DE GRUYTER

Lynette Hunter

HUMANISM, CAPITALISM, AND RHETORIC IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

THE SEPARATION OF THE CITIZEN FROM THE SELF



RESEARCH IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURE

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Acknowledgments

This book presents my passionate commitment to recognizing what I do not know, that I do not know. It also documents a lifelong interest in how people communicate, why we trust or distrust one another, and in what belief might be. My scholarly life has grown with the transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary movements of the past fifty years, and these acknowledgments should take up the space of another book, so I will keep them short.

The rich and diverse academic environment of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric has been key to this book. Diane Macdonnel, and at the University of Leeds Institute for Bibliography and Textual Studies, John Barnard and Jonathan Sanderson, were central to my work in the history of the book. The second home for this book has been the University of California Davis, and I thank the Office of Research for grant support. The many colleagues I met through the emerging field of gender and sexuality studies led me to situated work inspired by Hilary Rose in science and technology, Danielle Fuller in reading and texts, and Maxine Craig in women and critical race. In performance studies I was helped by Stephen Morton, Susan Kelly, and Janelle Reinelt, crossing into afropessimism with Frank Wilderson III.

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Each of these persons I consider a friend, and I warmly thank all the unexpected friends and families for rooting the book in its critical positionality and living process.

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Introduction

Caxton, on rhetoric:
"thou must first devise some way to make thy hearers glad & welwylling to hear"
The Myrrour of the Worlde (1481), D3.

The Reasons for Writing This Book

The main reason for writing this book came into focus when I began studying the rhetoric of feminists in science and technology studies (SST) who were, in the 1970s, defining new epistemologies based on situated knowledge.[1] Science, or knowledge, was for them not fixed. It had a fluidity for which Western philosophers had argued since the late nineteenth century in the context of events such as Einstein's adjustments to Newtonian physics. But, as the SST feminists argued, neither was scientific knowledge coherent within a specific sociohistorical period. Their studies analyzed not only different ways of doing science, but also the distinct kinds of knowing that could be associated with those approaches. Situated knowledge, or, as I prefer, situated knowing, was built on the backs of theories from, among others, working-class history (Lukacs) to language studies (Wittgenstein) to media technologies (Baudrillard). It was also coincident with several other waves of thinking, from the critiques by women of color (Andalzua, Bannerjee, Mohanty) to the initial publications of indigenous thinkers putting into the written medium millennia of orally transmitted ways of becoming with the world (including: Armstrong, Delauria, LaRoque, Petrone, and Vizenor). It was further coincident with African American philosophers concerned with social death (Cornell West) and unrecognized social life (Hill Collins, Spiller) that led to theories of intersectionality (Crenshaw).

The simultaneity of these investigations with developments in other areas such as gender studies (Judith Butler) and performance studies (Phelan, Read) drew in part from an overwhelming sense – probably familiar to any critic who worked through this period – of determinist social structures. Twentieth-century theorists had long been concerned with authoritarian sociopolitical structures (Arendt, Adorno, Foucault, Althusser), and with the inexorable turn of the sociocultural discourse of a liberal politics into the fundamentalism of neoliberal globalism (Williams, Hall, Wynter). Many of these later philosophies were attempting

1 These writers included, among others, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Hilary Rose, and Evelyn Fox Keller.

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to account for the things in life that keep people going despite their sense that so much is fixed and seems unalterable. Why bother stepping out the door if one only fills a predetermined slot? Where does the energy for activism come from if nothing can ever change? During the latter part of the twentieth century post-structuralists talked about a "third way" (Kroetsch). Foucault began to talk about what it is like to be "beside" the determined, Levinas wrote about "otherwise," Derrida made a film about "elsewhere," feminist science fiction from Olivia Butler to Ursula LeGuin generated alternative and alterior atopias. All of which was accompanied by a consistent and ongoing chorus from cultural studies about the escapism of such theories, and the impossibility of not-being-determined.

Yet things do change. People do get up in the morning. Why they do so is not only to do with moments of crisis – birth, death, war (Agamben) – but also to do with the everyday (Smith). Not the banal but the beating heart of daily living alongside what is socioculturally determined by neoliberal states and their global-state apparatuses.[2] "Alterior" is one word that I use in this book to gesture toward the possible worlds which are often unrecognized by sociocultural discourse. But the word "alongside" is also used, and refers to the materiality of sociosituated lives in which each person is becoming and continually valuing into relationality with other people and objects. Friends and family in whatever form, love – however realized, communal relationalities particular to gender, skin color, ethnicity, age, ability . . . The sociosituated rarely occupies discursive space. Often the sociocultural is not that aware of it: for example, it rarely "sees" or "hears" the invisible homeless person on the street. At the same time, these aspects of our lives that the sociocultural "abjects" or throws out/away, to which it denies existence, are the source of our ability to keep on living. While the sociosituated is always alongside a sociocultural that often does not recognize it, it is a place where our needs are heard and sometimes attended to. It locates the particular elements of our lives without which we would not want to live, rather than the things we want from the sociocultural but may never get.

Thinking with these critical theories in the EuroAmerican West, my question became: how has Western liberal ideology's "subject" thought about or dealt with what sociocultural discourse leaves out, or cannot even recognize? Or, to flip this question: how does a person in a neo/liberal state bring into recognition what they need to value their life?

The early modern period in England has long been understood as a landscape in which a liberal political ideology acquired its shape inside a capitalist worldview. It was a worldview that defined the concept of the "subject" as the represented

2 Lynette Hunter, "Unruly Fugues" (2003).

subject of liberal social contract capitalism, one with an essentialized and stable identity necessary both for state control and for reliable marketing and profit-making. Flourishing in the new educational system of the early sixteenth century, buoyed by the Tudor redistribution of the vast wealth of the Roman Catholic church in England, the few people who were able to take advantage of the early capitalist economics benefited from humanist ideas, became "human," became representable, becoming citizens, becoming subject to the nation state, becoming subjects. And these people produced records, documentary and artistic materials, that attest to their culture, politics, and history – some of which was not formally part of accepted social discourse, for example sexuality outside the normative heterosexual (Bray, Laqueur). At the same time there was a far larger proportion of people who were there, undocumented, and non-human.

This book analyzes groups of documented humans over the period 1500–1660, in whose white, male, propertied culture I have inherited training in critical and performative practices. These are documents that speak the experience of acquired subjecthood, what subjecthood leaves out, and the need of those subjects to communicate their alternatives. The enfranchisements of the early twentieth century attempted to confront this subjecthood, but so entrenched was this ideology in structures of political power that it continues to provide the underlying assumptions for the concept of subjectivity in the hegemonic structure of neo/liberal politics – what we might call aspirational humanness, the attempt to be recognized as human. Through luck I have also been able to learn from a number of non-humans, and the final chapters of this book open the door to an early modern white woman's life, a person whose writing affords me, also a white woman, the opportunity to offer suggestions about the alterity of that life/way of living, the difficulty of communicating it into the seventeenth-century sociocultural world, and strategies for sustaining its positionality in the sociosituated.

The conversations in this book are transdisciplinary and engage directly with the confluence of printing history, women's history, the history of science and medicine, literary analysis, performance studies, and especially, the history of rhetoric. This means that words used in one way in a particular discourse may signify something rather different in another. For example, "positionality" may today be thought of as a self-reflective attempt to assess the impact of a person on the things they are observing or writing about. However, in this book it is allied with a political signification deriving from Gramsci's concept of a "war of position" that generates "historical self-awareness" and disables the civic state.[3]

3 Frank Wilderson, "Gramsci's Black Marx" (2005), 4–5.

My own use of it takes into account that people still classified as "non-human" are not part of recognized history nor necessarily interested in disabling the civic state that has classified them as such. Positionality for people left out of the civic state is about their work on their own ways of living, knowing, and valuing, that sustain them in their communities alongside sociocultural discourse.

The transdisciplinarity of the book also helps to locate gaps in vocabulary, and leads not only to the introduction of neologisms such as "sociosituated"[4] – parallel to the more familiar "sociocultural" – but also to the re-introduction of English words that have fallen out of usage in many places. For example, to the use of "witcraft" – an early modern translation into English of "rhetoric" – in chapter 2. Or of the Scots word "outwith," especially in chapter 7, to signify those elements of living that are not part of the civic state, but are sociosituated and alongside discourse and not particularly interested in reacting to it. As a result of this transdisciplinarity the text often spends time on definitions, some of which will be well known to one reader but not to another, some of which may run against the grain, and some of which may open doors. These attempts at disciplinary translation are tricky, and may not always work. I invite the reader to generate their own performatives.

I am well aware that my concerns for these early modern writers are part of my own current concerns. I approach this work through the lens of a cultural materialism that reads the historical documents/texts from the needs of a twenty-first-century, relatively privileged person. David Rundle comments that given the changing history of humanist studies, we do not know what English humanism was except that it is wrapped up in the world of script and print, of education, and of classical and indigenous languages.[5] I would add that it is wrapped up also in the history of rhetoric. Like Rundle I would also argue from a culturally materialist position, that we cannot know the past but can respect the understanding we do have from extant historical documents in many media, in the context of the present.[6] The focus I take foregrounds my own contemporary concerns with issues of rhetorical stance, social diversity, and appropriateness in the Anglo-European world of early twenty-first-century neoliberalism.

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4 This exceptionally helpful concept is one that I have been using for over a decade. See in particular, "Affective Politics in Álvaro Hernández' *Chairs*. . ." (2018).

5 David Rundle, "Editor's Introduction" (2010), xliv.

6 Catherine Belsey, in *Shakespeare and the Loss of Eden* (1999), argues that the words "archaeology," "anthropology," and "ethnology" are used to mark out different kinds of engagement with texts from the past that are related to, but different from, the concept of a material cultural history. For similar discussions, see Margreta de Grazia, Maureen Quilligan, and Peter Stallybrass, *Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture* (1996) and Jonathan Gil Harris and Natasha Korda, *Staged Properties in Early Modern English Drama* (2002).

The book starts with Erasmus, with a particular focus on his rhetoric for material written to a friend that he called *sermo* rhetoric. For Erasmus this becomes another rhetorical genre to supplement the judicial, deliberative, demonstrative, and epideictic of classical humanism. He perceived the genre as needed by the new and burgeoning technology of print circulation, so that the reader could assess the trustworthiness of the absent writer, and the writer could develop a rhetorical stance that engaged the absent reader in the process of the written text. For Erasmus, just as friendship was the key to recognizing a person's virtue in the civic world through the textual performance of temperance, prudence, and decorum, so friendship was key to the absent writer/reader of the written. *Sermo* rhetoric, the rhetoric of friendship, was to become the conversational rhetoric that underpinned the concept of a writer's engaged rhetorical stance, a process of what was called "probable" rhetoric in which the writer and reader collaborated on generating the new grounds needed by new ways of living. This book gives one account of how conversational rhetoric became one in which the writer and reader also collaborated on generating the new grounds needed by ongoing ways of living that were not recognized by the civic and then the national state.

A number of accounts of the history of rhetoric in sixteenth-century England tell a story of an increasing anxiety about the deceitfulness and plausibility of its argumentation and persuasion that heralds a split between logic and rhetoric. In contrast, this book follows accounts of conversational rhetoric from Erasmus's *sermo* in the early sixteenth century, through a series of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century waves that keep returning to it as a primary way to establish trust between people. After the initial study of Erasmus's work and a chapter touching on a few rhetoricians who attempted to explore the implications of his suggestions, the chapters attend to texts that work on the interrelation of probable rhetoric and social change. In the 1560–1590 period, a probable rhetoric of conversation developed around courtly behavior. Trustworthiness was allied to the way a person was visually perceived in the public setting of the court, but anxiety about the visual and its deceitfulness quickly grew. Overlapping, but focused on the 1590–1630 period, probable rhetoric of the written word was developed as a guide to civic behavior. Again, anxiety about its deceitfulness increasingly surfaced. Throughout the sixteenth and into the seventeenth century, the rhetorics of conversation – whether visual or verbal – that taught one how to attend to trustworthiness and to make friendships, were consistently thought to be trained in familial and domestic settings. Yet while the early discussions call on this training as one essential for participation in the public, it was gradually relegated to a personal social sphere.

The split between the public and the personal is a guide to the formation of the individual needed by capitalist economics, supported by the unseen and private world of the household. For a citizen, this gradual splitting parallels the

formation of the subject which defines a person as representable and autonomous, with a private life that is left out of the social world. Extant documents indicate that conversational rhetoric becomes, over the turn into the seventeenth century, a place for relatively privileged subjects to articulate any sensed private need into social discourse. It becomes a way for these people to bring alternative elements into the sociocultural realm. At the same time, more diverse groups of people, not classified as human, were beginning to access media for communication that have survived to document some non-human lives. Denied access to citizenship, non-humans nevertheless maintained the civic state and lived personal lives left out of it and running alongside it. From the 1630s to the 1660s and beyond, conversational rhetoric retained its probable stance in a number of locations but is documented mainly in the spiritual. Still embedded in familial training, increasingly associated with women's communication, the rhetoric called at times explicitly on a recognition of an alterior public alongside the citizenry of the developing nation state. At other times, as in the emerging modern science and medicine, it employed its probable rhetoric in the service of collaborating on, and even articulating into the sociocultural, an as-yet-unsaid experience of the non-human world.

The alongside, as a place in which people work on becoming, knowing, and valuing, is not a result of liberal capitalism. After all, Laotse describes this element as one in the braid of living in the *Daodejing*. It can be thought of as a result of any assumptive power that excludes alterity as a threat to that power. And as suggested by the *Daodejing*, many power systems simultaneously understand that while the alongside is necessarily a threat, because it is by definition generating positionalities that may disrupt the self-evident grounds of the assumptive system, it is also a source for positive critique and for change. As John Ward has explored, probable rhetoric was the acknowledged skill of the medieval court magician, who became the rhetorical counselor to renaissance princes.[7] The concept of counsel threads through the sixteenth-century discussions of conversational rhetoric and friendship, and is retained in slightly different modes in the concept of legal counsel that develops during this period. But the shift from the social relations of feudal correspondence into the more individualized hierarchy of early modern capitalism relegates counsel to a private sphere and the confidentialities of legal advice. The individual becomes his [sic] own counselor, as Romeo's father says of the lovesick Romeo, the melancholic introvert that he is before he meets Juliet. When asked whether he has tried to talk to his son he says:

7 John O. Ward, "Magic and Rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renaissance" (1988).

> Both by myself and many other friends:
> But he his own affections' counsellor
> Is to himself, I will not say how true,
> But to himself so secret and so close,
> So far from sounding and discovery,
> As is the bud bit with an envious worm
> Ere he can spread his sweet leaves to the air,
> Or dedicate his beauty to the same.[8]
> (1.1.144–50)

But what about Juliet? One of the strongest women in Shakespeare's plays, yet not an autonomous individual, and certainly not a human. Arguably a woman with different constraints to those that bind women in early modern England. A fictional woman, but still a non-human, who tries to bring her own alongside world into being, and in its denial, to choose death.

The Chapters in the Book

In some ways the public that lives alongside the nation state is clearer in the sixteenth century because it is all that is not considered human, or part of humanism. Yet the raising of consciousness that is at the heart of Erasmian humanism is anathema to Hobbes's Leviathan, and the first chapter studies elements of this earlier humanism. Because Erasmus recognizes the broadening geographical scope for a public, more diverse routes of communication, and wider access to power, he begins to consider what it might be like to open doors to groups of people previously excluded from human status. These are the artisans, women, strangers, that Erasmus links to the cobblers with whom Socrates associated. In considering their potential for humanism, Erasmus posits an association between the rhetoric a writer has to use because their audience is absent, and a political rhetoric that engages the rhetor and audience member in the process of generating common grounds – grounds particular to their situation, and by definition not part of the assumptive logic already in place. In the process he articulates a probable rhetoric for the written word, which he names *sermo* rhetoric.

The second chapter of the book looks closely at three rhetoricians trying to make sense of various aspects of Erasmian humanism and probable rhetoric in the mid-sixteenth century. In the context of the Henrician breakdown of social structures supported by arms of the Roman Catholic church for the previous four

8 William Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet* (1599); all quotations from this text are from the 2009 edition with line numbers following in brackets.

hundred years, in theory Erasmian humanism feeds into a huge social fluctuation. In the event, it leads to a distinct social fluidity for a small but significant group of people who get access to financial wealth through early capitalism. After all, in 1571 England established the Royal Exchange, effectively one of the first stock exchanges, indicating that enough people had a profit base, with its necessary exploitations in the slave trade, the colonies, and other resources. Exploitations of peoples inside the nation continued as usual. The shift in social status arising from the redistribution of wealth led to many books in the 1530s and 1540s that directly addressed the "common weal," signifying at this stage a common wellbeing and tied as often to medical remedies as to social behavior. These decades also see various rebellions by non-humans that are systematically put down. The three writers studied in the second chapter are concerned with the way probable rhetoric is viewed in texts written by this upstart group of privileged people. Thomas Elyot is worried about the rhetoric because it might affect his own newfound status. Thomas Wilson starts off dismissing social shift, but after a spell in exile rewrites the preface to his book on rhetoric in quite a different tone. And the little regarded Ralph Lever comes out of the archive closet as a premodern poststructuralist, who is all in favor of the cobbler as rhetorician.

During the 1560–1590 period, overlapping chronologically with these rhetoricians working on words, there is a distinct movement toward understanding the rhetoric of visible behavior – gesture, clothing, facial features – as a trustworthy guide to courtly status. The third chapter follows the rise and fall of the idea that the medical system of the humors can lead to a visual perception of civility and dependable conversation with friends. Possibly because there is little articulated probable rhetoric for visible behavior, and more likely that the theory of the humors becomes increasingly viewed as potentially deceptive with the advent of Paracelsan medicine and Vesalian anatomy, these behavioral rhetorics are displaced in the 1590–1630 period by writers focusing on the verbal rhetoric of the probable. Of pragmatic interest to these civic rhetoricians, it should be noted that verbal display often costs a lot less than the visual fashions of the court. Continuing the pathways set up by earlier English-language rhetorics of the word, many of the slightly later writers explore rhetorics of personal friendship and conversation and of public counsel as a better guide to civility. They also do so mainly in the context of civic politics, although they are responsive to the national rhetoric of the monarch.

The fourth chapter again follows the rise and fall of the idea that civic status of the human can be communicated in a dependable manner, but this time with a focus on the verbal. The texts evidence an increasing distrust of public verbal rhetoric, a critique of its plausibility, and a displacement of the probable verbal rhetoric of friendship and counsel into the familial, where moral activity is nurtured and learned. While this goes hand in hand with the growing dependence of the

sociopolitics of capitalism on a public made up of represented individuals, there is still a recognition of the importance of conversation and friendship. With the development of state controls, the simultaneity of citizenship and the familial shifts into the more hardline separation of the subject from the private. Both chapters 3 and 4 turn to plays by Shakespeare, *Macbeth* and *Romeo and Juliet* respectively, to explore the limits of trust in visual and verbal behaviors, and the advantages of a probable rather than plausible rhetoric of counsel.

If chapters 3 and 4 move from the humors to humanism, chapter 5 looks at one part of the condition of the early modern human, the relatively privileged person split between autonomous individuality and the private. Civility and conversation do not disappear from rhetoric. They become firmly rooted in the familial and in private friendship, coincident with the discourse that bans the "friend" from the new economics of capitalism because the friend should not be exploited. One place that we can find a documenting of how some of these relatively privileged writers, these educated men with enough time and opportunity to write, relate to each other in friendship is in the "address to the reader" that usually provides a book's handshake between the writer and their audience. These addresses are set up to introduce the ideas upon which the writer is going to expand, topics which they find important but are not yet articulated fully into social and cultural discourse. Effectively, they are offering alternatives or adjustments to sociocultural discourse drawn from their personal or sociosituated experience. Taking a suggestion from Angus Gowland, chapter 5 studies the way that the figure of autodeixis brings together the writer and reader into a co-generation of the grounds needed for this articulation. The rhetoric is a probable rhetoric, used in the name of an individual who is gesturing toward their singularity – a singularity that is not the same as that of their also relatively privileged readers, but structurally similar and inviting "identification" and "empathy." The changes in the address to the reader over the 1530–1630 period chart the growth of a consistent strategy to engage the reader as a friend, through a *sermo* rhetoric of autodeixis, of alternatives, of what is left out of the subject, that we could call literary "style." It also records the gradual creation of a sociosituated world that has been designated as private by sociocultural discourse, but which seventeenth-century aesthetics will flip into the "Arts" as the alongside emergence of what is needed by the relatively privileged person to make their life worth living – the genesis of genius.

At the same time, in England, education in both reading and writing had become partially accessible to groups of non-human people – workers, artisans, laborers, women, people of color. During the 1630–1660 period in England there are the events leading up to and culminating in the Commonwealth. There is a new kind of rebellion, a revolution, one that is coordinated better because of more easily distributed information coming from the printing presses, but also

because there are more people with a little more of that distributed wealth that can buy time and opportunity to protest – not to mention, also instill desire and want. Between 1530 and 1630 the common weal becomes the common wealth. It reminds me of a slow version of what happened in the twentieth century between the EuroAmerican enfranchisements of the 1920s and the realization in the 1960s that nothing had changed, which led to the political unrest of 1968. In the early modern period people must have thought through the events that broke up the powerful Roman Catholic church and redistributed its wealth, and asked not only why they then suffered the loss of the medical, agricultural, educational, and associated benefits, but also why they were not included in this re-allocation. After all, the liberal social contract was not for the aristocracy or the worker, but for capitalists.

Chapter 6 engages with the work of a relatively privileged white woman, an educated non-human who could communicate about her status to others. Her probable rhetoric is still allied with conversation, but it is not about articulating alternatives into sociocultural discourse. There is no autodeixis, no identification, no empathic pathway. At times she writes to humans, and at other times to non-humans. On the whole, unless the human is a friend, humans cannot hear what she is saying – or they cannot afford to. When she writes to other non-humans, or when she writes from her own sociosituated location, the rhetoric is full of gaps, enthymemes, allegories, which like the biblical chiasmus fold around an empty space – not the AB/BA of Greek chiasmus, but an AB/ /BA. Her sociosituated is an alterior public where, as she says, women, the "heathen," the sick, children, have equity with men. However, she finds out that this location, this positionality, cannot be articulated into the sociocultural public sphere, it is not even seen or heard by it. Her recorded life suggests that rather than compromise on it, she steps back from the sociocultural into a sociosituated sustained by participation in the conversations of a spiritual community.

Probable rhetoric has a history after the 1650s, but that is not the focus of this book. The story here concludes with a few remarks about how Robert Boyle, John Locke, and David Hume take on the probable rhetoric of conversation but not its potential for generating an alterior social space. Their work is implicitly autodeictic. It asks for identification with their style by drawing on their equal status with the reader or for agreement from those aspiring to that status. The audience is self-evidently similar enough to them that they engage it in shared alternatives to conventional thinking, but cannot include a range of backgrounds, a diversity of positionality. By the eighteenth century conversation is sloughed off as women's "chat," while men retain the ability to collaborate on decision-making. Yet, yet, this is only the recorded version. It is the sociocultural version that can only gesture to the sociosituated as the unconscious, the slave, the proletariat, the

animal – anything that can be exploited. The alongside, the place for the co-generation of common ground from sociosituated experience, surfaces in negative capability, in Nietzsche's processes of moral activity, in Husserl's phenomenology of experience – most of which quickly get coopted by the violence of liberal discourse. But it also surfaces in the alterior commentaries listed at the start of this introduction: in the work of SST feminists, in feminist, a-colonizing, and indigenous studies, in African American studies – to name those which have inspired my own writing.

For all its violence, the rhetoric of liberal discourse is at least sincere enough to hold an open secret: that it is necessary to remember to forget that all people are equal, the classic Orwellian "doublethink." Every liberal subject can aspire to become monied and powerful, yet has to simultaneously accept that exploitation of some others is necessary for profit – and that one may be an exploiter as well as an exploited. For an easy life you either forget that you are exploited, or forget that you are exploiting others. In an inexorable drift, neoliberalism does not require this forgetting. Neoliberals hold fundamentalist beliefs[9] that if they have power they have a birthright to power, and that exploited others are naturally disempowered. Curiously, this again brings the alongside more into focus. It is not as obscured by liberal tolerance, and can be starkly seen if we simply flip the discourse. Carol Pateman does this with breathtaking simplicity when she flips special rights and human rights so that rights for humans become special rights for neoliberal subjects.[10] Non-humans are people. People need to breathe to live. All breathing people have ways of becoming in the world, ways of knowing it, that they are continually valuing in their situated alongside groups. And when neoliberal discourse denies breath, we suddenly become intensely aware of why and how we are alive.

9 Mark Rieff, "The Attack on Liberalism" (2007).

10 Carol Pateman, *Democracy, Freedom and Special Rights* (1995).

Chapter 1
Sermo Rhetoric 1500–1560: Erasmus and the Rhetoric for an Absent Audience

Temperate Friendship in Probable Rhetorics for Writing

The chapter explores Erasmus's development of a fourth category of rhetoric, the familiar, in its work as a rhetoric of the absent audience in both personal and sociopolitical contexts, and as a rhetoric resonant with early modern theories of friendship and temperance. The discussion is set against a background of Caxton's printing of the translation of Cicero's *De Amicitia*, because Erasmus casts friendship as the context for appropriate communication between people from quite different education and training, along with the probable rhetoric that enables appropriate persuasion. The probable rhetorical stance of temperate friendship proposes a foundation for a common weal[1] based on a co-extensive sense of selfhood. This focus suggests that the familiar rhetoric set out in Erasmus's *De Conscribendis epistolis* draws on Cicero's rhetoric of *sermo*[2] at the heart of friendship.[3] It explores the effects of the rhetorical stance of probable rhetoric, both for personal and social writing, and for political action, and looks at the impact of *sermo* rhetoric on ideas of identity and civic politics in an age of burgeoning circulation of books in both script and print.

This first chapter analyzes the profound and radical challenge that this apparently innocuous *sermo* rhetoric, this rhetoric of friendship, offered to contemporary ideas about power. Erasmus writes in the context of an ongoing debate in England about the legitimacy of power either wielded through inherited blood or attained through education.[4] His rhetoric of friendship is firmly based in education that

1 "Weal" in the *OED* (accessed September 21, 2014), n.1, not only signifies general "welfare" or the "general good" (sense 3.) but also "goodness, and virtuous behaviour" (sense 4.); both senses are now obsolete but remind a reader today that "weal" refers to a sense of prosperity, or wealth (sense 1.) that depends on the interconnectedness of all elements in a particular location, whether that be the family or the nation.

2 John Tinkler points out Petrarch's development of *sermo* rhetoric of which Erasmus was no doubt aware: "Renaissance Humanism and the *Genera Eloquentiae*" (1987); see also Michele Kennerly, "*Sermo* and Stoic Sociality" (2010).

3 Gary Remer, *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration* (2010), 37ff.

4 For example, John Tiptoft's *The Boke of Noblesse* (1481), a translation of Bonaccorso da Montemagno, *Controversiae de Nobilitate* all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

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trains in temperance, prudence, and decorum, which generate the virtue needed to enact justice. Virtue ensures that each person co-creates with others the common grounds necessary to stability and reliability, at the same time that that co-creation becomes the source of virtue. This virtue, the goodness of friendship manifest in temperance, is at the root of a political education in the public arena and in the domestic and economic realms of civil duty. *Sermo* rhetoric, the rhetoric paradoxically both of the absent audience and of the present friend, is not only a rhetoric fundamental to the written, but also to the sociopolitical work both of public counsel and personal friendship. In the social, it can build a general conversation between people from diverse backgrounds who have virtue in common. Once it became acceptable to exercise power through the performance of an education in virtuous behavior, the doors of citizenship were pushed ajar and it also became possible to imagine people with little means such as laborers and women, as educable and even as citizens. There are distinct nudges in this direction in Erasmus's later writings, and a series of English-language rhetorics in the 1530–1560 period pick up *sermo* rhetoric and develop it into a "probable" rhetoric that offers guides to both behavior and language for a broadening citizenry.

In the late fifteenth century in England a discourse around friendship developed hand in hand with the increasing political discussion about virtue and nobility as acquired through learning. In what was to become a classic move, John Tiptoft's English-language translations of Cicero's *De Amicitia*[5] or *On Friendship,* and Buonaccorso da Montemagno's presentation of the "blood versus virtue" debate in *Controversiae de Nobilitate*, or *The Boke of Noblesse*, were both printed by Caxton in 1481. This essay explores some implications of Erasmus's articulation of familiar rhetoric in *De Conscribendis epistolis* (hereafter, *De Conscribendis*) derived partly in form and more distinctly in spirit from the *sermo* rhetoric of the *De Amicitia*. The history of rhetoric records many contexts for these two books. They contributed to ways of thinking about friendship tied to rhetorical ethos, some of which were incorporated into letter-writing genres and shaped the early essay tradition.[6] *Sermo* rhetoric also continued to be developed for sermons and the use of familiar homily in explaining theology,[7] both underlining the conversational mode. This chapter suggests that Erasmus's

5 John Tiptoft, *Of Friendship* (1481), a translation of Cicero's *De Amicitia*; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

6 Examples include the cited Cicero, *De Amicitia*, and Seneca's *Letters* to Lucilius. For commentary on the connection between friendship and letter-writing in Seneca's works, see John Schafer, "The Philosophical Ambitions of Seneca's *Letters*" (2014).

7 See for example David Buttrick, *Homilectic* (1987).

De Conscribendis not only inherits this tradition but also turns it toward political ends.[8]

Erasmus developed the relevance of familiar rhetoric specifically for a rhetoric of writing and reading. The development of this rhetoric had an effect on thinking about identity and interaction with other people, and an impact on the relation of a person with the nation state. Familiar or *sermo* rhetoric not only addressed the absent audience of the writer, but also Erasmus's growing recognition and defense of a variety of different ways of knowing from a range of social occupations. If one is to argue, as many did in early Tudor England, for virtue rather than blood and "noble" ancestry as a source of civil reason in politics, one must account for the recognition of virtue in people from diverse backgrounds. Both the absent audience and the diversity of audience knowledges were new elements key to social conditions for communication and politics in early modern England. While the first part of the chapter will focus on *De Conscribendis*, it will also attempt to follow some of the pathways that led Erasmus to this articulation of a rhetoric that ties together the explosion in the circulation of both manuscript and printed books with ideas of civic identity, and proposes a rhetorical stance based on friendship, temperance, and probable reasoning.

"Rhetorical stance" is a term that is introduced here to focus on the process-based work of rhetoric,[9] an element profoundly important to current Western philosophy and critiques of neoliberalism.[10] I would argue that while stance is embedded in some versions of classical rhetoric, it is not generally distinguished from "ethos" in current rhetorical studies.[11] Yet stance underlines the performativity of the rhetorical event, and the relational interaction of rhetor, audience, and medium in a particular context. Hence, for example, if ethos refers to the specific character of a rhetor, stance reminds us that there is a performative and ongoing process of recognition and change engendered by the elements of the audience, medium, and context. These are in a relation to ethos and can change its effects and affects, a relationality that is here called "stance."[12] Indeed, in the

8 I am grateful to a *Rhetorica* reader of an earlier article who notes that "the revival of Cicero's *sermo* is noteworthy in the same context" as Erasmus's *De Conscribendis*.

9 Lynette Hunter, *Rhetorical Stance in Modern Literature* (1984).

10 Edmund Husserl's work is key here. For an overview on process see Elizabeth Behnke's contribution *Edmund Husserl* (2011) accessed March 14 2011, and "Husserl's protean concept of affectivity" (2008); see also Alfred Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (1929).

11 Robert Cockcroft, Susan Cockcroft, Laura Downing, Craig Hamilton, *Persuading People* (2014), 56–58.

12 Brian Massumi outlines an individual and social activism of relationality that is directly relevant to rhetorical stance in the "Introduction" to his *Semblance and Event* (2011), 1–28.

discipline of performance studies, the word "performativity" relates directly to rhetorical stance. I bring these concerns about stance to the distinction – elaborated upon below – between probable and plausible rhetoric suggested by Erasmus's *sermo* rhetoric. The impact of that distinction on concepts of identity contributes to an understanding of late medieval and early modern English humanism. For the reasons outlined in the introduction, it is also intended as a contribution to understanding concepts of selfhood in the late modern inheritance of humanism in twenty-first-century (neo)liberalism.

Familiar or *sermo* rhetoric, as suggested by Erasmus[13] in the early sixteenth century, lays the basis for future concerns about any medium that involves an audience absent to the rhetor, and for any performance not immediately involving the live body of the performer yet focused through the live body of an audience. In doing so *sermo* rhetoric develops humanist concerns with probable rhetoric. While all rhetoric is based on doubtful premises, there are different ways of engaging with those premises. Plausible rhetorical strategy depends on a coherently defined audience that accepts the common grounds used by the rhetor.[14] A rhetor using probable rhetoric engages the audience in the formation of common grounds, and this may be behind its specific appeal to the diversifying audiences of humanist Europe which would not have had identical assumptive logics. However, the specific problem for Erasmus of how to involve an absent, reading audience in forming the common grounds of probable rhetoric when they are not present to the writer or to each other, is addressed by *sermo* rhetoric.

Caxton and Friendship

Over the past twenty years or more, scholars have recognized Cicero's *De Amicitia* as a central text in English humanism.[15] Caxton's early printing (1481) of John Tiptoft's translation from a French translation, indicates its importance to the culture of the time and provides a wider context for the Latin texts Erasmus was reading and writing. One of Erasmus's first books printed in English (1539) and

13 Erasmus, *De Conscribendis epistolis* (1985a), 71; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

14 For more detailed work on the difference between plausible and probable rhetoric see chapters 3 and 4.

15 Lorna Hutson, *The Usurer's Daughter* (1994), offers a comprehensive outline of early modern uses of *De Amicitia*, see 63ff.

translated by Richard Taverner,[16] the *Proverbes or Adages* of 1508, reads in many places like a response to *De Amicitia*. Kathy Eden has pointed out the close association between the adage or proverb and the communality[17] that arrives through the making of common grounds and was key to friendship.[18] While Erasmus was clearly not generating parts of the *Adages* from Tiptoft's English *Amicitia*, Taverner echoes Tiptoft, particularly in the texts on friendship. This translation, along with Tiptoft's, is used below to underline by comparison with twentieth-century translations the literalness with which early modern readers and writers worked. The comparison also foregrounds the close connection of physiology with emotion, and a terrain that uses the words "virtue," "shamefast," and "worshipful" rather than "goodness," for the Latin *virtus*. These are words that have a direct relevance to the kind of selfhood involved in early modern English friendship.

Tiptoft's *On Friendship* casts friendship as greater even than family, because it presents a communality or common weal of views not based on blood. This becomes doubly important to the development of civic behavior among the new aristocracy and emerging merchant political power base of sixteenth-century England. First and foremost it investigates the way that friends share something in common: "whosever seeth his frende, seeth a maner of lykenesse of hymselfe" (B1^{v}). In the Loeb edition of 1923, W. A. Falconer translates this "he looks as it were upon a sort of image of himself,"[19] and a more recent 1990 translation by James Powell puts it, "sees as it were a reflection of himself."[20] In these translations is a shift from early modern communality to twentieth-century identity – "likenesse" rather than "image," "manner" rather than "reflection" – foregrounded here as an exemplum for the rest of this chapter's argument. Because Erasmus lives in a world still formed by correspondences,[21] when he deals with the concept of

16 Richard Taverner, *Proverbes or Adages* (1539), a translation of Erasmus's *Adages*; all quotations from this text from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

17 "Communality" is used throughout this essay to distinguish groups of people who come together through joint making of common grounds across many diversities, from "community," which often signifies groups of people who come together because of a prior identification with a set of common grounds. The distinction draws on Jean-Luc Nancy's argument in *The Inoperative Community* (1983).

18 Kathy Eden, "'Between Friends All is Common'" (1998).

19 Cicero, *Laelius on Friendship* (1923), 133; all quotations from this text translated by Falconer are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

20 Cicero, *On Friendship and the Dream of Scipio* (1990), 39; all quotations from this text translated by Powell are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

21 See Angus Fletcher, *Allegory* (1964), on similitude as correspondence and interruption to correspondence; or Ann Drury Hall, *Ceremony and Civility in English Renaissance Prose* (1991), on the ritual function of commemorative mimesis.

friendship and selfhood, "identity" is less likely to be related to exact copy. Yet through this ambiguous "likeness" the "absent are made present" and "a harder saying still, the dead still live" in memory that makes them happy, and brings "honour" (Powell, 39), or, as Tiptoft says, "worshipfulness" (Dii[v]), to the rememberer. In Tiptoft's vocabulary, "worshipfulness" signifies "reputable," "honorable," or "respected,"[22] and is key to the relationality needed for friendship. It cannot exist without an ongoing to and fro of mutual respect for another's differences. "Worshipfulness" also becomes a signifier of someone trustworthy, someone worthy of holding power.

The *sermo* rhetoric Cicero outlines in *De Officiis*[23] and builds from the concept of friendship throughout the *De Amicitia*, brings together writing, memory, and absence or death, in an analogue with the fourth kind of love in Plato's *Phaedrus*:[24] not only the doctor and the gardener, but also Theuth, the god of death and writing. All four topical fields in this fourth kind of love – medicine, gardening, death, writing – eschew the rhetorical stance of the philosophical lover which works to make the rhetor "more like" the person who is listening or seeing. The rhetorical stance of writing, like that of the gardener or physician – and unlike the surgeon – is to engage with the other person or thing in a manner that enables a two-way communication in which each makes possible conditions in which the other may change its own self.[25] Writing, gardening, and the physician resonate with death through the absence of identification with an other yet in a relationality that continually forms the self. As Derrida reminds us, echoing Cicero, it is only in the absence that follows death that we become acutely aware of the material presence of the friend.[26] That material presence of the other person is, in death, found to be co-extensive with one's self and suggests a non-autonomous selfhood quite unlike the essentialized and isolated individual of the later modern period.

Cicero goes on to suggest that friendship derives from nature rather than from want, which latter is a "calculation of the amount of advantage that the

22 *OED*, worshipful adj. A.1.

23 Cicero, *De Officiis* (1913); the translator Walter Miller offers the following on the main comment by Cicero on *sermo* rhetoric, "conversation should find its natural place in social gatherings, in informal discussions, and in intercourse with friends" (1.37.132).

24 Lynette Hunter, *Rhetorical Stance in Modern Literature* (1984), chapter 2.

25 Both Daniel Wakelin's work, *Humanism, Reading and English Literature 1430–1530* (2007), on the importance of husbandry to fifteenth-century humanism, and Lorna Hutson's *The Usurer's Daughter* (1994) to sixteenth-century humanism, expand on gardening as a topos of relation and governance, albeit not often coincident with that of Plato's fourth lover.

26 Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (1997); Derrida uses the obituary genre to explore concepts of friendship.

association will bring" (Powell, 41; both Falconer and Tiptoft say "profit"). This is a consistent argument through the sixteenth century to Bacon's essay "On Friendship"[27] that repeats the idea, saying that it is difficult for "friends" to do business together since in a friendship it is inappropriate to make a profit from or take advantage of the relation. So friendship is from "nature" in the sense that it is done "freely" (Powell, 27), it "comes of its own accord" (Falconer, 139), it is a relationship of "good will" (Powell, 41) that brings people together often with no apparent cause. Yet Cicero is quite practical about the learned nature of friendship: it begins with a perception of "good character," then moves into receiving kindness, observing the other's interest, and then building a familiarity (Powell, 43). The process leads to a relationship of stability and reliability based on good faith (Powell, 59).

Friendship also uses a rhetoric of "pleasantness of manner and conversation," is "relaxed and generous" (Powell, 59). Tiptoft says, "bytwene frends a maner of swettnesse of speche and maners the whiche thing maketh friendship not a lytil the more savery" (C3). Yet, implicitly aware of the problem that such manners may cause if they are merely apparent, this translator goes on to say that there should be "nothynge feyned ne dissymiled" (C3). Flattery destroys friendship, as does a difference in interests, and we are advised to put difference between the self and the flatterer, precisely to distance oneself from the "lyght cytezeyn" (D1^{v}). How, then, is a person to discern the difference between the good faith of friendship that is reliable and constant, whether "sadde or witty" (D1^{v}), and the dissembling of flattery that destroys friendship?

In Powell's translation one can tell the difference if you "see into the other's heart and lay your own open as well" (71). Tiptoft's suggests with a direct physical immediacy that discernment is not possible "unless than ye shelbe your breste opene & and bare to you again" (D2). Both versions call on a radical openness that works between two people. The modern translator renders this as, "it moves towards it and in turn receives what the other has to give" (Powell, 73). Tiptoft puts it:

> When she exalteth & sheweth her owen light and whan she seeth & knoweth the/ same in another, she draweth it stoundmele unto her and taketh so the same that is in another. Whereof love and frenship of suche knyttynges of goodwillis is sette on fyre. (Dii^{v}–Diii)

Yet this openness to the other in friendship that generates good will is only possible if the individuals have virtue (Tiptoft, Diii) or goodness (Powell, 73).

What is individual virtue here? The Tiptoft translation hints at the significance through its vocabulary. He introduces the word "shamefastedness" as the

27 Francis Bacon, *The Essaies* (1616), 236–37; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

"grettest ornament that frenshyp hath" (Dii^{v}). To have shamefastedness is to be modest, to have humility in the sense of self-knowledge.[28] This virtue enables a person to work in relation to someone else with respect for their difference. Solitary virtue will not allow one to attain high things, but "worshipful" fellowship will. In friendship "he sholde love hymself and gete hym another whos will he shold medle with his that of the twayne he shold make wel nygh one" (Diii^{v}) – "medle" not only connotes "mixture" rather than solution, but also sexual intercourse.[29] Meddling may be virtuous or abusive, and the implication here is that coming together with a friend is analogous to virtuous intercourse in which each person retains their particularity, adding to the mixture. They do not become one, nor does one turn into the other, but they become "wel nygh one." "Stoundmele" signifies "from time to time" but also "at times this, and at times that," as in give-and-take, here as the words "draweth" and "taketh" emphasize process rather than a single end.[30] The figure of "knyttynge" is significant for the way that different threads come together and create strong fabric but do not dissolve or assimilate into each other. This insistence on retaining the particularity of self that casts virtue as self-knowledge is probably behind the insistence that while it is human nature "to seize upon things like itself" (Powell, 51) and claim similarity, it is virtue that knows the particular, and only virtue or goodness, is more excellent than friendship.

I read the Tiptoft translation as a demonstration of an early modern concept of melded selfhood, gesturing to a concept of identity that is not singular but continually in a material process of remaking itself in the familiar and nurturing context of friendship. This is not meant to imply that this is the only kind of selfhood inhabited at the time, but that it is a recognized and valued selfhood distinctly different from the autonomy of the social contract individual of today's Western liberalism foregrounded by the twentieth-century translations. It is the idea of a melded selfhood which is the foundation for my understanding of Erasmus's friendship and which also infuses the rhetoric of the probable.

28 *OED*, shamefast adj.1.

29 For connections in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries between "meddle," "medlar," and sexual activity, see *OED* medlar n.3, and meddle v.4.

30 *OED*, stoundmeal adv.1.

Erasmus on Topical Reasoning, Temperance, and Probable Rhetoric: 1490s–1520s

There is a pathway from some of Erasmus's earlier writings to *De Conscribendis* that suggests a journey impelled by an awareness of both the personal and sociopolitical implications of the enlargening democracy of the period and the need for strategies of communication that enable persuasion across difference. If one begins to think of social order as not being based on "blood" or natural power residing in a few, then how does a common weal form? Erasmus proposed and put into action education as the social mechanism for training in the virtue needed to belong to such a communality. Yet throughout his writings he is concerned with the possibility that the uneducated, the vulgar, may also demonstrate virtue. Taverner's translation of Erasmus's early work, *Adages*, often echoes the vocabulary and figures in Tiptoft's text of Cicero's *De Amicitia*. Yet, as Taverner notes, in the primary example of friendship Erasmus references Aristotle:

> The Lyke delyteth in the lyke. Similitude (as Aristotle sayeth) is mother of love wherefore where a ful lykenes in al poyntes in between persons, there no doubt is moste vehement and ardent love. (A8^{v})

There is a ring of certainty to some of these adages, not only those concerned with friendship, that becomes more ambiguous in the context of Erasmus's later thinking, but even in *Adages* there are nuances arising from the anecdotal reasoning that moves toward a concept of "similitude" as melded rather than exact identity. Part of the concern is with the growing diversification of people with whom one might become a friend. One of the earlier and most repeated adages, usually used to introduce the assumption of certainty in distinctions between the vulgar and the learned, is translated here as "Everyman must practise that science & facultie, it hath been afore taught him. Let not the shoemaker medle further then hys shoes" (Biii). At the same time, as another adage makes clear, the business of "shoes" is wide – so the shoemaker can advise the painter Appelles on details about shoes in his paintings, even though it would not be appropriate to comment on other aspects. What the distinction uncovers is an acknowledgment that there is learning or knowledge among those who do not speak Latin, who are the vulgar, and that that knowledge comes to light in appropriate contexts. The implication here is also, I suggest, that the vulgar or uneducated are less likely to be trained to understand the difference between "base" and "appropriate" reasoning – leaving open the possibility that education is a key element in learning not so much what a common ground is, but how to build the common grounds needed for a communal friendship.

Specifically on friendship, the *Adages* reiterates that "Where Frendes be, there be goodes. By thys is meant that frendes be better than money" (Bv^{v}). Friendship needs frequent company and "speaking unto," for it is broken by silence (Dvii), and, in another direct lift from Tiptoft's *De Amicitia*, it is as important to maintain as fire and water: the "necessaries" of life. You know your friends when fortune fails you, for many leave when your luck runs out (Fvii^{v}). "Friends" also leave when you speak truth, for those who are not friends hate you for it (Fvii^{v}–Fviii). As if drafting some of Thomas More's *Utopia*, Erasmus includes two important adages specifically on friendship. The "Amicorum omnia sunt communia" reads in English in 1539:

> Amonges frendes al thynges be commune . . . [Pythagoras] brought in, such a certayne communion of lyfe and goodness, as Christ wold have used amonges al Christians/ . . . al the mony & substance they had: thy layd it togither, . . . [and] resembled moche better that communion used in the primative churche amonges the Apostles, than doth either our Monkry at this day, or the wycked Anabaptistical sect. (Giv^{v}–Gv)

Complementing this is the adage "Amicitia aequalitas: Amicus alter ipse," which tells us, "Frendship (sayth Pythagoras) is equalitie, & al one mynde or wyll/ and my frende is as who shuld say an other I" (Gv–Gv^{v}).

It is Pythagoras who warns us to be careful whom we admit to our friendship (Giv), who says "Keep no swalowes under the same rouse of thy house" (Gviii^{v}), or: beware of friendships made when you are prosperous. Although, the *Adages* says, on the one hand some of the "fascions of they frende" will need "winking" at (E8), it also says that, on the other, friendship requires discernment, for some people bear "badges of greate holynes as though they were lambes, but inwardly they be ravenous wolves" (Cvi). Erasmus also warns "Breake not bread," by which Taverner takes him to mean "that we breake not amitie or frendship which thing is signifyed by bread" (Hi). Erasmus extends this out to Christ who, through bread, "maketh us all one with him, yea and all one togither with in our selves" (Hii), both brought together in Christ and simultaneously experiencing the self as an intense wholeness – a melded selfhood on which communality is founded. Yet when people do sever themselves from Christ who "thus in hys own bodye hathe knytte us together" (Hii), they become solitary, singular, autonomous. If we are unable to be simultaneously part of the body of Christ and particular to our self, in that concept of the melded selfhood of friendship, we become "breakers and no eaters" (Hii^{v}), unable to discern the body of Christ in the bread, or recognize the friend, the virtue of the other person, in the mingled good will of friendship. This discernment between breakers and eaters recalls that between the base and appropriate reasonings of the vulgar. Both the latter elements require a concept of melded friendship that Erasmus will go on to refine.

De Ratione Studii[31] was printed in 1511 but was in process for at least ten years previously and not unexpectedly also exploring some of these issues around selfhood and friendship. Here dissimilarity is still "the parent of hatred and disgust" and "the greater, the truer, the more deeply rooted the similarity, the firmer and closer will be the friendship" (685). Yet the text also offers the reader the ambivalent and thought-provoking example of Narcissus – a man who previously shunned friendship and then destroyed himself by falling in love with his own image – because "each is drawn to nothing other than his own character as reflected in another person" (686). This extreme example of the problems of a friendship based on autonomous identity develops the distinction between likeness that is rooted in the virtues of piety, justice and rhetorical stance, social diversity, and appropriateness, and one that is founded on "the transience of earthly things or even on baseness" (686). Virtuous behavior is founded on appropriateness to the present moment of relation, while the base is founded upon the transience that depends on apparent agreements and pre-formed assumptions that prevent it from the change that necessarily happens in appropriate relations.

Erasmus's *De Copia*,[32] begun in 1499, was first printed in Latin in 1512. If the *Adages* stressed, albeit with internal tensions, the centrality of similitude and communality for friendship among diverse knowledges, *De Copia* continues to respond to the increasingly mobile geographical and social world of early sixteenth-century Europe. It also responds to the growing presence of the printed book.[33] Both elements foreground the need to think of an absent reading audience as increasingly diverse, coming from different backgrounds, education, and familial economics – especially diverse in some respects for those who read and write in Latin and have a transcultural community. The question becomes: how to achieve the temperance of friendship that makes a virtuous relation with an absent and often diverse audience? The social implications expand the question into: how is the friendship needed for communality formed?

If justice is social and piety personal, temperance relates people each to one another. It is the guide to the distinction between friendship and dissembling, and will become the key to civil and then civic interaction in the later sixteenth century. *De Copia* moves from the anecdotal reasoning of the *Adages* to topical reasoning as central to a rhetoric of temperance. As it does so, it

31 Erasmus, *De Ratione Studii* (1978b); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

32 Erasmus, *De Copia* (1978a); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

33 For one study, see Lisa Jardine, *Erasmus Man of Letters* (1994).

moves also toward probable reasoning. Temperance is not a middle way, but an ability to work with others on building a communality appropriate to the particular event. Rather than an essential/relative distinction, or a truth/falsity binary, temperance is open to context. As many historians of rhetoric now recognize, Rudolphus Agricola's *de Inventione dialectica*[34] articulated a revolution in how invention was treated. The text emphasizes a redefinition of scholastic universal propositions that guarantee the truth or falsity of matter, into rhetorical dialectics that can posit a universal system of inquiry – not "what" but "how."[35] What this revolution released was an intense interest in the "probable."[36] Jean Dietz Moss develops Peter Mack's *Renaissance Argument* and points out that Agricola also distinguishes between different kinds of probable argument: provable, convincing, and suitable for creating belief, but also the probable as credible and appropriate, which underlines the effect of an argument on the audience.[37] She also positions Agricola's definition of "certainty" as "reigning opinion," the plausible masquerading as the universal, and notes the anchoring of topical reasoning in "substance" to be used for "particular cases" – or the probable.[38]

Agricola's redefinition of invention underlies the quality of appropriateness central to temperance in both the anecdotal reasoning of the *Adages* and the topical reasoning of *De Copia*.[39] The distinction between appropriate temperance and baseness offers one way of thinking these issues through the concept of friendship. "Baseness" is transient – the kind of relationship that is built on the superficial appearance of a person. This kind of relationship establishes *a priori* grounds, or tries to establish them. The strategy generates both the certainty of scholastic universals that depends on syllogism (soon to turn into rational logic), and of self-evident opinion that is grounded in the plausible. In

34 Marc Cogan, "Rodolphus Agricola and the Semantic Revolutions" (1984), 163, dates the work in the following way: "The presumed date of composition of the *de Inventione dialectica* is 1479. See Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 96. It was certainly completed no later than 1481: Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968), 167, n. 67. The first printed edition dates from 1515: Walter J. Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 538."

35 Lodi Nauta, "Lorenzo Valla and the Rise of Humanist Rhetoric" (2007).

36 See Thomas Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (1990), 127.

37 Jean Deitz Moss, *Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo* (2003), 29.

38 Jean Deitz Moss, *Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo* (2003), 30, 31.

39 For an important overview of the use Erasmus makes of Agricolan invention, see Peter Mack, *Renaissance Argument* (1993), 303ff.; see also Lisa Jardine, "Rudolph Agricola's Influence on Methodical Thinking in the Humanities" (1988).

contrast, a relationship built on temperance retains the particularity of the self. It understands appropriateness, or the simultaneous sense of particularity and melded wholeness in good will that depends on context. Virtue ensures that each person co-creates with others the common grounds necessary to stability and reliability, at the same time that that co-creation becomes the source of virtue. Hence virtue helps to form the structure or method of the probable, and a probable rhetorical stance supports the formation of virtue.

Recalling the concern for diversified knowledges in the *Adages*, *De Copia* also points out that vulgar words, for example those "derived from the low trades and occupations" (305), are sometimes self-evident, iconic, and referential, but sometimes necessary to particular contexts. Vulgar words based on self-evident reasoning are certain and founded on unquestioned assumptions, but vulgar words founded on the needs of a particular context, or necessary, are probable and hence take part in forming the common weal. The one is "base" and the other "temperate" or "appropriate." What this analysis of friendship also allows for is a distinction between the certain grounds of the plausible and the co-created or negotiated grounds of the probable in interactions with others, in words, in education, and in social interaction with people unlike oneself. Erasmus points out that *copia* are particularly important for translation and interpretive commentary (and writing verse), which require negotiation about meaning (302).

In 1515, Erasmus published *The Sileni of Alcibiades*.[40] David Wooton, who translated it in 1999, notes in his introduction that everything that seems absurd in More's *Utopia* is matched and explained in Erasmus's works. Wooton also draws links between Erasmus's writing on friendship and More's "commentaries" that extended friendship even to wives[41] – although it is doubtful that Erasmus himself thought this way about women until his acquaintance with More's daughters as they grew older in the 1520s, which made him change his mind on the value of educating women.[42] Yet in *Sileni* he develops the concept of seeing the friend in the particular, drawn from discerning Christ in the bread of communion, into the allegory of the Silenus that puts into play the social commentary central to More's *Utopia*. The *Sileni* is particularly interested in the vulgar, and not only in the implications of baseness and appropriateness as stances for the rhetor, but also for the audience or reader. The audience co-

40 Erasmus, *The Sileni of Alcibiades* (1999); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

41 Cited by David Wooton, in his "Introduction," to Erasmus, *The Sileni of Alcibiades* (1999); citation source reads: from *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 7, 23.

42 Cited by Erika Rummel, *Erasmus on Women* (1996), 10; citation source reads: from *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 24, epistle 1233.

creates the stance, and is as responsible for the temperate friendship as the rhetor, both needing to see beyond the assumptive social logics so that the appropriate relation may emerge. The argument presents the vulgar as either base or responding to need, the powerful as either base or temperate, and language as either certain or appropriate. In each case, the needed and the temperate and the appropriate are elements of friendship, and enacted through a probable rhetorical stance.

Picking up Plato's reference in the *Symposium*, Erasmus compares Socrates to the Sileni because "he was quite different when you got to know him properly from what one would imagine from his outward appearance and manner" (169), which is coarse and vulgar. Shortly afterward he recalls the earlier distinction between the vulgar who are base and certain, and the vulgar who are necessary to appropriate contexts:

> Such Sileni were the apostles – poor, unsophisticated, uneducated, base-born, powerless, rejected, spared no insult, ridiculed, hated, cursed, the public laughing stock, and the abomination of the world. But open the Silenus, and what tyrant has had powers to equal this? Devils obeyed their slightest word; they raised a hand, and the raging seas quieted; they spoke, and the dead returned to life. (172)

Most people, he continues, are "Sileni turned inside out," professors who are "windbags blown up with Aristotle" (173), priests who are "sticklers" for ceremony yet "furthest from religion" (174). He adds that magistrates who appear to be "guardians of the public good" are really "wolves and pirates that prey upon the community" (177); or rulers who "plunder, cheat, and oppress the poverty-stricken" (181) when their power "comes from the consent of the people" (178); and, finally, "power, if it is not combined with goodness and wisdom, is not power, but tyranny" (178).

Wooton reminds his readers that this reversal of conventional assumptions also has an impact on words. Erasmus comments "Upside-down values mean that the meanings of words have to be displaced. The lofty they now call lowly; the bitter is sweet; the precious is worthless; life is called death" (178) – hence there can be no neutral or "universal" rhetorical technique that guarantees the appropriate. *Sileni* presents probable reasoning as linked to knowledge communally produced for particular context, a skill needed by a highly diverse range of people who do not share assumptions but need to find appropriate relation, and a skill finding its performativity in a friendship that leads to temperance, piety, and justice. The implication is that people need to seek the appropriate, see inside the Silenus which might put a vulgar face on a learned person or an educated face on a fool, and co-create probable grounds with temperance and wisdom for both individual selfhood and the common weal. Returning to the shoemaker,

Erasmus describes Socrates: "his speech was plain, elementary, and working-class, for he was always talking about carters and cobblers, clothmakers, and blacksmiths. It was from them that he drew his examples" (169). Despite the plebeian appearance of Socrates, Plato spends his life discerning the friend in the vulgarity of Socrates, exercising temperance and creating common grounds for appropriate action. Appropriate rhetoric moves from anecdotal and topical reasoning to become the heart of the probable rhetorical stance of the familiar or *sermo* rhetoric articulated in later work by Erasmus.

Absent Audiences: The Personal and the Social: 1520s–1536

Erasmus's *De Conscribendis* was pirated in England in 1521 from a manuscript written much earlier[43] and embedded in the co-construction of the *Adages* and the *De Copia*. Possibly in response, an "authorized" edition was published in 1522 by Froben in Basle, and presumably reflects Erasmus's considered and much later thoughts.[44] In it he puts the appropriate rhetoric that we have followed from the anecdotal through the topical to the probable at the service of letter-writing, and combines the topical reasoning of *De Copia* with a more carefully delineated rhetorical stance of the probable. The rhetoric that results he calls *sermo* rhetoric. Indeed Ciceronian rhetoric distinguishes *sermo* from dialectics, because *sermo* or conversational rhetoric does not use rigorous logic but contextual topical reasoning.[45] It is as well to remember that Erasmus also uses *sermo* to translate the "word" in the "word is made God" from the New Testament Epistle of Saint John.[46] I use *sermo* interchangeably with "familiar," following the translations of Charles Fantazzi and Judith Henderson.[47] "Familiar" here connotes intimate, personal, dutiful, immediate,[48] but also has a tinge of the "banal," as in "familiarity breeds contempt."[49]

43 Lawrence Green, "Dictamen in England 1500–1700" (2007), 105.

44 The 1985a edition from which the translated quotations in this book are taken was published in 1555 by Nicholas Brylinger, who took over several of Froben's titles after his death in 1527.

45 See John Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the Genera Eloquentiae" (1987).

46 Joanna Martindale, *English Humanism* (1985), 22.

47 Judith Rice Henderson, "Erasmian Ciceronians" (1992); see also the introduction to Erasmus, *De Conscribendis* (1985a), 71.

48 *OED* familiar adj.

49 *OED* "familiarity": 1548 "N. Udall et al. tr. Erasmus *Paraphr. New Test.* I. John 34 a, Familiaritie bringeth contempte."

Both *sermo* rhetoric and the performative stance of probable reasoning require a keen attention to context. A letter's reasoning should "not only conform to the topic but, as befits any good go-between (for a letter writer performs the function of a messenger), it will take account of times and persons: it will not speak of the same subject on all occasions or to all persons alike" (20).[50] Commenting that different styles appeal to different writers, Erasmus asks also, "how can a single style be desired for such an infinitely varied context" (12), and notes that "the best form of expression is that which is the most appropriate to the context" (12). But how does one discern the appropriate? By creating "a conversation between friends" (20). The rhetorical stance of a letter-writing style enables a to and fro of the writer and the reader:

> the style will also keep in mind the writer and not merely the recipient or the purpose for which it was sent . . . transforming itself into every shape required by the topic at hand, yet in such a way that amid great variety it retains one feature unaltered, namely that of being always refined, learned and sane. (19)

What resists the potential relativism of copiousness is the virtue of the particular individual who is exercising temperance through probable rhetoric, and discerning the virtue of the recipient. Yet it depends not only on the virtue of the rhetor but also on the virtue of the reader. The alliance of humanism with an active life spreads also to an insistence on the humanist reader as one who reads actively. In recent detailed work undertaken by scholars of fifteenth- to sixteenth-century English humanism such as Daniel Wakelin,[51] there comes evidence for the period's acknowledgment of the activity of the reader that underlines the necessary relational process of probable rhetoric.

Much of *De Conscribendis* is an exploration of the way that familiar or *sermo* rhetoric is marked not only by persuasive argument but also by "encouragement." Persuasion that teaches by proof, changes the other's way of thinking through the expressed "will" of the rhetor. In contrast, encouragement is made up of "emotions, not proofs" (73), and leads the writer and reader to "action." Familiar rhetoric works with affects of "joy, pain, hope and fear" (71); it deals in praise and expectation. These elements, I would suggest, focus us on

50 See also footnote 25 above. This distinction is one that Plato makes between the rhetoric of the non-lover and that of the gardener, doctor, or writer in *Phaedrus*; it is also a fundamental principle of Galenic medicine, and today's traditional Chinese medicine – that each person has to be treated in their particular context, hence one medicine as a cure for all is anathema.
51 Daniel Wakelin, *Humanism, Reading and English Literature 1430–1530* (2007); David Rundle, "Humanism before the Tudors" (2002). For further background to education in reading, see also J. Adamson, "Literacy in Sixteenth Century England" (1929), and Joan Simon, *Education and Society in Tudor England* (1966), 83.

discerning the friend, whether as writer or reader, in the act of reading, and are best understood through the concept of rhetorical stance. Rhetorical stance locates the ways in which rhetor and audience interconnect with and within the medium of the rhetoric. The emphasis in stance is not on what the rhetor does to produce audience reaction but on the structure of their relationality in the context of the medium.[52] Hence, in Erasmus's terms here, a "persuasion" based on "will" attempts to change the recipient, and describes a stance in which the rhetor is in control of establishing the grounds or assumptions for certainty or plausibility. In contrast, a persuasion tempered with "encouragement" is a stance with a more open invitation to action because it leaves room for the recipient to engage actively with the setting of grounds and the recognition of the appropriate. Nevertheless, techniques associated with encouragement may create only an illusion of joint action, and, if so, the actual stance shifts from the probable to the plausible.

What is interesting is that the probable rhetorical stance of the familiar delineates the particular interaction between a rhetor and a member of an audience or a reader, yet this particular writer/reader engagement may well not be the same – although the words remain the "same" – for an interaction between the rhetor and another audience member. Familiar rhetoric attempts to establish the stance of the probable that invites a co-creation or negotiation with the friend, and Erasmus advises on strategies of encouragement that "discern" that friend. Each one of them evidences temperance. If we complain that a friend lacks in their duty, we must not "mar friendship" but soften the complaint "either with praise, or humour, or dissembling" (210). Similarly, if we indicate a friend's fault "we shall mitigate the harshness of criticism with praise" (189). If we rebut a complaint, we should first make clear that not only are we not offended but also "greatly appreciative" (214). If we "reprove" our enemies it is a "departure from humane conduct" (218), so with friends we must instead "remonstrate." Even when simply conveying news to a friend, we should "sometimes include congratulation or consolation" (225). And we may openly grieve with a friend (236) as well as praise them in congratulations (241).

Significantly, letter-writing is, however, not always familiar only in a personal sense.[53] As Erasmus works through the familiar rhetoric appropriate to

52 Lynette Hunter, *Modern Allegory and Fantasy* (1989).

53 Judith Henderson argues that Erasmus distinguishes between writing the letter and writing a book on the basis of the difference between singular and multiple readerships. I would agree with this, but am here pointing out that Erasmus learns from elaborating *sermo* rhetoric, about the difference between probable and plausible stance. See Judith Rice Henderson, "Erasmian Ciceronians" (1992), 14.

the letters to a friend, he also distinguishes between this and the rhetorical stance of the letter to those with whom one does not share friendship but with whom one is communicating often over sociopolitical issues.[54] While one may learn about how to address an absent audience by putting oneself in the position of the friend, there is a different deployment of temperance, which may build not only virtue and good will, but also good effective action in a larger social communality or common weal.[55] It may be judicial or accusatory, or invective, commendation, or conciliation – among other genres. Erasmus specifically notes that "when we are anxious to win over to ourselves men with whom we have had no previous acquaintance or friendship" (246), we inevitably flatter – but even here we should praise without "fawning, or fiction, or artifice, or the seeking of our own interests" (246) to maintain the temperance of virtue. When David Rundle argues that for Erasmus praise is didactic rather than panegyric, I suggest that this is most appropriate when addressing the person who is not a personal friend.[56]

Letter-writing is familiar because it uses encouragement, whether addressed to a friend or to someone whom one does not know, and encouragement is the key to its probable stance. The affects released by the encouragement of a person of virtue make the absent person, the letter-reader or the letter-writer, present in a manner analogous to the way that for Cicero, via Tiptoft, friendship makes the dead still live. They ensure that the reader has a place to engage with the common grounds of the persuasion, and in so doing the stance brings the reader and writer actively together into the performativity of the rhetoric. When dealing with affects that structure the positioning of reader and writer, rhetoric inevitably opens up, through pathos and ethos, potential issues of manipulation and abuse by argumentative strategy, deceit, and dissimulation. Hence the familiar stance is necessary because, whether written to an absent friend or simply to an absent audience, it anchors the virtue of the rhetor, discerns and encourages the virtue of the reader, not to identify specific ethos and pathos but to invite the co-creation of common grounds, and generates virtue through good will or good action.

In *De Conscribendis* the letter of "discussion" could be taken as exemplary of *sermo* rhetoric, and Erasmus calls it "reciprocal scholarly exchange" (254). Furthermore, he tells us that his school is like a "theatre" calling forth applause and praise (40) rather than a place of torture or punishment. With his students,

54 See Judith Rice Henderson "Humanist Letter Writing" (2002).

55 For analysis of the emergence of the "active life" in early modern humanism, see, among others, J. Hankins, "Humanism and Modern Political Thought" (1996), 126ff.

56 See David Rundle, "'Not so much praise as precept'" (1998) – on the panegyric as didactic, the praised prince must realize he is also the student.

as with his colleagues, he is working on friendship as a way to deal not only with the increasingly diverse social backgrounds of the citizenry, but also with their geographical displacement and the resultant need for a rhetoric that addresses the absent audience. Familiar rhetoric, he comments, is a rather low style – the vulgar again – but one that takes skill. It is rooted in the everyday, and we need to learn its skills because they both "assist the state" and "one's friends in private life" (37): "since a good man is not only born for himself, education should be acquired in order to be a help to others." As J. K. Sowards, the *Collected Works of Erasmus* editor of *De Pueris Instituendis* (1529) notes, Erasmus worries that private instruction in noble houses rather than public schools will make it impossible for people from poorer families to learn, saying "the rich ought to be generous and come to the aid of gifted children who, because of their family's poverty, are unable to develop their natural talents."[57] Two years later, in 1531, Leonard Cox publishes the first English-language handbook on rhetoric, dedicating the book to his patron, Lord Hugh Faryngton, abbot of Reading, who has put him in charge of just such a school. Erasmus's work on education and his writings, among those of others, inspired the explosion of vernacular, vulgar language printing of the 1530s, in the name of the common weal – a concept well articulated in the fifteenth century[58] and soon exacerbated by the requirement of the Church of England for priests to place an English-language Bible "in some convenient place within the said church that ye have care of, whereas your parishioners may most commodiously resort to the same and read it."[59] Erasmus responds to the diversifying citizenry of early sixteenth-century Europe by locating civility, the ability to discuss with people from a wide range of backgrounds not necessarily those of one's own, in education in familiar rhetoric and the rhetorical stance of probable reasoning.

57 Erasmus, *De Pueris Instituendis* (1985b), xxii.

58 See Daniel Wakelin, *Humanism, Reading and English Literature 1430–1530* (2007), chapter 4, on the "common weal" and Tiptoft's *The Boke of Noblesse*.

59 Fred Bewsher, "Thomas Cromwell, Injunctions to the Clergy" (1913); reproduced at http://www.northcravenheritage.org.uk/NCHT/RoyPriceArchive/CHURCH&ABBEY/(1538)InjunctionstotheClergy(Cromwell).pdf Accessed July 25 2021.

Sociopolitical Implications of Sermo Rhetoric: The Probable and the Plausible

Sermo rhetoric brings together the copious topics needed for appropriate and particular contexts of a situated[60] event and is hence often "vulgar" or common. It contributes to the probable reasoning that supports the rhetoric of the familiar. Hence it brings together the rhetor and recipient in a performative engagement with medium and context in which all elements respond and change so as to become appropriate, even though they are not immediately present to one another. It also calls forth the temperance of the friend that displays and discerns virtue and generates good will. Yet, as noted above, Erasmus elaborates this rhetoric in terms of both the intimate friend and the social communality. It is not only that we can learn to discern the personal friend in the Silenus, but that the virtue, the goodness of friendship – manifest in temperance – is at the root of a political education in civil and familiar duty. Familiar rhetoric, the rhetoric paradoxically both of the absent audience and of the present friend, is not only a rhetoric fundamental to the written, but to the sociopolitical work of private and public counsel as well as to personal friendship. In the social, it can build a general conversation between people from diverse backgrounds who have virtue in common. To do so it employs probable reasoning as an attempt to persuade not from assumptions but with a method of relationality that engages both rhetor and audience. Erasmus defines familiar rhetoric in terms that are based on Agricolan dialectic, or probable reasoning, and are passed through the lens of a citizenry diversifying not only in social background but also in geographical location, whose political principles are communality and a common weal.

While the familiar rhetoric of the letter to the friend may train one in addressing other absent readers, it is always difficult to distinguish between a probable rhetorical stance that invites co-creation of grounds, and a plausible stance that manipulates the reader or audience into acceptance of the self-evident. As later chapters in this book attest, it is especially difficult when working on the civic and communal rather than on intimate familiarity. Indeed it is impossible to explore every assumption in the intimate letter, and this difficulty becomes even more problematic in sociopolitical rhetoric. Hence the familiar needs skill not only to define the grounds central to the persuasion but also to manifest one's virtue so that other grounds will be able to be accepted rather than argued with the good reason generated by recognition of temperance. This latter can lead to the construction of

60 There is much in common here with "situated" knowledge and textuality; see Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges" (1988), and Lynette Hunter, *Critiques of Knowing* (1999a), chapter 5.

ethos, but the stance of probable rhetoric depends on the experience of the audience being invited by that stance to participate in forming the elements of the rhetor's virtue and in the co-creation of probably-the-best grounds.

In a probable rhetoric, ethos and stance cannot be separated from one another in the way that they can be in a plausible argument. Probable rhetoric depends on the audience being openly invited by the ethos of the rhetor into an engaged stance that may in turn affect and change that ethos. With plausible rhetoric, the ethos of the rhetor may be inflected by the stance of argumentation but does not depend on it. For example, a plausible rhetorical stance may well work to obscure, hide, or erase the possibility of negotiation over grounds. This may at times openly affect the ethos projected, but not necessarily and, indeed, not usually – because the technique of "obscuring" is not effective if it can be identified as an aim of the rhetor, and thus render the persuasion identifiable as manipulative rather than reasonable. In social uses of familiar rhetoric the virtue of the rhetor can be carefully constructed through devices that demonstrate temperance, but even with these devices often has to be taken on trust. This trust is based not on the ethos generated by the rhetor, but on the stance of the probable which has engaged the audience, medium, and context into the formation of temperance. Nevertheless, while this may be intimately felt in personal friendship, it is much more difficult to enact and discern in a larger sociopolitical context where the communication is among people who do not necessarily know each other, or in reading a book where the reader is often unknown to the writer.

The *Encomium Matrimonii*,[61] initially printed in 1518 but written much earlier, appears to be a culturally central example of the problem of familiar rhetoric being employed for a social argument. The letter offers a demonstration of probable rhetoric used in a declamation to create a letter "as if" to a young friend yet aimed at a more general public. The subtlety and complexity of the piece have been much discussed. What I would like to emphasize here is that one of the things it attempts is to create an argument that will carry familiar persuasion to people that the rhetor/writer does not know, and who are absent readers. To do so, the writer establishes first the familiarity of his position with respect to his reader, as Kathy Eden notes, by way of an adage about the cradle that embraces reader and rhetor in the common experience of birth.[62] He continues with a variety of copious material that is effective because it touches on points of recognition for a wide audience as the *Encomium* moves from biblical

61 Erasmus, *Encomium Matrimonii* (1993).
62 Kathy Eden, "From the Cradle" (2001).

to classical examples, from nature and trees and stones to the responsibility of a citizen, from the personal to the national. But at the same time, and precisely because of those points of recognition and non-recognition, the stance invites the reader to question and negotiate. As Erasmus notes in particular in *De Copia*, the enigmatic work of allegory, specifically in "speaking or writing for an educated audience" or in "writing," is needed for this kind of negotiation: "for one should not write so that everyone can understand everything, but so that people should be compelled to investigate and learn some things themselves" (336). Not only the writer but also the reader is involved in the stance of probable rhetoric.

Erasmus constructed the piece so well that it caused him and translators of the work untold trouble. The probable stance of the piece depended on a relationship of friendship, guaranteeing the virtue of the rhetor, yet most readers of the time knew that Erasmus did not have a young friend such as the addressee of the letter. Hence this was not a letter of friendship but instead a declamation. The reader's active engagement in co-creating the grounds for reasoning with the argument may well have been grounded in the discernment of virtuous friendship, but that friendship may well also have been read as establishing a plausible ethos that manipulated the reader into accepting as self-evident a tenuous, even heretical argument. Lorna Hutson argued in 1994 that the *Encomium* cut "affective power loose from the bonds of a specific relation, into a technology available to all men, a transferable instrument for the creation of credit."[63] This is to judge the work as a declamation, primarily plausible, and using the topic of friendship as a tactic to generate acceptance or credit. In this her argument agrees with a number of other readings.

Yet Hutson's later article (2011) on "Swetnes"[64] in the *Encomium* reads rather more positively, as she documents the different contemporary cultural fates of this declamation recognizing the drive not only to "credit" but also to good will. The fluctuation of the word "profit" links both these concepts, being both "to gain by taking advantage of credit" and, as attested to by Tiptoft's translation of Cicero's *virtus*, to support with the temperance of good will. Marc van der Poel's analysis of the declamations of Agrippa argues that, following Erasmus, Agrippa develops the declamatory style precisely "to argue a point of view . . . by means of probable arguments"[65] that will convey an ethos of "modesty" and lack of "arrogance" (176), in other words "good will," while it invites discussion. The use of

63 Lorna Hutson, *The Usurer's Daughter* (1994), 76.

64 Lorna Hutson, "'Especyall Swetnes'" (2011).

65 Marc van der Poel, *Cornelius Agrippa, the Humanist Theologian and His Declamations* (1997), 172.

Erasmus's *Encomium* in several early English-language rhetorics of the mid-sixteenth century is a clue to its culturally significant place as an example of the complexity of the *sermo* rhetoric of written materials, and the extent to which the medium could be thought of as either trustworthy or devious, probable, or plausible.

Endnote: Sociopolitical Implications of *Sermo* Rhetoric

Sermo rhetoric is in part Erasmus's response to the sociopolitical implications of the surge of geographical and economic mobility in the fifteenth century that generated increasingly absent and diverse audiences. In addition to the elements that *sermo*, drawing on concepts of personal friendship, contributes to the traditions of letter-writing and the essay, and its long-standing place in the rhetoric of sermons, the rhetorical stance of *sermo* also establishes communicative forms for particular kinds of probable counsel that underlie the understanding of civil behavior in the sixteenth century. These are displaced by the seventeenth century, as are most forms of counsel, in favor of social contract liberal humanism, but retain a vital place in rhetorics of conversation increasingly allied with women and with spiritual life. The displacement occurs rapidly, beginning in the 1530s. The next chapter takes a brief look at three rhetorics from this period by Thomas Elyot, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever, that deploy the two primary elements of Erasmus's *sermo* rhetoric: the use of probable modes of reasoning, and a sustained engagement with the way probable and plausible rhetorical stances affect the personal and sociopolitical relations among the rhetor, audience, and medium. In doing so they outline the parameters for performative civil engagement in the swiftly changing proto-capitalist shifts in democracy during the sixteenth-century Tudor period.

Chapter 2
Civil Rhetoric 1530–1575: English Rhetoricians, the Nation, and the Person of Virtue

Plausible and Probable Rhetorics in Embodied and Verbal Behavior

This second chapter explores rhetorics and books on behavior by Thomas Elyot, Ralph Lever, and Thomas Wilson, from the period 1530–1560. Early to mid-century sixteenth-century England witnessed distinct approaches to the performance of power. On the one hand there were the many translations from the Italian of how to physically perform "being empowered" and having status as if it were instrinsic.[1] These guides to behavior were contemporaneous with a number of printed books by English writers concerned with the possibility of a "common weal," a common wealth, health, and social purpose. The linking of wealth, health, and society is found in a number of other words of the time, such as "profit" and "credit," which carried not only the present-day connotation of money, but also the sense of "good will" toward other people. These latter books specifically linked the Galenic medical balance of the humors with an ethical behavior toward which all people should strive. Drawing together Erasmus's concept of temperance and virtue with the predominant medical system of the time, Elyot, Lever, and Wilson, in various ways, present the embodied and rooted performance of a probable rhetoric of friendship as good counsel. They also gesture to the possibility of a purely superficial performance of a plausible rhetoric that could be deceitful, and in common with other English rhetoricians of the time they place great faith in the effectiveness of straightforward English language to expose such manipulation. In so doing, they delineate probable rhetorics in writing and document approaches to individual and civic agency that offer insights into the Western neoliberal state rhetorical structures of today.

Sociohistorical Background

The central ethical dilemma of the written word in print is that its audience is usually absent, and hence what is put into words may be read by those who do not know the writer and the writer can never be sure of the context of the

1 For a discussion of these texts, see chapter 3.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501514241-003

reader. There is no necessary and common ground for the assumptions that make the persuasion work, and no in-person performance to generate assent. What is key to Erasmus's development of *sermo* rhetoric is that the politics of the early modern monarchical democracy of England was also based on a polity made up of people from increasingly diverse backgrounds, and one that was geographically widely spread and often absent from in-person rhetorical performance. That the rhetoric of writing in the printed medium provided an analogue for the rhetoric of the new politics may well be what knit the printed medium to the emerging nation state.[2] Erasmus works from Agricola's distinction between certain and probable persuasion, and delineates *sermo* rhetoric to solve the issue of distance by calling on both the writer and the reader, the rhetor and the audience, to be virtuous, and to generate this virtue through the performative temperance of probable rhetoric in words on the page. Probable rhetoric draws on the familiar to establish necessary contexts within which the writer can demonstrate virtue by inviting the reader to co-create the common grounds of the argument, and within which the elements of stance – reader, writer, medium, and context – are in a relational interaction so that reasoning is appropriate to both writer and reader.

The key to *sermo* or familiar rhetoric is probable reasoning that is founded on a performativity appropriate to such a relational stance. It enacts a persuasion in both oral and written media, which is used to make all participants present to each other in a way that later decades define as "conversational" rhetoric. In contrast, the key to the plausible rhetoric of opinion is success, to gain which it positions its audience to agree to its certain persuasion with a recognizable heroic ethos that later decades frequently call "eloquence." Just as with a universalized rhetoric of control, in which the key is often to build an apparently neutral ethos, plausibility requires the audience to accept its certain grounds as self-evident. Certain, or plausible, rhetoric avoids active engagement with the audience, favoring mediation that distances the audience so the rhetoric can build the impersonal and hence the inevitable. Indeed, certain rhetoric denies that it is a rhetoric.

The brief analysis above suggests that Erasmus could see the danger not only of plausibility in the printed medium but also of the universalizing Ramusian response of rational logic which would try to contain it, both of which work in the name of self-evident certainty. Familiar rhetoric faces the fact that persuasion is a technology and, as with all rhetorics, that technology is neither good nor bad but at the service of the hands and mouths of sentient beings.

2 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (1982).

Attempts to regulate a rhetoric, to ensure that it is "good" by providing guaranteed strategies, will always fail – although they may be more likely than not to work well in particular sociohistorical contexts. Far better, familiar rhetoric suggests, is to acknowledge the dangers and deal with the immediate context: not only of the particular persuasive moment, but taking a wider view of the sociopolitical moment.

Erasmus adds to the insight that familiar rhetoric can encourage virtue only by fusing ethos with the rhetorical stance of the probable, the suggestion that these necessary contexts are based in the lived lives of the writer and reader. In his discussions of the everyday contexts for familiar rhetoric, his increasing inclusion of the "vulgar" – those not educated in Latin – indicates a growing recognition of the diversification of power into groups previously excluded from social and political dialogue. These people are distinguished from those who are "basely" vulgar because they use the rhetoric to co-create "appropriate" grounds for reasoning rather than self-evident assumptions. This distinction is not the same as that between human and non-human: the basely vulgar fit too precisely into self-evident assumptions. The vulgar who co-create appropriate grounds are enacting Erasmian humanism. Yet it is this latter group of people, who do not fit the sedimenting assumptions of humanism, who need new grounds for reasonable action – grounds that emerge from their own non-privileged locations – who will become the non-human. For Erasmus anyone can demonstrate the virtue of humanism by co-creating appropriate grounds – even cobblers. Familiar rhetoric becomes a powerful social tool for an increasingly geographically mobile (needing written communication) and socially mobile (needing to be able to demonstrate civic virtue) populace. This social mobility means that all have to be trained how to use rhetoric, including familiar rhetoric. The logical destination of Erasmus's development of *sermo* rhetoric is that all people need education in order to maintain the civic state because education should train people in the temperance needed to connect personal piety and social justice.

Erasmus welcomed the diversity of early sixteenth-century humanism, recognizing the enormous personal potential in a common weal, and he formulated a rhetoric to encourage it rather than contain it. His notion of temperance lies at the heart of a virtuous enaction of melded selfhood. However, throughout the sixteenth century in England, this selfhood began to transform into the autonomous individual known as the subject. Those few profiting from the redistribution of wealth not only needed to learn how to behave as if they had a right to power, but also needed to learn the doublethink that is the basis for self-control and self-regulation that structures the subjecthood required by the capitalist state of the liberal social contract.

As noted at the beginning of chapter 1, the close association of friendship and civil behavior is hinted at in Caxton's printing of John Tiptoft's *On Friendship* in the same year as his *The Boke of Noblesse*. The latter raised an issue, intimately related to Cicero's statement that friendship is more important for virtue than blood, that would preoccupy English-language readers for the next two centuries (if not longer): how to perform according to the status you wish to inhabit as if you were born to it.[3] The concern was double-edged because until the end of the fifteenth century public status was a right. If you were intended to hold a specific status, then you would naturally know how to do so. Yet the number of sixteenth-century books on behavior indicates a radical uncertainty about the issue.[4] That many of them were translated from the Italian – among others, Baldassare Castiglione (Thomas Hoby), della Casa (possibly Thomas Blount), Francesco Patrizzi (Robert Robinson), Stefano Guazzo (Bartholomew Young and George Pettie), Giambattista Giraldi (Ludowick Bryskett) – indicates not only emulation of a humanist behavior that justified acquired status rather than natural status, but also a displacement of the social disruption this was causing. As will be explored in chapter 5, most of the "addresses to the reader" in contemporary books on behavior call attention to the fact that these are not the translator's ideas, but someone else's.

The need for such books began incrementally to increase from the 1530s. This chapter will now turn to Thomas Elyot's *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531), Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553 second edition 1560), and Ralph Lever's *The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft* (early 1550s, printed 1573), all of which use Erasmus's writing extensively along with several other sources. But these books evidence the beginnings of an increasing divergence between probable and plausible rhetoric that is a record of problems in English humanism. To put it in a nutshell, humanism promised equal opportunities for all, yet people quickly realized that, if this were so, there would be no one to exploit – and exploitation was necessary for the accumulation of capital necessary to be "equal." The printed books of the period offer examples of a series of specious arguments that keep people "in their place" and develop the concept of self-regulation at the heart of the nation state theory of capitalism that flowered in the seventeenth century and permitted the designation of some kinds of sentient beings as non-human, for example women, or even fungible, for example Africans.

Many people have presented the contradiction that humanism became for Henry VIII by generating a social mobility that initially helped his causes and then had to be contained. Humanism destabilized the status quo of the "honors"

3 Frank Whigham relates this to Castiglione's "sprezzatura," *Ambition and Privilege* (1984), 15.
4 Lawrence Green, "Stance Perception in Sixteenth-Century Ethical Discourse" (1992).

system by advocating for learning as a way to acquire virtue, and facilitated the pamphlet wars waged by a king with no standing army by providing wider education. During the late 1520s and early 1530s Cromwell managed many political crises by circulating printed pamphlets.[5] Effective pamphlets meant that people were being trained in written persuasive techniques, and were in the process learning how to make claims on social power. In 1530 Henry spuriously used a controversy around the "honors" system and its ennoblement of "bond men" and "vile persons" to wrest the powers of ennoblement that guaranteed a person's status away from the heralds and claim this power solely for himself.[6] When England broke away from the Roman Catholic church in 1533 and began the dissolution of the monasteries, Henry created a new nobility, often those educated people who had facilitated his aims, to fill its spaces. These were people who had quickly to learn how to behave as if they were born to the title.

Central to this humanist social revolution was training not just in rhetoric but in probable rhetoric. When Cromwell reformed the Inns of Court in the 1520s, he required lawyers to listen weekly to an orator or to rhetoric to get skills in arguing "probably."[7] At the time, Lincoln's Inn was home to a large number of yeomen and gentry who were becoming socially mobile. Thomas Starkey, in a letter to Cromwell, speaks of the power of his writing as probable persuasion.[8] Thomas Lupset, in *An Exhortation to Yong Men* (1535), says, "young men do walk in the pathway of honesty by probable argument."[9] As I have argued, probable rhetoric acquired the authorization to replace scholastic "universals" through the training of the virtuous man in temperance, piety, and justice. The stance of this rhetoric included the rhetor and the audience in the textuality of the performative moment. What this means is that both the rhetor and the audience, the writer and the reader, were co-creating the grounds for the persuasion. The coming together of critical engagement with concepts of friendship and probable rhetoric enabled Erasmus's generation of the fourth category of familiar or *sermo* rhetoric, which transferred this humanist couple of learning and virtue in oration also to writing, by introducing a rhetorical stance that addressed the "absent audience" of the written word.

However, between 1531 and 1534, and as if to control the mobility and change that support for humanism had unleashed, Henry and Cromwell introduced the

5 Arthur Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965), 136–40.

6 Mervyn James, *Society, Politics and Culture* (1988), 335.

7 Lorna Hutson, *The Usurer's Daughter* (1994), 74.

8 See the comment by S. J. Heritage, editor of, Thomas Starkey, *Starkey's Life and Letters* (1878), lxxvii.

9 Thomas Lupset, *An Exhortation to Yong Men* (1928), 233–62.

treason laws which effectively stopped the pamphlet culture in England until the reign of Edward VI.[10] Humanist arguments about education as a way to civic virtue slipped easily into arguments about education as a means to nobility. In his unprinted *Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset* Thomas Starkey has Pole say, "after the sentence of Aristotle, the mind of man first of itself is as a clean and pure table, wherein is nothing painted or carved but of itself apt and indifferent to receive all manner of pictures and images."[11] But Starkey was under no illusion that this meant that just anyone could be a citizen: citizenship was accorded only to an elite of the educated, and "free speech" was welcome only to the extent that that elite was recognized as reasonable and experienced in leadership.[12] Richard Morison, who was called back from Italy by Henry to write his *Remedy for Sedition* in the face of the 1536 Pilgrimage of Grace rebellion – one both enabled and challenged by those with a humanist education – says, "It far passeth Cobbler's craft to discuss, what lords, what bishops, what councilors, what acts and statutes are most meet for a commonwealth."[13] John Cheke was one among many who reiterated this concern in 1549 in *The Hurt of Sedition*, arguing that Henry's encouragement of education did not intend "that every subject should busily intermeddle with it of their own head, but only those whom his council thought most meet men for such an honest purpose."[14] John Guy suggests that this argument is based also on a move from counsel as a right to counsel as a duty. The latter concept allowed the monarch to decide upon to whom they would listen,[15] no doubt underlining Henry's assumption of the power of ennoblement to himself, but curiously inflected by the arguments between Protestant considerations of virtue and Calvinist belief in divine grace.[16] Yet "duty" can also convey a sense of passive obedience, and this becomes significant to the rhetoricians who adapted Erasmus's work for an English-language audience.

10 Arthur Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965).
11 Thomas Starkey, *Dialogue between Cardinal Pole and Thomas Lupset* (1878), 42.
12 Arthur Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965), 158–59.
13 Arthur Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965), 157.
14 Arthur Ferguson, *The Articulate Citizen and the English Renaissance* (1965), 157.
15 John Guy, "The Rhetoric of Counsel in Early Modern England" (1995), 292–310.
16 Ian Green comments at length on this debate in *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (2009), and it provides a complex tension with the work on "counsel."

Elyot, Wilson, and Lever

Erasmus's development of familiar rhetoric responded to at least three main historical events: the increase in geographical mobility and hence the need for written communication; an increase in social mobility that necessitated an education in civic virtue; and the shift to a larger democratic base and hence the need for a broader concept of reasoning that included the "vulgar." Each of Thomas Elyot, Thomas Wilson, and Ralph Lever takes up these three elements in ways that raise questions for us today about the structure of the contemporary Anglo-European twenty-first-century neo/liberal state.

Shortly after the first printing of Thomas Elyot's *The Boke Named the Governour* in 1531, he was ennobled by Henry for his service to the crown in assaying and organizing the redistribution of monastic lands. The community of "honor" or virtue becomes Elyot's "magistrates," working under a single and sovereign king, a monarch.[17] As he makes clear in his opening and central redefinition of the common weal as a "public" weal,[18] he co-opts Erasmus's educational programme based on acquisition of learning and rhetorical skill, not in the name of the people in common, whom he calls "plebians" rather than the "public," but for an oligarchical elite who will use argument to develop effective policy. *The Boke Named the Governour* defines the citizen as the subject of the king, in a move that will resound through the next hundred years, flowering most effectively in Hobbes's political speculations.[19] In a version of Starkey's argument, Elyot argues that rhetoric "civilizes" man. He says:

> in the first infancie of the worlde, men wandring like beastes . . . ordered all thing by bodily strength: until Mercurius (as Plato supposeth) or some other man holpen by sapience and eloquence, by some apt or proper oration, assembled them to geder and perswaded to them then what commodite was in mutual conversation and honest maners. (17)

Elyot's rhetoric[20] is specifically aimed at those who are to govern, and their need for friendship, learning, and conversation. Possibly connected is his shift

17 Patrick Collinson, "The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I" (1994).

18 Thomas Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531), cxcii; all quotations from this text are from the 1883 edition with page numbers following in brackets.

19 N. Jones argues that post-Reformation "popular scepticism" undermined appeals to natural and divine law and generated a dependence not only on individual conscience but also on "the fiction of a sovereign people," "Parliament and the Political Society of Elizabethan England" (1995), 241–42.

20 See John Wesley, "The Well-Schooled Wrestler" (2008), 34–60, for exploration of Mulcaster's later association of rhetoric with wrestling as temperance that turns war into sport; Elyot calls this kind of persuasion "daunsing."

of "worshipful" from Tiptoft's virtue of temperate friendship to a description of the "honorable" status of those in power, people worthy of wielding power.

If all people were to hold all things in common "without discrepancie of any state or condition, [they will] be there to be moved more by sensualite than by any good reason" and they will end in chaos and perpetual conflict (2). Elyot's exclusion of "plebians" from this education immediately restricts the diversity and *copia* that can inform probable reasoning. In doing so it inexorably moves the stance toward the certainty of plausibility because to exclude these more diverse grounds, those that are retained need to be taken as self-evident grounds. Elyot's call for the education of those who will govern to extend past the age of fourteen, and hence from grammar into rhetoric, indicates simultaneously this constriction of grounds and his belief in the need to contain negotiated probable rhetoric among the chosen few.[21] Yet, once on those pre-selected grounds for the privileged few, the distinction between the probable and the plausible again becomes important. Speakers who are only grammar-tutored "make a sonne without any purpose" (116), they need the ability to "unfold a sentence" (117). Without the further training in rhetoric, by definition limited to these few, governors will be declamators, artificial speakers (120) rather than rhetoricians. Furthermore, he goes on to distinguish within rhetoric itself between "gentill persuasion and quicke reasoning" and "oversubtill arguments of litigious controversies" (164), in a further attempt to separate a probable stance of temperance from the plausibility of manipulators.

Daniel Wakelin points out Elyot's emphasis on the diligence of readers, that to find "profit" they need not read "many" books but a few with skill.[22] Nevertheless, despite Elyot's attempt to make a distinction between the probable and the plausible on the basis of affect, of friendship as opposed to flattery, his assumptions about the governing elite never come under scrutiny: they are solidly embedded as self-evident. Indeed John Guy notes that Elyot's program "closely mirrored existing Crown policy since 1461, and therefore seemed authoritative."[23] Wakelin goes further to outline Elyot's (and Lupset's) approach as more restrictive than that of Erasmus in that "there are some beliefs so urgent that dialogue must be replaced by insistence."[24]

Just as Elyot used the *Adages*, *Encomium Matrimonii* and *De Conscribendis* in *The Governour*, so the first edition of Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique*

21 See Ann Drury Hall, *Ceremony and Civility in English Renaissance Prose* (1991), 24–29.
22 Daniel Wakelin, *Humanism, Reading and English Literature 1430–1530* (2007), 204.
23 John Guy, "The Rhetoric of Counsel in Early Modern England" (1995), 296.
24 Daniel Wakelin, *Humanism, Reading and English Literature 1430–1530* (2007), 210.

(1553)[25] draws heavily on Erasmus's writings. Like Elyot, Wilson begins with the topos of God giving rhetoric to man to move him from forceful persuasion toward social negotiation (Aiii^{v}), a movement essential for the progress of capitalism and the accumulation of property.[26] The argument reiterates the humanist claim that persuasion is better than war, policy is to be preferred to battle (Aii), equity and reason are better than "might is right" (Aii^{v}). Significantly prominent in the organization of material, after the five parts and seven divisions of rhetoric, is Wilson's elaboration on ethos and pathos (8). Rhetoric, it turns out, is not so much about technique but about context: to whom, about what, where, why, when, and how. Reading Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetoryke* is like reading a psychological analysis of the stances of rhetoric.

Wilson notes that although the rhetorics of praise (epideictic), profit (demonstrative and deliberative), and right and wrong (judicial) are "every one of them[. . . contained in any one of them" (11), he will focus on the profitable and the unprofitable. He focuses on just those areas of probable and plausible persuasion that *sermo* rhetoric addresses, at the same time as using this rhetoric to replace demonstrative and deliberative rhetoric. Wilson implicitly allies "profitable" rhetoric with the familiar by saying that he will speak "in plaine words, such as are usually received, and tell it orderly, without going about the bush" (2). The examples in *The Arte of Rhetorique* indicate that the use of "plain words" does not mean lack of the copiousness needed to speak to a variety of readers, but indicates a familiar style, one that invites the reader also into the counsel. Wilson also explicitly links profitable rhetoric to friendship, saying that it is to be used "when we see our frend enclined to any kind of learning" (35), and he distinguishes between friends we counsel by persuading with honesty – possibly with direct "evidence" or "in person" – and those we persuade with "profitableness."

His definition of temperance immediately precedes the outline of profitable persuasion. Temperance is a virtue with three parts: sobriety, "a bridelyng by discretion, the wilfulness of desire"; gentleness, "a caulmyng of heate, when wee begin to rage, and a lowly behaviour in all our body"; and modesty, "an honest shamefastnesse, whereby we kepe a constant loke, and appere sober in all our outward doynges" (Cii^{v}). Wilson follows this up with his opening discussion on the profitable:

25 Thomas Wilson, *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553): this book is foliated and the numbers of the main text, that follow quotations in brackets, refer to the foliation numbers on each recto page. Wilson, or his typographer, used 'rhetorike,' 'rhetorik,' and 'rhetorique.' The last was the most frequent and is adopted here.

26 Lynette Hunter, "Video Cicero" (2004b).

> After we have perswaded our frend, that the law is honest, drawing our arguments from the heape of vertues, wee must go further with hym, and bring him in good beleve, that it is very gainfull. For many one seke not the knowledge of learning for the goodnesse sake, but rather take paines for the gain, which they se doth arise by it. Take awaie the hope of lucre, and you shall se fewe take any paines. (Cii^{v})

This opening digresses, or appears to digress, into a series of observations about the way people now only work for money and neglect their souls. It then returns to consider profitable rhetoric specifically as lawyer's rhetoric. Yet a good lawyer will persuade to profitableness based on the temperance of honesty and virtue, without which his persuasion becomes evil. This kind of social persuasion within a larger context is an important element in Wilson's text. He says in his address to the reader, "If profite maie persuade, what greater gaine can we have, then without bloud shed achive to a Conquest?" (Aii^{v}). Given this focus on the social value of the profitable rhetoric of friendship, it is not surprising that Wilson's primary example is his translation of the declamation *Encomium Matrimonii*. Erasmus's text, even though rhetorically problematic as argued in the previous chapter, is an early example of an attempt to co-create trust and friendship between writer and reader, so that the writer can use probable rhetoric to invite discussion of social issues.

Nevertheless, Wilson in 1553 was part of a social order well described by Thomas Elyot. This profitable rhetoric, while in the vernacular English and addressed to a variety of friends, is also circumscribed to a certain kind of friend who enjoys civic status. Wilson's address to the reader contains one passage in which he outlines clearly the self-control essential to civil behavior that will maintain the governance of the state:

> Neither can I see that men could have been brought by any other meanes, to live together in fellowship of life, to maintaine Cities, to deale truly, and willingly obeye one an other, if men at the first had not by art and eloquence, perswaded that which they full oft found out by reason . . . [for what man] being better able to maintain himself by valiant courage, then by living in base subjection, would not rather rule like a Lord, then to live like an underling: if by reason he were not perswaded, that it behoveth every man/ to live in his own vocation: and not to seeke any higher roume, then whereunto he was at the first appointed? Who would digge and delve from Morne till Evening? Who would travaile and toyle with ye sweat of his browes? Who would for his King's pleasure adventure and hassarde his life, if witte had not so won men, that they thought nothing more needful in this world, nor any thing wehereunto they were more bounden: then here to live in their duetie, and to train their whole life according to their calling. (Avii–Avii^{v})

No longer based on "service" or on "right," but on duty, temperance is key to knowing the limitations of mobility and change and is marked by virtue that is learned or negotiated. Within "certain" social groups with similar backgrounds, the rhetoric is probable because all participants know the grounds

and can negotiate with temperance, but it is also potentially plausible precisely because it does not admit negotiation with those outside those grounds. Hence, as proponents of "strong objectivity" argue today,[27] it becomes enclosed within a certain framework that renders its logic weak – it becomes simply "opinion." Those outside the certain grounds of the privileged few have to use a manufactured temperance, a self-regulation, to understand that they cannot or should not challenge those grounds.

When the lengthy quotation above is read in the context of the 1560 edition to which Wilson added his narrative of capture, torture, and imprisonment in Rome in the 1550s, it is difficult not to catch an edge of the cynicism at the heart of late sixteenth-century melancholy. This later, problematic and highly conflicted edition was one written by a man who, unlike Elyot, never received preferment, was cast out of English society in a brutal manner.[28] Wilson's return was not unproblematic, as he adds to the usual list of reasons that describes why going into print results in criticism, those people who store up their comments for seven years (the period of his exile) only to use them to criticize him later on his return. Looking in from the outside, it is possible to read Wilson's 1560 *Arte* shifting the social context to expose how probable profit becomes plausible credit, a shift that changes the rhetoric from the familiar temperance of virtue to social self-regulation.[29] This double consciousness, of knowing that the negotiation that drives social mobility is possible but having simultaneously to deny it to oneself, becomes central to early modern melancholy. It is a response primarily found in those who are relatively empowered, often by education, and who come to realize their stasis, their ineffectualness – a realization that undercuts notions of the value of the self, that atomizes social bonds at the same time as implementing a universal status quo that requires acceptance of self-evident grounds. It turns temperance into the self-repression that spurs Hobbes to describe the contradiction of the autonomous yet universal identity of the citizen within the Leviathan state.

In my final example, a transparent gesture of hope in tune with the Western twenty-first-century point of view of this book, I turn to Ralph Lever's *The Arte of*

27 Sandra Harding, *Whose Science?* (1991).

28 On an analogous indication of conflict evidenced by Wilson's comparison between clowning and the courtly: see Wayne Rebhorn, "Baldesar Castiglione, Thomas Wilson, and the Courtly Body of Renaissance Rhetoric" (1993).

29 Mervyn James calls this the "internalization of obedience," *Society, Politics, and Culture* (1988), 358–59.

Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft.[30] This "witcraft," Lever's englishing of "rhetoric," was written in the early 1550s but not published until 1573, presumably because its clear Protestant leanings and enthusiasm for the English language would not have been appreciated by Mary, who ascended the throne in 1553.[31] While it, too, draws extensively on Erasmus's writings, it is a completely different kind of work in its ethos from Elyot's and Wilson's because it is addressed to all people. Rather than starting with the topos of God's gift of rhetoric to man that lifts him from the beasts, Lever develops Starkey's line, also found elsewhere in political tracts of the 1530s to 1540s, that of man's mind being clean at birth and hence the need for virtuous education to build human behavior among all. Specifically, he echoes Tiptoft on friendship, saying that "wit" – which is Lever's englished term for "rhetoric" – teaches men through written and spoken language to "looke into our heartes, and see what we thinke" (*iiij^{v}). Conceptually Lever links this education with language. In an exemplary syllogism he argues, "nothing learned by imitation is natural/ every language is learned by imitation, therefore, No language is natural" (115–16). Even more Saussurean, he states, "5. A Saying is a voice whose several partes do *by consent* [my italics] signify some matter. 6. I saye by consent, for that every language of speache growth *by consent* [my italics], and is learned by imitating and following others: neither is there any toung given naturally to men without a teacher, as weeping and laughter are" (66). For Lever, "witcraft" is the teaching of "a cunning to frame and to answere a reason,"([1]) in effect, probable rhetoric.

One of the points of Lever's book is to make witcraft, or rhetoric, pleasurable and accessible by providing English words for Latin grammatical terms, such as "backset" for "predicate." He is probably best known today for this "translation," but his political purpose is less well recognized. Given that there are "more things, than there are words to expresse things by" (*iiij^{v}), English, having a number of short one-syllable words, is particularly conducive to devising new compound words. He goes on to argue that the "common man" will understand these englished words far better than pronouncing foreign words with an English accent (*v^{v}–vi). The "gentle reader" is directed to look at the parts of the new word for its meaning, or to consult Lever's "table" at the back of the book. This is a rhetoric aimed at anyone English, probably more likely a man, who can read. Lever has no illusions about prevailing attitudes to englishing the classics and to learning in general, noting that there are those who say that grammar and rhetoric should not be "englished" because understanding

30 Ralph Lever, *The Arte of Reason* (1573); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets; please note that several of the printed paginations include an asterisk.

31 Michael McClintock, "The Reformation and the Emergence of Vernacular Rhetoric" (1997).

them too well will empower people and hence hinder conventional learning and cause contention (*vii^{v}). His answer is that the English are not fools, they have the wit to know "what standyth with reason, and is well done and seemeth to be so, and is not" (*iiij^{v}). Indeed contention "is no fault to be imputed or ascribed unto arte, but an infirmitie and heate of choler . . . which thing the arte of reason reproveth, terming it a shift, and a wrangler's point" (*vii). At the same time he acknowledges that "a man cunning in this Arte: is able to prove, the snow to be blacke, and the Crowe to be white, [yet they] judge unskilfully of this worthye facultie, which purposely forbyddeth the propounding of such fond stuffe" (231).

Witcraft, reason, rhetoric, hence offer guidance in temperance, even while having the potential for abuse. Lever argues as if rhetoric offers a metalanguage which is the only certainty of human communication – what is said can never be certainly "true" but how it is said can be evaluated with certainty. While all languages are learned, witcraft provides "grounds and sure principles . . . [because] God appointed some things to be evident and certain of themselves, that they might be a stay to mans wit" (5). Without witcraft people would be driven "to make reason upon reason infinitely" (5). With it, people have the certainties to "reason wittily of doubtful matters," to judge of "any matter whatsoever" (*viii), and to "discerne" what is said or done according to reason or not. Lever here provides the Chomskyean palliative to the relativist excesses of Sausurrean poststructuralism, although his "certainties" are possibly more substantial than transformational grammar's deep structures. Indeed they read not only as echoes of Agricola's rhetorical dialectic that offers a universality of inquiry but also like a twenty-first-century commentary on the metadiscourse of rhetoric:

> words and saying are meanes to expresse the thoughtes of the minde: byt sayings expresse the thoughtes of the mind, as matter is coupled to matter: and words expresse the thoughtes of the minde without any joyning of thynges together at all. Thoughtes of the minde, and matters whereof men use to speake and to write, be in all countreyes one and the same in kind: but letters and the voice whereby suche things are uttered, are not. (65)

Words are therefore denotations that have no referential connection to things. Sayings, in voice or letters, connote culturally agreed upon "consent" to significant verbal connections with things. This proto-distinction between *parole* and *langue* is then contextualized and complicated within Lever's treatment of argument.

Lever's organization of material indicates that, unlike Wilson, he includes logic in rhetoric and witcraft. He re-names the terms of logic as "respecting terms, or yoke fellows" and distinguishes between the necessary (in the sense of "essential" and analogous with the use of "certain" in texts by Erasmus above) "that

prove the being, or not being the one or the other," and the probable "when they are taken of the duetie and affection that is or should be betweene them" (199). One necessary example is: "He is not my guest, therefore I am not his host" (200). One of his probable examples, all of which – in common with Wilson – involve the relationality of rhetor and audience, writer and reader, and issues of friendship and trust, is: "the judge will take my parte, for he is my frende: or if I saye, he wyll judge against me, because he is my foe" (200). Implicit in the distinction is that those who use necessary logic (i.e. a logic of certainty) speak only to themselves, while those who use the probable speak to or in the context of others. Indeed he elaborates topical reasoning into an ordering strategy of the same power as syllogistic logic as he reorganizes Erasmus's *De Copia*.[32]

Similar to Wilson, Lever neglects the epideictic and the judicial, to focus on the "profitable." His list of "profits" (*viii–viii^{v}) echoes the *genera causarum* in *De Conscribendis*, with wit allied to discerning, debating, grounding (in precepts or assumptions), investigating, and negotiating. Each "profit" is presented as a relational term between two people. What Lever goes on to describe is the semiotic content of rhetoric: unlike arithmetic and numbers, or medicine (physicke) and health, witcraft "is tyed to no special matter: but taketh in hand the debating of all things," "shee [witcraft] sorteth all wordes, and placeth every kind by it selfe, eaching what they signifie, as they are considered, and taken alone: shee declareth what sense words do make, when they are coupled and knit together." His final "profit" is indicative: rather than truth and falsehood, it works between "troth," or "faith and belief," and "error" – fundamentally ethical terms of stance, of contextual interaction that underlie the entire structure of his rhetoric.

Lever's rhetoric arises from education in language as an education in wit for temperate behavior. It argues that the uncertain nature of words makes necessary the communal certainties of rhetoric, else witcraft devolves into fond, silly games with language. These "certainties" include the essentializing logic of syllogism as well as the context-bound disputation and copious invention of probable reasoning. Focusing on the latter, Lever expands on "profitable" witcraft as tied to Erasmus's genera of letter-writing, rooted in the rhetor–audience interlocution of probable stance. In doing so, he elevates the stance of probable rhetoric to a trusted universal inquiry, not because of its predictable outcomes but because of its insistence on temperate performativity.

32 Historians of rhetoric are in disagreement about whether the *De Copia* is disorganized on purpose; it could possibly be organized in a manner resistant to critical understanding today. Nevertheless, it was open to reorganization by most of the sixteenth-century rhetoricians that used it.

The radical difference from Wilson's *Rhetoryke* is in Lever's presentation of witcraft as a craft for all people if they are to behave as part of the common weal. Many of Lever's examples of relational terms are taken from the daily life of ordinary people. Finding the appropriate word for a thing is as "pained as a woman in travail" (Aiiii[v]). Making sure you have sufficient knowledge of invention and understanding of disposition is "as the good and ready merchant . . . [who] may with convenient speede sit and serve his customer when he calleth" (137). He is particularly keen on examples from trades such as building (see 138). Lever does not constrain rhetoric to an educated elite, but is teasing out the promise of Erasmus's *sermo* rhetoric and arguing for education for all – even the vulgar. Profitable rhetoric is not only for policy-makers, but also for merchants and builders, and even for cobblers. Possibly because of this openness to social diversity Lever is less concerned, naive perhaps, about the potential for manipulation, and about the propensity for self-knowledge to become self-regulation. Yet his use of Erasmus is an early example of the tradition of temperate, witty friendship as the anchor for persuasion to good will, found in the work of later sixteenth-century educators such as Richard Mulcaster.[33]

Endnote: The Social Shift of Virtue to the Privileged Few

While Cromwell and Henry VIII encouraged education for a much wider proportion of the population, those people were still a privileged few. Erasmus's work with John Colet at Saint Paul's School in London is one of the first examples of such an initiative in England. The probable rhetoric at the heart of the early Henrician civil nation had the effect of educating a generation capable of co-creating bases for argument appropriate to their particular situation, and forming good reasons for action that might well not have conformed to other powerful structures – such as the church. But as Henry divested the church and the regional hierarchies of their power and transferred it to himself, such activity, empowering a growing number of people, became more directly dangerous to the position of the monarch.

Thomas Elyot was clearly of the generation that benefited from the opening of education to a larger community. At the same time, he also recognized the impossibility of continuing the opening of education, especially education in

33 John Wesley, "The Well-Schooled Wrestler" (2008), argues the case for temperance as the foundation of human good will in the work of Edmund Spenser, a student of Mulcaster at the Merchant Taylor's School in London in the 1570s, contemporaneous with the printing of Lever's book.

the virtue of civic action, to all people. If this were done then the social mobility of his own generation would be under threat. He took on the elements of Erasmus's *sermo* rhetoric and confined it to the already "virtuous," the privileged few. Thomas Wilson, slightly younger than Elyot, was already part of a generation that would not participate in such radical social mobility. The first publication (1553) of his *The Arte of Rhetorique* underwrites Elyot's shift of familiar rhetoric, probable stance, and temperate ethos, to the privileged. It openly points out the restriction of virtue to a small group of people, and for the rest to know their place. Only with the introduction of the second edition (1560) do we get inklings of the ironic, cynical, and melancholic self-consciousness of the institutionally strategic need to implement and maintain this restriction. Ralph Lever, writing at the same time as Wilson, and apparently with less concern about social mobility, returns to the potential in Erasmus's familiar rhetoric for an educationally enfranchised population. He argues for it as the basis of a sound civic state in England that values even the cobbler.

Lever, we might say now, was an eccentric utopian. Yet his understanding of a democratic politics dependent on communally agreed upon and continually negotiated linguistic and rhetorical common grounds, resonates curiously with twentieth-century philosophical concepts that occur simultaneously with the political enfranchisement of many people in liberal nation states. And while Wilson's more realistic view of the essential, self-evident, self-regulation of a populace with the proto-capitalist nation state uncannily describes the early formation of the "subject," Lever's blithe insistence on our capacity to reconstitute the world through the probable rhetoric of the familiar is perhaps an unfamiliar lesson to which we should listen.

Chapter 3
Civic Rhetoric 1560–1630: The Humors as a Guide to Trustworthy Behavior

Part I: Embodied Rhetorics of Behavior in Civil Discourse

Both courtly and civic behaviors from 1560 to 1600 are thoroughly embedded in the issues of status acquired either through birth or education. Yet it was increasingly recognized that if one needs to access and employ power, the rhetoric and the counsel of a rhetorician are central to ethical governance. Many writers from the 1560s to the 1590s draw on *sermo* rhetoric to define probable rhetoric as dependable and trustworthy, as distinct from plausible rhetoric in both verbal and visual communication. Among others, William Fulwood notes that the civic world needs a probable rhetoric of words because it deals with large and ever more diverse audiences. He also echoes Erasmus, saying that many citizens may not be able to be addressed in person and that the written rhetoric of conversation makes the reader feel as if the writer is present. Slightly later, Henry Peacham and George Puttenham argue for the importance of the inclusive reasoning process of probable rhetoric to generate the honesty and decorum needed for civic counsel, with Puttenham explicitly linking it with medical diagnosis and treatment, and hence to embodied behavior. The development of a rhetoric of probable reasoning, an ethical rhetoric of counsel, is linked to medicine through the theory of humors on which the contemporary guides to behavior are founded. Writing on verbal rhetoric was often inextricable from writing on the embodied rhetoric of behavior, but the early guides to trustworthiness focus on the importance of the latter.

The interrelationship between the theory of the humors, the connection of behavior to how a person looks, and gestural communication, is particularly important in this period. The way that a person behaved was often considered a more trustworthy indication of friendship than what they said or how they spoke. However, by the late sixteenth century the visual indicators of trust – the embodied behavior of decorum, prudence, and temperance – were increasingly critiqued. As Galenic medicine came under attack from early modern science in the early seventeenth century, the humors as a guide to embodied behavior became supplanted by extensive commentary on the trustworthiness of the probable rhetoric of words. To open a window on this set of relations, the chapter ends with a brief look at Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. Perhaps because it was written in 1606 and was fundamentally a "history" play, the text consistently uses this earlier focus on humors, visual "look," and gesture to explore concepts of power, politics, and psychology.

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Or, perhaps it is because by the first decade of the seventeenth century the visual as a guarantor of trustworthiness has been exposed as unreliable, that *Macbeth* can be so devastating in its critique of established humoral guides to embodied behavior.

1560s–1590s: From the Courtly to the Civil

In the middle of the sixteenth century, many of the English writers on both verbal rhetoric and the embodied rhetoric of behavior were part of a new group of people who were defining for themselves a civil space outside the court, a social place of enormous respect and power. Their actions and behavior are central to the debate raging all through the period, concerning gentility and nobility by birth or by education – a debate that later set the terms prompting James I to write *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1598) which justifies absolute monarchy, as well as *Basilikon Doron or His Majesties Instructions To His Dearest Sonne, Henry the Prince* (1599, 1603). Yet this debate also laid out the position for the final disruption of the concept of divine power, a vocabulary for the Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century, and formed the basis for the constitution of a "class" called the bourgeoisie who became citizens of the liberal social contract instantiated by the beginning of the eighteenth century.

At the center of this debate about behavior, and a version of the probable/plausible discussion, was the issue of deceit: particularly of how you know deceit when it is happening, and specifically, deceit concerned with worthiness or suitability for power. In schematic terms this issue is mapped in the movement from Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), which portrays the courtier as a "humanist" and therefore good, to George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), which portrays the courtier as displaying himself, caught up in self-fashioning, and radically ambivalent. Roughly in between the two comes Thomas Hoby's translation of Castiglione, *The courtyer of Count Baldessar Castilio [The Courtier]* (1561),[1] which discusses the complex web of being noble by birth and how one displays this nobility in order to insist on a hierarchy of power. Many critics and historians have treated this question as one of ambivalence (Green in stance perception; Greenblatt in self-fashioning; Whigham in the social construction of identity). And, since a fundamental part of rhetoric is ethos, or the way the speaker is presented, if ethos becomes inevitably untrustworthy and ambivalent, then rhetoric –

1 Thomas Hoby, *The courtyer of Count Baldessar Castilio* (1561); all quotations from this text are taken from the 1928 edition with page numbers following in brackets.

whether verbal or embodied – necessarily moves to the popular definition we think of today: rhetoric as an unscrupulous mode of communication. However, in all the major writings on rhetoric from Plato onward, rhetoric is not defined in this way alone, but also as at the heart of moral philosophy. In the light of the fifteenth- to early sixteenth-century humanist revisioning of rhetoric precisely as moral training in trustworthiness or worshipfulness for those who wield power, one might ask why moral activity "disappears" from formal rhetoric in England by the late seventeenth century and becomes sequestered in a rhetoric of conversation.

The previous two chapters have outlined the way that the word "conversation" is allied to *sermo* rhetoric, elaborated on by Cicero in the *De Amicitia* on friendship, and significantly not mentioned in his more politically focused *Orator*. More important for this approach to the context of *sermo* is Erasmus's translation from the Epistle of Saint John: "In the beginning" was "logos" not as *verbum* or "word," as in many Bibles of the time, but as *sermo* or conversation (Cunningham), recalling the Greek understanding of "logos" as "proportionality" rather than a narrow and reductive mode of the rational (Swearingen), and establishing a fundamentally embodied mode of communication in the conversation between friends. As these chapters attempt to outline, conversation as counsel marks the travel of the trustworthy friendship of the courtier, from civil behavior in the court of the 1560s, first into the probable verbal rhetoric of the civic and economic realms of the city and household by 1600, and then into a more restricted sense of neighborliness and personal and family life by 1630. The Pettie and Young translation of Guazzo, *The Civile Conversation* (1581),[2] marks a time when the rhetoric of conversation is still at the center of political worthiness, yet needing the embodied rhetoric of behavior to guide it away from deceit.

There is much critical work on the issue of deceit and worthiness which has looked at the exclusive education system for the sons of aristocratic and wealthy families.[3] This education frequently acted as a precursor to court attendance and public display at a time when display was becoming part of the definition of the citizen in the early modern nation. There is also extensive critical literature on personal behavior explicitly in the non-court areas: of preachers, merchants, doctors, lawyers (Bruster, Halpern, Sullivan) and other work focusing on the more general categories of civic and domestic life (Hunter). In the history of courtiership, the infusion of Italian civic humanism has been allied with the development of courtly style (Whigham). The English translations of Castiglione, della Casa,

2 George Pettie and Bartholomew Young, *The Civile Conversation* (1581); all quotations from this text are taken from the 1925 edition with page numbers following in brackets.

3 For example, see Helen Jewell, *Education in Early Modern England* (1998); Lynn Enterline, *Schooling in the English Renaissance* (2016).

Guazzo, and others, are read as offering versions of definition for the courtier and differing only in whether you think they are exclusionary or not. In other words, these guides are either there to keep an established group of people in the nobility, or there to be used by others precisely to know how to get into the ranks of the courtly. More subtly, the guides could also have been used to identify people attempting to become "noble" so that they could be excluded.

The emphasis of the reading offered here differs, especially with Guazzo, whose work also suggests a different kind of rhetoric for the person outside the court. These rhetorics of courtly humanism follow the trend of increasingly using the word "civil" to distinguish not the court from the regal (Hoby (1561), Mulcaster (1567)), but the city from the court. In the process the word "civil" takes upon itself the role of arbiter and descriptor of the town and its civic space, shifting "oeconomics," which refers at least until 1640 to the subsistence financing of the household, to the "economics" of a mercantile world and capital. Pettie and Young's *The Civile Conversation* (1581) may be read not so much as a continuation of the Castiglione/ Machiavelli position on courtly self-display, but precisely a debate about how to distinguish that behavior from other kinds of behavior that are more trustworthy, more civil, and less competitive. Competition, and ethical problems of exploitation that it raises within capitalism, become the underlying concern for a rhetoric of counsel, which is based in friendship.

The mid-sixteenth-century English concern with the issue of gentility, honor, virtue, goodness, focused on what qualified you as recognizably worthy to access power, to be a person of the gentry and hence potentially of the ruling aristocracy. The comparison with Italy is significant because many of the translated Italian books dealing with this question from mid-century onwards set up the discussion not only in terms of birth and blood versus virtue and good behavior, sometimes with a little of both, but also at times with the notion of the "elect" in which good behavior and physical beauty were equated with "chosen by God." These terms are stated clearly in neo-platonic vocabulary in Hoby's *The Courtier*, elaborated by Pettie and Young's *The Civile Conversation*, and continue on into a number of English books as well as further translations from the Italian well into the seventeenth century[4] including *The Rich Cabinet* (1616) printed by B.I., itself printed with a selection of notes on behavior from John della Casa's *Galatea* – Galatea referring to the female statue brought to life by Pygmalion, the man-made woman standing in for the self-made man.

In the early years of Elizabeth's reign, the 1560s, there is extensive discussion not only about judging people by their looks and bodily gestures, but also by their

4 Lynette Hunter,"Technical, Domestic and Rhetorical Books, 1557–1695" (2002).

use of physical force – for if you use force you must believe you are right, and therefore, with the rhetorical impulse to aggressive physical persuasion, you *are* right: might *is* right. This embodied syllogism persisted despite many commentaries to the contrary which argued that one only uses force if all else fails, and that force is therefore an indication of weakness. But the association of behavior with how one physically behaves or "looks" was ubiquitous, and took the discussion firmly into contemporary Galenic medical practice. Thomas Newton's translation of Lemnius, *The Touchstone of Complexions* (1576),[5] takes the connection directly into the theory of the humors, observing on its title page that states and habits of the mind, the disposition and the constitution of the body, are all indicative of inclinations, affections, emotions, and desires. In 1580, Thomas Blundeville's *Three Morall Treatises* notes that virtue and an honest disposition are distinguished from malicious defrauding by the "Body."[6]

At the same time there was a parallel issue articulated clearly in this literature of behavior and the humors, around interpretations of the determinist bind through which the humors fixed the body into which one was born. This issue, as for the earlier sixteenth century, was to do with the balance between the potentially essentialist features of birth and the learned features of education. Birth, or heredity, was still often held to be the key designator of behavior. Later on, in 1601, a writer such as Thomas Wright, in *The Passions of the Minde*, discusses the humors in terms of "complexion,"[7] by which he means the complex interaction of our body chemistry with its environment that lies at the center of Galenic theory and which does, in present-day biochemical terms, often govern the "complexion" of our skin. Earlier, Thomas Newton himself had briefly argued that nationalities have characteristics defined by birth, but that "Education, institution and discipline, altereth the usuall Nature" (18). By 1600 this other side of the debate, education, indicates caution with the focus on the visual, embodied communication of the humors, and calls directly on humanist plans, especially in verbal rhetoric, for achieving the decorum and prudence appropriate to civic behavior.

To choose between blood versus good behavior, or birth versus education, is to restrict this discussion about civility to two among many other debates. Yet these two do focus on the physical manifestation of what we would now probably call "psychological characteristics," and lead directly into facial and

5 Thomas Newton, *The Touchstone of Complexions* (1576); all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

6 Thomas Blundeville, *Three Morall Treatises* (1580), $H5^{v}$–$H6^{v}$; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

7 Thomas Wright, *The Passions of the Minde* (1601), lix; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

other physical gesture. Underlying the two debates is a complex web of conceptual structures, areas which are generally separated in academic study, but which in fact are woven in with each other: in this chapter the focus is on neoplatonism, the humors and Galenic medicine, and rhetorics of gesture. Each of these structures has been taken at various times to be wholly deterministic. Here I argue that during the sixteenth century at least there was far more flexibility of understanding and application, that was directly tied to negotiating the nature/nurture debate: a debate that began with a focus on "nature" or birth, and moved toward "nurture" as the pendulum swung toward education by the end of the sixteenth century.

Earlier in the sixteenth century, neo-platonism, particularly the commentaries and translations of Ficino and the people influenced by him who combined readings of Plato with Christianity (in England these included John Colet and Erasmus), suggests "beauty" as the central principle guiding us to truth and goodness. Beauty focuses on the eyes and the visual as guarantors of trust, partly because with the eye we see "as a whole," instantaneously.[8] M. Allen notes that Ficino offers some speculation on the importance of the ear and mouth, but this is not to do with words, but with vibrations of the air and how they make our bodies vibrate in sympathy (26). On the other hand, the conceptual structure of neoplatonism does offer room for the improvement of the way we look. We can use "magic" or "free creative acts" to become more beautiful.[9] Ficino suggests a strategy of imitation, that if we imitate the planetary forces, which are on a higher level of beauty, then we will "correspond" to them, become more like them (30). Imitation can take the form of eating certain foods, dressing in particular fabrics, painting one's face with particular colors. The actions are closely related to the complex intersections between astronomy and astrology that developed during the period, forming an early version of ecological understanding. Yet neo-platonism effectively essentialized the humoral system of Galenic medicine, making it far more determinist of a person's intentions and motivations.

For many writers such as Castiglione and his translator Hoby, or Guazzo by way of Pettie and Young, beauty is best understood through "love," as it is also in Plato and his translator Ficino. Both *The Courtier* and *The Civile Conversation* debate the best means for recognizing trustworthy love, with the former suggesting the eyes, and the latter explicitly asking the question (184) and deciding on the mouth. *The Courtier* refers to the lover with a "pair of eyes that talk" (Bk3: 262) yet

8 M. J. B. Allen, *The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino* (1984), 191; all subsequent quotations from this book are with page numbers that follow in brackets.

9 John Mebane, *Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age* (1989), 11; all subsequent quotations from this book are with page numbers that follow in brackets.

with burning heart and cold tongue that can render them silent (Bk3: 269). It also refers to the lover, who after writing of love must entrust it to the eyes, the "trusty messengers" (Bk3: 278) of passion. Finding more ambiguity, *The Civile Conversation* sets up the debate in terms of gender: the final book concludes with a series of conversations among a group of men and women which revolve around the question of whether the eyes have more force to "ingender love" than the tongue (Bk3: 183). The "Queen," speaking on behalf of the women, argues for the tongue both in praise of the beloved and showing forth the passion of the lover (Bk3: 186), but when the men respond they do so to her looks, especially her face (Bk3: 189). Even though they mention both her eyes and her tongue, all the poems of love that then ensue are about eyes (Bk3: 191–92).

Imitation of beauty, whether in love or not, was discussed as a kind of magic, specifically sympathetic magic, which was held to be both black and white. The distinction between the two is largely to do with who is wielding the power. As Hart notes,[10] if magic is carried out by recognized people whose position has already been legitimated, the obvious example being the king, then the magic will be exercised on behalf of the nation, for the good of all. But people exercising magic for their own good, or magic undertaken by a person not recognized as legitimate bearer of authority, quickly slips into black magic. The pattern is mirrored in rhetoric.[11] The prince's counselor or rhetor is also his magician because he can persuade people to think like the prince, to imitate his good example which is closer to the divine than their own. This is a version of the argument that you need rhetoric to persuade people to do good things because it will not be self-evident what "good" is. Yet we all know that rhetoric is also used to persuade people to do bad things. One of the reasons Machiavelli's *The Prince* was so influential as a book was because people at the time, and indeed now, have difficulty deciding if it is advocating for a "good" rhetoric or a "bad." In Shakespeare we find this acted out in *Measure for Measure*.

Verbal rhetoric itself was downgraded by the neo-platonists and made subservient to instantaneous beauty because, as a process of reasoning, it takes place over time. As Thomas Wright notes, reason goes in the ears and passion in the eyes, so the eyes are the more certain messengers (Bk5: 174) because they are supposedly more direct. However, with verbal rhetoric in the sixteenth century in England and elsewhere, we find a conceptual structure that dealt with the notion of dialectical knowledge, of situated decision-making as it developed into a world of

10 V. Hart, *Art and Magic in the Court of the Stuarts* (1994), 12–29.

11 John Ward, "Magic and Rhetoric from Antiquity to the Renaissance: Some Ruminations" (1998), 78–84.

either plausibility (mere opinion) or probability (probably the best for the situation). The topic of the next chapter is to follow the commentaries that make this distinction increasingly clearly articulated in verbal rhetoric. As this chapter suggests, sixteenth-century commentaries on visual embodied rhetoric do not offer the same analysis or distinction. Even though there are critiques of visual display as potentially deceptive, it is possible that the neo-platonist dependence on visual determinism meant there were few analyses of the visual as being either trustworthy or manipulative that can parallel the work on the distinction between probable and plausible verbal rhetoric. While it is difficult to suggest why it should have happened, by the late sixteenth century there does seem to have been a growing recognition that the neo-platonic dependence on the eye was untrustworthy – it may be that it was recognized at the time that the articulated structures for analyzing visual display were without the long-term history of that related to verbal rhetoric.

Another reason for the gradual mistrust of using "looks" to determine whether a person was trustworthy or not may lie in the connection of a rhetoric of embodied behavior with the humors. However, by the early modern period many physicians had reduced the Galenic system to binaries. They still believed that disease came from imbalances in the humoral system that negotiated the effects of all these contexts within each human body, and that cures were usually effected by contraries. But they frequently constrained their practice to finding the "contrary" to any condition as laid out in *Materia Medica* of the time.[12] Galenic medicine influenced both physicians and apothecaries: both worked with "simples" or plant extracts but also with products from the alchemical tradition. As Hoeniger has elaborated in detail, alchemical vitalism also interconnects all aspects of the environment and uses this knowledge to produce "purer" elements: greedy alchemists aim only for gold, but responsible alchemists try to produce elements beneficial to many areas of life, including medicine.[13] However, the reduced form of Galenic understanding left the practices of both the physicians and apothecaries ripe for change. The transformation of alchemy into chemistry, with its understanding of the natural world as one made up of many pure and individual elements that may be compounded, is also beginning to happen during the sixteenth century and becomes part of the Paracelsan medical revolution that was a large part of that change.

12 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 234.
13 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 120–21.

Like Vesalius, the well-known anatomist of the period, Paracelsus was a surgeon.[14] Both men revolutionized the low status of the surgeon – who, unlike the physician, actually touched the patient – by reforming attitudes to the body and to disease.[15] Paracelsus interpreted alchemy in terms of a Christian neo-platonism that placed man at the center of God's universe and modeled relations between human beings and the natural world, not on contextual interaction but on an extreme form of Pythagorean correspondence, or the analogies between the microcosmic human body and macrocosmic forces.[16] Contrary to Galen, he posited that infection came from outside the body, a destructive seed from the planets or the earth.[17] Again, unlike early modern Galenic practitioners working with a reductive version of the humors, Paracelsus believed in careful observation of the patient,[18] and he also derived from folk medicine homeopathic ideas that "like cures like."[19] This was not a simplistic concept: it might involve the doctor in recreating the "same" or analogous situation in a chemical laboratory and treating the patient with the compound that resulted.[20] For example, Paracelsus discovered that compounding elements such as arsenic and sulfur reduced their poisonous side-effects, for example, potassium arsenate could be used to treat syphilis. Yet Paracelsan medical science drew an even more determinist conceptual structure from neo-platonism than did Galenic. At the same time, the Paracelsan began to universalize approaches to the body so that the particularities of a person's embodied behavior became more ambivalent and less significant.

Nevertheless, strategies and techniques for visually displaying a good ethos, or an improvement toward beauty, also came from the far more flexible tradition of embodied rhetoric recovered from Cicero and Quintilian in the early European renaissance. Both writers, notes Fritz Graf, learned from actors but demarcated themselves from them. As a civic orator, one needed the voice of an actor and the delivery of a good stage professional, but with no over-gesticulation.[21] The problem then, as now, was that since actors and rhetors were each taught their skills, both the words and the behavior of someone trained in rhetoric might be as fake

14 See Walter Pagel and Pyareli Rattansi, "Vesalius and Parcelsus" (1985).

15 See Andrew Boorde, *The breviary of healthe* (1547), esp. Aii–Aiv.

16 See Jonathan Gil Harris, *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic* (1998), 42, and David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 214.

17 See Jonathan Gil Harris, *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic* (1998), 24.

18 See Nancy Struever, "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986).

19 Jonathan Gil Harris, *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic* (1998), 51.

20 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 121.

21 Fritz Graf, "Gestures and Conventions: The Gestures of Roman Actors and Orators" (1991), 39–40.

as that of an actor. Hence the need to acquire spontaneity. An oxymoron that may be, but it sums up centuries of dealing with the slipperiness of rhetoric and ethics. Quintilian, whose impact on education throughout the Middle Ages is well documented,[22] devotes a large part of Book 11, part 3 to facial gesture, going through head, eyes, eyebrows, nose, and mouth. He claims that the eyes are the most important, especially the "glance."[23] *The Courtier*, which specifically says that the courtly man should have *sprezzatura*, picks up on the need to learn a number of these gestures in order to display spontaneity of behavior, as well as developing a long section on jest, from Quintilian on "humor," for man is "the laughing animal" (156).

The overlap between verbal jest and the physical gesture of laughing is, as Wayne Rebhorn has noted, as difficult a negotiation for Castiglione and for his translator Thomas Hoby,[24] as for their classical predecessors. The focus on laughter that here results from verbal jest is a significant indication that in the conceptualizing of facial gesture there was an undercurrent of concern about how it could abuse friendship. If you can make someone laugh, you can control their embodiment, which implies that they are not entirely in control of it themselves. And if you can make them laugh with a verbal jest, then words can control the body.

Curiously in contrast, among a number of clerical commentators from the end of the sixteenth century into the seventeenth, both Vossius in his *Commentariorum Rhetoricum* (1633, based on his education from 1599)[25] and Cresollius in *Vacationes Autumnales* (1620) bring together laughter as well as Quintilian's facial gesture to indicate "true" feeling. John Bulwer's much later works, heavily dependent on Cresollius, such as the *Chironomia* (1644) and *Pathomyotamia, or a Dissection of the significative Muscles of the Affections of the Minde* (1649), also use several of these sources and others, spending considerable time on laughter. He says, "The whole Countenance is poured out and spread with the Spirits that swell the Muscles; there being a great concourse of Spirits and bloud unto the Face, which beare a great stroke in this action."[26] Laughter is not animal but intellective: "true laughter hath both the effects of the intellectual part as the Principle upon which the

22 See Quintilian and Modern Pedagogy, *An Ancient Master Teacher Speaks to the Modern World* (2016).

23 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, Book 11, part 3, sections 69–81, 284–91. Accessed July 25 2021.

24 Wayne Rebhorn, "Baldesar Castiglione, Thomas Wilson, and the Courtly Body of Renaissance Rhetoric" (1993), 59.

25 Vossius was well known in England in the seventeenth century as "being perhaps the greatest of all grammarians," Foster Watson, *The English Grammar Schools to 1660* (1968), 273.

26 John Bulwer, *Pathomyotamia, or a Dissection of the significative Muscles of the Affections of the Minde*, 123; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

dilation of the Heart and contraction of the Coutenance ensue, it being not only an affection of the Body, but totius conjuncti, of the whole Man" (128). For Bulwer, laughter is an indication of spontaneity that expresses the whole person and is not controlled by anyone else. These clerical discourses, and Bulwer's much later attempt to categorize, are unusual for their prominent belief that the "truth" expressed by the visible is dependable, hence there is no need for the guidance offered by verbal rhetoric toward a distinction between the probable and the plausible.

What is interesting about the mid-seventeenth-century Bulwer, and the two earlier seventeenth-century clerical rhetoricians, is that they run quite against the growing civic concern with the potential deceit of visual behavior. Each writes as though it is unlikely that anyone would manipulate visual gesture to persuade to bad purpose. Presumably Vossius (Protestant) and Cresollius (Jesuit), and the number of clergy who wrote on physical gesture, assumed that argument in the service of God guaranteed good purpose. But however much we might want to be skeptical of such a guarantee, Bulwer has no such divine authority for the civic person. It is almost as if, with the loss of confidence in a Galenic system particular to each person, he wants to call upon the apparent consistency of its signifiers as a universal scientific truth parallel to Paracelsan experiment. Indeed many of the negative facial gestures he notes are ones we might still recognize, and which seem to have a long cultural history rather than being universal features. For example, a century earlier Thomas Tusser, in *Five Hundreth points of good husbandry united to as many of good huswiferie* (1573), includes in the "huswiferie" section "The description of an envious and naughty neighbour," which is curiously reminiscent of the visual portrayal of untrustworthy people in early twentieth-century films:

> An envious neighbour is easy to finde,
> His cumbersome tetches are seldome behinde . . .
> His mouth full of venim, his lips out of frame,
> His tongue a false witnesse, his friend to defame.
> His eyes be promoteres, some trespass to despye,
> His eyes by as spyals, a larum to crye.
> His handes be as tyrants, revenging each thing,
> His teete at thine elbos, as serpent to sting.
> His brest full of rancor, like Coprus to freat,
> His heart like a Lion, his neighbour to eat.
> His gate like a sheepbyte, flearing aside,
> His looke like a coxcomb, up puffed with pride.
> His face made of brasse, like a vice in a game,
> His gesture like Dauus, whom Terence doth name.
> His brag as Thersites, with elbowes abrode,

His cheekes in his fury shall swell like a Lode.
His colour like ashes, his cap in his eyes,
His nose is the ayre, his snout in the skies.[27]

Yet Tusser's descriptions are embedded in a field of Galenic probabilities, each one tied to a probing interpretive phrase such as "his neighbour to eat," or "like a vice in a game." A hundred years later, Bulwer presents these embodied elements as fixed indications of "good" and "bad" behavior.

Bulwer, for example, describes the way that in sadness or grief we wrinkle or bend our brows, and that in pride or arrogance we advance and lift up the eyebrows (148), turn our eyes up to the brows, and puff up the cheeks (206). Clearly – he implies – no one but a fool would imitate envy or arrogance, hence displaying these characteristics must betoken an unselfconscious revealing of behavior, and certainly an ignorance about the implications. It is surprising how few "good" facial characteristics Bulwer observes, as if "good" features do not need to be trained, but everyone needs to understand how to recognize those that are "bad." However, "good" facial gestures could be precisely those which one might want to emulate, not because one was imitating neo-platonic beauty and improving oneself, but because one was manipulating one's acquaintances. Bulwer notes some of the "good" gestures that the twenty-first century might recognize, even if as cliché, such as the consistent appearance of "modesty" in a slightly inclined head and downcast eyes. But it is the conceptual gestures that are the most different from those in Western culture today. For example, Bulwer describes "refusal," more vehement than a "no," not with the more common Anglo-European shaking of the head from side to side, but as a "cast-up backward Nod" (54) which has been retained in England, for example, only as a rare sign of arrogant dismissal.

Most of the earlier sixteenth-century translators from the Italian, and their English emulators, are more skeptical than Bulwer both about the ability of visual gesture to resist manipulation, and about the way visual gesture will necessarily betray one's "true" character. Nevertheless, despite the fact that *The Courtier* acknowledges early on that a person can have the eyes of an angel and the heart of a serpent (38), the writer still argues that a well-proportioned face, with agreement of colors and shades, orderly in appearance, has the ability to draw men's eyes and pierce through into the body to imprint in the soul of the other.[28] Even "Palmastrers" (those who can read the hand but also those with an "open hand,"

27 Thomas Tusser, *Five Hundreth points of good husbandry united to as many of good huswiferie*, Aa1.

28 In fact this comes not from Plato but from Aristotle, but is frequently found in neo-platonic thought of the renaissance.

i.e. rhetoricians) know by the face "many times the condicions, and otherwhile the thoughts of men" (348). At the same time, as if to counter the potential deceptions of sight (142), a long section on the verbal rhetoric of jests is included.

The Civile Conversation takes this much further, allying the eye and the mouth more closely. A number of statements concerning the "windows of the eyes" and their relation to the "clearness of the face" (Bk1: 131), a merry heart giving a fair face, blushing being a sign of "goodness" (Bk1: 170), or the beauty of a lively "natural" color achieved through work (Bk3: 41), indicate the tendency to take visual appearance as a guarantor of trust. At the same time, the writer also tells us of those who have the skill to dissemble through their eyes, countenance, and gesture (Bk1: 51); he tells us to judge not only by the face (Bk3: 14); he tells stories of people who try to appear younger than in fact they are (Bk1: 173). He says that to stop the mouth is to eat up the heart (Bk1: 106–7), even though to distinguish true love in women "least heart" is most tongue – in other words, the more they speak the less direct connection there will be with truth from the heart – hence the appearance of a woman is very important. Yet both words and their sounds come from the heart (Bk1: 132) and are related to the countenance. Beauty is most clearly conveyed through mind, body, *and* speech, and we can find this beauty in the eyes, ears, and mind (Bk1: 237). This text also proceeds to point the way to articulate the rhetorical strategies necessary to distinguish between heavenly and unheavenly love in terms of civil and uncivil conversation (Bk1: 234), which lay out some grounds for distinguishing the probable from the plausible. The "civil conversation" of the title is a probable rhetoric, not merely working the ambivalent ethics of the plausible, but based on the trustworthy conversation between and among friends.

1590s–1630s: From the Civil to the Civic

The early seventeenth-century English inheritors of these translations from the Italian and their focus on visual appearance and gesture are numerous. Among them are writers and texts such as Thomas Overbury's *Characters* (1615) (and the collections that emerged under his name), *The Rich Cabinet* (1616), and works such as Joseph Hall's *Characters of Vertues and Vices* (1608). However, writing in various attempts to describe embodied English social behavior, all of these texts show a marked consciousness of manipulation by visual gesture. In this they have much in common with comments on the visual by verbal rhetoricians of the later sixteenth century such as George Puttenham and Thomas Wright, and it is not surprising that Wright's work in particular turns to a guide for verbal rhetoric before expanding at much greater length on embodied social behavior (Bk4).

Puttenham decisively casts aside visual rhetoric as linked to fashion, opinion, and courtly manipulation – as opposed to verbal rhetoric. He specifically divests rhetoric of rational conceptual logic, and argues that words, despite their potential for manipulation, have more ability to link directly to the heart, and offer more strategies for discerning the heart in others.[29] (R4^{v}). Overbury and *The Rich Cabinet* do not go so far, but are part of a trend which increasingly trusts the words of the mouth over visual appearance. By 1628, Daniel Dyke's *The Mystery of Selfe-Deceiving* argues that the perception of deceit and the development of judgment are entirely verbal.

Overbury and *The Rich Cabinet*, like Thomas Newton in his earlier translation of *The Touchstone of Complexions* (1576) and Thomas Wright in *The Passions of the Minde* (1601), root their ideas in the humors, as if offering a counter-weight to the growing tendency in formal rhetoric to focus on rational logic and to categorize without attention to local environment. The link between the humors and embodied behavior meant that as the humors were displaced by modern science in the civic world of male practice, so embodied behavior came under suspicion. The humors, as part of Galenic medicine, had been central to professional healthcare for centuries, and from Andrew Boorde's *Breviary* and *Regyment* published in the 1540s the Galenic system was made accessible to English-language readers.[30] The second part of the sixteenth century had then produced an abundance of vernacular printed books on the subject of Galenic medicine and its contribution to the embodied rhetoric of behavior.[31] As John Partridge noted in his introduction to *The Treasurie of Commodious Conceits* (1584), a book dedicated to a member of the surgeon's company although addressed to women, through medicine and science we can know nature and our own nature better, and we need to experiment and understand the science of physic in order to acquire prudence and temperance and control the passions. Yet the biological determinism at play in the humors, whereby what you look like determines how people will assess you – again with that focus on the visual, both for your outward appearance and for the physician treating the body as well – is put into question by these early seventeenth-century commentators on behavior.

Their questions arose probably due to developments in the experimentation and proofs central to early modern science and medicine, as well as in the growing monopoly of the guilds, and in the exceptional increase of social mobility

29 George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), R4^{v}.

30 Other books had already begun to open this English-language pathway into the humors, for example Laurens Andrewes, *Vertuose Boke of Distyllacyon* (1527).

31 For a comprehensive starting list of all these books, see Lynette Hunter et al., *Household Books Published in Britain 1475–1914* (2010).

during the period with its pressing need to authenticate civic behavior as appropriate to the citizen of a nation. Not only had there been many books on the humors and on behavior in the mid-sixteenth century, but these were also backed up by books on household chemistry, physic, and medicine, which included receipts for make-up, eye-washes, tooth-cleaning products, and the like. The topics were frequently treated in a single book, one of the earliest being Alexis of Piedmont's *Secrets*, translated and published by Wynken de Warde in 1557. Positioning these receipts as part of a program of human volition and betterment, de Warde notes in his address to the reader that when we are ill we are not supposed to die but to work out how to heal ourselves. His receipts include many for blemishes that disfigure the face,[32] spots, pimples, and freckles, as well as a large number for the eyes and for the skin. Those for the skin are mainly concerned to reproduce, by augmenting or lessening with various colored pastes, the shades of red or white in the face that humors theory allies with particular emotions or behavior patterns. Later on, Hugh Platt's *Delightes for Ladies* (1602) reproduces the same concerns "In easie terms without affected speech,"[33] and sets up a much copied seventeenth-century generic form that combines medicine, domestic chemistry and distillation, sugar-cookery, and beauty products. The significance of this combination is spelled out by the presence of sugar-cookery: this book and others like it were for the emerging gentry who needed to know how to behave in an aristocratic manner. They may have had to make their own make-up products, just as they had to make their own elaborate sugar confections, but in then displaying both they were emulating the upper echelons of society which displayed them although they did not have to make them.

At the same time, the strategies and techniques for bodily "improvement" could be used, as mentioned above, either for white magic: to imitate the good and become beautiful, and to persuade to goodness, or for black magic: to imitate incorrectly and become deceitful, to manipulate people into potential evil. Not that these terms are used widely in the sixteenth-century books on the humors, but they depend on a concept of "beauty" as perfection and balance of the passions, that they get from neo-platonism rather than Galen. They also depend on a concept of dependable ethos or character through gesture, of trustworthy persuasion in bodily behavior, that they get from the history of embodied rhetoric. *The Courtier* is concerned to use make-up, but so that it is not noticed (Bk3: 192–98), to have white teeth in order *not* to display them. *The Civile Conversation* first

32 Andrew Drew-Bear, *Painted Faces on the Renaissance Stage* (1994), 38–39.
33 Hugh Platt, *Delightes for Ladies* (1602), A3.

suggests that "feigned colors" indicate a "feigned heart," but goes on to say that if one should come to a blemish "amiss" then discrete make-up is appropriate (Bk3: 13). Platt comments on the natural look of several of his receipts, and is concerned in *Delights* as well as in the earlier *Jewell House of Art and Nature* to provide a cleaning agent for the teeth. As an aside, he describes how people went to the Barbers to have the "scales" on the teeth removed, and then proffers a detailed paste to keep them clean, noting that the common use of aqua fortis (nitric acid) has a tendency to dissolve the teeth completely away.[34] It is noteworthy for the case studies in this and the following chapters that during this period of the late sixteenth into the early seventeenth centuries, roughly co-extant with Shakespeare's productive life, there is a distinct overlap between humoral and experimental medicine, embodied social practices, and the political and ethical guides found in verbal rhetoric.[35]

Many books on the humors pick up on both the concern with artificial gesture that so obsesses the rhetoricians of embodiment, and with artificial beauty that in turn obsesses the neo-platonists. *The Touchstone of Complexions* distinguishes between the "gait" of the normal person and the "counterfaicted" walk of actors and masquers (36^{v}). Thomas Wright, after noting that orators in society can learn much from actors, goes on to distinguish between the excesses that occur when one acts "faignedly" rather than "really" (Bk5: 179). Overbury's *Characters* is rather more positive about actors, even saying that "By his [the actor's] action he fortifies morall precepts with example,"[36] but does note that "Hee is much affected to painting, and tis a question whether that make him an excellent Plaier, or his playing an exquisite painter." The distinction between the natural and artificial is presented more strongly in terms of Overbury's "Fayre and Happy Milke-Mayd": "one looke of hers is able to put all face Phisick [make-up] out of countenance,"[37] adding that the "Garden and the Bee-hive are all her Physicke and Chyrugery, and she lives the longer for't" (I5^{v}) – presumably in a prescient recognition that beauty products (such as white lead, used in face make-up) were often poisonous.

Significantly, the early seventeenth-century *The Rich Cabinet* transfers much of the worry about artificiality to women alone. On "beauty," it tells us:

34 Hugh Platt, *The Jewell House of Art and nature* (1594), 74.

35 Lynette Hunter, "Women and Domestic Medicine: Lady Experimenters 1570–1620" (1997a).

36 T. Overbury, *New and Choice Characters* (1936), 77.

37 T. Overbury, *New and Choice Characters* (1615), I4^{v}; all subsequent quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

> Beautiful eyes are fooles idols, but true hearts are wisdomes love . . . Beauty is an ornament of nature, but painting is an enemy to knowledge: for wee can say a Swanne is white, a Raven black, etc. but cannot tell, what is the complexion of a painted woman.[38]

The focus for men is on decent, decorous self-display that carves out a specific place for the citizen as opposed to the courtier or the aristocrat: a citizen must be "a professor of civilitie" with appropriate habit, manner of life, conversation, and phrase of speech, while the wife of a citizen "goes at her pleasure" and "is decked, adorned, neatly apparrelled, sits for the gaze" (7). There is consistent commentary on how men should not present themselves as women do, but it is a marked shift that most of the books in the early seventeenth century focus on women's dissembling through "paint." Uncivil men, unlike the "Daffedowndillie" (203) of a young painted man, the passing fancy of women in the earlier *Civile Conversation*, now display their dissembling more through gesture. The catch here of course is that if one displays what one tries to feign, is one being a dissembler or not? *The Rich Cabinet* describes the Hypocrite saying he "makes a corrupt hart shew a dissembling countenance: and as a double face maketh a monster in nature; so a double hart makes a divell incarnate" (66^{v}). But how would we know?

The doubleness and potential deceit of gesture and "paint" is at the heart of all the late sixteenth-century English commentaries, and is again discussed often in terms of whether the eyes or the mouth are the more dependable guarantors of trust. However, there is a change in the way that references to the humors move from being diagnostic, to suggestive, to figural. In 1576 Thomas Newton emphasized through his translation the importance of the eyes, but even so from the start he is cautious, warning us to take care of what we see "in the countenance, which is the Image of the mynde, in the eyes, which are the *bewrayers* and *tokentellers* of the inward conceiptes" (36, my emphasis). Toward the end of the text we are introduced to the mouth: "The hart, by help of the Lunges, the vocal Artery and tongue . . . expresseth and uttereth the cogitations and meanings of the mynde" (141^{v}). Thirty years later Thomas Wright is far more suggestive: "it cannot be doubted of, but that the passions of our mindes worke divers effects in our faces" (Bk1: 26). However, "thorow the windowes of the face, behold the secrets of the heart . . . not that they can exactly understand the hearts which be inscrutable, and onely open to God, but that conjectures they may ayme well at them" (Bk1: 27). Yet he echoes neo-platonist determinism in arguing that:

38 *The Rich Cabinet* (1616), 7; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

> we have two senses of discipline especially, the eies & the eares: reason entreth the eares; the passion wherewith the orator is affected passeth by the eies, for in his face we discover it & in other gestures: . . . those passions we see, nature imprinteth then deeper in our hearts, & for most part they seeme so evident, as they admit no tergiversation. (Bk5: 174–75)

At the same time, Wright is much troubled by the fact that what "pierceth the eare, and thereby the heart" (Bk5: 175) may be "sophisticated" and misleading, and spends most of the second half of the book focusing on recognizing the trustworthiness of the word.

There is a fine line between some of the guidelines that each of Newton and Wright offer for visual judgment, and simple caricature. Both the earlier and the later writer spend a considerable part of their works describing in detail the physical characteristics of different "kinds" of people depending on where they fit in the humors. Newton offers descriptions of faces (69v, 80–80v, 93v–94, 98v, 129v, 146), and Wright of eyes (Bk1: 131–34), for example. Yet when these characteristics are explored by seventeenth-century writers, such as in Overbury's *Characters* (1615) and in *The Rich Cabinet* (1616), that line is more clearly demarcated, and has become more of a figure than a somatic reality. For example, Newton describes an angry countenance in this manner: "colour, grymme, visage, cruell and fierye eyes, puffing and wrynkled nosethrilles, byting lyppes, enraged mouth" (59^{v}). In contrast, *The Rich Cabinet* says "Anger lifteth the heart to a mans tongue, when a wise man keepeth his tongue in his heart" (5). Overbury's "Amorist" "sighs to the hazard of his buttons; his eyes are white, either to weare the livery of his Mistris complexion, or to keepe Cupid from hitting the blacke" ($C8^{v}$). Less literally, *The Rich Cabinet*'s lover "shewes that he findes more force in her eyes, than in his own heart" (85^{v}), "Love is happy, where eyes speak, harts answer, and faith is firme" (85^{v}), "Love is begotten by the eyes, bred in the braines, walks in the tongue, growes with the flesh, and dies in an humour" (87). Overbury tells us that a Dissembler "is not that he appears," "unto the eyes he is pleasing, unto the ear not harsh, but unto the understanding intricate and full of windings" (4^{v}). For example, the Tymist: "He is gravitie from the head to the foot, but not from the head to the heart" (8). With a different tone, but just as figural, *The Rich Cabinet* advises,

> Reason is discovered by speech, which indeed is the image of man's mind . . . as in a glasse a man might see the outward lineaments and proportion of the body: so in the speech, a man might discerne the inward disposition of the minde . . . Reason uttered by a plausible tongue, makes perswasions passable with a popular eare; but judgement that discernes substance from colour, the maske from the face, the forme from the matter, will easily find out the fallacie and error. (125–125^{v})

Both the later writers turn the observations and advice on embodied rhetoric of the earlier books, which are centered around the humors, into aphoristic commentary. Indeed, for a number of reasons, there are few serious books on the humors addressed to a general public after Wright's. Humors theory lodges itself in the stock of commonplaces with which we still live, at least partly through its turn into figuration by writers in the early modern period. As humors theory is displaced by a growing focus on modern, experimental medicine, among the monied and aristocratic citizens, so an embodied rhetoric of behavior, based on humors theory, becomes untrustworthy.

Part II: Case Study in Embodied Rhetoric: Macbeth's Face

The contexts I have so roughly sketched are one way to embed a renaissance text in a slightly less vague location. Often the literature of a period is both opened up by these historical contexts and simultaneously key to any contemporary engagement with them. Shakespeare's plays lie centrally in this period, documenting a shift from humanism to the subject, from a person in a common wealth to an autonomous individual, from the rhetorical to psychological probability and plausibility. In this chapter and the next I turn to *Macbeth* and *Romeo and Juliet*, respectively, to anchor some of the lines of engagement in this discussion. *Romeo and Juliet* (1597/1599) is far more confident in its parody of neo-platonism, a parody that also supports it. Just so, it both parodies and supports rhetoric, and parodies and supports Galenic theory. But *Macbeth* is devastating in its critique of all three, and there's little support – although some – for any of them. As an insight into the early seventeenth-century responses to the social and cultural discussions that were going on, it is remarkably full.

In *Macbeth*,[39] the whole of Act 1 may be read as an introduction to the relations between face, heart, eyes, and mouth, which the play moves on to intricate and complicate. The witches in Act 1 Scene 1 have for four centuries of modern production been the index of "bad things to come," but it is important to remember that the practice of magic was not by any means completely condemned. James I was interested in it as part of the strategy of improvement toward beauty suggested by neo-platonism, and in the right hands – those of authority, especially institutional authority – the white magic of imitation was widely practiced. One key here to black magic is the promise that "Fair is foul, and foul is fair" (1.1.11),

39 William Shakespeare, *Macbeth* (1603?); all quotations from this text are taken from the 1951 edition with line numbers following in brackets.

inverting the possibility of finding truth through beauty. Nevertheless, we know that the Thane of Ross, and by association Duncan's court, is on the side of the good because "haste looks in his eyes! So should he look/ That seems to speak things strange" (1.2.47–48). Macbeth, too, when first meeting the witches, shows a clear and honest response when he says "unfix my hair/ And make my seated heart knock at my ribs" (1.3.135–36). His physical appearance gives a direct visual index of his heart, and he goes on to suggest that he will meet with Banquo again to "speak/ Our free hearts each to other" (1.3.22).

However, the play moves swiftly on to unhinge such certainties as Duncan says of the traitor Cawdor, "There's no art/ To find the mind's construction in the face:/ He was a gentleman on whom I built an absolute trust" (1.4.23). In the same scene, and heightened by proximity, Macbeth invokes the eyes of heaven, the stars, to "hide your fires!/ Let not light see my black and deep desires;/ The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be,/ Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see" (1.4.25). Here Macbeth acknowledges the evil of what he desires but implies that if the eye does not see it being done, the good man may do it even if he afterwards fears what he has done. From this moment on, he also has to learn to divorce his heart from his face, so that others may not "see" that he has evil desires. Calling on the concept of the sun as ideal beauty, Lady Macbeth exclaims "O! never/ Shall the sun the morrow see!/ Your face, my Thane, is as a book, where men/ May read strange matters" (1.5.60–2), in fact rather like the Thane of Ross who spoke "things strange" (1.2.48). She continues, with an echo of *The Courtier*, "To beguile the time,/ Look like the time; bear welcome in your eye,/ Your hand, your tongue: look like th' innocent flower,/ But be serpent under 't" (1.5.62–66). A little later she reminds her husband to "look up clear,/ To alter favour ever is to fear" (1.5.71–72), and reminds the audience of a current belief found in Newton's extensive commentary on melancholy, of the imbalance of Saturn's powers that make men unconstant (148), full of sudden changes (148^{v}), and significantly of a "distempered brain" (143) that brings on dreams. Once more referring to the humors, she goads him as he wrestles with himself over whether to kill Duncan or not, with the charge that his hopes are only "green and pale," the colors of the coward, the sickly man, the inexperienced (1.7.37–38). Macbeth concludes his lessons with an explicit acknowledgment of the separation between heart and face: "Away, and mock the time with fairest show:/ False face must hide what false heart doth know" (1.7.82–83). It is a curious version of the Cretan lie, for if the false face shows a false heart, is it truly showing the heart? In which case it isn't false. But if it is a false face then is the heart true?

This Chinese-box effect of truth and dissembling opens the doorway onto labyrinths of uncertainty. The central focus of Acts 2 and 3 on issues of face, heart, eyes, and mouth hovers around Macbeth's increasing attempts to control the eyes:

not only how he and his wife display themselves and how others see them, but also how he can control what he sees. Eyes both take in and send out, so when he says, "Is this a dagger which I see before me . . .?" (2.1.33) the following lines are immersed in an attempt to explain the connection between the neo-platonic concepts of ideal and sensible things, and the proto-psychological inflection given to that structure by the humors:

> I have thee not, and yet I see thee still./ Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
> To feeling, as to sight? Or art thou but/ A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
> Proceeding from a heat-oppressed brain?/ . . . Mine eyes are made the fools o'th other senses.
> Or else worth all the rest . . ./ There's no such thing . . .
> It is the bloody business which informs thus to mine eyes. (2.1.34–49)

The attempt displays the success of his separation between the hand and the eye.[40] Later, disembodied hands "pluck out mine eyes" (2.2.58), to which Lady Macbeth replies "my hands are of your colour [red]; but I shame/ To wear a heart so white" (2.2.63–64). The heart is worn on the face, and a white heart is a heart without courage, strength, or stamina, without blood, for the blood is spilt/ spilled. If the King is dead, his blood is spilled/ gone, so how can Macbeth have blood in his heart is he is then to be king? If he has blood, is he not the king?

Another device Macbeth takes up is of hiding or masking things from the eye. He tells the murderers of Banquo that he could not "with bare–fac'd power sweep him from my sight," and hence must "Mask . . . the business from the common eye" (3.1.117ff.). When Lady Macbeth advises him to "sleek o'er your rugged looks;/ Be bright and jovial" (3.2.27–28), he replies that he will,

> Present him eminence, both with eyes and tongue:/Unsafe the while, that we
> Must lave our honours in these flattering streams,/ And make our faces vizards to our hearts,
> Disguising what they are." (3.2.31–35)

And yet faced with Banquo's ghost the eye is confounded and the heart still has power to subvert the face – as Lady Macbeth chastises, "This is the very painting of your fear:/ This is the air-drawn dagger . . . / Why do you make such faces?" (3.4.60–2). If the eyes tell the truth, one way of stopping truths one does not want to get out is by stopping the eyes, killing the person. But Banquo returns with open eyes, and Macbeth says,

40 The eye acts as a neo-platonic hook, according to Ficino; see for example, Fleur Rothschild, *Recovering Romeo and Juliet* (1987).

> Avaunt! and quit my sight! let the earth hide thee!/ Thy bones are marrowless, thy blood is cold;
> Thou hast no speculation in those eyes/ Which thou dost glare with. (3.4.92–95)

Ghosts are visual truths come back to claim their rights. And rather more directly, this ghost that threatens revelation also promises the ultimate mask: for the only state where we can escape the "heat-oppressed brain," enjoy the blood running cold, completely sever speculation from joining the heart to the eye, is in death.

There are a number of ways of dealing with self-deception. Lady Macbeth gives signs through both her visual rhetoric of red hands and "ruby . . . cheeks" (3.4.114), and her verbal rhetoric, of being choleric, hot, and, as was thought with most women, moist – as far away from the "natural" melancholic of cold and dry as she can be. Yet, as Thomas Newton tells us, all types of people can become melancholic. The distance of Lady Macbeth's natural humors from melancholy and dream violently precipitates her into them, so that she is taken over by Saturnine dreams. In sleep, as in death, the eyes are severed from the heart, but not so the mouth. She speaks the secrets of the murders despite her eyes giving nothing away:

> Doct: You see, her eyes are open.
>
> Gent: Ay, but their sense are shut. (5.1.23–24)

Even in sleep her words advise a masking or hiding of truth; "look not so pale," she says (5.1.59). Perhaps, although I can yet find no contemporary account of this, to sleep with one's eyes closed is to connect the heart most intimately with soul, and may partly explain Macbeth's fear of the voice that cries "Sleep no more! Macbeth doth murther sleep" (2.2.34–35). Certainly this "great perturbation in nature, to receive at once the benefit of sleep, and do the effects of watching" (5.1.9–10) is no "season of all natures, sleep" (3.4.140).

On the other hand, Macbeth becomes plagued with waking dreams: the vision of the sons of Banquo and Fleance, the illusion of Birnam wood, the delusion that Macduff, because he looks human, could not be the inhuman "thing" not of woman born. Significantly, during the first vision in which Banquo's crown "sears" his eyeballs, Macbeth interjects "Start eyes," "I'll see no more," "and some I see," "Horrible sight! – Now, I see, 'tis true" (4.1.113ff.). Following this he is reliant not upon his sight but upon other people's words to decode the visual misapprehension. When told of Birnam wood, his first reaction is to exclaim, "liar and slave!" (5.5.35), "If you speak'st false" (5.5.38). This is almost another Cretan paradox: if the messenger says he speaks the truth, you know he is lying. Yet Macbeth here does not resolve the paradox with reason, as he did when he saw the bloody dagger; he

accepts that it may be true, that he does not control it. Just so, when Macduff says he was "ripped" from his mother's womb, Macbeth replies "Accursed be the tongue that tells me so," accepting its truth, and complaining of the witches who "palter with us in a double sense;/ That keep the word of promise to our ear,/ And break it to our hope" (5.8.20–2), just as he had with his eyes and face.

The resolution of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth's situation in these final two acts is interspersed with two scenes specifically to do with dissimulation and trust. Lest we think falsity lies only in the visual and our control over it, in 4.3 Malcolm and Macduff play out the debate in terms of words, not images. In effect the scene raises an issue clear from the start, that words also deceive. But whereas the text has to tell us when a visual deceit takes place, especially within the perception of one person, with words – because the text *is* words – we can hear the deceit directly. The audience is left far more to its own devices with the connection between the mouth and the heart. Malcolm begins with a reference to Christian neo-platonism's "angels," the beings who have achieved beauty and irradiate goodness and truth. Macduff is such a person, he says, for "Though all things foul would wear the brows of grace,/ Yet Grace must still look so" (4.3.23–24). All humans have a responsibility to improve their fallen state, to display visually their grace. When Macduff responds with despair, Malcolm resorts to verbal deceits of rhetoric, saying his sins are worse than Macbeth's and forcing Macduff to counter his self-accusations with strategies ever more questionable. But unlike Macbeth, Macduff knows where to stop and desperately concedes that Malcolm should not rule (4.3.102–14).

At this point Malcolm has to take the self-accusations back, "My first false-speaking/ Was this upon myself" (4.3.130), naively expecting Macduff to believe him, but Macduff remains silent before confessing that he has difficulty with the turnaround. Like Macbeth who, when the separation of eye from heart occurs, ceases to trust himself, Macduff, having seen that separation and now hearing a separation of the mouth from the heart, cannot trust others. Both Ross and Malcolm attempt to reinforce the more direct trustworthy connection, Ross saying to Macduff, "Your eye in Scotland/ Would create soldiers" (4.3.186–87), and Malcolm urging him to "Shut not the heart, enrage it" (4.3.229). But Macduff has learned his lesson a terrible way; he dismisses them with "O! I could play the woman with mine eyes,/ And braggart with my tongue" (4.3.230–1). He is not going to make a display of his feelings, but feel them. His first call is not to deceive himself.

The other scene in which the play foregrounds these issues is the bathetic exchange between Macbeth and a servant in 5.3. Completely unexpectedly, Macbeth starts swearing at a servant who enters the room. It is unprovoked and sudden, and directed at what the servant looks like. He says "The devil damn thee

black, thou cream-fac'd loon!/ Where gott'st thou that goose look?" (5.3.11–12). He can tell from the whiteness of the servant's face that he comes with some fearful message, and tries to divert it into the humor of "goose look," naive, silly. On hearing of the approach of ten thousand soldiers, he reacts by telling the servant to prick his face, pinch the blood back into it, to paint himself red to hide his "lily-livered" cowardice. But the servant does not get angry, is not roused from fear. Hence Macbeth knows there is some truth in his face, and rejects it saying, "Death of thy soul" (5.3.16). He repeats "those linen cheeks of thine/ Are counsellors to fear. What soldiers, whey-face?" (5.3.16–17) and orders him to "Take thy face hence" (5.3.19). What is interesting is the power of this unaffected direct statement from the soul – wearing his heart on his face, as it were. Macbeth is left "sick at heart" (5.3.19), knowing that he will rarely receive such direct communication, but in its stead "Curses, not loud, but deep, mouth-honour, breath,/ Which the poor heart would fain deny, and dare not" (5.3.27–28). Deceit breeds deceit, especially when the king is deceit, for his subjects imitate him.

If subjects do not imitate the king then either they are rebellious, or he is not the king. When Macduff and Macbeth meet in their final fight (5.7 and 5.8), Macduff goes in with all the attributes of the good man attempting true improvement that we saw in 4.3. His opening words are "Tyrant, show thy face" (5.7.15). The audience knows he is trustworthy, hence Macbeth is not truly a king but a tyrant. Macbeth has no need to pretend with Macduff but what prompts him to fight is Macduff's taunt that he will "live to be the show and gaze o'th'time:/ We'll have thee as our rarer monsters are,/ Painted upon a pole, and underwrit,/ 'Here may you see the tyrant'" (5.8.24–27). Far worse than death would be a life where the face has no power. Significantly, the word "gaze" has connotations of commodification in the seventeenth century. People who gaze, look at objects which cannot return their look. Worse than death, these eyes have no connection with the mind, worse than unnatural sleep that stops the eyes connecting with the soul, this would be a living death. It is probably fitting that Macduff brings Malcolm Macbeth's "head" in the final scene.

Endnote: The Crumbling of Embodied Rhetoric as a Guide to Trustworthy Behavior

As the rhetoric of embodied behavior, which drew on the theory of humors, began to lose dependability in the late sixteenth century, so ideas of beauty and truth were loosened up, and left more open to flexible construction. Galenic humors emphasized variability in what we look like, from complexion to hair color to eye shape, and tied behavior directly to medicine and science, and to contemporary

theories of magic. Yet, as Galenic theory began to be challenged by neo-platonic thought, partly mediated by Paracelsan medicine, the humors became less reliable indicators of appropriate civil behavior. Although neo-platonism is not necessarily idealist or proto-essentialist in its focus on beauty and the visual as an instantaneous mode of proof, both focuses promoted concepts of "certain," immediate truth and downgraded the probability of rhetorical reasoning and counsel, which takes place over time.[41] But neo-platonism is only part of the picture. Others have argued, persuasively, that anatomy with its focus on revealing the previously unseen was even more devastating for Galenic medicine and the humors.[42] Neo-platonism was concerned with any visual observation and thus informed Paracelsan surgery, but anatomy linked illness or disease with visually identifiable internal parts of the body, breaking down the interconnectedness of the humoral system and the links between external bodily appearance, the passions, the soul, and the mind. At the same time that medical knowledge was becoming separated from rhetorical counsel, the humors became a figural discourse partly retained by psychology and partly reduced to stereotype.

The initial enthusiasm for the eye at the cost of the mouth, mildly guarded in *The Courtier* and definitely critiqued in *The Civile Conversation*, became increasingly a source for concern, as commentators began to realize that the visual was not the guarantor of trustworthiness that was supposed to be a guide for courtly civility. Gradually, to distinguish the civil behavior of a citizen as different to the deceit of the courtier, civic decorum began to depend on the conversations of probable verbal rhetoric, the *sermo* rhetoric that connected not to the eye but to the heart. Take John Cleland, who advised the young princes of James I on the need to supplement the virtues of birth with the virtues of education and learned duty. He says in a meditation on "Mortalitie":

> if yee looke upon Death onely with your eyes, heare of it, enquire after it, and take hold of it onely with your hand, and the heart be farre from it, then it cannot avalye or profit you. The eye without the heart is a deceiving eye, the eare without the heart is unprofitable, the tongue without the heart is a flattering tongue, the hand with the heart is a false hand, and God will confound all the rest of the bodie without the heart. Sonne give me thy heart.[43]

As in *Macbeth*, although dealing with the same field of signs, the issue here is no longer about beauty or fixed truth but about the heart and how to judge its trustworthiness through verbal rhetoric.

41 Lynette Hunter, "The Eye, the Mouth, the Heart: Guarantors of Trust?" (2000).
42 See, for example, Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned* (1995).
43 John Cleland, *A Monument of Mortalitie* (1624), 25.

Chapter 4
Civic Rhetoric 1560–1630: *Sermo* Rhetoric and Counsel as a Guide to Friendship and Conversation

Part I: Conversation as Probable Verbal Rhetoric

The discussion of appropriate behavior and communication that was emerging in the middle of the sixteenth century was embedded not only in embodied rhetorics of behavior, but also in the teaching of verbal rhetoric as a guide to distinguishing between the probable and the plausible. If embodied behavior began as the site for thinking about personal trustworthiness for the courtier, verbal rhetoric takes this element firmly into the emerging politics of citizenship and its discourses – initially the civic and then the national. Writings on verbal rhetoric ran alongside another dominant discussion about a separation between rhetoric and logic referenced in earlier chapters. Brought to the foreground by Peter Ramus,[1] some writers opposed logic to rhetorical eloquence – being concerned with rhetoric as deceit, and others opposed logic to the rhetoric of poetry – with all its ambiguities. Both arguments, about eloquence and poetics, are allied closely to court poetry, and in each case their implications are that rhetoric as a field for dealing with the probable reasoning, rather than the certainties of logic and the ambiguities of poetics, should simply disappear. This chapter will suggest instead that guides to appropriate behavior for the court, and then the civic world, are present in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century verbal rhetoric also as a methodology and philosophy for dealing with the probable, and developed quite firmly into *sermo* and a rhetoric of conversation.

What was this kind of rhetoric, this code of behavior that Erasmus allies with friendship and temperance, that civic counsel and verbal "conversation" signified or gestured toward? How did it contribute to the sociopolitical world? And why did it move into the familial and domestic? Many commentaries from the period discuss the way that there is evidence in the probable rhetoric of the words a person uses for their "true" nature. Yet the key areas under discussion around probable

1 A grounding article in what has been, in the history of rhetoric, a consistent discussion of Ramus's separation of logic from rhetoric, is Pierre Duhamel "The Logic and Rhetoric of Peter Ramus" (1949). More recent discussions include, among many others: K. Meerhoff and J. Moisan, eds., *Autour de Ramus* (1997), and Stephen Reid and Emma Wilson, *Ramus, Pedagogy and the Liberal Arts* (2013).

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rhetoric are not about the true as logical and rational. Instead, they continue the Erasmian focus on friendship and behavior in civic and government locations, and then in the personal and familial. They call, at each respective jointure, on the complexities of moral, economic, and political or ethical issues.

The first part of this pivotal fourth chapter mainly explores the contributions of Ludovico Bryskett (1606), James Cleland (1607), and D. T. (Daniel Touteville? 1608) in articulating, through verbal rhetoric, a split in identity, and therefore in the rhetoric of self, that is called for by changing medical and economic systems. The second part of the chapter is an extended study of parallel issues in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, written in the previous decade which calls on the theory of the humors. The Galenic medical definition of a person as existing in a particular relational process with their surrounding ecology – including food, geography, the weather, as well as social networks – was fundamentally part of early sixteenth-century "oeconomics," or the sustainability of an extended household, which, a century later, was undergoing change.

With the growing influence of Paracelsan medicine and experimental science through the century, the idea of a person's body as in a particular ecology gives way to the concept that a person's body has a specific anatomy common to all.[2] People become both more contained within an identity and more universalized, which are two of three key constitutive elements of the autonomous individual in a soon-to-be liberal nation state – the third being rational logic.[3] Simultaneously, the nation begins to ban displays of "might is right," arguing that war should only happen on behalf of the nation not within a nation (Robinson), and supplanting physical violence and private revenge with a far-reaching legal system. The insistence on a "peaceful" nation also supports an economics being wrested away from the household into a monetarized public system that depends on a stable market and that turns the value of labor into the cost of labor needed to yield profit – or capitalism. After the establishment of the stock exchange in 1571, the concept of profit increasingly meant that some people could get more out of an exchange than they put in, which also meant that others were getting less than the value of their labor. This kind of person cannot collaborate with their friends because their profit will be exposed as unfair. Many writers of the period such as Francis Bacon anxiously try to deal with the problem that a civic rhetoric based on the collaboration of friendship, and the reasoning process

2 See Matthew Wood, *Vitalism, the History of Homeopathy, Herbalism and Flower Essences* (2004).

3 See Lynette Hunter, *Modern Allegory and Fantasy* (1989), which specifically outlines three elements of liberal political conditions for modern fantasy.

of probable rhetoric, is impossible to sustain in the context of competitive capitalism.

Against this background, Bryskett, Cleland, and D. T. each take the rhetoric of conversation in a slightly different direction. Bryskett, whose 1606 book was probably written in the 1590s, argues that training in a rhetoric of conversation is a vital education in the interconnectedness of both reason and passion, words and the body. He pushes the move from court to the city further out, arguing that the learning has to take place in the country. By implication this education cannot happen in public society, which he notes has other priorities, such as rational and logical communication. D. T., who dedicates his work to a governness of James I's son Henry, specifically splits probable rhetoric into conversation that is trained in familial settings, and negotiation that is the medium of civic behavior. In contrast, the third commentator on rhetoric and behavior studied here is Cleland, a tutor to James I's second son Charles, who argues that the civic "man of action" must be educated in conversational rhetoric to acquire prudence and decorum, so that they can demonstrate virtue and be able to negotiate with the public. He argues that in public society the rhetoric of conversation becomes negotiation between individuals on "universal" common grounds, rather than participation in forming collaborative grounds particular to a situation.

What each writer suggests is that a man [sic] has to separate between the "true" person who is trained outside the civic – in the country or the family – in a rhetoric that presents the "self," and the individual who uses "bare words" that construct the more rational social identity needed by a civic world based on capital. Nevertheless, both the "true" person and the public citizen need to use a probable rhetoric if they are to be trusted. While conversational or *sermo* rhetoric is initially in the realm of the civic as "negotiation" between trustworthy citizens, it increasingly shifts into the familial as personal friendship, leaving negotiation as a more rational communication tied to the new economics. The accounts are explored here in the context of several other less detailed studies by other writers of this period. Their approaches are complex and often feel slightly desperate, if not a little guilty about the necessary separation between public and personal identity that allows prudence and decorum to be present without friendship, in order to perform trustworthiness in a civic world so that profit can appear to be necessary.

1560s–1590s: Civil Conversation and the Probable, Trustworthy Rhetorics of Words

During the period up to around 1600, as suggested by the previous chapter, guides to trustworthy behavior in England shift toward speech and away from appearance. This is part of a move toward more inclusive democratic principles because verbal rhetoric can be learned, so virtue is not something with which you are born. Yet, like embodied rhetorics of behavior, verbal rhetorics also move from the particular to the universal. A great deal that is said about *sermo* rhetoric is based on a concurrent shift to promote the use of words as reliable evidence of trustworthiness. The two ways of assessing behavior, through appearance and words, are connected to two systems of rhetorical signs. The primary elements associated with looks are the face and gesture, which are essential to the orator and courtier, and initially also to the citizen. As discussed in chapter 3, communication through hand positions, facial attitudes, and gestures is rather reductively illustrated in the voluminous and later *Chirologia* and *Chironomia* by John Bulwer (1644), writing possibly because the social disruption of the Civil War generated huge distrust of other people, and these visual systems seemed to give reliable insight into a person's character.[4] Yet with the raging debate about the superiority of logic to rhetoric, and the gradual undermining of Galenic humors by Paracelsan science, formal training in gesture became increasingly confined to the orators of the church, addressed by previously mentioned clerical writers such as Vossius and Cresollius.

It is worth noting here the "looks" trope of the eye and the soul: we look into the soul of another – translated by Hoby as: their eyes "perce" ours (BK3: 279) – with a gazing that is not necessarily an interaction. The parallel "words" trope of the tongue and heart has a different emphasis, for the originator/speaker displays their heart and the audience hears and recognizes it in a potentially more engaged and interactive manner. The pros and cons of each of "looks" and "words" were important to the development of verbal conversational or *sermo* rhetoric, which became allied initially with the civic interaction of negotiation, and distinguished from eloquence, fashion, and the gaze. As mentioned in the previous chapter, George Puttenham, among others such as Thomas Wright, differentiates between physiognomy as the clue to manners through the eyes, and writing or speech as the clue to manners through language – and he goes on to claim the latter as the appropriate path to trustworthiness.

4 Bulwer does the same thing with the face, see *Pathomyotomia* (1649).

Sixteenth- to seventeenth-century oral rhetoric is aware of three fields, not just the two fields that emerge from the split between logic and rhetoric as discourses about certain and uncertain things respectively. The three fields are roughly equivalent to those in classical rhetoric of the epideictic, deliberative or demonstrative, and the judicial. But in the many vernacular texts concerned with civic life they are shifted into, for example, William Fulwood's terms of Mirth, Gravity, and Doctrine in *The Enimie of Idlenesse* (1568),[5] or T. B.'s 1570 translation of Johannes Sturm's work on oratory, *A Ritch Storehouse or Treasurie for Nobilitye and Gentlemen*, which offers the terms Pathetic, Moral, and Proportional. Rhetoric comprehends that all logics have their own rhetoric and even rhetorics have stances with different ethical implications. Rhetoric also thinks of uncertain things as, at least, potentially either probable or plausible, and, as Agricola attempted to remind people, it lays claim to dialectics. The plausible indeed is the partner of the certain, because one person's certainty is another's arbitrary choice. Whereas in the probable all grounds for knowing are first to be discussed and agreed upon by the rhetor and the audience together. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century rhetorics debate the issues between these kinds of uncertainty at length, and, again, the plenitude of that word "logos," which Erasmus elaborates into signifying "sermo, verbum, oratio, ratio, sapientia, and computus," indicates that the debate is not a binary one but highly complex.

Arguably, the most contentious of the three areas of oral rhetoric is the deliberative or demonstrative, and particularly the deliberative if we take Angel Daie's distinction between the two,[6] since he argues that the demonstrative is closer to description and therefore less uncertain. The epideictic is largely without pragmatic aim, and the judicial is unashamedly focused on certainties and evidence. Those middle terms found in Fulwood and Sturm, of Gravity and the Moral respectively, which pertain to the deliberative and demonstrative, emphasize the importance of knowing how or whether you are being deceived, or if the speaker is trustworthy. They are completely dependent on ethos, as was Caxton's "rhetor" in *Myrrour of the Worlde*, whose first instruction was to devise some reason to make the hearer glad and willing to listen to him (D3). Echoing

5 William Fulwood, *The Enemie of Idlenesse* (1568), opens his discussion of a rhetoric for letters with these three sections; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

6 Angel Daie, *The English Secretarie* (1586), 44 and 84; all quotations from the text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

the distinction between the "heart" and the "eye" as different kinds of relation, the probable and the plausible make different demands on ethos. The former establishes stance by being grounded in context and necessary discussion between rhetor and audience, and the latter constructs a stance from grounds that it requires the audience to accept. An ethos of the former actively engages with the audience, and is open to change and even ambiguity. An ethos of the latter is far more certain and identifiable. For late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century civic rhetoric, the ethos of the probable is negotiated in conversation, and the ethos of the plausible is often called "character." Both are mediated in written rhetoric, but with quite different stances. Probable rhetoric in written texts, in other words by the privileged few with an education and designated as citizens, is explored in the following chapter partly as "style."

In the context of a growing literate public and an expanding written medium for communication through printing, the issue of ethos, as Erasmus understood, becomes problematic. How does the writer generate a probable rhetoric, a conversation with the reader? Erasmus, as outlined in chapter 1, suggests the writer develop the *sermo* rhetoric of Cicero, based in friendship, which has written strategies for temperance, prudence, and decorum about which the rhetoric of oratory had always had much to say. From the middle of the sixteenth century, the underlying stimulus for articulating a rhetoric of conversation and counsel is, like that for Thomas Wilson, to distinguish rhetoric from an abstract logic that will sever its connections with politics and ethics, and the social effects of friendship. But these writers are also attempting to search for the positive effects of rhetoric – even though some, such as Thomas Blundeville's *The Arte of Logike* (1599), in what could be seen as a desperate attempt to rescue the activity of rhetoric, argue that logic itself is the art of discoursing probably, in other words, that a logic has its own rhetoric. As outlined in chapter 2, Ralph Lever in *The Arte of Reason* is concerned that rational logic deprives one of the use of copiousness – the topical reasoning so necessary to addressing the diversifying public of the sixteenth-century city – and argues that what one needs is witcraft not logic. Fulwood, again, notes that a civil letter does not use logic but plain familiar speech (A7). While these comments are possibly part of the same impetus that led to Peter Ramus's separation of rhetoric from logic that attempted to render rhetoric ornamental and without reason, these writers make the claim that logic can only speak convincingly or be seen as "proof" when speaking to a restricted and specialized audience. Rhetoric, therefore, is needed to provide reason in all other areas, especially in a public world. Bulwer's hand gestures record logic as a closed fist, and rhetoric as an open hand.

Ramusian rhetoric most effectively reached England in the 1570s, culminating in Abraham Fraunce's *The Arcadian Rhetoric* and *The Lawiers Logike* of

1588. However, the more substantial and direct response to this debate came, for example, from the rhetorics of Henry Peacham, *The Garden of Eloquence* (1577) and George Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), which both explicitly argue that ornament is not the only thing that rhetoric generates. Peacham notes that one needs both eloquence and wisdom: eloquence that pierces, as do the eyes, to inward parts of the audience to gain affection is, on its own, ambivalent, and must be anchored by wisdom or reason. George Puttenham reiterates the observation, saying that in written materials eloquence alone is ambivalent and that honesty is necessary, requiring decency and decorum, first because language is transgressive by nature, and second because the speaker speaks of other people and hence has a responsibility toward them. Both of these arguments indicate a concern with the ethos of rhetoric and use the vocabulary of trustworthiness and friendship articulated by Erasmus and mid-sixteenth-century English rhetoricians to indicate the need for an engaged rhetorical stance, and an interaction with a particular audience. In a manner reminiscent of Thomas Elyot who, in his *Dictionary* of 1538, takes on both logic and eloquence, and similar to the host of writers on embodied behavior, Puttenham draws on the analogy of medicine for rhetoric. Elyot was concerned to distinguish between the eloquence of those like the humanist Lorenzo Valla and the preferable "many words" rhetoric of Agricola. He does so by distinguishing the former from the latter as a lawyer from a doctor – the doctor, and the rhetorician, being best able to determine the contentious and uncertain. Puttenham's famous description of "art" shows the artist working at his best as a gardener or physician (255), drawing explicitly on Plato's *Phaedrus* which distinguishes the rhetoric of the doctor from the rhetoric of power, and from the rhetoric of inwardly-focused philosophy based on sight, to the engaged rhetoric conveyed through gardening and medicine.[7]

These later sixteenth-century rhetorics are centrally concerned with ethos and with defining the "reason" or reasoning process of a written rhetorical stance, so that one can distinguish the deceitful from the decent and decorous, the manipulative from the persuasive. Many writers such as Puttenham attempt to establish courtly behavior as learned but not pedantic, and as non-violent, emphasizing that the defining elements of political responsibility are learned rather than inherited by birth. The move reflects more general concerns in the early philosophy of civil discourse to shift the education of the nobility and the newly empowered governing people away from hunting and fishing and fighting toward more book-based learning. It goes hand in hand with a growing insistence that fighting is inappropriate within the nation or city or family, and is

7 Lynette Hunter, *Rhetorical Stance in Modern Literature* (1984), chapter 2.

only tenable in war between nations.[8] This becomes part of the founding definition of a citizen accepting the liberal social contract: the person willing to go to war on behalf of the nation. Yet it is mainly from the 1590s, despite Fulwood's earlier commentary that one increasingly finds the concern of civic discourse is to claim a conversational rhetoric of temperate reason and the engaged activity of the stance of friendship as appropriate to its persuasion, and different from the rhetoric of the courtier.

1590s–1630s: Civic Rhetoric Becomes Negotiation, Conversation Becomes Familial Rhetoric

Having gleaned this set of issues from vernacular rhetorics concerned with spoken and written words of the 1560s to 1590s, let us look specifically at the three rhetorics, mentioned at the start of this chapter, from the turn into the seventeenth century: first, Lodowick Bryskett's *Discourse of Civill Life* (published twice, by different printers, in 1606), and then D. T.'s *Essayes Politike and Morall* (1608), and James Cleland's *The Institution of a Young Noble-Man* (1607). Bryskett's text is a translation from another Italian work, this time by Giovanni Battista Giraldi, and it speaks from the context of the 1590s in which Galenic medicine is still predominant but slowly being displaced among the educated, and monied, citizens of England. He argues that training in a rhetoric of conversation is a vital education in the interconnectedness of both reason and passion, words and the body, and has to take place in the country, not in the city or the court. By implication, this education cannot happen in public society, which he notes has other priorities such as rational and logical communication. During the period ca. 1590–1620, a rhetoric of conversation learned in the familial household informs the negotiated public rhetoric of the civic man and is an indicator of that person's behavior and the trustworthiness of their economic relationships. Negotiation becomes a marker of the "middle people," as Bacon calls them in an essay dating from 1597 (236), or, as described in *A President for Young Pen-Men* (1615), a marker of the "carriage of civility" for those whose status lies in the middle, between the lord and the lackey.

8 Francis Bacon, *The Essaies of Sir Francis Bacon* (1616), discusses this element of nation-formation (239); all quotations from Bacon's essays are from this edition, with page numbers following in brackets. Bacon's ideas follow on from Richard Robinson's *A morale methode of civille policie* translated from Francis Patrizzi and published in 1576, which focuses on defining the behavior of citizens with the civic world; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

The earlier sixteenth-century books on civil rhetoric, because of their focus on courtly behavior, speak of the necessity of learning conversation in the city. Conversation needs practice, meeting, and companying, and conversational *negotio* is contrasted to the otiose, the laziness and idleness of country life – idleness being associated with sexuality.[9] Later in the century, at a time when the English country house phenomenon[10] was locating many monied families in the country for at least part of the year, Puttenham underwrites this context when he claims that to learn civil and gracious behavior you need to live in the country but within fifty miles of London (120). The point about conversation for Puttenham, as for Bryskett, is that it unifies the rhetoric of gesture with that of language, it brings the body and mind together, whereas in the otiose and in rational logic either the body or the mind respectively, is at work – although Puttenham also depicts some otium as hidden negotium (251). A number of writers, including Ed. Willis in 1615, contrast the work of both body and mind in civic discourse with the split between the two that occurs in "idlenesse" or otium. Bryskett's text contrasts conversation with a logic devoid of both reason and passion that becomes a reductive, conceptual rationality. The distinction of conversation from both rationality and idleness redefines it by emphasizing the concept of the collaborative "work ethic" it brings to negotiation and business, and separates it from the superficiality of a rhetoric that is based only on individual opinion, and plausible logic. At the same time, the distinction makes it clear that if one uses rationality alone, if one isolates oneself from discussion, then one splits the body from the mind, and loses contact with emotion, passion, and reason. The intellectual clarity of this concept, in which conversation brings together what rational logic splits apart, casts Descartes's use of ratio, and the split of mind from body, as an individual's plausible opinion or otiose whim that could not have been accorded the status of reason or truth.

With the shift of "civility" from the court to the civic and the "middle people," the understanding of the distinction between the city and the country also alters its significance. The shift is contemporaneous with a change in the social use of the country and the just-mentioned development of the English country house, which developed new networks with local gentry, and a tremendous change in the scope of urban life in the city.[11] Increasingly, civil conversation is associated not with the city itself but with civic life, and civic life is dealing with

9 See T. Elyot (1533), "If thou flee idlenesse Cupid hath no myghte" (108).

10 For a well-researched study of this phenomenon, see Peter Brears, "Behind the Green Baise Door" (1996).

11 For a glimpse into this world see C. Wilson, *The Country House Kitchen Garden 1600 – 1900* (1998), and Mark Girouard, *Life in the English Country House* (1978).

the shift from oeconomics as a familial system often the remit of the housewife, to economics as a system of capital accumulation which is the remit of male citizens. As this happens, a distinction between a person's home life and their civic life forms more sharply. In the home there is a person's self, and in the city there is the civic citizen. The former engages in conversation, the latter in negotiation. Hence Bacon discusses negotiation largely under the topic of mercantile economics (193). In Bryskett's focus on the country as the place where conversation is learned, although his "country" also is close to the city, there is a particular emphasis on familial life as the training ground for a person's behavior that will feed into the city and eventually the nation. In this he echoes his friend Edmund Spenser, who portrays Guyon, in "The Legend of Temperance" in *The Faerie Queene*, as needing to develop the temperate friendship that supports conversational rhetoric through which one learns the behavior necessary for citizenship.[12] Familial training is a concept that is found in the earlier translations of Patrizzi, Guazzo, and della Casa, but is there downplayed in relation to the instructions on courtly behavior. In later English works, familial training seems precisely to deal with the gap left by the breakdown of the feudal concept of "service" which occurs concurrently during the latter part of the sixteenth century.[13] Bryskett's translation of Giraldi speaks of acquiring civility, the civil conversation of friendship, in domestic and familiar settings in order to focus on the moral and intellectual aspects of life[14] – although always in preparation to serve the nation as a citizen. This line recurs in a number of other early seventeenth-century texts, such as the younger Henry Peacham's *The Compleat Gentleman* (1622).

The inexorable alliance of civility with personal life, friendship, and verbal behavior begins to take on, in Bryskett and others, the idea of "true" personal life: the need for trustworthy personal actions and guidance on how to recognize these actions. Bryskett notes that it is not enough to have merely a good image, you need good manners and you learn these in the domestic and familial world, which trains one for action within the civic. He also notes that a system of "seeing" that assesses "comliness," and is focused on appearance and on physical beauty as one's ethos, is not a good indicator of personal worth. He explicitly says that the "misshapen" can be "nurtured" by conversation (33). Picking up on the other system, of words and of a written ethos, an exemplary letter from a city man in the country to someone in the city in *A President for Young Pen-Men* (1616)

12 John Webster, "Challenging the Commonplace" (1994).

13 Peter Brears's books on food-serving and service outline much of this history. See in particular, "Behind the Green Baise Door" (1996).

14 Lodowick Bryskett, *A Discourse of Civill life* (1606), 92; all quotations from this book are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

notes, with surprise, that he is writing "like himself" and not just with "bare words."[15] Presumably this is a surprise because the city man is trained to separate his working life from the personal and moral, and to use abstract rather than conversational language. The distinction marks an awareness of the growing separation between the personal and the civic. Braithwait, whose 1630 text *The English Gentleman* sanctifies the country as a topos for proper familial training, echoes this in his anxiety to distinguish the true orator from the actor or mere "verbal rhetorician." A gentleman's education consists in liberty (individual), conversation (familial), and public society. Therefore to show that he is "prudent" rather than "ridiculous" he must learn to converse over matter and not "just" with words,[16] again learning that rhetorical skill in the familial but for the public good.

While Bryskett, and later writers on behavior, sketch these changes within a continuity from the 1580s to the 1640s, the two other texts published contemporaneously with his explore the rhetoric of conversation within a different and more particular context. James Cleland and D. T. are responding to the books James VI of Scotland had printed in 1598 and 1599, when it was becoming increasingly apparent that he would take over the English throne as James I: *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1598) as well as *Basilikon Doron or His Majesties Instructions To His Dearest Sonne, Henry the Prince* (1599, 1603). In the latter book, James clarifies what he means by the "divine right of kings," which is set forth in declamatory and rigid terms in the former manifesto. James's son Henry would have been five years old in 1599, and this may explain the simpler, more direct, phrasing of what a "king" was in the latter book. In advising "Humilitie" as one of many virtues, James says:

> Foster trew Humilitie, in bannishing pride, not onely towards God (consider-ing yee differ not in stuffe, but in vse, and that onely by his ordinance, from the basest of your people) but also towards your Parents.[17]

In other words, a king is a normal person but has been placed by God in a position of enormous responsibility, about which, the book argues, he has to learn because it is not predetermined by the body. The most important virtue to learn, according to James, is temperance. His use of the word recalls that of Erasmus, and he defines it for his young son, in the section "A King's Duetie to his Office" – in other words, his political and ethical rather than his religious duty – as:

15 M. R., *A President for Young Pen-Men. or the Letter-Writer* (1615), F3^{v}.

16 Thomas Braithwait, *The English Gentleman and English Gentlewoman* (1635), 47; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

17 James Stuart, Basilikon Doron (1599), section 3; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition. Accessed March 7 2020.

> Temperance, Queene of all the rest within you. I meane not by the vulgar interpretation of Temperance, which onely consists in *gustu & tactu,* by the moderating of these two senses: but, I meane of that wise moderation, that first commaunding your selfe, shall as a Queene, command all the affections and passions of your minde, and as a Phisician, wisely mixe all your actions according thereto. Therefore, not onely in all your affections and passions, but euen in your most vertuous actions, make euer moderation to be the chiefe ruler.

Most of the text of *Basilikon Doron* continues with instructions about how to bring temperance into political life and into "behaviour in indifferent things," such as eating, dressing, speaking, and playing.

Responding to the books by James after he has become king of England, and to books by writers such as Bryskett, Cleland and D. T. each advise and guide on the way that familial training moves into the civic public world, as the person becomes an individual citizen. In D. T.'s *Essayes* the writer talks about the distinction between the rhetorical and the eloquent as one explicitly between the probable and the plausible, and outlines two distinct sets of rhetorical strategy. He argues that a rhetorical event consists of the person persuading, the affections of the audience, and the soundness of reason. As such, ethos is central and can be found in two forms of rhetorical stance. If the person persuading wants the audience to be of his opinion, he may simply insist that the audience agrees. However, what he should do is demonstrate that he is trustworthy in his heart, his mouth, and his works,[18] and negotiate with the audience. Significantly, James Cleland's *Institution* also states that even nobility of birth does not guarantee virtue. Virtue must be demonstrated to and negotiated with the public because this kind of negotiated rhetoric is appropriate to civil conversation. D. T. here and in his later book, *The Dove and the Serpent* (1614), is engaging in a response to the dangers of populist "opinion." For example, B. R.'s *Opinion Deified* (1613) rants:

> Opinion, the legitimate child of affection, a most inconstant thing, it standeth but upon the pleasure of men, but especially of the irresolute multitude. Opinion a smookie vapour, the breath of the vulgar, the applause of the ignorant, the mother of hypocrisie . . . turneth the world topsie-turvie.[19]

But for D. T. the legitimate affection of the audience, or pathos, is fundamental to the engaged negotiation of probable rhetoric, and he goes to some lengths to defend it as under the governance not only of passion and the senses but also the soul (15^{v}).

18 D. T., *Essayes Politicke, and Morall* (1608), fol. 10^{v}.
19 B. R., *Opinion Deified* (1613), 32–3.

The third element in D. T.'s rhetorical event is reason. He argues that it works by way of probable conjecture, to demonstrate need, not, as he says, against a sense of "justice and honestie" (26), but instead to ensure that an ethos of reasoning about necessity is wrapped up in and contextualized by a rhetorical stance in interaction between the speaker and the audience. The main strategies are not syllogisms but rhetorical enthymemes and inductions, "especially when they be seconded by a lively and decent action" (27^{v}). And yes, rhetorical eloquence may be separated from decency, at which point it becomes "a dangerous weapon in a mad man's hand" (29). And yes, it may be abused, especially when government is impoverished. But it need not be like a plausible rhetoric aimed at "sharpness" (in the sense of "sharp practice"). Probable rhetoric is perspicuous. In this D. T echoes Fulwood's earlier avocation of familiar speech over "rare and diffused speech" (A7). Perspicuous rhetoric addresses a diverse audience much as the physician heals different people in different ways (30) – even though waning, much of the popular medical system is still Galenic – and to do so it must use the topics and commonplaces to reach that diversity (30^{v}).

What is significant about probable rhetoric is that while its engaged stance usually leads to the topos of "good counsel" from subject to monarch which is standard to humanist literature about courtly behavior, D. T., with Erasmus, sees counsel as central to the development of friendship. Friendship between equals, within either liberal or mechanical professions, he says, is not lightly given because equals are always competing within their fields. Furthermore, friendship between those of "different meanes, or mindes" (95^{v}) is difficult precisely because of those differences. But a rhetoric of perspicuity is not competitive and is constructed to deal with difference, and can offer trustworthy conversation in both cases. In *The Dove and the Serpent*, these issues are developed further into the concepts of conversation in personal friendship and negotiation in civic friendship, *sermo* and *negotio* – probable rhetorics in the personal and civic realms. In the civic, they are also tied to a particular kind of civic behavior that, in common with other writers of the period to 1600–1630, he sets up against the ambivalence of the potentially deceitful courtier.

As John Cleland's 1607 *Institution of a Young Noble-Man* puts it, a courtier is "a slave to one humor, self-love."[20] Earlier, Puttenham calls those of "little conversation" (14), those people who keep to themselves, "phantasticall" men, and contrasts them with those who delight in a busy life, exercise, and invention (15),

20 John Cleland, *The Institution of a Young Noble-Man* (1607), 168; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

whose speech is the image of their heart. The man of conversation is a man of action, because, as Cleland says, it is one's duty to move toward action in service of one's country (9). It is not enough to know things (163), hence courtly displays of learning are not good enough. This is a theme echoed not only in the younger Peacham in 1622, but also in many of the plans of education drawn up by teachers for students and fathers for sons throughout the seventeenth century.[21] Furthermore, Cleland notes that because the end of conversation is action, one needs prudence, justice, and temperance (164), not fashion (5–6), and, agreeing with Braithwait, not the superficiality of "rhetorical varnish" (399).

Bryskett allies prudence with reason, which engages and controls passion, as opposed to the intellective, which represses passion completely into the rational and/or, curiously, the sublime contemplative. D. T. reiterates this but emphasizes that compassion is controlled passion through which reason tells us that civility is steadfast and faithful but not beyond "pietie and equitie" (19), since passion by itself leads to self-love. Cleland's notion of prudence extends these comments into a concept of "commonality," that the conversational rhetor speaks to many, not just to a restricted group with pre-agreed grounds for discussion. As Gibson later points out, speaking to a mixed audience requires one to frame one's conversation carefully,[22] through what Cleland calls "decorum" in words. In this, Cleland is reiterating the earlier commentaries on the decorum of conversation, and on the need to be copious and meete,[23] to have discretion and measure (della Casa 1576[24]), and decency (Puttenham 124–25). Cleland himself advocates the apt and meet (169) of prudence. He apostrophizes, "O dear prudence, how necessary art thou for our life and conversation" (167). And Cleland, as tutor to Charles Stuart, ties "commonality" to his argument that virtue is the source of nobility, not birth or wealth, and that virtue is shown and learned in action and conversation. Indeed he notes that it is a rare thing for a nobleman to be common, and when achieved it is an "imitation of God's goodness" (168–69). Yet, embedded in Cleland's concept of prudence, virtue, and commonality, is not only a sense of the "true" or "virtuous" person, and the liberal individual, but also a belief in a common universal

20 John Cleland, *The Institution of a Young Noble-Man* (1607), 168; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

21 For example, those of Francis Osborne, or the earl of Chesterfield. For introductory commentaries, see William. Sloane "Some Plagiarisms in 17th Century Books of Advice to Children" (1940), and W. Lee Ustick, "Advice to a Son" (1932).

22 See S. Gibson, *The Only Rule to walke by* (1616), "Dedication."

23 T. B., *A Ritch Storehouse* (1570), 44v.

24 John della Casa, *Galateo* (1576).

humanity. Cleland states that the best wit, or rhetoric, is also universal. By implication this wider social rhetoric has no need of conversational engagement.

The danger of the claim that underlying assumptions do not need to be discussed and agreed upon, indicates that probable rhetoric may be giving way to the plausible. The cluster of significant words around prudence: decorum, apt and meet, decency, discretion and measure, is echoed in Braithwait's insistence on prudence for "neighbourliness" (72–73), yet with his neighborliness we again approach the closed audience required by plausible argument. Braithwait's famous line, "As every man's house is his Castle, so is his family a private Commonwealth" (87), is wrought with ambivalence. The "home" that he imagines is an isolated island, not the familial ecology conceptualized by Bryskett. The neighborly person is not a self within a value-generating location different from the civic, even if informing it, but a private individual defined by the capitalist system of the city. Braithwait separates the domestic world from the economic, moves the former firmly into the private, and defines it as the root of sacred and moral knowledge (92), while economics defines the public actions of an individual. In his kind of neighborliness, you participate in discourse and communication, action and negotiation, pastime and recreation, but relatively unproblematically because you are living with like-minded people – who, in his case, enjoy an unspoken class privilege of access to money, along with similar education and social status. The same cluster of words also hovers around the notion of prudence in Hobbes's *Briefe of the Arte of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1639), but in that text one sees the problem of the simultaneous existence of the autonomous individual and the universal man emerging. The ethical stance of conversational rhetoric is not only a function of virtue in the rhetor but also of passion and engagement in the audience,[25] yet the rhetoric of the autonomous individual excludes the audience from co-making the grounds for reasoning and probable persuasion.

The simultaneity of the autonomous and the universal in the "individual" is famously articulated in *Leviathan* in terms of the rhetoric of governmental power and the need for a person to be represented by one inclusive image of all citizens as well as having a specific private identity. This is one of the clearest definitions of the implications for the early modern person who qualifies as a human – one with money (a sign of excess value), property, and education. Humanism has contracted from the Erasmian gesture toward women and the vulgar, who may have craft and value-generating ways of knowing even without money and property and formal education. Hobbes's kind of privileged person, a

25 Thomas Hobbes, *A Briefe of the Arte of Rhetorick* (1833) 295; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page number following in quotations.

human, shifts from being the citizen of a nation, and becomes a subject within a nation state. There is no space for counsel, for the engaged *sermo* rhetoric with which Erasmus infused conversation, if there can be no discussion about assumptions and no collaborative generation of the grounds for the interaction. The public and social rhetoric of civic negotiation is entering the more determined realm required by capitalism. And the conversational rhetoric learned in family locations is no longer perceived to be important to a public realm. With Hobbes, Erasmus's notion of "profit" created by the good will of temperance has become exploitative and leads to covetousness – the word at the heart of the contemporary translations of the Ten Commandments in the King James Bible. Common wealth has ceased primarily to mean distributed wealth and the wellness that accompanies it, and has come to mean individual access to profit: the proper citizen is "covetous."[26] In nation state capitalism, a human being has the sociopolitical identity of a subject represented by and for the Leviathan state. The communication of that representation is based on tacit, unexamined, and self-evident agreements, and on a social isolation that enables rational logic to uphold the doublethink of an autonomous individual who has to remember to forget that he is an exploiter and is in turn being exploited. In the public and national world, formal rhetoric is confined to plausibility.

Part II: Case Study in Probable Rhetoric: Counsel in *Romeo and Juliet*

Romeo and Juliet (1597, 1599[27]) is a play overtly about contesting models of medical discourse and the law, and the relationships between medicine and rhetoric that were preoccupying English practices in the 1590s. It is also concerned to draw parallels between a medical understanding of the human body and a political understanding of the social body, both dependent on a rhetoric of counsel or conversation. In the process, the play negotiates a pre-Cartesian breakdown into mind and body that is related to a contemporary movement to split the bodily wholeness of the humors into anatomical certainty and a symbolic

26 Thomas Gainsford, *The Secretaries Studie* (1616) 5; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

27 The play was first published in a short version (Q1) in 1597. This essay draws mainly on Q2, published in 1599, and, at times, on the differences between the two where they appear significant.

system that eventually becomes psychology.[28] One sign of this anxiety or breakdown is melancholia, a disease that obsessed late sixteenth-century medical texts and eluded treatment as successfully as the plague. Furthermore, because medical practice is inextricably bound to rhetoric, the breakdown is directly related to the shift in the fortunes of rhetoric from a discursive field that deals with probably-the-best actions to a system of plausibility that cannot compete with the certainties of logic. Rational logic cannot deal with melancholia, counsel might.

In the play, the topical field of medical discourse is carried largely by the Friar, and that of political discourse by the Prince, who tries to develop a negotiation with the social body. This negotiation is based on law, and a legal system that was shifting from case law to more universalized law, in a manner similar to medicine's shift from the humors to a Paracelsan approach to the body. As Andrew Majeske points out, the statues of Justice in England – and some other European countries – were changed during the second half of the sixteenth century by placing a bandage over the statue's eyes, so that they could not "see" the particular, and could therefore deliver all justice "impartially."[29] In this the law is similar to medicine as it shifts from the Galenic particular to the generalized approaches of modern medical science. Both the Friar and the Prince also deal with different kinds of canker: the canker that is the closed-over but ulcerous wound and the canker-worm that consumes the plant from inside its stem.[30] Both kinds of canker have the ambivalent potential to be at the same time internal contamination and external infection or contagion, a situation parallel to the often contradictory approaches to the plague that is raging throughout Verona, and London, but about which we hear so little in the play.[31] Yet the canker-worm is related to the canker – is possibly its social symptom – and both are treated with the Friar's salves, the Prince's bloodletting, with quarantine, and with expulsion, only to result in deaths, just as physicians of the period were helpless against the plague.

Galenic medicine brings together humors theory and rhetoric because it argues that the patient cannot be cured by treatment alone. They must also have

28 I am indebted to the plenary address made by Nancy Struever, "The Discourse of Cure: Rhetoric and Medicine in the Late Renaissance," The International Society for the History of Rhetoric, University of Gottingen, Gottingen, July 1988, for many conceptual insights into the relationship between medicine and rhetoric. Citations from this paper refer to the initial publication: Nancy Struever, "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986).

29 Andrew Majeske, *Equity in English Renaissance Literature* (2006).

30 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 224.

31 See Jonathan Gil Harris, *Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic* (1998), 8ff.

the interlocutions and the conversation of "counsel." The character of the Friar does precisely this but would probably have been understood as radical in the 1590s, for physicians in England prided themselves on diagnosis rather than action,[32] on prescription rather than counsel. Yet, while the world of the play is more traditionally Galenic in outlook, the Friar experiments with the new elements of Paracelsan medicine. Paracelsus's work is most relevant to *Romeo and Juliet* because he introduced herbal and chemical salves to heal wounds rather than the more usual cauterizing with boiling oil or hot metal scourges, and he believed in chemical medicines rather than bloodletting. All of these issues form topical fields in the play. The Friar spends the entire action of the play trying to cure a cankerous wound (the feuding families) with a rhetorical and Paracelsan salve made up of Galenic contraries (Juliet and Romeo).[33] A traditional Galenic system of medicine coalesces around the person to be treated and a thorough understanding of their particular environmental, physical, and social contexts. Hence its drug therapies are as various as the individuals it treats: as the Friar says, "Many for many, virtues excellent,/ None but for some, and yet all different" (2.3.13–14).[34] A further implication is that everything in all contexts is interdependent. Hence plants and stones, as much as planetary movements, are significant environments for each human being. From this perspective, astrology becomes a tool for sensitive ecological understanding.[35]

Most commentators read the scene that introduces the Friar as placing him within traditional Galenic medicine, given his stress on the need for humoral balance and his belief that the same herb may be virtuous and vile (2.3.21–22) or poisonous and powerfully healing (2.3.24). He also speaks of the imbalance of extremities that induces cankers that will eat up the body until death occurs from the inside out, and he refers to Romeo's "distempered head" (2.3.33), or unbalanced temper. But the Friar also adheres to the Paracelsan belief of

32 Nancy Struever "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986), 6.

33 Galenic medicine has received extensive treatment by a number of recent commentators, so I will keep reference to it here focused on aspects relevant to my argument.

34 Nearly any medical receipt book from the period will offer this evidence; see, for example, Thomas Moulton, *This is the myrour of glasse of helthe* (1530), Thomas Phayre, *The regiment of life* (1544), the manuscript No. 3547 at the Worthing Country Museum, or the many Wellcome Institute in London's manuscripts from the period 1550–1640.

35 Nicholas Culpeper's published work illustrates this interconnection with surprising subtlety as he finds English equivalents for continental remedies, following astrological guidance that is basically advising him about the best relevant times and places for gathering, preserving, and storing appropriate herbs, plants, and other ingredients. See, for example, *Culpeper's Complete Herbal* (1653).

correspondences. The apparently metaphorical statement, "The earth that's nature's mother is her tomb" (2.3.9), refers explicitly to the belief that the divine nature of all things makes every element the "mother" of another and that the earth is literally "the mother of all things growing from it."[36] Romeo proceeds to describe a medical problem ambivalently, as either Galenic or Paracelsan: "Where on a sudden one hath wounded me/ That's by me wounded, both our remedies/ Within thy help and physic lies" (2.3.50–2). And the Friar concludes his talk with Romeo with the lines "this alliance may so happy prove/ To turn your households' rancour to pure love" (2.3.91–92) – which could be cure by contrary or by like. Later on, the Friar has several other Paracelsan moments, especially when he offers Juliet the sleeping draught. He first says: "I do spy a kind of hope,/ Which craves as desperate an execution/ As that is desperate which we would prevent" (4.1.68–70), indicating a cure of "like by like." This cure is emphasized by his next question: if she will "undertake/ a thing like death . . . That cop'st with Death himself to scape from it" (4.1.73–75), then he will offer her a "distilling liquor," or a chemical preparation, to induce the look of death.

Despite the fact that some apothecaries like John Hester[37] or physicians like Thomas Mouffet[38] were enthusiastic advocates for the new Paracelsanism, the differences between Paracelsan and Galenic medicine were not so clear. Take, for example, John Gerard's introductory words to his *Herbal*, published in 1599: "if odours, or if taste werke satisfaction, they are both sovereign in plants, and so comfortable, that no confection of the Apothecaries can equall their excellent vertue."[39] The distinction between simples and chemical compounds in words that directly echo the Friar (2.3.25–26) seems obvious until one reads the "Address to the Reader" from the physician at St. Bredewell that probably refers to the newly installed Professorial Chair of Physick as Gresham College. He suggests that this Chair should be complemented by

> some ingenious labourer in the skill of simples . . . [to] mightily augment and adorne the whole science of Physicke. But if to it they join a third, namely the art of Chimicall preparation; [. . .] pure substances may be procured for those that be sicke [. . . and] this present generation would purchase more to the perfection of Physicke, than all the generations past.[40]

36 David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 120.

37 John Hester worked as a Paracelsan apothecary in London, 1570–1593: David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 123.

38 Thomas Mouffet wrote a Latin rationale of Paracelsus in 1584 and worked with Mary and Philip Sidney in her laboratory during the 1580s.

39 John Gerard, *The Herball or Generall Historie of Plantes* (1596), A2.

40 John Gerard, *The Herball or Generall Historie of Plantes* (1596), B4.

The blurring of these retrospectively perceived boundaries is also attested to by the domestic manuals of the period 1560–1617, in which Galenic receipt sits happily alongside Paracelsan.[41] The "Address to the Reader" in Gerard is more concerned to distinguish between the greedy alchemist and the good chemist, who also works with herbs, than between the Galenic and the Paracelsan.

As important to the social dynamic informing the medical topos of *Romeo and Juliet* and the Galenic–Paracelsan debate was the growing number of influential apothecaries who worried the Royal College of Physicians. Established in 1518 as a professional body and followed during the 1540s by incorporation of the Surgeons, the Physicians of the College became increasingly agitated by the power of the apothecaries who were still allied to the Grocers' Guild until the early seventeenth century. During the late sixteenth century, the College began to exert control over who could and could not practice as an apothecary, partly because they were worried about their own professional standing and partly because there undoubtedly were a considerable number of fraudsters. For various reasons, a gap had opened up in medical practice early in the sixteenth century, which was filled by lay practitioners and householders, many of them women.[42] There is a substantial literature of vernacular books addressed to this lay audience in the period 1540–1580, which is often prefaced by the comment that they were for the good of the "commonweal." But from the 1580s on, these prefaces begin to make polemic statements about how physicians in particular are attempting to keep herbal and chemical treatments to themselves,[43] or they warn women to keep to "appropriate" knowledge. These statements appear, possibly, because the College began to plan for a *Pharmacopoeia* for their members during the 1580s, and in 1593 appointed three doctors (including the Paracelsan Thomas Mouffet) to do so. Nothing came of this venture until 1618, but *Romeo and Juliet* was written against this fraught background.[44]

When the Friar is described as a "ghostly Friar" (2.2.192) by Romeo, this apparent tautology is more probably a reassurance that he is a serious physician

41 See Lynette Hunter, "Women and Domestic Medicine: Lady Experimenters 1570–1620" (1997a), 102.

42 These are documented in Lynette Hunter, "Women in Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" (2005), 126.

43 See John Partridge, *The treasurie of commodious conceits* (1584), which is dedicated to Rich. Wistow, Barber Surgeon.

44 See Jonathan Sanderson, "*Nicolas Culpeper and 'The London* Pharmacopoeia'" (1999), which explores the background to this publication and the moratorium on new vernacular books of medicine that held until Culpeper broke the College's hold with his 1649 translation of the *Pharmacopoeia*.

and apothecary, not a fraudster.[45] The drawbacks to apothecaries practicing with no medical knowledge are clearly demonstrated in 5.1, during Romeo's visit to the Apothecary. The Apothecary's shop does not display the "herbs, plants and stones" that are the essentials for a Galenic medicine and detailed in book after book of "Secrets" such as the popular *Secrets of Alexis of Piedmont*,[46] but displays instead the strange and exotic "tortoise," "alligator," and the "skins/ Of ill-shaped fishes" (5.1.42–46). His ingredients are "musty seeds" and "old cakes of roses." He himself is dressed in "tattered weeds, with overwhelming brows,/ Culling of simples. Meagre were his looks,/ Sharp misery had worn him to the bone" (5.1.39–41), which are symptoms of excess, as if he has abused his own drugs.[47] More to the point, the Apothecary makes no attempt to find out anything about Romeo or his context. His initial, apparent reluctance to sell the poison to Romeo is more probably a concern to evade the law: after all, there would be no reason to stock a deadly poison if he did not intend to sell it.

The Friar, on the other hand, refuses Romeo poison (3.3.44) and *is* concerned with his larger context. The Friar's cure of Romeo is his rhetorical argument in 3.3, a lengthy scene that often sees its point missed and its text cut. Galenic medicine combined moral instruction with medical cure,[48] believing in "the necessity of a mentor and the mentor's interventionist discourse as enabling both diagnosis and cure."[49] Health in a humoral system, as Thomas Wright noted, is the achieving of a "proper complexion" or decorum of behavior, but the relation of rhetorical discourse to health was changing during this period. Galenists believed that doctors could diagnose and cure the patient most effectively by persuading them to adjust their behavior and environment (e.g. food, drink, sleep, actions), thus bringing the humors into balance and restoring the passions to decorum. In contrast, Paracelsan doctors, believing that imbalance came from outside the body, thought that something infects or invades and corrupts the pathways of the body and affects the passions. This introduction of an external agent contributed to a change in attitude to the humors, such that by

45 The distinction may have been made necessary by a current fashion to present friars in league with the devil, for example in Robert Greene, *The Honorable Historie of frier Bacon and frier Bungay* (1594).

46 See Alexis, *The secrets of Alexis of Piedmont* (1557).

47 Compare Tarquin, in Richard Proudfoot, Ann Thompson, and David Scott Kastan, *The Rape of Lucrece, The Arden Shakespeare Complete Works* (1998), 530–32.

48 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 163.

49 Nancy Struever "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986), 12.

the early seventeenth century, writers would argue that excessive passion caused humoral imbalance,[50] and so health became a moral choice. Within this system, "error is like disease, discourse is the instrument of cure."[51] In any of these approaches, treatment by drugs, whether compound or simple, is ineffective and dangerous without a rhetorical understanding of context. It may seem self-evident to us, who live in a world where drug companies exploit a "one drug treats all" course of medication, but Lady Capulet's suggestion that she procure a drug from an apothecary in Mantua to get rid of Romeo is effective in early modern terms only because she wants to kill him rather than cure him: that is, the fact that she seeks a single drug with no contextual reference to Romeo himself is, in itself, potentially lethal.

At the same time, another aspect of Galenic medicine that had become popular in the late medieval period but extended beyond any classical procedure was purgation by bloodletting, which was firmly rejected by Paracelsan practice. Yet bloodletting runs as a consistent thread throughout *Romeo and Juliet* and is allied to the Prince. In this respect, the role of the Prince becomes parallel to the issues at work in the Friar–Apothecary dyad, as the play casts about for the civic equivalent of the "doctor," someone who will ensure the health of the state. However, the structure of the topos is quite different. Rather than weighted alternatives, with the character of the Prince the text demonstrates change. In his opening scene, the Prince refers to the "purple fountains" (1.1.83) pouring from the veins of the citizens of Verona as they get caught up in the Montague–Capulet feud. Thirty or so years before Harvey's publications on the circulation of the blood, "purple" blood was held to be "bad" blood that had to be drained until the red came in.[52] When we next see him, at the site of yet another civic brawl during which his kinsman Mercutio has been killed, as well as Tybalt, he refers first to Mercutio's "dear blood" (3.1.187) and then says: "My blood for your rude brawls doth lie a-bleeding" (3.1.193). The line, within the context of the religious references in the passage, makes it clear that he is no longer worried about needless bloodletting but about heedless sacrifice. In his third and final appearance at the end of the play, in surveying the death of all the young people (along with Lady Montague), he calls on the families to recognize the hand of God: "See what a scourge is laid upon your hate,/ That heaven finds means to kill your joys with

50 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 164.

51 Nancy Struever, "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986), 12.

52 See, for example, Catherine Belling, "Infectious Rape, Therapeutic Revenge: Bloodletting and the Health of Rome's Blood" (2004), and David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 93.

love" (5.3.291–92). The "scourge" was not only the whip but also the cauterizing heat used to burn out infected wounds, and, of course, the biblical scourges that brought death in order to clean out society.

The corollary movement in sociopolitical discourse to the implied critique of bloodletting as a medical cure is one concerned with rhetoric. Just as violence, at this hinge moment, was becoming forbidden to citizens within the nation, the rhetoric of authority is replaced by a rhetoric of negotiation. The Prince's opening speech is authoritative and dictatorial. He concludes by ordering the head of each of the two families to come and see him on separate occasions. His second appearance is conveyed in quite different rhetoric, as he asks for an account of what has been happening and then takes it upon himself to provide judgment, simply asking the families "to attend [his] will" (3.1.200). The final scene presents him carefully listening to evidence from the Watches, from the Friar, Balthazar, and the Page before calling on the families to recognize God's scourge directed not only at them but also at him, which leads to the apparent reconciliation between the Montagues and the Capulets. In other words, like the Galenic doctor, he comes to recognize the importance of understanding the particular contexts for the events: that he cannot simply command and/or judge, but has to observe, interrogate, learn, negotiate, and counsel.

Yet the movement is simultaneously toward a rhetoric of legal generalization, which is complicated by its affinity with anatomy: the opening out of what had been unseen in order to comprehend the working of a particular social body, for the play is an early "murder mystery." Generalized law becomes an end-directed judicial impulse that distinguishes it sharply from the probable rhetoric of earlier medical counsel. The anatomized body is experiencing medicine without counsel because it necessarily involves a dead body that cannot speak back. The counsel of the law in *Romeo and Juliet* does not go so far, but it is still drawing its impetus from an analysis of several dead bodies. In its invocation of authority and judgment, observation and evidence, and proof, it shifts the rhetoric of social healing to one of social control. It moves counsel to the deliberative and judicial stances of the new Justice that does not "see" the particularities of *sermo* rhetoric.

What both the Friar and the Prince are dealing with socially is an older system of family feuding inimical to civic and national peace. The concept of citizenship rested partly on that agreement not to fight those within one's city or country.[53] The feud between the Montagues and the Capulets has, from the start,

53 See Francis Bacon, *The Essaies* (1612), 239; see also Richard Robinson, *A morale methode of civille policie* (1576).

built a city "cankered with peace" (1.1.93), a social body with closed-over but unhealed wounds from previous fighting. More importantly, these derive from the "cankered hate" of the two families – the worm that will eat them up during the course of the play. The fashion of the newly forming civic state was to displace the action of fighting within the political boundaries of city or nation onto trained fencing, prominent in this play, in which swordsmanship was not supposed to result in bloodshed and death.[54] Yet, as Q2 underlines in its extended version of 1.1, the head of each family irresponsibly supports unschooled street brawls, which, the Prince tells us, do result in bloodshed. The play offers several markers of the imbalanced humors that have produced too much choler or anger and resulted in these actions. From the opening wordplay on coals, colliers, choler, and collar (1.1. 1–5), to the description of Tybalt as "fiery" (1.1.108), who, by his own admission, is full of "wilful choler" (1.5.88), and to Benvolio's reference to these days when the "mad blood" stirs (3.1.4) and "furious" Tybalt meets the "fire-eyed fury" of Romeo (3.1.128), the humors in these young people are disturbed, as if they embody a kind of disease. This family feud is an internal contamination of the state that, the Prince implies, is spilling bad blood throughout the city, infecting the populace.

At the same time, the sustained bloodletting in the play is a temporary release of a more deeply embedded wound or disease or canker: the melancholia of the young and its associated isolation and cynicism. This disease is rooted in the passions, another imbalance of the humors. But if the characters of the Friar and the Prince demonstrate an ambivalence between the Galenic and the Paracelsan, between bloodletting and anatomy, between the particular and the generalized, the ambivalence itself displays medical knowledge on a cusp of realistic and figural semiotics of the nature/nurture debate of today – and one that is intertwined with the political. For a conventional Galenist, the passions and the soul are inextricably part of a balanced humoral body that responds to its cosmological contexts through careful training in rhetoric and with the mentoring of the personal counselor. The title of Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Minde* (1601) underlines the shift from a holistic understanding of the body toward a separation of mind from body nevertheless still bridged by the complexion of the passions and negotiated by probable rhetoric (90ff.). The reduction of neoplatonism to the anatomies of external visualization become in Mercutio's words allied with conjuration and magical imitation or correspondence.[55] As is evident

54 See Jill Levenson, "'Alla Stoccado' Carries it Away." (1995), for an illuminating background to swordsmanship in the period in which the play was written.

55 See John Mebane, *Renaissance Magic and the Return of the Golden Age* (1989), 30.

in the change in the way that writers talk about the humors and their relation to behavior, as medical knowledge was becoming separated from rhetorical counsel and the humors become a figural discourse. Hence it is difficult to know, when Lord Capulet says to Juliet, "Out, you green-sickness carrion . . . You tallow-face" (3.5.156–57), whether he is really referring to a physical condition experienced by young women in the early years of menstruation, to the behavioral characteristics the humors induce during this period, or is using the words as a clichéd dismissal.

Romeo and Juliet is written and played for the first time at precisely this moment of the unhinging of the connections between body, passion, soul, and mind, a moment that is still central to Western concepts of the constructions of the subject. Between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the signal marker of this disconnection was melancholia, the disease of the passions. Melancholia eluded not only conventional Galenic medicine and the new Paracelsanism, but also anatomical discovery – largely, as suggested above, because the effectiveness of rhetoric and counsel as part of medical treatment was being undermined and relegated to merely plausible opinion. The foregrounding of the humors as a discourse balanced on the cusp of the actual and the figural is laid out in the first scene. For instance, Benvolio introduces Romeo's melancholia as similar to his own: "Being one too many by my weary self,/ Pursued my humour, not pursuing his/ And gladly shunned who gladly fled from me" (1.1.125–27). The isolation and inward-looking regard of this state is described by Montague Father as "artificial," a "Black and portentous . . . humour" (1.1.138) from which only "good counsel may the cause remove" (1.1.139). Yet Romeo has discarded traditional medical help, for he is "his own affections' counsellor," and Romeo is, in the words of Lord Montague:

> to himself I will not say how true
> But to himself so secret and so close
> So far from sounding and discovery
> As is the bud bit with an envious worm
> [. . .]
> Could we but learn from whence his sorrows grow
> We would as willingly give cure as know.
> (1.1.145–48; 1.1.51–52)

This melancholia, isolation, and self-regard is the canker-worm that destroys the entire younger generation. Romeo, Mercutio, Paris, and Juliet are described each singly as a flower, yet, as the Friar tells us, with imbalanced humors, "Full soon the canker death eats up that plant" (2.2.30).

Romeo links his condition quite openly with neo-platonism, in which love was considered by most of the English translators of neo-platonic texts as the

primary guide to beauty and truth.[56] At his first appearance, he claims that love is "muffled still" (1.1.168), showing him not certainty but the chaos of oxymoronic contraries: "heavy lightness, serious vanity,/ Misshapen chaos of well-seeming forms,/ Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health" (1.1. 175–77). The language becomes so ornate that it turns into a parody of the self-regarding stance of the lover, yet it is also resistant to Galenic cure, for how does one cure a state of contrariness by contraries? And it is resistant to Paracelsan remedies, for how does one find the counteraction to a contradiction? Romeo's "illness" (1.1.200) leads him to answer his father's question, "Is to himself I will not say how true[?]" (1.1.145), by saying: "I have lost myself, I am not here,/ This is not Romeo, he's some other where" (1.1.194–95). Not only Romeo, but also Mercutio and to some extent Benvolio, are caught up in this quest for love or beauty that will reveal truth. Still, all, especially Mercutio, find nothing but uncertainty.

Mercutio's characterization may be considered the limit case for the disease of melancholy and its attendant cynicism. Overwhelmed by anatomy's promise to locate specific places for the passions and cut out what does not work, Mercutio blazons Mab's coach (1.4.57–65), Rosaline's body (2.1.17–20), and Romeo's love-sick body (2.4.13–16) – degenerating, in his death throes, into invoking these lists (3.1.104–5). Yet these anatomies are not pursuits of truth, as his cynical use of Rosaline's body to "conjure" Romeo indicates. Mercutio's first invocation, "Romeo, humours madman, passion lover" (2.1.7), is a tidy list of Galenic and Paracelsan clues to his predicament, made more fragile by Q2's change of "liver" for "lover," which turns the set of correspondences into another potential anatomy that will dislocate the humors and separate the passion from the body, the body from the soul and mind. Mercutio, like Romeo, is also obsessed by dreams and their significant personal reality – just as Descartes was to turn to dreams as "so interior, so close, so remarkable,"[57] as if they were trustworthy guides. Mercutio and Romeo contest with each other over dreams, with the former preventing Romeo from telling about his dream by launching into the extended Queen Mab speech, as if he is afraid of hearing Romeo's personal fears, and the latter stopping Mercutio's speech as it turns to horror.

56 See chapter 3 for accounts of how Thomas Hoby, *The Courtier* (1561), and George Pettie and Bartholomew Young, *The Civile Conversation* (1581) relate love to beauty, truth, and rhetoric.
57 From Descartes's *Les Passions de l'Ame*, as quoted by Nancy Struever in: "The Conversable World, Eighteenth-Century Transformations of the Relation of Rhetoric and Truth" (1986), 16.

Juliet's part counteracts Mercutio's not only in her reversal of the blazon into an "anti-anatomy" (2.2.40–41), but also in her material realizing of Romeo's dream of love. When they meet for the second time, in 2.2, she asks him to discard his Petrarchan neo-platonism that has left him without a sense of himself.[58] She rejects his oath of love made to the "inconstant moon" (2.2.109), a Petrarchan cliché, and even the ambiguity of "[his] heart's dear love" (2.2.115), asking him to "swear by [his] gracious self" (2.2.113). After his marriage, Romeo ceases to question his "self" and even confidently reprimands Tybalt, saying: "I see thou knowest me not" (3.1.64). When Romeo questions whether this second meeting with Juliet "is but a dream" (2.2.140), twice she returns to him, reassuring him of its substantiality. The second time she returns, she, like Mercutio, invokes Romeo. Yet, here, unlike before, he appears as if claiming his "self" for the first time.

However, Romeo's final dream, that Juliet came "and found [him] dead/ (Strange dream that gives a dead man leave to think.)/ And breathed such life with kisses in [his] lips/ That [he] revived" (5.1.6–9), is a gesture that he simply forgets or loses in his self-centered attempt to "deny" the stars, to render himself literally alone, as if his dreams are private. The melancholy disease not only anatomizes and isolates parts of the body, but in its rejection of the counselor or mentor, it also turns in on itself and isolates the person from the community inside a private world of Romeo's "artificial night" (1.1.37).

An impulse toward the literal dominates Romeo's actions in the latter part of the play, dramatizing the displacement of probable rhetoric by the attempt at certainty. Once the swordplay has ceased to be a game and become literally deadly with Mercutio's death, Romeo seems to click over into a different mindset. Having killed Tybalt, Romeo embarks upon a grotesque literalization of the flea encomium (3.3.35–42), which is a type of anatomy, and then follows up with his attempt at suicide (3.3.111–12). Although there is a partial reprieve during the consummation of his marriage in 3.5, when he hears of Juliet's death in 5.1 he literalizes the Friar's analogy of a herb's poisonous and healing powers by telling the Apothecary that his poison is a cordial (5.1.85). The text indicates that this literalization sets up a congruency in Romeo's mind between the Friar and the Apothecary. Not only does it note that they both gather simples, but when he asks the Apothecary for poison it makes Romeo think that "the trunk may be discharged of breath/ As violently as hasty powder fired/ Doth hurry from the fatal cannon's womb" (5.1.63–65), directly recalling the Friar's language at 2.6.9–11 and 3.3.136–37. Romeo proceeds to offer

58 Although probably anachronistic, the experience is possibly on the "vertiginous edge" of the metaphysical horror that unlinks body and mind as discussed by Leszek Kolakowski, *Metaphysical Horror* (1987), quoted in Nancy Struever, "The Discourse of Cure" (1995), 14.

the Apothecary gold, claiming that the gold is poison while the poison is gold (5.1.80–1), calling up an image of the greedy alchemist pursuing the *aurum potabile*, the liquid gold that is the purest element rather than searching for pure elements beneficial to the health of mankind. It may be significant that, at the end of the play, the grieving fathers pledge to build statues of Juliet and Romeo in "pure gold" (5.1.298) as recompense.

The problem of the disease of melancholy is analogous to the plague that besets Verona. The Prince's answer is to banish, to expel the diseased, just as Lord Capulet attempts to expel Juliet and turn her onto the streets (3.5.194) as a diseased harlot. Yet both come to realize that the disease is not so cleanly cut out of the social and familial body. The Friar, in a sense, quarantines the diseased, keeps them separate from society until each is "better." His solution is far more ambiguous as regards who the diseased are: the people in the quarantined house (Verona, the Capulets' house) or those outside it. It may be important that, in a play where subtle and not so subtle references to syphilis abound (1.4.73; 2.4.28–32; 2.4.59–71; 2.5.25), Mercutio's curse on the Montague and Capulet households is changed from Q1's "A pox on both your houses" to Q2's "A plague o'both your houses" (3.1.95, 3.1.103, 3.1.110). "Pox," which refers generally to any pock-marks, had become connotative of syphilis since the disease entered England in 1518,[59] and by 1597 William Clowes was noting that over half his patients at St. Bart's suffered from the disease.[60] The self-conscious change to "plague" and the added biblical imagery in Q2 presumably recall the recent devastations of the 1590s plagues in England and the concurrent claims by Puritans that the disease was visited on Londoners as punishment for their sins. Syphilis had become partly treatable through Paracelsan science, but the plague was still resistant and doctors were ridiculed for leaving the city to preserve their own health. The plague, like melancholia, was untreatable.

But it is the Friar who makes the most important medical mistake when his counsel, so important to medical healing, is withdrawn. If Romeo becomes ill by becoming his "own affections' counsellor" (1.1.144), he is "cured" when he follows Benvolio's very Paracelsan counsel (1.2.45–50) to "Take thou some new infection to thy eye/ And the rank poison of the old will die" (1.2.49–50). He then finds counsel in Juliet (2.2.53, 2.2.81), and later in the Friar (2.3; 3.3.163). Similarly, with Q2's text rendering of the Nurse as silent in Juliet's presence after being rejected in 3.5 until her "deathbed" in 4.5, Juliet's predicament is deepened when she rejects the Nurse's counsel (3.5.208). Then, Juliet's predicament is

59 See William Kerwin, "Taking the Countenance at Face Value" (2000), 2ff.

60 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 219.

supposedly resolved when she asks the Friar to "Give [her] some present counsel" (4.1.61). But Romeo also turns away from counsel toward the certainty of love in his relationships with both Juliet and Mercutio. When he expresses the love that binds him and Mercutio together, Mercutio is led to say "Now art thou sociable, now art thou Romeo, now art thou what thou art, by art as well as by nature" (2.4.86–87). Mercutio is here distinguishing, as did Juliet when she rejected the Petrarchan clichés, between natural love, which is to do only with passion, and the love of counsel, which is a moral choice to do with virtue and beauty.[61] But when these two apparent certainties clash in 3.1, Romeo is left bereft, literally alone and without advice, and kills Tybalt. Finally, it is Romeo's insistence on the literal reading that signs refer to certainties and do not need the persuasive counsel of rhetoric which leads him to "misread" Juliet as actually dead.

The Friar explicitly tells the Prince and the audience on-stage and off that he has brought about the deaths of Juliet and Romeo by failing to give counsel. He did send letters to Romeo in Mantua, counseling him to return to find Juliet in the tomb, but the letters never reached Romeo because their bearer was detained in a quarantined house due to the plague.[62] The Friar attributes this to heaven, but the off-stage audience might attribute it to the Friar's forgetting that he had promised Romeo that he would send his "man" with any news (3.3.172–74), rather than send a brother Friar with a letter. In Juliet's instance, having become her counselor once she has rejected the Nurse, the Friar fails her because he abandons her in the tomb for fear of being caught (5.3.261). In both cases, he fails in his role of counselor, and therefore physician, and the young people make decisions on their own, in isolation, that lead to fatal actions. In the light of both Galenic and Paracelsan medicine, this is a profoundly serious error: he neither counsels nor acts on observation. It demonstrates the Friar's weaknesses as the central reason for the deaths of the young people. Simultaneously, it shows the Friar's initial impulse to be sound – it is just that he, as many physicians, fails.

If the Prince moves toward the position held by the Friar at the start, as the negotiator between the two families, he also assumes the Paracelsan centrality of a determined individual. Humanism has, by the end of the sixteenth century, become a humanism that requires a person to be both an individual who can negotiate with counsel, and a citizen who is determined by the institutions of capitalism. Yet the Prince's final judgments are prefaced by a curious self-positioning: "then I will be general of your woes/ And lead you even to death"

61 See David Hoeniger, *Medicine and Shakespeare in the English Renaissance* (1992), 172–73.
62 Quarantine had been common since the early sixteenth century. See Paul Slack, *The Impact of the Plague in Tudor and Stuart England* (1985).

(5.3.218–19) are lines that echo the Bible's twenty-third psalm that situates the Prince as the "good shepherd" or Christ. Perhaps the most positive moment to be drawn out of the gloomy ending to the play is the Prince's forgiveness of the Friar as a "holy man" (5.3.269) and the subsequent hearing of the evidence, which recognizes that no person works in isolation. This may be a reference to a continued focus on the particular within Christian humanism as understood by Erasmus. However, neither the Friar nor the Prince acknowledges the wide plague that besets their community. Both attribute the series of deaths that destroy an entire generation of young people (Benvolio dies in Q1 but only disappears in Q2) to the actions of the feuding families, and they remain completely oblivious to the melancholia whose only remedy appears, like that of the plague itself, to be death.

The Friar, as confessor to the Montagues and Capulets, is also their counselor, and, as previously noted, political and social leaders were always advised to have one in their households – usually a rhetorician. The Machiavellian Prince, however, becomes his own counselor, and once he has done so, counsel becomes suspect. In *Romeo and Juliet*, we see Verona's Prince moving from this authoritative position to one where he turns to the institutional rhetoric of the law for guidance, but not before both he and the Friar have been shown to have acted without counsel. What the text leaves as an open question is the condition of medicine, which, deprived of any rhetoric, cannot cure, and an implicit critique of a legal system that is shown to need a Christian humanism that sees the particular. As a result, neither can heal the state, and melancholia is its social disease whose effects cannot be cured.

Endnote: The Rhetoric of Conversation – from the Individual Subject to the Personal Self

Counsel, like conversation, has the rhetorical stance of engaging the speaker or writer in a discussion with their audience. It is anchored by the temperance, decorum, and prudence of friendship. Without it, the grounds for persuasion become determined, literally pre-scriptive, and self-evident. The modern liberal world has always seen what we now call "teenage" years as those in which each person has to claim a personal self, yet also allow their person to be made into a social representation. This doublethink is the state of an essentialized identity, an individual subject to the state, a person precisely hooded – as in the falconry term popular at the time – by the requirements of the nation state. This binding into subjecthood, this terrorization, produces in some people the melancholia of what seems to be an eternal disempowerment. It produces in others the aware

and cynical edge of those who want the promised freedom of power but know they cannot have it. These are the nightmares of the middling people, the minor aristocrats of the Montagues, the aspiring gentry/merchants of the Capulets, and Mercutio and Benvolio as distant relatives of the Prince. They save each other with friendship, and destroy each other in social competition. Those who change, the Friar and the Prince, are stand-ins for institutions – and if only these institutions would change . . ., the play seems to ask. But change also comes too late, and a generation dies.

Melancholia, with its attendant cynicism, despair, and isolation, is apparently a recognized and problematic disease of the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries. The confusions and anxieties of Timothy Bright's *Treatise of Melancholie* (1586) and Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), among others, were to be capped by Cartesian philosophizing that led people to separate the mind from the body more cleanly. The moment of unhinging presented in *Romeo and Juliet* may have been provoked by anatomy, by Paracelsan experimentalism, by neo-platonism, or by the shift in a rhetoric of counsel, conversational rhetoric, into the certainties of logic required by the emerging economic and legal system. All of these supported and were supported by the doubleness of the civic and the personal, induced by early capitalism and leading to the internalized conflict of a person as an individual subject and a self. Of course, the unhinging is not reducible to any of these, for none of the elements necessarily leads to isolating or subjecting the person. But when they combine, as they do in *Romeo and Juliet*, to reinforce each other in their self-regarding aspects, new and problematic ways of thinking about self, health, and community result. The interconnected contexts for social and personal health are held together at this stage by probable rhetorics of temperance and friendship, yet are beginning to look to the certainty supposedly found in universals. But a civic communication that has pushed negotiation into rational logic may end up all too often with uneasy plausibilities based on concepts of privacy and authority, and with health as an issue of curing the individual rather than counseling the particular person. *Romeo and Juliet* does not condemn the one or commend the other. Rather, it looks at the implications of the loss of conversation – in effect, it allows for whatever historical impetus that is responsible for mediating the issues through performance of the play – in order to assess their current impact.

Verbal rhetorics of *sermo* and *negotio* are wrapped up in trustworthiness during this period. If the distrust in embodied rhetorics of behavior begins earlier in the sixteenth century, by the turn into the seventeenth it is as if the potential for deceitful rhetoric in all areas outside rational logic becomes more and more worrying, more and more an articulated anxiety. For example, William Vaughan's *The Golden-grove* (1599), which addresses politics, the civic, and the

economic, speaks of truths as faith and promise which are "nowadays" beset by fraud,[63] (F4v), and of deceit becoming ever more rife (G2^{v}). Or, for example, one finds S. Gibson in 1616 having to argue that preachers must speak profitably – profit still being allied here to the probable – not plausibly, and must be honest and unreproachable in conversation (C2^{v}). Increasingly through from the early 1600s to the 1630s, the civic world itself becomes considered too competitive for a probable rhetoric based on friendship. If the later sixteenth century generated concern with the court as a place where the probable rhetoric of friendship cannot exist because a courtier is too competitive, the early seventeenth century generated growing criticism of civic competition. In a competitive context, probable counsel degenerates into the deceitful and manipulative tendencies of empowered people who use instead plausible rhetorics of apparent friendship. As deceit surfaces more prominently, a probable rhetoric of trustworthy ethos is pushed from the posed civility of the courts toward the civic negotiations needed by the city, and eventually, through the oeconomic of the familial, into personal and finally spiritual behavior.

Alongside these early seventeenth-century commentaries on training in civic negotiation and familial conversation, and the anxiety about deceit, there runs an ongoing attempt to distinguish the public role of conversation in serving the nation in the city from the actions of the courtier who may claim to do the same at court. By 1616, in *The Rich Cabinet* among others, texts reflect a growing emphasis on the negative effects, rather than the skill, of flattery and deception in the courtesy of the civil speech of the court. The larger debate is grounded in the opposition presented in chapter 3 between negotiation and its focus on words, and the visual fashion of court style. For the rhetorics of the period, the topos develops out of the notion of plausible rhetoric as sleight of hand, visual trickery, done by the rhetor to the audience, as opposed to probable rhetoric being an oral interchange between rhetor and audience, and having its primary location in speaking with other people. However, one also finds "interchange" in letter-writing, as Tiptoft notes in *Of Friendship* and Erasmus presents in *sermo* rhetoric. Thence more broadly, interchange with an audience also becomes an element of written diaries, journals, and autobiographies. In 1568, Fulwood had noted that the best letter-writing is that which makes the reader feel as if the writer is present (Aiii). Fulwood also notes that it is the primary work of the rhetor to get the benevolence of the audience by recognizing and valuing it for itself, which is the ethos position of probable negotiation. Yet

63 William Vaughan, *The Golden-grove* (1599) F4^{v}; all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

by the early years of the seventeeth century the fear of manipulation in verbal negotiation pushes civic rhetoric away from this kind of conversation and toward the certainties of logic.

While this notion of negotiated rhetoric without conversation is a precursor of liberal representation in its emphasis on a determined identity and a subjected citizenship, it also fuses and internalizes the conflicting systems of value by birth and/or value by virtue or works, that Castiglione's *The Courtier* attempted to keep separate. Anyone living in a world where ambition can change your status must see the possibility of economic change for the "better" for all people. Hence you must also accept that it is not always going to be possible because that change depends on being able to exploit someone else. In his *Essaies*, Bacon says explicitly that people should not all aim to be noble for that renders those left without nobility as peasants, "base swaine driven out of heart" (236), people with no value or virtue. In other words, if you – and in this essay he refers to the "middling people" so necessary to the civic world of a nation – accept your birth status you will find that value and virtue. A person needs to learn the doublethink of both aiming and accepting. *Negotio* becomes a place of doublethink: the place where you accept that certain elements of a person will be repressed or suppressed to serve the state as a good citizen. It is most fully retained in the concept of subjecthood: the schizophrenic doublethink of the citizen and subject of the state, and the attendant analyses of melancholia and cynicism in psychology and psychoanalysis. Hobbes's *Leviathan* neatly describes the context in which "conversation" and *sermo* rhetoric become increasingly separated from negotiation. The public understanding of *negotio* acquires the more reductive meaning of rational logic, persuasion that denies that it is persuading, reinforcing a soon-to-be "liberal" politics based on self-evident grounds that sustain privilege and its exclusions. Yet conversation and *sermo* rhetoric were retained in other areas, some of which this book will go on to discuss: first, in the notion of the "self," or what is left out of the subject; then, in how that emerges in a person's spiritual behavior; and finally, in women's language in the communal writings of letter, diary, journal, and autobiography.

Chapter 5
Personal Rhetoric 1530–1660: Autodeixis as a Probable Rhetoric for the Written Self

Part I: Generating Performativity between Reader and Writer in the "Address to the Reader": From the Patron to the Friend

The wide dissemination of the printed book in the sixteenth century foregrounded the rhetorical problem of the "absent audience" that so concerned Erasmus that he made a place for *sermo* rhetoric in his understanding of written verbal persuasion. Orators have a live audience in front of them to which they can respond. The manuscript writer often writes in a socially coherent community of readers and writers. But the printed book could be read by anyone who bought it, and while this was a relatively small audience in the sixteenth century, it was much more diverse than the one anticipated by the classical rhetorics that inspired the strategies for communication in the early modern period in England. This chapter looks at a particular genre of printed book that was related to the behavior and communication needed by those who were becoming privileged through the development of a new economic and political structure in sixteenth-century England[1] that some historians have linked with the institutionalization of a "public sphere." Unsurprisingly, these books on behavior by and for the relatively privileged writers and readers of the period are often self-consciously aware of ethos in the written text. Exploring the writer's self-presentation in one element of the forematter to the main contents, the chapter proceeds from a brief study of the earlier dedications to a patron, to the later address to the reader. This generic element is followed as it moves through the century from the reader as patron, to the reader as friend who may be collaboratively implicated in the stance of the writer. In particular, there is

1 This chapter is based on the study of over fifty books concerned with behavior, rhetoric, and communication more generally in the early modern period, focusing on a subset from those printed between 1531 and 1640, and recorded in the bibliography. The books were drawn initially from Lawrence Green's handlist to behavior books in the sixteenth century (unpublished), supplemented by primary research into additional books on behavior held largely by the British Library, and discussed in terms of their printing history in an earlier article, Lynette Hunter, "Technical, Domestic and Rhetorical Books, 1557–1695" (2002), and, within that field, concentrating on books from the period 1570–1620.

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a specific strategy of autodeixis[2] that performs this affective binding of reader to writer, and draws the reader into an engaged rhetorical stance in each of three predominant topics: of the rolled-up tapestry, the merchant adventurer, and the prodigal book. The chapter concludes by suggesting that this conversational rhetoric is a wellspring for what comes to be known as "style," the becoming-on-the-page of the writer's self.

Ethos or Probable Stance? Sociocultural Representation or Sociosituated Selving

Within the field of rhetoric, behavior, and communication, this study has concentrated on books from the period 1560–1600 that were key to the discussions in chapters 3 and 4. The discussion here follows the generic element of the "address to the reader" in these books as its addressee changes through the century from the reader as patron, to the reader as someone who may potentially misread the text, to the reader as a friend who is collaboratively implicated in the stance of the writer.[3] During this early period, the actual titles given to the sections of the forematter differ from book to book, but their content is often similar. The first study in this chapter looks briefly at addresses to patrons which are treated here as the "dedication," while the subsequent studies are focused more widely on the reader in the address to the reader. However, the books refer occasionally to both as "epistles," or at times to the latter as a "dedication," "proheme," or "preface." On the whole, because the emphasis of this inquiry is upon the writer's explicit address to the reader, any addresses from the printer to the reader, or other forematter such as commendatory poems, are put to one side.

The preceding two chapters have explored how these books turned humanism toward embodied and verbal rhetorics to establish a trustworthy behavior, and how they propose a way to present the person as human only to find that that presentation may be deceitful. By the early seventeenth century, these men of relative privilege – educated human beings with the time to write, but usually needing sponsorship and sometimes sales to sustain their lives – find

2 "Autodeixis" is a refinement of the terms elaborated by Peter Stockwell from the field of cognitive poetics, from the coordinates of a person, to location, and other frames including those of "the person," space, and time; see *Cognitive Poetics* (2002).

3 For an overview of a larger context for the address to the reader, see Roger Chartier, *The Order of Books* (1993), and Wendy Wall, *The Imprint of Gender* (1993). For commentary on later developments of the address to the reader, see Randall Ingram, "*Lego Ego*: Reading Seventeenth-Century Books of Epigrams" (2002).

their sociocultural presence caught into political representations that require them to accept the behavior needed by the developing nation state, what some researchers have linked to the concept of a "public sphere."[4] This acceptance of subjection is concurrent with an acknowledgment that they also have a personal life, a concurrence that generates the doublethink of capitalism: that one may seek profit and advancement at the same time that one must accept one's "place" because there must be someone for others to exploit for that profit. The books on behavior were written by the relatively privileged for the relatively privileged, so that the latter could behave appropriately to their desired "place" in the social structure. They are about self-presentation – but, as we have seen, they are not only about representation but also about what gets left out of representation. They present behavior as learned through friendship and counsel in a familial setting, that is molded into subjecthood as the person enters civic and national society, and in that molding the melded self at the heart of Erasmus's friendship becomes excluded from a public sphere. Through the virtue of the trustworthy friend or counselor, who displays temperance, decorum, and prudence, a person learns how to recognize and how to become a friend to others in their private life. Yet these elements at the root of behavioral learning stay with the person as alternatives to individual autonomy, and a site for potential change.

The writer's self-presentation in the forematter to the main contents is unsurprisingly self-consciously aware of ethos, the stance of which is rooted in accepted or plausible assumptions, and only at times aware of probable stance.[5] In many of the books there is a concern that the reader may misread ethos, and an increasing use of a specific device, similar to the moebius strip, that binds the reader into the writer's persuasion. However, some writers develop ways of making both reader and writer present through a rhetoric of conversation. I suggest that there is a stance of probable rhetoric in much of the topical reasoning of this

4 David Zaret, "Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Sphere in Seventeenth-Century England" (1992), 213.

5 While not often focused on the literary and generic strategies invented, there was extensive critical attention to books on behavior, courtesy, and communication in the 1980s and 1990s, possibly inspired by Stephen Greenblatt's *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980). For example, see: Jacques Carré, *The Crisis of Courtesy* (1993); M. T. Crane, *Framing Authority* (1993); Lawrence Green, "Stance Perception in Sixteenth-Century Ethical Discourse" (1992); Michael McClintock, "The Reformation and the Emergence of English Vernacular Rhetoric in Mid-Sixteenth-Century England" (1997); Joanna Martindale, *English Humanism* (1985); Wayne Rebhorn, "Baldesar Castiglione, Thomas Wilson, and the Courtly Body of Renaissance Rhetoric" (1993); John Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the Genera Eloquentiae" (1987); Frank Whigham, *Ambition and Privilege* (1984).

forematter, which develops a range of devices from *sermo* or conversational rhetoric to perform an affective strategy and draw the reader into engaged rhetorical work. The topical reasoning of conversational rhetoric employs strategies such as analogy, story, and anecdote, rather than syllogism or rational progression, and in doing so it opens its assumptions to alternative interpretations. It is conversational because it involves these readers in relations of friendship rather than of sociocultural civic life. It works instead in the sociosituated, and in doing so opens its concerns to what is left out of the personal by political representation. It is, in the critical discourse of the twentieth century, precisely concerned with singularity – the sociosituated public sphere in which the elements of a relatively privileged person's life are not accounted for or articulated by subjecthood.

Singularity has the ability to excavate the assumptive logic of the civic and of the nation state, and to sense and articulate alternative assumptions that the citizen needs in their life: the needs of their self. The conversational rhetoric in the element of the forematter studied in this chapter brings into visibility and legitimation elements of life that are not culturally recognized, yet are needed by these writers. That they are privileged should not detract from the key work the writing does of valuing in ways distinct from sociocultural structures. The chapter discusses a number of examples of ethos construction that bind the reader to the writer, and moves on to some examples of the stance of conversational rhetoric. In doing so, it focuses on the strategy of autodeixis, and suggests that this is both a wellspring for what comes to be known as "style," and is a location for the collaboration of friendship and conversation that is increasingly excluded from the representation of a citizen as an individual subject. Style is inexorably the singularity of the writer. It is also a kind of behavior on the page. It may be co-created with the reader in the process of reading, but in this period both reader and writer stand upon similar, relatively privileged grounds.

Style is an artform for the privileged, in which these friends meet friends and engage with what is left out of the personal by their representation in civic or national society. In the process they change their selfs, finding in the way that the writer and reader re-generate each other, a cure for melancholia. Cynicism is anathema to singularity because the cynic is continually in the position of being privileged yet in most instances disempowered – with that sense of being promised power but not being able to exercise it which is the root of cynical malaise – because it cannot find ways to identify alternative assumptions for behavior. Style is not only the ability to articulate alternative assumptions, but also the ability to generate an alternative public audience. Style, and the singularity of the relatively privileged person, focus on the values of being outside the representations of the nation state, and situated elsewhere. Artmaking,

and the written art of style, become the place where citizens drop their subjecthood, reside temporarily in personal selfhood, and become "otherwise." Insofar as they can bring their lived experience of that residing into their sociopolitical lives – moving back to subjecthood while retaining an articulation of what has changed – these subjects challenge, subvert, pervert, change what subjecthood can be, which in turn may shift the discursive structures of politics. But the effects of bringing style into the sociocultural public and turning it into a commodity, especially for these privileged citizen-writers, is complex and intertwined with what Roland Barthes called elements of the "author" and the "scriptor,"[6] and what I call the sociocultural and sociosituated locations for the writer. The scriptor may be the reader's friend, may be in collaboration with the reader, but the author wants to ensure that the reader is persuaded by the style that is attempting to articulate the alternative self. The scriptor works with probable stance, simultaneously with the author's construction of a stable ethos.

Autodeixis and the Performative Self

The primary reason for choosing the genre of books on behavior is that self-presentation is its marked concern. Its matter focuses on courtesy and gentility, on ethical conduct, and on their mediation via the rhetoric and poetic of language, gesture, and appearance. It does so in the context not only of the print revolution but also of the revolution that would eventually sweep aside Galenic medicine and supplant the psychophysical humors with psychology. In other words, these books are concerned with changing strategies for the singularity of self-presencing, for self-expression, and for representational identity. They are also concerned with the possibilities for control over those strategies, but specifically in the context of the relatively new medium of print and the emergence of national and then nation state politics. A book's introductory material establishes what amounts to a handshake with the reader, particularly important with this historically new medium of print that would only develop that handshake into sophisticated generic strategies over the following two centuries.

As suggested above, the rhetoric for this generic forematter is not only wrapped up in the authority of ethos but also and increasingly has to do with a performative autodeixis: the performance of self through an engaged stance of probable rhetoric. Chapter 1 outlined the way that rhetorical stance delineates

6 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author" (1977).

the inclusive elements of the rhetor or performer, the audience, and the material for mediation, in any one particular performance. Rhetorical stance relies on how these three elements treat the formation of the common grounds needed for their communication: plausible stance based on assumptions, and probable stance on engaged participation that may lead to alternative grounds for action. If stable ethos often requires an assumptive stance, an engaged stance differs because in its processual activity ethos cannot be predicted or determined. It insists, among other elements, that the performer's presence emerges out of collaborative work with an audience that is attuned to the process of mediation. In other words, it provides a site at which these three elements are experienced in terms of their probable co-participation.

The print-mediated performance of the writer's self, suggested by Angus Gowland's work on Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*,[7] argues that Burton offers a plausible ethos that he then disrupts and supplants with an autodeictic strategy. If ethos is a rhetorical concept that describes how a speaker or writer builds a sense of a stable persona for what is being said by depending on the recognition and acceptance of sociocultural assumptions, autodeixis generates the sense of a "real person" on the page even though they are not there. This is not the actual writer, nor the ethos that marks out the writer's sociocultural location, but a "real-on-the-page" self. The key distinction suggested by Gowland's study is that this "self" is generated by the engagement of the reader with the writer. In this, it carefully opens up the implications of what Montaigne, in common with the English contemporaries cited here, introduced as an engaged relationship between the writer and reader. First published in 1580, his *Essais* print an address "*Au lecteur*," in the fourth paragraph of which the writer says "je suis moy-mesmes la matiere de mon livre."[8] Hence reading the book is reading the writer – not reading in response to an ethos, but engaged in collaborative work in which the writer, and reader, "happen" into being.

In other words, autodeixis usually generates a probable stance – a communicative event that, like *sermo* rhetoric, relies on a recognized interweaving of the rhetor, the medium, and the audience. While in most cases these rhetors or writers are privileged, they weave their writing to encourage the reader to think differently, to become an audience for alternative valuing. The rhetoric is specifically an engaged stance in which the writer and the reader and the medium each openly

7 Angus Gowland, "Rhetorical Structure and Function in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*" (2001).
8 Michel de Montaigne, *Les Essais* (1580). Livre 1, Chapitre 1. Accessed April 5, 2020.

contribute to each other, in a collaboration: what might now be called a performative "becoming with."[9] The discipline of performance studies, which delineates much of contemporary rhetorical practice, suggests that performativity in any medium is distinguished from performance. Performance is usually rooted in representational identity and empathy, while performativity focuses on the interactive processes of stance and the generation of affect. Ethos is usually a performance based on cultural assumptions, and hence frequently rendered plausible rather than probable. In contrast, the rhetorical strategy of autodeixis in writing, or the printed word, is performative because it materializes alternative assumptions in the process of the rhetorical collaboration on the page and its affective force. In this, it fits well with the Erasmian concept of friendship that infuses *sermo* rhetoric, and the later rhetoric of conversation in which it is employed.

Performance often leads to reactive and subversive audience responses to recognized grounds. Performativity, however, focuses on highly relational interactive processes that this book has been referring to as "engaged," processes that generate grounds and also help to delineate the autodeictic stance. Rather than calling on pathos or ethos that depend on the content of the event or the "character" of the writer, the autodeictic implicates the reader in the way the writer's self is performed. It opens up not the performance of a specific identity but the process of the performativity that generates that performance, that presences the writer in the situated location of the reader – which in turn presences the reader-in-that-moment. This kind of presencing is sociosituated rather than sociocultural.[10] It happens in the moment of the particular performativity that occurs, which is itself a way of becoming, knowing, and valuing. It usually manifests previously unarticulated need, rather than a represented identity which has a knowledge and an ethics reacting to and attempting to fit into cultural discourse. As a performative device, autodeixis does political work radically different from the representations of the individual in the nation state, and at this time in history seems to offer the person who is a citizen a harbor for the singularity of everything left out of what becomes called the "subject."

Gowland argues that Robert Burton makes sure we understand that ethos is rooted in habitual patterns, while the writer's self is neither certain nor fixed. In other words, Burton establishes an ethos that he then disrupts and supplants. To do so, he often uses argumentative devices that promise "universally" recognized patterns of certainty, and goes on to demonstrate their specificity and

9 "Becoming with," the phrase used by Donna Haraway in "Sympoesis" (2016) to explore multispecies ecologies, and earlier used to explore neurobiological senses of networks, helps to materialize the sense of engaged stance.

10 For clarity on this distinction, see Lynette Hunter, *Politics of Practice* (2019), chapter 4.

tautologous logic. But his primary technique for disruption, Gowland suggests, is to locate a "pattern" in the self, so that it becomes autodeictic rather than universal. Furthermore, Burton then goes on to demonstrate the consistent instability of that autodeictic stance, which I would recast as its processual rhetoric. The disruption of the writer's ethos by autodeixis sacrifices any interaction with his reader that is based on stable sociocultural identity. I would add that the stance also builds a far more inclusive and engaged participation of the reader. It invites each reader to seek first for analogs of the pattern in themselves and hence to then experience the writer's destabilization as affecting their own sense of culturally located self, or pathos.

The destabilization of both ethos and pathos through autodeixis generates a highly performative sense of self that binds the reader, the writer, and the medium into a collaboration. That is, in common with *sermo* rhetoric, it focuses more on the process of rhetorical interaction than on the performance of specific identities, and the collaboration makes present, or presences, the absent writer and the absent reader in the performativity of what happens. In autodeixis, selfhood could be said to be absorbed into style, and both writers and readers are brought into a relation that recognizes that the trustworthiness of friendship, and civility is learned, and that "self" is performative. A person's self is a collaborative, ongoing process outside sociocultural discourse, rather than the stable performance of identity required by the nation state, which defines them as an autonomous individual. For these relatively empowered writers, the self is continually trying to articulate the alternatives that the civic world does not yet recognize.

Misreadings and the Moebius Strategy

The rhetorical distinction between a socioculturally stable ethos for the writer and the sociosituated and engaged stance of reader and writer in autodeixis underlines the slow emergence of doublethink: the tension around selfhood, autonomous identity, and social citizenship in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries in England, and how these began to be performed in the print medium for writing. As noted above, the ethos of a live orator can respond to audience reactions, yet the writer can only guess at those reactions. Hence the stability of a writer's ethos may be read as rigidity and end up alienating a reader who is not in their embodied presence and to whom they cannot specifically respond. A significant factor in the development of the probable rhetoric of autodeixis is this recognized element of the alienated reader, often referred to by writers at the time as an "envious reader." In the early part of the sixteenth century, the forematter to

courtesy books already indicates a problem with the reader who carries out "malicious misreadings," and who soon becomes designated as the "envious reader." It is possible that the envious reader arises because of the shift from manuscript-writing to print distribution. Instead of a manuscript reader who reads in a chain of readers, adding commentary that s/he knows will be commented upon in turn by later readers, the reader of a book could read relatively privately. If they wanted their response to be circulated, they would probably have begun with oral response rather than with printed.[11] And if they wanted that response to become part of a debate, they would enter the usual world of debate rhetoric in place in the early sixteenth century. Hence the reader's conventional public response is set up to provoke argument, becomes agonistic and opinionated: envious.

This is, of course, a hypothesis. What a twenty-first-century reader can be more confident about is that writer after writer, with a few significant exceptions, complains about the malicious misreadings of their texts by envious readers. What the awareness of the envious reader adds is a focus on the development of rhetorical devices that can guide those readers.[12] As the writer's relationship with the printing industry begins to develop, the forematter to many of these books is focused partly on establishing an ethos, which is so necessary to commercial success for the printer. The "dedications" to a well-known patron usually found in books from the early sixteenth century work to legitimize the writer, to authorize them. However, as patronage becomes less prominent toward the turn into the seventeenth century, writers themselves have to enact this authorial legitimation, or generate a different kind of relationship with the reader. Many writers are concerned to maintain ethos even while they are offering alternative ways of approaching their personal life. Some confidently use

11 For a study of the continued use of marginalia in printed books, see William Sherman, *Used Books* (2009).

12 I am grateful to Gina Bloom for noting a similar construction in the prologues, and some epilogues such as Prospero in *The Tempest*, to scripted plays. In many ways, and in contrast to the oratory of classical rhetoric, the theater that emerges in the late sixteenth century has much in common with the world of print: a capital-intensive pre-production process, a script that is mainly consistent and rarely improvised (despite some comic parts such as Peter in *Romeo and Juliet*) – although a staged play has a live audience, that audience is constrained by quite different conventions from those of an audience to an orator. At the same time, a reader *is* embodied. In this early period, the reader may well have been more likely to read aloud, and indeed read aloud to others. Furthermore, the print conventions for a play, as distinct from those for a printed speech, are quite different. The speech is simply recorded, and the play has semantic gaps, lacunae, and admitted interactions with absent materialities such as props – all of which require a quite different set of reading conventions from those for printed oratory which probably depended on education and learned sociohistorical contexts.

rational logic or syllogism, expecting immediate acceptance of their grounds. But others, presumably aware of the challenge that their alternative interpretations may offer, worry about the envious reader, and several of the addresses to the reader use a distinctive rhetorical device that works like a moebius strip between the writer and the reader.

A moebius strategy usually uses a syllogistic structure of "if p then q," and starts with an assumption "p" which the reader is expected to accept or agree to. It then flips it into "if not-q, then not-p," with "not-q" being any rejection of the writer's material, leading to an inevitable rejection of "p" – to which the reader has already assented. Unless the reader accepts or agrees to "q," the writer's alternative material or position, then they end up disagreeing with themselves, or being left in a contrary state – which, like Romeo's, is the source of melancholia. Similar to a Catch-22, it works rather like a syllogistic tautology: a device that lures the reader with a promise of argumentative development only to bind them to agreement with an unmarked assent to the opening premise. In doing so it requires them to accept the initial premise as self-evident, only to then insist on foregrounding its implications in favor of the writer's presentation of alternatives.

A moebic device is but one of many that can contribute to an autodeictic strategy, and in common with all devices this moebic strategy can be employed in different ways. As the studies that follow suggest, some use it to mask the process of ethos and stabilize the writer's authority, while some use it to foreground the co-responsibility of the reader for ethos, pathos, and meaning. With both uses the writer establishes the common grounds, in the first case binding the reader to assent to them, and in the second inviting the reader to follow the logic and agree – or inviting the reader to engage. Neither of the first two strategies fully trusts the reader to accept the grounds – hence the task of the device, which is there to guide the envious reader into believing the writer, and becoming their "friend." In these senses, the device itself becomes a kind of doublethink, a double consciousness. At the same time, the device may also work like an unresolvable paradox, and be exposed as an open welcoming of the reader that generates the collaborative and affective connection of trustworthy friendship with the writer needed by autodeixis. If early addresses to the reader identify the reader with the writer's patron they go on to position the reader as the writer's friend, who may be enlisted through that strategy into acceptance or agreement, or into collaboration with the writers themselves. Each of acceptance, agreement, and collaboration may be a rhetoric that relates the reader to the writer, yet only the third, that of collaboration, is based on the probable stance of friendship informed by temperance that Erasmus proposes.

When attempting simply to invalidate negative responses to the writer's argument and insist on acceptance, the logic of the moebic device is often masked or implicit. But, as noted above, its logic can also be a foregrounded invitation to agreement, or a performatively engaged collaboration. When masked, the analogical force of the device, which encourages a simple identification with the writer, leaves readers who disagree with the material arguing against themselves. This response works partly as a deterrent to questioning, but when the strategy becomes foregrounded as an invitation to agreement it asks for the reader's insight. When it is performatively engaged, it works to undermine and destabilize the identity of both reader and writer. As the initial focus on the patron's authority shifts to the reader as a friend, the paradox of the moebic device develops from the reader's identification with ethos, into their agreement with the ethos position and, at times, further, into the performative stance of autodeixis in which the reader becomes an element in the ongoing formation of the writer's self. In the process these writers generate complex theories of reading, writing, and interpretation, which bring together constraints of language and performative strategies in the medium of print. At the same time, they generate ideas that offer insights into personhood that lie outside the representations of the individual subject in early modern English society.

Dedications to a Patron

The shift in strategy, from an overtly authorizing ethos that identifies the writer with the honorable patron to a focus on a relation with the reader as a friend, is mirrored in the shift from "dedication" to "address to the reader" as the primary forematter used by writers of books about behavior to build a bridge to their print audience. To begin first with the dedication and the establishment of ethos: there are a number of relatively predictable devices and techniques that result in a rhetorical stance that manipulates the reader into accepting the text through the writer's or book's association with the patron. This stance is based on an assumptive logic that the patron is to be admired and emulated not only by the writer but by the readers and indeed by society in general. To be patronized is not only to be supported but also to be supported by someone who has more apparent learning, sensibility, and power. Foremost is the link with an important person who has hired the writer and therefore values them – by implication the reader also should value them or they will be making an adverse judgment on the patron. In his *Bibliothetca* (1545) Thomas Elyot associates himself directly with Henry VIII, a learned man with learned associates, and says

that he would have been destroyed by "malicious" readers[13] had not the king recognized his talent. The implication, embedded in the logic, is that any reader who does not agree with his arguments is opposing the king. Another related strategy is to reference this association and stress that the important patron is learned and likes the book – again the reader should as well, although explicit references to learning subside after the 1570s with an apparent contraction in the diversification of educational policy in Elizabethan England.[14] These two are by far the most common devices and may be found throughout the century, in for example Elyot (*Governor*, A3^{v}), Leonard Cox,[15] Hoby (B1^{v}), Newton (*Touchstone,* A5^{v}), Daie ([2^{v}–4]), and Bryskett (A3).

Other devices in dedications to patrons include: "the patron cannot be deceived" and therefore the reader is in good hands. In other words, the purchase and reading of the book are allied to the patron not the writer (Daie). Thomas Wilson addresses his patron, Lord Dudley, in rather ambivalent terms, saying that he is wise and reasonable but needs "eloquence," but then says the book will learn "eloquence" from him (1553, A1^{v}–A2). Rather oddly, in Ralph Lever's *The Arte of Reason*, there is the statement, "the patron failed to learn first time around" so the writer is trying again with this printed text. It transpires that this apparent criticism of a patron is in fact Lever's backhanded apology for failing to educate his patron (Lord Essex) until his patron taught him how to do so (*2v). Thomas Newton uses an even more convoluted device, but one that heralds the moebius strip of the address to the reader by identifying the reader's judgment with that of the patron to anchor the ethos of the writer. He says 1) that he cannot believe others will think worse of him than he does himself, and 2) that his patron sees through his imbecility. The moebic logic implies 3) if a reader thinks the worse of the writer (i. e. thinks he is imbecilic) then that reader cannot be like the learned patron, is without judgment, and hence the writer is not imbecilic (A5v–A6). Unlike the dedications to the patron, which succeed because of shared assumptions, Newton's address to the reader cross-identifies the reader and the writer through a moebic strategy that resists isolating an assumption to drive the syllogistic logic.

The earlier dedications to a patron consistently present the writer as a "humble orator," a "poor client and perpetuall servant," who is "yours to command," "your reader in reason," a "humble servant," "faithful orator," who wants "to do service." However, from the 1560s onward these genuflections to increasingly outdated concepts of "service," which, as noted in chapter 4, are in urban areas

13 Thomas Elyot, *Bibliothetca Eliotae* (1545), A2.

14 See Katherine Eggert, *Disknowledge* (2015), 14–54.

15 Leonard Cox, *The Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke* (1532), A2.

being replaced by the "servant," fade out. The dedication becomes more epideictic, and about the personality of the patron. These dedicatory devices all set up an activity for which the writer is recognized and with which the reader, as Thomas Wilson points out, not only "should" but "will" want to identify (1553, A3v–A[4]) – even though Wilson is the rare exception who also warns readers that the book may affect them, in other words change them, hence they read it on their own cognizance (1560, A5–A5v).

The shift away from the "service to a patron" is coincident with the Epistle Dedicatory beginning to shift to the Epistle to the Courteous Reader (Daie), and a rhetorical style more appropriate to the greater familiarity that is assumed in the purported friendship between the writer and reader. Significantly, from the 1560s onward the dedications begin to suggest that the patron is a friend (Hoby, B2), and since the general reader is also a friend, the separation between the patron and the reader is diminished. The reader in particular becomes a familiar interlocutor, a "gentle" reader (Bryskett, Lever, Mulcaster[16]), "judicious reader" (Newton), a "courteous reader" (Daie, Whetstone[17]), a "friend" (Bright,[18] Munday,[19] Whetstone). A case in point for this shift away from patrons and toward the companionable reader is Timothy Bright, who wants the reader to substitute the initial letter of their own name for the printed "M." throughout the book, M. being a close friend of the writer (*iiij^{v}), who with other friends urged the writer to publish. And it is from the 1560s that a more subtle and performative address to the reader becomes prominent.

Part II: The Address to the Reader

When it emerges fully in the 1560s, the address to the reader, for example with the "Prologue" of the second edition of Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique*, is rather different from the dedications that preceded it and that continue to be written although with less frequency. In general this address directly to the reader sometimes uses elements from dedications, but it sets them up differently

16 Richard Mulcaster, *The First Part of the Elementary* (1582); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

17 George Whetstone, *An Heptameron of Civill Discourses* (1582); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

18 Timothy Bright, *Treatise of Melancholie* (1586); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

19 Anthony Munday, *The Defence of Contraries* (1593); all quotations from this text are from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

so that the rhetorical stance moves the writer's ethos toward the acceptance, agreement, and performativity outlined above. The study here moves toward autodeixis by way of three topoi in addresses to the reader: of the rolled-up tapestry, the adventurer, and the prodigal book.[20] The presence of topics is significant in the context of Erasmus's development of *sermo* rhetoric: Ciceronian rhetoric distinguishes *sermo* from dialectics, because *sermo* or conversational rhetoric does not use rigorous logic but contextual topical reasoning.[21] As discussed in chapter 4, topical reasoning was the rhetorical basis for conversational or familiar rhetoric in commentaries by Lever, Fulwood, and Puttenham, to name but a few. The three topoi are among the most prominently repeated in the forematter of these early modern books, as the writer introduces the reader to the content that will follow and sets up the writer/reader relationship, and they each run alongside moebic strategies. Each of the topical fields of the rolled-up tapestry, the merchant adventurer, and the prodigal book engages with the reader around elements in *sermo* rhetoric, Erasmus's rhetoric of conversation. They introduce many devices that directly address the issue of the "absent audience" – and hence the absent writer – for printed books, by generating a stance particular to the genre of letter-writing among friends, a probable stance that Erasmus based on virtue and its associated features of temperance, prudence, and decorum.

These topoi often establish a performativity of the text, a rhetorical stance that is an active engagement between the writer and reader in making significance from the words, which is particular to the stylistic context of the actual reading taking place. In the activity of the rolled-up tapestry, the address to the reader takes on through the process called "translation" the distinction between information and ways of knowing, through the "merchant adventurer" the distinction between the writer's "rights" to control the book and the more engaged interaction with the reader, and through the "prodigal son" the distinction between heroic authorship and the social good of the printed book. Each offers a distinction between the socioculturally recognized ethos of the writer as a subject, and their processual style or articulation of a self that lies outside representation: possibly through a new translation or meaning, possibly through the introduction of new materials into the culture, or possibly by welcoming the erstwhile outlaw prodigal back into the home. At the same time, this subtlety is often interlaced with an ongoing anxiety about the absent audience and its propensity for misreading that bespeaks a parallel concern with the absent writer. As the

20 For an alternative topos, see that of beauty and the courtier in Hugh Sanford's address to the reader of the first "authorized" edition (1593) of Philip Sidney's *Arcadia*, Wendy Wall, *The Imprint of Gender* (1993), 156 ff.

21 John Tinkler, "Renaissance Humanism and the Genera Eloquentiae" (1987).

address to the reader develops, the "malicious" reader – all too easily set up by some of these writers simply to oppose a "misreading" – becomes the more fully realized "envious" reader that writers attempt to control through devices that insist on authorial presence. If a malicious reader is against what the writer is doing, an envious reader wants to be or to have what the writer is.

As these addresses to the reader as a friend suggest, writers begin to recognize this response as one that can be used, albeit to different ends. With a probable stance, for example one being generated by an autodeictic strategy, the reader becomes inextricably interconnected with the writer, often through the paradox of the moebic device as unresolvable in terms of contemporary assumptions that might guarantee acceptance or agreement. The strategy offers a relationship of friendship based on virtue: a conversational rhetoric that enables the destabilization of ethos and subjecthood, and a co-laboring on the becoming, knowing, and valuing needed by the singular self. The writer is presencing their self through style. The reader involved in this activity is a particular kind of friend: a critic. In this friendship, the writer and reader morph each affectively with the other through the performativity of verbal and typographic playfulness. The critic is the (relatively privileged) friend who can work with you (also relatively privileged) through your style, on articulating what is left out of representation: singularity.

The Rolled-Up Tapestry: Translation, Information, and Ways of Knowing

The first of the three topoi enlisted to catch the reader that is examined here is the "rolled-up tapestry." It is directly related to the extensive translations of books on behavior from the Italian into English that went into print in the sixteenth century, and draws on at least three social issues: concepts of interpretation, the need for a vernacular language worthy of the English nation, and the call on conceptual authorities to be available in English for a wider education. Each of these issues has received considerable attention in critical studies, although not with respect to the topoi of a book's forematter.[22] Their inclusion here is to underline their place in the construction of a particular kind of probable rhetorical stance for the writer and reader. Many translations are of texts

22 Among several examples, see: Allan K. Jenkins and Patrick Preston, *Biblical Scholarship and the Church* (2007); Su Fang Ng, "Translation, Interpretation, and Heresy" (2001); Warren Boutcher, *Vernacular Humanism in the Sixteenth Century* (1996); Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Nicholas Watson, Andrew Taylor, and Ruth Evans, *The Idea of the Vernacular* (1999); Jennifer Richards, "Useful Books" (2012); and Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood* (1997).

that already have translations, or which are written in a language such as French that is accessible to most of the privileged and educated readers that could be expected for the book. Since no translation can be exact, each is particular to the writer. Therefore, each will either present for the writer a meaning that has not previously been put forward for assent or agreement by the reader, or will generate a process in which an alternative "happens" for reader and writer.

The trope of the tapestry focuses on understanding the text and texture of a translated source. It is found in Thomas Hoby's translation of Castiglione's *The Courtier* (1561), which is addressed to a "friend" (the "address" is dated 1556), who is both patron and reader. It is found in a number of other addresses and epistles to the reader, including one in 1582 by George Whetstone, who probably takes it from Hoby. Both Hoby and Whetstone suggest that if a text is translated fully, with a subtle and complex understanding of the first language *and* the second, then it can be unrolled to disclose the beauty of its workmanship – in its tapestry, its textuality. But, if it is translated "foulded together," or briefly stated as information in note form because the translator does not fully know the originating language, it "hideth that beauty" (Hoby, Aiii). For example, Themistocles did not tell the story of his banishment to the king of Persia until he had learned the Persian language,[23] because something translated "peecemeale," which will "know hys [the book's] mynde, and to practise his principles" only through information and rules, is an "unperfect" thing (Hoby, Aiii). Here Hoby not only distinguishes between the fluent translator and the piecemeal raid on the text for information, but binds both of these actions to the work of writers and of readers.

A good translator, who is already necessarily both a reader and a writer, must know the fullness of each language including the strategies and structures of its rhetoric and figures. Twenty years after Hoby, Whetstone goes for a more implicit connection between writer and reader. He says that someone who translates only the superficial meaning with "forced speeches" produces a rolled-up tapestry that "reserves" or holds back the virtue of the book and loses the "show" or aesthetic beauty. A good translator is a "Trowchman," a virtuous person in whom one can trust, who unrolls the text and shows the beauty (A [iii–iv]). In Whetstone's case the reader is expected to trust the translator, but there is little evidence to present the process by which the reader recognizes the writer as virtuous. In contrast, in Hoby's case the reader and writer are presented as undertaking similar activities, and if the translator is trustworthy because he has fluent engagement with his work, so the fluent reader will be able to recognize that skill because they are a trustworthy interpreter. Whetstone

23 See also Benjamin Jonson, *The English Grammar* (1640).

asserts what he wants the reader to accept or agree to while Hoby involves the reader in the process of recognizing the basis for trust.

Translation is a vital trope in the forematter to a number of sixteenth-century books on behavior and communication. To follow Hoby, the implication is that translation in writing is like interpretation in reading. Decorous translation should not just be information and notes that tell the reader what something "means," but fully comprehending another language and being sensitive to its nuances of significance and communication. The concern is no doubt tied to the translation of the Bible and the *Book of Common Prayer* into English that was impelled by the formation of the Church of England in 1533, and the expectation that citizens be able to read these in English. But it is also part of a much larger project of translating many classical texts into English that begins to take place in the early sixteenth century.[24] Both Richard Sherry (1550),[25] and later on Henry Peacham (1577), who are otherwise remarkably straightforward in their grammar and argument, say that while it is necessary to speak simply in common terms, this is not always enough (Peacham, A2^{v}; Sherry, A4^{v}–A5, A7). To read, or translate, the Bible one must know and understand the way that another language works by studying not only its vocabulary and its grammar, but also its more complex rhetoric. The core of English school education at the time was its teaching of two languages and cultures: Roman and Greek. The focus on two languages, structures, and grammars made translation a key strategy for understanding that there could be alternative assumptions, even more apparent when translating into the still-vulgar language of English. Yet, since many of the texts did not need translation, the act of translation was one of offering alternative ways of knowing the material, ways that complemented the selfhood of the writing translator, and underneath these acts of translation there was a need for the reader to affirm the writer's vision of those alternatives – through acceptance, agreement, or engaged performativity.

At the same time, the issue of translation is intimately tied to the emergence of English as a valued vernacular language. Again and again these writers on behavior, many of whom consider themselves translators, say that they write in English to profit others. Some writers explicitly aim to profit those who do not speak other

24 As in other European countries such as Sweden – see Lars Furnland, *Literacy in Sweden* (1989), 8 – reading was important while writing for everyone was quickly seen as potentially dangerous because of its ease of distribution. See Jenny Cook-Gumperz, *The Social Construction of Literacy* (1986), 27–29; Thomas Laqueur, *Religion and Respectability* (1976), 255; and Margaret Spufford, *Small Books and Pleasant Histories* (1981), 9.

25 Richard Sherry, *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550); all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

languages, who are un-latined and unlearned (Cox, Hoby, Peacham). Others are more like Mulcaster, who writes in English to the reader of the *Elementarie* in order to "seke the friendship of both" (Ff2) the learned and unlearned. But the writers also write in English because they want to prompt the reader to go to the original to translate for themselves, to compare their translation to that of the learned writer, and generate better understanding. The very act of translating helps one to understand the material, and a comparative reading of one's own translation beside that of the printed translation helps one better put it into English. This is, of course, not only a genuinely helpful activity but also a strategy designed to encourage people who can translate for themselves – which is largely the readership for printed books at the time – to buy someone else's translation so that they can undertake the comparison.

There is the additional argument for translation based on the emergence of English as a "civilized" language that much preoccupies Tudor and Elizabethan culture. To insist on the civility of the English language counters accusations of England as a "barbarous" country (Hoby, A[v]; Wright, [A2–A2^{v}]). At the same time, through the activity of translation into English, which the reader is encouraged to take up, one learns the benefits of the language (Sherry, A7) such as its "short words" and "pliability" (Lever, *4^{v}; Mulcaster, *Elementarie*, Gg1 ff.). The elements of this argument, based on flipping "then England is not barbarous" into "England is civilized therefore . . .," often occur side by side. What is absolutely clear in these forematter addresses is the claim that English has its own ways of doing and meaning. The claim is possibly most forcefully argued by Ralph Lever in *The Arte of Reason* (1573) discussed in chapter 2. This remarkable thinker not only foresaw the progressivist theories of language developed in the later seventeenth century, but also gestures to the eighteenth-century concepts of history that will sustain the theory.[26] He tells us that he changes parts of Aristotle because the arts of reason "are like Okes" (xx2), they grow slowly and with additions over many years. Hence a writer writing centuries after Aristotle needs to add to the earlier writing, new material that is particular to the English context.

A third issue related to the rolled-up tapestry is the sense of dependence on authoritative, often classical, texts to make informed decisions. In other words, many of the books on which social judgments are formed are not in English, and whether they are central or peripheral, they need to be accessible (Elyot,

26 See for example, Pope's attempts to improve the English of Shakespeare: Alexander Pope, *Works of Mr. William Shakespeare* (1725), I:155. See also the extensive commentaries on Giambattista Vico's progressive concepts of history, for example Lawrence Simon, "Vico and Marx" (1981).

A2^{v}; Robinson, A3). Just as Aristotle spoke Greek to the Greeks, and Cicero Latin to the Romans, it is prudent for writers providing source texts and guides to the formation of argument and action to speak English to the English (Newton, A3^{v}; Bright, xiiij^{v}). Hoby says that it is possible for the un-latined to have knowledge, indeed even for women to be wise, if authoritative texts are translated into English (A3^{v}, A5). At the same time, there is a need to translate these authorities into simpler terms (Bright, xiiij^{v}) with better and more straightforward organization (Sherry, A6), and a real sense that the English language has the power not only to do this but also to put these texts into an English context (Lever, *5^{v}–6) – implicitly, that these texts are not able to convey appropriate wisdom unless they are in English. Authorities have knowledge that can benefit others but they are not to be written or read by those with little understanding, otherwise the writer/reader will be manipulated. Hence translation into English will prevent misinformation. Furthermore, one may use authorities to demonstrate learning, but one should use them with intelligence and a fusion with one's understanding – just as they were written. In other words, it is as necessary to read these texts within the context of English language and society, as it is for the writer to translate within such a context so that they are not only informative but can infuse ongoing ways of knowing the world.

The areas of interpretation, vernacular language, and authority that emerge from the topos of the rolled-up tapestry are used by writers of books on persuasion, behavior, and courtesy to establish a relation with the reader that is at times to do with giving the reader information, at times to do with establishing an argument, and at times engaging the reader in co-generating significance. Hoby says that writing should not be according to rules but to sense: or, the rules are not fixed but contextual, hence they need common sense. Written in 1623, but printed much later (1640), Jonson's *Grammar* echoes this logic, saying, "It is ridiculous to teach anything for undoubted Truth that Sense and Experience can confute" (E1), and goes on to say, "the most excellent creatures are not ever borne perfect." Even Mulcaster's "certainty" is not "truth," but "based upon our ordinarie custom" (*Elementarie*, ¶1). He adds, one may write with certainty but this should not be forced (¶1). The rules of rhetoric are general, not specific (Cox, A3; Lever, *3). Hence both reader and writer have to take personal responsibility for the particular action of translation and comprehension. Mulcaster contrasts the work of the learned, which is "considered" and temperate, with that of the unlearned who cause dissension by saying the first thing that comes into their mind – they "cannot staie the quicksilver, which at the first push it hath poord in peple's heads" (¶2).

Throughout the topical field there are strategies for presenting the writer as trustworthy, through decorum, prudence, and temperance. Nevertheless, in

this sophisticated field of translation surrounding the rolled-up tapestry, many writers are also openly concerned with the envious reader, the reader who may misread their texts. Concurrent with the openness about teaching the reader to translate for themselves, there is that need for their reader to affirm the writer's vision of alternatives, and they often use the moebius device to bind the reader into a relation with the writer. In 1531, Leonard Cox suggests that misreadings are similar to the misunderstandings that occur when the preacher's audience goes to sleep, implicitly binding his reader to either an agreement with his text or an admission of loss of concentration. Much later, Henry Peacham calls directly on God, saying that God gave man language, and so it is self-evident that Peacham's book about language is necessary to understand the world and the Bible – one could possibly argue with this logic, but in doing so might fall into a trap of arguing against God. Another strategy for protection against the envious reader was to claim that anything the reader does not like is not the fault of the translator, but of the original. Robert Robinson's translation of the politically radical work by Patrizzi on civic behavior begins by noting that even Homer had enemies (A5, not a bad comparison for the writer), and that the translator is as indebted to the source as the reader to the writer – both being responsible for interpretation, and who is to tell which one is generating the negative reading. But Robinson goes on to underline that Patrizzi is his source so that no matter how much he has rewritten the text, there are still elements of Patrizzi in the book and it is these elements that might be alienating the reader rather than Robinson's translation. Thomas Newton pushes this logic into a moebic device, noting that his translation of Lemnius's voluminous work on the passions and humors allies his translating of Lemnius with his readers interpreting his translation – and further allies both the translation and the interpretation with Cicero's attempts to understand Socrates ($A3^{v}$). He tacitly assumes a reader who is equally able to translate Lemnius, and hence able to recognize when his text draws near or fails the "original." Either way the reader will find the translation valuable. But: if they cannot translate Lemnius for themselves, then they are not judicious, not learned, and therefore not in a position to criticize.

Mulcaster takes this one stage further. The readers of his *Elementarie* are told by the writer that they will learn how to develop "considered opinion." From this he builds a moebius strip for the reader in which 1) the reader has to read the whole book to learn what it has to say before being able to pass judgment based on a considered opinion, and 2) that if the learning takes place then the judgment will not be unfavorable – in other words, 3) if the reader judges the book as poorly written then that reader has not learned the strategies for how to reach considered opinion that the book teaches. The logic: if the reader reads the whole book, they learn how to pass judgment. If judgment is

informed by learning, then the reader is favorable to the writer. But if the reader is unfavorable, informed judgment has not happened – implicitly (flipping the first term of the syllogism) because the reader did not read the whole book, so informed judgment cannot happen.

Both Newton and Mulcaster use moebic strategies to bind the reader to the writer, yet Newton does so by implication, masking the tautologous logic that reinforces the author's ethos, while Mulcaster lays the logic rather more clearly out on the table. The reader is not told that the book has to be accepted as sound because a valued patron legitimates it or because they can identify with the writer's education and ability to translate. Rather, the reader has to learn how the writer is embodying their knowledge and take that embodiment performatively into their own thinking. The device is not trying to persuade about a specific argument, but to bind the reader into a particular process. Because the writer is not simply imparting information, but focusing on ways of knowing, they are implicitly moving away from self-evident assumptions, even from persuasion to sociocultural norms. The writer's style is engaging the reader in the process of making meaning. A good translation helps the reader do their own translation; in other words, come up with an interpretation that is different from the writer's. However, involving the reader in the performativity of the text through the moebic device makes it difficult for the reader to disagree with what the book is imparting because they are co-producing its alternative significance in the like-minded context of similar background, education, civic expectation – of relative privilege. Nevertheless, this reader does at least experience the implicit critique of representation that is happening.

The Adventurer: The Writer's "Rights" to Control the Book/Joint Ventures and the Awareness of the Reader

The topos of the adventurer is allied with daring to print, and its resultant woes and travails.[27] The figure of the rolled-up tapestry establishes the topos of translation as a moebic interconnection of writer and reader that prevents the reader from finding fault and becoming an envious reader, or engages the two in co-creation of alternative singularity. The topos of the adventurer is more open about the work of the moebic device. There may be some connection between

27 For a number of related articles on sixteenth-century uses of the travel topos, see Mike Pincombe, *Travels and Translations in the Sixteenth Century* (2004).

the two, for in translation the writer uses their learning to "unroll" the text for the reader, and with the topos of the adventurer the writer heroically risks their life to bring the text to the reader. This second topos is distinctly less instructive, although with no less potential for enabling the writer to develop a style that expresses alternative visions of the world into which the reader is both controlled by the moebius and invited as a friend and co-creator of singular grounds.

The printer's address "To the Courteous Readers" (A2) of I. B.'s *Rich Cabinet* (1616) calls the book an "adventure[s] of Presse" (A2) furnished with "Treasures" (A2^{v}). Yet several issues associated with the topos circle around the writer's "rights." Many of these early modern writers on behavior extend the narrative of misunderstanding and misreading into asking "whose side is the reader on?" These writers set themselves up as heroic adventurers bringing back merchandise from afar, having risked much. Thomas Newton, in fact, in the dedication, sets himself up as a merchant bringing back new wares about which his readers will not yet know. He declares that this makes many readers "so squeamish stomacked, that nothing can satisfie" (A5^{v}), so he will take his chance with this state of the book rather than engage in continued rewriting. George Pettie who writes the "address" in *The Civille Conversation* specifically allies his writing with soldiering. He begins by noting that a writer's fame is dangerous: if it is good it generates envy, if bad it generates shame. He considers those who take shots at him as "friendly foes" not "deadly enemies," and if they criticize him for writing instead of soldiering, he argues that soldiering is also in the mind – especially a mind full of doubt. His readers should understand and value the risks that he takes as a writer in exploring the doubtful self that questions the world around him.

A similar but more direct statement is made by Thomas Gainsford, the author of *The Secretaries Studie* (1616), who uses the metaphor of adventuring on a journey in this his "first voyage . . . into the streights of opinion or severe Censure."[28] Ben Jonson, in *A Discourse of Love* (1629), generates a convoluted network of logical threads apparently to confute criticism by offering a plethora of arguments to the reader. In the address by the "Author to the Booke," he writes a long poem about writing being like the danger of going to sea, noting that he had previously said he would not do this again, but here he is risking another book into the unknown. Jonson also writes a note to his Reader insisting that "carping" will not prevent him from publishing, and a further note (in verse) to

28 Thomas Gainsford, *The Secretaries Studie* (1616), 2; all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

the "Envious Reader." Here he establishes a moebic logic suggesting that even though the socially ambitious are also the most envious, their attempts at high status mean they probably will not read the book – so if a reader does carp, either their judgment will be clouded by the ignorance of the ambitious, or they will not have read the book. The unstated end of this syllogism is, of course, that the reader who reads the book fully will be neither ignorant nor ambitious, may indeed already have high status, and will agree with the material and with the authorial persona. The logic: the socially ambitious (those without high status but who want it) are the most envious. But attempts at high status mean they will not read the book (because they think they do not need to – because they are ignorant). Again, if the reader is unfavorable, then they will either have the ignorance of the ambitious, or will not have read the book. Implicitly (the flipping of the first "ground" to which assent or agreement is expected), favorable readers will be neither ignorant nor ambitious, will have read the book, and will probably be of high status. Jonson does add that nevertheless he is ready to meet any envious reader "face to face," throwing down a challenge to the reader to self-define as ignorant, ambitious, and low status. Once more, it is not what the writer imparts that is at issue, but how the reader reads. What is more interesting than the deterrent force of the strategy is the idea that envious readers, those who want to be what the writer is performing, are only envious when they do not allow themselves to engage in that performativity.

Allied to the topos of the adventurer is the impact of print on the sixteenth-century shift of the mercantile world of the guilds into pre-bourgeois society, and the specific issue of the writer's copyright that surfaces with the beginnings of capitalism. This is, of course, rarely discussed in the early modern period: not only does the printer usually own the right to copy, but "style," that location of a writer's singular authority, has not yet become a conventional commodity. At the same time, as Ralph Lever's situation indicates, copyright is not necessarily focused on earning money. In his (englished) "Forspeache" to the reader he complains that an earlier book by him was reprinted by someone else. Saying that printing in his time is much easier than it used to be ($xx2^{v}$), he does not explicitly condemn the action, but notes that it was therefore printed without an essential table and makes him look like a fool. He suggests, "no mans work shuld be printed, nor no mans name put to any worke, excepte the partie firste knew therof, and were welwilling thereunto" ($xx3^{v}$), adding that there should be "certaine marks" to distinguish between editions, so that another reader's changes to the text – what will become known as an editor's changes – are indicated. He wants a responsibility to the writer because the book is not impersonal, fixed in print, and hence de-codable as denotative information. For Lever, the writer's relation to the reader may fluctuate with context. The "book" however, comes to

stand in for the writer's "style," and forms a particular context for the autodeictic person-to-person link with the reader. Just so, the "edition" will come to stand in for an editor's "style."

The root of the topos of the adventurer is also often buried in the idea that to put something into print is arrogant, partly because of pride or hubris, and partly because of the ostensible claims that printed matter makes to fixity, control, and truth. In Thomas Wilson's second edition "Prologue," he says that writers who go into print are thought to be either proud or fond (foolish), but goes on to say that there are other kinds of writers who use print. First, there is the writer who writes as if for their neighbor (A4): a trope that asks the reader to focus on neighborhood, or shared context, rather than fixed truth. And second, in a trope that Mulcaster will develop at length, there is the writer who writes as if for teachers, and asks readers to think of the writer and themselves as a conduit to a specific place of knowing. Both elements recall Erasmus's focus on friendship and co-creation in a written rhetoric for the printed book. This second trope underlines the performativity of knowing as "probably the best" rather than as fixed truth.

In Mulcaster's *Positions*, his first book to go into print, he says in his dedication that he is publishing in print to help teachers gain a better understanding of how to teach. Publishing the *Elementarie* a few years later, and twenty-two years after Wilson's 1560 "Prologue," he is still concerned about the public criticism of material simply because it has been printed. He argues again that print is the best way to distribute learning, especially if the "book be not big" (*4^{v}) and can therefore be affordable. But he is more concerned with the misleading belief that print differs from writing in kind by being fixed and is therefore dangerous. He argues:

> Can reading be right, before writing be righted, seing we read nothing else, but what we se written? Or can writing seme right, being challenged for wrong, before it be cleared? I account the print as a statarie writing, and therfor incident to the same term. (A4^{v})
>
> [I read this as: Can reading be correct if writing is not already considered correct, seeing that we read nothing but what we can see before us in writing? Or can writing only seem as if it is correct, and be challenged for being incorrect, before it has been read through and understood? I take print as a stationary kind of writing, and therefore naturally appertaining to the same terms.]

Here Mulcaster embeds right reading into right writing, and goes on to introduce the ambiguity of the reader "clearing" writing and possibly opening it up to challenge – but in both manuscript and print. This awareness of the reader's engagement with the writer underlines the potential for performative work central to an autodeictic stance, and the topos of the adventurer often moves distinctly

toward alerting the reader to the moebic strategy that it sets up to bind the reader to the writer's vision.

The Prodigal Book: Heroic Authorship and the Social Value of Writer–Reader Collaboration

The topos of the prodigal book usually takes this awareness of the autodeictic much further. It is frequently associated with the book as a social and public benefit, not printed for the writer's reward, and analogous to the relatively popular sixteenth-century take on the biblical story of the prodigal son who is accepted back into the family without that family looking for gain, in other words, on faith or in trust.[29] One key element of the topos is that the prodigal son has been a social outcast. His return to his family is the first step to a return to civic life and subjecthood, but he brings with him the outlaw elements of the life he has just left. The trope is one of the writer losing the manuscript, only to find it again and be persuaded to publish it. One interpretation of this situation is that the manuscript is so outlaw, so alternative, that it may offend the civic public. This is partly about the writer being persuaded to put faith in the writing again, but also that the printer and reader put faith in and trust the publication. Writer, reader, and printer become the family that welcomes the outlaw in, and explicitly prepares an audience for the book's alternative ways of dealing with the world. What this topos does, quite openly, is display its moebic work and lure the reader into an engaged performativity that affects not only the writer but also turns the reader into an alternative audience.

Possibly its most famous exemplum may be in Thomas Wilson's previously cited extraordinary "Prologue" in the second edition of his *Rhetorique*. He says the first edition of the book got him into trouble, and like a father betrayed by his son he disowned it. But he then recognized his responsibility also to help the reader. Hence, even though there is a chance that the book may have affective power considered to be against the social structure, he does not want to dissuade the reader from reading because of other social benefits the book may confer. In other writers, this trope becomes, in a number of different addresses to the reader: "I wrote part of it many years ago and my patron urged me to complete it," "I found a surviving manuscript copy after many years and on rereading it saw it was worthy," "My friends found a copy and urged me to print

29 Hardin Craig, "Morality Plays and Elizabethan Drama" (1950); Alan Young *The English Prodigal Son Plays* (1979).

it after many years," and "The printer found it and urged me to publish." In all cases the book is reclaimed by a reader, not a writer, and is now reproduced for another reader.

Many addresses to the reader claim that the book is produced for the common good: of learning, education, knowledge (Elyot, Sherry, Robinson, Peacham, Bryskett). This is not only to do with a common educational policy emerging from Erasmus's and Colet's experiments in the early decades of the century, that was increasingly focused on the sons of the relatively privileged gentry and monied merchants. It is also fundamentally tied to the belief that only if they know "reason" will the common people accept their position in the world and not rebel in this time of sudden social mobility (Elyot, Sherry, Wilson). In this case, the book is produced for sociocultural benefit so that learning will increase civility and peace, and to give the public an education in the temperance of civic behavior. Related to a self-conscious and growing awareness of national pride in English civilization, and the civility of the citizen within the nation, the prodigal book is produced for the benefit of the country and not for individual profit to the writer or the reader. Knowledge and learning bring quietness, for "peaceablenesse is the end of all government, as learning is the mean" (Mulcaster, *Elementarie*, ¶2). Great countries have educated citizenry who do not fight within their own borders (Robinson), and by the end of the sixteenth century this becomes a topic that argues that the English, peculiarly, do not do this (Wright).

This potentially idealist argument, performed through the altruism of the writer, refers mainly to the matter of the book but it can also be self-servingly tied into ethos. A good example of this approach is again Richard Mulcaster, who confidently asserts that readers cannot possibly want more benefits than the writer wants for them, and proceeds to use his "Peroration" to offer a direct appeal to his readers to become "learned" and to gain social benefit (*Elementarie*, Ff2). Yet for many writers these social "benefits" are part of a consistently present invention about man being man rather than animal through learning the content of the book (Elyot, Hoby, Mulcaster, Wilson). Derived probably from Thomas More's *Utopia*, the topos binds the readers to the writer into a moebic paradox: they need the content of the writer's book to be men not animals, so if they reject the book they reject their civility, therefore any negative response to the writer is due to a lack of judgment. The logic: the reader wants to be human not animal, and to be human is to have civility by reading the content of the book. To have civil judgment, gained by reading the book, means one is favorable to the writer, therefore (flipping the first ground) being unfavorable to the writer/book is an indication of the reader's less-than-human, bestial character. The invention of reader becoming human by acquiring civil

judgment through reading the book soon becomes a structural component in the printed book often named as the "Preface." The preface is the place where the matter of a book is laid out in an indirect address to the reader. Yet if the reader accepts the argument in the preface and reads on, there is an implicit bridge already in place between the writer and the reader.

The writers using the topos of the prodigal book in an altruistic claim of social benefit frequently attempt to establish other moebic devices for the potentially envious reader. In 1586 Angel Daie, having after six years "ransacked divers bundels of olde papers" and found his manuscript again, and coincidentally, the "Printer as then being by" ([1]), decides to publish. As he then explains, his haste in sending to the press caused errors in his book, but that just as corrections can be made before another setting of the type, so the learned can correct his errors ([1]). The logic runs: 1) learned readers will not criticize his book, but 2) attempt to correct it out of friendliness and courtesy for the public benefit. Hence, 3), a reader who is unfavorable to the book is not learned and is preventing a contribution to society. This logic, of the reader as a critic who "corrects" the book for social good, is echoed by Lodowick Bryskett, who takes a different tack and simply says that if anything is wrong or "ill" with the book, it is his "imperfections" ([A4^{v}]), and goes on to say that, as Philip Sydney exhorted, love men for their good will and do not hate them for their imperfections. In other words, if readers take against him, they are not behaving in a civil manner. Both of these writers suggest that if a reader disagrees with the writing, they are actively working against the nation, yet they also move toward an autodeictic stance that asks their readers to collaborate with the writer and to help in bringing social benefit to others by co-creating the materials in the book.

Rather mischievously, but possibly at the heart of these devices, Anthony Munday in 1593 points out that his book is one of "contraries," that is, after all, its title. He goes on to state that while he doesn't want to deceive, life is more interesting when unexpected. In other words, the book is deceitful and not deceitful at the same time, for if it were not deceitful it would not be like life, and hence would be deceitful. He ends this moebic paradox by saying that this kind of play should be welcomed by friends. The "contrary," a type of moebic device, is a rhetorical invention linked in argument both to contradictory relations in a syllogism and to raising emotions.[30] It is also sometimes linked to the figure of thought "antitheton," in which two exclusive things of the same kind are linked. In this definition the connections between the contrary and its melancholy, and

30 Heinrich Lausberg on "contrarius," *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric* (1998), 632.

doublethink, are clearly brought into focus. A present-day definition reads: "Because contraries occur in pairs and exclude one another, they are useful in arguments because one can establish one's case indirectly, proving one's own assertion by discrediting the contrary."[31] Munday, therefore, decides to be forthright and open about using the moebic device as a way to bind the reader to the writer's performativity, at the same time as stressing that this open awareness turns the device from manipulation of the reader by ethos into a rhetorical stance of playing, because the binding destabilizes that ethos. Indeed Munday is performing the playfulness that he expects of his reader in drawing attention to the paradoxical bind of this moebic device. It is performative and autodeictic, encouraging the reader to collaborate with the writer, to set aside the opinion of envy and be affected by the process. If melancholy is a marker of singularity, the alternatives generated by an open playfulness with its contraries may relieve it.

Autodeixis and the Printed Book: the Becoming-on-the-Page of Style, the Self, and the Critic

Nearly all of the strategic applications of these topics of the rolled-up tapestry, the merchant adventurer, and the prodigal book are concerned to present the writer as a person with new or alternative visions of how the world may be seen. Explicitly through the medium of the printed book, they lure the reader into questioning the assumptions of their subjecthood by associating what the reader does with what the writer does. The ethos or authority of the rhetoric is frequently interrupted by an engaged stance, the style, of the self of the writer bound to the self of the reader – often, as suggested here, through the strategy of autodeixis in the printed address to the reader. For those writers concerned with an envious reader, their voice also establishes moebic devices that can either strip the reader of critical response and require assent, or point out the co-responsibility of the reader to agree. But for those writers who welcome the reader into the process of making alternative worlds, as interpreters, editors, and/or critics, the moebic device augments the autodeictic strategy. This last offers an invitation that does not ask primarily for agreement but for the collaboration that accompanies the affective performativity of an engaged reader. The distinction is not only between a rhetorical stance in which the writer depends on the reader accepting common ground (in which the moebic is masked), and a stance that argues for those grounds in interaction with the reader (in which

31 Gideon Burton, on "Contraries," *Silva Rhetoricae* (2007), accessed March 5, 2012.

the moebic is foregrounded but resolvable in agreement), but also between these two strategies and a third that works by generating performativity in the print medium (in which the moebic enables the performatively engaged). The way that this last, performative activity of an autodeictic strategy offers the moebic device as play among reader, writer, and medium generates affective change that absorbs the writer's selfhood into becoming-on-the-page, or style, and the reader's into becoming a critic – or even an editor.

The textual performances in these addresses to the reader usually adopt a conversational situatedness allied to the ambiguity of language and the need to position and place interpretation within the singular context of elements left out of the sociocultural. Possibly because they are presenting an alternative to the representations of subjecthood, the performances are acutely anxious about the potential problem of an envious reader, who may not want to learn how to read in this way and may not engage with them. These writers use the moebius device to anchor their ethos, to make it plausible. The plausible stance is particularly telling with regard to the printed medium of communication which appears to underwrite fixity. Yet the autodeictic strategy in the addresses often presents certainty not as truth, but as "probably the best" for the moment, and as something that is in continual conversation because all readers read differently. This may have been acutely felt at the time because English as a language was new to the emerging national responsibilities of "civilization," and also because the Tudors had instigated a demographic shift that led to a much larger number of people claiming cultural power to which they had more access precisely because of the print medium.[32]

The through-line in each address to the reader, whether the moebic device is masked, foregrounded, or performatively engaged, is to distinguish between those readers who read for opinion and fantasy (Whetstone, Wilson) and believe that the certain is true, and those readers who read with the judgment of friendship – for the latter will learn how to read from engaging with the process of the writing, the style, of the book. In that engaged process, both writers and readers are caught in a world that recognizes that civility is learned and that "self" is performative rather than a stable representation of identity. Through the medium of the printed book, these writers attempt to create a relationship with the reader, a trustworthy friendship, in which their writing performs how the reader may read. When their probable rhetoric is interlaced with autodeictic

32 There has been much critical discussion of the relation of print to nationalism and capitalism, see the early influential texts: Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962), Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (1979), and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (1982).

devices such as the paradoxical and "contrary" strategy of the moebius, it destabilizes the identity of ethos into performative style.

As these writers, working in a genre dedicated to talking about behavior, move in the late sixteenth century from recognized patterns of inherited status located in their patrons to other, more questionable, authorities that reflect the changes of the times, they adopt topoi that directly address the problems of creating an understanding of the trustworthy behavior of a friend. The issues related to the topoi discussed here – the ethics of translation and classical authority, the author's status and role in a print society, and the writer's and reader's consociality – each contribute elements to the performativity of self in the printed book. They also contribute concepts about the performativity of the reader's self in interpretation, editing, and critique. In other places, such as Spenser's *The Shepherd's Calendar* (1579), with its commentary written by "E. K.,"[33] we see similar attempts throughout a whole book to persuade about the value of probable narrative and the role of the writer's autodeictic voice in the medium of print. Spenser's text attempts to ameliorate or guide the reader's response toward writing that claims neither to be "true" nor "untrue" by involving them in the experience of that ambiguity.

As is well known, E. K. firmly transports the translation of the text from a foreign language into a hermeneutics of English that is founded on the topos of interpreting the "old words" to restore "good and naturall English" (¶2^{v}). He warns the reader not to "rashly blame or condemne, or of witlesse headinese in judgying, . . . for not marking the compasse of hys bent, he will judge the length of his cast" (¶2^{v}). In other words, readers who rashly blame the writer simply display their own inadequacies. E. K. again uses a moebic strategy to encourage the reader who reads appropriately, saying they will in particular respond to the envious reader – implicitly, they are not envious:

> yf Envie shall stur up any wrongful accusation, defend with your mighty Rhetorick & other your rare gifts of learning, as you can, shield with your good wit, as you ought, against the malice and outrage of so many enemies. (¶3^{v})

The moebius is redoubled because, as we are openly told, the "Author selfe is shadowed" (¶3) under the voice of Colin. But Colin is a shepherd. Definitely not one of the privileged and educated readers to be expected for this text. Even though Colin is arguably the location of the medium of the poem, he too is shadowed by other voices destabilizing his presence, including a negatively present editor – possibly, if we follow E. K., to enable the author to argue "covertly"

33 Edmund Spenser, *The Shepherdes Calendar* (1579); all quotations from this text are taken from this edition with page numbers following in brackets.

rather than to "profess." To acquire a presence-on-the-page the author needs to be given a style which is the voice the editor gives to Colin, however ambiguous.[34] And even more explicitly, E. K. binds the reader to the writing through his own critical activity as commentator, which is frequently frustrating and apparently irrelevant, as are the voices of other potential readers. It has been suggested that E. K.'s misinterpretations are precisely there to prompt the reader into offering their own alternative interpretation.[35] Yet E. K. becomes the figure of a collaborative autodeixis as he recommends "the author unto you, as unto his most special good frend, and myselfe unto you both, as one making singular account of two so very good and so choise frends" (¶3^{v}). This figure of translator-as-commentator underlines the co-identification of reader and writer as "special good" friends – as a "singular" co-presencing entity – through the commentator's intervention. In *The Shepherd's Calendar* these are multiply autodeictic voices: an author, a translator, an editor, a critic/commentator, a speaker – all generating a performativity enabled by the printed book.

The cauldron of the formation of the writer's voice not only as ethos but also as engaged autodeixis is, as Angus Gowland argues, compellingly present in Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*.[36] Melancholy, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a disease resulting from the separation of the individual subject from the self, and is experienced by that small proportion of the population made up of relatively privileged people who are considered to have subjecthood. The doublethink required by capitalist structures demands that the subject be represented even though no one subject can be fully represented by the state. This is partly because what a person wants is what drives a market economy, hence "desire" – or what is not represented – is fundamental to the capitalist economy of the emerging liberal nation state. But the doublethink is more destructive than this. Its straitjacket locks a person into a condition that appears to be determined. Even if what a relatively privileged person wants can be negotiated into the public sphere, the needs of that self, its singularity, cannot be articulated. Hence, melancholy.

The moebic device is but one of the many that may generate the probable stance needed by autodeixis. Burton develops a range of strategies appropriate to the printed book to question the certainty of determination and to disrupt the stability of the writer's ethos which sustains this melancholy. The maneuver

34 Andrew Miller teases apart the "competing demands of style formation" in this text in "Spenser's Shameful *Shepheardes Calendar*" (2019), 31.

35 Theodore Steinberg, "EK's 'Shepheardes Calendar' and Spenser's" (1973), 48.

36 Angus Gowland, "Rhetorical Structure and Function in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*" (2001).

breaks down the tension between the predictability of authorized writing and the hermeneutics of probable reasoning. It either welcomes the reader to the ambiguous and performative autodeixis of the writer or binds them to the profound ambivalence and melancholy of individuality that becomes a marker of the early modern age. Lodowick Bryskett, whose *Discourse of Civill Life* (1606) emerges from a conversation with Spenser and others that is recounted in its opening pages, loosens this logic. His address "To the Gentle and discreet Reader" says that although there's nothing new under the sun, the understanding of man [sic] is such that there is an infinity of interpretation, and hence an infinitude of books. Given this, there is a need to distinguish between "good" and "bad" books to prevent corruption and give the benefit where it is due ([A4]). This shift of an envious reader into a critical reader, as we might understand it today, and of which Spenser's E. K. is a portentous example, is a sign of the acceptance not only of literary criticism but also of printers' and booksellers' readers and editors.[37] It is also an articulated understanding about the performative work of a printed book, and the engagement of the reader.

Thomas Wilson, in his "Prologue to the Reader" (1560), says that not all writers are so arrogant as to claim authority, just as not all readers are opinion-seekers without judgment. However, he then avoids the moebic strategy that a good reader will, unlike the envious reader, demonstrate that they have judgment because they approve of the book. Instead, his style is to display the hidden logic of the moebius, commenting that most readers do lack judgment and just want fancies, and then to openly shift the grounds to conclude that whatever the reader thinks of this book of his, it is the book's fault not his. Effectively the book mediates the performativity of the writer's autodeixis. Wilson warns: "He that goeth in th Sonne, shalbe Sonne burnt, although he thinke not of it. So thei that wil reade this, or soche like Bookes, shall in the ende, be as the Bookes are" ($A5^{v}$). The reader does not have to be aware of the process, but he, the writer, is alerting them to the way that in reading they will become one with the writer through the medium of the book, and that both will emerge changed. The autodeixis of these writers is concerned with what they write in the intertextuality of their translations and interpretations, with the risk to their self that is involved, and with why they write it – for the social good. But, just as for Montaigne, the writers are also concerned with how the process of their writing is realized in the printed medium as a style of behavior that necessarily

37 I would be prepared to argue for this kind of work even in the period of the late sixteenth to early seventeenth century. See Lynette Hunter, "Why Has Q4 *Romeo and Juliet* Such an Intelligent Editor?" (2001).

destabilizes an autonomous identity. This last finds its way into an occasional direct "address to the book" rather than the reader. Wilson's warning to the reader is a gesture to his awareness that the medium itself plays a part in the performativity of an engaged rhetorical stance, a conversation between writer and reader that changes both and presences that change.

Endnote: The Invention of the Private Sphere and Alternative Ways of Being

Conversational rhetoric was at the heart of writing about trustworthy behavior among the educated and relatively privileged men of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England. Partly because of changes in social status following the redistribution of monastic lands in the 1530s to 1540s, and the emergence of a monied and powerful merchant class that established the stock exchange by 1571, these men needed guidance about appropriate and dependable behavior. As the visual display of the court, and a trust in the humors, was found to be deceitful, the conversation of friends moved into the world of words in the civic arena. When words, as the key to humanist activity, were shown to be deceitful, the conversation of friends moved into civic space, only to find itself ruled out by the logic of capital. Profit is made because someone else "loses out," so capital should never exploit a friend. Friendship and trustworthy conversation can only take place outside the civic, in the familial – and so the invention of the private sphere begins. Conversational rhetoric is confined to the world of the family, of domesticity, and of friendship. For these writers, because they were educated, that domesticity was usually part of the world of the also-educated reader, and their co-generated alternative ways of being began to be realized in the singularity of style.

Chapter 6
Personal Rhetoric 1630–1660: Conversational Rhetoric: Co-generating Common Grounds for Non-Human People

Friendship and Probable Rhetoric from the Alterior to On-going Process: Dorothy Moore

The books on rhetorics of visual behavior and verbal communication in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that have made up the core of this study so far, were written by men. As foregrounded throughout the previous chapter, these writers were part of a relatively privileged group of citizens within the developing nation state of England. They wrote for like-minded humanists, and called on conversation with friends as a probable rhetoric through which to articulate the alternative views of the world that they brought into public discussion. In doing so, they carried new ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing from the sociosituated lives of their familial and friendship circles into the sociocultural landscape of nation state capitalism. At least in some small part their writing specifically addresses elements in their personal life that were being left out of subjecthood. While I have no doubt that the location of singularity in style was generated by several devices, in many of the forematter "address to the reader" sections, their co-generated interpretations as translator, editor, or critic are often rendered through autodeictic style.

But: what about those many other people who were not "human"? Women, most people of color, children, laboring and unpropertied men – all with distinct kinds of being non-human. They were neither citizens, nor subjects, so what were they? They had no representation, politically, socially, or culturally. They had no way of generating singularity or what was left out of subjecthood, because they had no subjecthood. Their social presence was a shadow of the civic man, a ghostly presence of exploited labor: physical, intellectual, sexual, psychological, affective. Yet, they got up in the morning. They were part of the network of capital and survival, but they were also part of an intricate web of sociosituated support and need, that may otherwise be named familial and/or friendship. This paragraph also be written in the present tense.

In previous chapters, the books on behavior that have been concerned with conversation and friendship take us up to the 1630s and herald the Long Parliament of 1641, the English revolution of the Civil War, the Commonwealth. The war fundamentally undoes that defining element of civility and citizenship,

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which is: not to take up arms against another citizen within the nation. Its turbulence recalls the earlier 1530s and 1540s currents of rebellion involving those excluded both from new ideas about citizenship and suddenly deprived of the previously extensive social services run by the monasteries and nunneries. It also recalls the plethora of books in English printed at that earlier time for the "common good," or the "common weal." The beginning of the Commonwealth period is a similar time of possibility for Ranters/Diggers/Levellers, for ecumenism, for women, if not for people of color and other people outwith citizenship and not yet even recognized by the nation state.

This chapter focuses on one woman, Dorothy Moore (1612/13–1664),[1] and her attempts to call on conversation with friends to articulate new ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing particular to her. She, too, was from a relatively privileged position of social status, but as a woman had no access to civic life or to subjecthood and its representational power in the nation state. Her place in this final chapter of my critical examination of the rhetoric of conversation in the early modern period is due not only to her exceptional rhetorical skill, but also to her articulation of a positionality outwith the nation state. To be outside implies a locatable inside which one might or might not want to or be allowed to join. To be outwith is to be in a place that has no direct relation to any "side," certainly not one that could be "joined" – it is a positionality that is alterior rather than alternative. Being a woman at the heart of a group central to the theological and associated political revolution of the English Commonwealth, Moore's letters document her radically emergent actions and thinking as she moves from the revolutionary optimism of the late 1630s to the pragmatic compromises of the 1640s. In doing so, they put into words some aspects of the alterior lives of women that had to wait nearly three hundred years to come into being when women in liberal nation states began to be re-classified from non-human to human in the early twentieth century.[2] The letters argue not for the singularity of the individual but for a communal concept of a public sphere outwith the civic and national institutions and embodied in an ecumenical Christianity, and they claim alliance between people left out of what will become called the social contract, specifically women and working men. The letters presence the tragic extinguishing of this intellectual imagination for a different kind of public outwith the

1 All quotations from letters written by Dorothy Moore, and unless otherwise noted, all those in relation to her life, are quoted from Lynette Hunter, *The Letters of Dorothy Moore 1640–1660* (2004a). This edition of the *Letters* numbers each single letter, and in this book any particular letter is cited in the text with a bold roman numeral.

2 For example, this was the year 1929 for women in Canada, excluding First People's women who had to wait until 1961.

nation state, but also indicate the practical alternatives in science, medicine, and education that Moore takes on as an amanuensis for her second husband.

There has been much attention paid to letter-writing by women in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially those letters of the aristocracy and gentry which are more likely to have been preserved within larger collections of family papers.[3] There are few letters still extant by those of little means, and even fewer of single women.[4] However, there has been considerable work done on the oral and written records of words women used in prophecy, which delineates a number of similarities with and distinctions from Moore's writing. Since 2003 there has also been a growing number of texts that refer to her letters and position them in various arguments.[5] Her letters complement and add to the research extensively laid out in Carme Font's *Women's Prophetic Writings in Seventeenth Century Britain*,[6] and where they differ in the account given in this chapter is in their self-reflective use of conversational rhetoric. They also differ in their intellectual theorizing not of the seventeenth-century national public that a number of critics have compared to Habermas's concept of a "public sphere,"[7] but of an alterior public sphere more akin to the concept of sociosituated groups articulated by people working in the twentieth century on situated knowledge and knowing,[8] or of the radical political critiques of African American philosophy that posit alterior positionality and emergent ways of knowing that are often unrecognizable to liberal and neoliberal political discourse.[9]

Moore's writings, as those by the widow of a younger son in the Irish aristocracy, with little money of her own but just enough to remain independent of family ties, would not be expected to have been preserved. However, her intellectual

3 See J. Daybell, *Early Modern Women's Letter Writing, 1450–1700* (2001).

4 However, the research conducted by Felicity Lyn Maxwell on servants' manuscripts is one project that may begin to rectify this gap, "Upper Servants' Letters" (2018). See also S. Whyman, who discusses some of the problems besetting single women, and their uses of letter-writing, in "Gentle Companions" (2001).

5 For a recent significant bibliography see Felicity Lyn Maxwell, "Calling for Collaboration" (2017). Maxwell refers to an important research project: "RECIRC: The Reception and Circulation of Early Modern Women's Writing, 1550–1700," directed by Marie-Louise Coolahan, and is working on a monograph from which unfortunately I have not been able to benefit*: Dorothy Moore's Intellectual Correspondence (ca. 1640–1661)*.

6 Carme Font, *Womens Prophetic Writings* (2017).

7 David Norbrook, "Women, the Republic of Letters, and the Public Sphere in the Mid-Seventeenth Century" (2003), 244.

8 See in particular, Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges" (1988), and Lynette Hunter, *Critiques of Knowing* (1999a).

9 For different approaches to this unknowability, see Frank Wilderson, *Afropessimism* (2020), and Fred Moten, *consent not to be a single being* (2018).

capabilities drew her into the Samuel Hartlib circle, and Hartlib's letter-copying dissemination project. As a result we have some of her letters, mainly from 1643–1645, which are probably those that she, and Hartlib, valued most highly for their contribution to a public, and one might hypothesize that her awareness that her letters could be copied to others made her more intellectually ambitious than other women writing at the time. Although like others she is concerned with managing her house, with business, with family relations, with spiritual experience, with patronage and protection,[10] she consistently weaves these issues into the larger fabric of the politics and religion of her time.

The letters self-reflectively display familiar, conversational, and formal rhetoric. Unlike the relatively privileged men writing on behavior, Moore could not even imagine citizenship or representation. She could not go into publication except through the manuscript circulation curated by Hartlib. Despite her upbringing in a family with sons and daughters noted at the time for their intellectual skills,[11] she could not teach in the general public. Moore was not simply outside sociopolitical representation, but outwith any sociocultural public recognition. This is at the heart of her critical theorizing. A devout if radical Christian, what is interesting about her early political imagination is its complete indifference to the marginality of women in the mainstream church, and its advocation for an alterior public sphere appropriate to their ministry which is found in the Body of Christ (BoC). For Moore the BoC means a community of all people – her letters list women, men, the poor, the sick, and the heathen. The BoC is an allegory of a person's body, which has many different functions – blood, stomach, spine, muscle – all acting to support each other in "service." It is a collaborative community that for Moore is based on difference.

The theological distinction that she consistently makes is between "being called" and "intending." A call involves work with a friend on alterior valuing. It is carried out by a self that is denied both subjecthood and singularity, but which is nevertheless sociosituated in familial and community circles of activity. "Self" is an evolving concept for the seventeenth century, as for today. It has been suggested that the actual words "self" and "selfhood" indicate the flesh rather than the spirit at this time,[12] and there is a need to clarify that these words here are used with a twenty-first-century signification of the distinction

10 These issues are those most commonly found in letter-writing by women of the period; see for example, V. Larminie, "Fighting for Family in a Patronage Society" (2001); see also R. O'Day, "Tudor and Stuart Women" (2001).

11 Lynette Hunter, *The Letters of Dorothy Moore 1640–1660* (2004a); see also Carol Pal, *Republic of Women* (2012).

12 Jonathan Sawday, "Self and Selfhood in the Seventeenth Century" (1997).

between the subject and the self, which is different for those people with subjectivity and for those outwith that classification. Chapter 5 studies the idea of "selfhood" in terms of the singularity of relatively privileged male writers who were subjects of the nation state. For the non-human, selfhood is not only outside the conditions of the subject yet with the possibility of being articulated into the sociocultural, but is outwith those conditions and located in a felt sense of an alterior commonality. For Moore, a call signifies a need to serve the community of the members of the BoC. In contrast, for a woman to intend is for her to focus on the sociocultural and what an individual person might want, and to be both potentially corrupted by and trapped into the determinations of a political structure that denies her representation. The person simultaneously occupying these positions of communal service and private desire is not-seen in civic public life. As *The Rich Cabinet* notes, she simply "sits for the gaze,"[13] is exploitable and corrupted into the new system of capitalist economics, and is at the same time non-human. The question for Moore becomes: how does this person serve in a public sphere if by definition she cannot serve in the socioculturally recognized public sphere of the nation state?

Historians have constructed Dorothy Moore's life elsewhere,[14] but it is helpful to understand that she came from colonial English gentry in Ireland, married into minor aristocracy, and became a widow in 1635 with two sons and an income that ceased with the Irish Rebellion of 1641. During the years 1635–1641 she traveled in England, Ireland, and the Netherlands, and became known for her intellectual activities[15] and possibly her preaching.[16] At this time she also met and formed a close friendship with John Dury, a preacher whose ecumenical perspective was one based on "practical divinity," ethical rather than doctrinal,[17]

13 *The Rich Cabinet* (1616), 7.

14 See Lynette Hunter, *The Letters of Dorothy Moore 1640–1660* (2004a); see also Carol Pal, *Republic of Women* (2012).

15 The well-known intellectual, Anna Maria van Schurman speaks of her "great achievements and actions," and writes to her in Hebrew (1640) and in Latin (1641) [letters **1** and **2**], praising her as the first learned lady to emerge from England since Lady Jane Grey nearly a hundred years earlier.

16 I am grateful to Felicity Lyn Maxwell for her close manuscript reading of the letter in the Hartlib Papers (Maxwell, "Calling for Collaboration" (2017), 10), which corrects my own transcription of "preachings" (Hunter *The Letters of Dorothy Moore, 1640–60* (2004a)) to "proceedings." Nevertheless, in an attempt to conjecture or hypothesize what the "activities" mentioned by van Schurman may have included, preaching, which is a widely interpreted verbal rhetoric, is a distinct possibility given that Moore was against women speaking "prophecy" but says nothing against them preaching.

17 John Young, "Durie [Dury], John (1595–1680)" (2008), accessed 5 November 2020.

and hence probably rather more open to differing theological viewpoints[18] – which may have encouraged her radical views and actions.[19] She could certainly read Latin, Greek, and French, probably Hebrew, and possibly Ethiopian.[20] She is referred to as "Mrs Aethiop" by Dury and Samuel Hartlib in 1644, which may be a reference to the role of women in Abyssinia who at the time were primarily responsible for preventing their church from being taken over by Roman Catholic missionaries.[21] Moore married Dury in 1645 and they returned to England with her two sons. From the 1630s to the end of the 1650s, Dury was closely associated with the Parliamentarians.[22] He acted on behalf of the Westminster Assembly as tutor to Charles I's children for several years in the 1640s, and was Keeper of the King's Library from 1648–1651. Dury and Dorothy had two children together, one dying young, and the other, DoroKaterina, surviving to marry Henry Oldenburg. With the Restoration John Dury left England rarely to return, while Dorothy stayed in England until her death in 1664. The extant letters referred to here date mainly from the period between the loss of her income in 1641 and her marriage to Dury in 1645, and are mainly to her friends Katherine Ranelagh and Samuel Hartlib, a significant exception being the exchange with a well-known Protestant cleric, André Rivet. Shortly after her second marriage in 1645 she disappears from civic public view, but not entirely from recorded documents.

As noted above, Moore uses three distinctive rhetorical strategies in her letters – formal, conversational, and familiar – depending upon the kind of audience or public she is addressing. She uses the formal and the conversational

18 Maxwell ("Calling for Collaboration" (2017), 10) points out that slightly later, in 1645, Dury made changes to one of Moore's letters that indicate that he was "proofreading Moore's French."

19 Carme Font brings another contemporary to life in her description of Eleanor Davis, *Women's Prophetic Writings* (2017). By her account Davis was similarly radical and outspoken.

20 Given the by then close relationship that Moore had formed with van Schurman, who compiled an Ethiopian grammar in the late 1630s/early 1640s (see Brita Rang, "'An Exceptional Mind'" (1996), 36), it may be that she also acquired other languages. It has been pointed out to me by Gordon Campbell, in a personal communication, that the reference could also refer to the quotations from the Ethiopian text of the Bible that occurred at this time in several ecumenical texts. These quotations were nearly all from the Latin translation. The text was published in the polyglot Bible of 1657.

21 The Ethiopian church was at the time considered by many Protestant reformers to be the church closest to early Christianity, and therefore important to the unification of Christian churches which they sought; see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *White on Black* (1995), 27–29; see also Galawdewos, *The Life and Struggles of Our Mother Walatta Petros* (2015).

22 Dury was chosen as a member of the Westminster Assembly in 1641, and joined the Assembly of Divines in 1645 after twice turning down their invitation, see Mario Caricchio (2021) accessed July 28 2021.

with André Rivet, all three with Katherine Ranelagh, and mainly the conversational and familiar with Hartlib. Just as men in England are changing the structure of governance and politics throughout this period, she is part of attempts to change the institutions of the church – in her case, by bringing different churches together. The kind of public delineated by her allegory of the BoC is made up of people within and outwith the discourse of the nation, and requires a conversational rhetoric because its grounds for argument are not all present in sociocultural discourse which uses recognized argumentation. Any discussion of an issue that concerns people outwith sociocultural discourse needs to use a rhetoric, such as the conversational, to co-generate the framework and vocabulary that are needed to value these unarticulated ways of being. To engage in such valuing Moore turns to the terms "assessment," "proportion," and "obligation." The readings below offer a detailed analysis of the connections these terms have with those of Erasmus: temperance, decorum, and prudence. The rhetoric of conversation and the associated terms are central to Moore's radical theology, whether in the service of the education and rights of women (**11**–**15**) or of "degree" and the equality of men (**39**). During 1644–1645, when she marries, her concept of the public unified in the BoC splits apart into the political and the spiritual that enacts on the page a fragmentation of self (**39**). Her letters then move from taking women and men as different but equal in the communal public sphere of the BoC, to arguments about class equality for men in the national public sphere, arguments that implicitly consign women to the private (**52**, **53**). At the same time, she develops the allegory of the BoC to conjecture what it would be like if Christ were like any other person, and if men, women, and Christ were all equal parts of a Body with God the father at the head (**44**, **45**).

Part I: The Allegory of the Body of Christ

Friendship: Letter 10, 1643, to Katherine Jones, Lady Ranelagh

Through her first marriage, Dorothy Moore had become an aunt to Katherine Jones (born Katherine Boyle), who as Lady Ranelagh was her social superior, and the two had connections through the Hartlib circle in the late 1630s. Their letters attest to the love and respect they had for each other, and date from the early 1640s.[23] The first extant letter between the two (**10**) is the most formal of

23 Katherine Jones arrived in London in 1641 after being under siege for two years at Athlone in Ireland; see Charles Webster, *The Great Instauration* (1975).

the letters addressed to Jones by Moore, which become markedly more familiar as they progress. It is 1643, and Moore is in the Netherlands with two sons, no work, and no income. In this letter, she considers two options: teaching, or taking a position in the court of Henrietta Maria, currently in Utrecht. It opens in direct response to a question that must have been put to her by Jones, of why she did not seek a court position. It transpires that Moore does not want to work at the court, and is trying in this letter to explore why this is so and at the same time to avoid alienating Jones. In the process she makes it possible for her reader, her friend Katherine Jones, to help distinguish between something socially acceptable – working at court – and something socially not acceptable but spiritually important – teaching.

Moore begins by referring to her "proceedings," being then governed according to an earlier sense of vocation of which she thinks Katharine Jones would have approved. A few sentences further on she says that she has sent the letter from Elizabeth of Bohemia, a letter of reference for a position at court one assumes, to the court, and is resolved to teach if the "Lord prevent not by calling me to that formerly spoken of" – the position at court. The implicit conflict between whether teaching is a "calling" or an "intending" then develops into the argument of the letter which lays out the central topos of Moore's theology concerning the membership of each individual in the BoC, with Christ at its Head. Key to this allegory is that to be a "member" of this body is to render service to the rest of its members, to communicate all "gifts and graces with all out ward provisions" for those who need them.[24] God makes this evident to us, she says, by showing us not only that such behavior is part of our spiritual nature, with his divine pattern in us so that even "heathens" undertake brave actions for each other, but also that these actions are better than those who "intend" themselves, who choose their own way and look only to "their owne profitt and pleasure." When people work out for themselves actions that they want to carry out, they intend something. But as Christians they may also be "called" to do something by God. At times an intention may overlap with a calling, but many times intentions turn out to be self-interested while callings are on behalf of a community. Even then it is not simple to assess what to do or how to pursue a calling. If a person believes in God's spiritual inspiration, then, as she indicates in this letter, they are "obliged" to act "proportionally." This may be difficult and needs prudence and decorum, since it is not easy to assess one's own "Inclination and Qualification" – one may do

24 For an introductory commentary on Moore's exploration of "members" in the "Body of Christ," see Lynette Hunter, "Unruly Fugues" (2003); see also Connolly, "Viscountess Ranelagh and the Authorisation of Women's Knowledge in the Hartlib Circle" (2011), 152.

too much yet to little effect, which is as ill-advised as doing nothing; both are intemperate. The spiritual argument about the need for temperance, decorum, and prudence – here called assessment, proportion, and obligation – lays the grounds for the justification for her own delay in seeking employment at court.

Moore then fairly abruptly states rather than argues that public work on behalf of the community is the duty of every member of Christ, including women. She explicitly acknowledges that women are excluded from being "administrators of his word" in the church, in Law, and in "Commanding Politick Government of a republicke," but notes that this leads some people, erroneously, to think that women cannot serve their Christian community in public. However, she says, this prohibition has yet to be proved, and that in the meantime all people can contribute "in some Measure." This syllogism is interrupted through reference to the previously stated highly questionable common ground – for the sociohistorical context – about the duty of every member of Christ to serve their public community. It is significant that Moore goes on to spell out the role of men in "Commanding Politic Government of a republicke" at a time when most men had only recently acquired this power by transfer away from the divine authority of the king. Implicitly she is establishing by association a ground for the acceptance of a change in what women can do. If men can acquire different responsibilities, so can women. Furthermore, by the addition of this detail women are only excluded from formal government, not from general practices of political power. Unlike the church and justice, which have recognized institutional systems, politics is in ferment and may yield opportunities for women just as it is doing for men. In effect Moore is arguing that rather than thinking of women as disempowered because they are excluded from institutions such as the church, they are in a particularly good position to serve the elements *not* included in that kind of institutional public life. Instead, women have the opportunity to serve politically in a different kind of public sphere.

Of course, Moore is a woman of her time and she goes on to propose what may today seem quite modest opportunities. Yet attention to the vocabulary she uses is important. She speaks first of women who are married and their responsibilities to their husbands, and "children sometimes." Married women may not have any children or their children may die, so their duty cannot lie only with care of offspring, but in giving a good example to all people. Second, they should give particular "edification by good Conversation" to those with whom they have opportunity to communicate. This second is possibly an honorific addressed to Katherine Jones herself, whose father Richard Jones educated

his daughters specifically in "conversation."[25] Conversational rhetoric in the context of written persuasion, as I have argued throughout this book, develops a probable stance in which both ethos and pathos are destabilized into the collaboration of reader and writer in the particular moments of engagement that happen, and in doing so may generate previously unarticulated positions or situations. Just as with Erasmus's *sermo* rhetoric, the conversational often persuades by analogy and story and anecdote. It depends on allegory, enthymeme, and paradox rather than syllogism or rational progression. The latter group of devices is more appropriate for formal argumentation, for instances of persuasion by public institutions in the civic state. The former group is appropriate for public persuasion within a personally known community, in Moore's terms the community of the BoC. Within the discourse of seventeenth-century rhetoric, the work of "edification by agood Conversation" is not casual pleasantry but serious ethical work on behalf of a situated community.

Moore – who at this stage is a widow with two sons probably around six and eight years of age[26] – then adds that if women do not want to engage in responsible care of a family or in edifying conversation, they should not marry but find some other employment that will allow them to exercise their Christian responsibility in ways more "proportionate" to their talents. And she herself chooses this last, even saying that she will beg God to leave her single and not put a suitable companion her way. What this means is that she must make her own way, and find her own decorum for doing so. In this case the logic is syllogistic, but it depends on the reader having accepted the distinction between "calling" and "intending," and the allegory of the BoC whose members should serve their community. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that she must make an "honest subsistence for mee and myne." In a sentence of extraordinary grammatical convolution and meandering, she moves hesitatingly through starts and stops to saying: yes, she will apply to the court for a position as Jones wants her to. But if she is refused she will take it as a sign from God that she should turn to "Instructing youth." This latter "service" she finds powerful for advancing "the Kingdom of Christ" but also for "making of our sex considerable," presumably both by the public work of teaching and the education of girls, and by being a woman who is

25 Nicholas Canny, *The Upstart Earl* (1982), 87. See also Margaret MacCurtain, "Women, Education and Learning in Early Modern Ireland" (1991).

26 Carol Pal suggests that the two young people, John and Charles, were two and four respectively at the death of their father, Arthur Moore – see *Republic of Women* (2012), 123, footnote 36, where Pal cites the *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Seventh Report, Part I* (London, 1879), 50. However, there is some discrepancy in scholars' accounts of the date of Arthur Moore's death, being either 1635 or 1637.

a teacher. She then re-states, distinguishing between individual intention and communal calling, that while private exercise is satisfying for herself it does not contribute to serving others as teaching would. At this point she directly asks Katharine Jones whether, should the court post fail, she knows of any way that she (Moore) can return to England to teach there in a "handsome settlement," since her Dutch is not good enough to teach in the Netherlands. Moore does not want to work at court, but will apply to do so if Jones wants her to because it may be a calling – and callings are not always what one would like for oneself. But if she does not get the position, this itself may be a calling that overlaps with what she intends, or wants. And if so, then she appeals to Jones, a fellow member in the BoC, to help her return to England and teach.

It should be noted that Moore's use of the word "service" recalls a worldview without "servants" as paid workers, which she is transposing from community practice to spiritual practice. A late feudal structure would have depended upon the notion of "service" as a set of practices that paid respect to people to be honored. Enacting various services also conferred honor on the practitioner. Furthermore, many "services" were explicitly modeled on religious practice in their gesture and their costume:[27] for example the carrying and serving of food was an elaborate performance analogous to the service of communion. Service was something one did for others in one's community. It was not a menial or humiliating action for which one was paid, usually poorly, although by 1643 it was on the way to becoming so. However, Moore here uses service in the earlier sense of the word, hence she calls her final request for help "most free and least serville" in an apology for selfishness. She is concerned about service to the community, which requires the choice of following a calling free from conventional social pressures.[28]

The 1643 letter lays out, through narrative, analogy, and allegory, several of the primary concerns that Moore will pursue over the next two years. It offers that delicate balance in which prudence, decorum, and temperance are needed to distinguish between God's calling and a person's intention. It states her belief in membership of a Christian community, a situated public sphere that she calls the Body of Christ. It outlines her understanding of the different but proportionately equal responsibilities of men and women to that community. It recognizes the exclusion of women from institutional public activity but implicitly

27 Peter Brears, "Behind the Green Baise Door" (1996); see also comments on service in D. T., *Essayes, Morall and Theologicall* (1609), 50.

28 The distinction is remarkably similar to that made by Jean Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (1943) between intention and freedom, cited by Alex Lichtenfels, "Materiality of Nothingness" (2020), 108.

argues that, just as earlier exclusions of some men from political power are being re-worked at that precise time, so the exclusions of women need to be re-worked, but not necessarily into institutional public space. And it claims that women's greatest avenue of opportunity to public action is through teaching. It also makes the philosophical distinction between sociocultural intention and the calling that is outwith, in the sociosituated, alongside, and often invisible to normative structures. Further, despite the vagueness of punctuation, the letter offers a good example of her control of epistolary argumentation. It is not formal despite the presence of some syllogism, but neither is it familiar – I would suggest that it is *precisely* conversational.

The reader is not addressed autodeictically but is asked to help the writer generate the temperance, decorum, and prudence that will allow her to distinguish a calling. To offer an overall summary for this letter: the rhetorical strategy starts rather abruptly with a realization of "conviction" about her calling as a teacher. A call, unlike an intention, will not find grounds for justification in conventional argument, hence it arrives as a feeling or conviction. But this is immediately followed by a topos of humility that sets up the receiver of the letter as a better spiritual guide than herself, hence Moore's own "mistake" is understandable because she has been without the guidance of her friend Katherine Jones until now. In only the second sentence, and a lengthy one, the writer declares her spiritual calling and ground, discussing God's calling and her relationship to it, citing biblical authority and giving biblical topoi and social analogies. She does so to justify her primary statement that if you believe in the grace of God being in all people then you are obliged to contribute to a Christian community. This sentence places boundaries around its logic and leaves no room for interruption until it has reached its conclusion. However, in the course of moving on to discuss her own situation in the text that follows she becomes detached, the sentences shorten and offer reasons, rational logic, condensed syllogisms, and careful wrong-footing strategies. Then, having made the transition from spiritual beliefs to public actions, she relaxes into the conjectural narrative that considers her options, moving back to longer sentences and coordinate conjunctions. Finally, the letter ends with a compliment that explicitly recalls the opening, saying that the receiver is spiritually better able to guide her, and that explicitly expects the receiver to do something about the situation.

A Radical Theology: 1643, to André Rivet

The conviction of her letter to Katherine Jones surfaces in a rather different and highly formal manner in the exchange of letters with Dr. André Rivet that takes

place two months later, in September and October 1643 (**11**–**15**). The formality of the rhetoric is central to the purpose of her exchange, since formal engagement with Rivet means a formal acknowledgment of her position from a highly influential Protestant theologian.[29] Unlike the men writing their "address to the reader" in books of behavior, Moore cannot assume a similar background and status, and needs to articulate a position that she hopes Rivet will legitimize.[30] In this she is also unlike writers emerging later in the 1650s, such as the Quaker Margaret Fell who attempted to use a conversational rhetoric to persuade a sociocultural public audience. Moore clearly feels the need for formal legitimation, probably because she was working with a public in the ecumenical movement that dealt with institutions such as the Church of England, and the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches.[31] Moore is fighting a revolution on the cusp of failure. Ten years later, Fell puts aside the failed revolution and proposes alternatives.[32] As Moore's exchange progresses one sees Rivet realizing this formality and its request for legitimation, and, in recognizing his lack of argument against what becomes a radical questioning of accepted theology, he abruptly curtails discussion.

Dorothy Moore's first letter to Rivet (**11**) is succinct and to the point. She asks first a question she expects to be answered in the affirmative: whether all people are members of the BoC and required to serve it, and then, second, if so, how can women best do so? She adds that since women are also members in the BoC (an acceptable common ground if taken conventionally), it is possible that they must be required to work for the community not just themselves (a supposedly acceptable common ground), but, if so, how? Here there is a general and a particular question, with both of which she needs help. The letter is constructed as a formal syllogism, with the "possible" in the third term an invitation to Rivet to agree – or disagree.

Rivet's letter (**12**) repeats back Moore's first argument word for word, with his own glosses, until he reaches the question about membership of the militant, institutional church, and answers that for women the best action here is prayer. The letter continues by repeating back the second argument with his

29 Phyllis Mack, *Visionary Women* (1995), 96–97.

30 Other letters from this time by Moore also demonstrate her need to make herself visible in social terms, usually by referencing men in support of her argument (see **8**).

31 See the important essay by Jane Donawerth, "Women's Reading Practices in Seventeenth Century England" (2006).

32 Carme Font notes in a comment about the work of Bathsua Makin in the 1660s that there was a "retreat from the revolutionary days of the 1640s and 1650s." *Women's Prophetic Writings* (2017), 21.

own glosses, but he misinterprets her to claim that she would like to participate in all the socioculturally public arenas of the church, justice, and government, so what follows entirely misses her point. However, the argument is also clearly anxious proleptically to forestall any claim not only to these areas but also to preaching, prophecy, and teaching. Significantly, Rivet disavows the possibility that men can be authorized to give power to women to preach or to administer the sacraments, which he intends as a device of closure that means women simply cannot have this authority – but which Moore later seizes upon as the reason that women must seek authority for themselves directly from God. Rivet's last section again repeats back Moore's concluding points about the "possibility" that women should act in public, and gives examples to show that she is wrong, such as women working as deaconesses which is no longer necessary. He offers her: special teaching for the ignorant, admonishing those who go astray, helping to distribute publications on meditation, and housework. He ends with a slightly patronizing note that she "fortify" her ideals, and deflects his goodbye into wishes for her children.

Dorothy Moore begins her reply (**13**) with a direct, but slightly backhanded compliment, saying that she is "obliged" to him for his "courteous and detailed" letter which "would have been more useful to me had I not given you occasion to misunderstand my meaning." In other words, he did not comprehend her argument and so he missed the point. Reiterating his strategy, she analyses her own first statement, spelling out the grammar of "the whole mystical body of Christ militant on earth, relatively set apart from Christian women . . . as a relative clause is set apart from everything else," and thereby gesturing to her formal education not only in grammar but in the rhetorical use of grammatical construction as invention. Her argument proceeds to explain where Rivet has gone wrong in the emphasis of his glosses, underlining the fact that had he been more careful and taken her more seriously he would have understood her meaning. Starting again from an abrupt "I insist on demanding by which path the female sex should pursue this goal," the prose builds to a testy reprimand: quoting in Greek from Galatians 3 28, which Rivet had offered in French in his previous letter, "there is neither male nor female for you are all one in Jesus." Moore goes on to say, "what you may think of my discourse, built on this incorrect assumption of my meaning, is superfluous as far as I am concerned, however learnedly and judiciously it may have been carried out in the course of morning prayer"; in other words, with only casual attention as he completed other clerical duties. After giving yet more examples of carelessness from his reading and in a tone of either testy defense or mock-despair, she says, "But in all this I have been misunderstood: for you interpret my words as if I had cited this passage as proof of what you had misunderstood in my discourse." She

presents herself as not being able to comprehend his misreading, as if he is either wilfully misunderstanding or trapped in a tautological error.

What is significant is not that Moore can analyze Rivet's mistakes, but that she has the confidence to speak them directly back at him. He is after all one of the three primary Protestant theologians in the Netherlands at this time. However, she then moves on to recapitulate the few "possibilities" that he offered to women in carrying out their service to the Christian community, adding her own glosses including the emphasis that not all married women have children and hence may not serve by being a parent. Having summarized the suggestions, she moves on to say that she still needs guidance both on what women may do and to what extent they may pursue it. The example she uses is one he hoped to put aside, prophecy, but she re-opens the issue with a citation from I Corinthians 11:5, 13 on prophecy, and demonstrates how "it came to me that" the problem was in the significance of the words "public" and "private."[33] After asking how far a woman may go in public with the science or knowledge that makes prophecy possible, she enters a convoluted syllogism. She is doubtful about the extent of this knowledge, even though it is for the benefit of others, and says that one's aim is limited in the pursuit of sciences or knowledge, in the same way that one's aim is limited in the study of prophecy – they both have to be restricted according to the amount of freedom normally "allowed" in the public administration of gifts befitting to women.[34] The sense here is that in experiencing a calling, a woman may well sense or see ways of living outwith – not allowed or even recognized by – conventional expectations.

Moore goes on to note that the allowed "amount of freedom" forbids women from exercising their gifts, and their insight, in public at all, so how are they to serve if they only exercise their gifts in "private," never bringing them to "the common good of the body" or community? "Private" here takes on the significance of "what one wants or intends." In this, she brings explicitly to the surface the repression that is being exercised: if the "amount of freedom" allowed were different none of this restriction would hold. Her syllogistic logic moves from the common ground that women experience spiritual calling to serve, yet do not have the freedom to do so in "public," to asking how they can balance their private intentions and spiritual calling to serve "a public." All people experience the restrictions of sociocultural convention on their freedom, but the subjecthood of citizens,

33 Christine Berg and Phillippa Berry note the challenge of many prophetic women to the concept of the public during the English revolution, "'Spiritual Whoredom'" (1981), 51–52.

34 This appears to be an explicit reference to the different concerns of herself and Anna Maria van Schurman, who knew André Rivet extremely well; see Brita Rang, "'An Exceptional Mind'" (1996), 26ff.

privileged men, allows for the generation of alternative visions for personal life. Implicitly, for women – who are neither subjects nor human – the amount of freedom *has* to be different, and it has to be changed to permit women more freedom, otherwise they cannot serve a common good. In other words, those alterior experiences and understandings relegated to the "private" in the lives of people outwith the sociocultural should be considered a different kind of public space. It is not just a matter of having "more" of the space for alternative ways of seeing the world. Freedom is the ability to choose to follow a calling even if it is not recognized in sociopolitical discourse. Unlike "liberty," which refers to the extent to which a person can behave the way they want to in the civic state, freedom is the possibility of valuing an alterior way of becoming in the world that may not even be recognized by the civic state.

The analogy with the sciences is instructive since Rivet has gone out of his way to relax the "amount" or extent to which women can pursue knowledge/science in his discussions with van Schurman. Although he has said that it is God who "permits," it is the ministers of God who have the earthly power to "allow" and hence also to ease the restrictions on prophecy and more generally on women's participation in, and contribution to, the common good. More important is Moore's conviction that women have to work in a public or they will fail to contribute to the common good at all. This realization, not logical but inspirational, generates the four, clear questions at the end of this letter. They start with the position of women as outwith subjecthood, and the resulting question of how the difference of women means they are *essentially* of greater use in some matters than men. The questions then go on to ask about the means, the kind of study, and the extent of discretion that should be employed in their acting differently. Moore is again framing her questions in terms of assessment, obligation, and proportion – otherwise cast as temperance, prudence, and decorum. In the original of this letter, which Moore keeps, the subscription is changed from "humble" to "affectionate" servant.[35]

The note at the end of the second letter, "the copy of my letter to Dr. Rivett the 8th October," indicates that Moore was aware of the significance of her argument, and that the letter had a formal enough status in her own mind to warrant copying. Rivet's reply on 18th October recognizes this, and enters into the spirit of barbed compliment by saying that he is honored to be discussing with her and will reply, "if not in the way that you hoped then at least in a manner befitting the opinion you have conceived of my desire to help you." Rather graciously, considering her direct criticisms, he takes on board her correction to

35 Felicity Lyn Maxwell, "Calling for Collaboration" (2017), 10.

his glosses on her first question about the church militant and the BoC, although he says these corrections are insubstantial. And he admits to misunderstanding her second question, an error which, in an attempt to undermine her implicit claim to rhetorical skill in grammatical invention, he puts down to a grammatical mistake she made with the "relative pronoun 'this'." Yet he then moves on to say, "But you require at present something which is more formal and more distinct," and after briefly repeating her final discussion and four questions, he simply says, "The first of these questions brings me to an abrupt halt." The remainder of Rivet's letter makes two points: that women do nothing essentially different from men in the public world and hence – here he quotes back to her in Greek, this time from her own source, St. Paul in Corinthians – are shamed when they do act in public,[36] and that women do different things from men in private, such as caring for the poor, teaching girls, and even prophesying.[37] Effectively, he disallows any public contributions of value from people outwith the social construction of a subject. Rivet's second letter concludes by acknowledging that Moore will "require something more distinct and essential," but he "cannot think of anything." His farewell edgily commends her "zealousness," a word carrying the connotations of excessive behavior.

Moore's second reply and third letter to Rivet has again an added note at the head, "The copy of my letter to Mr Rivet. 3," indicating her sense of the importance of this debate. Working analogously from the commonplace that women are subordinate to men, Moore uses a compressed syllogism to derive the conclusion that anything subordinate has been made so in order to carry out actions that are "not as fitting and essential for the principal agent to do." This is a fine distinction from "sub-ject": the "sub-ordinate" are not determined and subjected by a higher power, but are defined differently from a "principal agent" and do things differently.[38] The grammatical topoi of principal and subordinate are here contained in a sentence of extraordinary grammatical and semantic complexity. But at this point she interjects, "I have suddenly realized" the "twisted" or "braided" nature

36 Carol Pal notes the difference among St. Paul's letters, some being "the deutero-Pauline letters that mandated silence for women in church" and some being "authenticated letters [that] describe a ministry that included women as co-workers and equals," *Republic of Women* (2012), 127.

37 Kees Meerhof pointed out at the Edinburgh 1995 conference of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric that Protestants began to downplay prophecy early in the sixteenth century when it was recognized as an empowering discourse.

38 The distinction prefigures the concerns that Gayatri Spivak has with the "subaltern" who usually communicates from the position of the small amount of power invested in them by subjects, and yet has so much to speak if they would only speak about everything in their lives outwith that discursive power; see "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1984).

of body and spirit, a realization established through an enthymeme – the missing term of which is the union of body and spirit in the BoC rather than Descartes's separation between the two. From this realization she argues that men and women are unified in Christ only in grace, which is not achieved in the separate experience of the social or spiritual, but necessarily together. Hence women must have a public service or they will not be able to achieve grace. In language of increasing certainty, "it is evident," "consequently it seems," "all the more reason why," "for in view of the fact that," she concludes that women and men have essentially different "charges" or duties – but what are they? First she takes up the possibility of the role of deaconess that Rivet had dismissed, agreeing that it is not appropriate but going on to a reasoning completely distinct from his: that such work is not spiritually appropriate only bodily so, in terms of what it gives the "principal," or man. Here the implication is that as a deaconess, the woman is only acting as an inferior version of a man, and is not responding to a spiritual calling appropriate to women – they are "sub-altern," in Gayatri Spivak's terms, rather than "sub-ordinate." The logic recognizes that if someone not considered to be human works on the ground of the subject, who is defined as human, they always fall short. It is necessary to find another ground, a difference not in degree but in kind.

The argument then incorporates a second "I suddenly realized," which introduces the larger-scale issue of women working for public welfare and the good of the community, as well as the particular situatedness of each woman trying to use her spiritual gifts for "universal good." Here the enthymematic missing term is that women must use spiritual gifts for the good of a public community. Then a third "I suddenly realized" leads Moore to recognize that the spiritual "charge" is determined "by the sphere of our activity" so that it can be "settled and proportionate" to the person. Here she begins to delineate the alterior public sphere that is generated by membership in the BoC. The missing term in this enthymeme is that there is no absolute and distinct answer that can be authorized or allowed by ministers of God for all women or indeed all people, but that each person must determine this for themselves according to their own situation. The life of a person outwith subjecthood is woven into their surroundings, and is dependent on the co-generating of grounds for becoming and knowing that arrive through collaboration with members in the BoC.

Still left "in the dark" as to how to determine the call and its extent so that people can "behave in a settled way toward the body," Moore asks for Rivet's help so that "in your place I will have the opportunity of rendering acts of grace to God." Here the implication is that men have clear areas of both bodily and spiritual action for the public good and that this congruence between body and spirit yields the grace appropriate to spiritual union with God. Hence, until

women can determine the area of their spiritual action for a public good, they will not be able to achieve grace. The rhetoric insists that Rivet help her in this determination or he will be denying her the spiritual union with God to which he has earlier assented as a woman's right. This rhetorical device is moebic, in the manner explored in the previous chapter. What is interesting is that here, just as there, the writer is assuming a common ground with the reader. However, in the previous "address to the reader," that common ground, or the forming of that common ground, is based on the shared privileges of education, property, gender, color, and so on. Here the common ground is based on a shared spiritual membership articulated through the allegory of the BoC. In both cases the assumption of equitable collaboration is unarticulated. In the "address to the reader" that assumption is part of common privilege. In Moore's letter the assumption puts Rivet in a difficult position, precisely Moore's positionality, which he cannot afford to inhabit.

During the course of these letters, Moore's rhetoric moves from authoritative theological grounds developed by a formal syllogistic logic and embedded with biblical topoi and exempla, to an increasingly conversational argument hinged on her prophetic "sudden realizations." She cannot *prove* the role of public action in the service of Christ for women, for there are no biblical authorities to which she can turn that Rivet will accept. Hence she has to insert her arguments as divinely inspired perceptions, which by definition have missing terms like the biblical chiasmus, that then form the grounds to logical development. In doing so she enacts what she has learned from Rivet: that to incorporate a practical and different activity for women through theological argument, there has to be the possibility of divine calling because men have no authority to recognize such distinctly different activity, only God. Moore knows that if she wins the theological argument it would be an immensely powerful religious breakthrough. She is trying to make a case, which will never be made by male theologians, for a role within Protestant theology at least for a public service of women. Were she to gain Rivet's approval, and as the adviser to Anna Maria van Schurman he was one of the more likely people to give it, then Moore could make her case generally and socioculturally public. As a devout seventeenth-century Protestant, no matter how radical, she certainly cannot do it without approval or the public service would not be part of the ministry.

Rivet's stumbling inability to deal with her arguments in his second reply, and the lack of further correspondence, indicates the complexity of his position. He is not only "unable to see the problem from her perspective,"[39] but he

39 Felicity Lyn Maxwell, "Calling for Collaboration" (2017), 8.

must also disagree on self-evident grounds, or without discussion, with her rational and formal argument or he will have to accept her call for public service. However, he cannot disagree with her prophetic hinges, for to do so would be calling into question divine inspiration. His only option is to remain silent. He cannot win the argument with conventional grounds. He cannot afford the conversation that co-generates new common grounds. He cannot accept her formal rhetoric or he has to accept her call to a public service. He cannot disagree with her prophetic hinges, and if he did agree, he would again have to accept her call to a different kind of public service. From his position her argument is like an enthymeme gone wrong – no longer full of potential but of an inability to recognize that generates nothingness, and leads to his denial.

The emphasis on the "public" which has run throughout the letters instigates a closing marginal note from Moore to Rivet, in which she puts her finger directly on the problem, saying that for Rivet "public" means "ecclesiastical and political office," much as it came to mean in the institutions of the nation state that emerged from this period through to the twentieth century, whereas for her the "public" means "all that directly involves the state of the entire body, considered in itself to be an entirety." Rivet's "public" is the civic structure of the nation state, prefigured in the allegory of Leviathan that includes merely the 5 percent (maximum) of privileged citizens. The note anticipates the obscuring rhetoric of the liberal social contract which occludes the presence in public of women and all others who are not propertied citizens of the state. This of course is the inception of liberal ideology and the representations through which it determines the subjects of capitalist states. It is here precisely laid out at the center of the radical theology constructed by a woman, in a period when radical theology was empowering a great many men. The exchange of these letters allows us also to see the critique silenced by a profoundly self-interested, if also unspoken, inability on the part of one of those recently empowered men to accept the equity of difference, and to recognize a precise demonstration of the erasure of some of those classified as non-human, here, women, that will continue for centuries.

Collaborating with a Friend: 1644 Letter to Katherine Jones

A year later, at the end of 1644, Moore writes to Katherine Jones during significant changes to her life. The locations from which Moore's letters to Hartlib were sent indicate that she had often been in the same place at the same time

as Dury throughout the year, and their close friendship was encouraging gossip.[40] In November (**29**), recovering from a severe illness that caused her body to swell up and resulted in "fits" and loss of consciousness, Moore writes in a familiar rhetoric to Jones, telling her of a "triall of a very great submission" that has led to a physical, mental, and emotional collapse. She describes herself experiencing a split between body and spirit that leaves her "distempered," in pain, and, more importantly, realizing that she is no longer a member of the BoC. Citizens who feel alienated by the civic or national public experience melancholia, but what would the word be for feeling excluded not only from the sociocultural but also from the BoC in which is located the alterior, those ways of being, knowing, and valuing that sustain the non-human person? Perhaps a literal despair? Un-hope. Not the dystopia of failed utopia, but a neg-topia. Dury helps her through this time. Within two months it is apparent that he has proposed to her, and that part of her collapse is probably related to the change to her single life that is becoming more insistent. She has been told she cannot have a public role related to the church, the court position did not transpire, her attempts at teaching have not been supported, and she has no income. The previous eight to ten years of her life she has dedicated to finding a politically acceptable way for women to work in a public service for the BoC, and she has not yet found this possible. Indeed, it has been denied to her. She also acknowledges that her feelings for Dury have become more present. It is clear that she is trying to come to terms with working for the BoC through Dury, marrying him to support his service to the wider community which he is "allowed" to undertake.

A month later the central topic of Moore's December 2, 1644 letter to Katherine Jones (**30**) is again the question of how to discern a call from God, how to determine it and its extent, and Moore begins with the distinction between men and women that she had articulated in her letters to Rivet. The key issue is that she has to distinguish between intention and God's call if she is to do something essentially, and theologically, different from men. By "call," Moore elucidates the various means of deciding upon action, presented here as something that a person must determine but also take into a public that is not civic and defined by the nation, but is the Christian community in the world made up of all people because they are each a member of the BoC. Her detailed guidance to moral action leads to a direct connection between the person and this public world. One

40 An indication of Moore's wider reputation is given by the private discussion between Dury and Katharine Jones (**75**) on how to stop the "censorious" comments of criticism being made against her decision to marry.

can recognize a "call" when the work it involves is subordinate to and part of an end designed by God more generally for people in Christian and humane society. Significantly, when writing to Katherine Jones, the concept of a woman being subordinate to a man in the letter to Rivet shifts into people being subordinate to God. If we remember that Moore's "public" included women, the poor, the heathen, the sick, and many others, her understanding of God's more general design probably supported Dury's own ecumenism, but not because he was a man. Her rhetorical structure for making moral decisions is that people first have to do those things which further their spiritual and temporal employment, but, second, also have to assess the scope of possibility for action they imply and their effect on the context of other "intentions" or decisions. And third, that if a person is currently doing something that is undoubtedly such work, but which leaves little room for a new call, then the time for the new call is not yet proper. Hence callings "frame" events so that we see them in "perspective," and if it is possible to see clearly how to do such work within that framework, then we should probably do it even if it is difficult and hard for us.

The recognition of a call is situated in the braid of body and spirit lived by members of the BoC. As such it is not predefined but processual. At the same time, it is guided by Moore's versions of temperance, decorum, and prudence, which she carefully develops in the conversational rhetoric she uses with her friend in this letter. She says that one can recognize a call by the way it comes to us, although we also have to examine, question, and "try" it. If the recognition comes to us "directly," is in accordance with God's will, and is without "unwarrantable" implications – if it is temperate – then it is "lawful." Just so, if the work brings about order in our lives, "conveniently" – or with decorum – then it is legitimate. Further, if we see a "providential" – prudent – or long-term design rather than immediate selfishness, then again the work is legitimate, although it is also so when we see the selfish purpose in the proposer but do not let ourselves be swayed by this. Finally, Moore turns to a person's virtue, and discusses how we recognize a call by the way it comes to our own "inclinations and affections." One has to listen to "the testimonie of conscience" not the rules of worldly wisdom, for conscience works according to God's revealed will and the rule of grace. To refuse a call is sometimes sinful because callings are often difficult, so we must set aside flesh and blood desires when deciding on action. She summarizes that one needs to decide to act when God "appears," which can be recognized in three ways: first when circumstances, understood as part of a general duty and not self-interested, suit our practical obedience – prudence; second, when the occasion for exercising the work simply occurs – decorum; and third, when we find that someone needs our actions, even when

no "instrument" or reason or occasion appears, but the action has been found to be lawful and suitable to our lives – temperance.

Reiterating the vocabulary of her letters to Rivet, Moore argues that the scope of every Christian's life is in the service of Christ in his members or body or community. But this service cannot be specifically defined: it is "in our own sphere" and "according to our own capacity," the sociosituated. One has to determine one's service according to one's recognition of a particular and personal "calling" as well as the general aim of the community formed by the BoC. Any proposal should advance the "principall," here the command of God. The argument again uses the grammatical topos of principal and subordinate, not in the name of man and woman, but in the name of God and person. The shift is appropriate to Moore's recognition that men cannot prescribe the extents of women's actions, only God can do so. It goes along with a shift from her distinction between married and unmarried women when first speaking to Katherine Jones in July 1643, to speaking for all women in this letter to Jones of December 1644. Although the single and the married woman in the end have to assess and act on a calling according to their "own sphere of activity," the general distinction between women and men and the need for action in public applies to both. They may have different spheres of activity, different kinds of public – what I have called throughout this book the sociocultural and the sociosituated – but men and women are both answerable to God. When a person discerns the call, they discover "what is good or bad" because a calling will be good, and, once recognized, must be followed. "Conscience" is the agent of virtuous discernment that propels or moves a person to action. It is a critical faculty that assesses appropriateness, rather than a self-evident carrying out of conventional imperatives, and collaborates on ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing with everyone and everything in the common environment, the common weal. Moore's combination of conscience with the recognition of a call might today be named "consciousness" – not in the normative sense that Engels would later call "false consciousness,"[41] but in the sense of the critical awareness of the underlying assumptions that need to be assessed in moral activity.

41 "False consciousness" is a concept largely arising from a comment from Friedrich Engels to Franz Mehring in 1898: "Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process." The concept has been broadly interpreted according to the needs of the sociohistorical location of the writer, as it is here. The letter was published as "Letter to F. Mehring" (1949), 451.

The moral activity that Moore details here is not private but public, and conscience is the process by which a person translates "calling" into the ethics of a public sphere. Yet central to this notion of public action is the need to act from the particular, from selfhood rather than the individual civic identity or erased non-human position dictated by representations. One cannot act morally in response to God's call through a representative subjecthood. Once more, the argument focuses on an element central to the changing definitions of "public" in the seventeenth century. Unlike the emerging notion of a representative democracy in which individual citizens act primarily through representation, and unlike Hobbes's *Leviathan* in which the state becomes the perfect unity of all men, Moore is insisting on the collaborative action of the members of the BoC. The argument of this chapter continues to be that this is partly because she belongs to a body of people denied access to growing institutional power and its representations, during a period of revolution when the significant changes that are occurring suggest that such access might be achievable.

At the same time, from that external standpoint, she can see quite clearly the limitations of the institutional system. Most importantly, it derives from her understanding of an essential difference between men and women, which makes it impossible for a man to carry out or represent the spiritual calling of a woman. Moore's claim to effective difference allows her to counter the universalizing tendencies of the new politics that universalize only by eliding recognition of difference and repressing its articulation. Her claim expands into an acknowledgment that each person, whether man, woman, the heathen, the sick, the poor, the child, has their particular calling or service to a community. I repeat Moore's earlier list again to underline that the groups of people in her sense of a public include not only humans but also the much larger and varied number of peoples not considered to be human. The state of people in the public she envisages for Christian community is to live collaboratively with difference,[42] with the only unity being life in Christ. While this is curiously analogous to Hobbes's vision of unity in the Leviathan of the capitalist state at the center of the liberal goal of equality, liberty, and fraternity for privileged men, for Moore unity is not in the national public sphere. In her common weal, the common public of the BoC, all people have instead equity, freedom, and service. Pushing these characteristics into an institutional public sphere, one finds a state remarkably similar to what will later become identified as elements of socialist communisms. Moore's life in Christ is, simply put, based on recognizing the difference that

42 Note the similarity with current theories of community, more prominently those of Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (1983).

happens between and among people and acting appropriately in this alterior public sphere that is left out of the state.

Rather than exploring the ethical guidelines of civic or national public space, she investigates moral action as action that is not predefined but arising from decisions taken on the basis of "calling" or "sensing." Morality is about how to make decisions about how to act with no social or ethical guidance from the institutional public sphere. It can feel quite lonely, but there is also a different kind of ethical guidance from the alterior public for which Moore argues. What is the difference between these ethics attached as they are to two different publics? One is the reductively consensual and even corporate body of state capitalism, the other is collaborative and collective. The collaborative can drift into, or emerge into, the consensual, but without critical analysis it is difficult for the consensual to move toward the collaborative. That movement would require a study of underlying assumptions, and the consensual/corporate structures rely on self-evident grounds. The ethics of collaborative/collective space informs moral action by responding to the need of the people in the sociosituated community, rather than what is wanted by the individuals making up the sociocultural civic sphere.

Moore is approaching the question from the point of view of those people excluded from the assumptive logic of the social powers around them. Erasmus talks about them: they are the cobblers, and I read these letters as if the cobbler is articulating. Lever also allows the cobbler to speak. Juliet and Romeo are examples of young people forced into the institutional social patterns that will allow them to speak, and if they refuse the patterns, they die. Moore nearly dies from an illness that manifests the "corruption" that she experiences when she thinks that she will have to leave the BoC and become private, become a wife. But, as someone who does not value individual identity, she has to find a way to live consciously as a private person so defined by the larger sociocultural public, and as someone who has a self. This sets her on a path to redefining the allegory of the BoC, so that rather than having Christ at the head, God is at the head, and Christ lives with all people, equally, in the Body. If Christ's body is subordinate to God, she can still be part of the Body, but now that Body is subordinate to God.

Part II: Re-forming the Allegory of the BoC

Marriage, the Body, and the Kingdom: 1645 to Katherine Jones and Samuel Hartlib

On January 23, 1645 (**32**), Dorothy Moore again writes to Katharine Jones, this time far more confidently following her own advice on judging with her conscience.

Part of this letter is technically a conversational demonstration of how one might do so, and part of it is a familiar letter that engages a set of vivid, metaphorical, and anecdotal rhetorical devices that recall the direct immediacy of the earlier letter on illness (**29**). For example, she concludes that she can no longer pretend that the possibility of marriage is not part of her friendship with Dury,[43] and that she will consult frequently with God lest she seem a mere "Breaker," merely obstructive. The metaphor is revealing. A breaker is one who destroys, but also a breaker in the sea. At the same time there is Erasmus on "breakers": those who break bread but do not eat it, who go along with others but contribute nothing. The mixed rhetoric of the letter also occurs throughout her correspondence with her other close friend, Samuel Hartlib, although possibly for different reasons (see **28**). Yet on January 30, 1645 (**34**), and having agreed in the seven days since her letter to Katherine Jones (**32**) to marry Dury, she writes to Hartlib announcing her rhetoric in the opening sentence of the letter as "profitable conversation." The letter begins with a significant shift in grounds from the body of Christ to the kingdom of God, and goes on to pursue serious concerns for Dury within his ministry, for "many profess they cannot heare mr Durye, because he preacheth not in a gowne." Two months later, on March 28, 1645 (**37**), Dorothy Moore writes again to Hartlib in opening with the statement that "notwithstanding all opposition made by my owne great inclination to have lived single all my dayes," she has married. The paragraph goes on to explain how she reached the decision, explicitly speaking of the principles of how to discern a call.

The letter written by Dorothy Moore to Katharine Jones, dated May 5, 1645 (**39**) but referred to in a letter to Hartlib of March 17, was the only piece of her prose to be published in print during her lifetime, and it came out under John Dury's name.[44] In this letter, she begins with a discussion of the theological significance of marriage but extends it into a critique of class privilege. The letter is conversational in stance, but with formal elements, that is, it does not argue with formal syllogism or rational logic alone but also by analogy, example, and figural language. In many ways it indicates a recognition of a changing position on the implications of gender difference. In a continuing reference to her earlier definitions, Moore recognizes that she might place her energies better by working for people in other "subordinate" positions, as she perceives John Dury to be, with a more realistic chance of effecting change. And this letter of May 5 also speaks of needing to

43 See the letter about Dury to Katherine Boyle (**72**): December 4, 1644, on the "covenant of spirituall freindship" they contracted much earlier.

44 Hartlib has the letter printed in the pamphlet "Madam, although my former freedom," London, 1645, 1–7, 2nd series. Phyllis Mack, in *Visionary Women* (1995), 265, discusses the difficulties facing women in getting into print during this period.

provide an explanation for those people with "apprehensions" and "misunderstandings" about her change from a single life, "which condition my inclinations preferred before the other comparably."

The letter begins by repeating that all actions should be taken for "edificacion" but shifts the vocabulary from "members of the Body" to "all that are faithfull subjects of Christs kingdom." The aim of action should be God's glory, therefore every "lively member of Christ" should aim at this particular end when marrying. When two Christian people make that covenant, what is their aim? She answers, first, that they should aim to be a help to each other to advance God's kingdom in their own spirits and therefore in other people's, and, second, that they be a comfort to each other by discerning that spiritual help and advancement. In other words, they engage not only in helping each other but in the critical activity of conscience, assessing and "trying" the implications of that "help," and discerning between a calling and an intention. She rephrases this to signify first God's glory and second the advancement of his kingdom: again the spiritual and the social action.

Moore then offers the three specific reasons for her decision to cease to remain single. First, the understanding that within "humane society" a single woman cannot serve the advance of Christ's kingdom so well as being united to a godly man, for "surely" if she could, then God would not have instituted the impediment of denying public service for women in the church. Second, her conviction: she had already bound herself to the service of all members of Christ and not to herself. And third, the means: that she was brought to this by the hand of providence "carrying me contrary" to inclination. These areas, of decorum, temperance, and prudence, are precisely the three elements of recognizing a calling that she elucidates in her letter of December 2, 1644 (**30**). Yet embedded in them is a difficulty: the "surely" of the first indicates not surety but incipient doubt; the commitment to Christ and not to herself indicates a division between the two which previously had been braided together; and the third concludes that she is carried against her intentions to "the ground I went upon," a figure that conveys the doubleness of a common ground of reason at the same time as the ground upon which a ship fails. The delicacy of this second reading laces through her determination, not shrouding it but stitching it onto a shadow of her earlier life.

Having explained her own actions, she turns to the criticisms that have been made by others, calling them "carnall." They are: that she married "below my degree" and not to "great or certaine fortune." What the letter then does is unexpected: it moves into a critique of class or "degree." The syllogistic argument begins with the commonplace that the man of greatest honor is the one most trusted by God, and he who is most trusted "subordinates" himself and works to the highest end, which is God's call. It is the man who "dispenses mysteries" of man's salvation who has the highest honor; in other words, the godly man

preaching the word of God. Like Christ, this man does not have an earthly kingdom but a kingdom in the consciences of men, a spiritual kingdom. Hence in marrying the preacher Dury she has married honorably, and to a man with a great spiritual kingdom, although not to a gentleman with earthly goods. The argument proceeds by using this argument to create the ground for another. She states that the nobility may have the honor of titular greatness, but this was originally conferred by human policy rather than spiritual and is supported only by the "foolish fancy" of men. From the commonplace that the honor of a titled lord is not the honor of God's preachers that she brings from the preceding logic, she derives syllogistically that there is a considerable and real difference, that "even a weak Christian" can perceive, between the end of God's glory and the end of man's, between God's "Institutions" and man's. Hence "there is no such inequality as some Imagine" between a man with a title and a poor man who preaches. Tacitly, she has also articulated a reason for her own "subordination," that it is evidence of her recognition that she is trusted by God and works toward his end.

On the second criticism, that she did not marry for fortune, Moore begins with the standard topos that her inheritance is in heaven and not on earth. She opens this out by saying that the only certainty is not in material things but in the spiritual, and that this should be recognized as a lesson from God for the "Nation" at the current time. People should, she argues, live by faith using their conscience, rather than by flesh and blood, which is corrupt on its own. However, this is elaborated in an activist rather than defeatist way. All people have the power to effect and change their own worldly circumstances, not just wait for God to give them opportunity. Hence people can change their "estate," and there is no God-given right to greatness simply because one has a large estate. It is an error to consider people great because they have enough estate "to consume," by "satisfying theyr foolish fancies," by "fulfilling all sinful appetites," and by "observing every foolish superfluous Custome, now taken up in practice." Instead, greatness is conferred on those who "shake off those fetters" so that they are "free to work in Christs Kingdome." And yet all this in moderation, for Dorothy Moore is as practical as ever, and points out that by marrying she has herself changed her estate, since now she will have the "necessary food" to keep herself and her children.

The letter effectively makes the claim that through marriage women can make men better, and better able to carry out public duty. Yet the activity is not one-way but engaged, so that the man also helps the woman and she thereby can better help him. What is striking given the rest of her vocabulary for theological argument, is the way in which this letter leaves behind the membership in the Body of Christ, moving firmly into a terrain of kingdom and subject, nation and worldly goods, power and estate. This is an institutional terrain on

which people may be members of Christ, yet not focused on or attempting to participate in the BoC, which is a spiritual body presented as a public that is alterior to the public of the nation state, At the same time Moore – since her argument about equity is based on the possibility of taking God's word into this institutional public which she has been persuaded women cannot at this time do – leaves behind her concern for women and moves into a critique made on behalf of a man and, by implication, all men, both citizens and the non-human, both the privileged and Erasmus's vulgar people.

The argument is directly parallel to her earlier concern with the need for another sense of "public" for women, one that does not relate only to the "institutions" of men but embodies the grace of God. In the seventeenth century, as now, it was easier to argue for the public recognition of men than for public recognition of women. What is surprising is that she makes her argument for a possible alterior public space for men through a critique of economic privilege, defining it just as she had defined the public of women serving the BoC as alterior. She is not concerned to achieve an equality of privilege that might render working men the same as propertied citizens, but to insist on equity for men excluded from privilege so they can retain their differences.[45] Just as her earlier letters were concerned with men and women being only equal before God, her argument for the equity of men is based on their fundamental differences yet equality before God. As with the bodily and spiritual differences between men and women that she articulated before her marriage, in what men do they differ widely from each other including in estate or property. And as with bodily and spiritual differences, estate should confer no special rights that unjustly affect equity.

Nevertheless, as the vocabulary shifts it splits the allegory of the BoC. The body and its members are still there, but changed. A man will still serve Christ but also be concerned to advance his kingdom and honor God in the public space of the nation. If one is working to advance the kingdom, then to be free changes its valence. One is no longer most free when least servile and offering honored service, but most free when acting as a servant to the kingdom. This kind of freedom is liberty. It does not open to alterior happening, but is more pragmatic about generating opportunity within religious structures recognized by the nation, such as the church. The bifurcation in spiritual freedom, between the BoC and the kingdom of God, renders men more in tune with civic structures. In parallel to the spiritual kingdom, in which a person retains membership of the

45 For a study of the relation of the "religious" woman in the seventeenth century to issues of gender and class, see Kimberly Anne Coles, *Religion, Reform and Women's Writing in Early Modern England* (2008), 181–86.

body while being subject to the kingdom of God, these men serve Christ but also become subject to the nation and concerned with worldly wisdom, and the corruptions of flesh and blood. The shift in imagery performs the construction of the doublethink involved in being subject of the nation state. A person's selfhood may reduce to the binary division between the body and the kingdom, and when this happens they become the individual divided between private and public who is required to remember to forget the personal elements of the self that are denied to them by ruling or governing state power.

A man without the BoC may become the divided subject split between the kingdom of God and the nation of worldly humanity, which split, as Hobbes demonstrates, can nevertheless be scarred over the closer the notion of God as father comes to the paternalist state of the liberal social contract.[46] Writing to Hartlib ten years later from the l645 letter to Jones, in the 1650s (**53**), Moore speaks of the complete division between the "Kingdome of Christ" and the "states" that "minde the kingdome of the earth." As if losing any confidence in personal agency within the public sphere of politics, Moore links her "breathings" for Christ with his "glorious appearance [that] may at once destroy all the enemies of his cross." Men in these days are governed by "base carnall selfe interest," so that any proposal to any state for a Christian order is "rather zeale from good affections, then possible nay or probable." To expand upon her thinking: if a man's conscience recognizes both the kingdom of God and the worldly value of each person, as well as the need to braid the worldly with the spiritual, there is no doublethink. However, this consciousness also presupposes that you cannot both exploit others and maintain spiritual union with Christ. Because the citizen has to work in a capitalist structure, their spiritual life depends on their lack of consciousness of its exploitation – or false consciousness. While this is the condition of the citizen, these conditions mean that the non-human person, without the BoC, also experiences a split between the private and the self. But for the non-human the private is the invisible state of those exploited, forbidden to show their selfhood in public where their presence would disrupt the rhetoric of remembering to forget. However, for Moore the self is still there – no longer living in a promise and waiting for a call, but in intention that overlaps with a call to the BoC that makes it present.

Hartlib prints the letter on marriage of May 5, 1645 with several others by Moore and Dury, probably in June, as "a good example to others."[47] Moore

46 James Stuart, in *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1598), consolidates and grounds the idea that as the father is to the family, the king is to the subject.

47 Felicity Lyn Maxwell, "Calling for Collaboration" (2017), 12.

writes to him in some anger, saying that he has given her a cause for "quarell" because the letter was a "rude indigested paper" which might discredit her argument. Significantly she points out that the argument puts forward "thes unknowen principles," and that because of their newness to "most men" they should have first come to the public "cleerly and substantially exprest and opened" in case people became prejudiced against them for lack of good rhetoric. She is probably not referring here to her principles for marriage, which are familiar, but to the argument about economic privilege.

Although the rhetoric of her letters has elements in common with the field of civil conversation and behavior, her preoccupation with money and its effects on her life is firmly in evidence throughout these months. From March to July 1645, Moore often refers to her lack of possessions but always as if this is a good thing. In among her continuing politicking on behalf of Dury, she refers cheerfully to not having beds or chairs for servants or visitors. She speaks of the manner of living "far different" from England and without "a table of meat dayly." Twice she informs Hartlib that though she does not want to take boarders, she will need "altogether" to find out about how to keep them, and will only do so for no "profit" but for the will of God. On July 7 (**45**), just before her return to England, she writes to Katharine Jones saying that if her life is like a journey "there is nothing more cumbersome and distracting in a journey than much carriage." Worldly goods are a "huge burthen over-charging" the ship in its straight passage. And if her aim is "the constant pursuite of holding a conversation with God" to find union with Christ, then "things" are a hindrance. She concludes practically, asking Jones to send her nothing for the house so that she may be "free from present worldly love or delight in such poore things."

Moore's writing increasingly uses figural language to express the way she senses what is happening to her. In particular, she draws on nautical figures of ships, the sea, storms at sea, the breakers on the land – possibly embodying the deaths in her family that had occurred at sea and her own frequent travels. The extended metaphor of the ship upon a journey in the letter of July 7 (**45**) lends hope to the idea that her boat had ceased to run aground through this marriage to Dury. The final letter concerning her marriage is sent to Jones on June 2, 1645 (**44**). What this letter attempts is a description of her married life in a return to the conversational rhetoric of her earlier letters. It foregrounds the status of the earlier May 5 (**39**) letter on marriage as one intended, despite all, for publication, which may explain the shift and split in the allegorical field of the BoC into the kingdom of God because it specifically addresses an audience primarily made up of men. However, this later script begins by laying out the contents of the directories that she and Dury have written, and how they help them "intend," in the first place, toward the "whole body of Christ"; second toward the congregation; third

toward children, family, and servants; fourth toward one another; and fifth toward "what studies we must perfect in one another to enable us for this service." The list underlines the way that Moore, despite marriage, still puts the body of Christ and the public congregation they are within, before family.

By this time she had been joined by "my Boyes," who have their own directories so that they may be "ordered" but not oppressed "beyond their capacity." These directories for practicing service to the BoC seem to be similar to the commonplace books of the time which were often catalogs of figures for conventional argument that provided ways of inserting self-evident grounds into persuasion. Given that her use of conversational rhetoric is founded on the collaborative generation of common grounds, these "directories" for ordered living would probably also have offered places for guidance to persuasion and action, but in a distinctly different manner. Moore has a practical outlook that goes along with a moral responsibility to others, based on – as discussed above – moral action that involves generating grounds that are appropriate to the particulars of the alterior experiences of membership in the BoC. On becoming married, it is as if she decides that for her an active life has to be alongside her husband in their personal membership in the BoC. This membership also forms and informs the selfhood that she lives alongside the private space as designated by nation state – a definition of being non-human necessary to ensure the unpaid labor of women in a capitalist structure. Membership in the BoC is not contemplative in the sense of absenting one's self from social responsibility, but this is a sociosituated rather than a sociocultural activity.

The letter (**44**) then shifts its focus to her own genre of religious political commentary. Moore tells Jones that Dury is to go to England to lay the groundwork for gospel light. This probably refers to Dury's summons to join the Assembly of Divines that had been appointed in 1643 to restructure the Church of England. She comments that the work is something needed particularly at this time when God is unsettling all nations for a "new frame of the Body of Christ." The body is now so disordered and distempered that there is little relation between the body and its head, but God must intend this and people need to wait to understand that intention. The topical logic finished, she moves on to a more direct rhetoric that acquires its emotive power from bringing the topical framework into a familiar rather than conversational position, infusing the everyday with a literalization of analogy. Dorothy Moore then speaks of the "rare change" it would be to have faith turned to perfect knowledge, to be "immediately" under the government of God with Christ as a man. Moving this literalism back to analogy, she says "he still as the head, wee as Members, but both immediately to the father." Then she expands, that if *now* we all go by Christ who governs men under the father, when the body is completely perfect and there is a union

between the head and its members, *then* we will be as "one body inseparably and as it were with an equality" in Christ and making one motion to the father, sub-ordinate only to God.

Moore goes on to reassure Katharine Jones that this vision of equality with Christ, and hence men, is not to dishonor him, but to say that it is his glory that he tries to perfect his own body in achieving this equality, so God may be glorified in it. The allegory emphasizes that the added element to Moore's earlier theology is the "father." This father makes no appearance in any of her earlier letters, but as she has entered marriage it/he has loomed larger and larger. Clearly she was surrounded by discourses that referred to the "father," but it is as if she has taken on the image to legitimate her change of conscience. The letter demonstrates that she retains for her self, despite its displacement when speaking about the condition of men as in this letter (**44**), a vocabulary of the body. However, she concludes that *all* those in union with Christ the son are called to the father. Perhaps the insertion of the "father" is in part a realization that now that she is married she has to accord with a higher familial authority, Dury, which she reflects in the spiritual.

Endnote: Alterior Ways of Becoming Alongside the Private Sphere

The earlier theologizing of Dorothy Moore suggested that conscience and recognition are needed to discern a call from God that may gesture toward alterior ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing. The initial allegory of the Body of Christ was, in many ways, a vision that was happening in a place unrecognized by the civic and national state. Her allegory then changes from one that has alterior and institutional public spaces to one that retains the alterior public in the personal spirituality of the BoC, and a public sphere that is subordinate to the kingdom of God. From my own point of view, that public sphere also defines a private sphere in which the (relatively) privileged can generate alternative ways of being that can be brought into civic life, and in which the nonhuman exist as shadows, as ghosts, that cannot be recognized without jeopardizing the doublethink that sustains nation state capitalism. What I find admirable about Moore's changing vision is that it is moving away from a utopia that is neither possible nor likely to manifest, and toward an ongoing practice of spiritual alterity that is the work of her directories. Conversation, or the probable rhetoric of *sermo*, is processual and experiential. At the same time, being part of the BoC means to be part of a group of people, a public employing their conscience in recognizing alterior lives and ways of living, generating appropriate

grounds, and practicing conscious decision-making – whether or not the resulting activity ever emerges into the civic public sphere.

Conversation for her is not simply a relational process, it is a rhetoric. It persuades to action. It generates common grounds that communicate the value of a person's life, what their self needs, so that it can inform the process of moral decision-making. As with definitions of the sociosituated today, this is by definition in an alterior sphere for which there are no sociocultural conventions because the public sphere of the nation state often cannot even recognize that this other sphere exists. In this sphere, moral decision-making involves the difficult task of working out what to do when there are no widely agreed upon guidelines. Moore discovers through her exchange with André Rivet that any attempt to add to the grounds from her alterior public to those of this civic public sphere will simply be erased. Through her friendships of many years, and her marriage to John Dury, it seems that she found people who did not erase the common grounds that communicated the way she was valuing her life. I suggest this because the lack of any new letters after her marriage need not gesture toward silencing, but to a change in positionality tied to a change in location. On her return to England, she was close enough to her key correspondents, Dury, Jones, and Hartlib, that she could have oral rather than written conversations with them. From my own perspective, which brings to the discussion the needs of a particular twenty-first-century critic, there is also the distinct possibility that she realized that her energy would be better spent living an alterior life more fully, allowing that selving to inform and develop the lives of those around her, her friends, rather than expending it on sociopolitical structures that would continually erase or obscure it. And her relatively privileged status, as a woman married to someone with a sociocultural identity, would allow her to do so.

Chapter 7
Concluding Conversation 1650–1730: Effeminacy, Women, and Chat

The Privatization of Friendship and Probable: The Outwith and Alongside Presencing

The grounds Dorothy Moore draws upon are from topical sources remarkably similar to those that occur in the "address to the reader" of books on behavior. In the letter to André Rivet she reaches for interpretations and translations of the Bible, and, behaving as might a relatively privileged man, she attempts to value her alternative ways of seeing the world with biblical interpretations. But she is a woman, so these are not alternatives but alteriors. Rivet has a confident singularity that either rejects, or cannot even "see," Moore's grounds. They are outwith his sphere of life, not just outside. Because he cannot engage with the alterior grounds of the conversational rhetoric, she is stuck with formal rhetoric and divine inspiration – neither of which can Rivet accept in this argumentative context so he ignores her, he erases the discussion. Rivet initially enters the moebius of comparative biblical translation with her but then simply vanishes, or steps out of, a logic that might entrap him.

Moore is also an adventurer: she is storm-tossed, in a boat, a breaker on the seashore, a boat running aground, a ship over-burdened with worldly goods. Through this and other topoi she makes the experience of existing outwith the civic and nation state come alive through a figural rendition and a topical logic. Yet on returning from adventure she brings no "new" produce. Her aim is "the constant pursuite of holding a conversation with God" to find union with Christ, in which "things" are a hindrance. In her writing, her boat brings her to a harbor of familial life and into historical silence. She risks all, nearly dies in the attempt to reject the structures required by sociocultural convention – structures that mean choosing to live is choosing what we now recognize as the schizophrenia of the private and the erased representations for women that are allowed by the developing capitalist nation state.

And then, in her last letters, she turns to the topic of the father. Is Moore a prodigal daughter? That would be to discount the processual practices of the directories, and turn the story of the allegory of the body of Christ too simply into the kingdom of God. Is her change of conscience one that goes along with the classification of women as non-human, and excludes recognition of the value of her as a person? Might this imply, from a twentieth-century perspective,

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the beginning of the formation of an unconscious, so that her "great submission" is a submission to the law of the father? Or does she now speak "for" Dury, the relatively privileged citizen caught between the spiritual and the civic, denying the self and opening the box of the individual autonomous being who is simultaneously universal man? Or is the figure of the prodigal child one that gives up utopia and turns to a place where one can practice friendship? If so, Dury becomes her medium for exploring the working man, who like her is part of the practicing BoC.

As a woman, Moore is placed outside the civic and national public world by those inside it. At the same time, she lives as a person outwith it, not caught in the doublethink of the citizen, but in the conundrums of people still accessing in the sociosituated an alterity rather than possible alternatives for the sociocultural – for that alterity is the condition of the non-human. Key to the argument of this book is an understanding that to be put outside structures of power, to be abjected, is not the same as to live outwith those structures. On the one hand, Moore is caught in the private world that is the place of women in the liberal nation state, with the ghosts and monsters that will emerge into cultural inscription over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, signifying those with no access to alternatives. On the other hand, conversation with the friend becomes the realm of the self, a self also in conversation with God. Moore's life outwith power and in the alongside everyday world that generates reasons for going on living is where she finds trustworthy friends and engages in conversation. If sociocultural power has effects on the sociosituated, the alongside world is a source of change through affect and indeed, affection.

To return for a moment to the impetus for this book laid out in the introduction: conversation as a rhetoric of process. For Emmanuel Levinas's concept of "otherwise," as for Jacques Derrida's concept of "elsewhere," process is central to sustaining the sociosituated presencing of experience. This is similar to several more recent theorizings: for example, Stacey Alaimo's "Trans-corporeal Feminisms," which offers a history of feminist writing on ecology. In a section following a critique of the limits of intersectionalism, and just preceding "Agency without Subjects," she posits:

> The material turn in feminist theory casts matter as, variously, material-semiotic, intercorporeal, performative, agential, even literate. Whereas discursively oriented studies of human corporeality confine themselves to the corporeal bounds of the human, material feminisms open out the question of the human by considering models of extension, interconnection, exchange, and unraveling.[1]

1 Stacy Alaimo "Trans-corporeal Feminisms" (2008), 244.

Or Jasbir Puar's redefinition of intersectionality away from a "disciplinary subject and its identitarian interpellation,"[2] and toward a political "agencement" or assemblage. Or María Lugones, in "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," interpreting Audrey Lorde, who notes that cosmologies are a "be-ing in relation that extends and interweaves its peopled ground."[3] She continues,

> the affirmation and possibility of self in relation lies not in rethinking of the relation with the oppressor from the point of the oppressed, but through a furthering of the logic of difference and multiplicity and of coalition at the point of difference.

What has been left out of the subject is defined as outside by the sociocultural, but, as these critics attest, we each also live alongside and outwith in a sociosituated ecology that is in continual process. The distinction between the seventeenth-century Dorothy Moore and these twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers is that for Moore the concept of the subject in a capitalist liberalism was just forming, yet for the later writers it has been taken as a limit case, a determinist and reductive all-encompassing vice from which each of them has had to work hard to find release into an alterior.

From a twenty-first-century perspective, Moore's conversational rhetoric is intriguing because it is not only processual but also offers the guidance of a directory. It encourages communication about alterior living in order to generate appropriate common grounds that enable decisions and actions in the BoC. Politically, it moves from the effective to the affective, and not on the grounds of sociocultural conventions. It is almost as if her later stance on conversational rhetoric is that actions in the BoC have been proved not to be effective if they disrupt or erupt into the nation state. For Moore as a non-human, one needs to live according to the grounds generated by a community of people who are members of the alterior public sphere of the BoC. These grounds will eventually, literally through events that happen, affect others working in the civic public sphere, so that they remake what is considered as the alterior guided by their own alternative needs. Her early life as a revolutionary wanted to be effective, to change the civic and national world. Her later life seems to be working on the valuing of an alterior life that runs affectively alongside the sociocultural.

2 Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages* (2007), 206.

3 María Lugones, "Toward a Decolonial Feminism" (2010), 755.

Conversational Rhetoric: The Friend and Science

Dorothy Moore spent many years after 1645 thinking about and educating others so that they would be full members of the BoC. It is likely that she and Dury had discussed education with Comenius through the Hartlib circle in the 1630s. In the 1640s John Milton was tutor to Katherine Jones's son, so Moore may have read his *On Education* (1644). Around 1650 she produced a guide to the education of girls,[4] probably for Katherine Jones. Part of her thinking for the education of girls involved training in the practice of science, and various comments in letters circulating within the science circles of the time – the Hartlib group, the Oxford group,[5] the Invisible College group[6] – indicate that she took an active interest in practicing science, particularly the chemistry and pharmacology of herbs and medicines. During this period, 1645–1660, John Dury refers to Moore's "zeale to be a nurse" (**77**),[7] and there are many references to her receipts and experiments in Hartlib's *Ephemera*: she and Katherine Jones are trying out the countess of Kent's powder in 1647, working together on distillation in 1649, in 1650 experimenting alongside Thomas Mayerne who used to be Queen Henrietta's doctor. Moore is passing on receipts to Hartlib through 1652, working with Gerard Boate on "Paris chemistry" in 1654, and with Benjamin Worsley and Katherine Jones in 1658.

As a woman, Dorothy Moore was not alone in these interests. Indeed women householders in England had for centuries assumed responsibility for producing the chemicals and herbal medicines needed by their immediate and extended families, and often their larger communities.[8] In the 1650s, several upper-class women went into print for the first time with receipts for household

4 BL Sloane MS 649, fols. 203–5. For those who agree that treatise is written to Lady Ranelagh, see: Lynette Hunter, *The Letters of Dorothy Moore 1640–1660* (2004a); Sarah Hutton, ODNB entry for "Katherine Jones, Viscountess Ranelagh (1615–1691)" (2004), accessed March 5 2010; Carol Pal, "Republic of Women" (2012), I.

5 John Wilkins at Wadham College, Robert Hooke, Christopher Wren, Seth Ward, Robert Wood, and John Wallis. See Lynette Hunter, "Sisters of the Royal Society" (1997b), 186.

6 Lauren Kassell, "The Invisible College" (2010), accessed March 5 2020, who cites Robert Boyle referring to the "invisible college" in 1646, 1647. Its members were closely associated with the Hartlib circle, possibly centered around Benjamin Worsley, and included William Petty, Arnold and Gerard Boate, Cressy Dimock, Gabriel Platte, and Miles Symner.

7 As with chapter 6, all letters related to Moore are quoted from Lynette Hunter, *The Letters of Dorothy Moore 1640–1660* (2004a).

8 See Lynette Hunter, "Women and Domestic Medicine: Lady Experimenters 1570–1620" (1997a).

chemicals and medicines.[9] There is evidence that one issue for Moore was that she wanted to sell the medicines to derive an income from them for her family. Benjamin Worsley's letters from Amsterdam in June and July 1649[10] discuss the difficulties of reconciling a mechanical trade such as the distilling of perfumes "with spiritual calling," yet he also says he will teach her how to distill from herbs and spices since in the Netherlands it is a "private fashion" for the great and for women. Dury wrote to Worsley soon after this letter asking about distilling and the possibility of setting up a shop, but nothing seems to have come of it. However, on December 17, 1649 William Hamilton writes to Hartlib that Mrs. Dury should not "stoop" to a "public shop" for selling oils[11] because Worsley had suggested that Moore could sell them privately among a selected clientele of honorable persons. By the 1660s these concerns had been displaced by the new generation of educated women of the "middling" kind, such as Hannah Wolley,[12] who were firmly in the commercial and capitalist world, and also quite firmly educators whose writing was more instructional.

From the 1620s to the 1660s, Hartlib's circle of correspondents included a number of aristocratic women and women of the gentry who wrote about science and medicine, and who often sent him receipts or accounts of cures.[13] Many of these women were related – as mothers, sisters, wives, daughters – to men also interested in science, and the kitchens of homes of the gentry and aristocracy had most of the equipment needed for a basic laboratory.[14] In 1660 these men went on to form the Royal Society,[15] however they did not invite their female relatives. This was probably not a matter of exclusion, but that women simply did not exist as citizens in their public realm. Part of the aim of the men of the Royal Society was to democratize science, even if in the process they wrested the technical "secrets" away from the artisans who made a living from them.[16] Many of these modern scientists did not need to make money from

9 Lynette Hunter, "Women in Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" (2005).
10 Benjamin Worsley, Harleian Manuscripts, British Library (HL:26/33/1, 23/33/4A).
11 Benjamin Worsley, Harleian Manuscripts, British Library (HL: 9/11/18B).
12 Lynette Hunter, "Technical, Domestic and Rhetorical Books, 1557–1695" (2002).
13 See Lynette Hunter, "Women in Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" (2005), 126–27.
14 See Lynette Hunter, "Women in Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" (2005), 126–27.
15 See Steven Shapin, "The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England" (1988), 375.
16 Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth* (2011), quotes Robert Boyle's comments on the "avarice" of "secretists" (175), noting that Boyle became aware of his social and economic privilege much later in his life.

their inventions, and indeed, as noted previously, their representative civic democracy represented at most only 5 percent of the population. It would have been considered highly inappropriate for a woman of the gentry, especially one with aristocratic connections, to go into science for commercial gain as Dorothy Moore clearly hoped to do in 1649. However, with the loosening of the guild control over pharmacy and medicine during the Commonwealth period,[17] there would have been little to prevent her from the study of God's work in nature for the health of the people in her personal community.

In 1644 Moore and Dury were moving toward a consideration of marriage. Moore was writing to Hartlib about finding a position for Dury so that he could leave an increasingly problematic job as tutor to Charles and Henrietta's children, and she visited England at least once during 1644 pursuing work possibilities for Dury. At around the same time, a seventeen-year-old Robert Boyle returned from the continent to stay with his sister Katherine Jones for a few months.[18] It was a period he later acknowledged as one that was formative for his religious beliefs and his approach to natural science. For Robert Boyle and his colleagues in the study of the natural sciences, which included his sister Katherine, and Dorothy Moore until her death in 1664,[19] the study became a way of understanding God's work on earth.[20] In his shaping of the need for the probable rhetoric of conversation in scientific inquiry, there are many elements present in the letters between Jones and Moore that Boyle attempts to bring into the civic public space of a gentleman's science. This is not to claim that Moore and Jones taught Boyle about the probable rhetoric of conversation. Rather, it is to note that he developed his ideas while he worked closely with people who communicated their beliefs and ideas in this way, and who had an intellectually robust philosophy that made a space for experiences and occurrences that were not yet spoken, or acknowledged, or even recognized by sociocultural conventions. In particular, they used the kind of conversational rhetoric present in Moore's writings that values process and leads to action on the basis of

17 This was aided by Nicholas Culpeper's publication of the *London Pharmacy*, the English-language version of the guild's *Pharmacopeia*, in 1649; see Jonathan Sanderson (1999), quoted in Lynette Hunter, "Technical, Domestic and Rhetorical Books, 1557–1695" (2002), 527.

18 Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth* (2011), 157; for this journey Shapin cites British Museum Sloane MSS 4229, f. 26.

19 Moore and Dury left their daughter Doro-Katerina in the hands of the tutor to Jones's son Henry Oldenburg who married her in 1668, and their grandchildren were brought up by Boyle and Jones on the death of Doro-Katerina and Henry in 1677. See Lynette Hunter (2004a).

20 See Robert Boyle, *Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy* (1663).

co-generated common grounds. This is a rhetoric that has much in common with Boyle's concept of "experimental conversation," and Moore's reasons for using it can lend insight to its suitability for modern science.

The men of the 1650s, who became the scientists of the Royal Society, were citizens who wanted science to be valued as individual civic action. Some of them not only wanted a clearer, more precise use of language, but also Boyle's "experimental conversation" of gentlemen. Both these groups were, by all accounts, frustrated by the disputations and agonistic rhetoric of the old science. However, their paths took different directions. Thomas Sprat, in an echo of the insistence on logic rather than rhetoric, notoriously suggested that language should have the clarity of one word referring to one thing. In a frequently quoted statement, he claimed that the Royal Society's *Transactions* would "return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men deliver'd so many *things* almost in an equal number of words."[21] This kind of communication is of course a rhetoric in itself, but one that often denies that it has a rhetoric, having no consideration of ethos or stance, no need for probable rhetoric, and certainly no need for conversation. It reflects upon one of the practices of the Royal Society, which was to devise experiments in their household settings – an activity likely to involve at least oral conversation and consideration of the probable. When repeatable, when finding replicable clarity, they could bring the experiment to London to perform before their colleagues, achieving the illusion of certainty.[22] Robert Boyle, in the detailed reconstruction by Steven Shapin,[23] moves instead away from rational logic and certainty and toward conversational rhetoric itself as a performative medium. As such it is a medium that stresses performativity rather than performance, and process rather than certain ends.

Shapin presents Boyle's creation of the idea of the civil gentleman of science as a move – that we can recognize from the texts discussed in this book as widely held at the time – away from "melancholy" and into conversation (2011, 154, 163). Boyle articulates civil conversation during the 1650s specifically in contrast to the precision of mathematics, mathematics being appropriate to certain analysis but not to experimental or investigative conversation. Civil conversation is a resource "by which gentlemen traditionally managed the daily practices of

21 Quoted in A. Jeffares and M. Davies, *The Scientific Background: A Prose Anthology* (1958), 22.

22 See Christine Blondel and Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, *Science and Spectacle in the European Enlightenment* (2008), for accounts of various attempts to legitimate science in this period.

23 Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth* (2011); all quotations from this text are from this edition with the year of publication and page numbers following in brackets.

assenting, modifying, believing, and disbelieving" (2011, 191). In 1597, Bacon had discussed this kind of communication in his essay on "Discourse," saying that discourse should be "interlocutory" and adjusted to the needs of its audience, first, so they understand what is being said, and second, so that in understanding an audience the rhetor or speaker can learn from them (2011, 117–18). Boyle's *Sceptical Chymist* (1662), the result of many years of thinking about ways of knowing, also suggests that scientific inquiry should take place in the context of collaboration: it depends on probable rhetoric and opens out inquiry to possibilities. One of the key elements for Boyle, argues Shapin, is that conversation can be civil in the face of unwanted truth, and can keep the discussion going among people who disagree. In doing so, it can also bring you toward a truth built on co-generated grounds rather than self-evident assumptions. Mathematics, in contrast, violates civil "decorum" by insisting on the single truth and certainty. Conversational rhetoric is signaled as present in the performances that make up the written dialogues of the *Transactions*, conducted exclusively by men. I would suggest it was also present in the oral communications between and among practitioners, such as Robert Boyle and Katherine Jones,[24] and in the performativity of the practice of scientific experiment.[25]

For Boyle, according to Steven Shapin, civil conversation is needed for experimental natural philosophy to sustain the "community of inquirers" on the basis of trustworthiness (2011, 308–53), which depends on the presence of virtue and involves "Syncerity, Integrity, and Perseuervance."[26] Moore's recasting of Erasmus's conditions for *sermo* rhetoric turned temperance, prudence, and decorum into "warrantable" action that was suitable for the needs of the communal occasion, long-term providential grounds that would sustain God's will, and behavior that was unforced and "convenient" to all involved in what was happening. In common with Erasmus, she argues that these ways of valuing lead to the embodiment of virtue, and the recognition of a trustworthy friend. Boyle's "syncerity" is close to Moore's concept of the warrantable in its calling forth the deeply felt needs of a person and the way others perceive them, and hence to Erasmus's temperance. "Perseverance" is close to Moore's providential grounds that echo Erasmus's prudence in their aim to bring people together around long-term action. And Boyle's "integrity" is allied to Moore's sense of

24 See R. Maddison, *The Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle* (1969), for a description of Katherine's household (128ff).

25 For the distinction between the performativity and performance of science, specifically between its first- and second-order textuality, see Lynette Hunter, *Critiques of Knowing* (1999a), chapter 5.

26 Robert Boyle, *The Aretology or Ethicall Elements of Robert Boyle* (1645), 101.

behavior that occurs because the person knows what is convenient or appropriate to the situation – indeed, someone who exercises decorum. Each age, each situation, finds its own vocabulary for conversational rhetoric, and centers its work on communication with the trustworthy friend.

When John Locke, who bases his idea of philosophical conversation on Boyle's skeptical rhetoric,[27] enters the discussion in the 1660s, women do not enter this kind of conversation – although he had close relationships with women whom he said he respected. He sets the probable rhetoric of the Royal Society in contrast with rational and certain disputation which destroys "Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society."[28] Conversational rhetoric respects the autonomy of materials and natural phenomena. It occurs between friends and requires an active reader who has "Diligence, Attention and Exactness"[29] rather than just assent. Because it uses probable rhetoric "there can be no appeal either to general consensus or to absolute principles,"[30] hence the reader needs to co-generate with the writer the common grounds needed for agreement or disagreement. The danger lies in "taking conventional names of substances and arranging our experiences to fit them,"[31] Instead, the reader relies on what Locke calls "testimony,"[32] remarkably similar to concepts of "witnessing" in situated knowledge rhetorics of today.[33] However, Locke is moving toward the doublethink of liberal capitalism: he knows that people are equal, but he also knows that some people – those defined as human – are more equal than others. Some people are not human, and for him this will inevitably make their testimony less reliable.

Locke allies conversation with friendship, but the friendship with other humans that underlies trustworthy testimony is distinctive, if still bounded by the concept of a human who is a recognized citizen. True friends help us to critique the assumptions or grounds on which we are depending, weak friends simply lure us into the comfort of club culture.[34] He also suggests an early version of Sandra Harding's "strong objectivity," that strangers – presumably those who are citizens rather than non-humans – are important to talk with because their

27 Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 388.
28 Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 381–94, 385.
29 Quoted in Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 391, from John Locke, *Essay*, IV.xvi.9.
30 Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 391.
31 Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 392.
32 Quoted in Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation" (1993), 391, from John Locke, *Essay*, IV.15.
33 See for example, Lorraine Code, *Essays on Gendered Locations* (1995), 144ff.
34 Richard Yeo, "John Locke on Conversation with Friends and Strangers" (2009), 23.

backgrounds are different from our own.[35] In this he is tacitly arguing for a different kind of a public sphere: the sociosituated alternatives which are left out of sociocultural discourse yet which relatively privileged, educated gentlemen can pull into civic and national space. Critical friendship also prevents against both the solitariness of an individual, which gives no clarity of thought, and the inertia of customary behavior. Instead it encourages collaboration and questioning, and depends on "Diligence, Attention, and Exactness." These three elements could still be associated with Erasmus's prudence, temperance, and decorum respectively. But in Locke's shift of gear fully into the liberal social contract, they push Boyle's collaborative perseverance, sincerity, and integrity into attributes of the autonomous individual. In other senses, the discussion acutely recalls Erasmus on friendship and *sermo* rhetoric, although Locke, unlike Erasmus, does not include women or cobblers. Locke is beginning to mask the inequities that are growing apparent with the entry of women into the commercial world of the late seventeenth century, in which they work in civic public space but do not exist in it as human.[36] He is also carefully pushing conversation away from alteriors toward a kind of negotiation that generates the private alternatives that are appropriate to the relatively privileged citizen, and that may become recognized within the sociocultural.

John Evelyn's *Public and Private Employment* (1667), a classic defense of *negotio* against *otio*, continues to ally conversation and negotiation, but shifts the alliance of *otio* with idleness, and its associated sexuality, to an alliance with the "closet." *Otio* or idleness can be perceived as laziness by the sociocultural imperative of a capitalist work ethic, but it is also the place of anything that is outwith the ability of the capitalist state to recognize – or the alterior. Evelyn's association of the otiose with the closet is his understanding of it not as an alterior sociosituated public, but as a private alternative. The closet holds both the sense of the sexual and the sense of secrets[37] – remember Romeo whose father thinks he is "to himself so secret and so close" (1.1.143). Secrets may indicate either the need for education in an aspect of knowledge, or a private ownership of a piece of knowledge.[38] Secrets can also signify a "club culture" of

35 Sandra Harding, *Whose Science?* (1991) on strong objectivity 138ff.; also Richard Yeo, "John Locke on Conversation with Friends and Strangers" (2009), 25.

36 Carol Pateman and Teresa Brennan, "Mere Auxiliaries to the Commonwealth" (1979), 183–200.

37 In this period, the word "closet" was used, along with "cabinet," as a figure for a woman's womb (Lynette Hunter (1980)), 22–23.

38 In scientific proceedings the idea of secrets is complicated by the distinction between the secrets of nature and the secrets of artisan technicians; see footnote 13 above.

people working within an assumed and unquestioned set of grounds, which has since been seen as the rhetorical basis not only for fantasy but also for the structure of the liberal social contract which was beginning to take shape by the end of the seventeenth century.[39] We might now see it as unfortunate that sexuality was being confined to private alternatives that linked it inextricably with sociocultural institutions such as normative heterosexuality. Furthermore, the otiose as laziness has been a weapon of condemnation for any person making their self unavailable to capitalism.[40] In other words, instead of being experienced as a site for alterior valuing, the otiose often becomes used to denigrate people, for example slaves, for not working hard enough within the sociopolitical norms of exploitation. However, other concepts of the otiose understand it to locate a situated community not of the private, but of the alongside – that public world that the state cannot afford to recognize but which sustains many people in their reasons for staying alive.

By the 1740s, and David Hume's essay "Of Essay Writing,"[41] the erasure that results from non-recognition of an alongside public has acquired a more extreme logic. Conversation begins to be relegated not to the alternatives to what is left out of the subject, nor to the alteriors outwith it, but to private female occupation as allowed/imagined by the representations of nation state ideology. In this essay Hume addresses the divide between the "learned" and the "conversible" as if beginning where Locke leaves off. The learned is analytical, while the conversible is about life and experience, and he is setting himself up as an ambassador from the former to the latter. Conversation is closely linked to morality, and is based on friendship that is formed not on the individual rights of a public sphere, but on forming "sentiments."[42] One learns morality through conversation and relationships with others. Significantly, this is connected to the development of the "sentimental gentleman" in the eighteenth century, which was behavior that was in the preceding century condemned as effeminizing – just as Romeo, pulled into conversations with Juliet, judges himself made "effeminate" (3.1.115) when faced with the sword-fighting culture of his male friends.

39 Carol Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation* (1979).

40 For one account of the otiose in this period, see Brian Vickers, "Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance" (1990).

41 Hume's "Of Essay Writing" was published in an anonymous collection in 1742, and withdrawn when the collection was re-published a few years later.

42 See Phyllis Vandenberg, "A Humean Look at Feminist Ethics" (2013) for a discussion about Humean sentiment.

Hume overtly locates conversation in the realm of women's communication, but their "private" status is shifting in the context of the development of colonialism and the African slave trade. If Locke masks the implications of liberal privilege, as if unwilling to acknowledge its inequities, Hume is attempting to justify them and in doing so laying the foundations for neoliberalism. It is probably no mistake that Hume is known most widely for his legitimation of capitalist economics, which requires groups of people and things that can be classified as "non-human" in order to exploit and make a profit. He notes that [white] women are inferior, but if they are a different "species" from [white European] males, they are still "moral objects,"[43] unlike animals and people of color. Hence, if they are not to be treated as slaves, they must be accorded the "art and politeness" of conversation, through the generosity of gentlemen – who are citizens – to women that he defines as "gallantry."[44] The feminist critic Christine Battersby, writing in 1981 at the height of a first wave of academic women's criticism, notes that Hume thinks of gallantry as a way also to protect men from women's dominance and subjection,[45] just as he co-opts the "correct" sensibilities of women for the sentimental man. Phyllis Vandenberg, writing thirty years later in 2013, chooses to focus on the positive aspects of the "conversible." Voicing the silent "white" in front of Hume's "women" unsettles both of these critiques.

From the point of view of the partial history of probable rhetoric of *sermo* or conversation presented in this book, I think it is important to note that Hume sets himself up as the ambassador from the "learned," one who will prevent women's conversation, which is without "rules," from diminishing into "chat."[46] For Hume, it is the responsibility of men to prevent conversation from becoming a club culture, by importing their own sociocultural conventions which are self-evidently *a priori*. This means that Hume's morality is not the difficult work of co-generating common grounds to guide one toward action that is not recognized by the sociocultural, but is precisely the adoption of the sociocultural assumptions of relatively privileged men. This perspective enacts the inability of a civic gentleman to acknowledge that humans exist outwith the nation state ideology. It is impossible for Hume to think of the lack of conventional rules as his own blindness, or to recognize the presence of alterior ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing. He has to remember to forget that all people are equal, to maintain his assumption that all humans are equal.

43 Christine Battersby, "An Enquiry Concerning the Humean Woman" (1981), 305; citation source reads: David Hume, *Enquiry into the Principles of Morals*, III, 1, 190–91.

44 David Hume, "Of Essay Writing" (1742), EW 7, Mil 536–37.

45 Christine Battersby, "An Enquiry Concerning the Humean Woman" (1981).

46 David Hume, "Of Essay Writing" (1742).

Conversational Rhetoric: What is Left Out of the Subject of the Liberal Nation State

Fundamental to conversational rhetoric is the ability to co-generate common grounds from lived experience that needs to be brought into circulation to support ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing that are unrecognized by the sociocultural – either as alternative or as alterior. Probable rhetoric attends not to the individual, nor to certainty, but to collaborating on how to communicate the experience of a person that discursive communication either cannot yet speak, or fails even to recognize. It is needed most in particular contexts, in the sociosituated, where there are no acceptable common grounds for the felt sense of an experience, such as with new or extra-discursive ways of becoming and knowing. As such, conversational rhetoric prefigures the emergence of experiential philosophies from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, which coincides with a time in many English-language nation states when people classified as non-human begin to be re-assigned as voting citizens. As they claim cultural or political power, they begin to redefine what constitutes a citizen by insisting on articulating the values of their ways of living, whether or not they want to be re-categorized as "human."

In this book, one way of telling this story has been to focus on the abundant extant records of relatively privileged men, for whom conversation and probable rhetoric are the locations for beginning to articulate what is not said, not-yet said, cannot-be said, in the representations of the autonomous individuals of the liberal capitalist social contract. It is possible to suggest that this articulation becomes what we now refer to as "the Arts" – Hume seems to have thought so. The arts are the place where relatively privileged men, either directly as "artists" or indirectly through patronage and sponsorship, express the feelings generated by experiences that they value, into the discourse of the sociocultural. The arts, linked to the conversational and hence to women, bring with them a sense of the effeminacy of the male artist in many commentaries over the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, just as they also often bring a sense of gender blurring and sexual variation. For women in this story, even relatively privileged women, conversation is about thinking of their lives as ways of valuing, although there is no way to bring these not-saids, these alteriors, into the sociocultural. Dorothy Moore's work is but one example of someone who attempted to build another public sphere, and this was not only not acceptable, but also impossible to think or see or recognize from the perspective of a citizen of the nation state.

Telling her story this way it becomes a tragic story, and it is as if we recognize that Hume makes [white] women a special case but cannot do so for

"Barbarous" people, the people of color. All of them are non-human even if the special case for [white] women is that they are not "slaves." The story of Moore's thinking becomes a tale of erasure and oppression, not only for her and other women, but also for those she was concerned about: again, the heathen or "barbarous," the working-class men, the sick, the children. In this sense, there are times when conversation – which takes friendship, trust, time, collaboration – is prevented from moving toward the not-saids of alterior lives or those lives will become present in discourse and disrupt nation state representations. This kind of conversation cannot be afforded by those who are citizens of the state and caught into its doublethink strategy that enables exceptionalism and exploitation. Their civic structures insist that those outside the certain grounds of the privileged few have to use a manufactured temperance, a self-regulation, to understand that they cannot or should not challenge those grounds, that they should erase their selves. Telling the story this way, we could call Moore's BoC a "political unconscious,"[47] or a more intersectional "undercommons."[48] But it is only from the perspective of those in power that it is "down there." The story of the represented individual can be flipped – as we do when in some performance studies we call the not-yet said of relatively privileged men "Art" and the not-said of the non-human "artmaking." From the perspective of a person who is part of an alterior public sphere, in Moore's case that of the Body of Christ that she imagines as a social community of people who are interlaced and braided together, the self outwith the sociocultural is not less valuable, is not erased. To flip Dorothy Moore's story: a person is always making value, is continually presencing the self, has ways of knowing the world that possibly do not make sense to others yet go on, alongside the dominant discourses.

Conversational rhetoric enables the co-generation of new grounds that are not-yet made or communicated, and are needed for people to group together and around. In the seventeenth century the Quakers, the Friends, understood this in their "conversations" with God.[49] To begin to make a common ground, one that is close to the needs of a community rather than in response to what might be allowed by the sociopolitical public sphere, people can work from the sociosituated particularities, the lived experience of that group. Often the performativity of the making is founded on rhetorical/poetic strategies that work

47 Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* (1981).

48 Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, *The Undercommons* (2013).

49 The early Quakers Margaret Fell and George Fox believed in "holy conversation" as spiritual conversation with God, that was learned in the household; see Barry Levy, *Quakers and the American Family* (1992), 53, 130.

with and around the missing terms in paradox, enthymeme, anecdote, allegory, and similar devices. In performance studies, the rhetoric would be thought of as moving from a felt sense of change, to scoring, and to co-generating forms that enable improvised repetition into embodied performance. A recent example could be Fred Moten's argument around the social emergence of Black culture that is based on the improvisations of African American performativity such as jazz.[50] This kind of performativity can form sociosituated groups that support and sustain alterior publics, whose needs for becoming, knowing, and valuing may emerge into articulation – although Afropessimist philosophy would deny that this is possible within the current structure of the civic and national state.

Endnote: Flipping the Story

I admire Dorothy Moore's ability to turn to the alongside – at the same time I recognize that not all people have this privilege of friendship, trust, time, and collaboration, especially time. I write this at the time of the death of George Floyd and the upsurge in public awareness about the non-human category still binding African Americans. I am unembarrassed at inserting this current political event into a book that I hope will have a significant shelf life, mainly because it is unlikely that the social death of Black people in the United States will, for many years, resolve into more equitable ways of living. The condition leads me to emphasize that many people are still under the threat of living or dying according to the conventions and actions of national institutions, and having to address the dominant discourse of the state. There is a pressing need to emerge into this discourse, to change its hegemonic structures. Nevertheless, as Moore's life begins to document, when the sociosituated attempts to instigate revolution by erupting into, disrupting the sociocultural, it can place the alongside ways of becoming, knowing, and valuing all too closely on the grounds of what it would like to change. The familiarity means, therefore, that hegemonic discourse has strategies to co-opt this kind of revolution, to erase it, obscure it, or, like André Rivet, to step out of it.

Another way of telling Moore's story is to conjecture why such a revolutionary spirit turns toward the directories of her sociosituated community. If change is to be sustained, to have longevity, to satisfy Moore's requirement of prudence, and, as she saw it, long-term providential value, the people effecting the

50 Fred Moten, *In the Break* (2003).

change have to have confidence in the ways of living that they need to keep on going. Politically, revolutionaries need an alterior public that enables them to value their own social structures, to communicate with each other about them, and have strategies for the sustainability of their vision. As the relatively privileged humanists, the English men writing about behavior at the turn into the seventeenth century, realized, only then can they set their co-generated common grounds toward nationally empowered discourses and offer the possibility of change, for only then do they have the collaborative networks of trust and support that give resilience to their differing positions.

To continue to flip Dorothy Moore's story: without the attempts at conversational rhetoric by people like her, alterior ways of living would not be available for communication. They would never be attended to and sensed in process, never be a sustaining help to the group in which she lived, never be embodied or even articulated. They would never have the chance to emerge, however compromised, into a wider public – and make a wider public different. The conversational, processual, strategies of probable rhetoric, *sermo*, are needed by the diversifying democracies of the twenty-first century if they are to generate political structures more equitable than neoliberalism. To echo Erasmus once more: conversation, ongoing communication in whatever medium, among people who may or may not agree, can change the political landscape through the work of trustworthy friendship. It sounds so simple. We know it is not. This brief history documents groups of people new to power – in the schools, the courts, the civic and national space, the family, the spiritual – turning to conversation and friendship, realizing their difficulties, sometimes even pushing the probable rhetorics away only to have them rediscovered by another group. But for those with no hegemonic power, and in all those areas of our lives left out of the now neoliberal nation state, friendship and its conversation can be a moment of feeling and recognizing lived change.

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