locke's idea of natural law.[11] The term had become essential to sophisticated political debate by Locke's time. During the Interregnum, Locke was studying at Christ Church at Oxford; by 1660 Locke had been discussing the idea of the law of nature with other students from Oxford for an indeterminate amount of time.[12] In 1664, Locke wrote a series of essays based on these discussions, collectively entitled *Essays on the Law of Nature*. These essays were not published by Locke; they were recovered from his estate after his death and only recently published by W. von Leyden in 1954.[13] Most important about these *Essays* for the present analysis is the distinction drawn between disparate forms of reasoning by Locke in a manner consistent with the distinction between *logos* and *nous*.[14]

The fact that Locke understood and articulated a conception of *noetic* reasoning in these early *Essays* is essential to this analysis; precisely because Locke covers up *noesis* in his mature writings, those mature writings may be characterized as subtle ideological constructions. This interpretation of Locke's maturation as a thinker adequately and robustly accounts for the fact that the *Essays*, which many of Locke's critics have ignored in their own interpretations of his writings, appear to have an earnest openness to the reasoning style associated with *nous*. As Richard Ashcraft has asserted, this early attunement to a religious or more spiritual type of thinking (as is associated with *nous*) is evidence that Locke's political theory is concerned with the type of issues raised by *noetic* contemplation:

> The *Essays on the Law of Nature*, in which Locke maintains a running argument against the Hobbesian perspective, is an especially significant work, one which Macpherson and the Straussians conveniently chose to ignore. The otiose attempt to portray Locke as a secular thinker, either because he distances his own beliefs from those of the masses (Macpherson) or because he concealed his true beliefs from public view for fear of persecution (Strauss), reflects a monumental obtuseness in the face of massive evidence of Locke's religious convictions contained in these unpublished notebooks, journals, and private correspondence.[15]

I will argue that Professor Ashcraft is plum wrong regarding the implications of the "massive evidence" uncovered in the *Essays*.[16] I will offer the contradictory hypothesis, and a sufficient amount of evidence to support it, that the philosophical venerability detectable in Locke's early writings has

been watered down to the point of meaningless ambiguity in Locke's mature and more consequential works, the *Two Treatises* and the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. The Strauss-Macpherson-Voegelin assertion that Locke's mature writings were political propaganda and not political philosophy is not at all put down by evidence of philosophical inspiration in the *Essays*. Rather, evidence of philosophical inspiration in the *Essays*, suggesting that Locke understood the proper role and scope of philosophic activity (*nous*), only corroborates my assertion that Locke *knowingly* attempted to conceal the propriety of philosophic reasoning (*nous*) in his mature writings. Locke's political theory is *subtle* ideological construction, as opposed to simple political propaganda, precisely because he knew the distinction between philosophy and propaganda and chose to present his political propaganda as if it were derived philosophically.

Locke understands reason to entail two distinct mental capacities in the text of the *Essays on the Law of Nature*. Locke refers to reason in the sense of *logos* as "that powerful faculty of arguing" (ELN 125).[17] He speaks of reason in this sense as the capacity to construct syllogisms, understand mathematics, form "trains of thought," and reach logical conclusions (ELN 111, 125, 149). While Locke appears to possess an affinity for capacities of this form of reasoning—"I admit it astonishing what reason finds and tracks out in mathematical science"—he does not appear to believe that Baconian or Hobbist pre-positivistic methodologies are in-and-of-themselves capable of disclosing the first principles which properly inform and guide (*nous*) the reasoning (*logos*) consistent with mathematical science: "this is dependent upon a line, is built within a plane, and has a solid substance as foundation to rest on" (ELN 149). Locke seems to speak of reason (*logos*) as being powerless unless it is capable of openness to the first principles which ground reasonableness:

> if you would run through each single speculative science, there is none in which something is not always taken from granted and derived from the senses as a way of borrowing. Every conception . . . arises out of some pre-existing material, and reason proceeds in the same manner in the moral and practical sciences also and demands to be allowed this material. (ELN 149–151)

In other words, reason (*logos*) is conducted within the mind always with certain assumptions taken for granted. The mental process whereby these assumptions are formed and either assented to or rejected by individuals as propositions consistent with reality, the way in which these assumptions are "derived from the senses by way of borrowing," is understood by Locke to be a form of reasoning consistent with *nous*.

Locke uses the term "right reason" to articulate the *noetic* reasoning whereby humans can gain insight into the first principles which should

inform mathematical calculation (*logos*) (ELN 111). Right reason is "that faculty of the understanding which forms . . . certain definite principles of action from which spring all virtues and whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals" (ELN 111). By right reason Locke is speaking of that type of "awareness" brought about through the opening of the *psyche* to transcendent reality as a medium of empirical observation: "reason is here taken to mean the discursive faculty of the mind, which advances from things known to things unknown and argues from one thing to another in a definite and fixed order of propositions. It is this reason by means of which mankind arrives at the knowledge of the law of nature" (ELN 149).

Locke articulates the manner whereby right reason is cultivated, and this process is both different than it will appear in the later *Essay* as well as revelatory of a *noetic* form of reasoning in the *Essays.* Sense perception supplements reason by supplying it with the objects of consideration (ELN 147). It is clear that Locke views the *psyche* as an open medium of sensation based upon the type of insights gained through the interaction of reason and sense-perception.[18] The most telling piece of evidence in this regard is that Locke argues, unequivocally, for the use of the soul as a medium of sensation: "we must search not the lives of men but their souls—for it is there that the precepts of nature are imprinted and the rules of morality lie hidden together with those principles which men's manners cannot corrupt" (ELN 167). Furthermore, the substance of the insights made through right reason is consistent with *noetic* insight; right reason is not based on calculations. Right reason is a type of reasoning that "carefully perceiving in itself the fabric of this world . . . to find out what was the cause, and who the maker, of such an excellent work" (ELN 153). Right reason, then, is recognition of and contemplation concerning a transcendent or objective ground by which logical calculations may be properly oriented (ELN 153–155). Locke clearly argues that this ground "governs all of existence, and . . . may . . . raise us up or throw us down, and make us by the same commanding power happy or miserable" (ELN 153–155). Hence, the style of reasoning which induces man to live in accordance with natural law is the same style of reasoning (*noesis*) that inclines man to religiosity and spirituality (ELN 157–159). Locke thereby articulates his understanding that the *noetic* process whereby the first principles of the law of nature are discerned by humans also inclines humans to seek their welfare. Whereas Locke's later conception of the law of nature prioritized, as I argued in chapter 4, individual rights and articulated the premises for natural rights, Locke's earlier conception of the law of nature maintained the character of "law," as opposed to "right," and implied more social duties than rights for humans.

By the time Locke wrote the *Second Treatise*, this robust conception of reason is presented ambiguously at best. Reasoning clearly contains the *logos*

necessary to realize the corporeal value of self-preservation and material convenience: "natural *Reason* tells us that Man, being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence" (25). However, it is unclear whether there is a *noetic* underpinning to the rational ordering of corporeal existence. Respected scholars have noticed inconsistency between the two texts regarding the ethical implications of Locke's earlier and later conceptions of the law of nature.[19] Peter Laslett, for example: "As Dr. Von Leyden has shown, these earlier essays would not have provided a doctrine of natural law capable of reconciling the theory of knowledge in Locke's *Essay* with the ethical doctrine of that work and of *Two Treatises*. This, it is suggested, may have been one of the reasons why Locke was unwilling to be known as the author of both books."[20] As I will argue, Locke not only deviates from the ethical implications of reason posited in the *Essays* in the *Essay* but, contrary to Laslett's assertion, in the *Two Treatises* as well; I will argue he makes this deviation in order to justify the ideological suppositions of the *Second Treatise*.

LOCKE ON CONSCIENCE: REASON IN THE *TWO TREATISES* (1690)

In about 1680, approximately sixteen years after writing the *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Locke wrote the bulk of what would become its publication ten years later an epochal and consequential work in modern political theory, the *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. Much had changed in Locke's life, and in England, between 1664 and 1680. In the 1660s, England had restored a Stuart as king, and Locke was occupying himself with a wide range of scholarly activities. Locke received his BA in 1656 and his MA in 1658.[21] In the early 1660s, he occupied positions at Christ Church as Reader in Greek, Reader in Rhetoric, and eventually as Censor of Moral Philosophy in 1664.[22] He also displayed interests in logic, medicine, and chemistry.[23] He did not meet Ashley Cooper, later Earl of Shaftsbury, his future employer, and political leader of the nascent Whig party, until 1667.[24] And, indeed, it was in his early years as Cooper's employee that we see a shift in his theoretical attitude toward philosophy: Locke the philosopher became Locke the political advocate.[25] While Locke of the early 1660s wrote as a scholar and open-minded academic in an objective quest for truth, Locke of the 1670s and onward wrote as a political ideologue who used the academic skills polished in his formative years at Oxford to justify a political cause to which he was closely tied. Evidence from the texts themselves make this case.

Disconcertingly, Locke does not provide a detailed account of the process of reasoning in the *Two Treatises* (above and beyond that retributive violence is reasonable). We are told in the text of that work, nonetheless, that reason plays an absolutely critical role in facilitating the best possible social and political conditions for man:

> the busie mind of Man [can] carry him to a Brutality below the level of Beasts, when he quits his reason, which places him almost equal to Angels. Nor can it be otherwise in a Creature, whose thoughts are more than the Sands, and wider than the Ocean, where fancy and passion must needs run him into strange courses, if reason, which is his only Star and compass, be not that he steers by. (I 58)

Although the specifics of the reasoning process are not disclosed in the *First Treatise*, the first principle of reason is clearly articulated as "natural freedom" (I 1–6, 15).

Locke uses one of his favorite historical references to help substantiate the idea of an individual natural right to freedom. Locke cites a 1633 French work, *Garcilasso de la vega hist. des yncas de Peru*, to demonstrate the unnatural and abhorrent dominion carried out when "the rule of war" obtains (I 57). Here, Locke means that malevolent condition which arises during his historical state of war/heuristic state of nature. "In Peru," he argues, "People begot Children on purpose to Fatten and Eat them" (I 57). Locke quotes the French author in length, apparently for emphasis:

> "In some provinces," *says he*, "they were so liquorish after Mans Flesh, that they wou'd not have the patience to stay till the Breath was out of the Body, but would suck the Blood as it ran from the Wounds of the dying Man; they had publick Shambles of Man's Flesh, and their Madness herein was to that degree, that they spared not their Own Children which they had Begot on Strangers taken in War: For they made their Captives their Mistresses and choisly nourished the Children they had by them, till about thirteen Years Old they Butcher'd and Eat them, and they served the Mothers after the same fashion, when they grew past Child bearing, and ceased to bring them any more Roasters." (I 57)

From the abhorrence of such behavior, Locke concludes that social norms have led man away from his more natural propensity for individual freedom:

> when Fashion hath once Established, what Folly or craft began, Custom makes it Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to contradict or question it. He that will impartially survey the Nations of the World . . . will have Reason to think, that the Woods and Forests, where the irrational untaught Inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to give us Rules, than

> Cities and Palaces, where those that call themselves Civil and Rational, go out of their way, by the Authority of Example. (I 58)

Because the dictates of social norms have led to such morally unnatural conclusions, reason, and not custom, must be the guiding principle of social interaction. The fact that the undesirable customs of Peruvians occurred in a more natural setting than the "cities and palaces" where natural right obtains is irrelevant: "if [custom] proves a right to do so, we may, by the same Argument, justify Adultery, Incest, and Sodomy" (I 59).

There are several difficulties regarding Locke's position on this matter which are not pertinent to our question at hand. My analysis regards the style of reasoning which underlay Locke's conception of natural right. I will ignore, therefore, the difficulties regarding whether the Peruvians existed in a historical state of nature or a historical state of war, whether or not the existence of money influenced their corrupt nature, or whether or not the ostensibly natural brutish condition posited for man in this section of the *First Treatise* conflicts with Locke's theory of history posited in the *Second Treatise*.[26] We may further ignore, for the moment, whether or not this reference to *Garcilasso* conflicts with Locke's use of the same passage in the *Essay*, which I will discuss later in this chapter. The more immediately consequential point regarding this passage is the implication of it for the conception of reason advocated in the *First Treatise*. In the *Essays*, I detected a reasoning style (*nous*) that stood in awe of all of the creation of nature. The first principle which motivated such a reasoning style was the open-minded spirit in which one reasoned; the first principle was the method of reasoning itself and not any particular response to any specific aspect of the natural creation being contemplated. Natural freedom is an auspicious enough principle; but it is a principle based upon a particular reaction to a particular condition of human experience within nature, one which may occur, but by no means characterizes the complexity of the potential human conditions to be found under the sun, and can therefore not possibly be an adequate characterization of that natural principle, whatever it may be, which most appropriately summarizes man. The type of open-minded contemplation (*nous*) which considers the first principles of existence is not to be found in a theoretical response to a particular experience. The reason of the *First Treatise*, man's "only star and compass," is the *logos* which calculates the most feasible means to the achievement of a predetermined end. That end is, indeed, emancipation from kings' capacity to possess "an Absolute, Abritrary, Unlimited, and Unlimitable Power, over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of [individuals]" (I 9). The ground for action, individualistic materialism as consistent with Whig political prerogatives, is taken as a given in the *First Treatise* and presupposed as the foundation of all valid theoretical insight; the

assumption is posited in the text's opening sentence: "Slavery is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man" (I 1).

The lack of further discussion regarding the definition of reason in the *First Treatise* is so disconcerting because reason plays an imperative role in the political theory of the *Second Treatise*, and Locke makes little effort therein to clarify the manner in which the first principles inherent to his civil society are discerned. What he says of reason in the *Second Treatise* is epistemologically vapid, and, as I will demonstrate in the next several pages, little of value can be added to what I have already said regarding the conception of reason posited in the *First Treatise* and to what I have said regarding Locke's conception of the law of nature in chapter 4. To summarize, in the *Second Treatise*, reason is articulated as the founding or first principle underneath the law of nature. Nonetheless, the law of nature regards the appropriateness of punishing transgressions of safety and property in the state of nature (8–12). In this sense, reason implies *logos* as opposed to *nous* because the first principle of society, being natural freedom, is unquestionably accepted, despite legitimate questions regarding whether the punishing of transgressions comprises *the* fundamental law of human nature. If Locke's premises are not questioned, the complexity of nature and the mystery of God are reduced to an individualistic prerogative for material convenience.

Despite the epistemological vapidity regarding reason in the *Two Treatises*, man's reasoning style, the way he ultimately determines what action is reasonable to undertake, is ultimately very significant to the political theory articulated therein. As discussed in chapter 5, Locke's rudimentary institutional assurance of civil society's standards is a right to resistance, grounded in individuals' own determinations regarding the propriety of their society's government. Thus, the "appeal to Heaven" is utterly consequential to Locke's political theory (21, cf. 13, 19, 20, 89, 93, 125, 131, 136, 168, 181, 240, 241). What is and what is not a justifiable cause for resistance depends on the answer received from heaven. The terms of this answer, Locke argues, are formed in "my own Conscience" as "I my self can only be Judge" (21). This, however, does not shed light on the standards or principles which underlay pronouncements of conscience, and the *Second Treatise* says even less regarding the definition of conscience than it says of the definition of reason.

To inform ourselves of Locke's conception of conscience, we must turn to the *Essays* and to the *Essay*. Although Locke's theoretical prerogatives change dramatically between the compositions of these two works, his conception of conscience appears to be fairly consistent throughout his career. For this brief analysis of the definition of conscience, I will cite the *Essays* and the *Essay* with a temporal indiscrimination that would be inappropriate, from a methodological perspective, regarding many other aspects of Locke's thought.

For Locke, conscience is "the sentence which everyone passes on himself" (ELN 117). It is a judgment pronounced within a man's head, concerning the morality of his own actions; in Locke's words, "conscience is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions" (ECHU I ii 8):

> It is not conscience that *makes* the distinction of good and evil, conscience only judging of an action by *that which it takes to be* [eternal] rule of good and evil, acquits or condemns it. I call not conscience practical principles. He who confounds the judgment made with the rule of law upon which it is made perhaps talk so. Conscience is not the law of nature, but judging by that which is (by it) taken to be the law. (ECHU, p. 71, n 1)

Conscience is a judgment, but it does not provide the basis upon which the judgment is rendered; conscience is only the voice that announces the decision. Conscience is the voice, but not the reason. Conscience, then, is the judgment pronounced as a result of man's sense perception and reasoning faculty. Using his senses and faculties, man may arrive at judgments concerning the morality of his actions. At this point, the epistemological workings of the conscience could feasibly be read in the *noetic* sense that I have argued the term "right reason" in the *Essays* should be read. Indeed, conscience is grounded in the interaction between sense perception and reason, the same general paradigm which, in the *Essays*, grounds the *noetic* term "right reason."

In the *Second Treatise*, the judgments announced by conscience have political ramifications, affecting the decision to resist or to consent to political authority. Despite the significance of the term, it is not defined in the text. The critical question is whether or not the conscience of the *Second Treatise* means the soulful wonderment at final causes that Locke implies in the *Essays*. In short, the answer to this question is no, it is a reduced, soulless version of conscience that may judge the propriety of retributive violence. If one attempts to understand Locke on conscience, solely from the text of the *Second Treatise*, one may do little more than operate from context clues in the few passages where conscience is either mentioned or ostensibly applicable. Undertaking such an exercise is profitable, for it reveals that Locke's conception of reason indeed prompts man to pursue that action which is most personally advantageous from a materialistic perspective.

Locke suggests that the appeal to heaven resembles Jephtha's appeal to heaven: "whether I may as *Jephtha* did, appeal to heaven" (21, cf. I 163; II 109, 168). That is, we may appeal, as much as possible, "as Jephtha did." Conscionable decisions resemble Jephtha's decision. It is necessary to inquire as far as possible into Jephtha's appeal if Locke's view of conscience is to be garnered from the *Second Treatise*. Locke writes:

> Had there been any such Court, any superior Jurisdiction on Earth, to determine the right between *Jephtha* and the *Ammoniites*, they had never come to a State of War, but we see he was forced to appeal to *Heaven*. *The Lord the Judge* (says he) *be Judge this day between the Children of* Israel, *and the Children of* Ammon, *Judg.* 11. 27. and then Prosecuting, and relying on his *appeal*, he leads out his Army to Battle. (21)

This evidence has been radically misinterpreted by some scholars. Jacqueline Stevens, for example, argues that Jephtha's appeal was made by the people of Israel, and was not a private decision by Jephtha.[27] Stevens concludes that, consequently, a right of resistance may only be made by the people at large, and not by private individuals. Stevens's evidence is Locke's line, later in the text, "they may *appeal,* as *Jephtha* did, *to* Heaven, and repeat their *Appeal*" (176). Steven's ignores Locke's first reference to Jephtha, "I may as *Jephtha* did, appeal to heaven" (21). Taken together, the lines suggest that either an individual or the people at large may make such an appeal. It is true, as has been noted, that the majority must at some point conclude that resistance is reasonable; but this decision must be reached by the independent people that compose the majority.[28]

Stevens further argues that Jephtha's decision to go to war against the Ammonites was decided by the "'the people' of Israel."[29] A manner of reading the account in scripture affirms Stevens's interpretation; Israeli people and elders decided to attack the Ammonites and to make Jephtha the military leader.[30] This argument, however, ignores the fact that we are dealing with Locke's reading of Jephtha and not our own. Locke insists that Jephtha made this appeal as an individual act: "and relying on his *appeal*, he leads out his Army to Battle" (21). Such an argument further ignores Locke's position on individual action versus the action of a ruler. Locke distinguishes between the powers inherent to princes and the powers inherent to the people given cases of interstate war: "the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council. Though the War it self, which admits not of Plurality of Governours, naturally devolves the Command into the *King's sole Authority*" (108). Thus, by Locke's account Jephtha's decision was ultimately made in his own conscience; that is, as a purely individual act. Locke later affirms, clearly, that single individuals may undertake an individual appeal to heaven: "And where the Body of the People, or any single Man, is deprived of their Right, or is under the Exercise of a power without right, and have no Appeal on Earth, there they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven, whenever they judge the Cause of sufficient moment" (168).

This point is consequential. Locke's justification for resistance is greatly expanded because it is countenanced in terms of the appeal to heaven—in terms of the individual conscience—and not in terms of majority rule, a

theme emphasized elsewhere in the *Second Treatise* (95, 96). The first thing discerned from the use of Jephtha, then, is that conscience does not only countenance resistance when it is approved by a majority of individuals. A majority of the Israeli people may have supported Jephtha's decision to confront the Ammonites, but it was not necessary for Jephtha to make the appeal, or to act on the basis of his appeal, which was a result of his action alone.

The second thing to be learned from Jephtha's appeal is that the moral character of decisions rendered through conscience are not always self-evident. Jephtha's appeal was, exactly: "Wherefore I have not sinned against thee, but thou doest me wrong to war against me: the Lord the Judge be judge this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon."[31] The Ammonites, however, insisted that the Israelis were the aggressors in the confrontation: "Israel took away my land . . . now therefore restore those *lands* peaceably."[32] Jephtha argued that the Israelis had taken the land in question from the Ammonites three hundred years ago, and that the amount of time to have passed since implied the rightfulness of the Israeli claim to the land.[33] Scripture, therefore, suggests that the land was originally possessed by the Ammonites, taken and held for three hundred years by the Israelis, before being challenged by the Ammonites. It would seem, then, that the Israelis, not the Ammonites, were the aggressors in the state of war between the two parties. The circumstance would, given Locke's typology of power, be a case of unjust conquest. In such an event: "the Conquered, have no Court, no Arbitrator on Earth to appeal to. They may *appeal*, as *Jephtha* did, to *Heaven*, and repeat their *Appeal*, till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors" (176).

Locke insists that the native possessor of lands is entitled to a right of war against unjust conquerors, regardless of the time to have elapsed since the conquering invasion. The puzzling aspect of the above quote is Locke's suggestion that it is the Israelis, and not the Ammonites, who are granted this right of war. It was, after all, the Ammonites who had possessed the land first, and time cannot exempt them from this claim. This discrepancy can be explained in one of two ways. First, Jephtha's actual appeal provided convenient scriptural support for Locke's resistance theory. Judges 11:27, stripped from the context, is attractive in that regard, and this attractiveness is only watered down upon a close inspection of the full history between the Ammonites and the Israelis. Perhaps Locke thought such an analysis superficial, somehow inappropriate, or otherwise unlikely to be undertaken. Second, intentionally or not, Locke's argument makes a subtle point regarding the nature of the appeal made by the conscience. Jephtha's appeal, in actuality specious, provides no moral foundation to the appeal. One may proclaim that one is a victim, that one is invoking one's right of war, while one is actually introducing and the aggressor in a state of war.

Locke's writings on Jephtha, then, give us no more evidence that conscience will countenance the morally superior position than it gives us evidence that conscience will approve of morally deplorable propositions. As virtuous moral decision making falls under the purview of *noetic* reasoning, the moral vapidity inherent to Locke's "as Jephtha" is suggestive of the fact that a *noetic* style of reasoning is not cultivated through Locke's writing on conscience in *The Second Treatise*.

The *noetic* vapidity of reasoning style in *The Second Treatise* is affirmed through a summary of Locke's position on resistance. As I argued in chapter 5, Locke's view is that resistance should be executed upon the "feeling" that a governing agent is attempting to consolidate power in order to tyrannize. It is worth noting, however, that the reasoning style which underlays or prompts the "feeling" to resist tyranny has not been disclosed as *noetic*. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that Jephtha's decision to resist the Ammonites was the result of logical calcuations (*logos*), made in self-interest, that do not seem to be grounded by *noetic* reflection. Jephtha's conscience announced a decision reached for personal acquisition, and the decision was ultimately conscionable to him, according to Locke's standards, because Jephtha stood to gain something from his action.[34]

These two points suggest that Jephtha is a good example of Locke's tendency to use traditional justifications for action in an unconventional manner in order to support arguments that are actually quite transformative of traditional ideals. It is precisely because Jephtha's actions could be viewed as either communally oriented (that is, carried out for the best interest of the Israeli community), or viewed as individually oriented (that is, carried out for the best interest of Jephtha personally), that Locke relies so heavily on Jephtha as traditional evidence for his arguments. Jephtha allows Locke to offer a transformative conception of the underpinnings of man's moral action while appearing to be grounding his arguments in a traditional reading of Judges and affirming traditional assertions regarding morality.

At this point, the appeal to heaven, being an appeal to conscience, is somewhat tractable, but far from lucid. An appeal to conscience is an appeal to one's own judgment about the moral standing of one's own actions. Thus, whether or not one takes up one's right to resistance depends on the judgment one's conscience reaches regarding the morality of resisting in a given situation. Locke argues that the judgment of conscience is made by an individual's reasoning abilities. Hence, an analysis of conscience suggests that the moral judgments made by conscience are informed by reason, which, I have already shown to be inadequately defined in the text of the *Two Treatises.*

Whereas reason is presented ambiguously in the *Two Treatises*, in other of Locke's mature writings reason is simply devoid of *nous*. The ambiguous

presentation of reason in the *Two Treatises* could be excused as outside of Locke's purposes in that text, but when we closely examine his other mature writings *nous* does appear, but he pays it nothing more than lip-service; it is clear that Locke knows what *nous* is but wishes for its effects on society to be diminished. I have already explained the reasoning style articulated in the *Essays*, and its *noetic* character. But that reasoning style, despite sharing the same general structure of being an interaction between sense perception and internal thoughts, is emphatically discordant with the definition of reason as described in the text written contemporaneously to the composition of the *Two Treatises*, which is the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

LOCKE ON REASON IN THE *ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING* (1690)

In the *Essay*, Locke argues that man reasons through the combination of reflection upon past experiences with sense perception. Man necessarily interacts with a number of external objects in his life, Locke calls them "substances," and many of the notions in man's mind are perceptions of things encountered in the physical world; simple ideas such as "yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet" are designations in the mind of things in the outside world perceived by man through the senses (ECHU II i 3). Reflection indicates the mind's pondering of past and present encounters with these external objects. The processes within the mind itself, "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing," are the mind's ways of organizing and giving meaning to perceptions experienced in the past (ECHU II i 4). The combined efforts of these two faculties, reflection and sensation, are the "fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring" (ECHU II I 2). Even the most complicated of notions derive from these faculties:

> by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may, and does, attain unto. (ECHU II xii 8)

Although man's understanding is grounded on interactions with the external world, the nature of that world is dependent upon the perceptions man forms regarding the world. Locke argues that "there is nothing like our ideas, ex-

isting in the bodies themselves" (ECHU II viii 15). Man's ground of reason is not the hierarchy of being, but what man senses himself regarding being:

> light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, *as they are such particular ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts. (ECHU II viii 17)

The equipment needed to properly determine what is reasonable, then, occurs within man's mental faculties. In opposition to the view of reason offered in the *Essays*, Locke does not provide any evidence in the *Essay* that the soul (*psyche*) is among the faculties which sense external objects.[35] The properties of external objects are determined in relation to how they affect man, not how they comply with a hierarchical order of the cosmos. The self-interested ends of reason (*logos*) as described in the *Essay* can be elucidated through an analysis of the significant roles pleasure and pain play in determining how man is to interact with external objects.

Sensation and reflection provide human individuals with many ideas. We, as individuals, decide between alternative choices for action based on how they are processed within our minds: "if [ideas] were wholly separated from all our outward sensations, and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest" (ECHU II vii 3). The decision between negligence and attention is made, according to the *Essay*, based on the presence or absence of pleasure or pain: "Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this" (ECHU II vii 4). Good and evil is determined "only in reference to pleasure or pain" (ECHU II xx 2).

Decisions are most fundamentally determined by pain (ECHU II xxviii 5). "The uneasiness of desire" is the first factor that motivates action (ECHU II xxi 33). Happiness is defined as the absence of pain, not as the presence of pleasure: "that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action will always be—the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step toward happiness" (ECHU II xxi 36).

Locke distinguishes "moral good and evil" as the conformity of our actions to a law which is capable of allocating pleasure or pain to individuals through rewards or punishments (ECHU II xxviii 5).[36] "It would be in vain," Locke insists, "for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation

from his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself" (ECHU II xxviii 6).

Reasonable behavior, therefore, is behavior that, first, avoids pain, and second, pursues pleasure. Moral rectitude, in particular, is determined in reference to pain and pleasure. Moreover, moral good and evil, being determined by punishments and rewards doled out in reference to pleasure and pain, is reduced to contemplations of pleasure and pain.

The importance of pleasure, and more importantly pain, to human morality betrays a lack of seriousness in Locke for spiritual issues. This spiritual dearth can be further illustrated through Locke's discussion on the various types of law that humans might choose to follow. Three distinct types of law are capable of rewarding or punishing individuals, based on three distinct standards. Locke identifies "divine law," "civil law," and "the law of opinion or reputation," otherwise called "the law of fashion" (ECHU II xxviii 7, ECHU II xxviii 12). Although Locke encourages adherence to the divine law, an individual's ultimate determination regarding whether an action is conscionable is a product more of the law of fashion than of the divine law. This section of my analysis is intended to support my argument that Locke's conception of reason is restricted to *logos*, to means-ends calculations deprived of a *noetic* underpinning.

First, the divine law is that law "promulgated by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation" (ECHU II xxviii 8). This is the law that discerned through philosophic contemplation (*nous*). Divine law is, only ostensibly, argued to be the essential foundation of our conception of good and evil: "this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude . . . it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions" (ECHU II xxviii 8). Divine law rewards through heaven, and punishes through sin (ECHU II xxviii 8, ECHU II xxviii 14).

Second, civil law rewards and punishes on the basis of civil or societal standards of right and wrong. Consistent with the idea of reasonable retributive violence expressed in the *Second Treatise*, punishments are allocated on the basis of attempts to "take away life, liberty, or goods" (ECHU II xxviii 9). In this case the standard for moral action is the legal code of the society, punishment being designated through the idea of crime, instead of sin (ECHU II xxviii 14).

Third, the law of fashion describes circumstances where the standard for moral action is determined by the customs, opinions, and traditions of a certain place. Individuals are punished or rewarded through the fact that their action is viewed as either virtuous or vicious by those with whom they interact (ECHU II xxviii 10). Because virtue and vice are a matter of subjective opinion, Locke asserts they can vary between one society and the next. However,

> as to the main, they for the most part are kept the same everywhere. For, since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem that wherein everyone finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should, in a great measure, everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule God hath established. (ECHU II xxviii 11)

Locke is asserting that the divine law operates on man indirectly, that it influences man only insofar as the law of nature is accurately detected in a society's law of fashion: "the greatest part [of men] we shall find govern themselves, chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magistrate" (ECHU II xxviii 12). The divine law may be influential over a society, but it also may not. Men only need be influenced by "one" of the three types of law (ECHU II xviii 13). Locke asserts that the divine law is the rightful foundation of the law of fashion, but elsewhere in the text he contradicts his assertion that men almost always follow the same laws of fashion. Locke argues, early in the *Essay*, that man possesses no innate ideas or principles (ECHU I i). In order to support his claim, which contradicts scholastic tradition, he asserts the natural depravity of man, "robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure"[37] (ECHU I ii 9), and the fundamental subjectivity of moral standards; there are people who "bury their children alive without scruple" (ECHU I ii 9); "there are places where they eat their own children" (ECHU I ii 9). Locke very fundamentally contradicts himself. Either the divine law is the "only true touchstone of moral rectitude," in which case the divine law is either indifferent to or approves of cannibalism of one's progeny, or the supremacy of the law of fashion is affirmed by the fact that "there are places where they eat their own children."

Locke acknowledges this discrepancy. The divine law is not so much a practical standard as an objective and ideal standard, "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." Locke argues that morality is "among the sciences capable of demonstration" (ECHU IV iii 18, cf. ECHU IV iv 7). If the divine law is properly applied, it may be understood with as much certainty as a mathematical truth (ECHU IV iii 18). Locke also argues, however, that man struggles and ultimately fails to understand the science of morality. Morality is more difficult than mathematics for man to understand for several reasons. First, mathematics deals in figures that may be diagramed, and whose universal applicability may thereby be understood (ECHU IV iii 19). Morality, on the other hand, deals with ideas that cannot be as easily quantified, and notions that can be more complex (ECHU IV iii 19). Nonetheless, Locke is certain that "if men would in the same method, and with the same indifferency,

search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a stronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come near to perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined" (ECHU IV iii 19). Locke continues, and asserts the reason men do not understand with mathematical precision the divine law is because of the law of fashion: "But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches or power makes men espouse the well-endowed opinions in fashion, and they seek arguments either to make good their beauty, or varnish over and cover their deformity" (ECHU IV iii 19).

As suggested by these contradictions, the law of fashion is the law that actually informs man's moral decisions. A rational man follows the law of fashion before he follows the divine law. Man's reason is a product of pleasure and pain, and this is affected, first and foremost, through the law of fashion. The divine law, a source of objective moral standards disclosed through faith in a transcendent order of existence in our cosmos, is radically subordinated to the law of fashion, or to the law of nature, as these terms are ultimately one and the same.

The law of fashion requires no *noetic* reasoning to be understood. The process of reason according to fashionable laws does not involve subjecting those laws to intense scrutiny, just as most men have never scrutinized why it is that they cannot wear black socks with brown shoes, or why they shake hands as social cordiality; these things, and similar things, individuals simply do, they do not think about why they do them. Revelation, faith, *noesis*, he implies through the supremacy of the law of fashion, and cannot disclose reasonable ordering principles for moral behavior. Revelation cannot reveal truths which could not already be communicated to other men through means of sense perception and reflection (ECHU IV xviii 3). Man cannot conjure images of things which do not already exist in our minds by our reasoning faculties. We cannot think of substances other than clouds, planets, mountains, and other things that actually exist in the physical world. We possess no "sixth sense" (ECHU IV xviii 3). Revelation cannot, moreover, alter ideas disclosed by reason (ECHU IV xviii 4). Revelation cannot change truths discovered by Euclid; it cannot teach us that a triangle has four sides (ECHU IV xviii 4). Consequently, that which is learned through faith is radically subordinated to that which is learned through reason, as discernible in Locke's definitions of "reason" and "faith":

> *Reason*, therefore, as contradistinguished to *faith*, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such ideas, which it has got but the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation and reflection.

> Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation. (ECHU IV xviii 2)

Locke does not dismiss faith altogether, but man cannot be faithful about anything of moral consequence. "Faith," he maintains, "can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge" (ECHU IV xviii 5). "The proper matter of faith" is restricted to speculative and trivial questions such as whether "part of the angels rebelled against God" (ECHU IV xviii 7). "These and the like" are all that faith may ponder. The actual existence of God is, for Locke, a matter of knowledge. The idea of God that results from knowledge, instead of faith, is restricted to ideas concerning the physical world with which man interacts through sense and anamnesis. God becomes a Euclidean truth in Locke's philosophy, grounded in physical and practical instead of metaphysical and moral concepts:

> So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions; or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple ideas, which we originally received from sense or reflection: and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law. (ECHU II xviii 14)

The immortality of the soul is dismissed by Locke as irrelevant (ECHU IV iii 6, ECHU IV iv 15). The premises for human action, pleasure and pain, are divorced from the idea of God: "we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute [pleasure and pain] wholly to the good pleasure of our maker" (ECHU IV iii 6). Our sense of identity is only "as far extended as our ideas themselves" (ECHU IV iii 8). Reason provides no information regarding the existence of spirits: "we have no information . . . but by revelation . . . our natural faculties give us no account at all" (ECHU IV iii 27). Our faculties ultimately provide no idea of God or of spirits, only revelation discloses such information. If our moral behavior is demonstrable, if it is based on the reasonable preservation of man's corporeal self, this behavior is not derived from God. Man's faculties, properly applied, will not waste time pondering revelatory matters, as such matters cannot be detected by *logos* to affect the likelihood of preservation.

Consequently, Locke's man orients his moral behavior toward those mundane and self-serving interests disclosed by passionate reflection (*logos*). Realizations of a natural necessity for the communal good, of the ideal of self-sacrifice because one exists in a hierarchy of being whose value transcends individual human self-interests, cannot be disclosed to a man

whose reasoning faculties are restricted to the material concerns motivated by passionate pangs.

Locke's theory, therefore, ignores, or denies the very existence of the sort of reasoning (*noesis*) that is capable of rejecting Locke's philosophical premises. Locke's thought analyzes man's rational pursuit (*logos*) of mundane satiety, while assuming, without questioning, that mundane satiety is the proper final objective of human action. The lack of questioning regarding the ultimate end of action (*noesis*) satisfactorily silences objections regarding the ultimate materialistic objectives of Locke's thought.

Locke's manner of determining good and evil, the idea of reason as passionate reflection, does not ground the chain that hangs in the air. The answer to "why do I act" is, according to Locke, "to avoid pain." The infinite regression is not closed, as one may next inquire, "why do I seek to avoid pain." The desire to avoid pain cannot be determined to be rational, in the sense of *nous*, unless we understand why man exists, and if this existence demands any sort of positive fulfillment, perhaps of ambition or potential. Locke's nature of man has no positive character, only the negative desire to avoid pain. Man's nature is fulfilled, therefore, when man lives for a long time, and suffers very little during his life. The two pillars of Locke's law of nature, preservation and material convenience, fulfill these demands. This falls in stark contrast to, for example, Aristotle's supposition that man's essence is fulfilled through the realization of his potential. The Lockean man has no potential (beyond corporeal longevity and material convenience).

Man's reason is therefore a matter of passionate reflection, determined by immediate mundane exigencies, which are themselves determined by the utterly mundane law of fashion. Reason considers issues pertinent to a corporeal existence in a material world. An increased probability for preservation, signaled to man by the absence of pain, is the prime cause of this sort of reasoning. Almost always, avoiding pain means going along with the obtaining law of fashion in a society. Pain inflicted because of retributive violence is different from one society to the next: eating one's children is, after all, looked upon differently in some societies than it is in others.

However, as discussed in the *Second Treatise*, the law of fashion sometimes dictates that men resist civil laws when those laws fail to reflect the social standards of society. Although Locke intimates that the divine law is the theoretical premise for reasonable behavior; the resistance movement which would inspire the insurrection that would overturn a tyrannical king and replace him with a "civil society" needs only be brought about in Locke's world through calculations (*logos*) based on the law of fashion. According to Locke, such a revolution would be wrought because individuals saw—with their eyes and not their souls—what other individuals were pursuing, and

that it had become socially acceptable for each individual to now pursue self-preservation and individual material convenience. Locke argues that fashion condones reasonable behavior; not that men should actually learn (*noesis*) what the law of nature is for themselves.

REASON AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

One of the best ways to see that Locke's philosophical nature had given way to political priorities by the time of his mature writings, is to compare the political outcome of the reasoning process as it appears in his earlier *Essays* against the political outcome of the reasoning process as it appears in the later *Second Treatise*. This section of the analysis will demonstrate that when Locke removes the *noetic* aspects from the reasoning process in his mature work, arguments once used to support deference to governing authorities begin to read as arguments used to support resistance against government.

Arguments used to justify tyrannicide in the *Second Treatise* are only slight modifications of arguments used to justify obligations to kingly authority in *Essays on the Law of Nature*. In the former text, Locke argues that man can conscionably identify miscreant rulers with thieves and pirates (18–21). Locke uses the metaphor of a thief, within the context of the language of the state of nature, state of war, and civil society, to justify the argument for resistance against arbitrary societal rulers.[38] He begins from the following: "it is Lawful for me to treat [a thief], as one who has put himself into a State of War with me, i.e., kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a State of War, and is aggressor in it" (18). He does not specify, in section 18, whether this thief is a fellow society member.[39] In section 19, Locke extends the argument against the thief to clearly include thieves that were, before undertaking a malicious design against society, members of one's society: "the Right of War even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow-subject" (19). This argument extends the right of war to individual men who live within societies, but who do not have recourse to the society's laws in order to rectify a grievance (cf. 207). This argument includes, for example, instances in which a robber assails an individual in the street. If there are no police present at that moment, the individual retains the right to kill his assailant, as an act of retributive violence that is reasonably executed for the individual's self-preservation. From here, Locke argues that rulers-as-pirates may be resisted.

In the *Essays*, Locke argues that man should not compare rulers to pirates (ELN, 185). The arguments Locke uses to support the deferential position of the *Essays* will be further familiar to students of the *Second Treatise*. Locke

begins, in both texts, from the workmanship argument: "God is supreme over everything . . . if He pleases, will reduce us again to nothing" (ELN, 187, cf. ELN 153). In the *Second Treatise*, the workmanship argument is used to support the position that man cannot be obliged to slavery (23). In the *Essays*, the exact same starting position leads to the conclusion that man may be obliged to superior powers: "the will of any other superior is binding, be it that of a king or a parent, to whom we are subject by the will of God" (ELN, 187). Locke does not simply use this argument to justify obedience to kings, but obedience to parents, and one is led to believe by the inclusion of "any other superior" that this argument could as well be extended to the conjugal society, and to the relationship between master and servant; namely, the argument could apply to all the types of power identified by Locke in the *Second Treatise*. Indeed, subsidiary requirements of the law of nature include: "reverence and fear of the Diety, tender affection for parents, love of one's neighbor, and other such sentiments" (ELN 195; cf. ELN 203).

The *Essays* does not condone tyranny; its point is not absolute subjection to higher powers. Rather, the whole thing is a matter of emphasis. In the *Essays*, Locke's emphasis is on subjection to power established in accordance with the law of nature. Locke emphasizes individual subordination to kingly and paternal authority, but kings and parents are passively referred to as bearing "indirectly [a] delegated power" (ELN 187). Locke is speaking of kings and parents that exercise power within the confines of the law of nature. It is almost in passing—the reference is literally parenthetical—that Locke argues against tyranny (ELN 189). Conscience, used in later texts to justify resistance, is here used to justify submission to authority. What follows from emphasizing resistance as opposed to deference Locke's construction and presentation of these arguments? I am now prepared to make a few remarks concerning how individual behavior is impacted as a result of this change in emphasis.

Individuals, concerned whether or not an action may jeopardize their preservation, fail to concern themselves with whether or not an action is good, right, conscionable, and otherwise amenable to the divine law.[40] Even if one were to excuse the supremacy of philosophical reasoning, even in times of grave danger, one might conclude that this is a very accurate way of describing how the mind might process certain extreme and dangerous events. If I am being held up at gunpoint on the street, good and right is determined solely within the context of the state of war in which I have found myself. But Locke's political theory does not teach how to behave responsibly when one is *not* defending oneself within a state of war. It does not teach how to behave in honest business transactions with other honest members of society,

it does not teach respect for elders, or how to get along with those in society who we might find disagreeable.

Imagine that not I, but my neighbor's child, is being attacked in the street, and I witness the assault from my home's window. Locke's thought cannot motivate me, as the Good Samaritan was motivated, to risk personal safety for the sake of the personal safety of another individual with whom I share no close bonds. I may come to the child's defense, but only on the grounds that I am preemptively stopping a danger that may later befall me as well. Nothing in Locke's thought suggests that I am bound to act in this dangerous situation for anything other than my own preservation. If I act in accord with the law of fashion, namely, if I save the child in accord with social norms, I am still abiding by norms for my own interest, for example, to avoid the shame of inaction, or to prevent a future attack on myself or my own family. Locke's political theory does not countenance the defense of innocents because it is the right, good, or conscionable thing to do; the defense of innocents is right, good, and conscionable because it is conducive to individual preservation. If the attacker does not see the witness hiding in the window, thereby threatening the witness's future safety, the Lockean witness would not be inspired to come to the aid of the innocent neighbor.

Locke's well-known example of prerogative power as being prudently exercised by demolishing a burning house to save the other houses in the neighborhood is another revealing example of the moral dilapidation that ensues from Locke's theory. In the event that an individual's house is on fire, an executive would be justified in using his prerogative power to forgive that individual's neighbors if they demolish the burning house in order to save their own houses (159). Locke does not provide details regarding the severity of this hypothetical fire, but the spirit of his argument is indicative of the civic irresponsibility that his citizens would display by demolishing the neighbor's house without serious effort to help the neighbor. Why does Locke not, in this famous passage, encourage the neighbors to fight the fire with ferocity—so they can not only stop the fire, but help their neighbor in duress to salvage what he may of his valuables? If Locke took the idea of the common good seriously, he would not only have encouraged his citizens to defend what is valuable to them personally, by encouraging them to quickly demolish their neighbor's home so they may save their own, but he would have asked them to defend things in their community which provide value to others but are of no value to them personally. In this example, which is Locke's own, aid is not given to the victim of the fire for his sake, to save what possessions might remain that are of value to him, but rather for sakes of the other residents of the neighborhood. In the event of a fire, it is justifiable to tear down a neighbor's house,

for the sake of one's own house. The alternative which would have been found more appealing to the neighbor, for all the neighbors to collectively douse the fire with water and put out the fire so that some of the neighbor's possessions can be salvaged, is not suggested by Locke as a possible course of action. It is significant that Locke frames this entire discussion in terms of the rightfulness of the act of the many, and does not suggest that it would have been dutiful, honorable, or virtuous for the owner of the burning home to himself suggest sacrificing his own home in order to save the neighborhood.

The selfish attitude is also evident in the man on the ship bound for Algiers (210). The man detects that the captain of a ship on which he is traveling is taking him and "the rest of the company" to a destination where they will become slaves. The man who has detected their collective fate does not attempt to save the entire company but cannot help from "casting about how to save himself" (210). Perhaps this man will decide to instigate a mutiny among his fellow passengers, thereby saving the entire company. However, from Locke's presentation, it appears as if the other passengers would be saved only because their assistance in the mutiny would be required to save the suspicious man. To look at it from another perspective, if it were the case that the cross winds should blow the ship near an island, it seems from Locke's presentation that the suspicious man would be inclined to quietly jump overboard, and swim for safety without alerting the captain or the crew. As it would hardly be possible to save the other passengers with this course of action without alerting the crew, and as this course of action would be potentially less dangerous than fighting against the crew in a violent uprising, it does seem that the Lockean individual would choose to save himself and to abandon the rest of the company. The actions of individuals in Locke's anecdotal stories, such as the burning neighborhood and the ship bound for slavery, do suggest a particularly self-interested individual whose concern for the community goes only so far as the community can further his personal interests.

From these examples, the significance of the style of the reasoning process is evident. Whereas arguments used in Locke's early writings led to deference, patience, and civil obligation, very similar arguments that appear in Locke's mature writings lead to disparate consequences. Locke's later writings, through encouraging resistance, also encourage a sort of selfishness that is not normatively desirable within a society. The main difference between the arguments associated with Locke's civically responsible individual as depicted in his early writings, and the morally dilapidated individual to appear in his mature writings, is the method of the reasoning style employed by the theoretical individual of Locke's early writing contains *noetic* reason, and the style of reasoning employed by the theoretical individuals of Locke's mature writing does not think in a *noetic* manner.

CONCEALING *NOUS*

The *logos* which describes reason in the *Two Treatises* and in the *Essay* is starkly distinct from the *noetic* reason in Locke's earlier writings, the *Essays*. My hypothesis is, again, that Locke intentionally whittled away the *noetic* form of reasoning out of his later writings because they are designed to foment a political cause that could only be hampered by nuisance questions regarding the *noetic* validity of natural freedom as being the absolute and fundamental final cause for human action. Having demonstrated, textually, that Locke's mature conception of the law of nature is indeed more restrictive in terms of *nous* than his earlier conception, I now turn to a discussion of historical evidence that suggests that the theoretical restrictions placed on *nous* are designed intentionally for political purposes.

Several pieces of historical evidence can be brought to bear to suggest that Locke intentionally weaned *nous* out of his conception of reason in order to justify Shaftsbury's politics. For starters, Locke's change is not slow to develop; an immediate attitude shift can be discerned after his acquaintanceship with Cooper. The 1690 publication date of the *noetically* vapid *Essay* should not mislead us. In 1671, only seven years after composing *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Locke wrote the first two drafts of the text that would eventually be published, in 1690, as the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. It is indeed as early as 1671 that some of the pneumopathological tendencies began to develop in Locke. In 1667, Locke became an acquaintance of Ashley Cooper, who later became the Earl of Shaftsbury in 1670.[41] In 1668, it appears that Locke still adhered to a *noetic* view of reason, as suggested by the following lengthy quote from a paper entitled *De Arte Medica*, recovered among his papers and dated 1668:

> He that in physics shall lay down fundamental questions, and from thence, drawing consequences and raising disputes, shall reduce medicine into the regular form of a science, *totum, teres, atque rotundum*, has indeed done something to enlarge the art of talking, and perhaps laid a foundation for endless disputes: but if he hopes to bring men by such a *system* to the knowledge of the infirmities of their bodies, or the constitution, changes, and history of diseases, with the safe and discreet way of their cure, he takes much what a like course with him that should walk up and down in a thick wood, outgrown with briars and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map of the country. True knowledge grew first in the world by experience and rational observations; but proud man, not content with the knowledge he was capable of, and which was useful to him, would needs penetrate into the hidden causes of things, lay down principles, and establish maxims to himself about the operations of nature, and then vainly expect that nature, or in truth God, should proceed according to those laws which *his* maxims had prescribed to him; whereas his narrow and weak

> faculties could reach no further than the observation and memory of some few facts produced by visible external causes, but in an way utterly beyond the reach of his apprehension—it perhaps being no absurdity to think that this great and curious fabric of the world, the workmanship of the Almighty, cannot be perfectly comprehended by any understanding but His that made it. Man, still affecting something of Deity, laboured by his imagination to supply what his observation and experience failed him in; and when he could not discover (by experience) the principles, causes and methods of nature's workmanship, he would needs fashion all these out of his own thought, and make a world to himself, framed and governed by his own intelligence. The vanity spread itself into many useful parts of natural philosophy; and by how much more it seemed subtle, sublime, and learned, by hindering the growth of practical knowledge.[42]

As late as 1669, Locke's relationship with Cooper is best described as a fawning acquaintance and occasional errand boy.[43] The decisive switch in Locke's mentality from dedicated philosopher to ideologue can be dated sometime between 1669 and, as I will show below, 1671. By 1671, Locke was a full-time employee of Shaftsbury, and Shaftsbury appears to be developing his political aspirations at this time. In that year, Locke was among five or six colleagues who gathered regularly at Shaftsbury's home to discuss matters of philosophy and, assuredly, politics.[44]

It can be surmised based on differences between two early editions of the *Essay*, both written in 1671, that Locke sought to modify his philosophical considerations of the 1660s in such a way as to corroborate Shaftsbury's political agenda. The earliest version, Draft A, contained scattered references to arguments originally found in the *Essays*. Von Leyden tells us that such arguments "are marshaled now for an elaborate attack upon innate knowledge, and it is this part of Draft B that has given rise to Book I of the *Essay*."[45] The refusal to acknowledge innate knowledge is a central component of Locke's attempt to eradicate questions inspired by *noetic* objections; as the attack on innate knowledge is essentially an attack on the idea of sensation occurring through the soul (*psyche*). Part of Locke's argument regarding reason in the *Essay*, inconsistent with his position in the *Essays*, is that man's reason is informed by five corporeal senses of which the soul is not included.

We can also surmise that Locke continued to develop and refine the theoretical ideas he used to conceal *noetic* thought for an extended period of time. His personal journal tells us that in June of 1681 he was still contemplating the idea of the law of nature; we also know that he purchased texts by Pufendorf and Hooker in that year, used in his mature conception of the law of nature.[46] Also in 1681, he noted a belief in the demonstrability of ethics; a position which appears to undermine any *noetic* view of ethics retained after 1671.[47] And most interesting, a certain manuscript has been recovered in

the Lovelace Collection entitled *Of Ethick in General*. This paper, which is believed to have been cut out of the final 1690 edition of the *Essay*, contains an ostensibly *noetic* view of morality. "Morality," this text tells us, being "the great business and concernment of mankind, deserves our most attentive application and study," and is "the proper province of philosophers, a sort of men different from priests and lawyers."[48] If this paper was indeed originally intended for inclusion in the *Essay*, the decision to remove it from the text is consistent with an attempt to remove indications of *noetic* awareness from Locke's theory on epistemology, and to thereby conceal the existence of *nous* and to discredit the *psyche* as a sensorium of knowledge.

We can further identify two events in the early 1680s that may have drove Locke further into his pneumopathology. The period between 1679 and 1683 was a tumultuous time for Locke. Shaftsbury's plot against the Crown was reaching its height; and Locke appears to have been connected, through Shaftsbury, to the Exclusion Bill. The death of Shaftsbury in 1683, who had become a close and beloved friend of Locke's, probably helped to concretize Locke's devotion to political ideals over and above philosophical truths. It appears, indeed, that Locke participated, to some extent, in the Rye House Plot of April 1683.[49] By 1684 Locke had escaped to Holland to avoid political persecution. Whether involved or not, Locke's name had become tied up in the conspiracy against the Crown, and this meant that, as a result of devoting his energies to the aspirations of a dear friend, Locke was now a fugitive. If he wished any semblance of the peace offered by his old academic life back, it would only be achieved through a Whig political victory against the Crown.

The second event which may have affected Locke's proclivity to pneumopathology was his expulsion from Oxford in 1684. This event is probably less consequential, but worth mentioning nonetheless. Locke's expulsion was directly related to his political activities, and particularly resulted from his suspected involvement in the Rye House Plot. Laslett tells us that his removal was illegal and not justified, having been brought about "by the Crown as a piece of political vindictiveness."[50] Oxford was, at this time, "a traditionalist institution" that "mistrusted his politics" and was troubled by the "developed originality of his thought."[51] Locke wanted his post back, and it appeared to have been his aspiration to spend his entire life in academia.[52] From the scant evidence available, it appears that Locke did not take this expulsion very well. Between 1679 and 1683, Locke went to Oxford for 27 visits; Locke did not make one visit to Oxford after 1684.[53] Although we may only speculate on his personal feeling regarding his expulsion, we may question whether Locke became disenchanted with the *noetic* truth academia, which had once helped him to understand. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that after 1684, any conflicting emotions Locke may have

previously been entertaining regarding whether he should pursue political prerogatives or philosophical truths in his writings were reconciled in favor of political ends. The death of Shaftsbury and the ensuing expulsion from Oxford provided the experiences—if indeed any such experiences were necessary—to enliven the appeal of the second reality of Whig political ideals that offered an abode from Locke's troublesome personal life.

CONCLUSION

Peter C. Myers argues that Locke's ends, amenable to the ideals of faith, if albeit dismissive of faith itself, justify his thought: "he attempts to promote the life of reason or rational liberty, whether within or without the life of faith, as the condition and purpose of a healthy politics."[54] Myers's analysis views Locke as articulating a philosophy of "political rationalism," a system where reason leads to an ordered "rational liberty" and facilitates a "rational pursuit of happiness."[55] While Myer's condones Strauss's methodology, he insists Strauss's critique "restores respect for Locke's enduring relevance and power at the cost of obscuring his moral design, especially by associating Locke's thought with the morally debilitating reductionism and conventionalism for which Hobbes was 'justly decried.'"[56] Myers argues Locke moderates Hobbes's modernism through an insistence on a politically oriented version of wisdom, a type of reason reliant on the will and the passions to incline men toward an ordered sort of liberty whereby they may achieve happiness. Myers views Locke's conception of reason, for its ability to produce happiness, as a theoretically sufficient alternative to the *summum bonum* of old.

This chapter has argued, in opposition to Myers, that Locke's political thought is indeed reductionist. In particular, I have argued that Locke restricts *noetic* reasoning from the reasoning process. This reduction is morally debilitating for the citizens of a Lockean society. The attempt to remove *nous* from reasoned thought is an attempt to remove open-minded contemplation regarding the transcendental ground of morality from individuals' moral speculations. The practical problem with Myers's reading of Locke is that Lockean individuals are expected to become moral without understanding why they act morally. The reasonable foundation of moral behavior is *nous*, not *logos*. Against Myers, I suggest that men will not behave in a fashion that is wise unless they actually understand what wisdom entails. Because Locke's definition of reason is restricted to *logos*, Lockean citizens will make decisions in light of the assumption that natural freedom is the first and primary human good, but they will not actually contemplate the true character of the highest good. Because natural freedom is merely assumed

by Lockean citizens as the highest good, and because its value to human existence has not been determined by contemplation, Lockean citizens will be incapable of recognizing those situations in which action in accordance with natural freedom is not the best course of action.

The Lockean citizen, consequently, has a proclivity to look after his own interest before he looks after the interest of the community: the Lockean citizen is selfish. That Locke's citizen may die in battle (205), in defense of things that he personally derives value from (e.g., the nation that provides his individual security and material convenience), is less revealing of his citizen's disposition toward civic responsibility than the fact that Locke's citizen will not bother injury, or even the possibility of losing his own property, to help a neighbor in need if it is not personally beneficial. Contrarily, the Lockean citizen will do more damage to their neighbor's home than the fire possibly might have. Locke's man may march under orders into battle, but Locke's man would not be the type of individual to act above and beyond the call of duty, risking personal injury or death to aid a fellow soldier under duress in combat.

Of course, brave soldiers are a fact of life: they exist, and Locke knew it. In order for Locke's strange type of reason to appear coherent to his audience, he actually undertook a rather intricate theoretical operation in order to develop the social atmosphere in which individuals would not think, "maybe I should help my neighbor." In the next two chapters, I turn from an analysis of Locke's theoretical justification for the restricted reasoning process which must be carried out by citizens of a Lockean society, to an examination of the measures Locke takes to actually implement the restrictions on reason within society. These restrictions include, most importantly, the way that individuals think about religion and the way that individuals think about education. I will discuss Locke on religion in the next chapter, and Locke on education in chapter 8.

NOTES

1. Myers, *Our Only Star and Compass*, 22.
2. Ibid., 22, 137–177.
3. Ibid., 24.
4. This reading of Locke's view of reason has gained some traction in recent years; see Steven Forde, "What does Locke Expect us to Know?" *The Review of Politics* 68, no. 2 (2006): 232–258.
5. Von Leibniz, *New Essays on the Human Understanding* (1704); quoted in Ellis Sandoz, *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 69.

6. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 309n; quoted in Sandoz, *A Government of Laws*, 69–70.

7. Sandoz, *A Government of Laws*, 62–63; see also n20 on page 63. Sandoz agrees with my underlying metathesis, that Locke's "true profundity, however, is perhaps obscured by an ambivalence that was probably calculated and which follows from his systematic intention to break with the classical and Christian tradition in philosophy and religion while appearing to be the true advocate of that tradition" (ibid., 59).

8. A good summary of the classical view of reason can be found in: Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989, 89–115).

9. The word *nous* has been explained in incredible depth by, especially, Eric Voegelin and Ellis Sandoz. See Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, 89–115; Voegelin, *The Collected Works: Volume 11*, 224–251; and Ellis Sandoz, *The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 210–216; my own discussion of *nous* and *logos* can be found in chapter 3 of this book.

10. W. von Leyden, introduction in *John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature and Other Associated Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37.

11. Cf. ibid., 37–39.

12. Specifically, Locke's correspondence shows discussions with William Uvedale and Gabriel Towerson, but, unfortunately, does not say much about the particulars of these discussions; see E. S. de Beer, *The Correspondence of John Locke: Volume 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 157–160 (letters 105, 106, 108); cf. von Leyden, introduction in *John Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature*, 8–9.

13. Ibid., 1–2.

14. See also, ibid., 45.

15. Ashcraft, "The Politics of Locke's *Two Treatises*," 17.

16. Ibid.

17. References to Locke's *Essays on the Laws of Nature* will be made parenthetically in this book and follow this formula: (ELN page number). I rely on John Locke, *John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature and Other Associated Writings*, Ed. W. Von Leyden (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002).

18. See chapter 3 for my discussion on how the *psyche* is the faculty in the mind that is responsible for processing *noetic* reasoning. In other words, the *psyche* is the sensorium in the mind for perceiving things which are not empirical in nature.

19. Peter Laslett, introduction in *John Locke: "Two Treatises of Government"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82; von Leyden, introduction in *John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature*, 45.

20. Laslett, introduction in *John Locke: "Two Treatises of Government,"* 82.

21. von Leyden, introduction in *Essays on the Law of Nature*, 15.

22. Ibid., 15.

23. Ibid., 17–19.

24. The first correspondence between Cooper and Locke is dated August 29, 1669 (De Beer, *The Correspondence of John Locke: Volume 1*, 321).

25. See also Maurice Cranston, "The Politics of John Locke," *History Today*, September 1952, 620; and Richard Ashcraft, "Revolutionary Politics and Locke's

Two Treatises of Government: Radicalism and Lockean Political Theory," *Political Theory* 8, no. 4 (1980), 433; Cranston writes that "I have searched in vain for evidence of Locke holding liberal view before his introduction to Lord Shaftsbury in 1666. There is much to show that Locke held such views soon afterward; and I cannot help wondering if he learned them from Shaftsbury. For it is certainly not the case . . . that Shaftsbury learned his liberalism from Locke."

26. See chapter 4 of this book.

27. Jacqueline Stevens, "The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority: Property Rights, Consent, and Resistance in the Second Treatise," *Political Theory* 24 (August 1996), 461.

28. Robert C. Grady II, "Obligation, Consent, and Locke's Right to Revolution: Who Is to Judge?" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 9, no. 2 (1976): 272–292; Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action," *California Law Review* 73, no. 1 (1985): 52–118.

29. Stevens, "The Reasonableness of John Locke's Majority," 461.

30. Judges 10:18.

31. Judges 11:27.

32. Judges 11:13.

33. Judges 11:26.

34. Jephtha stood to be made king of Israel for his work (Judges 11:8). He cannot have cared innately for the recovery of the land, as he was an Israeli outcast (Judges 11:3), and victory meant not only that he would gain membership to a society, but that he would become ruler of that society.

35. The soul, again, is the mental faculty responsible for *noesis* (see chapter 3).

36. The idea that individuals are primarily motivated by pain is iterated in Locke's religious writings, discussed in chapter 7 of this analysis.

37. Incidentally, this passage affirms Locke's heuristic state of nature, and contradicts his historical state of nature.

38. This argument derives from John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature,* 181–189.

39. The metaphor of a thief, robber, or pirate as unreasonable is a favorite strategy of Locke's (see, John Locke, *Second Treatise §*203, John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature,* 169–171; see also Richard Ashcraft, *Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"* [London: Allen and Unwin], 200–202).

40. Socrates's ability to ignore corporeal dangers for the sake of philosophic truth is lauded by Plato in *The Apology*.

41. Alexander Campbell Fraser, "Prolegomena" in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), xxii.

42. Ibid., xxiv–xxv

43. De Beer, *The Correspondence of John Locke: Volume 1*, 321–323.

44. von Leyden, introduction in *John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature*, 61.

45. Ibid., 64.

46. Ibid., 67–68.

47. Ibid., 67.

48. Ibid., 70.

49. Laslett, introduction in *John Locke: "Two Treatises of Government,"* 31–32.
50. Ibid., 17, 23.
51. Ibid., 23.
52. Ibid., 17.
53. von Leyden, introduction in *John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature* 21.
54. Myers, *Our Only Star and Compass*, 22; this view is iterated by Cambridge scholar John Dunn [John Dunn, "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke," *The Historical Journal* 10 no. 2 (1967): 182], who insists that Locke's political thought does not lead to any sort of "political solipsism."
55. Myers, *Our Only Star and Compass*, 22, 137–177.
56. Ibid., 24.

Chapter Seven

Locke's Limited Idea of Religion

The clearest expression of Locke's reduction of reason to *logos* appears in his religious writings. Of particular interest are *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and *A Discourse of Miracles.* Locke wrote *A Letter* in 1685, *Reasonableness* in 1695*,* and a *Discourse* in 1702; all at a point when Locke was attempting to cover over *nous* in philosophical reasoning. Because philosophy is dependent upon the sensorium of the soul, and because the soul is the main faculty of religious thought (*nous*), it was necessary for Locke to cover over *nous* in religion. He can be seen doing so in two ways. I will deal with these texts in an anachronistic fashion, because the points made by Locke in *The Reasonableness* and *A Discourse* are more consequential to this analysis. First, in the *Reasonableness* and in a *Discourse*, Locke attempts to eradicate *noetic* reasoning from the Christianity by arguing that the truth of Christianity can only be affirmed because of the evidence provided by the miracles performed by Jesus. Second, in the *Letter*, he restricts matters of *nous* to voluntary or private thought. When one keeps in mind that the *Essay* attempts to eradicate *nous* from private thought, the attempt to keep *nous* out of civic matters becomes all the more consequential.

THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AND *A DISCOURSE OF MIRACLES*

The most forceful critique of Locke's religious doctrine is that Locke attempts to remove *noetic* reasoning from the Christian experience; that is, he attempts to remove religiosity and spirituality from the individuals' minds that adhere to the religion. In these texts, the veracity of Christianity is argued to be evident to man through the reasoning faculties, sensual

perception and memory, as described in the *Essay* as not including the soul. This veracity is detectable through the miracles Christ performed, which are sensed by humans through sight and sound, and are impressive because of their physical inexplicability, but not because the metaphysical experience (*nous*) of religion is revealed when a human perceives himself to be witnessing a miracle. An analysis grounded in *nous* would, contrarily, focus on the adherence of Christ's teachings to a conscionably discernable *noetic* truth; a *noetic* analysis of Christianity would focus on the truthfulness and moral propriety of the religion's fundamental principles, as disclosed through a philosophical query into whether or not a religion's precepts are made in accordance with wisdom. Such a defense of Christianity simply cannot be found in Locke's religious writings.

The evidence that Christ revealed the truth of God can be discerned in three ways according to Locke: through miracles, phrases and circumlocutions, and by plain and direct words (RC 58–61).[1] Locke focuses on the ability of these three types of evidence to influence individuals, not on the actual content of the evidence. Miracles are the most necessary of these means to influencing people. Few individuals would have been convinced of Jesus's truth if "as soon as he appeared in public, and began to preach, he had presently professed himself to have been the messiah" (RC 62). Even John the Baptist was persuaded that Jesus was the messiah after perceiving through his senses a miracle associated with Jesus: "he saw the Holy Ghost descend upon him" (RC 55). For Locke, Christianity is not a true religion because of the content of its doctrines; Christianity is a true religion because of the abundance of miracles which persuaded individuals to believe the indirect words of the apostles and the direct words of Christ. According to Locke, the force which accompanies an idea is a more significant determinant of the idea's veracity than the nature of the idea itself.

Locke defines a miracle as a "sensible operation, above the comprehension of the spectator, taken by him to be divine" (DM 79).[2] The miraculous act serves as a "credential" for the veracity of a divine revelation (DM 80). A miraculous act is a viable credential for divine revelation because a miracle is always an act of supernatural proportions, an act that cannot be explained by man's reasoning faculties to result from natural powers. God's power being more forceful, more omnipotent, than any other conceivable power, miracles, as the product of God's supernatural power, always "carry the evident marks of a greater and superior power" (DM 83). "The number, variety, and greatness of the miracles," are sensually determined indicators of the veracity of a purported miracle (DM 83). If something held to be a miracle can be discounted by a miracle of greater proportions, the latter is taken to be the expression of divine revelation. Locke argues, for example,

that both the Egyptian sorcerers and Moses produced by ostensible miracles "serpents, blood and frogs": "But when Moses's serpent ate up theirs, when he produced lice which they could not, the decision was easy," and Locke determines that because the quantity and magnitude of Moses's miracles were more miraculous than the Egyptian's miracles, that Moses's miracles were authentic expressions of divine power (DM 83). Locke thus concludes that "supernatural operations attesting such a revelation may, with reason, be taken to be miracles, as carrying the marks of a superior and over-ruling power, as long as no revelation accompanied with marks of a greater power appears against it" (DM 84).

Locke recounts a variety of miracles performed by Christ, which persuaded people of his veracity, including: recounting the events of woman's life whom he had never met (RC 26), his miraculous birth (RC 29), resurrecting twice after death (RC 31, DM 82), the appearance of the Holy Ghost to John during Christ's baptism (RC 55), turning water into wine (RC 76), walking on water (DM 82), curing inveterate palsy (DM 82), giving sight to the blind (DM 82), and raising the dead (DM 82). Locke's incomplete list of Christ's miracles amounts to nine miraculous acts that cannot be explained by natural, physical explanations. Because history has recorded no man who has performed ten miracles, nor resurrected himself thrice, Locke concludes that miraculous evidence for Christ's veracity is insurmountable.

Such insurmountable evidence, Locke attests, forms the foundation of man's faith in Christ's teachings. Faith, Locke argues in this text, is "nothing but a firm belief of what God declared" (RC 24). Faith in God is faith in sensual evidence pertaining to God's veracity. Faith, requiring proof, is thus transformed from the open acceptance of a transcendent realm of reality to a proto-positivistic phenomenon supported by evidence perceived by the physical senses.

From this definition of faith, that is, from a belief in that which has accumulated insurmountable physical evidence, Locke argues for the moral standards symbolized by what he refers to as the "law of faith" (RC 25). This law carries the obligatory character of all law, binding men to a set of moral criteria. First, men must repent (RC 187). Second, they must "be exemplary in good works" (RC 188). Third is a list of prohibitions: uncleanliness, all irregular desires, causeless divorces, swearing in conversation, forswearing in judgment, revenge, retaliation; ostentation of charity, of devotion, and of fasting; repetitions in prayer, covetousness, worldly care, and censoriousness (RC 188). Fourth is a list of commands: loving enemies, doing good to those that hate us, praying for those that despitefully use us, patience and meekness under injuries, forgiveness, liberality, and compassion (RC 188). Finally, the law of faith prescribes the Golden Rule as expressed by Matthew: "whatsoever

ye would have that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."[3] Locke argues that the law of faith "tends entirely to the good of mankind, and that all would be happy if all would practice it" (RC 243). Locke views a "sincere obedience" to the law of faith as an indispensable means toward the achievement of worldly happiness. This is not doubtable.

But the specious manner in which Locke argues for men to be convinced to adhere by this law of faith is central to this analysis. Christianity is reasonable, Locke argues, not because the essence of the moral standards it teaches are compatible with *noetic* truth, but because it provides a dogmatic and thoughtless manner of inclining men to those moral standards without actually requiring that they contemplate (*nous*) the moral standards to which they adhere. Locke argues that the best way to induce men to religion is to appeal to their desires for material convenience and for self-preservation. In other words, by playing upon the physical spectacle of miracles and man's mundane desires, men can be induced to adhere to the law of faith without ever once considering the *noetic* truth of the law. In this regard Locke does two things: first, he argues against man's capacity for *noetic* reasoning; and second, he argues for the idea of corporeal pleasure and pain as a motivating factor in religion.

First, Locke argues against man's capacity for *noetic* reasoning. Locke's account of the history of religion suggests that human order cannot be achieved through *nous*, and that it is consequently more practical to found religion on calculations derived from *logos*. Locke argues that Christ entered a confused, cacophonous philosophical scene. "Sense," blind lust, and "fearful apprehension," at the beginnings of history, induced men to conceive of ideas of deities, grounded in "false notions" and "foolish rites" (RC 238). An initial polytheism was challenged by Platonic monotheism, although the latter was able to persuade few individuals against polytheism:

> Few went to the schools of the philosophers, to be instructed in their duties and to know what was good and evil in their action. The priests sold the better penny-worths, and therefore had all their custom. Lustrations and processions were much easier than a clean conscience, and a steady course of virtue; and an expiatory sacrifice, that atoned for the want of it, was much more convenient than a strict and holy life. (RC 241)

Locke is less concerned with what Socrates has to say, and more concerned that Cephalus has wandered off stage before Socrates has made his point. The problem, as Locke sees it, is that human nature is of such a degenerate condition that men cannot be led by the truth itself to a realization of the veracity of the truth: "human reason[4] unassisted, failed men in its great and proper business of morality" (RC 241), "the opinion of this or that philosopher, was of

no authority" (RC 242), "philosophy seemed to have spent its strength" (RC 243). The problem regarded the inaccessibility of the veracity of *noetic* truth:

> The priests that delivered the oracles of heaven, and pretended to speak from the God, spoke little of virtue and a good life. And on the other side, the philosophers who spoke from reason,[5] made not much mention of the deity, in their ethics. They depended on reason and her oracles, which contain nothing but the truth: but yet some parts of that truth lie too deep for our natural powers easily to reach, and make plain and visible to mankind, without some light from above to direct them. (RC 243)

Thus, Locke argues for a lie to make the moral consequences of *noetic* truth palpable to individuals incapable of the intellectual depth required to actually perceive the truth through their own free thought (*noesis*). Locke does not tire of quoting the scriptural passages which refer to the miracles Christ performed and the dictates of the law of faith that follow from Christ's supernatural authority. But Locke does not once quote, nor refer to the ideal inherent to John 8:32: "ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Locke, instead, conceals the very idea that the *noetic* truth of Christ's teachings reveals an order inherent to the cosmos, and that it is the human participation with this order, it is an experiential tension toward this order, which gives happiness to men, which inspires by man's free will the lifestyle suggested by Locke's law of faith. The participation by free will in the order disclosed by Christ produces human happiness.

Locke, however, argues that most men are simply incapable of discerning or participating by free will in such an order. Therefore, Locke believes it is important to emphasize the sensual aspects of Christ's teachings, because sensual arguments will be most influential to most individuals:

> there needs no other proof for the truth of what he says, but that he said it: and then there needs no more but to read the inspired books to be instructed: all the duties of morality lie there clear and plain, and easy to be understood. And here I appeal, whether this be not the surest, the safest, and most effectual way of teaching; especially if we add this farther consideration, that . . . it suits the lowest capacities of reasonable creatures. (RC 243)

Locke's system is philosophically inadequate because, discounting man's capability to handle the truth disclosed by philosophy, it discourages philosophic activity. Philosophic activity involves contemplation (*noesis*). Locke encourages a dogmatic application of Christianity because it is a safe and efficient means of teaching and enforcing the moral standards necessary for worldly happiness. Yet, without actually contemplating moral standards, and without abiding by these standards through individual free will, human

beings can neither be sure that the rules they dogmatically follow actually reflect humanity's place in nature, nor may humans experience the higher happiness that follows from the contemplation (*noesis*) of such matters.

A second manner in which Locke removes *nous* from religious thought in the *Reasonableness* and a *Discourse* is by inclining men to the law of faith through corporeal rewards and punishments; the means of influencing individuals regarding the moral standards they are to adopt derive from their passionate reasoning (*logos*) concerning mundane affairs. That is, individuals are influenced regarding the veracity of Christianity, Locke argues, from principles affecting individuals' self-preservation and material convenience: Christianity is reasonable because it is a conduit to mundane satiety.

Locke argues that individuals may be persuaded of Christianity's veracity by the sensual evidence provided by miracles. Jesus's miracles, recounted by Locke, each provided a miraculous improvement to mundane conditions. He improved or restored health to individuals, he provided food for individuals, and he demonstrated a command of material existence by walking on water. Each of these miracles played on the desires for self-preservation and material convenience. And the promise of eternal life represents the extreme of self-preservation. The essence of Christian truth to Locke lies in its ability to persuade individuals, and Lockean individuals are persuadable through materialistic arguments. According to Locke's argument, Christianity is ultimately persuasive because the veracity evidenced by Christ's miracles offers the ultimate promise of mundane convenience. Miracles must not only provide insurmountable evidence, but persuasive evidence as well. Miracles providing insurmountable evidence of a natural order that called for the self-destruction of societies, for example, would not be compelling to the individuals of the societies which must perish. Christianity, then, is ultimately reasonable, not because the truths of its doctrines are compatible to *noetic* truth, but because its doctrines offer ideals human *logos* is indisputably drawn toward; that is, Christianity is true because it offers ideals which humans concern themselves with, "safety, ease and plenty," if divorced from conscience and the *noesis* which prompts conscionable decisions. Christianity is reasonable, like Locke's law of nature, because it is transformed from its original and *noetic* concerns to a *logos*-driven infatuation with mundane satiety.

Locke also accentuates the *logos* driven fear of corporeal punishment that awaits those who do not believe. To Locke, however, it is not the lack of faith for which the unbelieving are punished. Rather, the unbelieving are punished because they do not adhere to the law of faith: "but the rest wanting this cover [of faith], this allowance for their transgressions, must answer for all their actions; and being found transgressors of the law, shall, by the letter and sanction of the law, be condemned, for not having paid a full obedience to that

law, and not for want of faith; that is not the guilt, on which the punishment is laid" (RC 227). Locke emphasizes the idea of "everlasting punishment," in addition to the idea of everlasting life (RC 226). The emphasis on everlasting punishment, to Locke, supplies a force of such persuasive mundane force that it need not be reinforced by civil power: "if there be a necessity, either of force, or miracles, will there not be the same reason for miracles?" (TC 97)[6] To Locke, the crux of faith, the loving openness toward a transcendent truth, is not an element of human happiness. Faith is not as important as abiding by the principles that would be revealed by faith. Locke asserts that living by the principles inherent to the law of faith provides man with a complete users-guide to happiness. Locke further asserts that it is not important for the individual to understand the philosophical or theoretical underpinnings regarding the moral dictates he is to live by, because most individuals are simply incapable of understanding (*noesis*) the moral truth disclosed by faith. Thus, Locke transforms the essential doctrine of Christianity, that faith discloses a truth which transcends mundane satiety, into a dogmatic, blind following of the law of faith, a dissembling of transcendent truth, for the promise of mundane satiety.

Through these religious ideas, Locke discourages precisely the *noetic* thought necessary to understand, as far as humans may, the reasons behind moral obligations. *Noesis* is concealed through an appeal to man's *logos*, philosophic inquiry is hidden behind the teaching that man must do what is most conducive to his preservation, and that he may receive everlasting life, that which is unquestionably best for self-preservation, through a dogmatic following of the law of faith, without questioning the dictates of that law. Mundane satiety is the prime cause underlying his devotion to the law of faith, and, one is led to believe, Locke would condone any moral law that ultimately led to his goal of mundane satiety.

THE *LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION*

Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1685) assigns matters of religion to voluntary and civically irrelevant activity. The *Letter* clearly articulates that civil society is an utterly mundane organization: "The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like" (LT 393).[7] Accordingly, civil magistrates are charged with the duty of securing "unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of

these things belonging to this life" (LT 394). Magistrates must ensure a just distribution of goods which individuals "might and ought to enjoy" (LT 394). Civil society clearly does not encompass aspects of existence which might be considered extra-mundane. "The whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments," and "neither can nor ought in any manner be extended to the salvation of souls" (LT 394).

Locke provides three reasons for restricting civil society to mundane interests. First, Locke argues that one man may not, by any authority, compel another man to believe in a religion in which he does not believe: "Faith is not faith without believing" (LT 394). Second, Locke argues civil magistrates may exercise outward force, but compulsion cannot provide the "true and saving inward persuasion of the mind" (LT 395). Finally, Locke asserts that even when force of law does compel individuals to assent to a religion, salvation cannot be achieved through compulsion but only through the "dictates of their own consciences" (LT 396). Essentially, religion must contain an inherently voluntary character because salvation cannot be provided to men who truly do not believe in Christ's teachings.

As such, Locke defines a church as a voluntary organization: "A Church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls. I say it is a free and voluntary society" (LT 396). The content of church society is radically distinguished from the content of civil society. Unlike civil power, the power of the church is limited to persuasion, never compulsion (LT 397). Excommunication cannot deprive the excommunicated individual of civil goods (LT 400). Civil goods, moreover, cannot be disparately distributed based on church affiliation (LT 400). In short: "the civil government can give no new right to the Church, nor the Church to the civil government" (LT 401). Because church membership is based on consent, and because church authority is wholly distinguished from civil authority, Locke may appropriately argue that "the care, therefore, of every man's soul belongs unto himself" (LT 405).

On its face, through the intimation that individuals ought to care for their souls in private, Locke appears to be arguing for a *noetically* inspired faith in Christianity. He is, after all, suggesting that individuals should care for their souls. His expectations of individuals in this regard, however, do not rise to the level of *noetic* thought. He is simply arguing that individuals should realize the veracity of the law of faith through persuasion rather than compulsion, not that they develop a proper understanding of *why* the law of faith is veritable. He does not require that they understand the essential importance of abiding by the law of faith; that is, he does not require that his men understand that one should love one's neighbor because *noetic* reflection reveals

the conscionable and practical benefits of such action. He instead requires that they freely partake in the belief in sensory evidence for Christ's veracity, as told by miracles recounted in Scripture. Locke's men must simply believe in the omnipotent power of Christ to dole out everlasting mundane rewards and punishments and must be inspired by this belief to partake in the law of faith. Locke does not require his individuals to actually believe *(nous*) in the practical or mundane benefits of partaking in the law of faith.

If we assume, contrary to Locke, that individual men typically possess the *noetic* insight to ascertain the moral foundations of social behavior, we may see different results from Locke's religious teachings than is expressly articulated in Locke's works. Let us assume that men are smart enough to understand that one should love one's neighbor because such action is individually fulfilling and socially productive, that happiness and order are preferable to brute individualism and discord, if they are taught this lesson. This is to say: run-of-the-mill individuals are capable of understanding the essence of religious teachings regarding transcendent ideals. The essence of Locke's religious teaching concerns mundane, not transcendent, ideas. Locke's religious teachings insinuate that behind religious action is a self-interested motivation for mundane ease by teaching that moral behavior is based on mundane-like rewards and punishments to be experienced in the afterlife. The essence of Locke's religious teaching is that the law of faith is true because it affects material convenience.

As Locke's after-life takes the form of this life, his theory only allows men to conceive in mundane terms. We must recall, moreover, that it is the law of fashion, not the law of faith, which most commonly motivates action and determines morality. Locke has articulated a man who would compose laws of fashion to be consistent with mundane convenience. By reducing the law of faith to a civically irrelevant dogma, Locke restricts that which is pertinent to man to those things of material value. Spirituality (*nous*) becomes a wayward exercise, the results of which cannot affect civil society.

CONCLUSION: RELIGION AND RATIONALITY

John Dunn questions Macpherson's interpretation of Locke as promoting the "rationality of unlimited desire."[8] Dunn asserts that the logical desire for infinite rewards in Locke's religious thought is indicative of a morally venerable philosophy:

> I have tried to question the felicity of inflicting [Macpherson's interpretation] upon Locke by pointing out his persisting adherence to a conception of rationality firmly premised upon the reality of an afterlife. In a calculus of rational

> choice in which infinite satisfactions are available in another world and only the most discomforting finite pleasures accessible in this one it would indeed be remarkable if the decisions judged rational turned out to be a series constructed solely from the full set of immediate terrestrial desires which it was in principle possible to satisfy.[9]

Others iterate Dunn's suggestion that habitual discourse regarding biblical things in seventeenth-century England constitutes a sincere devotion to the highest principles of the Bible. Kim Ian Parker writes that "Locke, it is important to state, was not an atheist, nor did he seek to eliminate God from the arena of human activity. As demonstrated by his unflagging interest in the Bible, Locke saved room for God within his political order."[10]

But to write about the Bible, especially at this time in history, does not mean that one is saving room for God within a political order. Indeed, a Lockean view of religion would produce a spiritually thin individual whose arguments—either for or against religion—do not reflect noetic thoughtfulness. This description might fairly characterize some of today's evangelical Christians, whose religious views sometimes motivate political resistance that is not connected to their own property rights, such as regarding abortion—a dynamic that supports the notion that Locke's resistance theory is amenable to expansive interpretations. This description might also fairly characterize the agnostic left of today in America, who consistently tout the religiously motivated as simpletons or idiots in the manner that Locke describes religion in the works reviewed in this chapter. Both of these behaviors reflect the philosophically weak view of the soul and of soulfulness that Locke touts. This weakness contributes in obvious ways to the uncivilized behavior we see in American society today, as, for instance, in the abortion inspired murders discussed in chapter 1.

I have shown, against Dunn's and other's positions, how Locke's type of rationality, driven by such things as rewards (articulated in material terms, whether terrestrial or not) and sensational miracles, is actually counterproductive to the reasoning (*noesis*) which characterizes truly rational religious thought. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how Locke aims to exacerbate the individuals' concern for material interests through his proposed education system.

NOTES

1. References to John Locke's *The Reasonableness of Christianity* are made parenthetically in this book and follow this formula: (RC section number). I rely on John Locke. *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London, Rivington, 1824, 124th edition).

2. References to John Locke's *A Discourse of Miracles* are made parenthetically in this book and follow this formula: (DM page number). I rely on John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity, with a Discourse of Miracles, and Part of a Third Letter Concerning Toleration,* edited by Ian T. Ramsey (Paolo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press).

3. Matt 7:12.

4. Here Locke means *nous*.

5. Again, Locke means *nous.*

6. References to John Locke's *A Third Letter Concerning Toleration* in this chapter are made parenthetically and follow this formula: (TC page number). I rely on John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity, with a Discourse of Miracles, and Part of a Third Letter Concerning Toleration,* edited by Ian T. Ramsey (Paolo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press).

7. References to John Locke's *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in this chapter are made parenthetically in this book and follow this formula: (LC page number). I rely on John Locke, *Political Writings*, edited by David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003).

8. John Dunn, "The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives,* edited by John Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 263.

9. Ibid.

10. Kim Ian Parker, *The Bibilical Politics of John Locke* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 2004), 151.

Chapter Eight

Locke's Limited Idea of Education

Philosophy and education were once synonymous; Aristotle once wrote that "it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens . . . not by philosophy."[1] This is, as argued for by a Lockean education paradigm, not true today. I have been developing the argument that Locke actually makes an effort in his mature texts to conceal *noetic* reasoning. In chapter 6, I showed how his conception of reason is restrictive, only concerned with calculating rational ends (*logos*) given the assumption that material convenience and individual preservation are man's highest goods. Such a conception of reason fails to utilize the soul (*psyche*) as the sensorium of the mind's perceptions and intuitions, and, consequently, fails to utilize the reasoning style, *noesis*, that occurs within the soul. In chapter 7, I demonstrated how Locke's conception of religion supports his effort to conceal *nous*. As religious thought is frequently a significant medium of *noetic* reasoning for individuals, and as Locke does not wish to encourage *noetic* reasoning, Locke argues that the Christian experience, and the "law of faith" pursuant to that experience, should be based only on mundane and material considerations; he argues that the *noetic* truth of Christianity should be assented to, but that the ground (*nous*) upon which Christian principles are based should not be reflected upon by those practicing Christianity. In short, Christianity, like reason itself, is reduced to a sort of calculating based upon first principles that are to be dogmatically and blindly accepted. Both of these methods of eliminating *nous* are indicative of Locke's objective of subtle ideological construction.

In this chapter, I will make two important arguments. First, I will show how Locke's scheme for education helps to facilitate the restrictions on *noetic* reasoning, thereby further corroborating Locke's political agenda. Locke's education scheme does this through both what and how individuals are to

learn. Substantively, he omits the lessons in ethics and philosophy that would incline students to *noetic* reasoning. Methodologically, he asserts that individuals be taught almost exclusively by custom and fashion. I will argue that the lessons taught, in conjunction with the method of learning advocated, are not conducive to *noetic* thought.

Second, I will elaborate on my comments near the end of chapter 6 regarding the character of the individual who utilizes Locke's conception of reason. Some of the specifics regarding the rationality of the Lockean citizen are indeed most deeply developed by Locke in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. Although I described the Lockean citizen as selfish in chapter 6, it is fair to argue that some scholars have perhaps been too harsh on Locke in this regard. While Locke's political theory indeed facilitates a sort of "atomism," it does not argue for or produce a haphazard hedonism or solipsism; it does not produce men who follow each and every passionate impulse. Yet on the other hand, other scholars have reacted too exuberantly in response to Locke's critics.[2] The character of the individual produced by Locke's political theory is, indeed, "rational" given the ends he is to pursue. However, the sort of rationality produced by Locke's political theory is a very self-interested rationality. While it is unfair to accuse Locke of facilitating a society of hedonists, it is equally unfair to argue that Locke's political theory facilitates a society of morally conscious individuals.

CONCEALING *NOUS* THROUGH EDUCATION: SUBSTANCE OF THE EDUCATION

Locke's education scheme conceals *nous* both through the substance of the material to be taught and through the method of education. First, I will discuss the substance of the material that Locke suggests should be emphasized. Essentially, the substance of Locke's education scheme attempts to bury over those subjects of study, particularly classical philosophy, which would teach students how to think *noetically*.

Locke's education scheme is aimed at cultivating a "young gentleman" (STCE 133). In this regard, Locke is not simply concerned with developing individuals who are capable of intelligent thought, but he is rather concerned with cultivating proper young gentleman who will eventually grow up to be members of a society's ruling class. For this reason, Locke distinguishes the areas of education between "virtue, wisdom, breeding, and learning" (STCE 134). The first three areas simply concern the development of the social skills—the politeness, the mannerisms, and the social formalities—necessary to interact with other members of the ruling class. Locke prioritizes learning least of these four areas: "I put *learning* last" (STCE 147). Learning is

not prioritized because, as will be discussed below, Locke believes that the greatest part of the educatory process occurs through the workings of custom and fashion: "if a true estimate were made of the morality and religions of the world, we should find that the far greater part of mankind received even those opinions and ceremonies they would die for rather from the fashions of their countries and the constant practice of those about them than from any conviction of their reasons" (STCE 146). I will deal shortly with that which is learned as a result of virtue, wisdom, and breeding; but for now, I will deal with the substance of that which is taught through learning.

Locke asserts that "children can be cozened into a knowledge of the letters" and that learning should be "made a play and recreation to children" (STCE 149, 148). In other words, if children are forced to learn and to read too much before their minds are capable of such activity they will develop an abhorrence to learning: "the reason why a great many have hated books and learning all their lives after: it is like a surfeit that leaves an aversion behind not to be removed" (STCE 149). He has produced hereby a decidedly un-Aristotelian view of study: to enjoy learning, do not do too much of it.[3]

One weakness of Locke's education scheme is that he is never lucid regarding the age of the children being educated. At one point, he refers to children as "little apes" (STCE 152), at another he mentions "a boy of three or seven" (STCE 81, cf. STCE 84), providing the image of prepubescent and preadolescent children; indeed the type of immature individual who cannot be expected to possess the patience or mental capacities of a mature man. Yet, at another point in the text of *Some Thought Concerning Education*, he mentions that young men "at twenty" will not have "the same thoughts you have at fifty" (STCE 97). Locke suggests, consequently, that young individuals as old as twenty should not be taught the more recondite lessons of language and philosophy because they are not mentally capable of appreciating the value of such lessons.

Locke, as a result of the remedial mental capacities of individuals as old as twenty (and perhaps as old as forty-nine), places a number of restrictions upon learning. The most prevalent of the restrictions upon learning come in the form of restrictions upon reading. Locke argues that language is not a subject that most people should spend much time studying: "there is nothing more evident than that languages learned by rote serve well enough for the common affairs of life and ordinary commerce" (STCE 168):

> Men learn languages for the ordinary intercourse of society and communication of thoughts in common life without any farther design in their use of them. And for this purpose, the original way of learning a language by conversation not only serves well enough, but is to be preferred as the most expeditious, proper, and natural. Therefore, to this use of language one may answer that grammar is not necessary. (STCE 167)

Not only does Locke suggest that language is primarily a tool for the communication of practical ideas pertinent to material existence, for which grammatical exactness is not necessary, he suggests that little of value can be garnered from detailed studies of language. Grammar, as mentioned, is not an important component of a basic understanding of one's first language so long as one is capable of communicating clearly. Gentlemen, on the other hand, may require some training in grammar regarding their first language: "he may understand his own country speech nicely and speak it properly. . . . And to this purpose grammar is necessary. But it is the grammar only of their own proper tongues, and to only those who would take pains in cultivating their language and in perfecting their styles" (STCE 167).

Significantly, Locke argues against even gentleman cultivating in-depth understandings of ancient languages, particularly Greek and Latin (STCE 167). The learning of foreign languages is an area in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* where Locke's presentation is incredibly ambiguous. On the one hand, Locke seems to have some modest respect for the learning of foreign languages. He suggests that "as soon as [a child] can speak English, it is time for him to learn some other language; this nobody doubts of when *French* is proposed" (STCE 162). French is venerated for the practicability of its use: "because *French* is a living language and to be used more in speaking, that should be first learned" (STCE 162). Locke suggests that Latin should be learned after French, but his advocacy of Latin is extremely qualified. In the first place, the value of Latin is restricted to the fact that other gentlemen speak the language, and if one wishes to become a gentleman, some dilettantish understanding of Latin is required, but only because such knowledge is fashionable for gentlemen: "*Latin*, I look upon as absolutely necessary to a gentleman; and indeed, custom, which prevails over everything, has made it so much a part of education that even those children are whipped to it and made to spend many hours of their precious time uneasily in *Latin*" (STCE 163). Despite the customary practice of teaching Latin, Locke believes the language is a distraction from learning the practical lessons that will be more useful in the real world: "Can there be anything more ridiculous than that a father should waste his own money and his son's time in setting him to learn the *Roman language*, when at the same time he designs him for a trade, wherein he having no use of *Latin* fails not to forget that little which he brought from school and which it is ten to one he abhors for the ill useage it procured him?" (STCE 164). Consequently, he insists that a governor not require Latin as an integral component of education, and not expose his students to the custom of venerating Latin:

> But under whose care soever a child is put to be taught during the tender and flexible years of his life, this is certain: it should be one who thinks *Latin* and

> *language* the least part of education; one who, knowing how much virtue and a well-tempered soul is to be preferred to any sort of *learning* or *language*, makes it his chief business to form the mind of his scholars and give that a right disposition, which if once got, though all the rest should be neglected, would in due time produce all the rest and which, if it be not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, *languages* and *sciences* and all the other accomplishments of education will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man. (STCE 177)

And:

> But till you can find a school wherein it is possible for the master to look after the manners of his scholars and can show as great effects of his care for forming their minds to virtue and their carriage to good breeding as of forming their tongues to the learned languages, you must confess you have a strange value for words, when preferring the languages of the ancient Greeks and Romans to that which made them such brave men, you think it worthwhile to hazard your son's innocence and virtue for a little Greek and Latin. (STCE 70)

And:

> He that thinks [good practical experience] not of more moment to his son and for which he more needs a governor than the languages and learned sciences, forgets how much more use it is to judge right of men and manage his affairs wisely with them than to speak Greek and Latin, or argue in mood and figure, or to have his head filled with the abstruse speculations of natural philosophy and metaphysics, nay, than to be well-versed in the Greek and Roman writers. (STCE 94)

And:

> Latin and learning make all the noise, and the main stress is laid upon his proficiency in things a great part whereof belong not to a gentleman's calling, which is to have the knowledge of a man of business, a carriage suitable to his rank, and to be eminent and useful in his country according to his station. (STCE 94)

And:

> I would not be mistaken here, as if this were to undervalue Greek and Latin: I grant these are languages of great use and excellency, and a man can have no place among the learned in this part of the world who is a stranger to them. But the knowledge a gentleman would ordinarily draw for his use out of the Roman and Greek writers, I think he may attain without studying the grammars of those tongues and by bare reading may come to understand them sufficiently for all his purposes. (STCE 168)

Although Locke focuses on Latin throughout his discussions on language, he is clear that Greek is of no greater utility, and should not occupy a prominent place in the educatory process of any but the most advanced scholars:

> it will possibly be wondered that I should omit *Greek*, since among the Grecians is to be found the origin, as it were, and foundation of all that learning which we have in this part of the world. I grant it so and will add that no man can pass for a scholar that is ignorant of the *Greek* tongue. But I am not here considering of the education of a professed scholar, but of a gentleman, to whom Latin and French, as the world now goes, is by everyone acknowledged to be necessary. When he comes to be a man, if he has a mind to carry his studies farther and look into the *Greek* learning, he will then easily get that tongue himself; and if he has not that inclination, his learning of it under a tutor will be but lost labor. (STCE 195)

Locke seems to imply that nothing of moral value can be wrought from learning the prominent languages of traditional Western philosophy. At one point he suggests that Latin and Greek were simply means of communication for the men who spoke those languages; they are nothing more than dead languages of little practical utility (STCE 189). At another point he writes: "especially young gentleman, should have something more in him than *Latin*, more than even a knowledge in the liberal sciences; he should be a person of eminent virtue and prudence. . . . But of this I have spoken in another place" (STCE 177). By "in another place," Locke is referring to the sections of the text where he discusses virtue, wisdom, and good breeding.[4] I will demonstrate shortly that Locke wishes these qualities to be cultivated in youth through custom alone. He does not wish that the substantive material of the education process may contain matters of moral consequence.

Locke overlooks the most basic value of ancient languages, understanding the fundamental definitions behind concepts through etymology. Understanding the relation between ancient roots and contemporary modern English words helps one to understand the idea conveyed by a word. This is an important oversight given the semantic metamorphosis Locke conducts on the word "rebel," discussed above in chapter 5. The fundamental changes Locke makes to the definition of this concept are integral to his overall scheme. There is a double irony at play in this move: Locke provides the Latin root (*rebelare*) as evidence that his new definition of rebellion is classically buttressed, though one educated through his education plan would lack the ability to diagnose the propriety of applying the Latin usage to his definition.

Locke not only downplays the Greek and Latin languages; he downplays the philosophy that was produced in those tongues. The assertion that Locke is actually attempting to wane matters of moral consequence from the sub-

stantive matter of the education process is evident in the quite restricted role ancient philosophy plays in the education process. The disparity between the ancient emphasis on morality, or soul-craft, and the modern emphasis on rationality, or state-craft, is well known.[5] This book has implicitly argued all along that the priorities of the ancients' philosophies are morally superior to the priorities of the moderns' theories, as evidenced by the fact that I have had to rely on the ancient terminology of *nous* to denote philosophical reasoning. A lack of emphasis on ancient philosophy, as ancient philosophy is one of Western civilization's most effective conduits of soulful and robust philosophical thought (*nous*), betrays a lack of emphasis upon morality and moral issues in Locke's education process.

In Locke's prognosis, exposure to the essential foundations of morality (*nous*), as expressed in ancient philosophy, is to be radically limited. Once children are somewhat mature, Locke recommends study in natural and political philosophy (STCE 192–193; 186). Locke's recommended readings on these subjects are restricted to authors of his era. In natural philosophy, Locke recommends studying Cartesians, Paripatetics, and Corpuscularians (STCE 193). Each of these schools focused on particularly materialistic views of reality. Corpuscularians such as Robert Boyle, for instance, believed that reality was composed of atoms, or corpuscles.[6] As regards political philosophy, Locke suggests studying in detail Pufendorf's *De officio hominis & civis* and *De jure naturali & gentium* as well as Grotius's *De jure belli & pacis*; the irony of recommending texts whose titles his students can barely read calls into question the seriousness with which he wished individuals to dwell upon "the natural rights of men, and the origin and foundations of society, and the duties resulting from thence" (SCTE 186). Indeed, his own speculations regarding these matters become more readily accepted when competing ideas are not considered. Of course, Grotius and Pufendorf only vary slightly from Locke; which may explain why he considers their texts a sufficient education in political philosophy.

Noticeably absent from Locke's list of recommended reading are the original texts of classical philosophy. Locke does not recommend perusing the ancient texts concerning morality themselves; instead, he recommends, "he that would look farther back and acquaint himself with the several opinions of the ancients, may consult Dr. Cudworth's *Intellectual System*" (STCE 193). Locke suggests that Dr. Cudworth, his personal friend, has summarized the maxims and ideas of all of classical thought "with such accurateness and judgment" that is not necessary to acquaint oneself with the original texts themselves (STCE 193). This outcome becomes probable if Locke's education scheme is adhered to, in which case there will be few or no individuals capable of actually reading ancient texts in their original tongue.

Locke does recommend the Bible should be read during the education process. But, exposure to the Bible is to be limited in a manner very consistent with the type of Christianity articulated in the *Reasonableness of Christianity* and discussed in chapter 7 of this book. Locke does not suggest that children "read through *the whole Bible*" (STCE 158). Instead, he recommends that only snippets of the Bible should be read: "there are some parts of the *Scripture* which may be proper to be put into the hands of a child" (STCE 159). In the *Reasonableness*, Locke suggested Christianity's veracity be detectable by regular individuals because of the miracles Christ performed. Accordingly, Locke recommends children should be exposed to rather extra-ordinary aspects of Scripture: "such as are the story of Joseph and his brethren, of David and Goliath, of David and Jonah, etc." (STCE 159).[7] In the *Reasonableness*, Locke also advocated that regular individuals can be induced to abide by the law of faith without really knowing (*nous*) the fundamental causes for the necessity of abiding by the law of faith. Accordingly, he asserts in *Some Thoughts* that children should read passages that contain rules pertinent to the law of faith, but does not suggest passages that disclose the *noetic* style of reasoning that enlightens the law of faith: "And others that he should be made to read for his instruction, as that *What you would have others do unto you, do you the same unto them;* and such other easy and plain moral rules" (STCE 159); "The Lord's Prayer, the Creeds, and Ten Commandments, it is necessary he should learn perfectly by heart" (STCE 157). In these ways it can be discerned that, although Locke recommends reading the Bible as part of the education process, he means to censor Scripture in such a way as to facilitate a type of Christianity that is divorced from *noetic* reasoning. Reducing reason to exclude *nous* was the main objective of Locke's mature writings. His writings on religion and on education can be seen working together to articulate the theoretical system whereby reason is reduced to exclude *noetic* thought. Again, without questions inspired by *nous* to disclose the unphilosophical nature of Locke's political theory, his political theory may more readily be accepted.

Locke's denigration of the ancient tongues and of ancient philosophy occurs despite the fact that Locke understands the value and philosophical quality of the ancients. Locke articulates this understanding at several inconsequential points in the text: "to be well-versed in the Greek and Roman writers [is] much better for a gentleman than to be a good Peripatetic or Cartesian because those ancient authors observed and painted mankind well and give the best light into that kind of knowledge" (STCE 94). The term "right reasoning," used to express *nous* in the *Essays on the Law of Nature*, reappears in this text: "the end and use of right reason be to have right notions and a right judgment of things, to distinguish between truth and falsehood,

right and wrong, and to act accordingly" (STCE 189). The term is only mentioned one other time in the text: "Right reasoning is founded on something else than the *predicaments* and *predictable* and does not consist in talking in *mode* and *figure* itself. But it is besides my present business to enlarge upon this speculation" (STCE 188). It is never Locke's present business to discuss right reason after the year 1667—even in an immensely detailed text that discourses upon such things as the proper frequency of foot washing (STCE 6), the type of bed a child should sleep upon (STCE 22), and that dedicates six sections to bowel movement regularity (STCE 23–28)—because right reason (*nous*) is precisely what Locke aims to conceal from the reasoning process.

CONCEALING *NOUS* THROUGH EDUCATION: PEDAGOGICAL METHODOLOGY

Next, I will discuss the implications of Locke's pedagogical methodology. The main critique to be leveled against Locke's pedagogy, which is heavily reliant on customs and habits to form morality, is that this method of learning will not incline students to the depth of analytical and critical thinking (*nous*) necessary in order to discern whether or not the lessons they are learning are consistent with the full gambit of reality as disclosed through *noetic* contemplation; participating in behavior because it is customary does not enliven the soul (*psyche*) as a sensorium. Locke's prognostication for moral behavior is a strange scenario in which individuals act in a morally responsible manner, but in which none of the individuals understand why they are acting as they act.

Locke's education paradigm focuses on the ability of prevailing customs to persuade individuals to partake in moral behavior. Locke's position on custom in *Some Thoughts* iterates the important role he articulated for custom in the *Essay*. "Custom prevails over everything" (STCE 164) he writes, and "if a true estimate were made of the morality and religions of the world, we should find that the far greater part of mankind received even those opinions and ceremonies they would die for rather from the fashions of their countries and the constant practice of those about them than from any conviction of their reasons" (STCE 146). Locke's position is lucid: men are motivated by custom, if moral behavior is to be inculcated in individuals it must be inculcated through custom.

Consequently, custom plays an important role in the method of education. "Custom prevails as much by day as by night," Locke writes, and "the great thing to be minded in education is what *habits* you settle" (STCE 18, 164). "You must do nothing before him which you would not have him imitate" (STCE 71). Particularly, custom is integral at cultivating the character,

virtues, sensibilities, dispositions, mindsets, and other aspects of human behavior, which fall under the general purview of morality.

For example, manners are to be developed by exposing children to good manners: "manners . . . are rather to be learned by example than by rules; and then children, if kept out of ill company, will take a pride to behave themselves prettily, after the fashion of others, perceiving themselves esteemed and commended for it" (STCE 67). The particular manners Locke has in mind include civility, respect, good will, good nature, and kindness (STCE 67). "Make them as habitual as you can," Locke asserts, and argues that this be accomplished by exposing children only to the proper sources of inspiration (STCE 67). Children are to be kept out of the company of the "meaner servants" (STCE 68). They are, moreover, to be home-schooled so as to avoid "ill-bred and vicious boys":

> How anyone's being put into a mixed herd of unruly boys and there learning to wrangle at trap or rook at span-farthing fits him for civil conversation or business, I do not see. And what qualities are ordinarily to be got from such a troop of playfellows as schools usually assemble together from parents of all kinds that a father should so much covet, is hard to divine. (STCE 70)

Instead, children are to be "kept as much as may be in the company of their parents and those whose care they are committed" (STCE 69). Locke presumes that his audience in this text has cultivated gentlemen of upstanding morals and does not delve into the moral qualities expected of good parents.[8] He does, however, urge parents to choose governors for children based on their moral character (STCE 90). He recommends a man with the qualities of "great *sobriety*, *temperance*, *tenderness*, *diligence*, and *discretion*" (STCE 90; cf. STCE 92–94). He does admit, however, that these are "qualities hardly to be found united in persons that are to be had for ordinary salaries nor easily to be found anywhere" (STCE 90).

One of the main jobs of the governor or tutor, as suggested by the moral qualities he should possess, is to instill the same moral qualities that he possesses in the children he is rearing. Locke relies on the law of fashion to instill these qualities into children. Locke argues against doling out corporeal rewards and punishments to children. He makes this argument because it is his intention to cultivate rational creatures. Rationality for Locke, as I will discuss further in the next section, consists solely in the capacity to rationally manage one's corporeal condition. Because Locke wishes to subdue these desires through rationality, he argues against using corporeal rewards and punishments for children:

> Remove hope and fear, and there is an end of all discipline. I grant that good and evil, *reward* and *punishment*, are the only motives to a rational creature;

> these are the spur and reigns whereby all mankind are set on work and guided, and therefore they are to be made us of to children too. For I advise . . . that children are to be treated as rational creatures. *Rewards*, I grant, and *punishment* must be proposed to children, if we intend to work upon them. The pains and pleasures of the body are, I think, of ill consequence when made the rewards and punishments whereby men would prevail on their children: they serve but to increase and strengthen those inclinations which it is our business to subdue and master. (STCE 55)

Instead, Locke argues that the law of fashion can be used to instill rationality in children: "The *rewards* and *punishments* then, whereby we should keep children in order, *are* quite of another kind and of that force, that when we can get them once to work, the business, I think, is done and the difficulty is over. *Esteem* and *disgrace* are, of all others, the most powerful incentives to the mind, when once it is brought to relish them" (STCE 56). Locke argues:

> By which way of treating them, children may, as much as possible, be brought to conceive that those that are commended and in esteem for doing well will necessarily be beloved and cherished by everybody and have all other good things as a consequence of it; and, on the other side, when anyone by miscarriage falls into disesteem, and cares not to preserve his credit, he will unavoidably fall under neglect and contempt, and in that state the want of whatever might satisfy or delight him will follow. In this way the objects of their desires are made assisting to virtue, when a settled experience from the beginning teaches children that the things they delight in belong to and are to be enjoyed by those only who are in a state of reputation. (STCE 57)

From this description of the method of education, Locke develops the manner whereby virtuous behavior may be inculcated in children (I will discuss the nature of Locke's idea of virtue below). Custom is the prime method whereby children are to develop a sense of virtue or reasonable behavior. In order to do so, Locke suggests that children should be censored from those who are likely to tempt them with behavior that is not virtuous, including servants and other children. They are to be homeschooled by a tutor of eminent virtue, a man who will be difficult to find at best. The tutor and the parents are to shun or praise the child according to the behavior he is displaying. From the sense of pride or shame that comes from being admonished or praised, children develop a sense of value for the sentiments of their parents and tutor, all being of eminent virtue, who the child will then grow to imitate.

Although Locke's method for education is provocative and in many regards appealing—it has been compared to Plato's *Republic* as a foundational text in education theory—several questions arise regarding its ultimate effectiveness.[9] Much like the *Republic*, elements of Locke's education theory are

normatively disturbing. Where the student of the *Republic*, upon contemplating the value he places upon being a son, father, and brother, finds himself recoiling against the idea of the community of wives and children, for example, the student of Locke's education theory, upon contemplating the value of his personal friendships, may find himself reeling against Locke's insistence on social isolation through home schooling. The inherently undesirable aspects of Locke's education paradigm occur because Locke's method for education attempts to instill ideas regarding morality and virtue in a manner that does not enliven children's souls to the authentic *noetic* ground of moral and virtuous behavior. As we recall from chapter 6 of this analysis, Locke's idea of the law of fashion is completely divorced from the divine law. Because Locke attempts to teach virtue and morality, which is derived, even according to Locke's own argument from the divine law, from the law of fashion, the experience which the children educated by Locke's methods partake in is best described as inauthentic. Of course, where Plato is widely regarded as having written ironically, as well as articulating one of most enduring classical conceptions of the good (*agathon*), there is no indication that Locke's presentation in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* is ironic, otherwise meant in jest, or articulates an earnest veneration of a conception of a higher good that transcends individual material well-being. The only real irony in Locke's education scheme is that it has been compared to Plato's at all.

The inauthentic childhood experience is most discernible in the fact that children must be home-schooled. Cultivating friendships is, at least according to Aristotle, an important aspect of human behavior.[10] Locke wishes interactions with other children to be radically limited because children must learn to duplicate the moral behavior of their tutors and parents. Indeed, it is critical for Locke that a tutor of nearly unattainable virtue teach the children because learning by fashion and habituation is their only source of learning what is and what is not morality. It is fair to say that Locke makes these odd and impracticable requirements of children because he is aware that they should have no cultivation of their *noetic* sense if they are to, when grown, unquestioningly accept his political theory. Children who have developed a *noetic* style of reason are capable of using their consciences to determine whether or not the friends they chose to associate with are decent and trustworthy individuals. Indeed, it is even fair to say that the childhood process of choosing friends is one of the ways whereby children develop a sense of morality. Nevertheless, Locke does not wish for children to have this freedom of choice regarding their friendships, because he is wholly reliant on habituating them to virtuous behavior. In other words, Locke wants children to act virtuously, but he has provided them no opportunity to realize (*nous*) the foundations of morality. Children are provided neither the substantive material needed to comprehend the value of *noetic* reasoning, namely classical philosophy and

a robust understanding of scripture, nor are they provided the educational methodology needed to cultivate a conscience-oriented sort of reasoning (*nous*). Children must be brainwashed into moral behavior, because teaching them the foundations of morality would also instill in them the reasoning capacities necessary to call into question Locke's political theory.

One possible criticism to my view of Locke's education paradigm would be that Locke is discussing children, and children are immature creatures who cannot be expected to cultivate the type of reasoning processes necessary for philosophical contemplation (*nous*).[11] Although I have already mentioned that Locke's education scheme applies to children as old as twenty (and maybe forty-nine), it is worth mentioning that anecdotal evidence suggests that children as young as eight years of age have responded well to teachings which attempt to facilitate philosophical thought, as the following brief excerpt from a *New York Times* article argues:

> A few times each month, second graders at a charter school in Springfield, Mass., take time from math and reading to engage in philosophical debate. There is no mention of Hegel or Descartes, no study of syllogism or solipsism. Instead, Prof. Thomas E. Wartenberg and his undergraduate students from nearby Mount Holyoke College use classical children's books to raise philosophical questions, which the young students then dissect with the vigor of the ancient Greeks. "A lot of people try to make philosophy into an elitist discipline," says Professor Wartenberg . . . "But everyone is interested in basic philosophical ideas; they're the most basic questions we have about the world." . . . [We] ask them "What do you think? We're trying to get them engaged in the practice of doing philosophy, versus trying to teach them, say, what Descartes thought about something."[12]

Wartenberg is not the first contemporary philosopher to believe that children's capacities for philosophical thought should be cultivated at an early age. Matthew Lipmann, former director of Montclair State University's Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, has found that young children are indeed capable of philosophical reasoning, and that such reasoning needs to be cultivated in children if the virtues inherent to a democratic government are to be realized in society.[13] Gareth Matthews has argued that "young children very often engage in reasoning that professional philosophers can recognize as philosophical, but typically their parents or teachers don't react in a way that encourages them. They might say, 'That's cute,' but they don't engage the children in thinking further about whatever the issue is."[14] Important in these observations are the settings in which they are made: children are cultivating their philosophical skills by practicing them in a social setting with other school children. Although the value of learning substantive lessons from an experienced tutor is undeniable, this distinct value of experientially

developing morality through freely interacting with peers appears integral to proper social development.

This strain of fairly recent interest in developing the philosophical propensities of youth could be viewed as an encouraging backlash against a Lockean education system. One commentator argues that "American public schools have been slow to embrace philosophy for children . . . many school officials either find the subject too intimidating or believe it does not fit in with the test-driven culture of public education these days."[15] In other words, a system ordered by testing standards and efficiency is one which promotes children to retain answers to questions that are likely to appear on such tests, but it does not encourage children to develop the rigorous analytic skills necessary, not to recall answers from memory, but to ask profound questions about the world. As I have argued, this is precisely the type of education system that Locke argues for, based on the assertion that many or most individuals are incapable of philosophical thought. Such an education system creates individuals who can efficiently perform practical tasks given an assumed set of first principles (*logos*); but it does not create the type of individuals who may contemplate first principles (*nous*) with any degree of profundity, nor does it, consequently, create individuals who may cultivate the insight to challenge the prevailing social opinions (*doxa*) that have been derived from some given first principle.

The social and political consequences of such an education system cannot be overstated. As Lipman argues, "A higher quality democracy is not achieved by attracting to it a plurality of individuals capable of higher order thinking. It must itself engage in the cultivation of such thinking."[16] Perhaps Lipman's point that a citizenry whose propensity for philosophy has been actualized is essential to effective democratic societies can best be made through an explanation of the selfish values that Locke encourages to be held by individuals who have been educated by a Lockean education system.

THE CHARACTER OF THE LOCKEAN INDIVIDUAL

Locke says more in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* regarding his conception of morality than he says in all of his other writings combined. Indeed, there are many lines of text which lead to the conclusion that Locke's idea of morality, because it is discussed in depth and valued as an end for which education should strive, is substantively robust, or at least good enough to accommodate the requirements for citizenship in a functioning society. Accordingly, some scholars have concluded that the text does not "lend much support to the view that a society of self-interested individuals pressing partisan demands is sufficient to sustain Lockean liberal politics."[17] The conclu-

sion is made that the "portrait of the Lockean citizen or gentleman, with its emphasis on concern for esteem, may be surprising, contrary as it is to the views of Lockean man as either a hedonistic seeker of property or a rational perceiver of the good. It suggests an understanding of the *Two Treatises of Government* quite different from those associated with such views of Lockean morality."[18] I will argue in this section that such conclusions are only partially correct. Locke's man is not hedonistic but is wholly concerned with the rational acquisition of property. In other words, Locke's man is rational, but his rational contemplations (*logos*) are undertaken for the sake of materialistic ends. I will argue that this conception of rationality, in opposition to much recent Lockean scholarship, leaves a great deal to be desired in terms of the moral capacities of the Lockean citizen, as the Lockean citizen turns out to be an extremely self-interested—albeit rational—individual.

Locke argues fervently against allowing children to indulge in too many of their appetites, because one of the most important outcomes of a proper education is a child who is able to rationally manage his desires; forgoing immediate pleasures when his long-term interest is best served: "to flatter children by *rewards* of things that are pleasant to them are to be carefully avoided. To make a good, wise, and virtuous man, it is fit he should learn to cross his appetite and deny his inclination to *riches*, *finery*, or *pleasing his palate* etc. whenever his reason advises the contrary and his duty requires it" (STCE 52). Locke is emphatic about the necessity for learning how to rationally manage corporeal affairs as essential to the development of rationality, and indeed characterizations of his moral proclivities as hedonistic are not sound. Locke writes, for example, that:

> As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardships, so also does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to *deny himself* his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs as the best though the appetite lean the other way. (STCE 33)

Locke suggests various means whereby the rational management of corporeal desires can be cultivated. Children should be kept from drinking strong alcoholic drinks, for example, and especially from doing so in secret with servants (STCE 19). And, of course, children should be led through the fashions of their parents and tutor to a capacity for the rational management of desires. The parents should be responsible for allocating the proper amounts—not too much and not too little—of food, drink, and protection from nature. In this way, children will be capable of refraining from acting upon irrational cravings that pertain to these things (STCE 106). It is important that children learn to distinguish "between the wants of fancy and those of nature" (STCE 107):

> Those are truly natural wants which reason alone, without some other help, is not able to fence against nor keep from disturbing us. The pains of sickness and hurts, hunger, thirst, and cold, want of sleep and rest or relaxation of the part wearied with labor are what all men feel; and the best disposed minds cannot but be sensible of their uneasiness and therefore ought by fit applications to seek their removal, though not with impatience or over great haste upon the first approaches of them where delay does not threaten some irreparable harm. The pains that come from the necessities of nature are monitors to us to beware of greater mischiefs, which they are the forerunners of, and therefore they must not be wholly neglected nor strained too far. But yet the more children can be inured to hardships of this kind by a wise care to make them stronger in body and mind, the better it will be for them. I need not here give any caution to keep within the bounds of doing them good and to take care that what children are made to suffer should neither break their spirits nor injure their health, parents being but too apt of themselves to incline, more than they should, to the softer side. But whatever compliance the necessities of nature may require, the wants of fancy children should never be gratified in nor suffered to *mention*. The very *speaking* for any such thing should make them lose it. (STCE 107)

Liberality is to be cultivated as a means of preventing undesirable cravings: "Covetousness and the desire of having in our possession and under our dominion more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, should be early and carefully weeded out and the contrary quality of a readiness to impart to others implanted" (STCE 110.3).

It is interesting that Locke's discussions on morality are always couched in terms of the rational management of material possessions. Locke does not insist that children should learn a steadfast avoidance of material possessions, but only that their material interests should be rationally managed; desires and pleasures should only be avoided "when reason advises" (STCE 52). In fact, Locke's idea of justice, the great "social virtue," is developed completely in reference to an equitable distribution of material possessions: "children cannot well comprehend what *injustice* is till they understand property and how particular persons come by it" (STCE 82). Read alongside the *Second Treatise*, one forms the impression that Locke's idea of virtuous action is any action which does not result in being prosecuted for transgressing other's property rights. Transgressions against property are not the only type of moral transgressions, of course. They are, however, the type of transgressions which frustrate the idea of civil society articulated in the *Second Treatise*, and they are consequently the type of transgressions which concern Locke's political theory.

Locke's political theory, concerned with protecting property rights, does not facilitate a robust citizenry. Locke's political theory creates individuals who are conscious of their own long-term material interests, but there is no

evidence that Locke's individuals will possess the moral proclivity to be concerned with the welfare of their neighbors. I have already discussed that this means a Lockean citizen will tear down his neighbor's home during a fire in order to save his own home, but the Lockean citizen will display no innate moral proclivity to help a neighbor in need unless the Lockean citizen has a personal material or financial interest in helping his neighbor. If the neighbor's home is far enough away from the Lockean citizen's home that there is no danger of the fire leaping from one home to the next, Locke has given us no reason to believe that his citizen would lift the first finger to help a fellow society member.

In the sense that Locke pursues the rational management of material possessions, characterizations of Locke as advocating material hedonism are misleading. Such characterizations are, however, grounded in an important and valid observation regarding Locke's political thought. Namely, Locke's thought is driven by a rationality that is limited to material concerns. Locke does not advocate that men indulge in immediate mundane desires, because such impulses may be harmful to one's long-term material interests. Locke ignores the cultivation of the *psyche* for the cultivation of the material rationality needed for temporal longevity. One may develop the capacity for temporal longevity through developing rationality in the sense of *logos*. Reasoning (*nous*) through the *psyche* is not necessary for temporal longevity. Animals achieve temporal longevity through instinct, and plants through fortune; *noetic* reasoning is not necessary to achieve longevity.

CONCLUSION

The restricted reasoning style discussed in chapter 6 is fomented through the religious system described in chapter 7, and through the education system described in this chapter. The negative effect of selfishness manifests from the success of Locke's religious and education systems at fomenting the type of reasoning style that would endorse the Lockean concerns for materialism and longevity. The religious and education systems described in these chapters do indeed produce the type of reasoning process Locke was aiming to produce. The major criticism to be cast against the Lockean reasoning style is that this reasoning style does not include the *noetic* reasoning that convinces men to consider things above and beyond personal atomized interests. Although atomized interests may be purused in a rational manner by Lockeans, the negative effects of the selfishness produced by Lockean rationality will far outweigh the benefits.

This is the case because *noetic* reasoning does not eclipse the human capacity for *logos*, but merely deepens *logos*, grounding it against *noetic*

contemplations. The human choice is not between *logos* and *nous*; it is not between being rational and being good; the consequential human choice is whether or not to augment *logos* with *nous*: the choice is whether we wish to be rational, or whether we wish to be rational and good.

In the concluding chapter, I will analyze ways that the Lockean concerns for materialism and longevity can be realized through methods that are more philosophically robust, methods that ground the Lockean style of rationality against contemplations of an ethical-moral substance, carried out in a *noetic* fashion. For indeed, my criticism against Locke is not that the ends that he values are malignant ends for humans to value, for they are not; my criticism is that the manner in which these ends come to be valued is thin. A more robust manner of reasoning would allow ends that are basically Lockean to manifest without being enervated by the thin manner in which they are justified.

We need not travel to distant shores in order to find a philosophically robust justification for liberalism. The manner of reasoning I am describing is not foreign to modern political philosophy, nor is it foreign to the Anglophile world, nor would it have been foreign to Locke's own Whigs. Whereas Locke made liberalism a new political breed, his contemporary, Algernon Sidney, saw in liberalism the ancient philosophical traditions, venerated as the good old cause.

Before turning to that analysis, however, I will present a case study of Lockean thought in a contemporary issue—that of toleration of Islamic extremism in Western civilization. Through this analysis, I will demonstrate that contemporary applications of Locke to the idea of toleration do indeed exhibit the limiting of rationality that has been discussed in the previous three chapters.

NOTES

1. Aristotle, *The Politics*, 1263b38–40.

2. Anthony G. Wilhelm, "Good Fences and Good Neighbors: John Locke's Positive Doctrine of Toleration," *Political Research Quarterly* vol. 52, no.1 (1999): 145–166, for example, suggests that Locke's education writings produce civic responsibility.

3. See Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, book VIII.

4. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §*134–146; Tarcov and Grant believe Locke has in mind §88–94. This is incorrect; those sections concern the character of the student's tutor; not the character of the student to be produced through education, which, although quite similar to the character of the tutor, is dealt with at another place, in §134–146.

5. The terms "state-craft" and "soul-craft" are Donald S. Lutz's.

6. Cf. Nathan Tarcov and Ruth Grant, eds., *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 146, n105.

7. Cf. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, §192, where Locke offers a supernatural or miraculous element of the story of Noah.

8. This text was originally a series of letters written to Locke's friend, Edward Clark, and his purpose was not to give his friend a lecture on his perception of his friend's morality.

9. Nathan Tarcov, *Locke's Education for Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 2.

10. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), 214–272 (1155a–1172a).

11. Jean Piaget, for example, has argued that children under the age of 12 are incapable of abstract reasoning (Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of a Child* [London: The Free Press, 1965]); see also Rheta DeVries, "Piaget's Social Theory," *Education Researcher* 26, no. 9 (1997), 9.

12. Abby Goodnough, "The Examined Life: Age 8: Taking Philosophical Reasoning to the Second Grade," *New York Times*, April 18, 2010.

13. Matthew Lipman, "Teaching Students to Think Responsibly: Some Findings from the Philosophy for Children Program," *The Clearing House* 71, no. 5 (1998): 277–280.

14. Goodnough, "The Examined Life: Age 8"; Gareth Matthews has written elaborately against Piaget's theory, cf. Gareth Matthews, "The Idea of Conceptual Development in Piaget," *Synthese* 65, no. 1 (1985): 87–97.

15. Goognough, "The Examined Life: Age 8."

16. Mathew Lipman, "Teaching Students to Think Responsibly," 277.

17. Tarcov and Grant, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, viii.

18. Tarcov, *Locke's Education for Liberty*, 5.

Part IV

CONCLUSION

Chapter Nine

Islamic Terrorism, Locke's Theory of Positive Toleration and How the Ideological Dynamics of the War on Terrorism Advantaged the Islamic State

The preceding pages have developed the argument that Locke's political thought was developed in a particularly political and theoretical manner, as opposed to a philosophical manner. That is, Locke's thought was designed to empower certain political ideas, and not designed as an objective inquiry into the nature of the best possible regime. As such, each of the pieces of the Lockean puzzle fit together to justify the specific political events of his day: resistance was tied to aggressive executive action without consent of Parliament. We might expect that some applications of Locke's thought to today's contemporary political circumstances may yield puzzling policy choices, as the puzzle pieces that combine to form the current American political landscape are distinct from 1683 England. The application of Locke's work to present issues is even further challenged by the effect of Locke's work as portrayed in this book: Americans tend to read Locke's works in a hamstrung manner which, much like Locke's work itself, is an ideological attempt to justify specific policy prerogatives of the day. This chapter's purpose is to demonstrate the consequences for America today when we apply the political prerogatives of seventeenth-century English Whigs to the exigencies of our own time. A number of issue areas may have been selected for this purpose, as chapter 1 and Rebellion chapters concerning the splintering of Locke's arguments for political rights in America today exemplify.

In those chapters, we saw that the focus on one specific area of Locke's thought, like resistance, without attention to others, like consent, produces resistance movements that would not have been condoned through Locke's scheme. I have been calling this phenomenon the splintering of Locke's thought. The same splintering also occurs in recent interpretations of Locke's arguments for toleration. An analysis of the Lockean concept of toleration as it was applied to the fight against Islamic terrorism and

especially against the Islamic State (ISIS) provides a vivid illustration of the consequences of today's splintered Lockeanism. Although ISIS has since been effectively routed, we may glean a sense of the consequences of today's Lockeanism by revisiting the Americans' relaxed policy toward them prior to the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and the theoretical underpinning for it.

Two widespread myths in the United States regarding Islamic terrorism inhibited the Americans' ability to combat this threat. The first myth was the fallacious notion that radical ideas in contemporary Islamic thought are isolated incidents; rather, a centuries-old and widely-believed religious narrative drove the mindset of Islamic terrorism in the 2010s. The second myth was the fallacious assertion that radical Muslims operating in the United States were not especially dangerous, or at least not as dangerous as traditional right-wing extremists; this narrative, though widely spread, does not find empirical support in data regarding extremist violence, as I will review below.

The policy prerogatives of the United States concerning the Islamic State focused on strategic air strikes and a reliance on local militia ground forces. A corollary policy was implemented to prosecute lone-wolf terrorists operating within the United States within the confines of traditional criminal proceedings, within the limits of traditional criminal intelligence gathering methods, and in a way that respected the constitutionally assured civil rights of American citizens. These policies illustrate a desire to treat a threat imposed by a foreign entity in a manner that actualizes the American proclivities for equality and toleration by downplaying that foreign entity's desire to exercise interstate war against the United States. A central thesis of this chapter is that a commonsense reading of the threat should have conveyed that more aggressive military and prosecutorial policies (in cases not involving actual United States citizens) were warranted, but that something ideologically construed occurred in the American motivation to downplay this foreign threat while accentuating a different domestic threat from white supremacism. Locke's writings on toleration inspire these motivations, but only if his ideas on toleration are splintered and cherry-picked in the same way that we saw above regarding resistance.

This chapter first summarizes the theoretical dimensions of radical Islam to demonstrate that the problem comprised a very serious national security threat during ISIS's ascendancy. This chapter then summarizes the curious trends within American popular culture that downplayed this threat and makes the case that the tendency to downplay Islamic terrorism was linked to the fairly recent academic reading of Locke as cultivating "positive toleration." I next analyze and rebut the reading of "positive toleration" in Locke as it was developed in two recent scholarly articles. I conclude by remarking

on the interesting and ironic effects that positive toleration has had upon the idea of a "civilized society" in America today.

APOCALYPTIC IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Historical incidents of apocalyptic speculations are replete in the Islamic world. The basic structure of using religious and especially of using apocalyptic rhetoric to justify political goals has been well analyzed, most notably in the work of Eric Voegelin, whose work has been applied fairly recently to the Islamist movement. Voegelin explained in many writings that apocalyticism (regardless of the specific religion) can be used as a means of creating pneumopathological political arguments; it is a means of creating subtle ideological arguments. But, moreover, apocalyptic ideologies tend to aspire for world dominion as the manifestation of the "end times"; an inherent component of apocalyptic politics is the creation of conflict against the outside world. Barry Cooper's analysis of the history of Salafist and Wahhabist movements dating back to the Kharijites, evolving in the thought of Sayyid Qutb, and eventually culminating in Osama bin Laden, provided an excellent survey of pneumopathological Salafist thought.[1] Jean-Pierre Filiu's analysis of apocalypticism in Islam depicts both the prominence of millenarian thought throughout Islamic history and how it became an integral component of the global jihadist movement in the years immediately following the publication of Cooper's work.[2]

Apocalyptic speculation in Islam centers around a final battle between the faithful and infidels, and the Mahdi is a figure who features prominently in these speculations. He is depicted in this literature as the leader of the army of the faithful who will appear just prior to and lead the final battle of the apocalypse, and his appearance, Shi'a believe, "will mark the advent of an epoch of universal justice, itself the prelude to the end of the world."[3]

Filiu's work shows that apocalyptic end-time speculations particularly emphasizing the symbol of the Mahdi have been, in the 1384 history of Islam, a persistent trend during revolutionary movements. I have identified nineteen incidents of (prominent) political movements within the Middle East that were inspired by propaganda related to Islamic apocalyptic thought, which means that such incidents occur on average approximately every seventy-three years. A brief survey of these incidents is provided as an appendix.

The sheer volume of historical incidents of apocalyptically inspired political movements in Islam accentuates that there should have been great

urgency in American policy for the fight against the Islamic State, but the historical consequences of some of these movements should certainly have cultivated great concern. Mahdi-inspired movements that were successfully carried out include formations of several significant political dynasties, including the Abbasid and Safavid dynasties. Included in the incidents that were not successful are several historically noteworthy insurgencies, which, due to the fervor of the insurgents who were inspired by the apocalyptic hype of the movement, continued in their insurgency even after the death or significant defeat of their leader. In the case of the successful dynasties, the apocalyptic hype typically gives way to the need for real-world administration of government. In the case of unsuccessful insurgencies, the radicalism of the insurgents and the fate of the movements upon defeat are both instructive. The cases demonstrate that the Islamic State should not have been minimized, for it likely would have built a dynasty inimical to the concept of nation-states upon which world order rests had its expansion continued unchecked. The cases further demonstrate that a movement will die out when a significant and thorough military defeat demonstrates to the movement's adherents that the movement is not mystically empowered to usher any end time but their own, even though the radical nature of the movement's followers means that some will persist for some time to attempt to achieve the goals of the movement.

Historical studies of ISIS have revealed a strong reliance on the Mahdi and on apocalypticism within that organization. In the years following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Islamist thinkers capitalized upon popular literature celebrating the Mahdi and apocalypse to turn Al Qaeda from an elite vanguard into a mass movement.[4] Al-Suri, for instance, in 2005 advocated for self-intelligent/self-motivated swarming tactics utilized by networks as means of executing military attacks against stronger Western forces, and combined this idea with apocalyptic speculations regarding the immanent appearance of the Mahdi in order to inspire Al Qaeda adherents to act; he very closely described what manifested in practice and in theoretical articulation one decade later as the Islamic State.[5]

Al Qaeda-Iraq morphed into the Islamic State in 2006. At this time their leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, relied upon apocalyptic propaganda that insinuated that the Mahdi's return was imminent and that his appointment of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi as caliph would fulfill this prophecy.[6] Propaganda reflecting this language was widespread. For instance, when the Islamic State unveiled their flag, they proclaimed that "it will be the flag of the people of Iraq when they go to aid . . . the Mahdi." Foreign language propaganda magazines (*Inspire* and then *Dabiq* in English; *Dar-al-Islam* in French; *Konstantiniyye* in Turkish) also relied heavily on apocalyptic pro-

paganda, especially prior to 2015. The success of these efforts provided the inspirational foundation for the small terror cells that operated in Western nations on behalf of the Islamic State.

The ideological tendencies of this apocalyptic literature are fairly easy to see. The magical figure of the Mahdi, leading an army through a final pitched battle to establish a new Islamic world order, is the work of speculation, abstracted from the evidence provided by an objective analysis of historical evidence available to humans at this time. The destructive tendencies of this idea are also clear; the construction of this caliphate requires the annihilation of existing societies and governments, including the United States. Comparable movements in the twentieth century, from German Nationalism to Russian Communism—both of which also aspired for world dominion—were met with fervent military and intellectual opposition. What is more difficult to see, in this context, is the motivation for the lax response to ISIS exhibited in American policy summarized above.

IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE WESTERN WORLD

The failure of the Western world to forcefully combat Islamic terrorism was a direct result of the concept of toleration in Western thought. The original Lockean articulation of toleration contained a much greater degree of sensitivity to the contextual settings in which toleration might be exercised than do contemporary readings of Locke's toleration writings. This analysis will demonstrate that recent applications of toleration to apocalyticism in Islamism are ideologically construed interpretations that deviate significantly from the Lockean formula for toleration. Here, as with resistance, the manner in which Locke constructs his ideas for toleration allows contemporary interpreters to cherry-pick his work for a radically expansive view of toleration that Locke would not have endorsed. Particularly, recent academic literature can be found accentuating the idea of "positive toleration," and downplaying the limits to toleration, or "negative toleration," that are associated with responding to perceived threats so as to facilitate self-defense.

Two trends relating to the toleration of the Islamic State will suffice to demonstrate the undercurrents of American toleration ideas. The first is the tendency among Western scholars to focus on similarities between Islam and other religions when analyzing Islam, with the purpose of articulating that Islam is no more dangerous than any other religion. The second trend is the accentuation of the threats posed by right-wing extremism while downplaying the threats posed by Islamic jihad, for the purpose of suggesting (misleadingly) that Islamic terrorism was not the most serious terror threat at the time.

First, the ideology surrounding toleration created an apparent need for Western analysts of Islamic terrorism to point out the similarities between Islam and other religions, and most especially Islam's similarities to Christianity.[7] Cooper objects to the term "Islamic terrorism" because "no one calls the IRA 'Christian terrorists' or 'Catholic terrorists.'"[8] Stern and Berger point toward a "helpful comparison . . . between Salafism and Protestant fundamentalism" because they share, as Scott Appleby refers to it, "an attitude toward religion itself."[9] Filiu points out, along these lines, that Jerry Falwell could be compared to contemporary Islamic apocalyptic propagandists, and scholar Robert Fuller referred to the Antichrist in 1995 as "an American obsession."[10] In order to drive home the point that Americans too can be fundamentalists, and that Americans too can cause damage through violence inspired by this fundamentalism, Western scholars enjoy comparing Islamic fundamentalism to Western movements such as David Koresh's Branch Dividian cult, or the suicidal cult from the 1990s, Heaven's Gate.[11] Filiu went so far as to claim that Christian apocalyptic literature following 9/11 is directly responsible for the rise of apocalyticism in Islam.[12]

I do not dispute many of these assertions; apocalyticism is often dangerous, regardless of religion. Though there may be a fundamental similarity in this regard, there is, in recent decades, much less ideologically inspired apocalyptic fervor in the West than in the Middle East. Despite the fact that a *Time* survey in 2002, shortly after 9/11, was able to find 55 percent of American Christians believed in the events in Revelation, it also found that only 25 percent of those respondents associated 9/11 with those prophecies.[13] Recent survey indicators of religious fervor in the United States indicate that the *Time* survey would no longer hold. In America, in 2014, a Pew survey found that 72 percent of Americans felt that religion's influence was waning.[14] The same study found that despite the fact that a very strong majority of American Christians profess that religion is important or very important to them, less than half attend church on a weekly basis.[15] A direct correlation to attitudes toward Revelation could not be analyzed because *Time* has not replicated their survey in subsequent years, and other survey questions directly relating to apocalyptic belief could not be found. My own commonsense observation is that the Antichrist has not been anything close to an "American obsession" in my lifetime. Kim Kardashian and the Super Bowl fit that description much better.

The current belief in apocalyptic ideas in the Islamic world is much higher than even *Time* was able to detect in America in 2002. Because Pew data does not ask the same questions across religions and did not even ask the same questions pertaining to the Mahdi to different geographic regions within the Islamic world, interpreting this data is prone to some inaccuracy. Nonetheless, whereas in 2002 some 25 percent of American Christians

believed 9/11 was associated with apocalyptic prophecy, in 2012 in the war-torn regions of Iraq and Afghanistan, some 72 percent and 83 percent of respondents believed the Mahdi would return in their lifetime. Turks responded affirmatively at 68 percent and Tunisians, shortly after igniting the Arab Spring, responded affirmatively at 67 percent. Many of the regions with higher affirmative responses than in America in 2002 are not experiencing military conflict that would play into the apocalyptic Islamic rhetoric (such as Maylasia, 62 percent). Of the twenty-three Islamic nations that were asked this question, only seven responded at lower rates than the United States did in 2002.[16] This evidence suggests that Muslims in Middle Eastern nations indulge in apocalyptic speculations more commonly than do their Western Christian counterparts, and that this allows radical thinkers to accentuate fundamentalist concepts with much more widespread success than can be experienced by Christian fundamentalists in the West. Indeed, Filiu makes a compelling case for the prevalent acceptance of apocalyptic ideas in the Muslim world, and he produces many examples of popular propaganda pieces, whose Christian equivalents simply cannot be found in any widespread or mainstream manner in the United States.[17]

Hence, portrayals of Islamism in the West emphasize its structural similarity to Western movements; an observation which is indeed correctly noticed. But the differences between the movements—that Islamic apocalyticism has had a widespread appeal and produces mass casualties that Western movements do not—are not pointed out and in some cases actively obfuscated.

Thus, a second Western tactic is to accentuate the dangers posed by such domestic fundamentalist groups and to downplay the harm caused by Islamic terrorism. Yet, the argument that Islamic terrorism does not directly affect our own society to the extent that right-wing extremism does is also erroneous.[18] The evolution of this claim is instructive. Sally Kohn tweeted in 2015 that "since 9/11 right-wing extremists have killed more Americans than Islamic terrorists."[19] Peter Bergen quickly compiled a controversial data-set that supported this claim.[20] As recently as February 2016 the prominent American publication *Newsweek* repeated the claim in a cover story.[21] Bergen explains the situation in his *Jihad in America* this way:

> Americans have long tended to overestimate the threats posed by jihadists while underestimating the sources of other forms of terrorism. . . . Since 9/11, extremists affiliated with a variety of far-right-wing credos, including supremacists, antiabortion extremists, and anti-government militants, have killed around the same number of people in the United States as have extremists motivated by al-Qaeda's ideology. . . . by the end of 2015, forty-five people have been killed in jihadist terrorist attacks in the United States, while right-wing racists and antigovernment militants have killed forty-eight.[22]

Bergen fails to provide any form of evidence which would corroborate his claim that "Americans have long tended to overestimate the threats posed by jihadists." He nonetheless makes the profession, and it becomes part of his narrative. He follows this remark by recounting the story of Dyllan Roof in detail; Roof was the 2015 Charleston church shooter, and his story accounts for the single deadliest event of right-wing extremism in his data set; one might argue that such is a rather unscientific accentuation of the outlier in his data set. Bergen's data and use of it is controversial and sloppy at best; it is a design to obfuscate basic empirical evidence for ideological gain.

Even before the shootings in San Bernardino and Orlando, Bergen could only make such a case by excluding the 9/11 attack itself from his data set, by beginning his count in 2002, more than a decade before the lone-wolf trend in the West appeared, and by including controversial cases of so-called "right-wing extremism," such as an incident of domestic violence.[23] Even according to these tortured figures, at the time when that tally most advantaged Bergen's argument, the count was thirty-four deaths resulting from right-wing attacks and twenty-three deaths resulting from violent jihadist attacks. By July of 2016, after San Bernardino and Orlando, these figures had changed dramatically: ninety-four deaths could be attributed to violent jihadism, while only forty-eight could be attributed to right-wing extremism.[24] If Bergen's data set were extended back one year further to include 9/11, his tally would show 3,090 total deaths from violent jihadism, versus only thirty-four deaths by right-wing extremism between 2001 and 2016. Moreover, while the trend of right-wing violence remains relatively stagnant with a small footprint of 2.6 deaths per incident, and while no incident of right-wing extremism in Bergen's data set resulted in more than nine deaths (the Roof incident cited above), the violent attacks inspired by the Islamic State are significantly more violent, averaging 9.4 deaths per incident excluding 9/11 (281 average deaths per incident including 9/11). Ensuing attacks in Paris, Brussels, Istanbul, Dhaka, Baghdad, and Nice all supported the claim that terrorist attacks associated with the Islamic State tended to be more deadly, and were occurring with greater frequency at the organization's height, than attacks associated with a vague definition of right-wing extremism at any point in time. Finally, it is useful to recall that right-wing extremist groups cited by scholars as comparable to the Islamic state tend to pale in size to the Islamic State: the Heaven's Gate cult consisted of thirty-nine members, the followers of David Koresh totaled eighty, yet analysts estimated the Islamic State to have had between 15,000 and 30,000 militant fighters who persistently carried out violent attacks on all areas of the globe, who performed the essential functions of governance in some of its claimed territory and who claimed to have established provinces of the Islamic State on two continents.

LOCKE AND CONTEMPORARY ACADEMIC LITERATURE ON TOLERATION

The Western trend to downplay the threats posed by the Islamic State, especially by comparing that organization to other types of extremism that originate within the West, belies an increasing trend of subtly constructed ideologically charged views in American political attitudes. The ideologically charged type of "toleration" is conceptually not the same "toleration" that was originally articulated by John Locke or once employed in American political culture, while it is at the same time an outgrowth of the thin method by which Lockean principles were originally articulated by Locke and of the ways in which those principles have evolved in America.

Locke's writings on toleration are clear on the issue of whether those who would do harm to others should be tolerated. His view on this matter in *A Letter Concerning Toleration* is fundamentally consistent with his presentation in the *Second Treatise* of the right to preemptive self-defense in cases where one's well-being is threatened. He asserts in both his basic ideas for individual property rights, writing in the *Letter* that men "have need of several outward conveniences" for which they form societies: "for as much as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compact of assistance, for the defense of their temporal goods" and "the temporal good and outward prosperity of society; which is the sole reason of men's entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at in it"[25] (LT 422, 423). In the *Letter*, this purpose both facilitates the right to religious freedom and supersedes any unlimited interpretation of a right to religious freedom. In other words, society, and the pleasant existence it provides for individuals, cannot exist if undermined by a religious sect: "The principal and chief care of everyone ought to be for his own soul first, and in the next place of the public peace: though yet there are very few will think 'tis peace there, where they see all laid waste" (LT 424).

Locke specifically identifies two conditions in which a religious sect would be effectively attempting to do the same thing that a tyrant would do (exercise rule by force and to dissolve the government) (LT 424 and 426). The first condition is when "opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of society" are propagated by a particular religious sect (LT 424). Locke argues that this will probably not occur because such would diminish the ability for the sect to exist. His reasoning is that "such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and are therefore condemned by the judgement of all mankind: because their own interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered" (LT 425). Locke views such an organization as

one which contains a "degree of madness" and cannot be tolerated; he sees this is painfully obvious (LT 424–425). Locke's second condition is when "men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative . . . in effect opposite to the civil right of the community" (LT 425). In this case he points to instances where sects believe that "faith is not to be kept with heretics" (LT 425). He argues that such men, by not keeping faith with heretics, are themselves seizing a "privilege of breaking faith" (LT 425). The Islamic State's targeting of various types of "infidels" is a very appropriate application of Locke's "heretic" to contemporary issues. The fact that the Islamic State particularly targets infidels, means, in Locke's words: "These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, this is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any particular privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concernments . . . I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate. . . . For what do these and the like doctrines signify, but that those men may, and are ready upon any occasion to, seize the government, and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects" (LT 424–425).

Throughout this section of the *Letter*, Locke has used language and phrasing which is very similar to that of the *Second Treatise*: he writes of law and force and that "where the one ends, the other always begins"; he writes of "controversies . . . without a judge to determine them"; he writes of "civil society" and argues that its existence is correlate to the rule of law (not force) and the individual possession of private property (LT 424–426). The commonsense interpretation of these clauses is that Locke viewed the existence of society as paramount to the existence of unfettered toleration, that toleration mattered for the welfare of society but that it must be subordinated to the way of life inherent to civil society when a religious sect was itself attempting to subvert society.

American foreign policy in areas dealing with the toleration of the views put forward by our military enemies has changed dramatically over the past century. Early twentieth- and mid-twentieth-century policies related to this issue demonstrate an interpretation of toleration that is fundamentally consistent with the limited version of toleration sketched out above. The Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I (upheld by *Schenck 1919*) and the policy of Japanese internment during World War II (upheld by *Korematsu 1944*) are two well-known examples of such policies, as both countenanced some degree of intolerance in circumstances that fit precisely into the conditions that warrant Locke's call for self-defensive action (i.e., a foreign military is attempting to kill Americans, and some of its adherents are attempting to infiltrate American society so as to dissolve it from within). The trend to protect rights of potential or even declared adversaries evident in, for example,

Hamdan 2006 is a fundamental inversion of the way in which toleration was once limited to tolerating only those who wished to live within the existing civil society and not to alter it into something else.

Contemporary scholarly interpretations of Locke on toleration are often challenged by the circumstantial limitation of toleration. Traditionally, many scholars had noticed and justified Locke's excepting of Catholics and atheists from his paradigm of toleration.[26] Although this literature, advocating what may be called negative toleration, varies in the specific accounts of why Locke developed these exceptions, all of these scholars seem to agree that the historical circumstances of English society in the late seventeenth century justified the concern that these groups posed a threat to the stability of English society. David Lorenzo explains these concerns, for instance, in terms of "prudential exceptionality, practical judgements, and [their impacts on the interpretation of] traditional texts."[27] The implication for contemporary scholars attempting to apply these ideas to our own times is that a prudential application of Locke's ideas might facilitate a reasonable policy regarding when toleration is inimical to order for certain practical reasons. Scholarly literature in this vein robustly characterizes the academic understanding of Locke's view of toleration in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Contrarily, examples of a more recent trend of Lockean scholarship argue that a citizenry can be cultivated that can exercise what has been referred to as positive toleration. This literature generally argues, in one form or another, that behavior can be cultivated in a civil society that will allow individuals to overcome the types of differences that would pose a threat to the maintenance of a society (such as the differences between a protestant and an atheist in Locke's day). Such research quintessentially exemplifies the splintering of Locke's thought by contemporary commentators. The concept of positive toleration in Lockean research today represents the inability or unwillingness for contemporary Lockean scholars to critically and objectively assess the need for self-defense (or intolerance) in situations where a threat can be detected. A close analysis of a few of these more recent arguments for positive toleration will exemplify that positive toleration must be crafted by ignoring or discounting the practical exceptions to toleration that Locke himself had laid out, and that were reviewed above.

Anthony Wilhelm interpreted Locke's view of toleration in a manner that accentuates cooperation and downplays conflict:

> Locke offers a consistent message throughout his mature political and philosophical writings: since human affairs remain "in so constant a Flux," the positive duty of tolerance is essential to discharge our obligations supportive of a good life, encompassing civility, humanity, and friendship. . . . Rather than believing that people are better off retreating to the confines of their private

> lives for fear of provoking the entrenched orthodoxy of the other, Locke encourages public discussion and debate, including reaching common understanding through conversation. If Locke believed that one's partiality to received opinions and prejudices could never be extirpated once planted, then his relatively optimistic exhortations toward civility, friendship, and neighborliness would seem awkward and contradictory.[28]

Alex Tuckness also attempts to tease a justification for positive toleration out of Locke by accentuating the uncertainty of others' motivations.[29] Tuckness argues that Locke insists that the individuals who rule may "apply a principle incorrectly," and in fact harm the public good when they claimed to be protecting it.[30] Tuckness correctly concludes that Locke's theory of toleration would not countenance a militia group attacking unarmed civilians (as the Islamic State did), and he also correctly argues that Locke would not insist that the potential harm must be imminent before acting to stop the movement.[31] But the emphasis on certainty as a motivation for self-defensive action in his interpretation leads him to conclude that his correct interpretation of Locke is an insufficient encapsulation of the Lockean principle of toleration: "Majorities may tend to overestimate the dangers of minority beliefs. It is entirely possible that the clear and present danger test [waiting until the danger is imminent] is an even better standard than is Locke's, according to Locke's own criteria. . . . It is more likely that we would misuse the Lockean power to preempt than we would suffer from acting too late."[32] Certainty of one's moral correctness is not a criterion for self-defensive action in any of Locke's writings. Locke argues for preemptive resistance, or *ex ante facto* action in circumstances where self-defense might be necessary, not for *ex post facto* action. Reluctance to act for fear that demonstrable danger is not dangerous enough is simply a concept that does not exist in Locke's political thought.

Tuckness understands that this is Locke's view of resistance—"if the danger is really clear, we need not wait until it is present"—but it is precisely the way that he construes this point to imply that the traditional reading of Locke is "intolerant" that obfuscates the importance of resistance to danger in certain contexts.[33] He implies that just as frequently the danger is not all that clear, that even when it is believed to be clearly detected, we can err in our detection of a threat. Wilhelm asserts with him that it is more reasonable to trust first, and to resist later. The result of all of this pussy-footing around is that the one passage in Tuckness's essay, explaining that a violent militia should be resisted, will become easily lost to the view of positive toleration that his essay more forcefully (if subtly) emphasizes: we cannot really be certain that harm is imminent when we are fearful of something foreign, and therefore we should mistrust our instinct for fear, and we should not act preemptively in self-defense against threats that we conscionably believe to be

immanent. I can't imagine Tuckness wishing to apply this lack of certainty to justify toleration of the Islamic State; he would probably point out that armed militia groups are the exact incident used to exemplify the sorts of behavior that are beyond toleration. But the problem is that this was precisely the basic argument put forward by popular commentators regarding toleration during the spate of ISIS terrorist attacks during the 2010s.

The question in this book is not why American commentators chose to make such an interpretation. The question is how does Locke's thought encourage or facilitate such ways of thinking. The splintering of Locke's ideas also appears in this issue area. In resistance arguments, we saw that the concepts of property, consent, and resistance were separated from one another by contemporary American commentators, and ideas for resistance were justified by loosely articulated grievances that were only partially supported by the complex of conditions sufficient and necessary to justify resistance. In the area of toleration, we will see that arguments for positive toleration must splinter Locke's complex arguments regarding toleration into two different areas, ignore the circumstances in one area that speak to occasions in which toleration should be limited, while relying exclusively on the circumstances in the other area that speak to occasions in which toleration should be exercised. The diminishment of Locke's ideas is once again achieved by splintering Locke's work, and relying only on the portions cherry-picked for one's purposes.

Wilhelm and Tuckness both cherry-pick Locke's various *Letter*s *Concerning Toleration*. Whereas the (*First*) *Letter*, summarized above to explain negative toleration, speaks to cases in which a magistrate is essentially tolerant of religions that are benign to civil society, and lists cases in which the magistrate might reasonably limit religious activity to preserve civil society, the *Third Letter Concerning Toleration* (cited by Tuckness) and the *Fourth Letter Concerning Toleration* (cited by Wilhelm) concern a fundamentally different scenario. In both the *Third* and *Fourth Letter*s, Locke is developing an argument against a magistrate enforcing his own preferred religion on society for arbitrary reasons.[34] In the *Third* and *Fourth Letter*s, the magistrate is acting in an offensive manner, whereas the context of the *First Letter*'s discussion places the magistrate in the context of self-defensive action; the *Fourth Letter* depicts the magistrate as tyrant, whereas in the *First Letter* he is acting as defender of civil society.

The proper application of Locke's ideas toward positive toleration can be and are exaggerated by the advocates of positive toleration by citing the context depicted in the *Third* and *Fourth Letter*s. Indeed, the argument presumes that the context of the *First Letter* (wherein a dangerous foreign religion is attempting to undo civil society) does not obtain. To emphasize arguments

from the *Third* or *Fourth Letter*s places the society already into a state of disorder wherein the magistrate is acting in a tyrannical fashion for his arbitrary intolerance of a benign religious sect; in this context the magistrate is causing harm, and the religious sect is the victim. It makes sense, in this context, to argue for the importance of positive toleration, for indeed the law is the source of disorder caused by an intolerant magistrate, and therapy for this is tolerance. However, when attempting to apply Locke's thoughts on toleration to contemporary American political circumstances, reliance upon arguments in the *Third* or *Fourth Letter*s *of Toleration* are tenuous; since staunchly tolerant interpretations of the establishment clause began appearing in US case law in the 1940s (for instance, prohibiting praying and bible reading in public schools), the argument cannot be tenably advanced that American legal norms enforce, even in the softest of ways, any particular religious practice. Because America's laws are already tolerant, the opening up further of positive toleration not only does not make logical sense (the door is as open as open gets), but it instead infringes on the limits placed on toleration for the sake of security. To exercise this component of Locke's toleration arguments made especially little sense given the ISIS threat at the time, where an armed militia group was randomly attacking public spaces, which is perhaps the quintessential time to apply negative Lockean toleration.

At the end of the day, an essential difference between the proponents of negative toleration and the proponents of positive toleration regard whether Locke was acting as a political philosopher or as a political propagandist in his political writings. Negative toleration proponents occasionally argue that Locke is articulating a philosophically thin propaganda effort.[35] Positive toleration proponents, on the other hand, view Locke's philosophical enterprise as legitimate, and the work cited above is no exception. Tuckness takes Locke's toleration paradigm as serious science, turning Locke's works on the topic into a four-tiered system for toleration with a precision that is utterly lacking in any of Locke's ambivalent writings.[36] Wilhelm, similarly, takes Locke's thought at face value as earnest philosophy, and does not view the possibility that Locke's work was a propaganda effort not actually designed to cultivate deep thinking or deeply sensitive individuals: "If Locke was not so centrally concerned about the well-being of individuals and the public sphere . . . then he would in all likelihood not have spent so much energy in defending his conception of a good life, one so easily brought to ruin by secular and religious domination."[37] But making political ideas appear to be consistent with the good life is, of course, precisely how a propogandist spends one's time; and Locke's public good would have also meant political power for Locke's employer.

My argument throughout this book has been that Locke pieced together a propaganda effort for a healthily functioning liberal civil society, and that the

grave danger of his methodological construction was that it could easily be perverted; that a Lockean society would not possess the philosophical acumen to properly identify the meanings behind articulated political symbols, would accordingly fail to recognize threats to its constitution, and would therefore be prone to being augmented into something other than a healthily functioning liberal society. Precisely this occurred regarding contemporary Americans' abilities to detect the threats posed by the Islamic State and to forcefully combat them. The willful ignorance in a society built upon Lockean symbolism of Locke's fundamental ideas regarding self-defense, and overemphasis of lines regarding duties toward others without regard to the context in which they were written, radically changes Locke's thought into something it simply was not.

Some of the ramifications of our present eagerness to cultivate positive toleration have been summarized above, regarding the way in which the danger posed by the Islamic State is discounted by comparing it to less dangerous "homegrown" movements. But a few examples arising from the wake of the terrorist shooting in 2016 at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, will suffice to hammer home the illogical consequences of an ideological proclivity for positive toleration despite the context. Although the rise of the Islamic State had been well publicized in America since the summer of 2014, and although there had already been several related murders in America prior to Orlando, one Muslim man who was interviewed outside of a mosque in Orlando the day after the shooting at Pulse promised that he would "start paying more attention."[38] Another Muslim man professed to having had a casual conversation with the Orlando shooter about Anwar al-Awlaki's ideas some months before the shooting; despite the fact that the shooter had said that he found al-Awlaki's rhetoric "powerful," this man took no action whatsoever to alert authorities or to persuade the shooter against such ideas.[39] Perhaps just as troubling as the response of the Muslim community to this threat was the response of NBC News to this interview: the network's anchors expressed no alarm that young men who are attending mosques in the United States are having casual conversations about the philosophical veracity of someone who has inspired many murderers. These examples reflect a socially proliferate inability to deliberate concerning the proper application of positive versus negative toleration.

CONCLUSION

The historical facts and contemporary trends pointed out in this chapter's early sections—the proliferate use of apocalyptic symbols to generate substantial

political movements in the Islamic world, and the contemporary popularity of such symbolism in the Islamic world—paint a picture of Islamism as manifest in the Islamic State as a movement that is not historically unique, and one whose historical antecedents show that a strong military response was all along required to prevent the movement from establishing a political dynasty of global legitimacy. In other words, a strong incongruence existed between the ideological constructions aimed toward an ideal of positive toleration, and the national security threat posed by the movement which facilitated a need for a principled focus on negative toleration.

The cumulative effect of an ideologically ingrained interpretation of positive toleration can be detected in American political culture at present. The tendency presented above in the Lockean academic literature is to accentuate positive toleration; the tendency presented in the literature on ISIS is to downplay it as a threat and the idea of negative toleration associated with combatting it. In this context, it would be wrong to describe the Lockean Civil Society as ironically uncivilized, as I did in chapter 1, when describing the eagerness for Americans to fight with themselves (though the scapegoating of white supremacy for Islamism does produce this result). Rather, the Lockean Uncivilized Society is here seen behaving in an uncharacteristically and therefore ironically civilized fashion; the irony is that the display of such civility at the organizations who would harm the society cannot produce the intended good. In sum, the Lockean society is one that acts with incivility toward itself, though its acts are authorized through consent, while acting with great civility toward foreigners who are demonstrating an imminent threat that fundamentally would have violated the American process for providing consent to government. This is a radical perversion of the normal goals of any society, which are to treat its members with a reasonable modicum of trust, and its non-members with a like modicum of suspicion, so that its own existence may be maintained by those who exist as a part of it. This perversion of these essential societal goals represents a threat to the maintenance of Lockean liberal societies, and, in our time of liberal hegemony, to the maintenance of civilization and world order writ large.

The commercially available popular literature in the United States on the Islamic State reflects these tendencies. Peter Bergen's commercial monograph on the rise of lone-wolf attacks in the United States concludes that an "endemic . . . anti-Muslim paranoia"—fueled by Donald Trump and Pamela Geller—are reflections of a "vocal conspiracy theorist element of the American far right."[40] Even further, he argues that such conspiracy theorists "sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms."[41] Hence, Bergen turns the issue onto its head: so-called apocalyptic anti-Muslim paranoia became viewed as the problem, while the apocalyptically inspired Muslim movement that had executed numerous violent random attacks against society

at large was minimized. Bergen's analysis through such a lens allows him to conclude that: "The extent to which our government and the media participate in this endemic paranoia is damaging in that, apart from doing the terrorists' job for them, which is to terrorize, it helps crowd out the far more serious issues the planet faces. Climate change is far less telegenic than ISIS. More to the point, homicide is the fifteenth leading cause of death for Americans."[42] Stern and Berger, advocating a passive "let them rot" approach to combatting the Islamic State, conclude their own commercial publication on the Islamic State with the disclaimer that "you are significantly more likely to die in a car accident, especially if you fail to wear your seat belt, than to be attacked by ISIS. Wear your seatbelt."[43] The natures of the threats posed by terrorist groups, climate change, car accidents, and traditional homicides are not at all similar. One could not plausibly combat a terrorist group by limiting pollution, wearing seatbelts, and discouraging domestic violence; and one could not plausibly limit car accidents or climate change through the use of military force. Despite the fact that such claims are essentially nonsensical and appear to be made for the sake of distracting from the terrorist threat instead of seriously addressing it, the individuals who make them are of prominent social standing. Jessica Stern is an often-cited Harvard lecturer; Peter Bergen appears regularly on cable news networks. The idea of positive toleration is not restricted to academia, it very deeply shaped the dogma of tolerating ISIS in popular culture. We see in these popular pieces the same subtle dismissal of relevant questions that we saw in the academic: as positive toleration is sold to those who ignore the difference between the contexts of the first and *Fourth Letter*s, the positive toleration of ISIS is sold to those who ignore the difference between the contexts of climate change and military terrorism. In both cases, the contemporary theoretician is employing only those components of a theoretical system which are conducive to his ultimate policy agenda. Though this move appears to result in the diminishment of the goals sought by Locke's liberalism, the foregoing chapters have argued that the diminishment of Locke's liberalism by contemporary Lockeans is best viewed as a result of errors committed by Locke in the original construction of his system; errors that were committed in Locke's plight to achieve specific political goods, because Locke's plight was to achieve specific political goods, and not merely to identify the complex of goods achievable through politics.

NOTES

1. Barry Cooper, *New Political Religions; or, An Analysis of Modern Terrorism* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004).

2. Jean-Pierre Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007).

3. Ibid., xi

4. The writings of Naji and al-Suri are particularly noteworthy here, see ibid.

5. See ibid., 187; Peter Bergen, *United States of Jihad* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2016), 52–54.

6. William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalyse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015).

7. Ibid., 24; Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam*, xiv, 196; Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 260, and especially 264; Cooper, *New Political Religions*, 2.

8. Cooper, *New Political Religions,* 2.

9. Stern and Berger, *ISIS,* 264.

10. Filiu, *Apocalyse in Islam*, 195.

11. Stern and Berger, *ISIS*, 225.

12. Filiu writes that "[9/11] unleased a wave of apocalyptic speculations throughout Christendom that could not help but stimulate literary productions in the Islamic world. . . . Radical messianic propagandists . . . promptly exploited the possibilities of the moment" (Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam*, 110). He does not explain how Christendom might influence Islam so directly in this way, and he moreover ignores his preceding chapter which had explained that apocalyptic literature had been produced and sold prolifically throughout the 1990s in the Middle East. (See chapter 5, "Pioneers of the Apocalypse," in ibid., 80–103.)

13. Ibid., 196.

14. Pew Research Center, "Public Sees Religion's Influence Waning," http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/22/public-sees-religions-influence-waning-2/, accessed 6/30/2016.

15. Pew Research Center, "Religious Landscape Study," http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/christians/christian/#beliefs-and-practices, accessed 6/30/2016.

16. Pew Research Center, "The World's Muslims," http://www.pewforum.org/datasets/the-worlds-muslims/, accessed 6/23/2016.

17. Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam*, chapters 5 through 7, provides a detailed and fascinating account of the advent and proliferation of this literature from 1970s through the present.

18. Please disregard, as do the American advocates of liberal toleration views, that though Western scholars tend to view a fundamental similarity between right-wing Christian groups and Islamic terrorist groups, violent jihadism is merely a subset of right-wing terrorism, and that the research on this point really indicates that violent jihadism poses a greater threat in America than all other forms of right-wing extremism combined (even in 2015 the data showed that it posed nearly as great of a threat as all other forms of extremism combined). The claim that all religious fundamentalist groups are similar in nature, but that violent jihadism should be compared against all other forms of fundamentalism when counting and comparing incidents of violence is facially nonsense, but is the typical type of logical and semantic game played by

ideological constructors of any era who wish to camouflage the unrealistic aspects of their arguments. It is precisely the proliferate nature of this type of logical imagination in the West that made the fight against the Islamic State so difficult to undertake.

19. Jon Greenberg, "Kohn: Since 9/11, Right-Wing Extremists Killed More Americans than Islamic Extremists," *PunditFact*, January 8, 2015, http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/jan/08/sally-kohn/kohn-911-right-wing-extremists-killed-more-america/.

20. John Sexton, "CNN's Peter Bergen: Right Wing Extremists Have Killed More Than Jihadists since 9/11," *Breitbart*, April 15, 2014, http://www.breitbart.com/blog/2014/04/15/cnn-s-peter-bergen-right-wing-extremists-have-killed-more-than-jihadists-since-9-11/.

21. Kurt Eichenwald, "Right-Wing Extremists are a Bigger Threat to America Than ISIS," *Newsweek*, February 4, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/right-wing-extremists-militants-bigger-threat-america-isis-jihadists-422743.html.

22. Bergen, *United States of Jihad*, 270.

23. Sexton, "CNN's Peter Bergen."

24. International Security In-Depth, "Terrorism in America After 9/11," http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html; accessed on June 30, 2016.

25. References to John Locke's *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in this chapter only are drawn from John Locke, *Political Writings,* ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).

26. See David Lorenzo, "Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (April 2003): 248–258, for an excellent summary of this literature; including Ellis Sandoz, "The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy," *The Journal of Politics* 34, no. 1 (1972): 2–36; Issac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism*; Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government"*; Richard Aschraft, "Religion and Lockean Natural Rights," in *Religious Diversity and Human Rights*, ed. I. Bloom, J. Martin, and W. L. Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); S. Mendus, *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989); Maurice Cranston, "John Locke and the Case for Toleration," in *John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus*, ed. J. Horton and S. Mendus (New York: Routledge Press, 1991); John Dunn, "The Claim to Freedom of Conscience"; David Wootton, introduction in *John Locke: Political Writings*, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing; A. Murphy, *Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001).

27. David Lorenzo, "Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions of Toleration."

28. Anthony G. Wilhem, "Good Fences and Good Neighbors: John Locke's Positive Doctrine of Toleration," *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (1999): 155–156.

29. Alex Tuckness, "Rethinking the Intolerant Locke," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 2 (2002): 288–298.

30. Ibid., 291.

31. Ibid., 297.

32. Ibid., 298.

33. See ibid., 295.
34. See especially John Locke, *Letters Concerning Toleration. Collected Works of John Locke: Volume 5*, 12th edition (London,1824), 553–554.
35. Such as Sandoz, "The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy," and Ashcraft, "Religion and Lockean Natural Rights."
36. Tuckness, "Rethinking the Intolerant Locke," 295–298.
37. Wilhelm, "Good Fences and Good Neighbors," 155.
38. Fox News, *The Five.*
39. NBC News, *Today Show.*
40. Bergen, *The United States of Jihad*, 268–272.
41. Ibid., 269.
42. Ibid., 273.
43. Stern and Berger, *ISIS*, 202.

Chapter Ten

The Hole in the Fence

Shortcomings of Lockean Theory and How to Improve Liberal Justifications for Resistance

The subtlety with which Locke's political theory was constructed highlights the fact that it is both political and theoretical in nature. Locke's speculative account of history and abstract idea of rebellion are semantic tools designed to justify Shaftsbury's political agenda. Locke's restrictive theory of reason—which his theories on religion and education are meant to corroborate—is yet another tool designed to limit questions regarding the philosophical veracity of the theory. In this way, Locke's theory is best described as political theory and not political philosophy: it is a theory designed to justify a specific political order, it is not an open-minded philosophical inquiry into the nature of the best possible political order.

The axis of this theory is Locke's resistance theory; Locke's civil society is organized so that individuals may protect their individual property. Resistance against powers that would use another individual's personal wealth for their own private gain is the means by which individuals protect themselves from threats by others: individual property rights are safeguarded by the fact that I may violently resist you if you do not leave my property alone. Locke's society is both initially achieved and then protected by the idea of individual retributive violence.

Resistance in this political theory occurs in a handful of specific circumstances where the consent of society to a law-making body cannot occur, or where the trust imposed in this body has been vitiated. But, and this is the important part, this resistance occurs without deep philosophical thought (*nous*) occurring as neither a necessary nor sufficient cause for resistance. In fact, such thought is actively discouraged by the body of Locke's thought. The resulting political order, despite its veneer of consent-based rights, embodies an ironically coercive social proclivity to facilitate social (not political) change through resistance. The pressing for social change in the manner

of resistance, not mere petitioning of the government, but through violence, destruction of property, murder of law enforcement agents and civilians, and so forth, expresses clearly the manner in which Locke's civil society is actually, by following his own formula for determining conscionable action, something of an uncivilized society.

Our contemporary politics does not merely represent the widening of partisan ideas, nor merely the effects of social media on our political behavior. It can be traced to a fundamental discordance in Locke's thought. Widespread reasonableness existing inherently throughout a population of individuals (through conscience), cannot have been cultivated through his education and religious schemes. Locke distributes power throughout society to achieve his justification for resistance, but he does not facilitate a like distribution of the reasonability upon which his scheme rests. Traditionally, individual rights (although not understood as rights) are protected by a political power so that the political power and social order upon which it rests can be maintained. Society simply does not function properly when composed of bad parents, spouses, and businessmen. For Locke, political power is derived from individuals who grant political power its sway so that their own individual goods can be realized; it is absolutely integral to the maintenance of a Lockean civil society that these individuals understand not merely their individual needs, but their communal obligations as well. Yet, the individuals living in the society suggested by his theories on politics, religion, and education will be lacking the philosophical awareness to consider any good beyond their own factional good when it comes to political power. This results in the proclivity for the strong-arm and coercive tactics associated with social justice movements (violence, looting, etc.) in a society of unreasonably selfish factions who are incapable of limiting expressions of discontent through persuasive discourse, petitioning, and voting.

In the areas where Locke's thought may have some bearing on the standards of civil behavior in contemporary America, interpreters of Locke have been shown in this analysis to interpret Locke in a loose manner that exaggerates rights-claims found in his writings. This is an expected outcome of the inconsistencies in Locke's theory discussed in the preceding paragraph. This was most obvious in interpretations of Locke's resistance theory as condoning broad-based and loosely articulated group grievances, and in interpretations of Locke's toleration theory as radically expansive through the doctrine of so-called positive toleration. Both of these features of Locke's thought, as interpreted by recent American commentators, exacerbate the lack of civility in American politics today. Such readings of Locke are possible, I argue, as a result of the political and theoretical nature of Locke's works, which permits, nay, subtly encourages, precisely such ideologically motivated interpretations.

Of course, Locke's works are also interpreted in a more traditional fashion, which permits, when grounded by consent, the life/liberty/property-based rights claims and limited views of toleration which characterized the Lockeanism of liberalism's earlier years, as when he was employed to justify the American Revolution. The traditional reading of Locke conflicts essentially with the loose reading summarized above, and this bifurcation of Locke is among the factors leading to polarizations of liberalism in recent years. It is reasonable to ask in this context, which reading of Locke should we endorse? My view is that the traditional reading of Locke is more salubrious for American political culture than the contemporary. The contemporary reading does a less effective job of grounding rights-claims and tolerance-claims through empirically objective standards; in other words, the contemporary reading of Locke is divorced from the standard of consent that Locke himself touted, as conscience becomes defined by factional assertions rather than by objective evidence (individually based life/liberty/property rights violations are empirically verifiable simply because individual life and property are empirical things; group-based grievances cannot be detected except through their effects on individuals). Yet my view is also that Locke himself understood that his use of conscience to ground resistance was flimsy, and that partisan actors might abuse it for partisan gain. Perhaps it was his intent that his employer, Shaftsbury, do precisely this. In any event, in his writings on reason, religion, and education, we find the formulas necessary for such an abuse to occur. In this way, Locke designed his thought to appear to be philosophically robust, while in reality he knew it to be quite philosophically deficient. Although this formula allowed for the American Revolutionaries to construct arguments against Britain that were quite consistent with the property-based rights claims in Locke, this was not because Locke restricted effective uses of his resistance theory to such instances. Today, we find Locke's thought being used in a way that is, as stated, less tied to the limited, property-based rights claims. Because social justice claims are not empirically objective to all, especially in the backdrop of a consent-based democracy, but felt passionately by some, they become divisive rights claims, rather than meshing into the traditional American resistance culture. The conclusion that this interpretation of liberalism and of Locke leads to is that it is the specifically political and theoretical articulation of liberalism employed by Locke that is plaguing liberalism today.

THE GOOD OLD CAUSE

Scholars of modern and especially liberal political thought should focus their efforts on enriching their understandings of the ways in which arguments

for individual rights have been made that are compatible with traditional philosophical ideas, and also, not by happenstance, more conducive to a philosophical awareness by common society members of the value of communal obligation. Thinkers other than Locke in modern English and early American history developed political philosophies that produce the respect for individuality sought in Locke's theory, but are not derived through philosophically vapid arguments. Algernon Sidney is exemplary, as his work enlightens a more normatively desirable conception of America's founding ideals and produces the attention to civic responsibility and robustness in citizenship and individuality that is lost in Locke's thought within a wilderness of ideological arguments.

Thomas Jefferson once suggested that John Locke and Algernon Sidney were the two principal sources of theoretical inspiration for the American Founding.[1] As table 10.1 suggests, Americans have tended to pay more attention to Locke than to Sidney when seeking to expand their understandings of the theoretical principles behind the American Founding. This appears to have been true even in Jefferson's day, as Locke studies outnumbered Sidney studies 20 to 0 from 1762 to 1782. But the tendency has been exacerbated with time (88 Locke studies to 0 Sidney studies from 1862–1882) and, in the post–World War II era, Lockean studies have outnumbered studies of Sidney by more than 200 times. In one indicative twenty-year time frame, from 1962–1982, 826 studies were conducted about Locke. In the same time span, a meager four studies were published about Algernon Sidney.

Sidney, much more effectively than Locke, provides justifications for individual rights while simultaneously justifying communal obligation, and the need for citizens to not only be rational, but to be virtuous as well. Sidney's resistance theory, for example, argues clearly that resistance can only be considered just if the action is not merely countenanced in the consciences of the citizens, but if their inspiration is virtuous.

Sidney argues that acts of resistance, even if they are countenanced by the majority, can be unjust rebellions. In particular, he insists that it is possible for rebellions to arise from mistake or from malice. A rebellion arises from mistake when a wrong is erroneously suspected by the people.[2] A rebellion arising from malice, on the contrary, aims at "the satisfaction of private lust,

Table 10.1. Number of Secondary Works Written about John Locke and Algernon Sidney during Selected Time Periods

Author / Time Period	*1762–1782*	*1862–1882*	*1962–1982*
John Locke	20	88	826
Algernon Sidney	0	0	4

Source: This table was created by Scott Robinson.

without regard to the publick good."[3] Sidney argues that malicious rebellions can be particularly dangerous to a society when they are undertaken by a corrupted people.[4] Sidney further identifies that malicious rebellions can only occur among a people lacking in virtue, and will originate "among the rabble."[5] Consequently, Sidney warns of a plethora of dirty tricks that might be employed by those seeking to foment a malicious rebellion. Many of these tricks are also those Locke warned about being used by a malicious tyrant: corrupting manners, bribing people, paying off debts, and similar measures.[6] The danger of an unjust rebellion is something that Sidney takes as seriously as Locke does the danger of an unjust kingship. Consequently, the warrant for rebellion arises in Sidney's text from the dual possession of power and virtue: "he that has virtue and power to save a people, can never want a right of doing it."[7] Locke's resistance theory, by comparison, is justified solely by the amount of power possessed by the rebels. In fact, the idea of an unjust rebellion is foreign to Locke. Locke believes that any rebellion that becomes powerful enough to become successful is *de facto* justified:

> nor let anyone say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rules become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are most disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. (230)

Sidney's resistance theory raises concerns over the viability of resistance that Locke does not see. Locke, at best, does not conceive that a people could become corrupted and resist government for causes that are not justifiable. Locke, at worst, actually encourages such a corruption through the concealment of philosophy. Sidney provides a key ingredient to a society which venerates rights but is also communally robust: the people, who are the ultimate sovereigns in a society whose fundamental law is individual rights, must be virtuous if their society is not to degenerate into a tyranny of private lust.

Hence, whereas Locke sees that the best fence against rebellion is the threat of rebellion itself, Sidney sees that the best fence against rebellion is the existence of a virtuous people that are not inclined to become corrupted and to rebel against their government for unjust purposes. To Locke, the people's virtue is inconsequential to their ability to detect whether or not the cause for rebellion is justified. "When the people are made miserable," or when "they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whether they are going" they are going to rebel, and the rebellion is justified due to the fact that they perceived "abuses prevarications and artifices" (224, 225). Where Locke sees that a ma-

jority is prone to be reasonable, Sidney anticipates Tocqueville by suggesting that even though a majority usually will be reasonable, it is possible and not completely unlikely for a majority to become corrupted. In this regard, there is a breach in Locke's "best fence against rebellion."

Sidney, perhaps more prudently than Locke, acknowledges mankind's poor ability to construct adequate fencing. "It is in vain," he argues, "to seek a government in all points free from a possibility of civil wars, tumults, and seditions."[8] Sidney strives with much greater fervor than Locke to communicate the point that the best fence against rebellion is to have a representative government in which the most virtuous citizens are elected by citizens who themselves possess the requisite amount of virtue to determine who the most virtuous citizens among them are and who is consequently fit to hold public office.[9] If a virtuous citizenry elects virtuous rulers, then the possibilities of either the ruler perverting his power, or of the citizenry mistakenly or maliciously rebelling against a fit ruler, both become greatly minimized because "'tis ever good to be governed by the wisest and the best."[10]

The difference between Sidney's and Locke's handling of virtue is further reflected in the disparate ways that Sidney and Locke methodologically arrive at their conclusions. An essential argument of the foregoing analysis of Locke has been that Locke's theory is composed through speculation and abstraction, and that he puts considerable effort into obscuring the fact that his theory is speculative and abstract instead of grounded in philosophy and historical evidence. Sidney, in contrast to Locke, spends a great number of pages buttressing his arguments for virtue with references to both classical philosophical sources and historical events. Plato, Aristotle, the Bible, Augustine, Tacitus, Machiavelli, Hooker, and numerous other thinkers are looked upon by Sidney as disclosing a tradition that venerates virtue and wisdom and that serves as the foundation of what is reasonably pursued through political philosophy.[11] Sidney sees and is not shy about suggesting that "true philosophy" is the appropriate method of identifying what is and what is not truly worthy of human veneration, referring to those who ignore it as "the worst of beasts."[12] Just as Sidney believes that wisdom has been unveiled historically through the tradition of philosophy, he treats historical evidence with a seriousness that shames Locke's speculative whimsy. Historical anecdotes support the philosophical assertions made by Sidney throughout the text.[13]

Pursuant to Sidney's prioritization of philosophy, he treats religion differently than does Locke. Whereas Locke does not believe that common individuals are capable of understanding the true principles of religion through the reasoning process, and that they must be persuaded to the truth of religion by playing on their corporeal appetites, Sidney argues that the veracity of true religious insights can be made evident to men through a

proper philosophical understanding of reason. In other words, philosophy and religion are compatible with each other because the ideas expressed in both share the quality that they can be discerned as reasonable. For example, Sidney defends an argument in Ecclesiastes because it "plainly shews, that true philosophy is perfectly conformable with what is taught us by those who were divinely inspired."[14]

Sidney argues that one thing that can be discerned as reasonable through historical, philosophical, and religious arguments—and he employs all three types of evidence to support his position—is that an important attribute of a virtuous citizenry is that they properly understand their communal obligations. This is made quite evident through Sidney's argument that a good society will be well prepared for war. "All defense terminates in force," Sidney argues.[15] Most fundamentally, this means that both societal leaders and common society members both understand and be capable of executing the maxim: "God helps those who help themselves."[16] Sidney makes it clear that "those who help themselves" include those who fight for the defense of their own individual estates: "men cannot rely on any league."[17] However, men who are interested in helping themselves realize that to defend the future private interests of their estates, they must defend the community at large. Sidney takes up the classical idea of the naturalness of growth and decay, suggesting that a well-functioning independent society will fruitfully multiply their population, thereby creating a need to effectively make war so that the necessary territory for this growing population may be supplied.[18] In other words, the private interest implies a communal interest; the society member does not have atomistic interests because his most important long-term interest involves his posterity, and if his posterity is to be well-off, the society member must take an active part in strengthening the community at present, so that the community can expand and possess the required territory to accommodate posterity.

Sidney supports this proposition with ample evidence from history ("that which we are led by reason to believe, is confirmed to us by experience"),[19] including anecdotes from: Assyria, Persia, Macedon, various Roman examples, and Spain.[20] He writes that "no king could ever boast to have overthrown any considerable commonwealth, unless it were divided within itself, or weakened by wars."[21] In other words, history demonstrates to Sidney that men who value their own individual good as concomitant to the good of their society have tended to compose the strongest, wealthiest, and most successful societies, in which individuals have tended to be happiest.

It is only after carefully explaining and qualifying the communal sense in which "God helps those who help themselves," and after carefully articulating the argument that rebellions aimed at private interests are malicious, that

Sidney suggests that justified resistance against one's own government is reasonable in certain instances.

Sidney makes two important limitations to justified resistance, neither of which takes center stage in Locke's theory. First, Sidney downplays the Lockean means of justifying resistance based on the "appeal to Heaven," asserting that the virtuousness and legality of an insurrection—and not conscience—determines whether or not an insurrection is just. He writes that

> men who delight in cavils may ask, who shall be the judge of these occasions? And whether I intend to give to the people the decision of their own cause? To which I answer, that when the contest is between the magistrate and the people, the party to which the determination is referred, must be the judge in his own case; and the question is only, whether the magistrate should depend upon the judgment of the people, or the people on that of the magistrate; and which is most suspected of injustice.[22]

But Sidney points out the example of Tarquin, who upon suspecting he would be so judged by his people, murdered all of the just members of society, so as to prevent a just determination being made against him by his people.[23] A people who are "lewd, foolish, mad, wicked, and desirous" will not make the same determination in their consciences when making the appeal to heaven as a "virtuous and good" people will.[24] Sidney argues that the sort of people that lack in virtue may as well be given the prerogative to save themselves from tyrannical rulers, although because of their corrupt nature they are not apt to take proper action. If God helps those who helps themselves, one need be virtuous enough to know that one needs help and how to best obtain it, for the correlate maxim is that God does not help those who do not help themselves. The emphasis on virtue in Sidney's recipe for resistance falls in contrast to Locke's, which, as I have argued, is premised upon the idea that the philosophical inspirations for virtuous behavior have been watered down; for Locke, all resistance is basically justified by the consciences of the people. This, to Sidney, is not a fail-safe fence against rebellion.

Second, Sidney distinguishes between the ideas of "legal, judicial, and extrajudicial" means of resistance.[25] He argues that although a good society will be well disposed to war, it will be extremely reluctant to undertake violent action against their own government and will pursue legal and judicial means of resistance before attempting extrajudicial resistance. Extrajudicial proceedings (or popular rebellions) occur only, Sidney asserts, when there is no recourse to the judiciary.[26] Sidney gives us three occasions for resistance (not unlike Locke's): (1) "when one or more men take upon them the power and name of a magistracy, to which they are not justly entitled"; (2) "when one or more men take upon them the power and name of a magistracy, to

which they are not justly called"; and (3) "when he or they who are rightly called, do assume a power, tho within the time prescribed, that the law does not give; or turn that which the law does give, to an end different and contrary to that which is intended by it."[27]

As I have argued, Locke advocates extrajudicial insurrection as soon as the people "feel" or sense that they may be under the control of a tyrant (94). Although both Sidney and Locke discuss political institutions in their treatises, and although both develop justifications for political resistance, Locke's theory possesses a certain eagerness for resistance that is buried in Sidney's writings beneath concerns for virtue and for legal and judicial means of resistance.

These two qualifications to resistance—virtue and legal appeals—are areas of Sidney's resistance theory that illuminate his dedication to *both* of the ideals of individual happiness and communal well-being. Sidney does not couch his arguments for rebellion in the questionable mushy ground between communal well-being and individual rights; he is clear that individual rights exists within the constellation of things which result from communal well-being, and therefore he does not, as Locke does, argue for resistance when the answer received from the appeal to heaven is conscionable. The terms of the answer of the appeal to heaven are terms which, according to Sidney, "no man of common sense ever thought" to dispute.[28] The acts of resistance against tyranny to occur in Hellenic, Hebraic, and biblical histories provide more than enough evidence that resistance which aims at the best interest of the community is justified.[29] Consequently, the ultimate vindication of resistance is determined by Sidney not according to whether the resistance is conscionable, but according to whether a rebellion is in pursuit of what is most reasonably (as disclosed through historical interpretation) discerned as fundamentally lawful: "the directive power of the law, which is certain, and grounded upon the inherent good and rectitude that is in it, is that alone which has a power over the conscience."[30] Conscience, in and of itself, Sidney sees as being malleable and liable to the dangers that accompany an unjust rebellion.[31]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter 3 of this book quoted Eric Voegelin's remark that Locke was "one of the most repugnant creatures in the history of humanity." The analysis conducted in this work has developed that thought into a systematic analysis of Locke's work. I hope to have demonstrated the merit of Voegelin's concern. One might expect, in light of Voegelin's view of Locke, that his

recommendations for Locke as an education tool might be rather bleak. However, Voegelin offered rather different advice:

> The foundation of [the Political Science Institute in Munich] offered the opportunity to establish political science, from the outset, on the level of contemporary science. One could avoid the conventional ballast of descriptive institutionalism, historical positivism, as well as of the various leftist and rightist ideological opinions . . . [I]t was possible to build a curriculum that had at its center the courses and seminars in classical politics and Anglo-American politics with the stresses on Locke and the Federalist Papers.[32]

What are we to make of this remark in light of the analysis conducted above? How could Voegelin possibly endorse in this manner a man that he believed to be a rapscallion? Two points are important. First, Locke must have been fairly successful for Voegelin to both loathe him and insist that he be a central figure in our civic education; even if Locke's work is political theory and not political philosophy, he does articulate the basic ideas of democracy and capitalism in a manner readily grasped by college freshmen. Voegelin's punt to Locke on this point is worth acknowledging. Second, liberalism was not as thoroughly degenerated by ideology when Voegelin made this remark in 1972 as it is today. Though there is a gulf between Voegelin's two remarks, this distance demonstrates something. For Voegelin to endorse Locke in this way does suggest that the clarity of his presentation in the *Second Treatise* is paramount in the liberal cannon, but the decline of liberalism into ideological extremism since Voegelin's time might urge us to wonder if Voegelin would make that same remark today. It might challenge us to wonder whether we should rethink the way that we use Locke in our college courses.

One profoundly important change to world order since 1972 has been a significant deepening of the international governing institutions, and of the interrelatedness of international economic forces. As the forces of globalization have intensified since World War II, so has the prominence of Locke's thought as an articulation of liberal values devoid of any nationalistic or communal sentiments. As some recent critics of Locke have also noted, Locke's theory is particularly adept at developing a non-nationalistic account of liberalism by isolating and accentuating the contractual elements of liberalism.[33] But this, of course, misses much about reality, and especially about how humans interact with each other. Certain issues, such as toleration of dangerous radical groups like ISIS in recent years, indicates the fundamental inconsistencies that eventually emerge from a Lockean construction of reality (indeed because his is a construction and not fundamentally realistic). At some point, the basic principles of liberalism break down, and some different view of reality, one missing from Locke's account, must help inform our views of the world. The

particular element of reality which is especially eschewed in Locke's work, and that leads to the emphasis on contractual freedom and the diminishment of communal obligation, is the acknowledgment—at the fundamental level—that humans are *both* individually and communally motivated at once. We are both always at once individuals and members of a tribe of individuals organized for political action; we are both individuals and members of, in the contemporary international order, nations.

The marked differences between Sidney's and Locke's resistance schemes, particularly the emphasis on virtue in Sidney that is lacking in Locke, reflect the devotion in Sidney to the good of the community, and the lack thereof in Locke. Locke's resistance theory cultivates an overly individualistic society because the justifications for resistance in Locke are, first, themselves based on individualistic arguments, and second, grounded in a theoretical structure which intentionally obscures the philosophically discerned truth that the healthiest society composed of the happiest individuals will be taut between the antipodes of individual happiness and communal obligation.

In my view, Patrick Deneen's proclamation that "liberalism failed" is only slightly overstated.[34] It is more accurate to suggest that liberalism is failing. Of course, not too long ago it seemed that liberalism was succeeding. At the fundamental level, there is clearly something salutary about liberalism. Indeed, the fundamental precepts of liberalism have done a tremendous amount to improve the human condition during the past four hundred years. The issue with liberalism today is not liberalism, but the tendency among contemporary liberals to apply liberalism to their own lives in a way that is philosophically vacuous, pursuing some factious goal by appealing to liberalism in a slogan-chanting manner, as the reviews of the Women's marches, Black Lives Matter movement, and Malheur occupations all demonstrated.

One way to encourage the development of a philosophically deeper breed of liberalism is through the education process, and this may begin with how we educate our students regarding the principles of liberalism. Liberalism should be taught as an idea rather than an ideology; individual rights need to be understood by advocates of liberalism as balanced against other goods, such as that of the nation. The political community or nation cannot be understood as merely a contractual organization through which one's own personal goods are fulfilled. Thinkers such as Sidney may provide a firmer footing for a robust defense of liberal ideas than Locke, and our students would profit from greater exposure to his thought. Improving the current character of liberalism does not require us to undo the past four hundred years of Western political thought, which have seen so much good come to the plight of the individual, but it may require us to reconsider the essence of liberalism. Perhaps it was not because of Locke's specific formula for a

radically individualistic liberalism that we have experienced so much success through liberalism, but in spite of it.

A turn away from Locke as the seminal articulator of liberal values implies a few other general recommendations for how we may, at this historical juncture, rescue liberalism from itself. I have argued that Locke does not treat the subject of philosophy seriously in his education paradigm. Although Sidney does not treat the topic of education rigorously in his text, we may glean a few ideas about the education process that lauds philosophy from his life and works. First of all, we do know that Sidney's own education emphasized the classical philosophical literature.[35] Sidney was only capable of composing a philosophically robust argument for justified resistance because his education provided him with the knowledge necessary to make such an argument. Secondly, based on the type of knowledge that is required to understand the philosophical bases of justified resistance that disclose the communal as well as individual obligations within society, we may make two suggestions about the type of education scheme that would be necessary to cultivate a Sidney-like understanding of philosophy.

First: teach philosophy, and especially classical philosophy. The appreciation for wisdom, for moderation, and for the entire gambit of virtues which lead to individual happiness and communal stability can be most readily communicated through texts which have cultivated such an appreciation for centuries. Far too much time is spent in contemporary higher education on theoretical political ideas, such as those articulated by many moderns, that are simply divorced from reality and foment far too much speculative abstraction among our students, and far too little commonsense reflection about the nature of wisdom in this reality. Our contemporary approach to philosophy is, in short, fueling the hyper-liberal selfishness that hallmarks liberalism today.

Another suggestion relevant to the suggestion to teach philosophy is to reevaluate the relationship between liberalism and religion. Although the standard, and Lockean, response to the religious question is that religious issues should be private, it would behoove liberalism to find ways to publicly encourage citizens to behave in some type of religious activity or another. It is important to cultivate *noetic* reasoning, not a dogmatic following of any one religion. Stephen K. White has recently summarized how individuals experience "full" experiences, for example, Vacláv Havel's experiential reaction to a peculiarly beautiful setting, and it is this type of full, or *noetic*, experience that we should aim to cultivate.[36] Liberalism needs to find some way to have a better relationship with religion. I imagine that such a relationship is not to be cultivated through the conventional religious channels, given the liberal disdain for these channels, but as White argues, conventional religious channels need not impugn our ability to have the "full" experiences derivative of *nous*.

Second: teach history. Junior high and high school students should be exposed to a more rigorous history curriculum than even the average college undergraduate receives at present. The gravity of the theoretical lessons taught through political philosophy regarding resistance, authority, obligation, right, power, and so forth, can only be seen by individuals who understand the effects that different societal priorities have had on the communal and individual fates of societies and society members that have actually existed. The fate of Rome, for example, can be of little guidance to living societies if their average (and voting) member knows little more of Roman history than that they had things called aqueducts and built a large stadium called the Coliseum. The ideological training of liberalism today is only enabled by a history curriculum that accentuates historical details that fit the narrative of liberalism and eschews facts that do not. As history is the substance of which political theories are made, to teach the latter without due knowledge of the former is tantamount to instruction in mathematics without due knowledge of numbers. Such a shortcoming greatly limits the philosophical capabilities of students today.

As Sidney suggests, any good society will possess society members who are capable of demonstrating commonsense. The teachings of philosophy and history help to develop individuals possessing common sense, who will be capable of judging whether or not resistance against his government is reasonable and just. To render these types of judgments is the very essence of noetic reasoning and of that part of us which ascertains truth and through that ascertaining experiences freedom. The first step to creating a society buttressed around common sense is to venerate and teach historical figures who reflect this common sense.

NOTES

1. Thomas Jefferson, "From the Minutes of the Board of Visitors, University of Virginia," March 4, 1825, in Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (New York: Library of America, 1984), 479; see also, Thomas West, foreword in *Discourses concerning Government* (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990), xv.
2. Algernon Sidney, *Discourses concerning government*, ed. Thomas West (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990), 217.
3. Ibid., 228.
4. Ibid., 229.
5. Ibid., 228.
6. Ibid., 229.
7. Ibid., 227.
8. Ibid., 217.

9. Ibid., 46–53; 77–87; 134–135.
10. Ibid., 80.
11. Ibid., e.g., 134–153; see especially page 135. Sidney's veneration of classical philosophy and of history is so deep that it is difficult if not impossible to correctly cite this affinity; evidence of Sidney's use of philosophy and history as evidence for his political thought can be found on almost every page of his text.
12. Ibid., 78.
13. See West, foreword in *Discourses concerning Government*, xxii.
14. Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, 84, 246.
15. Ibid., 212–213.
16. Ibid., 210.
17. Ibid., 209–210; by "league" he specifically means alliances with foreigners or mercenaries.
18. Ibid., 210.
19. Ibid., 213.
20. Ibid., 210–216.
21. Ibid., 213.
22. Ibid., 225.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 226.
26. Ibid., 227.
27. Ibid., 220.
28. Ibid., 226.
29. Ibid., 228; Sidney lists: "Thrasybulus, Harmodius, Aristogiton, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, Dion, Timoleon, Lucius Brutus, Publicola, Horatius, Valerius, Marcus Brutus, C. Cassius, Moses, Aaron, Othniel, Ehud, Barak, Gideon, Samuel, Jephtha, David, Jehu, Jehoiada, and the Maccabees." As I note in chapter 6, Locke makes a tremendous amount of the Jephtha case, which read alone could lead to the self-interested Jephtha I argue for in chapter 6. Sidney's use of Jephtha, as one of many pieces of evidence, does not allow one to interpret Jephtha in the self-interested manner that Locke's use of Jephtha, as a stand-alone piece of evidence, allows and encourages. It is not Sidney's use of Jephtha along with many other examples that is troubling; the troubling part of Jephtha-as-evidence-for-resistance is that Locke only uses Jephtha, and ignores the numerous other historical and biblical examples that provide the communal-good context in which the Jephtha evidence should be read.
30. Ibid., 381.
31. Ibid., 381.
32. Eric Voegelin. *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Volume 33* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 348.
33. See Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed?* and Hazony, *The Virtue of Nationalism.*
34. Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed?*.
35. West, foreword in *Discourses concerning Government*, xxviii.
36. Stephen K. White, "Fullness and Dearth: Experience and Democratic Life." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 4 (2010): 802.

Appendix to Chapter 9

685	Al-Mukhtar and Hashimite movement (McCants 2015, 24–25)
716	Ummayad caliph Suleyman casts himself as Mahdi to facilitate siege of Byzantium in 716 (Filiu 2007, 11)
Mid-700s	Ismail'i movement at beginning of Sunni schism (Filiu 2007, 50)
747	Abu Muslim (McCants 2015, 26), use of Mahdi to start revolutionary movement that results in Abbasid dynasty
Late 700s	rebel from 683 al-Zubayr is being recast posthumously as a Mahdi figure by Shi'a rebels against Abbasid (Filiu 2007, 12)
899	'Abd Allah Sa'id and revolution in Salamiyya in 899 (Filiu 2007, 50); counter-movement by Abu Tahir recognizes prisoner from Isfahan as Mahdi (Tahir kills him later) in approimately 930 (Filiu 2007, 50)
903	Sa'id's movement grows into Syria; his follower 'Abd Allah Mahdi flees to Morocco under Abbasid pressure and inspires another revolution (Filiu 2007, 51). This one is successfully established, and Abd Allah casts rebels as agents of Antichrist, stuffing corpse of leader with straw and "borne aloft" as a means of consolidating power. This established the Fatamid dynasty.

1121	Ibn Tumart proclaims himself Mahdi in Morocco. A military defeat ruins his credibility, has to pass torch to Lieutenant, who establishes Almohad dynasty; after his defeat he proclaims Mu'min as Mahdi, who expands territory and establishes Almohad dynasty (see Filiu 2007, 60).
1164	Alamut leader Hasan professes to be working for Hidden Imam; he had suspended Islam in anticipation of the final hour—all of this inspired by recent political tension/stalemate. Was designed to reconsolidate power, but backfired and he was stabbed to death two years later (Filiu 53). This began to upset the Fatamid dynasty, after 250 years of relative absence of apocalyptic revolutionary justifications.
1200s	Al-Qutubi and Almoravid and Almohad jihads (Filiu 2007, 37)
1256–1258	Shi'a help Mongols invade and destroy Abbasid capital in Baghdad, before being betrayed by Mongols; this strategic error arose due to a "biased interpretation of the apocalyptic calendar" (Filiu 2007, 55).
1514	Kurd named Ismael claims to be Mahdi in Persian area during advent of Safavid empire. Noteworthy: Ottomans rout him in 1514 battle near Tabriz, and he drops claim of Mahdi (Filiu 2007, 58).
1519	Banu Sa'did in Morocco, whose leader was named Mahdi Mohammad by birth, was attributed Mahdi attributes (Filiu 2007, 61)—his followers ruled Morocco for the next century.
1613	Ibn Mahalli uses apocalyptic rhetoric re: Antichrist to start revolution in Morocco, proclaims himself Mahdi—he was killed by Sa'did counter attack and hung from ramparts until disintegrated; nonetheless, some followers simply thought Mahdi had hid himself from view, not dead (Filiu 2007, 61–62).

1847	Algerian Bu Ziyan declares himself Mahdi in revolution against French. He was forced to surrender, but helps spread rumors of appearance of the Mahdi and immanence of the Final Hour. He was killed by French in an 1849 siege, after saying again that he was the Mahdi and must drive out French; his head was placed on pike in town—rumors exacerbated further, many didn't believe he was dead, but the movement seems to eventually die out (Filiu 2007, 61).
1881	Sudanese Mohammah Allah proclaims himself Mahdi; establishes a radical state that is put down a few years after his death in 1898 (that he died and proved not to be Mahdi provided gradual weakening of state; European military raid ends it) (Filiu 2007, 63; see also Cleveland and Bunton 2013, 114–115).
1979	Ikhwan take-over of holy site in Mecca (see Cooper 133; Filiu 74–78)
1979	Mahdi emphasized during Islamic Revolution in Iran (see Filiu)
(1979–present) or 2006–present	Global Islamism/Islamic State movement

Note: the globalism of the Islamism movement and its proliferate use of the symbol of the Mahdi make it incredibly difficult and not entirely practical to identify a head-count of uses of the Mahdi in political situations dating from approximately 1979 to the present; this symbol arises in this time span across the various geographically specific conflicts that occurred within the Middle East; many of these movements strike me as being neither mutually exclusive from one another, nor mutually reliant upon one another.

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Abbreviations used in text for John Locke's works:

(section number)	*Second Treatise*
(I section number)	*First Treatise*
(CU section number)	*Of the Conduct of the Understanding*
(DM page number)	*A Discourse of Miracles*
(ELN page number)	*Essays on the Law of Nature*
(ECHU book number, chapter number, section number)	*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*
(LT page number)	A *Letter Concerning Toleration*
(RC section number)	*The Reasonableness of Christianity*
(STCE section number)	*Some Thoughts Concerning Education*
(TC page number)	*A Third Letter Concerning Toleration*, Ramsey

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