Attitude and Stance in Discourse

Edited by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	accusative
Adj	adjective/adjectival
CL	clitic
DIST	distal
DOM	differential object marker
e.g.	*exempli gratia*
Engl.	English
EXALT	exalting form
F/fem.	feminine
Fr.	French
GEN	genitive
HUM	humble form
i.e.	*id est*
IMP	imperfect
Lat.	Latin
M/masc.	masculine
N	noun/nominal
NOM	nominative
PL/pl.	plural
POL	polite
PRES	present
PST	past
Q	question marker
Rom.	Romanian
s.v.	*sub voce*
SG/sg.	singular
T/V	*tu*/*vous*
TOP	topic marker
V	verb
vs	*versus*

INTRODUCTION

LILIANA IONESCU-RUXĂNDOIU

1. Preliminary Remarks

This volume includes a selection of papers presented at the international workshop *Attitude and Stance in Discourse*, held at the University of Bucharest, on November 23–24, 2018. The workshop aimed to address this complex topic from a wide range of perspectives and to promote dialogue among stance researchers from different countries, who have quite different professional backgrounds, experience, and scholarly interests. Some researchers joined our team afterwards. Their papers were also included in this volume.

One can speak of a certain "tradition" of scientific events devoted to stance and stancetaking. The panel organised by Shoaps and Kockelman at the 101st annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (New Orleans/Los Angeles, 2002), the symposium organised by Englebretson at Rice University, Houston (2004), and the panel organised by Jaffe at Newcastle upon Tyne (2004) are among the best known. There is also a basic bibliography of the problem, which includes volumes such as: Hunston and Thompson eds. (2000), Graumann and Kallmeyer eds. (2002), Englebretson ed. (2007), Jaffe ed. (2009), etc.

Stancetaking is inherent in verbal communication. It involves both a subjective and an intersubjective side, as expressing a position with respect to a certain matter is open to challenge by the others. The negotiation of the opinions and the calibration of the subjectivities (Du Bois 2007, 162) are jointly realised in interaction (Du Bois 2007, 172–173). Stancetaking is a multifaceted activity, including not only a linguistic and discursive component, but also sociocultural, epistemic, and psychological components. At the same time, stancetaking has a cross-cultural, cross-linguistic, historical, and developmental nature (Englebretson 2007, 18).

The papers included in this volume analyse the functioning of stancetaking in different oral and written communicative forms, such as political and judicial discourse, journalism, social networks, school

debates, private correspondence, bilingual communication, fiction, and explore variations in meaning negotiation processes, as well as intercultural differences and diachronic aspects. The approach to these topics is mainly pragma-rhetorical and interactional, but also interdisciplinary: cultural anthropology and social psychology play an important part in the analyses. There is also a specific focus on possible practical applications of some key findings of stance research, such as improvement of communication in bilingual or multi-ethnic communities, as well as improvement of language planning and policies, improvement of teaching foreign languages or refining students' communicative abilities.

2. Terminological Remarks

There is a certain terminological variation when discussing the individual differences in viewing and evaluating a certain thing, person, event or state of affairs, which are inherent in communicative interaction.

Researchers who are native speakers of English prefer the term *stance*, whereas some others prefer the terms *perspective* or *viewpoint* (*point of view*), as *stance* does not have a proper equivalent in their languages (mainly in Romance languages, but also in German) and is accordingly felt as lacking a necessary transparency.

Stance appears as a rather paradoxical term in view of its etymology. *Stance* is a Romance borrowing in English, connected with the Latin verb *stare* ("to stand", but also "not to move"). Basically, it designates a physical position or posture, preceding a specific move (in connection with the games and sports), which should be held for a certain time. The meaning of "intellectual or emotional attitude" (which is mentioned only by Webster's Dictionary) is a derived one. What connects the two meanings is the idea of "immobility". But for pragmatics and communication studies the most important aspect is to analyse the possibility of calibrating the subjectivities (= stances) in and through interaction.

As for *viewpoint* (or *point of view*), as well as *perspective*, they originate in the researches of the French school of narratology (Bremond, Genette, Todorov, Kristeva), in the second half of the past century. Within the limits of the dominant – at that time – paradigm of structuralism, they defined the narrative situation in relation to three basic parameters: time, person, and mood (or modality), which are transparently provided by grammatical – in this case, morphological – descriptions. The choice of these parameters can be explained by the fact that narrative involves

action. Accordingly, the grammatical categories used to describe verbs have been reinterpreted and adapted for the description of narratives. Mood (modality) refers to the perspective (point of view) from which the story is told: the perspective of the narrator – who can be either an outsider or an insider in the fictional world (s)he creates – or the perspective of one or different characters.

This way of viewing narrative is useful, as it involves the idea of a large diversity of perspectives from which the same facts can be approached, understood, and evaluated.

More recent research on narratives use *focalisation* to describe the above-mentioned aspects (see Mey ed. 1998, 619). In his definition of *focalisation*, Mey (2000 [1998], 145) brings together the concepts of perspective and point of view. He calls *focalisation* "the general *perspective*", which has to do with the fact that "every presentation is made in relation to the *point of view* of the presenter and his or her *focus* on the world" (emphasis mine, LIR). Accordingly, perspective and focus appear as "*relative* to a particular world of 'seers'" (Mey 2000 [1998], 145), expressing "the absolute *relativity* of our world" (Mey 2000 [1998], 146).

Modern theories of perspective in literature have taken into consideration Ba(k)htin's (1982) ideas about the internal dialogisation of voices, orchestrated by the writer, which results in a specific plurivocality, based on a reciprocal adaptation of the characters' voices, as well as of the characters' and author's voices.

The system of concepts discussed above, currently used in narratology, highlights the idea of the great diversity of our representations about the world and accordingly of our opinions, but at the same time, via dialogism, the idea of the possibility of negotiating the differences. In other words, they appear as having more dynamic connotations than *stance*.

German specialists (see Graumann and Kallmeyer eds. 2002) are the ones who accredited *perspective*, and the derived forms *perspectivity, perspectivation*, as basic terms in the analysis of the most different forms of verbal communication. They make reference to *perspective* as a relevant aspect in the analysis of narratives, as well as to Ba(k)htin's contribution to the modern understanding of the concept (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 5).

Starting from the general idea of the "relativity and perspectival structure of human knowledge", Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002, 1) define *perspective* or *viewpoint* as "a position from which a person or a group view something (things, persons, events) and communicate their

views". Admitting that human knowledge and cognition are "intrinsically perspectival" (Graumann 2002, 27), as the result of a subject's positioning in relation to a certain object (Foppa 2002, 17), *perspectivity* appears as an issue shared by different specialists, not only linguists, but also sociologists, psychologists, or literary theorists (Graumann 2002, 27), who have in view different elements of the perspectival structure of knowledge and communication. *Perspectivation* mainly concerns linguists, as it refers to the verbal practices speakers use to represent perspectives (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 4), that is, linguistic possibilities of expressing perspective. The dynamic and interactional nature of perspectivation is brought forward by the possibility of a *re-perspectivation*, as a result of recontextualisation of different viewpoints (Graumann 2002, 35).

3. Definitions of Stance. Specific Features

No matter which term we prefer, stance and perspective basically refer to the same kind of aspects regarding human communication.

In 2007, Englebretson noticed the absence of "an agreed definition of stance from an academic perspective" (Englebretson 2007, 4). This fact can be explained by the large diversity of perspectives from which stance can be approached and examined, given the complexity of the aspects it involves. Beside the pragma-linguistic, discursive, and interactional views on stance (Graumann and Kallmeyer eds. 2002; Englebretson ed. 2007; Weigand 2010, 2016), there are also sociolinguistic (Jaffe ed. 2009) and stylistic approaches (Johnstone 2009; Kiesling 2009), cognitive and psychological approaches (Sakita 2006), as well as approaches more connected with ideology and politics, like critical discourse analysis, etc. Stance is by its nature an interdisciplinary field, shared by different specialists, who examine it in connection with their scholarly background and research interests.

Still, there is an important number of constants in defining stance (or perspective). All definitions make reference to language, conceived not as an abstract system, but as a system which is used in interaction, in specific contexts, by persons with a specific psychological and sociocultural background, who intend to achieve certain results (to fulfil some specific goals).

Different researches make reference to a similar core of features which define stance (or perspective). Linell (2002, 43–47) identified 15 such features. Leaving aside some partial overlap between them, one can characterise stance (perspective) as: (1) subjective (it belongs to a certain person), (2) relational (it concerns a certain referent or topic, but it is also

directed towards a certain partner, who is conceived in a certain way by the speaker), (3) indexed and grounded in discourse, without being asserted as such (when asserted, it becomes meta-discourse), but including some elements which guide the partner's interpretation, (4) dynamic (being usually only partially shared by the interlocutors, perspectives are negotiated; they can undergo changes in and through interaction, but also through recontextualisation), (5) associated with and subordinated to specific activity types and discourse genres, which make speaker's position predictable.

Quite similar views are expressed by Englebretson (2007, 3), who insists on the situated, pragmatic, and interactional character of stance. As a situated activity, stancetaking is indexical for a broader sociocultural framework. As a public activity, it can be analysed and interpreted by the others, and accordingly it can have consequences for its authors or for the institutions they represent (Englebretson 2007, 6).

Further researches refine the analysis of these basic features. Defining stance from a sociolinguistic perspective, Jaffe (2009, 4) maintains that stance is not transparent, but inferred from the empiric analysis of interactions, in a specific social and historical context. Accordingly, stance appears not only as socially variable, but also as both culturally grounded and culturally variable (Jaffe 2009, 7). Stance is inherent in talk, no matter if it concerns the form or the content of the discourse. Communicative forms can be more or less stance saturated; neutrality is in itself a stance (Jaffe 2009, 3).

Kiesling (2009, 177) underlines the indexical nature of stance. Stances create and reflect the context. Their indexicality is both interior (reflecting the moment of speaking) and exterior (connected with the lasting social contexts, and accordingly transportable from one speech event to other). Kiesling (2009, 174) defines personal styles as repertoires of stances. Accordingly, stancetaking is considered as "the main constitutive social activity that speakers engage in when both creating style and style-shifting" (Kiesling 2009, 175).

In Kiesling's opinion, learning stances and their indexicalities is part of learning a language. Children learn stance meaning as part of the grammar, even before their being exposed to the full social variation in a speech community and learning the social identity indexicalities (Kiesling 2009, 175–176).

Johnstone (2009, 31–33) expresses, in a way, similar views, when speaking of recurrent patterns of stancetaking over time and situation, which create styles associated with different situations and social

identities. A recurrent use of certain forms in a certain context becomes indexical for that context.

Coupland and Coupland (2009, 228) underline the dialogic nature of stances, which can comply or conflict with other possible stances. This is due to the fact that stances involve evaluation and appraisal of a given object or situation, which can be highly individual, but sometimes are connected with certain culture-specific (or group-specific, I can add) ideologies.

4. The Functioning and Functions of Stance

Considering the mechanisms underlying the process of stancetaking or perspectivation, one can notice some differences in their description. Perspectivation is seen mostly as combining two complementary activities, one originating in the speaker, who sets a certain perspective on a given matter, and the other, performed by the receiver, who takes in that perspective. Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002, 5) speak about the interplay of these activities, but at the same time they consider them quite different in nature. Perspective-setting is connected with language use, whereas perspective-taking appears as a mental process.

The description of the stancetaking processes captures their interactional nature in a more convincing way. Du Bois (2007, 162–163) views stancetaking as a unified act, which involves three basic activities, simultaneously achieved in dialogue by the participants: evaluation, positioning, and alignment in relation to a certain object. Accordingly, even if only one of these activities is explicitly performed by a certain speaker, all participants are able to draw inferences about the other activities.

Du Bois's stance triangle parallels, at a different level, some well-known argumentative models, from the "classical" triadic model of reasoning: thesis, antithesis, synthesis, to the model of critical discussion in the extended theory of strategic maneuvering, proposed by van Eemeren and his co-workers (2002, 2010). All these models involve the idea of a possible difference of opinion, but whereas in the case of reasoning model the approach is monologic, in the other two cases it is dialogic (the differences of opinion between the interlocutors should be diminished through strategic maneuvering – van Eemeren 2010, or, evaluating a shared stance object, stancetakers position themselves, and accordingly align with each other – Du Bois 2007).

The stance model representation in the form of a triangle, proposed by Du Bois, reflects the fact that evaluation, as well as positioning, are

connected with the interlocutors' subjective value judgments, attitudes, and feelings. When positioning themselves towards a shared stance object, interlocutors simultaneously define either a convergent or a divergent alignment with each other. The implicit stance alignment is crucial for the management of the intersubjectivity in the process of dialogic action, as it serves to calibrate the relationships between two stances. In Du Bois's view, alignment does not necessarily involve agreeing with the interlocutor, but rather accepting to discuss a certain matter. Agreement is jointly constructed and negotiated in and through interaction (Du Bois 2007, 142–144; 162–165).

Starting from the idea that language users are dialogic individuals, some newer orientations in pragmatics conceive the hearer not only as an interpreter of the speaker's sayings, but also as an interlocutor, who reacts to what is said by the speaker in an attempt to arrive at an understanding (Weigand 2017, 174–175). Relying on the existence of some common ground (Linell 2017, 112), participants in a dialogue continuously try to "adapt and adjust themselves to each other" (Gee 2017, 67). Accordingly, meaning appears as dynamic, co-constructed, "turn-based and interactive" (Gee 2017, 68). Nevertheless, sharedness of opinions and intersubjectivity should not be understood as complete, but as "sufficient for the current practical purposes" (Linell 2017, 110). This is due to the fact that each participant in a dialogue has his/her personality, biography (including a specific cultural background), goals, and interests (Garfinkel 1967, apud Linell 2017, 110). As a matter of fact, differences of opinion and subjective perceptions of individuals are the basic stimulus for communicative interaction (see also Linell 2017, 111).

The stance dialogic action can be strategically performed, depending on the participants' intentions and goals, but also on the general communicative context, as well as on the norms of a certain discursive genre in a given culture. Irony and its extreme variant, sarcasm, rhetorical questions or quotations are some of the most commonly used strategies. All of them are based on a particular form of speaker's voice management, namely double-voicedness. It involves a split between an asserting and an interpretive voice. Double-voicedness can be explicit, as in the case of quotation, or implicit, as in the case of irony, sarcasm, or rhetorical questions. In the case of quotations, in the speaker's voice, one can hear a second voice, explicitly named or easily recognisable. The two voices can be either consonant or dissonant regarding their evaluation and positioning related to a certain topic, and accordingly their mutual alignment can be either convergent or divergent. In the case of irony (and sarcasm), one can hear the interpreting voice only; the asserting voice is silenced. Evaluation

and positioning of the two voices are always contrasting; accordingly, their mutual alignment is excluded. In the case of rhetorical questions, only the asserting voice is heard, but its similarity to the majority of the interpreting voices regarding the evaluation and positioning is taken for granted. Accordingly, the mutual alignment between the two voices appears as normal (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 151–165).

The description of the main features that define stance and of its functioning mechanisms is relevant to the complexity of its functions. Far from being "a matter of private opinion or attitude" (Du Bois 2007, 171), stancetaking is emblematic for the interdependence between communication, society, culture, and ideology. As Jaffe (2009, 13) puts it, "the individual acts of stance become *indirect* indexes (via language choices; emphasis mine, LIR) of the political, social, cultural, ideological fields of action". As "the smallest unit of social action" (Du Bois 2007, 173), stance plays specific functions in a given community. Kiesling's (2009, 172–173) distinction between epistemic and interpersonal stances reflects the bivalent nature of the concept. Stances are related both to the content of a certain assertion (expressing the degree of the speaker's certainty about his/her sayings) and to socialness (expressing the relationships with the interlocutors, which are usually socially, but also culturally controlled). A speaker's linguistic choices can reflect an intention to explicitly mark his/her belonging to a certain social group or to claim a certain social identity (Kiesling 2009, 171). Taking a certain stance, a person implicitly construes and performs – via his/her linguistic and discursive choices – a certain individual, social, and interpersonal identity for him/herself (Jaffe, 2009, 24), which can be genuine or enacted (see also Kiesling 2009, 171). His/her choices define (or redefine) the performance situation and the communicative context, the role relationships included (Jaffe 2009, 10–13). At the same time, they are indirectly indexical (Jaffe, 2009, 13) not only for that person's value system, but also for the value system of the particular community (s)he belongs to (Jaffe 2009, 5, 21).

As Kiesling (2009, 177) notes, the recurrent presence of certain stances in the discourse of certain social groups makes them emblematic for those groups. Cultural models serve to mediate the association of different stances with different social groups (Kiesling 2009, 172).

Community-relevant values which are activated via specific stances define a frame of interpretation of the speaker's position for the other interactants (Du Bois 2007, 141). Accordingly, sometimes they can become the trigger of ideological disputes (Jaffe 2009, 5). Still, depending on the communicative situation, the speaker can exploit this indexical

aspect of stance (see also Coupland and Coupland 2009, 227) and strategically construe his/her stance. (S)he can suggest the community of values with the interlocutors (Jaffe 2009, 13), in order to avoid conflict and/or reach a certain goal. Sometimes, construing a stance can be manipulative.

Accordingly, among the social functions of stancetaking, one can mention the definition of the communicative situation, which sometimes might undergo important changes during the same communicative event. Verschueren (2019, 304) views stance and stancetaking (perspective and perspectivation, in his terms) as an important dimension of "contextual indexing", which is always intersubjectively achieved. The redefinition of a given situation depends on the evolution of the interactive process, on the general goals of the participants at a certain moment, as well as on their communicative flexibility.

As a primary concern of the speakers in the interactive processes (see Kiesling 2009, 179), stancetaking mediates the negotiation between the participants of the variables and variants (Kiesling 2009, 191). This can result in a redefinition of the whole communicative event, which is made possible by a specific interplay between the interior and exterior indices of contextualisation.

Evaluation of an object and positioning towards it, as basic components of the stancetaking activity, are shaped by individual value systems, but at the same time by the value system of the community the interlocutors belong to, which defines a specific culture (Du Bois 2007, 173; Jaffe 2009, 5). Being dialogically achieved and publicly performed, stances involve a reference system that is shared by the interlocutors (Du Bois 2007, 171). In taking a stance, a person selectively enacts and reproduces components of the sociocultural value system of a given community, but also reshapes it in a specific way and to different degrees (Du Bois 2007, 173). This happens in the case of both affective and epistemic stances (for this distinction, see Jaffe 2009, 7). Speaker's claims to a particular identity and status, his/her specific manner of self-presentation, as well as the way of evaluating the identity and status of his/her interlocutors (or of the audience), which define the affective stance, are grounded in a specific sociocultural value system. In the case of epistemic stance, the speaker's degree of certainty about the truth and validity of his/her statements depends on the specific perception of the relationship between knowledge and authority in a given culture as well. This relationship has a strong impact on the evaluation of the relative authority of the interlocutors. The interactional calibration of social roles, reflected in the way a speaker presents him/herself, is influenced by

his/her cultural perception about people's preference for reliable sources
of knowledge or for a credibility based on social power, in a given
community (see Jaffe 2009, 7–8). The right cultural choice gives the
speaker the opportunity to have his/her stance unconditionally adopted by
the others or to win in the subsequent negotiation process. Cultural models
functioning in a given community mediate the association of certain
stances with particular identities (Kiesling 2009, 172). At the same time,
interpersonal stances reflect the culturally prevalent type of positioning
towards the interlocutors (Kiesling 2009, 173).

Among the sources of cultural variability, Jaffe (2009, 21) includes the
basic ideologies of personhood, as well as the way of evaluating the
relationships between the inner and the outer (social) life, in a given
society. One can invoke here Hofstede's (1980, 1997) dichotomy of
individualistic vs collectivistic cultures, and even the dichotomy of
masculine vs feminine cultures.

Accordingly,   one   can   recognise   cultural   differences   of
conventionalisation regarding both the scripts of different genres and
communicative forms, and the linguistic form of expressing personal
opinions, as well as of relating and referring to others. Jaffe (2009, 22)
notes that sometimes speakers can activate some ready-made cultural
(mostly ideological) scripts, whose efficiency in imposing a certain stance
has been proved in time.

Including, as it does, an evaluative component, which – as previously
mentioned – is socially and culturally controlled, stance has an ideological
nature (Jaworski and Thurlow 2009, 198). Taking a stance involves
presenting oneself as a socially situated person, who has certain views of
the world and certain opinions on the matters under consideration. At the
same time, it involves evaluating the interlocutor(s) (and, sometimes,
audience) as against speaker's own views and opinions. Depending on this
evaluation and, of course, on his/her communicative skills, the speaker can
insist on the similarities – when addressing in-groups – or can present
his/her views as obvious and normal, when addressing out-groups. In both
cases, this means doing some ideological work, i.e. communicating an
attitude and position either directly, or by triggering inferences. Inference
triggers can be strategically used as a resource for ideological transfer and
accordingly for the dissemination of certain ideological positions, which
are presented as normative. As Coupland and Coupland (2009, 246–247)
note, in most of the cases, stances are not fully controlled by individuals,
but they are the result of acknowledging – more or less consciously –
some normative ideologies, which become popular in a given society. At
the same time, speakers can present their own stances as largely accepted

or as belonging to an authoritative person, in order to get credibility and increase the chances of disseminating a certain ideology they adhere to. Still, for some communicative contexts and discursive genres (political discourse, for instance), expressing a stance can involve an explicit contestation of another ideological position.

Taking a stance does not involve only displaying epistemic certainty toward an ideological position and supporting it. Some communicative contexts and discursive genres are based on the competition between the interlocutors. Displaying doubt toward the validity of others' claims and even openly expressing disagreement with a different ideology is quite normative in these cases. Still, in order to be efficient, a speaker's challenging actions should make use of arguments and the points of view should be negotiated (for the whole problem, see Keisanen 2007, 253–256).

The social, cultural, and ideological functions of stancetaking are linguistically actualised in and through the dialogue between individuals who are engaged in different types of communicative interaction. Grammatical, lexical, semantic, and pragmatic resources are jointly activated by the interlocutors, who create both the form and the meaning of a discursive whole (Du Bois 2001, 8, apud Sakita 2006, 468; see also Sakita 2006, 468–469).

Taking Ba(k)htin's dialogism as a starting point, Du Bois (2007, 140) considers stance a "promising testing ground to explore the potential of a more explicit dialogic method in the context of conversational interaction". This method, called "dialogic syntax", is grounded in the direct observation of the fact that participants in a dialogue selectively reproduce components of the previous speakers' interventions. This kind of parallelism shapes the ongoing flow of conversation, reflecting the formal and functional resonance between successive stances, which are jointly produced in interaction (Du Bois 2007, 141), or as Sakita (2006, 494) puts it, "dialogic engagement" of the interlocutors.

Still, reproducing parts of another speaker's intervention does not mean that stances are always coincident. One can repeat somebody else's words not only to express a certain similarity of views, but also to dissociate from him/her. Resonance indicates only the abstraction of a communicative scheme, which is re-used by the participants in an interaction (Sakita 2006, 473, 494), and delineates a common topic. Invoking Jakobson's remark that vertical similarities can often express differences, Sakita (2006, 475–479) distinguishes between two types of dialogic parallelism: in integration and with discrepancies.

Du Bois's concept of dialogic syntax, as well as the phenomena of resonance, schematisation, and extension, which instantiate it, reflect the fact that, in communicative activity, language appears as a complex entity whose grammatical (syntactic, in this case) aspects are closely interwoven with its cognitive and dialogic ones (see Sakita 2006, 494).

Stance is a discourse organiser (see Johnstone 2009, 31), as it establishes a hierarchy of the topics that are approached and of their constitutive aspects, while marking a particular hierarchy of the speakers and a specific system of their interpersonal relations (Johnstone 2007, 51).

Stressing the dialogic nature of stances, which are taken either in alignment or in opposition to other stances and their supporters, Coupland and Coupland (2009, 228) make also reference to their dependence on the situational context, as well as on the discursive genre. One can add that these relationships are bidirectional, as in its turn, stance organisation becomes emblematic for certain situations and genres.

5. Expressing Stance: Formal Aspects

There is no "recipe" for a stance, as all we say, and even our silence, represent forms of stancetaking. Still, any language provides a large diversity of forms and structures that can be used as overt or hidden stance markers (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 4–5; for a list of possible stance markers in Romanian, see Vasilescu 2010). They can indicate the speaker's attitude towards his/her own stance and/or his/her relative position – objectively or subjectively defined – within a certain type of social (local, professional, political, age, etc.) group, that is they can be connected with the actional aspect of communication, but they can also represent "reading" cues, destined to the interlocutors (and/or the audience), who are instructed how to take speaker's sayings and accordingly to calibrate their own stances, that is they can pertain to the interactional component of communication.

Speakers' linguistic choices depend on their communicative intentions, but also on their capacity for evaluating the basic parameters of the communicative context, whose main component are the receiver and/or the audience, in some cases, and the way they relate to the speaker. Anticipating and managing stance differences between the interlocutors call for a specific discursive rhetoric, which is not equally mastered by all speakers. Noting the fact that stances mark individuals' degree of competence, authority, expertise, and compliance with different agendas, Jaffe (2009, 14–16) considers style an important resource used by the speaker to do relational work. She distinguishes between styling and

stylisation: styling regards the projection of speaker's identity by specific linguistic choices, whereas stylisation involves the manipulation of conventions in particular interactional contexts.

Considering the three components of Du Bois' triangle, some specific aspects of expressing a stance can be observed. The evaluation component can reflect different degrees of the speaker's personal investment in his/her stance: *heavy*, marked by the use of the personal pronoun *I* (the speaker completely assumes his/her sayings), *light*, marked by the use of generic pronouns or nouns: *we*, *people*, etc., or *undetermined*, marked by the use of impersonal forms and structures: *it is…*, *one…*, *you* (impersonal).

Speaker's positioning can also be different in nature. It can be *epistemic*, *deontic*, or *affective*. Their specific markers are verbs as well as adjectives or adverbs predicatively used, which irrespectively include these semantic features.

As for the alignment, which reflects the interpersonal dimension of stancetaking, linguistic markers are different, depending on its convergent or divergent nature. The speaker can agree or disagree with his/her interlocutor's stance. The gradable nature of agreement and disagreement is reflected by a complex system of possible markers. Partial or total agreement can be directed at the content of the stance taken by the speaker, his/her attitude towards this content – emotional aspects included – or his/her degree of assuming its validity. There is a smooth transition from agreement to disagreement. As Rees-Miller (2000, 1094–1095) noticed, some forms of partial agreement can express a softened disagreement, alongside prefacing disagreement with positive comments, humorous expressions, use of inclusive 1st person forms, questions, downtoners (*maybe*, *sort of*), or verbs of uncertainty (*it seems*). Some other forms of disagreement, like contradictory statements or verbal shadowing, are neither softened nor strengthened. Still, there is also aggravated disagreement, which can be expressed by accusations or by the use of judgmental terms directed to the interlocutor(s), differing in their degree of severity.

Considering for the moment only cases of cooperative communication, a speaker's capacity for adapting his/her discourse not only to the situation, but also to the interlocutor – in other words, his/her versatility – can also mark specific types of alignment in stancetaking. The speaker can preserve a certain stylistic pattern during the whole communicative activity, which can be the signal of a consistent point of view, maintained by a person who is not open to concessions, or (s)he can try to adapt to the interlocutor, borrowing some components of his/her stylistic pattern,

which reflects a more concessive attitude and becomes an important resource of the relational work.

A specific role in avoiding conflict in different forms of communicative interaction is played by metacommunication. Metacommunicative activities involve specific adjustment operations performed by the speaker in order to prevent possible misunderstandings or distortions of his/her intentions by the receiver. These operations can take the form of various kinds of explanations, evaluations, or justifications provided by the speaker when taking a stance. They regard mainly the discourse organisation, the discourse content (commentaries and evaluations), and the linguistic expression (glosses). Although considered brackets in the communication flow (Schiffrin 1980), they are not perceived by the participants as superfluous. The fact that, in many cases, metacommunicative sequences proper cannot be easily distinguished from some other discursive phenomena, such as corrections or reported speech (Franceschini 1994, 66–68), proves their integration within the communicative flow. As a matter of fact, some authors consider reported speech or intertextuality as metalinguistic practices, alongside of metalanguage proper (see Park and Takanashi 2011, 187). Metacommunicative sequences are genuinely interactional, both when elicited by the interlocutors, and when initiated by the speaker, as in the latter case they are a sign of the attention given by the speaker to other's reactions.

Although mutual understanding does not involve identity of views between the interlocutors, adjustment operations are a necessary part in the process of meaning negotiation.

6. Negotiating Stances

As shown in the previous discussion, stance is not something given, but rather, it is continuously construed and adjusted in the communicative processes (Du Bois 2007, 171). Participants in a given form of verbal interaction do not necessarily express similar stances, because, usually, they have different opinions, purposes, and needs. In negotiating their interests, interlocutors can use either cooperative – that is persuasive – or confrontational strategies, based on differences in power (Weigand 2017, 184). They have to mediate between their self-interests and social concerns (Weigand 2016, 360). Considering this aspect, cultural differences (such as individualistic vs collectivistic cultures – see Hofstede 1997) should also be taken into account.

Still, even in the case of discursive genres that are defined by competition and an overt dissociative attitude of the speakers (like, for example, most varieties of political discourse), a form of common ground ought to be created by them. Commenting on her "mixed-game model", Weigand defines the participants in what she calls the "dialogic game" as "dialogical individuals" (2017, 474), who successively play the parts of speaker and hearer, and are able to adapt not only to "ever-changing environments", but also to each other (see also Gee 2017, 471). As "intersubjectively oriented minds", they should be able to negotiate meaning (see the metacommunicative aspects of communication) and understanding in and through dialogue (Teubert 2018, 72).

Teubert (2018, 70) considers "negotiability" as the essence of dialogue, given the fact that participants in a dialogue are free to interpret what they are told, to agree or disagree with their collocutors, and to propose alternatives. In fact, their sayings make reference to a "discursively constructed reality", not to "discourse-external reality" (Teubert 2018, 71).

The concept of "conversational negotiation" (Fr. *négociation conversationnelle*) has been previously discussed by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2004, 17–41). In contrast to the Genevan school of Roulet (1985), which treats any conversation as a vast negotiation, she restricts the use of this concept to those cases where conflict and cooperation coexist, that is when an initial disagreement between the interlocutors is followed by their attempts to solve it. Conversational negotiations can have an intra-discursive and/or an extra-discursive object (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004, 30). The participants' aim is to create intersubjectivity. The author notes that conversational negotiations are implicit (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004, 26): metacommunicative forms or utterances are very seldom explicitly used by the interlocutors to define this type of verbal activity. At the same time, most of negotiations are not completed, but this fact does not affect the continuation of the conversation. Usually, the final result of such a negotiation is not an absolute consensus. Sometimes, absolute consensus between the interlocutors can result in silence (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004, 40).

The persuasive component of the conversational negotiations reflects the rhetorical nature of all dialogic processes (Adams 2017, 478).

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002, 132) consider that reasonable argumentation can occur in all spheres of life. Within the limits of their pragma-dialectical theory, all varieties of debates can be reconstructed as critical discussions, which include four stages. The confrontation stage, involving the existence of a difference of opinion, is usually implied in the definition of the activity type represented by a particular speech event. The

roles of protagonist and antagonist are either freely assumed by the participants or pre-assigned by some procedural rules. One can recognise an opening stage of the debate, where the two different positions are expressed, an argumentation stage, including the presentation by each participant of pros and contras, and a concluding stage, which may or may not bring a change in the initial position of the participants.

Strategic maneuvering, which, within the limits of this model, defines a specific form of managing discourse in order to diminish the potential tensions between the participants, characterises the communicative activity of both the protagonist and the antagonist. It involves mixing, in different forms and degrees, sound and fallacious argumentative moves, which have a situated character and sometimes are rather difficult to distinguish from one another (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 142). Strategic maneuvering degenerates when reasonableness is neglected by the participants in favour of their eagerness to be successful (van Eemeren 2010, 198).

Of course, this theoretical model is differently actualised in specific situations, contexts, and discursive genres, depending on their nature and complexity.

7. Methodological Perspectives in Stance Research

As a complex, multifaceted topic, stancetaking can be approached and studied from a large variety of scholarly perspectives, whose cooperation is required in order to get an adequate image of its forms and functioning. Linguistics, sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology are deeply involved in understanding stancetaking activity.

Advocating for "a broader ethnographically-informed conception of stance" (as against an academically-oriented one), Englebretson (2007, 2–3) considers "a dialogue among stance researchers" and an "interplay among ideas" necessary.

The common ground of stance researchers is represented by approaching language – which offers the raw material for expressing stance – not in system-functional, but rather in discourse-functional and interactional terms (Englebretson 2007, 1). This means considering its use, which is marked by the situational context (and the discursive genre), as well as by the interlocutors' communicative ability. This also means taking into account the role of language use in shaping particular social identities and specific subjectivities.

Most approaches of stance have an openly declared *interdisciplinary* nature. In the following, we chronologically present some examples.

Reference to speakers' *rhetorical* tactics, involving others' perspective, is made by Shethar, in the volume edited by Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002, 182). Sakita (2006, 494) requires bringing together *cognitive grammar* and *discourse*, and insists on the close connection between the syntactic, dialogic, and cognitive aspects of language use. Du Bois defines stance as a "*linguistically* articulated form of *social* action" (emphasis mine, LIR), which involves *intersubjectivity* (2007, 139). He distinguishes between *affective* and *epistemic* subjectivity (2007, 143, 156); see also Keisanen (2007, 253). The contributions included in Jaffe's volume (2009) adopt, as indicated in the title, a *sociolinguistic* perspective. Jaffe (2009, 24) refers to *sociocultural matrices*, which give social meanings to the situated linguistic acts of stance. Johnstone speaks of *communicative styles* (2009, 31), which reflect an *ethos* of persona or of the speaker's self (2009, 32), and are associated with different situations or *social identities* (2009, 31). Jaworski and Thurlow (2009) discuss the *ideological* nature of stance and connect it with a symbolic order in a given *society* and with the *social control*. Coupland and Coupland use the concept of *persona*: "a socially construed person image" (2009, 227), strategically projected in dialogue via stancetaking. In another volume, Kecskes speaks of a *pragma-dialogue* (2017, 79) and also of a *socio-cognitive* approach of dialogue (2017, 86).

In this volume, the approach of stance is mainly *pragma-rhetorical* and *interactional*, but also *interdisciplinary*: cultural anthropology and social psychology play an important part in the analysis. There is also a specific focus on possible *applications* of some key findings of stance research.

8. A Brief Overview of the Volume

The papers included in this volume are grouped into six sections. The first section is devoted to the analysis of stancetaking in the political and judicial discourse. The object of the second section is represented by some online communicative forms. The third section analyses the use of some types of linguistic markers of stance in oral conversation and in fiction. In the fourth section, stancetaking is approached in a diachronic perspective, considering its different oral, as well as written forms (parliamentary debates, press, or private letters). In the fifth section, stancetaking is viewed from the perspective of intercultural communication, whereas in the sixth section the perspective adopted is that of applied linguistics.

Daniela Rovenţa Frumuşani examines the public addresses delivered by the President of Romania between March 16 and May 14, 2020. Her analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, is focused on the stancetaking

resources and strategies that are used to index the crisis situation triggered by the COVID–19 pandemic. The author also uses the concept of conversational history to bring forward the relationship between successive presidential addresses.

In her paper, Liliana Hoinărescu analyses the persuasive force of the epistemic markers of certainty in a corpus of debates from the British and the Romanian parliaments, bringing forward some functional similarities as well as differences. She notices that these markers express not only speakers' discursive-rhetorical commitment, but also their politically engaged stance.

Adrian Toader discusses some image building strategies used by the Romanian parliamentarians when approaching a topic of tragic dimensions: the *Colectiv* nightclub fire in 2016. MPs claim responsibility through group identities, blaming others and disavowing their involvement.

Anca Gâță examines quotation as a reporting speech action allowing a person to specifically engage in an argumentative activity. She analyses the contribution of quotations to strategic maneuvering, as a substitute of argumentative moves. A special attention is given to official funeral speeches, where pseudo-quotations can appear as a strategy of valuing the deceased person.

Based on the transcript and the film of the Ceaușescu's trial proceedings, Andrea Cristina Ghiță discusses how the players involved in this atypical trial (the judge, the prosecutor, the defence attorneys, and the defendants) do their acting. In her opinion, the stance differential between them and their nonalignment are continuously escalated, as they constantly display a hybrid, fuzzy identity.

Considering the growing role of social media in expressing political opinions, Stanca Măda and Răzvan Săftoiu analyse, in a dialogic perspective, a post made by the former Mayor of Bucharest, Gabriela Firea, on her Facebook page, and the comments added by other Facebook users. The post was occasioned by a festive event, organised by the Mayor at the National Arena in Bucharest, that triggered some unforeseen reactions from the participants. The stances expressed in the comments concern some aspects of the public as well as private identity of the former Mayor and are based on a critical examination of her political performance.

Attitude and stance as generated by the *Colectiv* nightclub fire in Bucharest (2016), an event that had a strong impact on Romanian society, are also reflected in the comments made by online news readers to a news report dealing with this event. A corpus of these comments is examined in

Sorina Ciobanu's paper. They are quite different from those of the parliamentarians, analysed by Adrian Toader (see above). The epistemic viewpoints are rather prevalent, the authors' comments presenting themselves as "experts". Their comments reflect mainly a negative evaluation, harsh criticism, and disagreement with the report.

Andra Vasilescu tackles the problem of parentheticals. They are defined as cognitive stancetaking devices, mapped onto discourse as metacognitive speech acts, which have both discursive and argumentative functions. The author notices that parentheticals disrupt the syntactic linearisation of the discourse and dissociates between information centred, evaluative, allocutive, (auto)reflexive, and paralocutionary units, according to their discourse space of occurrence. She compares their forms and functioning in oral conversations and in written texts.

A particular reformulation marker: *adică* "I mean, namely", is analysed by Adriana Costăchescu in a number of excerpts from the Romanian literature, in connection with the topic of expressing stance. The author's intention is to explain why such a high-cost procedure, which involves supplementary efforts from both the speaker (production efforts) and the hearer (processing efforts), is quite frequently used in current communication.

Melania Roibu and Oana Uță-Bărbulescu examine the positioning of the MPs in relation to an event which took place in February 1933: the strike of the workers from the railway workshops in Bucharest, brutally repressed by the army. The authors analyse the indexical nature of the stance for the party affiliation of the MPs, as reflected in their linguistic and communicative strategic choices. Just like nowadays, the MPs try to keep a certain balance between reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, but their means were more elaborate before the Second World War than nowadays.

Mihaela-Viorica Constantinescu examines how humour can function as a stancetaking mechanism in the Romanian humoristic press of the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the past century. She notices that, typically, the authors align themselves with their audience and disalign from the objects they evaluate, managing multiple identities. Framed as entertaining performances, authors of humoristic productions trigger an implicit intersubjective alignment of the receivers. Nevertheless, usually, the authors try to control the audience or to manipulate it ideologically.

Gabriela Stoica explores affective stancetaking in some letters from the first half of the nineteenth century exchanged between a father and his son. She points out the existence of a special form of conceptualising the filial-

parental love, as well as a particular construal of the self, which are culturally bound and historically dynamic.

The paper written by Lidiya Shamova and Bella Bulgarova is based on the analysis of the sociolinguistic situation in a bilingual community: Catalonia. The authors take into account such phenomena as code interferences and code switching, as well as speakers' explicit comments on the two linguistic codes currently used in Catalonia: Catalan and Spanish. On this basis, they describe speakers' attitude towards both codes, as well as some specific forms of stancetaking, connected with bilingualism.

Masanori Deguchi's paper provides a comparative analysis of Japanese honorifics and of Romanian politeness pronouns. In author's opinion, one can notice a certain similarity between the use of the Romanian second person politeness pronoun *dumneavoastră*, which requires a plural form of the verb, and the use of long forms of the Japanese honorifics. Both create social distance. At the same time, third person politeness pronouns *dumnealui* (masc.) and *dumneaei* (fem.) in Romanian resemble Japanese referent honorifics, encoding respect for the referent rather than formality. In both languages, politeness pronouns are used to index specific types of stances.

Hiromasha Tanaka's research is based on the data provided by a real-life intercultural project involving Japanese students who used English as a *lingua franca* to communicate with their Romanian partners. The author analyses the co-construction of stance by the participants, as well as the evolution of stancetaking practices, ranging from distancing to alignment and commitment, from a socio-cognitive perspective.

Carmen-Ioana Radu's paper provides a comparative analysis of two school debates in Karl Popper format, organised in Romania and in the USA respectively, on topics of interest among teenagers. The author notices some differences in stancetaking between the two debates. Cultural differences between Romanian and American society, that is, between a predominantly collectivistic and a predominantly individualistic society, can provide a partial explanation of this fact.

9. Final Remarks

Summing up, this volume presents some theoretical findings and their practical implications connected with the expression of subjectivity and the construction of intersubjectivity in discourse. It is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the social and pragmatic nature of communicative interaction, as well as of its culturally variable forms.

Several aspects are specific to this volume when compared to other volumes approaching the same general theme. One of them is the authors' choice of topics, some of which refer to events with a strong impact on political life, at the national as well as international level, such as Ceaușescu's trial, or to events that affected everyday life all over the world, such as the COVID–19 pandemic. Other authors refer to the same event: the *Colectiv* nightclub fire in Bucharest (2016), which triggered vehement street protests, leading to important political changes. Accordingly, one gets a direct image of the way in which the setting – the channel of communication included – strongly influences the stancetaking processes.

Another particular aspect of this volume is its opening towards some aspects regarding intercultural communication, as well as towards some possible applications of the theory of stance in various practical activities connected with improving communication.

One can add also the fact that stancetaking is viewed and commented not only in synchrony, but also in diachrony, a number of articles referring to texts from the nineteenth century or from the interwar period.

We hope that, by presenting specific theoretical and methodological findings as well as their practical implications, our book can help clarify some particular aspects of stancetaking in different discursive forms, across time and space.

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PART I.

STANCETAKING IN POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL DISCOURSE

CHAPTER ONE

STANCETAKING, IDENTITY, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

DANIELA ROVENŢA-FRUMUŞANI

1. Introduction

The present study falls within the broader concepts of stance, stancetaking, evaluation, and intersubjective positioning (Biber and Finegan 1989; Hunston and Thompson eds. 2000; Martin and White 2005; Englebretson 2007; Du Bois 2007; Marín-Arrese 2013, 2015; Thompson 2014). With regard to the concept of stance, the terms "stancetaking" and "intersubjective positioning" (Englebretson 2007; Marín-Arrese et al. eds. 2013) are discussed in order to foreground the active, socially-constructed, audience-oriented nature of identity and relationality or strong interdependency ("We do not 'have' relations, but we are relations" in Protevi's definition, adopted by Sampson 2017, 134).

This study explores how speech acts, modality (epistemic and affective), interactant pronouns are used as a stancetaking resource and strategy to index a crisis situation (Romania in a state of emergency due to the COVID–19 pandemic). The corpus analysed here comprises the presidential addresses delivered between March 16 and May 14 (2020), and investigates the macro-narrative of the events in light of Du Bois's (2007) theory of stance and Golopenţia's (2018) concept of conversational history. The analysis starts with a brief review of the research that has informed the study, namely recent sociolinguistic studies on stance, highlighting stance, identity, intersubjectivity, epistemicity, and evaluation; continues with the Romanian COVID–19 context and the macro-narrative of the state of emergency as reflected in the presidential addresses; and, finally, analyses the paradigmatic tokens of the corpus using mixed (quantitative and qualitative) methods.

This investigation seeks to determine the functioning of stance in constructing subject positions and propositions at both the micro and the

macro level, as well as the interpellation and implication of the public. We maintain, like many previous studies, that stance and stancetaking should focus both on the expression of a speaker's stance, and on the reaction it produces in his/her interlocutors (obvious in a face-to-face interaction, but indirectly constructed, via the implied interlocutor who is indirectly addressed).

The specific objectives of our analysis are the following:

i) to discuss the frequency and significance of the selected stance markers in a specific discourse (crisis corpus);

ii) to discuss the similarities and differences in the use of the selected stance markers in each of the selected discourses;

iii) to discuss how the lexical and syntactic choices are indices of specific modes of stancetaking and intersubjective positioning, which constitute different styles and strategies.

From a methodological point of view, analytical perspectives in the field of stance are quite heterogeneous, ranging from conversation analysis to qualitative sociolinguistics (Jaffe ed. 2009) and pragmatics (Englebretson 2007; Bonnin 2019).

We propose a quantitative method, based on keyword analysis, that represents the point of departure for the identification of stance markers (epistemic and affective); this is followed by a qualitative analysis of speech acts, evaluative forms, and metaphors.

We also discuss the concept of *double stance* (Bonnin 2019) to describe how a speaker positions him/herself by introducing two different but not polemic perspectives: his/her own and others'. By taking a double stance, the stancetaker presents two related evaluations of an object or topic: one personal and the other collective (Bonnin 2019). In fact, stance does not involve mere textual features, but cumulative processes that exert an effect on the reader, for whom they are brought into existence. That is why we will discuss the "speaker in the text" as well as "the reader in the text" (infra).

2. Theoretical Frame

2.1. Stance

In the recent years, *stance* has become an increasingly important locus for research within the functional (pragmatic, cognitive, sociolinguistic, and interactional) paradigm. Stance may be indicated through established lexical, morphological, and prosodic devices, or indexed indirectly, via speakers' strategic use of particular linguistic signs or interactional patterns in the speech situation. Stance is a position that speakers assume towards

various objects, people, concepts, ideas, etc., based on their state of knowledge, personal beliefs, identity, sociocultural norms and values, among various other factors.

The concept of *stance* has been used to describe and explain how speakers position themselves with respect to the content and/or form of their utterances. The concept of stance has been analysed in a wide range of discourse practices and genres, such as political discourse (Bassiouney 2012; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018a; Ajiboye and Abioye 2019), journalistic and media discourse (Haddington 2007; Marín Arrese 2015), organisational discourses (McEntee-Atalianis 2013), and workplace narratives (Holmes and Marra 2005).

In a study on social interaction, Wang (2019) asserts that a common thread in recent analyses is the view that *stancetaking is a public act with a dialogic nature*. Ochs (1993, 288) defines stance as "a display of a socially recognized point of view or attitude". According to Ochs (1992), it is a *domain of social meaning*, which helps to *constitute social reality*. A stance is viewed by numerous scholars as referring to the speaker's position in talk and to one's relationship with others (e.g., Kiesling 2009).

Different terms have been put forth by different researchers to refer to different aspects of stance and stancetaking including epistemic state, commitment, judgment, evaluation, perspective, point of view, voice, evidentiality, affect, attitude, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity (see Jaffe 2009, 6). Apparently diverging, they have a common denominator: "Though not always easily separated from each other, these conceptual terms provide useful entry points into the intricate system of stance-marking and stance-taking" (Iwasaki and Yap 2015, 1). Our understanding of stance has increased to a remarkable degree following a number of important publications (Traugott 1995, 2010; Nuyts 2001; Kärkkäinen 2003, 2006; Englebretson ed. 2007; Jaffe ed. 2009; Du Bois and Kärkkäinen 2012, among others).

Whereas earlier researchers used the notion of subjectivity to explain lexical and grammatical constructions, at present, by focusing on *grammar-in-interaction,* researchers examine a variety of constructions as a means of encoding stance. An important shift has taken place. Earlier, subjectivity was seen as a motivation behind grammatical patterns, but now stance is approached as an interactional goal that grammatical resources help achieve (Kärkkäinen 2006; Iwasaki and Yap 2015).

2.2. Identity

Identity in a social and individual perspective is one of the fundamental concepts of the modern times (Goffman 1959; Giddens 1991; Beck 1992), socially generated, sustained, and transformed.

Spencer-Oatey (2007) mentions that there is a number of different social psychological theories of identity, which reflect a variety of approaches to this issue. Identity Theory (Stryker 1987) takes a sociological approach; Social Identity Theory (SIT) of Intergroup Relations (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) (Turner et al. 1987) both take a psychological approach.

It is worth highlighting that stance and identity are related concepts, in that taking a stance can contribute to identity construction. Ochs (1992) argues that social identities (like gender) are enacted over time through language functions, like stancetaking. Similarly, Bucholtz (2007) studied the relationship between stancetaking and long-term identity construction, connecting the two with time:

> Stance is therefore both a subjective and an inter-subjective process, for social identities may be built up through the habitual taking of stances, and interactional dynamics may sediment into social relations (Bucholtz 2007, 379).

What is significant for Bucholtz in identity formation is duration: a stance might have "temporary salience" within an interaction, but repeated stancetaking over time "solidifies into more enduring kinds of identities" (Bucholtz 2007, 395).

Bucholtz and Hall understand identity as fluid, temporary, and emergent from discourse, as it "is shaped from moment to moment in interaction" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 591). They include stance in the construction of identity and define identity broadly as "the social positioning of self and other" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 586). To explain the construction of identity through interaction, Bucholtz and Hall provide a framework involving five principles: *emergence* (as challenge of the classic psychological view of identity), *positionality* (valuing identity relations that arise in local contexts), *indexicality* (concerned with the different linguistic means whereby identity is produced in discourse), *relationality* (concerned with complementary relations active in the intersubjectively construction of identity), and *partialness* (issued from the postmodern critique of master narratives and the necessity of "partial accounts"). Their third principle, *indexicality*, is the principal focus of this analysis.

Identity relations emerge within interactions through several related indexical processes, including: (a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) implicatures and presuppositions regarding one's own or others' identity position; (c) displayed evaluative and epistemic orientations to ongoing talk, as well as interaction footings and participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically associated with specific persons and groups (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 594).

As Antaki and Widdicombe (1998, 3) claim, "for a person to 'have an identity' [...] is to be cast into a category with associated characteristics or features". However, identities are neither stable nor fixed, but rather emergent and dynamic, and situationally negotiated in discourse (Goffman 1959; Haddington 2004; Goodwin 2007; Johnstone 2007; Evans 2016, etc.). Moerman (1993, 85) considers that "the work of producing ethnicity and identity involves both durable culture and *momentary contingencies of interaction*".

However, it is worth noting that one person can be described by different categories (sex, class, status, or age) and therefore several identities can be at play simultaneously. Moreover, particular identities are not salient or relevant at all times, but rather several identities are potentially at work simultaneously, whereas others never become relevant in an interactional situation (cf. Haddington 2007).

2.3. Intersubjectivity

The perspective of dialogicality or intersubjectivity has been adopted from conversation analysis, "calling attention to the fact that stances often emerge as a result of joint engagement in stancetaking" (Du Bois and Kärkäinen 2012, 441).

The meaning of stance has to be construed within the broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural values. This approach to the problem brings into play several aspects of language in interaction. In searching for the theoretical resources needed to account for the achievement of stance, we find a complex web of interconnections, linking stance with dialogicality, intersubjectivity, the social actors who jointly enact stance, and the mediating frameworks of linguistic structure and sociocultural value they invoke in doing so (Du Bois 2007, 139–140).

The second theoretical and methodological foundation of our analysis is the dialogic perspective (Bakhtin 1981 [1934]), which is present in sociocultural linguistics and in the associated fields of philosophy, psychology, rhetoric, etc.

As several authors maintain, dialogicality deals with

the ways in which the words of the current speaker engage with the words of others who have spoken before, in ways that generate observable consequences for the production of discourse, the interpretation of situated meaning, and the collaborative construction of inter-subjectivity (Du Bois and Kärkäinen 2012, 443).

Many analysts point out the fact that *perspective* (and *perspectivation*) (Graumann and Kallmeyer eds. 2002) and *stancetaking* (Englebretson 2007) are similar, both being based on the relativity of human knowledge, which is reflected in communicative interaction through individual variations in object, people or event evaluation (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 1; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018a, 343). The interactional background explains the interplay between *perspective-setting* and *perspective-taking* (by the audience), as well as the triadic model of stancetaking (Du Bois 2007, 163).

2.4. Conversational History

Conversational history is a concept that researchers who approach conversation from different perspectives use quite frequently. Unfortunately, despite being based on the main findings of American conversationalists, its circulation is limited to French-speaking academic communities, given English-speaking authors' "tradition" of the last few decades of ignoring contributions in other languages (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018b).

The concept was introduced by Golopenția in 1980, and enriched by the same author in numerous studies and articles (Golopenția 2018) on the basis of a series of text analyses (French novels and plays), as well as of sociolinguistic and ethnological fieldwork in Romania. It was fruitfully applied by many authors in the pragmatic analysis of a number of well-known theatrical works.

Golopenția views conversational history as verbal interactions: a) occurring between or shared by the same set of interlocutors; b) defining the series thus obtained as a dynamic whole with distinctive syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties; c) positioning conversational history as a superordinate unit in the pragmatic hierarchy starting from speech act and progressing beyond conversation (Golopenția 2018, 10).

The concept of *conversational history* as defined by Golopenția parallels, at a different level, Bakhtin's concept of "interior dialogisation of discourse" (Bakhtin 1981 [1934]), which involves the meeting of two (or more) different languages and "different subjective horizons within the individual discourse". Bakhtin considers that a "dialogic intervention loses

its meaning if taken out of the mixed context of both (or all) interlocutors' discourse, as it is an organic part of a multi-lingual whole" (Bakhtin 1981 [1934], 139, apud Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018b, 83).

Conversational history proves to be useful both as a theoretical and as an analytical tool (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018b, 86). As a theoretical tool, it can be seen as a complement to Bakhtin's concept of interior dialogisation of discourse. As an analytical tool, it has already proved its efficiency in the analysis of literary texts. Some additional work may be needed to make it more fit for the analysis of authentic verbal exchanges (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018b, 86). That is why we propose to include a political or everyday series of discourses under the same label *conversational history* or *interactional history* (cf. Vion 1992), as an enlarged version of the flow of speech (oral or written) between the same actors (teacher/students, chief/subordinates, doctor/patient, etc.).

2.5. Defining Stancetaking

The impetus for research on stance as a linguistic category can be traced back to earlier works on modality and subjectivity in language (Benveniste 1971; Lyons 1977).

Stancetaking is the expression of an "attitude", "evaluation" (Hunston and Thompson eds. 2000), "footing" (Goffman 1981), "evidentiality" (Chafe and Nichols eds. 1986), "hedging" (Hyland 1998), "positioning" (Harré and van Langenhove eds. 1999; Baert 2012), "appraisal" (Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005; Hood 2019) or "judgment" of the speaker's point of view (Englebretson 2007; Jaffe 2009). Over the last twenty years, work on stancetaking by sociolinguists, linguistic anthropologists, grammarians, but also philosophers (Baert 2012, *inter alii*) offers a new perspective on a number of features that had previously been considered separately, as different ways of encoding evaluation, evidentiality, modality, hedging, or appraisal under the umbrella of act, performativity, and interaction.

> We have been assembling an analytic toolkit of interconnected concepts and methods designed to shed light on the various elements and processes of stance. Key components include the concepts of evaluation, positioning, and alignment, as well as the sociocognitive relations of objective, subjective, and intersubjective intentionality (Du Bois 2007, 162).

Accounting for stancetaking as an act has moved the study of stance from features of the clause (Halliday 1994; Biber 1999) to linguistic structures in dialogue (Kärkkäinen 2006; Haddington 2007). Primarily concerned with

structures such as choices of verbs or the syntax of turns, the study of stance should evolve in a macro-structural temporal and discursive dimension (for instance, sequences of discourses in a longer period of time, focused on the same issue). In fact, users activate all the components of Du Bois' stance triangle by evaluating, positioning, and aligning, without the explicit presence of another social actor.

Following ancient rhetorical tradition (Aristotle's triad ethos–logos–pathos), Du Bois introduced the visual representation of the Stance Triangle, in which "[t]he stance act [...] creates three kinds of stance consequences at once [...] [namely,] the stancetaker (1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self), and (3) aligns with other subjects" (Du Bois 2007, 163). Like many other researchers, Du Bois highlights a *social perspective* on stance.

Stancetaking is considered the *primary* discursive mechanism by which social identity is realised, through the shift of footing, i.e. one's alignment to the addressee/audience (Goffman 1981), the positioning of self relationally, i.e. simultaneously oriented vis-à-vis oneself and others, and an orientation towards extra-linguistic reality, i.e. physical, social, and mental referents and their discursive representations. Stance may be predicated on intellectual, moral, or affective grounds, but it always indexes a particular ideological position: political, social, cultural, economic, religious, and so on (Jaworski and Thurlow 2009). Stance expressions are also indexical of the speaker's *subjective* and *intersubjective positioning* (Traugott 1995; Nuyts 2012).

We will follow Du Bois (2007, 141), who distinguishes in his stance triangle the *subjective stance* (emphasising identity features and norms), the *objective stance* (focused on the construction and the evaluation of the object), and the *interpersonal* one. Put otherwise, the evaluation of the object goes through affective and/or epistemic marks, the self-positioning means assuming roles and responsibilities, and the alignment correlates two stances or two persons (cf. also Vasilescu 2018, 308).

2.6. Epistemic and Affective Stance

In the available literature on stance, a distinction between *epistemic* and *affective* stance, or between evidentiality/commitment and affect, is often made. An epistemic stance is related to the degree of certainty concerning the object of discussion, while affective stance is related to the emotional feelings about the object of discourse. Epistemic stances are, for instance, certainty or uncertainty shown when answering a question, while an

example of affective stance is happiness expressed verbally or with gestures (Chindamo et al. 2012).

The conceptual domain of epistemicity, as Boye (2012, 2–3) convincingly argues, comprises the "subcategories evidentiality and epistemic modality". Evidentiality is defined as "epistemic justification", in terms of notions such as "source of information", "evidence", or "justification" (Boye 2012, 2–3).

The features that contribute to the intersubjective construction of the *reader–in–the text* are more extensive than those initially mentioned in Traugott (2007) and include interactant pronouns (Kim 2009), non-declarative mood choices (Thompson 2014), evaluation (Martin and White 2005). An important component of discursive practices is the dimension of emotion, a dimension "at least as important, if, indeed, not more important [than mental representations]" (Bednarek 2009, 200). With the "affective turn" of the last decade, emotion has become a significant focus in discourse analysis and pragma-rhetoric (Kiesling 2011; Du Bois and Kärkkäinen 2012; Wetherell 2012, 2013). This trend began with Martin's (2000) models of evaluation, and Martin and White's (2005, 38) appraisal model, where the subsystem of Attitude is composed of Affect, Judgment, and Appreciation.

Affective stance is clearly linked with the expression of affect, which is one of the basic needs of humans as social animals (Chindamo et al. 2012). Consequently, the expression of stance is not merely verbal. It also includes prosody and body language. This is why, when describing stance in its multimodal expressions, we need to study the many different means that can be used to express stances, i.e. the different forms and amplitudes of a gesture, movement, sound, or position of body parts.

We hold that the articulation of epistemic and affective stance in the new "affective turn" context bridges the two pillars of communication: information and relationships. The "double stance" or correlation between the *author–in–the text* and the *reader–in–the text* (Thompson 2014) shows that the implicit dialogue between previous and current stances is an essential strategic manoeuvre in crisis communication. Bakhtin (1986) argues that every utterance (whether a single turn in a conversation or a longer written text) is a response to previous utterances:

> Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to preceding utterances […]. Each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account (Bakhtin 1986, 91).

3. The COVID–19 Context in Romania and the World

The 2019–2020 coronavirus pandemic, also known as COVID–19, began on December 12, 2019, in downtown Wuhan, China, where a group of people contracted pneumonia of an unknown cause. Starting with February 2020, many European countries (including Romania) reported COVID–19 cases and took preventive and protective measures against the virus.

Romanian authorities also started preparing to manage the sanitary and social crises by providing hospitals with the necessary equipment, establishing procedures for the triage of patients screened positive, etc. and, following the measures other countries adopted, preparing for the institution of a state of emergency.

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organisation declared the coronavirus outbreak a pandemic. The first measures taken by the Romanian authorities to combat the coronavirus pandemic were announced on March 16, 2020 (presidency.ro, 2020) by the President of Romania Klaus Iohannis who, on the same day, decreed a state of emergency for a period of 30 days. In article 2, the presidential decree mentions the following:

> Pentru prevenirea răspândirii COVID–19 și realizarea managementului consecințelor, raportat la evoluția situației epidemiologice, pe durata stării de urgență este restrâns exercițiul următoarelor drepturi, proporțional cu gradul de realizare al criteriilor prevăzute de art. 4 alin. (4): a) libera circulație; b) dreptul la viață intimă, familială și privată; c) inviolabilitatea domiciliului; d) dreptul la învățătură; e) libertatea întrunirilor; f) dreptul de proprietate privată; g) dreptul la grevă; h) libertatea economică. (presidency.ro, 2020)

> In order to prevent the spread of COVID–19 and to achieve the management of the consequences related to the evolution of the epidemiological situation, during the state of emergency the exercise of the following rights is restricted, in proportion to the degree of fulfilment of the criteria provided by art. 4 paragraph (4): a) free movement; b) the right to privacy; c) inviolability of one's home; d) the right to education; e) freedom of assembly; f) the right of private property; g) the right to strike; h) economic freedom.

The measures adopted in Romania during the emergency period deeply marked all socio-economic spheres as well as the private lives. Measures such as school closings, limits on the freedom to travel, mandatory written declarations concerning the reasons for leaving one's home, the right to partial unemployment, the suspension of bank payments for firms and

individuals unable to pay their monthly bank rates, etc. have had a major impact on people's life.

To determine the effect of these measures accurately, the Research Institute of the Quality of Life (Institutul de Cercetări privind Calitatea Vieții – ICCV) has elaborated a document, entitled *The Pandemic and the Standard of Living. Social Protection Policies* (*Pandemia și standardul de viață. Politici de protecție socială*, ICCV, April 2020), that focuses on the social protection system during the state of emergency. If working from home has been rapidly adopted and put into practice, life under lockdown poses a series of difficulties, especially for children and the elderly, deprived as they are of the possibility to socialise or to go out (ICCV 2020, 37).

A second inevitable challenge has been gaining the support of the population for respecting strict health measures in response to the pandemic. The *#stațiacasă* (*stayhome*) information campaign, aimed at the transmission of the basic information necessary to understand the pandemic, "needs an improvement of the strategic communication for making isolation and distancing more bearable for the population" (the possibility to socialise or to go out (ICCV 2020, 40).

Researchers have emphasised that, at the international level, governments have used two communication strategies: (1) openness and total transparency concerning the economic and sanitary situation as well as a decentralised communication style, and (2) centralised control over information and the communication channels: "Romania is more in the second category" (ICCV 2020, 40; translation our). This is why we are interested in scrutinising the style and strategies deployed by the presidential communication in order to gain support for concrete preventive actions.

Whatever the angle of approach, the COVID–19 pandemic affects the standard of living in the short and medium term:

> Pentru a atenua această tendință, impusă de o situație excepțională, e nevoie de măsuri excepționale; nu toate sunt populare, dar sunt imperios necesare pentru a reveni cât mai repede la standardul de viață de dinaintea pandemiei. (ICCV 2020, 41)

> To attenuate this trend imposed by an exceptional situation, it is necessary to adopt exceptional measures; not all are popular, but they are absolutely necessary to return as quickly as possible to the standard of living before the pandemic.

The state of emergency, lasting between March 16 and May 15, 2020, was marked by numerous information and mobilisation speeches delivered by

the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, at the seat of the Presidency – Cotroceni Palace – and broadcasted. Klaus Werner Iohannis, former leader of the National Liberal Party (Rom. Partidul Național Liberal – PNL), was elected President in 2014, and then re-elected in 2019. Iohannis is the first Romanian president to come from an ethnic (German) minority, as he is a Transylvanian Saxon. The government during the period under study is a liberal one, but the Parliament was dominated by members of the Social Democratic Party (Rom. Partidul Social-Democrat – PSD), currently in opposition.

4. The Macro-Narrative of the State of Emergency: 28 Presidential Addresses

The chronology of the 28 presidential speeches (see *Annex*) is predominantly represented by speeches referring to the internal sanitary situation (27 out of 28), discussing also the social consequences of the pandemic (25 out of 28), and internal politics issues (20 out of 28). The economic dimension is present in 14 addresses, foreign policy is discussed in 7 addresses, the legal dimension is approached in 3 addresses, and there are also 2 addresses discussing the diaspora's issues. Obviously, the topics overlap, but there is a central, nuclear issue that related topics revolve around.

From April 16 on, we notice an accentuation of the political character of the speeches in the emergence of criticism of the Parliament and the opposition party PSD (the Social Democratic Party). The 16 speeches of the period April 16 – May 14 show diminished concern for the health situation (there are only 3 speeches fully devoted to this topic). Out of the 16 speeches, 3 deal with Easter distancing measures, 6 speeches criticise Parliament and the PSD (Social Democratic Party), 4 addresses evoke the relaxation of pandemic control measures, 2 express appreciations for the Government's activities, 1 speech refers to the budgetary rectification, another speech is more socially oriented, and another one introduces the measures to be applied when the state of emergency was replaced by a state of alert.

5. Data Analysis

5.1. Corpus and Methods

Adopting the dialogic concept of conversational history, defined and applied by Golopenția in the 80's (see Golopenția 2018), in line with an

enlarged vision of intersubjectivity (Haddington 2004), we will approach the narrative of the presidential discourses during the pandemic (temporal and thematic episodes), based on the stancetaking models (Du Bois 2007).

Out of the 28 discourses of the emergency period, we selected the following discourses according to the dominant thematic (cf. *Annex*) and the narrative temporal scheme (initial, median, and final episodes): March 16, April 16, and May 14, 2020.

The macro-narrative of the conversation between the President and the people actualises the five drumsticks of everyday narrative (Labov and Waletzky 1967): *Orientation* (place, time, and situation), *Complication* (series of events), *Evaluation*, *Resolution*, and *Coda*.

The *Orientation* begins with the declaration of the state of emergency, the next episodes (March 16–31) concern budgetary, sanitary, social measures and recommendations. With March 31, the situation becomes more complicated, due to the sanitary crisis, quarantined cities, and a growing number of infections (in Labov and Waletzky's terms *Complication*). Compared to the first month, when there were 10 speeches, starting with April 14, when Easter approached, four addresses were delivered in four consecutive days (April 14–17): (i) the extension of the state of emergency (April 14); (ii) the measures that the Orthodox Church and the Ministry of Interior adopted for Easter (April 15); (iii) severe criticism addressed to Parliament and the PSD (April 16) just before Easter; (iv) good wishes and reconciliation message (April 17). April 16 marks the peak of the double crisis, sanitary and political, against a general background of discontent. But the day after Easter (April 21), the President congratulates the authorities for their good management of the Easter celebrations. The next five speeches criticise Parliament and the PSD's "toxic activity", and the last one announces a *finis coronat opus*: the measures and results of the two months' state of emergency.

Since stance positions subjects, evaluates objects (persons or situations), and aligns a subject with other subjects (Du Bois 2007), it is crucial in our view to understand and explain "discourse strategies and world representations along the lines of alignment and disalignment" (Ajiboye and Abioye 2019). That is why we will focus on linguistic structures, as well as on discourse strategies (contextually indexed): pronouns, speech acts, and epistemic and affective stances (**5.2.**–**5.5.**).

5.2. Dialogicality: The Speaker/Writer and Addressee/Reader. Interactant Pronouns

One of the most explicit resources available to the writer/speaker to construe the *reader/addressee–in–the text* – and the counterpart, the *writer/speaker–in–the text* – is the use of interactant pronouns (Thompson 2014, 84). The concept of interactant pronouns has been discussed primarily by Kim (2009), who emphasises that

> By using reader-oriented personal pronouns, the writer can evoke the reader's involvement in the textual interaction, i.e., encourage the reader to accept the role of the dialogic participant, and ultimately enhance the persuasiveness of the text (Kim 2009, 2087).

The first-person plural *we* has multiple referents and usually refers to a group of at least two people that include the speaker. The inclusive pronoun *we* refers to a speaker and his/her addressee or to a group that includes the speaker and other referents, but not the addressee or a group that includes the speaker, the addressee, and other referents. In the political discourse the multiple functions of inclusive pronouns are used by speakers/writers to foster alignment and disalignment (Bucholtz and Hall 2005).

As Romanian is a pro-drop language, 1st and 2nd person (sg. and pl.) pronominal subjects are usually omitted, verbal inflexion unambiguously indicating the person. Their presence in an utterance is emphatic. Accordingly, in our quantitative analysis, we considered both explicit and implicit forms of expressing person. One can notice a frequent polarisation of the interactants (verbs and pronouns: *we/us/our* vs *you/your*), which is typical of the populist discourse. In our corpus, the *I* vs *you* positioning appears quite frequently in all discourses (from the introductory, explanatory first address, to the final mobilising 28th discourse as well).

Discourse	First	Median	Final
1st person plural (*we/us/our*)	13 (18%)	11 (30%)	26 (33%)
inclusive	13	11	26
exclusive	0	0	0
1st person singular vs 2nd person (*I* vs *you*)	10 (14%)	2 (5,5%)	9 (11%)
1st person singular (*I*)	15 (20%)	6 (16,6%)	8 (10%)
3rd person	34 (47%)	17 (47%)	35 (46%)
Total	72	47	78

Table 1. *References to interactants in the initial, median, and final discourse of the state of emergency*

The general discursive connotation is authorial (in the first discourse):

(1) *Vreau să spun* românilor ce înseamnă instituirea stării de urgență pe teritoriul țării noastre potrivit decretului pe care l-am semnat astăzi. (16.03.2020)
I want to tell Romanians what the institution of a state of emergency in the territory of our country means.

(2) *Vreau să fie clar* următorul lucru (16.03.2020)
I want the following thing *to be clear.*

Klaus Iohannis assumes the authorial voice in a *magister dixit* stance. If in the first speech there are only 13 instances of inclusive *we* referring to the President and the general public, the first person *I-authorial* appears 15 times; see for example: *Vreau să spun românilor ce înseamnă instituirea stării de urgență* ("[*I*] want to tell Romanians what the institution of a state of emergency […] means"), *potrivit decretului pe care l-am semnat astăzi* ("[…] according to the decree [*I*] have emitted today"), *am dispus ca* ("[*I*] disposed that"). Promises pronounced iteratively are also present: *voi verifica personal* ("[*I*] will verify personally"), *Eu voi rămâne foarte implicat în continuare* ("*I* will continue to be closely involved").

In most cases, the inclusive *we* appears as including the general public: *Națiunea **noastră** trece prin momente dificile* ("*Our* nation crosses difficult moments"), *împreună suntem încrezători că vom depăși cu bine* "[*We*] are confident that together we will succeed"), since it explains the situation or mobilises people for future action; but in one example it includes the President and the Government: *Sunt hotărât ca **împreună cu Guvernul Orban** să luăm cele mai drastice măsuri pentru a proteja viața și sănătatea cetățenilor români* ("[*I*] am determined, *together with Orban Cabinet*, to take the most drastic measures in order to protect the life and health of the Romanian citizens").

The second address we analyse (delivered before Orthodox Easter, the most important religious event of the year for Romanians, 85% of them being Orthodox) has half as many words as the first address and approximately the same distribution of verbal and pronominal forms with one exception: inclusive *we* is much more present, but the ethos of the speaker fades. This seems in line with the increasing intensity of shared values and human-interest frames (example 3), doubled by a strong critical perspective (example 4):

(3) După ce vom depăși această criză, va trebui *să separăm* clar ce este *bine și ce funcționează de ceea ce nu este în regulă și nu funcționează.* (16.04.2020)

Once we overcome this crisis, we will have to *separate what is good and works from what is not in order and does not work.*

(4) Astăzi *vedem clar efectele dezastruoase* ale acestui *mod toxic de a gândi și a acționa, care ne-a ținut în loc zeci de ani*. (16.04.2020)

Today we *can clearly see the disastrous effects* of this *toxic way of thinking and acting, which has held us back for decades* [critique of the PSD, considered by the President and the National Liberal Party an enemy of progress in Romania].

The evaluation frame now becomes more important than positioning (the first address positioned the President as in charge of the crisis management and of the institution of the state of emergency). We now witness a *transition phase*: legal and organisational measures are replaced by a political frame (at an abstract and concrete level as well: punishment of guilt and of guilty people). As in fictional or everyday discourse narrative, a significant change (*Complication*) occurs. In the final address, different uses of *we*, either as *we = I + you* or *we = I + they* (the Government), highly dependent on the discourse context, mark solidarity strategies, as well as a symbol of power.

The final address doubles the *we* inclusive (33%), aiming to emphasise the "traditional collective identity denotation" (Du Bois 2012, 336) and the heroic sacrifices of the people:

(5) Împreună *am salvat* vieți [...] și la fel de puternici și uniți trebuie să continuăm și în lunile următoare, pentru că lupta cu acest virus nemilos este departe de a se fi încheiat. (14.05.2020)

Together, *we saved* lives [...] and we must stay just as strong and united in the following months, because the fight against this merciless virus is far from being over.

This strategic use of inclusive *we* aligns the addressee "into a community of shared value and belief" (Martin and White 2005, 95).

5.3. The Speech Acts

The hierarchy of references to interactants (*I* vs *we* vs *you*) is correlated with the distribution of speech acts (Searle 1969): representative (later named assertive), directive, expressive, comissive, and declarations.

Speech acts	First discourse	Median discourse	Last discourse
Representative (assertive)	45 (72%)	29 (88%)	50 (87%)
Directive	7 (11%)	1 (3%)	3 (5%)
Expressive	4 (6%)	2 (6%)	2 (3,5%)
Comissive	5 (8%)	1 (3%)	0
Declarations	1 (1,6%)	0	2 (3,5%)
Total	62	33	57

Table 2. *Speech acts in the three discourses*

Representatives are by far the most numerous (over 70%), due to the informative density and top-down direction: *vreau să spun românilor ce înseamnă instituirea stării de urgență* ("[I] want to tell Romanians what the institution of a state of emergency […] means"). The positive assertions consolidate the institutional position of the President (the presidency being the highest office in the state) and restricts the opening of dialogical discourse processes (cf. Hidalgo-Downing 2017, 70). On the contrary, modality (infra) enables the dialogic process to take place.

It is worth noting that few speech acts (thanking) are addressed to specified individuals (doctors and teachers) in a more concrete and personalised manner. Declarations clarify the state of emergency and the state of alert, and directives insist on citizens' obligation to stay home. The other addresses remain informative, declarative, judicial, and abstract. It is interesting to mention as well that commands are not realised by imperatives, but by representatives with deontic modality and inclusive *we* in a softened manner (softer than direct commands). Cf. for example:

(6) Şi la fel de puternici şi uniţi *trebuie să continuăm* şi în lunile următoare, pentru că lupta cu acest virus nemilos este departe de a se fi încheiat. (14.05.2020)

    And *we must stay* just as strong and united in the following months, because the fight against this merciless virus is far from being over.

Surprisingly, the fewest expressive acts mark the last "appraisal" speech at the end of the state of emergency, even if their general connotation is of implicit recognition and appreciation.

The same is true for modality, which functions either explicitly (with adverbials: *sigur* "evidently", *cu toată certitudinea* "certainly", and modal verbs: *trebuie* "should") or implicitly (*împreună* […] *vom depăşi cu bine* "together […] we will succeed").

5.4. Modality. Epistemic Stance

As Englebretson argues, the study of stance "represents an ongoing trend toward understanding the full social and pragmatic nature of language, as it is used by actual speakers or writers to act and interact in the real world" (2007, 1). Epistemic modality is one of the pragmatic categories that has received considerable attention in the studies on stance.

A speaker may take an epistemic stance with regard to the content of his/her speech, e.g., the speaker expresses his/her degree of certainty towards the content through adverbs expressing certitude, doubt, modal verbs, or stance complement clauses controlled by mental verbs: *know*, *think*, or *mean* (Precht 2003).

Researchers distinguish between *subjective modality*, where the source of the modality is overt, and *objective modality*, where the source is covert (cf. Lyons 1977).

Modality	Initial discourse	Median discourse	Final discourse
Epistemic	8	4	3
Deontic	2	2	2

Table 3. *Epistemic and deontic modalities*

The common denominator of all the presidential addresses is the regular alternation between epistemic constructions (as authority's voice) and deontic ones (decisions that must be urgently implemented):

(7) În această perioadă de criză, producția și întreaga economie *trebuie să fie pregătite* să susțină combaterea răspândirii infecției cu noul coronavirus. (16.03.2020)

In this period of crisis, [economic] production and the entire economy *must be prepared* to support the struggle against the spread of the novel Coronavirus [first discourse].

(8) De asemenea, *poate*, atenție, *poate fi interzisă gradual*, adică atunci când *se impune*, circulația rutieră, feroviară, maritimă, fluvială sau aeriană pe diferite rute și a metroului. (16.03.2020)

It is also possible, I repeat, *possible*, for road, rail, sea or air traffic on travel certain routes, and the subway, *to be gradually* banned *when necessary* [first discourse].

The intended acceptability of the decisions, the softening of drastic measures results from the use of mitigating syntagms, such as *may be + gradually + when necessary* (8), inducing the acceptance of the population (assumed agreement).

Moreover, the negotiation of the agreement with the reader–in–the text is prepared by the frequent invocation of strong actions and intentions:

(9) *Vreau să transmit* un mesaj special medicilor și personalului medical care, încă de la primul caz înregistrat în România, au demonstrat profesionalism și o extraordinară dedicare. (16.03.2020)

I want to send a special message to doctors, and the medical staff [...] who have demonstrated professionalism and extraordinary dedication [first discourse].

The direct address to specific professional categories (doctors, policemen, or teachers) is complemented before the final sequence of the speech by an address to the general public, including the same mitigating, supportive constructions:

(10) *Vreau să subliniez* că ele vor avea un *caracter temporar*, însă *sunt necesare acum,* pentru a preveni *un rău mult mai mare în viitor.* (16.03.2020)

I want to stress that these measures will be of a *temporary nature,* but they are *absolutely necessary now* to prevent *much greater harm in the future* [first discourse].

Generally, alternating modalities (epistemic and deontic) appear in different sequences, but sometimes they also act in the same stance (example 11), in order to close the speech convincingly (the voice is the inclusive *we*):

(11) *Era obligatorie* instituirea unor măsuri excepționale dacă voiam să reducem răspândirea virusului. Dar *știm sigur* că fără aceste măsuri, unele foarte dure, precum carantinarea unor localități, restricționări severe de circulație, închiderea școlilor, suspendarea întregii activități a restaurantelor, magazinelor comerciale, numărul victimelor ar fi fost mult, mult mai mare. (14.05.2020)

Instituting exceptional measures *was mandatory* if we wanted to reduce the spread of the virus. But *we know for certain* that without these measures, some of them very harsh, such as placing communities under quarantine, severe restrictions on circulation, closure of schools, suspension of all activities in restaurants and shops, the number of victims would have been much, much greater [last discourse].

Epistemic modality concerns the truth of the proposition, the factual status of a proposition (factivity), and the source of evidence speakers claim to have for or against a proposition (Marín-Arrese 2011). In our corpus, factivity and evidentiality, based on a rhetoric of numbers and expert knowledge (World Health Organisation), prevail and induce the presumed agreement of the audience. Status difference in the presidential address (top-down direction) is intensely marked by the *want*, *need* modality and evidentials to show involvement.

5.5. Affective Stances

Martin and White (2005) conceptualise the important notion of appraisal as

> the subjective presence of writers/speakers in texts as they adopt stances towards both the material they present and those with whom they communicate. It is concerned with how writers/speakers approve and disapprove, enthuse and abhor, applaud and criticize, and with how they position their readers/listeners to do likewise (Martin and White 2005, 1).

The Attitude subsystem of Appraisal deals with responses (affective or ethical). Within Affect, it describes emotional responses (un/happiness, in/security, dis/satisfaction, dis/inclination). Judgment deals with ethical responses (social esteem: normality, capacity, and tenacity; social sanction: veracity, propriety). Appreciation is related to aesthetic responses (reaction: impact, quality; composition: balance, complexity; valuation). However, their approach is lexical rather than grammatical.

Mode of realisation refers to options for expressing attitude, either explicitly, as *inscribed* attitude, or implicitly, as *invoked* attitude, determining gradual parameters. The rhetorical value of emotion is displayed through different linguistic strategies, labels, hyperboles, and metaphors in the first place, which operate at an interpersonal level.

The emotional dimension in language and discourse can be analysed as: (i) inscribed affect; (ii) intensifiers; (iii) hyperbole; (iv) metaphors; and (v) inscribed positive judgment, that enhance the figure and value of actors (Carranza-Marquez 2017).

In general, emotion in discourse is *empathic* and also *emphatic*, mainly through metaphors, intensifiers, and positive judgment. In our corpus, emotion is not displayed in empathic examples or micro-narratives, but only through negative valence, realised through strategies such as labelling, and the use of intense adjectives (cf. also Ajiboye and Abioye 2019).

Evaluation is mainly represented as judgment combined with appreciation in terms of complexity, difficulty, and exceptionality of global and local situation.

Discourse	Initial discourse	Median discourse	Final discourse
Positive and neutral lexemes and syntagms	12	7	6
Negative lexemes and syntagms	3	12	12
Metaphors	0	1	1

Table 4. *Positive and negative evaluation*

Predominantly informative at first (when declaring the state of emergency), the determinants of the situation are mainly neutral and positive: *un mesaj special medicilor și personalului medical* ("a special message to doctors and the medical staff"), *măsuri excepționale* ("exceptional measures"), *extraordinară dedicare* ("extraordinary dedication"), and the negative ones very general (*criză globală* "global crisis", *grea încercare* "terrible proof"); with the change in focus (April 16) – criticism and attack –, the lexical choices are completely opposite (*A lucrat mult și prost, toxic de-a dreptul* "Toxic manner of thought and action", *majoritate parlamentară lipsită de orice legitimitate* "parliamentary majority devoid of any legitimacy", *măsuri aberante promovate de niște iresponsabili* "absurd measures promoted by some irresponsible [politicians]" – labels targeting the members of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), which had a majority in Parliament. Even the last speech, intended as one of reconciliation, stresses the polarisation of the political camps on the threshold of local and parliamentary elections (*politicieni iresponsabili* "irresponsible politicians", *politicienii retrograzi* "retrograde politicians"):

(12) În Parlament, *politicieni vechi și retrograzi* au încercat să dărâme și modestele instrumente pe care le aveam la dispoziție.
Am văzut de altfel chiar zilele trecute *cu câtă iresponsabilitate* unii parlamentari erau gata să facă aproape inoperabilă și legea privind starea de alertă. (14.05.2020)

In Parliament, *old and retrograde politicians* tried to destroy even the modest instruments we had at our disposal.
We have seen, moreover, in recent days, *the irresponsibility* of certain MPs who were ready to render the law of the state of alert inoperable. [final discourse].

A positive connotation reappears in one sequence, with a positive metaphor: *este obligatoriu să începem resetarea* "Romania must be reset", as a unique solution for the difficult political situation (12), and the hyperbolic address to the Romanian people (13):

(13)   *Dumneavoastră, dragi români, sunteți eroii* acestui efort național. Vă mulțumesc pentru toate sacrificiile pe care le-ați făcut! (14.05.2020)
You, dear Romanians, are the heroes of this national effort. Thank you for all the sacrifices you have made [last discourse].

The inscribed positive emotional dimension is hardly present, with one exception: *Dumneavoastră, dragi români, sunteți eroii* ("You, dear Romanians, are the heroes") – mythical empathic designation; on the contrary, the neutral "scientific" style is dominant and, in the second part of the state of emergency, the crisis management and institutional discourse is replaced by political considerations and persuasion. The inscribed positive judgment enhances the value of doctors' and teachers' activity and dedication. On the other hand, negative labels are quite numerous ("irresponsible politicians", "retrograde politicians", "toxic manner of thought and action").

6. Conclusion

To summarise, the personal epistemic and moral authoritativeness that reflects and constructs the ethos of self is enacted in Iohannis's discourse in several ways, on several levels: via sentence-level features associated with *precision*, *strong informativity*, and *certainty*, via *consistency* in their deployment *across discourse practices and speech situations* (cf. also Johnstone 2009).

It is noteworthy that the President's discourse strategy resolutely changed during the two months: the argumentation is less empathetic, expressive and commissive speech acts are less frequent, and there is greater distancing, giving an impression of ineluctable necessity, which is probably intended to justify these constraints on freedom that would ameliorate the health crisis.

Our quantitative and qualitative analysis is in line with previous research that stresses the new, complex evaluative strategies that privilege ethos and pathos at the expense of logos (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018a, 471), and the importance of intersubjectivity in relation to evaluations, as declarations of attitude dialogically directed towards the addressee as part of a community of shared values.

Starting with Haddington's (2004) *large discourse* category and Golopenția's (2018) *conversational history*, we conclude that a "conversational history" is possible in different discourse genres, not only in everyday conversations; moreover, identity, ethos, and intersubjectivity interact and construct the writer/speaker–in–the text, and the reader/hearer–in–the text, in search of shared knowledge and values favouring intersubjective engagement.

This macro-analysis is illuminating for deepening the intersubjective construal of the writer and reader–in–the text (Thompson 2014), and the appraisal system (Martin and White 2005) subsumed to the triadic model of stance theory (Du Bois 2007).

As with editorials (Thompson 2014), that show a strong tendency to describe a situation (often undesirable in some way) and then move immediately to recommendation(s) or evaluation, we can also conclude that in crisis communication positioning, evaluating, and alignment work together with a strong emphasis on evaluation (judgment and appraisal) – reinforced and not softened.

In line with previous studies, we hold that stancetaking is a form of social action constituted within the *broader scope of language*, *interaction*, and *sociocultural values* (Du Bois 2007).

The present study contributes to contemporary research on stance and identity by highlighting the importance of semantic and pragmatic choices as a resource for speakers and as an analytic category for researchers. Further studies might continue along this line, and might also investigate how indexed stances mark leadership style and contribute to the formation of "metanarratives" about organisations, groups, or individuals.

We believe that identity and stancetaking co-construction in discourse will be enriched by empirical research and the use of more diverse perspectives (macro-narratives, dialogicality *in praesentia* and *in absentia*, or intersubjectivity).

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ANNEX

Topics of the Presidential Speeches

1. March 16: declaration of state of emergency;
2. March 23: recommendations on stopping the spread of the virus and rejecting discriminatory acts against vulnerable people;
3. March 24: introduction of traffic restrictions to stop the spread of the virus;
4. March 25: presentation of the first two budgetary rectification measures;
5. March 26: presentation of measures concerning the foreign policy of the country in the context of crisis and the activity of the President on the international level;
6. March 28: inauguration of the first military field hospital;
7. March 30: protection of vulnerable categories; importance of Romanian producers in this crisis situation;
8. March 31: quarantine of the city of Suceava; supplying hospitals with the necessary equipment and social protection;
9. April 6: political record: the measures adopted, the extension of the state of emergency, and the preparation of the budgetary rectification;
10. April 8: growing number of infections; approaching Easter holiday;
11. April 14: signing of the decree extending the state of emergency and presentation of the measures imposed by this extension;
12. April 15: first day of extended state of emergency; information regarding the Romanian Orthodox Church – the Ministry of the Interior agreement regarding Easter holidays;
13. April 16: information on the political struggle between the government party and the opposition; information regarding the Easter holidays;
14. April 17: celebration of Easter; insistence on the need to respect the rules of protection;
15. April 21: thanks to the authorities for the good management of the Easter holidays; introduction of the idea of relaxing the measures after May 15;

16. April 22: presentation of two measures of the release plan after May 15;
17. April 23: presentation of the European plan for economic recovery and creation of a European fund for economic recovery;
18. April 24: inauguration of a privately-funded facility for COVID patients;
19. April 27: measures taken in the area of education and aids for the Republic of Moldova;
20. April 28: appreciations of the activity of the Government; criticisms addressed to the Parliament and the PSD;
21. April 29: criticism of Parliament for the tacit adoption of the Ținutul Secuiesc autonomy law;
22. May 4: presentation of release measures; criticism addressed to the Parliament/PSD regarding the law of compulsory Hungarian language in Transylvania;
23. May 5: CEDO decision regarding the fact that Ms. Kovesi's fundamental rights have been violated; criticism against PSD; an economic recovery plan;
24. May 7: critics of the Parliament and the PSD party;
25. May 8: budget deficit; revitalization of the Romanian economy;
26. May 9: inauguration of the Târgu Mureș medical support unit;
27. May 12: presentation of the release measures which will be valid from May 15;
28. May 14 (last speech): presentation of the results of the measures taken to manage the pandemic during the state of emergency.

CHAPTER TWO

EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY AND METALINGUISTICS OF TRUTH IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

LILIANA HOINĂRESCU

1. Introduction

The present chapter aims to analyse several types of epistemic stance markers that explicitly pertain to the truth of the utterances. This particular stance or discursive attitude is interesting, because in genuine communication truth and sincerity are viewed as essential, basic conditions of dialogue. It has been theorised as a pre-requisite both by Grice (1975, 46), who included the Quality (sincerity) Maxim among the four maxims of the Cooperative Principle, and by Searle (1979, 12–13), in his speech act theory, where assertions are defined as speech acts that commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition[1].

Accordingly, by asserting something, the speaker simultaneously commits to the truth of what (s)he said[2]. Categorical assertions (lacking any modal particle) express certainty, the indicative mood functioning as

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[1] Grice (1975, 46): "Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim – 'Try to make your contribution one that is true' – and two more specific maxims: 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence". See also Searle (1979, 12–13): "Assertives. The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes true and false".

[2] The pragmatic theory concerning truth-validity of assertions was anticipated by the philosophical truth-redundancy theory, discussed by Tarski (1944), among others. According to truth-redundancy theory, the predicate "is true" does not express anything above and beyond the statement to which it is attributed. In other terms, affirming a proposition "P is true" has the same meaning as affirming P. For a detailed discussion, see Seymour (1989, 15), Heck (2005, 317).

an epistemic stance marker. Conversely, explicit references to the veracity of an utterance, which are semantically/pragmatically redundant, become a symptom of other discursive attitudes, in most cases polemical ones.

The metalinguistics of truth[3] can take different expressions, from the emphatic use of performative verbs, which implies (presupposes) factual veracity: "*I affirm* that…", to the expressions such as "*The truth is* that…", and stance adverbs and phrases: *actually*, *really*, *in fact* (for a comprehensible list of linguistic markers used in the construction of stance, see Biber 2006, 92–93, apud Weston 2014, 105–106).

My analysis refers specifically to the epistemic markers *in fact*, *in reality*, *in truth*, and the sequences *the fact is*, *the reality is*, *the truth is*, *this is reality*, and *this is the truth*, in the political discourse. I will examine their use and the possibility of their mutual substitution, as well as their recurrence or co-occurrence in particular contexts, in order to grasp their different functions and values. Ultimately, I am interested in determining their persuasive and polemical/dialectical force and the extent to which they express not only a discursive-rhetorical commitment, but also an engaged political stance[4] (for the epistemic stance in political discourse, see also Marín Arrese 2011). In order to emphasise the cognitive and rhetorical-argumentative patterns of these structures, as well as their intrinsic epistemic value, the inquiry has been carried out from a cross-linguistic and contrastive perspective. Two sets of data have been examined, namely debate transcripts in the British and Romanian Parliament, from 2015 to 2019, 2010 to 2019, respectively. Some relevant argumentative uses are illustrated by examples excerpted from the old Romanian Parliament (debates between 1888–1913), when MPs were more concerned with eloquence and displayed the ability to better exploit

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[3] The truth is defined here as in semantics, as propositional truth. According to Tarski (1944, 343), who adapts Aristotle's definition of truth to modern philosophical terminology: "The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with (or correspondence to) reality". Consequently, notions like "facts" and "reality" become definitional terms, included into the metalanguage of truth. As Tarski (1944, 350) states: "The vocabulary of the meta-language is to a large extent determined by previously stated conditions under which a definition of truth will be considered materially adequate".

[4] Here I adapt the concept of *engagement* to political discourse, a concept defined by Hyland (2005a, 177) as "an alignment dimension where writers acknowledge and connect to others, recognizing the presence of their readers, pulling them along with their argument, focusing their attention, acknowledging their uncertainties, including them as discourse participants, and guiding them to interpretation".

the force of rhetorical devices[5]. In addition, the diachronic perspective highlights the changes of the distribution and the use of some markers in Romanian.

The study is focused on the interpretation of the most rhetorically elaborate examples provided by the selected data, in both institutional contexts. Thus, it is not a statistical, but a symptomatic, qualitative analysis, which reveals some representative and salient cases, as well as some linguistic and cultural similarities or differences in time and space.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. (Epistemic) Stance

Stance is a comprehensive and complex category, expressing speaker's attitude in discourse, in a broad sense. The notion encompasses affective, evaluative, epistemic, as well as dialogical components (Englebretson 2007, 17), thus involving several communicative aspects, from the linguistic (modality, personal reference) to the pragmatic/sociolinguistic (speech acts, implicatures, or politeness strategies), and rhetorical (valid or

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[5] "Parliaments vary substantially in their constitutional design and in their practical development" (Ilie 2010, 880). By its long tradition and political effectiveness, British Parliament can be considered a benchmark of the parliamentary system. While the history of the British Parliament is generally well-known, a brief description of the Romanian Parliament is necessary here, for a better understanding of historical and cultural differences between them, which determine some deliberative and rhetorical aspects (see also Hoinărescu 2018, 221–222). The modern Romanian Parliament was created in 1866. Its activity was not continuous, but divided into two periods: the first lasted from 1866 to1938, and the second from 1989 until the present-day. Political oratory flourished during first period, when it was prized by cultural elites, whereas the second period was profoundly affected by the communist regime imposed after the Second World War. After 1989, the politicians had to learn and conform to the new democratic rules and adapt their communicative skills to various institutional speeches. In general, as many studies confirm, in post-communist countries, Parliament plays a less important role in the policy-making process in comparison with those of consolidated democracies (see Ionescu 2011, 307). This modest political relevance could be associated with a less effective deliberative/argumentative activity in plenary, since the decisions are actually taken at the governmental level. As far as the markers of certainty are concerned, the qualitative absence of salient samples in the present-day Romanian Parliament is in itself significant, indicating an insufficient mastery of rhetorical means or indifference to their discursive exploitation.

sophistic argumentation). Stance becomes a central notion and an analytical tool in discourse analysis, while having deep connections with psychological, sociological, and anthropological approaches. An agreed-upon definition of stance does not exist, researchers applying the notion in a narrower or broader sense, depending on their analytical goals.

As Englebretson (2007, 1) claims: "Definitions and conceptions of stance are as broad and varied as the individual backgrounds and interests of the researchers themselves". For example, Biber et al. (1999, 966) define stance as the expression of a writer's "personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments or assessments", while Hyland (1999, 101, apud Warchał and Łyda 2009, 221) understands it as "the ways the writers project themselves into their texts to communicate their integrity, credibility, involvement, and a relationship to their subject matter and their readers". In turn, Aijmer (2016, 17) considers that "the notion 'stance' is used in different disciplines such as linguistics, anthropology, sociolinguistics, and discourse-functional linguistics […] to refer to the functions of modal elements in the communication situation".

Englebretson (2007) undertook a corpus-based analysis, to inventory the specific meanings that scholars ascribe to the notion and to isolate the phenomena that are conceptualised using the term "stance". At the end of his investigation, he points out that stance is used to describe physical, personal, and moral attitude/beliefs/evaluations, that it is public, interpretable, interactional in nature, socially indexical, and consequential, i.e. taking stance leads to real consequences for the person or institution involved (Englebretson 2007, 6–7).

However, the most influential theoretical approach was provided by Du Bois (2007), who proposed a unified explanatory model, able to encompass the multiple facets of the concept. This model is articulated in terms of a set of triangular relations among the components of stance (Du Bois 2007, 141). Accordingly, by taking a stance, the speaker carries out a triadic act: (1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self), and (3) aligns with other subjects. The definition that results from this perspective is:

> Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field (Du Bois 2007, 163).

Du Bois's stance triangle will be applied in the present analysis, since it seems more appropriate for capturing and describing the layers of stancetaking and its dialogic complexity.

Epistemic stance has been considered in a communicative and socio-cultural sense as well. Along these lines, Ochs (1996, 410) understands epistemic stance as a central meaning component of social acts and social identities that

> refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge among other epistemic qualities.

(Epistemic) stance is often understood as (epistemic) modality in a communication situation (see Aijmer 2016, 17). Some scholars include evidentiality (i.e. the status of the knowledge contained in propositions[6] / the type of evidence grounding the speaker's claim and assessment of its validity) as a subdomain of epistemic modality (Palmer 1986; Ochs 1996, 410, 422), while others consider it as a distinct category (see, e.g., Cornilie 2009; Wiemer 2018). For my purpose, this formal/taxonomic criterion is less relevant than the extent to which the markers of certainty and evidentiality are co-occurrent and mutually increase their persuasive function. The linguistic relationship between certainty and evidentiality should be scrutinised, as it can give information about the speaker's real stancetaking and his/her social legitimacy with regard to affirming the truth[7]. Both epistemic modality and evidentiality are traditionally considered proposition-oriented (Cornilie and Pietrandrea 2012, 2110).

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[6] For Faller (2002, 2), evidentiality refers to the "encoding of the speaker's (type of) grounds for making a speech act". For Cornilie (2009, 45), "Evidentiality is defined as the functional category that refers to the perceptual and/or epistemological basis for making a speech act".

[7] See Sbisà (2014, 13): "Overlaps and connections between evidentiality and epistemic modality [...] can be explained in the light of the dynamics of illocution by considering the ways in which preparatory conditions and commitment may affect one another. Thus, an unsafe evidential situation may advise the speaker to introduce mitigating epistemic modalisation into her utterance, in order not to bear responsibility for something she is not prepared to be responsible for. Likewise, an epistemic modalisation that reinforces the speaker's commitment may make preparatory conditions more demanding and suggest (by accommodation) that the speaker's position as regards the illocutionary procedure to be carried out satisfies its requirements".

2.2. Subjectivity / Objectivity and Epistemicity

Epistemic certainty expresses the knowledge assumed by the speaker. Knowledge requires the speaker's epistemic certainty[8]. Notions such as *truth*, *belief*, and *justification* (Hay 2008) are related to epistemic certainty. However, from a philosophical point of view, *epistemic certainty* is rather a *subjective certainty*, since it expresses speaker's subjective assessment regarding the truth/facts. Real facts can take different interpretations, each speaker considering his/her version true and correct. Defining certainty is not easy, since epistemic certainty could be understood either as a guarantee of truth or as the most important consequence of knowing the truth (see discussion in Croce 2014, 122). Besides, the philosophical notion overlaps with the linguistic notion of *truth-factual validity*, as long as subjective certainty is regarded as propositional knowledge. From this perspective, the notion becomes central for an efficient interpersonal communication[9].

If subjectivity and epistemicity are interrelated from a philosophical point of view, in political discourse their boundaries are strategically marked. Political discourse aims at legitimisation, and an important strategy to acquire and maintain it is based on speaker's capacity to create a coherent representation of reality (see Chilton 2004, 54). The construction of a "discourse world" or "discourse ontology" entails a metarepresentational process; to validate it, the speaker appeals to epistemic and evidential expressions. As Chilton (2004, 111–117) observes, one basic type of legitimising strategy in political discourse „is essentially epistemic. It has to do with the speaker's claim to have better knowledge, recognition of the 'real' facts". At the same time, political control involves the control of information, which, in turn, implies different types of misrepresentation (secrecy, omissions, verbal evasion, lying, etc.) (see Chilton 2004, 46). Thus, political communication is subjected to institutional constraints that influence the observance of

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[8] See Stanley 2008: "For example, according to one kind of skeptical argument, knowledge requires epistemic certainty, and being epistemically certain of a proposition requires having independent evidence that logically entails that proposition. Since we do not have such evidence for external world propositions, we do not know external world propositions. According to another kind of skeptical argument, due to Unger (1975), knowledge requires subjective certainty, and we are never subjectively certain of any proposition. So, we never know any proposition".

[9] For a discussion concerning the psychological processes of epistemic stancetaking in dialogues, see Zuczkowski, Bongelli, and Riccioni (2017).

Grice's sincerity maxim. If direct knowledge of the facts or their interpretation in a relevant manner becomes an important means of legitimisation for the political actor, at the same time it is important to note that the construction of truth is a rhetorical construction, through which the speaker's subjectivity tends to be presented as rationality and objectivity.

2.3. Discourse Markers / Modal Particles / Booster Markers

As many scholars have emphasised, modal particles (MPrs[10]) constitute a class of elements that intersects with and overlaps the class of discursive markers (DMs). According to Degand, Cornillie, and Pietrandrea (2013, 3–4), who summarised the main viewpoints, it is hard to maintain the distinction between MPrs and DMs, especially on purely functional grounds. Both MPrs and DMs function in cognitive, social, and textual domains and express attitude, assessments, and emotions. In my opinion, even if DMs seem a broader category, which could include MPrs, a clear distinction regarding their main function is indicated only by the placement of a certain particle in the utterance. In this case, Schegloff's claim according to which what is critical for the interpretation of a sequence in interaction "can be grounded in its *position*, not just its *composition*" proves its validity (Schegloff 2007, 20).

Since the issue of a strict categorisation of DMs and MPrs remains difficult, because of their formal and functional overlap, in my analysis the expressions *in fact*, *in reality*, *the reality is*, and *the truth is* are considered contextually both discourse markers and modal particles/stance (certainty) markers. The initial position brings forward a connective function for the markers *in fact* and *in reality*, whereas a final or sentence independent position has only a modal function (e.g., *this is the reality*).

Epistemic certainty markers are also included among metadiscursive expressions, as *booster markers*, "which allow writers to close down alternatives, head off conflicting views and express their certainty in what they say" (see Hyland 2005b, 52–53). By using boosters, the speaker's voice is confident, thus more convincing.

To conclude, propositional certainty is conveyed by linguistic means and is not necessarily related to truth, viewed ideally or absolutely, or as a strict correspondence between words and facts/reality. Certainty/booster markers could have a rhetorical function, rather than expressing an

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[10] I use the abbreviation MPrs instead of MPs (which is the usual one) to avoid the confusion with the abbreviation MPs (Members of Parliament).

ontological commitment, i.e. a genuine tendency to describe reality objectively.

3. Analysing the Epistemic Certainty Markers

The position of the above-mentioned epistemic markers[11] at the beginning or at the end of the sequence is rhetorically important. I will start with the markers *in fact*, *in reality*, and *in truth*, and conclude with predicative expressions *the fact is*, *the reality is*, and *the truth is*, because they present certain functional similitudes, and are ranked on an epistemic and rhetorical scale from the low or neutral values to the most effective ones. However, as the following analysis will show, a precise separation is possible only for methodological reasons, since these markers often intersect with each other in the same speech and are used simultaneously to mutually increase their epistemic and rhetorical force.

   In fact and *in reality* have been already inventoried as non-paraphrastic reformulation markers, which express the highest distancing of the speaker, correcting and invalidating the statement they refer to (see Roulet 1987; Rossari 1990). Thus, they can be indicators of the speaker's disagreement with a previous point of view and often involve a polemical stance. While some researchers consider the pragmatic and discursive functions of *in fact* and *in reality* quasi-equivalent, others believe that they display significant differences (for a detailed discussion, see Rossari 1992).

3.1. *In fact*

The following examples capture the main functions and characteristics of this marker. Since in the same example there can be two or more occurrences of *in fact*, with different discursive values, each of them will be registered with a subscript number, in parentheses:

   (1) *Mel Stride*
         The hon. Lady makes an entirely reasonable request for that information. As I indicated, I am happy to provide it to her. *In fact$_{(1)}$*, divine inspiration has just arrived – I have an answer; I knew it was lost somewhere in my mind. There have, *in fact$_{(2)}$*, been 12 opinions, all of which have been supportive of HMRC. If she would care for any

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[11] I will call them as such, because this categorisation covers their pragmatic function better.

further information, I am happy to provide it outside the Committee. (Hansard Debates, Column 28, 27.11.2018)

(2) *Lord Alderdice*
What does disbandment mean? There are some paramilitary organisations or – who knows? – former paramilitary organisations that say, "We've already gone away". Whether people believe them or not is another matter. There are other paramilitary organisations that manifestly have not gone away **but** say that they would like to. *In fact(1)*, every year they say they would like to, and even sometimes give a date when they will, although it does not **actually** happen. There are yet others that clearly have not the slightest intention of going away and *in fact(2)* want to continue, grow and cause us all trouble and difficulty. (Hansard Debates, Column 241, 12.04.2016)

(3) *Michelle Donelan*
We have already announced the further £9 million. I completely agree with the hon. Member about the importance of tackling this issue. *In fact*, our manifesto included a £1 billion fund for holiday activities, and we are working on what that will encompass – *I believe* it will encompass some of these issues (Hansard Debates, Column 28, 22.10.2020).

In the examples above, *in fact* has significantly close values. In example (1), the speaker refers to his previous attitude and his own reply, in order to bring new clarifications. The reformulation introduced by *in fact(1)*, which has a connective value, is thus intra-discursive[12], and the ironical auto-correction: **In fact**, *divine inspiration has just arrived, I have an answer*; *I knew it was lost somewhere in my mind*, has also the function of a flimsy apology. In the second occurrence, *in fact(2)* has both a metalinguistic and epistemic value, since the speaker introduces exact, numeric information to confirm his previous viewpoint: *There have, in fact, been 12 opinions, all of which have been supportive of HMRC.* Here, the epistemic value is related to evidentiality, the 12 opinions mentioned belonging to persons who could prove the truthfulness of the statement.

The second example displays two occurrences of *in fact*, as well. *In fact(1)* has a mainly connective metalinguistic function, its weak epistemic value being reinforced by the marker *actually*. While *in fact(1)* introduces a specification, the second occurrence in the same example (2) adds information that rhetorically strengthens the previous arguments: *There are yet others that clearly have not the slightest intention of going away*

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[12] I distinguish here between *intra-discourse* (the speaker refers to his/her own speech) and *inter-discourse* (the speaker refers to another person's speech).

and *in fact*(2) *want to continue, grow and cause us all trouble and difficulty.* The cumulative construction ***p and in fact q*** is rhetorically quasi-equivalent to a metalinguistic negation: *not **p**, in fact **q***[13].

In the third example, *in fact* includes exact, numeric information, in a dialogical frame where agreement prevails, and thus reinforces the speaker's epistemic stance: *I completely agree with the hon. Member about the importance of tackling this issue. **In fact**, our manifesto included a £1 billion fund.* However, in the next sequence, by its subjective note, the verb *I believe* reduces the degree of epistemic certainty and functions as a mitigator: *I believe it will encompass some of these issues.*

Analysing the reformulation markers *en fait* ("in fact", "actually") and *en réalité* ("in reality"), Rossari (1992, 152–153) pointed out that the foremost function of *en fait* ("in fact") is connective. The viewpoint introduced by *en fait* ("in fact") creates a contrast, a distance between the previous opinions, but does not necessary imply an opposition. Rossari concludes that *en fait* ("in fact") cannot be classified as an opposition marker, as other researchers claim, especially Danjou-Flaux (1980, 1982). Furthermore, Forsgren (2009, 60) points out that the connector *en fait* ("in fact"), rather than marking a reformulation with a distancing enunciative perspective, seems to introduce a development, a more or less lengthy sequence of text. The connector has rather an interactional function of presenting something, as a textual deictic particle. These observations are valid in the case of examples from our English data, where the foremost function of *in fact* is metalinguistic, as it introduces an informative unit/sequence of superior rank. The epistemic certainty value of *in fact* is rather weak and the speaker's stance does not index/convey an opposition. I insist on the (non-)cooperative aspect that *in fact* could create or simply emphasise, because opposition and disagreement are attitudinal expressions of stance, through which the speaker could evaluate an object, position her/himself and align with other subjects (see Du Bois 2007, 163).

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[13] See Ducrot (1984, 217): "J'appelle « métalinguistique » une négation qui contredit les termes mêmes d'une parole effective à laquelle elle s'oppose. […] C'est cette négation « métalinguistique » qui permet par exemple d'annuler les présupposés du positif sous-jacent, comme c'est le cas dans : « Pierre n'a pas cessé de fumer ; en fait, il n'a jamais fumé de sa vie »". One should remark the role of *in fact* [Fr. "en fait"] to express a metalinguistic negation. See also Horn (1989, 63): "[Metalinguistic negation is] a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization".

The situation of the Romanian epistemic marker corresponding to Engl. *in fact* is a little bit complicated, since, like in French, there are two modal particles with apparently the same meaning: *în fapt* and *de fapt* (both being loan translations of the French *en fait* and *de fait*). Like their French correspondents, the two particles have pragmatic values that are difficult to distinguish (see Rossari 1992). However, their diachronic distribution is not similar, *în fapt* being used in the past, while nowadays it is rare, if not quasi-absent. I found occurrences of *în fapt* only in the old Romanian Parliament, contemporary records (2010–2019) exclusively attesting the particle *de fapt*. Examples below are taken from a discourse hold by Titu Maiorescu, an important Romanian politician and major cultural figure of the nineteenth century. A professor, logician, and a literary critic, Maiorescu was a member of the Conservative Party and a founding member of the cultural and then political Society *Junimea*:

(4) Şi astfel antidinasticii din opoziţie devin adeseori linguşitorii de la guvern, cu marele pericol că, sub pretext de a atribui Regelui toate meritele, îi atribuie *în fapt* toată răspunderea şi slăbesc simtimântul dinastic, de-abia statornicit după atâtea peripeţii. (Maiorescu, 16, 23.03.1888)

And thus the anti-dynastic members of the opposition often become the flatterers of the government, with the great danger that, under the pretext of attributing all the merits to the King, they *in fact* attribute all the responsibility to him and weaken the dynastic feeling, which has barely taken root here, after so many adventures.

(5) Dacă *în fapt* nu este aşa, sau dacă, precum arătaţi, călugării […] se întrebuinţează pentru alte servicii ecleziastice, aceasta rămâne de constatat *în fapt*; nu am avut cunoştinţă până acum. Decât, d-lor senatori, constatarea asta *în fapt* are partea ei delicată. (Maiorescu, 132, 20.01.1889)

If *in fact* this is not the case, or if, as you have shown, monks […] are used for other ecclesiastical services, it remains to be ascertained *in fact*; I was not aware until now. Except, senators, this finding *in fact* has its delicate side.

(6) A venit apoi proclamarea Independenţei. […] Turcia era biruită şi alungată de la Dunăre, şi eram acum *în fapt* deslegaţi de ea. (Maiorescu, 331, 5.02.1891)

Then came the proclamation of Independence. […] Turkey was defeated and driven from the Danube, and we were now *in fact* detached from it.

In these examples, *în fapt* ("in fact") refers to factuality and its meaning is equivalent to *in truth*. The marker has a metarepresentative value, helping the speaker to construct the "discourse ontology" (see Chilton 2004, 54). Its function is not connective, but essentially modal. These values are similar neither to those taken from the English data, nor to those from the contemporary Romanian political discourse, where Engl. *in fact* corresponds to Rom. *de fapt*. Below are some examples, taken from The Joint Session of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, on March 4, 2014, which record *The Changing of the Structure and Political Composition of Ponta government* after the break-up of the Social Liberal Union (USL), in February 2014:

(7) *Vasile Blaga*
Suntem noi astăzi în fața Guvernului Ponta III, în fața unui guvern care a rezultat din dezbateri ideologice? Nu. Suntem în fața unui Guvern care vrea să facă mult mai bine României? Nu. Spun că vin cu același program de guvernare. *De fapt*, trebuie s-o spunem deschis, USL-ul s-a rupt din cauza bătăliilor pentru scaune, pentru bani și pentru putere. (Aplauze) (CDEP, 4.03.2014)

Do we face the Ponta III Government today, a government that resulted from ideological debates? We do not. Do we face a Government that wants to do much better for Romania? No. They say they came with the same governing programme. *In fact*, we must say it openly, the USL broke up because of quarrels over seats, money, and power. (Applause)

(8) *Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu*:
În primul rând, domnul prim-ministru Ponta vine în fața noastră cu un guvern buchet: doi-trei ghiocei și, în rest, mărăcinii bătrâni ai politicii românești. Vă prezentați, domnule prim-ministru, în fața noastră, cu un guvern incomplet, *de fapt*. (CDEP, 4.03.2014)

First of all, Prime Minister Ponta stands before us with a bouquet-government: two or three snowdrops and, for the rest, the old thorns of Romanian politics. You came here, Prime Minister, with an incomplete government, *in fact*.

(9) *Markó Béla*:
Deci, stimați colegi, un scurt drept la replică. Da, nu am negat niciodată și nu am ascuns opinia mea legată de definiția de stat național, în legătură cu care o completare: prin drepturile minoritare existente deja și incluse în Constituție, bineînțeles că acest *enunț s-a modificat și*, **de fapt**, *s-a și anulat*, după părerea mea, în ceea ce

priveşte un stat naţional al unei singure naţiuni, singură cultură, singură limbă. (CDEP, 4.03.2014)

So, dear colleagues, a short right to reply. Yes, I have never denied and I have not hidden my opinion regarding the definition of the national state, in connection with which [I bring] an addendum: by the already existing minority rights that are included in the Constitution, of course, this *statement has been amended and,* ***in fact,*** *annulled*, in my opinion, in terms of a nation-state of a single nation, a single culture, a single language.

(10) *Victor-Viorel Ponta*
Stimaţi colegi aflaţi cu adevărat în opoziţie,
Vreau să ştiţi că nicio ordonanţă de urgenţă a Guvernului nu a fost adoptată sau publicată fără semnătura tuturor miniştrilor liberali din guvern şi le mulţumesc pentru asta, pentru că ordonanţele pe care le-am adoptat au avut ca scop fie angajamentele noastre internaţionale, fie, *de fapt*, să găsim o soluţie la blocajul permanent al promulgării legilor pe care dumneavoastră, Parlamentul României, le-aţi adoptat şi pe care preşedintele României, de fiecare dată, le-a refuzat. (CDEP, 4.03.2014)

Dear colleagues who are actually in opposition,
I want you to know that no Government emergency ordinance was adopted or published without the signatures of all the Liberal ministers in the government, and I thank them for that, because goals of the ordinances we adopted were aimed either at our international commitments or, *in fact*, at finding a solution to the permanent deadlock in the promulgation of the laws that you, the Romanian Parliament, adopted and that the President of Romania, each time, refused.

In example (7), *de fapt* ("in fact") occurs after a succession of rhetorical questions. The speaker, a prominent member of the opposition, wants to clearly underline the cause of the former coalition's dissolution, which, in his view, is neither ideological, nor related to better governance. *In fact* has the role of ensuring the rhetorical transition to the final sequence, which is meant to reveal the forthright truth. However, the parenthetical metacommunicative sequence that announces the blunt statement has a mitigating effect, first by its anticipatory character, which helps accommodate the public to what follows, second by its deontic structure, which implies a moral obligation from which the speaker could not evade: ***De fapt,*** *trebuie s-o spunem deschis* ("*In fact*, we have to say it openly")*.* The epistemic stance (deonticity and certainty) serves here to strengthen the speaker's moral political ethos (discursive image).

In examples (8), (9), and (10), *de fapt* ("in fact") has a metalinguistic value, introducing a succinct clarification/definition (8), a cancellation/correction (9), and a specification (10).

In their study, which adopts a perspective that combines a synchronic approach to pragmatic implicature and scalarity on one hand, and the role of pragmatics in semantic change on the other, Schwenter and Traugott (2000, 7–8; 11–13) recognise three different meanings of *in fact*:

(1) *in fact₁* is an adverbial [phrase] meaning "in practice, as far as can be told from evidence, in actuality". It answers the question "with respect to what". This value does not involve a scalar property, i.e. does not index one as higher or lower on a scale than any other (Schwenter and Traugott 2000, 11). In our data, examples (4), (5), and (6) better reflect this meaning.

(2) *In fact₂* functions as an adversative adverb, with an epistemic modal primary meaning. Its semantics combines aspects of the meaning of strongly epistemic adverbs, like *certainly*, and adversative adverbs, like *however*. *In fact₂* signals linguistically that the proposition over which it has scope (q) is more highly ranked than some preceding proposition on a scale of epistemic commitment (Schwenter and Traugott 2000, 13). Examples $(1_{(2)})$, $(2_{(2)})$, and (7) reflect this epistemic scalar property.

(3) *In fact₃* signals that what follows (q) is a stronger (yet parallel) argument for the speaker's rhetorical purpose than what precedes (p)[14]. Thus, *in fact₃* is a type of discourse marker with sequential role (Schwenter and Traugott 2000, 12–13). While *in fact₂* operates on the scale of epistemic commitment, *in fact₃* concerns the rhetorical strength scale. Given its property of introducing a gradual rectification, *in fact₃* is utilised by neo-Gricean pragmaticists for identifying linguistic scales that license implicatures, specifically to determine that some inferences are defeasible or cancellable (see discussion in Schwenter and Traugott 2000, 12). Example (9) from our data provides an utterance where *in fact* introduces a cancellation of the scalar implicature: "bineînțeles că acest enunț *s-a modificat și,* **de fapt***, s-a și anulat*, după părerea mea" ("of course, this statement *has been amended and,* **in fact***, annulled*, in my opinion"), where the participle *annulled* preceded by *in fact* cancels the inference conveyed by the participle *amended* ("it was amended, not completely changed"). Examples $(2_{(2)})$, (3), and (8–10) could represent *in*

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[14] "*In fact* indexes the expression or proposition in q as being a stronger argument on a scale of rhetorical strength than the expression or proposition in p, thereby strengthening the speaker's argumentative position" (Schwenter and Traugott 2000, 12). For this argumentative perspective, see also Anscombre and Ducrot (1983).

fact₃ instances, as well. However, it is worth noting that it was quite difficult to apply this theoretical perspective to my data, as the contextual meaning of *in fact* often seems to elude a strict categorisation.

As Schwenter and Traugott (2000) outline, their approach stands in opposition to the previous perspective of Roulet (1987) and Rossari (1992), according to which the marker has contextually-bound uses.

Now, I shall try to systematise and use all the previous observations, in order to better understand the functions of *in fact* in the context under scrutiny.

First, in my examples, *in fact₁* could be accurately isolated only in the examples (4–6), which, significantly, are drawn from the old Romanian Parliament (the second half of the nineteenth century). *In fact₁* preserves the meaning of the word *fact*, which means "act, deed, reality"; thereby it could not be considered as a discourse marker, but only a modal, epistemic particle. I suppose that Engl. *in fact₁* corresponds to Rom. *în fapt* (< Fr. *en fait*), while *in fact₂* and *in fact₃*, which function as discourse markers, correspond to Rom. *de fapt* (< Fr. *de fait*), which displays a high degree of pragmaticalisation.

Concerning modal values, *in fact₁* (meaning "in reality, in truth, according to the truth") expresses the stronger epistemic certainty[15]. This is the primary use, from which the secondary discursive, connective values derive[16]. The scalar properties of *in fact₂* and *in fact₃* influence their epistemic force as well. As Schwenter and Traugott (2000, 20) noticed, *in fact₂* rather indicates a subjective epistemic stancetaking, while *in fact₃* has non-epistemic values. In my opinion, a complete desemantisation of *in fact* never occurred, in any of its instances, both English and Romanian speakers retaining an intuitive perception of its primary meaning related to the metalinguistics of truth (see further analysis).

Second, modal/epistemic and argumentative uses of *in fact* overlap closely; accordingly, it is difficult to separate clear occurrences of one or another value. In argumentative contexts, the sequence/proposition introduced by *in fact* indicates a stronger epistemic commitment and simultaneously a stronger rhetorical stance than a previous sequence. Therefore, *in fact₂* and *in fact₃* are very difficult to dissociate. In my opinion, there are two distinct values that (often) occur at the same time.

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[15] For Schwenter and Traugott (2000, 11–12; 21), the higher epistemic certainty value is ascribed to *in fact₂*. This adversative meaning is considered the epistemic modal value par excellence.
[16] See Schwenter and Traugott (2000, 15–21), for the historical evolution of the English *in fact.*

Third, the discourse marker *in fact* indicates a progression, a gradual rectification, a metalinguistic and often an argumentative climax, but does not create necessarily an inter- or intra-discursive opposition (see especially the English examples and the Romanian examples (6) and (7)). In the Romanian examples (7) and (8), which apparently are more controversial, *de fapt* ("in fact") brings an evaluation that justifies the clear disapproving stancetaking, even the conflict between the party in power and the members of the opposition party. The context in which *de fapt* ("in fact") occurs is already polemical, and the marker serves only to introduce the highest rhetorical point. To create an opposition, as I shall show below, *in fact* must be reinforced by other discursive means (see infra, under **3.4.**). If on the epistemic, evaluative scale, *in fact* is rather neutral or subjective (see examples 3 and 9), it is not an indicator of speaker's convergent or divergent alignment too, as it can occur in cooperative contexts, as well as in polemical ones.

3.2. *In reality / the reality is / this is the reality*

In contrast to *in fact*, the marker *in reality* preserves its full semantic value. It creates an ontological tension immediately, as it involves the opposition between appearance and reality, which has an intrinsic argumentative dimension. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 415) consider this dissociation to be the prototype of all conceptual dissociation, because of its widespread use and its basic importance in philosophy. Appearance–reality is one of the philosophical dichotomous pairs (e.g., means–end, accident–essence, individual–universal, particular–general) that help describe and systematise reality. These pairs can ground a dissociative logical schema[17] and "are often introduced as data, not for discussion, as instruments that make it possible to structure the discourse in a manner that appears objective" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 422).

Referring to these abstract categories is a way of legitimising a certain point of view/stance. It is equivalent to a rhetorical and (pseudo)argumentative strategy, because it can support both a valid and an invalid point of view.

Examples below illustrate some characteristic uses of the marker *in reality* in British Parliament:

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[17] "The dissociation expresses a vision of the world and establishes hierarchies for which it endeavours to provide the criteria" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 420). For a detailed description of dissociation as an argumentative technique, see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 411–459).

(11) *Chris Davies*

"Fairness" seems to be the word of the day – the word of English votes for English laws. I heard it when the Prime Minister was on the steps of Downing Street following the Scottish referendum, I heard it when William Hague was drafting these proposals, and I now hear it every time this Bill is mentioned: "English votes for English laws – it's all about fairness." It is, after all, why we all are here – why this Chamber exists. We are here to decide the fairest way to spend our taxpayers' money, the fairest way to operate our public services, and the fairest way to run our country. Fairness, fairness, fairness – but what exactly is fair about this Bill?

Mr MacNeil

In reality, the hon. Gentleman is talking about a grievance – an English grievance. They never finish in this place talking about Scots with a grievance, but *the reality is* that the grievance is an English grievance and they dress it up with the word "fairness". This is grievance, grievance, grievance on the English side.

(Hansard Debates, Column 1229, 22.10.2015)

(12) *Sir William Cash*

The reality is that there are declared jihadists who have been in Syria and other parts of the Middle East. Jihadi John, as he was described, is a very good example of a declared jihadist who came from the United Kingdom, but I was not making a point about the United Kingdom, although I do perceive the danger. I was referring to the fact that *there is no doubt* that citizens – admittedly, they were French – who had been to Syria and come back via routes that enabled them to get to Paris contributed to the carnage. People can dispute that if they wish, *but the facts are clear. The reality is* that real problems have to be addressed, and that is an extremely important part of this debate. People can have differing views, *but the reality is* that there are real dangers. (Hansard Debates, Column 1337, 14.12.2015)

(13) *Mr. Hammond*

I am afraid that it is characteristic of the Opposition that they are able to see the world only through the lens of inputs—

Rachael Maskell

That is the reality!

Mr. Hammond

The reality is that since 2010 we have increased the number of schools that are good or outstanding. That means that 90% of schools are now either good or outstanding, and that 1.9 million more children are being taught in good or outstanding schools. That is the metric that matters to parents and to children themselves in terms of their life chances. It is not always just about the money; it is also about the outcomes. (Hansard Debates, Column 750, 13.03.2018)

(14)   *Lord Duncan of Springbank*

    The role of the Northern Ireland Civil Service is vital to the functioning of the situation in Northern Ireland *as we understand it. In reality*, civil servants have been placed in an invidious position. Without their work we would be in a much worse position. *However*, the *reality remains* that serious political decisions cannot *really* be taken by the Civil Service. That is why we require a restored Executive now (Hansard Debates, Column 1285, 18.03.2019).

One can notice the very mobile place of these modal and metadiscursive markers and their alternating position during the speech. The entire speech is organised around them, as the epistemic certainty stance constitutes in fact the core of the speaker's message. In other words, the speech is construed on this opposition. At the same time, the variability of the structures which contain the word *reality*: *in reality*/*the reality is that*, *that is the reality*/*the reality remains*, certifies that the term conserves its full referential meaning, without being affected by its simple connective value.

    The logical/argumentative connectors *but* and *however* (which indicate/infer opposition) combine with *in reality* to strengthen the polemical force of the reply. Here, *in reality* can be considered an argumentative connector/operator in the main. Alongside the logical connector *but*, it introduces a very common argumentative scheme in parliamentary discourse that involves two mental representations of the discursive object: one proposed as valid and the other rejected (*p*, but not *q*). It is both an adversative and polyphonic structure[18], which allows the speakers to bring forward their viewpoint on a certain situation or fact as a normative, objective one, and to reject another as invalid or incorrect (see also Hoinărescu 2018). Using this argumentative scheme, the speaker may express a critical view in affirmative terms, avoiding any negative linguistic structure. Disagreeing is induced by linguistic and cognitive structures (the connectors *but* and *however* imply a contrastive point of view, while the appearance–reality dichotomy involves ontological and moral assessments). The appearance–reality pair suggests an error, a misrepresentation, and even an intentional mistake on the opponent's part. In the latter case, namely that of intentional distortion, the opponent's message is indirectly characterised as a lie, which is an intrinsic negative evaluation whereby one denounces serious moral issues.

    The affirmative construction of the statement has an important rhetorical effect, the critical positioning of the speaker being perceived as

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[18] For the polyphonic structure of negative and adversative utterances, see Ducrot (1984, 213–233).

more objective than the one expressed by a direct refutation, in negative terms. Thus, this structure has a mitigating value, which makes it more rational and, at the same time, more polite/less aggressive. Besides, it can be associated with other mitigators or hedges, as in example (14), where the epistemic certainty is to some extent attenuated, speakers expressing the possibility of being wrong or misunderstanding the facts: *the situation… as we understand it*. As pragmatic phenomena, mitigation and evidentiality often interact in discourse (Figueras Bates and Kotwica 2020, 3). These examples prove scholars' claim that epistemic stance is closely linked to argumentation and other rhetorical strategies, and also to politeness strategies, since it can increase solidarity (positive politeness) or expresses more distance (negative politeness) (see Lakoff 1972; Holmes 1984, apud Aijmer 2016, 18).

It is important to notice that the rhetorical construction of truth is often achieved in the absence of actual evidentiality markers. The speaker does not prove the source of his/her knowledge, but dialectically or polemically affirms it. Let's consider example (12), where the speaker's certitude is increased by other strong epistemic markers, which also function as boosters: *there is no doubt*; *people can dispute that if they wish*, *but the facts are clear*. The speaker's firm epistemic commitment to the truth makes his evaluations understood as shared knowledge between interlocutors, common presuppositions, the veracity of which should not be questioned. Example (11) is interesting too, since it displays another type of subjective certainty. The dispute between the two speakers is merely a metalinguistic one, concerning how to call a vote a "fairness" or a "grievance", from the Scottish and English points of view. Defining words with an argumentative aim in mind is a common strategy in political/parliamentary discourse (see Zarefsky 2004, 2006; Hoinărescu 2018). Rhetorical repetition (in Chris Davies's intervention) and echoic-mention, polemical repetition (in MacNeil's reply) are devices for intensifying the epistemic certainty of the speakers. However, both definitions remain subjective, since both serve only the speaker's argumentative purpose. Example (13) displays a dialogical competition regarding the speakers' right to impose their own interpretation of reality. In this case, the representative of the government party resorts to factual evidence to prove the truth of his version. The use of the metrical (numerical) argument is convincing and difficult to refute, denouncing the intervention of the opposition as purely rhetorical.

The following examples are taken from contemporary Romanian data and provide new insightful perspectives on the rhetorical relation between epistemicity and evidentiality in political discourse:

(15) *Călin Popescu Tăriceanu*

Toată lumea a observat că opoziţia, *din păcate*, nu are niciun program **real**, alternativ la Guvern, nici persoane competente care să preia conducerea Executivului, iar, *din păcate*, noul PNL, o *spun cu mult regret*, este **în realitate** vechiul PDL, nu are ideologie, (Aplauze) nu mai are nicio legătură cu liberalismul – şi *vă daţi seama cu cât regret spun acest lucru* – dar are o legătură *certă*. Doamna Paul, legătura de care vreau să vă vorbesc o ştiţi: e legătura cu băsismul. (Aplauze) (CDEP, 29.09. 2015)

Everyone has noticed that the opposition, *unfortunately*, has no **real** alternative programme to that of the Government, nor people competent to take over the leadership of the Executive, and, *unfortunately*, the new PNL, *I say this with great regret*, is **in reality** the old PDL, it has no ideology, (Applause.) it has nothing to do with liberalism – and *you realise how sorry I am to say it* – but it has a *definite* connection. Mrs. Paul, you know what the connection I want to talk to you about is: it's the connection to "Băsism" [political ideology and behaviour of the former president Traian Băsescu] (Applause).

In this example, the affective component of stance is very strong. The speaker complains of the supposed lack of ideological direction in the Liberal Party, as a result of its fusion with the Democratic Party, a new political formation he was excluded from (therefore, the speaker has reasons to be resentful). The subjective, affective stance, which is clearly emphasised by different linguistic devices: *din păcate* "unfortunately"; *o spun cu mult regret* "I say this with great regret"; *vă daţi seama cu cât regret spun acest lucru* "you realise how sorry I am to say it", is meant to reinforce an epistemic certainty, the amplitude of the regret being apparently directly proportional to the gravity and accuracy of the empirical observation. In other words, emotion is a rhetorical tool for strengthening the idea of an objective, certain evaluation, which is already implied by the argumentative use of the appearance–reality opposition. Epistemic and affective stance are supported by evidential markers too, whereby the speaker emphasises the solidarity, the agreement with his point of view of a large category of people, generically designated by *toată lumea* "everyone". All these strategies rhetorically align the speaker's subjective epistemic certainty stance with the stance of a supposed consensual majority of people; thus, the critical point of view gains legitimacy and objectivity.

In the example below, evidentiality becomes a central device in advocating the speaker's correctness:

(16) *Ion Marcel Vela*

Principalul argument invocat de Guvern referitor la graţierea unor pedepse este acela al supraaglomerării din închisorile româneşti şi respectarea drepturilor omului. ***În realitate***, suntem în faţa unor politici normative menite să exonereze şi să facă scăpaţi o serie de lideri care au primit condamnări din partea instanţelor româneşti. [...]
*Dovada **clară** a faptului că, **în realitate***, coaliţia PSD-ALDE nu are ca obiectiv **real** soluţionarea problemei supraaglomerării din închisori constă în aceea că prin legislaţia propusă sunt graţiate pedepsele cu suspendare. Aici se află ***de fapt*** cheia acestei reglementări: ştergerea cu buretele a condamnării unor lideri ai coaliţiei aflate la guvernare.
(CDEP, 8.02.2017)

The main argument invoked by the Government regarding the [proposed] pardon of some punishments is that of overcrowding in Romanian prisons and of respect for human rights. ***In reality***, we are faced with normative policies meant to exonerate and bail out a series of political leaders who have been convicted in Romanian courts. [...]
The **clear** *proof that, **in reality***, the PSD-ALDE coalition does not have as its **real** objective a solution to the problem of prison overcrowding consists in the fact that, through the proposed legislation, suspended sentences [i.e. that are not actually carried out] are pardoned. Here, ***in fact***, is the key to this new regulation: wiping out the convictions of ruling coalition leaders.

The "clear proof", which the speaker metadiscursively invokes to refute the Government argumentation, is presented as a quasi-logical argument[19], consisting in highlighting the contradiction between the opponent's words and facts, namely the humanitarian objectives claimed by the ruling party and its partisans, and the biased benefits they would derive. This linguistic structure, which associates evidential and epistemic certainty: *Dovada clară a faptului că, în realitate* ("The clear proof that, in reality"), is almost conventionalised in Romanian. One should notice also the alternative use of *în realitate/de fapt* ("in reality"/"in fact") with referential, factual meaning in both examples (15) and (16).

Along with the explanatory force of the appearance–reality dichotomy, its speculative component can be also actualised in argumentation. Of course, not every politician is able to notice this potential and exploit it

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[19] According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 193), quasi-logical arguments, "lay claim to a certain power of conviction, in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics". Argumentation based on logical contradiction and incompatibility represents a subtype of quasi-logical argumentation.

rhetorically. A suggestive illustration of this specific use, excerpted from the English data is given below:

> (17) *Yasmin Qureshi*
>> Although everyone is aware that, ***theoretically***, prisoners are treated for drug or alcohol misuse, *in reality* it is not happening. *In reality*, substance abuse is leading to more disturbances in prison and, of course, causing much reoffending. We are spending something like £16 billion tackling reoffending, so something is not going right. Many people are coming into prison because they are addicted to drugs or alcohol. I remember from my 20 years of prosecuting and defending in the criminal law that many of my clients and some whom I was prosecuting, often involving domestic violence, for example, were there because one partner was normally drunk and, in an argument, would start hitting out at their partner.
>>
>> Young people I would see, who were often committing what we would call low-level offences – although I do not like to use that term – were often addicted to drugs. So, for example, they might be walking past a car with a door open or a window down, and if they saw a purse, they would take it; or they might break a window, take a purse and run off with it because they needed the money; or a mobile phone, which they could sell to get money to feed their drug addiction. In the same way, if they walked past a house with an open door and nobody seemed to be there, they often thought it was an ideal opportunity to go in and steal. I am not making excuses for anyone, ***but*** *that is the reality* of how things happened.
>>
>> Why did those people do those things? Because they were addicted and they needed to find money quickly. They needed to sell something and get their next fix, to use a colloquialism. Therefore, as I think everyone knows, a lot of people who come into prison already have substance or alcohol abuse problems, and they still have those problems when they leave prison. It is therefore appropriate for the Committee properly to consider this issue, so we very much support the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd. It is one thing to say what ***should happen in theory***, ***but*** that is not happening *in reality*. *In reality*, there is not enough provision in the Prison Service to deal with substance and alcohol abuse, and we know that that causes reoffending and violence. This really important issue needs to be addressed (Hansard Debates, Column 19, 29.03.2017).

In example (17) the speaker brings into discussion the theory–reality opposition to demonstrate that drug policy could be unintentionally wrong and consecutively harmful to people involved in these programs. More specifically, she intersects two dichotomous pairs in her speech, namely theory–practice and appearance–reality. "Theory" is understood thus as a

deceitful construct, an illusory appearance. The argumentation is construed here, as in other cases where philosophical pairs have a structuring function, through a dissociation technique[20]: *It is one thing to say what should happen in theory, **but** that is not happening in reality. In reality, there is not enough provision in the Prison.*

Old Romanian Parliament provides many instances to illustrate the speculative force of the pair appearance–reality, as important MPs had a deep background in philosophy and good oratorical skills. The following example is taken from a speech delivered, in 1889, by Al. Lahovari, a notable Romanian politician and diplomat. He led important ministries, including the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* and *Justice*:

(18) Toate pământurile pe hârtie au aceeaşi calitate, aceeaşi valoare, aceeaşi figură, aceeaşi *aparenţă*; *în realitate **însă*** nu e de loc aşa. (Lahovari, 125, 1.03.1889)

On paper, all lands have the same quality, the same value, the same figure, the same *appearance; in reality, **however***, this is not the case at all.

In Lahovari's speech the very dichotomy appearance–reality is put into question. The speaker suggests a more profound examination of the issue at stake in order to avoid an unintentional error. Invoking the appearance–reality pair is tantamount to an invitation to reflect on the very essence of the facts/reality.

The next example belongs to Titu Maiorescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs in office at that time:

(19) Orce aţi tălmăci şi răstălmăci d-voastră din acte împotriva acţiunei noastre, *realitatea este că* acţiunea aceasta a adus ca rezultat Pacea de la Bucureşti (aplauze puternice, mult repetate). Fireşte, după proverbul

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[20] "Argumentation leads to the dissociation of concepts if *appearance* is opposed to *reality*. Normally, reality is perceived through appearances that are taken as signs referring to it. When, however, appearances are incompatible – an oar in water looks broken but feels straight to the touch – it must be admitted, if one is to have a coherent picture of reality, that some appearances are illusory and may lead to error regarding the real. Because the status of appearance is equivocal, one is forced to distinguish between those appearances that correspond with reality and those that are only illusory. The distinction will depend on a conception of reality that can serve as a criterion for judging appearances. Whatever is conformable to this conception of the real will be given value; whatever is opposed to it will be denied value" (https://www.britannica.com/topic/rhetoric/Rhetoric-in-philosophy-the-new-rhetoric).

francez, multe căi duc la Roma, poate ar fi fost şi alte mijloace de
succes. Dar ce-ar fi fost dacă n-ar fi fost ce a fost (ilaritate)? Ce ar fi
fost, dacă ar fi fost ce n-a fost? (ilaritate). Aceasta duce la nesfârşitul
posibilităţilor omeneşti.
*Realitatea se mărgineşte în ceea ce este şi nu în ce ar fi putut fi;
realitatea este* Pacea de la Bucureşti (aplauze), *realitatea este că* am
ajuns la acest rezultat, fără a fi primejduit ţara, şi înălţând prestigiul
României, astfel cum recunoaşteţi toţi că este înălţat (aplauze).
(Maiorescu, 1130, 4.12.1913)

Whatever your interpretation and misinterpretation of the documents to
dispute our action, *the reality is that* this action resulted in the Peace of
Bucharest (loud, prolonged applause). Of course, according to the
French proverb, many paths lead to Rome, perhaps there would have
been other means of [achieving] success. But what if what was weren't
what it was (hilarity)? What would there have been if there had been
what wasn't? (hilarity). This leads to the endlessness of human
possibilities.
Reality is limited to what it is and not what it could have been; the
Peace of Bucharest *is reality* (applause), *the reality is* that we have
achieved this result, without endangering the country, and raising the
prestige of Romania, as you all acknowledge that it rose (applause).

Maiorescu thematises the philosophical pair appearance–reality to
ironically refute the inappropriate, even inept criticism of the opposition,
labelling it a simple misinterpretation. He distinguishes factual (reality)
from counterfactual history, rendering the allegation of the opposition
purely hypothetical or fictional. Due to the speculative nature of this type
of criticism in the specific political context, the orator succeeds in
ridiculing and discrediting the actions of the opposite side, and to
indirectly praise the actions of the party he represents.

    The reiteration in periodic sentences of the expression *realitatea este*
("the reality is...") increases the expressive and persuasive force of the
epistemic stance in this context. One can note how an intelligent and
creative speaker can turn epistemic markers into an important resource of
political legitimacy. By invoking a state of affairs (*reality*), the orator
gives a note of objectivity to his speech, praise and criticism resulting
from the very nature of facts, not from a subjective assessment. This
discursive attitude is very convincing and consolidates the orator's
credibility and reliability, as well as his intelligence ethos (discursive
image)[21].

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[21] For the description of these different forms of political ethos, see Charaudeau
(2005, 87–128).

3.3. *In truth… / The truth is… / This is the truth…*

On the epistemic evaluation scale, expressions containing the word "truth" are the strongest, introducing a polemical note par excellence. If the operator *(in) reality* introduced the opposition *appearance–reality*, the word *truth* comes into opposition with *lie*. The *truth–lie* pair has axiological and moral values. The rhetorical movement that invalidates the opposite opinion is to make the speaker's viewpoint objective, by resorting to facts. The dispute moves from the political or even interpersonal level to an abstract level, the speaker protesting against the violation of the truth condition. Invoking truth in discourse (what one can call the "metalinguistics of truth") becomes a strategy for transgressing the speaker's subjectivity. At the same time, the appeal to the truth can sub-textually reference an unfair practice on the opponent's part, i.e. lying, concealing, or omitting real data. The metalinguistics of truth (the definition of truth) gives the discourse a more speculative turn, in the rhetorical line of emphasising objectivity.

Interestingly, the connector *in truth* is absent in the English data. *Merriam-Webster* defines it "in accordance with fact" and considers it synonymous with *actually*, *in fact*, while *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) marked it as being formal. In Romanian, the corresponding phrases *în adevăr/într-adevăr* ("in truth") are not synonymous with *in fact*, but with the adverb *indeed*, "used to emphasize a positive statement or answer" (OED). One could notice a certain circularity in the definition of terms referring to facts and truth, since *indeed* is etymologically formed by prep. *in + deed*, similar to Latin phrase *in factum* > Engl. *in fact*, Fr. *en fait*, meaning "in fact, in reality, in truth". A discussion concerning the factors that determined the stylistic/pragmatic limitation of this strong epistemic certainty marker in English, or factors that influenced its semantic change in Romanian goes beyond the objectives of the present study.

Instead, the predicative expressions *The truth is…* are frequent in the British Parliament and significantly in the debates in which the subject is the (factual) truth:

(20)   *Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top (Lab)*
My Lords, is not the issue that there was a general consultation, which asked, "Do you have any ideas for deregulation?". That is how, on licensing, the idea of deregulating liqueur chocolates came into being. ***That is** the issue and **the truth**. **The truth is** that the idea of carrying out this precise measure was never put to anybody else. Health authorities would probably never even dream that somebody would be*

daft enough to include that in the Deregulation Bill. (Hansard Debates, Column 441, 19.11.2014)

(21) *Steve Baker (Conservative Party)*
    My hon. Friend is, of course, right. He and I sit on the Treasury Committee and we have heard from the Debt Management Office about the factors propping up the current level of borrowing. Not only has borrowing been back-stopped by the Bank of England, but bond market traders are aware of the Chancellor's and the Government's intention to balance the books, have confidence in it and, therefore, will keep lending to us. The situation, however, is precarious and the Labour party would put it in danger.
    VAT cannot really go up. If it went up further, it would hit the poorest hardest and that would be wrong. On income tax, perhaps Labour would reduce the personal allowance. *The truth is* that the top 1% already pay a quarter of income tax. How much further can we go? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said that the 50p rate was pointless, I think – I will have to check whether that is what he said, but it is pointless. It is an act of spite to pretend that the rich will pay through their income tax; all they will do is adjust their behaviour. We put up capital gains tax and the revenues from it went down. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) has explained that in detail on his blog.
    The truth is that the evidence shows that in this country there is a hard limit to how much the public will pay in taxation. Depending on how we measure GDP, it is somewhere between 35% and 40% of GDP. If we are committed to balancing the books, we have to take overall Government spending down to the level that people will pay in tax, and there is a historical limit.
    Labour Members have been rather hysterical about the Government consumption chart, which shows us going back to the 1930s. This is about balancing the books. I believe that Labour Members want to put up capital spending, and debt interest is already forecast to overtake education spending. There is a really tough problem here. *The truth is* that hysterics on either side of the argument will not do. For example, wealth taxes will not work. Opposition Members seem to think we will get the rich to pay, but Denis Healey said of a wealth tax:
    "I found it impossible to draft one which would yield enough revenue to be worth the administrative cost and political hassle."
    The truth is that there is very little chance of getting out of the mess we are in without taking extremely difficult decisions. Unlike turning around a commercial company, we cannot cut to the bone once and then build back up; reducing the deficit has to be taken gently, and we have done it at an appropriate pace. The Chancellor has the right plan, and I shall certainly back him tonight. (Hansard Debates, Column 775, 13.01.2015)

(22) *Owen Smith*

It is ***frankly arrant nonsense*** to suggest that staying within the EU or being in the customs union or the single market is in any way, shape or form an impediment to growing our trade outside the EU. ***The truth is*** that we have succeeded in doing that over the past 30 years from within the EU, and other countries are doing it even as we speak. ***It is utter nonsense****, and we need to call it out as such and not accept the set of **lies** that continues to be propagated* by those who are ideologically determined to drive Brexit through.

Finally, all I have just described *as truth is completely contested*. I fully accept our country is still very much divided, and it is not sufficient for the Government or for the Labour party in opposition to acquiesce, in respecting the will of the people, to allowing our country to become poorer, less secure and more isolated, but nor is it sufficient for us simply to overrule the will of people. The only way we can sort this out, the only way we can act in the national interest and secure the agreement of the British people, is to give them the opportunity, once we know the final terms of the deal – what is really on offer*, not the* **lies** *that have been told but* **the truth that is** *then exposed* – of a final ratifying referendum, a final say, a people's vote, or whatever we want to call it. That would bring this country together. ***Frankly***, it would save this country from a lesser future – a less secure, less prosperous and more isolated future. […] (Hansard Debates, Column 1105, 26.04.2018)

(23) *Lord Campbell-Savours*

My Lords, can the Minister establish the *truth* about a number of reports in national newspapers that the French are turning back people coming into France from Italy on the basis that they are claiming refugee status? Can we find out where *the truth lies*?

Baroness Williams of Trafford

I am sure that I cannot point to where *the truth lies* at this point at the Dispatch Box. First, do not believe everything that you read in the papers. *The truth is* that the UK is a great country. Quite often, we beat ourselves up about all sorts of things, but lots of people want to come here. I will not pass judgment at this point in time on what France is doing, but we are working very closely with our French partners, who are helping us in our endeavour.

Lord Campbell-Savours

I asked a specific question: can we find out the *truth*? Are these reports *true or not*?

Baroness Williams of Trafford

The answer is that I do not know but I know that we are working very closely with our French partners. (Hansard Debates, Column 2102, 07.01.2019)

(24)   *Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)*
         The truth remains that the Home Office does not actually know how
         many people were cheating. *The truth remains* that 35,000 people had
         their visas revoked as part of the Home Office and the Government's
         anti-immigration atmosphere and hostile environment. *That is the*
         truth. Lots of people gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, of
         which I am a former member, and *the truth is* that the concerns that my
         right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) raised
         are absolutely valid. People have lost their livelihoods. They cannot
         return home because of the shame and the stigma. They have no
         recourse to public funds to defend themselves. They have been labelled
         guilty and as cheats. That is a crying shame, and *I absolutely disagree*
         with the Minister when she says this is not a shameful episode. We
         have had Windrush and the whole hostile environment, and TOEIC is
         exactly the same thing. Given that the evidence is no longer secure, is
         it not right that we should not deport anybody else and not force
         through any more deportations from our detention centres of students
         who have found themselves the victims of the incompetence of our
         Home Office and Government? (Hansard Debates, Column 1344,
         24.07.2019)

It is worth noting the mobility of this structure, as in the case of the
previous expression regarding "reality". Rhetorical variants depend on
their placement and can occur in the initial position, where the expression
introduces a predicative subordinate: *the reality is* (examples 11–17, 19),
remains (14), the *truth is* (examples 20–24), *remains* (11), *lies* (23), in the
final position: *but that is not happening in reality* (17), in an independent
sentence: *This/that is the truth* (24), *this/that is the reality* (17), or even in
the interrogative rhetorical variant (23). There are noticeable rhetorical-
stylistic variations between its subordinate and its independent use. The
first challenges the truthfulness of the point of view discussed, integrating
the statement in a polyphonic structure, while the independent use has a
conclusive and verdictive value. The final sequence sets a final opinion
that does not allow contradiction, so the expression has a great rhetorical
force.

   Especially in example (21), which is longer, the rhetoric of truth is
very clearly developed as a polemical answer. This expression has a
discourse structuring function, and it is strategically repeated four times. In
this case, factual truth is sustained by evidence: numeric data that give the
speech scientific objectivity. The relation between truth, knowledge, and
source is balanced, as the discursive proofs are official, verifiable data.
Conversely, example (23) provides an interesting illustration of how
rhetorical construction of truth does not always depend on real facts. In
other words, the relation between truth-factual validity and evidentiality is

not unconditional. The speaker, Baroness Williams of Trafford, cannot give a concrete answer, based on facts, to a question, but replies with a general statement, which cannot be rejected, as it has the value of a political cliché: **The truth is** *that the UK is a great country.*

Example (22) develops an explicit opposition truth–lie. To make the dissociation technique more effective, these two opposite terms are combined with related words, like *frankly* ("in accordance with truth, affirming the truth"), ***arrant, utter*** *nonsense* ("untrue fact"), periphrastic constructions like *truth is* ***completely*** *contested*. Through this open, direct, and categorical approach (the underlined qualifiers are superlatives), the speaker supports a point of view as the correct, objective one, while rejecting the opposite opinion as being absurd, nonsensical. It is a rhetorical construction of truth, essentially based on attitude and emotion, through which the speaker conveys agreement and solidarity with all those who already share his opinion. At the same time, the discourse remains very unconvincing for those who disagree with it for at least equally solid reasons, who are referred to by the speaker in a very impersonal manner: *I* ***fully*** *accept our country is still very much divided*. The disagreement implied by the truth-lie rhetoric and the disapproval stance rhetorically construed through it is explicitly expressed by the speaker in example (24): *I absolutely disagree with…*

3.4. *Fact, Reality, and Truth*

The epistemic expressions including the words *fact*, *reality*, and *truth* can be co-occurrent, as they have a definitional circularity (one term enters in the definitional scheme of the other). They complement each other in the same sentence, as in the example below, to increase the speaker's certainty:

> (25)   *Mr Campbell*
> No. *That is the reality and the truth*. That is the Tory party – hypocritical (Hansard Debates, Column 806, 14.09.2015).

To illustrate the cognitive intersection of these words, an example from a speech of Lahovary is also relevant. Here the orator combines the appearance–reality and truth–lie dichotomies, to denounce a financial transaction that could be defined as imprudent and risky, if unintentional and inadvertent, but also dishonest and deceptive, in the case of an intentional action. The speaker conveys severe criticism while tactfully avoiding a personal attack:

(26) Care a fost dobânda? *În aparenţă* n'a fost d-l I. Brătianu care s'a
      lăudat de dibăcia acestei combinaţiuni, care-l făcea să realizeze un
      împrumut de 26.000.000 fără nici o dobândă; ***însă adevărul ştiţi,***
      domnilor, care este? Este ceea ce am avut onoarea să spun, când s'a
      făcut această operaţiune, şi ceea ce am avut durerea să constat că s'a
      împlinit întocmai precum o prevăzusem eu, când spuneam că dobânda
      acestui împrumut nu va fi nici de cinci, nici de şase, nici de zece la sută
      ci mult mai mare, că va fi un agio necalculabil, care va costa
      guvernului zecimi de milioane, şi ţării poate sutimi. (Lahovari, 36,
      13.12.1888)

      What was the interest? *Apparently*, it was not Mr. I. Brătianu who
      boasted of the skill behind this combination, which made him take out
      a loan of 26,000,000 at no interest; ***but do you know, gentlemen, what***
      the truth is? It is what I had the honour of saying when this operation
      was carried out, and what I was saddened to see happen exactly as I
      had predicted, when I said that the interest on this loan would be
      neither five nor six, not ten percent but much higher, that it will be an
      incalculable premium, which will cost the government tens of millions,
      and the country maybe hundreds.

As far as *facts* and *truth* are concerned, two examples taken from the
British and the Romanian Parliament are interesting, showing the
cognitive intersection of those categories:

(27) *The Prime Minister (Mr David Cameron)*
      My hon. friend makes a very important point. That Select Committee
      report has been held back because Labour Members of Parliament *do*
      *not want to tell the **truth*** about our national health service; they are
      only interested in trying to weaponise it. ***The fact is*** that there are more
      doctors and more nurses and more operations are being carried out.
      That is the truth, and it is disgraceful that Labour is trying to cover it
      up, just as it did in office (Hansard Debates, Column 1430,
      25.03.2015).

Here the epistemic stance implies factuality, a state of facts and its relation
with propositional truth. *Fact* and *truth* are equivalent: *The fact is… That*
is the truth. The epistemic value of the word *fact* (which, as mentioned
above, is to a certain extent desemantised, given its phraseological use) is
increased by the occurrence of the word *truth*, which helps the speaker
develop his counter-argumentative line. It is interesting to notice the
rhetoric of truth: firstly, the Prime-Minister denounces the refuse of the
opposition to provide exact information about the national health service
(*do not want to tell the truth*); secondly, he introduces the correction using
the expression *the fact is*, and afterwards he consolidates his interpretation

firmly affirming *That is the truth*, while evaluating the intentional misrepresentation as *disgraceful*. Construed via truth rhetoric, the speaker's correction seems objective and legitimates the negative assessment and, generally, the criticism of competing stance. The speaker clearly emphasises the moral issue of political deceit, without actually uttering the word *lie*, which has a strong emotional and insulting component.

In Romanian as well, the connective *de fapt* (which corresponds to Engl. *in fact*, see supra, **3.1.**) should be combined with other words in order to create an argumentative opposition, as one can see in the example below, where the supportive word is not *truth*, but its antonym, *lie*:

(28) *Mircea Geoană*

Este de neacceptat pentru noi – şi aici nu cred că trebuie să fii un om de stânga ca să recunoşti acest lucru – ca acest buget, *de fapt*, să proclame, în mod explicit, scăderea punctului de pensie de la 43,8% în 2009, în condiţii tot de criză, în condiţii de profundă recesiune, la 39% în România.

De fapt, aici, în acest proiect de buget, dragii mei, şi în bugetul asigurărilor sociale de stat, dacă vom vota un astfel de buget, ne vom face cu toţii vinovaţi, [...] vom fi vinovaţi de scăderea dramatică a puterii de cumpărare a celor mai vulnerabili dintre români: pensionarii şi salariaţii cu venituri modeste. [...]

Acest buget, de asemenea, nu acordă ceea ce s-a decis prin legi şi prin pactul naţional, de exemplu, pentru educaţie.

Este o minciună că există 6% din PIB pentru educaţie.

De fapt, sunt 4% pentru educaţie şi restul sunt venituri proprii.

Această păcăleală nu poate funcţiona şi nu putem să ne permitem să dăm afară dascăli din şcolile din provincie şi din şcolile din mediul rural, pentru că şi aşa am vorbit de prea multe Românii în această ţară.

Acest buget, *de fapt*, siluieşte bugetul educaţiei şi nu acordă cercetării şi dezvoltării un minim de resurse. (CDEP, 11.01.2010)

It is unacceptable for us – and here I do not think you have to be left leaning to acknowledge this – that this budget, *in fact*, explicitly proclaims the reduction of the pension point from 43.8% in 2009, also in crisis conditions, in conditions of deep recession, to 39% in Romania.

In fact, here, in this draft budget, my dears, and in the state social insurance budget, if we vote for such a budget, we will all be guilty […] we will be guilty of the dramatic decrease in the purchasing power of the most vulnerable Romanians: pensioners and low-income employees. [...]

This budget also does not grant what has been decided by law and the national pact, for example, for education.

It is a lie that 6% of GDP is allocated for education.

In fact, it is 4% for education and the rest is own income.

> **This hoax** cannot work and we cannot afford to lay off teachers from
> schools in the province and from rural schools, because we have discussed
> too many Romanias in this country.
> This budget, *in fact*, undermines the education budget and does not
> give research and development a minimum of resources.

By criticising the budget adopted by the government in office, the speaker
rejects the validity of some data of the project, while denouncing it as a lie
(*Este o minciună că există 6%* "It is a lie that there is 6% …") and a hoax
(*Această păcăleală nu poate funcţiona* "This hoax cannot work"). The
structures introduced by *de fapt* ("in fact") amend and bring corrections to
the budget project, legitimising and rhetorically preparing the critical
stance. The appeal to the lying and deceit rhetoric to the detriment of the
objective, positive truth rhetoric, as in example (27): *That is the truth*,
reveals that the speaker aims to discredit his opponent, without being
concerned with mitigation devices. If the qualification *is not true* is rather
neutral, the assessments *lie* and *hoax* are almost injurious and offensive,
since they imply an intentional error, the will to deceit. This negative,
unmitigated labelling is meant to enhance the critical force of the speech
by its inherent emotional component. The discourse becomes more
aggressive and loses its speculative or rational propensity induced by the
word *truth*. Truth is a philosophical category and whenever a speaker tries
to define it, the discourse acquires an objective feature. Epistemic certainty
markers and lying rhetoric serve here to indicate the clear, unconcealed
divergent alignment and adversarial stance, motivated by a moral political
view.

4. Concluding Remarks

The analysis of the epistemic markers *in fact*, *in reality*, *in truth* and the
sequences *the fact is*, *the reality is*, *the truth is*, *this is reality*, *this is the
truth*, and of their Romanian corresponding forms, based on authentic
data, rendered insights into the complex issues of the metalinguistics of
truth and its epistemic modal function. Adopting a comparative
perspective on both British and Romanian parliamentary debates (from
2010 to the present), the study tried to indicate the cognitive, rhetoric, and
argumentative patterns of these markers, as well as some linguistic and
cultural similarities and differences. To illustrate some particular
argumentative uses and the distribution of certain markers, the inclusion of
some excerpts from the Old Romanian Parliament was also considered
useful.

The expressions *in fact*, *in reality*, *the fact is*, *the reality is*, *the truth is*... are multifunctional. They have been defined as (meta-)discursive markers, modal particles, and argumentative operators/connectors. If their functional regime differs depending on their locutional or predicative status, their epistemic value may display some rhetorical variation as well.

Fact, *reality*, and *truth* are semantically ranked on a scale of abstractness; therefore, the expressions that contain them have significantly different rhetorical force. In political discourse, the words *reality* and *truth* are almost synonymous. *Truth* is understood as factual conformity, correspondence between words and deeds. To invoke truth and factual conformity in dialogue means to question the truth–factual veracity of the previous discourse, and implicitly the sincerity, honesty, and competence of the interlocutor regarding the interpretation of reality. Thus, given the competitive nature of political discourse, they create inter-discursive, polyphonic, echoic-mention structures, designed to be included into (highly) dialectical (controversial) or argumentative/rhetorical contexts, whereby speakers express their agreement or disagreement, solidarity or divergent stance concerning a certain issue. However, their contextual use depends on the speaker's intentions, attitude, and linguistic creativity, as they could mitigate the criticism or, on the contrary, enhance it. British debates and old Romanian debates reveal a mitigating value, while present-day Romanian debates display rather the tendency to clearly emphasise an adversarial stance.

The operator *in fact* has the weakest value on a rhetorical/polemical scale, because it has undergone a process of desemantisation. It is also the least common in the examined data. It does not always indicate an opposition, its main value being metalinguistic and connective, in both contemporary English and Romanian. To create an opposition, *in fact* must be reinforced by other discursive means, especially by an explicit rhetoric of truth–lie. Despite its non-transparent semantic value, in both English and Romanian, speakers intuitively associate the word *fact* with *truth* (or its antonym *lie*) and combine their notional fields whenever it is needed to enhance the argumentative force of an utterance.

In Romanian, as in French, there are two modal particles with apparently the same meaning: *în fapt* and *de fapt* (both being loan translations of the French *en fait* and *de fait*), corresponding to Engl. *in fact*. Their diachronic distribution is not similar, *în fapt* being used in the old Romanian Parliament, while contemporary records (2010–2019) exclusively attest the particle *de fapt*. *În fapt* preserved its semantic value and expresses the epistemic certainty, while *de fapt* is desemantised and acquired connective values.

In reality has a more prominent rhetorical force, because it introduces the argumentative component of the dichotomous pair appearance–reality. By resorting to this argumentative scheme, the speaker may express a critical view in affirmative terms, avoiding any negative linguistic structure. Disagreement is induced by linguistic and cognitive structures (connectors *but* and *however* imply a contrastive point of view, while the pair appearance–reality involves ontological and moral assessments). The dichotomy appearance–reality can be used as an instrument to structure the discourse in a manner that appears objective and rational, enabling the speaker to avoid an open adversarial stance. Both British and Romanian debates provide interesting examples in which speakers creatively exploit the argumentative value of the operator *in reality*. The speculative force of this dichotomous pair was highlighted in the older Romanian debates, where the speakers had not only a political but also a philosophical background.

Involving axiological and moral aspects, the expressions that contain the word *truth* are rhetorically the strongest. Epistemic modifiers of this type can thematically orient the discourse and structure it in periodic sentences. The rhetorical movement that invalidates the opposite opinion is to present the speaker's viewpoint as objective, by resorting to facts. The dispute moves from the political or even interpersonal level to an abstract level, the speaker apparently protesting against the violation of the truth condition. Invoking truth in discourse (what one can call the "metalinguistics of truth") becomes a strategy of transgressing the speaker's subjectivity. The argumentative structure based on truth–lie pair is frequent in British Parliament, while Romanian Parliament provides only examples where this opposition is conveyed through mixed dichotomous pairs, as appearance–truth and facts–lie/hoax.

The epistemic stance related to metalinguistics of truth functions as a strategy of political legitimisation, the binary oppositions appearance–reality and truth–lie allowing the political actor to define him/herself in relation to a system of values and to denounce his/her opponent as non-conforming to this axiological and moral system.

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CHAPTER THREE

ATTITUDINAL STANCE IN ROMANIAN PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE. THE CASE OF THE *COLECTIV* TRAGEDY

ADRIAN TOADER

1. Introduction

One main component of political discourse relates to the speaker's subjective interpretation of what transpires in the political arena. By employing a vast repertoire of discursive options, individuals will add a *personal touch* to their messages. Subjectivity in discourse allows people to evaluate the world and express their emotions in the process. This is mainly achieved through various means and strategies reflecting the speaker's linguistic and extra-linguistic competences.

In both written statements and public discourse, politicians will often advance their points of view by making "particular linguistic choices" with the intent of "accomplishing particular social and rhetorical actions" (Vasilescu 2010, 368). A starting point of this analysis is to identify instances of "self-expression" (Lyons 1994, 13) that account for a speaker's attitudinal stance and to discuss potential strategies of persuasion chosen by members of Parliament (MPs hereafter) when approaching a topic of tragic dimension.

2. Theoretical Background

From the early days of parliamentary life until today, the institution went through a process of continuous adaptation to social and political changes. In modern times, this legislative body was shaped by socio-historical and cultural factors (Vasilescu 2010), as a norm-regulated environment with specific rules and practices (Ilie 2006, 2010a, 2010b).

MPs do not always abide by the same principles, values, and ideological beliefs. Consequently, they can adapt to the institutional setting and use their deliberative skills and professional affiliations to fulfil personal or shared political agendas.

Speaking on their own behalf or as representatives of various political factions, politicians are "purposeful beings" (Weigand 2010), in the sense that they communicate to achieve the best possible result from the topic they are addressing. MPs attempt to get their message across the table to maintain, improve, or rebuild their public image as individuals or as members of the political party they represent.

Furthermore, Parliament can be viewed as a type of confrontational environment (Bayley 2004, 12), where speakers can use their communicative skills to discredit various political actors. MPs create positive selves while, at the same time, negatively present others through rhetorical, stylistic, and pragmatic discursive strategies. This, in turn, can help them keep or advance their positions of power. As the analysis below shows, MPs choose to express their attitude towards a highly emotionally charged event and use different linguistic and extra-linguistic means in this process.

2.1. Attitudinal Stance

Within the framework of political discourse, speakers incorporate instances of subjectivity in their messages. Politicians express a plethora of emotions and attitudes, which might influence the degree of popularity they attain when their actions are considered and interpreted by outsiders. As a result, subjectivity moulds the ways a speaker discursively builds his/her political image, "by means of a perpetual change of strategies as a persuasive means of gaining support and admiration" (Săftoiu and Toader 2018, 34).

In language studies, emotions and attitudes are often contextualised as *affect* (Goodwin 2007; Wetherell 2012; Massumi 2015). In a general sense, the term is representative of the

> emotional responses of human speech participants to phenomena (e.g., their misery or cheer, their disquiet or confidence, ennui or interest, displeasure or admiration, fear or desire and so on) (Miller 2004, 280).

Expressing subjectivity can be regarded as a critical discursive resource in politics. Firstly, it represents a way through which speakers react to unfolded events. Secondly, a broad spectrum of emotions can be evoked to add to the effect of an utterance, to elicit positive reactions, to help

politicians keep or accede to positions of power, to criticise and discredit their political opponents, or simply to add flavour to one's public image.

One school of thought that accounts for the subjective component of both written and verbal communication concerns itself with the study of *stance* or *stancetaking.* Simply put, this approach involves the analysis of the speaker's processes of self-expression, or of the way (s)he "overtly expresses attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the message" (Biber and Finegan 1988, 1). In line with this, subjectivity can be regarded as a reflection of the speaker's views, manifested in various social contexts.

Investigating both written and oral instances of subjectivity, Biber et al. (1999) provide a tri-partite classification of stance as *epistemic*, *attitudinal*, and *style*. *Epistemic stance* refers to the degree of knowledge and certainty of an individual "towards the truth of the propositional content being communicated" (Bongelli et al. 2018, 29). *Attitudinal stance* marks the addresser's attitudes, evaluations, feelings, or emotions, while *style* refers to "the manner of speaking which the speaker is adopting" (Biber et al. 1999, 558).

In terms of attitudinal stance, various lexical markers can underline the speakers' viewpoints. The presence of adjectives (*curious*, *angry*, *tragic*, etc.), nouns (*outcome*, *result*, *expectation*, etc.), adverbials (*sadly*, *amazingly*, etc.), verbs (*wish*, *love*, *hate*, *prefer*, etc.), and modal verbs (*ought to*, *should*, *might*, etc.) are linguistic means of expressing subjectivity (Biber et al. 1999). Vasilescu (2010, 370–371) expands the classification of stance markers to include morpho-syntactic elements (voice, tense, or aspect), discourse patterns (such as code-switching, repetition, or quoting), phonological aspects (voice quality, speech speed, repetition, or intonation), and non-verbal stance markers (body language, eye contact, physical contact, the use of space, facial expressions, etc.). Nevertheless, stance is deeply embedded in how people communicate, in the lexical and semantic choices they make, or various linguistic resources available in discourse (such as the paraverbal and non-verbal means employed in spoken interactions).

Stancetaking was also discussed in connection with dialogic interaction (Kärkkäinen 2007; Du Bois 2007; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012), given that communicative exchanges between participants or directed towards an audience have the potential of influencing how speakers take on various viewpoints and express their emotions in the process. In addition, on a pragmatic level, the interaction between interlocutors (particularly in oral discourse) might elicit reactions from those involved in this process, such as participants to parliamentary proceedings or audience members. As the

analysis shows, attitudinal stance is a discursive component that can be used strategically by politicians as "a prerequisite needed to influence the opinions and attitudes of others" (Vukovic 2014, 37).

2.2. The Dynamics of Parliamentary Discourse

In what follows, I will mention some features of parliamentary discourse to contextualise how MPs project their identity through *stancetaking*. The first aspect drawn into the discussion is the setting, or more explicitly, the structural design of Parliament as a political body of governance. In terms of functionality, MPs conduct their affairs in a representative capacity and should make decisions in the best interest of the citizens they represent. At the same time, they can make use of various resources at their disposal to achieve personal and professional goals.

If parliamentary discourse is, by design, goal-oriented and often available to the public, a subject of inquiry into the afore-mentioned field refers to how MPs will identify the needs and wants of an audience, and use them to forward their own personal and shared objectives. Consequently, "one of the core goals of political discourse analysis is to seek out the ways in which language choice is manipulated for specific political effects" (Wilson 1990, 410).

As part of an "individually tailored discourse" (Ilie 2010c, 202), MPs employ a wide array of discursive strategies for negotiating their identities. The projection of *self* and *others* is achieved through different discursive options "ranging from lexis to pragmatics" (Wilson 1990, 410–411), as MPs attempt to fulfil specific, deeply personal, or shared goals. By considering the dialogical nature of *stancetaking* (Du Bois 2007), personal pronouns should not be regarded solely as linguistic markers that function in a referential capacity. As the primary goal of MPs is "to construct a competent, trustworthy, powerful professional identity that can influence deliberative and decision-making processes" (Vasilescu 2010, 371), personal pronouns can be employed as mechanisms of persuasion. MPs use *I-reference*s to speak about themselves by bringing forward aspects of their personal and professional competences and achievements. At the same time, MPs can choose to use the plural *we* to speak in a representative capacity for their political party, ideological group, or constituency. Furthermore, the presence of pronouns also introduces the oppositional *others* "whose speech and actions *we* are trying to invalidate" (Săftoiu 2015, 432). The interplay between how MPs project their selves in discourse can be used strategically by speakers to challenge the credibility of political opponents and to obtain a positive image perception

as individuals or as members of political parties. Put differently, a political figure (in this case, an MP), purposefully communicates (to achieve personal/professional goals), with others (interlocutors) and/or with various hearers (the audience) through the use of strategic devices (to achieve persuasion).

Audiences hold immense power as they determine whether to accept, reject, or remain indifferent to political messages. The multi-faceted nature of the audience influences how speakers negotiate their identities, as MPs striving for persuasion should discover the potential needs and expectations of a majority and respond accordingly. Moreover, MPs can also use their discursive competences to add to the rhetorical craftsmanship of a message, with the intent of shaping public opinion.

Understanding why MPs communicate as goal-oriented individuals, the channels through which they speak, the topic of the discussion, the context in which the action takes place, or the relationship between political parties are just some of the aspects that influence the use and subsequent effects of attitude markers in parliamentary discourse.

3. The *Colectiv* Nightclub Fire

On the night of October 30, 2015, all Romanian media outlets reported that a fire had broken out at a nightclub in Bucharest, during a concert. As more information about the incident became available, people realised its tragic extent. The initial report provided by the emergency services that intervened on the night in question was staggering. In total, 27 people had lost their lives, while 180 were injured.

In the following days, more information about the fire surfaced. Although the club had an operating permit, experts claimed that the high number of victims resulted from improper functioning conditions. In the aftermath of the disaster, the injured victims were taken to local hospitals, as public opinion was assured that they would receive proper care and that the Romanian health system is capable of dealing with a case of this amplitude. Several countries expressed their willingness to assist by accepting patients in critical condition. Most of these transfers were delayed and, as a result, the patients developed severe bacterial infections, due to poor sanitary conditions and lack of proper medical equipment in Romanian hospitals.

As the death toll rose, ordinary citizens responded. People took to the streets, criticising an ineffective and out-of-date medical system and speaking against a corrupt political class. Massive protests were held throughout the country and even among diaspora communities. Tens of

thousands of Romanian citizens marched together, in solidarity, for the tragedy victims, urging that those responsible be held accountable for their actions. The slogan *corupţia ucide* ("corruption kills"), uttered by protesters or written on cardboard signs, perfectly encapsulates the discontent of a generation that seemed to have lost faith in its political ruling class and condemned the effects of systemic corruption that had led to the loss of innocent lives.

To this day, the *Colectiv* nightclub fire is considered one of the most tragic events in Romania's recent history, ultimately claiming the lives of 65 people.

United by a sense of solidarity for the fire victims or by the sheer desire to speak out against a corrupt and inefficient system, people rallied together in what became the second-largest protest in Romania after the fall of communism and forced the Government to resign four days after the incident.

4. Data and Method

The corpus used for the present study consists of 23 excerpts from speeches delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, between October 2015 and May 2020, on the topic of the *Colectiv* fire. The data were retrieved from the official website of the Romanian Parliament (www.cdep.ro), where it is available as public information. To examine the presence of attitude markers, I analyse the linguistic content and rhetorical effects of 9 oral and 1 written official statements, taken from the corpus, on the subject in question. The selection was based on how the subjective component of the statements brings into play various image-building strategies, through which MPs claim responsibility, express political accountability, criticise and assign blame to others, or invoke non-political identities for pathetic effect.

The process of collecting data was facilitated by keywords used to narrow the search. Nouns such as *Colectiv*, *incident* ("incident"), *tragedie* ("tragedy"), *eveniment* ("event"), *club* ("club"), or *incendiu* ("fire") were employed to this end. Furthermore, the analysis also took into account the topic of the Romanian healthcare system, discussed in Parliament after the disaster.

The present study involves qualitative research on the use of attitude markers in the speeches in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. Drawing from the classification of attitude markers put forward by Biber et al. (1999), I analyse various instances of subjectivity, discursively expressed through nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Moving beyond the

conventional structure of language, the analysis also considers the polysemy of personal pronouns that allows MPs to switch from *self* to *group* and/or *other* referencing, when approaching the subject in question. Identifying attitude and its pronominal markers (at a linguistic level) will be further approached from a pragma-rhetorical perspective. The analysis accounts for attack and defence strategies advanced by MPs in relation to the *Colectiv* nightclub fire. The main objective is to understand how they integrate an emotional and, at first glance, deeply personal component of discourse in their rhetorical arsenal, to obtain favourable outcomes while *politicising* a tragic incident.

Drawing from previous research on the persuasive use of pronouns in political discourse (Săftoiu and Toader 2018), pronouns will be organised in three distinct categories: *self-referencing* – which allows MPs to bring forward both personal and professional traits and achievements, marked by the first person, singular form, *I*; *inclusive* – used to express political affiliation or to establish bonds with audience and/or interlocutors; and *exclusive* – mainly employed by MPs to discredit political actors. I will also consider how, through the use of *I* and the affiliative *we* pronouns, MPs choose to claim responsibility, distance themselves from the event, or advance strategies of attack against their political adversaries.

In terms of transcribing conventions, it is worth mentioning that, unlike English, Romanian is a pro-drop language, allowing an independent clause to lack a subject either in the form of a pronoun or a noun (phrase). The subject may be omitted as it can be implied (deduced from context) or null (suggested by the inflection of the verb). By taking this into account, when providing a translation for the excerpts, some inferred pronominal references will be marked in square brackets.

5. Data Analysis

When approaching a subject of strong emotional content, one that pushes all political topics aside at a given time and becomes a focal point of discussion for the general public, MPs can employ various image-building strategies in connection to it. The analysis revealed two main tactics employed to this extent. On one hand, MPs can choose to *go on the defensive*, to protect their political standing and public image perception. This was primarily facilitated by persuasive strategies such as claiming responsibility for the event in question through *group-references*, using dissociation strategies to distance oneself from political accountability, and invoking instances of self that go beyond the institutional affiliation of the MP to potentially elicit positive reactions from the audience.

On the other hand, MPs can *go on the offensive* and discredit the image of other MPs or political groups, by blaming those they regard as directly accountable for the outcome of the fire or by raising accusations and allegations against the whole governing system that was in power when the event occurred. As the analysis shows, oftentimes, defence and attack strategies are intrinsically linked, as one can be advanced by way of the other (see, for example, section **5.2.**). Parliamentarians can choose to invoke their professional affiliation or present themselves as ordinary citizens. Furthermore, they can use subjectivity to add force to their claims, to paint a picture with powerful rhetorical effects, and to persuade people that they have their best interests at heart.

5.1. Claiming Responsibility

Through attitude markers, MPs can position themselves favourably when contextualising the tragedy. One such instance refers to how MPs connect their political actions and decision-making policies with the *Colectiv* fire. In the excerpts presented below, MPs use attitude markers to put forward a defence strategy when claiming responsibility for the incident:

(1) Cum e şi normal, *fiecare dintre cei implicaţi în tragicul eveniment* are o lecţie de învăţat şi măsuri de luat ca *acest dezastru* să nu se mai întâmple vreodată. Dar *noi, făcătorii de legi*, ce am învăţat din *tragedia* petrecută la acel club şi, mult mai important, ce măsuri *vom* adopta? *Cine vrem să vină să facă treaba în locul nostru*? (Vasile Popeangă, Social Democratic Party, oral statement, CD[1], 05.11.2015)

As it is normal, *each of those involved in the tragic event* has a lesson to learn and measures to take to ensure that *this disaster* never happens again. But what did *we, the lawmakers*, learn from *the tragedy* at that club and, more importantly, what measures will [*we*] take? *Who do* [*we*] *want to come and do the work for us?*

(2) *Nu pot rămâne indiferent la amploarea uneia dintre cele mai mari nenorociri ce s-au abătut asupra ţării în ultimele decenii poate*, nu pot suprima sentimentul de datorie morală pe care o avem faţă de semenii noştri şi faţă de noi înşine, aceea de a ne oferi un viitor sigur, un viitor cu cât mai puţine griji, o societate în care să *ne* simţim protejaţi, pentru a simţi că la rândul nostru avem datoria de a o proteja. (Paul Dumbrăvanu, National Liberal Party, oral statement, CD, 05.11.2015)

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[1] Chamber of Deputies.

> [*I*] *cannot remain indifferent to the magnitude of perhaps one of the greatest calamities that has befallen the country in recent decades*, [*I*] *cannot suppress the feeling of moral obligation that* [*we*] *have to our fellow men and ourselves*, that of ensuring a secure future for ourselves, a future with as few worries as possible, a society where [*we*] feel protected, in order to feel that in turn, [*we*] have a duty to protect it.

In the first example, the MP depicts the *Colectiv* fire as a hard lesson that needs to be learned by all those associated with the incident. The attitudinal lexicon employed in this case underlines its gravity, suggested by the adjective *tragic* ("tragic") and the nouns *dezastru* ("disaster") and *tragedie* ("tragedy") in reference to the nightclub fire.

At first, claiming responsibility is achieved by way of an impersonal construction: "Fiecare dintre *cei* implicați în tragicul eveniment" ("Each of *those* involved in the tragic event"). In this case, the demonstrative pronoun *those* implies "a sense of otherness" (Campbell 2019, 20), which can be used for signalling distance between the MP and a political faction associated with such an outcome. In what follows, accountability is expressed by an inclusive *we*, as the MP associates himself with the category of *făcătorii de legi* ("lawmakers") and highlights their professional obligation to ensure that such an event will be avoided in the future. The rhetorical question at the end of the fragment: "Cine *vrem* să vină să facă treaba în locul *nostru*?" ("Who do [*we*] want to come and do the work for *us*?"), can be seen as a harsh reproof through which the MP brings into question the professional responsibilities of the state's political institutions and argues that these should be reflected in the attitudes and actions of their representatives.

In the second example, the MP uses instances of self-expression to mark his emotional responses: "*Nu pot rămâne indiferent* la *amploarea uneia dintre cele mai mari nenorociri* ce s-au abătut asupra țării în ultimele decenii" ("[*I*] *cannot remain indifferent* to *the magnitude of perhaps one of the greatest calamities* that have befallen the country in recent decades"). Similar to the previous fragment, the MP's subjectivity is conveyed by an attitude marker, in the form of a first-person negative construction "*nu pot* rămâne indiferent" ("[*I*] *cannot* remain indifferent"). At the same time, responsibility is expressed by an inclusive *we*, further underlining a sense of moral obligation to the MPs and the electorate: "nu pot suprima sentimentul de datorie morală pe care *îl avem față de semenii noștri* și *față de noi înșine*" ("[I] cannot suppress the feeling of moral obligation that [*we*] *have to our fellow men* and *ourselves*"). The MP mentions ethical and professional prerequisites for parliamentary conduct

by arguing that their political actions should be directed toward providing a better, safer future for those that they stand to represent.

In both examples, claiming responsibility is often disguised under an affiliative association. MPs employ attitude markers to describe the event in question but resort to inclusive affiliations to express accountability. This is further suggested by a generalised *we*, present in both examples, as an embodiment of an all-inclusive vilified whole, blamed, to some extent, for the event. Group identities can potentially help the MP distance himself/herself from the incident. Through an emotionally-charged subject matter, an MP can express empathy and come across as someone who is preoccupied with the matter at hand while overseeing the shared interests of Romanian citizens as a parliamentarian.

5.2. Distancing from Political Accountability

MPs can also distance themselves from the tragedy by using dissociative acts. In the following excerpts, MPs put forward referential strategies (introduced by plural pronouns) to differentiate between the positive self-representation of the *we-group* and the *other-group*'s negative depiction. The use of personal pronouns is an intrinsic characteristic of political discourse that can be used "to induce interpreters to conceptualise group identity, coalitions, parties, and the like, either as insiders or as outsiders" (Chilton 2004, 56). In line with this, some pronominal references can attain the function of social indexicals and consequently establish in-group and out-group relations.

(3) Anul trecut, *constatam neputincioşi cu toţii* şi ni se confirmă pentru a nu ştiu câta oară, că sistemul public de sănătate de la noi din ţară nu are capacitatea nici măcar să cazeze în spitale, d-apoi să trateze corespunzător un număr de pacienţi aflaţi într-o stare gravă sau foarte gravă. *Am crezut şi sperat cu toţii că tragedia de anul trecut va reprezenta momentul de cotitură în care autorităţile române nu vor mai ascunde gunoiul sub preş*, ca în ultimii 26 de ani, că lucrurile vor intra pe făgaşul normal şi în câţiva ani vom avea şi *noi* un sistem de sănătate ca afară. (Florin Gheorghe, Social Democratic Party, oral statement, CD, 11.10.2016)

Last year, [*we*] *all witnessed helplessly*, and it is being confirmed to us, time and time again, that the public health system in our country doesn't even have the capacity to accommodate people in hospitals, let alone properly treat a number of patients in serious or in critical condition. [*We*] *all believed and hoped that last year's tragedy would represent the turning point where Romanian authorities would no*

longer sweep the garbage under the carpet, that things will return to normal and, in a few years, *we* will also have a health system comparable to the ones abroad.

(4) Căci, deşi *unii dintre noi, care încă mai ţinem legătura cu cei care ne-au ales să îi reprezentăm în legislativul ţării, am tras diverse semnale de alarmă de-a lungul timpului*, groasa majoritate a celor ce încă îşi mai închipuie că sunt reprezentanţii electoratului şi ocupă aceste scaune au preferat să se prefacă puţintel mai *şubrezi cu auzul*. (Vasile Popeangă, Social Democratic Party, Oral Statement, CD, 12.11.2015)

Because *some of us, who still keep in touch with those who elected us to represent them in the country's legislature*, *sounded several alarms over time, the thick majority* of those who still imagine themselves to be the voters' representatives and hold these seats, chose to pretend to be *a little hard of hearing.*

In example (3), the MP talks about Romania's underdeveloped healthcare system. An inclusive *we* is used to integrate him within a generalised group of observers that lacked the means of generating societal change: "anul trecut, *constatam neputincioşi cu toţii*" ("last year, [*we*] *all witnessed helplessly*"). At a linguistic level, this is further suggested by the adjective *neputincioşi* ("helplessly"). It marks the MPs position on the issue, allowing him to include himself within a group of bystanders with no political power, unable to contribute to the country's legislative process.

   When referring to the *Colectiv* nightclub fire, attitudinal markers are directed towards the governing body, which was liable for making political decisions in the aftermath of the tragedy: "*Am crezut şi sperat cu toţii* că *tragedia* de anul trecut va reprezenta momentul de cotitură în care *autorităţile române nu vor mai ascunde gunoiul sub preş*" ("[We] *all believed and hoped* that last year's *tragedy* would represent a turning point where *Romanian authorities would no longer sweep the garbage under the carpet*"). In this case, the MP includes himself in a minority or an oppositional group, one with limited power and authority, that can only oversee the legislative process. Using a dichotomous relationship between the ambiguous *we* (as an embodiment of all those who were unable to make political changes) and an inferred *they* (as the Romanian authorities responsible for bringing about change to the health care system), the MP can distance himself from political accountability.

   In excerpt (4), the dichotomous relationship between the affiliative *we* and the oppositional *other* is structured based on divergent actions taken in relation to the topic. The MP identifies himself as being part of the righteous political group, the one that minds the interests of the electorate,

and claims to have brought up, repeatedly, some of the issues that were raised after the nightclub fire: "*unii dintre noi*, care încă mai ținem legătura cu cei care ne-au ales să îi reprezentăm în legislativul țării, *am tras diverse semnale de alarmă de-a lungul timpului*" ("*some of us*, who still keep in touch with those who elected us to represent them in the country's legislature, *sounded several alarms over time*").

On one hand, the lack of political accountability is associated with a broad group of parliamentarians defined as *groasa majoritate* ("thick majority"). On the other hand, the MP describes himself as part of a category of elected political members of Parliament, concerned with the interests of their constituency. The MP's choice of contextualising political opponents is achieved by the adjective *groasa* ("thick"), which can be viewed as an unconventional way of classifying the group. Instead of using the adjective *marea* ("vast"), a common form of referencing a broad category, the MP's linguistic option can be interpreted as an irony-laden remark with pathetic effect. Referencing political opponents is achieved through a figure of speech with derogatory implications. This puts the group in a negative light as the word *groasa* ("thick") can be further associated with a Romanian saying *a avea obrazul gros*, meaning to be impervious to criticism and downright rude to others. Irony is also present in the remark *șubrezi cu auzul* ("hard of hearing"), used to criticise the opposing group's inaction on the issue at hand. The MP employs irony as a strategic means of negative image-building when referring to those seen as culpable. He claims that they deliberately avoided the issues brought forward by different political representatives and blatantly disregarded their warnings. This also suggests that the status-quo of bad political decision-making (taken after the event) is being perpetuated by the contextualised political group. Irony contributes to the perlocutionary effect of the utterance and can be viewed as a strategic means of discrediting political adversaries in the process.

The analysis reveals that a positive image is primarily achieved by a negative representation of those that held legislative power during the *Colectiv* fire. Furthermore, MPs invoke group identities to potentially relate to the electorate by showcasing themselves as victims rather than problem-solvers, and by underlining their continuous commitment to providing a better future for all Romanian citizens. Attitude markers can be used for projecting *self* in a favourable light while, at the same time, criticising the actions (or lack thereof) attributed to various MPs. By putting forward a dichotomous dynamic, MPs ascribe "various degrees of negativity to the out-groups" (Silverman 1998, 161) and further disavow

their involvement in how these issues are tackled within the legislative body of the governing system.

5.3. Projecting Non-Political Identities

Through discourse, MPs can project identities that go beyond their institutional affiliation. Using *self* and *group* referencing, they can bring forward aspects pertaining (but not limited) to "ethnicity, gender, personal beliefs, taste, attitudes, class" (Vasilescu 2010, 369). It is worth noting that there are as many options for the speaker to build his/her public image perception as there are ways to differentiate between individuals or groups. In parliamentary discourse, invoking non-political identities can be employed by MPs strategically, to attain different effects. Depending on the topic of discussion, the type of audience, and the "variety of identities that are particular to that politician" (Bramley 2001, 258), individuals can shed light on diverse aspects of their lives and approach an issue from a seemingly novel viewpoint. Changing the perspective through which an MP addresses the electorate can add to the effect of an utterance and can positively resonate with the receivers of a message. Depending on the identities projected, MPs can move from their primary public role as politicians towards a self-descriptive ascription of their stance, as concerned citizens within the institution of Parliament. This, in turn, can become a means of defence, which allows MPs to establish a bond with the audience, by further distancing them from their professional roles and obligations, and by coming across as deeply preoccupied with the event in question.

In the following example, the MP expresses his views on how the *Colectiv* tragedy influenced the decisional process of the Government regarding the improvement of the healthcare system. The MP projects his attitude towards the Social Democratic Party, in power before and after the event[2], criticising their inefficiency and lack of involvement, and deeming their actions a *ruşine răsunătoare* "resounding shame":

(5) Au trecut trei ani de la marea tragedie de la *Colectiv*, un eveniment care a zguduit România şi în urma căruia, spre *ruşinea răsunătoare a tuturor Guvernelor care au urmat*, lucrurile şi procedurile au rămas exact la fel. *În ceea ce priveşte sistemul medical, nu s-a schimbat*

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[2] During the *Colectiv* nightclub fire, Romania was governed by the Social Democratic Party. Soon after, a new government of technocrats was named. Following the 2016 Parliamentary elections, the Social Democratic Party returned to power, forming a new government that held the office until the end of 2019.

absolut nimic. Absolut nimic! Vă spun ca un om care s-a implicat direct în acel caz. Nu eram un om politic, nu eram un angajat al Ministerului Sănătăţii, ci eram doar omul Pavel Popescu care a rămas marcat şi am rămas marcat pe viaţă de ceea ce am văzut atunci. (Pavel Popescu, National Liberal Party, oral statement, CD, 24.10.2018)

Three years have passed since the great *Colectiv* tragedy, an event that shook Romania and as a result of which, to the *resounding shame of all the Governments that followed*, things and procedures remained exactly the same. *With regard to the health system, absolutely nothing has changed. Absolutely nothing!* [*I*]*'m telling you this as someone who was directly involved in that case.* [*I*] *wasn't a politician,* [*I*] *wasn't a Ministry of Health employee,* [*I*] *was simply the man Pavel Popescu*, who was scarred, and [I] remained scarred for life by what [I] saw then.

The MP moves on to projecting his *self* as a regular citizen, stricken by the amplitude of the event, expressing his discontent towards the actions of the Government: "În ceea ce priveşte sistemul medical, nu s-a schimbat absolut nimic. Absolut nimic! *Vă spun ca un om* care s-a implicat direct în acel caz" ("In regard to the health system, absolutely nothing has changed. Absolutely nothing! *I'm telling you this as someone* who was directly involved in that case"). He further reiterates how the Social Democratic Party made no significant improvements to the Romanian healthcare system, an issue which was raised by the public opinion and played a deciding role in the Prime Minister's resignation.

The MP takes the stance of a regular citizen, devoid of any political power and responsibility, personally affected by the amplitude and tragic dimension of the tragedy. By mentioning aspects that preceded his career in politics, the MP's attitudinal stance reflects the view of an ordinary citizen, self-described as "simply the man Pavel Popescu" (*doar omul Pavel Popescu*), which might suggest to the audience that his advocacy for the cause comes from a deeply-rooted self of justice rather than a political agenda. This can help the MP establish a bond with the audience, as he takes the stance of a non-political entity, expressing his view on the issue at hand and blaming those that held the majority in Parliament during and after the tragedy.

In a different case, the MP projects his image as a family man and brings forward a hypothetical scenario, when talking about the *Colectiv* fire:

(6) *Sunt în primul rând tată de băiat* şi mă gândesc că va veni vremea în care să iasă cu prietenii la un club să asculte muzică, să se distreze. Şi

îl vreau înapoi acasă. Iar atunci *vreau să mă gândesc că nişte funcţionari şi-au făcut treaba*, nimic mai mult, astfel încât să vină întreg acasă. (Nicu Macovei, Social Democratic Party, oral statement, CD, 31.10.2017)

First and foremost, [*I*] *am my son's father* and [I] think that the time will come when he will go out with friends to a club to listen to music and have fun. And [I] want him back home. And at that point, [*I*] *would want to think some officials have done their job*, nothing more, so that [he] can come home unscathed.

Through an inferred *self-referencing* remark, the MP invokes his identity as a father, one that, in his view, takes precedence over other identities: "Sunt *în primul rând tată* de băiat" ("*First and foremost*, I am my son's father"). The MP projects his personal identity and puts forward details of his private life through attitude markers, primarily suggested by the verb *gândesc* ("[I] think"), used to formulate his viewpoint. The MP appeals to the audience by underlining the value of *family*. At a linguistic level, the noun functions as a hyponym that can elicit affective reactions from the audience. This remark allows the MP to potentially obtain a positive image perception by establishing a bond with those who identify as parents. The MP can speak on their behalf as the voice of the citizens, who, in the same capacity, are concerned with the recurrence of such an event. Rather than choosing to speak as an appointed official, the MP distances himself from his institutional role.

Employing non-political identities and using an emotionally laden discourse to formulate standpoints can add dimension to the public image perception of an MP and help him/her build a credible ethos. Coming across as vulnerable and empathic, discussing the event from a personal standpoint allows the MP to generate positive reactions from the audience, by simply giving voice to their concerns and presenting their criticism in front of the Romanian Parliament.

5.4. Blaming Others

MPs can also bring into play attitude markers, with great effect, to *go on the offensive* by assigning blame to well-defined or ambiguously constructed *other* categories. In this case, MPs make "selective use of positive lexicals to accentuate better the positive traits attributed to the Self" (Tekin 2010, 159) and employ negative lexicals to define the opposing category. In some cases, MPs choose to criticise those holding

specific government functions, deemed culpable for the tragic outcome. In other cases, the attacks target the political party in power during the event.

The following excerpts support the claim that personal attacks can be indicative of inter-group conflicts (Wodak 2009). In examples (7) and (8), the political figures portrayed negatively belong to the Social Democratic Party, while the politicians accusing them are members of the National Liberal Party, their main political adversary. Hence, some strategies are directed against certain political figures, while some aim to discredit entire political groups. Thus, an event of high emotional charge for the Romanian electorate (and for the Romanian citizens as a whole) can be *politicised* with the purpose of tarnishing the public image of political counterparts.

This can be seen in an attack strategy directed at Victor Ponta, Romania's former Prime Minister, who tendered his resignation following the *Colectiv* street protests:

> (7) După ce a pierdut mandatul de președinte al PSD, deținut încă din februarie 2010, Victor Ponta a anunțat ieri că își depune și mandatul de premier, după ce peste 25.000 de oameni au protestat în București, *cerând demisia responsabililor pentru tragedia din Clubul Colectiv*. Acesta este finalul carierei politice a lui Victor Ponta. *Luna noiembrie se pare că nu-i priește premierului Victor Ponta.* (Gheorghe Dragomir, National Liberal Party, oral statement, CD, 5.11.2015)
>
> Having lost his position as president of the SDP[3], which he had held since February 2010, Victor Ponta announced yesterday that he is also resigning as Prime Minister, after more than 25,000 people protested in Bucharest, *demanding the resignation of those responsible for the tragedy of the Colectiv Club*. This is the end of Victor Ponta's political career. *November does not seem to suit Prime Minister Victor Ponta.*

In example (7), the MP makes a logical correlation between the actions of the politician and the reasons behind them, by implying that the former Prime Minister's decision of stepping down from his position was imposed by the collective voice of the protesters who asked for the resignation of the Government. This might further imply that the actions of the former Prime Minister are an expression of guilt.

Projecting the image of the former Prime Minister is achieved by an ironic remark: *luna noiembrie se pare că nu-i priește* ("November does not seem to suit him"), formulated as a conclusion following the aftermath of the *Colectiv* tragedy. The MP mentions Victor Ponta's failures, such as

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[3] The Social Democratic Party.

the loss of his leadership position within the SDP and his resignation as
Prime Minister following the street protests, and concludes that these
encompass "the end of Victor Ponta's political career" (*finalul carierei
politice a lui Victor Ponta*). By exemplifying some of the Prime Minister's
shortcomings as a politician, such as the loss of political power and the
implicit expression of guilt, the MP projects the image of his political
antagonist as an inefficient politician and suggests that these events will
result in the end of his political career.

    In example (8), personal attacks are also directed against two Health
Ministers of Romania, who are criticised for how they dealt with the
aftermath of the fire and for the lack of improvement to the Romanian
healthcare system.

> (8) O spun cu toată răspunderea – doamna ministru Sorina Pintea este la
> fel de *indolentă* şi *ineficientă precum colegul său*, *ministrul care a
> refuzat ajutorul extern şi astfel a condamnat la moarte zeci de oameni*,
> Nicu Bănicioiu – realitatea este tristă, *asistăm la o batjocură fără
> margini la adresa cetăţeanului român*, o *incompetenţă ce frizează
> bunul-simţ.* (Costel Alexe, National Liberal Party, oral statement, CD,
> 31.10. 2018)
>
> [I] say it with the utmost responsibility – Minister Sorina Pintea is as
> *indolent and inefficient as her colleague,* Nicu Bănicioiu, *the Minister
> who refused foreign help and thus sentenced dozens of people to death –*,
> it is a sad reality, [*we*] *are witnessing a boundless mockery at the
> expense of the Romanian citizen, a degree of incompetence that derides
> common sense.*

The MP describes the Health Minister (in office at the time) as *indolentă*
("indolent") and *ineficientă* ("inefficient"), and compares her with the
former Health Minister (in office during the *Colectiv* fire), whose
decisions are characterised as having "sentenced dozens of people to
death" (*a condamnat la moarte zeci de oameni*). The speaker comments on
the ethos of both politicians and regards their actions as a blatant display
of their contempt towards the Romanian citizens: "asistăm la o *batjocură
fără margini la adresa cetăţeanului român*, o incompetenţă ce frizează
bunul-simţ" ("we are witnessing *a boundless mockery at the expense of the
Romanian citizen*, an incompetence that derides common sense"). The MP
connects the negative implications of the event to the present and
questions the competence of both ministers. This can be seen as a negative
image-building strategy, chosen against the two political figures and their
political party, the Social Democratic Party. The *Colectiv* event, associated
with the wrongdoings or inefficiency of those in power at the time, is also

linked to the present actions of the Health Minister. In this oral statement, the MP emphasises the inaction of the Social Democratic Party (and their appointees), by mentioning the lack of measures taken after the event. The end result of the party's involvement (or lack thereof) can be seen as a form of mockery at the expense of the Romanian people.

Discrediting the image of political members in positions of power can also tarnish the party's image as a whole. Given this, MPs can exploit individual vulnerabilities. They can make claims or otherwise suggest to the audience that these particular examples are, in fact, representative of the entire group(s) targeted through discourse. These examples further suggest that the topic of the *Colectiv* nightclub fire can be *politicised* and integrated into attack strategies directed towards a political party and subsequent members, years after the incident unfolded.

Similar implicit strategies of attack against the ruling political party can be found in the following example:

(9) Au trecut trei ani de la dezastrul *Colectiv*, dar *în România, gestionată de PSD, încă se moare cu zile din cauza incompetenţei şi birocraţiei. Ocupaţi doar să-l salveze pe Dragnea de puşcărie, PSD-iştii au arătat că n-au învăţat nimic din această tragedie.* În continuare locaţii publice funcţionează fără autorizaţii de incendiu, în continuare lipsesc clinicile specializate în tratamentul arşilor, în continuare se moare mai mult din cauza infecţiilor din spitale decât din cauza bolilor pentru care pacienţii ajung în spital. (Sorin-Ioan Bumb, National Liberal Party, written statement, CD, 14.10.2018)

Three years have passed since the *Colectiv* disaster, but *in Romania, managed by SDP, people are still dying before their time, due to incompetence and bureaucracy. Concerned only with saving Dragnea from jail, the Social Democrats showed that they have learned nothing from this tragedy.* Public businesses still operate without fire permits, clinics specialised in the treatment of burned people are still missing, deaths still occur from hospital infections rather than from the diseases that brought patients to the hospital in the first place.

The political party under attack is the Social Democratic Party, whose government resigned after *Colectiv*, and which returned to power in 2016. The MP launches an accusation by claiming that they are guilty for the untimely death of ordinary citizens, due to how they chose to govern the country. Causality is suggested by way of attitude markers introduced by the nouns *incompetenţă* ("incompetence") and *birocraţie* ("bureaucracy"), which are used to describe the SDP's actions. At first, the MP builds a negative image for the *other* group by questioning their competence. The

MP moves on to further discuss their moral character: *Ocupați doar să-l salveze pe Dragnea de pușcărie, PSD-iștii au arătat că n-au învățat nimic din această tragedie* ("Concerned only with saving Dragnea from jail, the Social Democrats showed that they have learned nothing from this tragedy"). To provide context, the statement refers to criminal investigation charges formulated against the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Liviu Dragnea, who was accused (at that time) of embezzlement and abuse of power and was later convicted and imprisoned for these crimes.

As seen in the example above, a list of anti-qualities is put forward to describe the SDP. Two events are brought forward together. Both of them are related to the party's actions and had generated significant blowback for the political party's public perception. In reference to this, the events led to the biggest protests in the country's post-communist history, as people challenged the actions, reasons, and integrity of the ruling party. Referencing the *Colectiv* incident might constitute proof for the party's skewed priorities. This is achieved by suggesting that the SDP's members are driven by personal goals and lack any general sympathy for those who are still losing their lives in Romanian hospitals, after years of inefficient governing. This is further suggested by an anaphora *în continuare* ("still"), employed to list all of the party's misdoings in conjunction with the 2015 tragedy.

The MP emphasises the poor policies and decisions taken during the *Colectiv* incident, and the general disinterest of the Social Democrats in improving the Romanian healthcare system. This is also evident in the next example, where the MP underlines the possibility that such events might reoccur in the future:

(10) Din totalul de 64 de decedați, jumătate dintre ei au pierdut lupta cu viața în săptămânile de după incendiu, din cauza complicațiilor și mai ales din cauza infrastructurii spitalicești de specialitate, care, în România este slab pregătită pentru a reacționa la astfel de tragedii. *Cu toate acestea, nu am văzut nicio măsură din partea Guvernului, din partea Ministerului Sănătății* care să prevadă investiții masive în clinicile de arși sau măcar să vedem un plan de investiții pe următorii ani în acest domeniu. Liniște la Guvern, liniște în ministere, *toată lumea parcă așteaptă, inconștientă, o nouă tragedie!* (Petru Movilă, The People's Movement Party, oral statement, CD, 19.09.2017)

Out of a total of 64 deceased, half of them lost their lives in the weeks after the fire, due to complications and especially due to the specialised hospital infrastructure, which in Romania is poorly equipped to deal with such tragedies. *However,* [*we*] *have not seen any measures from*

the Government, from the Ministry of Health to provide massive investment in burn clinics or to at least see an investment plan for the coming years in this area. Silence in the Government, silence in the ministries, *everyone seems to be waiting, heedlessly, for a new tragedy!*

The MP brings into discussion the death toll of the *Colectiv* fire and claims that half of the casualties resulted from deficient hospital infrastructure and proper mobilisation after the nightclub fire. Delivered approximately two years after the incident, the MP's discourse mentions the Government and Ministry of Health's policies and the lack of changes after the incident: *Cu toate acestea, nu am văzut nicio măsură din partea Guvernului, din partea Ministerului Sănătății* ("However, [we] have not seen any measures from the Government, from the Ministry of Health"). The MP employs an inclusive *we* to express dissatisfaction from a position that can be loosely interpreted. Through generalisation, the MP can invoke his role as a concerned citizen or speak as a politician on the other side of the fence. The adjective *inconștienți* ("heedless") further adds to the effect of the claim, and signals that not dealing with the issues and remaining silent shapes the possibility that such events might reoccur in the future: "Liniște la Guvern, liniște în ministere, toată lumea parcă așteaptă, *inconștientă*, o nouă tragedie!" ("Silence in the Government, silence in the ministries, everyone seems to be waiting, *heedlessly*, for a new tragedy"). The MP criticises the Government and subsequent ministries, unable to learn from the mistakes of the *Colectiv* fire.

6. Conclusion

The presence of attitude markers in parliamentary discourse on the topic of the *Colectiv* nightclub fire is indicative of various image-building strategies. As the analysis shows, MPs formulate a *base of defence* or choose to *go on the offensive* when approaching the topic in question. The excerpts under scrutiny revealed that MPs claim responsibility through inclusive remarks, express political accountability, criticise and assign blame to *others*, and invoke non-political identities to come across as deeply involved in the issue at hand.

When claiming responsibility, MPs underline the tragic dimensions of the event and express their involvement under collective affiliations. Rather than employing *self-referencing* remarks that could indicate one's political complicity, MPs choose to account for their actions through *group-referencing*. This can be further interpreted as a diffusion of

responsibility, allowing an MP to distance himself/herself from culpability by sharing the blame with various political factions and their members.

When expressing political accountability, various dissociative acts were prevalent. As the study shows, MPs *go on the defensive* to disavow their involvement and wrongdoings. At a linguistic level, this is achieved through attitude markers, as MPs use referential strategies to present themselves as bystanders, as individuals who stood on the sidelines when policies and actions were taken after the *Colectiv* incident. At the same time, MPs *go on the offensive* and link bad political decision-making with the *other* contextualised group. This further establishes a dichotomy between the MP and those invoked in discourse, where the former comes across as deeply preoccupied with the well-being of the electorate, while the latter are regarded as accountable for the event. From a rhetorical standpoint, the MPs' approach can be regarded as a strategy of building a credible ethos for the *in-group*, while putting the *out-group* in a negative light. Subjectively describing the event can have the effect of eliciting emotional responses from the audience, potentially adding force to the MP's claims, and further enhancing the negative perception of political opponents.

When invoking non-political identities, MPs distance themselves from their political affiliation by addressing the issue at hand as regular citizens, concerned with the country's future and well-being. Attitude markers allow MPs to establish a positive relationship with the electorate by projecting a credible ethos.

Invoking the identity of an ordinary citizen rather than a political representative of the electorate allows an MP to potentially appeal to the affective perception of the addressees. As such, the audience might associate the MPs actions with someone who is personally and emotionally invested in the issue.

When shifting blame, parliamentarians employ attack strategies to discredit political figures or to tarnish the image of the Social Democratic Party, in power during the nightclub fire. As shown in the examples, a highly emotionally charged event can be *politicised* and used, years after its occurrence, as a negative reminder of a party's political track record. In parliamentary discourse, the MPs brought into question various aspects related to the *Colectiv* incident: clubs operating without fire permits, unsanitary and poorly-equipped hospitals that added to the death toll, inefficiency and miscommunication when dealing with medical transfers, and lack of political reforms after the tragedy. These unfortunate and troublesome outcomes, contextualised subjectively, are formulated against various political counterparts by way of association. The *Colectiv* fire is

also correlated with morally questionable decisions taken by the SDP, scrutinised by public opinion, such as the party's support for their political leader (in connection to the 2017 criminal charges brought forward against the head of the party, Liviu Dragnea). From a rhetorical standpoint, referencing the 2015 nightclub fire is an appeal to pathos, as the instances of subjectivity that resulted in the process have the potential to further damage the image of the party. MPs use attitude stance to present aspects of a strong negative resonance for groups and/or individuals targeted in the speeches. At the same time, the incriminated political figures choose to distance from the event, shift the blame towards different representatives (and/or political factions), or attempt to build a credible ethos. Using *self-referencing* remarks and attitude markers can bring to light positive character traits, which can diminish the MP's publicly perceived culpability in the eyes of both audience members and MPs.

The analysis showed that MPs choose to claim responsibility through group identities, attempt to distance themselves from political accountability, and try to blame *others* in the process. Frequently, *going on the offensive* and defending their public image are interdependent, as one can be achieved by way of the other. The fragments chosen for the analysis revealed that MPs mainly prefer to launch attack strategies when discussing a tragic event. This might complement the process of positive image-building (as seen in sub-section **5.2.**) or be used to criticise political opponents and their affiliated groups (as seen in sub-section **5.4.**).

The present chapter brought to attention how the Colectiv fire was contextualised in parliamentary discourse and highlighted the diverse socio-political implications of the event in question. Its tragic dimension generated significant public backlash against the political ruling class. After the Romanian Revolution of 1989, no other incident had managed to unite a broader group of discontent citizens. The Colectiv tragedy encapsulates citizens' desire to advocate and fight for a better governed Romanian society, in order to ensure that a similar calamity would never happen again.

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CHAPTER FOUR

STANCETAKING IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE: STRATEGIC MANEUVERING WITH QUOTATION

ANCA GÂȚĂ

> …what is said by uttering a sentence depends upon, and can hardly be severed from, the speaker's publicly recognizable intentions. (Recanati 2004, 14)

1. Introduction

According to the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, which the present contribution uses as a comprehensive theoretical background, two natural tendencies are at work in argumentative discussions: one dialectical, another rhetorical. The tension between the arguer's intention to reasonably defend a standpoint and his/her efforts to win the discussion is managed by *strategic maneuvers* (van Eemeren 2010) consisting in choices of specific *argumentative moves*, particular ways of *adapting to audience demands*, and appropriate *linguistic devices of presentation of the argumentative moves*. This chapter explores how *quotation* is used as a *linguistic instrument* meant to shape an argumentative move by concomitantly serving as a *stancetaking* device. The term *quotation* is used throughout this chapter with a wider meaning, covering notionally almost all instances of reported discourse/speech, not only what is conventionally called quotes or quotations, where the exact wording of the initial utterance is preserved. Quotation is thus examined as a reporting speech act or action with respect to its capacity of allowing an arguer to engage more in the underlying argumentative process – thus illustrating stancetaking by the practice of an *engaged argumentative style* – or to detach himself from the argumentative

situation and even intention (and what has caused it) – thus illustrating a *detached argumentative style.* The notion of argumentative style has been recently introduced in pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2019) as a conceptual tool meant to refine the analytical notion of *strategic maneuvering*. Sections two and three of this chapter serve as a theoretical preamble to an analysis of discourse excerpts in which quotation is shown to contribute to strategic maneuvering by substituting for argumentative moves such as advancing a standpoint, establishing communion with the audience, and enhancing the arguer's ethos. The fourth section deals with manifestations of quotations in funeral speeches, seen both as a circumstance in which stancetaking is obviously engaging the speaker positively in arguing on human qualities and an opportunity for the speaker to voice his/her own representation of reality. One discourse fragment is a particular funeral speech that, in all likelihood, is not a genuine quote from that funeral speech, but rather a pseudo-quote, created by the historian to praise the character of the historical figure whom (s)he attributes the speech to. The analysis also considers some excerpts of discourse that use quotation or self-quotation in their various makeups with an argumentative aim.

2. The *Stance* Metaphor and *Stancetaking* in Discourse

The ordinary meaning of the word *stance*, "position", was slightly adapted by specialists in the fields of orthopedics and neurology to describe a (normal or abnormal) upright body posture[1]. The word started being used as a synonym for *attitude* in the sixties[2], allowing anglophone researchers in social sciences and the humanities to link it to a much more abstract representation whose sign it has become. In the social sciences, *stance* has slowly evolved into a term assigned to a dense, dynamic, and manifold complex notion associated with the study of reality, of which subjectivity and interactional activity are a part. The work of philosophers and cognitive scientists may have contributed to this. An example is Dennett's concept of *intentional stance* (1987), a development of the theory of intentionality in

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[1] For the ordinary meanings of the word *stance*, any good dictionary may be consulted. Kockelman (2004, 145, note 4) reminds that in the "most mundane sense" *stance* means "how a person's body is positioned when standing".

[2] According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the figurative meaning of the word *stance*, attested in the sixties and seventies, in collocations such as *pro-Soviet stance*, *moral stance*, *public stance*, corresponds to "an attitude adopted in relation to a particular object of contemplation; a policy", being also a synonym for *posture* with the same meaning. These lexicographic details may contribute to an understanding of the "metaphorical" representation of *stance* I am speaking about.

which belief, desire, expectation, and especially intention are brought to bear as essential categories describing and explaining behaviour. Although not directly linked to the development of the notion of *stance* in linguistics[3], the fortune of the term deploying further specialised abstract meanings may be presumed to have been fostered and enhanced by the metaphorical force it carries. A case in point is represented by van Fraassen's developments on *empirical stance* (2004).

By means of a rich category of analytical notions elaborated over the last decades, linguists have given an overview of, or described in detail how speakers voluntarily (pretend to) convey or hide information about their attitude or position with respect to particular aspects of the reality, among them interactions, their own person and actions, including linguistic, discursive activity. Linguistic analyses of the '80s (Biber and Finegan 1988, 1989a, 1989b) use the word *stance* metaphorically, as an umbrella term, so as to encompass an ever-growing number of language and discourse mechanisms, as reflected in the definition proposed below:

> By stance we mean the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message (Biber and Finegan 1989b, 91).

The term *stance*, as defined above, corresponds to what Bally (1944 [1932]) conceptualised in the first part of the twentieth century under the medieval philosophical notion of *modus*, as opposed to *dictum*[4]. Ducrot (1991) points to this kinship of ideas that also extends to the concepts of *illocutionary force* and *speech act* developed within early pragmatics. In fact, the lack of a corresponding term for *stance* in French is not an obstacle in dealing with the same phenomena discussed in the anglophone tradition under the umbrella term *stance*. The francophone tradition in linguistics has discussed *stance* phenomena by elaborating substantially on the notion of *modus*, on the one hand, and of *énonciation*, on the other, as an activity, an act or action, and its result. The notion of *polyphony*, reconstructed, revived, and reconsidered by Ducrot (1991)[5] from Bakhtin (1984 [1963])'s and Bally's

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[3] See the next sections of this study and the other chapters of the present volume, in line with a huge literature on *discourse stance*.

[4] That *modus* corresponds to *stance* is also apparent from the title and the content of Kärkkäinen (2003), *Epistemic Stance in English Conversation*, dealing with the expression of modality in interactional settings.

[5] In fact, Ducrot (1991) reminds of the notion of *polyphony* he had introduced in approaching discourse phenomena relying on linguistic analytical tools. In French linguistics and discourse approaches, other notions encompassing the same manifestations are *modalisation*, *modalité*, or *point de vue*.

(1944 [1932]) discourse perspectives on language, has been less used in anglophone studies, which, in my opinion, have yet to solve the problem of finding, inventing or devising conceptually acceptable equivalents for notions such as *énonciation*, and the distinction *dialogique* vs *dialogal* used in French literature on such topics.

   The analytical notion *stance*[6] would thus allow to pinpoint the ways in which a speaker of a given idiom may express his/her evaluation and grip on reality by using linguistic tools (see also Englebretson 2007, 15), among which modal expressions (verbs, adverbs, or adjectives), evidential strategies, etc. Extending their approach to a wide range of phenomena, Biber and Finegan also propose a taxonomy of twelve linguistic categories corresponding to attitude, in which "adjectival, verbal, and modal markers of stance"[7] (1989b, 91ff.) are included. In this context, it is quite natural that the term *stance* or *stancetaking* has acquired some notoriety as a kind of derived notion and starred in monograph titles[8], as is also the case of this chapter and volume.

   A more comprehensive definition of *stance*, which corresponds more closely to the notion of *stance* as dealt with within this chapter, is Kockelman's (2004), viewing the various categories of stance as

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[6] Bakhtin's view on polyphony and stance remains to this day the basic reference when approaching discourses where various speakers perform: "For the purposes of critical thought, Dostoevsky's work has been broken down into a series of disparate, contradictory philosophical stances, each defended by one or another character. Among these also figure, but in far from first place, the philosophical views of the author himself. For some scholars, Dostoevsky's voice merges with the voices of one or another of his characters; for others, it is a peculiar synthesis of all these ideological voices; for yet others, Dostoevsky's voice is simply drowned out by all those other voices" (1984 [1963], 1).

[7] Stance markers identified by Biber and Finegan (1989b, 91ff.) are: "(1) affect markers (adverbs, verbs, and adjectives); (2) certainty adverbs; (3) certainty verbs; (4) certainty adjectives; (5) doubt adverbs; (6) doubt verbs; (7) doubt adjectives; (8) hedges; (9) emphatics; (10) possibility modals; (11) necessity modals; and (12) predictive modals". The notional domain of stance has evolved considerably in the last thirty years, and the vast literature on linguistic or discourse stance is represented well enough that it need not be tackled here in detail. The stance categories identified by Biber and Finegan may have been thought to circumscribe the domain. In fact, the vast majority of discourse phenomena that have not yet found a proper treatment have been absorbed within this same domain. The very notion of *stance* – profitable to analysis and interpretation – is somehow weakened today by the very fact of accommodating "markers" of so many natures, some of which are grammatical categories, and by allowing such a permeability between discourse and language mechanisms, lexical-semantic, and morphosyntactic aspects.

[8] See Englebretson ed. 2007.

those semiotically indicated modes of evaluative and intentional commitment that speakers take toward states of affairs, from epistemic possibility and necessity to deontic permission and obligation, from fear and desire to memory and disgust (Kockelman 2004, 142–143).

This perspective on stance allows to consider both *first-order stances*, concerning states of affairs, and *metastances*, or *second-order stances*, i.e. stances about stances (Kockelman 2004, 143), by means of which moral and psychological attitudes are voiced. This is analytically relevant because both first-order and second-order stances may serve to instantiate all types of speech acts and result in indirect speech acts.

In all cases where *stance* is being dealt with in this chapter, the adopted perspective is strictly linguistic[9]. This explicit mention specifically targets the distinction between *stance* as *a discursive analytic notion* or *a textual category*, which is the concern of this volume, and *stance* as simply "attitude".

3. Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions

3.1. Maneuvering Strategically in Argumentation

Pragma-dialectics provides an ideal model of critical discussion with the purpose of providing heuristic tools for the analysis of discourse by the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation. This amounts to positing, for the sake of the analysis, that a discourse sequence is argumentative in that it advances a standpoint and defends it in order to conclude that the standpoint at stake may be accepted within a given context.

In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the notion of *strategic maneuvering* (van Eemeren 2010) is meant to capture analytically the arguer's efforts to build the strongest support of a standpoint in a particular communicative situation. A tension builds between the arguer's intention to reasonably defend his/her standpoint and his/her commitment to winning the discussion, i.e. gaining acceptance from the targeted audience. This is managed with some effort by *strategic maneuvers* meant to keep the right balance between the two natural tendencies, one dialectical, the other rhetorical. Strategic maneuvering consists in maintaining this balance by making choices with respect to every argumentative move. It

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[9] *Stance* is used in the present context as a term assigned to a notion, as in most of this volume, i.e. with the restrictive meaning it has been used in language sciences for about five decades.

manifests itself when the arguer chooses *particular argumentative moves from the topical potential available* at every stage of the argumentation process, opts for a specific kind of *adaptation to audience demands*, and selects *specific linguistic devices of presentation of argumentative moves*.

In line with the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, the analysis adopts the maximally argumentative interpretation strategy, which treats the discourse excerpted for analysis as having an argumentative intention and its various elements to have argumentative functions. Consequently, from an analytical perspective, a speech act may be considered to operate as an argumentative move, allowing a speaker to produce a particular stream of discourse in order to advance a standpoint and/or argumentation in its favour; in doing so, the speaker is ideally expected to provide premises for the unfolding argumentation, to answer critical questions, and possibly conclude successfully in favour of the *bien fondé* of his/her argument. Although these are not obvious discourse moves, argumentation analysts may reconstruct them as such, by considering the argumentative potential of discourse fragments and speech acts.

Maneuvering strategically in discourse with an argumentative component corresponds to the speaker's efforts of balancing his/her rational defence of his/her standpoint (dialectic concern) with a successful presentation, so as to win the point (rhetorical concern).

3.2. Levels and Design of the Analysis

As it is based on speech transcripts and written discourse, the present analysis does not take into account body language, paraverbal elements, and suprasegmental features of oral discourse, which may otherwise have a role in interpreting discourse stance. The written discourse segments are either meant to be pronounced as speeches on various occasions or simply written in a conversational mode, as if addressing a hearer *in praesentia* (e.g., blog articles). This characteristic of the excerpts under consideration is important because they are interactional only in part, i.e. they do not expect a reply and, consequently, are exempt from an immediate test of critical questions or being put to doubt.

The analysis is concerned with the identification of morphosyntactic, lexical-semantic, and stylistic choices, the selection of specific linguistic patterns, structures, and operations, in order to assess their impact on patterns of argumentation and rhetorical design in connection with stancetaking.

3.3. Reported Discourse, Quotation, and Stancetaking

Quotation is a notion pertaining to that of reported discourse, or reported speech, defined as "a report of something someone else has said before" (Golato 2002, 49). Clark and Gerrig (1990, 769) provide a more "philosophical" and more technical definition of quotation: "The prototypical quotation is a demonstration of what a person did in saying something".

This means that a quotation may *represent* (not simply mimic, repeat, or recall) the content and the form of an utterance, being also – somehow in the sense of speech act theory and intentionality – a way of describing *an action performed by the original speaker in using a particular utterance*. As highlighted by Tannen (1989), quoted by Maynard (1996, 208):

> 'reported speech' is a misnomer since it is not actually 'reported'. Instead what is generally meant by 'reported speech' is, in fact, spontaneous speech creatively constructed by the speaker at the time of talk. The overall effect of constructed dialogue, Tannen points out, creates 'involvement'.

This is why, in the analysis, the term *quotation* is preferred to that of *reported speech*, by extending the former's scope to all instances of presentation of some *other voice or discourse*. Authier-Revuz (2019) introduces the French *discours autre* to refer to the complex phenomenon of reported speech. The equivalent structure in English could be *other discourse*, which I will use only for immediate convenience, but also the syntagm *different/distinct discourse*. I would rather suggest and prefer *other voice*.

The "stance" adopted in this chapter with respect to quotation is similar to that on reported discourse, viewed as not simply "a grammatical topic", but rather as "an interactional and social phenomenon", since language fulfils interactional functions, allowing speakers and listeners to collaboratively construct context (Golato 2002, 49). As previously mentioned, the term *quotation* encompasses, in this chapter, all instances in which a speaker's utterance or discourse is specifically reported or, in some way, made reference to. In dealing with reported discourse and quotation, a series of terms are used:

- a *quotative* or a *quotative marker* is an expression – prototypically a predicative verb from the category *verba dicendi* – used to indicate that (a fragment of) an utterance involves reference to a speech event and to its content/substance (cf. also Robles 2015);
- a *quoter* is a speaker who quotes (Maynard 1996, 208);

– a *quotee* is a speaker whose utterance or words are quoted (Maynard 1996, 208);
– a *quotation strategy* is the particular way or device use (direct, indirect, or free indirect style) to present a quote, i.e. a fragment of *other discourse* in order to echo a "voice" (Maynard 1996, 208).
– a *quote/quotation* is either a reproduced utterance (prototypically in direct or indirect discourse) or a "reconstructed" thought (free indirect style, more appropriate in writing, especially in fiction or essays), including *self-quotation* (in which case the quotee and the quoter are physically one and the same entity, corresponding to *distinct voices*; in the wider discursive context, the quotee's "voice" has a particular function and plays a specific role in the initial speech context; the quoter's voice plays another role in the quoting context; Maynard 1996, 208).

3.3.1. Quoting in Direct Discourse – Direct Quotation

Direct quotation, as in (a) *He said: "I am tired"*, and example (2a) (see the table in section **4.1.** below) is also referred to as *direct speech* or *quoting in direct discourse*. It consists prototypically in reproducing *verbatim* some words or discourse fragments in written form, by indicating the quoted words or fragments with graphic symbols characterising most writing systems and alphabets – when there are no strictly linguistic devices (evidentials) to indicate the existence of some reported discourse instance –, and in oral form by using an intonation, a tone of the voice as close as possible to the original one.

The assumption Jacobson (2004, 2) departs from is that "when an author or speaker […] chooses to use direct discourse to report" someone's speech, "that choice will shape the rhetorical impact" of a particular text "differently than if the author had not used direct discourse". This is commonly shared by linguists, hermeneuts, text interpreters, discourse analysts, and, as it were, text or discourse practitioners.

3.3.2. Quoting in Indirect Discourse – Indirect Quotation

Indirect quotation, as in (b) *I'm asking you if he ever made it there* is usually referred to as *indirect speech* or *quoting in indirect discourse*. The main characteristics of this quote type are consistently dealt with in reference books, which usually insist on their most significant and salient

characteristics[10]. Example (b), a particular case of indirect quotation since the reporting agent is identical to the initial speaker, also points to some more delicate aspects of reported speech analysis.

Such an utterance appears, at first sight, to have been produced because the addressee did not hear or understand what the speaker originally uttered, or else pretended not to hear an utterance which he was not eager to take into account as one.

The reporting agent and the interlocutor are identical, respectively, to those of the initial utterance, as well as the utterance content, for some reason reproduced a second time. This impacts on the status of the speaker and/or of the hearer, and on the form of the utterance as well. At least for considerations of linguistic economy, the form is expected to be slightly different (also in point of intonation, tone of the voice, etc.).

Third, the *dicendi* verb *ask* is almost certainly an "innovation" of the same speaker with respect to making explicit the intention of the initial interrogative utterance, which could have been something like (b_1) *Did he get there?*, (b_2) *Hey, was he there?*, (b_3) *Was he there indeed?*, or even (b_4) *I imagine he never even got there, did he?* (falling intonation). If this were the case, then the way in which the initial question is reported by the same speaker somehow modifies the initial relationship between speaker, hearer, and even the content of the utterance, including the person referred to in it. Reformulating it as a question by means of an explicit performative verb *ask* is already a choice and a tool by means of which pressure is put on the interlocutor. A kind of discourse rule or model process could be provisionally extracted/deduced from here, which takes into account all the relevant elements in the example.

The speaker's decision to re-perform the same speech act under exactly the same circumstances (usually with some distancing in time and/or space) corresponds to an indirect (self-)quotation.

It may result from an initial failure of the first performance, whatever the reason.

Making the illocutionary force of a previously performed speech act explicit in similar conditions (by indirect quotation) ensures a greater chance of success, but also shows the speaker's interest in:

i.   achieving his/her initially intended goal;
ii.   reaffirming his/her presence as initiator of a linguistic exchange in relationship with the hearer (who is put under pressure);
iii. a particular content element;

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[10] Such characteristics may be summarised as the adjustment of "the original utterance's indexicals to the reporting context" (Maier 2009, 134).

iv. a particular relationship with the initial speech act performed and the epistemic attitude attached to the utterance.

The falling intonation in (b₄), presumably interpretable as an epistemic mark of certainty ("almost/pretty certain"), acknowledges to a degree that an answer from the hearer is not needed. However, it is reconsidered and remodelled in reported speech in (b), by deletion of the initial mark of "certainty" and the explicit performative *ask* expressing the epistemic value "not very certain".

This particular case is meant to show that reporting in indirect discourse in the first person (self-quotation cases) may reveal a particular stance towards the addressee, who – from the naming of the speech act – appears not to have granted interest to the initial question or to the speaker.

In an actional framework, reported speech utterances are *assertive speech acts*, of the form *X said x*. In a previous version of his speech act taxonomy, reconsidering Austin's expositives and verdictives classes, Searle (1979) brings (most of) them together under the general class of the *representatives*, which he later calls *assertives* and defines as such:

> The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is *to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition* (Searle 1979, 12 ff.; my italics).

My italics concern an important aspect of assertive speech act performance: even when speakers "report" by announcing, predicting, or prophesying utterances to be produced in the future or evoked as belonging to a possible past, present, or future world (as hypothetically produced utterances, with zero speaker commitment to truth), the assertive act of reporting *still takes place*, is confronted with reality and subsequently assessed as having *true* or *false* content, being sincere or invalid and void of meaning.

3.3.3. Free Indirect Style

Free indirect style differs completely from the previous two categories of quotation, to the point that it is even difficult to term it *quotation*. It does not necessarily rely on an actual speech act, being a discourse strategy specialised in giving access to a reflexive agent's thoughts. Usually presented in literature as specific to fiction, it may be also encountered in journalistic discourse.

A distinction can be made between quotation used to demonstrate an epistemic stance, like in academic, scientific, or historical discourse, and

free indirect style used not to precisely demonstrate, but to attribute a particular line of thought to an individual or to a(n) acting voice.

4. Quoting Strategies in Argumentation and Stancetaking

4.1. Speech Act Reporting / Reporting Illocutionary Force

Direct and indirect discourse are forms or categories of reported speech, by means of which a speech act is reported. In some cases, a speaker may, for various reasons, choose a descriptive, encapsulating *verbum dicendi* to point to the illocutionary force of an utterance or the speech act (to be) performed, as in *I **congratulated** him on his success*. In such a case, the *verbatim* element is missing, which may lead to the conclusion that it is neither mandatory nor essential to reporting, and the specific speech act or the illocutionary force is the main concern. However, the speech act or, more precisely, the illocutionary force of the utterance is made explicit, otherwise the reporting action/act/activity is void – is not operative. If, for methodological reasons and for simplicity, school and foreign language textbooks are entitled to use the term *reported speech*, I deem it more adequate, in discourse analysis, to refer to the two kinds of quotation discussed above as *reporting a speech act*, or *speech act reporting*. This allows them to be treated under the same umbrella (varieties of direct and indirect reported speech), plus subtypes and mixed types, as well as condensed or summarising reporting activities, which could be termed *reporting illocutionary force*.

Reporting only illocutionary force is tantamount to disregarding the propositional content and the form in which it is brought about. This is the case in (1):

(1) In my inaugural address to the American People, I *pledged* to strengthen America's oldest friendships, and to build new partnerships in pursuit of peace. I also *promised* that America will not seek to impose our way of life on others, but to outstretch our hands in the spirit of cooperation and trust (Trump SA).

A *macro reporting speech act* is performed by an utterance or a series of utterances reporting *several utterances*, each performing a speech act.

E.g., *I promise to be there at noon. I assure you I won't be late any minute.*
macro reporting speech act:
Version A. *He promised to be there at noon. He said he would not be late.*
Version B. *He promised to be there on time/with no delay.*

While version A may be said to consist of two utterances[11], an identical or a different illocutionary force corresponding to each, version B appears to be the more natural one, synthesising the content of the two initial utterances and the illocutionary forces to what is communicatively essential.

The dependence of the quote (the exact discourse fragment that is being recalled and reproduced) and of the quotation (the act of reproducing someone's actual or imaginary words or utterance) from the context must also be taken into account: "when a speaker designs a quote it is the local context that is relevant to the speaker who is quoting, not the distant context in which the original discourse occurred" (Golato 2002, 64).

In a journalistic report on the portal *politico.eu*, aimed at a comparison between Donald Trump's (2017) and Joe Biden's (2021) inaugural addresses as U.S. Presidents, the authors use several types of reporting/ quotation strategies with the intention of substantiating their findings with probative evidence, a practice similar to those of an academic or scientific nature, which allows one to note that most direct quotations support other quotation strategies[12] (see infra the table):

> (2) Biden *spoke repeatedly about the pandemic* (c), *warning that* (b) the
>   U.S. is "entering what may be the toughest and deadliest period of the
>   virus." (a) Trump obviously had no inkling of the COVID-19 crisis (d)
>   when he gave his speech four years ago, but he did still mention health
>   (c), saying the U.S. was (c) "ready … to free the Earth from the miseries
>   of disease" (a) (Biden vs Trump IA).

The requirement of objectivity in professional journalistic accounts, similar in this respect to that of scientific discourse, relies here on the strategy of direct quotation (a) to provide the addressee with maximum of assertivity and transfer information in the most reliable way, by repeating more or less verbatim the quotee's original piece of discourse. While Biber and Finegan (1988) point to six semantic categories of adverbials (see note 7, above), direct quotation may be designated a stancetaking strategy meant to support appearances of speaker honesty, so it may be seen as a certainty marker of stancetaking, translating into argumentative terms something like "I am advancing this in all certainty (and I also find support and assurance in what another has voiced)". Since the information might be verified at any later time by the addressee, it may be also considered a marker of actuality, i.e.

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[11] *I promise to be here at noon. I won't be late.*
[12] In example (2), I have inserted references to the reporting strategies: (a) for direct quotation, (b) for the interpretation of the original illocutionary force, (c) for resumptive quotation and hybrid quotation, and (d) for reporting illocutionary force.

the reported quote was actually performed – usually in a more or less remote past – in the particular context referred to. Getting back to argumentative styles and their relationship to the type of discourse/context they appear in, direct quotation strategies can be considered, in the precise context of the quoted editorial, indicators of an engaged argumentative style. This use and such a strategy can be also seen as an instance of stancetaking, of factual assessment of (factual) actions and behaviours, characteristic of an argumentative discourse in search of objectivity and sound support for a standpoint, while the quote and its content serve to meet the burden of proof, providing the addressee himself with the basic elements for decision making at the same time (cf. also Maier 2009).

(a) Direct quotation	the U.S. is "entering what may be the toughest and deadliest period of the virus." (2a) the U.S. was "ready … to free the Earth from the miseries of disease." (2a)
(a, b) supporting direct quotation by explicating original illocutionary force as interpreted by the quoter	*warning that* (b) the U.S. is "entering what may be the toughest and deadliest period of the virus." (2 b, a)
(c) resumptive quotation, summarising a discussion topic	he [Trump] did still mention health (2c)
(c) Hybrid quotation integrated to quoter's speech by *applying* indirect speech conventions (by sequencing tenses, e.g., *was*)	saying the U.S. was "ready … to free the Earth from the miseries of disease." (2c)
(d) reporting illocutionary force	I *pledged* to strengthen America's oldest friendships, and to build new partnerships in pursuit of peace. I also *promised* that America (1)

Table. *Reporting/Quotation strategies,*
with reference to examples (1) and (2)

4.2. Self-Quote

A self-quotation/-quote, or self-reporting, is a reporting speech act in which a speaker is quoting himself/herself, i.e. is producing a quote of his/her own

actual or imaginary words (pseudo/fake quote), by presumably rendering his/her own utterance(s) in direct or indirect speech (see also Golato 2002, 49–50 ff.). According to Macaulay (1987, 22), self-quotation allows "a kind of distancing" for the speaker to present oneself "as an actor in a scene". In discussing self-quotation, Jacobson (2004, 50–81) suggests the possibility of the speaker quoting "words spoken" in the past, in the present, in the future, in a possible world ("hypothetical words"). He also speaks of the "rhetorical function" of self-quotations (Jacobson 2004, 77–81). In quoting himself/herself, a speaker generally attempts to point to his/her own prior discourse (see previous example) by investing the quote with (re)new(ed) relevance and prioritising some formal/linguistic or content/meaning aspect of the quote with ethical significance, as for instance in manifesting his/her credibility by reminding the audience a fulfilled promise/obligation, etc. The self-quote may consist in reproducing the original statement verbatim or in summarising it, as in the previous example, by reminding only its illocutionary force. A special, somewhat marginal case of indirect self-quote is *denying to have advanced some statement.* Such a case occurs in the last utterance presented in the media excerpt below:

> (3) Two weeks ago, President Trump made news as he opened his daily coronavirus briefing: "We're going to put a hold on money spent to the [World Health Organization]," Trump said. "We're going to put a very powerful hold on it."
> But asked 17 minutes later whether the best time to freeze aid to the organization was during a global health pandemic, Trump falsely claimed he had not said what he clearly just said.
> "I mean, I'm not saying I'm going to do it, but we're going to look at it," Trump said (Trump, WP).

These strategies or make-ups of the quotation act(ion) are mainly used to support the journalists' standpoint, i.e. in the editorial from which example (2) is excerpted, that there are specific similarities and differences between the two speeches. Given the context, the quotes may simply be seen as examples supporting a standpoint by symptomatic argumentation or as warrant/burden of proof. However, for this very reason, they may also be regarded as indicating an engaged argumentative style, adopted by the authors to allow the reader to consider the speeches of the two presidents and their resemblance more closely. When the particular wording was considered to have no impact on the force of the argument, the authors appear to favour summarising the original speech – this is what I termed above *resumptive quotation,* a strategy that may often be adopted, for instance, in academic or scientific discourse (e.g., state-of-the-art section of academic studies, such as PhD or master dissertations, scientific articles

publicising research findings, etc.). I am advancing the idea that, in either case, the quote, whether resumptive or in full form, indicates that the speaker/arguer strongly maintains a standpoint, with quotes serving as *onus probandi* and contributing to stancetaking affirmatively, clearly pleading for the certainty of the advanced ideas. In the same way, one may consider that explicitating the original illocutionary force in the quoter's interpretation (a warning in (2)b) is meant to address the audience's most vivid expectations by strengthening not only the authors' argument, but also by reconnecting the topic of the editorial to a preoccupation of the greatest concern at the time of publication: the evolution of the SARS-COV2 pandemic.

4.3. Pseudoquotation

Pseudoquotation (see also Dubois 1989) is a strategy by means of which a speaker attributes utterances to another speaker (including oneself at some other moment and/or place, i.e. *self-pseudoquotation*) by pretending to report an utterance that is not an actual quote[13]. The speaker using pseudoquotation makes it somehow clear that what (s)he presents as a quote is not one: the content of the quote is "abusively" created by the very utterance of the pseudo reported discourse, yet presented transparently in the process as "staged".

For the sake of the present analysis, I distinguish between the following categories of pseudoquotation, while making use of the more convenient terms *pseudoquote*[14] and *quote*:

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[13] Narrower meanings of the terms *pseudoquotation* and *pseudoquote* are not used in the current study, being irrelevant for the proposed argumentative analysis. For instance, *pseudoquote* (Moss 1986, 23–24) refers to the action of "taking over", "speaking for" a patient when, during an intervention, a psychoanalyst uses the pronoun 'I' instead of the patient, "as though he were, for the moment, the voice of the patient", like in the following analyst's utterance (addressing the patient): "…what you hear yourself saying is, uh, there's a place *for me* and *I'm managing* very well. *I'm throwing myself* into things and enjoying it. […] so it *makes me tired*, so who cares, you know? […] *I'm still enjoying* it anyway. […] And uh, *I'm not really missing* uh B. particularly ...*I understand how she's missing me*, but *I don't feel I'm missing her that much – I'm all involved and I have, my life is all filled up*" (Moss 1986, 30) (my italics, A.G., for pseudoquotes in the first person).

[14] Again, for simplicity reasons, the term *pseudoquote* may be replaced by *quote* in *adapted pseudoquote* and *invented pseudoquote*, since *adapted* and *invented* sound partially pleonastic along with *pseudo-*.

a) *adapted (pseudo)quote* = an utterance in which some aphoristic quote is modified, altered, so as to fit a particular communicative situation;

b) *invented (pseudo)quote* in direct/indirect/free indirect speech (A said: "…"/that…, while A has not actually uttered these words nor produced the utterance);

c) *self-pseudoquote* (Dubois 1989, 349) in direct/indirect speech.

4.3.1. Adapted Quote

I define *adapted (pseudo)quote*, or *pseudoquote by adaptation*, as the use of some easily recognisable phrase, an aphorism, a literary formula, a slogan, or a popular saying within a specific cultural (communicative) context, in identical form with the original or partially modified. The analytic literature abounds in such examples. In the Romanian public sphere, a slogan may be reiterated on various occasions, relying on the following initial "utterance":

(4) Moldova n-a fost a strămoşilor mei, n-a fost a mea şi nu e a voastră, ci a urmaşilor voştri, şi a urmaşilor urmaşilor voştri în veacul vecilor... (Ştefănescu Delavrancea, *Apus de soare*, 1909)

Moldavia did not belong to my ancestors; it belongs neither to me nor to my heirs – it belongs aye to your heirs and your heirs' heirs… (my translation – A.G.).

Excerpted from a Romanian drama inspired by national history, this reply is easily recognisable by some of the Romanians having lived during communism, when it was constantly taught in school, and also quoted on various occasions, either for reinforcement purposes in some official contexts or somehow ironically in ordinary conversations. Recalling it is an easy task, given its intrinsic rhetorical qualities, and its fit with the ideological revival of historical characters turned into national heroes[15] during communism.

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[15] For the connection between history, legend, and literature, in the case of the Moldavian governing prince Stephen the Great, see Mănicuţă (2004, 85), whose study gives an idea of the way historical truth was reflected in Romanian literary creation – poetry, fiction, or drama. Romanian literature evolved quite late, its evolution in the nineteenth century being simultaneous with a series of historical events that contributed to national emancipation (the 1821 and 1848 revolutionary movements, the outcome of the Independence War, 1877–1878). In my opinion, this may partially explain why, besides the romantic literary fashion of the time, the few

In example (5), produced in the public sphere as title of a blog article, the author makes use of an adapted quote criticising the Romanian Government (RGvt, from now on) for their lack of strategy in managing the road infrastructure. The adapted quote preserves intact the latter part of the original:

(5) Autostrăzile astea le veți plăti voi, și *urmașii voștri, și urmașii urmașilor voștri, în veacul vecilor*! (Glăvan 2013)
You are going to pay for these highways, and so will *aye your heirs and your heirs' heirs*!

The author addresses potentially a large audience, the Romanian citizens, by predicting a state of things extending in the future over an indefinite period of time. It also indirectly addresses the RGvt, as the final part of the article explicitly shows[16]. From the basic illocutionary force of prediction, a derived illocutionary force materialises in warning both the citizens and the RGvt about the negative consequences of a dissatisfactory or suboptimal political action (investing in highways vs in quality national roads). This is meant to achieve a perlocutionary effect of dissuasion of the RGvt's policy.

The use of this pseudoquote by adaptation allows the speaker to take an epistemic stance of certainty with respect to future events, which are introduced as part of an *argumentum ad consequentiam*, i.e. "if the RGvt builds highways to the detriment of national roads, you will pay them forever (and will be able to use neither on account of their poor quality)".

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writers of the time preferred national themes. The imaginary deeds and discourses performed by the heroes of this literature replaced history for both the poor or uneducated people and for members of the political class. This glorification of the remote past – not able to compete with the present anymore – was also practiced during communism for pragmatic reasons. It contributed to establishing a tradition of pompous glorification of the past in the Romanian public space, which has persisted for various reasons to this day (cf. also Alexe 2020). Since fragments of literary origin are more present in the people's minds than memories of history lessons, it is easier to catch up the audience's attention by quoting some memorable clichés. History magazines point to clichés in the Romanian (and Moldavian) cultural space, such as the quote mentioned above (see, for instance, Plăiașu and Pâslariuc 2020).

[16] "Cel mai probabil, genul de abordare realistă a problemei sugerată de acest articol va fi respins și construcția autostrăzilor va continua. Fiecare dintre noi vom plăti prin taxe cu vârf și îndesat, apoi unii dintre noi vor alege să circule tot pe DN" ("Most likely, the kind of realistic approach to this issue suggested by this article will be disconsidered, and highway building will continue. Each of us will pay heaps and loads of taxes, then some of us will still choose to drive on national roads") (Glăvan 2013).

The pseudoquote innovates morphosyntactically, semantically, and pragmatically by a rhetorical addition, the auxiliary verb *will*, so as to refer to the future as predicted based on calculus and financial scientific measurements: the epistemic stance is set from the beginning by pointing to a future event whose certainty cannot be better estimated other than by financial formulae.

The "pure quote" element in the adapted quote may simply enhance "the ongoing argumentation" (Weiss 2016, 187); if this is so, and if the properties of the part are translated to the whole, the adapted quote becomes rather superfluous, and has no particular influence on the argumentation; if not, then the adapted quote becomes an additional element in the argumentation, its function being pragma-stylistic and rhetorical since it implicitly evokes an authority recognised by the doxa. The adapted quote in (5) may be more effective rhetorically since the original quote is easy to reconstruct. The ethos of the speaker is concomitantly enhanced through at least three outcomes of the very rhetorical effectiveness: 1) the speaker may be credited with supporting national values and thus be assigned a place in a long line of predecessors acting as patriots, at least by the words if not by the deeds; 2) quoting a classic phrase makes him appear educated, well-read, witty; 3) the cliché is apparently avoided because of both the general interest of the issue he addresses (the lack of highways or quick and safe roads in Romania) and the irony resulting from the reverted global meaning of the original quote: while Stephen the Great was presumed to protect the legacy to be passed on by Moldavians to their heirs, Romania's citizens are in the position of bequeathing the future generations huge debts caused by inappropriate strategies and political decisions of building unnecessary infrastructure.

The title of a political statement in the Deputy Chamber in the Romanian Parliament in (6) could be intended to evoke the same cliché-quote, although in a less obvious way. If this is the case and the speaker's intention is to use the cliché rhetorically, the linguistic pattern of the original quote is reversed, with an affirmative statement in the first part and a negative one in the latter, to attack the political opponent:

> (6) Guvernul României este al fiecărui român, nu al candidatului Iohannis (Cojocaru, 4.09.2019, written[17])

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[17] As a rule, the Deputies' political statements are deposed in written form with the Chamber's Secretariat. Most of them are read/pronounced in front of the audience, but for particular reasons, a deputy may sometimes not (be able to) read his/her statement. For the examples of the type "political statement", mention is made if it was available only in written form.

> Government belongs to every Romanian, not to the candidate Iohannis.

Like the original, the pseudoquote is based, in this case, on an opposition between the Social Democratic government and the National Liberals' candidate for the Romanian Presidency, the President-elect, Klaus Iohannis.

4.3.2. Invented (pseudo)quote

The excerpt below displays several metacommunicative elements among which an imaginary quotation, marked as such by quote marks:

(7) Dacă îndrăznești să deschizi discuția despre durata lor de amortizare, vei fi imediat catalogat drept înapoiat, pentru că „*nu are sens să ne gândim în cât timp se amortizează autostrada"*, ea este… scuzați expresia, un bun public. (Glăvan 2013)

If you dare open a discussion about their amortisation period, you will, without delay, be labelled retrograde, since *"it is pointless to think of how long it takes for a highway to yield a return"*, it is … if I may, a public asset [emphasis mine – A.G.].

The larger context this fragment is excerpted from is a financial and economic blog. In this article, the blog's author, an academic in the field of finance and economy at a Romanian university, acts as a protagonist in a difference of opinion, advancing the standpoint that building highways in Romania is, on the whole, a faulty strategy. Throughout most of the article, he adopts a detached, scientific stance, making use of scientific arguments and aiming at a "virtual" resolution of the no less virtual difference of opinion between him and the Romanian Government. The italicised quote in (7) appears, or is presented, as the Government's comment concerning the protagonist's standpoint. By "inventing" this argument – which can also become a standpoint on its own in the argumentative discussion – and assigning it to the government, the speaker is easing the way for a counter-argument in his own specialty: finances. The italicised quote has also the purpose of presenting the government as virtually unwilling to have a discussion on the topic, by discrediting the topic (*it is pointless*) and thus limiting in this way the protagonist's freedom of approaching the topic by submitting it to a critical examination.

In what follows, I show that pseudoquotation may involve some rhetorical gain, by leaving the argument unchanged while moving the attention of the audience towards the stylistic contribution of the "quote" and to its content. Another gain comes from the speaker's pretended authority which (s)he shows off: (s)he appears as an omniscient character,

capable of finding, storing, and remembering an indefinite number of utterances virtually belonging to as many other speakers as possible.

4.4. Stancetaking with Quotation in Funeral Orations

Funeral orations have been seen as instances of the political genre (Williams 2018), which allows their interpretation from the perspective of rhetoric, argumentation, and discourse analysis.

In 431 BC, during a traditional ceremony at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, Pericles allegedly pronounced a "formal public eulogy" to honour the dead, who had heroically defended their land. This famous panegyric, known as "Pericles' Funeral Oration", which often serves as example of an exceptionally well achieved rhetorical and political speech, is quoted by Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. However, some historians maintain that this text was crafted by Thucydides himself and included in his *History*, long after Pericles' death, with the intention of restoring both Pericles' political image and the citizens' belief in the Athenian superiority over Sparta and other threats; controversies between historians and/or philologists concerning the originality or authorship of this speech also mention Pericles' wife as the composer of the text[18]. In spite of these conjectures and disagreements, the speech remains one of the master rhetorical discourses, regularly quoted for its force both by communicators and by public speaking trainers, and by researchers in social sciences. It has also become a model for modern orators on similar occasions and particular public events. On the other hand, Thucydides appears to have included a different speech from the one Pericles pronounced in his *History*. This is a *disguised*, *forged*, or *pseudo-quotation* (see also Moss 1986; Dubois 1989) meant to ensure Pericles' notoriety as a historical personality, to exhort Athens' citizens to continue on the same path, and allows Thucydides to present himself, the *History*'s author, as an authoritative historian. Like other speeches reported by Thucydides, Pericles' oration shows the historian's stance on the particular historical (and rhetorical) situation, while also exposing his "philosophy of rhetoric", i.e. "how discourse is utilised to mediate and frame military and social situations" (Banister 2015, 15):

> Thucydides' account of Pericles' speech reflects what Thucydides believed
> the situation demanded and the historian admits that even of the speeches he

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[18] For a summary of historical details, authorship theories, and the significance of this speech in rhetorical studies, see References section this chapter (Bosworth 2000; Asimopulos 2011; Samson 2011).

personally listened to, it was "difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory" (Thucy. 1.22) (Banister 2015, 27).

In 2018, during Republican Donald Trump's Presidency, the former Democratic US President Barack Obama pronounced a speech on the occasion of Senator John McCain's funeral, his 2008 Republican counter-candidate, who had himself asked Obama to deliver this eulogy in due time. Reportedly successful and "moving" for some, but "provocative", "controversial", and "quite disgusting" for others (Williams 2018), Obama's speech cannot pretend to absolute originality. Funeral speeches have been long considered by rhetoricians, communication analysts, and scholars in the humanities as belonging to the 2500-year-long tradition of "deeply political rhetorical genre" (Williams 2018), inaugurated by the Funeral Oration attributed by Thucydides to Pericles, but most likely devised by the historian himself to disguise his own admirative, confidence stance towards Athens's glorious past and heroism. A rhetorical device in former President Obama's above-mentioned eulogy is quotation. In (8a) a passage is quoted from Hemingway's *For Whom The Bell Tolls*[19]. In (8b) a repetition of the same quote is used towards the end of the eulogy. And a partial, or what could be called a "disguised", quote from Roosevelt's *Man in the Arena* Sorbonne address is also produced:

(8) a. Others this week and this morning have spoken to the depths of his [McCain's] torment, and the depths of his courage, there in the cells of Hanoi, when day after day, year after year, that youthful iron was tempered into steel. It brings to mind something that Hemingway wrote in the book that Meghan [McCain's daughter] referred to, *his favorite book*: *"Today is only one day in all the days that will ever be. But what will happen in all the other days that ever come can depend on what you do today"* […]. (Obama, 01.09.2018)

b. More than once during his career, John drew comparisons to Teddy Roosevelt. And I'm sure it's been noted that Roosevelt's "Man in the Arena" oration seems tailored to John. Most of you know it: *Roosevelt speaks of those who strive, who dare to do great things, who sometimes win and sometimes come up short, but always relish a good fight – a contrast to those cold, timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.* Isn't that the spirit we celebrate this week? That striving to be better, to do better, to be worthy of the great inheritance that our founders bestowed.
So much of our politics, our public life, our public discourse, can seem small and mean and petty, trafficking in bombast and insult, in phony

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[19] As mentioned in Meghan's (2018) eulogy. Meghan is McCain's daughter.

controversies and manufactured outrage. It's a politics that pretends to
be brave and tough, but in fact is born of fear.
John called on us to be bigger than that. He called on us to be better than
that.
*"Today is only one day in all the days that will ever be. But what will
happen in all the other days that will ever come can depend on what you
do today."*
What better way to honor John McCain's life of service than, as best we
can, follow his example? (Obama, 01.09.2018).

While quoting in academic discourse may have an informative, pedagogical
function, public speaking or political discourse are expected to use
quotation to give both credibility and engage the speaker with or against the
audience or a third party.

By positioning himself in line with Hemingway and Roosevelt[20], whom
he quotes, Obama is also *taking stance* with respect to his own framing of
particular actions and the personality he is evoking. In order to honour
McCain's memory, Obama (or his rhetor) chooses, with Hemingway,
Roosevelt, and also Meghan McCain, to point to the future, concentrating
less on the politician McCain's deeds and more on political actions to come
depending on everyone's involvement in public life. He makes the eulogy
sound more like part of a political campaign than recall McCain's
contribution to America's politics. By mentioning and explicitly or
implicitly quoting Hemingway and Roosevelt, Obama is also merging other
speakers' view into his own (*others this week and this morning*), aiming at
communion of thought and feeling with them, McCain's family, close
supporters, and with the larger audience.

As Williams (2018) reminds us, "for nearly 2500 years, funeral orations
have been used to influence public opinion and endorse political agendas",
so they are argumentative and not simply macro-expressive speech acts of
condolences. As was the case with Pericles' oration, when the speaker is a
political figure, (s)he may take the opportunity to direct the speech towards
future political action or one's own benefit, especially in terms of public

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[20] The part of the famous passage in *The Man in the Arena* speech quoted is: "The
credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust
and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and
again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does
actually strive to do the deeds; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great
devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end
the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while
daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who
neither know victory nor defeat" (Roosevelt, *Arena*).

image and representation. In some respects, doing politics today is being prepared for any internal or external threat to the state. During ancient wars, a funeral speech could be also used as a means of exhortation:

> The desire to inspire emulation in the audience is forefront in the mind of the funeral orator because he cannot make his primary purpose to recount events and actions, which the audience does not believe they can match, or the oration will create "envy" and "incredulity" in the listeners (Thucy. 2.35.2). In short, effective epideictic in war contexts must promote identification with both the acts being performed and the individuals who performed them (Banister 2015, 21).

This remark shows that, in political argument, communion with the audience is or should be sought by the speaker by evoking both representative characters and their deeds, including words or thoughts. Recalling such acts or individuals under a discursive form may involve quoting what such representative characters themselves have said, wanted to say, pretended to have said, or maintained about persons and actions. The fact that the quote from Hemingway is repeated verbatim, and twice present in the speech, should have some significance. Clark and Gerrig (1990, 794), for whom quotation is demonstration, point to the distinct functions of direct quotation, meant for the addressee to be "engrossed", i.e. transferred, in the quotee's world, which in this case appears to be not that of the author Hemingway, but that of his hero in *For Whom The Bell Tolls*. Robert Jordan admits sacrifice from the beginning of his mission, and the content of his thoughts is rendered in free indirect style. In it, the voice of an overarching character, an *alter ego* of the author or even of the reader/audience, may be heard. This layered experience of voices enhanced by Obama's repetition of the quote is supposed to "reenact" the "demonstrated" event, and give the larger audience (political supporters and opponents) the possibility of "reexperiencing" (Clark and Gerrig 1990, 794), on behalf of the character, a heroic deed. It is also significant that Obama recalls his former opponent's wish for him to pronounce a eulogy at the funeral.

In academic and scientific discourse, quotation works as an argument from authority, usually supporting the speaker's standpoint, by providing the audience good grounds for admitting a statement as valid, correct, or true and granting the speaker credibility. In political discourse, the function of quotation is to focus the audience's attention towards a particular line of action and simultaneously encouraging, exhorting them to act in a very specific manner, indicated either by the quotation or by some necessary deduction resulting from the quote contents.

Both Thucydides' quote of Pericles' funeral oration for the war victims and Obama's eulogy for McCain are instrumental, along with other rhetorical devices, in presenting the quotee (original speaker) and the quoter as engaged with a particular idea, creed, or action, which is illustrative of an engaged argumentative style.

5. Final Remarks

Quotation is seen in the present chapter as a complex interactional and rhetorical phenomenon, disguised in many forms, and occurring not only in conventionalised discourse, such as the academic and scientific genres, but also in public and, more specifically, political discourse. For instance, the editorial under discussion, by means of excerpts (2), by its topic and analytic concern may have a contribution in shaping political discourse by serving as an instrument with a normative component in public speech design. By examining several manifestations of quotation, the study offers proposals for possible categories of reported discourse to be taken into account for a taxonomy or an inventory of quotation strategies with impact on the argumentative style makeup. The analysis has had in view to identify formal and structural characteristics of quotations and to correlate these with their rhetorical function or role at the basic level of the utterance and at the superordinate level of a discourse fragment.

When a quotation was examined, a distinction was made between formal, structural, and content elements belonging to the quote (the repeated, or quoted, stream) and the same types of elements belonging to the quotation act.

In ordinary communicative situations a quote reviving a slogan may simply serve to make fun of someone or something in everyday contexts, with no historical or political allusion; an adapted pseudoquote of the original aphoristic quote, as in excerpt (4) above, may also serve to make reference to the quote itself, seen as a cliché.

Section four considers funeral speeches as an instance where the orator is given a heavy emotional task, mainly to evoke the personality of the deceased. Consequently, they are rather exemplary pieces of rhetoric, in which the speaker appears to favour evocations of others' discourses, which is the case in the last two examples under discussion. Although cultural traditions may differ in various respects, such speeches appear, as a general rule, to recall to the memory of the audience the positive actions of the person to whom they are dedicated. However, an interesting example in point is the first one, which is taken from a famous funeral oration, which commemorates the dead at war. Attributed to Pericles and quoted by

Thucydides in his *History,* the funeral oration might well be a pseudo-quotation, whose purpose might be not so much to restore the historical facts, but to plead in favour of Pericles' good nature. In other words, the quote is created by the quoter, being fake and allowing the quoter to take stance with respect to a character presented as a quotee in a deceiving manner. Although distinct from the following excerpts, which occasion real quotes, in the three cases quotation is instrumental for the speaker to take stance and use an engaged argumentative style.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE LAST CHRISTMAS.
STANCETAKING IN THE TRANSCRIPT
OF CEAUȘESCU'S POLITICAL TRIAL

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> In the dialogic shop of stances, there is a rule:
> If you take it, you own it.
> (Du Bois 2007, 173)

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the transcript of Ceaușescu's political trial drawing on the robust methodology provided by Du Bois' (2007) discourse-functional theory of stance. Du Bois opens his seminal study with a founding statement: "One of the most important things we do with words is take a stance" (Du Bois 2007, 139). The adapted reformulation of this statement sums up the controlling argument of the present study: *One of the most important things participants in Ceaușescu's trial do with words is take a stance.* The attempt to approach the trial proceedings as a fertile site for stancetaking produced in the unfolding development of the verbal interaction proves to be an interesting enterprise. As a key historical event, the trial was included in the narrativisations of the 1989 Romanian anti-communist revolution. It is incontestable that the trial was legally abused and politically instrumentalised for power legitimation. Scholars and observers of the trial have consequently produced a series of stigmatising conceptualisations of the summary trial as *a show*, *a farce*, *a masquerade*, *an obscene simulacrum*, *a melodramatic epic*, *a staged reality show*, *a fabricated media production*, *a legal disaster*, *a legal lynching*, *a felony through justice*, *a juridical circus or mini-extravaganza*. It is becoming increasingly difficult to de-familiarise these ossified labels and to shed new light on the material (the videotape and the journalistic transcriptions of the trial). The participants who took

part in the trial (the presiding judge, the prosecutor, the defence lawyers, and the defendants: the dictator Ceaușescu and his wife) were memorialised and vilified as *bad characters* unable to communicate coherently. Authors who took a closer look at the proceedings noticed that the trial was both a judicial failure and an interactional fiasco, "a shouting match of mutual incomprehension – a dialogue between the deaf" (Siani-Davies 2005, 139). The dictator was stigmatised as the theatrical commodity of the show trial, "an autistic individual, shut out in his [...] clichés" (Cesereanu 2009, 1). Du Bois' triangular model of stance offers the potential to revisit the trial as a stance-rich speech event and environment in which the co-participants are dynamically engaged in the joint achievement of stance construction. The interactional surface of the proceedings exhibits the adversarial action (the dialogue), while the socio-cognitive layer displays the pervasiveness of stancetaking mechanisms and strategies that are intersubjectively coordinated (the dialogicity). The predetermined verdict that vitiated the legally dysfunctional trial is a catalyst for the stancetakers' adaptive activity and for the stance exchanges emerging in the moment-to-moment production of turns. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to re-purpose and to de-politicise the transcript of the trial[1] and to present it as a valuable material that might inspire further interactional research.

The chapter is structured as follows: section **2.** contextualises the trial; section **3.** provides a presentation of Du Bois' theory of stance (2007) insisting on its conceptual framework; section **4.** accommodates Du Bois' stance model and examines the speaking subjects (**4.1.**), the stance objects, (**4.2.**), and the mechanisms and strategies of alignment (**4.3.**); section **5.** presents the conclusions of the chapter.

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[1] All the illustrative examples in this chapter have been checked in the available journalistic transcriptions, based on the videorecorded proceedings of the trial (Marcu 1991; Ardeleanu, Savaliuc, and Baiu 1996; Cartianu 2010). I have used Cartianu's (2010) clean verbatim transcription as a reference for being the most accurate. The journalistic transcription methodologically limits the analysis to the linguistic and discursive encoding of stance. An ideal multimodal transcription of the trial will allow the investigation of the "stancestacking" phenomena (Dancygier 2012), the multiple bodily articulators (co-speech behaviours) recruited in the expression of stance. Throughout the chapter, the examples are provided in the original language (Romanian), and then rendered into English. Identities of the speakers have been anonymised, with the exception of the Ceaușescu's.

2. Ceaușescu's Trial – Contextualisation

When studying Ceaușescu's trial, historians insisted on the predetermined verdict as the main flaw of this act of improper justice. Unlike Stalinist trials meticulously planned and staged as a *drama of didactic legality* (Vasiliev 2014, 337) in the communist Romania of the fifties, this political trial was conducted in extreme conditions that challenged both the accused (the dictatorial couple) and the legal professionals involved in carrying out justice[2]. This study emphasises the difficult task of participating in a trial under uncontrollable, unpredictable, improvised, and insecure circumstances. In such an environmental niche, verbal interaction becomes literally a battlefield. The very act of taking stance is not only expected, but it is also aggravated and tests the stancetakers' adaptive strategies and their "exceptional agility at managing the dialogic play of stance and counterstance" (Du Bois 2007, 171). For this particular trial, it is not only the pre-determined verdict that interferes with the participants' behaviour, actions, and decisions. The whole context of the 1989 anti-communist revolution, whose victory was uncertain at the very moment when the trial was taking place, is heavily loaded and marked by *exceptionality* and *urgency*. All the participants in the trial internalise the loaded circumstances from their perspective (according to the knowledge accessible to them) and they all approach their tasks under the pressure of undefined, ongoing events that literally threaten their lives, while forcing them to dramatically "shape and respond to the multiplex consequences which flow from [their] actions" (Du Bois 2007, 171). For all parties involved, to complete the assigned task of participation in such a trial required them to mobilise energies, knowledge, and abilities in a do-or-die situation, symbolically similar in its experiential intensity to an initiation on a road of trials[3].

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[2] With the exception of the prosecutor, none of the legal professionals knew that on Christmas Day 1989 they were brought to Târgoviște UM 01417 military base to put the dictator Ceaușescu and his wife on trial. They were vaguely informed about "some" terrorists' trial. Once they locally discovered their mission, they were instructed about the pre-established verdict (the death sentence), and also about the limited time afforded for the trial itself (no more than an hour).

[3] I refer here to Joseph Campbell's *Monomyth* (1972 [1949]). In this popular model for a mythical story or "thriller", the hero's journey approaches critical stages when the experience of trouble, obstacles, difficulties, adversities is totally beyond control. By choosing to enter the ordeal in the abyss and to reach the nadir (the ultimate point), the hero proves his/her willingness to let go of his/her old, un-evolved identity and to face the greatest challenge of his/her radical transformation. Analogically, the participants'

The legal professionals cannot be likened to actors in a predetermined show of justice. Their participation takes the form of a real task assigned via manipulation and forced exposure to action in deliberately unclear conditions. In no time, the makers of the trial are supposed to find a "working" identity for themselves, which requires them to strategically oscillate between their old, but stable institutionalised identity (the legal role), and their circumstantially unregulated and unstructured identity (the political role). The anomic circumstances of the event (the disintegrated order of the revolution) contribute to an atmosphere in which justice proves to be ostentatiously confused with revenge, while the institutional roles of legal professionals can be confused with revolutionary missions. In the absence of "normal" legal procedures, the only materiality of justice consists of talking – using words, language, and utterances that replace the proper criminal investigation. The analysts of legal discourse generally recognise the logocentrism of the courtroom proceedings (Bens 2018, 336), but, during the trial under examination, the institutional framework is suspended and the participants no longer have neither the constraints nor the protection of their rigid canonical roles, so the language loses its usual ritualistic predictiveness and emerges without any clear direction.

3. Revisiting the Trial – New Methodological Lens. Du Bois' Stance Triangle (2007)

Stance theories can methodologically facilitate the reinvention of the trial as an object of study. These theories, rooted in fields like sociology, anthropology, and discursive psychology, place stance at the heart of human interaction. Stance is developed in the socio-cognitive space created by verbal interaction (arising from it), and at the same time it is a property of verbal interaction (it is reified in it). In parallel with the production and the understanding of the talk-in-interaction, speakers simultaneously express their relationships with the other speaker/s, with the talk itself, with the topic or the object of the talk exchange. These relationships – subjective, objective, and intersubjective – are shaped by language, and they also shape language during the verbal interaction. More than this, these relationships are shifting and

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solid identities before the trial (Ceaușescu and his wife – the leaders of Romania; the members constituting the tribunal and the panel of judges – all experienced professionals) are forcefully tested and in danger to be disintegrated by an unclassifiable *trial.* By this analogy with the monomyth, the implication that the participants can be equated with heroes is acceptable if we think of the trial in terms of an experience of initiation.

intersubjectively negotiated by the speakers engaged in the here-and-now of the verbal interaction. Du Bois (2007) proposes a visual metaphor in order to organise his theory and to make it applicable and manageable. The equilateral triangle diagram shows both the key conceptual entities and the mechanism of stancetaking. The main idea of this geometrical choice is to symbolise the universality of stance (it is present in any verbal interaction or instance of language use) and its versatility. The two stance subjects and the stance shared object are placed in the corners of the triangle. The entities are inter-related, as shown by the three congruent sides of the triangle representing three relationships based on three acts: evaluation and positioning corresponds to the subject-object relationship, while alignment corresponds to the subject-subject relationship.

The main reason for choosing Du Bois' stance triangle for the study of Ceauşescu's trial lines in the way the model views the social dimension of stance as an act. The "sociality of stance" is fundamental to the theorist's definition of subjectivity and intersubjectivity from a socio-cognitive perspective. According to Du Bois, "even the mildest and most innocent utterance acts may activate the issue of stance alignment between dialogic participants" (2011, 55). In dialogic interaction, stance is "dynamically constituted by the participants", who invoke "a shared framework for co-action with others" (Du Bois 2007, 171). The weak understanding of stance as a social act concerns the impossibility of its being private, simply because stance "is something you do – something you take […] in the public arena" (Du Bois 2007, 171). The strong understanding of stance as socially relevant places the engagement presupposed by the stancetaking in the immediate reality where "consequences flow from our actions" and where the social actors take ownership and responsibility for their stance acts. Social actors play games in which they can exchange stances in a "combinatorial explosion of resonance relations" (Du Bois 2007, 172), but these games are neither gratuitous, nor suspended in a fictional void. Responsibility for the stance act "is serious business", ratified within the stancetaking community of discourse and counted "as negotiable coin in the currency of reported discourse" (Du Bois 2007, 173). This means that the community keeps a record of "who took which stance" (Du Bois 2007, 173). Stance narratives are characterised by social penetration, being open-ended in their social dissemination, and by durability, being remembered over time. The accountability of stance creates a resistant attachment between the stance act and the stance actor "with a name, a history, an identity" (Du Bois 2007, 173). In order to further alert the stancetakers to the severity of stance activities, Du Bois designs an explanation that juxtaposes the business analogy (*stance as business*, *stance as currency*) with the game analogy (*stancetakers as gamers*). We are notified that "as players in the

language-game of stance, we've all got some skin in the game" (Du Bois 2007, 173). Once we engage in acts of stance we actually play with sociocultural values that shape the life of a largely invisible community of discourse. Vigilance is required during this game in which we are advised to "know where the other players stand, who they stand with, and where they're headed" (Du Bois 2007, 173). The more sensitive side in the stancetaking game is the *howness* of the act, "how it is played, who plays well and fairly" (Du Bois 2007, 173). On the last wrapping up page of his study, Du Bois insists on leaving the readers with the take-home message that draws attention to "the force of social action" (2007, 174), particularly to the ambivalent social potential of stance – to construct and to destruct, to be dialogically created and to be individually owned. In the socially risky game of discourse (Du Bois, 2011, 63), the actors' identities can be scarred by "the sedimentations of co-opted intersubjectivity", by "the inscription of stances taken" (2011, 77). Du Bois' (2007) view on the social dimensions of stancetaking does not take into account a possible recycling or a revision of acts.

4. Accommodating Du Bois' Triangular Stance Model

4.1. The Speaking Subjects

The videorecorded material of the trial presents a limited number of people crammed together in a small garrison classroom, improvised as the place of the "ultimate lawlessness". The military establishment becomes the instrumental ground for authoritarian justice aimed at putting an end to the loyalists' fight for rescuing Ceaușescu, at directing the revolutionary events to a final victory, and at legitimising the new power. The typically controlled seating of a classroom with desks in rows is reorganised in a flexible arrangement with a new space syntax (Hillier 1996). The result of the conversion is an overcrowded courtroom. Without any rehearsal, the participants occupy their congested seats in a disciplinary manner: the two defendants are isolated in a corner in a "zero mobility" position (Popovici 2012, 97); two sides of the classroom are occupied by the panel of judges (five people) and, respectively, by the representatives of the people (five people); the two defence lawyers and the court reporter share a desk, while the prosecutor sits alone (most probably using the small teacher's desk). We cannot see the cameraman, who inserts himself in that place in the room allowing him to focus on the dictatorial couple, and the paratroopers, who obey the order to guard the door of the makeshift courtroom (one paratrooper from the inside, two others from the outside). The task assigned to the eighteen people in the room is to conduct a trial and to reach the

predetermined verdict within sixty minutes. The trial takes place literally behind closed doors. This was not the presiding judge's decision, but the general's strategy[4] to buffer the trial from any disruption that might compromise the event, and to maximise its security. The scarcity of the resources (place and time allocation) together with the difficulty of the task (the last-minute assignment with almost no preparation time) lead us to conceptually depict the situation in the Goffmanian terminology of "total institution" (Goffman 1961). The classroom in the garrison is like a prison where the defendants, the legal professionals, and the representatives of the new power are forced to cohabitate. For a limited amount of time, they share the same place controlled by the same impersonal and imperative authority of the revolution in whose service the trial takes place. The institutionalised pressure (a total institution) replaces the institutional setting (a regular trial courtroom) and triggers the participants' adaptively distorted approach to justice and truth.

What I have described so far portrays not only a physical layout, but the *rigid and fixed participation framework* of the trial that refers to the pre-established instances – the tribunal of the people, the court martial, and the panel of judges. This participation framework is observable from the exterior and does not point out the salient features of the participation dynamics. The trial is a climactic episode of the tele-revolution (Mustață 2012) and it maximises participation. A synthetic situation (Knorr Cetina 2009)[5] is created and attaches a participation extension to the trial. The courtroom has an extended territoriality (Knorr Cetina 2009, 63) in which synthetic participants emerge and upgrade the participation loop. The mediated massive participant called "the people" is connected to the event and changes the interactional order that is obviously detectable in the videorecorded trial. From this far-out mode, the complete picture of the participation framework subsumes the mediated response presence (Knorr Cetina 2009, 74) of a physically unseen interactive party. The tele-trial mobilises the people who distantly invade the courtroom through the portal of the video-camera and make the trial "witnessable" not through the co-present sight and hearing, but

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[4] General Stănculescu had the mission of organising the court and the firing squad for the execution. He had been the first Deputy Defence Minister under the communist regime and had helped the dictator and his wife escape by helicopter on December 22. During revolution he switched sides and became the new Minister of Defence.

[5] I adapt Knorr Cetina's definition of a synthetic situation: "an environment augmented and temporalized by fully or partially scoped components – in which we find ourselves in one another's and the scopic components' response presence, without needing to be in one another's physical presence" (Knorr Cetina 2009, 69).

through the mechanism of attentional integration, activated by "observation and projection" (Knorr Cetina 2009, 64). At the other end of the synthetic situation, the sequestered participants who are in the courtroom anticipate the delayed telepresence of the people (the awareness that the video footage of the trial will be broadcast later during the day) and rely on the people's scoped, augmented version. At the time when the trial takes place (it starts at approximately 1 PM) a situational hybrid is created. It joins, on the one hand, *the physical reality* of the garrison room at Târgoviște where eighteen enclosed individuals conduct a trial, and, on the other hand, *the synthetic scoped reality* that absorbs those millions of people for whom the political trial represents a crucial event of their lives, affiliated with the common destiny of the nation. They are at their homes sensorily attuned to the highly emotionally laden events coming into existence without a clear precise direction. The scoped tele-participants are physically distant, but at the same time cognitively and emotionally present in the event. They are not detached observers of the trial as they "may somatoviscerally, gesturally (motorically), and verbally" (Niedenthal 2007, apud Knorr Cetina 2009, 78) manifest themselves being plugged into the screen reality of the TVs, where they embody their temporalised participation in the trial, "thereby clarifying the situation to themselves and enhancing [their] response presence" (Knorr Cetina 2009, 78). The tele-participants keep their participative accreditation until the very end of the Romanian tele-revolution, the trial being the turning point in the unfolding of the revolutionary situation. The participation framework discussed so far is externally *pre-established* and is characterised by *fixity and rigidity*. It is also *situationally imposed* on both the participants placed in the courtroom, who cannot evade their assigned roles, and on the scoped synthetic participants, who are glued to their television sets. In the improvised courtroom, the physical arrangement coincides with the distribution of responsibilities and duties. The trial proceedings alter this participative structure.

The *participation status* represents the next level in the unpacking of the trial in its situational encounter. When participation is foregrounded as an analytic concept, the term refers to "actions demonstrating forms of involvement performed by parties within evolving structure of talk" and also to "the interactive work that hearers as well as speakers engage in" (Goodwin and Goodwin 2004, 222). In the case of Ceaușescu's trial, the understanding of involvement and engagement should operate with adapted typologies that construct the particular types of participants implicated in this exceptional speech event embedded in the 1989 revolution. The extended territoriality of the trial hosts a collective participation in a "national social gathering". Nobody can afford to disengage from the

emerging transformation of the political regime and from the nation's common course of action. No matter of their status in the "coordinated task activity" of the revolution, all the *participants* are *percipients* who share the same condition of being saliently connected to the event, and also the same propensity for recipiency. They might be communist party hardliners, reformers, terrorists, loyalists, Ceaușescu's extended family, civilians, demonstrators, ordinary people, or army officers. Irrespective of their attachments or ideologies, they are all ratified as participants, as they receive and perceive the event with a similar cognitive involvement, being in a constant state of alertness and in a mediated cognitive proximity to the garrison in Târgoviște. I have looked for "analytically coherent" categories (Goffman 1981, 129) that do not discriminate between the multiple participants' level of engagement. This goes against the standard analytical models of participation (Goffman 1981; Clark 1996; Goodwin 1999) that structurally differentiate between participants who engage/disengage, who attend/disattend, who are fully focused/partially focused, who are ratified/unratified at a particular moment of the talk as a situated action. I have identified three main categories of participants depending on the task responsibilities that they bear in the interactional format of the trial: A. *framers*, B. *players*, and C. *observers* (Scollon 1996)[6]. This *configuration* of the participation statuses de-emphasises hierarchies. The interactive positions are functional layers or dividers that are partially *established* during the trial to secure the court proceedings and to allow the trial to take place as a communicative event.

A. The *framers* of Ceaușescu's trial are a few members of the National Salvation Front, a group "endowed with a real political touch" and determined to get involved "in the organisation of the new power structure in order to avoid the extension of chaos in the country" (Scurtu 2010, 81). They are the ones who have decided the verdict of the trial in advance. It is also their decision to videorecord the trial and then to release it to the public. During the trial proceedings, they are under pressure in Bucharest and from

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[6] In order to avoid category proliferation and fragmentation (Goodwin and Goodwin 2004, 225), I have opted for Scollon's model of social-interactive roles or discourse identities "which are expected to be taken up by the participants [...] in a discourse system" (Scollon 1996, 1). There are asymmetrical rights and obligations associated to the statuses, but all participants should have their play in the social interaction and they collaborate in the production of the action. The *framers* have overriding rights to define communicative events; the *players* have focal attention upon maintaining the discourse; the *observers* neither define the events nor participate, but have heightened observational rights (Scollon 1996, 6–7).

time to time they manifest their mediated presence, calling the commander of the garrison on the phone and desperately asking for updates on the unfolding of the event. This amorphous entity of power aiming at political legitimation is represented in the Tribunal of the People by five members, one being the General in charge of the logistics of the trial and the execution. It is his decision not to interfere with the proceedings at all costs. Even if the representatives of the new power are physically present, they decline their right to an authorial voice, opting for a restrained scrutiny and surveillance that makes them look passive. The framers set the major task of the trial, but then retire from sight and delegate the authorship and principalship of the death sentence to the legal participants.

B. The *players* of the trial should have included all the members of the court martial, the panel of judges, and the defendants. The trial ends up with a minimal number of players who are ultimately unavoidable for the proceedings (the rest of those present displaying a silent and passive attendance). The trial is "talked into being" by a *trinity of players* who are forced to accomplish the institutional task and contextually shape and adapt its interactional organisation. The players' orientation to the institutional reality is founded on circumstances, this is why these participants literally play with their debilitated roles and responsibilities. The trinity of players interactively produce a configuration that includes three categories: 1. *the protagonist* (the presiding judge) and 2. *the antagonist* (defendant Ceaușescu Nicolae), who transform the interaction in a stance battlefield in which two opposing forces struggle: the stance setter (the presiding judge) against the (counter)stance instigator (the defendant); 3. *the deuteragonists* or *the secondary main participants* (allies or peers) are the defence lawyers, the prosecutor, on the one hand, and the other defendant (the dictator's wife), on the other hand. All the participants in this trinity of players become the speaking subjects who both co-create and confront themselves with the interactional dynamics of the trial. There is another category of *peripheral participants* who can be added to the trinity of players – *the side players*, who are situated in a shadow: the court reporter, whose job in the trial is to write everything out by hand, and the cameraman, who is ordered to record the trial focusing on the dictatorial couple, therefore he is subordinated to the framers of the trial, as well. In contrast with all the other players/*speaking* subjects, the cameraman can be considered a *viewing* subject of the trial. During the trial proceedings, Ceaușescu is the only player who tries to invalidate and to change the participation design. He

"breaks the frame" (Goffman 1986 [1974])[7] of the trial and laminates it with a meta-trial, in order to self-promote himself as a framer. Ceaușescu (the antagonist) shifts between these frames: he rejects his identity as a defendant; he asserts his identity as the President of Romania, and ultimately, he challenges the presiding judge's (the protagonist's) magisterial presence. There are only six players who finally remain "on the court", while the other present participants strategically adapt their interactive positions. In the same ecological habitat of the improvised courtroom, the participants carve out different ecological niches.

C. The *observers* of the trial are represented by the massive participant or by the collective body (the Romanian people) legitimated as the beneficiary of the trial. They have both observational and interventional rights, accredited by the Tribunal *of the people* itself and also by their revolt and determination to put an end to the communist dictatorship. Some of them are the *proximal observers*, located in the physical environment of the courtroom (the non-speaking members of the court martial, the non-speaking judges, the armed paratroopers supervising the courtroom, the soldiers and officers in the garrison, or the commanding officer of the military unit), while several million others are the *distant observers*, more precisely the scoped tele-participants sharing a cognitive and emotional proximity in the augmented territoriality of the trial. Unlike the framers, who form an abstract unstructured entity of approximately 25–30 diversified individuals, the observers are not only significantly numerous, but also unified and "alive". The observers of the trial as a collective audience are a product of the anti-communist revolutionary events. In the rhetorical situation of the revolution, Ceaușescu's de-humanised concept of "people" undergoes a radical transformation: from the inert automaton[8] to an active agent endowed with a will and a real voice; from an *audience as a text* like a "body without organs"[9] to a *textured audience* (Haviland 1986, 273) consisting of voices. The once regimented and docile citizens instrumentalised by the political theatre of the regime's propaganda become a collective chorus of individual voices jeering, booing, singing, rioting, whistling, and uttering insults at the dictator. The overture of the revolution,

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[7] "Breaking frame" happens when one participant unexpectedly leaves the frame while others still inhabit it: "Players shift between these different frames when making sense of actions, utterances, and events in the gaming activity" (Goffman 1986 [1974], 82).

[8] One example of indoctrinated objectification refers to the ritualistic meaningless situations in which "people [were] forced to participate in endless meetings, support demonstrations, congresses, and conferences, where neither the mobilisers nor the mobilised really believe in what they are saying or doing" (Ivaneș 2001, np).

[9] A core concept in Deleuze and Guattari's (1987 [1980]) "schizoanalysis".

when hundreds of thousands of people shout down the dictator at his last mass rally, is followed by traumatic twists of events that endanger revolutionary victory. The initial feelings of elation and freedom are replaced by fear and disorientation. The polarity of the emotions (euphoric vs dysphoric) compressed in a short time magnifies the revolutionary crisis. The rhetorical situation[10] of the trial is totally reconfigured – the tension of the *kairotic* moment[11] asks for the massive audience to listen, and not to speak. The collective audience is in "need of rhetoric" and the tension amplifies the nation's "shared sense of identity" and its "mass subjectivity" (Poulakos 2013, 13). For the framers of the trial, this is an opportunistic moment of legitimation for their political agenda. For the observers, this is a decisive moment for confronting the dictator collectively, on the one hand, and to celebrating the sense of "a unified audience with renewed consensus" (Poulakos 2013, 8), on the other hand. The massive audience that evolves as "a collective, uniform, mass subject in a shared [traumatic] psychological state" (Poulakos 2013, 13) is supportive of the trial, hoping that a rhetorical authority will be their spokesperson in the name of truth and justice, in the name of the deprivations and humiliations suffered during the dictatorship. The collective awareness ignores the illegality of the trial, and focuses on "time's hard necessity" which adopts "the controlling exigence" as the organising principle (Bitzer 1968, 6–7, apud Poulakos 2013, 15)[12]. The observers' rhetorical unification (Poulakos 2013, 8) places them in a seemingly passive state of recipiency. Even if they are silent and unseen, their privileged participation status is constantly validated by the trial's players. No matter of their legal role (defendant, prosecution, or defence), the players envisage themselves as rhetorical heroes and refer to *the people*. They take turns in conceptualising the stanceable entity (the people) according to their alignment priorities.

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[10] I adapt Poulakos' (2013) terminology in understanding traumatic events affecting a public *en masse*. Poulakos draws on key concepts attached to the rhetorical criticism model: rhetorical situation, rhetorical unification, rhetorical landscape, the composition of a collective public, or the leader as a rhetor whom the confused, perplexed, shocked, traumatised public turns to for answers (Poulakos 2013, 9).

[11] According to Poulakos (2013, 12), a special *kairotic* moment gives a rhetor an opportunity for the rhetorical unification of a collective audience who, being in need to listen, is easily accessible. *Kairos* is an ancient Greek word referring to a decisive moment when conditions are right for the accomplishment of an action.

[12] An exigence is "an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be" (Bitzer 1968, 7, apud Poulakos 2013, 15).

The deepest level in the unpacking of participation accounts for the encapsulated shared interaction space (Battersby 2011, 48), which is exclusively under the players' control. There are seven players who are literally the speaking subjects during the trial: the defendants Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu, the presiding judge, the two defence lawyers, the prosecutor, and the court reporter. They are currently involved in the multiparty interaction, but they do more than simply take turns according to the legal protocols of the courtroom discourse. Zooming in on their verbal exchanges brings their stancetaking work into sharp focus. This is the level of analysis where *the players* can be observed from an intangibly internal perspective. The first levels of participation depict what is pre-established (the rigid participation framework of the situation) and, respectively, what is instated and configured (the participation status of the interaction). This final level needs a conceptualisation of the intersubjective orientation in the socio-cognitive space of the trial. At this level, the players in the trial are *the speaking subjects*[13] whose task is to conduct the trial proceedings, on the one hand, and to dynamically inhabit the stance field, on the other hand. They simultaneously occupy a series of layers: first, they occupy the *ecological habitat*, which corresponds to the physical arrangement of the improvised courtroom; then, they occupy the *ecological niche* created both in the extended territoriality and in the rhetorical landscape of the trial; and finally, they occupy the *ecological huddle* of the multiparty interactional space that uses their physical response presence. In the courtroom, there are other *in praesentia* participants, namely the unmediated framers and observers, but they opt to become outsiders and to obey the rule of non-intrusion and non-interference with the trial proceedings, even if they are entitled to perform as members of the tribunal/court/panel. Once the trial starts, the co-participants delineate their exclusive *o-space* (Kendon 1990, apud Battersby 2011, 46)[14] transforming the physically shared space in a resource for the intersubjective stance arena. The speaking subjects' task is to use physical proximity and to transgress it within the stancetaking activity in progress. The *shared space of engagement* (Gill et al. 2000, apud Battersby 2011, 46) is further re-organised in fragmented clusters. For example, the defendants are seated side by side, which allows them to mark

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[13] When he refers to the subject as a component of the stance triangle, Du Bois (2007) alternatively uses the following terms: *speaking subject*, *speaker*, *stancetaker*, *participant*, *stance subject*, *social actor*, *co-actor*, *conversational co-participant*, or *discourse participant*.

[14] The *o-space* is a convex empty space surrounded by the people involved in a social co-located interaction, where every participant looks inward into it, have equal, direct, and exclusive access to it, and no external people is allowed in it.

their couple's secluded huddle from which they can best consolidate a collaborative stancetaking. The legal professionals, in their turn, are seated in a standard arrangement, but this does not prevent them from transgressing their regular roles in the trial. They manage their own accusatory o-space from which they persistently antagonise the dictatorial couple. As a consequence, different zones of *togetherness* are demarcated in the stance field of the trial. The speaking subjects are no longer confined to their roles, which is counterproductive to the fair trial, but the loosened legality enables dramatic stancetaking shifts and twists from one sequence of the proceedings to another. The defendant functions as a stance instigator and finishes the trial in the stance winner position, while the presiding judge tends to be the stance loser. When the presiding judge offers the floor to the defendant Ceauşescu asking him to make his last statement (*Inculpat Ceauşescu Nicolae, dumneata ce ai de spus la ultimul cuvânt?* "Defendant Ceauşescu Nicolae, what do you have to say at the last word?"), Ceauşescu reacts and bluntly rejects this identity attribution (*Nu sunt inculpat, sunt Preşedintele României, comandant suprem, şi voi răspunde în faţa Marii Adunări Naţionale şi a reprezentanţilor clasei muncitoare. Şi cu asta am terminat. Totul minciuni de la un capăt la altul* "I am not a defendant, I am the President of Romania, commander-in-chief, and I will answer before the Grand National Assembly and the representatives of the working class. And that's it. All lies from beginning to end"), which disarms the presiding judge and forces him to reach a helpless conclusion: *Cu dumneata nu se poate stabili un dialog civilizat, raţional, logic* ("A civilized, rational, logical dialogue cannot be established with you"). From an outside perspective, the fluctuations in the stance arena of the trial generate a sense of dangerous and sterile disjointedness. From an inside perspective, the constituent interlocutors of the interaction (the speaking subjects) jointly manage their shared space reserved for the co-production of stance exchanges. The cognitively rich observers (the massive scopic audience of the trial) exercise their competent co-authorship (Duranti 1986, 243) for the sense-making process of this "trial".

4.2. The Object of Stance

Du Bois' methodology prescribes that analysts have to make sense of a given stance, which means, among other things, to clearly identify "the referential object or target toward which the stance is being directed" (2007,

147)[15]. Ceaușescu's trial circulates a series of objects – some of them are predictable and overt, others emerge through the sequential contextualisation during the verbal interaction. The technically legal and predetermined *macro-object* of the trial is the dictator's culpability as it is presented in the indictment. The charges (genocide, the subversion and abuse of state power, undermining the national economy, and the destruction of public assets) are drafted hastily, but are still legally correlated to articles in the Criminal Code in force in 1989. As the trial unfolds, the legal discourse tends to deteriorate under the form of ordinary language that is loosely framed from an institutional perspective. The technical *superordinate macro-object* is consequently divided into subordinate emotional objects that are introduced arbitrarily (by either the presiding judge, the prosecutor, or the defence lawyers) in the verbal interaction. "Genocide" sounds like a strange technical definition of a criminal act[16] and needs to be explicitly translated from the legal jargon into comprehensible words (*subordinate micro-objects*) that could capture the experiential objects like *starvation*, *lack of medication*, *deprivation of electricity* and *heating*, *shortage of bread and wheat*. The word "genocide" is unavoidable in those sequences that are procedural, ritualised, and are based on the writtenness of the legal documents – like the indictment (presented by the prosecutor) and the verdict (presented by the presiding judge). The other instances place this technical word in rhetorical contexts for the amplification of the gravity of the act, in the attempt to sway the lay audience into alignment with the accusatory stance of the legal speaker.

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[15] In his article (2007), Du Bois reiterates this analytical protocol and calls it *resolving the reference*: "A crucial part of interpreting any stance utterance is identifying the object of stance, as part of the process of referential grounding" (Du Bois 2007, 148); "[…] identifying the object of stance – what the evaluation is about – is an essential part of the process of stance interpretation, for participants and analysts alike" (Du Bois 2007, 149); "it is a regular feature of subjectivity to orient to an object. If the stance object is not overtly specified within the immediate stance utterance, participants will feel something is missing. If subjectivity requires orientation to an object, the full meaning of any subjective stance must remain mysterious until we locate the object, even if this requires us to search the discourse context to find it" (Du Bois 2007, 154); "even self-positioning presupposes an object, namely, the specific entity or state of affairs toward which the speaker expresses their subjective stance" (Du Bois 2007, 155). Du Bois alternates the terminology *object/entity/target* of stance and, respectively, *resolving/identifying/locating* an object for the *grounding* or *contextualisation* of stance.

[16] A murder committed "for the purpose of completely or partially destroying a collectivity or a national, ethnic, or religious group" – Art. 356 in the Romanian Socialist Republic Penal Code (1976) (apud Nersessian 2010, 117–118).

Even the legal participants feel awkward in dealing with the technicality of the word. In his closing argument, one of the defence lawyers creates the strange pleonastic combination *crima de genocid* "crime of genocide".

Due to its legal undecidability (Tudor 2012, 76), the trial also facilitates the emergence of a *meta-object* of stance that consistently galvanises the interactionality of the proceedings and implicitly fertilises the divergent stancetaking in the stance battlefield. The procedural *meta-object* category turns the trial into a malfunctional meta-trial and includes those subordinate objects of stance primarily referring to jurisdictional issues like the legitimacy of the tribunal, the legal authority of the court, and Ceaușescu's status as defendant in the trial[17]. The meta-objects of stance are dominant and recurrent throughout the trial and they overlap and interchange with the other core objects of stance. The flow of the verbal exchanges specific to each technical phase (court investigation, court debate, and court verdict) identifiable in Ceaușescu's trial is obstructed, while the stance exchanges become more intense and dramatic. The meta-objects force the speaking subjects to constantly frame and reframe the speech event (a formalised trial vs an informal discussion), their roles and identities (in Ceaușescu's case – defendant, citizen, or President), and the asymmetry of their power relations. The meta-objects function contrastively as *interactional "killers"* for the courtroom procedures, and as *stancetaking starters* for the social-cognitive arena. The court proceedings are ambivalently co-constructed as a trial and a meta-trial. These laminated frames (two concurrent definitions of the same speech event) emerge during the verbal interaction. They are the products of the participants' co-work and collaboration, representing their interactive achievement[18].

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[17] Ceaușescu's obsessively reiterates a statement (24 occurrences) focused on *the tribunal* as the meta-object: *Nu recunosc niciun tribunal în afară de Marea Adunare Națională* ("I do not recognise any tribunal other than the Grand National Assembly"). His other resistant statement is focused on his *status* as the intensely negotiated meta-object (President vs defendant) of the trial: *Sunt Președintele României şi comandantul suprem al Armatei* ("I am the President of Romania and the commander-in-chief of the Army").

[18] For the theoretisation of framing, see Wang (2018, 27–36). The author reviews the most important contributions that emphasise the idea of framing as "a dynamic process of constant negotiation in interaction" (Wang 2018, 27). In this negotiated process, the laminated framing is not always successfully validated by participants. A frame can be "maintained, reconfigured or dismissed" or "failed, mis-matched". Wang uses Gordon's (2008, 2009) distinction between two types of multi-layered frames: *blended frames* and *embedded frames*, and he also mentions Schiffrin's (1993) differentiation between *in-frame, between-frame*, and *out-of-frame* segments of the same interaction

    The messy nature of the trial and its deviation from normative to vindictive justice lead to the *ad hoc* transformation of one main speaking subject into an object of stance, more precisely into a target[19]. This *objectification* (*someone* becomes *something*) is added to the specificity of stance components represented in the trial. Ceaușescu as a person/subject (and not Ceaușescu's guilt) becomes an evaluated entity in stance utterances that interfere with a criminal defendant's right to dignity: *nici astăzi nu vrea să vorbească, este laș și la propriu și la figurat* "even today he does not want to speak, he is a coward both literally and figuratively"; *în numele poporului român, victimele nevinovate ale acestor doi tirani* "on behalf of the Romanian people, the innocent victims of these two tyrants"; *acest inculpat paranoic* "this paranoid defendant"; *megalomania pe care a avut-o ne-a adus aici* "his past megalomania brought us here". The verbally aggressive conduct is technically defined as a serious disorder and a disruption in "normal" courts, and is typically less, if never expected from those participants who represent the judicial authority. They have the obligation to protect the integrity of the court proceedings and to ensure a fair trial (Scharf 2007, 157). From an interactional point of view, the vilifying utterances can be assimilated to *ad hominem* verbal attacks or to face-threatening insulting action. This is partially relevant to stance management that actually tolerates all forms of subjectivity with respect to a stance object. In the case of Ceaușescu's trial, the stance objectification is integrated in the divergent alignment exercised by all participants, particularly when *a stance rift* (Dori-Hacohen 2017, 24) or an evaluative breakdown occurs in the intersubjective world of the court proceedings. Ceaușescu's objectification is used as a stancetaking reactive strategy in the face of the dictator's identity resistance in court, on the one hand, and in the absence of proven charges against him as defendant, on the other hand. Stance methodology can shift the focus of analysis from the obviously maladaptive and improper administration of justice (transparent in the usage of insults targeted at the defendant Ceaușescu), to the dynamics of stancetaking as a strategic act that assigns discrediting value to an instantly objectified speaking subject.

(Wang 2018, 29). Adopting this terminology, the examined data display *embedded frames*, on the one hand, and include an *in-frame* (when the trial is maintained) and an *out-frame* (when the trial is put on hold being transformed into a meta-trial), on the other hand.

[19] I distinguish between two different situations: 1) a subject can become an *object* of stance when (s)he is absent; 2) (s)he becomes both an *object* and *a target* of stance when s(he) is present as an addressed or non-addressed speaking subject.

The loosening of the trial as institutionalised legal discourse, manifested by the improvised indictment, by the preordained verdict, and by the legal professionals' distorted roles, determines an unsystematic circulation of the stance objects. The participants in the trial develop tactical behaviours in the management of stance objects. They are all "stance shoppers" (Du Bois 2007, 173), but they have to make decisions on which stance object to pick up for the stance acts. Unlike regular trials, in which the multiparty interaction is pre-structured and supervised by the legal deontology, Ceaușescu's trial suspends important rules and leaves room for the participants' unorthodox moves and interventions. The superordinate macro-object and its derivatives tend to be manipulated according to unpredicted initiatives meant to contribute to the defendants' guilt, which is fabricated instead of being proved. As a result, there are many stance objects and meta-objects that are unsettled and repetitive. In their shifting and itinerant appearance/disappearance throughout the proceedings, they are strategically controlled by one participant or another, even if sometimes those participants are not procedurally entitled to do so. The stance objects are expected to be placed and supervised in the interaction primarily by the presiding judge whose role is to monitor the trial and to also censor the stance acts: *who* is accredited to evaluate and position *what*, *who* is aligned *with whom*, *to what extent* the stances are biased, abusive, or appropriate. The management of the stance objects relies on an open policy coming into existence during Ceaușescu's trial. Tracking the migration of the stance objects, I have identified the dominant pattern of *stance opportunism* displayed by all the speaking subjects involved in the trial. In what follows, I will present the strategies adopted in the stance objects competition, defining the dynamics of the difficult, unscripted situations identifiable in the proceedings.

The *strategies of individualism* are adopted by both the presiding judge and by other participants in the trial who operate with the stance objects according to their risky initiatives. Ceaușescu and the presiding judge are technically the protagonists of the trial, so in their need for epistemic authority and advance, they feel eligible to precipitate the launching of stance objects in the interaction. *The strategy of stance object prioritisation* places them in a *false-start* situation, as they precociously insert an object of stance at the wrong time during the stage and/or the sequence of the proceedings. Ceaușescu is impatient to introduce the coup d'état as a controversial object of stance, but he does not wait for the questioning about the events. The trial has just started and the presiding judge asks him to rise, while Ceaușescu defies the court and the tribunal asserting that *lovitura de stat nu poate fi recunoscută* "the coup d'état cannot be recognised". The

presiding judge does not hesitate to use the privilege of being the technical monitor of the proceedings, which allows him to experiment with and adopt another individualistic strategy in the management of the stance objects. The *strategy of stance object license* or *stance copyright* presupposes a self-induced exclusive property of a stance object. The copyright should be validated by the other participants who do not interfere with the exclusionary decision, recognising it as a strategy that temporarily disallows them to speak. It is the presiding judge who adjudicates "delicate" stance objects referring to Elena Ceaușescu while she is examined by the court. He ironically approaches the dictator's wife (and not the defendant) directly asking/insulting her about her fake scientific titles: *Savantul, inginerul, academicianul, nu știa să citească. Analfabeta ajunsese academician* "The scientist, the engineer, the academician, could not read. The illiterate had become an academician"; about her daughter's extravagant lifestyle: *Am văzut la televizor vila fiicei dumitale, avea un cântar de aur pe care își cântărea carnea adusă din străinătate* "I saw your daughter's villa on TV, she had a gold scale she used to weigh the meat brought from abroad"; or about her own birthday: *Am urmărit, şi știam că ziua dumitale este undeva înainte sau după ziua dânsului, dar nu știam niciodată anul în care v-ați născut, te-ai născut. Care este?* "I watched, and I knew your birthday was somewhere before or after his birthday, but I never knew the year when you were born. Which is when?". Contrary to the demonstrative show of power invested in the verbal action, this preferential strategy is adopted from a weak position. In his individualistic search for leadership, the presiding judge transgresses not only his professional role, but also the cultural rules and restrictions that govern his self-presentation as a gentleman addressing a woman (wife and mother).

There are also situations of crisis during the trial when the presiding judge is authorised to resort to the individualistic *censorship strategy* in the administration of stance objects that should be discontinued and dismissed from the interaction. The application of this strategy is dedicated to the recalcitrant defendant Ceaușescu, who constantly frames the trial as a discussion in which he may bring inflammatory or disruptive opinions about the traitors or about the obscure external forces plotting against Romania's sovereignty. The presiding judge's tool for autocratic censorship is metacommunication: *Acum discut cu inculpatul Ceaușescu Nicolae* ("Now I am talking to the defendant Ceaușescu Nicolae"); *Răspunzi numai la întrebările pe care ți le pun eu* ("You only answer the questions I am asking you"). The presiding judge sanctions the unmanageable Ceaușescu brutally deleting an object of stance and all its traces, in order to prevent any restock

with the undesired item and to keep the direction of the trial on the "right" track.

The last strategy of individualism allows for other participants to manifest their initiatives in the handling of stance objects. *The strategy of innovation and creativity* involves unanticipated contributions that have every chance of being taken into consideration in a trial that fails to provide proof of guilt, and alternatively promotes the invention of it. The objects of stance that the speaking subjects are welcome to bring in have every chance of being integrated in the dialogic circuit of stance acts that engage the participants' subjectivities. It seems that the prosecutor is ready to creatively improve his indictment and to add random charges. At some point during the examination, the presiding judge is confronted with the depletion of his stock of puzzling questions. It is an opportunity for the prosecutor to step in. He innovatively relieves the shortage with an extra he has kept on hand – he fortuitously introduces a new object of stance that is off topic, but produces a sense of guilt: *Domnule Președinte, am o întrebare. Să ne spună inculpatul Ceaușescu Nicolae, contul de peste 400 de mii de dolari […] Pe numele cui este, cui aparține?* ("Mr President, I have a question. Let the defendant Ceaușescu Nicolae tell us about the bank account of over 400 thousand dollars. […] In whose name is it, to whom does it belong?"). In this "legal jam session", other participants are ready to take the stage and play their solos. The presiding judge, Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu, and one of the lawyers are all engaged in disputing this new object of stance (the bank account), even if there is no basis for its existence. The strategies of individualism adopted by the participants in their management of stance objects endorse the idea that the trial proceedings represent a free borderless territory in which stances are situated achievements. Most of the initiatives divert the expected trajectory of the trial and then direct its progress on unexpected tracks.

The *introduction* or the *placement* of *new* stance objects is only one side of their circulation in the stance field of the trial. There are other strategies of impromptu management that contribute to the dynamic traffic of *recurrent* or *incomplete* stance objects. Unlike the individualistically *added* objects, the *itinerant* and *updated* stance objects dispose the participants in competitive team arrangements that transform the multiparty interaction in a stance battlefield. The tracking of these shifting objects reveals the moments of escalated crisis during the trial and the supportive behaviour of the teams needed for survival in the risky stance exchanges. The *strategy of long passing* is adopted by the speaking subjects when they cope with objects of stance that are perceived as unresolved or have been previously rejected as objects of stance acts. These objects are mentally archived as

incomplete or failed, and then are made available for reiterated stancetaking that might give them an adequate closure. The stance acts in replay require speaking subjects who are in the same team and who are motivated to save the dragging object on the off chance it is repeatable. When the presiding judge interrogates the dictator about the street fighting still going on at that moment between civilians and the unidentified forces, his accusatory stance forces the implication that they are Ceaușescu's loyalists. His intention is to coercively determine the defendant to accept this presupposition: *Cine sunt acești fanatici? I-am format noi poporul sau dumneata? Cine i-a plătit?* ("Who are these fanatics? Have we formed them or have you? Who paid them?"). These questions remain unanswered as the defendant directs the trial to the meta-trial frame and forces a break in the exchange. Later on, the prosecutor uses *the long passing strategy*, taking the aborted object of stance and replaying it in the game in order to consolidate the judge's initial act: *Domnule Președinte, să ne spună inculpatul cine sunt mercenarii străini* [...] *cine i-a adus și cine îi plătește pe acești mercenari?* ("Mr. President, let the defendant tell us who the foreign mercenaries are [...] who brought them and who pays these mercenaries?"). The defendant's refusal to answer these questions counts as an invalidated stance act (the dictator implies the stupidity of the hypothesis delivered so far). As a consequence, towards the end of the trial, the object is once again voluntarily put back into play by one of the defence lawyers in his closing speech. He rhetorically addresses to his client making him responsible for the actions (accusing instead of defending him), even if the accusation cannot rely on any proof: *teroriștii dumneavoastră și astăzi se duc, se alimentează și luptă împotriva oamenilor nevinovați* ("even today your terrorists still go, feed themselves, and fight against innocent people"). The object of stance is duplicated and reduplicated, but the *long pass strategy* obscures the repetition under the camouflage of three different words, used by the three different players distantly involved in the long passing: *fanatici* "fanatics" (the presiding judge), *mercenari* "mercenaries" (the prosecutor), and *terorişti* "terrorists" (the defence lawyer). The alternative designation shifts the object of stance and smoothly transfers it from one player to another, from one sequence of the trial to another. As a result, a collective stance is consolidated (*the dictator's actions are abominable, the dictator deserves the most severe penalty for his criminal acts*) and a convergent alignment is created by the alternation of synonymic lexis that indicates the sharing of the itinerant object.

In contrast with the consolidation of the stance object, the *strategy of recycling* involves movements that bring about a radical revision of the object and its associated stances already produced in the trial. Participants

from opposing stance teams are involved in this manoeuvre. The object of stance is dislocated from one sequence in the interaction and is unexpectedly relocated in another sequence. There is a delay between these movements as if the initiator of the strategy needs some time to process his latently revised stance and his divergent alignment with the opponent stancetaker. The dislocated-relocated object of stance is deliberately manipulated with metacommunicative props, meant to attenuate the disruption of the move, on the one hand, and to mark the stance-counterstance ostentatious act, on the other hand. The presiding judge insists on questioning about hunger in Romania, particularly about the bread shortage and its rationing, which at that time implied higher rations given to the people living in urban areas compared to smaller rations given to the rural residents: *De ce ai înfometat acest popor, de ce l-ai înfometat?* ("Why did you starve this people, why did you starve them?"). The judge's rhetorical attack is contrasted with Ceaușescu's replies based on arguments and statistical figures: *Pentru prima dată cooperatorii au primit câte 200 de kg de grâu pe persoană – nu pe familie! – și mai aveau dreptul încă să mai primească* ("For the first time, cooperators received 200 kg of wheat per person – not per family! – and they still had the right to receive more"). The judge's echoically ironical comment *Primeau, primeau...* ("They were receiving, they were receiving..."), and the exaggerated accusations: *[fiica dumitale] avea un cântar de aur pe care își cântărea carnea adusă din străinătate. Carnea asta de aici, a noastră, nu era bună* ("[your daughter] had a gold scale she used to weigh the meat brought from abroad. This meat from here, our meat, wasn't good enough") determine the defendant to dismissively disengage from any discussion about the topic and to take a distance from the concocted fantasy about his food as a "royal" survival substance. A series of other questions follow, addressing controversial issues like the secret bank accounts, the killings in Timișoara and Bucharest, and general Milea's suicide. After more than 13 minutes, without any connection with the questions being asked, Ceaușescu self-selects himself as a speaker and pushes the interaction backwards. He dislocates an apparently abandoned object (the discussion about food, bread, and his family's preferential menu) and relocates it when he is ready to provide the audience with verifiable facts: *Însă tot pentru informarea dumneavoastră, n-am scăpat nimic, mi-ați spus că eu mâncam numai mâncăruri din străinătate. Că există de ani de zile lista cu ce mănânc eu, ori 1.100 – 1.200 de calorii pe zi și numai legume* ("But also for your information, I did not miss anything, you told me that I only ate food from abroad. But there has been a list of what I eat for years, or 1100–1200 calories a day and only vegetables"). The strategy recycles the opponent's verbal material. First it

explicitly quotes it (the metastance segment *mi-ați spus că* "you told me that"), and then it rectifies it (the counterstance segment). Ceaușescu creates a window and a line of reasoning meant to amend the presiding judge's rhetorical authority. The defendant strategically attempts to get epistemic dominance and to occupy a privileged position: to be the knowledgeable one (the preface *pentru informarea dumneavoastră* "for your information"), and to also be the cognitively vigilant one (*nu am scăpat nimic* "I did not miss anything"). The recycled object of stance is incorporated in a stance-counterstance redress action, significant for the instantaneous identity formation.

The *strategy of soft interception* requires coordination in the circulation of the stance object, without generating tension in the stance field (typically associated with friction, pressure, and fighting). This strategy collaboratively shifts the object of stance from one participant to another, which is unusual when the participants are opponents, and not teammates. When this strategy is applied, the interaction has a harmonious flow and respects the discipline of the courtroom discourse, at least formally and sequentially. The interception refers to the temporary deviation of the stance object from its destination, and implies the promptness of the move. It is Elena Ceaușescu's turn to be examined. The question addressed to her points to the political role (Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania) which mandates her to give an answer: *Cine a dat dispoziții să se tragă în mulțimea de la Timișoara?* ("Who ordered the shooting in the crowd in Timișoara?"). Elena Ceaușescu undermines the questioning: *Nu răspund la nici o întrebare. De la început și până la sfârșit* ("I am not answering any questions. From beginning to end"). Using the meta-trial as a *way out*, Elena avoids being derailed by the object of the question (the genocide in Timișoara). This is the moment when Ceaușescu seizes the opportunity to create his *way in*, obstructing his wife's examination and temporarily "deselecting" her from the interaction. The dictator elegantly and pro-actively intercepts the object of stance: *Pentru cunoștința dumneavoastră, care sunteți ofițeri, pot eu răspunde la întrebare. Ordinul de a trage nu-l dă guvernul* ("For your knowledge, you who are officers, I can answer the question. The order to shoot is not given by the government"). First, Ceaușescu sets up a comfortable epistemic space for his action (*Pentru cunoștința dumneavoastră, care sunteți ofițeri* "For your knowledge, you who are officers"). He pretends that it is in the benefit of a large audience (in which he includes the presiding judge) to find out a solid, reliable answer to the question. He also implies the slightly condescending criticism that his audience (*dumneavoastră, care sunteți ofițeri* "you who are officers") should have actually possessed that piece of

knowledge. Next, he makes an explicit offer to answer the question that has been initially addressed to his wife (*pot eu răspunde la întrebare* "I can answer the question"). He makes himself available for answering with alacrity, as if he is ready to share his knowledge for free. Then, Ceaușescu goes back to the presiding judge's question (*Cine a dat dispoziții să se tragă?* "Who ordered the shooting"), copies its structure and systematically re-uses it in his answer (*Ordinul de a trage nu-l dă guvernul* "The order to shoot is not given by the government"). In the socio-cognitive layer of the interaction, the dialogic syntax divergently aligns the presiding judge with the defendant and places them in an epistemic competition. After that, Ceaușescu obstructs the presiding judge's attempt to take the speaking turn and he finally concludes his mini-lecture with a clarification that must be retained: *Guvernul nu poate să dea ordine, nu are în subordine armata* ("The government cannot give orders, it does not have the army under its command"). The initial question is disqualified and so is the presiding judge's supremacy. The *strategy of soft interception* assists the dictator in operating expeditiously with an object of stance (the genocide, in particular the order to shoot), but the focus is not the possession of the object itself. Ceaușescu (the assertive, and not the possessive stancetaker) capitalises on the object and uses it for an epistemic advance. Even if he technically remains a defendant, he can still work for a predominant position in the stance field of the trial. The intercepted object positions him as the knowledgeable one, who has a direct lead over his opponent, who is skilful enough to assemble both his self- and the other-positioning, and who takes enjoyment from the epistemic gratification.

4.3. The Alignment

Du Bois' stance triangle (2007) includes some components that are *elements* (speaking subjects and shared stance objects) and some other components that are *processes* (evaluating, positioning, and alignment). The process of alignment penetrates the talk-in-interaction and allows the analyst to shift from the *dialogue*, which shows how the turn taking occurs in the "flux of dialogic interaction" (Du Bois 2007, 173), to *dialogicity*, which concerns how the interlocutors maintain mutual understanding and get involved in *stance dialogism*. Many observers of Ceaușescu's trial share the opinion that it is both a judicial failure and an interactional fiasco. The former idea is uncontestably justified, while the latter is based on the impression that the proceedings of the trial are incoherent, stagnant, and absurd, "a shouting match of mutual incomprehension – a dialogue between the deaf" (Siani-Davies 2005, 139). This might hold true for the verbal exchange of the

speakers as opponents who, in the ongoing unscripted interaction, fulfil the roles of defendants and accusers engaged in a trial, which is a particular event of language use. The alignment is the "stance-saturated" (Jaffe 2009, 9) dimension or unit of analysis that goes beyond the talk and "can clarify the array of entities and socio-cognitive relations that are activated, constituted, and brought into relation to each other by a particular stance action" (Du Bois 2007, 170). The very fact that the trial is not fair and transgresses legal procedures triggers more dramatic stance exchanges that fructify the "polarity of co-action cycles" (Du Bois 2007, 170). In the public space of the trial, each speaking subject "plays the card of his own subjectivity" (Du Bois 2011, 54) and tries to calibrate it with the other subjects' displayed subjectivities. The double-edged difficulty of the task to put a dictator on trial with no solid criminal documentation and with a predetermined verdict impacts on "the actual practices of realizing stances and negotiating their significance" (Du Bois 2007, 170). All the participants in the trial are challenged in their role as stancetakers to strategically adapt their *subjectivity* to the locally *intersubjective* stance field. Unlike the verdict, which is scripted and is presented as a rigidly unnegotiable task assigned to the legal professionals, the intersubjective adjustment to an unexpectedly difficult defendant (the dictator Ceaușescu) requires an unplanned co-work and collaboration in the stance field. The verbal exchanges of the defective trial transparently display actions that perpetuate conflict, disagreement, dissension, offense, and verbal aggressiveness. These actions do not obviously adhere to the normativity of a trial. It is expected that the socio-cognitive level of the interaction is infiltrated and is also affected by turn exchanges that cannot unfold smoothly. At the socio-cognitive level, what emerges from the difficult interaction is a constant stance differential and a divergent alignment, at least between the speaking subjects/stancetakers who can be grouped into adversarial teams (the defendants vs the legal professionals). Moreover, the intersubjective dimension of divergent alignment cannot be enacted without the co-participants' "joint engagement" (Kärkkäinen 2006, 699). The analysis of proceedings shows that the tension of the trial is rooted in the specificity of the alignment strategies adopted by the co-located participants who cannot escape the courtroom, cannot escape the shared space of the interaction, and finally cannot escape the predetermined verdict.

The six players who are the speaking subjects take turns successively when they interact and generally observe the procedural authority of the presiding judge who monitors the trial. Contrastively, when approaching the socio-cognitive field embedded in the interaction, each speaking subject develops a multidirectional management of the co-participants' stances and

"jointly navigates" (Gillespie and Cornish 2010) the burden of a risky task. From the subjective perspective of each stancetaker, the endangered participation (as if "grasping at straws") is manageable if many anchors' points are promptly set up. In the game of this "trial", anyone can opportunistically play with the shared objects, therefore an increased need of cognitive preparedness is indispensable. Moreover, the constantly shifting field of stances requires an "exceptional agility at managing the dialogic play […]" and "an implicit awareness of the structure of the activity system that frames and enables the achievement of stance" (Du Bois 2007, 171). The speaking subjects feel trapped "between a rock and a hard place", so they have to self-protectively equalise two vital forces: the compulsion to stay in the trial, on the one hand, and the need to hopefully survive it, on the other hand. The alignment process is consequently adaptive and makes the most of what is available. Under the drastic circumstances and also in the locally interactive context of a defendant who proves to be a resistant stancetaker, the subjects collaboratively construct *a system of divergent alignment redundancy*. This load-distributing system is cautiously focused on an insecurity attenuation program and is meant to reduce the stressors and the "walking on eggs" sensation. The control of a "busy" stance field occupied by multiple participants designs an alignment configuration stabilised by four vectors. These vectors are oriented to four anchor points that serve as cognitive props or cognitive plugs. The anchor points are the pillars of the stance field and they govern it. They will be taken into consideration every time a speaking subject gets involved in the interaction and implicitly attempts at alignment with other subjects. Two of the co-present players: the presiding judge (the protagonist) and the defendant (the antagonist), are perceived and projected as the dominant instances structuring the alignment.

The anchoring system takes advantage of two more entities that are placed in the augmented territory of the trial and are added for their equalising potential: the new power (the framers) and the people (the observers). Each cognitive pillar activates its correlated vector of divergent alignment, as follows: the presiding judge activates *the competition vector*; the defendant Ceaușescu activates *the incrimination vector*; the new power activates *the commitment vector*; the people as a cognitive pillar activates *the solidarity vector*. The stance field presents itself as *a tetravalent web of vectors* shared by all the speaking subjects in the socio-cognitive space of the interaction. Once the vectors are *ad hoc* installed in the stance field, they will stay open until the very end of the trial. During the trial, the vectors are visited and adjusted by the speaking subjects according to their stance priorities. Each speaking subject keeps the four vectors in a corner of his

mind and strategically coordinates them to prevent the loss of control and to facilitate the effectiveness of stance. The *alignment distributed on multiple and concomitant vectors* may be calibrated within one speaking subject's same turn or across one speaking subject's successive turns. Whenever a vector is ignored, it serves as a passive redundancy in the system of alignment. No matter of their power status or role in the interaction, the speaking subjects adopt the multiple and concomitant alignment strategy metaphorically identified here as the *Brave Little Tailor* syndrome (*Seven with one blow, this is my thing*). The anxiety of the task accomplishment tends to be nullified when a speaking subject plays with a stance object manifesting the *one-hit polykill* synchronism of alignment. Similarly to Grimm's fairy-tale hero, the stancetakers behave like tricksters who use their presence of mind to complete the impossible mission of the trial and to extricate themselves from any trouble. There is one more vector that is also introduced in the stance field. Unlike the four main vectors responsible for the intense traffic of alignment, *the cooperation vector* concerns those speaking subjects who are in the same team and might need affiliative alignment, namely some assistance or support to overcome the side effects of the risky stancetaking manoeuvres. This minor and marginal vector brings either a fortification emphasis to the teamwork efforts or an immediate gratification in a temporary stancetaking success.

Each cognitive pillar forming a vector of divergent alignment deserves a special discussion. During the proceedings, *the presiding judge* is interactively recognised as an anchor in the system not because of his privileged role and status in court, but because of his self-induced extended attributions in this particular trial. Due to the exceptionality of the trial, the presiding judge substantially compromises his canonical responsibility (to be impartial, fair, and unbiased, and to follow the law) and his invigilating duty (to keep order and, like a referee of a game, to make sure that everyone plays by both the ethical and the interactional rules). From the very beginning of the trial, after he is challenged by the defendant who does not recognise the court, the presiding judge shifts from authority to authoritarianism, from institutional procedures to paternalistic guidance. He takes the role of the ultimate judge or moral expert who possesses the "father knows best" ideology (Ochs and Taylor 1995) and who exerts a militant justice. He instantiates himself as the *problematiser* of the trial, the one who is entitled to define the *problematisee* Ceaușescu as a dubious, if not a degradable target. Consequently, the presiding judge's inquisitorial and vilifying tone is instantaneously adopted by the other legal professionals. As a *stance setter*, the judge safeguards the defence lawyers when they engage in their clients' accusation instead of their protection. In addition to

being a speaking subject, the presiding judge is perceived as the cognitive anchor/the stance leader who secures an inappropriately divergent alignment with the defendant. The dictator, in his turn, seizes the possibility of disputed leadership and opportunistically uses the presiding judge as his stance antagonist.

From the vector of competition, Ceaușescu moves to *the vector of incrimination*. In spite of being *the defendant* in the trial, *the dictator* is competent enough to deserve the assignment of "his" vector in the dynamic system of alignment coming into existence during the trial. His saliency as a cognitive anchor arises from his circumstantial position in the symbolic setting of the trial. As a *defendant*, he is not *defended* according to his rights. As a defendant, he is not legally prosecuted either. On the contrary, he is constantly attacked, incriminated, offended, and insulted. All the co-present participants (with the exception of the general in charge with the trial and the execution) are for the first time in their lives unexpectedly brought face-to-face with the detested dictator. On this occasion, the *vector of incrimination* is activated for the dictator's brutal metamorphosis – from his deification as the almighty idol of propaganda (father of the nation) to his reification as the hatred fetish of the anti-communist revolution (the enemy of the nation, guilty of all evils); from his safe bureaucratic roles (President of Romania, etc.) to the condition of an ordinary human being who is not only vulnerable, but also accountable; from an image to a person[20]. The garrison where he is captured represents the Goffmanian "total institution" in which Ceaușescu goes through the process of his role mortification; he is fearlessly dispossessed of his identity kit, his self-determination is restricted, and he is subjected to constant contaminative exposure (Goffman 1961). Furthermore, the dictator experiences a reduction of his personhood to "abnormal" features, as if he "is not quite human" (Goffman 1963, 12, apud Handler 2009, 295). During the trial, all the legal professionals concertedly perpetuate the dictator's stigmatisation and mistreatment as "an incomplete person, an incomplete interactional unit" (Goffman 1963). They all perceive the dictator as a cognitive master-anchor that is put under strain to hold the burden of the defective criminal investigation. As a consequence, the defendant is constantly incriminated, as he personally (and not his guilt) becomes the target of the accusatory stance attacks. At his end, Ceaușescu's

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[20] All Romanians used to be familiarised with Ceaușescu's picture "not only placed on the first page after the flyleaf in every Romanian textbook, but also hung on the wall in all public and official rooms [greeting] everyone the moment they entered: the portrait of the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, President of Romania and Chairman of the State Council […]" (Laub 2020, 103).

stance resistance robustly controls *the vector* of his *incrimination* by not adhering to his identity alterations.

The last two cognitive pillars that play a key role in the alignment configuration are *the new power* and, respectively, *the people*. Unlike the presiding judge and the main defendant, who are both speaking subjects and can take stances, the two entities are not physically co-present in the multiparty interaction and cannot literally speak. For each entity there are metonymic representatives in the courtroom, but they keep silent during the trial. The entities are incorporated in the participation framework as mediated scopic participants with a defined status (framers and, respectively, observers). According to the technical definition of alignment, it is the speakers in the dialogic interaction who can perform stances and engage in the alignment process "when they converge to varying degrees, and, by the same token, when they diverge to varying degrees" (Du Bois 2007, 162). In the particular interpretive frame of the trial, the intersubjective relationship is considered to be dynamically constructed even if at least two key participants do not literally participate in the dialogic co-action. The entities – *the new power* and *the people* – are imagined, but nevertheless present in the socio-cognitive organisation of the interaction. They are *stanceable*, which means they can stand stance-attribution. In the participants' common ground (the one that is truly shared as the "common" common-ground, and is not partially the assumed common ground), the entities' stances are self-evident. In the real order of things, the new power's political priority is to dislocate the dictator (the decision is to actually liquidate him) and to control the improper and illegitimate trial. In spite of its spectral presence and its undefined morphology, the new power stands out as a cognitive anchor. The legal professionals may suffer from a salience bias when it comes to the new power. They are manipulated to conduct the trial and to reach a predetermined verdict. They internalise the ambiguous legality and are in need of a cognitive pillar to convergently align with for reasons of self-preservation. The new power functions as the Big Brother of the trial whose prosthetic eye is the video camera that records the trial, being manipulated by an amateur. The cameraman is less intimidating than an "eyeborg", but the legal participants cannot help associating the tool (the video camera) and the action (the filming) with control, fear, surveillance, and accountability. They use the new power anchor point primarily to attenuate the panopticon effect of being watched, and only secondarily to self-discipline themselves to successfully complete the assigned task (reaching the predetermined verdict). Ceauşescu also needs this cognitive pillar, but his alignment priority is to dissociate himself from it and to de-legitimise it. The dictator is used to being filmed and the action does not

imprison his mind. On the contrary, the eye of the video camera is a portal helping him to reach the whole world.

The people who are the beneficiaries and the massive participant in the trial are also transformed in a cognitive anchor. The collective entity is controversially disputed in the socio-cognitive space of the trial. It is stanceable, but the stance-attribution process manifests an irreducible polarity. All the participants compulsively need to align with the people insofar as the entity provides an inexhaustible source of immunity. The two opposing teams (the legal professionals vs the dictatorial couple) interactively operate with antithetical conceptualisations of "the people" and no conceptual pact (Brennan and Clark 1996) is wished for. The two teams intersubjectively play Tug of War with this entity and they pull on it as hard as they can to win it for their own "zone of influence". From Ceaușescu's perspective, "the people" is nothing but a de-humanised rhetorical collective, a textual "wooden" audience or the massive assemblage instrumentalised by the propaganda to attend his public speeches. The entity is devoid of agency, will, and autonomy. The dictator feels attached to the entity and perceives himself as the leader, the father whose loyalty mission is to look after the entity, to offer it a vision on the "way of building the socialist multilaterally-developed society". During the trial, the dictator is not aware that his conceptualisation of "the people" is disintegrated. He is in denial of the crowd, the mob, and the masses that have shouted him down. The dictator uses this cognitive pillar expressing his need to embrace the entity, to protectively align with it. From the legal participants' perspective, "the people" represents a reality in which they are included as individuals. They share with the people a series of years-long experiences: the silent resistance and the painful instinct of "underground fight" (Șerban 2009, 114) developed as a collective defence mechanism[21]; the unbearable and humiliating conditions of their lives reaching the edge of biological survival (Ivaneș 2001); the mindset of heroism adopted by all Romanians during their revolt against the dictator and the regime[22]; the magical feeling of *oneness* experienced by millions

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[21] According to Kuran's distinction (1991, apud Ivaneș 2001), "people were heavily engaged in preference falsification, having a private preference that was viscerally hostile to the regime and a public preference that was totally opposed to what they really thought".

[22] Ivaneș (2001) adopts Kuran's (1991) "now out of never" theory and explains that "the revolutionary threshold was reached and people did not care about risks and consequences. They had almost nothing to lose, and, though aware of the high risk of dying, they accepted that risk [...]. A strange sentiment of self-sacrifice penetrated the

of people in the streets shouting slogans like *noi suntem poporul, jos cu dictatorul* ("We are the people, down with the dictator") or *vom muri și vom fi liberi* ("we will die and we will be free"). These shared experiences empower the legal participants to conceptualise "their" people as an affective entity to which they belong[23]. The alignment with the people as a stanceable entity prompts the legal participants to de-select the dictator in critical moments of the trial, turning him into a non-engrossed participant (Goodwin 1986, 293). Any reference to the common ground of shared experiences ratifies the massive participant as a focal audience and, by selective reinforcement (Goodwin 1986, 291), commends the people for its competence and expertise in specific domains of discourse, like the discussions about hunger, terror, darkness, cold, rationing of food, and other shortages.

Depending on the stancetaker, the cognitive anchors can be either attractive or aversive, which implies that they are a source of divergence for the "cognitively sophisticated actors" (Goodwin and Goodwin 2004, 237) involved in the interaction. The dynamics of *the divergent alignment*, which is dominant across all vectors, is generated along each vector depending on the speaking subjects' particular stances. If each vector is compared to a front on a battlefield, then the divergent alignment patterns that intersect on each front can be compared to the trenches occupied by different stancetakers. Each vector hosts a pair of alignments in binary opposition. *The competition vector* contains the *divergent alignment* of *domination/subversion*. This vector is primarily the domain of the main players – the presiding judge and Ceaușescu. During the trial, from the very beginning, they compete for the right to frame the activity. While the presiding judge is in charge and also entitled to monitor the trial, Ceaușescu does not recognise the trial, the authority that patronises it, and his status as defendant. The object of their stancetaking is the trial itself, but Ceaușescu's consistent disagreement creates a diversion or an alternative object, which is the meta-trial. The competition vector might be visited by other legal players whenever they intend to repair the presiding judge's endangered authority. *The incrimination vector* contains the *divergent alignment* of *provocation/contestation*. This vector is oriented against the dictator Ceaușescu and mobilises the legal participants' coordinated efforts to accuse the defendant according to the assigned task (the predetermined verdict). Their *provocative alignment* becomes a circumstantial priority of

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participants and a declared willingness to die for the future of their children" (Ivaneș 2001).

[23] A feeling opposite to Kaplan's "empty empathy" (Kaplan 2005, 93, apud Poulakos 2013, 53).

the "trial" operating with incriminations that are biased, invented, or opportunistic. Ceaușescu's perception is that he is attacked, and not legally accused. As a consequence, his stancetaking favours the *contestation alignment* with all the legal players in response to their action. This generates a stance-counterstance dynamic during the trial and explains its aggravated tension.

The commitment vector contains the *divergent alignment* of *conformity/denunciation*. All the players involved in the trial are forced to take the new power into the account. In spite of being a spectral and amorphous participant, the new power is the framer of the trial, respectively the authority that legitimises the activity. The legal participants are in need of protection, so they display the *conformity alignment* with the new power. Contrariwise, Ceaușescu performs on *the denunciation alignment*. He does not hesitate to position himself as the leader of Romania, who knows about the state affairs and who has the right to express his hostility against the disloyal actions of the new power representatives. *The solidarity vector* contains the *divergent alignment* of *fraternisation/loyalty*. It seems that the people, that collective player or entity that participates *in absentia*, becomes a robust anchor point in the stance field of the trial. All the players feel drawn to the scoped entity and exploit it vigorously. The people may be perceived either as a subject or an object of stance, which shows its plasticity and malleability in the "hands" of the players who all feel affiliated to the massive participant/percipient of the trial. Even if the players use *the vector of solidarity* in the authorised attempt to represent the scoped entity IN the trial (to make the people as if present or embodied), there is a different conceptualisation of the people, which entails different alignments with this non-speaking, nevertheless stanceable subject. The legal participants define the people as the dictator's collective victim. They align with the cognitive anchor under the stance formula of *fraternisation*. They become the active spokesmen for the passively suffering collective, and they feel empowered to rectify the injustices. The dictator, in his turn, feels accredited to represent the people. His institutional role enables him to lead the people, to protect the collective entity from treachery and perfidious interests. Unlike the legal players, whose *fraternisation* is affective, Ceaușescu's alignment takes the form of an unsentimental *loyalty* and devotedness meant to secure the people's well-being and stability. All the players invade the *solidarity vector* and feel over prompted by the people. Their alignment is divergent and competitive, as if they would like to possess the collective entity and to adapt it to their emergent agenda during the trial.

The *cooperation vector* is a marginal vector and is visible and observable at the level of the verbal interaction. It responds to the players' need to assist each other in the difficult task of being a participant in the trial. This vector holds the *divergent alignment* of *complicity/support*. The members of the legal team align with each other in *complicity*, as their collaboration in the task completion is on the edge from a legal perspective. The dictatorial couple form the opponent team. Their cooperation during the trial takes the form of mutual *support* and empathy, which are vital tools for survival under the extreme circumstances of the trial. All the vectors described above encompass *a web of divergent alignments*. The totality of the vectors, characterised by their corresponding binary alignments, reveals the apparently disorganised complexity of the stancetaking operations that mobilise the tightly packed formations of speaking subjects.

The paradoxical combination of hostile forces (divergently aligned) that work together to produce the trial is analysable if we go beyond the "public space of the interaction" – *the dialogue* – and if we explore the socio-cognitive field – *the dialogicity*. The players' impromptu use of the multivectorial and concomitant alignment accounts for the strategically adaptive intersubjectivity instituted during the trial, on the one hand, and for the rising tension of the proceedings, on the other hand. In what follows, the dominant strategy of divergent alignment distributed on the *tetravalent web of vectors* is exemplified. The examination of the two segments selected from the trial transcription highlights the dynamics of alignment during the turn-by-turn sequential unfolding of the interaction. The analysis adopts the speaking subject's perspective and solutions when they each undertake the task of participating in a dysfunctional trial.

The first segment represents the opening scene of the trial. The speaking subjects are the presiding judge and Ceaușescu, who both define themselves as the main players of the trial. Their initial confrontation is unexpected and problematic for the trial, but beneficial for the stance field. Within a limited number of turns (8 turns), they prematurely install two vectors of alignment (competition and commitment); they identify themselves not only according to their roles (presiding judge and defendant), but also according to their negotiated power (the protagonist and the antagonist); they place themselves in the prominent dual positions of speaking subjects and cognitive pillars: the former position allows them to produce interaction, while the latter one locates themselves and the other discourse participants in the socio-cognitive field; lastly, they launch two intertwined lines of the multiparty interaction: the trial and the meta-trial.

(1) 1. Judecător: Vă rog să luați loc. Suntem în fața unui tribunal al poporului.

2. N. Ceaușescu: Nu recunosc niciun tribunal în afară de Marea Adunare Națională.

3. Judecător: Marea Adunare Națională s-a desființat. Noul organ al puterii este altul.

4. N. Ceaușescu: Lovitura de stat nu poate fi recunoscută.

5. Judecător: Noi judecăm după noua lege adoptată de către Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naționale. Te rog să te ridici în picioare, inculpat.

6. N. Ceaușescu: Citiți Constituția țării.

7. Judecător: Am citit-o, o cunoaștem și nu este cazul să dai dumneata indicații să citim Constituția țării. O știm mai bine decât dumneata care n-ai respectat-o.

8. N. Ceaușescu: Nu voi răspunde la nicio întrebare.

1. Judge: Please be seated. We are before a people's court.

2. N. Ceaușescu: I do not recognise any tribunal other than the Grand National Assembly.

3. Judge: The Grand National Assembly has been dissolved. The new organ of power is different.

4. N. Ceaușescu: The coup cannot be recognised.

5. Judge: We are judging by the new law adopted by the National Salvation Front Council. Please stand up, defendant.

6. N. Ceaușescu: Read the country's Constitution.

7. Judge: We have read it, we know it, and there is no need for you to give instructions to read the country's Constitution. We know it better than you, who didn't respect it.

8. N. Ceaușescu: I will not answer any question.

The presiding judge's initial intention is to make a protocol introduction in which he first invites everybody present in the improvised courtroom to sit down, and then he informs about the seriousness of the gathering. He avoids the formality and the rigor of the procedure, and instead he hesitantly presents the court using an inclusive strategy: *suntem în fața unui tribunal al poporului* ("we are before a people's court") [turn 1]. Ceaușescu perceives the hesitancy and self-selects himself as the next speaker, excluding himself from the all-inclusive 1st person plural. His move is deviant for many reasons: he does not ask permission to speak; he does not stand up when he addresses the court – specifically the presiding judge; he rejects the framing for the situation (the trial is deviated in a meta-trial); and he ostentatiously uses a negative verb in the 1st person singular that confidently challenges the legitimacy of the trial: *nu recunosc niciun tribunal* ("I do not recognise any court") [turn 2]. The dictator does not leave any time to the presiding judge to define him as defendant in the trial. The *vector of competition* is urgently set up together with a *divergent alignment*: the defendant's *subversion* of the interaction is a stance act that reacts against the presiding judge's tentative *domination* to frame and to monitor

the trial. The intersubjectivity of the stance differential is observable in the affirmative/negative polarity of the verbs (*suntem* "we are"/*nu recunosc* "I do not recognise"), in the contrasted inclusive/exclusive usage of the 1st person inflections of the verbs (*suntem* "we are" – 1st person plural/*nu recunosc* "I do not recognise" – 1st person singular), and in the dialogic syntax that recycles the indefinite determination (*unui tribunal* "a court" [turn 1]) turning it into a radical negation (*niciun tribunal* "[no] tribunal" [turn 2]).

In the next sequence of turns, Ceaușescu invests in his identity work. In spite of his humble and vulnerable status as defendant, he asserts himself as a powerful player, who antagonises the presiding judge's privileged position as protagonist. In each turn, Ceaușescu introduces a new object of stance: *Marea Adunare Națională* ("the Grand National Assembly") [turn 1], *lovitura de stat* ("the coup") [turn 4], and *Constituția țării* ("the Constitution") [turn 6]. He deviates the initial trajectory of the verbal interaction and attempts to self-promote himself from defendant to leader. This unauthorised attempt forces the presiding judge to ask the defendant to stand up, explicitly addressing him with the appellative *inculpat* ("defendant") [turn 5]. This is a delayed reminder of the protocol in court, which counts as a stance intervention and repair in the competition between the presiding judge and the defendant. Ceaușescu self-assuredly plays the role of the stance instigator who fights for epistemic supremacy. He positions himself as the knowledgeable one when he patronisingly orients the directive force of the verbal action towards the presiding judge and instructs him to update his readings: *Citiți Constituția țării* ("Read the country's Constitution") [turn 6]. The imperative form of the verb emphasises the dictator's dismissive stance that disqualifies the presiding judge from leading the trial.

The dynamics of divergent alignment on the competition vector opposes the presiding judge's domination to the defendant's subversion. The dialogicity of the divergence is linguistically articulated in the resonant verbal forms. The *stancyness* of the imperative *citiți* ("[you$_{PL}$] read"), which projects the action as to be urgently completed, is contrasted with the indicative used by the presiding judge' next turn: *am citit-o* ("we have read it") [turn 7]. In his extended turn, the presiding judge creates a progressive series of verbs meant to consolidate his epistemic status: *am citit-o, o cunoaștem* [...]. *O știm mai bine decât dumneata* ("we have read it, we know it [...]. We know it better than you") [turn 7]. The presiding judge tries to evade his vulnerable position playing with the clusivity (Wieczorek 2013, 15) of the *we*-pronoun. The verbal inflection of the 1st person plural IN-cludes all the present persons entitled to know the Constitution, and EX-

cludes, "expels" the dictator from the category of the initiated ones. The dictator avoids sterile conflicts in the verbal interaction. He prefers to look for epistemic advantage on the vector of competition, going back to the meta-trial frame opened earlier (*Nu recunosc niciun tribunal* "I do not recognise any tribunal" [turn 2]), and continuing his action as stance instigator: *Nu voi răspunde la nicio întrebare* ("I will not answer any question") [turn 8]. The turns display the same syntactic arrangement (*nu recunosc/nu voi răspunde* "I do not recognise"/"I will not answer") with the difference that the verb is used in the future. The dictator recovers his subversive alignment and upgrades it. He implicitly identifies the script of a prototypical trial (an interrogation will follow). Before the presiding judge starts the examination and the questioning, he (the defendant) anticipates his unwillingness to participate in the trial. He re-writes the script, opting for a meta-trial in which he may discuss, talk, explain, or clarify, without technically answering or declaring anything. The dictator thus manages to frame the encounter according to his own agenda.

The analysed segment also presents the inauguration of another vector, namely the *vector of commitment* oriented to the new power, that spectral entity functioning as a redundant cognitive anchor for the legal participants. They cognitively need the protective authority that motivates them into carrying out an illegitimate trial. The presiding judge is the one who explicitly mentions the new power in two successive turns. First, he timidly introduces the entity with a calculated indeterminacy: *Noul organ al puterii este altul* ("The new organ of power is different") [turn 3], and then, in a following turn, he specifies its full name: *Noi judecăm după noua lege adoptată de către Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naționale* ("We are judging by the new law adopted by the National Salvation Front Council") [turn 5]. The presiding judge aligns himself and the other members of his team with this cognitive pillar. His *conformity alignment* will be later challenged by the dictator, who uses the vector of commitment disputing the legality of the new power and objecting forcefully to its interests (the *denunciation alignment*).

The next selected segment is the direct continuation of the first one in the transcript. After the false start initiated by the dictator, the trial has to be re-started and the forces in the stance field should be rebalanced. This segment shows *the tetravalent web of vectors* in its entirety. There are four successive speaking subjects involved in the interaction and their adaptive moves display the strategy of *multivectorial and concomitant alignment*. The *vector of cooperation* is also activated and places the participants in a state of cognitive preparedness, so that they can provide each other different forms of support and encouragement.

(2) 1. Avocat 1: Suntem avocatul T.N. din baroul București și avocatul L.C. din baroul avocaților București. Noi suntem aceia care urmează să le asigurăm apărarea celor doi inculpați ce compar în fața tribunalului militar teritorial. Vă rog să-mi dați aprobarea să iau legătură cu cei doi.
2. Judecător: Poftim, două minute.
3. Avocat 1: Domnule Ceaușescu, este șansa de a spune ce v-a îndemnat să faceți, este un tribunal legal constituit. Organismul pe care dumneavoastră îl invocați a fost desființat prin forța poporului, prin voința poporului român. Dacă înțelegeți, vă rugăm să ne spuneți, cu ce înțelegeți să vă faceți această apărare? Este o obligație morală față de dumneavoastră, vă rugăm să vă ridicați în picioare, indiferent dacă dumneavoastră sunteți de acord sau nu. Pentru că acesta este totuși un tribunal legal constituit.
4. N. Ceaușescu: Nu dau socoteală decât în fața Marii Adunări Naționale. Nu recunosc tribunalul.
5. Judecător: Domnule avocat, vă rog să luați loc.
6. Avocat 1: Vă mulțumesc.
7. Judecător: Inculpatul a refuzat, timp de 25 de ani, să poarte un dialog cu poporul, deși a vorbit în numele poporului, ca fiul cel mai iubit al poporului, în derâdere și-a bătut joc de acest popor. Nici astăzi nu vrea să coopereze cu tribunalul, se cunosc datele. Zilele de sărbătoare erau adevărate festinuri, în care acest inculpat și această inculpată își aduceau în jurul lor camarila și cu cele mai luxoase toalete care nu existau nici la regii care au existat și există azi în lume nu era atâta fast, iar poporului îi dădea 200 gr de salam pe zi, pe buletin. Genocidul care l-au făcut acest inculpat și această inculpată jefuind poporul, își aroga dreptul de a vorbi în numele poporului, nici astăzi nu vrea să vorbească, este laș și la propriu și la figurat. Avem datele cunoscute, atât ale dânsei, cât și ale dânsului. Vă rog, reprezentantul procuraturii, îi dau cuvântul pentru a susține actul de acuzare.
8. Procuror: Domnule președinte și onorată instanță, avem de judecat astăzi pe inculpații Ceaușescu Nicolae și Ceaușescu Elena, ce se fac vinovați de grave crime îndreptate împotriva poporului român. Cei doi inculpați au săvârșit fapte incompatibile cu demnitatea umană și cu principiile justiției sociale, acționând discreționar, despotic și criminal, în mod deliberat, pentru a distruge poporul român, în numele căruia s-au erijat drept conducători, în numele căruia s-au dedat la cele mai odioase abuzuri. Pentru crimele grave săvârșite de cei doi inculpați în numele poporului român, victimele nevinovate ale acestor doi tirani, vă solicit, domnule președinte și onorată instanță, vă cer condamnarea acestora la moarte pentru săvârșirea următoarelor fapte penale [...].

1. Lawyer 1: We are the lawyer T.N. of the Bucharest bar and the lawyer L.C. of the Bucharest bar. We are the ones who are going to ensure the defence of the two defendants who appear before the territorial military tribunal. Please give me permission to consult with the two.

2. Judge: Please, two minutes.

3. Lawyer 1: Mr. Ceaușescu, this is the chance to say what he urged you to do, it is a legally constituted tribunal. The organism that you invoke was abolished by the force of the people, by the will of the Romanian people. If you understand, please, tell us with what do you mean to make this defence? It is a moral obligation to you, please stand up, whether you agree or not. Because this is still a legally constituted court.

4. N. Ceaușescu: I do not give an account except before the Grand National Assembly. I don't recognise the court.

5. Judge: Lawyer, please be seated.

6. Lawyer 1: Thank you.

7. Judge: The defendant refused, for 25 years, to have a dialogue with the people, although he spoke on behalf of the people, as the most beloved son of the people, in mockery he abused this people. He still does not want to cooperate with the court, the facts are known. Holidays were real feasts, where these defendants brought their camarilla around them and with the most luxurious toilets that did not even exist for the kings that existed and exist today in the world was not so sumptuous, and he gave the people 200 gr of salami per day, on the identity card. The genocide committed by this defendant and this defendant robbing the people, he used to claim the right to speak on behalf of the people, even today he does not want to speak, he is a coward both literally and figuratively. We have known facts, both his and hers. Please, the representative of the prosecutor's office, I give him the floor to support the indictment.

8. Prosecutor: Mr. President and Honourable Court, today we are to judge the defendants Ceaușescu Nicolae and Ceaușescu Elena who are guilty of serious crimes against the Romanian people. The two defendants committed acts incompatible with human dignity and the principles of social justice, acting in a discretionary, despotic, and criminal manner, deliberately, in order to destroy the Romanian people, in whose name they stood as rulers, in whose name they indulged in the most heinous abuses. For the serious crimes committed by the two defendants on behalf of the Romanian people, the innocent victims of these two tyrants, I request, Mr. President and honourable court, that you sentence them to death for the following criminal acts […].

The dictator keeps a low profile in this segment. He opts for a minimalistic move in which he simply reiterates his epistemic autonomy and invulnerability. No matter of the other co-participants' effort to involve him in the trial, he preserves and recovers his initial perspective through self-repetition (Rauniomaa 2008, 58). He returns to his prior talk and reuses it more or less word-for-word. He conflates the verbal material from the previous segment: *Nu recunosc niciun tribunal în afară de Marea Adunare Națională* ("I do not recognise any tribunal other than the Grand National

Assembly") [segment 1 – turn 2]; *Nu voi răspunde la nicio întrebare* ("I will not answer any question") [segment 1 – turn 8], and, after some intervening talk and gap (Rauniomaa 2008, 61), in this new segment he produces a freshly modified version of the explicitly stanced material (Rauniomaa 2008, 81): *Nu dau socoteală decât în fața Marii Adunări Naționale. Nu recunosc tribunalul* ("I do not give an account except before the Grand National Assembly. I don't recognise the court") [segment 2 – turn 4]. Ceaușescu's strategic recovery through self-repetition is located between two co-participants' contributions (the lawyer and the presiding judge).

The lawyer makes an attempt to restart the trial and to reinforce its framing as a legitimate activity. His language is pompous and procedural (abundant in courtesy formulae of address and in elements of legal jargon), but still resonates with the presiding judge's perspective. The lawyer recycles the appellative *inculpat* "defendant" and incorporates it in a technical presentation of his mission: *Noi suntem aceia care urmează să le asigurăm apărarea celor doi inculpați ce compar în fața tribunalului militar teritorial* ("We are the ones who are going to ensure the defence of the two defendants who appear before the territorial military tribunal") [turn 1]. He formally defines the trial using legal terminology. Then, in his immediately successive turn, he approaches his client, but the syntax of his extended contribution is ambiguous and duplicitous: *Dacă înțelegeți, vă rugăm să ne spuneți, cu ce înțelegeți să vă faceți această apărare? Este o obligație morală față de dumneavoastră, vă rugăm să vă ridicați în picioare, indiferent dacă dumneavoastră sunteți de acord sau nu. Pentru că acesta este totuși un tribunal legal constituit* ("If you understand, please tell us, with what do you mean to make this defence? It is a moral obligation to you, please stand up, whether you agree or not. Because this is still a legally constituted court") [turn 3]. The lawyer alternates sentences that refer to the legal service of his client's defence with sentences that address the issue of the trial and its legitimacy. The syntax is fragmented, discontinuous, and juxtaposes illogical sentences that contradict each other. This ambivalent approach signals the lawyer's strategy to engage in a demonstrative divergent alignment with Ceaușescu. Doing so, the defence lawyer visits the *commitment vector*. He aligns in *conformity* with the new power, which hopefully "sees" the pretentiousness of his role as a defence lawyer and his own self-reduction to a function without any substance and agency. Concomitantly, the lawyer reinforces *the competition vector*, continuing the presiding judge's failed work to frame the dictator as defendant. The lawyer adopts *the divergent alignment* of *domination* with Ceaușescu, when he resorts to the recovery through other-repetition technique (Rauniomaa

2008). The lawyer returns to the presiding judge's words ([turn 5] in the previous segment). He resonantly recycles them, reformulating the imperative of the verb *to stand up* in the 2nd person plural form and adding a politeness marker (*vă rugăm să vă ridicați în picioare* "please stand up" [turn 3]). The lawyer finally expands the words with an addition that aggravates the imposition of the action: *indiferent dacă dumneavoastră sunteți de acord sau nu* ("whether you agree or not") [turn 3]. The lawyer's contribution progresses the ongoing activity of the trial, on the one hand, and simultaneously fuels the interactive processes in the socio-cognitive domain, on the other hand. He secures his interventions using *the cooperation vector* and *aligning in complicity* with both the presiding judge and the other lawyer. The latter is strategically included in the institutional dissolving *we*-pronoun used in the self-introduction sequence [turn 1].

In the same segment, it is the presiding judge's turn to experiment with the strategy of *multivectorial and concomitant alignment*. Ceaușescu's minimalistic and self-resonant contribution [turn 4] puts more pressure on the stancetaking that intertwines with the talk-in-interaction. The dictator's stance resistance challenges the presiding judge to ignore the obstruction and to persevere with the trial, operating with a loose concept of justice. The trial has to be carried out (this is the imperative of the assigned task), but its completion requires a local restructuration of the participants' positions and roles. The presiding judge intersubjectively capitalises on the defendant's inadequate uptake, and feels prompted to adjust to his unresponsiveness. The solution rests on an elaborate verbal contribution that rhetorically reloads the decentred trial. From a legal point of view, the solution retrogresses the trial. The presiding judge spontaneously engages in a "lonely" monologue. His verbal action is cognitively anchored in the stance field, being distributed on multiple vectors concomitantly. New vectors are activated and mobilised: the *vector of incrimination*, oriented to the dictator (the antagonist), and the *vector of solidarity*, oriented to the people (the collective entity), in addition to the ones installed in the previous segment: the *vector of competition* and the *vector of conformity*. The presiding judge needs as many vectors as possible in his redundant action to inflate his authority, restoring his "injured" power and identity. The operative vectors do not have the same intensity and are not visited systematically. The presiding judge's verbal contribution [turn 7] is quantitatively excessive and rhetorically marked as atypical for the legal discourse. He assumes a heroic stance of confrontation that transforms the presiding judge's role into a histrionic zealous voice that speaks on behalf of the community (the people, the nation) and is determined to disgrace Ceaușescu to the world and to dismember his identity as president or leader. In this segment, *the vector of*

competition is focused on forcefully attributing the defendant role to the dictator. In his argumentative work, the presiding judge can no longer appeal to rationality ("wasted" in the first segment that represents the opening of the trial). He has to discursively build a frame in which Ceaușescu deserves nothing else than the shameful role of being a defendant. The presiding judge animates emotions and their "latent argumentative force" (Stoica 2020, 206) in order to get *dominance* in his *divergent alignment* with the stance instigator. His extended turn becomes a speech in which dysphoric emotions (raw under the circumstances of the anti-communist revolution) are strategically inserted through the mechanisms of pathemisation (Charaudeau 2000, 137–140, apud Stoica 2020, 207–208). The defendant is rhetorically hypothesised as a malignant character, who antagonises the people: *Inculpatul a refuzat [...] să poarte un dialog cu poporul, deși a vorbit în numele poporului, ca fiul cel mai iubit al poporului, în derâdere și-a bătut joc de acest popor* ("The defendant refused […] to have a dialogue with the people, although he spoke on behalf of the people, as the most beloved son of the people, in mockery he abused this people") [turn 7]. The word *people* is repeated in a tetracolon crescendo at the end of each paralleled sequence (epiphora placement). The effect of this pathemic structure is to present the dictator as the evil agent, and the people as the helpless victim. In the socio-cognitive space of the interaction, the repetition triggers the *vector of solidarity* and the *alignment of fraternity*, associated with the cognitive anchor *the people*. The presiding judge plays with one of his avatars, representing himself as the romanticised hajduk who unconditionally fights the battle against the enemy. In one of the four members of the tetracolon, the presiding judge creatively exploits an intertextual resource. The cemented syntagm: *fiul cel mai iubit al poporului* ("the most beloved son of the nation") is first decontextualised from its original and routinised context (the cult of personality repertoire circulated by the media propaganda in the service of the dictator), and then is sarcastically relocated in the dysphoric scenario of the speech (the most beloved vs the most hated). The intertextual operation dispossesses the dictator of his deified power and rearticulates his identity. The mental representation (the people as the genitor of the leader) is fractured and the indestructible relationship is broken (the son is rejected).

In the next sequence, the presiding judge amplifies his rhetorical work. He juxtaposes two vectors: he continues to operate on the *vector of solidarity* (the *alignment of fraternity* with the people) and he concomitantly explores the *vector of incrimination*. The strategy that interweaves the vectors involves the activation of the shared knowledge. The loaded memory of collective experiences (the hardships and the humiliation

endured by the people under the dictatorship) refreshes the presiding judge's speech and its pathemised texture, mobilising the people's reactions and emotional support. The presiding judge feels secured by this cognitive anchor that includes the people as an engrossed (Goodwin 1986, 293) massive entity, on the one hand, and excludes Ceaușescu as the non-engrossed "incompetent" participant, on the other hand. The judge controls the epistemics of expertise and shared experience and administrates the collective memory. He steps out from the present (the here-and-now of the trial proceedings) and steps into the past, inviting the initiated ones to time-travel together with him: *Zilele de sărbătoare erau adevărate festinuri* [...] *și cu cele mai luxoase toalete care nu existau nici la regii care au existat și există azi în lume nu era atâta fast, iar poporului îi dădea 200 gr de salam pe zi, pe buletin* ("The holidays were real feasts [...] and with the most luxurious toilets that did not even exist for the kings that existed and exist today in the world was not so sumptuous, and he gave the people 200 gr of salami per day, on the identity card") [turn 7]. The percipients are immersed in the temporal density of the past and in the storified phantasma (Beach 1985) of poverty, injustice, and abuses. The past is mythically reframed through the amalgamation of fragmented narrative tropes that amplify the pathemic investment (the prince and the pauper, the bad king, the monster king who commits a populicide, the insane ruler). The verbs used in the imperfect past tense (*erau* "were", *aduceau* "brought", *nu existau* "did not exist", *nu era* "was not", *dădea* "gave") intensify the projection and incite the people's cognitive imagism. The *vector of incrimination* is in charge with the "weaponised" accusations that are rhetorically crafted to justify the dictator's status in the trial (defendant) and to twist people's perception of him.

   The work of the accusatory alignment culminates in the stance arena when the presiding judge draws on the manipulation of the deictic field. The distal/proximal ambivalence of the deictic determiner locates the dictatorial couple on a stage of public shame. Pointing a finger at each of the two defendants makes their individual guilt more prominent and allows the people to transform each of them into an object of scrutiny: *acest inculpat și această inculpată își aduceau în jurul lor camarila* [...]. *Genocidul care l-au făcut acest inculpat și această inculpată* ("these defendants brought their camarilla around them [...]. The genocide committed by this defendant and this defendant") [turn 7]. The determiner *acest* "this" cumulates an ambivalent function: it refers orientationally (*deixis ad oculos*) to the defendants in the immediate vicinity of the improvised courtroom in which they are physically observable and exposed to the oppression of "legal hypervisibilisation" (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015, 176); it also

refers conceptually (*deixis ad phantasma*) to the defendants as if they are projected in a psychologically remote deictic field in which they should be identified as the degraded source of all evil and in which their guilt is cognitively incommensurable, non-demonstrable. In addition to the rhetorical *incrimination* of the dictator and to the *solidarity* with the victimised people, the presiding judge operates on the *commitment* vector, aligning in *conformity* with the new power. The technical terminology (*genocide* "genocide") is impersonally inserted in juxtaposition with the subjective stylistics of the speech. The genocide is the most important charge of the indictment dictated by the new power (the framer of the trial). The presiding judge needs the protection and the language of the framing entity to legitimise his rhetorical investment and to further authorise the progress of the "trial".

The prosecutor's turn validates that the presiding judge is the stance "trendsetter" of the trial. He prefaces the reading of the indictment with a series of redundant considerations that are resonant with the "subjective rationality" (Charaudeau 2000, 130, apud Stoica 2020, 206) of the previous speaker. The prosecutor's mini-speech starts with a courtesy form of address to the court, followed by a formal statement that hurriedly displays his willingness to *collaborate* with the team. He attunes with the presiding judge (*Suntem în faţa unui tribunal al poporului* "we are in front of a people's court" [segment 1 – turn 1]), and then with the lawyer (*urmează să le asigurăm apărarea* "[we] are going to ensure the defence" [segment 2 – turn 1]), when he expresses his involvement in the trial using the referential ambiguity and extended IN-clusivity of the *we*-pronoun (*avem de judecat astăzi* "today we are to judge" [segment 2 – turn 8]). He signals that he adopts the determination and the legitimisation of the group to put the defendant on trial, even if he cannot rely on a prosecutorial investigation. *The collaborative vector* (the *alignment of complicity*) is augmented by the *vector of competition*. The stance marker for the prosecutor's *alignment of domination* is the ostentatious repetition of the word *inculpat* "defendant" (*inculpaţii Ceauşescu Nicolae şi Ceauşescu Elena* "the defendants Ceauşescu Nicolae and Ceauşescu Elena"; *cei doi inculpaţi au săvârşit fapte incompatibile cu demnitatea umană* "The two defendants committed acts incompatible with human dignity"; *crimele grave săvârşite de cei doi inculpaţi* "the serious crimes committed by the two defendants" [turn 8]). This repetition is resonant with the presiding judge's effort [turn 7] to frame the trial and to convince the dictator that, technically speaking, he is a defendant, and that, rhetorically speaking, he deserves the moral disgust.

The prosecutor duplicates the strategy of pathemisation adopted by the presiding judge's prior turn and visits the same vectors: *the vector of*

solidarity (the *alignment of fraternity* with the victimised people) and the *vector of incrimination* (the *provocative alignment* with the dictator). In order to avoid a flat stylistic imitation, the prosecutor uses the cognitive operation of schematisation (Sakita 2006, 468). He extracts the principles of the rhetorical scheme and partially innovates it. The lexical parallelism (the repetition of the syntagm *în numele poporului* "in the name of the people") is recycled in the syntactic pattern borrowed from the presiding judge (*a vorbit în numele poporului* "he spoke on behalf of the people"; *își aroga dreptul de a vorbi în numele poporului* "he used to claim the right to speak on behalf of the people"). The prosecutor elaborates a rhetorical structure (a bicolon) that features the repetition of the words *on behalf of the people* using an anaphora: *pentru a distruge poporul român, în numele căruia s-au erijat drept conducători, în numele căruia s-au dedat la cele mai odioase abuzuri* ("in order to destroy the Romanian people, in whose name they stood as rulers, in whose name they indulged in the most heinous abuses") [turn 8]. The pathemisation strategy is upgraded by hyperbolisation (the use of superlative), which shows the rhetorical amplification of the prosecutor's incrimination. His rhetorical approach of the vectors (*incrimination* and *solidarity*) builds to a climax of beastification when the defendants are designated as agents of extreme domination (*cei doi tirani* "the two tyrants") and their actions are evaluated in the ascending gradation of a tricolon (*acționând discreționar, despotic și criminal* "acting in a discretionary, despotic, and criminal manner"). The prosecutor closes his mini-speech (the rhetorical preface of the indictment) with exactly the same courtesy forms of address he uses in the opening.

5. Conclusions

In this chapter, Du Bois's stance model (2007) has been accommodated and has proved to be a theoretically robust framework for examining Ceaușescu's trial as a revisited object of study. It is easy for any observer to notice the turbulent interactional surface of the trial, the legal abuse, or the political instrumentalisation of the proceedings. The present analysis has tried to go beyond the obviousness of the material (the dialogue), and to reveal its hidden mechanisms (the dialogicity). Participation in the trial has been viewed as a real task, completed under exceptional circumstances (the pre-established time frame and verdict). The key participants in the trial are literally landed at military base UM 01417 by helicopter. From a symbolic perspective, this placement in an unfamiliar environment can be deciphered as a *rite of passage* experience; from an interactional perspective, this has been approached as a structure that triggers "real-time behavioural events […] co-constructed by co-

acting agents" (Jensen 2014, 2). The speaking subjects' adjustment to the encounter has involved intensive sense-making and stancetaking processes fertilised by the adverse conditions: the legal exceptionality, the atmosphere, the psychological stressors, and the political pressure. The strategic hesitation and disorientation (the ambivalent adherence to the law and to the revolution) in completing the assigned task determined the dissolution and the hybridisation of roles. The dysfunctional trial operated permissively, deviating from the normative conduct of neutrality, impartiality, and dispassion, highly valued in the sanctum of a courtroom. Other analysts have rightly perceived these deviances as professional misconduct and as unethical submission to the political order.

The analysis of the stancetaking mechanisms has put the amorality of stance to good use and has consequently highlighted the strategic adjustment to the circumstantial priorities of the evolving verbal interaction. From the participants' perspective, the trial has not been a show, but an experience in which they strategically and intersubjectively positioned themselves. The assigned task necessitated the participants' vigilant investment and adjustment to the stressfully fragile process of identity destructuration and restructuration. In the stance battlefield of the trial, the institutional or political hierarchies have been suspended, all participants being equal in their free access to a diversity of stances. However, the social sensitivity of stance has made the participants responsible for their stance choices and has condemned them to stance ownership and accountability that, according to Du Bois (2007), are always for real and cannot be shifted, faked, or cancelled.

The analysis of the trial has systematically accommodated the three components of Du Bois' stance triangle – the speaking subjects, the stance objects, and the process of alignment. The exploration of each component (two elements and a process) supports the idea that the proceedings unfolded dynamically and progressed turn-by-turn, through the give-and-take of the multiparty verbal interaction. The tension and dramatism that evolved during the trial were stance-driven. The manipulation of the stance objects involved a complexity of strategies detectable in the socio-cognitive space. The borderline legality of the court proceedings catalysed the dynamism of the stance objects and their "agitated" mobility. The dual framing (a trial vs a meta-trial) compelled the stancetakers to manipulate objects and meta-objects of stance and to create coherent transitions between them. The participants were supposed to improve their stance performance "on the go", while interacting and facing the unstable boundary between the possession and the loss of the stance object, the possession and the loss of stance advantages. The strategies that have been

described reinforce the thesis that the predetermined verdict of the trial vitiated the legality, but stimulated the interactionality of the proceedings. This was demonstrated by the competitive stance exchanges and their unscripted modulations, trajectories, and configurations. The abundance of the stance objects inevitably generated disruptive stance attacks that ultimately mobilised and "coagulated" all the participants both successively (as shown by the *strategies of individualism*: *prioritisation*, *license*, *censorship*, and *innovation*), and simultaneously (as shown by the *collective strategies*: *long passing*, *recycling*, and *soft interception*). The trial divided the participants in legally opposing forces or teams, while the strategies used for the management of the stance objects required the participants' co-work and coordinated efforts, especially when they elaborated divergent stances and alignments or when they were pressured to find impromptu solutions in critical moments during the trial. The manipulation of the stance objects followed the general pattern of *stance opportunism*. In spite of its self-centricity and self-protection (each participant is focused on his survival in the achievement of the task), there are invisible bridges that were established between both the collaborating and the competing participants present in the unlevelled stance field.

The analysis of alignment focused on two successive segments that represent the opening of the trial. There were four speaking subjects involved in the analysed segments, totalling a number of sixteen turns. They set the socio-cognitive stage for the proceedings. In spite of the verbal exchanges, which were characterised by instability, conflict, and turbulence, the analysis has illustrated the force of the alignment to put the stagnant trial on a feasible trajectory. The precocious emergence of the *tetravalent web of vectors* (*competition*, *incrimination*, *commitment*, and *solidarity*) has been analysed as a strategic product of the participants' joint work. Right from the very start, a dynamic principle of divergence set the traffic of alignment in motion, which prompts the subsequent development of particularised forms of divergence or *stance differential modulations* (Du Bois and Kärkkäinen 2012, 446) for each vector: *domination*/*subversion*; *provocation*/*contestation*; *conformity*/*denunciation*; *fraternisation*/*loyalty*. The dictator's undisciplined behaviour as a defendant may seem counterproductive to the trial, but it empowered him to be the *stance catalyst* or the *stance instigator* who challenges the other stancetakers' alignment strategies. From the speaking subjects' perspective, the verbal contributions displayed the *adaptive strategy of multivectorial and concomitant alignment*. Some participants operated with the strategy of distributing it in successive turns, while others managed it within one single turn. As the trial has progressed, the speaking subjects learned from each other and improved

their ability to cognitively adjust to the difficulty of task through *stance imitation and contamination*. The calibration of the stancetakers' alignment involved a state of cognitive alertness that assisted them in scrutinising each other's words and utterances, on one hand, and on further recycling them in resonant, repetitive, and schematised patterns of dialogicity, on the other hand. While the verbal interaction exhibited adversarial and conflictual acts performed by radicalised opponents (who speak), the socio-cognitive field hosted coordinated stancetakers (who align themselves). The opponents still were competitive and combative in the stance battlefield, but they collaborated in order to make sense of the experience in which they were inescapably engaged. The socio-cognitive layer of the trial is more spacious compared to the verbal interaction. The verbal exchanges involved a limited number of interactants who were supposed to take turns, while the stance exchanges facilitated the alignment with imagined "scoped" cognitive entities that are non-speaking, but nevertheless *stanceable* and controlling. This ultimately explains the tension of the trial, its interactionality, and the density of engagement produced by the speaking subjects.

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PART II.

STANCETAKING IN ONLINE COMMUNICATION

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL POSTS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS
FROM A DIALOGIC PERSPECTIVE

STANCA MĂDA AND RĂZVAN SĂFTOIU

1. Introduction

Social media has become an important means of expressing political views or for commenting on political events. Whether the goal is to foster the image of a modern and dynamic politician or because they realise the immense potential for communication that these tools represent, nowadays "most politicians start a website and open a profile on social networking sites because they believe that they cannot *not* be there" (Giansante 2015, 7). Digital communication tools are employed by politicians either to amplify their message or simply to help increase the numbers of fans and followers. The Internet, like any technology, is employed at any given moment to meet the needs of those who use it: politicians, in our case. There are two essential objectives, in politics in general and on the web in particular: (i) to help people feel closer to the political process and build a relationship based on trust, and (ii) to encourage political participation, in the form of acquiring information, debating, attending rallies, and, finally, voting[1].

   Politicians use their official pages on various social networks to reach out to and influence specific audiences during political campaigns or other

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[1] "The web is not only a means of making content visible and accessible, nor even simply of attracting an audience's attention; it is far more than that. It is not merely an instrument of communication, as television and daily newspapers are. It is also an effective tool for listening to the opinions of voters, including them in the decision-making process, and building a relationship of trust that motivates them to participate personally, not only online – sharing content and helping to disseminate it – but offline as well, with their friends and families, taking part in political events and contributing their own time and effort as activists and campaign volunteers" (Giansante 2015, 8).

PR communication campaigns. Although academic research on social media campaigning has flourished in the past several years (see Boulianne 2016 and Jungherr 2016 for a thorough review of the literature), it has focused mainly on larger instances like entire campaigns or accounts on social networks, and not on particular dialogic action games.

In this chapter, we discuss stance as a dialogic phenomenon, as it unfolds in online political communication via Facebook. The analysis is based on a post published by Gabriela Firea, at that time the mayor of Bucharest, the capital of Romania, after an event organised for Simona Halep, the winner of the 2018 French Open at Roland Garros, and 1090 comments added by her followers and other Facebook users in the first 30 minutes from the original publication.

In our analysis, we will start from the following premises: (1) human beings negotiate their purposes with their fellow beings, i.e. they act and react, (2) acting and reacting means dialogic action, and (3) language use means language action. In other words, we will not simply treat utterances, i.e. the posts, as means of speaking or expressing thoughts, but as "carriers of action and result from the interaction of different human abilities: speaking, thinking, and perceiving" (Weigand 2018, 12). Web-based discussions, i.e. Facebook posts, are a particular model of dialogic interaction, where participants can act and react according to the ethos of their choice (e.g., supporter of a politician, supporter of an athlete, supporter of sports in general, etc.), as they try to achieve their purpose more or less effectively (Weigand 2008). These discussions can be polyphonic (White 2003) at times, and various action games can be achieved; they can be games of persuasion, evaluation, and/or solidarity. In carrying out these complex action games, speakers and hearers use multiple voices and perspectives, and encode dialogic stance.

In the next section, we will present the theoretical framework of the investigation. Section **3.** focuses on the initial post, which functions as the *action* of the dialogic game, while section **4.** deals with the *reaction*, examining the various types of comments following the original message. In these sections, we will identify and comment upon various realisations of the linguistic cues associated with stance. The final section is dedicated to conclusions and discussions.

2. Theoretical Framework

By simply talking to a friend, one may notice that one and the same thing can be viewed, categorised, and evaluated differently. Since the approach of this chapter is on the interactional co-construction of positions, or

stancetaking, we will move on to examine some theories that start from the premise that human beings, while interacting with peers, learn to adopt and adapt others' perspective or point of view. From a discursive perspective, stancetaking has been investigated under several labels, which – in our opinion – refer to the same phenomenon. One of these labels is *perspectivation*, put forward by Graumann and Kallmeyer (2002, 4):

> perspectivity is deeply incorporated in language structure as a result of the anthropomorphism of language […] [and] perspectivation [refers to] the verbal practices speakers use to represent perspectives – own and others', and their interrelations.

It appears that contextualisation and intertextuality are important when speakers communicate a certain perspective. Thus, perspectivity is the result of a speaker's positioning with regard to a certain object. The authors also emphasise the interplay between the two complementary activities involved in perspectivation (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 5): *perspective-setting* – the focus is on the speaker and it depends on language use, and *perspective-taking* – the focus is on the receiver and is achieved at mental level.

Since perspectives can be achieved both cognitively and linguistically, we bring forward a systematic investigation of stance expressions that was advanced by Biber and Finegan (1988). They attribute stance directly to the speaker and define it as "the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message" (1988, 12). Thus, stance covers epistemic expressions (i.e. expressions of certainty/doubt, actuality, precision, and limitation), attitudinal expressions (i.e. personal attitudes or feelings), and style-related expressions (i.e. a speaker's comments on the communication itself).

Based on his analyses of academic discourse, Hyland (2005) sees stance as an attitudinal dimension and includes features that refer to the ways writers present themselves and convey their judgments, opinions, and commitments. The author identifies four linguistic devices of stance:

(i) hedges (devices that withhold complete commitment to a proposition), e.g., *possible*, *may*, *could*, etc.;

(ii) boosters (devices that allow writers to express their certainty in what they say and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their audience), e.g., *should*, *definitely*, *of course*, etc.;

(iii) attitude markers (devices that indicate the writer's affective, rather than epistemic, attitude to propositions, conveying surprise, agreement,

importance, frustration, rather than commitment), e.g., *believe*, *remarkable*, *extraordinary*, *interesting*, etc.;

(iv) self-mention (the use of first-person pronouns and possessive adjectives to present information), e.g., *I*, *we*, *our*, etc.

However, stancetaking describes complex activities accomplished through language and, therefore, requires a holistic theory of human action. For Du Bois (2007), stancetaking is

> a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the socio-cultural field (2007, 163).

Accordingly, stancetaking refers to the evaluation of the world and the interlocutors, the expression of emotions, beliefs, and desires, claiming or disavowing authority, and even to the creation of alignment or dis-alignment with others. Du Bois (2007, 141) distinguishes between objective, subjective, and intersubjective stance and discusses the "stance triangle", a tri-act that contains a *first evaluating subject*, a *second evaluating subject*, and the shared *object of evaluation*. Within the triangle, there are three stancetaking activities: evaluation, positioning, and alignment. *Evaluation* happens when the subject orients himself/herself to an object and characterises it as having some specific quality or value: affective or epistemic. By *positioning* with regard to an object, the subject invokes sociocultural values with respect to that object. *Alignment* with an object involves adopting, directly or indirectly, a point of view between two stances and, implicitly, between two stancetakers. The *stance act* (Du Bois 2007, 163) includes the three parts described above and they can only be achieved simultaneously in dialogue.

According to orientation, stance can appear to be: *objective* – the author does not project self in the text, but (s)he records facts, events, or dialogues objectively; *subjective/individual* – the author projects self as part of an interactional process that leaves traces in discourse; or *intersubjective* – the dialogical dimension of textualisation becomes manifest and the author records voices from outside the text (Vasilescu 2010, 369).

As previously stated, we hold stance to be inherently dialogic since it is not based on a single speaker, but rather stancetaking is about the evaluation of entities in the discourse (Du Bois 2007) by (canonically two) speakers (or subjects, in Du Bois' terms) and the similarity and difference they display with respect to their evaluations. This is in line with Weigand's Mixed Game Model (2010), a holistic theory of dialogue that

describes how language is integrated in a general theory of human action (cf. Weigand 2017). The Dialogic Principle proper claims that communicative actions are dialogic actions, mutually dependent on each other. Weigand (2010) asserts that dialogic use of language means dialogic interaction, emphasising language ACTION instead of language expression. Thus, action is the fundamental concept of the theory of dialogue. Starting from the premise that "not everything is said or intended to be said explicitly" (2010, 79), Weigand puts forward a superordinate predicate, INTEREST, and shifts focus from the function (F) of a proposition (p) to the INTEREST, which becomes "the primary force of action [that is] rooted in human beings' nature as social individuals" (Weigand 2010, 79). One of the basic tenets of the dialogic action is the concept of *social interactive purpose*, which further leads to the idea that actions are not autonomous: they are dialogically-oriented, speakers and hearers negotiating meanings to arrive at an understanding. This is an integrative view of language use, which can be better understood if human abilities, cultural insights, and external surroundings are considered together.

Weigand also emphasises the idea that individuals do not communicate through independent acts, relying instead on what has been said before while, at the same time, shaping what will be said next. In other words, "every communicative act is dialogically related either to a preceding or a subsequent act" (Weigand 2010, 79). Taking the position of dialogic language use, the Dialogic Principle proper is based on the premise that human beings are social beings who engage in dialogues consisting of a sequence of *initiative actions* (the speaker makes a dialogic claim) and *reactive actions* (the speaker fulfils a dialogic claim):

> the initiative action makes a claim to the truth or volition, which is expected to be 'fulfilled' positively or negatively by the reactive action. In this way, any action in language use is dialogically oriented, either as initiative action or a reaction (Weigand 2012, 51).

Figure 1. *The Dialogic Principle proper* (Weigand 2010, 82)

Persuasion and influence are built in language as dialogue:

> rhetoric is inherent to dialogue. Texts are not just rhetorical texts if they contain rhetorical figures, they are always produced by human beings who are attempting to achieve more or less effectively certain purposes in dialogic interaction (Weigand 2010, 3).

Rhetorical principles involve rationality and logic, the traditional concerns of argument, but they also address power, emotion, and other contextual influences on dialogic utterances.

For the purposes of this analysis, the holistic theory of dialogue seems to us the most appropriate methodological framework. Under the guise of presenting facts, the Mayor of Bucharest meant to stir the emotions of her audience, and thus to influence public opinion. In other words, in her initial post, the Mayor made various claims (which will be presented in detail in section **3**.) and adopted a certain position regarding events, i.e. she *took a stance*. In turn, people reacted to this post, fulfilling the same claims (or, sometimes, making new claims, as we will discuss in section **4.**) and adopting certain positions with regard to the post, events, or politics at large, i.e. they *took a stance*. In the particular action game under scrutiny in this chapter, we hold stancetaking to be contingent on the context and define it as a process that involves the development of a discursive relationship by means of a mix of linguistic devices between a language user and a "discursive figure" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 688), that can be an interlocutor, the animator (i.e. the speaker in Goffman's (1981) terms), ideas represented in the initial post, or other texts or events. Thus, in the initial post, we will be interested in identifying those linguistic cues that may trigger a variety of reactions, while in the reactive posts, we will focus on those linguistic choices that signal either alignment (supportive stance) or disalignment (non-supportive stance) with the post, but also with the festive event or with the wider Romanian political stage.

3. The Initial Post

On June 11, 2018, Gabriela Firea organised a festive event at the National Arena in Bucharest to mark Simona Halep's return to Bucharest after winning the Tennis French Open. Simona Halep was greeted by an audience of tens of thousands, but when Gabriela Firea appeared on stage next to the tennis player, the cheers turned into jeers. Firea posted a message on her Facebook account, claiming that civic groups allied to the Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros conspired to "compromise the event". After receiving more than 1000 comments to her post in less

than half an hour, the account was blocked by the administrator[2]. It is worth noting that the event was organised two days after the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the ruling party at that time, held a public rally with more than 150,000 participants wearing white, in support of judicial reforms that were allegedly being endangered by the "parallel state"[3] or by foreign organisations that allegedly operate in Romania. While SDP politicians delivered their speeches, the participants watched the game whereby Simona Halep became the winner of the French Open at Roland Garros on wide-screen displays.

3.1. On the "Framed" Structure of the Initial Post

Though posted on her Facebook account only one hour after the event, the message was carefully edited and displays all the elements of a dialogic action, aimed at positioning the politician vis-à-vis the event and the reactions to the speech delivered by Gabriela Firea in front of the spectators at the National Arena. The post has numerous lexical elements displaying attitude and evaluation of the events[4]. At the same time, despite the block-aspect of the post, a layered structure of opening and closing frames can be depicted.

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[2] The post was retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/Alaturi-de-Gabriela-Firea-374906105980728/ on June 11, 2018, under the form of a print screen. The replies were copied in reversed order of their appearance (from the most recent one – about 28 minutes from the initial post, to the oldest one – seconds after), until the account was blocked and closed by the administrator, after repetitive attempts to edit and block the offensive replies.

[3] The term describes unofficial organisations or institutions. In the particular case of Romanian politics, the term refers to opposition against the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the ruling party at the time of the event under scrutiny in this chapter, through anti-corruption campaigns.

[4] The post will be sequentially translated in the following sections of the chapter.

The opening and closing sequences of the post mark the social frame, the larger one that includes all the others. The first ideological layer (mostly negative) prefaces the argumentative content of the post, which is immediately followed by a second ideological layer (mostly positive), as depicted below:

Figure 2. *Message layers*

In the following sections, we will analyse the social, ideological, and argumentative frames occurring in the initial post.

3.1.1. The Social Frame of the Message

The social frame comprises the opening and the closing sequences of the original post. The *opening* sequence makes an appeal to folk wisdom and presents the *context* of the event:

(1) Nicio faptă bună nu rămâne nepedepsită, spune o vorbă veche din popor!
În mai puțin de 24 de ore, Primăria Capitalei a organizat *un eveniment de ținută*, pe Arena Națională, în cadrul căruia *marea noastră campioană* Simona Halep să poată prezenta fanilor trofeul. A fost o *mobilizare uriașă*! *S-a lucrat frenetic* minut de minut.

No good deed goes unpunished, as the old folk saying goes!
In fewer than 24 hours, Bucharest City Mayor's Office organised *an outstanding event* in the National Arena, where *our great champion*, Simona Halep, would raise her trophy in front of her fans. This involved *a huge mobilisation*! Every minute was a minute of *frantic work*.

The appeal to popular wisdom (*spune o vorbă veche din popor* "as the old folk saying goes") is meant to validate Gabriela Firea's point of view vis-

à-vis the event and expresses her position towards her actions as being a *good deed* for which she was *punished* by the audience. The view of this act as an injustice seeks validation in the form of a popular saying and, at the same time, in the recognition of the politician's merits.

The *context* presented in the next few lines has two components: a factual one and a self-laudatory one. The factual data comprises elements related to time, place, organisers, the main guest, and the occasion. The self-laudatory component is rich in encomiastic constructions: *un eveniment de ținută* ("an outstanding event"), *marea noastră campioană* ("our great champion"), *o mobilizare uriașă* ("a huge mobilisation"), and *s-a lucrat frenetic* ("ongoing frantic work"). The marked time frame (*în mai puțin de 24 de ore* "in fewer than 24 hours", *minut de minut* "every single minute") adds intensity and displays the diligence of the efforts made by the Mayor's Office.

The closing sequence of the post also belongs to the social frame of the message:

(2) În rest, și mâine este o zi! Și mâine e o zi de muncă! Și mâine ne vom bucura că apare soarele, că suntem sănătoși, că putem avea credință și că putem ierta. Ai câștigat, continuă! Ai pierdut, continuă!

Irrespective of all that, tomorrow is another day! Tomorrow is another working day! And tomorrow we will rejoice that the sun rises, that we are healthy, that we can have faith, and that we can forgive. Did you win? Keep going! Did you lose? Keep going!

The post ends with an intertextual reference to the famous quote in the end of *Gone with the Wind*: "After all, tomorrow is another day!", emphasised by repetition and contextual additions: "working day" (*zi de muncă*), the day in which "we will rejoice that the sun rises, that we are healthy, that we can have faith, and that we can forgive" (*ne vom bucura că apare soarele, că suntem sănătoși, că putem avea credință și că putem ierta*). Health, faith, and forgiveness are commonly acknowledged as unquestionable human and Christian values, which is obvious in the use of the inclusive plural pronoun *we*. By means of the strategic use of this pronoun, Gabriela Firea aims at mending fences with both her followers and her detractors. Erasing the negative past in order to build a brighter future seems to be the key to maintaining good public relations with her followers. The very end of the post is a quote from the world of sports: *Ai câștigat, continuă! Ai pierdut, continuă!* ("Did you win? Keep going! Did you lose? Keep going!"), attributed to Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the modern Olympic Games. The allusion to one of the strongest beliefs of

the world of sports shows determination and a lifelong commitment to competing.

3.1.2. The Ideological Frame of the Message

The initiative action comprises two ideological sequences. The first one occurs immediately after the context:

> (3) De dimineață, însă, *aparatul* soroșist *de propagandă*, prin *organele sale tributare de presă, a demarat acțiunea: compromiterea evenimentului*. Cu tot felul de *știri false* și *comentarii răutăcioase*. Nu a contat că *umbresc* momentul unic pentru Simona Halep. Nu a contat că, seara, *martori au fost și copii, la un festival al urii și dezbinării.*
>
> But, in the morning, the Soros-ist *propaganda apparatus*, through *its mouthpieces in the media, put their plan into motion: compromising the event*. With all kinds of *fake news* and *malicious comments*. It did not matter that they *tarnished* what should have been a unique moment for Simona Halep. It did not matter that, later that evening, *children witnessed this festival of hatred and discord.*

It is a historical fact that, in Romania, SDP followed in the footsteps of the former Romanian Communist Party, and many elements of propaganda, specific to the communist regime, can be found in the lines above. This heritage is visible in expressions such as: *aparatul soroșist de propagandă* ("the Soros-ist propaganda apparatus"), *organele sale tributare de presă* ("its mouthpieces in the media"), *a demarat acțiunea: compromiterea evenimentului* ("put their plan into motion: compromising the event"). At the same time, the ideological sequence combines elements from the newly emerged, post-communist propaganda style, with an appeal to widely recognised reprehensible facts and the set of subsequent emotions raised by them: *știri false* ("fake news"), *comentarii răutăcioase* ("malicious comments"), *umbresc momentul unic* ("they tarnished this unique moment"), or *martori au fost și copii, la un festival al urii și dezbinării* ("children witnessed this festival of hatred and discord"). The set of contrasting timeframes (*de dimineață* "in the morning", *seara* "later that evening") contribute to the narrativisation of the first propagandistic sequence.

    The second ideological sequence closes the frame opened by the first one. It comes immediately after the argumentative part of the message and refers to the events that took place at the stadium:

(4) *Echipe de cetățeni cu venin au venit bine organizate, plasate strategic printre oameni decenți*, care au venit la un eveniment memorabil pentru Simona Halep. De dragul ei și din respect pentru performanța sa uriașă, puteau lăsa o jumătate de oră ura la poarta Arenei Naționale. Acolo este despre sport, respect, valori, performanță. *Nu despre câți bani primim de la ONG-uri dubioase, pentru a transforma Bucureștiul într-un oraș sub asediu*. Slavă Domnului că cei mai mulți sunt oameni civilizați, democrați, cu respectul fiecăruia de a avea dreptul să nu fie de acord cu celălalt.

Well-organised teams of spiteful individuals positioned themselves strategically among decent people who had come for a memorable event honouring Simona Halep. For her sake and out of respect for her tremendous performance, they could have left their hatred at the gate of the National Sports Arena for half an hour. This is about sports, respect, values, performance. *It's not about how much money we receive from shady NGOs to transform Bucharest into a city under siege*. Thank God that the majority of people are civilised and democratic, respectful of each person's right to disagree with another.

The elements of communist propaganda herald the revelation of a diabolic plan, orchestrated against the Mayor's well-meaning efforts: *Echipe de cetățeni cu venin* […] *bine organizate, plasate strategic printre oameni decenți* ("well-organised teams of spiteful individuals, strategically placed among decent people"); *Nu despre câți bani primim de la ONG-uri dubioase, pentru a transforma Bucureștiul într-un oraș sub asediu* ("It's not about how much money we receive from shady NGOs to transform Bucharest into a city under siege"). Contrasting elements such as *cetățeni cu venin* ("spiteful individuals") vs *oameni decenți* ("decent people"), *civilizați, democrați, cu respect[ul]* ("civilised, democratic, respectful"); *echipe* ("teams") vs *cei mai mulți* ("the majority") emphasise the manichaeistic view of this type of propaganda.

3.1.3. The Argumentative Frame of the Message

The central layer in the structure of the message is represented by the argumentative component and consists of two sequences: an appeal to history and a justification for the present action.

(5) Când am declarat-o Cetățean de onoare al Municipiului București, mulți au strâmbat din nas. Și au comentat negativ.
When I declared her an Honorary Citizen of Bucharest, many frowned. And made negative comments.

The mention (in this context) of a previous event (*am declarat-o Cetățean de onoare al Municipiului București* "I declared her an Honorary Citizen of Bucharest") along with its repercussions (*mulți au strâmbat din nas. Și au comentat negativ* "many frowned. And made negative comments") is meant to add weight to the justification of the present action:

(6) Acum, dacă nu o primeam așa cum merita, ar fi spus că sunt arogantă și că nu îmi fac datoria de primar general. În toate capitalele civilizate ale lumii, marii campioni sunt întâmpinați cu entuziasm de cetățeni și sunt recompensați prin intermediul autorităților de la acel moment: ministru, primar, președinte de federație etc. Nu există o altă cale civilizată prin care să ne arătăm respectul față de valorile noastre. Repet, dacă nu organizam nimic și nu ofeream Cheia Orașului într-un cadru festiv, aveam să fiu certată că sunt nepăsătoare. Dacă mi-am făcut datoria de român și primar, nici așa nu a fost bine... pentru unii.

Now, if I had not received her as she deserved, they would have said that I am arrogant and that I don't do my duty as the city's Mayor. In every civilized capital in the world, great champions are welcomed enthusiastically by the citizens and are rewarded by the authorities of the time: be it Ministers, the Mayor, the President of the Sports Federation, etc. There is no other civilized way of showing our appreciation for our outstanding citizens. I repeat, if I had not organised anything and if I had not offered her the Key to the City in a festive ceremony, I would have been admonished for being dismissive. When I did my duty as a Romanian and as Mayor, this wasn't good either... for some.

Offering a great champion the Key to the City in a festive ceremony is the event for which Gabriela Firea advocates her efforts. The appeal to foreign models of "every civilised capital" (*toate capitalele civilizate*) is marked as the only possible solution (*single authority* fallacy): *Nu există o altă cale civilizată prin care să ne arătăm respectul față de valorile noastre* ("There is no other civilised way of showing our appreciation for our outstanding citizens"). Her argumentation takes the form of an imaginary dialogue with her detractors: *dacă nu o primeam așa cum merita, ar fi spus că sunt arogantă și că nu îmi fac datoria de primar general* ("if I had not received her as she deserved, they would have said that I am arrogant and that I don't do my duty as the city's Mayor") or *Repet, dacă nu organizam nimic și nu ofeream Cheia Orașului într-un cadru festiv, aveam să fiu certată că sunt nepăsătoare* ("I repeat, if I had not organised anything and if I had not offered the Key to the City in a festive ceremony, I would have been admonished for being dismissive"). The argumentation closes with another conditional construction (*Dacă mi-am făcut datoria de*

român și primar, nici așa nu a fost bine "When I did my duty as a Romanian and as a Mayor, this was not good either") in the same manichaeistic manner, with little concern for nuances (*pentru unii* "for some")*.* The argumentation is fallacious for many reasons, the most obvious of all (given the repetition of the *if*-constructions) being the so-called *conjunction fallacy*, which describes the assumption that an outcome simultaneously satisfying multiple conditions is more probable than an outcome satisfying a single one of them. The repeated negations *dacă nu o primeam* ("if I had not received") / *dacă nu organizam* ("if I had not organised") / *dacă nu ofeream* ("if I had not offered") apparently counterpart the positive *dacă mi-am fãcut datoria* ("if I did my duty"), which still ends in a negative outcome *nici așa nu a fost bine* ("this wasn't good either").

The layered structure of the post displays three frames that contain each other: the social frame contains the ideological frame, which encloses the argumentative frame. The result is a densely-built message that corresponds to a dialogic *action*, to which Gabriela Firea would receive equally complex *reactions*, though split in many smaller replies, as we will detail in section **4**.

3.2. Attitude Display and Evaluation

The original post displays many linguistic constructions that express evaluative reactions to political or social events and serve as attitude/stance indicators. The polarisation of attitudes is obvious: on the one hand, there is a *positive* attitude rendered by means of adjectives: *de ținută* ("outstanding"), *mare* ("great"), *uriaș* ("huge"), *frenetic* ("frantic"), *unic* ("unique"), *de onoare* ("honorary"), *festiv* ("festive"), *memorabil* ("memorable"), *civilizat* ("civilised"); nouns: *datorie* ("duty"), *valori* ("values"), *respect* ("respect"), *performanță* ("performance"), *credință* ("faith"); and verbs: *a se bucura* ("to rejoice"), *a câștiga* ("to win"); on the other hand, there is a *negative* attitude, lexically marked by the use of negation adverbs: *nu* ("no, not"), *negativ* ("negatively"); adjectives: *negativ* ("negative"); pronouns: *nicio* ("none"); constructions with the prefix *ne-* (*un-*): *nepedepsită* ("unpunished"), *nepăsătoare* ("uncaring, dismissive"), and many other words with negative connotation (adjectives, verbs, and nouns).

We conducted a quantitative analysis of the occurrences of positively and negatively-loaded words in the initial post, as well as their display in the above-mentioned sections and structural frames, in order to account for their impact on the readers and on the reactions of the followers. The

positively-loaded keywords in the given context and the number of their occurrences in the original post are: *primar/primărie* ("Mayor"/"The Mayor's Office") – 4; *capitală/București* ("capital"/"Bucharest") – 4; *Simona Halep* – 3; *mâine* ("tomorrow") – 3; *civilizaţi* ("civilised") – 3; *bun/bine* ("good"/"well") – 3; *mare campioană/mari campioni* ("great champion(s)") – 2; *cetăţeni decenţi/democraţi* ("decent/democratic citizens") – 2; *valori* ("values") – 2; *performanţă* ("performance") – 2; *a continua* ("to continue") – 2; *respect* ("respect") – 2; *Arena Naţională* ("The National Arena") – 2; *Cheia Oraşului* ("The Key to the City") – 1; *Cetăţean de onoare* ("Honorary Citizen") – 1; *trofeu* "trophy" – 1; sport ("sport") – 1; *credinţă* ("faith") – 1; *sănătate* ("health") – 1; *a se bucura* ("rejoice") – 1. The words with negative connotations and the number of occurrences in the original post are: *ură* ("hatred") – 2; *aparatul soroşist de propagandă* ("Soros-ist propagandistic apparatus") – 1; *dezbinare* ("discord") – 1; *ştiri false* ("fake news") – 1; *media* – 1; *comentarii răutăcioase/a comenta negativ* ("mischievous/negative comment(s)") – 2; *compromitere* ("compromising") – 1; *a umbri* ("tarnish") – 1; *cetăţeni cu venin* ("spiteful citizens") – 1; *bani* ("money") – 1; *ONG-uri dubioase* ("shady NGOs") – 1; *un oraş sub asediu* ("a city under siege") – 1; *nepăsător* ("uncaring") – 1; *strategic* ("strategically") – 1; *nepedepsit* ("unpunished") – 1.

The distribution of these attitude-loaded words in the sequences of the initial message is as follows:

Section	Opening	Context	Propa-ganda 1	History	Justifi-cation	Propa-ganda 2	Closing	Total
Positive	1	**7**	1	**2**	**11**	**12**	**7**	41
Negative	1	1	**7**	1	1	6	0	17

Table 1. *Distribution of the positive/negative keywords in the sequences of the post*

Of the total 41 positive occurrences and 17 negative ones, in the social frame (opening, context setting, and closing sections) there are 15 positive and only 2 negative expressions. The ideology frame displays 13 positive keywords and 13 negative ones, while the argumentative frame has 13 positive ones and only 2 negative. When comparing the three frames, we realised that the positively-loaded words are almost evenly distributed, while the negative ones show significant differences. In the propaganda sections, the number of negative keywords equals the positive ones, while in the other two frames the negative attitude is represented by only 2

occurrences. The marked negative impact of the propaganda sections of the post is obvious. Because of their presence in the ideological frame, the 13 negative keywords occurring here have a greater impact on the audience and explain the mostly negative reactive actions.

3.3. Stancetaking from a Sociolinguistic Perspective

Mentioning certain membership categories in the political post represents an appeal to a certain identity by the politician under scrutiny in this chapter or of her followers. On one hand, the use of plural nouns (*cetăţeni* "citizens", *copii* "children", *campioni* "champions", *oameni* "people", and *fani* "fans") in the initial action is meant to evaluate aspects related to the constituency, and they resonate with the values and expectations of the voters. On the other hand, the use of certain singular nouns (*Cetăţean de onoare* "Honorary Citizen", *campion* "champion", *ministru* "minister", *primar* "mayor", and *preşedinte de federaţie* "President of Sport Federation") is meant to single out certain individuals. These categories are closely related with the official identity of the speaker (Mayor of Romania's capital at that time) and with the subject matter, i.e. the festive event on National Arena. They were not chosen randomly, but with the purpose of expressing the speaker's evaluative attitude (not only positive, but also negative – *echipe de cetăţeni cu venin* "teams of spiteful citizens", *ONG-uri dubioase* "shady NGOs") towards the actors of the event.

The positioning of the author in relation to her audience and the subject matter refers mostly to the speaker's image and her degree of involvement in communication.

At a declarative level, Gabriela Firea positions herself in relation to her audience first as the mayor of the people, as shown by the appeal to folk wisdom: *Nicio faptă bună nu rămâne nepedepsită, spune o vorbă veche din popor!* ("No good deed goes unpunished, as the old folk saying goes!"), to intertextual comments from films: *În rest, şi mâine este o zi* ("After all, tomorrow is another day"), and sports: *Ai câştigat, continuă! Ai pierdut, continuă!* ("Did you win? Keep going! Did you lose? Keep going!"). Second, she appears as the *hard-working* mayor when praising the event organised by the City Mayor's Office, then as the *patriotic* mayor (*român şi primar* "a Romanian and a mayor"), as a *religious* mayor (*Slavă Domnului* "Thank God", *Şi mâine ne vom bucura că apare soarele, că suntem sănătoşi, că putem avea credinţă şi că putem ierta* "And tomorrow we will rejoice that the sun rises, that we are healthy, that we can have faith, and that we can forgive"), and, finally, as the *all-for-sports* mayor: *Acolo este despre sport, respect, valori, performanţă* ("This is

about sports, respect, values, performance"). Implicitly, Gabriela Firea also positions herself as a member of the SDP, adhering to the propaganda of the party, and as a former journalist (*aparatul soroșist de propagandă, prin organele sale tributare de presă, a demarat acțiunea: compromiterea evenimentului. Cu tot felul de știri false și comentarii răutăcioase* "the Soros-ist propaganda apparatus, through its mouthpieces in the media, put their plan into action: compromising the event. With all kinds of fake news and malicious comments").

In relation to the subject matter, Gabriela Firea strategically positions herself in all possible manners (*down*, *among*, *against*, and *with*). Thus, she looks down on the *teams of spiteful citizens*, while positioning herself among "decent people, who came for a memorable event honouring Simona Halep" (*oameni decenți, care au venit la un eveniment memorabil pentru Simona Halep*). She advocates against the opposition: "It's not about how much money we get from shady NGOs in order to transform Bucharest into a city under siege", and positions herself with "the majority of people [who] are civilised and democratic, respectful of each person's right to disagree with another" (see example (4)).

These various displays of identity (both at a declarative level – as they appear in the post, and at an implicit level – as they are already known to the public and only alluded to in the post) are mirrored in the reactive posts. Firea's positioning *down*, *among*, *against*, and *with* certain categories of people are meant to offer to her constituency clues about her values. This attitude also determined certain reactions from her followers.

4. The Reactive Posts

In this section, we will analyse the reactive posts[5] – comments on the original post – in terms of the connections between the identities displayed by the author and the ones acknowledged by the audience, and of the reactions to the various stances of the politician vis-à-vis the event.

4.1. A Quantitative Outlook

In Table 2 below, we included the number of comments per minute (the vertical axis), in order of their publication, where 1 (on the horizontal axis) refers to the first minute after the publication of the initial post and 28 (on

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[5] These posts were taken as such and they display spelling differences (for example, in the use of diacritics) as well as spelling mistakes, which are not the focus of the analysis in this chapter.

the horizontal axis) refers to the last minute available for the analysis, just before the Facebook page was blocked.

Table 2. *Number of comments per minute (in order of their publication)*

In the first minute after the initial post, there were 121 reactions, while the largest number of posts per minute was 190 (min. 5), with a sharp increase of more than 400% (from 47 posts after 4 minutes). Starting with min. 9, the number of reactive posts constantly decreased with a new peak, 35 posts (min. 27), after only an average of 2 posts for 5 minutes (min. 19–25). We performed the following operations on these reactive posts:
  - deleted all data about comments, kept the initials of the author's name, the text itself, and the time of its publication (from the oldest to the most recent);
  - eliminated duplicate posts;
  - eliminated comments that were replies to comments made by others.

After these operations, we obtained 1090 reactions that we organised in three categories: reactions to the initial post, reactions to the event, and reactions to politics (to the political climate in general). The total number of posts according to the type of reaction is presented in Table 3 below.

Reactions to the post	Reactions to the event	Reactions to politics
621	207	256
57%	19%	23,5%

Table 3. *Total number of posts and percentages according to reaction*

We did not include 6 reactions that targeted the speaker's previous job, that of a TV journalist, due to their extremely low frequency (0,5%). The largest number of reactions (621) targeted the post, while only 19% of the reactive posts referred to the actual festive event in terms of organisation and participation. The larger number of reactions referring to the political

climate (256) may be intriguing, since the post appeared shortly after Firea left the sports arena, where the festive event had been organised. Yet, in the following section, dedicated to qualitative analysis, we will take the larger political context into account (see section **1.**) and the fact that Firea was the Mayor of Bucharest at that time, representing the ruling party (SDP). We also divided the reactive posts according to the type of stance, supportive or non-supportive, displayed by people when referring to the post, to the event, or to politics. The results appear in Table 4.

Reactions to the post		Reactions to the event		Reactions to politics	
Supportive stance	Non-supportive stance	Supportive stance	Non-supportive stance	Supportive stance	Non-supportive stance
19	602	59	145	43	213
3%	97%	28,6%	70,4%	17%	83%

Table 4. *Reactive posts in accordance with the type of stance*

No matter the type of reaction, it appears that people displayed a non-supportive stance in the majority of cases, ranging from 97% (disapproving various claims from the initial post, that will be discussed in the next section) to a little bit over 70% when it comes to talk about the event dedicated to the athlete. Since percentages are far higher for non-supportive stances than for supportive stances, in the next section, we will identify and comment upon various realisations of the linguistic cues associated with the former.

4.2. A View on Linguistic Cues for Non-Supportive Stances

Responding to a post in online media is similar to responding to a speech delivered in front of an audience. Web-based discussions like the ones occasioned by a post on the Facebook page of a public, political figure in the Romanian political arena are perfect venues for social engagement. We start from the idea that reactive actions are "elementary forms of social action" (Clayman 1993, 110) that usually fall within two categories – affiliative and disaffiliative –, and they are evaluative, displaying approval or disapproval with a certain point of view.

4.2.1. Booing

In the Facebook discussion under scrutiny in this chapter, the non-supportive stance takes the form of a disaffiliative collective response:

booing. This particular reaction was produced during the face-to-face encounter, when the Mayor of Bucharest appeared on stage next to Simona Halep to grant her Honorary Citizenship and present her with the Key to the City. It continued in the online environment, as an extension of the activity on the stadium. In the corpus, we identified 34 instances (i.e. 3% of the reactive posts) where respondents tried to replicate the actual auditory form by writing *boo* in capital letters to suggest raised voices, by repeating vowels (mostly "o" in "huo", the Romanian interjection) to suggest the length of the disapproval token, or simply by adding excessive punctuation to emphasise reaction. Given the continuous form of the reaction, from the offline to the online environment, we can say that the strategies employed by people in their posts were meant to show spontaneity and support the idea that the language of the online environment is dominated by "transcribed orality" (Zafiu 2001). Building on Clayman's findings that, from the point of view of preference organisation, "agreements tend to be produced promptly, [...] while disagreements are typically delayed" (Clayman 1993, 125), it appears that – in this particular context – 30% of the disaffiliative reactive actions in the form of booing were performed in the first ten minutes after the message was posted on Facebook. This suggests that mutual monitoring had already allowed participants to see what others did, so that the online community coordinated actions with the people in the sports arena and offered a collective response.

4.2.2. Unconventional Forms of Address and Verbal Aggression

It is admitted (Gumperz 1972, 13) that form of address is not randomly chosen, but rather reflects the communicative competence of speakers. This idea is based on the existence of a system of cultural and social rules and conventions and makes reference to the "whole of linguistic knowledge, interactional, and cultural, as it was learned by native speakers, that enables them to adequately express themselves in specific communicative contexts" (DSL 2001, s.v. *competență*, our transl.).

Address is an essential part of social encounters and is meant to smooth the way for further dialogues. On the one hand, the use of the generic names (*domn* "Mr.", *doamnă* "Mrs.", *cetățean(ă)* "citizen") is based on a primary set of knowledge that speakers use by virtue of their being members of a specific linguistic community. On the other hand, by using appropriate forms of address (deferential, non-deferential) individuals establish a social relationship and, at the same time, build a common background (Lee 2001, 24). Thus, forms of address may be used

to build a common background that is based on either *closeness* or *distance*. Sometimes, speakers deliberately alter forms of address and generic names of person in order to take a non-supportive stance.

In Romanian, the nouns *domn* ("Mr.") and *doamnă* ("Mrs.") may be used in the Vocative by themselves (*domnule* "Sir", *doamnă* "Madam") or accompanying a surname (*domnule Popescu* "Mr. Popescu", *doamna Popescu* "Mrs. Popescu") or a job title (*domnule președinte* "Mr. President", *doamnă primar* "Madam Mayor"). Among the reactions to the Mayor's post, we identified the form of address *doamnă primar* ("Madam Mayor"), which was reduced to *doamnă* ("Madam") and was intentionally misspelt *duamnă* (44 instances). This technique builds on the style of computer-mediated communication, as if simulating the spontaneity of casual conversation, while, at the same time, being realised in a written medium (Haase et al. 1997). Thus, the noun loses its meaning and, pragmatically, changes from a conventional polite term referring to a married woman, worthy of respect, into an unconventional impolite form of address, suggesting that the bearer of the title has lost her credibility and the respect of her fellow-citizens.

Along similar lines, we identified 31 uses of the noun *madam* ("Madam") with various spellings that bring the French origin of the word to mind. It is worth noting that this word was widely used in the nineteenth century, when it was a current term of address, especially in bourgeois urban areas. In time, the noun developed a pejorative meaning referring to a woman of loose morals, and it is this meaning that is emphasised by those reacting to the post, thus belittling the speaker.

Since the initial post was made by a woman, one might expect various reactions that referred to gender. Apart from the nouns mentioned above, we have also found 18 uses of the noun *cucoană* ("lady"). Although originally it referred to a woman of superior social status, this noun changed its meaning in time. It underwent some semantic changes. In fact, the diachronic dynamics of the meaning is in line with the tendency of pejoration: "(obsolete) child, daughter; (obsolete) girl from a ruling/noble family", "term for a woman (considered to be) socially superior", "term of polite address for a (married) woman; Mrs" > (derogatory) "a woman who considers herself to be superior to others from a social point of view" > "a woman who (for this reason) expects to be served/does not work" > "lazy woman"[6].

Counting up these forms of address in the reactive posts, we found out 93 uses of nouns referring to the gender of the speaker (*duamnă*, *madam*,

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[6] Cf. the Romanian proverb *Lenea e cucoană mare* "Laziness lives in style".

and *cucoană*), all of them displaying non-supportive stance. This is mainly achieved through offensive language: obsolete words that have developed pejorative meanings associated with laziness or loose morals, stereotypes, and sexist language. If we take into account preference organisation as discussed in **4.2.1.**, it appears that the participants in the online discussion built consensus and promptly agreed on belittling the speaker, giving the sense of a community that feels disappointed by politicians in general, not only by a particular politician.

4.2.3. Playing with Pronominal References

In previous studies of pronominal references (e.g., Săftoiu 2015; Săftoiu and Toader 2018), we pointed out their deep connection with the context of communication and emphasised the need to take into account the multiplicity of roles of the speaker: social, discursive, and interactional, when analysing such references. In actual language use, pronominal references are not simply "signs which have meaning on their own" (Weigand 2008, 72), but attain various functions and become communicative means of expressing social relations or ways of "socially construct[ing] identities" (Bramley 2001, 13–14), according to individual interests. In other words, speakers use pronominal references to persuade, to project self, or to make associations with others. This means that personal pronouns can be used by the speaker in complex games of persuasion with the intent of establishing interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Politicians' use of 1st person pronouns can be a strategy "to gain the people's allegiance, to have them believe that the decisions that are being made are the right ones" (Wilson 1990, 71), while the use of the pronoun *we* may be used to express self-reference with a view to exercising influence and power. Referring to this, Wilson (1990) showed that the inclusive pronoun *we* (referring to the speaker and the listener) can express solidarity, while exclusive pronoun *we* (the speaker and other(s), excluding the listener) can express shared responsibility.

Pronominal references are used to do strategic political work: coercion, resistance, dissimulation, or legitimisation (Chilton and Schäffner 1997), to accept, to deny or distance themselves from the responsibility of political action, to encourage solidarity, to designate and identify both supporters and enemies (Fetzer 2014, 332), to show affiliation, to create distance, or to construct various identities of speakers and others (Săftoiu and Toader 2018). Starting from this view, we extend it and contend that pronominal references are strategic linguistic cues used in the construction of identities within a group or a community. Both in face-to-face

interactions and in web-based discussions, once an individual reacts, (s)he joins a community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998) and will adopt (sometimes adapt to, sometimes fight against) the existing linguistic conventions of that group. Since identity "basically means *taking a position*, having to decide which side you are on" (Weigand 2015, 20), we discuss pronominal references as components of stance.

When it comes to this (e.g., Săftoiu 2015), one needs to note that modern Romanian is a *tu*/*vous* language, with a politeness pronominal system organised at three levels: *tu* (familiar) "you"$_{SG}$/*dumneata*[7] (*mata*) (polite) "you"$_{SG}$/*dumneavoastră* (polite) "you"$_{POL}$. According to Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu (2020, 548), "*dumneata* expresses a lower degree of politeness" and, in urban communities, "its use is basically restricted to the older generations, when placing oneself in a position of slight superiority (based on age or social status)". Moreover, in Romanian, a pro-drop language, the syntactic position of subject may be occupied by a full pronoun (*eu* "I", *tu* "you", etc.), but most often the pronoun is omitted since the category of subject is rendered by the verb form with specific morphemes (*vorbesc* "I speak", *vorbeşti* "*you speak*", etc.). If a full pronoun is used as subject, it may have a different illocutionary effect: the speaker either (1) emphasises his/her position while uttering the words, or (2) differentiates himself/herself from the interlocutor.

In the data drawn for this particular study, we looked at how people, in their reactive posts, negotiated their own identity (as a community and as individuals) in relation to the speaker (as a politician and as an individual). In their reactions to the Mayor's post, people mostly used 2nd person singular (*tu* "you"$_{SG}$) and 3rd person singular (*ea* "she") pronominal references, but there are also instances when 2nd person plural *dumneavoastră* (polite) "you"$_{POL}$ was used as well as *voi* "you"$_{PL}$, especially when posts addressed to the administrator of the Facebook page, who was monitoring and probably deleting the negative comments. As stated above (**4.2.2.**), interaction is not always harmonious and participants do not always share the same point of view, i.e. they do not take the same stance. The examples below belong to the non-supportive stance, and they are reactions to the initial post, to the event, and to politics in general.

> (7) CR: Eu nu inteleg ce cautai *matale* pe scena. *Ai vrut sa* mai *faci* un pic de imagine. Poftim imagine

---

[7] This politeness pronoun was developed from *domnia ta* "your lordship" and refers to the 2nd person singular.

CR: I don't understand what *you*POL, FAM, SG were doing there on that stage. *You*SG wanted to improve *your*SG image. Some image.

(8) DN: Dar oare cât de penibilă mai *poți* fi...?... Atâta tupeu... *să te prezinți tu* cot la cot cu Simona... *Ți-ai făcut* datoria de primar? Dar de ce *nu îți faci tu* datoria de OM față de toți oamenii din orașul ăla... și din țara asta... Cum dormi *tu* noaptea?

DN: But how pathetic can *you*SG be...? ... What nerve... to display *yourself* next to Simona... Y*ou*SG did your duty as mayor? But why don't *you*SG do your duty as a HUMAN BEING by all the people in that city... and in this country ... How can *you*SG sleep at night?

In these posts, people react to the event and characterise Gabriela Firea's presence on the stage, next to the champion of the Roland Garros, as opportunistic (*Ai vrut sa mai faci un pic de imagine* "[YouSG] wanted to improve [yourSG] image; *Poftim imagine* "Some image"). By means of 2nd person singular (*tu* "you"SG) pronominal references, people deliberately attack the rank and try to challenge it (*Ți-ai făcut datoria de primar?* "*You*SG did your duty as a mayor?"), while by excessive use of familiar language they deconstruct boundaries. Once the target is disempowered, further attacks can be made either against the individual (as in the examples above) or against the party the speaker belongs to (as in examples 9 and 10 below).

(9) GS: Nu, cucoana, *tu* nu ai voie sa-ti asociezi imaginea cu a Simonei Halep! *Nu* mai *distorsiona* cum *iti convine tie*. Oamenii de pe stadion n-au fost cei adusi cu japca la marele *vostru* miting.

GS: No, lady, *you*SG're not allowed to associate your image with Simona Halep's! (*you*SG) Stop distorting as *you*SG see fit. The people in the stadium were not the ones who were dragged in for *your*PL big rally.

(10) NN: *Primești* ce *meriți* […], și o să mai urmeze, *să fi* sigură de asta. *Să VĂ FIE* RUȘINE CĂ *VĂ FOLOSIȚI* DE ORICE PRILEJ *SĂ IEȘIȚI* CA PĂDUCHELE ÎN FRUNTE.

NN: *You*SG get what you deserve […], and more will follow, (*you*SG) be sure of that. SHAME ON *YOU*PL FOR USING EVERY OPPORTUNITY (*you*PL) TO STAND OUT LIKE LICE ON THE FOREHEAD.

Pronominal references are of particular importance to social interaction as they "are anchored in the spatio-temporal domains of the here-and-now"

(Fetzer 2014, 336). This may help to better understand both the development of the interaction, and the change in pronominal references from 2nd person singular (*tu* "you"$_{SG}$: ***Tu** nu ai voie sa-ti asociezi imaginea cu a Simonei Halep!* "*you*$_{SG}$'re not allowed to associate your image with Simona Halep's!"; *Primești ce meriți* "[You$_{SG}$] get what you deserve") to 2nd person plural (*vă, vostru* "you", "your"$_{PL}$: *Oamenii de pe stadion n-au fost cei adusi cu japca la marele **vostru** miting* "The people in the stadium were not the ones who were dragged in *your*$_{PL}$ big rally"; *Să VĂ FIE RUŞINE* "SHAME ON YOU$_{PL}$"). This change is associated with people bringing previous actions that took place closer to the here-and-now into the web-discussion, i.e. the public rally allegedly organised to unmask the intrusion of external organisations into the country's judicial affairs. Yet, the rally was a masquerade designed to prevent the truth, i.e. the judicial investigation against the SDP leader, Liviu Dragnea, from becoming public. Thus, *you*$_{PL}$ is used to move away from the disempowered individual, to her being a member of a particular party, and further to politics and political manoeuvres in general.

Unlike the previous examples, the ones below display the exclusive use of the 2nd person plural (*dumneavoastră* (polite) "you"$_{POL}$).

(11) LC: Cred ca *ati incercat sa obtineti* pe nemeritat un beneficiu de imagine. Iar oamenii *v*-au sanctionat. Cand *veti intelege* oare, doamna Primar, faptul ca asa este lumea asta, in care doar unii vor fi de acord cu *dvs* si o alta parte vor fi in dezacord cu *dv*...

LC: I think *you*$_{POL}$ tried to improve your image undeservedly. And people penalised *you*$_{POL}$. When will *you*$_{POL}$ understand, Madam Mayor, the fact that this is how the world is, only some people will agree with *you*$_{POL}$ and another side will disagree with *you*$_{POL}$...

(12) DB: Doamna Primar, nu tot *dumneavoastră*, in dimineata acestei zile, la ora 11.00 *ati declarat* ca toata ceremonia va avea loc DOAR pe scările ce permit accesul in Arena Naţionala? Dar presiunea oamenilor *v*-a determinat sa *va* schimbaţi decizia (ce bine!!!) asa ca de ce *va* miraţi ca *ati fost fluierata*? *Ati primit* exact ce *ati meritat*!

DB: Madam Mayor, wasn't it *you*$_{POL}$ who, this morning, at 11 o'clock, (*you*$_{POL}$) declared that the whole ceremony will take place ONLY on the stairs that allow access to the National Arena? But the public pressure determined *you*$_{POL}$ to change your decision (how good!!!) so why are *you*$_{POL}$ surprised that *you*$_{POL}$ were booed? *You*$_{POL}$ got exactly what *you*$_{POL}$ deserved!

Yet, apart from following the social conventions and showing respect for the position (*doamna Primar* "Madam Mayor"), people either made hedged accusations (*Cred ca ati incercat sa obtineti pe nemeritat un beneficiu de imagine* "I think [you$_{POL}$ tried to get an image benefit undeservedly") or asked rhetorical questions to answer the Mayor's pretended surprise when people booed during the event (*Cand veti intelege oare, doamna Primar, faptul ca asa este lumea asta, in care doar unii vor fi de acord cu **dvs** si o alta parte vor fi in dezacord cu **dv*** "When will [you$_{POL}$] understand, Madam Mayor, the fact that this is the world, in which only some will agree with *you$_{POL}$* and another part will disagree with *you$_{POL}$*"; *de ce va mirați ca ati fost fluierata?* "why are [you$_{POL}$] surprised that [you$_{POL}$] were booed?).

Even though the number of 3rd person singular pronominal references is not very high in the corpus, we consider it to be another component of stance, strategically used in this particular Facebook discussion.

> (13) MB: Madam Pandele *stie* foarte bine ca in afara unui mediu organizat de partidul mafiot, asta e reactia romanilor la adresa lor. Pentru un efect "de durata", propun cucoanei *sa faca*, impreuna cu infractorul Dragnea, bai de multime (neadusa de partid cu arcanul)!
>
> MB: Madam Pandele *knows* very well that outside of events organised by the mafia party, this is the reaction of the Romanians towards them. For a "lasting" effect, I would suggest to the lady that *she* and the indicted criminal Dragnea try pressing the flesh together (and not in a crowd that was dragged in by the Party)!
>
> (14) AG: A sarit *ea* repede cu teoria constipatiei... mentale. HAH!
> AG: *She* quickly brought up the theory of... mental constipation. HAH!
>
> (15) FB: Scena aia era pentru SPORT, nu pentru politicienii. Madam Firea *s-a suit* repede prima pe scena. NORMAL ca *a fost fluierata*. *Ea*, buna crestina, sufera de mândrie.
>
> FB: That stage was for SPORT, not for politicians. Madam Firea (*she*) quickly went on stage first. OF COURSE *she* was booed. *She*, the good Christian, suffers from pride.
>
> (16) VP: Putem sa dam offensive la ce a postat duamna ca *sa nu* mai *posteze*? 😊
> VP: Can we report what the lady posted as offensive so that *she* doesn't post anymore?

From a semantic-referential perspective, the pronouns in the 3rd person (*el* "he", *ea* "she", *ei*, *ele* "they"$_{M/F}$) indicate indirect participants, who are being talked about or are witnesses to the act of communication, and they can be used as deictics or anaphors. From a pragmatic point of view, using 3rd person pronouns instead of 2nd person pronouns may signal the power or status of the speaker, or, in other cultures, a form of self-effacement in order not to draw attention to oneself. In the examples above, 3rd person references are meant to lower the importance of the former mayor's message by ironic attacks, as in example (15): ***Ea**, buna crestina, sufera de mândrie* ("*She*, a good Christian, suffers from pride"). In other words, Gabriela Firea is thought to have posted her message after the event in order to defend her pride, one of the seven deadly sins in Christian belief, which was hurt when being booed. What is more, the use of the 3rd person gives these posts a sense of narrative as if the story is told to someone else, yet it also contains interpretations of the events.

4.2.4. Use of Quotations, Intertextuality, and Folk Wisdom

So far, we have discussed the use of various forms of address and pronominal references as linguistic cues of stancetaking. Either in the form of derogative nouns or the strategic use of pronouns, people created and joined a complex action game of persuasion in the reactive posts, with two directions: on one hand, they are trying to persuade the speaker that her post and deeds were wrong, inappropriate in connection with the event; on the other, they are trying to persuade others that what the speaker wrote and did was wrong, and extend the idea of wrong-doing to Romania's political class in general. This happens because the digital environment seems to be the perfect venue to give voice to a plurality of voices. On Gabriela Firea's wall, the story is constructed under people's eyes, either in the form of supporters or non-supporters, each of them bringing their own voice or other people's voices according to their own communicative intentions. Multivocality thus creates a "network of statements and responses, repetitions and quotations, in which new statements presuppose earlier statements and anticipate future responses" (Bakhtin 1984, 143). In this section, we analyse multivocality in the form of quotations, intertextuality, and folk wisdom, and consider how they make the dialogue more dynamic given that the elements of a text may be interpreted in different ways by different receivers. This happens because there are different mental representations of different receivers (Chilton 2004), which may be firmly established in their past.

Quotations are a common form of split voices (Săftoiu 2015) with high persuasive power. They have been defined as "staged intertextuality" (Kotthoff 2002, 208), but they may also be used as "ideological and argumentative codes, transmitting covert messages in reference to the quotation and to its source" (Shukrun-Nagar 2009, 460). What is more, in line with the framework of dialogue theory, we discuss quotations as speech acts that "reveal the constant presence of the speaker's dialogic attitude" (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 152), which are "aimed at pursuing a specific communicative goal" (Walton and Macagno 2011, 27–28) and have an argumentative force. Walton and Macagno (2011, 29) identified two specific functions of quoting: (1) to explicitly or implicitly support the standpoint (i.e. stance) of a given authority, or (2) to attack the opponent(s) with a view to a particular stance. Constantinescu (2012) adds a third function – to entail authenticity – as she considers that it is not ornamental, but rather may count as "a strategy meant to enhance speaker's ethos in the narrative part of the discourse" (Constantinescu 2012, 265).

In her post, Gabriela Firea called upon folk wisdom and used an old traditional saying – *Nicio faptă bună nu rămâne nepedepsită* "No good deed goes unpunished" – in order to positively frame her actions, i.e. organising the event for Simona Halep, the winner of the 2018 Roland Garros. At the same time, she expressed feelings of betrayal and unjust punishment, appealing to emotions and concomitantly building up the image of herself as a victim. Self-deprecation is a common strategy meant to draw attention to, and garner sympathy for the speaker. In their reactive posts, people either quoted the initial saying and commented on it (examples 17, 18) or called upon folk wisdom and used other sayings (examples 19–23) as in a "battle of proverbs".

> (17) AS: nu mai delira, cucoana, singura persoana care a umbrit evenimentul esti tu! N-aveai ce cauta pe scena, nu era momentul tau, traiesti in propria ta bula. Si acum mai faci si pe victima, auzi: "nicio fapta buna nu ramane nepedepsita!"
>
> AS: you are raving, lady, the only person who cast a pall over the event is you! You had no business appearing on that stage, it was not your moment, you live in your own bubble. And now you are playing the victim, hear this: "no good deed goes unpunished!"

(18) MT: Vezi că "Nicio fapta buna nu ramane nepedepsita" a zis-o si Udrea[8] :))))
      MT: Beware, Udrea also said "No good deed goes unpunished" :))))

In the particular action game we analyse, it appears that quoting is used as a "battle tool" similar to urban rap battles in the early 1980s (especially in the USA), where singers would take to the stage and vie for the public's support as to who had the best lyrics. In our corpus, the Mayor's Facebook wall turned into a stage where each participant is a potential contender who challenges the first action (as discussed in **4.1.**) in an attempt to "break down" the opponent and convince the audience that (s)he is better.

Apart from the fact that the appeal to folk wisdom is reinitiated and prefaced similarly (*Si eu stiu o vorba din popor* "I also know an old folk saying"; *Tot o vorba din popor* "Here's another old folk saying"; *asa zice o vorba din popor* "an old folk saying goes"; *o vorba veche din popor spune* "you know that old folk saying"; *mai e o vorba in popor* "there is another saying among the people"), the traditional sayings are framed as legitimate and unquestionable.

(19) IA: Si eu stiu o vorba din popor! *Cine se scuza se acuza* 😄
      IA: I know an old folk saying too! *She spoils her case who tries to prove a will.*

(20) MC: Slava Domnului ca nu ne-ai facut șobolani! Tot o vorba din popor: *culegeţi ceea ce semănaţi.*
      MC: Thank God you didn't call us rats! Here's another old folk saying: *you reap what you sow.*

(21) CF: Dacă scriai 'bravo simona' erai și tu om! cu aiurelile astea scrise plus apariţia de azi *ești de-a dreptu peste stangu*! asa zice o vorba din popor 😂😂😠😠😠😠

      CF: If you had written 'bravo Simona' you would have been a human being! With this nonsense you wrote, plus today's showing, *you botched things up*! That's another old folk saying 😂😂😠😠😠 😠

(22) RT: o vorba veche din popor spune: *"Daca taceai, filozof (filozoafa* 😊 *) ramaneai"...*

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[8] Elena Udrea is a former Minister of Tourism and Minister of Regional Development who has been indicted in several criminal cases.

RT: an old traditional folk saying goes: *"It is better to say nothing and be thought a fool than to open your mouth and remove all doubt"...*

(23) RIH: Pai cum făceam, Duamna, pă ăia de pe Arenă nu i-a plătit nimeni?!?? Nici măcar un microbuz nimic??! Mai e o vorba in popor: *ROATA SE ÎNTOARCE.*

RIH: What happened, madam, did someone forget to pay those people in the Arena?!?? Not even a minibus, nothing??! Plain folks have another saying: *WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND.*

Sayings are reflections of collective mentality and are usually based on cultural associations (Zafiu 2009). The sayings mentioned above display non-supportive stance and are used as indirect accusations (examples 19–20) or as calls on the guilty to take responsibility for their deeds (examples 21–23). Bringing up new traditional sayings in the reactive posts is a way of framing collectivity on two levels: on one hand, it is an *ad hoc* community (people reacting on a Facebook page, taking a stance towards the post, the event, the speaker, or towards politics at large), on the other, it is the community of Romanians (since each newly introduced saying is based on culturally-bound experiences). Both levels rely on a set of activities, motives, rights, obligations, and competences, which are specific to a certain category (*ad hoc* community, Romanians) and thus allow for easier identification and, when used in dialogue, allow for a better construction of the communicative goal. Furthermore, this is in line with comments in previous sections, where we discussed booing as a collective disaffiliative response and particular uses of forms of address that have developed derogatory meanings.

Another interesting situation is mixing various sayings and reinterpreting them in the light of the latest political events.

(24) IU: Ce să zicem doamna primar, știți vorba aia din bătrîni, *una caldă una rece, timpu trece, leafa merge noi cu drag mințim*, țara s-o pârjolim.

IU: What can we say, Madam Mayor, you know that old–time saying, *there are good days and there are bad days, time goes by, we still get paid and are happy to lie*, we are burning down the country.

In this example, the speaker mixes two sayings: *una caldă una rece* ("there are good days and there are bad days") and *timpu trece, leafa merge noi cu drag muncim* ("time goes by, we still get paid and are happy to work"), for a more dramatic effect, but changes the verb in the second

saying from *muncim* ("we work") to *minţim* ("we lie"). This is a deliberate change so that (s)he can make an indirect accusation about the ruling party that they have been lying for too long, they are not working in the best interest of the citizens, and the country and its citizens are poorer every day. In the urban digital arena, participants use quotations as dialogic speech acts that look like declaratives since speakers use them to create a world, a state of affairs. Nevertheless, they are (indirect) threats and criticism whose intended perlocutionary effects are meant to direct the interlocutor to a (future) change of behaviour.

5. Conclusions

From a dialogic perspective, it appears that the web-based discussion under investigation in this chapter has a conflictive character. On the one hand, the initial post and the Mayor's actual behaviour in the stadium are the starting point of the conflict; on the other, the reactive posts as well as the actual behaviour of the people at the stadium indicate various resolution strategies, as discussed by Vuchinich (1990): power assertion (physical action, criticisms, or use of threats) and disengagement (dropping the topic, taking no action, or walking away). Nevertheless, we could not identify negotiation (third-party mediation, compromise, and stepping down) in the corpus.

Starting from the idea that language as dialogue is a natural human skill, individuals used it to achieve a specific purpose, i.e. to express strong disagreement with the Mayor's post. Moreover, "we are confronted with divergent understanding, misunderstanding, and non-understanding as an inevitable consequence of interaction among individuals" (Weigand 2010, 60), which further conveys the idea that "meaning and understanding are different for different individuals" (Weigand 2010, 74). In other words, meaning is more than what is said, it is not necessarily clear and obvious from the outset, but it comes out not only on the basis of *what* is said, but also on the basis of *how* it is said. Furthermore, coming to an understanding does not necessarily mean that harmony is the preferred form of dialogue, but rather that communication is a creative activity, highly dependent on the specific context (Pablé and Hutton 2015, 9).

We contend that the particular choices of forms of address in the reactive posts (section **4.2.2.**) are the result of a conflict between what listeners (either as participants at the event, as viewers or as followers of the Facebook page) expected, based on a particular, situated behaviour, and the negative way their expectations were met (cf. Culpeper 2011). Thus, these choices are meant "to reduce the target's relative symbolic

power" (Culpeper 2011, 227). This goes in line with a special type of disaffiliative collective response, booing, as well as with the findings in section **4.2.3.**, where we showed that 2nd person singular pronominal references (*tu* "you"$_{SG}$) are used to challenge the rank of the speaker. Once the target is disempowered, further attacks can be made either to the individual or to the party the speaker belongs to.

Despite the rich linguistic material offered by this web-based dialogue, one of the limitations of the study resides mainly in the fact that it is still a case study. A larger study of online communication via internet platforms or other online social networks that should involve different politicians, circumstances, reactions, etc. may shed more light on the impact that the digital communication tools may have on voters' opinion, their involvement in decision-making processes, or their way of evaluating politicians' performances and stances.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

FROM VERBAL VIOLENCE
TO ARGUMENTATION:
STANCETAKING IN A CORPUS OF
NEWSREADER ONLINE COMMENTS

SORINA CIOBANU

1. Introduction

Fostered and fed by the expansion of interactive digital media, online comments are a form of computer-mediated communication (CMC) where stance and stancetaking strategies are very common and may be studied from various angles (Kiesling et al. 2018). Alongside social networks, discussion forums, or multi-user object-oriented environments, newspaper websites have become one of the most popular platforms for such reader-driven debates (Friemel and Dötsch 2015), providing anyone interested with an opportunity to get involved in the media and participate in a deliberative process (McMillen 2013; Friemel and Dötsch 2015). However, in spite of their democratic and egalitarian nature, online newspaper comments have also been shown to have a dark side, as they tend to be exceedingly critical and negative (Pérez-Granados et al. 2012) and encompass various forms of "negatively marked online behaviour" (Hardaker 2012), such as verbal violence, spamming, trolling, flaming, or cyberbullying. Even if online forums and news comments are fairly popular in Romania too, there is almost no research concerning the discourse-linguistic phenomena specific to this type of CMC in Romanian.

Starting from the definition of an online news comment as "an opinion about a body of news or a response to another comment within the discussion" (Pérez-Granados et al. 2012, 114), our analysis focuses on the stancetaking behaviour identifiable in the commentaries posted to a news report published on the website of the Romanian daily *Gândul* in the

aftermath of the fire at the *Colectiv* club in Bucharest, a national tragedy with profound societal and political consequences (detailed in section **3.**). We were interested in studying the online identities, stances, and linguistic features present in this type of computer-mediated interaction in a context that was highly emotional, controversial, and conflict-prone, i.e. particularly susceptible to the expression of various opinions and evaluations.

The theoretical framework used in this study, presented in section **2.**, draws on the works of Du Bois (2007) and Kiesling et al. (2018). Our analysis is based on the manual annotation of (i) the nicknames used by commenters in their interactions, (ii) the types of stance acts (Du Bois 2007) they performed, and (iii) the main linguistic resources and patterns identifiable in the corpus. This process and the dataset used are described in section **3**. Our findings for each of the analysed aspects reveal a type of interaction characterised by the predominance of male and genderless Internet identities, verbal violence, impoliteness, heteroglossic engagement, and misleadingly covert, low-investment stancetaking. The resulting discourse is one in which commenters tend to present themselves as patronising knowledgeable experts, "teachers" and "preachers", who express their opinions in the form of impersonal general truths and often give unsolicited advice through the use of imperatives. At the same time, they try to avoid conflict and direct confrontation by formulating their ideas as open-ended or rhetorical questions.

2. Theoretical Framework

Known by several names and approached from different perspectives (Englebretson 2007), the concept of *stance* is intrinsically linked to the subjective and interpersonal uses of language. Simply put, stance refers to the way in which speakers relate to (and mark their involvement in) the content of their own utterances and/or the utterances of other speakers. The following examples of stance are taken from our corpus[1]:

(1) Incredibil câți proști comentează (comment #27 by *dan*)
    It's incredible how many stupid people are commenting

(2) mă doare să văd atâția copii morți (comment #56 by *ionel*)
    It hurts me to see so many dead children

(3) Sunt de acord cu domnul Becali, foarte adevărat bravo (comment #31 by *ady*)

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[1] All examples are given with their original spelling and punctuation.

> I agree with mister Becali, that's very true, bravo!

As Du Bois puts it, "stance has the power to assign value to objects of interest, to position social actors with respect to those objects, to calibrate alignment between stancetakers, and to invoke presupposed systems of sociocultural value" (Du Bois 2007, 139). Englebretson lists five principles of stancetaking in discourse: 1) it occurs on three levels, i.e. physical action, personal attitude/belief/evaluation, and social morality; 2) it is public and thus open to the scrutiny of others; 3) it is interactional, constructed collaboratively through engagement with other speakers or ideas; 4) it is indexical, referencing or alluding to the broader physical or sociocultural context; and 5) it is consequential, as it may lead to actual consequences for the actors involved (Englebretson 2007, 6–7). Except for the fifth – which is difficult to assess in the context of this study –, these principles are also discernible in examples (1) to (3) above. All of them express a personal attitude/belief/evaluation, are public, interactional – (2) is actually taken from a reply to another reader –, and indexical: (1) refers to the context of communication and previous comments, (2) indexes the broader context, i.e. the tragedy at the *Colectiv* club, while (3) refers to the actual content of the news report commented upon.

These principles are reflected, in part, in the description of *appraisal* – a concept that overlaps with stance in many respects (Martin and White 2005, 35):

> Appraisal itself is regionalised as three interacting domains – 'attitude', 'engagement' and 'graduation'. ***Attitude*** is concerned with our feelings, including emotional reactions, judgements of behaviour and evaluation of things. ***Engagement*** deals with sourcing attitudes and the play of voices around opinions in discourse. ***Graduation*** attends to grading phenomena whereby feelings are amplified and categories blurred.

Martin and White (2005, 35–36) further divide *attitude* into three "regions of feeling", i.e. *affect*, the expression of emotional reactions, as in (2), *judgment* or assessing behaviour, as in (1), and *appreciation* or construing the value of things, "including natural phenomena and semiosis (as either product or process)", as in (4):

> (4) Adevărul e că tineretul e prost. Lipsit de deșteptăciune. Fără orizonturi. Fără bani. Adunat și alcolist. Și se vad rezultatele. (comment #4 by *hghggh*)
>
> The truth is that the youth is stupid. Lacking smartness. Without horizons. Without money. Herd-like and alcoholic. And the results are visible.

This example may also be taken as illustrative of *engagement*, an appraisal component which captures both the interactional and indexical nature of stancetaking, and "is concerned with the ways in which resources […] position the speaker/writer with respect to the value position being advanced and with respect to potential responses to that value position" (Martin and White 2005, 36). If the speaker acknowledges other positions than their own, the discourse is said to be *heteroglossic*, whereas the instances of discourse that do not take into consideration other potential value viewpoints are viewed as *monoglossic*.

2.1. Stancetaking in Interaction

These aspects of stance and appraisal are also captured by the two analytical frameworks taken as reference in our exploration of Romanian newspaper comments, i.e. the "stance triangle" proposed by Du Bois (2007), and the dimensions used in the annotation of stance by Kiesling et al. (2018).

Introducing the concept of *stance act*, Du Bois places it in a fundamentally interactive framework, stating that it is "shaped by the complex interplay of collaborative acts by dialogic co-participants" (2007, 141–142), and that it cannot be fully interpreted without "reference to its larger dialogic and sequential context" (Du Bois 2007, 142). He thus posits that the analysis of any given stance should start with the identification of three basic elements: (i) the stancetaker, (ii) the stance object, and (iii) the previous stance that triggered the production of the present one, i.e. the *contextual background* of that stance. The stance itself may be then decomposed along three dimensions:

–   *evaluation*, "the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value" (Du Bois 2007, 143);
–   *positioning*, "the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for invoking sociocultural value" (Du Bois 2007, 143);
–   *alignment*, "the act of calibrating the relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers" (Du Bois 2007, 144).

When performing an *evaluation*, speakers assign a certain value or quality to the object of stance. For instance, in example (4) above, the reader/commenter uses a series of labels to describe the Romanian youth (*proști* "stupid", *lipsit de deșteptăciune* "lacking smartness", *adunat* "herd-

like", *alcolist* "alcoholic") and in doing so assigns a negative value to it, as the object of stance. At the same time, the speaker also *positions* himself as a knowledgeable subject with respect to the topic approached, i.e. the youth. Du Bois subsumes both affective and epistemic stances under the dimension of *positioning*. In example (1), by stating *Incredibil câți proști comentează* "It's incredible how many stupid people are commenting", the reader *dan* evaluates commenters with opposing views as *stupid* and, at the same time, assumes an epistemic positioning in the stance, highlighted by the use of the adverb *incredibil* ("incredible"). In example (2), by saying that the sight of the victims "hurts" him (*mă doare*), *ionel* takes an affective stance in the utterance. *Alignment* may be *convergent*, when the speaker expresses agreement with previous stances or ideas, *divergent*, when the speaker disagrees with what has been previously stated (explicitly or implicitly), or *ambiguous*, if no clear points of convergence or divergence with previous speakers are apparent. As Du Bois points out, "two participants in dialogic interaction should be understood as engaging in the alignment process when they converge to varying degrees, and, by the same token, when they diverge to varying degrees" (2007, 162).

A fourth dimension of stance analysis which proved to be useful in our own investigation was introduced recently by Kiesling et al. (2018). Defining stance as "the discursive creation of a relationship between a language user and some discursive figure, and to other language users in relation to that figure" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 687), these researchers used a three-dimensional model to annotate stancetaking utterances in a corpus of online comments:

- – *affect*, i.e. "the polarity or quality of the stance to the stance focus";
- – *investment*, i.e. "how strongly invested in the talk the speaker is; how committed they signal their relationship to the stance focus" (this dimension seems to overlap with Du Bois' *epistemic positioning*);
- – *alignment*, "how much a speaker/writer aligns (or not) to their interlocutor(s), real or imagined" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 688).

If we map the first two dimensions in this model onto the other frameworks discussed so far, we see that *affect* seems to overlap, for the most part, with Du Bois' *evaluation* and *affective positioning*, and with Martin and White's *attitude*, whereas *investment* captures, in part, Du Bois' *epistemic positioning*, and Martin and White's *graduation* and *engagement*.

Since it factors in utterances in which the speaker's presence is not explicitly marked (e.g., general, 3rd person statements or questions), a situation fairly common in our corpus and which is not detailed in Du

Bois' model, our analysis also included the dimension of *investment* (Kiesling et al. 2018, 686):

> Investment is essentially the strength of an utterance, although theoretically it is the alignment of the actual speaker with the speech uttered. Investment thus includes things like to what extent a speaker is likely to defend the claim subsequently, how epistemically certain they are, and so forth, although investment is likely represented through multiple linguistic cues.

Investment may be thus characterised as high in an utterance like *I love football*, and rather low in *That game is all right*, in which the strength of the stance taken is diminished not only by the use of "all right" instead of the much stronger "love", but also by the removal of the speaking subject from the utterance.

2.2. Features of Online Newspaper Comments

By their very nature as reactions to news articles and previous commenters, online newspaper comments are a type of CMC in which stancetaking plays a central role. In fact, the word *comment* itself refers to the taking of a stance with respect to a particular state of affairs or opinion, and highlights the fundamentally interactive, dialogical nature of the process: one can only comment on something that has already happened or that has already been said, i.e. a *stance lead*, if we are to use Du Bois' terms. A survey conducted by Diakopoulos and Naaman (2011) highlighted the motivations that compel people to post and read comments on newspaper websites. The ranking of the reasons that justified writing and posting such comments reflects the centrality of stancetaking in this type of online behaviour (Diakopoulos and Naaman 2011, 137–138):

1) "expressing an intense emotion or opinion" (personal identity);
2) "educating others, answering/asking questions, adding information, sharing experience, clarifying, note missing information, balance discussion, correct inaccuracies, factual errors, or misinformation" (information);
3) "see reaction of community, persuade others, sympathize, leave condolences, applaud goodness, debate" (social interaction);
4) "inject humour into discussion, debate" (entertainment).

Owing to the medium that fosters their creation and distribution, three main features distinguish online comments (including those referring to news) from those made in face-to-face everyday communication or from lengthy commentaries made in writing (e.g., essays or newspaper columns):

- *anonymity*: commenters are able to remain anonymous through the use of nicknames;
- *asynchronicity*: as a rule, both comments and replies to those comments are separate events in time;
- *publicness*: anyone may read and react to an online comment.

Each of these features has an impact on the way in which online interactions are constructed and on the language resources used. *Anonymity* is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it encourages people to express their opinions freely, creating an egalitarian, democratic space for debates; on the other hand, it is largely responsible for the negative online behaviour permeating online environments, such as spamming, trolling, flaming, cyberbullying, or cyberstalking (Hardaker 2012; McMillen 2013). One of the results of *asynchronicity* is that the addressor-addressee reciprocity, specific to other forms of CMC (like chats) or to verbal interactions, is usually absent in online comments. Even if most messages are "spontaneous spur-of-the-moment reactions to a previous comment" (McMillen 2013, 25), *asynchronicity* also means that users are able to conceive and ponder on their contributions before they actually post them. This may result in elaboration and increased argumentativity, which make some comments more akin to written commentaries. This in turn explains why the language used in these interactions contains features pertaining to both spoken and written communication. *Publicness*, which is also supported by anonymity, is responsible for the highly interactive and democratic nature of online comments. Virtual forums (such as those offered by online newspapers) are environments which promote a type of *many-to-many communication*. Anyone can contribute to the on-going dialogue and this leads to the spontaneous creation of various threads and sub-threads of discussion in an incremental way: an initial commenter posts a message, which is then commented upon by other members of the group, who, in turn, receive replies to their own comments and so on. This is also due to the fact that *publicness* makes any message open to any kind of reactions: as opposed to everyday communication or to other online media, users posting comments on newspaper boards cannot choose or select the people who read or interact with their messages.

3. Dataset and Method

Our investigation focuses on the comments posted to one news report published on the website of the Romanian daily *Gândul* on November 1, 2015, two days after the devastating fire at the *Colectiv* club in Bucharest. The article titled "Declaraţii halucinante ale lui Gigi Becali despre tragedia

din Colectiv" ("Gigi Becali makes hallucinatory statements about the Colectiv tragedy"[2]) reports the statements made by a controversial businessman and politician, Gheorghe (Gigi) Becali. The lead sums up the contents of Becali's declarations and highlights their inflammatory potential, rendered even worse by the journalists' obvious stance against them:

> *Gigi Becali nu s-a putut abține și a comentat și el tragedia din Colectiv. Într-o intervenție la o televiziune, patronul Stelei a făcut o serie de declarații halucinante despre spectacolele „satanice" și „demonice" care ar duce la astfel de tragedii.*

> Gigi Becali could not help himself and commented on the tragedy too. During a TV show, the owner of Steaua Football Club made a series of hallucinatory statements about the "satanic" and "demonic" performances that lead to such tragedies.

The news report was one of the most read on the newspaper's website (counting almost 180,000 views in 2019), and one of the most commented on at the time of the tragedy, generating a total number of 263 reader posts.

3.1. Contextual Background

On the night of October 30, 2015, a devastating fire broke out in a Bucharest nightclub called *Colectiv*, during a rock concert by the band *Goodbye to gravity*. On that night and in the following months, no less than 65 young people lost their lives and over 147 were injured. As everybody soon found out, the rock concert had been organised at a venue that had no fire safety protocols or equipment, and Romanian hospitals were unable to treat burn victims properly. Thus, besides its highly emotional impact on the entire Romanian society, the tragedy brought to the fore and intensified discussions on a series of important social-political issues: corruption, incompetence, and lack of trust in state-run institutions. Moreover, the rallies to commemorate the victims that arose spontaneously throughout the country turned into demonstrations against the ruling Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat – PSD). Only a few days after the fire, on November 4, prime-minister Ponta

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[2] The entire article may be read here: https://www.gandul.ro/sport-miscare/ declaratii-halucinante-ale-lui-gigi-becali-despre-tragedia-din-colectiv-14869489. However, because the journal changed its online platform since the report was first published in 2015, the comments discussed herein are no longer available.

resigned, due to street and political pressure. Authorities declared three national days of mourning to honour the victims.

The tragedy and its collateral effects (street protests, public and political statements, and governmental measures) were the main topic approached by the Romanian news channels at that time. The daily *Gândul* – one of the most popular newspapers in Romania – published no fewer than 58 news reports about the fire and its results only on October 31, and continued to cover the topic intensely over the next month (an average of 18 articles/day). Owing to the high emotional impact of the topic, the readers got quite involved in the news reported too, and used the two channels provided by the newspaper's online platform (on-site comments and comments via Facebook accounts) to leave their thoughts on the news matters presented. On average, from the night of the fire until November 30, readers posted 515 messages/day to the news reports about the fire.

Gheorghe Becali, whose declarations sparked the debate we focus on here, is a controversial Romanian public figure. In his youth, he inherited his father's sheep farm and used the profits to smuggle various goods from Turkey into Romania. He started to invest in real estate and bought one of the top Romanian football clubs, *Steaua* (currently FCSB). In 2009, he was elected to the European Parliament on behalf of the far-right party România Mare (Greater Romania). However, he did not finish his term as an EMP; in 2013, he was convicted and sent to prison for corruption (a real estate deal with the state). In the spring of 2015, he was released after serving a third of his sentence. He is known for his conservative Orthodox Christian views, anti-gay statements, xenophobia, numerous slips of the tongue, and inflammatory remarks.

3.2. The Annotation Process

The news article reporting Becali's statements produced a total number of 263 user comments. Out of these, 185 were posted directly on the journal's website – using the comment board, which allowed readers to choose a nickname on the spot and immediately publish their thoughts –, and 78, using the facility which allowed readers to post messages via their Facebook account. The present study focuses on the former type of comments.

Being interested in a qualitative analysis more than in a quantitative one, our investigation is based on the manual annotation of several features of interest:

(i) the nicknames used by commenters in their interactions;
(ii) the types of stance acts (Du Bois 2007) they performed;

(iii) the main linguistic resources and patterns identifiable in the corpus.

The online identities assumed by commenters were annotated based on their form (real names vs made-up nicknames), gender (male, female, or genderless/unisex), and their symbolism (e.g., anonymity, randomness, national or local affiliation). The annotation of stance acts was mainly based on Du Bois' model, and took into account: the commenter's stance object (or *focus*), evaluation (positive, negative, or neutral/no evaluation), positioning (affective vs epistemic), and alignment (convergent or divergent). The last step was the annotation of the main linguistic resources and patterns present in the text: *I*-verb forms, impersonal V+N/ V+Adj structures, evaluative lexis (nouns and adjectives), modal structures, discourse markers, imperatives, questions, exclamations, forms of direct address, violent language, and fixed formulas.

4. Online Identities and Interactions

Highly indicative of the virtual self that people construct for themselves in synchronous or asynchronous CMC, "online nicknames, or nicks, are identity markers that are employed for self-presentation purposes in online interactions" (Lindholm 2013, 445). They facilitate the continuity and the cross-turn coherence of online conversations and they contribute to the efficient cooperative use of language through "self-presentation, negotiation of in-group identity, and triggering interaction" (Lindholm 2013, 449).

4.1. Types of Online Identities

The analysis of the nicknames used in our corpus highlighted the Romanian readers' preference for made-up names, male or genderless online personas, and the use of Romanian language in the creation of user names. Overall, the 185 comments of interest were produced by 121 different users.

DIMENSION	TYPE	COUNT	PERCENTAGE	EXAMPLES
FORM	made-up name	70	57.9 %	*anonim, Altu', Antiprostime, Belzebuth, dixit, hghggh, pe naiba…, unu*
	real name	51	42.1 %	*adi, Adriana, ionel, Laur, mona, olariu*
GENDER	male	61	50.4 %	*Dacus, ion ion, gigi, lucian, Family man*

	genderless	39	34.7 %	*Asdf, are dreptate…, Desteapta-te romane, Poli 21, zzz*
	female	18	14.9 %	*Ada, cristinela, ele, Mary, stanciu maria*
LANGUAGE	Romanian	82	67.8 %	*Atentul, asa e, dan, de-al casei, Dorel, Jos Guvernescu, un crestin*
	other	28	23.2 %	*961, Ctistisn, nivk, kfglfssfg, vp*
	English	11	9.1 %	*denver, hunter, K-man, Luck_1, Shark*

Table 1. *Online identities by form, gender, and language*

The degree of anonymity in the corpus is extremely high. More than half of the readers (57.9%) use overtly made-up nicknames (e.g., *cetățean x* "citizen x", *autor* "author", *dix*, *meee*), while the rest introduce themselves by proper names, usually mentioning only a first name (e.g., *Diana*, *Ionuț*, *liviu*). There are only six cases of usernames containing both a given name and family name (e.g., *petre costea*). It is impossible to know whether the seemingly real names adopted by commenters correspond to their real-life identities, but the choice of initiating a dialogue on a first-name basis signals both a type of egalitarian openness to others and a desire to remain anonymous, by keeping the amount of information given about oneself to a minimum, which may be interpreted as a violation of the Gricean maxim of quantity (Lindholm 2013). This tendency towards "levelling the field" of communication is further highlighted by the choice of writing these first names with no capital letter (64% of cases) and the presence of abbreviated or diminutive first name forms (e.g., *cristi < Cristian*, *Fane < Ștefan*, *Nicu < Nicolae*, *cristinela < Cristina*).

However, overtly made-up nicknames are prevalent in the corpus and they may be further grouped into the following categories:

- *self-referential nicknames*, referring to an aspect of the user's (assumed) online identity (e.g., *un crestin* "a Christian man");
- *stancetaking nicknames*, presenting in an abbreviated form the reader's stance on a topic or on what has been previously said (e.g., *asa e* "that's right");
- *nonsensical nicknames*, random monikers, impossible to decipher, which serve a purely referential function.

Self-referential nicknames frame the user's identity by revealing an aspect of their online self that is relevant to the conversation at hand, and,

sometimes, potentially, of their true identity. The self-referential nicknames in our corpus may be divided into the following categories, based on the values or qualities they reveal: anonymity (*anonim* "anonymous", *Altu'* "Another", *autor* "author", *cetățeanul x* "citizen x", *ele* "they" – fem., *unu* "one" – masc.), local/national affiliation (*un sibian* "a man from Sibiu", a Romanian town, *Dacus*, *Românul* "The Romanian", *ro* – abbreviation of Romania), religious affiliation (*un creștin* "a Christian man"), family values (*Family man*, *de-al casei* "a regular"), or personal qualities (*Atentul* "The Careful or Attentive man", *hunter*, *Shark*, *CREIERASUL VORBITOR* "the talking little brain"). Special mention should be made here to "savant" nicknames, which provide the user with prestige and the image of a knowledgeable speaker "by contamination": *Dante*, *Dardanos*, *erasmus*, *Ovidiuss*.

By using *stancetaking nicknames*, the readers align themselves to previously expressed stances or position themselves with respect to certain stance objects. Three nicknames in the corpus express agreement with Becali's statement: *asa e* ("that's right"), *da…* ("yes"), *are dreptate…* ("he's right"), whereas one, *pe naiba…* ("to hell with it") diverges with the businessman's views. The user *Antiprostime* ("Anti-stupidity/Anti-stupid people") takes an epistemic stance against people with opposing views (and possibly Becali), whom he qualifies as stupid. *Desteapta-te romane* ("Wake up, Romanian man") quotes the title and the first line of Romania's national anthem and thus takes an epistemic stance by positioning as a leader who launches a call to action to their fellow citizens or, arguably, as someone who thinks that the Romanian people is passive and sleeping and needs waking up. *Jos Guvernescu* ("Down with Guvernescu") is a nickname that creates a new proper name, by combining the word *guvern* "government" and the suffix -*escu*, a common ending in Romanian family names. A special type of stancetaking nicknames is represented by monikers that mock or take a derisive stance on Becali's name, and thus, indirectly, on Becali himself. This category includes usernames such as: *berbecali* (a clipping compound formed out of the words *berbec* ("ram") and Becali, which also alludes to the businessman's origins), *Jiji*, *gigione* (mocking variants of Becali's first name), or *meee* (a reference to the sound made by sheep).

As far as gender is concerned, most of the readers in our corpus assumed male or genderless identities. Only about 15% of the nicknames in the forum were female, and this finding aligns with other studies which have shown that, for various reasons (e.g., to gain credibility), women tend to hide their gender in online conversations (Lindholm 2013).

4.2. Interactions

In spite of the „anonymity cloak" that they chose to wear online, most of the readers in our corpus (78%) intervened only once in the discussion, as shown by Table 2 below.

Number of interventions	1	2	3	5	6	9	11	13
Number of participants	94	19	3	1	1	1	1	1
Percentage	78%	16%	2%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%

Table 2. *Number of interventions per participant*

Typically, readers posted messages that either responded directly to an aspect of the news reported, as in (5), or were general reactions to the comments already posted, without targeting anyone in particular (6):

(5) Ce altceva poate să zică becali dacă are mintea limitată? (comment #6 by *Laur*)
What else can Becali say if his mind is limited?

(6) și uite cum oamenii de nimic jegurile și scursurile societății încep să vorbească. urlă că dumnezeu (căutați 1930 biserica arsă românia de paști idioților apropos de coindicente) că pedeapsa că etc... sunteți niște persoane josnice și jenante care nu ar trebui să aveți drept de vot (comment #17 by *meee*)

and so we see how scoundrels jerks and the lowlifes of society are starting to talk. they're screaming that god (look up 1930 church burned down on Easter Romania, you idiots, talking about coincidences) that punishment that etc… you are some vile and embarrassing people who shouldn't get the right to vote.

Only a few comments generated replies. These commentaries on the stances taken by other speakers were marked in the text by the sign "@" followed by the addressee's name, as in (7). Even fewer comments sparked an exchange made up of several turns and interventions, as most readers chose not to answer to the comments posted to their own messages (or were simply unaware of these replies):

(7) @meee
Toți îl crede nebun (sic), dar când spui un adevăr te ia lumea drept nebun, dar are dreptate!.... (comment #20 by *Hadasha*)

> Everyone thinks he's crazy, but when you tell a truth people will take
> you for crazy, but he is right!...

In fact, the users with the largest number of interventions: *ionel* (13), *ele*
(11), and *erasmus* (9), got engaged in exchanges between each other, as
shown in (8) and (9):

> (8) @erasmus
>   mai draga erasmus, nu stiu de ce faci pe prostul (comment #158 by
>   *ionel*)
>   well dear erasmus, I don't know why you are playing the fool

> (9) @ionel
>   mai ionel, ce să-ți zic, Doamne ajută:)! (comment #161 by *ele*)
>   well ionel, what to say, God help us all :)!

The fact that most commenters had only one intervention in the on-going
interaction is consistent with the finding that the main reason behind
people's choice to write messages on newspaper forums is to express
personal viewpoints or feelings (Diakopoulos and Naaman 2011). This
also shows that while being highly heteroglossic in nature, because
commenters do take into account and envisage alternative viewpoints in
their interventions, as in examples (6) or (7), the discourse in our corpus is
to a lesser extent dialogical *per se*, as most participants are not interested
in continuing the debate after writing their initial post.

5. Stance Acts in Online Comments

As mentioned in Section **3.**, the news report, the quoted statement, and the
reactions they sparked may be seen as a set of Russian dolls made up of
potentially inflammatory stances. A very loud Christian Orthodox
believer, Becali gave a religious interpretation to what had happened in the
Club:

> [...] Am văzut niște filmări de la acele așa-zise spectacole. Erau lucrări
> demonice, se jucau cu focul și făceau mișcări satanice. Să mă ierte trupa
> care se promova acolo, dar ați văzut că atunci când dansau, țineau degetele
> lui Satan? […] Ei au vrut să distrugă tineretul, să acapareze suflete prin
> mișcări demonice!...

> [...] I saw some footage from those so-called shows. They were demonic
> works, they were playing with fire and making satanic moves. May the
> band that promoted itself there forgive me, but have you seen that when

they were dancing they displayed Satan's fingers? […] They wanted to destroy the youth, to gain their souls with demonic moves!...

His statements added fuel to the fire caused, at that time, by the silence of the Romanian Orthodox Church on the subject of the tragedy, in the first days after it happened. Many people accused the Church of being insensitive to the topic. Four days after the fire, the first statements made by Patriarch Daniel worsened the situation, as many Romanians interpreted them as victim-shaming[3].

This religious theme, along with the others presented above, are pervasive in our corpus of comments.

5.1. Stance Foci.
Becali and His Statements Take the Lion's Share

The messages posted by readers contained a variety of objects (or foci) of stance, dealing with many aspects of the tragedy, Becali's statements, and the larger sociocultural context. A quick view at the most frequent lemmas in the corpus is enough to paint an overall picture of the themes approached:

Rank	*Lemma* / translation	Count	Rank	*Lemma* / translation	Count
1	*om* "man"	90	6	*dreptate* "justice"	38
2	*Becali*	75	7	*viață* "life"	34
3	*Dumnezeu* "God"	64	8	*tânăr* "young (person)"	30
4	*a muri* "to die"	45	9	*cioban* "shepherd"	29
5	*copil* "child"	39	10	*club* "club"	28

Table 3. *Top 10 most frequent lemmas in the corpus*

Taken together, these words show that, overall, rather than focusing on state-related or political issues, the readers were more interested in general matters: life and death (*om*, *a muri*, *viață*), religion (*Dumnezeu*), or the victims (referred to sympathetically by *copil* and *tânăr*). However, Becali is shown as a central focal point, being designated by two lemmas in the

---

[3] "People should go to church, not to clubs. We pray in church. Let's not judge anyone, let's pray" (*our translation*), Patriarch Daniel is quoted saying (source: https://www.b1.ro/stiri/eveniment/patriarhul-daniel-prima-reactie-la-patru-zile-de-la-tragedia-din-colectiv-lumea-sa-vina-la-biserica-nu-la-club-nu-vrem-sa-se-considere -ca-facem-spectacol-video-129806.html).

top: his own name and the derisive appellation *cioban* "shepherd", a reference to his humble sheep-farming roots.

In fact, according to our annotations, a large part of the comments (42%) included stances on Becali's declarations or on Becali himself, as in (10) below:

> (10) bravo dle gigi aveți dreptate ptr că nimeni nu a avut curajul să spună adevărul până acum… (comment #60 by *dix*)
> bravo mr gigi you are right because no one has had the courage to speak the truth so far…

Besides Becali, there are several other interrelated stance foci in the corpus, which may be grouped into the following categories:

	%	Subthemes
G. Becali	42%	his statements & his person (education, past, and beliefs)
The tragedy	20%	the victims and the people responsible for the fire
General matters	19%	Romanian society, parenting, religion, and music
Previous comments & commenters	10%	the group of pro-Becali commenters, the group of anti-Becali commenters, and individual readers & stances
The media	9%	the newspaper and the journalists reporting on Becali's statements

(Row label at left: **CATEGORIES OF STANCE FOCI**)

Table 4. *Stance foci in the corpus by category*

The category referring to Becali includes only the stances that refer to his reported statements on the whole, like in (10), or those that either praise or attack him as a (public) person. The second group of stance foci refers to the tragedy itself. About 20% of the commenters had words to say about the victims (their youth, education, prudence or lack thereof, their taste in music, and so on), as well as about the club owners or other people that they deemed responsible for what had happened. The comment in the next example approaches both topics:

> (11) […] nu sunt vinovați acei tineri, nici părinții că sunt sigură că mulți le-au zis fie să nu se ducă fie să fie prudenți ce locuri frecventează... de vină este patronul clubului, cei care au acreditat acest loc!!! și voi jurnaliștii că nu luați atitudine ba dacă zice unul drept săriți și îl defăimați! […] (comment #5 by *cristinela*)

> […] it is not those young people who are to blame nor the parents cause I am sure that many told them not to go there or to be careful about the places they go to… the club owner is to blame, the people who licensed this place!!! and you the journalists who say nothing or if someone tells the truth you jump and discredit them! […].

Starting from Becali's statements, about a fifth of the readers launched into comments about general matters that were more or less closely related to the tragedy without being central to its unfolding: the state of the Romanian society (e.g., corruption, incompetence, lack of perspective, and morals), parenting, religion, music, etc. Example (12) is suggestive in this respect:

(12) nu vedeți unde a ajuns România numai lucruri rele se promovează dive -prostituate- sunt exemple pentru tineri țigani și mafioți sunt ridicați în slăvi de televiziuni cu așa exemple mergem tot mai rău (comment #8 by *un sibian*)

don't you see the state Romania has reached only bad things are promoted divas – prostitutes – are examples for the youth gypsies and mobsters are praised by television stations with such examples we're getting worse and worse.

Finally, almost 20% of the comments referred to previous comments and/or commenters, and to the media. The stances on previous messages targeted both some commenters as a group, as in example (1), or individual users and their stances. Some readers (9% of comments) also focused on the journalists' decision to publish Becali's statement (13) or, on the contrary, on their evident stance against the businessman (14):

(13) Mi-e silă de ziarele și televiziunile care încă îl bagă în seamă. Măcar azi puteau să se abțină. (comment #57 by *Dante*)
I'm disgusted with the newspapers and television stations that still pay him attention. Today at least they could've refrained.

(14) NU POT SĂ ÎNȚELEG PE CEL CARE A DAT TITLUL ACESTUI ARTICOL. CICĂ DECLARAȚII HALUCINANTE. HEIIIII, SUNTEȚI NEBUNI??? CUM SĂ FIE HALUCINANTE? (comment #73 by *cristi*)

I can't understand the person who gave this article its title. Hallucinatory statements, they say. Heyyy, are you crazy? How can they be hallucinatory?

It is worth mentioning that a large part of the interventions encompassed several stance foci, sometimes at the level of one single utterance, as in the examples below:

(15) Îmi e scârbă că astfel de oameni sunt solicitați să declare porcării procesate de mintea lor prea îngustă și mai mult îmi e scârbă de idioții care aprobă aceste mizerii. (comment #18 by *Mihai*)

I'm disgusted that such people are asked to voice the rubbish processed by their too narrow minds and I'm even more disgusted by the idiots who approve of this filth.

(16) @zzz
vă comvine nu vă comvine becali are dreptate acea muzica era muzica satanista iar toți cu semne de coarne sau v într-un fel sau altul au tras de capul lor.... cu parare de rău o spun au cules ce au semănat.... nu poți să faci ritualuri satanice și să te aștepți la bine (comment #68 by *bob.m*)

like it or not becali is right that music was satanic music and all people with symbols like horns or v one way or another brought on their head… I'm sorry to say that they reaped what they sowed… you can't perform satanic rituals and expect good.

In (15), in his two-line comment, the reader *Mihai* takes a stance against Becali, the journalists who disseminated his statements, and the people who agree with him. In (16), *bob.m* agrees with the businessman and takes a direct stance against the music played in the club at the time of the fire, blaming the victims for having attracted that misfortune upon them.

All in all, with some exceptions, the stance foci in the corpus did not diverge from the topic of the article or from the main themes in the general sociocultural context of that time.

5.2. Evaluation.
Negative Language, Trolling, and Verbal Violence

The results of our annotation process are in line with the findings of the sentiment analysis in Columbian online papers reported by Pérez-Granados et al. (2012) and other studies (McMillen 2013), which show that positive stances are very rare in online news comments (10% at most). In fact, 70% of the messages posted by the readers of *Gândul* were negative or, indeed, very harsh evaluations, using violent language and various forms of impoliteness.

Destructive criticism was directed at all the stance foci discussed in **5.1.**, but the protagonist of the news report attracted the largest share of verbal violence. Most commenters expressed negative evaluations of his background as a sheep farmer, his lack of education and intelligence, his morals (as he was convicted for corruption and made his fortune in questionable circumstances), his lack of connection with reality, and so on:

> (17) Vorbi un cioban-pușcăriaș-analfabet rupt total de realitate...
> (comment #173 by *K-man*)
> Says an illiterate-shepherd-jailbird [who is] totally separated from reality…

In fact, the lemmas *cioban* "shepherd" and *analfabet* "illiterate" are very frequent in the corpus (29 and 23 occurrences, respectively), being taken over and used by several readers, following a snowball effect that was initiated by the first comment to the news, in which *alex* uses the label *illiterate shepherd* to refer to Becali:

> (18) N-ați putut să vă abțineți, nici măcar acum, trebuia să publicați și părerea unui cioban analfabet și dus cu pluta. [...] (comment #1 by *alex*)
> You could not hold back, not even now; you had to publish the opinion of a deranged illiterate shepherd. […]

The businessman was the target of a long list of invectives and highly impolite forms of address (e.g., *maimuță* "monkey", *infractor* "criminal", *un criminal al gândului și rezonabilului* "a murderer of thought and the reasonable", *retardat* "a retard", or *fanatic religios* "a religious fanatic"). It is not surprising that this kind of violent and inflammatory remarks attracted, in turn, the criticism and violence of Becali supporters, who felt compelled to defend him, as in (19):

> (19) [...] Becali are dreptate - cioban cioban dar mai înțelept decât voi. El și fetele lui sunt în viață - ai vostrii nu, iar voi urmați pentru că nu învățați din pătania altora! [...] (comment #117 by *Dardanos*)
>
> […] Becali is right – [he might be] a shepherd shepherd but [he is] wiser than you. He and his girls are alive – yours aren't, and you are next because you learn nothing from other people's misfortunes! […].

Negative evaluations and criticism were also directed at the victims – who were mainly blamed for their allegedly reckless behaviour (i.e. attending a rock concert late at night, in a nightclub), their supposed Satanism (the idea launched by Becali), or their taste in music –, at their parents (for having given them a bad education), the Romanian society (e.g.,

corruption, lack of faith in the Orthodox Church, or moral decadence), and the journalists/the newspaper, criticised for their poor deontological standards both by Becali supporters (angered by the use of the word *hallucinatory*), as in (14) above, and by the readers who took a stance against the businessman (upset that his statements were published and further disseminated), as in (18) above.

The substantial presence of negative evaluations accompanies and results in a series of negatively marked online behaviours (NMOB) (Hardaker 2012). Besides verbal violence, the comments are brimming with flaming and trolling. Although similar and hard to distinguish in practice, the two phenomena differ in that, without being necessarily deceitful or even deliberate, flaming is a type of behaviour in which the user "adds fuel to the fire" through inflammatory, impolite, or insensitive remarks, whereas the latter is a type of online behaviour in which a commenter/a troller "uses aggression, deception, manipulation, or a mixture of these to create a context that is conducive to triggering, or aggravating conflict" (Hardaker 2012, 292). Due to the larger context and the nature of the news report itself, the most frequent type of NMOB in our corpus is *memorial trolling*, i.e. "deliberately offensive or hurtful comments when compassion, empathy, or tact is expected" (Hardaker 2012, 292):

> (20) Au mers să vădă un concert rock și au văzut pe drequ))) cât despre doliu național.... pentru ce???? Pentru 28 de agarici morți într-o crâșmă??? Ce au făcut acești "tineri" pentru țară să fie doliu național??? (comment #2 by *unu*)
>
> They went to see a rock concert and they saw the devil))) as for national mourning…. for what???? For 28 idiots dead in a pub??? What did these "young" people do for the country for national mourning to be declared???

Comment (21) below may be seen as an example of both *pseudo-naïve* and *concern trolling*:

> (21) Domnul Becali știe mai bine cum e cu oile. Chiar cel mai bine. Și cum oamenii sunt ca oile, nu-i așa? Deci Domnul Becali Are Dreptate! (comment #97 by *Costel Costelivu*)
>
> Mister Becali knows better what sheep are like. He knows best, actually. And since people are like sheep, isn't that so? So Mister Becali is right!

In pseudo-naïve trolling, the user posts deliberately naïve questions to trigger arguments, whereas in concern trolling, the commenter pretends "to support the opposition's (political, football, etc.) group whilst spreading doubt from within" (Hardaker 2012, 293). In (21), the reader pretends to be on Becali's side only to offend his supporters by calling them *sheep*, through the use of a naïve question: *Şi cum oamenii sunt ca oile, nu-i aşa?* ("And since people are like sheep, isn't that so?"), which hides a fallacious syllogism as well.

Most of the neutral comments in our corpus (23% of the total) do not take a stance focus *per se*, but are only meant to express the speaker's alignment with the news report or a previous intervention.

In the following example:

(22) Nu mă aşteptam să spun asta vreodată dar SUNT DE ACORD CU BECALI. (comment #51 by *vp*)
I've never expected to say this but I AGREE WITH BECALI,

although the comment may be interpreted as assigning a (rather) positive value to Becali's statements, the absence of an overt stance object and qualifying lexis made us annotate it – and the other similar utterances in our corpus – as neutral in terms of evaluation.

Finally, only 7% of the comments in our inventory include positive evaluations. Most of these (60%) come from the businessman's supporters and value either his ideas or several aspects of his personality, like his courage in example (10) above, or his intellectual abilities, as in (23) below:

(23) Doamne aici mai vezi şi *oameni deştepţi. Bv Gigi*. (comment #9 by *un creştin*)
Lord one can also see *smart people* here. *Bravo Gigi*.

5.3. Positioning. Teachers and Preachers

Although both the news report and the comments appeared in a highly emotional context, epistemic positioning prevails in the corpus (80%). Most commenters position themselves in the conversation as knowledgeable experts on the matters discussed, and the most frequent conventional linguistic resources used to signal this kind of stances are:
–   1st-person singular epistemic verbs

(24) *Nu-mi vine să cred* că poate cineva să fie de acord cu limitatul ăsta!

(comment #9 by *Mihai*)
I can't believe that someone can agree with this limited person!;

− impersonal constructions

(25) *se pare* că prostia e contagioasă, și nu are limite. (comment #53 by *ionel*)
it seems stupidity is contagious and has no limits

(26) *Incredibil* câți proști comentează. (comment #27 by *dan*)
It's incredible how many stupid people are commenting;

− modal verbs

(27) are dreptate Becali *trebuie* să-l căutăm pe Dumnezeu să ne întoarcem fața spre EL (comment #8 by *UN SIBIAN*)
Becali is right *we must* seek God and turn our faces towards HIM.

On the other hand, 1st-person singular verbs are the conventional linguistic resource that is most often used to signal overt affective positioning (28), followed by impersonal adjective constructions (29):

(28) *... nu mi găsesc liniștea* de vineri, da *sunt în stare de șoc* când am văzut atâtea drame și nu pot să le înțeleg, *mă doare* să văd atâția copii morți, da *sunt chinuit* de tragediile care le văd în fiecare minut !!!... (comment #56 by *ionel*)

...I haven't been able to find peace since Friday, yes *I've been in shock* since I saw so many misfortunes and I can't understand, *I'm in pain* to see so many dead children, yes *I am tormented* by the tragedies that I see every minute !!!...

(29) Pentru toți care îi dați dreptate unui criminal-pușcăriaș-analfabet: *păcat* că ne pierdem timpul cu falsurile gânduri ale unui delicvent! (comment #125 by *Atentul*)
To all those who agree with an illiterate-inmate-criminal: *it's a pity* that we waste our time with the false thoughts of a delinquent!

However, one of the most conspicuous features of the comments in the corpus is the low-investment discourse strategy (Kiesling et al. 2018) adopted by a large number of commenters, who preferred to remove themselves and take a certain distance from the statements they made. At the level of the language used, this translates into a preference for:
− 3rd-person and impersonal verb constructions

(30) Are dreptate de data asta d Gigi Becali! *Aceste spectacole sunt sataniste clienți îşi primesc porția de droguri şi alcool pt a încinge atmosfera - o porcărie*. Dumnezeu să îi ierte pe cei ce și-au pierdut viața, pt cei răniți însănătoşire grabnica iar vinovații să fie traşi la Răspundere şi bagați în puscariie pentru omor calificat (comment #111 by *marin*)

This time mr Gigi Becali is right! *These shows are Satanist, the clients receive their portion of drugs and alcohol to warm up the atmosphere – it's crap*. May God forgive those who lost their lives and may the wounded get well soon and the culprits be punished and sent to jail for murder;

– open-ended or rhetorical questions

(31) *Copii nevinovați? Sau copii vinovați? Vinovați... că ce? Care ar fi vina lor? Şi cine o stabileşte? Dar... o data "judecați", cine le da pedeapsa? Ce păcate trebuie să ai că să meriti să arzi de viu sau să mori otrăvit cu acid clorhidric şi cianuri?* Întrebări, întrebări. … (comment #150 by *Belzebuth*)

Innocent children? Or guilty children? Guilty… of what? What's their guilt supposed to be? And who establishes it? But… once "judged", who is to punish them? What sins should you have to deserve to be burnt alive or poisoned by muriatic acid or cyanides? Questions, questions. …;

– exclamative constructions and sentences

(32) Declarațiile și judecățile acestui individ sunt la fel de dezastruase că evenimentul în sine! … (comment #69 by *laura*)
The statements and judgements of this individual are just as disastrous as the event itself! …

The examples shown in (30–32) are illustrative of the way in which commenters distance themselves from the opinions they express. While removing the speaking subject from the utterance, 3rd-person and impersonal turns also frame the opinions expressed as general truths and unquestionable facts and thus position their authors as knowledgeable experts, who are certain of what is being said (e.g., *Aceste spectacole sunt sataniste* "These shows are Satanist"). Open-ended or rhetorical questions, which are particularly frequent in the corpus, are a convenient low-

investment[4] way of launching new ideas into the debate, while avoiding direct confrontation with other speakers, whereas exclamations such as that in (32) are used to express emotion, without actually putting it into words.

Finally, two other frequent discourse strategies, i.e. the use of imperatives (33) and 1st-person plural verbal constructions (34), paint the picture of an inventory of comments made by speakers who position themselves as "teachers" and "preachers" in the interaction:

> (33) a fost un concert satanist.. *uitați-vă* la crucile de acolo, la flacări, la oamenii aia cum se manifestau... […] *Analizați și voi* în profunzime ce s-a întâmplat acolo, *uitați-vă* la imaginile din club, sunt destule... (comment #41 by ele @ berbecali)
>
> it was a Satanist concert.. *look* at the crosses there, the flames, the way in which those people behaved… […] *Analyse* in depth what happened there, *look* at the images from the club, there are plenty…

> (34) Adevărul poate veni și printr-un om mai puțin educat. *Tuturor ne pare rău* de semenii care au probleme, dar se pare că *nu vrem să recunostem* că acolo se promovau lucruri diabolice. (comment #176 by *TOM*)
>
> Truth may come through a less educated man. *We are all sorry* for our neighbours who are in trouble, but it seems *we do not want to acknowledge* that diabolical things were promoted there.

In (33), the user *ele* takes on the position of an expert and, like a teacher, tries to convince others of the truth of the assertions made by using several imperative forms (*uitați-vă* "look", *analizați* "analyse"). Even if the comment is directed at *berbecali*, the imperatives are in the second person plural, addressing all potential readers. In (34), *TOM* positions himself as a leader of opinion who can speak in the name of everyone involved (e.g., *ne pare rău* "we are all sorry"). As in (33) and (34), most comments include several of the strategies discussed herein, combining 3rd-person statements with questions, imperatives, and exclamations.

5.4. Alignment

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[4] "a question is by definition low INVESTMENT (the speaker is professing to not know the possible world in which something is true)" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 700).

According to our annotations, 60% of commenters intervened in the debate to express their disagreement rather than their agreement (32%) with the contents of the news report or other speakers. As far as divergent alignment is concerned, most commenters expressed their disagreement with Becali's declarations (37%), with the businessman's supporters as a group (23%), and with other individual commenters (23%), and with the journal's decision to publish the news (19%). On the other hand, convergent alignment was mainly targeted at Becali, as 81% of the converging comments expressed agreement with the businessman's statements.

Evaluation (dis)alignment is by far the prevalent type of alignment in our corpus. It is defined by Kiesling et al. (2018, 699) as "agreement on the evaluation of a stance focus". In other words, in this type of alignment, the two speakers agree or disagree with respect to the value assigned to a particular object. In example (35) below, an unnamed commenter disagrees with *nivk*, who stated that churches are useless:

> (35) *Nu sunt inutile, acolo se adună proştii ca acest Becalii.* (comment #83 by unnamed user @comment #81 by *nivk*)
> They are not useless, they are places where stupid people like this Becali gather.

The comments that express the users' agreement or disagreement – e.g., (22), (24), (27), (30) – with the businessman's declarations, which contain his opinions and value judgements, also count as instances of evaluation alignment.

In fact, due to the highly evaluative nature of the comments, we could find only one case that may be interpreted as *propositional* alignment, i.e. "a general agreement about the propositional content" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 699). In example (36) below, the commenter expresses (some kind of) alignment with the news about the fire itself and not with a previous evaluation:

> (36) *s-a întâmplat şi aşa a fost destinul...* (comment #105 by *kfglfssfg*)
> it happened and destiny was such…

The third type of alignment discernible in our comments is *action* alignment, defined as a type of agreement in which the speakers show their willingness to participate in the interaction or to cooperate "faithfully" (Kiesling et al. 2018, 699). Answers to previous questions are an example of action alignment. An illustration of this type of agreement

may be seen in (37), in which the user responds to an interrogation referring to those responsible for the tragedy:

(37) […] răspuns la o întrebare: cine? Diavolul. (comment #9 by *un creştin*)
[…] answer to a question: who? The devil.

8% of the comments in the corpus did not align with previous stances. In (38) below, the commenter expressed their moderate opinion on the tragedy without agreeing or disagreeing with any existing viewpoint:

(38) În faţa morţii sântem cu toţii nişte vremelnici pe această lume. Nu contează că eşti rocker sau manelist. Nu ascult aceste genuri dar nici nu îi condam pe cei ce o fac. Este opţiunea fiecăruia. Dumnezeu să îi ierte! (comment #14 by *Luck_1*)

In front of death we are all ephemeral in this world. It doesn't matter if you're a rocker or *manelist*[5]. I don't listen to these genres, but I don't condemn those who do either. It's a personal option. May God rest their souls!

As mentioned in section **4.2.**, our corpus is highly heteroglossic, without being highly dialogical as well. The fact that the commenters took into account alternative points of view in their interventions is also highlighted by the presence of direct forms of address that do not refer to individual users but to vague groups of readers or previous commentators (e.g., *măi fraţilor*, *băi fraţilor* "brothers", *dragii taichii* "papa's darling [children]") as well as by the extensive use of 2nd-person plural verbs.

6. Conclusions

Our study set out to investigate the stancetaking behaviour of Romanian online newsreaders, and focused on a dataset of comments posted to a news report referring to the 2015 tragedy at the *Colectiv* club in Bucharest. Our annotation-based analyses paint the picture of a type of discourse characterised by "stancetaking for the sake of stancetaking", the predominance of negative evaluations, harsh criticism, disagreement, and the speakers' choice to present themselves as "experts" conveying unquestionable absolute truths.

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[5] Derogatory term for someone who listens to *manele*, a type of music mixing Oriental tunes with Romanian folk music and modern music that is often frowned upon by educated people.

Most readers (if not all) hide their identities under made-up monikers or usernames that reveal little information about their real-life selves. Although this high degree of anonymity should, in theory, support interactions and be conducive of dialogue, only a few commenters engage in actual conversations with other readers. Most post messages as spontaneous reactions to the contents of the news report or to previous posts on the board, but do not seem to be interested in engaging in further debates. Thus, the discourse specific to our dataset can be described as heteroglossic without being dialogic *per se*.

As far as stance acts are concerned, the comments focusing on Gheorghe Becali and his opinions are prevalent in the corpus. In line with the findings of other studies dealing with online comments, the stances taken in this type of discourse tend to encompass mostly negative evaluations which, encouraged by anonymity, take the form of harsh criticism accompanied by verbal violence and impoliteness. It seems that readers decide to publish their thoughts on these forums especially when they have something bad to say or, as our analysis of alignment has shown, to disagree.

The most interesting findings are related to positioning. Although the context seemed to favour affective stances, epistemic viewpoints prevail in our dataset. There are relatively few opinions expressed using first person singular verbal forms. The most frequent type of positioning involves the use of third person singular verbs, (rhetorical) questions, and imperatives. However, this distance taken by speakers from their utterances and their low investment in what is being said are misleading. The argumentative strength of this type of discourse is actually greater, since commenters present themselves as experts, "teachers and preachers" who, from a position of superiority as far as their addressees are concerned, frame their stances as facts and truths, ask questions, and give instructions.

Thus, according to our findings, the prototypical Romanian news commenter is someone who prefers to assume a made-up online identity and whose stances, expressing mainly negative evaluations and disagreement, are taken from the position of a knowledgeable speaker who frames opinions as irrefutable facts.

Our results, limited by the relatively small number of examples analysed and the specific context in which they were produced, could be expanded by further studies that could take into consideration other types of news or publications and online media.

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PART III.

STANCETAKING DEVICES IN ORAL CONVERSATION AND IN LITERATURE

CHAPTER EIGHT

PARENTHETICALS AS METACOGNITIVE STANCETAKING DEVICES

ANDRA VASILESCU

1. Preliminaries

Parenthetical constructions have been considered a peripheral aspect of language structure and use, and consequently have been quite neglected or only tangentially dealt with for some time. They have come into focus in recent years. Extensive research has highlighted complex and intricate features that prove to be challenging to capture in syntactic, semantic, pragma-discursive, and cognitive frameworks of description and interpretation.

The present contribution sketches the state of the art, elaborates on a previous article (Vasilescu 2019), and proposes a unified definition of parentheticals, as well as an integrated functional classification, which correlates the multileveled features of the structures under discussion in order to explain both their specificity, and their diversity in terms of cognitive relevance.

Here parentheticisation is viewed as a quasi-universal strategy of thought textualisation, which maps two regularly subsequent utterances onto a complex communicative unit, underpinned by a disrupted relation between a host sentence and a parenthetical constituent. The former is conceived as pertaining to the main informational plane (the frame), the latter to a secondary plane somehow included in the main one.

It is not a special configuration of syntactic–semantic–pragma-discursive features that would make parenthetical structures different from other textual patterns, but rather the cognitive relevance with which they are invested by the speaker: they anchor the speech flow into the cognitive processes of the speaker by projecting implicatures and higher-order explicatures on the surface structure of discourse in order to secure optimal relevance. Hence, parenthetical constructions will be considered

the grammaticalised epiphenomenon of speaker's metacognitive stancetaking activity: the speaker evaluates his/her ongoing discourse as a by-product of thoughts and communicative intentions, and, as it unfolds, (s)he enriches it with information of various types in order to maximise its uptake by the hearer. In parentheticisation, stancetaking focuses on the speaker's cognitive activities, as part of relevance optimisation and recipient design strategies (i.e. strategies meant to meet the recipient's needs or expectations). Consequently, parentheticals can be viewed as a partly grammaticalised metacognitive stancetaking device.

Whether they are intentional or unintentional, parentheticals disrupt hierarchical constituency, while still being somehow semantically related to the host sentence, they are cued by prosodic signals, and produce discursive effects, violating four principles (as defined under **4.**) that underlie thought textualisation by-default.

While real-time speech production and planning in progress can be invoked as triggers of parenthetical constructions in oral communication, disrupted structures in writing can be viewed as a conversion of genuine parentheticals to stylistic functions. Nevertheless, stylistic effects can be intentional in oral communication usages too. Here I will deal with constructed examples, which I assume to be representative types for tokens that normally occur in real conversations.

The structure of this chapter is the following. After Preliminaries (**1.**), I present the diversity of parenthetical structures (**2.**) and then I sum up some of the approaches to parentheticals (**3.**), in syntactic (**3.1.**), pragmasemantic (**3.2.**), and cognitive (**3.3.**) theoretical frameworks, along the lines that led me to the integrated approach I propose. In (**4.**), I elaborate on this interpretation: parentheticals are metacognitive stancetaking devices that feature a special type of deixis related to discourse deixis, i.e. cognitive deixis. The mechanism that underpins the various types of parentheticals is based on deviations from one of the four principles of thought textualisation: the Thinking and Speaking Principle (**4.1.**), the Linearity Principle (**4.2.**), the Deictic Frame Consistency Principle (**4.3.**), and the Non-Redundancy Principle (**4.4.**). In (**5.**), I explore parentheticals as discourse traces of speaker's activity of mapping mental spaces onto discourse spaces. The result is a classification of parentheticals on criteria related to the type of information used by the speaker to update the shared current universe of discourse with the interlocutor and his/her mental state: (1) information centred parentheticals; (2) information packaging parentheticals; (3) evaluative parentheticals; (4) allocutive parentheticals; (5) metacommunicative parentheticals; and (6) paralocutionary parentheticals.

2. Structural Variety of Parentheticals

There is a wide range of structures that have been labelled by various authors as parentheticals, exemplified under (1) below: vocatives (1a), propositional adverbials or modals (1b), verbs/verb phrases (1c), interjections (1d), pragmatic connectors (1e), discourse markers (1f), appositions (1g), tag questions (1h), quotatives (1i), various types of sentences or phrases syntactically not integrated with the host but more or less semantically connected to it (1j–m), left dislocated constituents (1n), right dislocated constituents (1o), self-corrections of various types (1p), repetitions (1r), self-interruptions addressing a different issue or a different interlocutor from the one of the frame sentence (1s), amalgams of two enunciation planes (1t), pragmaticalised verbs (1u), or fillers (1v).

(1) a. *Hey, John*, come here!
     b. *Frankly*, I don't like it.
     c. She will come, *I believe*.
     d. *Wow*, what a dog!
     e. She didn't tell me. *But* I won't give up.
     f. OK. *Now*, let's move on to something else.
     g. Mary, *his sister*, didn't show up.
     h. She is smart, *isn't she*?
     i. I'll be late, *she said*.
     j. I told my secret to Mary, *who is not the most trustworthy person in the world...*
     k. She is my virtual friend, *if I may say so...*
     l. It was not me, *and you know it...*
     m. Ask somebody to help you, *John for instance*.
     n. *As for John*, it was not his fault.
     o. She was very tired, *Mary*.
     p. I put it on the table, *I mean under*.
     r. Big mistake, *very big*!
     s. And now – *please, have a seat John* – we want to talk with you, young lady!
     t. I called *I think John*.
     u. I don't feel comfortable with it, *you see*…
     v. She's…*err*…*err*…she's my friend.

They can be words (a, b, d–f, o), phrases (g, m, n, r, u), full (c, i–l, s), or elliptical (h, p) clauses and sentences of various lengths, as well as paraverbal elements (u). They can be juxtaposed with the host (c, i, p, u, v), or linked by coordination (l) or subordination (j, k); they can be placed in front (a, b, d, e, f, n), in the middle (g, s, v), at the end of the host structure (c, h–m, o–r, u), or amalgamated with the host (t). At the same

time, they are diverse in meaning. Some parentheticals are syntactic clichés (like vocatives and interjections), others reflect semantic features or the information structure of the sentence (epistemic and deontic adverbs, quotative clauses, tag-questions, left/right dislocations), others encode discursive phenomena (like repetitions or self-corrections), and others are simply *ad hoc* constructions that supplement the information conveyed by the host sentence. In point of degree of integration with the host, they have been classified in free and anchored parentheticals (Kaltenböch 2007; Kluck 2015). Free parentheticals are interpolated in various positions with their hosts (between the head and the complement/modifier/specifier of a phrase) and tend to affect the semantics of the whole proposition (like a, b, c, h, i, k, l, s, u), while anchored parentheticals have a fixed position and take semantic scope over a particular constituent (like g, j, o, p); fillers (v) are floating parentheticals, which can occur anywhere in discourse.

Although authors have not agreed on the exact subtypes to be included in the category of parentheticals and proposed various names and subdivisions, the common denominator of such structures is an adjacency relationship between the parenthetical constituent and its host. Most often, adjacency implies parataxis, but connectives are nevertheless possible (as in e, j, k, l, n). Such connectives do not function as syntactic coordinators/subordinators, but as pragmatic connectors, which connect two speech acts and give procedural information about the logical relation that holds between them (Blakemore 2005, 2007).

3. Approaches to Parentheticals

Parentheticals have been approached in various theoretical frameworks: syntactic, pragmasemantic, and cognitive.

3.1. Syntactic Approaches

Two categories of syntactic approaches have been proposed for (some) parentheticals: integrated and unintegrated (an overview in Dehé and Kavalova's 2007, 4–7). The former claim a syntactic relationship between the parenthetical and the host, the latter claim no syntactic relations, solely discursive ones. Basically, the debate is whether parentheticisation is a phenomenon that pertains to the level of linguistic competence or to the level of performance.

In the syntax-centred integrated approach literature, the theoretical dispute was whether parentheticals are base-generated in a

complement/adverbial position or derived by a movement operation from an underlying structure that features the parenthetical as a main clause taking the rest of the sentence as object. For example, Ross (1973) proposed the first formal analysis for clauses like (1c), claiming that such structures are derived from a construction where the host sentence is the complement of the parenthetical verb (*I believe that she will come*), through the transformational rule of Slifting (= Sentence Lifting), which fronts the embedded clause and deletes the complementiser. Lakoff (1974) explained parentheticals as being part of a syntactic amalgam with ellipsis, and McCawley (1982) considers that parentheticals are the result of a rule that changes word order without affecting constituent structure. Espinal (1991, 741–745) stipulated a three-dimensional space where the host and the parenthetical do not share a syntactic node, but intersect via structural anteriority relations. Potts (2005) considered that parentheticals are adjoined to various functional projections and, unlike other adjoined constituents, are marked by a „comma feature" which accounts for their distinctive intonational pitch. The Comma Phrase is interpreted at the level of Phonetic Form and gives rise to conventional implicatures at the level of Logical Form. In order to represent parentheticals in syntax, De Vries (2007, 2012) stipulates a functional head (Par) whose existence would be proved by the occurrence of conjunctions, and a new, extra type of Merge operation, which he calls Par(enthetical)-merge, responsible for concatenating two elements without establishing a hierarchy among them. At the same time, he considered *behindance* a third dimension of grammar along with *dominance* and *precedence*, i.e. a local relation between nodes, which accounts for parenthetic relations. In a diachronic perspective, Thompson and Mulac (1991) presented parenthetical usages as originating from main clauses by means of a grammaticalisation or pragmaticalisation process: detachment from the former subordinate clause, followed by the migration to different positions in the sentence.

The unintegrated approaches start from the idea that, despite being linearly interpolated inside another clause, parentheticals are structurally independent from the latter: there is no syntactic relation between parentheticals and their hosts (Safir 1986; Fabb 1990; Peterson 1999; Burton-Roberts 2005; Haegeman 2009; Ott 2016a, 2016b). According to these views, also known as radical orphanage analyses, parentheticals would be syntactically unattached at all levels of representation, but rather derived in their own derivational space, while their semantic interpretation follows from the general discursive principles of utterance interpretation. Peterson (1999) considers relative clauses and appositions as special types of parentheticals and claims a special type of discursive relationship, i.e.

attachment, that must be distinguished both from subordination, and from adjunction. He also argues that there is a semantic bond between the two, which accounts for their association, including pronoun-antecedent and gap-antecedent relationships. Nevertheless, the discursive interpretations raise the linearisation problem: they do not explain the transfer from the discourse level to the syntactic level. One suggestion comes from Uriagereka (1999, 2002) who developed the Multiple Spell-Out model (MSO) and put forth the idea that some constituents (like specifiers and adjuncts), in order to be linearised, must be spelled-out separately, in distinct derivational spaces. The author postulated a memory buffer mediating between syntax and the interfaces, i.e. syntax-semantics and syntax-discourse/pragmatics interface (Uriagereka 1999). The main idea is that, before going to the interfaces, chunks derived in various workspaces are transferred and stored in a computational space until all derivations in all working spaces come to an end. Accordingly, parentheticals and their host would be derived in different workspaces and get intertwined through transfer via the memory buffer. Hence, syntax-centric models offer a unified manner of analysing various types of constructions, parentheticals included.

Classical approaches hold that parentheticals interrupt the prosodic flow of the host utterance, introducing intonational breaks and featuring prosodic properties different from those of their hosts. They have been considered to form distinct intonation phrases/intonation domains (Emonds 1979) that give rise to the specific intonation of *comma phrases* (Bolinger 1989), which is, most often, a marked shift to a compressed pitch range, reduced loudness, and increased tempo, as well as a tendency for the pitch to rise at the end (e.g., Crystal 1969; Bolinger 1989; Wichmann 2001). As an ever-larger variety of parentheticals was being analysed, it was shown that they can be realised prosodically in a variety of ways: stressed and prosodically independent, or non-stressed and prosodically integrated in the frame sentence, i.e. *right bound*, *left bound*, and *left-right bound* (Kaltenböck 2008). Nevertheless, it has been noticed that all these features can be suspended for certain usages, which means that none of the prosodic features is a necessary condition for parenthesis.

3.2. Pragmasemantic Approaches

The claims according to which parenthetical constructions are syntactically, phonologically, and semantically independent of their hosts (Mittwoch 1977; Fabb 1990; Espinal 1991; Haegeman 2009, among

others) were supported by research highlighting the exceptional informational status of these constructions.

In one way or another, all parentheticals supplement the information provided by the speaker in the frame sentence. Three aspects have been debated in relation to the meaning of parentheticals: their truth conditions, their contextual functions, and the discursive relationship between the host and the parenthetical.

Most parentheticals have their own truth conditions, which do not interact with the truth-conditional semantics of the host, but only indicate its illocutionary force and give the hearer procedural indications of how to understand the logical relevance, the emotional significance, and the reliability of the frame (Urmson 1952, 1963; Strawson 2017 [1971]; Recanati 1987, 36−40). As separate speech acts, although very diverse in meaning, they all help the speaker tailor his/her frame sentence by paying attention to various aspects, like modality (epistemic parentheticals), the attitude of the speaker towards the propositional content, the source of knowledge, the relationship between the speakers, or they impose restrictions on the context in which the proposition expressed by the host is true. Several authors argued that the meaning import of parentheticals resides in the information they communicate about the truth conditional content of the host.

Relying on Grice's distinction (1975) between *what is said* and *what is implied*, Jayez and Rossari (2004) included parentheticals in the category of conventional implicatures, that is "constraints on interpretation which are lexically triggered but do not contribute to delineate the referential content of a sentence" (Jayez and Rossari 2004, 2); the two authors consider that parentheticals express "what the speaker intends to be added to the listener's beliefs with regard to what the speaker believes" (Jayez and Rossari 2004, 11) and "update mutual information that concern the listener's beliefs" (Jayez and Rossari 2004, 17). Alike, Potts (2005, 2008) considers that parentheticals update the common ground in a manner distinct from that of assertions. For example, appositions alter the context of their interpretation or contextualise the contribution of the main clause to discourse, playing a role in identifying the conceptual content of the host by refining the hearer's search for the relevant contextual assumptions. By doing so, parentheticals prompt the recovery of the implicit content of the host, but not the interpretation of its truth conditional content.

More than marking disfluencies and a speaker's troubles in planning the discourse (Wichmann 2001, 189), parentheticals serve a wide range of functions and purposes (Dehé and Wichmann 2010): verbal fillers, making

explicit the places of hesitation in discourse; indicators of the speaker's attitude or mental processes of discourse planning; signals of interpersonal ends (like floor holding, politeness strategies, mitigation or boosting, feedback elicitors, etc.); markers of narrative cohesion (detailed by Fraser 1980; Kaltenböck 2007, among others). Focusing on reduced parenthetical clauses (finite verb clauses that may be inserted in the host, not overtly linked to the host, whose verbs lack one of the arguments which can be semantically recovered from the host sentence) and sentential adverbials, Griffiths (2015) distinguishes between quotes (of the *he said* type) and speaker use parentheticals, the latter further classified into mitigative (*I believe*), speech acts (*I promise*), and evaluative (sentential adverbs like *fortunately*).

The context dependent semantic relations between the host and the parenthetical appear to be underpinned by various discursive relations that provide cohesion between the frame sentence and the parenthetical. These relations may be tighter or looser, sometimes tending to be purely pragmatic in nature (i.e. the speaker picks up some contextual information and textualises it). For example, Leech and Svartvik (1975, 216–217) classified parentheticals as: (i) comments on the truth value, (ii) comments on verbalisations, and (iii) comments on the speaker's attitude. Quirk, Greenbaum, and Leech (1985, 1112–1118) identified two types of parentheticals, taking into account their discursive relationship with the basis: *content disjuncts* and *style disjuncts.* Lampert (1992, 134, apud Schneider 2007, 34) listed various types of relationships between the host and the parenthetical: associative relationships (the speaker introduces a secondary informational focus), reformulations (specification, exemplification, or generalisation), and regulatives (subjective assessments realised as epistemic modals, affective modals, or evidentials). Asher (2000) labelled parentheticals in terms of their argumentative roles: comment, proof, justification, motivation, additional judgment, and explanation.

3.3. Cognitive Approaches

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 204), hearers interpret speech by constructing hypotheses about their interlocutors' informative intentions and assuming the principle of optimal relevance. In doing so, they access constituent concepts and their associated logical and encyclopaedical entries as the message develops in time, some of them earlier, others later in the discourse flow. In the framework of the relevance theory, Blakemore (2005, 1179; 2007, 2009) considers that by uttering a

parenthetical, the speaker intends to optimise relevance: to direct his/her interlocutor's attention towards recovering certain meaning effects from that specific explicature, in an attempt to reduce the processing effort for the hearer. She analyses connectives as constraints on the implicatures, and true parentheticals as constraints on the explicatures. The host sentence and the parenthetical are considered to be compositionally independent one from another, to communicate distinct thoughts on the condition that the thought communicated by the parenthetical be about the thought communicated by the host. In several ways, the relevance of parentheticals is to help the hearer(s) optimally identify the thought communicated by the host sentence. As higher-level explicatures, i.e. conceptual representations which are recovered through a combination of decoded and inferred meaning (Wilson 1990, 102, apud Ifantidou-Trouki 1993, 207), they play a metaconceptual role, i.e. they communicate information about the conceptual content or the linguistic properties of the host (Blakemore 2007, 2009).

In a different approach, Schneider (2007, 1–36) considers parentheticals a stancetaking device for positioning the speaker towards his/her own discourse, hence a metacommunicative/metatextual stancetaking strategy (see also Petola 1983, 103).

4. A Proposal: Parentheticals as Metacognitive Stancetaking Devices

I herein propose the interpretation of parentheticals as *metacognitive stancetaking devices*: indices of planned strategies at which speakers resort in order to enhance uptake and mutual understanding with the hearer, by leaving traces in discourse of the metacognitive processes that occur in their minds during speech production. Below, I refer to examples (1a-v) as (2a-v).

As (s)he shares information with the interlocutor(s) by textualising thoughts, the speaker permanently monitors the ongoing speech and the quality of his/her interaction. Hence, (s)he may choose to adjust it on the spot, in order to secure optimal relevance for the recipient(s). In doing so, (s)he gives him/her cues for utterance interpretation. Parentheticals are such cues, which follow metacognitive processes of discourse self-assessment and "recipient design" strategies taking place in the speaker's mind at the moment of interaction. This explains why parentheticals are loose elements in the discourse flow. To sum up:

(i) they are syntactically non-integrated in the configuration of the frame sentence because they are generated into a separate syntactic space, kept in a memory buffer, and only interpolated in the host at a specific moment of speech production; parentheticals are syntactic configurations which follow the syntactic principles and rules of a specific language, whose place of insertion in the frame is almost totally controlled by the speaker's decisions at the moment of speech; there are few constraints on their position in the frame sentence, and generally they can move within the host sentence, although intrasentential movement is sometimes limited by scope and focus constraints;

(ii) semantically, they do not interact with the truth conditions of the host, because they are part of a different proposition, which simply collapses into the discourse space of the frame proposition at a moment of the speaker's choice;

(iii) they are independent speech acts (higher order speech acts, Grice 1989, 362) which indirectly comment on the speech act performed in the host utterance; they have a particular built-in metacommunicative intention, i.e. to add processing clues that might optimise relevance and the interlocutor's effective processing and understanding;

(iv) due to their conceptual meaning, they enter into various discursive relations with the host; these relations are the consequence and the proof of the evaluations and corrections initiated by the speaker in order to send procedural information which might help the hearer interpret the host sentence; procedural information is encoded in implicatures or explicatures;

(v) the various intonational curves of parentheticals are surface markers that draw listener's attention to the shift to a different syntactic-semantic-pragmadiscursive space.

Syntactic structures that do not differ in any way from others of the same type are co-opted in discourse to a new function: metacognitive stancetaking device, a device used by the speaker to jointly indicate how (s)he positions her/himself to her/his own discourse and to the hearer's affordances to interpret it at the moment of interaction. Along the same lines as Kaltenböck, Heine, and Kuteva (2011, 876), I consider co-optation a packaging strategy whereby a clause, a phrase, a word, or any other unit is taken out of Sentence Grammar and deployed for use as a (paren)thetical. For sentence grammar, such units are linguistic fossils (Jackendoff and Jackendoff 2002, 255) invested with the new role of metacognitive stancetaking devices.

In a way, parentheticals are related to discourse deictics (Yang 2011): they operate on a distinct discourse plane relative to the host sentence, index information from a different deictic frame, and entail deictic shifts of various types: shifts in subjective evaluations, addressee-oriented shifts, information supplementation, or metastatements about the text itself (Grenoble 2004, 1954). But the characteristic that unifies parentheticals and sets them apart from discourse deictics is their function of projecting metacognitive stance in discourse. Hence, I will consider parentheticisation a special type of deixis: cognitive deixis – the discourse trace of the speaker's metacognitive stancetaking relative to his/her own discourse, which derives its contextual function from the relationship between the host and the interpolated chunk of information. Parentheticisation as cognitive deixis indexes in discourse the psycho-cognitive processes of message planning, mental elaboration, and linguistic encoding of a specific thought, conceived in a particular setting for a particular hearer (see also Enfield 2003).

In what follows, I will assume that thought textualisation is underpinned by four Textualisation Principles: (i) The Thinking while Speaking Principle; (ii) The Linearity Principle; (iii) The Deictic Frame Consistency Principle; and (iv) The Non-Redundancy Principle, defined below.

I.   Thinking while Speaking Principle (TSP): Thinking and speaking occur simultaneously in spontaneous oral interactions.
II. Linearity Principle (LP): Text progression reflects the ordered sequence of two phases which occur in the process of thought textualisation: the mental phase of planification and the overt phase of textualisation.
III. Deictic Frame Consistency Principle (DFCP): The speaker, who is the *origo* of the deictic frame, is consistent with the deictic frame in which the event had occurred.
IV. Non-Redundancy Principle (NRP): By-default, messages are economically/non-redundantly encoded.

Interpreting parentheticisation as a type of cognitive deixis that functions as metacognitive stancetaking device, i.e. stancetaking directed towards one's own discourse, I consider that parentheticisation is enacted whenever the speaker deviates from one of the four principles above.

In communication, some things matter more than others and utterances have a relevance structure, in which elements occupy various positions depending on their role in it. The deviation from the default setting of one

of the four principles signals a process of relevance negotiation between the speaker and the hearer. By embedding/adjoining a parenthetical in/to a host, the speaker helps the hearer retrieve the intended referents, propositional content, associated emotions, and pre-existing contexts.

4.1. Parentheticisation as Deviation from TSP

Parentheticisation as deviation from the Thinking and Speaking Principle (TSP) occurs when internal or external noises (like hesitations, emotions, temporary lack of knowledge, etc.) disrupt speaker's fluency. Pauses, filled pauses, verbal tics are such examples, as shown in (2v) below.

> (2) v. She's…*err…err*…she's my friend.

The *err…err…* parenthetical shows speaker's hesitations and search for the right word to name the referent.

4.2. Parentheticisation as Deviation from LP

Parentheticisation as deviation from the Linearity Principle (LP) occurs when the speaker engages in replanning during the textualisation phase. This triggers a temporary overlap of phases projected in discourse as parenthetical insertion, resulting in a delay in the textualisation of the frame sentence, or in a supplementation of information for already textualised content. Compare examples (2g) and (2g') below, which refer to example (1g) above.

> (2) g. His sister, *Mary*, didn't show up.
>   g'. His sister Mary didn't show up.

In (2g'), the speaker conveys the message after having carefully planned it to make all referents clear for his/her interlocutor. In (2g), the speaker has planned to convey the message (*His sister didn't show up*), but while speaking (s)he realises that it might not be clear enough for the interlocutor, so (s)he adjusts the formerly planned discourse by inserting a clarification (*Mary*) which disrupts the linearity of the message.

The same interpretation of parenthetical insertions as deviations from the Linearity Principle holds for examples (1c, j, k−m, o−r, t), repeated here under (2).

  (2) c. She will come, *I believe*.
       j. I told my secret to Mary, *who is not the most trustworthy person in the world...*
       k. She is my virtual friend, *if I may say so...*
       l. It was not me, *and you know it...*
       m. Ask somebody to help you, *John for instance*.
       o. She was very tired, *Mary*.
       p. I put it on the table, *I mean under*.
       r. Big mistake, *very big*!
       t. I called *I think John*.

In (2c), the speaker adds an afterthought meant to refine his/her degree of commitment to the truth value of the proposition; in (2j), the speaker adds information to the current universe of discourse in order to secure the uptake of the speech act (regret, worry) by the hearer; in (2k), a comment is added to open a potential negotiation of a term in the host sentence (*virtual friend*); in (2l), the speaker redundantly brings to the fore some extra information to emphasise the mutual knowledge (s)he wants the hearer to retrieve from memory; in (2m), the parenthetical rephrases the suggestion in a more specific manner, as the speaker refines his/her ideas while speaking; alike, in (2o), the parenthetical occurs later in discourse, after the speaker re-assesses the referent of the deictic *she* and finds it to be ambiguous; the same self-evaluation process occurs in (2p), where self-correction illustrates a codification problem which occurred during the thought textualisation process; a verbalisation problem is illustrated in (2r) too, where the parenthetical proposes a degree rectification of a previously introduced term; the mechanism in (2t) is analogous with that in (2c), only the syntactic linearisation is different.

The complex syntactic–phonologic–semantic–pragmadiscursive features of such chunks index a clash in the passage from the message planification phase to the message textualisation phase. It is in this sense that I consider parentheticals cognitive deictics, which occur when the speaker positions him/herself towards his/her own message, assesses its degree of relevance while spelling it out, and decides to bring improvements on the spot: either by relevantly updating the current universe of discourse with new elements, or by focalising already existing information in the conversational history of the interlocutors. The interpretation of parentheticisation as a cognitive stancetaking device brings to the fore the metacognitive processes that underlie the thought textualisation process.

In oral interactions, such text disruptions may be spontaneous and accidental or intentional, while in written interactions they are exploited for stylistic and rhetorical effects or for creating the illusion of genuine interaction.

4.3. Parentheticisation as Deviation from DFCP

Parentheticisation as deviation from the Deictic Frame Consistency Principle (DFCP) occurs when the speaker textualises thoughts by swinging between/among deictic frames. This happens in (2i, s) below.

(2) i. I'll be late, *she said.*
s. And now – *please, have a seat, John* – we want to talk with you, young lady!

In (2i), the utterance „I'll be late" is taken from a previous deictic frame and inserted in the current deictic frame. The previous deictic frame has A as speaker, B as (one of) the hearer(s), at time t_1 and in space s_1. The current deictic frame has B as speaker, some hearers (covered in this de-contextualised example), at t_2 in s_2. In (2s), the deictic shift is of a different nature: two deictic frames overlap for a short period of time: the deictic frame DF_1 (speaker A, hearer B – the young lady, space s_1, time t_1) and the deictic frame DF_2 (speaker A, hearer C – John, space s_1, time t_1). A deictic frame shift, but of a different kind, is illustrated in (1b, h) too, re-written below as (2b, h).

(2) b. *Frankly*, I don't like it.
h. She is smart, *isn't she*?

The two examples illustrate a shift from intrapersonal to interpersonal communication, which produces a change in the deictic frame through the change of the interlocutor (I – I vs I – you) and a time lag. In (2b), the speaker projects in discourse the intrapersonal process of deciding about the sincerity condition of the speech act (s)he has planned and is about to perform. In (2h), the routinised tag-question (*isn't she?*) is the discourse trace of the speaker's recipient-orientation following the intrapersonal process of assessing the effect on the hearer of the recently performed speech act ("she is smart"); as the speaker reflects on the speech act (s)he has just performed in order to negotiate its propositional content with the listener, depending on the context, the tag-question can be interpreted either as politeness strategy (positive politeness – showing interest in the interlocutor's opinion, or negative politeness – avoiding imposition) or as the expression of the speaker's lack of self-confidence.

4.4. Parentheticisation as Deviation from NRP

The idea of an optimal balance between economy and redundancy in language has a long history in linguistics:

> The more economical or more abundant use of linguistic means of expressing a thought is determined by the need… Everywhere we find modes of expression forced into existence which contain only just so much as is requisite to their being understood. The amount of linguistic material employed varies in each case with the situation, with the previous conversation, with the relative approximation of the speakers to a common state of mind (Paul 1890, 251, apud Horn 1993, 33).

The interaction between economy and redundancy has been put forth by several linguists, like Martinet (1962) − The Principle of Least Effort, or Carroll and Tanenhaus (1975) − The Minimax Principle. According to Martinet (1962, 139, apud Horn 1993, 34), the Principle of Least Effort makes the speaker "restrict his output energy, both mental and physical, to the minimum compatible with achieving his ends", while Carroll and Tanenhaus (1975, 51, apud Horn 1993, 34) consider that "the speaker always tries to optimally minimize the surface complexity of his utterances while maximizing the amount of information he effectively communicates to the listener".

Some instances of parentheticisation are the result of contextually motivated deviations from the Non-Redundancy Principle (Economy Principle/Minimax Principle), indicating speaker's attempts to optimise the relevance of his/her message and the uptake of the speech act performed by connecting himself/herself to the interlocutor's mental state. Such examples are (2a, d−f, n, u) below.

(2) a. *Hey, John*, come here!
    d. *Wow*, what a dog!
    e. She didn't tell me. *But* I won't give up.
    f. OK. *Now*, let's move on to something else.
    n. *As for John*, it was not his fault.
    u. I don't feel comfortable with it, *you see*…

All the parenthetical chunks above are optional for the informational load of the proposition, but focalise a meaning which is otherwise implied in the utterance(s) and redundantly project it in discourse. In (2a), the speaker uses the Vocative to focalise the interlocutor, thus selecting him from a larger group of potential interlocutors or simply calling his attention. The imperative morpheme of the verb and the vocative morpheme of the noun

John redundantly express speaker's orientation toward the interlocutor. Moreover, a sort of „prosodic agreement" occurs between the two morphemes. Example (2d) illustrates a case of redundancy between the mirative meaning of the interjection *wow* and the mirative meaning of the exclamative sentence; on the one hand, the interjection expresses the emotion that preceded the message elaboration phase, on the other hand, the host sentence expresses the propositional content which occurred in speaker's mind and triggered his/her emotional response. In (2e), the pragmatic connector between the two speech acts overtly and redundantly marks the logical relationship between them, although the syntax of the speech acts and the context would be enough to recover it. It is the same with (2f), where the parenthetical *now* links two speech acts and marks speaker's transition from one topic to another. In (2n), the topicalised constituent redundantly expresses the same content with the possessive *his* in the host sentence, conveying the speaker's intention of giving the interlocutor cues for how to relate the currently generated thought to a previously textualised one. In (2u), the chunk *you see* redundantly directs the interlocutor's attention to the propositional content of the speech act.

Along with phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic redundancies, the various types of redundancies which underpin parentheticals could be labelled as discursive redundancies.

5. Parentheticals:
Mappings of Mental Spaces onto Discourse Spaces

Parentheticisation is a cognitive stancetaking device, which reflects speakers' metacognitive activity through which they assess thought textualisation and introduce cues to enhance the contextual relevance of their utterances in discourse. Parentheticals represent a special type of deixis, i.e. cognitive deixis, related to discourse deixis: they index, in discourse, speakers' cognitive activity of planning and textualising thoughts, which consists in introducing, activating, or repeating in the current universe of discourse those chunks of information that optimise or secure uptake and mutual understanding. The mechanisms that underpin parentheticisation rely on deviations from four principles of linguistic performance: the Thinking while Speaking Principle (TSP), the Linearity Principle (LP), the Deictic Frame Consistency Principle (DFCP), and the Non-Redundancy Principle (NRP). The host sentence and the parenthetical are linearised as adjacent, non-integrated, non-hierarchical structures, and most often prosodically marked. Semantically, the parenthetical does not

affect the truth value of the frame sentence, but discursive coherence is achieved via the pragmasemantic relationship with the frame sentence.

At the speaker's end, parenthetical structures reflect the three-stage process of mental planning, mental elaboration, and linguistic textualisation of messages. As metacognitive stancetaking devices, they signal the speaker's attempt to match the hearer's state of mind and they appear as surface traces of speaker's activity of mapping mental spaces onto discourse spaces. At the hearer's end, comprehension is based on the distinction *at-issue content/not-at-issue content* (in Potts's 2005 terms), which means that the parenthetical interpolation and the frame sentence draw on separate pools of computational resources. Empirical tests on discourse comprehension suggest that discourse segments on the same level are processed in a single memory store, whereas digressions and asides are processed independently, in a different store (Redeker 2006). Redeker presents evidence that the linguistic material pertaining to a level of discourse is suspended when a digression is processed, and the material prior to the digression is kept active in a buffer until the processor returns to it. The hearer is able to simultaneously maintain linguistic material at one level of discourse while processing a digression or an aside.

Based on experiential realism, cognitive approaches to language are built on the assumption that human knowledge is organised as idealised cognitive models (Fauconnier 1985; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 1991; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Idealised cognitive models (ICM) are complex conceptual structures (*gestalts*) whose constitutive elements correspond to conceptual categories. The association between conceptual elements and linguistic elements produce symbolic, idealised cognitive models. Accordingly, the meaning of a lexical element is represented as an element in an idealised cognitive model. Idealised cognitive models structure mental spaces, which are constructs distinct from linguistic structures, but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions (Fauconnier 1985, 16):

> Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action – they are very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models.

An example of such idealised cognitive model is the deictic ICM, where various deictic usages are distributed along a scale of prototypicality and exhibit prototype effects (as defined in Rosch 1978, among others). Within the deictic ICM, discourse deixis is based on the metaphorical understanding of discourse as linear motion in space, a linear

flow of entities. Parentheticisation shows exactly a disruption in this linear flow, caused by speaker's metacognitive activity: self-assessment of the emerging discourse. A fundamental role in the construction of meaning is conceptual blending, a basic mental operation and a basic feature of grammar that leads to new meaning (Fauconnier and Turner 2003, 57−58):

> The essence of the operation is to construct a partial match between two input mental spaces, to project selectively from those inputs into a novel 'blended' mental space, which then dynamically develops emergent structure.

Mental spaces can be modified dynamically as thought and discourse unfold. Four types of integration networks have been considered, one of them being Simplex, where one input consists of a frame and the other consists of specific elements. Extrapolating at the sentence level, parentheticisation appears to be such a blending of the Simplex type: a parenthetical builds specific meaning on some specific element in the frame sentence (see also Sweetser 1999).

Pop (2000) proposed the concept of discourse space, which would mirror mental spaces at the level of discourse. According to the author, discourse spaces are domains constructed as discourse unfolds, and which differ in point of information content: (a) the space of interdiscursive operators which connect the ongoing discourse to previous discourses; (b) the space of metadiscursive operations, which includes references to the discourse itself; (c) the space of interpersonal relations; (d) the space of subjective operations, which includes evaluations and attitudes; (e) the space of modal operators; (f) the descriptive space, which mirrors the state of affairs in the real world; (g) the space of presuppositions, which appeals to the discursive memory of the interlocutors; (h) the paradiscursive space, which includes activities of transposing language in discourse (Pop 2000, 18−19). I will add a 9th discourse space projected by parentheticals: the metacognitive space, which accommodates syntactically non-integrated chunks and sentences reflecting the metacognitive activity of the speaker and which is associated to a memory store where digressions and asides are processed independently, while the frame sentence is preserved in a memory buffer from which it is accessed to be projected later in discourse. The newly opened discursive space (see also Pop 2000, 21−22) gives the interlocutor access to implicit information in discourse, which has to be retrieved in order to accurately interpret the message. The newly stipulated metacognitive discourse space would bring a reorganisation of Pop's modal space and, consequently, the allocation of elements to various other discourse spaces (but I will not insist here on this theoretical issue).

Parentheticals are information transfer optimisers located in the metadiscursive discourse space. They feature several types of information used by the speaker to update the shared current universe of discourse with the interlocutor, as well as his/her mental state. Based on this criterion, I propose a classification of parentheticals which highlights the type of information they bring in the metadiscursive space of discourse. The examples in (1) above are replicated as (3) below.

(3) a. *Hey*, *John*, come here!
   b. *Frankly*, I don't like it.
   c. She will come, *I believe*.
   d. *Wow*, what a dog!
   e. She didn't tell me. *But* I won't give up.
   f. OK. *Now*, let's move on to something else.
   g. Mary, *his sister*, didn't show up.
   h. She is smart, *isn't she*?
   i. I'll be late, *she said*.
   j. I told my secret to Mary, *who is not the most trustworthy person in the world...*
   k. She is my virtual friend, *if I may say so...*
   l. It was not me, *and you know it...*
   m. Ask somebody to help you, *John for instance.*
   n. *As for John*, it was not his fault.
   o. She was very tired, *Mary.*
   p. I put it on the table, *I mean under.*
   r. Big mistake, *very big*!
   s. And now – *please, have a seat John* – we want to talk with you, young lady!
   t. I called *I think John*.
   u. I don't feel comfortable with it, *you see…*
   v. She's...*err...err...*she's my friend.

1. Information centred parentheticals display two functions: (*1′*) they enlarge or confirm the current universe of discourse, presumed to be shared by the interlocutors at the moment of interaction, so that the hearer can access the relevant information/meaning intended by the speaker (3g); (*1″*) they make explicit the information that might be otherwise opaque for the hearer (3o).

2. Information packaging parentheticals include three subtypes: (*2′*) they index cross-sentence operations, like economically introducing a second informational focus (3j, 3m); (*2″*) they topicalise, focalise (3n), or intensify repetitions (3r); (*2‴*) as pragmatic connectors, they point to logical/semantic relations between speech acts in discourse (3e) or, as

discourse markers, they point to the logical/semantic relations between discourse parts (3f).

3. Evaluative parentheticals encode the speaker's evaluations of the propositional content (s)he is communicating/has just communicated, in terms of commitment (3c, t), attitude to the truth value of the proposition (3b) or in terms of affective stance (3d). Many different types of terms fall in this class: sentential adverbials, modalisers and evidentials, emotions encoding interjections, etc.

4. Allocutive parentheticals focalise the interlocutor or the speaker-hearer relationship. It is the case of address terms (referential or bleached vocatives), interjections of address (3a), tag questions used by the speaker to check the hearer's opinion toward the (propositional content of the) speech act performed by the speaker (3h), chunks/sentences which seek for the interlocutor's validation (3l), or pragmaticalised verbs (3u).

5. Metacommunicative parentheticals encode elements of reflexive communication: (*5′*) metalinguistic parentheticals encoding self-centred chunks, which correct/check/negotiate the very word(s) used by the speaker in the textualisation of thoughts, as in (3k, p), and (*5″*) quoting words, as in (3i, s), used to announce the shift between two deictic frames.

6. Paralocutionary parentheticals signal disfluencies in the communication process: fillers (3v), false starts, anacoluthon, hesitations, etc.

6. Conclusions

The present chapter is a theoretical approach to parentheticals, which integrates hypotheses launched in various syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and cognitive frameworks.

I propose a definition of parentheticisation as a metacognitive stancetaking device, i.e. a strategy used by speakers to textualise thoughts: the current speaker assesses his/her ongoing verbal production and initiates readjustment on the spot, in order to secure optimal relevance for the interlocutor. This metacognitive process appears as a disfluency in the speech flow, specifically the discourse trace of a sudden change that occurred in the speaker's mind during the complex process of thinking–planning−verbalising thoughts. Hence, parentheticals can be viewed as a type of deixis, in some ways related to discourse deixis, which I labelled cognitive deixis. From a cognitive perspective, I reduced the large structural, pragmasemantic, and rhetorical variety of parentheticals to four types of parentheticisation, viewed as particular deviations from one of the four principles I defined herein and assumed to underpin the mapping of

thoughts onto discourse: the Thinking while Speaking Principle, the Linearity Principle, the Deictic Frame Consistency Principle, and the Non-Redundancy Principle. Further, I speculated around the edges of the cognitive theory of mental spaces, assuming that mental spaces are projected in discourse as discourse spaces. I stipulated a metacognitive discourse space that hosts such parenthetical information, while the information in the frame sentence is put on hold and stored in a memory buffer from where it is later retrieved and successfully interpolated with the parenthetical. As information transfer optimisers located in the metadiscursive discourse space, parentheticals feature several types of information that the speaker uses to update the current universe of discourse and/or the interlocutor's mental state. Based on the criterion of metainformation import, I classified parentheticals into (i) information centred parentheticals; (ii) information packaging parentheticals; (iii) evaluative parentheticals; (iv) allocutive parentheticals; (v) metacommunicative parentheticals; and (vi) paralocutionary parentheticals.

Parentheticisation occurs at the level of linguistic performance (as opposed to the level of linguistic competence) as syntactic structures independently generated and freely inserted in the host sentence. As adjacent non-hierarchical structures of various orders (phrases, simple/compound/complex sentences), most often prosodically marked, they are co-opted to fulfil a new discourse function: either to supplement the information in the frame sentence and help the speaker tailor it, or to impose contextual restrictions for interpretation, in the form of higher order explicatures. In oral communication, they are traces in discourse of thinking–planning–textualising thought processes, or artifices intentionally used for rhetorical effects; in written texts, they echo the oral genuine usage and acquire stylistic functions.

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CHAPTER NINE

A SELF-CRITICAL SPEAKER: THE ROMANIAN REFORMULATION MARKER *ADICĂ* "I MEAN/NAMELY"

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1. Introduction

Reformulation is a communication strategy that enables the speaker to rework his/her utterance, to find a different expression for the semantic information previously conveyed by a word, phrase, sentence, or set of sentences. Often the signal for this kind of repetition is a discourse marker named a "reformulation marker" (henceforth RM), such as *I mean*, *namely*, *in other words*, *i.e.*, *or even better*, *to be exact/precise*, *in plain English*, *specifically*, *strictly speaking*, *that is (to say)*, etc.

Currently, the use of RMs is the manifestation of a subjective dissatisfaction with the verbal exchange on the part of at least one of the persons involved in the dialogue[1]. Accordingly, their study belongs both to the field of the subjective evaluative language, and semantic-pragmatic theories of conversation. Curiously enough, neither theoretical framework accommodates reformulation quite well. It is necessary to broaden some notions in order to adequately describe this type of linguistic manifestation, although particular forms of the reformulation phenomenon were studied in older researches under the name of *paraphrase*[2].

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[1] According to the classical definition, reformulation occurs when one of the interlocutors considers that a previous formulation "was not an appropriate means of achieving communicative success" (Blakemore 1993, 101).

[2] For a synthesis of various studies that propose a distinction between a paraphrastic and a non-paraphrastic reformulation, see Eshkol-Taravella and Grabar (2014) or Fiorentini and Sansò (2017, 56).

In this chapter, the preliminary theoretical section presents a classification of stances. We introduce a new subcategory of intrapersonal stances, in order to provide an adequate framework for the study of RMs. Next, we try to explain how pragmatic models, such as the conversational theory of Grice (1975) or the cognitive pragmatics of Sperber and Wilson (1986), fail to account for reformulation, which involves the expenditure of additional mental and physical energy, both theories insisting on minimal effort in (verbal) communication. The corpus study in the following section describes the functions of the main Romanian RM *adică* "I mean", illustrated by excerpts from literary fiction (narrative or dramatic), dating from the nineteenth to early twenty first centuries. This part of the chapter illustrates the two main uses of this RM, reflecting the intrapersonal (section **3.**) and the interpersonal stances (section **4.**), uses that are quite common in Romance languages, e.g., Spanish RM *o sia* (Bordería 2014), Portuguese RM *aliás* (Lopez Macário 2014), or Italian RM *voglio dire* (Fiorentini and Sansò 2017).

2. Theoretical Framework for the Study of RMs – A Proposal

The RMs have two main characteristics. As shown above, they often express the subjective dissatisfaction of at least one participant in the verbal exchange and the wish to clarify or improve his/her conversation by means of a rectification, a correction, or an explanation. This request is usually part of a real dialogue, if the interlocutor asked for the rectification, or the result of an inner dialogue, if spontaneously offered by the sender. In both situations, speakers manifest a subjective attitude, a stance.

2.1. Some Considerations on Stance

In the last thirty years, the study of the different ways speakers express their subjectivity in communication and the investigation of its main realisations (evaluation, opinion, or affect) has become a multidisciplinary enterprise, involving a variety of terms that describe similar linguistic manifestations. For instance, with regard to the scientific fields dealing with the linguistic subjectivity, Benamara, Taboada, and Mathieu (2017) mention philosophy, sociology, and political sciences (their so-called "affective turn"), artificial intelligence ("affective computing"), and linguistics. In linguistics, the phenomenon is examined within a wide variety of theoretical frames, such as appraisal theory, stance, evaluation,

and non-veridicity (see Benamara, Taboada, and Mathieu 2017, 202, who also give bibliographical indications for each theoretical approach).

Curiously enough, this survey leaves outside an important linguistic-pragmatic field, that of discourse markers, i.e. those linguistic items that indicate discourse organisation, speaker's relationship with the interlocutor(s), as well as speaker's attitude in communicative exchanges (Ghezzi and Molinelli 2014, 1). This omission seems even more peculiar if we consider that the linguistic means expressing stances or those qualified as *discourse markers* are roughly the same: adverbs or nouns expressing certainty, likelihood, or doubt, complement clauses controlled by characteristic verbs (speech act or communication verbs), ability or willingness adjectives, interjections, etc.[3].

From a strictly linguistic point of view, RMs have two main characteristics. First, they have a clear metalinguistic character, the speaker rephrasing a previous utterance in order to make its meaning more understandable, more accessible to the addressees. Second, the use of RMs is triggered by the judgment that a second utterance, more or less synonymous with the first, is necessary. This is a subjective decision by the speaker, since (s)he spontaneously decides to do it mainly because (s)he appreciates that the hearer needs more explanations. The use of a reworded utterance can also be the result of a request from the addressee, if (s)he explicitly asks for a clarification, frequently for subjective reasons.

Among the multifaceted expressions of the complex manifestations in language of the speaker's/hearer's subjective evaluation, *stance* is one that is frequently used, not only in linguistics, but also in sociolinguistics (Jaffe ed. 2009), psychology (Jones and Harris 1967), anthropology (Silverstein 1976), discourse analysis (Silver 2003), etc. From the numerous definitions of the concept of *stance*[4], the one most appropriate for our

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[3] For bibliographical references see, for instance, Chindamo, Allwood, and Ahlsén (2012) for stances; Ghezzi and Molinelli (2014), Ghezzi (2014) for discourse (or pragmatic) markers. There is a striking similarity between the current delineations of discourse markers, usually focusing on the communicative and interactive side of linguistic exchanges, and definitions of *stances* such as "lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message" (Biber and Finegan 1989b, 93).

[4] This concept has various definitions, more or less rigorous, varying not only from field to field and from author to author, but also sometimes even between different studies by the same author. For instance, Chindamo, Allwood, and Ahlsén (2012) showed that Biber, considered one of the most influential researchers of stances, offered at least three different definitions (Biber and Finegan 1989a; Biber et al. 1999; Biber 2004, 2006), including attitudes, feeling, and judgments, sometimes commitments. Some of these definitions contain the lexical and grammatical

study of reformulation expressions is "a person's expression of their relationship to their talk, and a person's expression of their relationship to their interlocutors" (Kiesling 2009, 172). The first type of attitude, intrapersonal, is called "epistemic stance", expressing the speaker's judgment regarding the content of his/her utterance(s) (Biber et al. 1999, 854), while interpersonal stances characterise the spontaneous strategy employed by the speaker in the interaction with a person or a group of persons (Scherer 2005, 705–706).

In order to accommodate the use of RMs within one of the proposed classifications of stances (for instance, Berman, Ragnardóttir, and Strömqvist 2002, 258–261), it is necessary to improve the categorisation of intrapersonal stances. The only suitable realisation for this type of stance found in the bibliography are so called "epistemic stances". As their name suggests, epistemic stances are defined as expressing the speaker's degree of certainty regarding his/her assertions (cf. Kiesling 2009, 172), for instance when the speaker's utterance is part of an answer to a question. According to Kiesling, intrapersonal stances are often related to explanations, the speaker taking an additional role, that of an "explainer", "teacher", or "trainer". Depending on the higher or lower degree of certainty expressed by epistemic stances, speakers are more or less authoritative towards their interlocutors (Kiesling 2009, 179).

The very existence of RMs shows that speakers' relationship with their own utterances, this self-reflexive attitude, goes far beyond the certainty-uncertainty of the phrases, i.e. in logic terms, their "truth-value". RMs indicate that senders permanently evaluate their language performance and sometimes explain their own utterances, if their discontent is chiefly related to the accuracy of their thoughts' "translation" into a string of words, or if they appreciate the message as being too obscure for the receiver(s).

We call this second type of RMs *clarifying stances*, although *improving stances* or *explanatory stances* are credible alternative labels for these markers[5]. If the RM appears because the interlocutor asks the

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expressions conveying stances, others leave aside the linguistic means (Chindamo, Allwood, and Ahlsén 2012, 617–619). In the same article, the three authors cite various other definitions, provided by researchers such as Martin (1987), Precht (2003), Scherer (2005), Du Bois (2007), Kiesling (2009). Given this variety of definitions, often vague and frequently covering a range of topics too wide to describe it properly, we consider *stance* as a concept "éclaté", as the French put it (i.e. "exploded", "split up"), and in need of revision.

[5] The definition of epistemic stances is related, to a certain extent, to our clarifying stances, given that Kiesling (2009, 173) speaks of epistemic stances usually

speaker for a reformulation of his/her utterance, we are dealing with a recipient-oriented stance, communicatively motivated by the fact that the addressee needs an ulterior explanation.

2.2. Pragmatic Theories and Their Limits

In the framework of Grice's conversational theory (Grice 1975, 1989), reformulation is a manifestation of the speaker's effort to improve his/her message, in the sense prescribed by the theory. The result is that the discourse complies better with the Conversational Maxims, especially the Maxim of Quality ("Try to make your contribution one that is true") and the Maxim of Manner ("Avoid obscurity of expression", "Avoid ambiguity") (Grice 1975, 45–46).

Reformulation is an act involving complex mental processes, and has been studied by cognitive and lexical pragmatics, as approximation, lexical narrowing or broadening, metaphorical extension, *ad hoc* meanings, etc. (Sperber and Wilson 2007; Rubio-Fernández 2008; Wilson and Kolaiti 2017).

Nevertheless, reformulation contrasts with the general principle of communicational economy, because expressing the same information twice seems a waste of effort. The first consistent definition of the economy principle was proposed by Martinet (1955, 1960), who studied the functional performance of the linguistic code and formulated it as "the principle of least effort". In communication, speakers try to find a balance between the effort to verbalise their message (mainly efforts of memory and of articulation) and the amount of information conveyed, attempting to transfer the maximum amount of information with the minimum amount of effort. This tendency manifests both in phonology and in syntax. The balance takes the form of a tension between cost and benefit.

In addition to the speaker's conversational behaviour, the linguistic code also contributes to a good rendering: Martinet (1960) observed that all frequent words are short, often made up of one syllable. If the usage of a word gains in frequency, e.g., because the object designated by it becomes more common, this word tends to become shorter. An example is

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expressing that speakers "are also very certain (epistemic stance) about what they are saying, but they are also expressing something about that knowledge vis-à-vis their interlocutor, namely, that the interlocutor does not have the same knowledge". These stances can be also related with evaluation in a broad sense (Silver 2003), as "expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about" (Hunston and Thompson 2000, 5).

the French word *métro* "subway", which became shorter and shorter as the subway network in Paris developed and the number of passengers increased: *chemin de fer métropolitain* "urban railway" → *le métropolitain* → *le métro*. The same phenomenon explains words such as *vélo* (from *vélocipède* "velocipede"), *télé* (from *télévision* "television"), *ciné* (from *cinématographe* "cinema"), etc. (Martinet 1960, 178). Another manifestation of the linguistic trend toward economy is the use of abbreviations, very frequent in all European languages (*PC* for *personal computer*, *NATO* for *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, *EU* for *European Union*, *NBC* for *National Broadcasting Company*, etc.).

The economy principle is involved in Grice's Maxim of Quantity, which sets two boundaries, one inferior ("Make your contribution *as informative as* is required for the purposes of the linguistic exchange"), the other – superior ("Do not make your contribution *more informative* than is required") (Grice 1975, 45). If the speaker fails to respect the inferior boundary, his/her message is economical, the effort for its formulation and transmission is small, but it is not effective, as it does not convey all the necessary information. If the speaker does not respect the superior boundary, the outcome is opposite: the message passes on a large amount of information (it is effective), but its formulation and interpretation impose an effort greater than necessary, therefore the transfer of information has poor productivity.

The economy principle also appears in the revised variant of the conversational maxims proposed by Horn (1984, 13); it is present in both his "norms": the R-principle ("Say no more that you must (given Q)") and the Q-principle ("Say as much as you can (given R)"). Therefore, both classical Gricean theory and the neo-Gricean approach, build up by Horn, prescribe that the effort of message formulation and articulation must be proportional to the amount of information necessary for the good functioning of verbal communication.

Cognitive pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Wilson and Sperber 2004) is a theory that focuses on the inferential processes, enabling a listener to identify the speaker's communicative intention. The listener not only decodes the sentences that make up the message, but also uses other types of knowledge, including what the speaker may have implicated. The principle of economy appears also in cognitive pragmatics (called "relevance theory"), in the definition of its basic concept, relevance: the more notable the cognitive effects[6], the smaller the processing effort (to

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[6] In the relevance theory, cognitive effects measure the modifications made by the new information on the addressee's cognitive environment. For a passenger, the observation that his/her train is a minute late makes little difference (a small

produce, understand, and interpret the utterance), and the more relevant the utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 544). We can redefine the relevance of an utterance in Martinet's terms, as the relationship between effort and benefit: contextual effects should be as great as possible, the effort should be as small as possible. It is obvious that repeating an already communicated piece of information increases the processing effort (for the speaker to produce it and for the addressee to understand it), making the message more costly, and hence less relevant.

Sometimes the speaker makes it known that (s)he will employ a reformulation sequence by means of a reformulation marker and we consider that the examination of RM occurrences can help us understand the justification for the usage of such a high-cost procedure. The examination of a Romanian literary corpus containing its main RM, *adică* "namely, I mean" shows several motivations for the reformulation process. We classified the reasons into two main categories: the speaker's (personal) motivations, and the listener's motivation (Eshkol-Taravella and Grabar 2014, 2016), categories which largely overlap with those of intrapersonal and interpersonal stances.

3. Intrapersonal Clarifying Stances

The fact that sometimes the speaker rewords his/her previous utterances indicates that the cognitive framework of current pragmatic theories must be extended. Both Grice's conversational theory and, following his path, relevance theory only study the addressee's deductive processes, that is how the addressee comes to understand the speaker's communicative intentions, what was said explicitly ("explicatures") and implicitly ("(conversational) implicatures"). The fact that an utterance introduced by an RM seldom refers to the truth-value of a previous statement, at least according to our corpus, seems to indicate the necessity of introducing a new intrapersonal stance – the clarifying stance, which aims at improving the verbal exchange.

The phenomenon of the speaker's reformulation shows that the spokesperson, after the uttering of the message, becomes a kind of a second hearer, (s)he listens what (s)he has said and, if (s)he is unhappy with the pronounced utterances, (s)he often changes them. Therefore, the

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cognitive effect). But "the sight of my train arriving late might confirm my impression that the service is deteriorating, or make me alter my plans to do some shopping on the way to work. According to relevance theory, an input is RELEVANT to an individual when, and only when, its processing yields such positive cognitive effects" (Wilson and Sperber 2004, 608).

deductive processes characterise both the speaker and the addressee, the former undertaking a subjective evaluation of his/her speech production.

3.1. Correction

Corrections appear when the speaker realises that (s)he has made a mistake or that (s)he has used a linguistic expression that does not give an appropriate description of the situation:

(1) E o femeie rară, extrem de reușită, inteligentă, cultă și, ceea ce e mai important, cu mult caracter, *adică*... cu caracter! (Breban, *Bunavestire*)

She is that rare, worthy woman, intelligent, very learned and, what is more important, with a strong character, *that is* … she has character.

(2) Ne-am deșteptat pe la zece. *Adică*, am fost deșteptați. Bătea cineva la ușă, de credeam că s-a dispus demolarea hotelului. (Mușatescu, *De-a baba oarba*)

We woke up around ten. *I mean*, we were wakened up. Somebody was banging on the door; it sounded like the hotel was slotted for demolition.

The correction may involve not only the explicit meaning (the "explicatures"), but also the implicit significances (the "implicatures"). For instance, in the following example, the second speaker, Farfuridi, realises that the verb *a face* "to do, to make", which appears in a lot of set phrases, can mean not only "to become, to turn" (as in *a se face roșu* "to turn red", *a se face profesor* "to become a teacher") but also "to pretend" (as in *a se face bolnav* "to play the invalid"). He corrects himself immediately:

(3) Tipătescu: Amice, d-le Farfuride, nu ți se pare d-tale că te faci mai catolic decât Papa?
Farfuridi (hotărât): Da, când e vorba de prințipuri, stimabile, *da, mă fac, adică nu, nu mă fac*, sunt când e vorba de asta, sunt mai catolic decât Papa... (Caragiale, *O scrisoare pierdută*)

Tipătescu: Farfuride, my friend, don't you think that you are acting as if you were more Catholic than the Pope?
Farfuridi (very firm): *Yes*, when it comes to principles I do, *that is, no, I don't*, I am, when principles come into play, I am more Catholic than the Pope.

The RM *adică* introduces sometimes a radical revision of the message, which can go as far as saying the opposite:

> (4) E satul în care se găsesc mai puțini români, *adică* deloc. (Bacalbaşa, *Moş Teacă*)
> It's the village with fewer Romanians, *that is* to say, none.

> (5) Voi mă întrebați mereu cum stau cu examenele: foarte bine – *adică* foarte prost. Nu vă faceți griji, se va rezolva şi asta. (Breban, *Bunavestire*)
> You keep asking me how my exams went: very well – *I mean* very badly. But don't worry, I'll solve this problem.

Sometimes this type of correction is made because the speaker, after uttering his/her message, changes his/her opinion:

> (6) Cetățeanul: Da! vom lupta contra... *adică* nu... Eu nu lupt contra guvernului! (Caragiale, *O scrisoare pierdută*)
> Citizen: Yes, we'll take on… *I mean*, no… I'm not taking on the government.

> (7) Pampon: Mi se pare, *adică* nu mi se pare... sunt aproape sigur că sunt tradus. (Caragiale, *D-ale Carnavalului*)
> Pampon: I have a hunch, *I mean*, it is not a hunch. I am almost sure that my mistress is betraying me.

Sometimes this type of correction takes place because the speaker changes his/her discourse strategy, for instance (s)he wants to pay an implicit compliment to his/her interlocutor for a possible future success. For instance, in example (8), the speaker, Trahanache, changes the status of the person whom he was introducing from a parliamentary candidate for the current elections (real situation) to an elected MP (future desirable situation):

> (8) Trahanache: Dă-mi voie, Joițico, să-ți recomand pe d. Agamiță Dandanache! [...] Candidatul nostru!... *adică* ce mai candidat! alesul nostru. (Caragiale, *O scrisoare pierdută*)
>
> Trahanache: Zoe, my dear, let me introduce Mr. Agamiță Dandanache to you [...] Our candidate!... *that is to say*, our MP, practically.

The RM *adică* can point out that the speaker wants to give more precise information, especially about time, place, or quantities:

(9) – Care ospătărie de la Suceava?
– Este acolo o ospătărie. *Adică* era; acuma nu mai este. (Sadoveanu, *Frații Jderi*)

– Which inn in Suceava?
– There is an inn there. *I mean*, there was. Not anymore.

(10) ... o mizerabilă leafă de trei sute de lei pe lună, *adică*, vorba vine, trei sute... în mână iei două sute cinzeci și șase și cinzeci de bani... (Caragiale, *Momente și schițe*, *Mici economii*)

… a misery wage of three hundred lei per month, *I mean*, not even three hundred; you only take home two hundred fifty-six lei and fifty cents.

Corrections can appear in order to adapt a set phrase or a metaphorical expression to the actual situation: if objects are crushed under the wheels of a car, the speaker can modify the phrase *to crush under heels* into *to crush under tyres*:

(11) „Trabant"-ul pierde lăzile pe drum, de parc-ar semăna cartofi. Noi trecem peste ele, călcându-le-n picioare, *adică*-n anvelope, și ne aflăm pe punctul de a-l ajunge din urmă. (Mușatescu, *De-a baba oarba*)

Crates are falling off the Trabant [a car], as though it were sowing the road with potatoes. We drive through, crushing them under our heels, *that is* tyres, and soon we're catching up to it.

3.2. Expansions
(Definite Descriptions, Synonyms, and Explanations)

If the speaker considers that a part of his/her message is not explicit enough, (s)he rephrases it by giving supplementary definitions, synonyms, explanations, definite descriptions, etc. We found in our corpus a large number of pragmatic synonyms, phrases almost equivalent in a certain context, sometimes adding an ironic distance:

(12) Grozav, va face o impresie perfectă clubului (*adică* familiei) și asta era destul. (Breban, *Bunavestire*)
Amazing, she'll make the perfect impression on the club (*I mean* the family) and that is enough.

(13) Am rămas să întocmesc actele tatălui meu, în timp ce el rezolva tot felul de treburi. *Adică* stătea la taifas cu directorul școlii, cu polițistul și cu medicul veterinar, jucând câte un șeptic în patru și degustând după anotimp. (Lungu, *Cinci, cinci și jumătate*)

I stayed in the office to write out the documents for my father, while he handled everyday businesses. *Meaning*, he chatted about this and that with the school principal, the policeman, and the veterinary, the four of them playing cards, and enjoying various alcoholic drinks, depending on the season.

Often, the reformulation contains additional information about encyclopaedic terms that might be unknown to the addressee. Usually, the reformulation takes the form of a definite description when it comes to geographic names or historical facts:

(14) Dăm din sorginte autorizată știrea că în Bulgaria de răsărit, *adică* spre granița Dobrogei, și mai cu seamă în districtul Varna, a izbucnit revoluția printre țărani, din cauză că sunt amenințați a li se ridica dijma. (Caragiale, *Momente și schițe*, *Cum stăm*)

We inform you from a reliable source that in eastern Bulgaria, *i.e.* near the border with Dobrogea, and especially in the district of Varna, a peasants' revolt has broken out because of a threatened increase in their tithe.

(15) Prin anii 50, *adică* la cinci ani după moartea lui Stalin, sau mai precis după ce Hrușciov își dădu acordul ca trupele sovietice să se retragă de pe teritoriul nostru. (Preda, *Cel mai iubit dintre pământeni*)

In the fifties, *that is* five years after Stalin's death or more precisely after Khrushchev agreed to pull Soviet troops out from our territory.

(16) [Autorul și-a făcut] studiile superioare la Iași, unde e și domiciliul actual, cartierul Tătărași, *adică* nu în zonă centrală. (Lungu, "Prezentare")

[The author pursued his] higher education in Jassy, where he resides at present, in the district of Tătărași, *that is* not in a downtown area.

Sometimes the RM *adică* introduces definite descriptions, which add new information to the narrative universe created by the text:

(17) E o cameră înaltă, văruită în alb, cu un birou imens, câteva scaune și trei fișete metalice. Are o fereastră mare, chiar spre stradă. E camera

secretarului primăriei, *adică* a tatălui meu. (Lungu, *Cinci, cinci și jumătate*)
It is a tall room, painted white, with a huge writing desk, several chairs, and three metal filling cabinets. There is a big window facing the street. It's the town clerk's room, *that is* my father's.

(18) Șeful era la punctul silvic, *adică* la a treia casă. (Chiriță, *Cireșarii*)
The boss was at the forestry district office, *that is*, the third house down.

3.3. Enumeration – Summary

A reformulation can consist of two opposite operations: either an enumeration of the elements forming a set or a summary resumption of a series of relatively similar elements by a collective noun:

(19) Eu îi ofer un supeu – *adică* o porție de șuncă cu *pickles* englezești; o bucată de Camembert, două banane, o sticluță de vin Medoc, o cafea neagră și o cutie cu țigări egiptene. (Minulescu, *Corigent la limba română*)

I offer her supper – *i.e.* a slice of ham with English pickles, a piece of Camembert cheese, two bananas, a small bottle of Medoc wine, a cup of black coffee, and a box of Egyptian cigarettes.

(20) Cele două domnișoare, un cavaler și bineînțeles șoferul, *adică* toți pasagerii mașinii, făcură mare haz. (Chiriță, *Cireșarii*)
The two young ladies, a young man, and, of course, the driver, *that is* all the passengers of the car, had a good laugh about it.

(21) Meritam cu toții, și Penke și corpul expediționar (*adică* eu și tanti Ralița), masa pe care o admir, întinsă în sufragerie. Mai corect, cele ce se află pe masă. (Mușatescu, *De-a baba oarba*)

We, Penke and the expeditionary force (*that is* aunt Ralița and I) deserve the table I'm admiring, laid out in the dining room. Or, to be exact, what is on this table.

The clarifying intrapersonal stances seem to have two essential forms of manifestations, correction and (some forms of) explanation. Corrections deal with the exact transposition in words of speaker's thoughts or with a (more) accurate description of the topic of the conversation (examples 1–5). On other occasions, the second utterance introduced by the RM indicates the fact that the speaker has changed his/her opinion (examples 6–7), so the second utterance transmits a form of correction-actualisation.

All the other occurrences of the intrapersonal *adică* (definitions, synonyms, information about encyclopaedic terms, enumeration, summary, etc.) express the speaker's attempt to make the listener better understand what was said.

4. Interpersonal Stances

In other situations, the speaker rewords his/her message in order to help the listener(s), if (s)he realises or supposes that at least a part of his/her utterance was not understood. (S)he then adds new information, to bring it in line with the prescriptions of Grice's Maxim of Manner ("Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity"), in spite of the additional effort involved.

The occurrence of RMs introducing interpersonal stances indicates the speaker's determination to ensure the best possible transmission of information, an attitude that is consistent with Grice's conversational theory. It is another side of the "normal" human behaviour, which is rational and cooperative.

4.1. Definitions

If the speaker uses a word or a phrase that is complicated, difficult to understand, or too technical, (s)he can give its definition:

(22) Am învățat diferite opus, *adică* chipuri de așezare a cărămizilor în structura [zidului] (Călinescu, "Un arhitect")
      I learned about various opus, *that is* manners of arranging bricks in masonry construction.

(23) A apărut întâi un volum timid de „postume" – *adică* poezii definitive care nu au fost publicate de poet în timpul vieții lui... (Topîrceanu, *Articole, cronici, recenzii, Eminescu și epigonii lui*).

      First, they published a modest little volume of "posthumous" poems – *that is* finished poems that the poet did not publish during his lifetime.

In his/her attempt to make his message clearer, occasionally the speaker gives approximate which (s)he considers more comprehensible and more suitable to the encyclopaedic knowledge of the addressees (Sperber and Wilson 1986), generally exact in genus but inaccurate in the distinguishing characteristic:

(24) Aici la noi, în Bagdad, fiecare mahala își are geamia ei, cu câte un imam, *adică* popă, care e dator să facă rugăciunile la orele hotărâte după lege. (Caragiale, *Nuvele și povestiri*, *Abu Hassan*)

Here, in Bagdad, each neighbourhood has its own mosque with an imam, *that is* a priest, who has the duty of saying the prayers at the hours established in the ritual.

(25) Măria sa Ștefan-Vodă [...] luase cu sine trei mii de lefegii nemți, *adică* panțiri, și alte patru mii de călărime ușoară, cu căpitanii lor. (Sadoveanu, *Frații Jderi*)

His majesty Stefan Voivode […] was accompanied by three thousand German mercenaries, *i.e.* horsemen, and another four thousand light cavalries with their captains.

4.2. Narrowing and Broadening (*Ad Hoc* Concepts)

Linguistic expressions, even used in their literal sense, often have a more or less wide range of meanings. It is another manifestation of the economical organisation of the linguistic code because having a (relatively) small number of lexical units implies a less effort of memory. Usually the (linguistic and/or situational) context provides precise enough information to allow listeners to realise what the utterer intended to say. However, if the contextual information is not sufficient, a reformulation can help narrow down the set of possible meanings and bring more precision as to the particular significance of the phrase used.

The phenomenon of broadening and, especially, that of narrowing (two concepts proposed by cognitive pragmatics – Sperber and Wilson 1986, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 2007) are put in relation with a psychological phenomenon discussed by psychologists like Barsalou (1983): the *ad hoc* concepts.

Relevance theory holds that all lexical conceptual units have a corresponding concept in the mental language (the so-called "mentalese"). The relationship between words and concepts is expressed originally in the linguistic code. This correspondence is another manifestation of the economical organisation of language, and it is what every speaker (child or adult) learns first. Nevertheless, in actual communication, words can express concepts that are not codified, a phenomenon studied by "lexical pragmatics", which borrowed the idea of *ad hoc* concepts from psychology (Barsalou 1983; Wilson 2003; Kida 2015).

During the process of communication, concepts are often "adjusted", modified, modulated by the context. There are fundamentally two types of

semantic approximation: the new concept can convey a more specific sense than the codified meaning (*narrowing*) or on the contrary, the word can be used to give a larger, more general sense, so that its linguistically-specified denotation is wider (*broadening*) (cf. Wilson 2003, 274).

In her discussion of narrowing, Wilson (2003) cites various examples. For instance, *this coat costs 1,000 dollars* can signify "about 1,000 dollars". In *all doctors drink*, the verb *to drink* may signify, as normally in its encoded sense, "drink liquid" but also, more specially, "drink alcohol (in excess)". The sentence *I have a temperature* does not convey the obvious information that the speaker has some temperature, but that this temperature is higher than usual, higher enough to be a fever, a medical sign (Wilson 2003, 274).

Broadening is also called "category extension": in *brown is the new black*, the adjective *black* means "fashionable colour", *the water is boiling* conveys an approximate meaning if the water is sufficiently close to the boiling point, or is a hyperbole if the water is simply hotter than expected (Wilson 2003, 275).

Use of the RM emphasises another aspect of the formation of *ad hoc* concepts. The same phrase can have several meanings, depending not only on the context, but also on the speaker's "mental universe" (Fr. "l'univers mental") described by Martin (1987). For instance, the phrase *carte de valoare* "valuable book" can have various intended senses: "very well written book (by a famous writer)", "book containing valuable information", "well printed book (on glossy paper)", "book in leather/Morocco binding", "book from a limited, precious first edition", etc. This situation explains the necessity of introducing an explanation, to make the information conveyed explicit:

(26) [Se distrug] cărți de valoare, *adică* ilustrate de pictori și gravori celebri. (Preda, *Cel mai iubit dintre pământeni*)
[They are destroying] valuable books, *that is* illustrated by famous painters and engravers.

A large number of phrases have multiple meanings, which often causes to the speaker to add a narrowing piece of information in order to be clearer. This is the case of expressions having a vague meaning (example 27) or a metaphorical one (example 28). Sometimes, as in (27), it is the addressee who requests this narrowing:

(27) Mița: Cum este amanta dumitale?
Pampon: Cum să fie *adică*?
Mița: De roșu, de ghindă, de tobă, ori de verde?

Pampon: De verde... (Caragiale, *D-ale carnavalului*)

Mița: What kind of queen is your mistress?
Pampon: What do you *mean*?
Mița: Of hearts, of clubs, of diamonds, or of spades?
Pampon: Of spades.

(28) – Să ne-ntoarcem la oile noastre, *adică* la mine și la Mamarița.
(Mușatescu, *De-a puia-gaia*)
– Let us return to our muttons, *or rather* to me and Mamarița.

The opposite phenomenon, that of broadening, is less frequent. In our corpus, we found an example offered by the word *acasă* "at (one's own) home", which can be used also to designate an accommodation rented for a relatively short period, for instance to spend a holiday:

(29) – Ce cauți aici?
– Nimic. Sunt la mine acasă, *adică* la gazda mea... (Mușatescu, *De-a baba oarba*)

– What are you doing here?
– Nothing. I am at home; *I mean* at my landlady's.

Words belonging to the basic vocabulary, which are very frequent, develop various meanings that, sometimes, lead to real short-circuits in communication. In the following fragment, the two interlocutors fail to understand each other because they use the verb *a merge* "to go" in three different senses:
(i) "to walk, to move forward" (as in *bătrâna merge cu pași mici* "the old woman is moving forward in small steps"),
(ii) for a device, "to work, to run" (as in *telegraful/televizorul merge cu electricitate* "the telegraph/the TV set works on electricity"), and lastly
(iii) "be possible" as in *asta nu merge* "this is impossible, this cannot/won't work":

(30) – Sergent, na tabachera asta, să mi-o trimiți acasă. [...] Trimite-o cu tiligrafu!
– Nu merge, trăiți, don căpitan... telegraful nu duce decât idei...
– Cum nu merge, rătane?
– *Adică* merge... [...] Dați-mi voie să vă spui...
– Vorbește!
– Telegrafu ăsta nu merge...

– Bine-bine, nu merge... Știu eu că nu merge, că nu-i o bătrână să meargă...
– *Adică* merge...
– Firește că merge, că de-aia-i tiligraf! (Bacalbașa, *Moș Teacă*, *Telegraful regimentului*)

– Sergeant, take this snuffbox and sent it to my address […] Send it by telegraph.
– That won't work, with all due respect, sir, the telegraph only carries ideas…
– What do you mean 'it won't work', soldier?
– *I mean*, it works. […] If I may...
– Speak up!
– This telegraph does not work.
– All right, agreed. I know it doesn't work; it's got no hand to work with…
 – *I mean*, it works…
– Of course, it works! That's what it's for, the telegraph!

4.3. Anaphora Resolution

The speaker may use a different turn of phrase to resolve an anaphora, the new, reformulated sentence accomplishing a sort of "binding", i.e. making the connection between a pronoun (deictic or not) or another nominal element needing a semantic completion and its antecedent:

(31) E o datorie sfântă, pentru familie! spunea el, soțul meu *adică*. (Breban, *Bunavestire*)
It is a sacred duty, for the family! He used to say, my husband *I mean*.

(32) Minutele trecură și, ca și pe peronul gării Brașov, ea păru că uitase că e cu cineva, cu el, *adică*. (Breban, *Bunavestire*)

The minutes went by and, just like when she was on the station platform in Brașov, she seemed to forget that she was with someone, *that is*, with him.

Explanations are often needed if the speaker switches between direct and indirect speech, as in the following fragment where the speaker, Trahanache, reads out a letter to his listener, Tipătescu, who is his wife's lover and the author of the letter:

(33) […] vino tu (*adică* nevastă-mea, Joițica), la cocoșelul tău (*adică* tu) care te adoră. (Caragiale, *O scrisoare pierdută*)

[…] so why don't you (*that is*, my wife, Zoe) come here quickly to your loving rooster (*that is*, you), who adores you.

An RM introduces sometimes a nominal anaphora, that is bound to a preceding expression:

(34) Toate ar fi mers bine, dacă ar fi fost de părerea noastră şi "Turcu", *adică* unchiul Costică, cum era poreclit tatăl respectivei Juliete. (Băjenaru, *Cişmigiu et Comp.*)

Everything would have worked out, if our opinion had been shared by "the Turk", *meaning* uncle Costică ("the Turk" being the nickname of this Juliet's father).

(35) Iară verii, *adică* feciorii craiului şi fetele împăratului, nu se văzuse niciodată de când erau ei. (Creangă, *Poveşti şi povestiri*, *Povestea lui Harap Alb*)

And the cousins, *meaning* the king's sons and the emperor's daughters, had never met before.

4.4. Translations

Reformulations may be in the form of translations, which, in our corpus, are of two sorts: semiotic (non-verbal) or cross-languages. When non-verbal communication is ambiguous, the speaker/author can give a verbal "translation" of the described action:

(36) – Ce facultate urmezi, băiete?
      – Arheologia. Clipi cu subînțeles:
      – *Adică* sap! (Ojog-Braşoveanu, *Minerva se dezlănţuie*)

      – What faculty do you attend, sonny?
      – Archaeology. He winked ironically.
      – *Meaning*, I dig.

(37) – Când a plecat? Mitică amestecă cu mâna dreaptă şi arată cu cea stângă spre uşă, *adică*: acuşic-a plecat. (Caragiale, *Momente şi schiţe*, *Inspecţiune*)

      – When did he leave? Mitică stirs [his drink] with his right hand and shows the door with his left, *meaning*: he just left.

In the cross-language translation, the speaker who used an expression in a foreign language translates it into Romanian:

(38)   "Halt", zise neamțul. *Adică*, pe românește, "stai pe loc". (Mușatescu,
       De-a baba oarba)
       "Halt" said the German. *That is*, in Romanian "stai pe loc" ["don't
       move!"]

(39)   A fost vorba că merg *à la fortune du pot* (*adică*, pe românește, să te
       mulțumești cu ce s-o găsi). (Caragiale, *Momente și schițe*, *Mici
       economii*)
       He invited me to dine *à la fortune du pot* (*that is*, in Romanian, a
       potluck dinner, be happy with what can be found).

5. Conclusions

Reformulated sentences (with or without a specific RM) express the
speaker's attempt to make his/her message as understandable as possible,
even at the price of increased effort. This attitude clearly contradicts the
principle of minimum effort. It follows that speakers often prefer to use
further energy to be sure that their message will be better understood, a
fact in line with Grice's cooperative principle (Grice 1975). In our
opinion, the mere existence of RMs shows that the minimum effort
principle and what we can call the "clearer communication" principle are
not equal, despite what the current pragmatic theories seem to suggest.
The "clearer message" principle often supplants the minimum effort
principle, sometimes as the spontaneous choice of a self-critical speaker,
occasionally at the explicit request of the addressee.

The fact that the speaker corrects himself spontaneously clearly shows
that after pronouncing the utterance, new mental processes take place both
in the speaker's and in the addressee's mind. The speaker's reformulation
is a manifestation of his/her (negative) estimation of the accuracy and/or
the accessibility of what was said and of his/her effort to make
adjustments.

The examination of RMs also reveals types of *ad hoc* concepts, beyond
those proposed by current lexical pragmatics studies: when it comes to
phrases, it is difficult to associate them with a unique "encoded meaning".
Phrases, more that isolated words, often express a bundle of meanings, a
situation that often requires reformulations and explanations.

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PART IV.

STANCETAKING IN A DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER TEN

STANCETAKING IN THE ROMANIAN INTERWAR PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE

MELANIA ROIBU AND OANA UȚĂ BĂRBULESCU

1. Introductory Remarks

In this article, the use and the conceptualisation of stance are derived from five key principles, which cover several levels, as follows. Stance(taking) is:

1) the fluid intersection between action, (personal) attitude/belief/ evaluation, and social morality;
2) public (hence perceivable and available for inspection by others, see Du Bois 2007; Englebretson 2007, etc.);
3) interactional (it is collaboratively constructed among participants, Biber et al. 1999; Scheibman 2007, etc.);
4) indexical (Silverstein 1976, 1992, 2003; Haviland 1989; Jaffe 2016, etc.);
5) consequential.

The aim of the present paper is to explore how Romanian MPs positioned themselves in relation to the events at the Grivița Workshops in Bucharest and the linguistic means used to signal their positioning. In what follows, we shall attempt to analyse how the indexical nature of stance manifests itself in the speeches delivered by the representatives of both Power and Opposition in the days following the strike at the Grivița Romanian Railways Workshops in 1933 and the intervention of the Army on February 16. We shall also tackle the way speakers acknowledge the existence of different viewpoints and indicate their willingness to align with, or dis-align themselves from a claim or proposal in the preceding discourse. In order to achieve this goal, they can resort to either lexical or grammatical resources with indexical meaning, which are used interactively to respond to previous discourse or assumptions.

We have chosen this event for multiple reasons. Firstly, it is an event of great emotional impact, which implies the direct expression of attitudes, evaluation, and opinions by MPs. Secondly, the strike and the intervention of the Army against the strikers are historically important events, which gives us the opportunity to observe how aspects of the (broader) sociocultural framework are evoked in parliamentary debate (aspects reflecting the indexical nature of stance). Building on Moral Foundations Theory (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Graham et al. 2013), we shall also investigate the use of moral rhetoric in the debate over governmental authority.

The data have been collected from two issues of the Romanian official journal *Monitorul Oficial* (*The Official Gazzette*), which contain transcripts of the debates held in the Romanian Parliament following the Griviţa Workshops strike, in February 1933. Also, in order for us to see how the events were mirrored in the press, the corpus is complemented by two issues of *Adevărul* (*The Truth*), a Romanian daily newspaper that provides insights into the events from a (theoretically) unbiased perspective, by way of making a summary of – and sometimes a commentary upon – the facts that each side (the Power and the Opposition) presents from a biased perspective.

2. Historical Background

On January 30, the railway unions published the "Call to all public employees", in which employees of ministries, the post office, teaching staff of all grades, the national health system, the church, and the Romanian Railways workers showed their hostility towards a new project by the National Peasants' government led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, namely the reduction of salaries, a project proposed by Virgil Madgearu, the Minister of Finance. The day after the presentation of this call and after the debates of the Congress of Civil Servants, the protest was joined by the unions of journalists, civil servants, and war veterans. On February 4, 1933, after a series of strikes in Ploieşti and at the Griviţa Workshops in Bucharest, the National Peasants' government led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod managed to pass a bill through Parliament whereby a state of siege could be decreed by the government for a period of six months. On the same day, by Royal Decree no. 201, the government proclaimed a state of siege for six months in certain regions of Romania. On February 12, the factory committees were banned by the government because they resembled the Soviets of the 1917 Russian Revolution. The following day, the communist union secretly organised a 250-worker factory committee

at the workshops. On February 14/15, at night, the authorities arrested the main leaders of the union, including Bogătoiu and Doncea. The following morning, on February 15, the workers laid down tools, demanding the release of the arrested union leaders, the recognition of the unions that were disbanded on February 12, and the lifting of the state of emergency. Early in the morning of February 16, the Army surrounded and laid siege to the Workshops.

3. Indexicality and Indexical Layering

The concept of indexicality "has been a productive lens for a central disciplinary focus on conventional/stereotypical relationships between linguistic forms and social meanings" and it is central to the understanding of linguistic practice as context-sensitive and context-creating (Jaffe 2016, 86).

We shall focus on processes of indexicalisation, that is, on how indexical meanings accrue to particular forms, and how indexicals at one level (or "order") are projected onto subsequent orders. Analysing the speeches delivered by the representatives of both Power and Opposition in 1933, we have identified three indexical layers or orders. First-order indexicality is concerned with the narrative of the strike and the intervention of the Army, whereas the higher orders employ value judgements followed by their ideological conceptualisations.

3.1. First-Order Indexicality

At this level, we shall analyse how the object/target toward which the stance is being directed is constructed in and through discourse. In the speech of Mironescu, the Minister of the Interior in February 1933, one notes, on the one hand, a climactic arrangement of the terms by which the strike at the Grivița workshops is described, and, on the other, the strategic expression (or non-expression) of agency in the presentation both of the strike and of the intervention of the Army. At the beginning of the speech, Mironescu uses a complex nominal phrase, *fapte de o gravitate deosebită* ("deeds of unusual gravity"), which represents an ambiguous formula whose reference is difficult to establish (is it the strike or the intervention of the army?). As for the strike, it is never called by the neutral term (*grevă*), which was already attested and sanctioned by linguistic use, but it is defined from the beginning by terms that present in their semantic configuration the features [absence of agreement], [absence of order], and

[sudden and violent change], such as *conflict*[1] ("conflict"), *neorânduială*[2] ("disorder"), culminating with *revoluţie*[3] ("revolution").

The strike is described by using nominal terms that actualise, to varying degrees in their semantic configuration, the feature [sudden and violent change]. As a counterweight, the discourse of Power makes use of verbs that are placed in climactic configurations and describe the Government's attempts to maintain social order. Unlike the description of the strike (at the nominal level), verbs that imply reaching an agreement and defending/restoring order are preferred for government actions:

(1) guvernul şi căile ferate *le-au admis* (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4)
the government and the railways *admitted them*;

(2) guvernul *a luat măsurile necesare* pentru a preîntâmpina orice neorânduieli (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4)
the government *took the necessary measures* to prevent any disorder,

culminating with

(3) armata şi forţele poliţieneşti *găsindu-se în legitimă apărare trebuie să se apere* (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4)
as the army and the police *find themselves in a position of legitimate self-defence, they must defend themselves*.

In order to present the intervention of the Army on February 16, the members of the government resort to impersonal reflexive structures, in which agency is not asserted:

(4) *s-a dat ordin să se tragă* (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 5)
the order was given to fire;

(5) *s-a tras* în mulţime (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4)
the crowd *was fired upon*.

Yet agency is expressed when those who caused the riots (*neorânduielile*) at the Griviţa Workshops are brought into the discourse:

(6) provocaţiunile acestei mulţimi conduse *de agenţi provocatori* (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 5)
the acts of provocation by this crowd led *by agents provocateurs*,

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[1] *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4.

[2] *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 4, p. 6.

[3] *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 5.

who turn into

(7) *insurgenți înarmați* care căutau *să provoace o revoluție* (*Monitorul Oficial*, 1/23.02.1933, p. 5)
armed insurgents seeking *to provoke a revolution.*

In the speeches of the members of the government, one notes the frequent use of the verb *provoca* ("to provoke") along with its derivatives *provocator* ("provocative"), *provocațiune* ("provocation"), which help build up a scenario that establishes the guilt of a single part for the events at Grivița. In addition, when justifying the actions of the Army, the members of the government resort to arguments constructed as counterfactual conditional structures:

(8) Dacă atunci s-ar fi dat ordin de tragere, … am fi putut înregistra 1000-2000 de morți (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 5)
If the order to fire had been given then, … we might have been recording 1000-2000 deaths,

or as conditional or hypothetical concessive structures, in which at least the protasis is hypothetical:

(9) deși ar fi fost nevoie să riposteze imediat la hărțuielile… acestei mulțimi …, nu era bine din punct de vedere umanitar să se răspundă imediat (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 5)

although an immediate response to the harassment… by this crowd… would have been necessary, an immediate response would not have been good from a humanitarian point of view.

In MPs' speeches, whether they are members of parties detached from the National Peasants' Party (as in the case of N. Lupu) or members of Opposition parties (see, for example, the Social Democratic Party, the National Liberal Party, etc.), the presentation of the events is accompanied by judgements and evaluation in which affectivity is overtly expressed:

(10) *tragic* moment *de durere* al populației (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 6)
tragic moment *of grief* of the population;

(11) lucrătorii au fost supuși unui regim *de batjocură* (I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.933, p. 10)
the workers were subjected to *humiliation*;

(12) nemulțumirile și strigătele lor *de disperare* nu au fost ascultate (I.
      Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.933, p. 10)
      their discontent and *desperate* calls were not heeded,

or is prefaced by metadiscursive sequences with emotional impact:

(13) *cu inima strânsă de durere* pentru *victimele căzute…* iau cuvântul
      (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 6)
      with a heavy heart for the *fallen victims*… I proceed to speak.

The strike is almost always presented through nominal groups, in which a qualifying adjective from the series *just*[4] ("just"), *legitim*[5] ("legitimate") occurs, whereby the speaker shows himself favourable to the actions of the people of the Grivița Workshops, but this position is justified by the judgement and evaluation of their actions on the basis of an objective scale and of their integration into a conceptual framework that favours implicatures, such as *în urma unei nedrepte reduceri a salariilor, muncitorii recurg la protestări legitime și la revendicări juste* ("in the face of unjust pay cuts, the workers resort to legitimate protests and just demands").

Unlike the discourse of the members of the government, that of the members of the other parties is characterised by the expression of agency in the strike, either by the dissociation of the provocateurs (*agenți provocatori*) from the rest of the workers:

(14) incidente au fost provocate timp de 10 ore *de o bandă nu mai mare
      decât 200 de derbedei care nu erau muncitori* (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul
      Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 7)

      incidents have been provoked for 10 hours *by a gang of no more than
      200 good-for-nothings who were not workers*,

or by naming them (Mirescu calls the agents provocateurs by their names: Bogătoiu, Doncea and Tudor Alexandru, and Lungu Mihalache)[6].

At the same time, the intervention of the army is described by nominal phrases such as *dezastrul*[7] ("the disaster") and *vărsarea de*

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[4] I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10
[5] Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 6.
[6] *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 9.
[7] Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 7.

sânge[8] ("the bloodshed"), the latter being preferred because it entails the actualisation of emotionally marked scenarios.

Agency in presenting the military intervention remains mostly unattributed or not directly expressed, thanks to the use of impersonal (passive) reflexives:

> (15)   fără somațiune *s-a intrat* în massa nearmată, *s-a tras* cu mitraliera și *s-a ucis* (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 7)
> without warning, *there was an attack* on the unarmed mass, machine guns *were fired*, and there *was killing*;

> (16)   *s-a vărsat* din nou sânge muncitoresc (I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10)
> workers' blood *was shed* again;

> (17) sângele *s-a vărsat* cu multă… dărnicie (I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10)
> blood *was* copiously *shed*.

Rarely is agency expressed, but when that is the case, it occurs in interrogative (rhetorical?) structures:

> (18) Pentru ce totdeauna vărsați cu ușurință sângele muncitoresc? (I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10)
> Why do you always shed workers' blood so easily?

Agency is inextricably linked to fundamental questions of responsibility and legitimacy. Syntactic strategies – such as impersonalisation – are able to de-emphasise responsibility for specific actions.

3.2. Second-Order Indexicality

In second-order indexicality, we shall analyse the manner in which the crisis of February 16, 1933 is indexed by an array of signs that include values, attitudes, and a variety of judgements/evaluation. All these values, attitudes, judgements, and evaluation help to build the image that the speakers want to project for themselves and the party they belong to against the background of this crisis.

The *attitudinal lexis* is usually classified along four parameters: *goodness* (good/bad), *certainty*, *expectedness*, and *importance* (Hunston

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[8] Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 8; I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10.

and Sinclair 2000, 75–76), and can result in either *attitudinal inscriptions* (the use of locutions[9] that carry an attitudinal positive or negative value, that is largely fixed and stable across a wide range of contexts) or in *attitudinal tokens* (where a specific positive or negative value is activated indirectly, via mechanisms of association and implication) (White 2006). As for the *grammatical choices*, they consist in the use of semi/modals, adverbs, complement clauses, agency/affectedness, etc. and involve the expression of stance relative to some other proposition (Biber 2006, 89).

The members of the government invoke "an attitude deserving of full praise" (*o atitudine vrednică de toată lauda*[10]) in managing the crisis and construct a scenario in which events are treated "with truly exceptional calm" (*cu un calm într-adevăr excepțional*), with "admirable patience" (*admirabilă răbdare*), and "the greatest tact" (*cel mai mare tact*[11]), insisting upon social values and respect for the social contract.

Government authority remains implicit in the discourse of government members (and the strategy of avoiding assumption of authority is complementary to the way that they present the military intervention). In the discourse of Power, ranged against the attitudes and values to which the government adheres, the strike is seen as a "determined attempt to achieve the disintegration of the country" (*încercarea tenace de a ajunge la destrămarea țării*[12]), given that "the country is being stalked by a great danger" (*țara este pândită de o mare primejdie*[13]). The conceptual metaphor of rupture is doubled by that of predation, the gravity of the facts that the former designates being transferred from the political scene to a higher ontological sphere through the latter. The government is dealing not only with this specific attempt to "break up" (*destrăma*) the country, an attempt that failed, as the government stopped it in time, but also with a "great danger" (*mare primejdie*), without an exact reference in the discourse of Power, but which threatens "the existence of this country" (*existența…țării acesteia*[14]), and with a "plan" (*plan*) devised "in a foreign

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[9] "With such value-laden words, the existence of a stance is inferred from the use of an evaluative lexical item, usually a predicative or attributive adjective, main verb, or noun. Such lexical expressions of stance depend on the context and shared background for their interpretation. Rather, stance is embedded in these structures, depending on the addressee's ability to recognize the use of value-laden words" (Biber 2006, 89).

[10] G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41, 23.02.1933, p. 5.

[11] G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41, 23.02.1933, p. 5.

[12] G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41, 23.02.1933, p. 5

[13] G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41, 23.02.1933, p. 5.

[14] G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41, 23.02.1933, p. 6.

country" (*într-o țară străină*), against which no party (government) can fight alone. After this scenario is introduced into the speech, the solution is also proposed on the basis of values such as unity and agreement between the parties (and not only this):

> (19) [...] eu sper, din adâncul inimei că *toți oamenii de bine se vor uni împreună* ca să pună zăgaz primejdiei mari, care ne amenință. (G.G. Mironescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 6)
>
> [...] I hope, from the bottom of my heart, that *all good people will come together* to put an end to the great danger that threatens us.

Likewise, the members of government project the image of being those who seek to reach an agreement and negotiate a mutually accepted solution to the problems with members of the Opposition:

> (20) D-le președinte, d-lor deputați, înainte de toate *țin să mulțumesc tuturor antevorbitorilor*, deoarece *abstracțiune făcând de la mici malițiozități, cari sunt firești*, când un opoziționist ia cuvântul de la această tribună, în ce privește intențiunile guvernului, ba chiar și aplicarea stării de asediu, *îmi servește spre liniștirea sufletească și satisfacție că am avut parte de critici, nu numai binevoitoare, nu numai obiective, dar și de o pricepere a situației grele*, căreia acest guvern a trebuit să-i facă față. Dacă au căzut *unele cuvinte de critică, le suport cu sufletul senin…* (Dr. Al. Vaida-Voevod, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 21)
>
> Mr President, Members of Parliament, first of all, *I should like to thank all the previous speakers* because, *if one disregards the minor carping which is natural* when a member of the Opposition speaks from this rostrum about the government's intentions and even the application of the state of siege, *it serves my peace of mind and satisfaction that I have benefited from criticism, not only benevolent, not only objective, but also from an understanding of the difficult situation* which this government had to face. If *some words of criticism* have landed, *I accept them serenely…*

In a community of practice such as the Parliament, and especially in a critical situation, parliamentary debates are expected to come across as special discursive forms, in which disagreement is programmatic and constitutes the unmarked structural type, whereas agreement becomes the marked type (Kotthoff 1993). This strategy of Power to resort to an expressive act (of gratitude), through the performance of which it expresses its gratitude towards the Opposition interlocutors, and to express

agreement with the points of view of the Opposition, is part of cooperative communication, but is used to project a non-conflictual image of Power.

The speeches of Opposition MPs also refer to values such as "social order" (*ordinea socială*) and the observance of the social contract, but these values are subordinated to social responsibility. Yet, social responsibility is, in its turn, a metamorphic value in these speeches because it derives from a higher, divine order:

> (21) [...] eu mă adresez d-lui Vaida-Voevod, ministru-președinte al țării, *frate al nostru de dincolo de munți*… și îi spun: *liberat ... prin voința Celui de Sus și ajuns, tot prin voința lui și a acestei țări, în fruntea ei, nu-ți păta vieața și nu-ți mânji mâinile cu sângele fraților muncitori români* din această țară. (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 8)

> [...] I address Mr. Vaida-Voevod, Minister-President of the country, *our brother from beyond the mountains*… and I say to him: *since you have been liberated… by the will of the Most High, and have become, also by His and this country's will, the country's leader, do not stain your life and do not sully your hands with the blood of brother Romanian workers* of this country.

The speaker uses an emotionally charged sequence in which social responsibility is presented: the speaker does not directly reproach the prime minister (which would have triggered assumptions with an unfavourable semantic impact on him), but uses exhortations, and exercises formulas by which the speaker mitigates any form of symbolic aggression against the image of Vaida-Voevod. Note also the addressing formula *frate al nostru de dincolo de munți* ("our brother from beyond the mountains"), which reminds hearers of the Transylvanian origin of the prime minister and also functions as an attenuating element. The speaker tries to consolidate group cohesion, insisting upon common belonging either at national level after the unification of the three provinces, or at social level through solidarity, and uses the same term, but with a modified reference in *sângele fraților muncitori români* ("the blood of brother Romanian workers"). The nation-as-family conceptual metaphor is strategically modified, as the role of parent is not attributed to the government (which is assigned the role of brother), but to the country/nation.

In order to present themselves as objective critics and to build the ethos of someone who adheres to the social, economic, and religious values of the majority as representatives of the people, and not of particular

interests, Opposition MPs resort either to expressive acts (whereby they try to present themselves as defenders of the common good):

(22) [...] *blestemat să fie acel fiu al țării acesteia*, care în asemenea momente, când ne așteaptă asemenea lucruri, poate și mai grave înăuntru și în afară, *luptă aici cu pasiune politică! Blestemat să fie!* (Dr. N. Lupu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 8)

[...] *Cursed be that son of this country* who in such moments, when such things await us, perhaps even more serious things within and without, *fights here with political passion! Cursed be he!*

or to rhetorical questions (in which the distance from Power is reflected in the presentation of the institutional position as a privilege and as a renunciation of the defence of the common good):

(23) *Pentru ce, pentru interese ascunse, pentru interese politicianiste…* ați lăsat cu atâta ușurință *să se ajungă la vărsarea de sânge de astăzi*? (I.I. Mirescu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10)

Why, for hidden interests, for political interests… did you so readily allow *today's bloodshed to come about*?

(24) Și atunci, nu avem dreptul *să aruncăm răspunderea asupra d-voastră*, care de 4 ani de zile *ați tolerat, poate cu știință, poate din slăbiciune, această venală și incapabilă administrație, care v-a obligat să ajungeți la sângeroasa represiune* de astăzi? (R. Franasovici, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 11)

And then, do we not have the right to lay the responsibility on you, who for 4 years *have been tolerating, maybe knowingly, maybe out of weakness, this venal and incapable administration, which has forced you into* this day's *bloody repression*?

Ethos forms a crucial part of the debate along with pathos and the relationship between them raises the intriguing possibility that ethos–pathos dynamics are directly influenced by social events.

3.3. Third-Order Indexicality

This is the level at which we consider ideological conceptualisations, for the analysis of which we shall turn to Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). MFT argues that moral intuitions are based on five psychological systems, or foundations (Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty (= Ingroup)/

Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Purity). Our (moral foundations) approach looks at the ways the MPs conceptualise the primary moral components of Authority (concerns about order, tradition, and respect), engage in distinctive patterns of moral rhetoric, and place different weight on the foundations.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, as a function of the emergent urbanisation of the country, Romanian society shifted from being based on small-scale interactions (with close neighbours and relatives) to a social basis and to a personal identification with the nation. The citizens' understanding of the fact that they live in a shared society tends to change people's understanding of their relationship to each other and to their government (see Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Bonikowski 2016).

In the debates that followed the intervention at Grivița, one of the moral foundations, authority, is positively framed both in the speeches of the prime minister and in those of some members of the Opposition. In the prime minister's speech, authority is defined by an equivalence with the government (not with the government in general, but with "our government" – *guvernul nostru*):

> (25) [...] noi reprezentăm autoritatea în stat și… subminarea autorității noastre este subminarea acelei autorități care singură numai poate să asigure disciplina și ordinea. (Al. Vaida-Voevod, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 24)
>
> [...] we represent authority in the state, and… to undermine our authority is to undermine that authority which alone can ensure discipline and order.

Vaida-Voevod uses only two terms, *disciplină* ("discipline") and *ordine* ("order"), restricting the scope of the concept of authority according to the needs dictated by the social and political context. In the speeches of the Opposition members, authority is associated with one or two moral foundations depending on the speaker's ideological orientation, either with Ingroup: *ideea de autoritate… forța centrală care să strângă într-un mănunchiu toate firele*[15] ("the idea of authority… the central force to gather all the threads in one bundle") – through the conceptual metaphor of the nation as a bundle, in the case of Goga, a member of the National Agrarian Party, or with Ingroup + Purity: *atmosferă sănătoasă, care să facă posibilă rezistența tuturor elementelor moral sănătoase*[16] ("a healthy

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[15] O. Goga, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 11.

[16] Gr. I. Iunian, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 16.

atmosphere, which can make possible the resistance of all morally healthy elements") – through the conceptual metaphor of the nation as a healthy organism, in the case of Iunian, a member of the Radical Peasants' Party. More seldom is authority associated with three moral foundations, Care + Purity + Ingroup: *un guvern de autoritate, un guvern de muncă, un guvern de oameni având în gradul cel mai înalt conştiinţa datoriei lor*[17] ("a government of authority, a government of labour, a government of people with the highest degree of awareness of their duty"), but this (excessive) piling up appears rather in the speeches of populists such as A.C. Cuza.

4. Interactional Nature of Stance. Dissociation

The positioning of the MPs in relation to the two sets of events (the riots and the response to them) varies according to the speakers' political affiliation, i.e. to whether they belong to the Majority or to the Opposition: generally, the representatives of the Majority tend to label the riots as actions guided by non-professional demands and as a mere attempt of the communist agents provocateurs to destroy the integrity of the country, whilst the Opposition describes the action of the workers as justified by the difficult living conditions, that is, by professional demands. Consequently, the rhetoric registers used by the two sides oscillate between the poles of euphemism and hyperbole, respectively, with the focus shifting from the events to the military response placed in reverse ratio. The strategy consists in the Power maximising the gravity of the workers' actions (labelled as *revoluţie comunistă, mare pericol* "communist revolution, great danger" – G.G. Mironescu, the Minister of the Interior, *o gravă situaţiune şi o primejdioasă încercare de destrămare a statului* "a difficult situation and a dangerous attempt to destroy the state"[18]) and minimising the impact of the military response, which is presented as legitimate (*datorie faţă de ţară şi faţă de viitorime* "a duty towards the country and the future generations" – Dr. Al. Vaida-Voevod, Prime Minister[19], or *trista, dar absolut necesara măsură, pe care organele forţei publice au fost nevoite să o ia ... pentru ca să salvgardeze ordinea publică, în contra elementelor comuniste* "a sad yet necessary measure meant to save the country from the communist elements" – Richard Franasovici[20]), and in the Opposition minimising the proportions of the

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[17] A.C. Cuza, *Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 20.
[18] *Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 6.
[19] *Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 24.
[20] *Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 10.

workers' movement (*o mişcare a muncitorimii suferinde* "a movement of the suffering workers"[21], *o mişcare profesională, provocată de lipsa de lealitate a guvernului faţă de muncitori şi de acţiunea nefastă a agenţilor provocatori* "a professional movement generated by the Government's lack of loyalty towards the workers and by the ill-fated action of the agents provocateurs"[22]), while maximising the response, with insistence on the idea of disproportionate force used by the military (*vărsare de sânge* "bloodshed"[23], *măcel* "slaughter"[24], *catastrofă* "catastrophe"[25]). Moreover, the representatives of the Opposition complement the hyperbolic register with antithesis and different conceptual metaphors, such as the anthropomorphic representation of the country that is being mourned by its citizens (A.C. Cuza accuses the Majority of governing happily during times of mourning for the country[26]), or the metaphorical script of the artefact reinforced with the metaphor of de-construction (A.C. Cuza again: *ultimul incident, prin care îşi termină guvernarea sa guvernul de astăzi, încoronează această operă de destrămare a ţării* "the last incident, which marks the end of the actual government, completes this *work* of *destroying* the country"[27]).

Actually, the two sides of the events are presented synthetically in *Adevărul*, from February 18, 1933 (*Yesterday's discussion in the Chamber*):

(26) *Pentru guvern*, sprijinit şi de o parte a opoziţiei, problema era simplă: *comuniştii trecând la ofensivă* în contra societăţii burgheze, cu toate mijloacele cari le stăteau la dispoziţie, *autorităţile au trebuit să facă faţă şi să ia apărarea ordinei prin orice mijloace. Pentru d. dr. Lupu şi socialişti*, problema se punea *altfel*. În cauză *nu era o mişcare propriu-zis comunistă, ci o mişcare a muncitorimii suferinde*, în care au operat şi comuniştii şi diferite alte categorii de agenţi provocatori. (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 6, *Discuţia de eri dela Cameră*)

For the Government, supported by a part of the Opposition, the problem was quite simple: *since the communists initiated the offensive* against the bourgeois society, resorting to all means at its disposal, *the authorities had to cope with the situation and defend public order by*

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[21] *Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 6.

[22] *Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 6.

[23] I.I. Mirescu, *Monitorul oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10.

[24] I.I. Mirescu, *Monitorul oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 10.

[25] Prof. A.C. Cuza, *Monitorul oficial*, 42/24.02.1933, p. 16.

[26] *Monitorul oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 17.

[27] *Monitorul oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 17.

> *any means. To dr. Lupu and the socialists,* the approach was *different.*
> *It wasn't a genuine communist movement* at issue, *but a mere*
> *movement of the suffering workers,* in which communists took part
> alongside other categories of agents provocateurs.

The example features the use of deontic stance: "autoritățile *au trebuit să facă față* și să ia apărarea ordinei prin orice mijloace" ("the authorities *had to cope with the situation* and defend public order by any means"), in order to legitimate the response of the military, followed by a concessive *dar* "but" within a dissociation which applies to the subject term of the proposition: "În cauză *nu era o mișcare propriu-zis comunistă, ci o mișcare a muncitorimii suferinde,* în care au operat și comuniștii și diferite alte categorii de agenți provocatori" ("*It wasn't a genuine communist movement* at issue, *but a mere movement of the suffering workers*, in which communists took part alongside other categories of agents provocateurs"). As a matter of fact, dissociation is the main means of expressing engagement[28] in relation to the other voices and alternative value positions (*heteroglossic discourse*) when it comes to opposite sides, as is the case in politics. Here, the speaker concedes that he agrees with the statement that he criticises in one of the dissociated interpretations, the one that is presented as marginal, but firmly distances himself from it in the other interpretation, the one that is presented as crucial. In other words, he admits to the existence of some agents provocateurs, but considers it in a way peripheral to the main issue and consequently discards it.

A similar idea is to be found in the next example, where the adverbial stance is followed by a dissociation between strikers and communists. The epistemic stance conveys certainty by way of adverbs such as *neîndoios* ("undoubtedly") and *sigur* ("certain"), followed by another concessive *dar* ("but/yet"). The aim is to show that, despite the Opposition admitting to the existence of some communists among the railway workers, that does not justify the force of the response from the part of the military (de-legitimisation):

> (27)   *Este neîndoios* că, printre muncitorii ceferiști, sunt și comuniști. Și
>   *este tot atât de sigur* că aceștia urmăresc, în primul rând, agitația
>   politică. *Dar atât nu ajunge pentru a explica surescitarea extremă a*
>   *unei mulțimi de 5000 de oameni* – în imensa majoritate a căreia se află
>   elemente aparținând tuturor partidelor – care a recurs la acte disperate
>   și dezordonate. (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 1)

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[28] The positioning of an opinion in relation to another (Martin 2003, 174), which is realised by projection (via quoting and reporting techniques) and acknowledgement of a possibility (concession).

> *Undoubtedly*, among the railway workers there are communists too. And *it is equally certain* that those pursue mainly the political agitation. *Yet, that is not enough to explain the extreme agitation of a mass of five thousand people* – the vast majority of which consists of elements belonging to all parties – which resorted to desperate and uncontrolled acts.

Another example that follows the same line of argumentation resorts to a dissociation based on replacement *ci* "but", with the negation preceding the connective. This way, the speaker rejects the statement that he criticises in one of the dissociated interpretations, and replaces it with a statement that features the other interpretation (van Rees 2009, 43): "Autorităţile militare ... au arestat – *nu pe capii comuniști*, cum s'a spus – *ci* pe muncitorii cari au fost rândul trecut la minister" ("The military authorities … have arrested – *not the communist leaders*, as we were told, *but* the workers who went to the Ministry last time")[29]. The passive voice in reporting the events is used to cast doubt towards the source of knowledge, thus being in relation to the epistemic stance. By placing the proposition in the contingent subjectivity of some external source, the speaker shifts responsibility for the proposition away from himself and construes the value as but one position among a range of possible points of view. Instead, dr. Lupu, who is cited here (*Discursul d-lui dr. Lupu* "The discourse of dr. Lupu"), chooses to use a neutral verb[30] in the active voice, which reinforces credibility and claims objectivity by invoking people from the Majority:

> (28) Eu *voiu povesti* ceiace mi-*au relatat* doi oameni cari au venit azi dimineață la mine: un negustor *om de dreapta* şi un muncitor *din partidul dela putere*. [...] Autorităţile militare cari au răspunderea ordinei publice în urma proclamării stărei de asediu, știind că se vor produce agitații la ateliere, au arestat – *nu pe capii comuniști*, cum *s'a spus* – *ci* pe muncitorii cari au fost rândul trecut la minister. (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 3)
>
> *I shall tell* you what two people who have come to me this morning *told* me: a merchant who is a man *with Right-Wing sympathies*, and a worker *from the ruling party*. [...] The military authorities in charge

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[29] See the next example.

[30] *To say* and related locutions are "neutral" in that, of themselves, they present the writer neither as supportive of, or unsupportive of, the proposition. The "neutral" *to say* formulations are labelled as instances of "acknowledgement" in the appraisal framework, and *to claim* and related formulations as instances of distancing.

with maintaining the public order following the proclamation of the
state of siege, expecting agitations at the Workshops, have arrested –
not the communist leaders, as we were told, but the workers who went
to the Ministry last time.

The choice of reporting verbs is instrumental, since it signals the speaker's
position vis-à-vis the reported material. Reporting verbs are evaluative in
that they function as a way to incorporate voices in a text and to signal the
speaker's own distancing from (or closeness to) those voices[31]. Among the
reporting verbs that are used as forms of authorial negative
evaluation/authorial disalignment, *a pretinde* ("to claim") is the
commonest one. The same issue of the same newspaper (*Adevărul*,
February 18, 1933) presents a summary of the events from both perspectives
– the one of the Power, and the other one, of the Opposition –, using the
reporting verb *a pretinde* ("to claim") twice. Thus, the reported value
position is projected by formulations which overtly distance the authorial
voice from the attributed material and provide a signal that alternative or
contrary viewpoints may be valid. The author indicates his rejection of the
attributed material via explicitly attitudinal meanings, consisting in
reporting by means of the verb *a pretinde*, which delegates responsibility
from the speaker, while also signalling that the value is but one position
among other possible positions. Moreover, *a pretinde* ("to claim") actively
distances the speaker from the attributed material, presenting him as
withholding support for the proposition.

   The fragment also makes use of a syllogism and of some contrastive
definitions which feature the three main indicators of dissociation (van
Rees 2009, 15, 31): the performance of two speech acts (a conceptual
distinction followed by a definition of a term), the value scale, and the
specific aim, that is, resolving an incompatibility or contradiction:

   (29)   Aşa dar două teze diametral opuse. Guvernul *pretinde* că s'a aflat în
          faţa unei mişcări, cari *n'are nimic a face cu revendicări profesionale,
          ci cu o agitaţie periculoasă comunistă*; opoziţia nemulţumită *pretindea*
          prin d. dr. Lupu că *în fond a fost o mişcare profesională, provocată de
          lipsa de lealitate a guvernului faţă de muncitori şi de acţiunea nefastă
          a agenţilor provocatori* […]. Într'adevăr, din două una: ori guvernul
          s'a aflat în faţa unei *grave situaţiuni şi a unei primejdioase încercări
          de destrămare a statului*, şi atunci cuvintele lui trebuiau să arate voinţă

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[31] "If a piece of language is attributed, it is presented as deriving from someone
other than the author/speaker. A writer assumes responsibility for what is averred,
but delegates responsibility for what is attributed to the attributee" (Hunston 2000,
178).

și hotărâre care să dea impresia energiei, iar din partea opoziției trebuia
să avem concise manifestări de solidaritate națională; ori ceia ce s'a
întâmplat eri dimineață la Grivița este *expresia conflictelor obişnuite*
unde este o industrie puternică și cari dau loc la coliziuni și încăerări
sângeroase, și atunci trebuia înlăturat din discuție elementul de
primejdie națională […]. *Ori la Grivița a fost o primejdie reală* și
atunci [opoziția] trebuia să sprijine guvernul, rezervând pentru mai
târziu răfuielile politice; *ori vina este a guvernului* și atunci trebuia să-i
combată cu ultima energie. […] *Ori este o primejdie reală* și atunci
nu'i loc pentru politicianism; *ori este vorba de consecințe dureroase
ale unor conflicte fatale în dezvoltarea industrială și a unor greşeli de
conducere* […]. (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, *Discuția de eri dela Cameră*,
p. 6)

So, [there are] two opposing theses. The Government *claims* that it was
faced with *a movement that had nothing to do with professional
demands, but with a dangerous communist agitation*; the dissatisfied
opposition *claimed* by the voice of dr. Lupu that *it was basically a
professional movement generated by the Government's lack of loyalty
towards the workers and by the ill-fated action of the agents
provocateurs* […]. Indeed, one should choose: *either the government
was faced with a difficult situation and a dangerous attempt to destroy
the state*, and then its words ought to have displayed will and
determination which should create the impression of energy, and from
the part of the opposition we ought to have got concise manifestations
of national solidarity; or what happened yesterday morning at the
Grivița Workshops is the mere expression of usual conflicts brought
about by a strong industry and which generate collisions and bloody
riots, and then the element of national danger should have been ruled
out of discussion […]. *Either there was a real danger at Grivița* and
then the opposition ought to have supported the government,
postponing political fights; *or the responsibility belongs to the
government* and then the opposition ought to have fought it to its last
energy […]. *Either there is a real danger* and then there is no room for
politicking; *or one has to do with the painful consequences of some
fatal conflicts in industrial progress and of some leadership errors*
[…].

In the quoted example, two speech acts are performed that are typical of
dissociation: a conceptual distinction and a definition of one term. The
distinction is apparent in the fact that a notion that, up to that point, had
been considered as a unity is split up and the various aspects of the
original notion are subsumed under two new notions (van Rees 2009, 15),
each of which contains only part of the original one: one notion contains
the aspects of the original notion that belong to the realm of the merely

apparent, while the other one contains the aspects of the original notion that belong to the realm of the real. The words that are used for signalling the distinction are: *gravă situaţiune* ("serious condition"), *primejdioasă încercare de destrămare a statului* ("dangerous attempt to destroy the state"), *primejdie reală* ("real danger"), on the one hand, and *expresia conflictelor obişnuite unde este o industrie puternică* ("the mere expression of usual conflicts brought about by a strong industry") and *consecinţe dureroase ale unor conflicte fatale în dezvoltarea industrială şi a unor greşeli de conducere* ("painful consequences of some fatal conflicts in industrial progress and of some leadership errors"), on the other hand. The speech act of making the distinction is not performed overtly, but is merely presupposed by the use of the adjective *real* ("real")*.*

Dissociation involves definition as well, because the two new notions that are distinguished are indicated by (sets of) two new terms, each with its own definition (van Rees 2009, 15). The speech act of giving a definition is performed implicitly, by means of copula, that is, by the use of expressions like *X is either Y or Z*. Dissociation has to do with polysemy[32], since it involves "introducing differentiations within a concept, comparable to an activity like precization of concepts" (Schellens 1985, 59, apud van Rees 2009, 10), so it appears as an instrument of clarification, when a certain term has different interpretations. Dissociation results in redefinition of a term (Garssen 1997, 72, apud van Rees 2009, 10) and comes close to Naess' (1966) idea of *stipulative definition*, by means of which a language user stipulates that T0 be interpreted as T1 (apud van Rees 2009, 13). Dissociation always involves a stipulative definition (or redefinition in the case of an existing term) and a distinction: the diverse aspects of a notion that result in an incompatibility are separated, resulting in two distinct notions, indicated by two terms, term I and term II, which, respectively, correspond to the apparent and the real. The terms are placed in a value hierarchy, which is tantamount to saying that the two dissociated concepts are valued differently (van Rees 2009, 39), one being considered to contain the more important, crucial, essential, or central aspects of the original notion, associated with the reality pole of the prototypical appearance/reality pair, than the other, which is considered to contain incidental or peripheral aspects of the notion. Here, the sign of such an internal hierarchy is the use of the adjective *real*.

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[32] "In arguments by dissociation, concepts conceived as a whole are separated into two new concepts, introducing polysemy" (Macagno and Walton 2006, 2).

Also, by splitting up a seemingly unitary notion, the speaker can reconstruct[33] the audience's conception of the world, avoiding the risk of contradiction. He may serve certain interests and promote certain views, highlight certain elements of the situation for use in arguments and obscure others, describe causes and identify remedies, or invite moral judgements about circumstances or individuals.

Regarding the response of the authorities to the riots from the Griviţa Workshops, as seen before, the Government speaks of it in terms of a legitimate action, while the representatives of the Opposition try to de-legitimate it, via a definition by analogy, another means of signalling the speaker's disalignment from the facts presented. The strategy relies on a parallel the speaker draws between two objects, states of affairs, etc., by means of which he highlights and contrasts the opponent's arguments by correlating them with similar or comparable facts or phenomena (Ilie 2006, 672–674), in order to show an incompatibility:

(30) D. Gr. N. Iunian: *Cele întâmplate nu pot justifica măsura stării de asediu, pentrucă incidente de exact aceeaşi natură s'au întâmplat la Cluj*, unde nu exista starea de asediu şi ele au fost reprimate, fără ca acolo măcar să se înregistreze victime, aşa cum s'au înregistrat în Bucureşti. (*Monitorul Oficial*, 41/23.02.1933, p. 14)

D. Gr. N. Iunian: *The events that have taken place cannot justify the measure of the state of siege, since similar incidents happened in Cluj*, where there was no state of siege, and they were repressed, without there being any victims, as was the case in Bucharest.

Adevărul from February 18, 1933 reports the words of Mr. Gr. Iunian (*Cuvântarea d-lui Gr. Iunian, Partidul Radical-Ţărănesc* "The speech of Mr. Iunian, the Radical-Peasant Party"), who begins by praising the authorities, to then go on with a dissociation introduced by a concessive *dar* ("but"/"yet"), since saying of a statement that it *is false* is tantamount

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[33] A similar observation can be found in Gâţă (2007, 441) and Jasinski (2001, 176), who refer to dissociation as being made up of two constitutive moves: deconstruction and re-construction (*deconstruct* a notion by distinguishing some of its particular aspects, which are then reordered and *re-constructed* into two new notions out of the elements identified in the initial notion. "Dissociative arguments not only divide, but also redefine or reconstruct" (Jasinski 2001, 176). They allow the speaker to de-construct and then re-construct notions by generating or by giving the illusion to create (fresh and new) knowledge and by thus redefining and/or modifying the audience's and/or the opponent's experience of the world.

to saying that it is not true. The effect of such move is the de-legitimisation of the military response:

> (31) D. Gr. Iunian constată de asemenea că organele represive au lucrat cu prudenţă şi omenie şi nu li se poate imputa nimic. […] *Dar afirmaţia că incidentele survenite justifică starea de asediu este falsă. Dovadă că la Cluj o mişcare analoagă a fost reprimată fără să se înregistreze victime* (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 3).
>
> Mr. Gr. Iunian acknowledges in his turn that the repressive forces worked prudently and humanely and that nothing can be reproached to them […]. *Yet, the assertion that the unfolding incidents account for the state of siege is false. Proof is that a similar movement was repressed in Cluj, without generating any victims.*

A similar idea is expressed by means of epistemic stance, more precisely of a noun stance showing certainty, since a fact is to be regarded as a reality:

> (32) *Fapt este* că, la Cluj, fără asediu, liniştea a fost restabilită prin înţelegere; şi *tot fapt este* că, la Bucureşti, cu asediu, liniştea n'a fost restabilită decât cu victime omeneşti. (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 1)
>
> *Fact is* that, in Cluj, without a state of siege, the peace was restored by mutual agreement; and *still fact is* that, in Bucharest, with a state of siege, the peace was restored only with human victims.

The following example, instead, makes use of epistemic stance, combined with dissociation, given that it is not aimed at denying the standpoint of the protagonist as unacceptable, but is limited to casting doubt upon the attacked standpoint, while also providing a defence of the opposite standpoint. This way, the speaker positions himself in relation to his opponents by reinforcing his own standpoints and challenging or rejecting those of their opponents, thus marking the distance that separates them (Ilie 2006, 668):

> (33) Am ascultat pdv al guvernului. Dacă nu-l putem aplauda, aceasta ***nu pentru că n'ar fi sincer, ci pentru că nu ni se pare întemeiat pe informaţiuni precise.*** Guvernul ştie ce i *s-a raportat şi, după cele spuse de d-nii dr. Lupu şi I. Mirescu, avem impresiunea că **d. Mironescu cunoaşte numai o latură a problemei**.* (*Adevărul*, 18.02.1933, p. 1)
>
> We have listened to the government's point of view. If we cannot applaud it, ***that is not because it wouldn't be sincere, but because it***

seems not to be based on accurate information. The government knows what **it has been reported** *and, judging by the words of dr. Lupu and I. Mirescu, we have the impression that* **Mr. Mironescu knows only one side of the problem**.

In the previous example, dissociation is employed to diminish the acceptability of a standpoint (van Rees 2009, 45) and can be considered to be part of a critical discussion complemented with strategic maneuvering, since the participants try to resolve a difference of opinion in a rational fashion, but they try to do so in their own favour. In order to achieve these two objectives, the speaker begins by making explicit the existence of a difference of opinion: *Am ascultat pdv al guvernului. Dacă nu-l putem aplauda,...* ("We have listened to the Government's viewpoint. If we cannot applaud it,…"). Then, he takes the role of the antagonist, while the Government is assigned the role of protagonist. Next, the tenability of the Government's standpoint is tested by the antagonist, who raises doubt against that standpoint. In the example under scrutiny, one can identify a multiple mixed dispute, since the standpoint pertains to a number of propositions and, in addition to doubt, an opposing standpoint is brought forward (van Rees 2009, 47–48): *aceasta nu pentru că n'ar fi sincer, ci pentru că nu ni se pare întemeiat pe informaţiuni precise* ("that is not because it wouldn't be sincere, but because it seems not to be based on accurate information"). The result of this analysis is that the standpoint has not been defended conclusively, so the protagonist should withdraw it, as a result of its being incomplete and biased. The passive voice used in the reported verb – "Guvernul ştie ce i *s-a raportat*" ("The Government knows what it *has been reported*") – emphasises the idea of vague and uncertain, so not trustworthy.

5. Conclusions

In a time of crisis, such as the workers' strike at the Griviţa Railways Workshops in February 1933, the members of the government refer to the event in terms whereby they construct scenarios in order to contrast the disorder caused by the strike to the fairness of the Government's actions and to establish a vague sense of guilt, which is shared between the provocateurs, the past administration, and the previous governments. The Opposition uses scenarios in which affects play an important role and tries to establish hierarchies of guilt. The way the object of stance comes across has implications for the way that values, attitudes, and evaluations of second-order indexicality are actualised and, implicitly, for the image which the speakers wish to project, on the background of this crisis, for

themselves and for the party to which they belong. The government and
the parliamentarians of Power resort to an emotional and epistemic stance,
through which the speakers build an image of consensus (not only do they
accept the criticism of the Opposition, but they also imply that the
Opposition is on their side). The Opposition, on the other hand, has
different strategies depending on the party to which the speaker belongs.
For example, MPs who at one point belonged to the National Peasants'
Party tend to emotionally charge their appeal to the Government for the
protection of the workers' interests, personalising this appeal and placing
it in an order established from above, not in an actual order of the world.
But all Opposition MPs mark their distance from Power discursively by
presenting the institutional position as a privilege and as a renunciation of
the defence of the common good. In third-order indexicality, the
implications are that the Government equates authority with itself, and the
Opposition resorts to the association of authority with other moral
foundations according to the speaker's political affiliation.

   The difference in the approach of the events from the Griviţa
Workshops is apparent in the use of both lexical and grammatical stance.
The former consists in attitudinal tokens[34], used by the Majority, and in
attitudinal inscriptions, used by the Opposition, while the latter features a
preference for deontic stance, from the part of the Majority (who *had to*
act the way they did in order to save the country from the communist
danger), and for epistemic stance, from the part of the Opposition,
achieved via casting doubt upon the necessity and the force of the response
of the military, and also via mechanisms of attribution and reporting,
mainly by the use of reporting verbs such as *a pretinde* ("to claim") in
heteroglossic discourse.

   The positioning of the MPs in relation to the events, on the one hand,
and to the military response to them, on the other hand, is dictated by their
group affiliation. Consequently, their assessment of this twofold reality
places the linguistic means in complementary moves, with the Majority
trying to maximise the events and minimise the response to them, in order

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[34] Further distinctions have been made between *evoking tokens*, which involve no
subjective intervention on the part of the author and no evaluative lexis (the
positive/negative assessment is "evoked" via purely factual material, while
focusing on purely informational content), and *provoking tokens*, where the
subjective intervention is apparent in that the discourse contains evaluative
material, but not of an explicitly positive/negative type (positive/negative
assessment is "provoked" via material which, while evaluative, is not, of itself
positive/negative, so that evaluation is achieved via intensification, comparison,
metaphor, or counter-expectation).

to achieve legitimacy, and with the Opposition trying to minimise the events and maximise the response, in order to de-legitimate the actions of the Majority.

As proved by the examples under scrutiny, stance is also conveyed via the speaker's engagement in relation to other discourses, the main position being that of authorial disalignment. Dissociation is, thus, a powerful instrument aimed not only at clarifying discussions, but also at structuring one's conception of reality (modifying the audience's conception included) by opening the way to new possibilities of thought (Naess 1966, apud van Rees 2009, 108). It allows the speaker to attack arguments and to ensure that the conclusions drawn from the discussion are optimally precise, while at the same time creating a position for the speaker that is rhetorically advantageous (van Rees 2009, 93).

The speakers resort to dissociation when they would like to counter particular assertions, but cannot straightforwardly deny them either. It usually arises when there is a sense of unease that is the result of a clash between how things are defined and how one perceives or would wish things to be, without one being in the position to simply deny the given definition of the situation (van Rees 2009, 112). That is why a definition is frequently counter-attacked with another definition, since arguing, as well as refuting, from definition is a way to convince the audience that a particular ideological belief or commitment is reasonable because it can be supported by evidence (Ilie 2006, 669). The dialectical reasonableness is thus complemented by rhetorical effectiveness (van Rees 2009, 93), since definitions implicitly evaluate and qualify the commonly assumed interpretations of the two notions (Ilie 2006, 671), and orient the audience's interpretation usually in the direction that is more advantageous to the speaker. In this respect, definitions acquire more strength and may turn into polemical acts (see the stipulative definition and also the definition based on analogy).

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

STANCE IN THE ROMANIAN HUMORISTIC PRESS

MIHAELA-VIORICA CONSTANTINESCU

1. Preliminary Remarks

The analysis proposed in this chapter is mainly discursive, as it focuses on rhetorical strategies displayed in the texts of mid-nineteenth century Romanian journalists that convey a humorous stance. This analysis is also informed by the sociolinguistic approach to stance in its aim to explore particular subject positions (social roles and identities taken by Romanian journalists in the humoristic press), as well as the interpersonal relationship between journalists and readers (which can highlight power relations).

The context is extremely important: 1859 is the year of the Union between the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, at that time vassals of the Ottoman Empire. The two Principalities each had its own administration and institutions, and the transition from two separate (albeit similar) systems of governance to a unified system was not simple. The Principalities gained a new constitution (replacing the *Organic Regulations*, issued during the Russian Protectorate of the early 1830s) in 1856, at the Congress of Paris, in the wake of the Crimean War, as well as the protection of the great European powers. 1859 is also the official birth year of satirical publications in the Principalities, as the press in general benefited from the political changes. Nevertheless, sociopolitical turmoil affected the press in a number of ways, starting with a lack of financing and means of distribution for journals or magazines, and ending with censorship.

The focus of this chapter is a nineteenth century satirical magazine titled *Nichipercea*; its main contributor was N.T. Orășanu, an important figure in mid-nineteenth century Romanian humoristic journalism. Orășanu collaborated on the first Romanian satirical magazine, *Țânțarul* (*The Mosquito*), in 1859 (Trifu 1974). Between 1859 and 1862, the author was imprisoned on five occasions for press-related offences. The publications

he was the main author of are *Nichipercea* (the name is a euphemism for the devil) and the series that followed *Nichipercea*'s suspension in the 1860s. In general terms, the author aligns with a public that sees the reorientation of Romanian society towards Western Europe as a way of achieving democratic autonomy (from the Ottoman Empire). The old cultural and political model of the Principalities emphasised humble subordination to higher social-political power, following the Ottoman model, as opposed to the Western model of modernity and democracy (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018).

The chapter has the following structure: section **2.** is dedicated to the definition of stance and to the prominence of stance in (humoristic) journalism, section **3.** is concerned with the relationship between stance, identity, and positioning, section **4.** contains the analysis proper (focusing on identity and ideological load in satirical magazines), while section **5.** offers a discussion of the data and closing remarks.

2. Defining Stance

Stance is a multifaceted concept, various definitions of which have been proposed. *Stance* is seen as close to Goffman's (1981) concept of *footing* and Gumperz's (1992) *contextualization cues* (see also perspective and perspectivation, Graumann and Kallmeyer eds. 2002). Jaffe (2009, 4) emphasises the concept's role in the processes of indexicalisation, which bring together "individual performance and social meaning". A number of researchers hold that stance entails three aspects: evaluation, affect, and epistemicity (Biber et al. 1999, Biber and Finegan 1989, apud Englebretson 2007, 17), while others emphasise subjectivity, evaluation, and interaction (Englebretson 2007, 15–20).

In this chapter, the definitions of stance proposed by Du Bois (2007) are taken as a baseline: stance is held to be *a public act* performed by an individual who is a *social actor*, in a *dialogical* setting which allows the evaluation of objects, the positioning of various subjects, and the alignment with other subjects, "with respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field" (Du Bois 2007, 169).

Du Bois (2007) put forward a stance triangle in which evaluation seems to be the emphasised aspect; the triangle involves stancetakers and objects, as well as three actions: evaluation, positioning, and alignment. The socio-cognitive relations (Du Bois 2007, 170) within the triangle are: objective (evaluating objects), subjective (positioning subjects), and intersubjective (aligning with other subjects). Stance unites three aspects of social life: action, responsibility, and value (Du Bois 2007, 173).

The press proves to be an interesting field for investigating stance: discursive resources are deployed in order to "negotiate alignment and rapport with a particular readership" (Breeze 2016, 1). In satirical journalism, the authors (as social actors) perform stance acts located in a (pseudo-)dialogic setting and against the backdrop of a cultural, political, and ideological context, which also includes the authors' past stances (cf. Du Bois 2007, 145, 147); in a similar vein, Jaffe (2009, 12) argues that "conventional, socially and culturally embedded practices, roles, and expectations are the backdrop against which stancetaking occurs". The object of evaluation in humorous publications can be a person (referred to by actual name or by a usually unflattering sobriquet), an event, a situation, etc., which are already known to the readers; between the "first subject" – the authors of the articles –, and the "second subject" – the audience, the public (both actual and virtual/projected/imagined, see Jaffe 2009, 4), there is a convergent type of alignment. The authors' stances may reveal an identity that is constant in time or a preferred ethos. Stances in the press are performances through which actors align with their audience and often disalign themselves from the objects they evaluate. Sometimes, press actors manage a myriad of identities or facets of identities (Jaffe 2009, 4).

Nevertheless, in the press, when evaluating the objects of their discourse, the actors commit themselves to the propositional content of their utterances, thus revealing epistemic and affective stances. In humoristic journalism, actors cannot commit themselves to the propositional content of their statements (this impossibility is evident when one considers mechanisms of humour such as overstatement, understatement, or fantasy scenarios), and this aspect is known to the readership and accepted in the intersubjective relation.

Authentic and authoritative knowledge is an attribute of press actors as a result of an implicit interaction with the public: press actors project a self-ascribed image of knowledge and authority, and the audience acknowledges their claim to knowledge and authority (cf. Jaffe 2009, 7). At the same time, "speakers may use generalizations to shift the location of epistemic authority from the individual to the societal level" (Jaffe 2009, 7). When various beliefs are presented as shared, via the use of generalisations, speakers' stances may seem more powerful.

Since the utterances produced by journalists/actors in humoristic publications are framed as performances designed to entertain, receivers are automatically placed in the position of the audience, with an implicit collaborative interactional calibration vis-à-vis the actors (cf. Jaffe 2009, 8). Nevertheless, the actors can try to control or dominate the audience, or to manipulate it ideologically. While in general the prominent function of the

press is informative, supported by an evaluative function, the main function of satirical journalism is to entertain the public and evaluate objects (events, persons, etc.), its informative function being secondary. The informative and evaluative functions are inevitably related to the authentic and authoritative knowledge assumed by press actors.

3. Stance, Identity, and Positioning

Identity is seen as a product of social interaction, "constituted and reconstituted through the various discursive practices" (Davies and Harré 1990, 45, apud Bolander and Locher 2015, 102). Identity construction can be seen both as an individual and interpersonal process (Bolander and Locher 2015, 101) or, rather, as an interactionally emergent product of intersubjectivity[1] (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, apud Bolander and Locher 2015, 103).

As regards the identity of journalistic texts' authors, there are several layers at play: the discursive identity[2] of the *author/writer* is supplemented by a professional identity – *journalist*, and a transportable ("categorical") aspect of identity – ethnicity (*Romanian*) (Zimmerman 1992, apud Van De Mieroop and Clifton 2012, 193). Humour is a marker that contributes to identity construction (Van De Mieroop and Clifton 2012, 195). At the same time, building and negotiating a humorous identity is a prominent characteristic of self-presentation (Sinkeviciute 2019, 127; Evans Davies 2019). In the context of satirical magazines, an author needs to position him/herself as a humorous individual (or to construct a humorous *persona*) in order to be perceived by the readership as funny[3] (Bolander and Locher 2015, 102). In mid-nineteenth century Romanian humoristic journalism

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[1] Identity is "the social positioning of self and other", "intersubjectively rather than individually produced and interactionally emergent rather than assigned in an *a priori* fashion" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005, 586–587, apud Bolander and Locher 2015, 103).

[2] "[…] at a proximal level identities-in-talk carry with them discursive rights and obligations which constrain allowable contributions to the interaction and thus affect what actions participants can accountably perform. Identities-in-use thus provide instances of social actors' commonsense understandings of identity as a resource for conducting their affairs which reflexively reproduces identity as an external and constraining social fact" (Van De Mieroop and Clifton 2012, 194).

[3] "The more particular acts of positioning are performed by the same individual, the more central this attribute is to his/her own construction of identity. Thus, an individual who, for example, consistently positions him/herself as a humorous individual in the status updates, is more likely to perceive him/herself as funny, and to be perceived as *being* a funny person by others" (Bolander and Locher 2015, 102).

(and perhaps in other periods as well; this characteristic seems to be constant), a rebellious identity/*persona* is also needed, especially in the first years of a satirical magazine's existence (Constantinescu 2020). A *persona* is a sort of mask, "a socially constructed person-image, which may well be a strategic projection rather than a reliable index of the speaker's 'real identity'" (Coupland and Coupland 2009, 227). The characters created by the authors can be considered strategic projections or masks animated according to the aims and rhetorical needs of the publications (thus *personae*).

The situation of the press in late 1850s' and early 1860s' Romania was generally rather precarious, as it struggled to gain a public voice and avoid censorship. Journalists needed to create an image of legitimacy both for their readership and the powers that be, obeying discursive scripts. Adopting a writing genre, more or less conventional, influences the reflection of the journalists' alignment[4] (Jaffe 2009, 21).

Stance is prominent for *keying*, in which

> a set of conventions by which a given activity (which is already meaningful in terms of a primary framework) is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else (Slembrouck 2004, apud Jaffe 2009, 10).

In a Bakhtinian vein, Jaffe (2009, 10) considers keying as "shifting stances and frames", for example when a speaker changes his/her stance with regard to his/her previous communicative interventions, to objects or subjects[5]. An extension of keying is *loading*, a concept which refers to „the speaker's level on investment in the identity being negotiated" (Coupland 2007, 114, apud Jaffe 2009, 10). Actors in the press, in general, invest heavily in their public identity: one can speak of a high identity load.

Using certain rhetorical/discursive devices entails indirect indexicality and an active role on the part of the audience in the co-construction of stance (Jaffe 2009, 13). This implies complicity with the speaker (actor), which is based on shared values and knowledge (political, social, ideological, or

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[4] "[…] social actors are obligated to follow particular discursive scripts, following the required elements of those scripts cannot be read as a direct reflection of high personal alignment, affective stance (the individual's "true" feelings)" (Jaffe 2009, 21).

[5] "A speaker may rekey a presumed authorial role as a "figure", a serious declaration as humorous, or a joke as serious. In all of these cases, what is shifting is speaker stance toward his or her words, the situation, or other social actors. Keying – or shifting stances and frames – signals the multiplicity and complexity of stances and identities" (Jaffe 2009, 10).

cultural). Some discourses have a high ideological load, being more "stance-saturated" than other discourses on the same topic (Jaffe 2009, 22). Adopting a particular discursive style is a form of "deliberately and self-consciously performative" stancetaking (Jaffe 2009, 16): it involves an active agent (performer) manipulating different conventions.

Stancetaking allows access to "metapragmatic stereotypes, including the identities and relationships conventionally associated with particular discourses, variables, or forms of talk" (Jaffe 2009, 17; cf. Bucholtz 2009). A form of metastance can be achieved through "durable personal stances (or stance styles) across longer time frames" (Jaffe 2009, 19); as Du Bois (2007, 141) mentions, there are connections between current and previous stances, both from a structural and a functional point of view; furthermore, in an interaction, the participants have an active role in framing an utterance, an action that gives that utterance a certain value. A comparison between a stance and the individual's history of stances is needed in order to grasp its functions.

4. Stance in the Romanian Humoristic Press – A Case Study

This chapter analyses several articles from the weekly magazine *Nichipercea*, founded and directed by N.T. Orășanu in 1859. The magazine had several contributors (Radu Rosetti, Pantazi Ghica, I.A. Geanoglu, I.V. Adrian, I.C. Fundescu), but the greater part of the content was by Orășanu, who used the pseudonyms Nicor, Netto, Odobașa, Iago, etc. (DLRO s.v.). *Nichipercea* was suspended several times (in 1859, 1860, 1861, 1864, 1865, and 1866) and, on various occasions, due to the rigours of censorship, Orășanu's name no longer appeared on the first page as director or editor. Despite this, he continued to be in charge of the magazine's content (DPR s.v.). When the magazine was suspended, Orășanu published several brochures: for example, *Coarnele lui Nichipercea* (*Nichipercea's Horns*), *Coada lui Nichipercea* (*Nichipercea's Tail*) – in 1860, or *Ochiul dracului* (*Devil's Eye*), *Arțagul dracului* (*Devil's Truculence*), *Codița dracului* (*Devil's Little Tail*) – in 1861 (DPR s.v.). As regards the identity of *Nichipercea* texts' author(s), the layers at play reveal their discursive identity (authorship) supplemented by a professional identity (journalist) in which rebelliousness is one of the most important features, and ethnicity a prominent transportable aspect of identity.

Displays of stance are both linguistic and paralinguistic. In the case of satirical magazines, the paralinguistic component is extremely important in framing the content of the publication as humorous performance. The

graphic of the frontispiece (see Figures 1 and 2 below), for instance, reveals a "repeatable style" that emerges from relevant stancetaking strategies (Johnstone 2009, 29). For the press in general, an "ethos of persona" is enacted by the authors' "ability to construct different identities to meet different rhetorical exigencies" (Johnstone 2009, 35) which is necessary for the survival of the publication.

Figure 1   Figure 2

In mid-nineteenth century Romanian journalism, humour is sometimes presented via linguistic or paralinguistic means, as "the expression of a special kind of intelligence associated with evil" (Constantinescu 2020, 181). See above, Figures 1 and 2, for the graphic of *Nichipercea*: Figure 1 is the graphic initially adopted by the publication; the devil is represented as a fallen angel (it still has wings), while the hair could metonymically suggest the flames of hell. Its facial expression suggests that the character is amused by something and ready to write it down. The gaze of the character seems directed towards the readers. In the second figure, the devil is presented as a creature with mixt human-animal features, its expression suggests amusement, probably triggered by what it sees, and a similar intention to write. The direction of the gaze is outside the physical frame of the publication (the position of the character, placed on top of the planet, would entail an "out of this world" reason for amusement). The clothing differs, suggesting a uniform in the first figure, while in the second it resembles the costume of a *commedia dell'arte* character.

As regards the linguistic means (see Vasilescu 2010, 2018), the titles of several magazines or brochures in mid-nineteenth century Romanian press reveal a diversity of euphemisms for the devil: *Nichipercea*, *Sarsailă*, *Aghiuţă*; other titles allude to idiomatic expressions containing a taboo word (*drac* "devil"): *Ochiul dracului* (*Devil's Eye*), *Arţagul dracului* (*Devil's Truculence*) and *Codiţa dracului* (*Devil's Little Tail*). Orăşanu wrote for

many publications with this type of title; his preference for titles alluding to or naming the devil could mark an intention to create a specific ethos (see Trifu 1974; DLRO s.v.). According to Morreall (2008), in the Christian faith, laughing at the expense of others has been negatively perceived for centuries. Nevertheless, these publications claim a negative identity that entails "a hypercritical stance or an attempt to deceive people" (Constantinescu 2020, 181); this attitude highlights the importance of humour in shaping and promoting shared values, and also the use of humour as a means of confronting certain delicate aspects of the public life (cf. Freud 1988 [1905]). The demonic mask is associated with a rebellious *persona* (cf. Nieuwenhuis 2017).

At this point, *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* need to be taken into account, as they have a double influence on stance: on one hand, the existing texts and discourses are stancetaking resources, on the other, they offer an interpretive framework (Jaffe 2009, 20). The titles and the graphic representations demonstrate the importance of the intertextual and interdiscursive dimensions (quoting, transforming, or alluding to expressions, collocations, folk beliefs, or legends). The articles in satirical magazines are often parodies or parodic pastiches of parliamentary debates, official documents, news, advertisements, etc., discursive forms that readers are familiar with. These parodic forms can be seen not only as an illustration of intertextuality, but also of keying (see above).

Framing in the press involves not only the presentation of events or declarations, but also instances of cultural and social beliefs (which relate to intertextuality and interdiscursivity). Following Goffman's (1981) views, framing can be considered "a filtering process through which societal-level values and principles of conduct are transformed and refocused so as to apply to the situation at hand" (Gumperz 2001, 217, apud Park and Takanashi 2011, 185). Thus, the identities and *personae* that are adopted by the press authors are based on "existing social stances and stereotypes", as a result of interactional processes of resemiotisation and reinterpretation (Park and Takanashi 2011, 186–187). With this idea in mind, the analysis focuses on the rhetorical strategies that authors resort to in satirical articles that highlight the importance of the identity and ideological loads.

4.1. Identity Load

In the *Nichipercea* series (1861–1862, some cases even in 1864), there are several parodic articles with messages signed by *cavalerul Nichipercea* ("the chevalier Nichipercea") and addressed to *Maiestatea Sa Belzevut* ("his majesty Beelzebub"), or a rubric *Acte officiale din Infernu* (*Official Acts*

from Inferno), containing reports or letters. These articles are consistent with the identity projected by the publication and by the author (see above).

In Orășanu's case, a set of stances taken over time may index what Johnstone (2009) calls "an ethos of persona". The different characters created by the author reflect "relatively enduring *personas*" (Kiesling 2009, 174). Several stance choices can reveal a pattern that cumulates (Jaffe 2009, 19) and reflects an individual "footprint" (rebelliousness, sarcasm, etc.). We agree that stances have both retrospective and prospective implications (Jaffe 2009, 9): in order to create a certain ethos, current stances must both be coherent with previous stances, and facilitate the anticipation of a participant's future stances.

When the author creates a character (a *persona*), multiple layers of stances are at play. The character becomes the explicit stancetaker or a deceptive first subject, responsible for evaluation, knowledge, agency, etc.; the creation of this *persona* can be construed as a stance lead (Du Bois 2007). The readers can align or disalign with this character, bearing the history of the author's stances in mind (the implicit stancetaker). Thus, the character can be perceived as a *persona* the author aligns with, or as a *persona* the author usually distances himself from. This highlights the problem of "the exercise of agency and power in stance attribution, which is simultaneously a form of control of others and control over one's own projected stance" (Jaffe 2009, 9). The implicit stancetaker controls not only the projected stance (via the character), but also the readers' reaction.

Figure 3. *Multiple stance layers*

If the explicit stancetaker has a positive/negative position towards the object of evaluation, the second subject has to interpret the position of the implicit stancetaker towards that object, taking the history of stances (the ethos) into consideration. If there is a clash between the positionings, then the readers

could infer (stance follow, Du Bois 2007) that the intended positioning/evaluation is that opposed to the explicit positioning/evaluation. Du Bois (2007, 147) mentions that, in order to interpret an act of stance, knowledge of individuals' histories of stances is required. These stance histories represent "critical resources for the interpretation" (Jaffe 2009, 19).

In the articles from *Nichipercea* series, there are several elements that frame the demonic *persona*, beside the name of the characters. Role-taking is a mark of perspective-taking (Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002, 2):

a. the alocutive and delocutive formulae concerning the addressee of the reports or letters emphasise a characteristic that is culturally associated with the devil: darkness. If light and the sky are associated with divinity, darkness and what is underground are associated with the devil (who is believed to appear especially at night). The name *Belzevut/Belzebut*, mentioned in the Bible, one of the princes of hell, is not very frequently used in Romanian to designate the devil. The choice of name may have been surprising for mid-nineteenth century readers, suggesting a certain (high) level of culture on the part of the author (including good knowledge of foreign literary sources concerned with the topic of this demon) and a less familiar aura for the demonic character: *Prea neguroasă Maiestate* "Your All Tenebrous Majesty"; *Pre întunecosa Maiestatea Sa Belzevut* "His All Dark Majesty Beelzebub" (27.06.1861, p. 93); *Întunecime!* "Your Darkness" (10.11.1862, p. 397); *Conform întunecatei porunci a suveranului meu Belzebut I* "By the tenebrous order of my sovereign Beelzebub I"; *Nos/Belzebut I./Satani graţia* (sic!) *et Dracorum nationale voluntate Rex Iadorum et Inferris* "We/Beelzebub I/By the grace of Satan and the national will of all devils King of Hell and the Nether Regions" (12.12.1861, p. 254).

It should be mentioned that not all the formulae are in Romanian, as sometimes the authors resort to Latin (for example "Nos/Belzebut I./Satani graţia (sic!) et Dracorum nationale voluntate Rex Iadorum et Inferris"), where Latin is used to mimic the royal titulature of medieval and premodern official documents.

b. other delocutive formulae for the explicit stancetaker and the explicit addressee: in the case of the explicit stancetaker, darkness is frequently evoked (sometimes in a metonymical pattern) in relation to the government of Hell, presented as the "apartment of the curtain" (the "apartment of the tenebrous/dark curtain" could be an allusion to one of the deferent formulae used for the Sublime Porte – *luminata Poartă* "the Enlightened Porte"); the delocutive formula for the ministerial function has a negative evaluative word associated with it, but the word gains a positive aura due to the demonic framework – *scoundrel*: *Ministrul nostru secătură de stat la*

apartamentul întunecatei noastre perdele "Our Scoundrel of State Minister at the apartment of our tenebrous/dark curtain"; *Aghiuță ministru secătură de stat la apartamentul perdelei* "Aghiuță, Scoundrel of State Minister of the apartment of the curtain" (10.11.1862, p. 397).

In Romanian, *secătură* is a pejorative term used to designate a good-for-nothing, worthless person, or even a person lacking morality (DLR s.v.; the noun is feminine, a derivative from the verb *a seca* "to dry up", "to run dry"). It can be hypothesised that the pejorative term was selected due to its formal similarity with *secretar* ("secretary") – a pseudo-paronym, intended to create a pun (based on the similitude of the signifiers). In this case, (*ministru*) *secătură de stat* parallels (*ministru*) *secretar de stat* ("Deputy Minister"/"Secretary of State"). The same mechanism could trigger the replacement of *departament* ("department"), which is the word corelated with the state administration, with *apartament* ("apartment"), designating private housing. The switch could convey the idea that the government of Hell occupies an inconsequential space, which contrasts with the prominence of its ruler's power.

c. delocutive formulae for the "objects" of evaluation contain several loanwords from Turkish and Greek, typical of the Phanariot period (1711/1716–1821, when the rule of the Principalities was entrusted for the most part to members of high-ranking Greek families from the Fanar district in Constantinople, seen as more reliable by the Ottoman administration). The most prominent evaluative term in this category is *tombatera*, a loanword from Greek, referring originally to a type of headgear inspired by Ottoman fashion, while its figurative meaning is "retrograde" (DLR s.v.): *gașca peritoare a tombateriștilor* "the dying gang of the retrogrades"; *tefterul Tombateresc* "the retrograde register"; *prea vestiți patriohoți* "the well-known patri-thieves" (27.06.1861, p. 93).

These loanwords and the ideological implications of their use are discussed in the next section.

d. the demonic identity is also supported by speech acts: stereotypical expressive acts are transformed according to the new frame; for example, wishes or formal closing formulae are reframed to ensure coherence with the demonic characters. A stereotypical closing formula can receive a new ending: "Priimește încredințările stimei și considerațiunei ce *nu ți-am purtat niciodată*" ("I assure you of the esteem and regard that *I never held you in*"), that of the negation of positive affects; the wishes targeted at the addressee or at a third party – *pe care Dumnezeu să-l ție vecinic în focul Genei* ("[he] whom God keep forever in the fires of Gehenna"), or *Dracul să vă ia* ("May the devil take you/go to hell!") – are in fact curses in a non-demonic frame.

4.2. Ideological Load

The ideological load of the articles is sometimes highlighted by lexical choices. There are many derivatives from loanwords of Turkish or Greek origin: *binişlie*, *işlicoasa*, *tombatereşti*, referring to items of clothing and headgear borrowed from Ottoman fashion (DA s.v., DLR s.v.), thus lacking synchronisation with the modern Romanian world and mentality, which looks to the West:

(1) Suntem în ordinea regulamentară *binişlie*? Putem aduce pe tronul ţării pe cine vrem noi? Avem representanţii găşcei *tombatereşti* în *işlicoasa* adunare? Magistraţii publice ca în dulcele regim al knutului? Este poliţie ce trebue să stăruiască nu numai a tulbura ordinea netulburată, ci şi spre a nu fi attinse câtu-şi de puţin de nimeni nici bordurile cele mai rîioase alle *tombaterei*? sau *tombatera* este într-o permanentă stare de demascare, mergând din ce în ce mai repede şi mai profund în pieirea-i, şi din dispreţ în derîderea Naţiunei ce-i repet ş-acum cu indulginţă: "Dumnezeu s-o erte?" (11.07.1861, p. 107)

Do we live by the regulations of those who wear the *biniş*? Can we raise to the country's throne whomever we want? Are there representatives of the *tombatera* gang in the *işlic*-ish assembly? Public magistrates as during the sweet regime of the knout? Are there police that see not only to disturbing an undisturbed order, but also that nobody touch even the scabbiest edge of a *tombatera* coat? Or does the *tombatera*'s mask continue to slip, as it moves towards its rapid and complete dissolution, and from contempt to the derision of the Nation that now intones indulgently: "God rest its soul"?

The sarcastic fragment emphasises a negative evaluation and the distancing/disalignment of the explicit stancetaker with regard to the object of evaluation (politicians in power, the government in general, and the aristocracy faithful to the old regime). The interrogative structure contributes to the active involvement of the secondary subject (the readers) in the evaluative process. There are several allusions both to Russia's influence in the Principalities (the "regulations" – the *Organic Regulations*, which are considered the first constitution for the Romanian Principalities, created in the 1830s during the Russian occupation; the knout – symbol of despotic rule, presented in an antiphrasis as "the sweet regime of the knout"), and to Ottoman influence (all the derivatives from loanwords of Turkish or Greek origin: *binişlie*, *işlicoasa*, *tombatereşti*). The government's activity is criticised via metonymy through the police's activity – "a *tulbura* ordinea *netulburată*", a paregmenon ("*disturbing* an *undisturbed* order") – while the aristocracy's attachment to the old values is

made visible through fashion choices (the constant preference for Ottoman clothing). The end of the fragment implies a democratisation of the society and the active participation of the lower classes in political life, in competition with the aristocracy.

The attitude towards lexical choices can reflect a metasociolinguistic stance[6] (Jaffe 2009, 17): according to their lexical choices, participants in the public, sociopolitical life of the Principalities either have a preference for a modern, Western European societal frame (associated with the liberal ideology), or show a desire to preserve the old, traditional South-Eastern European societal frame, which favoured the sociopolitical elite. Kiesling (2009, 172) mentions the fact that speakers' linguistic choices convey certain stances, which are associated with different identities:

> any choice of linguistic form made by speakers is based ultimately on the interpersonal or epistemic stance they wish to take with their various interlocutors at a particular time, and that it is stances that become associated, through cultural models, with various identities (including particular speaking roles in specific situations).

The object (the Romanian political world) is evaluated, but its evaluation represents "a *vehicle* for expressing a relational, identificational, and […] ideological orientation" (Jaworski and Thurlow 2009, 219). The fragment reveals a type of *elitism*, construed (following the definition[7] proposed by Jaworski and Thurlow 2009, 196) as a claim to superiority on the grounds of knowledge, authenticity, experience, and insight on the part of the author (and, implicitly, of the readers); this allows the author to take a higher moral and intellectual standing in relation to the object (see Vasilescu 2010, 2018).

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[6] "Stancetaking can also have as its object the underlying assumptions, processes, and motivations behind those sociolinguistic correlations. That is, speakers can use sociolinguistically salient forms in such a way as to call into question – or leave unchallenged – specific language hierarchies: convictions that particular variables are inherently more or less prestigious, intimate, authoritative, and so on. At an even more basic level, people can take up stances toward the assumed connections between language and identity, from the individual to the collective level. We might call this display of an attitude or position with respect to language hierarchies and ideologies a *metasociolinguistic* stance" (Jaffe 2009, 17).

[7] "[…] we define elitism as a person's orientation or making a claim to exclusivity, superiority, and/or distinctiveness on the grounds of status, knowledge, authenticity, taste, erudition, experience, insight, wealth, or any other quality warranting the speaker/author to take a higher moral, aesthetic, intellectual, material, or any other form of standing in relation to another subject (individual or group). Elitism then is a claim or bid for an enduring identity position that requires constant, momentary, and interactive enactment" (Jaworski and Thurlow 2009, 196).

In another fragment, the social actor chooses a literary motif (the foreign traveller) as a vehicle for presenting various aspects of Romanian society critically. Thus, the character, the explicit stancetaker, is a deceptive first subject, who presents the Principalities, and moreover the capital Bucharest, with a (presumably) neutral eye. Nevertheless, the readers must be aware of the fact that the perceptions of the character cover an implicit, real first subject, which is the author of the article (the social actor). Those things that are evaluated positively from a demonic perspective are in fact negative aspects of various political situations and mores in mid-nineteenth century Romanian society. Positive positioning and alignment with the object of evaluation from the explicit stancetaker (Nichipercea) and his addressee (Beelzebub), the deceptive second subject, is doubled by a negative perspective and disalignment from the implicit stancetaker (and real first subject).

(2) Am pornit, dupe ordinul vostru, ca să strebat lumea și să adun din diferitele staturi pământești memorii de tot felul, care să te poată lumina în organisarea statului și a societății noastre.

Abia am scos capul din întuneric la lumina soarelui, în țara ce se află deasupra statului nostru, și care dupe unii se dice Principatele-Unite, iar dupe alții Principatele-Uimite, și am aflat atâta materie de notat, încât cred de prisos a mai vidita și alte țări. Daca, întunecimea voastră, și-ar organisa Iadul dupe cum e organisat acest stat, sunt sigur că nici un Iadu n-ar putea fi mai drăcește organisat decât Iadul vostru.

Într-această țară, unde toate sunt arababura, și care se dice regenerată, nimic nu e la locul său, ca cum ar fi jucat măestrele într-însa. Doctorii în medicină și-au lăsat hapurile și cataplasmele, și s-au apucat de politică, ignoranții cei mai mari s-au făcut oameni de stat, șarlatanii trec de liberali, streinii trec de patrioți, clerul îndeamnă pe oameni numai la mâncare de fasole, făcându-i să creadă că în fasole stă mântuirea sufletului, fiindcă nu poate să le dea modeluri de virtute, călugării, care s-au lepădat de lume când au îmbrăcat rasa, au acaparat mai toate veniturile laicilor în numele lui Cristu, și trăiescu într-această țară mai bine decât bivolii în țara Turcească și decât râmătorii în Ungaria; meritul cel mai mare e al aceluia ce știe linguși, onoarea e aceluia ce e mai bun de gură, dreptatea acelui ce are punga mai plină. Impertinența aci e spirit, furberia se dice capacitate, minciuna se numește politică; aurul e o deitate, ipocrisia o modestie, fanfaronada o franchéță, crima un coragiu. Am intrat în capitala acestui stat și am observat:

Că această țară se află pusă (pentru mai multă tărie poate) subt scutul a două legi, opuse una alteia. Guvernele (nu ficsăm care) se serv cu aceste legi ca să lovească tot ce le face umbră sau obstacol, și unde nu pot lovi cu una, sigur că pot lovi cu cea-altă. Aici se află o Cameră, pentru reorganisarea țării, dar care-și perd timpul în certuri infructuoase desorganisând orice organisare. Ministerul e responsabil, fără a-și da

socoteli nimenui, căci Curtea de Casație mănâncă leafă fără a avea dupe ce să judece pe ministri. Privilegele și monopolurile s-au dărâmat de legea nouă, dar ele pe subt lege tot există. Se află o lege pentru funcționarii priimitori de mită, dar pe subt mână Dumnedeu știe ce se face. (10.11.1862, p. 397)

Per your order, I set out to travel through the world and gather impressions of various earthly states, so as to aid you in organising our own state and society.

Barely had I emerged in the sunlight, in the country that lies above ours, which some call the United Principalities, and others the Astonished Principalities; I found so many things worth writing down that I believe it would be superfluous to visit other countries. If Your Darkness were to organise Hell following this model, I am sure no other Hell could be more diabolically organised than yours.

In this country, where there is complete confusion even though it calls itself regenerated, everything is out of place, as if wicked fairies had been at play. Doctors in medicine have set aside their pills and cataplasms to take up politics, the greatest ignorants have become statesmen, charlatans pass for liberals, foreigners pass for patriots, the clergy urge people to eat beans as the surest path to salvation since they can provide no models of virtue themselves, the monks – who abandoned worldly pursuits when they took the vow – have acquired most of the laity's incomes in the name of Christ, and they live here better than oxen in Turkey or pigs in Hungary; the greatest merit is his who knows best how to fawn, honour belongs to the glib, justice, to those who have a full purse. Here, impertinence passes for wit, perfidy for capability, lies are called politics, gold is a deity, hypocrisy passes for modesty, bluster for plain-speaking, and crime for a badge of courage.

I arrived in the capital of this country and I learned: [that] this country is placed (perhaps for greater surety) under the shield of two laws, each opposite to the other. Governments (no matter which) use these laws to strike at any slight or obstacle; if they cannot use one law, they can surely use the other. There is an Assembly, meant to reorganise the country, but its members waste their time in useless squabbles, disordering any semblance of order. The government is said to be accountable for its actions, but answers to no one, for the Justices of the High Court draw their salaries while there is no law for judging ministers by. Privileges and monopolies have been abolished by the new law, but they still exist underneath it. There is a law concerning clerks who receive bribes, but God knows how things really are.

The epistemic frame entails certainty, which is supported by the evidential frame – direct contact with the object of evaluation, thus the more credible or creditable the "witness" (deceptive first subject/explicit stancetaker). The "witness" seems to appeal to what is common knowledge for him and his

superior as regards the geographical configuration (Hell is underneath the Romanian Principalities); with respect to the readership (the second subject), a presupposition is manipulated (the geographical configuration of Hell and of the Principalities), and it needs to be accommodated (accepted) – the readers are thus required to accept the fact that their country lies above the space of eternal damnation. The fragment has a central paragraph concerned with particular social categories (doctors, clergy, monks, and politicians) and the moral transformation: what is apparently only a neutral acknowledgement of the situation represents a criticism of a perceived loss of values (in both public and private life). It is a case of using generalisations, which have to be recognised/accepted by the readers; as mentioned earlier, the use of generalisations shifts the actor's epistemic authority to the societal level (Jaffe 2009, 7). The generalisation helps present the negative perception of moral dissolution as shared with the readers; the social actor (the writer) can strengthen his stance via this discursive strategy.

The paragraph concerned with the delicate political and administrative issues alludes to the duplicity and superfluity of some institutions in the absence of appropriate laws. The (literal) duplicity consists in the appeal to both old and new constitutions: the *Organic Regulations* (1830–1858) and the *Paris Convention* (1858–1864), the former of which allowed privileges for the aristocracy, while the latter envisioned a more modern state, in which privileges and titles were abolished.

Many words or collocations have a negative affective potential (they could trigger negative emotional responses of the readers): "Într-această țară, unde toate sunt *arababura*, și care se dice regenerată, *nimic nu e la locul său, ca cum ar fi jucat măestrele într-însa*" ("In this country, were there is *complete confusion* even though it calls itself regenerated, *everything is out of place, as if wicked fairies had been at play*"); "care-și *perd timpul în certuri infructuoase desorganisând orice organisare*" ("its members *waste their time in useless squabbles, disordering any semblance of order*"); "Ministerul e *responsabil, fără a-și da socoteli nimenui*" ("The government *is said to be accountable for its actions, but answers to no one*"). There are several scenarios (administrative and political) entailing a lack of organisation, which trigger discontent (or anger); by analogy, the Principalities are presented as a place destroyed by evil spirits; another source of "confusion" is the politicians' activity (*desorganisând orice organisare* "disordering any semblance of order" – a paregmenon; "The government *is accountable for its actions, but answers to no one*" – a paradox), causing disharmony: its members "waste their time in useless squabbles" (*perd timpul în certuri infructuoase*). What is common to these

scenarios is the lack of control. There is no entity to manage the "confusion". This lack of control could accentuate the negative emotional response of the readers.

In some situations, the frequent explicit addressee, Beelzebub, is offered a more active role, that of stancetaker. When the explicit demonic stancetaker is Beelzebub, the explicit addressees are the chevalier/prince Nichipercea and *beizadea* Cipic (prince Slipper) – an unflattering sobriquet for one of the descendants of the Principalities' former rulers (in some satirical magazines, a character that epitomises, at the same time, the old and the contemporary representatives of the political power). Some of the "official acts from Inferno" mimic diplomatic correspondence. In several cases, *beizadea* Cipic (prince Slipper) is offered titles or distinctions by Beelzebub, the "acts" being written, apparently, in Latin:

(3) Vidi recomendatia nostri ministri secaturae de Statum ad apartamentum nigrae noastrae perdelae, in favore sui luminitiae Bei-zade Cipicus, vornicus inter vornicis Bucurestiorum.
Vidi suam amore pooularitate (sic!) quem destinxit ille in omnes luptes politicae.
Vidi suum eficace concursum ad susținendum in sua civitate focum quem susținemus nos semder (sic!) aprinsus.
Vidi suae dispositionae luate, ad aglomerandum in pluribus partibus capitatae Principatibus unitis, lemnis apud paduribus monastirorum non inchinatibus.
Vidi corespundentiae suae cum novis membris municipalitatis, ut truvare magazies convenabiles ad-hoc.
Vidi suam incurcaturam in affacera publicis, et suam boroboațam in quae aflatur cum questione Uniris.
Nos benevolemus ut parigoriam onorare ille cum magnus ordinus tufani, et autorisamus ille purtare hoc signum distinctione semper in suam spinare [...]. (12.12.1861, p. 254)

I saw the recommendation of our scoundrel State Ministers of the apartment of our black curtain, in favour of his highness *beizade* Slipper, statesman among statesmen of Bucharest.
I saw his love of popularity, which distinguishes him in all political battles.
I saw the decisions he took, to crowd various places of the capital of the United Principalities with lumber from the forests of monasteries not under foreign administration.
I saw his correspondence with new members of the municipal government, to the purpose of finding convenient warehouses (for it).
I saw the mess he made of public affairs and his roguery in the matter of the Union.

> We deign for his sake to honour him with the high order of the shrub,
> and we grant him leave to wear this distinction on his back […].

The deceptive Latin text contains some Latin words (*vidi*, Latin prepositions
or pronouns, etc.) to ensure a Latin appearance, but most frequently the
words have a Latin ending attached to Slavic, Turkish or neo-Greek
loanwords (for example, *vornic* "minister for Internal Affairs/Justice",
perdea "curtain" or *parigorie* "consolation, comfort", DLR s.v.) or to words
that have a Latin origin; the phrasing is mostly Romanian; there are several
expressions illustrating the political jargon of the period or words of
colloquial Romanian, which contrast with the official tone of the
"document" (*incurcaturam*/*încurcătură* "mess", *boroboaţam*/*boroboaţă*
"roguery", *spinarem*/*spinare* "back"[8]). It can be hypothesised that the
source of the humour resides not in the reminder of the political figure's
actions, but in the way it is displayed, in the apparently Latin phraseology
of the "official act", which offers the reader the opportunity to find lexical,
etymological, syntactic, and stylistic incongruencies. As already mentioned,
this type of text is interpreted by the readers with previous texts from the
same rubric in mind, and at the same time ensures the anticipation of similar
texts in future issues of the publication.

The metasociolinguistic stance of the explicit stancetaker, as revealed
by the linguistic incongruencies, is based on the interpersonal stance of a
very adaptable group: the cultural model of this group blends several
influences, while ensuring a dominant tone, even if only superficial,
according to the needs of the moment.

5. Final Discussion and Remarks

In considering the mid-nineteenth century *Nichipercea* magazine and series,
it is evident that the author's investment in the *personae* he puts forward
bears a high identity load. To ensure the publication's success, the author
needs to multiply the stancetakers in order to ensure the effect of
entertaining the audience. This is especially necessary since the magazine
and the following brochures are mainly the work of only one author. In the
case of a certain stylistic/rhetorical homogeneity, the explicit stancetakers
allow for a certain diversity of voices. This needs to be further explored by
the analysis of other mid- and late nineteenth century magazines that have
only one main contributor: for instance, a similar situation could be reflected

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[8] In the list, the first form is the one in the original text, the Latinised one
(*incurcaturam*, *boroboaţam*, *spinarem*), while the second form is the standard
Romanian word (*încurcătură*, *boroboaţă*, *spinare*).

in *Claponul* (*The Capon*) or *Moftul român* (*The Romanian Trifle*), issued by I.L. Caragiale, a well-known Romanian writer. The aim of the author – weaving a diversity of voices, and hence of stancetakers – could be achieved via different means from those seen in Orăşanu's publications. In the *Nichipercea* series, a high identity load is triggered by the naming and framing of *personae* consistent in time; this consistency of the *personae* is part of the common ground between author and readers, facilitating the interpretation of the stances. If a magazine has several authors, each contributing consistently, the entertaining effect is achieved, among other resources, by the stylistic/rhetorical diversity. In that case, it can be hypothesised that the authors would invest in an ethos of self, creating their own identifiable rhetorical matrix.

The articles in *Nichipercea* series show a particular discursive style and a high ideological load (maybe more "stance-saturated" than in other type of articles). Considering the typical audience for the satirical magazines in mid-nineteenth century – usually an urban and educated public, from the middle and upper classes –, one can hardly speak of ideological manipulation or control, but rather of a public manifestation of a group's ideology and attitude. A comparison can be drawn between the demonic stance and Orăşanu's history of stances (a constant feature is rebelliousness; in the discursive style there are ideological patterns of (dis)affiliation marked via lexis).

The high ideological load is achieved through lexical choices. The attitude towards the vocabulary of the period reflects a metasociolinguistic stance: salient forms are used to challenge the social and political hierarchy; an evaluative lexicon can be considered, at the same time, prestigious and authoritative by one group, and retrograde by the opposed group. Language is used to highlight collective identities: according to their lexical choices, participants in the public, sociopolitical life of the Principalities show either a preference for a modern Western European societal frame, or a more conservative attitude, preserving the old societal frame, which favoured the sociopolitical elite. The real stancetakers in the satirical magazines wish to promote, at the interpersonal level, the idea of modernity and liberalism and an epistemic stance of certainty, sincerity, and knowledge; this allows them to show their adherence to the Western cultural models, while being aware of the previous cultural model – still prominent for some social groups – and its frailties.

Another point that needs testing refers to the differences between authors in "quality"/broadsheet press and those of humoristic journalism: the need to be consistent and to create an identifiable pattern, thus an ethos of self, is in opposition to the need to create and animate *personae* in order

to entertain – i.e. constructing an ethos of persona. An ethos of self seems consistent with "quality" press (and also with politics, as already discussed by Johnstone 2009), while an ethos of *persona* would be well adapted for humoristic journalism; as a result of this difference in the preferences regarding the discursive construction of self, the identity load could sometimes be higher in the satirical magazines.

As regards the ideological load, it could be similar, but achieved through different means: in humoristic journalism, lexical resources can be used to exploit the ideological turn more than in the "quality" press, which has to adhere to certain standards, while using more direct discursive strategies to highlight a certain ideology (mid-nineteenth century Romanian journalism is usually explicitly associated to political groups or political parties). Sarcasm and rebelliousness are common features in mid-nineteenth century Romanian journalism: sarcasm can be considered a trait of the discursive identity, while rebelliousness seems more a trait of the professional identity.

In order to achieve the effect of entertaining, authors in satirical magazines need to use a complicated rhetorical design of stances and stancetakers (see the embedded triangles). There are multiple layers of interpretation that derive from using several *personae*. In general, "quality" press is more straightforward as regards stance and stancetakers.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

AFFECTIVE STANCETAKING IN CORRESPONDENCE: THE CASE OF FILIAL-PARENTAL LOVE

GABRIELA STOICA

1. Preliminaries

The present chapter deals with a particular form of representing subjectivity within discourse: emotional instantiation, in a twofold aspect: emotions as content, topic and object of the discourse itself, on one hand, and emotions as a persuasive strategy of (inter)subjective (meta)stancetaking, on the other.

I propose a corpus-based analysis, aimed at highlighting the saliency of the affective dimension of a discourse, which can indicate a specific construal of the (inter)locutors' personal and social identity. A subsequent purpose of the analysis is to tackle the historical and cultural dynamicity and specificity of the emotion concepts and of the emotional self, reflected by language use in discourse. The present investigation focuses on one basic emotion, filial-parental love, and takes into account a particular type of text: private correspondence, genuinely subjective and relevant for the father-son relationship. Based on the assumption that emotions and the construal of the self are culturally and historically variable, the corpus under scrutiny consists of a set of private letters from the mid-nineteenth century, sent by a retired Romanian military man to his adolescent son.

Given the multi-layered aspects of the topic, the analysis is set within a theoretical and methodological framework that combines stancetaking theory (Englebretson ed. 2007; Jaffe ed. 2009) and rhetorical-argumentative approach on emotions (Niemeier and Dirven eds. 1997; Charaudeau 2000; Plantin, Doury, and Traverso eds. 2000; Amossy 2006; Plantin 2011), while also using certain key-concepts from the sociology and the cultural anthropology of emotions (Kemper 1978; Kitayama and Markus eds. 1997).

The inquiry is based on a set of complex, fuzzy notions, interconnected and partially overlapping: *subjectivity*, *emotion*, *stancetaking*, or *evaluation*, which are situated at the crossroads between various disciplines: linguistics (semantics, pragmatics, or discourse analysis), sociology, psychology, or cultural anthropology, and are highly debated in the specific literature. Taking into account the polymorphic, kaleidoscopic nature of these concepts and their variable definitions, a prior clarification of their meaning and use in the present analysis is necessary.

2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

2.1. Subjectivity, Conceptual Self, and Culture

Subjectivity is a prominent, core notion in all the above-mentioned fields of research, and as such it is widely discussed. In a psychological framework, Holland and Leander (2004, 127) define subjectivity as „actors' thoughts, sentiments, and embodied sensibilities, and, especially, their sense of self and self-world relations". Nevertheless, the construal and the expression of the self are further shaped by the social and cultural context. Hence, a more comprehensive manner of viewing the concept is required, as suggested by Ortner (2005) or Luhrmann (2006), among others:

> by subjectivity I will mean the ensemble of modes of perception, affect, thought, desire, fear, and so forth that animate acting subjects. But I will always mean as well the cultural and social formations that shape, organize, and provoke those modes of affect, thought and so on (Ortner 2005, 31).

Individuals/subjects experience personal, inner feelings but, as in-group members of a community, they also transfer a social and cultural load to their personal sensibility in the process. In other words, any subjective experience is, at the same time, more or less culturally and socially saturated and codified. Moreover, the manifestation of individuals' subjectivity is diachronically dynamic, as cultures and societies change across time ("the subject is at once the product and agent of history", Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 2009, 14).

The conceptual self is the result of an ongoing, dynamic process of identifying with a category/group/community and of adjusting to its set of cultural and societal behavioural rules ("selving is not just a cognitive activity, but a dynamic collective behavioural process", Markus, Mullally, and Kitayama 1997, 48). From this perspective, each individual self is, at the same time, a sociocultural self; personal identity is genuinely embedded in collective, culturally shared experiences and values. Markus, Mullally,

and Kitayama (1997, 16) propose the concept of *selfway(s)*, defined as "culturally constructed patterns, including ways of thinking, feeling, wanting, and doing, [which] arise from living one's life in particular sociocultural contexts", and containing "key cultural ideas and values, including understandings of what a person is, as well as sense of how to be a 'good', 'appropriate', or 'moral' person". Any culture and society develop specific systems of beliefs about modes of being, about the rightness of specific feelings, (inter)actions, social roles, and hierarchies. It represents a defining cultural load, which is passed by from generation to generation and functions as a guideline for individuals as in-group members (see also Triandis 1997, 285). The self and self-conception are guided and altered by these cultural patterns of collective knowledge and expected social behaviour. Therefore, individual subjectivity (rather tautologically named) is not strictly self-referential, encapsulating as it does elements of collective and cultural subjectivity.

2.2. Subjectivity, Emotions, and Culture

The notion of subjectivity is intricately linked with emotion concepts. In the extended literature on the topic (for a synthetic overview, see Lutz and White 1986; Stoica 2015: 10–22), emotions are conceived and defined as both psychological and sociocultural phenomena, overt expression of individuals' subjectivity. They incorporate a quasi-universal dimension, given their fundamental cognitive nature – emotions involve subjective appraisal of a stimulus event, triggering physiological arousal and active-motivational behaviour – but, at the same time, they are culturally and historically dynamic, as they can vary between cultures/societies and with time. Emotions reflect the interplay between the strictly individual, subjective experience, and collective, cultural knowledge and practice. Emotions are governed and regulated by the existing set of societal and behavioural norms that define the cultural-anthropological pattern of a community at a certain moment in time. Within the boundaries of a given culture/society, they become the object of a particular *selfway* (see above, **2.1.**) – a model of expected, positively validated ways of feeling, displaying, and communicating personal sensibilities. Complying with this system of "feeling" rules, "universal" emotions may undergo various forms of instantiation – in their conceptualisation and expression –, indexing specific cultural-affective patterns.

2.3. Subjectivity in Language/Discourse.
Stance and Stancetaking

Subjectivity – as a psychological, anthropological, and sociological phenomenon – is transparent and routinely displayed in language/language use. Lyons (1994, 13) discusses the concept of "locutionary subjectivity", defined as "the self-expression in the use of language" (for various understandings of the concept of subjectivity in language, see also Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000; Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie eds. 2006). From this perspective, subjectivity implies the speaker's self-awareness and self-orientation, transposed in discourse through various linguistic means of expression.

When this linguistic/discursive self-expression is centred on a specific object, "entities and propositions that he or she is talking about" (Thompson and Hunston 2000, 5), we are dealing with a process of *evaluation*, or "subjectivity with focus", as Englebretson terms it (2007a, 16). At the discursive level, the evaluation is indexed by a complex set of linguistic markers and mechanisms (see infra), reflecting the speaker's attitude/stance/viewpoint/feelings about the content under discussion (Thompson and Hunston 2000, 5). The notions of *stance* and *stancetaking* are therefore relevant.

Stance is a heterogeneous concept, defined by Biber et al. (1999, 966), as "personal feelings, attitudes, value judgements, and assessments", which are linguistically expressed through specific lexicon and grammar. *Stancetaking* is also a multifaceted notion that broadly indicates the act of projection of self in the discourse; it refers to the speaker's positionality with respect to a specific (propositional) content (of his/her own utterance or others'), in a specific discursive, social, and cultural context (for an overview of the state of art of stance/stancetaking research, see Englebretson 2007a; Du Bois 2007; Vasilescu 2010, 2018).

Taking a stance is a dynamic discursive process that encapsulates, in its deeper structure, both subjectivity (self/subject-awareness, self/subject-focus, self-expression) and evaluation (object-awareness, object-focus). In this approach, evaluation and stance are not overlapping concepts; evaluation is a dimension of stance and is put forward by the act of taking a stance.

In a particular theoretical framework, Du Bois (2007, "the stance triangle"), stancetaking is depicted as a complex discursive, interactive act, in which actors' subjectivities intersect. Du Bois's model of stancetaking highlights the interplay of the three socio-cognitive dimensions that occur in any interaction: objective (specific to evaluation stage/action), subjective

(specific to speaker's positioning stage/action), and intersubjective (specific to alignment stage/action). They frame, and focus on, a certain topic of salient value in a particular social and cultural backdrop.

All these dimensions/actions are made transparent in discourse through various linguistic means of expression, discursive mechanisms and markers: lexemes (evaluative nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, particular pronouns, and quantifiers), syntactic structures (subject-clauses, predicative-clauses, tag-questions, topicalisation, etc.), discursive patterns (codeswitching, hedging, quoting, etc.), or/and phonetic features (intonation, speech speed, sound repetition, etc.) (see Vasilescu 2010, 370–371).

Analysing stancetaking implies delineating these linguistic markers and identifying their discursive functioning. A mapping between form and discursive meaning that takes into account, in a cohesive frame of analysis, the inventory of discursive markers of stance (lexical and grammatical items), as well as their strategic display within the discourse, is required. Taking a stance also involves the use of various devices/strategies of projection of self and of someone's viewpoint in the discourse (see also Vasilescu 2010, 369–370). There is a rhetoric of stance, aimed at highlighting the speaker's perspective on the content in discussion (Hunston 2007, 39–44). The act of taking a stance usually implies, in other words, a discourse of a salient rhetoric-argumentative/persuasive nature.

2.4. Stancetaking and Emotions in Discourse.
Affective Stancetaking

A particular type of stancetaking is the one involving appeals to emotion: the speaker's and the addressee's affectivity or of both of them are displayed and deployed in the discourse/interaction. In this case, the speaker positions him/herself along an affective scale with respect to the object of evaluation, the addressee's viewpoint, or even with respect to him/herself or his/her viewpoint (the metastance, Driscoll 1983, apud Vasilescu 2010, 371).

This type of affective stance, i.e. indexing the speaker's feelings about a (propositional) content, is usually discussed as complementary to epistemic stance (indexing the speaker's commitment to a truth-value (propositional) content). Biber and Finegan (1989) and Biber et al. (1999) distinguish the affects, "personal feeling", from two other categories of stance: evaluations (value judgments, assessments, and attitudes) and epistemicity. Conrad and Biber (2000) place emotions under the attitudinal stancetaking; similarly, Berman (2005, 107) considers affectivity a type of attitude, whereas Englebretson (2007b) situates affects under the

epistemicity dimension. Regardless of this terminological and categorial divergence, the place of emotions within the act of stancetaking is central.

Depending on their topic and goal, there are instances of discourse that are highly marked affectively, according to the speaker's emotional positionality (with respect to the propositional content and the interlocutor), which can be self-aware, acknowledged as such, or even genuine. This emotional load is transposed into a pathemised configuration of the discourse, with a prominent persuasive aim: to (re)orient interlocutor's position/attitude (and future action) and obtain addressee's adherence to one's own point of view.

In rhetoric-argumentative terms, the use of emotions within discourse may enhance a particular persuasive-argumentative force, instantiating a "subjective rationality" (Charaudeau 2000, 130)[1], especially if they are part of the matter under discussion, and as such are expected by the discursive actors. The display of the speaker's emotions, on one hand, and the appeal – overt or implicit – to the addressee's affectivity, on the other hand, are common strategies of persuasion that may inform the structure of a discourse. If the topic of the discussion is the emotion itself or is emotionally loaded, the affective dimension of the discourse is additionally reinforced.

Caffi and Janney (1994, 327) discuss the concept of *emotive capacity*, referring to the interlocutors' ability to manage, regulate, and negotiate emotions throughout an interaction; it is aimed at ensuring communicative synchronisation between participants. This emotive capacity, embedded in individuals' genuine psychological structure as social actors, implies strategies of coping with the interlocutor's subjectivity and of adjusting one's own subjectivity. Emotive capacity draws on an earlier conceptual-terminological distinction between *emotional communication* and *emotive communication* (Arndt and Janney 1991, 527–532), indexing the possible twofold aspect of emotional display in a discourse/interaction. The former refers to the speaker's spontaneous, genuine, unintentional, uncontrolled emotion; the latter indicates the premeditated, contrived, intentional, controlled emotion, activated within discourse by the speaker, and strategically focused on the interlocutor in order to influence him/her. In common discursive practices, the two forms of representing emotions may intertwine/overlap, amplifying the persuasive force of the discourse.

Therefore, the act of affective stancetaking may be, at the same time, *emotional* and *emotive*. In the processes of evaluating the object, of positioning oneself to it, and of alignment/disalignment with the

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[1] For the place of emotions in the modern theories of argumentation, see Plantin 1998, 2011; Charaudeau 2000, 2008; Amossy 2006; cf. also Caffi and Janney 1994, 328–329; Walton 1992.

interlocutor, both genuine and strategic emotions may be displayed, enhanced by default by a persuasive goal. In rhetorical-argumentative terms, the outcome of an affective stancetaking is a highly pathemised discourse. Charaudeau (2000, 140) defines the concept of *pathemisation* as the discursive effect triggered by the selection of certain topoi with an emotional potential (placed against the cultural and psychological background, which is specific to a certain community at a certain moment in time) and highlighted by a careful choice of the rhetorical devices. The *pathemes*, (linguistic) elements of latent emotional force, that elicit emotional inference[2], may be discursively instantiated in a double and complementary form: (a) *explicit, lexicalised emotion*[3], directly indicated by the emotion lexemes; (b) *implicit, non-lexicalised emotion, contextually reconstructed*. In the latter case, the emotional information can be inferred and recovered by identifying and mapping two types of pathemic markers: (a) *lexical items* (euphoric/dysphoric affectively loaded lexemes, evaluative terms, etc.) and (b) *rhetorical and stylistic items* (which focus and emphasise the emotional content: repetitions, syntactic parallelisms, topicalisations, tropes: epithets, comparisons, metaphors, etc.) (see also Stoica 2012, 83–87; Stoica 2020, 207–208).

The coherent and cohesive intertwining of all these markers and mechanisms of pathemisation can delineate a prominent emotional texture of the discourse, indexing the upper-ordinate act of affective stancetaking.

2.5. Sociocultural Stancetaking

Stancetaking may imply a particularly salient social and cultural dimension (Jaffe 2009). The speaker's positioning towards a certain topic of discourse and his/her interlocutor may index not only an individual, personal subjectivity, but also the claim of a culturally dependent social identity.

As others have pointed out (Brewer and Gardner 1996, 84; Spencer-Oatey 2007, 6), self-representation is a multi-layered and dynamic process, as it can instantiate, at three interrelated levels, three complementary facets of the self: individual level – "the personal self", interpersonal level –

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[2] See also the linguistic triggers and markers of emotional inferencing, discussed by Caffi and Janney 1994, 354–358; Ungerer 1997; Plantin 1998, 2011; Charaudeau 2000, 138–140.
[3] Cf. the concepts of *denoted emotion/connoted emotion – émotion connotée/ émotion dénotée* (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2000, 61), *described emotion/invoked emotion* (Ungerer 1997, 309), or *direct description of emotion/indirect designation of emotion – déscription directe de l'émotion/désignation indirecte de l'émotion*, (Plantin 1998; 2011, 142–159).

"relational self", and in-group level – "the collective self". Within the individual's self-definition, they coexist and are more or less prominently activated, according to specific contextual requirements. However, the interpersonal/relational and the collective selves, as outlined above, share a common feature: the social dimension, the hetero-orientation, as they both imply the reference to (role) relationships with (a) significant other(s) or the group. Therefore, the individual, personal self is, at the same time, a social self, grounded in and shaped by the collective norms of the community (see above, **2.2.**). This social identity may conventionally frame a certain social category, a certain interpersonal hierarchy, or a certain power/status relationship with others.

Consequently, taking a stance may be also the assertion of the subject's social role and identity, validated within the societal and cultural setting (s)he belongs to. The speaker may evaluate the object of the discourse by virtue of these social identity and interpersonal role(s), may position him/herself according to his/her public face (thus claiming certain attributes perceived as being ascribed as such by others), and may align with an upper-ordinate stance that acknowledges a certain social hierarchy, categorisation, and conduct. A socially saturated stancetaking also encompasses a salient moral dimension, as it invokes compliance with a set of behavioural norms active within a society/culture (conventions and rules for a proper mode of being and acting; see the above-mentioned concept of *selfway*, under **2.1.–2.2.**).

Affective stancetaking is particularly embedded in a social-moral dimension, as it may index statuses, social boundaries, and hierarchies (Jaffe 2009, 7–8), which are imposed by the feeling rules of a society.

3. Affective Stancetaking in Private Correspondence

3.1. Preliminaries

In what follows, taking into account the above-mentioned theoretical framework, I propose an analysis of affective stancetaking in a particular type of text, private correspondence, focusing on a particular emotion: *filial-parental love.*

Private letters (between lovers, parents and children, friends, etc.) are the quintessential discursive space of subjectivity and confession, where genuine emotional content highlights various types of self-projection.

The present analysis addresses one particular type of private letter, between parents and children, illustrating the conceptualisation of filial-parental love. It may also highlight a cultural and moral model of construing the parent-child relationship, which is presumed to be culturally-bound and

historically dynamic. For a more refined insight into this possible diachronic variation, the present analysis focuses on a set of Romanian private letters from mid-nineteenth century, sent by a father to his teen-aged son (see below, **3.3.**).

3.2. Private Letters as Conversation at Distance

Correspondence frames a particular type of discourse, whose primary function is to ensure the communication and transmission of (official or personal) information between interlocutors at distance. Due to their commonplace, practical, "functional" dimension, letters usually follow a pre-established stereotypical textual configuration, as dictated by use and tradition. Nonetheless, formal compliance with a required and expected textual structure and conventional items (such as address forms and closing formulae) does not preclude either the insertion of subjective content or rhetoric-stylistic innovation. On the contrary, private letters in particular highlight a discursive setting that is highly marked by personal expression of the self and of the correspondents' inner feelings. Letters take the form of a special "conversation" at distance (in which the interlocutor's response is chronologically delayed and anticipated), deploying all the specific subjective features of the routine personal interactions: familiarity, expressive intensification, and affectivity. By the very act of writing letters, the correspondents genuinely try to recreate a pseudo- face-to-face interaction, and, in this way, to nullify the space and time that separates them. The self-projection and the exposure of emotions are part of this attempt to negate the interlocutor's concrete, physical absence. This implicit focus on the addressee also triggers a salient feature of epistolary discourse: its highly rhetoric-persuasive dimension.

Private letters usually have a persuasive design, centred on both the addresser and the addressee. Narrating personal experience, expressing emotions, commenting and sharing them with the interlocutor represent acts of self-presentation/display, aimed at having an effect upon the addressee: to eventually obtain the affective synchronisation of the correspondents, and/or to trigger specific concrete actions that confirm the addresser's viewpoint. The display of the addresser's emotional self may overlap with the emotive configuration of the epistolary discourse, strategically manoeuvring rhetorical devices of affective appeal. Forms of emotional communication (spontaneous, unintentional) may intertwine, in this way, with mechanisms of emotive communication (strategic, intentional), the addresser's discursive ethos enhancing a pathemic force, directly oriented towards his/her interlocutor.

Starting with the Early-Modern period, in the Western European space particularly, private correspondence became a regular cultural and discursive practice that documents the social roles and interpersonal relationships of the time, shaped as such by societal and cultural norms (Fitzmaurice 2002; Del Lungo Camiciotti 2014). Letter writing comes to be perceived as expected social behaviour, signalling one's civility and conformity to a proper mode of being within society and family (Del Lungo Camiciotti 2014; Perrot 2015, 107–109). An illustrative example is the case of parents-children correspondence, which (besides the functional role of transmitting new information) tends to be regarded in moral-behavioural terms as an act of familial duty (Fitzmaurice 2002, 5). Parents write letters to their children in order to offer them guidance and life-experience expertise, whereas children are expected to write to their parents as a sign of filial respect and obedience, a willing acknowledgement of parental authority.

Nevertheless, this conventionalised motivation of the letter exchange does not eliminate the genuine affective relationships that bind the correspondents. It merely embeds a sociocultural dimension within it, which is salient for the period under consideration. In fact, the typology of the most familiar letters: love letters, friendship letters, or/and family letters, depicts the fundamental affective structure that governs individuals as social actors and in-group members of a community. The constant core emotion that activates the very act of writing letters and that may be, as well, the topic of the epistolary exchange, is love, in all its multifaceted forms of representation.

3.3. Filial-Parental Love and the Cultural-Historical Context

Filial-parental love is one of the multiple facets of love, which is perhaps the most complex and heterogeneous emotion concept, and as such a subject of wide discussion in psychological and cultural-anthropological literature. Various definitions, descriptions, and taxonomies of love have been proposed (see Fromm 2016 [1956]; Lewis 1960; Hazo 1967; Kemper 1978; Kelley 1983; Averill 1985; Hendrick and Hendrick 1986; Sternberg 1986; Murstein 1988; Hartfield 1988; Lee 1988; Stoica 2012, 342–345; Stoica 2018, etc.).

Parental love is discussed either singly, or differentiating between maternal and paternal love. For example – in a rather gender-biased theory of parental love –, Fromm (2016 [1956], 59–61) advances the idea that maternal love is unconditional in nature, whereas paternal love is more practical-pragmatic in nature, being conditioned by the child's merits and

compliance with the father's expectations. From this perspective, paternal love would imply a form of control of the child's actions, who must meet the father's standards in order to deserve and benefit from his love. Father-child love is understood as a mutual continuous work in progress, a laboured process, which is nevertheless perceived in positive terms, as it gives the child the opportunity of self-improvement by following paternal guidelines. In order to be successful, paternal authority requires tolerance and patience, forgoing force, or power/status abuse. While motherly love is enacted by default and is static and constant, fatherly love is dynamic, according to both actors' (father and child) involvement in the process of building their emotional relationship.

In a sociological frame, Kemper (1978, 291–292) also notes the dynamic nature of parental love. From early childhood, passing through adolescence and up to maturity, the father-child relationship may undertake forms of representation which are specific to other types of love: in Kemper's terms, *charismatic* or *discipleship love*, and *brotherly love*, respectively. In his theoretical framework, Kemper conceives all emotion concepts, including parent-child love, in terms of the power and status relational dimensions ("a love relationship is one in which at least one actor gives (or is prepared to give) extremely high status to the other actor", Kemper 1978, 285). The author notes that the father-son relationship may appear in some stages, rather frequently, as a charismatic love, a hierarchical relationship, in which one social actor (the father) is high in power and status. These attributes of authority are acknowledged as such by the other actor (the child), who assumes the role of an apprentice/novice. The parent has the social role of teacher/leading partner, offering guidance expertise to the child, to the latter's benefit (Kemper 1978, 288).

These modern psychological and sociological theories of paternal love may be validated, infirmed, or altered when we analyse its instantiation in a specific historical and cultural context, with its particular influence over emotional conceptualisation.

In the mid-nineteenth century, filial-parental love is shaped, both in conceptualisation and expression, by the broader cultural affective and social pattern current in European society at that time. In this context, the father-son relationship and father-son love are expected to comply with the set of moral values, beliefs, and meanings that are validated within the community and impose particular modes of being, feeling, and behaving – a specific *selfway* (see above, **2.1.**–**2.2.**).

Social, moral, and political nineteenth century Europe values the family as the core social structure, which, multiplied, configures larger-scale community and national social structures. The family is perceived as the

depositary of high moral values, fundamental for guaranteeing the "healthy" functioning of the entire society. The family is "a moral being" ("être moral", Perrot 2015, 10–11) and it is centred on the prominent figure of the father, who traditionally embodies the male authority that dominates the entire century. The father is the head of the family, and is owed respect, obedience, and submissiveness but, at the same time, is required to offer protection and guidance to the family's members (parents, wife, children, or siblings). This paternal familial cultural model is a small-scale pattern of an extended patriarchal society.

Moreover, family relationships tend to be idealised as guarantees of security, harmony, and happiness. In this configuration, love is the central feeling and plays a cohesive role, in three complementary facets: paternal, maternal, and marital love. In the safe privacy of the family space, the expression of emotions, of inner sensibilities, is encouraged, as signalling family membership and belonging. It also leads to strengthening the closeness between the successive generations (Walch 2016, 207–211, see also Ariès 1973). An "obsessive love" ("amour obsédant", Ariès 1973, 314) for (male) children is frequently manifest, especially for the heir, who is invested with a moral responsibility for the entire family, and the obligation to ensure the next generations' safety and well-being (Walch 2016, 210).

The Romanian cultural-affective pattern corresponds to this general nineteenth century European model, while emphasising certain salient dimensions. Traditional, prominently collectivistic, and favouring hierarchical interpersonal relationships, mid-nineteenth century society is hetero-oriented, resting upon a traditional moral code of personal representation of the self and of social behaviour. The construal of the self is an interdependent one, the individual identity being shaped and defined by constant reference to others' perception, evaluation, and validation. One's actions and feelings are filtered by the reference to an ideal social-moral model of being. Maintaining a proper public image, respecting one's role, status, and position within the society are core cultural ideals, required and whished-for dimensions of the existing selfway. They are perceived as ensuring the individual's in-group integration and the collective social order. A moral dimension of one's self is also salient (see Stoica 2016a, 2021; see also Pârvulescu 2017; Olariu 2019, 184–185).

3.4. Corpus

The corpus of the present analysis consists of a set of letters sent by Ioan Odobescu, a retired Romanian military man, between 1850 and 1854, to his adolescent son, Alexandru Odobescu, aged 16 in 1850, during the period

when the latter was completing his studies in Paris. The letters were sent constantly, in order to transmit information about the correspondents' everyday life (the basic role of correspondence exchange of the time), but they also encompass highly subjective content, as the father discloses his feelings towards his son, evaluates his actions, and, constantly, offers him pieces of moral advice as guidelines for an ideal personhood and education.

Naturally, in this type of letter exchange, emotions occupy a central place in a twofold aspect, as it is both expressed or inferred and discussed. The addresser reveals his and his addressee's affects, but also talks about them. Constantly, the topic of the discourse is the emotion itself – most of the time the filial-parental love, intrinsically presumed to describe the ideal father-son relationship. An ideal model of the filial-parental relationship and filial-parental love – as a core and direct expression of this relationship – is constantly evaluated, debated, or negotiated from the addresser's (the parent) viewpoint. A specific affective stancetaking is enacted: the stancetaker (the parent) positions himself on an affective scale with respect to the object of stance, the ideal profile of the filial-parental relationship and love, and aligns or disaligns with his interlocutor's stance (the son) (which remains implicit).

At the same time, the addresser constantly takes a sociocultural stance, indexing a bivalent, complementary construal of the self, according to the cultural model of the time. The father regularly positions himself not only in relation to his individual, personal identity (the father role within his own family) – thus activating his relational self, genuinely derived from the dyadic father-son relationship – but also considers his public, social-collective identity (in-group, father role, acknowledged as such by the community). The latter requires the confirmation of an ideal model of father-son relationship, of certain rights and obligations assigned to this role by the collective cultural model of the time (the father's role of moral guide, leader, and protector of his family). An ethos of parental authority is hence displayed, indicating the alignment with a collective stance on filial-parental relationship.

3.5. Aims and Methodology

The specific aim of the analysis is to delineate the discursive markers and mechanisms of the speaker's affective self-positioning towards the object of the evaluation (the ideal social-moral and affective father-son relationship, and the filial-parental love) and the interlocutor. At the same time, we shall tackle the way the speaker assumes the affective stance, in order to assert and defend his (inter)personal and sociocultural identity (of

fatherhood, head of the family), according to the expected cultural model of the time.

The upper-ordinate goal of the investigation is to delineate, in this way, a conceptual script of the father-son relationship and of the implicit associated emotion (love), configured in the Romanian cultural-affective setting of the mid-nineteenth century and indicated as such by the authentic data under consideration. Also, a subsidiary aim of the analysis is to examine the historicity and the cultural specificity of the affective pattern and of the emotion under consideration.

Methodologically, the following aspects will be taken into account: (a) identifying the nature of the speaker's self-projection in the discourse (personal/sociocultural); (b) identifying the nature of the emotional load that governs the discourse: positive/negative, explicit/implicit emotions; (c) mapping the conceptual configuration of the emotions that are elicited within father-son discourse, framing a possible cognitive-affective script: intertwined/correlated/subordinated emotions; (d) identifying the lexical-semantic and morphosyntactic markers of pathemisation (affective words, evaluative terms, quantifiers with an intensifying functioning, etc.; use of personal pronouns and verbal forms, passive/active structures, topicalisations, etc.), alongside rhetorical-stylistic mechanisms of emphasis (repetitions, symmetrical structures, climax, etc.) (see Vasilescu 2018, 308–310), which bring forward and focus on the affective stance; (e) outlining a conceptual script of the filial-parental love/relationship, as highlighted by the act of stancetaking in the discourse.

3.6. Data Analysis

The corpus data bring forward many contexts that illustrate the addresser's bivalent – individual, personal-relational, and sociocultural – affective stance. The addresser constantly projects in the discourse both his personal and social identity of father/head of the family, defending and claiming the acknowledgement of a pre-established authority, as a sign of filial love and duty.

Example (1) highlights this particular facet of affective stancetaking:

(1) Iubite Alexandre,
Poţi să-ţi închipuieşti *bucuria* ce-am avut priimind scrisori aşa des de la tine, prin care totdeodată am aflat că sînteţi sănătoşi şi petreceţi bine. *Nădăjduiesc* că nu vei înceta a urma şi pe viitorime această corespondenţie, *care aduce mare mulţumire părintelui tău, ce te iubeşte cu deosebire.* [...] Eu şi fraţii tăi, Costinca şi Bebi, sîntem sănătoşi. Costinca zice: „Măcar că Alexandru mă bătea câteodată, dar tot îl iubesc

şi îl doresc prea mult şi o să mă selesc să învăţ bine, ca să mă trimiţi şi pe mine la dânsul." [...] Adio, iubite Alex, îţi doresc sănătate şi *te rog ca un părinte să te sileşti la învăţăturile tale, ca să nu pierzi vremea cea scumpă.* [...]

<div align="right">Al tău iubit papa, Odobescu (iunie 1850, p. 69)</div>

Beloved Alexandru,
You can imagine the *joy* I felt at receiving letters from you so often, and learning that you are in good health and are having a good time. *I hope* you'll not stop this correspondence in the future, as *it brings great joy to your father who loves you very much.* […] I and your siblings, Costinca and Bebi, are in good health. Costinca says: "Even if Alexandru used to beat me sometimes, I still love and miss him very much, and I'll try to study better, so you'll send me to him, too." […] Goodbye, my beloved Alex, I wish you good health and *I ask you as a parent to work hard at your studies, so as not to waste time that is so precious.* […]

<div align="right">Your beloved papa, Odobescu (June 1850, p. 69).</div>

Within the discursive frame of the letter, the display of the addresser's both personal and social identity is inductively configured (from a particular-individual instantiation to a generic-social one). In the first part of the letter, the personal-relational affective stancetaking is prominent – pinpointing the addresser's particular father role within his own family. This is reflected by the use of first-person verbal forms or of explicit affective lexemes: *bucurie* ("joy"), *mulţumire* ("happiness"), *te iubeşte* ("[who] loves you"), that directly express the feelings towards the addressee (the son): "…această corespondenţie, care aduce *mare mulţumire părintelui tău*, ce *te iubeşte cu deosebire*" ("…this correspondence, as it brings *great joy to your father who loves you very much*"). The adjectival and adverbial collocations are noteworthy as well, as they indicate a euphoric-intensive evaluation of the emotional content under discussion (filial-parental love), object of the addresser's affective self-positioning: "*mare* mulţumire" ("*great* joy"), "te iubeşte *cu deosebire*" ("[who] loves you *very much*").

   The transition from asserting his personal identity of father to claiming his sociocultural identity is indicated by the shift in the referential perspective: the use of the third-person forms, in a pseudo-objective, generic, projection of the self: "*părintele tău* ce *te iubeşte* cu deosebire" ("*your **father*** who ***loves*** you very much"). The addresser clearly takes and asserts the stance of an upper-ordinate social status – the generic role of parent/father – in the last part of the letter, thus gaining persuasive-argumentative force: "Te rog *ca un părinte* să te sileşti la învăţăturile tale, ca să nu pierzi vremea cea scumpă" ("I ask you *as a parent* to work hard at your studies, so as not to waste time that is so precious"). The various use

of the lexical marker *părinte* "parent": *părintele tău* "your parent/father" –
in the first part of the text – and *ca un părinte* "as a parent" – in the second
one, indexes the bivalent identity assumed by the speaker along his
discourse.

The following, rather lengthy, fragment is another example of highly
marked affective stancetaking with respect to the ideal model of filial
behaviour and, implicitly, filial love:

(2) Iubite Alexandre!
Am priimit scrisoarea ta de la 4 avgust [...] şi *m-am mâhnit foarte* văzând
că scrisoarea mea de la 8 iulie, pe care o aşteptaţi cu *bucurie*, v-a pricinuit
*întristar*e, în vreme ce acea scrisoare coprindea numai *povăţuire
părinteşti, şi care le socotesc drept datoria mea de a le comunica fiilor
mei. Eu te încredinţez, iubite Alexandre, că nu voiesc niciodată să vă aduc
întristare, ci totdauna bucurie şi mulţumire, de aceea nu trebuie să luaţi
poveţile mele drept dojană, căci eu poţ cunoaşte mai bine cum stau
lucrurile în lume şi sunt dator să te păzesc de orice amăgiri ar putea să-
ţi aducă vătămare. Eu nu te-am învinovăţit că nu te-a priimit domnu Pare,
ci mi s-a părut ciudat că n-aţi găsit în Paris profesori şi aţi fost siliţi să
luaţi pe unul din cei ce a luat parte la nenorocirea ţării. După cum socotesc
că singur acum o pricepi […], aş fi dorit să fii depărtat de nişte asemenea
persoane ce nu sunt potriviţi cu ideile mele, după care eşti dator să urmezi
până vei ajunge în vârsta în care părinţii nu mai pot fi răspunzători, şi
atunci nu mai sunt răspunzători nici către Dumnezeu, nici către oameni.
Şi de vreme ce mama mă încredinţează că acest om este cumsecade, vei
urma învăţăturile tale la dânsul şi totdeodată îţi arăt cea mai mare
mulţumire văzând că mama este mulţumită de silinţele ce ai pus pentru
învăţătură şi pentru ascultarea şi respectul ce ai către dânsa. Ascult-o, te
rog, căci poveţile ei sunt pentru fericirea ta.* Am scris lu mama că dacă
nu vei putea găsi o casă în care să te aşezi cu preţu ce am hotărât, să mai
adaoge oricât va socoti de cuviinţă, *căci eu, deşi poate sunt econom, însă
pentru învăţăturile voastre sunt cel mai galant. Şi pentru orice altă
cheltuială poate că îmi pare rău, iar banii ce îi cheltuiesc pentru a voastră
învăţătură îi dau cu cea mai mare mulţumire a mea.* [...] Adio, iubite
Alexandre, *sileşte-te cât poţi la învăţătura ta, că vei avea mare răsplătire
şi la vreme vei sâmţi mare mulţumire, iar noi ne vom bucura ca nişte copii
când le dau cele mai frumoase jucării când vom vedea pe tine desăvârşit.*
[...] Te sărut de o mie de ori, al tău iubit tată, I. Odobescu (7/19 august
1850, p. 83–84)

Beloved Alexandru!
I received your letter on August 4 […] and *I was very upset* to find that
my letter from July 8 that you expected with *joy* caused you *sadness*, as
that letter contained only *words of fatherly advice that I feel it is my duty
to relay to my sons. I assure you, beloved Alexandru, that I never want to*

cause you sadness but always joy and happiness and that's why you don't have to take my advice as a reproof, because I can understand better how the things are in the world and I have a duty to protect you from any illusion that might harm you. I did not blame you that Mr Pare did not accept you, but I felt it strange that you could not find teachers in Paris and were forced to take one of those who caused misfortune to our country. As I think you understand yourself by now […], *I would have wished you to stay away from the kind of people who do not conform to my ideas, which you have the duty to follow until you reach the age where the parents can no longer be responsible, and then they are no longer responsible neither before God, nor before people.* And as long as your mother assures me that this man is decent, you shall continue your studies with him and *I also wish to express my greatest joy when I see that your mother is pleased with your efforts at learning and with the obedience and the respect you show her. Listen to her, please, because her advice is for your happiness.* I wrote to your mother, if you'll not be able to find accommodations at the price I had set, to add as much as necessary, because*, although I may be thrifty, yet, when it comes to your education, I am the most generous man. And any other expense I may regret, but the money I spend on your education I spend with the greatest joy.* […] Goodbye, beloved Alexandru, *work hard at your studies, because the rewards will be great, and, at the right time, you'll be very happy and we shall rejoice like the children offered the most beautiful toys when we shall see you finished.* […] I kiss you a thousand times, your beloved father, I. Odobescu (August 7/19, 1850, p. 83–84).

The text is extremely emotionally saturated, illustrating the addresser's explicit emotions, expression of the projection of his personal-relational self; see, in this regard, the affective lexemes: *m-am mâhnit* ("[I] was very upset"), *întristare* ("sadness"), *bucurie* ("joy") – *ne vom bucura* ("[we] shall rejoice"), *mulțumire* ("happiness"). The central feeling, *filial-parental love*, is associated with other correlated emotions, both euphoric and dysphoric: sadness, happiness, and joy.

Nevertheless, the text points out, first of all, the addresser's projection of his sociocultural identity: the role of *pater familias* – moral guide for the children and protector of the family[4], by virtue of his life experience, granting authority.

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[4] The father's roles of moral guide and protector of the familiy are represented, on one hand, in abstract, moral terms: see the reiteration of the word *povață* "advice" along the discourse and the explicit assertion: *şi sunt dator să te păzesc de orice amăgiri ar putea să-ţi aducă vătămare* ("I have a duty to protect you from any illusion that might harm you"); on the other hand, there is a concrete representation: the financial support offered to his son('s education): *banii ce îi cheltuiesc pentru a*

Once again, the object under evaluation, in relation to which the addresser positions himself both affectively and socio-culturally, is the ideal model of the father-son relationship. Throughout the discourse one can delineate a script of this particular relationship, deeply embedded in a social, behavioural, and moral dimension/value: what and how it is proper (for a father and a son) to do, to act, to behave, to feel, etc., according to a pre-established sociocultural model (see also the examples below).

The addresser takes a moral-affective and sociocultural stance, in explicit terms, firmly assuming and asserting his positioning. The father-son relationship – both personal and generic-ideal – is evaluated in a categorical manner, being assigned an epistemic and deontic value (of an absolute and only one acceptable truth; obligation and necessity). The addresser resolutely espouses his viewpoint, which is clearly stated as true/valid and aimed-for, as indicated by various discursive markers: verbs of certainty or with a deontic-volitive meaning, active structures: *eu te încredinţez* ("I assure you"), *nu voiesc niciodată* ("[I] never want to"), *trebuie* ("must"), *aş fi dorit* ("[I] would have wished"), *îţi arăt* ("[I] show you"), etc.

It is also worth noting the marked use of the personal deictics, highlighting (polemically – in an implicit way – with respect to the addressee's virtual opponent viewpoint) the discursive roles addresser–addressee and, simultaneously, the predetermined, extra-discursive father–son social roles, respectively: *datoria* **mea** ("*my* duty"), *fiii* **mei** ("*my* sons"), *ideile* **mele** ("*my* ideas"), *poveţile* **mele** ("*my* advice"), *mulţumirea* **mea** ("*my* joy") vs *învăţăturile* **voastre**, *a* **voastră** *învăţătură* ("*your* education"). The emphatic instantiation of the subject pronoun[5] also serves as a clear discursive marker of the addresser's stancetaking: **eu** *te încredinţez* ("*I* assure you"), **eu** *pot cunoaşte mai bine* ("*I* can understand better"), **eu** *nu te-am învinovăţit* ("*I* did not blame you"), **eu**... *sunt cel mai galant* ("*I*... am the most generous"), alongside of the variation with *noi* ("we") as subject pronoun: **noi** *ne vom bucura* ("*we* shall rejoice"), indexing an extended affective stance, on behalf of both parents.

As in the previous example (1), the projection of the individual identity is doubled by the projection of the sociocultural one: the addresser categorically lays claim to his authority, which is considered an inherent attribute, given his role as father, head and protector of the family, assigned

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voastră învăţătură îi dau cu cea mai mare mulţumire a mea ("the money I spend on your education I spend with the greatest joy").

[5] Romanian is a pro-drop language and, therefore, it does not require the instantiation of the subject pronoun. If it is expressed, the subject pronoun is emphatic and contextually justified as such.

by the sociocultural pattern of the time: *eu pot cunoaşte mai bine cum stau lucrurile în lume şi sunt dator să te păzesc de orice amăgiri* ("I can understand better how the things are in the world and I have a duty to protect you from any illusion").

The transition from the assertion of the personal identity to the focus on the sociocultural one is strengthened, within the discursive configuration of the text, with a rhetoric-argumentative force, as it highlights an endoxical viewpoint, of a collective, common ground authority, with which the speaker aligns.

This alignment with an upper-ordinate, sociocultural stance is pointed out in the fragment: *aş fi dorit să fii depărtat de nişte asemenea persoane ce nu sunt potriviţi cu ideile mele, după care eşti dator să urmezi până vei ajunge în vârsta în care părinţii nu mai pot fi răspunzători, şi atunci nu mai sunt răspunzători nici către Dumnezeu, nici către oameni* ("I would have wished you to stay away from the kind of people who do not conform to my ideas, which you have the duty to follow until you reach the age where the parents can no longer be responsible, and then they are no longer responsible neither before God, nor before people").

One can observe the transition from a personal, self-oriented reference (*ideile **mele*** "*my* ideas") to a generic reference, sustaining an endoxical stance. The latter culturally frames ideal filial behaviour in moral terms: the acknowledgment of parental authority, validated as such not only by the community (*răspunzători...către oameni* "responsible…before people"), but also by the divinity (*răspunzători către Dumnezeu* "responsible before God"). The appeal to a religious dimension – a highly marked affective and moral value of the time – functions as a strong argument, aiming to obtain the interlocutor's adhesion to the speaker's assumed and asserted viewpoint. Also noteworthy is the rhetoric-stylistic emphasis and the strengthening of the addresser's stance(taking), expressively and intensively amplified accordingly: the repetition of the keyword *răspunzător* "responsible", in a symmetrical, cumulative-oppositive clause configuration, with the strong anaphor of the negation markers: *nu mai pot fi..., nu mai sunt...* ("cannot be […], are not…"); *nici..., nici....* ("neither…, nor…"), which highlights the key-lexemes: *răspunzător – Dumnezeu – oameni* ("responsible" – "God" – "people").

The example illustrates a cultural-conceptual model of the *filial-parental love*, instantiated as *charismatic/mentor-disciple love*. This implies the acknowledgement of the within-family hierarchical roles and of parental authority, given the difference in status, intellectual, and moral expertise or in life experience. Therefore, *filial-parental love* is configured in moral terms, incorporating a hyper-marked ethical and behavioural dimension,

involved in both instances (father/parent – child). The repetition of the syntagm *a fi dator* ("to have a/the duty") is relevant in this respect. Conveying a deontic meaning, of necessity/obligation, it is instantiated with a double reference: the addresser (the father) – the addressee (the son), respectively. It focuses the essential rights and obligations ascribed to each role in the father-son relationship within the ideal moral-behavioural pattern validated by the cultural norms of the time, which the addresser adopts and firmly invokes: *sunt dator să te păzesc...* ("I have the duty to protect you…") vs *eşti dator să urmezi* [ideile mele]... ("you have the duty to follow [my ideas]…").

A similar pattern of the filial-parental relationship can be seen in the following fragment:

(3) Pe Alecu Ghica-vodă îl văz destul de des. *El te laudă mult, zice că i-ai plăcut cu deosăbire, şi aceasta îmi face mare mulţumire şi plăcere*. Lu mama spune-i multe complimenturi şi sărut-o din parte-mi. *Iubeşte-o, cinsteşte-o şi arată-i toată stima şi supunerea cuvenită, şi cu aceasta vei dobândi blagoslovenia lui Dumnezeu şi dragostea părinţilor tăi, care se trudesc cu mulţumire pentru voi.* Adio, iubite Ţaţule, *îţi doresc sănătate şi înaintări la învăţăturile tale.* Al tău iubit tată. Te sărut de mii de ori [...]
Odobescu
(16/28 februarie 1851, p. 95)

I see prince Alecu Ghica fairly often. *He praises you a great deal, says he liked you very much, and this gives me great joy and pleasure.* Send my greetings to your mother and kiss her on my behalf. *Love her, honour her, and show her respect and the obedience that is due to her, and, by this, you will obtain God's blessing and your parents' love, who toil with joy for you.* Goodbye, beloved Ţaţu, *I wish you good health and success with your studies.* Your beloved father. I kiss you thousand times […].
Odobescu

(February 16/28, 1851, p. 95).

The addresser's affective stancetaking is transparent through explicit affective terms: *îmi face mare mulţumire şi plăcere* ("this gives me great joy and pleasure"). As in the previous examples, one can identify the same transition from the projection of the individual identity to the projection of the sociocultural, generic one, focusing, in this case, on the maternal figure.

The affective stancetaking assumes a highly marked rhetoric-persuasive aspect, displaying a pathemic discursive configuration, based on a simple argumentative structure of a conditional-causal type: *if/because…, then…* ([if] *love + respect + obedience*, then *divine love/blessing + parental love*): "*Iubeşte*-o, *cinsteşte*-o şi arată-i toată *stima* şi *supunerea cuvenită*, şi *cu aceasta vei dobândi blagoslovenia lui Dumnezeu* şi *dragostea părinţilor tăi*,

care se trudesc cu mulţumire pentru voi" ("*Love* her*, honour* her, and show her *respect* and the *obedience that is due* to her, and, *by this, you'll obtain God's blessing* and *your parents' love, who toil with joy for you*").

The keywords, affective and moral terms: *iubeşte…* ("love [her]"), *cinsteşte…* ("honour [her]"), *arată-i…stima, supunerea cuvenită* ("show [her] respect and the obedience that is due to her"), are intensively highlighted by their placement in an exclamative sentence (in final position, in the frame of the letter, and, thus, rhetorically marked), in imperative form, and also deployed in an amplifying enumeration. At a conceptual and lexical-semantic level, it is worth mentioning the evaluative adjective *cuvenit* ("appropriate/due"), with a specific epistemic and deontic meaning (a truth/a true fact, acknowledged as such, and implying obligation) that refers to a behavioural model, socially validated.

The persuasive-argumentative discursive configuration relies on the manoeuvering of the pathemic mechanisms to trigger adhesion to the speaker's viewpoint. The simple conditional-causal structure (*if/because...*, *then…*) implicitly places in a cause-effect relationship the aimed-for filial behaviour (object of the evaluation) and the "reward" (*răsplătire*). This is brought forward with the function of a subjective argument, as it encompasses a moral-affective aspect: getting the divine blessing/love: *vei dobândi blagoslovenia lui Dumnezeu* ("you'll obtain God's blessing")[6] and the parental love: *dragostea părinţilor tăi* ("your parents' love"). The intended pathemic effect is further amplified through a strong lexical collocation: [*părinţii*] *care se trudesc cu mulţumire pentru voi* ([parents] "who toil with joy for you"). *To toil with joy* encapsulates a lexical-semantic and conceptual contrast (an oxymoron), associating an implicitly negative term: *trudi* ("to toil") – inferring the idea of sacrifice, effort, tiredness, or hardship – with an explicit positive term: *mulţumire* ("happiness; joy"). In this way, a particular emotion is implicitly appealed to: gratitude, an active-motivational affect, presumed to trigger and support a consequent extra-discursive conduct of the addressee (the son).

In the following fragment, one can identify the same bivalent positioning of the addresser, who projects both his individual and sociocultural selves in the discourse. The recurrency of this type of affective stancetaking pinpoints a constant pattern of cultural-affective conceptualisation (see also examples (1–3), (7)):

(4) Iubite Alexandre!

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[6] It is worth noting the reiteration of the appeal to the religious aspect, highly valued in the period under discussion.

Cu mare bucurie am priimit scrisoarea ta de la 8/20 decem., şi din coprinderea ei *m-am încredinţat* de *sentimenturile tale cele bune şi de judecata ta cea dreaptă, şi de vei urma într-acest chip, Dumnezeu îţi va fi spre ajutor şi vei fi norocit, iar eu nu voi înceta a te iubi şi a te povăţui din tot sufletu meu. Acum sunt odihnit* văzând că ideile tale s-au îndreptat *spre calea cea bună, şi cu mijloacele ce ai, şi cu zelu tău la învăţături, nădăjduiesc că vei fi folositor patriii şi vei fi norocit, iar noi vom avea cea mai mare mulţumire.* [...] Adio, iubite Alexandru, îţi doresc înaintări bune.

<div align="right">

Al tău iubit tată,
Odobescu
(5/17 ianuarie 1851, p. 92)

</div>

Beloved Alexandru!
I received your letter of December 8/20 *with great joy* and its contents *convinced me of your good feelings and of your sound judgement, and, if you'll continue this way, God will help you and you'll be happy, and I shall not stop loving you and advising you from the bottom of my heart. Now I am at peace* seeing as your ideas are *on the right path and, with what you have and your zeal in learning, I hope you'll be of use to your country and you'll be happy, and we shall have the greatest joy.* […] Goodbye, beloved Alexandru, I wish you the best.

<div align="right">

Your beloved father,
Odobescu
(January 5/17, 1851, p. 92).

</div>

The example points out, once again, the addresser's affective stancetaking: the personal identity and emotions are transparently indicated, through explicit affective words, reinforced with intensifying collocations: *mare bucurie* ("great joy"), *cea mai mare mulţumire* ("the greatest joy"), *din tot sufletul meu* ("from the bottom of my heart"). Paternal love is configured in its basic conceptual dimensions: affective and moral: "nu voi înceta *a te iubi şi a te povăţui* din tot sufletul meu" ("I shall not stop *loving* and *advising* you from the bottom of my heart"). As underlined before (see also examples (1–3)), within the cultural-conceptual model of the time, the moral dimension of the parental love is implicit and seems to be salient, illustrating the father's role of moral guide.

The argumentative structure follows the same simple conditional-causal pattern (see the example above): *if/because...*, *then...*, and it correlates the ideal filial conduct and the "reward" in a cause-effect relationship. The proper filial behaviour – expected and aimed-for, according to the active set of moral and social norms of the time/cultural setting – is illustrated through recurrent lexical collocations, containing evaluative terms: *bun* ("good"), *dreaptă* ("right"): *sentimenturile tale bune* ("your good feelings"), *judecata ta cea*

dreaptă ("your sound judgement"), *ideile tale s-au îndreptat spre calea cea bună* ("your ideas are on the right path"), *zelul tău la învăţături* ("your zeal in learning"). The "reward" is defined in moral-affective terms, in a twofold aspect: divine blessing/help, and, implicitly, divine love (*Dumnezeu îţi va fi spre ajutor* "God will help you"), on one hand, – and parental love (*nu voi înceta a te iubi* "I shall not stop loving you"), on the other hand.

This kind of persuasive-argumentative structure – instantiated just as in the previous example (3) – indicates a recurrent discursive pattern that counts on the manoeuvring of emotions and of certain highly valued cultural dimensions: religion/faith (religious love) and family love/happiness.

Nevertheless, as compared to the previous examples, what adds, in this case, to the recurrent script of the father-son relationship/the ideal filial conduct is the association of the *filial-parental love* and *individual happiness* with a particular moral emotion, very salient in the Romanian mid-nineteenth century (Stoica 2016b): *love of country/patriotism*, implicitly appealed to in the discourse: "nădăjduiesc că *vei fi folositor patriii* şi *vei fi norocit*, iar noi vom avea *cea mai mare mulţumire*" ("I hope *you'll be of use to your country* and *you'll be happy*, and we shall have *the greatest joy*"). This sentence points out a prominent feature of the cultural-affective pattern of the time: the individual affective well-being (*happiness* and *love*) may be achieved through the (mandatory) correlation with the collective well-being (*folosul patriei*) (see also Stoica 2015, 123–138).

One can also notice the implicit causal succession of the terms indicating the key-concepts and delineating this conceptual-affective script [*adequate moral behaviour*: education → collective well-being/patriotism + individual happiness → parental/family happiness – maximal degree of intensity]: *zelul la învăţături* ("the zeal in learning") → *vei fi folositor patriii* ("you'll be of use to your country") + *vei fi norocit* ("you'll be happy") → *noi* ("we") – *cea mai mare mulţumire* ("the greatest joy").

The correlation between the filial-parental love (concretely manifested through a proper ideal filial behaviour), individual happiness and well-being, on one hand, and patriotism, collective happiness and well-being, on other hand, is recurrently instantiated in the corpus under analysis. It indexes a salient cultural-conceptual pattern, which is specific to the period under consideration. In this respect, see also the examples below:

(5) Iubite Alexandre!
[...] Îmi descrii primăvara Parisului, şi precum înţeleg, după comparaţia ce faci, în ţara noastră este mult mai frumoasă şi în adevăr poţ să zic că nu poate găsi cineva în toată lumea o ţară aşa de îmbelşugată şi bună ca a noastră. *De aceea ai răbdare şi* **sileşti-te la învăţăturile tale**, ca la

*întoarcerea ta aici să aibi înlesnirile trebuincioase şi **să poţi fi folositor ţării, şi ţie şi tutulor nouă***.

<div align="right">(23 aprilie 1851, p. 100)</div>

Beloved Alexandru!

[…] You describe springtime in Paris and, as I understand from your comparison, it is more beautiful in our country and, indeed, I can say that one cannot find another country as rich and good as ours in the entire world. *That's why [I urge you to] be patient and **work hard at your studies** so that, on your return, you should have all the necessary aptitudes and **be of use to your country, to yourself, and to all of us***.

<div align="right">(April 23, 1851, p. 100)</div>

(6) Iubite Alexandre,

Am priimit două scrisori ale tale [...], din care am înţeles scopu şi aplecarea ta asupra învăţăturilor ce voieşti să faci şi nu pot să zic altceva *decât Dumnezeu să-ţi fie în ajutor ca să izbuteşti la întreprinderile tale, dar **orice învăţături vei începe sileşti-te a le cunoaşte bine şi desăvârşit**, căci numai în acest chip vei putea dobândi o carieră prin care **să aduci folos patriii tale***. (27 octombrie 1851, p. 111)

Beloved Alexandru,

I received two of your letters […], from which I understood your goal and interest in the studies you want to follow and I cannot say anything else except *God help you succeed in your endeavour, and, **whatever you begin to study, try to master it well and completely**, because in this way only will you be able to have a career that will **be of use to your country***. (October 27, 1851, p. 111).

Another excerpt from the corpus brings forward, in an apparently didactic discursive manner, the ideal model of the filial behaviour, to which the addresser aligns himself affectively, in the same bivalent instantiation of the self, both personally and socio-culturally:

(7) […] ***Mă bucur din tot sufletu** pentru **înaintările ce faci la învăţăturile** tale, precum îmi scrii. Urmează şi în viitor tot cu acel **zel şi silinţe, ca să poţi săvârşi învăţătura ta cu folos**, şi pe care nu le vei putea dobândi în alt chip, fără numai **ascultând cu desăvârşire poveţile părinţilor tăi**, şi care ţi le mai poftorez: să nu aibi adunare cu nimenea din persoane de care ţi-am vorbit la plecarea ta din Bucureşti; să cauţi de învăţătura ta, să nu te amestici în lucruri şi în descurse atingătoare de politică, lăsând toate acestea la o parte până vei ajunge la **vârsta cuvenită** şi cu **învăţătura săvârşită**, şi atunci **vei judeca şi vei deosăbi binile din rău**. Iar acum iubeşte şi ascultă pe părinţii tăi, care îţi doresc şi îţi voiesc desăvârşita norocire, şi Dumnezeu îţi va ajuta. Cinsteşte pe mama şi nu o supăra niciodată. Acestea sunt datoriile unui bun fiu către părinţii săi* [...].

Al tău preaiubit tată,
I. Odobescu
(6/18 martie 1851, p. 96)

> […] ***I rejoice with all my heart*** at ***the progress you're making in your studies***, as you wrote me. *Do likewise in the future with the same **zeal and hard work, so as to finish your education**, which you shall not be able to accomplish otherwise than **by completely listening to your parents' advice**, which I will reiterate*: *do not meet with anyone of those I spoke to you about at your departure from Bucharest; focus on your studies, do not get involved in things and discussions that touch politics, and leave all that aside until you reach to **the proper age** and **with your education completed**, and then **you'll be able to judge and discern right from wrong. And now love and listen to your parents who wish you the greatest happiness, and God will help you. Honour your mother and do not upset her ever. These are the duties of a good son towards his parents***.

(March 6/18, 1851, p. 96).

As in the previous examples, one can identify the dynamic construal of self, projected as such in the discourse, in a transient form, from the personal-individual identity to the sociocultural one, indicating the generic role of *parent/father*. The focus on the sociocultural identity is aimed-at with a persuasive function, by the alignment with a collective stance, which acknowledges and validates a certain cultural model of the father-son relationship. In this fragment, the linguistic marker that signals this conceptual and discursive dynamics is the transition from a self-oriented to a hetero-oriented reference, and, finally, to an absolute generic one. Initially, there is the use of the first-person verbal form: *mă bucur* ("I'm happy"); then there is a shift to a pseudo-objective self-positioning, yet directly implying the interlocutor: "(poveţile) *părinţilor tăi*" ("*your parents'* advice") (see also example (1), above). The last definition-type sentence (with the argumentative value of an absolute, undoubtable truth): *Acestea sunt datoriile unui bun fiu către părinţii săi* ("These are the duties of a good son towards his parents"), clearly asserts, in firm terms, a generic stance. This short sentence closes the discursive enumerative climax from the previous clause, in a rhetorically salient configuration, and conclusively summarises the object of stance under evaluation: the ideal filial conduct.

The example is representative of the polymorphic aspect and the dynamicity of self-construal, illustrating the three possible facets of the self: personal, interpersonal/relational, and social-collective (see the theoretical distinction above, under **2.5.**); they are gradually projected, indexing the possible shift in the self-representation across one's discourse.

The excerpt also reflects the culturally motivated conceptualisation of the ideal filial behaviour and, implicitly, of the filial-parental relationship. The basic parameters of the specific cultural-affective script that seem to be outlined are: *education* (*să poţi săvârşi învăţătura ta* "so as you finish your education", *cu învăţătura săvârşită* "with your education completed"), *love* and *respect* (of the paternal authority, the parents' moral and life experience superiority: **ascultând** *cu desăvârşire poveţile părinţilor tăi* "by completely *listening* to your parents' advice"; **iubeşte** *şi* **ascultă** *pe părinţii tăi* "*love* and *listen to* your parents"; **cinsteşte** *pe mama şi nu o supăra* "*honour* your mother and do not upset her"). The supreme affective motivation and goal are to obtain the divine blessing/love (*Dumnezeu îţi va ajuta* "God will help you"). It is the same pattern of conceptualisation and of discursive persuasive-argumentative configuration that could be delineated, recurrently, in other contexts (see the examples above). See the following example as well:

(8) Am priimit, iubite Alexandre, scrisoarea ta de la 7 mai. Am înţeles toate câte îmi scrii şi *am rămas foarte mulţumit că te-ai pătruns de dorinţa iubitul[ui] tău tată, şi care n-are altceva în vederea sa decât fericirea copiilor săi, şi pe care o pot dobândi numai prin purtări bune şi desăvârşirea la învăţăturile trebuincioase. Omul fără ştiinţe nu să bucură de viaţa sa şi toată viaţa simpte o mâhnire.*

(9/21 mai 1851, p. 102)

I received, beloved Alexandru, your letter of May 7. I understood everything you wrote to me and *I am very happy that you accepted your beloved father's wish, who is concerned with nothing but his children's happiness, which they can achieve solely through proper behaviour and the completion of the necessary studies. A man without knowledge does not enjoy his life and feels sorrow all his life.*

(May 9/21, 1851, p. 102).

The addresser takes a subjective-affective stance, projecting his personal-relational and sociocultural selves in the discourse, in an apparent act of objectivation; see the hetero-reference, the third-person forms: *dorinţa iubitului tău tată* ("your beloved father's wish"), *fericirea copiilor săi* ("his children's happiness"). The addresser aligns himself with an upper-ordinate, extra-discursive stance, of a social-moral type, validated by the cultural tradition: paraphrasing, *happiness may be achieved solely through proper social-moral conduct and education.* Relevant for this collective stance, assumed as such by the speaker, is the closing phrase, shaped as a sententia: *Omul fără ştiinţă nu se bucură de viaţa sa şi toată viaţa simte o mâhnire* ("A man without knowledge does not enjoy his life and feels sorrow all his

life"). This way, an epistemic meaning is asserted (a true, undeniable fact) and is conclusively inserted in the discourse, with an aimed-for persuasive-argumentative function; see also the pathemic load, the appeal to contrastive emotions, explicitly lexicalised: happiness (*nu se bucură* "does not enjoy/rejoice") and sadness (*mâhnire* "sorrow"), respectively.

As underlined in the analysis, all the contexts above highlight a particular affective stancetaking, which is recurrently instantiated throughout the corpus. This discursive recurrency brings forward a constant pattern of conceptualising the filial-parental relationship and love that seems to be culturally dependent. The filial-parental relationship is represented in terms of moral duty, requiring a certain conduct, which is expected as such and validated by the community, as a concrete manifestation of the mutual love. It is a love that should be proved by actions, according to the moral-affective code of the time, with a superordinate aim: to achieve both personal and collective well-being. Therefore, filial-parental love is particularly conceptualised as a *moral emotion*. The contexts seem to highlight a rather pragmatic type of love, in a *do ut des* manner of instantiation, in terms of duty, (moral) obligation, and gratitude.

This kind of emotional conceptualisation should not be critically evaluated, from a modern/contemporary perspective, as an abusive form of manifestation of the parental authority, as long as it meets the cultural pattern of the father-son relationship of the period under consideration. Within this pattern, the two instances involved in the filial-parental relationship mutually refer and define each other in affective and moral-behavioural terms.

The parent/father's duty is to be a moral guide and protector for the child (implying moral and financial support). The child/son's duty is proper moral conduct, "decent" in an etymological sense (cf. Lat. *decet, -ere*), on various levels:

(a) towards one's own family – parents/siblings. In the cultural model of the time – as pointed out in our corpus as well – the elder brother, the heir especially, is expected to display impeccable conduct, as he is presumed to eventually undertake his father's role of moral guide and protector for the entire family[7]; the concept of responsibility for one's family is herein implicit;

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[7] See the following context, excerpted from the corpus, clearly expressing this idea: *Tu cunoşti, iubite Alexandru, cât mă interesează creşterea cea bună şi învăţătura voastră, şi cea mai mare mulţumire a mea pe viitorime este să vă văz învăţaţi după cuviinţă şi cu purtări bune. Şi ţinta mea este mai mult la tine, ca la unu ce eşti mai mare între copiii mei, ca să poţi povăţui pe ceilanţi fraţi ai tăi la vreme de trebuinţă.*

(b) towards one's own community/society/nation. Achieving a good education, the importance given to study, or the responsibility for one's own actions are valued and aimed at self-improvement/well-being, but also at the welfare of the family, community/society, and nation. In the cultural model of the time, (*spre/în*) *folosul patriei* ("(for) the use/well-being of the country/nation") – a recurrent syntagm in the texts – is assumed as the supreme goal of individuals' actions. Relevant in this respect is the constant reference in the corpus – with a persuasive-argumentative function – to love of country/patriotism, a salient emotion of the time, morally evaluated and correlated with the filial-parental love.

As pointed out in the analysis, there are recurrent affective or affectively loaded isotopies framing the addresser's affective stance. They correlate moral, behavioural, and emotional key-concepts and usually follow a simple conditional-causal argumentative structure (*if/because…*, *then…*). These discursive recurrencies allow the delineation of the following cultural conceptual script, that places the father-son relationship – and the intrinsically ascribed and associated emotions and conduct – on a broader backdrop:

> *filial-parental relationship → filial-parental love → filial-parental behaviour* (*expression of love*)
> *ideal parental behaviour – love + moral guidance + protector (moral and financial support)*
> *ideal filial behaviour – respect and appropriation of*
>> *(a) social-moral values: (accomplished) learning, studies; responsibility; a proper, decent social conduct;*
>> *(b) affective-moral values: love and respect for the parents, acknowledgement of the parental authority and of their mentor-role (for the father, particularly)*
> *→ divine blessing and love + parents' love (+ parents' happiness) → individual happiness – individual well-being + patriotism ↔ collective happiness – collective well-being.*

De aceea, te rog, ia în băgare de seamă cu tot denadinsu poveţile unui părinte ce vă iubeşte mai mult de orice în lume şi care trăieşte numai pentru voi („You know, my beloved Alexandru, how much I care about your good education and my greatest future joy is to see you with a proper education and good behaviour. And my goal is especially to you, as you are the eldest of my children, so you can advise your brothers when the time comes. That's why, please take into consideration the words of advice of a parent who loves you more than anything else in the world and who lives only for you") (July 8/20, p. 79).

This conceptual script indexes the instantiation of an interdependent construal of the self, culturally shaped, which corresponds to the cultural-affective model of the period. It confirms the cultural configuration of the society/nation as a broader family and the individuals' intensive sense of membership and group-belonging, which seems to be salient in the Romanian space at that time. Individuals' personal, moral, and intellectual achievement/well-being and personal happiness – supreme aimed-for emotion – imply collective well-being and happiness. The small-scale, within-family relationships and emotions reflect and multiply to a larger scale, that of the community, ensuring the welfare and the harmonious and "healthy" functioning of society as a whole (see also above, **3.3.**). Individuals define themselves as members of society and are expected to adopt a consistent and adequate mode of being, acting, and feeling, thus meeting the cultural code of the time.

4. Final Remarks

The analysis proposed in the present chapter highlighted certain theoretical aspects regarding affective and sociocultural stancetaking (in general), and the conceptualisation of the filial-parental relationship and love, as object of a specific affective stance (in particular), based on their instantiations in the corpus taken into account.

In the case under scrutiny, affective stancetaking is extremely prominent, as it concerns the speaker's positioning on an affective scale towards a content which is, in its turn, affective/affectively marked: the father-son relationship and father-son love. Furthermore, the affective stancetaking is part of a broader persuasive process, aiming at obtaining the interlocutor's adhesion to one's own viewpoint. This salient persuasive dimension is brought forward by various discursive markers and mechanisms/strategies that were outlined along the analysis: affective lexemes, evaluative terms, pathemically "loaded" words; rhetorical-stylistic devices of emphasis, amplification, like (anaphoric) repetitions, topicalisations, intensifying climax, etc. Thus, the speaker's act of taking a stance is, at the same time, *emotional* (genuine, authentic) and *emotive* (strategical, intentional).

The corpus analysis also illustrates a constant discursive pattern of stancetaking, which indexes a dynamic positioning of the speaker. It reflects a counterpart multifaceted construal of the self: there is, on the one hand, the projection of a personal-individual and relational identity (parent/father at the scale of one's own family), and, on the other hand, the projection of a sociocultural, collective identity (parent/father, in general, at the scale of

an ideal cultural-social model). These interrelated facets of one's self overlap and are complementarily brought up in the discourse. Nevertheless, one can notice the prevalence of the sociocultural self, prominently asserted by the speaker throughout his discourse. It indicates alignment with an upper-ordinate, collective stance, which is socially and culturally motivated and validated, and which, at the discursive level, is embedded in a particular persuasive-argumentative force, as it appeals to the endoxical authority of a collective viewpoint.

In the configuration of the epistolary discourse, these facets of the addresser's identity are displayed following a recurrent pattern: first, the personal-individual and relational self is put forward – expressing and framing the personal-emotional relationship with the addressee; afterwards, the sociocultural self is brought forward and focused on.

The object of the evaluation is constant: the father-son relationship, with an emphasis on filial conduct, and, implicitly linked, father-son love. The data analysis pinpointed the instantiation of a particular type of filial-parental love: the *discipleship*, *charismatic love/mentor–apprentice love* (see the distinction and the lexical labels in Kemper 1978), a hierarchical affective relationship that frames the father's role of teacher/moral guide for the child, with an authority granted by his superior status/power. The dynamic nature of filial-parental love is thus confirmed, the corpus data capturing one of its possible transient stages, which is specific to the adolescent phase. This corpus-based outcome validates certain modern theories of filial-parental love and, apparently, seems to indicate a "universal" way of conceptualising it, which keeps constant across time. Nevertheless, the contexts under scrutiny allow the delineation of a conceptual script of filial-parental love, which attests its possible cultural-specificity and cross-time variation. The way filial-parental relationship and love are configured in the corpus is symptomatic for the period and the cultural setting of the Romanian mid-nineteenth century. It highlights a collective, patriarchal, and religious cultural model, deeply rooted in tradition and embedded in social-moral norms and values.

Filial-parental love is conceived as a *moral emotion*. It connects individual sensitivity and welfare to the collective affectivity and well-being, within a cultural-affective pattern that is defined by an interdependent construal of the self. Within this cultural pattern, emotions, in general, and (filial-parental) love, in particular, encapsulate salient and intertwined moral and social-collective dimensions. Emotions are conceptualised following a by default reference to the individuals' place and role within the hierarchical configuration of the community they belong to, and also following their relevance for the entire community/society/nation.

A specific *selfway* of the filial-parental relationship and love can thus be outlined. In the corpus under scrutiny, it makes the object of a particular stance taken by the speaker, both affectively and socioculturally, which is put forward by a prominent rhetorical-persuasive configuration of the discourse, highly pathemically loaded.

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PART V.

STANCETAKING AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ATTITUDE AND STANCE IN DISCOURSE IN A BILINGUAL COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF PRESENT-DAY SOCIOLINGUISTIC SITUATION IN CATALONIA

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1. Introduction

The Spanish Kingdom presents a complex and intriguing case of plurilingualism, of cultural and intellectual diversity. The problem of co-existing languages affects 41,3 % of Spanish territory or 18,4 million people, therefore the linguistic situation in the country is an issue of high importance (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009, 25). Absolute objectivity cannot exist when presenting the concepts of plurilingualism in Spain; however, we would like to share the position of the ex-president of RAE – *Real Academia Española* (The Royal Spanish Academy), Fernando Lázaro Carreter:

> Un principio democrático exige tener en cuenta los deseos de la población. El bilingüismo es el objetivo final, y para alcanzarlo se necesita actuar con tacto y flexibilidad mediante planes a corto, medio y largo plazo (Lázaro Carreter, 2011).

> A democratic principle requires bearing in mind the wishes of the population. Bilingualism is the ultimate objective, and in order to achieve it, it is necessary to act with tact and flexibility through short, medium and long-term plans.

2. Objective, Tasks, and Methodology

The objective of the present chapter is to present a brief overview of the current sociolinguistic situation in Catalonia.

The tasks we propose are:

– to offer a short description of the development of bilingualism on the territory of the Autonomous Region of Catalonia and to present some of the laws concerning language use in the Region and their impact on the educational system;
– to point out the basics of the sociolinguistic situation in Catalonia;
– to give examples concerning the attitude and the stance of Catalan society in everyday communication.

The methodology of our research is based on data collection and the interpretation of facts related to the Spanish-Catalan bilingualism in present-day Catalonia.

3. A Brief Overview of the History of Bilingualism in Catalonia

In the Iberian Peninsula, a group of idioms emerged, based on Latin and sharing common characteristics typical of the Roman world, which are called today Iberian Romance languages or dialects. The exact period when this formative process took place is unknown, but what is certain is that, during the Council of Tours in 813, priests were enjoined to preach sermons in a Romance language, understood by the common people, distinct from the classical Latin that they could no longer understand.

Two of the languages that emerged from Latin in the Iberian Peninsula are Catalan and Spanish, which developed separately over several centuries. Catalan spread in the eastern and north-eastern territories of the Peninsula, southern France, and the Balearic Islands. Philologists have identified features shared with Provençal and, in general, with Gallo-Romance language variants found in the territory of present-day France. Therefore, Spanish is not the native language of Catalonia, and it first arrived in this territory at the end of the Middle Ages (Veiga Rodriguez 2015, 1). From the twelfth to the first half of the fifteenth century, the only language that was spoken in Catalonia and the other areas of the Aragonese Crown, such as Mallorca and Valencia, was Catalan. As a written language, Latin continued to coexist with Catalan. In the same period, Spanish was the language of the Kingdom of Castile, and it is therefore also referred to as Castilian (Vila-Pujol 2007, 61).

The earliest contact between Catalan and Spanish took place at the end of the Middle Ages, with the beginning of Spanish political unity under the leadership of Castile. This initial interaction took place when a few representatives of the Castilian royal court moved to live in Barcelona, and

part of the Catalan aristocracy decided to learn their language. There was a slight start to the diglossia between Catalan and Spanish in this period. A process of diglossia was also observed between Latin and Catalan (Vila-Pujol 2008, 80).

Subsequently, during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the diglossia between Catalan and Spanish in Catalonia increased. Catalan continued to be the only language used in daily communication, and both Catalan and Spanish were treated as languages of culture, but Spanish was considered more prestigious. In the next century, an absolute diglossia developed between both languages in the common population, with Spanish becoming the only language of culture. There was a mild recovery of Catalan as a language of culture starting in the second half of the nineteenth century. In this period, both Spanish and Catalan could be found in daily use. There were different situations of diglossia throughout the past twentieth century as well. During the 2nd Spanish Republic (1933–1936), Spanish was still the main spoken language, but Catalan started regaining its position in Catalan territory (Orobon 2014, 186; Vila-Pujol 2008, 86–87).

In the next period – the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939–1975) – not only Catalan, but all the languages spoken in Spain, apart from Spanish, were restricted to family use and rural areas, a policy that accelerated the process of diglossia. Spanish became increasingly widespread, while the other peninsular languages suffered reduction. Official education policy contributed to this process (Soldevila Durante 2011). Spanish became an institutional language; however, bilingualism in Catalonia persisted, mostly in the cities (Vila-Pujol 2007, 63). After the adoption of a new *Spanish Constitution*[1] (*Constitución española*) in 1978, the *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia* (*Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya*[2]) in 1979, and the *Law of Linguistic Normalisation in Catalonia*[3] (*Llei de Normalització lingüística a Catalunya*) in 1983, the position of the Catalan language recovered, and it was recognised as an official language in Catalonia along with Spanish.

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[1] The link with the full text of the *Spanish Constitution* (*Constitución española*) is available in the references at the end of the chapter.
[2] The first *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia* is also known as *Statute of Sau* (*Estatut de Sau*).
[3] The link with the full text of the *Law of Linguistic Normalisation in Catalonia* (*Llei de Normalització lingüística a Catalunya*) is available in the references at the end of the chapter.

4. Language Use in Laws and Their Impact on the Education

In 1978, for the very first time in the constitutional history of Spain, plurilingualism was recognised over its territory. Article 3 of the *Spanish Constitution* states:

> 1. El castellano es la lengua oficial del estado. Todos los españoles tienen el deber de conocerla y el derecho de usarla.
> 2. Las demás lenguas españolas serán también oficiales en las respectivas Comunidades autónomas de acuerdo con sus Estatutos.
> 3. La riqueza de las distintas modalidades lingüísticas de España es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial respeto y protección.

> 1. Castilian is the official language of the state. All Spanish people have the duty to know it and the right to use it.
> 2. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities in accordance with their Statutes.
> 3. The richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage that will be the object of special respect and protection.

According to the Constitution, Spain is divided into 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities on the north coast of Africa (Ceuta and Melilla). There are three official languages beside Spanish ("el español" also known as "el castellano") according to the Statutes of Autonomy of the communities: Catalan ("el catalán") in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands (where it is called Balearic – "el balear", also named after each island: "el mallorquín", "el menorquín", "el ibicenco", and "el formenterero"), as well as Valencian ("el valenciano", a variety of Catalan) in Valencia; Basque ("el vasco" or "el euskera") in the Basque Country and part of Navarre, and Galician ("el gallego") in Galicia.

The *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia* recognises the existence of one more language in the area of Val d'Aran, called Aranese ("el aranés"); the Autonomous Region of Asturias recognises and protects the Asturian language ("el asturiano" or "el bable"); Aragon's Statute of Autonomy protects the Aragonese language ("el aragonés") and Catalan (spoken in a part of its territory).

All the communities mentioned above that use other language(s) beside Spanish approved laws that define their linguistic policy between 1982 and 1986. The majority are called "laws of linguistic normalisation" ("leyes de normalización lingüística") (Siguán i Soler 2001, 4).

A new *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia*[4] was approved by referendum, on the June 18, 2006. Article 6 of the Statute states the following:

> 1. La llengua pròpia de Catalunya és el català. Com a tal, el català és la llengua d'ús normal i preferent de les administracions públiques i dels mitjans de comunicació públics de Catalunya, i és també la llengua normalment emprada com a vehicular i d'aprenentatge en l'ensenyament.
> 2. El català és la llengua oficial de Catalunya. També ho és el castellà, que és la llengua oficial de l'Estat espanyol. […]
> 3. La Generalitat i l'Estat han d'emprendre les accions necessàries per al reconeixement de l'oficialitat del català a la Unió Europea i la presència i la utilització del català en els organismes internacionals i en els tractats internacionals de contingut cultural o lingüístic. […]
>
> 1. The language of Catalonia is Catalan. As such, Catalan is the language of normal and preferential use of public administrations and the public media in Catalonia, and it is also the language normally used as a tool for teaching in the learning process.
> 2. The Catalan language is the official language of Catalonia, as is Castilian, which is the official language of the Spanish state. […]
> 3. The Generalitat[5] and the State must undertake the necessary actions for the recognition of the official status of Catalan in the European Union and the presence and use of Catalan in international organisations and in the international treaties of cultural or linguistic content […].

The *Law of Linguistic Normalisation* not only protects the languages spoken in Catalonia, but also defines equality when choosing the language of discourse, and tolerance in everyday attitude of the Catalan citizens. It was approved on April 18, 1983. Article 2 states:

> 2. Les manifestacions de pensament o de voluntat i els actes orals o escrits, públics o privats, no poden donar lloc a Catalunya a cap mena de discriminació si són expressats totalment o parcialment en llengua catalana i produeixen tots els seus efectes jurídics igual com si fossin expressats en llengua castellana. […]
> 3. En cap cas ningú no pot ésser discriminat per raó de la llengua oficial que empra.
>
> 2. The manifestations of thought or will and the oral or written acts, public or private, cannot give rise to any type of discrimination if they are

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[4] The link with the full text of the the *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia* (*Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya*) is available in the references at the end of the chapter.
[5] The Government of Catalonia.

expressed totally or partially in the Catalan language, and produce all their legal effects equally as if they were expressed in Spanish. […]
3. In no case can anyone be discriminated against because of the official language used.

Fifteen years later, in 1998, the *Law of Linguistic Policy*[6] (*Ley de política lingüística*) appeared. Its objective was to modify and update the 1983's law, and to renew the political and social agreement that existed at that time.

The *Spanish Constitution* (1978), the *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia* (1979, 2006), and the linguistic laws of 1983 and 1998 clearly demonstrate not only the decision to respect and protect the official language of the State of Spain – Spanish, but also the official recognition of the native language of Catalonia – Catalan. Due to these laws, Catalan, as part of the region's cultural heritage, has been introduced in the school system as a main teaching language.

The implementation of these laws produced results immediately. In 1980, only 9% of the schools taught in Catalan, and the rest in Spanish. Later, in 1987, this number increased to 62%. At the present time, Catalan schools have promoted almost universal knowledge not only of Spanish, but also of Catalan among their students, ensuring that 97% of the studying population understands, speaks, and writes in Catalan. In this way, both languages coexist in harmony in society (Vila-Pujol 2008, 99–101).

In 2018, *La Generalitat* published an official document that clarifies the linguistic educative model applied in the Catalan schools and observes that it is based on a holistic approach to language and on the importance of its acquisition. Consequently, Catalonia arrived at an integrated management of languages and concepts, and applied a plurilingual model of education. Catalan is still used as the main communication bridge in the school system. The linguistic educational model, which has to guarantee a dependable degree of linguistic competence to all students, is conceived on the basis of different languages and is configured as the main axis of the educational policy of Catalonia. The evolution of the Catalan system of education has led to a new sociolinguistic reality that reflects the fact that the population, which in the past basically spoke either Catalan or Spanish, now shares (in schools) both, and many other languages besides. The linguistic project is the fundamental instrument for advancing the implementation of the multilingual and intercultural educational model

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[6] The link with the full text of the *Law of Linguistic Policy* (*Ley de política lingüística*) is available in the references at the end of the chapter.

that contributes to the acquisition of additional competences, enabling students to communicate effectively with speakers of other languages and cultural origins in a wide range of contexts (Generalitat de Catalunya 2018, 6–68).

5. The Bilingual Situation from a Sociolinguistic Point of View

5.1. Data Base

The sociolinguistic aspects which will be presented below are based on two articles by Vila-Pujol (2007, 2008). The results of this research have been extracted from Subirats (2010). All data collected are based on a poll conducted in 2000: *Encuesta de la Regió de Barcelona 2000: primers resultats* (*Poll of the Region of Barcelona 2000: first results*), directed by Giner et al. (2001) and created by the *Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona* (*Institut d´Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona*), that describes the population of the province of Barcelona over a period of 15 years. This is the 4th poll of a series, with previous publications in 1985, 1990, and 1995.

The data describing the rest of the Autonomous Community do not display the same evolution as Barcelona and its Metropolitan Region. This is because it represents a region of Catalonia – Metropolitan Region of Barcelona (AMB – Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona) – that is defined in the general territorial plan of the Community. It has a geographical extent of 3236 km^2, a total population of 3 239 337 (in 2012[7]), and a population density of 1496 inhabitants/km^2. Barcelona, the most important city, is one of the main axes of economic and business development in the Western Mediterranean. It comprises 10% of the territory of Catalonia, and 68% of the population (3 202 inhabitants/km^2). With the exception of provincial capitals such as Lerida and Tarragona, the rest of the territory of Catalonia has maintained Catalan as a common language, and there is outstanding knowledge of Catalan as a written language, since it was introduced in the school system effectively. In the large urban centres of the Community, as a result of the immigration of the 1960s and 1970s, the two-languages-relation process is not too different from that of Barcelona.

Beside the above-mentioned studies, in 2003, 2008, and 2013, INDESCAT (the *Institute of Statistics of Catalonia*, created in 1989)

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[7] The data are available on the official web of the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona (AMB 2020).

published the results of the "Poll of linguistic practices of the population" ("Encuesta de usos lingüísticos de la población"). The Poll focused on the use of Catalan, but also collected information regarding knowledge of Spanish, English, and French, as well as Aranese. The collected data also reveal the linguistic attitudes of the population and their stance on the use of Catalan. The Poll represents an official five-year statistical activity and was executed by INDESCAT and the Department of Culture, through the General Direction of Linguistic Policy[8] (INDESCAT 2018).

5.2. Summary of the Collected Data

Regarding linguistic identity, the collected data allow the profiling of three groups of speakers, who consider their primary language to be Catalan, Spanish, or both languages. The main variables for linguistic identity are: age, parents' language, language used in family relations, and knowledge of the language.

(a) Linguistic identity: groups of speakers and their area distribution

1) In Barcelona province, most people consider themselves Spanish speakers, although among young people the number of bilinguals (Spanish and Catalan) is increasing.
2) In the city of Barcelona, Spanish speakers predominate numerically. Still, there is a significant growth in the bilingual population.
3) In the territories included in *Segona corona* ("Second Ring"), the number of Spanish speakers grows slightly, the number of Catalan speakers decreases, but the number of bilinguals strongly increases.
4) In the periphery of Barcelona province, the external zone of the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona, less than a quarter of the population consider themselves Spanish-speaking. Bilingualism is growing in those regions where the majority use Spanish.
5) Inside the Metropolitan Region, Spanish predominates in a stable way in *Primera corona* ("First Ring"), 70%, while Catalan tends to decrease slightly; even so, bilingualism increases (figure adapted from IERMB 2019, INDESCAT 2018, and Miralles-Guasch and Tulla i Pujol 2012, 303):

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[8] The results can be consulted on the web page of INDESCAT, indicated in the references at the end of the chapter.

Figure. *Metropolitan Region of Barcelona*

(b) Linguistic identity: sociolinguistic variables

1) *Age*. When comparing people over 65 years of age with the younger portion of the population (18–25 years), one observes that there are more Spanish speakers among the young. The number of Catalan speakers decreases, but this highlights the fact that bilingualism increases. The current linguistic state coexistence does not demonstrate a tendency towards "catalanisation", but rather towards the coexistence of the groups of bilinguals and of Spanish speakers.

2) *Parents' language*. This variable allows reviewing the Catalan family and its members' linguistic identity. It includes the children of the people who immigrated to Catalonia from other autonomous communities in the 1960s and 1970s. Within this variable, one can group families in three types:

– *homogeneous families*: all family members claim the same linguistic identity (Spanish, Catalan, or bilingual). The poll indicates that these families are the most stable in terms of share and represent 73.1% of the population, of which 44.3% are Spanish-speaking, 25.6% Catalan-speaking, and 6.2% bilingual.

– *mixed families*: one of the parents identifies himself or herself with a different linguistic identity than the other parent. These families represent 12.8% of the population.

– *mutating families*: parents identify themselves with one of the linguistic identities (Spanish, Catalan, or bilingual), but one or all of their children claim another identity. These families represent about 10.2% of the

population.

3) ***Language used within the family***. It was observed that one third of families interact in Catalan; more than half – in Spanish and the rest – bilingually. However, if a speaker assigns himself/herself a Catalan linguistic identity, this does not necessarily mean that (s)he does not use Spanish for family relations or *vice versa*. Today, in most families, Catalan-speaking and Spanish-speaking, both languages coexist in harmony.

4) ***Knowledge of the language***. Such inquiries should cover not only the number of speakers, but also the speakers' degree of knowledge of each of the languages involved in the contact. The majority of the surveys carried out by the IERMB – *Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona* (*Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies of Barcelona*) – are dedicated to the knowledge of Catalan, the reason being the need to reintegrate Catalan in society at the end of twentieth century. The position of Catalan in the four previous decades, when it was absent from schools and official use, the great growth in the use of oral Spanish, and the influx of a Spanish-speaking population led to a lack of knowledge of Catalan by a large part of the Catalan society.

The recognition of Catalan in the Constitution and in the Statute has led to a great recovery of this language in the Autonomous Community. It has to be noted that knowledge of Catalan among younger generations has improved to more than 90% in three decades, due to schooling in Catalan.

Although knowledge of Spanish has not been analysed in the past studies, it is presumed that it remains well-known by most of the population, as it is present in schools, as well as in the mass media. However, in the new Poll of linguistic use of the population released by INDESCAT, the use not only of Spanish, but also of English and French, is studied, despite the fact that Catalan again occupies a central place in the research.

In the AMB, the number of Catalan as well as of Spanish speakers decreases, as a result of the increasing number of bilinguals. Despite political, legislative, and social policies, the society of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia is tending towards bilingualism.

6. Attitude and Stance in the Discourse of Spanish-Catalan Bilinguals

6.1. The Term *Stance* in Discourse

The term *stance* in discourse defines "a linguistically articulated form of social action" (Du Bois 2007, 139). It refers to a linguistic and social act interpretation through the language in use, personal behaviour in society, and the presence of sociocultural merit. Taking a stance implies the speaker's evaluation of a situation and his/her focus on a specific target (Rosado et al. 2014, 37).

The analysis of stance markers in oral speech and written texts are treated differently, according to the type of texts which are analysed. Some authors (cf. Kiesling 2009) classify the stance as *epistemic* and *attitudinal*. *Epistemic stance* marks a certain precision or limitation. *Attitudinal stance* expresses personal attitudes and feelings. *Epistemic stance* refers to the speaker's knowledge of how the event is realised. It is related not only to the speaker's assertion of the event, but also to speaker's evaluation. *Attitudinal stance* reports personal attitudes and feelings of the speaker or how (s)he presents the facts.

Expressing speakers' stance is connected with:
- deontic modality: is mainly performative and influenced by the context (*puedes*/*podrías* "may"/"can" refer to possibility; *tienes que* "must" refers to command or obligation);
- volitive modality: those are the ways of expressing the future and the intention in the event realisation (simple future tense in Spanish: *haremos* "will do", "shall do");
- participant internal and external possibility of attitude: is based on the ability of the speaker to carry out the event, considering the external circumstances (*Sí que podemos* "Yes, we can");
- participant internal and external necessity: is focused on the urgency in the development of an event (*es necesario* "needs");
- attitudinal expressions: the speaker expresses his/her interest that something will happen, regardless the possibility of success (*quiero* "I want", *ojalá* "hopefully");
- communicative evidentials: comprise performative verbs such as *Ya te/le/os/les digo yo a ti/a usted/a vosotros/a ustedes que* ("I say to you"), *Insisto en que tú/usted/vosotros/ustedes* ("I urge you to").
- imperative mood: it typically functions to give instructions (*Vamos a hacerlo* "Let's do it", *¡Cuídate!* "Take care!") (Hernández-Guerra 2016, 132–134).

6.2. Linguistic Interference:
Codeswitching and Code Alternation

Attitude and stance in Spanish-Catalan bilingual discourse can be considered from a different angle, as the *interference* between both languages is a continuous process that takes place at all linguistic levels. This *interference* leads to the emergence of different modifications in both languages that are in constant contact. Active speakers often generate phenomena such as *codeswitching* and *code alternation* and, in the process, they express their position in the conversation. The examples presented below are taken from various situations and describe the speaker's stance, who uses different ways of expressing his/her position in the discourse.

According to several contemporary studies, Catalans are delighted to speak Spanish in order to communicate with people from other parts of Spain or Latin America. Many of them also learn other European languages, such as French or English. They treat other languages and cultures with respect, and are always ready to engage in a successful dialogue, no matter what language is used. Like any other people, Catalans love to use their own language – Catalan – in their homeland – Catalonia (Hall 2001, 109). This fact clearly demonstrates two important tendencies in the Catalan society: tolerance for foreign cultures, and valuing their own language and cultural heritage highly. Therefore, Catalan citizens try to maintain such behaviour in everyday communication.

In a conversation between bilingual individuals, *codeswitching* (changing from Spanish to Catalan or *vice versa*) is a common process, mostly conscious, where new information, relevant to the discourse, is added, i.e. the speakers' stance. The attitude of the speaker when switching languages also demonstrates confidence in the capacity of the interlocutor to interpret the message. *Code alternation* refers to the situation where the speaker switches language (from Spanish to Catalan or *vice versa*) in the middle of the discourse, in a relatively unconscious way. Usually this happens in a short fragment of discourse (Vila-Pujol 2007, 72–73).

In the following examples of bilingual conversations, provided by Vila-Pujol (2007, 3), one can notice Spanish (printed in bold italics), as the base language, and Catalan (printed in italics) interfering with it. There is a *codeswitching* (1a and 1b – each 2nd sentence) and *code alternation* (1a. – "*viu amb ell*"):

(1a)   – ***Pero eso*** / *viu amb ell?*
     Huh / she lives with him?

    *– No peró / **¿sabes qué pasa?***
    Not, but / do you know what's wrong?

(1b)   *– **Entonces dice la madre que no le deja hacer nada.***
       Then mother says that she will not let her do anything.
       *– Clar, i llavorans / **le coge el ataque y mira / y ya es / y se pone
       enferma / es verdad.***
       Right, and then / she falls into a fit and look / and that's it / and she
       gets upset / it's true.

Interference is reflected by the possibility of markers from a given linguistic system to appear in another one, i.e. elements of one language (L1) appear when the individual speaks another one (L2). This is a common process in bilingual speech. However, *interference* should be distinguished from *integration*, i.e. from the regular use of the elements of one linguistic code into another (Payrató 1985, 120).

    Interference can be analysed at all levels, taking into consideration both structural and non-structural factors, as noted by Nadkarni (1975, 681):

> Structural borrowing at all levels of language, including syntax (the so-called "deepest" level), can take place irrespective of the factor of social prestige, but solely as a consequence of "intensive and extensive bilingualism" with a certain time-depth.

6.3. Interference on All Linguistic Levels:
Phonetic, Grammatical, Lexical, and Semantic

The comparison between the Spanish and Catalan language systems gives us the opportunity to explore different aspects of the *interference*.

6.3.1. The phonetic level

The presence of certain phonemes only in one of the language systems can lead to mergers or underestimations in the other (Spanish [θ] – [s] – Catalan [Z] – [s], *produ̱zco, ca̱sa*), as well as to insertions of sounds (Spanish [v] – Catalan [X]).

    Regarding the vowels, it is known that [ə] does not exist in Spanish, but is common in Catalan. There are also processes that have a common origin, but a different value in the receiving language: a Catalan speaker can "split" the Spanish phonemes [e] and [o] into two variants: [e] / [ɛ] – (*ve̱rde, dere̱cha*) and [o] / [ɔ] (*ho̱mbre, transcripció̱n*).

    When a phonological opposition exists in one language, it may

coincide with the same opposition in the other language; for example: [r] - [r̄] (Spanish and Catalan: *pared* – *paret*, *hie**rr**o* – *fe**rr**o*). On the other hand, one of the languages can preserve a certain opposition, while the other neutralises it (archiphoneme): in Catalan there are two phonemes [ʎ] – [l], while in Spanish there is only [L]. In Catalan, a distinction is made between: *cal*/*call* ("such"/"to scream"), *tal*/*tall* ("it is necessary"/"a cut"), *val*/*vall* ("O.K."/"valey"), and Spanish speakers have a certain difficulty to pronounce the final Catalan [ʎ] (Payrató 1985, 99–105).

In reference to to the word's accent, it has already been noted that *interference* is a marked aspect. In languages with similar accent patterns, such as Spanish and Catalan, the accent is transferred from one language to another. Such a transfer affects: lexical elements, for example, verb groups (-*iar*); diphthongs (in Spanish, under the influence of Catalan, [bíu̯ḍa], [kúi̯ðate] occur instead of the correct groups [jú], [wí] (*viuda* "widow", *cuídate* "take care"). The similarities between the elements of both languages favour the transfer of the accent: in Spanish, *peró*, *sinó*, *porqué* instead of *péro*, *síno*, *pórque* ("but", "if not", "because"); in Catalan, *estalvía* instead of *estàlvia* ("to save") (Casanovas Català 1998, 11).

When introduced in discourse, not only the accent of the above-mentioned examples, but also the presence of certain phonemes can stand out as markers of the speaker's stancetaking. Therefore, we can surmise that (s)he could be identified as a bilingual when this happens consciously, that is when the *codeswitching* process is observed. *Code alternation* will be considered (in case of neutralising phonological opposition or accent transfers) a non-controlled influence, despite the fact that the listener might notice differences, even if the speaker does not express his/her position during the discourse.

6.3.2. The grammatical level

As for grammatical *interference*, quite often in a discourse in Catalan, under the influence of Spanish, the forms *haver de* – which expresses obligation ("must"), and *deure* ("may") – which expresses possibility/probability, can be reduced to *tenir que* ("have to"); accordingly, possibility or probability may be expressed by use of the future tense or the conditional. The opposite process also exists – from Catalan to Spanish: *deber* can be used only with the meaning of probability, "erasing" the difference between *deber* ("must") and *deber de* ("should"), and preserving the meaning of obligation of *haber de* ("have to") (Vila-Pujol 1996, 273; Payrató 1985, 126; Casanovas Català 2004,

26).

There are two more points of interpretation for this grammatical phenomenon. On one hand, the speaker expresses his/her position in the discourse by choosing similar words, in order to be more comprehensible to the interlocutor. On the other hand, this is a typical stance, where Catalan people avoid confusion and show respect to Spanish monolinguals. This clearly demonstrates the need of Catalan people to use their own language in their own home country, while at the same time to express tolerance towards the others by choosing the above-mentioned forms.

What also stands out in the group as grammatical *interference* is the use of the particle *de* with a partitive value (example (2)) or as a prepositional verbal connector (example (3)). The examples are extracted from the article of Blas Aroyo (2011, 384–385):

(2) *Se coge tres o las que se quiere poner **de** patatas.*
    Standard Spanish: *Se coge tres o las patatas que se quiera poner.*
    He/She takes three potatoes or as many as he/she wants.

(3) *A mí me ha gusta(d)o mucho **de** leer y **de** hacer mis cosas.*
    Standard Spanish: *A mí me ha gustado mucho leer y hacer mis cosas.*
    I've really liked to read and to do my own things.

The following two discursive fragments are characterised as conversational language (Blas Aroyo 1998, 79). Dialogue 1 (example 4) contains a sample where the interlocutor changes register, but not the language, in order to introduce a direct speech sequence. This sample was produced by a third person, who does not participate in the current conversation. The sample reproduced below implies an intonational break, which is neutral and calm. This is an example of subjective stance in the discourse, which is also present in example (5). In example (4), the speaker uses Spanish as she wants to express respect to her monolingual partner. In example (5), the bilingual speaker is switching languages according to the language previously used:

(4) – *Y va la tía y me dice: "Pues no sería tan importante cuando no viniste".*
    And she is saying: "So, it shouldn't be so important if you didn't come".

    – *Y fui yo y le contesté: **"Mira, Toñi, si no fui fue porque estaba enferma y además a ti no te importa nada de lo que haga yo".***
    And I answered: "Look, Toni, if I didn't come it was because I was

sick, and apart from that, it's not your business at all what I am doing".

(5) – *La tia desgraciada va i* me *diu* l'artre *dia:* **A ver si limpiamos el portal, eh!**
The dumb chick told me the other day: Let us find out if we are going to clean the vestibule!

– *Ara que jo ja li vaig contestar ja; li vaig dir:* **Si no fueran tan marranos algunos…**
And so I replied her; I told her: If some people weren't so nasty…

In both conversations, the Spanish text is printed in bold italics and the Catalan – in italics. There is an interesting instance of grammatical interference in example (5): the pronominal form *me* contradicts the linguistic rules of Catalan, according to which it should be *em* ("to me"). We observe the same evidence in the indefinite pronoun *artre*, where the correct form is *altre* ("other").

Often in Spanish used in Catalonia, the verb *venir* appears in positions where only *ir*[9] (see in the example below) is possible, because of the Catalan influence. This case illustrates the frequency of unconsciously assuming an attitude by the speaker in the discourse. Those *interference* processes are observed in both bilinguals and monolinguals.

(6) – **Acércate a echarme una mano.**
Come here and help me.
– **Enseguida** vengo.
I am coming immediately. (Vila-Pujol 1996, 271)

Less common is the *interference* in bilingual speech behaviour observed in pronouns. An example of this is the negative indefinite pronoun with affirmative meaning after the Spanish verb, under the influence of Catalan:

(7) – **Si viene** nadie, **llámame.**
If someone appears, call me.

There is a direct link between the grammatical and the phonetic level of interference between both languages, for instance, the plural formation of nouns and adjectives in Spanish and Catalan, as well as various syllable structures. The syntactic calque as well as syntactic-grammatical relationships are involved (Payrató 1985, 124).

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[9] Spanish verbs *ir* and *venir* can mean either "go" or "come", depending on the direction of the speaker's movement (1st person: "I go", "I come").

6.3.3. The lexical-semantic level

Lexical borrowing in bilingual speakers leads to the incorporation of words from a "model" language into the discourse in another "copying" language. This phenomenon reflects linguistic and social integration, when speaking about embedded borrowings. *Codeswitching* is often used without an absolute or partial adaptation of the constituent elements. Temporary borrowings are not sufficiently widespread throughout society. Social integration is observed synchronously in the speech of the community, in the frequency and diffusion of a particular element. It is noticed diachronically as a phase of the borrowing process. The similarity of the borrowings can lead to a high index of social integration (Blas Aroyo 1998, 74). In the cases described previously, it might not be common to take a stance of expressing bilingual identity in a discourse. When a term or expression is unknown to the speaker, one can usually notice the use of foreign expressions in monolingual speech. Highly educated Catalan speakers often express their conscious attitude of stancetaking when using foreign terms which express intended connotations: *last but not least* (from English), or *quo vadis*, *grosso modo* (from Latin), etc. (Blas Aroyo 1998, 76).

Lexemes are used in a different way, depending on the stance of the bilingual individual in the discourse. The speaker frequently uses the same lexeme in both languages, in order to simplify his/her speech. This process can be applied in any case of *interference*, as for example: **pastel** – *pastís* ("cake"), **mantequilla** – *mantega* ("butter"), **sombra** – *ombra* ("shadow"), **mermelada** – *melmelada* ("marmalade")*.*

There is also a process, known as the tendency towards the word *omnibus*, which involves the use of lexemes with wide range of application. These lexemes express the meanings of two or three concepts from the other language: **probar** – *provar* (*emprovar*, *tastar*) ("to taste, to try, to test"), which reflects the speaker's attitude of simplifying the language in order to make it understandable not only for the bilingual, but for the monolingual interlocutor as well. Bilinguals often use a lexeme instead of a syntagma or a periphrasis, with the same intention. In Spanish, under the influence of Catalan, the verb *engegar/*enchegar* is used instead of *poner en marcha* ("to turn on"); as well as the use of the Catalan verb *plegar* (that has a completely different signification in Spanish: "to fold") with the meaning "terminar de trabajar" ("to finish work"). All the examples are taken from Payrató (1985, 113–115).

Choosing the same lexeme in both languages when using *omnibus* words facilitates not only the speaker's fluency of speech, but also makes

it more understandable for the interlocutor. Therefore, this practice can be interpreted as a stancetaking of tolerance to people who do not understand both languages. Its use is observed when Catalan people communicate with tourists or immigrants from other parts of Spain. In those cases, the attitude of the speaker is that (s)he is showing willingness to explain their speech even more clearly, in case the interlocutor needs that.

The different structure of the vocabulary of each language clarifies many of the issues related to lexical and semantic *interference*. On one hand, it is important to mention that the "birth" of semantic *interference* occurs from the meaning of a lexical unit in a particular context, and not from its value in its own linguistic system. This explains the difficulty of transmitting polysemy. When a bilingual speaker uses the words from the following examples, (s)he can express either the absence of the expression in the original ("model") language, or his/her intention to introduce a "new" word to the interlocutor, in case (s)he is a monolingual Spanish speaker. Payrató (1985) presents many examples, which clearly demonstrate speakers' attitude in discourse in order to simplify speech: to make it more comprehensible and to feel more flexible when expressing himself/herself in the discourse. The above-mentioned verb *plegar*, which has the meaning of "to fold" in Spanish, but is used with its Catalan meaning – "to finish work", is also conjugated without its typical change of the root vowel (-ie- 1st person, singular: ***pliego*** – *plego*) and represents a good example of this phenomenon. On the other hand, the semantic *interference* of the target ("copying") language could include:
– phonetic sequence: ***llavero*** ("keychain"), ***techo*** ("roof") in Catalan. This is the only case in which we can speak about semantic interference without its presence;
– introducing a new word with a new meaning, a loss (words of the target language without correspondences in the original language), or a semantic calque (***fora de servei*** "out of service"). It can also represent an addition, which relates to the target language. An example is the use of the English words: ***bàdminton*** ("badminton"), ***telex*** ("telex");
– re-interpretation, when following the model of the original ("model") language. This can lead to confusion in the use of some lexemes: ***muscle/múscul/musclo*** ("muscle"), ***medi/mitjà/mig*** ("medium") (Payrató 1985, 118–122).

Another type of *interference* occurs in the Spanish spoken in Barcelona, where, under the influence of the Catalan lexeme *coixí* ("pillow"), the use of *cojín* is preferred to the two Spanish terms that refer to related but not to identical objects: *cojín* ("small decorative pillow") and *almohada* ("pillow for sleeping"). Also, although in Spanish there are

various terms for the meaning "stubborn", such as *terco*, *obstinado*, *cabezón*, *testarudo*, *empecinado*, and *tozudo*, among others, in Barcelona, Spanish speakers prefer *tozudo* in the discourse, under the influence of the Catalan word *tossut* (Vila-Pujol 1996, 272, 273).

7. Conclusions

1) Catalan is the original language in Catalonia, dating back to the ninth century. The Spanish language was completely unknown in this territory until the fifteenth century, when the first contacts between the two languages occured. As a result of these first contacts and due to subsequent historical developments, the present situation in Catalonia leads to an absolute bilingualism. Today, one of the basic proofs of the existence of this bilingualism are the texts of the *Spanish Constitution* and the *Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia*, and their reflection in the educational system.

2) The data collected by official surveys reflect the fact that, in Catalonia, the number of speakers who consider Catalan or Spanish their native language decreases, while the number of bilinguals is increasing. Therefore, we can conclude that the Catalan society today is moving towards the absolute bilingualism.

3) The *interference* between Spanish and Catalan works on all linguistic levels: phonetic, grammatical, and lexical-semantic. Stance in the discourse of Catalan citizens usually reflects a positive attitude and tolerance on a linguistic and cultural level. In a variety of cases, we can observe the unconscious attitude of the bilingual individual where (s)he feels a lack of competence in one of the languages. This process can also be noticed in monolinguals. Quite often, the stance taken by the speakers is based on the idea of making their interventions in conversation more understandable. As a result of this attitude, the use of similar constructions appears to be preferred. The stancetaking of Catalans can be defined as an emanation of their positive attitude towards language differences. The desire of being successful in a conversation is of great importance. Moreover, Catalans are using their language on their own territory, like any other people in the world.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

WHAT JAPANESE CAN SAY ABOUT POLITENESS IN ROMANIAN[*]

MASANORI DEGUCHI

1. Introduction

It goes without saying that Japanese and Romanian are not genetically related with each other; nor are they even similar typologically in many respects. However, as I hope to demonstrate, these two languages share striking similarities in terms of politeness. The main goal of the present study is, as the title suggests, to shed new light on politeness in Romanian from Japanese perspectives.

Specifically, I argue in this paper that the plurality associated with politeness pronouns in Romanian marks social distance between the speaker and the addressee in the same way that the so-called "long" form predicates do so in Japanese. Based on this claim, I propose that the Romanian second-person politeness pronoun *dumneavoastră* "you (polite)" be analysed as an addressee honorific, but *dumneata* "you (polite)", another second-person politeness pronoun, as a referent honorific, on par with the third-person politeness pronouns *dumneaei* "she (polite)" and *dumnealui* "he (polite)". In addition, I claim that *dumneavoastră* only marks formality and that the deferential meaning that is often associated with it derives from the lexical meaning of formality at the level of pragmatics.

In so doing, I also illustrate that politeness expressions are manifestations of stancetaking. I adopt the definition of "evaluation" by Thompson and Hunston (2000)[1]. While similar, *stance* and *evaluation* are not exactly the same: while the former is a more abstract notion, the latter refers to the actual realisation of a stance. Thompson and Hunston (2000, 5) define evaluation as "the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer's attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about".

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section **2.** is dedicated to characterising the very notion of politeness; section **3.** illustrates how different aspects of politeness (i.e. formality and deference) are encoded in Japanese. This section serves as a background for **4.**, where an analysis of Romanian politeness pronouns is proposed in light of the politeness in Japanese; section **5.** is a summary.

2. Definition of Politeness

The notion of politeness, while intuitively clear, needs to be clarified and defined first[2]. The working definition adopted here is that of Eelen's (2001) "expressive politeness", a type of first-order politeness (politeness₁). Politeness₁ is what Watts (2003) refers to as "folk interpretations" and is relative to individual languages. In contrast, second-order politeness (politeness₂) is a theoretical construct and is universal to all languages. Expressive politeness₁ is observed when participants produce polite language through formulaic expressions and other means in the given language. I further assume that politeness has different facets, such as "formality" and "deference". These dimensions are related, but they belong to distinct axes of politeness (Kuno 1973). In fact, they manifest themselves differently in Japanese, as it will be illustrated in the next section. "Formality" refers to the social and emotional distance between the speaker and the addressee: close (informal) vs distant (formal). As such, it can be conceived as a relationship between interlocutors (e.g., *x* is close to *y*; *x* is distant from *y*). It is important to emphasise that it is with the addressee that the speaker establishes such a relationship; in addition,

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[1] See Chapter 12 of Biber et al. (1999) and Englebretson (2007) for introductions to *stance*, and Alba-Juez and Thompson (2014) and references cited therein for discussions on *evaluation* and its related concepts.

[2] For extensive discussions on different conceptualisations of politeness, readers are referred to Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003).

it is a symmetric relation, not an asymmetric/hierarchical one (e.g., who is inferior or superior), as it is ascribed to a relative distance from each other.

Deference can also be characterised as a relationship (i.e. *x* is deferential to *y*). However, there are a few crucial differences between formality and deference. First, deference is an asymmetric relation (i.e. *x* shows deference to *y*, but *y* may not do so to *x*). Second, it is with a referent, not with the addressee, that the speaker establishes a deferential relationship.

Before concluding this section, I would like to acknowledge that the above definition of politeness is, of course, a simplification. As Wardhaugh (1998, 272) points out "politeness itself is socially prescribed". As such, the exact meaning of politeness varies from society to society, and the usages also may change over time even in the same linguistic community[3].

3. Politeness in Japanese

As mentioned in the previous section, politeness has different dimensions: formality and deference. These facets manifest themselves separately in Japanese: formality is marked morphologically (i.e. suffixes), whereas deference is indicated lexically (i.e. honorific expressions). Let us first look at these aspects of politeness individually and then discuss how they interact with each other.

Formality distinctions are primarily marked by the so-called "short" and "long" forms of predicates. All Japanese verbs and adjectives, in their finite forms, come in short and long forms. For example, the verb for drinking is *nom-u* (short form) and *nom-imasu* (long form)[4]. These two forms are identical in their propositional meaning and only differ in social meaning. When interlocutors use short forms with each other, it indicates socio-emotional closeness. In contrast, when they mutually use long forms

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[3] See, for example, Brown and Gilman (1960, 261–264) for a discussion on the variation of formal vs informal pronouns (T/V pronouns) among French, German, and Italian. I will touch upon some complexities associated with Romanian politeness pronouns in the next section (see footnote 14, in particular).
[4] The final -*u* in *nom-**u*** and *nom-imas**u*** is the present-tense affirmative suffix. The comparable short vs long distinction is made for the present-tense negative (i.e. *nom-anai* "don't/doesn't drink (short)" vs *nom-imasen* "don't/doesn't drink (long)"), the past-tense affirmative (i.e. *non-da* "drank (short)" vs *nom-imashita* "drank (long)"), etc.

instead, a social distance is implied[5]. In other words, long vs short forms encode different speech styles employed by interlocutors: formal vs informal.

Deference, on the other hand, is mainly expressed lexically in Japanese. Let us use the same example of drinking. In addition to the neutral/non-deferential (short) form *nom-u* mentioned above, there are two other (short form) lexemes with the identical propositional meaning: *meshiagaru* "graciously drink" (i.e. the "exalting form") and *itadaku* "humbly drink" (i.e. the "humble form"). These latter two forms make up *keigo* (lit. "respectful language") or honorifics in Japanese.

In order to understand Japanese honorifics, it is crucial to keep in mind that what is relevant is who the speaker is talking *about* (i.e. the referent), not who the speaker is talking *to* (i.e. the addressee)[6]. With this in mind, let us now take a look at examples of exalting and humble forms:

(1) Deference in Japanese[7]

   a. Sensei-wa   osake-o   ***meshiagar**-imasu-ka.*
       teacher-TOP   alcohol-ACC   drink.***EXALT**-DIST.PRES-Q*
       Does the professor (graciously) drink alcohol?

   b. Watashi-wa   sensei-no   osake-o   ***itadak**-imashita.*
       I-TOP   teacher-GEN   alcohol-ACC   drink.***HUM**-DIST.PST*
       I (humbly) drank the professor's alcohol.

   c. Watashi-wa   osake-o   ***nom**-imashita.*
       I-TOP   alcohol-ACC   drink-DIST.PST
       I drank alcohol.

Imagine a scenario where two college students are planning a gathering for their professor. One of the students says (1a) to the other, trying to figure out if they should buy alcoholic beverages for the event. In this interaction,

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[5] Jorden and Noda (1987) call the "long" form the "distal" form for this reason. I reserve the term "long form" to refer to the form itself and describe the social meaning associated with it as "distal".

[6] The term "honorifics" is often used in a broad sense to include formality, as well as deference. However, what I mean by honorifics here is in its narrow sense: deference only. Recall from the previous section that deference is not a relationship between interlocutors; it is an attitude of the speaker toward a referent. It is, however, possible that the referent coincides with the addressee. When this happens, deference "appears" to hold between the interlocutors. We will return to this later in this section.

[7] ACC: accusative, DIST: distal, EXALT: exalting form, GEN: genitive, HUM: humble form, PRES: present, PST: past, Q: question marker, and TOP: topic marker.

the speaker shows two stances: one toward the referent (i.e. the professor), indicated by the topic marker *wa*, and the other toward the addressee (i.e. the other student). Upon evaluating the social status of the referent, the speaker shows deference as manifested in the exalting form; simultaneously, after evaluating the social distance to the addressee, the speaker displays formality as realised in the long form. Now, let us take a look at an example of a humble form in (1b), where two college students are talking about a dinner party held at their professor's house. Unlike in (1a), the act of drinking in (1b) is done by the speaker (i.e. one of the students). Upon evaluating the social status of himself/herself in relation to the professor, the speaker expresses deference by using the humble form of his/her own action. The humble form is a realisation of his/her stance toward the professor; the long form is a manifestation of his/her stance toward the addressee. If the student drank his/her own drinks instead, (s)he would use the neutral form *nomi-mashita* "drank" as in (1c), even in the presence of the professor. Pay attention to the fact that the interlocutors are the students, and that the deference is given to the professor, in both (1a) and (1b), who is not the addressee. In other words, exalting and humble forms are "referent-controlled" honorifics (Harada 1976; Shibatani 1990) or "referent honorifics" for short.

Let us now examine the verb endings in (1) more closely. As we just observed, all the endings are in long forms. If the students were close friends instead, they would use short forms as in (2):

(2)   Social Distance in Japanese
      a. Sensei-wa   osake-o   meshiagar-***u***-no.
         teacher-TOP   alcohol-ACC   drink.EXALT-***CLOSE***.PRES-Q
         Does the professor (graciously) drink alcohol?

      b. Watashi-wa   sensei-no   osake-o   itadai-***ta***.
         I-TOP   teacher-GEN   alcohol-ACC   drink.HUM-***CLOSE***.PST
         I (humbly) drank the professor's alcohol.

      c. Watashi-wa   osake-o   non-***da***.
         I-TOP   alcohol-ACC   drink-***CLOSE***.PST
         I drank alcohol.

In (2a) and (2b), respect is paid to the professor in the same way as in (1a) and (1b). The crucial difference between (2a) and (2b), on the one hand, and (1a) and (1b), on the other, is that there is no social distance between the interlocutors in (2), indicating intimacy between the students. The short vs long distinction, therefore, are "addressee-controlled" honorifics or "addressee honorifics" for short.

As we just saw, formality holds between interlocutors and is encoded by addressee honorifics; in contrast, deference is a relation between the speaker and a referent, and is expressed by referent honorifics.

There is, however, a case where addressee and referent honorifics appear to have merged as in (3):

(3)   Deference and Social Distance in Japanese: Special Case
    a. Sensei-wa   osake-o   ***meshiagar***-imasu-ka.[8]
       teacher-TOP   alcohol-ACC   ***drink.EXALT***-DIST.PRES-Q
       Do you (graciously) drink alcohol, Professor?

    b. #Sensei-wa   osake-o   ***meshiagar***-u-no.
       teacher-TOP   alcohol-ACC   ***drink.EXALT***-CLOSE.PRES-Q
       Do you (graciously) drink alcohol, Professor?

Suppose a student is speaking with a professor and asks the question in (3a). First, keep in mind that the addressee is a professor. Because the act of drinking is performed by the professor, the use of exalting form is unsurprising. In addition, since a teacher and a student are expected to maintain a social distance from each other, the use of a long form in (3a) is also expected. In fact, a use of short form, as in (3b), is socially unacceptable. Based on the contrast in (3), I argue that (3a) is not a case of addressee honorifics, but it is a special case of referent honorifics, where the referent happens to be the addressee.

There is another fact about different speech styles that needs to be discussed before leaving this section. While long or short forms themselves do not have intrinsic meanings of deference as mentioned earlier, a certain use of distinct forms indicates power differential between interlocutors. As a result, it induces a sense of respect. Consider the exchange in (4):

(4)   Asymmetric Use of Speech Styles
    a. Ashita   jugyoo-ga   ar-***u***-no.[9]
       tomorrow   class-NOM   there.is-***CLOSE***.PRES-Q
       Do you have class tomorrow?

    b. Hai,   ar-***imasu***.
       yes   there.is-***DIST***.PRES
       Yes, I do.

---

[8] This example is identical to (1a). Putting it differently, this sentence is ambiguous. It allows for two interpretations: "Does the professor drink alcohol?" and "Do you (= the professor) drink alcohol?", where the addressee is the professor.
[9] NOM: nominative.

Observe that, in the exchange in (4), a short form is used by one speaker and a long form by the other. This "asymmetrical" use of long and short forms suggests a difference in "power" between the interlocutors, as Brown and Gilman (1960) discussed for the so-called T/V pronouns in Indo-European (IE) languages (e.g., *tu* vs *vous* in French). An exchange, such as (4), is expected, for example, when (4a) is uttered by a college senior, while (4b) by a college freshman. With the use of a long form in response to a question asked in a short form, the freshman is acknowledging that the senior student is socially superior. This acknowledgement is the stance the freshman takes toward the senior student and is construed as a sense of respect. Let us now look at a similar exchange, but in which both utterances are in short forms:

(5) Symmetric Use of Speech Styles
   a. Ashita   jugyoo-ga   ar-***u***-no.
      tomorrow   class-NOM   there.is-***CLOSE***.PRES-Q
      Do you have class tomorrow?

   b. Un,   ar-***u***.
      yes   there.is-***CLOSE***.PRES
      Yes, I do.

Use of the same form by both interlocutors indicates that they have the same social status. In addition, since the same form used is the short form, it suggests that the interlocutors are not only socially equal, but also close with each other. This is reminiscent of "solidarity" associated with a reciprocal use of T/V pronouns that Brown and Gilman (1960) argued for IE languages.

4. Politeness in Romanian and
Other Indo-European Languages

A number of IE languages developed a distinction similar to the T/V distinction, which we touched upon in the previous section: *du*/*Sie* in German, *tu*/*Lei* in Italian, *ty*/*vy* in Russian, etc., just to name a few. One of the interesting facts about these pairs of second-person pronouns is that the polite "you" shows plural agreement although it is singular in meaning[10]. In fact, Brown and Levinson (1987) observe that the use of plural

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[10] Italian is an apparent exception in this regard, since the formal form *Lei* requires a verb in the third person singular. This is due to the fact that the second-person plural pronoun *voi* was replaced by *Lei* historically (Brown and Gilman 1960, 254).

pronouns for a singular addressee is cross-linguistically attested even in genealogically unrelated languages. They surmise that the use of plural forms has derived from the strategy of "impersonalisation". We will return to their claim later in this section.

Romanian is no exception to this, either. It has a polite form *dumneavoastră*, in addition to a non-polite form *tu*. The polite form has derived from the noun *domnia* "lordship" and the second-person plural possessive *voastră* "your" (Zafiu 2013, 283). As illustrated in the contrasts in (6), the polite form shows plural agreement, whereas the non-polite form shows singular agreement[11].

(6) Second-Person Pronouns in Romanian[12]

    a. *Te*   așteptam   pe *tine*.
      you(*SG*).CL.ACC   wait.IMPF.1SG   DOM you(SG)
    b. *Vă*   așteptam   pe *dumneavoastră*.
      you(*PL*).CL.ACC   wait.IMPF.1SG   DOM you(PL)
    c. *Te   așteptam   pe *dumneavoastră*.
      you(*SG*).CL.ACC   wait.IMPF.1SG   DOM you(PL)
      I was waiting for you.

Tine in (6a) is the accusative form of the non-polite *tu*, and it agrees with a singular clitic *te*. On the other hand, as contrasted between (6b) and (6c), the politeness pronoun *dumneavoastră* requires a plural clitic *vă*. Romanian, therefore, patterns with other IE-languages thus far. However, there is something quite unique about Romanian; there is another second-person politeness pronoun: *dumneata* (*domnia* "lordship" + *ta* "your(SG)")[13]. It is important to note that *dumneata*, unlike *dumneavoastră*, exhibits singular agreement, as illustrated in the contrast in (7):

(7) Second-Person "Familiar" Politeness Pronoun in Romanian

    a. *Te*   așteptam   pe *dumneata*.
      you(*SG*).CL.ACC   wait.IMPF.1SG   DOM you(SG)

---

[11] All the grammatical Romanian examples used in this paper have been adopted from Zafiu (2013); all the ungrammatical ones were constructed by the author and were checked for grammaticality by a native speaker.

[12] 1: 1st person, CL: clitic, DOM: differential object marker, IMP: imperfect, PL: plural, and SG: singular.

[13] In fact, Romanian makes not three, but four-way distinctions of politeness. Vasilescu (2013), for instance, recognizes the following four expressions for the second-person singular: *tu* (zero degree), *dumneata* (minimum degree), *dumneavoastră* (high degree), and *Domnia Voastră* (maximum degree). The present paper does not discuss *Domnia Voastră*. Interested readers are referred to works, such as Vasilescu (2013) and Zafiu (2013) and references cited therein.

b. *_Vă_   aşteptam   pe **_dumneata_**.
you(*PL*).CL.ACC   wait.IMPF.1SG   DOM you(SG)
I was waiting for you.

While it is also a politeness pronoun, _dumneata_ agrees with a singular clitic, unlike _dumneavoastră_ in (6b). Instead, it patterns with the non-polite form _tu_ (_tine_) as in (6a). Gönczöl-Davies (2008, 65) describes a typical use of _dumneata_ as follows[14]:

> _Dumneata_ is used instead of _tu_ only when addressing people older than us or people we want to show respect to, but this form implies a greater degree of familiarity with the people we address than is the case for _dumneavoastră,_ such as grandparents or elderly relatives or elderly neighbours.

Now recall the definition of politeness from section **2.**: politeness involves formality and deference. Given this distinction, it seems more accurate to call _dumneata_ a "deferential" form, rather than a "distal" form, for the lack of social distance between the interlocutors (i.e. formality). In the same vein, it seems more appropriate to describe _dumneavoastră_ as the "formal" or "distal" form since social distance is what separates _dumneavoastră_ from the other "politeness" pronoun _dumneata_.

I further argue that the deferential meaning associated with the distal form _dumneavoastră_ derives from an asymmetrical use of the second-person pronouns, pragmatically. I propose that the relevant meanings of _dumneavoastră_ and _dumneata_ should be analysed as illustrated in (8):

(8) Meanings of the Second-Person Politeness Pronouns in Romanian
     a. _Dumneata_: [-distal, + deferential]
     b. _Dumneavoastră:_ [+distal] → [+deferential]

---

[14] The actual usages are much more complicated and are subject to a wide range of variation. According to my informant, _dumneata_ is typically used by the elderly and/or certain populations in non-urban areas (e.g., an elderly person speaking to a seller at a market); however, people with certain educational levels tend to use _dumneavoastră_ instead, even in such contexts. My informant has confirmed that some people do use _dumneata_ with their old relatives, such as grandparents, although she personally does not use _dumneata_ with her own grandparents. Interestingly, she uses _tu_ for her grandfather, but _dumneavoastră_ for her grandmother (because she does not use _dumneata_ at all, the only choices she has are _tu_ and _dumneavoastră_). The use of distinct forms for different grandparents is an example of further complexity in second-person pronoun use in Romanian.

While the deferential meaning is part of the lexical meaning for *dumneata*, it derives from the distal meaning for *dumneavoastră*, as indicated by an arrow.

Recall that Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that the plurality associated with the V pronouns in IE-languages is a reflection of an impersonalisation strategy. I, however, claim that plurality in Romanian used for a singular addressee indicates a social distance between interlocutors in the same way that long form predicates do in Japanese. What this means, in turn, is that *dumneavoastră* is an addressee honorific; *dumneata* is a referent honorific, where the referent is the addressee.

A piece of evidence for this claim comes from the Romanian third-person pronouns. Unlike other IE languages, Romanian has politeness pronouns not only in the second person, but also in the third person. They are *dumneaei* "she" and *dumnealui* "he", and are morphologically parallel to their second-person counterparts (i.e. *dumneaei* "she" = *domnia* "lordship" + *ei* "her"; *dumnealui* "he" = *domnia* "lordship" + *lui* "his"). These third-person politeness pronouns, like the second-person deferential form *dumneata*, show singular agreement as illustrated in (9)[15]:

(9) Third-Person Politeness Pronouns in Romanian
     a. ***O***   caut   pe ***dumneaei***.
     CL.3F*SG*.ACC   search.1SG   DOM3F*SG*.POLITE
     a'. ****Le***   caut   pe ***dumneaei***.
     CL.3F*PL*.ACC   search.1SG   DOM3F*SG*.POLITE
     I am looking for her.

     b. ***Îl***   caut   pe ***dumnealui***.
     CL.3M*SG*.ACC   search.1SG   DOM3M*SG*.POLITE
     b'. ****Îi***   caut   pe ***dumnealui***.
     CL.3M*PL*.ACC   search.1SG   DOM3M*SG*.POLITE
     I am looking for him.

As illustrated in the contrast between (9a) and (9a'), and that between (9b) and (9b'), the third-person politeness pronouns *dumneaei* and *dumnealui* must agree with singular clitics *o* and *îl*, respectively. As it is evident in examples, such as (9), respect is paid to a third person referent (i.e. a female referent in (9a) and a male referent in (9b)) with third-person politeness pronouns. I therefore conclude that the second-person *dumneata*, like the third-person *dumneaei* and *dumnealui*, is a referent honorific. Claims of the present paper are summarised in (10):

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[15] 3: 3rd person, F: feminine, and M: masculine.

(10) Summary of the Claims
   a. 2nd Person   *dumneavoastră*   [+distal]   (→
   [+deferent])   addressee honorific
   b. 2nd Person   *dumneata*   [-distal, +deferent]
   referent honorific
   c. 3rd Person   *dumneaei/dumnealui*   [-distal, +deferent]
   referent honorific

It should be reminded that [+/-distal] always holds between the speaker and the addressee, since formality is a relation between the interlocutors; in contrast, [+/-deferent] holds between the speaker and a referent, where the referent can be the addressee, as it is the case with *dumneata*. As argued earlier, the deferential meaning is not part of the lexical meaning of *dumneavoastră*; it arises only when the interlocutors use distinct second-person pronouns for each other (i.e. asymmetric use), as shown by [+deferent] preceded by an arrow in (10a). The parentheses indicate the optionality of such meaning component, since a symmetric use of second-person pronouns will not result in a deferential meaning; with a symmetric use, second-person pronouns only indicate formality distinctions: formal [+distal] vs informal [-distal].

   To conclude this section, let us discuss theoretical implications of the present proposals. The analysis of *dumneata* in (10b) is consistent with Comrie's (1976) view of T/V pronouns in IE languages. He claims that the T/V alternations are not addressee honorifics; they are referent honorifics instead, because it is not possible to pay respect to the addressee without making reference to them. On the other hand, the analysis of *dumneavoastră* in (10a) is in conflict with Comrie's claim, as it would be analysed as a referent honorific (on par with *dumneata*), in Comrie's view. Recall our discussion that *dumneavoastră* is a formal/distal form; it only indicates a great social distance lexically. The deferential meaning associated with it derives from an asymmetric use of second-person pronouns as an epiphenomenon. In contrast, *dumneata* and *dumneaei/dumnealui* are deferential forms with the deferential meaning being part of the lexical meaning. Therefore, I argue against Comrie (1976) and claim that the T/V alternations, including the Romanian *tu/dumneavoastră* alternation, be analysed as addressee honorifics.

5. Conclusions

In Romanian and other IE languages, politeness manifests itself in pronouns and in their number agreement. Since a host of features have been syncretised in pronominal forms, it is not readily evident what

features are present in different pronominal forms. In Japanese on the other hand, formality and deference are encoded separately: (i) formality as long vs short form predicates, and (ii) deference through honorific expressions. Based on this dichotomy, I argued for a parallelism between the use of long forms in Japanese and the plural agreement in Romanian. Specifically, I claimed that *dumneavoastră*, as it requires plural agreement, expresses formality in the same way that long form predicates do in Japanese. I further maintained that *dumneavoastră* only encodes formality and that the deferential meaning arises pragmatically as a result of an asymmetric use of pronouns. I also claimed that *dumneata*, another second-person politeness pronoun, is specified for deference (toward a referent), as evidenced in its singular agreement, just like in the third-person politeness pronouns *dumneaei* "she (polite)" and *dumnealui* "he (polite)". The only difference between *dumneata*, on the one hand, and *dumneaei* and *dumnealui*, on the other, is that the reference coincides with the addressee for the former.

One consequence of the present analysis is that *dumneavoastră* is considered an addressee honorific as it displays formality, which is a relation that the speaker holds with the addressee; *dumneata* on the other hand is regarded as a referent honorific on par with the third-person polite pronouns, as they all express deference, which is a relationship that the speaker establishes with a referent.

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PART VI.

STANCETAKING AND APPLIED LINGUISTICS

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

STANCE AND LITERACY DEVELOPMENT:
JAPANESE LEARNERS IN LINGUA
FRANCA ENGLISH DISCOURSE

HIROMASA TANAKA

1. Introduction

Economic globalisation and digitalisation have changed the way people communicate. Global trade and investment and international supply chains make it critical for people to exchange necessary information and collaborate, not only across national borders, but also across industrial and disciplinary borders. Moreover, the increasing ease of communicating rich content across distances enables people in various locations to communicate, develop trust, and solve problems together. As a result, in such global communities, Gee (1991, 143) says that "a socially accepted association among ways of using language, of thinking, feeling, believing" is gradually being formed; one which Gee calls Discourse with a capital D. English is often chosen as a working language in globalised Discourses (Mauranen 2017) and a reasonable command of English language is a crucial part of competence. However, it is not English language competence alone that matters; it is a more holistic communication competence that is indispensable (Firth 2009), and such a competence may not be fixed, stable, or measurable. Drawing on the ideas of new literacy research, the term "literacy" is used to refer to such situated competence in achieving communicative goals in a given Discourse. For people to function in globalised Discourses, they need to develop a new type of literacy, to become an active agent in a new global Discourse (Williams 1994).

Co-construction of a Discourse and literacy acquisition take into account local, contextual, and individual factors. Each participant has a specific life environment that might enhance or constrain literacy acquisition. A local and emic perspective is taken for the investigation of

Japanese learners. Contextual, political, and historical issues related to English language in Japan have been discussed elsewhere (Tanaka 2008, 2009; Tanaka and Ogane 2011; Bargiela-Chiappini and Tanaka 2012; Tanaka and Bargiela-Chiappini 2012). Japan's history as a "closed" nation from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, its highly teacher-centred education system (Yoneyama 1999; Nakane 2006), and its urgent need to globalise business make Japan a particularly interesting case for the way people adapt to the demands and expectations of the global community.

This article does not investigate either language or language acquisition, but rather pays attention to the participants' process of gaining a new literacy in an emergent Discourse. Data were collected by video recording and interviewing at two Project-Based Learning (PBL) programme sites, one in the villages in Lăpuş Land, Romania, and the other in Ito, Japan. The participants' main objective was to transpose their experience as tourists into promotional ideas that could be used by Destination Marketing Organisations to promote the area. The recent body of research on human resource development proposes that PBL is effective in enabling participants to acquire combined skills and knowledge. In PBL, participants from various cultural backgrounds work as teams and aim to achieve real-life goals and/or solve problems. Participants are encouraged to engage in acquiring problem solving capabilities and leadership skills through this experience (Wankel and DeFillippi, 2005). Thus, PBL opportunities are perceived to be an excellent option for learning such new literacy.

Stance as a social practice is used here as a unit of analysis. I employ a social constructivist view of stance (Du Bois 2007), treating stance as a dynamic practice in a Discourse. Participants' shift of stance, therefore, is treated as phenomenal evidence of the participants' Discourse construction and literacy development. In examining the participants' multi-modal literacy development, I employ a socio-cognitive approach as an alternative to mainstream cognitive theory in the field of Second Language Acquisition (Atkinson 2011). A socio-cognitive approach assumes that learning is not an activity of the human brain alone, but involves environmental variables, including a geographical setting, human relations, and a chronological schema. Since this research assumes that literacy development involves mind and environment, it takes an interdisciplinary approach combining sociolinguistics and cognitive science. Thus, to understand the participants' literacy development from both a sociolinguistic and a psychological perspective, the following two research questions are asked:

1. How does stance influence Discourse construction?

2. How do participants develop literacy in the Discourse of the programme?

To deal with the complexity of the situated literacy, this article establishes a somewhat tenuous affiliation between several interdisciplinary theories and concepts (Crowley 2005). Concepts of Discourse, literacy, stance, and socio-cognitive approach are brought forth as frameworks of this study, and are elucidated in the following section. Then, a socio-cognitive approach to exploring literacy development is discussed.

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

In the first part of this section, I discuss Discourse as an analytic tool and theoretical framework for the present study, followed by the notion of literacy within Discourse. Then, I introduce the concept of Lingua Franca English (LFE) to view English as a socially co-constructed and situated language among multi-lingual participants. Based on the discussion of Discourse and LFE, I argue that the PBL is a site of LFE Discourse construction. In the second part, drawing on recent studies, I provide my definition of stance as a unit of analysis for this study. Finally, to frame my analysis of participants' cognitive development in terms of LFE Discourse, a socio-cognitive approach, that is, a pedagogical view of my data analyses, is presented.

2.1. Lingua Franca English Discourse and Literacy

The term discourse takes on different definitions in various disciplines. This study uses the idea of Discourse with a capital D, as defined by Gee (1991). Everybody is part of a group of people, such as a family, a school, a company, or a local community. In each of these groups, people usually share a certain language, terminology, protocols, and values. Gee (1991) defines Discourse as the combination of language with other social practices, and uses Discourse with capital D as a count term. Thus, different Discourses can be formed in different parts of the world and in different moments of one's life. When people are given access to a new Discourse, they will be surrounded by the new Discourse community members' ways of "saying (writing)-doing-being-valuing-believing combination" (Gee 1991, 142). Upon entering a new Discourse, people are expected to become fluent and "literate" in the new social environment. Gee's view of literacy is, therefore, more socially- and culturally-situated, while a conventional view of literacy is defined as the fundamental ability

to read and write. By acquiring literacy within a discourse, one can use the correct behaviour, language, and norms associated with that Discourse. In most cases, literacy might not be implicitly shared among people, and, similarly, newcomers usually detect, mimic, and acquire it through local interactions (Street 2008).

The research sites of this study are PBL programmes operated by participants from multiple cultural and disciplinary backgrounds. The participants mostly met for the first time in these projects. Taking a constructionist perspective, this research views the projects as Discourses under construction by the participants. In these projects, the participants, mostly non-native speakers of English, being aware of their linguistic constraints and cultural differences, actively search and co-construct ways of talking, acting, and advancing jobs.

The constructionist approach to understanding Discourse is particularly effective in investigating LFE Discourse. This is because the key premise of the notion of LFE is social constructionism, which views LFE as jointly constructed, invented, or created by people (White 2004). Thus, from this perspective, there is no given, correct, or authentic understanding of any social phenomena, such as language use or forms. English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) is the term commonly used to refer to English language used as a common working language; however, there are various ways to interpret the term. For example, some attempt to identify intelligible lingua franca variations or to search for acceptable deviations from the Standard English for the purpose of achieving mutual intelligibility (Jenkins 2000), while others argue that intelligibility in ELF interactions depends on participants, situations, and strategies (Firth 2009). For this reason, the term Lingua Franca English (LFE) is employed in order to emphasise the socially constructed nature and situated multiplicity of English used in the present research sites. Thus, in this study, LFE is defined as a language used by native and non-native speakers as the working language. While people work together, members of a community co-construct a Discourse. Thus, each worksite where LFE is used creates a specific Discourse, depending on how the level of English, the importance of subject matter knowledge, and the conventional ways of doing business are situated, that is, LFE is different in each worksite.

2.2. Stance as a Social Practice

Gee (1991) notes that one can become literate in a new Discourse by paying attention to others who are in it and by practicing what they do to enable themselves to perform the correct social practices associated with

the Discourse. Since literacy is embedded in the whole repertoire of social practices, Gee (1991, 137) states that "[the] focus of literacy study cannot be, and ought not be, on language […] rather the focus must be on social practices".

In investigating literacy in this article, stance, as a social practice, is used as a unit of analysis for the captured empirical data. In previous studies, stance was characterised in various ways. Attempts to approach stance from a linguistic perspective, on the one hand, define stance as an expression of individual speakers' (writers') personal feelings, attitudes, and evaluations by systematic use of lexico-grammatical resources (Biber 1989). On the other hand, research from psychological perspectives views stance as a holistic phenomenon, expressed through a variety of communicative resources. Scherer (2005) argues that stance is a style that develops spontaneously or is deployed strategically by an individual.

Recent trends in discourse analysis position the notion of stance as a social practice rather than the linguistic behaviour of one individual. Stance can be socially constructed by multiple discourse participants (Du Bois 2007). Jensen (2014) argues that it is crucial to widen the scope of stance to investigate it as part of (whole-body) multimodal and intersubjective sense-making. Chindamo, Allwood, and Ahlsén (2012) suggest that stance could be classified according to social signals. In this research, stance was classified by its signal to others in a Discourse, drawing upon Stivers' types of stance (2008). This view of stance helps current research in investigating participants' stance in LFE Discourses. Thus, processes of positioning and/or aligning/disaligning, situated in a multicultural project, are by no means restricted to a single individual's lexico-grammatical choice of words, but involve linguistic, paralinguistic, and non-verbal expressions working in concert as adaptive social behaviour. Therefore, a research approach with a multidisciplinary perspective is needed.

2.3. A Socio-Cognitive Approach of Discourse Acquisition

In our daily life, communication is fundamentally multimodal. Meaning is created by a combination of verbal exchanges, face expressions, tone of voice, and gestures. To develop literacy in a certain Discourse, people need to extend their attention to all these factors, which may vary from Discourse to Discourse (de Gelder, Vroomen, and Pourtois 1999). Similarly, in the field of second language acquisition research, Widdowson's schema theory (1983) pinpoints the importance of interaction between learners and environmental factors. He argues that

cognitive characteristics of schema allow learners to relate incoming facts to previously processed and acquired knowledge. A socio-cognitive approach considers the social environment rich in cognitive support structures, allowing learners to acquire language by integrating these supports into their own internal cognition systems (Atkinson 2011). Previous studies indicate that people need to understand the environmental, chronological schema, in order to negotiate with and encourage each other, develop trust, and solve problems; without such understanding, even a native speaker cannot acquire the prescribed literacy of the Discourse.

Drawing on the field of cognitive science, this research assumes that the development of literacy in a new Discourse can be achieved through interaction of learners and environmental factors.

3. Methodology

In this section, I provide contextual information about the research sites and the two PBL programmes' participants, followed by a discussion of the data from a discourse analysis approach.

3.1. Background Information

Globalisation, digitalisation, and English dissemination impact the economies, the politics, and the cultures of all countries. While Japanese business corporations have been relatively quick to react, the education system has been slow to adapt to change (Benesse 2013). Japanese learners are educated in speaking English through a fundamentally fixed system. English is regarded as measurable knowledge, and for many Japanese people English is merely content for a series of examinations that could lead them to a future career (Kubota 2002). This attitude has resulted in learners' weak English communication ability and low motivation (Nakata 2006). Ryan (2009) suggests that meaningful contexts in which to use English would greatly benefit Japanese learners of English.

For this reason, the two PBL programmes were chosen as data collection sites, because it was assumed that being members of an English-speaking community would provide opportunities for participants to develop literacy of LFE Discourse more effectively than being in conventional Japanese English language classrooms. In previous pedagogically oriented research, such as in Yamazumi (2009), empirical data suggested that participants learned holistically and sometimes transformed their identities through their experience in projects. My

participatory action research found that participants learned communication strategies and leadership (Nechita and Tanaka 2017) and developed agency (Tanaka and Ogane 2011). These studies reveal that silence and passive participation of Japanese English-speakers sometimes raises problems in intercultural settings.

PBL programmes require participants to construct rapport and trust, and to create solutions to real-life situations where participants need to combine existing skills and knowledge or acquire new skills or knowledge to deal with situational needs (Wankel and DeFillippi 2005). Social interaction in PBL sites entails the use of LFE. Thus, participants' literacy acquisition, like their LFE and their Discourse, may be achieved by social interaction. The educational objective of the programmes is to help students acquire the literacy of worksite LFE. It is hoped that students will, accordingly, adopt new social and cultural behaviours and ways of being (Williams 1994).

The naturally occurring data regarding interaction between native and non-native speakers were collected in two project-based learning sites. The first set of data was collected from mainly Romanian and Japanese participants at the Transilvania[1] Creative Camp (TCC), operated in Lăpuș Land, Romania. The second set was collected during the Italian-Japanese Fusion Culinary Project (FCP), held in Ito-city, Japan. Most participants were novices in PBL programmes. A few participants had prior experience in LFE-PBL projects. Some novice students showed gradual changes in their stance. The analysis section presents their stance transitions as examples of their literacy development.

Project	Objective	Number and Diversity of Participants	Location
Transilvania Creative Camp (TCC)	Visual Material Development for Destination Marketing	23 Participants: 13 Japanese (including 2 experienced), 5 Romanian, 1 Italian, 1 Vietnamese, 1 Albanian university student, 2 Romanian high school students.	Lăpuș Land, Romania

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[1] The project used local spelling of *Transilvania* rather than *Transylvania*.

Fusion Culinary Project (FCP)	Invention and Presentation of Italian-Japanese Fusion Culinary for Destination Marketing	12 Participants: 7 Japanese (including 1 experienced), 3 Italian, 1 Romanian, 1 Chinese university student	Ito City, Shizuoka, Japan

Table 1. *TCC and FC Details*

3.2. Approach

The present study pays attention to the participants' stancetaking practice, as it represents the notion of cooperation which is developed and deployed strategically or discursively from the outset to the completion of the project. Recent discussion on intercultural business discourse suggests that the complexity of intercultural issues can be approached from a multidisciplinary perspective (Tanaka and Bargiela-Chiappini 2012). I use a linguistically informed ethnographic approach to understand stancetaking practices in LFE Discourses (Davis and Henze 1998). Employing an ethnographic approach, interaction among participants was coded. My position as an insider enabled me to gain an emic perspective to my data analysis of the participants' stancetaking practices as situated social action. The data illustrate the process of stancetaking in the groups of participants, highlighting areas such as distancing, attentiveness, alignment, and commitment. The analysis documents the reality of LFE project sites in which, under cultural and linguistic constraints, the participants' multimodal stancetaking practices finally led to the achieving cooperative Discourse in the group.

Discourse analysis focusing on stance as a social practice aimed at exploring the participants' process of gaining literacy in a new Discourse. To capture the multimodal stancetaking practices, three research assistants videorecorded the participants' interactions during the programmes. To understand the participants' feelings and rationales for certain behaviour, informal interviews were carried out on-site.

In addition, after the projects, and with the intention of exploring the process of the participants' change in terms of learning the specific "lingo" and actions of the Discourse, semi-structured retrospective interviews were conducted on certain stancetaking behaviours and used as data for exploring the participants' cognitive activities. Relevant video segments were shown to interviewees, where possible, for the purpose of collecting

additional data. Because of practical constraints, post-event interviews were only possible with nine of the 12 Japanese students.

This qualitative study may have been influenced by researchers' subjective processes and social relationships with the participants, which may, to a degree, have interfered with objectivity. However, my involvement in the programmes affords me a perspective that serves the purpose of providing descriptive in-depth reports about how insiders' stancetaking practices were co-constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. Furthermore, interpretation of the recurrent issues through triangulation of data sources and data collection methods helps to ensure that the analyses are valid and that psychological reactions of the participants are comprehensible.

This study observes the Meisei University Code of Ethics for Research, in order to respect the rights and the dignity of research participants and to protect their privacy. Pseudo names are used for the individuals who gave consent to participate in the research. The photographs used in this article were downgraded for protecting privacy.

4. Data Analysis.
Discourse Construction, Literacy Acquisition, and Shift of Stance

This part first shows the multimodal analysis of the videorecorded data of the participants' stancetaking practices, then discusses the cognitive process of their literacy development as analysed from the participants' interview data that were collected in both Japanese and English, the data in Japanese being my translation.

Qualitative analysis identified four types of stance recurring in a certain order in the data: Distancing−Attentiveness−Alignment−Commitment. The observed unstable stance patterns that the participants displayed indicate a dynamic process of Discourse construction. The figures and excerpts were coded and shown as part of the recurrent data.

4.1. Distancing Stance

On the first day in the TCC, the participants from three universities gathered in the Transilvania University entrance hall. Although they were aware that they would all be working in the project together, with the exception of a few experienced participants, the majority did not initiate interaction with participants from other universities. Figure 1 shows participants from the Japanese and Italian universities drinking coffee,

where the Italians are looking, but the Japanese are averting their glance. Hyuma, a TCC participant (circled in the photo), confessed that he was so nervous, he did not feel like initiating any communicative action since nobody else did. In another part of the hall, female participants talked in a segregated group. Not only a lack of language exchange, but also limited eye contact with other participants, signals their distancing stance. Distancing stancetaking is quite common, at least in Japanese society, when people first meet. Previous sociolinguistic research indicates that active interaction with unknown others may not be highly valued in Japanese society. As part of negative politeness strategies, it is normal in Japan that people maintain social distance to convey respect for others' privacy (Brown and Levinson 1987). It could be interpreted that Japanese participants, being the largest group, transferred their typical Discourse practice to this intercultural Discourse at the beginning of the project.

Figure 1. *Hyuma's distancing stance*

Similar distancing attitudes were observed in the Fusion Culinary Project. Yuuri was in the team cooking sushi with parmigiano cheese, but stood at a distance gazing at the Italian students rolling sushi (Figure 2). Although a few participants with international experience tried to have a chat, stancetaking behaviour observed among novice participants was generally distancing; again, most participants were Japanese, including local senior citizens. As the project was located in a Japanese city, local traditional Discourse practice, that is, distancing from newcomers, could be transferred to this project site as well.

Figure 2. *Yuuri's distancing stance*

Post-event interviews revealed that Japanese participants' central attention was to their own language. The interviewees mostly talked about their lack of linguistic competence and their serious concern over syntactic and phonological correctness.

> **Interview data 1**
>
> 自分の使っている英語が間違っていると、相手が聞いてくれないの
> ではないのかと思って、間違わないように頭の中で英語を考えてい
> た」
>
> I was examining my English that I was going to talk because if I spoke wrong English, they would not listen to me (Yuuri, December 26, 2018).
>
> ちょっと英語が聞き取れないと思っていたので、話しかけられない
> ような態度になっていたかもしれない」
>
> I thought I was not able to comprehend English talk. I tried not to exhibit a kind of postures to be talked to. (Hyuma, July 2, 2017)

Japanese participants' interview data indicate that, even in an LFE context, they assumed that only correct English should be used, due to the influence of the Japanese education system, where correctness of English was portrayed as the most important aspect being tested in the classroom. Therefore, participants paid attention mostly to their own English with little consideration of the social context.

Romanian and Italian counterparts were also quiet in the beginning. Some of the Romanian participants paid more attention to Japanese participants rather than to their own way of using English:

Interview data 2

I thought they (Japanese participants) act differently, so I just waited to see what they would do (Ronald, August 30, 2016).

Excerpt 2 indicates that concerns for negative politeness and avoidance of imposition are not only noticed in Japanese participants, but also in Romanian participants.

4.2. Distancing to Attentiveness Stance Shift

Although several participants who had previously had access to this type of multicultural Discourse started interaction from the beginning, most novice participants were quiet. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that a few participants initiated interactive actions. They paid attention to other participants and started to talk with their peers. According to interviews, one of the reasons for these initiatives was the expansion of their attention. Initially, the novice participants were only concerned with their own English language. Later, they gradually started to pay attention to the people around them, namely experienced participants.

Interview data 3

気がついたら、美月さんとか、けっこう自分からルーマニアの人に話して、いい感じで会話しているのに気づきました。…あと表情とか…笑顔とか慣れてるなって。あ、自分から話しかけないとだめなんだと思いました。」

I noticed that Mitsuki was talking to Romanian participants and enjoyed the conversation. I found she was used to communicating with facial expressions…smiling…I thought I need to start talking to them. (Norika, October 19, 2018)

Norika saw Mitsuki, an experienced participant, show her literacy, which was embedded in her behaviour. Norika intentionally mimicked Mitsuki, not only in her behaviour of active interaction but also in her facial expressions including smiling. Thirty minutes later in TCC, while Norika was talking with her friends from Japan, she recognised Sandra with whom she was sharing a room and started talking to her (Figure 3).

Figure 3. *Norika's attentiveness stance*

Norika tried to tell Sandra that they were roommates (Excerpt 1), although it took some time before Sandra understood what Norika was trying to express.

Excerpt 1
Norika: Eh. Excuse me. You are my roommate…today.
Sandra: (does not understand what Norika said and smiles with confusion)
Norika: (laughter)
Sandra: …Sorry ….er
Norika: You are my roommate …from today…today.
Sandra: Ah. …Nice to meet you.
Norika: (Laughter and they shake hands)

Norika was talking with two other female Japanese participants and it was only Norika who recognised her roommate, Sandra. Norika tried to speak English to her, even though, at this stage, her fluency was still weak. She resorted to using other available communicative resources, such as facial expressions and laughter, to convey her attentiveness to Sandra. Two other participants avoided making eye contact with their Romanian counterparts (Figure 1). Norika was the one who extended her attention to her environment when she found the presence of her roommate and noticed the strategic deployment of facial expressions by experienced participants.

Interview data 4
フェイスブックで顔を知っているサンドラが見えたので、ああ今日
一緒の部屋にいる風景を思った。」

When I saw Sandra, I recognised her. I knew her through Facebook. I envisioned that I was staying with Sandra in a room. (Norika, October 19, 2018)

Norika was the first to talk to non-Japanese students in the TCC, and Yuuri was the first one in the Fusion Culinary Project. Yuuri initiated an exchange by mimicking the senior participants.

Interview data 5

見えてなかったと思います。最初はまわりが…自分の英語でいっぱい、いっぱいでした。でも上級生とかが話してたので、やっぱ、チームでやっていくから、発話してみると相手が理解しようとしてくれていることがわかりました」

In the beginning, I was not looking around. I paid attention only to my own English. I noticed my senior team member spoke out…because we work in a team…and when I talked, they tried to understand me. (Yuuri, December 6, 2018)

Despite the fact that they had little experience of using English for real life purposes, and that their English was not fluent, socio-cognitive analysis of the video recorded data and interview data of Norika (TCC) and Yuuri (Fusion Culinary Project) suggests that the two extended their attention to the environment. Yuuri mentioned that he was anticipating teamwork that would continue for two days after their initial encounter. I interpret that Yuuri's cognition of the chronological schema encouraged him to start interaction drawing on the argument that this schema helped relate incoming data (experienced students' stance) to their existing knowledge of teamwork tasks (Widdowson 1983). As a result, Norika and Yuuri's initiatives influenced the others, and some students started mimicking their practice.

4.3. Alignment Stance

In the TCC and the FCP, the participants were put into five (TCC) and two (FCP) teams respectively, consisting of either five or six members. Several participants shifted their stance from distancing to attentiveness, by possibly mimicking others' holistic communication. Thus, intercultural social interaction increased on worksites. Changes by a few participants gradually constructed a Discourse of the projects. In the meeting, tasks were given to each team. A few interviewees mentioned that participants

were aware they would need to cooperate to complete the tasks and that this would also require them to cooperate in developing literacy in this emergent Discourse. They started to talk in their own variants of English and started to ignore small grammar errors. They negotiated for mutual intelligibility in terms of pronunciation and word choice. Hyuma was one of the last participants who started to interact with the non-Japanese project members in TCC. Due to his lack of confidence in English, he kept silent and maintained social distance from other participants during the team meeting in the first two days. However, the video data recorded on the third day, indicate that Hyuma had become part of the team. His proximity to the other members and reaction to other participants' suggestions of new ideas by nodding or making eye contact demonstrate his alignment stance.

Figure 4. *Hyuma's alignment stance*

While Hyuma's stance shift was observed on the third day, Yuuri, in the Fusion Culinary Project, changed his stance from distancing to alignment one and a half hour after the groups met. While cooking sushi, it was revealed that Yuuri worked in a sushi restaurant and had professional knowledge and skills. As soon as Yuuri's expertise was known to the other participants, they asked Yuuri for advice and suggestions. This prompted him to interact with Italian participants even more actively than before, with gestures as well as facial and prosodic expressions (Figure 5). Yuuri was not quiet anymore; he made requests, asked questions, and gave suggestions with simple vocabulary.

Figure 5. *Yuuri's alignment stance*

Excerpt 2 shows Yuuri's interaction with Rosa in Figure 5.

Excerpt 2
Yuuri: …Would you get the vinegar?
Rosa: Balsamico?
Yuuri: Yes.

Interview data 6
「最初は、英語をちゃんと話した経験がないので恥かきたくないか
ら、話す気なかったです。（話せないのが）恥ずかしいし。でもみ
んな、なんかすしのこと誤解しているところがあって、これは俺が
言わないとだめじゃないかと思いました。」

I have no experience using English for real life purposes, so I had little
intention to initiate talk. I was worrying about losing face possibly because
of my poor English, but when I saw Italian participants cooking, I noticed
they misunderstood something about cooking sushi. I finally thought I
needed to explain. (Yuuri, December 6, 2018)

Yuuri's expertise influenced the Italian participants' behaviour. They
asked for advice and support, which gave him confidence. I deduce that
Yuuri's expertise is part of the literacy of the Discourse, and that his
actions speak louder than words. Hyuma and Yuuri both realised that, in
this LFE Discourse, people do not care much about their English as long
as their holistic stance conveys their message and attitude to other
participants. They realised that making errors helped them to start
negotiating meaning. This realisation encouraged them to become active

and this agency subsequently enhanced their sense of membership. Yuuri also mentioned the importance of practice rather than cramming.

> **Interview data 7**
>
> 英語を完全にして話すのではなく、使いながら覚えていくことが重要だと思いました」
>
> Rather than preparing perfect English, I realised that I needed to learn while using English. (Yuuri, December 6, 2018)

Video data also show evidence that Yuuri and Hyuma make use of non-linguistic and paralinguistic communication to supplement their verbal communication.

4.4. Commitment Data

By the end of both programmes, the participants had become literate in Discourse. Moreover, the data illustrate the participants' identity as team members of the projects, which, in turn, illuminates their commitment stance. Figure 6 shows Hyuma on the fifth day. Hyuma and Catarina were reviewing their visual data collection, so they could select adequate movie clips to add to their final presentation. They were not able to find suitable movie clips, and Catarina lacked confidence in her choice of clips, as she thought they were too short and irrelevant. In Figure 5, Catarina and Hyuma were discussing if they were going to search for other participants' data collections or stick to choosing one from their own collection. Hyuma tried to encourage Catarina and advised her to use her own movie clip rather than using somebody else's. The two participants finally agreed to compromise and use Catarina's. Although Hyuma's English was still unsophisticated (Excerpt 3), he made the best use of the skills he did have to communicate. His rich facial expressions and strong positive tone demonstrate his commitment stance. The data indicate that Hyuma gained enough literacy to contribute to the project as part of the TCC Discourse.

Figure 6. *Hyuma's commitment stance*

Excerpt 3

Hyuma: So Okay. This movie is okay (with a convincing tone).
Catarina: It's okay. We just make it like…shorter...like...okay you have seen the…like beginning of this issue.

The videorecording and interview data illustrate a general transition of participants' stance from distancing, attentiveness, and alignment to commitment. The next section provides commentaries and implication from the findings.

5. Commentary and Implications

The analyses in the previous section document stancetaking transitions while Discourse is being formed. From the outset, participants with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds worked together to achieve their goals. The most outstanding finding is that, despite constraints derived from their prior learning environments, participants continually attempted to search for adequate language, actions, and ways to use available communication tools to construct a Discourse of their own. A specific literacy was implicitly agreed upon and gradually developed by participants throughout the Discourse. While both research sites were similar, the participants themselves differed in terms of linguistic competence and cultural backgrounds, and as subject-matter specialists. Nevertheless, the analyses of the two PBL programmes show similar trends in the data as task completion gave participants no choice but to interact (Firth 2009). Although Japanese participants' prior English education had moulded their perception of English language, they were

able to redefine their perceptions and to become fluent in the literacy of their Discourse.

In terms of the first research question, the results of this investigation show the dynamic nature of Discourse and the reciprocal influence of stance and Discourse. It also highlights how participants construct their own Discourse by their stance and how, similarly, their stances were constructed by changing Discourse. According to Gee (1991), an "apprenticeship" would be one way of joining a Discourse, which means individuals are disciplined by people within the Discourse. A constructivist understanding emerging from this study is that the Discourse multicultural participants developed was not a monolithic, globalised Discourse; rather, Discourses were multiple and situated in context. Thus, the participants are apprentices as well as co-constructors. They need not only to mimic and learn, but also invent ways of saying, doing, being, valuing, and believing (Gee 1991) as a means of developing their literacy. Tuning their stance to a dynamic Discourse is part of literacy practice.

Another major finding was that extended cognition helps novice participants develop literacy. Regarding my second research question, the data show that the acquisition process includes attention and interaction with a social environment, awareness of social construction, and conscious choice of available communication tools. When shifting from distancing to attentiveness, the participants in this study extended their attention as the first step. By doing this, participants became conscious of how speakers, both novices and experienced participants, were co-constructing language on the spot. They recognised how the experienced participants were deploying their communicative resources, strategically or intuitively, as well as how they were using the English language *per se*. This resulted in a heightened awareness of how English communication in the LFE worksite is a product of social construction among participants and that using "correct English", as had been reinforced in their English classrooms, was of secondary importance. Furthermore, the data suggest that participants' awareness of Discourse as a product of their own social interaction enhanced their Discourse membership, ultimately leading to a commitment stance. These findings suggest that participants' learning resulted in active interaction with external resources. Qualitative research inherently involves hypothesis development rather than hypothesis testing. The implication from the second research question generates a weak hypothesis that could be further explored.

Concerning pedagogical implications, the data demonstrate that integrated, holistic learning provided by PBL is an effective and necessary way to develop competence, such as has been demonstrated here with

situated literacy. As Gee (2004, 77) put it: "people learn best when their learning is part of highly-motivated engagement with social practices which they value". Initial engagement with PBL challenges participants' perceptions that learning is the cognitive activity of one's brain and that language is an innate system in the human brain; however, PBL experiences finally emancipated participants from these conventional views.

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Chapter Sixteen

Stance and Stancetaking in Romanian and American School Debates

Carmen-Ioana Radu

1. Introduction

Moving from one social system to another requires young people to make changes to their mentality and value system, both of which are shaped by education. School debates, as shown below, are a suitable way for individual students or teams to form and freely express their opinions on a given topic, and do so in an assertive manner.

Stance/perspective and stancetaking/perspectivation (Graumann 2002; Graumann and Kallmeyer 2002; Du Bois 2007; Englebretson 2007; Vasilescu 2018; Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018), generally seen as expressing one's beliefs, are important conversational aspects that shape the flow of a debate, especially because the participants have to defend their own opinions and then understand and contest the perspective of the opponent. In this respect, stancetaking is a constitutive and integral aspect of the debate.

1.1. Research Aims and Data Presentation

In this chapter, we will analyse how stance and stancetaking are inherent in a school debate, and also how they function. We will compare two school debates from the point of view of the speakers' attitude: a Romanian and an American debate, both addressing topics of wide interest among teenagers, and not only.

The Romanian debate[1] we are going to analyse addresses the topic of whether zoos should be banned. It is a sample debate, provided by ARDOR[2] and recorded in 2018, involving teenage students who are approximately 15 years old. The American debate[3] is also a sample debate, recorded in 2012, whose participants are teenage students of approximately 12 years old. This debate was provided by MSPDP[4] and it addresses the topic of whether television is a bad influence on children/teenagers. We will work with the transcripts of the two debates.

When distinguishing between perspectivation and stancetaking, the differences are not significant: the first is evaluative (Graumann 2002, 37) and implies two complementary activities (perspective-setting and perspective-taking), while the second is a public act involving "explicit communicative means" that a person engages in and positions himself/herself with respect to (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2018, 343).

A way of representing the functioning of stancetaking is the stance triangle: there are two subjects (in our case, the two debating teams) and an object (in our case, the motion being debated). In this case, there are three activities, since both the first and the second subject, the two stancetakers, evaluate the object, position themselves with respect to it, and then align with each other (Du Bois 2007, 163). In general, the use of stance refers to "beliefs, attitudes and values" (Englebretson 2007, 10) and to "challenging the prior speaker" (Keisanen 2007, 253); this is why a debate is the verbal interaction that best illustrates stancetaking. According to Englebretson (2007, 6), there are five principles of stancetaking, and they apply perfectly to any debate: stance is a personal belief or attitude, it is observable/interpretable, interactional, indexical (gives information about the broader sociocultural framework), and consequential. From the perspective of the debate, stance is jointly "constructed, negotiated, and realized in and through interaction" (Englebretson 2007, 19).

In school debates, stance/perspective is the core mechanism. The attitude of the participants is generally situated within the area of cooperation, because the speakers contradict each other assertively, by using argumentation, and not by trying to attack each other's face. However, as we will show, there are some differences between the way

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[1] The video of the Romanian debate can be accesed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOQOkBsR-dQ.

[2] *Asociaţia Română de Dezbateri, Oratorie şi Retorică* [*The Romanian Association for Debates, Oratory, and Rhetorics*], https://ardor.org.ro/.

[3] The video of the American debate can be accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vv1S9QPblv0.

[4] Middle School Public Debate Program, https://kate-shuster-54jq.squarespace.com/.

Romanian and American students debate and use various techniques of argumentation. We are also going to conduct an analysis of different types of arguments, especially paralogisms, in the two debates.

1.2. Relevant Conversational Aspects in a Debate

Debates are an inherently confrontational type of verbal interaction, in which opposing teams choose/are assigned a motion (a statement, a proposition, or resolution that usually sets the topic for the given debate) to support or oppose. Each team tries to convince the judge or jury to decide in their favour. Thus, the judge's decision is to be influenced by means of arguments and strategies of argumentation, such as quoting, the use of rhetorical questions, teasing or the use of irony. Each team's point of view is presented to the judge, who, in turn, finds himself/herself on one side or the other. The judge's decision is influenced and brought about by the participants in the debate. Things function the same way in a school debate.

When debating and competing for the judge's final decision, speakers also defend their personal image and try to influence other people. At the same time, when defending their personal image, they sometimes attack the opponents' image. The way they defeat the opposing point of view is not always assertively attained.

Debates have both monological and dialogical parts, though the monological ones are prevalent. However, each monological segment, except for the first one, is a response to the previous section. From this perspective, they have a background structure, as a dialogue would.

Our analysis is based on the functionality of stance and stancetaking in school debates. Any form of communication involves stancetaking, but in a debate it is a constitutive feature. Therefore, taking part in a debate is a form of stancetaking in itself. Debates presuppose the idea of relativity when it comes to human knowledge. Taking part in a debate means evaluating the same idea from two different perspectives that belong to different speakers.

Our analysis is also based on the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984). Their theory maintains that the purpose of argumentation is to solve differences of opinion, and therefore the opposition of argumentative roles represents the main feature of argumentative speech. Argumentative speech is based mainly on valid arguments (deductive or inductive) of the syllogism or enthymeme type, but we are not interested in this type of arguments in our analysis, since they are extremely common. What interests us are fallacies

or paralogisms, which are considered bad logic or gaps in logic. Nevertheless, they play a very important part in argumentation and they function perfectly in rhetoric.

When analysing paralogisms, we accounted for the most common ones: *ad verecundiam* (appealing to authority to impose an argument), *ad misericordiam* (appealing to pity to inforce an argument), the *converse accident* fallacy (using a bad example to make a generalisation), *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (or the chanticleer fallacy: assuming that if one thing follows another, the first thing caused the second one), *reductio ad absurdum* (taking an opponent's argument to its illogical conclusion), the *straw man* fallacy (attacking a weaker version of the argument instead of dealing with the actual issue), or the *red herring* (the fallacy of distraction)[5].

2. School Debates

School debates have their own structure and rules that are known and accepted by the participants. They also have strict limits, an aspect that gives them an official character. School debates are competitions of ideas where two teams use arguments and counter-arguments in an attempt to convince the judge and the audience of the truth of their argument and of their own rhetorical abilities.

One of the most well-known and efficient forms of debate is the Karl Popper format (Kennedy 2007; Codreanu 2016), which involves six speakers, grouped in two teams of three members each, and six mandatory speeches: affirmative constructive (A1), negative constructive (N1), first affirmative rebuttal (A2), first negative rebuttal (N2), second affirmative rebuttal (A3), and second negative rebuttal (N3). There are also at least five mandatory episodes of cross-examination, when all speakers (except for the first one) are interrupted and challenged to answer the opponents' direct or indirect questions. This type of debate usually ends with two short summarising speeches, which are delievered by one member of each team. The team that supports the motion is the affirmative side, and the one that contests it is the negative side.

In the case of a school debate, stance/perspective is imposed on the teenagers, because they are always assigned (sometimes randomly) both the topic of the debate and the side they have to defend. In a debate, the speakers position themselves in relation to the topic, which is already given; they also position themselves vis-à-vis the jury, the members of

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[5] For a short description of them see Lanham 1991.

their team and of the opposing team, and the audience. At first, they are forced to take a certain position in relation to the topic, but the more they argue for their side of the motion, the more they believe in it. At this point, external stance/perspective is internalised and one can observe how, in the case of debates, stancetaking is a gradual process.

School debates include moments of cross-examination, which means that speakers from each team can ask questions related to the presented case arguments to their opponents. All in all, in a debate, there are six individual speeches that either present or contradict a speaker's perspective. The position of each team is assigned by drawing lots and the students have time to study and prepare their initial speeches. The speech of the affirmative constructive speaker (A1) is entirely prepared and delievered as such, all other speeches suffer alterations and become spontaneous, due to what the opponents say.

School debates develop the spirit of tolerance, an open mind, and interest towards the diversity of the viewpoints. Therefore, school debates are a means of teaching young students to provide arguments for their own decisions, to be able to recognise both sides of an argument, and, last, but not least, to communicate efficiently in any circumstances.

3. Case Studies

The two sample debates bring forward two topics of wide interest, namely whether zoos should be preserved (the Romanian debate) and whether television is a bad influence on teenagers (the American debate).

3.1. The Romanian Debate ("Zoos Should Be Banned")

The first speaker in the Romanian debate (A1) takes her first stance when she is assigned the role of the affirmative constructive. Roles are usually assigned by drawing lots, therefore stance is imposed in this case and it is a stance taken in relation to the topic of the debate.

(1) A1: *Mulţumesc, doamnelor şi domnilor!* Este momentul să recunoaştem că *pentru prea mult timp ne-am delectat şi am obţinut profit de pe urma suferinţei animalelor*. Acum a venit momentul să ne oprim. Prioritatea noastră ca echipă a guvernului reprezintă bunăstarea animalelor şi respectarea drepturilor acestora, *de aceea dorim să implementăm moţiunea de a interzice grădinile zoologice*.

A1: *Thank you, ladies and gentlemen!* It is time we admitted that, for too long, *we have derived enjoyment and profit from animals'*

> *suffering.* It is time we stopped. Our priority as a government team is the animals' well-being and respecting their rights, *that is why we wish to implement the motion of banning zoos*.

The speaker starts with the strategy of thanking the audience in an attempt of *captatio benevolentiae*. Her next strategy is making the audience (she includes herself in this group) feel guilty for the animals' suffering, when she associates them with gaining profit from it, and is immediately followed by the announcement of the motion. At the same time, she uses an *ad misericordiam* argument, when she appeals to the audience's pity for animals. The speech of the affirmative constructive part is well structured, since it announces the arguments the speaker is going to make use of:

> (2) A1: Vom prezenta două argumente: primul, că *grădinile zoologice provoacă suferinţă animalelor*, iar al doilea argument, că *atragerea animalelor în grădinile zoologice înrăutăţeşte perspectivele speciei din sălbăticie*.
>
> A1: We shall present two arguments: the first one, that *zoos cause suffering to animals*, and the second, that *sourcing animals to zoos makes the situation worse for the species in the wild*.

The arguments of the affirmative constructive speaker are extremely important, because the other speakers from the same team are not allowed to bring up any other arguments. At the same time, the first speaker suggests an alternative to zoos, thus foreseeing possible counter-arguments from the opposing team (the necessity of preserving certain endangered species and the need for them to be seen by children):

> (3) A1: Considerăm că grădinile zoologice reprezintă unităţi inumane şi fac rău şi, de aceasta, *propunem o alternativă*, şi anume *conservarea animalelor în rezervaţii naturale şi safariuri, unde am duce animalele eliberate odată cu desfiinţarea grădinilor zoologice*. Acolo se vor bucura de un ecosistem, unde vor avea locul întreg, hectare întregi, şi vor putea interacţiona cu alţi membri ai speciei şi îşi vor vâna hrana.
>
> A1: We believe that zoos are inhumane and that they cause harm; that is why *we suggest an alternative*, namely *preserving animals in natural reservations and safari parks, where we would release the animals that will be freed once zoos are abolished*. They will enjoy an eco-system, where they will have room, acres of land, and they will be able to interact with other members of the species and hunt for food.

It is in these first three fragments that the speaker positions herself towards the topic, towards the audience, the jury, and the opposing teams. For the rest of her speech, she develops the arguments that she had introduced, using the examples of lions and presenting the situation in zoos. It is in the end that she takes stance again, this time towards the jury, another receiver of her message:

(4) A1: În concluzie, *vă rog să votaţi* pentru această moţiune, pentru a respecta drepturile animalelor. *Mulţumesc!*
A1: In conclusion, *please vote* for this motion, to respect animal rights. *Thank you!*

The role of the first speaker from the opposing team (N1, the negative constructive speaker) is influential, because the first stance he takes is relative to the opposing team and their arguments. It is at this point that the debate as such begins:

(5) N1: În discursul meu de astăzi voi avea un *punct principal de contra-argumentare* vis-a-vis de argumentul adus de echipa Guvernului, după care voi prezenta propria mea parte constructivă legată *de ce încurajează statul să ofere condiţii bune acestor animale*, şi, mai mult decât atât, colega mea va prezenta ceva despre *cum divertismentul acesta este bun pentru oameni.*

N1: In my speech today I shall have a *main point of counter-argumentation* regarding the argument brought up by the Government team, after which I shall present my own constructive part regarding *why the state encourages [zoos] to keep the animals in good conditions,* and, more than that, my colleague is going to talk about *how this type of entertainment is good for people*.

It is at this moment that the negative constructive speaker takes stance towards the topic; he introduces the two arguments of his team and, as in the case of the first team, no further arguments will be accepted later. When taking stance towards the opposing team and their arguments, he advances the idea that there are many visually pleasing animals that live in captivity and their masters take good care of them. This is a good example of the *straw man* fallacy, since the speaker attacks a weaker version of the argument (some animals are well taken care of) instead of dealing with the actual issue (the problem of captivity). The first compulsory episode of cross-examination takes place when the second affirmative rebuttal speaker (A3) has her first intervention:

(6) A3: *Uite*, proprietarii acestor animale le privesc ca pe nişte obiecte care sunt uşor de înlocuit din sălbăticie.
N1: *Mulţumesc! Nu cred* că ăsta este adevărul pentru că să capturezi un leu pare destul de complicat şi, mai mult decât atât, este, e mult mai ieftin şi mai simplu, pur şi simplu să îngrijesc leul pe care deja îl am. Nu mai trebuie să spun de chestii mai mari, ca un elefant, un bizon, un urs, care sunt deja animale complicate.

A3: *Look*, the owners of these animals regard them as objects that can be easily replaced with others from the wild.
N1: *Thank you! I don't think* this is the truth, because capturing a lion seems quite complicated and, more than that, it is much cheaper and much easier to take care of the lion I already have. No need to mention bigger stuff, like an elephant, a buffalo, a bear, which are already complicated animals.

The episodes of cross-examination like (6) are very intense moments in the economy of the debate, because stances are clearly taken and defended. The second affirmative rebuttal speaker (A3) uses the interjection *look* to soften disagreement when she introduces her idea. The negative constructive speaker (N1) reinforces politeness (*Thank you!*) and takes a clear stance (*I don't think*). In cross-examination episodes, ideas are immediately defended and defeated, because such interventions should be very short and concise. This is a case of a *converse accident* fallacy, in which a bad example (animals being replaced with other animals from the wild) is used in order to make a generalisation.

In his speech, the negative constructive speaker (N1) also uses rhetorical questions, when he reinforces one of the arguments of his team (the state encourages zoos to offer better conditions to animals):

(7) N1: *Şi de ce e asta important?* Este păi, în primul rând, e bine pentru că e clar că aceste specii nu mai ajung pe cale de extincţie şi nu mai mor, când în habitatul lor natural n-ar avea şanse sau habitatul lor natural per se este pus în pericol de dezvoltarea umană, care distruge păduri ş.a.m.d. *OK, şi care e motivarea asta a statului?* Păi motivarea este faptul că animalele astea fac bani.

N1: *And why is this important?* It is, well, in the first place, it is a good thing because it is obvious that these species do not become extinct and do not die anymore, when they wouldn't stand a chance in their natural habitat or their natural habitat per se would be endangered by human developement that destroys forests, and so on. *OK, and which is that motivation of the state?* Well, the motivation is that these animals bring in money.

The two questions with rhetorical function involve the audience and the jury more, and are an important strategy that is commonly used in debates.

Stance is also clearly taken in the speech of the first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2), when he counterattacks one side-argument of the opposing team:

(8) A2: Practic, *ce ne spun ei*, este încă de la început, de pe primul lor discurs, că este nevoie ca animalele astea să aibă un loc unde pot să fie observate cu atenţie şi unde se poate asigura supravieţuirea speciei. *Credem că*, în primul rând, argumentul ăsta pleacă de la o *premisă fundamental greşită* şi anume că oamenii trebuie să aibă grijă ca animalele să supravieţuiască.

A2: Basically, *what they are telling us* even from the start, in their first speech, is that it is necessary for these animals to have a place where they can be carefully observed and where the species' survival can be ensured. *We believe that*, in the first place, this argument starts from *a completely wrong assumption,* namely that humans need to ensure that animals survive.

The first affirmative rebuttal speaker uses a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, taking the opponent's argument (the existence of places where some animals should be taken care of), which is a very good one, to an illogical conclusion, the one that people shouldn't take care of animals in need. The use of the personal pronouns *they/us* indicates a clear dissociation between the two teams and especially of the speaker, who includes himself in the larger group of the audience. Another mark of obvious stancetaking is the use of *we believe that*; in this case *we* refers to the affirmative team and the speaker's point of view is, in fact, that of the team. The superlative *completely wrong* implies total rejection; it is an indicator of the position that the affirmative team takes and its subsequent evaluation.

Over the course of the debate, during all the speeches, except for the one of the affirmative constructive speaker (A1), there are several attempts of cross-examination, i.e. members of the opposing team try to interrupt by asking questions or launching ideas, in order to create difficult moments for the speaker. The speaker has the right to refuse these interventions, but accepting at least one episode is mandatory. For instance, the first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2) accepts and gives an answer to the following intervention coming from the first negative constructive speaker (N1):

(9) N1: Putem totuşi măsura cât de bine se simte un animal şi, până la urmă, ce înseamnă că un animal se simte bine şi e fericit?
A2: *Noi* spunem că un mod foarte bun de a măsura este speranţa de viaţă a animalelor şi vedem că speranţa de viaţă a animalelor, *cum v-am zis încă de pe primul nostru discurs*, e mult mai mică în captivitate.

N1: Still, can we measure how well an animal feels, and after all, what does it mean for an animal to feel well and be happy?
A2: *We* say that a very good means of measuring [that] is the animals' life expectancy and we see that animals' life expectancy, *as we mentioned even in our first speech*, is much lower in captivity.

The first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2) clearly takes stance again in relation to the opposing team when using the personal pronoun *we* and when reminding his opponent they are discussing an idea previously mentioned by A1. In this case, *we see how* introduces an *ad verecundiam* argument, which is an invalid deductive reference (the animals' life expectancy is lower in captivity) that involves appeals to inappropriate authority or appeals to the testimony of non-experts (the teenagers are not experts or an appropriate authority).

The first negative rebuttal speaker (N2) starts by counter-attacking the arguments of the opposing team. When it comes about natural reservations, she starts negotiating:

(10) N2: Mai departe s-a vorbit despre cum am putea să conservăm animalele în rezervaţii naturale. *OK, acceptăm acest punct*, animalele ar putea să stea acolo, *doar că* nu-şi face impactul de grădină zoologică, pentru că pe această moţiune vorbim de animalele din grădini zoologice, deoarece acestea au cel mai mare impact faţă de oameni, pentru că în rezervaţiile naturale, având în vedere că trebuie să fie un spaţiu foarte mare, înseamnă că o să fie foarte departe de oraşele mari, ceea ce înseamnă că nu o să fie atât de accesibil pentru oameni, ceea ce înseamnă că nu atât de mulţi oameni o să se ducă şi astfel, moţiunea nu o să aibă un impact adevărat şi asta o să vorbesc mai mult pe argumentul meu.

N2: Then there was talk about how we could preserve animals in natural reservations. *OK, we accept this point of view*, animals could stay there, *but* that doesn't have the impact of a zoo, because in this motion we are talking about animals in zoos, since they have the greatest impact on people, because in the case of natural reservations, seeing as the space needs to be very big, it means it will be very far away from big cities, which means it won't be so accesible and not so

many people will go. Thus, the motion won't have any real impact and
I discuss this more in my argument.

When the two teams start alligning, yet remaining in different positions,
N2 continues to dismantle the case of the opposing team and accepts the
episode of cross-examination before building his own case:

(11)   A2: De ce avem neapărată nevoie de grădini zoologice ca să-i punem
       pe oameni în contact cu animalele în secolul tehnologiei în care avem
       inclusiv posibilitatea să avem grădini 3D, fie pe internet?
       N2: Mulţumesc! Asta o să vorbesc în argumentul meu.

       A2: Why do we necessarily need zoos to place people in contact with
       animals in the century of technology when we even have the possibility
       of creating 3D zoos or zoos on the internet?
       N2: Thank you! I will talk about it when I discuss my argument.

This time, the question of the first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2) is not
so inspired since it tackles an issue that N2 was going to talk about.
Moreover, the intervention of the first affirmative rebuttal speaker starts
with a *straw man* fallacy: the argument referring to 3D virtual zoos is not
the actual point of the debate, it is a weaker argument.
      The speech of A3 (the second affirmative rebuttal speaker) starts
powerfully with two questions with rhetorical function:

(12)   A3: Două mari puncte astăzi. *În primul rând, unde este interesul
       animalelor asigurat? Iar în al doilea rând, care este atitudinea
       oamenilor şi care este impactul asupra acestor animale?*

       A3: Two main issues today. *First, how are the animals' best interests
       protected? Second, what is people's attitude and what is the impact on
       these animals?*

The two questions signal the speaker's stancetaking against the arguments
of the opposing team (the animals' interest is ensured, they are well taken
care of; visiting a zoo is a good form of entertainment, without negative
impact on animals). The last speaker from the affirmative team uses very
powerful images, when she takes stance and defends their case:

(13)   A3: *Vedem* că multe animale mor de singurătate în grădini zoologice,
       din cauză că puii le sunt răpiţi, *vedem* că multe animale sunt tratate în
       nişte cuşti mult prea mici pentru spaţiul de care au într-adevăr nevoie,
       vedem că sunt mult prea multe semne care indică că bunăstarea
       animalelor nu poate să fie asigurată pentru că sunt supuse unui stres

psihologic, atât din partea administraţiei care le deţine, cât şi din partea publicului.

> A3: *We see* that many animals die of loneliness in zoos, because their cubs are taken from them, *we see* that many animals are kept in cages that are much too small compared to the space they really need, *we see* too many signs showing that the animals' well-being cannot be ensured because they are under psychological stress both from the administration that owns them and from the public.

When taking stance relative to her team's case, A3 uses *ad misericordiam* arguments, thus appealing to the pity of the audience and of the jury. When positioning herself in favour of the motion and against the opposing team, the second affirmative rebuttal speaker (A3) includes the audience and the jury in her speech; she uses the personal pronoun *we* three times. She is interrupted by a cross-examination episode, initiated by the negative constructive speaker (N1), and she accepts confrontation:

> (14) N1: Da! Păi cum rezolvăm animale ca urşii panda, care nu mai au un habitat natural, în care să se dezvolte sau să facem rezervaţii?
> A3: Sigur! Urşii panda în continuare au habitat natural, dar dacă asta e cea mai mare problemă, întotdeauna există moduri de creere a acestor habitate. Dacă vrei să faci o pădure de bambus, ai cum să faci acest lucru. Soluţia nu este să le îngrădeşti în 50 de metri pătraţi, iar acela să fie spaţiul lor.
>
> N1: Yes! Well, how do we deal with animals like panda bears that no longer have a natural habitat, where they can develop, or shall we create reservations?
> A3: Sure! Panda bears still have a natural habitat, but, if this is the biggest problem, there are always ways to create these habitats. If you want to create a bamboo forest, you have the means to do it. The solution is not to fence them in 50 square metres, and for that to be their [living] space.

In this episode, the negative constructive speaker (N1) brings up the argument of the panda bears, but A3, who is a very good speaker, defends her stance successfully. She continues her speech with similar powerful images, meant to appeal to the audience:

> (15) A3: Ni se spune că oamenii vor deveni mai conştienţi şi o să fie astfel mai atenţi cu animalele şi o să le pese mai mult. Sigur! O fetiţă de cinci ani cu tatăl ei, care aruncă ciocolată la lei, o să devină dintr-o dată mai empatică cu aceste animale, la fel şi părintele ei, care o lasă să

facă acest lucru, deşi la grădina zoologică se spune specific să nu hrăneşti animalele. Vedem că oamenii observă aceste animale ca surse pure de divertisment şi nimic mai mult în cadrul grădinii zoologice.

A3: We are told that people will become more aware and thus, more protective of animals and they will care more. Sure! A five-year-old girl who is with her father and who is throwing chocolate at the lions, will suddenly become more empathetic towards these animals, and so will her father, who lets her do this, even though the zoo specifically requests visitors not to feed the animals. We can see that people treat these animals as pure sources of entertainment and nothing more within the zoo.

However, when appealing to the audience, A3 uses a *converse accident* fallacy, when she gives the bad example of a five-year old girl to make a generalisation.

The negative team maintains balance in taking stance and the second negative rebuttal speaker (N3) tries to reject the previous argument:

(16) N3: Nu este singurul tip de oameni care merge la grădina zoologică, există şi grupuri de elevi care merg cu profesorii lor ca să vadă, ca să înveţe, ca să interacţioneze şi audienţa ţintă a acestor grădini zoologice sunt copiii, copii care sunt de altfel foarte impresionabili de animale sălbatice văzute pe viu.

N3: This isn't the only kind of people who go to the zoo, there are also groups of students who go with their teachers to look, to learn, to interact, and the target audience for these zoos are the children, who are otherwise very impressed by seeing live wild animals.

Allignment between the two teams regarding the evaluation of the motion on debate is permanently and assertively maintained. The second affirmative rebuttal speaker (A3) comes in with an episode of cross-examination, accepted by N3, who defends the stance he had taken:

(17) A3: *Ne-ai povestit* despre cum această experienţă a grădinilor zoologice te învaţă ceva. Dar cum te învaţă ceva în momentul în care tot din jurul acestor animale este artificial? Cum e o lecţie asta reală?
      N3: Nu este o lecţie complet corectă şi *cu asta suntem de acord*, dar este un mod mult mai bun de a învăţa despre animale în sine, nu neapărat despre ce le înconjoară, decât o rezervaţie, cum urmează să vă explic.

A3: *You told us* this zoos experience teaches you something. But how can it teach you when everything around these animals is artificial? How is this a real lesson?

N3: It is not a completely corect lesson and *we agree with that*, but it is a much better way to learn about the animals themselves, not necessarily about what surrounds them, than a reservation, as I am about to explain.

This cross-examination episode rather resembles a conversation between two friends (with teasing episodes and moments of clarifying aspects), who negotiate assertively over a point of view; yet stances are maintained.

At the end of the debate, after all six participants had spoken for 4 minutes, 2 minutes are alloted to a speaker from each team to summarise their arguments and draw conclusions. In our case, it is the first negative rebuttal speaker (N2) and the first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2) who are given this important task. N2 speaks first (the order is assigned by drawing lots) and, after giving a brief presentation of the main ideas set forth by her team, she takes stance towards the audience and the jury and concludes:

(18) N2: Deoarece, punând în balanţă ideile care s-au vorbit astăzi, *vedem* cum ar fi un impact negativ major pentru societate şi pentru animale să închidem grădinile zoologice, *vă rugăm, nu votaţi moţiunea*!

N2: Because, weighing the ideas that were brought up today, *we can see* that closing zoos would have a major negative impact on the society and on the animals themselves, *please don't vote the motion*!

She uses the first person plural subject pronoun to include herself in the audience group and she considers the impact on the society and on the animals to be the most important argument for her team. In the end, she addresses the jury directly, asking them not to vote the motion.

A2 summarises the two main arguments of his team and expresses his position towards the jury:

(19) A2: Deci, la finalul zilei, pentru că puii de leu sunt la fel de drăguţi şi pe internet, *vă rugăm să votaţi moţiunea*!
A2: So, at the end of the day, because lion cubs are just as cute on the internet as they are in real life, *we ask you to vote the motion*!

He uses the first person plural subject pronoun to speak in the name of his team and he addresses the jury directly, using an appealing argument and asking them to vote the motion.

In the case of the Romanian debate, the short format of the Karl Popper debate was used, meaning that shorter periods of time were alloted to each speaker than in the classical format (4 minutes instead of 5). However, this aspect did not influence the way teenagers debate.

3.2. American Debate
("Television Is a Bad Influence for Children")

In the case of the American debate, the classical format of the Karl Popper debate was used, meaning that 5 minutes were alloted to the first two speakers from each team and 3 minutes to each of the summarising speeches.

The first speaker in the American debate, the affirmative constructive speaker (A1), positions himself and the entire team in favour of the motion:

> (1) A1: The proposition side of this debate believes that television is a very bad influence *for these reasons*.

As a general feature of the American debate, speeches are very well structured, and arguments are introduced from the very beginning (*for these reasons*). Stancetaking is a gradual process that makes teenagers become more and more involved. A1 introduces the first argument of his team and then he explains it, expanding on several ideas:

> (2) A1: Our **first point is that children mimic bad things.** If a child under thirteen sees something on TV, they are very likely to want to feel more mature and try to view these things. But there are many bad things on TV: there's violence, there's drugs, language, alcohol use.

Each argument is introduced in the same manner and stance is clearly defined each time:

> (3) A1: Our **second point is there is no health.** When you're sitting watching TV, there is no health in that. You won't …, you will lose no weight, you could possibly even gain weight cause many people eat when they watch TV.

After introducing and developing the second argument of their team, the affirmative constructive speaker uses his first rhetorical question. This question is far fetched. It is inspired from the political discourse, where we encounter the idea that children of the future represent the image of the country and that their generation is going to run America. However, the

question has a powerful role, since it addresses both the public and the opposing team:

> (4) A1: Then, *how will you be able to run America*, since the children of the future are America, how will you be able to run America when you grow up?

The public of any debate takes stance, in turns, towards each of the debating teams and their arguments make the public balance between their points of view. The presence of such rhetorical questions plays an essential role in this process. However, the rhetorical question formulated by the affirmative constructive speaker contains a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, as not all the children of America watch too much television and, thus, endanger their health.

The first cross-examination episode is provoked by the first negative constructive speaker:

> (5) N1: You can eat things like vegetables or healthy things while you're watching TV.
> A1: Yes, you could, but how many kids you know who grab a carrot and go watch some cartoons?

The affirmative constructive speaker reacts accordingly and uses a rhetorical question. In the American debate, all episodes of cross-examination are extremely intense. A1 reacts rapidly to his opponent's questions and goes on presenting his next argument:

> (6) A1: *Our **third point is that there are many beneficial activities that are lost when you watch TV.*** There are many important things that kids thirteen and under need to do. One of them is homework.

The first constructive speaker is a very good one, and good debaters are usually assigned this position because a powerful start is essential for any debate. When he comes to the idea of homework, he makes use of another rhetorical question, which is again very powerful and impactful:

> (7) A1: If you are not doing your…, if you are watching TV instead of doing homework, then how are you going to get good grades and how are you going to pass school?

A1 displays mastery of the techniques of persuasive discourse. When developing the subsequent argument about lack of quality time spent with family and friends due to time spent in front of television, he builds his

speech in a flow of ideas. This flow reaches its climax with another rhetorical question that addresses the audience and the jury:

> (8) A1: You have no time to be social with friends or to talk to your family and hang out with them, what will you grow up to be?

Both (7) and (8) contain *converse accident* fallacies, because A1 uses the bad example of children who watch too much television (instead of doing homework or socialising) to make a generalisation. His entire speech is based on the idea of children seen as the future of America, children who are supposed to grow up in an ideal manner and help their society progress. Presidential speeches are regarded as an extremely educational TV, as can be deduced in the second episode of cross-examination from the speech of the first constructive speaker:

> (9) N2: What if their homework is to watch a presidential speech on TV?
> A1: Then, that's great. But most of the time… OK, yes, kids can watch presidential speech and over, but most of the time they are watching cartoons or violent shows.

The speech continues in the same manner. The affirmative constructive speaker presents their next argument, he explains it and then he addresses a rhetorical question to the opposing team, to the audience, and to the jury:

> (10) A1: *Our **fourth point is the stereotypes.*** In many cartoons and shows the good guys usually portray this pretty and shining light on them and then the bad guys kind of dark and ugly. If kids watch these shows and get these stereotypes stuck in their mind, what do you think will happen when they grow up?

On one hand, the use of the possessive adjective *our* clearly shows involvement and stancetaking of the affirmative team towards the topic they have to defend. The first affirmative constructive speaker uses it when he introduces each argument of his team:

> (11) A1: *Our **fifth point is obsession.*** It's fantasy versus reality. If *you* are sitting on the couch watching three to four or two hours TV every day, then *you* are going to confuse the real life with entertainment.

On the other hand, the use of the personal pronoun *you* with a general meaning is a strategy of directly involving the audience and the jury and of making the speech more appealing. The first affirmative constructive speaker also uses a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, when he tries to

illustrate their point about obsession (in the end, children don't confuse their lives with entertainment).

The first negative constructive speaker has a very difficult task, since he has to attack the arguments of his opponent and advance the arguments of his own team in the same period of time that his opponent had been allotted. He starts by clearly taking stance against the motion and against the opposing team:

> (12) N1: *There are many cases when television can be a good influence. I*'m going to tell you why television is not a bad influence for children under thirteen. First, I would like to *refute my opponent's points. They* said that children can mimic bad things, but children can also mimic the good things they see on TV.

The use of personal pronouns *I*/*they* clearly illustrates this opposition. The first negative constructive speaker (N1) begins his speech using the first person singular instead of the first-person plural, in an attempt to make his speech an individual one; this is not recommended in a team debate. However, later on in his speech, after he had refuted all his opponent's points, he uses the first-person plural to show partial agreement. But then, when he introduces their first argument, he comes back to using the first person singular (*my*):

> (13) N1: *We* agree with the proposition that TV does have some bad influences. But the goods outweigh the bad. Now, for *my* own point: **first, television provides a healthy message for children**. Disney Channel, for example, has many shows that encourage children to eat well.

> (14) N1: **Second, TV can be educational.** According to the *New Yorker*, IQs of people and children mostly increase by three points in the last thirty years.

In the case of N1, even if he only has time to introduce and develop two main arguments (compared to the five discussed by the opposing team), he supports these arguments with examples (as in the case of the first argument) or results of research studies (as in the case of the second argument). However, in example (14), he uses an *ad verecundiam* argument, when he appeals to inappropriate authority or to non-experts. Moreover, the research studies lead to invalidate deductive conclusions (the IQ cannot increase exclusively due to watching television). The cross-examination episodes are not so intense and stances taken in the beginning are negotiated and maintained:

(15) A1: Did you say before that, before TV, there were still stereotypes?
      We are not saying that TV created the stereotypes, but if kids are
      watching four hours of stereotypes a day, don't you think that will
      influence them?
      N1: But kids are not watching six or four hours of stereotypes a day.
      They are not watching because those shows that most kids under
      thirteen and thirteen do watch do not have very many stereotypes.
      Maybe one or two, but that is not many, for the whole world.

(16) A1: You said that in the last three or two years their IQs increased by
      three points. Well, just because IQs increase, didn't mean that they
      increase because of TV.
      N1: Actually, according to the *New Yorker*, which did I study about
      TV, it shows that the three points were mainly because of TV.

The first negative constructive speaker ends his speech with the powerful
example of sports that do not have a bad influence on children. The other
two members of the negative team are not allowed to introduce other
arguments; they can only develop and defend the two arguments discussed
by N1. Finally, he addresses the jury and the public when he positions
himself towards them:

(17) N1: For example, sports. How do things like sports: basketball,
      football, how is that a bad influence? You're learning exercise, it
      teaches you to go outside and try to be like Kobe Bryant or whoever
      you want to be. *For these reasons and more, the opposition has won
      this debate.*

The debate as such starts with the speech of A2 (the first affirmative
rebuttal speaker), since first rebuttal speakers, either affirmative or
negative, represent the core of the debate. In the case of A2, she starts by
attacking the opponent's arguments. Rhetorical questions and powerful
examples are widely used:

(18) A2: My opponent said that they can watch news on television. But as
      we have said before, it is better to read. *And what is better than
      reading the news in a newspaper?* […] *A recent study done* shows that
      Disney Channel movies on TV showed elderly portrayed as senile,
      crazy, wrinkled, ugly or missing teeth. *Do you want the children and
      the future of America to think that all adults are crazy and retarded?*
      No!

Her arguments are not always valid, but they work from the rhetorical
point of view. The idea about reading the news in a newspaper is a *straw
man* argument since it attacks a weaker issue of the debate and it shifts

focus from the issue of television. She also uses an *ad verecundiam* argument when she mentions facts from a recent study, without mentioning its name. This suggests that she appeals to inappropriate authority. The strategy of involving the audience and the judge directly is also present, and her discourse is characterised by pathos and involvement. Her flow of speech is very rapid, stance is clearly taken and she manages to deliever the most complex speech in the entire debate. The speech is only once interrupted by the croos-examination episode, which she handles rapidly:

(19) N3: You said that in newspapers there can be pictures of people die. Yes, there can be. On TV they show kids what's happening during… right now in the world.
A2: Actually, I said that newspapers show pictures of people dying, but they don't show it while people are killing them, like in actual motion, so children are as afraid of these pictures and not as influenced.

Her very well-structured speech clearly marks all ideas and arguments. The speaker uses connectors and she constantly marks her position towards the opponents and towards the judge of the debate:

(20) A2: *My opponent* also said that children have to do homework and other things. But actually children go to school for nine hundred hours a year. However, children watch TV for a thousand four hundred twenty-four hours. That is five hundred twenty-four more hours watching TV than in school, *judge*!

For every strong point of the opponent's speech, she brings in a more powerful one, and each time argumentation is taken gradually to the following level:

(21) A2: *My opponent* also said that the New Yorker has a study done about TV. And it proved that their IQs were increased by three points. *But reading the newspaper has been proved that can increase their SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) scores by at least a hundred points.* Children whose IQ scores have increased by at least a hundred points would be more likely to get into colleges and which will help them become successful later.

The speech is equally divided between defeating and defending arguments. She refers to the arguments of her team and supports them with quotations and results of research studies:

(22)   A2: I'd like to go on to my own points. My first point is that children can mimic bad things. "*Two thirds of all programming contain violence*", says the New University of Michigan Health System.

(23)   A2: Also, television causes ADD. *A study done of one thousand three hundred forty-five kids shows* that three hours or more of television a day make kids thirty percent more likely to have ADD, Attention Deficit Disorder.

Example (23) is a clear case of an *ad verecundiam* argument, because the first affirmative rebuttal speaker (A2) appeals to inappropriate authority (a study that is not attributed to anybody) and her conclusion is not valid (children are usually born with ADD, watching TV is not the cause of this disorder). At the end of her speech, she summarises the most important arguments of her team and reinforces stance taken in the beginning:

(24)   Because children can watch the news, they can read the news instead of watching it, because they mimic bad things on television, such as violence, because of the healthy crisis, because of television and because they can be doing many other beneficial activities is why television is a bad influence and *the proposition has won this debate.*

It is very difficult for the first negative rebuttal speaker (N2) to equal the speech of her previous opponent. She starts with an episode of alignment in which she tries to eliminate one argument of the opposite team:

(25)   N2: First of, *I would like to start off by eliminating the point of stereotypes.* The stereotypes should not be a factor in this debate because stereotypes have been around way before TV has even occurred. This is not even relevant because stereotypes are everywhere nowadays.

She uses a *red herring* argument, because she tries to distract the attention of the audience from a main argument that appears to be functioning. Surprisingly, she is not contradicted in the first cross-examination episode, but the second affirmative rebuttal speaker (A3) is going to react and re-establish the argument of her team in her final speech. In an attempt to maintain her positioning, N2 misuses one of her opponent's ideas:

(26)   N2: Also, what does the death penalty have to do with this topic? We're not talking about the death penalty, we're talking about TV.

At this point, A2 reacts immediately in the first episode of cross-examination and explains to N2 why she had misinterpreted her logic argumentation:

> (27) A2: The death penalty has to do because television influences violence. And the National Institute of Mental Health showed that violence on TV does lead to violence in the real world. And if children are permitting violence in the real world, they will commit other horrible crimes.
> N2: I understand, I understand, thank you! First of, the death penalty is on TV, yes, but it is on TV, it has something to do with kids watching it, I just … *Your point does not make any sense. It's just completely misinterpreted* for this point, debate.

However, N2's reaction is not an adequate one and she even becomes aggressive when she judges and qualifies the previous intervention of her opponent: *your point does not make any sense*, *it's completely misinterpreted*. It is an important moment of the debate, because the negative team is in a difficult position and the stance they had taken is threatened. The first negative rebuttal speaker continues her speech with powerful negative images and approximately in the same aggressive manner:

> (28) N2: And also, you said stereotypes of adults that Disney Channel has a percentage where they say adults have no teeth, that they're ugly and they're wrinkling. What about looking at their parents? Those are adults, grandparents… There's no stereotyping when you know the truth.

She has allotted more than half of her speech time to refuting the arguments of her opponent and she really strives to give positive examples for their case, among which that of the TV channel Nickleodeon, whose station stops broadcasting for one week in the summer. The opposite team immediately reacts in the second episode of cross-examination:

> (29) A1: You said that Nickelodeon one week in the summer they turn off the TV, that's one week out of fifty-two weeks.
> N2: One week is better than no weeks. *It's trying to help, it's a start, it's better than nothing.*

The reaction of N2 is appropriate when taking into account the question, but she does nothing else than admitting that there is a problem with too much television watching. However, the first negative rebuttal speaker

overcomes her moments of difficulty and ends her speech in a more logical, assertive, and convincing manner:

> (30) N2: Now, *I'd like to clear up a point*. My teammate has said it. The true point is that every decade since 1920 the average IQ of a child between the ages of ten and thirteen has gone up three points. This is a study from the *New Yorker* written by Stephen Johnson that proposes that what is making us smarter is really what we thought was making us dumber, which is TV.

The use of the example and the way she relates to her team and to the opposite team bring forward the assertive, yet desired way of debating.

The second negative rebuttal speaker (N3) and the second affirmative rebuttal (A3) have the most important mission, that of summarising the stance taken and maintained by their teams. From this point of view, N3 has a very good speech. She starts with addressing the judge directly and introducing a correct idea (parents are at fault), which should have been presented earlier in the debate:

> (31) N3: The TV is a machine, *judge*! It is not to blame for any yet few negative effects that it has. *If anyone is at fault, it would be a parent. Cause parents should be watching what their kids watch on TV.*

Her speech continues in the same manner, addressing the judge and maintaining the audience focused by means of a well-structured discourse, with powerful arguments that link in a logical manner:

> (32) N3: News, *judge*, news shows reality. News shows what happens in the world. That is reality. That's what kids need to know, that things are happening every day. People are dying, but that's something that they will have to get used to. You can't raise them in a world with perfect things.

The negative team ends the debate about the influence of television with a reinforcement of their arguments and with thanking the audience and the judge:

> (33) N3: IQ has increased over the years, we have showed you all these things that are obviously improving, that the opposition has won today. Thank you!

The speech of A3 is not as good as that of her opponent; yet she manages to deliever a good and concentrated summary of her team's arguments.

She refers to the stance taken by the opposite team by means of using rhetorical questions:

> (34) A3: *They were stating* how that they promote healthy things and that they encourage that the kids…, television shows encourage you to get up and dance and play. *But isn't it better to go outside and completely exercise and completely want to get more exercise than just dancing around in front of a television show?*

Reference to studies and continuous positioning towards the opposing team, towards the jury, and towards the audience are desirable characteristics of a speech within any debate. The speech of the second affirmative rebuttal speaker meets these characteristics; yet, her speech is a plain one:

> (35) A3: Also, *they stated that* the ADD is not true. That's not true because we have *evidence from the University of Michigan* and they have proven that *your kids* are likely to get ADD from watching television.

A3 delivers her final statement in the same classical manner and she thanks the audience and the jury. She uses the first person plural subject pronoun to speak in the name of her team and she directly addresses the jury, claiming they have won the debate:

> (36) A3: That's why the proposition team believes that television is a bad influence for children under thirteen and *we have won this debate. Thank you!*

When it comes to these debates, there is no information regarding who won the Romanian debate, but we found out that the affirmative team won in the case of the American debate.

4. Conclusions

Debates in general and school debates in particular are clear-cut examples of explicit stancetaking, which makes the object of this discursive form.

We have analysed transcripts of two school debates: a Romanian one, discussing whether zoos should be banned, and an American one, discussing whether television is a bad influence on children. We have seen how stancetaking is the core object of both debates: constructive speakers, either affirmative or negative, take stances, while rebuttal speakers, either affirmative or negative, maintain and negociate them. We have also

noticed how stancetaking is a gradual process and implies personal beliefs or attitudes, observation, interaction, contextualisation, and logical consistency of sequences. Once the motion is assigned, external stance becomes internalised and participants in the debate start positioning themselves vis-à-vis the topic, the jury, the members of their own team and of the opposing team, and the audience.

Both teams mostly use valid arguments, deductive or inductive ones. However, both the Romanian and the American teams use paralogisms, which are fallacies in formal logic, yet a great tool in rhetoric. The Romanian team uses a wider variety of paralogisms, with a preference for *ad misericordiam* arguments, while the American team, which is younger, uses only a few types, with preference for *ad verecundiam* arguments. In the case of the Romanian debate, the preference for *ad misericordiam* arguments is due to the topic of the debate; one appeals to emotion when it comes to animals and their rights.

In school debates, motions are chosen so that there are always two sides and most of the times there isn't a right or a wrong side. It is the arguments and the way the teams defend and defeat stances they had taken that convince the judge or the audience to be on one side or the other.

Even though the American students are younger than the Romanian ones, they seem to be more involved in the debate and their discourse is better structured in some cases. This can be due to the fact that most American teenagers can study debate as part of their curriculum; at the same time, debates are a more important part of American society, if we compare the more complex form and structure of presidential debates or of debates in the American Congress, to the simpler form and structure of Romanian parliamentary debates. The Romanian debate resembles a conversation between friends, and the teenagers' discourses are more assertive, when compared to those in the American debate. Speeches in the latter are more aggressive, yet more entertaining and to the point. While in the Romanian debate the predominant strategies are teasing and the use of irony, the prevailing ones in the American debate are quoting and the use of rhetorical questions. Cultural differences between the two societies can also account for these differences at the level of discourse. Romanian society is a collectivistic one, with an emphasis on common values and a preference for indirect expression (teasing and the use of irony), while North American culture belongs to the individualistic type, with an emphasis on standing out and being unique, and a preference for direct, explicit expression (quoting and the use of rhetorical questions).

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Index of Subjects