NONVIOLENT ACTIVISM IN ISLAM

· · · · · · · ·

THE MESSAGE OF ABUL KALAM AZAD

HAYAT ALVI

Nonviolent Activism
in Islam

Nonviolent Activism in Islam

The Message of Abul Kalam Azad

Hayat Alvi

Contents

Preface

This is the most incredible time in modern history to be writing this book. We have witnessed the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt (2011) and mass nonviolent uprisings throughout the Middle East demanding the ouster of cobwebbed ruthless dictators. Having lived in Egypt for four years, these events have affected me profoundly. I taught political science at the American University in Cairo, and I taught courses on the American civil rights movement. I have passionately tried to educate students about the idea of nonviolent activism in the spirit of Mahatma Gandhi, especially for regions like the Middle East.

At the time I was very pessimistic since these messages and lessons of nonviolent activism were not received with open arms. "The cases in the Middle East are different" is an answer I often heard. "Nonviolent civil disobedience will not work here." As I left Egypt in 2005, I was convinced that President Hosni Mubarak was firmly entrenched in Egypt's political system, and that his son, Gamal, would succeed him. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, followed by the February 2011 revolution in Egypt—it is actually called the January 25 Revolution since that is the date on which the mass protests organized themselves and began the mass sit-in at Tahrir Square—were absolutely unpredictable. But they were not improbable, given the tech-savvy youths' frustrations, grievances, and rage as a result of years of oppression, brutality, corruption, abuse, and socioeconomic stagnation.

The events that took place in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February 2011 were extraordinary, especially for Arab Muslim majority countries that, especially in the case of Egypt, have a legacy of regional wars (mainly Arab–Israeli conflicts) and internal violence perpetrated by terrorist organizations, individuals, as well as the government and security forces. No one saw the revolutions coming, and they will go down in history as the most important

sociopolitical movements in the twenty-first-century Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

In a post–September 11 world, the religion of Islam and its followers, Muslims, have unjustly been painted with the broad-brush stroke of the terrorism and violence stereotypes, albeit there is no denying the presence and real danger of Islamist extremism and militancy and the violence attributed to various such organizations and ideologies worldwide. Words cannot describe how refreshing and profoundly moving it was, in such a vitriolic environment, to witness revolutions in North Africa and mass uprisings in the Middle East that have embraced nonviolent activism to exact change and progress in politics, economics, freedoms and rights, rule of law and justice, and most of all, to demand to be treated with dignity.

In the process, these activists have proven to the world that terrorism is obsolete as a supposed means to overthrow oppressive regimes, and this message reverberated across the region and globally. And, even more importantly, this message came from majority Muslim populations, that is, the very same religious identity that has long been stereotypically associated with terrorism, the 9/11 attacks, and religious militancy. The message is golden, and even former US president Barack Obama commented about it soon after Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011: "In Egypt it was the moral force of nonviolence, not terrorism, not mindless killing, but nonviolence, moral force that bent the arc of history toward justice once more."[1] The terrorists themselves need to understand this serious and indispensable lesson, which is the purpose and focus of this book.

As a Gandhian, I have been sickened for so long about the spread of intolerant, militant ideologies (both secular and religious) that inspire acts of violence. In fact, as of this writing, terrorists have attacked a hospital's maternity ward in Afghanistan, killing two newborns and twelve mothers and nurses. Such mindless, senseless, and heinous acts leave one utterly shocked and speechless. Nothing can possibly justify these horrific atrocities.

With the world fixated on this militant interpretation of Islam, I strongly feel that the scale needs to tip to the other side, that of attention being focused on *nonviolent* interpretations of Islam, especially in the context of political activism in the pursuit of social justice. Also, it is my fervent desire for this message and focus of the book to reach the attention of those who espouse militancy, as now the arguments against violence and terrorism clearly outweigh the weak treatises and calls to arms and suicide attacks by the likes of the "bin Ladens" of the world. The latter have no legitimate ideological leg to stand on. They never did, and they never will.

In fact, history has proven that the profound power of nonviolent activism in the face of brute "hard power" duly outweighs violent power in the sense of moral courage, value, and credibility. Moreover, nonviolent activism should

not be misconstrued as passive; rather, it is highly proactive and one of the most powerful forces for change and social justice throughout history. Thus, it is appropriate to say that nonviolent activism as a tool of power ultimately disarms violent power, and not the other way round. It is the only case and context of nonviolent power disarming violent power achieved without ever lifting a weapon. Furthermore, the disarming of violent power translates into not only the security forces being rendered as helpless failures but also the policymakers behind them as well. That is an apt description of what happened to the British colonial power in India. Mahatma Gandhi brought the British Empire to its knees without any use of kinetic force.

Mahatma Gandhi's spirit has infused the twenty-first-century youth across the Arab and Persian Muslim and non-Muslim world with a fearless determination and a resilient embrace of nonviolence in the face of death, abuse, torture, threats, and destruction. It is as if they have collectively shook their fingers in admonition to all those who profess and employ repressive violence, brutality, and injustice in the false façade of pursuing justice, whether they be repressive regimes or violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and they reminded us that Muslims in particular do have it in them to bring about change nonviolently. Who will ever forget the image caught on video and posted on the Internet of Muslims praying congregational prayers in Cairo's Tahrir Square while the water cannons sprayed them even while they supplicated in worship?

Muslims embracing nonviolent activism was never unprecedented, nor was it ever incompatible with Islamic principles. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the leader of a large segment of Indian Muslims who endorsed and participated in Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience agenda and campaign against British colonial rule, was a renowned scholar in Islamic jurisprudence. Maulana Azad affirmed to the Indian Muslim community that nonviolent civil disobedience used against the British colonial power in India does not contradict Islam, rather it is wholly consistent with Islamic principles and laws. By doing so, and by virtue of his status as a legitimate religious authority, he was able to gather a substantial following from the vast Indian Muslim population. The end result was joint Hindu-Muslim cooperation in Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent campaign to expel the British colonial power from India. This book tells the story and explains the Islamic legal precedent of the nonviolent civil disobedience that Maulana Azad undertook in the face of British repression. I have written this book from a multidisciplinary perspective to underscore the point that nonviolent activism in Islam not only exists but is highly effective even in the face of tyranny, as Maulana Azad and his followers have exemplified.

It is remarkably befitting that "Azad" was his pen name. The word *azad* in the Urdu language means "free." This book invokes the spirit of freedom

and justice rooted in the moral force and courage of nonviolence, here in the context of Islam. It is in the name of nonviolent activism and freedom (*azadi*) that this book begins.

Hayat Alvi
February 27, 2021
Rhode Island, USA

NOTE

1. Francine Keifer, "Obama on Egypt: Praise for the 'Moral Force of Nonviolence,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 11, 2011, accessed from: https://www.csm onitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2011/0211/Obama-on-Egypt-Praise-for-the-moral-force-of-nonviolence.

Acknowledgments

There are many people to thank for this project. I have received encouragement, moral support, and cheers to the finish line from numerous friends and family members. I thank them all.

I want to specifically acknowledge the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS) in Kolkata, India, for supporting my interests in Maulana Azad and his legacy. Initially, P.R. Kumaraswamy, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, and the MAKAIAS encouraged me to write a journal article about Maulana Azad for the *Contemporary Review of the Middle East (CRME)*. The result is my published piece entitled "The Islamic Principles of Social Justice: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Nonviolent Civil Disobedience," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East (CRME)* (2015), 2 (1 and 2), pp. 14–30, parts of which are reprinted with written permission in chapter 3 of this book. That journal article began my journey in writing this manuscript.

I must also thank Mudassir Quamar for pointing me in the right directions when I searched for help in India. Also, many thanks to Md. Eisa for his excellent Urdu–English translations for the Appendix: Maulana Azad's Speeches. I am told that Hifzullah Qasmi assisted Eisa, so thanks to him as well.

As always, my dear friend Joe Follansbee (Col., US Army Reserve, ret.) stepped to the plate to help me whenever I requested it. Many thanks to him for his unwavering support and assistance.

I genuinely appreciate my editor at Rowman and Littlefield, Joe Parry, for his tremendous patience throughout this process. Thank you for not giving up on me.

Finally, it is with tremendous sadness that I have to announce the death of my father, Mustafa Alvi, on February 6, 2021, who would have loved and

cherished this book. I was so looking forward to him reading it and discussing it with me.

All views in this book are personal, and I take responsibility for any errors.

My intention has been to provide solid evidence proving the soundness of nonviolent activism in Islam as Maulana Azad exemplified. My deepest gratitude goes to Maulana Azad, Mahatma Gandhi, and all those who engaged in the greatest nonviolent civil disobedience campaign (against the British Empire) in history. Their actions, sacrifices, and moral credibility speak for themselves.

Introduction

There is such a thing as nonviolent activism in Islam. It is little known, and it is paid little attention in the global media as well as in classrooms, whether in secular schools or in religious madrassas (Islamic seminaries). That is a travesty, because the story of the Islamic legal precedent for nonviolent civil disobedience possesses the ammunition to disarm militancy, terrorism, and violent acts in the name of religion.

Abul Kalam Azad introduced nonviolent activism in the form of civil disobedience within the context of Islam. His full name was Abul Kalam Muhiyuddin Ahmed, but he adopted the pen name Azad, or "free" in the Urdu language to express his love and appreciation for freedom. As a legitimate religious authority, trained as an Islamic jurist and scholar, he endorsed Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience and activism to free India from British colonial rule. Maulana[1] Azad himself engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience in the frontlines of the anticolonial battles, and he spent considerable time in prison, not unlike Mahatma Gandhi. Most important, Maulana Azad mobilized the Muslim masses in India to join Mahatma Gandhi's movement, and in doing so he legitimized nonviolent activism in Islam.

Maulana Azad's example and messaging about nonviolent activism in Islam directly contradict the preaching and violent acts of Islamist terrorist organizations, also referred to as violent extremist organizations (VEOs). This book is premised on the theoretical, theological, and jurisprudential principles of nonviolent activism in the context of Islam, as seen in the example and religious authority of Maulana Azad. This book comparatively analyzes, through an interdisciplinary lens, the nonviolent activism of Maulana Azad aligned with Mahatma Gandhi's movement and the violent *jihadism* of VEOs in modern history. This book focuses on the legitimacy of nonviolent

1

activism in Islam, while proving the illegitimacy of violent *jihadism* that VEOs employ to achieve their political and ideological agendas.

From this comparative analysis, the clarity and legitimacy of nonviolent activism in Islam are emphasized, and, simultaneously, the abstract functions and illegitimacy of VEOs are identifiable. The moral integrity and status of nonviolent activism are contrasted against the moral bankruptcy of violent terrorist organizations. Essentially, the comparative variables between the nonviolent and violent Islamist elements involve the following: Intellectual Capital; Strategic Acumen; Moral Weight; *Ijtihad* versus Jihad; Religious Authority and Legitimacy versus lack of religious authority and legitimacy; Civil and Human Rights; and Intra-Islamic Rivalries, As Opposed to the "Clash of Civilizations" Theory.

Intellectual Capital

Violent jihadists, who are often characterized as "terrorists," have no intellectual capital, despite claiming to speak with religious insights. The VEOs/jihadists actually discourage the use of reason and intellect. Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent activism strongly encouraged the use of reason and intellectual capital. In fact, they keenly recognized the strategic necessity for applying reason and intellectual capital to achieve their goals. For Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi and their followers, the primary goal was to achieve independence from British colonial rule in India. The ways and means for achieving this primary goal were extremely challenging, especially since both leaders vowed to employ strictly nonviolent tactics.

For Maulana Azad, this meant that he had to persuade Indian Muslims that nonviolent activism is not only encouraged, but also it is wholly legitimate within Islam. Given that he was a highly trained and respected Islamic jurist and scholar, Maulana Azad's ability to persuade the Muslim masses encompassed religious authority and legitimacy that hardly no one could match. Hence, Maulana Azad embodied a deep well of intellectual capital from which he wholeheartedly embraced nonviolent activism and mastered his power of persuasion. In addition, nonintellectuals and the enemies of knowledge and reason have had no ammunition against Maulana Azad's intellectual capital.

Strategic Acumen

Maulana Azad did not operate in a strategic vacuum, whereas, VEOs most often have operated in strategic vacuums. Both Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi employed incredibly effective strategic acumen through means of

nonviolent activism. Their movement remained laser focused on the primary goal: achieving independence for India. The strategies that they devised for achieving this goal, while requiring major personal sacrifices, ultimately succeeded, and some argue that they eventually led to the collapse of the British Empire. In contrast, VEOs operate in vacuums and usually fail to display strategic acumen. The use of violent terror targeting civilians only leads to moral bankruptcy and sullies the legitimacy of their causes, especially in the eyes of global public opinion.

Moral Weight

The fact that Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience campaign against the British in India turned the tables on the moral claims of the West has been his greatest victory. Nonviolent civil disobedience disarms the violent party and renders it morally bankrupt because the reputation it leaves behind is solely as a violent brute. Meanwhile, the nonviolent activists remain steadfast in their vows to resist hitting back, and, in the process, they often suffer terrible pain and injuries—sometimes even death—as a result of the aggressor's violent repression. In the eyes of global public opinion, such a scenario rightly makes the nonviolent party heroic and morally righteous as opposed to the aggressors, who are viewed as morally bankrupt and needlessly cruel.

The British employed ruthless violence against Gandhian nonviolent activists and even committed massacres like the 1919 Amritsar massacre with more than four hundred killed. All the while, Gandhian nonviolent activists, including Maulana Azad, never even raised their hands in defense against such violent repression and brutality. In fact, the British frequently imprisoned Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad and their fellow Congress Party members and even their families. Yet, the nonviolent activists persisted despite the hardships imposed on them. Hence, they emerged atop the moral high ground and carried the greatest moral weight compared to the British and their cohorts in India. Moreover, it is the only case and context of nonviolent power disarming violent power without lifting a weapon, even in the face of brute force, imprisonments, and harsh oppression.

Ijtihad versus Jihad

Within Islam there exists an intellectual and ideological competition for its essence. The orthodoxy embraces literalist interpretations of Islamic law (shari'a) and principles. The violent extremists take the ultraorthodox views and beliefs to exponential levels of literal implementations and enforcement by means of coercion. For them, there is absolutely no room for flexibility

in Islamic interpretations, and that is what characterizes the VEOs, or violent Islamist extremists. Those who are more reform-oriented and embrace reinterpretations of Islamic laws and principles refer to the "opening of the gates of *ijtihad*," or reinterpretation and adjustments as the contextual circumstances change in real time. *Ijtihad* allows for flexibility, and it is the opposite of the literalist ultraorthodox paradigms of Islam. *Ijtihad* is often described as "independent reasoning" within Islamic jurisprudence.

The opposite of *ijtihad* is taqlid, which is often termed "blind faith" or "imitation" of someone, like a religious figure, without applying intellectual discourse and/or reasoning and questioning. The VEOs demand society to abide by taqlid, and they frequently use violence to enforce compliance. The Islamic reformists, on the other hand, reject taqlid, and instead they encourage the use of intellectual discourse and reasoning pertaining to religious issues.

Maulana Azad endorsed the application of *ijtihad* and loathed blind faith without reasoning. Clearly, he and the VEOs are on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, and his endorsement of *ijtihad* encompasses the use of nonviolent activism and unequivocally rejects violent extremism. Moreover, *ijtihad* is one of the primary religious tools and methodologies for empowering intellectual capital, which is imperative for adjusting to the changing times and circumstances of modern life.

Religious Authority and Legitimacy

Maulana Azad earned his religious credentials through vigorous Islamic training and learning from highly credible religious institutions and teachers. He mastered many secular subjects as well, including philosophy, languages, and science. His educational background proves his credentials, religious authority, and legitimacy as a Maulana and Islamic jurist. His credentials as such have remained unquestionable. On the other hand, the VEO leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri have had no credentials equaling Maulana Azad. Thus, bin Laden and Zawahiri's religious authority and legitimacy are highly questionable.

Civil and Human Rights, As Opposed to Denial of Rights

Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent activism fully supported and promoted fundamental civil and human rights for everyone, including women and the lowest castes in Hinduism. Due to Mahatma Gandhi's proactive and publicized compassion toward women and the so-called "untouchables," who are now referred to as Dalits, Indians became more conscious of egalitarianism and human rights. In fact, in 1950 the Indian constitution

legally abolished untouchability, and this happened only because of Mahatma Gandhi's steadfast commitment to officially eliminate it. The same is true with Maulana Azad's activism and promotion of human rights and equality within Islam and the broader Indian Muslim community. Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi, and the Congress Party in general, were committed to democracy in postcolonial India, and they relentlessly led the masses nonviolently toward that goal.

The VEOs, however, are totally against civil and human rights, as well as democracy. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) specifically denounce democracy and human rights, which include gender rights and parity. Instead, the VEOs want to enforce a social and political hierarchy with their own leadership on top and religious minorities on the bottom. Some VEOs even advocate genocide of certain groups in society, like the Yezidis, and the IS in particular has sanctioned slavery, especially sexual slavery.

Intra-Islamic Rivalries, As Opposed to the "Clash of Civilizations" Theory

In 1996, Samuel Huntington proposed the theory of the "Clash of Civilizations," wherein future conflicts will take place on cultural and civilizational fault lines. His theory contends that the West will clash against Islam and Islamic civilizations. However, his theory did not account for the more obvious trends of *intra*-Islamic rivalries. These rivalries include sectarianism—as seen in the intensifying Sunni–Shi'ite ideological and geopolitical competitions—and other theological and ideological differences involving gender issues, human rights, liberalism/reformism versus orthodoxy, and the role of *ijtihad*. Therefore, the clash of civilizations theory has been proven deficient in that respect.

Plus, the two theocracies in the world Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked in fierce competition for geopolitical and ideological hegemony in the Middle East, and some would say even the broader Islamic world. The clash of civilizations is more *within* Islam itself, with diverse views and interpretations competing against each other in the modern era. This is one of the reasons why it is wrong to view Islam and Muslims through a monolithic lens.

Maulana Azad was acutely aware of these intra-Islamic fault lines, and he strongly opposed the proponents of violence and religious/sectarian supremacy of any kind. Most importantly, he would wholly disapprove of violent jihad—regardless of sectarian identity—particularly targeting innocent civilians. He would find such behavior and acts as extremely repulsive and illegitimate in the context of Islam. Furthermore, it is well documented that Maulana Azad abhorred sectarianism. Undoubtedly, he would view modern-day Sunni–Shi'ite

violence and ideological competitions with deep disdain, and he would likely declare illegitimate any claims of violent jihad based on sectarianism.

WHAT IS JIHAD?

There are two forms of jihad in Islam, one of which is distinctly nonviolent. The two forms of jihad are the "greater jihad" and the "lesser jihad." Traditionally, the "greater jihad" has been described as the "jihad against oneself," or to strive to improve oneself to be a better Muslim. In this context one can also refer to "intellectual jihad," which employs reasoning and reinterpretation (i.e., *ijtihad*) to adjust to changing times and remain on a righteous path. One can also theorize that the other nonviolent jihad is the civil disobedience that Maulana Azad utilized in his partnership with Mahatma Gandhi. That is an innovative and praiseworthy use of the term "jihad" in strictly a *nonviolent* context.

The other form of jihad is the violent struggle, mainly for self-defense, but often interpreted as offensive warfare, or "holy war." This is also the form of jihad that many violent Islamist extremist organizations invoke as a religious duty in order to carry out specific political and ideological agendas. This is traditionally referred to as the "Lesser Jihad." Many call it "holy war," although that is arguable because the true meaning of the word is not the same. The root of the Arabic word for jihad is the verb (i.e., the infinitive) *jahada*:

> *jahada*   To endeavor, strive, labor; take pains.[2]

It can also loosely mean waging a "holy war," as these definitions explain:

> *jaa hada*   To endeavor, strive, to fight (for something); to wage holy war against the infidels.
> *jihad*   Fight, battle; jihad (holy war against the infidels, as a religious duty).[3]
> *mujahid*   Fighter, freedom fighter; warrior.[4]

In addition, a *mujahid* is someone who conducts jihad. The plural of mujahid is *mujaheddin* (with variations in spelling).

The definitions and contexts of the Lesser Jihad contain some ambiguities, which allow for misuses and abuses. Throughout Islamic history, there have been cases of more sound uses of both types of jihad, greater and lesser, as well as some blatantly distorted applications of violent jihad.

One of the most important uses of the greater jihad is in the area of intellectual reform. Islam has been suffering an intellectual crisis since the fall of

the Ottoman Empire following World War I. This has accounted for the intellectual malaise and stagnation found internally within the Islamic *ummah*, or community at large. While this stagnation has occurred, over time the voices of Islamic reason and intellect, who have tried to stimulate the "intellectual jihad" within the *ummah*, have not only been stifled, but outright violently repressed and marginalized by the orthodoxy.

Maulana Azad fervently advocated for the role of reasoning and intellectual discourse in Islam. This is evident throughout his writings, speeches, and personal letters and journal. In fact, he openly questioned orthodoxy and rigid authoritarianism within the religious establishment. He cited their unwillingness to allow intellectual jihad, that is, *reasoning*, as the source of theological stagnation and the obstinacy of dogma. Maulana Azad, himself a religious authority, defied the orthodoxy, and even fiercely opposed the partition of India to create a homeland for Indian Muslims, Pakistan. Maulana Azad unwaveringly embraced secularism and pluralist democracy for the future postcolonial India. Moreover, he proposed and fought for Hindu–Muslim unity in his activism, despite communal violence breaking out, internal Muslim divisions surfacing about the future of independent India, and the immense pressures on him from the Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to create Pakistan as a result of partitioning India.

Maulana Azad rejected violence as a means for achieving political agendas during the anti-colonial struggle in British India. He paid a hefty price for his activism, as the British colonial government in India constantly jailed him. That never deterred Maulana Azad, and he not only continued his activism, but he published numerous newsletters and periodicals in defiance. He was also a highly respected Islamic jurist, scholar, and poet. In India today, Maulana Azad is recognized and revered as one of the most important Muslim leaders and close friend of Mahatma Gandhi's, who worked tirelessly in the nonviolent civil disobedience—also referred to as noncooperation—struggle against British colonial rule in the UK's "jewel of the crown," India.

Maulana Azad earnestly embraced and practiced Mahatma Gandhi's principles of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa*, defined as follows: satyagraha is "truth," or "truth force," a term that Mahatma Gandhi used to mean "nonviolent resistance" or "civil resistance/noncooperation." The Sanskrit word "ahimsa" translates as "do no harm," and in the context of Mahatma Gandhi's movement it means "nonviolence," applying to all living beings. The *satyagrahis*, or nonviolent resisters or activists led by Mahatma Gandhi, remained highly disciplined in their ahimsa principles, even while facing fierce British brutality in colonial India.[5]

Maulana Azad served as one of the primary troops in this nonviolent resistance, and at times even led the charge in satyagraha campaigns. Because of his leadership, qualifications, and activism, Maulana Azad was able to rally

millions of Indian Muslims for the Mahatma Gandhi-led satyagraha movement, spearheading nonviolent Islamic activism, one can say in the form of "nonviolent jihad," and laying the foundations for Islam's legal precedence for nonviolent protests.

ABUL KALAM AZAD—A BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE

Abul Kalam Ghulam Muhiyuddin was born on November 11, 1888, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to a Tajik/Persian father, who was a renowned Muslim scholar named Maulana Khairuddin, and Arab mother who was the daughter of a prominent Arab sheikh. His family's roots originate in Herat, Afghanistan. During the 1857 mutiny against British colonial rule in India, Maulana Khairuddin moved the family to Mecca, and then later returned to Calcutta with his family in 1890.[6]

The young Abul Kalam Azad was a child prodigy, mastering several languages including Persian, Urdu, Arabic, Hindi, Bengali, and English. Maulana Azad "was a brilliant debater, as indicated by his name, Abul Kalam, which literally means 'Lord of Dialogue.' He adopted the pen name Azad as a mark of his mental emancipation from a narrow view of religion and life."[7]

According to the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Maulana Azad came from a religiously orthodox family that required him to acquire a "traditional Islamic education." His father conducted his religious education at home first, and then selected eminent teachers who took over the task.[8] Maulana Azad also learned many languages, including Arabic and Persian; he took on the task of learning English on his own. He also became proficient in secular disciplines such as geometry, algebra and mathematics, and philosophy, and through self-learning, he became knowledgeable in politics and world history.[9] Maulana Azad received formal training for Islamic clerical status. He was also an astute and prolific writer, publishing many works including the reinterpretation of the Islamic scripture, the Quran. His mastery of the Quran and Islamic jurisprudence "led him to repudiate *Taqlid* or the tradition of conformity and accept the principle of *Tajdid* or innovation."[10]

Maulana Azad traveled extensively throughout the Middle East, meeting prominent historical pro-independence figures and leaders in the Arab and Muslim world. He studied Jamaluddin Al-Afghani's Pan-Islamic principles, and he traveled to Egypt, Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq. He met with the Islamist activist Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, the disciples of whom inspired the *Salafiyya* movement,[11] and the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Hasan Al Banna, though Maulana Azad remained uninspired

by their religious rigidity. In addition, Maulana Azad witnessed firsthand the Young Turks revolutionary movement in Turkey, inspiring him as a "nationalist revolutionary."[12]

Maulana Azad also studied and admired the philosophy of the Indian Muslim scholar Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan, who rejected religious orthodoxy and promoted Western secular education and rational thinking. In this spirit, Sir Sayyed founded Aligarh Muslim University in 1875 for the purpose of providing a secular, comprehensive education for Indian Muslims to facilitate their socioeconomic development. All of these experiences, travels, meetings, and observations affected Maulana Azad intellectually and also in terms of his passions for revolutionary activism, transforming him into a die-hard activist opposing both British colonial rule in India and religious stagnation at the hands of the narrow-minded orthodoxy. Focused on these causes, Maulana Azad

> helped set up secret revolutionary centers all over north India and Bombay [. . .]. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad tried to convince his colleagues to shed their hostility towards Muslims.
>
> In 1912, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad started a weekly journal in Urdu called *Al-Hilal* to increase the revolutionary recruits amongst the Muslims. *Al-Hilal* played an important role in forging Hindu-Muslim unity after the bad blood created between the two communities [. . .]. *Al-Hilal* became a revolutionary mouthpiece ventilating extremist views. "The government regarded *Al-Hilal* as propagator of secessionist views and banned it in 1914."
>
> Maulana Abul Kalam Azad then started another weekly called *Al-Balagh* with the same mission of propagating Indian nationalism and revolutionary ideas based on Hindu-Muslim unity. In 1916, the government banned this paper too and expelled Maulana Abul Kalam Azad from Calcutta and interned him at Ranchi from where he was released [after WWI]. After his release, [. . .] Maulana Azad supported the Non-Cooperation Movement started by Mahatma Gandhi and entered the Indian National Congress in 1920. He was elected as the president of the special session of the Congress in Delhi (1923). Maulana Azad was again arrested in 1930 for violation of the salt laws as part of Gandhiji's Salt *Satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance). He was put in Meerut jail for a year and a half. Maulana Azad became the president of Congress in 1940 (Ramgarh) and remained in the post till 1946.[13]

Maulana Azad was also elected president of the All India Khilafat Committee and repeatedly spent time in and out of prison throughout his life due to his activism threatening British colonial rule in India. Maulana Azad became close to Mahatma Gandhi and adopted his philosophy, and both men were passionate about religion.[14] Maulana Azad also embraced

Mahatma Gandhi's tradition of spinning his own clothes made of cotton, referred to as homespun or *khadi*.[15] The spinning wheel on which the homespun is made is called the *charkha*. Maulana Azad joined Mahatma Gandhi and his entourage in the ashrams,[16] which are monastic communal retreats. Maulana Azad affiliated himself deeply with Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy and ideals, and he loyally accepted his leadership in the nonviolent civil disobedience campaign against the British. Maulana Azad eventually served as the Congress Party's president; he was the youngest person elected to that position.[17]

Maulana Azad led the famous Dharasana Salt March in May 1930, along with renowned Indian woman activist Sarojini Naidu, in which the nonviolent civil disobedience activists were viciously beaten by British-controlled soldiers when they tried to raid (nonviolently) the Dharasana Salt Works factory in Gujarat. This nonviolent activism was a protest against the British imposed tax on salt in India. This is one of many dramatic descriptions of the Dharasana Salt March:

> Column after column of Indians advanced toward the gates and were severely beaten by the native police under British direction. Not one of the Satyagrahis raised a hand to defend himself as the clubs rained down, fracturing skulls. Many lost consciousness, and several perished. In the Gandhi movie, the scene was famously encapsulated by a Western reporter: "Whatever moral ascendancy the West once held was lost here today." The Indians accepted this suffering on behalf of the Truth they clung to of ending colonial rule.[18]

The bloody Dharasana Salt March did not fuel the *satyagrahis'* (civil disobedience activists) thirst for revenge or anger. Their remarkable discipline despite the violent response has gone down in history as one of the most admirable and inspirational examples of nonviolent activism. The moral courage and discipline of the civil resisters only strengthened their resolve for protesting the injustices under British colonial rule in India. Maulana Azad exemplified that Muslims do not have to embrace violence in order to protest injustice and to bring justice to society. He also illustrated that the concept of revenge goes against the principles of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and *satyagraha* (civil disobedience), and they have no place even in Islam.

Maulana Azad was extremely upset with the partition of India, as it shattered his dream of Hindu–Muslim unity and coexistence in a pluralist Indian democracy. The creation of Pakistan for Indian Muslims went against every grain of Maulana Azad's principles and commitment to political secularism, and to some extent undermined the hard work, sacrifices, and efforts he and others contributed and led as revolutionary nationalist activists throughout the independence movement for India.

The internal rift among the Indian Muslims, exacerbated by the rising popularity of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League, threatened Hindu–Muslim unity and the prospects for a postcolonial pluralist secular democracy that would keep the subcontinent's geography intact. But, Maulana Azad remained steadfast in the face of such adversity, and stood his ground about his belief in the future of Hindu–Muslim unity and pluralist democracy in India. He said that he is proud of being an Indian national, and he emphasized and praised the country's unity and endurance despite the multitudes of identities and ideologies[19] living under the banner of India. Maulana Azad referred to India and his Indian identity as "this noble edifice,"[20] and he considered himself as one of the essential nation-builders for a future independent Indian republic. He saw himself as indispensable in the process of this great endeavor.[21]

In postindependence India, Maulana Azad continued to serve the public. The new government, under India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, appointed Maulana Azad as the country's first minister of education. On February 22, 1958, Maulana Azad died of a stroke. In 1992, he was posthumously awarded Bharat Ratna, India's highest civilian award.[22]

The historical Islamic legal precedent of Maulana Azad's endorsement of nonviolent activism for the cause of social justice and ending British colonial occupation of India serves as unequivocal proof of the legitimacy of nonviolent activism in Islam. The importance of this message that Maulana Azad has exemplified in his actions and life, despite enduring violent repression and lengthy prison sentences, cannot be emphasized enough. Those who distort Islam as a means to justify their violent jihadism ought to pay close attention to this message. Violent *jihadism* targeting innocent civilians is not the best approach to fight against injustices, nor is it sanctioned in mainstream Islam. Rather, history shows that nonviolent activism is legitimate in Islamic contexts, and it bears a far more positive legacy than terrorism, or violent Islamist extremism.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST MILITANCY AND EXTREMISM

This book analyzes the application of nonviolent activism in Islam—with the example of Maulana Azad's leadership in India—as a means of confronting injustices. If a legal precedent for nonviolent activism in Islam is promoted, as it was in the case of the Muslims in India fighting against British colonial rule, then the arguments for the use of violence (as terrorist organizations resort to) for political agendas are unsubstantiated.

In addition, the 2011 mass uprisings and nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA)[23] validate the nonviolent tactics utilized in Muslim majority states. These events serve as powerful evidence against the utility of militancy and terrorism, particularly in the name of Islam. While most, if not all, the young activists in Tunis, Tahrir Square, Benghazi, Der'a, Manama, Sanaa, Rabat, Algiers, Amman, and other cities probably never heard the name Abul Kalam Azad, they have carried his torch of nonviolent activism into the twenty-first century. In the process, these nonviolent activists unknowingly have conveyed Maulana Azad's enduring message to the violent Islamist extremists, who for decades have tried to achieve the very same political goals that the 2011 Arab Awakening activists have, but with indiscriminate acts of violence often targeting noncombatants. That enduring message has proven once again that nonviolent activism has greater moral strength and power than violence, and that it is compatible with Islamic principles and laws. This message is a powerful argument against Islamist militancy and extremism.

The Need for Intellectual Jihad in Islam

Throughout his writings and speeches, it is evident that Maulana Azad was a fervent proponent of reasoning and intellectual discourse, rather than blind imitation of religious traditions and practices. He consistently criticized religious observance and dogma without questioning or reasoning, and he stood firmly for "intellectual jihad," as much as for nonviolent activism.

In modern history, another Islamic scholar who strongly urged the Islamic *ummah* to undertake intellectual jihad was the late Professor Fazlur Rahman, originally from Pakistan. He was exiled for speaking against the fanaticism and fundamentalism that were on the rise in Pakistan. Professor Rahman wrote many books and articles, and his book, *Islam* (1979),[24] in particular, explains the sources of fundamentalism and fanaticism in puritanical Islamic movements since early Islamic history to the postcolonial era. His advocacy for "intellectual jihad" remained marginalized, while the voices and power of the puritanical orthodoxy in the *ummah* became popularized. At the same time, the greater form of jihad was rendered invisible and intangible, while the violent lesser form of jihad became more visible and noticeable in modern times.

This is particularly the case when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the Muslim world rallied jihadists (i.e., *mujaheddin*) to fight against the invaders. This marks the time in modern history when the proliferation of Islamic puritanical orthodoxy became widespread globally, in the process eclipsing and repressing reformist and liberal Islamic views. The repression of moderate voices was exacerbated when the Saudi religious authorities deemed it necessary to engage in an ideological competition against

the export of the Iranian Shi'ite revolutionary ideology upon the Islamic Revolution in Iran, also occurring in 1979.[25]

Over time, the Islamic puritanical orthodoxy has perpetuated intellectual stagnation and impeded the much-needed Islamic renaissance and reformation in the modern era. How did the Islamic orthodoxy manage to repress the calls for intellectual jihad and, in fact, how did it manage to eclipse the greater jihad by the lesser jihad, hence reversing the two, in recent history?

The answer is purely related to politics, and in particular international relations, with religion often acting as the cover and justification for the actions taken. The process began with the roots of puritanical fanaticism that date back to the early Caliphate formed immediately after the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 AD. Thereafter, the lesser form of jihad, the violent jihad, was employed throughout the expansion of the Islamic empire, which included the exploits of the Seljuk Turks who overthrew the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople (Istanbul) and established the Ottoman Empire in 1299 AD. In these cases, jihad was usually waged against non-Muslims, but with internal conflicts rising during the Caliphate, some cases of jihad against fellow Muslims did take place as well. The pretext of Muslim-against-Muslim jihad usually involved one party's subjective judgment of the other's status as "nonbeliever." This judgment is known as *takfir*, which is defined as "charge of unbelief,"[26] or apostasy, which is the act of leaving the faith. For hardliners, the punishment for apostasy is death. The concept of *takfir* dates back to seventh-century Arabia, and the first application of it is reported to be undertaken by the Kharijites.

The Evolution of Islamist Extremism

In 661 AD, the fourth Caliph of the Islamic Empire, Ali bin Abi Talib, was killed. The assassins were the Kharijites, puritanical religious extremists who considered the Lesser Jihad as the "sixth pillar" of Islam.[27] According to Fazlur Rahman, "Among the later Muslim legal schools . . . it is only the fanatic Kharijites who have declared jihad to be one of the pillars of the Faith."[28] Hence, for the Kharijites, violent jihad was deemed a religious obligation.

The Caliph Ali had signed a truce and agreed to a ceasefire with his opponent, the Umayyad leader Mu'awiya and the Kharijites saw this truce as a transgression of the Islamic ruler, who, in their view, was obligated to finish off Mu'awiya and his dynasty. The basis of Kharijite beliefs is the judgment of one's "Muslimness" upon committing a serious sin. In other words, if a Muslim commits a sin, is he or she still a Muslim? If the answer is no, then, according to the Kharijites, this person must be sentenced to death. Professor Rahman says:

The extreme sect of the Kharijites (the "Seceders") maintained that a grave sinner no longer remains a Muslim and turned the fury of their jihad (holy war) against the established rule and the Community in general in the name of a transcendent and extreme idealism which they combined with uncompromising fanaticism.[29]

The Kharijites are among the first Muslims to employ a rather harsh and extremist form of jihad. Clearly, they laid the groundwork for future fanaticism and militant fundamentalism. Their actions also exemplify the utility of the Lesser Jihad for expressed political purposes and agendas, with ramifications for regional and international relations. Since then, there have been numerous instances throughout Islamic history in which the Lesser Jihad was employed against fellow Muslims, employing *takfir*, for specific political and ideological agendas.

Just who were the Kharijites? The plural *Khawarij* means "seceders" as in seceding from the community; it's also translated as "rebel." They are described as the first real sect within Islam, employing the concept of *takfir*, or judging someone as a nonbeliever or apostate (*kafir*), based on the extent of one's departure from the religion of Islam. The Kharijites believed that

it was forbidden to live among those who did not share their views [. . .]—*khawarij* means "seceders" or "those who exit the community." Radical Kharijites . . . declared those who disagreed with their position to be apostates, and they launched periodic military attacks against mainstream Muslim centers until they ceased to be a military threat in the late 8th century CE. The Kharijites were also known as *Haruriyah* (from *Harura*, the site of one of one of their main camps in Iraq), and more generically as *ghulat* (extremists).[30]

Hence, violent jihad became weaponized for political and religious agendas even within Islam, that is, Muslims against Muslims, and this has been the model that modern Islamist extremists have been following, especially in the case of the so-called IS, or ISIS. Throughout history, violent Islamist extremism has been based on the Kharijite principles, as well as recent versions of Salafism and Wahhabism, the latter of which is a type of Salafism.

Muhammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhab (d. 1792) was the founder of the ideology of Wahhabism, which is based on the teachings of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya (b. 1263), who followed the highly conservative Hanbali school of Islamic law in Sunni Islam. Abdul Wahhab also adhered to the Hanbali school of Islamic law, and he was greatly influenced by ibn Taymiyya's teachings and interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. For ibn Taymiyya, the only legitimate Islamic doctrine was

based on two of the recognized sources of Islamic law, the Qur'an and the Sunna.[31] A major precept of Wahhabism, therefore, was rejection of any

religious belief or practice not based on those two sources, which he considered a heretical "innovation" *(bid'a)*. For example, he condemned intercessional prayers *(tawassul)* to Muslim saints and viewed pilgrimages to their tombs as heresy. He preached that the only valid intercession was to the one true God.

The doctrine of *Tawhid*, or monotheism, is the basic tenet of Islam, expressed in the *Shahada*, or profession of faith: "There is no god but God [*Allah*] and Muhammad is the messenger of God." It is thus the basic focus of Wahhabism. The term *Tawhid* is derived from the Arabic word *wahid*, meaning "one."

[. . .] As a fundamentalist, Ibn Wahhab subscribed to the classical Islamic interpretation of jihad that included Qur'anic verses supporting holy war, or "Jihad of the Sword."[32]

Taking violent jihadism to another level in the context of the modern era, the militant Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) has served as the principal source of inspiration for (Sunni/Salafist) jihadist ideology in postcolonial times. Qutb has exacted greater influence on the "present-day jihadist terrorists," more than Osama bin Laden and, arguably, even "the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab."[33] Qutb wrote a book entitled *Milestones*, which "became a classic manifesto of the terrorist wing of Islamic fundamentalism."[34] In his writings, Qutb merged religion with politics, which has served as the ideological pinnacle for modern-day violent *jihadism*.

Initially, Qutb promoted violence against the government but only in the context of the government's first use of violence against civilians. Later, Qutb posited the idea that any leaders who did not meet his Islamic criteria for leadership were themselves and the societies they governed to "be living in a state of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance),"[35] and called for the creation of a model Islamic society, essentially an Islamic utopia. Qutb considered that model Islamic society to be the "truly Islamic state."[36] Although he acknowledged the scientific and socioeconomic achievements in the United States, Qutb was

appalled by its racism, sexual permissiveness, and support for Zionism in view of the violation of Palestinian rights. Said to have been a key liaison between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers, who overthrew the monarchy in 1952. Tried and executed in 1966 for calling for armed overthrow of the Egyptian state. His writings advocating revolutionary change are influential among both Sunni and Shi'ite Islamists.[37]

While Qutb's teachings have resonated with extremists for decades, recent years have shown that Wahhabism still continues to be relevant; it inspires violent Islamist extremism, as seen with the IS, which professes its own even more extreme version of Wahhabism. As Author William McCants

explains, while the IS's Wahhabi ideology is "nearly identical to Wahhabism . . . it's very different from the kind of Islam you find in other parts of the world."[38] Essentially, "Wahhabi scholars might reach different conclusions from Islamic State scholars, but they start at much the same place."[39] Also, while Wahhabism is the national ideology of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the IS completely rejects the Saudi monarchy and its custodial management of the two holiest sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina. However, the ideological foundations and paradigms for both the Saudis and the IS are the same. Again, in these contexts, religion and politics are far from mutually exclusive.

It is important for the reader to understand the diversity of Islamic ideologies and interpretations—both *within and between* sects such as Sunnism and Shi'ism—and contrast the violent ones against the nonviolent teachings and practices of Maulana Azad. In doing so, the centrality of intellectual capital, reasoning, and *ijtihad* is apparent, even in using nonviolent activism as a strategic tool against injustice. In the face of violent criminal *jihadism* predominating today's headlines, the legitimacy and righteousness of nonviolent activism, by comparison, are hard to miss.

THE PURPOSE AND FOCUS OF THIS BOOK

This book intends to provide a counterargument to violent Islamist extremism/*jihadism* by means of educating the reader about Islam's nonviolent principles and how they can be used to fight against Islamist extremism and militancy. This is a substantial contribution to scholarship and dissemination of knowledge about something rarely discussed and something about which the global public lacks awareness. *Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad* provides a religious legal argument, with sound evidence and historical examples, serving as ideological and intellectual ammunition against religious militancy.

Scholarly research pertaining to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who is considered a highly respected religious authority and one of the heroes of the independence movement in India, is invaluable. Building awareness about nonviolent aspects of Islam in today's environment is equally invaluable.

The focus of this book is the moral, religious, and judicial comparisons between Maulana Azad's endorsement (as renowned Islamic jurisprudential authority) of nonviolent activism in the Islamic context—which provides the legal and theological precedents—and the violent acts and beliefs of Islamist extremists, which are immoral and unjust particularly in targeting innocent civilians, and hence un-Islamic, despite their rigorous claims.

THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the tendencies to interpret Islam in the context of violent jihad and fighting oppression and perceived injustices and proposes the counterargument of Islamic nonviolent activism that is more potent in fighting injustice. The historical precedence of the principles and actions of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has been introduced.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was he? That is the question that chapter 2 of this book addresses. It delves into more details about Maulana Azad's biography, his principles of nonviolent activism in the context of his interpretation of Islam, as well as his role as a leader of Indian Muslims in the nonviolent struggle against British colonial rule in India.

Chapter 3 follows this with a discussion and analysis of the concepts of *zulm* and *mazlum* in Islam. The concept of *zulm*, which means "oppression" in Arabic, and *mazlum*, the word for "one who is oppressed," dates back to early Islamic history, and the violent persecution of the early converts to Islam. In this chapter, linkages are made between those early historical concepts and the pro-independence movement against the British in India, and how, under Maulana Azad's leadership of Indian Muslims, nonviolent activism was compatible with these concepts. Also, the argument of extremists that oppression must be countered with violent jihad is dispelled. In fact, these extremists are perpetrating even worse brutality and injustice on the innocent masses, thus, their religious-based arguments are undermined by their own brutal actions.

Chapter 4 addresses the Islamic principles of social justice, and how Maulana Azad's teachings and principles relate to them. The whole idea of nonviolent civil disobedience is to act against injustice and unjust laws and policies. That has been Mahatma Gandhi's motivation, as well as Maulana Azad's. For an Islamic religious authority of Maulana Azad's stature and caliber to embrace nonviolent activism for the sake of social justice, it is a significant change in the course of action in Islam against oppression.

Chapter 5 offers a comparative analysis of the Islamist extremists and Maulana Azad's principles of nonviolence, pluralism, peaceful coexistence, and secular democracy.

Already there exists a proliferation of literature about the violent interpretations of Islam and violent *jihadism*, but there is insufficient literature about Islamic nonviolence. These nonviolent principles and the historical precedence examined in this book have strong implications for global peace and security. These implications are explained in chapter 6.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion, which summarizes the Islamic nonviolent principles the book presents, and highlights the significance of Maulana Azad's religious and political leadership and precedent-setting decrees

invoking nonviolent activism to fight oppression and injustice. The conclusion emphasizes the need to build knowledge and awareness about these significant nonviolent dimensions of Islam.

All of Maulana Azad's Persian and Urdu poetry presented in transliteration in this book are quoted from his book *Words of Freedom: Ideas of a Nation*, in English translation (2010).

This is a treatise against violent Islamist extremism and terrorism. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad once said, "We have not invaded anyone. We have not conquered anyone. We have not grabbed their land, their culture, their history and tried to enforce our way of life on them."[40] Yet, they brought the British Empire to its defeat without lifting a weapon.

NOTES

1. "Maulana" is a title for a respected Muslim religious scholar and leader.

2. Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Arabic-English Dictionary), edited by J. Milton Cowan, third edition (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1976), p. 142.

3. Ibid., p. 142.

4. Ibid., p. 143.

5. See "Non-Violence," Ethics Guide, *BBC*, Archive, 2014, accessed from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/war/against/nonviolence.shtml.

6. "Remembering Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Short Biography," Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIS), no date: http://makaias.gov.in/biography.html.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Salafism espouses the return to Tradition, that is, to observe the practice and lifestyle of the Islamic tradition during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. Salafism promotes taqlid and conformity without questioning.

12. MAKAIS, Short Biography.

13. Ibid.

14. *Abul Kalam Azad*, edited by Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, John McBrewster (Beau Bassin, Mauritius: Alphascript Publishing, 2009), p. 5.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. "The Pinch Heard Around the World: Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha 75 Years On," *Peace Power, Berkeley's Journal of Principled Nonviolence and Conflict Transformation* 1, no. 1 (Summer 2005): http://calpeacepower.org/0101/salt_march.htm.

19. Abul Kalam Azad, eds. Miller, et al., p. 9.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. MAKAIS, Short Biography.

23. The 2011 "Arab Spring" is referred to in this book as the "Arab Awakening."

24. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, second edition (University of Chicago Press, 1979).

25. See "Bitter Rivals," documentary film, *Frontline PBS*, February 20, 2018, available at https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/.

26. Wehr, p. 833.

27. The five pillars of faith in Islam are: (1) the declaration of faith that there is no god, except Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger; (2) praying five times daily; (3) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (4) paying the alms-tax (zakat); and (5) performing the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at least once in life, if affordable.

28. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), p. 34.

29. Ibid., p. 98.

30. Tamara Sonn, and Adam Farrar, "Kharijites," *Oxford Bibliographies,* December 14, 2009, accessed from: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml.

31. The Quran is the holy scripture of Islam; the Sunna refers to the words and acts of the Prophet Muhammad, which Muslims are encouraged to emulate.

32. David E. Long, "Tawhid or Jihad: What Wahhabism Is and Is not," *Middle East Institute (MEI)*, October 1, 2009, accessed from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/tawhid-or-jihad-what-wahhabism-and-not.

33. Ibid.

34. Paul Berman, "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror," *The New York Times*, March 23, 2003, accessed from: https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/magazine/the-philosopher-of-islamic-terror.html.

35. "Qutb, Sayyid," *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, 2020, accessed from: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1955.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. W. McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), p. 151.

39. Ibid.

40. "Here are Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's Profound Words, Take a Look," *The Indian Express*, February 22, 2020: https://indianexpress.com/photos/lifestyle-gallery/maulana-abul-kalam-azad-education-minister-journalist-scholar-death-anniversary-birthday-6281322/.

Chapter 1

Abul Kalam Azad

Who Was He?

Why is Maulana Azad's message of nonviolent activism important in today's context, as the world faces the iron fists of violent authoritarian regimes, injustices, and extremist ideologies and operatives? His message provides a blueprint for success and moral credibility that exposes and rises above the disgraced status of violent ideologies and practices, both secular and religious alike. Moreover, Maulana Azad's beliefs, convictions, philosophy, practices, and personal sacrifices for the cause of peaceful coexistence and tolerance illustrate laudable moral courage and righteousness that violent extremists absolutely fail to match. Maulana Azad's nonviolent strategy that embraced Mahatma Gandhi's principles of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and *satyagraha* (civil disobedience, or noncooperation) unequivocally proves Islam's compatibility with nonviolent strategy as a morally just tactic to fight against oppression in religious and secular contexts.

Maulana Azad's intellectual capital and depth of knowledge as a religious authority and scholar far surpass those of Islamist extremists and their self-declared, religiously unqualified leaders. Maulana Azad's partnership with Mahatma Gandhi and his nonviolent activism illustrate his strategic acumen. Both men keenly understood the importance of nonviolent civil disobedience as carrying greater moral weight and value compared to the violent strategies and tactics of the British colonial power and those who advocate violence. Plus, the commitment to peaceful coexistence is a positive approach to a future united India, as opposed to the British and religious extremists' propensity for stoking divisions within society and espousing intolerant, hateful attitudes toward "the other."

Maulana Azad completely accepted and advocated religious reinterpretation, or *ijtihad*, while the extremists have latched onto blind dogma, or taqlid.

In the minds of reformists like Maulana Azad, *ijtihad* constitutes the "intellectual jihad" required within Islam to adjust to changing times and circumstances. That allows adaptations to the forces of modernization. Meanwhile, the religious extremists embrace violent jihad, and, at the same time, they reject and suppress intellectual jihad, rational and critical thinking, questioning, and reasoning.

While Maulana Azad's religious education, training, authority, and legitimacy have never been in question, the religious extremists' claims to religious authority and legitimacy—particularly without comparable rigorous religious education and training—are usually dubious and lack credibility. Similarly, Maulana Azad's wholehearted acceptance and promotion of human rights and democracy, which he viewed as fully compatible with Islam, are totally rejected and condemned by religious extremists. Islamist extremists' leaders have given speeches and published literature that not only condemn the principles of human rights and democracy but also criticize Muslims who accept them. We have seen this with Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS), and many others. There is no room for human rights and democracy in religious fascism, since, by definition, it is totalitarianism at its worst.

Like Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad felt deep sorrow when Hindu–Muslim communal violence flared up in India, and, most importantly, when India's independence from British colonial rule came at the expense of the partition of the subcontinent. Early on, Maulana Azad grew incensed with the petty intra-Islamic sectarian rivalries primarily involving Sunnis and Shi'ites. However, the greatest blow for him and Mahatma Gandhi was the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. In a way, that also exhibited an aspect of intra-Islamic discord, because not all Indian Muslims agreed with Maulana Azad's proposals for a pluralist secular democracy in postindependence India. The Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah split from the Azad–Gandhi–Congress Party ideas of an independent united India. Everyone agreed on the fight against Western imperialism, but they differed over how and why and the end result. For Jinnah and the Muslim League, the idea of a Muslim homeland to escape from the supposed tyranny of a Hindu-majority India became nonnegotiable, resulting in the creation of Pakistan. Maulana Azad expressed in his speeches and writings that he was completely against the creation of Pakistan.

These characteristics of Maulana Azad and his message of nonviolent activism are crucial in understanding the stark differences between the principles of reformist Islam and Islamist extremism, and, specifically, the commitment to nonviolence by one group, and the ruthless violence targeting the innocent and guilty alike by the other. Further understanding this comparative analysis requires a deeper appreciation of exactly who was Maulana Azad.

ABUL KALAM AZAD: WHO WAS HE?

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad signifies a towering moral figure and model for emulating in struggles for social justice. Since a tender age, Maulana Azad possessed a drive for learning, intellectual depth and acuity, analytical prowess, and a resolute commitment to embrace truth and accuracy while rejecting superstition, falsehoods, and blind dogma. He strove to transcend and condemn society's afflictions of ignorance (*jihalat*, Urdu) and propensities for following nonsensical dogmas while blindly following dubious religious leaders. Maulana Azad had a ravenous appetite for interdisciplinary education and critical thinking. As he witnessed the intellectual stagnation of society and religious discourse, and, at the same time, the arrogant and often violent imperialist condescension of Western colonial rule gripping his country, he found Mahatma Gandhi's brilliant strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience to serve as the ideal ammunition against the ills of both his own society's toxic trends as well as the yoke of British colonialism.

Maulana Azad possessed his own ammunition of religious credentials and authority to lead India's Muslims in the path of Gandhian nonviolent (*ahimsa*) civil disobedience (*satyagraha*), independence, and secular democracy. He strongly believed that these strategies and courses of action are entirely compatible with Islam. Millions of Indian Muslims agreed with his assessment and wholeheartedly embraced the cause, aligning themselves with Mahatma Gandhi in the nonviolent struggle against British colonial rule.

Maulana Azad's activism took place on a stage consisting of an extraordinarily complex social fabric and configurations of religious, ethnic, gender, caste, and socioeconomic hierarchies, many of which the British colonial strategists were eager to exploit for their own advantages. Leading the masses in such a complicated context proved to be extremely challenging for both Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad. Yet, they persisted despite grave personal sacrifices and tragedies suffered along the way.

Early Life

Maulana Azad's real name was Sayyid Ghulam Muhiyuddin Ahmed bin Khairuddin Al Hussaini, and Abul Kalam Azad was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on November 11, 1888. Later, he adopted the name Abul Kalam Azad; the term *Abul Kalam* literally means "Master of Dialogue," and he "adopted the pen name Azad (meaning 'free') as a mark of his mental emancipation from a narrow view of religion and life."[1]

His father Maulana Khairuddin (full name: Sayyid Muhammad Khairuddin bin Ahmed Al Hussaini) was a Bengali of Tajik descent and his mother Sheikha Alia bint Muhammad was the daughter of a renowned Arab sheikh.

Specifically, Maulana Azad's father was a descendent of Afghan Islamic scholars who held distinguished religious titles with many disciples mainly in Herat, Afghanistan. In his autobiography entitled *India Wins Freedom*, Maulana Azad describes his father Maulana Khairuddin, who "became well known throughout the Islamic world after an Arabic work of his in ten volumes was published in Egypt. In [Bombay and Calcutta], many became his admirers and disciples. He had also toured extensively Iraq, Syria, and Turkey."[2] Maulana Khairuddin is known to have published twelve books and reportedly had thousands of religious disciples.

In his autobiography, Maulana Azad says, "As soon as I gained some knowledge of the [English] language, I started to read the Bible. I secured English, Persian, and Urdu versions of the book and read them side by side."[3] In addition, Maulana Azad confided in readers that his father "was a man who believed in the old ways of life. . . . He held that modern education would destroy religious faith and arranged for my education in the old traditional manner."[4] He goes on to explain the "old system of education for Muslims in India," which prioritized boys, who were taught Arabic after first-taught Persian. Islamic theology was a requirement, and Maulana Azad's father taught him at home, as he did not like the pedagogy at the Islamic seminary (*madrasa*).[5] Maulana Azad also learned secular disciplines along with the religious curriculum. According to Maulana Azad,

> [My father] wished me to be taught by the most eminent scholar in each field. Students who followed the traditional system of education normally finished their course at the age between twenty and twenty-five. This included a period when the young scholar had to teach pupils and thus prove that he had acquired mastery over what he had learnt. I was able to complete the course by the time I was sixteen, and my father got together some fifteen students to whom I taught higher philosophy, mathematics, and logic.[6]

Maulana Azad had an extraordinary personal drive to learn, and he learned English, politics, and world history without any help. He also had

> a natural inclination toward writing, and this resulted in the start of the monthly magazine *Nairang-e-Alam* (Facts of the World) in 1899. He also mastered the art of public speaking and debating.
>
> He was eleven years old when his mother passed away. Two years later, at the age of thirteen, Azad was married to young Zuleikha Begum.[7]

At a young age, Maulana Azad wrote Urdu poetry and prose, including "treatises on religion and philosophy,"[8] which encompassed the interpretation of the Quran, Islam's holy scripture. The gifted young Maulana Azad was

> running a library, a reading room, and a debating society before he was twelve; wanted to write on the life of [Imam] Ghazali[9] at twelve; was contributing learned articles to *Makhzan* (a literary magazine) at fourteen; was teaching a class of students, most of whom were twice his age, when he was fifteen; and completed the traditional course of study at the age of sixteen, nine years ahead of his contemporaries, and brought out a magazine at the same age.[10]

Despite his great accomplishments at such a young age, Maulana Azad grew increasingly disillusioned with his father's traditional views and approaches to education. He also began to resent certain trends, customs, and dogmatic beliefs among Indian Muslims. He craved modern education and the harmonization of Islam with modernity.

Spiritual Crisis and Rational Resolution

In his youth, Maulana Azad's views on Islam became increasingly disillusioned because of the customs and blind dogma prevalent among Indian Muslims. He acutely grasped the dangers that religious dogma poses, particularly in stifling intellectual discourse within religious contexts. To him, these were ominous deviations from the essence of religious intellectual discourse in the Islamic tradition. Departure from religious intellectual practices would lead to stagnation and decay in religious educational institutions as well as within the bodies of religious authorities. This is one of the reasons why Maulana Azad served as an unwavering proponent of education and intellectual freedoms, or what can be described as "rational" discourse, in both religious and secular domains. He wholly rejected blind following of religious dogma without questioning or critical analysis.

An Azad scholar, Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, recalls in her book *Maulana Azad, Islam and the Indian National Movement* that

> [He] became a devotee of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan . . . drawn to his *maslak* (creed). . . . He had extolled Sir Syed's rational interpretation of the Quran, and recorded in more than one place, his profound influence in molding his (Azad's own) religious beliefs.[11]

Maulana Azad remained almost obsessed with Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's teachings and principles, until, eventually, he lost faith in him.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898) was known as a reformist Islamic scholar, and he became a British loyalist, at one point earning an honorary Doctor of Law (LLD) degree from the University of Edinburgh and worked for the notorious East India Company. He sided with the British colonial government during the anti-imperialist rebellion of 1857 in India, also known as the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan sounded the alarm about Indian Muslims' tendency to embrace rigid orthodoxy and blind dogma. He promoted rational thinking, intellectual discourse, and secular education to be included alongside Islamic education. He believed in Westernization and modernization without compromising religious beliefs and tenets. He founded the Aligarh Muslim University (established in 1920), which began as the Muhammadan-Anglo Oriental College (MAOC) in 1875. The university's website provides a brief biography of its founder, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan:

> Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, one of the architects of modern India was born on October 17, 1817 in Delhi and started his career as a civil servant [. . .].
>
> In more than one way, Sir Syed was one of the greatest social reformers and a great national builder of modern India. He began to prepare the road map for the formation of a Muslim University by starting various schools. He instituted Scientific Society in 1863 to instill a scientific temperament into the Muslims and to make the Western knowledge available to Indians in their own language [. . .].
>
> In 1875, Sir Syed founded the Madarsatul Uloom in Aligarh and patterned the MAO College after Oxford and Cambridge universities that he went on a trip to London. His objective was to build a college in line with the British education system but without compromising its Islamic values [. . .].
>
> Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal observes: "The real greatness of Sir Syed consists in the fact that he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it—his sensitive nature was the first to react to modern age" [. . .].
>
> Sir Syed contributed many essential elements to the development of the modern society of the subcontinent. During Sir Syed's own lifetime, "The Englishman," a renowned British magazine of the 19th century remarked in a commentary on November 17, 1885: "Sir Syed's life "strikingly illustrated one of the best phases of modern history." He died on March 27, 1898 and lies buried next to the main mosque at AMU.[12]

Before Maulana Azad grew disillusioned with Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's philosophy, he subscribed to his journal *Tehzib-ul-Akhlaq*, and when Maulana Azad's father stumbled on his son's secret, "His father earned him what can only be termed the worst possible rebuke in a highly religious family such

as his father's—*dehri* (atheist) and *nacheri* (naturalist)."[13] This episode triggered a tumultuous internal spiritual crisis within the young Maulana Azad. Consequently, Maulana Azad, at that time, was so shocked from his father's admonition that he could no longer press himself to pray. Maulana Azad suffered an intense personal crisis as a result of this incident; in fact, "shock, anger, frustration, resentment, sadness felt as a result of what his father said or did was one thing, but his inability to say the prayers to Allah was quite another."[14] This was a momentous catalyst in Maulana Azad's formulation of his religious philosophy, views, and attitude later as an adult. This catalyst fueled his embrace of rational thinking and the inclusion of reason and analysis in religious discourse.

Maulana Azad emerged from this painful experience as an enlightened scholar. As he delved deeper into the reasons behind his father's reaction, which had as much to do with family lineage, legacy, and honor, as it did regarding religious orthodoxy, Maulana Azad revisited the issue of taqlid, which is described as "rigorously following the inherited traditions,"[15] while many Islamic studies scholars define it simply as "blind imitation." According to Maulana Azad, "The greatest impediment to human progress . . . is adherence to the beliefs of ancestors. Nothing can bind and chain man like these can; he cannot question them, nor can he ever violate them."[16]

Furthermore, Maulana Azad

> started questioning and rejecting the fact that his faith was grounded in the foundation of *taqlid* (imitation) and *tavaris* (heredity) rather than in *'ilm* (knowledge). When taqlid, the foundation of conventional belief . . . was taken away, there was nothing left to prop that crumbling wall.[17]

In his autobiography, he remarks,

> The ideas that I had acquired from my family and early training could no longer satisfy me. I felt that I must find the truth for myself. Almost instinctively, I began to move out of my family orbit and seek my own path.[18]

Maulana Azad eviscerated the concept of taqlid, describing it as the source of the corrosion of the spirit of Islam. He confronted the dilemma of the "tension between rationality and religion."[19] The end result of this internal spiritual inquisition was, for him, the realization that "the faith he lost was of heredity and what he gained was the fruit of his own search."[20] He candidly wrote that

there is one type of religion—hereditary; believe what your forefathers believed in. Another type is geographical, which comprises the well-worn path travelled by many on any given piece of the earth. Then there is religion for the census survey; put down "Islam" in the appropriate box. There is also the conventional religion— the compendium of rituals and ceremonies, do not tamper with it; allow it to run all over you. Apart from all these there is the *haqiqi* (true) religion and it is the path to this which somehow always gets lost.[21]

It is worth noting that Islamist extremist groups, from history to the present, all have claimed that they follow the "true" Islam. Yet, they have not only stubbornly adhered to taqlid, but, in fact, they have made it their cause and goal to violently force others to accept their respective interpretations of Islam without question. They are by definition the polar opposites to Maulana Azad's philosophy of Islam, as well as his embrace of reason and rational thinking and rejection of taqlid. Where the former employed violent jihad (holy war) to achieve their goals without any rational thinking, the latter promoted nonviolent activism to exact social justice and, in the realm of religious adjudication, advocated *ijtihad* (reinterpretation) as a better method of reconciling rationality with religion. The eminent scholar Fazlur Rahman defines *ijtihad* as follows:

> The effort to understand the meaning of a relevant text or precedent in the past, containing a rule, and to alter that rule by extending or restricting or otherwise modifying it in such a manner that a new situation can be subsumed under it by a new solution. This definition implies that the meaning of a past text or precedent, the present situation, and the intervening tradition can be fairly objectively brought under the judgment of the (normative) meaning of the past under whose impact the tradition arose. It follows from this that tradition can be studied with adequate historical objectivity and separated not only from the present but also from the normative factors that are supposed to have generated it.[22]

In other words, the historical context of scriptural verses matters greatly in interpretation (hermeneutics), and, in fact, *ijtihad* goes farther, attempting to account for the author's actual intent. As Fazlur Rahman says, "In modern hermeneutical theory, the 'objectivity school' has insisted that one must first of all ascertain the meaning intended by the mind that authored the object of study."[23] Hermeneutics is the discipline of interpretation of texts, including religious scriptures, and it provides the framework for *ijtihad*. Without accounting for the proper contexts, new religious rules and laws cannot be derived appropriately to changing circumstances. Hence, *ijtihad* is necessary to adapt to changing circumstances and reconcile religion with rationality and modernity.

Like Maulana Azad, Fazlur Rahman also addressed the shortcomings of taqlid, referring to it as the "hard crust of tradition." Both scholars believed that eliminating the "hard crust of tradition" from Muslims is an extremely challenging task, but it is one "that has to be faced."[24] Like Maulana Azad, Fazlur Rahman warned that Islam faces the danger of a "superficial" liberalism confronting taqlid, which is not likely to succeed, and, in fact, "the more likely it is to recoil upon itself and the more hardened its traditional crust may become."[25] His reference to "superficial" liberalism concerns the idea of liberalism excluding spiritualism, which, in his view, would be counterproductive.

At one point in his life, Maulana Azad traveled to Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. During his travels, he acutely examined and analyzed the political, sociocultural, and especially religious dynamics in those countries during a critical time in history. About Egypt, he said,

> When I visited Cairo in 1908, the system in Al Azhar [University] was so defective that it neither trained the mind nor gave adequate knowledge of ancient Islamic science and philosophy . . . the old conservative *ulamas* (Islamic body of scholars) defeated all [reform] efforts.[26]

He mentioned Egypt's Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah as a reformist scholar who tried to initiate reforms at Sunni Islam's premium Islamic higher education institution and seminary Al Azhar University. But, as Maulana Azad noticed, Sheikh Abdullah "lost all hopes of improving Al Azhar . . . he started a new college, Darul-Uloom, in Cairo, which exists to this date."[27] Eventually, Darul-Uloom merged with what is today Cairo University. Maulana Azad emphasized that "since this was the state of affairs in Al Azhar, there was no reason why I should go to study there."[28] He considered Al Azhar's lack of rational and critical thinking skills as actually facilitating and fortifying the culture of taqlid, which is a nail in the coffin of intellectual growth and *ijtihad*.

Progressive and rational thinking, along with liberalism, all within religious and spiritual contexts, are to be engendered from the people's own temperament. Critical to this concept is that "no liberalism that used illiberal means to establish itself ever succeeded."[29]

That quote by scholar Fazlur Rahman is highly relevant to the comparative analysis of Islamic progressives versus extremists. Where the religious extremists lose all moral credibility in their violent acts against civilian targets, the Gandhian activists like Maulana Azad focused on nonviolently targeting only the security forces and authorities in charge by means of civil disobedience, which embodies far greater moral courage than blatant terrorism. Thus, taqlid is undoubtedly a source of intellectual stagnation and moral degradation, not just for the average Muslim community and religious institutions, but, more ominously, in the domain of violent Islamist extremism.

Maulana Azad understood from his painful personal spiritual lesson in his youth involving his father's censure, as well as from his perspective as a highly respected religious scholar and authority, that *ijtihad* must eclipse taqlid in order for an "Islamic Reformation" to occur in the modern era.

According to Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, Maulana Azad "believed that he could re-orient and reinterpret the religion of his illustrious forefathers and reform the *quom*, or the community of Muslims."[30] Unfortunately, variations of religious orthodoxy have continued to dominate global Islamic trends and headlines throughout modern history, further suppressing the urgently needed Islamic Reformation. Moreover, Muslim reformists are often ostracized, threatened, or killed at the hands of violent extremists.

Another religious vice that Maulana Azad detested practically as much as taqlid was sectarianism. In effect, since the rise of the IS (also called ISIS/ ISIL) in 2014, the fierce, bloody sectarianism between Sunnis and Shi'ites has precipitated Islam into what can be called its version of the Thirty Years' War. That, in and of itself, is the reason for Maulana Azad to be cringing in his grave. Referring to Indian Muslims, he said in his autobiography, "The first thing which troubled me was the exhibition of differences among the different sects of Muslims,"[31] and that was during the early twentieth century. The IS-type of ideological regression seeks to push Islam back to not only the seventh century, but arguably, even farther back to *pre*-Islamic eras. Such is the IS agenda nauseatingly regressive and barbaric in its bloodlust. The IS has taken the concept of taqlid beyond imaginable extremes, and the IS wants to implement it violently, even with genocidal intentions. Nothing could be a greater blow to an Islamic Reformation than the IS and its grotesque ideology. The difference between the Islamist extremists' methodologies for exacting social change by means of an orgy of violence and those of the nonviolent Gandhian activists is practically immeasurable. Consider how the Gandhian activists brought the British Empire to defeat without ever wielding any weapons or raising a hand against their foes.

LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION

Maulana Azad wholeheartedly embraced the Indian independence movement to terminate British colonial rule, and he first met Mahatma Gandhi when he served as the leader of the Muslim Khilafat Movement. He also found inspiration during his travels to the Middle East. For example, he described his visit to Iraq, where

> [I] met some Iranian revolutionaries. In Egypt, I came into contact with the fol-
> lowers of Mustafa Kamil Pasha. . . . When I went to Turkey, I became friends

with some of the leaders of the Young Turk movement. I kept up my correspondence with them for many years after my return to India.[32]

Obviously, his greatest inspiration was Mahatma Gandhi, as Gandhi and Maulana Azad shared a common cause and strategy; and, both men shared the same political goals and social objectives for their country. Maulana Azad "became an enthusiastic supporter of Mahatma Gandhi's ideas of nonviolent civil disobedience, and worked actively to organize the non-cooperation movement in protest of the 1919 Rowlatt Acts,"[33] which permitted unlawful detention without due process or trial of any Indian prisoner as mandated by the superimposed British Imperial Legislative Council that overrode the preexisting Indian judicial systems.

Another aspect of Maulana Azad's disillusionment with and criticism of the legacy of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan concerned the latter's unwavering support for the British in India. According to Maulana Azad,

> The leadership of the Muslim politics at this time was in the hands of the Aligarh Party. Its members regarded themselves as the trustees of Sir Syed Ahmed's policies. Their basic tenet was that Muslims must be loyal to the British Crown and remain aloof from the freedom movement.[34]

That was absolutely unacceptable to Maulana Azad, who, along with Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party, demanded Indian independence from the British Raj and promoted peaceful coexistence between Hindus and Muslims in a pluralist secular democracy.

Over the years during the struggle against British colonialism, the British authorities frequently imprisoned Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi. Despite the formidable challenges they faced, both men engaged in relentless nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns. Maulana Azad not only helped organize these campaigns, but he also participated in them with steadfast commitment to nonviolent noncooperation. In fact, Maulana Azad

> was one of the main organizers of the Dharasana *Satyagraha*,[35] and [he] emerged as one of the most important national leaders of the time, prominently leading the causes of Hindu-Muslim unity as well as espousing secularism and socialism.[36]

The Dharasana Satyagraha—or nonviolent civil disobedience campaign—took place with Mahatma Gandhi's guidance and leadership to protest against the British-imposed tax on salt, a fundamental mineral for human survival. This nonviolent campaign led to Mahatma Gandhi's famed Salt March in which he planned to walk from Ahmedabad to Dandi (on the coast of the

Arabian Sea), almost 250 miles, while leading loyalists in an endless parade and many thousands joining him along the way. This episode began with Mahatma Gandhi writing a letter in March 1930 to Lord Irwin, the British Viceroy in India at the time, informing him of the plan to conduct satyagraha (nonviolent civil disobedience) against the British salt laws by marching to Dandi and, upon arrival, illegally making salt from the ocean's salty water. Mahatma Gandhi's campaigns boldly sought to break British laws non-violently, thus provoking the British authorities to act against the nonviolent activists. The British usually took the bait and often reacted violently against the nonviolent activists and arrested them by the tens of thousands.

During the Salt March, Mahatma Gandhi gave speeches to the massive crowds, and he inspired masses of fellow Indians to join the campaign along the way. By the time he reached Dandi in early April, all eyes were on him, including the world press, and his gesture of making salt from a handful of seawater mixed with muddied sand ridiculed British colonial law that had been imposed on indigenous Indians for the economic benefits of the imperialist aggressor. Mahatma Gandhi's Salt March and salt-making defiance inspired salt-making campaigns throughout the subcontinent, which at the time included today's Pakistan and Bangladesh. The British colonial power could do nothing except to arrest Mahatma Gandhi on May 5, in addition to tens of thousands of nonviolent civil disobedience activists. The prisons were overflowing; yet, the campaign continued without hesitation, illustrating that the British strategy remained completely ineffective.

The Dharasana Satyagraha is a crucial campaign involving Maulana Azad, because once Mahatma Gandhi was arrested, Maulana Azad joined forces with a famous Indian nationalist, poet, and women's rights activist Sarojini Naidu. Maulana Azad and Sarojini Naidu led about 2,500 activists on a march to the Dharasana Salt Works factory, about 150 miles north of the city of Bombay (now called Mumbai). On May 21, 1930, Maulana Azad and Sarojini Naidu led the nonviolent activists to the gates of the salt factory, where hundreds of Indian policemen under British authority and orders stood guard.

Once the nonviolent activists walked toward the factory in timely organized rows, the policemen beat them with steel-tipped clubs, called *lathis*, preventing anyone from entering. Wave after wave of nonviolent activists walked toward the vicious lathi beatings.[37] The beatings resulted in countless head fractures and severe injuries.

This dramatic nonviolent protest, in which none of the activists even raised their hands in defense of the lathi beatings, is described as the precise moment when the British lost any moral credibility in the judgment of global public opinion. An American journalist, Webb Miller,[38] a United Press correspondent, witnessed and reported the bloody episode wherein the nonviolent

activists emerged as the morally courageous group mercilessly pummeled at the hands of the British brutes. Webb Miller's dispatch led to global condemnation of British colonial rule and policies in India. His account of the beatings at the Dharasana Salt Works documents one of the most infamous British-led atrocities in colonial India. These are Webb Miller's words describing what he witnessed at the Dharasana Salt Works on that fateful day in late May 1930:

Slowly and in silence the throng commenced the half-mile march to the salt deposits. . . . Manilal Gandhi, second son of Gandhi, walked among the foremost of the marchers. As the throng drew near the salt pans, they commenced chanting the revolutionary slogan, *Inquilab Zindabad* (Long Live the Revolution!).

The salt deposits were surrounded by ditches filled with water and guarded by 400 native Surat police. Half-a-dozen British officials commanded them. The police carried lathis—five-foot clubs tipped with steel. Inside the stockade twenty-five native riflemen were drawn up.

In complete silence the Gandhi men drew up and halted a hundred yards from the stockade. A picked column advanced from the crowd, waded the ditches, and approached the barbed-wire stockade, which the Surat police surrounded, holding their clubs at the ready. Police officials ordered the marchers to disperse under a recently imposed regulation which prohibited gatherings of more than five persons in any one place. The column silently ignored the warning and slowly walked forward. I stayed with the main body about a hundred yards from the stockade.

Suddenly, at a word of command, scores of native police rushed upon the advancing marchers and rained blows on their heads with their steel-shod lathis. Not one of the marchers even raised an arm to fend off the blows. . . . From where I stood, I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their breaths in sympathetic pain at every blow.

Those struck down fell sprawling, unconscious or writhing in pain with fractured skulls or broken shoulders. In two or three minutes the ground was quilted with bodies. Great patches of blood widened on their white clothes. The survivors without breaking ranks silently and doggedly marched on until struck down. When every one of the first column had been knocked down stretcher-bearers rushed up unmolested by the police and carried off the injured to a thatched hut which had been arranged as a temporary hospital.

Then another column formed while the leaders pleaded with them to retain their self-control. They marched slowly toward the police. Although everyone knew that within a few minutes he would be beaten down, perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering or fear. They marched steadily with heads up, without the encouragement of music or cheering or any possibility that

they might escape serious injury or death. The police rushed out and methodi-
cally and mechanically beat down the second column. There was no fight, no
struggle; the marchers simply walked forward until struck down. There were no
outcries, only groans after they fell [. . .].

   The Gandhi men had been able to gather only a few native doctors, who were
doing the best they could with the inadequate facilities. Scores of the injured had
received no treatment for hours and two had died.[39]

A remarkable point to highlight in this incident is the fact that Maulana Azad
stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Sarojini Naidu. He had no qualms about a
woman leading beside him in the campaign. Yet, some organizers actually
objected to Sarojini Naidu's appointed leadership due to her gender. India is
not a woman-friendly country, embodying diverse social norms along with
some religious and cultural beliefs and superstitions that view females as
impure and having lower status and value in the socioeconomic and societal
strata, with very few exceptions. Higher caste and socioeconomic statuses
usually translate into better quality of life for females. However, lower caste
and socioeconomic conditions, particularly extreme poverty, constitute far
worse conditions for females in India across the board. Mahatma Gandhi
sought to change these harsh realities for most of India's women and girls,
along with his extraordinary campaign to end "untouchability," which refers
to the "untouchable" (lowest) caste in Hinduism, now called Dalits. Maulana
Azad concurred with Mahatma Gandhi's views and goals for social change
and progress pertaining to women's rights and equality. His partnership with
Sarojini Naidu in the Dharasana Salt Works campaign is evidence of his
acceptance of gender parity.

   Moreover, Maulana Azad served in various important positions in the
Congress Party and postindependence republic. He promoted Hindu–Muslim
unity, while at the same time, he also embraced secular democracy. From
1940 to 1945, Maulana Azad was the Congress Party's president, "during
which the Quit India rebellion was launched and Maulana Azad was impris-
oned with the entire Congress leadership for three years."[40] Maulana Azad
also notably "became the most prominent Muslim opponent of the demand
for a separate Muslim state of Pakistan and served in the interim national
government. Amidst communal turmoil following the partition of India, he
worked for religious harmony."[41]

   Maulana Azad served as India's first minister of education during the
newly independent republic's infancy. In this role, he

   oversaw the establishment of a national education system with free primary
   education and modern institutions of higher education. He is also credited with
   the establishment of the Indian Institutes of Technology and the foundation of

the University Grants Commission, an important institution to supervise and advance the higher education in the nation.[42]

He understood and appreciated the importance of secular curricula for social progress and the development of a pluralist liberal democracy. His accomplishments and agendas for the future democratic India indicate visionary prowess and insights for strong educational institutions and systems. Education provides the foundational support and serves as the facilitator for socioeconomic development and progress. Freedoms, rights, and civil liberties within a democracy broaden the opportunities for individuals and groups in society to excel and contribute to social progress. Without quality education, freedoms and rights, and opportunities, society suffers from arrested development. This is especially true for a newly independent country trying to stand on its own feet. Maulana Azad understood this, and he played a pivotal role in India's early developmental stages following independence.

Religious extremists, on the other hand, only engage in destructive rather than constructive behavior and practices. Therein exists a stark difference between progressive Islamic thinking and the regressive, violent propensities of the violent extremists.

Another crucial difference between the philosophy of Maulana Azad and Islamist extremists is the issue of tolerance. Maulana Azad embraced and advocated tolerance and peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims, including polytheists such as Hindus. On the other hand, the extremists on all sides—whether Muslim, Hindu, or others—reject tolerance and coexistence, and often resort to violence to implement their hate and prejudice in the effort to advance their respective cause. Consider that Mahatma Gandhi's assassin Nathuram Godse was an extremist Hindu nationalist, who "was involved in Hindu extremist organizations, including the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, his entire adult life."[43] He fiercely disagreed with what he saw as Mahatma Gandhi's appeasement of India's minorities, specifically Muslims, and tolerant coexistence in general. Instead, Godse and his cohorts promoted the idea of an independent Hindu nation and rejected secularism and pluralism under the umbrella of a tolerant democracy.

Similarly, within the context of Islamist extremism, which violently imposes strict monotheism (*tawheed*), polytheists are particularly reviled and derided. Maulana Azad's promotion of peaceful coexistence between Hindus and Muslims illustrates his dynamic, tolerant, and humane philosophy and attitudes, which are noticeably absent among the extremists.

There are also those who are neither extremists nor progressives, but harbor views and beliefs that linger somewhere in the center, or they lean slightly left or right of center in the ideological spectrum. The Indian Muslims demanding independence from the British Raj constituted a diversity of

opinions and views about their status and place in a majority-Hindu independent India. Many of them were uncertain about their future following British withdrawal from India. During the years of Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience campaign against British rule in India, communal violence intermittently broke out between Hindus and Muslims. The fragility of Hindu–Muslim unity at times exposed the Gandhi-inspired Congress Party campaign's Achilles' heel.

Like all Western colonial powers, Britain exploited these demographic and religious differences between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. "Divide and conquer" was always a useful tool in the colonial powers' toolbox. Therefore, as they withdrew, the British helped further divide— rather than unite—the subcontinent's Hindus and Muslims by coopting and exploiting the split leadership specifically within the Indian Muslims' pro-independence movements. Underscoring this point, it is worth noting what British historian Alex von Tunzelmann says in her August 2017 *New York Times* op-ed, entitled "Who Is to Blame for Partition? Above All, Imperial Britain," emphasizing that "rived by political violence for its entire existence, the empire had long resisted democratization and had institutionalized differences based on identity between its subjects as a matter of policy."[44]

This tactic not only complicated Maulana Azad's efforts, but it also further fueled the Hindu extremists against Mahatma Gandhi, who tirelessly tried to keep all Indians united. Since all Indians included Muslims and other religious minorities, the Hindu extremists viewed Mahatma Gandhi as a traitor.

The Hindu extremists, a violent but powerful minority, sought to create a Hindu-nationalist-based India after independence. They, just like Islamist extremists, wholly reject secularism, democracy, pluralism, and human rights and seek to impose their version of religious fascism. These variables allowed the British to drive the wedge even deeper between Hindus and Muslims by supporting the idea of India's partition. The partition of India was supposedly based on the demographics of higher concentrations of Muslim populations in the eastern and Western flanks of the subcontinent.

Another prominent Indian Muslim leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah proposed and promoted this plan of India's partition along religious demographic lines, and the British were very eager to back him. This was a severe blow to Mahatma Gandhi, and even more so for Maulana Azad since he stood as one of the most influential Indian Muslim leaders, and, by chance, in direct opposition to Jinnah. To both Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad, the partition of India felt like a stab in the back, and they acutely understood the ramifications of such a drastic mutilation of the subcontinent, as well as the unbearable pain and suffering that it would exact on the Indian people on all ideological sides and of all identities—linguistic, ethnic, and national, as much as religious. The birth of a new nation is almost always an extremely painful process,

especially if it is carved out of an existing one. Nothing could be more traumatizing to the people directly affected in one of the bloodiest forced mass migrations in modern history, with nearly two million killed and tens of millions displaced[45] in the process. The Partition (1947) has received little attention in the West, but the casualties resulting from it can be described as South Asia's postcolonial genocide along with countless crimes against humanity; it is an incalculable trauma, the outcomes from which generations afterward have been forced to contend in India and Pakistan.

THE PAIN OF PARTITION

The backdrop to the partition story is presented in the descriptions that historian von Tunzelmann presents:

> The British presence in India was run by the East India Company from 1600 to 1858 and was subject directly to the British crown from 1858 until 1947 (the British Raj). British rule always faced fierce resistance. This was visible not only in its many wars and the major rebellion of 1857–8, but also in countless acts of revolt, sabotage, and assassination. The British and their client princes frequently quelled dissent and imposed their will by force. Through Gandhi, India developed a tradition of political nonviolence—but the British authorities responded even to that with brutality and repression.[46]

While the resistance raged throughout these decades, some Indian Muslim intellectuals thought about the viable options for them as the largest minority in an independent India. According to von Tunzelmann,

> The idea of Pakistan was first proposed by Indian Muslim students at Cambridge University as recently as 1930. Had India been granted home rule earlier, the question of partition might never have arisen.[47]

These rifts and fault lines in India's exceedingly diverse religious, caste, ethnic, and linguistic identities provided the ideal ammunition for the British strategy of divide and rule. Von Tunzelmann quotes a Rudyard Kipling character in the story, "The Education of Otis Yeere" (1888), to drive home this point: "Strict supervision and play them off one against the other. . . . *That*, [he explains,] is the secret of our government."[48] The British historian goes on to emphasize that the British keenly and deliberately employed the divide and rule strategy in India. He says, Though the caste system had its roots in thousands of years of Indian history, it was codified as never before by the British. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the British

authorities partitioned Indians into categories, including "martial races" and "criminal tribes." From the 1870s, a census attempted to record every Indian subject's caste, religion, and language.[49]

Once the last viceroy to India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, arrived to oversee the transition for India's independence from the British Raj, he "did not have the men or means at his disposal to restore order. The government in London, dealing with severe domestic hardship after World War II, had no intention of sending more troops or resources to India."[50] Initially, he constructed cordial relations with the Congress Party and its leaders, and especially with Jawaharlal Nehru, who would later become independent India's first prime minister. According to the BBC, though, Mountbatten could not surmount Jinnah's determination to partition the subcontinent:

> Mountbatten soon gave up hope of a united country and on 14–15 August 1947, British India was partitioned into the new states of India and Pakistan. This resulted in widespread inter-communal violence, particularly in the Punjab, which now sat in East India, and West Pakistan. There were huge population movements as 3.5 million Hindus and Sikhs fled from the areas that had become Pakistan and around five million Muslims migrated to Pakistan. Mountbatten remained as interim governor-general of India until June 1948.[51]

The *BBC* version of the story is a lot softer on Mountbatten and the British government than historian von Tunzelmann, who is far more unforgiving for their role in *disuniting* the subcontinent and leaving it in disarray quite deliberately.

> Indian leaders and ordinary people on all sides resisted Lord Mountbatten's initiative to set up a peacekeeping Boundary Force to combat communal violence, viewing it as an extension of imperialism. What remained of British authority had lost both control and trust. All the last viceroy could hope to achieve—by hastening the end of imperial rule—was to save face for the empire. The fact that this was his priority was reflected in his decision to delay announcement of the new borders between India and Pakistan until the day after independence, Aug. 16 [. . .].[52]

Most importantly, von Tunzelmann emphasizes that the British withdrawal from India was far from smooth and respectable. In fact, the British left behind a violent chaotic mess, which has been the colonial method of operation in most cases throughout history. In particular, the British legacy can be described as highly destructive and divisive in nearly every place that they colonized, despite supposed efforts to "save face." Consider that

Lord Mountbatten's high-speed exit thus enabled a myth of "*après nous, le déluge*": the notion that Britain's rule of India was relatively functional and things fell apart only once the British left. But the blame for a disaster of this magnitude does not come down to a single man. *While everyone involved bears some responsibility, they were all acting in a context of decades, even centuries, of chaotic, violent, unresponsive, and willfully divisive rule. The truth is that the way the Raj ended was not so very different from the way it had existed.*[53]

For Maulana Azad, the formidable challenges during this critical time bore down on him from all sides, and the most painful consisted of the competing Indian Muslim ideologies, visions, and leaders who advocated different methodologies and goals concerning India.

Two significant Muslim leaders raced to secure their respective plans and visions for the future of Indian Muslims. One of them was Maulana Azad who resolutely desired and struggled for a united Indian subcontinent ruled by a secular liberal democracy. The other Muslim leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, sought to divide the Indian subcontinent based on the Muslim-majority demographics, situated mainly in the country's northwest and northeast regions, to create a safe homeland for Indian Muslims. The British supported Jinnah's efforts to divide the subcontinent, maintaining a consistent strategy of division and devastation.

Maulana Azad diligently engaged in efforts to change the minds of the Muslim League and its leader Jinnah, which proved to be immensely difficult, if not impossible. During World War II, the Indian nationalists "were infuriated that the viceroy had entered India into the war without consulting national leaders. Although willing to support the British effort in return for independence, [Maulana] Azad sided with Gandhi when the British ignored the Congress overtures."[54]

In fact, the rift between Maulana Azad and Jinnah deepened, especially when Jinnah referred to "Congress rule in the provinces as 'Hindu Raj,'" and the Muslim League and Jinnah's proposals for separatism saw their popularity among Indian Muslims climbing. According to Frederic Miller, et al., religious conservative Muslim leaders viewed Maulana Azad as being too secular given his participation in the Congress Party; they accused him of playing politics more than focusing on religion.[55] Maulana Azad did not back down; he even became president of the Congress Party. Maulana Azad criticized the religious orthodoxy for promoting separatist ideals, and he called on all Indian Muslims to embrace the concept of a united Indian republic. He fervently believed that all Muslims and Hindus are Indians sharing the same national identity.[56] Maulana Azad said the following in his Congress presidential speech:

If Hinduism has been the religion of the people here for several thousands of years Islam also has been their religion for a thousand years. Just as a Hindu can say with pride that he is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so also, we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I shall enlarge this orbit still further. The Indian Christian is equally entitled to say with pride that he is an Indian and is following a religion of India, namely Christianity.[57]

Upon accepting the title Congress Party president, Maulana Azad traveled throughout India. He met with local Congress Party officials and activists, and in rousing speeches he called on fellow Indians to take action by joining the nonviolent civil disobedience campaign.[58] In August 1942, the British authorities arrested Maulana Azad along with all the Congress Party leaders. Maulana Azad spent almost four years imprisoned at an Ahmednagar fort.[59] The other Congress Party officials were also imprisoned with Maulana Azad, while Mahatma Gandhi was held at the Aga Khan Palace in the city of Pune.[60] Several scenes in the 1982 film "Gandhi" depict Mahatma Gandhi's incarceration at the palace in Pune.

Once the British eventually released all political prisoners in 1946, the Congress Party under Maulana Azad's leadership proceeded to call for elections for the new Constituent Assembly of India, "which would draft India's constitution. [Azad] headed the delegation to negotiate with the British Cabinet Mission, in his sixth year as Congress President."[61] Maulana Azad also continued to condemn Jinnah's Pakistan proposal, which, at this point, became an ardent demand.[62] Maulana Azad said of Jinnah that "[he] felt that he must take advantage of every difference between the Congress and the Government. [Jinnah] started an offensive which ultimately led to Pakistan."[63]

Increasingly, the pro-Pakistan Jinnah loyalists attacked Maulana Azad for his unwavering position regarding a united secular India. With firm conviction, Maulana Azad contended that "the idea of *Pakistan* was against the spirit of Islam, since it implied that some are *pak* (pure), some are not. Islam recognizes no such division."[64]

With keen insight, Maulana Azad warned of the impending doom if the subcontinent were to be partitioned into a Hindu-majority India and a new state for Muslims called Pakistan. He predicted that upon the creation of a Muslim state carved out of the subcontinent, all Hindus

would have to leave Pakistan. All Muslims could not be accommodated in Pakistan; some 30 million would have to stay back in India. They would face three choices: they might migrate to Pakistan, they would become victims of riots until the generation that had to experience Partition passed away, or they would convert to Hinduism. Pakistan would be controlled by outside powers; India would have no problem with that because it would keep Pak

hostility in check. East Pakistan would secede once Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan passed away; that would leave West Pakistan open to regional conflicts and balkanization.[65]

Maulana Azad argued that "Partition would not solve the communal problem but would make it a permanent feature of the country. Jinnah had raised the slogan of two nations. To accept partition was to accept that slogan."[66] Maulana Azad went on passionately to emphasize, "How could Congress ever agree to divide the country on the basis of Hindus and Muslims? Instead of removing communal fears, partition would perpetuate them by creating two States based on communal hatred. Once States based on hatred came into existence, nobody knew where the situation would lead."[67]

Indeed, most of his prognostications pertaining to the devastating impacts of Partition proved correct. Maulana Azad "failed in his endeavor to make Muslims a part of independent India's mainstream. Jinnah walked away with Pakistan. But its later history followed Azad's predictions with brutal accuracy."[68]

In the Epilogue of her book about Maulana Azad, Syeda Saiyidain Hameed summarizes his legacy with these profound words:

> Azad's struggle for the fulfilment of his two dreams which had begun forty-four years ago in 1903, had run its course by 1947. His first dream was to attain independence, referred to in *Al Hilal* and *Al Balagh* (newsletters that Maulana Azad published) as his *nasbul ain* (goal). It had been fulfilled but at a price which he had always refused to negotiate; freedom for a "truncated and moth-eaten India," a phrase used by Jinnah for the Pakistan that he had won, which was equally applicable to India. The outcome was diametrically opposed to his declaration in 1923 that he would refuse to surrender the unity of India for the attainment of *Swaraj* (self-rule or self-governance) even if an angel were to descend from heaven with the offer.[69]

In his own words, Maulana Azad contends in his autobiography that "the only result of the creation of Pakistan was to weaken the position of the Muslims in the subcontinent of India. The 45 million Muslims who have remained in India have been weakened."[70] He adds, with glaring facts and perspicacity, that

> Mr. Jinnah and his followers did not seem to realize that geography[71] was against them. Indian Muslims were distributed in a way which made it impossible to form a separate State in a consolidated area. The Muslim majority areas were in the north-west and north-east. These two regions have no point of physical contact. People in these two areas are completely different from one another

in every respect except religion. *It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically, linguistically, and culturally different.* . . . Islam was not able to unite all the Muslim countries on the basis of Islam alone.[72]

Evidently, Maulana Azad did not believe in sugarcoating the facts. Furthermore, the process of Partition itself was an incredibly bloody undertaking on both sides for Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and anyone else caught in between the killing sprees. The mass migration of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs entailed a trail of tears and rivers of blood. Like a scene from a dystopian horror movie, entire trains loaded with corpses rolled into stations, and the streets overflowed with massacred women, men, and children while vultures circled above them. Historian William Dalrymple describes "The Great Divide"—which is definitely not for the queasy:

In August 1947, when, after three hundred years in India, the British finally left, the subcontinent was partitioned into two independent nation states: Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Immediately, there began one of the greatest migrations in human history, as millions of Muslims trekked to West and East Pakistan (the latter now known as Bangladesh) while millions of Hindus and Sikhs headed in the opposite direction. Many hundreds of thousands never made it.

Across the Indian subcontinent, communities that had coexisted for almost a millennium attacked each other in a terrifying outbreak of sectarian violence, with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other—a mutual genocide as unexpected as it was unprecedented. In Punjab and Bengal—provinces abutting India's borders with West and East Pakistan, respectively—the carnage was especially intense, with massacres, arson, forced conversions, mass abductions, and savage sexual violence. Some seventy-five thousand women were raped, and many of them were then disfigured or dismembered.

Nisid Hajari, in "Midnight's Furies" (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), his fast-paced new narrative history of Partition and its aftermath, writes, "Gangs of killers set whole villages aflame, hacking to death men and children and the aged while carrying off young women to be raped. Some British soldiers and journalists who had witnessed the Nazi death camps claimed Partition's brutalities were worse: pregnant women had their breasts cut off and babies hacked out of their bellies; infants were found literally roasted on spits."

By 1948, as the great migration drew to a close, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted, and between one and two million were dead.[73]

Moreover, Maulana Azad's warnings about Pakistan's inability to remain united were realized as well. In March 1971, Bangladesh seceded from

Pakistan as an outcome of a brutal civil conflict. All of this begs the question, "What has been gained?"

CONCLUSION

Maulana Azad was a man of principle. Despite his own religiosity, spiritualism, and religious authority, he never rendered himself susceptible to delusional ideas and beliefs. His pragmatism aligned with the Congress Party's demands for an independent, united, secular India. Plus, Maulana Azad sided with the secularists rather than the Muslim League in demanding a separate state called Pakistan.

Most importantly, Maulana Azad embraced and practiced Mahatma Gandhi's strategy of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) and *satyagraha* (civil disobedience), which, in turn, solidifies Islam's compatibility with nonviolent activism. Ahimsa and satyagraha are successful strategies and tactics even against the British Empire, and later under Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s (MLK) leadership in the struggle against racial segregation and discrimination in the United States.

In both cases, distinct religious/spiritual leaders (i.e., Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad, and MLK) led nonviolent activist movements against tremendous odds. Their adversaries lost any moral credibility since they pummeled the nonviolent activists with ruthless violence and repression. Conversely, the nonviolent activists operated with utmost moral authority, credibility, and legitimacy. Nonviolent noncooperation demands changes to unjust policies and laws that discriminate against and repress the masses or certain social groups. Therefore, it is one of the most effective means for securing social justice, equality, human rights, and self-determination.

In particular, Maulana Azad's character and inspirational leadership comprised of exceptional intellectual capital; strategic acumen; moral weight and values; the promotion of *ijtihad* (versus jihad); the embodiment of religious authority and legitimacy through years of rigorous training and education; the promotion of civil and human rights; the rejection of intra-Islamic religious schisms and sectarianism; and the condemnation of religious extremism, violent jihad, taqlid (blind imitation), and intellectual stagnation. Through his activism and practices, he exemplified what he preached, including peaceful coexistence, secularism, and democracy for the public good. His partnership with Mahatma Gandhi further illustrated his convictions for and commitments to a future secular democracy in India, and his fierce criticism of Jinnah and the separatist movement for the creation of Pakistan also indicate his unwavering loyalty to his Indian national identity, citizenship, and civic duties.

Maulana Azad not only absorbed diverse knowledge and education, but he also served as the very first minister of education in postindependence India. He fully served as the nation's educator and facilitator of interdisciplinary education for everyone. His intellectual capital and promotion of intellectual discourse distinguish him from religious extremists and zealots, who, usually, oppose questioning and analyses in religious contexts.

Overall, it is imperative to appreciate the differences between Maulana Azad, his character, his intellectual and educational credentials, and his commitment to nonviolence, and the characteristics of violent Islamist extremists. While the British oppressed the people of India, Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad illustrated the most morally convincing method of struggling against their oppressors. Through nonviolent civil disobedience, the British Empire had to withdraw from its "Jewel of the Crown."

However, violent Islamist extremists also seek to fight against oppression and oppressors. The extremists, though, engage in such fights with violence that often does not distinguish between the guilty and innocent. Yet, it can be argued that the extremists have not won any decisive victories over their oppressors.

These historical accounts of the oppressors and the oppressed and how one can exact justice in this context through "jihad" were a popular notion that dates back to the birth of Islam in the seventh century AD. However, as Maulana Azad has proven, the struggle for justice does not need to include violent methods. The next chapter examines the concept of oppression, the oppressed, and the struggle against injustice, and how violent Islamist extremists exploit cases of oppressed Muslims worldwide.

NOTES

1. "Remembering Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Short Biography," *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIS)*, Kolkata, India, no date, accessed from: http://makaias.gov.in/biography.html.

2. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version* (Hyderabad, India: Orient Longman Limited, 1988), p. 2.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

7. "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad," *Cultural India*, no date, accessed from: https://www.culturalindia.net/leaders/maulana-abul-kalam-azad.html.

8. *Abul Kalam Azad*, edited by Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, and John McBrewster (Beau Bassin, Mauritius: Alphascript Publishing, 2009), p. 1.

9. Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 AD) was an esteemed Persian Islamic scholar, jurist, theologian, and mystic.

10. "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: Visionary Educationist," *The Dispatch*, February 22, 2020, accessed from: https://www.thedispatch.in/maulana-abul-kalam-azad-visionary-educationist/.

11. Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, *Maulana Azad: Islam and the Indian National Movement* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 31.

12. "The Founder," Aligarh Muslim University, 2019, accessed from: https://www.amu.ac.in/ourfounder.jsp.

13. Hameed, p. 32.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 33.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 3.

19. Hameed, p. 34.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 8.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 128.

25. Ibid.

26. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, pp. 6–7.

27. Ibid., p. 7.

28. Ibid.

29. Rahman, p. 128.

30. Hameed, p. 35.

31. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 3.

32. Ibid., p. 7.

33. *Abul Kalam Azad*, edited by Frederic P. Miller, et al., p. 1.

34. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 8.

35. "*Satyagraha*" is a Sanskrit term that Mahatma Gandhi used to describe non-violent resistance. It means "Holding on to Truth," or "Force of Truth"; generally, it refers to mass nonviolent civil disobedience.

36. *Abul Kalam Azad*, edited by Frederic P. Miller, et al., p. 1.

37. This scene is depicted in the 1982 movie "Gandhi," starring Ben Kingsley as Mahatma Gandhi. Maulana Azad is the lead figure in this scene.

38. In the 1982 movie "Gandhi" with Ben Kingsley, the character of Webb Miller is depicted by Martin Sheen as journalist Vince Walker.

39. "Dharasana Salt Works Demonstration," University of Nebraska-Lincoln, no date, accessed from: https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj394dharsana.html; "taken from John Carey (ed), Eyewitness to History, New York: Avon, l987, pp. 501–504."

40. *Abul Kalam Azad*, edited by Frederic P. Miller, et al., p. 1.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Vinay Lal, "Nathuram Godse, the RSS, and the Murder of Gandhi," *MANAS*, UCLA Social Sciences, 2020, accessed from: http://southasia.ucla.edu/history-politics/hindu-rashtra/nathuram-godse-rss-murder-gandhi/.

       The RSS is the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, founded in 1925; it is an ultra-right-wing Hindu nationalist organization with a paramilitary wing, and its political wing is the *Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)*, a Hindu nationalist party, to which the current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi belongs. The Hindu Mahasabha is a Hindu nationalist political party formed in the early 1900s as a counter to the Muslim League.

44. Alex von Tunzelmann, "Who is to Blame for Partition? Above All, Imperial Britain," *The New York Times,* August 18, 2017, accessed from: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/opinion/india-pakistan-partition-imperial-britain.html.

45. See Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–1947: Means, Methods, and Purposes," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5, no. 1 (2003): pp. 71–101.

46. Von Tunzelmann, "Who is to Blame for Partition?"

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. "Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979)," *BBC History*, 2014, accessed from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mountbatten_lord_louis.shtml.

52. Von Tunzelmann, "Who is to Blame for Partition?"

53. Ibid. Emphasis added.

54. *Abul Kalam Azad*, Miller, et al., p. 7.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 8.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 118; 171.

64. Hameed, pp. 257–258.

65. Ashok V. Desai, "The Prophet of Doom: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Saw the Future with Brutal Clarity," *The Telegraph Online Edition*, May 4, 2010, accessed from: https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-prophet-of-doom-maulana-abul-kalam-azad-saw-the-future-with-brutal-clarity/cid/523686.

66. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 201.

67. Ibid.

68. Desai, "The Prophet of Doom."

69. Hameed, p. 369.

70. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 246.

71. See Hayat Alvi, "The (Non)Governance of Divided Territories: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Palestine," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (CSSAME)* 28, no. 3 (2008): pp. 467–472.

72. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 248. Emphasis added.

73. William Dalrymple, "The Great Divide: The Violent Legacy of Indian Partition," *The New Yorker,* June 22, 2015, accessed from: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple.

The Concept of Justice,
Zulm, and *Mazlum* in Islam

The religion of Islam was born into oppression. Mecca in the early seventh century AD consisted of powerful and weak Arab tribes that frequently fought their counterparts in the vast desert of the Arabian Peninsula. Poverty, inequality, slavery, female infanticide, torture, caravan raids, prisoners of war (POWs), and concubines were all characteristics of that time and place. Weaker tribes had to bandwagon with powerful ones to survive. Powerful tribes had to constantly assert their power in order not to succumb to defeat at the hands of yet a more powerful tribe. The setting was akin to desert tribal Darwinism, survival of the fittest, with violent and brutal oppression meted out against the poor, slaves, non-elites, the powerless, helpless, females, and captives. Conformity to the status quo in Mecca came with lashings with whips, torture, excommunication, forced exile, or execution. That oppressive conformity also pertained to religion.

The early Meccan tribes followed polytheistic belief systems that included worship of idols, statues, and stones usually in a hierarchy of deities constituting a pantheon. The Meccan and broader desert economy were intrinsically tied to the religious practices of pilgrims coming to Mecca and providing their offerings to the numerous gods, some of which even resided inside the Kaaba, the cubical structure that Muslims face during the required five daily prayers. According to the Quran, the Prophet Abraham (Ibrahim) built the Kaaba. By the seventh century, the Arabs practiced polytheism, hence indicating a drastic departure from Abraham's strict monotheism. Again, during the seventh century in Arabia, the pagan Arabs enforced conformity to their polytheism and idol-worship by violence if necessary.

Given that the religious customs and practices were interconnected with the mercantile caravan economy of the region, the powerful Meccan tribes had to strictly maintain the religious and economic status quo. That meant

no deviations were tolerated from the polytheism that the Arabs practiced at the time. Violent repression of any challenges to the status quo came swiftly and mercilessly. Hence, the concepts of oppression and injustice set the stage for the birth of Islam, which sought not only to replace polytheism with strict monotheism, but also it prescribed the ways and means for Muslims to secure social justice and eliminate oppression. In turn, that meant the ceding of power of the elite Meccan tribes like Quraysh, which did not happen without a fight.

Islam does not preach "turn the other cheek" for the reasons just described, particularly given the historical context of oppression in which Islam was born. However, Islam's demand not to tolerate oppression does not necessarily translate into violent acts and/or endorsements for revenge. In essence, Islam advocates for the fair and just means to achieve justice, and, again, that does not mean that one absolutely has to employ violence. A great example is how Maulana Azad pursued justice and fought against oppression nonviolently, and, at the same time, he remained in compliance with Islamic laws and tenets.

THE CONCEPTS OF OPPRESSION,
THE OPPRESSED, AND OPPRESSORS

The terminology and definitions as the Quran and Islamic principles refer to them regarding these issues must be addressed. In Arabic, the word for oppression is *zulm*; the word for one who is oppressed is *mazlum*; the oppressor is *zaalim*. Early Muslim converts faced horrific violent repression from the powerful tribes, mainly the Quraysh, in Mecca. The Quraysh tribal leaders and their allies (i.e., the oppressors) severely cracked down against the spread of the new monotheistic religion that the Prophet Muhammad was preaching. Those who suffered from the Quraysh tribe and its allies' harsh persecution have been viewed as the oppressed. Most of the victims were powerless in the Meccan political, economic, and social strata, and many held no significant social status such as the elites. They were easily victimized and persecuted, including Muhammad himself during the initial stages of Islam's birth.[1]

Still, the early Muslim converts persisted, and upon the exodus from Mecca to Medina fleeing persecution—called the hijra (migration) in 622 AD, the date from which the Islamic lunar calendar begins—a new Islamic city-state was established in Medina. This is the first time the real merger between religion and politics took place in Islamic history. However, this did not mark the end of the dynamics between the oppressors and the oppressed, although eventually the tables turned as the new monotheistic religion spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula, which yielded different results under the banner of Islam. Ultimately, the new Muslims outnumbered their former oppressors

in Mecca and returned there in 630 AD to claim the city victoriously, but Muhammad did not permit any acts of revenge against the Quraysh. In early 630, "His native city surrendered to him without a fight."[2]

Furthermore, the Meccan period revelations believed to be transmitted from the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad are contextually different from the Medinan revelations:

> The Meccan Period is characterized by the more elliptical and otherworldly portions of the Quran, and by the story of the rejected and persecuted prophet.
>
> [. . .] Though the Quran takes on more temporal issues in the Medinan Period, it does not abandon the notions of spiritual striving and God consciousness that were hallmarks of the Meccan Period. Even the concept of defensive warfare is placed within the larger concept of *jihad* as striving for what is right. Though jihad might involve bloodshed, it has the broader meaning of exerting an effort for improvement, not only in the political or military realm, but also in the moral, spiritual, and intellectual realms. Muhammad is often cited in Islamic tradition for calling the militant aspect of jihad the "minor" or "little" jihad, while referring to the improvement of one's self as the "greater" jihad.
>
> Other revelations and rulings during the period concerned the proper treatment of prisoners of war and non-combatants, the sanction against killing innocent civilians, and the respectful treatment of enemy corpses (in contrast to the custom of the time, which was mutilation). The wanton destruction of property or agricultural resources was put off limits too. Even words of consolation for prisoners of war are found in the Quran:
>
> *Prophet, tell the captives you have taken: If God finds some good in your hearts, He will reward you with something better than was taken away from you, and forgive your sins, for God is forgiving and kind.* (Quran 8:70)[3]

Clearly, Islam prescribes a conduct of war that is unambiguously restricted to humane treatment of combatants, while excluding noncombatants from the conflict. Cutting down trees and destroying agriculture are not fair game in Islam's code of conduct in war. Scorched earth strategies along with rape as a war weapon are also prohibited. These are important rules to emphasize, because the modern-day violent Islamist extremists tend to violate them repeatedly and try to justify such acts as part of the modernization of warfare and weaponry while cherry-picking Quranic verses to support their barbaric ways and means to achieve their agendas.

Volumes of books have been written about what happened between the time of the hijra and Muhammad's death in 632 AD. However, for the purpose of this chapter, the focus will remain on the concepts of *zulm*, *mazlum*, and *zaalim*, and how Islam endorses nonviolent activism even in cases of persecution and severe oppression. In addition, the religious extremists have found

ways to extract Islamic verses and principles out of context to support their agendas and often violent jihad as a way to achieve their goals. In the process, the religious extremists, in their calls to fight against oppression in the name of justice, most often become the oppressors themselves. The *mazlum* denounce the *zulm*, fight against it violently, and try to recruit others to do the same in the name of justice under the banner of Islam, and they end up becoming the *zaalim*, oppressing others in the process. They do so by implementing their version of Islam, which is usually literalist in interpretations, fascist in nature, totalitarian in enforcing compliance, and treats combatants and noncombatants equally as "fair game" targets.

The definition of justice in Islamic contexts is necessary because violent extremist organizations (VEOs) frequently use the pretext of exacting justice to carry out their agendas and attacks. They claim that Western powers and their Muslim allies in various regions worldwide, but mainly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), have long oppressed the Muslim masses. Therefore, according to extremists, it is the devout Muslims' obligation to engage in jihad against the forces that oppress them and hence justice prevails. From understanding Maulana Azad's situation, it is evident that the British colonial power violently repressed the Indian people. Yet, Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi never accepted violence as a means to exact justice, which was a perfectly sound strategy in Islamic contexts.

The Concept of Justice in Islam

Understanding the concept of justice (*'adl*) in Islam is critical to the analysis of nonviolent versus violent activism. According to Georgetown University's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, justice in Islam is

> owed to God by recognizing the duty to worship him and to others by treating them fairly and truthfully. In the end, ultimate justice will be meted out on Judgment Day, when God exercises his exclusive right to judge humans and to reward and punish them. Indeed, it is God who commands justice and forbids injustice, delegating to humans, as his representatives on earth, responsibility for "commanding the right and prohibiting the wrong." Shari'a was never conceived as state law; its supervision was the purview of religious scholars, whereas the duty of sultans, shahs, and other rulers was to abide by it, if not actively enforce it. Religious and political establishments have never overlapped completely; they have traditionally been seen as complementary, working together for the welfare of Muslim society. Since independence from colonial rule, most Muslim-majority nations have tended to adopt laws of European origin in all areas except family life. Influential exceptions are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which reserve a much larger role for Islamic law.[4]

As a result, just as the extremists reversed the importance of the greater and lesser Jihads, rendering the violent lesser jihad as a priority, they have managed to impose shari'a by coercion, which goes against the essence of mainstream Islam. Literalist theocracies like Saudi Arabia and Iran, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, have institutionalized shari'a and employed religious police to implement their ulama's (body of scholars) respective interpretations of Islamic law and principles and social policies. Undoubtedly, Maulana Azad would oppose such interpretations and harsh enforcement of Islamic law. Since the Quran repeatedly emphasizes that individuals will be held accountable for their actions by God on Judgment Day—as mentioned in the quote above—it is not up to political systems, leaders, and institutions to enforce the shari'a with violence, threats, and punishments.

When Muslims face collective oppression, as in the case of the early converts to Islam in a predominantly polytheist Meccan society and in the case of Maulana Azad and Indian Muslims facing the iron hand of the British, they are encouraged to fight back in order to end the oppression and exact justice. However, there is no prescription for the response. There are a number of hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad; the Arabic plural is ahadith) that discuss the issue of fighting oppression for justice. One hadith (source: Sahih Muslim) in particular describes the Prophet Muhammad's instructions when asked about how to fight against oppression; according to Abu Sa'eed al-Khudree, a companion of the prophet, he

> heard the Messenger of Allah say, "Whosoever of you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; and if he is not able to do so, then [let him change it] with his tongue; and if he is not able to do so, then with his heart—and that is the weakest of faith."[5]

The definition and explanation of the words "evil" and "change it with his hand" are not specified. The symbol of the hand could simply mean "take action," or it can be interpreted as physically fight back against "evil," which, again, is not defined.

Some Islamic scholars view the concept of justice as distributive, that is, if Muslims follow the guidelines for social justice that the Quran provides, then socioeconomic, political, and other aspects of justice will exist. According to scholars Hossein Askari and Abbas Mirakhor, in their coauthored book entitled *Conceptions of Justice from Islam to the Present*,

> the foundation of the Islamic political, social, and economic system was laid down [. . .] and briefly practiced by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. The Quran's basis for justice is that societies do not need a separate theory of justice

. . . but that compliance with rules of behavior handed down in the Quran and interpreted by the Prophet assures the emergence of justice as a natural outcome of the practice of a rule-compliant society. Justice and a just social and political system [are] thus an essential outcome of the Islamic system if Muslims individually comply with Divine rules.[6]

Askari and Mirakhor contend that "justice in Islam emerges within a system." When applied correctly, Islam provides the ideal blueprint for social justice. The Islamic system provides the rules and principles serving as guides, which encompass "unity of creation, availability of sufficient resources as long as humanity shares, with no opulence alongside poverty, and poverty eradication. . . . Islam addresses both output (by giving equal opportunities to develop) and distribution."[7]

The authors continue building their theory by mentioning that "a sound and useful conception of justice should begin by acknowledging that all humans are equal and equally deserving."[8] That is a noble sentiment, but not everyone abides by it. In particular, the violent Islamist extremists harbor superiority complexes, which in turn provide the pretext for their versions of social and religious hierarchies that they aspire to impose on others.

The main problem with both authors' approach is that there is no universal consensus on Quranic exegeses, and even more troubling for the proposed theory is the fact that Islam is not monolithic; it has immense diversity in sects and sub-sects within both major sectarian schisms (i.e., Sunni and Shi'ite), which illustrates the patent lack of consensus since the time of the birth of Islam to the present. The Sunni and Shi'ite extremists and even Islamic theocracies use this same claim as a pretext for imposing their supposedly perfect interpretations of Islam and Islamic law in their respective visions for an Islamic utopia.

The authors address this problematic issue in their analysis of Islamic law, or shari'a, although they primarily blame the Orientalists for misrepresentations of Islam. They cite the analysis of shari'a by the eminent law scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl, who posits that

the origin of the term Shari'a is in the Quran Verse 48: Chapter 5 in which Allah (God) declares that for all humans, He has provided Shari'a an Minhaj. The latter is the plural of Manhaj, which is a clear pathway to "well-being, goodness, and thriving existence," while the former constitutes the network of rules of treading the path. All humans have been guided to such paths. For Muslims, the Quran specifies the Manhaj and Shari'a given to the Messenger (i.e., Prophet Muhammad) for implementation (see Verse 18, Chapter 45). Together the Manhaj and the Shari'a provide "God's eternal and immutable law—the way of

truth, virtue, and justice. In essence, Shari'a is the ideal law in an objective and non-contingent sense, as it ought to be in the divine realm. As such, Shari'a is often used to refer to universal, innate, and natural law of goodness." Often the word "Shari'a" is used to refer to both the Manhaj and Shari'a together as does Abou El Fadl in his book.

Abou El Fadl goes on to make clear that the "conceptual distinction between Shari'a and fiqh was the result of recognition of the limitation of human agency and also reflection of the Islamic dogma that perfect belongs only to God. While Shari'a was seen as absolute ideal, every human effort at understanding this ideal was considered necessarily imperfect . . . in the Islamic legal traditions, there is only one Shari'a (*Shari'at Allah*), but there are a number of competing schools of fiqh (*madhahib fiqhiyya*)."[9]

In other words, inherent human biases inform and filter religious interpretations of shari'a in the science of *fiqh*, which is the Islamic equivalent of legal discourses and constitutes a complex methodology for deriving laws (i.e., Islamic jurisprudence). The average layperson would not have the skills and knowledge, including mastery of the Quranic Arabic language, to engage in *fiqh*. According to El Fadl, "By definition, fiqh is human and therefore subject to error, alterable, and contingent."[10]

However, Maulana Azad had acquired the linguistic and religious training and education to understand the processes of *fiqh*. Therefore, Maulana Azad, being a devout Muslim and prominent Islamic scholar/jurist, would not accept the practice of something that conflicted against his beliefs and principles. As a result, we can say with confidence and authority that Maulana Azad's acceptance of nonviolent civil disobedience, satyagraha, was Islamically sound. In addition, his assertion that Islam and satyagraha are compatible was used for the purpose of exacting social justice for all, and not just Indian Muslims. This is a great departure from the violent, prejudicial excesses of violent Islamist extremists. Yet, Maulana Azad's merging of satyagraha with Islam is far more legitimate, sound, and reasonable than the beliefs and violent actions of Islamist extremists.

Enjoin Good and Forbid Evil

The violent Islamist extremists use certain Quranic verses that order Muslims to "enjoin good and forbid evil," as justification for implementing the shari'a, as they interpret it, by coercion; and, many also use this verse as the umbrella under which they take it upon themselves to judge who is or is not a "true believer"; the verses include the chapter (*Surah*) number and verse (*Ayah*) number(s) as follows: 3:104; 3:110; 7:199; 5:78–79; and 7:165.

Quran

3:104

{وَلْتَكُن مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى ٱلْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِٱلْمَعْرُوفِ
وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ ٱلْمُنكَرِ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ ٱلْمُفْلِحُونَ}

Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.[11]

3:110

{كُنتُمْ خَيْرَ أُمَّةٍ أُخْرِجَتْ لِلنَّاسِ تَأْمُرُونَ بِٱلْمَعْرُوفِ وَتَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ}

Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God.[12]

7:199

خذ العفو وأمر بالعرف وأعرض عن الجاهلين

Hold to forgiveness; command what is right; but turn away from the ignorant.*[13]

*Translator Abdullah Yusuf Ali adds a footnote here, stating that, "God comforts the Apostle and directs his mind to three precepts: (1) to forgive injuries, insults, and persecution; (2) to continue to declare the faith that was in him, and not only to declare it, but to act up to it in all his dealings with friends and foes; (3) to pay no attention to ignorant fools, who raised doubts or difficulties, hurled taunts or reproaches, or devised plots to defeat the truth; they were to be ignored and passed by, not to be engaged in fights and fruitless controversies, or conciliated by compromises."[14]

5:78–79

{لُعِنَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِن بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ عَلَىٰ لِسَانِ دَاوُودَ وَعِيسَى ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ}

Curses were pronounced on those among the Children of Israel who rejected Faith, by the tongue of David and of Jesus the sone of Mary: because they disobeyed and persisted in excesses. Nor did they (usually) forbid one another the iniquities which they committed: evil indeed were the deeds which they did.[15]

7:165

<div dir="rtl">فلما نسواْ ما ذكّرواْ به أنجينا الّذين ينهون عن السّوء وأخذنا الّذين ظلمواْ بعذاب بِيس بما كانواْ يفسقون</div>

When they disregarded the warnings that had been given them, We rescued those who forbade Evil; but We visited the wrong-doers with a grievous punishment, because they were given to transgression.[16]

Since Islam emphasizes individual accountability, as mentioned in the Quran and ahadith, these verses referring to enjoining the good and forbidding evil are ideally applied to the "greater jihad." In other words, the command of enjoining the good and forbidding evil likely refers to the inner struggle of the individual Muslim to be and remain righteous. These verses do not necessarily mean that Muslims have the license to judge others and impose their beliefs and practices on them coercively. Yet, the literalists abide by the interpretations that allow them to do just that, while in mainstream Islam, such literalist "license" to forcefully impose one's beliefs on others is wholly rejected and condemned.

Certainly, this is something that Maulana Azad would equally reject and vilify. His struggle against the injustices of the British in India encompassed strictly nonviolent means to expel the oppressors, and his intentions and actions had nothing to do with forcing anything on anyone. He would never have deemed himself as an authoritative judge of others in religious beliefs and practices. He criticized the myopic and outdated religious beliefs and practices of the ulama and the Muslim masses, mainly because they have repressed intellectual discourse, reasoning, and reinterpretation. However, he would not allow the claim of one Muslim to judge another in terms of his or her "Muslimness." That has been the preoccupation of the violent Islamist extremists. There is a term they use for judging "Muslimness," it is called *takfir*.

Takfir: A Violent Tool for Extremists

Takfir is the labeling of someone as having left the religion, that is, he or she is no longer a "true believer." The general English equivalent for *takfir* is charging someone with apostasy, which is leaving Islam. The hardline Islamists consider the state of apostasy as highly blasphemous, hence that individual becomes fair game for excommunication, exile, or even death. Many Muslim activists have received death threats by extremists because the latter employ *takfir* against them. Moreover, *takfir* has nothing to do with exacting justice or fighting against oppression. *Takfir* is used to create an Islamic utopia in the minds of the religious extremists. Their delusional and distorted creed accepts the elimination of nonbelievers from their ideal Islamic society, and that elimination can come in the form of forced compliance to the extremists'

creed, excommunication, exile, or murder. This is a tool for religious fascism seeking to create and sustain the ideal Islamic utopia as they define it. *Takfir* is, essentially, a tool for bullying others who do not comply with the violent extremists' demands, and it is also a tactic for socioreligious engineering for the purpose of establishing the Islamic utopia consisting of only those who are acceptable according to the creed.

Maulana Azad had no such notions or delusions. In fact, he even rejected the concept of partition and the creation of Pakistan. He was not delusional in wanting an Islamic utopia. He was painfully aware of the realities that communalism posed in his country, but he did not allow them to derail him from his goal of removing the British from India and then establishing a secular liberal democracy by and for the Indian people, which includes Hindu–Muslim unity and coexistence. Maulana Azad would overwhelmingly reject *takfir* as well as the concept of an Islamic utopia.

Also, *takfir* is clearly a means of employing *zulm* (oppression) against fellow Muslims; whereas, the Quran explicitly forbids oppression of others, especially Muslims, who are considered brothers and sisters to each other in faith. For violent Islamist extremists, taking away the status of "believer" within Islam of an individual vis-à-vis *takfir* is a convenient way to target their enemies. Furthermore, their enemies are almost always nonviolent, but the extremists are not, even against fellow Muslims. Some scholars have pointed out that no one has committed a greater transgression than the violent Islamist extremists in employing *takfir*, because only God can judge a person's "Muslimness."

The concepts of *zulm*, *mazlum*, and *zaalim* are extremely significant to understand the mindset of violent Islamist extremists. They have exploited and abused these terms and applied them out of context to modern scenarios, mainly for their own political and ideological agendas. On the other hand, Maulana Azad maintained a highly disciplined view of these concepts within the specific context of fighting nonviolently against the British to expel them from India, exact justice and the rule of law, and establish a secular democracy. The fact that Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi and fellow activists maintained such incredible discipline of nonviolent civil disobedience adds to their moral credentials. The same cannot be said of the religious extremists.

Another concept that must be addressed is martyrdom. This too has been heavily exploited at the hands of violent Islamist extremist organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, and others.

Martyrdom in Islam

The reason why the concepts of jihad and martyrdom are relevant to this analysis is because Maulana Azad never used these terms in his struggle against the British in India. Neither did he exploit these concepts, even though he had

many opportunities to do so given his circumstances; whereas, the violent Islamist extremists take every opportunity to manipulate them for their own agendas and advantages. Moreover, the extremists stretch the contexts and meaning of these terms without regard to the circumstances and the rules of engagement in war as Islam dictates them. Therefore, there is a striking difference between Maulana Azad's integrity and moral credibility in his cause and the sinister agendas of the violent extremists particularly involving the concepts of jihad and martyrdom.

The concepts of violent jihad and martyrdom and the Quranic verse "enjoining what is right and forbidding what is evil" are interconnected, especially in the minds of the violent religious extremists. Expressly, the term *qital* means "fighting" or "armed combat" or killing, and it is usually in the context of jihad.[17] The word *harb* is the Arabic term for "war," and the Quran

> employs this last term four times: to refer to illegitimate wars fought by those who wish to spread corruption on earth (5:64); to the thick of battle between believers and nonbelievers (8:57; 47:4); and, in one instance, to the possibility of war waged by God and His prophet against those who would continue to practice usury (2:279). This term is never used with the phrase "in the path of God" [*fi sabil Allah*] and has no bearing on the concept of jihad.[18]

According to the Quran, there are circumstances in which violent jihad, primarily for self-defense, becomes obligatory. In particular, these chapters and verses describe such cases: "Fighting (*al-qital*) is prescribed for you, while you dislike it. But it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love a thing which is bad for you. God knows and you know not" (Quran 2:216);[19] "The Quran states further that it is the duty of Muslims to defend those who are oppressed and who call out to them for help (4:75), except against a people with whom the Muslims have concluded a treaty (8:72)";[20] and the conduct of war and rules of engagement concerning combatants versus noncombatants still apply.

Moreover, the concept of martyrdom (*istishhad*) is significant in Islam, just like in other religions including Christianity. The symbolism of the "Lamb of God" being sacrificed is prevalent in many religious contexts. The Quran has verses that have "been construed to refer to the special status of the military martyr," saying—"Do not think that those who were slain in the path of God are dead. They are alive and well provided for by their Lord" (3:169; cf. 47:4; 2:154).[21] Some Islamic scholars contend that the phrase "slain in the path of God" is not necessarily "restricted to those fallen in battle, but could be glossed in several ways."[22]

The Arabic term generally referring to a "martyr" is *shaheed*, but, in fact, "nowhere in the Quran is this word used for a martyr; rather, it is only used,

interchangeably with *shāhīd*, to refer to a legal or eye witness."[23] Later, the word *shaheed* came to possess "the specific meaning of 'one who bears witness for the faith,' particularly by laying down his or her life."[24] According to Islamic studies scholar Asma Afsaruddin, the Arabic word *shāhīd* may have origins in the word *sahedo*, which is a cognate Syriac term for "martyr-witness."[25] Thus, this may have led to the eventual derivation of the word "martyr." According to Afsaruddin, we find such terminology only in hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), which implies that the derivation of "martyr-witness" must have evolved later in Islamic history.[26] Furthermore, Afsaruddin contends that over the years many Islamic scholars have challenged the concept of jihad solely being defined as armed combat; some scholars attribute these terms—jihad as armed combat and combat-related martyrdom—to hadiths only and not to the Prophet Muhammad himself,[27] since the origins of hadith literature is based on the chain of transfer by the prophet's companions. Some hadiths are more valid than others, as Islamic jurists have determined.

Apparently, the body of hadith that emerged later on, as well as the development of the four distinct Sunni schools of law, specified the contexts in which the term *shaheed* (martyr) is applicable. For example, according to the Maliki school of Islamic law, the Prophet Muhammad "identified seven kinds of martyrs in addition to those who died from fighting in God's way":[28]

> He who dies as a victim of an epidemic is a martyr; he who dies from drowning is a martyr; he who dies from pleurisy is a martyr; . . . he who dies by [being burned in] fire is a martyr; he who dies by being struck by a dilapidated wall falling is a martyr; and　　is a martyr. . . . These early, expansive definitions of a martyr are an important corrective to the later predominantly military significations attached to the term *shaheed*.[29]

Fast forward to the age of colonialism, and this is when a number of Muslim scholars began to invoke jihad as a "defensive war," in this context it was meant as the struggle against "foreign aggressors."[30] Often, such sentiments referred to Quran verses 8:60, 9:38–40, and 9:123 to rally Muslims in the fight against "Western Christian occupiers."[31] These verses state the following, and notice that the phrase *fi sabil Allah* (in the path of God) is included[32]:

9:38

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ مَا لَكُمْ إِذَا قِيلَ لَكُمُ انفِرُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّهِ اثَّاقَلْتُمْ إِلَى الأَرْضِ أَرَضِيتُم بِالْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا مِنَ الآخِرَةِ فَمَا مَتَاعُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا فِي الآخِرَةِ إِلَّا قَلِيلٌ

O ye who believe! What is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the Cause of God, ye cling heavily to the earth? Do ye prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter.

9:39

<div dir="rtl">إِلَّا تَنفِرُواْ يُعَذِّبْكُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا وَيَسْتَبْدِلْ قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ وَلَا تَضُرُّوهُ شَيْئًا وَأَللّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ</div>

Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place: But Him ye would not harm in the least. For God hath power over all things.

9:40

<div dir="rtl">إِلاَّ تَنصُرُوهُ فَقَدْ نَصَرَهُ اللّهُ إِذْ أَخْرَجَهُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ ثَانِيَ اثْنَيْنِ إِذْ هُمَا فِي الْغَارِ إِذْ يَقُولُ لِصَاحِبِهِ لاَ تَحْزَنْ إِنَّ اللّهَ مَعَنَا فَأَنزَلَ اللّهُ سَكِينَتَهُ عَلَيْهِ وَأَيَّدَهُ بِجُنُودٍ لَّمْ تَرَوْهَا وَجَعَلَ كَلِمَةَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ السُّفْلَى وَكَلِمَةُ اللّهِ هِيَ الْعُلْيَا وَأَللّه عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ</div>

If ye help not (your Leader), (it is no matter): for God did indeed help him, when the Unbelievers drove him out: he had no more than one companion: they two were in the Cave, and he said to his companion, "Have no fear, for God is with us": then God sent down his peace upon him, and strengthened him with forces which ye saw not, and humbled to the depths the word of the Unbelievers. But the word of God is exalted to the heights: For God is Exalted in might, Wise.

9:123

<div dir="rtl">يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ قَاتِلُواْ الَّذِينَ يَلُونَكُم مِّنَ الْكُفَّارِ وَلِيَجِدُواْ فِيكُمْ غِلْظَةً وَاعْلَمُواْ أَنَّ اللّه مَعَ الْمُتَّقِينَ</div>

O ye who believe! Fight the Unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that God is with those who fear Him.

8:60

<div dir="rtl">وَأَعِدُّواْ لَهُم مَّا اسْتَطَعْتُم مِّن قُوَّةٍ وَمِن رِّبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدْوَّ اللّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِن دُونِهِمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ أَللّه يَعْلَمُهُمْ وَمَا تُنفِقُواْ مِن شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّه يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنتُمْ لاَ تُظْلَمُونَ</div>

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth

know. Whatever ye shall spend in the Cause of God, shall be repaid unto you,
and ye shall not be treated unjustly.

Surely that is something that the Muslim League and other Indian Muslim
anti-British movements may have considered. However, that is not the case
with Maulana Azad. While he viewed the anti-British nonviolent activism as a
duty for Indian Muslims, he did not couch this activism in explicitly religious
terms or contexts; and definitely not in the same way that modern-day violent
Islamist extremists have done so. Maulana Azad endorsed nonviolent activism
as the legitimate means for political activism against the British Raj. He did not
personally issue fatwas (religious decrees or edicts) right and left to advance his
agenda, though he had the religious authority and credentials to do so.

On the contrary, violent extremist groups' leaders such as Osama bin
Laden and the like have issued fatwas endlessly, and their fatwas have pro-
vided the guidance and plans, approved within religious contexts as they see
fit, to fight against their non-Muslim and Muslim enemies. Fatwas are essen-
tial for religious legal scholars or jurists mainly concerning religious issues
and questions that they are asked to address. According to *Oxford Islamic
Studies Online*, a fatwa is

[An] Authoritative legal opinion given by a *mufti* (legal scholar) in response to a
question posed by an individual or a court of law. A fatwa is typically requested
in cases not covered by the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) literature and is neither
binding nor enforceable. Its authority is based on the mufti's education and
status within the community. If the inquirer is not persuaded by the fatwa, he
is free to go to another mufti and obtain another opinion; but once he finds a
convincing opinion, he should obey it. Theoretically, muftis should be capable
of exercising legal reasoning independently of schools of law (*ijtihad*), although
followers of tradition (*muqallids*) are also allowed to issue fatwas. Historically,
fatwas were independent of the judicial system, although some muftis were offi-
cially attached to various courts. In the Ottoman and Mughal political systems,
the chief mufti was designated shaykh al-Islam. Other muftis were appointed to
positions as market inspectors, guardians of public morals, and advisers to gov-
ernment on religious affairs. Under colonial rule, madrasas (Islamic seminaries)
took over the role of religious guides, and special institutions were established
to issue fatwas. In modern times, print and electronic media have reinforced
the role and impact of fatwas by making them instantly available to the public.
Present-day Muslim states have tried to control fatwas through official consulta-
tive/advisory organizations within religious ministries.[33]

Thus, in addition to present-day violent Islamist extremists causing violent
jihad to run amok, the same is applied to the tool of religious decrees, fatwas,

that supposedly support and justify the ways and means of a given jihad. Plus, historical context matters when applying a fatwa for carrying out violent jihad. Islamic studies scholar Asma Afsaruddin comments about this, stating that many contemporary Muslim scholars have placed emphasis on the fact that the Quran needs to be read "holistically," and that emphasis must be applied to those Quranic verses that unequivocally "forbid the initiation of war by Muslims and which uphold the principle of *non-coercion in religion* [. . .]."[34]

In other words, the specific contexts of early Islamic history, when Islam was just born and started to expand regionally and then more broadly later at the global scale, inform the manner in which certain verses are interpreted and applied. The violent extremists' fatwas that are linked to certain verses to support a military jihad in the modern era are usually taken out of context and, therefore, in the abstract. Religious mandates usually do not occur in a vacuum.

Moreover, the reference to "non-coercion in religion" is to the Quran 2:256,[35] which unequivocally says, "Let there be no compulsion in religion":

لا اكراه في الدين

Again, the violent Islamist extremists conveniently ignore this verse, and, instead, they attempt to impose their beliefs on others—Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These examples illustrate that the violent extremists tend to revert back to the classical and more orthodox interpretations of Islamic principles for their convenience. On the other hand, mainstream Islamic scholars who embrace reform and reinterpretation, or *ijtihad*, emphasize the errors in dismissing historical contexts in modern applications and scenarios. Today, the world is very different from seventh-century Arabia, and modern religious exegetes and their interpretations need to take that into account.

For Maulana Azad, the application of religious obligations to fight against injustice and oppression was straightforward, and, most importantly, it did not have to entail violence of any sort against anyone. Yet, his strategies and nonviolent activism have always been considered Islamically sound and not in violation of any religious principles or edicts.

Furthermore, unlike many modern violent jihadists and their leaders, Maulana Azad and his loyalists had absolutely no preoccupation with carrying out jihad in order to gain entry into Heaven, or Paradise, as would-be "martyrs." The carrot that many violent Islamist extremists dangle in front of recruits is the promise of martyrdom status if they die during the act of violent jihad, and that status, theoretically, leads the jihadist operative into Heaven where he (usually the operative is a male, but there are exceptions to that) will enjoy the fruits of Paradise. This has been yet another manipulative tool that violent Islamist extremists have used to acquire recruits and entice them to carry out jihadist missions, which often consist of suicide attacks. Here

we see double vices, that of the violent jihad targeting civilians, and that of suicide, which is strictly prohibited in Islam.

Hence, the violent Islamist extremists have rendered the concepts of violent jihad, martyrdom, and suicide as a means of carrying out the jihadist missions as interrelated variables. As a violent jihadist carrying out jihad against a targeted enemy, one is likely to die especially if the means of the attack is by suicide. Regardless of the suicide, which, again, is condemned in Islam, the operative is promised Paradise, where he will partake in sublime pleasures, as he would have earned the status of martyr. While the grandiose myth of proper martyrs making love to seventy-two virgins repeatedly in Paradise is touted in violent Islamist extremist preaching, it has been a convenient method to incentivize a jihadist recruit and operative to carry out dangerous campaigns and attacks. An Islamic scholar with the pen name Ibn Warraq (for his safety) has dissected this myth, saying that

> it is in the Islamic Traditions that we find the 72 virgins in heaven specified: in a Hadith (Islamic Tradition) collected by Al-Tirmidhi (died 892 CE [common era]) in the Book of Sunan (volume IV, chapters on The Features of Paradise as described by the Messenger of Allah [Prophet Muhammad], chapter 21, About the Smallest Reward for the People of Paradise, (Hadith 2687). The same hadith is also quoted by Ibn Kathir (died 1373 CE) in his Koranic commentary (*Tafsir*) of Surah Al-Rahman (55), verse 72: The Prophet Muhammad was heard saying: "The smallest reward for the people of paradise is an abode where there are 80,000 servants and 72 wives, over which stands a dome decorated with pearls, aquamarine, and ruby, as wide as the distance from *Al-Jabiyyah* [a Damascus suburb] to Sana'a [Yemen]."
>
> Modern apologists of Islam try to downplay the evident materialism and sexual implications of such descriptions, but, as the *Encyclopedia of Islam* says, even orthodox Muslim theologians such as al Ghazali (died 1111 CE) and Al-Ash'ari (died 935 CE) have "admitted sensual pleasures into paradise."[36]

Ibn Warraq goes on to emphasize that modern linguists and Quran scholars have explained that the word *hur* is actually a Syriac term, and not Arabic, describing a plate of grapes or raisins, and therefore it "yields 'white raisins' of 'crystal clarity' rather than doe-eyed, and ever willing virgins—the *huris* . . . it is food and drink that is being offered, and not unsullied maidens or *huris*."[37] Other descriptions of Paradise are ubiquitous in the Quran, and they include scenic rivers flowing, gardens full of exotic flowers and fragrances, and exquisite food and drinks, including nonintoxicating wine, in great abundance that are served eternally.

Nonetheless, violent Islamist extremists and their loyal recruits continue to not only believe in the virgins of Paradise, but they also spread this promising

divine enticement worldwide. Whether or not the newer interpretations of the seventy-two virgins are revisionist, apologist, or denialist, the moral character of someone carrying out nonviolent activism for the sake of justice transcends such notions and desires. Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad were never interested in enticements, and they would have wholly rejected the entertainment of such ideas in the course of their activism.

Simply, Maulana Azad and others like him exhibited an immense selflessness as they suffered terribly at the hands of the British Raj. Yet, they did not seek heroism or martyrdom status; instead, they maintained a laser focus on the goal of India's independence and unity in spite of the consequences that they would have to bear. Dangling the promises of martyrdom and sensual rewards in Paradise would not have entered the minds of the nonviolent activists in early twentieth-century India. Yet, theirs was a "just war" that they carried out nonviolently.

CONCLUSION

As of this writing, one of the day's news headlines informs that Pakistan's prime minister Imran Khan recently referred to the late Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as a "martyr." As the BBC News reports, "Bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was killed in 2011 when US special forces raided his hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. Pakistan was not informed in advance."[38] The prime minister said, "I will never forget how we Pakistanis were embarrassed when the Americans came into Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden, martyred him"[39] using the Arabic word *shaheed* (martyr). The opposition has criticized the prime minister for his utterance, instead calling bin Laden a terrorist; in general, this illustrates how a religious term such as "martyr" can be deeply politicized.

The argument of violent Islamist extremists that oppression must be countered with violent jihad is dispelled in this chapter. In fact, violent Islamist extremists are perpetrating even worse brutality and injustice on the innocent masses, so their religious-based arguments are undermined by their own brutal actions. Often, in terms of frequency and proportionality, the violent Islamist extremists' actions against fellow Muslims are far worse and/or more heinous than the brutal oppressors; that has certainly been the case with the Islamic State (IS). In fact, the more grotesque the punishments and executions of transgressors, the better it is, purportedly, for the IS's image and reputation. That might be true for the IS circle of loyalists, but not so for the rest of the world.

The truth is that such IS tactics have severely backfired, and today the mainstream Muslims label them as barbaric, ignorant, and *un*-Islamic. Evidently,

those who claim to come to the rescue against the oppression of Muslims have themselves become the ultimate oppressors. We are reminded that

> with many of the billion-plus Muslims living in poverty or oppression, Islam has become a rallying point for independence movements worldwide. Since jihad and martyrdom were placed within religious context during the Medinan period, some of these independence movements have deployed the same concepts as sanctified tools for motivating combatants in the face of overwhelming odds. Thus, some seek a military solution to their political aspirations.[40]

However, oftentimes it is the leaders of Muslim-majority countries who are, themselves, the problem. Poor governance and violent repression have caused the cycles of poverty, oppression, and hardships of the Muslim masses. These realities have provided additional fodder for the violent Islamist extremists to exploit for their political agendas. Moreover, religious appeasements and entreaties go both ways, as seen with Prime Minister Khan's labeling of bin Laden as a "martyr." He has a vast array of Islamist extremist organizations in Pakistan to placate, and, clearly, he is very mindful of that reality.

Both Muslim political leaders and violent Islamist extremists have much to learn and appreciate from stellar Islamic figures like Maulana Azad. Nonviolent activism inherently embodies moral credibility and does not have to sugarcoat its image, nor does it have to entice and incentivize would-be loyalists and recruits with promises of divine rewards. Justice is plain and simple, and, once justice and the rule of law prevail under the auspices of good governance, oppression is aptly defeated.

Nonviolent activism is compatible with Islam, and Maulana Azad illustrated this with his proactive civil disobedience, selflessness, and tenacious persistence, in addition to his religious and political entreaties to Indian Muslims to adopt the same methods to oust the British Raj. His goals and the ways and means to achieve them took place in the cause of justice and the elimination of oppression. He pursued these goals nonviolently for selfless reasons affecting not only Indian Muslims but the entire Indian population, for the sake of the country's independence, unity, and future democracy.

NOTES

1. See John Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and, the movie, "The Message," starring Anthony Quinn, directed by Moustapha Akkad, 1977: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074896/.

2. Ahmad S. Moussalli, and Gordon D. Newby, "Muhammad," Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2020, accessed from: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0550.

3. "Muhammad and Violence and Jihad," from *Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet, PBS,* 2002, accessed from: https://www.pbs.org/muhammad/ma_violence.shtml.

4. "Islam on Justice and Injustice," *Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs*, Georgetown University, 2020, accessed from: https://berkleycenter .georgetown.edu/essays/islam-on-justice-and-injustice.

5. 40 Hadith, Hadith 34, Sahih Muslim, accessed from Sunnah.com, no date: https://sunnah.com/nawawi40/34.

6. Hossein Askari, and Abbas Mirakhor, *Conceptions of Justice from Islam to the Present* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 261.

8. Ibid., p. 265.

9. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

10. Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper One, 2007), p. 150.

11. *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, translated into English by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc., Publishers and Distributors of the Holy Qur'an, U.S. edition 2001), pp. 149–150.

[Arabic text from: https://www.al-islam.org/ramadhan-holy-quran-30-lessons -30-days-muhsin-qaraati/lesson-7-enjoining-good-and-forbidding-evil, for 7:199: http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=7&verse=199; and for 7:165: http:/ /corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=7&verse=165].

12. Ibid., p. 151.

13. Ibid., p. 400.

14. Ibid., footnote number 1170, p. 400.

15. Ibid., pp. 267–268.

16. Ibid., p. 391.

17. Asma Afsaruddin, "Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and History," Religion Category of the *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, March 2016, accessed from: https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001. 0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-46.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. *The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, pp. 451–452; 478; 430.

Arabic script accessed from: https://www.islamicity.org/quransearch/?q=8.

33. "Fatwa," *Oxford Islamic Studies Online,* Oxford University Press, 2020, accessed from: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e646.

34. Afsaruddin, "Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and History": https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-46. Emphasis added.

35. The *Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, p. 103.

Arabic script accessed from: https://www.islamicity.org/quransearch/?q=8.

36. Ibn Warraq, "Virgins? What Virgins?" *The Guardian,* January 11, 2002, accessed from: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/jan/12/books.guardianreview5.

37. Ibid.

38. "Imran Khan Criticized after Calling Osama bin Laden a 'Martyr,'" *BBC News*, June 27, 2020, accessed from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53190199.

39. Ibid.

40. "Muhammad and Violence and Jihad," from *Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet, PBS,* 2002, accessed from: https://www.pbs.org/muhammad/ma_violence.shtml.

The Islamic Principles of Social Justice

From Maulana Azad to the Arab Awakening

The idea of nonviolent civil disobedience is to act against injustice and unjust laws. This has been Mahatma Gandhi's motivation, as well as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's. For an Islamic religious authority of Maulana Azad's stature and caliber to embrace nonviolent activism for the sake of social justice, it is a significant change in the course of action in Islam against oppression, so it seems. At least, that remains the reputation of Islam in modern history, particularly in the West and in the media. The concepts of justice/injustice, oppression, and social justice need to be examined in historical context, beginning with early Islamic history, followed by the period of British colonial rule and the Indian struggle against it as led by Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad.

This chapter[1] analyzes the principles of Maulana Azad in the struggle against injustice, and how that compares to the principles and practices of violent Islamist militancy and jihadism. Terrorism targeting civilians is viewed as illegitimate, while Maulana Azad's Islamic credentials render his acceptance of nonviolent civil disobedience as far more legitimate and morally credible and courageous. Moreover, the success of the 2011 Arab Awakening uprisings and revolutions, which were carried out largely by nonviolent civil disobedience, cannot be emphasized enough, especially in light of decades of failures of violent militant organizations.

Early Islamic history is pertinent in this analysis of the concept of social justice. Islam was born in an extremely hostile and unjust environment in seventh-century Arabia characterized by tribal hierarchies, socioeconomic inequality, slavery, misogyny, and almost constant tribal warfare. Even the physical geography and climate were harsh. The desert environment consisted of scarce resources for survival.

In this scenario, powerful tribes oppressed weaker ones, and wealth distribution was far from egalitarian. Social justice was nonexistent. The Prophet

Muhammad's early teachings focused on fighting against oppression (*zulm*) in early Meccan society, which especially appealed to the oppressed (*mazlum*) and disenfranchised classes. He promoted social equality and protection of the poor and powerless from unjust practices and customs, such as female infanticide. The Prophet Muhammad also professed fighting against oppression and the oppressors zealously. He did not call for turning the other cheek in suffering from oppression and injustice. This fight against oppression and injustice took many forms, encompassing a broad spectrum of approaches, as articulated in the Quran. That spectrum includes showing mercy and forgiveness, as well as violent jihad, or "holy war," which is frequently in news headlines especially since the September 11 attacks.

Conceptually, in Islam, persecution and oppression can never be accepted. Social justice is the *umma*'s (broader Muslim community) responsibility, and that includes in the socioeconomic domain. That is the reason behind the requirement of the zakat tax, which is intended for distribution to the poor. Overall, Islamic society, along with its political, legal/judicial, economic, religious, and even military systems and institutions are required to uphold the principles of social justice and keep unjust policies and practices in check. That is the ideal. The individual and collective Muslim mind and emotions are very conscious of, and sensitive to oppression, persecution, and injustice.

The Quran and hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) contain numerous accounts of the crimes of the Quraysh tribe, and its horrific persecution of the early Muslim converts in Mecca. Many were tortured and killed, while many others were driven into exile. Battles between the Muslims and non-Muslims ensued, as the new Muslim community expanded in Medina. Tribal warfare was quite common at that time, and the concept of the greater and lesser jihad developed in the era of early Islamic history. At the same time, the concept of martyrdom developed in Islamic theology for both Sunnis and Shi'ites.

The concepts of jihad and martyrdom are inherently linked to the intolerance toward oppression, persecution, and injustice, as they are perceived. Historically, nonviolent responses to oppression and injustice would have been not only difficult, but nearly unheard of in that context. One either suffered terribly, or physically fought back against the oppressor, and Islam does prescribe a conduct of war that strictly prohibits harm to noncombatants, notwithstanding the modern-day militants' preponderance for targeting civilians. This is the historical backdrop for understanding the Muslim mindset and sentiments pertaining to oppression and injustice and tyranny.

Islam teaches a "no-tolerance" policy toward oppression. It is a Muslim's duty to combat oppression and injustice, even if it is only symbolic resistance. As mentioned previously, a famous hadith says, "If one of you sees

something wrong, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; if he cannot, then with his heart and this is the weakest faith" (Sahih Muslim). The Muslim community

> has a mission to create a moral social order: "You are the best community evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong" (3: 110). This command has influenced Muslim practice throughout the centuries, providing a rationale for political and moral activism. Government regulations, Islamic laws, and the activities of religious police who monitor public behavior have all been justified as expressions of this moral mission to command the good and prohibit evil. Again, Muhammad and the first Muslim community are seen as exemplifying this ideal, implementing the socially just society envisioned by the Quran.
>
> The Quran envisions a society based on the unity and equality of believers, a society in which moral and social justice will counterbalance oppression of the weak and economic exploitation.[2]

Maulana Azad was not only aware of this, but he chose to act against the British colonial oppressor. However, he purposely chose to be a nonviolent warrior in the struggle against the British in India, aligning himself with Mahatma Gandhi.

Maulana Azad embraced Mahatma Gandhi's nonviolent civil disobedience strategy and principles, and in his capacity and status as a highly qualified and reputable Islamic jurist and scholar, he declared nonviolent activism as completely compatible with Islam. Maulana Azad possessed the highest credentials for declaring the religious legitimacy of nonviolent activism in the context of Islam. In his youth, far outpacing his peers in school, he excelled in Islamic curricula at Calcutta's Dars-i-Nizami. At this school, a student usually received a rigorous education in numerous languages such as Urdu, Persian, and Arabic, in addition to learning the disciplines of Islamic theology, hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), mysticism (Sufism), philosophy, geography, mathematics, and history.[3] He finished in four years what usually took fourteen years to complete. Maulana Azad was a very prolific multilingual writer and remarkable public speaker. In his voluminous writings and speeches, he has clearly articulated the compatibility between Islam and nonviolent activism, as well as his assessment of oppression, tyranny, and unjust laws and policies.

One of the most revealing historical documents that Maulana Azad authored is *Qaul-i Faisal*. In the *Qaul-i Faisal*, Maulana Azad articulates his reasoning and support for nonviolent activism against "malevolence, oppression and tyranny." It is worth quoting some passages from the *Qaul-i Faisal*,

which are described as "one of the most outstanding monuments in Urdu literature."[4] Here are some select passages:

> No sensible person but the Government would deny the fact that in the present conditions there lies no hope of getting justice from the official law-courts . . . [because] they are based on such a system whereby no magistrate can do justice to the accused with whom the Government itself does not like to have a fair play. [. . .] For autocratic and repressive Governments there is no instrument better than this for revenge and injustice. Next to the battlefield, the greatest acts of injustice in the world have been committed in the law-courts. [. . .] Certainly I have said that "the present Government is a tyrant."[5]

Maulana Azad spent time in British court systems and prisons, so his insight is from firsthand experience and suffering. He mentions this in the *Qaul-i Faisal*, "For four years I suffered internment."[6] One of his biographers describes him in the following passage:

> Instead of sitting in a cozy seat of a spiritual leader, he adopted a harder, difficult and strenuous way of life to save the masses from the pitfalls of blind dogmatic superstitions and lead them toward an enlightened and broadminded faith; to free the minds . . . of all that makes for inter-communal misunderstandings, and to inspire them by his own examples of hardships and sacrifices.[7]

Maulana Azad's critique of legal injustices at the hands of the British colonial government sets the stage for his arguments about nonviolent resistance.

> Either the Government should refrain from doing injustice and depriving us of our rights, or if it cannot do so, it must be wiped out of existence. [. . .] Howsoever attractive we may coin the names for slavery and servitude, still slavery will remain what it is. It is against the will and canons of God. . . . I refuse to admit the present Government as a valid authority, and consequently think it to be my national, religious, and human duty to relieve my country and nation of this servitude.[8]

Maulana Azad then addresses this oppression specifically in the context of Islam, explaining that the religion of Islam

> proclaimed . . . that might was not right, and right alone was proprietorship; . . . no one else than God was worthy of enslaving or enthralling human beings. [Islam] swept off all racial and national gradations of distinction and authority and showed the world . . . that all human beings hold an equal rank, and all possess equal rights.[9]

Maulana Azad specifically mentions the April 1919 massacre in Amritsar at the hands of British Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer and his troops as an example of atrocities committed at the hands of the unjust Raj:

> The present Government is simply an illicit bureaucracy. . . . It always prefers prestige over justice and truth. It maintains the legality of the heinous massacre of the Jallian-walla Bagh at Amritsar. It admits of no injustice in its order to human beings to creep on their bellies like beasts. It allows whipping of innocent boys till they fall unconscious, simply because they would not salute the Union Jack like a puppet.[10]

In the *Qaul-i Faisal*, Maulana Azad speaks at length about nonviolent noncooperation:

> Opposed to us stands a power, . . . with all the cruel weapons of tyranny and violence, . . . I fully agree with the arguments of Mahatma Gandhi in the case of India's freedom and our present struggle; and I have complete confidence in their truth. I am . . . certain that India will achieve a victory through nonviolent efforts, and her success will be a lasting example of the triumph of moral and spiritual forces. This is the reason why I have always advised the public to do peaceful agitation [. . .].[11]

In modern times, violent Islamist militant organizations have proliferated worldwide, with high concentrations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asian regions. Militant ideologies that promote and implement violent jihad originate in early Islamic history. Ironically, these violent extremists use tools of oppression as a means, they claim, to fight against oppression and injustices. They do not hesitate to brutalize and kill civilians, nor do they hesitate to torture and extrajudicially kill their prisoners. In order to comparatively analyze nonviolent activism in Islam with violent jihad/militancy, an overview of the key concepts and historical evolution of violent Islamist militancy is necessary.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND KEY CONCEPTS OF VIOLENT ISLAMIST MILITANCY

Jihad is a loaded term, well known to the modern global public since the September 11 attacks in 2001. There are two forms of jihad in Islam, one is called the "greater jihad" and the other is the "lesser jihad." In the context of classical Arabic and early Islamic history, greater jihad was considered the priority for Muslims, as it promotes self-improvement in one's behavior

and righteousness. The lesser jihad in this context was secondary, and it was viewed as warfare, and many interpreted it as a form of "self-defense," although we know from history that it was also used as a tool of expansion for the early Islamic empire. Throughout Islamic history, there have been cases of more sound uses of both types of, as well as some blatantly distorted, applications. A *mujahid* is someone who conducts jihad, specifically a "fighter, freedom fighter; warrior."[12] The plural of *mujahid* is mujaheddin (with variations in the spelling).

Since the birth of Islam in the seventh century, many militant Islamist groups have declared jihad in various contexts. All of them have political objectives and motives traceable to them. Therefore, the utility of the lesser jihad, that is, the militant, violent form of jihad, is not simplistic. It is, however, grossly exploitative and manipulative, to the extent that this form of jihad in the modern world has eclipsed the actual greater (intellectual and spiritual) jihad. In other words, the greater and lesser jihads have been reversed in the modern context, in terms of how Islamist militants and ultra-orthodox ideologies have proposed and utilized them.

The colonial era ushered in the use of the lesser jihad by specific groups for achieving specific political goals and agendas. An example of this is the creation of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, wherein Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud fiercely crushed a rebellion within Arabia in order to secure his seat of power as king, and hence establishing the royal family as future heirs to the throne. With British help, Ibn Saud mercilessly annihilated the Ikhwan warriors, who he had used earlier to force tribes in the Arabian Peninsula to unite under the new kingdom. Ibn Saud asked his ulama (body of Islamic scholars) to provide the Islamic legal justification to crush the Ikhwan rebellion. Ironically, the very same Ikhwan warriors a few years earlier used violent jihad to achieve Ibn Saud's goals for securing his rule over the kingdom.

Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud used several strategies to unite the warring tribes within the Arabian Peninsula and bring them under his rule as king. He used religion, particularly appealing to the ultraorthodox ideology of Wahhabism and the ulama to legitimize his rule; he married a woman from each major tribe to create strategic political alliances and expand the base and numbers of the royal family; and he also used force to subjugate hold-out tribes. In 1932, Ibn Saud successfully established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and proclaimed himself the king.

The kingdom-building process was not without challenges. Ibn Saud had to use the war-savvy soldiers called the Ikhwan, or "Brothers," when the use of force was necessary. The Ikhwan were incredibly effective and successful in each of their battles, and the kingdom could not have been created without them. They also helped conquer the two holiest places in Islam: Mecca and

Medina. The Ikhwan comprised cooperative agricultural colonies in Arabia and were also

> divided into categories for the purposes of waging the jihad when called upon to do so: some of them were regarded as the standing army which could be called up for active service immediately and on the ruler's order, while the rest could be called up only on a fatwa (Islamic decree or ruling) of the Ulama.[13]

However, once all the tribes were united and Ibn Saud prepared to establish the kingdom, the Ikhwan strongly felt that the job was unfinished. They wanted to continue expanding Arabian territory conquering the then Transjordan and other neighboring areas and bring them into the sphere of Arabian rule. The Ikhwan wanted nothing less than to create a new Islamic–Arabian empire in the region. They also fiercely opposed the introduction of anything new or foreign into Arabia, including automobiles, radios, and telephones. The Ikhwan viewed these as dangerous innovations that threaten Islamic values.

Ibn Saud disagreed with the Ikhwan, especially concerning the territorial expansions. He was satisfied with conquering the Arabian Peninsula and uniting the numerous tribes under his rule, and he did not wish to engage in regional wars and battles that may be destructive and unsuccessful. He wished to stop the expansion within Arabia. The Ikhwan, who were strict Wahhabis, were not pleased with this, and much like the Kharijites, they strongly believed that it was Ibn Saud's duty as an Islamic leader to continue the expansion. If he failed to do so, he would not be regarded as a true Islamic leader. The Ikhwan launched a bloody rebellion against Ibn Saud and his interests.[14]

As a result, Ibn Saud turned to the ulama to judge the actions of the Ikhwan. The ulama's judgment, in the form of a fatwa (religious decree), was that the Ikhwan were wrong, and Ibn Saud was within his right to determine the limits of expansion of Arabian territories.[15] Thus, the Ikhwan were obligated to obey Ibn Saud, and failure to do so would give Ibn Saud the green light to crush the Ikhwan rebellion. Ibn Saud indeed crushed the Ikhwan rebellion, and he did so ruthlessly, with help from the British.[16] The marriage between religion and militancy is not unprecedented: "The feature of combining religious training with jihad was present in the activity of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself and is not an uncommon phenomenon in the pre-Modernist reform movements."[17]

During the Cold War period, the most pivotal moment of employing the lesser form of jihad in modern history came with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This triggered the anti-communist/anti-Soviet Reagan administration to launch a proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The Reagan administration achieved this by intensifying the call to arms of "jihadists," or mujaheddin, and providing them with weapons, funding, and intelligence.[18]

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia assisted the United States in this cause. Thus, the Cold War-motivated jihad against the Soviets spread Islamist militant fundamentalism at a fever pitch, especially at the Afghan–Pakistan border region, where ubiquitous madrassas (Islamic schools) training young boys and men in jihad (fighting a war) and the Quran served as mujaheddin "factories." Moreover, the Reagan administration explicitly sought out the most militant and fundamentalist mujaheddin factions to support[19] with the supposed logic that their religious fervor would be the most effective for recruiting fighters and maintaining their morale and steadfastness in fighting the Soviets.

These are some examples of the use of violent jihad in specific historical contexts and for certain political agendas. In general, Islam does not separate religion from politics, which further complicates the use and legitimacy of violent jihad. In fact, the roots of puritanical fanaticism in Islam actually date back to the seventh century. The Kharijites set the precedent for the use of *takfir* and violent jihad even against fellow Muslims.

The Roots of Puritanical Fanaticism: The Kharijites

In 661 AD, the fourth Caliph of the Islamic Empire Ali bin Abi Talib was killed. The assassins were the Kharijites, puritanical religious extremists who considered the lesser form of jihad as the "sixth pillar" of Islam. According to Fazlur Rahman, "Among the later Muslim legal schools . . . it is only the fanatic Kharijites who have declared jihad to be one of the pillars of the Faith."[20]

The Caliph Ali signed a truce with the Umayyad leader Mu'awiya, and this truce was seen by the Kharijites as a transgression of the Islamic ruler. The basis of Kharijite beliefs is the judgment of one's "Muslimness" upon committing a serious sin. In other words, if a Muslim commits a sin, is he/she still a Muslim? If the answer is no, then, according to the Kharijites, this person must be sentenced to death. This authority to judge someone as an apostate or nonbeliever is seen today. Islamist extremists often use *takfir* as a means to render one's status as an apostate, hence sentencing him or her to death. *Takfir* is judging someone a *kafir*, or nonbeliever. The term "takfiri jihadists" is commonly heard in the modern context. Rahman says,

> The extreme sect of the Kharijites (the "Seceders") maintained that a grave sinner no longer remains a Muslim and turned the fury of their jihad (holy war) against the established rule and the community in general in the name of a transcendent and extreme idealism which they combined with uncompromising fanaticism.[21]

The Kharijites were among the first Muslims to employ a harsh and extremist form of jihad. Clearly, they laid the groundwork for future fanaticism and militant fundamentalism. Their actions also exemplify the utility of the lesser jihad for expressed political purposes and agendas. Since then, there have been numerous instances throughout Islamic history in which the lesser jihad was employed against fellow Muslims for specific political agendas. Yet another dimension to this intra-Islamic jihad is the sectarian schism between Sunnis and Shi'ites.

The Sunni–Shi'ite Rivalry

Scholar Vali Nasr describes the sectarian schism between Shi'ites and Sunnis as "the most important in Islam."[22] Aside from the dispute over succession following the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 AD, Sunnis and Shi'ites differ over political authority and legitimacy, and nature of leadership of the masses. While Sunni Islam emphasizes social order, and hence more tolerance of even a tyrannical leader, Shi'ites (the global minority) look to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the Prophet's grandson in Karbala, as the model to follow or emulate; that is, to fight against tyranny and oppression. Nasr says: "Shi'ites have often invoked the Hussein story to define their conflicts in modern times: against the Shah's forces in Iran in 1979, against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon in the 1980s, and against Saddam Hussein's death squads in Iraq during the anti-Baathist *intifida* (uprising) that followed the first Gulf War in March 1991."[23]

Today we see the same concept applied against the monarchy in Bahrain, inspired by the 2011 Arab Awakening in the MENA region. In addition, Sunni militias have been targeting Shi'ite civilians, even inside mosques and during religious pilgrimages, in Iraq and Pakistan. In the latter, the term "Shi'ite Genocide" is popularized among activists seeking protection for Pakistan's minority Shi'ite population. Shi'ites in Lebanon are also locked in battles against Sunnis these days over the civil war in Syria, targeting pro- and anti-Bashar al-Assad communities.

Nasr reminds us that "Pakistan has the second largest population of Shi'ites, about 30 million, after Iran"[24] Following Zia ul-Haq's Islamization policies in Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sunni groups hardened against Shi'ites. Moreover, Saudi Wahhabi funding and support for madrassas (Islamic schools) combined with hardline Deobandi ideology proliferated throughout the country. According to Nasr, extremist Deobandi madrassas

trained Taliban and other violent recruits for action in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Militantly anti-Shi'ite militias such as Sipah-i-Sahaba (Army

of the Prophet's Companions) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Jhangvi's Army) hailed from the same madrassas and maintained close ties with Taliban and terrorist organizations such as Jaish-iMuhammad (Army of Muhammad), which was active in Kashmir and is responsible for acts of terror such as the kidnapping and savage videotaped murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Sipah and Lashkar have cadres who trained in the Afghan camps maintained by al-Qaeda before the US-led destruction of the Taliban regime following 9/11. Ahmad Ramzi Yusuf, who built the vehicle bomb that damaged the World Trade Center and killed six New Yorkers on February 26, 1991, is also alleged to have instigated a bomb attack the following year on the Shi'ite shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad, Iran.[25]

Sunni–Shi'ite violence pervades in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Bahrain, and now even in Saudi Arabia's eastern province and northern Yemen.[26] For much of these populations, "sectarian violence became a part of life, and has in fact become more prevalent in response to the growing Shi'ite–Sunni rivalry in Iraq"[27] With the current Iraqi government viewed as favoring the country's majority Shi'ite population, tensions continue to flare and daily suicide attacks and bombings have been taking place. Anti-Shi'ite sentiments and violence have intensified throughout the MENA region, and also in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. Consider Professor Nasr's ominous prophetic words:

> Lashkar-i-Jhangvi now openly identifies Shi'ites as "American agents" and the "near enemy" in the global jihad against America. The extremist group has declared that Shi'ites in Pakistan will pay for Shi'ite support for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan—where the main Shi'ite parties have joined the American-backed government of Hamid Karzai. Assassinations and bombings have become depressingly common since 2003 and are now mostly cases of Sunni attacks on Shi'ites. The extremist face of Sunnism has proven itself capable of reacting to the Shi'ite challenge, using violence but also theology and religious ideology to roll back Shi'ite gains; . . . [any Shi'ite gains] will lead to violence and will stoke the fire of Sunni extremism.[28]

The civil war in Syria, which began with a nonviolent Arab Awakening-like uprising against the Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2011, has numerous proxy supporters, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. The Assad regime has long been a strong ally of Iran, even during the tenure of Assad's rein. As a result, the fight is a sectarian power struggle, trying to overthrow an Alawite regime (which is an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam) that has ruled over the Sunni majority population for decades.

The rise of the ISIS further exemplifies the severity of the Sunni–Shi'ite sectarian divide. The ISIS has unequivocally targeted Shi'ites and does not hesitate to express its genocidal intentions toward them. In its propaganda videos and social media postings, Shi'ites are identified as the primary targets evoking theological and other differences between Sunnis and Shi'ites dating back to early days of Islam. While it routinely mocks Shi'ite beliefs and practices, the ISIS also targets numerous religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria. The Shi'ites remain its primary victims and the organization has beheaded hundreds of Iraqi and Syrian Shi'ite soldiers, and videotaped the massacres.

Most of the militants in the MENA and South Asian regions are hardcore Sunni extremists. The majority of violent acts being carried out from North Africa, in the Middle East proper, and in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir are at the hands of Sunni militants, primarily espousing some form of *Salafism*/Wahhabism, and many of whom, if not most, are supported financially by the Saudis. When we peel back the layers of political, military/security, financial, and other variables in this scenario, we see that at the core of it all is the Sunni–Shi'ite rivalry (i.e., Saudi Arabia versus Iran). These militants have many other motivations and agendas as well, but one of the main priorities they embrace is to "cleanse" their societies of Shi'ites and other minority groups. The Taliban committed horrendous Shi'ite massacres during their rule in Afghanistan. This is nothing new. The only thing that is new and alarming is the violent militant Sunni juggernaut sweeping across these regions.

THE 2011 ARAB AWAKENING

The January 14, 2011 "Jasmine Revolution" in Tunisia has boosted nationalist pride and feverish patriotism. It is not just Tunisians who are proud of the Jasmine Revolution, but the entire MENA region. The masses in the region have viewed the Jasmine Revolution as an inspirational impetus to remove their own corrupt, authoritarian regimes. The struggle against oppression continues. The fundamental reason behind the grievances of the region's masses is the failure of governments to meet the basic needs of the people. In other words, the desire to democratize respective political systems coincides with the desire to improve quality of life and human development statuses in a given country. Rampant corruption, abuses of power, gross brutality, and economic stagnation have exacerbated the grievances of the people.

In Tunisia, former President Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali's regime and his wife's clan suffocated the people with their brutality, authoritarianism, and corruption that earned the description "mafia-like." The Tunisian people

finally drew the line in the sand and shouted "Enough!" They took to the streets of Tunis and protested nonviolently. This resulted in regime change, not by military invasion or bloody coup, but by the masses exhibiting moral force and strength against a corrupt and violent regime.

The Jasmine Revolution, which Tunisians prefer to call the "Dignity Revolution," inspired the entire MENA region. Egypt's young activists followed the same strategy and staged the nonviolent Tahrir Square sit-in, which ultimately resulted in President Hosni Mubarak stepping down. In Benghazi, Libya, nonviolent protests broke out against Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Although Libya's case involved civil war, the initial Benghazi protest movement was nonviolent. That was also the case in Deraa, Syria, the southern town where nonviolent protestors expressed their discontent with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus.

All of these Arab Awakening movements began nonviolently, with young men and women staging nonviolent protests and demonstrations, at times in the face of heavily armed security police and militaries. In the case of the April 6th Movement in Egypt, which is a secular activist group that made its move against the Mubarak regime after the Tunisian Revolution inspired them, they actually received training in nonviolent civil disobedience from Serbian nonviolent activists.

From Martin Luther King, Jr., to the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa (which Mahatma Gandhi initiated in the late 1800s), to the April 6th Movement in Egypt, the strategies and methodologies of nonviolent civil disobedience as Mahatma Gandhi promoted and practiced have served as the inspiration and model for fighting against oppression. The Arab Awakening revolutions and uprisings have been predominantly nonviolent civil disobedience movements and agitation for similar ends, that is, to fight against oppression. These societies are primarily Muslim, and they are societies in which violent militant groups have operated for decades.

The successes of the 2011 nonviolent Arab Awakening achieved in a short time what violent militant groups have tried to achieve—that is, a regime change—for decades, and failed miserably. The nonviolent Arab Awakening revolutions and uprisings have in an instant delegitimized violent militancy and reaffirmed the moral validity and strength of nonviolent activism, whether secular or religious. This, in and of itself, is a significant and potent message that the Arab Awakening has conveyed: violent jihad has no moral legitimacy, nor does it succeed in its fight against oppression in any significant or tangible way. In addition, the Arab Awakening has also reaffirmed the power of nonviolent civil disobedience, both in terms of moral strength as well as in achievements.

It is safe to say that the vast majority of Arab Awakening activists throughout the MENA region are unaware of Maulana Azad. Yet, through their

nonviolent activism, they reaffirmed his teachings and principles. The Arab Awakening revolutions and uprisings have tried hard to put a secular face on their activism. However, especially in Egypt, religious symbolism and practices were not completely absent. Consider the images of Egyptians engaged in congregational prayers (*salat*), while many Christians formed a perimeter around them to protect them from the security police. Similarly, there are numerous videos and images of Egyptians in prayer in Tahrir Square being hit by water cannons. There is tremendous irony in this, because Maulana Azad "had an occasion to go out of India and tour in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey."[29] During his travels, he was deeply moved and inspired by the anti-colonial movements and revolutionaries in the region. In his book *India Wins Freedom*, he mentions how the Iranian, Egyptian, and Young Turk revolutionary movements inspired him. He maintained correspondence with his contacts in the Middle East, which, in turn, "confirmed [Maulana Azad's] political beliefs."[30]

In a remarkable comment foreshadowing future events, Maulana Azad says, "In Egypt, Iran, and Turkey the Muslims were engaged in revolutionary activities for the achievement of democracy and freedom."[31] It is also worth noting that he was not impressed with Al-Azhar University: "When I visited Cairo in 1908, the system in al Azhar was so defective that it neither trained the mind nor gave adequate knowledge of ancient Islamic science and philosophy."[32]

The revolutions and uprisings in Arab world are the manifestations of the historical precedent that Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad set in India. In 2011, the nonviolent activists broke many barriers, starting in Tunisia, and now autocratic regimes will never be able to wholly crush and repress the spirit, determination, and power of nonviolent civil disobedience. Whether secular or religious movements, they will find legitimacy and moral strength in the historical precedent of Mahatma Gandhi and also Maulana Azad.

For the Islamic world, it is imperative to educate the masses about Maulana Azad's religious status as a respected and credible Islamic jurist and scholar and his advocacy for nonviolent activism as compatible with Islam. This, in effect, is ammunition against violent Islamist militancy, because the 2011 Arab Awakening has proven that nonviolent activism works, and in fact works better, faster, and with greater moral legitimacy than any militant groups and ideologies.

CONCLUSION

Maulana Azad's teachings, principles, and nonviolent activism shoulder-to-shoulder with Mahatma Gandhi illustrate the effectiveness of nonviolent

action in fighting oppression and injustice. With his religious authority as an Islamic jurist and scholar, he declared nonviolent activism as wholly compatible with Islam, and, in fact, is stamped with legal legitimacy. Maulana Azad provided Islamic legal approval and legitimacy for nonviolent civil disobedience, and he used the term "peaceful agitation." Neither Maulana Azad nor Mahatma Gandhi believed in passiveness. They both supported and engaged in proactive nonviolent agitation against the oppressors.

Maulana Azad was *not* an armchair Muslim cleric, like so many today. He was a frontline foot soldier in the nonviolent struggle against colonialism and personally suffered and endured hardships and sacrifice. Despite internal differences among India's Muslim population, Maulana Azad united millions of Muslims and rallied them under the banner of Mahatma Gandhi's movement. He faced immense challenges with competing Muslim groups, leaders, and ideologies. However, he remained steadfast in his loyalty and commitment to the Congress party, Mahatma Gandhi, and the nonviolent campaign against the British.

Present-day Islamist extremists who embrace violence in the name of fighting oppression, while in reality oppressing others, are on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. They believe in militancy, violent jihad, and totalitarian religious rule over their subjects. They believe in using force to exact compliance to their religious policies and rules. Practically every aspect of their lives and ideologies involves violence and the use of force. Coercion and terror tactics are their tools for forced compliance and for achieving their political agendas. When it comes to identifying their targets, they make no distinctions between soldiers or police in uniform and civilians in the marketplace or worshippers in the mosques. They even target children, like the Pakistani Taliban's attempt in October 2012 to kill Malala Yousefzai, the prominent teenage (at the time) education activist.

Violent Islamist militants also firebomb schools, especially girls' schools, and mutilate or kill teachers and principals. On December 16, 2014, the Pakistani Taliban Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) carried out a horrific terrorist attack on a military school in Peshawar, in which 132 school children and 13 teachers and administrators were murdered. The TTP claimed that the attack was a revenge for the military incursions in the frontier provinces that targeted Taliban leaders and operatives and charged that the counterterrorism carried out by the Pakistani army have resulted in scores of civilian casualties. The Peshawar school attack has only angered the Pakistani public and has prompted the military to go after the TTP even more aggressively.

The violent Islamist extremists lack moral and Islamic legal authority and credentials for their deeds and tactics. They blur the lines between oppression and justice; and they target non-Muslims and Muslims alike, which is made easier with the concept of *takfir*. The Islamic principles of social justice

and order are now in disarray, thanks to ideological and social regression. Extreme orthodoxy threatens everything, as seen with the rise of the IS, for example. This is something that Maulana Azad constantly warned against, that is, regression contributes to intellectual stagnation, which calcifies within Islamic communities.

All Islamic schools' curricula should contain significant teachings about Maulana Azad and the compatibility between Islam and nonviolent activism in struggles against injustices and oppression. The fight against extremism is primarily a fight of education systems, and so far, the violent extremist ideologies have enjoyed a head start; for example, the Afghan and Pakistani-Taliban-run Islamic seminaries that teach only their agendas, which include violent *jihadism*. These Islamic seminaries are "jihadist factories," and their output has been phenomenal. One only needs to look at the headlines out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where suicide bombings and other forms of violence are rampant. This cannot happen without religious indoctrination in violent jihad.

The violent Islamist extremists exploit the end game of "achieving justice" by ways and means of violent attacks and terror targeting civilians and combatants alike. They also use ideological indoctrination to gain recruits and train operatives for their agendas.

The eminent Islamic law scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl has addressed these manipulated concepts and strategies that the violent Islamist extremists have employed by means of hijacking the religion of Islam. He wrote a book entitled *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. He dissects the concepts of violent jihad, Western misperceptions of these concepts, and the attention that the media pay to the violent extremists, as opposed to the moderate Muslims. He says,

> it won't come as a surprise that the positions of moderates and puritans (his word for extremists) on this issue [of jihad] are worlds apart. The problem is that the puritans speak much louder than the moderates. Puritans speak with guns; what weapons do the moderates possess?[33]

Yet, as he correctly states, "It is perhaps elementary that the vast majority of Muslims are not terrorists, and do not condone terrorism."[34]

El Fadl further explains why he refers to violent Islamist extremists as "puritans," saying that I

> prefer the label puritans, because the distinguishing characteristic of this group is the absolutist and uncompromising nature of its beliefs. In many ways, this orientation tends to be purist, in the sense that it is intolerant of competing points of view and considers pluralist realities to be a form of contamination of the unadulterated truth.[35]

In El Fadl's view,

> the consistent characteristic of puritanism is a supremacist ideology that com-
> pensates for feelings of defeatism, disempowerment, and alienation with a
> distinct sense of self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis the nondescript "other"—
> whether that "other" is the West, nonbelievers in general, so-called heretical
> Muslims, or even Muslim women.[36]

He adds that "in this sense, it is accurate to describe the puritanical orienta-
tion within Islam as supremacist, for it sees the world from the perspective of
stations of merit and extreme polarization."[37] Their acts of seeking compensa-
tion for their insecurities lead them to "respond to feelings of powerlessness
and defeat with uncompromising and arrogant symbolic displays of power,
not only against non-Muslims, but even more so against fellow Muslims, *and
women in particular*."[38] Undoubtedly, Maulana Azad was the polar opposite
of the puritans, and he had no angst about working side-by-side with women.

In his book, El Fadl expressly ascertains how the puritans compare with the
moderate Muslims in dealing with these complex issues concerning oppres-
sion and justice. According to El Fadl, in the eyes of many devout classicists
in Islamic discourse,

> The existence of injustice means the absence of Godliness, while justice means
> the presence of Godliness. And although only God is capable of perfect justice,
> humans must work hard and strive to achieve as much justice as possible.
>
> The basis upon which justice revolves is giving each person his or her due
> rights. Perfect justice means to achieve a perfect balance between duties/obliga-
> tions and dues/rights. Moderates reason that the pursuit of justice mandates that
> Muslims must attempt to construct a political system that is the most capable of
> creating the right kind of balance between rights and duties in society.
>
> Human experience has clearly demonstrated that only a constitutional demo-
> cratic system of government can fulfill these conditions. In non-democratic sys-
> tems, it is very difficult to hold a state accountable for its abuses, and it is also
> very difficult to guarantee access to venues that could correct or redress social
> imbalances or injustices. But even more, experience amply demonstrates that
> only a system of government that is founded upon a constitutionally recognized
> list of individual duties and rights is capable of respecting the basic dignities
> of people.[39]

El Fadl emphasizes that

> puritans entirely ignore the Quranic teaching that the act of destroying or
> spreading ruin on this earth is one of the gravest sins possible—*fasad fi al-ard*,

which means to corrupt the earth by destroying the beauty of creation. This is considered an ultimate act of blasphemy against God.[40]

Thus, those violent Islamist extremists who carry out scorched earth acts of violence and destruction are committing the worst sins. Such behavior of the extremists, or puritans, actually go against the grain of justice in Islam. Moreover, as El Fadl points out, Islamic principles actually encourage peace-making rather than engaging in hostilities. He says,

> The Quran pronounced a stronger mandate in stating: "If your enemy inclines toward peace, then you should seek peace and trust in God." . . . The Quran warned Muslims against adopting a belligerent attitude in which excuses are made to pursue war. If a people offer Muslims peace, according to the Quran, it is arrogant and immoral for Muslims to cite the fact that such a people are not Muslims as an excuse to continue fighting them.
>
> In other words, Muslims should not invent impediments to making peace. Doing so is an indication that Muslims have succumbed to the temptations of the mundane instead of staying focused on the temporal and Divine.[41]

Islam mandates moderation in religion, behavior, attitudes, and actions. In fact, it is

> reported that the Prophet Muhammad once explained that the earmark of the Islamic faith is moderation, and that Muslims should set an example to others by being in all matters fair-minded, balanced, and moderate. Many Muslims around the globe take this message to heart and try their best to be the kind of people the Prophet described.[42]

Maulana Azad abided by moderation, reasoning, intellectual discourse in Islam, and ijtihad, and he always emphasized the importance of education that promotes these concepts and disciplines.

Later in life, Maulana Azad went on to serve as India's first minister of education after independence. That is significant. He understood the "war of the schools," and he keenly understood the dangers of intellectual stagnation and blind dogmatic belief, such as those of the puritans. He said:

> The religious instruction often imparted in India in private institutions is of a kind which instead of broadening the outlook and inculcating a spirit of tolera-tion and good will to all men produces exactly the opposite results. . . . [I will conclude by stressing once again] the imperative necessity of reforming and expanding our system of education. Education should have the highest prior-ity in our national budget and should take its place immediately after food and

clothing. In fact, a proper system of education is necessary in order to tackle satisfactorily even these problems.[43]

The war of the schools will either make or destroy social justice and order. That is why it is absolutely imperative for the curricula promoting nonviolence to win the war of the schools, and Maulana Azad's example and teachings are the best weapons. Educational curricula are one of the weapons of the puritans/extremists, because they routinely indoctrinate pupils in their seminaries to conform to their puritanical orientation. That is all the more reason to understand the significance of moderation in Islam and proliferate this message.

As El Fadl eloquently states,

> If the two foundational values of Islam are mercy and moderation, and these foundational values are remembered and rekindled in the hearts of most Muslims, then extremism will have no quarter, and the shared pursuit of Godliness among all humankind can progress in earnest. There is no other choice.[44]

One of the poems Maulana Azad penned[45] is suitable to close this chapter:

> *Dar dasht-e-arzoo n'bood beem-e-daam-e-dau Raahe-st een ke ham z'tu khezad bala-e-tu*

> In the desert of longings, no effort was futile; The right path is there, only we ourselves create problems.

NOTES

1. Parts of this chapter were originally published as a journal article: Hayat Alvi, "The Islamic Principles of Social Justice: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Nonviolent Civil Disobedience," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East (CRME)*, SAGE Publications India (2015), 2 (1 and 2), pp. 14–30. Reprinted here with permission.
2. John Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 29.
3. A.B. Rajput, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, second edition (Lahore: Lions Press, 1957), p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 82.
5. Ibid., pp. 83–85, 87.
6. Ibid., p. 93.
7. Ibid., pp. 25–56.
8. Ibid., pp. 88–89.
9. Ibid., p. 89.

10. Ibid., pp. 91–92.

11. Ibid., p. 94.

12. Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Arabic-English Dictionary), third edition, edited by J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1976), p. 143.

13. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, second edition (London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 245.

14. Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 139–140.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Rahman, *Islam*, p. 246.

18. See George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times* (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

19. See Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); and Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, second edition (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

20. Rahman, p. 34.

21. Ibid., p. 98.

22. Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), p. 34.

23. Ibid., p. 43.

24. Ibid., p. 160.

25. Ibid., p. 166.

26. Adrian Blomfield, "Saudi Arabia Hit by Sectarian Violence as Two Killed," *The Telegraph*, July 9, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/middl eeast/saudiarabia/9386763/Saudi-Arabia-hit-by-sectarian-violenceas-two-killed .html.

27. Nasr, p. 168.

28. Ibid.

29. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1988), p. 6.

30. Ibid., p. 7.

31. Ibid., p. 5.

32. Ibid., p. 7.

33. Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper One, 2007), p. 220.

34. Ibid., p. 3.

35. Ibid., p. 18.

36. Ibid., p. 95.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., pp. 186–187.

40. Ibid., p. 237.
41. Ibid., p. 239.
42. Ibid., p. 109.
43. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *Words of Freedom: Ideas of a Nation* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010), pp. 48, 59.
44. El Fadl, p. 288.
45. Azad, *Words of Freedom*, p. 7.

Figure 1   Abul Kalam Azad Postage Stamp, India. *Source*: Dinodia Photos / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 2   Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi with Jawaharlal Nehru, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, Sardar Patel and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad at the A.I.C.C. meeting, Delhi, 1947. Gandhi (2 October 1869–30 January 1948) was the preeminent leader of the Indian independence movement in British-ruled India. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) was an Indian statesman, a leader of the Indian National Congress, and a founding father of the Republic of India. He was the first Home Minister of India. *Source*: World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 3   Indian leaders at the Simla Conference (1946). From Left to right: Rajendra Prasad, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, C. Rajagopalachari, X, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. *Source*: Matteo Omied / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 4   Mahatma Gandhi talking with Abul Kalam Azad, Birla House, Bombay, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. *Source*: Dinodia Photos / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 5   Painting of Azad. *Source*: Dinodia Photos / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 6   Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) (left) at a meeting with Mualana Azad and Jivatram Kripalani (right), 1946. Gandhi was the preeminent leader of the Indian independence movement in British-ruled India. Jivatram Bhagwandas Kripalani (1888–1982), known as Acharya Kripalani, was an Indian politician. Abul Kalam Muhiyuddin Ahmed Azad 1888–1958) was an Indian scholar and the senior Muslim leader of Indian National Congress during the Indian independence movement. *Source*: World History Archive / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 7   Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India's then Education Minister, addressing meeting of the members of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations in New Delhi; 9 April 1950. *Source*: Matteo Omied / Alamy Stock Photo.

Figure 8   Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mahatma Gandhi with Khudai Khidmatgars, Pakistan, October 1938. *Source*: Dinodia Photos / Alamy Stock Photo.

Chapter 4

The Islamist Extremists

A Comparative Analysis

The violent Islamist extremists are considered cowardly because they often target unarmed civilians, an act which delegitimizes the operatives and their organizations. Their behavior is viewed as illegitimate and their tendency to use violence against innocent civilians is immoral and un-Islamic. Clearly, moral behavior cannot be attributed to immoral tactics, and immoral tactics cannot be considered as moral behavior. We are compelled to ask, what is courageous about such violent behavior? It actually abrogates morality. Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi cracked the code pertaining to moral courage in the face of immoral violent repression at the hands of the British in India. Both men knew that their nonviolent activism would lead to a revolution without ever lifting a weapon, and they were correct.

Maulana Azad has proven through his own decisions, judgments, and actions that nonviolent activism and *satyagraha* are compatible with Islam. He engaged in the nonviolent campaign against the British Raj selflessly, suffering terribly for daring to demand independence. He remained steadfast in his nonviolent struggle to achieve justice, eliminate oppression, unite his country as an independent secular democracy, and promote peaceful coexistence and unity in the spirit of embracing pluralism.

Compare and contrast Maulana Azad and his principles of nonviolence to those of the most violent and puritanical Islamist extremists. It is difficult to comprehend that even among the violent Islamist extremists, some are more hardline than others, some are more brutal than others, and some are more fascist than others. An example of these differences among violent Islamist extremists is the case of Al-Qaeda's former leader Osama bin Laden and the founding ideological father of the Islamic State (IS) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

89

THE RISE OF ISIS

Zarqawi was a Jordanian criminal who became radicalized in prison, and then later he created and ran the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), also known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). From the beginning, Zarqawi had a reputation for being fiercely and grotesquely violent. In fact, it is reported that while in a Jordanian prison, upon being radicalized he used a razor blade to get rid of a tattoo on his arm.

Both Zarqawi and bin Laden were militants and promoted hatred of the West and basically anyone who did not follow their creed. As Zarqawi tried to enter into the "good graces" of Al-Qaeda, bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri (bin Laden's successor) disagreed with Zarqawi's tactics and brutality in Iraq. Zarqawi specifically targeted Iraqi Shi'ites, including civilians and worshippers in mosques, and he began the trend of leaving lines of decapitated heads on roadsides. Bin Laden feared that this behavior would stain Al-Qaeda's reputation, and he demanded Zarqawi to stop targeting Shi'ites in Iraq. However, according to Joby Warrick,

> Zarqawi was no one's acolyte. His brand of jihadism was utterly, brutally original. Osama bin Laden had sought to liberate Muslim nations gradually from corrupting Western influences so they could someday unify as a single Islamic theocracy, or caliphate. Zarqawi, by contrast, insisted that he would create his caliphate immediately—right now. He would seek to usher in God's kingdom on Earth through acts of unthinkable savagery, believing, correctly, that theatrical displays of extreme violence would attract the most hardened jihadists to his cause and frighten everyone else into submission. His strategy shook the region as al Qaeda never had.[1]

ISIS has a dual personality: on the one hand, it has a pragmatic, realist strategy to empower itself and control minds and territories. On the other hand, it purports to regressively return to the days of early Islamic history in the seventh century, and transfer the religious principles, concepts of political and military leadership, social policies, institutions (including concubines and slavery), and social structures of that time to the modern context. ISIS has sought to unite all Muslims under the leadership of its first Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now deceased, and although it now refers to itself simply as the "Islamic State" (IS), it does not define statehood in Westphalian terms. Rather, ISIS defines its reference to IS as the *Islamic Caliphate*, in reference to the seventh-century state in Medina, which led to the expansion of the Islamic Empire throughout the MENA region, and even reaching Spain. ISIS wholly rejects the notion of Westphalian

nation-states in the colonial and postcolonial era, as well as democracy and human rights. Hence, ISIS emphasizes its intentions for erasing the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) borders as part of the process of creating and expanding the Islamic Caliphate, in Arabic referred to as *ad-dawla al-Islamiya*. Sykes-Picot was the secret deal between Britain and France to carve up the territory of the dying Ottoman Empire in order to create and control their own colonies.

With the rise of ISIS, we witnessed not only a superimposition of seventh-century ideology, way of life, and extreme religious-social policies, interpreted through a fiercely literalist, violent, extremist, and rabid Sunni Wahhabi lens, but we also see ISIS imposing new identities and terminologies on ethnic, sectarian, and religious minorities having the misfortune of living under its rule. These terminologies originate from seventh-century Islamic history and numerous Islamic empires that followed. Examples include the use of the label "Nusayri," a classic Islamic term for modern-day Alawites, which Sunnis consider as heretical. Aaron Zelin and Phillip Smyth elaborate on this "new" sectarian vocabulary:

> When Sunni Islamists use "Nusayri," it is in reference to Abu Shuayb Muhammad Ibn Nusayr, the founder of the Alawite religion during the eighth century. It is used to frame the Alawite religion as following a man and not God and therefore not divinely inspired [. . .].
>
> It is easy to find supporters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) using Nusayri when talking about the people they are fighting. Further, in June 2013, Hassan Aboud, leader of the Islamic Front's strongest faction, Ahrar al-Sham, in an interview on *Al Jazeera Arabic* stated:
>
> *What is happening in Syria is that the country has been ruled by a Nusayri idea, a Shi'ite group that came to power and started discriminating against the Sunni people. They prevented them from practicing their religion and painted a picture of Islam that is far from what Islam is, with traditions and practices that are not Islamic at all. It wanted to wipe true Islam from the country.*[2]

Another common term being used in today's contexts in MENA conflicts is the word *rafidhi*, which describes Shi'ites. In particular, the term *rafidha* refers to the Twelver Shi'ites, which constitutes the mainstream sect within Shi'ism. Rafidha specifically means

> rejectionist and refer to the Shi'ites because . . . they do not recognize Abu Bakr and his successors as having been legitimate rulers after the death of Islam's Prophet Mohammad. In the Syrian context, rafidha has been used to denote Iran (a majority Shi'ite country) due to its support for the Assad regime.[3]

In addition, here is one of numerous samples of the language that militant Sunnis are using to express their animosity and ideological contempt for the Shi'ites:

> In one case, in July 2013, Zahran Alloush, the military commander of the Islamic Front and leader of Jaish al-Islam stated:
>
> The mujahidin of al-Sham [the Levant] will wash the filth of the rafidha and the rafidha from al-Sham, they will wash it forever, if God wills it, until they cleanse *Bilad al-Sham* [Greater Syria / Fertile Crescent] from the filth of the *majus* [unbelievers] who have fought the religion of God. So, go oh mujahidin . . . to fight in our ranks, the rank of sunna [traditions of Mohammad], the sunna of the messenger of God, which raise the banner of tawhid [pure monotheism] high, until the humiliation and destruction is upon the majus, the enemies of Allah.[4]

Along these lines is the lethal use of *takfiri* tactics, which entail an extremist branding another individual a *kafir*, or "non-believer/infidel," and by definition, no longer a Muslim. By virtue of this label, that individual becomes a target. But we cannot assume that the war of terms and labels is a one-way street, as the term *nasabi* refers to the Shi'ite political label for their Sunni adversaries.[5] In fact, "in Shi'ite jurisprudence those cast as *nawasib* (plural of *nasabi*), are considered non-Muslims"; hence, the Shi'ites fighting in Syria "are following religious decrees calling for religious holy war, which are coming from primarily Iranian-backed clerics."[6]

In turn, Sunni fighters are using the term *Safawi* for the Safavid Dynasty in Iran (1501–1736), "known for the 'Shi'ite-ization' of Iran, which used to have a Sunni population. Sometimes the term is used as a neologism of *Sahiyyu-Safawi* (Zionist-Safawi) to denote that there is a conspiracy between Israel and Iran against Sunni Muslims."[7] The Shi'ites respond in kind by calling their Sunni enemies "Wahhabis": "The word is directly affiliated with those who follow the teachings of Sunni Salafi Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the lead theologian who influenced Iran's foe across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia."[8] These escalations in the war of verbal insults portend a worsening of sectarian violence in the MENA region. Zelin and Smyth's conclusions are far from comforting: "Many players are pursuing a long-term dehumanization strategy because they view this as an existential cosmic religious battle between Salafi Sunnism and Khomeinist Shi'ism, indicating that peace conferences are not likely to solve the Syria problem."[9]

Moreover, ISIS, in particular, translates its written and audiovisual propaganda into multiple languages, including Mandarin, Swahili, German, French, Pashto, Urdu, English, Italian, and even, in one video, sign language in order to appeal to disabled Muslims and try to recruit them to join the IS. ISIS recruitment accepts ethnic pluralism, as long as ideologically,

theologically, and legally (i.e., in terms of Islamic law), IS "citizens" accept the IS way of life, social rules and policies, and Shari'a-based judicial codes, and they must give an oath of allegiance to the ISIS leader, or Amir/Caliph. The first ISIS Caliph was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died in Idlib Province, Syria, on October 27, 2019, as a result of a US-led air raid. The successor to al-Baghdadi is Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla.[10]

Ethnic pluralism is secondary to obedience of religious tenets as ISIS interprets them, yet, at the same time, ethnic pluralism allows for ISIS to fill its ranks and citizenry, for the expressed purpose of building and expanding the Islamic Caliphate. ISIS recruitment of diverse ethnic and national identities from across the globe indicates that even the global borders are unimportant. The central goal of populating the new IS/Caliphate transcends global borders and maps. However, ISIS has planned to expand its proposed Caliphate seeking to conquer vast territories consisting of existing nation-states with clearly defined borders. Of course, ISIS did not succeed in this endeavor. However, the success of ISIS marketing its schemes lies in one critical point that it repeatedly emphasizes: the existing borders are illegitimate. Cartography and geography are primary variables in the MENA "Great Game," which in recent years has involved a formidable player, ISIS.

The "ISIS Solution" to Muslim Humiliation

In the 2014 ISIS propaganda film entitled *Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun*, there is a scene in which ISIS fighters bulldoze the Iraqi–Syrian border. Its symbolic value is evident, but its impact on impressionable minds throughout the region, and even globally, transcends mere symbolism. Many view this as a substantial blow against the colonial "criminal cartography" in the MENA region. As much as many people do not embrace the ISIS ideology and murderous mindset, countless people have found this particular bulldozing gesture highly impressive, especially in light of extremely unpopular Western ventures and campaigns in the region, which many people view as extensions of their colonial/imperialist agendas. Specifically, in the bulldozing scene in the film, the narration refers to the ISIS objective of "erasing the Sykes-Picot" borders. This reference resonates frequently in ISIS written and audiovisual propaganda. It packs a punch in the eyes of many in the region for reasons that have been explained. The ramifications of this ISIS agenda to undo Sykes-Picot for the newer ethnic, sectarian, and religious dynamics and conflicts in the region are conveniently ignored, until the headlines report about Kurdish, Yazidi, Assyrian, and other victims of ISIS's genocidal violence.

Since ISIS is known for its genocidal agendas targeting certain ethnic and sectarian groups in the region, it cannot be accepted as the antidote to

colonial-borne woes. The rise of ISIS, particularly when it erased the Iraqi–Syrian border in the summer of 2014 and took over Mosul, only added yet another layer and dimension to the already fractured, stressed, and crisis-ridden ethnic, sectarian, and religious structures and relations throughout the region.

In addition, the Syrian civil war, and the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen have seen a tremendous influx of violent jihadists representing diverse ethnic groups joining the conflicts and fighting for various militias, including ISIS. For example, in the frontline, reputedly fearless combat forces fighting for ISIS happen to be ethnic Chechens. Reports from the fields also identify ethnic Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, along with European, Canadian, American, South African, and Australian Muslims and converts to Islam fighting side-by-side with fellow Syrians and Iraqis. This adds yet another complex layer to the already troubled ethnic matrices throughout the MENA region.

In July 2015, General Lloyd Austin, Commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said the following about identity politics in the region:

> Now, even more so than in the past, ethnic and sectarian identity is considered more important than national identity and this is causing some very real problems, and Iraq is a case in point. It is more important to be a Shi'ite or a Sunni or a Kurd than it is to be an Iraqi. And until this changes, it is going to be increasingly difficult to unify the country.[11]

Analysts are making similar predictions about Syria, as some have suggested partitioning of the country along ethnic and sectarian lines as part of the conflict resolution process. However, external powers making such predictions and/or suggestions have to tread carefully, due to the colonial legacy and undying memories pertaining to it on the ground. The case of India and Pakistan serves as a potent reminder of the pitfalls of partitioning a country. The "Great Game" of geopolitical competition engaging global powers has always involved maps. Nation-states

> are defined by territory, sovereignty, population, ethnicity, political independence, national identity, self-governance, and appropriate political and economic systems. Territory is a fundamental requirement, rendering a state tangible. Territory serves as a source of human and physical resources, a tax base from which the state is supported, and strategic assets in terms of geopolitical, trade, and military interests. Geography, then, is a paramount factor in the equation, and maps and boundaries have been used throughout history to exact advantages and exploit territoriality.[12]

Moreover, Gabriel Scheinmann's comments about this issue are fitting:

> Until now, the post-Ottoman order, fashioned by wartime exigency, imperialist ambitions, and ignorance of local identities, has survived a century of independence, revolution, and war. A political map of the region from 1930 looks nearly identical to one from 2013. Middle Eastern borders have become an inviolable and sacrosanct principle of Western international relations. Americans and Europeans have even shed blood to ensure that these borders remain unchanged: in Lebanon in the 1950s and again in the 1980s, Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and Mali in 2013.
>
> [. . .] Western reluctance to contemplate redrawing the map of the Middle East is understandable. Partition smacks of imperialism and war, arousing memories of India and Palestine in 1947, the numerous poorly executed partitions of the Middle East, and the various Cold War divisions of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.[13]

These interconnected variables are multilayered, encompassing secular nationalist ideologies as well as Islamist paradigms, all of which contain respective outlooks pertaining to ethnicity. Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism both embody implications, and at times consequences, for the various ethnic groups that each proposes to govern.

Still, we see some ethnic anomalies in the region. The Syrian regime, ruled by an Arab Alawite (Shi'ite offshoot sect) elite under Hafez al-Assad, sided with fellow Shi'ite theocracy, Iran, during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)—notwithstanding its Persian ethnic and linguistic makeup. The hardline Sunni Gulf Arab monarchies sided with and financed a fellow Sunni Arab, Saddam Hussein, in the fight against Iran. The outward appearances indicate a split along sectarian lines. Syria was the only Arab country to support Iran in the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), and the Shi'ite component may have played a major role in Assad's decision to go against the regional stream. Analyst Daniel Byman explains some of the reasons why Syria and Iran enjoy a special relationship:

> Iran provides a strange sort of legitimacy for the Baathist regime in Damascus. Syria is dominated by Alawites, a minority sect of Islam that is even more hated and even less accepted by militant Sunnis than is Shiism. Some Shi'ite religious leaders have bolstered the Damascus regime by claiming that the Alawites are simply part of the larger Shi'ite family—a claim that does little to appease highly chauvinistic Sunnis but appeals to those with a wider view of Islam.
>
> These many common interests have come together in Lebanon. Initially, Syria was wary of revolutionary Islam. However, after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Damascus welcomed Iranian help. Iranian officials nurtured Hezbollah,

helping to unite various Shi'ite factions and providing the movement with train-
ing, money, and ideological support. Syria also backed the new movement,
and with their help, Hezbollah became the edge of the sword against the Israeli
invaders. In 1985, Hezbollah attacks led Israel to withdraw from all but a sliver
of Lebanon. Fifteen years later, Israel left completely.[14]

Today we witness the Bashar al-Assad regime, with a lot of help from the
Iranian regime and Russia, trying to ruthlessly crush opposition fighters and
civilians alike, bringing the death toll to an estimated range of 38,500 to more
than 500,000 and climbing. This is also an anomaly of sorts, since Assad is
killing his own fellow Syrian Arabs, who share the same ethnic and linguistic
traits. However, it is mainly Syrian Sunnis who are targeted. Moreover, his
father Hafez al-Assad similarly crushed a Muslim Brotherhood–led upris-
ing in Hama in 1982. Casualty estimates vary between 10,000 and 40,000,
depending on the sources. Atrocities, mass murder, and even genocidal agen-
das are not unheard of when it comes to Middle Eastern dictators.

During the Iran–Iraq War, the most infamous case of ethnic cleansing
through mass murder is Saddam's chemical attack against the Kurds in
Halabja in 1988. BBC News reported the following details on that day:

> Thousands of people are reported to have been killed and many others injured
> in a poison gas attack on a Kurdish city in northern Iraq. Up to 20 aircraft, said
> to include Iraqi Migs and Mirages, were seen overhead at around 1100 local
> time in Halabja. According to experts, the chemicals dropped by the planes may
> have included mustard gas, the nerve agents sarin, tabun and VX and possibly
> cyanide.
>
> The attack on Halabja, which is about 150 miles (241km) north-east of the
> Iraqi capital Baghdad, is the latest in the Iran-Iraq war and follows its occupa-
> tion by Iranian forces. Iraq was said to be keen to avenge the fall of Halabja,
> which is seen as an important center for Kurdish resistance in their struggle for
> autonomy.[15]

The multiple fault lines throughout the region are along ethnic, racial, sectar-
ian, religious, ideological, territorial, and in some cases even nationalist lines,
and they only seem to be intensifying, rather than diminishing, since the 2011
Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the Libyan civil war, the Yemeni civil war,
conflict in Iraq, and the rise of ISIS. Flare ups within these contexts include
Saudi repression of (Arab) Shi'ite protests in the Eastern Province; Bahrain's
repression of (Arab) Shi'ites protesting against the Sunni monarchy and
demanding more political participation and equity; recent suicide bombings
of Shi'ite mosques in Yemen and Kuwait; and an immensely worrying esca-
lation of PKK–Turkey violence reignited in Turkey's eastern region, which

is a direct outcome of the Kurdish militias fighting against ISIS in Syria and the spillover thereof into Turkey. Given these developments, and substantial casualties of Turkish soldiers and police, Turkey is likely even more determined never to allow an autonomous Kurdish territory or state to emerge in the neighborhood.

Scheinmann posits that a Balkanization-modeled formula for self-determination in the MENA region might ultimately stabilize the region. He says,

> Ending the Sykes-Picot order does not mean unilaterally redrawing the map of the Middle East from Washington. Events on the ground will drive these changes, whether they are caused by Kurdish nationalism, Alawite retreat, or Sunni Arab brotherhood. The emergence of a Kurdistan or Alawistan, or the shrinking of the Maronite enclave in Lebanon, could partition clashing nations and tamp down on long-running ethno-religious violence. Shi'ite Arab Baghdad, Sunni Arab Damascus, Maronite Beirut, Alawite Latakia, Kurdish Irbil, Jewish Jerusalem, Sunni Turkish Ankara, and Shi'ite Persian Tehran would still compete, but the lowered stakes could ultimately lead to a more stable and peaceful region. Like the Balkanization of Europe, such a process would be slow, coming in fits and starts.[16]

In the horrific conflagration that is the Syrian civil war, we see the Bashar al-Assad regime colluding with the IS from the early stages of the creation of the so-called "Caliphate." Some IS documents that have been leaked or confiscated prove regime-IS collusion:

> The Islamic State and Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad have been colluding, according to leaked documents.
>
> An investigation suggests there was co-operation between the regime and the terror group over the city of Palmyra, which was held by ISIS for nearly a year before it was retaken by Syrian forces in March.
>
> They also appear to show ISIS and the Syrian government made a deal to trade oil for fertilizer.[17]

Similar details about Assad regime and ISIS collusion are provided in the coauthored book *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, the original edition of which is one of the very first authoritative and well-researched books about ISIS. Since then, similar reports about Assad regime collusion with ISIS abound, including this one in *The Telegraph*:

> The Syrian government cut deals with Islamic State to help the jihadists earn more than $40 million a month from the sale of oil, documents recovered from a US and British raid on a key commander have revealed.

Thousands of spreadsheets and accounts kept by the group's oil boss Abu Sayyaf, retrieved in the biggest intelligence raid in US Special Forces' history last year, reveal how the two sides forged a mutually beneficial arrangement despite being at war with one another.

ISIL fighters captured some of the state's best-producing oil fields of eastern Syria in 2013.[18]

Interestingly, both the founding father of ISIS Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and its now deceased leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are examples of "prison power." Both men spent time in prison, where they created and coordinated their militant networks. Zarqawi, whose full name is Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh, was a tattooed petty criminal who was sentenced to and eventually released (in 1999) from Jordan's al-Sawwaqa prison, "after serving five years of a fifteen-year sentence for weapons possession and membership in the *Bayat al-Imam*—a militant organization founded in 1992 by the infamous Jordanian jihadi ideologue Issam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi)."[19]

The bonds and networks that Zarqawi formed in the Jordanian prison, as well as Maqdisi's spiritual mentorship and influence on him, have been crucial in his post-prison formation of militant groups in Afghanistan and northern Iraq, which later led to the creation of ISIS. The best details and descriptions of Zarqawi's in-prison experiences, decisions, radicalism, and coordination are provided in Joby Warrick's book *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS* (2016)[20] and in it he describes how Zarqawi, once convinced that tattoos are *haram* (forbidden) in Islam, smuggles a razor blade into his cell and scrapes off the tattoos on both of his arms, leaving a bloody mess. That is the extent of Zarqawi's extremism and propensity for grotesque violence, and it serves as a precursor to his delight in beheading prisoners and lining the severed heads on roadsides in Iraq. Zarqawi's bloodlust compelled even the likes of Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri to call on him to "tone it down" and stop targeting Shi'ite civilians. However, Zarqawi was not deterred. He and his venomous ideology directly contributed to exacerbating the Sunni–Shi'ite rivalry and hence reinforcing the sectarian "tribalism" the fissures of which have only deepened in both Iraq and Syria.

Another example of "prison power" is that of the late ISIS leader, a diehard Salafist, named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; his full name was Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Sammarrai, and he claimed he was a descendent from the Prophet Muhammad's family. That is significant for his legitimacy as a religious authority, and especially for his initial reputation among Sunni inmates in the military prison, Camp Bucca, in Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also held a doctorate in Islamic Law (shari'a). According to scholars Jessica Stern and

J.M. Berger, Baghdadi "reportedly led a quiet life until the United States and its allies invaded Iraq. In 2003, Baghdadi is believed to have begun on the path of jihad."[21] Baghdadi was caught in an American-led sweep of insurgents and detained at Camp Bucca. The prison guards and authorities noticed how "the structure of Camp Bucca facilitated further radicalization among the prisoners."[22]

Andrew Thompson and Jeremy Suri coauthored an article about the radicalization in Camp Bucca, in which they state that

> before their detention, Mr. al-Baghdadi and others were violent radicals, intent on attacking America. Their time in prison deepened their extremism and gave them opportunities to broaden their following. At Camp Bucca . . . the most radical figures were held alongside less threatening individuals, some of whom were not guilty of . . . violent crime. Coalition prisons became recruitment centers and training grounds for the terrorists the United States is now fighting [. . .].
>
> Small-time criminals, violent terrorists and unknown personalities were separated only along sectarian lines. This provided a space for extremists to spread their message. The detainees who rejected the radicals in their cells faced retribution from other prisoners through "Shari'a courts" that infested the facilities. The radicalization of the prison population was evident to anyone who paid attention . . . few military leaders did.[23]

According to Major General Douglas Stone, deputy-commanding general of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq responsible for in-country detention and interrogation, a new reintegration process of the prisoners was instituted at Camp Bucca, in which

> [We decided to] separate the hard-core jihadists from the casual insurgents. Our biggest worry was that the real jihadists were using the prison as a terrorist training camp. We wanted to release the individuals who shouldn't have been there. . . . We hired hundreds of teachers to train detainees to read. We hired one hundred and fifty imams from around the globe to preach mainstream Islam. We offered them job training. After a couple of years, we were able to release most of the prisoners, with less than two percent ever returning to the fight. That left only the true problem cases. Only about five thousand were left. The majority were either former regime Baathists, former criminals, or serious *takfiri* ideologues, followers of Zarqawi's extreme beliefs regarding declaring other Muslims to be apostates. Even in American detention these *takfiris* were killing other detainees, cutting their eyes out, and trying to impose a version of Shari'a that most Muslims would find quite abhorrent.[24]

In this scenario, al-Baghdadi organized what would become ISIS. The way in which would-be ISIS leaders and loyalists organized themselves in prison was simple and genius at the same time, as described:

> Early in Bucca's existence, the most extreme inmates were congregated in Compound 6. There were not enough Americans guards to safely enter the compound—and, in any event, the guards didn't speak Arabic. So the detainees were left alone to preach to one another and share deadly vocational advice.
>
> Adel Jasim Mohammed, a former detainee, once described the scene to *Al Jazeera.* "Extremists had freedom to educate the young detainees," Mohammed said. "I saw them giving courses using classroom boards on how to use explosives, weapons and how to become suicide bombers."
>
> They were also networking in ways that never would have been possible outside the wire. A few months back, *The Guardian* published an extraordinary interview with an ISIS leader it called Abu Ahmed, who described his years at Bucca in glowing terms.
>
> "We had so much time to sit and plan," Ahmed said. "It was the perfect environment. We all agreed to get together when we got out. The way to reconnect was easy. We wrote each other's details on the elastic of our boxer shorts. When we got out, we called. Everyone who was important to me was written on white elastic. I had their phone numbers, their villages."[25]

Underwear became the database and spreadsheets for the future ISIS networks, structure, and organization. Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger describe al-Baghdadi's specific role in this process, quoting General Stone, who said that "Baghdadi was probably systematically organizing while he was in detention. Building up IOUs, getting to know whom to trust. He must have been plotting while he was incarcerated—he must have planned the whole rollout of the Islamic State."[26] He added, "Even if Baghdadi is . . . replaced, *the ideas that he is promoting will be with us a long time*."[27]

Since its inception, thanks to the Syrian civil war where ISIS was able to regroup, reorganize, and re-brand itself, ISIS has engaged in smuggling of diverse products and people, including ancient artifacts, oil, and recruits and operatives. A full-fledged underground economy has fueled ISIS revenue coffers, and kidnapping and ransom payments also supplement their income. ISIS decisions to collude with the Assad regime at times has already been discussed, and once again we see clear examples of transcendence, tribalism, and prison power. In fact, ISIS and many other terrorist groups frequently carry out prison raids to help fellow militants break out and escape and join their ranks.

ISIS also produces *nasheeds* (Islamic religious chants) that glorify their fighters, ideology, and leaders. ISIS propaganda videos usually play *nasheeds* in the background. ISIS has a very sophisticated cyber network, complete with encrypted sites where they chat and try to attract male and female recruits.[28] Nasheeds are common among mainstream Muslims; they are simply religious hymns praising the Prophet Muhammad and Allah (God). However, ISIS took something nonviolent from Islamic traditions and has used *nasheeds* as tools to promote their terror, violent jihads, and brutal ideology.

Here is a translation of a famous ISIS *nasheed*:

"My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared": Nasheed for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham

My Ummah, Dawn has appeared (loomed/begun to appear), so await the expected (manifest) victory,

The Islamic State has arisen by the blood of the righteous,

The Islamic State has arisen by the jihad of the pious,

They have offered their souls in righteousness with constancy and conviction,

So that the religion may be established, in which there is the law of the Lord of the Worlds.*

My Ummah, accept the good news, and don't despair: victory is near.

The Islamic State has arisen and the dreaded might has begun.

It has arisen tracing out glory, and the period of setting** has ended,

By faithful men who do not fear warfare.

They have created eternal glory that will not perish or disappear.

My Ummah, God is our Lord, so grant your blood,

For victory will not return except by the blood of the martyrs,

Who have spent their time hoping for their Lord in the Abode of the Prophets.

They have offered their souls to God, and for the religion there is self-sacrifice.

The people of giving and granting are the people of excellence and pride.

My Ummah, accept the good news: the Sun of Steadfastness has risen.

Verily we have marched in masses for the hills: the time-honored glory,

That we may return the light, faith and glorious might,

By men who have forsaken the dunya*** and attained immortality.

And have revived the Ummah of glory and the assured victory."

*-The Shari'a

**-Metaphorically, the language of sunrise and sunset.

***-The material world.

Update (10 October 2014)

"in which there is the law of the Lord of the Worlds"—I ought to have made clearer that the "which" (hā in fīhā) refers back to *ad-dawla al-islamiya* (the

Islamic State), thus perhaps better to render the line: "So that the religion may be established in it: the law of the Lord of the Worlds."[29]

Other ISIS *nasheeds* have invoked grotesque violence and threaten their enemies with violent and painful executions in their "divinely" sanctioned violent jihad. ISIS *nasheeds* often describe blood dripping off their swords and beheading the enemies:

Cry the takbir [Allahu Akbar] and rejoice: my state will not be vanquished.
My state, for we have continued supporting it.
My state's edifice is built from our blood.
My state's banners proudly fly in Excellence.
On the day of the tumult, our soldiers' horse does not slacken.
Their determination does not bend, their spear is not broken.
What noble men they are! For loftiness they have embarked.
In their efforts, our soldiers have bewildered mere men.
Oh our enemies, come forth, mobilize and issue the summoning call.
Gather your soldiers, in hellfire they will be burnt.
You will either be killed or taken prisoner.
Our swords have not ceased to drip with your blood.[30]

These successes in marketing have helped promote ISIS ideology globally and popularized its "brand" online and in the non-virtual world as well. This is despite the gratuitous violence that ISIS engages in and proliferates in its audiovisual propaganda. ISIS has lost significant territory recently, but its message, brand, ideology, and following among loyalists will persist into the future. Because ISIS has colluded with the Assad regime, we know that its power has transcended to different levels, and its prison lessons are taken to heart by its leaders. ISIS has penetrated some regional military personnel, governments, and institutions. These are hybrid realities that states must contend with in the globalization era.

THE UTILITY OF VIOLENT JIHAD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND HOW IT HAS BACKFIRED

The Afghan mujaheddin militias that were the most fundamentalist supposedly received the highest amount of United States's aid as part of the Reagan Doctrine of fighting against communism. The Reagan Doctrine:

was used to characterize the Reagan administration's (1981–1988) policy of supporting anti-Communist insurgents wherever they might be. In his 1985

State of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan called upon Congress and the American people to stand up to the Soviet Union, what he had previously called the "Evil Empire": "We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth."[31]

Typically, those who had the strongest ideological drive to fight against the Soviets were driven by Islamic ideals of jihad, martyrdom, and salvation. The Reagan administration believed that Islamic jihadist militancy would serve as the recruiters' rallying cry that would motivate Muslims (Afghans and non-Afghans alike) to join the fight against the atheist, communist Soviets. And, to a great extent, the recruitment of jihadist fighters and the proliferation of fundamentalist-based curricula in the countless madrassas (Islamic seminaries), heavily funded by the Saudis, were successful. Ironically, such tactics for recruitment and training are used by Al-Qaeda and similar militant groups today worldwide. They also use the appeal of the Islamic ideals of jihad and martyrdom to gain recruits. However, in the case of Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion, the ideological competition became extremely complicated.

One of the warlords commanding the fundamentalist faction called Hizb-e Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, "is an admirer of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and routinely denounces the United States as the 'Great Satan.' He rejects Western values, including capitalism and democracy, as social poisons and vows to create a 'pure' Islamic republic in Afghanistan."[32] He is a known drug trafficker as well. Yet, under the Reagan administration, he received some of the most substantial aid.

Moreover, Deobandi[33] and Wahhabi madrassas spread more in Pakistan, where they set up the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (JUI), a religious movement, which later became a political party and split into several factions. During the 1980s, the JUI, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Gulbuddin Hekmetyar's Hizb-e-Islami became rivals and fought against each other during the Afghan civil war. In the 1980s, Pakistan's intelligence organization, the ISI, supported Jamaat and Hizb, but ignored the JUI. These policies only exacerbated the competition between all these religious groups vying for political power and funding.

Throughout the 1980s, the JUI set up hundreds of madrassas along the Pashtun belt in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, offering free education, food, shelter, and military training. Pakistan's then President Zia ul-Haq funded all madrassas of all sects, supplying Afghanistan with the *mujaheddin* forces. The Saudis have mainly supported the (Sunni) Wahhabi-oriented madrassas.

The call to jihad to combat the Soviets popularized these madrassas. Furthermore, as Pakistan's state-run schools collapsed, these madrassas

became the only avenue for boys from poor families to receive any sort of education. There were 8,000 madrassas, 25,000 unregistered ones in Pakistan by 1988 training over half million students.[34] Most madrassas were in rural areas and Afghan refugee camps, and most were run by semi-educated mullahs with no intention to initiate or promote progressive reforms.

Meanwhile, many Afghan intellectuals were systematically killed in Pakistan, as the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia continued to pump millions of dollars, intelligence, and weapons selectively to the most radical, militant, and uneducated resistance groups that promised to train would-be guerrillas to fight the Soviet occupiers, in the spirit of the Reagan Doctrine.

Eventually, even Hollywood supported the Reagan Doctrine, with the film *Rambo III*. The hero, played by Sylvester Stallone, goes into Soviet occupied Afghanistan and helps the mujaheddin fight against the Soviets.

The war against the Soviets in Afghanistan became highly popularized, and the mujaheddin were viewed as heroes. Once the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, the United States decided its job was done in the area and suspended its support and presence. Afghanistan collapsed into a vicious civil war, with the warlords fighting ruthlessly against one another for power and territories. The cause of the eminent jihad faded into the smoke of the gun battles between the warring militias. It did not rise again since the Taliban gained control of the country. Jihad, then, became a tool of subjugating the various militias and warlords, many of whom now make up the "Northern Alliance," with whom the United States brokered deals for power sharing with President Hamid Karzai upon removing the Taliban from power in the 2002 campaign. Under the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda entourage were welcomed as guests in Afghanistan. All the while, the madrassas on the Afghan–Pakistan border have continued operating.

Once the United States decided to launch a military campaign in Afghanistan, in order to remove the Taliban from power and eradicate Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and his loyalists faced almost certain demise. Their popularity was also in severe decline, particularly for drawing the innocent Afghan population into the middle of the fight by carrying out the 9/11 attacks and inviting a vengeful US retaliation. The situation for Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was getting dire.

The United States's invasion of Iraq actually provided an outlet for Al-Qaeda and bin Laden to design another front for their "jihad." Not only that the shift of attention from a military campaign in Afghanistan to Iraq left the job unfinished in Afghanistan. Now, the result is that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan have been regrouping. The use of a new jihad weapon once unheard of in Afghanistan, suicide bombings, is on the rise and increasingly effective in targeting and casualties. Consequently, there is talk of Afghanistan being rendered a failed state.[35]

In addition, the situation in Iraq continues to be precarious. Reports indicate that a majority of the foreign fighters in Iraq originate from Saudi Arabia. Yet, despite the Saudi role in the 9/11 attacks and now in supporting fighters as part of the insurgency in Iraq, the American government has continued to strengthen U.S.–Saudi relations. Much of this collaboration has been in response to the regional threat posed by Iran, especially concerning its mysterious nuclear ambitions. During the George W. Bush administration, it was also a strategic partnership in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The Bush administration launched the GWOT following the September 11 attacks in 2001. This rather ambiguous policy, which contained problems in semantics as much as in substance and implementation, has once again propelled jihad onto a global frontline. Beginning with George W. Bush's use of the word "crusade" in one of his speeches soon after the 9/11 attacks, a seemingly religious-political declaration of war was implied. Of course, Al-Qaeda and company liked the idea of launching a supposed "clash of civilizations," the ideal rhetorical weapon of which would be jihad. As a result, Al-Qaeda's recruitment drives intensified, especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Once more, we have seen the rhetoric of jihad being used to gain recruits.

The US foreign policy, under the Bush administration, thrived with the GWOT. It provided the Bush administration with its raison d'être, and no other programs within the US Department of Defense has received more funding than the GWOT. Therefore, in an ironic twist, the more Al-Qaeda and company push for jihad, mainly against the United States' and Western interests, the more the Bush administration had been able to empower itself, domestically and abroad.

A strong undercurrent of the complexities involved in the GWOT, US foreign policies toward the Middle East and South Asia, and the 2008 US presidential election has involved oil politics. In January 2008, George W. Bush begged the Saudi royals to increase oil output, and enticed them with a $20 billion weapons deal, which included precision-guided missiles. In addition, the Bush administration tapped Saudi Arabia to serve as the Middle East region's "stabilizing force," in a direct attempt to counter Iran's growing regional influence. No one has seen any favorable results from this as of yet.

Empowering Saudi Arabia poses no less a threat, and, in fact, may even exacerbate the very global threats that the United States has been trying to defeat and eradicate in the GWOT. Therefore, the Bush administration's decision to empower Saudi Arabia was a short-sighted and potentially dangerous strategy, which might come back to haunt the United States and the international community in the future.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have striking similarities; yet even exploiting their differences will not result in positive outcomes, especially concerning the

GWOT. Hence, a strong US–Saudi alliance does not necessarily translate into sound foreign policy making.

First, examining the similarities between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we find that both are theocracies based on *shari'a* (Islamic law), albeit with two distinctly different Islamic ideologies: Iran follows Twelver Shi'ism, while Saudi Arabia adheres to an ultra-orthodox version of Sunnism called Wahhabism. Both utilize religious police to enforce Islamic law as the rule of law and social policies dictating dress codes, gender segregation in public spaces, harsh penal codes, censorship, and general enforcement of conformity in a totalitarian manner in virtual police states. Both countries also use the lesser form of jihad frequently in their respective internal and foreign policies.

Hence, US–Saudi warm relations contradict the United States' promotion of democracy and human rights in the Middle East region. How can the US government's National Security Strategy—in which the promotion of democracy and human dignity is clearly stipulated—be taken seriously if one of the United States' closest allies Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy that prohibits political parties and severely oppresses women, religious and ethnic minorities, carries out public beheadings and amputations, with a dubious judicial system that rarely renders due process, all in the name of religion?

Second, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have supported what the United States has referred to as terrorist organizations. Iran has long supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, and both Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to fund the Palestinian organization Hamas:

> The Saudis back the civilian infrastructure of Hamas with extremist textbooks glorifying jihad and martyrdom that are used by schools and Islamic societies throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ideological infiltration of Palestinian society by the Saudis in this way is reminiscent of their involvement in the *madrassa* system of Pakistan during the 1980s, that gave birth to the Taliban and other pro bin-Laden groups.[36]

Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the September 11 attacks were Saudis. Plus, the US military reports that a significant number of the foreign insurgents in Iraq have been Saudis, who volunteer to fight there for the expressed purpose of killing American soldiers.

Third, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are extremely proactive in exporting their respective religious ideologies worldwide. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, Iran has vowed to spread its revolutionary Islamic ideology throughout the region and beyond. In particular, Iran, a majority Shi'ite country, has tried to appeal to Shi'ites elsewhere in the region, and rally them to the revolution's cause. Iran has long aspired to be the dominant regional power but has faced a number of

competitors and checks and balances in the process, often involving foreign powers. One of those "checks" was Saddam Hussain in Iraq, who initiated a war against Iran in 1980. During that war, Iran's leader Ayatollah Khomeini routinely used the call for the violent lesser jihad to rally forces in Iran to fight against Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have viewed the spread of Iran's revolutionary Shi'ite ideology as a specific threat to their national security, interests, and religious security. However, since Saudi Arabia has reaped the fortunes of its oil wealth, the religious institutions have been actively spreading their Wahhabi ideology vis-à-vis sponsorship of Islamic seminaries and mosques propped up around the world. This has led to the radicalization of countless Muslim communities in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, the United States, Canada, and parts of Africa. In some cases, this in turn has inspired a number of locally radicalized individuals and groups to join militant organizations and/or carry out terrorist attacks either within their own countries of residence or elsewhere. Wahhabism is an extremely orthodox and literalist ideology. It indoctrinates followers with a "holier than thou" superiority complex, and with intense fervor identifies and vilifies perceived "enemies," including fellow Muslims who fail to follow its own brand of Islam, as it was used in the country's early history. Violence and intolerance are the pillars of Wahhabi ideology.

Fourth, both Iran and Saudi Arabia do not recognize Israel and have expressed anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish sentiments. Iranian President Ahmedinejad's anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rants have been infamous in the headlines worldwide. Similarly, Ayatollah Khomeini's hatred of Israel was well known. Saudi school textbooks and religious institutions do not hesitate to depict Jews, and sometimes Christians too, with the most unflattering language. Although King Abdullah has made political gestures for initiating an Arab–Israeli peace process, this does not seem representative of Saudi public sentiments toward Israel. Calls for a jihad against Israel (and usually the United States too) are not uncommon.

Fifth, both countries are major oil producers and exporters. Iran is the world's fourth largest oil producer and exporter and Saudi Arabia is the world's number one, hence their tremendous wealth. Both countries have invested substantial amounts of their oil wealth in their respective militaries as well as in their respective jihad campaigns. The real fear now is the possibility of a nuclear capable Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is capable of acquiring the best and most advanced weaponry from the United States and other Western allies but is incapable of using them by themselves. Saudi Arabia does not have the manpower, nor does it have the training and skills, for using such high-tech weapons and equipment. It is highly likely that when the next round of imminent threats loom over Saudi Arabia and the GCC

states, they will once again call on the United States to come to the rescue. To some extent, this is already happening, given Iran's ascendance. However, in smaller-scale campaigns, like the one involving the Iraqi insurgency, the Saudis are highly capable of funding and supporting the "jihadists" fighting against the United States and coalition forces in Iraq.

Finally, it is imperative to point out a glaring difference between Iran and Saudi Arabia, although it does not exonerate the clerical regime in Iran in any way. Saudi Arabia had a hand in the creation of the Taliban, and the Saudi regime was one of only three countries (Pakistan and the UAE were the other two) who recognized the Taliban regime during its reign in Afghanistan. The Taliban and Iran have been fierce enemies, as the Taliban have ruthlessly massacred Shi'ites in Afghanistan. Given the Taliban's indoctrination of militant Wahhabi ideology, it is no surprise that they view Shi'ites as mortal enemies. The Sunni–Shi'ite rivalry pervades violently in the region, and rest assured that at some level Iran and Saudi Arabia are pulling the strings in this ideological competition, both fervently invoking the term "jihad." It has resulted in disastrous Sunni–Shi'ite conflicts in Iraq, which lies at the heart of the political impasse that the Iraqi government faces today. A similar dilemma can propel itself region wide, if the Saudi–Iranian discord intensifies.

Saudi Arabia is not a country that generates wealth by its own ingenuity, accomplishments, and work ethics. The Saudis have been riding a wave of fortune thanks to oil and have used this wealth to spread a draconian ideology and values that represent the seventh century, some aspects of which go even further back in time. For this and other strategic reasons, courting the Saudis is a bad policy, unless one shares the agenda of putting the world into reverse and on a solid jihadist track. The West's thirst for oil so far continues to generate unwise foreign policies. Plus, having an unknown adversary out there somewhere lying in wait, threatening to wage jihad against the world, provides the impetus for policies like the GWOT. Consequently, the lesser jihad has become politically and, in some cases, militarily utilitarian for both the West (the United States in particular) as well as for the Islamic world. The violent lesser jihad is not only alive and well but also very potent in today's international relations arena. The nonviolent greater jihad seems wholly suppressed, thanks to the national interests of many countries. Global peace, stability, and security will pay a heavy price for the suppression of the greater jihad, and especially for the reversal of the lesser and greater jihad in international relations.

What can be done to facilitate the reversal of the lesser and greater jihads back to the way they were originally ordained? There are ways to reverse this once more: by instituting effective outreach programs with Muslim

communities, and by empowering and supporting the forces of intellectual (greater) jihad, especially by means of improving educational systems, curricula, and teaching methods throughout the Muslim world. Consider the links between Islamic seminaries and terrorism: In Indonesia,

> Al-Mukmin school . . . has produced a long list of some of the most sinister names known to Australia and Southeast Asia. Out of this school came the 2002 Bali bombers Mukhlas, Amrozi and Samudra, and the 2005 Bali suicide bombers. Also, from there was bomb-maker Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who wreaked terror in Indonesia, Singapore and The Philippines, and Mubarok, who drove a truck into the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004. Nur Said, aka Nur Hasbi, also studied here. It is widely believed he was one of two bombers in Friday's (July 17, 2009) attack on Jakarta's J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels.[37]

Following the 2004 terrorist train bombings in Madrid, Spain's government instituted a dialogue and outreach program that did not grossly antagonize the Muslim communities. Open dialogue with the Spanish Muslim community has helped develop understanding of and empathy for each side's grievances and fears. This is the kind of outreach that should be pursued by governments and civic groups, particularly in the West.

Furthermore, Muslims and Islamic religious authorities all have a responsibility to support and promote intellectual jihad to be undertaken in the modern Islamic world. This is imperative, and without such reformation the lesser form of jihad will continue to capitalize on its use of violence and terror. Hence, the proponents of the lesser jihad will continue to perpetuate national and global insecurity, and governments will continue to react with harsher constraints on civil liberties and rights. The vicious cycle will revolve indefinitely.

To break this cycle, the proponents of the greater jihad must continue their struggle resolutely against the proponents of the lesser jihad. Religious reform is embodied in the greater intellectual form of jihad, that is, "intellectual jihad." Given that religion and politics are not usually separate in Islam, such reform is imperative for facilitating progressive intellectual, spiritual, and political discourses. One of the methodologies of the greater jihad involves *ijtihad*, which is "reinterpretation," or "original thinking," applying reasoning and analytical thought to Islamic laws and principles.[38] *Ijtihad* allows for change and reform, without modifying the essence of Islamic principles and laws. In modern history, *ijtihad* has been static, as the ultra-orthodox religious authorities and institutions (i.e., the puritans) have suppressed the process of change, which has been urgently needed in order to adjust to modernity. Hence, Islamist extremism and fanaticism have predominated in modern history, especially in the headlines.

All of this is relevant for the subcontinent because of the nature of the creation of the state of Pakistan and the puzzling dichotomies that India and Pakistan pose to each other with their unique circumstances of being partitioned upon independence. It is significant to note that Maulana Azad was steadfastly against the idea of partition and Pakistan, yet, with British assistance, it happened. The issue of "political Islam," or "Islamism," has since been in the forefront of Pakistan's leadership and controversies about the country's national identity and ideology. In order to understand these dichotomies and *secular versus religious forces* in the region, the concept of "political Islam"—which Maulana Azad rejected for independent India—needs clarifying.

POLITICAL ISLAM ON THE SUBCONTINENT

India poses a bizarre puzzle to political scientists. Theoretically, it is not supposed to work given its immense diversity in identities, ideologies, belief systems, caste dynamics, ethnic and tribal groups, multitudes of languages and dialects, gender disparity, huge wealth-poverty gaps, and incredible paradoxes between modernity and traditions, customs, superstitions, and, in India's own politically incorrect lexicon, "backwardness."

Still, since its independence in 1947, India has not only survived as a secular constitutional democracy—the largest in the world population wise—but it has also managed to excel in technology, software engineering and programming, call center operations, and, overall, improving the economy with a vast rising middle class with the help of the forces of globalization. In the mind of political scientists, India most likely would have ended up being further divided, fragmented, and less unified along religious, ethnic, and linguistic lines. But clearly, India has persisted despite its formidable challenges and tribulations over the last several decades.

As this analysis has shown, the partition of India came with the demands of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, against the wishes of Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi. The creation of Pakistan, essentially, resulted in the carving out of the new country from the preexisting Indian subcontinent. This was done to placate Jinnah's demands for providing a separate Muslim country for Indian Muslims, because, he contended, in postindependence India, Indian Muslims ruled by a majority of Hindus would be persecuted, discriminated against, and in general face hardships and disadvantages in such a scenario. Maulana Azad rejected this notion, and instead he promoted Hindu–Muslim unity in the newly independent secular democracy, the Republic of India. While Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi won independence for India from the British Raj, they lost the struggle against partition for the creation of Pakistan.

The new country carved out of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan, has the official name "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan." This begs the question: Is Pakistan an example of "political Islam," or an "Islamic theocracy," or is it a constitutional democracy with a majority Muslim population, and Islam influences and informs many political and legal dynamics of the nation?

First, the definition of political Islam, or Islamism, which will be treated interchangeably, must be addressed. According to Oxford Studies on Islam, political Islam is defined as follows:

> The term Political Islam refers generally to any interpretation of Islam that serves as a basis for political identity and action. More specifically, it refers to the movements representing modern political mobilization in the name of Islam, a trend that emerged in the late 20th century. Political Islam is a distinctive aspect of a broader 20th-century development that is often called Islamic Resurgence, in which Muslims worldwide seek to strengthen their understanding of and commitment to their religion. Not all Islamic Resurgence movements can be characterized as Political Islam, however. The *Tablighi Jamaʿat,* for example, has expanded greatly since its beginnings in northern India in the 1920s. The movement resolutely avoids political activism, however, and many Sufi brotherhoods displayed renewed dynamism in the final decades of the 20th century without advocating programs of Political Islam. Similarly, Muslims engage in many different types of political activities that are not included in discussions of Political Islam. Thus, the term is usually used to identify a specific kind of political program and is not just a generic label for any political activity in the Muslim world.[39]

Scholar Mahdi Mozaffari expands on the definition, contending that Islamism consists of three branches: Shi'ite, Sunni, and Wahhabi. He adds that

> this classification is neither perfect nor exhaustive, but it is useful. For instance, Wahhabi is a Sunni sub-sect, but it is so different from other Sunni sub-sects that it may be treated as an autonomous entity. Sunnism is divided into four theological and juridical schools: Hanafi, Malaki, Shafii, and Hanbali. Wahhabi is a derivative of the Hanbali School, with a particularly dogmatic interpretation of Islam. The Sunni Islamists represent the vast majority of Islamists. Sunni movements embrace the geographical space reaching from Mali to Bali; from the Somalian desert to the Pakistani Himalayas. Chronologically, Sunni Islamism is older than both Shi'ite and Wahhabi Islamism.
>
> Contemporary Islamism, as a movement and as an organization, is a phenomenon of the 20th century. It emerged with the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928.[40]

Thus, political Islam, or Islamism, has a broad spectrum of applications, roles, agendas, goals, and actors. Specifically, political Islam requires that

> religion influence politics and the legal codes and framework of the country. This is one of the reasons why secularists are extremely skeptical, if not outright suspicious, of the Islamists' intentions and agendas. This is also the reason why Islamists and Western countries have hot and cold relations, and in fact, in the case of democratic elections in Algeria and Gaza that brought Islamists to power, the West has been manifestly opposed to, and even hostile toward them [. . .].
>
> Algeria's civil war began after an era of unprecedented openness in the late 1980s. Personal freedoms blossomed and dozens of new political parties were created. But when Islamist parties appeared ready to sweep to victory in the early [19]90s, the government canceled legislative elections. The Islamists fought back, initially targeted the army and police—but then they began attacking civilians; artists, teachers, judges and journalists were slain. State security forces, trying to root out the insurgency, often killed indiscriminately.
>
> By the end of the 1990s, an estimated 200,000 Algerians had died. When Islamists resort to violence, it is generally in the context of "jihadism," and, depending on the degree of orthodoxy of a given Islamist ideology, the extremism therefrom could embody totalitarian religious fascism, like in the case of the Islamic State (IS), also called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In such scenarios, there is no dialogue, no compromises, no democracy and human rights, and utter contempt for feminism, the West, and secularism. This is a case of the Islamist extremist pendulum swinging far beyond the spectrum of extremism, particularly in its depth of brutality and lust for violence against civilians and combatants alike. As bizarre as it sounds, it can be described as "*extreme* extremism."[41]

From the perspective of esteemed law scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl, the "expressions of" political Islam/Islamism are

> vague and broad enough to cover any form of Islam that a particular commentator might wish to disparage. In general, Islamists are Muslims who believe that Islamic theology and law should serve as an authoritative frame of reference in any social or political condition.[42]

Most importantly, El Fadl emphasizes that the framework of Islamic theology and jurisprudence does not translate into "believing in a theocratic state or imposing draconian laws upon an innocent group of people."[43] He explains that Islamic theology is meant to provide a source of inspiration "from Islamic ethics and morals in matter of public concern."[44] Therefore, Islam in

and of itself could provide an authoritative source but "could range widely from the most benign and noncoercive situations to a full-fledged theocratic state that dominates how people think and act."[45] The nuances exist in the methodologies and contexts of interpretations, or religious hermeneutics, which are usually not conducted without cognitive biases of the interpreter seeping into the translations.

In the case of Pakistan, before its birth, in India "the Muslim League . . . triumphed under Jinnah's leadership for he achieved what he had set out to."[46] Apparently, the Muslim League was

> his political instrument and his acumen enabled him to exploit the accumulated weakness of the Congress party's mistakes, principally from the 1930s onwards: upon which he heaped the British Empire's critical enfeeblement, post-Second World War, carving out for himself a Pakistan; even if "moth-eaten" and from birth.[47]

Jinnah himself was not an advocate of political Islam. He could be described as a sophisticated and strategically keen opportunist. In his biography of Pakistan's founding father, Jaswant Singh raises the pertinent question about Jinnah: "How and why did this 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,' the liberal constitutionalist, an Indian nationalist—Mohammad Ali Jinnah, become, in Viceroy Lord Wavell's phrase, a 'Frankenstein monster,' working to dismember that very world which had so generously created him?"[48] Seemingly, Jinnah viewed India very differently from his Congress party comrades. For Jinnah, the question of *what exactly is India?* became most pressing by the 1940s.

Jinnah

> asserted in his later years that "India is not one nation." If it is not "one nation," then what are we, even as a residue? Are we but a conglomerate of communities? Or a collection of "many nations," as Jinnah had rather casually put it while describing India as a residue of communities.[49]

Jinnah was born into a Khoja Muslim family in the village of Paneli sometime in late 1876. Khojas are indigenous to India; they are a branch of the Shi'ite Ismaili sect, and they are described as "peace-loving traders, accommodative, non-combative."[50] The famous Aga Khan is the spiritual leader of the Ismaili sect. Similar to Maulana Azad, Jinnah received a less formal education, but he attended primary school at age nine, although that lasted only a year. He then attended the Sindh Madrassat-ul Islam (religious seminary), and after three years of that education, he attended the Church Mission School of Karachi. Eventually, he traveled to London, but he was married to

eleven-year-old Emi Bai before he departed at the age of sixteen, in the year 1892.[51]

Eventually, he studied law in London, and he changed his surname from "Jennabhai" to "Jinnah," followed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, after numerous iterations of spellings. Jinnah's biographer Singh emphasizes that "this is not a small point. Any social psychologist would no doubt read much into these alterations. But clearly it points us to an evolution of the personality of the future *Quaid-i-Azam*,"[52] an honorific that he would earn in Pakistan, meaning "Great Leader." The title Quaid-i-Azam referring to Pakistan's founding father Jinnah is still used today.

Upon returning to India, Jinnah became deeply involved in pro-independence politics, joining the Congress Party alongside Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, and Sardar Patel, but Jinnah faced a personal dilemma. The Muslim League also attracted him like a magnet. He had to somehow reconcile his loyalties to both entities. Jinnah

> could scarcely ignore the [Muslim] League, and yet to adopt it, as his chosen political vehicle, at this stage of his life (still in his thirties) was to bind himself to a very narrow sectarian focus. Attending the meetings of the Muslim League as a member of the Congress party was clearly a way out. To this decision Jinnah added a caveat, his statement in the autumn of 1913—'loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the national cause to which his [Jinnah's] life was dedicated.' Was this to enable him to straddle this chasm on a bridge of apparent principles? But was it principles? Or a baser calculation of having a foot in both camps? There exist advocates of both views.[53]

Later, Jinnah became the president of the Muslim League. However, he lived a very liberal lifestyle, quite distanced from devout observance of religion. Jinnah "remained committed to his three-piece suits, his lorgnette, his cigarette holder and the King's English. No Gujarati for him, and no political language that invoked religion."[54] Jinnah disliked Mahatma Gandhi's "common man politics,"[55] and resisted wearing the *khadi* homespun cloth that Mahatma Gandhi transformed into his *satyagraha* movement's trademark uniform. Wearing the khadi was also a protest gesture to collectively reject British products made from exploiting Indian resources. Thus, the uniform symbolized the pro-independence movement against British colonial occupation and exploitation.

It wasn't until August 16, 1946, that Jinnah "called for direct action to defend Islam and in support of Pakistan. Jinnah then became the demagogue he deplored and detested in Gandhi."[56] Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi always had a relatively tense relationship, and Jinnah "saw Congress as his adversary

and his nemesis. It was Congress versus the Muslim League."[57] That meant rendering Maulana Azad as Jinnah's rival competing to win the opinion and good graces of the Indian Muslims. Because of this intra-Muslim leadership competition, Mahatma Gandhi had to choose the ideal Muslim leader to remain at his side.

In an exchange of correspondence between Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi in early 1938, the question arose about who Mahatma Gandhi trusted as a leader for Indian Muslims. In a letter to Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi replied,

> "So far as I am concerned, just as on the Hindu-Muslim question. . . . I have accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as my guide. My suggestion . . . to you is that conversation should be opened in the first instance between you and the Maulana Sahib. But in every case regard me as at your disposal."[58]

However, as Singh explains,

> "this was clearly an error, suggesting Maulana Azad as Mahatma Gandhi's alternative in the dialogue, he was clearly not the interlocutor that Jinnah would, or could work with. And that was Jinnah's response (to Mahatma Gandhi), sent within days on 3 March 1938 from New Delhi, saying:"[59]

> [I] find that there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line you will be repeating the same tragedy as you did when you expressed your helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and die-hard views, did not agree, and you had to say that you were willing, but what could you do. This happened, as you know, before you went to the Round Table Conference.
>
> We have reached a stage where no doubt should be left that you recognize the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India and, on the other hand, you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach.[60]

The intense political rivalry and competition between the Congress party and Muslim League as well as their respective Muslim representatives—Maulana Azad and Jinnah, respectively—had been set and ripe for the British to exploit. Jinnah was convinced that he would be the sole political representative of Indian Muslims, and Maulana Azad had already been working hard in Congress doing the same but with different goals and ideology compared to Jinnah. Maulana Azad aligned with Mahatma Gandhi to achieve India's independence in order to evolve into a secular, united democracy with no

partition, but with Hindu–Muslim unity and peaceful coexistence in one republic. Jinnah demanded the creation of Pakistan from partitioning India as a separate political entity to serve as a "refuge" for Indian Muslims who, in his view, may suffer persecution, discrimination, and injustices under Hindu-majority rule. Evidently, Maulana Azad and Jinnah were at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in the context of India's future political system and structures after independence. Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad stood their ground in Congress on one side; and Jinnah stood his ground in the Muslim League on the other side.

The significant distinction between Maulana Azad and Jinnah, ironically, involved their religiosity versus secularism. Maulana Azad was not only a devout Muslim, but he was, in fact, a highly trained and educated Islamic leader and authority. Jinnah was a London-educated lawyer and secular in his personal life and lifestyle. Yet, ironically, both men pursued what seems like opposite agendas: the secular Jinnah wanted a homeland for Indian Muslims, that is, Pakistan, whereas Maulana Azad demanded Hindu–Muslim unity and coexistence for India's secular democracy in the future independent republic.

Maulana Azad understood the stakes, and he applied reasoning and pragmatism to the situation and did not allow his religious identity and predispositions to influence his political position. He did not waver on his objections to partitioning India. On the other hand, Jinnah wanted to be viewed as the only political representative of Indian Muslims. Singh describes this impasse between Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah regarding the question of Indian Muslims' leadership, noting that

> this question of Maulana Sahib being the opening interlocutor with Gandhi insisting and Jinnah denouncing continued inconclusively for some time, and sadly, for it was precisely time that was a premium in the prevailing situation. Gandhi continued asserting with this request on the ground that as the Congress was not just a "Hindu" party therefore, it had a right to depute a Muslim representative, and sure enough Jinnah persisted unchangingly till the last that he, Jinnah, was the "sole spokesman" of all Muslims in India. The impasse continued [. . .].[61]

CONCLUSION

The end result for India at the time of independence in 1947 was, unfortunately for Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad, partition, which proved to be a disaster. Jinnah's biographer Singh confirms that

> the cruel truth is that this partitioning of India has actually resulted in achieving the very reverse of the originally intended purpose; partition, instead of settling

contention between communities has left us a legacy of markedly enhanced Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or other such denominational identities, hence differences. Affirmative action, reservations for Muslims, other castes and communities, unfortunately, does not dissolve those identities; it heavily underscores them, waters their roots, perpetuating differences through the nutrient of self-interest being poured constantly in separateness. Reservation results finally in compartmentalizing society, hence, ultimately in fragmenting national identity. That is what "special reservation" for Muslims in India did.[62]

In other words, Maulana Azad was right. He consistently warned his peers, including Jinnah, that partitioning India would only *exacerbate*, and not improve, the Hindu–Muslim rift. That is exactly what has been happening in India since partition.

The significance of Maulana Azad's sincere efforts to keep India in one piece for pragmatic reasons should not be lost in this historical tale. The fact that he proposed and persisted in his stance the idea of Hindu–Muslim unity and a postindependence secular democracy is remarkable. If any violent Islamist extremist, or even a nonviolent political Islamic party for that matter, had the opportunity to establish a homeland for Indian Muslims, they no doubt would have grabbed at the opportunity with ferocious zeal.

However, Maulana Azad illustrated extraordinary selflessness and an incredibly challenging exercise in detaching himself from the tempting enticements to follow in the same path as Jinnah toward partition. Maulana Azad believed in religious unity and coexistence. He believed in the justifiable rights under religious and secular laws for Indian Muslims to continue living in an independent secular democracy. He had no qualms about this notion, and he worked tirelessly to achieve this dream. The actual partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in no way diminish Maulana Azad's stature, religious authority, historical role and responsibility in the Congress party, and reputation as one of India's strongest advocates for Hindu–Muslim unity.[63]

Maulana Azad was at heart not only a "Maulana," but also a dedicated pro-independence Indian nationalist, Mahatma Gandhi's right-hand Muslim leader, and a loyal, selfless, and diligent nonviolent activist. His actions prove his love for his country, and he acted in a manner that maintained his religious integrity along with his pro-independence Indian activism. The idea of "political Islam" for India, or a partitioned Indo-Pakistan, for the sake of Indian Muslims never entered his mind. On the contrary, he rightly viewed such ideas as highly destructive for future Hindu–Muslim unity. In speech after speech, he warned audiences about the dangers of partition and migration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan. His behavior, attitudes, and actions have been exemplary. It is no wonder that he is considered a national hero in India.

NOTES

1. Joby Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS* (New York: Anchor Books, 2016), pp. 7–8.

2. Aaron Zelin, and Phillip Smyth, "The Vocabulary of Sectarianism," *Foreign Policy*, January 29, 2014: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/29/the-vocabulary-of-sectarianism/.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. See: "Terrorist Designation of ISIS Leader Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla," Media Note, U.S. Department of State, March 17, 2020, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-isis-leader-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al-mawla/.

11. Gen. Lloyd Austin, U.S. CENTCOM Commander, Opening Remarks, "The Middle East in Transition," Brookings Center for Middle East Policy-U.S. Central Command Conference, Washington, DC, July 22, 2015: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/07/centcom-middle-east-proceedings-2015/centcom-proceedings-final.pdf, page 4 of the Conference Proceedings.

12. Hayat Alvi, "The (Non)Governance of Divided Territories: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Palestine," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (CSSAME)*, Duke University Press, 28, no. 3 (2008), 467.

13. Gabriel Scheinmann, "The Map that Ruined the Middle East," *The Tower*, July 2013, issue no. 4, http://www.thetower.org/article/the-map-that-ruined-the-middle-east/.

14. Daniel Byman, "Strange Bedfellows: What's Behind the Enduring Alliance between Syria and Iran?" *Slate*, July 19, 2006: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2006/07/strange_bedfellows.html.

15. "1988: Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack," *BBC News on This Day*, March 16, 1988: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm.

16. Scheinmann: http://www.thetower.org/article/the-map-that-ruined-the-middle-east/.

17. Jenny Stanton, "Leaked Documents from ISIS Headquarters Show Terror Group and Syrian Dictator Assad Colluded over the City of Palmyra with Warning to Withdraw Forces before Attacks," *Daily Mail*, May 2, 2016: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3569934/Leaked-documents-ISIS-headquarters-terror-group-Syrian-dictator-Assad-colluded-city-Palmyra.html.

18. Josie Ensor, "How ISIL Colluded with Assad to Make $40m a Month in Oil Deals," *The Telegraph*, April 25, 2016: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/25/isils-deal-with-bashar-al-assad-and-the-40m-a-month-oil-profits/.

19. Charles Lister, *The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), pp. 5–6.

20. See: Joby Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS* (New York: Anchor, 2016).

21. Jessica Stern, and J.M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York: Ecco / HarperCollins, 2016), p. 34.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 35.

24. Ibid., p. 36.

25. Brad Parks, "How a US Prison Camp Helped Create ISIS," *New York Post*, May 30, 2015: http://nypost.com/2015/05/30/how-the-us-created-the-camp-where-is is-was-born/. NOTE: This is also described similarly in the Weiss/Hassan book, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*.

26. Ibid., p. 36.

27. Stern and Berger, pp. 36–37. Emphasis added.

28. See: "Video: Jihad Sisters, French Women Bound for ISIS," *France24 Documentary*, February 2, 2017: http://www.france24.com/en/20170202-video-rep orters-jihad-sisters-french-women-bound-isis-islamic-state-group.

29. "My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared"—Nasheed for ISIS, translated by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, January 28, 2014: http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/01/ my-ummah-dawn-has-appeared-nasheed-for.

30. Hayat Alvi, "Musical Criminology: A Comparative Analysis of Jihadist Nasheeds and Narco Corridos," *The Air Force Journal of European, Middle Eastern, & African Affairs (JEMEAA)* 2, no. 2 (Summer 2020): 50.

31. *Reagan Doctrine*, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Timeline of US Diplomatic History 1981–1989, US Department of State (http://www.state.gov /r/pa/ho/time/dr/17741.htm).

32. Ted Galen Carpenter, "US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The 'Reagan Doctrine' and Its Pitfalls," Cato Institute Policy Analysis, June 24, 1986 (http://www .cato.org/pubs/pas/pa074.html).

33. Deobandism is an orthodox ideology originating in India; it is very similar to Wahhabism.

34. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (London: Pan Books, 2001), see chapter 6, 82–94.

35. Roxanne Escobales, and Mark Tran, "Afghanistan Risks Becoming 'Failed State,' Reports Warn," *The Guardian*, January 31, 2008 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2008/jan/31/afghanistan.marktran1).

36. Dore Gold, "Saudi Arabia's Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism," *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, no. 504, October 1, 2003 (http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp504.htm).

37. Paul Toohey, "Inside Java's Production Line of Terror," *The Australian*, July 22, 2009 (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25817960-601,00.html).

38. Rahman, *Islam*, 84.

39. John Voll, and Tamara Sonn, "Political Islam—Introduction," *Oxford Bibliographies*, 2020, accessed from: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/ document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0063.xml.

40. Quoted in Hayat Alvi, *The Political Economy and Islam of the Middle East: The Case of Tunisia* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2019), p. 162.

41. Ibid., pp. 166–167.

42. Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper One, 2007), p. 20.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 4.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 5.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p. 53.

51. Ibid., p. 54.

52. Singh, p. 56.

53. Ibid., p. 66.

54. Singh, p. 68.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 69.

58. Ibid., p. 215.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 216.

62. Ibid., p. 6.

63. See select Maulana Azad speeches in the appendix.

The Implications of Nonviolent Islam for Peace and Security

Volumes of books and articles have been written about the violent inter-pretations of Islam and *jihadism*, but there is insufficient literature about nonviolent Islamic activism. The previous chapters have shown that Islamic nonviolence indeed exists and Maulana Azad set the historical precedent for it. These nonviolent principles and the historical precedence have strong implications for regional and global peace and security.

According to the US Institute of Peace,

> Individuals and organizations facing restrictive, oppressive and/or authoritarian forms of governance may be able to employ hundreds of nonviolent methods to amplify their voices, challenge power dynamics and press for reform. Tactics include protests, boycotts, sit-ins, civil disobedience, and alternative institutions. *Nonviolent resistance has been shown empirically to be twice as effective as armed struggle* in achieving major political goals.[1]

In the Islamic context, the concept of nonviolent activism is frequently eclipsed by its streams of violent extremism, which has been the method most often pursued, almost by default, to resolve injustices instead of just and fair conflict resolution (on all sides). Secular authoritarian regimes ruling in Muslim-majority countries share the same characteristics, that is, by default resorting to violent repression of the masses.

Also, the violent Islamist extremist streams are most prevalent in the news headlines. Usually, no one hears about the quiet, painstaking, gradual, nonviolent processes of conflict resolution, especially involving the Muslim world. Imagine if the Islamic religious authorities and Muslims worldwide became aware of Maulana Azad's precedent of rendering nonviolent civil

disobedience compatible with Islam. Potentially, that would pull the rug from underneath the violent Islamist extremists.

The 2011 so-called "Arab Spring," which is better served with the term "Arab Awakening," provided a glimmer of hope since mostly youthful activists protested nonviolently in the streets and city squares throughout North Africa and the Middle East, toppling regimes and demanding justice, respect, and the rule of law. However, the 2011 Arab Awakening, while delegitimizing the violent Islamist extremists, albeit temporarily, has been unable to sustain itself. Unfortunately, due to some immensely brutal regimes and in some cases foreign interference, the crackdown against the protesting youth metamorphosed into bloody civil conflicts in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. These conflicts have attracted a host of violent Islamist extremists forming and operating militias, and they have quickly occupied safe havens in these conflict zones and continue their violent operations. This resurgence of violent Islamist extremists includes the rise of the notorious Islamic State (IS), which has relished its bloodlust and fascist agendas. In sum, we have witnessed the reversal of the progress that was being made in nonviolent activism since the 2011 Arab Awakening. Nothing could be more tragic. The rise and potential revival of the IS as well as the ongoing attacks by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its global affiliates Boko Haram, and numerous other groups continue to plague the world today.

The onus is on the global Muslim communities and their respective religious establishments to educate the masses about Maulana Azad's nonviolent activism and its legitimacy within Islam. Given how the violent Islamist extremists proliferate worldwide, there are serious implications for peace, security, and conflict resolution—more importantly, the lack of the latter. Violent extremists have not achieved half of what the nonviolent Muslim activists have accomplished in comparatively shorter time frames, as seen in the case of Maulana Azad and Indian Muslims. In addition, the violent extremists actively seek the latest high-tech weaponry, including, at times, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities to exact the highest number of casualties, the greatest harm, and massive destruction. On the other hand, nonviolent activism seeks the exact opposite: peaceful dialogue and negotiations as a result of tenacious nonviolent civil disobedience and noncooperation campaigns to exact social justice, peace, and the rule of law.

The preeminent Norwegian sociologist who founded the discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies Johan Galtung has mapped the typologies of peace and violence. He identifies the forms of violence as follows:

> Direct Violence represents behaviors that serve to threaten life itself and/or to diminish one's capacity to meet basic human needs. Examples include killing, maiming, bullying, sexual assault, and emotional manipulation.

Structural Violence represents the systematic ways in which some groups are hindered from equal access to opportunities, goods, and services that enable the fulfillment of basic human needs. These can be formal as in legal structures that enforce marginalization (such as apartheid in South Africa) or they could be culturally functional but without legal mandate (such as limited access to education or health care for marginalized groups).

Cultural Violence represents the existence of prevailing or prominent social norms that make direct and structural violence seem 'natural' or 'right' or at least acceptable. For example, the belief that Africans are primitive and intellectually inferior to Caucasians gave sanction to the African slave trade. Galtung's understanding of cultural violence helps explain how prominent beliefs can become so embedded in a given culture that they function as absolute and inevitable and are reproduced uncritically across generations.[2]

Examples of all of these forms of violence persist in the Indian subcontinent. The Caste System has institutionalized socioeconomic hierarchies embedded within Hinduism, and that constitutes one of many structural forms of violence. Cultural violence is prevalent in Indian societies at all levels and involving many variables, including negative attitudes toward the poor, lower castes, females, and in some cases minority religious and sectarian groups. The intermittent outbreak of vicious direct violence based on communal hatred has been one of the tragic dichotomies of, supposedly, the world's largest democracy. India has countless internal fault lines, and then to add to that, historically the British established themselves as the colonial masters imposing yet another layer and dimension of direct, structural, and cultural violence.

In the face of such extreme challenges, Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi remained committed to nonviolent civil disobedience, and, ultimately, they succeeded in removing the colonial yoke from India. The British, rather disingenuously, warned the Congress Party that India would become a chaotic mess without their brilliant leadership as colonial occupiers. That was yet another colonial power tactic in addition to divide and conquer: convince the indigenous population that they cannot progress and harmonize without the colonial master. Maulana Azad, Mahatma Gandhi, and the Congress Party leadership did not buy the British pitch, and they were determined to own their mess and resolve their own issues for themselves and by themselves.

In the examples of violent Islamist extremists, they take what looks like the "easy route," which is armed struggle against the purported oppressors. Often, such armed struggles result in prolonging the conflicts, as well as provoking the political regimes to crackdown severely against the innocent and guilty alike. Hence, they all get locked in a cycle of violence within which

the innocent civilians pay the heaviest price. The question is begging: Where are the forces of conflict resolution? According to Galtung,

> Security studies are academically institutionalized paranoia—you're always doing worst case analysis. You're always assuming that there is an enemy out there who is waiting for his chance, whereas my assumption is there is a difficult conflict out there that is waiting for its solution and nobody comes.[3]

Nothing can substitute for nonviolent conflict resolution, as seen in the Indian case in the fight against British colonial rule. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad's activism set the stage for future nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns, including in South Africa against apartheid[4] and against racial segregation in the United States. Religious leaders have always been involved in nonviolent activism, as seen with the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Therefore, violent Islamist extremists have no justification for prolonged conflicts that cause immense suffering for civilians, who are frequently targeted in attacks or caught in the crossfire.

It is worth noting that Mahatma Gandhi himself was inspired by the writings of Leo Tolstoy and Henry David Thoreau, both of whom supported the strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience. In addition, Mahatma Gandhi spearheaded advocacy for the rights of the untouchables (Dalits), the poor, and females. He referred to poverty as "the worst form of violence."[5] He intimately understood the ills of direct, structural, and cultural violence, both internal to his country and externally imposed from the foreign oppression of the British colonial power. Interestingly,

> given Gandhi's understanding that *conflict is built into structures and not into people, and that violence could not resolve conflict* . . . his religious/moral belief in the sanctity of all life compelled him to seek a way to address conflict without the use of violence. . . . Gandhi soon rejected the law as a means of dealing with conflict too, preferring to mediate between conflicting parties in search of a mutually acceptable outcome.
>
> According to Gandhi, British imperialism and the Indian Caste System were . . . examples of structures that were perpetuated . . . as a result of people performing particular roles within them. The essence of Gandhi's approach was to identify approaches to conflict that preserved the people while systematically demolishing the evil structure. [. . .] Because he saw conflict as a perennial condition, his discussions about future society are particularly concerned with how to manage conflict and how to create new social arrangements free of structural violence.
>
> Gandhi believed that conflict should remind antagonists of the deeper, perhaps transcendental, unity of life, because in his view humans are

related by a bond that is deeper and more profound than the bonds of social relationship.[6]

Therefore, it is not enough to participate in nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns, but, also, it is imperative to diversify participants in the conflict resolution process, which should, ideally, immediately follow a campaign's success. Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad thought about all of these aspects of conflict. Galtung refers to three fundamental "corners" of what he calls the "conflict triangle," which entails the behavior, attitude, and the goal incompatibility.[7] As a result, all of these corners in the conflict triangle must be reconciled.

For the supreme strategist Mahatma Gandhi, the "method of conflict resolution is called *satyagraha*," which means "a relentless search for truth and a determination to reach truth," it is somewhat simplistically but more widely known (and practiced) in English as "nonviolent action" (or equivalent names). While the perpetrator of violence assumes knowledge of the truth and makes a life-or-death judgment on that basis, *satyagraha*, according to Mahatma Gandhi, excludes the use of violence precisely because no one is capable of knowing the absolute truth.[8] Even his autobiography is entitled *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Consequently, satyagraha was the core of Mahatma Gandhi's strategy and campaign, and it served as the basis for evolving "a theory of politics and conflict resolution that could accommodate his moral system."[9] He was a philosopher, mystic, crafty political strategist, religion aficionado, and the only example of an extremely public monastic leader the world has seen. His moral system led to the withdrawal of the British from India. Specifically, the genius of satyagraha lies not only in its nonviolent activism but also in its methods for reconciling all three corners of the conflict triangle. The actions cannot be detached from the

norms of nonviolence that govern attitudes and behavior . . . an action or campaign that avoids the use of physical violence but that ignores the . . . norms characteristic of satyagraha cannot be classified as Gandhian nonviolence.

But Gandhi was not just committed to nonviolence; he was committed to strategy as well . . . he knew that strategy, too, was imperative.

Consequently, for example, he set out to develop a framework for applying nonviolence in such a way that desirable outcomes were built into the means of struggle. "They say 'Means are after all means.' I would say 'means are after all everything.' As the means so the end."[10]

Overall, a nonviolent activism campaign without a visionary and astute conflict resolution strategy is not likely to succeed. Peace studies and education

emphasize this point, and they explain how all of these important variables come together and affect one another. Consider that Mahatma Gandhi

> [Developed] strategies to deal with four kinds of conflict: political, social, economic, and religious. He started combating social injustice and political oppression [there] through nonviolent means. He believed that India would be free from the British only through returning to its own moral roots and traditions. He formed a *tactical alliance with the Indian Muslims* and launched a program of non-cooperation that included economic boycotts and civil disobedience. He advocated for the rights of the Untouchables and urged the Indian people to develop their own economic foundation through such basic activities as spinning thread, weaving cloth, and refining salt. By gaining the support of the masses, going on long hunger strikes, and using his sheer force of character. *Gandhi made the British acknowledge the immorality of their position as oppressors*, and they withdrew voluntarily.[11]

Remarkably, for Mahatma Gandhi, conflict actually offered an *opportunity* "for oppressed people to gain empowerment and identity."[12] Moreover, Mahatma Gandhi always planned to establish personal relationships with the adversaries, because "he considered them to be potential partners in a search for fair and truthful solutions. For Mahatma Gandhi, the goal was to further the *process of self-realization* for both the British and the Indians."[13] Mahatma Gandhi worked tirelessly to "resolve deep-seated political, social, economic, and religious conflicts."[14] He not only promoted nonviolent activism, but he famously rejected any notions of revenge, stating eloquently that "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" would only make the world blind and toothless[15] (see table 5.1).

These nuances were not lost to Maulana Azad. In fact, he shared Mahatma Gandhi's creeds, strategies, and methods for fighting against oppression. If Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi could do it, then anyone with the same drive and resolve can as well. There is no excuse for rendering conflicts into violent, bloody, endless cycles in which innocent populaces suffer from the direct and indirect impacts of the vengeful bloodletting.

As table 5.1 indicates, the violent Islamist extremists have no interest in human rights, freedoms, liberalism, and democracy. On the contrary, they detest these concepts and dismiss them as "Western" inventions. Hence, they view these concepts as threats to their interpretations of Islam and their visions for establishing an Islamic utopia. The latter would come at the expense of many innocent people as well as violent conquests of territory. Maulana Azad not only had no such delusions about setting up an Islamic utopia, but, in fact, he even completely rejected the idea of Pakistan resulting from the partition of India.

Table 5.1   Conflict Triangle: A Comparative Analysis

	Maulana Azad—Nonviolent Activism	*Violent Islamist Extremists*
Attitude	• Fight nonviolently against oppression, that is, without oppressing others, using *satyagraha* and *ahimsa* as guides. • Revenge is never acceptable.	• Fight violently against oppression, by *any* means, including oppressing others. • Revenge is acceptable and is equal to justice.
Behavior	Moral • Nonviolent Civil Disobedience is considered moral, especially compared to immoral oppressors and their violent repression (usually the opponents of nonviolent activists). • Courageous moral struggle against oppression and injustices.	Immoral • Violently targeting civilians delegitimizes the operatives and their organization. • Illegitimate behavior that uses violence is immoral. Thus, moral behavior cannot be attributed to immoral tactics, and vice versa. • What is courageous about violent behavior? It abrogates morality.
Goal(s)	• Nonviolently force the oppressors to withdraw and/or end their oppressive behavior and actions. • Self-realization on all sides. • Build a fair, just, and equitable society with due process, rule of law, and freedoms and rights for all. • Achieve gender parity and eliminate poverty. • Establish a secular liberal pluralist democracy. • No need for an Islamic utopia. Everyone can coexist peacefully in a secular democracy.	• End the oppression by oppressing others. • Take revenge. • Make examples of others to deter and compel behaviors. • Implement totalitarian social structures and systems based on religious fascist ideologies. • Feminism is anti-Islamic; applying religious doctrines will make society economically just; and democracy, human rights, and secularism are all condemned and prohibited. • Social hierarchies are based on religious interpretations and codes; minority religions are repressed. • Establish an Islamic utopia.

Source: Author.

REVENGE DOES NOT EQUAL JUSTICE

One of the strongest driving forces of conflicts is the desire for revenge (see table 5.1). Those who embrace and practice satyagraha and ahimsa wholly reject the idea of revenge. However, revenge appears in the rhetoric of violent Islamist extremists as another enticement to gain recruits who have been

harmed by common enemies. Revenge can also be a sociocultural code. For example, the Pashtunwali, the unwritten social code for ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan, actually contains the provisions for exacting revenge, and it even prescribes how to seek revenge with the blessings of the (village) tribal elders who make decisions like judges in a court. The revenge code has a term *badal* which means "to seek justice or take revenge against the wrongdoer."[16] Note that in this definition the word "revenge" is equated with the word "justice." According to lawyer and scholar Yasmeen Aftab Ali,

> If *badal* is not exercised, the offended man or his family will be considered stripped of honor. The exercise of this principle can lead to generations of bloodshed, feuds, hundreds of lives lost for one insult. It requires a violent reaction to the insult or death or injury inflicted. A *badal* usually ends with a *badal*. An action elicits or demands an equivalent response—and *the cycle goes on*.[17]

Convincing an Afghan Pashtun to forego the Pashtunwali revenge code is an immensely challenging task. However, even within such strict societies, Maulana Azad's counterpart existed and practiced satyagraha. His name was Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Pashtun leader in the Northwest Frontier Province (at the time) in today's Afghanistan–Pakistan border region. He was "strongly inspired by Gandhi's strategy of nonviolence . . . [he] amassed the world's first major nonviolent army in his region."[18] He was given a number of monikers, including *Badshah Khan* (King of Chiefs) and "the Frontier Gandhi." Surprisingly, he managed to convince about 100,000 of his fellow Afghans to

> lay down guns and vow to fight nonviolently against the British regime. He termed this army the *Khudai Khidmatgar*, the servants of Allah. It was no mean achievement, considering the bloody and barbaric history of the Pashtun community—a history that was full of invasions, massacres, conquests and occupations.
>
> The *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement espoused nonviolent, nationalist agitation in support of Indian independence and sought to awaken the Pashtuns' political consensus.
>
> A devout Muslim and committed ally of Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan worked in close collaboration with his inspirer for independence. For almost 80 long years, the Pashtun leader struggled incessantly for the rights of his people without ever raising arms. Like Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan honestly believed that the upliftment of his people was essential preparation for independence. Khan opened schools in the province, brought women into the mainstream of society, and encouraged his nonviolent soldiers to vow to do at least two hours of social work a day.

Aware of the pervasive violence in his society, Ghaffar Khan decided to invoke people on religious and humanistic grounds. To this purpose, he initiated a pledge that was to become the motto of the Afghan people in their fight for freedom. The pledge went: "I promise to refrain from violence and from taking revenge. I will sacrifice my wealth, life and comfort for my nation and people." It called people to serve God by serving other people, which helped the growth of self-respect and human dignity.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's amazing success story will go down in the annals of nonviolent resistance not merely for its popularity but also for its innately simple and spiritual outlook.[19]

If Abdul Ghaffar Khan can persuade Pashtuns to put down their guns and confront the British nonviolently, then anything is possible. Moreover, this is yet another historical precedent in the modern history of Islam that proves the compatibility of nonviolent activism with Islam. In this case, 100,000 battle-hardened Pashtuns embraced satyagraha and ahimsa, aligning themselves with Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi.

Like Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan focused on improving education in his region. He "started a school for Pashtun children and made contact to [*sic*] other Muslims who were in favor of progress in the rest of India."[20] Abdul Ghaffar Khan was known as a dedicated social reformist who worked diligently to improve Pashtuns' quality of life through education and appropriate social reforms. After World War I (in 1919), he first contacted Mahatma Gandhi, and "like many other Indians, he was protesting against the Rowlatt Act."[21] Again, like Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested multiple times, initially in 1919.[22]

Later, he joined the Khilafat movement, which lamented the fall of the Ottoman Empire and attempted to align, spiritually and empathetically, Indian Muslims with Turkey's former Ottoman Caliphate.[23] Abdul Ghaffar Khan used strategies and tactics similar to Mahatma Gandhi's in his campaign, including publishing numerous pro-independence newsletters and magazines. In 1929, he established the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, which, by April 1930, consisted of "500 peace soldiers, and by the end of that year it had 300,000."[24] Significantly, the Khudai Khidmatgar movement used "a Muslim version of the Hindu Satyagraha [used] in the struggle for Indian independence [from] Great Britain."[25] In August 1931,

Gandhi seeks to pacify the British Viceroy about Khan: "I wish you would trust Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The more I see him, the more I love him. He is so sincere, he has no spiritual reservations, and he tells me that to him non-violence is not politics; it's a mantra."

According to the editor of the Magazine *Friends of India*, Ellen Hørup, this was what made a lasting impression at the Karachi Congress opening ceremony in 1931:

Abdul Ghaffar Khan who presented a company of his Red Shirts.

The Red Shirts and their leader are Muslims. They belong to one of those races, whom the British call warlike. But Abdul Ghaffar Khan has converted his 300,000 troops, who he claims to muster, into nonviolent Gandhists. With their shouting, *Inquilab Zindabad* (Long Live the Revolution), they weaken the discipline among those of their fellow countrymen who are enrolled in the army—and in every way, which is peaceful, they prevent the police in using violence against the people of the country.[26]

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Maulana Azad, and Mahatma Gandhi wanted to "achieve political unity between the two religions [Hinduism and Islam]— and the cement which kept the two very different religions on the road to Indian home rule, was, according to Mahatma Gandhi, *nonviolence*."[27] While World War II ripped Europe apart in flames and devastation, the British hoped to recruit Indians on their side supposedly in exchange for independence. Once World War II ended, the British accepted "a constitution drawn up by the Indian people, which in reality would mean independence for India."[28] The question of partition remained a sticking point and drove a wedge between Indian Muslims and Hindus. The Congress Party wanted a unified secular Indian democracy. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his acolytes demanded the creation of Pakistan. Apparently, at this point Abdul Ghaffar Khan "stepped back from the [Congress] Party's Working Committee with the following salute"[29]:

Some recent resolutions of the working Committee indicate that they are restricting the use of non-violence to the fight for India's freedom against constituted authority. . . . I should like to make it clear that the non-violence I have believed in and preached to my brethren of the Khudai-Khidmatgars is much wider. It affects all our life, and only that has permanent value. . . . The Khudai-Khidmatgars must, therefore, be what our name implies, servants of God and humanity by *laying down our own lives and never taking any life*.[30]

The story of Abdul Ghaffar Khan is significant because it complements Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad's life and achievements through satyagraha. In fact, the events in Abdul Ghaffar Khan's life almost directly parallel those of Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi's. The essence of his actions involves nonviolent activism in the context of Islam.

The violent Islamist extremists who seek justice through revenge—and equate the two concepts—must pay attention to these historical precedents,

because they provide the blueprint for moral, legitimate, courageous, and effective struggles against oppression and injustices by means of nonviolent activism.

Furthermore, justice and revenge are not interchangeable concepts, nor are they causal, that is, revenge does not cause or lead to justice. Revenge can actually entrap people in a long-lasting cycle of violence instead of achieving real justice.

UNITY WITHIN ISLAM

Another point of contention and rivalry involving violent Islamist extremists is the sectarianism within Islam, namely Sunnis versus Shi'ites, that has intensified over the last several years. The nonviolent activism of Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Mahatma Gandhi calls for unity between as well as within religions. Therefore, the divisive nature along sectarian lines that the extremists—in all faiths—exploit and to which they violently react is something that the nonviolent activists detest. Intolerance of others, even within one's own religion, is never acceptable.

Yet, the religious extremists feel entitled to judge the suitability of an individual in the faith. In Islamist extremism, the tool of *takfir* has been highly effective in excluding and eliminating the undesirable entities in the proposed Islamic utopia. Maulana Azad spoke against internal schisms among Indian Muslims, and he abhorred such tendencies that he observed in his travels throughout Muslim lands. There is nothing moral, utilitarian, or Islamic about sectarian conflicts and *takfiri* practices. Simply, *takfir* is a convenient tool for extremists to get rid of their targeted groups and individuals in society. Labeling Shi'ites or Sunnis and/or their respective sub-sects as heretics or apostates, hence judging them as "sinners" and "infidels" grants the Islamist extremists license to kill them. This is wrong.

To review, *takfir* is an example of puritanical fanaticism within (Sunni) Islam, and it is the legacy of the early Islamic sect called the Kharijites. In recent years, the rise of the IS has exacerbated the Sunni-Shi'ite rivalry by means of *takfir* declarations against Shi'ites. Professor Vali Nasr

has described the sectarian schism between Shi'ites and Sunnis as "the most important in Islam." Aside from the dispute over succession following the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 CE, Sunnis and Shi'ites disagree over political authority and legitimacy, and the nature of leadership of the masses. While Sunnism emphasizes social order, and hence more tolerance of even a tyrannical leader, Shi'ite (the global minority) look to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the Prophet's grandson in Karbala, as the model to follow; that is, to fight against

tyranny and oppression. Professor Nasr says: "Shi'ites have often invoked the Husayn story to define their conflicts in modern times: against the Shah's forces in Iran in 1979, against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon in the 1980s, and against Saddam Hussein's death squads in Iraq during the anti-Baathist *intifida* (uprising) that followed the first Gulf War in March 1991."[31]

The more recent Sunni–Shi'ite rivalry, especially instigated by the IS, has precipitated the Middle East into a geopolitical and sectarian power struggle, mainly between Saudi Arabia and Iran vis-à-vis proxies. This in and of itself has serious implications for regional and even global peace and security, as seen with impacts and spillover effects of the Syrian civil war, the devastating conflict in Yemen, ongoing strife in Iraq, Libya, northern Sinai, and between the Palestinians and Israelis.

The internal sectarian schisms have caused further fragmentation among the already very fragmented and factionalized populations in the Middle East region. Distrust and suspicions abound because of the geopolitical and ideological competition between the Saudis (Sunni/Wahhabi) and Iranian (Shi'ite) regime. Due to this competition, the Middle East is among the highest ranking regions in the world in terms of weapons purchases and proliferation, and global powers like the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China are eager to oblige with their highly lucrative weapons sales to their Middle Eastern patrons. The seemingly endless arms race in the region, together with the propensity for violent conflicts that have included non-state actors like the IS, Al-Qaeda, and Shi'ite militias including Hezbollah, only perpetuate more violent conflicts and repeatedly trigger humanitarian crises.

Maulana Azad and like-minded Muslims have spoken against sectarian rivalries, and they have encouraged peaceful coexistence and unity within Islam. The Islamist extremists of all sectarian shades and orientations only perpetuate violence against fellow Muslims. Nothing is more counterproductive to the essence of Islam and its provisions for social justice. Maulana Azad understood and promoted that essence of Islam, and his message for unity between and within religions and his nonviolent activism for achieving justice are all proven formulas for peace, security, and stability. These are also ideal formulas to employ in conflict resolution.

CONCLUSION

If people and countries embraced the principles and strategies of Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Mahatma Gandhi, the world would be a better place. The discipline of nonviolent activism in fighting against tyranny, injustices, and oppression has succeeded in achieving justice without violence

and insatiable revenge. Nonviolent activism rises far above the immoral, cowardly, and prejudiced tactics of state and non-state actors who engage in violent bullying and repression of the masses. Real justice is not begotten by unjust acts. Self-realization does not occur when a party is insincere.

The true path to peace, security, stability, and harmony requires a person to be true to him or herself. That applies to countries and governments as much as to individuals. If the goal of today's strategists is to achieve global peace and justice, then facilitating conflicts and arms races and geopolitical rivalries is not the way and means to do so. Global peace and justice presuppose real, just, and fair conflict resolutions. That cannot happen without a commitment to nonviolence—for all parties involved. Maulana Azad and like-minded nonviolent activists understood that. Moreover, the nonviolent struggle for peace and justice is ongoing; thus, it requires persistence and stamina. The story of Maulana Azad and his message of nonviolent activism have proven that it can be done.

In 2011, there appeared a glimmer of hope that Muslims in North Africa and the Middle East had grasped the importance and effectiveness of non-violent activism, and they viewed these strategies as compatible with Islam. That glimmer of hope came with the 2011 Arab Awakening uprisings and revolutions that began in Tunisia and reverberated throughout the region. These events prove that nonviolent civil disobedience is effective regardless of the stage of history in which it takes place. The early twenty-first century has already witnessed major nonviolent campaigns from Hong Kong to parts of Europe to North Africa, and throughout the Middle East, and in the United States.

In the case of Tunisia, the birthplace of, and inspiration for the 2011 Arab Awakening uprisings and revolutions, the commitment to nonviolent con-flict resolution, reconciliation, and negotiations and dialogues with different political parties earned it the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. The National Dialogue Quartet, a group of human rights activists, lawyers, and labor and business unions, facilitated national dialogues and negotiations between interest groups and political parties vying for power in post-revolution Tunisia. In particular, Tunisia experienced the dangers of the Islamist Ennahda Party, ruling at the time, confronting the secular parties in an ominous power struggle, and, like in Egypt, the potential for violent chaos to grip the country intensified.

The Tunisian people have been determined not to allow their country to descend into violent chaos as in the case of Egypt. Tunisia was able to avert the drop from the cliff, and the Quartet played a major role in maintaining the open channels of national dialogue to preclude any violent reactions.

Hence, the Quartet's approach to conflict resolution by means of non-violent dialogue has led to international recognition, respect, and praise for Tunisia. This has been a distinguished example of Maulana Azad's principles

of nonviolent activism applied in the twenty-first century, and, that too in a volatile region that has been known for its propensity for violent conflicts and paucity of real and just conflict resolution.

NOTES

1. "Nonviolent Action," *United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*, 2020, accessed from: https://www.usip.org/issue-areas/nonviolent-action. Emphasis added.

2. Johan Galtung, "Typologies of Violence and Peace," *Religious Literacy Project, Harvard Divinity School*, 2020, accessed from: https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/our-approach/typologies-violence-and-peace.

3. Johan Galtung, "Breaking the Cycle of Violent Conflict," The Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series, edited by Kaitlin Barker, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, December 9, 2020, p. 23.

4. Mahatma Gandhi actually planted the seeds for the fight against Apartheid in South Africa. See Ramachandra Guha, *Gandhi before India* (New York: Vintage Books, 2013).

5. See the 1982 film "Gandhi" starring Ben Kingsley: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083987/.

6. Robert J. Burrowes, "Comparative Political Leadership: Gandhi vs. Contemporary Leaders," *CounterCurrents.org*, September 10, 2019, accessed from: https://countercurrents.org/2019/09/comparative-political-leadership-gandhi-vs-contemporary-leaders/. Emphasis added.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. "Case Study of Conflict Resolution: Mahatma Gandhi," in "Peace Education" segment, *Universal Peace Federation (UPF International)*, September 12, 2005, accessed from: https://www.upf.org/peace-education-and-human-development/peace-education-reports/3183-case-study-of-conflict-resolution-mahatma-gandhi. Emphasis added.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. Emphasis added.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Yasmeen Aftab Ali, "Understanding Pashtunwali," *The Nation*, August 6, 2013, accessed from: https://nation.com.pk/06-Aug-2013/understanding-pashtunwali.

17. Ibid. Emphasis added.

18. "Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan," in "Associates of Mahatma Gandhi," *Mahatma Gandhi's Writings, Philosophy, Audio, Video and Photographs*, no date, accessed from: https://www.mkgandhi.org/associates/gafarkhan.htm.

19. Ibid.

20. Holger Terp, "Nonviolence in Islam: The Case of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan," *The Danish Peace Academy*, 2004, accessed from: http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/khan.htm.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. Emphasis added.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. Emphasis added.

31. Hayat Alvi, "The Diffusion of Intra-Islamic Violence and Terrorism: The Impact of the Proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideologies," *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)* 18, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 41.

Conclusion

This study has provided the ammunition to disarm violent Islamist extremism worldwide. Understanding the legal precedent in Islam that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has provided through his actions, behavior, conduct, discipline, and sense of obligation to fight nonviolently against oppression and injustice is the blueprint for employing such ammunition. Moreover, the 2011 Arab Awakening uprisings and revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have proven that nonviolent activism is more powerful and effective than violent militancy that locks people in a vicious cycle of unending tit-for-tat violence.

Maulana Azad's personal example in the struggle against injustice under the British Raj is a prime model for nonviolent activists to follow for exacting justice and eliminating oppression. Maulana Azad's Islamic orientation had always been moderate, and, in fact, he repudiated the puritans/extremists. Maulana Azad's stature, caliber, and credibility as an Islamic jurist and scholar far outweighs those of the violent Islamist extremists, most of whom have no deep education and training in Islamic jurisprudence and theology.

Maulana Azad not only attained his scholastic credibility in Islamic studies through rigorous educational, linguistic, and jurisprudential training, but he also possessed these attributes and beliefs: intellectual capital; strategic acumen; moral weight; *ijtihad* (versus jihad); religious authority and legitimacy (versus lack of religious authority and legitimacy); civil and human rights; and firm belief in inter- and intra-Islamic unity, pluralism, and secular democracy. The same cannot be said of the violent Islamist extremists, who embody, promote, and violently enforce taqlid—blind imitation—over intellectual capital and reasoning; violent jihad; ignorance of true Islam; denial of human rights; promotion of inter- and intra-Islamic schisms and rivalries; and hatred of secularism, human rights, and democracy. In essence, the violent

137

Islamist extremists strive to create their respective visions of an Islamic uto-
pia that would consist of a religious fascist, totalitarian system implementing
their own interpretations of Islam and Islamic law (shari'a) which would be
imposed on everyone by force.

Maulana Azad was a frontline warrior in the struggle against the British
Raj. Yet, he never raised a fist in accordance with the nonviolent tenets and
strategies of Mahatma Gandhi, which he judged to be wholly compatible
with Islam. As an Indian Muslim leader, Maulana Azad rallied the forces
among the millions of fellow Indian Muslims, despite the ideological divi-
sions among them, and together with their Hindu, Christian, Sikh, and other
counterparts, they disarmed the British colonial power. Maulana Azad, like
his peers, suffered terrible consequences in prisons and in his personal life, as
the nonviolent civil disobedience activists were compelled to make incalcu-
lable sacrifices for the cause. However, in spite of these trials and tribulations,
they stood their ground, and with tremendous self-discipline they remained
nonviolent in the face of violent British oppression.

The only jihad that Maulana Azad approved of was the nonviolent jihad
of struggling against oneself to be pious, righteous, and overall a good per-
son. This is the "greater jihad," which the violent Islamist extremists have
relegated to the margins and eclipsed it with the "lesser jihad," which is the
violent warfare type of jihad. Maulana Azad did not approve of the latter
in the struggle against the British in India. Instead, he aligned himself with
Mahatma Gandhi and his strategy of ahimsa and satyagraha, or nonvio-
lent civil disobedience. According to Maulana Azad, this partnership with
Mahatma Gandhi and adopting the strategy of satyagraha were completely in
compliance with Islam.

In addition, Maulana Azad fervently opposed the idea of partitioning India
upon independence (1947) to create a homeland for Indian Muslims that
would be called Pakistan. He strongly believed in inter- and intra-Islamic
unity and saw no problem with maintaining an undivided independent Indian
republic with a secular democratic system to accommodate the vast pluralism
of the Indian masses. This, too, he viewed as compliant with Islam.

Moreover, he criticized the creation of Pakistan even by name because
its meaning connotes "purity." Pakistan means "land of the pure," which
Maulana Azad contended, "was against the spirit of Islam, since it implied
that some areas are *pak* (pure), some are not. Islam recognizes no such
division."[1]

This study has presented a strong counterargument against violent jihadism
and Islamist extremism by focusing on the nonviolent principles and actions
of Maulana Azad, who, as a respected and recognized religious authority, set
the legal and religious precedent in the modern history of Islam for nonvio-
lent civil disobedience. The principles of Maulana Azad and his message of

nonviolent activism can be used in any struggle against oppression and injustices, and, importantly, they are the best ammunition against violent Islamist extremism, which grossly loses credibility and moral weight and value when compared to nonviolent activism.

In fact, Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi inspired Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a prominent Pashtun leader, to embrace the same nonviolent strategy against the British in his geographic region. That in and of itself marks a stark departure from the violent warrior reputation of the Pashtuns and the Pashtunwali code that calls for acts of revenge. For him to achieve forging an army of nonviolent fellow Pashtun warriors is akin to a miracle. Abdul Ghaffar Khan came to be known as the "Frontier Gandhi." This illustrates the power and magnetism of and moral courage required in nonviolent civil disobedience activism.

We live in a world that is inundated with negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims, and the extremists provide ample material for the media to perpetuate these unconstructive and unflattering labels. With Maulana Azad's moderate orientation in Islamic teachings and nonviolent practices, these negative trends can be reversed.

Maulana Azad and Mahatma Gandhi's examples have inspired other nonviolent civil rights activists in modern history, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The United States would not have changed the unjust laws supporting racial segregation and discrimination without the resolute nonviolent civil disobedience and activism of Dr. King and his cohorts. He personally adopted Mahatma Gandhi's strategy of satyagraha, citing it as his source of inspiration. Also, all three men, Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad, and Dr. King, were religious and found inspiration for nonviolent activism from their respective faiths. In addition, their faith-based messages to the masses proved effective in mobilizing them to participate in their respective morally credible causes. Joining nonviolent civil disobedience campaigns is far more morally acceptable than joining extremist groups, and the former is legal as opposed to the latter when extremists act on their agendas employing vicious violence against innocent targets.

As chapter 5 has explained, there is an intrinsic moral component and metric in nonviolent activism. Nonviolent civil disobedience is considered moral, especially compared to immoral oppressors and their violent repression. Moreover, nonviolent activists exhibit greater courage by rejecting violence while placing themselves in danger of bodily harm, imprisonment, and even death. That is why they earn the reputation of having great moral courage and credibility in the struggle against oppression and injustices. They display a level of selflessness in their nonviolent struggles for a just cause that is highly admirable. Nonviolent civil disobedience requires impressive discipline and the will to sacrifice one's comforts, health, personal life, freedom, and,

perhaps, even life itself. Where nonviolent activists willingly face batons, water cannons, imprisonment, and possibly even worse punishments, the opposite tactic of grabbing a gun is, in comparison, much less impressive and a lot more convenient.

Furthermore, nonviolent activism is more likely to resolve conflicts; whereas, violent conflicts frequently lock the warring parties in a cycle of terrible violence that causes direct and second-order negative consequences affecting civilians, resources, economies, security, stability, the environment, children's education, displacement of people, and long-term effects of munitions, mines, possibly chemical weapons, and the like. Violent wars that seem endless and have no resolution in sight serve no one's interests and nobody benefits from them. Nonviolent activism usually results in conflict resolution and changes in laws and policies toward more just social and legal codes. Everyone benefits from nonviolent activism.

Johan Galtung, the sage of peace research and education, urges that we as humans should: "Try to understand . . . deep cultures hidden in the collective subconscious. Pay much attention to culture and nation, less to threats/bribes and states. Be *solution*-, not victory-, oriented—also in your daily life."[2] He has underscored the counterproductive nature of states, politics, and multinational corporations that jump at any chance to use both hard and soft power for their own advantages often at the expense of the people, environment, and, perhaps, future generations. This is especially the case when states and some non-state actors, like religious and secular extremists, promote violent conflicts for their respective agendas. In the end, nobody wins.

The issue of extremism hit Galtung personally, as his granddaughter was one of the political activists of the Labourite Youth organization participating in a retreat on Utøya Island in Norway when white supremacist Anders Breivik gunned down almost seventy of the youth activists on July 22, 2011. While Galtung's granddaughter survived this "lone wolf" terrorist attack, it underscored the need for peace education, which promotes tolerance and moderation in attitudes toward others and especially in the process of conflict resolution. In an interview with Amy Goodman of *Democracy Now!* Galtung discusses terrorism and extremist ideologies soon after the July 22 terrorist attack in Norway carried out by Breivik. He says:

> We have 10 percent of Norwegians born abroad, and a heavy portion of them are Muslims. And by and large, they are integrated perfectly, speak fantastic Norwegian. You now have them second generation. And as I say to my family members, I am totally prepared for the circumstance that there will be a Mohammed Galtung and a Fatima Galtung in the future. And Galtung is some of the oldest families in Norway, from Viking times [. . .].

His ideology. . . . We have to try to understand him. So, I identify three features very quickly. Point one, a civil war in Europe between deep Christianity, which is his essentially as Catholic, and Islam. And a civil war has been going on and is going on. Point two, Islam is penetrating on a road greased by multiculturalism, tolerance, and key proponents of this tolerance are the builders of that road, which he finds in what he calls "cultural Marxism" and social democracy. And point three, debate is impossible. You cannot end the Norwegian democracy and have a debate about this, because people are deaf and dumb. The Islamists, as he calls and would refer to all Muslims, will not listen; they are just pursuing their cause. In other words, the only possible response, horrible as it is, is violence—terrible, but necessary. There you have three features.

And that makes me immediately ask the question, what does it remind me of? And I have one simple answer and one horrifying answer. I will take the simple answer first: it reminds me of Nazism.[3]

Galtung states that the intolerance of Islamophobia proliferating in Norway fueled Breivik's fear, anger, and hatred of Muslim immigrants and refugees coming to his country. Apparently, Breivik targeted the Labourite Youth because they espoused tolerance and receptive attitudes toward the inflow of Muslims. Breivik acted out his hatred by violently attacking the younger generation of political activists who promoted tolerance, human rights, and freedoms for everyone including non-Christians. Galtung has tried to allay the fears of the Islamophobes in Norway. He says, "Talk with the Islamic people you are so afraid of. And you will find them 99.99 percent very, very reasonable."[4]

Galtung encourages people to focus on solutions, not competitions and victory, as quoted earlier. Violent extremism serves no real purpose. Nonviolent activism leads to fair and just conflict resolution by means of dialogues, negotiations, and clear communication of the position of all parties involved. Nonviolent activism also requires relentless stubbornness, like Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad, Nehru, and others manifested as part of their satyagraha discipline. They posed as constantly irritating thorns in the side of the British Raj, but without ever resorting to violence. Through their perseverance, the nonviolent activists achieved their goals.

Moreover, the violent Islamist extremists' argument that oppression has to be countered with violent jihad has no leg to stand on, because Maulana Azad has proven otherwise. In committing violent jihad, the extremists usually perpetrate worse brutality and injustices on innocent people, hence their arguments for violent jihadism are undermined by their own brutality. Targeting fellow Muslims using *takfir* as a weak justification, as well as killing and injuring non-Muslims who have done nothing against the extremists,

renders the perpetrators as no better than the oppressors they claim to be fighting against.

The majority of Muslims in the world are moderate and condemn the violent extremism of the so-called jihadists. The world's moderate Muslims angrily condemn the violent jihadists whose actions are deemed "un-Islamic," contrary to the extremists' insistence that they are implementing "true" Islamic principles and mandates. The fact is that the violent Islamist extremists have hijacked Islam, and relating the story and message of Maulana Azad is one of the most effective ways to release it from the trappings of the extremists. Essentially, there is nothing religiously moral or acceptable about killing innocent civilians to achieve one's goals, which usually involve provoking others into a violent cycle of conflicts and vengeful bloodletting.

Moreover, Maulana Azad had the opportunity to demand a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, siding with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, but he rejected the entire scheme. Maulana Azad stood for Hindu–Muslim unity, tolerance, and peaceful coexistence for an independent India that would adopt secular, pluralist, liberal democracy as its political system. Any violent Islamist extremist—individual or organization—would never pass up the opportunity to demand, create, and then rule over a "Muslim homeland," as a means to establish the much dreamed about Islamic utopia. Yet, Maulana Azad never accepted such a notion. He was pragmatic, reasonable, and he believed in compromise and mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.

He also criticized intra-Islamic schisms, which the violent Islamist extremists like to intensify because they reject any creed that does not comply with their own, including among fellow Muslims. Maulana Azad detested the puritan/extremist dogma, that is, taqlid, or blind imitation of tradition in Islam. Instead, he advocated *ijtihad*, or reinterpretation, because he acknowledged and appreciated the potential impacts of modernization on Islam, and the fact that Muslims need to adjust to changing times. Taqlid is far too rigid, and it goes against the spirit and essence of Islam. In Maulana Azad's view, violent jihad also goes against the spirit and essence of Islam, especially when it is used as a pretext to fight against oppression and injustice. Oppression should not be fought with oppression. Besides, nonviolent activism has been proven to work, and it does not contradict or conflict against Islam.

Nonviolent Activism in Islam: The Message of Abul Kalam Azad has presented a convincing religious (Islamic) argument supporting nonviolent activism with ample evidence and historical examples, serving as ideological and intellectual ammunition against violent Islamist extremism and militancy. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad is undoubtedly a highly respected religious authority and historical figure, hero even, in India's struggle against colonialism. Maulana Azad adopted and practiced Mahatma Gandhi's principles of ahimsa (nonviolence) and satyagraha (civil disobedience), and, given his

status as an Islamic scholar and jurist, his embrace and implementation of these concepts and strategies indicate that they are wholly compatible with Islam.

One of the most potent attributes of Maulana Azad includes his approval and use of intellectualism in both secular and religious domains. Having served as India's first minister of education, he instilled in the newly independent republic educational structures and institutions that reflect his passion for learning, sharing knowledge, and embracing intellectualism. These attributes set him apart from a long list of would-be Islamic leaders, whose actions and intentions have clearly bended to their individual, often deranged agendas. Moreover, Islamist terrorist leaders and organizations in particular have sullied the name and reputation of Islam with their mockery of the faith using grotesque violence and rejecting intellectual capital and power. Nonviolent activism along with an acceptance of intellectualism and reasoning are the keys to success in the age of modernization, and they provide the blueprint for moral courage and credibility in the face of injustices and oppression. Raising people's awareness and consciousness about the effectiveness of nonviolent activism in Islam, as Maulana Azad illustrated and led the charge for Indian Muslims, is an exceedingly important mission.

We live in a stage of history wherein secular and religious violent extremism is proliferating and making the world less peaceful, tolerant, safe, and secure. The onus is on us to turn the tide against the forces of extremism, and this book has sought to do so with valid arguments against violent Islamist extremism and militancy. Maulana Azad is proof that nonviolent activism in Islam exists with full legitimacy and offers the formula for successful conflict resolution, as well as the greater likelihood for peace, tolerance, and security for all.

NOTES

1. Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, *Maulana Azad, Islam and the Indian National Movement* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 257–258.

2. Al McKay, "Interview—Johan Galtung," E-International Relations, May 27, 2014, accessed from: https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/27/interview-johan-galtung/.

3. "Norway's Johan Galtung, Peace and Conflict Pioneer, on How to Stop Extremism that Fueled Shooting," Interview by Amy Goodman, Transcript, *Democracy Now!* July 29, 2011, accessed from: https://www.democracynow.org/2011/7/29/norways_johan_galtung_peace_conflict_pioneer.

4. Ibid.

Appendix

Maulana Azad's Speeches

Translated by Md Eisa (with assistance from Hifzullah Qasmi)

ABUL KALAM AZAD'S SPEECH AT
JAMA MASJID, DELHI, IN 1947

[To persuade Muslims not to migrate to Pakistan]
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL5MG2vluW0
Maulana Azad:

جنگ میں وہی بچتا ہے جن کے پاوں کے نیچے زمین مضبوط ہو، میں آپ کو آئندہ نقشوں کے بھارت سے نہیں روکتا، لیکن آل انڈیا کانگریس کی صدارت کے دو برس میں میں نے جو کوششیں کیں اور مسلمان لیڈروں میں جس طرح انہیں ٹھکرایا اس کے بیان کرنے کا یہ موقعہ تو نہیں لیکن آپ کی یاددہانی کے لیے مجھے پھر دہرانا پڑتا ہے کہ جب میں نے مسلم لیگ کی پاکستانی اسکیم کی تمام پہلووں پر بہت کچھ غور کیاتو اس نتیجے پر پہنچا ہوں کہ پورے ہندوستان کے لیے اس اسکیم کے جو بھی نقصان ہیں وہ اپنی جگہ لیکن مسلمانوں کے لیے یہ تجویز سخت تباہ کن ثابت ہوگی، اس سے ان کی کوئی مشکل حل ہونے کے بجائے مزید مشکلات پیدا ہوجائیں گی۔ اول تو پاکستان کا لفظ ہی میرے نزدیک اسلامی تصورات کے خلاف ہے، پیغمبر اسلام صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کا ارشاد ہے کہ اللہ تعالی نے تمام روئے زمین کو میرے لیے مسجد بنا دیا ہے، اس روئے زمین کو پاک و ناپاک کے درمیان تقسیم کرنا ہی اسلامی تعلیمات کے منافی ہے، دوسرے یہ کہ یہ پاکستان کی اسکیم ایک طرح سے مسلمانوں کے لیے شکست کی علامت ہے۔ ہندوستان میں مسلمانوں کی تعداد دس کروڑ ہے اور اپنی زبردست تعداد کے ساتھ ایسی مذہبی و معاشرتی صفات کی حامل ہے کہ ہندوستان کی قومی و وطنی زندگی میں پالیسیوں و نظم و نسق کے تمام معاملات پر فیصلہ کن اثر ڈالنے کی طاقت رکھتے ہیں، پاکستان کی اسکیم کے ذریعہ ان کی ساری صلاحیتیں و قوتیں تقسیم و ضائع ہو جائیں گی، اور میرے نزدیک یہ بدترین بزدلی کا نشان ہے کہ میں اپنی میراثی ---کے بجائے ایک چھوٹے سے ٹکڑے پر قناعت کرلوں، میں اس مسئلہ کے دوسرے تمام پہلووں کو نظر انداز کرکے تنہا مسلم مفاد کے نقطہ نظر سے بھی غور کرنے کے لیے تیار ہوں کہ اگر پاکستان کی اسکیم کسی طور پر بھی مسلموں کے مفید ثابت کر دیا جائے تو میں اسے قبول کر لوں گا اور دوسروں سے اسے منوانے پر پورا زور صرف کر ڈالوں گا مگر حقیقت یہ ہے کہ اس اسکیم سے مسلمان کی جماعتی و ملی مفاد کا ذرا بھی فائدہ نہ ہوگا اور نہ ان کا کوئی اندیشہ دور ہو سکے گا،

145

ہاں جو تجویز اور فارمولا میں نے تیار کیا تھا جسے کابینہ مشن اور کانگریس دونوں سے ہی پاس کرانے میں کامیاب ہو گیا تھا اور جس کی رو سے تمام صوبے مکمل طور پر خود مختار قرار دے دیئے گئے تھے،اس میں پاکستانی اسکیم کی وہ تمام خوبیاں موجود ہیں جو ان نقائص سے پاک ہیں جو ان کی اسکیم میں پائی جاتی ہیں۔ اب آپ جذبات سے بالا تر ہو کر اس کے ممکنہ نقائص پر غور کریں کہ ہندو اکثریت کے علاقوں میں کروڑوں کی تعداد میں یہ مسلمان مگر بہت چھوٹی چھوٹی اقلیت کی صورت میں پورے ملک میں بکھر کر رہ گئے اور آج جو مقابلے میں آنے والے ہیں وہ کل کو بھی زیادہ کمزور ہو جائیں گے، جہاں ان کے گھر بار اور بود و باش ایک ہزار سال سے چلی آ رہی ہے اور جہاں وہ اسلامی تہذیب و تمدن کے مشہور اور بڑے بڑے مراکز تعمیر کیے، ہندو اکثریت کے علاقے میں بسنے والے یہ مسلمان ایک دن اچانک صبح آنکھ کھلتے ہی اپنے آپ کو اپنے گھر اور وطن میں پردیسی اور اجنبی پائے گئے، تعلیمی ومعاشی لحاظ سے پسماندہ ہو گئے اور ایک ایسی حکومت کے رحم و کرم پر ہو گئے جو خالص ہندو راج بن گئی، پاکستان میں خواہ مسلمانوں کی مکمل اکثریت کی حکومت ہی کیوں نہ قائم ہوجائے، اس سے ہندوستان میں رہنے والے مسلمانوں کا مسئلہ ہرگز حل نہیں ہو سکے گا، یہ دو ریاستیں ایک دوسرے کا مد مقابل بن کر ایک دوسرے کی اقلیت کا مسئلہ حل کرنے کی پوزیشن میں نہیں آسکتی، اس سے تو یرغمال اور انتقام کا راستہ کھلے گا۔

میرے بھائیوں، آپ کو یاد ہوگا کہ جون ۱۹۴۷ میں کانگریس کی حکومت سنبھالنے کے بعد جب میں نے ہندو مسلم اختلاف کے تصفیے کی طرف سے بحیثیت کانگریس صدر مسٹر محمد علی جناح صدر مسلم لیگ کو یہ تجویز بھیجی تھی کہ ہندوستان کے تمام صوبوں و مرکز میں کسی ایک پارٹی کے وزارت کے بجائے کانگریس اور مسلم لیگ پر مشتمل مخلوط وزارت بنائی جائے،لیکن مسٹر جناح نے میری تجویز کو یہ کہہ کر مسترد کردی کہ تم کو کانگریس کی صدر بنایا ہے،اس لیے تم نے کسی طرح کی گفتگو نہیں کرنا چاہتا ہوں اور برابر کی سطح پر ہندو مسلم تصفیہ کا وہ موقعہ جس طرح ہاتھ سے نکل گیا میں آج تک یہ سمجھنے سے قاصر رہا ہوں کہ غیر تقسیم شدہ ہندوستان کی پہلی حکومت جب چودہ ارکان پر مشتمل ہوتی اور جس میں سات مسلمان نمائندے ہوتے اور سات غیر مسلم نمائندے جن میں ہندو کے صرف دو ہوتے، اسلام اور مسلمانوں کے کون سے اہم مفاد کے پیش نظر مسٹر جناح کے لیے قابل قبول نہیں تھے، کیا اس طرح سے مسلمانوں کے لیے ہندوستان کی پہلی حکومت سے معقول حصہ نہیں مل رہا تھا، میرے بھائیوں، میں آپ کو اس واقعہ کی روشنی میں بتانا چاہتا ہوں کہ جب لارڈ ون کی جگہ لارڈ لاون پیٹن ہندستان کے آخری وائسرائے مقرر ہو کر آئے اور انہوں نے دھیرے دھیرے سردار پٹیل اور جوابر لال نہرو اور گاندھی وغیرہ کانگریسی رہنماوں کو تقسیم کا نظریہ قبول کر لینے پر آمادہ کر لیا ، بالآخر ۳ جون ۱۹۴۷ کو ہندوستان کو دو ریاستوں میں تقسیم کردینے کی تجویز کا اعلان کردیا گیا، میرے بھائی یہ اعلان در اصل نہ ہندوستان کے مفاد میں تھا اور نہ ہی مسلمان کے مفاد میں، اس سے صرف برطانوی مفاد کی حفاظت مقصود تھی اس لیے کہ ہندوستان کی تقسیم مسلمان اکثریت کے صوبوں کی الگ ریاست قائم کر دینے سے برطانیہ کو بر صغیر میں اپنے پاوں ٹکانے کا موقعہ حاصل ہو جاتا تھا، ایک ایسی ریاست جس میں مسلم لیگ کے نام پر برطانیہ کے پسندیدہ افراد بر سر اقتدار آجائیں گے، مستقل طور پر برطانیہ کے زیر اثر رکھی جا سکتی تھی، اور اس کا اثر ہندوستان کے رویے پر پڑنا لازمی ہوگا، ہندوستان یہ دیکھے گا کہ پاکستان میں انگریزوں کا اثر ہے تو وہ اپنے یہاں بھی انگریزوں کے اثر کا لحاظ رکھے گا ۔ آخر کار ۱۴ اگست ۱۹۴۷ کو ہندوستان تقسیم کردیا گیا، پاکستان اور ہندوستان کی دو آزاد ریاستیں وجود میں آگئیں، جو یکساں طور پر برطانوی کامن ویلتھ کا ممبر بننے پر راضی ہوگئیں، اور پھر یہ بدترین خدشات صحیح ثابت ہونے لگیں، ایک فرقہ دوسرے فرقے کا بدترین دشمن بن کر قتل عام و غارت گری اور لوٹ مار پر اتر آیا، خون کی لکیروں کے ساتھ دو ملکوں کی سرحدیں کھنچ جانے لگی اور افسوس یہ مسلمان تقسیم در تقسیم ہو کر رہ گئے، لیکن اب کیا ہو سکتا ہے؟ اب اگرچہ ہندوستان نے آزادی

حاصل کر لی لیکن اتحاد باقی نہیں رہا ، پاکستان کے نام پر جو نئی ریاست وجود میں آئی ہے جس
میں برطانیہ کے پسندیدہ افراد کا برسر اقتدار طبقہ وہ ہے جو برطانوی حکومت کا پروردہ رہا
ہے، اس کے طرز عمل میں خدمت خلق اور قربانی کا کبھی کوئی شائبہ نہیں رہا ہے، اور صرف
اپنے ذاتی مفاد کے لیے مسلم لیگ کے کاموں میں شریک ہوتے رہے ہیں اور پاکستان کے قیام کا
صرف ایک ہی نتیجہ نکلا ہے کہ بر صغیر میں مسلمانوں کی پوزیشن کمزور ہو کر رہ گئی ہے،
اور یہ ہندوستان میں رہنے والے مسلمان تو کمزور ہو ہی گئے ہیں ۔ یہ ہندوستان میں رہ جانے
والے کروڑوں مسلمان جو اب ابد تک ہندوں کے ظلم اور انتقام کا شکار رہیں گے پاکستان میں
بسنے والے مسلمان ان کی کوئی بھی مدد نہ کر سکیں گے اور اسی طرح سے پاکستان میں بسنے
والے مسلمان جس معاشرتی، اقتصادی کمزوری اور ذہنی پسماندگی کا شکار رہیں گے تو ہندوستان
میں بسنے والے مسلمان ان کی کوئی مدد نہ کر سکیں گے، اور کیا یہ بات غور کرنے کی نہیں
کہ جب تقسیم کی بنیاد ہی ہندو اور مسلمانوں کے درمیان عداوت پر رکھی گئی تھی تو پاکستان کے
قیام سے یہ منافرت ایک آئین کی شکل اختیار کر گئی ہے، اور اس کا حل اب اور زیادہ مشکل ہو
گیا ہے، اور اسی طرح یہ دونوں ملک خوف و ہراس کے تحت اپنے اپنے فوجی اخراجات دینے
پر مجبور رہیں گے، معاشی ترقی سے محروم ہوتے چلے جائیں گے، آج میں اگر ملامت کروں تو
کس کو کروں؟ کیسے کروں اور کیوں کر کروں؟اپنے بھائیوں کو ، اپنے عزیزوں کو ؟ کس دیوار
سے سر ٹکراوں؟ آپ جانتے ہیں کہ مجھے کون سی چیز یہاں لے آئی ہے؟ میرے لیے شاید یہاں
کی مسجد اس یادگار مسجد کا پہلا اجتماع نہیں ہے۔ میں ایک زمانے میں یہاں سے خطاب کیا تھا۔
تب تمہارے جگر پر مہنگائی کی جگہ پر اسلام تھا، اور تمہارے دلوں میں شرک کے بجائے اعتماد
تھا اور آج تمہارے چہرے پر مسکراہٹ اور دلوں کی ویرانی دیکھتا ہوں تو بے اختیار پچھلے چند
برسوں کی بھولی بسری کہانیاں یاد آ جاتی ہیں، تمہیں یاد ہے میں نے تمہیں پکارا تم نے میری زبان
کاٹ ڈالی ، میں نے قلم اٹھایا تم نے میرے ہاتھ قلم کر دیئے، میں نے چلنا چاہا تم نے میرے پاوں
کاٹ دیئے میں نے کروٹ لینی چاہی تم نے میری کمر توڑ دی حتیّ کہ پچھلے سات سال کی تلخ نوا
سیاست جو تمہیں آج داغ جدائی دے گئی ہے اُس کے عہدِ شباب میں بھی میں نےتمہیں خطرے کی
ہر شاہراہ پر جھنجھوڑا، لیکن تم نےمیری صدا سے نہ صرف اعراض کیا بلکہ غفلت و انکار کی
ساری سنتیں تازہ کر دیں جو تمھیں صراطِ مستقیم سے دور لےگیا تھا۔

Maulana Azad (translated into English):

Only those who have strong ground under their feet survive the war. I will not
stop you from the future maps of India, but of the efforts I made in the two
years of the presidency of the All India Congress and the way in which Muslim
leaders rejected them, this is not an appropriate time to talk about, but to remind
you, I have to reiterate that when I have considered all the aspects of the Muslim
League's Pakistan scheme, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the
disadvantages of this scheme are for the whole of India. Yes, they have their
place, but for Muslims, this proposal would be extremely destructive. It will
create more problems instead of any solution for them. First of all, the word
Pakistan is against Islamic concepts in my opinion. The Prophet of Islam (ﷺ)
has said that Allah Almighty has made the whole earth a mosque for me. To
divide this earth between the *Pak* and *Na-Pak* (pure and the impure) is contrary
to Islamic teachings. Pakistan's scheme is in a way a sign of defeat for Muslims.
The number of Muslims in India is 10 crores and with its enormous number, it

carries such religious and social attributes that have the power to have a decisive influence on all matters of policy and administration in India.

Through the scheme all their abilities and strengths will be divided and wasted, and to me, it is the worst sign of cowardice to be content with a small piece of land instead of inherited land. Ignoring all other aspects of this problem, I am ready to consider from the point of view of Muslim interest alone that if Pakistan's scheme proves to be useful to Muslims in any way, I will accept it and I will do my best to persuade others. But the fact is that this scheme will not benefit the Muslim community in the slightest and will not allay any of their fears.

Yes, the proposal and formula which I had prepared and was successful in passing through both the Cabinet Mission and the Congress and as a result, all the provinces were declared completely independent and have all the advantages of the Pakistani scheme that are free from the flaws that are found in their scheme. Now go beyond emotions and consider its possible flaws that in the Hindu-majority areas there are crores of these Muslims, but in the form of a very small minority, they are scattered all over the country and those who compete today will be even weaker tomorrow. Where their homes and barracks have been for a thousand years and where they have built famous and large centers of Islamic civilization, these Muslims, who live in a Hindu-majority area, suddenly found themselves strangers in their homes and homeland one morning. They became educationally and economically backward and at the mercy of a government that became a pure Hindu Raj. Even if a government of absolute Muslim majority is formed in Pakistan, it will not solve the problem of Muslims living in India. These two states cannot be in a position to solve the problem of each other's minority due to competing with each other. It will open the way for hostage-[taking] and revenge.

My brethren! You may recall that after the Congress took over the government in June 1940[1] when I, as the Congress president, sent a proposal to the president of the Muslim League, Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to settle all Hindu and Muslim differences that we should have a joint ministry of Congress and Muslim League instead of a single party ministry, [but] Mr. Jinnah rejected my proposal saying that you have been made the president of the Congress so I do not want to talk to you in any way and as the opportunity for Hindu-Muslim settlement on an equal footing was missed. I still fail to understand that when the first government of undivided India consisted of fourteen members with seven Muslim representatives and seven non-Muslims representatives, of which there were only two Hindus, why it was not acceptable to Mr. Jinnah in view of what important interests [there are] of Islam and Muslims? Weren't the Muslims getting a fair share from the first government of India in this way?

My brothers! In the light of this incident, I would like to tell you that when Lord [Archibald] Wavell was replaced by Lord Mountbatten as the last Viceroy of India and he gradually persuaded the Congress leaders like Sardar Patel,

Jawaharlal Nehru, and Mahatma Gandhi to accept the idea of partition, finally, on June 3, 1947, [the] announcement was made to divide India into two states.

My brother! This declaration was in fact neither in the interest of India nor in the interest of the Muslims. It was only to protect British interests, as the partition of India and the creation of a separate state of Muslim-majority provinces allowed Britain to set foot in the subcontinent. The state, in which Britain's favorite people would come to power in the name of the Muslim League, could be permanently under British influence, and its impact had to fall on the attitude of India. If India sees that the British have influence in Pakistan, then it will also consider the influence of the British here as well. Finally, on August 14, 1947, India was divided and two independent states of Pakistan and India came into being, which agreed to become members of the British Commonwealth alike, and then these worst fears began to come true. One sect became the worst enemy of the other sect and started massacres and looting. The borders of the two countries began to be drawn with lines of blood, and unfortunately these Muslims were divided into sect after sect. But what can happen now?

Now India has though gained independence, but the alliance is no more. The new state that has emerged in the name of Pakistan was controlled by the ruling class of Britain's favorite people who have been nurtured by the British government. In their practice there has never been a trace of serving the people and sacrificing for them, and they have been participating in the work of the Muslim League only for their own benefit and the only result of the establishment of Pakistan was that the position of Muslims in the subcontinent started weakening, and these Muslims living in India have become weak. The millions of Muslims who [are] left in India will forever be victims of the oppression and revenge of the Hindus. The Muslims living in Pakistan will not be able to help them at all and so will the Muslims living in Pakistan who are suffering from social, economic weakness and mental/intellectual deficiencies, Muslims living in India will not be able to help them. Shouldn't it be considered that when the basis of partition was based on enmity between Hindus and Muslims, due to the establishment of Pakistan this animosity has taken the form of a constitution, and it has become even more difficult to resolve, and so the two countries will be forced to pay their military expenditures out of fear, losing economic growth.

If I blame today, who will I blame? How and why? To my brothers? To my loved ones? Which wall should I hit my head on? Do you know what brought me here? For me, this is probably not the first gathering in this mosque. I addressed from here. Then there was Islam and confidence in your hearts instead of *shirk* (blasphemy), and today when I see the smile on your face and the desolation of hearts, I remember the forgotten stories of the last few years. Do you remember? I called you, you cut my tongue. I picked up the pen, you cut my hands. I wanted to walk, you cut my legs, I wanted to take rest, you broke my back. Even during

the bitterness of the last seven years of the politics that has given you the stain of separation today, I have shaken you on every highway of danger, but you have not only turned away from my voice but have renewed all the traditions of negligence and denial that have taken you away from the straight path.

INSPIRATIONAL SPEECH OF
MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD

Source : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n72A1VUYkF4
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting:

Abul Kalam Muhiyuddin Ahmed Azad was an Indian scholar and a senior political leader of the Indian independence movement. Following India's independence, he became the first minister of education in government. He was born on November 11, 1888, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He was one of the core members of the Indian National Congress and played an important role in the Indian independence fight against British Rule. He passed away in the year 1958 on February 22, in Delhi, India. He authored many books and notable among them are: *India Wins Freedom, The Dawn of Hope,* and so on. He was awarded the highest Indian civilian award—the *Bharat Ratna.*

Narration:

آئیے ایک ایسی ہی امر آواز سے نکلتے سندیش اور وچاروں سے آپ کو ملوائیں، یہ آواز ہے مولانا ابو الکلام آزاد کی۔

Maulana Azad:

ابھی کل کی بات ہے کہ ہم اپنے ملک کی آزادی کے لیے رو رہے تھے اور تمام دنیا میں ہندوستان کی قومی داد رسی کا شور مچ گیا، کیا کیا نقشے نہیں ہیں جو ہم نے آزاد ہندوستان کے نہیں بنائے، اور کیا کیا خواب نہیں ہیں جو ہم نے قومی زندگی کو اٹھانے کے لیے نہیں دیکھے، آج وہ سب کہاں چلے گئے، کیا ہمارے دماغ کے کسی کونے میں بھی ان کی پرچھائیں باقی رہی ہے، کیا ان کی بو باس بھی کوئی بد بخت آب و ہوا میں سونگھ سکتا ہے، ہماری آزادی کے مخالفوں نے ہمیشہ کہا تھا کہ ہندوستانیوں کے ہاتھ پاوں جب تک غلامی کے بندھنوں میں بندھے ہوئے ہیں تبھی تک امن و چین ہے، جہاں یہ بندھن ٹوٹے اور انہوں نے ایک دوسرے کی گردنیں کاٹنا شروع کردیا، آج آزاد ہندوستان کو اس کی زندگی کا سب سے بڑا خطرہ پیش آگیا ہے، وہ ایک بڑی گہری خندق کے کنارے کھڑا ہے، اس کی قسمت جھول رہی ہے، یا تو اسے خندق میں گرنا ہے یا چھلانگ مار کر صحیح سلامت پار اتر جانا ہے، اگر ہم چاہتے ہیں کہ اپنے ملک کی آزادی کو اس خطرے سے سلامت نکال لے جائیں تو ہمیں چاہیے کہ پہلے ٹھیک طور پر سمجھ لیں کہ خطرہ کیا ہے، اورپھر اس سے اس ملک کو بچانے کی تدبیر کریں، خطرہ ہمیں جو آج پیش آگیا ہے وہ ملک کی بد امنی

و بدنظمی کا خطرہ ہے، بد امنی و بد نظمی کا خطرہ آہستہ آہستہ سر اٹھا رہا ہے، اگر حکومت و ملک کی پوری قوت کے ساتھ یہ خطرہ نہیں دبا دیا گیا تو کوئی نہیں کہہ سکتا کہ معاملہ کہاں جا کر تھم سکے گا، اگر فی الحقیقت آپ ایسا یقین کرتے ہیں تو آپ کا فرض بنتا ہے کہ اس کام کے لیے اپنی ساری قوتوں کو لگا دیجئے، جہاں تک حکومت کا تعلق ہے اس نے پوری قوت کے ساتھ فیصلہ کر لیا ہے کہ کسی حال میں بھی بد امنی و بد نظمی کو برداشت نہیں کرے گی، اور ہر فتنے کو جو سر اٹھائے گا آہنی ہاتھوں سے ملیا میٹ کرے گی، آپ کو بھی چاہئے کہ اس کام میں حکومت کا ہاتھ بٹائیں اور ہر طرح کی بد امنی و بد نظمی کو روکیں، آپ اپنا یہ فرض کیونکر ادا کر سکتے ہیں اس کی تفصیل میں نہیں جاوں گا، اگر آپ دل کی سچی لگن کے ساتھ تیار ہو گئے ہیں تو آپ کو بتلانے کی ضرورت نہیں ہے کہ آپ کو ملک کی خدمت کے لیے جان دینی چاہئے۔

Narration (translation):

"Let us introduce you to the same message and thoughts coming out of a voice, this is the voice of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad."

Maulana Azad (translated into English):

Just yesterday we were crying for the freedom of our country and India sought for help all over the world. Aren't there maps that we didn't make of independent India and aren't there dreams that we have not seen to lift the standard of the country? Where have they all gone today? Do their shadows remain in any corner of our brain? Can even their scent be smelled in an unfortunate climate? Opponents of our freedom have always said that as long as the hands and feet of Indians are bound in the bonds of slavery, there is peace and tranquility. As long as these bonds are broken, they will start cutting each other's necks.

Today, independent India faces the greatest threat to its life. It is standing on the edge of a big deep ditch, its fate is swaying. Either it has to fall into the ditch or jump and cross it safely. If we want to take our country's independence out of this danger, we must first understand exactly what the threat is and then take measures to save the country from it. The danger that has befallen us today is a threat of instability and disorder [to the country]. The threat of instability and disorder is slowly rising. If this threat is not suppressed with the full force of the government and the country, then no one can say where the matter will go. If you really believe that, then it is your duty to put all your strength into it.

As far as the government is concerned, it has decided with all its might that it will not tolerate lawlessness and disorder at any cost and every tribulation that will be raised will be met with iron hands. You should also help the government in this work and prevent any kind of lawlessness and disorder. I will not go into the details of how you can fulfil this duty. If you are ready with true devotion, you will not need to be told that you have to give your life for the service of the country.

EXCERPTS OF A SPEECH DELIVERED
BY MAULANA AZAD

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cYRwnCS7NY

آپ کو یاد کرنا چاہئے کہ دنیا میں ہر ذمہ داری کے تقاضے ہیں، اور وہ تقاضے پورے کرنے پڑتے ہیں، دنیا میں ٹھوکریں انہیں کو لگتی ہیں جو چلتے ہیں، جو پاوں توڑ کر بیٹھ جاتے ہیں انہیں کبھی ٹھوکر نہیں لگتی ہے، گرتے وہی ہیں کہ جو دوڑیں گے، کانٹے انہیں کے تلووں میں چبھتے ہیں جو دوڑتے ہیں،کل تک جب تک کہ آزادی ہمارے ہاتھ میں نہ تھی آپ کے ملک کا کیا حال تھا، وہ اپنی قسمت کا مالک نہیں تھا، اس کی قسمت دوسروں کے ہاتھوں میں تھی، آپ کا امن بھی آپ کے قبضے میں نہ تھا، آپ کی بے امنی بھی آپ کے قبضے میں نہ تھی، جب کبھی ملک میں بے امنی ہوتی تھی تو آپ اپنی طرف نہیں دیکھتے تھے، ان کی طرف دیکھتے تھے۔ جب آپ کو کوئی تکلیف و پریشانی ہوتی تھی آپ ان کے آگے مجبور ہوتے تھے کہ اپنا ہاتھ بڑھائیں لیکن آج وہ نہیں ہے، آج اپنی قسمت کے آپ خود مالک ہیں، اور اگر آپ مالک ہیں اور میدان میں کھڑے ہوئے ہیں تو یاد رکھیے کہ ہر طرح کی آزمائشیں پیش آئیں گی، کوئی بھی نہیں چاہتا کہ اپنے کو آزمائش میں ڈالے، کوئی بھی نہیں چاہتا کہ اپنے کو غموں اور دکھوں میں ڈالے، لیکن اگر ہم نے ذمہ داری کا بوجھ اٹھایا ہے تو طرح طرح کی پریشانیاں ہمیں پیش آئیں گی، اگر ہم میدان میں دوڑ رہے ہیں تو قدم قدم پر ہم کو ٹھوکروں سے دوچار ہونا پڑے گا، اس سے ہمیں گھبرانا نہیں چاہئے، اس سے ہمیں اکتانا نہیں چاہئے، مرد بن کر ان تمام ذمہ داریوں کو اٹھانا چاہئے اور ان پریشانیوں کا مقابلہ کرنا چاہئے، اگر ایک زندہ انسان ہیں اور رگوں میں گرم اور زندہ خون دوڑ رہا ہے تب اس کے لیے بیماریاں بھی ہیں، ٹھوکریں بھی ہیں، مصیبتیں بھی ہیں، ہر طرح کی پریشانیاں بھی ہیں، تو زندگی کے معانی یہی ہیں کہ ہم بوجھ اٹھائیں اور بوجھ اس طرح نہ اٹھائیں کہ گھبرائے ہوئےاٹھائیں، مردوں کی طرح ہمت کے ساتھ اٹھائیں۔

Maulana Azad (translated into English):

You must remember that there are requirements for every responsibility in the world and those requirements have to be met. Stumbling in the world seems to those who walk, those who break their legs never stumble, falling occurs to those who run, thorns stick in the soles of those who run. What was the condition of your country till yesterday when freedom was not in our hands? It was not the owner of its own destiny. Its destiny was in the hands of others. Your peace was not in your possession. Your insecurity was not in your possession.

Whenever there was insecurity in the country, you would not look at yourself, rather you would look at them. When you had a problem you were forced to raise your hand in front of them but today it is not. Today, you are the master of your own destiny and if you are the owner and standing in the field, remember that all sorts of trials will come. No one wants to put himself to the test, no one wants to put himself to grief and sorrow, but if we have borne the burden of responsibility, we will have all sorts of troubles. If we are running in the field, we will have to stumble step by step.

We should not be afraid of it. We should not get tired of it. We should take up all these responsibilities as men and we must deal with these problems. If there is a living person and there is warm and living blood running in his veins, then there are diseases, stumbles, troubles, all kinds of worries for him. The meaning of life is that we should carry the responsibilities and should not carry the responsibilities in such a panic way, rather carry it with courage like men.

NOTE

1. The Congress Party held the first provincial elections during 1936–1937 in accordance with the Government of India Act of 1935. The reference to "June 1940" in this speech is unclear.

Bibliography

40 Hadith. Sahih Muslim, no date, https://sunnah.com/nawawi40/34.

"1988: Thousands Die in Halabja Gas Attack." *BBC News On This Day,* 16 March 1988, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000 /4304853.stm.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists.* New York: Harper One, 2007.

Abul Kalam Azad. Edited by Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, John McBrewster. Beau Bassin, Mauritius: Alphascript Publishing, 2009.

Address by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Lahore Session of Muslim League, March, 1940. Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1983. Columbia University, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/ txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html.

Afsaruddin, Asma. "Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and History." Religion Category of the *Oxford Research Encyclopedias,* March 2016, https://oxfordre .com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-978019 9340378-e-46.

Aftab Ali, Yasmeen. "Understanding Pashtunwali." *The Nation,* August 6, 2013, https://nation.com.pk/06-Aug-2013/understanding-pashtunwali.

Alvi, Hayat. "The Diffusion of Intra-Islamic Violence and Terrorism: The Impact of the Proliferation of Salafi/Wahhabi Ideologies." *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)* (Summer 2014), vol. 18, issue 2.

———. "The Islamic Principles of Social Justice: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Nonviolent Civil Disobedience." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East (CRME)* SAGE Publications India (2015), 2 (1 and 2).

———. "Musical Criminology: A Comparative Analysis of Jihadist Nasheeds and Narco Corridos." *The Air Force Journal of European, Middle Eastern, & African Affairs (JEMEAA)* (Summer 2020), vol. 2, issue 2.

155

———. "The (Non)Governance of Divided Territories: A Comparative Study of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Palestine." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (CSSAME)* (2008), vol. 28, issue 3.

———. *The Political Economy and Islam of the Middle East: The Case of Tunisia.* Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2019.

Askari, Hossein, and Abbas Mirakhor. *Conceptions of Justice from Islam to the Present.* Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

Austin, General Lloyd. U.S. CENTCOM Commander. Opening Remarks, "The Middle East in Transition." Brookings Center for Middle East Policy-U.S. Central Command Conference, Washington, DC, July 22, 2015, http://www.brookings .edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/07/centcom-middle-east-proceedings -2015/centcom-proceedings-final.pdf.

Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. *India Wins Freedom.* New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1988.

Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. *Words of Freedom: Ideas of a Nation.* English translation. New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2010.

Berman, Paul. "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror." *The New York Times,* March 23, 2003, accessed from: https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/magazine/the-philoso pher-of-islamic-terror.html.

Bin Laden, Osama. "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." English translation of Fatwa, published *in Al Quds al Arabi*, August 1996, https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2010/MVZ203/OBL___AQ_ _Fatwa_1996.pdf.

Bin Laden, Osama, et al. "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders." English translation. 23 February 1998 Fatwa, https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.

"Bitter Rivals," documentary film." *Frontline PBS,* February 20, 2018, https://www .pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/bitter-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia/.

Blomfield, Adrian. "Saudi Arabia Hit by Sectarian Violence as Two Killed." *The Telegraph*, July 9, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/middl eeast/saudiarabia/9386763/Saudi-Arabia-hit-by-sectarian-violenceas-two-killed .html.

Brass, Paul R. "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946–1947: Means, Methods, and Purposes." *Journal of Genocide Research* (2003), vol. 5, issue 1.

Burrowes, Robert J. "Comparative Political Leadership: Gandhi vs. Contemporary Leaders." *CounterCurrents.org,* September 10, 2019, https://countercurrents.org /2019/09/comparative-political-leadership-gandhi-vs-contemporary-leaders/.

Byman, Daniel. "Strange Bedfellows: What's Behind the Enduring Alliance between Syria and Iran?" *Slate,* July 19, 2006, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_p olitics/foreigners/2006/07/strange_bedfellows.html.

Carpenter, Ted Galen. "US Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The 'Reagan Doctrine' and Its Pitfalls." Cato Institute Policy Analysis, 24 June 1986, http://www.cato.org /pubs/pas/pa074.html.

"Case Study of Conflict Resolution: Mahatma Gandhi," in "Peace Education" segment, *Universal Peace Federation (UPF International),* September 12, 2005,

accessed from: https://www.upf.org/peace-education-and-human-developme nt/peace-education-reports/3183-case-study-of-conflict-resolution-mahatma -gandhi.

Crile, George. *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times.* New York: Grove Press, 2003.

Dalrymple, William. "The Great Divide: The Violent Legacy of Indian Partition." *The New Yorker,* June 22, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06 /29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple.

Desai, Ashok V. "The Prophet of Doom: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Saw the Future with Brutal Clarity." *The Telegraph Online Edition,* May 4, 2010, https://www.tel egraphindia.com/opinion/the-prophet-of-doom-maulana-abul-kalam-azad-saw-the -future-with-brutal-clarity/cid/523686.

"Dharasana Salt Works Demonstration." University of Nebraska-Lincoln, no date, https://www.unl.edu/eskridge/cj394dharsana.html.

Ensor, Josie. "How ISIL Colluded with Assad to Make $40m a Month in Oil Deals." *The Telegraph,* April 25, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/25/isils -deal-with-bashar-al-assad-and-the-40m-a-month-oil-profits/.

Escobales, Roxanne, and Mark Tran. "Afghanistan Risks Becoming 'Failed State,' Reports Warn." *The Guardian*, 31 January 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world /2008/jan/31/afghanistan.marktran1.

Esposito, John. *Islam: The Straight Path*. Third edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

"Fatwa." *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*. Oxford University Press, 2020, http://www .oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e646.

"The Founder." Aligarh Muslim University, 2019, https://www.amu.ac.in/ourfounder .jsp.

Galtung, Johan. "Breaking the Cycle of Violent Conflict." The Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series. Edited by Kaitlin Barker, Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, December 9, 2020.

———. "Typologies of Violence and Peace." *Religious Literacy Project*. Harvard Divinity School, 2020, https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/our-approach/typologies-violen ce-and-peace.

"Gandhi." Film, starring Ben Kingsley (1982), https://www.imdb.com/title/ tt0083987/.

Gold, Dore. "Saudi Arabia's Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism." *Jerusalem Viewpoints*. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (October 2003), no. 504, 1, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp504.htm.

Guha, Ramachandra. *Gandhi before India*. New York: Vintage Books, 2013.

Hameed, Syeda Saiyidain. *Maulana Azad: Islam and the Indian National Movement*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Haqqani, Husain. *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military.* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

"Here are Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's Profound Words, Take a Look." *The Indian Express.* February 22, 2020: https://indianexpress.com/photos/lifestyle-gallery/

maulana-abul-kalam-azad-education-minister-journalist-scholar-death-anniversary
  -birthday-6281322/.

The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation, and Commentary. Trans. Abdullah Yusuf Ali.
  New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc., Publishers and Distributors of the Holy
  Qur'an, U.S. edition, 2001.

Ibn Warraq. "Virgins? What Virgins?" *The Guardian.* January 11, 2002, https://www
  .theguardian.com/books/2002/jan/12/books.guardianreview5.

"Imran Khan Criticized after Calling Osama bin Laden a 'Martyr.'" *BBC News.* June
  27, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53190199.

"Islam on Justice and Injustice." *Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World
  Affairs.* Georgetown University, 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ess
  ays/islam-on-justice-and-injustice.

"Johan Galtung Quotes." *Goodreads.* 2020, https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes
  /22129372-johan-galtung-pioneer-of-peace-research.

Keifer, Francine. "Obama on Egypt: Praise for the 'Moral Force of Nonviolence.'"
  The Christian Science Monitor, February 11, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com
  /Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2011/0211/Obama-on-Egypt-Praise-for-the-
  moral-force-of-nonviolence.

"Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan," in "Associates of Mahatma Gandhi." *Mahatma
  Gandhi's Writings, Philosophy, Audio, Video and Photographs,* no date, https://
  www.mkgandhi.org/associates/gafarkhan.htm.

Kostiner, Joseph. *The making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to
  Monarchical State.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lal, Vinay. "Nathuram Godse, the RSS, and the Murder of Gandhi." *MANAS*, UCLA
  Social Sciences, 2020, http://southasia.ucla.edu/history-politics/hindu-rashtra/nat
  huram-godse-rss-murder-gandhi/.

"Lesson 7: Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Evil." *Al-Islam.org,* Ahlul Bayt
  Digital Islamic Library Project, 1995–2020, https://www.al-islam.org/ramadhan
  -holy-quran-30-lessons-30-days-muhsin-qaraati/lesson-7-enjoining-good-and-for
  bidding-evil.

Lister, Charles. *The Islamic State: A Brief Introduction.* Washington, DC: Brookings
  Institution Press, 2015.

Long, David E. "Tawhid or Jihad: What Wahhabism Is and Is Not." *Middle East
  Institute (MEI),* October 1, 2009, https://www.mei.edu/publications/tawhid-or-ji
  had-what-wahhabism-and-not.

"Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979)." *BBC History,* 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
  history/historic_figures/mountbatten_lord_louis.shtml.

"Maulana Abul Kalam Azad." *Cultural India,* no date, https://www.culturalindia.net/
  leaders/maulana-abul-kalam-azad.html.

"Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: Visionary Educationist." *The Dispatch,* February 22,
  2020, https://www.thedispatch.in/maulana-abul-kalam-azad-visionary-education
  ist/.

McCants, William. *The ISIS Apocalypse.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015.

McKay, Al, "Interview – Johan Galtung." *E-International Relations* (May 27, 2014),
  https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/27/interview-johan-galtung/.

"The Message." Film. Directed by Moustapha Akkad, 1977, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074896/.

Moussalli, Ahmad S., and Gordon D. Newby. "Muhammad." Oxford Islamic Studies Online, 2020, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0550.

"Muhammad and Violence and Jihad," from *Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet, PBS,* 2002, accessed from: https://www.pbs.org/muhammad/ma_violence.shtml.

"My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared." Nasheed for ISIS. Trans. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, January 28, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2014/01/my-ummah-dawn-has-appeared-nasheed-for.

Nasr, Vali. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006.

"Nonviolent Action." *United States Institute of Peace (USIP),* 2020, https://www.usip.org/issue-areas/nonviolent-action.

"Norway's Johan Galtung, Peace and Conflict Pioneer, on How to Stop Extremism that Fueled Shooting." Interview by Amy Goodman. Transcript. *Democracy Now!* July 29, 2011, https://www.democracynow.org/2011/7/29/norways_johan_galtung_peace_conflict_pioneer.

Parks, Brad. "How a US Prison Camp Helped Create ISIS." *New York Post,* May 30, 2015, http://nypost.com/2015/05/30/how-the-us-created-the-camp-where-isis-was-born/.

"The Pinch Heard Around the World: Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha 75 Years On." *Peace Power, Berkeley's Journal of Principled Nonviolence and Conflict Transformation* (Summer 2005), vol. 1, issue 1, http://calpeacepower.org/0101/salt_march.htm.

Quran. English Translation. Language Research Group. University of Leeds. Copyright 2009–2017, http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=7&verse=199.

"Quran Smart Search." IslamiCity.org. Copyright 1995–2020, https://www.islamicity.org/quransearch/?q=8.

Rahman, Fazlur. *Islam.* New York: Anchor Books, 1968.

———. *Islam*. Second edition. London: University of Chicago Press, 1979.

———. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Rajput, A.B. *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.* Lahore: Lion Press, 1957.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Second edition. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

———. *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords.* London: Pan Books, 2001.

Reagan Doctrine. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of the Historian. Timeline of US Diplomatic History 1981–1989, US Department of State, no date, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dr/17741.htm.

"Remembering Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Short Biography." Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIS), no date, http://makaias.gov.in/biography.html.

"Sayyid Qutb." *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*, 2020, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1955.

Scheinmann, Gabriel. "The Map that Ruined the Middle East." *The Tower*, July 2013, issue no. 4, http://www.thetower.org/article/the-map-that-ruined-the-middle-east/.

Singh, Jaswant. *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Sonn, Tamara, and Adam Farrar. "Kharijites." *Oxford Bibliographies,* 14 December 2009, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155 /obo-9780195390155-0047.xml.

Spyer, Jonathan, and Aymenn Jawad Al Tamimi. "Butchers: Syria's ISIS Crucifying Opponents, Justifying Horror with Quran Passages." *PJ Media*, May 27, 2014, https://pjmedia.com/blog/jonathan-spyer-and-aymenn-jawad-al-tamimi/2014/05/ 27/butchers-syrias-isis-crucifying-opponents-justifying-horror-with-quran-passag es-n7479.

Stanton, Jenny. "Leaked Documents from ISIS Headquarters Show Terror Group and Syrian Dictator Assad Colluded over the City of Palmyra with Warning to Withdraw Forces before Attacks." *Daily Mail,* May 2, 2016, http://www.dailymail .co.uk/news/article-3569934/Leaked-documents-ISIS-headquarters-terror-group -Syrian-dictator-Assad-colluded-city-Palmyra.html.

Stern, Jessica, and J.M. Berger. *ISIS: The State of Terror*. New York: Ecco/ HarperCollins, 2016.

Terp, Holger. "Nonviolence in Islam: The Case of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan." *The Danish Peace Academy,* 2004, http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/khan.htm.

"Terrorist Designation of ISIS Leader Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla." Media Note. U.S. Department of State, March 17, 2020, https://www.sta te.gov/terrorist-designation-of-isis-leader-amir-muhammad-said-abdal-rahman-al -mawla/.

Toohey, Paul. "Inside Java's Production Line of Terror." *The Australian*, 22 July 2009, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25817960-601,00.html.

"Video: Jihad Sisters, French Women Bound for ISIS." *France24 Documentary*, February 2, 2017: http://www.france24.com/en/20170202-video-reporters-jihad-si sters-french-women-bound-isis-islamic-state-group.

Voll, John, and Tamara Sonn. "Political Islam – Introduction." *Oxford Bibliographies,* 2020, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155 /obo-9780195390155-0063.xml.

Von Tunzelmann, Alex. "Who is to Blame for Partition? Above All, Imperial Britain." *The New York Times,* August 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/0 8/18/opinion/india-pakistan-partition-imperial-britain.html.

Warrick, Joby. *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*. New York: Anchor Books, 2016.

Wehr, Hans. *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Arabic-English Dictionary). Edited by J. Milton Cowan. Third edition. Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 1976.

Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*. New York: Phaidon Press, 2015.

Zelin, Aaron, and Phillip Smyth. "The Vocabulary of Sectarianism." *Foreign Policy* (January 29, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/29/the-vocabulary-of-sectar ianism/.

Index

161

About the Author

Hayat Alvi is an associate professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College. She has served as the director of International Studies at Arcadia University, and she taught political science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, for four years. Dr. Alvi is a Fulbright Fellow studying Arabic in Damascus, Syria, in the mid-1990s. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu.

Dr. Alvi's specializations include International Relations, Political Economy, Security and Strategic Studies, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Conflict Resolution, Genocide Studies, Middle East and South Asian Studies, and Islamic Studies. She is an adjunct professor for Norwich University's online program. She has published numerous books, journal articles, and chapters.