PLATO'S *HIPPIAS MINOR*

The Play of Ambiguity

ZENON CULVERHOUSE

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In memory of John Glanville.

Contents

Acknowledgments

This book is the product of a decade-long preoccupation with this vexing little dialogue. I never planned to focus and write exclusively on it then or now, yet I found myself constantly drawn back to it, trying to work out its many puzzling details. I hope the present work does this or, at the very least, shows that the *Hippias Minor* deserves more attention than it has traditionally received. Any successes in this book I owe to those who patiently remarked on various presentations and writings I have done on the dialogue over the years, especially participants at the West Coast Plato Workshop in 2014 and the Ethics and Politics, Ancient and Modern Workshop at Stanford University. I also owe many thanks to the anonymous reviewer of this book, whose comments helped make this work better. All errors, of course, are entirely my own. I also owe thanks to my family for constantly asking me how the book is going. Much love to Mady, Zora, Zenon, Maida, Fred, Marina, Brenda, and Marc.

Introduction

Despite recent efforts to rehabilitate Plato's *Hippias Minor (HiMi)*, the dialogue is still mainly discussed for what it fails to do. For some, it fails to offer even a valid argument.[1] This view can be traced as far back as Aristotle, who states that the dialogue's main arguments are "misleading" (*Met.* V.29 1025a6–13). Others maintain that, whatever we are to make of the arguments, the dialogue is mere play, an effort to disabuse Hippias of his pretense to wisdom or his unreflective reliance on Homer, rather than a depiction of Socrates doing serious philosophical work.[2] More recently, the dialogue has been absolved of its fallacies, but even here the dialogue fails. When Socrates concludes that the person who does wrong voluntarily is the good person, he qualifies it with "if in fact there is such a person" (376b4–6).[3] In doing so, Socrates indicates that he has yet to see what he makes explicit in other dialogues, namely that no one does wrong voluntarily.[4] At best, Socrates makes some strides toward identifying problems with the analogy of crafts and virtues, but his reticence to accept the possibility of voluntary wrongdoing is entirely the result of lacking complete knowledge of virtue.[5]

There is truth in these interpretations, but I will argue that they do not go far enough. Instead, I will show that *HiMi* makes substantive, positive contributions to Socrates' philosophical views, while at the same time doing justice to the puzzling, playful way in which Socrates conducts himself in the dialogue.[6] Much scholarship tends to emphasize one at the neglect of the other. Readers who take the main point of the dialogue to depict Socrates disabusing the sophist, Hippias, of his pretenses to wisdom capture well the dialogue's play and provocation, but risk reducing it to an ad hominem attack on Hippias. Approaches that emphasize the philosophical work save the arguments and avoid an ad hominem interpretation, but at the cost of ignoring Socrates' playful if not deceptive manner of engaging with Hippias.[7] In order to appreciate

the full effect of the dialogue, I argue that the two should be treated in concert. Central to interpreting *HiMi* is the unique way in which the behavior of characters in the dialogue mirror the subject matter of the dialogue: it is a dialogue about deception and hidden intention, in which Socrates especially appears to engage in deception. But it remains an open question for Socrates as to what counts as deception as opposed to, say, mistakenly saying something false and how it reflects one's excellence. More broadly, then, *HiMi* is about the relationship between the speaker and what is said, between agent and action. This represents at once both Socrates' character and his thinking about virtue. Socrates the character is often suspected of hiding something, and Socrates' conclusion about voluntary wrongdoing has generated a great deal of suspicion. As for his views, in many dialogues Socrates repeatedly argues that action (or act-types) are not sufficient for identifying virtue. His signature belief, that no one does wrong voluntarily, essentially questions the relationship between agent and action, holding that the action (doing something wrong) can only be evaluated in terms of the agent's beliefs and desires regarding that action (whether he knows it is wrong or wants to do it). To accuse Socrates of deception or unfair argument in *HiMi*, then, is to assume that Socrates himself does wrong voluntarily. I suggest we take Socrates at his word in *HiMi*. Nothing he says in the dialogue is misleading or false. But he does give the appearance of doing so. One reason he does so, I submit, is to provoke Hippias into revealing what he himself thinks. Hippias is, after all, a sophist and ambassador to Athens, so his motives, too, are suspect. Rather than resolving the myriad equivocations Socrates appears to commit with the central terms of the dialogue, we can preserve the playfulness of the dialogue by instead treating the terms as ambiguous. Socrates' playfulness, then, is in leaving it up to Hippias and the reader to explore those ambiguities, rather than exploiting them to trip up Hippias. In provoking careful thought, Socrates' playfulness puts the reader on notice to take care in examining his words. Attention to the details of Socrates' arguments reveals important insight into the conditions for voluntary action: In particular, *HiMi* provides a more detailed analysis of the relationship between δύναμις (i.e., ability) and voluntary action, than what we find in other dialogues.

In the course of examining the *HiMi,* I argue that the following insights into Socrates' views on virtue emerge:

1. The δύναμις of voluntary action: a person's δύναμις consists not only in propositional knowledge (e.g., that x is true), but also knowledge that explains action, such as knowing what one is doing and what one wants. In dialogues where Socrates seeks the δύναμις of virtue, the concept is deployed as though its meaning were already settled and then only as propo-

sitional knowledge. In *HiMi*, by contrast, the mechanics of the concept are exposed to explain how such knowledge issues in voluntary action. (See especially chapters 2, 3, and 4.)

2. The analysis of δύναμις and the subsequent discussion of calculation offer key insight into Socrates' craft-virtue analogy. First, it draws inspiration from the Homeric view that all "better" is "better at," such that there is no equivocation between moral and nonmoral superiority. In short, it shows that that the δύναμις of the craft of virtue, if there is such a thing, is no different than any other craft insofar as it should include knowledge of some truth, knowing how to accomplish or express that truth, and wanting to do so, though the knowledge that the virtuous person has is distinct from other craft-abilities. Secondly, *HiMi* reveals an important respect in which virtue is disanalogous from other crafts, specifically on the question of what motivates them to use or misuse their expertise. There is no part of craft-expertise that explains why a person would misuse their craft, but there ought to be in the case of virtue and vice. Throughout the dialogue, I identify clues that suggest Socrates identifies self-interest as a factor determining the misuse of any ability, which gets him much closer to the idea that justice cannot be misused if the agent knows it is against his own interest to do so. This, of course, is not the full Socratic view, but it is the source of it.
3. Socrates in *HiMi* is indebted to Homer for some of his philosophical insights. He does not use or misuse Homer as a "mere peg" for his own views, as some suggest.[8] *HiMi* devotes more attention to interpreting Homer than any other dialogue. While I do not mean to suggest that Homer has a moral psychology, Socrates relies on plausible interpretations of Homer in developing his arguments.

The dialogue form itself does not escape suspicion, either. While Plato, among others, writes Socratic dialogues, his work is one among several genres competing for the claim to wisdom. The *HiMi* is Plato's engagement with two of the main contenders, poetry and rhetoric, both of which are subversive in their own ways. The present work reads the dialogue as Plato's effort to mark out the contested boundaries of *philosophia* by both drawing on and developing themes from Homer and sophistic rhetoric. His portrayal of Socrates' strangeness emerges within the context of these genres and their social function. Hippias, for one, sees them engaged in a contest of wits, and Socrates never explicitly corrects him. The dialogue as a whole challenges the reader to separate Socrates from the sophists. I begin, then, with an analysis of the opening lines of the dialogue to show how the central theme of the dialogue is evident from the start and informs or frames the entire dialogue.

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE *HIPPIAS MINOR: EPIDEIXIS* AND *PHILOSOPHIA* (363A1–364B5)

The *HiMi* begins in a manner similar to other early dialogues. The sophist, Hippias, has just delivered an *epideixis* or display speech about Homer. Hippias' host in Athens, Eudicus, asks Socrates to "praise or examine" what Hippias has said now that the crowd has dwindled to those most suited to *philosophia* (363a1–5). Socrates asks a question which ultimately leads to a general discussion of false speaking and voluntary wrongdoing. In the broadest understanding of these two points of discussion, the dialogue explores the relationship between speaker or agent and his words or actions and the role this relationship has in evaluating a person. Given that this is the subject of the dialogue, Plato's framing of the dialogue as Socrates' engagement with a sophist's *epideixis* takes on special significance, for in the hands of the sophists the epideictic genre itself leaves it open as to whether the speaker means what he says. The problem that Plato has with *epideixis* as a genre is usually that it is done under the *pretense* of wisdom, often for the sake of money (*HiMa* 281b–c and 282e), reputation (*HiMa* 281b*, HiMi,* 363d and 367c), flattery (*Mx* 235a–b*, Lysis* 210d), or entertainment (*Ion* 530d).[9] Whatever its aim, an *epideixis*, first and foremost, is used to showcase a sophist's ability and talent. Whether the sophist's aim is to appeal to prospective (paying) clients, or demonstrate an argumentative technique to current clients, the contents of his *epideixis* is always subordinate to achieving this aim. That the audience is convinced of what the speaker says, therefore, is often of secondary importance and typically the audience's follow-up questions are more a test of the speaker's skill than a search for truth.[10] But the distinction was not always a sharp one in a society where wisdom and political success were closely associated, and exposing this distinction is what motivates Socrates to examine the sophists in the first place. Probing this ambiguity between skill in persuasion and commitment to the truth of what's said is central to Socrates' approach in the dialogue and his effort to discern Hippias' own intellectual and moral commitments. *HiMi* is unique in that the subject of discussion, deception, directly addresses Plato's general criticism of sophistic *epideixis*.[11] But the question of whether the speaker means what he says also applies to Socrates, who is often accused of feigning ignorance (e.g., *Rep.* I) or arguing unfairly. This is especially true of Socrates in *HiMi*, as is evident from Hippias' objections throughout the work and many scholars' negative assessments of him in *HiMi*. Here, too, it is important to keep in mind that Socrates and Hippias are inquiring about deception in a context that is itself potentially deceptive. In *HiMi*, Socrates' *elenchus* is as much open to the charge of deception as Hippias' *epideixis*, if not more. The fact that the con-

versation of *HiMi* is framed in the context of *philosophia*, too, suggests that the dialogue as a whole is an effort to sharpen the blurred boundaries between Socratic intellectual activity and that of the sophists. Whatever sharpening is done, however, is difficult to see.

The opening exchange between the host, Eudicus, Hippias, and Socrates is remarkable in how it obscures rather than illuminates any contrast one might expect between Socratic and sophistic activity. It begins with a burst of frustration toward Socrates worth quoting in full (363a1–5):

> Come on, Socrates! Why are you silent after Hippias gave such a great display (ἐπιδειξαμένου)? Why don't you either join in praising some of what he said or contest it (ἐλέγχεις), if you think something wasn't well said (μὴ καλῶς . . . εἰρήκεναι)? This is especially appropriate now that we who may partake most in intellectual pursuits (φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς) have been left to ourselves.

These words come from Eudicus, about whom we know nothing outside the two *Hippias* dialogues. In both he plays the small but revealing role of Hippias' host and adjudicator between Socrates and Hippias. His name, *eu* + *dike* or "well-adjudicating," suggests Plato intends him just for this purpose.[12] In *HiMi*, his importance is evident in the urgency of his words, which express both irritation and enthusiasm for Socrates to engage the sophist Hippias.[13] More specifically, he invites Socrates to evaluate an *epideixis* or "display speech," a standard practice among sophists in the 5th century, using his typical (if not unique) *elenchus* or "examination," in the context of *philosophia* or "intellectual pursuits." That this comes from a generic host of a sophist suggests that this is a standard expectation at such events. But what, exactly, is the expectation? Furthermore, how, if at all, does Socrates meet this expectation? The few scholars who do give attention to the set-up of the dialogue only answer the latter question, arguing that Socrates departs from such expectation. Blundell, for one, says it pits "Socrates against both traditional [Homeric] and sophistic educational methods,"[14] and a recent book on the dialogue claims: the opening "neatly juxtaposes three different methodologies . . . the sophistic *epideixis,* Socratic *elenchus*, and Platonic *philosophia*."[15] In many early dialogues, Plato is at pains to separate Socrates from the sophists, and in some cases Socrates explicitly and immediately criticizes the sophists' penchant for long epideictic speeches, preferring to ask questions instead.[16] But in *HiMi* this contrast only emerges as the dialogue unfolds, and never explicitly. Socrates explains his silence in a fairly banal way: he "did not keep up with," the speech and did not want to interrupt with questions (364b5–7). Furthermore, contesting and questioning an epideictic speech is standard procedure in such contexts, as Hippias will point out shortly (363c7–d2).[17] In contrast to Blundell and others, Ausland points out that Eudicus' request that

Socrates contest (ἐλέγχεις) Hippias' speech "is not tailored for Socrates as the inventor of philosophical refutation but is instead a traditional rhetorical *tropos*," one typically associated with forensic rhetoric.[18]

I am inclined to agree with Ausland here, though it is worth pointing out that *HiMi* is not a forensic debate, as obvious as that may seem. As a feature of forensic rhetoric, the *elenchus* is designed to sway the jury and win a certain verdict. As such, it aims as much at victory as epideictic speeches do. But the victory in an *epideixis* is a boost to the speaker's reputation rather than secure an acquittal.[19] That such a request is "especially appropriate" in the context of *philosophia* or "intellectual pursuits" suggests that Eudicus expects a contest of wits. That it is Eudicus who requests Socrates contest the speech in the context of *philosophia* implies that both are within the boundary of *epideixis*.[20] As such, it is not at all obvious that the discussion is shifting its focus from the pursuit of victory to the search for truth, much less that there is a clear distinction between the two. For Socrates' contemporaries, in other words, the juxtaposition is hardly neat.

If Eudicus' request is a standard expectation of intellectual discourse, discerning exactly what he and his contemporaries expect in such a context will illuminate how Socrates distinguishes himself—and philosophy—from sophistry. Sophistry was diverse in its practice, beliefs, and representation, and the sophists' use of epideictic speeches was no exception. It will be best, therefore, to start with Hippias' own use of the genre in *HiMi*. Here, too, the contrast between the pursuit of victory and the pursuit of truth is especially obscure. Socrates says immediately following Eudicus' opening that Hippias' speech "exhibited material of all sorts about Homer and other poets" (363c1–3). His speech's aim may have been to model his skill as an educator, if it is the one referred to at *HiMa* 286b–c. There Hippias says that he will give an *epideixis* in which he cites Homer in the course of showing what sorts of activities a young man should undertake if he is to become κάλος, i.e., "fine" or "good." Hippias also says he will give this speech in "Pheidostratus' schoolroom" at Eudicus' invitation, which, presumably, is where we find them at the start of *HiMi*. But we need not rely on the *HiMi*, given that Eudicus acknowledges the audience has changed. The aim of the inquiry has changed too, presumably. Socrates does not ask whether Hippias' speech is appropriate for educating the young (unlike, for example, the *epideixis* of the *Laches*). He only asks Hippias which of Homer's heroes he thinks is better, Achilles or Odysseus.

The use of Homer and other poetic authorities was also common practice in epideictic speeches, both among sophists and their predecessors. Over the course of the dialogue Hippias defends a fairly uncontroversial, conventional interpretation of Homer and appears to endorse the moral he derives from it as well. As such, Hippias' *epideixis* appears cast more from the traditional, pre-

sophistic, mold of Pindar's *encomia* or praise poems rather than the sophistic appropriations of it.[21] Pindar's victory odes, typically commissioned by an athletic victor or his family, featured mythical narratives that served as a heroic analog to the victorious athlete and immediate subject of praise. At the start of *HiMi*, Hippias goes out of his way to point out that he, too, is for hire at the panhellenic games (363c7–d2):

> When I go from my home in Elis to Olympia for the panhellenic festival when the Olympic games are held, I present myself at the sanctuary to deliver upon request any speech I've prepared for exhibition and to answer anything anyone wants to ask.

Hippias' delivery of an epideictic speech in an intellectual (or possibly educational) context, a speech which uses Homer as a paradigm, does little to expose the genre's ambiguity between a genuine offer of truth and a mere showcase of rhetorical ability. In such a context, it is not at all clear that Eudicus expects a search for wisdom any more than a contest of wits.

The ambiguity is nonetheless present, both in the opening exchange and over the course of the dialogue. For one thing, it is clear that Hippias is deeply concerned about his reputation. After Socrates says he would like to ask Hippias some questions about his display speech, Hippias reassures Eudicus that this will be no problem: "I'd surely be acting strangely (δεινὰ), Eudicus . . . were I to avoid Socrates' questions now [when I answer questions all the time at the Olympic festival]" (363c7–d4).[22] Hippias likens the current context—a private gathering of intellectuals—to the public and politically charged atmosphere of the panhellenic festival. But in doing so he also implies that answering Socrates' questions is not nearly the same challenge he faces at the festival. Socrates, clearly sensitive to this, points out Hippias' concern for reputation in a not-so-subtle way at 364a1–6:

> You are surely blessed, Hippias, if you show up at the sanctuary every time the Olympics are held so confident in your soul's wisdom. I'd certainly be surprised if any athlete who goes there to compete in a physical contest had such unwavering confidence in his body as you claim to have in your intellect.

Socrates does not say Hippias is wise, but only that he is confident in his wisdom. He makes a similar remark just a few lines later at 364b1–3: "You are right, Hippias, that your reputation for wisdom is a fine monument to the city of Elis and to your parents." Likening Hippias' wisdom to athletic prowess also casts the discussion to come as a competition rather than a mutual inquiry, and Hippias reinforces this by stating it outright: "from the first time I began competing at Olympia, I never met anyone who was better than me at

anything" (364a7–9). The emphasis on reputation suggests that Hippias may prize it more than the correctness of what he says.

Hippias' reputation as a sophist may not be the only thing at stake for him. Socrates' statement that Hippias' wisdom is "a fine monument to the city of Elis" also hints at Hippias' role as ambassador to Athens. We know from Thucydides' *Histories* that Elis managed the Olympic games (2.160) and initially sided with Sparta against Athens. Also, in *HiMa* Socrates remarks on the dual roles Hippias occupies as a dispenser of wisdom, one in private, earning money from the youth, and the other in public, speaking on behalf of Elis as her ambassador (281b). Where *HiMa* distinguishes these two roles, *HiMi* seems to conflate them. Socrates praises Hippias' reputation as a representative of Elis at the games, which is cast as a contest, but is also a precarious political atmosphere, given that the audience members would come from all over Greece. In *HiMi,* Hippias' public persona serves as an analogy to the present context, namely a private, intellectual gathering. By tying Hippias' private persona to his public, political role, the stakes of preserving his reputation are made all the higher for Hippias. Risking his reputation for wisdom in a private context also puts at risk any political ambitions he may have. This, too, may explain why Hippias takes a conventional, uncontroversial tack in the dialogue. If so, the reader has all the more reason to wonder whether Hippias really believes what he says.

The scope of Hippias' wisdom is ambiguous between being able to speak well and being committed to the truth of what he says. Eudicus' request that Socrates contest Hippias' speech "if you think something wasn't well said (μὴ καλῶς . . . εἰρήκεναι)" (363a3) could, therefore, be an invitation to question the correctness of what was said or the quality of the speech itself (e.g., its clarity or its use of rhetorical tropes). But even if it is a request to contest the truth of what is said, the competitive context suggests that this ultimately is about reputation. At the midpoint of the dialogue, Hippias accuses Socrates of arguing unfairly and demands that he and Socrates trade speech for speech: "that way, those present will know which of us speaks better" (369c7). Here the point is to be judged by the audience and casting it as a competition recalls Socrates' comparison of Hippias with Olympic athletes at the start of the dialogue. In reply, Socrates says he does not doubt that "Hippias is wiser than I," which is precisely why he asks questions of him (369d1–5). Does Socrates now recognize that Hippias' reputation for wisdom is deserved? Most likely not. The implication—even at the midpoint of the dialogue—is that while Hippias may be better at giving speeches, his wisdom and commitment to truth will only be revealed through questioning.

Hippias' defense of his *epideixis* on Homer is conventional. Hippias never comes across as one who tends to "make the weaker argument stronger," which

Aristophanes' *Clouds* presents as a hallmark of sophistry. Socrates, however, does. Even if Socrates' arguments in *HiMi* are not fallacious, he still appears guilty of "making the weaker argument stronger" when he concludes that the true and false person are the same, that Odysseus is better than Achilles because he deceives intentionally, and that the good person is the one who is voluntarily unjust. Many scholars agree with Hippias that these positions are δεινὸς or strange (365c7 and 375d3), either in their own right or because they appear to contradict what Socrates himself claims in other dialogues, and many conclude that Socrates does not really endorse these conclusions. In other words, Socrates' sincerity is just as much in question as that of the sophists Plato reviles. Even if there is a reasonable position to be found in *HiMi* and one that Socrates does take seriously in the dialogue, the way in which he pursues the argument makes it very hard to see. Hippias hints at Socrates' reputation for unfair argument, accusing him at 369b8–9 of "*always* weaving arguments" that distract from the larger issue. One might object that it is Hippias' argument that leads to these strange conclusions, as Socrates claims at several points in the dialogue. But even if Socrates' is working from Hippias' own beliefs, he still guides the argument in questionable ways. He offers what appear to be plainly misguided interpretations of Homer (e.g., 369e2–5: Odysseus is never portrayed as false in Homer), and he appears to mischaracterize Hippias' own position (e.g., 366a2*ff*: arguing toward a controversial conclusion by omitting Hippias' pejorative characterization of the false person).

Socrates' treatment of Hippias, too, comes across as insincere. From the start, Socrates appears to mock Hippias with underhanded flattery. Mocking or not, Socrates in *HiMi* could very well be in need of his own advice from *Lysis,* where he thinks to himself that Hippothales is wrong to praise his beloved: "This is the way . . . to converse with your beloved, humbling and diminishing him rather than puffing him up and pampering him, as you did" (210e). One scholar puts it more bluntly: "Does Socrates care for Hippias' soul? He does not."[23] Hippias appears far more serious in his convictions than Socrates, and this juxtaposition makes Socrates far more open to the criticisms that Plato levels against the sophists.

If Socrates' examination of Hippias opens him to the charge of sophistry, it is all the more difficult to see how he, and Plato, can stake their own claim among the hotly contested boundaries of *philosophia* in the 5th century.[24] But Plato never makes Socrates easy to discern. It is odd, then, that so much scholarship is alarmed at Plato's portrayal of Socrates in *HiMi*. Why not give him the benefit of the doubt here as well? Most likely, it is because Socrates argues for claims that appear outrageous even for him. As I will show, though, throughout the dialogue Socrates is at once playful and deadly serious, and the former is a means to the latter. Once we see this, it is no coincidence that Socrates appears

to engage in deception most in a dialogue about deception. The opening framework of the dialogue is the first indication that we should be wary of a possible distinction between what Socrates says and what he means.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

Framing the dialogue as Socrates' engagement with Hippias' *epideixis* should make us alert to the potential disconnect between what is said and what the speaker believes. The subject of discussion, too, turns out to be about deception, for Hippias' speech and Socrates' question about it both concern Homer's portrayal of Achilles and Odysseus, with Hippias claiming that Achilles is better than Odysseus because the former is "true" and the latter is "false." In chapter 1, I argue that Socrates' engagement with Homer is a serious effort to understand him, rather than a mere starting-point for a more general philosophical inquiry. Scholarship on *HiMi* tends either to ignore the dialogue's engagement with Homer or show Socrates to distort and misinterpret him.[25] Many of the charges of equivocation against Socrates in this dialogue revolve around terms that originate in Hippias' and Socrates' analysis of Homer's texts. I argue that rather than misinterpreting Homer, Socrates sees difficulties and ambiguities in Homer's text, ambiguities which inform rather than distort the arguments of the dialogue. Careful attention to the questions Socrates raises about Homer shows that Socrates sees the seeds of his own philosophical thought about moral psychology in Homer. The passages and terms both he and Hippias draw from Homer reveal unanswered questions about motivation, intent, power, and voluntary action.

One of the main charges of equivocation against the dialogue is Socrates, use of the term δύναμις or "ability." Socrates introduces it after Hippias has stated that Achilles is "true" and Odysseus is "false," by asking whether the false person is able or unable. Its introduction in the dialogue seems to come out of nowhere, for it does not feature in the prior discussion. In chapter 2 I trace the origins of this term to Hippias' quote of Homer's *Il.* 9 and show how the ambiguity in Homer regarding Achilles' and Odysseus' ability informs Socrates subsequent analysis of δύναμις. This concept is central to Socratic thought throughout the early dialogues, but it receives especially extensive treatment here. Since Hippias thinks Odysseus and the false person in general behave badly, Socrates' analysis of the false person's ability follows Homer's lead in an effort to identify the relationship between agent and action, two things potentially disconnected in deception and epideictic speech.

After Socrates' analysis of δύναμις, he deploys this concept in an argument that shows the true and false person are not distinct after all. Many think

Socrates reaches this conclusion by equivocating between describing the false person in terms of how they typically act and what they are able to do. Others try to resolve the fallacy by arguing that Socrates means ability throughout, and is only following Hippias' view in doing so. Drawing from the results of chapter 2, I show in chapter 3 that there is no equivocation because the assumption that Socrates has to mean one or the other is a false dilemma. To understand a person's action, it is necessary to identify the agent's ability, i.e., the knowledge, intent, and desire behind the action. In other words, ability and action are two sides of the same coin, and making sense of action requires showing how one informs the other. What the argument in this segment of the dialogue does is to explore the ways in which a person's ability can explain action. Since Hippias claims that the false person behaves badly, he must show that the false person's δύναμις includes knowing, intending, and wanting to do what is bad, and not simply knowing that something is true or false in some realm of expertise (e.g., calculation). The question is not whether a person with an ability will use his abilities one way or another. The question is what in his ability explains his action in the first place. In this segment of the dialogue, we get the first hint of Socrates' concern over voluntary wrongdoing, and the problems that are exposed here inform the final arguments of the dialogue, which I discuss at length in chapter 5.

After arguing that the true and false persons are the same, Socrates concludes that this is true of Achilles and Odysseus, too. Hippias objects on the grounds that this is not what Homer says, and in the next segment of the dialogue Socrates and Hippias return to a discussion of Homer's text. Once again, Socrates is accused of misinterpreting Homer and, as a result, setting up the absurd conclusion that the person who lies voluntarily is better than the one who lies involuntarily. In chapter 4 I offer a close examination of this segment of dialogue, and show how it picks up problems left over from the analysis of δύναμις and the calculation argument, situates them in a plausible reading of Homer's text, and identifies the role of knowledge and desire in voluntary action.

The final set of arguments has Socrates examine the conclusion that the person who is voluntarily unjust is better than the one who is involuntarily unjust. This set of arguments begins and ends with Socrates claiming to waver over whether to accept this conclusion, though scholars are divided over whether Socrates' wavering is sincere. In chapter 5, I consider what purpose the arguments between waverings serve if they do not settle the question for him. In particular, I identify what in this set of arguments motivates Socrates to qualify the final conclusion that the voluntarily unjust person is the good person with "if in fact there is such a person." On my reading, the final set of arguments allude to the view that persons generally do not want to act

contrary to their own interests. This does not necessarily invoke a distinctly Socratic thesis. It does not isolate justice as something that is always in one's interest. But it does provide a basis for it. Though these arguments again yield the conclusion that the voluntarily unjust person is the good person, they allow Socrates to get closer to the specific problem he has with it, namely that there is no such person as the voluntarily unjust person.

On my reading, Plato's *HiMi* is essential in that it displays the mechanics of Socrates' views about virtue and motivation. But its influence extends to Plato's thought and perhaps even to Aristotle's own ethical philosophy. In a brief Epilogue, I consider the grounds for Paul Shorey's bold but seldom discussed claim that "The extent of [the dialogue's] influence upon Aristotle has escaped the attention of most commentators. It is plainly the source of the distinction between a δύναμις and a ἕξις. . . ."[26] I argue that while it is not *the* source, there are some grounds for thinking it is a source, and not a purely negative one. Rather than appeal to the brief remarks Aristotle makes in his more mature works, such as the *Metaphysics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, I take tentative steps toward identifying traces of *HiMi* in earlier works, such as the *Topics*, *Magna Moralia*, and *Eudemian Ethics*. There Aristotle is more preoccupied with the potential misuse of virtue and its distinction from science. Passages in those works often identify Socrates as the source of the problem, and use similar examples and arguments as we find in *HiMi.* In this regard, Plato's *HiMi* is a Janus-faced dialogue, looking back to the influence Homer and rhetoric had on Socrates, but also looking forward to problems that Socrates' successors, Plato and Aristotle, inherited from him.

NOTES

1. Because the arguments were deemed so bad, Paul Friedlander, in his 1964 work, states that "without the explicit testimony of Aristotle, probably few critics would consider the *Hippias Minor* a genuine Platonic work." Plato. Translated from the German by Hans Meyerhoff. 2nd ed., with revisions. (Princeton, N. J.:Princeton University Press, 1973) Vol. II, 146. So also Jowett (my italics): "This dialogue can be ascribed to Plato *only* because it always has been, from Aristotle's day on" (1892, reprinted in Hamilton, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961, 200). More recent scholarship to identify fallacies in the dialogue includes J. J. Mulhern "Tropos and Polutropia in Plato's Hippias Minor" Phoenix 22: 283–288, 1968, Blundell "Character and Meaning in Plato's Hippias Minor," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary volume (1992) 131–172, and Beversluis, *Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

2. For example, Wilamowitz describes it as mere "child's play" ("kinderspiel" in *Platon* [Berlin: Weidmann, 1920] 135), and Stone concludes that Socrates "outdoes

the sophist in sophistry," I. F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates* (Boston: Anchor, 1989, 56–57). Guthrie is slightly more sympathetic, writing that "to read through this little dialogue without a growing sense of irritation at its manifest absurdities calls for a strong historical imagination" (W. C. K. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. iv (London: Cambridge, 1975, 195).

3. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Greek texts are my own.

4. Roslyn Weiss, in *The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Paul Carelli, "Power and Character in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," *Ancient Philosophy* 36 (2016): 65–79. Russel Jones and Ravi Sharma, "The Wandering Hero of the *Hippias Minor*: Socrates on Virtue and Craft," *Classical Philology* 112 (2017): 113–137. Jones and Sharma allow that Socrates does have positive beliefs about justice that inform his wavering, but not a complete enough view of justice to give him the confidence he needs to settle his wavering at this point.

5. Jones and Sharma, 133: "[W]e take Socrates' wandering to be rooted directly in his lack of knowledge. He is confident when considering the arguments at hand, so much so that he cannot offer viable alternatives. . . . So far, he has been unable to develop the results of his argument into one coherent and complete theory." I find their paper very compelling and it has helped me to think more carefully about my own interpretation of the dialogue, I agree that Socrates' wavering is due to ignorance, but I also think there is more positive evidence in the dialogue to cause his wavering than Jones and Sharma allow. I discuss this in detail in chapter 5.

6. I mean Socrates as he is depicted in Plato's early dialogues. I do not have a particular stake in the placement of *HiMi* in the chronology of Plato's dialogues. For one thing, I treat the dialogue as a self-contained entity, without relying on other dialogues for interpreting it. I do reference other dialogues, but only to mark a contrast with what Socrates is doing in *HiMi.* The grouping of Plato's dialogues is most solidly based upon studies of philosophical and dramatic themes, and *HiMi* bears many marks of the early or Socratic dialogues. Though stylometric studies also confirm it, no matter how sound an argument can be made for stylistic similarities and differences among the dialogues, that does not negate the possibility that Plato returned to an "early" style later in his career. See Charles Young, "Plato and Computer Dating," *OSAP* 12 (1994): 227–250.

7. Don Adams, in "Socrates Polutropos?" *Apeiron* 43 (2010): 33–62 argues that "Socrates is the one who turns out to be the straight talker. . . ." I agree, but this does not explain why he actively resists appearing that way.

8. A. E. Taylor in Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) 35.

9. See also *Lysis* 204e–205a and 210e, and *Symposium* 198d–e. Plato's criticism is not limited to sophistic *epideixis*, which adopts and sometimes distorts its more traditional uses by Pindar and others. Plato also criticizes non-sophistic *epideixeis* along similar lines, e.g., the *Laches* 182e–184c has the general, Laches, criticize the usefulness of a "display" of fighting in armor for real world applications. He relates a humorous story of someone who invented a new weapon and gave demonstrations of its effectiveness, only to have it get tangled up in a ship's rigging during a battle, drawing laughter from his own crew. The overall point, though, is similar to Plato's

critique of sophistic *epideixis*: the demonstration does not reveal whether the demonstrator knows what he is doing.

10. Sometimes these speeches are transparent in their aim, such as Gorgias' *Praise of Helen,* which he concludes by saying the whole speech is a "plaything," or Antiphon's *Tetralogies*, which are mock court speeches intended only as examples of Antiphon's skill. In other cases, such as Hippias' own *epideixis*, the speech is ostensibly given for educational or intellectual purposes and the contents is supposed to be taken seriously. But even in these cases, the speech may be tailored to the audience rather than a reflection of the speaker's own view. As I will show, Hippias' adherence to conventional wisdom in *HiMi* may reflect his desire to maintain his audience's sympathy, especially given his role as Ambassador of Elis, rather than an expression of what he really thinks.

11. The *Protagoras*, for example, involves some criticism of the sophist's use of epideictic speeches and whether they contain any actual wisdom, but the subject of the dialogue is the relationship among the virtues and whether they can be taught.

12. Debra Nails, in *The People of Plato* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), xxxi, maintains that "Plato did not invent Athenians with names, demes, and kin; he wrote about real people." Nevertheless, there seems to be little that distinguishes Eudicus as a character beyond his role as an enthusiastic supporter of intellectual activity. Blundell, in "Character and Meaning in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 141n45, even speculates that Eudicus is a counterpart to Neoptolemus just as Hippias and Socrates stand in for Achilles and Odysseus, respectively.

13. For Eudicus' irritation, see Ovink *Philosophische Erklärung Der Platonischen Dialoge Meno Und Hippias Minor*, (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1931), 136, who identifies the irritation in the opening words Σύ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς. He most likely picks this up in the particle δὴ which can convey an apprehensive or even contemptuous tone, particularly in conjunction with Σύ δὲ (Denniston, *Greek Particles,* Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1954, 207–8, 259). Eudicus' enthusiasm comes through in his subsequent remarks at 363c4–6: "Of course Hippias won't mind [answering Socrates' questions]!" Twice he repeats his confidence in Hippias: "If you ask him anything, he'll answer. Right, Hippias? If Socrates asks you something, you'll answer him, right?" The repeated need for confirmation ("right?") also reveals Eudicus' desperate desire for an intellectual exchange.

14. Blundell 135.

15. Fletcher in Chan, *Hippias Minor* (DESTE, 2015) 101.

16. Most notably in *Prot.* 329a–c, *Ion* 530d5, *Gorg.* 447b3, and *HiMa* 286c–d.

17. In the *Gorgias*, Callicles explicitly states that inviting others to ask questions and answering all of them is "in fact, one part of his display (ἐπιδείξεως)" (447c–d). See also Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

18. Hayden W. Ausland, "Forensic Characteristics of Socratic Arugmentation," in *Does Socrates Have a Method?*, edited by G. A. Scott (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2002), 38.

19. As recently as 2016, the scholar of ancient rhetoric, Laurent Pernot in *Epideictic Rhetoric* (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2016) viii, begins his work on

epideictic rhetoric by stating that "while epideictic is important, its role remains unclear. Unlike judicial and deliberative speeches, epideictic orations are not meant to elicit any vote or any decision on the part of the listener. From a functional point of view, one is right to wonder what use they were," and acknowledges that "epideictic was an exhibition with no practical finality . . . *epideixis* contrasted with true advocacy and with political deliberation" (ibid. 5). In distinguishing epideictic from judicial and deliberative speeches, Pernot invokes Aristotle's categorization of three types of rhetoric. Aristotle's codification of epideictic speech defines it exclusively as *encomium* or praise speech. Its actual usage in 4th and 5th century literature is much broader than just speeches of praise, but there is general agreement that Aristotle's categories reflect actual rhetorical practices, at least in broad strokes.

20. Perhaps recognizing the conflation of sophistry and philosophy, Plato's rival, Isocrates, is often at pains to distinguish the two. In his *Against the Sophists*, he states that sophists "pretend to truth, but deceive with lies (ψευδῆ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν)" and lack "devotion to serious intellectual pursuits (φιλοσοφίαν διατριβόντων)" (1.6), and in *Ad Demonicum* remarks that those who compose speeches are not "seriously devoted to intellectual pursuits" that would "win reputation as men of sound character" rather than "proficiency in speech" (4.1).

21. It is less transparent than, for example, Antisthenes' unusual interpretation and defense of Odysseus or Gorgias' playful *Defense of Helen*, not to mention Socrates' interpretation of Homer in *HiMi*.

22. Hippias uses the term δεινὸς throughout *HiMi* to describe the seemingly absurd conclusions Socrates draws (365c7 & 375d3), which further underscores his commitment to the status quo. Socrates says it is Hippias' own argument that is δεινὸς, for it leads to the absurdity (373b7) and he uses the term to describe Hippias' inability to keep them on the right course (376c5).

23. John Beversluis, *Cross Examining Socrates* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), 122.

24. Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995) and *Spectacles of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004).

25. E.g., Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Lampert, "Socrates' Defense of Polytropic Odysseus: Lying and Wrong-Doing in Plato's *Lesser Hippias*," *The Review of Politics* 64, 2 (2002), 231–244; and Blundell in "Character and Meaning in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992). One notable exception is Phillip Mitsis, in "Achilles Polytropos and Odysseus as Suitor: *Iliad* 9.307–429," *Allusion, Authority, Truth: Critical Perspectives on Gree Poetic and Rhetorical Praxis*, eds. P. Mitsis and Christos Stagalis, (Amsterdam: De Gruyter, 2010) 51–76. I discuss these further in chapter 2.

26. Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), 89–90.

Chapter One

Socrates on Homer, Part 1

364b3–365d5

After the opening pleasantries of the dialogue, Socrates has Hippias clarify whether and how he thinks Achilles is better than Odysseus, something Hippias apparently addressed in his *epideixis* (363c1–3). Socrates is puzzled by Hippias' initial answer. After Hippias quotes *Iliad* 9 as evidence of what he means, Socrates says "let us set aside Homer for now since we can't ask him what he was thinking when he wrote these verses" (365c8–d1). In this regard, *HiMi* appears to treat Homer in a similar manner as the *Protagoras* treats the poet Simonides. In that dialogue, Socrates offers the implausible interpretation that Simonides thinks no one does wrong voluntarily (339a–347b), only to abandon the effort: "We should put the poets aside and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and our own ideas" (348a). A. E. Taylor, among others, sees Socrates do the same in *HiMi*: the interpretation of Homer is "a mere peg on which to hang a discussion of the purely ethical problem in which Socrates is really interested."[1] Unlike the *Protagoras,* however, Hippias turns the discussion back to Homer at 369b8, and insists on basing his beliefs in Homer's text. He is, after all, "taking up [Homer's] cause," as Socrates says at the end of the initial discussion of Homer's text (365c8). Getting at the "purely ethical problem," therefore, is never entirely separated from Homeric exegesis, even when Socrates frames the argument in generic terms. It is all the more troubling, then, that Socrates in *HiMi* is accused of "giving a deliberately misleading account of Achilles' character," an "indefensible exegesis," and giving a "farcical treatment of Homer" in the course of generating paradoxical arguments.[2] If the move to "testing our own ideas" cannot be made at the expense of Homer, then misinterpreting Homer in order to get to those ideas makes the dialogue's overall argument a straw man. Furthermore, Socrates' misinterpretation will also be a basis for the myriad equivocations Socrates is accused of when he does argue on generic grounds. To counter

this, one overall argument I advance in this work is that Socrates does not misinterpret Homer, nor does he need to, for in Homer Socrates identifies the very concerns about motivation and action that he is most occupied with in *HiMi* and other early dialogues. This chapter examines the opening analysis of Homer to show how it lays the groundwork for the remainder of the dialogue. Socrates concludes this portion of dialogue by saying that he is somewhat clear on how Hippias characterizes the two heroes, but he does not say that this characterization makes it clear to him that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus. From the start it is an open question as to *how* one person is better than another. But that is not evident to Socrates, even with Hippias' quote of *Il.* 9 to explain his view. This suggests that Socrates sees Homer as offering a more complicated comparison of the heroes than is immediately obvious. If there are ambiguities in the terms Socrates deploys later, it is because he is exploring ambiguities he sees in Homer rather than exploiting them at the cost of misinterpreting Homer. Getting clear on this will be important to show how he avoids the fallacies typically associated with his later arguments.

The opening exchange over Hippias' view of Homer commits Hippias not only to interpreting Homer's words but also to endorsing them. In the process of puffing up Hippias, Socrates twice asks Hippias to say which of Homer's heroes, Achilles or Odysseus, Hippias thinks is better (363b6–7 & 364c1–2). Hippias, however, takes Socrates to ask him what Homer thinks: "I say Homer made (Ὅμερος . . . πεποιηκέναι) Achilles the best . . ." (364c4–5). Socrates initially accepts this shift, pressing Hippias to clarify what he (Hippias) means in saying that Homer "made" his heroes the way he did. The following discussion of Homer here and later (369b8–371e5) are always framed as a discussion of how Homer "made," composed, or depicted his heroes.

This first exchange reveals a distinction between what one can derive from Homer's texts and what the author himself thought. When Socrates suggests they leave Homer behind, he is abandoning the effort to understand what "Homer was thinking when he composed these lines" (365c8–d1), i.e., Homer's intent. But this is not to abandon any effort to see what can be drawn from the texts of the epics. This is evident in a clarification Socrates makes in this initial exchange. After Hippias quotes a passage from *Iliad* 9, Socrates acknowledges a potential distinction between what Hippias thinks and what he thinks Homer meant, asking Hippias if he, too, believes that Achilles is better than Odysseus in the way he attributes to Homer (365c6). Hippias replies that "It would certainly be strange (δεινὸν) if I didn't" (365c7). Socrates will then tell Hippias to speak on Homer's behalf, not his own (365d3–4).

Hippias' incredulousness over whether he would answer Socrates' questions makes sense for him, as is his willingness to carry the Homeric torch. As a foreign ambassador and for-hire sophist, Hippias must maintain his au-

dience's trust.[3] Aligning himself with the authority of Homer is an effective way to do so, especially by endorsing Homer's apparent belief that the honest person is better than the liar. Socrates' need to clarify whether Hippias is so aligned also makes sense, given that an epideictic speech does not necessarily reflect the speaker's own beliefs.

Since Hippias aligns himself with Homer, Socrates' evaluation of any "purely ethical problem" is going to be constrained by Homeric exegesis. In other words, any effort Socrates makes to clarify and examine Hippias' view is also an effort to clarify and understand Hippias' grasp of what Homer said. This elevates the seriousness of charges that Socrates distorts Homer. If he is distorting Homer in drawing his paradoxical conclusions, he is guilty of several straw men. But this assumes that there is a clear, unambiguous way of understanding Homer in the first place. That Plato is aware of the richness of Homer's text in *HiMi* is evident in the fact that the dialogue spends more time than any other quoting and interpreting passages from Homer's *Iliad.* By contrast, Plato's *Ion* only quotes Homer to show that if he knows what he is talking about, he must be an expert in a vast range of subjects, from generalship to fishing. *Republic* II and III have Socrates disagree with Homer's depiction of divine and human behavior, but there is no question about how to interpret those passages. In *HiMi*, a dispute about how to interpret Homer is raised at the start. So it is not only Hippias' understanding of Homer that forms the basis of the argument. By challenging it, Socrates shows that he is interested in deriving a substantive view from Homer's texts.[4]

The initial dispute is over Homer's use of epithets. To answer Socrates' question about which hero is better, Hippias says that Homer made Achilles the best (ἄριστον), Nestor the wisest (σοφώτατον), and Odysseus the "man of the most twists and turns" (πολυτροπώτατον) (364c4–7). In terms of how Homer assigns epithets to his heroes, this is a fairly straightforward, literal reading of the epics: Achilles, at least in the *Iliad*, is almost exclusively labeled ἄριστος, and the term πολύτροπος, used only in the *Odyssey,* is exclusive to Odysseus. Socrates' response raises a question about this literal reading (364d7–e6):

> [W]hen you said that Homer made Achilles the best and Nestor the wisest, I thought I understood what you meant, but when you said that the poet had made Odysseus the man "of the most twists and turns" (πολυτροπότατον)—well—as for this, to tell you the truth, I don't know at all what you mean. So tell me, that I might learn something more from you: didn't Homer make Achilles a man of many twists and turns?

Socrates is not only puzzled about the term πολύτροπος. If all Socrates wants is to clarify this term, he could have asked simply, "What is πολύτροπος?"

Or he could have asked what Hippias thinks it means to say Odysseus is πολύτροπος, thereby inviting him to cite passages from the *Odyssey*. By the same token, Socrates is not only interested in understanding how these epithets are mutually exclusive, such that simply pointing out their assigned epithets is enough to demonstrate that Achilles is better than Odysseus. When Socrates says he "thought he understood" what Hippias meant *until* he went on to characterize Odysseus as πολύτροπος, Socrates implies that doing so has also led him to doubt his original understanding of the epithets applied to Achilles and Nestor as well. This is puzzling if the epithets Homer uses are restricted to their explicit attributions and cannot be implicitly attributed to other characters. This is further evident in Socrates' odd follow-up question, "didn't Homer make Achilles a πολύτροπος man?" This is one of several claims for which Socrates is accused of "farcical" treatment of Homer.[5] It is only if Homer restricts his use of epithets to their explicit attributions, for Homer never describes Achilles using πολύτροπος. Socrates will reveal later (370a1–3) that he thinks Homer's *Iliad* implies that Achilles is in fact πολύτροπος, but at this point, his question provokes Hippias to provide textual evidence from the *Iliad* that he thinks shows that Achilles is not πολύτροπος. The quote Hippias provides does not use πολύτροπος, yet Hippias thinks it clarifies his use of the term. This indicates that Hippias himself is not committed to a literal reading of Homer, but allows that Homer leaves some things implicit. Whether or not this is the right way to read Homer, this move is important because now a nonliteral reading of Homer is fair game for Socrates, too. The discussion of how Homer "made" his heroes should now be based on a plausible interpretation of Homer's texts.

Why does Socrates think labeling Odysseus πολύτροπος casts doubt on Achilles' label, too? In Homer, ἄριστος, in the sense of "the best of the Achaeans," is typically restricted to skill in battle. For instance, Ajax is described as "best" of all "as long as Achilles was enraged," i.e., as long as he refused to fight (*Il.* 2.761). Achilles is the champion of the Greeks and is the one who should have faced Paris in *Il.* 3, where the best, i.e., the champions of each army, fight to settle the war (cf. *Il.* 3.42–44). I agree with Mulhern that Socrates wants to know what type of action is distinctive of πολύτροπος, since it does not admit as distinct a type of action as ἄριστος and σοφώτατος.[6] But πολύτροπος also casts doubt on what sorts of actions might be acceptable for someone who is ἄριστος. Mulhern takes Socrates to understand πολύτροπος as "resourceful." Understood this way, Socrates wonders why resourcefulness is not part of what makes someone best in battle or wisest in counsel. But if Socrates is adhering to Homer's text in raising his questions this will not explain his puzzlement, for Homer does not use πολύτροπος simply to mean "resourceful."

Unlike the other two epithets that are most frequently attributed to Odysseus, πολυμήχανη and πολύμετις, πολύτροπος is relatively rare in Homer. It is only used twice, both times of Odysseus (1.1 and 10.330), and only in the *Odyssey*.[7] So Socrates may also be puzzled about why Hippias uses this, of all terms, to describe Odysseus in comparison with Achilles.[8] The two more common epithets Homer uses for Odysseus, πολυμήχανη and πολύμετις, are always used in an active sense to describe Odysseus' cunning and wit. The contexts in which πολύτροπος is used, on the other hand, could be active or passive. The term can be understood actively, "turns in many ways" or "wily," and in this sense it is synonymous with the other epithets. But it can also be used passively, to denote what happens to or befalls someone, e.g., "is turned in many ways," and in this sense it is different from the other epithets.

Both active and passive senses of the term are appropriate to Odysseus, so understanding Socrates' question in this way should signal his adherence to Homeric exegesis, rather than a departure from it. Odysseus is wily, he assumes several disguises, he experiences a variety of misfortunes, and he has traveled to many places, some by chance or divine intervention, some by choice. Neither of the term's uses in Homer completely resolve this ambiguity. In the first instance, 1.1, the poet himself introduces the poem as a request for the story of Odysseus: "tell me, Muse, of the πολύτροπον man, who has been driven about so much after he had sacked the sacred citadel of Troy." In this case, the fact that he is "driven about" suggests that πολύτροπος is passive, e.g., "much-wandering," thus alluding to Odysseus' journey after the Trojan war, much of which was out of his control. Yet the reference to *his* sack of Troy suggests the active sense, for in book 8.488*ff* Odysseus asks the bard Demodokos to sing of Odysseus' "trick" (δόλον) of the hollow horse that brought down Troy.

The second instance of πολύτροπος appears to have both senses at once.[9] At *Od*. 10.330, Homer has Circe use it to identify Odysseus: "You are Odysseus, πολύτροπος . . ." Circe clearly uses the term in its active sense. She utters it at the moment she recognizes that Odysseus has not succumbed to the poison she gave him and surmises that "there is in you a mind that is immune to enchantment" (10.329). Circe thinks Odysseus's cleverness allow him to escape her poison. Yet, Odysseus has tricked Circe merely by doing what Hermes told him to do.[10] If Odysseus is only carrying out Hermes' plan to the letter, it is not his own intelligence at work and the line between acting and being acted upon is blurred. Circe may base her judgment on Odysseus' reputation, but it is far less obvious to the reader. When Socrates asks whether Achilles is πολύτροπος, he may wonder whether Achilles' actions are subject to the same ambiguity.

Hippias quotes *Iliad* 9.308–14 to further explain what distinguishes Achilles from Odysseus and, by implication, how Achilles is not πολύτροπος.[11] While this clarifies some things for Socrates, it leaves much unclear. This portion of *Il.* 9 is the start of the "Embassy" in which Achilles responds to Odysseus and other Greeks who are attempting to persuade Achilles to rejoin the fight. They are unsuccessful, as Achilles angrily confirms his refusal to rejoin the battle and rejects Agamemnon's offers of compensation. Hippias quotes Achilles saying (365a1–b2):

> Son of Laertes in the line of Zeus, resourceful Odysseus,
> I must state the matter bluntly,
> I will do exactly as I intend to do.[12]
> For as hateful to me as the gates of Hades
> Is he who hides one thing in his mind, but says another.
> But exactly as I say, so also will it be done.

Hippias says that these lines show each man's τρόπος or "way": He takes Achilles' claim to do and say what he intends to do as a mark of being ἀληθής, "true," and ἁπλῶς, "blunt," while Odysseus, being the sort of person that "hides one thing in his mind, but says another" is ψευδής and πολύτροπος.[13]

Socrates' response to Hippias' interpretation of *Il.* 9 appears to clarify Socrates' initial puzzlement over Hippias' use of πολύτροπος: "Now, Hippias, I think I understand what you're saying. By 'the man of many twists and turns' it looks as though you mean the false man" (365b7–8), and that "Homer thinks that the truthful man and the false man are different and not the same" (365c3–4). But Socrates again does not say it is clear to him that Achilles is better than Odysseus. While identifying differences between two people may be necessary for showing how one is better than the other, Socrates does not yet think Hippias' identification of Achilles as true and ἁπλῶς and Odysseus as false and πολύτροπος is sufficient. Why not? If Socrates is going by Hippias' quote of *Il.* 9, it seems clear enough that Achilles condemns lying in contrast to his own blunt honesty. To sharpen the question a bit, then, why does Socrates think is it not clear *in Homer* how one is better than the other in this regard? For instance, why does the quote from *Il.* 9 not at least resolve the ambiguity in πολύτροπος? Achilles refers to Odysseus as "πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ," and if it is Odysseus that he condemns for deception, Socrates could be led to think Hippias takes πολύτροπος in its active sense, synonymous with πολυμήχανη. I think ascribing only one or another sense of these terms to Socrates (or Hippias) is a false dilemma. If, for example, it was clear that Hippias is describing each hero's typical behavior, and behavior alone were sufficient to evaluate each character, then it would show that one is better than the other, which Socrates has yet to admit.

Since Socrates concludes this section of the discussion by saying they should set Homer aside (365c8–d4), it is tempting to think that Socrates would rather explore what it is to be true and false independently of what Homer thinks. He does go on to examine the true and false person without mentioning Homer's heroes, but he concludes that section by stating that it shows Achilles is not better than Odysseus (369b3–7). If Socrates characterizes the true and false persons in terms that do not fit Homer's characterization of them, then he would be guilty of a straw man argument.[14] It is preferable, then, to attribute Socrates' lack of clarity and his subsequent argument to a problem he sees in Homer or in Hippias' interpretation of Homer. A closer look at the context of *Il.* 9 and Hippias' interpretation of it in the first discussion of Homer will reveal the contours of the problem.

One lingering problem is that Hippias' characterization of Achilles and Odysseus as true and false, respectively, does little to resolve the ambiguity of πολύτροπος, despite Achilles' reference to Odysseus as "πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ." If all Socrates is after is to clarify how Achilles is not also "resourceful" in battle, then it is hard to see how Hippias' quote and the implicit identification of πολύτροπος with "false" and ἄριστος with "blunt" and "true" offers the clarity Socrates says it does.[15] If anything, Hippias thinks the quote shows Achilles is not only best in battle. More generally, he is better than Odysseus because he is direct and transparent in his words and actions. By citing *Il.* 9, Hippias at least reveals that he is not thinking of Achilles in terms of his battle skill, but his manner of speaking.

Achilles' speech, from which Hippias quotes, is also an exemplar for Socrates' larger concern over whether Hippias himself says what me means. Understood in the context of Homeric society, Achilles' words reveal a manner of speech that reflects the skill in battle that earns him the moniker "best," for blunt speech is a form of courage. The key to this is in the term ἀπηλεγέως ("bluntly"), for it not only describes straightforward speech, but also an utterance spoken without regard for consequences. *Il.* 9 has Odysseus and other Greeks attempt to persuade Achilles to rejoin the fight, and the portion that Hippias quotes is the start of Achilles' response in which he declines to rejoin the battle, and rejects Agamemnon's offer to compensate Achilles.[16] Achilles' words suggest an awareness that what he is about to say will further alienate him from his comrades, but that such a consequence will not hinder him from saying what is on his mind. In this regard, speaking bluntly denotes the same sort of directness and fearlessness that Achilles displays in battle. For example, in the *Iliad* (9.346) Achilles tells Agamemnon that the Greeks—he names Odysseus in particular—that all their planning (φραζέσθω "to contrive") will not stand up to Hector's strength in battle without Achilles' own strength to keep Hector at bay. Achilles' superior fighting ability, then,

makes it possible for him to accomplish in a direct and transparent way what less (physically) superior persons can only accomplish in a more "deceptive" manner by resorting to trickery. Achilles does not need to resort to tricking his opponent because his physical strength and skill in fighting are sufficient to achieve results desired in wartime. Generally construed, then, directness in battle is a kind of straightforwardness and boldness in presentation. In certain circumstances, such as the embassy in *Il.* 9, this directness in battle becomes directness in speech. Achilles does not need to lie or resort to verbal trickery out of a concern for tact or a fear of consequences.[17] By contrast, then, lying and deception are kinds of cowardice.[18] Furthermore, these passages suggest that the *Iliad* prizes physical superiority in battle and its attendant "bluntness" over the sort of wisdom associated with Nestor, namely sound advice. No amount of advice will be effective if it cannot be accomplished through action on (or off) the battlefield. Achilles, by stating that he will speak bluntly, asserts his status as an equal, if not superior, of both those in his company and Agamemnon. He also asserts the superiority of fearless, blunt speech over Nestor's wisdom and Odysseus' deceptive speech. Understood this way, Achilles' speech itself is an example of the very sort of action that Achilles endorses in it and other Greeks admire most. So why should this not suffice to show that Homer thinks Achilles is better than Odysseus?

The immediate context provides some clues that Socrates may think it is not so straightforward even in Homer. While Achilles' bluntness is generally admirable, his fellow Greeks meet Achilles' speech in *Il.* 9 with consternation and anger rather than admiration. The question for them is not so much over what Achilles has a mind to do, but *why* he is speaking so bluntly in the first place. Modern scholars remark that Achilles' speech is a rhetorical tour de force. It is the longest speech yet in the epic, and though it uses many standard rhetorical techniques, it is a raw expression of Achilles' rage: "Achilles' speech comes through with blunt, obsessive power. He leaves each topic only to return to it, as though is mind were prowling within the closed circle of his rage."[19] Achilles' rage in this portion of the *Iliad* and his dismissal of the embassy prompts his own comrades to remark that he is more of a beast than a man (and Apollo, too, at *Il.* 24.39–54). Two members of the embassy remark that Achilles allows his rage to cloud his judgment. Even Ajax, the closest to Achilles, says Achilles "has made his great heart savage (μεγαλήτορα θυμόν σχέτλιος) . . . and has no regard (οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται) for the love his friends have honored him with."[20] Ajax' use of μετατρέπεται is striking. Just as πολύτροπος can describe a literal or figurative turn, μετατρέπομαι also describes either spatial orientation or attention, i.e., to show regard for a person. When Ajax uses it, he is telling Achilles that he is turning his backs on the

Greeks, both literally and figuratively. By all his comrades' account, Achilles is behaving irrationally in contravening standard social expectations.

The situation is no better if we pan out to the reader's view, for here too there is disagreement among scholars, some of whom take Achilles' bold words and the actions that follow to show he is transcending social norms to achieve a kind of self-awareness.[21] In either case, the question is not whether he acts intentionally, but what moves him to do so. Whatever view we take it is unclear what those motives are and therefore, what acting intentionally amounts to. When Socrates later gets Hippias to explain what motives he thinks are behind Achilles' falsehoods, Socrates infers that Achilles acts unintentionally. This suggests that even if a person acts out of certain motives and is aware that he is doing so, he still acts unintentionally. Here is Achilles' τρόπος: through his words he has literally and figuratively turned his back on the Greeks. If Achilles is πολύτροπος, it is not simply because he says something false, it is because he does so without full control over his actions. Achilles' reasons for speaking falsely leave his "turn" just as ambiguous as Odysseus' πολύτροπος. Distinguishing Achilles' τρόπος from that of Odysseus in terms of their way of speaking suggests Socrates is more puzzled about an ambiguity in the term πολύτροπος than identifying its characteristic action. Since Achilles, too, is subject to forces beyond his control, he too could be πολύτροπος in this passive sense.

This context reveals why Socrates does not find clarity in Hippias' own gloss on *Il.* 9, namely that the passage reveals each hero's τρόπος, Achilles being ἁπλῶς and odysseus πολύτροπος (365b3–5). Hippias' choice of ἁπλῶς, for starters, is unfortunate given its ambiguity. The term never appears in Homer, but it can be a synonym for ἀπηλεγέως. Just as ἀπηλεγέως can describe bluntness or a lack of regard or care, so too does ἁπλῶς describe straightforwardness or foolishness. It is the latter sense that fits Ajax' description of Achilles as μετατρέπεται, i.e., lacking regard for his fellow Greeks. In this regard, Hippias' characterization of Achilles as ἁπλῶς is ambiguous in just the same way that πολύτροπος is.

The term τρόπος fares no better, and the doubts about Achilles' behavior show why scholarly assessments of the term generate a false dilemma. Some scholars think Hippias uses τρόπος to denote each hero's character, where this is understood as typical behavior, while Socrates thinks it denotes ability, i.e., what the person can do.[22] Others claim that Hippias and Socrates both have ability in mind from the start.[23] All of these scholars are looking ahead to trace (or resolve) an equivocation Socrates is accused of later in the dialogue. There, so the objection goes, Socrates will focus on the abilities of the false person at the neglect of their behavior in order to derive the absurd conclusion that the true and false person are the same because they have the

same ability. Either way, there is unanimous consensus that it should mean one or the other.

If Socrates and Hippias are adhering to Homer's text, they should not be committed to one sense of the term exclusive of the other. When it comes to evaluating a person, in Homer action is primary. Adkins, for instance, in his analysis of responsibility in Greek thought says of Homeric society that "success is so imperative that only results have any value: intentions and are unimportant." But this does not mean that in Homer intention and other mental states of the agent never factor in determining responsibility. In *Il.* 23, for example, after the young Antilochus cuts of Menelaus during a chariot race, Menelaus reproaches him for "shaming my excellence (ἀρετήν), and demands he swear "you did not intentionally (ἑκών) hinder my chariot" (23.585). Antilochus capitulates by blaming his actions on the "impulsive mind and weak sensibility" of youth (23.590). This strongly suggests there is some interest in identifying the source of behavior in order to explain that behavior, which is precisely at issue in *Il.* 9. By identifying Odysseus and Achilles in terms of their respective τρόποι, then, neither Hippias nor Socrates should be focused exclusively on action or ability, but rather how the latter relates to the former.

The context of *Il.* 9 reveals a deeper concern over whether and how Achilles' words reveal his inner states. Without clarifying this, it is also unclear how he could be better than Odysseus. The discussion of Homer's heroes thus far also reveals what is meant by the comparative ἀμείνων or "better" in the first place. The general scholarly assessment of value in Homer is that the comparative describes types of action. In Homer, all "better" is "better at." Achilles fighting skill, for example, is what makes him superior, and if his bluntness is an extension of this, then being better at bluntness will also make him superior.[24] Whether it be fighting or speaking, a person is praised or blamed for what they do. Already, then, we can head off another charge of equivocation, namely that Socrates shifts between "better at" and "better" in some moral sense.[25] To suggest that all Homer or Hippias mean by the term is "better at" some skill wrongly assumes that this excludes any moral evaluation. Socrates is not yet clear on which hero is better, not because he is unsure which action is better, bluntness or deception, but because Homer's text intimates that Achilles' actions (and words) alone do not reflect his mental states.

As a justification for his characterization of Achilles, Hippias could do better than quoting Achilles' self-assessment.[26] But this is precisely the point Plato is making in having Hippias cite this passage. Starting at 370a1–3, Socrates will reveal that he thinks Hippias misunderstands the passage from *Il.* 9: what Achilles says about himself is not a reliable guide to understanding him and this makes Achilles, too, just the sort of person he says he "hates like the gates of hell." This concern is already implicit at this early stage of the

dialogue if we understand the subject matter under discussion as a reflection of the wider context, namely concern over transparency in epideictic speech and Hippias' specific need to appear trustworthy both in using the genre and in appealing to Homer for authority. Socrates' commitment to Homeric exegesis is not precluded by saying we should leave Homer behind. Homer cannot tell us what he meant, but we can extrapolate from his text, i.e., how he "made" his characters. Socrates and Hippias will return to Homeric exegesis after what appears as a shift to general philosophical discussion but this does not mean Socrates is not still adhering to a plausible interpretation of Homer's text, or so I will argue in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Taylor, 35. See also, T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, II* (New York: New York, 1905) 292. Using Homer as "a mere peg" was common practice among Plato's contemporaries (e.g., Antisthenes), and Homeric exegesis often featured in epideictic speeches of the time (Nightingale: 1995, 14–15). Hunter in *Plato and the Traditions of Ancient Literature: The Silent Stream* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 237 and 242, says that "recourse to the Homeric text and/or ideas about Homer has [by the classical period] become a way of constructing and seeking to understand the present" and that "later literature appropriates and subsumes the past, so that the past is made in the image of the present."

2. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 124; "Socrates' Defense of Polytropic Odysseus: Lying and Wrong-Doing in Plato's Lesser Hippias," *The Review of Politics* 64, 2 (2002), 245; and Blundell 155, respectively. Blundell disagrees with Taylor's assessment, arguing instead that Homeric interpretation is integral to the argument of the dialogue. But she does not think the dialogue's primary function is to advance any significant philosophical claim. Rather, the analysis of Homer aims to show Hippias that he himself is just the sort of person he condemns Odysseus for being. The dialogue shows Hippias that his reliance on Homer does not give him the wisdom he claims to have. It is, in effect, an ad hominem argument.

3. Socrates acknowledges Hippias' need to keep his audience when he frames his question to Hippias in terms of what Eudicus' father, Apemantus, thought about the same question (363b1–5): "As it happens, I often heard your father, Apemantus, say that Homer's *Iliad* is a better poem than the *Odyssey*, better precisely to the extent that Achilles is better than Odysseus, Odysseus being the subject of the one poem and Achilles the subject of the other." It may be that having an opinion about which hero is better was a popular subject of discussion at the time. This is supported by, for example, Antisthenes' surviving work on Homer, which I discuss in chapter 4. Like Eudicus, nothing is known of Apemantus outside of *HiMi*, and Socrates may mention him merely to let Hippias know that he is engaging a popular topic of discussion. Apemantus' reasoning on Homer is curious from a modern standpoint, on par with

saying that Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is better than *Macbeth* just insofar as Hamlet is better than Macbeth. But Socrates' point here is also illuminating, for it suggests that Apemantus' understanding Homer's heroes depends on a comparison between the epics. It also suggests that the characterization of each hero depends on their depiction in each epic as a whole, rather than on their behavior in one instance or another.

4. The Homeric constraint also reveals what is and what is not an acceptable challenge to Hippias' understanding of Homer. One might object that it is not Homer, but Hippias' understanding of Homer that Socrates distorts. Blondell, in *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 154, for instance, observes that Hippias' interpretations of Homer (as opposed to Socrates') are "plausible" even if they are "banal," "traditional," or "unthinking." That Hippias' reading of Homer is both plausible and unreflective suggests that the source of the problem is in Homer. But we certainly need not think that Homer is simply as banal as Hippias makes him out to be, much less that Socrates has to diverge from Homer's thought in order to provoke Hippias to reconsider his thinking. Hippias is also subject to the Homeric constraint, and that constraint does not require that Socrates agree with Hippias' own interpretation of Homer. It only requires that the alternative Socrates proposes ought to be equally plausible.

5. Blundell, 155.

6. Mulhern, 283.

7. Πολθμήχανη: *Iliad*: 7 instances; *Od*.: 15. Πολύμετις: *Iliad*: 18 instances; *Od*.: 68.

8. Adams in "Socrates Polutropos?" *Apeiron* 43 (2010), points this out, though he does not think the problem is in the term's ambiguity.

9. Pucci in *Odysseus Polutropos: Intertextual Readings in the Iliad and the Odyssey*, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 24–25.

10. In the Homeric hymn to Hermes, πολύτροπος is used twice in the active sense to describe Hermes' skill at theft and evasion (*h. Merc.* 13 and 439). But Odysseus is being "turned" by Hermes and so is actively πολύτροπος only by proxy. Odysseus is not one to blindly accept the advice of a divinity (cf. his skepticism of Ino, a sea-nymph, at 5.358–60), and he seems to have a choice in taking, rejecting, or altering advice as he sees fit. This is evident in his alteration of the reconciliation speech Agamemnon asked Odysseus to repeat to Achilles in *Il.* 9.

11. *HiMi*'s text of the *Iliad* is different from the vulgate in three ways, though none of these discrepancies has an impact on the argument of *HiMi*. Scholars agree that these are not misquotes, but are due to a discrepancy between the vulgate and the text available to Plato, on the grounds that no MSS of *HiMi* carries the vulgate reading (see, e.g., Waterfield in *Early Socratic Dialogues*, edited with a general introduction by Trevor J. Saunders [New York: Penguin Books, 1987] 285).

12. The Greek in Plato's text reads ὥσπερ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀίω. The verb ὀίω with a future infinitive τελέεσθαι normally conveys intent or "what I have a mind to do" (LSJ; cf. *Il.* 1.170). I use "intent" only to denote what one plans or has in mind. I discuss these lines in greater detail in chapter 4.

13. Hippias says that Achilles says this αὐτῷ "to him." It is clear that Hippias thinks Achilles is not just addressing Odysseus, but is talking about him when he

says he hates those who hide one thing but say another. The dative does not require it, though. There is some debate over whom Achilles refers to when he says that he hates the one who hides one thing but says another. Odysseus has just repeated Agamemnon's offer, but he omits the last four lines of Agamemnon's speech, most notably the part where Agamemnon says Achilles must still submit to his authority. Others think Achilles has Agamemnon in mind too. Hainsworth in *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 102, for example, says that "it would be pointless to make Odysseus, the obvious candidate for a charge of duplicity, the sole target of Akhilleus' remarks: rather it is Agamemnon." In other words, while the phrase describes something that Odysseus often does, it refers to Agamemnon, whom Achilles accuses of deception a few lines later (343 and 372).

14. To be fair, so would Hippias. Socrates tells him to answer on behalf of Homer, so his agreement with the subsequent premises Socrates introduces is, in effect, to say Homer endorses them too. Nevertheless, Socrates is leading the charge and so bears most of the responsibility.

15. Weiss, on the other hand, thinks that Odysseus is described as πολύτροπος by Homer because (in Socrates' mind) he is "careful and calculating" and suggests that Achilles thinks this way about Odysseus too (Weiss, 2006, 126n10, following Zembaty in "*Socrates' Perplexity in Plato's Hippias Minor*," *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. John P. Anton, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 154. But this would have Socrates misread Achilles, for Weiss does not make it clear why Achilles would "hate like the gates of Hades" someone careful and calculating, much less why he would hate a neutral attribute.

16. A nearly identical phrase occurs at *Od*. 1.373, where Telemachus tells the suitors to enjoy Odysseus's palace now, for the next day they will all appear before the assembly so that Telemachus may "declare the matter to you bluntly (ἀπηλεγέως)," i.e., tell the suitors to leave despite the likelihood that the suitors will revolt against him.

17. This "boldness" is also a mark of higher social status. When Thersites, a lower-ranking Greek, reproaches Agamemnon with the same harsh words that Achilles just used, but is beaten by Odysseus to remind him of his place (*Il.* 2.246*ff*). Thersites ought not to have spoken without fear of reproach because his position in society dictates that he is not entitled to speak that way to his superiors. He ought to speak with greater tact and deference, or not at all.

18. Twice in the *Iliad* Achilles' mother, Thetis, urges him to speak and not hide what is on his mind, implying that his silence is either fear or an inability to reveal what concerns him.

19. James Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) 7. Redfield observes that modern scholarship is also divided over how to interpret Achilles' speech: either it is a moral failure or a heroic transcendence of social convention (ibid. 7–11).

20. *Il.* 9.648–50, translated by Lombardo.

21. Pucci, 187. See also Mitsis, 63–64.

22. Mulhern, 283 and Zembaty, 54.

23. Weiss, 122.

24. In Homer, the term almost exclusively describes physical actions, such as superiority in battle (*Il*. 7.111, 11.787 and *Od*. 18.334), running and other skills (*Il*. 15.641 and *Od*. 22.156, 2.180.), strategic advantage (*Il*. 3.11: "better than night for a thief" and *Od*. 5.364, 22.104), not to mention superiority in speaking (*Il.* 4.400, 7.358, 12.232, and *Od.* 14.466).

25. Hoerber, in "Plato's *Lesser Hippias*," Phronesis 7 (1962), 127; Sprague, in *Plato's Use of Fallacy: A Study of the Euthyphro and Other Dialogues* (London: Routledge, 1964) 72; Mulhern, Guthrie, in *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 72, and Beversluis in *Cross-Examining Socrates* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 108.

26. Carelli, 68.

Chapter Two

Δύναμις **in Action**

365d6–366c4

After establishing that Achilles is better than Odysseus because the former is "true" and the latter, being πολύτροπος, is "false," Socrates proceeds to clarify what is meant by the false person. But he does so in a puzzling way. He begins by asking whether the false person is ἀδύνατος, i.e., "unable" or able to act (365d6–7) and proceeds to secure Hippias' agreement about a number of points regarding the false person's ability. Socrates' introduction of δύναμις seems to come out of nowhere. Unlike many other dialogues in which δύναμις features in a discussion of virtue, the term does not appear as part of the preamble of *Hippias Minor* (*HiMi*).[1] Hippias has not used it in his characterization of Achilles or Odysseus nor does Homer use it to characterize the two. In this regard, especially, the characterization of the false person in terms of his δύναμις appears to violate the constraint on Homeric exegesis stated at 365d and outlined in the previous chapter. To make matters worse, construing the true and false persons in terms of their ability sets up the alleged equivocation many scholars detect in the subsequent argument. So if the equivocation is a result of misinterpreting Homer, Socrates is also guilty of a straw man argument. Yet Hippias is initially unfazed by the sudden turn Socrates takes the argument. Either Hippias does not see the immediate relevance of this new turn of argument or he thinks it is somehow implicit in what he has said.

I will argue that it is implicit. In the previous section, Socrates does not yet see that Achilles is better than Odysseus simply by the manner Hippias' describes them. The quote of *Il.* 9 that Hippias relies upon to make his case does suggest that one who speaks truthfully or bluntly does so because they do not need to hide anything for fear of consequences. But this does not reveal the motives behind speaking truthfully or falsely. The analysis of δύναμις receives extensive treatment here in an effort to solve this lingering

problem. It draws on what Socrates sees as implicit in Homer in an effort to specify the relationship between agent and the action. More specifically, Socrates will focus on the sort of knowledge at work in the exercise of the false person's δύναμις, revealing the need for an important qualification: does the false person simply know that what he says is false, or does he also know that he is behaving badly?

Scholarship is divided on the motivation for Socrates' introduction of δύναμις in this section of the dialogue. Some take it to depart from Hippias' act-based characterization of Odysseus and the false person generally, which sets up the equivocation he will use in the subsequent argument at 366c5–369b7. There he draws the conclusion that the true and false persons are identical because they have the same ability or potential when he should argue in terms of a person's τρόπος.[2] Zembaty, for instance, states that Socrates' characterization of the false person in terms of their δύναμις "is a brazen departure from common usage" of ψεύδης, which she takes to describe typical behavior.[3] Others think that there is no distinction between Socrates' and Hippias' view, since both implicitly understand πολύτροπος and ψεύδης to denote ability or δύναμις.[4] On the former view, Socrates appears to break the Homeric constraint unless both Socrates' and Hippas' understanding of the Homeric heroes derive from a plausible reading of Homer's text. As I argue in the previous chapter, this is a false dilemma.[5] It is not at all obvious that Hippias or Homer should think of these characterizations solely in terms of action or ability alone. Socrates, too, thinks Hippias' characterization of Achilles and Odysseus is ambiguous enough to leave Homer's account of the heroes open to question. The latter view also breaks the Homeric constraint unless it can be shown that both use δύναμις consistently with Homer's own use of the term. None consider the Homeric antecedents of these terms.

One recent work does trace Socrates' introduction of δύναμις to the text of *Il.* 9 quoted by Hippias. Like the scholars mentioned above, Carelli argues that Hippias, from the start, understands ability to be part of his characterization of Odysseus and the false person generally.[6] But unlike his predecessors, Carelli thinks δύναμις is implicit in Achilles' words in *Il.* 9, quoted by Hippias, that "I will do exactly as I intend to do" and "But exactly as I say, so also will it be done." Carelli takes Achilles to claim (and Hippias to believe) he has "power in the form of knowing what is going to happen."[7] One problem with this interpretation is that it is now difficult to see how Achilles' claim to know the future is contrasted with hiding one thing while saying another. Carelli takes Hippias to admit inadvertently that there is in fact no contrast here, for if one hides what he intends, he, too, must know what is going to happen.[8] This makes the contrast Achilles makes between transparent and hidden intent superfluous, and so could explain why Socrates specifically asks whether

Hippias thinks the two are not the same at the end of the previous section of the dialogue. But there is still a distinction, even in Hippias' mind, if his (and Homer's) understanding of ability in *Il.* 9 is not predictive power.

I agree with Carelli that Socrates' introduction of δύναμις has its origin in Achilles' words, though I do not think it is in the form of predictive power. The ability to make accurate predictions is not the same as intending to bring about some future state of affairs.[9] If we preserve the latter meaning of Achilles' phrase, as saying what you will do and doing what you intend, the power at work here is the ability to accomplish something despite potential obstacles. This may require knowledge, but it is knowledge about how to accomplish something, not that it will happen. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, Achilles contrasts hiding one thing but saying another with his own bluntness or ἀπηλεγέως, which not only identifies his manner of speech but also his fearlessness. Achilles is therefore contrasting his own bluntness and fearlessness with deception and cowardice. This also means that Achilles thinks that those who deceive do so because they lack power![10] Achilles can afford to be blunt and make assertions about what he will do because he is confident in his ability to make it happen. The Greeks will not be able to stop him from leaving Troy either by force or persuasion. This way of thinking about ability will make better sense of the details of Socrates' subsequent analysis of δύναμις, for he will focus on the ability that is supposed to manifest itself in the act of speaking falsely in an effort to understand how the true and false persons are distinct.[11]

The term δύναμις and its cognates appear regularly in Homer, but almost exclusively to denote physical ability whose exercise depends on external, physical conditions or states of affairs. The most frequent use of the term describes a person's inability to see something due to it not being within one's line of sight[12] or to describe a person's physical strength[13]. In some cases, acting is contingent upon ability, with the suggestion that if one does not act in the manner expected of them it is not due to a lack of desire, but a lack of ability, e.g., physical strength.[14] If Socrates' analysis of δύναμις adheres to Homer's general usage, then he should treat it as an ability to act or do something provided one is not hindered by external factors. He does at first, as we will see, but he will also emphasize the internal (cognitive and affective) conditions.

If Socrates' introduction of δύναμις originates from *Il.* 9, it should be because the passage suggests the false person lacks power and Socrates wants to explore why and to what extent. This is why Socrates' next question is whether the false person is ἀδυνάτους rather than assuming he is able from the outset: "Do you mean that the false are unable to do something, like sick persons, or are they able to do something?" (365d6–7). The example of the

sick person suggests an external, physical constraint on ability. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the ambiguity between passive and active senses of Odysseus' defining characteristic, πολύτροπος, raises questions about his agency and whether this also applies to Achilles. Now Socrates' first question about ability focuses his inquiry on just that, the way external constraints or influences on one's behavior affect a person's power or ability. The role of external constraints in determining ability dominates Homer's own uses of δύναμις, for whom ability and action are closely associated, such that if one fails to act due to some external hindrance, he lacks the ability.[15] In this regard, Achilles may think Odysseus is inferior to him because his lack of physical prowess forces him to resort to deception. Odysseus is πολύτροπος in the passive sense. But Odysseus is also πολύτροπος in the active sense when he lies. Given that Achilles and Odysseus are compared in terms of their manner of speech, Socrates may also want to know what sort of ability is at work here.

There is a basic sense in which Odysseus and the false person are "able" and a sense in which they are not. The power that Odysseus lacks, by Achilles estimation, is an ability of a higher order, either brute physical strength or some other property that prevents him from being blunt and contravening social expectations without consequence. Odysseus is not the "best" in the manner Achilles is, for he has to resort to subterfuge to get what he wants. Yet despite not having the power to act in the same manner that Achilles does, Odysseus is still able to say one thing but hide another. In other words, nothing hinders him from speaking in the manner he does and he's clever enough to get around obstacles by lying in ways that others are not. As we saw, there is also evidence in Homer's text to suggest that the agency behind Achilles' bluntness is also questionable, and this would extend to his ability too. Recall that Achilles' comrades' remark that he is acting out of recklessness while Achilles seems to think he is acting boldly and bravely. While Achilles may have the physical ability to do what he intends and, therefore, is not subject to any external constraints, he may be unable to manage the impulses—the internal constraints—that direct him in the first place. If Achilles, too, is hiding something, there is a need to sort out the differences between them. But even on Hippias' reading it is difficult to see what is meant by ability, if the two are distinguished in terms of having or lacking an ability to be "true" or blunt. If Socrates' introduction of δύναμις is motivated by this difficulty, the difficulty is already evident in Homer's own use of the term and his portrayal of the heroes. The use of πολύτροπος both complicates the issue, given that it is ambiguous between passive and active senses, but also illuminates the question about agency that Socrates attempts to sort out in the next section: in what sense is the false person able to act under constraint?[16]

SOCRATES′ ANALYSIS OF ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ

Δύναμις or "ability" is first introduced as one of several characteristics of the false person. From 365d6 to 365e10, Socrates gets Hippias to agree to the following:

1. False persons are able to do something (δυνατούς τι ποιεῖν), unlike the sick, who are unable (365d6–7).
2. Hippias: They are very much able, especially to deceive (ἐξαπατᾶν) people (365d7–8).
3. According to Hippias' account, false persons are able (δύνατοι) and πολύτροποι (365e1–2).
4. Hippias: The πολύτροποι deceive most of all by unscrupulousness (πανουργίας), a sort of prudence (φρονήσεως), not by foolishness (ἠλιθιότητος) and folly (ἀφροσύνης) (365e4–5).[17]
5. So (ἄρα) false persons are prudent (365e5–6).
6. Because false persons are prudent, they know what they're doing (ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν) when they behave badly (365e6–7).
7. Because false persons know [what they're doing], they are wise (σοφοί) in deception (365e9–10).

Socrates' sums up this characterization of the false person as follows:

8. False persons are able, prudent, know what they're doing,[18] and are wise in the things about which they are false (366a3–4).
9. According to your [Hippias'] account, false persons are among the able and wise, and by "able and wise" Hippias means that the false persons are able to speak falsely if they want to (366a6–b3).
10. In sum, false persons are wise and able to be false (366b4–5).
11. Each person is able who does what he wants when he wants (βούληται), I [Socrates] mean someone who is not hindered by sickness or anything like that. Rather, I mean each is able just as you are able to write my name whenever you want (366b7–c4).

The characterization of ability in 1–3 is consistent with its use in Homer, but there is a shift in focus between 1 and 11 from external to internal factors that identify ability. This is evident in the sickness analogies that bookend the discussion (1 and 11). The first analogy makes it clear that the exercise of an ability depends on the presence or absence of some physical or external constraint. In this regard, Socrates' introduction of δύναμις conforms to Homer's use of the term.[19] But the final illness analogy, 11, is less clear; 11 is intended to clarify what is meant by saying that the able person does what he wants when he wants. The Greek for that clarifying clause reads as follows:

> Οὐχ ὑπὸ νόσου λέγω ἐξειργόμενον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ σὺ δυνατὸς εἶ γράψαι τοὐμὸν ὄνομα ὅταν βούλῃ, οὕτω λέγω.

Nearly all translators take the negative particle, οὐχ, at 366c1 to modify λέγω to read:[20]

> I don't mean someone who is hindered by sickness or anything like that . . .

The ἀλλὰ ("but") at c2 and οὕτω λέγω at c3 show Socrates is making a contrast between the clauses before and after ἀλλὰ, prompting translators to understand the contrast as "I don't mean X, I mean Y." Reading it this way, Socrates appears to repeat the point he made in 1. But it makes little sense to think that Socrates believes a person who "does what he wants when he wants" would be construed as someone who is hindered by sickness in the first place, such that he would need to make it clear that that is not what he means. Furthermore, between 1 and 11 ability has been identified in terms of its cognitive and affective states (i.e., the able person knows and does what he wants, etc.). Why should the exercise of this kind of ability depend on physical health? Socrates could have in mind a person who has a fever and is unable to think clearly or has laryngitis and is unable to express his thoughts. But this ignores Socrates' point in (4) that the false person's δύναμις is knowledge and wisdom, not ignorance or foolishness. In other words, Socrates is interested in clarifying the cognitive and affective conditions of the false person. A better way to read 366c1, then, is with the negative particle modifying ἐξειργόμενον ("prevented") rather than λέγω:

> I mean one who's not prevented by sickness or anything like that.

Read this way, it is clear that Socrates is not contrasting ability with physical sickness. Rather, he is setting aside physical hindrance to isolate intellectual or other nonphysical factors in ability and to emphasize that the sort of ability he is talking about does not have these sorts of hindrances. Based on 1, Socrates is making the point that the physically disabled or otherwise externally constrained person lacks ability, in keeping with Achilles' implicit assessment of the cowardly deceiver and Homer's general use of δύναμις. But physical or external constraint alone fails to distinguish the person with knowledge from the person who lacks it. Hence, in 11 once the threat of physical disability is set aside, the inner conditions for ability, i.e., the distinction between the possession of wisdom and the lack of it can be made apparent. This is confirmed in the writing example that follows (366c4). The person who is able to write can exercise this ability at will not because of a presence

or lack of physical hindrance (e.g., broken hand), but because he possesses the knowledge of how to do so.

Homer's use of δύναμις never construes it as an intellectual ability. If Socrates' use of δύναμις to describe the false person generally is also meant to apply to Odysseus, he is characterizing Odysseus in terms unfamiliar to Homer and, therefore, potentially violates the Homeric constraint. But this shift from external to internal conditions for ability only makes sense as an effort to address the problems Socrates already sees in Hippias' characterization of Achilles and Odysseus. Socrates' question of whether Homer also made Achilles πολύτροπος (364e5–6) points to a question about agency in Homer that Hippias appears to miss. Achilles' companions wonder at his rationality when he rejects Agamemnon's gifts, and blame his behavior on unchecked rage. In this regard, it is an open question as to whether Achilles is able in the sense just outlined. By the same token, characterizing Odysseus as πολύτροπος does not obviously mark his agency, and yet if Hippias thinks that *Il.* 9 implies that Odysseus lacks power, it is difficult to reconcile with the cognitive skill, his "μήτις," attributed to him in his usual epithet, πολύμητις. Though δύναμις is not used in this way, Homer often depicts actions as having their source in knowledge or being in one's right mind, and this could serve as a basis for Socrates' move.[21]

Socrates identifies the πολύτροπος person as wise, starting in 7 above. But wisdom is not the only characteristic Socrates discerns for the πολύτροπος person. Thus far, wisdom has been attributed to Hippias, specifically in giving epideictic speeches and answering questions, and Nestor, whose wisdom is in giving advice. But given the ambiguities underlying Odysseus' and Achilles' actions, it is less clear what wisdom amounts to for them.[22] Socrates' analysis of δύναμις between 1 and 11 comprises the initial steps toward figuring that out. Step 4 is where ability is first stated to include a cognitive component, φρονήσις.[23] After Hippias has said the false person's ability is an ability to deceive (2), Socrates gets him to agree to the following:

> Hippias: The πολύτροποι deceive most of all by unscrupulousness (πανουργίας), a sort of prudence (φρονήσεως), not by foolishness (ἠλιθιότητος) and folly (ἀφροσύνης) (365e4–5).

In 5–7, Socrates establishes a relationship between φρονήσις and σοφία:

5. So (ἄρα) false persons are prudent (φρονήσεως) (365e5–6).
6. Because false persons are prudent, they know what they're doing (ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν) when they behave badly (365e6–7).
7. Because false persons know [what they're doing], they are wise (σοφοί) in deception (365e9–10).

The prudent person knows what he is doing (6), and the person who knows what he is doing is wise (7). If the steps amount to a hypothetical syllogism, wisdom is necessary but not sufficient for knowing what one is doing when one speaks falsely, where speaking falsely is to hide one thing while saying another. In what way might Odysseus and the false person generally know what he is doing when he speaks falsely and what wisdom might he be utilizing in doing so? His wisdom is "regarding the things about which [he] speaks falsely" (366a3–4). That is, he knows *that* what he is saying is false, but that alone is not sufficient for deception. He must also know what he is doing. There are at least two ways of understanding this criterion of ability, both of which identify intent as a feature of ability. First, consider the paradigmatic case of lying in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus "made falsehoods look like truth" (*Od.* 19.235). To deceive one must be able to hide the falsehood. To be deceived, one must not be able to see what is hidden. To deceive, then, the false person must also know *how* to convince another to believe that a falsehood is true or at least have the skill not to reveal what is hidden. To do that requires more than propositional knowledge about what is true and false: he has to say what is true or false with the intent to deceive. If πολύτροπος is any indication of what sort of knowledge this requires, it should be the ability to tailor one's speech to the audience. Odysseus' lies are almost exclusively about his identity.[24] But knowing that he is not the person he tells others he is is only part of his deception. He tailors his lies to the person he is lying to.[25] This is, of course, similar to what the speaker in an epideictic speech does, even if it is not designed to deceive. So too, for Odysseus and Achilles: even if Odysseus and other false persons know what they are doing in the sense of knowing how to deceive, it is still not clear why they do it and what they are thinking in doing so. A second way of understanding the criterion "knows what he is doing," then should specify whether the liar intends to "behave badly" or be "unscrupulous."

Hippias' use of pejoratives (deceptive, unscrupulous, behaves badly) are supposed to mark out the difference between Achilles and Odysseus. But the terms with which the false person's ability is described do not obviously distinguish them, which may explain why Socrates ignores the pejoratives in his summary of Hippias' view (steps 8–10 above). He wants to identify the cognitive and affective conditions for being false before determining whether and how these pejoratives apply. Thus far, the false person is able to speak falsely insofar as he knows that what he is saying is false and knows what he is doing in the process of presenting a falsehood as truth. But merely saying what is not true and intending to do so is not enough to earn the pejorative designation Hippias wants to attach to Odysseus and the false person. This already describes Hippias' own epideictic skill after all: he can give a speech

on any subject requested of him, and he can answer any question put to him. The fact that he does so at the Panhellenic games, where the audience will come from various city-states, requires that he be all the more versatile. But Hippias' epideictic speeches may not reveal what he actually thinks about the subject, and he appears to do it for money and reputation rather than truth (364a1–6). There must be some criterion to distinguish what he is doing from deception, and Hippias thinks he is doing this when he claims the false person deceives and does so "by unscrupulousness" (ὑπὸ πανουργίας), but it is not clear that it does the work Hippias thinks. Unscrupulousness suggests the act of hiding one thing but saying another is done without regard or care for the means by which one accomplishes something, but this is not necessarily bad to someone like Odysseus, whose lies are supposed to earn him an advantage. In *Il.* 9, Odysseus and his comrades recognize they need Achilles to give up his grudge and return to battle, and we may suppose Odysseus leaves out part of Agamemnon's speech because he thinks doing so increases the chances of accomplishing that goal even if it means hiding something from the very person they depend on. Yet Achilles' own "bluntness" or ἀπηλεγέως also implies acting without regard, and Ajax describes his behavior as such with the pejorative οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται.

Whether or not these acts are in fact unscrupulous, Hippias himself seems to think he clarifies this by adding that the false person knows what he is doing "when he behaves badly" (6). This, again, does not entirely clear up what makes the person's actions bad. On the one hand, Hippias could mean that the able person also knows that what he is doing is bad. This would potentially rule out cases in which a person does something wrong while believing it to be right (or simply not knowing it to be wrong). If "knowing what you are doing" identifies the person's intent, then the false person's ability involves doing wrong intentionally. On the other hand, a person might perpetuate a falsehood while believing it is a good thing to do. This fairly describes Odysseus, who rarely, if ever, thinks his own lies are bad, for they all serve his advantage.

Hippias may be assuming from the outset that the false person's behavior is bad, whether the false person thinks so or not. On this reading, the false person is able who knows what he is doing, i.e., that he is presenting as true something that is false and believes (but does not know) it to be the right thing to do regardless of whether or not it is actually right or deemed right by society. In this case, it is less clear whether the act is intentionally wrong. Does the false person's ability consist only in knowledge of the truth or falsity of what he is saying, or also in knowledge of the moral value of what he's doing? It is not at all clear which one Hippias has in mind, but the distinction is crucial for moral evaluation and, later, for determining voluntary action. If in Homer all better is better at, Socrates' analysis of δύναμις highlights the need

to sort out what kind of wisdom or knowledge is at work in one's actions, if better is to have a distinct moral connotation.

Socrates' analysis of the false person's ability reveals a complex notion of wisdom and knowledge that underlies the act of speaking falsely. This complexity persists with Socrates' addition of "if they wanted to" in (9):

> According to your [Hippias'] account, false persons are among the able and wise, and by "able and wise" Hippias means that the false persons are able to speak falsely if they wanted to (ἐὰν βούλωνται) (366a6–b3).

Socrates phrases this as a question: Does Hippias think that because the false person is "able and wise" he also does what he wants? This inference is not explicit in what Hippias has said or agreed to in 1 through 8, so why does Socrates add it? I suggest Socrates is marking a distinction between knowing what you are doing and doing what you want. David Charles' detailed analysis of action in Aristotle can help illuminate the difference. Charles suggests that Aristotle may use ἑκων in some cases as "intentional" and others as "voluntary." For the latter, he says "we may ask 'Given that the action was intentional, was it freely or willingly chosen?'"[26] If the answer is yes, it is voluntary. Aristotle's account, though not explicit in *HiMi*, offers a possible way of understanding why Socrates adds various criteria for δύναμις in steps. A person might know that what he is saying is false, and know that he is lying. Thus far, the false person is lying intentionally. But the addition of "if he wants to" answers Charles' question: His action is also voluntary.

By asking whether the false person's action is voluntary, Socrates may have in mind for (9) Achilles' words from *Il.* 9 and their implication that the straightforward and blunt person is able while the one who hides what he's thinking is unable. If Achilles' bluntness means he will do and say what he wants, then the false person, by contrast, does not do what he wants. Socrates may then want to know whether the unable person fails to do what he wants to do. So, in 11, Socrates asserts that the false person does what he wants. By admitting that the false person does what he wants, Socrates allows that Odysseus and the false person generally are able in much the same way that Achilles thinks himself to be, at least in that they both do what they want. This criterion for the false person's ability is open to the same ambiguity as the other two: just as one wonders whether the false person knows that what he's saying is false or also knows that doing so is wrong, so also one can ask whether the false person wants to speak falsely, or also wants to do something wrong. Either way, Socrates could presumably rule out cases in which a person knowingly but unwillingly lies. Odysseus, for instance, may not want to lie to his wife, Penelope, or his father, Laertes, but recognizes that doing so is the best way to accomplish his goal. If so, he lacks ability

in the sense described here. But if he wants to lie knowing it is wrong to do so, it looks as though the false person's ability consists in voluntarily doing something wrong. This brings the reader just short of the Socratic view that no one does wrong voluntarily, which Socrates will hint at near the end of the dialogue when he says the voluntary wrongdoer is the good person "if in fact there is such a person." Socrates' doubt later in the dialogue has its first seeds planted here in the analysis of δύναμις, which will persist through the remaining arguments.

The notion that Achilles and Odysseus both do what they want conflicts with the sense in which Achilles thinks the false person lacks ability. The false person, in Achilles' estimation, knows what he is doing in hiding one thing but saying another, but is unable to avoid acting this way because a more "noble" means of achieving his goals is not available to him. But the false person's ability entails that he still does what he wants. It is not clear though what this person wants and what he knows regarding his actions. In other words, the passive/active ambiguity of πολύτροπος leaves open the question of whether Odysseus' or the false person's behavior amounts to an ability and in what way. This suggests that when the able person fails to do what he wants, we should understand that he does not want to lie for its own sake.[27] But this leaves open the possibility that the false person still wants to lie if that is the best means available to him to accomplish his goal. Under Achilles' estimation, the false person lacks ability in the former sense, though Socrates' analysis allows him to have ability in the latter sense, and this describes Odysseus' duplicitious activity quite well: Odysseus still manages to exercise agency in spite of great obstacles.

The distinction identified in Aristotle between intentional and voluntary actions also helps mark some important distinctions in Socrates' criterion that the false person's ability entails knowing what he is doing. If this is the mark of an intentional action, then we might also ask what the intent is or, more specifically, 'Under what description is the agent acting?' Odysseus presumably knows he is lying, so his act is not unintentional, but what he intends can be understood under at least two descriptions: he intends to lie whenever he does so, and in doing so, he intends to, say, earn the trust of person to whom he is lying or Odysseus also intends to lie under the description "doing something bad." As I point out above, Hippias himself adds that the false person knows what he is doing "when he behaves badly" (6), where this could mean that the able person also knows that what he is doing is bad. Odysseus does not seem to fit this description, so while he may behave badly by Hippias' (and Achilles') estimation, it does not follow that his ability consists in him speaking falsely with the intention of behaving badly. In short, if Hippias thinks ability explains the false person's behavior, and the false person is a

bad person, he still has to give an account of ability that explains what makes the false person bad.[28]

Let us step back and see what Socrates' analysis of δύναμις does for their effort to distinguish Achilles from Odysseus, and what problems remain. Thus far, Socrates' analysis of δύναμις suggests that ability is defined as follows (I will label this Δ for convenience):

> (Δ) A person is able to act *F*-ly only if he (a) is not hindered by external constraints from acting *F*-ly, (b) has knowledge of the relevant facts involved in acting *F*-ly, (c) knows what he is doing when he acts *F*-ly, and (d) does what he wants when he wants in acting *F*-ly.

Without the pejoratives, supplying "speaks falsely" for "acting *F*-ly" provides a base-line account of being false: This person (a) has nothing preventing him from speaking falsely, (b) knows that what he is saying is false, (c) knows what he is doing when he speaks falsely, and (d) wants to speak falsely. This bare-bones account, however, could just as easily apply to a performer on stage or a sophist giving an epideictic speech that he does not endorse. But Hippias wants to distinguish the true from false persons AND assert that the true person is better than the false person. Simply saying that the false person also knows that he is deceiving when he speaks falsely will not suffice. There is nothing in Δ thus far that marks out what makes the action morally reprehensible. Now suppose that we supply "badly" for "*F"* in "acting *F*-ly," In this case, the false person (a) has nothing that stops them from acting badly, (b) knows that he acts badly, (c) knows what he is doing when he acts badly, and (d) wants to act badly. By Achilles' estimation, the person who hides one thing but says another lacks ability in this sense (Δ) because (a) he is constrained or limited by circumstance and (d) does not do what he wants (no one would deceive that could accomplish the same thing transparently). Hippias wants to add that this person is worse for being this way. Socrates' analysis of δύναμις exposes problems with trying to do so, for it is unclear whether the false person intends to do something bad and does so willingly. Furthermore, if they do so willingly, is it for the sake of some further end or in itself? The ambiguity of πολύτροπος is sharpened somewhat: this sort of person makes many "twists and turns" either in speech or behavior voluntarily, because he knows what he is doing, but it is less clear whether he also knows that what he is doing and that what he wants is good.[29]

This analysis of 365d6–366c4 is suited to respond to some scholarly complaints. Many scholars have noted that in summarizing Hippias' view of the false person's ability in 8 through 11, Socrates leaves out Hippias' pejorative qualifications that the false person deceives, behaves badly, and acts unscrupulously. Some think this is because Socrates believes that being false or

πολύτροπος is neutral, and exploits Hippias' agreement with his neutral version of ability in the next argument.[30] In the next phase of argument, Socrates does give wholly neutral examples of the ability to speak falsely, and he does so in an effort to convince Hippias that the false and true persons are the same because they have the same ability. However, interpreting Socrates' omission this way puts him in an unfavorable light, if not open to the charge of equivocation. As I have mentioned before, there is no reason to think Socrates has any preconceived notion about these characterizations as such. He does, however, think that Homer's text reveals a more complex moral psychology than Hippias sees. His analysis of δύναμις points precisely to the problem in identifying who is better: it is not clear what sort of knowledge, intent, and desire informs the false person's ability to speak falsely. Socrates gets an answer from him later, but for now it is still an open question as to whether the false person's wisdom consists in the knowledge that deception is bad. A more charitable explanation for Socrates' dropping the pejoratives, then, is that he does so only temporarily in order to focus on clarifying what Hippias thinks about the false person's knowledge.

Socrates' analysis of δύναμις in relation to action leaves many questions about the precise knowledge, intent, and desire of the able person. Some of these questions, particularly whether the able person knows that what he is doing is wrong, and why he does it, motivate the later arguments of the dialogue. The analysis of δύναμις also reveals Socrates thinking on the mechanics of δύναμις and its relation to virtue. In all other early dialogues, Socrates introduces it as though it were a settled, established concept. In these dialogues, Socrates invokes ability as a model for the sort of account he wants of a virtue, namely knowledge of good.[31] What we do not get in these dialogues is an account of how this knowledge manifests itself in its characteristic activity, even though it is stipulated in each case that it does. This leads some scholars to suggest that Socrates is not satisfied with the identification of virtue with δύναμις. So Burnyeat, for example, concludes that the level of generality Socrates seeks for the ability characteristic of a virtue renders it insufficient for explaining every instance of that kind of behavior: "this means, I think, that a virtue is not a power or *dunamis*, but that it is not properly a disposition either. For the latter is nothing if not an explanatory notion."[32] However, looking for an adequate explanation of how ability manifests itself in action would be beyond the scope of these dialogues, dialogues whose primary aim is to provide a correct definition of a virtue. In these other dialogues, Socrates only isolates certain features of the concept of ability that are relevant to the current discussion.[33] The *HiMi*, by contrast, introduces it as a means to understanding Homer's heroes, particularly the relationship between agent and action. As such, it is a concept that explained rather than

one that is used to do the explaining. Insofar as it helps Socrates establish that knowledge of good and bad must be its own δύναμις apart from other areas of expertise, Socrates' analysis of the concept in *HiMi* also marks an important moment in Socrates own thinking about virtue.

NOTES

1. *Protagoras*: Protagoras' speech on the teachability of virtue identifies it as a power. This motivates Socrates' question about the unity of the virtues, which he frames in terms of a single δύναμις. I discuss this point for the *Laches* and *Charmides* below (see note 31).

2. Grote, in *Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates* (London: J. Murray, 1865) 67; Ovink, in *Philosophische Erklärung Der Platonischen Dialoge Meno Und Hippias Minor* (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1931) 177; Shorey, 86–87; Hoerber, 1212–31; Sprague, 67–70; Mulhern, 283–88; Guthrie, 196–7; Blundell, 146–147; Kahn, 114; and Beversluis, 100–101.

3. Zembaty, 55; Blundel, 147, agrees with Zembaty but also argues that Socrates is aware of the equivocation and uses it to get Hippias to see the folly in thinking that mere possession of a δύναμις is sufficient for being praiseworthy. I find Zembaty's overall assessment of Socrates' argument in line with my analysis of Homer in chapter 2. She interprets the dialogue as a whole as exposing the problem of using evaluative terms that describe actions to describe dispositions or cognitive states instead. There is evidence that Socrates is motivated to expose this problem by locating it in Homer's depiction of Achilles, whose lie points to a more complicated relationship between one's words and thought. Zembaty observes that the characterization of the false person in terms of δύναμις alone makes nonsense of Hippias' view that the two heroes are not the same. Socrates wants to explore this possibility and does so by deliberately focusing on the possibility that one can satisfactorily evaluate persons in terms of their δύναμις alone. Nonetheles, Zembaty, too, does not consider whether the "common usage" of the term is consistent with its use in Homer's epics. And this leaves open the possibility that Socrates violates the Homeric constraint.

4. Weiss, 244–245 and Carelli, 67–68.

5. Chapter 1, 15–16.

6. Carelli, 68.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. To be fair, Achilles and Odysseus are the agents of the predicted outcome, though in the case of Odysseus' lies, the other characters are not aware that the speaker and agent are one and the same person. In both cases (Achilles in *Il.* 9 and Odysseus in *Od.* 14.160, the claim "αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται" means something like "mark my words. . . ." It is worth noting, too, that in the *Laches* Socrates rejects the suggestion that courage is the power to know future goods and evils. Socrates argues that this cannot be a correct definition of courage since it essentially says that courage is the power to know good and evil *simpliciter*, and this fails to distinguish courage from other virtues.

10. Contra Weiss, 125: "Hippias [like Protagoras, Polus, and Thrasymachus] regards the deceitful and unjust as men most able, prudent, powerful, and wise."

11. As I show in chapter 1, Hippias and Socrates are not restricted to explicit attributions of terms for understanding Homer, so the fact that Homer does not explicitly describe his heroes using this term does not automatically violate the Homeric constraint. That said, if the notion of ability or power denoted by the use of δύναμις in Homer is at work already in the portion of *Il.* 9 in the manner I suggest, then we should expect Homer's use of δύναμις to be compatible with it. I address this below, ch. 2, 33–34 and 37.

12. *Il.* 3. 236, 5. 475, 17. 643, 22. 47, & 23. 463.

13. *Il.* 8. 294, 13. 786, 22. 20, & *Od.* 11. 414.

14. *Il.* 14. 196, 18. 427, *Od.* 5. 90, & 10. 69.

15. Perhaps most striking is a passage that uses similar language as Achilles' speech in *Il.* 9. At *Odyssey* 5.89–91 Calypso says to Hermes, "say what you have in mind (φρονέεις), my heart commands me to accomplish it (τελέσαι)/If I am able (δύναμαι) to, and it is something that can be accomplished (τετελεσμένον)." There are other external circumstances that hinder ability besides brute physical conditions. For instance, twice in Homer is one's ability to act hindered by social or strategic considerations. At *Il.* 15. 399, Patroclus exclaims that he is "no longer able to stay" with the wounded Eurypylus because the fighting had reached the walls of the Greek camp and he says he needs to go persuade Achilles to help. Similarly, at *Od.* 13. 331 Athena says to Odysseus "I am not able to leave you . . ." because he has a keen mind and is therefore deserving of her help. Homer at times even uses δύναμις in the context of describing *hubris*. At *Il.* 13.787, it is remarked that "beyond his ability (παρ᾽δύναμιν) one should not to fight, despite being eager," since attempting to do so will turn out badly. These are just the sort of hindrances Achilles thinks do not apply to him. Achilles is mistaken and acts involuntarily, as Hippias admits later at 370e5–9: Achilles does not go home but rejoins the fight "because he was compelled by the army's misfortune."

16. This model of δύναμις suggests that ability is at least closely associated with action or behavior. In his comprehensive study of δύναμις in Plato and his predecessors, Souilhe observes that among all these writers, "δύναμις . . . is the characteristic property of beings, especially the particular way they act. . . . There is no distinction between what [these abilities] are and what they produce," Souilhe, *Etude Sur Le Terme Dynamis Dans Les Dialogues De Platon* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 70. Even Plato identifies the δύναμις of knowledge this way in *Republic* V (477c–d), where he states that to identify a δύναμις "I only use what its object is and what it does, and by reference to these I call each the power it is." Plato's concept of power here and in the early dialogues is of course more sophisticated, and I will discuss this later in the chapter, but it has its source in the close association between action and ability. This is especially significant if δύναμις is implicit in Hippias' quote of Homer, for the dichotomy some scholars identify there between δύναμις and τρόπος, between ability and behavior, in the initial discussion of Homer's characters is premature and, in effect, a false dichotomy. Socrates addresses it in this next section precisely because the act of speaking falsely complicates the near-universal acceptance of a correlation between action and ability, in this case between what one does

or says and what one thinks. The use of πολύτροπος and the problems it raises also suggest that the disagreement between Socrates and Hippias over the term's meaning is not so much between its pejorative and neutral uses or its use as a δύναμις-term or τρόπος-term. As I will show, it is clear that Hippias thinks the term is pejorative, and Socrates does not disagree about that. Rather, for Socrates it is a question about agency: What is it about false speaking that makes the agent deserving of this pejorative designation in the first place?

17. I translate φρονήσις as "prudence" since it captures the action-oriented nature of knowledge better than intelligence or cleverness. In this sense, it means having a plan in mind, and it use in 6 suggests it is sufficient for "knowing what you are doing." The term is consistent with Homer's use of it. See, for instance, *Odyssey* 5.89–91. In formulating 4, I combine Socrates' question and Hippias' response. Socrates asks if the πολύτροποι deceive by "unscrupulousness and a sort of prudence" and Hippias emphasizes this by responding "most of all . . ." φρονήσεώς τινος is ambiguous between "a sort of prudence," i.e., a species of prudence, or "prudence of a sort," i.e., something that falls short of true prudence. Socrates exploits this ambiguity elsewhere, for instance in *Apology* 20d6–7. There Socrates says that his poor reputation among Athenians is due to his having σοφίαν τινὰ. This means "wisdom of a sort" and not "a sort of wisdom" because, as Socrates goes on to explain, he recognizes that neither he nor any other human being has the sort of wisdom he and others are credited with, namely knowledge of the excellence appropriate to humans and citizens (20b4–5). In *HiMi*, φρονήσεώς τινος is a gloss of or conjunction with "unscrupulousness," which suggests that unscrupulousness is either recognized as a legitimate form of prudence or somehow falls short of it. Since it is contrasted with ἀφροσύνης or "folly" Socrates may take Hippias to think that unscrupulousness is a legitimate kind of prudence. If prudence is equated with wisdom, then Hippias implicitly accepts that the πολύτροπος person is in fact wise, but with respect to deception.

18. Given that the term used here, ἐπιστήμονας, only appears in 6 as ἐπίστανται ὅτι ποιοῦσιν, I take its repetition in the summary Socrates is giving here to be an abbreviation of "knows what one is doing" and not "knows" *simpliciter*.

19. An example Souilhe cites is from the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*, in which the δύναμις of a drug is identified with its effect (e.g., 3.18, 14.5, and 13.25). Lloyd (1983, 35), agrees, translating δύναμις at 14.5 as "effect": "each process [of preparing food or drugs] . . . has a totally different effect (δύναμιν) from another."

20. The lone exception is Ruden: 2015, though she does not explain her departure from other translations on this point.

21. It is generally thought that the Greeks from Homer onward often take action to have a cognitive source (See, e.g., Dodds, in *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 16–17; O'Brien, 15 and 22–25). Agamemnon, for example, says he was not in his right mind when he took away Briseis: "having been blinded by Ate and Zeus took away my understanding" (Il.19.86). Similarly, Antilochus says he acted involuntarily and attributes his dangerous behavior in the chariot race to youthful folly and rash decision-making (Il. 23.590). In this context, we should understand the second sickness analogy and its implicit conception of δύναμις

as an extension of Homer's use of the concept, from external constraint to internal conditions for action, but one that is based in what is already present in Homer's text.

22. Mulhern's interpretation of Socrates' question "Didn't Homer make Achilles πολύτροπος?" is that it is less clear what behavior this quality manifests, compared to Achilles' bravery and Nestor's counsel. I agree that it is less clear, but this is due to an ambiguity in πολύτροπος between its active and passive senses and not, as Mulhern supposes, between its δύναμις and τρόπος senses. Bravery, wise counsel, and deception all have manifestations in action, but none of them reveal their moral quality by the action alone.

23. An anonymous reviewer suggested that a cognitive component may be introduced earlier in Hippias' claim that the false person deceives (ἐξαπατᾶν). It could for Hippias, but Socrates is less clear on what the cognitive component is, exactly.

24. All of Odysseus' lies in the *Odyssey* involve concealing his identity: Bk. 9 Odysseus speaks falsely to the Cyclops, Polyphemus, about his name. Bk. 13: He speaks falsely to Athena (who is disguised as a shepherd) about his identity upon landing in Ithaca. Bk. 14: He speaks falsely to Eumaeus and Telemachus about his identity. Bk. 17: He speaks falsely to Penelope, the maids, and the suitors about his identity. Bk. 24: He speaks falsely to his Father, Laertes, about his identity.

25. See especially the differences between the story he tells Eumaeus (Bk. 14) and Athena (Bk. 13).

26. David Charles, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984), 61.

27. In Socrates' analysis there seems to be lurking a potentially important qualification on voluntary action that Aristotle makes explicit in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between voluntary and "mixed" actions. Considering what he says there will be instructive for Socrates analysis of δύναμις in *HiMi.* In *NE* III.1 1110a5–25, Aristotle uses the example of a ship's captain throwing precious cargo overboard in a storm in order to save the ship and crew. He says these actions are "mixed," for they are voluntary in the sense that they are desired at the time and the agent is not caused to act by some force outside himself. But its involuntary insofar as no one would desire this action for its own sake.

28. Whether the false person acts knowing that his behavior is bad presents an obstacle to Hippias' effort to evaluate Achilles and Odysseus in terms of their actions and to derive their abilities from those actions. Here it is instructive to look at Socrates' discussion of "true power" and desire in the *Gorgias.* At 466d–467e, Socrates claims that the tyrant lacks power (δύναμις) in his actions, and does so by making the apparently paradoxical claim that when the tyrant kills and exiles his critics, he does whatever he thinks is best but at the same time he does not do what he wants. Socrates argues that having power is a good thing insofar as it enables one to do what one wants, where all wanting is for what is actually good. The tyrant, by contrast only does what he mistakenly believes is good, not what is actually good. He is not able because he does not know what he really wants. We might say his action is intentional, but only pseudo-voluntary. He acts on a desire, but the desire is falsely interpreted as something good. While this distinction is not explicit in *HiMi*, it helps to see the problem facing Hippias' account of the false person: Odysseus might speak falsely knowing that what

he is saying is false and intending to convey it as such, and he may think this is the best course of action. But thus far it is not clear from what has been said whether Odysseus does what he wants or knows that what he is doing is *actually* best.

29. The problems posed in *HiMi* for identifying the basis of moral evaluation is consistent with Socrates' view in other early dialogues that a virtue can never be defined as an action or type of action. In the definitional dialogues, Socrates' interlocutors initially define a virtue such as courage (*Laches*) or temperance (*Charmides*) as an act-type, e.g., "standing one's ground." Socrates shows that actions are not necessarily good. For instance, standing one's ground can be courageous in one context, but cowardly in another. In *Republic* I, Socrates shows that this is also true for telling the truth. At 331c–d, Socrates says that Glaucon's view that justice is "speaking the truth and repaying whatever debts one has" cannot be correct, for telling the truth is not always good: one should not "want to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind." Socrates' analysis of δύναμις in *HiMi* is getting at this same concern, but it is a laborious effort. This may be because in *HiMi* he is working out what is already so obvious to him in other dialogues. In *HiMi* he is subject to the Homeric constraint, and the labor is in extracting it from Homer.

30. Weiss, 126 n.10, following Zembaty, 54.

31. In the *Laches*, for example, Socrates clarifies what he wants in asking for an account of courage by offering an analogy with swiftness (192a–c):

If anyone should ask me, "Socrates, what do you say it is which you call swiftness in all these cases," I would answer him that what I call swiftness is the ability (δύναμιν) to accomplish a great deal in a short time. . . . So try yourself, Laches, to speak in the same way about courage. What ability (δύναμις) is it which, because it is the same . . . in all cases . . . is therefore called courage?

As in many of the so-called definitional dialogues, here Socrates restates his request for an account of a virtue by asking for a single universal that is true of all and only instances of that virtue. This move is usually made in response to the suggestion that a virtue is a type of action (e.g., Laches initially says courage is standing one's ground in battle). Since act-types by themselves are not always virtuous, the emphasis on ability shifts attention to what is true about the courageous person that makes his actions courageous and not otherwise. Similarly, in the *Charmides*, Socrates disputes Critias' suggestion that temperance is knowledge of knowledge by showing that this definition conflicts with a standard way of thinking about ability (168b–d):

This knowledge is knowledge of something and has a certain δύναμις of being 'of something' . . . The very thing which has its own δύναμις applied to itself will have to have that nature towards which the δύναμις was directed.

As in the Laches, Socrates uses the concept of ability as though it were equivalent to knowledge, knowledge that somehow underlies and manifests in a certain kind of activity.

32. Myles Burnyeat, "Virtue in Action," *The Philosophy of Socrates: a collection of critical essays* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 230.

33. In the *Laches*, he uses it to demonstrate the level of generality he seeks. In the *Charmides*, he uses it to distinguish ability from its object, and in the discussion of the unity of the virtues in the *Protagoras*, he uses it as a model for distinguishing related concepts.

Chapter Three

Calculated Deception

366c5–369c2

Following the analysis of δύναμις, Socrates explores Hippias' claim that the true and false persons are not the same. He does so by addressing virtually all of Hippias' own claimed areas of expertise, but especially arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, and argues that for each of them the able person knows both what is true and what is false about that subject. Socrates concludes from this that since both the true and false persons have the same knowledge, they are the same. Hence, Achilles is the same as Odysseus. Hippias objects both to the conclusion that true and false persons are the same and to the specific conclusion about Odysseus and Achilles. Many readers, including Aristotle, think he is right to do so on the grounds that Socrates' argument equivocates on the meaning of ψευδής between "being able to speak falsely" and "is a speaker of falsehoods."[1] Hippias, the argument goes, has the latter sense in mind all along and Socrates unfairly refutes him by switching to the former sense. Attempts to absolve Socrates of equivocation rely on showing that Hippias has ability in mind all along, but end up with the result that the argument is merely an ad hominem designed to expose Hippias' muddled thinking, or at least the problem with evaluating character in terms of ability alone.[2]

I will argue that we need not take either route. The argument should be taken in its context, coming after the initial analysis of δύναμις and its attendant ambiguities, and provoking the subsequent return to Homer's text, where some of the initial ambiguities are resolved. The aim of this section of the dialogue addresses a problem remaining from the previous section, namely to identify what sort of knowledge the able person has that explains his behavior. By focusing on Hippias' many abilities, particularly nonpractical ones such as calculation, Socrates will provoke Hippias while also making a serious philosophical point about the connection between knowledge, desire, and action. While it is significant that the argument between them focuses on

Hippias' own abilities, those of Homer's heroes are still implicitly in play as contrasts to the expert craftsman.

The scholarly debate over the argument of 366c5–369c2 rests largely on identifying what Hippias thinks about the ψευδής person prior to this argument: does he think it refers to a person's ability or their typical behavior? If the source is in Homer, as I have argued in chapters 1 and 2, this is a false dilemma.[3] The terms of debate, ψευδής included, stem from Homer, for whom ability and behavior are two sides of the same coin. The problem is not which one Hippias has in mind, but rather what goes into a person's ability that explains why they act the way they do, and what the basis is for evaluating them. As I have argued, the problem that underlies Socrates' specific questions of Hippias from the start is what motivates the two heroes to act as they do, and what does this motivation reveal about their agency. Socrates' initial question about whether πολύτροπος applies to Achilles as well as Odysseus acknowledges the very ambiguity the term's use in Homer exhibits between active and passive senses. Achilles may be hiding something himself, but even if he is telling the truth, it looks as though his extreme anger is what drives his behavior. In terms of (Δ), he may not know what he is doing or what he wants. Odysseus' agency, as πολύτροπος, is also unclear, but even in cases in which he appears to have control over his deceptions, it is not clear why that makes him less powerful or less good than Achilles. In short, there are ambiguities to sort out in their thinking about Homer's heroes.

Socrates' subsequent analysis of δύναμις reveals in greater detail just what needs to be sorted out: what does the able person know, intend, and want when he speaks truthfully or falsely? Is it simply knowledge of what is true or false, or also of what is good or bad? This section focuses on problems with the former in order to provoke Hippias to recognize the latter. Hippias' disagreement with Socrates' conclusion is not due to an equivocation, but is the result of recognizing what he missed before: There must be more to the false person's ability than mere knowledge of some area of expertise. If ability is what manifests in action, and the false person's ability is nothing more than knowledge of what is true or false in some given area of expertise, then any expert, Hippias included, is open to the charge of being a false person. This, to Hippias' mind, is the deceiver and a bad person.

The first three arguments on calculating, astronomy, and geometry follow largely the same pattern in terms of the questions Socrates poses and the answers Hippias gives. Since the first—on calculation—is the most detailed, I will focus on that one. There are peculiarities in both Socrates' questions and Hippias' answers that help illuminate the aim of the argument, so it is worth treating in detail. The first part establishes that Hippias is "best" at calculation (366c5–d6):

> Socrates: Then tell me, Hippias, aren't you experienced in calculation, that is, the art of calculation?
>
> Hippias: Most of all, Socrates.
>
> Socrates: Then if someone were to ask you how big a number three times seven hundred is, if you wanted to, you would tell him the truth about it the fastest and best (μάλιστ') of all?
>
> Hippias: Certainly.
>
> Socrates: And is that because you are most able (δυνατώτατός) and wisest (σοφώτατος) regarding these things?
>
> Hippias: Yes.
>
> Socrates: Then are you only most able and wisest, or are you also the best (ἄριστος) at what you are most able and wisest, namely at what has to do with the art of calculation?
>
> Hippias: The best (ἄριστος), too, of course, Socrates.

That Hippias is ἄριστος just insofar as he is "most able and wisest" alludes to Hippias' initial characterization of Achilles and Nestor in the same terms. Some have suggested that Socrates gets Hippias to contradict his earlier view that the heroes' qualities are mutually exclusive.[4] But Nestor earns the superlative in a limited area of expertise, namely giving counsel. This does not exclude anyone else from having wisdom or being most wise in their own area (e.g., combat or deception). What is more telling is that Hippias claims to be "best" at everything. In admitting this, he seems to say that he is better than Homer's heroes, who only reach the pinnacle of achievement in one area rather than many. Socrates will exploit this later to show that none of his abilities make him better in the sense he thinks.

The more immediate point of this section of dialogue is that the designation "able and wise" invokes the analysis of δύναμις of the false person in the previous section and extends it to truth telling. The label "able and wise" refers specifically to Socrates' summary of their analysis at 366b4–5. Socrates' summary is based upon the claims that the false person is able, the able person knows what he is doing, and the person who knows what he is doing is wise. Ability and wisdom are the "extreme terms" to borrow from Aristotle's characterization of the deductive syllogism, so bringing together "able and wise" should implicitly include the syllogism's "middle terms."[5] In other words, the expert calculator should also know what he is doing. The logic in this section on calculation also follows that of the previous analysis of δύναμις by taking "able and wise" to be the basis for doing what one wants ("if you wanted to tell the truth . . . it is because you are most able and wise").

By getting Hippias to admit that being "best" is as a result of ability and wisdom, i.e., a δύναμις, he effectively characterizes Achilles in the same terms used to characterize the false person in the previous section of the dialogue, under what I termed Δ:

> (Δ) A person is able to act *F*-ly only if he (a) is not hindered by external constraints from acting *F*-ly, (b) has knowledge of the relevant facts involved in acting *F*-ly, (c) knows what he is doing when he acts *F*-ly, and (d) does what he wants when he wants in acting *F*-ly.

As I pointed out in the last chapter, it is unclear whether in acting *F*-ly, the able person knows what is true or false about what he is doing or also knows that what he is doing is good or bad. The calculation example exposes this. Note that all Socrates explicitly identifies for the expert calculator's ability is (b) knowing that 3 × 700=2100, and (d) wanting to utter the truth of that equation. What is left implicit, at best, is (c), whether the expert calculator knows what he is doing when he tells the truth about an equation. If the ability of this expert is simply to speak the right answer, then there is no distinction between (b) and (c). This squares with Socrates' identification of crafts in other dialogues, where knowing the relevant facts about the craft is sufficient for being a craftsman of that sort.[6] But the distinction between (b) and (c) is crucial in the analysis of δύναμις, where the false person, i.e., the deceiver by Hippias' estimation, must not only (b) know that what is true and false, but also (c) know how to do so convincingly or, at the very least, intend to do what he does under some appropriate description. As will become clear in the example of Achilles's involuntary action at 370e5*ff*, a person might (b) know that something he is saying is false, but not (c) know what he is doing in uttering it, because he does so either unconvincingly or unintentionally. At this point, however, (b) and (c) are conflated. This is not controversial for abilities such as calculation, where knowledge and its application are very similar, if not identical. This makes Socrates' point seem trivial and innocuous. But the work of this distinction becomes apparent in Socrates' next move.

After securing agreement that Hippias is best in telling the truth about calculation, Socrates asks about speaking falsely regarding calculation (366e1–367a8):

> Socrates: And what about speaking falsely about these same things? Answer me, Hippias, in just as genuine and as dignified a manner as before. If someone should ask you how much three times seven hundred is, would you be false the best and consistently speak falsely about these things if you wanted to speak falsely and never answer truthfully? Or would the person more ignorant of calculations be more able to speak falsely than you, if you wanted to? Or would an ignorant person, when he wants to speak falsely, often say what's true involun-

tarily, possibly[7] because of his lack of knowledge, whereas you, a wise person, if you wanted to speak falsely, would do so consistently?

Hippias: Yes, it is as you say.

Socrates: Then the false person, is he false about other things, though *not* about number, and would not ever speak falsely when counting?

Hippias: Yes, by God, of course he would speak falsely also about number!

Hippias' exasperation at Socrates' last question suggests he thinks Socrates is belaboring the point, but in emphasizing that the false person in calculation is false about calculation primarily, if not exclusively, Socrates wants to know whether being false involves anything other than criterion (b) of Δ, namely knowledge of the subject matter about which one is speaking falsely. If the ability to be false is distinct from the ability to calculate, it should involve more than simply knowing what is true and false regarding calculation.[8] The analysis of δύναμις in *Hippias Minor* (*HiMi*) left it open as to whether the false person's knowledge is of what is true, or also of what is good or bad. If it is the latter, then being false involves more than simply knowledge that what they talk about is true or false. Hippias' insistence that the false person deceives, is unscrupulous, and behaves badly points to this possibility, but the discussion of calculation shows he fails to recognize this yet. The discussion of calculation here is an attempt to see whether Hippias will distinguish false speaking from expertise in some given craft.[9] And he should want to. By holding to the view that he is best at speaking falsely about calculation, he either will have to admit that he, too, is the sort of person he condemns in Odysseus and the false person or explain what the difference is between the person the expert calculator and the false person.[10] By appealing to Hippias' own abilities, Socrates can provoke him into recognizing this crucial point.

Socrates consistently frames his remarks about the false person's activity as hypothetical, and Hippias may only agree to these premises for that reason. But keeping false speech hypothetical will not help distinguish Hippias from the false person. The activity of behaving badly is only explained by appeal to the speaker's δύναμις, and if the false person's δύναμις consists only in knowing what is true or false, then there is nothing that obviously explains why this person would or would not speak falsely. This suggests that knowing and wanting, as constitutive of a person's δύναμις, inform one another. In other words, there appears to be no basis in a person's δύναμις, i.e., his knowledge, that explains why he would want to speak truthfully rather than falsely, if that knowledge consists in nothing other than knowing how to calculate correctly. It seems intuitive that knowing what is true about calculation would, by itself, include motivation to explain that knowledge and discovery of truth to others. That the expert in calculation speaks truthfully about it

does not typically invite the question "Why would he speak truthfully about calculation?" But speaking falsely about that same knowledge is somehow counterintuitive. One would at least want to know why a person would speak falsely about it, and this assumes that there is some motive above and beyond one's knowledge of calculation. This shows the calculation example, and such crafts in general, to be disanalogous to the case of Odysseus. He does not lie just because he can or because he knows what is false. He does so as a means to a distinct end.

For Hippias, it will become clear that he thinks it is having "a scheme in mind" (370e9). But the analysis of δύναμις earlier in the dialogue has already provided a similar basis, namely the false person's πανουργία, or "a sort of φρονήσεως" (365e4). This implies that the false person's knowledge includes a plan or end to which he applies his knowledge. Odysseus, for instance, lies because he wants to test his wife or best the suitors. Knowledge of calculation, on the other hand, entails no such practical knowledge. His knowledge of calculation is sufficient for being a calculator and doing calculation. It is striking that φρονήσις drops out of the argument after being a component of δύναμις. But this makes sense if Socrates is attempting to get Hippias to see that there is a distinct kind of knowledge involved in deception than calculation, a sort that involves having a plan or aim of action in mind. Hippias has yet to realize this distinction, though he already implied it, and is stuck in the position of admitting he, too, is the false person.

Socrates' example of the ignorant person's involuntary action at 367a3 further underscores the problem of distinguishing the ability of the calculator from the false person: [W]ould an ignorant person, when he wants to speak falsely, often say what's true involuntarily (ἄκων), possibly because of his lack of knowledge?" This is the first explicit use of ἄκων in the dialogue (ἔκων has yet to appear). If it is implicit in the analysis of δύναμις, its appearance here should be no surprise, and its use here should reflect what was implicit. In the analysis of δύναμις, it was unclear not only whether the false person's ability involved knowledge of good and bad, but also whether the person knows how to accomplish it and under what description he wants to do it. In other words, it is unclear whether he is able to act voluntarily. The person ignorant of calculation, Socrates now says, often involuntarily tells the truth because of a lack of knowledge. What criteria of Δ does the ignorant person fail to meet? So far it looks as though all he lacks is (b) knowledge that what he is speaking about is true or false. If this is all that is involved in (c) knowing what one is doing when speaking falsely, then lacking (b) entails lacking (c): the ignorant person does not know what he is doing and, as a result, fails to do what he wants (criterion (d)). Once again, (b) and (c) are conflated. But simply knowing that something is true or false, by itself,

is only necessary for having the ability to speak falsely. The original analysis of δύναμις adds (c) to explain how one uses what one knows. Without such a distinction, the account of the would-be liar about calculation is open to some obvious counterexamples. For instance, one could easily imagine a case in which an expert on calculation is no good at deception, even about his subject of expertise, because he does not know how to lie. For instance, he has some "tell" that gives him away or, as we learn about Achilles later, he does not know what he is doing (e.g., that it is bad). There is nothing in one's knowledge of calculation that would explain or guide such action. This example suggests that the ignorant person would not count as an able liar even if he did have expert knowledge of calculation. He is still unable to lie. In short, the ability to lie does not amount to knowledge of what is true and false *simpliciter*. There is something more to criterion (c) of Δ beyond knowledge that what one is able to lie about is true or false.

Socrates' contrast between the expert and the ignorant calculator highlights the ambiguity of criterion Δ (c), namely knowing what one is doing when acting *F*-ly. But it also highlights the attendant ambiguity in Δ (d), doing what one wants: does one want to speak falsely under the description "say what is false" or "behave badly"? The example of the person who accidentally tells the truth about calculation seems to suggest that a person will not be able to lie about calculation consistently *only if* he is not an expert in calculation. But the analysis of δύναμις allows that he could fail to lie even when he is such an expert. This extends to doing what one wants. The example Socrates gives allows that if a person only knows calculation, but wants to lie, i.e., do something deceptive and wrong with that knowledge, he could still fail to do what he wants. His knowledge of right and wrong is not included in his knowledge of calculation, so there is no basis by which he is able to do so voluntarily. Even though he does have one necessary component of ability, namely knowledge of what is true and false in some given area of expertise, his action is still involuntary because he lacks the components of ability necessary for behaving badly.[11]

Thus far Hippias has agreed without hesitation to all of Socrates' points, but in the next few lines he wavers, then objects outright (367a8–d3). The very next step has provoked puzzlement among readers:

> Socrates: Then should we posit this, that there is a man who is false about calculation and number?
>
> Hippias: Yes.
>
> Socrates: Then who would he be? Should he already have acquired the ability to speak falsely if, as you just now agreed, he's going to be false? For the one

who is unable to speak falsely, if you recall, you said that he would never prove false?

Hippias: I recall and it was expressed that way.

The phrase "there is a man" is often treated as an existential instantiation and, therefore, a bald assertion that there is a person who actually speaks falsely voluntarily.[12] Up to this point, Socrates qualifies the potential actions of both the true and false person with "if he wants to . . ." (e.g., 366b2, c8, e5–6) and characterizes them as persons with ability, neither of which commit him to stating that there is a person who actually wants to, and does, intentionally speak falsely. With the existential instantiation, the implication seems to be that Hippias is that sort of man. If the false person is the bad person, as Hippias maintains, then Hippias is bad too. But nothing in the dialogue so far would warrant such an inference. Furthermore, Hippias does not even waver in the way he does toward Socrates' next claim. There Socrates emphasizes that the existence of a false person "if . . . he's going to be false," is none other than the person with the ability to speak falsely. Here Socrates reverts to the conditional expression, but one more akin to what he says at the end of the dialogue: "if there is such a person" who is voluntarily unjust (376b5–6). He may signal already his doubt as to whether there is a person who wants to speak falsely, if speaking falsely means behaving badly. But all Socrates says here is the claim that carries over from Homer and the analysis of δύναμις: the ability to speak falsely is the sole basis by which to determine whether a person who speaks falsely is false.

It is from this claim that Hippias starts to distance himself with the passive "it was expressed that way" (367b5–6). If, as many suppose, Hippias is fine with admitting that he or any expert calculator have the ability to be false, why does he hesitate to endorse the claim here? It may be that Hippias is uncomfortable with being described as the person who "is false" as opposed to the label "able to speak falsely about calculation," which is how the false person regarding calculation was first introduced at 366e1. Yet he responds in a nearly identical way to Socrates' next question, which only describes Hippias as one who is able to speak falsely:

Socrates: And just now weren't you revealed to be the person most able to speak falsely about calculations?

Hippias: Well, yes, this too was indeed expressed.

The problem that Socrates is getting and Hippias is starting to see is that if the sole basis for being false is the ability to speak falsely, and the ability to speak falsely is solely construed as having expert knowledge about the truth

and falsity of what one speaks, then the possession of any expert knowledge is sufficient for being a false person. If Hippias wants to distinguish the false person from all others, Hippias has to show that the false person *qua* bad person has some ability beyond merely knowing what is true and false. It is not enough to say that he never does because there is nothing in this formulation of δύναμις to explain why he does not speak falsely. The same would go for the person who does speak falsely. There is nothing in his δύναμις that would explain his behavior either.

The remaining discussion ends with Hippias denying that the true and false persons are the same and, therefore, that one is no better than the other. The same problem that he has begun to recognize becomes most manifest with the claim that the true person is no better than the false (367c1–d3):

> Socrates: Then aren't you also most able to tell the truth about calculations?
>
> Hippias: Certainly.
>
> Socrates: Then the same person is most able to tell the truth and speak falsely about calculations, and he is the person who is good at this, namely the calculator?
>
> Hippias: Yes.
>
> Socrates: Then who other than the good calculator proves false about calculation? For the same person is also able, and he is true.
>
> Hippias: It appears so.
>
> Socrates: Do you see, then, that the same person is both false and true about these things, and that the true person is no better than the false one? For obviously they are the same person and not complete opposites as you just now maintained.
>
> Hippias: He doesn't appear so in *this* case, at least.

Hippias' objection to Socrates' argument in this section emerges with Socrates' suggestion that the "good calculator" is false, and becomes outright rejection at the suggestion that the true person is no better than the false. Hippias recognizes, as does Homer, that ability explains behavior, but thus far his account of behavior does not do that adequately. This is why he should be uncomfortable with the claim that one is no better than the other: he wants to say that the false person is bad, but he is unable to see what is missing from his account that would distinguish him from the true person. One might object by pointing out that Socrates moves from saying that the person good at calculation is true and false to the claim that the true person is no better *morally speaking* than the false. Recall, however, that for Homer all better is better at. It should be for Socrates, too, if he is sticking to his craft analogy:

being just is simply being good at justice. The problem here is not that Socrates equivocates, for there is nothing to equivocate if there is no distinction between being good and being good at. The problem is that being good at deceiving or behaving badly must amount to a δύναμις, but it cannot be the δύναμις of some other area of expertise alone, such as mathematics. Being good or bad consists in its own δύναμις, and involves not only knowledge of what is good, but also knowledge of what one is doing and what one wants.

The argument is not invalid, much less in the way many scholars make it out to be, for Socrates does not equivocate within the argument itself (e.g., by shifting from "able to lie" to "actually does lie").[13] Nor is it an ad hominem in the sense that it depends from the start on Hippias' ill-formed view that the false person is only "able to lie" while Socrates has no stake in the argument.[14] The concept of δύναμις that emerges from Homer and is endorsed by Hippias makes little distinction between ability and its manifestation in action, and that conception carries over to this argument. It is clear from the start of the argument about Achilles and Odysseus that the false person does actually speak falsely, and the emphasis on the false person's ability is based on the assumption that action is a manifestation of ability. The problem is not whether the false person *qua* able person actually behaves a certain way, but what it is about his ability that informs his motives and makes his behavior bad. There is, therefore, no "confusion of capacity with disposition" or typical behavior, as many suggest.[15] Hippias has simply not characterized the capacity correctly enough to reflect the characteristic behavior or disposition he wants to attribute to the deceiver. Similarly, my account anticipates a conclusion Carelli draws later in the dialogue, such that Hippias mistakenly assumes that "bare power is an unqualified good," overlooking the fact that "it only becomes good or bad depending on what use is made of it."[16] In the argument from 373c5, Socrates describes powers as instrumentally good. But this argument already assumes a distinction between powers of expertise and the power to achieve morally good ends, an distinction that is coming into focus here. Hippias may think he is wise and excellent by possession of his own powers, but he should not think that the false person's power is an unqualified good. What Socrates shows is that different uses of one power will still not be enough to show that the power is good or bad. The analysis of δύναμις is problematic precisely because Hippias has failed to show what it is in that ability that explains its manifestation in moral behavior.

My account of the calculation argument can also resolve a discrepancy Zembaty sees between the account of δύναμις in *HiMi* and other early dialogues. My account is similar to Zembaty's in that we both argue that the conception of the false person that Hippias originally endorses in *HiMi* is not exclusively a δύναμις or τρόπος, an ability or actual behavior. But her

reading of the calculation argument differs from mine in crucial respects. Following Burnyeat, Zembaty notes that in the *Laches* and *Protagoras,* Socrates maintains what Burnyeat calls the "requirement of reciprocity" (RR). This is the thesis that "a *dunamis* that *defines* a human excellence or its opposite cannot be a *dunamis* for the opposite of that which it defines."[17] A person is courageous, for instance, only if he acts courageously. The *HiMi*, by contrast, ignores RR by driving "a wedge between the use of evaluative terms in assessments of human worth and the use of the same terms in assessments for human actions."[18] In doing so, Zembaty says, Socrates allows that one could be a ψευδής or liar without ever actually lying or, by the same token, be the truthful person without ever being honest. This results from characterizing the ability of the true and false persons in a way that does not reflect their usual behavior. This argument, however, assumes δύναμις is from the start knowledge *simpliciter*, such that by the time it is deployed in the calculation argument, Socrates can easily say that the true and false persons have the same ability, understood as knowledge of some body of expertise, and are therefore are no different morally speaking. I have shown that the argument should not be read this way. Δύναμις was originally analyzed not simply in terms of knowledge that something is true or false, but also knowledge of what one is doing and doing what one wants. The problem there was that it was unclear whether this exhausted the extent of the false person's knowledge, and this problem is illuminated in the calculation argument. The argument about calculation implies that being false in its pejorative sense must involve a δύναμις other than the ability that defines the calculator or other expert, where this would include knowledge of what is good and bad rather than simply knowledge that, say, 3 × 700 = 2,100. On this reading, *HiMi* does not violate the requirement of reciprocity. Rather, it anticipates it by looking for the connection between ability and action, particularly how one's knowledge informs one's desire to act. For instance, knowledge of calculation does not inform a desire to lie. If RR is assumed in other dialogues, it is being worked out here. Similar to *Laches* (among others), which shows that an act-type alone cannot count as virtuous if the agent lacks the right sort of knowledge, so also *HiMi* shows that speaking truthfully or falsely cannot count as moral behavior if his δύναμις consists in nothing other than knowledge of calculation: he does not know that what he is doing is right or wrong. If Hippias and Socrates were clear from the start that the false person's ability consists in knowing that what he is doing is wrong and wanting to do it, then his ability would, hypothetically, manifest in bad behavior. RR, of course, only applies to virtue given the Socratic thesis that no one does wrong voluntarily, which Socrates does not invoke in *HiMi*. But the same would go for the honest person at this point in *HiMi*, if honesty were a virtue: if the truthful person

knows what is good with respect to honesty, then he would act accordingly. But as it stands, simply knowing what is true and false, or even uttering what is true or false in an effort to persuade a person to believe something, will not be enough to distinguish the good from bad person. In the next section of the dialogue, the problem of voluntary wrongdoing will emerge more clearly, once Hippias says that Odysseus lies with nefarious and, hence, unjust intent. But at this point Hippias has yet to recognize that this is what he needs to show that the δύναμις of the false person explains unjust behavior.

Socrates' choice of mathematical expertise, specifically, as the focus of his examination is also designed to push Hippias to disagree with the conclusion that the true and false persons are the same. To be sure, these are all areas in which Hippias claims expertise, and in appealing to them Socrates ensures Hippias a greater stake in the argument. But this does not explain why Socrates dwells on calculation, astronomy, and geometry, given the long list of Hippias' crafts from which Socrates could choose (and lists at the end of this segment of dialogue). Furthermore, it is not immediately obvious how expertise in mathematics is analogous to the δύναμις of Achilles and Odysseus. But this is just the point. A theoretical expertise such as mathematics depends very little on practical considerations for its exercise. The expert's knowledge of mathematics and knowing what he is doing when he does mathematics is not subject to the same conditions as, say, Odysseus' knowing what he is doing when he deceives others. Odysseus tailors his lies to his audience, so he must know something about his audience as well. If the false person knows that he is doing something good or bad, one must know what it is about the action and circumstances that make them good or bad. Consider Socrates' example in *Republic* I about whether it is right to return weapons to someone who is not in their right mind. One must connect general knowledge with particular circumstances. These circumstances will vary, which is why act-types are insufficient to define a virtue. One must also know whether the action is right in those various circumstances. This, again, points to the importance of criterion (c) of Δ, namely knowing what one is doing. For the mathematician, knowing the relevant facts about mathematics is not substantively distinct from knowing what he is doing when calculating. But for the false person, the deceiver, or even the virtuous person, it is the ability to apply general knowledge to particular circumstances. This, essentially, is πολύτροπος in its active sense, namely adapting to the circumstances in order to accomplish one's goals.[19]

Socrates goes on to make nearly identical arguments for the expert in geometry and astronomy, as well as many other areas of expertise Hippias claims to have, whose products he even wears on his body, from a cloak, belt, and ring to the original poems he carries (368a8–369a2).[20] Socrates' lengthy

diatribe is provoked by Hippias's increasing reluctance to accept many of the claims being entertained about calculation, geometry, and astronomy. Blundell points out that many of the crafts Socrates attributes to Hippias are superficial adornments of the body, such as clothing and jewelry, reveal his equally superficial wisdom: "Plato could not make it clearer that the ambivalent word *sophia,* which can be used for such an ingenious but trivial and even decadent item, fit only for the admiration of the many, is no guarantee of philosophical wisdom."[21] But if the point Socrates is making here follows what he says for calculation, astronomy, and geometry, the more immediate point is that for all his wisdom, i.e., his abilities in various areas of expertise, Hippias cannot claim to possess moral wisdom in virtue of those abilities alone. His various abilities are not unified under one master-δύναμις that would enable him to use them only for good rather than evil. Without it, he "wanders" as Socrates says at the end of the dialogue (376c4–6). That is, he is πολύτροπος only in the passive sense.

NOTES

1. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.29; Grote, 67; Ovink, 177; Shorey, 86–87; Hoerber, 1212–1231; Sprague, 67–70; Mulhern, 283–288; Guthrie, 196–7; Blundell, 146–147; Kahn, 114; and Beversluis, 100–101.

2. Weiss, Blundell, and Carelli. Zembaty's view, 55, is more nuanced. She shows clearly why assuming a δύναμις sense of ψευδής all along makes nonsense of Hippias' initial characterization of the two heroes, arguing instead that Socrates recognizes and Hippias allows for an "unspecified" sense of the term, one that primarily focuses on actual behavior but also may include the abilities that underlie it. I think she is right that the sense is unspecified, though not to the extent she thinks. As I have described Socrates' analysis of δύναμις in the previous chapter, the problem is specifically about what the false person knows, intends, and wants.

3. Chapter 1, p. 15 and chapter 2, p. 5*ff*.

4. E.g., Weiss, 141.

5. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 25b32–35.

6. E.g., *Gorgias*.

7. Reading εἰ τύχοι following LSJ's suggestion "it may be." This is how the phrase is translated by Reeve (in Cooper, *Plato. Complete works*. [Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1997] 146) at *Crat*. 430e: "But it may be (εἰ τύχοι), Socrates, that it's possible to assign paintings incorrectly, but not names, which must always be correctly assigned." The idea expressed here by "it may be" is a contrast between what is possible and what is not, hence my "possibly." On the significance of this qualification, see note 9 below.

8. There is an instructive parallel with *Gorgias* 450d5–e. There Socrates is asking Gorgias what oratory is. Socrates says that some crafts such as calculation and geometry

are primarily exercised through speech and wonders, if oratory is the same sort, what are its speeches about that distinguishes them from speeches about calculation. Gorgias replies that oratory is about "the greatest (μέγιστα) of human concerns . . . and the best (ἄριστα)" which he eventually says is of matters of justice and injustice (451d7 & 454b7, respectively).

9. Socrates' use of εἰ τύχοι or "possibly" suggests that he leaves it open as to what would explain the ignorant person's involuntary action.

There is a further parallel to the *Gorgias*. In the course of Socrates' cross-examination, Gorgias also says that the orator can better convince those without knowledge of say, medicine, to follow doctor's advice than the doctor himself can. Oratory, Gorgias says, aims to produce "conviction without knowledge," i.e. a kind of "false knowledge" (454e5–7). It turns out that if oratory is a distinct practice but lacks knowledge, it cannot be a craft at all. Gorgias then claims that the orator must know what is just and unjust, which leads him to the contradiction that oratory would never be unjust, while also allowing that orators can use oratory unjustly (461a–b). Like Gorgias, Hippias will prefer not to admit that he is unjust, which is what he thinks of the false person. Yet he proudly claims to possess knowledge (indeed, *wisdom*) and admits that he could speak falsely about calculation, if he wanted to. But if the false person is the bad person, as Hippias also maintains, he is caught in a similar dilemma as Gorgias. If the false person's ability is nothing other than knowledge of calculation, and the false person is a bad person, then Hippias, too, is a bad person. While the *Gorgias* questions whether oratory is a craft or ability at all, *HiMi* aims to identify what the craft or ability of speaking falsely would have to include. But just as Gorgias is shamed into saying oratory is just, Hippias is provoked into denying that his expertise makes him a bad person.

10. Weiss claims this section of the dialogue establishes that there is no craft proper to speaking falsely, for there is nothing to distinguish the false person beyond what he knows, and what he knows is proper to other crafts, e.g., calculation. This seems to me to anticipate the *Gorgias* and Socrates' claim that anything that fails to know and aim at what is good in it cannot count as a craft, but it is premature to attribute it to Socrates in *HiMi*. After all, *HiMi* will conclude that the person who does bad things voluntarily is the good person, which clearly overlooks the argument in *Gorgias* that the one who does wrong lacks δύναμις altogether. Socrates point in this section of the dialogue, as I understand it, is not to determine *whether* being false is a true δύναμις, but on the assumption that is a δύναμις, he seeks to understand what that person knows and intends that would distinguish the deceiver from the expert calculator.

11. This helps avoid Penner's conclusion that Socrates makes the just person into a "potential ethical clown" by applying to justice the general claim offered at 368e3–5, namely that for any craft, X, the one who is able to speak truthfully about X is also able to speak falsely about X (Penner, "Socrates on Virtue and Motivation." *Exegesis and Argument, Phronesis*, Supplementary Volume 1 (1973): 133–151. E. N. Lee, A. Mourelatos, R. Rorty, eds.). Penner (137) incorrectly I think, calls this an example of the "principle of ambivalence of the arts" (PA), which holds that

(PA) A man skilled at F-ing will be skilled at the opposite of F-ing.

According to Penner (1973, 139), PA in *HiMi* has the following form (among others):

(PA-False) The person skilled at speaking truthfully *simpliciter* is also skilled at speaking falsely *simpliciter*.

(PA-False) is not correct for Hippias or Socrates in *HiMi.* Speaking truly and falsely is not a skill by itself, such that the skilled false speaker is able to speak falsely about any subject. Instead, the ability to speak truly or falsely is restricted to one's area of expertise.

12. Most striking is Waterfield's translation: "May we further assume, then, Hippias, the existence of a liar about arithmetic?" (in Saunders, *Plato's Early Dialogues*).

13. See note 1 above for proponents of this view.

14. See note 2 above for proponents of this view.

15. Blundell, 152. For similar reasons, I question whether "typical" behavior is an issue at all. At the very least, what makes a liar's behavior typical should be more clearly defined. It could mean that the liar is one who often speaks falsely, but if this designation is to reflect at all the liars of δύναμις, it should mean that he is expected to lie for certain reasons (e.g., self-interest), in certain situations (e.g., when it is to his advantage), or to certain audiences (e.g., the gullible). This would characterize his behavior as a manifestation of the ability to know what one is doing when one lies. This may be what Socrates has in mind when he says at 366e5 that the expert in calculation could speak falsely about 3 × 700 "consistently" (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτα). He can maintain the ruse under scrutiny and in a variety of situations.

16. Carelli, 71.

17. Zembaty, 58, paraphrasing Burnyeat, "Virtues in Action," 226–227. Like many others, Burnyeat argues that the point of *HiMi* is to show that virtue cannot be a δύναμις only (230).

18. Zembaty, 58.

19. I concluded the previous chapter by claiming that *HiMi* explores the concept of δύναμις where other dialogues assume it. Socrates argument about Hippias' mathematical abilities furthers this development. As I have already suggested, this portion of the argument highlights a potential distinction between the sort of knowledge characteristic of theoretical expertise and the more practically oriented knowledge needed for deception. In this regard, *HiMi* also offers a somewhat different focus on δύναμις than what we get in the definitional dialogues, which construe it as knowledge of good and evil, a single δύναμις of virtue that unifies the individual virtues. Many scholars think that Socrates in the early dialogues, particularly the *Laches*, *Charmides,* and *Protagoras,* does not individuate the virtues by δύναμεις, for they all are manifestations of one unified δύναμις of virtue, namely knowledge of good and bad. The individual virtues are not act-types, but are distinct "applications" of the same power, namely knowledge of good and evil, that accomplish different things. There is little discussion about the mechanics of application, mainly because of the emphasis these dialogues place on finding a universal definition of virtue. By highlighting the importance of knowing what one is doing and doing what one wants, in addition to having knowledge of what is true and false *simpliciter, HiMi* points toward such mechanics. There is a proto-version of the unity thesis in *HiMi,* such that telling the truth and speaking falsely in various areas of expertise are distinct applications of the

same power, namely knowledge of what is true and false. This also updates the active sense of πολύτροπος as it is found in Homer. Odysseus, whether he lies or tells the truth, always has a scheme in mind. Odysseus' "scheming" or πανουργία apply his knowledge to various circumstances in order to accomplish his aims. In other words, he has a singular power that he applies in different circumstances.

20. There are some discrepancies between the calculation argument and the arguments for geometry and astronomy, but these are superficial. For instance, Hippias appears inconsistent in his agreement to (1) below, regarding geometry, and his reluctance about (2) and (3), regarding calculation and astronomy, respectively:

> (1) The good geometer is both able and wise at both speaking truth and falsehood, and no one else but the good man is false about diagrams, for he is able, whereas the bad geometer could not be false, as he is unable to speak falsely. (367e1–6)
> (2) None other than the good man is false about calculation, for the same man is able, and he is also true. (366c4–6)
> (3) In astronomy, none other than the false man, the good astronomer, will be false, namely he who is able to speak falsely, for he is not unable. (368a3–7)

All three assert that the good expert is false insofar as he is able to speak falsely regarding his craft. If Hippias is being consistent with his agreement to characterizing these persons as able, he ought to assent to all of them. The only differences between them is that (1) extends this claim to the speaker of truths, the wise man is identified as the one who is false, and it states that the bad man is the unable man. It seems that if Hippias is going to express hesitation at any of these claims, it would be (1) rather than the other two, for (1) brings the true and false persons closer than Hippias will want to allow and it sounds as though the bad person is the opposite of the sort of person Hippias would take him to be, namely the one who does not speak falsely. Nevertheless, the point stands for the cases of astronomy and geometry just as much as it does for calculation: if being false is morally wrong, then the false person's ability should explain what makes him that way. If his ability is nothing more than knowledge of some area of expertise, then all experts will be bad persons.

21. Blundell, 149.

Chapter Four

Socrates on Homer, Part 2

369b8–371e5

After Socrates' long tirade about Hippias' polymathy, Hippias concedes that he cannot show that the true and false persons are distinct. But when Socrates says this must therefore be true of Achilles and Odysseus as well, Hippias objects, saying (369b8–c5):

> Socrates, you are always weaving arguments of this sort, where you pick out whatever is the most vexing part of the argument and lay hold of it . . . but you don't debate the whole matter with which the argument is concerned. Now, if you want, with a lot of evidence I'll demonstrate to you, with a satisfactory argument, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and not false, and that he made Odysseus deceitful, a teller of many falsehoods, and inferior to Achilles.

In a sense, he is right: Socrates has fixated on the details of δύναμις and the expert craftsman in such a way that is not analogous to the cases of Achilles and Odysseus. But this was precisely Socrates' point. The expert's knowledge of what is true and false does not explain why that person would use that knowledge to earn Hippias' pejorative designations. By focusing on Hippias' own abilities and playfully leading him to an absurd conclusion, Socrates can provoke Hippias into admitting a serious philosophical problem about the connection between ability and action. In the next section of dialogue, this problem will be solved, and Socrates indicates that Homer was never far from his mind in doing so (369e2–370a2): "I've noticed while you were speaking, that the verses you just now mentioned where you indicate that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as though he were a deceiver, I think it is misguided, if you're telling the truth. . . ." Once again, however, Socrates is accused by both Hippias and subsequent scholarship for misinterpreting Homer.[1] This second discussion of Homer is the source of the alleged absurdity that occupies

the remainder of the dialogue, namely Socrates' conclusion that the one who does wrong voluntarily is better than the one who does so involuntarily. Again, however, Socrates is provoking Hippias while also offering a plausible, albeit subtle, interpretation of Homer, one which also yields a serious philosophical point about voluntary action. More so than the first discussion of Homer in *HiMi,* this second, extended discussion not only confirms that Homer is not a "mere peg" for a purely ethical inquiry but is also the foundation of it.

Socrates begins by stating that Hippias misunderstands the portion of *Il.* 9 he cites, offering instead what looks like a patently false reading (369e2–370a1):

> I think it is strange (ἄτοπον), if you're telling the truth, that Odysseus πολύτροπος is nowhere obviously false (οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ψευσάμενος). Whereas Achilles is obviously (φαίνεται) πολύτροπος, according to your argument. At any rate, he speaks falsely (ψεύδεται γοῦν).

Many take Socrates to contradict what is obvious to anyone that reads Homer: Odysseus says things he knows are not true.[2] A more recent interpretation by Carelli is more charitable to Socrates: Hippias appeals to Achilles' claim that he does and says what he intends to do in order to show he's better than Odysseus. But it is in fact Odysseus who accomplishes everything he sets out to do (i.e., he gets home, he kills the suitors, and retakes his place in Ithaka). Achilles does not. Therefore, Odysseus is in fact better than Achilles by Achilles' own criterion.[3] But Socrates does not need to show this, nor should he claim that Achilles does not accomplish what he intends. After all, Achilles does accomplish what he sets out to accomplish by *Il.* 9 and beyond, if this means watching the Greeks die while he refrains from fighting. While it will become clear what Socrates means in saying Odysseus is never false, Socrates' immediate point in making this claim is to provoke Hippias into recognizing a distinction between voluntary and involuntary falsehoods, a key distinction necessary for addressing problems left from the previous section, namely how to specify the ability of the false person that manifests in his characteristic activity.

Rather than clarify what he means up front, Socrates focuses on showing why he thinks Achilles is the one who speaks falsely. He first cites two passages from *Iliad* in which Achilles says he will leave Troy. Since he never does leave, Socrates concludes (370e2–4): "it's difficult to discern which is better regarding falsehood, truth, and the rest of excellence, for according to this account they're both about the same." This bit of the *Iliad* shows that Achilles does not do what he says he will do, but it also invokes the problems raised in the previous arguments of the dialogue. Note the qualification he makes at the start (370a1–2): "Achilles is obviously (φαίνεται) πολύτροπος,

according to your argument. At any rate, he speaks falsely." But Odysseus, Socrates says, is πολύτροπος but "nowhere obviously false (οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ψευσάμενος)." Here Socrates acknowledges that speaking falsely is distinct from being πολύτροπος. As I point out in chapter 1, Socrates' initial puzzlement over Hippias' use of πολύτροπος to characterize Odysseus is due to its ambiguousness about agency. The subsequent analysis of δύναμις raised the problem of whether saying what is false is the same as being deceptive, such that one could speak falsely without being πολύτροπος in the active sense. Without disambiguating the term, it is impossible to know what Socrates means by uttering this puzzling statement about the two heroes. The example of Achilles not doing what he says he will do situates this problem in Homer's epic and provokes Hippias to state, in effect, that Achilles is πολύτροπος in the passive sense. But as the calculation argument already demonstrated, Hippias needs to explain why a person would speak falsely in the first place.

He takes the bait and provides such an explanation, exclaiming (370e5–9):

> [Y]ou're looking at it wrong, Socrates. For when Achilles says something false he's not portrayed as saying something false with a scheme in mind (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς), but involuntarily, because he was compelled by the army's misfortune to stay and help. But when Odysseus speaks falsely, he does so voluntarily and with a scheme in mind.

ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς supplies what was missing in the earlier analysis of δύναμις and the calculation argument: the false person not only knows what is false, but utters a falsehood in order to carry out a nefarious plan.[4] If Odysseus' acting ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς is an exercise of his ability, then it should be understood in terms of the earlier analysis of δύναμις. Previously, the expert calculator's knowledge did not distinguish two criteria for possession of a δύναμις (Δ), namely (b) knowing that what one is saying is false and (c) knowing what one is doing when speaking falsely. Recall that for the false person to be deceptive, he must not only (b) know that what is true and false, but also (c) intend to do what he does under some appropriate description. ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς provides just that description. Hippias' objection disambiguates πολύτροπος for Odysseus, too. He is πολύτροπος in the active sense. Hippias' objection, thus far, offers a partial interpretation of Socrates' puzzling statement that both heroes are πολύτροπος, but only Achilles is false. Achilles lacks the δύναμις of the false person when he speaks falsely because he does not do so intending to speak falsely. But Hippias attributes Achilles' lack of ability to an external constraint, suggesting that he is not able to do what he says because he is "compelled by the misfortune of the army" (370e7–9). As we saw with the analysis of δύναμις, however, Socrates is more interested in the

inner cognitive and affective states that prevent a person from exercising an ability.[5] Socrates' next bit of evidence from Homer is designed to elicit this.

Socrates responds to Hippias' objection by offering further textual evidence to suggest that Achilles does speak falsely ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς. In *Il.* 9.650–55 Achilles speaks falsely when he tells Ajax one thing and another to Odysseus in the presence of both. Socrates concludes from this passage (371c6–d7):

> So, Hippias, do you think that the son of Thetis, he who was educated by the most wise Chiron, was so forgetful that just after rebuking those who deceive him in the most extreme way he says to Odysseus that he will sail away, and to Ajax that he will stay, and he didn't do so with a scheme in mind, nor think that Odysseus is senile and that he can best him with this craftiness and speak falsely to him?

This evidence is not as easy to explain away as Achilles' being forced to stay and fight. As Socrates says, Hippias will have to admit either that Achilles simply does not know what he is doing (he is "forgetful") or that he is deliberately (and brazenly) deceiving Odysseus.[6] Hippias attempts to avoid both horns by insisting that it was out of "fellowship" toward Ajax that Achilles told him he would stay, but Odysseus that he would leave (371d8–e3). Whatever is meant by "fellowship," Hippias seems to think that Achilles is telling the truth to Ajax because he does not want to deceive him. He is not forced in the sense that external circumstances made him go back on his word. His disposition toward Ajax moves him to speak the way he does. This, of course, does not solve the problem: what moves Achilles to lie to Odysseus? Furthermore, are these inner dispositions that move Achilles sufficient to explain whether his actions are voluntary? Socrates thinks they are not, inferring that now it looks like Odysseus is better than Achilles because the voluntarily false person is better than the involuntarily false person.

Before turning to examine Socrates' inference, it is worth noting how the exchange so far reveals why Socrates would say Odysseus is not false, for it looks as though the opposite is true. It turns out Socrates' puzzling claim about Odysseus is true, but only trivially so and in a way that has little bearing on the larger philosophical investigation. Carelli takes the last part to mean "Odysseus is never shown lying in Homer."[7] Understood this way, it is obviously false, but Socrates is not making a claim about all of Homer. Rather, he is restricting his point to the passages he cites from *Il.* 9. Furthermore, he is not saying that Odysseus is not false, but only that he is not *obviously* so. The key is in the phrase οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται ψευσάμενος, which Socrates contrasts with Achilles who is φαίνεται . . . ψεύδεται. In other words, in *Il.* 9 Odysseus is not brazenly and transparently lying. Achilles is, when he says one thing to Ajax after saying the opposite to Odysseus in the presence of both. Socrates

is in effect saying it is strange that Hippias thinks Achilles is accusing Odysseus of deception while Achilles is the one who is more obviously doing so in this passage.[8] While this may bolster Socrates' point that Achilles appears to be out of control in his speech, the outrageous claim that Odysseus is not false only serves to provoke Hippias (and Plato's readers). It is as if Socrates is testing our resolve in sticking to the inquiry rather than resigning in outrage at Socrates' "manifest absurdities."[9]

Hippias' claim that Achilles acts out of "fellowship" is the source of Socrates' initial claim that the voluntary wrongdoer is better than the involuntary wrongdoer. Since an examination of this claim occupies the remainder of the dialogue, it is worth seeing how it is inferred at this stage in the dialogue. At 371e4–5, Socrates infers from Hippias' explanation the following:

(I) Then apparently Odysseus is better than Achilles.

This, Socrates says at 371e7–8, is true because it was "just now" shown that:

(II) The one who is voluntarily false is better than the one who is involuntarily false.

Hippias understands (II) to imply (371e–372a2):

(III) Those who are voluntarily unjust are better than those who are involuntarily unjust.

Hippias is the one who describes Achilles behavior as involuntary, but what would warrant the inference that voluntary lying is better than involuntary lying? Hippias defends Achilles against the charge of contradiction by appeal to an internal constraint. Hippias says at 371d8–e2 that "I am convinced that fellowship[10] moved (ἀναπεισθείς) him to say to Ajax different things than what he said to Odysseus." He says both times that Odysseus, by contrast, speaks falsely "with a scheme in mind" (ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς). In other words, by Hippias' own estimation, Achilles lacks ability: he both fails to be free of external constraints and fails to do what he wants. By saying that Odysseus voluntarily lies implies that he does possess ability: he knows what he is doing (he has "a scheme in mind") and does what he wants. What about Achilles?

A textual variant at 371e1 provides an important clue to what makes Achilles' act involuntary. The variation in question occurs in Hippias' response to Socrates' suggestion that Achilles lies. Socrates has just observed that Homer has Achilles say one thing to Ajax (in Odysseus' presence) after he has just said the opposite to Odysseus (371d4–7, in reference to *Il.* 9.625ff.). Hippias objects to the charge of lying (with the variation in question left blank):

> I don't think so, Socrates! On the contrary, I'm convinced that _____ moved (ἀναπεισθείς) him to say to Ajax different things than what he said to Odysseus. But Odysseus, whether he says what's true or what's false, always speaks in the same way, having some scheme in mind (ἐπιβουλεύσας).

Burnet's 1903 edition of the text fills the blank with εὐνοίας, following MS F, while Vancamp's 1996 edition reads εὐηθείας with MSS T, W, S, and a later version of F.[11] The majority of translations follow Burnet's text, and English translations translate εὐνοίας as "goodwill" or "kindness of heart."[12] Among those who read εὐηθείας are Smith, who translates it as "guilelessness," Weiss as "naivete," and Pinjuh's German translation of Vancamp's edition, "Arglosigkeit."[13] Regardless of which word or translation is used, the passive ἀναπεισθείς is enough to imply that the act is involuntary in some way. The contrast with Odysseus, who always has "a scheme in mind" suggests the difference is in intent or what he has a mind to do. But each reading offers different grounds for Socrates to infer how the action in question is involuntary. Reading εὐνοίας, Hippias understands Achilles' remarks to show he cares more for Ajax than Odysseus. But this suggests Achilles in some sense knows what he is doing, but that he is motivated by feeling rather than knowledge of what he will actually do. Εὐηθείας is ambiguous, but in an illuminating way. Either it has Achilles contradict himself out of naivete or without malicious intent. If he is naïve, he is ignorant of some fact about what he is doing. If he acts without malicious intent, which contrasts more directly with Odysseus' mode of behavior, he either knows what he is doing but acts with a different intent or no intent at all.

Weiss' argument for reading εὐηθείας is instructive for finding a solution to this puzzling passage. Her justification for εὐηθείας is that this choice "makes better sense given Hippias' characterization of Achilles as *haplous*" at 365b4.[14] Weiss takes ἁπλούς to mean gullible or simple, thus construing εὐηθείας as naivete. Weiss overlooks the fact that "naïve" cannot be what Hippias means when he describes Achilles as ἁπλούς in his initial characterization of him. As I argued in chapter 1 (22–23), Homer's text strongly suggests that Hippias describes Achilles as ἁπλούς on the basis of Achilles' claim to speak ἀπηλέγεως, i.e., "blunt" or "straightforward" not "naïve." But if it is clear from the start that Hippias does not think Achilles is naïve, why should Socrates go on to get Hippias to commit to saying he is naïve over the course 365b–366c, only to have him return to the initial meaning again at 371e1? Rather than think that Socrates has a single notion of Achilles in mind throughout, the evidence suggests he is attempting to clarify Achilles' τρόπον (365b3), which Hippias describes with several ambiguous terms. As I pointed out, ἅπλος can have an active sense, i.e., "blunt" as a manner of speech, but also a passive sense, naïve. By revisiting Homer's portrayal of Achilles,

Socrates is in a position to sort out this ambiguity, only to have Hippias use yet another, equally ambiguous term εὐηθείας.

There is a parallel use of εὐηθεία in the *Republic* that displays this ambiguity. *Republic* I 343d2, c6, and 348c12 have Thrasymachus characterize the just person using εὐηθεία.[15] But Socrates' response to Thrasymachus 348c12 reveals that εὐηθεία is ambiguous and in need of clarification. After Thrasymachus says that justice is γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, Socrates immediately asks "so you call injustice maliciousness (κακοήθειαν)?" Thrasymachus responds, "no, I say it's good judgment (εὐβουλίαν)." Socrates recognizes that εὐηθεία can mean either without malicious intent or naivete/poor judgment, and his question gets Thrasymachus to reveal which of the two he has in mind. In *Hippias Minor* (*HiMi*), Hippias contrasts εὐηθεία with ἐπιβούλευσας, which is close in meaning to κακοήθειαν. Achilles lacks malicious intent, but his contradictory statements now look like the result of ignorance or conflicting attitudes. Socrates' immediate inference is that Odysseus is now better than Achilles because only the former lies voluntarily, which Hippias takes to mean that the voluntarily unjust are better than the involuntarily unjust. What Socrates has done, in effect, is to get Hippias to admit that Achilles' bluntness is not a power after all.

The only thing that could warrant Socrates' inference that Odysseus is better than Achilles, it seems, is the account of ability outlined in this earlier analysis of δύναμις. While it is clear that his concept of ability distinguishes the voluntary from the involuntary, it was unclear in the analysis of δύναμις how one is better than the other on this basis alone. Now the difference Hippias offers does this: Odysseus acts with a scheme in mind, i.e., behaves badly, *regardless of whether he lies* (371e3–4), whereas Achilles does not. Here, again, Socrates makes an important clarification of the concept of ability. Cast in terms of Δ, Achilles is (a) hindered by external constraints, (c) does not know what he is doing, and (d) does not do what he wants. If his contradictory statements to Ajax and Odysseus amount to ignorance, it also appears that he does not even know (b), that what he is saying is true or false. Odysseus not only knows that what he is saying is true/false, but (c) he also knows what he is doing: he is doing something wrong and wants to do it (d). If ability is the basis for a moral evaluation of an agent's actions, and better means better at something, then Odysseus is better insofar as he is better at doing bad things. Achilles is not better at this, so he is worse. This, of course, is paradoxical as both Hippias and Socrates will admit.

Hippias will object to Socrates' comparison of the heroes, exclaiming "how . . . could the voluntarily unjust, those who scheme voluntarily and do bad deeds be better than those who do so unintentionally?" (372a1–6). Scholars have observed that Hippias, not Socrates, is the first to explicitly bring

justice into the discussion. Socrates, one suggestion goes, does not think there is anything wrong with speaking falsely and this transition marks a transition from Homeric to Socratic analysis. Since the person who speaks falsely does so with wisdom, and wisdom is good, he is better than one who does so out of ignorance.[16] But as Socrates' analysis of δύναμις shows that the problem is not whether Hippias equates being false with being unjust. He clearly does. The problem is that he has not given an adequate account for what in the false person's ability makes them unjust. The wisdom that characterizes the false person *qua* able person is not obviously the sort of wisdom Socrates seeks in the *Apology* and many other dialogues, i.e., knowledge of what is good and bad.[17] It is clear that Hippias thinks lying is wrong, but he has not given a clear account of what makes it so until Socrates pushes him with the example of Achilles' contradictory behavior. Given that wisdom is introduced in the analysis of the false person's δύναμις as wisdom "regarding the things about which [the false person] speaks falsely]" (366a3–4), all wisdom amounts to is knowing that something is true or false. Hippias does say that the false person knows what he is doing when he behaves badly, and this appeared to rule out cases in which a person knows what he is doing but does not know that it is bad. So it is possible that the false person's wisdom includes knowing what is good and bad, such that they could deceive someone into thinking that what is actually bad is good. But Hippias seems to want to restrict the false person's wisdom to the subject matter of deception, i.e., a person knows that what they are saying is false, and they know how to present it as true in an effort to deceive. Is part of their wisdom the knowledge that deception is bad? Hippias' justification of Achilles behavior as well as his objection regarding voluntary injustice makes it clear why he thinks so. Hippias appeals to legal practice for justification of his objection, stating at 371e9–372a5 that the courts are more lenient toward someone who has committed wrong involuntarily. This suggests he understands Achilles' falsehood as a wrong, but one that is done out of ignorance of wrongdoing. By contrast, Odysseus and the false person know that what they are doing is wrong.

The remainder of the dialogue is concerned with examining the claim that the voluntary wrongdoer is better than the involuntary wrongdoer. Before turning to that final section of the dialogue, let us take stock of what leads to this claim in the first place. For one thing, Hippias' legal objection picks up a less obvious point first made in the calculation argument. There, it was unclear why the person who is an expert in calculation would speak falsely in the first place. In other words, nothing in his expert knowledge would explain it, so there must be some other knowledge that would explain his motive. This is just what the example of Achilles contradicting himself reveals: he lacks knowledge of what he is doing and he fails to do what he wants. The legal

objection also illuminates Hippias' concern, for it implies that a person is treated more leniently for doing wrong involuntarily *on the assumption* that he would not have done wrong had he known it was wrong. It is at least clear that he did not want to do it. While this does not preclude the possibility that a person could want to do what is wrong, and do so voluntarily (as the law also recognizes), it does bring into focus the Socratic question about why anyone would want to do wrong voluntarily in the first place. It points to the role of desire in voluntary action, an important part of the Socratic puzzle that no one wants to do what is wrong. And he gets it from a plausible reading of Homer, who has Achilles' companions question whether he is really in control of his actions.

NOTES

1. E.g., Blundell, 155.
2. See note 1 above.
3. Carelli, 68.
4. For an action to be ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς typically means that it is aimed at doing harm to someone (e.g., Herodotus, *Histories* 1.12, Isocrates 4.148).
5. Chapter 2, 36.
6. This is yet another place where Socrates is accused of mischaracterizing Homer, but there is textual evidence to suggests otherwise. In an illuminating paper on the intertextual dialogue between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Mitsis argues that Socrates is right. Achilles nowhere is described as having a reputation for honesty and before *Il.* 9 we see him mischaracterize his argument with Agamemnon to his mother, Thetis (Mitsis, 54–60). More significantly, in the *Odyssey* 14.156, Odysseus uses nearly identical phrases as Achilles to condemn lying and to indicate what will come to pass. There Odysseus says to Eumaeus "as hateful to me as the gates of Hades/ is he who, driven by poverty, utters deceptive (ἀπατήλια) words." In the same speech he predicts the return of Odysseus and the death of the suitors, stating "all will come to pass, just as I say" (14.160). Yet Odysseus says this while in disguise, hiding from Eumaeus the fact that he is Odysseus. Furthermore, in the course of hiding his true identity from Eumaeus, he has told the truth: Odysseus has returned and will kill the suitors. Mitsis argues that this passage alludes to Achilles' words in *Il.* 9. This allusion reveals that Achilles and Odysseus are not as distinct as Hippias and many modern scholars of Homer think, at least not when it comes to saying one thing and hiding another. Mitsis observes that key phrases in Achilles' speech only appear again in the Odyssey, and there only spoken by or about Odysseus (55). Just as Odysseus says the suitors will die while hiding the fact that he, the beggar in disguise, is the one who will bring it about, so too Achilles hides a murderous wish for the destruction of the Greeks while saying he hates those who hide what is in their minds. Achilles' desire to see the Greeks die is known to us readers but not to the Greeks. Similarly, only we know that it is Odysseus in disguise. While concealing, however, both reveal their inten-

tions. In other words, they both truthfully say what they have a mind to do. Socrates cites this evidence himself, quoting *Il.* 9.650–55, where Achilles tells Ajax that he will not fight until "Hector is upon the tents . . . killing Argives" (371c1–3). In short, there is no basis for thinking Socrates distorts Homer, for there is ample evidence in Homer's text and Socrates' use of it to show that "Achilles is being more 'distinctly Odyssean' than Odysseus, since he manages to have his enemies punished by Zeus solely through his words and passivity" (61).

7. Carelli, 70. The same interpretation is found in Lévystone, "La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate 'polutropos'," *Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy* 50, no. 3 (2005) 199.

8. One potential problem with this interpretation is that Achilles may accuse Odysseus precisely because he suspects Odysseus has just lied to him by omitting crucial parts of Agamemnon's reconciliation offer. Hippias, at any rate, thinks Achilles' accusation applies to Odysseus more generally "both in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*" (365c1–2).

9. Guthrie, 196.

10. Reading εὐηθείας with MSS TWS (Vancamp) instead of εὐνοίας with MS F (Burnet). See next paragraph and note 11.

11. *Platonis Opera*, ed. by John Burnet (Oxford; New York; Toronto [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1903). *Hippias Major; Hippias Minor / Platon*. Textkritisch herausgegeben von Bruno Vancamp. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996. Recently, some scholars have argued in favor of εὐηθείας on text-critical grounds. One advantage of doing so is that if the intended term can be decided up front, the interpretive issues are narrower in scope. These attempts, however, are insufficient to decide the matter. Weiss, for instance, gives the following rationale: "Burnet, following the less reliable manuscript F has εὐνοίας (good will) in place of εὐηθείας (naivete), which is found in the more authoritative T and W" (2006, 131 n. 19). It is unclear on what grounds Weiss thinks F (Vindobonensis Suppl. Gr. 39) is less reliable and T (Venetus Marcianus gr. App. Class. IV, 1) and W (Vindobonensis Suppl. Gr. 7) are more authoritative. A manuscript's reliability is only determined by how close it gets the editor to the archetype (M. L. West. *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique*. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1973). Although MS F does have many errors, both Burnet and Vancamp argue that F is of central importance to the *HiMi*. It descends from a separate hyparchtype (g) than T and W, which descend from the same hyparchetype (b). So, T and W may agree more, but that is because they descend from the same hyparchetype. F is therefore important as an independent witness to the text. Burnet attests to F's authority, too, arguing that F is "derived from an archetype of greater antiquity than any extant Platonic MS," on the grounds that its errors are mainly typographical rather than conjectural. Burnet, "A Neglected MS of Plato," *The Classical Review*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Mar., 1902), 99. Burnet explicitly includes the variation at 371e1 among this sort of error, implying that ΗΘ in ΕΥΗΘΕΙΑ could easily be confused with ΝΟ in ΕΥΝΟΙΑ. Burnet, in "Vindobonensis F and the Text of Plato," *The Classical Review*, vol. 17, no. 1 (1903) 13. In the absence of compelling contextual grounds for reading εὐηθείας with T and W, Burnet's evidence provides some justification for following F on textual grounds.

Vancamp favors εὐηθείας in his edition, though it is not clear that his edition offers compelling reasons to depart from Burnet. The advantage of this edition over Burnet's is mainly in its apparatus, which gives a much more comprehensive treatment of the manuscript tradition. Vancamp's edition has few variations from Burnet's, and more often than not his edition provides greater support for readings already attested by Burnet. But in the few instances where Vancamp does depart from Burnet, of which 371e1 is an instance, the majority reading is what tip the scales. In the case of *HiMi* 371e1, Vancamp's apparatus reads "εὐηθείας TWSF^{3il}: εὐνοίας F^{ac}." The first implication here is that there is greater agreement among independent MSS for εὐηθείας than εὐνοίας (where T and W belong to one family, S to another). Like Burnet, Vancamp acknowledges that F *ante correctionem* ("F^{ac}") is authoritative, but for the variation at 371e1, Vancamp relies mostly on the weight of S (Venetus Marcianus gr. 189). Vancamp states that the discrepancy between S's and F's reading of 371e1 is a separative error (1996, 37). Given, then, the independence of S from F, and the former's agreement with the independent witnesses T and W, F is taken to contain the erroneous reading. Burnet, however, is aware of S, listing it in his 1903 edition of *HiMi*. Though he states that "the precise relation between F and S (which is of earlier date than F) must be left for future inquiry" he is already aware that S is independent of F (1903, 13). His apparatus for *HiMi* almost entirely leaves out S, on the grounds that F and S mostly agree in *HiMi.* If the majority reading was not reason enough for Burnet to side with εὐνοίας in T and W over eu0hqei/av in F, the addition of S did not change his view. In the absence of clear reasons to side with the majority reading, that MS S contains errors not found in the F establishes separation, but it does not decide which MS contains the correct reading. It remains unclear, then, on text critical grounds why we should prefer S's reading over F's and, therefore, why we should favor εὐηθείας over εὐνοίας.

12. Jowett: "in the innocence of his heart" (*Lesser Hippias.* Tr. by B. Jowett, in Hamilton, 1961), Fowler: "by the goodness of his heart" (*Hippias Minor. Plato II.* Tr. by H. N. Fowler. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959), Waterfield: "goodwill" (in Saunders), Allen: "kindness of heart" (*Plato: Ion, Hippias Minor, Laches, Protagoras*, tr. by R. E. Allen. [New Jersey: Yale University Press, 1996]), and Ruden: "good-heartedness" in Chan.

13. Nicholas Smith in *Plato: Complete Works*. Edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper; Weiss, 2006 no.19; Jan-Markus Pinjuh, *Platons Hippias Minor*, *Classica Monacensia*, 2014.

14. Weiss, 125.

15. Weiss, 126, also appeals to these texts in making her case, though in translating the term as "naivete" she does not seem to acknowledge the ambiguity of the term.

16. Lévystone, 199, says that Homer is abandoned at this point. Also Weiss, 143. Against Weiss, Jones and Sharma, 22, argue that both Hippias and Socrates recognize the moral implications of Hippias' assessment of Homer's heroes. They are responding to Weiss' claim that the shift from speaking falsely to acting unjustly reveals a problem with thinking virtue is a craft. Jones and Sharma argue that Socrates preserves the craft analogy even though he is unable to give a complete account for how justice cannot be misused as other crafts can. I agree with Jones and Sharma, though

on slightly different grounds: Hippias and Socrates are basing their view on Homer's values, and risk violating that constraint here if the turn to voluntary wrongdoing is a departure from what he says (as Lévystone's account requires). We need not do this if we recognize that in Homer already there is no distinction between morally better and better at some skill. Achilles fighting skill, for example, is what makes him morally superior. Understood this way, the craft-virtue relationship is preserved but the debt to Homer also remains intact.

17. At *Apology* 22d–e, Socrates explains that he found craftsmen to have wisdom in their areas of expertise, but not in anything else, especially not wisdom of the most important sort, i.e., knowing how to live well.

Chapter Five

"If in fact there is such a person"

372b–End

The final set of arguments has Socrates examine the conclusion that the person who is voluntarily unjust is better than the one who is involuntarily unjust. This set of arguments begins and ends with Socrates claiming to waver over whether to accept this conclusion, though scholars are divided over whether Socrates' wavering is sincere. To settle this, I want to consider what purpose the arguments between waverings serve if they do not settle the question for him one way or another. Socrates' initial wavering results from the final comparison of Achilles and Odysseus (369e2–371e8). That discussion settled a problem regarding the false person's δύναμις, namely that if the false person's δύναμις is what explains his bad behavior, he must not simply know what is true or false in some arena of expertise, but he must know what he is doing (i.e., have a plan in mind), and know that what he is doing is wrong. But there are additional problems that still linger from their analysis of δύναμις and the two Homeric heroes, problems which inform Socrates' wavering about whether to accept the conclusion about voluntary wrongdoing. These problems motivate Socrates' initial wavering and are addressed in the subsequent arguments.

Though these arguments again yield the conclusion that the voluntarily unjust person is the good person, they allow Socrates to get closer to the specific problem he has with it, namely that there is no such person as the voluntarily unjust person. This explains why Socrates includes the strangely specific qualification on his final conclusion, namely that the voluntarily unjust person is good, "if in fact there is such a person" (376c4–6). This does not necessarily invoke a distinctly Socratic thesis. It does not isolate justice as something that is always in one's interest. After all, Socrates wavering is not only about justice, but about erring and behaving badly. On my reading, the final set of arguments appeal to the view that persons generally do not want to

act contrary to their own interests. Is Socrates therefore sincere in his doubt? Yes and no. He attributes his wavering to his own ignorance, but also to Hippias' failure to guide him. He is sincere that reliance on expertise as a guide to morality can mislead us. But does he accept the conclusion? To answer that, we have to recognize first and foremost that the dialogue as a whole is a play of ambiguity. It is deadly serious as a reflection on the pitfalls of relying on appearance—in this case, what is said or done—as a guide to truth—in this case, what is intended or believed. In such a work, we can hardly expect an answer to this question one way or another. Rather, it provokes us to continue thinking about how to solve the problem it leaves.

The final argument of the dialogue both begins and ends with Socrates claiming that he "wavers" over the conclusion he and Hippias draw from their argument, between believing that the person who does something wrong voluntarily is better than the one who does so involuntarily and believing the opposite. At 372d4–e3, Socrates specifies the claim about which he wavers as follows:

> (I) Those who harm people and are unjust, false, deceptive, and err voluntarily and not involuntarily are better (βελτίους) than those who do so involuntarily.[1]

Hippias has already rejected this conclusion, and Socrates says that he believes the opposite "at times" (372d7). After going through multiple examples to test this claim, he concludes with the following at 376b4–6:

> (I) The one who errs and does shameful and unjust things voluntarily, if in fact there is such a person, is none other than the good person.

Hippias says he does not know how to accept this conclusion. Socrates agrees with Hippias, saying "Nor indeed to do I know how I'll agree with myself, Hippias. Yet it has to look that way under the circumstances, given our argument" (376b8–c1). Here I use Jones' and Sharma's translation, by which they argue that Hippias and Socrates acknowledge the soundness of the argument leading up to it, yet they are both reluctant to accept it.[2] Hippias does not offer any reasons for his reluctance, aside from his objection at 372a2–5 that the law is more lenient toward involuntary wrongdoing. But scholarship is virtually unanimous in thinking that Socrates hints at his own reason in (II) above. By qualifying his conclusion with "if there in fact is such a person," Socrates leaves open the possibility that there is no such person who is voluntarily unjust. This could point to a distinctly Socratic thesis, either the view that no one wants what is bad for him or to the related view that injustice is not a δύναμις. Either way, this is a fairly specific doubt that Socrates raises

in the dialogue's final conclusion, so it is worth considering whether there is anything in the dialogue's arguments that warrant it. To put it another way, since the qualification "if in fact there is a such a person" only appears in (II) but not in (I), is there a new development in between the two that moves Socrates to introduce it?

Most scholars say there is not, which suggests that Socrates' reluctance is due to beliefs he holds at other times, in other dialogues, but does not reveal or has not fully formulated in the *Hippias Minor* (*HiMi*). Jones and Sharma argue that Socrates' "wandering" is due to the fact that while he believes (and states in other dialogues) that justice is always in one's interest, such that knowing what is just is tantamount to knowing what is in one's interest, he does not yet have a complete theory of voluntary action. But would this not imply that he already suspects, at the very least, that truly just persons would not want to act unjustly? When Socrates first admits to wavering at 372d8, he says it is due to ignorance.[3] Of course, simply reducing an interlocutor to *aporia* in an investigation of human excellence has benefit for Socrates, too. As he argues in the *Apology*, exposing the deficiencies in the wisdom of others tells Socrates something about his own wisdom. It is better to be who he is, i.e., someone who recognizes his own ignorance, rather than parade about with an untested claim to wisdom. Socrates echoes this in *HiMi,* saying "I am the sort of person I am," namely someone who acknowledges his own ignorance (372d2–3). A further bit of evidence in favor of Jones' and Sharma's view is that Socrates wavers not only about voluntary injustice, but also deception and error. He does not single out justice as a special kind of δύναμις exempt from misuse, even if he believes it is a special case. But Socrates is also clear that his not knowing which view is right, i.e., his wavering, is due to a failure in Hippias' ability to lead him to knowledge, which allows that he may think differently independent of Hippias' guidance. So, Jones and Sharma acknowledge that in *HiMi* Socrates is careful never to claim that a person would in fact act unjustly voluntarily. This, again, leaves readers with the distinct feeling that Socrates is hiding something, even if it is not a fully formed view. If he maintains "at times" the opposite (and fully Socratic) view, then why does he not offer those reasons here?[4] Concealing those reasons may just be Plato's aim in a dialogue whose central concern is deception and falsehood.

Not all are convinced that Socrates endorses the argument that leads to it, much less that Socrates is genuinely puzzled about the conclusion. Carelli provides the most detailed analysis to date of the argument between wanderings, starting at 373c6, and although he does not explicitly stake a claim about Socrates' sincerity, he suggests that the failure of the argument points only to a problem with Hippias' thinking, specifically Hippias' belief that ambivalent powers, i.e., those that can be used for good or bad, are good in their own

right.[5] He concludes that the dialogue shows Hippias that his claim to wisdom and excellence is unfounded, for his polymathy and versatility do not amount to being a good person. This, in effect, suggests that Socrates "wavering" is not sincere puzzlement. Yet Carelli recognizes in the argument a Socratic point about the difference between the power of justice in its own right and the ambivalent powers of nonmoral crafts and abilities.

In the argument starting at 373c6, there is a progression of examples, from the uses of bodies and bodily organs and tools to the uses of souls and finally to "our own souls," namely souls as agents rather than instruments (375c6). Some have noted this progression, but only Carelli explains its function in the argument.[6] The examples of the powers of bodies, organs, tools, and even souls as instruments, Carelli shows, are subordinate to their user. If a tool, for instance, is in good condition it can be used for good or bad. It is preferable, as Socrates says starting at 374c5, to have a tool that one can use this way voluntarily rather than one that cannot be used however one wants. These powers are only good relative to their user. When it comes to the power of the user himself, however, the power to act justly or unjustly is not subordinate to another power. Therefore, it cannot be good derivatively, but must be good in itself. This puts Hippias in a dilemma: either he has to admit that justice is an ambivalent power, such that the person who voluntarily commits injustice is good, or he has to give up the claim that ambivalent powers are in themselves good. He expresses puzzlement over the former and cannot embrace it. But in doing so he gives up the latter. In effect, he must also give up his own claim to excellence, which is itself based on his myriad, but ambivalent powers.

Carelli's interpretation is illuminating, and it confirms what I argue is already at work earlier in the analysis of δύναμις and the argument about calculation. There Socrates is getting at what the false person's δύναμις consists in that makes him behave badly and unjustly as opposed to merely exercising his craft. If the false person's ability consists in nothing more than knowledge of calculation or some other expertise, behaving unjustly voluntarily must come from some other ability. If this problem is already exposed earlier in the dialogue, then Carelli's reading shows how the argument fleshes out this problem. In this regard, the dialogue at least takes tentative steps toward the view that justice cannot be voluntarily misused. But showing that justice is a superordinate craft does not show why we might think the person who possesses it would never use it unjustly.[7] If Socrates has not yet introduced the thesis that justice is always in one's interest, it is possible in *HiMi* that one could act unjustly as a means to what is in one's interest. This, again, would make the power of justice subordinate too. This possibility, I submit, is still open at this point of the dialogue, and it is why Socrates includes the specific doubt in his conclusion as to whether "there in fact is such a person" who

acts unjustly voluntarily. Socrates says he wavers not only about voluntary injustice, but also voluntary harming, deception, error, and falsehoods. In other words, his worry is not specific to justice, but to all sorts of wrongdoing. If he had the interest thesis, and all he meant by wrongdoing is that one does something bad for oneself, it would be easier to avoid his conclusion.

Like that of Jones and Sharma, Carelli's account reveals Socrates at work on problems central to his own philosophical outlook about virtue, but these accounts also place Socrates' solution outside the dialogue. Without something in the dialogue to motivate Socrates' hint at a more developed moral psychology, it is difficult to see the dialogue as anything other than a refutation of Hippias. I agree that *HiMi* does not contain the answer to the puzzle, but I do think it gets us closer than previous scholarship allows. Socrates' interest in moral psychology is already evident in the dialogue's attention to Homer. As I explain in chapters 1 and 4, Socrates' specific questions about Homer's characterization of Achilles reveal in Homer questionable motives behind Achilles' behavior, specifically whether his falsehoods are voluntary and what motivates his behavior. The analysis of δύναμις in chapter 2 showed that to give an adequate account of voluntary action, one must show that it results from knowledge, intent, and desire to act. But as we saw in chapter 3, the argument regarding calculation showed difficulties in explaining how knowledge connects to desire in such a way that explains why one uses one's knowledge for this or that end. It seems intuitive that the calculator, for instance, would want to tell the truth about calculation, but to lie about it points to some other motive, intent, and knowledge besides what is specific to his expertise. Odysseus, by contrast, does have a motive or intent, namely the "scheme" he has in mind. But even if Odysseus' ability to speak falsely includes knowing what is bad and wanting to do it, it is not clear that wrongdoing or injustice is his ultimate aim. The final conclusion over which Socrates wavers results from these lingering questions, which are explored in the arguments that lead to his final wavering.

SOCRATES' DOUBT, PART I: 371E4–372A5

The discussion of Homer's heroes led to the first conclusion that the voluntarily unjust person is better than the involuntarily unjust, and to Socrates' first confession that he wavers over it. Yet this first wavering does not include his later qualification "if there is such a person." With this qualification, Socrates could think that no one wants what is bad for him (e.g., *Protagoras*), or he could suspect that injustice and wrongdoing in general signals a lack of δύναμις (e.g., *Gorgias*). So, in order to see whether Socrates' qualification "if

there is such a person" is derived from something within the argument that leads up to it, I will consider in greater detail what provoked Socrates' initial wavering, and how the lingering doubts about Achilles and Odysseus identified there motivate the subsequent argument.

At the conclusion of their discussion of Achilles' contradictory behavior, Hippias claims that although both Achilles and Odysseus speak falsely, Achilles does not do so voluntarily, while Odysseus, on the other hand, does so "with a scheme in mind." At 371e4–5, Socrates infers from this:

(I) Then apparently Odysseus is better (ἀμείνων) than Achilles.

This, Socrates says at 371e7–8, is true because it was "just now" shown that:

(II) The one who is voluntarily false is better (βελτίους) than the one who is involuntarily false.

Hippias understands (II) to imply (371e–372a2):

(III) Those who are voluntarily unjust are better (βελτίους) than those who are involuntarily unjust.

Up until (II), the two heroes, as well as the true and false persons generally, are compared using ἀμείνων. Hippias balks at (I), exclaiming "Not in the least, Socrates!" If the comparative ἀμείνων simply means that one person is better at something than another, then Hippas should have no problem admitting that Odysseus is better at deception than Achilles. By inferring (II) Socrates could mean the same thing. Yet Hippias clearly thinks that being better at something can be grounds for moral excellence. In Homer, as we saw, being excellent at something, e.g., combat, entails being highly valued by society. Hippias believes all along that Odysseus is morally inferior to Achilles and that the false person is inferior to the truthful person. By thinking that (II) implies (III), Hippias takes Socrates to mean that Odysseus, the voluntarily false person, and the voluntarily unjust person are better persons. But Hippias does not have any basis to resist this conclusion. The only basis for evaluating a person's behavior is his ability. If ability is the basis for a moral evaluation of an agent's actions, and better means better at something, then Odysseus is a better person insofar as he is better at doing bad things, whether he is speaking truthfully or falsely (as Hippias asserts of Odysseus at 371e2–3). While Hippias has identified what makes the false person a bad person, namely his δύναμις, he now has to reckon with the implication that having a δύναμις is better than lacking one regardless of how it is exercised. If Hippias and Socrates want to refute their conclusion, one option is to show

that a person could exercise a δύναμις but still be a bad person. But to do this, they need to show that there is some other criterion for being good or bad than what is entailed by the concept of δύναμις in the dialogue thus far. Another option is to try to show that in doing something bad, a person is not exercising a δύναμις at all.

Hippias' appeal to law at the end of this section of dialogue reveals a possible way out. The law, says Hippias, is more lenient toward those who do injustice involuntarily than those who do so voluntarily. The assumption behind this leniency is that the person who did wrong involuntarily did not do what he wanted to do, or at least did not intend to do it.[8] If the person knew that what he was doing was unjust, he would not have done it. At the very least, the involuntary wrongdoer is given the benefit of the doubt, such that he could do wrong without being a bad person. Socrates even reminds Hippias of his objection when Hippias accuses him of deception. Socrates says he does not do this voluntarily, and so Hippias ought to be lenient toward him, i.e., educate him as to what he has done wrong (372b6–9). Achilles' behavior, which motivated this argument in the first place, can also be understood under this description. He spoke falsely involuntarily, according to Hippias, either out of anger, fellowship, or ignorance (371d8–e3). If an action is involuntary, it is a failure to exercise one's δύναμις, which means he either did not know what he was doing or did not want to do it. He may have done something wrong, and he has done so involuntarily, but insofar as he did not want to do this he could still be a good person (or at least not a bad person). Conversely, to show that the person with the power to behave badly is not a good person, he has to show that being good is based on criteria other than the person's δύναμις as they have defined it so far.

Socrates' doubt at this stage in the dialogue reveals a problem for him, too, for he will not want to give up the notion that being good essentially involves possessing a δύναμις. The analysis of δύναμις in *HiMi* provides all the elements of Socrates' moral psychology (i.e., Δ: that the able person knows, intends, and wants to do what he does), and that conception of δύναμις is consistent with what he says about it in other dialogues. Up to this point in the dialogue, Socrates does not reveal what he makes explicit in the *Gorgias*, namely that acting unjustly could never be the result of a δύναμις. Without the realization that a just person would never want to act unjustly, Socrates is unable to show that the unjust person lacks power altogether: they do not know what is good, they do not know what they are doing, and they do something (in acting unjustly) that they do not want to do. To get this far, Socrates would need to resolve the problem implicit in the calculation argument, namely how knowing is connected to wanting. The calculator might know what is true, but fail to do what he wants, i.e., lie about it. His knowledge is

incomplete, or of the wrong sort. So too, the just person does not really know what is good without also knowing that it is in his interest. But Socrates in *HiMi* is not committed to saying that injustice is the result of a δύναμις either. Here, too, Hippias' appeal to law offers a clue, insofar as it points to the fact that Achilles may not want to speak falsely or behave badly. This depends on the belief that acting unjustly is not in one's own interest. To solve the problems Socrates faces in *HiMi*, it will not be enough simply to invoke the view that no one wants to do what is unjust. Under the concept of δύναμις in *HiMi,* wanting is tied closely to knowing, such that *in theory* a person could know what is unjust and want to do it. But the interest thesis suggests that if a person knows what is unjust they will also know that it is not in their interest and, hence, not want to do it. Again, however, Socrates' wavering is not only about justice, but about wrongdoing in general. This wider scope may mean that he, like his contemporaries, wonders why one would do wrong for its own sake. The notion of interest raised in Hippias' objection also applies to Odysseus. Odysseus as Homer presents him speaks falsely to his own advantage. If his advantage is to reclaim what is rightfully his and to punish the suitors for violating the guest/host relationship, then his wrongdoing—his lies—may characterize the means by which he accomplishes something, but not necessarily the accomplishment itself. Nothing in the dialogue thus far rules out the possibility that one could want to do what is wrong or unjust insofar as it serves his interests. In short, if there is reason in *HiMi* for Socrates to doubt the conclusion of the argument thus far, the paradigmatic examples of Achilles and Odysseus may provide it.

A further clue to underlying problems is Socrates' sudden, unexplained shift to the comparative βελτίους in (II). If Socrates' shift of comparatives from ἀμείνων in (I) to βελτίους in (II) is valid, the two comparatives should be equivalent, or at least the latter is entailed by the former. But Hippias' reaction to (II) suggests he may not see it that way. Ἀμείνων is the only comparative used to compare the two heroes up to this point in the dialogue, and Socrates' use of it confuses Hippias, as is evident in his response to (I). Hippias thinks that Achilles is the better person, more deserving of praise and imitation, but Hippias does not have a clear idea of what makes a person good in the first place. By using βελτίων, Socrates is ensuring that Hippias is clear on the implications of his view, for βελτίων is more restricted to superior social standing than ἀμείνων.[9] Again, Socrates may want Hippias to explain what makes a person good or bad if not their δύναμις, and shifting to this comparative opens that possibility. While it is difficult to establish a consistent pattern of use, Socrates does allow for some distinction among these comparatives and tends to use βελτίων in contexts concerning justice. Hippias' inference from Socrates' claim and his subsequent complaint 371e9*ff,*

that the involuntarily unjust are treated differently under the law, suggests that he takes βελτίων to have this connotation too. The remaining arguments of the dialogue have Socrates shift repeatedly from ἀμείνων to βελτίων in an effort to understand whether they are distinct at all.

AGENTS, INSTRUMENTS, AND ACTIONS, 373C9–375D7

The arguments leading up to Socrates' initial wavering over the conclusion reveal that his doubt is due to unresolved questions about what makes a person good, if that person is evaluated in terms of his ability, and his ability explains his actions. Thus far their analysis does not specify how a person could be better in terms of their ability yet not be a better person. In other words, it does not specify the distinction between ἀμείνων and βελτίων. Socrates, too, has an interest in this potential distinction, especially if he wants to establish any correlation between crafts, i.e., abilities in general, and virtues. The next set of arguments has Socrates follow a similar pattern as he does at the end of the previous argument, starting with ἀμείνων and concluding with βελτίων. This suggests that his pattern or switching is meant to address the problems raised there.

While scholars are generally in agreement that the switching between comparatives seems deliberate, they all acknowledge that it is difficult to see any consistent pattern. Hoerber, for example, says that "the frequent interchange between ἀμείνων and βελτίων in the latter part of the dialogue seems to be more than merely coincidental; the variation of terms could be a clue both to the confusion which permeates the dialogue and to a possible solution of the perplexing propositions."[10] He suggests that Socrates uses ἀμείνων to denote ability or skill while βελτίων refers to ethical superiority. Despite this, he remains uncommitted to drawing such a conclusion: "whether Plato had such a distinction in mind would be difficult to prove."[11] Weiss agrees: "if this is so [that Plato makes this distinction between the comparatives], it is very difficult to see why Socrates uses βελτίων about instruments [as he does at 374e3–4]."[12] Though Zembaty does not make anything out of using two different comparatives, she thinks that the argument starting at 373d is meant to address the concern raised at 372d*ff*, namely that "better" must mean something other than "more capable," namely "an unspecified sense but having to do with judgments about human excellence."[13] I have already shown that Hippias thinks there is a difference between the two comparatives, but his only criteria for human excellence is δύναμις. So it has been specified already, but Hippias and Socrates question the adequacy of that specification. Therefore, I agree with Zembaty as far as Hippias is concerned, but I will show that

Socrates' interchange of the comparatives is intended to bring them in alignment rather than separate them. Socrates does use them in a systematic way, then, but only to show that there is no basis by which to distinguish them.

The first step in the argument distinguishes the evaluation of action and accomplishment from that of the agent. The argument begins by evaluating the agent in terms of his action alone (independently of his ability or intent):

1. Some runners are good runners and some are bad runners.
2. He who runs well is the good runner. He who runs badly is the bad runner.
3. He who runs slowly runs badly and he who runs quickly runs well.
4. Therefore, in a race, speed in running is good and slowness is bad.

In 1, good is said of the agent, who in 2 and 3 is evaluated by the way he acts, specifically the speed with which he runs (3 can read "the slow runner is a bad runner"). Two and 3 imply that he who runs quickly is good and he who runs slowly is bad. 4 identifies what is good and bad in the activity of running. If 4 follows validly from 2 and 3, Socrates must be claiming that if the agent is evaluated solely in terms of the way he acts, namely whether he runs slowly or quickly, then the evaluation of his action applies to the agent as well. What makes a runner a bad runner is the way he runs. This is what Hippias maintained initially for the speaker of falsehoods when he characterized Odysseus as such at 365b–c: the act of speaking falsely by itself entails that the speaker is bad. It should follow from 1 through 4 that the fast runner is better than the slow runner. In 5, however, Socrates evaluates the action in terms of the agent:

5. In fact (οὐν), the one who runs slowly voluntarily is a better (ἀμείνων) runner than the one who does so involuntarily.

Whereas in 1 through 4, focus on the runner's speed allows one to distinguish the fast runner from the slow runner and, hence, the good from the bad, in 5 the comparison is between two people who act the same way, at least by outward appearances: they both run slowly. What 5 says is that when two persons perform the same act, it is intention (or its absence) that distinguishes one person from another. If the runners in 5 are evaluated solely on the basis of their action, they are both bad runners according to 1 through 4. But if the runners' intent is taken into account and one acts voluntarily while the other does not, then according to 5 the voluntarily bad runner is good. Socrates must imply the following:

4.5. The person who does F voluntarily is better (ἀμείνων) than the person who does F involuntarily.

Whether "F" is good or bad is irrelevant to the evaluation made in 4.5. So even if we substitute for "F" "runs fast" 5 should follow in this form:

5. The one who runs fast voluntarily is better (ἀμείνων) than the one who runs fast involuntarily.

Just as Odysseus acts "with a scheme in mind" whether he tells the truth or lies, so also the good runner is better whether he runs slowly or quickly. The comparative ἀμείνων is used here as it is used consistently in the dialogue, to claim that one person is better at something in virtue of his ability. Since an act is voluntary just in case it is an exercise of a δύναμις, 5 can be analyzed in terms of the analysis of δύναμις earlier in the dialogue, namely Δ:

> (Δ) A person is able to act *F*-ly only if he (a) is not hindered by external constraints from acting *F*-ly, (b) has knowledge of the relevant facts involved in acting *F*-ly, (c) knows what he is doing when he acts *F*-ly, and (d) does what he wants when he wants in acting *F*-ly.

In the running case, "runs badly" and "runs slowly" are equivalent (by 1–4 above), so the runner's ability involves (a) not having a physical constraint on his ability to run, (b) knowing that he is running slowly, (c) knowing what he is doing by running slowly, and (d) wants to run slowly. This instance is importantly different than the application of Δ to Odysseus and the false person. There Hippias needed to show how Odysseus behaved badly in an unqualified sense, not that he does a bad job at speaking falsely. This does not yet rule out the possibility that Odysseus and the false person behave unjustly, but for the sake of their own interests. The end goal of the action is conspicuously absent from that earlier discussion as well as here. As we saw for the expert calculator, knowledge should inform desire, such that the agent knows what he wants. Odysseus' "scheme" implied intent, a plan to accomplish what one wants. But omitting mention of a plan or intent here, or at least leaving it implicit, reinforces the need to explain one's aim in action. In the running case, behaving badly is restricted to running. This leaves open the possibility that a person uses his skill to run slowly, but for a morally good end. But if that is the case, then (c) would have to be different. He would have to know that he is doing something wrong, and that is not part of his ability as a runner, strictly speaking. In such a case, the ability to run fast or slowly is subordinate, as Carelli would put it, to the ability to behave morally well or badly. Thus far, though, his ability and behavior are restricted to running. As a result, ἀμείνων can be understood in a morally neutral sense, as better at running. This may be why Hippias readily agrees to 1 through 5. He is reticent when Socrates introduces shame into the example.

In the next portion of the argument, Socrates introduces shame to the evaluation of action and emphasizes the accomplishment of the action, not just what the person does. In doing so, Socrates frames voluntary action as something that is done for the sake of, or at least results in, shame, i.e., social disapproval. Socrates leaves out mention of running well and focuses on running badly, most likely because it is the voluntary performance of bad acts that arouses the greatest concern in Hippias (he is certainly unlikely to object to the claim that the voluntarily just person is better than the involuntarily just person, though Socrates' argument would yield that result as well). The argument continues by identifying what makes a runner—the agent—good or bad, but by further qualifying the action as "shameful" Socrates appears to broaden the scope of what makes the action bad, implicitly using the comparative ἀμείνων in the sense more appropriate to βελτίων, which thus far is restricted to social superiority. Previously, in 1 through 5, it was simply running slowly, which could be done for a good or bad end. Now, the end is implied by establishing what the action "accomplishes" (ἐργάζεσθαι), namely something "shameful" (αἴσχρον):

6. To run is to act (ποιεῖν). (373d7–8)
7. To act is to accomplish (ἐργάζεσθαι) something. (373d8–e1)
8. Therefore, the one who runs badly accomplishes something bad and shameful (αἴσχρον). (373e1–2)
9. The one who runs slowly runs badly. (373e3)
10. Then (οὐκοῦν) the good runner accomplishes bad and shameful things (τὸ κακὸν . . . ἐργάζεται καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν) voluntarily and the bad runner, involuntarily. (373e4–5)
11. Therefore, in a race, the one who involuntarily accomplishes bad things (κακὰ ἐργαζόμενος) is worse (πονερότερος) than the one who voluntarily does them. (373e6–374a1)

The argument of 6 through 11 is similar in structure to the argument of 1 through 5 above: it moves from an evaluation of action alone to an evaluation of the agent performing the action. But the addition of 6 and 7 can only mean that Socrates wants to emphasize the outcome or result of action as opposed to acting in itself, regardless of what end the agent has in mind. Achilles might do something wrong in contradicting himself, but that is not what he aims to accomplish. Odysseus, too, may do something wrong in lying, but that is not what he wants to accomplish. The addition of shame makes this especially pointed for Hippias.

Hippias agrees without hesitation to 6 through 9, even that the runner accomplishes something shameful. Yet Hippias is reticent to accept claims 10

and 11. He qualifies his agreement by responding to 10 with "It seems that way at least" (ἔοικέν γε) and to 11 with "In a race, at least" (Ἐν δρόμῳ γε). If all Socrates means in 6 through 11 is that the good runner is the one who runs slowly voluntarily, then this argument is identical to the previous one and Hippias should accept both without hesitation. But shame is a powerful motivator for Hippias, just as it is for Gorgias and Polus in the *Gorgias*. The only mention of shame prior to this point in the dialogue comes early on at 364d3–6, where Hippias remarks that "it would be shameful" if he did not live up to his reputation for being able to answer any question put to him. For Hippias, the ultimate aim of his myriad powers is to win approval and bolster his reputation for wisdom, as Socrates himself remarks at 364a1–6 and as Eudicus reminds him at 373a9–b3, just before the argument about running. Failure to exercise his powers in such a manner would accomplish the opposite, i.e., shame. For Hippias, then, if reputation is what makes the difference between good and bad sophists, doing something shameful would be the mark of a bad sophist: it would reveal a lack of power. This explains why Hippias restricts his agreement to racing. Unlike the runner, Hippias the sophist cannot separate his ability from what it accomplishes, for failing to win a good reputation for wisdom essentially amounts to a failure of his ability. Characterizing the act as shameful also suggests that it is something one would not want to do. This does not necessarily invoke Socrates' thesis that no one wants to do what is wrong. But Hippias believes that he, at least, would not want to do something shameful, for it is not in his interest. The legal objection Hippias raised already suggests this for others, insofar as the involuntary wrongdoer is given the benefit of the doubt. If he knew it was wrong and a risk to his social standing, he would not have done it.

Qualifying a person's action as shameful also highlights the fact that skill or ability, i.e., what makes a person better ἀμείνων, is not necessarily distinct from his moral worth. For Homer, Achilles' excellence lies in his skill and accomplishments on the battlefield and his fearlessness in speech. So, too, a runner doing something shameful undermines his standing in society even if it is only as a runner. In this segment of argument, Socrates begins to interchange "A is better than B" with "B is worse than A." The term for "worse," i.e., πονερότερος, could describe being in a worse state or, in a moral sense, one who is less worthy as a person. With respect to the runner, this could simply mean that the one who is unable to do anything other than run slowly is in worse physical condition than the able runner. So Hippias' qualification signals that he accepts that the good runner is the one in good physical condition even though he does something shameful, but not that he is, say, a better person for doing so. Nevertheless, being in a better condition describes moral as well as nonmoral excellence. The better runner has a body in excellent con-

dition even if he does something that invites shame and weakens his social standing *as a runner*. Furthermore, thus far in the argument "better" means "more able" and describes a person's δύναμις. By introducing πονερότερος as the opposite of "better" Socrates will be able to connect ability with a person's "condition." As I state above, I agree with Zembaty that "better" is "understood in an unspecified sense having to do with judgments about human excellence," but also that Socrates works to specify it in this argument. Here Socrates takes the first step in specifying it by contrasting it with being in a worse condition. Socrates also specifies the stakes of being better, since the "better" person accomplishes something shameful, i.e., what undermines his status in society.

Socrates has used the comparative ἀμείνων in the running argument and switching to πονερότερος preserves the ambiguity of the former. As I have argued, ἀμείνων generically describes an action, i.e., being better at something, though this does not exclude moral superiority. In Homer being morally praiseworthy is essentially being better at something that society values (e.g., combat, counsel, etc.). His accomplishments in battle are not distinct from his value to society. Socrates' introduction of shame, and Hippias' reaction to it, suggests a similar equivalence, for the excellence of the agent is at stake. This brings ἀμείνων more closely in alignment with βελτίων, for being good at something has implications for one's status as a member of society. Because Hippias restricts his assent to running, Socrates offers the same argument for wrestling, but in doing so he shifts to the comparative βελτίων. Recall that when Socrates concluded at 371e7–8 that the voluntarily false person is better than the involuntarily false person, he switched from ἀμείνων to βελτίων, and Hippias objected to this, understanding Socrates to imply that the voluntarily unjust person is better (βελτίων) than the involuntarily unjust person. If βελτίων is more restricted to moral or social superiority than ἀμείνων, its use would disambiguate πονερότερος to make it clear that the involuntary wrongdoer is worse, morally speaking.

The wrestling argument has Socrates start with ἀμείνων and conclude with βελτίων, at a4. The argument can be summarized as follows:

1. The one who falls voluntarily is better (ἀμείνων) than the one who does so involuntarily. (374a2)
2. In wrestling, it is worse (πονερότερον) and shameful to be thrown than to do the throwing. (374a3–4)
3. Therefore, in wrestling, the voluntary doer (ἐργαζόμενος) of bad and shameful things is better (βελτίων) than the involuntary. (374a4–5)

Hippias expresses reticence toward 1 and 3 by replying "I guess" to 1 and "it seems that way" to 3. His reluctance to accept 3 is in line with his reluctance to accept a similar claim involving bad and shameful accomplishments in running. He allows, following 2, that the wrestler who voluntarily falls is in better physical condition than the one who does so involuntarily, but not necessarily morally superior. After all, his action of falling is described as shameful. But the use of βελτίων in 3 suggests that what is ἀμείνων is also βελτίων. In other words, being better at accomplishing something entails being in a better condition. Thus far, though, being in a better condition only means being in better physical shape. If being in better shape allows a person to voluntarily commit shameful acts, it is less clear how one could be βελτίων, in the sense that one is socially or morally superior. At the very least, it raises the question of what, if not one's physical condition, makes one better in spite of doing shameful acts. The next phase of the argument addresses this by distinguishing between better persons and better bodies, i.e., between agents and instruments, using βελτίων throughout.

At 374a7–8, Socrates asks "Isn't the person better (βελτίων) in respect to the body able to do both with the body—both things involving weakness and things involving strength, and both fine and shameful things . . .?" Hippias responds in a similar manner as before, by restricting his agreement to strength. Hippias likely means that he does not agree to this claim for shameful behavior, for this would entail agreeing that the morally superior person is the one who voluntarily does things that threaten his superior standing. Socrates' next move is to ask a series of questions regarding the better *body*. From 374b5 to c4, Socrates secures Hippias' agreement that the better body is the one that does shameful things voluntarily, for it is in better condition or "nearer to excellence of the body" (πρὸς ἀρετῆς . . . σώματος). Specifying the body as "better" allows Socrates to distinguish agent from instrument. What makes a body better cannot be a δύναμις of the sort defined earlier in the dialogue, for it is an agent that knows what he is doing and does what he wants. A more able body will only lack physical hindrances that prevent the agent from doing what he wants. It is the agent that uses the body however he wants. But by describing both agents and bodies as βελτίων, both are understood as being in better condition, and being in a better condition allows one to be better at accomplishing some end. Doing something shameful with the body does not undermine the condition of the body. Agents are in better condition or "nearer to excellence" insofar as they are able to do what they want, even if what they want is shameful. But it is less clear that in doing so they do not undermine their own good condition. If a soul's good condition essentially means having a δύναμις, and this ability explains shameful behavior, then this person knows that something is shameful and wants to do it. But as Hippias has implied by

his resistance to Socrates' claims about shame, he finds it difficult to imagine that one would want to "accomplish" this.

In the next phase of the argument, Socrates introduces preference as a further gloss on what makes something better, but in doing so distinguishes agents from instruments. At 374c5, Socrates asks, "Do you prefer to have good things or bad things?" Hippias responds that he prefers to have good things, and his responses to Socrates' subsequent examples make it clear that he thinks having good things is preferable because one can use them as one wants. From 374c6 to e6, Socrates secures Hippias' agreement that the better body parts, organs of perception, as well as tools and musical instruments are all better (βελτίων) because they are in such a condition that a person can use them voluntarily, even if it is to do bad (κάκα) things. Bad instruments—those that malfunction and cannot be used voluntarily—are described as being πόνερος, i.e., in poor condition. Whether they are used for the sake of a good or bad end is up to the agent. Therefore, the instruments themselves are not evaluated in terms of their use, but their condition. Socrates uses βελτίων in all these examples to describe the instrument, not the agent. In so doing, it appears that the term describes nothing more than being in a better condition. If this carries any connotation of moral superiority, it only underscores the point that has been at issue all along, namely that the superiority of something is distinct from its application. The instrument examples provide the clearest expression yet of this difference, for instruments, like skills and δύναμεις, are not evaluated in terms of how they are used. The agent uses them for good or bad ends, but that is separate from what makes it good. Socrates establishes in the argument just prior to this one that both agents and bodies are βελτίων insofar as they are in good condition.[14] If βελτίων says something about human excellence, it is essentially the same as all other excellence: to be a good person is to have a soul in good condition, except that the δύναμις of this soul involves different knowledge, intent, and motivation than other sorts of soul-excellences. While this allows that one could be excellent even if one accomplishes bad things, the feature of excellence that Socrates isolates here is being (or having something) in a condition that allows one to accomplish what one wants. This, after all, is what makes something preferable.

The argument regarding runners and wrestlers aligned ἀμείνων with βελτίων, insofar as it showed that being better at some activity essentially requires being in a good condition. The argument from instruments aligns βελτίων with ἀμείνων insofar as the powers, i.e., conditions, of such instruments make their users better at accomplishing something. Hippias, however, was resistant to describing these persons as better persons. As long as a person's δύναμις is what makes him better, these two comparatives identify the same qualities of that person. The body/instrument argument made it easier

for Hippias to accept this equivalence, for in those cases it was clear that the quality of the instrument is independent of what one does with it. But it also delays the problem, for one could still object that even though the body or tool is good, the user who uses the tool to accomplish bad things is not. Socrates addresses this next by applying the same reasoning to souls as instruments.

When Socrates turns to discuss souls as instruments in the very next part of the argument, he exploits the equivalence of comparatives by switching back to ἀμείνων. Like tools, souls as instruments are better at accomplishing whatever the user wants to do with them. Twice he emphasizes its use to ensure that Hippias is aware he is agreeing to a claim using ἀμείνων when he has already agreed to similar claims using βελτίων. At 375a1–2, Socrates asks whether it is better (ἀμείνων) to have a horse's soul by which one rides badly voluntarily. Hippias agrees and Socrates' immediately follows up by asking, "Then it is ἀμείνων?" ("Ἀμείνων ἄρα ἐστίν;" at 375a3). He does this again for an archer's soul and the soul "more skilled at medicine" (ἰατρικωτέρα), with Hippias agreeing to each one and concludes that in "all crafts and sciences" (τὰς τέχνας τε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας) the better (ἀμείνων) soul is the one that accomplishes bad things voluntarily (375b8–c1). The preferable soul is one that can be used to do bad things voluntarily. It is better at (ἀμείνων) accomplishing whatever its user wants to accomplish with it. Like better bodies and instruments, these souls are also, by implication, in better condition (βελτίων). But when Socrates is talking about the condition of a soul, e.g., its abilities as an archer or medical doctor, he is talking about the δύναμις specific to those crafts. As we saw with the calculation argument, having a δύναμις specific to some craft does not explain how that person behaves badly, for it does not include knowledge of what is bad. They may use their expertise to accomplish ends that are not part of the δύναμις specific to that expertise. In these arguments, too, souls good at some skill are not going to explain voluntary injustice. It looks as though Socrates has collapsed βελτίων with ἀμείνων, but at the cost of the moral connotation of βελτίων that generated Socrates' puzzlement at the start. But again there is nothing to appeal to in identifying a moral condition of the soul other than the agent's δύναμις. Moral excellence, i.e., excellence in social conduct, is no different in kind than any other excellence. It only differs in terms of the contents of one's δύναμις, i.e., what one knows, intends, and wants.

Socrates once again switches back to βελτίων when it comes to "our own soul" at 375c7, to which Hippias again objects:

> Socrates: Wouldn't we want our own soul to be in the best condition (βελτίστην)?
>
> Hippias: Yes.

> Socrates: Then will it be better (βελτίων) if it accomplishes bad things and misses the mark voluntarily than if it did so involuntarily?
>
> Hippias: It would be awful, Socrates, if those who are voluntarily unjust will turn out to be better (βελτίους) than those who are involuntarily unjust.

Is Hippias right to object? Not if he is in keeping with the way in which the two comparatives have been used. In the previous arguments, it is possible to agree that the soul or instrument is in good condition while allowing that the user uses it for bad ends, and does so voluntarily. This means that there is something besides the soul or instrument that makes the user or agent good or bad. But that could only be another δύναμις, namely the agent's power of justice or moral excellence. If all that involves is knowing what is just and unjust, then the one who does wrong voluntarily has the better soul, both βελτίων and ἀμείνων. Carelli points out that in this case, because the soul is the agent and not the instrument, the good soul is not subordinate to the user and it cannot be good in the same sense that ambivalent powers are good. But justice could be a subordinate power if what is just is not always equivalent to what is good. This possibility always remains open as long as the interest thesis is not stated explicitly for justice. An agent's interest, what he wants, has always been just under the surface of the dialogue's arguments. This is not the Socratic thesis about justice, but a general thesis about what one wants. Socrates himself wavers not only over whether the good person is voluntarily unjust, but also over voluntary error, deception, and other sorts of bad behavior. If the good person's power involves knowing good and bad (whether or not this includes justice), this person will also know what is good for him, i.e., what is to his advantage. It is not necessarily clear that justice is to one's advantage. If we switch "just/unjust" with "good/bad," Socrates is making a stronger point here: It makes no sense to say that a good person does what is bad voluntarily, for there is nothing within his power to justify the end goal or "accomplishment" of his action. Just as the expert calculator's δύναμις does not obviously explain why one would lie about it, so too the good person's δύναμις does not obviously explain why one would behave badly. He cannot say that he thought it would benefit him, because either "beneficial" would describe yet another δύναμις or benefit is already included in knowing what is good and bad. Here, again, shame plays a crucial role: the person who has the power to do what is shameful knows what is shameful, i.e., what undermines his status in society. If this is not to his advantage, he has no other reasons to appeal to in explaining why he does it. This is not the Socratic thesis and Socrates, of course, does not make this possibility explicit. But the interest thesis is there in a more general form, in the sense that if doing badly issues from an agent's knowledge of what is good and bad, is intentional, and in-

volves doing what the agent wants, then it is puzzling at the very least why a person would do that as an end in itself.

375D7–376B6: SOCRATES' DOUBT II, JUSTICE AS POWER OR KNOWELDGE

Hippias' legal objection does acknowledge that persons are voluntarily unjust. As a form of wrongdoing, injustice is subject to the same sort of analysis as any other form of wrongdoing. But when Hippias objects that the good soul is one that does wrong voluntarily, Socrates singles out justice and, for the first time in this dialogue, explicitly identifies it as a δύναμις, an ἐπιστήμη, or both. Thus far, Socrates and Hippias have gone through several arguments, all of which were motivated by their doubt that the voluntary wrongdoer is better than the involuntary wrongdoer. As I suggested earlier, one possibility is to show that there is something other than one's δύναμις that explains what makes a person good or bad. That turns out not to be the case. This explains why Socrates returns to make explicit that justice is a δύναμις. The other option, which we see Socrates take in the *Gorgias*, is to deny that wrongdoing issues from a δύναμις at all. The last phase of the argument in *HiMi* takes a tentative step in this direction. The argument is summarized as follows:

1. Justice is either an ability or knowledge or both.
2. The more able soul was shown to be better (βελτίων).
3. Then if justice is an ability, then the more able soul is more just.
4. If justice is knowledge, then the wiser soul is more just, and the more ignorant is more unjust.
5. If justice is both an ability and knowledge, then the soul that has both is more just, but the more ignorant [and more incapable] soul is more unjust.
6. Then the more able and wiser soul was shown to be better (ἀμείνων), i.e., it is more capable of doing both the shameful and the fine regarding any deed.
7. Then, whenever shameful things are accomplished, the voluntary soul does them because of his ability and craft, where these belong to justice, either both or one.
8. To do something unjust is to do a bad thing, and to do something not unjust is to do a fine thing.
9. Then the more able and better (ἀμείνων) soul, whenever it does something unjust, does it voluntarily, and the worse soul does injustice involuntarily.
10. Then the good man is the one who has a good soul, and the bad man is the one who has a bad soul.

11. Therefore, the good man does something unjust voluntarily and the bad man, involuntarily, if the good man has a good soul.
12. Therefore, the one who voluntarily misses the mark and does shameful and unjust things, if in fact there is such a person, is none other than the good person.

Socrates admits that this result is "necessary" given the argument: 6 through 9 follows the same pattern as many of the preceding arguments. The act of injustice is bad and shameful, but the person who does an injustice voluntarily is good, i.e., in a good condition (βελτίων) and better at (ἀμείνων) committing injustice. It adds that the just soul does fine and shameful things "regarding any deed," which suggests that any subordinate ability (e.g., running, medicine, etc.) that is used to accomplish what is unjust does so by having a just soul. This rules out doing something unjust for the sake of some further good, again leaving one to wonder why someone would do this at all.

The addition of ἐπιστήμη as a potentially separate way of understanding justice is peculiar. The original analysis of δύναμις uses this term in stating that the able person "knows what he is doing" and again to describe Hippias' expertise in astronomy at 367e9. In other words, there is little in the dialogue to suggest that ἐπιστήμη is anything other than a component of δύναμις. By separating it, however, Socrates suggests that justice may be nothing other than knowledge of what is just and unjust or good and bad. This points to the definitional dialogues and Socrates' preoccupation with defining virtue. In the *Meno*, for instance, Socrates tells Meno that virtue is not to want good things, for all persons want good things. Instead, virtue must involve the power to get good things. Although Meno has the wrong idea of what is good, the point Socrates makes here is also made elsewhere, that wanting what is good is endemic to all persons. The δύναμις of virtue need not include wanting what is good. So what truly separates the virtuous person from all the rest is his knowledge of what is good. The *HiMi* drives at a different point, namely the connection between what a person knows, intends, and wants, all of which are part of the person's δύναμις. In other words, it gets at the question "Under what description does the able person act, such that he knows what he wants when he acts?" This, too, is an essential component of the Socratic paradox, one which Socrates is settled on elsewhere. By pointing to justice as an ἐπιστήμη, Socrates may be hinting that this is the next step to take.

But at the end of *HiMi* Socrates harbors doubt, this time in the form of a specific qualification: "if in fact there is such a person." As I pointed out earlier, Socrates could have said "If there is someone who wants to act unjustly" in keeping with his earlier qualifications. While the qualification should be understood this way, it also makes the stronger assertion about whether there

is in fact anyone who is voluntarily unjust. Clearly there are such people, if we understand "voluntary" by most legal standards. In *HiMi* voluntary action is the exercise of a δύναμις in which the agent knows, intends, and wants to do what he does, and the dialogue spends more time than others in sorting out what a δύναμις consists in. That Socrates returns the focus on δύναμις at the end of the dialogue suggests he thinks that if it is properly understood, acting unjustly would never result from a δύναμις. The final argument contains some further steps toward Socrates' motivation behind making this qualification. First, the unjust soul is identified in 4 as ignorant and it is implicit in 3 and 5 that injustice is not a δύναμις. Secondly, justice is identified in 8 as a good or fine thing. All of this is implicit in the prior arguments, but making it explicit here gets Socrates tantalizingly close to his view in the *Gorgias* that acting unjustly cannot result from a δύναμις. The true possessor of a δύναμις knows what is good, and his knowledge of good makes it clear what it is that he and everyone else wants, namely what is good.

There are hints in the *HiMi* that Socrates is moving toward this view, just below the surface of the dialogue. Socrates brings attention to the connection implicit in a δύναμις between knowing, intending, and wanting. The view that persons tend to want what is in their interest is also there in proto-Socratic form in Hippias' legal objection, and especially Socrates' introduction of shame as the accomplishment of voluntary action. All of this continually raises the question of why a person would voluntarily do something contrary to his interests. Socrates' resistance to the overall conclusion of the dialogue need not be motivated by what he says elsewhere, for the interest thesis is already present in the dialogue, at least enough to give him pause. While this is not the Socratic thesis that no one does wrong voluntarily, it is an intuitive position that finds expression even among the Thrasymachus' and Callicles' of the world, who advocate tyranny because they believe it serves their interests. Socrates' own position is, after all, a paradoxical thesis. It is not obviously true, to say the least, which means it took time for Socrates to arrive at it. *HiMi,* I think, does some of this work on its own.

NOTES

1. Why does Socrates qualify his remark about the voluntary wrongdoer using "and not involuntarily"? The negative is the particle μὴ, which implies a more general, sweeping negation than οὔ. What Socrates may have in mind here is to distinguish the intentional agent who consistently acts intentionally from persons like the mistaken liar of 367a3, who means to lie but does not succeed. The mistaken liar lies intentionally in the subjective sense, namely he presents as true what he *believes* is false. But objectively speaking, he acts unintentionally: he unknowingly says something that is

actually true. By saying that the voluntary wrongdoer does not in any way act involuntarily, Socrates may mean to rule out this type of scenario for the truly voluntary agent.

2. Jones and Sharma, 114–115. They argue for this translation both on the grounds that the grammar of Socrates' sentence does not require that it be read as an outright rejection of the conclusion, and through a defense of the arguments of the dialogue against charges of equivocation.

3. Jones and Sharma acknowledge that Socrates may have some sense of why he resists this conclusion: he does believe that justice is in one's interest, but he is not yet prepared to defend it (121–122). But this still puts any reasons he may have for resisting it outside the *HiMi*.

4. He does so in the *Apology,* at least. While professing ignorance, Socrates also asserts that no one wants to be harmed (25d) and that he could not voluntarily harm another (25e & 37a).

5. Here and the following sum up Carelli, 76–78.

6. Weiss, 134, goes further than most in noting that Socrates shifts between better instruments and better agents throughout the argument starting at 373c6, but she does not explain what the significance of the shift is.

7. Carelli does not state whether Socrates already has in mind the view that persons cannot act unjustly voluntarily. He only says that it is "bracketed" (Carelli, 78).

8. It is not clear the extent to which Athenian homicide law distinguished various types of involuntary harm and killing, and the debate over this found in, for instance, Antiphon's *Tetralogies* may signal that it was not clear then either. Nevertheless, some of the examples found from the time period show that intent is central. Antiphon's second and sixth *Tetralogies* both consider cases in which a person acted intentionally (throwing a javelin or serving drinks), with the act causing death. But both were charged with unintentional killing because they did not intend harm or death. Plato's *Apology* also has Socrates observe (without having to temper outrage from the jury) that if a person is found to do wrong involuntarily, they should be corrected in private rather than prosecuted in court (26a).

9. Uses of βελτίων in Plato and in literature prior to him suggest it can be distinct from ἀμείνων. The term appears in Homer as βέλτερον (LSJ), where it means "more excellent." For example, at *Il*. 15.511 and 21.483, the same sentiment is expressed, namely that it is better, i.e., more honorable, to die fighting than to be slaughtered by inferior enemies. In Homer's *Iliad*, then, the term is associated with excellence in battle, which is the primary means of achieving honor and good standing in the context of war, and is therefore closely associated with Achilles' excellence or ἄριστος. Most often, βελτίων describes one's social status. Theognis, for example, in one of his lyric poems (91–92), remarks that "citizens' stock is growing feeble (δείνος) [by marrying baser persons], for what is noble (βέλτερος) is being mixed with what is base." In its superlative form, the term is used to refer to the aristocracy (οἱ βελτίστοι), for instance in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, 5.2.6. A similar use is found in Plato's *Prot*. 318b1–d2, where Protagoras says that when students leave his tutelage, they are "better" (βελτίονι γεγόνοτι). This example is particularly illuminating, for Socrates indicates that Protagoras's unqualified statement does not explain much, and he goes on to ask Protagoras what he means by "better." Protagoras explains that he means

they will become better citizens. Similarly in *Apology* (24d*ff*), Socrates uses βελτίων several times in his cross-examination of Meletus regarding the charge of corrupting the youth: "who influences the young for the better?" i.e., for their social and moral development.

These examples suggest two things. First, the term refers to excellence of character in a narrower sense than ἀμείνων does in *HiMi*, where the latter may describe actions primarily, whether moral or neutral, e.g., calculation, whereas βελτίων, though it describes actions and agents as well, is more often restricted to social or cultural excellence (e.g., better at being a citizen). Second, the example from *Prot*. suggests that Protagoras takes the term to be clear without having to qualify it, while Socrates is constantly interested in qualifying it and other terms, especially when it comes to the sophists claims about their expertise. Socrates requests clarification in a similar way at *Gorgias* 488c*ff*. There Socrates wants to know whether Callicles is referring to the same person when he says that the "superior" (κρείττω) person should take what he wants from the inferior, and that the "better" (βελτίω) person should rule over the worse. Socrates eventually gets Callicles to admit that "better" means "intelligent in the affairs of the city" (491d). As in *HiMi*, Socrates' questioning in *Gorgias* concerns the nature of justice, where Callicles thinks true or natural justice is the opposite of conventional or legal justice: the truly just person is able to get away with contravening the norms of society to get what he wants.

10. Hoerber, 127.
11. Ibid., 127 n.1.
12. Weiss, 298 n.41.
13. Zembaty: 1989, 60.
14. Weiss remarks that if βελτίων describes moral excellence, it is difficult to see why Socrates uses it to describe tools and instruments (Weiss, 298 n. 41). But if the term is understood more generically, as being in a good condition, the application makes better sense. If there is a distinction between moral and nonmoral excellence, it would be the specific area (e.g., in the assembly or court) or subject (e.g. justice or piety) for which that thing or person is designed to be used.

Conclusion

What should we make of this strange dialogue? More than most, Plato's *Hippias Minor* (*HiMi*) exemplifies Gregory Vlastos' elegant characterization of Socrates: he is as "innocent of intentional deceit as is a child's feigning that the play chips are money, as free from shamming as are honest games, though, unlike games, serious in its mockery . . . dead earnest in its playfulness."[1] At every turn of the dialogue, Socrates appears to both Hippias and us readers to say one thing while hiding another. This, I hope to have shown, is only an appearance, but one that is designed to compel us to scrutinize every move Socrates makes in the dialogue. The reward for doing so, I also hope to have shown, is a substantive thesis about the role of δύναμις in action that fills in some gaps left in other dialogues concerning central Socratic theses about virtue and motivation. It is also an argument Socrates bases on a plausible reading of Homer's epics, one that gets at the heart of Socratic thought. Yet if those problems and their solution are just under the surface of the argument, and Socrates hints at this with a very specific qualification on the argument's conclusion, we are still left with the distinct feeling that he is hiding something. This is no mistake on Plato's part.

Socrates claims in the *Crito* that "at all times I am the kind of person who listens only to the argument that on reflection seems best to me" (46b). If the argument that leads to the paradoxical conclusion is sound, why does Socrates not embrace it? The argument of *HiMi* leaves him with some doubt, not because the argument is invalid or unsound, but because it is incomplete. Nevertheless, it gets us closer than much scholarship on the dialogue admits thus far.

To understand why Plato leaves us with a mysterious ending, we should keep in mind that the dialogue is about deception or, more neutrally, the discrepancy between what a person says and does, and what he thinks and intends. Throughout the dialogue, uncertainty about the subject of discussion

blends into uncertainty about Socrates' own intent. Hippias continually objects to Socrates' argumentative moves, to the point of accusing him of deception. We readers, too, wonder at the many strange points of the dialogue. The portrait of Socrates in *HiMi* reveals how easy it is to mistake his words for deception given how close he treads to it. Even his own admissions of ignorance are suspect. But all of this invites scrutiny and inquiry. By suspecting whether Socrates says what he means, we pay close attention to his words only to find that he is serious all along.

At the end, Hippias and Socrates "waver" between accepting what is necessitated by the argument and wanting to reject its conclusion, which appears to turn morality on its head. The image of wavering or wandering alludes to Odysseus and, like him, Hippias and Socrates are faced with having to navigate their own Scylla and Charybdis. They are both πολύτροπος in the passive sense, tossed back and forth by the argument, but Socrates is also πολύτροπος in its active sense. Presented with a dilemma, "his mind teeming"[2] he looks for a way through. For Socrates, this is a genuine dilemma, regardless of whether he sees a way out. But Socrates is no Odysseus, for Odysseus does deceive to his own advantage, often at the cost of human life. Socrates, by contrast, has cared for Hippias' soul as much as he can by constantly provoking him to deeper inquiry. At the very least, Hippias' wavering should help him (and us) recognize our own ignorance in matters of great importance.

We should also keep in mind that the dialogue as a whole is a response to an epideictic speech, a genre that, intentionally or not, hides the speaker's own commitments. In the hands of the sophists and educators of 5th century Athens, these speeches promote their skill of persuasion and their own reputation as wise men. Hippias is a master of the genre as Plato makes clear at the start of *HiMi*. But his confidence in his own wisdom is unfounded, which makes his deployment of epideictic speeches dangerously deceptive, even if unintentionally so. By bringing attention to the genre from the start Plato can promote *philosophia* by addressing its potential for deception. This is a thin line to walk, but it makes for a dialogue that is both playful and serious in its effort to ensure that we pay careful attention.

On this point, many see *HiMi* as a response to one of Plato's rivals in particular, namely Antisthenes.[3] But here, too, I think we should recognize that Plato is after a different quarry. Antisthenes is reported by Porphyry (*SSR* VA 187) to have weighed in on the debate regarding Homer's depiction of Odysseus as πολύτροπος,and he references the very same passage from *Il.* 9 that Hippias appeals to at 365a–b. Antisthenes argues that the term does not have to refer to a negative character trait. Instead, he thinks Homer intended it to refer to the way one uses language: the man "of many twists and turns" describes one who "uses many turns of phrase" (*SSR* VA 187.13).

In characterizing Odysseus this way, claims Antisthenes, Homer is praising Odysseus for his wisdom rather than blaming him for his deceitful character. The opponents whose view Antisthenes characterizes is strikingly similar to the one that Hippias advances in *HiMi.* Hippias' odd selection of the terms to interpret Homer, τρόπον, ἁπλῶς, and πολύτροπος may be allusions to Antisthenes' work, given the way they are used in both and given that τρόπον and ἁπλῶς are not used in Homer. In the most comprehensive discussion of this exchange to date, Lévystone concludes that the accounts of πολύτροπος in Antisthenes and Plato's *HiMi* are never in any real opposition.[4] Both Antisthenes and Plato, he says, recognize that the term is ambiguous. It can describe variations in disposition or it can describe versatility in the use of language. Achilles is πολύτροπος in the former sense, exhibiting "instability of character" in being thwarted by circumstance and contradicting himself. Odysseus, on the other hand, is πολύτροπος in the latter sense, which points to his wisdom or ability to craft falsehoods.

While there are striking similarities in the two accounts, there are two reasons to resist treating *HiMi* as a response to Antisthenes. For one thing, Antisthenes' characterization of πολύτροπος bears little resemblance to the ambiguity of the term in Homer, as it is discussed in *HiMi*. While it is true that Odysseus tailors his deceptive personas to suit the person he's talking to, in neither of Homer's actual applications of the term is Odysseus unambiguously exercising wisdom or exhibiting agency. This is just Plato's point in addressing the controversy over the term: using words a certain way does not by itself indicate wisdom, much less what sort of wisdom is at work that could earn the πολύτροπος person praise or blame.

Secondly, Antisthenes does not adhere to any Homeric constraint, preferring instead to draw a general philosophical point about language use. While Antisthenes' argument appears to be purely exegetical, it is not, for he uses his "interpretation" of Homer as confirmation of a more general claim he wants to make. Tailoring one's words to the audience is certainly true of Odysseus, it is not what Homer means by πολύτροπος in the two instances he uses it to describe Odysseus, nor does it capture the point Plato is making in *HiMi.* The view regarding language that Antisthenes goes on to develop in the passage is clearly a departure from Homer. *HiMi*, by contrast, is committed to a plausible interpretation of Homer.

In *HiMi,* Plato is not simply responding to his rivals, he is responding to the opinion that Socrates and his brand of *philosophia* are not distinct from sophistry. In doing so, he is also advocating for the value of *philosophia* in civic life. Recall that the start of *HiMi* frames the discussion between Socrates and Hippias as one that "is especially appropriate now that we who may partake most in intellectual pursuits have been left to ourselves" (363a4–5). The

dialogue starts as a contest of wits, which develops into a serious philosophical discussion about how we evaluate persons on the basis of their actions. Hippias' contrast of the present discussion with his epideictic displays at the panhellenic festival subtly underscores what is at stake in philosophical discussion.

In her *Spectacles of Truth*, Nightingale argues that Plato develops his conception of philosophy within the context of traditional θεώρια or the religious "spectacle" which Greeks made a pilgrimage to be "observers" θεώροι. Nightingale explains:

> The comparison of philosophical activity to *theoria* at religious festivals was not a casual rhetorical trope: this move had powerful ideological associations. For, by linking philosophical theorizing to an institution that was at once social, political, and religious, the fourth-century thinkers identified theoretical philosophy as a specific kind of cultural practice. By aligning their discipline with the traditional practice of *theoria*, the fourth-century thinkers attempted to ground theoretical philosophy in the social and political world (4).

The reason this association was so important to Plato and others is that *philosophia* needed to be legitimized as something of *practical* and political value.[5] Socrates' willingness to push the boundaries of inquiry toward, at minimum, uncomfortable paradoxes about human excellence shows that his brand of *philosophia* is not just for show and reputation. It can make important contributions to society. The playful, nearly sophistic manner in which Plato unflinchingly portrays Socrates in *HiMi* also shows how difficult such important work really is.

NOTES

1. Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 29.

2. A frequent description of Odysseus, e.g., *Od.* 11.387, 19. 546.

3. Kahn, 114, and Lévystone, 205 argue that *HiMi* is a response to Antisthenes. Lévystone thinks they are largely in agreement, while Brancacci, *Oikeios Logos—La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990) 51, Caizzi, (*Antisthenes Fragmenta* (Mailand: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1966) 105, and Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae. Collegit, disposuit, apparatibus notisque instruxit (Naples, Italy: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1990) vol. 4, 315–16, do not. Prince, in her translation and commentary on Antisthenes' work, is not committed to either, noting that "Plato might have seen an opportunity to play with Antisthenes' material" (Prince, *Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015], 603).

4. Lévystone, 210.

5. In Thucydides' *History* III.38, Cleon criticizes the Athenian audience for putting more stake in fancy speech than sound argument and evidence: "You are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience (θεάταις) sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer (σοφιστῶν) than an assembly deliberating matters of the city-state." In response to Cleon, Diodotus says at III.42 that speeches are invaluable to the well-being of Athens, and "most dangerous are those who . . . accuse a speaker of making a kind of exhibition (ἐπίδεισίν τινα) for profit." This passage is telling for several reasons. First, Cleon's remark implies that the sophistic "spectacle" has no place in a political arena and, second, Diodotus' response takes Cleon to imply that this spectacle is a kind of *epideixis*. The exchange recorded by Thucydides therefore identifies sophistic *epideixis* in terms of what is expected of the audience, namely to witness a spectacle. If Plato's dialogues also engage in this activity, they risk marginalization from social and political affairs.

Epilogue

The Influence of the Hippias Minor *on Aristotle's Ethics*

Paul Shorey concludes his analysis of Plato's *Hippias Minor* with a bold claim:

> The extent of [the dialogue's] influence upon Aristotle has escaped the attention of most commentators. It is plainly the source of the distinction between a δύναμις and a ἕξις, a faculty and a habit, on which Aristotle bases his definition of virtue, and with the aid of which he disposes of many fallacies, including the Socratic analogy between the virtues and the arts. A δύναμις or faculty, he repeatedly says, is equally capable of opposites. A ἕξις or habit is not.[1]

Shorey offers this valuable insight at the end of his analysis of *HiMi,* leaving a thread for his many students to grasp. Shorey is correct in his insight, as usual, but there are many details in the trajectory from Socrates to Aristotle than Shorey includes here, which are worth tracing. Shorey does not offer much explanation for this view, but his reasons are clear enough. Shorey's overall interpretation of the dialogue, one that is endorsed by many before and after him, is that it points to an omission in Socratic moral psychology, an omission that leads to the absurd conclusion and is explicitly supplemented in other dialogues. On this reading, however, it is *a* source at best, and only a negative one. Drawing from the interpretation of the dialogue developed over the previous chapters, I argue that although the dialogue is not *the* source, it is a positive one. This influence does not merely rest on an interpretation of the dialogue. It also requires tracing the development of Aristotle's distinction within his own works. Here I offer some tentative steps toward tracing this development.

Shorey wrote this in 1933, but if he is right, then the *HiMi*'s influence continues to escape notice.[2] Subsequent scholarship on Aristotle's criticisms

of Socrates and on his distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις make no mention of *HiMi*.[3] Shorey appears to single out *HiMi* as *the* source because this dialogue alone exposes the problem of treating virtue as a δύναμις of the sort that characterizes all crafts, namely one that is open to misuse. In doing so, he cites two sources from Aristotle in making his claim. First, he points out, Aristotle explicitly names the dialogue in criticizing its main arguments in his *Metaphysics* V.29 1025a5–10. There Aristotle says the following:

> The false man is the man heedless of and inclined to choose [false] statements for no particular reason, and causes others to believe them, just as we say that things are false that cause a false appearance. For this reason, the argument in the *Hippias* that (1) the false and true persons are the same is misleading (παρακρουέται). For it assumes that the false person is the one who is able to be false (δυνάμενον . . . ψεύσασθαι), i.e., the one who knows and is intelligent (ὁ φρόνιμος). Furthermore, it assumes that (2) the voluntarily bad person is better. This falsehood is arrived at through induction, for he who limps voluntarily is better than he who does so involuntarily—where limping means to imitate being lame—for if he were voluntarily lame, he would probably be worse, just as in the case of character (ἤθους).

Aristotle clearly criticizes the argument for failing to distinguish δύναμις, or having knowledge of something, from *being* that sort of person, where "in the case of character" being that sort of person is to have, for Aristotle, a ἕξις or disposition to act that way. Shorey also references *NE* 1140b23, where Aristotle distinguishes practical wisdom, or φρόνησις from craft, on the grounds that "in craft he who errs voluntarily is more choice worthy, but in practical wisdom less so."[4] Shorey also must have in mind *EN* V.1 1129a12–16, where Aristotle begins his discussion of justice by stating that that a ἕξις is not the same as science and ability: "the same ability (δύναμις) . . . is of opposites, whereas a disposition that has a contrary is not."

Shorey's assessment follows a standard reading of the dialogue and a fairly straightforward picture of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates. In the dialogue, Socrates first argues that both the liar and honest person have the same knowledge and, therefore are identical. He further argues that the person who makes mistakes voluntarily is better than the one who does so involuntarily, on the grounds that the former and not the latter has the capacity to act both well and badly. It is on the basis of these arguments that Socrates draws a jarring conclusion: "The person who errs, and does shameful and unjust things voluntarily, if there is such a person, is none other than the good person" (376b4–6). Like virtually every scholar after him, Shorey sees the phrase "if there is such a person" as the key to understanding the dialogue: it leaves the door open to a solution to the potential misuse of virtue made explicit

in dialogues such as the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, namely that there is no such person who does wrong voluntarily. The dialogue, voluntarily or not, omits a crucial feature of Socratic intellectualism which maintains that the rational, all-things-considered desire for what best is innate to humans. Given that persons are always and only motivated to act on this desire, failure to do what is best is a cognitive failure. The basis for distinguishing the good from bad person, then, is his knowledge of good. That Socrates identifies virtue with knowledge alone, of course, is the central error Aristotle attributes to Socrates in all of his ethical works.[5] *HiMi* is the earliest, if not the only, dialogue to exemplify why virtue cannot be a δύναμις only. Shorey's argument, in sum, is that since Aristotle distinguishes δύναμις from ἕξις and singles out Socrates for thinking virtue is a δύναμις, i.e., knowledge, and *HiMi* is where Socrates makes this error, it is THE source of his distinction.

Shorew was certainly aware that there is no straight line from *HiMi* to Aristotle's conception of virtue as a ἕξις, for the development of Aristotle's concept goes through Plato to Aristotle and within Aristotle's own works. If *HiMi* reveals the need for an affective component to motivate virtuous action, supplementing Socrates' view that all persons desire the good should be enough to explain why virtue is not misused. But this does not solve the problem as Aristotle sees it, at least not enough to require the relatively developed idea of a ἕξις. For that we would need to show that the affective component that motivates virtuous action is acquired, not innate, and that this acquisition requires both acknowledging the presence of nonrational desires in the soul as well as the need to condition such desires. To find Aristotle's source for this, we would typically look to other, later dialogues such as the *Republic*. At best, *HiMi* is *a* source of the distinction, but a purely negative one at that.

Aristotle's distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις also developed within his own works, and his criticism of *HiMi* in *Met.* V.29 is at a relatively late stage in that development. Note, for instance, that his criticism of *HiMi* does not *conclude* that such a distinction ought to be drawn. Rather, the distinction serves as the premise of the argument. Insofar as it relies on such a distinction already suggests that it is applied to rather than derived from *HiMi*. This is also the case in *NE*, which only briefly explains why virtue cannot be a δύναμις. Furthermore, in *NE* δύναμις is characterized as a bare, natural capacity. In the passage Shorey cites, *NE* V.1, it is a "faculty" of reason (otherwise why distinguish it from science or *episteme*), and in *NE* II.1 it is a capacity to feel, while in *Met.* V.29 and in *HiMi* it is a developed capacity, i.e., knowledge (1105b20–1106a13). The two senses of δύναμις—a bare, innate capacity and a developed one—is made explicit in Aristotle's *De Anima* in the course of explaining what sort of actuality the soul is.[6] There knowledge is given as an example of a "first actuality," i.e., a capacity that is developed but is not

being used. This is the sense in which Aristotle thinks the term δύναμις is used in *HiMi*, but in *DA* it characterized as a ἕξις. The implication is that being a δύναμις does not automatically preclude being a ἕξις. More needs to be said, then, for why the ἕξις of virtue is more than mere δύναμις, and for this Aristotle looks to affective, nonrational states of the soul in addition to its cognitive state.

The characterization of virtue as a ἕξις that includes developed states of the nonrational soul is also left implicit in most of Aristotle's criticisms of Socrates that Shorey cites. While *NE* mainly criticizes Socrates for identifying virtue with knowledge, echoing the complaint made in *Met.* V.29, and criticizes him for denying *akrasia* on this basis, it leaves implicit how this connects to the further problem of what parts of the soul this view omits. It is only in the *Magna Moralia* that Aristotle explicitly connects the two, stating that Socrates went wrong in identifying virtue with knowledge because he locates virtue exclusively in the rational part of the soul, "doing away with the non-rational part of the soul" (I.1 1182a21). *MM* references Socrates' view of virtue twice as much as *NE*, suggesting he was more preoccupied with Socrates' thought in the former.[7] Similarly, the problem of the misuse of virtue is not addressed in *NE* outside of a short section Shorey references. But it is extensively treated in *EE* VIII.1 and *Topics* II.9, IV.2, and V.7.[8] Again, it seems as though Aristotle is more occupied with the problem in these works. To get a clearer picture of the influence of *HiMi* on Aristotle's thought, then, I will identify some connections between *HiMi*'s characterization of δύναμις in the course of its argument for the misuse of virtue and Aristotle's more extended treatments of the problem in these earlier works.

HIMI ON THE ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ OF THE FALSE PERSON

To see whether *HiMi* has any influence over Aristotle's thought, I want to return to *HiMi*'s treatment of δύναμις. Again, the short bit in *NE* only speaks of δύναμις as a bare, innate capacity, whereas Aristotle's first criticism of *HiMi* is identifies δύναμις as knowledge:

> The argument in the *Hippias* that (1) the false and true persons are the same is misleading (παρακρουέται). For it assumes that the false person is the one who is able to be false (δυνάμενον . . . ψεύσασθαι), i.e., the one who knows and is intelligent (ὁ φρόνιμος).

On Shorey's reading, this complaint extends to the dialogue as a whole, insofar as the dialogue's main point is to show that knowledge is not sufficient for virtue. But Aristotle's first criticism of *HiMi* pertains to a specific, and early,

section of the dialogue, in which Socrates argues that the true and false person are the same since they have the same knowledge, using examples of calculation, geometry, and astronomy to make his case. As I explain in chapter 3, this argument follows an extended analysis of the δύναμις that characterizes the false person, a characterization that is at work in the remainder of the dialogue. So, if this early argument is in keeping with that characterization, the problem it exposes extends to the remainder of the dialogue. As many scholars observe, Socrates' characterization of δύναμις omits Hippias' pejorative qualifications that the δύναμις of the false person is oriented toward specific action, i.e., deception. As I argue in chapter 2, this omission is misunderstood, and it is crucial to understanding the argument about calculation that follows. To recap my analysis from chapter 3, Hippias consistently assents to the claim that the true and false persons are both able, i.e., have the same knowledge, but denies the claim that they *are* the same. What basis would he have for this denial if not his earlier insistence that the false person is able precisely insofar as they actually deceive and intend to do so, as he says of Odysseus later (he "always has a scheme in mind" at 371e5)? This points to a distinction, albeit a rough one, between theoretical and practical knowledge by raising a question about the role of knowledge in action and intention. More specifically, the argument about calculation reveals a problem with treating δύναμις as knowledge without qualification, i.e., without a proviso for its role in guiding action. There Socrates gets Hippias to see that the expert calculator cannot be a false person, in the sense of being someone who behaves badly, if all his ability consists in is knowledge of calculation. Furthermore, it is unclear what in his knowledge of calculation would motivate him to speak falsely. To identify this, shows Socrates, we must look to a different ability. On this interpretation of *HiMi*, a stronger case can be made for the dialogue's influence on Aristotle.

Reading the dialogue this way better fits Aristotle's own discussions of science or ἐπιστήμη and virtue, some of which have Socrates as his target. Recall Aristotle's criticism of the dialogue at *Met*. V.29. Aristotle's immediate point is that knowing what's false is not sufficient for being false, and he has just characterized the false person as something of a pathological liar, a characterization closer to Hippas' than Socrates'. When it comes to virtue of character, the distinction between knowing and being ultimately rests on the claim that being X must involve a ἕξις rather than a δύναμις, but more directly, Aristotle must have in mind the distinction he draws between science and virtue, where knowledge is sufficient for *being* in the former case but not the latter. Again, while *NE* does generally distinguish theoretical from practical knowledge, the *MM* argues for this distinction by explicitly attributing it to Socrates, and has close parallels to the *HiMi* argument criticized in *Met.* V.29. At *MM* 1.1 1183b9–18, Aristotle says:

> Neither was Socrates right in making the excellences sciences (ἐπιστήμας). For he used to think that nothing ought to be in vain (μάτην), but from the excellences being sciences, he met with the result that the excellences were in vain. Why so? Because in the case of the sciences, as soon as one knows the science, it results that one is scientific (for anyone who knows medicine is forthwith a physician, and so with the other sciences). But this result does not follow in the case of the excellences. For anyone who knows what justice is is not forthwith just, and similarly in the case of the rest.[9]

This passage not only distinguishes knowing from being virtuous, but also states that equating virtue with science implies that virtue is μάτην, translated here as "in vain," but can mean "idle" or "indifferent" (LSJ). Aristotle may mean that being scientific is not action oriented in the way that practical knowledge is, or that it is not moved by desire the way that justice is.

The difficulty of the argument about calculation in *HiMi* amounts to a problem about what sort of knowledge distinguishes the δύναμις of the false person from the true one. The original analysis of δύναμις at 365e5*ff* has Socrates identify the features of ability. Among them are 5 through 7:

5. False persons are prudent (φρόνιμος).
6. Because false persons are prudent, they know (ἐπιστάσθαι) what they're doing.
7. Because false persons know [what they're doing], they are wise.

These criteria establish a relationship between φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη, and σοφία such that being a φρόνιμος entails knowing what one is doing and so on. But as I explain in chapter 3, this leaves open many questions about the sort of knowledge the able person has and under what description the person knows it. The use of φρόνιμος is parallel to the use of φρόνιμος in Aristotle's criticism of *HiMi* in *Met.* V.29. Aristotle cannot be using the term in his own specialized sense, as practical reason that "is in harmony with the correct desire," as he says at *NE* 1139a26–31. One of the questions left open in *HiMi* is the relationship between what one knows and what one wants. At the very least, though, Socrates seems to suggest that the able and prudent person knows what he wants, though it is unclear what would count as the "correct desire." Aristotle must, instead, be echoing Socrates' own use of the term in the dialogue, leaving it open to misuse as Socrates seems to do. *NE* clearly distinguishes φρονήσις from other intellectual and moral virtues, but if we look to earlier works, the separation is not so clear, and Aristotle's development on this point rests on problem of misuse, the very problem that occupies Plato in *HiMi*.

In the *Topics* V.7 137a8–20, Aristotle uses φρονήσις to illustrate whether something can share two similar defining properties:

> Given that φρονήσις exists in the same way with respect to good and bad, in being a science (ἐπιστήμη) of each of them [and] it is not proper to φρονήσις to be the ἐπιστήμη of good, it will not be proper to it to be the ἐπιστήμη of bad. But if it is proper to φρονήσις to be the ἐπιστήμη of good, it will not be proper to it to be the ἐπιστήμη of bad, since it is impossible for the same thing to be the defining property of more than one thing.[10]

At the general level, this discussion is similar to the argument about calculation in *HiMi*. Aristotle addresses the potential for misuse in terms of the relationship between ἐπιστήμη and φρονήσις, rather than in terms of moral psychology or voluntary action. So also in *HiMi* the question is whether the expert calculator's ability and knowledge is sufficient to explain why he would speak falsely in the first place, much less behave badly. Knowing calculation is enough for being an expert calculator. The expert calculator's ability is essentially his knowledge of calculation and so does not capture what Socrates is looking for in the prudent person. But the δύναμις for being a good person is the same sort of δύναμις for being an expert calculator, which leads Socrates to the paradoxical conclusion about voluntary wrongdoing. Aristotle's remarks are also similar to Socrates' final argument that justice is either a δύναμις an ἐπιστήμη, or both. As I suggest in chapter 5, Socrates is perhaps struggling with the question of whether justice consists only in knowledge of what is good and bad, or also connects to doing what one wants, i.e., what is in one's interest, such that the ability to be just would not issue in unjust behavior.

The nature of φρονήσις in relation to virtue and science is addressed earlier, in *Top* IV.2 121b30–38, where it is argued that justice cannot belong to the genus of science if it also belongs to the genus of virtue:

> There is a difficulty: some think that φρονήσις is both a virtue and science (episteme), and that neither of the two genera is contained in the other . . . [if so] it would seem necessary for the genera of [φρονήσις] to both be subordinated one to the other, or that both be subordinated to a third genus, and this is what happened in the case of virtue and science (ἐπιστήμη), since both of them are contained in a genus, and each of them is a ἕξις and a disposition (διάθεσις).[11]

Here Aristotle is wrestling with a view he has sorted out in *NE*, namely where φρονήσις fits with respect to virtue of character and science. It cannot be both virtue and science. But both are identified as ἕξις and διάθεσις, which, elsewhere, Aristotle treats as synonymous with δύναμις.[12] This difficulty is

addressed again in *EE* VIII.1 (1246a28–36) for physical ability, science, and φρονήσις:

> Someone might wonder if it is possible to use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise . . . for example as an eye, to see or also in another way to mis-see twisting it so that one thing appears as two . . . Likewise also, knowledge: it will be possible to use it truly, and in order to err (ἁμαρτάνειν)—for example when someone voluntarily writes incorrectly, he will be using the capacity (δύναμις) as ignorance . . . So if all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible also to use justice as injustice. So the man who does unjust things will act unjustly from justice, in the same way that he will be doing ignorant things from knowledge . . . further, if φρονήσις is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and something true, it will do the same thing too.[13]

These examples bear a general resemblance to the examples used in a later argument of *HiMi,* an argument that includes examples of mis-seeing and the limping example that Aristotle subjects to his second criticism in *Met* V.29. *HiMi* also uses the same term, ἁμαρτάνειν, to describe misuse, one of the many terms in *HiMi* that Socrates groups with wrongdoing in general. But they also focus on a central point made in *HiMi*, namely using an ability, in this case an organ, for an end other than its "natural purpose."

That argument in *HiMi* from 373c6 to 375d6 examines the claim that the person who does wrong or misses the mark (ἁμαρτάνειν) voluntarily is better than the one who does so involuntarily by showing that the claim holds for a variety of abilities including limping seeing, speaking, posing, and so on, and draws the same conclusion for justice. As I argue in chapter 5, this section of the dialogue is attempting to identify what makes a person good or bad in some arena (e.g., running, wrestling, etc.), and focuses first on the condition of the body and later, by analogy, the condition of the soul. Aristotle focuses on this aspect of the argument at *Met.* V.29, where he refers to an example of limping in *HiMi* "[I]t is misleading that the one who is voluntarily bad is better. This result through induction is false—For he who voluntarily limps is in fact better than he who does so involuntarily—where to limp means to imitate limping, since if he were lame voluntarily, he would probably be inferior, as in the case of character." Just as the body that is really in bad condition would in fact be worse, the soul in bad condition would be a worse character. Since there is nothing other than a person's δύναμις to explain the condition of the soul, i.e., knowledge, Socrates and Hippias are left with their undesirable conclusion.

Reading *HiMi* this way helps make sense of the emphasis Socrates puts on the condition of bodies throughout this argument and the analogy he draws with the condition of the soul. The limping argument, for example, is a case

in which the person who errs involuntarily bears the marks of an ability as defined earlier: he knows what he is doing. He also fits the criterion for voluntary action identified earlier in the dialogue: he has an end in mind, like Odysseus (who "always has a scheme in mind"), but is still unable to do it. So if having an end in mind is still not sufficient, what is? His inability is a case of failing to do what he wants when he wants, but this failure is physical, not intellectual. The running example, as well as the subsequent examples of wrestling, "all other uses of the body," and "all the organs of perception," each construes ability and inability in terms of what one is able to do with the body. Socrates sums up for limping, seeing, and "all the other uses of the body" at 374a7–b1: "the better person with respect to the body is able (*δύνατα*ι) to do both with the body—both things involving weakness and things involving strength, and both shameful and fine things." The same is said for voluntary action: "Voluntary gracelessness results from excellence (ἀρετή) of the body" (374b8). In doing so, the argument distinguishes ability from inability not in terms of knowledge alone, but knowledge plus a sound body. So voluntary action in these cases requires having a sound body. When Socrates turns to consider examples of voluntary and involuntary actions of the soul, he again concludes that the one that does bad things voluntarily is the better soul. As I argue in chapter 5, if Socrates is holding to the analogy, he must claim that the better soul is one that is able to do both fine and shameful things: The analogy with the soul, therefore, should also require the able and voluntary agent to have a soul in good condition. He says at 375c7 that we should want our souls to be in the best condition, and in keeping with the body analogy, it is those that are in the best condition that can err voluntarily. As we saw, though, the argument gives Socrates reason to doubt the conclusion he draws, for one might wonder why a person who knows what is good would not want to pursue it. If Aristotle is at all influenced by *HiMi* on this point, in keeping with the body analogy, he may recognize this hidden point as well, and be motivated to think that the condition of the virtuous soul does not necessarily consist in knowledge alone.

The condition of the soul is precisely what Aristotle turns to in sorting out his version of these cases of misuse. After raising a worry about how φρονήσις can be misused if it is the supreme thing in us, Aristotle goes on to say in *EE* VIII.1 (1246b12–18), that it could be due to a conflict with the nonrational part of the soul:

> What then is [φρονήσις]? Or is it as incontinence is said to be a vice of the non-rational part of the soul, and it is said that the incontinent man, possessing φρονήσις, is intemperate? But, if it is the case that, if desire is strong, it will distort, and the φρονήσις of the incontinent man, distorted by the non-rational part, will reach the opposite conclusions . . .

Here it is the condition of the nonrational part of the soul that could distort φρονήσις leading him to act contrary to his knowledge. And at the end of this passage, Aristotle reveals that he has Socrates in mind all along: "the view of Socrates is correct, that nothing is stronger than φρονήσις; but in saying that it is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), he was not correct; for it is a virtue and not knowledge. . . . " (1246b33–36). Much like Socrates, who moves close to his own view of virtuous action, here Aristotle seems to be moving closer to—but does not quite reach—his view in *NE*, that φρονήσις and ἐπιστήμη are both virtues, but of different kinds and ranging over different objects and ends.

The way in which Aristotle develops his thinking about the problem of misuse and the relationship between virtue, φρονήσις, and ἐπιστήμη bear a more than coincidental resemblance to the way they are handled in Plato's *Hippias Minor*. In general, though, correlation does not imply causation and so too here. There are certainly more issues to sort out, and many of the texts I have referenced, particularly *Topics* and *EE VIII*, are notoriously difficult both at the textual and interpretive levels. In other words, *HiMi* is not "plainly" the source, but I hope to have offered compelling reasons for thinking it is an important source. Many of the passages in Aristotle's early works exhibit a greater preoccupation with the potential misuse of virtue. Given that *HiMi* is Plato's most extended treatment of this problem, and potentially points to the composition and conditioning of the soul as a solution, it likely had some influence over Aristotle's thinking.

This also has implications for how we read the *Hippias Minor*: how we understand the key phrase in the dialogue's conclusion, "If in fact there is such a person" represents a genuine puzzle—as recent scholarship argues, but not one that is necessarily solved by invoking Socratic motivational intellectualism. Instead, as I suggested in chapter 5, the dialogue takes seriously the conditioning of the soul which, although described in very opaque terms, points to more than just cognitive conditioning. Socrates will eventually make it explicit that the soul's desire for the good is fixed, while Plato will divide the soul to make sense of *akrasia.* Aristotle has his own solution, influenced by Plato, of course. Aristotle may see the *HiMi* pointing to the question of whether the soul's desires are fixed on the good, as the Socratic doctrine suggests, or are malleable and therefore in need of conditioning, as the Platonic and, ultimately, Aristotelian doctrines maintain. In this regard, *HiMi* stands at a crossroad in Plato's development and, as such, reveals difficulties that vexed his greatest student, Aristotle, for a long time after.

NOTES

1. Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), 89–90.

2. Among scholarship on *HiMi,* Mulhern is the only one to mention of Shorey's work, albeit only in a brief footnote (285, n. 3).

3. Steven Menn's extensive analysis of the origins of Aristotle's concept of ἐνέργεια traces Aristotle's development of ἕξις to the language of possession (κτῆσις) in Plato's *Euthydemus* and *Theaetetus* ("The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of 'energeia'." Ancient Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1994), 82–83). But these passages concern different senses of the possession (vs. use) of knowledge and do not directly illuminate Aristotle's characterization of virtue as a ἕξις. And although the *Euthydemus* 280b5–282a6 gives examples of someone who possesses something but does not use (χρῆσις) them, this does not quite get at the misuse problem.

4. It is not clear how this is influenced by *HiMi*, particularly regarding the distinction between δύναμις and ἕξις. While it clearly states that what is desirable in craft is not necessarily so in other arenas, the contrast with practical wisdom does not get at the heart of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates. After all, Aristotle criticizes Socrates for thinking that virtue is nothing other than practical wisdom, too (*NE* VI.13 1144b18–30).

5. *NE* III.11 1116b4, VI.13 1144b18–30, *MM* I.1 1182a15, I.1 1183 b8, I.20 1190b27, and *EE* I.5 1216b2, VII.13 1246b32.

6. δύναμις and ἕξις are also used interchangeably in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* B40 and B67 (cf. Menn, 83).

7. I follow Cooper in the view that *MM* is by Aristotle and earlier than *NE* (Cooper, "The Magna Moralia and Aristotle's Moral Philosophy," *The American Journal of Philology* Vol. 94, No. 4 (1973), pp. 327–349).

8. The *Topics* is generally regarded as an earlier work of Aristotle. It is less clear whether the *Eudemian Ethics* is prior to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. My argument does not hang on chronology, but on the fact that the passages I discuss from *Top. EE* and *MM* give a more extensive discussion of the misuse of virtue and other issues related to *HiMi.*

9. Translated by St. G. Stock in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. J. Barnes (New Jersey: Princeton, 1995).

10. Translated by Carlo Natali, *The Wisdom of Aristotle,* tr. by G. Parks, SUNY, 2001.

11. Translated by Natali.

12. E.g., *Protrepticus* B40 (cf. Menn, 83).

13. This and subsequent quotes of *Eudemian Ethics* translated by Michael Woods, *Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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